17-1677 

Rahman v. Whitaker 

BIA 

A089 114 546 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 11th day of February, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

PETER W. HALL, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

MAKSUDUR RAHMAN, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-1677 

 NAC 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, 

New York, NY. 

 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Jessica E. 

Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

Edward C. Durant, Attorney, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Maksudur Rahman, a native and citizen of the 

Bangladesh, seeks review of an April 28, 2017, decision of 

the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Maksudur Rahman, 

No. A089 114 546 (B.I.A. Apr. 28, 2017). We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

history in this case. 

 We review the BIA’s denial of Rahman’s motion to reopen 

for abuse of discretion and consider whether its conclusion 

regarding changed country conditions is supported by 

substantial evidence. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 

138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). It is undisputed that Rahman’s 

2016 motion to reopen was untimely as it was filed 

approximately four years after his removal order. See

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 

Accordingly, to succeed on his motion to reopen, Rahman had 

to demonstrate both his prima facie eligibility for the 

relief sought (asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)) and that his 
3

untimely filing was excused. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 

F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005). The time limitation for filing 

a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to 

apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed 

country conditions arising in the country of nationality or 

the country to which removal has been ordered, if such 

evidence is material and was not available and would not 

have been discovered or presented at the previous 

proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 

C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The agency did not abuse its 

discretion in denying reopening because, as discussed 

below, Rahman failed to establish either his prima facie 

eligibility relief or a material change in conditions given 

the underlying adverse credibility determination and the 

lack of evidence that he would be targeted as a result of 

the rise in extremist violence. 

 Rahman asserted that Islamic terrorists would perceive 

him as an outsider for living in the United States and target 

him on that basis. He also claimed that the ruling Awami 

League was exploiting public fear stemming from this 

terrorist violence to persecute political opponents. He also 

alleged that members of the Awami League continue to seek him 

out and target his family. 
4

 First, the BIA did not err in denying the motion based 

on Rahman’s failure to file a new asylum application because 

a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate 

application for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). 

 Second, as the agency found, Rahman’s county conditions 

evidence of the rise in terrorist incidents is not material 

because general violence or crime is not a basis for asylum 

or withholding of removal. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 

F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & 

N. Dec. 439, 447 (BIA 1987). Moreover, his evidence that 

foreign diplomats are seeking more security in light of this 

terrorist violence does not support his speculative claim 

that terrorists will target him as an “outsider” or 

“foreigner” as he has not described how or why terrorist 

organizations would view him as similarly situated to foreign 

diplomats. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 

129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the 

record,” an applicant’s “fear is speculative at best.”); see 

also C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), 1208.16(b)(2) (providing 

that applicant can establish fear of future persecution by 

showing he would be “singled out” for harm); Mu-Xing Wang v. 

Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring CAT 
5

applicant to show that someone in his “particular alleged 

circumstances” would likely be tortured). 

 Third, Rahman’s contention that the country conditions 

evidence reflects a more dangerous situation “for those who 

have previously been the target of violent individuals,” 

fails because he was found not credible in the underlying 

proceedings. The BIA did not err in finding that Rahman’s 

letters from family members and friends were insufficient to 

overcome that prior adverse credibility determination. See 

Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(holding that the BIA may decline to credit documentary 

evidence submitted with a motion to reopen if it has 

“legitimate concerns about [the petitioner’s] credibility” 

based on a previous adverse credibility determination and the 

petitioner offers no other corroborating evidence); see also

Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We 

generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to 

be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”). 

 Thus, on this record, the agency was not compelled to 

conclude that Rahman’s evidence reflected a change in 

conditions material to his fear of harm or his prima facie 

eligibility for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) 

(“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 
6

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary.”); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 157-58. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk