United States Government Accountability Offi ce

GAO

February 2010

GAO-10-227SP

Report to Congressional Committees

NASA

Assessments of 

Selected Large-Scale 

Projects
Highlights of GAO-10-227SP, a report to 

congressional committees

 United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found

The National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) 

plans to invest billions in the 

coming years in science and 

exploration space fl ight initiatives. 

The scientifi c and technical 

complexities inherent in NASA’s 

mission create great challenges 

in managing its projects and 

controlling costs. In the past, 

NASA has had diffi culty meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives for many of its projects. 

The need to effectively manage 

projects will gain even more 

importance as NASA seeks to 

manage its wide-ranging portfolio 

in an increasingly constrained fi scal 

environment.

This report provides an 

independent assessment of selected 

NASA projects. In conducting this 

work, GAO compared projects 

against best practice criteria for 

system development including 

attainment of knowledge on 

technologies and design. GAO also 

identifi ed other programmatic 

challenges that were contributing 

factors in cost and schedule growth 

of the projects reviewed. The 

projects assessed are considered 

major acquisitions by NASA—each 

with a life-cycle cost of over $250 

million. No recommendations are 

provided in this report; however, 

GAO has reported extensively and 

made recommendations on NASA 

acquisition management in the 

past. GAO has designated NASA’s 

acquisition management as a high 

risk area since 1990. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-10-227SP. 

For more information, contact 

Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.

GAO assessed 19 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than 

$66 billion. Of those 19 projects, 4 are still in the formulation phase where 

cost and schedule baselines have yet to be established, and 5 just entered 

the implementation phase in fi scal year 2009 and therefore do not have any 

cost and schedule growth. However, 9 of the 10 projects that have been in the 

implementation phase for several years experienced cost growth ranging from 

8 to 68 percent, and launch delays of 8 to 33 months, in the past 3 years. These 

10 projects had average development cost growth of almost $121.1 million—or 

18.7 percent—and schedule growth of 15 months, and a total increase in 

development cost of over $1.2 billion, with over half of this total—or $706.6 

million—occurring in the last year. In some cases, cost growth was higher 

than is reported because it occurred before project baselines were established 

in response to the statutory requirement in 2005 for NASA to report cost and 

schedule baselines for projects and implementation with estimated life-cycle 

cost of more than $250 million. See the table below for a summary of the 10 

projects. Additionally, NASA was recently appropriated over $1 billion through 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 

Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected NASA Projects in the Implementation Phase

Note: Shading indicates projects that exceeded their cost and/or schedule baselines.

Many of the projects GAO reviewed experienced challenges in developing new 

or retrofi tting older technologies, stabilizing engineering designs, managing the 

performance of their contractors and development partners, as well as funding 

and launch planning issues. Reducing the kinds of problems this assessment 

identifi es in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business case 

for a project. Based, in part, on GAO’s previous recommendations, NASA has 

acted to adopt practices that would ensure programs proceed based on a 

sound business case and undertaken initiatives aimed at improving program 

management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight. Continued attention to 

these efforts and effective, disciplined implementation should help maximize 

NASA’s acquisition investments. 

February 2010

NASA

Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Project Baseline

(FY)

Development cost growth

($ in millions) Percent cost growth Launch delay (Months)

Aquarius

Glory

Herschel

Kepler

LRO

MSL

NPP

SDO

SOFIA

WISE

Average

Total cost growth

$15.9

$37.0

$9.7

$77.5

$52.3

$662.4

$132.1

$58.9

$162.3

$2.8

$121.1

$1,210.9

8.3

14.3

8.3

24.8

12.4

68.4

22.3

9.4

17.7

1.5

18.7

10

16

21

9

8

25

33

18

12

1

15

2008

2009

2007

2007

2008

2008

2007

2007

2007

2008

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data.
Contents

Page i GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Foreword 1

Letter 

A Sound Business Case Underpins Succesful Acquisition Outcomes 7

NASA Continues to Improve Its Acquisitions 9

Our Observations 11

Project Challenges 14

Project Assessments 22

 Aquarius 25

 Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) 27

 Glory 29

 Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission 31

 Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) 33

 Herschel 35

 Juno 37

 James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) 39

 Kepler 41

 Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) 43

 Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) 45

 Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) 47

 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 49

 NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) 51

 Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) 53

 Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) 55

 Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) 57

 Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 59

 Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) 61

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 63

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

 Administration 66

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 69

Appendix III: NASA Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a

 Knowledge-Based Approach 76
Page ii GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 79

Appendix V: NASA Projects Receiving Additional Funding 81

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 82

Tables

Table 1: Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected NASA Projects in the 

 Implementation Phase 13

Table 2: Assessment of Challenges for Selected NASA Projects 15

Table 3: Schedule Growth for Projects with and without Partners 20

Table 4: ARRA Funding for Review NASA Projects 81

Figures

Figure 1: Summary of Projects Assessed by Phase of the NASA 

 Project Life Cycle 12

Figure 2: Illustration of Project Two-Page Summary 23

Figure 3: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a 

 Knowledge-Based Approach 76

 

Abbreviations

AFB Air Force Base

AFS Air Force Station

AIA Atmospheric Imaging Assembly

APS aerosol polarimetry sensor

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

ASI Argenzia Spaciale Italiana (Italian Space Agency)

C&DH Command and Data Handling

CCD charged-coupled device

CDDS Cavity Door Drive System

CDR critical design review
Page iii GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle

CLV Crew Launch Vehicle

CNES Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales

CONAE Comision Nacional de Actividades 

 Espaciales (Space Agency of Argentina)

CrIS Cross-track Infrared Sounder

CSA Canadian Space Agency

CSL Centre Spatial de Liege

DCI data collection instrument

DLR German Aerospace Center

DPR dual-frequency precipitation radar

ESA European Space Agency

EVE Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment

FSSA Fine Sun Sensor Assembly

GMI GPM microwave imager

GPM Global Precipitation Measurement (mission)

GRACE Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment

GRAIL Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory

HIFI Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared

HIPO High-speed Imaging Photometer for Occultation

HMI Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager

HOPE Helium-Oxygen-Proton-Electron

IPO Integrated Program Offi ce

JAXA Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency

JCL Joint Cost and Schedule Confi dence Levels

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JWST James Webb Space Telescope

KDP key decision point

LCROSS Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite

LDCM Landsat Data Continuity Mission

LIO Low Inclination Observatory

LRO Lunar Reconnaisance Orbiter

MEP Mars Exploration Program

MMS Magnetospheric Multiscale

MSL Mars Science Laboratory

NAR nonadvocate review

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NID NASA Interim Directive

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.

NPOESS National Polar-Orbiting Operational 

 Environmental Satellite System

NPP NPOESS Preparatory Project

OCO Orbiting Carbon Observatory

OLI Operational Land Imager

PA&E Offi ce of Program Analysis and Evaluation (NASA)

PDR preliminary design review

PICA phenolic impregnated carbon ablator

RBSP Radiation Belt Storm Probes

SBC single board computer

SDO Solar Dynamics Observatory

SDR system defi nition review

SOFIA Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy

SPIRE Spectral and Photometric Imaging Receiver

TIM total irradiance monitor

TLGA Toroidal Low Gain Antenna

TMDS Thermal Mass Dynamics Simulator

TRL technology readiness level

ULA United Launch Alliance

USGS U.S. Geological Service

VIIRS Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite

WISE Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer

Page iv GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Page 1 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Washington, DC 20548

February 1, 2010

Congressional Committees

I am pleased to present GAO’s second annual assessment of selected largescale NASA projects. This report provides a snapshot of how well NASA 

plans and executes major acquisitions—a topic that has been on GAO’s 

High-Risk List since the list’s inception in 1990. 

In this year’s report, we found that NASA frequently exceeded its own 

acquisition cost and schedule estimates, even when those estimates 

were relatively new. In fact, 9 out of 10 projects that have been in 

implementation for several years signifi cantly exceeded their cost or 

schedule baseline estimates—all in the last 3 years.

NASA’s ongoing struggle to meet budget and schedule demands comes at a 

time when the agency is on the verge of major changes. The Space Shuttle 

is slated to retire this year after nearly 30 years of service, the International 

Space Station draws closer to its scheduled retirement in 2016, and a new 

means of human space fl ight is under development, and the very future of 

which has been hotly debated and recently reviewed by an independent 

commission, and awaits a presidential decision. 

Amid all this change, one thing that will remain constant is NASA’s need to 

manage programs and projects with a budget that has remained relatively 

constant in recent years. This will require hard choices among competing 

priorities within the organization, which must balance its core missions in 

science, aeronautics, and human space fl ight and exploration. In addition, 

NASA will be competing for an ever-shrinking share of discretionary 

spending against other national priorities, such as the economy, combatting 

terrorism, and health care reform. 

We believe that this report can provide insights that will help NASA place 

programs in a better position to succeed and help the agency maximize 

its investments. Our work has shown that reducing the project challenges 

that can lead to cost and schedule growth this report identifi es hinges 

on developing a sound business case that includes fi rm requirements, 

mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, realistic cost 

estimates, and suffi cient funding. To its credit, NASA has continued to take 

steps to improve its acquisition process along these lines. The revisions aim 

to provide key decision-makers with increased knowledge needed to make 
Page 2 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

informed decisions before a program starts, and to maintain discipline once 

it begins. Implementation of these revisions, however, will require senior 

NASA leaders to have the will to terminate projects that do not measure 

up, to recognize and reward savings, and to hold appropriate parties 

accountable for poor outcomes. 

Gene L. Dodaro

Acting Comptroller General

of the United States
Page 3 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

United States Government Accountability Offi ce

Washington, DC 20548

February 1, 2010

Congressional Committees

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) portfolio 

of major projects ranges from highly complex and sophisticated space 

transportation vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites equipped with 

advanced sensors to study the earth. In many cases, NASA’s projects are 

expected to incorporate new and sophisticated technologies that must 

operate in harsh, distant environments. These projects have also produced 

ground-breaking research and advanced our understanding of the universe. 

However, one common theme binds most of the projects—they cost more 

and take longer to develop than planned.

We reported last year that 10 out of 13 NASA projects experienced 

signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth from baselines established only 

2 or 3 years earlier.1

 For example, the Glory project, a science satellite 

designed to help understand how the sun and particles in the atmosphere 

affect Earth’s climate, saw its development costs increase more than 50 

percent—from $169 to $259 million—since 2008. Congress reauthorized2

 

the Glory project in fi scal year 2009 and new cost and schedule baselines 

were then established. Similarly, technical issues delayed the Mars Science 

Laboratory by 2 years, and the project, which was already over budget, is 

now scheduled to cost over $660 million more than estimated in 2007—an 

increase of over 68 percent in development costs. In prior years, programs 

such as the X-33 and X-34, which were meant to demonstrate technology 

for future reusable launch vehicles, were cancelled because of technical 

diffi culties and cost overruns after NASA spent more than $1 billion on the 

programs.

NASA acknowledges the problem and is striving to improve its cost 

estimating and program execution. The agency notes that most missions 

are one of a kind and complex and that external factors, such as launch 

scheduling and spotty performance by development partners, also cause 

delays and cost increases. Although space development programs are 

1 GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-09-306SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

2 If development cost of a program will exceed the baseline estimate by more than 30 

percent, then NASA is required to seek reauthorization from Congress in order to continue 

the program. If the program is reauthorized, NASA is required to establish new cost and 

schedule baselines. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e).
Page 4 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

complex and diffi cult by nature, our work consistently fi nds that inherent 

risks are exacerbated by poor acquisition management. Moreover, the 

reality of cost and schedule increases can have secondary impacts when 

projects that are seemingly on track end up being the bill-payer for troubled 

projects. This also makes it hard to manage the portfolio and make 

investment decisions.

Congress has expressed concern about NASA’s performance and has 

identifi ed the need to standardize the reporting of cost, schedule, and 

content for NASA research and development projects. In 2005, Congress 

required NASA to report cost and schedule baselines—benchmarks against 

which changes can be measured—for all NASA programs and projects with 

estimated life-cycle costs of at least $250 million that have been approved 

to proceed to the development stage, known as implementation,3

 in which 

components begin to take physical form. It also required that NASA 

report to Congress when development cost is likely to exceed the baseline 

estimate by 15 percent or more, or when a milestone is likely to be delayed 

beyond the baseline estimate by 6 months or more.4

 In response, NASA 

began establishing cost and schedule baselines in 2006 and has been using 

them as the basis for annual project performance reports to the Congress 

provided in its annual budget submission each year. While establishing the 

baselines required by the Congress enabled a more consistent reporting 

among NASA projects, it also made past cost and schedule growth less 

transparent. Consequently, the cost and schedule breaches presented in 

this report represent only increases from the baselines established after the 

2005 congressional requirement.

Recently, NASA was appropriated over $1 billion through the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 20095

 to help spur technological 

advances in science. The agency’s Science and Exploration Systems Mission 

Directorates were each appropriated $400 million under this supplemental 

appropriation. As of October 2009, the projects covered in this assessment 

are scheduled to receive $470 million as a part of the total allocation that 

NASA intends to use to assist with such items as developing instruments 

and spacecraft, maintaining the current workforce, and building test 

facilities. Appendix V provides a listing of NASA projects in our review 

receiving funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

2009 and the intended use of those funds for each project.

3 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-

161, §103; 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b).

4 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d).

5 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, Division A, Title II (2009).
Page 5 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 

accompanying the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act directed 

GAO to prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA 

programs, projects, or activities. This report responds to that mandate by 

assessing 19 NASA projects, each with an estimated life-cycle cost over 

$250 million. The combined estimated life-cycle cost for these 19 projects 

exceeds $66 billion. Each assessment is presented in a two-page summary 

that analyzes the project’s cost and schedule status and project challenges 

we identifi ed with the objective to identify risks that, if mitigated, could put 

NASA in a better position to succeed. We also provide general observations 

about the performance of NASA’s major projects and the agency’s 

management of those projects during development. In doing so, the report 

expands on the importance of developing a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy and to provide decision-makers with an independent, knowledgebased assessment of individual systems that identifi es potential risks and 

allows the decision-makers to take actions to put projects that are early 

in the development cycle in a better position to succeed. NASA provided 

updated cost and schedule data as of October 2009 for 14 of the 19 projects.6

We reviewed and compared that data to previously established cost and 

schedule baselines for each of those 14 projects. We took appropriate steps 

to address data reliability.

