alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit No. 32.1
----------------
Form 10-KSB
Parallel Technologies, Inc.
File No. 0-19276


          Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted
            Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In  connection  with the  Annual  Report of  Parallel  Technologies,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Glenn
A.  Little,  Chief  Executive  and  Financial  Officer of the  Company,  certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Date: July 16, 2004                                   By:  /s/ Glenn A. Little
      -------------                                      -----------------------
                                                                 Glenn A. Little
                                                             Chief Executive and
                                                         Chief Financial Officer


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to  Parallel  Technologies,  Inc.  and will be  retained  by  Parallel
Technologies,  Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or
its staff upon request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

UNIFIED MESSAGING SYSTEMS, LLC, 

 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAREERBUILDER, LLC,

 Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-1486

Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER

Plaintiff Unified Messaging Solutions, LLC (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant CareerBuilder,

LLC’s Stipulation of Joint Dismissal without Prejudice is GRANTED. All claims between the

Plaintiff and Defendant CareerBuilder, LLC are hereby dismissed without prejudice, with each

party to bear their own costs and expenses.

DATED: June 5, 2012 _________________________________

JUDGE JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW

U.S. District Court Judge

1

Case: 1:12-cv-01486 Document #: 31 Filed: 06/05/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:384
#### Phyllis C. Rapp, Respondent, v. William M. Cansdale, Appellant.

lant. Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe Equity Term canceling deeds by plaintiff conveying interests in realty to defendant and directing reconveyance of an undivided one-half interest in said realty to plaintiff.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Mary Vahkeuren, Respondent, v Christopher D. Craft, Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Christopher D. Craft, Appellant, v Mary R. Vankeuren, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[832 NYS2d 444]

—In two related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Christopher D. Craft appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Sammarco, J.), dated December 9, 2005, which, after a hearing, found that he committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree, directed the issuance of an order of protection, inter alia, directing him to stay away from his sister, her family, her home, and her job, and dismissed his family offense petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The fair preponderance of the credible evidence adduced at the hearing supported the determination of the Family Court that the appellant committed the family offense of harassment *764in the second degree *(see*Family Ct Act § 832; *Matter of Santiago v Friedman,*35 AD3d 482 [2006]). Accordingly, the order of protection was properly issued.

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Spolzino, J.E, Goldstein, Fisher and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Earl Alexander, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered on December 4, 1975, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant's counsel to withdraw is granted. (See Anders v California, 386 US 738; People v Saunders, 52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant's assigned counsel that there are no meritorious points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur-Birns, J. P., Silverman, Evans, Fein and Markewich, JJ.
§ 536.157 Settlement/approval authority for claims involving tortfeasors other than nonappropriated fund employees. ( a ) *Settlement authority.* TJAG, TAJAG, and the Commander USARCS are authorized to approve in full or in part, or deny a non-NAFI RIMP claim, regardless of the amount claimed, except where an apportioned amount to be paid from APFs exceeds their monetary authority and the action of the Attorney General or Assistant General Counsel is required as set forth in § 536.151(a).
( b ) *Approval authority.* ( 1 ) The staff judge advocate, Commander or chief of a command claims service, and a head of an area claims office are authorized to approve in full or in part non-NAFI RIMP claims presented in the amount of $50,000 or less, provided the acceptance is in full settlement and all claims and potential claims arising out of a single incident do not exceed $100,000.
( 2 ) The above authorities are not delegated authority to deny or make a final offer on a claim under this section. Claims requiring such action will be forwarded to the Commander USARCS with an appropriate recommendation.
( c ) *Finality of settlement.* A denial or final offer on a non-NAFI RIMP claim is final and conclusive and is not subject to reconsideration or appeal.
IC 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 765 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 4, 2017 

Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

AN ACT 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for penalties for the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a 

member of the Armed Forces. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

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2 

S 765 RFH 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Private Corrado Piccoli 

3 Purple Heart Preservation Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress finds the following: 

6 (1) The Purple Heart medal solemnly recog7 nizes the great and sometimes ultimate sacrifice of 

8 American servicemembers like Private Corrado 

9 Piccoli. 

10 (2) The Purple Heart medal holds a place of 

11 honor as the national symbol of this sacrifice and 

12 deserves special protections. 

