T EX . P EN A L C ODE §1 9. 03 (a ); T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art . 3 7. 07 1. Un le ss o the rw ise 1 indicated, a ll refe renc es to article s ref er to the Code of

Criminal Procedure

. Art. 37.071, §2(h)

. 2 

## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS

OF TEX AS

N O . A P - 75, 213 M O I SES SA N D O V A L M EN D O Z A , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N D I R E C T A P P E A L F R O M C A U SE N O . 401- 80728- 04 I N T HE 4 0 1 S T J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT

CO LLI N CO UNTY K ELL ER , P. J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h M E YE RS , W OMACK , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . P RI CE and J OHNS ON , J J ., c onc ur r e d. I n J u n e 2 0 0 5 , appellant wa s convicted of capital murde r and se ntence d to death. Direc t 1

a pp e a l to thi s Cour

t is a uto ma tic

. Ap pe lla

nt ra ise s e ig hty -o ne po int s o f e rr or . F ind ingno re ve rs ibl e 2

err or, we aff

irm the conviction and se ntence

.MEN DOZ A – 2 I. BACKG ROUND Sometime after 9:00 p.m. on Wednesda y , Marc h 17, 2004, Rache lle Tolleson and her mother Pa m O ’N e il w e nt t o th e sto re to p ur c ha se fo rm ula and dia pe rs fo r T oll e so n’ s f

ive -m on th-o ld daug hter, Aver

y . Tolleson and Aver

y visited at the O’Ne il home for a short time af ter re turning from the sto re , b ut To lle so n did not fe e l we ll, ha d tak e n med ic a tio n for a sin us he a da c he , an d w ante d to be in her own home. Around 10:00 p.m., Tolleson phone d the O’N eils to let them know that she and Aver y had ar rived home. Around the same time that evening , Efre n Gamez, appellant, and seve ral fr iends wer e having a par ty . Gamez, appe llant, and two y oung women had purcha sed t wo t hirty -pac ks of beer and two forty -ounce cans of

beer ear lier in the eve ning. A t some point , t h e wo men left the pa rty and later called to let Ga

mez and appellant know that they wer e not re turning . Appellant bec ame a ng ry , and as he dr ank mor e b ee r, he bec ame more bellige rent. Eve ntually , appellant sa id something to two other g irls at the par

ty that scar ed them. Appe llant told Gamez that he spoke t o t h e girls in that

manner “bec ause he could.” Appellant left the party and returned se vera l times, finally leavingfor the la st t ime be tw e e n mi dn ig ht a nd 1:0 0 a .m. The following morning, O’N eil went to Tolleson’s home a s she often did. Althoug h her c ar was pa rked in th e drive way , Tolleson was not there . A note fr om the landlord wa s taped to the

scre en door, but the w ooden bac k door stood wide open. O ’Ne il entere d the house a nd noticed that

a pil low ha d be e n lef

t on the fl oo r be tw e e n the kit c he n an d the be dr oo m. T he be dr oo m w a s a me ss. Papers we re stre wn ac ross the floor, the night stand w as pulled aw ay from the wa ll, the mattress and box spring wer e aske w, and the he adboar d was broke n and lying a g ainst the bed. Ave ry was on the bed, cold, we t, and alone in the house

.MEN DOZ A – 3

Alarme d, O’Ne il collected Ave ry and ca lled her husba

nd, who contac ted the police. Of fice r Scott Col lins of the Fa

rmersvi l l e Police Depa

rtment responde d. Colli ns confirme d O’Ne il’s d es cr i p t i o n of the be droom – things we re throw n ever y wher e and f

urniture wa s out of place . To Colli ns, it looked as though the re h ad b een a fig ht, or a torna do, in the bedroom. The rest of the h o u s e w a s o r d e r l y, an d

t h e r e w e r e n o s i g n s o f

a f o r c e d e n t r y. Fa rmersville police beg an int ervie wing potential witnesses t hat day . They lear ned that, on the Fr iday

befor e her

disappea ranc e, Tol l es o n h o s t ed a pa rty for a bout fifteen pe ople, including appellant. Dur ing the party , Tolleson spoke with appe llant a fe w times but told he r best frie nd Meg an Ke nnedy

that she wa sn’t interested in a ppellant in “that wa

y .” Police also lear n ed that, on the Saturda y befor e Tolleson’s disappe ara nce, K ennedy ’s boy friend T im Holland returne d to T olleson’s home with a ppellant and Cody Wil tbanks to retrie ve his musical instruments, but Tolleson wasn’t home, and the doors wer e locked. Whil e Holland a nd Wil tbanks went a

round the house lookingfor a way in, appellant manag ed to open the locked bac k door. Afte r lear

ning this, Collins i nterview ed appe llant, who told Col lins that he had last see n To lle so n at th e pa

rt y . Co lli ns no te d th a t a

pp e lla nt c ou ld n ot s it s til l and

se e me d v e ry

ne rv ou s. Searc h parties we re or g anized to look for Tolleson but wer e u n s u cc es sful. Six day s after Tolles o nd is a

p p e ar e d , Ja me s Po w e ll w a s h u n ti n g f o r ar r o w h e a d s n e ar

B r u s h y Cr e e k , e a s t of Fa rmersville. Walking along the cr eek, he came acr oss a body that had bee n burned a

nd was lying fa c e do wn . T hr ou g h th e us e of de nta l r e c or ds , th e bo dy

wa s e ve ntu a lly

ide nti fi e d a s T oll e so n’ s. J err y Fa rmer, a n FB I evidenc e technician who was one of the first on the sce ne, noted that tall veg etation h ad b ee n piled on top of Tolleson’s body in an attempt to cover

it. Her body

was badly burned a nd had begun to decompose. F ly eg g s and magg ot activity around her head and ne ckMEN DOZ A – 4

indicated that she had bee n there fo r at least two da y s. Her skin wa s char

red bla ck in place s and

s e ar e d ye l l o w i n o t h e r s w h e r e h e r f l e s h h a d s p l i ta p art

. M o s to f

h e r h a i r h a d b e e nb u r n e d a w a y. Scraps of burned c lothing clungto her uppe r torso, but no clothing was found be low her w aist. An ora ng e rope was ti ed around Tolleson’s rig ht ankle, and two g rommets from a ta rp we re ly ing on the back of her left leg and head. Bur nt pie ces of tarp and skin wer e found on a path leading to Tolleso n ’s b o d y , indicating that she had be en dra g g ed or c arr ied to that spot. A short distance from whe re the body

was discove red, steps led to a dugout under a tall tree wher e investig ators found evidenc e that something had bee n burned. Evidence technicia ns found ashe s, firew ood, a clump of hair, piec es of tar

p and skin, and ora

ng e rope like that found tied ar ound Tolleson’s ankle. Dr. Willi am Rohr, the medica l examiner, testified that Tolleson had s ustained a f ive-inch diameter bruise on her

left knee , a smaller bruise on the front of her left thig h, bruises on either side of her tongue , a lar g e amo u n t of hemorr hag e dee p in her lef

t shoulder, and se vera l bruises on her scalp ra ng ing in diameter from three quarte rs of an inch to three inches. A deep wound, consistent with injury

from a knif

e, pene trated he r nec k all the way to he r spinal column, and her body had bee n burned post-morte m. Rohr determined that Tolleson’s death was consistent with strang ulation or another form of a sphy

x iation. Afte r f u rth e r in te r v ie w s w it

h p o te n ti a l w it

n e s s e s , p o li c e o b ta in e d

anar r e s t w ar r an t f or appellant. Onc e in custody , appellant told police that, late Wednesday evening , he h ad driven by To lle so n’ s h ou se and

ha d s e e n a

lig ht o n. He ba c ke d h is tru c k in to t he dr ive wa

y and le t hi mse lf

int o the ho us e thr ou g h the ba c k do or wi tho ut kn oc kin g . Ac c or din g to a pp e lla nt, To lle so n le ft

wi th h im to g et a pack of cig are ttes. Appellant drove “for a little” and then “ for no r eason” started to choke Tolleson. Tolleson passed out, and a ppellant drove to a field be hind his home, where he had se x ualMEN DOZ A – 5

Se e Kitc he ns v . S

tat e , 823 S.W .2d 256, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 3 intercour se with Tolleson and “c hoked her ag ain.” Appe llant then drag g ed Tolleson out of the truc k and int o the field, wher e he choked her unti l he thoug ht she was de ad. To “ make sure ,” he “ poked he r t hr oat” wi th a

kn if e . App e lla

nt le ft To lle so n’ s bod

y in the fi e ld u

nti l Mo nd ay , a ft e r h e wa s f ir st interviewe d by

police. Scare d that Tolleson’s body would be found a

nd tied to him, appellant moved the body to a re mote are a and bur

ned it, ultimately

drag g ing it to wher e it was found. II. SUFF ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE A. G uilt - Underlying O ff enses I n points of error

twenty -three and twenty -four , appellant c h al l en ges t he leg al and f actua l

su f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e s u

p p o rt i n g h i s c o n v i c t i o nf o r c a p i t a l m u r d e r . A p p e l l an ts p e c i f i c a lly alleg es that the State did not prese nt evidence sufficie n t to prove the unde rlying of fense s of kidnapping and ag g ravated sexual assault. He a rg ues that “[t] hat there is no c onclusive evide nce that Ms. Tolleson was abducte d rathe r than havingleft her home on her

own volition” and that “[t] here

was no c onclusive evide nce that the sex betwee n [appellant] and Ms. Toll eson wa s not consensual.” 1. Burgl ary – No Attack on Su

fficie ncy Appellant wa s indicted for c ausing the death of R ache lle O’Ne il Tolleson by strang ling he r wi th h is han ds and sta

bb ing he r w itha

kn if e wh ile in t

he c ours e of

c omm itt ingor

a tte mpt ingto commit the offe nses of burg lary and kidnapping and ag g ravated sexual assault. The three underlying of fe ns e s w e re su

bmi tte d disj un c tiv e ly in the jur y c ha rg e so that app e lla

nt wa s cha

rg e d w itha lte rn a te methods of committing the c ri m e o f ca p i t al murder , and the jury delivere d a g ener al ver dict that 3 encompa ssed all t hree theories. A verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidenc e is sufficie nt on anyMEN DOZ A – 6

So rto v . S tat e , 173 S.W .3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 4 J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 5 W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 & 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 6 Ma rsh all

v . S tat e , 210 S.W .3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) , cert. de nied , 1 28 S.Ct

. 7 87 (2007). one of the theories submitted. To obtain relief on sufficie ncy

of the e vidence g rounds, then, a 4 defe ndant m u s t challeng e all alter nate theor ies submitted to the factfinde r. Appe llant does not

e x p l i c i t l y c h a l l e n g e t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e u n d e r l yi n g o f

f e n s e o f b u r g l a r y. Ho we v er , as s u m i n g arguendo t h at ap p ellant’s conse nt argument with respec t to the kidnapping

c on sti tut e s an im

pli e d c ha llenge wi th r e sp e c t to the burg lary , w e wi ll p ro c e e d to a dd re ss h is

c on te nti on s. 2. Legal Principles Whe n d e c idi ngwh e the r e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a c on vic tio n, we a sse ss a ll the evidence in the l ight most favor able to the verdict to deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct

c ou ld fi nd

the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Ev ide nc e is f a c tua lly 5 insufficient whe n, althoug h leg ally sufficie nt, the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is “so weak” that the ve rd ic t “ se e ms c le arl y wr on g or

manif e stl y un jus t” or the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is

“ a g a ins t th e g re a t w eight and pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e .” A f

a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w i s 6 “bar ely distinguishable” from a le g al suffic iency revie w. The differe nce be tween the two standards

7 is that the leg al s ufficie ncy standard require s the reviewing court to defer to the jury ’s cr edibility andMEN DOZ A – 7

Id

. 8 T EX . P EN A L C ODE §20.03. 9 Id ., §20.01(2). 10 Id ., §20.01(1)( A). 11 Id. , §30.02(a) (1), ( 3). 12 Id. , §22.021(a) (1)( A)(i) & ( 2)(A) (i), (iv). 13 weight d ete rm in ati on s w hi le t he fa ctu al s uff ici ency st and ard p erm it s t he revi e wi ng c ou rt to s ub sti tut e its judgment for

the jury ’s on these que stions, “albeit to a ver y limit ed deg ree .” 8 Kidnapping is the intentional or knowing abduction of a nother pe rson. A p e rs on a bd uc ts 9 another when he restra ins a person w ith the intent to subst antially interfe re wi t h h er l iberty by

se c re tin g or

ho ldi nghe r i n a

pla c e wh e re sh e is no t lik e ly to be fo un d or by us ing or thr e a te nin g to use deadly forc e. That restraint is without consent if it is acc omplished by forc e, intimidation, or 10 dece ption. A per son commits burg lary if he e nters a ha bitation without t he conse nt of the owne r 11 with the intent to commit a felony or an a ssault or commits or attempts to commit a fe lony or an assault. A person commits a g g ravated sexual a ssault if he intentionally or knowing ly

penetr ates 12 the se xua l or g an o f an oth e r wit ho ut he r co ns e nt an d ca

us e s ser iou s b od ily

inj ur y or a tte mpt s to c a

us e her de ath in the cour se of the sa me cr iminal episode or uses or exhibi ts a dea dly

wea pon in the

course of the same criminal episode. 13 3. Application Although a

ppellant claims that all of his conduc t with Tolleson was consensua l until he ine xplic a bly de c ide d to mur de r h e r i n h is c ar, the e vid e nc e a t tr ia l pa int s a dif fe re nt p ic tur e . In h is state me nt to Ran g e r David so n, a pp e lla nt cl a ime d tha t Toll e so n lef t her ho me wi th h im v olu nta ri lyMEN DOZ A – 8

to drive to another

town to purcha se a pa ck of c iga rettes. When off

icials sear ched T olleson’s home, howeve r, they

found a thre e-qu arte r-f

ull pack of c iga

rettes on a

desk in Tolleson’s bedr oom and

ano the r p a c k in he r c ar. Ap pe lla nt a lso tol d of

fi c ia ls that he ha d n e ve r b e e n in To lle so n’ s b e dr oo m. But h i s boot print was identified on pape rwork that Tolleson had obtained f rom her unc le the day of her disappea ranc e and that was found lying on the bedroom floor

