alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1480.401 Requirement to give preference to Indian Economic Enterprises. ( a ) IA must use the negotiation authority of the Buy Indian Act to give preference to Indians or Federally Recognized Tribes whenever the use of that authority is practicable. The Buy Indian Act provides that so far as may be practicable, Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products (including, but not limited to printing, notwithstanding any other law) of Indian industry may be made in open market at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. Thus, IA may use the Buy Indian Act to give preference to IEEs through set-asides when acquiring supplies, general services, A&E services, or construction to meet IA needs and requirements. All other FAR and DIAR requirements that do not conflict with this part, such as requirements applicable to the acquisition of A&E and construction services, remain applicable.
( b ) The Buy Indian Act does not apply when a supply requirement can be met by existing inventories of the requiring agency or excess from other agencies.
( c ) The CO will give priority to ISBEEs for all purchases, regardless of dollar value. COs when prioritizing ISBEEs may consider either: ( 1 ) A set-aside for ISBEEs; or
( 2 ) A sole source award to an ISBEE, as authorized under the FAR.
( d ) If the CO determines after market research that there is no reasonable expectation of obtaining offers that will be competitive in terms of market price, quality, and delivery, the CO may consider either: ( 1 ) A set-aside for IEEs; or
( 2 ) A sole source award to an IEE, as authorized under the FAR.
( e ) If the CO determines after market research that there is no reasonable expectation of obtaining offers that will be competitive in terms of market price, quality, and delivery from ISBEEs or IEEs, then the CO must follow the Deviation process under 1480.403.
( f ) When only one offer is received from a responsible IEE in response to an acquisition set-aside or direct negotiation under paragraph (c)(1) or (d)(1) of this section: ( 1 ) If the offer is not at a reasonable and fair market price, then the CO may negotiate with that enterprise for a reasonable and fair market price.
( 2 ) If the offer is at a reasonable and fair market price, then the CO must: ( i ) Make an award to that enterprise;
( ii ) Document the reason only one offer was considered; and
( iii ) Initiate action to increase competition in future solicitations.
( g ) If the offers received from one or more responsible IEEs in response to an acquisition set-aside under paragraph (c)(1) or (d)(1) of this section are not reasonable or otherwise unacceptable, then the CO must follow the deviation process under 1480.403. The CO must document in the deviation determination the reasons why the IEE offeror(s) were not reasonable or otherwise unacceptable. ( 1 ) If a deviation determination is approved, the CO must cancel the set-aside solicitation and inform all offerors in writing.
( 2 ) When the solicitation of the same requirement is posted, the CO must inform all previous offerors in writing of the solicitation number.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 21, 2009 

s1214 

Order 

 

December 21, 2009 

139066 

TOWNSHIP OF SCIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139066 

 COA: 289816 

Washtenaw CC: 96-006655-CE 

ERNEST BATESON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 8, 2009 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>                         0000318852
<NAME>                        COLORADO WYOMING RESERVE COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1
<CURRENCY>                                U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                             208
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,708
<PP&E>                                         577,678
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (13,885)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 565,501
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          158,270
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       106,077
<OTHER-SE>                                     301,154
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   565,501
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   93,869
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (445,441)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (445,441)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (445,441)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.04)



</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Elizabeth Probert, as Executrix of Emma C. Hoffman, Deceased, and for Emma C. Hoffman, as Trustee under Trust Created under the Will of Joseph Hoffman, Deceased, Respondent. Harold S. Laws, as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Hoffman, Deceased, et al., Appellants. Lois B. Gammons et al., *Respondents.*

