Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2365 | February 18, 2020 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Evan Matthew Comer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

P.M.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 18, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JV-2365

Appeal from the Decatur Circuit

Court

The Hon. Timothy B. Day, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

16C01-1907-JD-244

16C01-1907-JD-243

16C01-1902-JD-53

Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2365 | February 18, 2020 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] For actions taken in January, May, and July of 2019, the State alleged in three 

separate cause numbers that P.M. committed what would be Level 6 felony 

theft of a firearm, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Level 6 felony 

residential entry, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, 

Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, two counts of Class A 

misdemeanor theft, Class B misdemeanor unauthorized entry of a motor 

vehicle, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia if committed by 

an adult. P.M. eventually admitted to committing theft in cause number 

16C01-1907-JD-244 (“Cause No. 244”), theft in cause number 16C01-1907-JD244 (“Cause No. 243”), and, in cause number 16C01-1902-JD-53 (“Cause No. 

53”), theft of a firearm, carrying a handgun without a license, resisting law 

enforcement, and unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle. Noting the many 

failures of less-restrictive placements to cause P.M. to reform himself, the 

juvenile court ordered P.M. committed to the Indiana Department of 

Correction (“the DOC”) for an indeterminate term. P.M. contends that the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him committed to the DOC. 

Because we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] P.M. was born on April 10, 2002, and began having problems at an early age. 

Beginning in 2008, P.M. has received counseling from Centerstone after he was 

diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and 

parent–child relational problem. In 2009, P.M. started a fire in his 
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grandmother’s house, nearly destroying it. In September of 2009, P.M. was 

expelled from a summer youth program and a vacation Bible school due to 

verbal and physical aggression and admitted for inpatient treatment for 

behavioral difficulties. In November of 2011, P.M. took a mobile telephone to 

school that contained pornographic images, which he showed to other students. 

Between November 2 and 7, 2011, P.M. was placed at Whitewater Valley Care 

Pavilion after expressing suicidal and homicidal ideation. 

[3] More recently, and prior to the events at issue in this appeal, P.M. was found 

delinquent for committing battery resulting in bodily injury, criminal trespass, 

escape, and conversion and for leaving home without permission. P.M. has 

been placed on probation several times and has violated the terms of probation 

by committing such acts as unauthorized entry to a motor vehicle, leaving 

home without permission, illegal consumption of an alcoholic beverage, 

multiple drug screens that were positive for marijuana, and truancy. At least 

once previously, P.M. was placed on home detention but was terminated from 

the program after he cut a monitoring device from his ankle. The resulting 

escape charge, as well as other probation violations, led to P.M.’s commitment 

to the DOC in April 2017. After his release, P.M. was returned to the DOC for 

violating parole in March of 2018. P.M. was released again from the DOC in 

May of 2018 and remained on parole until November of that year. 

I. Cause No. 53

[4] On January 16, 2019, Decatur Sheriff’s Deputy Eric Blodgett was dispatched to 

investigate a call regarding a suspicious juvenile male who was reported to be 
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breaking into vehicles in the Hillcrest neighborhood of Greensburg. At 2:21 

a.m., Deputy Blodgett saw a male subject matching the description he was 

provided, pulled his vehicle over, and turned off his headlights. Shortly 

thereafter, Deputy Blodgett observed the juvenile, who turned out to be P.M., 

walking in-between houses and near several vehicles. Deputy Blodgett

approached P.M. with his emergency lights activated. After seeing Deputy 

Blodgett approaching, P.M. turned and started to walk away. The uniformed 

Deputy Blodgett pulled up alongside P.M. and ordered him to stop, but P.M. 

refused, asked “what the f[***] for?”, and ran behind a nearby house. Ex. Vol. 

p. 9. After a brief pursuit, Deputy Blodgett tackled P.M. to the ground and 

restrained his hands. P.M. was taken into custody and a handgun was 

recovered from his person. 

