```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 249 (Friday, December 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78864-78878]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-30974]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Comparability Determination for Australia: Certain Entity-Level 
Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Comparability Determination for Certain Requirements 
under Australian Regulation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') regarding certain 
parts of a request by the Australian Bankers Association (``ABA'') that 
the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in in the 
Commonwealth of Australia (``Australia'') provide a sufficient basis 
for an affirmative finding of comparability with respect to the 
following regulatory obligations applicable to swap dealers (``SDs'') 
and major swap participants (``MSPs'') registered with the Commission: 
(i) Chief compliance officer; (ii) risk management; and (iii) swap data 
recordkeeping (collectively, the ``Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements'').

DATES: Effective Date: This determination will become effective 
immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Barnett, Director, 202-418-5977, 
gbarnett@cftc.gov, Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5949, 
ffisanich@cftc.gov, Adam Kezsbom, Special Counsel, 202-418-5372, 
akezsbom@cftc.gov, Israel Goodman, Special Counsel, 202-418-6715, 
igoodman@cftc.gov, Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction

    On July 26, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal Register 
its ``Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations'' (the ``Guidance'').\1\ In the Guidance, 
the Commission set forth its interpretation of the manner in which it 
believes that section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') 
applies Title VII's swap provisions to activities outside the U.S. and 
informed the public of some of the policies that it expects to follow, 
generally speaking, in applying Title VII and certain Commission 
regulations in contexts covered by section 2(i). Among other matters, 
the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework 
under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance 
program with respect to Commission regulations applicable to entities 
located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed a 
recognition program where compliance with a comparable regulatory 
requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable 
substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA 
and the Commission's regulations promulgated thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 2013). The Commission originally 
published proposed and further proposed guidance on July 12, 2012 
and January 7, 2013, respectively. See Cross-Border Application of 
Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 FR 41214 
(July 12, 2012) and Further Proposed Guidance Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 909 (Jan. 7, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the Guidance, on July 22, 2013, the Commission 
issued the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations (the

[[Page 78865]]

``Exemptive Order'').\2\ Among other things, the Exemptive Order 
provided time for the Commission to consider substituted compliance 
with respect to six jurisdictions where non-U.S. SDs are currently 
organized. In this regard, the Exemptive Order generally provided non-
U.S. SDs and MSPs in the six jurisdictions with conditional relief from 
certain requirements of Commission regulations (those referred to as 
``Entity-Level Requirements'' in the Guidance) until the earlier of 
December 21, 2013, or 30 days following the issuance of a substituted 
compliance determination.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 78 FR 43785 (July 22, 2013).
    \3\ The Entity-Level Requirements under the Exemptive Order 
consist of 17 CFR 1.31, 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 
23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.608, 23.609, and parts 45 and 46 of the 
Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 22, 2013, the ABA (the ``applicant'') submitted a request 
that the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in 
Australia provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of 
comparability with respect to certain Entity-Level Requirements, 
including the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.\4\ The applicant 
provided Commission staff with an updated submission on June 7, 2013. 
On November 8, 2013, the application was further supplemented with 
corrections and additional materials. The following is the Commission's 
analysis and determination regarding the Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements, as detailed below.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ For purposes of this notice, the Internal Business Conduct 
Requirements consist of 17 CFR 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606.
    \5\ This notice does not address swap data repository reporting 
(``SDR Reporting''). The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to the SDR Reporting requirement in a 
separate notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Background

    On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act \6\ (``Dodd-Frank Act'' or ``Dodd-
Frank''), which, in Title VII, established a new regulatory framework 
for swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding 
section 2(i), which provides that the swap provisions of the CEA 
(including any CEA rules or regulations) apply to cross-border 
activities when certain conditions are met, namely, when such 
activities have a ``direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States'' or when they 
contravene Commission rules or regulations as are necessary or 
appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions of the CEA 
enacted under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the three years since its enactment, the Commission has 
finalized 68 rules and orders to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The finalized rules include those promulgated under section 4s of 
the CEA, which address registration of SDs and MSPs and other 
substantive requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs. With few 
exceptions, the delayed compliance dates for the Commission's 
regulations implementing such section 4s requirements applicable to SDs 
and MSPs have passed and new SDs and MSPs are now required to be in 
full compliance with such regulations upon registration with the 
Commission.\8\ Notably, the requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act related to SDs and MSPs by their terms apply to all 
registered SDs and MSPs, irrespective of where they are located, albeit 
subject to the limitations of CEA section 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The compliance dates are summarized on the Compliance Dates 
page of the Commission's Web site. (http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ComplianceDates/index.htm.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide guidance as to the Commission's views regarding the 
scope of the cross-border application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Commission set forth in the Guidance its interpretation of the 
manner in which it believes that Title VII's swap provisions apply to 
activities outside the U.S. pursuant to section 2(i) of the CEA. Among 
other matters, the Guidance generally described the policy and 
procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a 
substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations 
applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the 
Commission addressed a recognition program where compliance with a 
comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve 
as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant 
requirements of the CEA and the Commission's regulations. With respect 
to the standards forming the basis for any determination of 
comparability (``comparability determination'' or ``comparability 
finding''), the Commission stated:

    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign 
regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the 
applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, 
the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those 
requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction's 
authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant. In 
this context, comparable does not necessarily mean identical. 
Rather, the Commission would evaluate whether the home 
jurisdiction's regulatory requirement is comparable to and as 
comprehensive as the corresponding U.S. regulatory 
requirement(s).\9\

    \9\ 78 FR 45342-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Upon a comparability finding, consistent with CEA section 2(i) and 
comity principles, the Commission's policy generally is that eligible 
entities may comply with a substituted compliance regime, subject to 
any conditions the Commission places on its finding, and subject to the 
Commission's retention of its examination authority and its enforcement 
authority.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See the Guidance, 78 FR 45342-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this regard, the Commission notes that a comparability 
determination cannot be premised on whether an SD or MSP must disclose 
comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction, 
but rather on whether information relevant to the Commission's 
oversight of an SD or MSP would be directly available to the Commission 
and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP.\11\ The 
Commission's direct access to the books and records required to be 
maintained

[[Page 78866]]

by an SD or MSP registered with the Commission is a core requirement of 
the CEA \12\ and the Commission's regulations,\13\ and is a condition 
to registration.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Under Sec. Sec.  23.203 and 23.606, all records required by 
the CEA and the Commission's regulations to be maintained by a 
registered SD or MSP shall be maintained in accordance with 
Commission regulation 1.31 and shall be open for inspection by 
representatives of the Commission, the United States Department of 
Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator.
    In its Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 FR 858 (Jan. 7, 2013), the Commission noted 
that an applicant for registration as an SD or MSP must file a Form 
7-R with the National Futures Association and that Form 7-R was 
being modified at that time to address existing blocking, privacy, 
or secrecy laws of foreign jurisdictions that applied to the books 
and records of SDs and MSPs acting in those jurisdictions. See id. 
at 871-72 n. 107. The modifications to Form 7-R were a temporary 
measure intended to allow SDs and MSPs to apply for registration in 
a timely manner in recognition of the existence of the blocking, 
privacy, and secrecy laws. In the Guidance, the Commission clarified 
that the change to Form 7-R impacts the registration application 
only and does not modify the Commission's authority under the CEA 
and its regulations to access records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs. Commission access to a registrant's books and records is a 
fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly monitor and 
examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and the 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto. The Commission has maintained 
an ongoing dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis with 
foreign regulators and with registrants to address books and records 
access issues and may consider appropriate measures where requested 
to do so.
    \12\ See e.g., sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the 
CEA.
    \13\ See e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.203(b) and 23.606.
    \14\ See supra note 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Regulation of SDs and MSPs in Australia

    On April 22, 2013, the applicant submitted a request that the 
Commission assess the comparability of laws and regulations applicable 
in Australia with the CEA and the Commission's regulations promulgated 
thereunder. The applicant provided Commission staff with an updated 
submission on June 7, 2013. On November 8, 2013, the application was 
further supplemented with corrections and additional materials.
    As represented to the Commission by the applicant, currently all 
five Australian registered SDs are Australian authorized deposit-taking 
institutions (``ADIs'') and holders of an Australian financial services 
license (``AFSL''). Thus, for the purposes of the Commission's 
comparability determination, the Commission will consider the laws and 
regulations applicable to the five SD ADIs with respect to their swap 
activities. The relevant laws and regulations are administered by two 
agencies; the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (``APRA'') and 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (``ASIC'').\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Because the applicant's request and the Commissions 
determinations herein are based on the comparability of Australian 
requirements applicable to ADIs and AFSL holders, an SD or MSP that 
is not an ADI or AFSL holder, or is otherwise not subject to the 
requirements applicable to ADIs and AFSL holders upon which the 
Commission bases its determinations, may not be able to rely on the 
Commission's comparability determinations herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    APRA is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial 
services industry and oversees the banking industry. It has developed a 
regulatory framework for Australian ADIs under the Banking Act 1959 
(the ``Banking Act'') that is based on the banking supervision 
principles published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
This regulatory framework is set out in a number of different 
prudential standards that govern the activities of ADIs.
