### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE N ove mb er

6, 200 8 S es sio n

TOT AL BUI LDI NG MAINT ENANCE, INC., v. J & J CONTRACTORS /RAI NES BROT HERS, a Jo in t Ventu re, J & J CON TRA CTO RS , IN ., RA INES BR OTHER S, INC ., ST. PA UL FIR E & MA RIN E INS UR AN CE COM PA NY , and FID ELITY & D EP OSIT C O. OF MARYLAND

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Hamilton Coun ty No. 06-0227 Hon. W. Frank Brown, III, Ch ancellor

No. E2008-00678-COA- R3-CV - FILED MARC H 13, 2009

In t his action plainti ff sued for money ow ed under its subcontract with the de fenda nt contrac tor. The defe ndants’ contr actor

denied liability, rai s ed as aff irmative def

enses, wa iver/estoppel, unc lean hands and br eac h of contra ct, filed a counter -cla im alleging that plaintiff failed to complete its work in a timely a nd proper manner and permitted the roof to be harme d by others during the c onstruction and gene rally fa iled to cooper ate. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge deter mined that both parties had br eac hed the contrac t, that plaintiff was guilty of unclean hands, denied both parties

a ny re c ov e ry a nddis mis se d th e c a se . O n a pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., and D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., joined.

Ti mothy M. Gi bb on s, Chatta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt.

Ra nd y W ils on a ndRob e rt F. Pa rs le y, Chatta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lle e s.

OP IN ION-2- Plaintiff in this action alleg ed that it was owed money for work perf ormed on the ne w headqua rters for t he Electric P ower Boa rd i n Chattanoog a. F urther, that defe ndants J &J Contractors and Raines B rothers, Inc., (he reina fter “ contra ctor” ) for med a joint vent u re t o act a s g ener al

con t ractor for the construction proje ct, and that unnamed def endants we re the perf

ormanc e bond sureties.

Plaintiff aver red that it entered into two contra cts with contrac tor to work as a roofing

su bc on tr a c tor

on thi s pr oje c t, and a tta c he d c op ie s of the su bc on tr a c t a g re e me nts and a lle g e d that it had a numbe r of disputes with contra ctor reg arding the fact that contra ctor soug ht to hold plainti ff liable for da

mag e ca used by other pa rties to the work pe rfor

med by plaintiff.

Plai n t i ff ch ar ged that contr actor also tried to incre ase the scope of the work, a

nd

re fu se d to e xec ute c ha

ng e or de rs fo r t

he a dd iti on a l w or

k. Pla int if

f as se rt e d tha t it ha d co mpl e te d a ll of t h e work, but had not be en fully paid, and wa s owed $193,000.00, be cause contra ctor ha d br e a c he d th e c on tr a c t, i nte rf e re d w iththe c on tr a c t and br e a c he d c ov e na

nts of good faith a

nd fa ir d ea l i n g.

Plaintiff later amended its Complaint to add St . Paul Fire & Ma rine I n s u ra nce Company and F idelity

& D eposit Company

of Mar y land, as sure ties on the bonds.

De fe nd ants ans we re d, de ny i n g a ny l i a b i l i t y , p l e a d i n g

w a i v e r / e s t op pe l, u

nc le an h a nd s, brea ch of contrac t, comparative fault, lac hes, insufficie ncy of proc ess, etc. D efe ndants also filed a Counterclaim asse rting that plaintiff had failed to complete its work in a ti mely and prope r manne r, failed to insure t h at t h e ro o f was inspected by a re prese ntative of the ma nufac turer to obtain a

war ranty , permitted the roof

to be harme d by others during construction, and w ithheld nece ssary lien rele ases. De fenda

nts attache d an Interim Ag ree ment which the pa rties had e x ecute d.

Pla int if f f ile d a Re ply to C ounte rc la im, de nyingit h a d b re a c he d any of its responsibilities, and the ca se we nt to trial before the Trial Judge on November 27-30, 2007.