[5] During an interview with authorities, P.M. admitted that he had been in 

possession of the handgun, which he knew to be loaded, and also admitted that 

he had stolen the handgun from a vehicle parked near a school building several 

days earlier and his intent was to sell the weapon. On February 14, 2019, the 

State filed a delinquency petition in which it alleged that P.M. had committed 

what would be Level 6 felony theft of a firearm, Level 6 felony obstruction of 

justice, Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, Class A 

misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class B misdemeanor 

unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle if committed by an adult. 
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II. Cause No. 243

[6] On May 17, 2019, P.M. and another juvenile were in the Greensburg Walmart 

store when asset protection personnel observed them put bottles of liquor into

their backpacks. After P.M. and his companion walked past the last point of 

purchase, asset-protection personnel approached them, and police were 

dispatched to the scene. On July 16, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition 

in which it alleged that P.M. had committed what would be Class A 

misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. 

III. Cause No. 244

[7] Early in the morning on July 7, 2019, P.M. was a passenger in a vehicle that 

was stopped by Greensburg Police Officer Derek Fasnacht. When Officer 

Fasnacht approached the car, he detected the odor of marijuana emanating 

from inside the vehicle, and he subsequently ordered the occupants, including 

P.M., to exit the car. A search of the interior of the Buick revealed the presence 

of a marijuana grinder with plant residue on it. Also in the backseat, near 

where P.M. had been sitting, Officer Fasnacht found a pair of Air Jordan 

basketball shoes, a PlayStation 4 video gaming console, a purple and teal 

PlayStation 4 controller, and a gray plastic garbage bag that contained another 

PlayStation 4 console, multiple PlayStation 4 video games, and virtual-reality 

equipment. 

[8] Later that morning, Officer Fasnacht received a report from Jesse McClinic, 

who claimed that several items had been stolen from his home overnight. 

Officer Fasnacht was dispatched to McClinic’s residence, where McClinic 
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informed him that he was missing two PlayStation 4 consoles, multiple video 

games, movies, and pieces of virtual-reality equipment. McClinic informed 

Officer Fasnacht that there were no signs of forced entry at the residence, and 

he indicated that the only other individuals who had a key to the home were his 

mother and his former roommate, Trent Ruble. 

[9] The next day, after learning that a person matching P.M.’s description had 

attempted to sell a PlayStation 4 with no serial number, police travelled to 

P.M.’s home and spoke to him. During the interview, P.M. produced a 

PlayStation 4 console, several games, and a controller from his backpack, 

claiming that he had received them from a friend. Later that same day, P.M. 

and his mother (“Mother”) were called to the Greensburg Police Department 

where, after being advised of their Miranda rights, they consented to an 

interview. P.M. eventually acknowledged that Trent Ruble had let him into 

McClinic’s residence. On July 17, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition 

in which it alleged that P.M. had committed what would be Level 6 felony 

residential entry, Class A misdemeanor theft, and Class C misdemeanor 

possession of paraphernalia if committed by an adult. 

IV. Common Procedural History

[10] The juvenile court held an initial hearing in Cause Nos. 53, 243, and 244 on 

July 23, 2019, and P.M. admitted to committing theft in Cause No. 244, theft in

Cause No. 243, and, in Cause No. 53, theft of a firearm, carrying a handgun 

without a license, resisting law enforcement, and unauthorized entry of a motor 

vehicle. The juvenile court ordered P.M. to undergo a pre-dispositional 
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diagnostic evaluation with the DOC and further ordered P.M. detained until his 

dispositional hearing. From August 7 to August 27, 2019, P.M.’s diagnostic 

evaluation was conducted at the Logansport Juvenile Detention Facility. 

[11] During P.M.’s evaluation with psychiatric social service specialist Mary 

Ingram, P.M. disclosed the use of multiple illegal substances, including daily 

use of marijuana since the age of eight or nine, weekly use of prescription pills

since the age of thirteen, and ecstasy use every other day. Ingram noted that 

P.M. expressed frustration with his lengthy history of residential placements 

and admitted that his relationship with Mother was poor. P.M. informed 

Ingram that his father (“Father”) was willing to allow P.M. to reside with him, 

and Ingram recommended that the juvenile court attempt a placement with 

Father if he is willing, as well as strict court supervision to ensure that P.M. 

would be successful with community-based services. Ingram also stated, 

however, that if P.M. “fail[ed] to cooperate with the stipulations of his 

probation, placement in a structured residential treatment setting is 

recommended.” Ex. 1 p. 26. 

