# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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## N O



## . 12-0946

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# I N R E 

# B R ID G E S T O N E 

# A M E R IC A S 

# T IR E 

# O P E R A T IO N S 

# , L L C , R E L A T O R

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## W R I T O F 

## M A N D A M U S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued Novem ber 5, 2014

J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.

Be fore us once ag ain is the Texas-reside nt exception to the forum-non- convenie ns statute.
We consider whether the exception—which allows a plaintiff residing in Texas to maintain a lawsuit
here even when the suit would otherwise be subject to dismiss al for forum non convenie ns—applies
in a case in which two nonresident minors sue by a next friend who is a Texas resident. The minors
themselves reside in M ex i co wi t h their g randpa rents, who are the minors’ leg al g uardia ns under
Mexi can law. W e h o l d that the Texas-reside nt exception does not apply and that the trial court
abused its discretion in ref using to dismiss the case on forum-non- convenie n s g r o u n d s
. A ccor dingly ,

we c onditionally

g rant manda

mus relief. I. Background
This c ase arises from a J une 2009 car acc ident in Mexi co. Armando Alvara do was driving

a 1 9 96 For d Ex plorer on a highw ay near Monterre y in the State of Nuevo L eon. His wife, Maria

## I sabel Rodrigue z, and their two minor children wer e passeng ers. The Ex plorer’ s left rea r t i re alleg edly failed, causing a rollover that killed Armando and Maria and injured the children. At the
time of the acc ident, t h e fa m i l y resided in Nuevo L eon. The children’ s materna l g randpa rents
beca me the children’ s leg al g uardia ns by opera tion of Mexi can law and took custody of the children
in Nuevo L eon.
Gilberto Rodrigue z, a Texas resident who is the children’ s materna l uncle, filed a wrong fuldeath lawsuit “as next friend” of the children in Texas ag ainst Br idge ston e Americ as Tire Oper ations, L L C (B ridg estone), a Delaw are company that manufa cture d the alleg edly defe ctive tire.
Other defe ndants included Gutierre z Br others, I nc., doing business as Gutierre z Auto Sales, and that

company ’s individual owner s, brothers J uan, J aime, and Manuel Gutierre z. Gutierre z Auto Sales, 1


## wh i ch is in Hidalg o County , Texas, had purcha sed the used Ex plorer from a New J erse y Ac u ra
deale rship throug h a New J erse y auction house on J uly 12, 2007. Approxim ately two wee ks later, 2


## Gutierre z Auto Sales sold the Ex plorer to wholesale r L ibrado L eal, a company based in Nuevo L eon,
“F or Ex port Only .” The acc ident occur red almost two y ear s later. The rec ord does not ref lect when

or wher e the tire at issue was put on the Ex plorer, and nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that the tire was
manufa cture d in Texas.

Br idge stone filed a motion to dismiss for forum non convenie ns, arg uing that the case belong ed in Mexi co, not Texas. The trial court denied the motion, and Br idge stone filed a petition

T h e o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n n a m e d o n l y B r i d g e s t o n e a n d J a i m e G u t i e r r e z d / b / a G u t i e r r e z A u t o S a l e s a s d e f e n d a n t s
. 1 T h e o p e r a t i v e T h i r d A m e n d e d P e t i t i o n n a m e s G u t i e r r e z B r o t h e r s , I n c
. , a n d a l l t h r e e G u t i e r r e z b r o t h e r s
.

T h e E x p l o r e r ’ s f

i r s t t w o o w n e r s w e r e N e w J e r s e y r e s i d e n t s
. 2


### 2

## fo r wr i t of m andamus in the court of appeals. I n deny ing relief, the court of appea ls held t hat t h e

case may not be dismiss ed on forum-non- convenie ns g rounds beca use the plaintiff, next-friend Rodrigue z, is a Texas r esident. 387 S.W .3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—B eaumont 2012). Br idge stone

now seeks mandamus relief in this Court, arg uing that the trial court abused its discretion in deny ing

Br idge stone’s motion to dism iss. II. Analysi s
The doctrine of forum n o n co n v eniens, which orig inated in the common law and is now
codified in Texas, “come s into play when there are sufficie nt contac ts betwee n the defe ndant and the
forum state to confe r persona l jurisdiction upon the trial court, but the case itself has no signific ant

connec tion to the forum.” In re Pirelli Tire, LL C , 247 S.W .3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 2007) . Texas’s
forum-non- convenie ns statute provides:

I f a court of this state, on written motion of a party , finds that in the interest of justice and for the convenie nce of the parties a claim or action to which this section applies would be more proper ly hear d in a forum outside this state, the court shall decline to exercise j u risdiction under the doctrine of forum non convenie ns and shall stay or dismiss the claim or a ction.

T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(b). Notwithstanding this mandatory lang uag e, courts “may 3



## not sta y or dismiss a pla intiff’s claim [on for um-non-conve niens g rounds] if the plaintiff is a leg al
resident of this state.” Id. § 71.051(e)

. This so-ca lled Texas-reside nt exception “ensur e[s] acc ess to
Texas courts for T exas plaintiffs.” In re Ford M otor Co. , 442 S.W .3d 265, 269 (Tex. 2014).

T h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o a c t i o n s f o r p e r s o n a l i n

j u r i e s o r w r o n g f

u l d e a t h

. T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E 3 § 7 1

. 0 5 1 ( i )

. 

