J-S53025-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEVIN BLENMAN,

Appellant No. 1430 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013908-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED September 5, 2017

Appellant, Kevin Blenman, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on April 14, 2016, following his bench trial convictions for persons 

not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, 

and firearms not to be carried without a license.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On November 5, 2012, Philadelphia police officer Jeffrey Opalski 

[(Officer Opalski)], along with his partner Officer Mundrick,[2]

were on patrol in an unmarked police car in plain clothes. At the 

time, Officer Opalski had been a police officer for two and a half 

years with ten [firearm-related] arrests, along with specific 

training in firearms and the methods in which they are carried on 

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.

2 We were unable to determine Officer Mundrick’s first name from the 

certified record.
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a person. The officers were traveling along the 5100 block of 

Viola St[reet] in Philadelphia, when they observed [Appellant] 

standing in front of an abandon[ed] building. Officer Opalski 

testified that drug sales are typically conducted in and around 

abandoned properties. The officers were patrolling in that 

specific area because there were reports of drug sales and gun 

violence associated with rival drug gangs. As the officers drove 

down Viola St[reet], [Appellant] looked in their direction, turned 

and walked through an alleyway next to an abandoned house. 

The officers then continued down Viola St[reet], circled the block 

a few times, and again spotted [Appellant] on a nearby block. 

At this time, he was walking with a noticeable limp and had a 

large bulge in the front area of his waistband. The officers 

stopped their car, exited and identified themselves as police 

officers. Immediately [Appellant] grabbed his waistband area 

and ran from the officers. After running for about a block, the 

officers observed [Appellant] remove a large silver revolver from 

his waistband and discard it in a pile of trash bags. He was 

arrested shortly thereafter.

[Appellant] was taken to a local hospital for some minor injuries 

and then released back to police custody around 2:00 a.m. the 

following day. [Appellant] was initially too groggy to be 

interviewed at that time. On November 6, 2012, at around 3:20 

a.m.[,] Detective [Matthew] Maurizio read [Appellant] his 

Miranda[3] warnings and conducted a post-arrest interview. 

[Appellant] did not appear to be in any distress at that point, 

was not injured, and was lucid in his recollection. [Appellant] 

then gave a very detailed statement of his activities that night, 

including where and from whom he received the gun and what 

he was intending to do with it. He read and signed the 

statement along with his Miranda warnings.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/2016, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the physical 

evidence recovered, as well as his subsequent statement to police. The trial 

court held a suppression hearing on December 1, 2014 and denied relief. 

____________________________________________

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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On February 3, 2016, the trial court held a bench trial and convicted 

Appellant of the aforementioned firearm offenses. On April 14, 2016, the 

trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of two and one-half to 

five years of imprisonment followed by five years of probation. This timely 

appeal resulted.4

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Did not the lower court err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress physical evidence and his statement obtained in 

violation of the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution, 

and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as said 

evidence and statement were the fruits of an unconstitutional 

stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In sum, Appellant argues:

When initially observed by police, Appellant was standing in front 

of an abandoned house, doing nothing illegal or suspicious. He 

then walked away; again, an action neither illegal [n]or 

suspicious. Officer Opalski decided, solely on the basis that the 

house where Appellant was standing was abandoned, to try to 

find him, to do so [by] circling the block not once but “a few 

times,” and expanding his area of search. Finally he observed 

Appellant at a busy intersection, this time doing nothing but 

walking in what the officer described as “a labored manner,” with 

a bulge in his waistband. Officer Mundrick thereupon exited the 

police vehicle, identifying himself, and demanding that Appellant 

stop. Although Appellant fled, at the point when Officer 

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4

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 11, 2016. On June 20, 

2016, the trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant complied timely on July 12, 2016. The trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on November 14, 2016.
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Mundrick made his demand Appellant was unlawfully seized, and 

the firearm ultimately recovered[, and his subsequent 

statements to police, were] fruit of the unlawful seizure. 

Because Appellant was stopped illegally, the lower court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress the [] evidence [obtained] from 

the illegal stop.

Id. at 9-10. 

Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. When reviewing rulings of a suppression court we must 

consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in 

the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports 

the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those 

facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error.

In re M.D., 781 A.2d 192, 195 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).

In addition, 

it is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to 

pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony. The suppression court is also entitled to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence presented. Finally, at a 

suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

evidence was properly obtained.

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc).

We have further determined:

Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution afford protections 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. Among the 

protections is the requirement that an officer have reasonable 

suspicion before an investigatory stop. 
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Our [S]upreme [C]ourt has interpreted Article I, § 8 protection 

more broadly than the Fourth Amendment and has found that a 

seizure occurs when an officer gives chase. Under Pennsylvania 

law, any items abandoned by an individual under pursuit are 

considered fruits of a seizure. Those items may only be received 

in evidence when an officer, before giving chase, has at least the 

reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop. Stated 

another way, when one is unconstitutionally seized by the police, 

i.e. without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, any 

subsequent flight with the police in pursuit continues the seizure 

and any contraband discarded during the pursuit is considered a 

product of coercion and is not admissible against the individual.

In deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists for an 

investigatory stop, our analysis is the same under both Article I, 

§ 8 and the Fourth Amendment. 

The fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether 

the facts available to the officer at the moment of the intrusion 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action 

taken was appropriate. This assessment, like that applicable to 

the determination of probable cause, requires an evaluation of 

the totality of the circumstances, with a lesser showing needed 

to demonstrate reasonable suspicion in terms of both quantity or 

content and reliability. 

Among the factors to be considered in forming a basis for 

reasonable suspicion are tips, the reliability of the informants, 

time, location, and suspicious activity, including flight.[5]

While a tip can be a factor, an anonymous tip alone is 

insufficient as a basis for reasonable suspicion. Likewise, 

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5

Furthermore, in examining factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion, “we 

must give due weight ... to the specific reasonable inferences the police 

officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” 

Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 456 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

citation and original brackets omitted). “A police officer cannot reach such a 

conclusion based upon an ‘unparticularized suspicion’ or ‘hunch.’” 

Commonwealth v. Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1144 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation 

omitted). 
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presence in a high crime area alone or flight alone does not form 

the basis for reasonable suspicion. However, a combination of 

these factors may be sufficient.

* * *

Case law has established that certain facts, taken alone, do not 

establish reasonable suspicion. However, a combination of these 

facts may establish reasonable suspicion. 

Id. at 196–197 (internal citations, quotations, and original brackets 

omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded:

[T]he Commonwealth established by a preponderance of the 

evidence that officers had reasonable suspicion to attempt to 

stop [Appellant]. [...T]he officers observed [Appellant] standing 

in front of an abandon[ed] house in a known violent crime area. 

They drove past him and he turned around and went down an 

alleyway. [...T]hey [again] observed him turn and walk[] away. 

Additionally, officers observed a very large bulge in his 

waistband area that was indicative of a large handgun. 

* * *

The officers’ [knowledge and] experience in that area making 

arrests, training in the handling and carrying of firearms, 

[Appellant] turning and walking away from officers and a large 

bulge in his waistband area provided sufficient articulable facts 

which gave officers reasonable suspicion to stop him in an 

investigatory detention.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/2016, at 5.

Based upon our standard of review and careful examination of the 

certified record, we agree with the trial court’s assessment and discern no 

abuse of discretion in denying suppression. At the time of the incident, 

Officer Opalski had two and one-half years of experience as a police officer 

and he had made approximately ten arrests involving firearms violations. 
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N.T., 12/1/2014, at 8, 25. Additionally, he previously completed 

“improvised and concealed weapons training” through the Institute of Law 

Enforcement Education. Id. at 33. Officer Opalski testified that the officers 

were on patrol in an area known for narcotics trafficking, at 1:00 a.m., 

where there had been three shootings the week prior to this incident. Id. at 

9. The prior shootings were linked to drug sales in front of the abandoned 

property, already known to police, where Appellant was seen first standing. 

