J-A10029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.L.S., JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2962 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 27, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000336-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., BECK, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2024

J.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree terminating her parental rights 

to D.L.S., Jr. (“Child”) entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common 

Pleas (the “trial court”).1 Finding that the trial court’s termination decision is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.

2

The record reflects that the hearing court held a combined hearing to 

determine Child’s permanency goal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f) and to 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The trial court further entered an order on November 27, 2023, changing 

Child’s dependency permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Mother 

does not challenge that order on appeal.

2

 The trial court also issued a decree terminating the parental rights of D.S. 

(“Father”) the same day. Father’s appeal is separately pending before this 

Court.
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rule upon the petitions filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to 

Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother 

attended the hearing, although she arrived late and then left the proceedings 

shortly thereafter because she became upset by the testimony provided by 

the visitation supervisor about Child’s behavior during Father’s visits, 

reentering later in the proceedings. See N.T., 11/27/2023, at 26, 36, 69.

Father was not present, despite receiving notice of the hearing, but was 

represented by counsel.

The trial court summarized the testimony provided related to Mother, 

which our review of the record confirms, as follows:

Jasmine Brown testified that she is a visitation coach for CUA 

and that she has supervised many visits between the parents and 

the child. ... She testified that during the visits Mother often has 

difficulty keeping the child inside of the visitation room and from 

preventing him from climbing on things or throwing toys. Ms. 

Brown stated that she frequently has to direct Mother to attempt 

to control the child during the visits.

Ms. Brown noted that during the visits Mother appeared 

uncertain of the child’s actual name. She testified that Mother 

said, “what’s his name?” and then articulated similar sounding 

names as though she was guessing what her son’s true name was. 

Ironically, when Mother identified herself at the hearing and stated 

her relation to the case, she identified the Child, her son, by an 

incorrect name. Ms. Brown testified that the Child calls Mother by 

her first name and sometimes “mommy.”

Ms. Brown testified that Mother has expressed concern that 

she is unable to parent the Child in his current state and that she 

often gets frustrated when the Child is upset. Mother informed 

Ms. Brown that she does not want the Child returned to her until 

he is older because he will be better behaved then. Mother has 
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also told Ms. Brown that she does not have a bond with the child 

because he is not well behaved and does not listen to her. Mother 

believed that “when [the child] gets older he can listen better then 

[she] can probably take care of it.” Ms. Brown testified to the 

wavering of Mother’s intentions concerning parenting the Child. 

Mother would often say that she could not parent the Child on her 

own and that she believed it was best for the Child to stay with 

the resource parent. Mother would then say that she wanted full 

custody. 

Ms. Brown testified regarding a concerning incident of the 

Child choking while being fed by Mother during a supervised visit. 

She stated that Mother fed the Child a heaping serving of oatmeal 

that was too substantial for the Child to eat. This resulted in the 

child choking when he tried to swallow it. Mother panicked when 

this happened, and the Child fell off her lap. Ms. Brown picked 

the child up and performed the Heimlich maneuver which cleared 

the child’s airway. As this was happening Mother became 

hysterical. 

Ms. Brown noticed that Mother seems to have an 

extraordinarily difficult time reading even simple texts. She 

witnessed Mother attempting to read the Child a children’s book 

but stated that she struggled to read and often asked her what 

certain words were. Mother accompanied the Child on a trip to 

Sesame Place with CUA but did not parent the Child appropriately. 

CUA noted that Mother frequently tried to pass the Child off to 

CUA workers so that Mother could enjoy the amusement park on 

her own. Mother did not push the Child in a stroller during the 

trip and depended on CUA to do so. 

Ms. Brown testified that she has been involved in this case 

for approximately ten months. She stated that Mother has not 

made any progress in terms of being able to implement any 

parenting skills. She noted that Mother seems to always be 

looking for other people to take care of the Child for her or with 

her. She also observed that Mother is aware that she is unable to 

parent the child on her own. 

Dr. Elizabeth Johnson has a doctorate in clinical psychology 

and is employed as a therapist and performs forensic evaluations. 

She testified as an expert witness in this area during the hearing. 

