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38–847 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–465 

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: STATE AND LOCAL 

EFFORTS TO PREPARE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, 

AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS 

AND INTEGRATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 3, 2007 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR 

PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

KRISTIN SHARP, Staff Director 

MICHAEL MCBRIDE, Minority Staff Director 

AMANDA FOX, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 1 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 10 

Senator Sununu ................................................................................................ 15 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Obama ................................................................................................. 33 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007 

Rear Admiral William C. Vanderwagen, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services .. 3 

B. Tilman Jolly, M.D., Associate Chief Medical Officer for Medical Readiness, 

Office of Health Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................... 4 

Paul K. Halverson, DrPH, MHSA, FACHE, Director and State Health Officer, 

Arkansas Department of Health ......................................................................... 16 

Christopher M. Pope, Director, Homeland Security and Emergency Management, State of New Hampshire ........................................................................... 18 

Yvonne S. Madlock, MAT, Director, Memphis and Shelby County Health 

Department, Memphis, Tennessee, on behalf of the National Association 

for County and City Health Officials .................................................................. 20 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Halverson, Paul K., DrPH, MHSA, FACHE: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Jolly, B. Tilman, M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Madlock, Yvonne S., MAT: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Pope, Christopher M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Vanderwagen, Rear Admiral William C., M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses for the Record from Dr. Jolly ....................................... 84 

Chart submitted for the Record by Senator Pryor ................................................ 90 

(1) 

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: STATE AND LOCAL 

EFFORTS TO PREPARE 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND

PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Pryor, Akaka, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. I call the Subcommittee to order. Senator 

Sununu is on his way, but he wanted us to go ahead and get started, so he will join us and probably have some questions in a few 

moments. 

Let me thank everyone for being here and welcome everyone to 

the Senate and specifically to our Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, 

Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration. I know everybody is busy, has a lot going on, but to come and talk about 

something as important as a flu pandemic, I think it is a very important part of the process to make sure that we are prepared. We 

hope that day never comes, but we hope that this country is prepared if that day should come. 

I would especially like to welcome Dr. Paul Halverson. Thank 

you for coming up from Arkansas and I look forward to hearing 

from you in the second panel. 

Let me just make a few opening comments and then I would like 

to jump right in with our first panel. The first thing I would say 

is that for most Americans, the idea of a flu pandemic is abstract. 

When we hear about it on the news, it seems to be pretty much 

in birds and on the other side of the world. I think for a lot of people in this country, even though they know it is a potential threat, 

it is not real, and I think we, as leaders and as planners, need to 

make sure that we are ready in the event that it does come. 

The thing that concerns the experts about a flu pandemic is 

when you look at bird flu around the world, the numbers are startling. How rapidly it spreads through an avian population is very 

alarming, but also when you look at the humans who have been 

infected—there have been 329 infected with bird flu and 201 have 

2 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 90. 

passed away. So 61 percent of the people that have had it have 

died from it. Those are very alarming numbers. 

You can see this chart here with the confirmed cases by age and 

outcome and you see some very disturbing numbers there because 

it is not one of those diseases that hits young people and old people.1 If you get it, you have a very real chance of not surviving contact with bird flu. 

So the concern would be is if you have a flu with these characteristics and it mutates into a contagious human disease, the consequences could be very dire. I don’t want to talk like a science fiction movie here, but some of the scenarios that people have talked 

about really cause great concern. The number of Americans who 

could not survive this, what it could do in terms of overwhelming 

our health care infrastructure, the restrictions on travel, maybe 

having to institute some sort of quarantine or martial law, there 

are a lot of ramifications of this that we need to think through and 

be prepared for in the event that it does come. 

The other thing that we see is that a flu pandemic is problematic 

for the government because there are so many different levels of 

the government that have to deal with it. Just on the Federal level, 

you look at DHS, HHS, Homeland Security, and other agencies, but 

it is also a State and local issue, as well. Health officials are involved, as are first responders. It is a lot of local officials that have 

to make very critical decisions in a short period of time. 

That is why we keep coming back to planning and being able to 

test our planning. Today, Senator Sununu and I wanted to encourage dialogue and make sure that everybody is planning like they 

should be, and we are working through this in preparation for that 

day, if it ever comes. 

With that, let me go ahead and introduce our first panel. Again, 

Senator Sununu may have an opening statement in a few moments. We will have probably one or more Senators in addition to 

Senator Sununu that come in throughout the course of this hearing. We have votes and a lot of other committee hearings going on 

right now, so it is a pretty hectic day in the Senate. 

But let me go ahead and introduce our first panel. First we have 

Rear Admiral William Vanderwagen, who serves as Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services. His office is charged with leading the 

Nation in the prevention, response, and reduction of adverse health 

effects of public health disasters. He is the Department’s senior advisor to the Secretary for matters relating to bioterrorism and public health emergencies and he will be discussing the progress his 

office has made as well as efforts they are making in coordinating 

public health preparedness across all levels of government. 

Our second panelist will be Dr. Tilman Jolly. He is the Associate 

Chief Medical Officer of the Office of Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Jolly brings an extensive background in emergency medicine and medical operations, planning, 

and consulting. In addition to practicing emergency medicine and 

serving on the medical planning staff of events, including five 

Super Bowls and the U.S. Open Golf Championship, he has spoken 

3 

1The prepared statement of Admiral Vanderwagen appears in the Appendix on page 34. 

and published extensively on these subjects. Today, he will report 

on the progress of the DHS Office of Health Affairs in coordinating 

with relevant DHS Departments as well as other Federal, State, 

and local agencies. 

Admiral Vanderwagen, would you like to go ahead and start, 

please. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM C. VANDERWAGEN, 

M.D.,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a 

real pleasure to be here. I think you spoke to partnerships and I 

think there is a partnership between the Legislative and the Executive Branch that has to be strengthened and built upon. 

Let me submit my written testimony for the record and I will 

speak for a few minutes and summarize. 

As you noted, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response is the responsible party for Health and Human Services 

(HHS) in coordinating medical and public health responses. It was 

established about 10 months ago, December 19, 2006, with the 

signing of a law, the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act, 

that transferred many authorities to our responsibility, including 

NDMS, the hospital preparedness programs, enrollment of volunteers, and so on, various authorities related to the Medical Reserve 

Corps, partnerships with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 

etc., and many new authorities related to the development of medical countermeasures, and that would include such things as vaccines, anti-virals, diagnostics, etc. And in August, we assumed leadership in our office for pandemic flu for HHS. 

As you noted, pandemic flu really could be quite a catastrophic 

event and it will affect all sectors of our society, and it involves 

planning and interoperability between a wide variety of many sectors in this country. Public safety, energy, transportation, commerce, labor, all have a role in addressing the issues and preparing 

for a pandemic flu. 

About a year and a half ago, Congress and the Executive Branch 

did lay out a plan for how we would try and address issues with 

pandemic flu—a strategy. That strategy was based on a theory of 

victory that was not with the expectation that we could absolutely 

stop dead in its tracks this disease, but, in fact, we could delay its 

emergence and we could reduce the number of people who became 

ill with this disease. And the critical elements of that strategy was 

the development of vaccine capability, anti-virals for treatment, 

and recall at that time production capability for anti-virals was relatively small. In addition to that, there were commitments to community mitigation strategies and the development of surge capabilities, including additional facility space and people with skills 

who could be employed in addressing this illness as it hits in many 

communities around the Nation. 

We have made pretty good progress, and I think we will hear 

from some of our State and local colleagues today about the 

4 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Jolly appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

progress they have been making. I would report to you, sir, that 

I made numerous visits to States. I was in North Carolina last 

week and in North Carolina last year, they did 87 exercises involving about 7,000 people in preparing for a pandemic flu. So there 

is a great deal of activity that is going on at the community level 

where it really needs to be, particularly in a pandemic flu. 

This really highlights, as you suggested, the shared responsibility that prevails, particularly as we look forward to future steps. 

Early in this course, the last year or two, the Federal Government 

and State Governments have been the lead players. Vaccine infrastructure development, anti-viral infrastructure development, expanded bed capacity, initial planning and training, these were all 

roles for the Federal and State Governments. The next steps will 

have to build on the successes, including anti-viral prophylaxis, but 

this will require wider application of shared responsibilities among 

businesses, the health care industry, individuals, and families. 

There are new developments that need to be taken advantage of. 

We need a cheaper, less labor-intensive ventilator for the kind of 

respiratory support we may need. We need additional guidance— 

and we are working on these issues—additional guidance is needed 

for augmentation of community mitigation strategies using respiratory protection, such as M–95 respirators. The science doesn’t 

give us a clear answer on many of these issues, but we will have 

to find solutions to these gaps and we will have to find them in 

concert with our State, local, business, and individual colleagues. 

In summary, our office is functional. The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act is being implemented. Pan flu preparedness 

has moved along pretty smartly and we have made pretty good 

progress, not only in pan flu, but on a variety of hazards. Gaps still 

exist and additional steps will and must be taken, but they must 

be done in the context of shared responsibility. We will continue to 

consult with our State, local, business, and private sector partners 

as we develop actions to address this next set of gaps. Without that 

consultation, we will not have an effective plan and a comprehensive capability to respond when the Nation needs us. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Dr. Jolly. 

TESTIMONY OF B. TILMAN JOLLY, M.D.,1 ASSOCIATE CHIEF 

MEDICAL OFFICER FOR MEDICAL READINESS, OFFICE OF 

HEALTH AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. JOLLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today to discuss our efforts toward 

overall pandemic flu preparedness. Before I begin, I would like to 

take the opportunity to thank you and the Members of the full 

Committee on behalf of Secretary Chertoff for your continued willingness to work alongside the Department to provide leadership in 

protecting and ensuring the security of our homeland. I would also 

like to thank our partners at HHS and others with whom we work 

every day. 

5 

A pandemic is unique. It is likely to come in waves, passing 

through communities of all sizes across the Nation and the world 

simultaneously. But then it may last as long as 18 months. An unmitigated pandemic—and I emphasize unmitigated—could result in 

200,000 to two million deaths in the United States, depending on 

its severity. Further, an influenza pandemic could have major impacts on society and the economy, including our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, as you have said, based on the illness and related absenteeism. 

DHS has been and remains actively engaged with its Federal, 

State, local, territorial, tribal, and private sector partners alongside 

HHS to prepare our Nation and the international community for an 

influenza pandemic. As outlined in the implementation plan, DHS 

is responsible for the coordination of the overall domestic Federal 

response during an influenza pandemic, including implementing 

policies that facilitate compliance with recommended social distancing measures, developing a common operating fixture for all 

Federal departments and agencies, and ensuring the integrity of 

the Nation’s infrastructure, domestic security, and entry and exit 

screening for influenza at our borders. 

In working with our partners, such as HHS, the State Department, and USDA, DHS has developed and implemented a number 

of initiatives and outreach to support continuity of operations, 

planning for all levels of government and private sector entities. I 

will highlight a few noteworthy accomplishments and responsibilities under the implementation plan particular to DHS. 

DHS produced and released the ‘‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and 

Key Resources.’’ The Guide has served to support business and 

other private sector pandemic planning by complementing and enhancing but not replacing their existing continuity planning efforts. 

With that in mind, DHS and its partners developed the guide to 

assist businesses whose existing continuity plans generally do not 

include strategies to protect human health during emergencies like 

a pandemic. As a next step, DHS is currently leading the development of specific guides for each of the 17 critical infrastructure and 

key resource sectors using the security partnership model. 

In coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, 

DHS is developing a coordinated government-wide planning forum. 

An initial analysis of the response requirements for Federal support has been completed. From this analysis, the national plan defining the Federal concept for coordinating response and recovery 

operations during a pandemic has been developed and will be undergoing interagency review. Utilizing this planning process, a coordinated Federal border management plan has been developed 

and is currently also under review. This process included a wide 

range of partners. 

DHS has also conducted or participated in Federal and State 

interagency pandemic influenza exercises and held workshops and 

forums with critical infrastructure key resources owners and operators. Consistent with this role under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD–5), as it is known, Secretary Chertoff 

pre-designated Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, Vice Commandant of the 

Coast Guard, as the National Principal Federal Official (PFO), for 

6 

pandemic influenza and has pre-designated five regional PFOs and 

10 deputy PFOs. Likewise, our partners have pre-designated infrastructure liaisons, Federal coordinating officers, senior officials for 

health, as well as defense coordinating officers. Vice Admiral Crea 

and the regional PFOs have participated in multi-agency training 

and orientation sessions regarding preparedness duties. Additionally, the PFO teams have begun outreach both nationally and in 

their regions in advance of a more formalized exercise program 

which is being developed at DHS. 

On an ongoing basis, DHS participates in interagency working 

groups to develop guidance, including community mitigation strategies, medical countermeasures, vaccine prioritization, and risk communication strategies. 

In closing, significant progress has been made in national preparedness for pandemic influenza. DHS looks forward to continuing 

its partnership with the Federal interagency, State, local, tribal, 

territorial, and private sector stakeholders to complete the work of 

pandemic preparedness and to further the Nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of 

the Department of Homeland Security and I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, and I appreciate again both of you 

being here and your testimony. We will submit your written testimony for the record. 

Let me ask just on the front end about roles and responsibilities, 

basically who is in charge, and I guess the way I would—did you 

say that he is in charge? Is that what you are saying? [Laughter.] 

That is like the old ‘‘Far Side’’ cartoon. But I guess what I might 

do is ask this of both of you, and if one wants to answer or one 

wants to add something to the other, that would be great. 

There was a study done, an evaluation done by GAO not too long 

ago, of the Homeland Security Council’s National Strategic and 

Pandemic Influenza Plan. Basically, it says that responsibilities in 

a crisis are split between HHS and DHS with HHS taking responsibility for health issues and DHS directing in ‘‘emergency situations.’’ But since a pan flu crisis is both by definition, do you all 

feel comfortable that the two departments have worked it out in 

terms of that happens if a decision is made that we have a flu pandemic coming? Who wants to take that? 

Dr. JOLLY. I will begin. I believe we both do feel comfortable and 

all of our teams feel comfortable. Pandemic influenza is unique, but 

in fact, every crisis has health implications and HHS has an important role to play in public health and medical response to almost 

any crisis you can name. 

Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 and under 

other authorities, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for the overall incident coordination, and that is well accepted 

throughout the government, and the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services is responsible for the specific public health and 

medical responsibility, which is quite large in this situation. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you want to add anything to that? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. No, I would just affirm what he said. 

There are 15 useful emergency support functions. Health is one of 

7 

them. In this case, it has a big role. I think the health messaging 

and the health interventions and so on are our responsibility, but 

it is under the overarching direction of DHS. 

Senator PRYOR. This same report I referred to a few moments 

ago talked about how there only has been one national multi-jurisdictional exercise as kind of a run through on our response, and as 

I understand it, I guess that was done before there was a National 

Response Plan. Do we have plans for further national or multi-jurisdictional exercises that would coordinate all the various levels 

and people that have to be coordinated? 

Dr. JOLLY. We certainly do have plans for those and that report 

does discuss that exercise initially done. Since then, there have 

been a number of exercises at the State and local level and those 

are quite important to exercise those roles, and we do have ongoing 

plans in the coming months for exercises of our Principal Federal 

Official structure and the interagency structure and then the national structure. It is a complex set of exercises. I don’t think that 

one exercise of the structure would do it, but a complex set, and 

yes, we will be advancing with those and HHS has also had exercises to inform that process. 

Senator PRYOR. What is your time frame on doing those? Are you 

doing those now? 

Dr. JOLLY. We are beginning the planning of those now. We have 

been working through—as I said in my testimony, one of the important things to develop those exercises is to develop strategic and 

then operational plans that you would then exercise rather than 

just designing the exercises off a scenario. And so those are being 

completed now and we hope that in the coming months—I don’t 

have a specific date scheduled that I can announce, but we hope 

that in the coming months, we will start that process and build to 

an exercise that goes from the cabinet level down. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Let me also ask about something that is 

part of the nature of a pandemic flu epidemic. Generally when 

there is a national disaster or regional disaster, the Stafford Act 

gets triggered and States help neighboring States and there is 

often a regional approach. But I can see in a flu epidemic or pandemic where governors, for example, might be reluctant to send his 

or her people to a nearby State to help because they may be next, 

and plus they may be spreading the virus back and forth across 

State lines. So to me, that seems to be something that is—I don’t 

know if I would say unique, but certainly a characteristic of a pandemic—a flu pandemic. How do you adjust your overall planning 

for that contingency, that this just behaves differently than most 

national disasters? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, let me speak to the health segment of that, and you may recall that Secretary Leavitt back in 

2005 started—he went to every State for a summit on pan flu and 

his message was pretty much the same, and that is you need to be 

prepared to take care of yourself because the very circumstance you 

just described is highly likely. 

So I think in our work with the States and localities, the notion 

here is how much capacity can we build locally and within a State 

in order to fill as many gaps as we can internally, not relying on 

the EMAC or the Federal system as a means to fill gaps. Very difVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:07 Aug 20, 2008 Jkt 038846 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38847.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 90. 

ficult, particularly if we are talking about facilities and personnel 

which will be in short supply in just about every location. But it 

is the best way we can plan, and that is try and build from the 

base of making the localities as self-sufficient as you can in the 

event. 

Senator PRYOR. And do you feel like we are making progress 

along those lines? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Yes. What are some objective measures? 

The Medical Reserve Corps, which is a way of organizing community-based volunteers into identifiable teams, has expanded up to 

over 650 units and 120,000 individuals, and that is just one approach to organizing volunteers. States have local programs, as 

well. We are seeing a real increase in pre-identified volunteers with 

skill sets needed to fulfill roles that the States and localities have 

identified as being in need during an event like this. 

Senator PRYOR. Let us stay with that general line of questioning—how a flu pandemic behaves and how it unfolds across the 

country. In this chart here,1 the one with the black background, 

that is a scenario that the Los Alamos National Lab came up with 

where 10 avian flu individuals get off the plane at LAX, Los Angeles, and then you can see the sequence of how it spreads across the 

country and runs its course through the country. Do you all generally agree that is a realistic model? Does that model ring true to 

you, or is that fair? 

Dr. JOLLY. I think it probably is fair. There are a lot of modelers 

who have done a lot of models based on where the first case is or 

where first clusters are and how it spreads, depending on the disease characteristics and travel characteristics and behavioral characteristics. I think that is a reasonable assumption of one possibility of a model and how a disease might spread that is largely 

based on history from 1918 and the other couple of pandemics of 

the last century. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Let me add one other comment to that. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, go ahead. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. I think that is an unmitigated or 

unintervened-upon event that we see unfolding there, and again, 

the modelers, given this as the base, what can we do to intervene, 

the community mitigation strategies that were employed, for instance, by St. Louis in 1918—— 

Senator PRYOR. Where they basically quarantine the city and 

more or less quarantine—— 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Respiratory protection and slow down, 

get social distancing, and so on, they were able to reduce by 50 percent the number of cases and the mortality associated with it, and 

so the community mitigation strategies using fairly simple community social distancing practices, could give us—some people in the 

modeling world say as high as 70 percent. We operate on a more 

conservative notion that it will reduce it 50 percent, and that is 

without adding anti-viral prophylaxis and without really having a 

vaccine in play. 

