SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2227-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KELBY B. KRAMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Argued November 6, 2019 – Decided

Before Judge Yannotti and Hoffman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 18-

022.

John Menzel argued the cause for appellant.

Paula Cristina Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Paula Cristina Jordao, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 27, 2019
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The Florham Park Municipal Court convicted defendant of driving while 

intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, obstructing the administration of the law,

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), and reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. The court 

sentenced defendant to three months loss of driving privileges and assessed 

mandatory fines and penalties. Following a de novo trial, the Law Division 

again found defendant guilty of the same charges and imposed the same sentence 

as the municipal court. 

Defendant filed this appeal. He contends the following arguments warrant 

reversal of convictions:

I. With Only Observations of Defendant's Eyes, 

Breath, and Demeanor, Police Had Neither 

Reasonable Suspicion to Justify Ordering Her to 

Get Out of Her Car Nor Probable Cause to Arrest 

Her.

II. Because Defendant Fully Cooperated With 

Police Beginning When They Guided Her Out of 

Her Car and at All Times Thereafter, the State 

Failed to Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that 

She Purposefully Obstructed, Impaired, or 

Perverted the Administration of Law via 

Affirmative Interference with Governmental 

Functions.

III. The State Failed to Prove that Defendant Drove 

Either Recklessly or Carelessly.

After reviewing the record in light of defendant's arguments, we affirm.
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I.

We derive the following facts from the record. Just before midnight on 

October 1, 2016, Officer Daniel Braico of the Florham Park Police Department

observed defendant leave the Wyndham Hamilton Park Hotel in her car and attempt 

to turn left and northbound onto Park Avenue. Instead, she turned into the 

southbound lane, placing her head-on with oncoming traffic. Another vehicle 

flashed its high beams to alert defendant of her error. Defendant corrected her course 

and proceeded to the northbound side of the median. 

Based on these observations, Officer Braico signaled defendant to pull over; 

upon asking for her credentials, he immediately "smelled a potent odor of alcohol 

emanating from the interior of [her] vehicle and also observed her eyes to be watery 

and bloodshot." Asked if she consumed any alcohol, defendant responded she was 

"fine." When asked if that meant she previously drank alcohol, she nodded 

affirmatively. Defendant mistakenly thanked Officer Braico multiple times for 

warning her of her wrong turn, confusing him with the driver who flashed high 

beams at her. Defendant confirmed she had just left a bar located in the hotel. 

Due to his suspicion that defendant was intoxicated, Officer Braico instructed 

defendant to exit her vehicle so he could administer field sobriety testing (FST). In 

response, defendant questioned why she needed to exit her vehicle and expressed 
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concern over performing any testing in her high heels. Officer Braico explained the 

FST and, after informing defendant multiple times of his suspicion of DWI, he took

her keys based on his concern defendant would attempt to drive away. 

Officer David Rubelowsky then arrived to provide backup for the stop. He 

also instructed defendant to exit her vehicle multiple times, informing her of his 

suspicion of DWI, and the need for her to submit to FST; however, defendant

continued to express confusion as to why she needed to exit her vehicle.

Officer Geoffrey Rothrock also provided backup, detected alcohol on 

defendant's breath, and noticed her eyes bloodshot and watery. He explained to her 

that she had to exit her vehicle so Officer Braico could continue his investigation of 

DWI and administer the FST. In response, defendant claimed she did not

understand, asked what her options were, and proclaimed she was a "good person." 

Officer Rothrock repeated his instructions and explained he needed a "yes or 

no" answer, if she was willing to exit her vehicle, because he believed defendant 

intended to stall the investigation. If she did not comply, he explained he would 

place her under arrest for obstruction. Defendant did not respond to his warning. 

Thereafter, Officers Rothrock and Braico escorted defendant out of her vehicle and 

placed her under arrest. While transporting defendant to the police station, Officer 

Braico noticed his vehicle smelled of alcohol. 
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At the station, defendant said she consumed only one glass of wine. 

According to Officer Rothrock, his first three attempts to administer the Alcotest to 

defendant failed because her breath samples were inadequate, as defendant blew 

"very softly" into the machine. On the fourth attempt, defendant finally provided an 

adequate breath sample, indicating a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .089; a fifth 

breath sample indicated a BAC of .091. At that point, the police charged defendant 

with the charges under review, and also careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.

