alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




         We  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 33-36004) of Public Storage,  Inc.,  formerly Storage
Equities,  Inc.,  pertaining  to the 1990 Stock  Option Plan,  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No.  33-55541)  pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan,
the Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No.  333-13463)  pertaining to the 1996
Stock Option and Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No.
333-75327)  pertaining  to the  1994  Share  Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-50270) pertaining to the PS 401(k)/Profit Sharing
Plan, the Registration  Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-52400)  pertaining to the
2000   Non-Executive/Non-Director   Stock  Option  and   Incentive   Plan,   the
Registration   Statement  on  Form  S-8  (333-59218)   pertaining  to  the  2001
Non-Executive/Non-Director  Stock Option and  Incentive  Plan and the 2001 Stock
Option  and  Incentive  Plan,  the  Registration  Statement  on  Form  S-3  (No.
333-81041) and in the related prospectus, the Registration Statement on Form S-4
(No.  333-86899) and in the related  prospectus,  the Registration  Statement on
Form S-4 (No.  333-84126)  and in the related  prospectus,  in the  Registration
Statement  on Form S-3  (No.  333-101425)  and in the  related  Prospectus,  the
Registration  Statement  on  Form  S-4  (No.  333-103190)  and  in  the  related
prospectus,  the Registration  Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-115660) and in the
related prospectus,  and the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-130137)
and in the related  prospectus of our report dated March 10, 2006,  with respect
to  the  consolidated  financial  statements  and  related  financial  statement
schedule of Public Storage,  Inc., Public Storage, Inc. management's  assessment
of the  effectiveness  of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  and the
effectiveness  of internal  control over financial  reporting of Public Storage,
Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31,
2005.

                                                               ERNST & YOUNG LLP

March 15, 2006
Los Angeles, California


                                   Exhibit 23
#### Helena Bowler, Respondent, v. Robert Metrick Co., Inc., Appellant.

— In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injury, defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 18,1962 after trial, upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed, with costs. In our opinion, on this record a question of fact was presented for the jury’s determination as to whether the defendant exercised reasonable care in supervising its premises *(Finch*v. *Bohaeh Go.,*11 A D 2d 1064, affd. 9 N Y 2d 952). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-1545

___________________________ Katherine Jacobs lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Johnson Storage & Moving Co. Holdings, LLC lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________ Submitted: November 6, 2020 Filed: November 12, 2020 [Unpublished]

____________ Before ERICKSON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Katherine Jacobs appeals after the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in this action under, inter alia, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the

1 The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.Missouri Minimum Wage Law. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’

arguments on appeal, we find no basis for reversal. See Banks v. John Deere & Co., 829 F.3d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO JOSUE IRAHETA

- LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 73026 Agency No. A205

- 513

- 353

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 9, 2020 * * Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. Mario Josue Iraheta

- Lopez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under th e Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 13 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 15

- 73026

the agency’s factual findings. Garcia

- Milian v. Holder , 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny in part and grant in part the peti tion for review, and we
remand. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Iraheta

- Lopez failed to establish a protected ground was or would be one central reason for the harm he experienced or fears in El Salvador

. See Ayala v. Holder , 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on
account of his membership in such group”); Parussimova v. Mukasey , 555 F.3d 734, 7 40 (9th Cir. 2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”)

. Thus,
Iraheta

- Lopez’s asylum claim fail s
. As to withholding of removal, the agency did not have the benefit of Barajas

- Romero v. Lynch , 846 F.3d 351 , 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the “one central reason” standard applies to asylum but not withholding of removal). Thus, we grant the petition for review and remand Iraheta

- Lopez’s withholding of removal claim to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. See INS v. Ventura , 537 U.S. 12, 16

- 18 (2002) (per curiam). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Iraheta

- Lopez failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or3 15

- 73026

with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See Wakkary v. Holder , 558 F.3d 1049, 1067

- 68 (9th Cir. 2009) (no likelihood of torture).
Iraheta

- Lopez’ s removal is stayed pending a decision by the BIA. The government must bear the costs for this petition for review. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;
REMANDED.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-40067

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS SAN MIGUEL-CRUZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-96-CR-236-1

- - - - - - - - - -

October 23, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jesus San Miguel-Cruz appeals his guilty-plea conviction and

sentence for reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2). He argues that he was charged with and pleaded

guilty to simple reentry under § 1326(a) but that he was

sentenced as if he had pleaded guilty to reentry following a

felony conviction pursuant to § 1326(b)(2). His argument is

foreclosed by this court’s opinion in United States v. VasquezOlvera, 999 F.2d 943, 946-47 (5th Cir. 1993).
No. 

-2-

AFFIRMED.
#### 1433.211 Contracting officer's decision.