Our approach included an examination of the current phase of a project’s 

development and how each project was advancing. Each project we 

reviewed was in either the formulation phase or the implementation 

phase of the project life cycle. In the formulation phase, the project 

defi nes requirements—what the project is being designed to do—matures 

technology, establishes a schedule, estimates costs, and produces a plan for 

implementation. In the implementation phase, the project carries out these 

plans, performing fi nal design and fabrication as well as testing components 

and system assembly, integrating these components and testing how they 

work together, and launching the project. This phase also includes the 

period from project launch through mission completion. We assessed each 

project’s cost and schedule and characterized growth in either as signifi cant 

6 NASA did not provide cost or schedule data for the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) 

project despite that project being in the implementation phase. NASA did provide 

preliminary estimates in the form of cost ranges for three of the four projects in the 

formulation phase. Since the values provided were ranges, rather than specifi c values, 

we did not include these projects in our analysis. Further, the agency did not provide 

schedule baselines for these projects so we could not determine any schedule changes they 

experienced.
Page 6 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

if it exceeded the baselines that trigger reporting to the Congress under the 

law.7

Based on our previous reviews and discussions with project offi cials and 

drawing on GAO’s established criteria for knowledge-based acquisitions and 

on other GAO work on system acquisitions, we identifi ed six challenges that 

can contribute to cost and schedule growth in these projects: technology 

maturity, design stability, contractor performance, development partner 

performance, funding issues, and launch manifest issues. This list of 

challenges is not exhaustive, and we believe these challenges will evolve 

as we continue this work into the future. To assess technology maturity, 

we examined the projects’ reported critical technology readiness levels—a 

measure that NASA devised and that is now used at other agencies as 

well. We looked at the technology readiness level at the time of the 

project’s preliminary design review, which occurs just before it enters the 

implementation phase, and compared that against the level of maturity that 

best practices call for at that stage to minimize risks. Based in part on our 

discussions with offi cials for the individual projects and data submitted by 

the projects, we identifi ed the extent to which project cost and schedule 

were negatively impacted by challenges integrating heritage—or preexisting—technology into their projects. To assess design stability, we 

examined the percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected 

to be completed by the critical design review—which is usually held about 

midway through the project’s development. We asked project offi cials to 

provide this information, and we compared it against GAO’s best practices’ 

metric of 90 percent of drawings released by the critical design review. We 

also discussed the extent to which contractors’ and development partners’ 

challenges in developing and delivering project hardware affected overall 

project cost and schedule. To assess funding issues, we interviewed project 

offi cials and reviewed budget documents to determine if increases to cost 

or schedule resulted from interrupted or delayed funding, or if project 

offi cials indicated that the project had poor phasing of the project’s funding 

plan. To assess launch manifest issues, we interviewed launch services 

offi cials to determine what projects had to reschedule launch dates based 

on an inability to be ready for launch or other factors. The individual project 

offi ces were given an opportunity to provide comments and technical 

clarifi cations on our assessments prior to their inclusion in the fi nal 

product.

7 NASA is required to report to Congress if development cost of a program is likely to exceed 

the baseline estimate by 15 percent or more, or if a milestone is likely to be delayed by 6 

months or more. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d).
Page 7 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to February 2010 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain suffi cient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. Appendix II contains detailed information on our 

scope and methodology. We do not provide recommendations in this report.

Many of NASA’s projects are one-time articles, meaning that there is little 

opportunity to apply knowledge gained to the production of a second, third, 

or future increments of spacecraft. In addition, NASA often partners with 

other domestic partners and other space-faring countries, including several 

European nations, Japan, and Argentina. These partnerships go a long way 

to foster international cooperation in space, but they also subject NASA 

projects to added risk such as when partners do not meet their obligations 

or run into technical obstacles they cannot easily overcome. While space 

development programs are complex and diffi cult by nature, and most are 

one-time efforts, the nature of its work should not preclude NASA from 

achieving what it promises when requesting and receiving funds. We have 

reported that NASA would benefi t from a more disciplined approach to its 

acquisitions.

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for 

these projects can provide early recognition of challenges, allow managers 

to take corrective action, and place needed and justifi able projects in a 

better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice organizations show 

the risks inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by developing a solid, 

executable business case before committing resources to a new product 

development.8

 In its simplest form, this is evidence that (1) the customer’s 

needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the 

chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—

that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and 

adequate time to deliver the product when needed. A program should not 

go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be 

made. If the business case measures up, the organization commits to the 

8 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System, GAO07-376 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case 

Key for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-564T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006); 

NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to Better 

Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005); 

NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure Requirements 

Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005).

A Sound Business 

Case Underpins 

Successful Acquisition 

Outcomes
Page 8 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

development of the product, including making the fi nancial investment. 

Our best practice work has shown that developing business cases based 

on matching requirements to resources before program start leads to more 

predictable program outcomes—that is, programs are more likely to be 

successfully completed within cost and schedule estimates and deliver 

anticipated system performance.9

At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product 

development that is a best practice among leading commercial fi rms. Those 

fi rms have created an environment and adopted practices that put their 

program managers in a good position to succeed in meeting expectations. 

A knowledge-based approach requires that managers demonstrate high 

levels of knowledge as the program proceeds from technology development 

to system development and, fi nally, production. In essence, knowledge 

supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge can be described over 

the course of a program, as follows:

• When a project begins development, the customer’s needs should match the 

developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time, and funding. 

An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of the technologies 

needed to meet customer needs—referred to as critical technologies. 

If the project is relying on heritage—or pre-existing— technology, that 

technology must be in appropriate form, fi t, and function to address the 

customer’s needs within available resources. The project will normally enter 

development after completing the preliminary design review, at which time 

a business case should be in hand.

• Then, about midway through the product’s development, its design 

should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance 

requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point in time 

because it generally signifi es when the program is ready to start building 

production-representative prototypes. If design stability is not achieved, but 

a product development continues, costly re-designs to address changes to 

project requirements and unforeseen challenges can occur. By the critical 

design review, design should be stable and capable of meeting performance 

requirements.

• Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 

shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 

have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate that it 

performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack of testing 

9 GAO-05-242.
Page 9 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

increases the possibility that project managers will not have information 

that could help avoid costly system failures in late stages of development or 

during system operations.

Our best practices work has identifi ed numerous other actions that can 

be taken to increase the likelihood that a program can be successfully 

executed once that business case is established. These include ensuring 

cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated regularly and holding 

suppliers accountable through such activities as regular supplier audits 

and performance evaluations of quality and delivery. Moreover, we have 

recommended using metrics and controls throughout the life cycle to gauge 

when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained and when to direct 

decision makers to consider criteria before advancing a program to the next 

level and making additional investments.

The consequence of proceeding with system development without 

establishing and adhering to a sound business case is substantial. GAO and 

others have reported that NASA has experienced cost and schedule growth 

in several of its projects over the past decade, resulting from problems that 

include failing to adequately identify requirements and underestimating 

complexity and technology maturity. We have found that the need to 

meet schedule is one of the main reasons why programs cannot execute 

as planned. Short cuts, such as developing technology while design work 

and construction are already underway, and delaying or reducing tests, 

are taken to meet schedule. Ultimately, when a schedule is set that cannot 

accommodate the work that needs to be done, costs go up and capability 

is delayed. Delaying the delivery of these capabilities can also have a ripple 

effect throughout NASA projects as staff must then stay on a given project 

longer than intended, thus increasing the project’s costs, and crippling other 

projects that had counted on using newly available staff to move forward.

In 2005, we reported that NASA’s acquisition policies did not conform to 

best practices for product development because those policies lacked major 

decision reviews at several key points in the project life-cycle that would 

allow decision makers to make informed decisions about whether a project 

should be authorized to proceed in the development life cycle. Based in part 

on our recommendations, NASA issued a revised policy in March 200710 that 

institutes several key decision points (KDP) in the development life cycle 

for space fl ight programs and projects. At each KDP, a decision authority is 

10 The revised policy, issued March 6, 2007, is NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA 

Spacefl ight Program and Project Management Requirements (Mar. 6, 2007). On September 

22, 2009, NASA Interim Directive (NID) NM 7120-81 for NASA Procedural Requirements 

(NPR) 7120.5D was issued, hereinafter cited as NID for NPR 7120.5D (Sept. 22, 2009).

NASA Continues 

Efforts to Improve Its 

Acquisitions
Page 10 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

responsible for authorizing the transition to the next life-cycle phase for the 

project.11 In addition, NASA’s acquisition policies also require that 

technologies be suffi ciently mature at the preliminary design review before 

the project enters implementation, that the design is appropriate to support 

proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, integrating and test at the 

critical design review, and that the system can be fabricated within cost, 

schedule, and performance specifi cations. These changes brought the policy 

more in line with best practices for product development. A more detailed 

discussion of NASA’s acquisition policy and how it relates to best practices 

is provided in appendix III of this report.

Further, in response to GAO’s designation of NASA acquisition management 

as a high risk area,12 NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve 

the effectiveness of NASA’s program/project management.13 The approach 

focuses on how best to ensure the mitigation of potential issues in 

acquisition decisions and better monitor contractor performance. The 

plan identifi es fi ve areas for improvement—program/project management, 

cost reporting processes, cost estimating and analysis, standard business 

processes, and management of fi nancial management systems—each of 

which contains targets and goals to measure improvement. As part of this 

initiative, NASA has taken a positive step to improve management oversight 

of project cost, schedule, and technical performance with the establishment 

of a baseline performance review reporting to NASA’s senior management. 

Through monthly reviews, NASA intends to highlight projects that are 

predicted to exceed internal NASA cost and/or schedule baselines, which 

are set lower than cost and schedule baselines submitted to Congress, so 

the agency can take preemptive actions to minimize the projects’ potential 

cost overruns or schedule delays. During our data collection efforts, we 

reviewed several projects’ monthly and quarterly status reports, which gave 

us insight into their status, risks, and issues. While this reporting structure 

might enable management to be aware of the issues projects are facing, it 

is too early to tell if the monthly reviews are having the intended impact of 

enabling NASA management to take preemptive cost saving actions, such as 

delaying a design review or canceling a project.

As a part of the continuing effort to improve its acquisition processes, NASA 

has begun a new initiative—Joint Cost and Schedule Confi dence Levels 

(JCL)—to help programs and projects with management, cost and schedule 

11 NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.4.2 (Sept. 22, 2009).

12 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007).

13 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Plan for Improvement in the GAO HighRisk Area of Contract Management (Oct. 31, 2007).
Page 11 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

estimating, and maintenance of adequate levels of reserves. Under this new 

policy, cost, schedule, and risk are combined into a complete picture to help 

inform management of the likelihood of a project’s success. Utilizing JCL, 

each project will receive a cost estimate with a corresponding confi dence 

level—the percentage probability representing the likelihood of success 

at the specifi ed funding level. NASA believes the application of this policy 

will help reduce the cost and schedule growth in its portfolio and improve 

transparency, and increase the probabilities of meeting those expectations. 

NASA’s goal is for all projects that have entered the implementation phase 

to have a JCL established by spring 2010.

While these efforts are positive steps, it is too early to assess their impact 

and they will be limited if project offi cials are not held accountable for 

demonstrating that elements of a knowledge-based business case are 

demonstrated at key junctures in development. For projects to have better 

outcomes not only must they demonstrate a high level of knowledge at key 

junctures, but decision makers must also use this information to determine 

whether and how best a project should proceed through the development 

life cycle. If done successfully, these measures should enable NASA to 

foster the expansion of a business-oriented culture, reduce persistent cost 

growth and schedule delays, and maximize investment dollars.

We assessed 19 large-scale NASA projects in this review. Four of these 

projects were in the formulation phase where cost and schedule baselines 

have yet to be established, while 15 had entered implementation. Nine of 

the 15 projects experienced signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth from 

their project baselines,14 while fi ve of the remaining projects had just 

entered implementation and their cost and schedule baselines were 

established in fi scal year 2009. NASA provided cost and schedule data for 14 

of the 15 projects in the implementation phase of the project life cycle. 

Despite being in implementation, NASA did not provide cost or schedule 

data for the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) project. NASA will not 

formally release its baseline cost and schedule estimates for this project 

until the fi scal year 2011 budget submission to Congress, and late in our 

review process agency offi cials notifi ed us that they will not provide project 

estimates to GAO until that time. NASA also did not provide formal cost and 

schedule information for the projects in formulation, citing that those 

14 For purposes of our analysis, cost or schedule growth is signifi cant if it exceeds the 

baseline thresholds that trigger reporting to Congress under the law. The thresholds are 

development cost growth of 15 percent or more from the baseline cost estimate or a 

milestone delay of 6 months or more beyond the baseline schedule estimate. 42 U.S.C. § 

16613(d).

Our Observations
Page 12 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

estimates were still preliminary. See fi gure 1 for a summary of these 

projects.

Figure 1: Summary of Projects Assessed by Phase of the NASA Project Life Cycle

Based on our analysis, development costs for projects in our review 

increased by an average of over 13 percent from their baseline cost 

estimates—including one project that increased by over 68 percent—

and an average delay of almost 11 months to their launch dates. These 

averages were signifi cantly higher when the four projects that just 

entered implementation are excluded. Specifi cally, there are 10 projects 

of analytical interest because (1) they are in the implementation phase, 

and (2) their baselines are old enough to begin to track variances. Most of 

these 10 projects have experienced signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth, 

often both. These projects had an average development cost growth of 

18.7 percent—or almost $121.1 million—and schedule growth of over 15 

months, and a total increase in development cost of over $1.2 billion. Over 

half of this total increase in development cost—or $706.6 million—occurred 

in the last year. These cost growth and schedule delays have all occurred 

within the last 3 years, and a number of these projects had experienced 

considerable cost growth before baselines were established in response to 

the 2005 statutory reporting requirement.15 See table 1 below for the cost 

and schedule growth of the NASA projects in the implementation phase.

15 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b).

9

Projects in 

implementation without 

significant 

cost/schedule 

growth

Projects 

establishing 

initial baselines 

in FY 2009, thus 

no cost/schedule 

growth

Projects with 

significant cost 

and/or schedule 

growth

Total projects 

reviewed

Projects in 

implementation

Projects in 

formulation

19

4

15

5

1

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data. 

9
Page 13 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Table 1: Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected NASA Projects in the Implementation Phase (dollars in millions)

Project

Baseline

(FY)

Development

cost growth

Percentage

cost growth

Launch

delay (months)

Aquarius 2008 $15.9 8.3 10

Glory 2009 $37.0 14.3 16

GRAIL 2009 $0.0 0.0 0

Herschel 2007 $9.7 8.3 21

Juno 2009 $0.0 0.0 0

JWST 2009 $0.0 0.0 0

Kepler 2007 $77.5 24.8 9

LRO 2008 $52.3 12.4 8

MSL 2008 $662.4 68.4 25

NPP 2007 $132.1 22.3 33

RBSP 2009 $0.0 0.0 0

SDO 2007 $58.9 9.4 18

SOFIA 2007 $162.3 17.7 12

WISE 2008 $2.8 1.5 1

Average 13.4 11

Total development cost growth $1,210.9

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data.

Note: Shading indicates projects that exceeded their cost and/or schedule thresholds.

Despite having baselines established in fi scal year 2008, two projects have 

sought reauthorization from Congress because of development cost growth 

in excess of 30 percent.16 Congress reauthorized the Glory project in fi scal 

year 2009,17 and new cost and schedule baselines were established after the 

project experienced a 53 percent cost growth and 6-month launch delay 

from original baseline estimates. The Glory project has since breached its 

revised schedule baseline by 16 months and exceeded its development cost 

baseline by over 14 percent—for a total development cost growth of over 75 

percent in just 2 years. Project offi cials also indicated that recent technical 

problems could cause additional cost growth. Similarly, the Mars Science 

Laboratory project is currently seeking reauthorization from Congress after 

experiencing development cost in excess of 30 percent.

