Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Joan H. Lefkow Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 2535 DATE 4/17/2012

CASE

TITLE

Nugent vs. Wihse, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [4] and for appointment of counsel [5] are

denied. The complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case is terminated.

O[ For further details see text below.] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.

STATEMENT

Joanne Nugent has presented a complaint for filing, along with an application under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(1) for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees. Plaintiff names as defendants the City of

DesPlaines, the Des Plaines Police Department, City Attorney David Wihse, and Police Officer Adam

Skotnicki. The complaint alleges that Officer Skotnicki at an unspecified time came to Nugent’s home after

she had called for assistance, and that while there he behaved unprofessionally in a number of ways, such as

telling her he heard someone in a closed room, distrusting her brother-in-law who arrived while the officer

was present, and giving her advice that she believed inappropriate, all causing her to feel uncomfortable. The

complaint alleges that Skotnicki gave Nugent a false name and badge number when she requested his

identity. Nugent made a complaint to the Police Department, which conducted an investigation and

determined that Skotnicki’s conduct had been improper. He was given a formal reprimand. Now Nugent

believes she is being followed either by Skotnicki or at his behest, although she is not sure. She claims to

have suffered emotional harm in the form of nightmares, migraine headaches, anxiety and depression. She

asks for damages in the amount of $75,000.

It is well established that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,

30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). In assessing any complaint the court must first decide whether it has jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the lawsuit. See Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The

requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the

judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction

if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l

Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If this condition

exists, then the complaint must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. To be “wholly

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STATEMENT

insubstantial and frivolous,” however, the complaint must be “absolutely devoid of merit” or “no longer open

to discussion.” Id. at 1182 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–39, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 39 L. Ed. 2d

577 (1974)). A frivolous complaint is one in which “the petitioner can make no rational argument in law or

facts to support his or her claim for relief.” Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827,

104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). 

This complaint is frivolous because it lacks necessary elements of a properly pleaded complaint. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (A complaint must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction,

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the

relief the pleader seeks.) The complaint does not allege a basis for federal court jurisdiction. Although the

allegations imply violation of Nugent’s civil rights, they do not set forth facts that would permit even a

colorable inference that Nugent’s civil rights have been violated. She was not arrested, so there can be no

arrest without probable cause. The officer “never touched [her],” so there can be no excessive force. 

(Compl. at 14.) Although stalking by an officer suggests the possibility of a civil rights violation,

Christensen v County of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007), held that an officer’s watching and trailing

two residents of a municipality did not deprive them of their right to privacy, freedom of association, freedom

from unreasonable search and seizure, or substantive due process. The allegations here are considerably less

egregious than those in Christensen in that Nugent only suspects, but is not sure, that Skotnicki is engaging

in such conduct. Such a claim could not succeed in light of Christensen. 

For these reasons, the plaintiff’s petition for leave to proceed IFP must be denied and the complaint

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

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