FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 (ASSIGNMENT NO. S-08-021-00) 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA’S CONSTELLATION STANDING REVIEW BOARDS 

ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DUE REGARD FOR MEMBER 

INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

 
Final report released by: 

 signed 

Evelyn R. Klemstine 

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 

Acronyms 

CSSS Constellation Space Suit Systems 

CxP Constellation Program 

EVA Extravehicular Activity 

FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IPAO Independent Program Assessment Office 

NPD NASA Policy Directive 

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 

OGC Office of General Counsel 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 

SRB Standing Review Board 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 
FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

OVERVIEW

NASA’S CONSTELLATION STANDING REVIEW BOARDS 

ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DUE REGARD FOR MEMBER 

INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS

The Issue 

NASA established Standing Review Boards (SRBs) to ensure certain Agency projects are 

reviewed by groups of uniquely qualified experts who can provide, essentially, quality 

control reviews throughout the project’s life cycles.1

 Agency directives require that SRB 

members be independent of the program or project they review (i.e., unbiased and outside 

the advocacy chain of the program or project) to ensure that the SRB can provide an 

impartial, unbiased opinion of the program or project’s potential success. This report 

addresses the SRBs for the Constellation Program (CxP) and the CxP projects. Our 

objective was to determine the independence of the members of those SRBs. 

This report follows up on and expands the scope of our April 2008 report concerning 

independence and conflict-of-interest issues involving the SRB for CxP’s Orion Project.2 

In that report, we state that NASA did not establish the Orion SRB in accordance with 

Federal law or NASA guidance. The Orion SRB met the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act3 (FACA) definition of an advisory committee. Although advisory committees 

meeting this definition must be established in accordance with FACA and NASA Policy 

Directive (NPD) 1150.11, “Federal Advisory Committee Act Committees,” September 

22, 2004, the Orion SRB was not. Had NASA initially recognized the Orion SRB as an 

advisory committee subject to FACA, NASA’s ethics process associated with advisory 

committee participation would have been triggered, resulting in a focus on board member 

independence and conflict of interest resolution. We found that 6 of the Orion SRB’s 

19 members were not fully independent of the Orion Project, as required by NASA 

Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements,” March 6, 2007. All 6 were employees of companies having 

contracts for Orion work and 4 of the 6 were also stockholders. In addition to the Orion 

SRB, NASA initiated SRBs for the Constellation Program itself and CxP’s other projects: 

 

1

 NASA’s program and project “life cycles” includes independent review milestones such as the System 

Requirements Review, System Definition Review, Preliminary Design Review, and Critical Design 

Review. 

2

 NASA Office of Inspector General, “Final Memorandum on the Standing Review Board for the Orion 

Crew Exploration Vehicle Project” (Report No. IG-08-018, April 28, 2008). 

3

 Title 5, United States Code (5 U.S.C.), Sections 1–16, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), as 

amended. 
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Ares Project, Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Systems Project, Ground Operations 

Project, and Mission Operations Project. Details of the review’s scope and methodology 

are in Appendix A. 

Results 

We found 21 SRB members—close to one-third of all non-Federal CxP SRB members— 

with conflicts of interest and determined that each of the SRBs for CxP and its 

constituent Projects included at least one non-Federal Government employee who was 

conflicted. Specifically, each SRB included at least one non-Federal Government 

employee who was an employee or consultant of a NASA contractor with an interest in 

or contract with either CxP or one of its projects. For example, the 12 non-Federal 

members of the CxP SRB included 4 members (33 percent) who were not independent. 

Table 1 below summarizes the extent of conflict-of-interest issues found amongst nonFederal Government employees of the CxP SRB and CxP project SRBs. 

Table 1. Composition of Constellation Program 

Standing Review Boards (SRBs) Non-Federal Government Employees 

(as of October 1, 2008) 

Members with Conflicts 

SRB 

Number of 

Non-Federal 

Government 

Employees Total 

Percentage of 

Non-Federal 

Government 

Employees 

CxP 12 4 33 

Ares 10 2 20 

EVA 

Systems 

8 2 25 

Ground 

Operations 

13 6 46 

Mission 

Operations 

8 1 13 

Oriona 15 6 40 

 a As reported in NASA OIG Report No. IG-08-018 (April 28, 2008). 

This condition occurred because NASA’s procedures for determining the independence 

of an SRB member were inadequate. Specifically, because the SRBs met the definition 

of FACA committees but were not organized under FACA, they did not trigger the ethics 

review process associated with the establishment of FACA committees. Instead, NASA 

used a process that was lacking in both rigor and accuracy for determining independence 

of SRB members. For example, we identified seven SRB members who failed to indicate 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 iii 

on their self-assessment forms that they were employed by companies receiving funding 

from CxP or CxP projects. 

Because SRB members were not independent, NASA lacked assurance that SRB 

members provided impartial and unbiased opinions on the project’s success in meeting 

technical, schedule, and cost-related milestones. Furthermore, by not verifying an SRB 

member’s independence, NASA placed the SRB member at risk of violating the 

Procurement Integrity Act because the Agency did not take precautions, as required by 

the Act, to ensure that certain persons do not have access to source selection information 

that the Agency had not previously made available to the public. 

Management Action 

In November 2008, NASA took actions to address our concerns with FACA and the 

conflict-of-interest issues. Specifically, NASA initiated the Constellation Program and 

Project SRB Alignment and Continuous Improvement Activity with the objective of 

ensuring all SRBs maintain the highest level of technical expertise, currency, and 

independence. Between November 2008 and February 2009, the Agency will “pause” 

most CxP SRB activities while it addresses the FACA and conflict of interest compliance 

issues we disclosed in our April 2008 report. NASA plans to adopt an annual SRB 

review process that includes a disclosure document similar to the confidential financial 

disclosure report that Federal employees must file annually. In addition, the Agency 

plans to conduct a review for best practices and improvements to include transitioning 

the SRBs to be FACA compliant. We will continue to monitor these activities to assure 

consistency of management action with Federal law and NASA policy. 

In our January 16, 2009, draft of this report, we recommended that prior to reactivating 

the CxP SRBs, the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation 

implement adequate procedures to ensure identification of SRB members who have 

conflicts of interest and that NASA’s Chief Engineer include or reference the 

implemented procedures in an applicable Agency requirements document. 

The Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation concurred with our 

recommendation to implement procedures to ensure identification of SRB members who 

have conflicts of interest and stated that he incorporated such procedures into Program 

Analysis and Evaluation guidance to be released by March 31, 2009. NASA’s Chief 

Engineer concurred with our recommendation to include or reference implemented 

procedures in an applicable Agency requirements document and will update 

NPR 7120.5D to reference the Program Analysis and Evaluation guidance. 

Management’s comments are responsive; however, both recommendations will remain 

open until we have verified that the SRBs were reestablished in a manner consistent with 

Federal law and revised agency guidance. (See Appendix D for the full text of 

management’s comments.) 

FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background __________________________________________ 1 

Objective ____________________________________________ 4 

RESULTS

Standing Review Board Members Were Not Independent of the 

Constellation Program _______________________________ 5 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology _______________________________ 17 

Review of Internal Controls _____________________________ 18 

Prior Coverage_______________________________________ 18 

APPENDIX B 

Initial Self-Assessment ________________________________ 19 

APPENDIX C 

Proposed Self-Assessment _____________________________ 23 

APPENDIX D 

Management Comments _______________________________ 29 

APPENDIX E 

Report Distribution ___________________________________ 32 

INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background 

The Constellation Program (CxP) is responsible for designing and developing the next 

generation of NASA space vehicles that will return human explorers to the moon and 

carry them onward to Mars. CxP is a tightly-coupled program with multiple projects and 

each executes portions of CxP’s mission. CxP consists of six major projects—the Orion 

Crew Exploration Vehicle (Orion), Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicles (Ares I and Ares 

V), Ground Operations, Mission Operations, Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Systems, 

and Lunar Lander (Altair)—all of which are managed independently but are 

interdependent because no single project is capable of implementing the complete 

mission. For example, Ground Operations will provide the infrastructure for the Orion 

vehicle to launch on Ares I supported by Mission Operations, and the EVA Systems will 

develop elements (i.e., spacesuits) to protect the Orion crewmembers. 

Standing Review Boards (SRBs). NASA established SRBs for CxP and each of its six 

projects to conduct a series of independent reviews throughout the program’s and 

projects’ life cycles. The reviews include assessments on the adequacy and credibility of 

the program or project’s technical and management approaches, schedules, resources, 

costs, and risks; compliance with Agency management and systems engineering 

guidance; and readiness to proceed to the next life-cycle phase. NASA’s Independent 

Program Assessment Office (IPAO), part of the Office of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation, prepares the SRB nomination packages, which are then approved by the 

program or project’s convening authority.4

 The number of SRB members differs based 

on a project’s complexity, but each SRB has a single chairperson and a NASA Review 

Manager, who assists the chairperson in interfacing with the NASA program and project 

managers. Although IPAO can augment a particular SRB with specialized reviewers 

when needed, the concept is to have the same core membership for the duration of the 

project. Even though the SRBs are advisory and do not have authority over any program 

or project content, NASA management must consider the SRB’s input when deciding 

whether the program or project should proceed to the next phase of development. 

SRB Guidance. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight 

Program and Project Management Requirements,” March 6, 2007, which provides 

guidance for establishing SRBs, was revised in response to multiple Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) reports that recommended NASA change its approach to 

 

4

 Convening authorities vary with the significance of the program or project under review. For the CxP 

and associated projects, the convening authority included the NASA Associate Administrator; the NASA 

Chief Engineer; the Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems; the Associate Administrator for 

Program Analysis and Evaluation; and the Director of the responsible center. 
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

program and project management, specifically as it related to the acquisition process.5 

NPR 7120.5D notes that board members are chosen based on their management, 

technical, safety and mission assurance expertise, their objectivity, and their ability to 

make a broad assessment of a program/project that employs numerous engineering and 

other disciplines. SRB reviews assessing, for example, program/project technical and 

management approaches, resources, and related costs would bring industry expertise to 

bear on project-specific investment decisions. NPR 7120.5D requires that SRB members 

be independent of the program or project under review; that is, none of the members 

should have a stake in the outcome of any of the life-cycle reviews or in the program or 

project itself. The NPR requires independence to ensure that the SRB can provide an 

impartial, unbiased opinion of the program or project’s success. The CxP and its 

associated projects were NASA’s first space flight program and projects to implement the 

new guidance. 

In addition to NPR 7120.5D, IPAO developed the draft “SRB Handbook,6

 Version 1.0,” 

August 1, 2007, to supplement that guidance. The Handbook contains guidelines for 

SRBs such as organizational structure, roles and responsibilities, processes the SRB must 

implement, and products it must produce to support the Agency’s implementation of its 

integrated independent life-cycle review process. 

Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Previous Review of the Orion SRB. In our 

“Final Memorandum on the Standing Review Board for the Orion Crew Exploration 

Vehicle Project” (Report No. IG-08-018, April 28, 2008), we showed that the Orion 

SRB’s purpose, responsibilities, and membership met the definition and characteristics of 

a committee that should be established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 

(FACA). FACA generally applies to committees that (1) are established by a Federal 

official, (2) include at least one non-Federal Government employee, and (3) are 

responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the agency. Because the Orion 

SRB established by NASA included 15 non-Federal Government employees, and its 

primary responsibility was to provide NASA management an advisory opinion of the 

Orion Project’s success in meeting technical, schedule, and cost-related milestones, we 

conducted further analysis of FACA and FACA-related case law to consider FACA’s 

applicability to the Orion SRB. Based on that analysis, we believe that FACA did apply 

to the Orion SRB; therefore, the SRB should have been established and operated in 

accordance with FACA. NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 1150.11, “Federal Advisory 

Committee Act Committees,” September 22, 2004, requires that NASA employees 

coordinate with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) when committees or teams 

involving non-NASA personnel are established to ensure that the Agency complies with 

 

5

 For example, GAO’s report, “NASA-Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could 

Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes” (GAO-06-218, December 21, 2005), stated 

that NASA’s acquisition framework did not provide the information needed to make major investment 

decisions, which contributed to NASA’s difficulties in meeting cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives for its programs and projects. 

6

 The draft SRB Handbook, undergoing Agency review, will be released once the review is completed. 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 3 

FACA if it is applicable. There was no coordination with the OGC when the Orion SRB 

was established. 

Although advisory committees meeting the definition and having the characteristics 

outlined by FACA must be established in accordance with FACA and NPD 1150.11, the 

Orion SRB was not. Had NASA initially recognized the Orion SRB as an advisory 

committee subject to FACA, NASA’s ethics process associated with advisory committee 

participation would have been triggered, resulting in a focus on board member 

independence and conflict of interest resolution. Furthermore, we found that six of the 

Orion SRB members, including the Chair, were not independent of the Orion Project, as 

required by NPR 7120.5D. Those six Orion SRB members were employees (and in four 

cases were also stockholders) of companies having contracts for Orion work. Because of 

their employee/stockholder status, those members had a vested interest in Project 

assessments concerning the adequacy and credibility of technical and management 

approaches, schedules, resources, costs, and risks; compliance with Agency management 

and systems engineering guidance; and readiness to proceed to the next life-cycle phase. 

Thus, they were unsuited to serve on an advisory board that emphasizes “objectivity and 

independence.” We determined that their employee/stockholder status created an 

organizational conflict of interest between the members’ employers and NASA. 

We recommended that the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

in coordination with the OGC and the Office of the Chief Engineer, suspend the 

involvement of the six Orion SRB members found to be not independent of the Project 

from further SRB activities until an evaluation of the legality and propriety of the 

participation of these individuals in the SRB was concluded. That evaluation should 

include an analysis of whether the Orion SRB should be reorganized under FACA and 

whether the ethical rules for special Government employees are implicated. To ensure 

that the lessons learned from the issues associated with the establishment of the Orion 

SRB are incorporated into NASA practice more generally, we also recommended that the 

Agency evaluate the purpose, roles, responsibilities, and membership of SRBs to 

determine the optimum approach for accomplishing the SRB mission while ensuring 

compliance with all applicable Federal laws and NASA guidance. We further 

recommended that, based on the evaluation results, the Agency should revise 

NPR 7120.5D and NASA’s draft SRB Handbook to reflect any revised SRB roles, 

responsibilities, and membership requirements. 

In our April 2008 final report, we found the Agency’s response to our recommendations 

to be nonresponsive. However, subsequent management action resulted in the issuance 

of our February 9, 2009, “Addendum to Final Memorandum on the Standing Review 

Board for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Project,” which summarized 

management’s actions that were responsive to the intent of the recommendations. The 

recommendations are resolved, but remain open pending completion and verification of 

the corrective actions. 
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Objective 

The objective of this review was to determine the independence of the members of the 

remaining SRBs for CxP and CxP projects.7

 We also reviewed internal controls as they 

related to the objective. See Appendix A for details of the review’s scope and 

methodology, our review of internal controls, and a list of prior coverage. 

 

7

 We did not review the Altair SRB because it was temporary–established in June 2008, using members of 

other SRBs, to conduct the Mission Concept Review and disbanded in October 2008 upon completion of 

that review. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 5 

STANDING REVIEW BOARD 

MEMBERS WERE NOT 

INDEPENDENT OF THE 

CONSTELLATION PROGRAM

Each CxP SRB included non-Federal Government employees who were employees 

or consultants of NASA contractors that had an interest in or a contract with either 

CxP or one of its projects. For example, the 12 non-Federal members of the CxP 

SRB included 4 members (33 percent) who were not independent of CxP or its 

Projects. This condition occurred because NASA did not have adequate procedures 

to determine if the members were independent. Specifically, because the SRBs were 

not organized under FACA, it did not trigger the ethics review process. As a result 

of this condition, NASA lacked assurance that SRB members provided impartial and 

unbiased opinions on the project’s success in meeting technical, schedule, and costrelated milestones because SRB members had a vested interest in project assessment 

outcomes. Furthermore, by not verifying an SRB member’s independence, NASA 

places the SRB member at risk of violating the Procurement Integrity Act because 

the Agency did not take precautions, as required by the Act, to ensure that access to 

source selection information, which the Agency had not previously made available to 

the public, is limited to only the appropriate personnel. 

FACA Applicability 

FACA. FACA was enacted in 1972 to formalize the process for establishing, operating, 

and terminating advisory committees that are formed to provide expert advice to 

Executive Branch agencies concerning Federal policies and programs. The membership 

of these advisory committees includes non-Federal Government employees, which 

provides a unique opportunity for the public to participate actively in the Federal 

Government’s decision-making process. 

To ensure that FACA applicability is appropriately considered for NASA committees, 

NPD 1150.11 requires NASA personnel to coordinate with the OGC prior to establishing 

committees that will include non-NASA personnel. Once the OGC renders the opinion 

that FACA is applicable, the advisory committee must operate in a manner fully 

consistent with the provisions of the Act. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Applicability of FACA to the CxP SRBs. Because each of the CxP SRBs were 

established and managed like the Orion SRB, they also meet the definition of a FACA 

committee. FACA generally applies to committees that (1) are established by a Federal 

official, (2) include at least one non-Federal Government employee, and (3) are 

responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the agency. This places each 

of the CxP SRBs in violation of FACA. 

Office of General Counsel Coordination. The CxP SRBs were not identified as an 

advisory committee subject to FACA because IPAO convened the SRBs without first 

coordinating with the OGC as required by NPD 1150.11. NPD 1150.11 states that “all 

employees are responsible for coordinating with the Office of the General Counsel 

regarding the establishment of committees or teams involving non-NASA personnel.” At 

a minimum, the IPAO Director should have discussed the issue with the OGC, which 

would have provided the OGC an opportunity to render a decision concerning FACA’s 

applicability to the CxP SRBs. 

Independence Requirements 

In addition to the NPR 7120.5D requirement that SRB members be independent of the 

project under review, IPAO required each of the candidate SRB members to complete the 

“Personal, External, and Organizational Independence, and Political Influence SelfAssessment,” September 28, 2005 (see Appendix B), to identify potential independence 

impairments or conflict-of-interest situations. In the self-assessment, each candidate 

provided yes or no answers to questions in seven categories, including financial interests, 

undue influence, and employment. A yes answer would indicate a potential impairment 

to independence and required the candidate to provide additional information. For 

example, a question from the “Current or Former Employee” section asked, “Have you 

ever directly worked for the program or project being reviewed or been an employee of a 

contractor that receives funding from the program or project being reviewed?” If the 

candidate answered yes, he or she then had to provide details of that employment, to be 

used in conjunction with the self-assessment to determine the candidate’s fitness for SRB 

participation. 