. When O’Ne il discovered T olleson missi ng , it appear ed that a strugg le had take n place in the

m as t er b e d r o o m . T h e m at t re s s an d b o x s p ri n g i nT o l l es o n ’s b ed ro o m we re d i s tu rb edas t h o u gh “something had bee n drug to se parate the two.” The shee ts and comfor ter we re in disar

ray at the foot of the be d, and the he adboar d was broke n and lying at a n ang le ag ainst and almost on top of the bed. The nig ht stand was turne d awa y from the wa ll, a

nd the television in the bedroom was on. Appellant argues that the be droom was in disarr ay beca use Tolleson wa s in t h e process of pa cking to move. The nurse ry and re mainder of the house, howe ver, w ere in order. A lso, both Tolleson’s husband and mot he r t e sti fi e d th a t th e ho us e ha d n ot be e n in tha t con dit ion wh e n eithe r ha d be e n the re e arl ie r i n the day befor e Tolleson disappea red. I t w as also extremely unchar acte ristic for Tolleson to be f ar fr om h e r f ive -m on th- old

da ug hte r, y e t th e c hil d h a d b e e n le ft a lon e wi th t

he ou te r do or of the ho us e wide open. A p p e l l an tp o i n t s o u tt h a ti n v e s t i g a t o r s t e s t i f i e d t h a tt h e r e w e r e n o s i g n s o f a f o r c e d e n t r y. Howeve r, Tim Holland testified that seve ral da y s befor e Tolleson disap pear ed, he w ent to Tolleson’s house with appe llant to retrieve some musical instruments. Tolleson was not home at the time, and the door s we re l o ck ed. Holland testified that the back door was “ flimsy ” and that appellant somehow mana g ed to g ain entry into the house throug h that door.MEN DOZ A – 9

Th e sp e c ia l is su e a sk s: “ wh e the r t he re is a p ro ba

bil ity that th e de fe nd ant w ou ld c omm it 14 criminal ac ts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society .” Art. 37.071, §2(b)( 1). Appellant admitted to investig ators that he ha d sexual interc ourse with Tolleson, a f act that

wa s c or ro bo rate d b y

the pr e se nc e of a

pp e lla nt’ s DNA in sampl e s tak e n fr om To lle so n’ s bod y . Wh ile appellant claimed that the sexual interc ourse was consensua l, he also admitted in his stateme nt that he choked Tolleson to unconsciousness bef ore ha ving inter course with her. Appe llant sugg ests that the c ho kin g wa s fo r the purp os e of e ng a g ingin a

uto e ro tic a sp hy

xiat ion . H ow e ve r, To lle so n h a d to ld her be st f ri end that she w as not intereste d in appellant in “that wa y ” just day s befor e her

murder. Fur th er , when Tolleson r eg ained c onsciousness, appe llant ag ain choke d her a nd then stabbed he r until he believed she was de ad. Whil e the se x ual assault exam reve aled n o ev idence of sig nificant tra uma to Tolleson’s g e nit a l are a , th e me dic a l e xami ne r t e sti fi e d th a t th is w a s n ot u nc omm on in se x ua l a ssa

ult c a se s. Tolleson’s body

was found na

ked below the waist, and she ha d sustained bruises that the me dical examiner testified we re c onsistent with having be en sexually assaulted. Vi e wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, a ratio na l trie r of fa c t c ou ld have fo un d a

pp e lla nt guil ty of any of the thr e e un de rl y ingof

fe ns e s. F ur

the r, the e vid e nc e is n ot s o

weak as to make a

ny such dete rminations clear ly wrongand manifes t l y u n j u s t , nor ar e any

such d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a g a i n s tt h e g r e a t w e i g h t an d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e . P o i n t s o f

e r r o r t w e n t ythree and twenty -four

are overr uled. B. P unis hm e nt - F ut ur e Da nge r ous ne ss I n point of err or for

ty -three , appellant c halleng es the l ega l s ufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting the jury ’s deter mination reg ardingthe future dang erousne ss spe cial issue. A jury may 14MEN DOZ A – 1 0

Se e W ar dr ip v . S tat e , 5 6 S. W.3 d 5 88 , 5 94 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 2001 ); se e als o Keeton v. 15 Sta te , 724 S.W .2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

Lad d v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 547, 557-58 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999). 16 c on sid e r a

va ri e ty of fa c tor s wh e n de te rm ini ng wh e the r a de fe nd ant wi ll po se a c on tin uin g thr e a t to society

. We must vi ew a ll of the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable t o t h e j u ry ’s finding and

15 de te rm ine wh e the r, ba se d o n th a t e vid e nc e and re a so na ble inf e re nc e s the re fr om, a ratio na l jury c ou ld have f ound bey ond a reasonable doubt that the answe r to the future dang erousne ss issue was “y es.” 16 Appellant points out that no prior criminal r ec o rd was introduced duringpunishment, that the State did not present e x pert testimony to rebut appe llant’s expert testimony , and that the State’ s wi tne ss t e sti mony

duri ngthe punis hme nt p ha se wa s no t c or ro bo ra te d. Ap pe lla

nt p ro vid e s u s w ith

no le g a l a uth or ity to s up po rt

the pr op os iti on

that, i n o rd e r t o c on vin c e the jur y be y on d a re a so na ble doubt that appellant would be a continuing threat to society , the State is require d to present the jur y wi th a c ri min a l r e c or d, e xpe rt

te sti mony , o r c or

ro bo ratin g te sti mony

fr om a dd iti on a l w itn e sse s. The jury hear d the fa cts of the of fe n s e: ap p el l ant took Tolleson from her home, leaving be hin d a fi ve -m on th- old

ba by wi tho ut c are or

pr ote c tio n. App ell ant ch ok e d T oll e so n to unconsciousness “ for no r eason,” sexually assaulted he r, then c hoked her ag ain with the intention of killing he r, and f

inally stabbed he r to make c erta in she was de ad. Appellant left Tolleson’s body in a field until he fe are d authorities would find it and link the murder to him. He moved the body to a de so la te are a

and , w hil e a tte mpt ingto b ur n it , h e c hatte d o n h is c e ll p ho ne wi th f ri e nd s. Two of appellant’ s high school teac hers testified that appellant had bee n s m ar t , but unmanag eable . Appellant was disrespec tful to f emale te ache rs, lost control, and bec ame ve ry ang ryMEN DOZ A – 1 1

a t ti me s. Ap pe llant’ s n e ig hb or s te sti fi e d th a t th e y ha d w itn e sse d a

pp e lla nt p hy sic a lly

a tta c k h is mother and sister. A

ppellant had a lso stolen money from his brother

. The jury also hea

rd of a ppellant’s ofte n violent and ca llous behavior. When Robert Ramirez confr onted appe llant about having put a pill in a gir l’s drink at a pa rty , appellant pulled a knife on Ramirez and threatened to stab him in the stomach. At anothe r par ty , appellant se x ually

assaulted fourtee n-y ear -old L aura

Dec ker twic e, once while a f riend videota

ped the e ncounter . Appellant later laug hed as the footag e of him assa ultin g Dec ker w as shown at a party . When Sarah B enedic t repe atedly

asked a ppellant for a

cig are tte while the two s at n ex t t o each other at another pa rty , he responde d by near ly choking her to unc onsciousness. He stoppe d only when two young men pulled him away from Sara

h. The jury

hear d of how a

ppellant intentionally

threw a bo y d o wn o n to a tram p o li n e an d “ s to mp e d ” o n th e b o y ’ s mo u th w it h o u t an y s ig n o f r e mo r s e . Wh e ntwo y oung

wo me n d isa g re e d w ith a

pp e lla nt a bo ut a c a mpi ng te nt, he thr e a te ne d to c ut t he ir thr oats w itha

ru sty

saw. The State a lso presente d evidenc e fr om the complainants fr om two d i fferent a g g ravated robber y offe nses. Melissa Chavez and Nhat Vu t estified that appellant had pulled a g un on them and stolen their ca

rs and belong ings. Chavez testified that appellant attempted to force her into the trunk of the c ar, and Vu te sti fi e d tha t app e lla nt ha d d ri ve n a wa y takin g Vu ’s fr ie nd , L ian T ri nh , w ithhim

. Offic er Scott Ke rmes of the Plano Poli ce D epar tment testified that appellant wa s issued a cr iminal trespass wa

rning afte r police r esponded to a disturbance call re g ardingthreats be ing made and that

a m ac h et e wa s found i n appellant’ s vehicle. While appe llant was beingsupervised by the Dallas County pr ob a tio n d e pa

rtme nt a nd wa s on ele c tr on ic mon ito ri ng , ap pe lla nt c ut t he mon ito r f

ro m hi s ankle a nd stopped repor

ting to the pr obation office r.MEN DOZ A – 1 2

476 U.S. 79 (1988). 17 F ina lly , th e jur

y he ard ho w a pp e lla nt be have d wh ile awa iti ngtr ia l in the Col lin

County Jail

. Appellant cr eate d wea

pons and re fused to take his medication as pre scribed. D uring his recr eation time, appellant subver

ted the jail’s sec urity

doors and attacked a

nother prisone r. A rational jury

could deter

mine from this evidenc e that, beyond a re ason a ble doubt, there was

a pr ob a bil ity that a pp e lla nt w ou ld co mmi t cr imi na l ac ts of vio le nc e in the futur e so a s to c on sti tut e a continuing threat to society . Point of error f orty -one is over

ruled. III . G UI LT P HA SE ISS UE S A. Jury Select ion 1. Batson I n po in ts o f e rr or

on e a nd tw o, a pp e lla nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis

c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e S t a t e ’ s u s e o f p e r e mp t o r

y s t r i k e s a g a i n s tv e n i r e m e m b e r s S c a l e s an d A n t h o n y. Ap p e ll an t a

r g u e s th a t t

h e St a te u s e d

it s s tr ik e s in

a r a c ia ll y d is c r im in a to r

y ma n n e r in v io lati o nof Batson v. Kentuck

y . Appellant alleg es that t he race -neutra l rea sons for the strikes proff ere d by the 17 State wer e pr etext and that the only objection the State ac tually had to these ve nire membe rs was their ra ce. Batson pr ov ide s a

thr e e -s te p p ro c e ss f

or a tr ia l c ou rt to u se in a dju dic a tin g a cla im tha t a pere mptory

challeng e wa s based on r ace : First, a de fenda

nt must make a

prima fa cie showingthat a per emptory challeng e has been e x erc ise d o n t h e basis of r ace . Second, if that showing has bee n made, the prosec ution must offe r a race -neutra l basis for striking the juror in question. Third,MEN DOZ A – 1 3

Mi lle r- El v . Co c k re ll , 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003)( citations omitt ed). 18 Gi bs on v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 19 Batson , 476 U.S. at 98, n.21. 20 Snyder v . Louisi ana , 128 S. Ct . 1203, 1208 (2008). 21 Id. 22 Id

. 23 in light of the pa

rties' submissi ons, the t ri al court must deter mine whether

the defe ndant has shown pur

poseful discrimination. 18 A tri a l c ourt ’s ru lin g on

the iss ue of di scr im inator y int e nt m us t be su sta ine d unle ss i t is clea rly err oneous. Step three of the Batson inquiry

includes an e valuation o f a prosecutor’ s 19

cre dibilit y . Often the best evidenc e of discr iminatory intent is the dem ea n o r o f the prosec utor 20 exercising the challeng e. Additionally , rac e-ne utral re asons for pe remptory challeng es often tur

n 21 on aspec ts of a venir e member ’s demea nor, such as n er vousness or inattention, ca using the trial court’s obse rvations to be even more important. The trial court must not onl y evaluate whethe r 22 the prosec utor’s deme anor e vidence s discriminatory intent, but also whether the venire member’ s demea nor display ed the ba sis for the strike. 23 Th e eth nic a

nd ra c ia l make up of

the ve nir e is n ot c on ta ine d in the re c or d o n a

pp e a l. Howeve r, the re cord doe s show that 2 1 5 v enire members we re r eac hed bef ore the jury

was filled. Of that numbe r, the re c or d s up po rt s tha t si x were me mbe rs of a ra c ia l mi no ri ty . T wo of the six

serve d on the j ury ; one was excused by ag ree ment; one was struck for cause ; and the St ate e x erc ised pere mptory

strikes ag ainst Scales and A nthony

. Prospectivejuror ScalesMEN DOZ A – 1 4

I mmediately following Scales’s individual voir dire , the prosec utor David Waddill indicated that the State wished to challeng e Scales for cause . After conductingfurther voir dire, the tr ial court denied the c halleng e for

cause , and the State e x erc ised a pe remptory strike. When defe nse counse l made a Batson objection concerning the s trike of Scales, a Hispanic juror, Waddill offere d sever al

rac e-ne utral re asons for the strike. He e x plained:

There are many . First of a ll, my ability to communicate to the juror as to her understandingof the law

was c ompletely

sty mied during my

entire voir dir e. To wa rd s th e e nd , w he n I

a m t alkinga

bo ut S pe c ia l I ssu e 2, sh e be g an to descr ibe to me lesser

included off

enses. So my

ability to expl ain the law to he r and in my mind her ability to f

ollow the law and unde rstand this proce ss, Idon’t have any fa ithwh a tso e ve r t

ha t sh e c an d o th a t. Number two, she has a brother who she said that she’s very close to with two prior off enses whe re she drove him to jail to serve his time. The ne x t one is she was r aised f o r 20 y ear s, the first 20 y ear s of her life, as a R oman C ath o li c . I t’ s v e r y w e ll e s ta b li s h e d thr o u g h o u t t

h is v o ir d ir e w h a t t

he po sit ion of that c hurc h, he r ini tia l c hurc h, re g ard le ss o f t he wa y sh e fe e ls n ow , a s to t h e i r p o s i t i o nan d

t h e w ay s h e w a s r a i s e d

a s t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. Ithink som e o f her

answe rs with reg ard to mitigation she still , even a t the Court’s last sugg estion to her, does not unde rstand the e ntire issue of what miti g ation is or wher e it ’s going to come from. I mean, I think the l ast thing she asked the Court is, is the Court go i n g t o t el l u s what it is. And this i s after both my self and Mr

. Sanchez had spe nt numerous questions to her a s to what the law is and what it’s g oing to require of

her a s a juror. I

didn’t see a

ny thing out of he r as to any un de rs tand ingof

that ba sic a lly

or a t a ll. She a lso de sc ri be s h e rs e lf a s a lib e ra l De moc ra

t. A nd tha t do e s a ff e c t my d e c i s i o n , c o mp l e t e l y r a c e n e u t r a l , a s t o w h y s h e s h o u l d n o ts e r v e o nt h i s j u r

y. Th e oth e r t

hin g I wr ote on my no te s to my se lf lon g a g o whe n I fi rs t g ot t his is she also dec lare d bankruptc y herse lf, and that to me is objectionable

. Def ense c ounsel responde d that Scales unde rstood how the Texas sentencingscheme works afte r it was ag ain expla i n ed to her by the trial cour

t. Counsel stated that he believe d Scales ha dMEN DOZ A – 1 5

intimated that she thoug ht her brother’ s encounte rs with the criminal justice sy stem had bee n g ood for him. Counsel also reminded the trial court that while Scales wa s raised Catholic, she had insisted that she no long er be lieved in Catholicism. Counsel ad d i t i o n al l y pointed out that the State had

acc epted Juror Number Six, who had also decla red bankruptcy with her husband. After considering counsel’s r esponse, the tr ial court ove rruled the Batson challeng e:

The State’s of

fer ed ra cially

ne utr a l e xp la

nations, a number of

them, and base d on the totality

of this voir dire and he r q uestionnaire, e ither one of y ou could have e xer c ise d a

pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e fo r a

mul tit ud e of re a so ns . As soon as y ou started a sking your questions, M r. S an ch ez , Ikind of had a suspicion it was coming up beca use there was no way

tactica lly , other than the fac t that she see med to like y ou, that we would have spent the t i m e we we re spending other than to set up a Batson challeng e in a c ase w here there was no Batson ch al l en ge to be made. But that aside, there are more than sufficie ntly rac ially neutra l rea sons offer ed by [t he State]. You have not in my opinion come any

wher e nea

r close to sustaining y our burde n that [t he State] ex erc ised this challeng e i n an y way , manner , shape or form, par tially – in any partial de g ree based on this individual’s rac e. Your Batson challeng e is denied a nd overr uled. Appellant ar g ues to this Court that a care ful revie w of Sca les’s questionnaire indicates that she would be a

strong juror for the S tate. Appellant insists that none of the answ ers Sca les provided on the questionnaire o r t o t h e p rosecutor identify Scales a s being differ ent from juror s who wer e

acc epted by

the State. Appellant f

urther a rg ues that while Sca les initially did not understand Te x as law, she did unde rstand af ter it was e x plained to her by the trial cour

t. Wit hout providing a

ny discussion reg arding other individual jurors, appe llant appea rs to be urg ing this Court to eng ag e in a compar ative analy sis of the jurors who we re a cce pted by the State. The re cord is silent reg ardingthe State’s re asons for not acc epting Scales but acce pting pr ospective jurors who we re Catholic, had filed bankruptc y , had family members with convictions, or desc ribedMEN DOZ A – 1 6

themselves as liber al Democ rats. Neve rtheless, the rec ord shows that while other jurors may have sh a re d is ola ted ch aract eri st ics wi th S cal es, no ne s hare d a co mb in ati on of ch aract eri st ics su c h a s th os e that cause d conce rn for

the State. The trial c ourt pointed out that, ba sed on the totality of the individual voir dire a nd Scales’s questionnaire, the re w ere rea sons for either side to strike S cale s. Viewing the evidence in the light most favora b l e to the trial c ourt’s ruling , we c annot conc lude that the trial c ourt’s ruling on the pe re mpt or

y str ike of Sc a le s w a s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. Prospectivejuror Anthony I mmediately following Anthony ’s individual voir dire, prose cutor Gr egDavis indicate d that the State wished to exercise a pere mptory strike. When de fense counsel made a Batson objection

conce rning the strike of A nthony , a bi-ra cial juror, the State offe red severa l rac e-ne utral re asons for the strike. Davis ex plained:

Firs t o f all, on her

questionnaire, on Pag e 7, in her response to the police o ff i ce rs , s h e ga v e ao n e- wo rdre s p o n s e w h i ch wa s p ro fi l i n g. I n th is c a se the re c or d w ill re fl e c t th a t th e De fe nd ant i s H isp anic , is a minority . Iwould have g reat conce rn that he r attitude towar ds police off icer s and their bias or pr ejudice towa rd minorities would influence her when hear ing a police office r. And s ev era l police offic ers will be testify ing in this ca se, both at the g uilt/i nnocenc e and the punishment phase, Your Honor. Secondly , on Pag e 3 of he r questionnaire in r esponse to: Ar e y ou in f avor of the death penalty , she stated y es. We asked : P l ea s e ex plain y our answe r. He r response was: In extreme situations the death pena lty may be appr opriate. First, the wor d “extreme” cause d some conc ern to me. A nd as y ou noticed during my questioning, I asked her to plea se g ive me some unde rstanding of what she m e an tb y t h a tt e r

m s i n c e i ta

p p e ar e d t o b e a v e r y h ar d qu a l i f i e r t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. And despite numer ous attempts to ask Ms. Anthony to qualify

that answe r, she wa s unable to do so. I still have no understanding of what she means by the term extreme.MEN DOZ A – 1 7 Ibe lie ve he r a

ns we r w a s: I ’m

un a ble to a ns we r t hat qu e sti on . I ’m

un a ble to e xpla in i t. I c an’ t gi ve y ou a sin g le e xamp le of wh a t extre me me ans to me , eithe r i n a hy po the tic a l se ns e or

in a pu bli c ly -k no wn c a pit a l mur de r c a se . A nd

that g ive s me g re a t c on c e rn

a bo ut h e r f ro m th a t st and

po int

. Thirdly , on a g ener al s en s e, this woman qualified esse ntially ever y answe r that she g ave me . Her

answe rs wer e both vague – I d o n ’t believe that she was intentionally

trying to e vade the answe rs, but Ithink for whate ver r eason she was un a ble to g ive me a

str a ig ht a ns we r t o p ro ba

bly 95 pe rc e nt o f my

qu e sti on s. Idid notice – it was m y impression that her a nswers be came much firmer and less hesitant with Mr. S anche z. But I was g reatly

bothere d that ever

y question was qualified that she c ouldn’t answer it, couldn’t answer it, and on many occa sions said, Ican’ t answer

that question. And, as a n example, and as a

fourth point, when I asked he r to tell me about he r f e e lin g s a bo ut t he a g e of 18 be ingthe a

pp ro pr ia te ans wer for death p e na lty elig ibilit y in the S tate of Texas, and I g ave he r the option of re writing that law, her answe r wa s: Ican’ t answer that question. Idon’t want to answe r that question. Fifthly , when I

asked he r about the issue of reha bilitation and r emorse, a

nd Ig ave he r the ex ample of an indi vidual who commi tted an intentional murder in the course of ra

pe, and I aske d her w hether

that person c ould commit that offense a nd the n h a ve no re mor se – an d tha t is the State ’s the or y in t his c a se – s he wa s e xtre me ly hesitant in g iving me a

n answe r to that question, took severa l seconds. And e ven then said, we ll, I g uess it’s possible, and still answere d with hesitancy there. And the n w e nt o n to qu a lif

y he r a ns we r t he re that, w e ll, y ou kn ow , tha t in div idu a l c ou ld have so me me nta l pr ob le ms. That conc erns me be cause Iant i ci p at e in this case that that will be the de fe ns e , tha t this i nd ivi du a l so me ho w s uf fe rs fr om a

ne wl y -d ia g no se d me nta l il lne ss afte r the c ommissi on of this offense

. N e xt, c o n c e r

n s me g r e a tl y

th a t s h e h a s a

ma s te r ’ s in

c o u n s e li n g , b e c ause I anticipate in this ca se, and I ’ve a lrea dy been g iven notice, that ther e will be ps y c ho log ist s and

ps y c hiatr ist s te sti fy

ingon be ha lf of the De fe nd ant. An d I wo uld not have a ny body on this jury with this much experience in psycholog y or psy chiatry reg ardle ss of their ra ce . And t hat would conc ern me g reatly beca use of he r e x p e r i e n c e i nt h a tf

i e l d t h a ts h e w o u l d

b e e s s e n t i a l l y ane x p e rto nt h e j u r y. On Question Number

2, when I

asked a bout miti g ation, one of t h e few unqualified a

nswers that she g ave me without hesitation was her answer y es, that she would keep a

n open mind and s h e wo u l d be able to consider mitigating circ u ms ta n c e s . A n d I f

o u n d th a t to b e in g r e a t c o n tr a s t to th e r e ma in d e r o f herMEN DOZ A – 1 8

qu e sti on s. An d I tr

uly be lie ve or

fe ar t hat sh e ’d have a bs olute ly no pr ob le ms at a ll consideringever

y thing a s a possible mitigating circ umstance in this case

. And lastly , when I asked her if she could find someone g u i l t y o f capital murder if the State prove d their g u ilt bey ond a re asonable doubt, even with that question there w as hesitanc y . And, in fac t, she qualified that to sa y , well, it depends on the fa c ts a

nd wh e the r h e ’s pr ov e d guil ty or no t. Ifound that disturbing beca use my hy pothetical to her

assumed that the person ha d, in fac t, been f ound g uilty , or had the evidenc e pre sented a g ainst him that would enable a juror t o fi n d him guilty bey ond a re asonable doubt, and I was dis tur be d b y that a s w e ll. Def ense c ouns el re s p o n d ed that the he sitancy cited by the State was a ctually

“a ve ry int e lli g e nt jur or wh o wa s thou g htf ul be fo re ans we ri ng he r que sti on s. ” De fe ns e c ouns e l st a te d th a t, to him, it appea

red that Anthony

was one of the “ most open-minded jurors” in the proce ss and that “she did not want to commit to certain fa cts that would ca use her to vote a ce rtain wa

y .” Counsel additionally

pointed out that Anthony was ne v er asked to ex plain her “ profiling ” re sponse to the questionnaire. Da vis fu rt he r e xpla ine d to the tr ia l c ourt that: Idid not ask any

questions on [ profiling ] because that’s a ve ry unambig uous term to me. I

clea rly understand what that term means, and ther e is no nee d to further de lve int o th a t. Profiling mea

ns – in everyday

terms we he ar that, a

nd it is t hat individuals are sin g le d o ut b y

po lic e of fi c e rs be c a

us e of the ir ra c e . T hat is pr of

ili ng . An d, in f

a c t, Ibelieve that’s what t h e l aw t h at ’s been e nacte d states it to be here in Texas. So I c le arl y un de rs tand

that te rm . And I will also state for the rec ord that no other juror who’ s been a cce pted by the State ha s sh ow n e ve n a sc int ill a of he sit a tio n to the de g re e that th is w oma n h a s. Th is w oma

n is wa y of f t he sc a le wi th re g ard s to he sit a tio n a nd e va siv e ne ss of qu e sti on s. An d, a g a in, Ido n’ t c la im that sh e int e nti on a lly e va de d, bu t I c an te ll y ou that Icould not g et a stra ight answer out of her, and that disturbs me. And I ’m not goingto acc ept anyone who r efuse s to give me an answer to a question here beca use I ’m not g onna g uess on what their answe rs ar e.MEN DOZ A – 1 9

The trial c ourt found that the State of fer ed ra ce- neutra l rea sons for the strik e an d denied the de fe ns e ’s Batson challeng e. Appellant argues that Anthony was “cle arly a qualified juror whose answe rs in both voir dire and on her questionnaire wer e no differ ent from the non minority jurors.” A

ppellant insists t hat the State’s re asons for strikingAnthony wer e pre tense a

nd the only

rea son she was struc k is that the State “thoug ht that as a blac k woman she would be more responsive to the fac t that appellant wa s also a minority .” Whil e a c old rec ord ca

nnot provide evide nce of Anthony ’s demea

nor, it does show the vag ueness of

Anthony ’s answe rs. Duringquestioning by the S tate, Anthony

repe atedly

qualified he r

re sp on se s and

c ould no t pr ov ide e xamp le s to ill us tr a te he r a ns we rs . F or

e xamp le , w he n a sk e d to explain in what sort of extreme situation the death penalty would be appr opriate, she responde d that she could not make a blanke t statement. Also, when que stioned about the appr opriate a g e for the de a th p e na lty

and wh e the r e ve ryon e is c a

pa ble of be ingre ha

bil itate d, An tho ny

state d th a t sh e c ou ld not answer

either que stion. Viewingthe evidenc e in t h e l i gh t most favora ble to the trial cour

t’s ruling , we c annot

c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on the pe re mpt or

y str ike of An tho ny wa s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. Points of er

ror one and two ar e over

ruled. 2. Im properly Discharged Juror I n point of err or three , appellant complains that the t rial court improperly discharg ed juror Bro ac h as disabled. Appe llant argues that B roac h did not meet the def inition of “disabled” a

nd

s h o u l d h a v e b e e nr e qu i r e d

t o s i to nh i s j u r

y.MEN DOZ A – 2 0

On May 16, 2005, during her individual voir dire , Br oach e x plained that she h ad been diag nosed w i t h a “weak he art.” The de fense challeng ed B roac h for c ause a nd argued that her condition and medication would preve nt her from g iving the trial the prope r foc us “espe cially in a

case of this importance.” At that time however , there was no indication that Broa ch would not be able to fulfill the duties of a juror, and she was seated on the jury

. On May 26, 2005, Br oach’ s car diologist faxed a letter to the t rial court reque sting that B roac h be excused fr om jury

duty and explaining that her car diac function had not improved and that ther e

was a likelihood that she would soon require invasive treatments. On the morning of June 21, 2005, befor e the tria l beg an but af ter the jury had been sworn, the trial court spoke with Broa ch re g arding the ca rdiolog ist’s fax. Broac h informed the tr ial court that she w as in the proce ss of being schedule d for he art surg ery

to have a

defibrillator implanted. B roac h had not y et bee n pl ac ed on the heart tr an s p la n t l is t. H o w e v e r , s h e a d mi tt e d to th e tr ia l c o u rt t

h at c ar d ia c ar

r e s t w a s a

r e a l c o n c e r

nf or patients with her c ondition. Broac h stated that she ha d been instructed t o avoid s tressful situations and that she f

elt constantly

fatig ued. Th e tr ia l court a sk e d Br oa c h, “ I s y our h e art c on dit ion su c h th a t it

wi ll h ind e r your a

bil ity to p e r f o r m yo u r d u t i e s a s a j u r o r , t o s i t i n t h i s c o u rt r o o m , t o e v a l u a t e t e s t i m o n y, t o l i s t e na t t e n t i v e l y, to deliberate? ” B roac h resp o n d ed , “I b eli eve that it will .” At def ense c ounsel’s re quest, the trial court que stioned Br oach how her c ondition affec ted her daily life. Br oach a

nswere d that while she continued to work at her business ever y day , her husba

nd drove he r and she would rest whe n she wa s tir e d. She c on tin

ue d to wa lk se ve ra l day s a we e k with he r d oc tor ’s a

pp ro va l but di d n ot w or

k o ut, and she e nlisted the help of other s to complete h o u s eh o l d ch o res. The trial court f ound Br oach disabled and discha

rg ed her from the jury

over de fense objection.MEN DOZ A – 2 1

Ar t. 3 6. 29 ; se e als o La nd

ru m v . S tat e , 788 S.W .2d 577, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). 24 Hi ll v . S

tat e , 90 S.W. 3d

30 8, 31 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Car ril lo v . S tat e , 597 S.W .2d 25 769, 770-71 (Te x . Crim. App. 1980).