    ASIC is Australia's corporate, markets, and financial services 
regulator. ASIC licenses and monitors financial services businesses to 
ensure they operate efficiently, honestly, and fairly. ASIC 
administers, among other things, the following legislation and 
regulations: the Corporations Act 2001 (the ``Corporations Act''), the 
Corporations Regulations 2001, and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (the ``ASIC Act''). Under the 
Corporations Act, an Australian entity that undertakes specified 
activities, including dealing or market making in derivatives 
(including swaps) is required to hold an AFSL. The AFSL regime 
establishes a number of general licensing obligations that all 
licensees must comply with. ASIC has also issued regulatory guidance 
which sets out its expectations of how licensees may comply with their 
licensing obligations in a range of situations and taking into account 
the nature, size, and complexity of their financial services business.

IV. Comparable and Comprehensiveness Standard

    The Commission's comparability analysis will be based on a 
comparison of specific foreign requirements against the specific 
related CEA provisions and Commission regulations as categorized and 
described in the Guidance. As explained in the Guidance, within the 
framework of CEA section 2(i) and principles of international comity, 
the Commission may make a comparability determination on a requirement-
by-requirement basis, rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as 
a whole.\16\ In making its comparability determinations, the Commission 
may include conditions that take into account timing and other issues 
related to coordinating the implementation of reform efforts across 
jurisdictions.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 78 FR 45343.
    \17\ 78 FR 45343.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory 
requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the corollary 
requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission 
will take into consideration all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to:
     The comprehensiveness of those requirement(s),
     The scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory 
requirement(s),
     The comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator's 
supervisory compliance program, and
     The home jurisdiction's authority to support and enforce 
its oversight of the registrant.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 78 FR 45343.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an 
``outcome-based'' approach. An ``outcome-based'' approach means that 
when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction's regulatory 
requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary 
areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately 
focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction's 
requirements do not have to be identical).\19\ This approach recognizes 
that foreign regulatory systems differ and their approaches vary and 
may differ from how the Commission chose to address an issue, but that 
the foreign jurisdiction's regulatory requirements nonetheless achieve 
the regulatory outcome sought to be achieved by a certain provision of 
the CEA or Commission regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 78 FR 45343. The Commission's substituted compliance 
program would generally be available for SDR Reporting, as outlined 
in the Guidance, only if the Commission has direct access to all of 
the data elements that are reported to a foreign trade repository 
pursuant to the substituted compliance program. Thus, direct access 
to swap data is a threshold matter to be addressed in a 
comparability evaluation for SDR Reporting. Moreover, the Commission 
explains in the Guidance that, due to its technical nature, a 
comparability evaluation for SDR Reporting ``will generally entail a 
detailed comparison and technical analysis.'' A more particularized 
analysis will generally be necessary to determine whether data 
stored in a foreign trade repository provides for effective 
Commission use, in furtherance of the regulatory purposes of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See 78 FR 45345.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In doing its comparability analysis the Commission may determine 
that no comparability determination can be made \20\ and that the non-
U.S. SD or non-U.S. MSP, U.S. bank that is an SD or MSP with respect to 
its foreign branches, or non-registrant, to the extent applicable under 
the Guidance, may be required to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ A finding of comparability may not be possible for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that the foreign jurisdiction has not 
yet implemented or finalized particular requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The starting point in the Commission's analysis is a consideration 
of the regulatory objectives of the foreign jurisdiction's regulation 
of swaps and swap market participants. As stated in the Guidance, 
jurisdictions may not have swap specific regulations in some areas, and 
instead have regulatory or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable 
and comprehensive regulation to the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on 
a more general, entity-wide, or prudential, basis.\21\ In addition, 
portions of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory 
objectives, but the means by which these objectives are achieved with 
respect to swaps market activities may not be clearly defined, or may 
not

[[Page 78867]]

expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission 
concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or 
outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission's regulations. In 
these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and 
registrants in these jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches 
that may result in a determination that substituted compliance 
applies.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 78 FR 45343.
    \22\ As explained in the Guidance, such ``approaches used will 
vary depending on the circumstances relevant to each jurisdiction. 
One example would include coordinating with the foreign regulators 
in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, 
particularly where changes or new regulations already are being 
considered or proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative 
bodies. As another example, the Commission may, after consultation 
with the appropriate regulators and market participants, include in 
its substituted compliance determination a description of the means 
by which certain swaps market participants can achieve substituted 
compliance within the construct of the foreign regulatory regime. 
The identification of the means by which substituted compliance is 
achieved would be designed to address the regulatory objectives and 
outcomes of the relevant Dodd-Frank Act requirements in a manner 
that does not conflict with a foreign regulatory regime and reduces 
the likelihood of inconsistent regulatory obligations. For example, 
the Commission may specify that [SDs] and MSPs in the jurisdiction 
undertake certain recordkeeping and documentation for swap 
activities that otherwise is only addressed by the foreign 
regulatory regime with respect to financial activities generally. In 
addition, the substituted compliance determination may include 
provisions for summary compliance and risk reporting to the 
Commission to allow the Commission to monitor whether the regulatory 
outcomes are being achieved. By using these approaches, in the 
interest of comity, the Commission would seek to achieve its 
regulatory objectives with respect to the Commission's registrants 
that are operating in foreign jurisdictions in a manner that works 
in harmony with the regulatory interests of those jurisdictions.'' 
78 FR 45343-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission will generally rely on an applicant's 
description of the laws and regulations of the foreign jurisdiction in 
making its comparability determination. The Commission considers an 
application to be a representation by the applicant that the laws and 
regulations submitted are in full force and effect, that the 
description of such laws and regulations is accurate and complete, and 
that, unless otherwise noted, the scope of such laws and regulations 
encompasses the swaps activities\23 \ of SDs and MSPs \24\ in the 
relevant jurisdictions.\25\ Further, as stated in the Guidance, the 
Commission expects that an applicant would notify the Commission of any 
material changes to information submitted in support of a comparability 
determination (including, but not limited to, changes in the relevant 
supervisory or regulatory regime) as, depending on the nature of the 
change, the Commission's comparability determination may no longer be 
valid.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under 17 CFR Part 23 are limited in scope 
to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \24\ No SD or MSP that is not legally required to comply with a 
law or regulation determined to be comparable may voluntarily comply 
with such law or regulation in lieu of compliance with the CEA and 
the relevant Commission regulation. Each SD or MSP that seeks to 
rely on a comparability determination is responsible for determining 
whether it is subject to the laws and regulations found comparable. 
Currently, there are no MSPs organized outside the U.S. and the 
Commission therefore cautions any non-financial entity organized 
outside the U.S. and applying for registration as an MSP to 
carefully consider whether the laws and regulations determined to be 
comparable herein are applicable to such entity.
    \25\ The Commission has provided the relevant foreign 
regulator(s) with opportunities to review and correct the 
applicant's description of such laws and regulations on which the 
Commission will base its comparability determination. The Commission 
relies on the accuracy and completeness of such review and any 
corrections received in making its comparability determinations. A 
comparability determination based on an inaccurate description of 
foreign laws and regulations may not be valid.
    \26\ 78 FR 45345.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Guidance provided a detailed discussion of the Commission's 
policy regarding the availability of substituted compliance \27\ for 
the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See 78 FR 45348-50. The Commission notes that registrants 
and other market participants are responsible for determining 
whether substituted compliance is available pursuant to the Guidance 
based on the comparability determination contained herein (including 
any conditions or exceptions), and its particular status and 
circumstances.
    \28\ This notice does not address Sec.  23.608 (Restrictions on 
counterparty clearing relationships). The Commission declines to 
take up the request for a comparability determination with respect 
to this regulation due to the Commission's view that there are not 
laws or regulations applicable in Australia to compare with the 
prohibitions and requirements of Sec.  23.608. The Commission may 
provide a comparability determination with respect to this 
regulation at a later date in consequence of further developments in 
the law and regulations applicable in Australia.
    This notice also does not address capital adequacy because the 
Commission has not yet finalized rules for SDs and MSPs in this 
area, nor SDR Reporting. The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to these requirements at a later date or 
in a separate notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Supervisory Arrangement

    In the Guidance, the Commission stated that, in connection with a 
determination that substituted compliance is appropriate, it would 
expect to enter into an appropriate memorandum of understanding 
(``MOU'') or similar arrangement \29\ with the relevant foreign 
regulator(s). Although existing arrangements would indicate a foreign 
regulator's ability to cooperate and share information, ``going 
forward, the Commission and relevant foreign supervisor(s) would need 
to establish supervisory MOUs or other arrangements that provide for 
information sharing and cooperation in the context of supervising [SDs] 
and MSPs.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ An MOU is one type of arrangement between or among 
regulators. Supervisory arrangements could include, as appropriate, 
cooperative arrangements that are memorialized and executed as 
addenda to existing MOUs or, for example, as independent bilateral 
arrangements, statements of intent, declarations, or letters.
    \30\ 78 FR 45344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is in the process of developing its registration and 
supervision regime for provisionally-registered SDs and MSPs. This new 
initiative includes setting forth supervisory arrangements with 
authorities that have joint jurisdiction over SDs and MSPs that are 
registered with the Commission and subject to U.S. law. Given the 
developing nature of the Commission's regime and the fact that the 
Commission has not negotiated prior supervisory arrangements with 
certain authorities, the negotiation of supervisory arrangements 
presents a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships 
between and among authorities, as well as highlight any potential 
issues related to cooperation and information sharing.
