alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Harry Burgess, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered April 28, 1977, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him thereunder, is unanimously affirmed. The only error claimed on appeal is that two police officers testified that the eyewitness victim had identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and that this constituted "bolstering” under the rule of *People v Trowbridge*(305 NY 471). The evidence and reference to it in the summation were not objected to. In any event, in our view, the error was harmless. *668The identification was strong, positive, and made within minutes after the crime. No evidence at all was offered by defendant. While court and counsel should be careful to guard against impermissible bolstering, it would appear to us that such bolstering standing alone would rarely constitute reversible error except where there is a reasonable danger that the jury may take the officer's testimony, that the eyewitness victim identified the perpetrator, as a substitute for identification by the eyewitness victim, as for example, if the eyewitness identifier does not testify or if undue prominence is given to the bolstering testimony. Absent these considerations, it is hard to see how the defendant is prejudiced by the fact that a police officer says that the eyewitness victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator in a case where the police officer does not himself purport to identify the defendant as the perpetrator, and the eyewitness who makes the actual identification testifies at the trial that he made such identification and subjects himself to cross-examination. We note that in the present case nobody disputes the truth of the police officers' testimony that the eyewitness victim said that the defendant was the perpetrator; and of course the eyewitness’ own testimony that he made the out-of-court identification is expressly admissible. (CPL 60.30.) Concur—Silverman, J. P., Fein, Markewich, Lynch and Sullivan, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 26, 2016

a1017 

# Order

Clerk October 26, 2016

152943

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 152943

COA: 329182

Wayne CC: 11

- 002069

- FC

DEMETRIUS DARELL CLARK,

Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 19, 2015

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
214.408-1 General. ( b ) For acquisitions that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, if only one offer is received, follow the procedures at 215.371.
[77 FR 39138, June 29, 2012]
EXHIBIT 13.3





CONSENT OF EXPERT





I have reviewed the Annual Report of Avino Silver & Gold Mines Ltd. on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012, as amended, which includes information derived from my technical reports on the Property in the Durango Mining District of Mexico dated July 19, 2013 entitled "Technical Report on the Avino Property", and I concur that the information as set forth is an accurate summary of my reports. I further consent to the use in this Form 20-F of the reference to myself as an expert in the Annual Report.


TETRA TECH WARDROPDate: November 19, 2013

/s/Hassan GhaffariHassan Ghaffari, P.Eng.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                EXHIBIT 23.1(b)
 
                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
 
  As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference of our report included in this Form 10-K, into the Company's Form S-
8 Registration Statements filed on January 29, 1987 (Reg. No. 33-11627);
September 28, 1987 (Reg. No. 33-17359); March 17, 1988 (Reg. No. 33-20706);
June 30, 1989 (Reg. No. 33-29636); June 23, 1992 (Reg. No. 33-48663); and
April 30, 1996 (Reg. No. 333-03001); and S-3 Registration Statement filed on
August 16, 1996 (Reg. No. 333-10311).
 
/s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
 
Houston, Texas
February 8, 1999
Source: 6/2/21 Data from the PEPS Waiver Screen (pepsd109)

OPEID SCHNAME STATE ELIGIND CERTCD WAIVER_TYPE_CD WAIVER_TYPE_DESC

00301200 Ashland University OH Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

02063500 Coastline Community College CA Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00180000 Grace College and Theological Seminary IN Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

03002500 J.F. Ingram State Technical College AL Y P 03 Incarcerated Student

00576100 L. E. Fletcher Technical Community College LA Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00121700 Lassen College CA Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

03206300 Mesalands Community College NM Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00675600 Northshore Technical Community College LA Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00182400 Oakland City University IN Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00125900 Palo Verde College CA Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00110500 Shorter College AR Y C 03 Incarcerated Student

00954900 Western Texas College TX Y C 03 Incarcerated Student
209.571-4 Mitigation. ( a ) Mitigation is any action taken to minimize an organizational conflict of interest. Mitigation may require Government action, contractor action, or a combination of both.
( b ) If the contracting officer and the contractor have agreed to mitigation of an organizational conflict of interest, a Government-approved Organizational Conflict of Interest Mitigation Plan, reflecting the actions a contractor has agreed to take to mitigate a conflict, shall be incorporated into the contract.
( c ) If the contracting officer determines, after consultation with agency legal counsel, that the otherwise successful offeror is unable to effectively mitigate an organizational conflict of interest, then the contracting officer, taking into account both the instant contract and longer term Government needs, shall use another approach to resolve the organizational conflict of interest, select another offeror, or request a waiver in accordance with FAR 9.503 (but *see* statutory prohibition in 209.571-7, which cannot be waived).
( d ) For any acquisition that exceeds $1 billion, the contracting officer shall brief the senior procurement executive before determining that an offeror's mitigation plan is unacceptable.
[75 FR 81913, Dec. 29, 2010]
#### In the Matter of William Ryan, Respondent, v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant.

