alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RANDALL W. SYLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 12 C 1408

) (USCA No. 13-1593)

COUNTY OF WILL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court's January 8, 2013 memorandum opinion and order dismissed the putative 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") Complaint and action brought by Will County Jail inmate 

Randall Syler ("Syler"), based on what this Court had found was a violation of his obligation to 

exhaust available administrative remedies -- a statutory precondition to his filing suit (see 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Syler appealed that ruling to our Court of Appeals, which has now issued a

May 7 unpublished order vacating the judgment of dismissal and remanding the case for further 

proceedings.

This Court is of course well aware of the principles announced in Pavey v. Conley, 663 

F. 3d 899 (7th Cir. 2011) and has regularly followed that case's dictates by conducting Pavey

hearings where there is a factual dispute over the issue of exhaustion. But in this instance it 

viewed Syler's case as an extraordinary one in which his own conduct negated his purported 

response, after the exhaustion precondition to suit had been raised, in which he produced a 

supposed grievance form that lacked any indicia of its having been filed.1

 However, this Court 

1

 Blank grievance forms are of course readily available to inmates for their use, so that 

the fabrication of a bogus filing is readily accomplished.

 
of course respects our Court of Appeals' directive as definitive and will (also of course) honor 

that directive.

That said, it would trouble this Court greatly if the result of a Pavey hearing were to 

produce the same conclusion that this Court originally reached and if Syler might mistakenly 

view that renewed conclusion as a matter of "don't bother me with the facts -- my mind is made 

up." Accordingly this Court exercises its prerogative under 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) to recuse itself in 

this matter, so that a fresh set of judicial eyes and ears can evaluate the matter after conducting 

the required Pavey hearing.

__________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 8, 2014

- 2 -
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    <FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-1995
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1834.203-70 NASA solicitation provision and contract clause. Except for firm-fixed price contracts and the contracts identified in 1834.201(c), the contracting officer shall insert— ( a ) The provision at 1852.234-1, Notice of Earned Value Management System, in solicitations for contracts for— ( 1 ) Development or production, including flight and ground support projects, and institutional projects (facility, IT investment, etc.), with a value exceeding $20M; and
( 2 ) Acquisitions of any value designated as major by the project manager in accordance with OMB Circular A-11; and
( b ) The clause at 1852.234-2, Earned Value Management System, in solicitations and contracts with a value exceeding $50M that include the provision at 1852.234-1. The contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I when the contract value is less than $50M.
[71 FR 66120, Nov. 13, 2006, as amended at 76 FR 40281, July 8, 2011; 80 FR 12944, Mar. 12, 2015]
#### 2149.505 Other termination clauses.
AAM-13-225-E 

 April 11, 2013 

 Exemption No. 10298A 

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2011-0616 

Mr. William Leppert 

Chief Pilot/DER 

Long Bay Aviation, LLC 

538 Wild Horse Court 

Myrtle Beach, SC 29579 

Dear Mr. Leppert: 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption 

No. 10298. It explains the basis for our decision, describes its effect, and lists the conditions 

and limitations. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter dated February 21, 2013, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

on behalf of Long Bay Aviation, LLC (Long Bay) for an extension of Exemption No. 10298. 

That exemption from part 120 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) allows Long 

Bay, which is operating under separate parts of the regulations, to cover its safety-sensitive 

employees under one testing program. 

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption. 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested extension of the exemption would not set a 

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Long Bay. 
 2

Our Decision 

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 10298 

remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the 

authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has 

delegated to me, I grant your petition, subject to the following conditions and limitations. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. Employees of Long Bay are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all times 

while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91. 

2. The drug and alcohol testing program must be implemented under the auspices of 

the Long Bay part 135 operation, not under part 91. 

The Effect of Our Decision 

Our decision extends the termination date of Exemption No. 10298 to June 30, 2015, unless 

sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Frederick E. Tilton, M.D. 

Federal Air Surgeon
#### The People of the State of New York v. William Massey, John English, Charles Burney and Thomas Hall. (And 12 Other Actions.)