    Accordingly, the Commission is negotiating such a supervisory 
arrangement with each applicable foreign regulator of an SD or MSP. The 
Commission expects that the arrangement will establish expectations for 
ongoing cooperation, address direct access to information,\31\ provide 
for notification upon the occurrence of specified events, memorialize 
understandings related to on-site visits,\32\ and include protections 
related

[[Page 78868]]

to the use and confidentiality of non-public information shared 
pursuant to the arrangement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Section 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.606 require a registered SD or MSP to make all records 
required to be maintained in accordance with Commission regulation 
1.31 available promptly upon request to, among others, 
representatives of the Commission. See also 7 U.S.C. 6s(f); 17 CFR 
23.203. In the Guidance, the Commission states that it ``reserves 
this right to access records held by registered [SDs] and MSPs, 
including those that are non-U.S. persons who may comply with the 
Dodd-Frank recordkeeping requirement through substituted 
compliance.'' 78 FR 45345 n. 472; see also id. at 45342 n. 461 
(affirming the Commission's authority under the CEA and its 
regulations to access books and records held by registered SDs and 
MSPs as ``a fundamental regulatory tool necessary to properly 
monitor and examine each registrant's compliance with the CEA and 
the regulations adopted pursuant thereto'').
    \32\ The Commission retains its examination authority, both 
during the application process as well as upon and after 
registration of an SD or MSP. See 78 FR 45342 (stating Commission 
policy that ``eligible entities may comply with a substituted 
compliance regime under certain circumstances, subject, however, to 
the Commission's retention of its examination authority'') and 45344 
n. 471 (stating that the ``Commission may, as it deems appropriate 
and necessary, conduct an on-site examination of the applicant'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These arrangements will establish a roadmap for how authorities 
will consult, cooperate, and share information. As with any such 
arrangement, however, nothing in these arrangements will supersede 
domestic laws or resolve potential conflicts of law, such as the 
application of domestic secrecy or blocking laws to regulated entities.

VI. Comparability Determination and Analysis

    The following section describes the requirements imposed by 
specific sections of the CEA and the Commission's regulations for the 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that are the subject of this 
comparability determination, and the Commission's regulatory objectives 
with respect to such requirements. Immediately following a description 
of the requirement(s) and regulatory objective(s) of the specific 
Internal Business Conduct Requirements that the requestor submitted for 
a comparability determination, the Commission provides a description of 
the foreign jurisdiction's comparable laws, regulations, or rules and 
whether such laws, regulations, or rules meet the applicable regulatory 
objective.
    The Commission's determinations in this regard and the discussion 
in this section are intended to inform the public of the Commission's 
views regarding whether the foreign jurisdiction's laws, regulations, 
or rules may be comparable and comprehensive as those requirements in 
the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations promulgated thereunder) 
and therefore, may form the basis of substituted compliance. In turn, 
the public (in the foreign jurisdiction, in the United States, and 
elsewhere) retains its ability to present facts and circumstances that 
would inform the determinations set forth in this notice.
    As was stated in the Guidance, the Commission recognizes the 
complex and dynamic nature of the global swap market and the need to 
take an adaptable approach to cross-border issues, particularly as it 
continues to work closely with foreign regulators to address potential 
conflicts with respect to each country's respective regulatory regime. 
In this regard, the Commission may review, modify, or expand the 
determinations herein in light of comments received and future 
developments.

A. Chief Compliance Officer (Sec.  3.3)

    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(k) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 3.3 generally sets forth the following 
requirements for SDs and MSPs:
     An SD or MSP must designate an individual as Chief 
Compliance Officer (``CCO'');
     The CCO must have the responsibility and authority to 
develop the regulatory compliance policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP;
     The CCO must report to the board of directors or the 
senior officer of the SD or MSP;
     Only the board of directors or a senior officer may remove 
the CCO;
     The CCO and the board of directors must meet at least once 
per year;
     The CCO must have the background and skills appropriate 
for the responsibilities of the position;
     The CCO must not be subject to disqualification from 
registration under sections 8a(2) or (3) of the CEA;
     Each SD and MSP must include a designation of a CCO in its 
registration application;
     The CCO must administer the regulatory compliance policies 
of the SD or MSP;
     The CCO must take reasonable steps to ensure compliance 
with the CEA and Commission regulations, and resolve conflicts of 
interest;
     The CCO must establish procedures for detecting and 
remediating non-compliance issues;
     The CCO must annually prepare and sign an ``annual 
compliance report'' containing: (i) A description of policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance; (ii) an assessment 
of the effectiveness of such policies and procedures; (iii) a 
description of material non-compliance issues and the action taken; 
(iv) recommendations of improvements in compliance policies; and (v) a 
certification by the CCO or CEO that, to the best of such officer's 
knowledge and belief, the annual report is accurate and complete under 
penalty of law; and
     The annual compliance report must be furnished to the CFTC 
within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year of the SD or MSP, 
simultaneously with its annual financial condition report.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission believes that compliance by 
SDs and MSPs with the CEA and the Commission's rules greatly 
contributes to the protection of customers, orderly and fair markets, 
and the stability and integrity of the market intermediaries registered 
with the Commission. The Commission expects SDs and MSPs to strictly 
comply with the CEA and the Commission's rules and to devote sufficient 
resources to ensuring such compliance. Thus, through its CCO rule, the 
Commission seeks to ensure firms have designated a qualified individual 
as CCO that reports directly to the board of directors or the senior 
officer of the firm and that has the independence, responsibility, and 
authority to develop and administer compliance policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, remediate noncompliance 
issues, and report annually to the Commission and the board or senior 
officer on compliance of the firm.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(k) of 
the CEA and Commission regulation 3.3.
     APRA prudential standard CPS 520--Fit and Proper (``CPS 
520'') requires the appointment of ``responsible persons.'' CPS 520 
states that responsible persons must be fit and proper, and that the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that an institution's responsible 
persons are fit and proper remains with the board of directors.
     ASIC Regulatory Guide 105 Licensing: Organisational 
competence requires AFSL licensees to appoint ``responsible managers'' 
who have direct responsibility for significant day-to-day decisions 
about the financial services provided, and for maintaining 
organizational competence of the entity. Such responsible managers must 
have the relevant skill and experience and be of good fame and 
character.
     ASIC Regulatory Guide 104 Licensing: Meeting the general 
obligations (``RG 104'') also requires AFSL holders to allocate to a 
director or senior manager responsibility for overseeing the AFSL 
holder's compliance measures, and reporting to the governing body 
(including having ready access to the governing body).
     When ASIC assesses an application for an AFSL, ASIC 
requires applicants to describe whether their compliance arrangements 
are generally consistent with ``Australian Standard 3806'' (``AS

[[Page 78869]]

3806'').\33\ AS 3806 provides principles and guidance for designing, 
developing, implementing, maintaining and improving a flexible, 
responsive effective and measurable compliance program within an 
organization. Although this is a non-governmental standard, ASIC refers 
to AS 3806 in its regulatory guidance for AFSL licensees and asks AFSL 
holders to refer to the standards when complying with their regulatory 
obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ AS 3806 is a standard published by ``Standards Australia,'' 
a non-government standards organization. Australian Standards are 
not legal documents, but can be referenced in Australian legislation 
and become mandatory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     AFSL licensees must comply with section 912A of the 
Corporations Act, which, among other obligations, requires that such 
entities: Do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services 
covered by the license are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly; 
have adequate arrangements in place for managing conflicts of interest 
that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities 
undertaken by the licensee or a representative of the licensee in the 
provision of financial services as part of the financial services 
business of the licensee or the representative; comply with any 
conditions on the license; comply with the financial services laws; 
take reasonable steps to ensure that representatives comply with the 
financial services laws; maintain the competence to provide the 
financial services covered by the license; ensure that representatives 
are adequately trained and competent to provide those financial 
services; and if those financial services are provided to retail 
clients, have a dispute resolution system.
     AFSL licensees are also required under section 912D of the 
Corporations Act to report to ASIC any significant breach (or likely 
breach) of its regulatory obligations. ASIC Regulatory Guide 78 Breach 
reporting by AFS licensees expands on this obligation and requires AFSL 
holders to have a documented process for, amongst other things, 
rectifying breaches and ensuring that arrangements are in place to 
prevent the recurrence of the breach.
     ADIs are also required under APRA prudential standard APS 
310 Audit and Related Matters (``APS 310'') to provide APRA a high-
level description of its risk management systems covering all major 
areas of risk and annually, within three months of its annual balance 
date, provide APRA with a declaration from its CEO endorsed by the 
board that attests that: they have established systems to monitor and 
manage those risk including, where appropriate, by setting and 
requiring adherence to a series of prudent limits, and by adequate and 
timely reporting processes; the risk management systems are operating 
effectively and are adequate with regard to the risks they are designed 
to control; and the descriptions of risk management systems provided to 
APRA are accurate and current.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Not relevant for the Commission's comparability 
determination herein, the applicant also referenced APRA draft 
prudential standard CPS 220 Risk Management (``Draft CPS 220''), 
which was released by APRA on May 9, 2013. This draft prudential 
standard, if finalized in a form similar to its draft form, will 
require each ADI (including SD ADIs) to have a designated compliance 
function that assists senior management in effectively managing 
compliance risks. It will also require that the compliance function 
be adequately staffed by appropriately trained and competent persons 
who have sufficient authority to perform their role effectively, and 
have a reporting line independent from business lines. APRA expects 
to finalize Draft CPS 220 prior to its implementation date of 
January 1, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
and requirements under the Australian regimes specified above are 
generally identical in intent to Sec.  3.3 by seeking to ensure firms 
have designated a qualified individual as the compliance officer that 
reports directly to a sufficiently senior function of the firm and that 
has the independence, responsibility, and authority to develop and 
administer compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve 
conflicts of interest, remediate noncompliance issues, and report 
annually on compliance of the firm.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the CCO requirements of the 
provisions of Australian law and regulations specified above are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  3.3, with the exception of 
Sec.  3.3(e) concerning preparing and signing an annual compliance 
report and Sec.  3.3(f) concerning certifying and furnishing an annual 
compliance report to the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Australian law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec. Sec.  3.3(e) and 3.3(f), any SD or MSP to which 
both Sec.  3.3 and the Australian law and regulations specified above 
are applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with 
Sec. Sec.  3.3(e) and (f) if that SD or MSP complies with the 
Australian law and regulations specified above, subject to preparing 
and signing an annual compliance report in accordance with Sec.  3.3(e) 
and certifying and furnishing the Commission with an annual compliance 
report in accordance with Sec.  3.3(f). The Commission notes that it 
generally expects registrants to submit required reports to the 
Commission in the English language.

