FIRST DIVISION

									February 9, 2004

No. 1-01-2703

In re J.W., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois

	Petitioner-Appellee,

		v.	

J.W.,

	Respondent-Appellant).

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Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County

00 JD 5031

Honorable 

Edward N. Pietrucha,

Judge Presiding

	JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

	J.W. was prosecuted under the "extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions" provision of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2000))(EJJ statute) for the stabbing of her

mother.  A jury convicted her of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(West 2000)).  The court

sentenced her to juvenile detention for a minimum of five years as required under section 5-750(2)

of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-750(2)(West 2000)) and the EJJ statute (705

ILCS 405/5-810(4)(i)(West 2000)).  It further sentenced her to an adult sentence of 35 years'

imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(West 2000)), which sentence was stayed pursuant to the EJJ

statute (705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii)(West 2000)).  

	At trial, the evidence showed that the victim, Ms. Walters, who was J.W.'s mother, and her

boyfriend Christopher Morris had lived together for five years.  In late August 2000, they moved from

their one-bedroom apartment into a two-bedroom apartment in the same complex at 1931 Prairie

Square, Schaumburg, Illinois, so that J.W., who was 13 years old at the time, could live with them. 

J.W. had previously lived with Ms. Walters' grandmother in Chicago.  Ms. Walters pressured J.W. to move to Schaumburg because she was concerned that J.W.'s friends were a negative influence on her and that J.W. was going to get pregnant while she was young.    J.W. did not want to move in

with her mother, but she felt she had no choice.  She moved to Schaumburg on Monday, August 28,

2000.

	Her first day there, J.W. made an entry in her diary about killing her mother with a knife.  She

wrote the following, striking out certain portions:

	"go and hide in the hall stab her in the back intill [sic] she dies come back in the house and call grandma.  tell her my mom said she was going out to the car to get something

that was like 20 minutes ago.  I'm going to see where she's ate because she asked me to clean my glass mirror off but I don't see the windex leave out Oh ma ma-ma	Dead

grandma. Help somebody knock on someones door help my mom's has got stabed.

Oh let me go get my folder out of her trunk while she's out their [sic] I'm about to she [sic] where she is Oh grandmama mama has got [illegible word] layene [sic] on the floor dead."

During the rest of the week, J.W. described that Ms. Walters "would wake up mad all the time" and

"holler at [J.W.] for no reason."  She explained:

	"And she'd get mad about the dishes and I don't even know how to cut the dishwasher

on.  And then she get [sic] mad about my clothes and ask me why I can't be like other people, about something with some shirts. And just wanted me to be and dress like

somebody I can't be."

Ms. Walters did not hit J.W. during the week they lived together.

	On Friday, September 1, 2000, J.W. took a knife from the kitchen and put it inside her black

purse.  That day she thought about using the knife to kill her mother in the hallway, but she "didn't

have the guts."	

	That night Ms. Walters' young cousins, nine-year-old Asia Ashley and eight-year-old Devonte

Taylor,1 spent the night at Ms. Walters' apartment.  Ashley slept with J.W. in her unfurnished bedroom that night.  On Saturday morning, September 2, 2000, Ashley and Taylor watched television

until J.W. awoke and fed them.  According to J.W., her mother got up around 1 p.m. "with a [sic] attitude" and started "hollering" at J.W. about breakfast for Ashley and Taylor.  The lights went out

in the apartment, and Ms. Walters called someone to fix the problem.  Ms. Walters showered and

dressed for a medical appointment.  Meanwhile, J.W. took the knife from her black purse and put it

in the back of her pants.  

	After she was dressed and ready, Ms. Walters went out to her Nissan Altima in the parking

lot.  Ms. Walters called back to the house for her sunglasses.  J.W., who had been playing in her room

with Ashley and Taylor, went outside.  Ashley thought she heard J.W. slide something off of a table

before going outside.

	J.W. was having second thoughts about stabbing her mother when she came outside, but she

knew her mother "was gonna holler if [J.W.] wouldn't of said nothing and came downstairs."  J.W.

approached the driver's side of her mother's car and knocked on the door.  Ms. Walters "had a [sic] attitude and she was just like, what, what."  J.W. opened the door and began stabbing her mother, first in the head, then in the arm.  J.W. and Ms. Walters struggled.  J.W. asked Ms. Walters if she

loved Morris more than she loved J.W. and J.W.'s brother, Edward.  Ms. Walters did not answer the

question.  She told J.W. to "stop."  

	At one point, Ms. Walters got the knife away from J.W. and stabbed J.W. in the hand.  Ms.

Walters, who was lying with her head near the passenger's door, opened the door and dropped the

knife to the ground.  J.W. went around the car and picked up the knife.  Ms. Walters pulled J.W.'s

hair.  J.W. stabbed her mother more, eventually stabbing her in the stomach, where the knife got

stuck.  Ms. Walters was lying on the floor, underneath the dashboard, gasping for air--breathing

"[l]ike she had asthma."  Ms. Walters scratched J.W. on the neck and said "lord, let me die.  And if

you want to kill me, you need a bigger knife."

	Fanlam Jing, a resident of 1931 Prairie Square, was in her car in the parking lot at

approximately 3 p.m. on September 2, 2000.  She noticed another car parked on her left-hand side,

about two spaces away.  A person was seated in the passenger's side.  Her first impression was that

the person was a young male with short dark hair.  However, she could only see the person's head

and was not sure whether her first impression was correct.  She heard a slight noise and felt "a little

uncomfortable and perhaps a little uneasy" when she noticed the person in the car.

	J.W. was out of the apartment for 15 to 20 minutes before Ashley and Taylor noticed her

absence.  They looked through the apartment for her, and when they were unable to find her, they

stepped out onto the apartment's balcony.  They saw Ms. Walters and J.W. inside Ms. Walters' car. 