The Tr ial Court filed a Memor andum Opinion, and found t h at plaintiff was the roofingsubcontrac tor on the newEPB off ice building in d owntown Chattanoog a, and that the defe ndant joint venture was the gene ral contractor on the projec t. The Court found that the pa rties

an d t h e a rc h i t ec tal l agr ee d

t h e r o o f i n s t al l at i o nb ega nt o o ea rl y , an d t h at t h e co n t ra ct o r wa s i nch ar ge of sche duling the w ork, and did a sk plaintiff to install the roof ea rlier than nor

mal, but that the
contra ctor contended that plainti ff wa s supposed to protect its work. The Court said that other par ties

wer e still working in the roof are a, and that the roof w as dama g ed by water , and par

t of it had to be

re pla c e d. Th e Court

fo un d th a t th e ro of

ingmanu fa c tur e r, Ga

rl and Com pa ny , w ou ld n ot w arr a nty the roof until a se cond ca p sheet wa s installed over the init i al o n e, and that plainti ff c laimed defe ndants owed the m for this installation. The Court found that plaintiff also cla imed to be owed for a ll the repa ir work to the r oof.-3- The Court found that Marvin C ornelison, president of Raines B rothers, te stified that

ev ery o n e h adre s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r da m agi n g t h e ro o f, an d t h e co mp an y t h at ca u s ed t h e m o s td am age

wa s Sta le y

Marb le & Gr anit e, I nc ., the su bc on tr a c tor . T he Court

fo un d th e c on tr a c tor

wi thh e ld $3 2, 32 8. 00 fr om S ta le y ’s fi na l pay me nt to co ve r ro of dama g e s, and that th e c on tr a c tor e xpla ine d in

a le tt e r to St a le y th a t th is w a s 2 0 % o f th e a mo u n t in v o ic e d f o r r e p a ir s b y p la in ti f

f ($161,638.00)
, beca use the c ontrac tor assesse d that Staley was responsible for 20% of t he roof damag e. The Court found there was no evidenc e that any other sub wa s back- char g ed for roof damag e, and the re w ere pictures in evide nce of

other subs workingon the roof, w hich could have cause d damag e.

Th e Court fo un d that the e vid e nc e wa s c le ar that pla int if f ha d to sh are in the bla

me for pa rt of the r oof dama g e, as the re w as proof that it had failed to properly install an ice a

nd water shield in one are a, and w ater damag e re sulted, and there was a lso proof of imprope rly installed flashing , as we l l as d am ag e ca used by improper pr eca

utions by plaintiff’s employ ees, a

nd that plaintiff was la

rg ely responsible for

the re pair wor

k neede d on the roof.

The Co u rt f

o u n d th e c o n tr a c to r a g r e e d to p ay p la in ti f f f o r c e rta in r e p a ir w o rk, and asked pla intiff to ide ntify its c osts a ssociated with the same, by providing invoices, time ca rds, etc., b u t t h at p l aintiff neve r complied with this reque st until late in the discove ry proce ss, and did not provide a brea kdown re g ardingwhich invoices w ere related to which wor k

. T h e C o urt held that
reg ardingthe sec ond cap she et, plaintiff provide d a quote f o r t he wor

k of $86,779.00, but the
contra ctor g ot a quote fr om another for $47,000.00 for the same work. The Court found t hat plaintiff

was d ir e c te d to d o th e w o r k p u r s u an t to th e s u

b c o n tr a c t, an d to k e e p d e ta il e d c o s t r e c ords on the work, b u t p la in ti f

f f a il e d in th is r e g ar d

. T h e Co u rt s a id th e p la in ti f f w a s r e p e a te d ly a s ked by the
contra ctor to itemize its expenses related to the second c ap shee t, and the contr actor ref ere nced the
contra ct re quirements (f

ound in the Supplementary Conditi ons) re g ardingfinanc ial information

ne e de d to c on sid e r a

c ha ng e or de r. Th e Court

he ld t hat pl a in ti ff nev e r p ro vid e d a c tua l c os t information, althoug h it did provide a couple of estimates.

The Court obser

ved that the plaintiff’s cre dibilit y was damag ed by

the cha ng ing
nature of its p o s i tion reg ardingthe ac tual costs associate d with the second c ap shee t, and that plaintiff’s invoices a

ppear ed to be “padded”
, e.g ., the re pair a ssociated with one ba lcony roof wa s billed to the contrac tor three differ ent times.