[12] Dr. Ellen Keris, Ph.D., performed a psychological examination, which included 

a battery of assessments, the results of which led Dr. Keris to diagnose P.M. 

with childhood-onset conduct disorder and polysubstance abuse. Through her 

observations, Dr. Keris also disputed several previous diagnoses that P.M. had 

received from other service providers over the years, including diagnoses of 

autism spectrum disorder, ADHD, and certain thought disorders. Dr. Keris 

concluded that P.M.’s conduct-disorder diagnosis is “[h]ighly [l]ikely to develop 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2365 | February 18, 2020 Page 8 of 16

into Antisocial Personality Disorder once he turns 18.” Ex. Vol. p. 33. Dr. 

Keris determined that treatment of P.M. would likely be “difficult” based on 

her observations due to P.M.’s desire to manipulate treatment providers, and 

she found that P.M. appears to have “functioned the best while in the DOC[.]” 

Ex. Vol. p. 34. 

[13] The final of P.M.’s three evaluators was Dr. Shivani Sharma, M.D., who 

performed a substance-abuse and mental-status examination on P.M. Dr. 

Sharma concluded that P.M. appeared to be “at risk for violent behavior, 

oppositional behavior, and aggression.” Ex. Vol. p. 64. Dr. Sharma also 

expressed concern that if P.M. could remain with family members, he “may 

continue to run away in times of conflict.” Ex. Vol. p. 64. These findings led 

Dr. Sharma to recommend that P.M. be placed in a “temporary group 

home/residential” until his relationship with family could be stabilized. Ex.

Vol. p. 64. 

[14] From July 23 to August 6, 2019 (prior to P.M.’s diagnostic evaluation), and 

from August 23 to September 11, 2019 (immediately following his diagnostic 

evaluation), P.M. was housed in the Johnson County Juvenile Detention 

Center (“the JCJDC”). In the approximately one month that P.M. was in the 

JCJDC, thirteen incident reports were filed against him for behavioral 

problems, including spitting on staff members and student detainees, punching 

the wall, kicking his room door and windows, cursing at staff members and 

other student detainees, disrupting the educational environment, threatening 

female student detainees, willfully obscuring the monitoring camera in his 
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room, and shattering a plastic cup and retaining shards of the cup hidden in his 

room. P.M.’s behavior was so erratic that he was removed from the facility’s 

general population. Facility staff attempted multiple interventions to improve 

P.M.’s behavior, but these were largely unsuccessful. For example, P.M. would 

cover the camera in his room to prevent facility staff from monitoring him. 

Additionally, P.M.’s behavior prevented him from being offered school time at 

the facility, and he also frequently refused personal-hygiene time. 

[15] The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing in P.M.’s cases on September 

11, 2019. At the hearing, P.M. testified and requested that the juvenile court 

place him on home detention with Father. Father also testified, and he too 

requested that P.M. be placed on home detention under his supervision. Father 

explained that he had developed a safety plan for P.M. Under his proposal, 

Father planned for P.M. to work with him in Cincinnati, Ohio, for a maximum 

of nine hours per day, at least five days a week. During the remaining time, 

P.M. would be alone and unsupervised inside a room at Father’s workplace 

while Father finished out the workday. According to Father, P.M. would also 

be expected to complete educational tasks once he and Father arrived home at 

night, usually between the hours of 8:00 and 11:00 p.m. 

[16] When Mother took the stand, she testified that P.M. would not be allowed to 

reside in her home upon his release from State custody. Mother described her 

relationship with P.M. as “toxic” and further stated that P.M. was “very 

disrespectful, and rude, and arrogant; [and] treats females horribly.” Tr. Vol. II 

p. 119. Mother stated that she believed that P.M. posed a safety risk for her 
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other children at home due to his violent behavior and the fact that he 

continuously brought drugs into the home. 

[17] The juvenile court rejected P.M.’s request to be placed on home detention with 

Father. Specifically, the juvenile court took issue with arguments raised by 

P.M. claiming that he had never been treated for an autism diagnosis. After 

reviewing P.M.’s history of delinquency adjudications, the juvenile court 

concluded that the most suitable placement for P.M. was a commitment to the 

DOC: 

I have not let this child down. I have not institutionalized this 

child. I have done everything I can do since I’ve been a judge, to 

try to help this child. 