*Per Curiam.*

These are appeals from those portions of a decree of the Surrogate of Schenectady County which denied requests for allowances for legal services rendered in connection with construction proceedings and which directed distribution by the accounting fiduciary to the personal representatives -of certain estates rather than to the persons under the various estates that might he entitled to receive such assets. Two issues were presented for construction, the time of vesting of the principal of the trust in question and apportionment between principal and income of certain General Electric Company stock. As to the first issue the Surrogate impliedly found no occasion for controversy and all of the parties agreed that such principal would vest at the testator’s death. As to the second issue the Surrogate merely applied the distinction between shares of stock distributed as a result of a stock split-up and a stock dividend as authoritatively defined in *Matter of Fosdick*(4 N Y 2d 646, 653). The correctness of the Surrogate’s determination is not disputed; the issue is confined to the denial of allowances. The Surrogate stated: “In view of the nature of the problems before me, the numerous counsel, the duplication of counsel’s efforts and the fact that a sizeable number of respondent-beneficiaries are not represented by personal counsel, the requests of counsel are denied.” Whether we agree or not with the disposition of the application for reasonable allowances, we cannot say there was an improvident exercise of the discretion conferred on the Surrogate by section 278 of the Surrogate’s Court Act. *Matter of Booth*(18 A D 2d 985, affd. 14 N Y 2d 554) may be distinguished. In that case the Surrogate in the exercise of Ms discretion granted allowances and the Appellate Division modi*736fled by increasing .the attorneys’ fees allowed. However, in *Booth*it was contended that language in the will manifested a treatment contrary to the *Fosdick*rule. Moreover, putting aside that distinction, the Surrogate, having exercised his discretion to grant allowances, was required in the proper exercise of further discretion to make allowances that were not unreasonable. As to the remaining issue on appeal the Surrogate correctly provided in the decree that the distribution of assets should be made to the legal representatives of the estates of any remaindermen who did not survive the life estate. Decree affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents filing briefs payable from the trust estate. Herlihy, J. P., Reynolds, Taylor, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 31.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, James J. Polakiewicz, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A-1 of Alpha Technologies Group,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) (Intentionally left blank)

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


/s/ James J. Polakiewicz
----------------------------
James J. Polakiewicz
Chief Financial Officer
May 14, 2004
EX-10.2



 







Exhibit 10.2




MODIFICATION AGREEMENT




     THIS MODIFICATION AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is made at Cleveland, Ohio, this 3rd day of
April, 2006, between PARAGON REAL ESTATE EQUITY AND INVESTMENT TRUST, a Maryland business trust
(the “Trust”), and JOHN J DEE, 26151 Pebblebrook Lane, North Olmsted, OH 44070 (“Dee”).



WITNESSETH:




     WHEREAS, the Trust previously entered into an Employment Agreement dated March 4, 2003
(“Employment Agreement”) with Dee;



     WHEREAS, at the time set forth herein, Dee holds the offices of Trustee, Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial of the Trust;



     WHEREAS, Dee is expected to devote time to the business and objectives of the Trust; and



     WHEREAS, the Trust and Dee desire to enter into this Agreement pursuant to which the Trust
will continue to employ Dee and Dee will serve the Trust;



     NOW, THEREFORE, the Trust and Dee, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants
herein contained, agree as follows:



     Sections 2(c) and 2(d) shall be deleted from the Employment Agreement and the following
substituted:



     2. POSITION, DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES.




       (c) At all times during the Contract Period, Dee shall use his best efforts
to direct the business and objectives of the Trust. Nothing in this Agreement
shall preclude Dee from devoting time to charitable and community activities,
service on boards of other companies (public or private), or any other business
or personal investment.




       (d) The duties to be performed by Dee under this Agreement shall be
performed primarily in the United States, except for travel outside the United
States incident to his performance of services hereunder.


The remaining provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged.




 









 








     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been signed by the Trust and Dee as of the date first
above written.



	 	 	 	 	 
	PARAGON REAL ESTATE EQUITY AND INVESTMENT TRUST  
	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	     /s/ Daryl J. Carter	 	 
	 

	 	 	 
	Title:

	 	     Trustee	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	     /s/ John J. Dee	 	 
	 

	 	 	 
	 

	 	     John J. Dee
#### Bella Davis, Respondent, v Michael Melnicke, Respondent, and Naftali Weisz et al., Nonparty Appellants.

[832 NYS2d 437]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered February 3, 2006, which denied a motion by nonparties Weisz and the Kollel to modify petitioner’s subpoena with respect to three of the seven categories of documents sought, and granted petitioner’s cross motion to compel compliance therewith, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The credibility and good faith of the subpoenaed parties are at issue here, and the materials sought are a legitimate subject of that inquiry. We have considered appellants’ remaining arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Andrias, J.E, Nardelli, Williams and Catterson, JJ.
#### Owens *v.*The State.