The two appeared to be wrestling.   Ashley and Taylor threw berries at Ms. Walters' car to try to get

J.W.'s attention.  About the same time, two boys, Mike and Evan Harris, rode by on bicycles.  J.W. got out of the car and yelled that someone had stabbed her mother.  Ashley and Taylor called 911.

	J.W. went back into the apartment.  She made two calls and washed her hands and her face,

which had blood "all over" them.  She changed out of her white capri pants, which also had blood on

them.  She went into the kitchen and got a bread knife, which she took outside to the car.  Ms.

Walters was still lying on the floor, gasping for air.  Her eyes were open and her fists balled up.  J.W.

climbed into the car and tried to stab her mother some more.  Because the knife was not penetrating

well, J.W. used the knife to cut her mother, rather than to stab her.  

	Ms. Walters was still breathing when J.W. decided to go back upstairs.  J.W. put the bread

knife inside a black garbage bag with her clothes.  J.W. then took a third knife, a steak knife, from

the apartment.  When her cousins saw her getting the knife from the kitchen, she told them that she

was "gonna [sic] kill whoever stabbed [her] mother."  J.W. took the steak knife out to the car where her mother was lying, still in the same position, still gasping for air.  J.W. stabbed her mother "a little"

with the third knife "from her thighs on up."  Ms. Walters was still gasping for air but "a little slower." 

J.W. began crying and then went back upstairs and threw the knife in the kitchen.  One of her cousins

picked up the knife and threw it in the garbage can.      

	At 3:57 p.m., the Schaumburg police and fire departments received a call regarding a stabbing

at Walden Woods Apartments, at 1931 Prairie Square.  Paramedics Steven Lafin and Eric Marto

arrived at the scene and were directed by two boys on bicycles to a car in the parking lot.  Lafin

looked inside the car and saw "an African-American female with her upper body, her head and chest

on the passenger's side with her head down towards the floor on the passenger's side with her feet

up on the driver's side seat."  Officer Mike Carroll, a Schaumburg police officer, who arrived at about the same time, "observed the female [occupant] slumped over from driver side into the passenger seat

near the floor board area passenger seat of the vehicle."  There were large amounts of blood in the

interior of the car, and some  had leaked from the car onto the ground.  A black handle was

protruding from Ms. Walters' abdomen.     

	The paramedics removed Ms. Walters from the car.  She was still breathing, but she had no

pulse.  She had "multiple lacerations and stab wounds to the throat, the chest area, the left forearm

had multiple lacerations to the front side of her forearm, both hands had stab wounds."  At one point,

her heart stopped, but the paramedics were able to get her heart beating again.  They transported Ms.

Walters to Northwest Community Hospital, where she was treated by Dr. Robert Rao. 

	When Rao, a general and trauma surgeon, first encountered Ms. Walters in the emergency

room at Northwest Community Hospital, she had no vital signs and "was dead or very close to dead." 

	"[S]he had multiple stab wounds, especially in the arms.  Her arms looked sort of like

hamburger. ***  With large amounts of blood coming out of both arms.  She had

multiple little stab wounds to the chest and abdomen.  And there was a large knife

sticking out of her abdomen or the handle sticking out of the abdomen.  And she had

a tube in her neck, a tracheostomy tube that was breathing for her." 

Rao and other doctors were able to get Ms. Walters' pulse back and her heart beating again, but only

for about 10 minutes.  Ms. Walters was pronounced dead at 5:34 p.m.  At some point, Rao removed

the knife from Ms. Walters' abdomen.  He did not suffer any cuts while doing so.    

 	In the parking lot at 1931 Prairie Square, Carroll noticed three children nearby.  One of them was J.W.; she was crying. "[H]er shirt had blood on it," front and back.  She also had cuts on her hands.  She told Carroll and Schaumburg police detective Vince Liberio that she did not know who

had hurt her mother.  She said "she had seen a female -- female teenager approximately 14 years of

age running westbound from the area of the vehicle when she had returned from the apartment to

retrieve sunglasses for her mother."  J.W. requested to use the restroom, and Carroll took her into

the apartment.  

	Inside the apartment, J.W. led Carroll to a hallway bathroom, where, "on the tile floor[,] there

were what appeared to be diluted blood droplets on the tile floor."  Carroll did not allow J.W. to enter

that bathroom; instead, J.W. used the bathroom adjacent to the master bedroom.  Carroll did a

cursory search of the rest of the apartment and "observed an open garbage can basket *** on the

kitchen floor," on top of which a bloody knife was lying.  While in the apartment, J.W. removed the

bread knife from the black garbage bag in her bedroom and put it in the pillow case of her pillow. 

Carroll and J.W. left the apartment, and the apartment was sealed off. 

	At approximately 4:30 p.m., on September 2, 2000, Karen Brzezicki, a paramedic with the

Schaumburg fire department, arrived at the scene in a second ambulance.  Brzezicki examined J.W.

and noticed "lacerations on her right hand down the center of her palm.  On her left hand she had

another laceration toward the outside of her hand *** by her small finger.  She also had minor

lacerations to her face toward *** her chin area."  Additionally, J.W. had an abrasion on her left arm. 

Brzezicki and her partner bandaged J.W.'s hands.  Carroll rode inside the ambulance with J.W. while

she was transported to Alexian Brother's Medical Center for treatment of her hands.  

	At the hospital, Hope Carroll, the triage nurse, did not notice any abrasions or lacerations on

J.W.'s face.  J.W. received seven stitches in her left hand and three stitches in her right hand.  Schaumburg youth officer Mike Degiulio went to Alexian Brothers Medical Center to meet with

J.W., who "was the number one witness to this crime."  He took limited custody of her because she

had no family present.  J.W. told Degiulio that she did not know who had hurt her mother.  Degiulio

took J.W. to the Schaumburg police department where she remained until her maternal relatives

arrived at approximately 11:30 p.m.  That night J.W. stayed at her maternal great grandmother's

house in Chicago. 

	Morris, who had been in Crystal Lake, Illinois, for a softball game and a barbecue on

September 2, 2000, went to the Schaumburg police department immediately upon receiving a

message from the police that evening.  He was informed that Ms. Walters had been killed.  He

consented to a search of his vehicle and his apartment. 

	On September 3, 2000, Thamrong Chira, a forensic pathologist with the Cook County medical

examiner's office, performed the autopsy on Ms. Walters.  Chira noticed "123 incise and puncture

wounds and two of the abrasion wound [sic]" and 87 stab wounds.  Ms. Walters had defensive wounds on her hands, arms, and legs.  The wounds were consistent with the knife that was recovered

from Ms. Walters' abdomen and the two that were recovered from her apartment.  Chira opined that

it was possible that the wounds were inflicted by "a 13 year old girl approximately 5 [feet] tall, 100

pounds."  Chira determined the cause of death to be "multiple stab and incise wounds" and the

manner of death to be "homicide." 

	In the afternoon on September 3, 2000, J.W. and her brother, Edward, were brought to the

Schaumburg police department.  J.W. was given food.  Then, she was interviewed by Liberio and

Degiulio.  Again, she told them that she did not know who stabbed her mother.  They took her outside to the parking lot, and she demonstrated how she found her mother.      

	Morris again consented to the search of his apartment, and at 3:40 p.m., Schaumburg

Detectives Czerniak and Somski went to the apartment to "look for anything that may be related to

the homicide."  They found "a small knife" in the dishwasher.  They found "a larger bread type knife"

that appeared to have blood on it inside a pillow case in J.W.'s bedroom.  Czerniak also discovered

J.W.'s diary inside her bedroom closet.  Czerniak contacted Liberio about what had been found in the

apartment.  The items were brought to the police department. 

	Some of J.W.'s maternal family members were contacted and arrived at the police department

between 9 and 9:30 p.m.  At approximately the same time, Assistant State's Attorney Mary Beth

Kinnerk arrived.  She met with J.W. and told J.W. that she was a prosecutor and was not J.W.'s

attorney.  She "Mirandized" J.W. by reading each of the Miranda rights and having J.W. explain what each meant.  She further explained to J.W. that she could be tried as an adult for the murder of her

mother.  J.W. indicated that she understood her rights and that she could be tried as an adult.  She

signed a waiver of rights.  

	Kinnerk asked J.W. if she wanted to see her maternal relatives.  When J.W. said she did not

want to see those relatives, Kinnerk asked whether there were any relatives she wanted to see.  J.W.

said she would like to see Jerilene Mitchell, whom she called Aunt Babs; her father, Gilbert Mitchell;

or her paternal grandmother, Arlene Mitchell.

	J.W.'s father was contacted by telephone.  He gave permission for continued conversations

with J.W.  After arrangements were made for police cars to pick up Jerilene and  Gilbert Mitchell,

Kinnerk asked J.W. if she wanted to continue talking or if she wanted to wait for one of her paternal relatives to arrive before continuing the conversation.  J.W. said she would continue speaking with

Kinnerk.  At that time, J.W. confessed to stabbing her mother.  Kinnerk asked J.W. whether she

would be willing to make the statement again so that it could be videotaped.  J.W. said she would. 

	Between 12:30 and 1 a.m., Jerilene Mitchell arrived at the police department.  J.W.'s father

did not come to the police department.  When he was told that Jerilene Mitchell was on her way to

the police department, Gilbert Mitchell said he did not need to be there as well.  Jerilene Mitchell

spoke with Kinnerk, Liberio, and Degiulio, who informed her that J.W. had agreed to give a

videotaped statement. Jerilene Mitchell was allowed to see J.W.  Timothy Bennett, a shorthand

reporter and videographer, saw Jerilene Mitchell and J.W. together while he prepared the video

equipment.  He did not hear whether they were saying anything, but he saw their mouths moving.

	At about 2:30 a.m., Bennett began taping J.W.'s statement.  J.W., Kinnerk, Degiulio, and

Jerilene Mitchell were in the room and are visible on the videotape.  Only Kinnerk and J.W. spoke

during the taping.  Kinnerk first reviewed J.W.'s rights with her.  Then, J.W. again confessed to killing

her mother.   

	Several days later, on September 7, 2000, Morris consented to another search of his

apartment.  He also went to the apartment that day and saw that three knives were missing from the

apartment.  They were the three knives that J.W. had used in stabbing her mother. 

	At trial, the State's evidence consisted of a significant amount of physical evidence, including

photographs of the car after Ms. Walters' body was removed, photographs of "reddish stains [found]

on the wall and floor" inside the apartment, photographs of the victim, the three knives that J.W. used

to stab her mother, the diary, J.W.'s bloodstained clothes, and various items recovered from inside and around the car.  The State also played a videotape of the crime scene and a videotape of J.W.'s

confession for the jury.  

	J.W.'s palm prints were found on the door of Ms. Walters' car and her fingerprints on one of

the knives she used in the stabbing.  Her blood was found on a black garbage bag, the bread knife,

and one of the kitchen drawers in the apartment.  J.W. could not be excluded as a contributor to

bloodstains on one of the car's door handles and on the steak knife.  Morris' DNA was not found on

any of the items tested by the crime lab.

	Jean S. Brundage, a document examiner with the Illinois State Police Crime Lab, compared

the handwriting on the diary page that described the killing with a writing exemplar given by J.W. 

Brundage's "findings were inconclusive."  She "found isolated similarities as well as discrepancies

between the known and the questioned writing[;] the absence of directly comparable repititions [sic] as well as the wide rang [sic] of variations within the questioned writing preclude[s] a definite conclusion."  Brundage requested another writing exemplar.  Her examination was still inconclusive. 