Decision of motion for change of venue reserved in accordance with the following Memorandum: The People have moved pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an order removing these actions from the Onondaga County Court to a term of Supreme Court in another county. That section provides, so far as here material, that such relief may be granted on the ground “that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the indictment is pending.” The People presented three grounds for *798requesting such relief: first, the congested condition of the Civil and Criminal Calendars in Onondaga County Court and the alleged disqualification to preside of one of the Judges of that court; second, that one of the defendants is the Sheriff of Onondaga County and by virtue of that office he and his deputies, including court attendants, would play important roles before and during any trial; third, that another defendant is the Onondaga County Correction Commissioner and as such is and would be in charge of certain persons confined in his custody, who are prospective witnesses for the People. On September 18, 1963 the Oswego Special Term of Supreme Court made an order on motion of the defendants pursuant to subdivision 1 of section 344 removing these actions from Onondaga County Court to the Supreme Court of that county. The granting of such relief effectively removed the first ground advanced by the People in this court for a change of venue. There remains for our consideration a removal of the trial to a county other than Onondaga upon the two remaining grounds. Upon the argument of this motion it was stated by the attorneys for some of the defendants that the latter proposed to make certain pretrial motions. These, of course, may now be addressed to a Special Term sitting in Onondaga County. In the exercise of its power, this court will forthwith set up such a Special Term of Supreme Court in Onondaga County and designate a Justice to preside thereat. At the time fixed in our order for the convening of that term, the defendants should make such pretrial motions as they may be advised. After the making and final decision of such motions, if any, this court will pass upon the application of the People for a change of venue of the trial.
#### In the Matter of Isobel McDonald, Petitioner, v Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Albany County) to annul a determination of the State Comptroller, which disapproved petitioner’s application for accidental death benefits. John McDonald was a patrolman with the Buffalo Police Department and was also a member of a police pistol team. On October 6, 1970, the team attended a pistol match in Greece, New York, approximately an hour from Buffalo, and competed with a team representing Rochester, New York. After completion of the match, McDonald and a fellow patrolman were preparing in their motel room in Greece to attend a cocktail party and dinner. They were putting on their off-*779duty revolvers, and, while the fellow patrolman was practicing drawing his gun, it accidentally discharged and killed McDonald. Petitioner, McDonald’s wife, subsequently filed an application for accidental death benefits, which, after a hearing, was rejected by the Comptroller upon the ground that her husband’s death was not occasioned during the performance of duties in the service upon which his membership was based. Petitioner now seeks to annul that determination. The Retirement and Social Security Law provides, in part, that an accidental death benefit is payable where the member’s death is "the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in the performance of duty in the service upon which his membership was based” (Retirement and Social Security Law, § 361, subd a, par 1). The Comptroller is vested with "exclusive authority” to determine all applications for retirement or benefits (Retirement and Social Security Law, § 374, subd b), and thus the issue is whether his determination that the decedent’s death did not result from an accident sustained in the performance of his duties is supported by substantial evidence (see *Matter of Demma v Levitt,*11 NY2d 735, 737; *Matter of Croshier v Levitt,*5 NY2d 259, 265-266; *Matter of Tremblay v Levitt,*65 AD2d 901). The Comptroller’s determination rested upon his findings that the City Council of Buffalo did not authorize the decedent’s attendance at the pistol match in accordance with the terms of section 77-b of the General Municipal Law; that the expenses for the trip were paid by the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association and not by the City of Buffalo; that prizes for the match were financed by donations from private corporations; and that the decedent was absent from duty since he was "absent with leave”. Thus, there is a rational basis for the Comptroller’s determination and, since it is supported by substantial evidence, it must be confirmed *(Matter of Tremblay v Levitt, supra).*Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Kane, Staley, Jr., and Main, JJ., concur.
#### 1552.211-76 Legal analysis.

As prescribed in 1511.011-76, insert this contract clause when it is determined that the contract involves legal analysis.

# Legal Analysis (APR 1984)

The Contractor shall furnish to the Contracting Officer's Representative one (1) copy of any draft legal analysis. The Government will provide a response to the Contractor within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt. The Contractor shall not finalize the analysis until the Government has given approval.

(End of clause)

[49 FR 8867, Mar. 8, 1984. Redesignated at 55 FR 39622, Sept. 28, 1990, as amended at 60 FR 21994, May 4, 1995. Redesignated at 61 FR 57339, Nov. 6, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 33573, June 20, 1997; 78 FR 46291, July 31, 2013]
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
Corcom, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 2- 96731, 33-22257, 33-41142, 33-80204, and 
333-28873) of our report dated  February 27, 1998, on our audits of the 
consolidated financial statement schedules of Corcom, Inc. as of December 31, 
1997 and 1996, and for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 
1997, which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.


s/s Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P.
Chicago, Illinois
March 19, 1998
<PAGE>
#### National Equipment Rental, Ltd., Plaintiff, v. Joseph George, Doing Business as Dairy Treat Restaurant, et al., Defendants.

In an action pending in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, plaintiff moves pursuant to statute (Civ. Prac. Act., § 132, subd. 1) to vacate a temporary stay contained *788in an order made ex parte on April 20, 1962 by a Justice of the Supreme Court resident in the Seventh Judicial District; such order being returnable at a Special Term of the Supreme Court to be held in the County of Ontario, City of Canandaigua, on May 7, 1962, and requiring the plaintiff to show cause why the trial of the action should not be changed from Nassau County to Ontario County. Application granted, without costs; stay vacated. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Hill, JJ.
#### 1314.201-7 Contract clauses.

The designee authorized to waive the requirement for inclusion of FAR clause 52.214-27 “Price Reduction for Defective Cost and Pricing Data—Modifications—Sealed Bidding” in a contract with a foreign government or agency of that government is set forth in CAM 1301.70.
Mr. Michael F. Martin 

United States Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE 

Washington DC 20590 

November 4, 2014 

Dear Mr. Martin; 

, . . -. 