### 3

## We have held that a trial court’s err oneous denial of a forum-non- convenie ns motion cannot

be adequately reme died on appea l and there fore war rants mandamus relief

. In re Gen. Elec. Co. , 271
S.W .3d 681, 685 (Tex. 2008). We revie w the trial court’s forum-non- convenie ns ruling for an abuse
of discre tion. Id. A. Application of the Texas-Re sident Exception
When the Texas-reside nt exception outlined in subsection 71.051(e) applies, a case may not
be dismiss ed on forum-non- convenie ns g rounds no matter how tenuous its connec tion to Texas. I n
this case , as discussed above, Texas-reside nt Rodrigue z broug ht a wrong ful-dea th suit on behalf of

two nonresident minors to re co v er damag es for their parents’ deaths. Rodrigue z may not asser t a
persona l cause of action under Texas’s wrong ful-death statute and has sued solely in his capa city as

next friend of his nephew s. See T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.004(a) (“A n action to rec over damag es as provided b y [t he wrong ful-death statute] is for the exclusive benef it of the surviving

spouse, chil d re n , and pare nts of the dece ased.” ). Br idge stone arg ues that Rodrigue z’s Texas
residenc y does not fore close dismiss al for two rea sons: (1) Rodrigue z lacke d authority to sue as the
children’ s next friend beca use t hey had a leg al guar dian, and (2) even if the children could s ue by

next friend, a next friend is not a “plaintiff” whose residenc y may trig g er the exception. We addre ss
these c ontentions in turn.
1. Next -F riend Represe ntation
We first addre ss whether Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 44 allowe d t h e ch i l dren to sue throug h a n ex t fr i en d. When we analy ze Texas’s proce dural rules, we apply the same rules of
construction that g overn the interpre tation of statutes. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia , 363 S.W .3d 573,

4

## 579 (Tex. 2012)

. That is, w e look f irst to the rule’s lang uag e and construe it accor ding to its plain meaning

. In re Christ us Spohn Hosp. Kleberg , 222 S.W .3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007). At the same time,

we bear in mind that the rules are g iven a liberal construction in order to obtain “a just, fair, equitable
and impartial adjudication of the rig hts of litigants under established principles of substantive law.”

T E X



## . R. C I V



## . P. 1.
Rule 44, which is derive d from a statute that was orig inally enac ted in 189 3 , go v erns the 4


## instit ution of suit by

next friend and provide s:
Minors

. . . who have no leg al g uardia n may sue and be repr esente d by “next friend” under the following rules: (1 ) S u ch next friend shall have the same rig hts conce rning such suits as g uardia ns have, but shall g ive s ecur ity for costs, or affidavit s i n l i eu there of, when require d. (2) Such next friend or h i s at t o rney of rec ord may with the approva l of the court compromise suits and ag ree to judgme nts, and such judgme nts, ag ree ments and compromises, when approve d by the court, shall be fore ver binding and conclusive upon the par

ty plaintiff in such suit.

T E X



## . R. C I V



## . P

. 4 4

. The only other proce dural rule to mention next friends is Rule 173, which 5 

## require s the court to appoint a g uardia n ad litem for a party repr esente d by a next friend or g uardia n
if “the next friend or g uardia n appea rs to the court to have an interest adver se to the party ” or if the parties ag ree
. T E X



## . R. C I V



## . P. 173.2(a)

. Br idge stone arg ues that Rule 44’s plain lang uag e allows suit

A c t a p p r o v e d F e b

. 1 1 , 1 8 9 3 , 2 3 d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 , § 1 , 1 8 9 3 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 4 3 3 ( f o r m e r T E X

. R E V

. C IV

. 4 S T A T

. a r t

. 3 4 9 8 u ) ( r e p e a l e d ) ( “ [ A ] n y m i n o r h a v i n g a s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e o f a c t i o n , a n d w h o h a s n o l e g a l g u a r d i a n , c a n b r i n g s u i t i n a n y o f t h e c o u r t s o f t h i s S t a t e b y n e x t f r i e n d

. ” )

.
T h e f e d e r a l r u l e g o v e r n i n g n e x t

- f r i e n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u s e s s i m i l a r b u t n o t i d e n t i c a l l a n g u a g e : “ A m i n o r o r 5 i n c o m p e t e n t p e r s o n w h o d o e s n o t h a v e a d u l y a p p o i n t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e [ w h i c h i n c l u d e s a g e n e r a l g u a r d i a n , a c o m m i t t e e , a c o n s e r v a t o r , a n d a l i k e f i d u c i a r y ] m a y s u e b y a n e x t f r i e n d o r b y a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m
. ” F E D

. R

. C IV

. P

. 1 7 ( c )

. 

### 5

## by a next friend only when the minor has “no leg al g uardia n” and that the minor plaintiffs in this case
have le g al g uardia

ns: their g randpa

rents.
The parties do not dispute that, under the law of the State of Nuevo L eon wher e the children

re s ide, the children’ s g randpa rents automatically beca

me the children’ s leg al g uardia ns upon th e
death of their pare nts. Howeve r, the cour t of appe als conc luded that, beca use no Texas c ourt had 6



## acc epted the g randpa

rents’ g uardia

nship established in Me x ico, “the minors ha d no leg al g uardia n
in Texas,” and next-friend repr esent ati on was appropr iate under Rule 44. 387 S.W .3d at 846.

Br idge stone co n t en d s t h at this interpre tation improperly adds words to the rule and that “no lega l

g uardia n” mea ns just that: “no lega l gua rdian.”

