State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: December 29, 2016 107588 

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RAMONN S. DRISCOLL,

Appellant.

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Calendar Date: November 15, 2016

Before: Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Devine, Clark and Mulvey, JJ.

__________

Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for appellant.

Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (John R.

Thweatt of counsel), for respondent.

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Devine, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung

County (Hayden, J.), rendered March 2, 2015, convicting defendant

upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a

controlled substance in the third degree.

On the afternoon of March 16, 2014, a sheriff's deputy

stopped a vehicle in the Town of Southport, Chemung County after

observing that it had a temporary inspection sticker. Defendant

was the driver of the vehicle and fled on foot before the deputy

could approach. The deputy pursued defendant but lost him, then

returned to the abandoned vehicle in order to have it towed. At

that point, the deputy looked into the vehicle's window and

observed a plastic baggie on the front seat of the vehicle

containing packets of what appeared to be and, in fact, was crack
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cocaine. 

Defendant was apprehended later that day and was eventually

charged in an indictment with two drug offenses. His motion to

suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the traffic stop

was denied, after which he pleaded guilty to criminal possession

of a controlled substance in the third degree in full

satisfaction of the indictment. County Court sentenced him, as

agreed, to a prison term of three years to be followed by

postrelease supervision of two years. Defendant now appeals,

arguing that County Court erred in denying his suppression

motion. 

Inasmuch "as defendant did not waive his right to appeal,

his challenge to the denial of his suppression motion survives

his guilty plea and, since he entered a guilty plea thereafter,

harmless error analysis is inapplicable" (People v King, 137 AD3d

1424, 1425 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1070 [2016]; see CPL 710.70

[2]). Upon the merits, defendant's suppression motion should

have been granted, as the People failed to meet "their initial

burden of showing that the stop was lawful" (People v Allen, 90

AD3d 1082, 1085 [2011]; see People v Willette, 42 AD3d 674, 675

[2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 883 [2007]). In order for a traffic

stop to pass constitutional muster, before making the stop, "a

police officer [must have] probable cause to believe that the

driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation"

(People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]; accord People v

Guthrie, 25 NY3d 130, 133 [2015]). An officer has probable cause

to effect a stop if he or she can "articulate credible facts

establishing reasonable cause to believe that someone has

violated a law" (People v Robinson, 97 NY2d at 353-354; see

People v King, 137 AD3d at 1425). 

The deputy who made the stop was the sole witness at the

suppression hearing, and he testified that he stopped defendant's

vehicle because it had a temporary inspection sticker. The

deputy candidly admitted that he had no idea whether the sticker

was valid when he made the stop, nor did he indicate that the

temporary sticker gave him any other reason for suspicion. He

instead stated that his "general practice" was to stop any

vehicle he encountered with a temporary inspection sticker in
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order to "ensure [that the sticker had] not expired." It is

entirely proper to operate a motor vehicle with a temporary

inspection sticker under certain circumstances and, as a result,

the display of one does not constitute grounds for a traffic stop

absent a "specific articulable basis" to believe that illegality

is afoot (People v Bowdoin, 89 AD2d 986, 987 [1982]; see Vehicle

and Traffic Law § 306 [b]; People v Perez, 149 AD2d 344, 345

[1989]). The practice of stopping any vehicle with a temporary

inspection sticker, without more, represents impermissible "idle

curiosity" as to the sticker's validity rather than the

"reasonable suspicion" of illegality needed to effect a traffic

stop (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 420 [1975]; see People v

Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 563-564 [1978]; People v Simone, 39 NY2d

818, 819 [1976]). Thus, we reverse "County Court's order

[denying] defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as

a result of [the illegal traffic stop] and, pursuant to CPL

470.55 (2), vacate defendant's guilty plea and restore the action

to its prepleading status" (People v Samuels, 270 AD2d 779, 781

[2000]).

Defendant's remaining arguments are rendered academic in

light of the foregoing.

Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Clark and Mulvey, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, guilty

plea vacated, motion to suppress granted and matter remitted to

the County Court of Chemung County for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this Court's decision.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court