In a proceeding to compel the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation to accept, as timely filed, a notice of claim filed by the petitioner under an automobile accident insurance policy containing the usual indemnification endorsement against uninsured motorists required by statute (Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2-a), the MVAIC appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County: (1) an order dated September 24, 1962, which granted the application without a hearing; and (2) an order dated October 25, 1962, which denied MVAIC’s motion for reargument. Order of September 24, 1962 reversed on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to the Special Term, Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing and decision as to the timeliness of the notice of claim sought to be filed by the petitioner. No questions of fact have been considered. In our opinion a hearing is required to determine the factual issues here presented (see *Matter of MVAIC [Brown],*15 A D 2d 578). Appeal from order of October 25, 1962 denying reargument, dismissed, without costs, as academic and on the further ground that no appeal lies from such an order in any event. Kleinfeld, Acting P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
14 CFR §45.23 (B): Marking of the Aircraft 

The regulation requires: 

When marks include only the Roman capital letter “N” and 

the registration number is displayed on limited, restricted or 

light-sport category aircraft or experimental or provisionally 

certificated aircraft, the operator must also display on that 

aircraft near each entrance to the cabin, cockpit, or pilot 

station, in letters not less than 2 inches nor more than 6 

inches high, the words “limited,” “restricted”, “light-sport,” 

“experimental,” or “provisional,” as applicable. 

Even though the UAS will have no airworthiness certificate, 

an exemption may be needed as the UAS will have no 

entrance to the cabin, cockpit or pilot station on which the 

word “Experimental” can be placed. Given the size of the 

sUAV, two-inch lettering will be impossible. The word 

“Experimental” will be placed on the fuselage in compliance 

with §45.29 (f). 

The equivalent level of safety will be provided by having the 

sUAV marked on its fuselage as required by §45.29 (f) 

where the Pilot, Spotter (Observer) and others working with 

the sUAV will see the identification of the UAS as 

“Experimental.” The FAA has issued the following 

exemptions to this regulation to Exemptions Nos. 10700,

8738, 10167 and 10167A.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.0.3

Eastern Division

Anna Haney

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:12−cv−02729

Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan

Lockheed Martin Corporation, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, October 10, 2012:

 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sheila Finnegan: Telephonic status hearing held

on 10/10/2012 and continued to 10/24/2012 at 9:30 a.m. The parties report on the status of

the settlement documents. The status hearing will be cancelled if a stipulation to dismiss is

filed prior to the hearing. Mailed notice. (is, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          149794
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                            1899
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 86064
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     452552
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          460503
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            446703
<LOANS>                                        2004145
<ALLOWANCE>                                      23871
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3228541
<DEPOSITS>                                     2745110
<SHORT-TERM>                                    171676
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              29935
<LONG-TERM>                                      23711
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         49708
<OTHER-SE>                                      268401
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 3288541
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  82447
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                28577
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                  3301
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                114325
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               42398
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                4034
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            67893
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                     1789
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  58159
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  35112
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       35112
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     22918
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.92
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.92
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.71
<LOANS-NON>                                      11822
<LOANS-PAST>                                      4717
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   109
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  16762
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 24050
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     2248
<RECOVERIES>                                       280
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                23871
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             23871
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### Georgia Athletic Club *v.*City of Atlanta *et al.*

Beck, J.

Georgia Athletic Club brought its equitable petition against the City of Atlanta, the recorder, and the chief of police, seeking to enjoin the city and the said officers from further prosecuting a case made against one of petitioner’s officers in the municipal court, and from making other cases against petitioner, its officers, agents, and employees, for the violation of the ordinance of the city relative to locker-clubs, which required them to obtain a permit from • the city before commencing to operate a club as a locker-club. Petitioner alleged that it *177had paid the looker-club tax prescribed in § 933 of the Civil Code. It also alleged that the club-rooms had been furnished and fitted up as such for the use of its members, at great expense. The ordinance was attacked as invalid on numerous grounds, among others, that it violated certain provisions of the constitutions of the State of Georgia and of the United States. Among other defenses urged was the contention “that the alleged club, claimed to be operated by Gavaghan [the president of the club], is a mere subterfuge for the operation of a barroom or place at which intoxicants can be secured,” and that the defendants “deny that petitioner is a bona fide organization, but aver that they operate a place at which whisky is kept and at which whisky is sold, and that they have adopted this method which is the merest subterfuge to evade the law; and these defendants deny this is a bona fide locker-club in any respect.” Evidence was submitted, tending to establish the truth of that portion of the defendants’ answer which is specifically set out above, and authorizing the court to hold that this defense was true. *Eelcl:*

December 13, 1912.

Rehearing denied January 24, 1913.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. May 30, 1912.

*Gober, Jackson & Smith*and *Morris Macks,*for plaintiff.

*J. L. Maysoh*and *W. D. Ellis Jr.,*for defendants.