Br idge stone’s arg ument has appea l, but it leave s out a very importa n t i n q u iry

. The signific ance of a minor’s having a leg al g uardia n in the context of Rule 44 i s t h at , wh en a minor
alre ady has a g uardia

n who may sue on his behalf , the minor does not need next-friend repr esenta tion
in order to litig ate his c laims. For Rule 44 to make sense, it must be construed to enable minors to

prosec ute their claims—throug h a next friend—w hen they otherwise could no t t h ro ug h a leg al

g uardia n. I t follows that, if a leg al g uardia n has been appointed or rec og nized in another jurisdiction,

A t o r a l a r g u m e n t , R o d r i g u e z ’ s a t t o r n e y a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e g r a n d p a r e n t s h a d e x e c u t e d a n a f f i d a v i t r e n o u n c i n g 6 t h e i r s t a t u s a s g u a r d i a n s f o r h e a l t h r e a s o n s
. T h a t a f f i d a v i t w a s e x e c u t e d o n D e c e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 1 1

— s e v e n m o n t h s a f t e r t h e u n d e r l y i n g l a w s u i t w a s f i l e d

— a n d i s a b i t u n c l e a r
. T h e g r a n d p a r e n t s a v e r t h a t t h e y h a v e c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n a n d

“ h a v e p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a l l c a r e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e w e l f

a r e o f t h e c h i l d r e n , ” b u t a l s o t h a t t h e y “ a r e i n t o t a l a g r e e m e n t ” t h a t R o d r i g u e z “ t a k e c h a r g e ” o f t h e c h i l d r e n
. N o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n h a v e e v e r l i v e d w i t h R o d r i g u e z o r t h a t R o d r i g u e z h a s p e t i t i o n e d a n y c o u r t f o r g u a r d i a n s h i p
. F u r t h e r , B r i d g e s t o n e ’ s M e x i c a n - l a w e x p e r t t e s t i f i e d w i t h o u t o p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e g r a n d p a r e n t s w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o p e t i t i o n a c o m p e t e n t c o u r t t o b e e x c u s e d f r o m t h e i r g u a r d i a n s h i p d u t i e s , a n d t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e f l e c t t h a t s u c h a c t i o n w a s t a k e n
. F i n a l l y , w e n o t e t h a t R o d r i g u e z s u b m i t t e d , w i t h a p o s t

- s u b m i s s i o n b r i e f , c o p i e s o f t w o f

e d e r a l t a x r e t u r n s p u r p o r t i n g t o s h o w t h a t h e c l a i m e d t h e c h i l d r e n a s d e p e n d e n t s i n 2 0 0 9 a n d 2 0 1 0

. W e g r a n t B r i d g e s t o n e ’ s m o t i o n t o s t r i k e t h i s e v i d e n c e , w h i c h i s n o t i n t h e m a n d a m u s r e c o r d

. 

### 6

## but that g uardia n lacks auth o ri t y t o sue on the minor’s behalf in Texas and has no leg al basis for obtaining such authority , the minor may sue by next friend under Rule 44. I n this case , then, 7


## whether the children could sue by next frie nd turns on whether their g randpa rents could have filed
suit in Tex as on the c hildren’s be half a s their g uardia ns. I f they

could not, Rule 44 steps in.

Br idge stone summarily arg ues that the g randpa

rents’ g uardia

n status entitled them (and only
them ) t o bring the underly ing suit, but Br idge stone fails to addre ss the potential limit ations on a
g uardia n’s authority outside the jurisdiction in which he was appointed or otherwise desig nated. The
U.S. Supreme Court rec og nized long ag o that “[t] he authority of a g uardia n, like that of an executor

or administrator, appointed by a court of one sta t e, i s limit ed to that state, and he cannot sue in a

court .

. . held wit hin any other state, except so far as authoriz ed to do so by its laws.” Morgan v.
Potter , 157 U.S. 195, 197 (1895) (noting that “[t] he statutes of Kansa s do au t h orize executors or
administrators appointed in another state to sue and be sued as such in Kansa s,” but “they confe r no
such g ener al authority upon g uardia ns appointed in another state”) ; cf. Faulkner v. Ree d , 241 S.W

. 1002, 1007 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, h o l d i n g approve d) (“A n administrator, appointed by the

courts of Ohio, could not, by virtue of said appointment sue or be sued in the courts of Texas, or in

any way act as a leg al repr esenta tive of said estate in Texas. An administrator is the ag ent solely of
the court appointing him, clothed wi t h au t h o ri t y to administer only such assets as are within the jurisdiction of the court making such appointment.”)

.

N o t h i n g i n t h e r u l e p r e v e n t s t h e f o r e i g n g u a r d i a n a n d t h e n e x t f r i e n d f r o m b e i n g t h e s a m e p e r s o n
. 7


### 7

## Our courts of appea ls have rec og nized this principle over the y ear s in addre ssing challeng es

to next-friend repr esenta tion, starting with Bonner v. Ogilvie , 58 S.W

. 1027 (Da llas 1900, no writ).

I n that case , a child’s mother appointed as his leg al g uardia n in L ouisiana sued on his behalf in her

ca p ac i t y as gu ardia

n. Id. at 1028. The court held that the mother’s appointment as g uardia n i n
L ouisiana “would not g ive her authority to sue as such g uardia n in T exas, but it would not de prive
her of the power

to sue in this st ate a s next friend.” Id.
As Br idge stone points out, Bonner was de cided be fore this Court adopted the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedur e. Howeve r, Rule 44’s “no leg al g uardia n” lang uag e trac ks the 1893 statute from
which the rule is derive d, and courts have relied on B o n n er to interpre t Rule 44. I n Hende rson v.
Shell Oil Co. , for example, a g uardia n appointed by a Missouri court sued in Texas on behalf of his

war d, also a Missouri resident, reg arding a trac t of land in Texas that the war d owned. 179 S.W .2d 386, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.—For t Worth), rev’

d on other grounds an d d i s missed for want of jurisdictio n , 1 8 2 S

. W

. 2d 994 (Tex. 1944). The court noted that “the only capa city in which [t he
Missouri g uardia

n] could be rec og nized as having the rig ht to bring the suit is that of ‘next friend.’ ”
Id. at 388. This conclusion was reiter ated in He r r i n v. Falcon , in which the court of appea ls held
that a fathe r appointed by a L ouisiana court to be his minor son’s g uardia n proper ly broug ht suit in

Texas “as next friend” wher e no ancillar y or orig inal g uardia

nship proce eding had been broug ht in
Texas. 198 S.W .2d 117, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.—Bea umont 1946, writ ref’ d n.r.e.)

