State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: March 12, 2015 519474 

________________________________

In the Matter SCOTT NAUGHTON,

Petitioner,

v OPINION AND JUDGMENT

THOMAS P. DiNAPOLI, as State

Comptroller, et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

Calendar Date: January 14, 2015

Before: Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ.

__________

Sherman, Federman, Sambur & McIntyre, New York City (Sean

Patrick Riordan of counsel), for petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E.

Storrs of counsel), for respondents.

__________

Peters, P.J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this

Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to

review a determination of respondent Comptroller which denied

petitioner's application for performance of duty disability

retirement benefits.

Petitioner, a correction officer, applied for performance

of duty disability retirement benefits alleging that he was

permanently incapacitated due to a work-related injury to his

right knee. The application was initially denied and petitioner

requested a hearing and redetermination. At the ensuing hearing,

petitioner testified that he injured his knee while involved in a

struggle to restrain an unruly inmate who had threatened another
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officer. According to petitioner's testimony, he and the other

officer were in the process of taking the inmate down to the

floor when he felt pain in his knee. In contrast, petitioner

signed a written report on the day of the incident that stated

that, after the other officer had taken down and restrained the

inmate, who had stopped resisting, he injured his knee when he

slipped as he was placing shackles on the inmate's legs.

Crediting the description of the incident in the written report

over petitioner's testimony, the Hearing Officer found that

petitioner failed to establish that his injury was the result of

an act of an inmate and upheld the denial of the application.

Respondent Comptroller adopted that determination, with

supplemental conclusions of law, and this CPLR article 78

proceeding ensued. 

Upon our review, we are mindful "that inconsistencies

between a petitioner's sworn testimony and written documents

present a credibility issue for the factfinder to resolve"

(Matter of Stimmer v DiNapoli, 98 AD3d 1216, 1217 [2012]; see

Matter of Ferguson v DiNapoli, 114 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2014], lv

denied 23 NY3d 901 [2014]). Thus, we defer to the Hearing

Officer's decision to credit the account of the incident set

forth in the contemporaneous written report over that testified

to by petitioner during the hearing. Yet, even accepting as true

the version of the event contained in the written report, the

record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination

that petitioner's injury was not "the natural and proximate

result of any act of any inmate" (Retirement and Social Security

Law § 607-c [a]). 

Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-c (a) provides, in

pertinent part, that performance of duty disability retirement

benefits shall be available to a correction officer "who becomes

physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of

duties . . . by, or as the natural and proximate result of[,] any

act of any inmate" (emphasis added). As we have repeatedly held,

the statute requires "that the petitioner demonstrate that his or

her injuries were caused by direct interaction with an inmate"

(Matter of Perry v DiNapoli, 88 AD3d 1047, 1048 [2011] [internal

quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Palmateer v

DiNapoli, 117 AD3d 1228, 1229 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 901
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[2014]; Matter of White v DiNapoli, 94 AD3d 1290, 1290 [2012];

Matter of Koziuk v New York State Comptroller, 78 AD3d 1458, 1459

[2010]).

Here, even accepting the version of the incident set forth

in the written reports, we find that such direct interaction was

present. Petitioner was injured while attempting to shackle an

inmate who, just seconds earlier, had been taken down to the

ground after violently threatening another correction officer.1

While respondents place great emphasis on the fact that,

according to the written report, the inmate had stopped resisting

when petitioner proceeded to shackle him, this is not a situation

where "any connection between the inmate's actions and

petitioner's injury was too attenuated to afford coverage under

the statute" (Matter of Allesandro v DiNapoli, 68 AD3d 1592, 1594

[2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 705 [2010]; compare Matter of Palmateer

v DiNapoli, 117 AD3d at 1230 [rejecting the petitioner's

contention that, inasmuch as he injured his knee while leaving

his desk to respond to a potential emergency involving inmates,

his injuries were the natural and proximate result of an act of

an inmate]; Matter of Davis v DiNapoli, 56 AD3d 933, 934 [2008]