The Court observed t hat pl aintiff’s c laim was primar ily based upon the testimony of Mr. Whitm ore, a

nd his credibility

was damag ed in seve ral wa y s, and set for

th examples.

The Co u rt deter

mined that it would deny rec overy to plaintiff beca

use Whitm ore admitted that plaintiff re ceive d formal, wr itten chang e orde rs for some extra work, and that it was paid for that work; plaintiff did not rec eive c hang e ord er s for the disputed r epair work nor the second c ap shee t, and s hould not have perfor med t he wor

k without chang e orde rs. The Court found that reg ardingthe sec ond cap she et, plaintiff wa s told to keep detailed c ost recor ds, but did not, and pla int if f c ou ld n ot p ro ve the a c tua l c os ts w ithre g ard to any sp eci fi c wo rk , a

nd c ou ld n ot e xpla in billing discre pancie s. Plain t i ff admitted responsibilit y for f ailing to pr otect the f

ield laps on the-4-

balconies, but did not de duct for the repa irs to the same, a nd failed to produc e docume ntation for a long pe riod of time, and a s a re sult was g uilty of uncle an hands. F i n all y , the Court found that plaintiff was se eking quantum meruit rec overy , and quantum mer uit recove ry should not be base d on the value of

the servic es of the one performing the s ame, but should instead be ba sed on the va lue of the be nefit confe rre d. The Court he ld the re was no proof of the bene fit confe rre d on the contra ctor by the re pair wor

k or the extra cap sheet. Moreove r, plaintiff failed to a dequate ly prove the value of its se rv ic e s.

The Court also denie d the contra ctor’s c o u nte r c la im
, f

in d in g that it had failed to prove that plaintiff was c ontrac tually liable. Reg arding attorney ’s fee s, the Court f ound that plaintiff was

no t e nti tle d to an a

wa rd of at to rn e y ’s fe e s, be c a

us e mos t of

the tim e sp e nt o n th e c a se wa s d ue to pla int if f’ s unw ill ing ne ss t o a c c e pt r e sp on sib ili ty fo r a ny dama g e to t

he ro of , a nd its un wi lli ng ne ss to produce its actual costs re lating to t h e wo rk

. The Court also denie d the contra ctor’s c laim for attorney ’s fe es, and or dere d that the contra ctor pa y plaintiff the balance due on the adjusted c ontrac t price upon plaintiff’s satisfa ctory completion of the punc h list and rece ipt of the war ranty , but dismiss ed the r emainder

of plaintiff’s c laims with prejudice.

Both pa rties filed Motions to A lte r or Ame nd the J udg ment, and the Tr ial Court found that considering the “big picture”
, plaintiff was g uilty of unclea n hands, and thus should be de nied all relief

.
Reg ardingthe contra ctor’s motion, the Court also denied r ecove ry beca use the Court fo un d th a t th e ro of

was begun too e arl y , a nd fu rt he r f ound the c on tr a c tor

a lso bo re so me responsibil ity

in protecting the roof w ork. The Court r eaf firmed its denial of attorney fee s to the

c on tr a c tor , fin din g that both pa rt ie s b re a c he d th e ir

a g re e me nt, c on c lud ingthat bo th p art ie s sh ou ld be lef t where they

are

.

Nume ro us iss ue s h a ve be e n p re se nte d o n a pp e a l, a s f

oll ow s:

1. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rred by a

pp lyingthe wr on g le g a l st and a rd in analy zing extra-contr actua l work by requiringclea

r and c onvincing proof?

2. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in mis a pp lyingthe le g a l st and ard s g e ne ra lly applicable to quantum meruit claims by requiringactua l pay

ment by the

ow ne r t o th e c on tr a c tor

fo r e xtra wo rk pe rf or me d b y TB M?

3

. W h et h er t h e Tr i al C o u rt erre d i nap p l y i n g co n t ra ct t er m s as s u m i n g a c h an ge dir e c tiv e or

a c ha ng e or de r, ne ith e r o f wh ic h exist e d an d for wh ic h d e fe nd a nts prese nted no proof?