. · Scoits:i3Juff County Commissioners 

}\dministration Building 

q : ..) ~?5 1Oth Street 

Gering, Nebraska 69341-2487 

(308) 436-6600 

I am writing on behalf of our local Airport Authority and in support of their decision to accept the 

Aerodynamics Inc. (AD I) bid for our Essential Air Service. 

I was first elected County Commissioner in 1983, and have been its Chairman for the last 16 years, and I 

would like to believe that I have some experience in making decisions for our community. 

In the early years the airport was managed by an Advisory Board, made up of elected and private sector 

representatives from the communities within the county. Ten years ago the County Board of 

Commissioners made the airport its own political subdivision and allowed for the election of 

representatives to the Scotts Bluff County Airport Authority. We have great confidence in their abilities. 

During my time as Commissioner, and certainly since the Authority was established we have been 

struggling to provide reliable, dependable, and affordable air service between our Panhandle 

communities and Denver Colorado, our closest hub. I think we can all agree that air service is a critical 

part of the economic growth, and probably the economic survival of any community today. 

We have been through a myriad of providers and have had marginal success with all of them. But none 

of them have provided reliability, dependability and affordability. The One thing that all of the providers 

have in common is that they were "Low Bid". As a Commissioner providing other services to our 

communities, I have learned that the "Low Bid" is almost never the best bid. 

As you consider the proposals offered to The Scotts Bluff County Airport Authority for Essential Air 

Service, I implore you weigh heavily on their recommendation and award the contract to ADI. Although 

their proposal is more expensive, it is my belief that their plan and type of aircraft will be the best choice 

for Scottsbluff/Gering, and the entire Panhandle of Nebraska. Thank you for your consideration. 

Mark J. Masterton 

Chairman of the Board
No. 7829.

#### Halker *v.*Trustees of Ottawa Township.

(Decided October 6, 1903.)

Error to Circuit Court of Putnam county.

*Messrs. Bailey & Bailey,*for plaintiff in error.

*536*Messrs. Sir aman <& Malone,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Burket, C. J., Spear, Shauck, Price and Crew, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.9


BID.COM
THE Online Auction
                                                    BID.COM International Inc.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                    February 2, 2000


Dear Dan,

This letter of agreement replaces the original letter dated January 22, 1999 and
will remain in effect for a period of 1 year unless breached by either party.




                       Netjewels.com and Bid.Com Contract
                       ----------------------------------

Bid.com will market and sell netjewels.com products for a period of 1 year.
Bid.com will use reasonable efforts to market the accepted products
appropriately and strategically, in its sole discretion, so as to insure the
highest possible return on all accepted products. Newjewels.com will provide a
wide array of jewelry product including but not limited to; rights, earrings,
pendants, chain, loose gemstones, bracelets, and watches. Metals will include
Gold, silver, platinum, and vermeille.

Bid.com will make payments for shipments fourteen days after an invoice is
received. They will also provide a valid Shipping account number for the various
major delivery service companies or a Bid.com designated carrier.

A commission of 15% will be paid, to Bid.com on all jewelry sales and 10% on
watches and other products. If Bid.com starts a minimum bid at a lower price
than stipulated by netjewels.com, Bid.com agrees to pay the difference.

Feel free to contact me with any feedback,


/s/ Rob Joynt
---------------------------
Rob Joynt
V.P. General Merchandising
### NUMBER 13

- 10

- 00 227

- CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ ALVARO SANCHEZ , A ppellant ,
v. OMAR LUCIO, CAMERON COUNTY SHERIFF, ET AL. , A ppellees

.

____________________________________________________________ On “Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation”

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Alvaro Sanchez, attempts to appeal a n “Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” entered by the United States District C ourt Southern District of Texas Brownsville Division on March 2, 2010

. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal , the Clerk of this Court notified Sanchez that it did not appear that this Court has jurisdiction, so that steps could be taken to correct the defe ct, if it could be2

done. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 37.1, 42.3. The Clerk further notified Sanchez that the appeal would be dismissed if the defect was not corrected after the expiration of ten days from receipt of the Court’s notice. In response, Sanchez has sent numerous handwritten documents, including an “Application for Certificate of Appealability Under to Comply with 28 U.S.C. §2253.” The Court, having fully reviewed and considered the documents herein, concludes
that the order appealed from fails to in voke our appellate jurisdiction and is of the opinion that the cause should be dismissed. In terms of appellate jurisdiction, each court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases within its district of which the district courts or county co urts have jurisdiction when the amount in controversy or the judgment rendered exceeds $250, exclusive of interest and costs. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. §22.220 ( Vernon 2004). In this case, the order appealed from was not from a district or county court, r ather it was an order issued by the United States Southern District Court. The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(a),(c). PER CURIAM
D elivered and filed the 22nd day of July , 20 10

.