.

8

## Evaluating these decisions require s an examination of the Texas Guar dianship Code, which

includes provisions g overning g uardia ns’ authority to f

ile suit on behalf of their war ds. I n Texas, 8


## the term “g uardia

n” encompa sses both a “g uardia n of the person” and a “g uardia n of the estate” of

a minor or other incapa citated person. T E X



## . E S T



## . & G’ S H I P 

## C O D E 

## § 1002.012(b). “A g uardia n of the

estate of a war d appointed in this state ” has authority to sue for damag es on the minor’s behalf

. Id. § 1151.104(a) (1) (empha sis added)

. Howeve r, like the Kansa s statute at issue in Morgan , Texas’s

g uardia nship statutes confe r no such g ener al authority on g uardia ns appointed or rec og nized in other jurisdictions. I n limit ed circ umstances in which a nonresident war d owns proper t y in Texas, the
Cod e p ro v ides a mecha

nism by which a g uardia n appointed in another jurisdiction may “be appointed and qualified as g u ar d i an o r coguar dian” of the war d’s estate located here

. Id. §§ 1252.051–.053. But a nonresident g uardia n of a nonresident war d with no connec tion to Texas bey ond a possible lawsuit simply has no authority to su e o n b eh al f o f t he war d in Texas in his

capa city as g uardia

n. 9

T h e L e g i s l a t u r e r e c e n t l y a m e n d e d a n d r e c o d i f i e d T e x a s ’ s g u a r d i a n s h i p s t a t u t e s , w h i c h w e r e f o r m e r l y h o u s e d 8 i n t h e P r o b a t e C o d e b u t , e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1 , 2 0 1 4 , a r e n o w c o n t a i n e d i n t h e E s t a t e s a n d G u a r d i a n s h i p s C o d e
. A c t o f J u n e 1 7 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 8 2 3 , § 1

. 0 2 , 2 0 1 1 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 1 9 1 7

. B e c a u s e t h e a m e n d m e n t s d o n o t a f f e c t o u r a n a l y s i s , w e w i l l c i t e t h e c u r r e n t v e r s i o n s o f t h e s t a t u t e s i n t h i s o p i n i o n
.

W e n o t e t h a t w e d i s a g r e e w i t h B o n n e r a n d H e r r i n t o t h e e x t e n t t h e y h o l d t h a t a c h i l d ’ s p a r e n t i s n o t a l e g a l 9 g u a r d i a n q u a l i f

i e d t o s u e o n h i s c h i l d ’ s b e h a l f i n t h a t c a p a c i t y
. U n d e r T e x a s l a w , a p a r e n t h a s t h e r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t h i s c h i l d i n l e g a l p r o c e e d i n g s a n d t h e d u t y t o m a n a g e t h e c h i l d ’ s e s t a t e u n l e s s a g u a r d i a n o f t h e e s t a t e h a s b e e n a p p o i n t e d

. T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 1 5 1

. 0 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 ) , ( 7 )

. A p a r e n t t h u s t y p i c a l l y q u a l i f i e s a s a l e g a l g u a r d i a n f o r p u r p o s e s o f R u l e 4 4 , a n d h i s m i n o r c h i l d m a y n o t s u e b y n e x t f r i e n d

. S e e I

n r e K C G r e e n h o u s e P a t i o A p a r t m e n t s L P , 4 4 5 S

. W

. 3 d 1 6 8 , 1 7 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 2 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; s e e a l s o R

. H

. v

. S m i t h , 3 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 6 , 7 5 9 , 7 6 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 2 0 1 1 , n o p e t

. ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a f a t h e r h a d n o r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t h i s m i n o r c h i l d i n a l a w s u i t w h e n t h e c h i l d ’ s g r a n d p a r e n t s h a d b e e n a p p o i n t e d t h e m i n o r ’ s m a n a g i n g c o n s e r v a t o r s )

. 

### 9

## Acc ording ly , in this case , althoug h the children’ s g randpa rents ar e re co g nized as the
children’ s g uardia

ns under the law of Nuevo L eon wher e they reside, they have no authority to sue
in tha t c apac ity on the children’ s behalf in T exas. To avoid depriving the children of the ability to

purs u e t h ei r cl aim s befor e they turn eig hteen, Rule 44 allows them to do so by next friend.
Acc ording ly , we ag ree with the court of appea ls that, for purposes of Rule 44, the children could sue by next friend. We theref

ore turn to whe ther Rodrig uez, as a ne x t friend, qua lifies as a “ plaintiff” who may take a dvantag e of the forum-non- convenie ns statute’s Texas-re sident exception.
2. Status of

Next F riend
As noted above, a plaintiff’s claim may not be stay ed or dismiss ed on forum-non- convenie ns
g rounds if the plaintiff is a leg al resident of Texas. T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(e)

. I n
deter mining whether Rodrigue z is a plaintiff for purposes of this provision, we focus on the specific
statutory definition of “plaintiff,” but we also consider that definition in the context of the entire
forum-non- convenie ns statute and chapte r 71 as a whole. See CHCA W oman’s Hosp. v. Lidji , 403
S.W .3d 228, 232 (Tex. 2013) (“We analy ze sta tutory lang uag e in context, considering the specific
section at issue as well as the statute as a whole.”)