OIG Determination of Compliance with Independence Requirements. We reviewed 

the self-assessments and biographies submitted by each non-Federal SRB member. We 

focused our review on the non-Federal members because they were not subject to the 

more robust financial disclosure and criminal conflict-of-interest provisions of Title 18, 

United States Code, Section 208, which applies to Federal employees and “Special 

Government Employees.”8

 From our review, we identified all the companies employing 

SRB members as either an employee or a consultant. We then researched NASA 

procurement records and company Web sites to ascertain whether the companies 

performed work as either a prime contractor or subcontractor for CxP or its constituent 

 

8

 We note that had the Agency used the required FACA process, all of these persons could have been 

deemed Special Government Employees and subject to the conflict of interest provisions of Title 18. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 7 

projects. Because each CxP project is dependent on the successful outcome of the other 

projects, we considered it a conflict of interest if an SRB member was an employee or 

consultant of any CxP contractor. 

Conflicts of Interest 

Based on our review, we determined that each SRB contained at least one non-Federal 

Government employee who was not independent of CxP or its projects. We calculated 

the percentage of members with conflicts compared to the total number of members as 

well as the number of non-Federal members. Table 2 below summarizes the extent of 

conflict-of-interest issues found in the CxP SRB and CxP project SRBs. 

Table 2. Composition of Constellation Program Standing Review Boards (SRBs) 

(as of October 1, 2008) 

Members with Conflicts 

Number of Members 

SRB Total 

Non-Federal 

Government 

Employees Total 

Percentage 

of Total 

Percentage of 

Non-Federal 

Government 

Employees 

CxP 16 12 4 25 33 

Ares 16 10 2 13 20 

EVA 

Systems 

11 8 2 18 25 

Ground 

Operations 

17 13 6 35 46 

Mission 

Operations 

11 8 1 9 13 

Oriona 19 15 6 32 40 

a

 As reported in NASA OIG Report No. IG-08-018 (April 28, 2008). 

CxP SRB. NASA established an independent review team in the early summer of 2006 

to conduct a Preliminary Non-Advocate Review of CxP at the conclusion of the 

Constellation constituent project System Requirements Reviews. These reviews were 

scheduled to be completed in early 2007, and the independent review team was expected 

to report to the Agency Program Management Council in June 2007. 

However, in August 2006, NASA was drafting an update to NPR 7120.5D (released on 

March 6, 2007) to implement significant changes in the scope and conduct of 

independent review teams. In fact, independent review teams were being replaced with 

SRBs, which would conduct multiple life-cycle reviews beginning with an assessment at 

the System Requirements Review. Since the CxP independent review team was already 
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

in place, NASA management allowed the team to complete its CxP System Requirements 

Review and provide an informal outbrief and report to the CxP Manager. On 

December 5, 2006, in anticipation of the updated guidance, NASA management 

disbanded the independent review team following submission of their preliminary 

observations report to the CxP Manager.

In May 2007, NASA established the CxP SRB in accordance with the updated NPR. The 

CxP SRB comprised 16 members, of whom 12 were non-Federal Government 

employees. The CxP SRB participated in the June 2008 Systems Definition Review. 

The next technical review the CxP SRB is scheduled to participate in is the Preliminary 

Design Review scheduled for July 2009. 

Of the 16 members, we determined that 4 members (25 percent of the total board and 

33 percent of the non-Federal membership) were not independent of the CxP or its 

projects. Specifically, we found the following: 

• One member was an employee of the ARES Corporation, which provides 

program planning and control support to CxP as a subcontractor on NASA’s 

Constellation Program Support Contract awarded to Stinger Ghaffarian 

Technologies on February 28, 2008. 

• One member was an employee of Lee & Associates, which provides engineering 

and technical services to the Ares Project under a blanket purchase agreement. 

• Two members were employees of Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC), which supports CxP and the Orion Project with program planning and 

control services under the Agency’s Constellation/Crew Exploration Vehicle 

Engineering Service Contract and with safety and mission assurance services 

under a Johnson Space Center contract. 

Ares SRB. The Ares SRB was established in May 2007 to conduct the reviews for the 

Constellation launch vehicle Ares I project. The launch vehicle delivers crew to Earth 

orbit as well as trans-lunar trajectories. The Ares SRB comprised 16 members, 10 of 

whom were non-Federal Government employees. The Ares SRB participated in the 

October 2007 Systems Definition Review and the September 2008 Preliminary Design 

Review. The next technical review the Ares SRB is scheduled to participate in is the 

Critical Design Review scheduled for March 2011. 

Of the 16 members of the Ares SRB, we determined that 2 members (13 percent of the 

total board and 20 percent of the non-Federal membership) were not independent of the 

Ares Project or CxP. Specifically, we found the following: 

• One member was an employee of Quality Assurance & Risk Management 

Services, a subcontractor to Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. (Honeywell) 

(a business segment under Honeywell Aerospace, which is a business segment 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 9 

under Honeywell International, Inc.). Quality Assurance & Risk Management 

Services provides safety-related services to the Ares Project under the Agency’s 

NASA Contract Assurance Service Contract. 

• One member was an employee of SAIC, identified above in relation to the CxP 

SRB. 

EVA Systems SRB. The EVA Systems SRB was established in March 2007 to provide 

an independent assessment of the EVA Systems Project’s technical and programmatic 

approach, risk posture, and readiness to proceed to the next life-cycle phase. The EVA 

Systems includes the elements (pressure suits, EVA life-support systems, EVA tools, and 

mobility aids) necessary to protect crewmembers and allow them to work effectively during 

all mission phases in environments that cannot sustain human existence. The EVA Systems 

SRB membership comprised 11 members, 8 of whom were non-Federal Government 

employees. The EVA Systems SRB participated in the April 2007 System Requirements 

Review and the May 2008 Systems Definition Review. The next technical reviews the 

EVA Systems SRB is scheduled to participate in are the Preliminary Design Review 

scheduled for September 2009 and the Non-Advocate Review scheduled for November 

2009. 

Of the 11 members, we determined that 2 members (18 percent of the total board and 

25 percent of the non-Federal membership) were not independent of the EVA Project or 

the Orion Project. (Not included here was a third conflicted SRB member, discussed on 

page 13, whose participation was terminated prior to the October 1, 2008, timeframe 

covered in this section.) Specifically, we found the following: 

• One member was an employee of Honeywell, which is a subcontractor to 

Lockheed Martin on Johnson Space Center’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 

Contract and part of a contractor team competing for the Agency’s Constellation 

Space Suit Systems (CSSS) contract and also subcontracts work to Quality 

Assurance & Risk Management Services identified above in relation to the Ares 

SRB. 

