[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10944

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEAN KERWIN BINDRANAUTH, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cr-10016-KMM-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10944

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sean Bindranauth was convicted of multiple money laundering offenses and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He 

now appeals his convictions and sentence, raising two issues. First, 

he argues that the district court erred by giving an unwarranted 

jury instruction on deliberate ignorance that was further aggravated by supplemental instructions that misstated the law. Second,

he contends that the district court committed reversible error by 

miscalculating the Sentencing Guidelines. After careful review,

and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Bindranauth’s

convictions and sentence. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From February 2018 through September 2019, Bindranauth 

operated a money laundering scheme from Key West, Florida. 

His co-conspirators perpetrated investment or romance scams on 

social media, engendering trust with victims to eventually induce 

them into sending or delivering something of value. The victims 

were instructed to send money to Bindranauth, who received the 

fraudulent proceeds.

The government never alleged that Bindranauth himself 

participated in the underlying online scams that induced the victims, but his defense did not deny their existence at trial. Bindranauth ultimately laundered around one million dollars of traceable funds, including from many victims that did not testify. At 

trial, the government called six witnesses who were victims of 

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either romance or investment scams and who sent money to Bindranauth.

For instance, Dorothy Bates met “Nicholas Strickland” on 

Facebook and believed that they were in a romantic relationship. 

At Strickland’s request, Bates sent $15,000 in March 2018 and then 

$38,000 in May 2018 to Bindranauth to finance transporting food 

to an island. Karen Webster received a “follow” request from “Peter Clark” on Instagram. Clark asked for financial support to fund 

a private plane to the United States from the United Kingdom due 

to alleged issues in security and customs. Webster sent multiple 

wires to multiple individuals, including Bindranauth in September 

2018. In total, she sent $53,000 for the “private plane.” Kathleen 

Tucker met “Nick Vanterheyden,” allegedly a doctor based in Afghanistan, on the online game Words with Friends. They developed a romantic relationship, and he asked her to help pay for a 

courier to move a large sum of money that he had in Afghanistan. 

Tucker sent a total of $200,000 to multiple individuals, including 

two payments in January 2019 to Bindranauth that totaled $36,000. 

Lastly, Kathleen Houser met a man named “Miguel” on Facebook 

in January 2018. They discussed purchasing a home together in 

Tuscon, Arizona, and Miguel asked her for $15,000 to help someone else buy a truck. She sent $16,000 to Bindranauth with the 

notation “fixed my pool” in January 2019 after Miguel told her to 

lie about the reason for sending the money. Houser’s bank blocked 

the transaction as suspicious activity. 

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In total, Bindranauth sent $47,823 through Western Union 

and MoneyGram while directing others to send a total of $211,284 

through Western Union and MoneyGram. Through his bank accounts, Bindranauth sent or withdrew a total of $914,227.51. He 

sent or withdrew additional amounts through non-traceable funds 

such as “ATM withdrawals, cash withdrawals, [and] cash advance[s].” 

The money was laundered through transfers to bank accounts in Nigeria provided by co-conspirator Nancy Turney. Turney gave Bindranauth the bank account information for him to 

route the incoming wires to and kept close tabs on the funds that 

he laundered. The government’s theory was that Turney worked 

with other co-conspirators to defraud the victims and launder the 

money through Bindranauth. 

Bindranauth referred to Turney as his “wifey” and “fiancé[e]” in communications. They regularly communicated as 

though they shared a romantic relationship. However, law enforcement explained at trial, “Nancy Turney, at the very least, is a 

Facebook page that Mr. Bindranauth communicates with willingly. 

As far as who controls it, we don’t know that. . . . But as far as the 

concept of the physical person of Nancy Turney, as it’s portrayed 

by Mr. Bindranauth, we’re relatively certain that person doesn’t exist.” 

Bindranauth’s methods of transferring funds evolved over 

time. At first, he transferred money through MoneyGram and 

Western Union both by himself and through others working at his 

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direction. As of August 2018, the only bank account he had open, 

at the Monroe County Federal Teachers Credit Union, did not allow him to send money internationally. Bindranauth then opened 

five additional accounts to wire funds through. 