She noted, however, that the samples "were more carefully written than what the questioned writing

was. *** [I]t [sic] was with more control.  There wasn't as much variation as far as the slant, the size or the formation of some of the letters."  A request for additional writing exemplars went

unanswered.  

	At the close of all of the evidence, the jury found J.W. guilty of first degree murder.  After

a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced J.W. to juvenile detention.  He also imposed a 35-year

adult sentence, which was stayed pursuant to the EJJ statute (705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii)(West

2000)).

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 removed here.]

[The preceding material is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23].

	J.W. argues that the EJJ statute is unconstitutional because it undermines the right to a jury trial "by insulating some factual issues from the jury, and because it fails to apply the reasonable doubt

standard, where constitutionally, it must be applied."  Specifically, J.W. complains that the EJJ statute, like the statute declared unconstitutional in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), allows for an enhancement of penalty based on a fact that should be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  That fact is whether the case qualifies for prosecution

under the EJJ statute.

	In response, the State contends that the EJJ statute does not violate Apprendi because it is not an enhancement provision.  The State urges us to follow In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276 (2002), in which the Second District Appellate Court found that the EJJ statute does not violate

Apprendi.  J.W. replies that Matthew M. was incorrectly decided.

	In Apprendi, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that allowed the sentence of a defendant convicted of a second degree offense to be enhanced beyond that

usually allowed for a second degree offense based on a judge's finding that the " 'defendant in

committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because

of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S.Ct. at 2351, quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.

1999-2000).  It found that the New Jersey statute was "an unacceptable departure from the jury

tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system" because it allowed a defendant

to be sentenced in excess of what was authorized by the jury's verdict.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 459, 120 S. Ct. at 2366.  The Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.  

	In the only case considering the constitutionality of the EJJ statute in light of Apprendi, the Second District Appellate Court held that the EJJ statute was not unconstitutional under Apprendi "[b]ecause the trial court's determination to designate a proceeding as an EJJ prosecution does not

adjudicate the minor's guilt."  Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 289.  Importantly, the court noted that "[a]lthough *** in designating a proceeding as an EJJ prosecution, the trial court may make findings

that expose [respondent] to a greater sanction, he has no due process right to have a jury make those

findings."  Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 289.  The court explained: "As a minor respondent has no constitutional right to be prosecuted through the juvenile court system, the legislature's decision

to require the imposition of a conditional adult sentence in certain instances does not result in a

constitutional deprivation of due process."  Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 290. 

	We agree with the court in Matthew M., that Apprendi is not applicable under the circumstances of this case.  As a general rule, minors do not have the right to a jury trial in

delinquency cases. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101(3)(West 2000) ("Minors shall not have the right to a jury

trial unless specifically provided by this Article"); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 29 L.Ed. 2d 647, 661, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986 (1971) (plurality op.) ("[W]e conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement"); In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 318-19 (2001) (while other procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings apply in juvenile cases, the right to a jury trial does not).  Moreover, a juvenile does not have a constitutional

right to a juvenile adjudication and juvenile sentence in lieu of a criminal prosecution and adult

sentence. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 223 (1991) ("[J]uveniles have neither a common law nor a constitutional right to adjudication under the Juvenile Court Act").  Our courts have applied

similar reasoning in holding that transfer provisions, which also subject juveniles to adult sentences,

are not unconstitutional under Apprendi.  See People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690-91 (2002); People v. Beck, 339 Ill. App. 3d 413, 418 (2003). We find no reason to depart from this reasoning.

	Moreover, unlike the statute in Apprendi, the EJJ determination does not increase the allowable penalty for murder based upon a judge's independent finding with regard to additional

elements of the crime.  J.W. was convicted of first degree murder, which requires proof that a person

killed another without lawful justification and that

	"in performing the acts which cause the death:  

	(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or

knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or 

	(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm

to that individual or another; or 

	(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree

murder."  720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(West 2000).  

If the State succeeds in proving these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge has discretion

in sentencing the offender to 20 to 60 years' imprisonment.  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b)(West 2000). 

In this case, the jury found that the State proved each of these required elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  J.W. does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence.  The EJJ statute does not modify or

change the elements of first degree murder in any way.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2000)). 

Thus, the EJJ statute does not violate J.W.'s due process rights under Apprendi.

	J.W. next contends that the EJJ statute is unconstitutionally vague because it "does not

provide a juvenile with proper notice as to what actions by the minor will result in a violation of the

minor's juvenile sentence" and it does not "provide a judge with any guidance or standards for

determining when a violation of the conditions of the juvenile sentence should result in the imposition

of the adult sentence."  Particularly, J.W. complains of the statute's failure to define the "conditions"

of the juvenile sentence and the term "offense." 

	The State first contends that J.W. has no standing to contest the constitutionality of this

provision because her "claimed injury derives from her challenge to the provisions contained in the

EJJ [statute] which detail when an adult sentence will be served.  Respondent has yet to suffer any

injury, however, because she has yet to have her adult sentence imposed and may never have that

adult sentence imposed."  Regardless, the State contends, the statute is not vague.  It claims that use

of the term "offense" means criminal offense, and "[t]o assume or argue otherwise is absurd."  The

State also argues that the term "conditions" is not vague because "it is evident that the juvenile court-- in individual cases--actually imposes the 'conditions of the juvenile sentence.' " (Emphasis in original.)

	The provision at issue provides:

		"When it appears that a minor convicted in an extended jurisdiction juvenile

prosecution under subsection (1) has violated the conditions of his or her sentence,

or is alleged to have committed a new offense upon the filing of a petition to revoke the stay, the court may, without notice, issue a warrant for the arrest of the minor. 

