Fullerton v. Amblo, No. 1286-04 Cncv (Norton, J., Dec. 22, 2004) 

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from 

the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont 

trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.] 

STATE OF VERMONT 

Chittenden County, ss.: 

KRISTY FULLERTON 

 

v. 

JAMES AMBLO 

ENTRY 

 The defendant, Kristy Fullerton, appeals a small claims court decision awarding 

$1,060 damages or, in the alternative, the return of a sapphire and diamond ring to the 

plaintiff, James Amblo. The small claims court held that although the ring was not an 

engagement ring, it was analogous to one. Therefore, Ms. Fullerton had to return the ring 

when the relationship dissolved. Ms. Fullerton argues that because the ring was not an 

engagement ring, the small claims court should have considered it an absolute gift, and 
she should not have to return it to Mr. Amblo. For the following reasons, this court 

reverses.

1

 Mr. Amblo and Ms. Fullerton were in a relationship for more than two years. 

About mid-way through this relationship, Mr. Amblo bought Ms. Fullerton a sapphire 

 

1

The court notes that the small claims court also held that Mr. Amblo could not recover a 

birthday gift that he gave to Ms. Fullerton because it was an absolute gift. The parties do not 

contest, and the court does not disturb, this holding. 

and diamond ring. When he gave it to her, Mr. Amblo asked that she be his girlfriend for 

a long time. About a year and a half later, they split up permanently. 

 In small claims court, Mr. Amblo sought to have Ms. Fullerton return the ring, 

arguing that it was an engagement ring. The small claims court found that the ring was 

not an engagement ring, but it was analogous to one. Though Mr. Amblo did not give the 

ring for a promise of marriage, he did give it for a proposal that Ms. Fullerton be his 

girlfriend for a long time. Ms. Fullerton accepted that proposal by accepting the ring, so 

the small claims court held that the ring could be treated “as though it were an 

engagement ring.” Accordingly, the court applied rules related to gifts given in 

contemplation of marriage, and held that Ms. Fullerton must return the gift given that the 

relationship did not carry on as Mr. Amblo had anticipated. 

 On appeal, Ms. Fullerton argues that the small claims court’s treatment of the ring 

as an analogue to an engagement ring was error. 

 This court’s review of small claims court decisions is one of high deference. The 

court is limited to questions of law, Vt. R. Small Claims P. 10(d), and is not authorized to 

make its own substantive findings of fact, Kopelman v. Schwag, 145 Vt. 212, 214 (1984). 

Therefore, this court defers to the small claims court finding that the ring was not, in fact, 

an engagement ring. The dispositive issue then concerns whether a gift may be analogous 

to a gift given in contemplation of marriage, even though the donor did not actually 

contemplate marriage. This court holds that it cannot. 
3

 Courts at common law long recognized a cause of action to recover gifts made in 

contemplation of marriage, along with many similar actions related to engagements. 

Vermont has abolished causes of action for breach of contract to marry, seduction, and 

the like. 15 V.S.A. § 1001. The Legislature, however, preserved a cause of action “for the 

recovery of a chattel, the return of money, or the value thereof at the time of the transfer . 

. . where the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or securities . . . was 

a contemplated marriage.” Id. § 1002. In Vermont, as elsewhere, courts have treated this 

cause of action as a species of an enforcement of a conditional gift. See, e.g., Williamson 

v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 384–85 (1890); Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement 

and Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue, 44 A.L.R.5th 1, § 3; Comment, 

“But I Can’t Marry You”: Who Is Entitled to the Engagement Ring When the Conditional 

Performance Falls Short of the Altar?, 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 419, 421–22 

(2001). 

 Unlike other conditional gift actions where the donor may need to more clearly 

articulate the condition attached, actions involving items like engagement rings apply 

only where the parties actually “contemplate[] marriage,” according to the express 

wording of the statute. The Legislature recognized this specific application of conditional 

gift rules most likely because gifts given in contemplation of marriage are presumptively 

conditional on the marriage occurring. Indeed, several courts have upheld a presumption 

that engagement rings are conditional on the marriage occurring and the donee must 

return the ring where the parties terminate the engagement. See, e.g., Fierro v. Hoel, 465 

N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa 1990); Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 634 (Kan. 1997). 

Therefore, courts should not extend this statute liberally to marital analogies, such as 

“girlfriend for a long time,” because the same presumptions of a conditional gift may not 

exist. See State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275 (1996) (“We presume the Legislature 

intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language. It is inappropriate to read into a 

statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute 

effective.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, other courts have declined to apply conditional 

gift rules in engagement circumstances to gifts given in mere courtships. See, e.g., 

Fortenberry v. Ellis, 271 So. 2d 792, 793–94 (La. App. Ct. 1969); Pass v. Spirit, 35 

A.D.2d 858, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 

 Moreover, the special recognition for gifts given in contemplation of marriage 

have invited criticism in legal academia. One commentator has noted that the rule does 
4

not comport with modern expectations of engagements and is applied in a sexist manner, 

because the prospective bride cannot typically recover expenses that she incurs in 

preparing for the wedding as she does not “transfer” these expenses to the prospective 

groom. See Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 Yale L.J. 2583, 2600–14 (1998). It is, of 

course, not this court’s place to overturn a cause of action that the Legislature specifically 

preserved. But given the antiquated condition of this rule, the court does not wish to 

extend it beyond explicit boundaries. Accordingly, this court must reverse the small 

claims court holding that, because the ring in this case was analogous to an engagement 

ring, the court should treat it as a gift given in contemplation of marriage. 

 The court still must consider, however, whether the gift was conditional even 

though it was not given in contemplation of marriage. The only condition that the small 

claims court found is based on Mr. Amblo’s statement that Ms. Fullerton be his girlfriend 

for a long time. As stated above, the court must defer to the small claim court’s factual 

findings. Additionally, small claims court findings “must be construed, where possible, to 

support the judgment.” Kopelman v. Schwag, 145 Vt. 212, 214 (1984). Nevertheless, the 

evidence must support the small claims court findings and judgment. Brandon v. 

Richmond, 144 Vt. 496, 498 (1984). 

 Despite this court’s deferential standard of review, the court cannot construe the 

small claim court’s findings to support its judgment by applying the law of conditional 

gifts. “A gift may be conditioned upon the donee’s performance of specified obligations 

or the happening of a certain event. If the obligation is not performed, the donor is 

entitled to restitution.” Ball v. Hall, 129 Vt. 200, 207 (1971) (citations omitted). 

“Whether a gift is conditional or absolute is a question of the donor’s intent, to be 

determined from any express declaration by the donor at the time of the making of the 

gift or from the circumstances.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gifts § 72. 

 Cases addressing conditional gifts outside the context of engagements discuss 

situations of clear statements that specify precise conditions. See, e.g., Ball, 129 Vt. at 

206 (discussing condition that town use monetary gift for maintenance of high school); 

Univ. of Vt. v. Wilbur’s Estate, 105 Vt. 147, 160–74 (1933) (discussing conditions of 

gifts to University of Vermont); Blanchard v. Sheldon, 43 Vt. 512, 514–15 (1871) 

(discussing condition of defeasance, which expired upon donor’s death). 
5

 Here, Ms. Fullerton could not have reasonably ascertained the precise terms of the 

condition attached to Mr. Amblo’s gift from his statement. For instance, she may have 

reasonably understood a “long time” commitment to amount to the year-and-a-half 

relationship they shared after the gift. The law requires “specified” obligations in order to 

render an otherwise absolute gift conditional, and Mr. Amblo’s obligations were not 

specific. Therefore, this court cannot uphold the condition that Mr. Amblo may have 

attempted to attach to the ring, and the small claims court judgment must be reversed. 

ORDER 

 For the foregoing reasons, the small claims court’s judgment is REVERSED. 

 Dated at Burlington, Vermont, December 22, 2004. 

__________/s/______________ 

Richard W. Norton Judge