• One member was an employee of Lockheed Martin, Inc., the prime contractor for 

the Orion Project’s Crew Exploration Vehicle Contract. 

Ground Operations SRB. The Ground Operations SRB was established in March 2007 

to conduct the Ground Systems life-cycle reviews. Ground Systems provides the launch 

site ground processing, integrated testing, logistics services, and launch services for 

Orion and Ares, and post-landing, recovery and de-integration services for the Orion and 

the Ares solid rocket boosters. The Ground Operations SRB membership comprised 

17 members, 13 of whom were non-Federal Government employees. The Ground 

Operations SRB participated in the May 2007 System Requirements Review and the May 

2008 Systems Definition Review. The next technical reviews the Ground Operations 
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

SRB is scheduled to participate in are the Preliminary Design Review scheduled for 

April 2009 and the Non-Advocate Review scheduled for July 2009. 

Of the 17 members, we determined that 6 members (35 percent of the total board and 

46 percent of the non-Federal membership) were not independent of the CxP or its 

projects. Specifically, we found the following: 

• One member was an employee of Analex Corporation, which is the prime 

contractor on Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Service Program Expendable 

Launch Vehicle Integrated Services Contract and provides technical analysis and 

document reviews for the Ground Operations Project. 

• One member was an employee of ASRC Aerospace, which provides engineering, 

configuration management, and project management services to CxP and the 

Ground Operations Project under its University-affiliated Spaceport Technology 

Development Contract with Kennedy Space Center. 

• One member was an employee of Honeywell, identified above in relation the Ares 

SRB and the EVA Systems SRB. Honeywell is a subcontractor to Lockheed 

Martin (also identified above in relation to the EVA Systems SRB) on the Orion 

Crew Exploration Vehicle Contract and a member of a contractor team competing 

for the Agency’s CSSS. 

• Two members were employees of Lee & Associates, identified above in relation 

to the CxP SRB. 

• One member was an employee of Tecolote Research, Inc., which provides cost 

estimating support to CxP. 

Mission Operations SRB. The Mission Operations SRB was established in 

February 2007 to conduct the Mission Systems’ life-cycle reviews. Mission Systems 

includes the Mission Control Center in Houston and its interfaces with the flight systems 

for flight operations; crew and flight controller training facilities; mission planning and 

flight design tools; personnel for planning, training, and flight operations; and Mission 

Operations facilities development and maintenance. The Mission Operations SRB 

membership comprised 11 members, 8 of whom were non-Federal Government 

employees. The Mission Operations SRB participated in the March 2007 System 

Requirements Review and the March 2008 Systems Definition Review. The next 

technical reviews the Mission Operations SRB is scheduled to participate in are the 

Preliminary Design Review scheduled for February 2010 and the Non-Advocate Review 

in May 2010. 

Of the 11 members of the Mission Operations SRB, we determined that 1 member 

(9 percent of the total board and 13 percent of the non-Federal membership) was not 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 11 

independent of the Ares Project and CxP. Specifically, we found that one member was 

an employee of SAIC, identified above in relation to the CxP SRB and Ares SRB. 

Inadequate Procedures 

The CxP SRB and every CxP project SRB was not organized in accordance with FACA 

and included at least one non-Federal Government employee with a conflict of interest 

because NASA did not have adequate procedures to trigger an ethics review process for 

identifying conflicts of interest. NPR 7120.5D established the requirement that SRB 

members be independent but did not address what Agency officials should do to ensure 

independence. The IPAO’s draft SRB Handbook discusses ethics and independence and 

states that SRB member nominations should undergo an independence check but does not 

identify or establish procedures and processes for verifying independence. 

IPAO’s “Personal, External, and Organizational Independence, and Political Influence 

Self-Assessment,” September 28, 2005, further limited the independence evaluation 

because it does not require the same level of detailed information required for conflict-ofinterest reviews of Federal employees or those serving on Federal advisory committees. 

For example, IPAO’s self-assessment form requires SRB candidates to identify their 

employer, or their clients in the case of consultants, only if the employer or client 

receives funding from the program or project under review. By comparison, Federal 

employees are required to list all sources of salary and other earned income in excess of 

$200 per year. When we compared the information disclosed on the self-assessment 

forms with the candidates’ biographies, we identified seven SRB members whose 

employers either received funding or competed for CxP or CxP project work. We 

determined that one cause for IPAO’s failure to identify these conflicts of interest was 

that the IPAO form did not require sufficiently detailed information. 

In addition, IPAO’s guidance does not require the OGC to review the self-assessment 

forms even though General Counsel is delegated the authority for coordinating and 

managing NASA’s ethics program, which specifically addresses conflict-of-interest 

issues. IPAO relied solely on its self-assessment form in making determinations about 

the candidate’s independence. As the General Counsel is the designated Agency ethics 

official for NASA, we believe that OGC staff could make a more informed determination 

about an SRB candidate’s independence and, especially, if candidates are required to list 

all sources of income. 

As evidenced by the results of our review, IPAO’s process and procedures for 

determining an SRB member’s independence and freedom from conflicts of interest were 

inadequate. As a result, NASA lacked assurance that SRB members provided impartial 

and unbiased opinions about CxP and the CxP projects’ success in meeting technical, 

schedule, and cost-related milestones. 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Potential for Violation of the Procurement Integrity Act 

NASA’s lack of assurance that SRB members were independent could possibly have 

caused a violation of the Procurement Integrity Act,9

 which prohibits improper disclosure 

of confidential Government procurement information. Two EVA Systems SRB 

members, who were also employees of companies that “teamed” to bid on the CSSS 

contract, had access to source-selection information not available to the general public 

and not disclosed publicly.10 NASA’s inadequate process and procedures for 

determining an SRB member’s independence and freedom from conflicts of interest 

resulted in NASA not taking the precautions required by the Procurement Integrity Act to 

prevent disclosure of confidential source selection information. 

Procurement Integrity Act. The Procurement Integrity Act prohibits improper 

disclosure of confidential Government procurement information. Specifically, the 

Procurement Integrity Act prohibits a person from knowingly, other than as provided by 

law, obtaining source selection information before the award of the contract to which the 

information relates. The Act also prohibits a person who is advising or has advised the 

United States, with respect to a Federal agency procurement, from disclosing source 

selection information before the award of the contract. Source selection information is 

any “information prepared for use by a Federal agency for the purpose of evaluating a bid 

or proposal to enter into a Federal agency procurement contract, if that information has 

not been previously made available to the public or disclosed publicly.” Disclosure of 

source selection information would jeopardize the integrity or successful completion of 

the procurement to which the information relates. 