13 SEC. 3. PENALTY FOR SALE OF PURPLE HEARTS AWARDED 

14 TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. 

15 Section 704 of title 18, United States Code, is 

16 amended— 

17 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘Whoever’’ 

18 and inserting ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (e), 

19 whoever’’; and 

20 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(e) PURPLE HEART.— 

22 ‘‘(1) PENALTY.—Whoever willfully purchases, 

23 attempts to purchase, solicits for purchase, mails, 

24 ships, imports, exports, produces blank certificates 

25 of receipt for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, 

26 advertises for sale, trades, barters, or exchanges for 

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3 

S 765 RFH 

1 anything of value any Purple Heart awarded to a 

2 member of the armed forces or former member of 

3 the armed forces by the Secretary of the military de4 partment concerned, except when authorized under 

5 regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined 

6 under this title, imprisoned not more than 6 months, 

7 or both. 

8 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION ON REGULATIONS.—Regula9 tions described in paragraph (1) may not authorize 

10 the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a member 

11 of the armed forces or former member of the armed 

12 forces by the Secretary of the military department 

13 concerned, unless the sale is conducted by the mem14 ber or former member to whom the Purple Heart 

15 was awarded. 

16 ‘‘(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 

17 ‘willfully’ means the voluntary, intentional violation 

18 of a known legal duty.’’. 

Passed the Senate August 3, 2017. 

Attest: JULIE E. ADAMS, 

Secretary. 

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CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

         We  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 33-36004) of Public Storage,  Inc.,  formerly Storage
Equities,  Inc.,  pertaining  to the 1990 Stock  Option Plan,  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No.  33-55541)  pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan,
the Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No.  333-13463)  pertaining to the 1996
Stock Option and Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No.
333-75327)  pertaining  to the  1994  Share  Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-50270) pertaining to the PS 401(k)/Profit Sharing
Plan, the Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-52400)  pertaining to the
2000   Non-Executive/Non-Director   Stock  Option  and   Incentive   Plan,   the
Registration   Statement  on  Form  S-8  (333-59218)   pertaining  to  the  2001
Non-Executive/Non-Director  Stock Option and  Incentive  Plan and the 2001 Stock
Option  and  Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration  Statement  on  Form  S-3  (No.
333-81041) and in the related prospectus, the Registration Statement on Form S-4
(No.  333-86899) and in the related  prospectus,  the Registration  Statement on
Form S-4 (No.  333-84126)  and in the related  prospectus,  in the  Registration
Statement  on Form S-3  (No.  333-101425)  and in the  related  Prospectus,  the
Registration  Statement  on  Form  S-4  (No.  333-103190)  and  in  the  related
prospectus and the  Registration  Statement on Form S-3 (No.  333-115660) and in
the related  prospectus  of our report  dated March 11, 2005 with respect to the
consolidated   financial  statements  and  schedule  of  Public  Storage,   Inc.
management's  assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of
Public Storage,  Inc.,  included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for 2004 filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

                                                               ERNST & YOUNG LLP

March 15, 2005
Los Angeles, California

                                   Exhibit 23
Case: 1:12-cv-01422 Document #: 37-1 Filed: 01/15/13 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:158
Case: 1:12-cv-01422 Document #: 37-1 Filed: 01/15/13 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:159
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Aniello Caccio, Appellant.

