United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-3007

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

$34,918 United States Currency

 Defendant

Christopher Hester

 Claimant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

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Submitted: April 13, 2023

Filed: June 13, 2023

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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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BENTON, Circuit Judge. 

Christopher William Hester claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic 

stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, 

the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default 
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judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Hester appeals, arguing that the 

district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8). Having jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court reverses and remands. 

I. 

On November 2, 2021, police stopped a car for a traffic violation. Hester was 

driving. The passenger, Antonio Burris, had a backpack at his feet. Smelling 

marijuana, police searched the car, finding a few marijuana cigarettes, two empty 

suitcases, and $34,918 in cash vacuum-sealed and plastic-wrapped inside the 

backpack.

Hester and Burris claimed they had pooled their money for a trip to Las Vegas, 

where they planned to gamble, shop, and bring back winnings in the empty suitcases. 

The government thought the money was drug-related. The Drug Enforcement 

Administration sought forfeiture of the cash under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 

Hester claimed ownership of the money, filing a verified answer under 

Supplemental Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims 

and Asset Forfeiture Actions, which governs forfeiture actions in rem and establishes 

procedures for claiming defendant property.

1

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G. 

Three provisions are relevant: First, Rule G(5) describes filing a claim. Supp. 

R. G(5). This “low threshold” is “a bare-bones requirement to ‘state the claimant’s 

interest in the property.’” United States v. $579,475.00 in U.S. Currency, 917 F.3d 

1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc), quoting Supp. R. G(5). Second, Rule G(6) 

allows the government to “serve special interrogatories . . . to test the claimant’s 

relationship to the property.” Id., citing Supp. R. G(6). Finally, Rule G(8) 

authorizes motions to strike a claim “for failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6).” 

Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(A). 

1

Burris did not file a claim. 
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Hester filed a claim under Rule G(5). The government served 17 special 

interrogatories under Rule G(6). Hester responded, but just barely. He answered

three days past the deadline, objected to 9 of the 17 interrogatories, provided 

incomplete responses to four, and failed entirely to respond to one. He did not even 

sign and swear to his answers. 

The parties began a back-and-forth. Hester promised to supplement all but 

one of his (admittedly insufficient) responses. The government agreed to drop the 

one objectionable interrogatory and allow 15 days to supplement the rest. Hester

supplemented his responses, verified the document, and attached financial records, 

but he also gave terse and incomplete answers.2

 

The government, still unsatisfied, identified deficiencies and threatened a 

motion to strike if Hester failed to fully supplement. Hester responded with some

2

For example, Hester simply responded “Virginia” to an interrogatory asking 

him to “[i]dentify the states, provinces and foreign countries in which you have 

obtained a driver’s license, driving permit, or state identification, including, where 

applicable, the license, permit, or identification number, and state whether the 

license, permit, or identification is currently valid.”
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additional information,3 some objections,4 and much agitation.5

 He again neglected 

to verify.

The government moved to strike Hester’s claim as a sanction for failing to 

fully answer the special interrogatories. See Supp R. G(6), (8). It alternatively 

requested an order that Hester answer certain interrogatories. Hester’s response to 

the motion had three parts: First, he provided more complete answers to the 

interrogatories, including new details about his withdrawals; an affidavit from his 

girlfriend saying she had gifted him part of the cash; and new annotations on the 

previously disclosed bank documents. Second, he argued that his responses 

sufficiently established standing. Finally, he asked that, if the court found his 

responses insufficient, it compel him to answer whatever interrogatories needed 

supplementing. 

3

He informed the government, for example, that his girlfriend has the “Same 

Address as Christopher Hester.” 

4

In response to the government’s claim that his attached bank documents fell 

short of the special interrogatory request to provide “records, documents, or tangible 

items that document or relate in any way to your [claim] . . . , including the name, 

address, telephone number and email address of its custodian,” Hester objected that 

“Special Interrogatories are not standard discovery. The information provided 

shows where the money comes from, where the money was transferred and sent to 

Mr. Hester. The relationship with the money has been firmly established. No other 

information will be provided.”

5

Informed that he provided insufficient information about his driver’s license, 

Hester said: “Please contact Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to find out if

the license is valid, further whether the license if [sic] valid has nothing to do with 

identifying Mr. Hester, as special interrogatories are only to be used to identify the 

claimant and their relationship to the property and nothing else. As for the license 

number, you have this information already on the ticket where Mr. Hester was pulled 

over, but since you can’t read the information that you already have: [LICENSE NO. 

REDACTED].”
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The district court found Hester’s interrogatory responses insufficient and, 

rather than compel responses, struck his claim as a sanction for failing to fully 

respond. See Supp R. G(8). It found that Hester had violated Rule G(6), and that 

even Hester’s more detailed responses to the motion to strike were “either 

incomplete or raise significant questions about his standing.” (quotation omitted). 

It declined to order Hester to supplement because, the court explained, three months 

had passed since Hester received the special interrogatories and he had not identified

the specific obstacles preventing him from producing financial records. Hester 

appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by striking his claim, and 

that he had established standing.

II. 

This court generally reviews the district court’s decision to strike a claim for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. One Parcel of Prop. Located at RR 2, 

Indep., Buchanan Cnty., 959 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1992). When a district court 

bases its decision on an interpretation of the Supplemental Rules, this court reviews 

that interpretation de novo. United States v. Real Props. Located at 7215 Longboat 

Drive (Lot 24), 750 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2014). See also Koon v. United States, 

518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it 

makes an error of law.”).

The district court struck Hester’s claim under Rule G(8), which permits 

motions to strike a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6), the specialinterrogatory rule. Hester argues that Rule G(8) did not authorize striking his claim 

because he did not “fail[] to comply” with the special interrogatories. 

In determining what constitutes “failing to comply” with special 

interrogatories, this court relies first and foremost on the Rule’s plain meaning. 

$579,475, 917 F.3d at 1049, citing Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 

U.S. 120, 123 (1989). 
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“Failing to comply” with an obligation requires actual or constructive 

awareness of it. “Compliance” presupposes a “requirement” or “direction.” 

Compliance, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com

(last visited May 30, 2023); Compliance, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009), 

https://www.oed.com (last visited May 30, 2023). A boss has not “required” or

“directed” a subordinate to do something by typing up an email and forgetting to hit 

“send.” It makes no sense to criticize the subordinate for “failing to comply” with 

the boss’s unsent email when the subordinate neither read it (actual knowledge) nor 

could have read it (constructive). The term “failure to comply” simply does not fit. 

Another example: a driver fails to comply with a stop sign after overlooking or 

ignoring it, but not after a vandal removes the sign and the driver has no idea it 

existed. 

An individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A 

party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those 

obligations. See Aziz v. Wright, 34 F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1994). Even without a 

court order, a loan servicer fails to comply with statutory obligations when their

scope—and their applicability to the loan servicer—is obvious and should be

understood. See Wirtz v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 886 F.3d 713, 718 (8th 

Cir. 2018). But a citizen does not fail to comply with a police order—does not even 

have an “opportunity to comply”—when the official does not identify himself and 

the citizen is “unaware of a police presence.” Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View, 709 

F.3d 1201, 1210 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule 

G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of, and violates, Rule G(6) specialinterrogatory obligations.

Often, this bar is easily met. Rule G(6) imposes non-ambiguous obligations 

to answer or object to special interrogatories about “the claimant’s identity and 

relationship to the defendant property.” Supp. R. G(6)(a). See Supp R. G(6)(b). 

A claimant’s total failure to respond to special interrogatories, for example, 
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obviously runs afoul of Rule G(6). See, e.g., United States v. 2008 33’ Contender 

Model Tournament Vessel, 990 F.3d 725, 726 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Real 

Prop. Located at 17 Coon Creek Rd., Hawkins Bar California, Trinity Cnty., 787 

F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 2015). Often, the district court need not hesitate to strike a 

claim under Rule G(8). 

Sometimes Rule G(6)’s obligations are harder to understand. If a special 

interrogatory is arguably beyond the scope of Rule G(6), does objecting to it rather 

than answering it constitute “failing to comply” with the Rule? On the one hand, 

Rule G(6) explicitly authorizes “objections to [the] special interrogatories.” Supp. 

R. G(6)(b) (“Answers or Objections. Answers or objections to these interrogatories 

must be served within 21 days after the interrogatories are served.”). On the other, 

if a special interrogatory is appropriate, a claimant cannot avoid answering it merely 

by objecting. 

If a claimant’s special-interrogatory objections straddle the line between 

discovery dispute and “failing to comply,” the record should indicate that Rule G(6) 

violations were known or should have been known by the claimant before the claim 

is struck under Rule G(8). The district court can explicitly make this finding. Or, if 

a court order has compelled responses, the claimant will have actual knowledge of 

the Rule’s scope. 

On this record, this court cannot conclude that Hester knew or should have 

known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had 

provided. Hester articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and 

check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by 

“show[ing] where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred 

and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government 

exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had 

actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither 

found that he should have known he was violating the Rule, nor issued an order 

compelling him to respond to interrogatories. Without either a finding of knowing 
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non-compliance or a district court order, this court cannot conclude that Hester’s 

responses were properly struck under Rule G(8) for “failing to comply with” Rule 

G(6).

Requiring either knowing noncompliance or a court order reflects existing

practice, as exemplified by cases like United States v. $284,950.00 in U.S. Currency, 

933 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2019). In $284,950, this court affirmed dismissal of a claim 

after the district court had ordered the claimant to “supplement his responses to the 

special interrogatories as requested by the United States.” Id. at 973. The 

government moved to strike under Rule G(8) after the claimant provided incomplete 

responses and refused to supplement. Rather than immediately dismiss the claim, 

the district court ordered compliance with the government’s special interrogatory 

requests. When the claimant then “failed to verify” his answers, “failed to 

supplement” his responses, and “failed to identify relevant documents” to 

substantiate his claim, the district court struck his claim, and this court affirmed. Id.

at 974–75. See also United States v. Real Prop. Located at 17 Coon Creek Rd., 

Hawkins Bar California, Trinity Cnty., 787 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[C]ourts 

typically afford claimants one or even several opportunities to cure defective Rule 

G(6) responses.”).

The district court here correctly noted “striking” similarities between Hester’s 

responses and the claimant’s responses in $284,950. But it omitted the key 

difference: Hester might have believed himself engaged in a standard discovery 

dispute. The $284,950 claimant, due to the court order, knew he was not. 

Supplemental Rule G’s advisory committee notes support the requirement 

that, before striking a claim under Rule G(8), a district court either find a knowing 

violation of Rule G(6) or issue an order compelling answers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Supp. R. G Advisory Committee’s Notes to 2006 Adoption. They instruct that 

Rule G(8) is “somewhat more demanding” of claimants than Rule 37, which permits 

striking a claim “where there is [1] an order compelling discovery, [2] a willful 

violation of the order, and [3] prejudice to the other party.” United States v. 
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$11,3071,188.64 in United States Currency, 825 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 2016)

(alterations added), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Requiring either a knowing violation 

or a court order is more demanding of claimants than Rule 37’s three-part test.6

 

The government argues that, because the special interrogatories help 

determine a claimant’s standing, district courts require wide latitude to strike claims 

under Rule G(8). It cites $579,475, where this court, en banc, pointed to Rule G(8)’s 

strictures in dismissing fears that Rule G(5)’s “low threshold” for stating a claim 

would encourage meritless claims. $579,475, 917 F.3d at 1049.

The government’s argument is inconsistent with Rule G(8)’s “failing to 

comply” requirement. See id. (“[C]ourts are not licensed to impose heightened 

pleading requirements in certain classes of cases simply to avoid the risk that 

unsubstantiated claims will burden the courts and opposing parties.” (citing 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 514–15 (2002)). In any case,

requiring a court order or a finding of knowing noncompliance in cases where the 

claimant raises a reasonable objection to the scope of specific interrogatories aligns 

with current practice. See $284,950, 933 F.3d at 973; 17 Coon Creek Rd., 787 F.3d 

at 973. 

The district court did not find that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge 

of his obligation to further supplement, nor did it issue a discovery order that would 

have put him on notice. The record thus contains insufficient evidence that Hester 

“fail[ed] to comply” with Rule G(6). Because Rule G(8) did not authorize striking 

Hester’s claim, the district court abused its discretion by striking it. See Koon, 518 

U.S. at 100. 

6

In some cases, a district court could properly strike a claim under either Rule 

G(8) or Rule 37. 
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III. 

Complying with the special-interrogatory rule does not guarantee that a 

claimant has standing. See $284,950, 933 F.3d at 973. The district court did not 

rule on Hester’s standing, but noted “significant questions.” The district court

should answer those questions in the first instance. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Seats, Inc., 

900 F.3d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 2018) (“When it would be beneficial for the district court 

to consider an alternative argument in the first instance, we may remand the matter 

to the district court.”). 

Moreover, Hester has not necessarily escaped sanctions. The district court’s 

order solidified which requested information “fell within the scope of the 

interrogator[ies] Mr. Hester was bound to answer under Supplemental Rule 

G(6)(b).” Any future failure to respond as the district court directs could constitute 

“failing to comply” with Rule G(6), justifying striking the claim under Rule G(8). 

* * * * * * *

The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

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