9 

Senator PRYOR. OK. So you are saying that HHS, DHS, State, 

and local people might take some steps to make sure that we don’t 

see the rapid spread across the country? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Yes. That is the planning that most 

communities are doing, and in fact, now we are looking to invest 

in new vaccines, and we should make that investment here in the 

next month or two, that may reduce the production time from 20 

weeks, which is the current production time for a vaccine, down to 

8 weeks. So there are a number of strategies that technologies will 

allow us to bring into play so that we can put more tools in the 

hands of communities. If they use just the community mitigation 

without these other interventions, they will get a certain reduction. 

And as we are able to give them more tools, like faster turnaround 

on vaccine production, anti-virals for prophylaxis, we may be able 

to reduce the rate of this spread even more significantly. 

Senator PRYOR. And let me ask this quickly about vaccines. I 

want to leave plenty of time for Senator Akaka to ask questions. 

But in terms of the vaccine, as I understand it, medically and scientifically, you need samples of the real strain, and so once you get 

those samples, then it is just going to take you some time in order 

to develop enough vaccine to get it out to the public. Is that right? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Yes. In the stockpile, we have a significant number of doses of pre-pandemic vaccine based on the current 

H5N1s that have been present in Asia. But you are absolutely 

right. If that is not the particular strain, we will have to produce 

a different vaccine and production time right now is about 20 

weeks from identification of the specific virus to the time that you 

are in full production of a vaccine. 

There are other things on the horizon that make this a very positive picture, and that is testing that currently shows that with adjuvants, that is things that augment the ability of the vaccine to 

increase your immune response, we may have 20-fold the amount 

of vaccine that we currently have in the stockpile by adding adjuvants to the existing vaccines, which would give us enough probably to cover everybody in the country if it was an H5N1 as we 

have developed the vaccine for at this point. 

There are lots of technological activities that in the next year or 

two give us much hope that we can intervene and slow this thing 

down very dramatically. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask one more question before I turn it 

over to Senator Akaka, and that is in terms of our health care infrastructure, when I see a map like that, I look at the Los Angeles 

area. To me, it seems the Los Angeles area medical infrastructure 

could be totally overwhelmed, whereas in other parts of the country, they are not feeling any stress from this at all. Is that part of 

our planning, to figure out how to allocate those resources nationally? Do you just have some concrete limitations on the number of 

hospital beds available? I guess part of the planning, I hope, would 

be figuring out other arrangements to take care of people outside 

of a hospital context, but also to bring in more medical professionals into that area. How is the planning going there? What are 

the recommendations there? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. I think that States using the Hospital 

Preparedness Grants and their own funds—States have been inVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:07 Aug 20, 2008 Jkt 038846 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38847.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
10 

creasing their fiscal commitment to these activities as much as the 

Federal Government have—are investing in expanded bed capacity 

in the form of stand-up portable hospitals so that they have that 

mobility for a variety of events, but they can certainly use them 

within a pan flu environment. The limiting step in many of these 

things is going to be the number of people who are ill or not ill and 

are available in the community. If you have a 40 percent absentee 

rate, for instance, in health care workers, it is going to be tough 

for them to provide the care. That is where the volunteer workforce 

is being pre-identified. 

Yes, where we see the cases coming early in the environment, 

and this is where many of these exercises are targeted, we are seeing it emerge in Location X. What can we bring to that particular 

fight? That is a high priority. Once it goes to a half-dozen or so 

communities, then we would probably back off with some of that 

extra push because then we are going to be looking at a broaderbased problem. If we can slow it down in L.A., better for us. But 

if it is in 20 cities, well, it is already on the spread. Then we need 

to go to Plan B, which is the local capacity plan. 

Dr. JOLLY. And I would add the key in this is really up front trying to reduce the burden on the health care system. The health 

care system is under stress now and would be under more stress, 

and the more we can employ community mitigation strategies 

broadly across the community very early, and the modeling shows 

that the key is doing it early when you can really make a difference to really reduce the load and spread out the load on the 

health care system to improve everyone’s outcome. 

Senator PRYOR. Does that also include the economic load? Have 

you thought about these hospitals, because they are going to treat 

people and if they are totally overwhelmed, and given the percentage of uninsured, etc., just special circumstances, is this going to 

financially, not ruin, but greatly burden our health care system? 

Dr. JOLLY. I think there are a number of potential effects, economic being one, and supplies and others that are all part of the 

mix and they are part of the modeling and part of the exercises. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. And this goes to how we work in sync. 

What Secretary Leavitt can do is declare a public health emergency 

behind Secretary Chertoff’s leadership on the Incident of National 

Significance. If we declare a public health emergency, that sets in 

effect many waivers. That gives the hospitals many opportunities 

to take care of people and be reimbursed in ways they might not 

otherwise be reimbursed. 

Second, hospitals that are part of the National Disaster Management System in disasters, if they are taking additional patient burdens, can get paid at about 115 percent of the existing Medicare 

rate. So that helps to over-compensate. And then there are always 

supplemental requests. In Hurricane Katrina, for instance, we had 

some additional funds identified to support the facilities in Louisiana and Mississippi that were under dire economic stress. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am glad 

to be here with you and with our witnesses. You know that I share 

11 

your concerns about the possibility of pandemic influenza outbreak 

not only in our country but around the world, and also because of 

the prediction that was made by WHO in 2004 about the concern 

about A H5N1 outbreak and how deadly it would be and what a 

disaster that would be. 

So I was glad to note that last month, the Department of Homeland Security conducted a National Preparedness Month campaign 

and 1,700 State and local-level organizations participated in that, 

and this week, Senator Pryor and I have had respective hearings 

in our Subcommittees on pandemic flu. So I am glad that we are 

giving it that kind of focus. 

Admiral it is good to see you. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. [In Hawaiian.] 

Senator AKAKA. Aloha. According to the CDC, Admiral, among 

the three flu strains it is preparing for in the 2007 and 2008 season, one is type AH3N2. This strain is linked to the 1968 Hong 

Kong pandemic flu, noted as the deadliest flu in the past 30 years, 

which killed two million people worldwide. What is the outlook for 

this upcoming season, and are we prepared for this type of influenza? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, as you know, vaccines are produced, or they have to begin production about 6 months before the 

season actually arrives, and so the folks who are prognosticating 

these things, looking at the epidemiology, try and pick those virus 

strains that are most likely to appear. Sometimes you don’t get absolutely the right one. One of the things that we are seeing in the 

Southern Hemisphere right now is a virus that we may not have 

full protection from. We think that the influenza viruses that we 

have will provide pretty good coverage for it, but we are seeing in 

the Southern Hemisphere a pretty tough influenza season. 

As you know, in a routine year, 36,000 people die in the United 

States from this seasonal influenza. So while we worry about 

pandemics, seasonal influenza is not a white event, either. 

Dr. JOLLY. If I could, I would add that some years are more 

closely matched than others, as a physician, in the influenza vaccine, but I think our major issue is to really get the word out and 

get people vaccinated who need to be vaccinated and have them— 

I believe we have 130 million doses available for this coming year, 

so our supply is good and our challenge is to get the public vaccinated early and aggressively. 

Senator AKAKA. There is a big concern about whether we will be 

able to have the vaccine. Is there any concern that as avian flu attacks chickens and eggs, and I understand that the eggs play a 

part in this vaccine or are used to produce this vaccine, that these 

may be problems producing enough vaccine? Is that true? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, as you know, sir, we received in 

the supplemental about $5.6 billion. We have invested about $3.2 

billion of that already and much of that has gone into helping companies convert from egg-based to cell-based technologies. I think we 

have five or so manufacturers now that are converting over to cellbased production capability, and that would be useful both for seasonal flu, but also in a pandemic event. That is one of the major 

investments. Our next investment, we are trying to target a recombinant vaccine that will shorten the production time by half, at 

12 

least it appears that it will do that based on European studies. So 

we are trying to get around this egg-based older approach to vaccine production. 

Dr. JOLLY. I would add that our poultry industry has taken great 

strides toward biosecurity in general and this subset of the industry that produces these eggs is a very secure subset and that is a 

key part of keeping that supply open. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral and Dr. Jolly, HHS and DHS are the 

Federal leaders in pandemic emergency response, but GAO recently testified that their respective roles haven’t been clarified. 

Have HHS and DHS communicated to the State and local jurisdictions around the country the roles and responsibilities of each 

agency? 

Dr. JOLLY. As we have stated in the prior hearing, I think, when 

GAO was there and also in our statements, there is a fairly clear— 

a very clear delineation of roles of HHS as the manager of the overall incident, and that is being manifested in all of our interactions 

with the States and also through the work of our Principal Federal 

Official group and their support group as they move throughout the 

States and regions. That leaves HHS with a large role of managing 

emergency support function, the public health and medical. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, do you want to comment? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. I fully agree. I think we have worked 

very closely with Admiral Crea as she has tried to develop the DHS 

overarching response capability and we nestle into that with our 

health piece. But she has got a broader responsibility—public safety, transportation, energy, etc. Our’s is the health link. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, you mentioned that the current flu vaccine may not give us sufficient protection this season. If this is the 

case, have you made any new predictions about the number of possible fatalities this season? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. I don’t have any epidemiologic projections of any change in our seasonal usual. We have seen some different behavior, some increased infectivity in the Southern Hemisphere and we will just kind of have to see how that projects into 

our population. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, HHS has responsibility for overseeing 

and administering the Strategic National Stockpile of anti-viral 

drugs and vaccines. Congress appropriated $6.1 billion over 3 years 

for HHS to work with States on building a stockpile of Tamiflu, 

Relenza, and available vaccines. Can you give us a status update 

of the stockpile for Hawaii? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. [In Hawaiian.] I couldn’t answer specifically with Hawaii. I can get that for the record for you, sir. I didn’t 

do my full homework, I guess. 

