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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

SUSAN DOBRZENIECKI, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

HEIDI BROWN and ST. JAMES 

HOSPITAL, 

 Defendants. 

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 No. 11 C 7956 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge: 

This matter is before the court on the respective bills of costs filed by defendants St. 

James Hospital (“St. James”), Dr. Heidi Brown (“Dr. Brown”), and Dr. Joseph Yates (“Dr. 

Yates”). (Dkt. Nos. 285, 286.) On May 6, 2015, Dr. Yates withdrew his claim for costs. (Dkt. 

No. 292.) For the reasons stated below, the requests set forth in the remaining defendants’ bills 

of costs are denied in their entirety. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 8, 2011, Susan Dobrzeniecki (“Dobrzeniecki”) and her now-deceased 

husband, Thomas Dobrzeniecki, Sr., filed this lawsuit against Sauk Village, Illinois and several 

of its police officers (collectively, the “Sauk Village Defendants”), St. James, two St. James 

security guards, and two St. James emergency room doctors: Drs. Yates and Brown (along with 

St. James, the “Medical Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 6, 2014, the court issued a 

Memorandum Opinion and Order (1) denying the Sauk Village Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on Dobrzeniecki’s § 1983 claims against them, (2) denying the Medical Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on Dobrzeniecki’s state law medical malpractice claim against 

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them, and (3) granting the Medical Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Dobrzeniecki’s state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress.1

 (Dkt. No. 251.) 

On January 22, 2015, after Magistrate Judge Gilbert and this court invested considerable 

time helping the parties resolve their protracted litigation, Dobrzeniecki and the Sauk Village 

Defendants reached a settlement on Dobrzeniecki’s federal claims. (Dkt. No. 270.) The Medical 

Defendants did not participate in the settlement but benefitted nonetheless: following the 

resolution of Dobrzeniecki’s federal claims, they moved to dismiss Dobrzeniecki’s state law 

malpractice claim for “lack of supplemental jurisdiction.” (Dkt. Nos. 274, 276.) Although the 

court did not “lack” supplemental jurisdiction—it is a matter of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a)—the court relinquished jurisdiction over Dobrzeniecki’s malpractice claim because 

significant expert discovery remained to be completed in the case, and because Illinois courts are 

highly experienced at addressing medical malpractice claims arising under Illinois law. (Dkt. No. 

284.) The court therefore dismissed Dobrzeniecki’s medical malpractice claim without prejudice 

to her ability to refile the claim in Illinois state court. (Id.)

On March 19, 2015, twenty-eight days after the court’s order of dismissal, the Medical 

Defendants filed bills of costs seeking reimbursement of various costs and fees pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Local Rule 54.1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (Dkt. Nos. 285, 

286.) St. James seeks $6,536.17 for electronically ordered deposition transcripts and $57.21 for 

witness fees paid to Peter Dobrzeniecki, Susan Dobrzeniecki’s son. (Dkt. No. 285.) Dr. Brown 

 

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 The court issued two additional written opinions between the filing of Dobrzeniecki’s 

complaint and the court’s ruling on summary judgment, including an opinion dismissing Dr. 

Yates from the case. (See Dkt. Nos. 60, 98.) Because Dr. Yates has withdrawn his claim for 

costs, however, a more detailed recitation of this case’s procedural history is not necessary to 

address the instant claims for costs. 

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and Dr. Yates initially sought $10,329.67 for electronically ordered deposition transcripts and 

medical records. (Dkt. No. 286.) As stated earlier, Dr. Yates has since withdrawn his claim for 

costs, but Dr. Brown’s claim remains pending for the full amount (Dr. Yates’s motion to 

withdraw does not adjust the amount sought in Dr. Yates’s and Dr. Brown’s joint bill of costs). 

(See Dkt. No. 292.) Dobrzeniecki, not surprisingly, opposes the taxation of any costs in favor of 

the Medical Defendants. (Dkt. No. 289.) 

ANALYSIS 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), a prevailing party shall be allowed to 

recover costs other than attorneys’ fees unless a statute or other rule states otherwise or the court 

specifically disallows such costs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (setting forth 

costs that are generally recoverable). There is no superseding statute applicable to this case and, 

as such, the Medical Defendants are entitled to recover their costs if they were in fact a 

“prevailing party,” within the meaning of Rule 54. 

I. The Court’s February 19, 2015 Order of Dismissal 

The Medical Defendants first argue that they are entitled to costs as a “prevailing party” 

based on the court’s decision not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Dobrzeniecki’s 

medical malpractice claim. This argument borders on the frivolous. To be a “prevailing party,” a 

litigant must receive at least some relief on the merits that alters the legal relationship of the 

parties. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human 

Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603-06 (2001). The court dismissed Dobrzeniecki’s malpractice claim 

solely on jurisdictional grounds and purely as a matter of discretion. The court’s ruling had no 

effect on the legal relationship between Dobrzeniecki and the Medical Defendants; she is free to 

file suit, making identical allegations of medical malpractice, in Illinois court. The Medical 

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Defendants “prevailed” to the extent they have now been accorded their preferred court in which 

to litigate, Illinois, but such a minor “victory” is not enough to award costs under Rule 54. See, 

e.g., Catalina Marketing Intern., Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., No. 00 C 2447, 2004 WL 

421739, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2004) (Darrah, J.) (dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction 

does not make a party a “prevailing party”); Lichtenheld v. Juniper Features, Ltd., 1996 WL 

685443, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (Coar, J.) (same). 