. We presume the L eg islature enac ted the statute
“with complete knowledg e of the exis ting law and with ref ere nce to it.” Ack

er v. T ex

. W ater
Comm’n , 790 S.W .2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990).
The for um-non-conve niens statute def ines the term “ plaintiff” a s follows:
“Plaintiff” means a party seeking rec overy of damag es for persona l i njury or wrong ful death. I n a cause of action in which a party seeks rec overy of damag es for persona l injury to or the wrong ful death of another person, “plaintiff” includes both that other person and the party seeking such rec overy
. The ter m does not include a counter claimant, cross-c laimant, or third-par ty plaintiff or a person who is assig ned

1 0

## a cause o f ac t i o n for persona l injury , or who acc epts an appointment as a persona l

repr esenta tive in a wrong ful death action, in bad faith for purposes of aff ecting in any way the applica tion of this section.

T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(h)( 2). I n the context of this case , we consider whether Rodrigue z, as a next friend, qualifies as “a party seeking rec overy of damag es for persona l injuries

or wrong ful dea th.” We hold that he does not.
The status of a next friend under Texas law is w ell settled. “I n a suit by a ‘next friend,’ the

rea l party plaintiff is the child and not the next friend.” Gracia v. RC Cola–7-Up Bottling Co. , 667
S.W .2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984); accord Safe way Stores of Tex. v. Rutherford , 111 S.W .2d 688, 689 (Tex. 1938)

. I ndeed, we long ag o stated that “the next friend is not a party to the suit instituted by

a minor by his a id.” Martin v

. W eym an , 26 Tex. 460, 468 (1863) (citation omitted); see also G ulf,
C. & S. F. Ry. Co. , 1 S.W

. 161, 163 (Tex. 1886) (“When it appea rs with cer

tainty

. . . that the action [by next friend] i s based on the r ight of the minor; that the relief soug ht is such as the minor alone
would be entitled to on the fac ts pleade d, and that this is soug ht for the use and benef it of the minor;
then we are of the opinion that the minor is the rea l plaintiff, whatsoeve r may be the formula used.”)

. The U.S. Supreme Court ha s simil arly stated:

I t is the infant, and not the next friend, who is the rea l and p ro p er party

. The next friend, by whom the suit is broug ht on behalf of the infant, is neither technica lly nor substantially

the par ty , but rese mbles an attorney , or a gua rdian a d litem, by

whom a suit is broug ht or defe nded in beha lf of anothe r. Morgan , 157 U.S. at 198. This is consistent with our longsta nding rec og nition that a minor’s lack
of capa city to sue, unlike standing , is not a jurisdictional defe ct and that a challeng e to capa city may
be wa ived. Austin Nurs ing Ctr. v. Lovato , 171 S.W .3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005).

1 1

## I n light of this well-settled l aw, we cannot conclude that a next friend is “a party seeking

rec overy of damag es for persona l injury or wrong ful death.” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(h)( 2). That descr iption fits the persons who are authorized to bring a wrong ful-death action
under section 71.004, but not the person serving as a conduit when the ones authorized to bring the
action are minors. As such, a next friend’ s leg al residenc y in Texas does not trig g er the forum-nonconv en i ens st atute’s Tex as-r esident ex ception. So interpre ted, t he st atute’s plain lang uag e serves its purpose of “ensur [i ng ] ac cess to T exas c ourts for Te x as plaintiffs.” In re Ford M otor Co. , 442
S.W .3d at 269. Texas courts have no responsibi l ity to protec t the interests of next friends, who
themselves must prote ct and advanc e the interests of the minors suing throug h them. That is, next
friends have no interest in keeping a case in Texas bey ond the interests of the minors they repr esent.
I f the minors whose wrong ful-dea th claims are being prosec uted are not Texas residents, their rig ht

to acc ess Texas courts does not trump a de fenda nt’s rig ht to dism issal for for um non conveniens.
The court of appeals i nterpre ted t he st atute differe ntly , rely ing principally

on the l ang uag e excluding persona l repr esenta tives appointed in bad faith from qualify ing as plaintiffs. The specific
l an g uag e at issue states: “The term [pl aintiff] does not include

. . . a person
. . . who acc epts an
ap p o intment as a persona l repr esenta tive in a wrong ful death action, in bad faith for purpos es o f
aff ecting in any way the application of this section.” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(h)( 2).
The court conclude d, and Rodrigue z arg u es, that this exclusion demonstrates that the L eg islature
intended a next friend to qualify as a plai ntiff for purposes of the Tex as-r esident ex ception unless
the def endant shows the ne x t friend wa s appointed in bad fa ith. W e disag ree
.