In a *coram nobis*proceeding, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme 'Court, Kings County, dated October 9, 1962, which denied without a hearing his application to vacate a judgment of said court rendered March 9, 1955 upon his plea of guilty, convicting him of murder in the second degree and sentencing him to serve a term of 20 years to life. Order affirmed. Defendant’s application is based on the fact that originally, on an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree, his retained counsel was absent when he was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on his behalf. Thereafter, defendant — ■ represented by counsel — ■ withdrew that plea and pleaded guilty to the lesser included charge of murder in the second degree (see Code Grim. Pro., § 342-a). For the reasons stated at length in the case decided herewith *(People*v. *Combs,*19 A D 2d 639), the order here must be affirmed. Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of William Grear, Respondent, against P. J. Garvey Carting & Storage, Inc. et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision and award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. In the course of moving household furniture on February 27, 1957 from one residence to another in Buffalo, claimant, who for 20 years had been a truck driver and mover, experienced certain physical sensations which he described in the record. He testified that while he was carting the furniture “ my arm went to sleep on me ”; and that he continued to work “ until my arm gave out.” The work was arduous. It included lifting and helping to carry a refrigerator upstairs. These are sufficiently describable events in the course of the work to spell out an accident. They are definitely placed and described sensations which in turn suggest altered physical conditions ; and they are associated with the act of performing heavy work. Following these events, claimant’s physical condition became worse. On the following day his condition was diagnosed as a cerebrovascular accident. Even in the light of the existence of a predisposing physical condition, a physician testified that in his opinion the “ heavy lifting would be competent to bring on the attack ”. The record before the board is sufficient to sustain its finding of accident and of *583association of the resulting disability with the accident. *(Matter of Kelpin*v. *Watts é Sons,*5 A D 2d 722; *Matter of Fiedler*v. *Grand Textile Gorp.,*5 A D 2d 706; *Matter of Moses*v. *Steel Drum Co.,*8 A D 2d 864.) Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Louis G. Carbone, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Patterson et al., Constituting the New York City Transit Authority, Respondents.

Proceeding under article 75 of the Civil Practice Act to review the determination of the New York City Transit Authority, made after a hearing, dismissing petitioner .from his position of railroad clerk on the ground that he had absented himself from duty, without authority, for a period in excess of 30 days. By. order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated June 9, 1960, the proceeding has been transferred for disposition to this court (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1296). Determination confirmed, without costs. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Ughetta, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:1

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:2

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 3 of 14 PageID #:3

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 4 of 14 PageID #:4

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 5 of 14 PageID #:5

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:6

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:7

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:8

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 9 of 14 PageID #:9

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:10

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:11

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:12

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:13

Case: 1:12-cv-02089 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:14
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Gonzalez, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered on January 20, 1977, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw is granted. (See *Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no meritorious points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Sandler, Lane and Silverman, JJ.
#### § 935.16 Emergency authority.

During the imminence and duration of any emergency declared by him, the Commander may perform or direct any acts necessary to protect life and property.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Rose McKeon, Appellant, v. City of New York, Department of Sanitation, Respondent. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Decision unanimously affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Present—• Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
Case: 1:12-cv-01665 Document #: 29 Filed: 06/20/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:146
Case: 1:12-cv-01665 Document #: 29 Filed: 06/20/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:147
#### Waverly Chemical Co., Inc., Respondent, v. Gilbert Forman, Appellant.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied on condition that appellant argue or submit the appeal at the December Term. The appeal is ordered to be placed on the calendar for said term. The record and appellant’s brief must be served and filed on or before November 14,1960. Nolan, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
#### 19.1308 [Reserved]
Fourth Department,

July, 1960

(July 1, 1960)

#### Eleanor B. Kipp, as Administratrix of the Estate of Warren J. Kipp, Deceased, Respondent, v. International Harvester Company, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Order unanimously modified in accordance with the memorandum and as modified affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. Memorandum: While section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act authorizes the courts of this State to take judicial notice of the -laws of other States in the exercise of their discretion, without pleading or proof *(Pfleuger*v. *Pfleuger,*304 N. Y. 148), it is permissible and proper for a party who wishes to avoid the risk of an adverse exercise of discretion, to plead the relevant laws of other States so that he may be in a position to prove them, if the court decides not to take judicial notice of them. The further provision of section 344-a that questions of foreign law are to be decided by the court as questions of law and not by the jury as questions of fact does not affect this point. This action was brought to recover for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate as the result of injuries suffered in the State of Ohio while he was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defendant Tullar and alleged to have been operated in the business of the defendant-appellant International Harvester Company. Paragraphs of the answer of the appellant, which are not under attack, pleaded the Ohio guest statute as an affirmative defense. Paragraphs 9 and 10, which are attacked by the motion to strike, alleged the substance of the Ohio decisions construing the Ohio guest statute. Paragraph 11, which is also attacked, pleaded the Ohio decisional law as to what constitutes the scope of employment for the purpose of determining the liability of a master for the negligence of a servant. The decision of Special Term, striking out these paragraphs, was erroneous. It is proper to plead the substance of the decisions of the courts of another State, where the law of that State is relevant. Such pleading is not to be stricken as merely stating legal argument or legal conclusions (3 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, § 61, p. 491; *Angell*v. *Van Schaick,*132 N. Y. 187). Paragraphs 12 and 13 merely repeated the denials set forth earlier in the answer. They were properly stricken. Paragraph 14 pleaded the Ohio law as to the right to sue a master and servant jointly in a tort action. The striking out of this paragraph by Special Term was proper. The question of whether the master and servant may foe joined is a question of procedural law, which is governed by the law of the forum; the law of the place of the accident is irrelevant (Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 592). The order should foe modified by deleting from the ordering paragraph the reference to paragraphs 9th, 10th, 11th and, as modified, affirmed. (Appeal from order of Monroe Special Term granting plaintiff’s motion to strike certain paragraphs from the amended answer of defendant Harvester Co.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Halpern and MeClusky, JJ.
#### Jeanne Groner, Appellant-Respondent, v Angel Guardian Home et al., Respondents-Appellants.

— In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages *696for breach of an employment contract predicated on alleged unlawful discrimination on account of age, the parties cross-appeal from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated March 15, 1978, which determined defendants’ motion to strike certain interrogatories, and defendants appeal from so much of a further order of the same court, dated May 15, 1978, as, upon plaintiff's motion for reargument as to certain of the interrogatories, modified the original determination. Appeal from so much of the order dated March 15, 1978 as was affected by the order granting reargument, dismissed, without costs or disbursements. That portion of the order was superseded by the order entered upon reargument. Orders dated March 15, 1978 and May 15, 1978 modified by adding thereto provisions: (1). That the memoranda and other information to be submitted in answer to Interrogatories No. 6, 14, 15, 16, 45 and 46, as limited, be redacted or otherwise edited to delete therefrom the names of any children or present or potential foster parents, together with any other identifying material, such as addresses, which may be contained therein; (2). That Interrogatory No. 45 and those specific subdivisions thereof which are still to be answered be further limited to promotions to district supervisor during the two years preceding the date of plaintiff’s demotion; (3). That Interrogatory No. 46 and those specific subdivisions thereof which are still to be answered be further limited to senior social workers and district supervisors whose assignments have been changed during the two years preceding the date of plaintiff’s demotion; (4). That Interrogatory No. 84 be limited to stating whát percentage of the children serviced by the agency were committed to its care by nongovernmental private agencies; (5). That Interrogatory No. 101 be limited to apply only to such minutes, memoranda and draft proposals as may exist; (6). That Interrogatory No. 104 be further limited to apply only to those employees who have been demoted; and (7). That all of the disclosure to be had hereunder be kept in the strictest of confidence and not be divulged for any purposes unrelated to the instant lawsuit without the prior approval of Special Term, upon such notice as the Justice presiding thereat may direct. As so modified, orders affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. Under the circumstances of the instant case, it is our opinion that the interests of justice and the mandate of section 372 of the Social Services Law require that the disclosure ordered by Special Term be further limited as indicated. The quantum of disclosure to be had herein is consistent, to the greatest extent possible, with both the policy of liberality embodied in CPLR article 31 and the policy of confidentiality incorporated into section 372 of the Social Services Law. Titone, J. P., Rabin, Gulotta and Cohalan, JJ., concur.