4. Whether the Tr ial Court erre d in ruling cost information was withheld instead of ac knowledg ing that counsel were in ag ree ment on the produc tion of do c ume nts ?-5- 5. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t ig no re d th e e xten siv e pr oo f o n c os ts a nd the tim e lin e of the pr oje c t?

6. Whether the Court’s fa ctual ana ly sis is contrary to the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e?

7. Whether the Court er red in foc using on a

conver sation not taken ser iously by

any pa rt y and e le vatin g it t o o ne of

the Court ’s ke y

fi nd ing s?

8. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d b y fa ili ngto r

ule on TBM’ s e nti tle me nt t o relief based on the theory

of ca rdinal cha ng e?

9. Whe the r t

he Court e rr e d in fa ili ngto g ra

nt T B M a ne w tri a l?

10

. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t pr op e rl y de nie d d e fe nd ants ’ c la im f or a tto rn e y s f

e e s,

and wh e the r t he y are e nti tle d to re c ov e r f

e e s a nd c os ts o n a

pp e a l?

Pla int if f a rgue s th a t th e Tr ia l Co ur t a pp lie d th e wr on g sta

ndard in ana ly

zingits quantum meruit claim, as the T rial Court requir ed the claim to be prove n by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. What the Trial Court actua lly said, howeve r, was that damag es needed to be pr oven by showing “ac tual documented e x penses” , not that it was requiringclea r and c onvincin g evidenc e. Th e Tr ia l Co ur

t e xpla ine d th at, even if pl a int if f’ s c la ims we re no t ba

rr e d b y its un c le an h a nd s, plaintiff did not prove its damag es in quantum merui t beca use there was no a dequate proof of the benef it confer red on the contra ctor, nor pla intiff’s ac tual costs. Th er e i s n o adequate proof of the value of plaintiff’s ser

vices. The rec ords /invoices supplied are ambig uous, contradic tory , and difficult to deciphe r. The e vidence does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the Trial Judge’ s determination. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Pla int if f f ur the r a rgue s th a t th e Tr ia l Co ur

t er re d in re qu ir ing it to show the be ne fi t confe rre d by

showing actua l pay

ment to the contra ctor by the owner

for the e x tra wor

k perf ormed by pla int if f. Pla int if

f a g a in misc ha

ra c te ri zes the Tr ia l Cour

t’ s o pin ion . T he Court

e xpla ine d th a t, in Tennesse e, an a

war d in quantum meruit is based on the va lue of the be nefit conf err ed rather than the value of

the servic es to the one perf orming the service s. Citi ng Parris Roofing & Sheetme tal Co. v. SCR Elec tric, Inc. , 2007 WL 596396 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 27, 2007). The Court then noted the fac t that the owner did not pay the contractor any additional money as a result of the “ extra” work. Moreove r, pl aintiff had not shown any proof of what it s service s were worth, thus resulting in the Court’s conclusion that there was no proof of a be nefit conf

err ed.

I n any event, plaintiff’ s arguments reg ardingquantum meruit are larg ely moot given the Tr ia l Cour

t’ s fin din g that pla int if

f wa s g uil ty of

un c le an h and s. Qu antum me ru it i s an e qu ita ble

rem edy
, and re qu ir e s th a t a pa rt y se e kin g to r e ly

up on it mus t be a

ble to “ ov e rc ome the e qu ita ble ‘lac k of cle an hands’ defe nse.” Castelli v. Li en , 910 S.W .2d 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Also see, Hogue v . Kroger Co. , 373 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1963)

