alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

§602.18 Ensuring consistency in decision-making.

The agency must consistently apply and enforce standards that respect the stated mission of the 

institution, including religious mission, and that ensure that the education or training offered by an 

institution or program, including any offered through distance education or, correspondence courses, or 

direct assessment education,, is of sufficient quality to achieve its stated objective for the duration of 

any accreditation or preaccreditation period granted by the agency.. The agency meets this 

requirement if the agency— -

(a) Has written specification of the requirements for accreditation and preaccreditation that 

include clear standards for an institution or program to be accredited;

(b) Has effective controls against the inconsistent application of the agency's standards;

(c) Bases decisions regarding accreditation and preaccreditation on the agency's published 

standards;

(d) Has a reasonable basis for determining that the information the agency relies on for making 

accrediting decisions is accurate; and

(e

(a) Provides the institution or program with a detailed written report that clearly identifies any 

deficiencies in the institution's or program's compliance with the agency's standards.;

(b) At the request of an institution, performs a review of the agency’s respect for the institution’s

stated mission, including religious mission, and provides a written report of the results of that review; 

(c) Does not deny preaccreditation or accreditation, or take action against an institution or 

program, due to an institution’s adherence to its religious mission in any of its policies and practices; 

and. 

(d) Agencies must pPublishes any policies for retroactive application of an accreditation decision. 

(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1099b) 

Comment [FB1]: The subcommittee agreed on 

this change.

Comment [FB2]: Alternate language discussed 

included:

OPTION 1

(c) Respects institutional mission, including religious 

mission, when making preaccreditation or 

accreditation decisions, or taking action against an 

institution or program; and

OPTION 2

(c) Does not deny preaccreditation or accreditation, 

or take action against an institution or program in a 

manner that is disrespectful to its religious mission; 

and
#### Chattooga County *v.*Megginson.

February 26, 1913.

Illegality of execution. Before Judge Maddox. Chattooga superior court. December 23, 1911.

*Wesley Shropshire*and *Maddox £ Doyal,*for plaintiff.

*J. M. Bellah,*for defendant.

Hill, J.

Moneys received from tlie sale of bonds lawfully issued by a county for the erection of a court-house are “county funds” within the meaning of the Civil Code, ,§ 588. See *Aaron*v. *German,*114 *Ga.*587 (40 S. E. 713).

(а) It follows that, for receiving and paying out funds thus acquired by the county, the county treasurer is entitled, within the limit therein specified, to the commissions allowed him by that section.

(б) He is also, for making a disbursement of county funds in paying accrued interest on the bonds, entitled to commissions under the same section.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Appeal No. 74-232.

#### Maureen Alfonso *v.*Wayne Alfonso.

*Alfred Factor,*for appellant. *Bucci & O’Neill, James L. O’Neill,*for appellee.

Motion of appellee, Wayne Alfonso, to dismiss the appeal denied.
(87 App. Div. 156.)

#### VALENTINE v. VALENTINE.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 23, 1903.)

1. Divorce—Allowance for Alimony and Support op Children.

Allowance to plaintiff of $500 a year alimony and $300 a year for support of each of her two children, in all being but a little more than half of defendant’s conceded income, is not excessive.

2. Appeal—Objection not Raised Below.

Objection in an action for divorce that the wife was incompetent, under Code Civ. Proc. § 831, to testify concerning the husband’s property and income, cannot be made for the first time on appeal.

Appeal from Special Term.

Action by Grace I. Valentine against Charles C. Valentine. From portions of the interlocutory judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.

David May, for appellant.

Henry J. McCormick, for respondent.

PATTERSON, J.

Judgment in an action for divorce was rendered in favor of the plaintiff herein, the marriage between her and the defendant was dissolved, and she was awarded the custody of two infant children. By the interlocutory decree it was provided that the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum of $300 per annum for the support and maintenance of each of the two children during their infancy, and that he also pay to her for her support and maintenance the sum of $500 during her natural life. The defendant appeals only from so much of the interlocutory judgment as requires the payment of the sums of money above mentioned, the ground of appeal being that the sums allowed are excessive, in view of the evidence relating to the defendant’s property and the sources from which he derives his income. These sums are not excessive, even upon the appellant’s own *38statement. They amount to but a little more than one-half of what he concedes to be his income. The allowance of $300 per annum for the support, maintenance, and education of each child is not excessive, and $500 a year, which is less than $10 a week, is a very moderate allowance for the support of the plaintiff.

