NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 22-1948

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PETER CRISAFULLI

COREY FLOYD,

Appellants

v.

TOWNSHIP OF BRANCHBURG, SOMERSET COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, 

KATE PROSCIA-BERGER, and DAVID YOUNG

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05709)

District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on April 28, 2023.

Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 6, 2023)

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OPINION*

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Krause, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants Peter Crisafulli and Corey Floyd, a former Lieutenant and Sergeant, 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not 

binding precedent.
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respectively, in the Branchburg, New Jersey Police Department (BPD), challenge the 

District Court’s dismissal of their claims against the Township of Branchburg, New 

Jersey (the Township), the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office (SCPO), and their 

former colleague Kate Proscia-Berger. Because we agree with the District Court that 

Appellants’ claims are barred by New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine and that the

SCPO is not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND1

According to Appellants’ Complaint, after Appellants declined to recommend 

Proscia-Berger for promotion to Sergeant, she accused them of sexual harassment, 

prompting the BPD to open an investigation of Appellants and to refer the matter to the 

SCPO, where Proscia-Berger’s husband worked. At the conclusion of the SCPO’s

investigation, Crisafulli and Floyd had to choose between pleading to an administrative 

charge and retiring, or facing potential disciplinary proceedings or even criminal charges. 

Both chose to retire.

A flurry of litigation followed. Proscia-Berger sued Crisafulli, Floyd, the 

Township, and the BPD, claiming, inter alia, that they had sexually harassed and 

assaulted her and subjected her to a hostile work environment. But she settled with the

BPD, and her entire suit, including the claims against Appellants, was dismissed with 

1 Because this is an appeal of a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

we accept Crisafulli’s and Floyd’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in their favor. See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. County of Delaware, 

968 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2565 (2021). 

Thus, these facts are taken from their Complaint.
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prejudice. That same day, however, Appellants sued the Township, the SCPO, ProsciaBerger, and the BDP’s former Chief of Police,

2

claiming violations of their constitutional 

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against all defendants, and 

raising a state-law claim against Proscia-Berger for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (IIED). The District Court granted Appellees’ motions to dismiss, and this 

appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION3

Crisafulli and Floyd argue that the District Court erred in concluding (1) that their 

claims were barred by New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine, and (2) that the SCPO 

was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither argument is persuasive.

A.

Under New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine, “[n]on-joinder of claims required 

to be joined . . . shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims,” subject to certain 

exceptions. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A. The entire controversy doctrine is “New Jersey’s 

specific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional res judicata principles.” Rycoline 

Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). It 

2 The Chief was dismissed from the lawsuit on April 30, 2021.

3 The District Court had original jurisdiction over Appellants’ § 1983 claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and it had supplemental jurisdiction over the IIED claim under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the 

District Court’s dismissal de novo. Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citations omitted). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss “when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
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applies and bars a party’s subsequent suit so long as (1) “the claims against the different 

parties arise from related facts or the same transaction,” DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 

494, 502 (N.J. 1995) (citation omitted), (2) the first proceeding produced a final 

judgment, Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 888–89, and (3) the party had “a fair and 

reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated that claim in the original action,” Wadeer v. 

N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 110 A.3d 19, 27 (N.J. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Those conditions are satisfied here. First, the allegations in the Complaint arise 

out of the same facts as Proscia-Berger’s original suit. In that suit, Proscia-Berger 

accused Appellants of sexual harassment and assault. Appellants then sued for IIED and 

constitutional violations stemming from those accusations and the defendants’ handling 

of those accusations. Thus, Proscia-Berger’s and Appellants’ complaints did not merely 

rely on the same evidence; Proscia-Berger’s complaint “actually formed the basis” for 

Appellants’ lawsuit, DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 503, and thus “ar[o]se from interrelated facts,” 

id. at 504.

Second, because the state court dismissed Proscia-Berger’s claims with prejudice, 

that dismissal constituted a final judgment on the merits. See Velasquez v. Franz, 589 

A.2d 143, 148 (N.J. 1991) (citations omitted).

Finally, Appellants “had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated 

[their] claim in the original action.” DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 505 (citation omitted). While 

Appellants object that their original lawyer “continuously and repeatedly failed to . . . 

advise them” of “the Entire Controversy Doctrine’s limitations,” Opening Br. at 18–19, 

they cite no authority that makes knowledge of the doctrine the touchstone for whether 
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they had a fair and reasonable opportunity to assert their claims. The relevant question is 

whether they knew about Proscia-Berger’s alleged tortious conduct and the Township’s 

and the SCPO’s alleged abuses at the time of the original proceeding. See Wadeer, 110 

A.3d at 27; Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 662 A.2d 523, 531 (N.J. 1995).

That they did. Appellants began to look for new counsel to press their claims in 

November 2020, months before Proscia-Berger settled, and apparently, they had retained 

new counsel more than a week before the state court dismissed Proscia-Berger’s case 

with prejudice. Yet they did not press their claims during the pendency of ProsciaBerger’s action or try to stay the settlement.

Because Appellants’ claims arise from the same transaction as Proscia-Berger’s 

original suit, the dismissal of that suit was a final judgment, and Appellants had a fair and 

reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in that suit, the District Court properly 

dismissed their Complaint under the entire controversy doctrine.

B.

The District Court also was correct to dismiss Appellants’ § 1983 claim. A 

plaintiff claiming the violation of a constitutional right under § 1983 must show the 

violation “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). A state’s sovereign immunity prevents it from 

being sued under § 1983—i.e., from being a “person” subject to the statute—absent 

abrogation or waiver. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)

(citation omitted). As a result, if it was acting as the state when it allegedly violated 

Crisafulli’s and Floyd’s rights, the SCPO is not a proper defendant for purposes of 
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§ 1983. Id. at 71. If, however, the SCPO was acting as a local governmental entity, 

Appellants can proceed if their Complaint satisfies the strictures of Monell v. Department 

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978).

We have found that “county prosecutors in New Jersey can be characterized as 

having a dual or hybrid status,” conducting both state- and municipal-level duties. 

Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, “[w]hen county prosecutors 

engage in classic law enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the 

State[,] [b]ut . . . [when they perform] administrative function[s] on the local level 

entirely unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution,” they can be sued under 

§ 1983. Id. at 1505–06. To determine whether prosecutors were acting in investigative 

or administrative functions, the “complaint must be read as a whole, and its averments 

and the inferences reasonably drawn from those averments must be viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 

F.3d 850, 855 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Here, the Complaint describes the SCPO’s investigation of Proscia-Berger’s 

allegations against Appellants as “both an administrative and criminal investigation.” 

App. 27 (Compl. ¶ 20) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, it notes the BPD referred the case 

to the SCPO because the Police Chief believed that Crisafulli and Floyd might have 

committed crimes. The SCPO’s investigation thus served a classic law-enforcement 

function, not an administrative one, and the District Court correctly determined the 
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SCPO, acting as the State, was immune from § 1983 liability. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.