U.S. Department of Justice 

National Institute of Corrections 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to 

Jail Emergencies 

Self-Audit Checklists 

Resource Materials 

Case Studies
U.S. Department of Justice 

National Institute of Corrections 

320 First Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20534 

Morris L. Thigpen 

Director 

Thomas J. Beauclair 

Deputy Director 

Virginia A. Hutchinson 

Chief, Jails Division 

Jim T. Barbee 

Project Manager 

National Institute of Corrections 

www.nicic.gov 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to 

Jail Emergencies 

Self-Audit Checklists • Resource Materials • Case Studies 

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D. 

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D. 

LETRA, Inc. 

Campbell, CA 

October 2009
 

NIC Accession Number 023494
 
This document was funded by cooperative agreement number 06J48GJJ5 from 

the National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of 

view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily represent the official opinion or policies of the U.S. Department 

of Justice. 

Cover photos: Left photo ©Photodisc Illustration/Getty Images. Middle photo ©Shutterstock 

Images. Right photo ©Photodisc Illustration/Getty Images. 
 

Contents
 

Foreword............................................................. v
 

Preface.............................................................. vii
 

Acknowledgments ..................................................... ix 


Section 1: Introduction ................................................. 1
 

Which Jails Will Benefit From These Self-Audit Materials? ................ 3 


Development of This Guide ......................................... 13
 

Section 2: Conducting an Audit ......................................... 15
 

Purpose and Philosophy ............................................ 17 


Preliminary Considerations.......................................... 21 


How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists ................................ 27
 

Section 3: Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails..... 37
 

Section 4: Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails ..... 53
 

Section 5: Resource Materials ......................................... 117 


Leadership Issues During Crises..................................... 119
 

Prevention of Jail Emergencies...................................... 127
 

Emergency Teams................................................ 139
 

Section 6: Case Studies ............................................... 153
 

Maury County Jail Fire ............................................ 155
 

Disturbance and Escape at a New Direct Supervision Jail................. 161
 

Hurricane Andrew and the Florida Department of Corrections............. 169
 

Riots at Camp Hill State Correctional Institution........................ 173
 

iii
Contents (continued)
 

Exhibits
 

Exhibit 6-1: Maury County Jail ..................................... 155
 

Exhibit 6-2: Rensselaer County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
 

Exhibit 6-3: Camp Hill State Correctional Institution .................... 174
 

iv
 

The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) has 

maintained a substantial focus on emergency 

preparedness for prisons. In 1981, NIC first 

offered seminars on dealing with major crises 

to prison administrators throughout the country. 

Even before that, NIC had provided technical 

assistance on emergency preparedness to various state prison systems. In the wake of some of 

the worst riots, hostage situations, and natural 

disasters, NIC has often been asked to provide 

specialized expertise in conducting independent, critical incident reviews (also referred to 

as “after-action reports”), usually in the form of 

technical assistance projects. 

In 1996, NIC published Critical Analysis of 

Emergency Preparedness: Self-Audit Materials. 

An updated and expanded version of that guide 

was published in 2005 as A Guide to Preparing 

for and Responding to Prison Emergencies: 

Self-Audit Checklists, National Survey Results, 

Resource Materials, Case Studies. Both of those 

publications were intended to provide prison 

managers and administrators with comprehensive, detailed checklists with which they could 

evaluate the readiness of a prison or entire state 

department of corrections for a major emergency 

or large-scale crisis. NIC also sponsored a series 

of interrelated seminars providing hands-on 

training to prison administrators in the use of 

these new audit instruments. 

Jails have always shared many of the same concerns and needs as prisons with regard to emergency preparedness. However, until recently, 

Foreword
 

jails have placed less emphasis on emergency 

preparedness than has been true of prisons. 

Clearly, large-scale crises and major emergencies represent the same kind of catastrophic risks 

to jails that they do to prisons. In fact, what I 

wrote on the subject more than 10 years ago 

in the Foreword to NIC’s Critical Analysis of 

Emergency Preparedness: Self-Audit Materials1 

applies to today’s jails equally well: 

Emergency preparedness is a crucially 

important topic...for every correctional 

institution. Large-scale inmate violence 

or a natural disaster can threaten the 

lives of both the institution staff and 

inmates. In hours, a major emergency 

can cost...tens of millions of dollars and 

result in many years of litigation. The 

negative publicity surrounding a major 

institutional crisis can also be overwhelming and almost interminable. 

Emergency preparedness is often not 

afforded the priority that it needs and 

deserves. In some cases, this may be due 

to complacency. In other cases, it happens because establishing a comprehensive system of emergency preparation 

and emergency response is not easy. It 

requires budget, time, equipment, interagency coordination, and long-term 

management attention. 

1 Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry, Critical Analysis of 


Emergency Preparedness: Self-Audit Materials (Washington, 


DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 


1996). 


v
Over the past several years, a number of factors both internal and external to U.S. jails have 

resulted in a burgeoning appreciation for emergency readiness. The events of September 11, 

2001, have made terrorism a local as well as an 

international issue. High profile escapes, largegroup disturbances, staff murders, and hostage 

incidents have served to put jails interminably 

at the top of the news and remind those of us 

in this field of the risks inherent in operating any correctional institution. Moreover, an 

executive order signed by the President has 

made it mandatory to familiarize staff in all correctional agencies with the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). The most graphic 

evidence of the importance of emergency preparedness to jails lies in the stark video footage 

of events surrounding Hurricane Katrina, particularly with regard to the problems encountered 

in attempting mass evacuation of the jails in 

southeast Louisiana. For all the reasons outlined 

above, and perhaps more, there is a newfound 

wave of interest in emergency preparedness 

among this country’s jails. That is, in itself, a 

very positive development because few issues 

relate as directly to community safety, staff 

safety, and inmate well-being as does emergency preparedness. 

It is NIC’s hope that this publication will be 

broadly useful to U.S. jails in planning for crises, emergencies, and natural disasters and in 

developing the appropriate response capacities 

to cope with these events where they cannot be 

prevented. 

Morris L. Thigpen 

Director 

National Institute of Corrections 

vi
After working with jails and prisons across the 

United States and Canada for more than 35 

years, with a substantial amount of that work 

centered on emergency preparedness, we find 

that several conclusions have become apparent. 

The most positive is the developing appreciation for the emergency preparedness on the part 

of jails that Morris L. Thigpen describes in the 

Foreword. There are a number of other conclusions that are more challenging or more troubling. Jails are well behind prisons in this area. 

Today, most state departments of corrections 

and most individual prisons have thorough, 

extensive, and detailed emergency plans and 

there is staff training on those plans. There are 

emergency specialists ranging from negotiators 

to public information officers to tactical teams, 

and there are drills, exercises, and specialized 

emergency equipment. 

Certainly, some jails carefully and thoughtfully 

prepare for emergencies. However, in too many 

jails, preparation is seriously substandard or 

lacking altogether. Some jails have emergency 

plans or manuals that are badly out of date or 

so poorly developed in the first place that they 

would be of little or no use to staff in a real 

crisis. Further, staff often have no training or 

familiarity with those plans; in a fast-developing 

major emergency, staff would have no chance to 

read the plans. Instead, they would simply rely 

on experience and instinct and hope for the best. 

The evidence that most jails are inadequately 

prepared for major emergencies is beyond 

dispute, and it extends to a very broad range 

Preface
 

of areas. For example, most administrators in 

corrections and law enforcement now acknowledge that staff and their families will predictably have extraordinary needs during and after 

major emergencies. The aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina underscored this conclusion. Yet many 

jails have no realistic plans for dealing with hostages after release, assisting their families during an incident, or addressing the gamut of other 

staff and staff family issues that go far beyond 

counseling for posttraumatic stress. 

There are several reasons why many U.S. jails 

are poorly prepared for major emergencies. One 

is that some jails simply believe “it can’t happen here.” Of course, when it does happen, it is 

too late. A second reason is that most U.S. jails 

are sheriff’s jails. The sheriff’s department may 

have a well-trained, professional correctional 

emergency response team (CERT) or special 

weapons and tactics (SWAT) team and welldeveloped contingency plans for various kinds 

of large-scale problems in the community, but 

the jail may be an afterthought, or there may be 

an assumption that if a serious problem occurs 

within the jail, the patrol side of the organization will handle it. Also, if the patrol and investigative divisions of the sheriff’s department are 

the prestigious assignments and the jail is the 

“red-headed stepchild,” then an issue as technically complex and demanding as emergency 

preparedness is unlikely to be near the top of 

anyone’s list. 

A third reason emergency preparedness in 

jails is not what might be hoped for nationally 

vii
involves the task itself. Good emergency preparedness is neither quick, nor cheap, nor easy. 

In an era of ever-tightening resources, it is difficult to divert any of those scarce resources from 

day-to-day needs, even though everyone recognizes that a badly handled major emergency 

can negatively define an entire organization for 

many years. 

Not all the news about emergency preparedness 

is bad. There are more positive aspects than may 

be apparent, some of which are subtle. First, 

although some kinds of jail emergencies cannot 

be prevented (e.g., tornadoes or floods), other 

kinds can be (e.g., disturbances and escapes). 

Good preparation is inevitably good prevention. 

Second, even when emergencies cannot be prevented because they are outside the jail’s control, good preparation can mitigate the impact 

of the crisis. Thus, even in a natural disaster, the 

difference between a massive tragedy and an 

emergency managed without deaths or serious 

injuries may depend on the jail’s level of 

preparedness. 

A less obvious advantage has to do with day-today security. Most correctional institutions that 

have engaged in a major initiative to strengthen 

their emergency preparedness have found along 

the way that their security practices and security 

procedures improved significantly, even though 

the emergency effort did not target those areas 

specifically. 

It stands to reason that if a jail is to achieve a 

reasonable level of emergency preparedness, 

there must be some way to evaluate the jail’s 

current degree of readiness for emergencies 

and then measure its progress toward achieving optimum preparedness. That is the primary 

purpose of the self-audit materials at the heart 

of this guide. They are intended to enable a jail 

to evaluate its own emergency preparedness in a 

thorough, objective, and detailed manner. 

One final issue must be emphasized: size. A 

5,000-bed jail is not the same as a 50-bed jail. 

In fact, there are many, many more 50-bed jails 

in this country than 5,000-bed jails. Yet materials developed for jails too often address only 

the issues of the 1,000- or 5,000-bed institution 

and ignore the concerns of smaller jails. In this 

guide, NIC, the project advisory board, and 

LETRA, Inc., have worked to overcome that 

problem and make A Guide to Preparing for 

and Responding to Jail Emergencies a resource 

that addresses the needs of small jails as well 

as the larger jails. Thus, this guide provides 

two self-audit instruments: a basic emergency 

preparedness checklist for smaller jails and an 

expanded checklist for larger jails. It is our hope 

that the supervisor or administrator in a smaller 

jail or a police “holding facility,” will not be 

frustrated or intimidated by the audit instrument 

intended for larger jails but will instead find the 

audit instrument designed for smaller jails to be 

easily and immediately applicable. 

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D. 

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D. 

LETRA, Inc. 

Campbell, CA 

viii
Acknowledgments
 

This guide is the result of a cooperative agreement funded by the National Institute of 

Corrections (NIC). However, it could not have 

been developed without the efforts of many 

individuals. 

Five consultants served as an advisory board for 

this project, each of whom has a long history and 

deep experience with jails. Joe Lynch is the jail 

administrator for a 100-bed facility in Auglaize 

County, Ohio. Tony McClung is a consultant in 

charge of the homeland security program of the 

Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police. Prior to 

that, he worked with county and municipal jails 

throughout Georgia before retiring after 34 years 

of service. Bill Page is a senior risk consultant 

with the Michigan Municipal Risk Management 

Authority. He is also a retired jail administrator 

whose former responsibilities included oversight 

of jails training for the Michigan Department of 

Corrections. Larry Powers is the jail administrator for the Spartanburg County Jail in South 

Carolina. Dennis Williams was the jail administrator for the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office 

and is now the director of research and planning 

for that agency in Pensacola, Florida. 

Each of the five members of the advisory board 

made major, original contributions to this guide 

and also provided ongoing review and critique 

as the guide developed. We are indebted to each 

of them for their professionalism, expertise, and 

commitment to this project. 

NIC did not just fund this project. The staff of 

the NIC Jails Division played an active and continuing role in the development of this guide. 

Richard Geaither, now with NIC’s National 

Academy; Alan Richardson, formerly a Jails 

Division staff member; and Virginia Hutchinson, 

Jails Division Chief, all made substantive contributions to this guide, particularly in the planning stages of the project. Jim Barbee, also a 

long-time Jails Division staff member, served as 

NIC’s program manager for this project from its 

inception. Jim provided suggestions on content, 

offered alternative strategies and methods of 

organization, and generally helped the project 

staff in more ways than can be enumerated. 

Without Jim’s generous and ongoing support, 

this project would not have been completed in 

its current form. Rita Rippetoe served as NIC’s 

publications coordinator throughout this project. 

In addition to substantive contributions, Ms. 

Rippetoe kept communications flowing among 

the authors, other NIC staff, and the editors. We 

are particularly grateful for her unfailingly positive approach to problems and questions. 

For authors, it is a luxury to be able to work 

with professional editors. This manuscript was 

edited in its entirety by Donna M. Ledbetter, a 

senior editor and writer; Janet M. McNaughton, 

the editorial team lead; and other staff of the 

Lockheed Martin Corporation, Rockville, MD. 

Good editors do a great deal more than correct 

typos and misspellings. Ms. Ledbetter and Ms. 

McNaughton were as helpful in reorganizing 

ix
whole sections of this manuscript as in making 

the grammar and syntax consistent. They were 

patient with the authors’ many idiosyncrasies of 

style and supportive throughout a quite lengthy 

editing process. The authors remain solely 

responsible for any errors in this guide, but Ms. 

Ledbetter, Ms. McNaughton, and the staff at 

Lockheed Martin have our thanks for making 

this work more professional and readable. 

NIC developed this guide through a cooperative agreement with LETRA, Inc., of Campbell, 

CA. LETRA is a nonprofit training and research 

organization with many years of experience in 

working with law enforcement and correctional 

agencies across the United States and Canada. 

LETRA has specialized in developing comprehensive emergency systems for prisons and jails 

and in training prison and jail staff in emergency preparedness for the past 30 years. Several 

people associated with LETRA supported this 

project and made contributions to this guide, 

and we gratefully acknowledge that assistance. 

Sylvia Heins was LETRA’s office manager 

throughout most of this project and had primary 

responsibility for preparing draft materials, 

providing logistical support to project staff and 

consultants, and formatting draft materials. She 

also carried out a wide range of other duties that 

kept the project moving forward. 

The last section of this guide consists of case 

studies featuring a variety of high-profile emergency situations in jails. In most instances, the 

case study was developed either by the jail staff 

after the emergency or by LETRA, Inc., with 

the active cooperation and assistance of the jails 

involved. It is not easy or comfortable after a 

major emergency or large-scale crisis to publish 

an analysis of what went right and what went 

wrong, but that is one of the most important 

ways that those of us in the field learn, and it 

is one of the hallmarks of professionalism. We 

extend our thanks to those jails that provided 

materials or otherwise assisted in the preparation of the case studies in this guide. 

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D. 

Project Director 

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D. 

Project Deputy Director 

LETRA, Inc. 

Campbell, CA 

x
Section 1 Section 1
 

Introduction 
In This 

Section 

Which Jails Will Benefit From These Self-Audit Materials? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
 

Jails and Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
 

Assessing Emergency Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
 

Small Jails and Large Jails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
 

Development of This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
 

Relationship of This Guide to the Earlier NIC Prison Publications . . . . . . . . . . . .13
 

What Is in This Guide? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Which Jails Will Benefit From 

These Self-Audit Materials? 

This guide is intended for all jails, whether 

small, megasized, or somewhere in between; 

whether private or public; whether high security 

or minimum security; whether presentenced or 

sentenced . Whether a jail is a short- or long-term 

facility; a city, county, or regional facility; a 

holding facility or a full-service jail; emergency 

readiness is a crucial consideration, and the selfaudit materials provided in this guide will be 

relevant . 

Jails and Major Emergencies 

Emergency preparedness is a central, even 

critical, issue throughout American corrections . 

Today, most public agencies must have emergency plans, and even private businesses have 

turned to disaster preparedness and business 

recovery planning . Jails, however, are not like 

other public agencies . They are responsible for 

the safety of large numbers of individuals who 

are usually locked up and cannot protect themselves in many emergency situations . Further, 

and perhaps ironically, the very people who are 

locked up and whose safety must be assured are 

the source of the most frequent and most serious 

jail emergency situations . Finally, the first priority for every jail is community protection, which 

means that even in the chaos of a major emergency, jails must ensure against escape . 

No jail is immune from large-scale emergencies . A small, minimum-custody jail facility 

housing short-term inmates may be at very low 

risk for riot and disturbance situations, but a 

minimum-security designation and small size are 

no shield against fire, earthquake, chemical spill, 

or staff walkout . A hostage situation—perhaps 

the jail crisis demanding the most sophisticated 

response—can happen at any correctional facility . Contrary to the belief of some, “no smoking” policies did not signal the end of fire risk 

for jails . For example, the lack of self-contained 

breathing apparatus (SCBA) units means staff 

may not be able to evacuate inmates (or themselves) in the event of a serious fire . There may 

be an unwritten rule that jails must be built near 

railroad tracks or a curve in a major highway, 

but that has not lead to widespread planning for 

Hazardous Materials: Awareness and Operations 

situations . 

A complicating factor is that the twin risks that 

an emergency will happen and that it will then 

go badly are heightened by population overcrowding and decreases in staffing levels and 

other resources, and also by the elimination of 

some programs that help stabilize jails (e .g ., 

educational programs, earned good time, etc .) . 

Along with overcrowding, (which is typically 

more severe in jails than in prisons), today’s jail 

populations are substantially more violent, more 

influenced by gang issues and increasingly comprised of more individuals with serious mental 

health disorders . Add to this equation that jails 

have limited control over who comes and goes, 

so that a new police initiative or an event in the 

community can result in a sudden and unpredicted influx of new prisoners . Unlike prisons, which 

collect a great deal of information on almost 

(continued on p. 5) 

3 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Could This Be You? 

An electrical fire starts in an area of the jail without sprinklers and that staff cannot reach quickly. 

Some of the materials burning are plastic, and the heating/ventilation/air conditioning (HVAC) system spreads a thick, heavy, toxic black smoke throughout the jail. The on-duty weekend staff do not 

know how to shut off the HVAC system. 

A crowded visiting hall is one of the first areas filling with smoke, but deputies cannot open the 

doors without allowing inmates out of the jail along with the visitors. The crowd has panicked and 

people are reported down. The fire has disabled some of the electric system (unfortunately, not 

the roof-mounted HVAC system), and the emergency generator does not operate the door panels. 

The jail has never conducted an actual evacuation of housing areas since fire drills have always 

been staff walkthroughs or simulated evacuations. There are not enough sets of emergency keys 

because they were distributed too late, and the manual unlocking of the single- and double-cell 

areas cannot keep up with the rate at which those areas are filling with smoke. 

Staff have already retreated from some housing areas to avoid being overcome by the smoke, leaving inmates trapped in those areas. Fire equipment and firefighters are arriving quickly, but they 

have not toured the jail and are unfamiliar with its layout. With the chaos at the main entrance to 

the jail, there are not enough deputies to escort the firefighters through the jail. There are preliminary reports of multiple fatalities, including some staff. 

* * * * * 

Two inmates with a smuggled handgun have taken a correctional officer, a nurse, and a doctor 

hostage in the jail’s clinic. A second correctional officer was shot and wounded in the initial melee 

and is also inside the clinic in unknown condition. The two inmates are awaiting trial in a firstdegree murder capital case stemming from a particularly brutal robbery-homicide they (allegedly) 

committed together. They are yelling that they want a car and safe passage out of the jail or they 

will kill a hostage in 10 minutes. 

The jail has no hostage plan and no negotiators. The shift supervisor is trying unsuccessfully to 

reach the jail director (it is a county department of corrections) because policy prohibits taking 

firearms into the jail’s secure perimeter. With two locked steel doors at either end of a long corridor, and the second door barricaded, an assault into the clinic area will be slow and extremely 

difficult. The jail’s correctional emergency response team (CERT) does cell extractions but is not 

trained or equipped for hostage rescue. 

One of the inmates in the clinic is on an outside telephone line to a local radio station. The inmates 

also have two staff radios and can monitor all transmissions because there is no tactical channel. 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

Section 1. Introduction 

Could This Be You? (continued) 

The local police chief is offering his negotiating team, but they work for his tactical commander 

and will only work in the situation with the police department’s special weapons and tactics 

(SWAT) team and if the police are given sole authority over the hostage incident, which the shift 

supervisor cannot grant. The response to the increased number of media inquiries is “No comment.” The shift supervisor has just been told the nurse’s family is being interviewed live on TV. 

* * * * * 

A category four hurricane (“Maude”) has changed course dramatically and is now expected to 

make direct landfall in the area of the jail in 24 hours. The jail’s informal (unwritten) evacuation plan 

calls for relocating inmates to 3 surrounding county jails and, if necessary, to a small federal prison 

that is within 30 miles. That prison was evacuated 2 days ago, and 2 of the 3 surrounding jails are 

already empty. A request 12 hours ago for county buses was rejected because they were committed to schools, hospitals, and senior residences. Movement is no longer possible because the 

roads are in gridlock. 

The roof and windows of the old half of the jail will have trouble if winds exceed 70 to 80 miles 

per hour. The emergency generator has not been tested recently but should have fuel for 24 

hours. Water should not be a problem as long as the municipal water system is not compromised. 

Flooding in the jail area will not be an issue unless the storm surge exceeds 6 feet. 

Panic has been growing in the community since the storm track changed. Jail staff are tense and 

many are requesting time off to get their families out of the area. Jail administration is denying those 

requests and notifying staff calling in sick that they must show up or be terminated. Keeping on-duty 

staff informed is difficult, but they are getting information from inmates who are watching dayroom 

TVs. Pretrial and sentenced misdemeanants are requesting to be released in return for a promise to 

present themselves at the jail after Hurricane Maude has passed. They are being informed there is 

no such process and that their current predicament is one more consequence of their crimes. 

all inmates, jails house pretrial populations that 

include many individuals who are “unknown 

quantities .” The most dangerous situations 

involve prisoners who know both that serious 

felony warrants are outstanding against them 

and that the jail does not yet know their status . 

These conditions are ubiquitous in U .S . jails . As 

a result, most jails are in a more precarious position with regard to major emergencies than they 

were 15 or 20 years ago . 

Another factor affecting how jails deal with 

major emergencies is the change in composition 

of the jail workforce . Recent years have seen the 

wholesale retirement of staff who began their 

careers in the late 1960s and 1970s—staff with 

25 or 30 years of experience, many of whom had 

been through riots and hostage incidents and had 

demonstrated leadership under fire . Today, most 

jail staff receive far better pay and enjoy earlier 

5 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

retirement than was the case “in the day .” A jail 

staff member is also far more likely to switch 

agencies or even switch careers than was true 

20 or 30 years ago . Thus, staff turnover is relatively high . In most sheriff’s jails, new deputies 

must have from 2 to several years’ tenure in 

the jail before they have enough seniority to be 

transferred to patrol . That process is then repeated at every promotional level . 

Two consequences are that the jail’s staff 

remains young and relatively inexperienced 

and that morale suffers because most deputies 

wanted to be law enforcement professionals 

rather than corrections professionals . Jails also 

promote staff much more quickly than was once 

customary . A jail captain may have 8 years of 

service now, whereas 20 years ago a “young” 

captain in the same department would have had 

16 to 20 years of experience . In the absence of 

a deep experience base, agencies are far more 

dependent on policies, plans, and particularly on 

training . The mix of youth, inexperience, and 

low morale among staff with overcrowding and 

higher percentages of violent and mentally ill 

inmates can be incendiary . 

Every sheriff and every jail administrator recognizes that a riot, a fire, or a hostage incident 

may be over in a matter of hours or less but may 

profoundly change the facility and the agency 

forever . One of the case studies in this guide 

recounts the story of a small jail in which a fire 

resulted in 42 inmate and visitor fatalities in less 

than 5 minutes . The fatal shooting at the courthouse in Atlanta, GA, and subsequent escape 

continue to reverberate through that community, 

and it appears that the name of Attica prison 

will remain legendary among correctional facilities . If the likelihood and dangers of large-scale 

crises in jails are widely acknowledged as real, 

does it not follow that almost all jails would 

commit serious time, resources, and thought to 

emergency preparedness? In fact, that is not the 

case . The reasons are complex . 

First, most jails have not given high priority 

to emergency preparedness because planning 

for emergencies does not seem as pressing as 

day-to-day problems—until there is an actual 

emergency . Second, most people judge emergency situations by their outcome—whether 

they ended well—rather than by looking at how 

the situations were handled: whether staff performed properly, the right training and equipment were in place, policies were proved valid, 

etc . In too many systems, no serious scrutiny 

or review takes place until a situation ends in 

tragedy . Third, as this guide illustrates, effective, comprehensive emergency preparedness 

is demanding and difficult to achieve . Fourth, 

most jails are part of a larger sheriff’s office, 

and emergency preparedness tends to be defined 

as a community and patrol division issue . Patrol, 

and perhaps other divisions or bureaus, may 

be given priority over jails for resources . Fifth, 

some traditions in jails actually work against 

effective emergency preparedness through: 

●	 Management by personality rather than by 

procedure and policy . 

●	 Separate plans for various types of emergencies, with no requirement that the plans be 

integrated, consistent, or current . 

●	 The deep-rooted belief that riots and hostage 

situations are the only jail emergencies that 

really matter . 

●	 The equally deep-rooted belief that planning 

is not really important because every emergency situation will be different . 

Assessing Emergency Readiness 

Effective planning plays a crucial role in preventing major emergencies and, as importantly, 

in containing crisis situations once they arise . 

With good planning, some situations—planned 

disturbances, some kinds of fires, some types 

of hostage incidents—may not occur in the first 

place . Good planning can also result in early 

6 
Section 1. Introduction 

Characteristics of a Good Correctional Emergency Preparedness System 

The hypothetical case studies in this section point to major flaws and absences in emergency preparedness systems. Regrettably, these omissions are all too common. Some facilities operate with 

little or no emergency system in place. Other facilities do have systems, but know their emergency 

preparation and response capabilities are outdated, inadequate, or otherwise unhelpful. In both of 

these situations, the facility needs a comprehensive emergency preparedness system, and identifying the key parameters of such a system may help. The following 13 characteristics represent the 

minimum criteria for an effective system of emergency preparation and response in a correctional 

facility. 

1. Practical: The system must be useful to line staff, supervisors, and managers both before and 

during an emergency. It should not be theoretical. It should provide specific direction and procedures, tell staff what to do and what not to do, identify choices, etc. 

2. Simple: The KISS, “Keep It Simple, Stupid,” principle applies here. Emergency provisions that 

are too technical or too sophisticated may be beyond some staff. If the emergency system is overly 

complex, staff may forget key elements when an unanticipated crisis occurs. Compare the following instructions for maintaining facility fire doors: 

Keep all fire doors closed in any major emergency unless ordered to open 

specific doors to assist with inmate evacuation. 

Versus 

Type I and Type II doors are maintained closed in fire situations but are 

opened in other natural disasters and may be opened in emergencies involving inmate violence reaching Level Three or above. Type III doors shall be 

controlled by the highest ranking supervisor on scene in unaffected areas of 

the institution and by the Incident Commander in areas directly affected by the 

emergency. 

The first set of instructions is reasonably straightforward. The second set is neither straightforward 

nor simple. 

intervention that resolves small, localized crises 

before they escalate into major emergencies 

that threaten the entire institution . The lack of 

effective emergency preparedness may increase 

the likelihood both that a major emergency will 

occur and that if a large-scale crisis does occur, 

it will be worse than necessary . 

If a jail does not have the level of emergency 

preparedness it wants or needs, assessment 

is the logical first step . Traditionally, jail 

administrators have either asked their own staff 

to conduct an assessment or have contracted 

with outside consultants to do the job . Each 

7 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Characteristics of a Good Correctional Emergency Preparedness System 

(continued) 

3. Corrections-Specific: An emergency system that was not developed specifically for correctional 

facilities is unlikely to be effective in a jail. For example, although an emergency system developed 

for nuclear facilities may be sophisticated and comprehensive, it will not tell staff in high-security 

housing what to do differently when evacuating administrative segregation inmates as compared 

with protective custody inmates. It will not help staff operate under lockdown conditions, and it is 

not likely to be useful in preventing staff retaliation after a major disturbance. No amount of discussion about who reports to whom and who controls which resources will substitute for the sound, 

detailed correctional practices that must be at the heart of an emergency system if it is to be effective for jails or prisons. 

4. Generic: A single plan that addresses all major emergencies (an “all risk” plan) is more effective than the traditional approach of having a different plan for each different kind of emergency. 

Keeping staff trained and current with 8 or 10 different emergency plans is impossible, and there 

is little chance that staff will remember and differentiate among the various plans. Because 70–90 

percent of what is done in any major emergency in a correctional facility is common to all emergencies—particularly in the crucial first 30 to 40 minutes—it makes sense to have a single plan 

that covers those common elements. Appendixes or addenda specifying additional steps particular 

to each type of emergency should then be added at the end of the generic emergency plan. 

5. Policy-Based: Developing an emergency plan to no policy is impossible. Who is in charge at the 

outset of a major crisis is a policy decision, not a training or planning issue. Similarly, more specific 

questions such as what is nonnegotiable in a hostage situation and who, if anyone, is authorized 

to deviate from policy during an emergency, must be determined by policy decisions. Furthermore, 

with regard to some issues, emergency policies should differ markedly from day-to-day policies. 

Thus, an effective emergency system and its plans must be developed with regard to specific decisions about emergency policies. 

approach has its own drawbacks . Involving 

the management staff of a jail in evaluating 

the strengths and weaknesses of its emergency 

preparedness (policies, procedures, plans, equipment, etc .) may be all the motivation they need 

to begin to improve their emergency systems . 

On the other hand, staff may lack the objectivity to point out areas in which they are at fault . 

Even if they are objective, in-house staff may 

not notice obvious problems because they have 

worked under the conditions for so long that 

they think of them not as problems but as the 

natural state of affairs . Further, internal staff are 

unlikely to be aware of the breadth of alternative solutions available across U .S . jails . Finally, 

politics and personalities can compromise the 

integrity of an internal assessment . 

A different set of problems arises if jail administrators engage consultants . First, consultants 

8 
Section 1. Introduction 

Characteristics of a Good Correctional Emergency Preparedness System 

(continued) 

6. True System: The word “system” is badly overused, but with regard to emergency planning 

and response, it is appropriate and essential. To be a true system, all parts of a jail emergency 

system—each element of planning and response—must be compatible and operate seamlessly. 

Each element must be developed with full awareness of all other parts of the system. For example, 

the policy, procedures, and training for hostage negotiators must take into account and fit with tactical team operations. Both of these areas must be entirely consistent with the emergency policy 

on command and with training for staff at the level of shift commander and above. If one or more of 

these system elements is not consistent with the training and procedures for first responders, the 

outcome of an emergency could be tragic. This principle, “true system,” is one of the biggest challenges in developing an effective jail emergency system. 

7. User Friendly: The jail emergency system must be quick and easy to work with, and designed 

primarily for on-duty staff. When a major emergency strikes, there is no time to read through 

lengthy instructions or research questions. If the staff on duty cannot begin to contain an emergency, it may be irrelevant that the jail has highly trained and sophisticated specialists, because 

they will arrive too late. 

8. Checklist-Driven: The primary method of making an emergency system user friendly, simple, and 

practical is to build as many of the procedures as possible into checklists. A checklist keeps staff 

from relying solely on memory. Checklists embody the key procedures for responding to an emergency and condense the experience and judgment of senior staff into an outline form that any staff 

member can follow. Checklists remind staff of the specifics in an emergency plan and of information covered in training. Later, they serve as accurate and detailed logs of what was done when 

and by whom. 

9. Agencywide: In a department with more than one jail facility, it is essential that emergency plans 

follow the same format and principles in all facilities. Furthermore, the emergency plans at any one 

cost money, and a serious evaluation may be 

expensive . Second, most consultants have 

specialized areas of expertise . Some are very 

good with fire prevention and fire-fighting 

systems, others with correctional emergency 

response teams (CERTs) and special weapons and 

tactics (SWAT), and still others with training hostage negotiators—but very few consultants have 

indepth experience and expertise with the entire 

gamut of comprehensive emergency preparedness 

issues . Third, management staff may see outside 

consultants as “walkthrough experts” and not 

take them seriously . Finally, political rather than 

purely constructive motives may govern how a 

jail chooses to use a consultant’s report . 

The self-audit materials in this guide offer 

an alternative to those traditional methods of 

9 
 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Characteristics of a Good Correctional Emergency Preparedness System 

(continued) 

facility must plan for the use of resources from the other facilities. Thus, while each facility will 

have its own emergency plan, the emergency system will be agencywide. 

10. Tailored to Each Facility: Tailoring systems to each facility applies to agencies that operate 

more than one jail. For example, the emergency plans at a new highrise facility with elevators will 

in some respects be dramatically different from the emergency plans for an older, “Auburn Style” 

(telephone-pole design) jail facility. Similarly, the emergency plans for a work-release center will 

be very different from those for a high-security facility. If emergency plans are so general that the 

same plan fits all jail facilities, then the plan may be close to useless. A good emergency plan, on 

the other hand, may specify that the vehicle sallyport be double posted early in any emergency and 

that inmate phones on living units be disconnected. However, not all jail facilities have a vehicle 

sallyport or inmate-access phones on living units. Without that kind of facility-specific detail, emergency plans are unlikely to be helpful. 

11. Detailed: An emergency system must be detailed, whether in describing armory checkout procedures, outlining relief of staff during an extended emergency, or in addressing hundreds of other 

issues. A generalized emergency system fails to prepare staff adequately and to provide direction 

during an actual emergency. 

12. Auditable: A good emergency system must be subject to audit. If it is not, the agency cannot 

know how much of the system is in place or how well staff maintain it. A good emergency system 

will include audit measures and procedures. 

13. Field Tested: Field testing is not an essential criterion, but it is highly desirable. Staff do not want an 

emergency system that looks and sounds good but has never been tested under real life conditions. If 

a jail needs to develop or adopt an emergency system, it should insist on one that has been used successfully in other jails and that has been tested through a variety of real crises and emergencies. 

evaluating emergency readiness in jails . A 

self-audit has the obvious advantage that the 

price is right; there are no external costs, and a 

jail can conduct the audit at a time that is most 

convenient . Although the audit is conducted by 

the jail’s own staff, the detailed and objective 

nature of the checklists works to overcome many 

of the concerns with political and personality 

issues . Jail staff conducting the audit are no 

longer limited to answering questions derived 

from their own experience or preconceived 

notions of what constitutes adequate emergency 

preparedness . For the many jails that have never 

attempted a rigorous analysis of their planning 

or preparation for large-scale crises, these materials offer a convenient, inexpensive, and practical solution . 

10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 1. Introduction 

Are You Prepared? 

For each type of crisis or emergency listed in the table below, rate how likely your jail is to face that situation 

in the next 10 years: impossible (I), highly unlikely (U), possible (P), or likely (L). For each situation you ranked 

possible or likely, fill in the remaining columns about your degree of preparation for that type of emergency. 

(For situations you rated impossible or highly unlikely, go no further.) 

 Level of Preparation 

Event

Likelihood 

(I, U, P, L) 

Current 

Detailed, 

Realistic 

Plan 

All Staff 

Trained to 

Policy/Plan 

Specific 

Drills/ 

Exercises 

1. Disturbance/riot 

2. Major fire 

3. Hostage incident 

4. Mass escape 

5. Tornado 

6. Flood 

7. Hurricane 

8. Earthquake 

9. Staff job action 

10. Epidemic 

11. Bomb/explosion 

12. HAZMAT 

13. Terrorist incident 

14. Mass casualties 

15. Mass evacuation 

Key: I = impossible, U = highly unlikely, P = possible, L = likely, HAZMAT = hazardous materials 

Small Jails and Large Jails 

Emergency preparedness is often seen as an 

issue for medium-sized and large jails but not for 

smaller jails . Nonetheless, a compelling case can 

be made that emergency preparedness is more 

challenging—and equally important—for small 

jails . Larger jails have resources that do not 

exist in many smaller jails . These resources may 

include equipment, budgets, staffing patterns, 

training time, and many other things . Yet an 

emergency demands the same types of response 

and functions from a smaller facility as from a 

larger one . Someone must deal with the media . 

