NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0304n.06

No. 22-3495

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES CARTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN 

DISTRICT OF OHIO

OPINION

Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Charles Carter pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. He now appeals the district court’s assessment of a four-level enhancement for possessing 

a firearm in connection with another felony offense. We AFFIRM.

I.

On April 5, 2021, the Cleveland Police executed a search warrant at Carter’s residence as 

part of a broader drug trafficking investigation. The police found a firearm under Carter’s bed;

$4,280 in cash and two cellphones in his bedroom; and several bags of marijuana and a digital 

scale under the kitchen sink.

A federal grand jury charged Carter with being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 992(g)(1). Carter pleaded guilty to the charge without a plea agreement.

The Probation Department prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which 

recommended a four-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for 
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possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. Carter objected to this 

enhancement. The district court overruled Carter’s objection, finding that Carter possessed the 

firearm in connection with his illegal drug trafficking activities and kept the gun to protect himself, 

his drugs, and his drug money. Applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Carter to 

37 months’ imprisonment, a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. Carter timely

appealed his sentence.

II.

Carter raises only one argument on appeal: that the district court erred by assessing a

four‐level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). When considering a challenge to a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) 

enhancement, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and accord “due 

deference” to the court’s determination that the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with 

another felony. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2011). We review pure 

questions of law de novo. Id. at 431.

The Guidelines provide for a four-point enhancement to a defendant’s base offense level 

“[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). “Another felony offense” is defined as any federal, state, or 

local offense—other than the underlying firearms possession offense—punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, 

or a conviction obtained. Id. cmt. n.14(C). The Guidelines’ application notes indicate that the

enhancement should apply “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of 

facilitating, another felony offense or another offense, respectively.” Id. cmt. n.14(A). 

Specifically with respect to a drug trafficking offense, the enhancement should apply if the firearm 
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“is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” Id. 

cmt. n.14(B). A district court should apply the enhancement only if the government establishes, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the firearm and an independent felony. 

United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 2009). By contrast, possession of firearms that 

is “merely coincidental” to the underlying felony offense cannot support a § 2K2.1 enhancement. 

United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2001).

The district court did not err in applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. First, the 

record supports the court’s determination that a preponderance of the evidence suggested that 

Carter was engaging in felonious drug trafficking: law enforcement saw a drug transaction at 

Carter’s residence,

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and they found multiple bags of marijuana, thousands of dollars in cash, a 

scale, and two cellphones in Carter’s home. See United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 495–96 

(6th Cir. 2010) (noting that large sums of cash are indicative of drug trafficking); United States v. 

Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “tools of the trade” such as scales, 

guns, and large quantities of cash are suggestive of drug trafficking). 

Second, Carter cannot overcome the “due deference” we owe to the district court’s 

determination that Carter possessed the firearm in connection with his drug trafficking. Taylor, 

648 F.3d at 432. The government relies on the “fortress theory,” which “presume[s], under certain 

circumstances, [that] guns in close proximity to drugs warrant the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement.” 

Seymour, 739 F.3d at 929. “We have repeatedly relied on the fortress theory to uphold applications 

1The district court stated that “Carter was observed conducting a drug transaction involving 

marijuana.” R. 50, PageID 214. But the PSR states only that detectives “observed a drug 

transaction” while conducting surveillance at Carter’s residence; it is silent as to whether Carter 

participated. R. 31, PageID 122. However, even assuming Carter did not participate in the 

transaction that law enforcement observed, the fact that his residence was associated with drug 

trafficking is relevant. See United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2014).
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of the firearm enhancement where the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking.” Id. at 930.

Under the fortress theory, a “sufficient connection is established if it reasonably appears that the 

firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive 

possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction.” Angel, 

576 F.3d at 321 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our court has said that the § 2K2.1 

enhancement should apply under the fortress theory if the firearm “emboldens” the defendant to 

undertake felonious conduct. Ennenga, 263 F.3d at 503.

Here, Carter admitted that the gun beneath his bed was in his actual possession, and the 

evidence supports the district court’sreasonable conclusion that Carter possessed the gun to protect 

the drug proceeds found in his bedroom and the drugs and drug paraphernalia found in his house. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(B); Taylor, 648 F.3d at 432 (holding that the fortress theory 

applied where officers found a firearm, drugs, a scale, packaging paraphernalia, and $400 in cash 

in the defendant’s residence). Carter argues that the fortress theory should not apply because the

firearm and the drugs were found in different rooms, and thus were not in close enough proximity 

for the enhancement to apply. But our court has rejected similar arguments. For example, in 

Taylor, we concluded that “although the firearm was not found in the same room as the drugs (and 

thus arguably not in close proximity), the fact that Taylor was trafficking drugs from his house and 

the fact that the firearm was loaded and found on the bedroom floor support[ed] the theory that 

Taylor was emboldened in his trafficking by having the firearm in the house.” 648 F.3d at 432. 

Giving the district court’s nexus determination and the deference it is due, we cannot say that the 

court erred in concluding that Carter possessed the gun in connection with his drug trafficking.

Carter’s remaining counterarguments are unavailing. He suggests that because the 

government did not file drug trafficking charges against him, the enhancement should not apply. 
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But the Guidelines’ commentary makes clear that the enhancement can apply “regardless of 

whether a criminal charge was brought.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) cmt. n.14(C); United States v. 

Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905, 919 (6th Cir. 2019). Carter also argues that the district court erred because 

it “rubber-stamped” the PSR without hearing any sworn testimony that Carter possessed the 

firearm in connection with another felony offense. But the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

permit sentencing courts to “accept any undisputed portion of the [PSR] as a finding of fact.” Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A); United States v. Fuller-Ragland, 931 F.3d 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2019). And 

Carter never challenged the factual recitations in the PSR that the district court used to support the 

enhancement. 

The district court did not err in assessing the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement. 

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We AFFIRM.