16 If development cost of a program will exceed the baseline estimate by more than 30 

percent, then NASA is required to seek reauthorization from Congress in order to continue 

the program. If the program is reauthorized, NASA is required to establish new cost and 

schedule baselines. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e).

17 42 U.S.C. § 16613(e).
Page 14 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

All six factors we assessed can lead to project cost and schedule growth: 

technology maturity, design stability, contractor performance, development 

partner performance, funding issues, and launch manifest issues. These 

factors—characterized as project challenges—were evident in the projects 

that had reached the implementation phase of the project life cycle, but 

many of them began in the formulation phase. We did not specifi cally 

correlate individual project challenges with specifi c cost and/or schedule 

changes in each project. The degree to which each specifi c challenge 

contributed to cost and schedule growth varied across the projects in this 

review and we did not assign any specifi c challenge as a primary factor for 

cost and/or schedule growth. Table 2 depicts the extent to which each of 

the six challenges occurred for each of the 19 projects we reviewed.

Project Challenges
Page 15 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Table 2: Assessment of Challenges for Selected NASA Projects

Project

Technology maturity

Design

 stability

Contractor 

performance 

Development 

partner

performance

Funding

issues

Launch

manifest

Critical 

technology 

maturity

Complexity 

of heritage 

technology

In Implementation

Aquarius X X X

Glory XXXX X

GRAIL X X

Herschel X X X

Juno X X X

JWST X X

Kepler X X X

LRO X X

MMS

MSL X X X

NPP X X X X

RBSP

SDO XXXXXX

SOFIA X X X

WISE X X

In Formulation

Ares I X X

GPM X X

LDCM X X

Orion X X X

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data.

Technology Maturity was by far the most prevalent challenge, affecting 15 

of the 19 projects. When combined with design instability—another metric 

related to technical diffi culty—17 projects were affected. A discussion of 

each challenge follows.

Our past work on systems acquisition has shown that beginning an 

acquisition program before requirements and available resources are 

matched can result in a product that fails to perform as expected, costs 

more, or takes longer to develop. We have found that these problems are 

largely rooted in the failure to match customer’s needs with the developer’s 

resources—technical knowledge, timing, and funding—when starting 

Technology Maturity
Page 16 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

product development. In other words, commitments were made to deliver 

capability without knowing whether the technologies needed could really 

work as intended. Time and costs were consistently underestimated, and 

problems that surfaced early cascaded throughout development and 

magnifi ed the risks facing the program. Our best practices work has shown 

that a technology readiness level (TRL) of 6— demonstrating a technology 

as a fully integrated prototype in a relevant environment—is the level of 

maturity needed to minimize risks for space systems entering product 

development.18 NASA’s acquisition policy states that a TRL of 6 is desirable 

prior to integrating a new technology.19 Technology maturity is a 

fundamental element of a sound business case, and the absence is a marker 

for subsequent problems, especially in design.20

Similarly, our work has shown that the use of heritage technology—proven 

components that are being modifi ed to meet new requirements—can also 

cause problems when the items are not suffi ciently matured to meet form, 

fi t, and function standards by the preliminary design review (PDR).21 NASA 

states in its Systems Engineering Handbook that particular attention must 

be given to heritage systems because they are often used in architectures 

and environments different from those in which they were designed to 

operate. Although NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage 

technologies, our best practices work has found critical technologies to 

be those that are required for the project to successfully meet customer 

requirements, regardless of whether or not they are based on existing 

or heritage technology. Therefore, whether technologies are labeled as 

“critical” or “heritage,” if they are important to the development of the 

spacecraft or instrument—enabling it to move forward in the development 

process—they should be matured by PDR.

Of the 14 projects for which we received data and that had entered the 

implementation phase, four entered this phase without fi rst maturing all 

their critical technologies, and 10 encountered challenges in integrating or 

modifying heritage technologies. Additionally, two projects in formulation—

Ares I and Orion—also encountered challenges with critical or heritage 

technologies. These projects did not build in the necessary resources for 

18 The “product development” stage on GAO’s knowledge-based approach is equivalent to 

“implementation” on NASA’s life cycle, see appendix III.

19 NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7123.1A , NASA Systems Engineering Processes 

and Requirements, Appendix G, paragraph G.19(b) (Mar. 26, 2007).

20 Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess technology maturity.

21 Projects will modify the form, fi t, and function of a heritage technology to adapt to the 

new environment. For example, the size or the weight of the component may change or the 

technology may function differently than its use in a previous mission.
Page 17 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

technology modifi cation. For instance, the recent cost and schedule growth 

in the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) highlights the problems that can be 

realized when a project proceeds past the formulation phase with immature 

technologies. MSL reported seven critical technologies were not mature at 

the time of its preliminary design review, and over a year later two of these 

technologies were still immature at the critical design review; however, the 

project moved forward into the implementation phase with established cost 

and schedule baselines and the lack of technology maturity contributed 

to an unstable design. In part as a result of immature technologies and 

an unstable design, MSL delayed its launch date by 25 months, and 

development costs have grown by more than $660 million. In November 

2008, the GRAIL project also moved beyond its PDR with an immature 

heritage technology—the reaction wheel assembly. This technology has 

been fl own on other NASA missions, but the project team must modify it for 

GRAIL by integrating electronics into the assembly.

NASA acknowledges in its Systems Engineering Handbook that 

modifi cation of heritage systems is a frequently overlooked area in 

technology development and that there is a tendency on the part of project 

management to overestimate the maturity and applicability of heritage 

technology. NASA recognizes that as a result of not placing enough 

emphasis on the development of heritage technologies, key steps in the 

development process are not given appropriate attention, and critical 

aspects of systems engineering are overlooked.

The importance of establishing a stable design at a project’s critical design 

review (CDR) is also critical. The CDR provides assurance that the design is 

mature and will meet performance requirements. An unstable design can 

result in costly re-engineering and re-work efforts, design changes, and 

schedule slippage. Quantitative measures employed at CDR, such as 

percentage of engineering drawings, can provide evidence that the design is 

stable and “freeze” it to minimize changes in the future. Our work has 

shown that release of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the 

CDR provides evidence that the design is stable. Though NASA’s acquisition 

policy does not specify how a project should achieve design stability by 

CDR, NASA’s Systems Engineering Handbook adheres to this metric of 90 

percent drawings released by the CDR.

Eight projects in our assessment have already held their CDR and were 

able to provide us with the number of engineering drawings completed and 

released. None of these 8 projects met the 90 percent standard for design 

stability at CDR; however, NASA believes that some of these projects had 

stable designs and pointed to other activities that occurred prior to CDR as 

Design Stability
Page 18 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

evidence. Nevertheless, the percentage of engineering drawings released 

at CDR by these 8 projects averaged less than 40 percent, and more than 

three-fourths of these projects had signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth 

from their established baselines22 after their CDR when their design was 

supposed to be stable. Although all the cost and schedule growth for these 

projects cannot be directly attributed to a lack of design stability, we believe 

that this was a contributing factor.

Discussions with project offi cials showed the metric was used 

inconsistently to gauge design stability. For example, Goddard Space Flight 

Center requires greater than 80 percent drawings released at CDR, yet 

we were told by several project offi cials that the rule of thumb for NASA 

projects is between 70 and 90 percent drawings released at CDR. However, 

there was no consensus among the offi cials. For example, one project 

manager from Goddard Space Flight Center told us the project is planning 

to have 70 percent of the drawings released at CDR; a project manager 

from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory cited that having 85 to 90 percent of 

the drawings released is what he prefers at CDR; otherwise, he does not 

consider the project design to be complete. Goddard’s Chief Engineer said 

that, as a member of a design review board, he will generally question 

projects that have less than 95 percent of engineering drawings released, 

especially if the project is using heritage technologies. Offi cials added that 

at CDR it is more important to have drawings completed that relate to 

critical technologies than those related to integration activities.

In addition to released drawings, NASA often relies on subject matter 

experts in the design review process and other methods to assure that 

a project has a stable design. Some projects indicated that completing 

engineering models, which are preproduction prototypes, and holding 

sub-system level CDR’s for instruments and components helped to assess 

design stability, at least in part. Offi cials for these projects indicated that 

use of engineering models helps decrease risk of fl ight unit development; 

projects that did not use engineering models indicated they might have 

caught problems earlier had they used them. For example, at CDR the Mars 

Science Laboratory’s engineering models were incomplete and could have 

been a cause of concern. Mars Science Laboratory project offi cials were 

aware that avionics were an issue at CDR, but were unaware of future 

problems with other project components, such as the actuators. Project 

offi cials told us that if the engineering models for all subsystems had been 

completed at CDR, many of the later problems would have been caught and 

22 NASA reported to the Congress that these projects had exceeded their cost and/or 

schedule baselines. 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d).
Page 19 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

mitigated earlier in the process, thereby avoiding schedule delays. However, 

these project offi cials added that engineering models are expensive to 

employ and not all projects have the available funding required to utilize 

them.

NASA relies heavily on the work of its contractors. Offi cials at fi ve of the 

projects we reviewed indicated that the contractors for their projects had 

trouble moving their work forward after experiencing technical and design 

problems with hardware that disrupted development progress. Since about 

85 percent of NASA’s annual budget is spent by its contractors, the 

performance of these contractors is instrumental to the success of the 

projects.

Shifts in the industrial base and a lack of expertise at the contractors 

affected performance. For example, project offi cials for the SOFIA project 

reported that the contractor for the aircraft modifi cation was bought and 

sold several times during the development process. Project offi cials further 

reported that the contractor had limited experience with this type of work 

and did not fully understand the statement of work. Consequently, the 

contractor had diffi culty completing this work, which led to signifi cant cost 

overruns. While project offi cials told us that issues with that contractor 

have since been resolved, this year another SOFIA contractor that is 

responsible for developing hardware and software has performed poorly, 

which offi cials attribute to a recent buyout of the company. In addition, 

agency offi cials said that NASA is a low priority for the contractor, and the 

project is fi nding it diffi cult to exert pressure to ensure better performance. 

Project offi cials told us that they currently have three people at the 

contractor’s site as a permanent presence. They added that if the contract 

were to be cancelled due to poor performance, this work would be brought 

in-house and would result in a one year delay. In addition, the Glory project 

has struggled for several years to develop a key instrument. The Glory 

project manager cited management ineffi ciencies with the instrument’s 

contractor including senior leadership changes, a loss of core competencies 

because of a plant closure, and a lack of proper decision authority. The 

contractor agreed that the plant closure and the need to re-staff were major 

project challenges.

Six projects in our review encountered challenges with their development 

partners. In these cases the development partner could not meet their 

commitments to the project within the planned schedules. For example, 

NASA collaborated with the European Space Agency (ESA) on the Herschel 

space observatory. NASA delivered its two instruments to ESA in a timely 

manner, but ESA encountered diffi culties developing its instruments, and 

Contractor Performance

Development Partner 

Performance
Page 20 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

the result was a 14-month delay in Herschel’s schedule. Because of this 

delay, NASA incurred an estimated $39 million in cost growth because of 

the need to fund component developers for a longer period of time than 

originally planned. We found that of the projects that are currently in 

implementation and have experienced cost and/or schedule growth, those 

with international or domestic partners experienced more than one-and-ahalf times as much schedule growth on average as those with no partner. 

Table 3 below shows the average schedule growth for projects with 

partners as compared to those without partners.

Table 3: Schedule Growth for Projects with and without Partners

Project 

with partners

Schedule growth

(in months)

Projects 

without partners

Schedule growth 

(in months)

Aquarius 10 Glory 16

Herschel 21 Kepler 9

LRO 8 SDO 18

MSL 25 WISE 1

NPP 33

SOFIA 12

Average

schedule growth 18 11

Source: GAO Analysis of NASA data.

During the course of our review, we identifi ed six projects in the 

implementation phase, as well as three projects still in formulation, that had 

experienced issues related to the project’s funding because of issues such 

as agency-directed funding cuts early in the project life-cycle and projects 

whose budgets do not match the work expected to be accomplished. For 

example, NASA management cut $35 million from the Kepler project’s fi scal 

year 2005 budget—a cut amounting to one-half of the project’s budget for 

the year. Contractor offi cials told us that this forced the shutdown of 

signifi cant work, interrupted the overall fl ow and scheduling for staff and 

production, and required a renegotiation of contracts. This funding 

instability, according to a NASA project offi cial, contributed to an overall 

20-month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169 million in cost 

growth.

The funding instability for Kepler affected more than that one project. 

The WISE project had to extend the formulation phase since funding was 

unavailable at the time of the confi rmation review in November 2005. 

Funding Issues
Page 21 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

According to NASA and contractor offi cials, the WISE project experienced 

funding cuts when NASA took money from that project to offset increased 

costs for the Kepler project. As a result of the extended formulation phase, 

the WISE project manager told us that development costs increased and the 

launch readiness date slipped 11 months. This is an example of how, when 

problems arise, one project can become the bill-payer for another project, 

making it diffi cult to manage the portfolio and make investment decisions.

We also identifi ed several projects where, according to NASA offi cials, 

the projected budget was inadequate to perform work in certain fi scal 

years. For example, the Constellation program’s poorly phased funding 

plan has diminished both the Ares I and Orion projects’ ability to deal with 

technical challenges. NASA initiated the Constellation program relying on 

the accumulation of a large rolling budget reserve in fi scal years 2006 and 

2007 to fund program activities in fi scal years 2008 through 2010. Thereafter, 

NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle program in 

2010 would free funding for the Constellation program. The program’s 

risk management system identifi ed this strategy as high risk, warning that 

shortfalls could occur in fi scal years 2009 through 2012. According to the 

Constellation program manager, the program’s current funding shortfalls 

have reduced the fl exibility to resolve technical challenges. In addition, the 

James Webb Space Telescope project had to delay its scheduled launch date 

by one year in part because of poor phasing of the project’s funding plan.

We identifi ed four projects in our assessment that are experiencing launch 

delays or other launch manifest-related challenges. By their nature, launch 

delays can contribute signifi cantly to cost and schedule growth, as months 

of delay can translate into millions of dollars in cost increases. For example, 

the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) project missed its scheduled launch 

date in August 2008 because of test scheduling and spacecraft parts 

problems. This delay resulted in the SDO project moving to the end of the 

manifest for the Atlas V launch vehicles on the East coast, causing an 

18-month launch delay and $50 million cost increase. While the primary 

reason for the cost growth is that the SDO project could not meet its 

original schedule for launch, the project is incurring additional costs to 

maintain project staff longer than originally planned as they await their turn 

in the launch queue. According to SDO offi cials, this has also affected 

staffi ng at Goddard Space Flight Center since these personnel were 

scheduled to move to other projects. Furthermore, launch delays of one 

project can potentially impact the launch manifest for other projects. The 

25-month delay of the Mars Science Laboratory project has the potential to 

cause disruptions for other projects on the launch manifest in late 2011, 

including those outside of NASA, since planetary missions—those missions 

Launch Manifest Issues
Page 22 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

that must launch in a certain window because of planetary alignments—

receive launch priority to take advantage of optimal launch windows.