After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor

committed a new offense, the court shall order execution of the previously imposed

adult criminal sentence.  After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the minor committed a violation of his or her sentence other than by a

new offense, the court may order execution of the previously imposed adult criminal

sentence or may continue him or her on the existing juvenile sentence with or without

modifying or enlarging the conditions.  Upon revocation of the stay of the adult

criminal sentence and imposition of that sentence, the minor's extended jurisdiction

juvenile status shall be terminated.  The on-going jurisdiction over the minor's case

shall be assumed by the adult criminal court and juvenile court jurisdiction shall be

terminated and a report of the imposition of the adult sentence shall be sent to the

Department of State Police."  705 ILCS 405/5-810(6)(West 2000).

	"The general rule is that courts will not consider the validity of a statutory provision unless

the person challenging the provision is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so

pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid."  People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 482 (2003).  Our inquiries into the constitutionality of statutes are limited to the extent required by the particular

case, and we will not formulate a rule broader than necessitated by the circumstances of that case. 

See P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 223 (holding that "gang-transfer" statute was constitutional).  Thus, we first consider whether J.W. has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the revocation of stay

provision of the EJJ statute.  

	"The doctrine of standing is intended to insure that issues are raised and argued only by those

parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy."  People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 409 (2003).  It requires that the person has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury

as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute.  See Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 409.  Standing is determined on "a case-by-case basis."  Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 409. 

	In this case, the trial court sentenced J.W. to a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence;

however, it stayed her adult sentence pursuant to the EJJ statute.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-

810(4)(ii)(West 2000).  The portion of the EJJ statute that J.W. challenges provides for the

revocation of the stay and the execution of the adult sentence.  See 705 ILCS 405/5-810(6)(West

2000).  She directs us to a case from the Supreme Court of Montana in support of her standing.

	In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 30, 951 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1997), the Supreme Court of Montana considered a number of constitutional challenges to its Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act, which

provides that under certain circumstances juvenile offenders may be sentenced to a juvenile sentence

and an adult sentence, which is stayed " 'on the condition that the youth not violate the provisions of

the disposition order and not commit a new offense.' " S.L.M., 287 Mont. At 30, 951 P.2d at 1369, quoting Mont. Code Ann. §41-5-1604(1)(b).  Five juveniles contested the constitutionality of the

statute, claiming that it violated "equal protection by subjecting them to a longer period of

incarceration than that permitted for an adult offender."  S.L.M., 287 Mont. At 31, 951 P. 2d at 1370.  The court found that the juveniles had standing to contest the constitutionality of their adult

sentences.  S.L.M., 287 Mont. At 31, 951 P. 2d at 1370.  In that case, however, adult sentences had been executed against three of the five juveniles who had violated the provisions of their disposition orders or had committed a new offense.  S.L.M., 287 Mont. At 26-28, 951 P.2d at 1367-68.  Moreover, at issue in that case was whether imposition of the sentence, rather than execution of it,

violated the juveniles' equal protection rights.     

	In this case, J.W.'s sentence has been imposed and she does not contest the constitutionality

of imposition of the sentence on equal protection grounds as in S.L.M.  Nor does she contest imposition of the sentence on vagueness grounds.  Instead she contests revocation of the stay on

vagueness grounds.  However, under the law in this state, her claim is premature and we will not

consider it.

	In People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 108 (1975), the supreme court reviewed an appellate court decision, which held that section 5-8-1(e) and a portion of section 3-3-9(a)(3)(i) of the Unified Code

of Corrections (now see 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(a)(3)(i), 5-8-1(e)(West 2000)) were unconstitutional

because their terms provided that "in the event of revocation of [a mandatory] parole, a defendant

could be incarcerated for periods which in the aggregate exceeded the maximum of the indeterminate

sentence imposed by the [circuit] court."  Wills, 61 Ill. 2d at 109.  The supreme court reversed that portion of the appellate court's holding, finding that the constitutionality of the provisions was not

properly before the court because the defendant was not eligible for parole at the time and

consequently, "there [was] no basis for application of the statutory provisions which the appellate

court held invalid."  Wills, 61 Ill. 2d at 109.  

	In People v. Mengedoht, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1086 (1975), the court considered the same mandatory parole provision and similarly recognized that where the defendant was not yet eligible

for parole, "the situation had not developed to the point of parole and no injury had yet occurred."  	In People v. Therriault, 42 Ill. App. 3d 876, 890 (1976), the court also considered a mandatory parole provision and similarly concluded that the defendant's constitutional claim was not

properly before the court because "the constitutionality of the statute in question [would not be] ripe

for decision until parole [had] actually been revoked."  Likewise, in this case, J.W.'s claim is premature until a petition to revoke the stay is filed in accordance with the EJJ statute.  705 ILCS

405/8-810(6)(West 2000).

	J.W. next argues that even if the EJJ statute is constitutional, the trial court erred in

designating her proceeding as an EJJ prosecution because J.W. was only 13 years old at the time of

the offense and had no history of delinquency.  The State responds that the trial court appropriately

considered and weighed all relevant factors and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court

to designate these proceedings as an EJJ prosecution.

	The EJJ statute provides that upon a petition by the State, alleging that the minor committed

a crime when she was 13 years of age or older that would have been a felony if committed by an

adult, if the trial court determines there is probable cause to believe the allegations, "there is a

rebuttable presumption that the proceeding shall be designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile

proceeding," and

	"[t]he judge shall enter an order designating the proceeding as an extended

jurisdiction juvenile proceeding unless the judge makes a finding based on clear and

convincing evidence that sentencing under the Chapter V of the Unified Code of

Corrections would not be appropriate for the minor based on an evaluation of the

following factors:

	(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;

	(ii) The minor's history of delinquency;

	(iii) The age of the minor;

	(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the alleged offense;

	(v) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;

	(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the

alleged offense.

	In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of

the alleged offense and the minor's prior record of delinquency than to other factors

listed in this subsection."  705 ILCS 405/5-810(b)(West 2000).

	At the hearing on the State's petition for an EJJ prosecution, the parties stipulated that J.W.

was 13 years old at the time of the offense and that the alleged offense, murder, would be a felony

if committed by an adult.  Degiulio testified that the victim was alive at the scene of the stabbing on

September 2, 2000, but was pronounced dead at Northwest Community Hospital at 5:34 p.m. the

same day.  The victim died of multiple stab and incise wounds, nearly 200 such wounds.  On

September 4, 2003, at 2:38 a.m., J.W. implicated herself in her mother's death.

	"She indicated that she had stabbed and caused the death of her mother.  It was also

indicated that prior to this, she had placed some writings in a diary that had indicated

her intent or plan, and this plan was ultimately carried out to stab and kill her mother."

J.W. used a deadly weapon.  In fact, she used three knives in the course of stabbing her mother. 

Degiulio also stated that J.W. had no prior record of delinquency.  On cross-examination, Degiulio stated that handwriting exemplars obtained from J.W. were inconclusively compared with the

handwriting in the diary.  He also admitted knowing that there were fingerprints found in the car that

did not belong to J.W. or to the victim.  However, J.W.'s fingerprints were on at least one of the

knives.

	The defense offered the statement of Ashley as it was recorded by Assistant State's Attorney

Lawrence M. Lykowski on September 12, 2000, at 4:50 p.m.  Ashley, a fourth grader, reported that

she was at the victim's house on Saturday, September 2, 2000.  At one point, the victim left the house

wearing a denim shirt and a hat.  The victim then called "up to [J.W.] and asked her to bring down

her sunglasses."  Ashley heard J.W. "grab something from the table."  Then, she heard the door close

as J.W. went outside.  Twenty minutes later, Ashley could not find J.W. so she went out on the

balcony.  She saw the victim's car.  

	"[S]he looked through the rear window and could see into [Ms. Walters'] car. ***

[S]he saw [J.W.] in the front driver's seat of the car, and she could see that [Ms.

Walters] was in the front passenger area. *** [I]t looked like [Ms. Walters] and

[J.W.] were wrestling.  It looked like they were rolling around."  

At some point, J.W. noticed Ashley and Taylor standing on the balcony.  She yelled to them that

somebody had killed her mother.  Ashley called 911 at that time.  J.W. came back into the house "and

got a knife from the block on the counter."  J.W. said, " 'I am going to kill whoever killed by mother.'

" J.W. made a telephone call and washed her hands "because she had cuts on her hands." 

	The trial court granted the State's motion and designated the proceedings as an EJJ

prosecution.  The court considered "the seriousness of the alleged offense, the crime of murder.  That the minor does, in fact, have no history of delinquency.  That the minor was at the young age of 13

years old."  The court also considered J.W.'s confession, that she committed the crime alone, and that

there was evidence that the crime was premeditated.

	Admitting that no cases have analyzed a court's decision to designate a proceeding as an EJJ

prosecution, J.W. relies on a case interpreting the juvenile transfer statute in support of her argument

that the trial court's EJJ designation was improper because she was only 13 at the time she committed

the crime and had no history of delinquency.  In People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987), the minor was charged with intentional murder, knowing murder, and felony murder in each of two deaths,

along with two counts of home invasion, two counts of residential burglary, two counts of robbery,

and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault.  Upon the State's petition, the case was

transferred to criminal court.  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 4.  Ultimately, the minor was found guilty on all counts.  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 6.  On appeal, the minor contested the adequacy of the transfer hearing, specifically on the grounds that "(1) no consideration was given to whether or not his best interests

or the best interests of society necessitated that he be imprisoned for the remainder of his life [as

required upon conviction of two counts of intentional murder] and (2) no consideration was given

to his social and personal history, particularly as this bears on his rehabilitative potential." Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 6-7.  

	The court recognized that "[w]here the juvenile judge considers evidence on the various

statutory factors and evidence on any other relevant matters as provided in [the transfer statute], the

resulting decision is a product of sound judicial discretion which will not be disturbed on review."  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 14.  However, the court found that the juvenile judge did not "consider whether or not imprisonment of the defendant for the duration of his natural life was in his best interests or

was required for the security of society" as necessitated under the transfer statute.  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 16.  Thus, the court held that the transfer hearing was inadequate.  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 16.  As an alternative ground for finding the hearing inadequate, the court found that the trial court failed "to

investigate the history of the defendant, especially as it related to his potential for rehabilitation." 

Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 16. 

	In this case, there is no evidence that the trial court failed to consider J.W.'s age or her lack of previous delinquency.  In fact, the court's ruling affirmatively states that it considered both factors

along with the other relevant statutory factors.  One of the factors that the EJJ statute allows the

juvenile court to give greater weight is the "seriousness of the alleged offense."  The trial court did

so in this case.  Accordingly, its decision "is a product of sound judicial discretion which will not be

disturbed on review."  Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 14; see also People v. D.B., 202 Ill. App. 3d 194, 200 (1990).  

[The following material is nNonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 removed here.].

	J.W. next claims that she was denied her rights to a fair and impartial jury and the effective

assistance of counsel based on certain actions during voir dire.  J.W. complains that four jurors were improperly seated on her jury.  She further complains that a prospective alternate juror, who was not

seated on the jury or selected as an alternate, should have been excused for cause.  J.W.

acknowledges that defense counsel failed to properly preserve her objections to three of the jurors. 

However, she contends that her trial counsel was ineffective, and we should not apply waiver to bar

her claims.  J.W. also claims that she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury because the trial court failed to sufficiently question and instruct the jury pool following one perspective juror's in

camera admission that he had discussed the case with other prospective jurors.  