R o u t ie r v . S tat e , 112 S.W .3d 554, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Br oo k s v . S tat e , 990 26 S.W .2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial cour

t may discharg e a jur or fr om duty who suffe rs from a sufficie ntly serious disability

. A disability is ge nera lly

descr ibed as some phy sical illness, mental condit i o n , or 24

e mot ion a l st a te that pr e ve nts a jur or fr om p e rf or min g he r d

uti e s a s a jur or . Th e de c isi on

to e xcu se 25 a juror onc e the jury

has be en impaneled a

nd sworn is revie wed unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. 26 Appellant ar g ues that B roac h did not meet t h e d ef i n i t i on of “disable d” bec ause she never

a ff ir ma tiv e ly state d th a t her c on dit ion wo uld ke e p he r fr om b e ingfa ir and imp art ia l. A

pp e lla nt a lso

c on te nd s th a t B ro a c h n e ve r s ta te d une qu ivo c a lly that t he con di tio n w ou ld h ind e r h e r a bil ity to pe rf or m he r d uti e s a s a jur or bu t on ly sa id that sh e “ be lie ve d” it w ou ld. Ap pe lla nt t a ke s is su e wi th Br o ac h ’s s t at ements t hat she wa s still g oing to wor k at her business eac h day

and ar g ues that “[s] itting and listening to testimony is clear ly

less stressful than runningy our own business.” Finally , appellant insists that Broa ch’s f atig ue could have bee n “ea sily dealt with in court.” Br oach’ s phy sical ac tiviti es had be en cur tailed such that she w as no long er a ble t o work out or complete all of her

household chore s herse lf. Whil e she did still g o to he r business eac h day , she

wa s dr ive n the re by

he r h us ba nd and of te n r e ste d w he n s he be c a me fatigue d. She wa s in the pr oc e ss of beingschedule d for he art surg ery and explained that there was a possibili ty

that she would be pla c e d on the lis t to re c e ive a he art tr ans pla nt. B ro a c h ha d be e n dir e c te d by he r docto r t o av oid stressful situations and fac ed the r eal c oncer n of ca rdiac arr est. Fina lly , her c ardiolog ist contactedMEN DOZ A – 2 2

Appellant does not individually label points of e rror four throug h twenty -two but, instead, 27 lists the name s of prospec tive jurors and c itations to t he re porter’ s rec ord. I f ea ch re cord r efe renc e is counted as a

point of err or, then the points number only to twenty -one r ather

than twenty -two. Se e Sta nd e fe r v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 28 the trial cour

t reque sting that Broa ch be e x cused be cause of her deter iorating health and upc oming inv a siv e pr oc e dure s. Given these circ umstances, the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tion in discha rg ing B roac h and re placingher w ith an alternate. Point of error three is overrule d. 3. Stan defe r I n points of error four throug h twenty -two, appellant c omplains that the State was per mitted 27 to pose voir dire que stions that im proper ly committed jur ors to a particula r set of f acts upon whic h the y wo uld c on sid e r p ro batio n. Ap pe lla nt b ri e fs e ig hte e n p oin ts o f e rr or c omp la ini ngthat th e Sta te 28 was pe rmitted to pose improper commitment que stions. While appellant lists the names of f ourtee n venire members a

nd rec ord cites to the a lleg ed improper q u est ioning, in only one instance does appellant e x plain his complaint reg ardinga commitment question. Appellant complains that prospe ctive juror Cha lif o ux initially

indicated that he could not consider pr obati o n i n a m u rder case , but that after

the State was a llowed to pose a hy pothetical involving eutha

nasia, Chalifoux stated that he could conside r probation. The rec ord of Chalifoux’s individual voir dire, howeve r, shows the orde r of events differ ently

. The State be g an by explaining

c a pit a l murd e r a

nd the ra ng e of punis hme nt f

or c a pit al mu rder . T he pr os e c uto r n e xt expl a ine d to Chalifoux the lesser -included of fense of murder

and g ave vary i n g ex am p les of what could be considere d murder, inc luding the e x amples of a merc y killing and of someone w alking out of the courthouse a

nd shooting the f

irst person he saw “just for fun.” Def ense c ounsel objecte d followingMEN DOZ A – 2 3

Id . at 179. 29 the me rc y kil lin g e xamp le re fe re nc ingthe de fe ns e ’s pr e vio us Standefer objections. The tria l court took the objection under

advisement but dec lined to rule until the State actua lly posed a que stion. The prose cutor c ontinued by discussing the wide rang e of punishment for murder , including probation, and e x plaining that punishment is depe ndent on the fac ts of the ca se and the backg round of the de fe nd ant. Th e pr os e c uto r r e ite rate d th a t th e jur y ha s th e op tio n of se nte nc ing a de fe nd a nt t o “as little as five y ear s probation or if they deter mine that he dese rves 20 y ear s, 50 y ear s or 60 y ear s in the pen up to li fe i n p rison, they have those options as well” for the lesser -included of

fense of murde r . T h e p r o s e c u to r th e n a s k e d Ch a li f o u x: “ I f y o u w e r e p r e s e n te d w it h a c a s e in w hich y ou found the De fenda

nt guilty of murder, okay , as y ou are here now ar e y ou open to the full ra ng e of p u n i shment for that pa

rticular pe rson havingfound him g uilty of the off

ense of murder?” The defe nse objec ted base d on Standefer , and the tria l court over ruled the obje ction. Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t th e e uth ana sia hy po the tic a l pose d to Cha lif ou x ef fe c tiv e ly bo un d h im “to the idea

of probation being a

ppropriate only

for those ty

pe of case s thus disinge nuously planting the idea that probation in any other fa ct situation would be inappropriate.” Appellant cla ims that any juror “e x posed to this ty

pe of questioning [i s] pre disposed to impose the maxi mum punishm ent for any thing that did not re semble the hy potheticals.” Com mitme nt q

ue sti on s are tho se that c omm it a pr os pe c tiv e jur or

to r e so lve , o r t o r e fr a in from resolving , an issue a cer tain way afte r lea rning a par

ticular fa ct. A question may be prope r 29 if it s e e ks to d isc ov e r a

juro r’s vi ews on

an is su e a

pp lic a ble to t he c a se ; ho we ve r, an o the rw ise proper question is impermissible if it attempts to commi t the juror to a pa rticular ve rdict base d onMEN DOZ A – 2 4

Id . at 181. 30 At k ins v . S tat e , 951 S.W .2d 787, 789 (Te x . C ri m. App. 1997)(opinion on orig inal 31 submissi on).

Se e Ha lpr in v . S

tat e , 1 70 S.W. 3d 11 1, 119- 20 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 )( e uth a na sia 32 hy pothetical). Standefer , 59 S.W .3d at 181. 33 T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(h). 34 pa rt ic ula r f a c ts, un le ss t

he law re qu ir e s a

c omm itm e nt. Ho we ve r, it i s p e rm iss ibl e to u se fa c t-

30 sp e c if ic hy po the tic a ls t o e xpla in t

he law, so lon g a s th e pr os pe c tiv e jur or is n ot a sk e d to c omm it t o

re so lve or to r e fr a in f

ro m r e so lvi ngthe c a se a c e rt a in wa y ba se d on the c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nte d in the hy po the tic a l. 31 Al t h o u gh t h e p r o s e c ut o r

d i s c u s s e d a fa c t sp e c if

ic hy po the tic a l, t

he hy po the tic a l w a s u se d o nly to he lp e x plain the law. The prosec utor did not seek to e licit how Chalifoux would respond to the hy pothetical situation. The que stion the prosecutor did a sk soug ht only to de termine if Chalifoux 32 was ope n to the entire r ang e of punishment author ized by the leg islature for

the les s er -i n cluded

o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , a qu e s t i o n t h a t t h e l aw a l l o w s b e c a u s e i t t e s t s w h e t h e r a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r or is challeng eable for c ause. 33 Appellant provides no explanation or argument reg arding his c omplaints c oncer n i n g t he individual voir dire of the rema ining thirteen listed pr ospective jurors. The points of e rror perta ining to those t hirteen pr ospective juror s are inadequately briefe d. I n any

event, e ven if the tria l court 34 ha d e rr e d w ithre sp e c t to a ll o f a pp e lla nt’ s Standefer

c omplai nt s, su ch e rr or s w ou ld b e ha rm le ssMEN DOZ A – 2 5

Do wth itt v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)(“B eca use appe llant was 35 convicted of

capital murder, any err oneous or misleading hy potheticals to prospec tive jurors about punishment f

or the lesser- included offe nse of murde r made no contribution to appellant' s conviction or punishment.”). 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 36 beca use appe llant was found g uilty of capital murder, not mur der, a nd probation wa s not an option at the punishment stag e of a ppellant’s trial. Points of er ror f our throug h twenty -two ar e over ruled. 35 B. Evid ence 1. V olu nta rine

ss o f S tat e ment I n p oi nt o f e rr or

thi rt y -n ine , a pp e lla nt c omp la ins that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti nghis statement to the police. Appellant argues t hat hi s statement was involuntary beca use he be lieved the police wa nted to speak w ith him reg arding two extraneous ag g ravated robber y offe nses from Da llas County . App e lla

nt a sse rt s that he wa ive d his ri g hts wi th r e g ard to t he Da lla s Co un ty

of fe ns e s o nly – not for the instant off

ense. Appellant wa s arr ested at his home pursuant to an ar rest warra nt for Tolleson’ s murder. H e was subseque ntly

transporte d to the Colli n County J ail, wher e he was i nterview ed by Texas Rang er A. P. David so n an d Ser g e ant Mitc h Selm an of the Col lin County She ri ff ’s Of fi c e . T he a dmi ssi bil ity of appe llant’s statement wa s addre ssed in a hea ring outside the prese nce of the jury . Both Da

vidson

an d S e l m an t e s t i f

i e d t h a t a p p e l l an t w a s g i v e n th e w ar n i n g s a s r e qu i r e d

b y Miranda v. Arizona , as 36

we ll a s th e wa

rn ing s r e qu ir e d b y

art ic le 38 .2 2. Pr ior

to i nit ia lin g the wa

rn ing s, a pp e lla nt w a s to ld by Selman, “I

want to make some closure for the family out there in F arme rsville.” Af ter spea king with Davidson and Selman, a ppellant was a g ain advised of his rights, a

nd appellant a g ain waive dMEN DOZ A – 2 6

Ga rza v . S

tat e , 213 S.W .3d 338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 37 Id

. 38 Id

. 39 his rights prior

t o p ro v iding a

written statement. Dur ing the hear ing, a ppellant testified that he

vo lun tari ly

a nd fr e e ly wa ive d h is r ig hts

. The trial c ourt is the sole and exclusive trie r of fac t a nd judge of the c redibility of witnesses

as we ll as the weig ht to be g iven their testimony in a motion to suppress. T h e t ri al judge may 37

c ho os e to b e lie ve or

dis be lie ve any

or a ll o f a wi tne ss’ s tes tim on y . Th is Court is n ot at li be rt

y to 38 disturb any

fac t finding that is supported by the re cord. The trial c ourt found that ther e wa s no

39

c re dib le e vid e nc e that app e lla nt wa s thr e a te ne d or co e rc e d in any mann e r o r t

hat he wa s im

pr op e rl y ind uc e d in to p ro vid ing the state me nt to po lic e . Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso fo un d th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s p ro pe rl y

a d v i s e d o r a l l y an d

i nw r i t i n g o f

h i s r i g h t s a s r e qu i r e d

b y Miranda and ar

ticle 38.22, and the tr ial court conclude d that appellant f ree ly and knowing ly

waived his rig hts. These finding s are supported by the re cord. Appellant ar g ues that “[i] f law enfor ceme nt of fice rs ca n talk to a suspect who ha s a lawy er on some offe nses but the offe nse they want to talk about he ha s no lawy er o n , beca use a

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht i s f

a c t sp e c if ic , th e n ju sti c e re qu ir e s th a t a susp e c t be Mir and ize d o n th e sp e c if ic

c ha rg e the y wi shto s pe a k to the su sp e c t a bo ut. ” We h a ve pr e viousl y addre sse d th is a rgume nt, statin g that: I f a person has alre ady

been c harg ed with an of

fense and has a

n attorney repr esenting him on tha t c ha rg e , th a t a tto rn e y

c an tel l hi s c lie nt n ot t o ta lk t o th e po lic e if qu e sti on e d a

bo ut a ny thi ng . I t is the n u

p to the a c c us e d to de c ide wh e the r o r n ot t o follow his counsel’s advice. I f law e nforc ement off icer s subsequently

approa ch the suspect about a

nother off

ense, w hether

related to the charge d offe nse or not, andMEN DOZ A – 2 7

Cob b v . S tat e , 85 S.W .3d 258, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 40 administer Miranda wa

rn ing s, ne ith e r the fe de ra l no r t he Te xas c on sti tut ion

pr e ve nts the su sp e c t fr om vo lun tari ly wa ivi ng his pr ivi le g e and sp e a kin g to o ff ic e rs a bo ut h is other off ense, e ven without the bene fit of his counsel’s a ssistance. 40 The trial c ourt did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing a ppellant’s motion to suppress. Point of error thirty -nine is over

ruled. 2. Admiss ion of Op inio n Te

sti mony I n point of erro r t we n t y -e i g ht, appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting the opinion testim ony

of Serg eant Mitch Selman of the Colli n County Sheriff’ s Off

ic e r e g a r d in g wh ether the sexual activity

betwee n appellant a

nd Tolleson was consensual. Specifica lly , appellant a rg ues that th e su bje c t matte r o f S e lma

n’ s te sti mony

wa s b e y on d Se l m a

n ’ s e xpe rt ise and

that Se lma

n s ho uld not ha ve been a llowed to state such a prejudicia l opinion without the prope r qualification required of an e x pert witness on the issue. Selman interviewe d appellant a nd took appellant’s wr itten statement describing the offe nse. During Selman’s testimony in the g uilt phase, he de scribed a d i agr am of appe llant’s house and

re fe rr e d to the fi e ld n e arb y a s “ wh e re [ap pe lla

nt] h a d s e xua lly ass ault e d [T oll e so n] and , I g ue ss, ultimately

killed her.” Def

ense counsel obj ecte d “to t he chara cter ization of sex ually assaulted he r. Idon’t think the testimony has bee n that [appellan t ] s t ated that at any time.” The tria l court

overr uled t he objection. The S tate further questioned Selman reg arding appellant’ s statements that the se xua l a c tiv ity

ha d b e e n c on se ns ua l. When the S t at e as ked Selman to g ive his opinion of whether the sexual activity

had bee n

consensua l based only

on what appe llant had told him, the defense o b j ec t ed t h at Selman had not been qua lified as an e x pert. The trial court sust ai n ed t hat objection. The State then questionedMEN DOZ A – 2 8