Some NASA projects are also experiencing launch manifest-related 

challenges. For example, the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory 

project is monitoring the availability of trained launch personnel as that 

mission is the last to launch on the Delta II vehicle. United Launch Alliance23

offi cials told us that they are taking active steps, such as cross-utilizing the 

Delta II personnel with other launch vehicles, to ensure that trained launch 

personnel are available for all the remaining Delta II launches. In addition, 

the recent failure of the Taurus XL launch vehicle during the launch of the 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory has the potential to delay the Glory mission if 

the Taurus XL is not cleared for use before Glory has corrected its technical 

problems. 

The 2-page assessments of the projects we reviewed provide a profi le of 

each project and describe the challenges we identifi ed. On the fi rst page, the 

project profi le presents a general description of the mission objectives for 

each of the projects; a picture of the spacecraft or aircraft; a schedule 

timeline identifying key dates for the project; a table identifying 

programmatic and launch information; and a table showing the baseline 

year cost and schedule estimates and the most current available cost and 

schedule data; a table showing the challenges relevant to the project; and a 

project status narrative. On the second page of the assessment, we provide 

an analysis of the project challenges and the extent to which each project 

faces cost, schedule, or performance risk because of these challenges. In 

addition, NASA project offi ces were provided an opportunity to review 

drafts of the assessments prior to their inclusion in the fi nal product, and 

the projects provided both technical corrections and more general 

comments. We integrated the technical corrections as appropriate and 

characterized the general comments below the detailed project discussion. 

See fi gure 2 below for an illustration of the layout of each two-page 

assessment.

23 United Launch Alliance is a provider of launch services to the U.S. Government.

Project Assessments
Page 23 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Figure 2: Illustration of Project Two-Page Summary

Page 18 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

Detailed Project Discussion

The only critical technology the project office identified was the Aquarius instrument itself, which 

includes the scatterometer and the radiometer components. The project deemed the instrument mature 

at the preliminary design review because the instrument uses heritage technologies, even though those 

technologies were brought together in a different form, fit, and function for use on Aquarius. The instrument 

design, however, was not stable at the critical design review (CDR) as the Aquarius project had released 

only 16 percent of the engineering drawings. Project officials told us that some detailed parts were either 

not accounted for or not very mature at CDR, and they needed a follow-on review to clear up the issue. For

example, details in the design of a connector arm of a reflector to the instrument were lagging. In addition, 

project officials said that the Aquarius instrument design was far ahead of development of CONAE’s

spacecraft, so the project could not finalize and release all the instrument drawings until CONAE finished

the spacecraft design. To help minimize project risk in the interim, project officials said NASA provided

CONAE with an engineering model to work with as the Argentines developed the spacecraft. All engineering

drawings have now been released.

Aquarius’ schedule slipped 10 months, prompting NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius program

has exceeded its development schedule threshold. According to project officials and budget documents, a

delay in development of the spacecraft bus by CONAE is the primary reason for the schedule slip. Project

officials said that CONAE is using some newer and unfamiliar technologies on the spacecraft, such as

lithium-ion batteries for power storage. NASA’s review of CONAE’s proposed schedule indicated that

CONAE had made several high-risk decisions in order to meet a planned launch date of September 2009. 

For example, CONAE decided to begin flight model fabrication before completing adequate testing of the

engineering models. Subsequent discussions between NASA and CONAE led to a decision to set a new

launch date of May 2010. The spacecraft will also house several instruments for CONAE science missions.

According to project officials, those instruments all appear to be on schedule, but officials added that none

of those instruments are needed for NASA’s Aquarius mission and that the mission would launch without the 

CONAE instruments if any were delayed.

NASA expects the Aquarius instrument to be completed in March 2009 and held until June 2009 when it will 

ship to Argentina to be integrated with the spacecraft. Since no funds are exchanged between the U.S. and 

Argentina for this project, NASA bears its own costs associated with any further delays for its portion that 

could occur. Project officials indicated that the schedule slip increased NASA’s cost by $10.7 million. They 

also noted that this cost increase does not include increased launch vehicle costs because of the delay or

Delta-II launch site maintenance costs at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Project Office Comments

The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that Aquarius had changes to its baseline due to slips by

its development partner, the CONAE, and that they believe the NASA contribution to this mission is on

schedule for completion in March 2009. They added that the benefit of the international partnership, plus 

the groundbreaking information about the Earth’s climate, out weigh the additional costs, which NASA 

has chosen to absorb within its budget. Project officials said that NASA will continue to closely monitor

progress and work with its development partner to minimize impacts.

Aquarius

Page 17 GAO-09-306SP Assessments of Selected Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

Source: Aquarius Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Performance (then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Dec. 2008) Change

Total Project Cost $241.8 $253.1 4.7%

Formulation Cost $35.5 $35.6 0.3%

Development Cost $192.7 $204.5 6.1%

Operations Cost $13.6 $13.0 -4.4%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 7/2009 5/2010 10 months

Project Challenges

Design Stability

Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: Argentina's National Committee of

Space Activities (CONAE)

Major Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: May 23, 2010

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II

Mission Duration: 3 years for Aquarius mission

5 years for SAC-D (CONAE) mission

Formulation

Formulation

start

(12/03)

GAO Review

(12/08)

Preliminary

Design Review

(6/05)

Critical Design

Review

(9/06)

Launch Readiness

Date

(5/10)

Implementation

Project Status

The launch for Aquarius has been delayed 10 months,

from July 2009 to May 2010 because of delays in CONAE’s

spacecraft development activities. The launch delay

prompted NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius

project exceeded its development schedule threshold and 

caused NASA to experience a $10.7 million cost increase.

Based on the cost-sharing arrangements with CONAE,

NASA will also bear its own costs associated with future

delays. NASA has continued its development of the Aquarius

instrument, which is currently scheduled for completion 

in March 2009 and shipment to CONAE in June 2009 for

integration with the Argentine-developed spacecraft.

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA

and the Space Agency of Argentina (Comisión 

Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to

investigate the links between the global water cycle,

ocean circulation, and the climate. It will measure 

global sea surface salinity. The Aquarius science 

goals are to observe and model the processes that

relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the

global cycling of water and to understand how these

variations influence the general ocean circulation. By

measuring salinity globally for 3 years, Aquarius will 

provide an unprecedented new view of the ocean's

role in climate.

Aquarius

A

A

B

B

D

D

E

E

F

F

G

G

H

H

I

I

C

C

General description of mission’s science objectives

Illustration of spacecraft or aircraft

Schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project including when the project began 

formulation, major design reviews, confirmation to begin the implementation phase, and 

scheduled launch readiness

(Project Essentials) Programmatic information including the responsible NASA center, 

international or domestic partners, major contractors, and launch information

(Project Performance) Cost and schedule baseline estimates and the latest estimate updates 

 (Project Challenges) Summary listing the challenges facing the project based on a successful 

acquisition business case

(Project Status) Brief narrative describing current status of the project with regard to the 

challenges identified

(Detailed Project Discussion) Analysis of project challenges and the extent to which each 

project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk due to these challenges

(Project Office Comments) General comments provided by the cognizant project office

Source: GAO
Page 24 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

[This page intentionally left blank.]
Page 25 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

Source: Aquarius Project Office (artist depiction). 

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $241.8 $260.0 7.5%

Formulation Cost $35.5 $35.6 0.3%

Development Cost $192.7 $208.6 8.3%

Operations Cost $13.6 $15.8 16.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 7/2009 5/2010 10 months 

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

➢ Funding Issues

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partner: Argentina's National Committee of 

Space Activities (CONAE)

Major Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: May 23, 2010

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 3 years for Aquarius mission 

 5 years for SAC-D (CONAE) mission

Project Status

The launch of Aquarius has been delayed from July 2009 

to May 2010 because of delays in CONAE’s spacecraft 

development. The launch delay, which added costs to the 

project, prompted NASA to report to the Congress that 

the Aquarius project exceeded its development schedule 

baseline. NASA completed its development of the Aquarius 

instrument, which is currently awaiting integration with 

the Argentine-developed spacecraft. Project officials are 

concerned about potential future delays during testing and 

integration. The project received $15.6 million under the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will 

maintain the current Aquarius workforce through launch.

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA 

and the Space Agency of Argentina (Comisión 

Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to 

investigate the links between the global water cycle, 

ocean circulation, and the climate. It will measure 

global sea surface salinity. The Aquarius science 

goals are to observe and model the processes that 

relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the 

global cycling of water and to understand how these 

variations influence the general ocean circulation. By 

measuring salinity globally for 3 years, Aquarius will 

provide an unprecedented new view of the ocean's 

role in climate.

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(9/05)

Critical design

review

(9/06)

Preliminary

design review

(6/05)

Formulation

start

(12/03)

Launch

readiness date

(5/10)

Aquarius
Page 26 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Aquarius

Detailed Project Discussion

The only critical technology the project office identified was the Aquarius instrument itself, which 

includes the scatterometer and the radiometer components. The project deemed the instrument mature 

at the preliminary design review because the instrument uses heritage technologies, even though those 

technologies were brought together in a different form, fit, and function for use on Aquarius. The instrument 

design, however, was not stable at the critical design review (CDR) as the Aquarius project had released 

only 16 percent of the engineering drawings. Project officials told us that some detailed parts were either 

not accounted for or not very mature at CDR, and they needed a follow-on review to clear up the issue. 

For example, details in the design of a connector arm of a reflector to the instrument were lagging. Project 

officials added that the Aquarius instrument design was far ahead of development of CONAE’s spacecraft, so 

the project could not finalize and release all the instrument drawings until CONAE completed the spacecraft 

design. To help minimize project risk in the interim, project officials said NASA provided CONAE with a 

structural model to work with as the Argentines developed the spacecraft. However, the Aquarius project 

did not build or test engineering models because of the funding constraints. Instead, breadboard units of 

most components were assembled to check the designs and interfaces. The development of Aquarius only 

involved the actual flight units, a type of project referred to by NASA as a “protoflight.” 

The completed Aquarius instrument arrived in Argentina on June 3, 2009. The instrument is currently 

awaiting integration with the spacecraft bus, which cannot take place until CONAE corrects problems 

with identified non-compliances. Specifically, there is electrical interference from CONAE instruments that 

may affect Aquarius’ performance. These non-compliances will need to be corrected before the CONAE’s 

instruments are integrated with the spacecraft bus. The CONAE’s instruments are currently being tested. 

After those efforts are completed, the project will integrate the Aquarius instrument with the spacecraft bus. 

Aquarius’ schedule has slipped 10 months, prompting NASA to report, as required by law, to the Congress 

in 2008 that the Aquarius project had exceeded its development schedule baseline by more than 6 months. 

According to project officials and budget documents, a delay in development of the spacecraft bus by 

CONAE was the primary reason for the schedule slip. There have been additional delays. CONAE has 

recently experienced up to 16 weeks of schedule slip because of delayed delivery of its ROSA instrument 

and long-lead components such as s-band transponders and GPS receivers. These delays in turn are causing 

a challenge with integration/test planning and a decrease in schedule reserves that could ultimately delay 

the current May 22, 2010 launch readiness date. At this time, NASA has personnel at CONAE to assess and 

monitor the integration activities and correction of non-compliances. Since no funds are being exchanged 

between the U.S. and Argentina for this project, NASA bears the costs it incurs associated with any further 

delays. Project officials indicated that past schedule slips increased NASA’s cost by $10.7 million. They also 

noted that this cost increase does not include increased launch vehicle costs because of the delay or DeltaII launch site maintenance costs at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The project received $15.6 million under 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will maintain the current Aquarius workforce 

through launch.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. The project officials also commented that they concur with GAO’s assessment with the 

exception that they believe the instrument design was stable at critical design review. They commented that 

although only 16 percent of drawings were released at that review, over 80 percent of the drawings were 

completed and the Standing Review Board indicated that design was stable and mature enough for Aquarius 

to proceed with development.

Aquarius
Page 27 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: CLV

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Funding Issues

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Critical design

review

(9/11)

Preliminary

design review

(9/08)

Formulation

start

(09/05)

Launch

readiness date

(3/15)

Source: Ares Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest

 (Oct. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $17,000 to $20,000

*This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation 

and there is still uncertainty in the value as design options 

are explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning 

purposes. This estimate is for the Ares I vehicle only.

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 3/2015

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Marshall Space Flight Center

Partners: None

Major Contractors: Alliant Techsystems, Pratt and Whitney 

Rocketdyne, Boeing

Projected Launch Date: March 2015

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla. 

Launch Vehicle: Ares I

Mission Duration: N/A 

 

 

Project Status

Technical and design challenges within the Ares I project 

are proving difficult, costly, and time-intensive to resolve. 

As a result of technical challenges and design modifications, 

the cost of Ares I developmental contracts has increased 

over $500 million since 2007. The Ares project received 

nearly $109 million under the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will be used to manufacture 

and assemble engine components for development testing. 

The first manned launch has slipped from September 2014 

to March 2015 to accommodate these challenges.

NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, as part of the 

Constellation program, will carry the Orion Crew 

Exploration Vehicle into low Earth orbit for missions 

to the International Space Station and the Moon. 

The mission of the Ares I project is to deliver a 

safe, reliable, and affordable launch system with a 

24.5-metric ton lift capability. 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
Page 28 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: CLV

Detailed Project Discussion

Citing the use of heritage systems and existing technologies in the design of the Ares I, project officials did 

not identify any critical technologies. We found, however, that technical and design challenges within the 

Ares I project are proving difficult, costly, and time-intensive to resolve. For example, NASA has identified 

thrust oscillation as a technical issue. Thrust oscillation, which causes shaking during launch and ascent, 

occurs in some form in every solid rocket engine. Computer modeling indicates that there is a possibility 

that the magnitude and frequency of thrust oscillation within the first stage may be outside the limits of the 

Ares I design and could cause excessive vibration in the Orion capsule and threaten crew safety. The Ares I 

project is pursuing multiple design solutions, but does not expect to resolve the thrust oscillation issue until 

the Constellation program’s preliminary design review, currently scheduled for March 2010. NASA is also 

concerned that vibroacoustics—the pressure of the acoustic waves produced by the firing of the Ares I first 

stage and the rocket’s acceleration through the atmosphere—may cause unacceptable structural vibrations 

throughout Ares I and Orion and force NASA to qualify components to higher vibration tolerance thresholds 

than originally expected. Analysis of the Ares I flight path also indicates that, under some conditions, the 

Ares I vehicle could hit the launch tower during liftoff. NASA plans to deal with this issue by steering the 

Ares I launch vehicle away from the tower and not launching when southerly winds exceed 15 to 20 knots.