I think that where we are—you may recall that the acquisition 

of anti-virals, the strategy was to purchase enough anti-virals, and 

at the time that the strategy was marked out they were only producing 15 million regimens a year, so the notion was, let us buy 

enough to treat the percentage of people we think may get infected, 

not prophylaxis, treatment. We have purchased on plan in 2007 

about 37 million treatment courses and the States have purchased 

about 15 million. We were on plan to purchase the balance up to 

13 

a total of 81 million treatment courses by the end of 2008, and we 

are on plan to get that done. I think we are making good progress. 

Our other investments, as I spoke to you, are about increasing 

our vaccine production capability, looking for alternatives to the existing anti-virals so that if we develop resistance, we have another 

drug to work with, diagnostics so that we can determine is it just 

seasonal flu or is it an avian flu. Those investments have gone a 

long way to building an infrastructural base that gives us more options in the future. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you so much for your responses. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator Akaka. We appreciate your 

time on this. 

Let me follow up, if I may, with you, Admiral, about something 

we got into just a few minutes ago and that is the vaccine. I would 

like your comments on the World Health Organization report that 

says that worldwide production capability for pandemic flu vaccine 

would be 1.2 million doses total. I am wondering if that is consistent with your understanding or if you think that there is more 

worldwide capacity than that. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. I think there is much more capacity 

than that. We have taken delivery this year alone into the stockpile 

something on the order of magnitude of about 15 million doses of 

vaccine. So just for our purchases alone, we are purchasing a lot 

more than that. 

Senator PRYOR. I was going to ask you that, because you mentioned the stockpile a few moments ago and I think you mentioned 

that you had some stockpile of the flu that you have seen mostly 

in Asia that you are already stockpiling. Tell me about our stockpiles. What is the shelf life of the vaccine? How long can we stockpile them before we have to replenish? If you don’t mind, give us 

the status of our stockpile. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Sure. With regards to vaccines, and now 

I am talking about a pre-pandemic vaccine, H5N1—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN [continuing.] There are two or three different varieties of that that have been identified in South Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam. We have about 26 million doses. By the end 

of this calendar year, we will have 26 million doses of vaccine 

based on those viruses. They have about a 3-year shelf life to them. 

It is just biologicals. They only last for a fixed period of time, which 

leads to the question about sustainability that I think, over time, 

this is going to be the issue that we are all going to have to confront, State, local, Federal, is how will we sustain some of these investments that we have made when they run out of shelf life or the 

equipment becomes obsolete, etc. 

I have mentioned to you the 37.5 million doses of anti-virals that 

we have. We will purchase another 13 million or so up to 50 million 

on the Federal side. The States have 15 million. They will purchase 

another 3 to 4 million to meet that treatment goal. Right now, we 

are entertaining, with the production capability that the anti-viral 

manufacturers have for Relenza and Tamiflu, should we consider 

the use of these in a prophylactic way, that is for people who are 

in high-risk work environments—hospital workers. We know from 

14 

seasonal flu that 15 to 30 percent of health care workers in hospitals that have influenza load will get sick. 

Should we be using anti-virals for prophylaxis for those kind of 

folks, people who are home taking care of somebody with pan flu? 

Should we recommend using the anti-virals in a prophylactic mode 

there? That will have implications for acquisition, purchasing, and 

is that a local responsibility? Is it an individual responsibility? Is 

it a business responsibility? These are some of the issues that we 

are working through right now with our stakeholders. 

Senator PRYOR. And you also hinted—maybe I misunderstood 

what you said earlier, but maybe hinted that you were looking at 

ways to have a larger capacity. I read something recently about 

maybe retrofitting some domestic production plants. Could you give 

us a status report—— 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Production capacity, I spoke to adjuvants, and I will come back to that in just a minute, but production 

capacity has expanded significantly with the investments we have 

been able to make with the $6 billion that Congress gave us. That 

has been a major part of our investment. We have put about $133 

million into facilities retrofitting. We have put about $10 million 

into international vaccine production. 

Antigen spearing, which is what I mentioned earlier, antigen is 

the part of the virus that is in the vaccine that stimulates your immune system. These antigen spearing agents, when added to the 

vaccine, may make that vaccine more potent, in effect reducing. 

Right now, it takes 90 micrograms to get a good response when we 

give the vaccine, but these adjuvants, some of them have demonstrated efficacy down to three micrograms. We are not betting on 

three micrograms, but if it gets us a 10- or a 20-fold increase, down 

to 15, 20 micrograms, or below that, we are going to have a lot 

more vaccine available to us fairly quickly just by adding these adjuvants. Those are in clinical trials right now to establish their 

safety and their efficacy. 

Senator PRYOR. On the vaccines, what is the criteria that HHS 

uses to decide which producers receive vaccine production contracts? Are you limited based on patents and brand names, what 

is out there, or are these more like generics that it is a competitive 

bid? How does that process work? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Our basic criterion is very simple. We 

want U.S.-licensed manufacturers because we want domestic production capability. We have five or six firms in the hunt. They have 

different approaches and so on, but we believe that by building the 

infrastructural base across the market base, we are doing a better 

job of assuring that we have the domestic production capability 

that we may need in this event rather than relying on international suppliers. 

Senator PRYOR. And the last thing on that is we have a certain 

stockpile. Are we planning on, assuming we have a pandemic like 

the chart shows there, being able to go out and get quite a bit more 

in a very rapid fashion, and if that is the plan, are we doing advance pricing contracts or are we working with the manufacturers 

to be ready in the event that terrible day comes? 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. Well, the material is plentiful and we 

have recently conducted some gap analysis and we don’t believe 

15 

that—some of the industries don’t have any further production capacity available to them and we are going to have to work out how 

we could expand their production capacity if they are going to provide a surge product in high demand. That would include such 

things as M–95 respirators. Other products rely heavily on offshore 

raw materials. They may have production capacity domestically, 

but they have offshore materials supplies. This gets to be a pretty 

complex market analysis and will take continued dialogue with our 

industry partners to achieve reasonable solutions. We are trying to 

prioritize it against the highest priority demands, such as ventilators and other respiratory care materials. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Sununu, did you have any questions of 

this panel? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUNUNU 

Senator SUNUNU. No, I don’t. I just appreciate the testimony. 

Sorry to have arrived a little bit late. I will submit a written introductory statement for the record, but I want to give an opportunity 

for all the panelists to have some time, so I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of our witnesses on the first panel. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Sununu follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUNUNU 

Good afternoon. I would like to thank all of the witnesses who have agreed to testify before today’s hearing, and would especially like to thank Homeland Security 

and Emergency Management Director Christopher Pope from my home State of New 

Hampshire who will provide testimony on our second panel. 

Director Pope came up through the ranks in the Concord, NH fire department 

having served as a Firefighter, Paramedic, Lieutenant, Acting Captain, Battalion 

Chief, and Division Commander before becoming Chief. As Chief, Director Pope was 

responsible for 117 employees and a regional dispatch enter that handled 20,000 

emergency calls per year. Additionally, he developed the Emergency Management 

Master Plan for Concord. Director Pope’s strong background in public safety administration and emergency management is an asset to New Hampshire and I am 

pleased that he could be with us today. 

This afternoon, this Subcommittee looks into the issue of Pandemic Influenza Preparedness at the State and Local level. While we know that we can never be truly 

prepared for a pandemic outbreak, it is important that our State and local partners 

have the resources they need from the Federal Government to be ready. This hearing is an important step in opening those lines of communication. I look forward 

to hearing from both our Federal and State partners. 

Senator PRYOR. I want to thank both of you for being here. We 

may submit some written questions and we will leave our record 

open for a little while in order to do that back and forth. Thank 

you. 

Admiral VANDERWAGEN. The dialogue is absolutely necessary, 

Mr. Chairman. We have a challenge together to meet the Nation’s 

needs. Thank you for your interest. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

As the first panel is leaving, I will ask the second panel to come 

forward. Let me go ahead and introduce them. First, we will hear 

from Dr. Paul Halverson, Director of Health for the Arkansas Department of Health and State Health Officer. Dr. Halverson has an 

extensive background in public health, having served as a member 

of the Senior Biomedical Research Service at the Centers for Disease Control and also as the Director of the Division of Public 

Health Systems Development and Research. 

16 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Halverson appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

Next, we will have Christopher Pope, the Director of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Management for the New Hampshire Department of Safety. He has a solid background in public safety administration and emergency management. He served as the fire 

chief there in Concord and he has developed an emergency management master plan. As a former fire chief, he brings a unique 

perspective on the role of first responders in a health crisis. 

And our third panelist will be Yvonne Madlock, Director of the 

Memphis and Shelby County Health Department and a Board 

member of the National Association for County and City Health Officials. She has a strong background in public health, particularly 

in dealing with issues at the local and county level. 

Dr. Halverson, welcome, and if you want to give your opening 

statement. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL K. HALVERSON, DrPH, MHSA, FACHE,1

DIRECTOR AND STATE HEALTH OFFICER, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

Dr. HALVERSON. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Senator 

Pryor and Senator Sununu for the invitation to appear today. This 

is a very important time, I think, for our State and also our Nation 

as we work together in putting together a plan and to exercise that 

plan in preparation for a pandemic. 

As Senator Pryor mentioned, I serve as a member of Governor 

Beebe’s cabinet and am responsible for public health in Arkansas. 

We have nearly 5,000 employees and contractors in 95 local offices 

and in 75 counties in Arkansas. The Arkansas Department of 

Emergency Management has the primary responsibility for emergency response generally, but the governor has designated the Arkansas Department of Health to have lead responsibility for pandemic influenza preparedness and response. 

Arkansas is a great small State with approximately 2.8 million 

people. We have six metropolitan areas with a population of over 

55,000, but the majority of our State is a collection of small towns 

and villages. Although we are home to Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in the world, approximately one-third of our workforce is employed by small business. Most small businesses cannot withstand 

the impact of lost workers and the workers cannot afford to miss 

work. We have 84 hospitals that are part of our Hospital Preparedness Program and 10,897 licensed beds and approximately 2,000 

active physicians. According to the CDC-anticipated attack rate of 

around 35 percent, we would have over 500,000 people clinically ill, 

over 11,000 hospitalized, and over 3,500 people would die in the 

event of a pandemic that is being forecasted. 

One of the biggest challenges facing our State is the ability to 

sustain basic needs, such as electricity, food, water, and other services during an emergency because many of our smaller communities lack the resources and manpower to support these services. 

Federal funding and guidance have provided our State with the 

ability to provide critical infrastructure and make extensive 

progress in preparedness efforts in our State. We have taken an 

early proactive position in regard to pandemic preparedness, enactVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:07 Aug 20, 2008 Jkt 038846 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38847.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17 

ing planning strategies designed to protect Arkansans from any 

threats to public health, really an all-hazards approach from the 

public health perspective. 

Hurricane Katrina was an example of our ability to respond to 

over 75,000 evacuees that came to our State, and we believe because of our preparedness, we were able to meet the challenge of 

that great influx of individuals. 

We have conducted 233 pandemic briefings and over 97 exercises, 

working with over 9,000 people in Arkansas, including county, 

State, and our work with CDC. We are working closely with State 

and county government organizations, first responders, police, sheriffs, hospitals, and a variety of private sector partners. Partnership 

really is the key. It will allow us to be successful as we work together to make the most of our resources. 

With the support of our legislature, we have been able to purchase our maximum allotment of anti-virals and personal protective equipment. We convened an expert panel on recommendations 

regarding priority use of anti-virals and vaccine when it becomes 

available. We have worked to develop a medical reserve corps with 

volunteer physicians and nurses and other health professionals and 

our state-of-the-art laboratory has been designated by CDC for 

testing avian flu. 

Surveillance really is very critical in our State and every State 

and we work very closely with the CDC as well as sentinel sites 

and physicians in the monitoring of Medicaid claims data as a part 

of our approach towards surveillance. 

There are a number of things that we have done to respond, including mass flu vaccination campaigns, and we will again this 

year be working to try to exercise those plans and believe that the 

whole idea of exercising is critical to our success. 

We have also focused on special populations with physical disabilities and partnered with the Governor’s Commission on People 

with Disabilities and the Arkansas Association of the Deaf, and we 

are developing a List Serve for our deaf population, 60 to 80 percent of whom use Blackberries and cellular telephones to communicate. 

There are a number of issues, and I will talk about those briefly. 

Our hospitals in Arkansas have worked carefully with the Department to address issues around capacity, but we really do need to 

focus on our ability to be prepared in terms of not just the materials, but the people necessary to achieve that. In our urban areas 

in particular, we have shared staffing that really needs to be sorted 

out because people who will work in multiple facilities will only be 

able to work in one generally and we need to work in terms of that. 

Funding is also very important to us. In a small State like Arkansas, it is critical to have stable and sustainable funding. 

And last, let me just mention that, again, our working together 

in partnership with State, Federal, and county governments is really crucial to our continued success. 

Thank you so much and I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

this morning. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Pope. 

18 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pope appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER M. POPE,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF 

NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Mr. POPE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sununu. My 

name is Christopher Pope and I do serve as the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management in the State of New 

Hampshire. I was appointed by Governor Lynch just over a year 

ago following a 30-year career in the fire service, functioning as a 

local responder both in EMS and fire and hazardous materials response. 

Each State has characteristics which make it unique in terms of 

pandemic planning. I wish to point out a few of these unique factors about New Hampshire which impact our public health and our 

all-hazard planning efforts. 

First, while New Hampshire is small geographically, it sits in a 

compact region of States in the Northeast. The cities of New York, 

Boston, Hartford, Providence, Portland, Albany, and Montreal all 

exist within a shorter driving distance from New Hampshire’s 

Emergency Operations Center than the distance separating Los 

Angeles from San Francisco. This means that evacuation surge secondary to any natural or human-caused disaster in this denselypopulated region will significantly impact our State. 

Second, we share a border with Canada, which is important both 

due to the potential of the illegal entry of those intent on committing harm, but also because local citizens routinely cross the border 

every day to conduct business. As we all know, State and foreign 

borders do not stop floods, terrorist events, or pandemics. 

Third, Portsmouth, New Hampshire is an active seaport with significant critical infrastructure that supports not just the economy 

of the State, but that of the entire region. 

Fourth, New Hampshire is a major tourist destination in all four 

seasons of the year. 

And finally, New Hampshire has a very small county government 

presence within the State. There are no county emergency management directors. There are no county public health officials or county emergency operations centers. Prior to recent pandemic planning 

initiatives, all 234 communities within our State reported to one 

central government agency on all matters related to natural disasters and public health crises. 

These unique factors have caused New Hampshire to take a 

slightly different approach to public health planning and response. 

For example, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the New Hampshire Department of Safety and the New 

Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services to allow 

collaboration in the area of emergency preparedness by actually 

embedding Department of Health and Human Services staff in the 

Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Our 

bioterrorism unit exists within the Department of Safety rather 

than within our Department of Health and Human Services. This 

forces these two key State agencies to work closely together, thus 

building a strong partnership. 

19 

The Director of Public Health, the State epidemiologist, the chief 

of our public health lab, our grants manager, our bioterrorism 

chief, and I, along with several other staff, meet twice per month 

to review public health planning efforts and further our strategic 

planning. 

Because of the lack of a county public health structure, it became 

evident for the need to develop a regional approach to respond to 

a pandemic. Thus, New Hampshire developed 19 what we refer to 

as All-Health Hazard Regions (AHHR) covering all 234 of our communities. As of late summer, 14 AHHRs had completed a pandemic 

influenza annex to their all-hazard public health plan, with the remaining five nearing completion. The AHHRs have identified acute 

care centers, neighborhood emergency health centers, point of dispensing distribution centers, and mass quarantine centers, and 

they have already developed or are in the process of developing 

plans on how these would be operationalized. 

All 19 AHHRs have conducted tabletop exercises of their allhealth hazards plan for public health response. Pandemic Phase 1 

and 2 funds were distributed to AHHRs to support enhanced regional response plans, including community medical surge. These 

efforts have increased the capability and capacity of the health care 

system with these regions. Several of these regions have purchased 

medical supplies to support acute care centers to reduce the likelihood that hospitals will be expected to provide them. Because of 

the number of exercises that have occurred, community-based partners and health care system partners have demonstrated they have 

a better understanding of the real capacity of hospitals. 

My submitted written testimony details a list of cross-cutting lessons learned from the many exercises conducted in New Hampshire. It further lists a large number of accomplishments subsequent to these exercises. It also delves into details related to our 

building of interstate and international regionalization initiatives. 

Two I will mention quickly. 

The Northeast States Emergency Consortium (NESEC), is a 

group of the six New England emergency management directors 

and those from New York and New Jersey cooperatively working 

to deal with emergency management issues and now public healthrelated issues, as well. 

The second group, International Emergency Management Group 

(IEMG), exists with those same States and our friends in the Eastern Provinces, including Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 

Prince Edward Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland. 

I would like to briefly relate to you some feedback that we have 

received from our State partners and our local communities in 

terms of what the Federal Government, and State Government, for 

that matter, working together can do to improve our efforts. 

One, the need to support for small towns to update and develop 

their local emergency operations plan, either directly to the community for hiring of a consultant or other staff member, and to require the plans be all-hazard. 

Earmarked funding for disability agencies and organizations to 

participate in planning and exercises. For example, interpreters for 

the deaf and hard of hearing individuals to participate in a 90- 

minute planning meeting can cost between $200 and $250. 

20 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Madlock appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

Cooperative funding between DHHS and Homeland Security to 

fund Points of Distribution where communities share a border with 

other States or Canada. It is difficult to prepare a plan and fund 

for POD activations without these cross-border fundings. 

These are but four of many recommendations that we have and 

many I have submitted as part of my written testimony. 

Finally, I would say that local government, States, and the private sector have made great strides in their preparedness and response capabilities in public health crises. However, we are still not 

at the acceptable level of readiness that our citizens expect and deserve. States and local governments continue to need funding and 

leadership from the Federal Government as we continue to build 

these capabilities. 

I wish to thank the Members of this Committee for inviting me 

here today to report these findings and I also wish to publicly 

thank the many local public health and emergency management officials who provided me with input for this report. Together, we 

commit to you to continue to knock down the stovepipes and continue to foster a cooperative environment between the myriad public and private entities that will be called upon to serve our citizens 

in times of disaster. Thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Ms. Madlock. 

TESTIMONY OF YVONNE S. MADLOCK, MAT,1 DIRECTOR, MEMPHIS AND SHELBY COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTY AND CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS 

Ms. MADLOCK. Good afternoon, Senator Pryor and Senator 

Sununu. On behalf of the citizens of Memphis and Shelby County 

and on behalf of local public health agencies across the United 

States, I appreciate the opportunity to come and share with you 

some comments on the state of pan flu preparedness at the public 

health level, local level, across the Nation. 

My name is Yvonne Madlock. I am Director of Memphis and 

Shelby County Health Department and I have worked there for the 

last 12 years. Along with my staff, I have been deeply engaged in 

pandemic flu preparedness planning activities. 

As a part of our work, we have had an increasing number of opportunities over the last several years to work closely with our colleagues throughout the Mid-South Region and particularly with our 

colleagues in Arkansas. I would like to tell you about the successes 

we have had as we have prepared our community and our region 

for what we perceive to be the inevitability of pandemic influenza. 

We believe we have done a good job in coordinating with Federal, 

State, and community entities in developing a strong and comprehensive local plan for pandemic response, and I would believe 

that most local public health departments have had similar experiences. Key to our success in coordinating has been our ability to 

bring elected officials, key community leaders, and stakeholders together to learn and engage in pandemic flu planning. 