1. That, irrespective of the questions raised as to the validity of the ordinance for the violation of which the prosecutions have been instituted and are threatened, and as to whether the court should enjoin prosecutions under an ordinance in the nature of a criminal law, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the injunction.

2. The evidence rejected by the court was not of such materiality as to affect the real issue in the case.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank Nelson, Appellant.

Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County, ren dered on January 20, 1976 and April 7, 1977, respectively, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw is granted. (See *Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no meritorious points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Lane, Markewich and Lupiano, JJ.
#### UNION BANK OF BROOKLYN v. CASH.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 6, 1903.)

1. Evidence—Objection—Waiver.

Though evidence of an agreement relieving defendant from liability might have been objected to as varying a written instrument, it having been admitted without objection, is in the record for all purposes.

Appeal from City Court of New York.

Action by the Union Bank of Brooklyn against David K. Case individually and as trustee. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and BISCHOFF and BLANCHARD, JJ.

R. P. Orr, for appellant.

David K. Case, for respondent.

BLANCHARD, J.

This is an action upon a note which reads as follows:

> “§700. f New York, November'28, 1902.

> “Four months after date I promise to pay to the order of myself seven hundred dollars at Union Bank of Brooklyn, New York.

> “Value received. Charles R. Porterfield.”

> Indorsed: “Charles R. Porterfield, Mary Augusta Nott, and Charles R. Porterfield, David K. Case, as Trustee.” ,

The plaintiff introduced the note in evidence and rested. The defendant, Case, took the stand in his own behalf, and testified without objection to an agreement between the Kings County Bank, plaintiff’s *551predecessor, and himself, the effect of which agreement was to relieve the defendant, Case, from any individual liability, and likewise from liability as trustee, except under certain conditions.

We fail to find any error in the submission of the case to the jury. It may be that, had the evidence introduced been objected to as tending to relieve the defendant, Case, as trustee, from liability in contravention of the terms of the note itself, it might have been error to have admitted it for all purposes, but that contingency is not here presented. The evidence is in the record for all purposes, and as the record stands we fail to find any error.

The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED NO VEMBER 15 , 2018

NO. 03

- 17

- 00807

- CR

Christopher Lynn Newberry, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 403RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUS TICE ROSE, JUSTICES FIELD AND TOTH

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction r en d ered by the trial court. Having reviewed

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

judgment . Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction

. Because

appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 11 (Tuesday, January 19, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 5252]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-01043]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--MLCommons Association

    Notice is hereby given that on January 5, 2021 pursuant to Section 
6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 
15 U.S.C. Section 4301 et seq (the ``Act''), MLCommons Association 
(``MLCommons'') has filed written notifications simultaneously with the 
Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in 
its membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of 
extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust 
plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. 
Specifically, Landing AI, Palo Alto, CA; Lingjie Xu (individual 
member), San Jose, CA; Neuchips Corporation, Hsinchu, TAIWAN; VerifAI 
Inc., Palo Alto, CA; CTUNING FOUNDATION, Cachan, FRANCE; VMind 
Technologies, Inc., San Francisco, CA; Poonam Yadav (individual 
member), York, UNITED KINGDOM; Relja Markovic (individual member), 
Bothell, WA; Emily Potyraj (individual member), Houston, TX; Tom St. 
John (individual member), Mountain View, CA; Debojyoti Dutta 
(individual member), Santa Clara, CA; Hanlin Tang (individual member), 
San Francisco, CA; and LSDTech, Seoul, KOREA have joined as parties to 
this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open and MLCommons intends to file additional 
written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.
    On September 15, 2020, MLCommons filed its original notification 
pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice 
published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of 
the Act on September 29, 2020 (85 FR 61032).

Suzanne Morris,
Chief, Premerger and Division Statistics, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2021-01043 Filed 1-15-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P
EXHIBIT 23.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS




Board of Directors


Sparta Commercial Services, Inc.





As independent registered certified public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-159166) of our reports, which include an explanatory paragraph regarding the substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern, dated August 13, 2009, August 13, 2010, August 15, 2011 and August 14, 2012 included in Sparta Commercial Services, Inc.’s Annual Reports on Form 10K for the years ended April 30, 2009, April 30, 2010, April 30, 2011 and April 30, 2012, respectively, and to all references to our Firm under the caption “Experts” appearing in the Registration Statement.





/s/RBSM LLP





New York, NY


October 30, 2012
EXHIBIT
      23.1












**Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**








We
      have
      issued our report dated March 30, 2007, accompanying the consolidated financial
      statements included in the Annual Report of Access Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on
      Form
      10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006. We hereby consent to the
      incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements of
      Access Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on Form S-1 (File Nos. 333-125349 and 333-135734),
      Form S-3 (File Nos. 333-92210, 333-39330, 333-37786, 333-52030,
      333-95413, 333-64904 and 333-113909) and on Form S-8 (File
      Nos. 333-45646 333-75136, 333-125796 and 333-114269).










/s/
      Whitley Penn LLP





Dallas,
      Texas


March
      30,
      2007