She stated that she completed a Parenting Capacity Evaluation

(PCE) for Mother. The PCE consisted of reviewing records, 

interviewing Mother, and having Mother submit to psychological 
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testing. Dr. Johnson testified that she reviewed mental health 

records from Mother’s current provider. She also reviewed 

visitation notes from CUA and had a conversation with her current 

CUA worker. Mother also completed the Child Abuse Potential 

Inventory, the Parenting Stress Index, and the Personality 

Assessment Inventory (PAI) assessments. The purpose of the PAI 

is to help gain an understanding of whether the person being 

examined meets the criteria for a mental health diagnosis. Mother

completed this assessment, but the results were not valid for 

interpretation as they showed elevated inconsistencies. Dr. 

Johnson stated that an elevated inconsistency scale such as this 

is often the result of the person submitting to the test not paying 

attention or having reading comprehension difficulties. The 

results of the Child Abuse Potential Inventory assessment were 

also invalid. Dr. Johnson opined that this was due to Mother trying 

to present herself in an overly positive light. Mother’s results on 

the Parent Stress Index showed that she scored high for 

inattention. Dr. Johnson said that this indicates that Mother 

perceives the Child as inattentive, hyperactive and someone who 

does not listen to her. Dr. Johnson noted in the PCE that Mother 

“may lack energy to keep up with the child’s energy level or have 

unrealistic expectations from mature adult like behaviors.”

Dr. Johnson believes that the services extended by DHS 

have had no effect on Mother’s ability to parent. She noted in her 

report that Mother “exhibits behaviors that suggest her ability to 

effectively parent her son independently remain limited. And 

services rendered thus far may have had minimal impact. 

Although DHS was originally involved primarily due to concerns of 

her ability to physically care for [the Child] and provide a safe, 

sanitary home environment additional area of concern are 

present. These include employment, partner selection, violence, 

and general parenting skills, all of which are significantly 

influenced by her mental health.”

Dr. Johnson observed that Mother does not want to 

discipline the Child. Mother specifically shared that with her 

during their interview. Mother prefers that someone other than 

her discipline the Child when necessary. This concerned Dr. 

Johnson who also noted that one of Mother’s primary coping 

mechanisms is to leave, rather than address an issue. This causes 

concerns regarding safety, supervision, and neglect. Mother also 

has a normalization of violence in relationships as a result of her 
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past experiences. Dr. Johnson believes that Mother requires 

therapy with a specific focus on emotional regulation skills. 

Whitney Crawford testified that she is a case manager for 

CUA and that she was assigned this case. She testified that Child 

has always lived with the resource parent and at no time has the 

Child resided with Mother or Father. She stated that the Child 

currently receives speech therapy, occupational therapy, 

behavioral therapy, and physical therapy. She noted that she has 

seen the Child in the presence of the resource parent and that 

sometimes the Child calls the resource parent “mom” and other 

times by her first name. 

* * *

Mother has a history of conflict with others in employment 

and therapeutic settings. Mother recently began working at 

McDonald’s after leaving a job at FedEx because she was not 

getting along with other people there. Ms. Crawford also testified 

Mother was discharged from Family School because she was not 

able to get along with staff members. Mother was re-referred to 

Family School later and was only able to attend two sessions 

because she continued to have issues with staff. Mother’s most 

recent assessment was that she was only minimally compliant 

with her SCP objectives. Ms. Crawford stated that she does not 

believe that the Child would be irreparably harmed if the parental 

rights of Mother were terminated. 

Ms. Crawford testified that the resource parent provides 

care, comfort, and support for the Child. She also ensures that 

the Child sees the doctor when he is sick and gets whatever he 

needs. She makes certain that the Child is clothed, fed, and 

attends daycare. The resource parent monitors the Child to 

ensure that he is developmentally on target. Ms. Crawford 

testified that she believes it is in the Child’s best interest for the 

parental rights of Mother and Father to be terminated and for the 

Child to be free for adoption. 

Mother testified that she is living in an apartment with 

another person and is employed. She claimed that her [f]ather 

is her support system but then described being abused by her 

[f]ather and stating that their relationship is better when they are 

distant. She testified that she “would do anything to get [her] son 

back” and stated that the CUA staff who testified lied in some of 
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their testimony about statements they attributed to her. The 

court was not persuaded by Mother’s testimony.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/2024, at 18-24 (record citations omitted).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order 

changing Child’s goal from reunification to adoption and decrees terminating 

the parental rights of Mother and Father. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal 

from the decree; Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Mother raises five separate issues, each of which challenges 

the trial court’s decision as it relates to a different subsection of the 

termination statute. See Mother’s Brief at 7 (raising claims concerning the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support terminating her parental rights to Child 

under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)). 

When reviewing a challenge to a decree terminating parental rights, we 

are mindful of the following: 

Termination of parental rights is among the most powerful 

legal remedies that the judicial system possesses. The decision 

to sever permanently a parent’s relationship with a child is often 

bound up in complex factual scenarios involving difficult family 

dynamics and multiple service providers. Our trial courts are 

tasked with carefully considering and weighing all of the evidence 

presented at termination hearings in determining whether the 

petitioning party has met its burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination meets the exacting 

standards outlined in the Adoption Act.

Because trial courts are on the front lines assessing the 

credibility of witnesses and weighing competing and often 

challenging evidence, it is paramount that, in reviewing trial 

courts’ decisions in this arena, appellate courts defer to trial 

courts’ first-hand observations as they relate to factual 

determinations. In this regard, we reiterate that appellate courts 
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must review such decisions for an abuse of discretion or error of 

law, and appellate courts may reverse trial courts only when that 

discretion has been breached or when the law has been 

misapplied. In other words, an appellate court should review the 

certified record to decide whether it supports the trial court’s 

order, regardless of whether the appellate court agrees with the 

result that the trial court reached.

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1129 (Pa. 2021). Our Supreme Court 

has often “emphasized our deference to trial courts,” but has also 

acknowledged that “we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by 

competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021) 

(citations omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which 

requires a bifurcated analysis. Id. at 359. “Initially, the focus is on the 

conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in section 2511(a).” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 

261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019). If the trial court determines the petitioner 

established grounds for termination under section 2511(a) by clear and 

convincing evidence, the court then must assess the petition under subsection 

2511(b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 

A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is 

so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come 

to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 
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issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

As stated hereinabove, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8). “This Court may 

affirm the [orphans’] court’s decision regarding the termination of parental 

rights with regard to any one subsection of [s]ection 2511(a).” In re J.F.M., 

71 A.3d 989, 992 (Pa. Super. 2013). We focus our analysis on section 

2511(a)(2).

Mother argues that DHS failed to provide sufficient evidence that she is 

currently unable to care for Child and that “past incapacity alone is not [a] 

sufficient basis for involuntary termination[.]” Mother’s Brief at 17 (citing In 

re Adoption of A.N.D., 520 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. 1986)). According to 

Mother, she has completed nearly all that has been required of her by DHS 

and the trial court; she is employed and receiving social security benefits that 

will allow her to financially care for Child; she has housing with a friend; and 

“with the appropriate support, can provide a safe home for herself and her 

child.” Id.

The trial court found that although Mother was willing to care for Child, 

she was simply unable based upon her mental health and intellectual 

disability. Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/2024, at 24.

This court does not take the fact that Mother suffers from a form 

of mental disability lightly, when assessing whether or not her 

parental rights should be terminated. Frequently, termination of 

parental rights is a result of conscious decisions made by a parent. 
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In this case, Mother seems to genuinely care about her [son] but 

is unable, and possibly unwilling, to care for [him] due to her own 

involuntary mental disability. It is well[]settled that a parent, 

whether disabled or not, must be able to meet the irreducible 

minimum parental requirements for a child who is in care. If a 

parent cannot, or will not, meet her irreducible minimum parental 

responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the rights 

of the parent. It is not required that a person, such as Mother, be 

offered a plan that she can meet if such a plan would then be 

insufficient to address her irreducible minimum parental 

responsibilities. 

Id. (citation omitted).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides as grounds for termination of a parent’s 

rights:

The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). As this Court has explained, termination of a 

parent’s rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) requires that the petitioner 

show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is presently unable 

to care for the child and will not be able to care for him for the foreseeable 

future. Int. of A.R., 311 A.3d 1105, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal 

citations omitted), appeal denied, __ A.3d __ 2024 WL 1650723 (Pa. Apr. 

17, 2024). “This two-pronged test applies in the case of intellectually 

challenged parents as well as abusive or neglectful parents.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). 

A child has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in 

which to grow, and the child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in 
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the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting. When a parent has demonstrated a 

continued inability to conduct her life in a manner conducive to 

providing a safe environment for a child, and the behavior is 

irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the 

termination of parental rights is justified.

Id. at *1111.

The record reflects that Child was originally removed from Mother’s care 

immediately after his birth—over three years ago—based upon concerns 

about, inter alia, her mental health and ability to care for Child. DHS Exhibit 

10 (Dr. Johnson’s Expert Report), at 2. During visits with Child, Mother has 

exhibited an inability to control his behaviors or to maintain his safety. See 

N.T., 11/27/2023, at 19 (Ms. Brown testifying that Mother “has difficulty 

keeping him inside the room or preventing him from climbing on things,” and 

requires continued direction by the visitation supervisor when, for example, 

Child is standing on a table), 28 (Ms. Brown testifying that Mother was not 

permitted to go outside with Child because “she lets him run freely,” and there 

is concern that she would allow him to run into the street), 39 (describing a 

visit when Child was running through the halls, playing with light switches and 

knocking things over, and Mother responded by telling Child that he was “bad” 

without trying to redirect or stop him). 

She also has been inattentive during visits with Child. For example, 

during the one supervised outing Mother attended with Child—a visit to 

Sesame Place—Mother refused to push Child’s stroller, having visitation staff 
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do that instead, and left Child with staff so that she could go on a ride that 

Child did not want to do. Id. at 28-29. She reportedly regularly speaks to 

staff about frustrations in her life instead of visiting with Child and has to be 

reminded and redirected to pay attention to Child. Id. at 20-21. She also 

has repeatedly asked to be reminded of Child’s name. Id. at 20. In fact, as 

the trial court noted, she misstated Child’s name when she entered the 

underlying hearing. Id. at 30.

Significantly, during visits, Mother reportedly gets frustrated with Child’s 

behaviors, which Ms. Brown described as typical toddler behavior, and despite 

Ms. Brown coaching her on different ways to approach Child, Mother does not 

listen or respond. Id. at 22. Ms. Brown testified that Mother told her that 

she cannot handle Child at this age because he does not listen well enough, 

and that she would be better equipped to parent him when he is five because 

his behavior would improve by then. Id. 

Mother has never been able to progress beyond one-hour supervised 

visits during the three years Child has been in care. Id. at 13. Over the ten 

months that Ms. Brown was assigned to supervise visits, she testified that she 

saw no progress by Mother in terms of her being able to implement parenting 

skills. Id. at 41. 

Dr. Johnson testified that she evaluated Mother’s parenting capacity. 

Id. at 51. She found that the issues that brought Child into care have 

multiplied and that these problems have not been remedied by the 
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interventions that DHS has provided. Id. at 65. It was Dr. Johnson’s opinion

that Mother’s compliance with her permanency plan did not remedy the 

concerns about her parenting, as “she continues to exhibit behaviors that 

suggest her ability to [e]ffectively parent her son independently remain 

limited.” Id. In particular, problems surrounding her employment, romantic 

relationships, violence, and ability to parent remain, “all of which are 

significantly influenced by her mental health.” Id. According to Dr. Johnson, 

the provision of services has not and will not remedy these concerns. Id. at 

65-66. To the contrary, Dr. Johnson was of the opinion that Mother is unable 

to independently parent Child. Id. at 66. In her report, which DHS admitted 

into evidence without objection, Dr. Johnson states:

[Mother] continues to demonstrate a gross lack of appreciation for 

the initial behaviors that resulted in DHS involvement. She does 

not appear to have made gains from services rendered thus far as 

evidenced by her inability to, or limited recall of, information 

shared in parenting education, domestic violence, or individual 

therapy. In addition, [Mother] has continued to exhibit violent 

and aggressive behaviors that place herself and others at risk, 

maintained that it is a viable response, and stated that aggression 

remained the primary coping response to feelings of anger. 

DHS Exhibit 10, at 11. It was Dr. Johnson’s opinion that Mother’s history of 

trauma, mental health diagnoses, and cognitive limitations will make it 

unlikely that she will be willing or able to reflect on her behaviors or retain

and internalize the information she is taught through the myriad services and 

interventions she has been provided. Id.
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Based on the foregoing, our standard of review, and the trial court’s 

credibility determinations, the evidence of record shows that Mother is not 

able to presently parent Child and will be unable to do so for the foreseeable 

future. See A.R., 2023 WL 8226326, at *6. We therefore find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s finding that DHS presented clear and convincing 

evidence in support of termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). 