Id. at 12. Appellant looked in Officer Opalski’s direction, turned, and walked 

into an alleyway. Id. When Officer Opalski saw Appellant again, he noticed 

Appellant “was laboring with his walk as if something [] heavy [was] in his 

waistband” which, in his experience and training, was “the typical location 

for an illegal firearm to be carried.” Id. at 16. Officer Opalski opined that 

“most guns are carried illegally in the front of [the] waistband without a 

holster.” Id. He also testified that the location of the bulge and its size led 

him to believe that Appellant could be carrying a large firearm. Id. at 17. 

Based upon the time and location of the incident, Appellant’s 

suspicious behavior, the officer’s training and experience, and the 

identification of a bulge in Appellant’s waistband (a characteristic place to 

conceal an illegal firearm) before stopping Appellant, Officer Opalski had 

reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was engaged in criminal activity. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the totality of the circumstances led 

Officer Opalski to believe that Appellant possessed a firearm in violation of 
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). Thus, the Commonwealth met its burden of 

proof and suppression was not warranted. 

Finally, the case law upon which Appellant relies does not compel a 

different result. Appellant principally relies upon our decision in 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 588 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 1991). See

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. In that case, police officers in plain clothes in an 

unmarked car approached an intersection where four or five individuals were 

standing on a corner. Martinez departed in one direction and the others 

went another. The police drove alongside Martinez and observed her 

“holding her hands in the front of her coat, leaning forward, as if to be 

holding something, leaning forward, walking quickly up the street.” 

Martinez, 588 A.2d at 515. When the police ordered Martinez to put her 

hands on the police vehicle, a bag containing contraband fell from her coat. 

We noted that the trial court “mixed together facts of events occurring both 

before and as a result of the stop” and “seemingly believed that Martinez 

brought the search and seizure upon herself by ‘drawing attention to 

herself.’” Id. at 516 (emphasis in original). We concluded that the only 

“articulable facts attributable to Martinez” was that she “walked quickly away 

from a street corner, at 12:20 a.m.” and “[s]he was holding her hands in the 

front of her coat and walking quickly up the street.” Id. 

In stark contrast to Martinez, Officer Opalski articulated his specific 

observation that, prior to stopping Appellant, he saw a bulge in Appellant’s 

waistband which, in his experience and training, led him to believe that 
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Appellant was carrying a large firearm given the size and the location of the 

bulge. In Martinez, we said that the police had little more than an 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch that the defendant was engaged in 

criminal activity when they observed her holding her coat out in front of her. 

Martinez could have just as easily been holding any number of innocuous 

items at the time of the seizure. Here, however, Officer Opalski’s 

observations showed that, prior to stopping Appellant, he was able to state, 

with specific detail, his belief that Appellant was carrying a gun, a violation 

of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). Moreover, in Martinez, we recognized that 

the trial court “mixed together facts of events occurring both before and as a 

result of the stop.” Id. at 516. In the case sub judice, however, the 

undisputed testimony shows that Officer Opalski’s observations regarding 

the location and size of the bulge in Appellant’s waistband led him to believe 

that Appellant possessed a firearm, which, in turn, prompted him to detain 

Appellant. 

As such, we are persuaded that this case stands on all fours with our 

recent en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 766 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), where we concluded, on very similar facts, that 

the officer’s objective and particularized suspicion legitimately supported the 

challenged investigatory detention.6 See Carter, 105 A.3d at 774-775 

____________________________________________

6 We reject Appellant’s suggestion that Carter is distinguishable since “no 

bulge [was] observed on Appellant at initial view.” See Appellant’s Brief at 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(police officer had reasonable suspicion for investigatory detention, where 

the defendant was standing on street corner in a high-crime area at night, 

had a weighted and angled bulge in his coat pocket, was alerted to the 

officer's presence and intentionally turned his body away several times to 

conceal the bulge in his coat pocket, and the officer observed the defendant 

walking away from known drug corner when officer repeatedly circled the 

area). For each of the foregoing reasons, we hold that Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on his suppression claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/5/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

16. The only relevant fact is that Officer Opalski observed the bulge before

commencing the stop.