alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(October 29, 1963)

#### F. N. Jean Gindorff, Respondent, v. Mobil Overseas Oil Company, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

*Per Curiam.*

In the first cause of action, to which no exception is taken, and no relief requested, plaintiff sues Mobil Overseas Oil Company for a finder’s commission of $1,000,000. In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that, with knowledge of the claim, defendant So cony Mobil Oil 'Company caused the dissolution of Mobil Overseas Oil Company, took over its assets and assumed its liabilities. It is alleged that this was done to impede collection of the judgment. The third cause of action is against the directors of the dissolved corporation and alleges that the assets of the latter were more than enough to pay its creditors, including this plaintiff.

As regards the third cause of action, no fraud or malfeasance is alleged, nor any way in which plaintiff could be damaged by any act of these defendants. No liability by virtue of section 15 of the Stock Corporation Law is involved. No transfer to them, nor any transfer forbidden by the section, is alleged.

As to the second cause of action, the moving defendant concedes that it has assumed the liability and that any judgment that may be entered against the dissolved corporation may be entered against it. Plaintiff apparently is not content to accept the concession. Instead, he wishes to prove all the corporate steps by which the dissolution and transfer of assets and liabilities was accomplished. It is hard to discern any legitimate practical purpose behind that attitude. Defendant contends with some plausibility that what plaintiff desires to do is patent — first, to harass defendant by means of an extended examination before trial as to these steps, and, secondly, to bring the transaction before the jury in the hope that the main issue will be influenced by claims of fraud, based on dubious interpretations of the Debtor and Creditor Law. Plaintiff *819is- in the fortunate position of there being no impediment to the collection of any judgment he may obtain, but would make it appear that he fears this is not so. The reasons given for the fears on argument were demonstrably specious.

As a matter of discretion, all proceedings on the second cause of action are stayed until the disposition of the first cause of action.

The Order should be modified on the law by striking out the third cause of action and, as a matter of discretion, staying all proceedings on the second cause of action until the first cause of action is disposed of, and, as so modified, affirmed, with costs to appellants.

Botein, P. J., Rabin, Eager, Steuer and Bergan, JJ., concur.

Order, entered on June 6, 1963, unanimously modified, on the law, by striking out the third cause of action and, as a matter of discretion, staying all proceedings on the second cause of action until the first cause of action is disposed of, and, as so modified, affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellants.
(June 30, 1964)

#### In the Matter of Alfred Satz, an Attorney.

Motion for reinstatement to the Bar granted. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, McNally and Eager, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection
with the Quarterly Report of Lubys, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended February 10, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Christopher J. Pappas, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |     |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: March 19, 2010 |  | By: |  | /s/ Christopher J. Pappas            
|                     |  |     |  | Christopher J. Pappas                
|                     |  |     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:551
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:552
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:553
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:554
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:555
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:556
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:557
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:558
Case: 1:11-cv-07972 Document #: 73-3 Filed: 05/07/13 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:559
```

                    Electro Rent Corporation
                            FORM 10-Q
                         August 31, 2002

                          Exhibit Index

Exhibit #   Description
---------   -----------
99.1        Statement Pursuant to Section 906 the Sarbanes-Oxley
            Act of 2002 By Principal Executive Officer Regarding
            Facts and Circumstances Relating to Exchange Act
            Filings

99.2        Statement Pursuant to Section 906 the Sarbanes-Oxley
            Act of 2002 By Principal Financial Officer Regarding
            Facts and Circumstances Relating to Exchange Act
            Filings

99.1

Statement Pursuant to Section 906 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
By Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
Regarding Facts and Circumstances Relating to Exchange Act Filings

Dated September 26, 2002

I, Daniel Greenberg, certify that the periodic report, to which
this Statement is attached, fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, and the information contained in the periodic report to
which this Statement is attached, fairly present, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the registrant.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Statement
as of the date first written above.

/s/ Daniel Greenberg
Daniel Greenberg
Chief Executive Officer

99.2

Statement Pursuant to Section 906 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
By Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
Regarding Facts and Circumstances Relating to Exchange Act Filings

Dated September 26, 2002

I, Craig R. Jones, certify that the periodic report, to which this
Statement is attached, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, and the information contained in the periodic report to
which this Statement is attached, fairly present, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the registrant.

                                    Page 1

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Statement
as of the date first written above.

/s/Craig R. Jones
Craig R. Jones
Chief Financial Officer

                                    Page 2
```
Attachment to August 9, 2013 Electronic Announcement 

Federal Direct Student Loans 2013-2014 Interest Rates 

Effective for Loans With a First Disbursement on or After July 1, 2013 

Loan Type Student Grade Level

Cohort Index Rate 

Add-On 

2013-201

Fixed Inter

Rate 

First 

Disbursed 

On/After 

First 

Disbursed 

Before 

10-Year 

Treasury 

Note Index 

Direct 

Subsidized 

Loans 

Undergraduate 

Students 7/1/13 7/1/14 1.81% 2.05% 3.86% 

Direct 

Unsubsidized 

Loans 

Undergraduate 

Students 7/1/13 7/1/14 1.81% 2.05% 3.86% 

Direct 

Unsubsidized 

Loans 

Graduate/Professional 

Students 7/1/13 7/1/14 1.81% 3.60% 5.41% 

Direct PLUS 

Loans 

Parents of Dependent 

Undergraduate 

Students and 

Graduate/Professional 

Students 

7/1/13 7/1/14 1.81% 4.60% 6.41% 

Direct 

Consolidation 

Loans 

N/A 

Consolidation Loan Application Received on or after July 1, 2013 

Interest rate remains the weighted interest rates of the loans included consolidation, rounded up to the neighth of one percent. New law recap.
January 23, 2014



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

IN THE ESTATE OF BAR BARA CHAPMAN, DECEAS ED

NO. 14

- 13

- 00041

- CV

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgment signed October 8, 2012 in favor of applicant Catherine C. Valby , was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find error in the judgment. We order the judgment of the court below REVERSED and we REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion

. We order appell ee , Catherine C. Valby
, to pay all costs incu rred in this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
#### Micheline Lerner, Respondent, v. Alan J. Lerner, Appellant.

Order, entered November 2, 1964, unanimously affirmed, without costs. We affirm because we understand that an early trial of this action may be had, and our affirmance is not to be taken as any indication that the child may stay indefinitely in California or that the Court would approve of leaving the child with strangers for any appreciable length of time. It seems only too clear that these parties are concerned more with their selfish interests than *863with their parental responsibilities and the welfare of their child. It is trite but true to observe here that the welfare of the child is of paramount concern and that he must not be treated as a mere pawn of the parties to this action. That they, the parents of this boy, should use him for purposes of personal recrimination and vengeance is beyond comprehension. There is absolutely no justification for these parties or their attorneys to make this child the subject of maneuvers or litigation designed for the purpose of gaining an advantage in the prosecution of their charges and counter-charges. We trust the parties will press for an early trial and abide, without further litigation, upon the determination of the trial court to be worked out for the best interests of the child. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Valente, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Ballantine Books, Inc. and Capital Distributing Company.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with $10 costs, unless the appellant procures the record on appeal and appellant’s points to be served and filed on or before August 25, 1960, with notice of argument for September 6, 1960, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Respondent’s points are to be served and filed on or before August 31, I960. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally, Stevens and Noonan, JJ.
# state_vol

# Sheet1
162 So. 718

#### MOUNICOU v. HAISTRE.

No. 32895.

May 27, 1935.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 1935.

John D. Nix, Jr., of New Orleans, for appellant.