	The State argues that J.W. was not denied the effective assistance of counsel during voir dire.  Further, it claims that she was not denied a fair trial because the allegedly objectionable jurors

unequivocally stated that they could be fair and impartial. The State claims that the trial court

appropriately and effectively inquired of each prospective juror regarding their knowledge and

conversations regarding the case, that this questioning did not reveal any taint on the jury by

discussions between the prospective jurors, and that the trial judge properly instructed the jurors not

to discuss the case once they were sworn.

	Defense counsel did not challenge Phillipson or Silvers for cause.  Nor did defense counsel

exercise peremptory challenges to prevent Garvey and Griffin from being seated on the jury.  In fact,

all four jurors served on the jury.  Yet, the defense had peremptory challenges remaining at the time

each juror was accepted.  Thus, J.W.'s claims of error with respect to these jurors are waived and

reversal is not required.  See People v. Pendleton, 279 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675 (1996)("[T]he settled principle in Illinois is that a court's failure to remove a juror for cause is grounds for reversal only if

the defense has exercised all of its peremptory challenges and an objectionable juror was allowed to

sit on the jury"); People v. Cedeno, 263 Ill. App. 3d 257, 262 (1994)("[B]ecause defendant had two peremptory challenges remaining at the time the jury was empaneled, he has waived his claim against

the denial of these two motions to excuse for cause").

	With regard to jurors Phillipson and Silvers, however, J.W. claims that her trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to challenge them for cause.  In order to show that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel, J.W. must show that her "counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and *** that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 560 (2002), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698 (1984).  She has failed to show either.  

	When examining an attorney's conduct to determine whether it was ineffective assistance, we

consider the conduct "at the time of the attorney's conduct."  People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 303 (1994).  We presume that the challenged actions were the product of sound trial strategy, and it is

the defendant's burden to overcome this presumption.  Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 561.  Specifically, our courts have held that "defense counsel's conduct during jury voir dire involves matters of trial strategy that generally are not subject to scrutiny under Strickland."  Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562; see also Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d 411, 428 (2001).  In this case, J.W. presents no evidence to rebut the presumption that her trial counsel's actions were the result of sound trial strategy.  

	Regardless, even if J.W. could show that her attorney's actions during voir dire were not the product of sound trial strategy, she would still have to show clear bias or prejudice by a juror that

affected the outcome of the trial.  See Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 562; Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 428- 29. In order to do so she must show "the actual existence of a disqualifying state of mind as will raise

the presumption of partiality."  People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 138 (1992).  An equivocal response by a prospective juror is not enough where the prospective juror later states that he will try

to disregard his bias.  Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d at 297. "The juror's entire voir dire examination must be considered."  Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 422 (2001). 

	In this case, the voir dire of each contested juror revealed that each could keep a fair and open mind.  Significantly, each juror affirmed an understanding of certain basic principles of law such a the

State's burden, J.W.'s right not to testify, and the presumption of innocence.  Further, any equivocal

answers given by these jurors were followed by statements indicating that the juror would attempt

to put aside any biases.  The voir dire of Phillipson, for instance, revealed that he had been a victim of a burglary.  Although he initially responded that he was not sure whether anything about that

incident would cause him to be unfair to either side, he agreed that he could put aside his feelings

about that prior incident and decide the case based on the evidence adduced during trial. 

Additionally, although Phillipson volunteered that he was working with his girlfriend and her son on

anger management issues when the judge asked whether there were any additional facts that might

affect his ability to be fair and impartial, Phillipson affirmed that he could put his personal experiences

aside and decide the case based solely on the evidence.

	Likewise, Silvers, who indicated that she was acquainted with a number of judges (although

initially contending that she could not be certain whether any conversations with one of those judges

would affect her ability to be impartial), agreed to put aside those discussions and decide the case

based on the evidence.  Under these circumstances, J.W. has failed to show that either of these jurors

was clearly biased or prejudiced against her.  Accordingly, we find no ineffectiveness of counsel.

	J.W.'s last challenge to an individual juror is to Wehrle, an Assistant State's Attorney, who

was not seated on her jury.  She claims that the trial court erred in not excusing Wehrle from service

as an alternate juror for cause because of Wehrle's position in the State's Attorney's Office. 

	Defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse Wehrle. As a general rule, "a defendant may not challenge on appeal the denial of a motion to excuse for cause a juror who is

eventually excluded by use of a peremptory challenge, for he has suffered no prejudice."  People v. Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 258, 274 (1993); see also People v. Johnson, 162 Ill. App. 3d 952, 955 (1987).  An exception to this rule exists, however, where the defendant was "forced to accept another

objectionable juror after he had exhausted his peremptory challenges because the court refused to

excuse the venire member challenged earlier for cause."  People v. Novak, 242 Ill. App. 3d 836, 856- 57 (1993).  In this case, J.W. does not allege that she was forced to accept another objectionable

juror because of the trial court's failure to excuse Wehrle for cause.  Moreover, the only jurors seated

after Wehrle was excused by peremptory challenge were alternate jurors who never participated in

the deliberations.  Thus, no prejudice resulted from the failure to excuse Wehrle for cause, and we

need not consider the merits of J.W.'s claim.

	J.W.'s final contention regarding jury selection is that the trial court failed to properly question

jurors regarding their discussions about the case.  During voir dire, two prospective jurors informed the trial court that they had participated in discussions regarding the case with other prospective

jurors earlier in the day.  However, both jurors indicated that the discussions would not affect their

abilities to be fair and impartial.  Defense counsel requested further questioning of the jurors about

the discussions, however, the judge denied that request.  J.W. claims denial of the request was error. 

	J.W. relies on People v. Cain, 36 Ill. 2d 589 (1967), for support.  That case, however, dealt with trial publicity and is not applicable.  In any event, the trial court asked each prospective juror

about whether the juror had read or heard anything about the case.  If a juror responded in the

affirmative, the trial court conducted further inquiry outside the presence of the venire.  We cannot say that this method of voir dire was an abuse of discretion, especially considering that defense counsel did not submit any additional voir dire questions regarding discussions between jurors.  See People v. Porter, 111 Ill. 2d 386, 401 (1986).

