J-S25012-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWARD ARTHUR GEIER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1185 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-14-CR-0000885-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWARD ARTHUR GEIER JR. 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1186 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-14-CR-0000412-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2020

Edward Arthur Geier, Jr., appeals from the order, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Centre County, denying his petition without a hearing

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. Because Geier has established ineffective assistance of counsel per se

with regard to the filing of his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 
J-S25012-20

- 2 -

complained of on appeal, we vacate the order of the PCRA court and remand 

for reinstatement of his direct appeal rights.

In April of 2016, a jury found Geier guilty of one-thousand-seventythree sex crimes.

1 Geier, through counsel, filed a direct appeal in this Court. 

In a memorandum decision, a three-judge panel found that Geier’s sole issue 

on appeal was waived because his Rule 1925(b) statement was “far too vague 

to warrant meaningful review.”2 Commonwealth v. Geier, 881 MDA 2016, 

at 7 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 23, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). Our 

Supreme Court denied Geier’s petition for allowance of appeal. Geier

____________________________________________

1 At Centre County docket number 412-2015, the jury found Geier guilty of 

counts 1-32 (rape of a child - victim less than thirteen years of age, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c)); counts 33-80 (statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3122.1(b)); counts 81-590 (unlawful contact with a minor, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6318(a)(1)); counts 591-617 (involuntary deviate sexual intercourse - person 

less than 16 years of age, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7)); counts 621-622

(involuntary deviate sexual intercourse - forcible compulsion, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3123(a)(1)); counts 623, 627-673 (sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1)); 

count 674 (corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii)); counts 675-

1034 (indecent assault - person less than 13 years of age, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3126(a)(7)); and counts 1035-1074 (indecent assault - person less than 16 

years of age, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(8)). Counts 618-620 and 624-626 were 

nolle prossed. At Centre County docket number 885-2015, the jury found 

Geier guilty of one count each of: rape - unconscious person (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3123 (a)(3)); unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1)); 

statutory sexual assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b)); incest (18 Pa.C.S.A. §

4302(b)(2)); and indecent assault without consent (18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3126(a)(1)).

2 Geier’s Rule 1925(b) statement indicated his intent to raise one issue on 

appeal: “Was there sufficient evidence to find [Geier] guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt on the charges he was convicted of?” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of [Errors] Complained of On Appeal, 6/16/16, at [1]. 
J-S25012-20

- 3 -

subsequently filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed 

counsel who filed two amended PCRA petitions: an amended PCRA petition

on June 18, 2019 (“counseled amended petition”), and an adopted amended

PCRA petition (“adopted petition”) that Geier attempted to submit pro se on 

March 19, 2019.3 

The issues raised in the counseled amended petition were: (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel for calling Geier as a witness in his own 

defense without adequately preparing him; and (2) ineffective assistance of 

counsel by filing a concise statement of errors that was so vague as to render 

the sole issue on appeal waived. See Petitioner’s Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief, 1/8/19, at [4]. The issues raised in the adopted petition 

were: (1) imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum; and (2) 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a post-sentence motion. See

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, 3/25/19, at Appendix 

A.

On June 18, 2019, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing Geier’s 

PCRA petition. In its opinion accompanying the order, the PCRA court 

____________________________________________

3 Geier attempted to file the adopted petition pro se on March 19, 2019, after 

counsel had already filed an amended petition, but it was rejected. See

Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999) (approving postconviction court’s refusal to consider issues raised in counseled appellant’s pro 

se petition), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 975 (1999); see also Commonwealth v. 

Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1993) (hybrid representation is not permitted 

and defendants have right to proceed without counsel only if decision is 

knowing and voluntary). On March 22, 2019, the PCRA court granted Geier’s 

motion to adopt the pro se amended petition. Geier then filed the adopted 

petition on March 25, 2019.
J-S25012-20

- 4 -

addressed the claims raised in Geier’s adopted petition, but neglected to 

address those raised in his counseled amended petition. See PCRA Court 

Opinion and Order, 6/18/19, at 1-3. The PCRA court found that the issues 

raised in his adopted petition lacked merit and a sufficient factual basis. Id. 

