alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### American Cyanamid Company, Appellant, v. Sidney M. Fox et al., Respondents. Harry Grossman, as Receiver, Appellant.

Order, entered on September 16, 1963, unanimously reversed on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellants, and application by defendant Fox, pursuant to section 775 of the Judiciary Law, *873for release from jail, denied, with $10 costs. A certain microfilm, and certain micro-organisms, documents, cultures, strains and other items, were found to be in the possession or under the control of the defendants, and by order of this court, entered July 3, 1962, the defendants were directed to turn them over to the duly appointed Receiver. The Referee appointed herein, following a hearing and the taking of evidence, reported that the record fully supported the finding that the defendants were in possession of the items specified in the said order of July 3, 1962. Thereafter, by order entered June 18, 1963, the defendants were duly adjudged guilty of contempt of court in having willfully disobeyed the July 3, 1962 order by failing and refusing to turn over the said items to the Receiver; and by said order of June 18, 1963, the defendant Fox was committed to the county jail until he complied with the turnover direction. Under the circumstances, the defendant, applying under section 775 of the Judiciary Law, for an order for discharge from imprisonment, was bound to present a frank and full explanation of his dealings with respect to the items directed to be turned over, and to establish factually his inability to comply with the turnover order. The defendant, by his affidavit and statement presented in connection with the application, repeats his previous statements that none of the particular items were in his possession or under his control and that he had no knowledge whatever as to the whereabouts of the same; and he has failed to come forward with a frank and full disclosure of relevant facts tending to establish his inability in good faith to comply with the turnover direction. Thus, it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to direct his release. (See *Matter of Black,*261 App. Div. 791; *Matter of Howard,*201 App. Div. 123; *Matter of Steinert,*29 Hun 301, 302; *Matter of Canakos,*60 Mise. 63.) Concur — Rabin, J. P., Valente, McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.0.3

Eastern Division

Marvin H. Maurras Revocable Trust, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:12−cv−03395

Honorable Gary Feinerman

Edgar M. Bronfman, Jr., et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, October 9, 2012:

 MINUTE entry before Honorable Gary Feinerman: Status hearing scheduled for

10/10/2012 [56] is stricken and re−set for 1/22/2013 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice.(jlj)

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:12-cv-03395 Document #: 57 Filed: 10/09/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:1188
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 10 , 2015.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 15

- 00091

- CV

XUN HUANG AND YUYING DING , Appellant s

V.
RAJESH DALAL , Appellee

On Appeal from the 239th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court C ause No. 63361



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is an appeal from a judgment signed October 29, 2014

. On February 5, 2015, appellants filed a notice that they no longer wish to pursue this appeal, which
we have construed as a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted.
Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and McCally.
#### Lillian Lyon, Respondent, v. Relaxacizor Sales, Inc., Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs to the respondent. No opinion. Concur — Botein, P. J., Rabin, Valente, Eager and Bastow, JJ.
#### Selma R. Carnel, Appellant, v Herbert Carnel, Respondent.

— In an action for divorce, plaintiff appeals, on the ground of inadequacy, from so much of a resettled judgment of divorce, of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated September 9, 1977, as granted her a counsel fee of $750. Resettled judgment modified, on the facts, by increasing the counsel fee to $2,500. As so modified, resettled judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to appellant. The counsel fee award was inadequate to the extent indicated herein. Damiani, J. P., Titone, Shapiro and Margett, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 3, 2016

Order 

June 3, 2016

150643(96)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

BOBAN TEMELKOSKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

SC: 150643

COA: 313670

Wayne CC: 94-000424-FH

________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to extend the time 

for filing its brief on appeal is GRANTED. The brief will be accepted as timely filed if 

submitted on or before July 22, 2016.
400 MARYLAND AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202-2600

www.ed.gov

The Department of Education’s mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness

by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 

August 17, 2020

Honorable Barbara Guy 

Director of Special Education 

Grimes State Office Building, 400 East 14th Street 

Des Moines, Iowa 50319 

barbara.guy@iowa.gov 

Dear Director Guy: 

This letter grants final approval under Section 421(b) of the General Education Provisions Act for 

grant awards H027A180097 and H173A180102. 

The Department received your July 30, 2020 request on behalf of the Iowa Department of

Education for a waiver extending the period of availability for Federal fiscal year (FFY) 2018 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B grant award funds. 

With this approval, the FFY 2018 IDEA Part B grant award funds will be available for obligation 

through September 30, 2021 and may be liquidated through December 30, 2021. 

Please contact your Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) State Lead, Kimberly 

Mitchell, at Kimberly.Mitchell@ed.gov if you have any questions. 

Sincerely, 

/s/

Mark Schultz 

Commissioner, Rehabilitation Services Administration. 

