IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ANA SANCHEZ-REYES, on behalf of 

herself and all other employees similarly 

situated, known and unknown, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

A&R SCREENING, LLC, an Illinois 

not-for-profit corporation, and JOELLEN DORZANO, individually, 

 

 Defendants. 

 Civil Action

No. 

JURY DEMAND 

COMPLAINT

 By and through her attorneys of record and on behalf of himself and all other 

employees similarly situated, known and unknown, the plaintiff, ANA SANCHEZ-REYES 

(the “Plaintiff”), hereby complains of the defendants, A&R SCREENING, LLC, 

(“A & R”), an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, JO-ELLEN DORZANO, individually, 

(collectively the “Defendants”). Pleading hypothetically and in the alternative, the Plaintiff 

alleges as follows: 

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This action arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 

 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as a result of the Defendants’ failure to pay certain overtime 

compensation to the Plaintiff, and to other similarly situated employees of the Defendants 

(the “Collective Class”). The Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week for the 

Defendants during certain weeks, but the Defendants failed and refused to pay her time-andone-half overtime compensation for some of the hours she worked in excess of 40 as the 

FLSA requires. Upon information and belief, the Defendants failed and refused to pay the 

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Collective Class members time-and-one-half overtime compensation for some of the hours 

they worked in excess of 40 as well during certain weeks. In Count I, the Plaintiff brings a 

claim pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. 

2. In Count II the Plaintiff brings a supplemental claim under the Illinois 

Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. 

3. In Count III, the Plaintiff brings a supplemental claim for violation of the 

Illinois Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/20. 

4. In Count IV, the Plaintiff brings a claim under the Illinois Wage Payment and 

Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. 

5. In Count V, the Plaintiff brings a common law retaliatory discharge claim. 

II. THE PARTIES

6. The Plaintiff is an individual domiciled within Illinois and resides within the 

Northern District of Illinois. 

7. JO-ELLEN DORZANO is an individual who, upon information and belief, 

is domiciled in Illinois and resides within the Northern District of Illinois. 

8. A&R SCREENING, LLC is an Illinois corporation that maintains its 

registered office and principal place of business at or near 8417 S. Beloit, Bridgeview, IL 

60455. 

9. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO is/was a 

member, manager or officer of A & R. 

10. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO 

exercises/exercised significant control over A & R’s day-to-day operations. 

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11. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO 

exercises/exercised significant control over A & R’s human resources and payroll functions. 

12. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO was the 

Plaintiff’s supervisor and/or manager. 

13. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO was/is the 

Collective Class members’ supervisor and/or manager. 

14. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO had the power 

to: a) hire and fire the Plaintiff; b) set the Plaintiff’s work schedule; c) set the Plaintiff’s rate 

of pay; d) define the Plaintiff’s job duties; and e) direct the particulars of the Plaintiff’s work. 

15. At all times relevant to this action, JO-ELLEN DORZANO had/has the 

power to: a) hire and fire the members of the Collective Class; b) set the Collective Class 

members’ work schedules; c) set the Collective Class members’ rates of pay; d) define the 

Collective Class members’ job duties; and e) direct the particulars of the Collective Class 

members’ work. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. Federal question jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Section 16(b) of the 

FLSA and 28 U.S.C. §1331. 

17. Supplemental jurisdiction over the Illinois statutory claims alleged herein is 

conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

18. Venue is proper as the acts or omissions that gave rise to the claims alleged 

herein occurred within this judicial district. 

19. Venue is proper as A & R maintains its principal place of business within the 

Northern District of Illinois. 

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IV. STATUTORY CONSENT

20. The Plaintiff brings this case as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf 

of herself and the Collective Class, and in accord with Section 16(b) of the FLSA, the 

Plaintiff has given written consent to bring such an action (attached as Exhibit A). 

V. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

21. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants, and each of them, were 

the Plaintiff’s “employer” within the meaning of Section 3(a) and (d) of the FLSA in that 

the Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of the “employer” in relation to the 

employee plaintiffs represented herein, and are therefore jointly and severally liable for the 

unpaid wages and other relief sought herein. 

22. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants are/were the Collective 

Class members’ “employer” within the meaning of Section 3(a) and (d) of the FLSA in that 

the Defendants act/acted directly or indirectly in the interest of the “employer” in relation 

to the employee plaintiffs represented herein, and are therefore jointly and severally liable 

for the unpaid wages and other relief sought herein. 

23. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants were the Plaintiff’s 

“employer” within the meaning of Section 3(c) of the IMWL in that the Defendants acted 

directly or indirectly in the interest of the “employer” in relation to the Plaintiff, and are 

therefore jointly and severally liable for the unpaid wages and other relief sought herein. 

24. Upon information and belief, A & R had gross receipts in excess of 

$500,000.00 in: a) 2007; b) 2008; c) 2009; d) 2010; and e) 2011. 

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25. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants operated, controlled 

and/or constituted an “enterprise” within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA (the 

“Enterprise”). 

26. At all times relevant to this action, the Enterprise operated a silk screening 

business within the Northern District of Illinois. 

27. Upon information and belief, the Enterprise may operate, and may have 

operated, additional establishments in Illinois. 

28. At all times relevant to this action, the Plaintiff was an “employee” of the 

Defendants within the meaning of Section 3(e)(1) of the FLSA. 

29. At all times relevant to this action, the members of the Collective Class 

are/were “employees” of the Defendants within the meaning of Section 3(e)(1) of the 

FLSA. 

30. At all times relevant to this action, the Plaintiff was an “employee” of the 

Defendants within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the IMWL. 

31. During the course of her employment by the Defendants, the Plaintiff handled 

goods that moved in interstate commerce including but not limited to cleaning solvents, 

dyes and inks, and textiles. 

32. During the course of their employment by the Defendants, the Collective 

Class members handled/handle goods that moved in interstate commerce including but not 

limited to cleaning solvents, dyes and inks, and textiles. 

33. During the course of their employment by the Defendants, the Plaintiff and 

the Collective Class members are/were not exempt from the overtime wage and minimum 

wage provisions of the FLSA. 

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34. During the course of their employment by the Defendants, the Plaintiff and 

the Collective Class members are/were not exempt from the overtime wage and minimum 

wage provisions of the IMWL. 

35. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from about September, 2001, 

to about April, 2010. 

36. The Defendants routinely and as a matter of practice and policy required the 

Plaintiff to work more than 40 hours per week, but then failed and refused to pay her 

overtime compensation at the requisite statutory rates for certain hours. 

37. Upon information and belief, the Defendants routinely and as a matter of 

practice and policy required the Collective Class members to work more than 40 hours per 

week, but then failed and refused to pay them overtime compensation at the requisite 

statutory rates for certain hours. 

38. As part of a scheme to conceal their violation of the FLSA, the Defendants 

would sometimes pay the Plaintiff and the Collective Class members for a small number of 

overtime hours at the time-and-one-half rate, while requiring them to work the remainder of 

their overtime hours off-the-books. 

39. The Defendants often required the Plaintiff to work “off-the-books” on 

weekends – paying her for certain weekend hours on the books, but not all, in an attempt to 

conceal the practice. 

40. When the Plaintiff worked on the weekends for the Defendants, she would 

typically observe about 4 Collective Class members working for the Defendants. 

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41. Upon information and belief, the Defendants often required the Collective 

Class members to work “off-the-books” on weekends – paying them for certain weekend 

hours on the books, but not all, in an attempt to conceal the practice. 

42. The Defendants can likely point to records that appear to show the Plaintiff 

and the Collective Class members did receive some overtime compensation at the time-andone-half rate; but, this is part of the Defendants’ deliberate scheme to conceal their failure to 

pay proper overtime compensation. 

43. The Defendants paid the Plaintiff in cash for the off-book hours she worked 

on weekends, and sometimes failed to pay her at all for the off-book hours she worked on 

weekends. 

44. For example, the Plaintiff might have actually worked 50 hours in one week, 

for which the Defendants might have paid her on-the-books for 42 hours, at the straight rate 

for 40 hours and at the time-and-one-half rate for two hours. Then, in that same week for 

the remaining 8 hours, the Defendants might pay the Plaintiff: a) in cash at the rate of oneand-one-quarter times her straight hourly rate; b) in cash at her straight hourly rate; or 

c) nothing at all. 

45. When the Defendants paid the Plaintiff in cash as described above, it was 

always either at the Plaintiff’s straight hourly rate, or at the rate of one-and-one-quarter 

times the Plaintiff’s straight hourly rate. 

46. The hours for which the Defendants would pay the Plaintiff in cash as 

described above were usually overtime (greater than 40 in a given week) hours and, 

therefore, the Defendants should have paid the Plaintiff at a rate not less than one-and-onehalf times the Plaintiff’s straight hourly rate. 

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47. On several occasions during her employment, the Plaintiff complained to JOELLEN DORZANO about not receiving proper overtime compensation for some of the 

weekend hours that she worked, to which complaints JO-ELLEN DORZANO replied with 

words the same as or similar to “What do you care? It’s cash. You don’t have to pay taxes 

on it, so it’s the same thing as normal overtime.” 

48. On several occasions during her employment, the Plaintiff overheard 

members of the Collective Class make the same or similar complaints to JO-ELLEN 

DORZANO, and the Plaintiff overheard JO-ELLEN DORZANO respond to them with the 

same or similar words. 

COUNT I 

(Violation of the FLSA) 

49. The Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the foregoing allegations. 

50. The Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay the Plaintiff for certain 

overtime (in excess of 40 in a given workweek) hours at a rate equal to or greater than oneand-one-half times the regular rate at which she was employed. 

51. Upon information and belief, the Defendants also violated the FLSA by 

failing to pay the Collective Class members for certain overtime (in excess of 40 in a given 

workweek) hours at a rate equal to or greater than one-and-one-half times the regular rates 

at which they are/were employed. 

52. The Defendants’ violation of the FLSA was willful in that the Defendants 

were aware or should have been aware of their obligations under the FLSA, but 

nevertheless attempted to circumvent its provisions. 

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53. The Defendants failed to take affirmative steps to ascertain their obligations 

under the FLSA. 

54. The Defendants’ practice or requiring the Plaintiff to work off the books on 

weekends, and paying the Plaintiff in cash for some of those hours, evidences the 

Defendants’ knowing and willful violation of the FLSA. 

WHEREFORE, on behalf of herself and the Collective Class, the Plaintiff prays for 

judgment in her favor and against the Defendants, and each of them, and for the following 

relief: 

A. damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime compensation due and 

owing to the plaintiffs for each hour the plaintiffs worked in excess of 40 in any 

given week, but for which the Defendants failed to pay the plaintiffs at a rate 

equal to or greater than one and one-half times the regular rate at which the 

plaintiffs were employed (in no case less than one and one-half times the IMWL’s 

mandatory minimum rate); 

B. statutory liquidated damages as allowed by the FLSA;

C. interest on all amounts awarded;

D. attorneys’ fees, together with costs of suit and collection; 

 

E. such further relief as may be fair and just in the premises. 

COUNT II 

(Violation of the IMWL) 

55. The Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the foregoing allegations. 

56. The Defendants violated the IMWL by failing to pay the Plaintiff for certain 

overtime (in excess of 40 in a given workweek) hours at a rate equal to or greater than one 

and one-half times the regular rate at which she was employed. 

57. The Defendants were aware or should have been aware of its obligations 

under the IMWL, but nevertheless attempted to circumvent its provisions. 

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58. The Defendants failed to take affirmative steps to ascertain their obligations 

under the IMWL. 

59. The Defendants’ practice or requiring the Plaintiff to work off the books on 

weekends, and paying the Plaintiff in cash for some of those hours, evidences the 

Defendants’ knowing and willful violation of the IMWL. 

WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and against the 

Defendants, and each of them, and for the following relief: 

A. damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime compensation due and 

owing to the Plaintiff for each hour the Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 in any 

given week, but for which the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff at a rate equal 

to or greater than one and one-half times the regular rate at which the Plaintiff 

was employed (in no case less than one and one-half times the IMWL’s 

mandatory minimum rate); 

B. statutory punitive damages as allowed by the IMWL; 

C. interest on all amounts awarded; 

D. attorneys’ fees, together with costs of suit and collection; and 

E. such further relief as may be fair and just in the premises. 

COUNT III 

(Common Law Retaliatory Discharge) 

60. The Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the foregoing allegations. 

61. In about September, 2009, the Defendants fired the Plaintiff’s co-worker, 

Magdalena Aranefi. 

62. Subsequent to the termination of her employment, Magdalena Aranefi filed 

for unemployment compensation benefits. 

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63. Upon information and belief, Magdalena Aranefi also filed a charge of 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and/or the Illinois 

Department of Human Rights. 

64. In about December, 2009, JO-ELLEN DORZANO asked the Plaintiff to sign 

and attest to a statement that the Defendants had prepared (the “Statement”). 

65. The Statement was part of the Defendants’ attempt to defeat Magdalena 

Aranefi’s application for unemployment compensation benefits. 

66. Upon information and belief, the Statement was also part of the Defendants’ 

attempt to defend themselves against the charge of discrimination filed by Magdalena 

Aranefi. 

67. However, significant portions of the Statement were false. 

68. The Plaintiff refused to sign the Statement because significant portions of it 

were false. 

69. On or about January 5, 2010, the Plaintiff testified truthfully, and contrary to 

significant portions of the Statement, in a telephonic hearing conducted by the Illinois 

Department of Employment Security. 

70. When the Plaintiff refused to sign the Statement, she believed that to do so 

would be a crime – perjury. 

71. The Plaintiff’s belief, as described above, was reasonable. 

72. On or about April 6, 2010, the Defendants fired the Plaintiff. 

73. The Defendants had no legitimate or lawful reason to fire the Plaintiff. 

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74. Shortly before the Defendants fired the Plaintiff, JO-ELLEN DORZANO 

made derogatory comments to the Plaintiff regarding the Plaintiff’s decision to testify 

truthfully in the telephonic hearing referenced above. 

75. Shortly before the Defendants fired the Plaintiff, JO-ELLEN DORZANO 

made derogatory comments to the Plaintiff regarding the Plaintiff’s refusal to sign the 

Statement. 

76. The Defendants fired the Plaintiff in retaliation for her refusal to sign the 

Statement and in retaliation for her decision to testify truthfully in the telephonic hearing 

referenced above. 

77. When the Defendants fired the Plaintiff, they failed and refused to pay her for 

32 days of vacation time she had accrued. 

78. This vacation pay constitutes regular wages to which the Plaintiff is entitled 

under the IWPCA by virtue of the course of dealing between the Plaintiff and the 

Defendants, i.e., the Defendants and their predecessors had always allotted vacation pay to 

the Plaintiff her co-workers according to a certain policy (the “Policy”); and, the 

Defendants’ failure to pay the Plaintiff’s accrued vacation pay was violation of this policy. 

79. Any alleged, formal changes to the Policy were: a) made after the Plaintiff’s 

vacation pay had already accrued under the existing Policy; b) were never made known to 

the Plaintiff or her co-workers at any time before April 6, 2010; and c) were never published 

to the Plaintiff or her co-workers at any time before April 6, 2010. 

80. The Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff for the 32 vacation days she had 

accrued, to which she is entitled under the IWPCA, in retaliation for her refusal to sign the 

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Statement and in retaliation for her decision to testify truthfully in the telephonic hearing 

referenced above. 

81. The Defendants’ firing of the Plaintiff was willful and wanton, and was 

enacted with malicious disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights. 

82. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ wrongful firing of the 

Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has sustained damages including but not limited to lost wages. 

83. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ wrongful firing of the 

Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has sustained damages including but not limited to pain, suffering, and 

emotional distress. 

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and against the 

Defendants, and each of them, and for the following relief: 

A. make-whole damages including but not limited to reinstatement, back pay and 

front pay in lieu of reinstatement; 

B. compensatory damages; 

C. punitive damages in an amount no less than three times any award of 

compensatory damages, back pay and front pay; 

D. interest on all amounts awarded; 

E. attorneys’ fees, together with costs of suit and collection; and 

F. such further relief as may be fair and just in the premises. 

COUNT IV 

(Violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act) 

84. The Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the foregoing allegations. 

85. The Defendants’ retaliatory firing of the Plaintiff was in violation of the 

Illinois Whistleblower Act. 

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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and against the 

Defendants, and each of them, and for the following relief: 

A. make-whole damages including but not limited to reinstatement, back pay and 

front pay in lieu of reinstatement; 

B. compensatory damages; 

C. punitive damages in an amount no less than three times any award of 

compensatory damages, back pay and front pay; 

D. interest on all amounts awarded; 

E. attorneys’ fees, together with costs of suit and collection; and 

F. such further relief as may be fair and just in the premises. 

COUNT V 

(Violation of the IWPCA) 

86. The Plaintiff hereby re-alleges the foregoing allegations. 

87. The Plaintiff brings this Count as an opt-in representative action under 

Section 11 of the IWPCA on behalf of herself and the Collective Class. 

88. The Defendants violated the IWPCA by: 

a. failing to pay the Plaintiff for accrued vacation hours upon the termination 

of the Plaintiff’s employment; 

b. failing to pay the Plaintiff certain wages either weekly or biweekly; and/or 

c. failing to pay the Plaintiff certain wages within either 7 days of the close of 

each relevant workweek, or within 13 days of the close of each relevant 

biweekly pay-period; and 

d. failing to pay the Plaintiff certain wages altogether by requiring her to 

work “off-the-books” on certain weekends. 

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89. Upon information and belief, the Defendants violated the IWPCA by: 

a. failing to pay some of the Collective Class members for accrued vacation 

hours upon the termination of the their employment; 

b. failing to pay the Collective Class members certain wages either weekly or 

biweekly; and/or 

c. failing to pay the Collective Class members certain wages within either 7 

days of the close of each relevant workweek, or within 13 days of the close 

of each relevant biweekly pay-period; and 

d. failing to pay the Collective Class members certain wages altogether by 

requiring them to work “off-the-books” on certain weekends. 

WHEREFORE, on behalf of herself and the Collective Class, the Plaintiff prays for 

judgment in her favor and against the Defendants, and each of them, and for the following 

relief: 

A. damages in an amount equal to the unpaid wages (including but not limited to 

minimum wages, regular wages, overtime compensation and accrued vacation 

pay) due and owing to the plaintiffs for each hour the plaintiffs worked but for 

which the Defendants failed to pay the plaintiffs at a rate equal to the regular rate 

at which the plaintiffs were employed (and as applicable, one-and-one-half times 

the regular rate at which the plaintiffs were employed – for those hours over 40 in 

any given workweek); 

B. an order commanding the Defendants to pay the plaintiffs any all unpaid wages 

(including but not limited to minimum wages, regular wages, overtime 

compensation and accrued vacation pay) due and owing to the plaintiffs for each 

hour the plaintiffs worked, but for which the Defendants failed to pay the 

plaintiffs at a rate equal to the regular hourly rate at which the plaintiffs were 

employed (and as applicable, one-and-one-half times the regular rate at which the 

plaintiffs were employed – for those hours over 40 in any given workweek); 

C. interest on all amounts awarded; 

D. attorneys’ fees, together with costs of suit and collection; and 

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E. such further relief as may be fair and just in the premises. 

JURY DEMAND

The Plaintiff demands trial by jury of all issues set forth herein that are capable of 

being tried by a jury. 

Roy P. Amatore, Esq. 

Paul Luka, Esq. 

AMATORE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 

120 S. State Street · Suite 400 

Chicago, IL 60603 

312.236.9825 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/Paul Luka 

One of the Plaintiff’s Attorneys 

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EXHIBIT 

A 

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