He first opened an account with Iberia Bank. The bank 

closed the account in October 2018 because of a security request 

based on suspicious activity, namely, the rapid movement of funds 

and unusual wire activity. He then opened a Bank of America account in October 2018, which he stopped using in February 2019. 

Bindranauth opened a Wells Fargo account in January 2019 which 

the bank closed the next month due to suspected fraud. Wells 

Fargo sent several notifications to Bindranauth advising him that 

the bank closed the account because “one or more money transfers 

to [his] account [were] reported as unauthorized.” He opened a 

BB&T account in February 2019, which closed in May 2019. Finally, he opened an account with First State Bank in May 2019, 

which the bank shut down in a few weeks after two suspicious 

wires of around $7,000 each. 

Law enforcement agents detected no evidence of “legitimate incoming sources” in these accounts. From these accounts, 

Bindranauth wired money to a United Bank for Africa account associated with an individual named Olukayode Ayodele Michael 

(“Mr. Michael”) along with other individuals based in Nigeria. He 

did not send money to an account under Nancy Turney’s name and 

had no family or business ties to Mr. Michael specifically or Nigeria 

generally. He also pulled cash from these accounts and used the 

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accounts to make personal purchases and payments on his Toyota 

truck and phone. 

All told, Bindranauth laundered about one million dollars, 

and according to the plan’s design, he intended to pocket three percent of the laundered funds, amounting to about $30,000. In one 

interview with law enforcement, he said he already spent much of 

his cut from the overall scheme. 

Bindranauth admitted recruiting individuals to send money 

for him. Tristan Vergara sent $1,000 multiple times at Bindranauth’s direction. Bindranauth paid him $20 for each transaction, drove him to make the transactions, and directed him with 

the name and banking information for the receiving end of the 

wire. On multiple occasions in the spring of 2018, Bindranauth also 

drove and directed James Sweeting to make transactions, paying 

him $20 each time. Bindranauth recruited his mother and aunt to 

send money for him too. Crystal Hernandez, who was living with 

him and apparently in a romantic relationship with him, also sent 

money on his behalf. 

On January 24, 2020, a federal grand jury returned a tencount superseding indictment against Bindranauth, charging him 

with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count One); money laundering, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (Counts Two-Nine); and engaging 

in the business of money remittance or transmitting without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1960(a) and 2 (Count Ten). 

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Bindranauth proceeded to trial, which lasted four days. In 

its case-in-chief, the government offered the testimony of fourteen 

witnesses and introduced exhibits that included bank statements, 

Facebook messages, and two video interviews between Bindranauth and Homeland Security Investigations agents. Bindranauth offered the testimony of two witnesses of his own. 

At the conclusion of trial, the district court instructed the 

jury, including instructions on both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance. For the deliberate ignorance instruction, the court 

used the “Deliberate Ignorance as Proof of Knowledge” Eleventh 

Circuit pattern instruction. During the jury deliberations, the district court received the following note from the jury:

Would like clarity on statement on p. 23 of Judge’s 

instructions. ‘But I must emphasize that negligence, 

carelessness or foolishness isn’t enough to prove that 

the Defendant knew.’ Can we have elaboration on 

how this applies to ‘Deliberate avoidance of positive 

knowledge.’

The district court discussed the note with the parties, then brought 

in the jury to elaborate on the deliberate ignorance instruction. 

The district court provided the jury with the following explanation:

So if somebody was really stupid enough to, let’s say, 

be in Colombia, South America—they’re American, 

coming back to the United States, and somebody 

comes to them and says, will you please take this 

package off the plane for me and I will pay you $1,000; 

and you say, Sure why not, you know.

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And I’m deaf, dumb and blind, and I go ahead and do 

it, and I was stupid enough to do that and I get 

through Customs and they find out that there’s drugs 

in the package, maybe that person is negligent, careless, or foolish, in which case, he didn’t know something that some other person might know.

After the district court provided the supplemental instruction, Bindranauth’s counsel requested a sidebar and stated the following to the court:

I agree, and don’t take any issue to the description of 

someone may be deaf, dumb, and blind can be foolish, but the standard also says that there can be negligence; and I’m concerned that maybe by saying unless he was deaf, dumb, and blind, then he was being 

deliberately ignorant. I would like the jurors to understand that if he was negligent that it doesn’t have 

to go to --

The district court interjected by asking, “Was that in?” Bindranauth’s counsel responded, “No, you didn’t, you said careless 

and foolish.” The district court then reminded the jury to consider 

the instructions as a whole and not focus solely on the deliberate 

ignorance instruction. And the district court repeated for a third 

time that negligence, carelessness, or foolishness was not enough 

to prove deliberate ignorance. Bindranauth raised no further objection to the supplemental instruction and the district court dismissed the jury to return to its deliberations. 

The jury returned a verdict finding Bindranauth guilty of 

conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count 1). It found him 

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not guilty of two substantive money laundering counts (Counts 2 

and 3), but guilty of the remaining money laundering counts 

(Counts 4-9). The jury also found him guilty of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business (Count 10). 

Prior to the sentencing hearing, a probation officer prepared 

a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). The PSI grouped 

Counts One and Four through Ten and set the base offense level 

at 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. The PSI then applied (1) a four-level 

increase under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(2) for being “in the business of 

laundering funds”; (2) a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 

2S1.1(b)(3) because the offense involved “sophisticated laundering”; (3) a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) because 

Bindranauth “knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim”; and (4) a four-level increase under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because Bindranauth “was a leader or organizer 

and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was 

otherwise extensive.” Bindranauth’s total offense level was 34. 

Bindranauth’s criminal history included six previous convictions. Bindranauth’s first four convictions for petit theft, marijuana 

possession, driving with a suspended license, and battery did not 

score criminal history points. Bindranauth received a total of three 

criminal history points from two convictions including two counts 

of marijuana possession, two counts of possession of narcotic 

equipment, and one count of possession of narcotics. Bindranauth 

committed the money laundering offenses while under a criminal 

justice sentence, so two points were added pursuant to § 4A1.1(d). 

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In sum, Bindranauth had five criminal history points, placing him 

in criminal history category III. The advisory guideline range for 

Bindranauth’s sentence was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. 

The statutory range, if sentences for each count ran concurrently,

was zero to 240 months’ imprisonment. 

Bindranauth filed written objections, challenging each of the 

four adjustments applied to his offense level, and the government 

responded. The district court then held a sentencing hearing. During the hearing, after defense counsel had presented its arguments 

on the first enhancement, the district court announced that:

In the event that this matter is taken up on appeal, 

and any one or more of this Court’s objections is 

overruled—in fact, on appeal, that the appellate 

Court would have the benefit of this Court’s ruling, 

that it would have imposed the same sentence, in any 

event, as . . . a reasonable sentence based on [the]

3553(a) factors. 

The district court then overruled Bindranauth’s objection to 

the four-level enhancement for being in the business of laundering 

funds, noting “multiple sources, multiple banks, does not suggest 

an isolated instance of money laundering.” The district court also 

overruled Bindranauth’s objection to the two-level enhancement 

for sophisticated laundering. 

The district court did, however, sustain the objection to the 

two-level vulnerable victim enhancement. The district court also 

overruled Bindranauth’s objection to the four-level enhancement 

for his role as a leader or organizer in a criminal activity that 

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involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. The 

final offense level was 32 with a criminal history category III, which 

made the advisory guidelines range 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. 

Bindranauth addressed the district court, and two witnesses 

spoke on his behalf. Bindranauth’s counsel asked the district court 

to impose a sentence of no more than sixty months. The government advocated for a sentence within the guidelines range. 

The district court sentenced Bindranauth to a term of imprisonment of 180 months as to each of Counts One and Counts 

Four through Nine, and to 60 months’ imprisonment as to Count 

Ten, with all counts to run concurrently. Bindranauth renewed his 

objections to the three enhancements that the court overruled in 

calculating the guidelines range. 

This timely appeal followed. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Several standards of review govern this appeal. We review 

de novo whether evidence supports a deliberate ignorance instruction. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993). But our 

review of jury instructions is deferential, and we will reverse only 

if “left with a substantial and eradicable doubt as to whether the 

jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. 

Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008)). And when “a party did 

not object to a jury instruction in the district court, we review that 

instruction for plain error.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 

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1270 (11th Cir. 2000). “The district court has broad discretion in 

formulating a jury charge as long as the charge as whole is a correct 

statement of the law.” Crabtree, 878 F.3d at 1289 (quoting United 

States v Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d at 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994). 

When reviewing Sentencing Guidelines issues, we “review 

legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with due deference, which is ‘tantamount to clear error review.’” United States 

v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980, 990 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. 

Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010)). “The government 

bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement.” 

United States v. Kinard, 472 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Bindranauth raises two issues. First, he argues 

that the district court erred by giving an unwarranted jury instruction on deliberate ignorance that was further aggravated by supplemental instructions that misstated the law. Second, he contends 

that the district court committed reversible error by miscalculating 

the Sentencing Guidelines. We address each argument in turn. 

A. The Instructions on Deliberate Ignorance

Bindranauth’s convictions for money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering required the government to 

prove that Bindranauth knowingly transacted funds that were the 

proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. See United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2001) (listing the elements of an 18 

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U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) offense); United States v. Broughton, 689 

F.3d 1260, 1280 (11th Cir. 2012) (listing the elements of an 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(h) offense). To satisfy the knowledge element, the government had to show that Bindranauth knew the funds came from 

“some form of unlawful activity” but he did not need to know the 

exact nature of the crime from which the money was derived. See

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). On appeal, Bindranauth argues that the government failed to prove that he knew that his financial transactions 

involved illegal proceeds. 

As an initial matter, the evidence presented at trial supported actual knowledge by Bindranauth. The evidence presented 

at trial suggested that Bindranauth knew the funds he laundered 

were illegal proceeds. The government presented evidence including Bindranauth’s own repeated acknowledgments that he might 

have been involved in a scam with Nancy Turney, and Bindranauth’s continued activity after repeated warnings by banks, 

friends, family, and law enforcement, that his conduct was illegal. 

As one example, Wells Fargo closed his account a month after he opened it, due to suspected fraud.1 Wells Fargo sent several

notifications to Bindranauth advising him that the bank closed the 

account because “one or more money transfers to [his] account 

[were] reported as unauthorized.” His personal communications 

indicated that he knew why the banks had closed his accounts. For 

instance, in October 2018, Bindranauth told Turney, “Baby, I went 

1 In total, the evidence showed that Bindranauth opened five bank accounts, 

four of which were later shut down for suspicious activity.

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to the bank. They told me the money is in there and I can’t get it 

until the people that said I’m doing a fraud with the other bank 

release my account.” In December 2018, he told her, “I do not 

want the bank to say anything to me about money laundering, then 

I will be pissed off.” By all accounts, the circumstances of the transactions made it plausible for a jury to conclude that Bindranauth 

knew he laundered illegal funds. See, e.g., United States v. Puche, 350 

F.3d 1137, 1143–44 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding sufficient evidence to 

sustain a money laundering conviction where the jury could infer 

intent from the large volume of transfers, their frequency, and 

other suspicious features). Even setting aside Bindranauth’s clear

communications referencing possible fraud or money laundering, 

a jury could have determined that Bindranauth must have known 

there was some fraudulent explanation for the money arriving in 

his account from strangers based on the nature of his “work” with 

his co-conspirators.

Bindranauth argues that the district court erred by giving a 

deliberate ignorance jury instruction, over his objection, because 

he proactively sought out information about whether he was committing a criminal act. He asserts that he sought information and 

assurances from Turney repeatedly in response to questions and 

concerns that he received from friends, family members, and 

banks. He also contendsthat the record contained no evidence that 

he purposefully attempted to avoid learning all of the facts. 

A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the 

facts “support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high 

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probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely 

contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense 

in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Rivera, 

944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (11th Cir. 1987)). It is not error to give 

the instruction “when the evidence could support both actual 

knowledge or deliberate ignorance and the jury was instructed on 

both.” United States v. Maitre, 898 F.3d 1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 2018).

As Bindranauth points out, “[t]he record is replete with examples of [him] actively seeking information and assurance from 

Nancy” that he was not committing a crime. Bindranauth provides 

examples such as when he asked Nancy if he was “doing money 

laundering.” He also points to when he asked her “what’s going 

on” in response to a bank official telling him that he was committing 

wire fraud. But this is precisely the evidence that warranted the deliberate ignorance instruction. Bindranauth concedes that he was 

warned repeatedly, by friends, family members, and banks, that he 

was potentially engaging in illicit activity. Yet, he chose to ignore 

it. 

Here, the circumstantial evidence also suggested actual 

knowledge. Bindranauth, however, argued that, despite the optics, 

he never knew that he was participating in a money laundering 

scheme. For his defense, he directed the jury to his communications with Nancy Turney that suggested that he was unaware of 

the precise nature of his activity. It was therefore for the jury to 

determine whether this ignorance was feigned. To enable the jury 

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to make that determination, the district court properly instructed 

that the jury could find knowledge if it determined that Bindranauth’s failure to learn the true facts was conscious avoidance 

on his part. 

Since the evidence supported actual knowledge, if Bindranauth is right that his conduct did not warrant a deliberate ignorance instruction, then his “contention contains the basis of its 

denial.” Stone, 9 F.3d at 938. If, as he contends, there was insufficient evidence that he was deliberately ignorant of the money laundering scheme, then our precedent is clear that the jury must have 

convicted on the alternative theory of actual knowledge. See United 

States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2021). The district 

court therefore committed no reversible error when it gave a deliberate ignorance jury instruction.

B. Supplemental Jury Instructions 

Turning to the supplemental instructions, Bindranauth argues that the district court misled the jury by providing an erroneous explanation of the law in response to the jury question on deliberate ignorance. 

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Bindranauth

objected to the supplemental instruction below. Whether the challenge is persevered or unpreserved determines whether our review 

is for an abuse of discretion, See United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 

1247 (11th Cir. 2009), or for plain error. See United States v. Schlei, 

122 F.3d 944, 973 (11th Cir. 1997). 

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On appeal, Bindranauth argues that the district court’s reference to being “deaf, blind, and dumb” misled the jury to believe 

that one must be physically incapacitated to be negligent, careless, 

or foolish. Based on the wording of the purported objection below, 

however, it appears that he was objecting to the court’s failure to 

specifically reference negligence in its supplemental instruction. 

Indeed, following the supplemental instruction, Bindranauth’s 

counsel requested a side bar and stated: “I agree, and don’t take any 

issue to the description of someone may be deaf, dumb, and blind 

can be foolish.” The transcript indicates that Bindranauth’s 

claimed objection to the supplemental instruction consisted of

merely prodding the court to explain that negligence, carelessness

or foolishness is not enough. This is further supported by the district court’s next statement to the jury, following the sidebar, 

where it reiterated that it “must emphasize negligence, carelessness, or foolishness isn’t enough to prove the defendant knew.” After the district court provided that clarifying statement at Bindranauth’s request, the court dismissed the jury to continue its deliberations. 

Here, Bindranauth never objected to the supplemental instruction, let alone to the specific language that he now challenges 

on appeal. And “to preserve an objection to jury instructions for 

appellate review, a party must object before the jury retires, stating 

distinctly the specific grounds for the objection.” Schlei, 112 F.3d at 

973 (quoting United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 

1995)). Even where a defendant objects to a jury instruction in the 

district court, we review for plain error if that objection was “on 

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different grounds than the ones he raises on appeal.” United States 

v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 661 (11th Cir. 2016). We thus conclude that 

plain error review applies because Bindranauth failed to object to 

the use of “deaf, dumb, and blind” in the supplemental instruction 

by arguing that the jury would be misled into believing that it could 

not find negligence, carelessness, or foolishness unless Bindranauth 

was physically incapacitated. 

Under plain error review, we ask whether there was (1) error, that (2) was plain, (3) affected the defendant’s substantial 

rights, and (4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Here, the court did not plainly err in giving its supplemental instruction because Bindranauth cannot show that any error affected 

his substantial rights. Satisfying the substantial rights prong of the 

plain error test is “anything but easy” and “almost always requires” 

that the alleged error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 

2005). And it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion 

regarding the third prong. Id. Bindranauth cannot carry that burden here. As noted above, the evidence was sufficient to convict 

Bindranauth based on his actual knowledge, so he cannot demonstrate that the result would be any different if the court had never 

given the supplemental instruction.

Even assuming the challenge to the supplemental instruction is preserved, we conclude that there is no reversible error. “A 

trial court enjoys broad discretion to formulate jury instructions 

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provided those instructions are correct statements of the law.” 

United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1014 (11th Cir. 2012)). And 

we defer to district courts “on questions of phrasing.” Prather, 205 

F.3d at 1270. When jury instructions, taken together, accurately 

state the applicable law, “there is no reason for reversal even 

though isolated clauses may, in fact, be confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.” United States v. Gibson, 

708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Beasley, 

72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Reviewing the supplemental instruction in light of the entire 

jury charge, as we must, we are not left “with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its 

deliberations.” See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1248. (quoting United States 

v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th Cir. 1997)). Notably, at Bindranauth’s request following the supplemental instruction, the district court repeated for a third time that the jury could not find Bindranauth’s deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge merely because of “negligence, carelessness, or foolishness.” Juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them by district judges. 

United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Therefore, we presume here that the jury understood that it could 

not convict based on negligence, carelessness, or foolishness, and 

that it convicted because the evidence suggested that Bindranauth 

either knew of, or else purposefully avoided knowing, the nature 

of his conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury was not 

misled in its deliberations, and we affirm Bindranauth’s convictions. 

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C. The Sentencing Enhancements 

Bindranauth also argues that the district court committed 

several errors in calculating the applicable sentencing guidelines. 

He contends that the court misapplied enhancements for being “in 

the business of laundering funds” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C), 

for “sophisticated laundering” under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), and for 

being an “organizer or leader” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Bindranauth further asserts that the district court made an invalid finding under United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006), 

which cannot shield its sentencing errors from appellate review. 

For the reasons below, we conclude that the district court’s sentencing enhancements do not require reversal.

1. The “Business of Laundering Funds” Enhancement

Section 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides 

for a four-level enhancement if the defendant was “in the business 

of laundering funds.” We look to the totality of circumstances to 

determine whether a defendant was in the business of laundering 

funds. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, cmt. n.4(A). The commentary lists six 

non-exclusive factors for courts to consider, including whether the 

defendant: (1) regularly engaged in laundering funds; (2) laundered 

funds for an extended period of time; (3) engaged in laundering 

funds from multiple sources; and (4) generated a substantial 

amount of revenue in return for laundering funds. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, 

cmt. n.4(B)(i)-(iv). 

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Bindranauth concedes that he “may satisfy” the second factor, but he asserts that the length of his money laundering scheme 

alone was insufficient to support the enhancement. We disagree.

First, Bindranauth did engage in laundering funds with regularity. We have defined “regularly” as “more than isolated, casual, 

or sporadic activity.” See United States v. Saunders, 318 F.3d 1257, 

1265 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 

703 (1st Cir. 1992)). And “[i]n exploring the regularity of a defendant’s illegal operations—the most important factor—the stolen 

goods need not be the defendant’s sole or even dominant source of 

income.” Id. The evidence at trial showed that Bindranauth engaged in the laundering of funds repeatedly, resulting in convictions for six separate counts that each related to a specific illicit 

transaction. He received funds from severalsuspicious sources and 

sent money through bank wires, money orders, and other means, 

to individuals with bank accounts in Nigeria for more than a year

and a half.

For similar reasons, Bindranauth satisfies the second factor 

because he laundered funds for an extended period of time, from 

February 2018 to September 2019. § 2S1.1, cmt. n.4(B)(i)-(ii); see 

Saunders, 318 F.3d at 1265. Third, Bindranauth laundered funds 

from multiple sources. § 2S1.1, cmt. n.4(B)(iii). Six individuals testified that they deposited money to Bindranauth’s accounts after 

being victimized by his coconspirators. And his victims were not 

limited to the individuals that testified at trial. At sentencing, the 

district court noted that the Iberia Bank investigation was sparked 

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by evidence that multiple suspected fraud victims wired money to 

Bindranauth along with law enforcement’s confirmation that Bindranauth received fraudulent proceeds from various sources. As 

to the fourth factor, Bindranauth admitted to law enforcement that 

he received three percent of the fraudulently acquired proceeds, 

generating nearly $30,000, which could be considered a substantial 

amount of revenue in return for laundering funds. See § 2S1.1, cmt. 

n.4(B)(iv).

In applying the enhancement, the district court remarked 

that multiple sources and multiple banks did “not suggest an isolated instance of money laundering.” The court did not clearly err 

in applying the facts to the guideline provision here. Accordingly, 

we affirm its imposition of the enhancement.

2. The “Sophisticated Laundering” Enhancement

Bindranauth next objects to the district court’s application 

of the sentencing enhancement for sophisticated laundering. The 

guidelines define sophisticated laundering as “complex or intricate 

offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of the 

18 U.S.C. § 1956 offense,” typically involving the use of “fictitious 

entities,” “shell corporations,” “two or more levels (i.e., layering) 

of transactions,” or “offshore financial accounts.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, 

cmt. n.5(A). 

Bindranauth argues that his conduct “involved none of the 

above—no fictious entities; no shell corporations; no layered transactions; and no offshore financial accounts.” Therefore, he contends, his actions “were the opposite of sophisticated” and the 

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district court erred in applying the enhancement. The record, however, indicates that Bindranauth layered his transactions.

In remarking on a sophisticated means enhancement in

United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007), we saw “no 

difference between ‘hiding assets or transactions . . . through the 

use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts,’ and hiding assets or transactions through the use of a straw 

man or campaign fund.” Id. at 1316 (emphasis added) (quoting 

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, cmt. n.4). At trial, the evidence showed that Bindranauth recruited, directed, and paid at least twenty individuals to 

receive and send money on his behalf. In other words, Bindranauth 

hired others to act as “straw men” to conceal the broader money 

laundering scheme. Namely, when Bindranauth was prohibited 

from sending money to Turney via Western Union or 

MoneyGram, he located friends and family members who would 

send the money on his behalf, and he would pay some of them $20 

to compensate them for their actions. See § 2S1.1, cmt. n. 5(A)(iii). 

Bindranauth received victims’ funds, then withdrew the funds and 

wrote himself checks, before sending the money to Nigeria via 

money orders. To do so, he used others to send the money that he 

had received via check and had deposited into his Monroe County 

Teachers’ Credit Union Bank account. By using others to send 

money to Nigeria on his behalf, Bindranauth “layer[ed]” the transactions to avoid raising suspicion and to hide his involvement in the 

money laundering scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 931 

F.3d 1245, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the sophisticated 

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money laundering enhancement applied to a defendant who used 

a company to funnel salaries and commissions). 

On these facts, the district court did not clearly err in finding 

that the scheme involved “two or more levels . . . of transactions,”

so we affirm its application of the sophisticated laundering enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, cmt. n. 5(A)(iii).

3. The “Leader or Organizer” Enhancement

Finally, Bindranauth also challenges the district court’s finding that he was an organizer or leader of the scheme. Section 

3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level enhancement if a “defendant was 

an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or 

more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). 

Bindranauth argues that he was not a leader or organizer because 

the individuals that he recruited to assist him were not “participants” because they were not criminally responsible for the offense, 

and their participation was de minimis.

District courts examine whether a defendant was an organizer or leader by considering the following factors: 

(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the 

nature of participation in the commission of the offense, (3) the recruitment of accomplices, (4) the 

claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the 

crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or 

organizing the offense, (6) the nature and scope of the 

illegal activity, and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 

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United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4). The factors are nonexclusive, and there 

may be more than one leader in an organization. See United States 

v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1348 (11th Cir. 2018); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. 

n.4.

Several factors apply to Bindranauth’s role in the scheme. 

Bindranauth exercised decision-making authority, as shown by his 

exchange with Turney where he took charge to determine how 

they would address Kathleen Houser’s report of fraud. His offenses involved the coordination and recruitment of multiple people, and two witnesses testified that Bindranauth drove them to the 

banks and paid them to execute transactions on his behalf. Bindranauth received a larger share of the profits, paying his accomplices $20 while he received three percent of the proceeds. And 

numerous text messages support the conclusion that Turney and 

Bindranauth planned and organized some of the offenses, and the 

record suggests that Bindranauth’s offense affected hundreds of 

people. Although Turney was directly involved in defrauding the 

victims, her role as a leader or organizer does not foreclose the possibility that Bindranauth was also a leader or organizer of the conspiracy. 

Of those directed by Bindranauth alone, the scheme involved at least twenty other participants who laundered money. 

On appeal, Bindranauth focuses on the lack of criminal responsibility of the accomplices he recruited, which, he argues, is necessary for those accomplices to be “participants” under the guideline. 

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The guideline, however, also allows for the imposition of the enhancement if the defendant “plays a leadership role and the operation ‘is otherwise extensive.’” United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 

1045 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)). The nature and 

scope of the illegal activity here can be reasonably described as extensive because Bindranauth and his co-conspirators laundered approximately one million dollars over a year and a half, using multiple different banks and layering techniques to mask their crimes. 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Bindranauth was a leader in a criminal operation that was extensive. 

We thus affirm its application of the enhancement.

4. The District Court’s Keene Finding

Finally, the government argues that we need not decide 

whether the guidelines were properly calculated because the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence despite the guidelines. The government thus contends that we may 

affirm the sentence under Keene, 470 F.3d 1347. 

Here, the district court—before hearing arguments from the 

parties regarding their positions pursuant to § 3553(a) and before 

hearing from Bindranauth himself—announced that:

In the event that this matter is taken up on appeal, 

and any one or more of this Court’s objections is 

overruled – in fact, on appeal, that the appellate Court 

would have the benefit of this Court’s ruling, that it 

would have imposed the same sentence, in any event, 

as . . . a reasonable sentence based on the 3553(a) factors. 

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In Keene, we determined that any error in calculating the 

guidelines is harmless where the district court makes clear that it 

would impose the same sentence regardless of the guidelines, provided the sentence is substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). 470 F.3d at 1349. The district court in Keene noted that 

“even if the guideline calculations are wrong,” its application of the 

sentencing factors under § 3553(a) would still have compelled the 

conclusion that a 10-year sentence was reasonable and appropriate 

under all the factors that it considered. Id. Notably, the court made 

this statement after it had reviewed and overruled Mr. Keene’s objections to his PSI, found what it believed to be the appropriate 

guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and pronounced 

its sentence. Id. at 1348–49. We determined that, because the district court had made clear that the sentence imposed would remain 

the same even “after the § 3553(a) factors are considered,” any error 

was harmless. Id. 

But we note that had there been a guidelines error here, the 

district court’s statement would not have shielded its sentence 

from reversal. In determining a sentence, the guidelines range is 

the beginning of the analysis, not the end. Ensuring that a sentence 

adequately reflects all of the applicable § 3553(a) factors is a “holistic endeavor” that requires consideration of the specific individual 

before the court, and consequently involves hearing from the parties about the individual facts and circumstances of the case before 

imposition of a sentence. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Relatedly, we have made clear that 

“the right of allocution is ‘the type of important safeguard that 

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helps assure the fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sentencing 

process.’” United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 

2002) (quoting United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 

2001)). 

The problem with providing a purported Keene statement before listening to the parties’ arguments is illustrated by what occurred at the sentencing hearing here. The district court ultimately 

changed its mind on one of the four proposed enhancements. The

court initially stated that it appeared that each of the “adjustments 

are warranted, based on the evidence.” Yet after hearing arguments on the vulnerable victim enhancement proposed in the PSI, 

the court reversed course, finding that the government did not 

meet its burden of establishing that Bindranauth knew the victims 

were vulnerable. 

In United States v. Delgado, we advised that “the better practice would be for the court to make clear at the time of pronouncing 

the sentence that it would reach the same sentence regardless of the 

Guidelines range.” 981 F.3d 889, 900 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis 

added). We reiterate that instruction. “To arrive at an appropriate 

sentence, the district court must consider all of the applicable § 

3553(a) factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. A sentencing 

court therefore cannot insulate itself from appellate review by declaring—before hearing any argument on those factors and before 

providing the accused the opportunity to allocute— that it would 

have imposed the same sentence anyway. If that were so, important procedural safeguards, federal sentencing hearings, the 

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requirements of § 3553(a), and the right to allocution, all might be 

rendered meaningless.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm Bindranauth’s convictions and 

sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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