Geier timely filed separate appeals, one at each docket number, and this Court 

sua sponte consolidated the cases by order dated September 9, 2019. See

Pa.R.A.P. 513.

On November 4, 2019, the PCRA court issued an order and opinion

acknowledging that it did not address the claims raised in Geier’s counseled 

amended petition, and finding that Geier was entitled to a hearing on both 

claims raised in that petition. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/4/19, at 3-4. At 

the time of the PCRA court’s November 4, 2019 opinion, the matter was 

already on appeal.

On appeal, Geier raises the following claim for our review: “[w]hether 

the PCRA court erred in failing to address either issue raised in the counseled 

[a]mended PCRA [p]etition in its opinion denying and dismissing [Geier’s] 

PCRA action.” Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Our standard of review for claims denying PCRA relief without a hearing 

is well-settled:

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition 

is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline 

to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and 

has no support either in the record or [in] other evidence. It is 

the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine 

each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record 

certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in 
J-S25012-20

- 5 -

its determination that there were no genuine issues of material 

fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing.

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness under the

PCRA, [the petitioner] must demonstrate[:] (1) that the

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of

conduct was without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his

client’s interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable probability that but for

the act or omission in question[,] the outcome of the proceeding

would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2012)). 

“A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to 

satisfy any one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 

45 (Pa. 2012).

Here, Geier’s amended petition alleged that his trial counsel told him he 

had no choice but to testify on his own behalf and that he was not adequately 

prepared to testify. See Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief, 1/8/19, at [4]. With regard to establishing an ineffectiveness claim for

failing to advise the defendant on his right to testify, our Supreme Court has

stated:

[t]he decision of whether or not to testify on one’s own behalf is

ultimately to be made by the defendant after full consultation with

counsel. In order to sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the 

appellant must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his 

right to testify or that counsel gave specific advice so 

unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to

testify on his own behalf.
J-S25012-20

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Carson, 741 A.2d 686, 699 (Pa. 1999) (internal citations 

omitted). Moreover, to establish such a claim, the appellant is required to 

prove prejudice—in other words, a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (Pa. 1987); see also 

Commonwealth v. Alderman, 811 A.2d 592, 596 (Pa. Super. 2002). “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome of the proceeding.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 

(Pa. 2012). “[C]ounsel is ordinarily presumed to be competent” and it is the 

appellant’s burden to “demonstrate that a constitutional violation has 

occurred.” Id. at 614. 

[A] claim of ineffective assistance generally [cannot] succeed 

through comparing, by hindsight, the trial strategy employed with 

alternatives not pursued. A finding that a chosen strategy lacked 

a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded 

that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success 

substantially greater than the course actually pursued.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 324 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (Pa. 2002)).

Here, Geier’s counseled amended petition stated in relevant part:

21. The facts in support of the alleged error(s) upon which this 

[m]otion is based are as follows:

a. [Geier] knows the following facts to be true of his own 

personal knowledge:

i. [Geier] requested that Attorney McClain file and 

perfect an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to convict him of all offenses;
J-S25012-20

- 7 -

ii. [Geier’s] direct appeal was denied by the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court because his sole issue on 

appeal was [] waived due to a concise statement of 

errors that was so vague as to preclude meaningful 

review by the appellate court[];

iii. [Geier] testified in his own defense at trial;

iv. [Geier] was informed by Attorney McClain that he 

had no choice but to testify because he had no 

defense; and

v. [Geier] was not adequately prepared by Attorney 

McClain to testify on his own behalf. 

22. In the event [Geier’s] motion is allowed, the matters which 

[Geier] intends to assert are as follows:

a. Ineffective assistance of counsel by filing a concise 

statement of errors that was so vague as to render the sole 

issue on appeal to be waived; and

b. Ineffective assistance of counsel by calling [Geier] as a 

witness in his own defense and failing to adequately prepare 

him for said testimony. 

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 1/8/19, at [4]. In his 

supporting memorandum of law, Geier notes that:

it is difficult to envision any strategic reason to advise [Geier] to 

[testify on his own behalf], as [his] version of events entailed him 

testifying to being aroused by seeing his stepdaughter masturbate 

(N.T. [Trial], 1/19/2016, [at] 511), masturbating with his 

stepdaughter in her room (Id. at 512), and being unable to resist 

her. (Id.)

* * *

According to [Geier], Attorney McClain met with him three to four 

times, ranging from five minutes to forty minutes per meeting, 

with the last meeting prior to trial occurring approximately one 

month in advance of trial. Failure to advise [Geier] against 

testifying and failure to prepare [Geier] for his testimony once it 

was decided that [he] would testify falls below the minimum level 

of performance required of defense counsel. 
J-S25012-20

- 8 -

Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief, 1/8/19, at 6-7. 

Here, Geier’s amended petition alleged that his trial counsel told him he 

had no choice but to testify on his own behalf and that he was not adequately 

prepared to testify. Nevertheless, Geier failed to plead prejudice sufficient to 

establish an ineffectiveness claim—his petition failed to indicate precisely how 

the result of the proceeding would have been different, by a reasonable 

probability, by his not testifying. See Pierce, supra; see also Alderman, 

supra. Accordingly, this claim fails. See Busanet, supra.

4

 The PCRA court, 

____________________________________________

4 Geier’s claim fails if it does not satisfy any one of the three ineffective 

assistance of counsel prongs. See Busanet, supra. In addition to failing to 

prove the “prejudice” prong above, Geier’s claim also fails on the “reasonable 

basis” prong.

Geier correctly notes above that his testimony corroborated his guilt. 

Nevertheless, upon reviewing the record, Geier’s trial strategy, and reason for 

testifying, reveals itself quite plainly: Geier’s strategy was to admit to the 

lesser crimes and deny the more substantial charges against him. During the 

opening argument, Geier’s counsel stated to the jury:

Make no mistake, [Geier] failed as a father. He failed himself, his 

family, and most importantly, [K.K.M.]. He failed. He will tell you 

what he did, and I am asking you to convict him of some of these 

charges. I expect you to hold him accountable for the things he 

did, specifically corruption of minors. Ed will tell you he did not 

touch these girls. He did not rape these girls. He did other things, 

but he did not rape these girls. 

N.T. Trial, 1/18/16, at 67. During closing argument, Geier’s trial counsel 

pursued the same strategy when he stated to the jury:
J-S25012-20

- 9 -

therefore, did not err in its determination that there were no genuine issues 

of material fact with regard to this claim when it denied Geier relief without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Grayson, supra. 

Geier’s second ineffectiveness claim is that his counsel filed a Rule 

1925(b) statement so vague that it rendered his sole issue on appeal waived. 

Geier claims his counsel’s actions amounted to ineffectiveness per se. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 17-18. We agree.

In Commonwealth v. Rosado, 150 A. 3d 425 (Pa. 2016), our Supreme

Court explained ineffective assistance of counsel per se as follows:

[g]enerally, an accused asserting that he has been denied his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate that counsel engaged in errors which caused him

prejudice—i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s . . . errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” In Pennsylvania, we have set forth the [] standard as

a three-part test, requiring an accused to show that (1) his

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or

____________________________________________

Ed did do terrible things, and as I told you, he failed as a father. 

I don’t know if there is a worse thing you can do than fail as a 

father, but he did. I expect, he expects, everybody in this room 

expects you to hold him accountable, and now you have to 

determine what you have to hold him accountable for. Facts over 

emotion, and I ask you to find him guilty of a number of charges, 

but specifically the corruption of minors. Review the facts, listen 

to what Ed said, and you’ll have most of the exhibits and you can 

review them. In your collective determination, remember what 

happened and what was said, and I’m going to ask you to find him 

guilty of corruption of minors[.] Thank you.

N.T. Trial, 1/19/16, at 609. Geier has not demonstrated that an alternative 

trial strategy offered a potential for success substantially greater than the 

course he actually pursued. See Reed, supra. Therefore, Geier has not 

demonstrated that the chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis. Id.
J-S25012-20

- 10 -

inaction lacked a reasonable strategic basis; and (3) but for

counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. However,

in certain limited circumstances, including the actual or

constructive denial of counsel, prejudice may be so plain that the

cost of litigating the issue of prejudice is unjustified, and a finding

of ineffective assistance of counsel per se is warranted. See

[United States v.] Cronic, 466 U.S. [648,] 658-59

[(1984)] (“There are . . . circumstances that are so likely to

prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a

particular case is unjustified. Most obvious, of course, is the

complete denial of counsel.” (footnote omitted))[.]