Negotiators may be required . Someone must 

attend to the special needs of staff and their families . With sharply limited resources, the smaller 

jail is challenged to be reasonably prepared 

and—in the event of an emergency—challenged 

to respond . Even external resources are different . The larger jail is likely in a larger community with a city police department and major fire 

department close by . The smaller jail may have 

no surrounding or adjacent police department, 

11 
 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

and the local fire department may be a volunteer 

organization that is not as well trained or as well 

equipped as its urban counterparts . Moreover, 

many of the staff of a smaller jail may also serve 

in the volunteer fire department and cannot function in both capacities at the same time . 

This guide is designed to be truly practical and 

useful for smaller jails as well as larger jails . 

The administrator of a smaller jail or the sheriff 

in a county with a smaller jail should not allow 

the size of this guide or the number of questions and degree of detail in the checklists to be 

intimidating . Although the larger jail self-audit 

checklist is extremely thorough and detailed by 

design, the self-audit checklist for smaller jails 

is basic and straightforward . Administrators 

of jails with 25 beds to 125 beds are strongly 

encouraged to review the smaller jail self-audit 

checklist before deciding whether the materials 

in this guide may be helpful . 

The goal of the larger jail self-audit checklist is 

to be all-inclusive . For managers and administrators of larger jails, including mega jails, the 

larger jail checklist will likely prove challenging 

and demanding; some jails, particularly jails that 

have given little attention to emergency preparedness, may find the audit instrument somewhat overwhelming . 

The key question is, “What is a smaller jail and 

what is a larger jail?” The answer is a decision 

for the reader to make . This guide does not provide a definitive numerical answer . Clearly, a 

100-bed jail is a smaller jail and a 2,000-bed jail 

is a larger jail, but what of a jail that has 225 

beds? Should that jail use the self-audit checklist 

for smaller jails or the one for larger jails? The 

jail may choose to use either or both . That is, 

the 225-bed jail may find that the checklist for 

smaller jails raises so many serious issues that it 

has no need or desire to delve into more detail . 

On the other hand, the jail may find it looks 

quite good in terms of the basic issues raised for 

smaller jails, and then it may wish to pick and 

choose additional material from the larger jail 

checklist and include that in its self-audit . 

Finally, it must be recognized that two different 

500-bed jail facilities may arrive at very different decisions about these materials, and each 

decision may be well justified . One facility may 

have extensive emergency plans and may have 

conducted ongoing emergency training and be 

generally sophisticated and current with regard 

to emergency preparedness . The other 500-bed 

jail may have nothing in place with regard to 

emergency preparedness . The former facility 

may rightfully decide to use the larger jail selfaudit while the latter facility quite reasonably 

decides to begin with the version for smaller 

jails . Facilities of similar size will differ markedly in history, culture, and preparation with 

regard to major emergencies, and one self-audit 

instrument will not be appropriate for all jails . 

The National Institute of Corrections and those 

who participated in the development of this 

guide hope and intend that almost every jail 

across the country will find something in these 

materials that will be of use to it in evaluating its 

emergency preparedness . 

12 
Development of This Guide 


An interesting parallel exists between emergency preparedness audits and security audits . 

Like emergency preparedness audits, security 

audits were once rare in jails . Today they are far 

from universal, but they are quite common . That 

change may be attributed largely to the advent of 

detailed self-audit checklists designed to evaluate security practices in correctional institutions . 

As the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) 

supported the development of generic security 

self-audit checklists and made them available to 

the field without cost, jail and prison administrators needed little encouragement to apply those 

instruments to their own facilities . The annual 

security audit, conducted internally using a standardized self-audit checklist, is a mainstay of 

many correctional institutions . That history and 

reasoning may be extended to emergency preparedness self-audits quite directly . 

Several factors led to the development of this 

guide . In 1996, NIC published a set of self-audit 

materials on emergency preparedness for prisons 

in Critical Analysis of Emergency Preparedness: 

Self-Audit Materials, the first extensive emergency preparedness audit materials available in 

the United States . The reaction to that publication was extremely positive, and its success 

led directly to the substantially expanded and 

updated set of prison emergency preparedness 

self-audit checklists and related information published by NIC in 2005 as A Guide to Preparing 

for and Responding to Prison Emergencies: 

Self-Audit Checklists, National Survey Results, 

Resource Materials, Case Studies. Some jail 

administrators encountered those NIC publications and used them to evaluate emergency preparedness in their own jails, but it was clear that 

if NIC wanted to reach a wider jails audience, 

self-audit materials would have to be designed 

specifically for jails . Also, as alluded to in the 

Preface, events ranging from the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, to Hurricane Katrina raised 

awareness of the crucial nature of emergency 

preparedness efforts in jails across the country . 

The Relationship of This Guide to 

the Earlier NIC Prison Publications 

Although this guide is based in part on the two 

prison emergencies publications cited above, it 

has been rewritten and restructured to address 

the particular concerns of jails . The guide includes several other changes that are the result 

of criticisms, suggestions for improvement, and 

ideas for reorganization that came in response 

to the earlier NIC publications . Finally, this 

guide also reflects changes in the environment 

in which jails operate that have occurred over 

time . For example, in 1996, no one could foresee 

today’s pervasive concern with terrorism, and 

the original publication on emergency preparedness did not consider counterterrorism strategies . 

Similarly, in 1996, there were few connections 

between the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency and local jails . That is no longer the 

case . 

13 
 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

This guide, like its NIC predecessors, draws 

primarily on expertise from the field . That is, 

ideas about what is important and what is not 

important in terms of jail readiness for crises 

and emergencies, what are best practices, and 

what are promising new ideas come in large part 

from staff working in jails and prisons across 

the country . The two checklists at the heart of 

this guide are not derived from some theoretical 

perspective nor are they intended for academic 

use . Importantly, most of the material in the two 

emergency preparedness checklists has been 

field-tested by line staff, supervisors, and managers in working jails and found to be essential, 

important, or helpful . 

What Is in This Guide? 

The first section of this guide has discussed the 

rationale for self-audit materials on emergency 

preparedness, their history and development, and 

their goals . Section 2, “Conducting an Audit,” 

discusses the purpose and philosophy of auditing and then presents specific information and 

recommendations about who should conduct an 

audit, when to conduct it, and how that should 

be done . Sections 3 and 4 present the smaller 

jail and larger jail checklists, respectively . In 

addition, readers may download these checklists 

from the NIC website at www.nicic.gov. These 

electronic versions make it possible to share the 

checklists via e-mail or a local area network in 

addition to being able to print them . 

Section 5, “Resource Materials,” presents three 

important papers: “Leadership Issues During 

Crises,” “Prevention of Jail Emergencies,” and 

“Emergency Teams .” The first paper focuses 

specifically on leadership during jail emergencies, but much of the discussion could apply to 

crisis management in other settings . Some of the 

issues discussed in this paper are quite relevant 

to day-to-day operations as well as to crises 

and emergencies . The paper on preventing jail 

emergencies covers a broad range of measures 

that have the potential to decrease risks and 

reduce the probability that a jail will actually 

face a major crisis . The paper on jail emergency 

teams discusses some of the specialized teams— 

including tactical, hostage negotiation, and crisis intervention teams—required to respond to 

emergency situations in jails . The emphasis in 

this paper is not on the required training, equipment, or policies and procedures for such teams . 

Instead, it examines the salient issues surrounding the management of emergency teams . 

Section 6, which concludes the guide, presents 

case studies illustrating how jails have responded 

to a variety of emergency and crisis situations . 

The majority of these case studies were written 

specifically for this guide . 

14 
Section 1 Section 2
 

Conducting an Audit 
In This 

Section 

Purpose and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
 

Purpose of an Emergency Preparedness Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
 

Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
 

Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
 

Deciding To Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
 

Selecting a Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
 

Who Should Conduct the Audit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
 

Standards for Auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
 

Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
 

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
 

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
 

Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
 

Examples of Completed Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
 

Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Purpose and Philosophy
 

Purpose of an Emergency 

Preparedness Audit 

Conducting emergency preparedness audits is 

important for a number of reasons . Some reasons 

are obvious, others more subtle . 

An audit validates a comprehensive emergency 

preparedness system . For a jail, comprehensive 

readiness for crises, natural disasters, and major 

emergencies is no easy matter; it is a far-reaching effort that can take years to develop fully 

and can require large amounts of money, staff 

time, management attention, and other scarce 

resources . An audit specific to emergency preparedness makes a strong statement that all of 

the work undertaken to develop and maintain the 

emergency system has been intended, planned, 

and coordinated . 

Perhaps the most obvious reason for an audit is 

that it provides management with an objective 

assessment of the progress and status of the 

emergency system . Because a jail’s emergency 

system is necessarily large and multifaceted, 

nothing short of a systematic audit procedure 

will effectively evaluate the system . A jail’s 

emergency preparedness coordinator may be 

familiar with several substantial problems and 

may also have several initiatives awaiting funding or management commitment . However, the 

person in charge of emergency preparedness is 

inevitably too close—too involved in the system 

and too familiar with what is in place—to serve 

as an independent evaluator . To varying degrees, 

the same will be true of the facility’s managers 

and emergency specialists, who may be quite 

familiar with its emergency preparedness and 

response capabilities . An objective and detailed 

audit process can surmount these limitations . 

For management, then, the emergency preparedness audit offers the opportunity to identify 

weaknesses, deficiencies, developing problems, 

areas of vulnerability, inconsistencies, and 

simple mistakes in the facility’s emergency preparedness efforts . 

The audit also provides an opportunity to 

evaluate or reevaluate resource allocation . 

For example, a jail’s correctional emergency 

response team (CERT) program may have 

become more and more expensive because of 

costs associated with increased training time 

and range practice, while its hostage negotiators 

may have stopped training regularly and may not 

have worked together for more than a year . It 

may be time for the jail’s administrators to revisit the priorities reflected in the allocation of their 

training resources . Such questions of resource 

allocation and relative priorities run throughout 

a comprehensive emergency system . 

Relatively frequent audits can help a leader 

identify tendencies toward complacency and 

cutting corners in critical practices . Audits can 

also offset the dangerous consequences of fast 

turnover in management and supervisory positions . Rapid turnover means a loss of knowledge 

and experience in important areas . Without regular audits, a facility’s policies and post orders may 

come to bear little resemblance to actual practice . 

17 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Another central purpose of an emergency preparedness audit is to verify compliance with 

standards and policies . Regardless of whether 

the standards or policies involved are at the 

departmental or facility level, or whether the 

standards are external (e .g ., from the American 

Correctional Association) or internal, the point 

is that the organization has adopted them and 

expects them to be followed . Compliance with 

stated standards and policies goes hand in hand 

with accountability, which is essential to any 

management endeavor . However, even if a policy is well written, disseminated, discussed, and 

reinforced by training, compliance is not guaranteed . Although first-line supervisors generally 

carry the primary responsibility for day-to-day 

compliance with policies, a comprehensive review is the best way to ensure compliance with 

policies, standards, and written procedures in an 

area as broad as emergency preparedness . 

An audit may also be an excellent staff development tool and may increase staff awareness of 

crucial issues related to emergency preparedness . 

This function of the audit applies not only to the 

audit team members, but also to the facility’s 

staff at large . As the audit team reviews records, 

asks about emergency procedures, observes 

emergency responses, and focuses on the less 

visible aspects of emergency preparedness, jail 

staff infer this message: management believes 

emergency preparedness is important and is 

checking to see if things are as they should be . 

Inevitably, staff other than audit team members 

spot deficiencies as the audit progresses . In addition, when management takes corrective actions 

after reviewing audit findings, those actions will 

likely have greater impact because of the staff’s 

heightened awareness of emergency issues . 

Employees who have not understood why some 

procedures were necessary for emergency preparedness may come to appreciate the rationale 

for those procedures . Finally, the audit offers the 

facility staff a chance to learn best practices with 

regard to emergency preparedness . 

All of these reasons point to the same conclusion: an audit of a jail’s emergency preparedness 

system provides an opportunity to improve that 

system . That is the ultimate goal . If management 

does not subscribe to that goal, then there is little 

point to engaging in a vigorous, demanding, and 

detailed evaluation of the emergency system . 

(The same can be said of any kind of large-scale 

institutional audit, and this guide’s focus on 

emergency preparedness in no way suggests that 

an audit in this area is more important than, or 

conceptually different from, a security audit or 

other kinds of major audits .) 

Philosophy 

Protecting the community is the primary mission 

of all jails . An audit of emergency preparedness 

is consistent with that mission . In fact, with the 

exception of some highly specific aspects of jail 

operations such as perimeter security, one would 

be hard pressed to find an activity more closely 

related to protecting the public than evaluating 

the jail’s readiness to handle large-scale crises 

and major emergencies . 

Emergency preparedness audits also involve 

philosophic considerations beyond the jail’s mission . If the jail is a policy-driven organization, 

then audit procedures necessarily will be philosophically consistent with that orientation . In a 

personality-driven organization or in an organization that has no consistent orientation with 

regard to decisionmaking, audit processes may 

be less helpful or even counterproductive . 

More specifically, an audit should be a win-win 

approach to improving emergency preparedness . It should define current conditions and 

offer opportunities for improvement . However, 

if an audit becomes a kind of witch hunt (“who 

screwed up, and where and when?”), then it will 

not be a positive exercise and it will be unlikely 

to help the jail improve . Worse, if administrators regard the audit as an opportunity to assign 

18 
 

Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

blame for shortcomings, then staff will be defensive and the audit results will almost certainly be 

inaccurate and incomplete . This point is critical: 

Sending the wrong message to staff about the 

purpose and philosophy of an emergency preparedness audit will invariably compromise 

the audit findings themselves . 

Similar considerations apply to the concept of 

“audit scores .” Some audits and audit procedures, such as audits of American Correctional 

Association standards, produce an overall 

numeric score for the facility . Jail administrators often speak proudly of such scores (“We 

got a 99 .2 percent and that is the highest score 

any jail in our state has ever received”) . For the 

emergency preparedness audits presented in this 

guide, however, such a view would be meaningless or worse . Every staff member involved in 

these audits should understand from the outset 

that there is no acceptable overall score . The 

individual items in the self-audit checklists are 

not presented in any particular relationship to 

each other and are not of equal weight or value . 

In fact, different jails probably will place different weights and values on different items, and 

that is as it should be . Thus, an overall score or 

average rating is meaningless, and may be misleading or even dangerous . As Richard Franklin 

pointed out in a National Institute of Corrections 

(NIC) monograph on security auditing, “It is 

quite possible to drown in a river that has an 

average depth of 6 inches .”1 

Before an emergency preparedness audit begins, 

its underlying philosophy should be discussed 

and disseminated . That philosophy should 

include the following goals: 

●	 To support the mission of the jail in general 

and the jail’s emergency preparedness system specifically . 

●	 To increase staff awareness of emergency 

preparedness and provide opportunities for 

staff development . 

●	 To provide management with rigorous, 

objective, detailed, professional assessments 

of the current status of the emergency preparedness system, with particular attention 

to unusual strengths and weaknesses . 

●	 To provide opportunities for recognition of 

innovation and excellence . 

1 Richard Franklin, Conducting Security Audits: A Special 

Issues Seminar Hosted by the NIC Prisons Division and the 

NIC Academy, Program No. 93 P3201 (Washington, DC: U .S . 

Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 1993) . 

19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Preliminary Considerations
 

Deciding To Audit 

Using the self-audit materials in this guide to 

assess the emergency preparedness of a jail 

will be demanding, and the results may be 

daunting—especially if the jail has not previously placed a high priority on emergency preparedness . Before deciding to conduct an emergency 

preparedness self-audit, jail management should 

first consider all of the implications and be ready 

to support the process fully . 

Management should also closely examine some 

very specific considerations before initiating an 

emergency preparedness audit: 

●	 Be careful what you wish for. This is an 

example of “Don’t ask questions if you 

aren’t prepared for the answers .” Consider 

the following: 

o	 Does jail management really want to know 

the results of a detailed and demanding 

review of emergency preparedness? 

o	 Do jail managers and/or departmentlevel administrators have a realistic view 

of the jail’s current degree of emergency 

preparedness? 

o	 Do jail managers believe emergency preparedness in the jail is reasonably good 

because there has been no recent major 

crisis? 

o	 If the jail audit results document a pattern 

of dire needs and unmitigated risks, will 

leaders react constructively or will they be 

defensive and in denial? 

Audit Decisions in Multiple 


Facility Departments
 

If a sheriff’s office or local department of 

corrections simply mandates emergency 

preparedness audits at all jails in the jurisdiction without first discussing the subject 

with facility managers and giving them time 

to consider it, the audits will take place but 

the timing may not be good and the process 

may not be supported at the facility level. 

An audit initiated by administrative decree 

from above is likely to produce resentment 

from facility-level management, and that 

resentment will informally but effectively 

be transmitted to facility staff. As a result, 

the audit effort is unlikely to be a positive learning experience, and the results 

may be inaccurate and incomplete. Thus, 

it is prudent for administrators to involve 

facility-level management in the decision to 

conduct emergency preparedness audits 

jurisdictionwide. 

Optimally, jail leaders and department leaders 

will consider these questions candidly and realistically before embarking on an audit . 

More than occasionally, a facility undertakes 

an audit because line staff or mid-managers 

recognize serious problems in the jail and 

21 
 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

suggest an audit as a way to bring the problems 

to management’s attention . That is, when leadership is not responsive to subordinates’ suggestions or concerns, those subordinates may 

push for an audit, hoping it will alert management to serious jail deficiencies . That strategy 

may be successful, but it also has substantial 

risks . When management is not committed to an 

audit initially, they may ignore the results of the 

audit . Worse, unfavorable results may provoke 

anger toward the audit team (the “blame the 

messenger” syndrome) or the subordinates who 

advocated for the audit . 

●	 What else is going on? If another activity 

is demanding large amounts of staff time 

and pushing staff hard, expecting an audit to 

proceed smoothly at the same time is unreasonable . The audits in this guide, though 

not extremely lengthy, should begin only 

when they are likely to be “the only game in 

town” for several days . 

●	 Can audit team members focus exclusively on the process until it is completed? 

Management must make the commitment 

that, barring some absolute emergency, the 

small number of staff assigned to the audit 

team will be free to complete the audit 

without interruption . This means avoiding 

the all-too-common practice of assigning 

staff to a project and then reassigning them 

before they complete the project . If management fails to honor its commitment of staff 

time, an otherwise serious audit effort will 

be undermined or rendered useless . 

●	 Is management committed to reviewing 

the audit findings? Sometimes management tends to regard an audit as completed 

once the team has finished filling out the 

forms . Actually, the most important work 

in the audit process does not begin until the 

checklists have been finished . The single 

most important product of the audit 

process is management decisionmaking— 

at review meetings, in which audit findings 

are discussed and analyzed—that develops 

a plan of corrective action and followup . 

Managers must commit to participating in 

the review process . Top managers should 

recognize that the review will be time consuming . Before the audit begins, managers 

should agree to an initial review meeting 

and should understand that, barring emergencies, they will need to attend all review 

meetings . 

Selecting a Self-Audit Checklist 

A jurisdiction with a single jail facility may 

choose to use either the Emergency Preparedness 

Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails or the 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist 

for Smaller Jails . That is, for some jurisdictions, 

it may be difficult to decide which of these 

two checklists will be more helpful for their 

jail . For other jurisdictions, the answer will not 

be difficult because the jail in that jurisdiction 

is quite small, and it will be obvious that the 

checklist for smaller jails is most appropriate . 

Jurisdictions with a single, large jail facility may 

draw the opposite conclusion . 

Deciding which checklist to use also may be 

difficult for jurisdictions with multiple jail facilities . In particular, there are many counties that 

have two jails: a sentenced facility and a presentenced facility . In these situations, the presentenced facility is almost always multilevel 

with regard to security, with minimum-security 

or minimum/medium security areas at the low 

end but including maximum-security areas as 

well . On the other hand, county sentenced facilities seldom include maximum security or high 

security areas (except for segregation units), and 

the facility is usually designated as minimum/ 

medium or medium security . 

22 
Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

If a jurisdiction has both pre-sentenced and 

sentenced facilities, should both facilities use 

the same checklist, or should the pre-sentenced 

facility use the checklist for larger jails while the 

sentenced facility uses the checklist for smaller 

jails? The answer is a local decision . As a guideline, however, it is typically easier to work with 

the results of the audits if both facilities use the 

same checklist . Also, the decision about which 

checklist to use should have more to do with 

facility size than with security level . 

A different situation occurs when a jurisdiction 

has one or more large jail facilities but also one 

or more small, freestanding, minimum-security 

facilities . Most typically, the latter facilities 

might be residential work-release centers, but 

there are a variety of other types as well . In 

these cases, it will almost always be the correct 

decision to use the checklist for smaller jails . 

Even then, administrators should recognize that 

local police or fire departments, rather than the 

jail system itself, may be responsible for some 

checklist items . 

Who Should Conduct the Audit? 

The audits in this guide are better performed 

by a team than by an individual . Once a team 

completes the audit, it may be acceptable for 

an individual, perhaps the jail’s emergency preparedness coordinator, to manage the audit 

followup . 

Using a team for an audit has distinct advantages . Most obviously, more staff develop interest in and ownership of the jail’s emergency 

preparedness; secondarily, the jail benefits from 

two or three independent assessments, which 

may reveal problems that would not have come 

to light had a single person conducted the audit . 

The audit team should have two to four members . Management should appoint one member 

as team leader . If the jail has an emergency 

preparedness coordinator or someone in charge 

of the emergency area but perhaps with a different title, that individual should be part of the 

team but should not serve as team leader . (Issues 

of ownership, defensiveness, ego, lack of perspective, etc ., might interfere with a coordinator’s ability to lead the team objectively .) The 

team leader must have sufficient rank or other 

status to have access to all relevant data and all 

areas of the jail . 

Ideally, at least one member of the audit team 

will be from another jail within the department, 

from some other area of the department (if it is 

a sheriff’s jail), or even from a jail in another 

jurisdiction . This may not be practical and it is 

not essential, but it does contribute to the independence and objectivity of the audit . At least 

one member of the team should be from management or midmanagement level . In general, 

team members should be chosen on the basis of 

experience, credibility, knowledge of custody 

and security operations, and, to a lesser extent, 

familiarity with emergency operations . To avoid 

compromising the audit’s objectivity, management should not create an audit team composed 

predominantly or entirely of emergency specialists (e .g ., a four-person team consisting of the 

jail’s CERT leader, armory officer, emergency 

preparedness coordinator, and chief negotiator) . 

The audit team should meet with the jail’s top 

managers before beginning the audit . Members 

should clearly understand their recourse if they 

encounter serious resistance or other trouble as 

they conduct the audit . (Typically, a team will 

have negotiated the right to call an impromptu 

meeting with top administrators to review such 

situations and will wait until management intervention clears the way before proceeding with 

the audit .) The team members should meet at 

the end of each day while the audit is in process . 

This requirement may seem overly structured 

but, in practice, it has proven to be essential . 

Individual team members working in different 

23 
 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

areas can get distracted, lose perspective, etc ., 

and the end-of-day meeting serves to bring the 

team together to sort out trivial problems from 

serious problems and keep efforts coordinated . 

They should meet face-to-face with top management as soon as they complete the self-audit 

checklists, before the management review meetings take place . During this prereview meeting, 

the team gives top management an informal read 

on how the audit progressed, the most important conclusions, and any particularly surprising 

findings . It should be the verbal equivalent of a 

written executive summary, and it should prevent major surprises at the management review 

meeting . 

Standards for Auditors 

The self-audit checklists do not attempt to 

impose standards for emergency preparedness 

but rather provide criteria by which jails can 

measure their own preparedness . However, certain basic standards of conduct should guide the 

efforts of the audit team . 

1 . 	 Maintain confidentiality . Audit findings 

and information are confidential, to be 

shared initially with the jail’s top management only . The administration should determine how the findings are disseminated 

from that point on . 

2 . 	 Be considerate . To the extent possible, 

auditors should not interfere with ongoing 

operations . They should respect other staff 

responsibilities . 

3 . 	 Report dangerous situations . If auditors 

encounter a life-threatening condition or 

situation, they should report it immediately 

to the jail administrator . 

4 . 	 Be discreet . When auditors find a problem 

or potential deficiency in an area, they 

should not explain it or point it out to staff 

in the area unless asked . However, if asked, 

audit team members should provide accurate, straightforward answers about what 

they are looking for and what they are 

finding . They should limit the information 

shared to the question asked and should not 

encourage discussion . If the issue is confidential (e .g ., a plan for responding to an 

employee work stoppage or job action), the 

auditors should say that they are looking at 

a confidential matter and should provide no 

information . 

5 . 	 Be professional . Auditors must not use their 

role, information, or findings to impress 

other staff or create dissension . 

6 . 	 Try not to single out individuals . To the 

extent possible, auditors should not report 

in a way that singles out individual staff 

members . However, if the reported problem 

results from complacency, cutting corners, 

ignorance of policy, or other violations of 

sound practice or policy, auditors may have 

to cite specific persons or posts in need of 

training or supervisory attention . There may 

also be situations where it is impossible to 

report audit findings forthrightly without 

implicating a staff member . For example, if 

the jail armory is in terrible condition, and 

there is only one armory officer, the audit 

finding will inevitably identify the armory 

officer as responsible for the problem . An 

auditor must not allow the desire to protect a 

staff member affect the purpose of the audit . 

7 . 	 Be ethical . Auditors should not create artificial situations to detect deficiencies in 

practices (e .g ., hide keys left lying around 

or tamper with documents to see how long 

the change goes unnoticed by staff) . Instead, 

they should seek legitimate opportunities to 

evaluate practices (e .g ., fire drills, emergency 

counts) . There is an important difference 

24 
Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

between openly testing a policy or procedure 

(asking, for example, “Would you show me 

the insulin syringes so we can verify the 

count against the inventory balance in the 

log?”) and setting staff up (e .g ., planting 

contraband to see if it is discovered) . The 

former is good auditing; the latter is not . 

8 . 	 Audit rigorously . Auditors should be rigorous and demanding . They do a disservice to 

the jail if they assume something is acceptable without verification, gloss over problems, or give the jail a pass on an item they 

know to be deficient to some extent . 

9 . 	 Choose appropriate methods . Direct 

observation of practices is the best way 

to audit individual items and generally is 

a more reliable method than reviewing 

records and policies or interviewing staff 

and inmates . It often is necessary to use both 

observation and documents to ensure that 

practice and policy are consistent . 

10 . 	Maintain objectivity . Auditors should 

maintain objectivity, professionalism, 

and perspective . No one is perfectly objective, but auditors should neither hope to 

find problems with almost everything 

nor hope for extremely positive findings . 

The easiest way to ensure objectivity is to 

focus on the evaluation criteria and not on 

personal preferences . 

11 . 	Be a reporter, not an advocate . The auditor’s job is fact finding, not decisionmaking . 

Top management decides what will be done 

concerning the audit findings . Although 

auditors can and should recommend and 

advise when they believe they have insight 

about a deficiency, their primary role is 

to present the facts as they find them . The 

audit team and its work product may lose 

credibility if top management perceives that 

auditors are advocating strongly for certain 

decisions and are heavily invested in what is 

done with the audit findings . 

Disclaimers 

Before moving on to the specifics of how to 

use the self-audit materials in this guide, readers should be aware of some fundamental points 

about the nature of these materials and about jail 

audits in general: 

●	 This audit system does not represent advice 

from NIC about what a jail’s emergency 

system should or should not include . That 

decision has to be made by the jail’s 

management . 

●	 The self-audit checklists in this guide are not 

the only method for evaluating emergency 

preparedness in a jail . One alternative is to 

retain consultants to perform such an analysis . Another is to conduct comprehensive 

critical incident reviews when serious situations occur . 

●	 An emergency preparedness audit is not 

a security audit . The two types of audits 

should complement each other, but one 

cannot be substituted for the other . Both 

are extremely important undertakings in a 

jail . NIC has developed a comprehensive, 

sophisticated security audit manual, which 

interested readers are encouraged to consider 

as the foundation for an indepth evaluation 

of institutional security policies, procedures, 

and practices . 

●	 Some departments engage in policy audits, 

and many conduct their audits against 

some national or state set of correctional 

standards—most commonly, the American 

Correctional Association standards . Because 

such audits cover so many areas, they are 

not detailed or comprehensive with regard 

to emergency preparedness (or institutional 

25 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

security) . A jail may “pass” all of the emergency preparedness items on a national standards audit and yet be woefully unprepared 

for a large-scale crisis . 

●	 Jail administrators must be absolutely clear 

about what type of emergency preparedness 

audit they are conducting and must be equally clear in communicating this information 

to staff . Is it a policy audit, an operational 

audit of practices, or both? If a jail passes a 

policy audit, the staff may assume all is well 

when in fact there are major problems with 

practices, procedures, and operations, which 

were not within the purview of the policy 

audit . Clarity about the purpose and scope of 

an audit is essential . (The audit materials in 

this guide cover both policies and practices .) 

26 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How To Use the 

Self-Audit Checklists 

All managers who will be involved with the self-audit of emergency preparedness should read 

these instructions thoroughly before proceeding. (Some issues discussed in this section were 

raised in previous sections of the guide but bear repeating here.) 

Note: The checklists are also available from NIC on the Web at www .nicic .gov . 

Overview 

The purpose of the self-audit checklists in this 

guide is to help a jail administrator evaluate its 

readiness to contend with a major emergency . 

The two checklists—one for smaller jails and 

one for larger jails—are extensive but they 

are not all-inclusive . They cannot cover every 

emergency preparedness-related issue and detail, 

and some of the issues and details that are not 

covered may be crucial for a particular jail . The 

ultimate decision about what is important in 

emergency preparedness must be the province 

of each individual department or facility . 

Similarly, the fact that a jail does not meet 

some of the criteria in the checklist does not 

necessarily mean that the facility is wrong or 

in jeopardy . For example, if the jail’s management has thoughtfully decided not to purchase 

certain equipment or not to include certain policies or procedures in the jail’s emergency preparedness plan, there may be an excellent reason 

for that decision . Conversely, if management has 

decided that certain criteria are important but has 

not complied with them or if it simply has never 

considered some of the criteria, then the checklist 

may serve a useful purpose in stimulating corrective action or consideration of new possibilities . 

The checklists in this guide can provide a framework for a thorough review of emergency preparedness . Before getting started, however, the 

jail contemplating such a review should carefully consider the following points: 

●	 If the self-audit is not going to be taken 

seriously and conducted rigorously, it probably should not be done at all . An audit that 

glosses over problems or fails to report deficiencies can create an illusion of emergency 

preparedness and may be more dangerous 

than no assessment at all . 

●	 The manner in which a facility approaches 

the audit is most important . If top management expects a grade or scorecard from 

the audit, then that perspective will be 

transmitted to subordinate staff, and the 

audit process is unlikely to be productive . 

Management should emphasize that these 

are self-audits designed to help the jail 

review highly important areas . The audits 

should be a source of ideas and constructive 

change, not criticism . 

●	 If the audits are not done carefully and 

accurately, the results will be misleading . 

If auditors are unsure about an item, they 

should investigate it further or leave it blank . 

27 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

A Note About Minimum-Security Facilities 

A small or minimum-security facility typically does not have the same set of risks for emergency 

situations as a large, high-security jail. (This fact illustrates the importance of good risk assessment 

as a starting point for emergency preparedness.) A minimum-security facility may have a relatively 

low risk of large-scale disturbances or planned hostage incidents and so may understandably 

choose not to maintain its own tactical teams. However, such situations certainly are possible in 

a minimum-security facility, and if a facility does not have its own tactical team, it needs to know 

who would provide one if needed. Furthermore, compared to many large, high-security facilities, 

a small or minimum-security facility may be at greater risk for loss of life from some other kinds 

of emergencies (e.g., fires, tornadoes). Most items in the self-audit checklists for emergency preparedness are relevant for small or minimum-security facilities, even though these facilities have 

unique considerations (e.g., staff may be responsible for multiple functions in an emergency, and 

the facility may depend heavily on external resources). In this sense, emergency preparedness is 

often a greater challenge for the small or minimum-security jail than for the large, high-security 

facility that has far greater resources. 

Guessing and assuming will defeat the purpose of the audit . 

Should Conduct the Audit?” p . 23, for staff qualifications) . Auditors will require approximately 

2 days of uninterrupted time to complete the 

checklist . They will need full access to all areas 

of the facility, to staff who manage specialized 

functions in an emergency (e .g ., the CERT leader 

and hostage negotiators), and to all relevant policies, procedures, and other written documents . 

(Access to all areas during all shifts is especially 

critical because, as stated earlier, it is more 

important to audit practices than to audit documents .) The checklist for smaller jails will perhaps require one day of uninterrupted time from 

two staff . Neither of the self-audits will require 

special equipment or unusual resources . 

● Top management should schedule a meeting to review audit findings as soon as the 

audit team has completed the checklists . 

All appropriate administrators and managers should attend . During the extensive field 

testing of the self-audit materials, review 

meetings were strongly correlated with the 

usefulness of the self-audit process to the 

department or facility involved . Without 

such meetings, a department or facility may 

never address the problems a careful selfaudit can reveal . 

These audits are not intended to take a long time 

to complete . In field testing, the time required 

for audit teams (typically two to four staff) to 

complete the earlier version of the larger checklist ranged from 1 to 2 days . 

Directions 

This section provides specific directions for 

beginning an audit, completing the audit 

checklists, and completing a Summary of 

Noncompliance Items for each checklist . 

(Underlined words are the actual terms the 

checklist and summary forms use to label spaces 

What resources will be needed to conduct a 

self-audit? The checklist for larger jails will 

require two to four assigned staff (see “Who 

28 
Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

A Note About Sections 5 and 6 in This Guide 

Reading the sections that follow the checklists—“Resource Materials” and “Case Studies”—is 

not a prerequisite for completing the self-audit checklists. These materials are intended to provide 

additional background information, a thought-provoking source of new ideas and approaches, and 

some lessons learned in responding to jail emergencies. 

for entries .) Examples of completed checklist 

and summary pages follow the directions . 

Getting Started 

1 . 	 The guide contains two assessment documents (self-audit checklists) . The first is for 

smaller jails and the second is for larger jails . 

Each checklist is separate and freestanding . 

Be sure you have the right document . 

2 . 	 Make as many photocopies of each checklist 

as needed . For example, if you will be auditing 3 facilities and you want 2 copies for 

each jail, plus some extras, you may want 

to start by making 10 copies of the original . 

Retain the original, unmarked, for future reference and use . 

3 . 	 Also make copies of the noncompliance 

summary sheet at the end of each checklist . 

Auditors complete this summary for use by 

management in reviewing the audit results . 

In field testing, auditors typically needed 

between 5 and 15 of the summary sheets 

for each checklist . A particular facility may 

need fewer or more, depending on how 

many items are partially met, not met, or not 

applicable (see direction 9) . Note that the 

format of the summary sheet is the same for 

both checklists . 

4 . 	 One person should be in charge of the 

audit . That person need not conduct the 

entire audit alone but should direct and 

supervise every aspect of it . The person 

selected to lead the audit should be high 

ranking enough to be aware of all necessary 

information . The selection should send the 

appropriate message to staff regarding the 

importance of the audit to the jail . 

5 . 	 Plan to conduct the audit without interruption, in a relatively short period of time . It 

should not take months to complete, and it 

should not stop while individual items are 

fixed or brought into compliance . (However, 

as noted earlier, if the team discovers a lifethreatening problem, it should report the 

situation to management immediately .) 

6 . 	 Before attempting to complete the checklist, 

read the “Glossary of Terms” that follows 

these directions . Every jail has some unique 

terminology, and the same term may mean 

different things in different facilities . Some 

ambiguity about terminology may be inevitable in these generic checklists, but the glossary should help to minimize this problem . 

Completing the Checklists 

7 . 	 On the first page of the checklist, enter the 

facility name, the audit team leader’s name, 

and the names of everyone on the team . 

Print the names legibly . 

8 . 	 Each item on the checklists has two blanks 

to be filled in: status and method . The items 

do not have to be taken in the order presented, but all items must be completed . 

29 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

9 . 	 Status . For every item, enter a code in the 

status box: MC (“meets criterion”), PM 

(“partially meets criterion”), NM (“criterion 

not met”), or NA (“not applicable”) . Choose 

just one status code for each item . Make 

no other entry in the status box . 

Determining status. For some items, the distinction between MC and PM, for example, 

will be a difficult judgment call . In assigning status to items, try to be rigorous and 

consistent . Remember that an item checked 

MC probably will not be reviewed further . 

Items checked with any of the other three 

status codes, however, should be subject to 

further discussion and review . 