The CO's decision shall reference the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, 6th Floor, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036, and its rules of procedure at *http://www.cbca.gsa.gov.*
| Name                                                                                             |   | Percentage      owned                                        |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                                             |   |                                                         |   |   |
| Fushi      Holdings, Inc.( Fushi Holdings)                                                       |   |                                                         | 100    | % |
|                                                                                             |   |                                                         |   |   |
| Fushi      International (Dalian) Bimetallic Cable Co., Ltd. (Fushi International      (Dalian)) |   |                                                         | 100    | % |
|                                                                                             |   |                                                         |   |
| Dalian      Fushi Bimetallic Wire Manufacturing, Co., Ltd. (Dalian    Fushi)                     |   | 0%      (control is through a contractual relationship only) |   |
|                                                                                             |   |                                                         |   |   |
| Copperweld      Bimetallic, LLC                                                                  |   |                                                         | 100    | % |
|                                                                                             |   |                                                         |   |   |
| Copperweld      Bimetallic LLC, UK                                                               |   |                                                         | 100    | % |

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

DONNELLY JOSEPH LEBLANC,

Petitioner

v.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LANCASTER 

COUNTY,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 185 MM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2019, the Application for Leave to File 

Original Process is GRANTED, and the King’s Bench/Extraordinary Writ is DENIED.
# Repay Rate
#### Christopher Henley et al., Respondents, v Foreclosure Sales, Inc., Appellant.

[835 NYS2d 599]

In an action for a judgment declaring a deed to be a mortgage, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (O’Rourke, J.), dated September 16, 2005, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

*“A*deed conveying real property, although absolute on its face, will be considered to be a mortgage when the instrument is executed as security for a debt” *(Basile v Erhal Holding Corp.,*148 AD2d 484, 485 [1989]; *see*Real Property Law § 320; *Maher v Alma Realty Co.,*70 AD2d 931 [1979]). To establish that a deed was meant as security, “examination may be made not only of the deed and a written agreement executed at the same time, but also [of] oral testimony bearing on the intent of the parties and to a consideration [of] the surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties” *(Corcillo v Martut, Inc.,*58 AD2d 617, 618 [1977]; *see Hughes v Harlam,*166 NY 427, 431 [1901]; *Matter of Newcourt Realty Holding Corp. v Gabel,*28 AD2d 704, 704 [1967]).

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the defendant was required to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, the deed was not meant as security for the debt owed by the plaintiffs *(see Ujueta v Euro-Quest Corp.,*29 AD3d 895, 895-896 [2006]; *Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, *471324 [1986]; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Because questions of fact were raised by certain provisions of the underlying use and occupancy agreement, as well as the admitted absence of “the closing adjustments characteristic of a sale” *(Tortorello v Rosenthal,*45 AD2d 1050, 1051 [1974]; *see Matter of Newcourt Realty Holding Corp. v Gabel, supra*at 704), the defendant failed to demonstrate his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Miller, J.P., Spolzino, Ritter and Dillon, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                EXHIBIT (10)(b)
                                ---------------


                        OPINION AND CONSENT OF ACTUARY
<PAGE>

                    [PFL Life Insurance Company Letterhead]
April 10, 2000


PFL Life Insurance Company
4333 Edgewood Road NE
Cedar Rapids, Iowa  52499-0001

Re:  PFL Retirement Builder Variable Annuity Account Registration on Form N-4
     SEC File No. 333-78743

Dear Sir/Madam:

With regard to the above registration statement, I have examined such documents
and made such inquiries as I have deemed necessary and appropriate, and on the
basis of such examination, have the following opinions:

Fees and charges deducted under the PFL Immediate Income Annuity policies are
those deemed necessary to appropriately reflect:

(1)  the expenses incurred in the acquisition and distribution of the Policies,

(2)  the expenses associated with the development and servicing of the policies,

(3)  the assumption of certain risks arising from the operation and management
     of the Policies and that provides for a reasonable margin of profit.

Fees and charges assessed include:

(i)  Separate Account Charge

(ii) Taxes (including Premium and other Taxes if applicable)

The magnitude of each of the individual charges listed above in (i) through (ii)
is established in the pricing of the PFL Immediate Income Annuity, to achieve a
reasonable Return on Investment (ROI), which is within the range of industry
practice with respect to comparable variable immediate annuity products.
<PAGE>

PFL Life Insurance Company
Page 2
April 10, 2000


Except by coincidence, it is not expected that actual charges assessed in a
given year would exactly offset actual expenses incurred. Acquisition expenses
(as well as major product and/or systems development expenses) are incurred "up
front" and recovered, with a reasonable profit margin, through future years'
charges. In addition, the company cannot increase certain charges under the
Policies in the pricing process.

Therefore, in my opinion, the fees and charges deducted under the Policies, in
the aggregate, are reasonable in relation to the services rendered, the expenses
expected to be incurred, and the risks assumed by the company.

I hereby consent to the use of this opinion, which is included as an Exhibit to
the Registration Statement.