The objection is urged that an error was committed by the court in allowing the plaintiff to testify concerning her husband’s property and his income. It has been held that in an action for divorce under the statute the wife is prohibited from being examined as a witness regarding other matters than such as are specifically mentioned in section 831 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Colwell v. Colwell, 14 App. Div. 80, 43 N. Y. Supp. 439; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 63 Hun, 516, 18 N. Y. Supp. 485); but we think it is too late to raise the objection for the first time on appeal. No exception was taken on the trial to the introduction of this evidence, and it was allowed to go before the court with the acquiescence of the defendant.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### George Accomando et al., Appellants, v. Joseph J. Johnke, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated October 24, 1960, which granted defendant’s cross motion to vacate the service of the summons and complaint upon him. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. Ho opinion. Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sergio RUBALCABA-RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-40783

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 17, 2008.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sergio Rubalcaba-Ramirez appeals his conviction of and sentence for possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. He argues that he was subjected to an illegal traffic stop because his conduct did not violate a state *424statute and that his stop was not supported by an informant’s tip because no new indicia of probable cause was discovered after a fruitless search at the border checkpoint.

The government failed to address the validity of the traffic stop, relying instead on the reasonable suspicion arising from the informant’s tip. Rubalcaba-Ramirez contends the government has waived and effectively conceded the issue. This court, however, is not bound by the government’s concession of error. *See United States v. Claiborne,*132 F.3d 253, 254-55 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam).

We examine the legality of police investigatory stops based on (1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. *United States v. Brigham,*382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (citing *Terry v. Ohio,*392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). A decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. *Whren v. United States,*517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Rubalcaba-Ramirez was stopped for driving on an improved shoulder. He contends that his conduct was not a traffic violation under state law and cites several state court decisions. Those decisions are distinguishable in that they involve traffic stops for failing to drive in a single lane of traffic.

Rubalcaba-Ramirez was not stopped for that violation. Instead, he violated Tex Transp. Code Ann. § 545.058, driving on an improved shoulder. Though there are exceptions to that prohibition, RubalcabaRamirez does not claim one. His conduct objectively justified the stop, and there was probable cause to stop him. *See Whren,*517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769; *see also United States v. Lopez-Valdez,*178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir.1999). Because the stop was justified, it is unnecessary to address his challenge to the stop based only on the informant’s tip. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
215.371-2 Promote competition. Except as provided in sections 215.371-4 and 215.371-5— ( a ) If only one offer is received when competitive procedures were used and the solicitation allowed fewer than 30 days for receipt of proposals, the contracting officer shall— ( 1 ) Consult with the requiring activity as to whether the requirements document should be revised in order to promote more competition (see FAR 6.502(b) and 11.002); and
( 2 ) Resolicit, allowing an additional period of at least 30 days for receipt of proposals; and
( b ) For competitive solicitations in which more than one potential offeror expressed an interest in an acquisition, but only one offer was ultimately received, follow the procedures at PGI 215.371-2.
[80 FR 21657, Apr. 20, 2015]
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 5, 2019

No. 04-19-00344-CV

IN RE MURPHY EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

On May 23, 2019, relators filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an emergency motion 

to stay the trial court proceedings. After considering the petition and the record, this court 

concludes relators are not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of 

mandamus is DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). Relators’ motion to stay is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

It is so ORDERED on June 5, 2019.

_____________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of June, 2019.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk of Court

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 15-03-54356-CV, styled Garrett Waites v. Murphy Exploration & 

Production Co. d/b/a Murphy Exploration & Production, et al., pending in the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells 

County, Texas, the Honorable Richard C. Terrell presiding.
Case: 1:12-cv-02596 Document #: 30 Filed: 10/11/12 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:163
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#### 213.7002 Purchase orders.

The contracting officer need not obtain a contractor's written acceptance of a purchase order or modification of a purchase order for an acquisition under the 8(a) Program pursuant to 219.804-2(2).

[71 FR 3413, Jan. 23, 2006]
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA

- HQ

- OW

- 200 9-0 819

DCN:_____

__ SE02972

________________________

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS I NFORMATION (CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:12-cr-50027

) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

RITA A. CRUNDWELL, )

)

Defendant. )

)

PERCOTT COMPANY, LLC, )

IDAL REALTY, LLC, by BRUCE LANS )

)

Petitioner )

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S ANCILLARY CLAIM

WHEREAS, Petitioner Percott Company, LLC, and Idal Realty, LLC, by and through 

representative Bruce Lans, (hereafter Petitioner) filed a claim to forfeited property (Dkt. 239), 

specifically, monies used to repair a Cub Cadet Lawn Mower Model 53BB5BBP750, serial 

number 3F066Z82042;

WHEREAS, As the parties agree that the value of the lawn mower is approximately the 

cost of the repairs plus $500.00, the United States and Petitioner have agreed on July 22, 2015, to 

settle this claim by transferring ownership of the above-referenced lawn mower from the United 

States to Petitioner in exchange for $500.00 payable to the United States of America;

WHEREAS, Under the settlement Petitioner releases all claims to forfeited property, 

including the claim filed before this Court (Dkt. 239);
NOW THEREFORE, PETITIONER AND THE UNITED STATES HEREBY 

STIPULATE to dismiss the above-captioned matter with prejudice. This stipulation and 

dismissal completely terminates the Petitioner’s claim in the above-titled action.

The parties hereto also request that this Court retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms and 

conditions of the settlement and release. 

Respectfully submitted,

M. Kendall Day, Chief Percott Company, LLC

Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section Idal Realty, LLC

By: /s/ g By: /s/ g 

Julia E. Jarrett, Trial Attorney Bruce Lans, Petitioner

Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section Post Office Box 211

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division South Beloit, Illinois 61080

1400 New York Ave NW merijranch@gmail.com

Washington, D.C. 20053

202-514-5131

julia.jarrett@usdoj.gov
Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the 

Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of 

record for the defendant.

I also certify that on this date, I mailed the foregoing to Petitioner at:

Bruce Lans

Post Office Box 211

South Beloit, Illinois 61080

Email: merijranch@gmail.com

Pro Se Petitioner

/s/ Julia E. Jarrett

Julia E. Jarrett

Trial Attorney

Dated: August 14, 2015
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:12-cr-50027

) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

RITA A. CRUNDWELL, )

)

Defendant. )

)

PERCOTT COMPANY, LLC, )

IDAL REALTY, LLC by BRUCE LANS, )

)

Petitioner )

ORDER

Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefor,

The release by Petitioner of all claims and potential claims he has or may have against

forfeited property in the above-titled action is hereby APPROVED; and

IT IS ORDERED that this claim be, and hereby is, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

___________________________________

PHILIP G. REINHARD

United States District Judge

DATED: _________
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| 1 | The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2019, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 4, 2020 (“accompanied report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

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| 2 | The information contained in the accompanied report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition and results of operations of Capital Southwest Corporation. |

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|                              |  |  |
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| Date:  February 4, 2020 | By: | /s/ Michael S. Sarner |
|                         |   | Michael S. Sarner |
|                         |   | Chief Financial Officer |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Chauncey Bray, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered April 26, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of selling narcotics (Penal Law, § 1751, subd. 1), and of possessing narcotics (Penal Law, § 1751-a); and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed (see *People*v. *Wright,*20 A D 2d 652). Beldoek, P. J., Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld and Christ, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment insofar as it relates to the conviction and sentence for selling narcotics; to dismiss the count of the indictment which charges defendant with selling narcotics; to vacate the sentence upon the conviction for possession of narcotics; to affirm the judgment insofar as it convicts defendant of possession of narcotics; and to remand defendant to the County Court, Suffolk County, for appropriate resentencing upon the conviction for narcotics possession, with the following memorandum: In our opinion, the proof established that defendant was acting merely as an agent for the purchaser; hence, he cannot be convicted of selling narcotics *(People*v. *Lindsey,*16 A D 2d 805, affd. 12 N Y 2d 958; *People*v. *Branch,*13 A D 2d 714; *People*v. *Buster,*286 App. Div. 1141; *United States*v. *Moses,*220 F. 2d 166; *United States*v. *Sawyer,*210 F. 2d 169). The proof did establish, however, the defendant’s guilt of the misdemeanor of unlawful possession of narcotics.
2009.570-2 Definitions. *Affiliates* means business concerns which are affiliates of each other when either directly or indirectly one concern or individual controls or has the power to control another, or when a third party controls or has the power to control both.
*Contract* means any contractual agreement or other arrangement with the NRC except as provided in 2009.570-1(c).
*Contractor* means any person, firm, unincorporated association, joint venture, co-sponsor, partnership, corporation, affiliates thereof, or their successors in interest, including their chief executives, directors, key personnel (identified in the contract), proposed consultants or subcontractors, which are a party to a contract with the NRC.
*Evaluation activities* means any effort involving the appraisal of a technology, process, product, or policy.
Offeror or prospective contractor means any person, firm, unincorporated association, joint venture, co-sponsor, partnership, corporation, or their affiliates or successors in interest, including their chief executives, directors, key personnel, proposed consultants, or subcontractors, submitting a bid or proposal, solicited or unsolicited, to the NRC to obtain a contract.
*Organizational conflicts of interest* means that a relationship exists whereby a contractor or prospective contractor has present or planned interests related to the work to be performed under an NRC contract which: ( 1 ) May diminish its capacity to give impartial, technically sound, objective assistance and advice, or may otherwise result in a biased work product; or
( 2 ) May result in its being given an unfair competitive advantage.
*Potential conflict of interest* means that a factual situation exists that suggests that an actual conflict of interest may arise from award of a proposed contract. The term *potential conflict of interest* is used to signify those situations that— ( 1 ) Merit investigation before contract award to ascertain whether award would give rise to an actual conflict; or
( 2 ) Must be reported to the contracting officer for investigation if they arise during contract performance.
*Research* means any scientific or technical work involving theoretical analysis, exploration, or experimentation.
*Subcontractor* means any subcontractor of any tier who performs work under a contract with the NRC except subcontracts for supplies and subcontracts in amounts not exceeding $10,000.
*Technical consulting and management support services* means internal assistance to a component of the NRC in the formulation or administration of its programs, projects, or policies which normally require that the contractor be given access to proprietary information or to information that has not been made available to the public. These services typically include assistance in the preparation of program plans, preliminary designs, specifications, or statements of work.
\00*-l&E COPY