Ms. Schilling looked up for me this week, how much money has 

been spent to try to help this child. Can you believe over 

$300,000 has been spent to try to help this child? So, don’t give 

me that crap of you’re not doing enough for him, we’ve done 

plenty for him. We have done every gamut of service that I can 

think of. He’s had homebound services. He’s been in residential 

treatment. He’s been with the Department of Corrections of 

Johnson County. He’s been on home detention. He’s failed 

them all. 

Tr. Vol. II pp. 127. In its dispositional order, the juvenile court took judicial 

notice of the other cases in which P.M. had previously been ordered into 

“services, placement, and wardships[,]” namely, cause numbers 16C01-1506-

JD-172, 16C01-1410-JD-318, 16C01-1408-JD-221, 16C01-1305-JM-77, 16C01-

1202-JC-37, 16C01-0911-JC-310, and 16C01-0904-JM-109. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 94. The juvenile court granted wardship over P.M.to the DOC for an 

indeterminate term.
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Discussion and Decision

[18] P.M. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him 

committed to the DOC for an indeterminate time. A juvenile court is accorded 

“wide latitude” and “great flexibility” in its dealings with juveniles. J.S. v. State, 

881 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “[T]he choice of a specific disposition 

of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the juvenile court and will only be reversed if there has been an 

abuse of that discretion.” Id. The juvenile court’s discretion in determining a 

disposition is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, 

the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least-harsh 

disposition. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court’s action 

is “clearly erroneous” and against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Id. 

[19] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment. R.H. 

v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Accordingly, juvenile 

courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles with delinquency 

problems, none of which are considered sentences.” Id. Indiana Code section 

31-37-18-6(1)(A) provides that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community 

and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional 

decree that is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate 

setting available.” “[T]he statute contains language that reveals that a more 

restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances.” J.S., 

881 N.E.2d at 29. The law requires only that the disposition selected be the 
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least restrictive disposition that is “consistent with the safety of the community 

and the best interest of the child.” D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005).

[20] Here, neither P.M.’s interests nor those of his community are best served by a 

placement outside of the DOC. P.M.’s history indicates that his many 

placements, both in an out of the DOC, have failed to reform him. Prior to the 

delinquency adjudications at issue in this appeal, P.M. was found delinquent 

for committing battery resulting in bodily injury, criminal trespass, escape, 

conversion, and leaving home without permission. P.M. has been placed on 

probation several times and has violated the terms of probation several times. 

At least once previously, P.M. was placed on home detention but was 

terminated from the program after cutting his monitoring device from his ankle. 

The resulting escape charge, as well as other violations of the terms of 

probation, led to P.M.’s commitment to the DOC in April 2017. After his 

release, P.M. was returned to the DOC for violating parole in March of 2018. 

P.M. was again released in May 2018 and remained on parole until November 

of that year, only to commit the theft-related offenses in Cause No. 53 three 

months later. 

[21] Moreover, P.M. has a long history of violent behavior that includes multiple 

batteries involving Mother, Mother’s boyfriend, his grandmother, and another 

juvenile placed at the Youth Opportunity Center with P.M. In 2011, P.M. 

expressed “homicidal ideation” toward the son of Mother’s boyfriend. Ex. Vol. 

p. 30. On one occasion during his previous commitment to the DOC, P.M. 
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disclosed to medical staff that he had been “waiting all day to cut somebody 

up.” Ex. 1 p. 31. Not only has P.M.’s behavior not improved over time, it has 

worsened: during P.M.’s detention pending disposition in this cases at issue in 

this appeal, he accrued thirteen disciplinary reports while housed in the JCJDC, 

one of which was for spitting on female residents while another involved an 

incident where he struck a staff member. 