Since the project is still in formulation, NASA has not released official cost and schedule estimates for the 

Ares I project. NASA officials stated that these estimates will be made available when the project moves 

into implementation, or at the conclusion of the Constellation Program’s non-advocate review. However, the 

value of various development contracts for the Ares I have increased by $500 million since 2007, and the first 

manned launch has slipped from 2014 to 2015.

The Constellation program’s poorly phased funding plan has diminished the Ares I project’s ability to deal 

with technical challenges. NASA initiated the Constellation program relying on the accumulation of a large 

rolling budget reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund program activities in fiscal years 2008, 2009, 

and 2010. Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle program in 2010 would free 

funding for the Constellation program. The program’s integrated risk management system identified this 

strategy as a high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 through 2012. 

According to the Constellation program manager, the program's current funding shortfalls are reducing the 

flexibility to resolve technical challenges. The Ares project received nearly $109 million under the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will be used to manufacture and assemble engine components 

for development testing, completion of a test stand, and preparation for test operations. Nevertheless, in 

September 2009, an independent commission formed by the President to study the future of U.S. human 

spaceflight reported that NASA’s plans for the Constellation program to return man to the moon by 2020 are 

unexecutable without drastic increases to NASA’s current budget profile. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Ares I project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the project is successfully 

progressing in the design of a new crew launch vehicle and meeting all major technical and programmatic 

milestones. The officials added that the project continues to use proven risk management systems to 

identify technical risk and is using proven engineering and management techniques to effectively mitigate 

these risks while limiting cost and schedule impacts to the overall program.

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
Page 29 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Glory

Source: Glory Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Design Stability

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Launch Manifest

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Raytheon Space and Airborne 

Systems, University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric 

and Space Physics, Orbital Sciences Corporation

Projected Launch Date: October 2010

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Taurus XL 

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal)

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(12/05)

Critical design

review

(7/06)

Preliminary

design review

(9/05)

Formulation

start

(9/05)

Launch

readiness date

(10/10)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2009) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $347.9 $394.9 13.5%

Formulation Cost $70.5 $70.8 0.0%

Development Cost* $259.1 $296.1 14.3%

Operations Cost $18.3 $28.1 53.6%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 6/2009 10/2010 16 months

*Represents a 75% growth in development costs since the 

original baseline of $168.9 established in fi scal year 2008. 

Project Status

Since Congress reauthorized the Glory project in fiscal 

year 2009, and a new cost and schedule baseline was 

established, costs and schedule have continued to increase. 

Furthermore, the project may experience additional delays 

because of uncertainty of the status of the Taurus XL launch 

vehicle, which failed to deliver a payload to orbit during a 

recent launch. Glory, now currently scheduled to launch not 

earlier than October 2010, has exceeded its new schedule 

baseline and will likely exceed its new cost baseline. Glory 

received $21 million under the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will help offset increasing 

development costs.

The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that 

will contribute to the U.S. Climate Change Science 

Program. The satellite has two principal science 

objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of 

aerosols and black carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere 

and climate systems and (2) collect data on solar 

irradiance. The satellite has two main instruments 

---the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the 

Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)---as well as two 

cloud cameras. The TIM will allow NASA to have 

uninterrupted solar irradiance data by bridging the 

gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate 

Experiment and the National Polar Orbiting 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) missions.

Glory
Page 30 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Glory

Detailed Project Discussion

The Glory project has experienced significant delays because of a technical problem; according to the 

project manager, a crack in the Single Board Computer (SBC) Printed Wiring Board was confirmed in 

January 2009. While the project was working through manufacturing issues with the SBC vendor, the 

project concurrently pursued an alternate solution to the problem using an SBC manufactured by a second 

vendor. In July 2009, project officials changed the baseline to the alternate SBC. The project will experience 

significant delays based on this decision since the new SBC will not be delivered until spring 2010. The 

project will need to use an engineering model of the SBC in the spacecraft for thermal vacuum testing until 

the new computer box is available in order to minimize schedule impact caused by the change. 

The Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) was delivered on March 9, 2009—over one year behind schedule 

and $103 million more than estimates at project confirmation—and was successfully integrated with the 

spacecraft in April 2009. This development of the APS, which is based on heritage technology, has resulted 

in significant cost increases and delays to the project. The instrument was the project’s only immature 

technology at the mission preliminary design review in September 2005 and was beset by contractor 

performance issues throughout development. Project officials said that the APS development issues were 

not technical issues, but instead resulted from the contractor’s inability to plan and execute the work 

and the closure and move of the contractor’s facility. According to contractor officials, moving the APS 

development effort from one facility to another and deciding to finish building the instrument rather than 

doing a complete design analysis led directly to cost and schedule increases. 

The project’s design was not stable at the mission critical design review as the project had released only 

68 percent of its drawings. As of GAO’s review, 99 percent of total drawings had been released. However, 

Glory’s drawing count increased by 27 percent after the critical design review. This increase is attributed to 

the modification of drawings for heritage parts for Glory’s unique configuration. 

As required by law, Glory had to be reauthorized by the Congress in fiscal year 2009 in order for the project 

to continue after a 53 percent increase in development cost, and a new cost and schedule baseline was 

established. Since that time there has been a 14 percent increase in development costs and a 10-month delay 

in the scheduled launch date. In total, since the original fiscal year 2008 baseline, the project’s development 

costs have grown by 75 percent. Glory received $21 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act of 2009 which will maintain the current contractor workforce through the launch. 

Recent failure of the Taurus XL launch vehicle during the launch of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory 

(OCO) further threatens to delay Glory’s launch date. The launch failure Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) 

subsequently released findings and suggested corrective actions. Specifically, the MIB found that a payload 

fairing—a clamshell-shaped cover that encloses and protects a payload during early flight—failed to 

separate during ascent. Glory project officials indicated that Orbital Launch Systems Group will modify the 

fairing deployment design.

Project Offi ce Comments

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. Project officials also commented that all mission activities are on track to support the launch 

of Glory in 2010. However, project officials noted that following the February 2009 launch failure of the 

OCO, the Taurus XL launch vehicle requires approval for re-flight. They added that the return-to-flight 

requirements continue to be addressed but the timeline for their completion remains a threat to Glory’s 

launch date.

Glory
Page 31 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: GPM

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(11/09)

Critical design

review

(12/09)

Preliminary

design review

(11/08)

Formulation

start

(7/02)

Launch core

spacecraft

(7/13)

Launch low -

inclination spacecraft

(11/14)

Source: GPM Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest 

 (Oct. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* not provided

*NASA suggested it will provide baseline estimates for this 

project when it proceeds from formulation into development.

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 7/2013

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Funding Issues

Project Essentials

NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: Japanese Aerospace Exploration 

Agency (JAXA)

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace

Projected Launch Date: July 21, 2013

Launch Location: Tanegashima Island, Japan

Launch Vehicle: H-IIA (Japan)

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 years consumables)

Project Status

Technical challenges surrounding the ability of the GPM 

spacecraft to burn up as it re-enters the atmosphere and 

minimize debris— its demisability—have delayed the 

establishment of cost and schedule baselines by 8 months. 

NASA has identified fiscal year 2009 as a high-risk year 

because of previous reductions in funding levels and low 

contingency reserves. GPM is slated to receive $32 million 

under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

with which NASA intends to accelerate construction of 

the GPM Microwave Imager (GMI) instrument for the core 

spacecraft to ensure successful launch of the mission at the 

earliest possible opportunity.

The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) 

mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace 

Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to 

improve the scientific understanding of the global 

water cycle and the accuracy of precipitation 

forecasts. The GPM is composed of a core spacecraft 

carrying two main instruments: a Dual-frequency 

Precipitation Radar (DPR) and a GPM Microwave 

Imager (GMI). In addition, the GPM project includes 

a second Low-Inclination spacecraft with a second 

GMI instrument. The GPM builds on the work of the 

Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission and will provide 

the first opportunity to calibrate measurements of 

global precipitation.

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission
Page 32 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: GPM

Detailed Project Discussion

The GPM spacecraft was designed to be demiseable--that is it will burn up during re-entry into the Earth’s 

atmosphere to limit orbital debris. However, in December 2008, a structural analysis at Johnson Space 

Center of GPM indicated that the spacecraft would not be demiseable as originally predicted by the GPM 

project office, which based its analyses on demisability of a similar predecessor spacecraft. The project 

delayed the start of the implementation phase and establishment of GPM cost and schedule baselines by 

8 months because of the budgetary impact of the demisability issue. But the project continues to develop 

alternative design solutions in order to minimize the debris area as the spacecraft returns through the 

atmosphere during reentry. Specifically, the project manager said they will continue development of a fully 

demiseable aluminum propulsion tank as opposed to using a heritage-technology titanium propulsion tank, 

which would not fully burn up in the atmosphere upon re-entry. While the titanium propulsion tank would 

have been “off the shelf,” the spacecraft would have had to be redesigned to accommodate it; whereas, 

the aluminum propulsion tank has already been specifically designed for GPM and has a larger propellant 

capacity, thus increasing mission capability and the possibility of post-prime mission operations. Project 

officials confirmed that the only critical technology they are maturing is the treatment processes for the 

propellant management device with the aluminum composite propulsion tanks. However, this technology 

was immature at the preliminary design review in November 2008.

GPM technologies are largely heritage technologies patterned after those used on other NASA missions. 

According to project officials, the two main instruments—the JAXA-supplied Dual-frequency Precipitation 

Radar (DPR) and the NASA-supplied GPM Microwave Imager (GMI)—are based on heritage technology and 

therefore are not considered critical technologies. However, the DPR and GMI will have to be adapted to 

the GPM spacecraft design for this mission. In addition, NASA recently renegotiated the contract for GMI 

to account for delaying the delivery of the instrument from May 2009 to April 2011 because of past year’s 

budget reductions. 

The GPM project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability. The project 

currently has released 48 percent of its engineering drawings and anticipates releasing approximately 70 

percent of its drawings prior to the mission critical design review. The project manager said that all design 

drawings are not needed at the time of the critical design review, especially assembly and integration 

drawings, which can be released after the design review. 

NASA had identified fiscal year 2009 as a high-risk year because of reduced funding levels and low 

contingency reserves. However, the GPM project is slated to receive $32 million under the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. NASA intends to use these funds to accelerate construction of 

the GPM Microwave Imager (GMI) instrument for the core spacecraft to ensure successful launch of the 

mission at the earliest possible opportunity. Further, the project manager said GPM officials are discussing 

project requirements with NASA to make sure the budget contains sufficient reserves. While the project 

manager maintains that the prime mission requirements will be met, he said the project office may reduce 

requirements for the Low Inclination Observatory (LIO) mission, which is the second spacecraft under this 

project, due to launch in November 2014. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The GPM project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that the mission is on track for project 

confirmation in late 2009, and will then proceed into implementation.

Global Precipitation Measurement Mission (GPM)
Page 33 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: GRAIL

Source: Courtesy of NASA/JPL-Caltech.

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Launch Manifest

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partners: None

Major Contractors: Lockheed Martin

Projected Launch Date: September 8, 2011

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla. 

Launch Vehicle: Delta II Heavy

Mission Duration: 9 months

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2009) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $496.2 $496.2 0.0%

Formulation Cost $50.5 $50.5 0.0%

Development Cost $427.0 $427.0 0.0%

Operations Cost $18.7 $18.7 0.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2011 9/2011 0 months

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(1/09)

Critical design

review

(11/09)

Preliminary

design review

(11/08)

Formulation

start

(12/07)

Launch

readiness date

(9/11)

Project Status

In January 2009, the GRAIL project was confirmed and 

established its cost and schedule baselines. While the 

project relies heavily on heritage technologies, one 

technology, the reaction wheel assembly, was not mature 

at the preliminary design review. The development of 

the engineering model for this component was lagging 

and could affect the flight unit development. In addition, 

the project is concerned about availability of Delta II 

launch personnel since this mission is scheduled to be the 

last for this launch vehicle. There is also concern about 

GRAIL’s launch date since it is positioned very close to two 

planetary missions, which have launch priority.

The GRAIL mission will seek to determine the 

structure of the lunar interior from crust to core, 

advance our understanding of the thermal evolution 

of the Moon, and extend our knowledge gained from 

the Moon to other terrestrial-type planets. GRAIL 

will achieve its science objectives by placing twin 

spacecraft in a low altitude and nearly circular 

polar orbit. The two spacecraft will perform highprecision measurements between them. Analysis of 

changes in the spacecraft-to-spacecraft data caused 

by gravitational differences will provide direct and 

precise measurements of lunar gravity. GRAIL will 

ultimately provide a global, high-accuracy, highresolution gravity map of the moon.

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL)
Page 34 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: GRAIL

Detailed Project Discussion

The GRAIL project instruments are similar to those used in the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment 

(GRACE) mission, a project with similar twin satellites launched in March 2002 that made detailed 

measurements of Earth’s gravity field. The project identified only one critical technology---the Time 

Transfer System in the Lunar Gravity Ranging System. The project currently has an engineering model 

of it and has deemed it mature. Project officials said they included no new technology in designing the 

GRAIL orbiters to keep the mission simple, cost effective, and as close to the GRACE mission as possible. 

Heritage technologies incorporated by the project include the Lunar Gravity Ranging System instrument, the 

MoonKam outreach cameras, Flight Software, and the reaction wheel assembly. The project had deemed all 

of these technologies as mature at the preliminary design review (PDR) except the reaction wheel assembly, 

which the project has identified as a risk to the project. Project officials told us that during formulation they 

reviewed the reaction wheel assembly and determined that it did not meet the standards for this mission, 

causing the project to undertake a new development effort. The officials added that the development of the 

engineering model for this component was lagging and could affect the flight unit schedule.

In addition to the reaction wheel assembly, the project is tracking and managing several other risks. For 

example, project officials explained that mass reserve margin has been a priority for the project since PDR. 

They were concerned the project is still in development where mass can continue to grow as the design 

is matured. Project officials indicate that the dry mass is currently at 14 percent margin, above the 10 

percent margin required by JPL standards as they near the critical design review. The project also identified 

a risk for long lead items and placed emphasis on obtaining quality parts, employing tiger teams to help 

mitigate the risk. At this time the project has received 85 percent of the items and has ordered additional 

commercial parts for those not yet obtained. In addition, project officials told us they are concerned about 

the availability of trained personnel to process the launch since GRAIL will be the last Delta II to launch. 

Project officials said that the project is also monitoring the launch schedule very closely since their launch 

date is currently between two planetary missions---one month after the Juno mission and one month prior to 

the new date for the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). Planetary missions have specified windows for launch 

and are given priority for launch manifest scheduling. Consequently, changes to either Juno or MSL’s launch 

date could impact GRAIL’s launch date.

The project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability. Although the project 

did not calculate the number of engineering drawings complete at PDR, project officials expect to have at 

least 98 percent of drawings released by the mission critical design review (CDR) in November 2009. This 

is primarily due to the high degree of heritage technology being utilized by the project. Project officials told 

us they plan to hold a series of component and sub-system design reviews prior to the mission CDR, and the 

project test program includes engineering model testing prior to the mission CDR. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The GRAIL project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. Project officials commented that they concur with GAO’s assessment of the GRAIL project.

Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL)
Page 35 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Herschel

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(3/01)

Critical design

review

(7/01)

Preliminary

design review

(7/00)

Formulation

start

(1998)

Launch

readiness date

(3/09)

Source: ESA/AOES Medialab (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partner: European Space Agency (ESA)

Major Contractors: in-house development

Launch Date: May 14, 2009

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana

Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied)

Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $325.4 $277.0 -14.9%

Formulation Cost $10.4 $10.4 0.0%

Development Cost $117.0 $126.7 8.3%

Operations Cost $198.0 $139.9 -29.3%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 8/2007 5/2009 21 months

Project Status

Herschel launched on May 14, 2009, after a 21-month 

delay. Since Herschel’s 2007 baseline, ESA delayed 

Herschel’s launch three times because of scope changes 

and challenges with integration of the instruments onto 

the spacecraft. These launch delays resulted in a project 

cost increase of $43 million and required NASA to report 

to the Congress that it exceeded its schedule baseline.

The Herschel Space observatory, a collaborative 

project between NASA and the European Space 

Agency (ESA), will seek to discover how the first 

galaxies formed and how they evolved to give rise 

to present-day galaxies like our own. Herschel has 

the largest mirror ever built for a space telescope at 

3.5 meters in diameter. The mirror will collect longwavelength radiation from some of the coldest and 

most distant objects in the Universe. It will be able 

to observe dust-obscured and cold objects that are 

invisible to other telescopes. Additional targets for 

Herschel will include clouds of gas and dust where 

new stars are being born, disks out of which planets 

may form, and cometary atmospheres packed with 

complex organic molecules.

Herschel
Page 36 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Herschel

Detailed Project Discussion

Herschel launched on May 14, 2009, after a 21-month delay. After completion of the commissioning phase in 

July 2009, responsibility for operating the Herschel observatory transitioned from ESA’s Space Operations 

Centre in Darmstadt, Germany, to the Herschel Science Centre in Madrid, Spain. Initial science observations 

began in October 2009, followed by routine science observations in November 2009.

NASA developed and delivered components for two Herschel instruments---the Heterodyne Instrument 

for the Far Infrared (HIFI) and the Spectral and Photometric Imaging Receiver (SPIRE) instrument. 

However, during both the preliminary and critical design reviews, some of the critical technologies for these 

elements were considered immature. At the preliminary design review (PDR) for HIFI, five of the eight 

critical technologies were immature. Later, at critical design review (CDR), two of the eight HIFI critical 

technologies were still assessed as immature. SPIRE had a similar record. At the PDR for SPIRE, three of 

the five critical technologies were assessed as immature. Two years later at CDR, two of five SPIRE critical 

technologies were still assessed as immature. 

In addition to technology maturity issues, NASA committed to developing components for the HIFI and 

SPIRE instruments before achieving design stability for the instruments. At the CDR for both the HIFI and 

SPIRE instruments, NASA had released less than 10 percent of the engineering design drawings. According 

to the project officials, this was primarily because of the fact that ESA’s interface drawings were preliminary. 

The officials also said that the lack of timeliness in the submission of design drawings is a challenge when 

the project has to depend on multiple partners for input. According to project officials, both the HIFI and 

SPIRE teams relied heavily on the use of engineering models to verify that adequate maturity of the designs 

was achieved at CDR, and used the model development to change the final design of the flight components. 

In addition, project officials indicated that the procurement of long lead-time items was a constant challenge 

during development.

Herschel’s $43 million growth in life cycle costs can be largely attributed to technical integration problems, 

which resulted in launch delays. According to NASA officials, ESA’s contractor could not complete 

development of its instruments or integrate Herschel’s instruments in a timely manner, prompting ESA to 

pull the integration work in-house. In addition, problems were found during subsystem testing of NASA’s 

components in Europe. According to the project office, the HIFI failed during instrument integration and 

SPIRE had problems with the wiring that connects its detectors during the system thermal vacuum test. 

NASA faced some technical problems with development of components for the HIFI and SPIRE instruments, 

resulting in about $3.9 million of cost growth. Project officials said the remaining increase of about $39 

million is because of the three slips in Herschel’s launch date since the project’s baseline was established in 

February 2007. This amount is attributed to the additional costs to the project of maintaining a workforce 

to support testing and integration activities. Based on a 14-month delay in launch date, as required by law, 

NASA reported to the Congress in February 2008 that the Herschel project would exceed its schedule 

baseline by more than 6 months. The project experienced a subsequent 7-month slip in its launch after 

further delays in spacecraft integration. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Herschel project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the reason for having so few drawings 

released during the critical design review was mostly attributed to delays by the ESA Herschel project office 

firming up interface definitions, a delay that they say prevented releasing the final version of the drawings.

Herschel
Page 37 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Juno

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(8/08)

Critical design

review

(4/09)

Preliminary

design review

(5/08)

Formulation

start

(7/05)

Launch

readiness date

(8/11)

Source: NASA/JPL.

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

International Partners: Agencia Spaziale Italiana (ASI)- 

Selex Galileo; ASI - Thales Alenia Space; Centre Spatial de 

Liege (CSL) Belgian Science Policy; Centre National 

d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) - Centre d'Etude

Major Contractors: Lockheed Martin

Projected Launch Date: August 5, 2011

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 6 Years

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2009) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $1107.0 $1107.0 0.0%

Formulation Cost $186.3 $186.3 0.0%

Development Cost $742.3 $742.3 0.0%

Operations Cost $178.4 $178.4 0.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 8/2011 8/2011 0 months

Project Status

The Juno project recently established its cost and schedule 

baseline. One of the heritage technologies for Juno was 

reassessed as immature after the mission preliminary 

design review. In addition, two components remain on the 

critical path and could cause a delay to Juno’s launch. An 

earthquake in central Italy in April 2009 caused damage to 

a factory in which a Juno component was being developed. 

Project officials and the Italian Space Agency are working 

to mitigate the project risks from this event. 

The Juno mission seeks to improve our 

understanding of the origin and evolution of Jupiter. 

Juno plans to achieve its scientific objectives by 

using a simple, solar-powered spacecraft to make 

global maps of the gravity, magnetic fields, and 

atmospheric conditions of Jupiter from a unique 

elliptical orbit. The spacecraft carries precise, 

highly sensitive radiometers, magnetometers, and 

gravity science systems. Juno is slated to make 32 

orbits to sample Jupiter’s full range of latitudes 

and longitudes. From its polar perspective, Juno 

is designed to combine local and remote-sensing 

observations to explore the polar magnetosphere and 

determine what drives Jupiter’s remarkable auroras.

Juno
Page 38 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Juno

Detailed Project Discussion

The Juno project office indicated that there are no new critical technologies. The project did identify four 

heritage technologies that were all deemed mature at the preliminary design review in May 2008----the Stellar 

Reference Unit, Solar Cells, Toroidal Low Gain Antenna (TLGA), and Waves Instrument. However, after 

the preliminary design review, the project reassessed the TLGA as immature when it was determined that 

the materials being used in the highly charged particle environment could store an electrical charge, which 

would in turn interfere with some lower-level science requirements from two of the instruments on the 

spacecraft. The project plans to coat the surface of the TLGA with germanium to provide a discharge path to 

the grounded metal structure. In February 2009, the project also widened the Solar Array Panels to increase 

power, which in turn increased the mass, causing the project to exceed mass margin requirements. Project 

officials told us they performed an analysis of the spacecraft’s mass and made modifications to achieve the 

standard 10 percent mass margin required by JPL standards at project critical design review (CDR). They 

added that this will continue to be monitored closely.

The Juno project’s design was unstable at the CDR as the project had released 77 percent of the engineering 

drawings. Project officials, however, said they used engineering models for all instruments to demonstrate 

design maturity at CDR. For some spacecraft components, the Juno project did not build or test engineering 

models because they were of heritage designs. For example, some spacecraft components utilized are very 

similar to the ones used on the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter such as some Command and Data Handling 

(C&DH) and power cards. Therefore, the project accepted some of the spacecraft card designs based on 

qualification testing. In addition, subsystem and component-level reviews were held prior to the mission 

CDR, and project officials told us the results of these lower-level reviews provided evidence that the design 

was stable. 

Juno project officials said they must have all instruments delivered by July 2010 in order to begin integration 

and testing on schedule. They identified two components that they believe are challenges for the Juno 

project to maintain its schedule----the Jovian Infrared Auroral Mapper (JIRAM) instrument and the C&DH 

module. JIRAM experienced delays early in design and manufacturing work, and has only 20 days of 

schedule margin remaining to meet the July 2010 deadline. The C&DH module delays are a result of late 

workforce ramp-up and start of the flight design effort. Project officials said that test and integration 

will begin with a test unit for the C&DH module and that they will incorporate the flight model when it is 

complete.

Juno’s international partner, the Italian Space Agency (ASI), has experience delays because of the April 

2009 earthquake in central Italy. The factory where the Ka-band Translator was being developed was badly 

damaged and rendered unusable, causing ASI to develop a comprehensive plan to move that development 

to another factory. There is still schedule margin available by dual qualifying the engineering model as the 

possible flight model. The project will continue working toward a separate flight model, but has accepted 

the risk associated with using a flight-qualified engineering model instead if this becomes necessary. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The Juno project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that the number of drawings released at the critical design 

review was per NASA’s plan and do not represent design instability. They added that neither the JIRAM 

instrument nor the Ka-band Translator are needed to meet the science requirements, and Juno could launch 

without them if necessary. In addition, they commented that multiple schedule workarounds exist if the 

C&DH module deliveries are further delayed.

Juno
Page 39 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: JWST

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(7/08)

Critical design

review

(3/10)

Preliminary

design review

(3/08)

Formulation

start

(3/99)

Launch

readiness date

(6/14)

Source: JWST Project Office (artist depiction).

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology 

➢ Funding Issues

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partners: European Space Agency (ESA), 

Canadian Space Agency (CSA)

Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman

Projected Launch Date: June 2014

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana

Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied)

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2009) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $4963.6 $4963.6 0.0%

Formulation Cost $1800.1 $1800.1 0.0%

Development Cost $2581.1 $2581.1 0.0%

Operations Cost $582.4 $582.4 0.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 6/2014 6/2014 none

Project Status

After confirmation, JWST established a baseline life cycle 

cost of $4.96 billion and a June 2014 launch date. This 

constitutes about a half billion increase and a 1-year launch 

delay from NASA’s fiscal year 2006 re-plan. Concerns 

over low contingency funding, project development, and 

remaining technical challenges were cited as reasons for 

delaying the launch. Additionally, the project received $75 

million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act of 2009. NASA plans to use these funds for spacecraft 

and instrument development, in hopes of meeting its launch 

date.

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a 

large, infrared-optimized space telescope that is 

designed to find the first galaxies that formed in 

the early universe. Its focus will include searching 

for first light, assembly of galaxies, origins of stars 

and planetary systems, and origins of the elements 

necessary for life. JWST's instruments will be 

designed to work primarily in the infrared range of 

the electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability 

in the visible range. JWST will have a large mirror, 

6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield the 

size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade 

will not fit onto the rocket fully open, so both will 

fold up and open once JWST is in outer space. JWST 

will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers 

(1 million miles) from the Earth.

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
Page 40 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: JWST

Detailed Project Discussion

The JWST project identified 10 critical technologies and assessed all of them as mature during the 

preliminary design review in March 2008. However, the data from the project indicated that two of its 15 

heritage technologies—the Solar Array and the S-band Transponder—are still immature over a year after 

the preliminary design review. Project officials indicated they are not tracking the development of these 

technologies as project risks, and one official said they are not overly concerned about maturation of 

these two heritage technologies. The Fine Sun Sensor Assembly (FSSA), which is also based on heritage 

technology, has not yet been selected, but the project intends to select a specific FSSA unit from among 

those that have previously been flown on other missions. In addition, the JWST project office has released 

87 percent of its design drawings as of September 2009, and anticipates releasing 95 percent of its design 

drawings by the critical design review in March 2010.

In 2009, we reported that the project had to address several issues related to testing identified at the 

project’s preliminary design review. One concern was that the project planned to conduct only one test at 

the highest level of assembly in the cryogenic vacuum chamber at Johnson Space Center. The preliminary 

design review board advised the project to add another test cycle to its schedule. According to a project 

official, JWST still plans to conduct only one test campaign at the highest level of assembly, but the official 

added that cost and schedule reserves have been set aside to accommodate additional testing if needed. The 

review board was also concerned that the project was not planning to test the deployment of the sunshield 

at the highest level of assembly in the cryogenic chamber, and required the project to defend its current 

plans for sunshield deployment testing, including the possibility of additional tests. Project officials said 

they are studying this issue and hope to have an updated plan for sunshield testing by mission critical design 

review. In addition, the project heeded the review board’s recommendation to add a center of curvature test 

on the Optical Telescope Element.

The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion cost increase and a 2-year schedule 

delay on the project. In fiscal year 2009, the project established its baseline with a life cycle cost of $4.96 

billion and a June 2014 launch date. This represents about a $500 million increase over NASA’s 2006 replan figures and has resulted in another 1-year delay of the launch readiness date. According to the project 

manager, in July 2008, JWST adjusted its launch date from its previous June 2013 date to June 2014 in order 

to accommodate low budget and schedule reserves. Prior to this schedule delay, an independent review 

team expressed concern that budget and schedule reserves were too low to meet the June 2013 launch date. 

The revised June 2014 launch date was also based on assessments of the project's development progress to 

date, estimates of the technical challenges remaining, and the need to maintain an acceptable level of risk. 

JWST received $75 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that it plans to use 

for spacecraft and instrument development activities including design and fabrication of key component 

systems. NASA believes these activities will increase the likelihood that JWST will launch on its planned 

launch date. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The JWST project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they do not consider the heritage 

technologies to be immature.

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
Page 41 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Kepler

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(5/05)

Critical design

review

(10/06)

Preliminary

design review

(10/04)

Formulation

start

(12/01)

Launch

readiness date

(3/09)

Source: Kepler Project Office.

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.

Launch Date: March 6, 2009

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 3.5 years

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Funding Issues

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $497.5 $604.6 21.5%

Formulation Cost $138.1 $141.2 2.2%

Development Cost $312.8 $390.3 24.8%

Operations Cost $46.6 $73.1 56.9%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 6/2008 3/2009 9 months

Project Status

Kepler successfully launched in March 2009 and is currently 

in operations. However, since being baselined in fiscal year 

2007, Kepler’s development costs have increased by about 25 

percent and its schedule has increased by 9 months. Project 

officials attribute the cost and schedule growth to many 

things, including a $35 million budget reduction in fiscal 

year 2005. This funding instability contributed to an overall 

20-month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169 

million in cost growth. NASA reported to the Congress that 

both Kepler’s development costs and schedule exceeded its 

baselines.