/s/ Roger Freeman
--------------------------------
Roger Freeman, MAAA
Vice President
PFL Life Insurance Company
#### Wilhelmina Models, Inc., Respondent, v Iman Abdulmajid et al., Appellants.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 19, 1978, granting plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, is unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, and the motion is denied, without costs and without disbursements, on appeal. By its terms, the preliminary injunction expired on October 18, 1978, three months before this case was submitted to us. But as a $1,500 undertaking was furnished in connection with the preliminary injunction, we think the issue of the propriety of the injunction should not be treated by us as moot. (Cf. *Margolies v Encounter, Inc.,*42 NY2d 475.) Coming now to the merits of the preliminary injunction, as Special Term said, "plaintiff has not clearly shown at this point that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief.” The court nevertheless granted the preliminary injunction, primarily in reliance upon the decision of this court in *King Records v Brown*(21 AD2d 593), and the fact that the contract in the present case as in the *Kings Records v Brown*case recited that the defendant Iman Abdulmajid’s (hereinafter defendant model) services are extraordinary and unique and that there is no adequate remedy at law for the breach of the agreement and that in the event of breach or threatened breach, plaintiff should be entitled to equitable relief by way of injunction or otherwise. We do not think that *King Records v Brown (supra),*requires the grant of preliminary injunction merely because of these circumstances. The uniqueness of defendant model’s services would seem to be somewhat diluted by the fact that plaintiff apparently requires all of the models it manages to sign contracts with such recitations; the contract is obviously a form contract. Insofar as defendant model’s services are “unique,” in the sense that she looks like herself and not somebody else and is very popular, that uniqueness is not vis-á-vis plaintiff but vis-á-vis the photographers and commercial organizations who hire the model. Vis-á-vis plaintiff, defendant model is simply one of a number of models whom plaintiff manages, some of whom are in the same price category as defendant model, and as to whom plaintiff’s interest is not in having the model render services to plaintiff but rather in plaintiff’s receiving commissions from the compensation for the services that defendant model renders to third persons. Furthermore, unlike *King Records v Brown (supra),*the defendant model does not render any services to plaintiff nor does plaintiff pay the defendant model. It is quite the other way around. Plaintiff renders services to defendant model as manager and defendant model pays plaintiff. Thus damages would appear to be an adequate remedy. Concur — Evans, J. P., Sandler, Sullivan, Lane and Silverman, JJ.
#### Victor Shanley, 3d, an Infant, by Victor Shanley, Jr., His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Judgment in favor of infant plaintiff for $55,000 and for plaintiff father for $5,000, unanimously reversed on the law and on the facts, the verdict vacated, and a new trial granted, with costs to defendant-appellant, unless plaintiffs stipulate to accept $20,000 and $1,500, respectively, in lieu of the award by verdict in reduction of the judgment, in which event the judgment is modified to that extent, and is affirmed as thus modified, with costs to defendant-appellant. In this personal injury negligence action it is evident that the jury verdict is grossly excessive in its award of damages, and that a verdict in excess of $20,000 for infant plaintiff and $1,500 for plaintiff father *745is not warranted by the record. Settle order on notice. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, Eager and Bergan, JJ.
(87 App. Div. 240.)

#### In re ROSE.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 6, 1903.)

1. Supplementary Proceedings—Venue—Debtor’s Residence.

A judgment debtor, who had lodgings in the city of New York, which he hired from month to month, and which he had occupied for three or four years, though his permanent residence was in another county, was a resident in New York City, within Code Civ. Proc. § 2458, providing that, to sustain the issue -of an order in supplementary proceedings, an execution must have been issued to the sheriff of the county where the judgment debtor resides.

Appeal from Special Term, New York County.

Supplementary proceedings by Heloise D. Rose, a judgment credit- or, for the examination of William. W. Durant. From an order vacating the order for - examination, the applicant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J„ and HATCH, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ.

H. W. Harden, for appellant.

H. W. Simpson, for respondent.

PATTERSON, J.

Heloise Durant Rose, a judgment creditor of William W. Durant, procured an order for the examination of the judgment debtor in supplementary proceedings upon an affidavit setting forth that he was a resident of the city and county of New York, and had a place for the regular transaction of business in the county of New York. Thereupon the judgment debtor moved to vacate the order upon affidavits tending to show that his residence was in Hamilton county, in the state of New York, and that he had no place of business in the county of New York. The motion to vacate the order was granted, and from the order entered thereupon the judgment creditor appeals.

In reply to the affidavits presented by the judgment debtor, it was made to appear that he had lodgings in the city of New York; that he occupied those lodgings from time to time, and hired them by the month. It has been held that the residence of a judgment debtor, contemplated by section 2458 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not necessarily his permanent residence, and that, where he has a permanent residence and also a summer residence, an execution issued to the sheriff of the county in which the debtor has his summer residence, returned unsatisfied, is sufficient to sustain an order for an examination in supplementary proceedings. Matter of Rowland, 21 App. Div. 172, 47 N. Y. Supp. 493, affirmed in 154 N. Y. 777, 49 N. E. 1104. Here it is shown that the judgment debtor, while his permanent residence may have been in Hamilton county, had a residence in the city of New York; that he hired lodgings from month to month, and that he occupied such lodgings, and had had them for three or four years. We think there was enough shown to sustain the order for his examination.

The order vacating the order for the examination of the judgment debtor should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the *277motion to vacate denied, with $10 costs, and he should be required to attend, under the order for his examination, at a date to be fixed. All concur.
222.404-2 General requirements. ( c ) (5) Follow the procedures at PGI 222.404-2(c)(5) when seeking clarification of the proper application of construction wage rate schedules.
[72 FR 20764, Apr. 26, 2007]
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