[22] It is undisputed that P.M. suffers from several mental-health and behavioral 

disorders that are, to varying degrees, related to his delinquent acts. Past 

services, however, have not been effective. As Dr. Keris opined, P.M. is 

generally “quite resistant to treatment” for these illnesses. Ex. 1 p. 33. Past 

services ordered for P.M. include counseling, home-based services, and

inpatient residential treatment programs, none of which have taken. P.M. 

refused outright to participate in home-based treatment sessions and out-ofhome therapy when ordered into services in the past. Most recently, P.M. was 

ordered into a residential placement at Fayette Regional Care in 2018, which 

ended in P.M.’s unsuccessful termination from the program after he was 

observed making gang signs to his peers and found in possession of tobacco 

products in his room. According to Dr. Keris, P.M.’s “reported mental health 

symptoms appear [] to almost be a source of pride and validation for poor 

behaviors and while he endorsed several problems, behavioral observations 

contradicted them all.” Ex. 1 p. 31. In summary, P.M.’s history is one of 

worsening behavior and failure of all previous attempts to address it. We see 

little in the record to suggest that a less-restrictive placement will work this time. 
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[23] P.M. points to Rebecca Kime’s testimony to support his argument that the 

juvenile court should have ordered a placement less restrictive than the DOC. 

Kime testified that placement in Father’s home was in P.M.’s best interests

because it would permit him to receive treatment for autism spectrum disorder, 

for which P.M. had never before been treated through court-ordered services. 

Kime never testified, however, that there was any kind of causal nexus linking 

P.M.’s delinquent behavior to his autism diagnosis, and P.M.’s autism 

diagnosis was rejected by Dr. Keris during P.M.’s diagnostic evaluation in any 

event. The juvenile court was under no obligation to credit Kime’s testimony

and did not. P.M.’s argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which 

we will not do. See J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),

trans. denied. 

[24] P.M. also relies on two cases, R.A. v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010), and E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, in 

which we overturned juvenile court dispositions for juveniles with serious 

mental illnesses. While P.M. is correct that both he and the respondent in R.A.

have histories that include diagnosed psychological illnesses, the two cases are 

otherwise easily distinguished. In R.A., we reversed the juvenile court’s 

decision to commit the respondent to the DOC because the respondent, unlike 

P.M., had “no prior contact with the juvenile justice system” and because 

multiple mental-health experts testified—with the State’s agreement—that 

placement in a residential facility was in the best interests of both the child and 

the community. R.A., 936 N.E.2d at 1291. As mentioned, P.M. has had many 
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unsuccessful contacts with the juvenile justice system, and there is certainly no 

consensus that he is suffering from serious mental illness or that residential 

placement is in his, or the community’s, best interests. 

[25] In E.H., 764 N.E.2d at 686, we reversed a juvenile’s commitment to the DOC 

after concluding that the record established that the juvenile had made 

“considerable progress” while undergoing treatment in a less-restrictive 

placement and that his lack of a history of violence meant that he presented no 

threat to the community. E.H., like R.A., is easily distinguished. In contrast to 

the juvenile in E.H., P.M. has no history of success in less-restrictive 

placements, and the escalating seriousness of his criminal behavior supports a 

conclusion that he does, in fact, pose a threat to the community. P.M.’s 

reliance on R.A. and E.H. is unavailing. 

[26] Finally, P.M. argues that he should have been placed with Father. As the 

juvenile court concluded, however, Father is an inappropriate placement for 

P.M. due to his undisputed criminal history, history of family violence, and 

historical lack of involvement with P.M. Father himself acknowledged during 

the dispositional hearing that he had essentially “abandoned” P.M. Tr. Vol. II 

p. 65. Moreover, Father’s safety plan for P.M. would have required P.M. to be 

away from home for between twelve and sixteen hours each day with lengthy 

periods of time spent without adult supervision. The safety plan would permit 

P.M. to work with Father for a maximum of nine hours per day, with the 

remaining time being spent alone and unsupervised in a room at Father’s place 

of employment while Father continued to work. In sum, P.M. is asking to be 
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placed with a father who has never parented him before and for us to endorse a 

safety plan that fails to provide the structure and supervision necessary to 

ensure that he receives the educational and rehabilitative services that he 

requires. P.M. has not established that a placement with Father would be in 

either his or the community’s best interests. 

[27] The juvenile court’s decision to order P.M. committed to the DOC was not an 

abuse of its broad statutory discretion. The record supports a conclusion that 

P.M. is likely to benefit most from a highly restrictive placement in the DOC, as 

it is the only placement that both ensures P.M. has access to treatment while 

preventing him from committing new delinquent acts. We conclude that the 

juvenile court’s decision was not contrary to the facts and circumstances before 

it.

[28] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.