U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [5]

some legal duty of petitioning the State supreme court for
permission to seek a review of an appellate opinion and order.

5. I contend I never recklessly nor willfully nor
intelligently nor even knowingly defaulted on any procedure which
waives my privilege to habeas corpus relief; instead, there
exists circumstances which render exhaustion of a would-be
available supreme court remedy ineffective to protect my
aforesaid rights.

6. In the past 5u years since 1964, the legislated and
opinionated rules of judicial procedure have become so
indescribably complex and confounding that even a significant
number of supreme court judges have found said rules intricately
puzzling, as evinced by the multitude of judgment reversals
during said half-century time span.

7. I am, by every known measure, what may be conservatively
classified as scarcely educated and barely intelligent; moreover,
because I am no more competent to practise law than I am qualified
to be this Court's chief consultant, I am constrained to rely on
expertise of fellow prisoners who profess to be jailhouse lawyers,
then I am at mercy of Federal Officials whom I pray comprehend my
plight and show compassion therefor.

8. From the outset, and the judicial record reflects, my
trial attorney consciously disregarded RPC Rule 1.2 and 1.4, by
refusing (A) to explain the matter of unreasonable seizure, to

the extent reasonably necessary for me to make an informed


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [10]

22. While it may be true that this Court should not hear a
federal question presented by a petitioner if he has failed to
raise said issue at the time and in the manner required by State
law, the People of Illinois are not entitled to treat as forfeited
a proposition that lawyers under Their supervision and control
recklessly refused to impart in the right court and in the right
way and at the right time, as the State professional conduct code
directs lawyers to perform.

WHEREAS, with me being innocent, and my arrest being illegal,
and the subjectmatter jurisdiction being null, and the judgment of
guilt being altogether void, there is no way possible I would
ever, anywise, knowingly or voluntarily waive my privilege to the
writ of habeas corpus, to redress my unconstitutional custody
grievance.

WHEREFORE, if not for State appellate attorneys refusing to,
either, petition for leave to appeal, or, inform me of any duty to
file a pro se pleading for permission to seek such supreme court’
review; and if not for Respondent's law librarian misinforming me
on this matter; I most certainly would have made two complete
rounds of State court proceedings, and Respondent would not now
be claiming procedural default to be relieved from liability for

my fundamentally lawless conviction.


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [7]

thereof, the legal authority which shows that said tribunal
suffered a want of original jurisdiction of any justiciable
accountability for attempt murder subjectmatter, when it was
obvious such revelation would be directly beneficial to my
position as the defendant in this criminal case.

12. As a result of such nonfeasance, said circuit court
entered a void judgment that I was proved guilty of being
accountable for the attempt to intentionally kill two people
without a lawful justification; because there is no indictment
wherein a grand jury demands that I be hald to answer for such
otherwise infamous crime punishable by terms of penitentiary
imprisonment.

13. The Illinois appellate defender is the State official
who was pretending compliance with RPC Rule 3.1, insofar as
rationally concluding there was a tenable basis for commencing a
proceeding for review of my wrongful conviction, and therein
advocating the issue of reasonable doubt, and bringing a
good-faith argument for extension of 720 ILCS 5/3-1, and requiring
that every essential element of the case be established.

14. Contrary to requirements of RPC Rule 1.2, this same
appellate defender who knew my trial attorney had neglected to
disclose said want of jurisdiction matter to the circuit court,
perpetrated a fraud upon the appellate court by refusing to reveal

this issue of jurisdiction to the appellate judges.


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion {6]

decision on requesting that my arrest be quashed; (B) to respect
my decision to complain of an illegal arrest pursuant to 725 ILCS
109-1; and, (C) to obtain a copy of the circuit clerk's docketing
statement which showed no proceeding occurred under 725 ILCS
5/107-9.

9. I have been informed and, thereon, I reasonably believe
that county prosecutors, in their official capacity, are
representatives of everybody, including me as the defendant in a
State criminal prosecution, and they are obliged to safeguard my
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and a
due conviction as they would conserve these rights of all other
citizens, so it is as much their duty to forgo illegitimate
methods aimed at producing an undue conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a due one.