Constellation Space Suit Systems Contract. The CSSS contract is for the design, 

development, test, evaluation, and production of a space suit system to support astronauts 

while aboard the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander and 

during human exploration of the surface of the moon. NASA issued a request for 

proposal for the CSSS contract on October 1, 2007, and accepted proposals through 

December 20, 2007. Two companies submitted proposals for the contract, Oceaneering 

International, Inc. (Oceaneering), and Exploration Systems and Technology, a joint 

venture between Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation and ILC Dover. On June 12, 2008, 

NASA awarded the CSSS contract to Oceaneering. Major subcontractors for 

Oceaneering included Cimarron Software Services, Inc. (Cimarron); Honeywell 

International, Inc.; United Space Alliance; David Clarke Company, Inc.; Air-Lock, Inc.; 

 

9

 Title 41, United States Code, Chapter 7, Section 423 (41 U.S.C.§ 423), “Restrictions on Disclosing and 

Obtaining Contractor Bid or Proposal Information or Source Selection Information.” 

10The OIG Office of Audits referred the EVA SRB conflict-of-interest issue to the Office of Investigations 

on July 1, 2008 to determine if a violation of the Act occurred. The Office of Investigations could not 

confirm that the SRB member used the source selection information to influence the outcome of the 

procurement. In fact, in that instance, the SRB member recused himself after learning his company was 

interested in the EVA competition. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 13 

Harris Corporation; Paragon Space Development Corporation; e-Pro; Raven Aerospace 

Technology; Bastion Technologies; and Ecliptic Enterprises. 

EVA SRB Members Employed by CSSS Contractors. We found that two of the EVA 

Systems SRB members worked for contractors that competed for the CSSS contract. One 

member was the President and Chief Operating Officer of Cimarron and the other was a 

quality procurement analyst for Honeywell Technology Solutions. 

The President and Chief Operating Officer of Cimarron was an original member of the 

EVA Systems SRB when it was established in March 2007. He served as the board’s 

expert on mission operations and participated in the EVA Project’s System Requirements 

Review in April 2007. The Cimarron official recused himself from future EVA Systems 

SRB activity in July 2007, stating that his company was “negotiating a teaming 

agreement with one of the EVA suit competitors.” IPAO preserved his membership by 

designating him as a non-participating member. After NASA awarded the CSSS contract 

to Oceaneering in June 2008, the EVA Systems SRB Review Manager formally 

terminated the Cimarron official’s membership. Furthermore, unlike the other nonFederal Government employees of the EVA Systems SRB, the Cimarron official was not 

under contract for his work on the board and, as a result, did not sign an agreement 

stating that he would not disclose source selection information to any party not 

authorized by the CSSS contracting officer. 

The Honeywell quality procurement analyst was also an original member of the EVA 

Systems SRB and served as the board’s expert on safety and mission assurance. He 

participated in the EVA Project’s System Requirements Review in April 2007 and the 

System Definition Review in May 2008. We did not find evidence of him informing the 

EVA Systems SRB Chairperson or the NASA Review Manager of Honeywell’s teaming 

with Oceaneering for the CSSS contract, nor did we find evidence of Agency officials 

reviewing his employment status for a potential conflict of interest prior to award of the 

CSSS contract. As of October 1, 2008, he remained a member of the EVA Systems SRB. 

Termination of CSSS Contract. NASA terminated and subsequently rebid the CSSS 

contract. On July 14, 2008, Exploration Systems and Technology filed a bid protest with 

GAO stating that NASA’s evaluation process on the CSSS proposals contained 

prejudicial errors. Included in the bid protest was a claim that Oceaneering possessed an 

unfair competitive advantage because employees of Oceaneering subcontractors served 

as members of the EVA Systems SRB. On July 21, 2008, Exploration Systems and 

Technology filed a supplement to the bid protest that identified additional procurement 

irregularities. After the GAO bid protest was filed, NASA announced it had determined 

that a compliance issue with the procurement process required termination of the contract 

with Oceaneering. Based on the compliance issue, the Agency decided to re-open the bid 

process to the two bidding companies. 

Potential for Future Violations. Procurement Integrity Act violations could potentially 

occur on future solicitations, such as the CxP’s Ground Processing Services Contract, 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

because NASA does not have adequate procedures to identify and monitor the 

independence of SRB members. The contract is for ground processing, assembly, 

integration, test, launch, and recovery services to support the Ares I Crew Launch 

Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. NASA plans to release a request for 

proposal during the spring of 2009 and award the contract in the spring of 2010. This 

procurement could place one or more Ground Operations SRB members in violation of 

the Procurement Integrity Act because NASA has not adequately verified members’ 

independence. For example, one member of the Ground Operations SRB works for 

ASRC Aerospace, a company currently providing engineering, configuration 

management, and project management services to the Ground Operations Project under a 

contract with Kennedy Space Center. If ASRC Aerospace competes for the Ground 

Processing Services Contract, the SRB member could be in violation of the Procurement 

Integrity Act because of information the member would have had access to during the 

life-cycle reviews. 

Conclusion 

In establishing the CxP SRBs, NASA failed to abide by the legal requirements associated 

with establishing Federal advisory committees. NASA established an inadequate 

framework for assessing conflicts of interest. In the absence of an appropriate set of 

internal controls, almost one-third, 21 of 66 non-Federal SRB members, had conflicts of 

interest resulting in a lack of assurance that their individual views were not subject to 

inappropriate bias or that these persons did not seek advantage from their SRB 

participation. NASA could reduce the risk of SRBs that include non-Federal 

Government employees with conflicts of interest by establishing and implementing 

formal procedures and processes for checking the independence of nominees. 

Management Actions 

In November 2008, we met with representatives from the Program Analysis and 

Evaluation Office and IPAO to discuss actions the Agency was taking in response to 

recommendations in our April 2008 report on the Orion SRB. After further analysis and 

consultation with the OGC, the Agency decided to pause most CxP SRBs activity while it 

addressed the FACA and conflict of interest compliance issues. The Associate 

Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation stated in comments dated 

December 18, 2008, that since the issuance of our April 2008 report, the interim 

configuration of the Orion SRB had been redesigned to not trigger FACA requirements. 