Os bo ur n v . S tat e , 92 S.W .3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 41 See id. a t 53 5 ( “ Pe rc e pti on s” un de r t he ru le of e vid e nc e re la tin g to l ay

wi tne sse s “ re fe r t o 42 a witness’s inter

pretation of information acquir ed throug h his or her own senses or experience s at the time of the e vent (i.e., thing s the witness saw, he ard, smelled, touc hed, fe lt, or tasted).” ). T EX . R. E V ID . 702 (empha sis added). 43 Ne nn o v . S

tat e , 9 7 0 S

. W

. 2 d 5 4 9 , 5 6 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 8 )( qu o t i n g Da ub e rt v . M e rre ll 44 Do w Ph ar

ma c e uti c als , 509 U.S. 579, 588, 593 (1993)). Selman r e g ar d in g th e s e qu e n c e o f e v e n ts a s r e late d

to h im b y a p p e ll an t. Se lm ante s ti f

ie d th at appellant ha d stated that bef ore he had sex with Tolleson, he choked her to unc onsciousness. The State the n e sta

bli sh e d th a t Se lma

n h a d p re vio us e xpe ri ence and tr a ini ngin s e xua l a ssa

ult c a se s. Selman testified that he be lieved that he c ould provide an o p i n i o n as to whethe r or not the se x ual cont act be tween T olleson and appe llant was conse nsual. The de fense ag ain objecte d that Selman was not qualified a s an expert. The State responde d that it wa s not se eking an expert opinion. The objection was ove rruled. The a dmissibi lity

of evide nce is within t h e d iscretion of the trial court a nd will not be

reve rsed a bsent an a buse of discr etion. Although the State claimed that it was not see king a n expert 41 opinion, it i n essenc e did. Selman’s opinion did not satisfy the re quirement for

lay witnesses that it be based upon a

first-hand perc eption of the events to w hich the opinion r elates. The rule for the 42

a dmi ssi on

of e xpe rt te sti mony

pr ov ide s: “ I f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, or oth e r sp e c ia lize d k no wl e dg e wi ll assist the trier of f

act to under stand the evide nce or to determine a fac t in issue, a witness qualified

as an expert by

knowledg e, skill, expe rience , training or education, may testify there to in the form of an opinion or ot herw ise.” We keep in mind that the inquiry into ex pertise is “a

flexibl e one,” 43 and that the rule was promulg ated to “ rela x the traditional barr iers to opinion testimony .” A law 44MEN DOZ A – 2 9

See Ne nno , 970 S.W .2d at 562. 45 enfor ceme nt official who has no formal education on a matter can never theless qualify as an expert fr om h is o wn

e xpe ri e nc e and

stu dy

. Un de r t

he fa c ts o f t

his c a se , th e tr ial court

wa s w ith in i ts 45 discretion to conc lude Selman’s testimony was admissi ble as expert opinion based upon his training and experienc e. Ho we ve r, e ve n if the tr ia l c ourt ha d e rr e d in

a dmi tti ngthi s e vid e nc e , a ny su c h e rr or

wo uld be har mless. By his own admission, appellant choke d his vic tim into unconsciousness befor e having

se x with he r, and he la te r kil le d he r, mov e d he r to a re mot e loc a tio n, and

burn e d h e r b od

y . T he se events oc curr ed af

ter the vic tim had indicated to s o m eo n e t h at s he wa s not interested in a se x ual relationship wit h appellant a nd afte r the victim’s bedr oom had bee n completely wre cked. Selman’ s opinion that this evidenc e showed that the sex was not consensual a dded little to what the jury had alre ady hear d. Point of error twe nty -eig ht is overruled. 3. Admiss ion of

Pho tog ra phs I n points of error

twenty -six and twenty -seve n, appellant c laims that the trial court

err oneously

admitted autopsy

and cr ime scene photogr aphs at the guilt stag e of tria l in violation of Rule 403 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. He argues that, bec ause the medica l examiner g ave detailed testimony

reg ardingthe wounds Tolleson sustained, ei gh t autops y photogr aphs (State’ s Ex hibits 63 - 70) and seven crime scene photogr aphs (State' s Ex hibits 26 and 28 - 34) should have been e x cluded. Appe llant further complains that the photog raphs we re a lmost all close-ups a nd that the pre sence of mag g ots and the contortion of t he body make the photog raphs pa rticularly g ruesome. He a lso complains that the photogr aphs wer e display ed during trial on a ten f oot by ten foot scr een. F i n a l l y, a p p e l l an tc o mp l a i n s t h a tt h e p h o t o g r a p h s ar e c u m u l a t i v e o f

o t h e r t e s t i m o n y.MEN DOZ A – 3 0

T EX . R. E V ID . 403. 46 Sa nt ell an v . S

tat e , 939 S.W .2d 155, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Lon g v . S tat e , 823 47 S.W .2d 259, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

So nn ie r v . S

tat e , 913 S.W .2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 48 Santellan , 939 S.W .2d at 172. 49 Rul e 40 3 p ro vid e s: “ Al tho ug h r e le va nt, e vid e nc e may

be e xclu de d if its p ro bativ e va lue is substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of t h e is sues, or misleading the jury , or by consi derations of undue delay , or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” 46 A c ourt may c on sid e r m any

fa c tor s in

de te rm ini ng whe th er the pr ob a tiv e va lue of ph oto g ra ph s is substantially

o u t we i gh edb y

t h e d an ger

o f u n fa i r p re

j u d i ce , i n cl u d i n g: t h e n u mb er o f e x h i b i t s o ff

er ed, their g ruesomene ss, their detail, their size, whethe r they are in color or blac k-an d

- wh it e , wh ether they

are close up, whe ther the body depicted is clothed or naked, the availability of other me ans of pr oof, and other circ umstances unique to the individual case

. The a dmissibi lity of photog raphs ove r an 47 ob je c tio n is wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

. Autop sy ph oto g ra ph s are g e ne ral ly 48 admissible unless they

depict mutilation of the victim caused by the autopsy

itself. 49 State’s Exhi bits 26 and 28 - 34 ar e p h o t o graphs take n at the cr ime scene and introduce d thro ug h the testimony

of evide nce te chnician Jerry Fa rmer. T he photog raphs we re taken fr om dif fe re nt r ang e s and

fo c us on dif fe re nt a sp e c ts o f t

he c ri me sc e ne , in c lud ing To lles on ’s bo dy a s it was initially

discovere d, g rommets from the tar p used to move Tolleson’s body , and the r ope tied

aro un d T oll e so n’ s ank le us e d to dr a g he r bod y , a s w e ll a s th e e vid e nc e -c oll e c tio n te a m’ s atte mpt s to remove Tolleson’ s body without causing further

damag e.MEN DOZ A – 3 1

State’s Exhi bits 63 - 70 are autopsy photogr aphs of Tolleson that we re introduc ed duringthe testimony of medica l examiner Dr. Wil liam Rohr. State’s Ex hibits 63 and 64 are f ace up and fa ce down photog raphs of

Tolleson’s body

as it was rece ived i n the medica l examiner’s offic e. State’s Ex hibits 65 - 69 are autopsy photogr aphs take n from diffe rent a ng les and ra

ng es showing the wounds Tol l es o n sustained, how her ankle wa s bound, and the leve l of burning and dec ompositi on of her body . State’s Exhi bit 70 shows the damag e done to Tolleson’ s head f rom the underside of her sc alp. Dr. Rohr testified that the scalp wa s re fr ac t ed i n that photogr aph in orde r to show the bruising damag e that could not be se en other wise. The c rime sce ne photog raphs, whic h are included in the re cord, a re in color and are all four by six inches or sma ller. The photog raphs r efle ct the fa ct and the ma nner of Tolleson’s death and

are no more g ruesome tha n the offe nse itself. The photogr aphs depict fac ts that ha d been te stified to by witnesses at trial and which wer e rele vant to the manner in which the off ense w as committed. Some of the p h o t o s we re close-up a nd showed the de tails of the damag e sustained by Tolleson. Appellant urg es that photog raphs should have been e x cluded be cau s e t h ey s how ea rly stag es of decomposition and mag g ot activity which wa s the result of de cay rathe r t han the cause of

death. The medical e x aminer did explain to the jury that Tolleson’s body

had begun to decompose a nd that the

a uto ps y ph oto g ra ph s d e pic te d th e bo dy

a t th e tim e it w a s r e c e ive d at the mo rgue. Th e a uto ps y photos show the condition of the body and the wounds r ece ived and, except for State’s Exhi bit 70, do no t sh owany mut ilatio n o f t he bo dy . St a te ’s Exhi bit

70 sh ow s T oll e so n’ s sk

ull wi th t he sc a lp ref rac ted, which Dr . Rohr explained was nec essa r y to clea rly show the bruising damag e to Tolleson’s head. B eca

use Dr. Rohr ne eded the photogr aph to s h ow an injury that was other

wise not visible,MEN DOZ A – 3 2

Se e Ha rri s v . S tat e , 661 S.W .2d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (bec ause r efr actingthe 50 skin from a victim’s skull did not “obfuscate the re sults of the crime” but allowed the jury to see the injury , there was no e rror in admitting the photog raph)

. S e e M a d d e n v . Sta te , 799 S.W .2d 683, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (photog raphs we re 51 admissible despite showing decomposition and cha ng e ca used by submersion in water for f ive day s); Kno pp a v . S tat e , 505 S.W .2d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (photog raphs showingthe pre sence of dec ompositi on and mag g ots on the body wer e admissible). sh ow ingre fr a c tio n o f the sc a lp is not f a ta l to the a dmi ssi bil ity

of State ’s Exhi bit

70

. Con tr a ry

to 50 appellant’ s position, depiction of a victim’s body at the prec ise time of death is not a prer equisite for admissibili ty

of photog raphs, nor

is it fata l to admissibili ty when photos show de composition and mag g ot activity

. Appellant has not e x plained why otherwise admissible photog raphs become more 51 pr e jud ic ia l be c a

us e of the wa y the y we re dis pla

y e d at tr ia l. Considering all fac tors, we c annot conclude that the probative va lue of the photog raphs wa s substantially

outweig hed by

their pre judicial eff

ect or the nee dless prese ntation of cumulative

e vid e nc e . T he tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti ngthe ph oto g ra

ph s at tr ia l. Poin ts of er ror twe nty -six and twenty -seve n are overr uled. IV . P UN ISHM EN T P HA SE ISS UE S

A. Evidence 1. Adm ission of Drawing an d Rap Lyrics I n p oin t of err or tw enty -f ive , a pp e lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in admitting at the puni shment stag e of trial piece s of paper containing a draw ing ( State’s Exhi bit 131) and orig inal rap ly

rics (State’ s Ex hibits 132 - 134) . Appellant spec ifically claims that the dra

wing

an d l yr i c s w e r e h i g h l y p r e

j u d i c i a l b e c a

u s e t h e y “ c o n t a i n e d

r e f e r e n c e s t o v i o l e n c e , m e n t a l i n s t a b i l i t y, and a r efle ction that whoeve r wrote [t he conte nts] was tortured and angr y .” Appellant also a

rg uesMEN DOZ A – 3 3

that the evidenc e should have been e x cluded be cause they lacke d the prope r “f

oundation” for

a dmi ssi bil ity , th

us re nd e ri ngthe m ir

re le va nt. State’s Exhi bits 131 - 134 were admitte d d uring the testimony of Collin C ounty

Sheriff’ s Offic e Detention Offic er Christy Davis. Davis testified that the exhibi ts ha d been r ecove red f rom

a pp e lla nt’ s c e ll at th e Col lin County Jail by the of fi c e r wh o wa s ass ig ne d with Da vis . Stat e ’s Exhi bit 13 1 is a pie c e of no te bo ok pa pe r c ov e re d wi th va

ri ou s dr awi ng s. A f

la min g sk ull wi th a ke y ho le in the fore h ea d o cc u p i es t h e ce nter of the pag e. A butter fly , a flaming star , a spider w eb, anothe r key hole, and two ske leton key s surround the skull. “DEA TH PENAL TY” is wr itten in the bottom left cor ner, a nd “PAYASO” is wr itten acr oss the top of the pag e. “P ay aso,” the Spanish word for “clown,” is appellant’s nickname. State’s Exhi bit 132 is a pag e of or igina l rap ly rics or poe try

signe d “Moises Sandoval Mendoza 3- 18-05 Pay aso ‘05.” The ly rics re ad: Don’t wa nna try to give y ou a re ason for

all the things that Idid; Cause if I do Iknow I ’ll brea

k & put a hole thru my

head. Ilay in bed toss-n-turnin fig hting my conscie nce; Confident that one day

I ’ll be for ever

unconscie nce. Mo mma ne ve r u nd e rs too d, bu t ne ve r q

ue sti on e d my

re a so ns ; Slowly breathin got me f

ucked up I

done see n too much bleedin. A military

minded Gang sta’s the only way to survive; So best believe I ’m still a Gang sta till t he day Idie. What should I do when times g et har d if I ’m conde med for my action; Ila c k th e ho pe that th ing s’ ll c ha ng e c a us e a ll I se e is d istra c tio ns . So fuck ‘e m all I ’m on my own untill I ’m laid underg round; I ’m tired of pa in, but fuck the c hang e So let the Rain come dow n. State ’s Exhi bit

13 3 is tit le d “ Slip Aw ay ” and re a ds : What will I be in time; Ifee l my self slowly g oin insane Yea h it’s about time to make an e ntranc e, so hold up; I’ m c o m i nt o g e tya

g an k ya , s h an k ya , t i e yo uu

p i nb a c k an d r e ar r an g e ya Iput my pen on pape r & turn my

thoughts into fire

. Isp e a k my

min d a bo ut w hat I

thi nk un til l th e da

y that I die So l e t me do wh a t I

do & ho ld your t

ho ug hts fo r t

he toi le t. I ’m boiling a

nd I ’m bound to blow; Ileave ‘em g aspin for br eath;MEN DOZ A – 3 4

T EX . R. E V ID . 901(a)

. 52 So ria v . S

tat e , 933 S.W .2d 46, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 53 I ’ll chewy ou up and spit y ou out and have y ou askin for D eath. Whatever be ef you wanna bring I ’ll leave y ou chec ked and dismantled. State ’s Exhi bit

13 4 is ano the r p a g e of

ly ri c s th a t r e a ds : Who’d’ve thoug ht a movie starts once another movie ends Pic kin fr ie nd s li ke pic kin

pe ns ; y ou

pic k ‘ e m up and

us e a g a in F uc kin c ho os in i s c on fu sin

so Ic ho os e no t to g o thru it; F uc k ‘ e m Sc re w ‘ e m le a ve ’m c he wi n o n th e ir

na ils wh ile Ike e p o n mo vin See eve ry day Imake it clea

r that whe n I ’m nea

r to watc h y our re ar; Cause over

the y ear s I ’ve he ld tears, watched my back & watche d my

peer s Do it now or do it never

that’s the say

in Ilive by Don’t wa nna do these things that my brain tells me to do; Don’t nee d to live a life if I ’m alwa y s alone. I ’ve trie d my

best to cry

the pain out buy

my brain won’ t let my

wee p out the str e ss. Wou ld b a

by s g ro w t o s e e be tte r d ay s if the y ’r e ta

ug ht t he be tte r w ay s; M y m o m w a s t h e r e t h r o u g h t h i c k & t h i n , b u tye tI s t i l l t h i n k t h i s w ay. Con tr oll y our l if

e do n’ t sl ip & fa ll o r i t’ ll s lip & be y our l a st. B on e to a sh& blo od

to d us t is the wa

y that’ s me ant f

or us ; Fuc k the world & Fuc k the re asons time to relea se the inner DEMOND Give me a

scre wdriver

so Ican digin y our temple, Bust y our fa ce w ith a crowbar like I ’m poppin a pimple. Plain & simple Ilose my

temper its the end of

y our time; I ’ve be en dre amin to be dead; cause all the pain & heavy strain fuc ked up my

mind Ev e ry tim e Itake a

br e a th i t’ s li ke I ’m

makin a de a th w ish I ’m havin g me mor ie s o f n ig htm are s; c uz th e re we re ple nty of the m. (Interna l editing omitted.) Exhibit 134 is signed “ Moises Sandoval Mendoza Pay aso ‘05.” Appellant’s “ foundation” c laim appea rs to be an attack on the suffic iency of the proof

of the do c ume nts ’ a

uth e nti c ity . T he a

uth e nti c a tio n r e qu ir e me nt “ is s a tis fi e d b y e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o support a finding that the matter in que stion is what its propo nent claims.” Evidence that the 52 draw ing and ly

rics wer e found in appellant’s c ell is sufficient to support the infe renc e that they wer e

cre ated by

appellant. Additionally , beca use ap p ellant did not contest the authe nticity of the 53MEN DOZ A – 3 5

Dr ue ry v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 491, 502-03 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007); see also Zimmerman 54 v . S tat e , 860 S.W .2d 89, 97-98 (Te x . Crim. App. 1993), vacate d o n o t h erg r o u nds , 510 U.S. 938 (1993). Gr e e n v . S

tat e , 934 S.W .2d 92, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 55 Se e id . (the de fenda

nt’s descr iption of himself as “trigg er happy ” was indicative of future 56 da ng e ro us ne ss a

nd wa s n ot m or e pr e

jud ic ia l than p ro bativ e ); se e als o Co rwi n v . S tat e , 870 S.W .2d 23, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (the defe ndant’s depic tion of a larg e g ree n monster holding a bloody axe and a woma

n’s sca lp ha d “an infere ntial be aring ” on appellant’ s char acte r for violence, w hich related to his future da

ng erousne ss). sig natur e s o n th e pa

pe rs un de r o a th, pr oo f b y c omp ari so n to oth e r w ri tin g sampl e s, su c h a s h is written statement, is also sufficient to authe nticate the pa pers. The c ombination of these fa ctors 54 supports the infer ence that the dra wing and wr itings we re a ppellant’s handiwor

k. W ith respec t to the “pre judice” c laim, we point out that admission or ex clusion of an inmate’s wr itings ar e eva luated under Rule 403 under the usual standards that confe r g reat discretion on the trial court, and we will not find an abuse of di scre tion unless the trial cour t’s deter mination lies outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. The State intro d u ce d t he pape rs to show 55 appellant’ s continuing threat to society as indicated by his a rtwork and his ly

rics. Un d er s i m ilar

c ir c ums tanc e s, we have he ld that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of su c h e vid e nc e to sh ow futur e da ng e ro us ne ss was not outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion 56 in admitting this evidence . Point of error twe nty -five is ove rruled. 2. Adm ission of Photograph I n point of err or thirt

y , a p p e lla nt alleg es that the trial c ourt err oneously admitted a photog raph (S ta te ’s Exhi bit

86 ) at the punis hme nt sta g e of tr ia l in vio la tio n of Rule 40 3. He argue s th a t E xhibi t 86 was not identified by

any sponsoring witness to make it r eleva nt to a ny issue of punishment orMEN DOZ A – 3 6

On appe al, appe llant discusses the adm i s sion of the photog raph in re lation to Erazo v. 57 Sta te , 1 44 S.W. 3d

48 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ), c omp la ini ng a bo ut the la c k o f s po ns or ingwi tne ss and lac k of prope r authe ntication. ap p l i cab l e i nan y fo rm , an d h e a rgu es t h at t h e i n fl am m at o ry as p ec t s o f t h e p h o t o grap h fa r o u t we i gh i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e , i f

an y. State’s Exhi bit 86 is a photogra ph showing a male very closely rese mbling appe llant from

a p p r o xim a te ly

th e s h in s to th e f

o r e h e a d r e c li n in g w it

h th e h e a d o f a f

e ma le s it u a te d in h is la p . “ [M ]e g e tti nghe a d” is w ri tte n o n th e ba c k o f t he ph oto g ra

ph . App e lla

nt o bje c te d that the State fa ile d to pr e se nt a pr op e r p re dic a te fo r the a dmi ssi on of State ’s Exhi bit 86 , tha t the ph oto g ra phis i rr e le va

nt, and that its admission violates Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. The trial 57 court asked defe nse counsel to “ tell me wher e y ou think the predic ate is de ficient.” C o u n s el responde d that “[w]e have no idea what this picture is about, who took the pic ture, whe n it was taken, what ty

pe of c amer a wa s used, [or] whether it fairly depicts the e vents that are pictured in it.” The trial c ourt viewe d the photog raph a nd then admitted it into evidence. Duri ngthe g uil t ph a se , Se rg e ant To dd Ra inw a te r te sti fi e d that the ph oto g ra ph wa s f ound in appellant’ s b ed ro o m on the eve ning of his arre st. St ate’ s Ex hibit 76, about which Rainwater specific ally

testified, is a photog raph taken in appe llant’s bedroom followinghis arre st and shows evidenc e collec ted from the be droom. State’s Exhi bit 86 is feature d prominently in that photogr aph. A compar ison of State’s Ex hibits 76 and 86 supports that Ex hibit 86 was foun d i n ap p el l ant’s bedroom. F u rth e r , th e d e s c r ip ti o nw r itte no nth e b a c k o f th e p h o to g r a

p h , c o u p le d w it h w h e r e the photo gra p h was found, pr ovides evidenc e that the photog raph is of a ppellant despite the la ck of te sti mony a ff ir ma tiv e ly ide nti fy ingthe man in

the ph oto a s a

pp e lla nt.MEN DOZ A – 3 7

Se e Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g ). 58 During the punishment phase, a ppellant’s chara cter was at issue by virtue of the mitig ation specia l issue. The fact t hat appellant had such a photogra ph of himself and the unidentified woman is as least mildly

probative of

his attitude toward sex

. State’s Ex hibit 86 did not confuse the issues by distracting the jury

from the main issues of the case . The jury was not misled in its deliberation of the spec ial issues by

any undue we ight plac ed on the photogra ph. Admission of the photog raph did not cause undue delay or nee dlessly

prese nt cum u l at ive evidenc e. While the photogr aph may have be e n pre

jud ic ia l to a

pp e lla nt, it w a s n ot u

nf a ir ly so sim ply be c a us e it c a st h im i n a

po or lig ht. 58 We c ann ot c on c lud e that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the ph oto g ra

phwa s su bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

its prejudicia l effe ct. The tria l court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photogr aph duringthe punishment phase. Howeve r, eve n if the trial cour t had er red in a dmitti ng the photog raph, a ny such error wa s harmless be cause the potential pre judici al ef

fec t of this evidence pales in compa rison to the rape

murder of which appe llant was convic ted, and the jur y hear d a s u b s t anti al amount of e vidence of prior violent conduc t, including pr ior sexual assaults. I t i s u n l i k el y that a sing le photog raph depicting what may be consensual s exual activity would have exerted any signific ant influenc e upon the jury in this case. Point of err or thirty is overrule d. 3. Exc lusion o

f E xp e rt T esti mony I n po int of err or twenty -nine, a ppellant alleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in holding that Dr. John Sor e ns on wa s no t qu a lif ie d to te sti fy a s an e xpe rt on the top ic of futur e dan gerous nes s. Appellant ar g ues that th e predic ate pr esente d for Sore nson’s testimony adequa tely met theMEN DOZ A – 3 8

Whil e appe llant claims that the proff ere d testimony

was re levant to spec ial issues two and 59 thr e e , th e c ha

rg e of the c ourt a t pu nis hme nt l ist s o nly

tw o s pe c ia l iss ue s, the futur e da ng e ro us ne ss specia l issue and the mitigation spec ial issue. Fur ther, Appe llant states that Sorenson’s testimony met Rule 705 require ments, but his arg ument relates to the trial cour t’ s “ga t e-keepe r func tion,” which is ac tually

contained in Rule 702. Ke lly v . S tate , 824 S.W .2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 60 Nenno , 970 S.W .2d at 561. 61 require ments of Rule 705 of the T exas Rules of Evidence and that the pr offe red te stimony was rele vant to specia l issues two and three

. 59 Under Rule 702, the proponent of expert testimony must show by clea r a n d co nvincing evidenc e that the testimony he seeks to introduc e is sufficie ntly rele vant and r eliable to assist the trier of fa ct in acc urate ly understanding other evidence or determining a fac t issue. I n the soft scienc es 60 context, s u ch as t h e p redic tion of future da ng erousne ss at issue here , we a sk three que stions: “(1) wh et h er t h e fi el d o f ex p er t i s e is a le gi t i m at e on e, (2 ) wh et h er t h e su b j ec t m a t t e ro f

t h e e x p er t 's testimony is w ithin the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert' s testimony pro p er l y relies

u p o n an d / o r u t i l i z e s t h e p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e f i e l d

. ” Sor e n s o n p o s s e s s e s a B

. A . from Pan 61 A m e r i c anU n i v e r s i t y, anM

. A

. i nc r i m i n o l o g y an d c o r r e c t i o n s f r o m S a m H o u s t o nS t a t e U n i v e r s i t y,

and a Ph. D. in c ri min a l ju sti c e , a lso fr om Sa m Ho us ton State Un ive rs ity . So re ns on te sti fi e d o n v oir dir e that he anti c ipate d “ makin g an in div idu a lize d a sse ssm e nt o f t he ri sk [ap pe lla nt] p re se nts wh ile incar cer ated.” Sorenson s tated that he would tell the j ury that appellant presented only a 23.8 per cent likelihood of co m mitti ng “a se rious violent act” w hile in prison, which Sorenson desc ribed a s “ave rag e.” Sorenson base d his opinion on “[ d]ata collecte d from the Te x as De partment of Corr ections

on 6, 39 0 mu

rd e re rs and

the ir be havio r w hil e inc arc e ra te d d ur ingthe 19 90 s. ” Ac c or din g toMEN DOZ A – 3 9

Sor e n s o n ’ s e s ti ma

te , a p p r o xim a te ly 1 ,500 of the studied individuals were capital murde rer s, but none had bee n sentenc ed to death. Of that number, S orenson estimated that only “a ha ndful” or “ betwee n 20 and 30” wer e case s in w hich the State soug ht the death penalty . Sorenson re stricted his definition of the ser ious crime committed by the studied individuals to only “L evel 1 r

ule violations.” Sor e ns on a lso re vie we d a

pp e lla nt’ s arr est re c or ds fr om C oll in C ounty , a pp e lla nt’ s ja il

rec ords, and the Texas Rang ers’ work-up of this case . Sorenson ex plained that he ar rived at the 23.8 perc ent fig ure by starting with a base rate of 16.4 percent, whic h was the a vera g e base rate for the 6, 39 0 s tud ie d mu

rd e rers , and the n f

a c tor ingin 7 .4 pe rc e nt f

or a pp e lla nt’ s e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s. Acc ording to Sorenson, appellant did not have any other ag g ravating fac tors that would have r aised appellant’ s rate

. Sorenson admitted he was awa re that appellant had assaulted a nother inmate a

nd

c re a te d w e a

po ns wh ile he wa s ho us e d in the c ounty ja il. Ho we ve r, tho se inc ide nts did no t f a c tor int o Sorenson’s pre diction in any way . Up on qu e sti on ingby

the tr ia l court

re g ard ingwh e the r a

ny on e ha d “ loo ke d at and c ri tic a lly evaluated [his] methodology , pro o r co n o r neutral” and published a ny thing r eg ardingthat evaluation, Sorenson responded that nothing had been published e valuating his methodology . The trial court a sked Sorenson to identify his po t en t i al rate of er

ror. Sore nson answer ed that if the predic tion is “23.8 perce nt, then it would prove over the cour se of the ne x t forty y ear s of incar cer ation that if I

said a pe rson’s not g oing to be violent, I would have been w rong 23.8 perc ent of the time.” Th e tr ia l c ourt

the n a sk e d d e fe ns e c ouns e l to e xpla in w hy Sor e ns on sh ould be all ow e d to testify . Counsel told the trial court that Sorenson “me t the Da ub e rt te st. ” Whe n a sk e d s pe c if ic a llyMEN DOZ A – 4 0

a bo ut t he iss ue of

re lia bil ity , c ouns e l r e sp on de d th a t “ Ibe lie ve tha t’ s a ll b e e n p re se nte d to th e Court , and it’s on the re cord.” The trial court found that Sorenson’s anticipated te stimony was not re liable and that it risked confusingand misleading the jury . The trial c ourt stated:

An expert opinion is admissi ble only if it would be helpful to a jury

. I t can’ t be helpf ul to a jury

if it’s not reliable

. His last series of answe rs to me telling me he’s g ot an excess of 23 pe rce nt rate of err or is simply

just by his own

-- that’s not reliable

. The methodolog y

is flawed not only , as t he State points out, by the exclusion of c a pit a l mur de re rs wh o ha ve be e n sen te nc e d to death, bu t th e inc lus ion of pe op le who have been convicted of murder, a method that does not look - - or that e x cludes a ve ri ta ble c or nu c op ia of a c ts o f v iol e nc e that th e Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls h a s h e ld t o b e - - t o c o n s t i tu t e c r i m i n a l a c t s o f v i o l e n c e i s a

f l aw e d m e t h o d o l o g y. To limit it to the sim ple ana ly sis of Ty pe I violations in the prison sy stem -- which, by his own paper , essentially is homicides, ag g ravated as s au l t s , and sexual assaults -- is to eliminate a broad spectrum of criminal activity that a jury is allowed to c on sid e r, that th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s sa id t hin g s th a t c on sti tut e criminal ac ts of violence. I t is sil ly . I t is poor scholarship to come into a criminal cour troom to predict future a cts of violence and not to include all of the thing s or eve n a majority of the things that a

jury could consider

. It d o e s n ’ th e l p t h e j u r

y. Ev e n if so me ho w s ome c ourt we re to f ind tha t Da ub e rt and it s prog eny

under the applica

ble Texas case law were satisfied, it fails under a 403 analy sis because of the risk of pre

judice. The risk of conf usion to the jury

is too gre at

. T h e risk of misleading the jury

is too gre at to be outweighe d by its probative value w ith an err or rate of m ore than one in five. That’s not helpful. I t’s -- it flat out fa ils under a 403 ana ly sis

. The trial c ourt conc luded that it w o uld not qualify Sorenson as e x pert, that the te stimony he anticipated pr oviding wa s not admissibl e bec ause it did not satisfy the requirements of Rul e 702, and that th e te sti mony

a lso fa ile d und e r a

Rul e 40 3 a

na ly sis

.MEN DOZ A – 4 1

Given the nature of Sore nson’s future dang erousne ss a s s e s s me nt, we disag ree with the trial 62 court’s c onclusion that the rate of er ror is twenty -three perc ent. We ag ree with the tr i al court’s c o n s i d e r a t i o no f

t h e a b s e n c e o f p e e r r e v i e w , h o w e v e r . S o r e n s o nd i d c l a i m t o h a v e a m e t h o d o l o g y, and so pe e r r e vie w o f that me tho do log y wa s a le g iti ma te a

fa c tor to c on sid e r i n d e c idi ngwh e the r t o admit the evidenc e her e. Contrast Nenno , 970 S.W .2d at 562 (expert witness did not claim to have a pa rt ic ula r m e tho do log y

fo r d e te rm ini ngfutur e da ng erous ne ss, bu t r e lie d u

po n h is e xpe ri e nc e in study ing c ases involving sex offender s). Thoug h appellant discusses six photogr aphs, he acknow ledg es t hat onl y two of those we re 63 excluded. He doe s not s ep ar at el y list t he six points of error , and he g ives no explanation for why there are six points inst ead of just two. I n r e a c hin g his c on c lus ion that a pp e lla nt, wh o h a d be e n c on vic te d of c a pit a l murd e r, wo uld prese nt only

a 23.8 per cent c hance of committing violent ac ts in the future, Sorenson r eli ed on a stu dy that on ly marg ina lly inc lud e d c a pit a l mur de re rs a g a ins t w ho m th e State ha d s ou g ht t he de a th penalty . Sorenson also re stricted his definition of ser i o u s cr i m e, rely ing only on what the Te x as Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice cla ssifies as a L evel I violation, which excludes many offe nses that

c on sti tut e a c ts of vio le nc e . Whe n sp e c if ic a lly e va luatin g a

pp e lla nt, Sor e ns on did no t take into

c on sid e ratio n a

pp e lla nt’ s ac tio ns of

a ssa ult ingano the r i nmate or

c re a tin g we a

po ns wh ile ho us e d in the county

jail. Furthe r, Sorenson’s methodolog y has not bee n critica lly

evaluated in any

published mat er i al

. W e c an n o td i s agr ee wi t h t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d et er m i n at i o nt h at t h e e v i d en ce ap p el l ant s oug ht

62 to i ntr od uc e thr ou g h So re ns on ’s te sti mo ny was no t su ff ic ie ntl y re lia ble to a ssi st the jur

y in i ts de c isi on of wh e the r a

pp e lla nt po se d a c on tin

uin g thr e a t to so c ie ty

. Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in excluding Sore nson’s proposed te stimony . Point of error twe nty -nine is over ruled. 4. Exc lusion o

f P hot og ra phs I n points of error

thirty -one throug h thirty -six , appellant c omplains that the trial court improperly

excluded mitigation evidenc e in the for m of photogr aphs duringthe punishment phase. 63 Appellant ar g ues that the trial court should have admitted the photog raphs be cause they are rele vantMEN DOZ A – 4 2

542 U.S. 274 (2004). 64 Id . at 284-85. 65 Id

. 66 under Tennard v. Dre tke

. I n Te nn ar d , the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Cou

rt re je c te d th e F if

th C ir c uit 64 Court of Appea ls’s constitutional relevanc e test and r eaf firmed that the sta

ndard f or re lev a n c e is “ any tendenc y to make the exis tence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba

ble or less proba

ble than it would be without the evidenc e.” Evidence that the jury 65 could re asonably

find war rante d a sente nce le ss than death c annot be ba rre d. 66 The two photog raphs e x cluded by the trial cour

t were a photo of appellant at less than one y e ar o f a g e sta

nd ingou tsi de in a dia

pe r (D e fe ns e Exhi bit 1) and a ph oto of a pp e lla nt p os ingon

a hil l with his mother, si ster, brother, sister-in-la w, and c ousin (Def

ense Exhibit 6). Appellant rea sons that these photogr aphs, as mitigating evidenc e, wer e admissible be cause the photog raphs “ humanize[ d] him before the jury

as something other than a monster” a

nd could be use d by the j ury “to believe that [ap pe lla nt’ s] c on du c t c ou ld be mod if ie d in the e nv ir on me nt of c on tin uo us pr iso n cu sto dy fo r t

he re st of his life.” Contrary to appellant’ s argument, the photog raphs a re not a utomatically

considere d rele vant under Te nn ar

d

. Whil e a ph oto g ra

ph of a pp e lla nt in a dia pe r an d a pho tog ra

ph of him po sin g ha pp ily wi th his fa

mil y do sh ow that a

pp e lla nt wa s on c e a sma ll c hil d and pa rt of a se e min g ly

ha pp y fa mil y at one time, neither photogr aph is a utomatically

rele vant to the mitigation spec ial issue. Neither of the se ph oto g ra

ph s has any te nd e nc y

to s ho w t

hat a pp e lla nt i s n ot a

futur e da

ng e r, no r d o th e se photogr aphs af

fec t whether sufficie nt mitigating circ umstances ex ist to warra nt a life sente nce r atherMEN DOZ A – 4 3

See art. 37.071(e )(1) (mitigation special issue). 67 W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 692, *37 (J une 11). 68 See id. a t *7 5 (t

ri a l c ourt may e xclu de “ e xec uti on -i mpa c t” te sti mony ); Go ff v . S tat e , 931 69 S.W. 2d 53 7, 55 4- 56 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 )( tr ia l c ourt no t r e qu ir e d to a dmi t “ re c ipr oc a l vi c tim impact” e vidence showing the alleg edly bad cha rac ter of the victim). See W illiams , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S at *32. 70 than the death penalty

. Appellant is essentially advocating a

defe ndant ana logue to the “quick 67 g limpse of the life” aff

orded by victim chara cter

evidenc e. But c oncept s re l at i n g to impact and

68 char acte r evide nce w ith respec t to victims cannot ne cess ar i l y b e i nverte d for the be nefit of the de fe nd ant. 69 Ev e n if the y c ou ld, a pp e lla nt co nc e de s tha t the tr ia l court a dmi tte d f our o f h is p ho tog ra

ph s, which showe d (1) a

ppellant g raduating f

rom junior high sc hool, ( 2 ) ap p el l ant at a track me et, (3)

a pp e lla nt a s p art of hi s sc ho ol b a sk e tba ll t e a m, a nd (4 ) a pp e lla nt a s p art of his y ou th g ro up a t St. Wil liams Church. Under

the applica

ble standar ds relatingto vic tim impact a nd char acte r evide nce, the trial cour

t retains discre tion under Rule 403 to limit the amou n t and scope of the e vidence desig ned to show the quick g limpse the defe ndant was seeking

. We c annot say that the trial cour t 70 abused its discre tion in withhol ding the admission of Defe nse Exhibi ts 1 and 6. Moreove r, eve n if the trial court ha d err ed in excluding the photog raphs, a ny such er ror wa s harmless. As we have jus t explained, appellant was able to introduce four of his “g limpse in the life” photogr aphs to the jury

. Considering the admitted photog raphs, a nd also the enor

mity of appe llant’s crime a nd his prior bad acts, we c an conf idently say bey ond a re asonable doubt that the exclusion of these two photogr aphs did not contribute to the jury ’s assessment of punishment. Poi nts of err or thirty -one throug h thirty -six are overr uled.MEN DOZ A – 4 4 5. Id e ntif ic ations I n point of err or thirty -seve n, appellant c omplains of testimony rega rdi ng photo lineups

co n d u ct ed during the inve stigations of two ag g rava ted robbe ry

extraneous offe nses. Thoug h the point of err o r s p ea k s o f t he trial c ourt err ing in pe rmitting the a dmission of the photo li neup, the argument section of a

ppellant’s brie f indicat es t h at h e is complaining about the in-c ourt identifications made by

the victims of the two offe nses. He claims that the in-cour t identifications

wer e tainted by

impermissibly

sug g estive photog raphic arr ay s and should have be en excluded. First Identification Th e tr ia l c ourt

he ld a he ari ngou tsi de the pr e sen c e of the jur y on a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to suppress the identific ation of appe llant by Nhat Thine Vu, the complainant in an ext rane ous ag g ravated robbe ry . Dallas Police Depa rtment Offic er Paul D emaa g testified that he pre pare d and showed a photo lineup to Vu. Vu stated that he was eig hty perc ent sure that appellant wa s one of the pe op le wh o r ob be d h im. De ma a g te sti fi e d th a t, a ft e r Vu ma de the te ntativ e ide nti fi c a tio n, he did not indicate to Vu in any

manner that Vu had “ picked the rig ht guy .” Demaa g also testified that he did not prepar e any

other photo lineups with appellant’ s picture in them in order to obtain a strong er identification. The trial c ourt denied the moti o n to suppress and Vu subse quently made a n in-court identification of a

ppellant. Vu testified dur ing punishment a nd ident i fi ed appellant as one of the three men who held him and L ian Trinh at gunpoint, demande d the couples’ belong ings, a nd then drove a way taking Trinh with them. During Vu’s te stimony , no mention was made of any identification other tha

n the identification of appellant that Vu ma de in cour t and no testi mony reg ardingthe photog raphic arr ay in which Vu orig inally

i d en t ified appe llant was pre sented to theMEN DOZ A – 4 5

Se e Ne il v . B igge rs , 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 71 Con ne r v . S

tat e , 67 S.W .3d 192, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 72 W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 937 S.W .2d 479, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 73 Fo rd v . S tat e , 919 S.W .2d 107, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 74 jury . The re cord does not indicate that Vu’s in-court identification was based on any thing other

than his in-court re cog nition of appellant as the pe rson who committed the off ense. Appellant’s br ief on a

ppeal doe s not point t o any alleg edly

sug g estive aspe ct of the photogr aphic a

rra y prese nted to Vu. Thoug h it is t rue that an in-cour t identification ca

n be tainted by an impermissibly

sug g estive lineup, the first step in suc h a proce ss w ould be to showthat the 71 lin e up wa s in fa c t impe rm iss ibl y su g g e sti ve . With re sp e c t to the ph oto g ra ph ic lin e up pr e se nte d to 72 Vu, appe llant has not even attempted to do so. He simply claims th at t h e p rosecutor did not interrog ate Vu w ith re s p ec t to the “ef fica cy ” of his identification, that Vu made only a tentative ide nti fi c a tio n at th e tim e of the ph oto g ra

ph ic lin e up , a

nd th at “ the re is n oth ingin t he re c or d to i n dicate that his identification was untainted by the photog raphic sprea d.” B ut it is appellant’ s burd e n to e xpla in wh a t he thinks is sug g e sti ve a bo ut t he arr ay , a

nd a fa ilure to d o s o is fa

ta l to his claim. Absent a showingthat the photog raphic lineup wa s i m p er m i s sibly sug g estive, the mer e 73

c on c e rn that a wi tne ss’ s id e nti fi c a tio n ma y be ina c c ur a te do e s n ot i mpl ic a te du e pr oc e ss. 74 Second I dentification Th e tr ia l c ourt

he ld a he ari ngou tsi de the pr e se nc e of th e jur y on a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to suppress the identific ation of appellant by Melissa Chavez, the complainant in another extraneous ag g ravated robbe ry . Dallas Police De partment Of fice r Tim Stewart testified that he compiled a photo arra

y of si x individuals using appellant’s photogra ph and thos e of suspects in other ca ses. HeMEN DOZ A – 4 6

See Un ite d Stat es v . B au tis ta , 23 F.3d 726, 731 ( 2d Cir. 1994)(slig htly brig hter a

nd more 75 c los e -u p p ho tog ra

phdid no t r e nd e r p ho tog raph ic arr ay mor e su g g e sti ve ; th e dif fe re nc e s “ wo uld (continued...) showed the arr ay to Chavez, instructing her that “the suspec t may or may not be in the line-up, that she wa s to just l ook at them, and if she rec og nized a ny one, point them out.” Stewar t testified that he did not tell Chavez that she had to pick anyone out and that he did not indicate in any way who she should pick. Stewar

t testified that Chavez chose the photo of appe llant almost im mediately upon seeingthe photo arr ay . Stewart de scribed Chavez’s identification as “ positive.” The trial c ourt d en i ed the motion to suppress and Chavez subsequently made a n in-court identification of appellant. Chavez testified during punishment that appellant a pproac hed her

as she

wa s sittin g in he r c ar in a pa rk ing lot a t Ric hla nd Col le g e . App e lla

nt f ir st a sk e d Ch a ve z if

he c ou ld

se e he r p ho ne . H e the n p oin te d a g un a t he r and de mand e d he r ke y s. Ap pe lla nt pa sse d the ke y s to another person a nd order ed Chave z int o the trunk of he r ca r. When Chavez refuse d twice, a ppellant tol d h e r t o s tart

wa lki ngtow ard

the str e e t. Whe n Chave z be g an wa lki ng , a pp e lla nt d ro ve awa y in her c ar. Chave z testi fied that she pic ked appe llant out of the phot o arr ay and identified him in court beca use she would “ never

forg et his fac e.” I n his brief

, a p p e ll ant points out that S tewar t admitted that appellant’s photog raph in the a rra y that was pre sented to Chavez had a closer f ocus on his fac e than the othe r suspec ts. The photogr aphic a

rra y , State’s Exhi bit 122, contains headshots of a ppellant and f

ive other me n. Although a

ppellant appears to be in slightly closer focus than the ot hers, the other indi viduals in the

arr ay are no t g re a tly

dis sim ila r i n a pp e ara nc e fr om a

pp e lla nt. Al l have sh or

t ha ir and are Hi sp a nic wi th s imi lar f

a c ia l f e a tur e s. Th e y e a c h f

it a ro ug h d e sc ri pti on

of a pp e lla nt. Th e c los e r c a me ra

a ng le on appellant is a minor differ ence that does not a ffe ct the reliability of the arr ay . We find that the 75MEN DOZ A – 4 7

(...continued) 75 hardly sug g est to an identifying witness that [t he defe ndant] wa s more likely to be the culpr it”); Sta te v . A n th ony , 8 5 7 S