B. Risk Management Duties (Sec. Sec.  23.600--23.609)

    Section 4s(j) of the CEA requires each SD and MSP to establish 
internal policies and procedures designed to, among other things, 
address risk management, monitor compliance with position limits, 
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote diligent supervision, as 
well as maintain business continuity and disaster recovery 
programs.\35\ The Commission adopted regulations 23.600, 23.601, 
23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606 to implement the statute.\36\ The 
Commission also adopted regulation 23.609, which requires certain risk 
management procedures for SDs or MSPs that are clearing members of a 
derivatives clearing organization (``DCO'').\37\ Collectively, these 
requirements help to establish a robust and comprehensive internal risk 
management program for SDs and MSPs with respect to their swaps 
activities,\38\ which is critical to effective systemic risk management 
for the overall swaps market. In making its comparability determination 
with regard to these risk management duties, the Commission will 
consider each regulation individually.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
    \36\ See Final Swap Dealer and MSP Recordkeeping Rule, 77 FR 
20128 (April 3, 2012) (relating to risk management program, 
monitoring of position limits, business continuity and disaster 
recovery, conflicts of interest policies and procedures, and general 
information availability, respectively).
    \37\ See Customer Documentation Rule, 77 FR 21278. Also, SDs 
must comply with Commission regulation 23.608, which prohibits SDs 
providing clearing services to customers from entering into 
agreements that would: (i) Disclose the identity of a customer's 
original executing counterparty; (ii) limit the number of 
counterparties a customer may trade with; (iii) impose counterparty-
based position limits; (iv) impair a customer's access to execution 
of a trade on terms that have a reasonable relationship to the best 
terms available; or (v) prevent compliance with specified time 
frames for acceptance of trades into clearing.
    \38\ ``Swaps activities'' is defined in Commission regulation 
23.600(a)(7) to mean, ``with respect to a registrant, such 
registrant's activities related to swaps and any product used to 
hedge such swaps, including, but not limited to, futures, options, 
other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, 
foreign currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives.'' The 
Commission's regulations under 17 CFR Part 23 are limited in scope 
to the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs.
    \39\ As stated above, this notice does not address Sec.  23.608 
(Restrictions on counterparty clearing relationships). The 
Commission declines to take up the request for a comparability 
determination with respect to this regulation due to the 
Commission's view that there are not laws or regulations applicable 
in Australia to compare with the prohibitions and requirements of 
Sec.  23.608. The Commission may provide a comparability 
determination with respect to this regulation at a later date in 
consequence of further developments in the law and regulations 
applicable in Australia.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 78870]]

1. Risk Management Program for SDs and MSPs (Sec.  23.600)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.600 generally requires that:
     Each SD or MSP must establish and enforce a risk 
management program consisting of a system of written risk management 
policies and procedures designed to monitor and manage the risks 
associated with the swap activities of the firm, including without 
limitation, market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal, 
operational, and settlement risks, and furnish a copy of such policies 
and procedures to the CFTC upon application for registration and upon 
request;
     The SD or MSP must establish a risk management unit 
independent from the business trading unit;
     The risk management policies and procedures of the SD or 
MSP must be approved by the firm's governing body;
     Risk tolerance limits and exceptions therefrom must be 
reviewed and approved quarterly by senior management and annually by 
the governing body;
     The risk management program must have a system for 
detecting breaches of risk tolerance limits and alerting supervisors 
and senior management, as appropriate;
     The risk management program must account for risks posed 
by affiliates and be integrated at the consolidated entity level;
     The risk management unit must provide senior management 
and the governing body with quarterly risk exposure reports and upon 
detection of any material change in the risk exposure of the SD or MSP;
     Risk exposure reports must be furnished to the CFTC within 
five business days following provision to senior management;
     The risk management program must have a new product policy 
for assessing the risks of new products prior to engaging in such 
transactions;
     The risk management program must have policies and 
procedures providing for trading limits, monitoring of trading, 
processing of trades, and separation of personnel in the trading unit 
from personnel in the risk management unit; and
     The risk management program must be reviewed and tested at 
least annually and upon any material change in the business of the SD 
or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: Through the required system of risk 
management, the Commission seeks to ensure that firms are adequately 
managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the 
SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing 
business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. To this 
end, the Commission believes the risk management program of an SD or 
MSP must contain at least the following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(2) 
of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.600.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Not relevant for the Commission's comparability 
determination herein, the applicant also referenced Draft CPS 220. 
Draft CPS 220 seeks to introduce additional requirements in respect 
of the risk management framework for ADIs. APRA expects to finalize 
CPS 220 prior to its implementation date of January 1, 2015. Under 
Draft CPS 220, an APRA-regulated institution must have policies and 
procedures that provide the board with a comprehensive institution-
wide view of its material risks. Draft CPS 220 also requires the 
risk management function of an ADI be ``operationally independent'' 
and must be headed by a designated Chief Risk Officer (``CRO''). The 
CRO must be involved in, and have the authority to provide effective 
challenge to, activities and decisions that may materially affect 
the institution's risk profile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The regulatory framework for ADIs under the Banking Act is 
based on the banking supervision principles published by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.\41\ This prudential framework 
includes requirements (largely set out in detailed and separate 
prudential standards) regarding capital adequacy, credit risk, market 
risk, liquidity, credit quality, large exposures, associations with 
related entities, outsourcing, business continuity management, audit 
and related arrangements for prudential reporting, governance, and fit 
and proper management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The Corporations Act requires AFSL holders to comply with 
risk management requirements, however, this requirement does not 
apply where an entity is regulated by APRA. See section 912A(1)(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In particular, APS 310 (discussed above) requires an ADI's 
board and management to ensure that the ADI meets prudential and 
statutory requirements and has management practices to limit risks to 
prudent levels. APS 310 mandates that the ADI's risk management 
practices must be detailed in descriptions of risk management systems 
that must be regularly reviewed and updated, at least annually, to take 
account of changing circumstances.
     APRA Prudential standard APS 116 Capital Adequacy: Market 
Risk (``APS 116'') states that the board, or a board committee, of an 
ADI must ensure that the ADI has in place adequate systems to identify, 
measure and manage market risk, including identifying responsibilities, 
providing adequate separation of duties and avoiding conflicts of 
interest.
     For certain trading positions, APS 116 states that an ADI 
must have ``clearly defined policies and procedures for the active 
management of positions such that: positions are managed on a trading 
desk; position limits are set and monitored for appropriateness; 
positions are marked-to-market daily and when marking-to-model the 
parameters are assessed on a daily basis; and positions are reported to 
senior management as an integral part of the institution's risk 
management process.
     If an ADI has received approval to apply an ``internal 
model'' for market risk, as opposed to the ``standard method'' of 
calculating capital requirements, APS 116 requires the ADI to have an 
independent risk control unit that is responsible for the design and 
implementation of the ADI's market risk management system. The risk 
control unit must produce and analyze daily reports on the output of 
the ADI's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of limit 
utilization. This risk control unit must be independent from business 
trading and other risk taking units and must report directly to senior 
management of the ADI.
     If an ADI has received approval to apply an ``internal 
model'' for market risk, APS 116 states that the board or a board 
committee and senior management of an ADI must be actively involved in 
the risk control process. Daily reports must be prepared by the 
independent risk control unit and must be reviewed by a level of 
management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce 
reductions of positions.
     APS 116 states that an ADI must ensure that an independent 
review of the risk measurement system and

[[Page 78871]]

overall risk management process is carried out initially (i.e., at the 
time when model approval is sought) and then regularly as part of the 
ADI's internal audit process.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
of Australian law and regulations specified above are generally 
identical in intent to Sec.  23.600 by requiring a system of risk 
management that seeks to ensure that firms are adequately managing the 
risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, 
which could result in losses to counterparties doing business with the 
SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. Specifically, the 
Commission finds that the Australian provisions specified above 
comprehensively require SDs and MSPs to establish risk management 
programs containing the following critical elements:
     Identification of risk categories;
     Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category 
of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the 
governing body;
     An independent risk management unit to administer a risk 
management program; and
     Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management 
and the governing body.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the risk management program 
requirements of the provisions of Australian law and regulations 
specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  
23.600, with the exception of Sec.  23.600(c)(2) concerning the 
requirement that each SD and MSP produce a quarterly risk exposure 
report and provide such report to its senior management, governing 
body, and the Commission.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Australian law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.600(c)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.600 and the Australian law and regulations specified above are 
applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  
23.600(c)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the Australian law and 
regulations specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement 
that it produce quarterly risk exposure reports and provide such 
reports to its senior management, governing body, and the Commission in 
accordance with Sec.  23.600(c)(2). The Commission notes that it 
generally expects reports furnished to the Commission by registrants to 
be in the English language.