Although in discussions with senior management the Associate Administrator stated that 

organizing the SRBs under FACA remains an option, OGC stated in a February 6, 2009, 

meeting with OIG that the Agency is focusing on three other options that call for SRBs 

composed of (1) all civil service employees who would provide a consensus opinion; (2) 

civil service employees, with support from subject matter experts, who would provide a 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 15 

consensus opinion; and (3) a mix of civil service and non-Federal employees who would 

render individual opinions rather than a consensus opinion. 

Further, to prevent programs and projects from experiencing the potentially negative 

impacts of having SRBs with possibly biased SRB members, the Agency plans to adopt 

an annual review process for future SRB members similar to the process Federal 

employees undergo annually. IPAO plans to update the “Personal, External, and 

Organizational Independence, and Political Influence Self-Assessment” form to 

incorporate relevant elements of the Office of Government Ethics Form 450 

“Confidential Financial Disclosure Report,” which requires employees to provide 

information on reportable assets or sources of income, reportable liabilities, outside 

positions, and reportable agreements or arrangements. (See Appendix C for IPAO’s 

proposed updated form.) We intend to examine closely the Agency’s plans for 

addressing these issues to ensure compliance with Federal law and to assure that the 

redesigned system of internal controls protects the integrity of SRB activities. 

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response 

Recommendation 1. The Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

prior to reactivating the Constellation Standing Review Boards (SRBs), should assure that 

all SRBs are established in a manner consistent with Federal law and that the Standing 

Review Board Handbook includes procedures that ensure identification of SRB members 

who have conflicts of interest. The procedures should include, but not be limited to, 

methods to determine whether nominees are employees of companies competing for work or 

performing work on behalf of the program or project under review. In addition, Agency 

ethics officials should be required to sign off on the independence of SRB participants and 

an annual review to verify board members’ independence should be conducted. 

Management’s Response. The Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and 

Evaluation concurred with our recommendation and incorporated procedures into the 

revised Standing Review Board Handbook and NPR 7120.5D that will ensure 

identification of SRB members who have conflicts of interest. The procedures include 

methods to determine whether nominees are employed by companies performing work 

for the program or project under review. The Office of General Counsel reviewed the 

procedures to ensure that SRBs will be established in a manner consistent with Federal 

law. In addition, ethics officials will verify the independence of SRB participants and the 

Independent Program Assessment Office and the Office of General Counsel will review 

board members’ independence annually. The Associate Administrator expects that the 

Constellation SRBs will be reestablished in a manner consistent with Federal law and 

revised agency guidance by April 30, 2009. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s actions are responsive. The 

recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of 

management’s corrective action. 

Recommendation 2. NASA’s Chief Engineer should revise NASA Procedural 

Requirements 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements,” to include reference to, or inclusion of, the procedures incorporated into the 

Standing Review Board Handbook. 

Management’s Response. NASA’s Chief Engineer concurred with our recommendation 

and is in the process of revising NPR 7120.5D with a NASA Interim Directive. The 

Directive will reference the Standing Review Board Handbook as the source of guidance 

for establishing SRBs and assessing SRB members for potential conflicts of interest. 

Estimated completion date for the Directive is June 30, 2009. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. Management’s action is responsive. The 

recommendation is resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of 

management’s corrective action. 
APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 17 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology 

We performed the review from April 2008 through January 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the review to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our review objectives. We performed fieldwork at Johnson Space Center and Langley 

Research Center. 

During our audit of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Project, we found that the Orion 

SRB was not established in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act; 

NASA Policy Directive 1150.11, “Federal Advisory Committee Act Committees,” 

September 22, 2004; or NPR 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements,” March 6, 2007. We reported this finding in “Final 

Memorandum on the Standing Review Board for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 

Project” (IG-08-018, April 28, 2008). Based on that prior audit finding, we initiated this 

review to include all CxP SRBs (except the Altair SRB because it was temporary, from 

June 2008 to October 2008, and comprised members of the other projects’ SRBs). 

To determine the independence of the other CxP projects’ SRBs, we focused on whether 

NASA officials took appropriate actions to identify independence impairments or 

conflicts-of-interest issues and adequately reviewed and mitigated those issues. We also 

reviewed internal controls as they related to the establishment and operation of the SRB. 

We reviewed NPR 7120.5D and IPAO’s draft “SRB Handbook, Version 1.0,” 

August 1, 2007, for Agency policies, procedures, and guidelines pertaining to 

independence of SRB members. We also reviewed Title 41, United States Code, Chapter 

7, Section 423, “Restrictions on Disclosing and Obtaining Contractor Bid or Proposal 

Information or Source Selection Information,” for Federal requirements pertaining to 

access and release of source selection information. 

We reviewed the IPAO “Personal, External, and Organizational Independence, and 

Political Influence Self-Assessment” forms completed by members of the CxP and 

associated projects’ SRBs to identify potential conflicts of interest. We also looked for 

potential conflicts of interest by reviewing SRB members’ biographies contained in 

nomination letters that the IPAO submitted to convening authorities for each 

Constellation-related SRB. 
APPENDIX A 

18 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

We interviewed the Director of the IPAO and review managers for each of the 

Constellation-related SRBs to find out what steps they took to identify, review, and 

mitigate conflicts of interest associated with SRB members. We interviewed five 

members of the EVA Systems SRB to verify information they provided on their 

respective self-assessments. We also talked with officials with Johnson Space Center’s 

Office of Procurement and Office of Chief Counsel regarding potential for violations of 

the Procurement Integrity Act associated with the CSSS contract. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this portion of the review. 

Review of Internal Controls 

We reviewed and evaluated internal controls the Agency established and implemented to 

identify, review, and mitigate conflicts of interest on the part of SRB members. We 

identified a weakness in the Agency’s identification of SRB members for conflicts of 

interest. Implementing the recommendations in this report should improve the internal 

controls over the identification of SRB members with conflicts of interest. 