1 2

## Considering this lang uag e in the context of chapte r 71 as a whole, as we must, we rea d this

exclusi o n t o ap p l y to the prosec ution of a wrong ful-death action by an executor or administrator
under subse ction 71.004(c) . Section 71.004 provides: (a) An action to rec over damag es [for wrong ful death] is for the exclusive benef it of the surviving spouse, childre n, and par ents of the de cea sed. (b) The surviving spouse, children, and pare nts of the dece ased may bring the action
or one or more of those individuals may bring the ac tion for the bene fit of all. (c) I f none of the individuals entitled to bring an action have beg un the action within three cale ndar months afte r the death of the injured individual, his ex ec u tor or administrator shall bring and prosec ute the action unless reque sted not to by all those individuals.
An executor or administrator thus ha s express statutory authority to br ing an action that wrong fuldeath benef

iciarie s could have broug ht but chose not to. When th at h ap p ens, the executor or administrator—i.e., the persona l repr esenta tive—is the only possible party plaintiff. See In re Ford 1 0



## Motor Co. , 442 S.W .3d at 281 (noting that a persona l repr esenta tive qualifies as a party “see k[i ng ]

rec overy of damag es for persona l injury to or the wrong ful death of another person” (quoting T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(h)( 2)))

. I n turn, the bad-f aith exclusion prec ludes such a plaintiff from taking advanta g e of the Texas-reside nt exception when he a cce pted the appointment “in bad
faith for purposes of a ffe cting in any way the applica tion of this section.” Id. § 71.051(h)( 2).

S e c t i o n 7 1

. 0 1 2 i s a l s o i n s t r u c t i v e
. E n t i t l e d “ Q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f F o r e i g n P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , ” s e c t i o n 7 1

. 0 1 2 10 p r o v i d e s t h a t , w h e n a n e x e c u t o r o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f a n o n r e s i d e n t ’ s e s t a t e “ i s t h e p l a i n t i f f ” i n a w r o n g f

u l

- d e a t h a c t i o n , t h a t “ f o r e i g n p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ” n e e d n o t a p p l y f o r l e t t e r s t e s t a m e n t a r y “ t o b r i n g a n d p r o s e c u t e t h e a c t i o n ” s o l o n g a s h e h a s c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e p r o b a t e o f a f

o r e i g n w i l l

. T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 7 1

. 0 1 2

. T h i s l e n d s f u r t h e r s u p p o r t t o o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f “ p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , ” a s u s e d i n t h e T e x a s - r e s i d e n t
e x c e p t i o n , t o a p p l y t o e x e c u t o r s o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o s u e u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n 7 1

. 0 0 4 ( c )

. S e e a l s o T E X

. E S T

. & G ’ S H IP C O D E § 2 2

. 0 3 1 ( a ) ( d e f i n i n g “ p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ” t o i n c l u d e : a n e x e c u t o r a n d i n d e p e n d e n t
e x e c u t o r ; a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r , i n d e p e n d e n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r , a n d t e m p o r a r y a d m i n i s t r a t o r ; a n d t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s )

. 

### 1 3

## The court of appea ls’ overly broad rea ding of the bad-f aith exclusion stretche s the definition
of plaintiff bey ond the brea king point. I f the term “per sonal repr esenta tive” as used i n s ec t i o n
71.051 wer e broad enoug h to include a next friend, we see no principled re as o n why it would not
also include a g uardia

n ad litem, an attorney ad litem, or an amicus attorney

. See Morgan , 157 U.S. 1 1



## at 198 (noting that a next frie nd rese mbles a g uardia n ad litem). Yet it would be absurd to classify

a gu ar dian ad litem as a plaintiff, and, for the rea sons discussed above, it makes no more sense to

so classify a next friend. We note that, had the children at issue been adults when suit was filed, the
Texas-reside nt e x ception clea rly would not ha

ve applied. Allowing the m to take adva ntag e of the exception and maintain a suit in Texas mere ly beca use they are m i n o rs who lack capa city to

repr esent themselve s in lit iga tion defies log ic as we ll as the statute’s plain lang uag e and pur pose.
I n sum, we hold that the Texas-reside nt exception does not fore close dismiss al of this action
for fo ru m n o n convenie ns. Acc ording ly , we turn to whether the forum-non- convenie ns fac tors
mandate dismissal. B. App lication of F orum -Non-Conveniens F actor s
As noted above, the forum-no n -conveniens statute mandates the stay or dismiss al of a
persona l-injury or wrong ful-dea th action when the court “finds that in the interest of justice and for

t he convenie nce of the parties [t he action] would be more proper ly hear d in a forum outside t h i s
state.” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(b). I n short, the statute require s dismiss al of a case

N e x t f r i e n d s g e n e r a l l y a r e n o t a p p o i n t e d

. T h e y s i m p l y a c t o n b e h a l f o f t h e m i n o r u n l e s s a n d u n t i l t h e c o u r t 11

s t e p s i n t o p r o t e c t t h e m i n o r i n t h e e v e n t o f a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t

. T E X

. R

. C IV

. P

. 4 4 , 1 7 3 ; s e e a l s o S a l d a r r i a g a v

. S a l d a r r i a g a , 1 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( n o t i n g t h a t R u l e 4 4 “ d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r a n y k i n d o f p r o c e d u r e f

o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f

a n e x t f r i e n d , ” b u t “ m e r e l y g i v e s m i n o r s a n d i n c a p a c i t a t e d p e r s o n s t h e a b i l i t y t o s u e a n d a p p e a r b y a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ” )

. 

### 1 4

## that “has no signific ant connec tion to the forum.” In re Pirelli Tire, LLC , 247 S.W .3d 670, 675–76

(Tex. 2007).
The statute lists six fac tors for consideration in evalua ting a forum-non- convenie ns motion. Specifica lly , the cour

t must consider whethe r: (1) a n alterna te forum e x ists in which the claim or ac tion may be tried; (2) the a lternate forum provide s an ade quate r emedy ; (3) maintenanc e of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work a substantial injustice to the moving pa rty ; (4) the alterna te forum, as a result of the submissi o n o f the parties or otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all th e d ef en d ants proper ly joined to the plaintiff’s cla im; (5) the balanc e of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of the state predominate i n favor of the claim or action being broug ht in an alterna te forum, which shall include considera tion of the extent to which an injury or death resulted f rom ac ts or omissions that occur red in this state; and (6) the stay or dismiss al would not result in u n re asonable duplication or prolifer ation of litiga tion.
Id. § 71.051(b)( 1)–(6)