More specifically, we have established 20 Points of Distribution, 

what we call PODs, and the mechanisms for distributing and adVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:07 Aug 20, 2008 Jkt 038846 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38847.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

ministering vaccines and medications to a large population, in our 

case, an MSA of more than 1.2 million people in just a few days. 

This spring, we had a great turnout in learning from our pan flu 

exercise, where more than 86 persons from across the region representing public health, local elected officials, police and fire and 

emergency medical services, public schools and college, the airport 

authority, and community organizations and businesses. 

The following is a list of some of the things that we learned as 

a result of those experiences. First, we learned there is still work 

to be done in the area of public education. As Senator Pryor referenced earlier, many people are either under-informed or misinformed about the reality and the threat of flu and the need to 

plan for self-sufficiency. Delivering this message is challenging, 

particularly in this age of short attention spans when headlines 

compete for our attention moment by moment. 

Second, we are very concerned about business continuity planning. Pandemics are not like hurricanes or tornadoes. They are not 

a single incident that happens over the course of a few hours or 

even a few days. Sustaining life as we know it and its necessary 

business processes over weeks, months, and maybe even years with 

a shrunken workforce is one of the major challenges and consequences of pandemic flu that we all face and that I believe has 

not yet been adequately addressed. 

Third, the exercise emphasized for us the distinct role of local responders. For instance, the Strategic National Stockpile is a Federal and State resource, but its deployment will be a local responsibility. Memphis and Shelby County residents will look to the local 

health department and to local government to distribute vaccines 

and medications in a quick and efficient manner. They will look to 

us for specifics on the epidemic in our community, where to go for 

assistance, and how to protect themselves and their families. 

All disasters are local and response is dependent upon the knowledge, the skills, the resources of local responders representing multiple disciplines. But local does not mean isolated. Regionalism in 

planning is critical. Disasters, whether manmade or naturally occurring, do not respect political or geographic boundaries. National 

policies and guidance, written into funding opportunities that encourages and supports multi-State planning, minimalizing 

credentialing challenges, encouraging inter-governmental agreements, would be very helpful. 

For example, Memphis is located in the extreme Southwest corner of Tennessee and really serves as the metropolitan hub of a 

three-State region, a mostly rural set of counties that surround us 

for almost 120 miles in either direction. So in terms of disaster 

planning, as Memphis goes, so goes the multi-State region that surrounds us. Adequate cross-jurisdictional planning can mean the difference in our ability to immunize our MSA in 48 hours or not. 

At the local level, our uniform public safety partners have 

learned the value of public health in protecting communities in 

emergencies. We need to translate those lessons learned locally to 

the Federal level. The Federal Government can help by insisting 

that local public health be at the table at the local, State, and Federal levels as planning is done and funding allocations are made. 

22 

Again, I thank you very much for the opportunity to come before 

you today and for your interest in this very important issue to the 

health of all of our Nation. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. What I would like to do is go ahead 

and lead off with a few questions, then turn it over to Senator 

Sununu. It looks like we may have a vote here in the next 10 or 

15 minutes, but we will just play it by ear and see how it goes. 

The first thing I have for all three of you is just a general statement on the working relationship that you all have with the Federal Government. Is there sufficient two-way communication between your offices and the Federal Government? Is the Federal 

Government providing resources and accessibility on a variety of 

fronts? Dr. Halverson. 

Dr. HALVERSON. I appreciate the question because I think it really is important. As we talked about earlier, this is about a partnership and if the partnership is not effective, our response will not 

be, either. And I think, at least from Arkansas’s perspective, we 

have a very positive relationship between the Department of 

Health and the Department of Health and Human Services and 

CDC in particular. 

One of the things that CDC has done specifically to address this 

issue is the development of what is called the Senior Management 

Official. That is an individual from the Director’s Office at CDC 

who works in Arkansas on our executive staff and provides a responsibility as a liaison. That has been incredibly important to us 

as we have been able to use that individual to work with us to address issues that we have from time to time. 

The issue of Homeland Security, I think, and the Department of 

Homeland Security is a relatively new partner for us. We did attend a briefing recently that described the partnership between the 

Department of Homeland Security and HHS and the State and 

local health departments and how it will work. Frankly, it is too 

early to tell. This is really about relationships and I think that our 

strong working relationship and history with HHS has been very 

positive. I have a lot of hope for what could be a strong partnership 

with the Department of Homeland Security, but we really need to 

work that out and develop those relationships, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Pope. 

Mr. POPE. I would certainly echo Dr. Halverson’s comment. And 

frankly, it is refreshing to see people at the Federal level who work 

as hard and just are as dedicated as we sense these folks are, and 

there is nothing that if you could not in some way add an additional 10 or 20 hours to each day, I don’t think there are any problems we couldn’t overcome. 

One other comment that I would make is that States and local 

governments tend to get a little bit frustrated with short deadlines, 

quick turnaround times that are imposed upon us by the Federal 

Government in order to comply with certain grant requirements. 

That is a controversial issue at times, but I will say that it is my 

opinion that it is those deadlines which will—it needs to be a balance, but it is those deadlines that keeps us making progress. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. 

Ms. MADLOCK. Thank you. I would say that the relationship as 

I perceive it between the Tennessee Department of Health and the 

23 

Federal level in the health sector is a very strong one. Ours at the 

local level is a bit more by proxy and a bit more indirect. But we 

do have a growing strength in that relationship, and I think overtures and recognition of the importance of direct communication between the Federal level and the local level is absolutely growing. 

On the flip side, when we go to Homeland Security, that represents for us a new construct also and we really are working in 

two different organizational constructs. While we have a very well 

developed, historically developed State structure for public health, 

the emerging structure for Homeland Security is a new one and we 

are working with different regions, different counties comprising 

those regions, and beginning to learn one another, so that the opportunities, I think, ultimately will be there for us to communicate 

a lot more with Homeland Security at the local level than has 

emerged or has grown or evolved to exist thus far directly with the 

Department of Health and Human Services. 

So it is a set of relationships that are different depending upon 

the office we are working with and they are in different States of 

evolution. But again, I think meetings like this and other opportunities we have had bode well for the potential for us to strengthen 

those relationships. I think everyone wants that to happen and I 

think we all recognize that is a critical element of success of planning. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you for those answers. One of the 

reasons I asked is because the two witnesses from the previous 

panel stayed here to listen to what you all had to say, and that is 

a good indicator to me that they are listening and they are working 

with you. As Senator Sununu will tell you, that is not always the 

case. A lot of times, the one panel will just leave the room, but I 

am so pleased that the previous panel stayed here to listen to what 

our local people have to say. 

At this point, I am going to turn it over to Senator Sununu for 

his questions and I will have a few follow-ups. Thank you. 

Senator SUNUNU. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, that they saw 

your question and super simply were well prepared, but somehow, 

I think that is probably not the case, having spent time with Chris 

Pope and others who have been working on these issues. I do get 

the sense that, partly because of the priority Congress has made, 

but I think because of the dedication of people at the local level, 

there is a good channel of communication. 

I want to begin by asking Chris Pope about that regional communication and regional coordination. You mentioned New Hampshire’s involvement with the Northeastern States Consortium to 

help facilitate a better regional approach. Can you give some specific examples of how that regional approach has had an impact on 

New Hampshire? 

Mr. POPE. Sure. Well, a practical example that I can give you is 

in a non-public health scenario where we had an ice storm, a severe ice storm in the Northeast that affected New Hampshire, 

Vermont, Maine. I had tens of thousands of citizens without power 

for more than a week, and there is a very specific need to get a 

very basic line, electric company line truck from the Eastern Canadian Provinces into New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine to help 

local utility crews restore power. It is part of a mutual aid agreeVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:07 Aug 20, 2008 Jkt 038846 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38847.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24 

ment, and without agreements and conversation and planning 

ahead of time, those line trucks will sit at a border because of credible homeland security concerns and not get into the country as 

quickly as they are needed. 

So you meet ahead of time, you identify issues, you conduct tabletop exercises, and you exchange business cards before a disaster 

occurs, and this has been incredibly valuable. 

Senator SUNUNU. Why is it important to be part of that Northeastern Consortium even as you have the FEMA Region 1 structure in place on top of it? 

Mr. POPE. Well, simply because we as the regional, either the directors of the Eastern Canadian Provinces or the directors in the 

New England Northeast States, we are driving our agenda. FEMA 

is not driving our agenda. And by the way, we attend meetings 

called by FEMA Region 1. We have got a terrific working relationship with FEMA Region 1. 

But there are times when we need to meet where we are in control of our own agenda, we are talking about the issues that are 

germane to us, and I think—and FEMA attends our meetings, as 

well, as does DHS. So this has been a positive, very positive thing. 

And by the way, we have had visitors from the Southern U.S. border attend these meetings and interest from, for example, Guam, 

who wants to build a similar relationship with Japan, who would 

be their primary help in a disaster. 

Senator SUNUNU. Dr. Halverson, you mentioned 96 exercises that 

you have participated in. Have any of those extended into a regional approach, and what are some of the key findings or experiences that have come out of those exercises for you? 

Dr. HALVERSON. Well, we do an awful lot on a regional basis, and 

in particular as we think about some of our border States between 

Tennessee and Texas. We have taken a little bit different approach 

in the issues related to pandemic, however, with guidance from 

CDC and the Department of Homeland Security and Health. The 

issue here is that in the event of pandemic, we really need to be 

planning what we can do as a State and not—and frankly, it is a 

very difficult thing for us because it is our standard operating procedure to work together on a regional basis to create and share resources. 

In this instance, we certainly are aware of what is occurring, particularly in Texarkana, Texas, and Texas, and in Memphis, West 

Memphis, and in those areas. We do the planning, but we also are 

very deliberate in some of our work with pandemic to be thinking 

about what are we going to be doing collectively within the State. 

So our emphasis really has been on a State level. 

Now, from the perspective of counties, we are working together, 

and we do an awful lot of work sharing between counties within 

the State of Arkansas and we have a very established regional approach within our State, sharing resources, both people and material, to be able to work together in that regard. 