Substitutes. If the facility or department does 

not have the specific item mentioned in the 

checklist but has something else that serves 

the same purpose, enter NM for that item 

rather than MC . The management review 

will determine whether what is in place is 

comparable to or better than what is specified in the checklist . 

Written policies. Several checklist items ask 

for specific written policies . Do not check 

MC just because almost all staff understand 

something to be informal policy (even 

though it is not written) or because a group 

of related items are scattered throughout 

procedural manuals (where they would be of 

little use during an emergency) . The facility 

may follow a particular procedure regularly, 

but if the checklist asks whether that procedure is “required by policy” and it is not 

part of written policy, then the status box 

should show NM . 

10 . 	Method . For every item, enter in the method box the code(s) for the method(s) used 

to determine status: OB (“observed”), DR 

(“document review”), SI (“staff interview”), 

II (“inmate interview”), and/or OT (“other”) . 

You may enter more than one method . 

This is not like the status box, where only 

one entry is permissible . Enter all of the 

methods actually used . If you enter OT, 

specify the other method used . 

11 . 	Comments . Use this field to record notes 

about an item’s status or the audit process . 

Keep in mind that the noncompliance summary (see below) requires explanations for 

any items not coded MC . The comments 

field also provides extra space for describing “other” audit methods (OT entries in the 

method box) . 

12 . 	 When every item on a page has been completed, the audit leader should print his or 

her name at the bottom of the page and date 

it (unless another audit team member has 

completed all items on the page, in which 

case that team member should sign and date 

the page at the bottom) . 

13 . 	NC# . When the entire checklist is complete, 

the audit team leader should fill in the NC# 

(noncompliance number) boxes at the far 

right of the form . The objective here is to 

create a numbered list of items subject to 

management review . Starting on the first 

page of the checklist, use the NC# boxes 

to number consecutively all items except 

those with the code MC . 

Summary of Noncompliance Items 

14 . 	 At the end of each checklist is a page titled 

“Summary of Noncompliance Items .” The 

purpose of this summary is to list all items 

that did not fully meet criteria (i .e ., all items 

coded PM, NM, or NA) and to explain the 

reasons for noncompliance . As noted above, 

management will use this summary in its 

review of the audit results . The audit team 

leader completes the first three columns 

of the summary (entries may be typed or 

30 
 

 

 

 

 

Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

handwritten) . The other columns are completed during the management review . 

15 . 	Audit team leader . Using as many copies of the summary page as necessary, list 

every item numbered in the NC# boxes in 

the checklist (i .e ., every item not coded 

MC) . First, enter the NC# (entries should 

be in NC# order) . Below the NC#, enter the 

status code and the method code . (Thus, 

for each noncompliance item, you will make 

three entries in the first column: NC#, status code, and method code .) Under Item 

Description, briefly summarize the item (as 

a convenience, so reviewers will not have to 

refer back to the checklist) . Under Reason 

for Noncompliance, explain why the item 

was marked PM, NM, or NA . (Be brief, 

clear, and forthright . If there is no clear reason, leave the space blank . Do not invent 

an explanation .) At the top of each page, 

enter your name, the date the page was 

completed, and the page number . 

16 . 	Management review . Use the noncompliance summary to document management 

response for each noncompliance item . 

Under Assigned To, enter the name of the 

person assigned responsibility for bringing the item into compliance (leave blank 

until the item is reviewed and an assignment is made) . Under Due Date, enter the 

date compliance is to be completed (enter 

a date only if the item has been assigned) . 

The administrator responsible for reviewing 

the audit results should sign his or her name 

under Approved By and date the signature 

under Approval Date after he or she has 

reviewed and approved the corrective action . 

(Typically, the reviewer should not be a 

member of the audit team . Different administrators may review different items, or one 

administrator may review all items .) 

The Management Review 

Meeting: Translating Audit 

Results Into Action 

The management review meeting may be the 

most crucial element in the entire emergency 

audit process. If the meeting is not attended 

by the “right” people (the facility’s top managers) or if management’s consideration of the 

audit results is superficial or defensive, the 

entire audit effort may be rendered useless. 

For most jails, the management review process will be lengthy—two or more meetings may be required to complete the work. 

Management must be willing to consider 

policy and practices in detail. For any particular item, it may be tempting to conclude 

that “What we are doing is more than adequate.” However, managers should never 

reach that decision without understanding 

why the audit instrument includes the criterion in question—i.e., specifically how 

the criterion relates to best practices in 

emergency preparedness and how the jail’s 

practices differ from the criterion. 

As with so many other areas of corrections, 

there is no substitute for strong leadership 

in management reviews of emergency audit 

results. If the jail administrator or other 

top manager is in and out of the review 

meeting and appears uninterested or dismissive in responding to the audit team’s 

findings, other staff will follow that lead and 

the results will be less than constructive. 

On the other hand, if the leader clearly is 

determined to translate audit results into 

action, other staff will be inspired to share 

that commitment. 

31 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Examples of Completed Forms 

Completed Page of Self-Audit Checklist 

32
Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

Completed Page of Summary of Noncompliance Items 

33
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Glossary of Terms 

After action report: See critical incident 

review . 

Chain of command: A prioritized list, by job 

title, of the individuals who would assume command of the facility in an emergency . 

Chain of custody: Procedures and documentation that verify who is in possession of evidence, 

the location of the evidence, and the integrity of 

the evidence at every point in time . 

Command post: The location from which the 

emergency operation is directed and controlled . 

It is almost always in or at the facility experiencing the emergency and is the place from which 

the commander works . 

Commander: 

Initial commander: The person in charge 

of the facility and the emergency at the 

beginning of a large-scale crisis . 

Ultimate commander: The individual, by 

job title, who assumes and maintains authority over the facility and the emergency once 

he or she arrives and is briefed . The person 

who remains in charge until the emergency 

has been resolved . 

Contingent contracting: A formal agreement 

for crucial services that may only be required 

during or after an emergency . Typically, the 

agreement includes either an annual retainer or a 

rate of compensation that is substantially above 

market, to guarantee that the jail will receive 

highest priority for the services or equipment in 

an emergency . 

Correctional emergency response team 

(CERT): See tactical team . 

Cover group: A group of staff sent to the location of a reported emergency, with responsibility 

for isolating and containing the emergency . 

Critical incident review: A comprehensive 

and factual review of a major emergency, with 

emphasis on lessons learned . Also referred to by 

some agencies as an “after action report .” 

Critical indicator system: A mathematical or 

other analytic procedure that produces a summary of the frequency of certain events and 

the trend of those frequencies over time . Such 

events may include grievances per month, 

inmate-on-inmate assaults per month, inmate 

disciplinary actions per month, percentage of 

inmates in protective custody by month, etc . 

Deactivation checklist: A list of actions and 

procedures to be followed immediately after the 

resolution of a major emergency . See also stepdown plan . 

Defend in place: Also called “safe harbor .” An 

alternate strategy to mass evacuation of a facility 

to another location, used when time and/or circumstances make mass evacuation impractical . 

This strategy differs with type of emergency but 

usually involves concentrating inmates and staff 

in the easiest locations to defend and then further mitigating risks with equipment, supplies, or 

specialized procedures . 

Desert island operations: A plan to operate a 

jail for an extended period of time without contact or assistance from outside the facility—for 

example, if a hurricane and flood cut off all road 

access and communications, and air access is 

impossible because of severe weather . 

Disturbance control team: A sublethal force 

team or riot squad that is trained to clear a yard 

or retake a cell block when there is an inmate 

disturbance . A disturbance control team usually 

trains with shields, batons, and chemical agents . 

It is distinguished from a tactical team that 

trains with firearms . 

34 
 

 

 

Section 2. Conducting an Audit 

Emergency operations center (EOC): A physical location—a situation room or “war room” 

set up and staffed to provide high-level administrative support in an emergency, usually at a 

headquarters or a sheriff’s administrative office . 

The EOC is distinguished from a command post, 

which is usually set up onsite to direct the emergency operation . 

Emergency post orders: A job description for a 

specialized function that exists only in an emergency or for a function that is different during an 

emergency than it is day to day . 

Emergency preparedness coordinator: The 

staff member assigned the responsibility for 

emergency preparedness . This may be a parttime or full-time assignment, and the staff 

member’s title will vary in different jails . 

Emergency staff services (ESS): A planned 

operation providing comprehensive support and 

assistance to traumatized staff members and 

families of staff, during and after an emergency . 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA): The federal agency charged with 

building and supporting the nation’s emergency 

management system . By law, each state must 

maintain a state emergency management agency 

that coordinates with FEMA . 

Fireloading: The amount of potentially combustible material available to contribute to the 

growth of a fire . In jails, this term is often used 

to refer to the amount of inmate personal property (magazines, clothing, etc .) in cells but, more 

properly, it also includes material in corridors, 

store rooms, or anywhere else a fire might reach . 

Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team: A 

team that is trained to deal with toxic gas releases, chemical spills, etc . HAZMAT teams may be 

public or private and vary widely in training and 

capabilities . 

Initial response checklist: Also known as command post checklist . A prioritized list of actions 

to be taken by the initial commander at the onset 

of an emergency . The checklist should include 

columns for initials and time next to each item . 

It is generic rather than specific to a particular 

type of emergency . 

Intelligence function: In day-to-day operations, 

a person or persons in charge of coordinating 

information about certain types of security threats 

and problems for the entire facility . In an emergency, the intelligence function is an operation 

designed to help resolve the situation by developing information about motives, plans, identities, etc ., of the inmates or victims involved . 

Job action: A strike, “blue flu,” or other crisis 

caused by staff acting in concert and intentionally interfering with the operation of the facility . 

Planned use of force: The use of force in a situation where time and circumstances allow some 

degree of planning, marshaling of resources, and 

supervisory or management review and direction . The opposite of “reactive use of force .” 

Plot map: Also called a “plat map” or a “platte 

map .” For a jail, a map or diagram of the 

grounds or compound showing buildings, fences, 

and other developments to scale . “As built” 

plans and diagrams often differ from “initial 

design” plans and diagrams; current, as-built 

plans and diagrams are preferable for almost all 

emergency purposes . 

Risk assessment: An examination of a jail’s 

relative exposure to various types of emergencies . Determines which emergencies are most 

probable and which areas of the facility are most 

vulnerable . See also vulnerability analysis . 

Safe harbor . See defend in place . 

Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team: 

See tactical team . 

35 
 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Stepdown plan: A plan for how a facility will 

return to normal operations after an emergency . 

A stepdown plan may involve days, weeks, or 

even months . See also deactivation checklist . 

Sublethal force: Force that is not reasonably 

expected to produce death or permanent bodily 

injury . Sublethal force includes use of chemical 

agents, pain-compliance holds, batons, electronic 

immobilizing devices, water hoses, etc . Also 

referred to as “less than lethal” or “less lethal” 

force . 

Tabletop exercise: A planned activity in which 

a small group of facility staff is presented with 

a simulated emergency situation . The exercise is 

conducted either verbally or with paper and pencil in an office setting; it does not involve roleplaying, use of actual jail facilities, or resources 

from external agencies . 

Tactical team: A weapons team trained for 

situations such as hostage rescue and firearms 

assault . Distinguished from a disturbance 

control team or sublethal force team . Many 

tactical teams are called SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team, CERT (correctional emergency response team), or some similar acronym . 

Tone: The “climate” or interpersonal atmosphere of a jail, sensed by experienced staff 

when walking through the facility . 

Turnout gear: Outer clothing worn for firefighting . Typically a jacket and pants, worn with 

a hat and high boots . Key characteristics are a 

waterproof/water-resistant outer fabric and the 

ability to protect the skin from burns and blistering due to radiant heat . 

Vulnerability analysis: A detailed review of a 

jail’s areas, functions, people, equipment, procedures, etc ., to determine relative risks and the 

attractiveness of various targets . This term is 

commonly used with regard to counterterrorism 

activities, whereas risk assessment—a similar 

concept—is more frequently used with regard 

to general emergency preparedness and natural 

disasters . 

36 
Section 3
 

Emergency Preparedness 

Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 
Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails

 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

 Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

In This 

Section
39

 I . General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

 II . Prevention of Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

III . Jail Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

IV . Staff Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

V . Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

VI . Emergency Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit 

Checklist for Smaller Jails: Outline
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Status 

Method 

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

FACILITy: __________________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT:________________________________
 

TEAM LEADER: _____________________________________________________________
 

AUDIT TEAM: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 

Criterion Comments 

I. General Considerations 

B. Does the jail have a statement 

of its objectives or goals in 

A.	 Does the jail have an identified 

system of emergency preparation 

and/or emergency response? 

I.B.2 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS 

NC#

major emergencies? 

I.B.1 

NC#

C. Emergency policies I.C 

1.	 Command 

a. 	 Does policy specify who is in 


initial command of the jail in 


an emergency? 

NC#

b. Does policy specify who is in 

ultimate (final) command of the 

jail in an emergency? 

NC#

c. Does policy specify the 

institutional chain of command 

in an emergency? 

NC# 

d.	 Does policy state any limitations 

on the authority of the person in 

command during an emergency? 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________
 

41
 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

2.	 Notifications 

a.	 Does policy specify that the 


jail make notifications in a 


major emergency?
 

b.	 Does policy include a priority 


level or order in which those 


e.	 Does policy specify how 

to change command in 

an emergency? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS

notifications will be made? 

NC# 

3. Use of force 

a.	 Does policy differentiate between 


planned use of force and reactive 


use of force? 

NC#

b. If planned use of lethal force is 

necessary, does policy state who 

will use such force? 

NC#

4.	 Public information 

a.	 Does policy identify who at the 


jail will deal with the media during 


an emergency? 

NC#

b.	 Does policy specify who at 

the jail has the authority to 

release information during a 

major emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

42
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

b.	 Does policy specify emergency 

preparedness training 

standards for inmates (fire 

5. 	 Training 

a.	 Does policy provide additional 

minimum requirements for 

emergency preparedness 

training for staff at shift command 

level and above? 

NC# 

evacuation, tornado, etc.)? 

NC#

6.	 Deviation from policy 

a.	 Does policy identify which 


individuals have the authority 


to deviate from policy in an 


CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS 

emergency? 

NC#

b.	 Does policy outline responsibilities 

of a staff member if he/she is 

ordered to deviate from policy in 

an emergency? 

NC#

7.	 Evacuation 

a.	 Does policy require detailed 


plans for an offsite (out-of- 


compound) evacuation?
 

b.	 Does policy require detailed 


plans for an onsite (out-of- 


buildings) evacuation? 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

43
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

b. Does policy provide a statement 

8.	 Hostage incidents 

a.	 Does policy specify that persons 

taken hostage have no rank or 

authority and that staff will not 

comply with orders from a person 

held hostage? 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS

NC#

listing nonnegotiable items? 

NC#

9.	 Emergency coordinator: Does policy 

require that one individual at the jail 

have overall responsibility for emergency preparedness? 

NC# 

10. National Incident Management 

System (NIMS): Does policy require 

the jail to maintain compliance 

with NIMS? 

NC#

D. Emergency tests/drills IV.B 

1. Does policy state how often the jail 

must conduct emergency tests/drills? 

NC#

2.	 If yes, has the standard been met 

during the past 12 months? 

NC#

3.	 Does policy require that the jail 

conduct some tests/drills on 

evenings, weekends, and on 

all shifts? 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

44
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

Status 

Method 

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

2. Do managers consistently review 

4. 	 Does the jail conduct unannounced 

fire drills in which inmates are 

actually evacuated? 

NC#

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

II. Prevention of Major Emergencies 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS 

A. Management philosophy V.A

1.	 Is prevention of major emergencies 

stressed at management meetings? 

NC#

prevention issues with subordinates? 

NC#

3.	 Does management stress early 

intervention in problem situations? 

NC#

4. Does management stress the need 

for frequent, open communication 

between staff and inmates? 

NC#

5.	 Does management monitor staff/ 

inmate communication issues? 

NC# 

6.	 Are staff trained to recognize 

traditional signs of impending 

trouble (stockpiling commissary 

items, more racial grouping than 

usual, etc.)? 

NC# 

7.	 Does management inspect the jail 

regularly for fire risk? 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

45
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

2. Is the classification system 

B.	 Classification V.E

1.	 Is there an objective 

inmate classification system? 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS

NC#

followed rigorously? 

NC#

C. Security V.F

1. Does the jail perform random 

cell searches for contraband? 

NC#

2. Is there a standard for the minimum 

number of random cell searches to 

be performed in a given time period? 

NC#

3.	 Has the cell search standard been 

met during the past 12 months? 

NC#

4. Does the jail perform random security 

inspections of cells (bars, locks, 

vents, etc.)? 

NC#

5.	 Is security equipment organized 

and maintained in good working order? 

NC# 

6.	 Is there a standard specifying the 

frequency of inspections of 

perimeter security, vehicle and 

pedestrian entrances, gates, 

sallyports, visiting areas, control 

centers, and administration areas? 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

46
 

 

1. Do the jail’s emergency plans include 

 an initial response (command post) 

 checklist? 

____________________________________________

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

7. Does the jail conduct random 

urinalysis testing of inmates? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

D. Inmate grievance system V.G 

1. Is there an inmate grievance system? 

________________________________________

2. Does management review a 

monthly or quarterly summary of 

all grievances, including subject, 

area of jail, and number of grievances 

upheld and denied? 

____________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________

III. Jail Emergency Plans 

A. Does the jail have a single, comprehensive 

emergency plan (versus individual plans 

for various emergencies)? 

 VI.C ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Did the jail’s emergency plan go 

through a formal approval procedure, 

and is the plan signed and dated? 

 ______VI.D ____ __________________________________________________________________________________________ 

C. Are the jail’s emergency plans 

checklist-driven? 

 VI.G _______________________________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________

NC# NC#

__________ NC# NC# NC#

_____________ NC# 

_________ NC# 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

47
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS

3.	 Does the plan include procedures 

and a checklist for the aftermath of 

a major emergency, such as command 

2.	 Does the jail’s emergency plan include 

procedures and checklists for specific 

types of emergencies, including 

disturbances, hostage, fire, natural 

disaster, etc.? 

NC#

post deactivation? 

NC#

D.	 Do the emergency plans specify 

interagency responsibilities? 

XI 

NC#

E.	 Do the emergency plans specify staff 

recall procedures? 

VIII.A 

NC#

F. Are copies of facility plot plans and/or 

blueprints kept in or available to the jail’s 

designated command post? 

VIII.B 

NC#

G.	 Do the emergency plans include provisions 

for dealing with injured staff, staff held 

hostage, and their families during and 

after an emergency? 

XIX 

NC#

H. Do the emergency plans include provisions 

for operating medical and food service 

functions during an emergency? 

VIII.L & XX 

NC# 

I. Do the emergency plans specify the 

primary location for an emergency 

command post? 

XIII.A 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

48
AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

49

 

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 

NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

J. Do the emergency plans include 

procedures for emergency lockdowns 

and emergency counts?

__________ __________________________________________________________________________________________

IV. Staff Specialists 

A. Does the jail have its own correctional 

emergency response team (CERT), 

special operations response team (SORT), 

or other tactical team? If not, has the jail 

made specific arrangements to use 

another agency’s team?

__________

 __________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the jail have its own hostage 

negotiators and, if not, are there specific 

arrangements for the jail to use another 

agency’s negotiators?

__________

 I

__________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Training 

A. Do all uniformed jail staff receive at 

least 8 hours of training on the emergency 

plans and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Do all jail staff participate in emergency 

drills and exercises?

__________

 __________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC#

CHECKLIST for SMALLE

R JAILS

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued)

NC#

 XIV.F

IX.A

X.C

 X

IV.B
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Does policy or regulation specify all 

approved weaponry, chemical agents, 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

C. Does the jail have sufficient chemical 

agents to control a major disturbance 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

D. Does the jail have an adequate supply 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

E. Does the jail have an emergency 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

F. Are emergency sets of keys available for 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

VI. Emergency Equipment 

A.	 Does the jail conduct an inventory of 

emergency equipment, including the 

armory, at least annually? 

XII.A 

CHECKLIST for SMALLEr JAILS

NC#

ammunition, and defensive equipment? 

XII.C.2 

NC#

or riot at the facility? 

XII.C.12.a & b 

NC#

and variety of firearms? 

XII.C.13.a & b 

NC# 

generator? 

XII.F 

NC#

all areas of the jail? 

XII.E 

NC# 

See marked section of Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails. 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

50
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 3. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Smaller Jails 

SuMMAry of NoNCoMPLIANCE ITEMS 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklists 

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________ 

DATE: _________________________________________________________ 

NC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance 

Assigned 

To 

Due 

Date 

Approved 

By 

Approval 

Date 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Review of all items on this page completed? Yes________ No ________ 

NAME: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________ 

51

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ 
Section 4
 

Emergency Preparedness 

Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 
Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

In This 

Section
55

I . Emergency System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

II . National Incident Management System (NIMS) Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

III . Role of Sheriff’s Command Staff or Central Office in Emergencies . . . . . . . . 64

IV . Emergency System Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

V . Prevention of Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

VI . Jail Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

VII . Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

 VIII . Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

IX . Staff Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

X . Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

XI . External Agency Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

XII . Emergency Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

 XIII . Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

XIV . Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

XV . Evacuation and Fire Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

XVI . Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

 XVII . Extended Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

 XVIII . Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

XIX . Emergency Staff Services (ESS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

XX . Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

XXI . Natural Disaster Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit 

Checklist for Larger Jails: Outline
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

FACIlITy: __________________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT:________________________________
 

TEAM lEADER: _____________________________________________________________
 

AUDIT TEAM: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 

Criterion Comments 

I. Emergency System 

A.	 Is there a philosophy statement 

or mission statement governing 

major emergencies? 

B.	 Goals, objectives, and overall 

emergency system 

1.	 Is there a written statement of 


the jail’s goals or objectives in 


NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

major emergencies? 

NC#

2.	 Does the jail have an identifiable, 

comprehensive, written overall 

system of emergency preparation 

and emergency response? 

NC#

C.	 Emergency policies 

1.	 Command 

a.	 Does policy specify who is in 


initial command of the jail in 


an emergency? 

NC#

b. Does policy specify who is in 

ultimate (final) command of the 

jail in an emergency? 

NC# 

c.	 Does policy specify the jail’s chain 

of command in an emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

57
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

e. Does policy specify how to change 

d.	 Does policy state any limitations 

on the authority of the person in 

command during an emergency? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

command in an emergency? 

NC#

2. Notifications and communication 

a.	 Does policy require the jail to 


make specific notifications during 


a major emergency? 

NC# 

b.	 Does policy specify the role of the 

sheriff’s command staff in the 

central office during an emergency 

and the relationship of the jail to 

the command staff or central office 

during an emergency? 

NC#

c. Does policy require a 

communications plan for 

emergency operations? 

NC#

3.	 Use of force 

a.	 Does policy differentiate between 


planned use of force and reactive 


use of force? 

NC#

b.	 Does policy state the conditions 

under which the jail may engage 

in the planned use of lethal force 

during an emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

58
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

d.	 Does policy specify minimum 

standards (training, equipment, 

etc.) for individuals who may 

engage in planned use of 

c.	 Does policy state the conditions 

under which the jail may engage 

in the planned use of sublethal 

force during an emergency? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

lethal force? 

NC#

4.	 Public information 

a.	 Does policy require a media 

plan for emergencies? 

NC#

b.	 Does policy specify who at the 

jail has the authority to release 

information during a major 

emergency? 

NC#

c.	 Does policy explain how 

media operations will be 

coordinated between the jail 

and the sheriff’s command staff 

or the department’s central office 

during an emergency? 

NC# 

d.	 Does policy identify who will be 

responsible for communicating 

with the local community in 

an emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

59
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

b.	 Does policy provide additional 

minimum requirements for 

training staff at shift command 

5.	 Training 

a.	 Does policy provide minimum 

requirements for training all staff 

in emergency preparedness? 

NC#

level and above? 

NC#

c. 	 Does policy include specific 

requirements for training various 

staff specialists (negotiators, 

public information officers, etc.)? 

NC# 

d. Does policy provide standards for 

both initial and annual/refresher 

training for emergencies? 

NC#

e. Does policy specify training 

standards for inmates (fire 

evacuation, tornado, etc.)? 

NC#

6.	 Deviation from policy 

a.	 Does policy identify which indivi-


duals have the authority to deviate 


from policy in an emergency? 

NC#

b.	 Does policy outline responsibilities 

of a staff member if he/she is 

ordered to deviate from policy 

in an emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

60
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

8.	 Evacuation 

a.	 Does policy require detailed plans 


for an offsite (out-of-compound) 


7. 	 Does policy require that one individual 

at the jail have overall responsibility 

for emergency preparedness? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

evacuation? 

NC#

b. Does policy require detailed plans 

for an onsite (out-of-buildings) 

evacuation? 

NC#

9.	 Hostage incidents 

a.	 Is there a policy statement 


specifying that persons taken 


hostage have no rank or 


authority and that staff will not 


comply with orders from a person 


held hostage? 

NC#

b.	 Is there a policy statement 

listing nonnegotiable items? 

NC# 

10. Employee job action 

a.	 Does policy require the jail to 


maintain a plan (or an appendix 


to a generic emergency plan) 


for responding to a strike or 


other employee job action (e.g., 


“blue flu”)? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

61
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

11. Mutual aid 

a.	 Does policy require the jail to 


maintain written mutual aid 


agreements with other corrections 


b.	 Does policy require the jail to 

plan for employee job actions 

confidentially and to distribute the 

restricted plan only to a designated 

group of top managers? 

NC#

and/or law enforcement agencies? 

NC#

12. Allied agencies 

a.	 Does policy require the jail to 


maintain written interagency 


emergency agreements with 


civilian agencies (fire department, 


utility companies, hospitals, etc.)? 

NC#

13. Natural disaster and fire planning 

a.	 Does the jail have policies in place 


specific to natural disaster and fire 


planning, response, and recovery 


operations? 

NC#

b.	 Is there a requirement to update 

risk assessments and modify 

emergency plans and procedures 

when a major modification has 

been made to the jail facilities or to 

its operations? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

62
 

 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Status

Method

Criterion Comments 

14. Risk assessment 

a. Does policy require the jail to 

conduct annual risk assessments 

for emergencies, including natural 

disasters, fires, and terrorist 

incidents? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

15. Counterterrorism 

a. Does policy specify command 

and coordination with local law 

enforcement, the local health 

department, state police, the state 

emergency management agency, 

the FBI, and the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

b. Does policy specify which 

agencies to notify during a 

terrorism event? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the jail emergency system include 

a high degree of redundancy (checks and 

balances, backup systems, multiple levels 

of protection)? 

___________________________________________________________________________________________

II. National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) Compliance 

A. Does policy require the jail to maintain 

compliance with NIMS, pursuant to 

Executive Order HSPD-5? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

NC# NC# 

________ NC# NC#

________ NC# 

_________ 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

63
 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 

NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.

AUDITOR:AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________ 

64

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies

Status

Method

Criterion Comments

B. Has the jail generally achieved 

NIMS compliance? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Have all jail staff completed 

NIMS training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the jail have a continuity of 

operations plan (COOP)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the jail’s emergency plan 

include incident action plans (IAPs) 

for specific types of emergency 

situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. If the jail has adopted an emergency plan 

primarily defined by NIMS, has it been 

modified to make it corrections specific?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. If the department has adopted an 

emergency system primarily defined by 

NIMS, has it been tailored in detail to the 

specifics of the jail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

III. Role of Sheriff’s Command Staff or 

Central Office in Emergencies

A. Does the sheriff’s administration or the 

department’s central office have its own 

emergency plan for a jail emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are interagency responsibilities detailed 

 in the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued)

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#

CHECKLIST for L

arg

er Jails

NC# NC#
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

C. Does the emergency plan include 

a public information plan? 

D. Does the emergency plan include a 

NC#

resource allocation plan? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

E.	 Does the plan specify how the sheriff’s 

command staff or central office will 

communicate with unaffected jails during 

the emergency (if the department has 

multiple jail facilities)? 

NC#

F.	 Does the plan outline responsibilities 

for communicating with the county 

executive/mayor’s office and the board 

of commissioners/supervisors? 

NC#

G. Does the plan include a duty officer 

system or other 24-hour notification 

method? 

NC#

H.	 Emergency operations center (EOC) 

1.	 Does the sheriff’s command staff or 


the central office plan call for 


establishing an EOC during an 


emergency? 

NC#

2. Is the location of the EOC specified? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

65
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

4. Are current emergency plans for 

each jail, and diagrams of each jail, 

3.	 Are an adequate number of 

telephones (or telephone jacks), 

adequate radio communications, 

and the ability for an open phone 

line with the jail available in EOC? 

NC# 

available in the EOC? 

NC# 

5. Does the EOC have broadcast and 

cable television, an AM/FM radio, 

and a video recorder? 

NC#

6.	 Does the plan outline EOC 

security procedures? 

NC#

7. Is the EOC large enough for the 

number of individuals necessary 

to staff it? 

NC#

IV. Emergency System Review 

A.	 Audit procedure 

1.	 Is there a departmentally specified 

procedure for auditing each jail’s 

emergency system? 

NC# 

2. Does the jail conduct an annual review 

or audit of its emergency preparedness 

system? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

66
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

2. If yes, has the standard been met 

B. 	 Emergency tests/drills 

1.	 Is there a standard for how often the 

jail must run emergency tests/drills? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

during the past 12 months? 

NC#

3.	 Are monitors always assigned to 

evaluate emergency tests/drills? 

NC#

4.	 Are monitors and/or evaluators 

trained and authorized to temporarily 

or permanently stop an emergency 

exercise, drill, or simulation in the 

event of a serious safety or security 

problem? 

NC#

5.	 Do policies or procedures require 

monitors and/or evaluators to debrief 

staff involved in drills and exercises, 

pointing out strengths and weaknesses observed? 

NC#

6.	 Are monitors required to provide 

written evaluations of every test/drill? 

NC# 

7.	 Does someone in authority routinely 

review and approve monitors’ 

evaluations and recommendations 

of emergency tests/drills? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

67
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

8.	 Does policy require that some 

emergency tests/drills be conducted 

on evenings and weekends and on 

all shifts? 

NC# 

scenarios? 

NC# 

V. Prevention of Major Emergencies 

A.	 Management philosophy 

1.	 Is prevention of major emergencies 

stressed at management meetings? 

NC#

2.	 Do managers consistently review 

prevention issues with subordinates? 

NC#

3.	 Does management stress early 

5.	 Does management monitor 

9. Does policy require that some tests/ 

drills include a variety of emergency 

intervention in problem situations? 

NC#

4. Does management stress the need 

for frequent, open communication 

between staff and inmates? 

NC#

staff/inmate communication issues? 

NC# 

6.	 Does management aggressively 

monitor the “tone” (climate) of the jail? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

68
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

B.	 Are all staff trained to recognize 

traditional signs of impending trouble 

(stockpiling commissary items, more 

7.	 Does each jail’s top manager visit 

and review all areas of the facility 

at least twice per month? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

racial grouping than usual, etc.)? 

NC#

C.	 Does the jail use a “critical indicator 

system” (mathematical/statistical 

charting of trends in inmate grievances, 

assaults, etc.)? 

NC#

D.	 Is there a formalized facilitywide 

intelligence function, as distinguished 

from security threat group operations 

or facility investigations? 

NC#

E.	 Classification 

1.	 Is there an objective inmate 

classification system? 

NC#

2.	 Is the classification system 

followed rigorously? 

NC# 

3.	 Is there a system that identifies and 

manages high-risk inmates (escape 

risks, racists, violent psychotics, 

assault risks, security threat 

groups, etc.)? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

69
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

F.	 Security 

1.	 Does the jail perform random 

urinalysis testing of inmates for 

illegal drugs? 

NC# 

be performed in a given time period? 

NC# 

3	 Has the cell search standard been 

met during the past 12 months? 

NC#

4.	 Is there a “shakedown log” for 

the facility or for each area that 

documents all random searches of 

cells or areas of the jail? 

NC#

5. Does the facility perform random 

security inspections of cells (bars, 

7. Are supervisors and managers 

required to regularly file written 

2. Is there a standard for the minimum 

number of random cell searches to 

locks, vents, etc.)? 

NC#

6. Do managers and supervisors 

monitor day-to-day security issues 

closely and regularly? 

NC#

reports evaluating security practices? 

NC# 

8.	 Are there logged or otherwise 

documented inspections of the 

internal and external areas of each 

housing unit on a daily basis? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR: AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________
 

70
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Status

Method

Criterion Comments 

9. Is there a standard specifying the 

frequency of inspections of perimeter 

security, vehicle and pedestrian 

entrances, gates, sallyports, visiting 

areas, control centers, and administration areas? 

________________________________________

10. Are these inspections logged or 

otherwise documented? 

____________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________________________________

11. Are staff assignments monitored to 

ensure adequate staff experience in 

the most volatile areas of the jail? 

___________________________________________

12. Is there a security inspection/review 

of tool control and key control at 

least monthly? 

_________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

13. Are such inspections/reviews 

documented? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

G. Inmate grievance system 

1. Is there an inmate grievance system? 

___________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Has an outside agency, such as the 

U.S. Department of Justice, or a 

court, certified or reviewed the 

inmate grievance system? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC#

_____________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

_________ 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

71
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

4. Does management regularly 

review the substance of inmate 

3.	 Is there a monthly summary of 

all grievances, including subject, 

area of facility, numbers upheld 

and denied, and percent answered 

within time standards? 

NC# 

grievances? 

NC# 

VI. Jail Emergency Plans 

A. Are jail emergency plans required to 

be written in a standardized format? 

NC#

B.	 Is there a formal approval process 

for jail emergency plans? 

NC#

C.	 Does the jail have a single, 

comprehensive emergency plan 

(versus individual plans for various 

types of emergencies)? 

NC#

D. Has the jail’s emergency plan been 

formally reviewed during the preceding 

12 months, and is it signed and dated? 

NC# 

E. Is each copy of the plan identified by 

a unique number or letter, and is there 

an inventory system for the copies? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

72
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

F.	 Does the emergency plan include a 

procedure for documenting changes 

and updates to the plan? 

G.	 Checklists 

1. Does the plan include an initial 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

response (command post) checklist? 

NC#

2.	 Does the plan include job-specific 

checklists to be used during 

emergencies (emergency post 

orders)? 

NC#

3.	 Does the plan include a 

deactivation checklist? 

NC#

H.	 Is the jail emergency plan tailored 

to the specific facility? 

NC#

VII. Risk Assessment 

A. Does the jail’s emergency plan 

require an annual risk assessment? 

NC#

B.	 Is the section on risk assessment 

specific to the facility? 

NC# 

C. Does the risk assessment include 

identification of those emergencies 

judged most likely to occur at the facility? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

73
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

Status 

Method

D. Does the risk assessment 

identify facility “hot spots”? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

E. Does the risk assessment include 

provisions for mitigating those risks 

that could be reasonably reduced? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

VIII. Preparation 

A. Emergency notifications 

1. Are home phone, cell phone, 

and pager numbers of key staff 

immediately available in the initial 

command post? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

2. Are home phone, cell phone, 

and pager numbers available 

for staff specialists (public 

information officers, negotiators, 

etc.) as well as for top managers? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Are the phone numbers for 

key emergency staff and top 

management staff maintained 

separately from general staff recall 

phone lists? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Are the general staff recall phone 

procedures organized by geographic 

proximity to the jail? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

74
 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

5. Are staff emergency notification 

lists (next of kin) updated annually? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Are special ID cards used to 

expedite entry of outside emergency 

personnel? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

7. Is there a system in place to 

minimize the number of calls the 

control center must make in an 

emergency (e.g., phone trees)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

8. Are there phone lines that can 

be restricted to outgoing calls in the 

event of an emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Plot plans 

1. Are plot plans/blueprints for every 

area of the facility available in the 

command post? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

2. Do plot plans show the location 

and type of all emergency utility 

cutoffs (electric, water, gas, oil, etc.)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Do plot plans show all fire 

extinguishers, standpipes, fire 

hose locations, and secondary 

fire access doors? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Does the facility have current video 

of all areas showing entry, egress, 

windows, door operation, and floor 

layout? 

_______________________________________ ____________________________________________________

NC# 

_________ 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

75
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

C. Can all inmate pay phones and/or 

outside phones be disabled quickly 

5.	 Is there a mechanism to update 

emergency plot plans if the facility 

is modified or renovated? 

NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

in an emergency? 

NC# 

D.	 In an emergency, can staff quickly 

disable inmate access to television? 

NC#

E.	 Are all roofs painted with numbers 

or letters for helicopter identification? 

NC#

F.	 Are all buildings labeled with large 

letters or numbers on at least two 

sides for immediate identification 

by outside agency staff? 