. Our decisi o n i n P i r el l i Tire g uides the application of these fac tors to this

case
. The fac ts of the two case s are strikingly simil ar. Pirelli Tire involved an alleg ed tire failure leading to a rollover acc ident in Mexi co that cause d the death of a Mexi can resident who was in the

t ruck at the time of the acc ident. 247 S.W .3d at 673. Two y ear s befor e the acc ident , a T ex as
deale rship had purcha sed the truck at an auction in another s t ate and sold it eleve n day s later to a
Mexi can citizen who imported it into Mexi co the same day , wher e it was used and service d until the

1 5

## acc ident. Id. The tire was not manufa cture d in Texas, and the tire’s manufa cture r, Pirelli Tire, was

not formed in Texas, nor did it maintain its prin ci p al place of business here

. Id. The dece dent’s family sued Pirelli Tire for

neg lige nce a

nd strict liability

in desig ning a

nd manufa cturing the t ire.
Id. Pirelli Tire filed a motion to dismiss for forum non convenie ns, which the trial court denied. Id. Apply ing the fac tors listed a bove, we g rante d Pirelli Tire’ s petition f or writ of mandamus.

We held that Pirelli Tire had demonstrated the availability of an adequa te forum by stipulating that
it would submit to persona l jurisdi ct i on in Mexi co and would not asser t a statute-of- limit ations
defe nse, and that Mexi co was not r ender ed an inadequa te forum mere ly beca

use its laws may have
been “less favor able” to the plaintiffs. Id. at 677–78. We also held that private- i n t er es t fa ctors
favor ed a Mexi can forum, not ing that “key evidenc e and witnesses conc erning damag es [were ] i n
Mexi co,” including a witness to the acc ident, the acc ident i n vestig ators and medical personne l,
witnesses most likely to be familiar with the condition and maintenanc e of the truck and the tire, the
truck’s owner , and the acc ident scene itself. Id. at 678–79. We also noted that evidenc e conce rning
the tire’s de sign a

nd manufa cture was in Ge org ia or I owa, not Te x as. Id. at 679. Fina lly , we he ld
that the public interests involved “strong ly favor [ed] Mexi co,” as Mexi co has a “par amount” interest
in seeing that its citizens are comp en s at ed for their injuries as well as interests in the safe ty of
Mexi can highwa

y s and produc ts within i ts borders. Id. We concluded tha t “it is unfair t o impose

upon the citizens of [t he T ex as forum county ] the cost and administrative burden of a complex products-liability

suit with no si g nificant c onnection to Texas.” Id.

L ike Pirelli Tire , this case inv olves: Mexi can citizens and residents involved in a car acc ident
in Mexi co; an alleg ed failure of a tire manufa cture d in the United States, but not in Texas; and brief

1 6

## owner ship of the subject vehicle by a Texas deale rship approximately two y ear s befor e the acc ident,

fo l l o wed by owner ship and maintenanc e of the vehicle in Mexi co. Also like Pirelli T i r e , k ey
evidenc e and witnesses rela ting to the acc ident, the vehicle, the tire, and damag es are in Mexi co, and
the evidenc e conce rning the tire’s desig n and manufa cture may be in the United States, but it is not
in Texas. These simil arities wo u ld seem to rende r Pirelli Tire dispositi ve of the forum-nonconvenie ns analy sis. Howeve r, Rodrigue z arg ues that this case is distinguishable from Pirelli Tire 1 2


## beca use of the prese nce of Texas defe ndants in the suit. As noted above, in addition to Br idge stone, the plaintiffs sued the T exas dealer ship—and its individual owner s—that had owne d the Expl orer
for two wee ks in 2007 befor e selling it to a wholesale r for export to Mexi co. The petition alleg ed 1 3


## that the dea lership was liable for se lling the ve hicle with a r eca lled tire. Rodrigue z asser

ts that Mexi co’s courts lac k p e r s o n a l ju r is d ic ti o n over these defe ndants—one
of whom has aff

irmatively stated that he will not submit to such jurisdiction—render ing Mexi co an inadequa te alterna te forum. See T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(b)( 4) (re quiring
consideration of whether “the alterna te forum, as a result o f the submissi on of the parties or otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defe ndants proper ly joined to the plaintiff’s claim”)

. We need not addre ss whether a showing that the Mexi co courts lack jurisdiction over the Gutierre z

W e f o u n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n P i r e l l i T i r e e v e n t h o u g h t h e a p p l i c a b l e v e r s i o n o f 12 t h e f o r u m - n o n - c o n v e n i e n s s t a t u t e p e r m i t t e d , b u t d i d n o t r e q u i r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d i s m i s s f o r f o r u m n o n c o n v e n i e n s w h e n i t f o u n d n o s i g n i f

i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n t o T e x a s u n d e r t h e e n u m e r a t e d f a c t o r s
. S e e A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 1 9 9 7 , 7 5 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 4 2 4 , § 1 , s e c
. 7 1

. 0 5 1 , 1 9 9 7 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 1 6 8 0 , 1 6 8 0 , a m e n d e d b y A c t o f J u n e 2 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 0 4 , § 3

. 0 4 , s e c
. 7 1

. 0 5 1 , 2 0 0 3 T e x
. G e n
. L a w s 8 4 7 , 8 5 4

. A s a m e n d e d i n 2 0 0 3 , t h e c u r r e n t v e r s i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s d i s m i s s a l u p o n s u c h a f i n d i n g
. T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 7 1

. 0 5 1 ( b )

.
T h e p l a i n t i f

f s i n P i r e l l i T i r e i n i t i a l l y s u e d b o t h P i r e l l i a n d t h e T e x a s d e a l e r s h i p t h a t h a d b r i e f l y o w n e d t h e 13

v e h i c l e
. 2 4 7 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6 7 3 n
. 1

. H o w e v e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f s n o n s u i t e d t h e d e a l e r i n e x c h a n g e f o r P i r e l l i T i r e ’ s a g r e e m e n t
n o t t o r e m o v e t h e c a s e t o f e d e r a l c o u r t

. I

d

. T h e d e a l e r t h u s p l a y e d n o r o l e i n o u r f o r u m - n o n - c o n v e n i e n s a n a l y s i s
. 