December 10, 1912.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Boañ. Fulton superior court. August 31, 1912.

*John W. Gox,*for plaintiff in error. *T. S. Felder, attorney-general, U. M. Dorsey, solicitor-general,*and *F. A. Stephens,*contra.

Evans, P. J.

1. Where the court defines direct and circumstantial evidence and gives an instruction, that, “before the jury would be authorized to convict upon circumstantial evidence alone, the proven facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of the defendant’s guilt, but should exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused,” the omission of the court to instruct in so many words that the defendant’s guilt was sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence is not sufficient ground for new trial.

2. There was no error in receiving in evidence an affidavit made by one of the defendant’s witnesses previously to the trial, which was contradictory of lier evidence delivered at the trial; nor in instructing the jury that such affidavit should not be considered as evidence of any statement which it contained, but only as impeaching evidénee, bearing on the credibility of that particular witness.

3. The charge on the prisoner’s statement was in substantial accord with the statute; the evidence did not authorize an instruction on the law of voluntary manslaughter; the evidence supports the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES 

July 8, 2020 

Honorable Carey Wright 

State Superintendent of Education 

Mississippi Department of Education 

P.O. Box 771 

Jackson, Mississippi 39205 

cwright@mdek12.org 

Dear State Superintendent Wright: 

This letter grants final approval under Section 421(b) of the General Education Provisions Act 

for grant award H027A180108 and H173A180113. 

The Department received your June 9, 2020 request on behalf of the Mississippi Department of

Education for a waiver extending the period of availability for Federal fiscal year (FFY) 2018 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B grant award funds. 

With this approval, the FFY 2018 IDEA Part B grant award funds will be available for obligation 

through September 30, 2021 and may be liquidated through December 30, 2021. 

Please contact your Office of Special Education Programs State Lead, Josiah Willey, at 

Josiah.Willey@ed.gov if you have any questions. 

Sincerely, 

/s/

Mark Schultz 

Commissioner, Rehabilitation Services Administration.

Delegated the authority to perform the functions and duties 

of the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Special 

Education and Rehabilitative Services.

cc: State Director 

400 MARYLAND AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202-2600 

www.ed.gov 

The Department of Education’s mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness 

by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.
#### 222.101-1 General.

Follow the procedures at PGI 222.101-1 for referral of labor relations matters to the appropriate authorities.

[71 FR 18670, Apr. 12, 2006]
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 7789** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. IVORY RONZELL WILLIAMS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. ( 3:06

- cr - 00209

- REP

- 1; 3:12

- cv - 00051

- REP )

Submitted : April 16, 2015 Decided: April 20, 2015

Before AGEE and KEEN AN , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Ivory Ronzell Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Daniel Cooke, Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Michael C. Wallace, Sr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ivory Ronzell Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

con stitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional clai ms is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and the informal appellate brief and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a c ertificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### H IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30764 c/w No. 10-30800 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JULIUS WALKER, Defendant-Appellant Cons. w/ No. 10-30800 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JOHNNY RAY HARPER, Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:09-CR-164-4 USDC No. 5:09-CR-164-7
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D June 17, 2011 Lyle W. Cayce ClerkNo. 10-30764 c/w No. 10-30800

2 Julius Walker and Johnny Ray H arper appeal their sentences following guilty pleas toconspiracy todistribute 50grams or more ofcocaine base. Walker
was sentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the lowest sentence in his advisory sentencing guidelines range, while Harper received a 240-month statutory minimum sentence due to a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 815. Walker argues that his sentence is unfair due to the disparity in punishments for crack and powder cocaine offenses in effect at the time of his sentencing. He raised this issue at sentencing, but the district court concluded that regardless ofthe disparity, a 188-month sentencewas appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) due toquantity ofdrugs involved, his role in the conspiracy, and his previous crimi nal history. He has not shown that this sentence is unreasonable. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 526 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008). We find no merit in Walker’s alternative contention that he should be resentenced pursuant to the amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that became effective on November 1, 2010. See United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2007); U nited States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1216 (5th Cir. 1996). Harper argues that his sentence should be vacated because the Fair Sentencing Act o

f 2010 applies retroactively to persons on direct appeal; however, he correctly concedes that the argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the defendants’ sentences are AFFIRMED.