alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Peter Lack, Appellant, v. E. P. Lawson Co., Inc., Respondent.

In an action against the manufacturer of a paper-cutting machine to recover damages for personal injury sustained as the result of its operation with safety devices which were claimed to have been negligently designed, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered February 18, 1960 after a jury trial, dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case. Judgment affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur; ICleinfeld, J., dissents, and votes to reverse the judgment and to grant a new trial, with the following memorandum: The Trial Justice struck out the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness on the ground that in his (the Justice’s) opinion the expert was not qualified. Without the expert’s testimony, there was no proof of negligent design of the safety devices. With his testimony, the proof may well have been adequate to show prima facie such negligent design. But regardless of the efficacy of the testimony, it was error to strike it out since its admissibility depended upon the expert’s qualifications rather than upon his ability or credibility. The record discloses that this expert was amply qualified. He had 2 years’ experience in machine designing; 3 years’ experience in field construction; and 12 years’ experience with the Industrial Board of the New York State Department of Labor, where his duties included the writing of the safety rules in the Industrial Code and where he was a member of a committee which decided whether particular machines should receive Industrial Board approval. He remained in the employ of the Labor Department until his retirement in 1959. The record also shows that he was familiar with the type of machine involved in the accident here; that he was familiar with the operation of the specific machine here involved; and that he was familiar with the principles of its safety devices. Under all the circumstances, his testimony should not have been struck out; it was an abuse of discretion so to do. It should be emphasized that the admissibility of the expert’s testimony is not to be affected or determined by its efficacy or its adequacy in establishing defendant’s prima facie negligence. The admissibility of an expert’s testimony should not be confused with the weight to be given to it. The weight to be *796accorded to such testimony is for the trier of the' facts — the jury here *(Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.*v. *Roman,*269 N. Y. 451, 456-457). Where, as here, the expert was clearly qualified, his testimony should have been permitted to remain in the record, and the case should have proceeded to a determination on the merits upon the basis of all the proof adduced — including the testimony of the expert.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Thunder Mountain Gold Inc, (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robin S. McRae, Secretary/Treasurer, Director and Chief Financial Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Robin S. McRae

By  ____________________________________

Robin S.  McRae

Secretary/Treasurer and Director and Chief Financial Accounting Officer

Date:  April 15, 2005
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT OCTOB ER 31, 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1262 6 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D
. C. D oc ke t N o. 03- 0397 3- CV -W SD -1 BETTIE J. LITTLE, DIEDRE M. GOODW IN, Pl ai nt iff s- App el la nt s , ve rs us COBB C OUNTY , Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Northern D istrict of Ge orgia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (O ct ob er 31, 200 6) Befo re W ILSON , PRYOR an d FAY, Cir cu it Ju dg es . PE R CU RIA M:2

T he sum m ar y j udgm en t gr an te d inf

av or of Co bb C ounty

is af firm ed fo r the
re as ons se t f

orth i n the O RD E R of the U nit ed St at es D istri ct Judg e en te re d M ar ch 30, 2006 , and so m

uch of the Report and Recom m endation o f the Un i ted States Ma gis tr at e Judg e as is ad opt ed the re in. AFFIRMED.
#### 1808.870 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.208-81, Restrictions on Printing and Duplicating, in solicitations and contracts where there is a requirement for any printing, and/or any duplicating/copying in excess of that described in paragraph (c) of the clause.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 30401 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
MICHAEL DILLON, also known as Bubba Dillon, also known as Michael Dillion , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:03

- CR

- 252

- 1

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Defendant

- Appellant Michael Dillon, federal prisoner # 28533

- 034, was convicted of two drug

- related offenses and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 300 months of imprisonment to be followed by 10 years of supervised release.
He la ter filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 782 to the Unit ed States Sentencing

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 21, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-30401 Document: 00514282489 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/21/2017No. 17

- 30401

2 Guidelines, which the district court denied. After this court remand ed for clarification of the record, see United States v. Dillon , 676 F. App’x 377 (5th Cir. 2017), the district court again denied Dillon’s motion . He now appeals for a second time; w e affirm.
We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion

. United States v. Henderson , 636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011). The record reflects that the district court implicitly determined that Dillon was eligible for
a sentence reduction. See United States v. Larry , 632 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2011). The record also reflects that the di strict court considered the materials that had been presented to it, including Dillon’s arguments that a sentence reduction was warranted in light of the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors and his positive record of post

- conviction conduct

. See Hende rson , 636 F.3d at
718. The district court correctly conducted the applicable two

- step inquiry

. Dillon’s disagreement with the court’s denial of his motion fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. See id. at 717

- 18. AFFIRMED. Case: 17-30401 Document: 00514282489 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/21/2017
PUBLIC LAW 111–151—MAR. 26, 2010 124 STAT. 1027 

Public Law 111–151 

111th Congress 

An Act 

To reauthorize the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 

2004 through April 30, 2010, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Satellite Televison Extension 

Act of 2010’’. 

SEC. 2. SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION. 

(a) AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 119 OF TITLE 17, UNITED STATES

CODE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 119 of title 17, United States 

Code, is amended— 

(A) in subsection (c)(1)(E), by striking ‘‘March 28, 2010’’ 

and inserting ‘‘April 30, 2010’’; and 

(B) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘March 28, 2010’’ 

and inserting ‘‘April 30, 2010’’. 

(2) TERMINATION OF LICENSE.—Section 1003(a)(2)(A) of 

Public Law 111–118 is amended by striking ‘‘March 28, 2010’’, 

and inserting ‘‘April 30, 2010’’. 

(b) AMENDMENTS TO COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934.—Section 

325(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 325(b)) is 

amended— 

(1) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking ‘‘March 28, 2010’’ and 

inserting ‘‘April 30, 2010’’; and 

17 USC 119 note. 

17 USC 101 note. 

Satellite 

Television 

Extension Act of 

2010. 

Mar. 26, 2010 

[S. 3186] 


ccoleman on DSK8P6SHH1PROD with PUBLIC LAWS
124 STAT. 1028 PUBLIC LAW 111–151—MAR. 26, 2010 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 3186: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 156 (2010): 

Mar. 25, considered and passed Senate and House. 

Æ 

(2) in paragraph (3)(C), by striking ‘‘March 29, 2010’’ each 

place it appears in clauses (ii) and (iii) and inserting ‘‘May 

1, 2010’’. 

Approved March 26, 2010. 


ccoleman on DSK8P6SHH1PROD with PUBLIC LAWS
file:///P|/...%20City/Request%20for%20Information%20on%20FGD%20Wastewater%20Treatment%20System%20at%20Homer%20City.txt[1/21/2010 9:31:15 AM]

From: Kurtis Blohm

To: jstanek@mwgen.com

CC: Bartram, Deborah; Finseth, Thomas; Hall.Josh@epamail.epa.gov; Jordan.Ronald@epamail.epa.gov

Date: 12/3/2009 9:53 AM

Subject: Request for Information on FGD Wastewater Treatment System at Homer City

Attachments: Questions for Homer City.doc

Mr. Stanek,

Thank you for your time on the phone on Tuesday. As I described on the

phone, Eastern Research Group (ERG) is a technical contractor to U.S.

EPA’s Office of Water. We are currently supporting EPA’s Engineering

and Analysis Division with revising the effluent limitations guidelines

and standards for the steam electric power industry under contract

number 68-C-02-095. For more information on steam electric effluent

limitations guidelines and standards, please visit the following

website:

http://www.epa.gov/guide/steam/ 

As a part of this process, EPA is planning to conduct sampling episodes

at several power plants to collect wastewater samples from FGD

wastewater treatment systems. Please note that these sampling episodes

are different from the samples that you recently collected as part of

EPA's methods study.

During EPA’s detailed study, EPA conducted a site visit at Homer City

in February 2007 and collected wastewater samples in August 2007.

During these plant visits, EPA collected information regarding the

operation of the plant’s FGD system and FGD wastewater treatment

system. EPA would like to confirm the information that was previously

collected to identify if any changes have been made to the plant's

operation. This up-to-date information will help EPA make decisions

about which plants and systems will be selected for the as part of the

rulemaking.

We would appreciate receiving responses to these questions by

Wednesday, December 9th. As noted in the questions, please identify if

any information should be handled as confidential business information.

Please let me know if you have any questions. Additionally, you can

contact Josh Hall via e-mail (hall.josh@epa.gov) or by phone

(202-566-1002) if you have any questions.

Regards,

Kurt Blohm

Chemical Engineer

Eastern Research Group, Inc.

14555 Avion Pkwy, Suite 200

Chantilly, VA 20151

(703) 633-1675
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines

of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally

disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and

judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 7/30/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID ROBIN WHITMORE,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

RON CHAMPION,

Respondent-Appellee. 

No. 96-6051

(W.D. Oklahoma)

(D.C. No. CIV-95-134-R)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Petitioner David Robin Whitmore proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

appeals from an order of the district court dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. According to Whitmore, the district court

erred in reaching the following conclusions: (1) Whitmore’s guilty plea was

voluntary; and (2) Whitmore’s guilty plea was not the result of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Finding that Whitmore is not entitled to a certificate of

appealability, we dismiss the appeal.

This court is required to examine the appeal of a denial of a writ of habeas

corpus to determine whether the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (the “Act’), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This court has

held that the standard for granting a certificate of appealability under the Act is

the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

893 (1983). Under this standard, a certificate of appealability will issue only

where the petitioner has demonstrated the issues raised by the petition are

debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues differently, or

the questions presented are deserving of further proceedings. Id.

We have reviewed the magistrate’s report and recommendation, the district

court’s order, Whitmore’s brief and application for a certificate of appealability,

and the entire record before us on appeal. We conclude that Whitmore has failed
-3-

to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” for the

reasons set forth in the magistrate’s report and recommendation and the district

court’s order. Accordingly, we DENY Whitmore’s application for a certificate of

appealability and DISMISS the appeal.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<NAME> CALIFORNIA JOCKEY CLUB
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995              
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
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<CASH>                                           1,023
<SECURITIES>                                     5,159
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,037
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</TABLE>
AGREEMENT TO REPAY INDEBETNESS AND TO CONVEY OPTION

     WHEREAS,  Security  National  Financial  Corporation  and its wholly  owned
subsidiaries  entered into those  certain  agreements  referred to as "Option to
Acquire" and "Memorandum of Understanding"  (hereinafter the "Agreements")  with
Ronald Motzkus on or about December 19, 2001;

     WHEREAS,  pursuant to the  Agreements  certain  monies were advanced in the
form of a loan to  Monument  Title  totaling  an  amount  to  $77,952.50,  which
including interest to November 1, 2004, totals $94,177.27.

     WHEREAS, also according to the Agreements, Security National had the option
to acquire 100% of the common stock of Monument Title (the Option to Acquire);

     WHEREAS,  pursuant to the lending  transaction  whereby  Security  National
advanced to Monument Title the $77,952.50,  it caused a Uniform  Commercial Code
Filing (the "Filing") to be placed upon all assets of Monument Title;

     NOW THEREFORE, as of the 1st day of November 2004, the parties hereby agree
as follows:

1.   That the loan in the current amount of $94,177.27 be repaid within 7 (seven
     days) from the date hereof with interest in cash.

2.   Upon receipt of the loan  repayment  Security  National  shall  release its
     Filing upon the assets of Monument Title.

3.   That Security  National  shall convey its interest in the Option to Acquire
     in return for the payment of an additional  $94,177.27 to be paid under the
     following terms and conditions:

     a.   A minimum payment of $500 per month for the first 12 months  following
          the date of execution hereof;

     b.   A minimum payment of $1,000 per month for the 13th through 24th months
          following the date of execution hereof;

     c.   After the 24th month the then outstanding  balance shall bear interest
          at the 3-year Treasury Rate plus one percent (1%). The minimum payment
          for the 25th month  through 36th month shall be $1,500 per month,  the
          minimum  payment for the 37th month through 48th month shall be $2,000
          per month.  The minimum  payment for the 48th month through 60th month
          shall be $2,500 and any remaining unpaid balance,  including interest,
          shall be due and payable at the  conclusion of the 60th month from the
          date hereof.



Monument Title by Ronald Motzkus        Date       Ronald Motzkus, Individually



Security National Financial Corporation     Date
By:  Scott M. Quist
# Issue Paper 5

# Session 1:  January 12 – 14, 2016

# Issue: Whether to revise the financial responsibility or administrative capability regulations, and whether to add disclosure requirements, to help protect students, the federal government, and taxpayers against potential school liabilities and risks.

**Statutory cite:**§§487(a) and (c), 498 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1094(c), 1099c, 

**Regulatory cite:** 34 CFR Part 668 Subpart L, 34 CFR §668.16, 34 CFR §668.43, 34 CFR §668.14

**Summary of Issue**: 

To participate in the title IV student aid programs, an institution must demonstrate both financial responsibility and administrative capability.  Under the HEA, the Secretary is charged with establishing standards for financial responsibility and administrative capability necessary for the sound administration of the financial aid programs.  If an institution violates these requirements, the Secretary may limit, suspend, terminate, or otherwise condition the institution’s participation in the title IV, HEA programs.  

Questions****to be considered by the negotiating committee include:

1. Should the Department take additional steps to protect students and taxpayers from a) potential borrower defense to repayment (DTR) claims, b) liabilities stemming from closed school discharges, and c) other conditions that may be detrimental to students?  

· If so, what conditions, triggering events, metric-based standards, or other risk factors should the Department consider indicative of failing financial responsibility, administrative capability, or other standards?  

· What should the consequences be for a violation?  Letter of credit or other financial guarantee?  Disclosure requirements and student warnings?  Other consequences?  

2. If a letter of credit or other financial guarantee is required, how should the amount be determined?
Questions Submitted to the Department from Robert Anderson

The Department writes that institutions are legally authorized if the State “Ensures the 

institution...continues to meet a State’s general-purpose or education-specific laws and regulations

It also writes at (3) that The institution may be exempted from requirements for initial or renewed 

application for authorization or licensure if the institution is offering distance education in that state 

under a state authorization reciprocity agreement.

Virginia, as one example among many, has regulations stating that institutions must either be a) 

“certified” by the state (authorized) and follow numerous requirements related to closure, audits, etc or 

b) participate in a reciprocity agreement that the Commonwealth is a member of. 

Thus, out-of-state institutions are fully compliant with Virginia’s laws. 

Does the Department’s framing suggest that Virginia cannot construct its regulations this way?

Does the Department’s framing suggest that states cannot choose a reciprocity agreement that prevents 

other states from enforcing education-specific laws on out-of-state institutions?
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.32

                                              Original Date:  February 23, 2000
                                                  Amended Date:  April 14, 2000

                               CROWN MEDIA, INC.
                             CROWN MEDIA LOAN NOTE

                            AMENDMENT TO LOAN NOTE

AMENDMENT, effective April 14, 2000 (this "Amendment"), to LOAN NOTE, dated
February 23, 2000, as amended (the "Loan Note") between CROWN MEDIA, INC.
("Borrower") and HC CROWN, CORP. ("Lender").

                                  WITNESSETH:

       WHEREAS, Borrower executed the Loan Note dated February 23, 2000, in the
maximum principal amount of $10,000,000.00, payable to the Lender;

       WHEREAS, the parties hereto, desire to further amend the Loan Note, to
increase the maximum principal amount thereof to $20,000,000.00;

       NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for other good and
valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:

The Loan Note is hereby amended to delete "$10,000,000.00" as the maximum
principal amount of the Loan Note, and substitute "$20,000,000.00" therefor.

All other terms and conditions of the Loan Note shall remain unaffected and in
full force and effect.


       H C CROWN CORP.                    CROWN MEDIA, INC.

   By: /s/ WILLIAM D. JARVIS         By: /s/ WILLIAM J. ALIBER
      -----------------------            -----------------------
           William D. Jarvis                 William J. Aliber