At trial, the municipal court judge found both Officers Braico and Rothrock 

"clearly very credible[,]" forthright and consistent in their testimony. When 

addressing the obstruction charge, the judge distinguished defendant's current case 

from State v. Powers, 448 N.J. Super. 69 (App Div. 2016), and found defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because "defendant here repeatedly refused to exit 

her vehicle after repeated instructions to do so. . . [t]hat in itself I find constitutes a 

physical interference or obstacle satisfying the first prong of 2C:29-1(a)." 

The judge also found defendant guilty of DWI and reckless driving, after 

reviewing the officer's testimony and the evidence submitted. He dismissed the 

careless driving offense as a lesser-included offense of the reckless driving charge. 

On December 13, 2018, following a trial de novo, the Law Division judge 

found defendant guilty of the same charges as the municipal court and issued a 
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comprehensive forty-one-page written opinion explaining her decision. The judge 

found Officers Braico and Rothrock credible, describing their testimony as "candid 

and forthright," with "each officer . . . corroborat[ing]. . . the other officer on a 

number of material facts, including the fact that defendant failed on multiple 

occasions to abide by officers' instruction that she had to exit her vehicle to undergo

[FST] on the night of the incident." 

The judge first addressed whether the police officers had sufficient reasonable 

suspicion of DWI to ask defendant to exit her vehicle. She ruled Officer Braico's 

observations of defendant's motor vehicle violation and his observations during his 

initial contact permitted him to "broaden[] his inquiry to ask defendant if she had 

been drinking." She ruled, "Given defendant[] sidestepping [his] direct question 

about whether she had anything to drink by saying she was 'fine,' in addition to what 

[he] had just smelled, seen and heard," the officers established reasonable suspicion 

to ask defendant to exit her vehicle to perform FST. 

The judge next addressed whether the police officers had probable cause to 

arrest defendant for DWI. She found after Officer Braico first observed and pulled 

defendant over for careless driving, "he immediately detected a potent odor of 

alcohol emanating from the interior of her car and saw that her eyes were bloodshot 

and watery." She noted that Officer Rothrock made the same observations when he 
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addressed defendant, and that all three officers explained to defendant why she 

needed to exit her car, but defendant continued to indicate she did not understand. 

The judge ruled, "In light of the totality of these circumstances, the court finds 

[the] officers had a well-grounded suspicion that defendant's consumption of alcohol 

had affected her judgement, making it improper for her to drive. Thus, there was 

probable cause to arrest defendant on suspicion of DWI." 

The judge then carefully analyzed the evidence present and concluded the 

State had proven defendant guilty of DWI by both the per se standard, based on the 

BAC readings, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), and the observational standard. State v. Bealor, 

187 N.J. 574, 590 (2006).

Addressing whether defendant drove recklessly, the judge found Officer 

Braico observed defendant turn into oncoming traffic and drive within twenty feet 

of another vehicle, which "suggest[ed] a lack of due caution on her part and creat[ed] 

a serious safety concern." She found, independent of defendant's intoxication,

defendant still drove recklessly. She concluded the State demonstrated beyond a 

reasonable doubt defendant "drove heedlessly, showed a wanton disregard for the 

safety of those around her, and her driving conduct was likely to endanger another 

person or property." Therefore, she found defendant guilty of reckless driving. 
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Regarding the obstruction charge, the judge found defendant was "beating 

around the bush" and "stalling," when she disregarded the officer's repeated requests 

to exit her vehicle. She ruled defendant's actions prevented the officers from 

performing their official duties and found that it was "defendant's conscious 

object[ive] to avoid exiting the car to perform FST, even though defendant was 

physically able to get out of her car." 

Based upon her detailed findings, the trial judge concluded that the State met 

its burden in establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of 

DWI, reckless driving, and obstruction. 

 II.

In reviewing a judgment of the Law Division on a municipal appeal, this court 

applies a sufficiency of the evidence standard. See State v. Ugrovics, 410 N.J. Super. 

482, 487-88 (App. Div. 2009). This court must "determine whether the findings 

made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in 

the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). "When the reviewing court 

is satisfied that the findings and result meet this criterion, its task is complete and it 

should not disturb the result . . . ." Ibid.

Superior Court review of a municipal court conviction is conducted de novo 

on the record. R. 3:23-8. The Superior Court should defer to the municipal court's 
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credibility findings. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999) (citing Johnson, 

42 N.J. at 161-62). However, the municipal court's "interpretation of the law and 

the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special 

deference." Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Thus, 

"[o]n a de novo review on the record, the reviewing court . . . is obliged to make 

independent findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining defendant's guilt 

independently but for deference to the municipal court's credibility findings." 

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 3:23-8 (2018).

 III.

We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in finding 

that the arresting officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation 

of law, to support requesting defendant to submit to FST. Specifically, 

defendant claims the observations of Officer Braico and Officer Rothrock 

regarding "defendant's eyes, breath, and demeanor" did not provide the requisite 

reasonable suspicion of intoxication to request that she exit her vehicle.

We are guided by well-settled principles. A police officer may, without a 

warrant, conduct an investigatory traffic stop based on a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that a defendant committed a traffic offense. "[A] stop 

founded on a suspected motor vehicle violation essentially is governed by the 
10 A-2227-18T1

same case law used to evaluate a stop based on suspected criminal or quasicriminal activity." State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 213 (2003).

The "articulable reasons" or "particularized suspicion" 

. . . must be based upon the law enforcement officer's 

assessment of the totality of circumstances with which 

he is faced. Such observations are those that, in view 

of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken 

together with rational inferences drawn from those 

facts, reasonabl[y] warrant the limited intrusion upon 

the individual's freedom.

[State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).]

Reasonable suspicion is a "lower standard than the probable cause 

necessary to sustain an arrest." Golotta, 178 N.J. at 213. Reasonable articulable 

suspicion may exist even if there is an innocent explanation for the objective 

facts. See State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279-80 (1998) ("The fact that purely 

innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person's actions does not mean that 

an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long 

as a reasonable person would find the actions consistent with guilt.") (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

During an investigatory stop, an officer may require a driver to perform 

field sobriety tests if the officer has reasonable suspicion of DWI. See State v. 

Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 374 (App. Div. 2011) ("In our view, 

administration of the field sobriety tests is more analogous to a Terry stop than 
11 A-2227-18T1

to a formal arrest, and therefore may be justified by a police officer's reasonable 

suspicion based on particularized, articulable facts suggesting a driver's 

intoxication.").

We are satisfied that these facts support a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence, sufficient to warrant 

FST. The municipal judge found both officers credible and the trial judge on de 

novo review reasonably adopted those same credibility findings. The trial judge 

also found Officer Braico – who observed defendant's motor vehicle violation, 

talked to defendant and immediately smelled alcohol, and noticed her blood shot 

and watery eyes – "properly broadened his inquiry to ask defendant if she had 

been drinking."

During the inquiry, the judge found defendant sidestepped questions 

regarding drinking, later nodded in affirmation that she consumed alcohol, 

admitted to leaving a bar, and confused Officer Braico on several occasions with 

another driver. Additionally, she found Officer Rothrock smelled alcohol on 

defendant's breath and observed her bloodshot eyes. The judge's factual findings 

clearly establish the officers had reasonable suspicion to request defendant exit 

her vehicle to conduct formal FST. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. at 374.
12 A-2227-18T1

We next turn to defendant's obstruction charge. Defendant argues she fully 

cooperated with the police officers "beginning when they guided her out of her car 

and at all times thereafter, the [S]tate failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

she purposefully obstructed, impaired, or perverted the administration of law via 

affirmative interference with governmental functions." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), obstructing administration of law or other governmental 

function, provides:

A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, 

impairs or perverts the administration of law or other 

governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent 

a public servant from lawfully performing an official 

function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, 

or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any 

independently unlawful act. This section does not apply 

to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official 

duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law 

without affirmative interference with governmental 

functions.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).]

"The purpose of this statute is 'to prohibit a broad range of behavior designed 

to impede or defeat the lawful operation of government,'" and confines its limits to 

"(1) violent or physical interference, [or] (2) other acts which are 'unlawful' 

independently of the purpose to obstruct the government." State v. Camillo, 382 

N.J. Super. 113, 116-17 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Final Report of the New Jersey 
13 A-2227-18T1

Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II, 1971, at 280). Under the statute, "not 

just any interference with the administration of law constitutes the criminal act of 

obstruction." Id. at 118.

Simply obstructing, impairing or perverting the 

administration of law or the governmental function is no 

longer a statutory violation; the obstruction must be 

carried out in a manner described in the statute: "by means 

of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical 

interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently 

unlawful act." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.

[Ibid.]

Defendant's argument focuses on her cooperative conduct only after the 

officers found she obstructed their investigation of her DWI and ignores her actions 

prior to her arrest. The municipal judge found her actions constituted a "physical 

interference or obstruction." The trial judge agreed, finding it was defendant's 

"conscious objective" to delay the officer's investigation of her DWI and she only 

exited her vehicle when escorted by the officers. 

We agree with the trial judge's finding that defendant's actions amounted to 

obstruction. The record clearly demonstrates defendant's attempts to delay the 

officer's investigation of her DWI by not exiting her vehicle to perform FST and by 

failing to obey the instructions of three different officers. Officer Braico made 

multiple attempts to administer FST to defendant, as did his partner, Officer 
14 A-2227-18T1

Rubelowsky. After these efforts proved unsuccessful, Officer Braico called Officer 

Rothrock for assistance in dealing with defendant's delay tactics. Officer Rothrock 

further explained FST to defendant, and then provided her with an ultimatum: either 

perform FST or be arrested for obstruction. By failing to comply with the officers' 

commands to exit her vehicle to perform FST, she physically interfered with the 

investigation of her DWI. See Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. at 118. 

We next turn to defendant's argument that the police did not have probable 

cause to arrest defendant for DWI. In finding probable cause, a court must examine 

the totality of the circumstances, State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004) (citing 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 122 

(1987)), "and view those circumstances from the standpoint of an objectively 

reasonable police officer." State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 585 (2010) (quoting 

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Probable cause for DWI exists where an officer has a well-founded suspicion 

that an offense has been committed, State v. Moskal, 246 N.J. Super. 12, 21 (App. 

Div. 1991) (citing State v. Wanczyk, 201 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. Div. 1985)), 

meaning the officer "'had reasonable grounds to believe' that the driver was operating 

a motor vehicle in violation of" the DWI statute. Moskal, 246 N.J. Super. at 21 

(quoting Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J. Super. 279, 284 (App. Div. 1967)). Probable 
15 A-2227-18T1

cause requires more than a bare hunch or suspicion, but less than the legal evidence 

required for conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 

87(1972).

The trial judge's conclusions are well supported by the testimony of Officers

Braico and Rothrock regarding their observations of defendant, her bloodshot eyes, 

her driving into oncoming traffic, her admission of drinking alcohol and leaving a 

bar, and her smelling of alcohol. The judge correctly found, based on the totality of 

the evidence presented, the officers had "reasonable grounds to believe" defendant 

operated her vehicle while intoxicated. Moore, 181 N.J. at 46. We agree with the 

trial judge's findings because her analysis is consistent with applicable law and 

"could reasonable have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the 

record." Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162. 

Lastly, we address defendant's reckless driving charge. Defendant argues the 

State failed to prove defendant drove either recklessly or carelessly. Specifically, 

she argues her driving never "posed any danger to any person or property. Nor was 

there willful operation." Under N.J.S.A 39:4-96, reckless driving states that:

A person who drives a vehicle heedlessly, in willful or 

wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, in a 

manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a 

person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving and 

be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal 

jail for a period of not more than 60 days, or by a fine of
16 A-2227-18T1

not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00, or both.

[N.J.S.A. 39:4-96.]

The trial judge found defendant turning into oncoming traffic and driving 

within twenty feet of another driver showed a wonton disregard for the safety of

others around her. The judge found defendant's conduct "was likely to endanger

another person or property" and, even absent her DWI, found her driving reckless. 

The record amply supports these findings.

Defendant drove on the wrong side of a highway separated by a median and 

came within twenty feet of colliding with oncoming traffic. These facts alone 

amount to "sufficient credible evidence" to uphold the trial judge's findings that 

defendant drove recklessly. Johnson, 43 N.J. at162. Additionally, the judge found 

defendant was legally intoxicated based on the per se violation and circumstantial 

evidence. Defendant's erratic driving, in addition to her BAC, overwhelmingly 

supports the conclusion she drove recklessly. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. at 12.

Affirmed.