The Kepler mission was designed to discover Earthlike planets in orbit around stars in our galaxy. The 

goal of the mission is to detect tens or even hundreds 

of Earth-size planets in the habitable zones of stars 

similar to our own sun. The habitable zone is the 

region around a star where the temperature of a 

terrestrial-type planet can be expected to allow water 

to exist in liquid form on the planet's surface, thereby 

increasing the probability of life. Kepler will explore 

the structure and diversity of planetary systems by 

conducting a census of extra-solar terrestrial planets 

using a photometer in heliocentric orbit to observe 

the dimming of starlight caused by planetary transits.

Kepler
Page 42 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: Kepler

Detailed Project Discussion

Kepler successfully launched in March 2009 and is currently in operations. According to officials, the 

spacecraft has experienced some minor electronic sensitivity issues. Specifically, the telescope has 

“artifacts” in its field of view because of very low level electrical noise in some detector channels. According 

to project officials, problems of this nature could have been avoided if the project had developed an 

engineering model, but this would have increased cost and schedule. Project officials indicated that the 

artifacts in the data will not keep Kepler from meeting its science requirements.

None of Kepler’s technologies were identified as critical by the project office. All of Kepler’s technologies 

have flown on other missions and were therefore considered heritage. However, the project office 

acknowledged that the customization of some of Kepler’s instruments, and the reliance on heritage 

technology, proved to be a challenge to Kepler’s development. Project officials told us that Kepler’s large 

photometry array added to the complexity of the project because photometers of Kepler’s sensitivity have 

not flown before and proved more difficult to adapt than anticipated—an adaptation that contributed to 

cost growth. Specifically, development of the focal plane array of the photometer was a challenge because 

it is the largest ever flown in space and has stringent requirements. We were unable to determine if Kepler’s 

design was stable at its critical design review since drawing counts at the critical design review in October 

2006 were unavailable. In addition, Kepler officials told us that the project had difficulty obtaining quality 

parts as well as parts that satisfy NASA radiation tolerance standards. The project also had difficulty 

accessing facilities---such as the facilities that put coating on the mirrors---because of the competition among 

government programs for the facilities and the consolidation of the industrial base. 

Between its 2007 baseline and March 2009 launch, Kepler experienced a nearly 25 percent increase in 

development costs and a 9-month increase in schedule. As required by law, NASA reported to the Congress 

that Kepler exceeded its development cost baseline by more than 15 percent and its schedule baseline by 

more than 6 months. The project office attributed this to the prime contractor’s inability to execute the 

project’s planned activities within the original proposed cost and schedule. Contractor representatives 

agreed that they underestimated the complexity and the effort required to modify the existing heritage 

technologies. According to both the Kepler project manager and the contractor’s representatives, a $35 

million funding cut in fiscal year 2005 significantly contributed to project delays. This funding instability 

contributed to an overall 20-month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169 million in cost growth. In 

an effort to keep the project executable with sufficient reserves, the project office shortened its operations 

by 6 months and accepted additional project risk when it cancelled or de-scoped several tests. For example, 

the flight segment vibration test was reduced to an acoustic test, and the vibration tests of the solar panel 

were eliminated. Additionally, the prime contractor put new management personnel in place and according 

to contractor representatives, agreed to convert $7.9 million of its projected incentive fee into project 

reserves held by JPL with the understanding that this money could be earned back for good performance 

subject to the availability of reserves at the end of development. The contractor will be eligible to earn 

award fees related to operations.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Kepler project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that NASA is extremely pleased with the 

quality of science coming out of the Kepler mission.

Kepler
Page 43 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: LDCM

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(12/09)

Critical design

review

(3/10)

Preliminary

design review

(7/09)

Formulation

start

(10/03)

Launch

readiness date

(12/12)

Source: General Dynamics (CAD drawing).

Project Essentials

NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center 

Partner: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corp., General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, 

The Hammers Company

Projected Launch Date: December 2012

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 years propellant)

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest 

 (Oct. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $730 - $800

*This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there is still 

uncertainty in the value as design options are explored. NASA uses these 

estimates for planning purposes.

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 12/2012

Project Status

The project’s estimated launch date slipped from July 2011 

to December 2012 after a review board reported that the 

previous development schedule was unachievable. Since 

then, NASA has directed the LDCM project to proceed with 

development of the Thermal Infrared Sensor pending an 

official decision whether that instrument will be included 

in the mission. Inclusion could add an estimated $160 

million to $200 million to development costs. The project 

received nearly $52 million under the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will aid development 

of a thermal infrared sensor and its integration onto the 

spacecraft.

The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a 

partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS), seeks to extend the ability to detect 

and quantitatively characterize changes on the global 

land surface at a scale where natural and man-made 

causes of change can be detected and differentiated. 

It is the successor mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat 

data series, begun in 1972, is the longest continuous 

record of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from 

space. Landsat data is a unique resource for people 

who work in agriculture, geology, forestry, regional 

planning, education, mapping, and global change 

research.

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
Page 44 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: LDCM

Detailed Project Discussion

The LDCM instrument payload currently consists of a single science instrument---the Operational Land 

Imager (OLI). The project is considering the addition of the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS)—a sensor 

designed to capture thermal information to be used for air quality modeling and wildfire assessment and 

to operationally monitor water consumption on a field-by-field basis. Although the LDCM project is still 

awaiting an official decision to include the TIRS instrument in the project, NASA has directed it to proceed 

with mission development presuming TIRS will be included. The project has begun development of the 

instrument as it proceeds in the implementation phase, which is scheduled to begin in December 2009 once 

the project is confirmed. The TIRS project is estimated to cost an additional $160 million to $200 million, 

and LDCM received $52 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will assist 

in incorporating the TIRS instrument. The LDCM project delayed its estimated launch date from July 2011 

to December 2012 after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in September 2008. During this 

review, the project reported that the previous development schedule was unachievable and increased risk to 

the mission. 

The project reported that TIRS should not impact the performance of the OLI or the planned launch date. 

While the TIRS instrument is a new development effort, many of the subsystems and components were 

used in earlier flight projects. The project reported that many of the technologies for TIRS were assessed 

as mature. In September 2009, the project reported that the focal plane array was assessed as mature and 

that the project has reduced the TIRS development design schedule from 48 months to 39 months, with 

instrument delivery planned for December 2011. 

The LDCM project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability. As of September 

2009, the project has released 83 percent of its design drawings. 

Project officials reported the United States Geological Survey (USGS)—a partner responsible for ground 

systems elements—is experiencing funding shortfalls that may impair LDCM’s ability to meet ground 

systems requirements for on-orbit verification of instruments and transition to normal operations. The 

project reports that USGS has taken steps to reduce its funding shortfall through technical redesign, changes 

in procurement strategy, and some minor exchanges of responsibilities with NASA. Presuming USGS 

receives its requested funding increase for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, project officials said they believe 

there should be no impact to LDCM other than an increase in project costs that will be offset by subsequent 

cost reductions, as NASA assumes some of the responsibilities from USGS. To save costs in the near term, 

the project reported that USGS has selected a data-processing architecture with heritage from Landsat 7 

that provides a good technical solution and reduces cost and schedule risk. Other cost savings include the 

decision to keep the mission operations center at Goddard Space Flight Center, and opting to procure the 

services of a flight operations team through an existing contract with NASA. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The LDCM project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. In addition, the project office commented that the LDCM project is on track for 

project confirmation in late 2009, and will head into implementation.

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
Page 45 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: LRO

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(5/06)

Critical design

review

(11/06)

Preliminary

design review

(2/06)

Formulation

start

(5/04)

Launch

(6/09)

Source: LRO Project Office.

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partners: Boston University, University of California Los 

Angeles, Southwest Research Institute, Russian Institute for 

Space Research, Arizona State University, Naval Air Warfare 

Center

Prime Contractors: in-house development

Launch Date: June 18, 2009

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 1 year (then science mission)

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Launch Manifest

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Nov. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $540.1 $590.4 9.3%

Formulation Cost $93.3 $94.4 1.2%

Development Cost $420.8 $473.1 12.4%

Operations Cost $25.8 $22.9 -11.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 10/2008 6/2009 8 months

Project Status

LRO successfully launched on June 18, 2009, after an 8- 

month delay, and is currently operating in lunar orbit.

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is NASA’s 

first mission in its plan to return to the moon and 

beyond —its Vision for Space Exploration. LRO’s 

mission is to orbit the moon for one year measuring 

lunar topography, resources, temperatures, and 

radiation. These data will be used to select a 

landing site for manned missions to the moon and 

to ensure astronaut safety. The LRO has a scientific 

payload of six main instruments and one technology 

demonstration instrument. LRO’s launch vehicle 

contained a secondary payload, the Lunar Crater 

Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS), which 

impacted the Moon to investigate lunar surface 

volatiles such as water.

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
Page 46 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: LRO

Detailed Project Discussion

The project did not identify any critical technologies. Each of the project’s major instruments is based 

significantly on heritage technology. However, the project manager said the project had underestimated the 

difficulty of the modifications needed. For example, the project manager said the Lunar Reconnaissance 

Orbiter cameras needed some technical work to adapt designs for the lunar thermal environment as well 

as some redesign when areas needing reinforcement were found during testing. The lunar orbiter laser 

altimeter, while similar to laser altimeters that have flown on previous Mars and Mercury missions, had 

issues with the electronics that time the laser pulses of the altimeter, which, according to the project 

manager, took more time to resolve than originally expected. The Diviner Lunar Radiometer Experiment 

instrument is almost a copy of an instrument on Mars now, but it experienced motor failures in testing, 

which the project manager said took extra time and money to recover from. Finally, the Lyman-Alpha 

Mapping Project instrument, a copy of the Pluto Alice instrument, was slightly delayed because of a detector 

failure during thermal vacuum testing. According to the project manager, most instruments required 

additional design and analysis of their thermal control designs to operate reliably on the mission. Redesign 

was necessary because the lunar environment presents a harsher thermal environment than the environment 

faced by earth-orbiting missions. 

The project did not measure design stability by percentage of drawings completed at the critical design 

review (CDR), and therefore, we did not assess design stability.

LRO successfully launched on June 18, 2009, and, according to the project manager, entered lunar orbit 

with roughly three times the amount of fuel the program had planned on having at that point, which may 

allow for an extended mission. LRO’s launch, however, was delayed 8 months from October 2008 because 

of several factors. Initially, the project delayed launch for one month to accommodate problems with the 

ground data system software, reduced schedule slack, and improved launch window opportunities. NASA 

then accepted a request from United Launch Alliance to swap launch positions with a non-NASA mission, 

moving the launch date to March 2009. Delays in the launch manifest since then caused LRO’s launch date 

to slip into June 2009. The project manager reported that the project team used the 8-month schedule delay 

to further mitigate technical risks. As a result, the project fully investigated identified issues and made 

hardware changes. For example, the LRO Wide Angle Camera was replaced during this time. As a result of 

the launch delays, the project’s development cost increased by over $52 million, or 12.4 percent.

Project Offi ce Comments

The LRO project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate.

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
Page 47 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: MMS

Source: MMS Project Office (Computer Model).

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partners: Austria, France, Japan, Sweden

Major Contractors: Southwest Research Institute

Projected Launch Date: October 2014

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 2 years

Project Challenges

➢ None Currently Identifi ed

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(6/09)

Critical design

review

(8/10)

Preliminary

design review

(5/09)

Formulation

start

(5/02)

Launch

readiness date

(10/14)

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest* (Oct. 2009)

Total Project Cost Not provided

Formulation Cost Not provided

Development Cost Not provided

Operations Cost Not provided

*NASA suggested it will supply the baseline estimates for 

this project when it provides them to Congress in the FY11 

budget.

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 10/2014

Project Status

MMS was approved for implementation in July 2009 after 

being in formulation for 7 years, due in part to budget 

cuts to the Solar Terrestrial Probes program and in 

part from the difficulty of developing a new spacecraft. 

NASA has not yet provided a cost baseline. Initial cost 

estimates for the project in 2002 were $369 million, but 

the new life cycle cost baseline will likely exceed $900 

million because of the need for a larger instrument 

suite and multiple spacecraft. The project is currently 

scheduled to launch in October 2014.

The Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) is made up 

of four identically instrumented spacecraft. The 

mission will use the Earth's magnetosphere as a 

laboratory to study the microphysics of magnetic 

reconnection, energetic particle acceleration, and 

turbulence. Magnetic reconnection is the primary 

process by which energy is transferred from solar 

wind to Earth’s magnetosphere and is the critical 

physical process determining the size of a space 

weather storm. The four spacecraft will be launched 

together in a stacked configuration, and then fly 

in a tetrahedral (pyramid) formation, adjustable 

over a range of 10 to 400 kilometers, enabling them 

to capture the three-dimensional structure of the 

reconnection sites they encounter. 

Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS)
Page 48 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: MMS

Detailed Project Discussion

MMS is a classic research mission and was ranked as the highest priority moderate-sized mission in 

the 2003 Solar and Space Physics Decadal survey of the National Research Council. Due in part to the 

groundbreaking nature of this mission, NASA and the project’s major contractor have partnered with several 

other countries, including Austria, France, Japan, and Sweden. These countries are contributing several 

instruments to the project as well as engineering support and test facilities. There is no exchange of money 

between NASA and the foreign governments, as each will pay for its respective contribution.

At the preliminary design review, the MMS project assessed both of its critical technologies and three of its 

five heritage technologies as mature. The two remaining heritage technologies—the four pound thrusters 

for large maneuvers and the payload separation system—will start testing and modifications after their 

contracts are awarded in 2009. According to the project manager, the four pound thrusters should be 

available “off the shelf,” but will require testing to ensure they are compatible with a spinning spacecraft 

such as MMS. The project also reported that flight-proven thrusters will need to be qualified to the MMS 

firing cycle, which is different than that of the heritage missions. In addition, the project manager told us 

that the payload separation system was not procured from the launch vehicle provider because of the high 

cost. Instead, the project has decided to build its own separation system based on heritage flight-proven 

systems which will need to be modified to meet the grounding requirements for MMS. 

The MMS project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability. The project did 

not formally release design drawings at the preliminary design review. Project officials told us that they are 

preparing for the critical design review (CDR) by completing flight and ground system design and analysis, 

completing development and test of spacecraft and instrument engineering models, conducting peer 

reviews, and conducting instrument- and spacecraft-level CDR’s. A project official added that having 70 to 80 

percent of design drawings completed by CDR is normal, but officials have not established any goals for the 

project. 

Despite being authorized to enter implementation in June 2009, NASA has not yet provided a cost baseline 

for MMS. However, the project manager indicated that the life-cycle cost would be at least $900 million. The 

project was authorized to enter formulation in 2002 with an initial cost estimate of $369 million. The project 

manager said initial cost estimates were for a smaller instrument suite than what is currently planned 

for the mission and added that cost drivers for the project since the initial cost estimates included the 

requirement for magnetic and electrostatic cleanliness and the need for multiple spacecrafts. Additionally, 

MMS was in formulation for about 7 years due in part to budget cuts to the Solar Terrestrial Probes program. 