. W .2d 861, 867 (Mo. App., W.D. 1993)(photog raph taken at a slightly closer distance tha

n the others wa s a “minor” differ ence that did not re n der photog raphic arr ay imp e rm iss ibl y

su g g e sti ve ); see also Pe ople v. Johnson , 3 Cal. 4th 1184, 1217, 842 P.2d 1, 17 (1992) (d if fe re nc e s i nb a c k g r o u n d

c o l o r an d i m a g e s i z e d i d

n o tr e n d e r

p h o t o g r a p h i c ar r ay i mp e r m i s s i b ly sug g estive). ph oto arr ay

pr e se nte d to Cha

ve z wa s n ot i mpe rm iss ibl y su g g e sti ve. P oi nt o f e rr or thi rt y -s e ve n is

overr uled. 6. Statem ents to Police Regarding E xtraneous Offenses I n p oin t of

e rr or thi rt y -e ig ht, a pp e lla nt c omp la ins that th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in allowing Dallas Police De partment Of fice r Tim Stewart to testify about t h e s t at em ents appellant

ma de re g ard ingtw o e xtra ne ou s a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

of fe ns e s. Ap pe lla

nt a lle g e s th a t hi s st a te me nts to Stewart we re involuntarily made. Duri nga he ari ng ou tsi de the pr e se nc e of the jur y , a pp e lla nt t e sti fi e d th a t, at th e tim e of his

arr est for ag g ravated robber y , he was mistreated by the arr esting office r. Appellant told t h e t rial court that he had suff

ere d a deep cut to his arm and that the arresting office r kept “slapping” the open wound u n ti l a p p e ll an t w o u ld

p r o v id e h is n a me . H e a ls o c o mp la in e d th a t t h e ar r e s ti n g o f f ic er squeezed a

ppellant’s ar

m tightly when handcuf

fing him. Appellant further stated that he ha

rbore d a fe ar of the police as a result of his a nd his family ’s past dea lings with police. A ppellant explained that he had le arne d that his father had bee n beate n rec ently by the police. Howeve r, appe llant also testified that an officer other than the arr esting office r transpor ted him to the police depar

tment approxim ately

forty -five minutes afte r hi s arr est. Appellant admitted that this second offic er ne ver thre atene d him and did not mistreat him. Appellant waited in a holding cell for less than fifteen m inutes befor e being moved into an intervie w room. Appe llant was allowe dMEN DOZ A – 4 8

to u se the re str oo m be fo re sp e a kin g wi th Ste wa rt

. Ap pe lla

nt ad mit te d tha t Stew art , who wa s th e on ly person in the r oom with him during the int ervie w, never t hreatened him. Appellant neve r re quested medical c are . Appellant testified that St ewa rt promised t o allow appe llant to phone his mother and that Stewart would tell the district attorne y that appellant ha d been c ooperative. Stewart, howe ver, te stified that he did not make a ny promises to appellant. Stewa rt testified that he a dv ise d a

pp e lla nt o f h is r ig ht s and th at a pp e lla nt u nd e rs too d a

nd vo lun tari ly

wa ive d th os e rig hts. Accor ding to Stewa rt, appe llan t wa s n ei ther re luctant nor fe arf ul during the interview

. Additionally , Stewart did not rec all appellant c omplaining to him that the ar resting o ff

i cer had

m i s t r e a t e d

a p p e l l an ti nan y w ay. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d that a pp e lla nt fr e e ly and vo lun tari ly wa ive d his ri g hts and wi ll ing ly provided the statements to Stewa rt fre e of threa

ts. The trial cour

t found no cre dible evidenc e that fo rc e wa s u se d a g a ins t a

pp ell ant or that th e re we re any a ff ir ma tiv e pr omi se s ma de to a pp e lla nt t o obtain the s tatements. Be cause the t rial court’s finding s are supported by the record, they will not be disturbed on a

ppeal. Point of err or thirty -eig ht is overruled.

7. Im proper Cross-exam inati on I n p oin t of erro r forty , a

pp e lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli ngthe de fe ns e ob je c tio n to the S tat e’s c ro ss- e xami natio n o f d e fe ns e e xpe rt Dr . M ark

Vi g e n d ur ingpunis hme nt. Ap pe lla nt s pe c if ic a lly e xpla ins tha

t th e State ’s mann e r o f c ro ss- e xami natio n b ro ug ht i rr e le va nt f a c ts of capital murder case s not associated w ith appellant bef ore the jury

in a way not sanctioned by

the Texas Rules of Evidence

. During t h e cr oss-examination of Dr. Vig en, the State be g an questioning him reg arding

ano the r c a

pit a l murd e r t

ri a l in wh ic h h e ha d te sti fi e d a s a mit ig a tio n e xpe rt

fo r t he de fe ns e . D e fe ns eMEN DOZ A – 4 9

Se e Can tu v . S

tat e , 939 S.W .2d 627, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 76 Id

. 77 c o u n s e l o b

j e c t e d t o t h e r e l e v an c y o f t h e o t h e r c a s e . T h e S t a t e r e s p o n d e d , “ It g o e s t o c r e d i b i l i t y . It g o e s t o t h e j u r

y’ s o p p o rtu n i t y t o j u d g e h i s c r e d i b i l i t y an d b i a s i n t h e s e t yp e s o f m a t t e r s an d [ t h e j u r y] is entitled to hear wha

t other ty pes of c ases in which he has t estified to judge his cre dibilit y .” The tr ia l c ourt ov e rr ule d th e ob

je c tio n. Dr . Vig e n tes tif

ie d tha t he pr ov ide d te sti mony in “ aro un d f

if ty or so” capital mu

r d e r c a s e s o nb e h a lf

o f th e d e f e n s e . H e f

u rth e r te s ti f ie d th a t w h e r e h e h a s been called a s a mitigation expert, it has “alway s” been by the defense. The State que stioned Dr. Vig en reg ardingsix notable ca

pital murder c ases, identify ing e ach by the def

endant’ s name a

nd by a brie f sy nopsis of the fac ts of the ca se. In eac h, Dr. Vig en h ad t estified for the def ense a s a mitigation expert or in the ar ea of

future da ng erousne ss. Rule 611(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that a w itness may be cr oss-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case , including c redibility . The trial c ourt has discre tion

r e g ar d i n g t h e e x t e n t o f c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n o f a w i t n e s s f o r t h e s h o w i n g o f

b i a s o r a s t o c r e d i b i l i t y. 76 I ts decision is not subject to rever sal absent a clea r abuse of discre tion. 77 The que s t i o n s p o sed by the State wer e re levant to Dr. V ige n’s cr edibility , and more specific ally , h i s possible bias. We cannot say that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in allowing the State to c ro ss- e xami ne Dr . Vig e n re g ard ing oth e r ca se s in whic h h e te sti fi e d. Poi nt o f e rr or fo rt y is overrule d. B. Jury Charge

1. Instr uctions Regarding V ictim Im pact EvidenceMEN DOZ A – 5 0

W illiams , 2 00 8 T e x. Cr im. Ap p. L EX I S a t *3 4; Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 532 78 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. de nied , 128 S. Ct . 282 (2007). 983 S.W .2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 79 Se e Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 80 I n point of err or fifty -two, appe llant alleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to limit t he jury ’s consider ation of victim impact evidenc e “suc h that it is not to be co n s i d er ed i n connec tion with the future da

ng erousne ss special issue, a nd to mak e a prope r application of such law to the fac ts.” The a

rg ument section of a

ppellant’s point of error is a si ng le s entenc e, which fails to cite any authori ty , a

p p ly la w to th e f a c ts , o r ma

k e an y e xp la

n a ti o n f o r w h y h e th ink s h e is e n ti tl e d to the instruction. The point of er ror is inade quately

briefe d. Moreove r, the e vidence shows that appellant kn e w hi s vic tim . Wh e n th e de fe nd ant k no ws his vic tim , v ic tim -r e la te d e vid e nc e is “ ne c e ssa ri ly rele vant” to the de fenda

nt’s future dang erousne ss, a s well as his moral culpability

. Point of error 78 fifty -two is overr

uled. I n point of err or fifty -four , appellant c omplains, citing to Mo sle yv . S tat e , that the trial cour

t 79 failed to instruct the jury that victim impac t e vidence was not to be used to make a ny compar ative worth ana ly sis. Even if we wer e to a ssume, for purposes of ar g ument , that a pp e lla nt w a s e nti tle d to

su c h a n in str uc tio n, he do e s not cl a im that he re qu e ste d the ins tr uc tio n at tri a l, an d with ou t a r e qu e st, he would be e ntitled to relief only if the record showed that he suffere d eg reg ious harm. Appellant 80 has fa iled to argue that he suf fer ed any harm, much le ss eg reg ious harm, and we p erceive no eg reg ious harm in this case. Point fifty -four is overrule d. 2. Agreement

on Mit igatin g Circum stancesMEN DOZ A – 5 1

Art. 37.071, §2(f

)(3)

. 81 I n p oin ts o f e rr or

fi ft y -f ive thr ou g h fi ft

y -e ig ht, a pp e lla nt a lle g e s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in failing to instruct the jury t h at i t did not have to unanimously ag ree on which mitigating

c ir c ums ta n c e s w e r e s u f

f i c i e n t t o w ar

r an t t h e i mp o s i t i o n o f a l i f e s e n t e n c e i n o r d e r t o g i v e a “ y e s”

ans we r t o th e mit ig a tio n s pe c ia l is su e . App e lla nt c ites no aut ho rity , b ut w e ob se rv e that art ic le 37.071 require s that the trial cour t instruct the jury , with respec t to the mitigation s pecia l issue, that it “need not a g ree on what par ticular e vidence supports an af firmative finding on the issue.” An 81 instruction conformingto this statutory require ment was submi tted in the jury char g e. Points of error fifty -five thr oug h fifty -eig ht are overr uled. 3. V a r i o u s C h a l l e n g es t o t h eD e a t h P e n a l t y Sc h e me I n a number

of points of err or, appe llant raises attacks on the Texas death pena lty scheme that we have alr eady

reje cted. In points of err or forty -two and six ty -seve n, appellant contends that the mit ig a tio n s pe c ia l is su e is es se nti a lly a nu lli fi c a tio n issu e ba rr e d by the Sup re me Cou

rt ho ldi ng s in Smith v. Texas and Penry v . Johnson . I n points of error forty -three t h ro u gh fo rty -six , appellant

a ssa ils the ra

tio na lity of the sp e c ia l is su e ins tr

uc tio ns a s no t pr ov idi ng any me anin g fu l g uid anc e to t he jury and fa iling to g ive an a dequate vehicle f or g ranting merc y

based upon mitig ating circ umstances. In point of err or for ty -seve n, appellant c omplains that the jury was not instructed that it may consider “n o n- Pe nr y ”mitigating e vidence to rebut, and r aise re asonable doubt about, the State’s claim of future dang erousne ss, deliberation, and rea sonable e x pectation of death, a s well as in consideration of Special I ssue No. 2 on mitigating circ umstances. I n points of error forty -eig ht throug h fifty -one, a

nd seventy -two, appe llant alleg es that the jury should ha ve been instructed on the meaning s of par

ticular wor ds and phra ses associated with jury char g es in death penalty

case s andMEN DOZ A – 5 2

Con tr ary to a pp e lla nt’ s c la im, the tr ia l c ourt did su bmi t an e xplic it “ be y on d a re a so na ble 82 do ub t” ins tr

uc tio n w ithre sp e c t to e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s. claims that the failure t o do so violates the constitution. I n point of err or fifty -three , appellant a lleg es that t h e trial court err ed in not instructing the jury that the pre sentation of victim impact evidenc e does not relieve the State of its b u rden to prove the future dang erousne ss special issue be y ond a

rea sonable doubt. I n points of error fifty -nine throug h six ty -two, appe llant contends that the trial court e rre d in failing to inform the jury that a fa ilure to unanimously agr ee o n t h e answers to the specia l issues would result in a l i fe s en t ence rathe r than a mistrial. I n point of err or six ty -three , a pp e lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in i ns tr

uc tin g the jur

y on the sp e c ia l is su e s b e c a

us e tho se issues were not alleg ed in the indictment. I n points of err or six ty -four and seve nty , he conte nds that due proc ess re quires that the burden be place d on the S tate to prove lack of mit iga ting c ircumstance s bey ond a re asonable doubt. I n point of err or si x ty -five, appellant conte nds that the trial cour t erre d in “ f a i l i n g t o r e q

u i r e p r o o f

o f e xtr an e o u s o f

f e n s e s an d o t h e r m i s c o n d u c tb e y o n d

a r e a s o n a b le doubt.” I n points of error six ty -six , seventy -three , seventy four, a nd seventy -s even, a

ppellant 82 contends tha t t h e ca p i tal punishment scheme, or the mitigation issue in par ticular, c reates an unconstitutionally open-e nded and arbitra ry proce ss for impos ing the death penalty in violation of th e fede ral a n d

s tate c o n s ti tuti o n s . I np o in ts o f e r r o r s ixt y - e ig h t, s ixt

y - n in e , an d

s e v e n ty

- s ix, appellant c ontends that the def endant implicitly

bear s the burden of

proof on the mitig ation specia l iss ue , o r at le a st o n a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s r e le va nt t o tha t issu e , in viol a tio n of fe de ra l and state constitutional requireme nts

. I n point of err or seve nty -one, a ppellant contends that the statutory

r e qu ir e me n t o f a t le a s t te n “ n o ” v o te s f o r th e ju r y to r e tu r n a n e g a ti v e an s w er to the f uture dang erousne ss special issue violates the prohibition ag ainst crue l and unusual punishments. I n pointMEN DOZ A – 5 3

Sa lda no v . S

tat e , 232 S.W .3d 77, 104-09 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007), cert. de nied , 1 28 S. Ct

. 83 14 46 (2 00 8) ; Bl ue v . S

tat e , 125 S.W .3d 491, 504-05 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003). Saldano , 232 S.W .3d at 107. 84 of e rr or se ve nty -f ive , a pp e lla nt a lle g e s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli nga pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to hold article 37.071 unc o n s tituti onal bec ause the “statute fa ils to require the issue of mitigation be considere d by the jury .” I n point of err or seventy -eig ht, a ppellant contends that capital se ntencing sche m e v i olates applica

ble constitutional require ments beca use it does not permit meaning ful appellate revie w. All of these c halleng es have been r ejec ted. We have held that it is sufficient to dispose of 83 the se ty pes of cha lle ng e s “ by

re c og nizi ngthat th e tr ia l c ourt su bmi tte d a c ha rg e c on sis te nt w ith applicable state statutes, which ha ve withstood numerous constitutional challeng es.” Such is the 84

c a s e h e r e . P o i n t s o f

e r r o r f o rt y- t w o t h r o u g h f

i f t y- o n e , f i f t y - t h r e e , an d

f i f t y- n i n e t h r o u g h s e v e n t yeig ht are overr

uled. I np o in t o f

e r r o r s e v e n ty

- n in e , a

p p e ll an t a ll e g e s th a t t

h e tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in o v err uling appellant’ s second motion to set aside the indictment as being unconstitut ional. Appellant states that he “f iled a Mot i o n t o Quash the indictment ra ising numer ous constitutional is sues conc erningthe de a th p e na lty .” Ap pe lla

nt l ist s th e te n c on sti tut ion a l is su e s th a t w e re ra ise d in the Mo tio n to Q ua sh but provides no ar g ument and does not a pply these issues to the fac ts of this case. Point of err or seventy -nine is inadequately briefe d and is overr

uled. V. CU M UL AT IV E ERRO R I n points of error

eig hty and eig hty -one, a

ppellant urg es this Court to consider the cumulative imp a c t of the e rr or s p re se nte d a

bo ve . Wh ile a

numbe r o f e rr or s ma

y be fo un d harmfu l in

the irMEN DOZ A – 5 4

Cha mb e rla in v . S

tat e , 998 S.W .2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 85 W rig ht v . S tat e , 28 S.W .3d 526, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 86 c u m u l a t i v e e f

f e c t , c u m u l a t i v e e r

r o r h a s n o t b e e n s h o w n h e r e . P o i n t s o f e r r o r e i g h t y an d

e i g h t y- 85 86

one ar e over

ruled. We affir m the judgme nt of the trial cour t. Deliver ed: Novembe r 5, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh