PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 16

- 2644

_______________

ANTHONY ALLEN, for himself and as parent of A.A.; TODD BENNETT, for himself and as a parent of E.B.; SCOTT EDELGLASS; SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself

and as p arent of A.F. and J.F.; WERNER GRAF, for himself

and as parent of A.G. and A.G.; KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as p arent of A.H.;

SA MIR JOSHI, for himself and as parent of J.J., J.J. and J.J.; YEHUDA B. LITTON; SURENDER MALHAN, for himself and as parent of E.M. and V.M.; CARLY OLIVIER, for himself and as parent of M.O.; ANTONIO QUINLAN, for himself and as parent of K.Q.; ZIA SHAIKH, fo r himself and as parent of M.S., S.S., and H.S. for themselves and on behalf

of all others similarly situated

v.

LAWRENCE DEBELLO; TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN DELANEY; JAMES M. DEMARZO; MADELIN EINBINDER; MARLENE LYNCH FORD; CHRISTOPHER GARENGER; LAWRENCE JO NES; SEVERIANO

LIS BO A; ANTHONY MASSI; JOHN TOMASELLO; SHERRI SCHWEITZER; NANCY SIVILLI; MAUREEN SOGLUIZZO; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; MICHELLE M.2 SMITH, in her official capacity as Clerk, Superior Court o f New Jersey; JOHN L. CALL, JR., in his official capaci ty as Presiding Judge Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County; CATHERINE L. FITZPATRICK; LISA THORTON; PATRICIA B. ROE, in her official capacity as Presiding Judge, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean

County

(D.C. No. 3 : 14

- cv

- 00760)

A NTHONY ALLEN for himself and as parent of A.A.; TODD BENNETT, for himself and as parent of E.B.; SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself and a s p arent of A.F. and J.F.; KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as pa rent of A.H. ; CARLY OLIVIER

, for himself and as parent of M.O.;

ZIA SHAIKH

, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S. and

H.S. for themselves and on behalf of all other similarly

situated

v.

TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN DELANEY; JAMES DEMARZO; MADELIN EINBINDER , LAWRENCE JONES, SEVERIANO LISBOA; JOHN TOMASELLO; SHERRI SCHWEITZER, NANCY SIVILLI AND

MAUREEN SOGLUIZZO

(D.C. No. 3 : 15

- cv

- 03519)

Anthony Allen; Todd

Bennett ; Scott Edelglass;3 Sharir Feldman; Werner Grag; Karl Hagberg; Clifton Hill; Samir Joshi;

Yehu da B. Litton; Surender Malhan; Carly Olivier; Antonio Quinlan; Zia Shaikh, Appellants

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey ( D.C. N os. 3 : 14

- cv

- 00760 & 3 : 15

- cv

- 03519 ) District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

_______________

Argued November 17, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTE S

, Circuit

Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 27, 2017 )4 Paul A. Clark , Esq. [ARGUED]

Suite 1N

10 Huron Avenue Jersey City, NJ 07306

Attorney for Appellant

s

Daniel J. Kelly, Esq. Eric S. Pasternack, Esq. Akeel A. Qureshi, Esq. Benjamin H. Zieman, Esq. [ARGUED] Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

P.O. Box 112
25 Market Street

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorneys for Appellee s

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge

.

In this case, Plaintiffs, fathers of minor children in New Jersey, challenge the state law governing ch ild custody proceedings between New Jersey parents. Seeking dramatic changes in the way New Jersey conducts these proceedings, Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the “best interest s5 of the child” standard that New Jersey courts use to determine

c ustody in a dispute between two fit parents is

unconstitutional

. To bring about their desired changes

, Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act against state court judges who presided over their custody disputes, and se ek declaratory and injunctive relief : a declaration that the challenged standards and practices are unconstitutional and unlawful, and an enforceable injunction against their use

. But before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments, we first answer a

t hreshold question: whether these state court judges are proper defendants in this Section 1983 suit.

I. Factual Background

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey’s family courts have unconstitutionally deprived them of custody of their children and have unconstitutionally interfered with their fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children without a full hearing

, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

In addition to raising the “best interests of the child”6 po int identified above, 1 Plaintiffs allege that their parental rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or temporarily separated from their children

, by order of the New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to counsel, or a pl enary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to present evidence or cross

- examine. They allege that New Jersey state court policy, authorized by the New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division, denies parents a plenary hearing when one parent loses custo dy to the other
parent. Plaintiffs further assert that although mothers and

fathers are

, in theory

, treated equally in custody disputes under New Jersey law, i n practice courts favor mothers

. Additionally, they assert that New Jersey discriminates against indigent parents by failing to provide them with counsel in a divorce proceeding or other inter

- parent dispute that results in a loss of custody. In short

, as the District Court explained,

Plaintiffs interpret the United States Constitution as requiring th at when parents divorce or separate, each parent has a fundamental right to automatically receive 50

-

1 Plaintiffs assert that a court should not deprive a parent of his rights unless the court finds exceptional circumstances or unfitness, which Plaintiffs allege is ak in to the standard New Jersey cour ts use in determining whether to deprive a parent of custody in a dispute between a parent and non

- parent. Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey courts should use the same standard when evaluating a dispute between two parents. They allege that using separate standard s denied them the equal protection of the law.7 50 custody of his or her children, and that courts are limited to ordering a different custody arrangement only upon a finding, by clear and convincing evi dence, in a plenary hearing (and with a right to counsel for both parents), that one of the parents abuses or neglects the child or is otherwise an unfit parent. 2

This interpretation would , in the words of the District Court, “dramatically change the lega l landscape of New Jersey and the laws governing child custody proceedings between parents.” 3

Plaintiffs br ing suit under Section 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act 4 against New Jersey state court judges. 5 They s eek declaratory and injunctive relief re quiring

Defendants to , among other things, provide a plenary hearing within ten days to any parent who has his right to the care, custody

, and control of his children reduced through state

action.

B. New Jersey’s Custody Regime

Plaintiffs challenge the New Jersey state statute

2 A46.

3 Id.

4 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

5 Plaintiffs initially sued other defendants, including the State of New Jersey, but those defendants were dismissed on bases that are not appealed here.8 instituting the best interest s of the child standard 6 and the New Jersey courts ’ policy on plenary hearings in custody disputes, which has not been codified by statute but instead developed in the state case law. 7 Under this case law, a plenary hearing is not required in every contested motion in New Jersey state court; a trial judge has discretion to decide such a motion without a hearing. 8 “It is only where the affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and t hat the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful in deciding such factual issues, that a plenary hearing is required.” 9

6 See Hand v. Hand , 917 A.2d 269, 271 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“Custody issues are resolved using a best interests analysis that gives weight to the factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 9:2

- 4(c).”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2

- 4 ( setting out such factors and providing that “ [t] he court shall order any custody arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless it is contrary to the best interests of the child.”).

7 On appeal, Plaintiffs allege that they “do not seek to have any statute declared unconstitutional.” Plaintif fs’ Brief at 4.

How ever, this contention is inconsistent with the operative complaint, in which they do challenge the constitutionality of

the best interest of the child statute.

8 Shaw v. Shaw , 351 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).

9 Id

. ; s e e also Lepis v. Lepis , 416 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1980) (“We therefore hold that a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary . . . . Without such a standard, courts would be obligated to hold hearings on every modification application.”).9 II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“Because this case comes to u s upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” 10 Our review of the gran t of a motion to dismiss is plenary. 11 However, to the extent the denial of declaratory relief was discretionary, we review for abuse of

discretion. 12

Before the District Court, the state d efendants asserted that Plaintiffs’ suit improperly attempts to app eal concluded and pending s tate court proceedings

— their final and ongoing

divorce and c ustody proceedings

— and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker

- Feldman

doctrine. 13 The District Court found that Rooker

- Feldman did not apply, because Plaintiffs do not challenge the state court custody decisions themselves, but instead the policies underlying those decisions. Defendants do not raise this

10 James v. City of Wilkes

- Barre , 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).

11 Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Grp., Inc. , 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005).

12 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995);
Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co. , 852 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2017)

. 13 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923)

.10 doctrine on appeal, but because we have a continuing obligation to determine for ourselves whether subject matter jurisdiction is or was in question, 14 we consider the doctrine’s application to this suit.

Rooker

- Feldman prohibits a federal court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by

state

- court losers complai ning of injuries caused by state

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court revi ew and rejection of those judgments.” 15 A s both we and the Supreme Court have explained, the doctrine has narrow applic ability. Rooker

Feldman does not bar suits that challenge actions or injuries underlying state court decisions

— and especially those that predate entry of a state court decision

— rather than the

decisions themselves. 16 Four requirements must be met in

14 Bracken v. Matgouranis , 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2002).

15 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi B asic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

16 See Skinner v. Switzer

, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (finding

that Rooker

- Feldman did not bar jurisdiction because “Skinner does not challenge the adverse [state court] decisions themselves; instead, he targets as unconstitutional the Texas statute they authoritatively cons trued”); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To the contrary, when the source of the injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state

court

. ”).11 order f or Rooker

- Feldman to bar suit: “ (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state

- court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviti ng the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” 17

In line with th ese decision s , our Circuit previously

found that Rooker

- Feldman did not bar suit in B.S. v. Somerset County , whose facts were similar to those in the
present case

. 18 In B.S.

, a mother sued after Somerset County
Children and Youth Services obtained an order from a Pennsylvania state court judge transferring custody of her daughter to her father. We held that “[b]ecause the injury

Mother claims is likewise traceable to [the defen dants’] actions, as opposed to the state court orders those actions allegedly caused, we reject [the defendants’] contention that

the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction.” 19

Like in B.S. , Plaintiffs here are not challengi ng the state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed those judgments : the alleged policy of the New Jersey s tate

c ourts of stripping parents of custody, in favor of the other
parent s , without a plenary hearing and employing an allegedly im proper best

- interest s

- of

- the

- child standard in such

17 Great W. Mining , 615 F.3d at 166 (internal citations

, quotation marks, and alterations removed).

18 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013)

. 19 Id. at 260.12 proceedings

. Thus, Rooker

- Feldman does not bar suit. 20

III. Discussion

Plaintiff s challenge the two orders of the District C ourt granting the Defendants’ successive motion s to dismiss on

two bases. 21 First, t hey appeal the District C ourt’s decision

that Defendants were not proper parties to a suit brought

under Section 1983. Second, they argue that the District Court should have granted them declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that j urisdiction under the

Act is co

- extensive with jurisdiction under Article III. 22

A. Are Defendant Judges Properly Sued under
Section 1983?

“It is a well

- settled principle of law that judges are

20 Younger abstention , which requires federal abstention in limited cases involving parallel state proceedings, and the domestic relations exception also do not bar review of this case, for the same reasons cited by the District C ourt. See
A19

- 21 (domestic relations exception); A21

- 24 ( Younger abstention).

21 The second motion was technically granted in part , but then became final when remaining claims were resolved.

22 In addition to responding to Plaintiffs’ argument s, Defendants ask us to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ complaint and find that on the merits Plaintiffs’ claims would

not survive a motion to dismiss. We note, however, that t he
District Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims

because it dismissed the complai nt on procedural grounds.13 generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.’” 23 Although the Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Allen held that judicial immunity was not a bar to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief under Section 1983

, 24 following this decision, in 1996

, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, amending Section 1983 with the intent to
overrule Pulliam

. 25 The amended Section 1983 clarifies that

“ injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ” The amended language “does not expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief against judges. Instead, it implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is available i n some circumstances, and then limits the availability of injunctive relief to circumstances in which declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate .” 26

Two key Third Circuit cases address whether judges are proper parties to a Section 1983 suit: Reynolds 27 and

23 Figueroa v. Blackburn , 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam)).

24 466 U.S. 522, 540

- 42 (1984).

25 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds , 201 F.3d 194,

19 7

- 8 (3d Cir . 2000).

26 Id. at 197

- 98 ; see also id. at 198 (“The language is not an express authorization of declaratory relief, but simply a recognition of its availability or unavailability, depending on the circumstances, whic h the statute does not delineate.”).

27 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds , 201 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2000).14 Georgevich

. 28 These cases apply a test borrowed from the

First Circuit ’ s seminal case on this subject, In re Justices

. 29

Under the In re Justice s test , a judge who acts as a neutral and impartial arbiter of a statute is not a proper defendant to a Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the

statute . This is because “[j] udges sit as arbiters without a personal or institutional stake on either side of [a]

. . . controversy ” and they “ have played no role in [a] statute ’ s enactment, they have not initiated its enforcement, and they do not even have an institutional interest in following their prior decisions (if any) concerning its const itutionality if an authoritative contrary legal determination has subsequently

28 Georgevich v. Strauss , 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) . Section 1983 was amended between the issuance of

our decision s in Georgevich and Reynolds . However, Reynolds cited and d istinguished Georgevich with no mention
that the Section 1983 amendments had called part of its holding into question . Thus, we continue to apply its holding. In any event, Plaintiffs do not persuasively argue that injunctive and declaratory relief warrant different “proper party” treatment under the amended § 1983

. See Wolfe v.
Strankman , 392 F.3d 358, 36 5

- 66 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing
whether judicial

- capacity judges were appropriate § 1983 defendants in a suit seeking “prospective injunctive and

declarat ory relief”).

29 In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico , 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982). Although In re Justices was decided

before Pulliam and before the 1996 amendment to Section 1983, we have continued to adopt and apply its test. See Reynolds , 201 F.3d at 198.15 been made .” 30 However, a judge who acts as an enforcer or

administrator of a statute can be sued under Section 1983 for declaratory or (if declaratory relief is unavailable) inju nctive

relief. 31

30 Id. at 21; s ee also id. at 25 (“ To require the Justices unnecessarily to assume the role of advocates or partisans on these issues would tend to undermine their role as judges. To encourage or even force them to participate as defendants i n a federal suit attacking Commonwealth laws would be to require them to abandon their neutrality and defend as constitutional the very laws that the plaintiffs insist are

unconstitutional

— laws as to which their judicial responsibilities place them in a ne utral posture. Indeed, a public perception of partiality might well remain even were the Justices to take no active part in the litigation. The result risks harm to the court's stance of institutional neutrality

— a harm that appeal would come too late to re pair. ”).

31 See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of Am. , Inc.

, 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs could sue judges in their enforcement capacities to enjoin them from enforcing bar membership requirements that the judges themselves promulga ted); In re Justices , 695 F.2d at 23 (“In Consumers Union, unlike the case before us, the requirements under attack were promulgated by the judges themselves in the form of court rules; the judges had acted in a legislative capacity,
which made their invol vement in the litigation more direct and which gave them an institutional stake in the litigation’s outcome. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court

in Consumers Union

. . . treated the judicial defendants as having acted in a nonadjudicatory (enforcement) capacity.”).16 In Georgevich and Reynolds

, we have twice applied

the In re Justices test to determine whether state court judges could face suit under Section 1983, coming to two different outcomes based on the role and authority of the state court judg es. In Georgevich

, we held that state court judges who

were administrators of the parole power under state statutes

were proper parties to a Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of those statutes. 32 In so holding, we observed that “[t]he Penn sylvania statutory arrangement divides the authority to make parole decisions between the sentencing judges and the Board. ” 33 Thus, there was “ no basis for distinguishing the role of the sentencing judges from that

of the Board ” and “ no reason why the Board , but not the judges, may be sued on a similar challenge.” 34

In Reynolds

, on the other hand

, we found state court judges who had committed minors to involuntary drug and

alcohol treatment services

, as set forth by a state statute authorizing this commitmen t

, to be improper defendants to a suit for declaratory relief challenging the co nstitutionality of
the statute. We considered these judges to be neutral adjudicators, not enforcers or administrators of the statute. 35

As the judges did not initiate the proce edings under the

32 Georgevich , 772 F.2d at 1087 (“This is not a case in which judges are sued in their judicial capacity as neutral adjudicators of disputes . . . . Rather, the judges are sued as enforcers of the statutes, in other words as admi nistrators of the parole power. ” ).

33 Id. at 1088.

34 Id.

35 Reynolds , 201 F.3d at 199.17 statute and were required to appoint counsel for the minor s and order an assessment of each minor’s alleged drug and/or alcohol dependency , we held that “[t]he judge ’ s position in

the

. . . proceeding is simply not adverse to that of the

m inor

. ” 36 We further explained that the informality of the

process “ [did] not alter the position of the judges as neutral

arbiters

. ” 37 We explicitly distinguished Georgevich : “although in Georgevich we held the judges amenable to suit under § 1983, our decisi on nevertheless recognized the impropriety of such suits wh ere the judge acted as an adjudicator rather than an enforcer or administrator of a
statute.” 38

Thus, the qu estion here is whether, as the D istrict

C ourt found, the state court judges sued here ar e neutral arbiters of the New Jersey custody statute and its policies like the judges in Reynolds

, or if instead they have enough latitude

under the statu t e and policies that they become enforcers like the judge defendants in Georgevich

. The answer is not clearly decided by our case law, as the proceedings at issue here do not have all of the same protections as those in Reynolds

— mainly

, the mandatory appointment of counsel.

Decisions from our sister Circuits applying the In Re

Justices test help to clarif y. In Grant v. Johnson

, 39 the Ninth Circuit found that a judge had acted in his adjudicative capacity by appointing a guardian for a per son deemed

36 Id.

37 Id. at 200.

38 Id. at 199.

39 15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1994).18 mentally incompetent

. Although the proceeding did not require notice or hearing , it was initiated by a third p arty (in this case, the plaintiff’s former husband) and was not initiated by the judge himself

. Because the judge had acted in his adjudicative capacity, he was not a proper party to the suit

.

In Bauer v. Texas

, 40 the plaintiff sued the presiding judge of a probate court in his official capacity, seekin g declaratory judgment under Section 1983 that Section 875 of
the Texas Probate Code was unconstitutional. That Texas statute permitted the court to appoint a temporary guardian for an incapacitated person af ter three conditions were satisfied: 1) there was substantial evidence establishing probable cause, 2) an attorney was appointed to represent the incapacitated person, and 3) notice was given and a hearing

was held . The Fifth Circuit found that “judicial

d eterminations [under] section 875 are . . . clearly within a judge ’ s adjudicatory capacity, as this statute requires notice and a hearing, among other safeguards and limitations.” 41

Like in Grant , t he Fifth Circuit further noted that the Texas

court did not initiate the request for temporary guardianship. 42 Thus, it found that the state court judge was not a proper party

to the suit. 43

The First Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a suit

40 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003).

41 Id. at 360

- 61.

42 Id. at 361.

43 That decision ultimately rested its conclusion on Article III grounds, finding that there was no case or controversy, but
is nonetheless relevant to our discussion.19 even more similar to the present case, Nollet v. Justices of the

Tria l Court of the Co mmonwealth of Massachusetts

. 44 In
Nollet , men who were litigants in domestic relations and/or abuse prevention matters in the trial courts of Massachusetts

sued state court judges under Section 1983

, seeking

de claratory and injunctive relie f . They objected to state statutes that permitted the granting of temporary restraining orders at ex parte hearings

. 45 In spite of the “wide latitude”

the state statute s gave the state court judges “in fashioning the conditions of both temporary and permane nt restraining

orders

, ” the judges were found to have acted in their adjudicatory capacity, “because the statute neither confers upon them the power to initiate actions, nor does it delegate to them any administrative functions.” 46

In this case, because we conclude that the judicial
defendants have acted in an adjudicatory capacity and not in an enforcement capacity, they are not proper defendants. To be sure, the best

- interest s

- of

- the

- child standard statute gives state court judges broad discretion to dete rmine a custody

situation . S tate court judges also have broad discretion to

decide motion s on the papers under New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division precedent. However, like in Reynolds

, Grant

, Bauer , and Nollet

, the state court judges

themselves do not have any right to initiate the se action s

. Instead, a parent must initiate a custody dispute. Nor were the state court judges here given any administrative function.

44 83 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Mass.), aff ’ d , 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000) (unpublished per curiam table decision).

45 Id. at 206.

46 Id. at 211

.20 Moreover, t he state court judges did not promulgate either the statutes or the judi cial standards to which the Plaintiffs object. Furthermore, where the judge determines that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact relating to the custody dispute, a plenary hearing must be held , providing Plaintiffs

with additional procedural safe guards

. Thus , this case is more

similar to Reynolds than Georgevich . Accordingly, the

Defendants here are not proper parties to this action under
Section 1983 for declaratory or injunctive relief

. 47 48

B. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Failing t o Exercise Jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act?

Plaintiffs argue that even if the District Court

determined that declaratory relief was unavailable under Section 1983, the District Court should have separately determined whether declaratory re lief was available under the

47 Because we determine that the judges were not proper
Section 1983 defendants for declaratory or injunctive relief

, we need not reach or comment upon the District Court’s separate “available remedy at law” basis for denying injunctive relief

. 48 Plaintiffs argue that it was error for the District Court to dismiss the defendant judges as improper parties without specifying the “appropriate enforcement official” that would

be a proper defendant to the action. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 26.

But Plaint iffs do not offer any support for the assertion that the District Court was required to assist them in this way or

otherwise to litigate on their behalf by identifying possible

defendants to sue.21 Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs argue that their case presents an Article III case or controversy, 49 and that Article III jurisdiction and Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction are

co

- extensive

. 50 Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the In Re Justices test does not apply to declaratory relief under the Act

— that

the Act offers declaratory relief that is broader than that
available under Section 1983. 51 Plaintiffs further argue that the District Court erred in not considering the requir ed factors before declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. 52

The Declaratory Judgment Act states, in relevant part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate p leading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be

49 Like the District Court and the First Circuit in In Re

Jus tices , we decline to rest dismissal of this case on Article III grounds. See In re Justices , 695 F.2d at 22 (“[W]e are reluctant to rest our decision directly on Article III when the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”).

50 Plaintiffs’ Brief at 28 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 126

- 27 (2007) and Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)

, for the proposition that the phrase “case of actual controversy” in the
Act refers to those “Cases” and “Controvers ies” that are justiciable under Article III).

51 Id. at 29

- 30.

52 Id. at 30.22 sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree

and shall be reviewable as such. 53

Given “[t]he statute’s textual commitment to discretion, and the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to suggest,” district courts “possess discretion in determining

whether and when to entertain an action under the

Declara tory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.” 54 Both the Supreme Court and our Court have established certain

non

- exhaustive factors that , in an ordinary case, guide a
district court’s decision to ex ercise jurisdiction under the

Act. 55 Appellate courts review these discretionary

determinations for abuse of discretion. 56

53 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a)

. 54 Wilton , 515 U.S. at 282, 286

- 87 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. , 316 U.S. 491 (1942)); see also id. at 287 (“When all is said and done . . . the propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” ( internal citations and quotations omitted) )

. 55 Id

. at 283 , 289

- 90 ; Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp. , 751 F.3d 129, 138 (3d Cir. 2014)

. 56 Wilton , 515 U.S. at 289; s ee also Reifer , 751 F.3d at 140 (“ Brillhart and Wilton stand for at least two broad principles: (1) that federal courts have substantial dis cretion to decide whether to exercise DJA jurisdiction, and (2) that this discretion is bounded and reviewable.”).23 T he Declaratory Judgment Act d oes not , however, provide an independent basis for subject

- matter jurisdiction; it merely defines a reme dy. 57 The District Court thus properly

understood that the Act d oes not render the state court judges appropriate defendants for declaratory reli ef , and the District

Court properly applied the In re Justices test to Plaintiffs’

claims for declaratory relief . Because it correctly determined that the Defendants were not properly sued in this action, it
did not need to consider whether to exercise its discretion using the factors we and the Supreme Court have articulated

.

57 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“Congress enlarged the range of remedies

available in the federal court s but did not extend their jurisdiction.”); Auto

- Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc.

, 835 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not itself create an independent basis for federal jurisdiction but instead provides a remedy for

controversies othe rwise properly within the court’ s subject matter jurisdiction”); Ne. Dep’ t ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund , 764 F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Congress did not intend the

F ederal Decl aratory Judgment Act . . . to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts

. ”). We note that the Act, which dates from 1934, see Steffel v. Thompson , 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974) , has been in effect for all of the “ appropriate
defendant” decisions that we now rely on.24 IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reaso ns, w e will affirm the judgment

of the District Court.