So again, for us, we do both regional approach but also be thinking about what we have to do on our own. 

Senator SUNUNU. Ms. Madlock, I have heard a lot of concerns 

about a lack of surge capacity within our health care system. Is 

this an issue in Memphis and Shelby, and what is being done or 

25 

what might be done to deal with a lack of surge capacity in the 

event of a pandemic? 

Ms. MADLOCK. I would say I think the information you have 

heard, sir, is absolutely correct. I think the reality for most health 

care systems across the United States, and it is certainly true in 

Memphis and Shelby County, is that it is working at capacity right 

now. We have limited bed capacity in our community. 

One of the things we realize is that we probably could never 

build and create the full amount of beds and support services that 

would be available to medically respond to a pandemic as you see 

depicted here. And so one of the things we obviously try to do is 

to create strategies that will provide us distance of time and the 

luxury of time so that we can minimize that medical impact as 

much as possible. 

But in addition, we are working—we have a Medical Reserve 

Corps in Memphis and Shelby County. I know that they exist 

throughout the United States and I think they create great opportunities for bringing in folks to work in non-traditional roles that 

they may not assume on a regular day-to-day basis so that they 

can aid the effort as much as possible. 

So I think there are different approaches to responding to that, 

whether it is to build capacity through the use of volunteers, 

whether it is work to maximize the relationships of hospitals and 

health care systems across regions, and we are working to do that 

also, working with 19 hospitals in our region to try and identify capacities of both equipment, beds, workforce, etc., or to develop 

strategies of intervention so that we can minimize the demand to 

the extent that we possibly can. 

Senator SUNUNU. Director Pope, have New Hampshire hospitals 

taken a similar approach, a slightly different approach to dealing 

with the question of surge capacity? 

Mr. POPE. Our plan for the most part, and I am going to oversimplify it, but it is essentially not to rely on the hospitals for any 

kind of surge capacity for the same reasons that were very well 

enunciated by Ms. Madlock. We have asked our 19 AHHRs to go 

out, identify facilities in their communities that meet certain requirements, characteristics, that could function in an infrastructure 

capacity as an acute care center, as a help center, or any of the 

other, a POD, and we have actually started to exercise these locations as the operational plans are being built out. 

Senator SUNUNU. One of the things you mentioned in your testimony that would be of value that the Federal Government could 

provide is cooperative funding between DHS and DHHS to support 

Point of Distribution centers for communities that border other 

States, or in the case of New Hampshire, other countries like Canada. Has the Northern States Consortium or the International 

Emergency Management Group reached out to DHS and DHHS 

and how have they responded? 

Mr. POPE. That is the direction we have taken, and more specifically the issue becomes, and I will give you a very quick specific 

example. On the Western border of New Hampshire, where we border Vermont, we have major medical centers, including DartmouthHitchcock on the Western part of the State. So you will see people 

from Vermont coming in on an every day basis to seek medical 

26 

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 90. 

care, doctors’ offices, into New Hampshire. And that is unique compared to what might happen on the Eastern border of our State 

with Maine, where we may actually have people from New Hampshire going into Maine to normally seek medical care. 

So the issues are a little bit different, but the problem we run 

into is we can’t take Federal—we have had difficulty in trying to 

fund exercises where it appears in any way, shape, or form that the 

funds are going towards some activity or benefit in another State. 

So we have had some challenges there and we have asked NESEC 

to look into that with FEMA and DHHS/CDC. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Dr. Halverson, you mentioned in 

your opening statement about non-medical containment exercise. 

Could you tell me what that is, why you did it, and what were 

some of the lessons? 

Dr. HALVERSON. Well, again, our issue, Senator, is that, as Dr. 

Vanderwagen testified earlier, the issue early on is to slow down 

the spread of this disease, and frankly, issues around social 

distancing, the limiting of large crowds, the early use of social 

distancing and limited quarantine, we think are really important. 

They relate to our ability to more effectively manage the spread of 

disease. So it really has been our focus to try to create an interest 

not just in the use of the anti-virals or the vaccine, but practical 

issues that individuals could take to try to minimize their risk and 

contain the exposure. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask you, Ms. Madlock, about Memphis. 

We have seen this chart here with the map of the United States 

where hypothetically something starts in Los Angeles, and we appreciate that, but we also need to recognize that Memphis has one 

of the busiest airports in the United States.1 Is it the largest 

freight—— 

Ms. MADLOCK. It is the largest cargo airport in the world, Senator. 

Senator PRYOR. There you go, the largest cargo airport in the 

world. When I hear a statistic like that, I think it is just as likely 

that something like this could start in the mid-section of the country, in Memphis, Tennessee. 

Memphis is such a regional city because it is right on the Mississippi River and Arkansas is across the river. If you draw a little 

circle around it, you are touching Mississippi, the very Southern 

part of Illinois and Missouri. It has always been that way. In Memphis, they call it the Mid-South, right? 

Ms. MADLOCK. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. I am curious about your sense about your capability for early monitoring and detection of a flu problem. In other 

words, theoretically, it could be some airport workers or some pilots 

or whatever it may be. I know you have a lot of people coming in 

from overseas because you are an international airport, as well. Do 

you feel like your city and your State has the tools necessary to do 

that early monitoring, to maybe try to contain it there before it 

really becomes a pandemic? 

27 

Ms. MADLOCK. We are working on several fronts, and I think you 

have highlighted both our pride and our great challenge in the 

event a pandemic comes into the United States. We are working on 

several fronts. One of those is to develop very strong surveillance. 

We have recently been able to further the development on three 

different levels and on three different approaches. 

One is the Syndromic Surveillance System, using the early aberrant reporting system that was developed by CDC, which allows us 

to receive electronically information from emergency rooms 

throughout our region so that we can monitor and see if we have 

unexpected rates or incidences of infections or diseases that we 

would not otherwise expect. 

In addition to that, we have a system in place utilizing a surveillance system that provides us data from our public school system, 

where we get reports from 49 different schools to measure and 

monitor absenteeism rates. 

We are also working with a program that I believe is a national 

program also, but in the Mid-South region is looking at the retail 

pharmaceutical sales of drug stores, pharmacies throughout the 

Mid-South, so that we can see if we have had an exceptional spike 

in sales of anti-diarrheals or cold and flu medication. 

Those are kinds of early warning signals that will allow us to, 

as Dr. Halverson has mentioned and Dr. Vanderwagen mentioned 

earlier, provide us with an opportunity for early detection to slow 

down the spread. It is classic public health. It is the attempt to 

identify a risk early enough so that preventive interventions can be 

effective. 

So those are some of the major thrusts that we have, and I had 

another response, and as I went down that path I lost it, but I will 

be happy to respond further to that question. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. 

Ms. MADLOCK. I can submit you something in writing along those 

lines. 

Senator PRYOR. That would be great. Let me ask the whole panel 

about a patient care question, and that is, as I understand it, in 

most day-to-day practices, doctors naturally tend to treat the sickest people first, but with flu and when you have a pandemic situation, there is at least one school of thought that says you should 

treat those who are the most likely to survive. Who makes that 

kind of decision? Do we have a protocol? Is it a national protocol 

or a State-by-State protocol, or city-by-city, hospital-by-hospital? 

How will that be done? That is kind of a micro question, but I am 

curious about how that works. Who wants to take that? 

Dr. HALVERSON. I would be happy to start. Senator, I think you 

have identified one of the most difficult questions that I believe our 

physicians and health officials will face in the event of a pandemic. 

In Arkansas, one of the ways in which we have addressed this is 

by working very collaboratively with the Arkansas Medical Society 

and ethicists and we have created the opportunity to provide a consultation team to hospital ethics committees to begin working now 

to begin to address those kinds of questions that you have mentioned. 

Whether it is the priority of treatment is a major issue. The 

other issue relates to, for example, patients who are currently on 

28 

a ventilator and the ability at some point in time to say that this 

person who has been on a ventilator for the last 6 months or 8 

months or more may not necessarily be able to be sustained on a 

ventilator because there are other patients that might benefit 

more. 

These are difficult questions and ones in which we have asked 

our hospitals to begin to address now prospectively. Obviously, it 

is easier to face these issues today than it is to deal with them in 

the heat of the moment. So again, it is not going to make it a whole 

lot easier, but it will hopefully begin to address those issues now. 

Senator PRYOR. Did either of you want to take that, as well? 

Mr. POPE. Well, I would certainly echo, and my background is 

not epidemiology or medical ethics for sure, but we will, from the 

State perspective, look for some guidance from the Federal Government, broad guidelines. Absent those, we will build our own protocols. We do have a group that we can pull together, an ethics 

group. It may or may not be practical to do that. It is best done 

ahead of time, obviously, and not after the incident occurs. 

Ms. MADLOCK. I certainly would agree with both gentlemen who 

have spoken thus far on that issue. The other piece would be that 

I think that is only one of the ethical issues that, again, we at the 

local level will be looking for support from our partners in the medical community as well as our partners at the Federal level. I know 

that the Centers for Disease Control is grappling with issues as to, 

for example, how do we prioritize the distribution of a relatively 

scarce commodity, such as the vaccine maybe in the early stages. 

So we have many issues as to how do we utilize scarce resources 

in a time of medical and public health crisis. 

If I might, Senator, just as a point of privilege—not any privilege, but a point of response to your earlier question in regard to 

Memphis serving as a transportation hub for the Nation, indeed 

the world, one of the things we are also working on is the development of guidelines and protocols as to how do we isolate, quarantine, or control the potential for an infection to be introduced 

through that international travel, and so we have convened the airport authority, our medical community, our public health community, and local officials to begin to talk about that very issue and 

to begin to develop some really strong plans in that regard. We do 

recognize that is a major point of vulnerability. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask one more question, and Senator 

Sununu may have some more, as well, but on the issue of quarantine, I think all the witnesses have mentioned quarantine, all 

five of you, in different contexts. I know the University of Michigan 

did a study looking at 43 of the cities who were impacted by the 

1918 pandemic and St. Louis, Missouri, had the fewest deaths. One 

of the reasons they did is because they closed schools, churches, 

and other community gatherings for 10 weeks to 21⁄2 months. 