	In her reply brief, J.W. reminds us that the jury was selected over the course of two days and

that a juror's negative response to a question about exposure to the case meant nothing "if the

discussions amongst the venire members took place after that juror had been questioned by the

court."  However, there is no evidence that jurors participated in any discussions regarding the case

after they were selected and prior to being sworn, when the trial court instructed them not to discuss

the case until their deliberations.  Regardless, "[a] verdict will not be set aside where it is obvious that

no prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury."  People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 132 (1988).  In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the two juror's affirmations that the

discussions with other jurors did not lead them to any conclusions regarding guilt and would not

affect their abilities to be fair and impartial, we cannot say that prejudice resulted in this case. 

	J.W. also claims that the trial court should have instructed the venire members not to discuss

the case once it learned that they had.  Defense counsel, however, never requested such an

instruction, and in failing to do so, waived this claim.  See People v. Flores, 282 Ill. App. 3d 861, 864 (1996).  J.W. was not denied the right to a fair and impartial jury.      

	J.W. claims that the 35 year adult sentence was excessive and ignored her potential for

rehabilitation.  The State first claims that J.W. waived this claim by not objecting at the sentencing

hearing or filing a motion for reconsideration of sentence.  Alternatively, the State contends, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing J.W. to a 35 year adult sentence because the court weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors appropriately.  J.W. admits that she waived this issue

by not filing a written motion in the trial court but urges us to review her claim under the plain error

doctrine because it affects her substantial rights.  

	Our supreme court has held that sentencing issues must be raised in the trial court in order

to be considered on appeal.  People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997).  However, we may consider the waived issue under the plain error doctrine.  See People v. Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 523, 534 (2001).  The doctrine allows us to decide a waived issue in two instances: (1) where the evidence is

closely balanced, or (2) where the error " 'is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused

was denied a fair trial.' " Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 534-35.  In this case, the evidence was not closely balanced.  Nor did the trial judge's sentencing order deny J.W. a fair trial.  Accordingly, J.W.'s claim

that her sentence is excessive is waived and does not rise to the level of plain error.    

	Waiver aside, we give "great deference to the trial court's judgment regarding sentencing

because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better

opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the 'cold' record." 

People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999).  The trial judge has great discretion "to fashion an appropriate sentence within the statutory limits" based on the circumstances of each case, considering

factors such as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social

environment, habits, and age and the nature of the offense.  Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 53, 55.  On review, we must "proceed with great caution" and avoid substituting our judgment for that of the trial court

merely because we would have weighed the factors differently.  Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 53.  We review the trial judge's sentencing order for an abuse of discretion.  See Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 532.  "A sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the

spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense."  Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54.  Further, 

	"a claim that a sentence is excessive must be based on the particular facts and

circumstances of that case.  If a sentence is appropriate given the particular facts of

that case, it may not be attacked on the ground that a lesser sentence was imposed in

a similar, but unrelated case."  Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 62.

	At the sentencing hearing, the State presented a victim impact statement from Amber

Archibald, a first cousin of the victim.  The defense presented a letter from Frankie Swoope of the

Nancy B. Jefferson Alternative School.  They presented a second letter from Georgio Marty, a

counselor at the juvenile Counseling Detention Center.  Nicole Joseph, a caseworker at the Cook

County Juvenile Detention Center, testified regarding J.W.'s positive behavior, leadership roles, and

initiative while at the center.  Cheretha Gaston, a counselor at the Cook County Temporary Detention

Center, explained that J.W. conformed to discipline codes "[w]ith no problems" and that J.W. was

"very respectful." 

	Natalie Hilton, Gilbert Mitchell, Annie Jones, and Carolyn Lekkowski, one of J.W.'s

grandmothers, testified that they visited J.W. regularly and would continue to do so if she were

sentenced to the Department of Corrections.  They also requested leniency with regard to J.W.'s adult

sentence.

	Reverend Leroy Sanders, pastor of Kennerwelt Church of Youth, where the Walters family

and J.W. were members, described J.W. as "sort of a quiet person," who never caused him any trouble and worked in the youth fellowship, the choir, and with other children.  J.W. also read a

statement to the court.  

	In announcing its sentence, the trial court considered the social investigation prepared by the

juvenile probation officer, the adult probation department investigative report/sentencing report, the

psychological evaluation prepared by Forensic Clinical Services, the victim impact statement written

by Amber Archibald, the testimony of the witnesses, and the arguments of the parties.  The trial court

also recognized that its duty was to "balance the interest of the minor with the interest of the public." 

The trial court made a detailed oral ruling in which it outlined the factors it considered in mitigation

(including J.W.'s lack of a criminal background and potential for rehabilitation) and in aggravation

(including the brutality of the crime).  Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing J.W.

[The preceding material is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23].

	Finally, J.W. argues that the dispositional order and the mittimus should be amended to reflect conviction of only one count of first degree murder.  The State agrees, and we do as well.  "A

defendant cannot be convicted of more than one murder arising out of the same physical act."  People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 377 (1990)(vacating four of six murder convictions because only two homicides occurred).  In this case, there was but one homicide, yet both the dispositional order

and the mittimus reflect convictions for first degree murder under sections 9-1(a)(2) and 9-1(a)(1)

of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)(West 2000)).  "When multiple murder convictions have been entered for the same act, the less culpable convictions must be vacated."  Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d at 377.  Thus, the dispositional order and the mittimus should be amended to reflect only

one conviction for murder under section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)(West

2000)).

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm J.W.'s conviction for first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)(West 2000)) and her sentence under the EJJ

statute (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2000)).  We order that the dispositional order and the mittimus

be amended to reflect only one conviction for first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(1) of the

Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)(West 2000)).

	Affirmed as amended.    

	O'MALLEY, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.