.-6- Next, plainti ff a

rg ues the Tr ial Court err ed in quot ing pr ovisions of the contrac t that de a l w ithc ha

ng e dir e c tiv e s/c ha

ng e or de rs , w he n th e re wa s no c ha ng e dir e c tiv e /or de r a

pp lic a ble to this work. Plaintiff cites to pag es in the re cord, w here in the Trial C ourt does gene rally discuss the require ments for a chang e order, etc., but the Trial Court did not find that a cha ng e orde r wa s issued. I n fac t, the Trial Court found that a chang e order was not issued for the work (as had bee n done for other “ extra” work in the pa rties’ prior

dealing s) and this should have be en a re d flagto plaintiff not
to co ntinue with the work until an under standing was re ache d. The Court ana logized the documentation re quired for a cha ng e orde r to that which was reque sted by the contra ctor for

the extra work, a nd pointed out that plaintiff was spec ifically asked to keep records of its actua l costs relate d
to the se c on d c a

p sh e e t, bu t fa ile d to do so . T he Cou rt fu rt he r o bs e rv e d th a t if

pla int if f e xpe c te d to be pa id f or the wo rk , it sh ou ld have e xpe c te d to have to s ub sta nti ate its c os ts i nv olv e d, bu t f a ile d to do so e ith e r b e fo re or

duri ngtr ia l. T he re is n o e rr or in t he Tr ia l Co ur

t’ s a na ly sis

. Next, plainti ff a

rg ues the Tr ial Court erre d in finding that cost informati o n was withheld, rathe r than a cknowledg ing that counsel had a g ree d on a ce rtain date for the pr oduction of do c ume nts . Pl a int if

f a rgue s it sh ou ld no t be pe na lize d f or the tim e it t oo k to pr ov ide the do c ume nts in discovery , as it is undisput ed that the doc um en t s we re provided on a date a g ree d upon by

the attorney s for a

mutual document exchang e.

What the Tri al Court found, howeve r, wa s that backup c ost documentation was
repe atedly reque sted by the contra ctor, and was ne ver pr ovided in an ef fort to substantiate plaintiff’ s

e xpe ns e s in

do ingthi s w or

k, wh ic h, the or e tic a lly , co uld have pr ov ide d a

ba sis fo r r e so lut ion

of the se iss ue s w ith ou t go ing to co ur t. Th e c on tr a c tor pr e se nte d nume ro us le tte rs and e ma ils re qu e sti ngthi s documentation, but it was undisputed that this was neve r provided be fore d i s co v er y i n this case. Whil e it appea

rs that the docume nt exchang e wa s handled in a timely fashion once t he ca se re ache d the discover

y phase, this does not cha ng e the f act that the d o cu m ents clea rly could have been provided sooner , as re quested by the contra ctor in an eff

ort to determine if pla intiff could be pa id for its wo rk

. Pla int if

f’ s f a ilure to c oo pe rate on ly

le ng the ne d th e pr oc e ss a

nd str e ng the ne d th e anim os ity betwee n the par

ties, as the Tria l Court found. The fa ct that the discove ry proce ss was handle d on schedule does not excuse the fa ct that plaintiff could have provided the infor mation sooner if it had

so e le c te d. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot pr e po nd e ra te a g a ins t the Tr ia l Co ur

t’ s f ind ing . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(d).

Plaintiff also takes issue with othe r specific fac tual finding s of the trial c ourt, arguing that the Court ignor ed the e x tensive proof of ac tual costs contained in the F inal Report, that the Court ignor ed the undisputed proof that ever y one bore responsibility

for damag e to the roof, and that the Trial Court er

red in its assessment of Whitmore’s cr edibility on sever al levels. We conc lude the Trial Court’s opinion is detailed and spe cific, a nd is supported by

the re cord.

I n addre ssing the spe cific issues r aised by plaintiff, it is clear th at the Find Repor t does conta in cost information, an d t h e T rial Court noted the same . Howeve r, a f ew of the Trial Court’s problems with the re port wer e that it wa s not pr ovided in a timely and coope rative f

ashion

u n t i l d i s co v ery , an d

i td i d n o ts p ec i fi ca l l y

t ra ckco s t s re l at i n g t o t h e s ec o n d cap s h ee t ev en t h o u gh-7-

this was expressly

reque sted by

th e contra ctor, a

nd could have been done acc ording to plaintiff’s

o ff i ce m an age r. Fu rt h er , as s t at edea rl i er , t h e c o s ti n fo rm at i o np ro v i d edi ngen er al wa s co n fu s i n g, du pli c iti ve , a

nd c on tr a dic tor

y , an d the Tr ia l Cour

t sta te d tha t it did

no t f e e l th a t it c ou ld a de qu a te ly
assess any

measure of dama g es b as ed on the proof e ven without the unclea n hands issue. The evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the Trial Court’s fa ctual finding s. Tenn R. App. P. 13(d).