Delegated the authority to perform the functions and duties 

of the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Special 

Education and Rehabilitative Services. 

cc: State Director
<PAGE>

                                                                EXHIBIT 10.4

                       PaineWebber Financial Products Inc.
                                 1285 6th Avenue
                                New York NY 10019

                               September 15, 1998


Patriot American Hospitality, Inc.
1950 Stemmons Freeway, Suite 6001
Dallas, Texas 75207

Wyndham International, Inc.
1950 Stemmons Freeway, Suite 6001
Dallas, Texas 75207

         Re:      Purchase Price Adjustment Mechanism Agreement,
                  dated as of April 6, 1998, as amended on July 30, 1998
                  and August 14, 1998 (the "PaineWebber Agreement")

Gentlemen:

         We understand that you wish to settle an amount not in excess of
$45,627,725 of your obligation under the Forward Stock Contract between you and
Union Bank of Switzerland, London Branch, dated December 31, 1998, as amended on
August 14, 1998 and September 11, 1998, solely by means of applying cash
collateral previously delivered under such Forward Stock Contract (together with
any interest earned thereon) (the "Partial UBS Settlement"). We hereby agree and
confirm that (i) the Partial UBS Settlement will not give rise to a Cross-
Default under Section 4.3 of the PaineWebber Agreement, and (ii) we will not
require you to settle all or part of your obligation under the PaineWebber
Agreement in connection with the Partial UBS Settlement. In all other respects,
the PaineWebber Agreement, and any right of PaineWebber arising in the past or
in the future to settle under the PaineWebber Agreement, either due to a
cross-default described in Section 4.3 of the PaineWebber Agreement or arising
or having arisen under any other provision of the PaineWebber Agreement, shall
remain in full force and effect.

                                     Very truly yours,



                                     PAINEWEBBER FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, INC.


                                     By:/s/
                                             ----------------------------------
                                     Title:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                         713,449
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  377,755
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (4,300)
<INVENTORY>                                    837,838
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,946,608
<PP&E>                                       2,410,278
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,072,296)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,793,867
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,708,070
<BONDS>                                         12,229
<COMMON>                                       734,787
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (661,219)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,793,867
<SALES>                                        590,921
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,568,092
<CGS>                                          529,145
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  529,145
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               450,952
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,301
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                558,694
<INCOME-TAX>                                   134,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            424,694
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   424,694
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.58
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.58
        

</TABLE>
#### Southern Railway Co. *v.*Rome Railway & Light Co.

Atkinson, J.

1. If a commercial railroad company, owning the land in fee on which its tracks were laid, dedicated to a city in which the land was located a street crossing on the railroad tracks, and if thereafter, by permission of the city authorities, an electric street-car company proceeded to construct, along the street, 'tracks for the operation of street-cars, the commercial railroad company would not be entitled to an injunction against the laying of the street-car tracks on such crossing, on the ground that it interfered with the property of the railroad *727company and the use of its tracks, and rendered the crossing dangerous. *Southern Ry. Co.*v. *Atlanta Ry. Co.,*111 *Ga.*679 (36 S. E. 873, 51 L. R. A. 125); *Brunswick Railroad Co.*v. *Mayor etc. of Waycross,*88 *Ga.*68 (13 S. E. 835). See also Southeast etc. R. Co. *v.*Evansville etc. Ry. Co., 169 Ind. 339 (82 N. E. 765, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916, and note, 14 Ann. Cas. 214).

April 18, 1913.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Maddox. Floyd superior court. November 30, 1912.

*Copeland, Hamilton & Hutchens*and *Maddox, McCamy & Shumate,*for plaintiff. *Dean & Dean*and *J. M. Hunt,*for defendant.

2. There was no abuse of discretion in refusing an interlocutory injunction.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices coneur.*
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Bernard Flynn, Appellant. W. T. La Rose and Associates, Respondent; Martin P. Catherwood, as Industrial Commissioner, Respondent.

Appeal by claimant from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board which affirmed a Referee’s decision disqualifying claimant, pursuant to the statute (Unemployment Insurance Law [Labor Law, art. 18], § 593, subd. 1, par. [a]), from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. On March 27, 1962 a dispute arose in the plant of the employer between claimant, an assembly worker, and a coemployee known as a group leader to whom limited supervisory authority had been delegated concerning the return to its appropriate place of an air hose not in immediate use. In the course of the verbal controversy claimant directed an expletive to the group leader designed to indicate a contempt for behavior considered by claimant to he obsequious. This episode resulted in claimant’s discharge by the employer on the following day. Pursuant to the provisions of a subsisting collective bargaining agreement the issues of the justifiability of the discharge were submitted to arbitration. Following a hearing the authorized arbitrator directed that claimant be reinstated to his former position without loss of status, rights or benefits but without pay for the time which he had lost. The employer thereafter notified claimant to report for work at the company plant on June 4, 1962. He rejected the afforded opportunity to resume employment for the reasons that he could not countenance the supervisory power exercised by the group leader which he conceived to be inconsistent with union membership and that he feared a managerial disposition to be vengeful. The hoard adopted the Referee’s findings that neither the refusal to recognize the grant of authority nor concern about future vindictive treatment was justified and found, as did the Referee, that claimant voluntarily left the employment without good cause. The record presents only questions of fact within the competency of the board to determine. *(Matter of Karman [Lubin],*2 A D 2d 626.) Its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Decision unanimously affirmed, without costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Carla Pizzano, an Infant, by Her Father and Natural Guardian, Joseph Pizzano, et al., Respondents, v Central School District No. 1 of the Town of Smithtown, Appellant.