CCA # 13-14-00175-CR OFFENSE: Capital Murder

STYLE: Manuel Pena v. The State of Texas COUNTY: Cameron

TRIAL COURT: 107th District Court MOTION

TRIAL COURTS: 2009-CR-1438-A FOR REHEARING IS:

TRIAL COURT JUDGE: Hon. Benjamin Euresti Jr. DATE: June 25, 2015

DISPOSITION: Affirmed JUDGE: Gina M. Benavides

DATE:

JUSTICE: L PC S

PUBLISH: DNP:

CLK RECORD: x SUPP CLK RECORD

RPT RECORD: x SUPP RPT RECORD

STATE BR: x SUPP BR

APP BR: x PROSE BR

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

PRO S£ Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

K^t^

DATE: _ f//0t//SLdir

JUDGE:

CCA IS:.

JUDGE:

iuSi^*^=~

MOTION FOR REHEARING IN

ON

CCA# \OQ*t'lf

Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED:.

PUBLISH:

PC:

DNP:

MOTION FOR STAY OF MANDATE IS:

ON

JUDGE:
EAST\49606704.2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION

GREER G. ZUMMO, )

) Case No. 1:12-cv-01099

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Holderman

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Gilbert

TRANS UNION LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 

DEFENDANT TRANS UNION, LLC

______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Greer G. Zummo and Defendant Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”), by their 

respective counsel and pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

hereby stipulate that: 

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Trans Union are dismissed, with prejudice, with each 

party to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees. 

2. The putative class claims are dismissed without prejudice, and without costs or 

notice.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: July 19, 2012 /s/Keith J. Keogh

 One of her attorneys

Keogh Law, Ltd.

101 North Wacker Drive, Suite 605

Chicago, IL 60606

Telephone: 312-726-1092

Fax: 312-726-1093

E-Mail: keith@keoghlaw.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

Case: 1:12-cv-01099 Document #: 36 Filed: 07/19/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:151
EAST\49606704.2

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Michael O’Neil (by permission)

One of Its Attorneys

Michael O’Neil (ARDC # 06201736)

Albert E. Hartmann (ARDC # 06256064)

DLA PIPER LLP (US)

203 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1900

Chicago, Illinois 60601

T: 312.368.4000

F: 312.236.7516

Email: michael.oneil@dlapiper.com

Email: albert.hartmann@dlapiper.com

Robert J. Schuckit, Esq. (IL #15342-49)

William R. Brown (IL #26782-48)

Schuckit & Associates, P.C.

4545 Northwestern Drive

Zionsville, IN 46077

Telephone: 317-363-2400

Fax: 317-363-2257

E-Mail: rschuckit@schuckitlaw.com

E-Mail: rbrown@schuckitlaw.com

Counsel for Trans Union, LLC

Case: 1:12-cv-01099 Document #: 36 Filed: 07/19/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:152