In their reply briefs, the Medical Defendants’ contend that Judge Leinenweber awarded 

costs in a nearly identical situation in Bennett v. United Global Services, LLC, 2014 WL 

1322711 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2014). The Medical Defendants are incorrect. In Bennett, Judge 

Leinenweber awarded costs to the defendants after granting summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants on the federal claims and dismissing the remaining state law claims following his 

decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at *1-2. That is not the case here. Unlike 

Bennett, the Medical Defendants did not win a judgment on any federal claim, nor did the court’s 

summary judgment ruling create an opportunity for the court to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction. Dobrzeniecki’s federal claims were brought only against the Sauk Village 

Defendants. Those federal claims were settled. That settlement of those federal claims, which did 

not involve the Medical Defendants, was the sole basis for dismissing the remaining state law 

claim against the Medical Defendants. 

The same reasoning applies to the Medical Defendants’ reliance on Seventh Circuit case 

law stating that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice renders the opposing party a “prevailing 

party” within the meaning of Rule 54. See Gwin v. Am. River Transp. Co., 482 F.3d 969, 974-75 

(7th Cir. 2007) (citing First Commodity Traders, Inc., v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.3d 

1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 1985)). In Gwin, the Seventh Circuit awarded costs to the defendant after 

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the plaintiff engaged in extensive discovery on various legal theories but submitted only a 

discrimination claim to the jury. Id. A party’s abandonment of a claim, whether through a 

voluntary dismissal or last minute abandonment at trial, is materially different from the situation 

in this case. The abandonment of a claim after an opposing party has accrued costs recoverable 

under Rule 54 implies that the claim lacked merit, or at the very least that the defendant did 

something to cause the plaintiff to forego the claim. Here, Dobrzeniecki has not abandoned her 

claim—she is free to pursue it in state court—and the Medical Defendants did nothing to affect 

the dismissal other than stand aside while Dobrzeniecki engaged in settlement negotiations with 

the Sauk Village Defendants. 

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, Dobrzeniecki’s malpractice claim against 

the Medical Defendants survives should she choose to pursue it in Illinois state court. This 

court’s decision not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the claim does not grant the 

Medical Defendants a “victory” entitling them to costs under Rule 54. 

II. The Court’s October 6, 2014 Summary Judgment Ruling 

Dr. Brown alternatively argues that she is entitled to costs as a result of the court’s grant 

of summary judgment in her favor on “a clear majority of the counts against her.”2

 (Dkt. No. 291 

at 4.) Even though the court granted Dr. Brown summary judgment on Dobrzeniecki’s two state 

law claims for emotional distress on October 6, 2014, (Dkt. No. 251), she is not be entitled to 

costs based on the that ruling. Dr. Brown prevailed on two of the three state law claims brought 

against her but she lost her bid to dispose of Dobrzeniecki’s medical malpractice claim. And 

although Dr. Brown need not win on every claim to be awarded costs, she must prevail on a 

“substantial part of the litigation.” First Commodity Traders, Inc., 766 F.3d at 1015. In this case, 

 

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 St. James seeks costs only on the basis of the court’s February 19, 2015 dismissal. 

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as evidenced by the percentage of Dr. Brown’s briefs (Dkt. Nos. 197, 202) and the court’s 

opinion (Dkt. No. 251) devoted to the medical malpractice claim, it is clear that the malpractice 

claim was more than merely one-third of the case against Dr. Brown. It was the main claim and 

on its own constituted a “substantial part of the litigation.” 

Finally, even if the court were to find that Dr. Brown prevailed on a substantial part of 

the litigation, the court is unable to prorate Dr. Brown’s submitted costs to account for her failure 

to prevail on Dobrzeniecki’s medical malpractice claim. As far as the court can tell, Dr. Brown 

has submitted an invoice for every deposition transcript and medical record her counsel obtained 

throughout the litigation. Some of the transcripts and records—probably most of the transcripts 

and records—related to Dobrzeniecki’s malpractice claim rather than her claims for emotional 

distress. Although the court is mindful of the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that preparing a bill 

of costs occasionally imposes a burden so high that it negates any potential recovery, see 

Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 

1991), Dr. Brown must at least make some initial effort to limit her desired recovery to the costs 

associated with her (claimed) victory. She has not done so, and neither can the court given the 

limited information available to it. 

Accordingly, the court rejects Dr. Brown’s argument that she is entitled to costs based on 

the court’s summary judgment ruling because she did not prevail on a substantial part of the 

litigation (yet), and because the court cannot identify the costs associated with the two state law 

claims on which Dr. Brown won summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, Dr. Yates’s motion to withdraw his claim for costs 

[292] is granted, and the remaining defendants’ bills of costs [285], [286], are denied. This case 

remains closed. Although Dobrzeniecki’s medical malpractice claim against St. James and Dr. 

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Brown remains alive and well should Dobrzeniecki choose to refile her case in state court, the 

court encourages the parties to revisit their settlement negotiations before continuing what has 

already been a lengthy (and apparently expensive) litigation. 

 ENTER: 

 _______________________________ 

 JAMES F. HOLDERMAN 

Date: May 8, 2015 United States District Court Judge 

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