As to the dama g e to t

he ro of , th e te sti mony

sh ow e d th a t e ve ryon e inv olv e d b or e so me responsibility , which the Tr ial Court found. The Tr ial Court r elied upon this fac t in basically holding that th e mos t e qu ita

ble re so lut ion

in t his sit uatio n w a s to le a ve the pa rt ie s whe re the y

we re , b e c a

us e

e a c h p art y ha d li a

bil ity and re sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he dama g e , a s mi sta

ke s w e re ma de by

bo th p a rt ie s.

Fi n al l y , re gar d i n g cr ed i b i l i t y , t h e p ar t i es agr ee t h at t h e T ri al C o u rt i s t h e b es tj u d ge of witness cr edibility , and that the Tr ial Court’s deter mination reg ardingsame c an be r e-e valuated if there is c lear and convincing evidenc e to the contra ry

. See Bingham v. Dy ersburg Fabrics, Co., Inc.
, 5 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d

1 6 9
, 1 7 0 (T en n

. 1 9 7 8 ). I n t h i s ca s e, t h e re co rd s u p p o rt s t h e Tr i al C o u rt ’s fi n d i n gs reg ardingMr. Whitm ore’ s cre dibilit y , as his testimony was c ontradictory
, co n fu s i ng , and
argumentative at tim es. The testimony reg ardinghis comment about “pa dding” the bill was stated to b e in j e st, and

the Tr ia l Co ur

t me re ly c omm e nte d th a t so me of

the pla int if

f’ s in vo ic e s d id, in f

a c t,

a pp e ar t o b e “ pa dd e d” . T he Tr ia l Co ur t ob se rv e d th e wi tne ss a

nd he ard his te sti mony , an d is th e be st jud g e of his c re dib ili ty . T he re is n o c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that the Tr ia l Court e rr e d in its deter mination. W e conc lude the re cord in this c ase supports the fac tual finding s made by the Trial Court, and we a ffirm the Tr ial J udg e on these issues. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

As an a dditional issue, plaintiff ar g ues the Tr ial Court should have aw arde d it relief
purs ua nt t o th e the or

y of “ c ard ina l cha

ng e ” , whi c h it argue s is a

pp lic a ble to c on str

uc tio n c on tr a c ts,

and wh ic h a llo ws the c on tr a c tor to r e c ov e r i ts c os ts, ov e rh e a d, and pr of it whe n it is re qu ir e d to perf o r m w o r k o u ts id e it s r e a s o n a

b le e xp e c tati o na t t

h e ti me th e c o n tr a c t w a s e xe c u te d

. Pl a in tif f

a c kn ow le dg e s th is d oc tr ine ha s n ot b e e n a do pte d b y Te nn e sse e c ourt s.

We conclude this is clea

rly not a ca se for

the adoption/application of the ca rdinal

c ha ng e do c tr ine , w hic h r e qu ir e s a sh ow ingthat the re is a

n “ a lte ratio n in

the wo rk so dr a sti c that it

e ff e c tiv e ly re qu ir e s th e c on tr a c tor

to p e rf or m dutie s mater ial ly

dif fe re nt f ro m th os e or ig ina lly barg ained f

or.” Allied Materials & Equip. Co., Inc. v. U nited States , 5 69 F .2 d 5 62
, 56 3 (Ct. Cl. 1 9 7 8 )

. T h e c h an g e m u s tb e s o p r o f o u n d t h a ti tw o u l d

c o n s t i tu t e a

b r e a c h o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o n tr a c t, and ca uses damag e that is not redr essable by the contra ct. Global Engineering & C o n st., LL C v. Merc hants Bonding Co. , 2 00 7 WL 17 52 46 3 ( S.D . G a . Jun e 15 , 2 00 7) . N o p ro fo un d c ha ng e in t his

c on tr a c t ha s b e e n s ho wn . M or e ov e r, sin c e thi s is a n e qu ita ble re me dy

aki n to qu antum me ru it, it

wo uld a lso be ba

rr e d b y pla int if f’ s unc le an h and s.

Pla int if f a lso argue s th e Tr ia l Co ur t e rr e d in fa ili ng to g ra

nt it a ne w tr ia l, be c a

us e it

wa s e nti tle d to a

ne w tri a l ba se d o n th e Tr ia l Co ur t’ s “seri ou s erro rs ” in r e fu sin g to c re dit c e rt a in testimony and over looking mate rial evide nce. T hese issues have bee n addre ssed, and we have f ound that th e re c or d s up po rt s th e Tr ia l Co ur t’ s fa c tua l fin din g s and le g a l c on c lus ion s. Th e re is n o b a sis-8-

fo r t he g ra nti ngof a ne w tri a l.

Def endants a rg ue the Tr ial Court erre d in failing to awar d them any attorney ’s fe es in this case , beca

use plaintiff was shown to ha ve bre ache d the contra ct, to have unc lean ha nds, etc. W h at t h e Trial Court found, howe ver, w as that both parties br eac hed their a g ree ment, and thus conclude d that both parties should be left wher e they are

. I t appea rs t hat, based upon the evidenc e in this case, this was the mos t equitable r esolution where it was shown that both parties bor e responsibility

for the pr oblems leading up to the lawsuit, and both parties w ere technica lly in brea ch. The proof showed that the c ontrac tor direc ted the wor k on the roof to beg in too early in construction, and the c ontrac tor also bore responsibility for f ailing to pr otect the r oof.

The c ontrac tor argues, howe ver, that it should be awa rded fee s based on the contra ct pr ov isi on s c on ta ine d in

e ith e r t he I nte ri m A g re e me nt o r t he Sub c on tr a c t i ts e lf

. T he I nte ri m Ag ree ment specific ally provides that fees ca n be aw arde d from the “ brea ching ” par tyto the “nonbrea ching ” par

ty , but since the Tr ial Court found breach on both sides, this is not applicable. The Sub c on tr a c t, h ow e ve r, do e s n ot c on ta in s uc h la ngua g e re g ardi ng a “b re a c hin g ” pa rt y , r a the r, it simply states that if the c ontrac tor commenc es any actio n re l at i n g to the Subcontrac t or the subcontrac t o r’ s wo rk
, then the subcontra ctor is to reimburse the contra ctor for “all costs and expenses of such lega l action, arbitration or ot her procee ding, including reasona ble attorne y s’ fe es.” Whil e the Tr ial Court found the contra ctor’s c o u n t erclaims ag ainst plaintiff would constitute the

c omm e nc e me nt of an a c tio n, the Court de nie d a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, fi nd ing that bo th pa rties were in b r e a c h
, a s s tate d a

b o v e

. T h e T r ia l Co u rt a ls o f o u n d th a t th e c o n tr a c to r mi g h t h a v e a windfall of $4 7, 00 0. 00 ba se d o n He lto n’ s e sti ma te of the c os t of

the se c on d c a

p s he e t, a

nd too k in to consideration the potential “windfa ll” in denying the claim. We aff irm the Trial Court’s judg ment in d e nyinga tto rn e y ’s fe e s to the de fe nd ants , b e c a us e un de r t

he fa mil iar r ule c on tr a c ts a

re e nf or c e a ble in acc ordanc e with equity and good conscience

. Gr e e ne Cou nty Ba nk v . S ou the as te rn Pr op e rti es, Inc., e t al., 19 96 WL47 14 69 (T e nn . Ct . App . A ug . 2 1, 19 96 ); CGR Inve stments, Inc., v . Hack

ney Petroleum, I

nc., 2000 WL 1285246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2000); and Brown v . McCord, et al., No. 03A01-9509- CH-00329 (Ct. App. issued J an. 30, 1996).

We a ff ir m th e Judg me nt o f t

he Tr ia l Co urt and rem and , w ithon e -h a lf of the c os ts

a sse sse d to the pla int if

f a nd on e -h a lf a sse sse d to de fe nd ants

.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.