Daly & Hamlin, of New Orleans, for appellee.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

This is a suit for the interdiction of the defendant. She is alleged to be an imbecile, notoriously insane, and not capable of taking care of herself or of managing her estate. The plaintiff is the son of a deceased first cousin of the defendant. The suit was dismissed on an exception of no .right of action, because there was living in the parish a first cousin, who was the nearest relation, of the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment dismissing his suit. The first cousin of the defendant was a widow named Mrs. Octavie Teoulet Lasalle, the daughter of a deceased brother of the defendant’s mother and of the plaintiff’s grandmother. The defendant’s mother and the plaintiff’s grandmother were dead when this suit was filed; and Mrs. Lasalle, the first cousin of the defendant, died after the plaintiff had appealed from the judgment dismissing his suit. A certified copy of the death certificate has been filed in this court; and it is admitted, of course, by counsel for the defendant, that Mrs. Lasalle is dead. The only reason, therefore, for the judgment which denied to the plaintiff 'a right of action has disappeared ; that is to say, that there was, when the judgment was rendered, a person who was of closer relation to the defendant than the plaintiff was. Whether that was a sufficient reason for the dismissal of the suit is a question which we need not now decide. It was the only reason for the judgment which was rendered, and, as the reason has vanished, the judgment must be set aside and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

The judgment is annulled and the case is ordered remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The defendant is *887to pay the costs of this appeal; the question of liability for other court costs is to abide the final disposition of the case.
Order entered July 15, 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 15
- 01390
- CR ERNESTO JENNINGS, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 363rd Judi cial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F
- 1131021
- W



### O RDER
We REINSTATE this appeal

. We abated this appeal for findings regarding the record, specifically why appellant’s brief
had not been filed. We ADOPT the trial court’s July 11 , 2016 findings that appellate counsel will travel to the Formby Unit to meet with appellant and appellant’s brief will be filed by August 13, 2016

. We ORDER appellant’s brief filed no later than August 15, 2016.

/s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Elliott Wright, True Name Alexander Wright, Respondent.

Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated March 6, *9311978, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented before the Grand Jury was not legally sufficient to establish the crimes charged. Order reversed, on the law, motion denied, and indictment reinstated. On July 13, 1977, the evening of New York’s most recent blackout, at 10:45 p.m., defendant was discovered by Police Officer Robert Foglia inside the Public Appliance Store at 840 Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. The iron gate outside the store had been torn away, the display windows had all been shattered and the front window was also broken. The store was not then open for business. As Foglia approached the store, defendant, who had "property” in his possession, dropped the property and attempted to flee. He was arrested and, based solely upon Foglia’s testimony, he was indicted for third degree burglary, petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree. Defendant then moved to dismiss the burglary count on the ground that the owner of the store had neither testified nor submitted an affidavit stating that defendant had no permission or authority to be present inside the store when he was arrested. Defendant demanded the dismissal of the remaining counts on the ground that the owner had not testified or presented an affidavit stating that the property which defendant was attempting to remove did not belong to him. The court granted the defendant’s motion. The indictment must be reinstated. In *People v Borrero*(26 NY2d 430) the Court of Appeals held that a necessary element of a crime, namely the defendant’s nonownership of property, could be established by circumstantial evidence alone, where the circumstances of the crime, according to common human experience, would lead a reasonable man to accept the inferences asserted for the established facts. Since circumstantial evidence alone can provide proof of an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, *a fortiori,*it can provide the legally sufficient evidence required for an indictment (CPL 190.65). That the defendant in the instant case was present in a store not open for business, that the blackout made the use of the store impossible, that the store had been forcibly entered at some point, and that defendant dropped the property that he was holding and fled upon the arrival of the police, all warrant the conclusion that he had no right to be inside the store (cf. *People v Borrero, supra).*Therefore, the burglary count must be reinstated. For the same reasons, the remaining counts of the indictment must also be reinstated. Titone, J. P., Shapiro, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
Case: 3:12-cr-50027 Document #: 3 Filed: 04/13/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:13
(December 14, 1978)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andrew Sobel, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered *689on June 5, 1978, unanimously affirmed. The case is remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (subd 5). No opinion. Concur-Murphy, P. J., Lupiano, Fein, Sandier and Sullivan, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Virginia Glass, Appellant, v. Board of Education of the City of New York, Respondent.

In a proceeding under article 78 of the former Civil Practice Act by a teacher: (1) to review and to annul a determination of the respondent Board of Education of the City of New York, terminating without a hearing her permanent license as a teacher of library; (2) to restore her to such position; and (3) for other related relief, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated July 22, 1963, which denied her application and dismissed her petition (see 39 Misc 2d 761). Order reversed on the law and the facts, with costs; determination of the board annulled; petitioner directed to be restored to her position; and her petition granted in all respects. Findings of fact contained in the decision of the Special Term which may be inconsistent herewith are reversed, and new findings are made as indicated herein. This disposition is without prejudice to such further proceedings not inconsistent herewith, as the board may be advised. Petitioner, a substitute teacher of library in respondent’s school system since 1954, was appointed a regular teacher in September, 1959 after passing an examination as to which the announcement provided that by October 1, 1961 the applicants had to meet in full the eligibility requirements. The required probationary term having been completed by petitioner, her appointment was made permanent on October 26, 1960 and she acquired tenure. Thereafter, on January 31, 1963 her services *892as a regular teacher with tenure were summarily terminated without a hearing by reason of her failure to submit proof of timely completion of two required courses of two semester hours each. In our opinion, such dismissal was error. A teacher with tenure may not be summarily dismissed without a hearing on charges (Education Law, § 2573, subds. 5, 7; *Matter of Boyd*v. *Collins,*11 N Y 2d 228, 233; *Matter of Kobylski*v. *Agone,*37 Misc 2d 255, affd. 19 A D 2d 761). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-1912

___________ Charles Armstrong, * * Appellant, * * v. * * State of Missouri; Mel Carnahan, * Governor; St. Louis County, Missouri; * Buzz Westfall, County Executive; * St. Louis County Government; City * of Vinita Park; Virginia Bira, Mayor * of Vinita Park, Missouri; Daniel B. * Appeal from the United States Kramer, Vinita Park, Missouri, * District Court for the Eastern Municipal Court Judge; R. Hartz, * District of Missouri. Vinita Park, Missouri, City Marshall; * Richard Aites, Vinita Park, Missouri * (UNPUBLISHED) Police Officer; Unknown Mudd, * Vinita Park, Missouri Police Officer; * Unknown Vinita Park, Missouri, City * Court; Ku Klux Klan, Overland, * Missouri; Ku Klux Klan, of the State * of Missouri, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: December 22, 2000 Filed: January 5, 2001

___________1 TheHonorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.
-2- BeforeMcMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Charles Armstrong appeals the district court’s 1 order dismissing without prejudice his pro se civil rights complaint against numerous defendants. After careful review of the record, we conclude that Mr. Armstrong’s complaint was frivolous and failedto state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); B ray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic , 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993); West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Martinv. Sargent , 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a).
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 32.1

              Certification of President and Chairman of the Board

  Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code


     I, Gary L. Martin, President and Chairman of the Board of Capital Southwest
Corporation, certify that, to my knowledge:

         1. the Form 10-Q, filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on
November 7, 2008 ("accompanied  report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. the information contained in the accompanied report fairly presents,
in all material respects,  the consolidated  financial  condition and results of
operations of Capital Southwest Corporation.


Date: November 7, 2008                           By:   /s/ Gary L. Martin
      ----------------                                 -------------------------
                                                       Gary L. Martin, President
                                                       and Chairman of the Board
Exhibit 32(d)








CERTIFICATION FURNISHED PURSUANT TO




18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Carolina Power & Light Company (the “Company”) for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Mark F. Mulhern, Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)           the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/ Mark F. Mulhern


Mark F. Mulhern


Senior Vice President and


Chief Financial Officer


August 7, 2009








This certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
1913.505-2 Board order forms in lieu of Optional and Standard Forms. ( a ) Optional Forms 347 and 348 shall be used as prescribed in FAR 13.505 unless an equivalent form has been authorized for use by the Board Procurement Executive (or Designee). Exceptions may be granted, on a case-by-case basis, in order to accommodate computer-generated purchase order forms. Exception approval for over printing (FAR 53.104) is not needed.
( b ) The Broadcasting Board of Governors Form IA-44 (see 1953.370-44) is authorized for use when obtaining nonpersonal services on an intermittent basis for such services as script writers, translators, narrators, etc.
[50 FR 13205, Apr. 3, 1985]