2. Monitoring of Position Limits (Sec.  23.601)
    Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA, 
Commission regulation 23.601 requires each SD or MSP to establish and 
enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
monitor for, and prevent violations of, applicable position limits 
established by the Commission, a designated contract market (``DCM''), 
or a swap execution facility (``SEF'').\42\ The policies and procedures 
must include an early warning system and provide for escalation of 
violations to senior management (including the firm's governing body).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The setting of position limits by the Commission, a DCM, or 
a SEF is subject to requirements under the CEA and Commission 
regulations other than Sec.  23.601. The setting of position limits 
and compliance with such limits is not subject to the Commission's 
substituted compliance regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulatory Objective: Generally, position limits are implemented to 
ensure market integrity, fairness, orderliness, and accurate pricing in 
the commodity markets. Commission regulation 23.601 thus seeks to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs have established the necessary policies and 
procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of 
applicable position limits established by the Commission, a DCM, or a 
SEF. As part of its Risk Management Program, Sec.  23.601 is intended 
to ensure that established position limits are not breached by the SD 
or MSP.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(1) 
of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.601.
     Section 912A(1)(ca) of the Corporations Act, which 
requires AFSL holders to take reasonable steps to ensure its 
representatives comply with the financial services laws, which would 
include regulatory position limits.
     APS 310 (discussed above) requires an ADI's board and 
management to ensure that the ADI meets prudential and statutory 
requirements and has management practices to limit risks to prudent 
levels.
    In addition to the foregoing, the applicant also submitted various 
guidelines and required best practices concerning the setting of 
internal risk tolerance limits and monitoring for compliance with such 
internal limits. Although the Commission recognizes these as prudent 
risk management practices, the Commission does not believe that these 
provisions are comparable to Sec.  23.601 because Sec.  23.601 requires 
monitoring for compliance with external position limits set by the 
Commission, a DCM, or a SEF.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Australian 
provisions specified above are generally identical in intent to Sec.  
23.601 by requiring SDs and MSPs to establish necessary policies and 
procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of 
applicable position limits established by applicable laws and 
regulations, including those of the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF. 
Specifically, the Commission finds that the provisions of Australian 
law and regulations specified above, while not specific to the issue of 
position limit compliance, nevertheless comprehensively require SDs and 
MSPs to monitor for regulatory compliance generally, which includes 
monitoring for compliance with position limits set pursuant to 
applicable law and the responsibility of senior management (including 
the board of directors) for such compliance.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the compliance monitoring 
requirements of Australian law and regulations, as specified above, are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.601. For the avoidance 
of doubt, the Commission notes that this determination may not be 
relied on to relieve an SD or MSP from its obligation to strictly 
comply with any applicable position limit established by the 
Commission, a DCM, or a SEF.
3. Diligent Supervision (Sec.  23.602)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.602 implements 
section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and requires each SD and MSP to 
establish a system to diligently supervise all activities relating to 
its business performed by its partners, members, officers, employees, 
and agents. The system must be reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with the CEA and CFTC regulations. Commission regulation 
23.602 requires that the supervisory system must specifically designate 
qualified persons with authority to carry out the supervisory 
responsibilities of the SD or MSP for all activities relating to its 
business as an SD or MSP.
    Regulatory Objective: The Commission's diligent supervision rule 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs

[[Page 78872]]

strictly comply with the CEA and the Commission's rules. To this end, 
through Sec.  23.602, the Commission seeks to ensure that each SD and 
MSP not only establishes the necessary policies and procedures that 
would lead to compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, but 
also establishes an effective system of internal oversight and 
enforcement of such policies and procedures to ensure that such 
policies and procedures are diligently followed.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 
4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.602.
     CPS 520 (discussed above) sets forth the fitness 
requirements for all APRA regulated institutions. These standards apply 
to all directors and senior managers of an ADI as well as other 
``responsible persons.'' The applicable key requirements of this 
prudential standard are: an ADI must have a Fit and Proper policy that 
meets certain standards; the fitness and propriety of a responsible 
person must generally be assessed prior to initial appointment and then 
re-assessed annually; and an ADI must take steps to ensure that a 
person is not appointed to, or does not continue to hold, a responsible 
person position for which they are not qualified.
     Section 912A(1)(ca) of the Corporations Act requires that 
an AFSL licensee take reasonable steps to ensure that its 
representatives comply with the financial services laws.
     RG 104 (discussed above) sets forth guidance for an AFSL 
licensee with respect to supervision. These regulatory guidelines 
require that an AFSL licensee have measures for monitoring and 
supervising their representatives to determine whether they are 
complying with the financial services laws. They also require that an 
AFSL licensee take measures to ensure that their representatives who 
provide financial services have, and maintain the necessary knowledge 
and skills, to competently provide those services.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
of Australian law and regulations specified above are generally 
identical in intent to Sec.  23.602 because such standards seek to 
ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with applicable law, which 
would include the CEA and the Commission's regulations. Through the 
provisions specified above, Australian law and regulations seek to 
ensure that each SD and MSP not only establishes the necessary policies 
and procedures that would lead to compliance with applicable law, which 
would include the CEA and Commission regulations, but also establishes 
an effective system of internal oversight and enforcement of such 
policies and procedures to ensure that such policies and procedures are 
diligently followed.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the internal supervision 
requirements of the provisions of Australian law and regulations, as 
specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  
23.602.
4. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (Sec.  23.603)
    Commission Requirement: To ensure the proper functioning of the 
swaps markets and the prevention of systemic risk more generally, 
Commission regulation 23.603 requires each SD and MSP, as part of its 
risk management program, to establish a business continuity and 
disaster recovery plan that includes procedures for, and the 
maintenance of, back-up facilities, systems, infrastructure, personnel, 
and other resources to achieve the timely recovery of data and 
documentation and to resume operations generally within the next 
business day after the disruption.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.603 is intended to 
ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether 
caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and 
severity. To that end, this requirement seeks to ensure that entities 
adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient resources capable 
of carrying out an appropriate plan within one business day, if 
necessary.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission 
regulation 23.603.
    APRA prudential standard CPS 232 Business Continuity Management 
(``CPS 232'') requires each ADI to implement a whole-of-business 
approach to business continuity management. Specifically, CPS 232 
states that:
     A regulated institution must identify, assess, and manage 
potential business continuity risks to ensure that it is able to meet 
its financial and service obligations to its depositors, policyholders 
and other creditors;
     The board of a regulated institution must consider 
business continuity risks and controls as part of its overall risk 
management systems and approve a Business Continuity Management Policy;
     A regulated institution must develop and maintain a 
Business Continuity Plan that documents procedures and information 
which enable the regulated institution to manage business disruptions;
     A regulated institution must review the Business 
Continuity Plan annually and periodically arrange for its review by the 
internal audit function or an external expert; and
     A regulated institution must notify APRA in the event of 
certain disruptions.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
of Australian law and regulations specified above are generally 
identical in intent to Sec.  23.603 because such standards seek to 
ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether 
caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and 
severity. To that end, the Commission finds that the provisions of 
Australian law and regulations specified above seek to ensure that 
entities adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient 
resources capable of carrying out an appropriate plan in a timely 
manner.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the business continuity and 
disaster recovery requirements of the provisions of Australian law and 
regulations, as specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive 
as Sec.  23.603.
5. Conflicts of Interest (Sec.  23.605)
    Commission Requirement: Section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 23.605(c) generally require each SD or MSP to establish 
structural and institutional safeguards to ensure that the activities 
of any person within the firm relating to research or analysis of the 
price or market for any commodity or swap are separated by appropriate 
informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or 
oversight of persons whose involvement in pricing, trading, or clearing 
activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.
    In addition, section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission regulation 
23.605(d)(1) generally prohibits an SD or MSP from directly or 
indirectly interfering with or attempting to influence the decision of 
any clearing unit of any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to provide

[[Page 78873]]

clearing services and activities to a particular customer, including:
     Whether to offer clearing services to a particular 
customer;
     Whether to accept a particular customer for clearing 
derivatives;
     Whether to submit a customer's transaction to a particular 
DCO;
     Whether to set or adjust risk tolerance levels for a 
particular customer; or
     Whether to set a customer's fees based on criteria other 
than those generally available and applicable to other customers.
    Commission regulation 23.605(d)(2) generally requires each SD or 
MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition 
between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of 
any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to reasonably ensure compliance 
with the Act and the prohibitions set forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) 
outlined above.
    The Commission observes that Sec.  23.605(d) works in tandem with 
Commission regulation 1.71, which requires FCMs that are clearing 
members of a DCO and affiliated with an SD or MSP to create and 
maintain an appropriate informational partition between business 
trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of the FCM to 
reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and the prohibitions set 
forth in Sec.  1.71(d)(1), which are the same as the prohibitions set 
forth in Sec.  23.605(d)(1) outlined above.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) requires that each SD or MSP have policies 
and procedures that mandate the disclosure to counterparties of 
material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of 
a counterparty to execute a derivative on a swap execution facility or 
DCM or to clear a derivative through a DCO.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.605(c) seeks to 
ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD or MSP is 
unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD or MSP 
arising from the SD's or MSP's trading business.
    In addition, the Sec.  23.605(d) (working in tandem with Sec.  