Id. at 429-30 (some internal citations omitted).

In Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999), our Supreme 

Court found that “a failure to file or perfect [a requested] appeal results in a 

denial so fundamental as to constitute prejudice per se.” Id. at 571. In 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court 

extended the Lantzy holding to cases in which counsel failed to file a Rule

1925(b) statement after the court directed counsel to do so. Id. at 801. The 

Court reasoned that, in Halley, like in Lantzy, counsel’s dereliction left 

“[a]ppellant without an ability to challenge his conviction and sentence by 

means of the direct appeal,” and that “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient 

performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have 

taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” Id. at 800.

In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2006), our 

Supreme Court distinguished between situations in which “counsel has 

narrowed the ambit of appellate review by the claims he has raised or 
J-S25012-20

- 11 -

foregone,” versus those “in which counsel failed to file an appeal at all,” with 

the second category amounting to per se ineffectiveness. Id. at 1273. 

Additionally, the Court stated, “the failure to file a requested direct appeal or 

a [Rule] 1925(b) statement in support thereof is the functional equivalent of 

having no counsel at all.” Id.

Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2020), 

our Supreme Court found that a Rule 1925(b) statement filed by PCRA counsel

amounted to ineffectiveness per se because it was “so vague as to render all 

of the appellant’s claims waived for purposes of th[e] appeal.” Id. at 684. In 

that case, the Court discussed the purpose of Rule 1925 and then analyzed 

the Rule 1925(b) statement in issue as follows:

[A] litigant appealing from the denial of PCRA relief is required to

strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 1925(b), or his or her

appellate issues are deemed to be waived. Rule

1925(b)(4)(ii) directs that “[t]he [s]tatement shall concisely 

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with

sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the

judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added). As the 

comment to Rule 1925(b) further elaborates:

The more carefully the appellant frames the [s]tatement, 

the more likely it will be that the judge will be able to 

articulate the rationale underlying the decision and provide 

a basis for counsel to determine the advisability of raising 

that issue on appeal. Thus, counsel should begin the 

winnowing process when preparing the [s]tatement 

and should articulate specific errors with which the appellant

takes issue and why.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), comment (emphasis added).

The statement filed by PCRA counsel [] did not identify any 

specific legal error committed by the PCRA court in its rulings on 

the multifarious claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness presented 
J-S25012-20

- 12 -

in the amended PCRA petitions, nor did it even identify which of 

those rulings were being challenged on appeal. Rather, it 

generically and capaciously encompassed every conceivable claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel contained in the amended 

PCRA petitions. As such, it forced the PCRA court to guess which 

of its rulings were being challenged. Accordingly, waiver of all 

appellate issues is mandated by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), which 

provides that “[i]ssues . . . not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii).

Id. at 700 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that whenever counsel 

“takes any action that wholly deprives his or her client of the right to appellate 

review of collateral claims, counsel will be deemed to be ineffective per se.” 

Id. at 701 (emphasis in original).

Here, we find that it is of no moment that defendant’s counsel in Parrish

filed a vague Rule 1925(b) statement on collateral appeal rather than direct 

appeal, as in Geier’s case. Rule 1925(b), and its underlying principles, govern 

both situations equally. Geier’s counsel on direct appeal, like PCRA counsel in 

Parrish, filed a Rule 1925(b) statement that was so vague as to render all

claims on appeal waived. See Geier, supra. Geier’s direct appeal Rule 

1925(b) statement did not address the sufficiency of the one-thousandseventy-three crimes of which Geier was convicted with any specificity. See 

Parrish, supra at 700; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Counsel’s filing of a 

vague Rule 1925(b) statement “wholly deprived” Geier of his right to appellate 

review; thus, counsel’s filing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per 

se. See Parrish, supra at 701-02. 
J-S25012-20

- 13 -

Accordingly, we must remand the case for reinstatement of Geier’s

direct appeal rights. See Halley, supra at 801.

Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2020