My question for the panel generally is do we have plans on the 

shelf that we can pull out to do that and take such drastic steps 

if we need to? I mean, have you all gone through the planning of 

all the things that need to be done in order to do that type of quarantine? 

Dr. HALVERSON. Senator, I think that is an excellent example of 

the reason why we need to work together in partnership. As we 

29 

speak, actually, we have a very strong relationship with our Department of Education and the over 200 school districts in the 

State of Arkansas. One of the issues that we are addressing is the 

authority to actually close schools, and not close schools for a couple of weeks but potentially for several months or maybe the entire 

term. As you pointed out very correctly, it is really about being able 

to move quickly and take decisive action to limit public gatherings. 

Schools are one example. Churches are another. There are a lot of 

factors relating to—and consequences of taking that action. 

So we are working with our Department of Education and school 

superintendents. We have actually conducted a State-wide planning meeting with our education leaders, and this is one of the 

issues that we are addressing right now. We are in the process of 

finalizing a draft on indicators for when we would take action, who 

would do it, how we would notify people. 

But there are a lot of other downstream issues, also, Senator, relating to the credit for children, how the teachers are going to be 

paid, who would pay the teachers, how to deal with a lot of downstream effects of making that kind of a decision. It is a very big 

decision, but we think it is important to address it early on. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask this. Who makes that decision? Is 

that made on the local school board level or is that made city, county, or State? 

Dr. HALVERSON. In Arkansas, and I guess each State may be a 

little bit different, but as the State Health Officer, I would have the 

authority to make that decision generally in collaboration with the 

Director of the Department of Education and with the governor. 

But we clearly have the legal authority to actually close schools, 

and that would then be communicated to the local school superintendents and principals. But we really do want to see this as a 

collaborative decision, but we are in the process right now of delineating roles and responsibilities and action steps to make that very 

clear with everyone. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have any comments on that? 

Mr. POPE. I would just add that the problem is highly complex 

because in the case of private schools, for example, you have students who may be coming from overseas. You may have students 

coming from an area where there are already test-positive cases. 

But I would also say that schools throughout the Nation, especially 

in the Northern climates, close due to weather events and other 

events, so they are fully aware of what the consequences are as 

enunciated by Dr. Halverson when you do close a school. 

That said, we have exercised this particular issue. There is a 

clear delineation as to who makes the call in our State, and that 

doesn’t mean it is an easy call, but we have an educational annex 

to our State pandemic flu protocol. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. I have one last question for all of you to address. You have all participated in different simulations, tabletop 

exercises, also live exercises, drills, some on a small scale, I know 

some on a very significant large scale involving movement of materials and people to try to work through all the issues associated 

with pandemic response. I would like each of you to name the exercise or the program that you have found to be the most helpful in 

30 

revealing steps that need to be taken, assessments that need to be 

made to improve your level of preparedness. Why don’t we start 

with you, Ms. Madlock. 

Ms. MADLOCK. Yes, happy to. We conducted a drill, an exercise 

in late June of this year. It was an exercise of our POD administration system. We tested our ability to convene all of our partners 

and stand a POD up in a very brief period of time and be able to 

work patients through the system and have them immunized and 

back out again. 

I found it to be incredibly valuable for a number of reasons. One, 

it gave us an opportunity to work with all of those partners that 

came from all different disciplines throughout the community and 

the region. 

Second, I think the thing that was particularly valuable is that 

it gave our lay, not our lay, but our professional public health employees across the board, a cross-section of those employees, an opportunity to experience emergency response activities. It is one 

thing to read about it. It is another thing to learn about it. It is 

another thing to learn the language of NIMS and be able to talk 

the talk. But to be actually able to work in a different capacity and 

see the importance, the critical importance that your role and your 

showing up, your presence in an emergency situation can make and 

be is vitally important. We also then gave those same employees 

an opportunity to participate in the after-action report development 

so that they gave input into what worked for them, what else they 

needed to learn and know, and how it changed their perspective of 

their roles. 

So from the standpoint of interagency coordination and internal 

organizational staff development, to be really ready to respond, I 

found it to be incredibly valuable—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Roughly how many people participated? 

Ms. MADLOCK. Oh, I would say probably about 100 of about 500 

to 600 people on our staff. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. Director Pope. 

Mr. POPE. I would point to two things quickly. One is, and some 

of my peers may not agree with me, but the HSC compliance, 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Compliance—these are 

standards that exercises should follow when they are being conducted and I think they force you to really look at your weaknesses 

and what you need to do to improve. 

The second thing is just exercising, getting to your full-scale exercises where you are exercising various pieces. We had a large 5- 

day pandemic exercise in New Hampshire this past spring. We relocated SNS assets from Georgia to New Hampshire, distributed 

them. We had hundreds of volunteers in five different cities, communities, or three different communities in New Hampshire actually going through and receiving a theoretic anti-viral or whatever 

it happened to be. 

First of all, it is very heartwarming to see the number of volunteers and people that are actually doing this. This is the battlefield, 

as far as I am concerned, and the work that is being done is just— 

I can’t say enough about it. But the rewards will be there. Will it 

be perfect when it happens? No, but if we continue to do this, we 

31 

are going to see, I hope, a much better outcome than we did back 

in the early part of the 20 Century, the last time this happened. 

Senator SUNUNU. Dr. Halverson. 

Dr. HALVERSON. Probably the most significant exercise for us occurred mid-summer this year. We actually participated with the 

CDC and created—we were corresponding with CDC in real time 

using our videoconferencing equipment, stood up our Emergency 

Operations Center for a couple of days, worked with our hospitals 

and local health departments. So it really was for us a test of our 

Federal, State, and local response. It allowed us to deploy equipment that we don’t normally use on a day-to-day basis. It allowed 

us to test things. We found things that didn’t work. We found 

things that we needed to improve on. And frankly, that was a great 

exercise for us. 

Probably one of the most important things, though, that we have 

identified is now working with our local communities and having 

them have that same kind of experience. And so we work very collaboratively standing up our EOC as necessary, then working with 

the local community to test communications systems, work with 

hospitals, and again, all coordination with our Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, that is a partnership for us, as 

well, and we communicate very frequently in much the same way 

that Director Pope has mentioned that they coordinate their efforts. 

We do in Arkansas, as well, and that has been a good relationship. 

But that Federal, State, local exercise, I thought was very revealing, very helpful, and we did a full after-action review, as well. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Sununu, thank you for your participation here today, and Senator Akaka, as well. 

I want to say that we will leave the record open for 2 weeks. I 

know that some Senators will want to submit questions to the 

panel. We appreciate you all getting those answers back to us as 

quickly as possible. 

I want to thank both panels, and again give a special thank you 

to the first panel, who stuck around to hear the testimony of the 

second panel and to continue the dialogue. It is very helpful. 

So I want to thank everybody for participating and this hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(33) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR OBAMA 

I would like to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for their leadership on 

what continues to be an important health issue in our country—pandemic flu. 

As all of you know, we are facing the start of flu season here in the United States, 

and by many indicators, our public health officials and the medical community are 

better prepared than in previous years. Recent reports from the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention indicate that a shortage of flu vaccine is not expected, as 

production has reached an unprecedented 132 million doses. This preparedness is 

particularly good news, because improving our ability to respond to seasonal flu will 

certainly enhance our ability to respond to other natural and manmade disasters, 

including a top concern of mine—pandemic flu. 

The Centers for Disease Control has described pandemic flu as inevitable and the 

biggest threat to public health in this Nation. And we know that much work remains to be done with regards to pandemic preparedness and response. The recent 

incident involving tuberculosis-infected Andrew Speaker is one stark reminder. As 

serious as XDR tuberculosis has been to contain and control, dealing with pandemic 

flu will be many times more difficult. 

We need only look back over the last hundred years to remind ourselves of the 

speed and devastation caused by this potentially fatal virus. The Spanish flu pandemic in 1918, the Asian flu pandemic in 1957, and the Hong Kong flu pandemic 

in 1968 are all harrowing reminders. The Spanish flu pandemic was the most severe, causing over 500,000 deaths in the United States and more than 20 million 

deaths worldwide. Obviously, with our global trade and travel, the United States 

remains highly vulnerable to any pandemic; the recent tuberculosis incident involving Andrew Speaker clearly indicates that much work needs to be done in the area 

of surveillance and tracking the whereabouts of infected citizens, especially those 

leaving and entering our country. 

Congress has a responsibility to be proactive in building this Nation’s defenses 

against all public health disasters. During my time in the U.S. Senate, I have introduced two bills specific to this challenge—one that speaks directly to the threat of 

avian flu and another that speaks more broadly at improving our emergency response. Briefly, the AVIAN Act of 2005 focused on pandemic preparedness and response in the areas of surveillance, preventive and medical care, core public health 

functions, information, and communication, with emphasis on collaboration and cooperation at the State, national and international level. More recently, I introduced 

the Improving Emergency Medical Care and Response Act of 2007 which will improve the coordination of emergency medical services, expand communication and 

patient-tracking systems, and implement a regionalized data management system. 

Even though the last flu pandemic occurred almost 40 years ago, we need only 

look as far back as 2005 to the events of Hurricane Katrina to be reminded of our 

poor response to a large-scale emergency. Preparing for flu outbreaks goes beyond 

just vaccine production, and we must remain vigilant in our efforts towards refining 

and implementing an effective and comprehensive preparedness strategy. I commend you for holding this hearing today and I look forward to working with my colleagues on this issue moving forward. 

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