1.71) seeks to ensure open access to the clearing of swaps by requiring 
that access to and the provision of clearing services provided by an 
affiliate of an SD or MSP are not influenced by the interests of an 
SD's or MSP's trading business.
    Finally, Sec.  23.605(e) seeks to ensure equal access to trading 
venues and clearinghouses, as well as orderly and fair markets, by 
requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to counterparties any material 
incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a 
counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or to clear a 
derivative through a DCO.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission 
regulation 23.605(c).
     Section 912A(1)(aa) of the Corporations Act requires AFSL 
licensees to have adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts 
of interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to 
activities undertaken by a licensee or a representative of the licensee 
in the provision of financial services.
     ASIC Regulatory Guide 181 Licensing: Managing conflicts of 
interest and ASIC Regulatory Guide 79 Research report providers: 
Improving the quality of investment research (specific to research 
reports provided in Australia), set out ASIC's expectations regarding 
how financial service licensees are to manage conflicts of interest 
that arise in relation to the financial services that they provide. The 
conflicts management obligation requires that all conflicts of interest 
be adequately managed, recognizing that many conflicts of interest can 
be managed by a combination of internal controls and disclosures. Where 
conflicts cannot be adequately managed through internal controls and/or 
disclosure, the ASIC guidelines require that an AFSL holder must avoid 
the conflict or refrain from providing the affected financial service.
     Section 941A of the Corporations Act requires AFSL 
licensees to provide a Financial Services Guide to retail clients if 
they provide a financial service to the client.
     Section 942B(2)(f) of the Corporations Act states that the 
Financial Services Guide must provide disclosures about relationships 
that may influence the provision of the financial service.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ In addition to the foregoing, the applicant referenced 
Draft CPS 220. This draft prudential standard, if finalized in a 
form similar to its draft form, will require each ADI (including SD 
ADIs) to have policies and procedures for identifying, monitoring, 
and managing potential and actual conflicts of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The applicant has represented to the Commission that ASIC and APRA, 
in the process of their oversight and enforcement of the foregoing 
Australian law and regulations for ADIs and ASFL licensees, would 
require any SD or MSP subject to such law and regulations to resolve or 
mitigate conflicts of interests in the provision of clearing services 
by a clearing member of a DCO that is an affiliate of the SD or MSP, or 
the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, 
or clear a derivative through a DCO, through appropriate information 
firewalls and disclosures.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
of Australian law and regulations specified above with respect to 
conflicts of interest that may arise in producing or distributing 
research are generally identical in intent to Sec.  23.605(c) because 
such standards seek to ensure that research provided to the general 
public by an SD is unbiased and free from the influence of the 
interests of an SD arising from the SD's trading business.
    With respect to conflicts of interest that may arise in the 
provision of clearing services by an affiliate of an SD or MSP, the 
Commission further finds that although the general conflicts of 
interest prevention requirements under the Australian law and 
regulations specified above do not require with specificity that access 
to and the provision of clearing services provided by an affiliate of 
an SD or MSP not be improperly influenced by the interests of an SD's 
or MSP's trading business, such general requirements would require 
prevention and remediation of such improper influence when recognized 
or discovered. Thus such standards would ensure open access to 
clearing.
    Finally, although not as specific as the requirements of Sec.  
23.605(e) (Undue influence on counterparties), the Commission finds 
that the general disclosure requirements of the Australian law and 
regulations specified above would ensure equal access to trading venues 
and clearinghouses by requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to 
counterparties any material incentives or conflicts of interest 
regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a 
SEF or DCM, or to clear a derivative through a DCO.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the provisions of Australian law 
and regulations specified above in relation to conflicts of interest 
are comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.605.
6. Availability of Information for Disclosure and Inspection (Sec.  
23.606)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.606 implements 
sections 4s(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA, and requires each SD and MSP to 
disclose to the Commission, and an

[[Page 78874]]

SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator (if any) comprehensive 
information about its swap activities, and to establish and maintain 
reliable internal data capture, processing, storage, and other 
operational systems sufficient to capture, process, record, store, and 
produce all information necessary to satisfy its duties under the CEA 
and Commission regulations. Such systems must be designed to provide 
such information to the Commission and an SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential 
regulator within the time frames set forth in the CEA and Commission 
regulations and upon request.
    Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.606 seeks to ensure 
that each SD and MSP captures and maintains comprehensive information 
about their swap activities, and is able to retrieve and disclose such 
information to the Commission and its U.S. prudential regulator, if 
any, as necessary for compliance with the CEA and the Commission's 
regulations and for purposes of Commission oversight, as well as 
oversight by the SD's or MSP's U.S. prudential regulator, if any.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec.  23.606 unless the required information is 
available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator under the 
foreign legal regime. Thus, a comparability determination with respect 
to the information access provisions of Sec.  23.606 would be premised 
on whether the relevant information would be available to the 
Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on 
whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its 
regulator in its home jurisdiction.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission 
regulation 23.606.
    Section 912C of the Corporations Act and sections 29-33 of the ASIC 
Act enable ASIC to gather information from AFSL licensees, including:
     A statement containing specified information about the 
financial services provided by the AFSL holder or its representatives, 
or the financial services business carried on by the licensee;
     Inspection of books without charge;
     Issuance of a notice to a body corporate to produce books 
about the affairs of the body corporate;
     Issuance of a notice to a person who carries out a 
financial services business to produce books relating to, among other 
things, a dealing in financial products, or the character or financial 
position of the business;
     Issuance of a notice to produce books relating to the 
supply of financial services; and
     Issuance of a notice to produce documents in the person's 
possession that relate to the affairs of the body corporate.
    In addition, Section 988A of the Corporations Act requires AFSL 
license holders to keep financial records that correctly record and 
explain the transactions and financial position of the financial 
services business carried out by the licensee.
    Part 2.3 of the ASIC Derivative Transaction Rules (Reporting) 2013 
places certain requirements on reporting entities (which includes the 
five SD ADIs as reporting entities from October 1, 2013). Specifically, 
Rule 2.3.1 requires reporting entities to keep records in relation to 
OTC derivatives transactions (including swaps) that enable the 
reporting entity to demonstrate it has complied with the Derivative 
Transaction Rules, and must keep the records for a period of at least 
five years from the date the record is made or amended. Reporting 
entities must also keep a record of all information that it is required 
to be reported under such rules.
    Rule 2.3.2 further requires a reporting entity to, on request by 
ASIC, provide ASIC within a reasonable time with records or other 
information relating to compliance with or determining whether there 
has been compliance with the Rules.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Australian 
law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent 
to Sec.  23.606 because such standards seek to ensure that each SD and 
MSP captures and stores comprehensive information about their swap 
activities, and are able to retrieve and disclose such information as 
necessary for compliance with applicable law and for purposes of 
regulatory oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the Australian law and 
regulations with respect to the availability of information for 
inspection and disclosure, as specified above, are comparable to, and 
as comprehensive as, Sec.  23.606, with the exception of Sec.  
23.606(a)(2) concerning the requirement that an SD or MSP make 
information required by Sec.  23.606(a)(1) available promptly upon 
request to Commission staff and the staff of an applicable U.S. 
prudential regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of 
law or regulations applicable in Australia upon which the Commission 
could make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be required to retrieve 
and disclose comprehensive information about their swap activities to 
the Commission or any U.S. prudential regulator as necessary for 
compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, and for purposes of 
Commission oversight and the oversight of any U.S. prudential 
regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Australian law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.606(a)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.606 and the Australian law and regulations specified above are 
applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  
23.606(a)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the Australian law and 
regulations specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement 
that it produce information to Commission staff and the staff of an 
applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with Sec.  
23.606(a)(2).
7. Clearing Member Risk Management (Sec.  23.609)
    Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.609 generally 
requires each SD or MSP that is a clearing member of a DCO to:
     Establish risk-based limits based on position size, order 
size, margin requirements, or similar factors;
     Screen orders for compliance with the risk-based limits;
     Monitor for adherence to the risk-based limits intra-day 
and overnight;
     Conduct stress tests under extreme but plausible 
conditions of all positions at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to meet initial margin requirements 
at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to meet variation margin requirements 
in cash at least once per week;
     Evaluate its ability to liquidate positions it clears in 
an orderly manner, and estimate the cost of liquidation; and
     Test all lines of credit at least once per year.
    Regulatory Objective: Through Commission regulation 23.609, the 
Commission seeks to ensure the financial integrity of the markets and 
the clearing system, to avoid systemic risk, and to protect customer 
funds. Effective risk management by SDs and MSPs that are clearing 
members is essential to achieving these objectives. A failure of risk 
management can cause

[[Page 78875]]

a clearing member to become insolvent and default to a DCO. Such 
default can disrupt the markets and the clearing system and harm 
customers.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission 
regulation 23.609.
     The regulatory framework for ADIs under the Banking Act is 
based on the banking supervision principles published by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.\44\ This prudential framework 
includes requirements (largely set out in detailed and separate 
prudential standards) regarding capital adequacy, credit risk, market 
risk, liquidity, credit quality, large exposures, associations with 
related entities, outsourcing, business continuity management, audit 
and related arrangements for prudential reporting, governance, and fit 
and proper management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The Corporations Act requires AFSL holders to comply with 
risk management requirements, however, this requirement does not 
apply where an entity is regulated by APRA. See section 912A(1)(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In particular, APS 310 (discussed above) requires an ADI's 
board and management to ensure that the ADI meets prudential and 
statutory requirements and has management practices to limit risks to 
prudent levels. APS 310 mandates that the ADI's risk management 
practices must be detailed in descriptions of risk management systems 
that must be regularly reviewed and updated, at least annually, to take 
account of changing circumstances.