NC#

G. Is an inventory of serious staff 

medical conditions available to the 

commander during an emergency? 

NC#

H.	 Is a list of staff blood types available 

to the commander in an emergency? 

NC# 

I. Is there a written plan for dealing with 

inmate family members who may come 

to the jail during an emergency? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

76
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

K. Are there written procedures for 

command post security during 

J. Is there a plan for providing information 


on the status of individual inmates to 


family members via phone during an 


extended emergency or evacuation? 


NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

an emergency? 

NC#

l.	 Is there a plan for operating food 

service during an emergency? 

NC#

M. Is there a written plan for facilities 

maintenance engineering during 

an emergency? 

NC#

O.	 Is there a written plan for medical 

operations during an emergency? 

NC#

P.	 Is the jail’s main control room secure in 

the event of inmate violence? 

NC# 

IX. Staff Specialists 

A.	 Tactical teams 

1.	 Does the jail have its own tactical 

team trained to respond to emergency 

situations? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

77
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status Method

2. If the jail does not have its own 

tactical team, have clear, detailed, 

written arrangements been made 

with an external tactical team? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Are the tactical team’s structure and 

minimum size specified in writing? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Is the tactical team currently at 

or above minimum strength? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

5. Is the tactical team currently in 

compliance with its written minimum

training standards? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Does the tactical team include 

an individual with medical training 

(nurse, medical technician, etc.) 

and a video operator? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

7. Does the tactical team’s equipment 

currently meet specified standards? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

8. Does the tactical team train with 

the jail’s command-level staff and 

negotiators? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

78
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

10. Are tactical team members 

9. Does the tactical team practice 

with a wide variety of scenarios? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

available by pager? 

NC#

11. Does the tactical team include 

snipers? 

NC#

12. Are the team members’ leave 

and vacation schedules coordinated 

to ensure maximum team availability? 

NC#

B.	 Disturbance control 

1.	 Does the jail have a disturbance 

control team? 

NC#

2.	 If the jail does not have its 

own disturbance control 

team, have clear, detailed, 

written arrangements been 

made with an external 

disturbance control team? 

NC#

3.	 Are the disturbance control team’s 

structure and minimum size specified 

in writing, and is the team currently 

at minimum strength? 

NC# 

4.	 Are the minimum training standards 

for the disturbance control team 

specified in writing and is the team 

currently in compliance? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

79
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

5.	 Does the disturbance control team 

include an individual with medical 

training (nurse, medical technician, 

etc.) and a video operator? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

NC#

written standards? 

NC#

7.	 Are all team members current with 

chemical agent training? 

NC#

C.	 Hostage negotiators 

1.	 Does the jail have its own trained 

negotiators? 

NC#

2.	 If not, does the jail have detailed 

written arrangements with external 

negotiators who would be used in 

4. Does the number of negotiators 

currently available meet the written 

6. Does the disturbance control team’s 

equipment currently meet minimum 

an emergency? 

NC# 

3.	 If the jail relies on external negotiators, do the arrangements guarantee the availability of the negotiators 

to the facility on a 24-hour basis and 

with an acceptable response time? 

NC#

standard? 

NC# 

5.	 Is there an identified chief negotiator 

and assistant chief negotiator? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

80
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Method

Status 

NC# NC#

________ NC# NC# NC#

__________ NC# NC# NC# 

6. Are there minimum standards for initial 

and refresher training for negotiators, 

and are all negotiators currently in 

compliance? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

7. Is the working structure of the 

negotiating team specified in writing? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Do the negotiators have a portable 

audiotape recorder, throw phone, 

and preprinted negotiation log forms? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

9. Do the negotiators train with the jail’s

command-level staff and with 

the tactical team? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

D. Public information officer (PIO) 

1. Does the facility have an identified 

PIO? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

2. Is there at least one alternate or 

assistant PIO? 

__________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are minimum training standards 

specified for the PIO, and are they met?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Is a written overview or description 

of the facility available for distribution 

to the media in an emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

81
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

5. Is there a procedure for logging 

 and returning media phone calls 

 in an emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Are there procedures to establish 

a toll-free information line during 

an extended emergency? 

___________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Is the required equipment available 

for the identified media center during 

an emergency (podium, easel, 

microphone and sound system, 

departmental seal, phone jacks, etc.)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

X. Training 

A. Do new security staff receive at least 

8 hours of training on the facility’s 

emergency plan and emergency 

procedures? 

________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Do new civilian (nonsecurity) staff 

receive at least 4 hours of training 

on the facility’s emergency plan and 

on emergency preparedness? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC#

_________ NC# NC# NC# 

____________ NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

82
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

C.	 Have all facility staff at the level of 

shift commander and above received 

at least 20 hours of formal training on 

emergency preparedness? 

D.	 Have all facility staff at the level 

of shift commander and above 

participated in emergency preparedness 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

exercises/drills? 

NC#

E. Have all facility staff received at 

least 4 hours of training on emergency 

situations during the past 2 years? 

NC#

F.	 Has the facility conducted emergency 

exercises or simulations during the past 

year that involved external (mutual aid) 

agencies? 

NC#

XI. External Agency Agreements 

A.	 Does the jail have written agreements 

for assistance during an emergency 

with the following external agencies: 

1.	 State police? 

NC#

2. local police? 

NC# 

3. local sheriff? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

83
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

7.	 Nearest hazardous materials 

4.	 Nearby state and local correctional 

facilities (including institutions, federal 

prisons, immigration services)? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

NC# 

5. National Guard? 

NC# 

6. local fire department? 

NC# 

(HAZMAT) team? 

NC# 

8. 	 local hospitals and ambulance 

service? 

NC#

9.	 local and state emergency 

management agencies? 

NC#

B.	 Does each written external agency 

agreement include the following: 

1.	 Emergency contact names and 

24-hour phone numbers? 

NC#

2.	 Services and equipment the 

agency can provide? 

NC#

3. Reporting (staging) locations? 

NC# 

4.	 Command and jurisdictional 

relationships? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

84
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

2. Is the inventory current within 

5. Provision for annual review of 

the agreement? 

NC# 

XII. Emergency Equipment 

A.	 Is there a comprehensive inventory 

of emergency equipment? 

1. Is the inventory available 

to the command post? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

NC#

the past 12 months? 

NC#

3.	 Does the inventory include the 

location of each item? 

NC#

4.	 Is emergency equipment secured 

to prevent inmate access? 

NC#

B.	 Is there a comprehensive motor vehicle 

inventory for the jail? 

1.	 Is the vehicle inventory available 

to the command post? 

NC#

2.	 Is the vehicle inventory updated 

for accuracy at least quarterly? 

NC# 

C.	 Armory 

1.	 Are there written policies and 

procedures for the armory? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

85
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

2.	 Does policy or regulation specify 

all approved types of weaponry, 

chemical agents, ammunition, and 

other defensive equipment? 

NC# 

and other defensive equipment? 

NC# 

4. Is the armory currently in 

compliance with these policies 

and procedures? 

NC#

5.	 Is the armory secure from rioting 

inmates? 

NC#

6. 	 Are armory keys restricted from 

8.	 Is the armory inventoried at 

3.	 Does policy or regulation specify 

minimum quantities of such weaponry, 

chemical agents, ammunition, 

inmate areas? 

NC#

7.	 Do on-duty staff have immediate 

24-hour access to the armory? 

NC#

least monthly? 

NC# 

9.	 Do management-level staff inspect 

the armory at least quarterly? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR: AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________
 

86
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

10. Is there a written procedure for 

checking out weapons and other 

armory equipment? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

11. Is there a procedure to ensure 

that an individual staff member is 

currently qualified in firearm and/or 

chemical agent use prior to issuing 

a firearm and/or chemical agent to 

that individual (except for training or 

qualification purposes)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

12. Chemical agents 

a. Are there sufficient chemical 

agents to control a large riot 

at the facility? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

b. Are several different types of 

chemical agents (pyrotechnic, 

blast, barrier, smoke, etc.) 

available both as projectile 

and throwing grenades? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

c. Are all chemical agents clearly 

dated? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

d. Are all chemical agents (except 

those for training use) within the

manufacturer’s recommended 

shelf life? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

87
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

f.	 Does policy require immediate 

medical screening/treatment for 

offenders and staff who have 

e.	 Does policy specify a minimum 

number or percentage of security 

staff who must currently be 

qualified in the use of chemical 

agents and is the facility in 

compliance with that requirement? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

NC# 

been exposed to chemical agents? 

NC#

13. Firearms 

a.	 Considering the size and nature 


of the jail, is there an adequate 


supply of firearms? 

NC#

b. 	 Are the types of firearms and 

ammunition appropriate for the 

nature of the facility and for the 

location and function of armed 

posts? 

NC#

c. Are all firearms cleaned, 

inspected, tested, and sighted 

on a regular schedule? 

NC# 

d.	 Does policy specify a minimum 

number or percentage of security 

staff who must currently be 

qualified in the use of firearms 

and is the facility in compliance 

with that requirement? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

88
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

b.	 Has the armory been inventoried 

in detail, including ammunition, 

at least quarterly during the 

14. Armory inventory 

a.	 Do written procedures specify 

how the armory shall be 

inventoried, and how frequently? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

last year? 

NC#

D. 	 Does the jail’s emergency 

equipment include an adequate 

supply of the following: 

1.	 Flexcuffs (four times the entire 

inmate population)? 

NC#

2. Steel restraints? 

NC#

3. Binoculars? 

NC#

4. Flashlights and batteries? 

NC#

5.	 Distraction devices (flash-bang 

grenades)? 

NC#

6. loud hailers? 

NC# 

7.	 High-visibility clothing 

(fluorescent vests, etc.)? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

89
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

Comments 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC#

_________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#

8. Portable smoke ejectors? 

9. Portable emergency generator? 

10. Portable lighting? 

11. High-speed cutting torch? 

12. Bolt cutters? 

13. Radios with a tactical channel? 

14. Riot shields? 

15. Helmets with face shields? 

16. Riot batons? 

17. Potable water (48 to 72-hour supply)? 

18. Fire axes? 

19. Gas masks? 

20. large-scale delivery systems for 

chemical agents (37-mm or 40-mm 

launchers, projecto-jet, etc.)? 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

90
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

22. Other intermediate force options 

(pepperball system, beanbag rounds, 

21. Stun shields or stun guns? 

NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

multiple baton rounds, etc.)? 

NC#

E.	 Emergency keys 

1.	 Are there emergency keys for 

all buildings and areas of the jail? 

NC#

2. 	 Is there a set of emergency keys 

outside the perimeter of the jail? 

NC#

3. Are emergency keys and locks 

color coded for quick identification 

(red for fire, etc.)? 

NC#

4.	 Are emergency keys and locks 

notched for night identification? 

NC#

5. Are emergency keyrings soldered 

or welded closed to prevent 

unauthorized removal of keys? 

NC#

6.	 Do emergency keyrings include a 

metal disk (“chit”) stamped with the 

name of the area the ring accesses 

and the number of keys on that ring? 

NC# 

7.	 Have all emergency keys and locks 

been tested in the past 12 months? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

91
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

F.	 Emergency generator 

1.	 Is there an emergency generator? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

2.	 Is the emergency generator and 

available fuel adequate to run 

critical areas of the jail and critical 

NC# 

equipment safely for 72 hours? 

NC#

3.	 Are the critical areas and equipment 

powered by the emergency generator 

documented and tested annually to 

confirm that power is adequate? 

NC#

4.	 Is the emergency generator secure 

from inmate sabotage? 

NC#

5. 	 Are staff trained to know which 

systems will be run on emergency 

power and which will be inoperable 

during a main power outage? 

NC#

6.	 Is there battery-powered lighting 

in the emergency generator areas? 

NC# 

7.	 Is the emergency generator full-loadtested for 10 minutes or more at least 

quarterly to determine that it is in 

proper working order, and are such 

tests documented? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

92
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Status 

Method

Comments 

XIII. Locations 

Are the following locations specified in the 

facility emergency plans: 

A. Command post? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

B. Alternate command post? 

NC# 

C. Command post location outside 

the compound? 

NC#

D. Media room and/or staging area? 

NC#

E. Staff/family support area? 

NC# 

F. Inmate family area? 

NC#

G. Staff staging/reporting area? 

NC#

H. Mutual aid staging area? 

NC#

I. External traffic control points? 

NC# 

J. Mass casualty/triage area? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

93
 

 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

K. Disturbance control team dressing/ 

assembly area? 

NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

l. Tactical team dressing/assembly area? 

NC# 

XIV. Procedures 

B. Do procedures call for audio recording 

in the command post during an 

A.	 Does the facility have a general 

procedure for responding to major 

emergencies? 

NC#

emergency? 

NC#

C.	 Do written procedures specify who will 

keep a log during an emergency? 

NC#

D. Do written procedures call for doubleposting key locations and specify 

those locations in an emergency? 

NC#

E. Does procedure call for relieving 

staff from noncritical posts in an 

emergency? 

NC# 

F. Are there written procedures for 

emergency lockdown and emergency 

count? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

94
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

G.	 Is there a procedure for controlling 

the initial staff response to a reported 

emergency to avoid setup or distraction 

(as opposed to a procedure in which 

all available staff respond as quickly 

as possible to the location of the 

reported emergency)? 

H.	 Is there a standard procedure for 

sending staff to investigate a report 

of a developing emergency (a cover 

NC#

group)? 

NC#

I.	 At the onset of a major emergency, 

could the jail quickly account for all 

staff, visitors, and volunteers within 

the jail and determine the identities 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

of those not accounted for? 

NC#

J.	 Are emergency traffic-control 

procedures specified? 

NC#

K. Does procedure call for cutting off 

inmate telephones at the onset of 

a major emergency? 

NC#

l. Is there a procedure for briefing onduty and returning staff about the 

nature of an emergency? 

NC# 

M. Does procedure call for informing 

the inmate population of emergency 

conditions on a discretionary basis? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

95
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

N. Does the facility use a system of 

first responders? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Does the facility use a system of 

second responders? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

P. Does the jail have plans, procedures, 

and the capacity to intervene quickly 

with force to stop or contain a spreading 

disturbance? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

XV. Evacuation and Fire Safety 

A. Is there an evacuation plan for all 

areas of the facility? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Does every area of the facility have 

a secondary evacuation route? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

C. Are evacuation routes posted in all areas? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

D. Are there battery-powered or 

emergency-generator-powered 

emergency exit lights in all living 

and program areas? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

E. Self-contained breathing apparatus 

(SCBA) units 

1. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent 

to all living areas of the jail? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

________ 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

96
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

2. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls 

in pairs and are staff trained to use 

them in pairs? 

___________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are SCBAs examined annually 

for functionality? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Are all SCBAs inspected, charge 

checked, and tagged at least 

quarterly? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

5. Have all staff been trained in the 

use of SCBAs? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Does the SCBA training for all 

staff include donning the SCBA, 

achieving a seal, and then breathing 

for some period of time? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

7. Have all staff had refresher 

training on SCBA use within 

the past 24 months? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

F. Fire drills and other fire safety measures 

1. Are staff trained in fire evacuation 

procedures for areas currently 

assigned? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC#

_________ 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

97
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

Status 

Method

2. Are inmates given orientation 

on fire evacuation procedures? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Are fire drills unannounced? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Are all fire drills: 

a. Monitored and evaluated in 

writing? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

b. Timed for clearing the area 

in which the drill was held? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

c. Timed for clearing a count 

of inmates evacuated? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

5. Does the jail conduct actual 

evacuation fire drills on all shifts? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Are there minimum standards for 

how often actual evacuation fire 

drills must be conducted in each 

area of the facility, and have those 

standards been met in the past 

12 months? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

7. Are written fire drill reports, 

evaluations, and plans for 

improvement reviewed and 

approved by management? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

98
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Status

Method

Criterion Comments 

8. Has the local or state fire marshal 

inspected the facility within the past 

year for compliance with state/local 

fire codes and regulations? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

9. Are all fire extinguishers charged, 

tagged, and inspected at least 

quarterly? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

10. Are all fire hoses and standpipes 

charged, inspected, tested, and 

tagged at least annually? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

11. Have firefighting trucks and 

equipment been brought into 

facility areas to make sure the 

equipment can be connected 

and used effectively in each area? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

12. Fire prevention and response 

a. Does the jail have written 

standards for the amount 

of inmate property permissible

in cells or dormitories and are 

these written standards 

consistent with minimizing 

fireloading in living areas? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

b. Are all areas of the jail inspected 

at least monthly to determine if 

there is excess fireloading? 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

NC# NC# NC# NC# 

_______________ NC# NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

99
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

c. Does the jail have a staff 

member in charge of fire safety? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

d. Are all areas of the facility 

inspected at least monthly to 

determine if fire doors are 

operable, if fire exits and 

evacuation routes are kept clear, 

and if there is a written report 

of each inspection? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

e. Are inmates given orientation 

on fire evacuation procedures? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

G. Are manual unlocking devices and/or 

backup keys available onsite for 

unlocking every living area of the 

facility 24 hours a day? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

H. Are manual unlocking devices tested 

at least quarterly? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

I. HAZMAT 

1. Does the jail have a staff member 

responsible to identify and inventory 

hazardous materials? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

2. Are all hazardous materials and 

flammable liquids stored in locked 

metal cabinets? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

100
 

 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments Status 

Method

J. Is there a written, realistic, offsite 

evacuation plan? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

K. If yes, does the offsite evacuation 

plan include the following: 

1. Potential destinations? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

2. Specific transportation alternatives? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Security procedures during 

evacuation? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

4. Which inmate records must be 

moved with inmates? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

5. Procedures for providing 

medical services during and 

after the evacuation? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

6. Provisions for coordinating with 

local and state police during 

the evacuation? 

_______________________________________________________________________________________

NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

_____________ NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

101
 

 

 

7. Arrangements for meal service 

at the new location? 

NC# 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

8. Arrangements for inmate 

identification and count at 

the new location? 

NC# 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

9. Arrangements for housing 

and security at the new location? 

NC#

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

10. Predetermined evacuation routes? 

NC#

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

11. Procedures for protection 

or destruction of confidential 

records that cannot be evacuated? 

NC#

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

12. Procedures for maintaining 

security of the facility after 

evacuation? 

NC#

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

13. Procedures for reoccupying the 

facility after the emergency has 

concluded? 

NC# 

__

l. 

__

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Are there defend-in-place (“safe harbor”) 

NC# 

procedures, equipment, and supplies 

to protect the inmate population in 

emergencies when evacuation is not 

necessary or feasible? 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

Status 

Method

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

102
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

M.	 Have areas been designated for defendin-place within the facility, based on 

the types of potential hazards identified? 

N. Are facility staff trained on the defendNC# 

in-place areas and procedures? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

O.	 Does the jail have a procedure for 

establishing a toll-free phone number 

to communicate with staff if the facility 

is inoperable? 

NC#

XVI. Organizational Structure 

A. Is an emergency organizational 

structure defined in detail? 

NC#

B. Are responsibilities for managing the 

unaffected portions of the jail during 

an emergency specified? 

NC#

C. Are supervision and direction 

of the cover group (staff initial 

response group) specified? 

NC#

D.	 Is supervision of perimeter staff 

during an emergency specified? 

NC# 

E.	 Is the responsibility for coordinating 

on-duty and returning staff identified? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

103
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status

Method

Criterion Comments 

F. Is the responsibility for liaison 

with external agencies assigned? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

G. Is the intelligence function during an 

emergency described and responsibility 

for it assigned? 

______________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is the responsibility for coordinating 

emergency staff services (ESS) assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

I. Are there written guidelines 

(emergency post orders) available 

for each specialized emergency 

assignment? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

J. Is there an emergency checklist 

available for each specialized 

emergency assignment? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

XVII. Extended Emergencies 

A. Is there a written plan for staffing in an 

extended emergency (beyond 12 hours)? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Is responsibility assigned for scheduling 

and assignments in an extended 

emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

C. In an extended emergency, do specialized 

assignments dictate the length of the shift?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

______________ NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

104
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

E. Does the plan for extended emergencies 

include arrangements for onsite bivouac 

D.	 Does the plan for extended emergencies 

include provision for staggered relief of 

key positions? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

of key staff? 

NC#

XVIII. Aftermath 

A. 	 Incident review and damage assessment 

1.	 Are incident review and damage 

assessment procedures outlined 

and responsibilities assigned in the 

emergency plan? 

NC#

2. Is there a procedure for assessing 

and reporting deaths, injuries, 

and/or escapes? 

NC#

3.	 Is there a procedure for accounting 

for all on-duty and off-duty staff? 

NC#

B. Are report writing and debriefing 

procedures detailed in the emergency 

plan? 

NC#

C. In the aftermath of an emergency, 

is there a review and approval procedure 

for all reports? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

105
 

 

 

D. Is there a chain-of-custody procedure 

for all reports, logs, photos, video, and 

audiotapes, etc.? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

E. Is there a procedure for gathering 

external agency reports? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

F. Do procedures specify the identification,

segregation, and interviewing of inmate 

suspects and witnesses? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

G. Are crime scene preservation 

procedures specified? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

H. Are criminal evidence collection 

and preservation procedures specified? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

I. Is immediate liaison with criminal 

prosecution authorities required? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

J. Does the plan include procedures for 

managing released hostages? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

K. Are medical and psychological screening 

required for key and/or traumatized staff? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

l. Does the emergency plan specify 

developing a media relations strategy 

as part of the aftermath activities? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

106
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

M. Do procedures specify releasing 

information updates to all on-duty staff? 

N. Do procedures specify releasing 

information about emergency status 

NC#

to inmate populations? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

O. Do procedures require developing 

a plan for communicating with the 

local community? 

NC#

P. 	 Do procedures require developing 

a plan for regularly briefing the mayor 

or county executive and other branches 

of local government? 

NC#

Q.	 Is there a procedure for establishing 

emergency purchasing and payroll 

authority in the wake of a major 

crisis or natural disaster? 

NC#

R.	 Does the emergency plan include 

procedures to prevent staff retaliation? 

NC#

S. Do the emergency plans specify how 

key positions will be staffed and relieved 

in the aftermath? 

NC# 

T. Does the emergency plan include 

procedures to deactivate the command 

post? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

107
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

U. Do the emergency plans mandate 

the development of both a shortterm stepdown plan and a longterm stepdown plan after any 

major emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

V. Is a short-term stepdown procedure 

required before key staff are relieved 

of duty, and does that procedure include 

measures to prevent reescalation or 

new violence? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

W. Is a critical incident review mandated 

and are critical incident review 

procedures specified? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

X. Is civil liability review mandated? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

y. Is a review of insurance issues mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Z. Do the emergency plans specify other 

procedures to cope with an extended 

emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

XIX. Emergency Staff Services (ESS) 

A. Is there a general plan for ESS? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Are responsibilities for ESS during 

emergencies assigned? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

108
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

D. Does the family support plan include 

provisions for child care, transportation, 

C. Are ESS resources for specialized help 

(e.g., trauma counseling) identified? 

NC#

and emergency financial assistance? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

E. Does the plan include a staff liaison assigned to each family of a hostage/injured 

staff during and after the emergency? 

NC#

F. 	 Is a staff family briefing area identified 

in the ESS plan and is it separate from 

the inmate family area and the media 

briefing area? 

NC#

G. Does the plan include provisions for 

individual and group trauma counseling 

within 48 hours of the incident? 

NC#

H.	 Does the plan include procedures 

for rehabilitating traumatized staff? 

NC#

I.	 Is administrative leave mandatory for 

hostage/ traumatized staff? 

NC#

J.	 Does the plan include death notification 

procedures? 

NC# 

K.	 Does the plan include housing assistance 

for homeless staff after a natural disaster? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

109
 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

Status 

Method

XX. Medical Services 

A. Is there a comprehensive medical 

plan for a facility emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

B. Does the plan include mass 

casualties/triage? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

C. Does the plan include evacuation 

procedures for nonambulatory 

or critically ill inmates? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

D. Is a location other than the infirmary 

identified for mass casualties/triage? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

E. Does the jail have an emergencyequipped medical crash cart? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

F. Are an adequate number of gurneys 

available for a major crisis? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

G. Are backup medical resources in the 

community identified for use in a largescale emergency? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

XXI. Natural Disaster Planning 

A. Does the jail conduct routine training in 

natural disaster response, including drills 

and exercises? 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

110
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

C.	 Does the jail have a plan to operate 

the facility with reduced staffing levels 

should a natural disaster make that 

B.	 Does the jail have emergency response 

plans and checklists specific to natural 

disaster response? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

necessary? 

NC#

D.	 Has the jail planned for “desert island 

operations” (operating for an extended 

period without contact or assistance 

from outside) in the event of a natural 

disaster? 

NC#

E. 	 Does the facility have current copies 

of the county emergency management 

agency’s emergency operating plan 

and are those copies kept with or as 

part of the facility’s emergency plan? 

NC#

F.	 Are staff encouraged to maintain a family 

emergency preparedness kit at home? 

NC#

G.	 Are staff encouraged to identify family 

relocation areas? 

NC#

H. Have staff been encouraged to maintain 

a 3-day supply of their medications and 

an extra pair of eyeglasses onsite? 

NC# 

I. Are staff encouraged to identify an outof-area relative or friend for family phone 

contacts and to relay messages? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 

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____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

J. Are there specific tornado procedures in 

the jail’s emergency plans? 

1.	 Have tornado shelter areas 

NC# 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS

been identified within the facility? 

NC#

2.	 Are there procedures for evacuating 

towers or other vulnerable staff posts 

in the event of a tornado watch or 

warning? 

NC#

3.	 Are there procedures for 

bringing in outside inmate 

work crews and/or moving at-risk 

inmate groups to safety in response 

to a tornado watch or warning? 

NC#

4. 	 Does the facility have written 

procedures mandating that the 

yard and other outside areas of 

the facility be inspected each 

spring for objects or supplies 

that might become airborne 

and hazardous in a tornado? 

NC#

5. Do inmates receive orientation on 

tornado response and participate in 

tornado drills at least once per year? 

NC# 

6.	 Does the facility have a National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) radio with battery 

backup and warning alarm? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

112
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

K. Does the facility have a specific 

response plan for earthquakes? 

1. Are the facility’s maintenance plans, 

diagrams, and architectural records 

NC#

available onsite? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

2.	 Has the facility completed a structural 

engineering review of earthquakevulnerable buildings to design 

potential retrofitting with foundation 

ties, sheer wall, foundation beams, 

etc.? 

NC#

3. Have staff and inmates received 

specific training on response to 

earthquakes? 

NC#

l. Has the jail conducted a thorough risk 

assessment of vulnerable areas and 

equipment in the event of rising water? 

NC#

1.	 Does the facility have a plan for 

moving expensive or crucial 

equipment in the event of rising 

water? 

NC#

2.	 Is the facility’s offsite evacuation 

flood plan developed in stages, so it 

can be enacted in response to 

predetermined flood stages or 

severity of warning? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

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____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

M.	 Has the facility analyzed the surrounding 

area for potential situations involving 

hazardous materials, including the 

proximity of chemical and fertilizer 

manufacturing and storage facilities, 

3. 	 Does the facility’s flood plan 

include an analysis of which 

access and egress routes would 

be rendered unusable at various 

flood stages, along with alternate 

access and egress plans for use 

during those flood stages? 

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

NC#

and transportation routes? 

NC#

1.	 Does the facility have interagency 

agreements or arrangements with 

a nearby HAZMAT team that is fully 

trained and equipped? 

NC#

2.	 Has the external HAZMAT team 

participated in an emergency drill, 

exercise, or simulation at the facility 

within the past 3 years? 

NC#

N. Do the jail’s emergency plans 

include specific response procedures 

for a hurricane? 

NC# 

1.	 Has the facility conducted an analysis 

of all buildings to determine their 

ability to withstand hurricane-force 

winds? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________
 _____________________________________________

114
 

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Status 

Method 

Section 4. Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist for Larger Jails (continued) 

Criterion Comments 

O. Do the jail’s emergency response 

2.	 Have staff and inmates received 

any specific training on preparing 

for and responding to a hurricane 

within the past 24 months? 

NC#

CHECKLIST for LArgEr JAILS 

plans include severe winter storms? 

NC#

1.	 If the jail were to lose heat during 

extended below-freezing weather, 

does the facility have a backup 

system or backup plan? 

NC#

2. 	 Is the institution dependent on 

perimeter electronics that would 

be likely to fail in an extreme 

winter storm? 

NC# 

3.	 Is there a specific and detailed 

plan for managing the inmate 

population during an extended 

period of extreme winter weather? 

NC#

4.	 Is there a plan for transporting 

staff to and from the facility in 

small groups or in pairs, for their 

own safety, during extreme winter 

weather? 

NC# 

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable
 

Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify) 


NC# Boxes: See section 2: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists, direction 13.
 

AUDITOR:_________________________________________________________ DATE: _____________________________________________ 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

SummAry of NoNComPLIANCE ITEmS 

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklists 

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________ 

DATE: _________________________________________________________ 

NC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance 

Assigned 

To 

Due 

Date 

Approved 

By 

Approval 

Date 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Status: 

Method: 

Review of all items on this page completed? Yes________ No ________ 

NAME: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________ 

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ 

116
Section 1 Section 5
 

Resource Materials 
In This 

Section 

Leadership Issues During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
 

Importance of Leadership During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
 

Status of Leadership Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
 

Preparation for Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
 

The Isolation of the Leader During a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
 

Crisis Leadership Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
 

Dynamics of a Crisis Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
 

Elements of Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
 

Aftermath and Deactivation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125
 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126
 

Prevention of Jail Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
 

Commitment to Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
 

Can Jail Emergencies Be Prevented? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
 

Specific Measures Designed To Prevent Jail Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129
 

Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in the 


Prevention of Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134
 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137
 

Emergency Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
 

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
 

General Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140
 

Tactical Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142
 

Hostage Negotiation Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
 

Crisis Intervention Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150
 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Leadership Issues During Crises*
 

This section is intended as a think piece about 

leadership during crises and major emergencies . 

Although it focuses on crises in jails and prisons, 

most of the discussion is also relevant to leadership in other emergency services such as law 

enforcement and fire fighting . 

The literature on leadership is extensive . Much 

of it is concerned with leadership in industry, 

and many books are devoted entirely to qualities of leadership . This discussion, then, is not 

exhaustive; rather, it is intended to raise some 

of the most crucial issues concerning leadership 

during a crisis . The authors have not attempted 

to explore each issue in detail and also recognize 

that many aspects of leadership are not explored 

herein at all . 

Importance of Leadership 

During Crises 

The importance of leadership in an emergency 

or a major crisis cannot be overstated . The 

actions, decisions, style, presence, and direction 

of the person in charge will often determine the 

outcome of a situation . At a personal level, a 

leader’s performance during a time of crisis may 

define his or her future, not only with regard to 

career, but also with regard to broader matters 

having to do with health, family, and life goals . 

In the world of corrections, a major crisis (e .g ., 

*Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency 

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A . Schwartz, Ph .D ., and Cynthia Barry, 

Ph .D . (Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc ., 2002), by permission of the 

authors . Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A . Schwartz and Cynthia Barry . 

the inmate uprisings at Attica and Santa Fe) can 

define for decades not only an institution and its 

leaders but also the entire larger organization . 

Status of Leadership Development 

Fortunately, in the wake of large-scale inmate 

insurrections (e .g ., Attica, Santa Fe, Lucasville, 

and Camp Hill), most state prison systems and 

some medium-sized and large jail organizations 

now engage in serious and comprehensive emergency preparedness efforts . Unfortunately, many of 

these same organizations do not believe that they 

have the time, budget, or other resources to engage 

in serious leadership development . Leadership 

during crisis has received precious little attention 

within management development efforts and often 

receives short shrift even within emergency preparedness and crisis management training . 

Preparation for Crisis Situations 

Preparation for emergencies is essential, but 

every crisis will be different . In fact, no two 

jail or prison emergencies will ever be close to 

identical . A crisis in a prison or jail is, by definition, complex, and each situation is unique in 

many important aspects . This is not an argument 

against planning or preparation . To the contrary, 

the challenge is to find common elements that 

make it possible to generalize across crisis situations so that policy, procedure, equipment, 

and training can be developed and meaningfully applied . That proposition also holds true 

for leadership . The leader who has planned for 

119 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

emergencies and is personally and organizationally prepared is far more likely to succeed than 

the leader who has not . The common wisdom is 

that “leaders are born, not made .” Yet, the individual who is not a “natural” leader but is well 

trained and prepared for crisis situations may be 

more successful and may exhibit more leadership than the individual who is a natural leader 

but lacks training and preparation . 

On the other hand, a leader in a crisis situation 

can do everything right and still have a negative 

outcome or do everything wrong and have a positive outcome . After a riot, natural disaster, or 

other major emergency, judgments by the public, 

media, and political elements—and, often, even 

most of the corrections organization itself—are 

based on the outcome . Usually, however, only 

a few people actually know the details of what 

happened and recognize whether leadership was 

strong and positive and whether decisions were 

justified given the information available to the 

leader at the time . 

It would be foolhardy to ignore the importance 

of attributes such as common sense, judgment, 

maturity, and even luck in a crisis, but that does 

not negate the importance of planning, training, 

and other preparation . Simply put, crises are situations in which it can be better to be lucky than 

good . The enlightened leader hopes to be both 

lucky and good but recognizes that he or she can 

only control the latter . 

For the leader, it is crucial to recognize the role 

of luck (or fate, if one prefers), the fact that he 

or she will be judged primarily on the outcome 

of the crisis, and the fact that no amount of 

planning and preparation can anticipate everything that will be encountered in a real emergency . Consideration of these factors should 

occur before the leader actually manages a crisis . 

Otherwise, if a crisis ends badly, the aftermath 

can be personally devastating . These are not 

lessons best learned by trial and error . 

The Isolation of the Leader During 

a Crisis 

In addition to making the key decisions during 

a crisis, the leader is also setting the tone for the 

rest of the staff (and sometimes the inmates as 

well) . The leader is on view during the entire crisis, typically surrounded by staff from beginning 

to end . Staff members may not offer alternatives 

while a decision is being made but may then 

quickly criticize that decision if the situation deteriorates . The leader experiences not only constant 

pressure from the situation itself but also constant 

scrutiny by staff . 

Despite being surrounded and scrutinized by staff 

during an emergency, the leader is in a sense 

alone . Staff may offer fewer suggestions and participate less actively than the leader anticipated . 

The reasons are simple . Staff see the awesome 

responsibility of making life-and-death decisions, 

many are intimidated, and some are reluctant 

to become involved . Recognizing the pressure 

on the leader, staff may also be hesitant, fearing 

their contributions may interfere with the leader’s 

work . 

Strong teamwork can help to reduce the leader’s 

sense of isolation . In general, it will not be possible to establish a good working team of top 

managers during a crisis unless those individuals 

have a history of teamwork and trust . Similarly, if 

the culture of the organization has been predominantly negative, staff will find it difficult to support each other during an extended emergency . 

There are some exceptions . Regardless of past 

relationships, staff sometimes rise to the occasion 

in a crisis, particularly in a short-term emergency . 

Also, emergency conditions do tend to bring out 

the best in many people . Over time, however, particularly during an extended emergency, the history and the culture of the organization will exert 

a strong influence on behaviors during the crisis . 

After an emergency has ended, some crisis managers walk away nonchalantly and say something 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

like “I’m fine . I did what I had to do and it didn’t 

affect me .” (Some will dismiss that reaction as 

denial, and readers are free to draw their own 

conclusion .) However, most leaders emerge 

from a crisis and acknowledge a dramatic, sometimes profound, personal impact . Yet, in this 

“enlightened” era in which corrections has finally 

acknowledged the importance of posttrauma care 

and other emergency services for staff, it is disturbing that the one individual frequently omitted 

from psychological screening, employee assistance programs, posttrauma debriefing, and other 

forms of support is the leader . 

Crisis Leadership Attributes 

In the “good old days,” a booming voice and 

stern demeanor were the qualities associated 

with effective leadership in prisons and jails . An 

intimidating physical presence seemed to help as 

well . Although corrections has not completely 

abandoned the old stereotypes, most professionals recognize that strong leadership has nothing 

to do with size or gender . 

The word “strong” is important . In times of crisis, strong but flawed leadership may be preferable to weak leadership or no leadership at all . 

Almost all organizations depend on and reflect 

their leadership, and in paramilitary organizations such as correctional institutions, the central 

importance of leadership is heightened because 

of the enormous risks inherent in operating these 

organizations and because staff expect decisive 

direction . 

No single set of characteristics defines the ideal 

leader . The huge literature on management and 

leadership makes this point beyond any argument, as many influential authors and theorists 

each advance their own set of essential attributes 

or qualities, with little or no overlap or synthesis . Those who are natural leaders seem to come 

in a wide variety of personality types: stern 

or humorous, quiet or verbal, etc . Similarly, 

those who have worked, trained, and studied 

to become effective leaders are a varied group . 

Individuals can be themselves and still develop 

and enhance qualities associated with effective 

leadership . 

What, then, are the crucial qualities of effective leadership during a crisis? Integrity is the 

core and foundation . Decisiveness is obvious, 

as are calmness and support for subordinate 

staff . Many crucial qualities are not so obvious . 

Patience is near the top of the list; however, staff 

may misinterpret patience as indecisiveness . 

Maturity is a necessity; ego involvement and 

testosterone-driven behavior have the potential, 

quite literally, to be fatal . Tenacity, physical 

endurance, mental flexibility, and the ability 

to tolerate ambiguity are also high on the list . 

Communication skills, often overlooked in discussions of crisis management, are important; 

listening well and expressing oneself clearly and 

succinctly are skills that any crisis situation will 

test repeatedly . Understanding and compassion 

must be on the list, and analytic thinking may 

be a crucial quality . On the other hand, lack of 

judgment or lack of common sense can render 

any of these qualities and attributes ineffectual . 

Because second guessing and blunt criticism 

are inevitable in extended crisis situations, selfconfidence and grace under pressure might be 

excellent qualities to add to the list . Effective 

leaders need to know themselves and be able 

to draw on inner resources because, at the end 

of the day, no one else may be there . Once the 

crisis is over, they need to live comfortably with 

their decisions and their performance and must 

be able to continue to lead, which is often the 

greatest challenge . 

Dynamics of a Crisis Situation 

Cycles, waves, phases, stages—all of these terms 

characterize the progression of a crisis situation 

through time . Certain dynamics are characteristic 

121 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Important Qualities of Leadership 

During a Crisis 

•	 Integrity

•	 Decisiveness

•	 Calmness

•	 Tenacity

•	 Patience	and	maturity

•	 Physical	endurance

•	 Mental	flexibility	and	creativity

•	 Tolerance	for	ambiguity

•	 Support	for	staff

•	 Communication	skills

•	 Compassion

•	 Analytical	thinking

of crisis situations, and these dynamics change 

as the crisis unfolds . To some limited extent, the 

dynamics of a crisis are predictable . 

The Early Phase 

The initial phase of an extended crisis situation 

(or the entirety of a short crisis or emergency) 

typically is quite different from the rest of an 

extended situation . If planning, preparation, and 

training have been good, much of the initial 

response is almost reflexive . A host of steps 

commonly taken when a crisis first arises— 

lockdowns, emergency counts, dispatching staff 

to try to resolve or to isolate and contain the 

situation, notifying top staff, etc .—may be carried out relatively easily because they have been 

planned and practiced . At this point, the leader’s 

challenge typically is to figure out what has happened and what is continuing to happen . Early 

information is always incomplete or inadequate, 

and often some of the crucial information available early on turns out later to be simply wrong . 

Also, the early stages of crises usually are characterized by some degree of chaos, which makes 

it difficult to interpret available information . 

Interpreting Available Information 

During a crisis, every staff member typically 

has some specific task or defined responsibility . 

The only person who by necessity must take the 

long view and the broad view is the leader . That 

is, only the leader may have access to all of the 

information from all areas of the institution . If 

the leader does not recognize an important pattern in the events (indicating, perhaps, that the 

crisis is a planned mass escape rather than a 

spontaneous disturbance), no one else is likely 

to do so, and the actual nature of the problem 

may go unrecognized for a long time, with 

disastrous consequences . It is up to the leader to 

identify the broad parameters of the situation as 

soon as possible . How much of the institution is 

involved? Was this planned? Is “another shoe” 

about to drop (and if so, what might that “other 

shoe” consist of)? The leader is in the unenviable position of directing an immediate and 

almost all-consuming response while simultaneously functioning as a data analyst and as the 

only strategist in the situation . 

Avoiding the “Ambiguity Trap” 

Early in many crises, the leader is likely to 

encounter a specific trap . (In the later stages of 

a crisis, staff may press the leader to resolve the 

situation with a decisive use of force, which can 

be an additional trap, even though conditions do 

not warrant such action .) In the early stage, the 

leader may face pressure to adopt a view of the 

emergency that is inconsistent with the available 

information . It is an ambiguity trap . The leader 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

and many staff may want the certainty of knowing what they are confronting . However, because 

early information is typically incomplete, contradictory, or wrong, it may not be possible to 

know the true nature or extent of the crisis in the 

early stages . The leader must be able to tolerate 

ambiguity and reject the allure of false clarity 

that may lead to unfortunate outcomes . 

Helping Staff Remain Calm 

During the early phase of a crisis, the leader 

must be careful not to allow panic to set in 

among staff, particularly if the crisis threatens to 

overwhelm the initial response . In guiding staff 

through this intense period, the leader must be 

decisive without becoming impulsive . He or she 

must listen well but be resolute, even in the face 

of pressure or emotion from subordinate staff . 

As the Crisis Unfolds 

In an extended crisis, staff reactions will change 

predictably as the early adrenaline rush gives 

way to anger, anxiety, and doubt, along with 

moments of enthusiasm and even elation . 

Different staff will, of course, react differently . 

The volatility of the crisis situation itself and of 

the staff reactions to the situation make it essential that the leader remain steady and portray 

confidence and professionalism . 

Serving as a Role Model 

Although a sense of humor, if used judiciously, 

can be invaluable, a crisis is not a time for jokes . 

Nor is it a time for cynical observations, profanity, or expressions of anger . When staff realize 

that the crisis, with its attendant dangers and 

personal risk, may continue for a long time, 

the leader must function not only as the chief 

decisionmaker but as a highly visible role model . 

In an extended crisis, the leader may also serve 

directly or indirectly as a role model for inmates . 

For example, in a large-scale hostage-taking 

incident, the leader’s steady, measured responses 

may calm highly agitated inmates and bring 

down their emotional tone, which in turn may 

lessen the danger to the hostages . Additionally, 

the leader’s steady demeanor may begin to 

build the inmates’ trust toward the institution or 

department leadership, and that trust may be an 

essential ingredient in later attempts at resolution . 

Fiction Versus Real Life 

Television	and	movies	often	portray	extremely	dramatic,	high-risk	initiatives	as	the	

only	way	to	successfully	resolve	emergencies.	The	wise	leader	recognizes	that	television	and	movie	scripts	are	written	to	be	

compelling	and	that	real-life	emergencies	

often	require	thoughtful,	measured,	low-risk	

initiatives	that	are	quite	the	opposite	from	

what	Hollywood	might	choose.

Meeting Staff Needs 

The effective leader also recognizes the need 

to build staff confidence during the actual crisis event . Keeping in mind that the occasional 

mistake or bad behavior is always easier to recognize than the many things done correctly or 

unusually well, the leader must consciously look 

for ways to be positive with subordinate staff 

and to reinforce their actions and decisions— 

even if doing so means swallowing some doubts . 

At the same time, some individuals can come 

apart under the pressure of crisis conditions, 

and it is seldom possible to predict who will 

be unusually strong in a crisis and who may 

fall apart . Inappropriate anger or incapacitating 

anxiety is a sign that a staff member is losing 

emotional control, and the leader must be aware 

of these signs . If a staff member is losing control, the leader usually will not have time to help 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

and should be prepared to have the individual 

removed, quickly and firmly, from the crisis 

situation . 

The Resolution 

As a crisis continues, the pressure on the leader 

builds . If the situation involves inmate violence, 

the leader almost always is urged to assault— 

to use a sniper or in some other way commit 

to a tactical initiative that will end the crisis . If 

a response was dismissed early in the crisis as 

too dangerous, the mere passage of time will 

seldom transform that option into a much better 

response . Nevertheless, the leader may be under 

pressure from many sources to end the situation . 

A tactical team may lobby for action, saying 

that they can assault quickly and take control 

with minimal risk . Political decisionmakers may 

be asking when they can expect something decisive to happen . Rank-and-file staff may strongly 

feel that doing something is better than doing 

nothing . Seldom does it help for the leader to 

explain that waiting, talking, planning, and further analyzing available information is far different from “doing nothing .” 

The leader’s greatest pressure at this point may 

come from within . Managers have commonly 

reported that after some period of time in a crisis, 

they began to feel that it did not matter whether 

the situation ended badly or well, as long as it 

ended . That reaction may be typical and instinctual, but some crisis situations may demand an 

opposite and counterinstinctual posture . For 

example, during the 2-week siege of the federal 

prisons at Atlanta and Oakdale, Michael Quinlen, 

then Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

said “My patience is endless .” Larry Meachum, 

the former Director of Corrections for Oklahoma 

and Connecticut, later pointed out in print that 

“Endless patience is active management .” This 

concept is an especially important one for a 

leader to understand, particularly in an extended 

crisis situation . 

Elements of Strategy 

In an extended crisis, strategy is essential . 

The frantic pace of the emergency can easily 

consume everyone’s time and attention, and 

staff can easily mistake tactics for strategy . It is 

up to the leader to take specific steps to focus 

on strategy, because it will not happen by accident . The leader may choose to take full responsibility for strategy, to work with one or more 

top staff members on strategy (a crisis management team approach), or to develop a separate 

Tactics Versus Strategy 

Strategies	and	tactics	are	both	plans	or	

courses	of	action.	In	general,	whereas	tactics	are	narrower,	shorter	term,	and	more	

limited	in	their	objective,	strategies	are	often	

intended	for	the	duration	of	the	situation;	

they	are	broad	in	scope,	and	their	objective	

is	to	resolve	the	matter.	The	expression	“we	

won	the	battle	but	lost	the	war”	suggests	

good	tactics	but	bad	strategy.	

In	a	developing	jail	disturbance,	one	

leader’s	strategy	might	be	to	contain	the	

disturbance	and	then	let	it	dissipate	on	its	

own;	another’s	might	be	to	regain	control	

as	soon	as	possible	before	the	inmates	get	

better	organized.	These	two	very	different	

(almost	opposite)	strategies	would	lead	to	

very	different	tactics,	and	either	strategy	

will	suggest	a	rather	large	number	of	specific	tactics.	

Finally,	when	a	tactic	is	unsuccessful,	it	

is	usually	possible	to	try	a	different	tactic.	

However,	if	the	overall	strategy	is	wrong,	

the	entire	venture	may	be	lost.	

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

group to formulate and evaluate strategy alternatives (a strategic planning group) . Any of these 

choices will demand some of the leader’s time 

and attention . 

A common problem in formulating strategies 

is failing to consider risks as well as benefits . 

The leader must identify and weigh the risks of 

various strategies contemplated e .g ., asking the 

SWAT team leader “You said with this kind 

of dynamic entry, your team has an 80-percent 

chance of controlling the hostage takers before 

they can reach the hostages . If you aren’t successful, what do you expect we will have in 

injuries and deaths if we are in that 20 percent? 

And then how long will it take to control the 

situation? Is there any risk that other people may 

come under threat?”) 

Another common problem is simply failing to 

identify and evaluate additional strategies, particularly those that may be unusual and creative . 

A leader can easily lose perspective and concentrate too soon on a single, obvious strategy . 

The leader must remember that crisis conditions 

tend to constrict creative thinking . This tendency 

may be an argument for using a strategic planning 

group, particularly during extended emergencies . 

Aftermath and Deactivation Issues 

Once a crisis has been resolved, the leader’s 

responsibilities as a role model for staff may 

take precedence over decisionmaking responsibilities . The leader knows, from training, experience, and preparation, that the aftermath of a 

major crisis is often longer and sometimes more 

dangerous than the crisis itself . A huge amount 

of work remains to be done (e .g ., preserving 

evidence, protecting the crime scene, developing a short-term stepdown plan, isolating key 

witnesses), and much of it cannot be postponed 

simply because staff are physically tired and 

emotionally drained . The leader must make it 

The Road Not Taken 

It	is	always	hardest	to	analyze	alternate	
 

strategies	that	are	furthest	from	what	is		
 

currently	underway.	
 

For	example,	in	the	midst	of	a	long,	very	

difficult	hostage	siege,	the	commander,	

through	a	well-trained	negotiator,	is	making	no	progress	deflecting	the	leader	of	the	

hostage	takers	from	a	time	ultimatum	tied	

to	a	threat	to	harm	the	hostages.	While	the	

commander	tries	different	approaches	with	

the	hostage-taker	leader,	someone	else	

suggests	using	a	different	negotiator	and	

asking	to	talk	with	all	the	hostage	takers	at	

once,	as	a	group.	Surprisingly,	it	works.	The	

leader	is	the	most	aggressive	and	committed	of	the	hostage	takers;	as	a	group,	the	

other	inmates	are	“easier”	and	less	focused.	

Changing	negotiators	does	not	undermine	

the	rapport	between	the	original	negotiator	

and	the	inmate	leader,	and	the	change	provides	a	logical	reason	for	asking	to	talk	with	

the	group.	This	successful	strategy	might	

never	have	occurred	to	the	commander,	

who	was	locked	in	to	the	confrontation	with	

the	inmate	leader	and	was	no	longer	evaluating	alternative	approaches.	

It	is	the	leader’s	responsibility	to	see	that	the	

road	not	taken	is,	at	least,	fully	considered.

clear by direction, but also by example, that this 

work requires immediate attention . 

Responding to Criticism 

This is also the point when instant media analysis of the event often leads to internal and external criticism, recriminations, and even outright 

125 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

expressions of guilt and anger . Here, the leader 

must walk a fine line . The leader must thank 

staff for their efforts and, where it is reasonably 

clear that work has been good, acknowledge 

that . On the other hand, in the case of controversial issues, media criticism, and inmate 

complaints, the leader cannot make snap judgments and simply exonerate staff out of hand . 

The leader must see to it that these matters are 

investigated promptly, thoroughly, and honestly . 

Although others may press the leader to say 

“staff did nothing wrong,” that statement, combined with “The causes of the disturbance are 

still under investigation,” clearly signals savvy 

observers that the “investigation” is actually a 

whitewash . The leader needs to support staff, 

particularly after a lengthy and emotional crisis . 

However, supporting staff does not mean exonerating them before the facts are known . 

Driving the Agenda 

The single most important principle to guide 

the leader in the aftermath of a major crisis is 

“drive your own agenda or someone else will 

drive theirs .” Even if the leader is devastated 

and the institution is in shambles, the leader 

must develop a game plan and pursue it aggressively . Otherwise, other forces, usually external, 

will step into the vacuum, and the leader and 

the institution will find themselves in a reactive, 

rather than proactive, position . Driving the agenda, however, is easier said than done . It involves 

myriad tasks, including the following: 

●	 Developing a thoughtful, detailed stepdown 

plan . 

●	 Beginning a comprehensive inquiry into the 

events of the crisis itself . 

●	 Initiating a careful study of damage control 

and establishing repair priorities . 

●	 Taking firm control of media relations and 

establishing a proactive media plan . 

●	 Holding staff briefings and attending to staff 

morale . 

●	 Communicating frequently with the inmate 

population . 

●	 Preventing staff retaliation . 

●	 Briefing departmental officials and political 

decisionmakers frequently and candidly . 

Energetically undertaking these and other deactivation tasks allows the leader to maintain control 

in the aftermath of the crisis . It also has a beneficial byproduct: staff are engaged and challenged 

and begin to reestablish their own balance and 

confidence . 

Addressing Human Needs 

Good emergency plans include comprehensive 

preparation for dealing with the special needs of 

staff and their families in a crisis and separate 

procedures for dealing with traumatized inmates 

and their families . Such plans should also provide for services or procedures to help the leader 

cope in the aftermath of a major crisis . Often, 

it is best if this assistance for the leader is kept 

separate from the rest of the department and the 

leader’s colleagues, so the leader can work out 

personal issues privately . (Once again, the twin 

themes of the isolation of the leader in crisis and 

the extraordinary demands placed on the leader 

by the crisis are both apparent .) 

Conclusion 

Awareness of the issues discussed in this section can help prepare a correctional manager 

or administrator for leadership during a major 

institutional emergency . However, because 

every crisis is unique, even the most thorough 

preparation cannot guarantee a positive outcome . 

Recognition of that fact provides some of the 

realistic perspective the leader needs to function 

effectively during and after a crisis . 

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Prevention of Jail Emergencies*
 

An emergency in a jail is a serious matter. Even 

a relatively brief jail emergency can leave a 

wake of deaths, serious injuries, and millions 

of dollars in damage. Regardless of whether an 

emergency involves inmate violence, the stakes 

are always high, for obvious reasons: 

●	 Population densities in jails are very high. 

●	 Inmates typically are locked in their cells or 

living units or on the jail compound and cannot protect themselves in many emergency 

situations. 

●	 In any kind of emergency, some inmates 

may attempt to capitalize on the situation, 

complicating matters and escalating risks. 

●	 Efforts to respond to or control an emergency in a jail must be weighed against security 

interests and the jail’s overriding mission of 

preventing escapes and protecting the public. 

These issues are the rationale for a familiar 

adage in corrections: “The best way to deal with 

jail emergencies is not to have them in the first 

place.” Although not every emergency can be 

prevented, serious prevention efforts can stop 

some crisis situations from occurring at all and 

will mitigate other incidents so they do not 

develop into full-scale crises. 

This section discusses jail management’s 

commitment to crisis prevention and then the 

*Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency 

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D., and Cynthia Barry, 

Ph.D. (Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the 

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry. 

question of whether jail emergencies can indeed 

be prevented. Specific measures designed to 

prevent emergencies and day-to-day operational issues that play a role in prevention are 

addressed. 

Commitment to Prevention 

Given the issues discussed above, it seems reasonable to expect a universally strong commitment to preventing emergencies and large-scale 

crises in jails. That is not the case. Certainly the 

rhetoric is there. Almost every jail administrator 

and/or sheriff talks about the importance of preventing emergencies. However, the level of commitment to prevention in most institutions and 

agencies, if measured by allocation of resources, 

management attention, or degree of accountability, is surprisingly low. This generally negative 

assessment has two significant qualifications, 

both related to current jail practices. 

First, one of the most important ways to prevent jail emergencies is to be well prepared to 

respond to emergency situations and to situations 

that have the potential to escalate into emergencies. Today, some jails do engage in serious, 

broad-scale efforts to maintain a high level of 

preparation for emergency situations, but too 

many do not. Those that do are also engaging in 

important preventive activity. 

Second, many jail practices have the effect of 

lowering the probability of a riot, a hostage 

situation, or some other major crisis involving 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

inmate violence. However, jails engage in most 

of these practices because the practices represent 

good day-to-day operations and are recognized 

as effective ways to run jails—not because the 

practices have a preventive role. 

It can be argued that such distinctions are unimportant—that as long as a desirable practice with 

a preventive effect is in place, it does not matter 

why it is in place. Evidence suggests, however, 

that prevention of major emergencies does not 

receive the priority it deserves. A number of 

jails have excellent inmate grievance systems, 

emphasize positive staff/inmate relationships, 

have moved toward direct supervision, and generally use day-to-day procedures that tend to 

reduce the probability of inmate violence. By 

comparison, efforts that are not common to dayto-day jail management but that focus narrowly 

and clearly on prevention are largely lacking. 

Thus, prevention of major crises is far better 

today than it was 20 or 30 years ago, but primarily because today’s jails are generally much better managed and because some of today’s jails 

engage in comprehensive emergency preparedness. A great deal of room remains for increased 

emphasis and improvement with regard to pure 

prevention efforts. 

Can Jail Emergencies Be Prevented? 

This question is more complex than it first 

seems. The answer is “Yes and no.” 

Some jail emergencies obviously cannot be prevented. Most natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, 

tornados, or tsunamis) fall into the “unpreventable” category. Even if a natural disaster conceivably could be averted (e.g., a flood), the 

necessary measures are generally beyond the 

influence or jurisdiction of correctional officials. 

However, other kinds of large-scale crises and 

emergencies in jails are potentially preventable. 

The most common of these are situations that 

involve inmate violence—riots, disturbances, 

sit-downs, hostage incidents, etc. Fire is another 

common, potentially preventable emergency. 

(Forest fires are a separate matter. Although 

most jails are not at risk from forest fires, a 

small number of jails could be devastated by 

a serious forest fire. Some forest fires, such as 

those caused by lightning strikes, cannot be prevented; others can. However, the prevention of 

forest fires is not within the purview of sheriff’s 

offices or departments of corrections.) A number 

of less common situations, ranging from staff 

job actions to food poisoning, are also potentially preventable. Finally, some crises fall into 

both categories. For example, jails may be able 

to prevent a toxic material spill within the compound but they cannot prevent a similar event 

outside jail property. 

“Potentially preventable” is an important distinction. No emergency is completely preventable. Even the best run jail may have a hostage 

incident or a riot. A devastating fire can happen 

even if a jail minimizes combustible loading 

and ignition possibilities and conducts frequent, 

serious fire drills. Nevertheless, common sense 

dictates that even though many kinds of jail 

emergencies cannot be totally prevented, good 

prevention efforts can reduce the probability that 

they will occur. 

Another important element of this discussion is 

mitigation. Good emergency preparedness can 

result in both prevention and mitigation. For 

example, an administrator may not be able to 

foresee a power surge that creates an electrical 

fire. If the fire starts in an area equipped with 

sprinklers, no emergency may ensue; good preparation has completely prevented a crisis. If the 

fire starts in an unprotected area and begins to 

spread, but the jail has minimized combustibles 

that would fuel the fire, and the jail’s fire alarm 

system, fire-fighting response, and evacuation 

drills are all excellent, then the jail may experience a relatively minor emergency instead of an 

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institutionwide crisis or even a disaster; in this 

case, emergency preparedness has resulted in 

mitigation. 

It is easy to envision hypothetical situations in 

which good emergency preparedness may mitigate a disturbance or a hostage situation. Even 

with unpreventable situations such as natural 

disasters, good preparation efforts can make 

it much easier for the jail to contend with the 

emergency. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had a 

devastating and well-documented effect on jails 

in southeastern Louisiana. In the face of such 

overwhelming natural disasters, thorough and 

effective emergency preparedness—particularly 

with regard to comprehensive evacuation planning—could have made a profound difference in 

mitigating the effects of the hurricanes on those 

jails. 

The importance of preparedness in preventing jail emergencies cannot be overstated. 

Preparedness may seem to be concerned primarily with responding to an emergency that 

has already occurred—at a point when it is too 

late to be concerned with prevention. Closer 

examination reveals this not to be the case. For 

example, after a jail riot in which lives have 

been lost and millions of dollars in damage has 

occurred, it may become clear that the crisis 

started with an unplanned fight among a few 

inmates, which escalated into a full-scale riot 

throughout the facility. Better emergency preparedness might have produced an earlier, better 

response. Perhaps the initial fight could have 

been stopped. Perhaps the disturbance could 

have been isolated within just one living unit or 

at least contained within one building. If the jail 

translates its experience into better emergency 

preparedness, it may be able to prevent a major 

riot in the future. In addition to prevention and 

mitigation, good emergency preparedness may 

also mean faster resolution of a major emergency and/or a more successful resolution. 

Specific Measures Designed To 

Prevent Jail Emergencies 

Measures designed specifically to prevent jail 

emergencies include training staff to recognize 

traditional early warning signs, avoiding agencyinitiated crises, creating a prevention-specific 

intelligence function, being alert to hot issues 

likely to cause dissension among inmates, and 

implementing automated early warning systems. 

Proactive management, though less specifically 

related to prevention, also plays a critical role in 

emergency preparedness. 

Traditional Warning Signs 

This is the one prevention initiative that almost 

all jails use, and it is primarily a matter of staff 

training. Correctional staff have long recognized 

a number of warning signs of impending violence in a correctional facility. The list of traditional warning signs may vary somewhat, but 

almost all jails have such a list and teach it to 

staff as part of the recruit academy curriculum. 

Some departments revisit the list as part of inservice or refresher training. 

Warning signs are part of many experienced 

staff members’ sense and feel of the institution. 

When an experienced staff member walks into 

a familiar jail and notices that the noise level, 

inmate groupings, and staff-inmate interactions are out of the ordinary, the staff member 

quickly registers that something is amiss, perhaps without articulating exactly what led to that 

conclusion. (This and other aspects of “institutional tone” are further discussed below, under 

“Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in 

Prevention of Emergencies.”) 

Training staff in the traditional warning signs of 

impending violence is an important preventive 

measure, particularly with new staff. The problem is that in many jails, it is the only initiative 

targeted specifically at preventing emergencies. 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Traditional Warning Signs of 

Impending Violence 

•	 Inmates	hoarding	food	or	canteen	goods.	

•	 Inmates	refusing	to	go	to	recreation.	

•	 Increase	in	requests	for	protective	custody	status.

•	 A	sharp	increase	or	decrease	in	the	number	of	inmate	grievances.

•	 Increase	in	racial	grouping	of	inmates.

•	 Increase	in	inmate	sick	calls	and	attempts	

to	be	admitted	to	the	infirmary.	

•	 Inmates	sending	personal	items	out	of	the	

institution.	

•	 A	substantial	change	in	the	noise	level	in	

the	institution.	

•	 Inmates	wearing	extra	clothing	at		
 

recreation.	
 

•	 Decrease	in	inmate	visiting.

•	 Decrease	in	staff/inmate	interaction.

•	 Inmates	warning	well-liked	staff	not	to	

come	to	work.

Agency-Initiated Crises 

A number of now-infamous crises in correctional facilities resulted from some change 

or other action by the facilities’ administrations. For example, the 11-day hostage siege 

at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in 

Lucasville, OH, which resulted in the murder 

of one staff member and nine inmates, can be 

traced to a decision by the Ohio Department 

of Corrections (DOC) to conduct skin tests for 

tuberculosis on the entire inmate population in 

the department. Other jurisdictions can point 

to riots that began with an administration-level 

decision to introduce a no-smoking policy, to 

restrict visits or packages, to change food service 

providers, etc. 

Unfortunately, too many jail and prison crises 

have been initiated by decisions at the facility or 

departmental level. The problem is not with the 

decisions themselves—although some may not 

have been the best choices (or even wise), they 

were properly within the authority of the institution or the department. The problem is that a 

negative and potentially explosive reaction from 

inmates was foreseeable, but nothing was done 

to prevent that reaction. 

A good example is the decision by many jail 

administrators to designate their facilities as 

tobacco-free environments. Such decisions are a 

relatively recent phenomenon but may already be 

the classic example of an agency-initiated crisis. 

Some jails have decided to make the change, 

announced the decision and the effective date, 

done nothing else, and then had a serious inmate 

disturbance. Other jails have made the same decision but then developed plans for minimizing the 

impact on inmates and communicated frequently 

with inmates about the change. (Many jails in this 

latter group have used phased-in approaches and 

offered smoking cessation classes and/or cessation patches and gum, etc.) Very few institutions 

that engaged in preventive efforts had any serious 

problem making the change. The question appears 

to have been not whether those efforts were good, 

better, or best but rather whether the jail did anything at all. 

The issues in this no-smoking policy example 

appear to apply to a broad range of policy decisions and other changes a jail may institute. 

Experienced correctional professionals can easily foresee which changes have a high potential 

for angering inmates. Once this potential is 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

recognized, it is often a fairly straightforward 

matter to plan ways of introducing the change 

that will make it more likely to gain inmates’ 

acceptance. Still, it can be extremely challenging 

to find ways to soften the blow when a change is 

necessary but likely to elicit a strong emotional 

reaction from inmates. Even in these cases, what 

appears to be most important is that the jail recognize the situation in advance and make its best 

effort to communicate and implement the change 

as constructively as possible. 

A Day-to-Day Intelligence Function 

The term “intelligence” means different things 

in different institutions and departments. It may 

mean information from inmates, particularly from 

known informants. It may mean information 

about gangs. In some institutions, the staff member assigned to “intelligence” is the gang coordinator (or security threat group coordinator). In 

others, “intelligence” refers to the investigator or 

to the staff member who works with outside law 

enforcement agencies and with other institutions. 

These definitions are not mutually exclusive. 

Intelligence, as it pertains to prevention of jail 

emergencies, is none of the above. Rather, it 

refers to a staff member (or group) responsible 

for reviewing security data and inmate information across the institution’s areas, shifts, and 

functions. Many jails do not have this kind of 

intelligence function. For example, an incident 

that occurs on the day shift between two inmates 

in an education classroom may not be serious 

enough to require much attention. That same evening, another incident occurs in the gymnasium, 

involving one of those two inmates; that incident 

is also not particularly serious by itself. The next 

morning, a fight breaks out in the dining room 

involving inmates who are close friends of two of 

the inmates involved in the two earlier incidents. 

None of these three incidents is by itself surprising or predictive of a major problem. However, 

any experienced staff member in the institution, 

looking at all three incidents together, would have 

an “Oh no!” reaction and be quite certain that 

large-scale violence was likely. The question is 

whether the jail has assigned a staff member the 

specific responsibility to look for such patterns. 

Some jails would answer “yes” but then go on to 

explain that recognizing dangerous patterns is the 

responsibility of the Jail Chief (or the Deputy), 

who sees all the reports and is responsible for 

everything. The problem with this response lies 

in the last three words of that explanation. The 

chief is responsible for everything and therefore 

cannot focus enough attention on incident reports 

and on information from staff and inmates to reliably identify patterns like the one in the example 

described above. 

An effective intelligence function can be one 

of a jail’s most important means of preventing 

large-scale crises and emergencies. However, the 

prevention-focused intelligence function must be 

something quite different from, and in addition to, 

investigations and gang information. 

“Hot” Issues 

Experienced correctional staff know that a few 

issues, if sufficiently mishandled, have the potential to start a riot or disturbance almost immediately. Food is one of them. Several years ago, 

for example, the Kansas DOC had three different 

prison disturbances occur concurrently because of 

a statewide change in food service and problems 

with the new food service provider immediately 

after the change. Clearly, food-related issues— 

changing inmates’ food, feeding them too little, 

or feeding them food they hate—can easily cause 

a riot. 

Several other areas—visitation, medical services, 

recreation, mail—are also highly sensitive issues 

for inmates. Jail staff, especially management, 

need to pay particularly close attention to any 

developing problems or incidents in these areas. 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

The “Turkey à la King Riot” 

In	Hawaii,	“luau”	food	(Kahlua	pig,	lomi	lomi	

salmon,	poi,	etc.)	is	the	traditional	fare	on	

Hawaiian	holidays,	the	most	important	of	

which	is	King	Kamehameha’s	birthday.	Many	

years	ago,	perhaps	the	most	serious	corrections	riot	in	Hawaii	history	occurred	on	that	

holiday,	when	many	jail	officials	had	the	day	

off.	No	one	remembered	to	plan	appropriate	

food,	and	the	Oahu	Community	Correctional	

Center,	Hawaii’s	largest	jail,	attempted	to	

serve	turkey	à	la	king	for	dinner.	The	ensuing	

disturbance	is	still	referred	to	as	the	“turkey	

à	la	king	riot”	in	Hawaii.

As emphasized in the discussion of agencyinitiated crises, quickly recognizing a problem 

in one of these hot issue areas appears to be the 

largest part of the battle. Once the problem is 

recognized, managers should usually find it a 

straightforward matter to either fix the problem 

quickly or communicate clearly and frequently 

with the inmate population about the problem and 

about the steps being taken to address it. 

Automated Early Warning Systems 

An automated early warning system is a 

software-driven computerized system specifically designed to crunch numbers, analyze data, 

and alert jail staff when the data indicate that 

trouble may be brewing. The earliest, most 

impressive work on such a system was carried 

out by the Pennsylvania DOC in the aftermath 

of the Camp Hill riots. 

The Pennsylvania DOC looked retrospectively 

at a small number of key indicators at the Camp 

Hill prison: the number of inmate-on-inmate and 

inmate-on-staff assaults per month, the number of 

grievances per month, the number of disciplinary 

reports, staff use of sick leave, etc. The research 

found dramatic changes in these indicators during 

the months leading up to the Camp Hill riots. 

Based on this research, Pennsylvania developed 

a software-driven system in which each of the 

state’s prisons collects data on critical indicators 

every month and sends the data to the DOC’s 

central office for entry into a database. Because 

the data are monthly numerical totals, this process is quick and easy. The software then analyzes the data from each prison, measuring changes 

from previous months and, since some indicators 

follow a cyclical or seasonal pattern, from the 

same month of the previous year. The software 

flags any indicator with a significant change and 

produces a printed report for review by department administrators and prison managers. 

In some cases, indicators might be flagged 

for predictable reasons. For example, a major 

increase in grievances about food service might 

result if an institution remodels its kitchen 

and changes to two cold meals a day until the 

remodeling is completed. If the prison took steps 

to communicate these changes to inmates in 

advance and to mitigate the impact of the changes on the inmates (thereby avoiding an agencyinitiated crisis), the flag may not be cause for 

concern, because some inmates will file grievances under these circumstances no matter what 

steps the prison takes. However, if several key 

indicators are flagged at a high-security prison, 

and the warden, in discussions with departmental 

officials, cannot identify any particular incident 

or change that might have caused a dramatic shift 

in those indicators, then actions designed to get 

additional information and steps to prevent a 

crisis should begin immediately. 

This approach has great potential for preventing 

institutional crises. Experienced jail staff like to 

think they understand everything that is going 

on within the institution, but no one can make 

sense of so much information all of the time. 

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Institutional Climate Scales 

A	number	of	state	departments	of	corrections	now	use	some	form	of	institutional	climate	(or	atmosphere)	scale	to	evaluate	the	“tone”	of	prisons*	on	a	weekly	or,	more	commonly,	monthly	basis.	

These	scales	are	closely	related	to	the	early	warning	systems	discussed	in	this	section,	but	there	are	

important	differences.

The	primary	difference	between	institutional	climate	scales	and	automated	early	warning/critical	

indicator	systems	is	that	the	climate	scales	tend	to	be	subjective.	With	an	automated	critical	indicator	

system,	the	number	of	inmate	grievances	filed	in	a	month,	for	example,	is	what	it	is—it	generally	is	

not	subject	to	interpretation.	With	an	institutional	climate	scale,	a	prison	manager’s	evaluation	of	the	

quality	of	staff-inmate	interactions	over	the	course	of	a	month	is	profoundly	subjective.	The	authors	

have	toured	state	prisons	in	which	wardens	“filled	in”	climate	indicators	in	the	same	way	month	after	

month	after	month,	an	empty	exercise	that	predicts	nothing.	

Requiring	jail	managers	to	evaluate	changes	in	institutional	climate	over	time	has	real	merit.	Such	

evaluations	can	produce	information	that	might	not	emerge	from	a	computer-driven	early	warning	

system.	Both	approaches	may	be	important	in	predicting	and	preventing	jail	emergencies.	However,	

the	process	for	measuring	prison	climate	must	involve	more	than	a	warden	writing	“acceptable”	next	

to	every	indicator	every	month.	Promising	methods	share	the	following	attributes:

•	 Combining	objective	measurements	with	subjective	judgments.

•	 Requiring	staff	to	assess	detailed	aspects	of	jail	operations	rather	than	making	a	broad	judgment	about	the	overall	climate	in	the	jail.

•	 Involving	the	perceptions	of	at	least	several	staff	members	from	different	levels	and	locations	

within	the	institution.

Jails	across	the	United	States	have	been	slower	to	experiment	with	either	institutional	climate	scales	

or	with	early	indication	systems,	and	there	is	little	jail	work	to	review	in	either	regard.	Both	approaches	hold	substantial	promise	for	prevention	of	crisis	in	jails.	

*Institutional	tone	is	also	discussed	below,	under	“Ongoing	Operational	Issues	That	Play	a	Role	in	Prevention	of	Emergencies.”

Computerized methods for regularly analyzing 

crucial information may bring to light serious, 

imminent problems that otherwise would be 

overlooked. 

Pennsylvania’s automated early warning system 

is a true prevention initiative. It is important to 

note that some departments collect data on almost 

every aspect of prison operations, and some then 

enter all of that information into large databases. 

Although valuable for documentation, accreditation, management review, and other purposes, 

that approach is not particularly useful for early 

warning purposes and should not be confused 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

with software-driven critical indicator or early 

warning systems. In a comprehensive database, 

too much information operates like no information. It is impossible to sort the wheat from the 

chaff. With hundreds of indicators, most will 

have nothing to do with predicting a riot or disturbance. Further, when data are collected on many 

different dimensions, some of those dimensions 

will show unusual changes each month simply as 

a matter of statistical probability, and those results 

will be indistinguishable from any results that are 

true positives. An effective early warning system 

should be quick and easy to use and should track 

fewer than 10 key indicators. 

Proactive Management 

Proactive management is the least specific of the 

methods that may be used to prevent emergencies in jails. It may not be a specific initiative at 

all. Nevertheless, the quality of leadership in a 

jail is a crucial factor in every area of management and operation, and prevention of emergencies is no exception. In fact, without proactive 

management, a number of the more specific 

prevention initiatives discussed above may be 

rendered useless. 

The relationship between proactive management 

and emergency prevention is neither ambiguous 

nor theoretical; it is direct and practical. Two 

examples may illustrate that relationship. When 

staff morale is low and employees are angry 

because of a bad incident, proactive management 

engages employee groups and works to rebuild 

communication and trust; in the same situation, status quo (laissez-faire) management does 

little as the situation deteriorates and perhaps an 

employee job action then throws the jail into a 

major crisis. When a jail faces escalating racial 

tension, proactive management aggressively 

pursues conflict resolution, whereas status quo 

management denies the problem exists until a 

race riot occurs. 

Proactive management is closely related to 

the operational issue of early intervention as a 

philosophy and a skill set for supervisory and 

frontline staff. This related concept is one of the 

issues discussed in the next section. 

Ongoing Operational Issues That 

Play a Role in the Prevention of 

Emergencies 

In addition to measures designed specifically for 

the purpose of preventing emergencies, many 

elements of day-to-day jail operations play a 

role in prevention. These elements include dayto-day security practices, inmate classification, 

early intervention, the tone of the institution, and 

staff professionalism. 

Day-to-Day Security Practices 

Good day-to-day security practices are crucial in 

preventing jail crises such as riots, disturbances, 

and other incidents involving inmate violence, 

both planned and unplanned. For example, were 

it not for a series of cascading security breaches 

and mistakes, the 1993 inmate takeover of the 

“supermax” unit at the Montana State Prison in 

Deer Lodge, Montana, would not have occurred. 

That incident, which resulted in the murder of 

five inmates, was planned by inmates based on 

their knowledge of chronic security lapses by 

staff. 

Fortunately, planned riots and disturbances are 

relatively uncommon. Far more common is the 

unplanned situation that escalates into a riot or 

disturbance. Here too, the role of day-to-day 

security practices is central. In many cases, a 

security error creates an opportunity that initiates the entire incident. In others, a security error 

allows what should have been an isolated incident to escalate into an institutionwide crisis. In 

both cases, the end result is a riot or disturbance 

that is truly a crime of opportunity, the opportunity being a lapse in security. 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

Common Myths About Jail Security 

Myth: Maximum-security facilities and units have the best security practices.	Fact:	It	is	not	difficult	

to	find	examples	of	very	good	and	very	bad	security	at	all	kinds	of	units	and	institutions—minimum,	

medium,	and	maximum	security.

Myth: Security is the responsibility of the jail’s uniformed (custody) staff.	Fact:	In	a	correctional	institution,	security	must	be	every	staff	member’s	first	priority.

Myth: A natural tension exists between good security practices and an emphasis on inmate programs and services. Fact:	Effective	inmate	programs	and	services	complement	good	security	practices.	Poor	or	inconsistent	security	undermines	programs	and	services	and	forces	inmates	to	worry	

about	their	own	safety.	Good	inmate	programs	and	services	reduce	idleness	and	anger	and	provide	

inmates	with	incentives	to	comply	with	security	practices.

Myth: Staff will be able to tighten security as soon as they realize they are in a major emergency
 

situation.	Fact:	If	staff	security	procedures	are	sloppy	day	to	day,	they	will	predictably	be	sloppy	 
 

during	a	crisis	or	major	emergency.
 

It is tempting to assume that most jails are very 

good with basic security procedures and practices. That is a myth. While many jails have welldesigned security procedures and follow those 

procedures consistently and in detail, many do 

not. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to 

attempt to identify specific security practices that 

are important but frequently violated. However, 

even the most superficial review of some jails 

will reveal problems such as poor or nonexistent 

key and/or tool control, munitions stored in areas 

where inmates could gain access, sallyport doors 

operating on override rather than interlock, poor 

escort procedures—the list goes on. Given such 

opportunities for unnecessary incidents to occur 

and for incidents to escalate unnecessarily, the 

mystery is why major inmate disturbances are 

not more common. 

than bad procedures, but bad procedures do 

exist. Furthermore, despite an emerging national 

consensus about what constitutes good security 

practices (a byproduct of the proliferation of 

security audit processes), specific areas of disagreement remain. In addition, many jails maintain security practices on the basis of custom 

rather than reason. 

Finally, the centrality of the security audit in 

maintaining or improving security practices has 

become increasingly clear. A particular institution may have exceptionally good security 

without conducting audits. However, in general, jails that perform external security audits 

or even self-audits annually or biannually have 

substantially better security practices than those 

that have no means of comprehensive security 

assessment. 

It is important to emphasize that staff must follow security procedures consistently, and those 

procedures must be well-designed and effective. Poor implementation is far more common 

Classification 

Good classification practices—a key component 

of effective jail management—are a foundation 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

of emergency prevention. Two problems— 

misclassified inmates and mismatches between 

inmates and institutions—can lead directly to 

crisis situations. If many inmates are classified 

at a higher security level than a facility’s design, 

staffing, and operating procedures were designed 

to handle, serious problems may be inevitable. 

Another very serious warning signal is frequent 

overrides of classification rules. 

Early Intervention 

Early intervention is conceptually related to proactive management. It is a matter for front-line 

and supervisory staff rather than a managementlevel concern. Early intervention is to some 

extent a result of institutional culture, but it is 

largely an issue of training. 

In short, the issue is whether staff attempt to 

deal with inmate conflicts, confrontations, and 

personal crises as early as possible or whether 

staff wait until a problem escalates into a fight 

or some other clear disciplinary issue. When 

low-level problems are not dealt with, some may 

simply go away but others will not. Those that 

do not tend to escalate in intensity and scope. 

Yesterday’s argument is today’s fight. Today’s 

fight is tomorrow’s stabbing. Tomorrow’s twoinmate confrontation is the next day’s gang war. 

Today’s race riot may have its roots in yesterday’s conflict between two inmates of different 

races, even though the conflict itself had nothing 

to do with race. 

Despite these clear connections, some correctional administrators hesitate to commit substantial 

resources to developing early intervention skills 

and practices because the payback is not visible. 

Hesitant administrators may ask, “If an inmate 

disturbance does not occur because of our investment of training and other resources, will anyone 

recognize that it would have occurred without 

the investment?” Jail administrators should keep 

in mind that an early intervention philosophy is 

a worthwhile objective not only because it helps 

prevent major emergencies but also because it 

produces two highly visible results: a better running facility and increased staff professionalism. 

Tone of the Institution 

The “tone” of a jail is also referred to as its 

“atmosphere” or “climate.” (“Institutional culture” is quite different; it refers to a more abiding set of attributes, although some overlap 

exists between an institution’s culture and its 

tone, atmosphere, or climate.) 

An institution’s tone is complex, but, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of traditional 

warning signs, it is something that experienced 

corrections staff register quickly (if subjectively). Many staff are certain that they know when 

something is wrong or substantially changed 

within a minute of entering a jail. Is it the noise 

level? Partly. The way inmates are speaking to 

and dealing with other inmates? Again, partly. 

Does it also have to do with the nature of staffinmate relationships? Absolutely. Most staff 

(and most inmates) believe they can feel the difference between a tense and a relaxed jail. 

A jail’s tone also has to do with the way the 

facility is run. In a jail operated much more 

restrictively than necessary, where staff are 

heavy handed, distant, and quick to write disciplinary reports, the tone will differ dramatically 

from that in a facility operated as openly as possible for its security level, where staff-inmate 

interactions are low-key, informal, and generally 

positive. 

Unlike an institution’s culture, which generally 

transcends any single turn of events to remain 

relatively stable over time, its tone can change 

dramatically because of an incident, a policy 

change, or even external events. Thus, a jail’s 

tone, which can predict the likelihood of largescale inmate violence (see earlier discussion 

of institutional climate scales), can also cause

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

crisis situations. A hostage situation or some 

other major disturbance is far less likely to occur 

in a jail that is clean, quiet, and run within the 

boundaries of constitutional requirements than in 

a jail that is dirty, noisy, and run without regard 

to the constitutional rights of inmates. It is the 

overall tone of the jail that may produce violence in one case and a secure and constructive 

environment in the other. 

Staff Professionalism 

As is true with many of the factors and issues 

discussed in this section, staff professionalism 

does not exist in a vacuum. It contributes to and 

reflects the tone of the institution. It is enhanced 

by proactive management and strengthened by 

skills such as conflict resolution, and it helps 

the institution achieve consistency in security 

practices. Beyond these considerations, however, 

staff professionalism itself plays a direct role in 

preventing jail emergencies. 

In most jails, even though inmates interact far 

more frequently with other inmates than with 

staff, they depend on staff when something 

is wrong. Staff intervene before an inmate is 

seriously injured in a fight, arrange for medical assistance when an inmate appears to be in 

immediate distress, and provide counseling when 

an inmate has a serious personal problem. In 

a jail that values and rewards professionalism, 

staff take these kinds of responsibilities most 

seriously; in doing so, they avert more dangerous problems. 

Inmates also rely on staff for many day-today functions. In a minimum-security facility, 

inmates with outside jobs may live relatively 

independently but still depend on staff to let 

them in and out of the facility. Staff take inmates 

to probation or court, track their release dates, 

and arrange for family visits, among many other 

tasks. In a high-security unit, inmates depend on 

staff for most of the necessities of daily life— 

food, clothing, showers. In part because of these 

dependent relationships, inmates are sensitive 

to lack of professionalism—to the officer who 

practices verbal “one-upmanship” as inmates eat 

or shower or who plays favorites and makes a 

point of writing up an inmate for personal reasons. Staff members who behave unprofessionally toward inmates may never know that their 

own behavior initiated an institutionwide disturbance. When viewed in this light, it is clear that 

staff professionalism can help prevent inmate 

violence (among a number of other obvious benefits) and is also a major factor in staff safety. 

Conclusion 

As noted at the beginning of this section, some 

jail emergencies cannot be prevented. However, 

serious prevention efforts can stop some crisis 

situations from occurring and will mitigate other 

incidents so they do not develop into full-scale 

crises. A surprisingly wide range of initiatives 

have excellent potential to prevent jail emergencies, and many of these initiatives have been 

underutilized in jail management. In addition, 

many aspects of a jail’s day-to-day operations— 

especially, perhaps, its security practices and 

overall tone—are important preventive factors. 

Good prevention efforts are an important part 

of good jail management. The old adage bears 

repeating: “The best way to deal with jail emergencies is not to have them in the first place.” 

137 
Emergency Teams*
 

Emergency teams are critical to emergency 

preparedness in any correctional facility. The 

three types of teams discussed in this section— 

tactical, hostage negotiation, and crisis intervention—deal with life-and-death matters. Tactical 

teams, sometimes at great personal risk, have 

rescued hostages who otherwise almost certainly 

would have been killed. Hostage negotiation 

teams have worked out nonviolent surrenders 

when almost every observer predicted a bloodbath. Crisis intervention teams have saved staff 

and their families from long-term mental anguish 

and the kind of downward spiral depicted so 

poignantly by Joseph Wambaugh in The Onion 

Field. Lives have been lost when a department 

lacked one or more of these crucial functions. 

However, while there should be no debate about 

the importance of these teams, a few management mistakes can turn an emergency team into 

a high-profile liability (in the words of some jail 

administrators, “Emergency teams—can’t live 

with them, can’t live without them”). 

Clearly, the subject of emergency teams is 

important. This section is directed to institutional CEOs and departmental administrators 

and focuses on strategic, organizational, and 

management issues associated with emergency 

teams—with particular emphasis on the problems and pitfalls that may confront a manager 

or administrator. 

*Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency 

Preparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D., and Cynthia Barry, 

Ph.D. (Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of the 

authors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry. 

A wealth of material is available on the training of negotiators and tactical teams. Many 

emergency teams have voluminous policies and 

procedures. This section does not attempt to 

synthesize training or procedural materials for 

the various types of emergency teams, nor is this 

section intended as a how-to manual. 

Background 

Terminology 

Most medium-sized and large local jails and 

most state DOCs have one or more emergency 

teams. However, different departments have different names for their teams, and terminology 

can be a major barrier to thoughtful discussion. 

The most common of the three general types 

of emergency teams is a tactical team. This 

section uses “tactical team” as a generic name 

for various units—disturbance control, Special 

Operations and Response Team (SORT), 

Correctional Emergency Response Team 

(CERT), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), 

and many others—that are specially trained in 

the use of sublethal and/or lethal force. 

The second most common type of emergency 

team is a hostage negotiation team. Other terms 

for these teams include “SitCon,” “crisis negotiation team,” and “crisis intervention team.” 

The third type of emergency team is most commonly known as a crisis intervention team, 

although some departments use that term to refer 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

to hostage negotiators. Crisis intervention team 

members are specially trained to provide some 

combination of support, postincident debriefing, 

peer counseling, and posttrauma care to staff 

and staff families. These teams have the broadest range of names, such as “peer counselors,” 

“critical incident debriefing team,” and “posttrauma team.” 

To summarize, this section refers to a use-offorce team as a tactical team, to hostage negotiators as a hostage negotiation team, and to a 

group that provides psychological services and/ 

or support to staff during and after an emergency 

as a crisis intervention team. 

Clarifications 

Correctional institutions often have special 

teams trained to do cell extractions (also commonly referred to as “forced cell moves”). In 

some institutions, cell extractions are performed 

by the tactical team (whatever that team may 

be called). Other institutions may have a cell 

extraction team (or teams) and a completely 

separate disturbance control team, CERT, or the 

like. This section does not address cell extraction 

teams or the cell extraction responsibilities of 

tactical teams. 

Confusion also may arise about nomenclature 

and organization of duties in tactical teams. 

Tactical teams can be viewed as having two 

general levels. This section uses “disturbance 

control team” to indicate the first level—a 

tactical team trained for some combination of 

application of sublethal force, mass arrests, and 

use of riot formations. The term “CERT/SORT 

team” is used to indicate the second level—a 

tactical team trained for hostage rescue missions, 

dynamic entries (a surprise forced entry into a 

barricaded or locked position, typically using 

firearms to take control of the situation inside as 

quickly as possible), and use of semiautomatic 

weapons. Some agencies have a single level or 

type of tactical team that performs all of these 

functions; others have two levels. Departments 

with two levels often make successful participation in the disturbance control team for a period 

of time (e.g., 2 years) a prerequisite for joining the CERT/SORT team. Generally, that has 

worked well for selection. 

Finally, this section does not address “first 

responder” systems. (These systems are designed 

to provide a controlled response to an alarm or 

an officer’s call for assistance while maintaining 

some secondary response capability. Typically, 

first and second responder staff are identified 

at the beginning of each shift.) First responder 

systems are becoming increasingly common in 

prisons throughout the country, and less so in 

jails, but their function is not within the scope of 

this discussion. 

Emergency Teams and the Small Jail 

It may be impractical for a small or moderatesized jail to maintain one, two or all three types 

of emergency teams described in this chapter. 

However, even the very small jail may encounter 

a crisis in which one or more of these functions 

is an absolute necessity. If a jail cannot have, 

or chooses not to have, some or all of these 

emergency teams, it is that jail’s responsibility 

to arrange for emergency teams from a nearby 

agency through mutual aid agreements. Such an 

arrangement does not absolve the jail of responsibility for the issues discussed in this chapter. 

General Management Issues 

Coordination 

Jail administrators should ensure that emergency 

teams understand each other’s missions and the 

potential importance of each team in resolving 

an emergency. Without such understanding, one 

team may lack respect for another’s role (e.g., 

a CERT/SORT team responsible for hostage 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

rescue may regard the hostage negotiation team 

as a weak and unacceptable alternative). All team 

members must clearly understand their own roles 

and be committed to overall departmental policy. 

Preparing teams to function effectively and 

seamlessly in an emergency requires coordination. Ideally, a management-level person will be 

assigned responsibility for coordinating all three 

types of teams throughout the department. This 

person needs the authority to ensure that teams 

are properly trained, follow departmental policy, 

and maintain a positive team culture. That person should not be a member of, or the leader of, 

any of the three teams. 

Membership and Selection 

The qualifications of emergency team members 

are extremely important, and the department 

should have a strict policy on membership 

requirements for each team. Membership should 

be voluntary. The goal is to attract the very best 

individuals—those who are concerned about 

saving lives and who understand what it may 

take to respond to an emergency in a controlled 

manner. Applications for team membership 

should be reviewed and approved by the team 

leader, the institution’s security administrator, 

and the warden or a jail chief. 

Applicants for emergency teams should have 

at least 1 year of experience in the correctional 

field. This requirement allows the applicant to 

become accustomed to the correctional environment and familiar with the department’s mission 

and philosophy, and it allows the department to 

observe and evaluate the employee’s demeanor, 

professionalism, and approach to handling 

inmates in difficult situations. Applicants should 

not hold positions with other emergency-related 

responsibilities (e.g., commander, intelligence 

officer). In addition, applicants should demonstrate the following: 

●	 Emotional maturity, ability to function under 

stress, and willingness to defer decisionmaking to higher authorities. 

●	 Total commitment to the department and 

team philosophy. 

●	 A good job history, free of disciplinary 

infractions (especially excessive use of force). 

To select the right type of employee for membership on an emergency team, psychological 

evaluations may be conducted. However, a psychological evaluation may not be helpful if a 

thorough evaluation and background investigation 

of the employee are conducted. The question is 

whether a psychological evaluation adds value to 

Diversity 

Emergency team composition should reflect 

the importance of diversity as a workforce 

issue. Hostage negotiation teams traditionally recruit for diversity (i.e., participation 

by women and minorities) because it is well 

established that in some situations a female 

negotiator, for example, may be effective 

where a male negotiator will not. However, 

some tactical teams have not wanted 

diversity—especially if the department 

has not emphasized diversity in its overall 

recruiting and selection practices. A tactical team’s mission may place extraordinary 

physical demands on members. If that is the 

case, the department should specify those 

demands and the related selection requirements. However, departments should eliminate any membership requirements that are 

not essential and that tend to work against 

diversity of team membership (a minimum 

height requirement, for example). 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies

Why are problems with tactical teams so frequent and so serious? The answer is simple: 

inadequate management or, more frequently, 

complete lack of management. Tactical teams 

require strong, active management in addition to 

strong leadership. The team leader’s role is crucial, but the leader is a member of the team and 

cannot also be its manager. Some administrators 

fail to actively manage the tactical team because 

they lack the necessary technical background 

and feel intimidated by the team. Other administrators are themselves “wannabe” tactical team 

members and go too far in trying to please the 

team. Regardless of the underlying reason, if top 

management at the institutional and departmental levels is not actively involved in directing the 

tactical team, serious problems are inevitable.

Ideally, management would start from scratch 

with its tactical team, defining and planning the 

mission, philosophy, structure, leadership, training, incentives, and management oversight. In 

most departments, however, tactical teams have 

been around for years and are not the result of 

an analytic process. A team may have been the 

pet project of a well-known (and long since 

departed) administrator, or it may have simply 

managed to stay beneath management’s radar 

until a well-publicized incident places it in the 

spotlight. If a department or institution does not 

have the opportunity to design its tactical teams, 

it needs to work with existing teams to ensure 

their professionalism and effectiveness. 

Team Culture 

A clear understanding of mission and philosophy—shared by the team members and leader, 

institutional managers, and department administrators—is fundamental for any tactical team. 

Managers can and should insist on a tactical 

team that reflects the values of the overall agency 

rather than behaving as a rogue “organizationwithin-an-organization.” An example from the 

law enforcement field illustrates the difference. 

the selection process. If an employee has a clean 

work history of several years with the department 

and is in all other ways well qualified, should 

that employee be eliminated because of a score 

on, say, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 

Inventory (MMPI)? On the other hand, psychological testing sends an unmistakable message 

about the importance the department places on 

psychological stability in these positions. This is 

not an open-and-shut decision and is one of the 

reasons a time period should be established before 

a new employee can apply to become a member 

of the team. That allows the supervisor and the 

administration to focus on the employee’s behavior and attitude rather than on a test that may or 

may not predict that behavior and attitude.

Tactical Teams

The Importance of Strong Management

The best tactical teams have a most impressive 

degree of professionalism in addition to their 

technical skills. Even tactical teams that have not 

been well equipped or thoroughly trained have 

sometimes been able to resolve life-and-death 

situations because of their bravery and commitment. However, of the three types of emergency 

teams, tactical teams present the greatest risk for 

management. There are many well-documented 

situations in which a tactical team has embarrassed its agency, or worse. Tactical teams 

have engaged in and covered up excessive or 

unauthorized use of force, worn unauthorized 

uniforms and carried unauthorized equipment, 

harassed and provoked inmate populations, 

alienated themselves from the rest of the correctional work staff, threatened to quit en masse 

if they did not get their way (and carried out 

the threat), conspired to create false overtime 

or training records, created incidents that made 

front-page news, and initiated incidents that 

led to court judgments or settlements in six and 

seven figures. 

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143

One of the authors worked on a project involving a large police department and a large sheriff’s office in the same county. At the time, the 

police tactical team had been on many consecutive assignments in which no shots were fired, 

and the team took great pride in that record. 

Conversely, the sheriff’s tactical team regarded 

any assignment in which no shots were fired 

or force used as frustration or failure. The two 

teams, which were similar in terms of equipment, staffing size, training hours, and budget, 

had totally different levels of professionalism, as 

reflected in their attitudes, appearance, language, 

demeanor, and more subtle attributes. 

Management has many ways of defining the culture and professionalism of its tactical teams. In 

addition to emphasizing a positive, professional 

statement of team mission, philosophy, and 

values, management must also scrutinize leadership, selection, and training.

In sheriff’s jails it is common to find that the 

CERT/SORT team is part of the patrol division 

and that its orientation is focused entirely on 

“street” situations. If that same team is to serve 

as the jail’s tactical team, it is imperative the 

team members become familiar with the jail and 

that some of the team’s training and exercises 

reflect jail situations. These same principles will 

apply to hostage negotiation teams.

Leadership 

Managers of correctional facilities tend to think 

that the tactical team leader should be one of the 

physically toughest officers in the institution. 

Often, however, such an officer may not be the 

best candidate for the job. Integrity, character, 

judgment, and intelligence are more important 

qualities for the tactical team leader than physical strength, familiarity with weapons, or training in martial arts. The leader must be able to 

deal rationally with team members’ pressures to 

use heavier weaponry, make the team more elite, 

increase shooting time during training, engage 

in “wilder” training simulations, etc. It takes 

character not to bow to such pressures to appear 

tough and loyal to the team. 

Elitism and Anonymity: The Twin 

Scourges of Tactical Teams

The twin scourges of tactical teams are elitism and anonymity. A good tactical team will 

have strong identity, cohesiveness, and pride. 

However, these must not be achieved by team 

members setting themselves apart from the rest 

of the workforce. This can be a difficult balance 

to maintain. 

Why Management Matters 

Management presence and involvement are 

essential in properly maintaining a tactical 

team. Even if team leadership is excellent, 

management involvement is important for 

several reasons:

•	 Motivates	team	members.	

•	 Provides	opportunities	for	the	manager	

to	transmit	personal	values	directly	to	

the	team	and	reinforce	the	values	of	the	

organization.

•	 Allows	the	manager	to	personally	assess	

the	team’s	style,	culture,	and	tone—

without	the	team	leader’s	“filter.”

•	 Refines	the	manager’s	knowledge	of	the	

team’s	capacities,	equipment,	training,	

and	procedures—knowledge	that	may	

prove	invaluable	in	an	emergency.

•	 Establishes	an	informal	open-door	

between	the	manager	and	individual	

team	members.

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There is nothing wrong with an identifying 

patch on the uniform, or a ribbon or the like. 

More than one identifying insignia on the uniform should sound warning bells, and different 

uniforms should not be permitted unless they 

are a necessity during training or during actual 

assignments. If that is true, then the different 

uniforms should be worn for training only or 

when on assignment as part of the tactical team; 

the rest of the time, the members of the tactical team should wear the same uniform as other 

officers. 

Similarly, it is not a good idea to organize tactical teams in such a way that between tactical 

assignments they perform other specialized 

duties as a team. Although this is a common 

way to operate a tactical team, team members 

do not do “regular” correctional officer work, 

elitism is hard to control, and team members 

get comfortable talking tough to inmates from 

behind smoked-glass helmet visors. 

As a manager, you know you are in trouble 

when you notice that your tactical team uniforms are black (the rest of the department 

wears gray and green) and they rather resemble 

Ninja outfits. Another bad sign is when the team 

seems to spend most of its time in its basement 

ready-room, telling apocryphal stories, talking 

“trash” about other staff, and otherwise being 

“special.” 

A mark of a good tactical team is support for 

accountability as a team and as individuals. 

However, tactical team members often resist 

the idea of individual accountability, usually 

by pushing for anonymity. Team members may 

argue against having their names stenciled on 

helmets or jumpsuits as is done for other staff, 

claiming that inmates will retaliate against 

them after an incident. Team members may 

even rebuff the idea of using identification 

numbers or letters on their uniforms. If a manager permits anonymity, a team member may 

escape accountability for even the most blatant 

malfeasance. Perhaps more importantly, when 

team members know they are identifiable and 

accountable, it often works as a deterrent, preventing problem behaviors. 

Training 

Training tactical teams is a tricky business. 

Training needs to instill a set of values in team 

members, prepare them for the dangers they face 

(without making them paranoid), and develop 

multiple skills. 

If possible, a department should conduct its own 

training for tactical team members. Too often, 

external training will not reflect the department’s 

values and needs. Even if a department has a 

policy stating that any contradictions between 

external training practices and departmental 

expectations will be resolved in favor of the latter, external training can be more detrimental 

than helpful. For example, in the early 2000s, 

a Midwestern state DOC was sending its tactical team members to a larger neighboring state 

for initial training at a “CERT Academy.” After 

complaints from new team members that the 

training was sometimes abusive and humiliating, 

and after managers observed that the new team 

members had developed an extreme, military 

combatant philosophy, the department committed 

the time, money, and other resources to develop 

its own tactical team training. 

Training should not focus on terrorist incidents. 

It should not be “warmed over” police training. 

Nor should it be designed to make team members 

paranoid. Rather, tactical team training should 

be practical and varied. It should emphasize skill 

building, discretionary decisionmaking, and professionalism. Exercises and simulations should 

reflect the range of crises, emergencies, and 

disasters that the jail might realistically expect to 

confront. 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

The initial training for tactical team members 

is especially important. If new team members 

receive training that sets false expectations, the 

team probably will develop a culture that is not 

what management wants and needs. Initial training for tactical team members is not Marine boot 

camp. It should not include hazing. Instructors 

should not scream at, swear at, intimidate, or 

otherwise demean trainees. Unnecessarily harsh 

treatment does not develop mature, thoughtful, 

independent decisionmakers. Initial training for 

new tactical team members should always begin 

with a strong emphasis on ethics and professionalism and then establish the mission and philosophy of the tactical team and how that supports the 

mission of the institution and department. Initial 

training can then go on to develop basic skills, 

communication methods, contingency plan familiarity, and weapons proficiency. 

Tactical team members need a high level of competence with a relatively broad range of skills. In 

addition to physical fitness (and, for CERT/SORT 

members, weapons training), teams must know 

how to use various other authorized instruments 

of force and/or chemical agents. Tactical team 

members typically need a higher level of training in CPR, first aid, and HAZMAT procedures 

than other staff. Their training often also includes 

mass arrest techniques and various formations and 

disturbance control procedures. Their firearms 

training should go beyond qualifying scores on 

the firing range to include weapons familiarity, 

“shoot/don’t shoot” contingent decisionmaking, 

and overall use-of-force policy. Tactical team 

members also need substantial understanding of 

tactics and strategies in crisis situations. 

Incentives 

Most tactical team members are highly motivated 

with regard to their team duties. Typically, that 

is true even for bad tactical teams, although there 

are certainly some exceptions. Many tactical team 

members would serve gladly without any incentives; however, management should still attempt 

to provide incentives, both to attract qualified 

applicants and to demonstrate the importance 

management places on the team’s function. The 

question of incentives is tricky and a matter of 

balance: bad decisions can lead to development 

of team elitism and individual prima donnas. 

Reasonable incentives may consist of a small pay 

increment, overtime for training in an agency in 

which overtime is rare, comp time, or other more 

creative solutions. If the incentives are too great, 

the rest of the workforce will resent them and the 

team may develop unrealistic expectations. On 

the other hand, if the incentives are trivial, team 

members will regard them as an insult and the 

agency would do better to provide no incentives 

at all. 

Team Size and Structure 

With regard to structure and function, several 

management issues are worthy of exploration. 

There is little or no consensus among tactical 

experts about the appropriate size and structure 

for tactical teams. Thus, emergency teams come 

in a wide variety of sizes and shapes. Teams 

sometimes consist of two to four subordinate 

squads with squad leaders, an assistant team 

leader, and an overall team leader. Some teams 

do not have squads. Where there are squads, they 

may have specialized functions (e.g., a chemical 

agent squad), or every squad may include every 

team function. This guide does not endorse any 

particular team size or structure, although it is 

recommended that each tactical team include a 

medic and a video camera operator. 

The number of tactical teams and the total number of staff trained for tactical team duty will 

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vary with the size and geographic location of the 

jail. The key questions are usually “What is the 

minimum number of people we will need assembled for the team to be effective?” and “How 

long will it take to assemble that many specially 

trained staff?” (The same questions are, of course, 

equally relevant for hostage negotiation teams.) 

Similarly, there is no general rule about whether 

various emergency teams should be facility-based, 

or departmentwide. That decision will depend on 

the same set of factors described above. It is not 

uncommon for departments to have institutionbased disturbance control teams and departmental 

CERT/SORT teams. 

Weapons Assault and Marksman 

(Sniper) Capacity 

A jail cannot avoid the possibility that it will need 

to use a weapons assault team. Similarly, it cannot deny the chance that it may need a marksman 

(sniper). Situations where hostage rescue teams 

must handle the incident using firearms are, fortunately, very rare in American correctional institutions. Situations that require the use of marksmen 

are far more rare. Still, either is possible. (For 

sheriff’s jails, it may be that the patrol or enforcement side of the agency has trained marksmen/ 

observers, in which case they will serve the jail as 

well). The jail that does not want to develop and 

maintain either of these capacities must decide in 

advance which law enforcement agency it would 

call on for that kind of help. It must then work 

out any policy and jurisdictional issues with that 

law enforcement agency. For example, if the law 

enforcement agency’s policy requires that its tactical team commander have overall control of the 

entire crisis situation, that would not work for the 

correctional department. Such dilemmas should 

be resolved in advance. Further, the correctional 

agency should conduct joint training with the law 

enforcement agency to further ensure a common 

understanding of the working relationship and 

effective coordination. 

Backup Planning: The Key 

to Handling Simultaneous 

Emergencies 

If the department has more than one correctional facility, the department should have 

policies and procedures in place to govern 

how tactical teams will back up each other 

in a crisis. In general, when a team is called 

out, at least one other team should be called 

out as backup. (The same logic applies 

to hostage negotiation teams.) A good 

approach is to have all institutions agree 

to a predetermined backup/relief plan that 

goes into effect at the outset of a crisis. The 

plan immediately mobilizes the team at the 

affected institution, sends the team at the 

next nearest institution as backup, and 

places a specific team at a third institution 

on standby. If the department operates a 

single jail, the “back-up” function for emergency teams must be a part of the jail’s 

interagency agreement. Such an arrangement can be crucial if emergencies break 

out at two or more institutions concurrently, 

which has happened on a number of occasions across the country. 

Traditionally, a two-person marksman/observer 

(sniper) team is assigned to the hostage rescue 

team. Because of the architectural design of jails, 

this team is much more likely to be relied on 

to observe hostage-taker activities than to take 

a shot to end a situation. Marksman/observer 

teams generally have extensive training in accurate long-range shooting but much less training 

in how to observe situations and provide essential intelligence to the commander. Departments 

should ensure that policies and procedures are 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

Why Marksman Capacity 


Is Necessary 


If a jail refuses to consider the possible 

(though unlikely) need for a marksman, the 

consequences could be dire. Here is one 

scenario. An inmate takes hostages, kills 

one or more of them, and then becomes visible in an area where a marksman could take 

a shot and end the situation. But the agency 

has no marksman on hand, either from its 

own staff or through arrangements with a 

law enforcement agency. The hostage taker 

then retreats out of sight and kills more hostages. The agency would find it difficult to 

explain (or live with) this outcome. 

unmistakably clear about authorizing a shot by a 

marksman. Similarly, policy and training need 

to be clear and consistent about how long the 

two-person team can be in place before being 

relieved by another team and about how frequently the marksman and observer should switch 

roles. (It is well established that snipers must 

be cross-trained for both positions and that one 

should not remain “over the gun” for very long— 

usually a matter of minutes—at a time.) These 

details and procedural issues, although not treated 

comprehensively here, require consideration in 

great detail. 

Hostage Negotiation Teams 

Team Size and Structure 

Like tactical teams, hostage negotiation teams 

come in many varieties. A team may have two 

to seven members, or even more. (Here, “team” 

refers to the actual working group assembled to 

deal with a specific hostage situation, not to the 

total number of trained negotiators available 

to the department or institution.) Often, the 

size and structure of a negotiation team reflect 

recommendations that original negotiators 

received during their initial training. When this 

is the case, the administration and the negotiators may be unaware of the major differences 

among various approaches to negotiator training, 

and the department probably has never considered alternatives to the current structure of its 

negotiation team. 

The most crucial negotiating functions are almost always handled by a two-person unit: the 

active negotiator (or “negotiator one”) and the 

coach (also called the “passive negotiator” or 

“negotiator two”). The team may also include 

an intelligence officer, a communications officer, a recorder, and other positions. It must be 

clear that all other positions exist to support the 

two team members—the active negotiator and 

coach—who are conducting the actual negotiations with the hostage takers. All team members 

must be cross-trained, so that the first two who 

arrive on the scene and are briefed can immediately make contact with the hostage takers, without waiting for the rest of the team to assemble. 

Reporting Relationships 

In hostage negotiations, the reporting relationship is essential. The hostage negotiation team 

must report directly to the situation commander. 

Not long ago, law enforcement hostage negotiators often were attached to the tactical team 

and reported to the tactical team’s commander. 

Fortunately, that is no longer common, and one 

has to look no further than the FBI handling 

of the Branch Davidian siege at Waco, TX, for 

compelling evidence. To weigh options for resolution as carefully as possible, the situation 

commander must receive information firsthand 

from both the hostage negotiation team and the 

tactical team. Even with a coequal reporting 

structure, commanders have a strong tendency 

to rely on the tactical team over the negotiating 

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team. A number of factors play into this tendency: Tactical information is often more dramatic 

than negotiation updates, and planning for an 

assault and dynamic entry can be very seductive. Unlike on television and in the movies, 

real-life hostage negotiations are often lengthy, 

“two steps forward, one step backward” affairs. 

Finally, most people’s gut reaction to a serious 

hostage incident is that it will not be resolved by 

talking. If, in addition to these factors, the hostage negotiation team reports to the commander 

through a tactical team leader, negotiation most 

certainly will receive short shrift as a realistic 

alternative for resolving the crisis. 

A great deal of attention has rightfully been 

placed on the rapport and chemistry that develops between the negotiators and the hostage 

takers. However, the chemistry between the 

commander and the negotiators is also important, and that is often ignored. There is a good 

reason why modern hostage phones have provision for a remote speaker or earphones in the 

command post. At some points in a hostage 

situation, there may be no adequate substitute 

for allowing the commander to listen to the tone 

and quality of the negotiations firsthand. The 

same logic suggests that the commander needs 

unfiltered access to the pair of negotiators. Most 

departments that rely on two-person negotiator teams do not use a negotiation team leader 

concept. However, departments that use fiveperson, seven-person, or larger hostage negotiation teams typically do include the position of 

team leader. Where there is a team leader, he 

or she may report to the command post. If the 

commander’s information about the negotiations 

always comes by way of a team leader, then it 

will reflect that person’s judgments, values, and 

subjective perceptions to some unknown degree. 

Training 

Too often, a department or an institution decides 

to have a team of hostage negotiators, chooses 

The Stockholm Syndrome 

The phenomenon in which hostages begin to 

identify with their captors, and vice versa— 

the so-called “Stockholm Syndrome”—is 

well documented. This syndrome can also 

have a profound impact on hostage negotiators.	Part	of	the	negotiation	coach’s	role	is	

to make sure the active negotiator does not 

overidentify with the hostage takers. If the 

department uses a team leader position, 

that individual is also responsible for making 

sure that the two-person negotiating team 

is not “losing distance.” However, the commander bears the ultimate responsibility for 

determining whether the negotiating team 

is overidentifying with the hostage takers 

and beginning to blur its allegiances. That is 

an important reason for the commander to 

assess negotiations firsthand. 

the team members, arranges for their initial 

training, and then forgets they exist. With 

promotions, transfers, and retirements, the list 

identifying which negotiators are available at 

which institutions becomes increasingly inaccurate over time. If the department or institution 

is fortunate enough not to have any situations 

requiring a hostage negotiation team, individuals on the list may grow cynical and bitter about 

their decision to volunteer and about the effort 

they put into their initial training. In other words, 

they may burn out without ever having taken 

part in a hostage negotiation. Perhaps more 

importantly, if a hostage situation arises 3 years 

after the initial training, the negotiation team 

is unlikely to be able to perform in accordance 

with that training. Hostage negotiators do not 

need as much (or as frequent) refresher training 

as tactical teams, but they do need regular, serious, well-planned refresher training. 

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Conducting some hostage incident simulations 

or full-scale exercises that provide training for 

both the negotiation team and the tactical team is 

an excellent idea. However, because their training needs are different, the two teams should 

not always train together. Varying the outcomes 

of joint simulations and exercises is also important. If the sessions always end with an assault 

by the tactical team, negotiators will come to 

believe they are irrelevant at worst or a diversion 

at best, and the tactical team will get the wrong 

message—i.e., success in an emergency means a 

weapons assault. This state of affairs is demoralizing for the negotiating team and counterproductive for the department or institution, but it is 

surprisingly common. 

Negotiators need experience, and because actual 

hostage incidents fortunately are quite rare, 

much of a new negotiator’s experience must be 

achieved through training. Some of that training 

can take the form of having new negotiators participate in critical incidents that do not involve 

hostages, such as cell extractions and group 

confrontations. The negotiators can develop their 

skills in establishing rapport, communicating 

within limits set by the person in command, and 

avoiding making decisions themselves. The jail 

may then benefit from their increasing expertise 

in resolving volatile situations without violence. 

Some managers regard negotiator training as 

entirely a matter of experience (“just get used to 

doing it—there are no rights and wrongs, it is all 

judgment”). However, negotiators also need specific skills, and some of their training must identify what is right and wrong, what is good, better, 

and best. This requires specific skill training, 

including rigorous critiques of actual incidents. 

Communication Equipment 

The hostage negotiation team’s most basic 

equipment is the hostage phone. Many kinds of 

phones are available, including throw phones 

(the handset or part of a hostage phone sent or 

thrown into the hostage situation to be used 

by the hostage takers), phones with recording 

capabilities, phones that make it possible to hear 

and/or see what is happening inside the hostage 

area, and phones that can detect chemical agents. 

Prices for hostage phones vary widely, but none 

are cheap. 

In selecting a hostage phone system, a department must decide what capabilities it needs and 

what funds are available. Ideally, the phone 

system is easily operated, requires minimum 

maintenance, can record conversations, and can 

be used as a freestanding phone or connected to 

the institutional phone system. Other capabilities such as listening devices and cameras can be 

helpful, but they are not necessary for successful 

negotiations. In fact, some agencies have found 

that additional technologies increase the likelihood that the phone will malfunction. 

If an agency purchases technologically sophisticated hostage phones, it must be able to deploy 

this equipment quickly to any institution. More 

importantly, hostage negotiators must train with 

the equipment to the point that its use becomes 

second nature and “transparent” (i.e., the negotiators can “look through” the equipment and 

focus entirely on the hostage takers at the other 

end of the line). 

Incentives 

Negotiation teams, like tactical teams, deserve 

recognition and incentives. Compared with 

tactical teams, the negotiators’ assignment is 

more reflective, and their motivation may be 

more internal and less dependent on esprit de 

corps. Whereas management must watch that 

tactical team identity does not go overboard, 

the challenge with the negotiation team is to 

develop cohesiveness and pride. Despite the differences between the two teams, management 

often can use the same types of incentives for 

both (see “Incentives” in the section on tactical 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

teams). As with tactical teams, management’s 

involvement constitutes a strong incentive for 

negotiation teams to perform well, and it also 

keeps management in touch with the team’s 

capacities and limits. 

Crisis Intervention Teams 

Crisis intervention teams are not as common as 

tactical or hostage negotiation teams, but they 

are quickly coming into wider use. These teams 

vary far more in structure, mission, and procedures than the other two types of teams. In some 

departments, consultants or local mental health 

professionals, rather than a staff team, primarily 

fulfill the crisis intervention function. 

The starting point in developing a crisis intervention team is to define its mission and specify 

how and when the team will operate. This entails 

answering a number of questions: 

●	 Will the team screen employees for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after an 

incident? 

●	 Will the team treat PTSD? 

●	 Will the team interview (debrief) involved 

staff after an incident, to give staff someone 

to talk with? 

●	 Will team members refer to or coordinate 

with professional resources? 

●	 Do the psychology and psychiatry staff who 

work with inmates have a role in the crisis 

intervention team? 

●	 Is it mandatory or voluntary for staff to see 

the crisis intervention team or a team member after an incident? 

●	 Can the team guarantee anonymity? 

●	 When is the team mobilized—at the outset 

of a crisis, in the midst of a crisis, or after a 

crisis has been resolved? 

These questions have important implications. 

Although detailed answers are beyond the scope 

of this section, some recommendations are in 

order. 

Recommendations 

After a large-scale jail crisis or other potentially 

traumatic event, psychological screening for staff 

should be mandatory. However, psychological 

treatment should be voluntary. That is, the department has a right to ensure that staff are able to 

work. It has a responsibility to determine whether 

some staff need professional assistance and provide related information to the staff involved. 

However, it is the right of individual staff to 

decide whether to accept treatment and to determine what kind of treatment they will receive, 

just as would be true of a medical situation. 

In most jurisdictions, uniformed correctional 

staff will need an alternative to a local or state 

employee assistance program (EAP) for assistance after a crisis. Some staff will not use the 

EAP even if their need is acute. They may question the program’s confidentiality or they may 

want to deal with professionals who have experience in a correctional environment. Uniformed 

staff also may be unwilling to accept treatment 

from professional staff who treat inmates. 

However, some jurisdictions have had success 

with this approach when front-line staff and 

supervisors acknowledge the credibility and 

expertise of treatment staff. 

A few more specific recommendations may 

prove useful: 

●	 The crisis intervention team’s mission is 

best defined broadly. 

●	 The team’s mandate should include both 

staff and their families. 

●	 The team should be mobilized at the outset 

of a crisis or a major emergency, not after it 

is over. 

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Section 5. Resource Materials 

●	 Team members should have no other specialized role in emergency response. 

●	 Attention to ethics and confidentiality is crucial for crisis intervention teams and must be 

strict and ongoing. 

As with hostage negotiation teams, crisis intervention teams typically are more effective when 

they are used frequently, in a broad range of 

situations. Thus, it makes sense to extend the 

use of crisis intervention teams from traumatic 

incidents and major emergencies to day-to-day 

situations involving staff trauma and crisis (e.g., 

a terminally ill staff member). Clearly, however, 

a team of this kind can be crucially important 

both to staff and staff families during a critical 

incident and in its aftermath. 

Conclusion 

As noted at the beginning of this section, jail 

emergency teams—tactical, hostage negotiation, 

and crisis intervention—all deal with life-anddeath matters. Properly managed, these teams 

save lives and offer correctional staff paths for 

recognition and professional growth. The issues 

discussed in this section provide institutional and 

departmental leaders with food for thought in 

managing these emergency teams so as to ensure 

that they make a positive, professional, and 

effective contribution to the department. 

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Section 1 Section 6
 

Case Studies 
In This 

Section 

Maury County Jail Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 


Disturbance and Escape at a New Direct Supervision Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161
 

Hurricane Andrew and the Florida Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169
 

Riots at Camp Hill State Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173
 

Exhibits 

Exhibit 6–1: Maury County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155
 

Exhibit 6–2: Rensselaer County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162
 

Exhibit 6–3: Camp Hill State Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174
 
 

 

Maury County Jail Fire
 

Maury County is a rural area in middle Tennessee . 

The county seat is Columbia, TN, a city with a 

population of 38,000, approximately 45 miles 

south of Nashville . 

On Sunday, June 26, 1977, a fire broke out 

in a padded cell in the Maury County Jail in 

Columbia . The jail was just under 12,000 square 

feet and was rated for 58 inmates . On the day of 

the fire, the population was at 40 . There were 42 

fatalities from that fire—33 prisoners and 9 visitors . Twenty-nine others were injured . 

The Maury County Jail was originally built in 

the 1960s, opening in 1964 . It was a single-story 

building in the shape of a cross with four wings . 

The north wing of the building was referred to 

as “the workhouse” and consisted of five single 

cells on each side of the area . Steel picnic tables 

were fixed to the poured-concrete floor in the 

center area, referred to as the dayroom The 

entire perimeter was a walking corridor, separated from the workhouse by heavy iron or steel 

fencing . The roof of the jail was 4-inch-thick, 

steel-reinforced poured concrete . The workhouse 

ceiling was below the building’s roof deck and 

comprised of heavy fencing material as well . 

The workhouse was used primarily for trusty 

housing . 

The south wing of the jail was given entirely 

to administrative offices and some mechanical 

areas . The west wing included the kitchen, the 

laundry, and two maximum-security, two-person 

cells . These cells were of the same construction and layout as other cells in the jail but were 

Exhibit 6–1 Maury County Jail 

highly visible because of their location on either 

side of the main jail corridor . The east wing of 

the jail included a single padded cell for agitated 

or disruptive inmates, and it was also used when 

juveniles were locked up . The east wing also 

had a restricted drunk tank intended primarily 

for combative drunks, but that area could also 

be used for juveniles if necessary . Finally, the 

east wing also had the main large drunk tank, 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

an open area the size of three or four cells with 

a floor drain, and two eight-person cells, one 

of which was medium-security male and the 

other designated for the female housing area (a 

diagram of the jail as it existed at the time of 

the fire is provided as exhibit 6–1) . A dispatch 

office was at the center of the cross, with reasonably good visibility into cell areas . 

Although the jail did have portable fire extinguishers, there were no smoke detectors, sprinklers or other type of automatic extinguishing 

system, and no fire alarm system of any type . 

Also, and there was no emergency lighting and 

fire exit routes were not posted within the jail . 

Sunday was visitation day in the jail, and trusties were free to visit with family members in the 

outer lobby or on the grass outside the jail . The 

standard procedure for visitors was to enter the 

jail and then walk down either the main corridor 

or the corridor forming the perimeter to the workhouse area until they were in front of the cell or 

housing area holding the inmate they wished to 

visit . Visitors would then stand in the corridor 

visiting and often pass food, cigarettes, and sometimes contraband to the inmate they were talking 

to through the steel bars or grating . 

Jail deputies operated all cell doors in the jail 

individually and manually, although they could 

also operate them from remote locations . That is, 

a jail deputy could lock and unlock a cell door 

in the workhouse from an area outside the workhouse, but the deputy required a key and could 

operate only one cell at a time . There were only 

two sets of jail keys . The Sunday in question, the 

sheriff had one of those sets with him when he 

went to church and afterward, when he went to 

dinner at a restaurant about 20 miles outside of 

Columbia . There were no cell phones at the time 

and the restaurant the sheriff was at happened to 

be in an area that was out of radio range from the 

jail and the sheriff’s headquarters . 

The jail typically was staffed by two deputies on 

each shift . (The total staff of the sheriff’s office 

numbered 14 .) It is likely there were times when 

a single deputy may have been responsible for 

the entire jail, but that was not the case on June 

26, 1977—two deputies were on duty . The sheriff 

had a chief deputy within his organization, but 

no one was specifically responsible for the jail . 

On any given shift, the senior of the two staff 

assigned to the jail typically would be in charge . 

The operation of the sheriff’s office was more ad 

hoc and informal than policy-driven in those days . 

For example, there was little designated patrol or 

“preventative patrol” in the community; instead, 

the sheriff’s office responded primarily when they 

received calls . Further, the sheriff’s office had no 

reserve deputy program at that time . The countywide picture was of elected officials in a largely 

political patronage system . There was no civil 

service system and all employees in the sheriff’s 

office were “at will” and appointed . The rest of 

the county political organizations were similarly 

based on patronage . 

Visiting began that Sunday at approximately 

12:30 p .m . The jail’s padded cell held a 16-yearold juvenile male runaway from Wisconsin who 

had been picked up hitchhiking on the highway 

outside of town . He had no visitors, but he asked 

other visitors in the hall outside his cell for cigarettes and matches . A visitor gave him several 

cigarettes and a book of matches . The juvenile 

then attempted to set fire to the padding of his 

cell . 

The cell walls were concrete and went all the way 

up to the concrete roof deck of the building but 

the walls were covered from the floor to about 

the 6-foot mark with padded foam . The foam 

was backed by plywood and protected by 

nylon-reinforced material over the front of the 

foam itself . This foam also covered the inside 

of the cell door . The foam padding was labeled 

“fire retardant .” The foam was approximately 4 

inches thick . Evidently, the foam and its covering 

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Section 6. Case Studies 

material had been repaired at least twice since the 

original construction . Laboratory tests conducted 

after the fire found that the original foam was 

butadiene-styrene, and the original covering material was neoprene with nylon reinforcement . The 

foam used in the later repairs was polyurethane 

and the covering for the repairs was a PVC material with nylon reinforcement . Research indicated 

that no appropriate test methods or performance 

criteria existed at that time for evaluating foam 

materials for fire resistance . 

The juvenile’s first few attempts to set fire to the 

foam padding failed, but after three or four tries 

the matches were successful in setting the material afire . Once started, the fire spread very quickly . 

The material burned almost explosively, with an 

audible roar, and at least one witness described it 

as burning “like gunpowder .” 

Once the fire started, the juvenile tried to move 

away from the intense heat and fell to his hands 

and knees and began yelling . Initially no one paid 

attention because yelling was not uncommon in 

the jail . Very soon, the juvenile was screaming 

at the top of his lungs and a thick plume of black 

smoke was coming out of the padded cell . 

The heating and ventilation system in the jail had 

no dampers built into the ducts . (In fact, it was 

this fire that led to a requirement for dampers in 

HVAC systems, a requirement that is now almost 

universal in modern fire standards and building 

codes .) There happened to be an intake air supply 

grill high on a corridor wall very close to the door 

of the padded cell . Witnesses described watching 

the thick plume of black smoke coming out of the 

padded cell go directly into the air supply duct . 

The thick black smoke was then pumped out of 

vents throughout the jail . 

A deputy reached the padded cell quickly and 

was able to open the door, pull the juvenile out, 

and drag him through the jail corridor and out the 

door into the outer lobby to safety . The juvenile 

survived with only second-degree burns . 

While dragging the juvenile to safety, the deputy 

was jostled by visitors trying to run through the 

corridor and find safety; in the process the deputy 

dropped the only available set of jail keys . They 

slid across the floor, and in the darkened atmosphere created by the smoke, they were not relocated . All five of the cell area doors had to be 

opened to release the inmates, and none were . 

When the fire began, none of the visitors was 

much more than 50 feet from the door to the 

main corridor and the door from the main corridor to the outer lobby . Once in the outer lobby, 

the smoke was less incapacitating, and it was not 

difficult to get across the outer lobby and out the 

main jail doors to the outside and to safety . In 

spite of the short distance involved, many visitors were unable to escape the fire because of the 

speed with which the smoke filled the facility 

and reduced visibility to zero . One of the vivid 

descriptions from someone who survived the fire 

was that it was “like someone pulling down a 

black curtain .” 

Because most of the inmate trusties were outside 

the jail or in the outer lobby when the fire began, 

most of them survived . Fortunately, the noon 

feeding had been completed and laundry work 

was usually done in the morning, so there were 

no inmate workers in the laundry or kitchen areas 

at the outbreak of the fire . The nontrusty inmates, 

locked in cells and tanks, were not so lucky . 

Some inmates took towels and soaked them in 

toilets or sinks and tried to use them to prevent 

smoke from entering their cells or, more commonly, to cover their heads and faces as makeshift masks . Other inmates got in the shower and 

turned the showers on, hoping that the flow of 

water would counteract or serve as a barrier to the 

smoke . Those tactics may have worked for a very 

short period of time, but the oily smoke contained 

not only strands of carbon and other thick particulate matter, but also cyanide . In something of a 

final irony, the main water intake pipe to the jail 

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A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

passed through the ceiling of the padded cell . The 

pipe was aluminum and its joints were soldered . 

The extreme heat of the fire bent the pipe, and 

the solder turned molten . A soldered joint in that 

ceiling broke, and no water could reach the taps 

or outlets to the jail . When firefighters and other 

emergency personnel finally did gain access to 

the jail, they found inmates huddled in the corners of showers, wrapped with towels . All were 

covered with the fire’s black oily residue . Thirtythree of the forty inmates in the jail that day perished . All of the fatalities from the fire were due 

to smoke inhalation . 

Sheriff’s personnel tried unsuccessfully to contact 

the sheriff . He had left word about his restaurant 

destination and, when he could not be reached, 

someone was sent to find him and bring him 

back to Columbia . Even if the sheriff had been 

somewhere in the downtown area in Columbia, it 

almost certainly would have made no difference 

in the outcome of the fire . All of the fatalities 

probably occurred within 3 to 4 minutes of the 

first recognition of the fire . 

Fire personnel had responded almost immediately 

upon being called . (The city fire station was only 

two blocks away .) The breathing apparatus that 

they were using allowed only 2 to 4 minutes of 

breathing time in a smoke-filled environment . 

With no keys and no visibility, fire fighters were 

stymied from any comprehensive attempt at 

rescue . When fire fighters and emergency 

personnel first arrived on the scene, they were 

able to rescue a few visitors—those who had not 

been completely overcome by the smoke but were 

moving around inside the building trying to find 

the exit door and those who had found corners or 

other areas where the smoke was not as thick . 

The jail was in a heavily populated area of the 

city, and on this early Sunday afternoon with a lot 

of sirens in the air, a crowd of hundreds quickly 

formed across the street from the jail . One sheriff’s deputy was posted with a rifle and riot gear 

on the roof of the building next to the jail, more 

as a preventative measure than to take any specific action . That aroused the ire of many in the 

crowd and people yelled complaints about the 

sheriff’s office posting deputies on rooftops rather 

than trying to rescue people from the jail . In fact, 

a rescue operation was impossible . 

Fire personnel still needed access to the jail to 

vent the building, to extinguish the fire and to 

search for any potential survivors . Fire personnel went to the roof of the jail with jackhammers 

and tried to create venting and an entryway, but 

the 4-inch thick reinforced concrete stymied their 

efforts . After a substantial amount of time, all the 

jackhammers were able to accomplish was one 

very small hole through the roof deck . Finally, a 

D-9 Caterpillar was brought to the jail and successfully used to knock a large hole in the external wall of the jail and provide ready access . The 

fire was eventually extinguished by hose lines run 

down the main jail corridor and by a hose stream 

from the roof directed into a roof vent of the 

padded cell . 

Columbia, TN, is a small town today, and it 

was smaller at the time of the fire; it seemed 

that everyone knew people who had been killed 

or injured . In the aftermath of the fire, immediate public reaction was one of shock and horror . 

Surprisingly, some of the community reaction 

quickly hardened into “Well, if they hadn’t gone 

to jail they wouldn’t have had that problem .” 

Perhaps that was part of the community’s psychological defense mechanism, but that is speculation . In reality, of the 40 inmates in the jail at the 

time of the fire, only 1 was a serious criminal . 

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Section 6. Case Studies 

The other 39 were alcoholics, bad check writers, 

fathers who had failed to pay child support, and 

the like . And, of course, there was one runaway 

juvenile . 

There was no critical incident review or comprehensive inquiry . There were many lawsuits . 

One of the only things that went right for Maury 

County about the whole situation was that their 

insurance turned out to be first rate and covered 

almost all of the damage as well as almost all 

of the costs of the civil suits . The extent of the 

costs is unknown because many of the civil suits 

were settled prior to trial and with confidentiality 

clauses or sealed agreements under court jurisdiction . Unfortunately, the manufacturer of the foam 

padding (labeled “fire retardant”) that had burned 

so vigorously and produced the toxic smoke could 

not be held liable because there were no relevant 

consumer protection statutes that could be applied 

to the facts of the case at that time . In short, there 

were no laws then about misrepresentation in 

labeling material . 

A few comments are in order by way of epilogue . 

The sheriff did not receive great criticism in the 

aftermath of the fire and continued successfully 

as sheriff . As this case study was written, he 

had been retired and continued to live in Maury 

County . The jail building where the fire occurred 

continues to stand in Maury County and is today 

the home of the County Government archives . 

On the 25th anniversary of the fire, the Maury 

County historian prepared a retrospective newspaper article about the fire . He located a phone 

number for, and called the individual who had 

started the fire . When the county historian identified himself and said he wanted to ask about the 

jail fire, the individual hung up . 

Lessons Learned 

1 . 	 A relatively small fire can kill a 

large number of people . 

2 . 	 A relatively small and localized 

fire can fill a large building with life-threatening smoke in 2 or 3 minutes . 

3 . 	 The smoke a fire produces can 

almost immediately reduce visibility within a building to zero, 

so exit routes that may appear 

easily accessible can no longer be found . 

LJ 

XII.D.8 

4 . 	 In jails and prisons, backup 

sets of emergency keys must be 

quickly accessible at all times 

on all shifts . 

5 . 	 There is no substitute for realistic, full evacuation fire drills . 

Staff must prove they can successfully evacuate all inmates 

from a building filling with smoke, and they 

must know how long the evacuation will take . 

Then they must practice regularly . 

LJ 

XV.G 

LJ 

XV.F.4– 

XV.F.6 

6 . 	 The fact that a building is constructed of concrete and steel LJ 

XV.F.12.a,b 

LJ 

I.C.8.b 

SJ 

II.A.7 

SJ 

I.D.4 

LJ 

XV.F.12.b 

SJ 

II.A.7 

LJ 

XV.F.11 

SJ 

III.D 

SJ 

VI.F 

SJ 

I.D.4 

SJ 

II.A.7 

does not mean that lethal fires 

cannot occur . 

7 . 	 Controlling the type of combustible loading (“fire loading”) in 

a building may be more important than source of ignition . 

8 . 	 Realistic jail fire plans must 

include provisions for emergency access from the outside 

by fire department personnel . 

Note: = Checklist for Larger Jails 

= Checklist for Smaller Jails 

LJ 

SJ 

159 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

9 . 	 Jail staffing at all hours 

must be adequate to 

effect an immediate and 

complete building evacuation . 

LJ 

XV.F.5 

SJ 

I.D.4 

10 . Lifelines and utilities can fail, including 

those that may be relied 

upon to prevent or help 

suppress fires (in this 

case, the main water supply) . Jails cannot rely on mechanical, electrical, or electronic systems of fire detection 

or fire suppression completely (for example, 

an electrical short that has itself incapacitated smoke ejectors may cause an electrical 

fire that produces thick smoke) . 

LJ 

XV.F.12.e–H 

SJ 

I.D.1 & 2 

160 
Disturbance and Escape at a 


New Direct Supervision Jail*
 

Rensselaer County, NY, began studying alternatives for a new jail in 1987. In 1990, the county 

legislature committed to build a new, direct 

supervision jail designed to hold 238 inmates. 

That capacity was larger than the county anticipated it would need for its own prisoners, but 

the county’s decision was based in part on its 

expectation of boarding inmates from other 

jurisdictions to generate revenue. Approximately 

18 months before the new jail opened, the sheriff 

appointed a five-member transition team composed exclusively of custody staff. The transition team met infrequently, but its members did 

attend National Institute of Corrections (NIC) 

training seminars on operating a direct supervision facility and opening a new jail. In October 

1991, the transition team requested $241,346 to 

support a procedure development and training 

unit, but the sheriff did not support or transmit 

that budget request. 

A new sheriff took office in January 1992. He 

met with the transition team on several occasions and, in March 1992, requested $100,000 

to $200,000 from the county legislature for 

transition to the new jail. In May of 1992, a 

four-member transition team was assigned on a 

full-time basis, with the jail administrator operating as a fifth member. The team was tasked to 

produce, among other things, a comprehensive 

operations manual for the new facility and a 

training program for staff. The team produced 

*Abstracted from “Investigation Into the Disturbance and Escape 

from the Rensselaer County Jail on February 14, 1993” by the New 

York State Commission of Corrections; June, 1993. 

an inmate handbook and preliminary, though 

incomplete, staff post orders. Emergency preparedness procedures were not completed until 

December 1992, when the facility operations 

manual was first sent to the printer. Thus, 

there were no working copies of the operations 

manual available to staff when the facility was 

completed in November 1992 or upon its opening on December 28, 1992, nor were copies 

available through January and February of 1993. 

Staff had neither training nor familiarity with 

the emergency procedures in the manual. The 

transition team was disbanded when the county’s 

entire inmate population was transferred from 

the old, linear jail facility to the new building in 

December 1992. 

The transition to the new, direct supervision jail 

was poorly planned, funded, and executed. Staff 

were unfamiliar with the new computer-based 

security system. Staff had little training on the 

operation of the new systems. Many of the 

computerized systems had not been tested adequately prior to the building’s occupancy. 

Faulty door sensors and false alarms on unsecured doors led to staff frustration and alarms 

were frequently not reset. Key control was inadequate, and some crucial keys were unavailable 

to the staff at the time of the building’s occupancy. For example, there was only one key available for all fire extinguisher boxes, forcing staff 

to leave those boxes unlocked and accessible to 

inmates. The sewage system was not working 

properly and sewage would back up into adjoining cells, leading inmates to block ventilation 

161 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

ducts, preventing some sewage odor but impeding adequate ventilation. No written food service 

procedures were available for the new jail. There 

were not enough uniforms for inmates—each 

inmate had only one uniform and was without 

outer clothing while that uniform was laundered. 

The recreation equipment planned for the new 

facility did not arrive by the time the building 

was opened, contributing to excessive inmate 

idleness. 

Jail staff received 24 hours of training on the 

new facility’s operation (none of that training 

was based on the facility’s operation manual). 

At the time, the NIC recommendation for staff 

Exhibit 6–2 Rensselaer County Jail 

opening a new facility was 160 hours of inservice training. 

At the time the new jail opened, the inmate 

population was 111, including 13 federal 

prisoners and one from another New York 

county. The county actively sought additional 

inmates for the new, larger capacity jail and had 

increased the number of “contract” inmates to 

26 by mid February. Seventeen of the twentysix contract inmates were federal. They posed a 

particular problem because they were generally 

longer term and higher risk than most of the 

county inmates, but the county had no criminal 

history information on the federal inmates and 

162 
Section 6. Case Studies 

were unable to use normal classification procedures with them. Instead, the facility administrator placed most of the federal inmates in a single 

housing area (E-1) and the rest in a second housing area (E-2) based on his belief that it would 

be better to limit these inmate problems to one 

portion of the jail. 

In January and February of 1993, the many 

problems that had been apparent when the new 

facility was populated in December 1992 continued and were largely unabated. There were 

other serious operational problems. The inmate 

grievance system was functionally inoperative 

and produced inmate frustration rather than 

problem identification or resolution. Inmate discipline was markedly inconsistent and in some 

cases unreasonably harsh. For example, the jail 

had initiated a no smoking policy in December 

1992 and an inmate with contraband matches 

was given 30 days in segregation as was another 

inmate with cigarette papers and a lighter. An 

inmate request for outdoor smoking areas was 

denied, although staff were permitted to smoke 

outdoors on their breaks. Staff–inmate communication was poor and staff chain-of-command 

protocols within the new jail were noticeably 

inconsistent. The jail administrator met with an 

inmate council on a weekly basis and repeatedly 

assured them that major problems were being 

addressed, but as the weeks went on, no visible 

changes were apparent. 

On January 15, 1993, inmates in housing area 

E-1 refused to lock down for morning count, 

complaining that the breakfast they had just been 

served was cold and inedible. The captain (or 

“facility administrator”) examined the food and 

confirmed that the complaints were valid. The 

captain then directed that new breakfast meals 

be served. Although this confrontation ended 

peaceably, staff were upset that the captain had 

not demanded that the inmates “lock in” as a 

prerequisite for replacing their breakfast meals 

and that no disciplinary action was initiated. 

On February 10, staff of the New York State 

Commission of Corrections were present in the 

jail for a training session on direct supervision. 

They toured the jail and interviewed inmates and 

staff. They found that inmate attitudes were belligerent and that staff were not touring the facility or “working the floors” but rather confined 

to work stations. They described officers as 

“overwhelmed, ineffective, and not in control of 

the housing areas.” In providing feedback to the 

captain, one commission investigator specifically 

asked whether the captain was concerned that 

the jail might lose control of housing area E-1. 

The captain insisted there was no risk of losing 

control of any portion of the facility. That same 

day, members of the Correctional Officers Union 

met with members of the county legislature and 

complained of security problems at the facility, 

including lack of trustee accountability, faulty 

radio reception, and computer-based gate and 

door malfunctions. When these complaints were 

transmitted to the sheriff by the chairperson of 

the legislative subcommittee, the sheriff gave 

assurances that the facility was secure. 

On February 11, facility managers met with shift 

supervisors, and the captain announced that all 

housing area security posts would be reassigned 

in 2 days, on February 13, in response to the 

problems observed on E-1 by commission staff. 

Supervisors expressed concern with the concentration of federal hardcore felony prisoners 

on E-1 and asked that they be dispersed among 

other areas. The captain refused. On February 

12, an inmate informed a correctional officer 

that the inmates on E-2 were going to refuse 

to eat breakfast on Monday, February 15. The 

next day, the same correctional officer overheard inmates on E-2 talking about how the E-1 

and E-2 inmates were going to have to “stick 

together.” The correctional officer reported both 

of these incidents to supervisors. One supervisor later denied knowledge of either intelligence 

report. Another supervisor acknowledged receiving the report from the officer, but he said he 

163 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

was unable to confirm the intelligence after 

interviewing an inmate and did nothing further 

with the information. 

On Sunday, February 14, the inmate count was 

154. At 6 a.m. the E-1 cell doors were opened, 

but few inmates left their cells. When the breakfast cart was delivered, no inmates took food 

trays. The inmates told the correctional officer 

on the unit that they were staging a boycott. The 

E-2 inmates also refused to eat breakfast. The 

sergeant on duty was advised, and he phoned the 

operations lieutenant, reporting that the inmates 

in the E-1 and E-2 units would not eat and were 

refusing to lock back into their rooms. By 7:15 

a.m., it became clear that the 67 inmates in E-1 

and E-2 were staging a sit-down demonstration. 

Although the 11:30 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. shift was 

still at the facility, and the morning shift was just 

coming in, neither the sergeant nor the lieutenant 

directed the evening shift to remain at the facility. (Had the evening shift been held at the facility and the rest of the jail locked down, there 

would have been approximately 23 officers and 

supervisors available to deal with the situation 

on E-1 and E-2. Investigators could later find no 

evidence that those alternatives were contemplated or discussed at that time.) A lockdown of 

the rest of the facility was not ordered. The lieutenant, on the phone from his home, told the sergeant that he would respond to the facility and 

that he would inform the captain. The lieutenant 

arrived at the facility at 7:25 a.m. 

The inmates on E-1 and E-2 told staff they did 

not want to speak to the captain and were tired 

of the “lies by the administration.” The captain 

arrived at the jail at 7:45 a.m. and was briefed. 

The captain did not believe a show of force 

was an option because staff had no protective 

equipment, batons, chemical agents or training 

in the use of chemical agents or batons. He also 

believed a use of force would have compromised 

staff with regard to their subsequent ability to 

manage the facility. The 8 a.m. shift change 

occurred and, because of the facilitywide change 

in assignments 2 days before, the correctional 

officer sent to E-1 was an individual who had 

a total of 6 weeks’ experience as a correctional 

officer. At 8:20 a.m. the captain phoned the new 

sheriff and briefed him. He called the sheriff 

back 10 minutes later to report that the situation 

had escalated and advised that the sheriff come 

to the facility. The sheriff arrived at 9:56 a.m. 

At 9:45 a.m. the captain ordered the other housing areas locked down. The captain decided to 

cancel visits to E-1 and E-2 inmates at 10 a.m. 

and conveyed that message over the intercom. 

The inmate response was openly hostile and 

threatening. The sheriff withdrew the officers 

from E-1 and E-2 at 10:30 a.m., leaving that 

side of the jail (the east side) in control of the 

inmates. (The inmates had exclusive control of 

that housing area for almost 4 hours, from 10:30 

a.m. until 2:15 p.m.) At 10:35 a.m. additional 

staff were ordered to the facility. At 11 a.m. the 

Troy Police Department was notified, but police 

did not establish a security perimeter around the 

facility nor did they establish listening or surveillance posts. 

Inmates on E-1 and E-2 went on a destructive 

rampage, throwing furniture, destroying computer hardware, and tearing out sections of the 

ceiling on E-1. Damage on E-2 was less severe. 

The sheriff opened direct negotiations with 

the E-1 inmates while Troy Police Department 

Emergency Response Team members and correctional officers assembled into assault teams 

in a garage outside the facility. Water to the 

east side of the jail was turned off. Through an 

inmate in direct negotiations with the sheriff, the 

E-1 inmates agreed to return to their cells and 

the sheriff agreed to meet with a delegation of 

three E-1 inmates. E-1 was secured between 2 

and 2:15 p.m. At 2:25 p.m., it was discovered 

that two unidentified inmates had escaped from 

E-1. E-2 inmates still had not been locked into 

their rooms, and they became agitated when 

they saw the E-1 inmates were being served 

164 
Section 6. Case Studies 

lunch at about 4:15 p.m. At about that time, the 

operations lieutenant and a squad of correctional 

officers equipped with batons went to the E-2 

entrance, but the corporal in the area convinced 

them that he could manage the E-2 inmates and 

that they should leave. The E-2 inmates were 

given lunch and were locked into their cells at 

4:40 p.m. At 8:45 p.m., the 17 federal detainees were transferred to another facility and the 

remaining E-1 inmates were housed in other 

areas of the jail. 

When staff reentered E-1, inspection of damage 

to the mezzanine ceiling in the area revealed that 

a suspended ceiling had been pulled down and 

that a concrete block wall extending above the 

suspended ceiling had been breached. No inmate 

count had yet been initiated; a commissioned 

staff member recommended an emergency count 

be conducted immediately. Within a few minutes of staff reentry into E-1, an E-2 inmate told 

the operations lieutenant that two inmates had 

escaped from E-1. The lieutenant notified the 

captain and then ran outside the facility to look 

for clues. He found footprints in the snow leading away from a fire escape toward the fence 

surrounding the facility. The standard 8-foot 

high cyclone fence had no barbed wire or razor 

ribbon on top, nor did it have a cantilevered 

top. In short, it was not a security fence and 

was easy to climb. At 2:40 p.m. the Troy Police 

Department was notified of the escape. At 3 p.m. 

the emergency count revealed the identities of 

the two escaped inmates. Commission investigators reconstructed the escape and estimated that 

it had occurred at approximately 12:50 p.m., 

about 2 hours earlier than the notifications. 

After pulling down suspended ceiling panels, 

inmates saw that the cement block wall did not 

extend to the roof but that there was a 2- to 

3-inch gap filled with fiberglass insulation. 

Inmates then used a fire extinguisher tank and 

a mop wringer to knock out the ceiling panels, 

loosen the cement blocks and remove them. The 

breach in the ceiling wall then led to a mechanical equipment chase that led to an access corridor and a fire escape door. The fire escape door 

had a built-in alarm, but it was not working. 

Inmates in control of E-1 and E-2 had tampered 

with computer equipment and produced a steady 

malfunction alarm during the insurrection. The 

system could have been reset with a single command, but most correctional staff were not familiar with that procedure. 

In examining the escape site, it became obvious 

that the cement block wall in the ceiling that 

had been breached for the escape had neither 

reinforcing steel nor poured concrete, although 

it was a key portion of the only secure perimeter. Records revealed that the jail had originally 

been designed with reinforced concrete walls 

in the mezzanine ceilings of the housing areas. 

However, when the county required the design 

group to reduce the cost of the new facility by 

approximately 5 percent (from $22.8 to $21.8 

million), one of the cost-cutting measures agreed 

to by the county engineer, the architects, and 

designers was to forgo reinforcement of those 

walls. That change accounted for a specific savings of $72,000. When the construction was 

actually bid, the winning bid for the new facility 

was approximately $17 million but none of the 

cost reduction measures were then added back 

into the modified design. An additional postescape finding was that one of the two federal 

inmates who had escaped was known to be a 

high-escape risk, with a prior felony conviction 

for escape, but that information had never been 

made available to the county jail. Fortunately, 

both inmates were apprehended relatively quickly—one the next day, on February 15th, and the 

other, 2 days later. 

165 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Lessons Learned 

1.	 Planning to open a new 

correctional facility is a 

lengthy, complex, and 

demanding task. Planning 

failures escalate security risks in the 

new facility. 

LJ 

VII.A, D 

SJ 

& E 

II.C.6 

2.	 If a new correctional 

facility uses different 

operational concepts than 

existing facilities, extensive staff training is a necessity. 

LJ 

X 

SJ 

II.C.6 

3.	 A new jail should be 

opened and populated in 

stages, beginning with 

low-security inmates. 

However, none of that should be initiated 

before the facility has been thoroughly tested 

with staff walk-throughs. 

LJ 

I.C.13.b 

SJ 

II.C.6 

4.	 Emergency procedures for 

a new jail must be developed and staff trained to 

use them before the facility is opened. These emergency procedures 

must not be limited to situations such as 

fire and evacuation but must also anticipate 

crises involving inmate violence, such as 

disturbances and hostage incidents. 

LJ 

I.C.13.b 

SJ 

III.C.2 

5.	 The lure of external revenue does not compensate 

for accepting inmates without adequate knowledge of 

their backgrounds and criminal histories. 

LJ 

V.D & E 

SJ 

II.B.1 & 2 

6.	 Redundancy is a key concept in facility security. Checks and balances are 

built in because it is unsafe to assume 

that any single protective measure is 

infallible. 

LJ 

I.D 

7.	 Emergency response 

must be anticipatory 

rather than reactionary. Extra staff should 

be called in during an emergency before 

they are needed. Do not wait until they are 

already needed. The same concept holds for 

notifying top administrators, reinforcing a 

facility’s security perimeter, equipping staff 

for a show of force or an assault, etc. 

LJ 

VIII.A.1–5 

SJ 

III.C.1 

8.	 Poor inmate–staff 

relations can escalate 

security risks sharply. 

9.	 An effective inmate 

grievance system can 

be invaluable in identifying pervasive or 

chronic problems, and it can allow the resolution of many low-level conflicts. 

LJ 

V.G 

SJ 

II.D.1 & 2 

LJ 

V.A.4–6 

SJ 

II.A.4 

10. Poor or inadequate 

inmate programs and 

services can contribute to or cause major 

facility emergencies. Poor staff communication combined with management failure to 

respond to increasing belligerent inmate attitudes is a recipe for disaster. 

LJ 

V.A.5–D 

SJ 

II.A.5 

11. It is dangerous to assign the least 

experienced staff to supervise 

the most difficult inmate housing 

areas. 

LJ 

V.F.11 

12. When a “sit down” 

develops without 

weapons or hostages, 

it makes little tactical 

sense to abandon the area and allow inmates 

to organize and escalate into a full-scale disturbance or riot (unless staff have no capacity to intervene at that time and no realistic 

choices). 

LJ 

IX.B 

SJ 

II.A.3 

Note: LJ = Checklist for Larger Jails 

SJ = Checklist for Smaller Jails 

166 
Section 6. Case Studies 

13. Staff in a relatively small 

jail still need access to 

batons, chemical agents, 

body armor, a disturbance 

control team and training in the use of those. 

Additionally, they should have hostage 

negotiators or interagency agreements with 

surrounding law enforcement agencies to use 

their hostage negotiators or other mutual aid. 

Those mutual aid agreements should involve 

joint training sessions and drills or exercises 

on a basis specified by policy or agreement. 

LJ 

I.C.5.b 

SJ 

IV.A 

14. Shift supervisors and 

facility managers 

should be well trained 

in emergency preparedness procedures. In this case study, the lack 

of early decisionmaking about holding in the 

night shift and locking down the unaffected 

areas of the facility, along with the lengthy 

periods of delay in notifying the sheriff 

and the police, appear in retrospect to be 

unjustifiable. 

LJ 

I.B.2 

SJ 

I.C.5.a 

167 
Hurricane Andrew and the Florida 

Department of Corrections 

On August 21, 1992, U.S. Weather Service 

information suggested that Tropical Storm 

Andrew was taking a route that might hit the 

Bahamas and then south Florida. The Florida 

Department of Corrections (DOC) sent out a 

teletype advising managers throughout the DOC 

to monitor the storm’s progress. It also advised 

each facility within the DOC to designate a contact person in case the threat worsened. At Dade 

Correctional Institution (Dade CI), the superintendent directed the duty officer, the shift officer 

in charge (OIC), and the control room officers 

to monitor the storm’s development by weather 

band radio, TV, and commercial radio. 

On Saturday, August 22, the tropical storm 

strengthened into Hurricane Andrew. Its projected path continued to target Florida’s southeast coast. At Dade CI, the superintendent and 

assistant superintendent went to the institution to 

supervise the securing of the compound. Inmate 

workers removed loose items from the ground 

and tied down or otherwise secured equipment. 

The superintendent also organized a contingency 

plan for a DOC Department heads meeting at 

9 a.m. the following day to discuss evacuation 

plans. 

On Sunday morning, the hurricane was so 

imminent that the state government activated 

its Emergency Operations Center and began 

to evacuate low-lying areas along the southeast coast. A meeting was called at the DOC 

headquarters, with key personnel beginning to 

prepare the facilities that were within the likely 

path of the hurricane. An immediate decision 

was made to direct a small facility in the Florida 

Keys—Big Pine Key Road Prison—to evacuate 

north to Lantana Correctional Institution. The 

evacuation was completed without incident over 

the course of the next 9 hours. 

At Dade CI, the DOC heads and supervisors 

reported for the 9 a.m. hurricane preparation 

meeting. The superintendent decided to evacuate the work camp with its 293 medium- and 

minimum-custody inmates to the main prison 

unit. Two inmates were moved to a local hospital because of the seriousness of their health 

problems. 

By midday Sunday, Hurricane Andrew carried 

winds of over 150 miles per hour and seemed 

highly probable to strike Florida at Florida City, 

which would subject Dade CI to the full force of 

the center of the hurricane. Dade CI is located 

20 miles west of the coast, but it is only 6 feet 

above sea level. The force of hurricane winds 

was expected to create a coastal water surge of 

12 feet or higher that could travel many miles in 

from the coast. At 2 p.m., the DOC decided to 

evacuate all inmates from Dade CI to other state 

institutions. 

To accommodate the 1,000 inmates from Dade 

CI, the DOC located space at 5 other state prisons. Two of these potential transfer sites were 

eliminated because they were themselves close 

to the storm’s projected path and in potential 

danger. The Central Florida Reception Center 

was added to the list of receiving institutions, 

169 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

and all available transfer buses and vans within 

the DOC were dispatched toward Dade CI to 

begin transferring inmates among the following 

facilities: 100 inmates to Glades Correctional 

Institution, 150 inmates to Martin Correctional 

Institution, 450 inmates to the South Florida 

Reception Center, 250 inmates to the Central 

Florida Reception Center, and approximately 50 

inmates to another state facility. 

The DOC also decided to evacuate 76 inmates 

from the small Copeland Road Prison to Hendry 

Correctional Institution. The DOC quickly 

assessed the evacuation situation as a timing 

problem. The DOC had adequate transportation 

and other resources, and adequate space to house 

the relocated inmates on an emergency basis, but 

it was not immediately clear that the appropriate resources could be put in play in time to stay 

ahead of the approaching hurricane. 

At Dade CI, classification staff began to sort 

inmate transfers by custody level and psychological profiles. The decision was made to move 

all close-custody inmates first, with minimumand medium-security inmates to follow. Inmate 

folders and medical records were gathered and 

prepared for transporting along with the inmates. 

Vehicle security was arranged at the rear gate of 

the institution, and additional perimeter security 

was added. The institution’s business manager 

provided security staff with maps outlining the 

travel routes to the various receiving institutions. Security staff were divided into teams 

for screening inmates, searching inmates, and 

escorting them to the departure area. As the last 

of the inmates were evacuated out of Dade CI, 

staff members at the institution began to prepare 

for the hurricane. Emergency supplies were 

gathered, and staff prepared to ride out the hurricane in the administrative offices and the medical area. 

At 10:30 p.m. on Sunday, August 23, the last 

inmates being evacuated arrived at the Central 

Florida Reception Center. Approximately 1,000 

inmates had been moved, all over the southern 

half of Florida, on short notice, without any injuries to staff or inmates and without any escapes. 

At Dade CI, the superintendent sent staff home 

to evacuate their own families. A small number 

of staff volunteered to stay at the institution to 

prevent possible looting or post-storm damage. 

At the South Florida Reception Center, staff 

were called to the institution and helped maintenance staff tie down or secure equipment that 

was judged vulnerable to wind damage. Food 

and water were stockpiled within the dormitories, and handcuffs were distributed because 

transport to segregation housing would not be 

possible during the storm. 

When the hurricane hit, the storm damage was 

very severe at Dade CI. Sections of roof were 

ripped away, and the wind-driven rain soaked 

large areas of the facility. Windows were broken 

and the perimeter fence and some outbuildings 

were destroyed completely. At the rest of the 

DOC’s facilities, storm damage was moderate. 

No other facilities were rendered uninhabitable. 

Late Monday, August 24, some Dade CI staff 

returned to the institution from the South Florida 

Reception Center to try to help the remaining 

staff get to safety. They organized a convoy to 

get staff out of the institution to their own homes. 

The superintendent and assistant superintendent 

toured the institution grounds with other staff, 

assessing the damage, and then attempted to make 

contact with the DOC headquarters or another 

institution to request help. A correctional officer 

arrived from Broward Correctional Institution. He 

had been sent to find out the status of Dade CI 

and had walked 5 miles to get to the institution 

because of the condition of the roads. 

On August 25, the day after the storm, the 

Secretary of Corrections, along with the 

Assistant Secretary for Operations and the 

Inspector General of the Department, arrived 

at Dade CI to thank the staff for their efforts in 

completing the evacuation and to pledge support 

170 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 6. Case Studies 

and assistance with the many personal problems 

staff were experiencing. (In addition to the institutional damage, approximately 400 DOC staff 

members found that their homes had been completely destroyed by the storm.) 

That same day, the Civil Air Patrol established 

a radio communications post at the institution. 

The state’s fire marshal arrived, and a National 

Guard unit set up camp on the grounds to provide perimeter security. The DOC initiated a 

number of recovery programs, including providing free gasoline, water, ice, clothing, food, 

and household goods as available to staff. The 

administrative building of the main unit of Dade 

CI was kept open as a shelter for staff and family members who were without housing. Tools, 

roofing materials, electric generators, etc., were 

made available to employees at no charge. The 

DOC also coordinated FEMA applications and 

established a toll-free number for staff and their 

families to use in arranging assistance. 

The DOC began to identify temporary housing locations for homeless staff. It also made a 

major effort to coordinate the staff who were on 

special assignments with other institutions. The 

DOC coordinated donations of money to assist 

the 1,000 homeless staff and families. 

On August 26, a meeting was held at the DOC’s 

Central office to begin developing plans for 

rebuilding the Dade CI work camp and the main 

prison. Actual reconstruction on Dade CI and 

the Dade CI work camp was initiated within 48 

hours after a damage assessment was complete. 

Lessons Learned 

1.	 The department’s comprehensive emergency planning system provided an 

appropriate framework for 

responding to the specifics of the hurricane. 

LJ 

VI 

SJ 

III.C.2 

Note: LJ 

SJ 

= Checklist for Larger Jails 

= Checklist for Smaller Jails 

2.	 With some emergencies, particularly with some types of 

natural disasters, the aftermath 

may be more challenging than 

the response to the disaster itself. 

LJ 

XV.J–N 

SJ 

I.C.7.a 

3. 	 No emergency is completely 

predictable and the sequence 

of events during an emergency may preclude commonly accepted response protocols. During 

Andrew, the uncertainty of a hurricane’s 

path, and the risks involved in trying to 

evacuate large numbers of high-security 

inmates made it impractical to evacuate several institutions, or to evacuate days before 

the storm hit. This placed a huge premium 

upon fast, clear decisionmaking and leadership at the department level. 

LJ 

XIX.A 

SJ 

V.A & B 

4.	 Staff performed admirably at 

many locations throughout the 

state, in spite of great stress on 

some individual staff members. 

Individual acts of bravery and compassion 

were common. Staff must give first priority to 

their duty to the department and the state, even 

in cases where their homes are threatened or 

the fate of loved ones is uncertain. Staff must 

be willing to volunteer for particularly hazardous duty, such as remaining behind and riding 

out the effects of a natural disaster. 

LJ 

XVIII.S 

SJ 

I.D.1–3 

5.	 Inmate cooperation was apparent throughout the hurricane 

and its aftermath and was 

essential to the evacuation and 

to the operation of partially disabled 

facilities after the hurricane. 

LJ 

XIX 

SJ 

III.C.3 

6.	 After disaster strikes, communication to the most seriously damaged 

areas of a state may initially be 

impossible and remain very difficult for a long time. 

LJ 

XVIII.T & U 

171 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

7.	 After the hurricane, the 

problems of dealing with 

large numbers of homeless staff were more difficult in many ways, and took more creativity, 

than the formidable problems of repairing 

badly damaged facilities. An emergency 

plan should include a contingency for a 

search team in the aftermath of a disaster. 

Some 2 weeks after the hurricane, 22 staff 

from Dade CI still had not reported to the 

institution or the DOC. The DOC instituted 

search teams in a matter of days to search 

for the missing staff. 

LJ 

XVIII.A.3 

SJ 

III.G 

8.	 Because of the difficulty 

in establishing communication after a natural 

disaster, it makes sense 

to establish a date, time, and place for staff 

to report before they leave during an evacuation. For similar reasons, it makes sense 

to pre-establish and disseminate a toll-free 

number for staff and their families to call for 

emergency assistance. 

LJ 

XV.O 

SJ 

I.C.7.a 

9.	 A mechanism for tracking employees temporarily assigned to different 

facilities would be a useful addition 

to a department’s emergency plan. 

LJ 

XVIII.A.3 

10. Unlike most flood and 

earthquake situations, cellular telephones may be 

knocked out of service by 

a hurricane because so many transmitter and 

repeater locations can be damaged over such 

a wide area. 

LJ 

XIX.K 

SJ 

III.G 

11. When a large-scale evacuation of inmates is anticipated, it is useful for the 


department to authorize 


an emergency inmate processing and 


receiving policy, so that the receiving institutions have flexibility in intake procedures. 


LJ 

XV.K.8 & 9 

SJ 

I.C.7.a 

12. Inmate medical records should, 

whenever practical, accompany 

inmates in an evacuation to 

the receiving institution. As a 

backup, it is helpful if basic inmate medical information is available in a database or 

online for access from any institution. 

LJ 

XV.K.5 

SJ 

I.c.7.a 

13. Lack of potable water will 

become a crisis for an institution long before food delays or 

cold food may produce serious 

problems. It is also far easier to arrange 

for emergency food from external sources 

than for quantities of potable water during a 

communitywide emergency. Be prepared to 

move food items from one facility to another 

and, if possible, have at least one vehicle (a 

24-foot truck, for example) designated for 

food service use only. 

LJ 

XII.D.17 

SJ 

III.H 

14. Emergency plans should include 

provisions for an expert team 

that can evaluate food items for 

contamination and spoilage in the 

wake of a natural disaster. 

LJ 

VIII.L 

15. A department may be in a difficult 

position to issue paychecks in the 

absence of attendance and leave 

records. It may also be challenging 

to distribute paychecks to employees in the 

aftermath of a communitywide disaster. In 

such emergencies arrangements need to be 

made to pay in cash rather than through paychecks. Even with electronically transferred 

funds, bank accounts may not be available. 

This was the case in Florida during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. 

LJ 

XVIII.A.1 

16. Emergency purchasing authority may be an absolute necessity 

following a large-scale disaster. 

LJ 

XVIII.V 

SJ 

III.I 

172 
Riots at Camp Hill 

State Correctional Institution* 

The Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution 

at Camp Hill was constructed in 1937 as a 

juvenile facility. As a result of a 1975 Attorney 

General ruling that Camp Hill was no longer 

suitable for juvenile commitments, it was designated in 1977 as an adult male institution. Camp 

Hill’s institutional function was modified to 

serve as one of three diagnostic and classification centers. The prison was originally accredited and reaccredited by the Commission on 

Accreditation for Corrections in December 1984 

and October 1987, respectively. 

Six general population cell blocks were located 

at the southwest side of the facility. Four cell 

blocks located on the northeast side of the facility were used for a general population unit, a 

restricted housing unit, a special needs unit and a 

diagnostic center. Designed for juvenile offenders, the original cell walls consisted of hollow 

core glazed block. The walls and ceilings were 

not reinforced with steel stabilizing rods or 

mesh. Program and support service buildings— 

including an infirmary, eight modular dormitory 

units, a chapel, an education building, a food 

service building, a gymnasium, an auditorium, 

and a laundry—were located between the housing areas. Camp Hill’s administrative building and central administration building for the 

*This case study is based on the Adams Commission [the panel 

charged by the Governor of Pennsylvania (PA) with examining 

the causes and events of the Camp Hill riots] report, now out of 

print; the report of the PA Attorney General’s Office on those 

same riots, also out of print; and the NIC 1990 technical assistance 

report examining emergency readiness in the PA Department of 

Corrections by Jeffrey A. Schwartz, John Lum, and Si Mariano. 

Department of Corrections were located on the 

compound outside the security perimeter. 

The institution consisted of 1,414 single cells in 

10 different cell blocks. The rated capacity in 

October 1989 was 1,825 beds, but Camp Hill’s 

population had reached an unprecedented level 

at 2,656. Camp Hill was severely understaffed. 

Resulting from the shift-bidding procedures, the 

2 to 10 p.m. shift was frequently staffed with the 

youngest and least experienced officers. Camp 

Hill’s staff training programs were not in compliance with accreditation standards. 

Correspondence from the Camp Hill superintendent in September 1989 suggested that the 

administrative staff recognized the strain the 

growing offender population was placing on 

the facility. In addition to describing the level 

of overcrowding, the correspondence outlined 

short- and long-term plans and resources necessary to address the overcrowding, including 

increased bed space and program expansion. 

Reports of an inmate disturbance at Camp Hill 

began to emerge in the summer of 1989. Inmates 

were frustrated by overcrowding, food quality, 

inoperative and overcrowded showers, inadequate educational and vocational opportunities 

because of understaffing, and limited law library 

privileges. Policy changes enacted in September 

1989 that altered the procedures governing inmate family visiting days and sick calls further 

fueled inmates’ frustration. In the weeks preceding the disturbance, inmates made verbal reports 

of a potential disturbance to several officers. The 

173 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

Exhibit 6–3 Camp Hill State Correctional Institution 

most specific reports indicated that members of 

the Fruits of Islam (FOI), a Muslim sect, were 

attempting to organize an institutional disturbance. In addition, some staff interviewed after 

the disturbance noted that inmates demonstrated 

unusual behavior immediately before the disturbance, including changes in the dress of Muslim 

inmates, en masse requests for sick call, intentional misconduct by an inmate informant so he 

could be transferred from the general population, 

and reduced noise and activity by inmates in the 

Restricted Housing Unit. There was considerable 

frustration prior to the disturbance, particularly 

among correctional officers, which may have 

also contributed to the institutional unrest. 

On October 25, 1989, at approximately 2:50 

p.m., 3 correctional officers were moving 

approximately 500 inmates in the main stockade yard between housing groups 2 and 3. An 

inmate, without provocation, reportedly struck 

an officer stationed at E Gate after the officer 

requested to see the inmate’s movement pass. 

Officers responding to the assault were then 

chased and assaulted by other inmates in the 

yard. Some inmates went back to housing units 

and began assaulting officers in the blocks. 

Around 4 p.m., the rioting inmates began to set 

fires and loot the kitchen, commissary, and auditorium, which were accessible from the main 

stockade yard. 

Between 3 and 4 p.m., approximately 300 inmates moved about in the main stockade yard. 

No apparent inmate leadership was identified. 

At approximately 3:15 p.m., a dozen unarmed 

174 
Section 6. Case Studies 

correctional officers arrived at E Gate and 

remained near E Gate for almost 10 minutes 

until inmates sprayed them with a fire extinguisher retrieved from the cell blocks. 

As the officers attempted to retreat to the control 

center, inmates gained access to E Gate using 

a key obtained from an officer taken hostage. 

The inmates then poured through the gate and 

into the compound. Three unattended vehicles 

were parked in an area adjacent to the education 

building. Officers made no attempt to remove 

these vehicles following the assault and subsequent disturbance in the main stockade yard. 

An inmate hotwired a truck and attempted to 

run the vehicle through an interior perimeter 

gate. Unsuccessful in his attempts, he drove the 

vehicle wildly through the main stockade field 

and succeeded in breaching the inner perimeter fence but not the outside perimeter fence. 

Through the penetrated inner fence gate, inmates 

gained access to the correctional industries 

building, which they ransacked, obtaining wood 

and other flammable materials that were used to 

set fires in the E Gate gatehouse and in a dispensary. Inmates destroyed the culinary manager’s 

office and caused minor damage to two modular 

housing units, basements in two cell blocks, a 

kitchen, and the furniture factory. They also pillaged the commissary portion of the education 

building and set it on fire. 

Several correctional officers who were trapped 

in “switch boxes” (small rooms with barred 

windows that serve as the cell block offices) in 

two cell blocks were taken hostage as inmates 

broke through the hollow block walls around the 

switch boxes. Hostages were paraded around the 

main stockade yard as inmates threatened to beat 

them with shovels and other objects. Directly 

below a perimeter tower, a group of inmates 

repeatedly beat one hostage in full view of staff 

watching the disturbance unfold from windows 

in the department’s administrative building 

overlooking the main stockade yard. After an 

unspecified period of time, the tower officer 

fired his shotgun into the air to chase the inmates 

from the officer. In total, 18 officers and other 

institutional personnel were taken hostage. 

Correctional officers, Camp Hill Correctional 

Emergency Response Team (CERT) members, 

municipal police, and approximately 100 state 

police gathered at the sallyport in the rear of the 

facility intending to move in and gain control of 

the modulars, education building, and commissary while allowing inmates the opportunity to 

get out. They established sufficient presence to 

regain control of E Gate. E block was reported 

to be seriously damaged; H block, which still 

had officers inside, was burning; and the four 

housing units in group 1 were locked down 

(Administrative Log, 1989). At approximately 

5:05 p.m., police regained control of the education building, the chapel, and four modular units. 

Inmates were moved from the modular units to 

the main stockade yard, where a skirmish line 

was established to keep inmates in the yard 

between two housing units. 

Throughout the disturbance, inmates obtained 

radios, cell block keys, and personal property 

from their hostages. Using radios and telephones, institution representatives began to 

negotiate with an inmate, and at approximately 

6:45 p.m., a negotiation table was set up in the 

education building. The negotiation team consisted of six Camp Hill staff members including 

the deputy for treatment. The inmate negotiation team consisted of six Muslim inmates led 

by a known FOI leader who had previously 

established contact with the Control Center 

via radio. Inmates focused on concerns regarding overcrowding, revisions in the family day 

and sick line policies, medical procedures, the 

general condition of the facility, lack of inmate 

programs, and poor staff morale. Although no 

concessions were granted during the 2-hour 

negotiation session, hostages were gradually 

released as a sign of good faith. 

175 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

At approximately 7:30 p.m., inmates began 

returning to their housing units for lock down 

pursuant to an agreement by the institution 

administrators to meet with inmate representatives the following day at 1 p.m. 

At approximately 9 p.m., officers in a Pennsylvania 

State Police helicopter circling the facility where 

inmates had set up camps instructed them to return 

to their cells. At approximately 10 p.m., a large 

contingency of institutional and state police officers moved through E Gate and began to sweep 

the main stockade yard to secure the facility. 

During this sweep, officers conducted pat-down 

searches of some inmates as they returned to the 

cell blocks from the adjoining exercise yards. 

These inmates, however, were not actively 

involved in the disturbance. There was no 

reported shakedown of cells in groups 2 and 3 

where the disturbance occurred, and debris and 

weapons were reportedly strewn on the floors. 

At 10 p.m. and again at 11 p.m., prison officials 

released press announcements that the facility 

was secured. As a result of the disturbance, 45 

injuries were reported, including injuries to 36 

staff, 7 inmates, 1 firefighter, and 1 state police 

officer. 

In the early morning hours of October 26, the 

superintendent, the deputy and director for treatment, and the deputy for operations met to assess 

the damage to the facility. They decided against 

conducting a shakedown, in part because they 

believed the facility was secure and also because 

following a previous disturbance, staff had retaliated against inmates during a shakedown. 

All was not secure, however. Officers feared that 

the cell door locking systems were not working following the lockdown, as they heard cell 

doors being opened and closed and saw several 

inmates out of their “secured” cells moving 

about the cell block between 2 and 3 a.m. on 

October 26. Additionally, there were reports of 

critical damage to the locking mechanisms in the 

cell blocks, as some of the security panels were 

removed and were lying on the floors in the 

blocks. The shift lieutenant reported these concerns to the captain. Supervisors and officers in 

the blocks suggested using padlocks and chains 

to secure inmates in their cells, but institution 

administrators rejected that recommendation. 

At 1 p.m., per the agreement reached on October 

25, the institution administrators met with inmate 

negotiators for an hour. The same concerns noted 

in the first night of negotiations were raised 

again, with the addition of poor scheduling and 

lack of commissary items. Though no decisions 

had yet been made, at 2 p.m., institution administrators ended negotiations so the superintendent 

could report to a prescheduled briefing at the 

Central Administration Building. Upon leaving the negotiations, the inmate representatives, 

apparently disgruntled about the lack of movement on their concerns, reportedly made verbal 

threats about burning the institution. Correctional 

officers reported these threats to their supervisors; however, it is unclear whether this information was forwarded to the administration. 

Only 15 of 24 officers on the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. 

shift reported for duty due to injuries sustained 

in the first disturbance. No officers from the 

previous shift were retained, and no additional 

officers were called to supplement the depleted 

officer ranks. 

At 3 p.m. on October 26, institution administrators conducted a press conference for local 

media news. In a prepared statement, the superintendent reported that inmate negotiations had 

been held, that further meetings were scheduled 

for the following day, and that the facility was 

secure. He also stated that he did not believe 

the inmate negotiators were representative of 

the inmate population and that none of their 

demands had been met. He further stated that 

the normal staff complement was on duty, no 

176 
Section 6. Case Studies 

additional staff had been called in, and almost all 

state police had left the institution. These comments reportedly incensed those inmates who 

watched the news conference from their cells. 

At approximately 7 p.m., while staff were distributing dinners in E and F cell blocks, inmates 

began to throw items from the tiers. They 

were observed reaching through their cell bars 

toward the locking devices left exposed by the 

missing security panels. Staff reported hearing inmates scream “Turn your lights off” after 

which inmates from all six cell blocks located 

in groups 2 and 3 were seen pouring into the 

courtyard between the housing areas. They ran 

through E Gate, which, despite its strategic 

security importance in separating groups 2 and 

3 from the other housing and program buildings, 

had not been repaired following the riot the previous day. Inmates proceeded to group 1 housing 

blocks and modular units and released others. 

Fires were started in modular units 1 through 6; 

the education building; and E, F, and H blocks. 

Five staff members were taken hostage. 

As inmates proceeded through E Gate, they 

chased staff and nonrioting inmates, who locked themselves in the Control Center. Rioting 

inmates broke windows and entered the Control 

Center by removing a window air conditioner, 

and then they set fires on the first floor. (Staff 

and nonrioting inmates trapped in the Control 

Center had moved to the second floor and contacted the main gatehouse for assistance.) A 

contingent of 25 Pennsylvania state police and 

a municipal police officer arrived at the front 

gate in response to a radio distress call from a 

state police officer trapped in the Control Center. 

After a delay at the main gate, the officers 

were permitted to enter the institution, established a skirmish line between the main gate 

and the Control Center, and used a ladder to 

rescue all staff and nonrioting inmates from 

the second floor of the burning Control Center. 

Following the rescue, state police issued a call 

for assistance and attempted to move inmates 

back through E Gate. 

Within several hours, nearly 900 state police 

officers arrived at the institution. Throughout 

the night, they attempted to sweep the institution, one section at a time, to force inmates back 

into the main stockade yard. Municipal police 

encircled the perimeter. 

At approximately 10:45 p.m., state police negotiators and institution staff threw a telephone 

with a long cord over the fence and began talks 

with an inmate representative in the K block. 

Negotiations continued throughout the evening 

of October 26. The same issues raised at earlier negotiations were emphasized. The inmate 

expressed his desire to speak with the commissioner, the superintendent, and the Governor. 

Although those demands were not granted, two 

hostages were released during the negotiations, 

communication decreased as the evening 

progressed. 

At approximately 5:45 a.m., a large water cannon was used to dislodge barricades inmates had 

constructed at E Gate. State police then activated 

the plan that would regain control of the facility. 

The plan included diversion and entry, use of a 

fire crash truck, tear gas, and warning and defensive shots as inmates resisted. Four inmates were 

wounded, but none were killed. The last inmate 

surrendered at approximately 9 a.m. on Friday, 

October 27. 

Although Camp Hill had an emergency plan 

prior to the riot, it was not used during the event 

itself. The emergency plan was not well known 

to most staff and was not practical. It referred to 

equipment and procedures that were no longer in 

use or no longer available. It had not been tested, nor had it been reinforced through training. 

During the second night of rioting, 66 injuries 

were reported to staff and inmates. Thirty-seven 

individuals, including the five officers who had 

been taken hostage, required transport to local 

177 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

hospitals for treatment. No deaths resulted from 

the incident. 

Damage from the 2 days of rioting at the State 

Correctional Institution at Camp Hill was monumental. 

● Fifteen of the facility’s 31 buildings were 

substantially damaged or destroyed. 

●	­ Six of eight modular housing units and 

a new, unused modular office unit were 

destroyed; the two therapeutic community 

modular units suffered moderate damage. 

●	­ Significant damage was reported to modular 

units 7 and 8, the Control Center, the greenhouses, the education building, the staff 

dining room, H-block basement, the gymnasium, kitchens I and II, the furniture factory, 

and dispensary II. 

●	­ Substantial damage was noted in the group 1 

cell blocks as inmates broke through walls to 

access the plumbing chases. 

Over the 2 days of rioting, upwards of 100 

staff were injured and 24 staff were taken hostage. Approximately 130 staff, including 70 

correctional officers, took disability leave for 

injuries sustained during the disturbances. As 

noted by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 

1990, “Camp Hill was on the verge of disaster, 

and all involved must count it fortunate that 

no lives were lost.” The monetary loss from 

the Camp Hill disturbances was staggering. In 

Pennsylvania State Police estimates, physical 

damage to the facility was more than $15 million, and costs associated with staff overtime and 

disability leave were $40 to $50 million. 

Approximately 700 inmates were transferred 

to other institutions on October 27 and 28. By 

October 29, staff began returning the remaining inmates to the cell blocks. Cell doors were 

chained and padlocked because their locking 

mechanisms were unusable. On October 30, state 

police and institution personnel continued to 

sweep the facility, its underground utility passageways, and remaining structures. By the sweep’s 

completion on October 31, the institutional count 

still failed to account for five inmates. 

On November 1, 7 days after the first disturbance occurred at E Gate, the superintendent 

was suspended. In late January 1990, the 

superintendent and deputy of operations were 

terminated, and the deputy for treatment was 

transferred. The major of the guard had previously retired. 

Lessons Learned 

1.	 A number of broad predisposing factors evidently set the 

stage for this riot. The following 

factors did not cause the riot 

directly, but likely added to the possibility 

that an individual incident would escalate 

into a major insurrection: 

LJ 

V.A.6–D 

SJ 

II.A.1–6 

a.	 Overcrowding. 

b. Understaffing. 

c.	 Decreased access to inmate programs. 

d.	 Poor labor management relations and 


poor staff morale.
 

e.	 Failures in the inmate disciplinary process. 

f.	 Housing large numbers of maximum-


security inmates in a facility that was 


at best appropriate for medium- and 


minimum-security inmates.
 

g.	 Lack of interaction and communication 

between the administration and frontline 

staff and between the administration and 

the inmate population. 

2.	 Against these general conditions, 

the actual provocation for the riot 

appears to have been two policy 

changes imposed on the population: 

LJ 

V.G.4 

Note: LJ 

SJ 

= Checklist for Larger Jails 

= Checklist for Smaller Jails 

178 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Section 6. Case Studies 

a.	 Family members could no longer bring 

food into the institution on family day. 

b.	 Inmate sick call was reduced to every 

other day rather than daily. 

3.	 Management did not 

respond to some of the classic signs of impending disturbance or attempt to deal with inmate leaders 

appropriately. 

LJ 

V.A.3 

SJ 

II.A.3 

4.	 Like many prison disturbances, the first day of 

rioting was spontaneous, 

but the entire prison was 

nevertheless lost because staff failed to 

mount an appropriate response to the initial 

disturbance. 

LJ 

XVIII.F 

SJ 

VI.C 

5.	 Leadership was problematic throughout the two 

days of rioting, and the 

lack of strong, decisive 

leadership was an integral part of many of 

the other problems at Camp Hill. 

LJ 

I.C.1.a–d 

SJ 

I.C.5.a 

6.	 Emergency plans were 

inconsistent from institution to institution in 

Pennsylvania prior to 

the riot, and it was impossible to coordinate resources effectively, such as CERT 

teams from other institutions when the riot 

occurred. 

LJ 

VI.A 

SJ 

IV.A 

7.	 Coordination between the 

institution and external 

agencies such as the 

Pennsylvania Emergency 

Management Agency and the Pennsylvania 

State Police was similarly ineffectual, primarily as a result of lack of prior planning. 

LJ 

XI.A.1–9 

SJ 

III.D 

8.	 In spite of the extent and seriousness of the second day’s 

rioting, state police regained 

control of the institution in a 

few minutes as soon as it was clear to the 

rioters that they would face lethal force. 

LJ 

XIV.P 

9.	 Individual officers were not 

prepared through training 

or supervision to follow the 

department’s use of force policies. They also lacked 

appropriate weaponry. Some staff might not 

have been taken hostage and/or beaten if 

force had been used appropriately. 

LJ 

XII.C.12.a 

10. If the aftermath of an emergency is not handled competently 

and stepdown plans are not 

realistic with regard to issues 

like security, then an institution may face a 

second emergency that can be more destructive than the original situation. 

LJ 

XVIII.U & V 

11. Institutional managers and 

administrators must recognize 

that media coverage and the 

course of the event are interactive, and that the coverage can dramatically 

affect the course of the event. 

LJ 

I.C.4.a 

12. After an emotional situation has 

been resolved, some staff may 

think about retaliation against 

the inmate population. It is a 

management responsibility to prevent such 

retaliation, and the primary issue will be 

leadership. 

LJ 

XVIII.R 

13. Poor day-to-day security procedures such as lack of key 

control, leaving motor vehicles 

LJ 

V.F 

SJ 

I.C.3.b 

SJ 

VI.D 

SJ 

III.C.3 

SJ 

I.C.4.a & b 

SJ 

I.C.5.a 

SJ 

II.C.1–7 

179 
A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Jail Emergencies 

unattended within a prison compound, poor 

control of heavy tools, etc., are likely to 

haunt an institution if serious trouble occurs. 

14. A prison control center 

or main control room 

located inside the security 

perimeter of a medium 

security, close custody, maximum security 

or super-max institution must itself be as 

secure as is practically possible. 

LJ 

VIII.P 

SJ 

III.I 

15. Communication failures 

and failures of an intelligence operation during 

a disturbance can lead to 

security lapses that increase the chance that 

the disturbance will re-escalate or spread. 

LJ 

XVI.G 

SJ 

I.C 

16. An institutional emergency plan 

will likely prove close to useless 

during an actual emergency if it 

is: 

LJ 

VI 

SJ 

III. A. & B 

a.	 Impractical. 

b.	 Written to reflect resources that no longer exist or never existed.
 

c.	 Unfamiliar to most institution staff. 

d. Unavailable during an emergency. 

e.	 Written to reflect procedures that the 


department does not use.
 

f.	 Not reinforced with training simulation 


and exercises.
 

17. Even when almost everything goes wrong 

in a disturbance at an institution that has 

not been running well, a large measure of 

good luck combined with the good work and 

experience of some of the staff and external 

agencies may result in avoiding both loss of 

life and increased risk to the community. 

180 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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