IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHERRI A. STARK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

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No. 12 C 3427

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Sherri Stark’s claims for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment [Doc. No. 15] is granted in part and denied in part, and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied.

BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2009, Stark filed a claim for disability benefits, alleging 

disability since March 21, 2009 due to degenerative disk disease, disk bulging, 

ankle enthesopathy following numerous surgeries, spinal pain, and fibromyalgia.

1 Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for her predecessor, Michael J. Astrue, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

 
The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which she timely 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held 

on November 18, 2010. Claimant personally appeared and testified at the hearing 

and was represented by a non-attorney representative. Medical expert Bernard 

Stevens, M.D. and vocational expert Edward Steffan also testified.

On January 12, 2011, the ALJ denied Claimant’s claim for benefits, finding

her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Claimant’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

The ALJ found at step one that Stark had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since her alleged onset date of March 21, 2009. At step two, the ALJ 

concluded that Claimant had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the 

lumbar spine, fibromyalgia, status post multiple foot surgeries for neuromas and 

bone deformities, and depression. The ALJ concluded at step three that her

impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a Listing. The 

ALJ then determined that Stark retained the RFC to perform sedentary work with 

limitations on climbing, exposure to unprotected heights or uneven terrain. In 

addition, Plaintiff was limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks without 

specification as to the number of steps required to complete the task; low stress 

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work with only occasional changes in the work setting; and only occasional 

interaction with coworkers. At step five, based upon the VE's testimony and Stark’s 

age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Claimant can 

perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a 

finding that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant 

presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the 

claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 

(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a 

finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Id. 

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Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts 

to the Commissioner to show the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing 

in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, 

resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d 

at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 

ALJ’s decision must be affirmed even if “’reasonable minds could differ’” as long as 

“the decision is adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in 

the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning 

behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th 

Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an 

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accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d 

at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence 

with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex 

rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 

F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before 

drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we 

can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 

2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Stark argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) it erroneously adopted the testimony of the medical expert over the 

opinions of her treating physicians; and (2) it failed to properly evaluate her 

credibility.

Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to follow the “treating physician rule” by 

not appropriately weighing the opinion of her treating physicians, instead giving too 

much weight to Dr. Stevens, the testifying expert. An ALJ must give controlling 

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weight to a treating physician’s opinion if the opinion is both “well-supported” and 

“not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c); see Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ must 

also “offer good reasons for discounting” the opinion of a treating physician. 

Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); 

Scott, 647 F.3d at 739. The regulations require the ALJ to consider a variety of 

factors, including: (1) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; 

(2) the frequency of examination; (3) the physician’s specialty; (4) the types of tests 

performed; and (5) the consistency and support for the physician’s opinion. See id. 

Dr. Jennifer Crane had seen Plaintiff since 2008 for multiple medical issues. 

On December 13, 2009, Stark reported to Dr. Crane that her back was worsening 

and she was having difficulty working. However, she again reported that 

manipulation was helping her back pain. (R. 515.) Dr. Crane submitted a letter 

dated November 25, 2009 stating that she recommends that Stark “quit working as 

of December 4th, 2009 due to chronic medical illness.” (R. 550.) Dr. Crane’s

December 31, 2009 notes state that Stark’s “[c]hronic back pain is stabilized again 

but still severe.” (R. 510.) They also reflect Dr. Crane’s earlier recommendation 

“that [Stark] stop work due to pain associated with working. Had to stop her other 

job already.” (R. 511.) The notes further recommended that Stark use an exercise 

bike. (Id.)

Dr. Crane submitted another letter dated May 12, 2010, stating that Stark 

had “severe myalgia and cervical and lumbar dysfunction” and that “[s]he is unable 

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to work at any type of occupation now due to severe foot, back and neck pain. She is 

unable to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time and due to medications which 

she is taking for these conditions she must use caution if she drives. I have advised 

her on multiple occas[ ]ions that I do not recommend she work. I do not feel she is 

able and feel that working has and will exacerbate her symptoms and cause decline 

of her disease.” (R. 549.)

In assigning no weight to Dr. Crane’s opinions, the ALJ stated that her 

statements were conclusory and not consistent with the medical record, including 

Dr. Crane’s own records. Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Crane’s 

recommendation that Plaintiff walk daily (and Plaintiff’s report that it helped her) 

to be inconsistent with a claim of total disability. The ALJ was correct in finding 

that Dr. Crane’s ultimate conclusion that Stark was “unable to work” does not 

entitle her to benefits, as the issue of disability is reserved solely for the 

Commissioner. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. However, the analysis does not end 

there, because even if a treater’s opinion is not given controlling weight, an ALJ 

must still determine what value the assessment does merit. Scott, 647 F.3d at 740; 

Campbell, 627 F.3d at 308. In this case, the ALJ did not adequately discuss Dr. 

Crane’s opinion with respect to the exacerbation of her pain and other symptoms as 

well as the side effects of Stark’s medications.2 For example, the fact that Dr. Crane 

recommended that Stark walk for exercise did not, by itself, suggest that Stark 

could do so for up to two hours in a workday. In addition, although the medical 

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 At the time of the hearing, Stark’s medications included two narcotic pain relievers, a 

Fentanyl patch and Norco (hydrocodone/acetaminophen); a muscle relaxer; Lyrica; and

anti-depressants.

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expert opined that the side effects would not interfere with her ability to work, his 

statement that “the side effects that make you drowsy and such usually wear off 

after you’ve been on a medication for a couple of months,” (R. 75-76), was itself 

conclusory and did not refer to any particular medications Plaintiff was taking or 

explain the basis for his blanket assessment. 

Similarly, the ALJ did not adequately assess Plaintiff’s credibility with 

respect to her subjective claims of disabling pain. An ALJ=s credibility 

determination is granted substantial deference by a reviewing court unless it is 

Apatently wrong@ and not supported by the record. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 

843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000); see also 

Elder, 529 F.3d 413 (holding that in assessing the credibility finding, courts do not 

review the medical evidence de novo but “merely examine whether the ALJ’s 

determination was reasoned and supported”). However, an ALJ must give specific 

reasons for discrediting a claimant=s testimony, and A[t]hose reasons must be 

supported by record evidence and must be >sufficiently specific to make clear to the 

individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the 

individual=s statements and the reasons for that weight.=@ Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539-40 

(quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88); see SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 

(S.S.A. 1996). Pursuant to SSR 96-7p(4),3 a claimant=s statements about the 

intensity or persistence of symptoms cannot be disregarded solely because they are 

3 Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Regulations (ASSR@), do not have force of 

law but are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. ' 402.35(b)(1); accord Lauer 

v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).

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not substantiated by objective medical evidence. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 

646 (7th Cir. 2012). When evaluating a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must also 

consider A(1) the claimant=s daily activity; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity 

of pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and 

side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions.@ See Scheck v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2004); see SSR 96-7p at *3. When the claimant attends 

an administrative hearing, the ALJ “may also consider his or her own recorded 

observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the credibility of 

the individual=s statements.” SSR 96-7p at *5.

The ALJ was “not persuaded that the claimant’s intense episodes of pain 

have been so frequent or long lasting that they have precluded all work at all 

exertional levels at all times material to this decision. Although the claimant has 

received treatment for the allegedly disabling impairments, that treatment has 

been essentially routine and/or conservative in nature. Additionally, the claimant 

has described daily activities which are not limited to the extent one would expect, 

given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” (R. 39-40.)

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Plaintiff’s complaints of daily pain are not contradicted by her medical 

history, and the ALJ’s credibility determination failed to identify any of her daily 

activities that are inconsistent with the level of pain claimed, let alone consistent 

with the ability to perform competitive work without being off task for substantial 

periods of time.4 See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (finding that an ALJ failed to explain 

how a claimant’s daily activities were inconsistent with the medical record). Indeed, 

the only daily activities mentioned in the ALJ’s opinion were cooking and doing 

housework at her own pace, walking her dog, and sitting for fifteen to twenty 

minutes at a time and walking slowly for two blocks. The ALJ also noted that Stark 

had trouble sleeping due to an inability to lie flat, increased difficulty standing and 

moving around or performing personal care and household chores, and rarely drove 

due to the side effects of her medication. It is unclear which of these daily activities 

led the ALJ to conclude that Stark could stand and walk for up to two hours in an 

eight-hour workday without being off task. On remand, the ALJ is directed to more 

thoroughly analyze Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and the side effects of her 

medications, as they relate to her ability to perform even sedentary work.

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 The vocational expert testified that there would be no jobs in the economy for a person 

who would need more than a ten to fifteen minute break, other than the lunch break; could 

not work two hours at a time; and would need more than eight to ten days off in the course 

of a year. (R. 80.)

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 

15] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should 

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: January 22, 2015 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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