     APRA Prudential standard APS 116 Capital Adequacy: Market 
Risk (``APS 116'') states that the board, or a board committee, of an 
ADI must ensure that the ADI has in place adequate systems to identify, 
measure and manage market risk, including identifying responsibilities, 
providing adequate separation of duties and avoiding conflicts of 
interest.
     For certain trading positions, APS 116 states that an ADI 
must have ``clearly defined policies and procedures for the active 
management of positions such that: Positions are managed on a trading 
desk; position limits are set and monitored for appropriateness; 
positions are marked-to-market daily and when marking-to-model the 
parameters are assessed on a daily basis; and positions are reported to 
senior management as an integral part of the institution's risk 
management process.
     If an ADI has received approval to apply an ``internal 
model'' for market risk, as opposed to the ``standard method'' of 
calculating capital requirements, APS 116 requires the ADI to have an 
independent risk control unit that is responsible for the design and 
implementation of the ADI's market risk management system. The risk 
control unit must produce and analyze daily reports on the output of 
the ADI's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of limit 
utilization. This risk control unit must be independent from business 
trading and other risk taking units and must report directly to senior 
management of the ADI.
     If an ADI has received approval to apply an ``internal 
model'' for market risk, APS 116 states that the board or a board 
committee and senior management of an ADI must be actively involved in 
the risk control process. Daily reports must be prepared by the 
independent risk control unit and must be reviewed by a level of 
management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce 
reductions of positions.
     APS 116 states that an ADI must ensure that an independent 
review of the risk measurement system and overall risk management 
process is carried out initially (i.e., at the time when model approval 
is sought) and then regularly as part of the ADI's internal audit 
process.
    Further, on June 4, 2013, APRA issued a letter to all ADIs, 
including the Australian SDs outlining the framework for the 
application of risk management requirements to the Australian banks' 
membership of CCPs. Such a framework should include, at a minimum: 
application of appropriate systems and controls to monitor, on a 
continuing basis, the risk that membership of and conduct of business 
through a CCP or multiple CCPs may create and to manage such risk. This 
would include application of limits on potential risk exposures. These 
clearly articulated conditions together with APRA's prudential 
standards are designed to achieve a comparable regulatory outcome as 
Commission regulation 23.609.
    Specifically, APRA has represented to the Commission that, in the 
process of its oversight and enforcement of the foregoing Australian 
law, regulations, and prudential standards, any SD or MSP subject to 
such standards that is a clearing member of a DCO would be expected to 
have established risk-based limits and a compliance and assessment 
framework for these limits consistent with the Commission's 
requirements for a clearing member and set out in the SD's or MSP's 
risk management policy framework. APRA would expect banks in Australia 
to adhere to their risk limit policies and any targeted review would 
examine the banks' risk management policy framework that captures these 
regulatory obligations.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Australian 
law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent 
to Sec.  23.609 because such standards seek to ensure the financial 
integrity of the markets and the clearing system, to avoid systemic 
risk, and to protect customer funds.
    The Commission notes that the Australian law and regulations 
specified above are not as specific as Sec.  23.609 with respect to 
ensuring that SDs and MSPs that are clearing members of a DCO establish 
detailed procedures and limits for clearing member risk management 
purposes. Nevertheless, the Commission finds that the general 
requirements under the Australian law and regulations specified above, 
implemented in the context of clearing member risk management and 
pursuant to the representations of ASIC and APRA, meet the Commission's 
regulatory objective specified above.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations above, the 
Commission hereby determines that the clearing member risk management 
requirements of the Australian law and regulations specified above are 
comparable to and as comprehensive as Sec.  23.609.

C. Swap Data Recordkeeping (Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203)

    Commission Requirement: Sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the 
CEA, and Commission regulation 23.201 generally require SDs and MSPs to 
retain records of each transaction, each position held, general 
business records (including records related to complaints and sales and 
marketing materials), records related to governance, financial records, 
records of data reported to SDRs, and records of real-time reporting 
data along with a record of the date and time the SD or MSP made such 
reports. Transaction records must be kept in a form and manner 
identifiable and searchable by transaction and counterparty.
    Commission regulation 23.203, requires SDs and MSPs to maintain 
records of a swap transaction until the termination, maturity, 
expiration, transfer, assignment, or novation date of the transaction, 
and for a period of five years after such date. Records must be 
``readily accessible'' for the first 2 years of the 5 year retention 
period (consistent with Sec.  1.31).

[[Page 78876]]

    The Commission notes that the comparability determination below 
with respect to Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 encompasses both swap data 
recordkeeping generally and swap data recordkeeping relating to 
complaints and marketing and sales materials in accordance with Sec.  
23.201(b)(3) and (4).\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See the Guidance for a discussion of the availability of 
substituted compliance with respect to swap data recordkeeping, 78 
FR 45332-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulatory Objective: Through the Commission's regulations 
requiring SDs and MSPs to keep comprehensive records of their swap 
transactions and related data, the Commission seeks to ensure the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and 
transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market 
participants.
    The Commission's regulations require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data 
in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to 
understand an SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps 
exposure.
    By requiring comprehensive records of swap data, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, and 
strictly comply with Commission regulations. Further, such records 
facilitate effective regulatory oversight.
    The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the 
regulatory objective of Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 unless the 
required information is available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator under the foreign legal regime. Thus, a 
comparability determination with respect to the information access 
provisions of Sec.  23.203 would be premised on whether the relevant 
information would be available to the Commission and any U.S. 
prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on whether an SD or MSP must 
disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home 
jurisdiction.
    Comparable Australian Law and Regulations: The applicant has 
represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and 
regulations applicable in Australia are in full force and effect in 
Australia, and comparable to and as comprehensive as sections 
4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the CEA and Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203.
     Section 286 of the Corporations Act requires firms to keep 
financial records that correctly record and explain its transactions, 
financial position and performance for 7 years after the transactions 
are completed.
     Section 988A of the Corporations Act requires AFSL 
licensees to keep financial records that correctly record and explain 
the transactions and financial position of the licensee's financial 
services business.
     Section 988E of the Corporations Act specifies a list of 
categories of information to be shown in the records of an AFSL 
licensee, including records of all money received or paid by the 
licensee; acquisitions and disposals of financial products, the charges 
and credits arising from them, and the names of the person acquiring or 
disposing of each of those products; all income from commissions, 
interest and other sources and all payments of interest, commissions 
and other expenses; and records pertaining to the securities or managed 
investment products that are the property of the licensee or held by 
the licensee for other persons.
     Corporations regulation 7.8.11 further specifies 
categories of information to be shown in records, including all 
financial products dealt with by the AFSL licensee under instructions 
from another person; and records pertaining to property held by the 
licensee for another person.
     Corporations regulation 7.8.12 further specifies 
categories of information to be shown in records, including separate 
particulars of every transaction by the AFSL licensee, the date of such 
transactions, and copies of acknowledgments of the receipt of financial 
products or documents of title to financial products.
    Part 2.3 of the ASIC Derivative Transaction Rules (Reporting) 2013 
places certain requirements on reporting entities (which includes the 
five SD ADIs as reporting entities from October, 1 2013). Specifically, 
Rule 2.3.1 requires reporting entities to keep records in relation to 
OTC derivatives transactions (including swaps) that enable the 
reporting entity to demonstrate it has complied with the Derivative 
Transaction Rules, and must keep the records for a period of at least 
five years from the date the record is made or amended. Reporting 
entities must also keep a record of all information that it is required 
to be reported under such rules.
    Rule 2.3.2 further requires a reporting entity to, on request by 
ASIC, provide ASIC within a reasonable time with records or other 
information relating to compliance with or determining whether there 
has been compliance with the Rules.
    Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the provisions 
of Australian law and regulations specified above are generally 
identical in intent to Sec. Sec.  23.201 and 23.203 because such 
provisions seek to ensure the effectiveness of the internal controls of 
SDs and MSPs, and transparency in the swaps market for regulators and 
market participants.
    In addition, the Commission finds that the provisions of Australian 
law and regulations specified above require SDs and MSPs to keep swap 
data in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities 
to understand an SD's or MSP's swaps business and to assess its swaps 
exposure.
    Finally, the Commission finds that the provisions of Australian law 
and regulations specified above, by requiring comprehensive records of 
swap data, seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk 
management, seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with 
applicable regulatory requirements (including the CEA and Commission 
regulations), and that such records facilitate effective regulatory 
oversight.
    Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, 
the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of Australian 
law and regulation with respect to swap data recordkeeping, as 
specified above, are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, Sec. Sec.  
23.201 and 23.203, with the exception of Sec.  23.203(b)(2) concerning 
the requirement that an SD or MSP make records required by Sec.  23.201 
open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United 
States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of Australian 
law or regulation upon which the Commission could make a finding that 
SDs and MSPs would be required to make records required by Sec.  23.201 
open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United 
States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential 
regulator.
    Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the 
requirements of Australian law and regulations are comparable to and as 
comprehensive as Sec.  23.203(b)(2), any SD or MSP to which both Sec.  
23.203 and the Australian law and regulations specified above are 
applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with Sec.  
23.203(b)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the Australian law and 
regulations specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement 
that it make records required by Sec.  23.201 open to inspection by any 
representative of the Commission, the United States Department of 
Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with 
Sec.  23.203(b)(2).

[[Page 78877]]

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 20, 2013, by the 
Commission.
Melissa D. Jurgens,
Secretary of the Commission.

Appendices to Comparability Determination for Australia: Certain 
Entity-Level Requirements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and 
Wetjen voted in the affirmative. Commissioner O'Malia voted in the 
negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioners 
Chilton and Wetjen

    We support the Commission's approval of broad comparability 
determinations that will be used for substituted compliance 
purposes. For each of the six jurisdictions that has registered swap 
dealers, we carefully reviewed each regulatory provision of the 
foreign jurisdictions submitted to us and compared the provision's 
intended outcome to the Commission's own regulatory objectives. The 
resulting comparability determinations for entity-level requirements 
permit non-U.S. swap dealers to comply with regulations in their 
home jurisdiction as a substitute for compliance with the relevant 
Commission regulations.
    These determinations reflect the Commission's commitment to 
coordinating our efforts to bring transparency to the swaps market 
and reduce its risks to the public. The comparability findings for 
the entity-level requirements are a testament to the comparability 
of these regulatory systems as we work together in building a strong 
international regulatory framework.
    In addition, we are pleased that the Commission was able to find 
comparability with respect to swap-specific transaction-level 
requirements in the European Union and Japan.
    The Commission attained this benchmark by working cooperatively 
with authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Switzerland to reach mutual agreement. The 
Commission looks forward to continuing to collaborate with both 
foreign authorities and market participants to build on this 
progress in the months and years ahead.

Appendix 3--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia

    I respectfully dissent from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's (``Commission'') approval of the Notices of 
Comparability Determinations for Certain Requirements under the laws 
of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and 
Switzerland (collectively, ``Notices''). While I support the narrow 
comparability determinations that the Commission has made, moving 
forward, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to 
harmonize our respective regimes consistent with the G-20 reforms.
    However, I cannot support the Notices because they: (1) Are 
based on the legally unsound cross-border guidance (``Guidance''); 
\1\ (2) are the result of a flawed substituted compliance process; 
and (3) fail to provide a clear path moving forward. If the 
Commission's objective for substituted compliance is to develop a 
narrow rule-by-rule approach that leaves unanswered major regulatory 
gaps between our regulatory framework and foreign jurisdictions, 
then I believe that the Commission has successfully achieved its 
goal today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Determinations Based on Legally Unsound Guidance

    As I previously stated in my dissent, the Guidance fails to 
articulate a valid statutory foundation for its overbroad scope and 
inconsistently applies the statute to different activities.\2\ 
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') states that the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over foreign activities unless 
``those activities have a direct and significant connection with 
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States * * *'' 
\3\ However, the Commission never properly articulated how and when 
this limiting standard on the Commission's extraterritorial reach is 
met, which would trigger the application of Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act \4\ and any Commission regulations promulgated thereunder 
to swap activities that are outside of the United States. Given this 
statutorily unsound interpretation of the Commission's 
extraterritorial authority, the Commission often applies CEA section 
2(i) inconsistently and arbitrarily to foreign activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
    \3\ CEA section 2(i); 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
    \4\ Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, because the Commission is relying on the legally 
deficient Guidance to make its substituted compliance 
determinations, and for the reasons discussed below, I cannot 
support the Notices. The Commission should have collaborated with 
foreign regulators to agree on and implement a workable regime of 
substituted compliance, and then should have made determinations 
pursuant to that regime.

Flawed Substituted Compliance Process

    Substituted compliance should not be a case of picking a set of 
foreign rules identical to our rules, determining them to be 
``comparable,'' but then making no determination regarding rules 
that require extensive gap analysis to assess to what extent each 
jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable based on overall outcomes of 
the regulatory regimes. While I support the narrow comparability 
determinations that the Commission has made, I am concerned that in 
a rush to provide some relief, the Commission has made substituted 
compliance determinations that only afford narrow relief and fail to 
address major regulatory gaps between our domestic regulatory 
framework and foreign jurisdictions. I will address a few examples 
below.
    First, earlier this year, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group 
(``ODRG'') agreed to a number of substantive understandings to 
improve the cross-border implementation of over-the-counter 
derivatives reforms.\5\ The ODRG specifically agreed that a 
flexible, outcomes-based approach, based on a broad category-by-
category basis, should form the basis of comparability 
determinations.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6678-13.
    \6\ http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/odrgreport.pdf. The ODRG agreed to six understandings. 
Understanding number 2 states that ``[a] flexible, outcomes-based 
approach should form the basis of final assessments regarding 
equivalence or substituted compliance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, instead of following this approach, the Commission has 
made its comparability determinations on a rule-by-rule basis. For 
example, in Japan's Comparability Determination for Transaction-
Level Requirements, the Commission has made a positive comparability 
determination for some of the detailed requirements under the swap 
trading relationship documentation provisions, but not for other 
requirements.\7\ This detailed approach clearly contravenes the 
ODRG's understanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The Commission made a positive comparability determination 
for Commission regulations 23.504(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), 
(b)(4), (c), and (d), but not for Commission regulations 
23.504(b)(5) and (b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, in several areas, the Commission has declined to 
consider a request for a comparability determination, and has also 
failed to provide an analysis regarding the extent to which the 
other jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable. For example, the 
Commission has declined to address or provide any clarity regarding 
the European Union's regulatory data reporting determination, even 
though the European Union's reporting regime is set to begin on 
February 12, 2014. Although the Commission has provided some limited 
relief with respect to regulatory data reporting, the lack of 
clarity creates unnecessary uncertainty, especially when the 
European Union's reporting regime is set to begin in less than two 
months.
    Similarly, Japan receives no consideration for its mandatory 
clearing requirement, even though the Commission considers Japan's 
legal framework to be comparable to the U.S. framework. While the 
Commission has declined to provide even a partial comparability 
determination, at least in this instance the Commission has provided 
a reason: the differences in the scope of entities and products 
subject to the clearing requirement.\8\ Such treatment creates 
uncertainty and is contrary to increased global harmonization 
efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Yen-denominated interest rate swaps are subject to the 
mandatory clearing requirement in both the U.S. and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, in the Commission's rush to meet the artificial deadline 
of December 21, 2013, as established in the Exemptive Order 
Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap

[[Page 78878]]

Regulations (``Exemptive Order''),\9\ the Commission failed to 
complete an important piece of the cross-border regime, namely, 
supervisory memoranda of understanding (``MOUs'') between the 
Commission and fellow regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 FR 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I have previously stated that these MOUs, if done right, can be 
a key part of the global harmonization effort because they provide 
mutually agreed-upon solutions for differences in regulatory 
regimes.\10\ Accordingly, I stated that the Commission should be 
able to review MOUs alongside the respective comparability 
determinations and vote on them at the same time. Without these 
MOUs, our fellow regulators are left wondering whether and how any 
differences, such as direct access to books and records, will be 
resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as I have consistently maintained, the substituted 
compliance process should allow other regulatory bodies to engage 
with the full Commission.\11\ While I am pleased that the Notices 
are being voted on by the Commission, the full Commission only 
gained access to the comment letters from foreign regulators on the 
Commission's comparability determination draft proposals a few days 
ago. This is hardly a transparent process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement071213b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unclear Path Forward

    Looking forward to next steps, the Commission must provide 
answers to several outstanding questions regarding these 
comparability determinations. In doing so, the Commission must 
collaborate with foreign regulators to increase global 
harmonization.
    First, there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and outcome 
of the MOUs. Critical questions regarding information sharing, 
cooperation, supervision, and enforcement will remain unanswered 
until the Commission and our fellow regulators execute these MOUs.
    Second, the Commission has issued time-limited no-action relief 
for the swap data repository reporting requirements. These 
comparability determinations will be done as separate notices. 
However, the timing and process for these determinations remain 
uncertain.
    Third, the Commission has failed to provide clarity on the 
process for addressing the comparability determinations that it 
declined to undertake at this time. The Notices only state that the 
Commission may address these requests in a separate notice at a 
later date given further developments in the law and regulations of 
other jurisdictions. To promote certainty in the financial markets, 
the Commission must provide a clear path forward for market 
participants and foreign regulators.
    The following steps would be a better approach: (1) The 
Commission should extend the Exemptive Order to allow foreign 
regulators to further implement their regulatory regimes and 
coordinate with them to implement a harmonized substituted 
compliance process; (2) the Commission should implement a flexible, 
outcomes-based approach to the substituted compliance process and 
apply it similarly to all jurisdictions; and (3) the Commission 
should work closely with our fellow regulators to expeditiously 
implement MOUs that resolve regulatory differences and address 
regulatory oversight issues.

Conclusion

    While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the 
Commission has made, it was my hope that the Commission would work 
with foreign regulators to implement a substituted compliance 
process that would increase the global harmonization effort. I am 
disappointed that the Commission has failed to implement such a 
process.
    I do believe that in the longer term, the swaps regulations of 
the major jurisdictions will converge. At this time, however, the 
Commission's comparability determinations have done little to 
alleviate the burden of regulatory uncertainty and duplicative 
compliance with both U.S. and foreign regulations.
    The G-20 process delineated and put in place the swaps market 
reforms in G-20 member nations. It is then no surprise that the 
Commission must learn to coordinate with foreign regulators to 
minimize confusion and disruption in bringing much needed clarity to 
the swaps market. For all these shortcomings, I respectfully dissent 
from the Commission's approval of the Notices.

[FR Doc. 2013-30974 Filed 12-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```