— In a proceeding pursuant to section 50-e of the General Municipal Law (as amd L 1976, ch *709745, § 2) for leave to serve a single late notice of claim as to three accidents which occurred on October 17, 1972, October 17, 1974 and during February, 1976, respectively,. the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated May 9, 1977, which granted leave to the infant petitioner. Order modified, on the law, by (1) deleting so much thereof as granted the motion to file a late notice of claim as to the October 17, 1972 and October 17, 1974 accidents and (2) substituting therefor a provision denying the motion as to said accidents. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Petitioners’ notice of claim alleges that on three separate occasions the infant petitioner injured her left knee in schools operated by the appellant. No claim was made against the appellant until April, 1977, when the infant’s father moved for an order directing that they be allowed to serve their notice of claim upon the appellant. Special Term had no power to grant the application as it pertained to the two earlier accidents. Although subdivision 5 of section 50-e of the General Municipal Law was amended effective September 1, 1976, the petitioners may not avail themselves in any way of the change. The Court of Appeals has only recently held that the amendment "does not revive claims that accrued more than one year prior to its effective date” *(Matter of Beary v City of Rye,*44 NY2d 398, 413; see *Matter of Rifenburgh,*63 AD2d 1004; *Matter of McGrath v Board ofEduc.,*63 AD2d 1046). The October, 1974 and October, 1972 accidents occurred, respectively, almost two and four years prior to the effective date of the instant amendment. As to the remaining or third accident, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in granting the application. In deciding the instant appeal we have proceeded on the assumption that Special Term did not intend to grant the application by the petitioner father in his individual capacity, and to that extent we fully concur in the determination. A contrary determination on this issue would not have been sustained. Mollen, P. J., O’Connor, Rabin and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.22

              AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF GEORGE C. EVANS
                             DATED JANUARY 20, 1995

This Amendment to the above Employment Agreement refers only to page two,
termination paragraph, which is deleted from the Employment Agreement of
January 20, 1995 and replaced with the following provisions:

Termination: If your employment hereunder is terminated by the Company for
cause, you shall receive your benefits hereunder which have vested through the
date of termination. If your employment hereunder is terminated without cause,
you shall continue to receive your then current salary for the remainder of the
contract and vested stock rights through the remainder of the contract, but you
shall not receive a bonus. Cause for these purposes shall be defined to mean
being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or committing a dishonest
act harmful to the Company.

                                        
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Brean Murray
                                        Director, Executive Committee
                                        SEARCH CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED THIS
DATE OF MAY 10, 1995.



------------------------------------
George C. Evans
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       1,217,068
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  295,021
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,467
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,576,435
<PP&E>                                       9,142,267
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,677,432
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,080,520
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          237,678
<BONDS>                                        460,782
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,381,733
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,080,520
<SALES>                                      4,550,037
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,550,037
<CGS>                                        1,765,771
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,765,771
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,465,429
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              42,491
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,358,856
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,358,856
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,358,856
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       45
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       45







</TABLE>
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


  Exhibit
   10(i)

  

 CONSENT OF
   INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’

  

 To the Board of
   Directors of

 Massachusetts Mutual
   Life Insurance Company

  

         We consent to the
   inclusion in this Post-Effective Amendment No. 15 to Registration Statement
   No. 33-7724 on Form N-4 of our reports dated February 1, 2000 and February
   14, 2000 on our audit of the Flex Extra (Qualified) Segment of Massachusetts
   Mutual Variable Annuity Separate Account 1 and the Flex Extra
   (Non-Qualified) Segment of Massachusetts Mutual Variable Annuity Separate
   Account 2 respectively, as of December 31, 1999 and for the year then ended,
   and of our report dated February 1, 2000, on our audit of the statutory
   financial statements of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company as of
   December 31, 1999 and for the year then ended, which includes explanatory
   paragraphs relating to the use of statutory accounting practices, which
   differ from generally accepted accounting principles. We also consent to the
   reference to our Firm under the caption “Experts” appearing in the
   Statement of Additional Information.

  

 DELOITTE
   
 & TOUCHE 
 LLP

  

 Hartford,
   Connecticut

 April 24,
   2000
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 3, 2017

d0925 

# Order

Clerk October 3, 2017

150443

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 150443

COA: 316044

Ottawa CC: 12

- 037100

- FH

RYAN VICTOR KUPRES,

Defendant

- Appellant.

____________________________________/

By order of October 26, 2016, the application for leave to appeal the September

25, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyanc e pending the decisions in

People v Steanhouse (Docket No. 152849) and People v Masroor (Docket Nos. 152946

- 8). On order of the Court, the cases having been decided on July 24, 2017, 500 Mich ___

(2017), the application is again considered, and it is DENI ED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.