is direct evidence of McDonald’s discriminatory animus. However, as detailed above, the phrase
was used in the context of providing Matagrano guidance on how to support Dovgin, allow her to
grow her skills, and help her take on a larger role within McDonald’s. The statement was not
used to direct Matagrano to sabotage Dovgin’s career. For the same reasons the phrase does not
establish pretext, it is not direct evidence of discrimination.

Alternatively, Dovgin may rely on circumstantial evidence that creates a convincing
mosaic supporting an inference of discrimination. See id. Dovgin contends that she has created
a convincing mosaic with the following evidence: (1) McDonald’s promoted Marquardt, Silberg,
Wayman, and Arvanitis but not her despite her superior qualifications; (2) Matagrano received a
better performance evaluation despite his use of vulgar language; (3) Matagrano’s review of
Dovgin’s performance was a pretext for discrimination because a coworker falsely stated that
Dovgin always missed deadlines; and (4) the 2009 performance review contained the following
ambiguous comment: “Michelle [] was taken from Aria’s management because of her inability
to effectively train Michelle through a complex RAP exercise.” Pl. Facts Ex. 2 at 10.

As discussed above, the fact that McDonald’s favored the relevant experiences amassed
by Marquart, Silberg, Wayman, and Arvanitis over Dovgin’s advanced degrees is not evidence
that McDonald’s discriminated against Dovgin based on her race, national origin, or gender. See
Stephens, 569 F.3d at 788 (courts are not super-personnel departments). Also as discussed
above, the superior performance rating Matagrano received is not evidence of discrimination
because his report was prepared by a different supervisor. Patterson, 281 F.3d at 680.

Dovgin has not shown that Matagrano’s reasons for the performance rating he gave her

were based on a coworker’s false statement that she missed deadlines and, therefore, pretextual.

14


317, 323 (1986). If satisfied, this burden shifts to Dovgin to go beyond the pleadings and present
specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e)(2); Kramer v.
Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004). There is a genuine issue of material
fact if the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable jury verdict in Dovgin’s favor. Pugh v.
City of Attica, Indiana, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001). In considering the motion, all facts
and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to Dovgin. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Dovgin brought her claim of race discrimination under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seg. Race claims under § 1981 and Title VII are analyzed identically,
and so the court will not distinguish between the two. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir.
2012) (“The substantive standards and methods of proof that apply to claims of racial
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII also apply to claims under § 1981.”).
IL. Indirect Method
A plaintiff may prove discrimination under either the direct or indirect method. Grigsby
v. LaHood, 628 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). Dovgin attempts to prove discrimination under
each method. The court begins with her efforts under the indirect method.
Dovgin relies on the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Dovgin must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
reasonably met the legitimate job expectations of McDonald’s; (3) McDonald’s took an adverse
employment action against her; and (4) McDonald’s treated her differently than similarly-situated

persons outside her protected class. Jd. at 802; Burks v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d



McDonald’s hired Jeffrey Wayman to be Director, Packaging Strategic Sourcing, he had six
years’ more experience as a senior manager at McDonald’s than Dovgin. When McDonald’s
hired Cathy Arvanitis to be Sourcing Manager, she had six years’ experience as a director and
experience in labor sourcing, which Dovgin lacked.

Dovgin contends that she was more qualified for the positions because she had two
advanced degrees, while the candidates hired had no advanced degrees. Although an advanced
degree was listed as preferred on some of the vacancy announcements, it was never listed as a
requirement. In any event, courts do not second-guess personnel decisions, such as McDonald’s
decision to favor work experience over advanced degrees. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779,
788 (7th Cir. 2009) (courts are not super-personnel departments reviewing the soundness of
promotional decisions). Because the candidates had more experience than Dovgin, she cannot
show that she was similarly-situated to them, and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.

2. Pretext

Even if Dovgin had set out a prima face case for her failure to promote claim, she has not
established pretext. To establish pretext, Dovgin must do more than show that McDonald’s
decision to favor experience over education was wrong—she must show that McDonald’s did not
honestly believe that candidates with more experience were better suited for the vacancies than
Dovgin. Bottoms v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 174 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(Conlon, J.). Dovgin has failed to identify any evidence that McDonald’s did not honestly
believe it was hiring the more qualified candidate. Dovgin’s only evidence that she was the

better candidate is her own subjective beliefs, which is inadequate to establish discrimination.