[finding that the petitioner's injuries were not a natural and

proximate result of an act of an inmate where the petitioner

injured his neck when he "abruptly" stood to answer a phone call

signaling a potential altercation among inmates]; Matter of

Egiziaco v Office of Comptroller of State of N.Y., 15 AD3d 747,

748 [2005] [finding that a correction officer who slipped on ice

in a parking lot while transporting the paperwork of inmates who

had applied for furloughs was not injured as a natural and

proximate result of an act of an inmate]; Matter of Escalera v

Hevesi, 9 AD3d 666, 667 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 608 [2004]

[rejecting the petitioners' claim that the psychological injuries

1 In its determination, which was adopted by the

Comptroller, the Hearing Officer erroneously found that

"[petitioner] simply injured himself when he slipped after

placing shackles on the inmate's feet" (emphasis added). Neither

the testimony at the hearing nor any of the documentary evidence

supports a finding that petitioner was injured after he had

shackled the inmate. 
-4- 519474 

they allegedly suffered as a result of the arrests, suspensions,

negative publicity, trials and hearings that occurred following

certain inmates' accusations of sexual abuse were a proximate and

natural result of an act of an inmate]). To the contrary, the

injury producing event here – the shackling of the inmate –

occurred contemporaneously with, and flowed directly, naturally

and proximately from, the inmate's unruly and combative behavior

toward the other officer and his resistance to being restrained. 

Under these circumstances, there is simply no evidentiary basis

in the record to conclude that petitioner's injury was not the

natural and proximate result of an act of an inmate (see

Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-c [a]). 

Moreover, it is clear that the act of restraining a

combative and unruly inmate is precisely the type of activity

that was intended to trigger the protections afforded correction

officers by Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-c. The

legislative justification for the enactment of both Retirement

and Social Security Law §§ 507-b and 607-c – which provide

performance of duty disability retirement benefits to correction

officers employed by the Department of Corrections and Community

Supervision and county-employed correction officers, respectively

– was that "the increased inmate population of the state's prison

system created strain and tension, manifesting itself in an

increase in altercations among inmates and between inmates and

correction officers" (Matter of Kaler v DiNapoli, 86 AD3d 898,

899 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 808 [2012]; see Matter of Parish v

DiNapoli, 89 AD3d 1315, 1316-1317 [2011]; Senate Mem in Support,

1999 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2015-2016; Assembly Mem in

Support, 1996 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2655-2656). The

Legislature recognized that county-employed correction officers,

like those employed by the state, "serve in one of the most

dangerous aspects of the criminal justice system" and "are

constantly exposed to violence [and] assault" when called upon to

"arrest, detain, transport and house convicted criminals"

(Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1999, ch 639 at 5). The

statutes were thus "clearly intended to compensate correction

officers who, because of the risks created by their 'daily

contact with certain persons who are dangerous [and] profoundly

antisocial'" (Matter of Kaler v DiNapoli, 86 AD3d at 899, quoting

Governor's Mem approving L 1996, ch 722, 1996 McKinney's Session
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Laws of NY, at 1943; see Senate Mem in Support, 1999 McKinney's

Session Laws of NY, at 2015-2016), become permanently disabled as

a natural and proximate result of an act of an inmate (see

Retirement and Social Security Law §§ 507-b [a]; 607-c [a]). The

process of restraining an unruly inmate – irrespective of whether

such inmate momentarily stops resisting – presents the very risks

and dangers contemplated by the Legislature in providing

correction officers with the added protections contained in

Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-c.

Having determined that petitioner's injury was a natural

and proximate result of an act of an inmate, the matter must be

remitted for further proceedings on the issue of the permanency

of petitioner's alleged disability (see Retirement and Social

Security Law § 607-c [a]).

McCarthy, Garry and Rose, JJ., concur.

ADJUDGED that the determination is annulled, without costs,

petition granted to that extent, and matter remitted to

respondent Comptroller for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this Court's decision.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court