10. It has been explained to me that pursuant to RPC Rule
3.8, and in the light most favorable to the offence attorney, the
county prosecutor in this criminal litigation made a timely
disclosure of existence of blankfaced accountability for attempt
murder indictment to my defence attorney, because said prosecutor
knew such information tended to negate my guilt of such otherwise
infamous crime.

11. In appearing in his professional capacity before the
Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County, following disclosure by
the county prosecutor, my trial attorney recklessly violated

RPC Rule 3.3, by refusing to disclose to the circuit judge


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [9]

18. On appeal of this summary dismissal, when it was
exceeding obvious I could not possibly be seeking the
postconviction appeal of any issue respecting a fee, the State
appellate defender obstructed justice, with intent to prevent me
from prosecuting my ineffective counsel and undue conviction
claims, by altering these claims I made in the trial court to
furnish the appellate court the false information that I was
raising said meaningless issue of fees.

19. Whereas, 28 U.S.C. 2254 provides that application for
habeas corpus writ on behalf of prisoner in custody pursuant to
State court judgment shall be granted if it appears applicant has
exhausted available State court remedies; wherefore, the
Respondent concedes (on Document #:12 .... Page 5 of 22 PageID#:
64) my habeas petition is timely, and I exhausted State court
remedies for each of five claims therein; therefore, Respondent
contradicts himself in further stating that all five claims are
procedurally defaulted.

20. For all practical purposes, there is no way a habeas
petitioner can exhaust his remedies and simultaneously fail to
Properly present his claims, any more than a person can be alive
and dead at the same time.

21. Nonetheless, the salient issue in this case involves
existence of circumstances which render this State's corrective

judicial process ineffective to protect my habeas privilege.


IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE
EASTERN DIVISION OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS Fil L. E D
. . TWAas-l4 35

JUL 25 2014

United States ex rel. a
THOMAS MOORE, THOMAS G. BRUTON

MMT

CLERK, U.S, DISTRICT COURT

Petitioner,

-vs- No. 12 C 1062
DONALD GAETZ, Warden
Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Honorable Mr. Judge
JOHN Z. LEE,
Respondent, Presiding.

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
ON QUESTION OF EXHAUSTION

YOUR HONOR, this is a pro Motion of Petitioner for Entry of
a Judgment on the Question of Exhaustion, for a determination of
federal law, upon the respective privilege and claim of
Petitioner and Respondent in this habeas corpus action, by
proclamation of a competent United States Judge, as the result of
this motion filed to the Clerk of this District Court, affirming
that, upon exhaustion of remedies matters submitted for this
tribunal's decision, Petitioner is not liable for the procedural
default claimed by Respondent, because there exists exonerating
circumstances which render exhaustion of a would-be available
State supreme court remedy ineffective to protect Petitioner's
privilege to the writ, and in support thereof Petitioner avers

that:


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [11]

THEREFORE, and becausa Respondent forgot to mention that
from the commencement to the conclusion of both my direct and
postconviction appeals, attorneys employed by and acting on
behalf of the People of the State of Illinois had absolute control
over the litigation; and because it would be unfair to the point
of being obscene to compel me to remain in Respondent's custody
in blatant violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution; I am requesting this Honorable Court to enter a
judgment on the question of whether the aforesaid malpractise of
the appellate defender imputes to me as procedural default.

THUS, under the penalty of perjury prescribed by law, I
declare that all of the foregoing statements are true and correct

and executed as such by me:

“Wome Wee 1.78448 SWORN-TO AND SIGNED BEFORE ME
Thomas MOORE

Prisoner No. B-78448

Petitioner/Affiant pro se -aA
Illinois State Penitentiary Def)
Pinckneyville 62274 Notary Public

ruts /G7%_ ot Galle 2014.

