1 

Filed 4/17/14 In re P.C. CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Colusa) 

---- 

In re P.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law. 

C075201 

COLUSA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

I.V., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

(Super. Ct. No. JU3655) 

 I.V., mother of the minor P.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders 

terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)1 Mother contends 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 

there was insufficient evidence that her continued custody of P.C. was likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to him. 

 Disagreeing, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders. 

BACKGROUND 

 On May 9, 2012, the Colusa County Department of Health and Human Services 

(Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of minor P.C. (then 11 years old). 

The petition was also filed on behalf of P.C.’s half siblings Ad. (then almost three years 

old), A. (then two years old), and An. (then two months old).2 The petition alleged use of 

methamphetamine by the parents and that Ad. and A. tested positive for 

methamphetamine. Mother had also failed to follow up with prenatal care for An., 

missed her scheduled caesarean section delivery, and tested positive for 

methamphetamine at his birth. 

 Prior to An.’s birth, the minors had been the subject of a previous dependency 

case, resulting in P.C.’s detention from parental custody in August 2010. Mother had a 

history of alcohol abuse and father was incarcerated for domestic violence. The previous 

dependency had been terminated in August 2011. 

 The minors were found to be Indian children but the tribe decided not to intervene. 

Instead, the tribe asked to receive notices of hearings and to be kept informed of the 

parents’ progress and any decision to pursue adoption or termination of parental rights. 

 The juvenile court sustained the petitions on June 4, 2012; Ad., A., and An. were 

placed together in foster care. P.C. was placed in a separate home, the same home he had 

been placed during the previous dependency case. The parents engaged in services and 

 

2 This appeal was taken from the orders entered at the section 366.26 hearing as to minor 

P.C. Mother filed an earlier appeal from the termination orders as to minors Ad., A., and 

An. This court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders in that case. (In re A.J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 

C074566 [nonpub. opn.].) The facts, up to the time of the permanency planning hearing 

for the half siblings, are taken almost verbatim from our previous opinion.
3 

were having supervised visitation three times a week. The juvenile court declared the 

minors dependents of the court at the July 16, 2012 disposition hearing. 

 On August 4, 2012, mother was arrested for public intoxication and father, who 

had also been drinking heavily, was arrested for spousal abuse. The parents had just 

begun unsupervised visitation prior to the arrests but supervised visits were reinstated. 

Unsupervised visits were resumed in September 2012 and the Department planned to 

begin unsupervised weekend visits on October 5, 2012. Mother, however, was arrested 

again for public intoxication on October 13, 2012. She had been so intoxicated that she 

did not remember her arrest. At that point, mother recognized she needed to enter an 

inpatient treatment program and entered the Salvation Army program on November 26, 

2012. Supervised visits were reinstated. 

 Reunification services were terminated on February 15, 2013. The section 366.26 

selection and implementation hearing for the half siblings was held on July 15, 2013. At 

that time, the juvenile court received into evidence two reports from the social worker 

and reports from the adoptions specialist and Dr. Art Martinez, the Indian Child Welfare 

Act specialist. Dr. Martinez and the social worker testified at the hearing. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

continued custody by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical 

damage to the half siblings. The juvenile court also found that the half siblings were 

adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied. The juvenile court terminated 

parental rights as to Ad., A., and An. 

 P.C.’s selection and implementation hearing was held on September 16, 2013. In 

addition to the evidence presented at the hearing for the half siblings, there was also an 

updated report from the adoptions specialist and additional testimony from Dr. Martinez. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

continued custody by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical 
4 

damage to P.C. The juvenile court found that P.C. was adoptable and that no exception 

to adoption applied. The juvenile court terminated parental rights as to P.C. 

DISCUSSION 

 Mother contends there was insufficient evidence that her continued custody of 

P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. We disagree. 

 In order to terminate parental rights when an Indian child is involved, there must 

be “a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the 

continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); see also 

§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(B)(ii).) 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on 

appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence 

which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier 

of fact. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 

908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this 

determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and issues 

of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (People v. Johnson, supra,

26 Cal.3d at p. 578; In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 924; In re Jason L., supra, 

222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing 

court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 

(In re Stephanie M., (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) 

 Mother identifies no evidence establishing that she was able to safely take physical 

custody of P.C. To the contrary, the June 2013 written report by Dr. Martinez 

specifically stated that mother was not at a place where return of the minors was 

indicated. Dr. Martinez noted that, while mother was doing well in her recovery, she was 

living at the Salvation Army Treatment Center where there were “a few observed issues 
5 

of harm or risk” and, furthermore, “without the safety and security of the current 

[sheltered] environment, it is at least possible that the mother’s enduring post-traumatic 

responses would reengage, therefore causing her to become emotionally volatile leading 

to mismanagement of the children.” He believed she was unable to live on her own 

outside a sheltered environment and he did not believe she was currently able to care for 

the minors. 

 In a June 2013 letter to the juvenile court, mother’s therapist opined that mother 

was doing well in her approach to recovery, but the therapist said nothing to establish that 

it was safe to return the minors to mother’s custody. 

 The social worker believed that, due to mother’s progress in recovery, six months 

of additional reunification services might be warranted. However, the social worker did 

not suggest returning the minors with maintenance services. 

 Mother argues that although those reports were made in June or July of 2013, 

P.C.’s hearing was held two months later, giving mother “two additional months to 

progress in her ability to care for the child.” But the passage of time, without more, does 

not evidence remediation of risk to P.C. There was no evidence of any new progress or 

change to suggest mother was currently ready to safely take custody of P.C. 

 Mother also points out that Dr. Martinez did not believe serious emotional or 

physical damage would result if mother had legal custody. But even if the juvenile court 

had accepted that opinion, it was still required to find detriment if mother’s physical 

custody of P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. The 

use of the word “custody” in 25 U.S.C. section 1912(f) and section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(2)(B)(ii) includes both legal and physical custody, and the Indian Child 

Welfare Act recognizes different types of custody. (In re Crystal K. (1990) 

226 Cal.App.3d 655, 667-668.) The use of the phrase “continued custody,” without 

delineating the type, means the phrase encompasses both physical and legal custody. 

(Ibid.) 
6 

 Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s continued 

custody of P.C. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. 

DISPOSITION 

 The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed. 

 MAURO , J. 

We concur: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 HULL , J.