### 1 7

## defe ndants would be dispositi ve o f t he forum-non- convenie ns analy sis beca use the only rec ord
evidenc e on the subject is that such jurisdiction exis ts. Br idge stone’s Mexi can- law expert testified 1 4


## that the M exico courts would have jurisdiction over all defe ndants, both beca use B ridg estone had

ag ree d to submit to Mex i co ’s j urisdiction and beca use the “denia l of justice” doctrine allows a
Mexi co court to “seize jurisdiction” if a fore ign court has reje cted a case on forum-non- convenie ns
g rounds. Rodrigue z did not desig nate an expert to counter these conclusions and thus prese nted no
evidence to support his interpre tation of Mexi can law. Acc ording ly , the prese nce of the Texas
defe ndants does not meaning fully distinguish this case from Pirelli Tire for purposes of evalua ting
the ade quacy

of the a lternate forum as pa rt of the f orum-non-c onveniens a

naly sis. 1 5



## As they did in Pirelli Tire , the forum-non- convenie ns fac tors “cle arly and overw helmingly
favor a Mex ican forum for resolution of this dispute.” 247 S.W .3d at 679. Acc ording ly , we hold
that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in deny ing B ridg estone’s motion to dismis s.

F a c t u a l l y , R o d r i g u e z ’ s i n c l u s i o n o f c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e d e a l e r s h i p d o e s n o t p r o v i d e m u c h o f a d i s t i n c t i o n f r o m 14 P i r e l l i T i r e
. N o t a b l y , n e i t h e r t h e N e w J e r s e y d e a l e r t h a t s o l d t h e E x p l o r e r t o t h e T e x a s d e a l e r s h i p n o r t h e w h o l e s a l e r t h a t i m p o r t e d t h e c a r t o M e x i c o w e r e s u e d , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s u n c l e a r w h e n t h e t i r e a t i s s u e w a s p u t o n t h e E x p l o r e r
. T h e p r i n c i p a l c l a i m s i n t h e c a s e i n v o l v e t h e a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e d e s i g n a n d m a n u f a c t u r e o f t h e f a i l e d t i r e
. A s i n P i r e l l i T i r e ,
“ [ t ] h e h a p p e n s t a n c e t h a t t h e t r u c k w a s i n T e x a s f o r [ l e s s t h a n a m o n t h ] b e f o r e i t w a s s o l d a n d i m p o r t e d t o M e x i c o i s s i m p l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t t o p r o v i d e T e x a s w i t h a n y i n t e r e s t i n t h i s c a s e
. ” I d

. a t 6 7 9

.
T o t h e e x t e n t R o d r i g u e z c l a i m s M e x i c o i s a n i n a d e q u a t e f o r u m b e c a u s e t h e d e f

e n d a n t s h a v e n o t w a i v e d a n y 15 l i m i t a t i o n s d e f

e n s e s , w e a g r e e w i t h B r i d g e s t o n e t h a t t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h i s a s s e r t i o n
. L e a v i n g a s i d e t h a t R o d r i g u e z d i d n o t m a k e t h i s a r g u m e n t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t , n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d s u g g e s t s t h a t M e x i c a n l a w d i f f e r s f r o m T e x a s l a w o n t h e r u n n i n g o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n a m i n o r ’ s c l a i m
. T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 1 6

. 0 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) , ( b ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n a m i n o r ’ s c l a i m s d o e s n o t b e g i n t o r u n u n t i l t h e m i n o r t u r n s e i g h t e e n )

. W h i l e w e d o n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s u m e t h a t t h e l a w s o f M e x i c o a n d T e x a s a r e i d e n t i c a l , a t b e s t t h e a b s e n c e o f e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d r e n d e r s u s u n a b l e t o e v a l u a t e R o d r i g u e z ’ s i m p l i e d a s s e r t i o n t h a t s t a t u t e - o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s i s s u e s a f

f e c t t h e f o r u m - n o n - c o n v e n i e n s a n a l y s i s
. 

### 1 8

## III. Conclusi on

We hold that Texas law allows minors to sue by next friend when they have a leg al g uardia n
who is not authorized to sue i n T ex as in that capa city

. We also hold that a next friend is not a plaintiff for purposes of the forum-non- convenie ns statute’s Texas-reside nt exception. Finally , we
hold that application of the forum-non- convenie ns fac tors mandates dismiss al of this case as a matter
of law. Acc ording ly , we conditionally g rant Br idge stone’s petition for writ of mandamus and order
the trial court to vacate its order deny ing Br idge stone’s motion to dismiss

. We further order the trial

court to “set terms and conditions for

. . . dismiss ing [t his] action

. . . as the interests of justice may require, g iving due reg ard to the rig hts of the parties to the claim or action,” in a m an n er t h at i s
consistent with this opinion. T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 71.051(c)

. The writ will issue only
if the trial cour

t fails to comply

.

_________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: April 24, 2015

1 9