10


2. Similarly-Situated Employees

Even if she had established an adverse employment action, she could not show that
similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. A coworker is similarly-situated if
directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219
F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must look at all relevant factors, including whether the
employees “dealt with the same supervisor” and were “subject to the same standards.” Id. at
617-18.

Dovgin contends that Matagrano was treated more favorably because he received a
perfect “4” on his performance review, even though he used foul language and exhibited
inappropriate conduct. Pl. Facts J 11. However, Dovgin cannot show that Matagrano was
similarly-situated. At the time of the 2009 performance evaluation, Matagrano supervised
Dovgin and prepared her evaluation. Matagrano’s more favorable evaluation was prepared by
Senior Director Laura Kohl. Id. § 14, 17. Because their performance evaluations were prepared
by different supervisors, Dovgin cannot show that she was similarly-situated to Matagrano.
Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is clear that Meyer
was not similarly situated to Patterson because they reported to different supervisors.”); see also
Taylor v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 10 C 1611, 2012 WL 4467655, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2012)
(“Because [a coworker’s] Performance Management review, which was the basis for obtaining
merit pay, was completed by a different supervisor than the one who completed [the plaintiff's,

the plaintiff] cannot show meaningful similarity to [the coworker].”).


744, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2006). If Dovgin satisfies her burden, McDonald’s must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Burks, 464 F.3d at 751. If it does, Dovgin
must show that the explanation is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Burks, 464
F.3d at 751.

McDonald’s does not dispute that, as an Asian-American woman of South Korean
national origin, Dovgin is a member of a protected class. It also does not dispute that she was
meeting its legitimate job expectations. But it argues she cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, or that its conduct was a pretext for discrimination.

A. Performance Review

1. Adverse Employment Action

McDonald’s argues that Dovgin’s 2009 performance review did not affect her pay or
otherwise impact her job, and therefore was not an adverse employment action. A negative
performance evaluation, unaccompanied by a tangible job consequence, is not an adverse
employment action. Jones v. Res-Care, Inc., 613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2010); Smart v. Ball St.
Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996) (“But [the plaintiff] has not identified, nor have we
discovered, a single case where adverse performance ratings alone were found to constitute
adverse action.”). Dovgin argues that she suffered a tangible job consequence because she did
not receive the full year-end bonus and stock options she had received in previous years.
However, the loss of a discretionary bonus is not an adverse employment action. Maclin v. SBC
Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2008). Nor can she show the need to obtain permission
to apply for a promotion was an adverse action because she received permission. Accordingly,

she has not established that her 2009 performance evaluation was an adverse employment action.



Dovgin also attempts to establish pretext with evidence that other supervisors had given
her higher ratings in the past, and stated that they would have rated her higher than Matagrano
did. Pl. Facts {J 9, 15. However, evaluations given by different supervisors do not establish
pretext because ““[d]ifferent supervisors may impose different standards of behavior, and a new
supervisor may decide to enforce policies that a previous supervisor did not consider important.’”
Smith yv. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99 C 906, 2002 WL 4853874, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002)
(Nolan, Mag.) (quoting Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Dovgin has failed to establish her performance review was an adverse employment
action, that similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or that the reasons for the
performance review were pretextual. For these reasons, she cannot establish under the indirect
method that her performance review was discriminatory.

B. Failure to Promote

1. Similarly-Situated Employees

McDonald’s argues that Dovgin cannot show that she was similarly-situated to the
employees hired for the promotions she sought. To establish a prima facie case for a failure to
promote claim, Dovgin must show she was as qualified for the open positions as the persons
hired. Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2003). The persons hired each
had more experience either at McDonald’s or in food procurement than Dovgin, whose
experience was limited to technical procurement. For instance, when McDonald’s hired Jill
Marquardt to be Director, Product Category Leader, she had two years’ experience as a director
for McDonald’s, while Dovgin had none. When Todd Silberg was hired as Manager, Product

Category Leader, he had experience in food procurement, which Dovgin did not. When


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ARIA DOVGIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No.: 11 C 7883
v. )
)

McDONALD’S CORPORATION, and, ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge

McDONALD’S USA, LLC )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Aria Dovgin sues McDonald’s Corporation and McDonald’s USA, LLC (collectively

“McDonald’s”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 claiming employment discrimination on the basis of her race, national origin, and sex.
McDonald’s moves for summary judgment on all of Dovgin’s claims. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and exhibits.

Aria Dovgin is an Asian-American of South Korean national origin. Defs. Facts { 3. She has
masters degrees in computer science and business administration. Pl. Facts 1. She began
working at McDonald’s corporate headquarters in 1994. Defs. Facts § 7. In 2004 she was
promoted to manager, and the following year to senior manager. Jd. Her experience has been in

technology procurement. Jd. J 62.



unrelated to plaintiff's gender was not so egregious to lead a reasonable employee to quit).
Matagrano’s alleged threat was also insufficient to establish a constructive discharge. Chapin v.
Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (“a working condition does not
become intolerable or unbearable merely because a prospect of discharge lurks in the
background.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Dovgin has failed to identify evidence of discriminatory conduct so egregious as to
support a claim of constructive discharge, and thus cannot establish such a claim under the
indirect method of proof.

D. Disparate Impact

McDonald’s contends that Dovgin cannot establish a claim of disparate impact because:
(1) she has not identified the practice she contends impacted her protected class; and (2) she has
not identified statistics showing a disparity. To establish a prima facie case, Dovgin must
identify a particular employment practice that disparately impacts the protected class. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 717 (7th Cir. 2012). “[I]t is not enough
to simply allege that there is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy that
leads to such an impact.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). The plaintiff must
also “offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in
question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group.” Id. at 994-95.

If Dovgin establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to McDonald’s to show that the
practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); Puffer, 675 F.3d at 717. If the employer succeeds, “the burden shifts

12


Hall v, River Forest, Inc., 536 F.3d 615, 620 (7th Cir. 2008) (“an employee's own subjective
belief that she is as qualified or more qualified than another applicant is insufficient”).

Dovgin has failed to establish that McDonald’s promoted or hired similarly-situated
employees over her, or that McDonald’s promotion decisions were a pretext for discrimination.
For these reasons, she cannot establish under the indirect method that McDonald’s failure to
promote her was discriminatory.

Cc. Constructive Discharge

McDonald’s argues that Dovgin cannot show she was constructively discharged because
she voluntarily resigned. To establish a constructive discharge, Dovgin must show that her
working environment was so unbearable as a result of unlawful discrimination, a reasonable
employee would have quit. Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010).
The work conditions must be even more egregious than the conditions that create a hostile work
environment. Overly v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 662 F.3d 856, 864-65 (7th Cir. 2011).

Dovgin contends that her environment was sufficiently hostile because Matagrano
constantly cursed, was unstable and unpredictable, and wrote in her performance review that
“2010 will be a pivotal year,” which she took as a threat to her continued employment. Dovgin’s
evidence is insufficient to establish constructive discharge. Dovgin has identified no evidence
that Matagrano’s conduct concerned her race, national origin, or gender. To the contrary, she
contends he was boorish around everyone, including vendors. Defs. Facts 12. Dovgin cannot
establish a constructive discharge based solely on boorish conduct, such as the use of vulgar
language. Armintrout v. Bloomingdale's Pizza, Inc., No. 04 C 313, 2007 WL 837279, at *12

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2007) (Filip, J.) (use of vulgar and sexually explicit language in workplace

11


3. Pretext

Even if Dovgin had established a prima facie case of discrimination, she could not show
pretext. To establish pretext, Dovgin must show that the reason given for her low performance
rating—her inadequate communication skills—are unworthy of belief. Gusewelle v. City of
Wood River, 374 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 2004). Pretext must be “more than just faulty reasoning
or mistaken judgment;” it is a lie—a phony reason. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832.
838-39 (7th Cir. 2009).

Dovgin contends that she established pretext with evidence that Matagrano’s supervisor
directed him to criticize Dovgin because of her “cultural differences.” Pl. Facts ] 17. The
supervisor made the statement in Matagrano’s performance review:

Frank appears tentative to give Aria critical feedback unless given
via email. Since Aria was a peer of Frank’s and has cultural
differences, I challenge Frank to think about how he can work with
her in a different way to grow her skills and the perception of her
work within US IT. She’s a tougher case than Michelle, but has
potential to fill a larger role on the team.
Pl. Facts Ex. 4 at 4. Dovgin argues that the phrase “cultural differences” is evidence of
discriminatory animus.

Viewed in context, the quoted statements direct Matagrano to help Dovgin succeed by
growing her skills, creating a favorable perception of her, and helping her fill a larger role within
McDonald’s. The statement does not direct Matagrano to sabotage Dovgin by falsifying grounds

for a low performance rating. Because the statement is not evidence of discriminatory motive, it

does not establish pretext.


On August 31, 2010, Dovgin submitted a letter of resignation. Defs. Facts { 66. Her last
day of work was September 13, 2010. Jd. Before resigning, Dovgin accepted a position at the
University of Chicago. Id. 70. She started her new job on September 20, 2010. Id. § 71.
When she resigned from McDonald’s, Dovgin’s annual salary was $105,000, before bonuses and
stock options. Jd. (69. At the University of Chicago, she earned $140,000. Id. 4 71.

On September 28, 2010, Dovgin cross-filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. Fourth
Am. Compl. Ex. 2 at 2. She received a right-to-sue letter dated August 1, 2011, and filed this
suit on November 5, 2011. Jd. at 1. In her fourth amended complaint, she alleges the following
claims: (a) race, national origin, and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count I); (b) race discrimination in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II); and (c) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination
and Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 ef seg. (Count III).

Before the court is McDonald’s motion for summary judgment on Dovgin’s claims of
race, national origin, and gender discrimination. Dovgin has voluntarily dropped her claim of
age discrimination. Dkt. 74 at 17 (“Dovgin abandons her age discrimination claim.”).

DISCUSSION
IL Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record evidence reveals no genuine issue of
material fact and McDonald’s is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010). McDonald’s bears the initial

burden of showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US.



After Dovgin received Matagrano’s review, she submitted a rebuttal. Defs. Facts 28. While
investigating the rebuttal, Human Resources Partner Carol Davis interviewed Patrick Phalen,
who told Davis that Dovgin missed deadlines. PI. Facts 18. The statement was made after
Matagrano had reviewed Dovgin and, therefore, Matagrano could not have used the statement to
falsify a basis for Dovgin’s performance rating. Accordingly, Phalen’s statement, even if false, is
not connected to Matagrano’s performance review and, therefore, not evidence that the review
was pretextual.

As for the allegedly ambiguous statement in her performance review, Dovgin does not
explain how the statement supports an inference of discrimination. Instead, she merely cites to
deposition testimony from her former supervisor, Stephen Novotny, who found the statement to
be lacking “specifics,” such as how Dovgin could have done a better job. Novotny Dep.
(attached to PI. Facts) at 65. Undeveloped arguments unsupported by citations to relevant
evidence are forfeited. White Eagle Cooperative Ass'n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 476 n.6 (7th Cir.
2009).

Because she failed to identify direct evidence of discrimination, or circumstantial
evidence creating a convincing mosaic from which discrimination could be inferred, Dovgin
cannot prove discrimination under the direct method.

CONCLUSION

McDonald’s motion for summary judgment is granted. McDonald’s is entitled to
judgment on Count I for race, national origin, and sex discrimination and Count II for race
discrimination because she has failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext under the indirect

method of proof, and has not identified direct evidence or created a convincing mosaic of

15


16 years’ experience in the food industry outside of McDonald’s, and had worked in food
procurement. Defs. Facts | 43. Neither had an advanced degree. Pl. Facts §{ 2, 3.

On October 20, 2009, Dovgin applied for the position of Director, Packaging Strategic
Sourcing. Jd. J] 4; Defs. Facts ] 48. McDonald’s received more than 480 applications for the
position. Defs. Facts 49. McDonald’s hired Jeffrey Wayman, who is white, to fill the vacancy.
Pl. Facts | 4; Defs. Facts ] 53. Wayman had served as a Senior Manager for 6 years longer than
Dovgin, and his experience was strategic in nature, including working in McDonald’s U.S.
Strategy group. Defs. Facts § 53.

On February 19, 2010, Dovgin applied for the position of Sourcing Manager. Id. { 54; Pl.
Facts {5. The notice of vacancy stated that an MBA would be preferred. Pl. Facts J 5.
McDonald’s received more than 275 applications for the vacancy. Defs. Facts 56. McDonald’s
hired Cathy Arvanitis, who is white, to fill the position. Jd. 59; Pl. Facts ]5. Arvanitis had
more than 15 years’ procurement experience, including labor procurement. Defs. Facts 4] 60,
62. In addition, she had six years’ experience as a procurement director. Id. 60. She did not
have an MBA. PI. Facts J 5.

Dovgin asserts that she also asked to be considered for an unposted director’s position
that McDonald’s offered to a different applicant. Pl. Facts 6. However, the only evidence she
cites to support her assertion that she applied is the Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule
30(b)(6) served on McDonald’s, and deposition testimony from the Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Jd.
Neither discuss Dovgin applying for an unposted director’s position. Accordingly, the statement
of fact is disregarded. Hunter v. Jewel-Osco, No. 11 C 8967, 2013 WL 53894, at *2 n.2 (N.D.

Ill. Jan. 3, 2013) (Kocoras, J.) (assertions unsupported by record evidence may be disregarded).



In 2009, another senior manager, Frank Matagrano, began to supervise Dovgin. Id. 4 9.
Matagrano prepared Dovgin’s 2009 performance review. Jd. 17. Out of a possible four points,
he rated her performance a “2.” Pl. Facts ] 14. The performance rating Matagrano gave her was
lower than the “3” rating she received on her previous five performance reviews. Jd. 9. In the
performance review, Matagrano stated that Dovgin demonstrated a lack of strong communication
skills. Defs. Facts {J 18, 20.

Dovgin’s 2009 performance rating did not affect her salary, but did factor into her year-
end bonus. Jd. § 22; Pl. Facts J 18. Dovgin received half of her usual bonus and no stock
options. Pl. Facts { 18. In addition, she needed a supervisor’s permission to apply for other jobs
within McDonald’s. Id. 7.

After obtaining permission from Matagrano, Dovgin applied for other positions within
McDonald’s. Defs. Facts {{] 39, 57, 58. On March 2, 2009, she applied for the position of
Manager/Director Product Category Leader. Jd. {| 40, Pl. Facts 2. The notice of vacancy stated
that corporate supply chain experience was required, and that supply chain experience related to
food and an advanced degree were preferred. Defs. Facts {| 42; Pl. Facts {f] 2, 3. McDonald’s
received more than 500 applications for the vacancy. Defs. Facts 41.

McDonald’s hired two persons. Jd. 43; Pl. Facts ff 2, 3. Jill Marquardt, who is white,
was hired as Director, Product Category Leader. Defs. Facts { 43; Pl. Facts §{[ 2, 3. She was
Manager of Purchasing from 2001-07, and was promoted to be a director in 2007. Defs. Facts
4] 45. She had experience in procuring food preparation equipment. Jd. McDonald’s hired Todd

Silberg, who is white, as Manager, Product Category Leader. Jd. § 43; Pl. Facts 43. Silberg had



back to the plaintiff to show that an equally valid and less discriminatory practice was available
that the employer refused to use.” Puffer, 675 F.3d at 717.

Dovgin has identified the practice she argues disparately impacted Asian-American
employees. She contends in 2009, McDonald’s stopped requiring supervisors to base
performance reviews on documented facts and, instead, allowed supervisors to rate employees
based on subjective opinions. PI. Facts | 8. According to Dovgin, the change led to low
performance ratings for at least six Asian-American employees.

But Dovgin has not identified a baseline needed to make meaningful comparisons. For
instance, she has not identified the total number of Asian-American employees, the total number
of McDonald’s employees, and whether employees outside her protected class also received low
performance ratings after the alleged new practice. The only statistic she has offered is that the
practice adversely affected “at least 6 employees out of 100, or 6%.” Response at 16. But she
has not identified whether the group of 100 consists of all the Asian-American employees, or all
McDonald’s employees. Without a basis of comparison, Dovgin’s anecdotal evidence that six
Asian-American employees received low performance ratings “tells us nothing about the
presence or absence of discriminatory practices.” Ibarra v. Martin, 143 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir.
1998). For these reasons, Dovgin has failed to establish a prima facie case in support of her
disparate impact claim.

IL. Direct Method

To prove discrimination under the direct method, Dovgin may rely on direct evidence,

such as an admission. Brown v. Advocate South Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.

2012). Dovgin argues that the phrase “cultural differences” in Matagrano’s performance review

13



circumstantial evidence of discrimination. McDonald’s is entitled to judgment on Count III for

age discrimination because Dovgin has abandoned the claim.

ENTER:

Suzannd B. Conlo:
April 22, 2013 United States District Judge

16