OFFICIAL Seay
T f

NOTap

MY cone



U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [3]

15. Notwithstanding that the appellate court completely
omitted any mention of one procedure executed by the circuit court
in lawfully obtaining original jurisdiction of one justi¢iable
matter respecting a violation of the conjunctive statutes codified
as 720 ILCS 5/5-2 for 5/8-4 at 5/9-1, this reviewing court never
explained why there was no legitimate reason to doubt that I was
proved guilty of every essential element of these two crimes I
have never been properly charged with committing.

16. I never sought supreme court permission to appeal the
opinion of said reviewing court; because Respondent's law
librarian said a discretionary appeal is not a remedy available to
me, so I can bypass such petition for leave to appeal and still be
eligible for federal habeas corpus relief; and because the
appellate defender misled me into believing they would file such
petition if it were necessary and, in the alternative, they never
anywise stated nor suggested that I needed to petition pro se.

17. In response to my application for redress of the
substantial denial of my guaranteed federal rights in trial court
proceedings resulting in my conviction, where the prosecutor was
prepared to admit these violations, the same trial court
complained against decided sua sponte that I had no strict legal
right to a due conviction, and that I failed to state a claim
upon which an opportunity to amend my pro se pleading could be
granted, so my postconviction petition was summarily dismissed

under pretence it did not allege the gist of a claim.


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion [4]

AFFIDAVIT
SUPPORTING MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION

I, Thomas MOORE #B-78448, being first duly Sworn upon My
Oath to Tell the Truth, hereafter set forth facts according to my
own personal knowledge, or to what I reasonably believe to be
true; and if I am ever summoned or subpoenaed to appear before
any Court within the United States, to testify as to any matter
contained herein, I am competent and eager to state under oath
before a jury or Judge that:

1. I was born in the United States and have full legal
capacity to contract.

2. I am the Petitioner in above-numbered Habeas Corpus
Case before this Federal District Court for the Eastern Division
of Northern Illinois at Chicago 60604.

3. In pursuit of redress of illegal imprisonment
grievances, I seek inquiry into questions of whether Respondent,
in violation of my rights and privileges guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution,

(A) is enforcing the State's code of professional
responsibility (hereafter: "RPC Rule #") to deny me effective
assistance of my trial attorney and appellate defender; and,

(B) ais depriving me of liberty without due process of
720 ILCS 5/3-1.

4. In response to said complaints, Respondent does not
deny my claims of ineffective counsel nor undue conviction but,

instead, pray this tribunal indulge his unconstitutional

transgressions, to punish me for allegedly failing to perform


U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion {3]

THEREFORE, Petitioner moves this Honorable Court to Enter a

Judgment on the Question of Exhaustion, as I thank you and remain

Respectfully,

paTe:_ Tul + Tong flax 673.448
Thomas MOORE
Prisoner No. B-78448
Petitioner/Movant pro se
Illinois State Penitentiary
Pinckneyville 62274.



U. S. ex rel. MOORE -v- GAETZ Motion Judgment Exhaustion {2]

ALTOGETHER, Petitioner seeks the final decision of this
Court to resolve the question of whether malpractise of appellate
defender, recklessly refusing to petition for leave to appeal the
rejection of their own issues, and likewise to inform Petitioner
of duty to file a pro se pleading for permission to seek such
supreme court review, together with Respondent's law librarian
misinforming Petitioner on this matter, imputes to Petitioner as
a procedural default, or imputes to Respondent as a circumstance
which renders exhaustion of a would-be available supreme court
remedy ineffective to protect Petitioner's privilege to the writ
of habeas corpus.

WHEREAS, the primary and secondary and third-rate cause of
any failure to exhaust any remedy available and prerequisite to
enjoyment of the habeas corpus privilege is Petitioner's
ignorance of jurisprudence and State attorney malpractise and
Respondent's misinformed subordinate.

WHEREFORE, the facts more fully appear in the hereto attached
Affidavit which explains the reasons for why Petitioner should be
exonerated to redress the cause and prejudice respecting this

matter of remedy exhaustion.