Prior Coverage 

Government Accountability Office

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office issued one report of 

particular relevance to the subject of our review: “Federal Advisory Committee Act: 

Issues Related to the Independence and Balance of Advisory Committees” (GAO-08-

611T, April 2, 2008). Unrestricted reports can be accessed over the Internet at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Our office issued the “Final Memorandum on the Standing Review Board for the Orion 

Crew Exploration Vehicle Project” (Report No. IG-08-018, April 28, 2008). We 

determined that, although the Orion SRB met the definition of a committee that should be 

established and operated in accordance with Federal Advisory Committee Act, the 

Agency did not require the SRB to comply with the Act’s requirements. In addition, 6 

(32 percent) of the Orion SRB’s 19 members were not independent of the Orion Project, 

as required by NPR 7120.5D and the draft SRB Handbook. Unrestricted reports can be 

accessed over the Internet at http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY08. 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 19 

INITIAL SELF-ASSESSMENT

Personal, External, and Organizational Independence, and 

Political Influence Self-Assessment 

Instructions to potential team member: 

1. Read the following questions in each section below and assess your personal 

situation as it applies to the review team for which you are being considered. 

2. Check the appropriate response. 

3. If your response is “yes,” please provide a detailed explanation of the 

circumstances for the specific situation that may impair you. While a “yes” 

answer will not automatically disqualify you from consideration, a review 

committee will consider your response(s) to determine your fitness for 

participation. Hence, a detailed explanation for each “yes” response is 

necessary to render and informed decision. 

When you have completed the self-assessment, sign, date, and fax this form to 

Michelle Calloway 757-864-3927. 

Disclosed impairments are not automatic grounds for disqualifying a potential team 

member from serving on an independent review team. Upon adjudication, the IPAO 

team lead will make a recommendation to the IPAO Director who make the final 

determination and approve/disapprove each candidate’s membership. 

I. Personal Independence 

Conflicting Financial Interests 

Will the contemplated consulting work in support of a particular program or project 

review have an effect on your own personal financial interests? Are you a 

stockholder in a company that receives funding from the program or project being 

reviewed? Do you own a patent or hold a copyright to a product or service or 

invention that is being considered for use by a program or project being reviewed? 

You also must be concerned about the financial interests of your spouse, your minor 

children, and outside persons or businesses that employ you. You should be 

concerned if anything you are asked to work on would affect them. 

No. Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 
APPENDIX B 

20 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

Seeking Other Employment

Are you job-hunting, seeking employment or engaged in discussions with an 

organization, contractor, business entity or prospective new employer that could 

directly benefit from the program or project being reviewed? Have you received an 

offer of employment from a NASA contractor, subcontractor, or grantee in 

connection with a program or project being reviewed by NASA? 

 No. Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 

Outside Activities and Public Speaking 

Have you ever written an article, published a paper, or taught a class that expresses a 

personal opinion, advocates a viewpoint, or proffers a professional judgment on the 

merits of the program or project being reviewed, or on the merits of the products and 

services associated with the program or project being reviewed? Do you belong to or 

are you a member of an organization that receives charitable contributions, gifts, 

monies, compensation, or honorariums from a contractor or person(s) that directly 

benefit from the program or project being reviewed? 

 No. Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 

II. External Independence 

Impartiality in Performing Official Duties

Will the contemplated consulting work being performed in support of a particular 

program or project review give rise to an “improper appearance,” that is, make a 

reasonable person who knew the circumstances of the situation (and had knowledge 

of the facts) legitimately question your fairness? For example, your fairness might 

reasonably be questioned if you were to perform an independent assessment of a 

program or project that could directly benefit a family member, relative, friend, or 

business partner. 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 21 

 No. Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 

Undo Influence and Coercion 

Do you feel you are unable to perform your work unfettered, uncompromisingly, 

openly, and effectively and free from schedule pressures, resource constraints, and 

opposing institutional, organizational or cultural forces? Do you feel you are unable 

to perform your work unfettered, uncompromisingly, openly, and effectively without 

fear of retribution, intimidation, threat, or prohibited personnel practices, including 

reprisal for whistle-blowing, as defined by law at § 2302(b) of title 5 of the United 

States Code (U.S.C.)? 

 No.  Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 

III. Organizational Independence 

Current or Former Employee 

Have you ever been a superior or subordinate of an employee of a program or project 

being reviewed? Have you ever directly worked for the program or project being 

reviewed or been an employee of a contractor that receives funding from the program 

or project being reviewed? 

 No.  Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 
APPENDIX B 

22 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

IV. Political Influence 

Do you serve as an officer, director, or trustee of a for-profit organization or a nonprofit political advocacy group or do you belong to or support a political party, 

lobby, association, organization, group, or action committee that seeks to advance, 

promote or advocate legislation in support of a program or project being reviewed? 

 No.  Yes. [Explain circumstances in detail and use additional sheets if 

necessary]: _________________________________________________________. 

V. Certification: 

I, ________________, have completed this self-assessment of my fitness to serve on 

the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Project Standing Review Board. I have read 

and answered all the questions and I certify that the statements I have made on this 

form and all attached statements are true, complete, and correct to the best of my 

knowledge. 

_____________________________ ____________________ 

Signature Date
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 23 

PROPOSED SELF-ASSESSMENT
APPENDIX C 

24 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 25 
APPENDIX C 

26 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 
APPENDIX C 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 27 
APPENDIX C 

28 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 29 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX D 

30 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 
APPENDIX D 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 31 
APPENDIX E 

32 REPORT NO. IG-09-011 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Engineer 

Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation 

General Counsel 

Director, Independent Program Assessment Office 

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals 

Office of Management and Budget 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch 

Government Accountability Office 

Director, Defense, State, and NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial 

Management and Assurance 

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

House Committee on Science and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
Major Contributors to the Report: 

Ray Tolomeo, Director, Mission Programs and Projects Directorate 

Loretta Atkinson, Project Manager 

Doug Orton, Team Lead 

Eugene Bauer, Auditor 

Jimmie Griggs, Auditor 

Barbara Moody, Auditor 

Cedric Campbell, Attorney Advisor 

Janet Overton, Editor 

REPORT NO. IG-09-011 33 
FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

REPORT No. IG-09-011 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ADDITIONAL COPIES

Visit http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY09 to obtain additional copies of this report, or contact the 

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing at 202-358-1232. 

COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT

In order to help us improve the quality of our products, if you wish to comment on the quality or 

usefulness of this report, please send your comments to Ms. Jacqueline White, Quality Assurance 

Division, at Jacqueline.White@nasa.gov or call 202-358-0203. 

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE AUDITS

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing. 

Ideas and requests can also be mailed to: 

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing 

NASA Headquarters 

Washington, DC 20546-0001 

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