Turning to section 2511(b), Mother argues that DHS failed to satisfy its 

burden of proving that termination best served Child’s needs and welfare. 

Tacitly conceding that Mother and Child do not share a bond, she asserts that 

this is the fault of either DHS or the trial court because Mother was not 

provided with “therapeutic visits” or parent/child therapy. Mother’s Brief at 

20. 

The trial court found that Child was bonded with his foster mother and 

additionally credited and gave “great weight” to the testimony presented by 

Ms. Brown, Dr. Johnson, and Ms. Crawford. Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/2024, 

at 24. Although the court believed that Mother genuinely loved Child, it was 

not persuaded by her testimony and further found that it did not warrant 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Id.

Section 2511(b) provides:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 
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to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Under section 2511(b), we focus on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[T]he determination of 

the child’s needs and welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The utmost attention should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted). But it is not enough that there exists a bond 

between parent and child to avoid termination. Rather, the trial court must 

determine whether the bond is “necessary and beneficial” to the child, such 

that “maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare.” In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105-06 (Pa. 

2023). Focusing upon the “child’s development, and mental and emotional 

health,” the trial court should assess whether severing the bond “is the kind 

of loss that would predictably cause extreme emotional consequences or 

significant, irreparable harm” to the child. Id. at 1110-11.

Thus, a court must examine the matter from the child’s perspective, 

placing his “developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above 

concerns for the parent.” Id. at 1105. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that 

“the law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 
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mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the 

needs and welfare of the particular children involved.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 

268-69. The party seeking termination bears the burden of proving, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights serves a child’s 

needs and welfare. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105.

When determining whether the petitioner met its burden to prove that 

termination serves a child’s needs and welfare, the trial court must consider, 

at a minimum, the factors delineated by our Supreme Court in K.T., all of 

which are of “‘primary’ importance in the [s]ection 2511(b) analysis” and “may 

contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at 1109. In addition to the 

child’s bond with his biological parent, the section 2511(b) analysis must also 

include the consideration of factors such as: “the child’s need for permanency 

and length of time in foster care ...; whether the child is in a preadoptive home 

and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the 

child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible 

needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. at 1113 (citations 

omitted). Importantly, “trial courts have the discretion to place appropriate 

weight on each factor present in the record before making a decision regarding 

termination that best serves the child’s specific needs.” Id.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings and its 

determination that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence that 
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termination of Mother’s parental rights best served Child’s needs and welfare. 

The record reflects that Child, who at the time of the termination was over 

three years old, has been in care since his birth, living in the same foster 

home. N.T., 11/27/2023, at 79-80. Child is bonded to his foster parent, who 

is also an adoptive resource for Child. Id. at 79, 82. The foster parent meets 

Child’s needs, including ensuring that he receives services to address his 

development, behavior, motor skills, and speech, for all of which he has 

deficiencies. Id. at 80, 81. She also has enrolled him in daycare. Id. at 104.

Further, while Mother regularly visits Child, as the foregoing recitation 

of the evidence reflects, she is not capable of parenting Child or meeting his 

needs. Although Mother now contends that she should have been provided 

with more therapeutic interventions to assist her in parenting Child, the record 

before us is devoid of any evidence that she raised such a claim before the 

trial court or in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. This claim is therefore 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 1925(b)(4)(vii). Even if not waived, it is 

meritless, as the evidence of record that the trial court found to be credible 

shows that no amount of interventions will allow Mother to internalize the 

lessons such that she could safely and independently parent Child. N.T., 

11/27/2023, at 66; DHS Exhibit 10, at 11.

DHS provided evidence, in the form of testimony by Ms. Crawford, that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child would not irreparably harm him, 

and nothing in the record refutes that evidence. See N.T., 11/27/2023, at 
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104. To the contrary, the record clearly reflects, based on the trial court’s 

credibility determinations, that the length of time Child has been in care, his 

need for permanency, his foster mother’s continued and unwavering 

dedication to addressing his physical, emotional, mental, educational and 

physical needs, and despite her best efforts, Mother’s inability to parent Child, 

all support a finding that Child’s needs and welfare are best met by terminating 

Mother’s parental rights and freeing Child for adoption. We therefore find no 

error in the trial court’s decision.

Decree affirmed.

Date: 5/17/2024