IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-2017

Filed February 25, 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B., J.B., AND D.B.,

Minor Children,

T.B., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Jane F. Spande, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children, born 

in 2010 and 2012. AFFIRMED.

Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney 

General, Timothy McMeen, County Attorney, for appellee State.

Dennis Mathahs, Marengo, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children, born 

in 2010 and 2012. He also challenges a termination ruling as to a third child, 

contending he is the “putative father” of this child. However, the juvenile court 

determined the father of the third child could not reasonably be discovered. We 

conclude this appeal only involves the father’s parental rights to the two children.

The father (1) challenges the grounds for termination cited by the juvenile 

court and (2) contends termination was not in the children’s best interests. On

our de novo review, we are not persuaded by either argument.

I. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to the older child 

pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (i) (2013), and the younger 

child pursuant to Iowa Code sections (h) and (i). The State concedes section (h) 

is inapplicable. We examine paragraph (i), applicable to both children. See In re 

S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (stating we may affirm if we find 

clear and convincing evidence to support any statutory ground cited by the 

juvenile court).

Paragraph (i) requires proof of several elements including proof “the offer 

or receipt of services would not correct the conditions which led to the abuse or 

neglect of the child within a reasonable period of time.” This ground was 

satisfied. 

The Department of Human Services began investigating the family in 2012 

based on the filthy conditions in the parents’ home. The State filed a child-inneed-of-assistance action. The parents improved the conditions and the action 

was dismissed.
3

Within a month, home conditions had again deteriorated. The State filed a 

second child-in-need-of-assistance petition. The children were placed with their 

paternal great-grandmother, who lived next door to the parents. The parents saw 

the children almost daily. They made sufficient progress towards reunification 

goals that the children were returned to their care on a trial basis, first with both 

parents and then with the father, who had since separated from the mother and 

moved in with his grandmother. Because the trial home placement was shaky, 

the department asked the court for an additional six months to facilitate 

reunification.

In time, police found the children close to a highway near the 

grandmother’s home. Their father and his new girlfriend were asleep inside the 

home. The children were removed from his care and placed in foster care.1

The father regularly attended supervised visits with the children but, when 

the visits became semi-supervised, he violated protocol by bringing along an unapproved person. 

The father was afforded extensive reunification services over a two-year 

period. At the department’s behest, services continued well beyond the statutory 

deadline for consideration of termination. See In re C.B. and G.L., 611 N.W.2d 

489, 494-95 (Iowa 2000) (“Once the limitation period lapses, termination 

proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.”); see also In re C.K., 558 

N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997) (after statutory time, the patience with parents 

must yield to needs of the child). A department employee did not see 

 

1 The grandmother stated her health prevented her from serving as caretaker again.
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reunification prospects changing if the father were afforded more time. We 

conclude the State proved this ground for termination.

II. Termination must be in the children’s best interests. Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2); see In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 36-39 (Iowa 2010). A service 

provider acknowledged the father was “affectionate with the kids during visits.” 

She nonetheless opined termination was in the children’s best interests “[f]or 

safety reasons.” We concur in this assessment. 

The father was equipped with the support and resources of the 

department as well as his grandmother. Both did everything in their power to 

facilitate reunification. The father squandered this opportunity. His inattention to 

the young children placed them at risk of serious injury, if not death. 

We conclude termination of the father’s parental rights to the two children 

was in the children’s best interests.

AFFIRMED.