Additionally, in 2005 it was determined that the original approach to use an off-the-shelf spacecraft bus was 

not viable, and in 2006, NASA assigned the development for the MMS spacecraft to Goddard Space Flight 

Center.

Project Offi ce Comments

The MMS project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. The project office also commented that during a June 2009 review with the 

NASA Administrator, the project was approved to enter implementation and establish a cost and schedule 

baseline. In addition, project officials believe MMS is currently on schedule in its development of the 

detailed mission design, with no significant unresolved challenges heading toward the CDR in August 2010.

Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS)
Page 49 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: MSL

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Design Stability

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Partners: U.S. Department of Energy, Centre Nationale 

d'Etude Spatiale (France), Russian Federal Space Agency, 

Centro de Astrobiologia (Spain), Canadian Space Agency

Major Contractors: in-house development

Projected Launch Date: October 2011

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 1 year of travel, 2 years of operations

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(8/06)

Critical design

review

(6/07)

Preliminary

design review

(6/06)

Formulation

start

(11/03)

Launch

readiness date

(10/11)

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech.

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $1642.2 $2305.3 40.4%

Formulation Cost $515.1 $515.5 0.1%

Development Cost $968.6 $1631.0 68.4%

Operations Cost $158.5 $158.8 0.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 9/2009 10/2011 25 months

Project Status

Since the project was baselined, MSL’s cost has grown over 

$660 million because of technological and engineering 

problems. This includes more than a 68 percent increase 

in development costs. The project is using a 25-month 

schedule delay to work on overcoming technical challenges 

with the actuators and avionics that were the primary 

drivers for the slip. NASA reported to the Congress 

that MSL had exceeded both its development cost and 

schedule baselines. In addition, MSL is currently seeking 

re-authorization from the Congress since the project has 

exceeded its cost baseline by more than 30 percent.

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is part of the 

Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP seeks 

to understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a 

habitable world. To answer this question the MSL 

project will investigate how geologic, climatic, and 

other processes have worked to shape Mars and its 

environment over time, as well as how they interact 

today. The MSL will achieve these objectives by 

placing a mobile science laboratory on the Mars 

surface to assess a local site as a potential habitat 

for life, past or present. The MSL is considered one 

of NASA’s flagship projects and will be the most 

advanced rover yet sent to explore the surface of 

Mars.

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
Page 50 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: MSL

Detailed Project Discussion

At the preliminary design review, the project assessed all seven of its critical technologies as immature 

resulting from late development challenges it encountered. At the critical design review a year later, three 

of the seven critical technologies had been replaced by backup technologies with two of the seven still 

assessed as immature, including one of the replacement technologies. In addition, the MSL project relied on 

several heritage technologies that had to be re-designed, re-engineered, or replaced. For example, the heat 

shield—constructed of a super light-weight ablator that had flown on previous missions—was considered 

nearly ready at the critical design review but experienced a significant setback in testing and could not be 

approved for use on MSL. As a result, the project selected a new and less mature technology—phenolic 

impregnated carbon ablator (PICA)—which was successfully used on the STARDUST mission Earth return 

capsule. According to the MSL project office, the impact of this change was approximately $30 million in 

cost growth and a nine-month delay in delivery of the heat shield. 

The MSL project design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). Several design changes were 

required to address various issues. For example, the plumbing for the propulsion system was redesigned 

because it was determined that MSL needed larger, rigid lines for the system than were previously used on 

smaller Mars rovers. These thicker lines inadvertently became load-bearing components, which caused the 

project to redesign part of the structure to account for the loads and shift them to MSL’s primary structure. 

Furthermore, project officials said they underestimated the overall complexity of the rover and realized in 

2008 that MSL could not maintain a 2009 launch readiness date. The project experienced problems with the 

actuators—the motors that allow the vehicle to move and execute the sample operations performed by the 

lab. MSL project officials said they wanted to implement a dry lubrication scheme with lightweight titanium 

gears for the actuators. However, during fabrication it was discovered that this scheme did not provide the 

durability needed for MSL. The project reverted to a heavier stainless steel gear system with the same wet 

lubricant used by prior projects. Project officials added that this decision to change the actuator scheme 

was late in the process, ultimately causing delays when one of the vendors developing the stainless steel 

gears could not meet production demands. In addition, project officials stated that the avionics package was 

also part of the reason for the launch delay. They said that the avionics hardware was a new design that had 

never been flown on earlier missions and was delivered to the project in an immature state. The delay in 

development of the avionics hardware resulted in delays to the related avionics software. Project officials 

told us they hope to have these issues resolved by November 2009 and that they plan to perform all the 

necessary test and integration activities for the spacecraft in 2010. They added that extra time will allow for 

a much more robust test campaign.

Since the baseline in 2008, the life-cycle cost for the project has increased by over $660 million—including 

more than a 68 percent increase in development costs—and the launch has been delayed until at least 

October 2011 since launch windows for Mars mission are optimally aligned every 26 months. As a result, 

NASA reported to the Congress, as required by law, that MSL had exceeded its development cost baseline by 

more than 15% and schedule baseline by more than 6 months. In addition, NASA is seeking re-authorization 

from Congress since the project has exceeded its development cost baseline by more than the 30 percent. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The MSL project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate.

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
Page 51 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: NPP

Project Challenges

➢ Technology Maturity

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Design Stability

➢ Development Partner Performance

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partner: National Atmospheric and Oceanic 

Administration and U.S. Air Force

Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman Electrical 

Systems and Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.

Projected Launch Date: January 15, 2011

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 5 years

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(11/03)

Critical design

review

(8/03)

Preliminary

design review

(1/03)

Formulation

start

(11/98)

Launch

readiness date

(1/11)

Source: Ball Aerospace.

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $672.8 $799.4 18.8%

Formulation Cost $47.3 $47.7 0.8%

Development Cost $593.0 $725.1 22.3%

Operations Cost $32.5 $26.6 -18.2%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 4/2008 1/2011 33 months

Project Status

Due primarily to the late delivery of two key instruments 

being developed by the project partners, the NPP has 

experienced over $132 million in development cost 

growth and a 33-month delay in its launch readiness date. 

As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress that the 

NPP project has exceeded both its development cost 

and schedule baselines. The project is currently slated to 

launch in January 2011—although continuing problems 

and delays put this launch date at risk.

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint 

mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The satellite 

will measure ozone, atmospheric and sea surface 

temperatures, land and ocean biological productivity, 

and cloud and aerosol properties. The NPP 

mission has two objectives. First, NPP will provide 

a continuation of global weather observations 

following the Earth Observing System missions Terra 

and Aqua. Second, NPP will provide the National 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS) with risk-reduction demonstration 

and validation for the critical NPOESS sensors, 

algorithms, and ground data processing.

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
Page 52 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: NPP

Detailed Project Discussion

 The NPP project office identified six critical technologies for the project—the spacecraft and all five 

instruments. Five of the six critical technologies were assessed as immature at the preliminary and critical 

design reviews. The NPP project now considers all critical technologies to be mature. However, the project 

reports an inability to reduce risks to an acceptable level on three instruments, including the Visible Infrared 

Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), and the Ozone Mapper Profiler 

Suite. NASA officials told us they lack confidence in the processes used by the NPOESS Integrated Program 

Office (IPO), which is composed of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Department 

of Defense officials, in developing the instruments and are unsure how the instruments will function on 

orbit. Therefore, NPP will be launched with significant residual risk against mission success, including the 

potential for a gap in continuity or degraded capability. Furthermore, project officials report that these 

instruments have failed tests and had difficulties meeting mission science requirements. 

Management and developmental partner challenges have resulted in cost overruns and schedule delays 

in the VIIRS and CrIS instruments. VIIRS began thermal vacuum testing in early May 2009; however, 

continued slow test execution and problems during environmental testing have led to further delays in its 

delivery to the NPP integration contractor. The instrument is now scheduled to be delivered in December 

2009. Additionally, testing of the CrIS instrument found problems such as a faulty calibration target and 

overstressed semiconductors, which led to delays in its production. According to the project manager, the 

CrIS instrument was supposed to be delivered in 2008 but is now slated to be delivered by late spring 2010. 

The project is currently slated to launch in January 2011—although continuing problems and delays threaten 

this launch date. Since this will be one of the last missions to be launched on a Delta II, availability of trained 

personnel to launch NPP may be limited. 

The NPP project design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). Both the CrIS and the VIIRS had 

to be redesigned because of failures that were detected during testing after the CDR. Project officials said a 

31 percent increase in new engineering drawings was largely attributed to the redesign of the VIIRS and CrIS 

stemming from testing failures. 

Since NPP was baselined in fiscal year 2007, the project’s development cost has increased 22 percent, and 

its schedule has increased by 33 months. As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress, as required by law, 

that the NPP project has exceeded its development cost baseline by more than 15 percent and its schedule 

baseline by more than 6 months. The project office attributes almost all of the cost and schedule changes 

to the late delivery of the VIIRS instrument by the project partners. To manage NPP cost increases, the 

NPOESS program halted or delayed activities on other components—including a sensor planned for another 

satellite—and redirected those funds to the VIIRS and CrIS instruments. Furthermore, because NPOESS is 

now not scheduled to launch until 2014, NPP will not be the research satellite it was originally intended to 

be; instead, it will have to function as an operational satellite until the first NPOESS satellite is launched. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The NPP project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. In addition, project officials commented that they agree with GAO that delays continue to be 

experienced because of issues with development of instruments by the project’s partners.

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
Page 53 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: CEV

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Funding Issues

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Latest

 (Oct. 2009)

Preliminary Estimate of

Project Life Cycle Cost* $20,000 to $29,000 

* This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 

there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are explored.

NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. This estimate is 

for the Orion vehicle only.

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 3/2015

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Johnson Space Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Lockheed Martin

Projected Launch Date: March 2015

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla

Launch Vehicle: Ares I

Mission Duration: Varied based on destination

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Critical design

review

(2/11)

Preliminary

design review

(8/09)

Formulation

start

(7/06)

Initial operational

capability

(3/15)

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems (artist depiction).

Project Status

Technical challenges, mass growth, and design issues 

delayed Orion’s preliminary design review by 12 months 

to August 2009. In December 2008, NASA decided to defer 

work on Orion’s lunar mission requirements in order 

to focus on developing a vehicle that can fly to the ISS. 

The Orion project received nearly $166 million under the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that 

will be used for technology development and reduction 

of technical risks. NASA delayed the first crewed flight 

from September 2014 to March 2015 to increase schedule 

confidence in program cost and schedule goals.

NASA’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), as 

part of the Constellation Program, is designed to be 

the next-generation of spacecraft to carry crew and 

cargo to the International Space Station (ISS) and to 

the Moon. The initial Constellation Program includes 

the Orion and the Ares I system that are expected to 

replace the Space Shuttle, which is slated to retire in 

2010. The Orion CEV is to be launched by the Ares 

I Crew Launch Vehicle. Plans call for Orion to carry 

four astronauts to the International Space Station 

(ISS) and to the Moon after linking up with an earth 

departure stage. The capsule will return to Earth 

and descend on parachutes to the surface. Orion has 

three main elements—the crew module (capsule), 

service module/spacecraft adapter, and launch abort 

system.

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
Page 54 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: CEV

Detailed Project Discussion

The Orion project identified one critical technology for the spacecraft: the thermal protection system, 

or heatshield. This is a heritage technology from the Apollo program and is required for the spacecraft 

to survive reentry from earth orbit. However, it may be difficult to repeatedly manufacture to consistent 

standards because the heatshield uses a framework with many honeycomb shaped cells, each of which must 

be individually filled with no voids or imperfections. In addition, development of the launch abort system, 

which would pull the Orion capsule away from the Ares I launch vehicle in the case of a catastrophic 

problem during launch, remains a high risk area even though it was not identified as a critical technology. A 

year after the initial contract was awarded, the first launch abort system subcontractor did not have a viable 

design and was replaced. Furthermore, continued weight growth and requirements changes are contributing 

to instability in the Orion design. For example, in its efforts to reduce the mass of the Orion vehicle, NASA 

chose to move from land nominal landing to water nominal landing to reduce mass by eliminating air bags 

and, according to officials, by reducing the number of parachutes. 

To increase its level of confidence in the Constellation program baseline, NASA has delayed the first crewed 

flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and deferred work on a vehicle that can meet the lunar mission 

requirements so that NASA can focus its efforts on developing a vehicle that can fly the ISS mission. NASA’s 

original strategy for the Orion project was to develop one vehicle capable of supporting both ISS and lunar 

missions. This new phased approach, however, could require two qualification programs for the Orion 

vehicle—one pre-2015 Orion qualification program for ISS mission requirements and a second post-2015 

Orion qualification program for lunar mission requirements. 

According to the Constellation program manager, the Constellation program’s poorly phased funding plan 

has diminished the Orion project’s ability to deal with technical challenges. NASA initiated the Constellation 

program relying on the accumulation of a large budget reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund activities 

in fiscal years 2008 through 2010. Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle 

program in 2010 would free funding for the Constellation program. The program’s risk management system 

identified this strategy as high risk, warning that shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 through 2012.

NASA has not released official cost and schedule estimates to complete the Orion project. NASA officials 

stated that these estimates will be made available when the project moves into implementation, or at the 

conclusion of the Constellation Program’s non-advocate review. However, the value of the development 

contracts for Orion has increased by $2.5 billion since 2006. The Constellation program received $400 million 

under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, of which the Orion project is slated to receive 

nearly $166 million that will help the project mitigate technical challenges. Nevertheless, in September 2009, 

an independent commission formed by the President to study the future of U.S human spaceflight reported 

that NASA’s plans for the Constellation program to return man to the moon by 2020 are unexecutable 

without drastic increases to NASA’s current budget profile.

Project Offi ce Comments

The Orion project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe NASA will continue to 

narrow the trade-space options as the project moves through the formulation phase and toward a confirmed 

baseline design. They also believe that steady progress has been made in all technology areas and that 

the project has achieved stability in requirements. Project officials commented that Orion met the mass 

requirements for the ISS phase at their preliminary design review, and that the mass trend is favorable 

toward meeting lunar phase requirements.

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
Page 55 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: RBSP

Project Challenges

➢ None Currently Identifi ed

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

Partner: National Reconnaissance Offi ce

Major Contractors: John Hopkins University - Applied 

Physics Laboratory, Boston University

Projected Launch Date: May 18, 2012

Launch Location: Cape Carnaveral, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 2 years

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(12/08)

Critical design

review

(12/09)

Preliminary

design review

(10/08)

Formulation

start

(9/06)

Launch

readiness date

(5/12)

Source: NASA/Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2009) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $685.8 $685.8 0.0%

Formulation Cost $88.2 $88.2 0.0%

Development Cost $533.9 $533.9 0.0%

Operations Cost $63.7 $63.7 0.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 5/2012 5/2012 none

Project Status

In January 2009, the RBSP project was confirmed and 

established its cost and schedule baselines. At that 

time, NASA added $54 million and seven months to the 

project’s cost and schedule to ensure the project entered 

implementation with a higher confidence of mission 

success.

The RBSP mission will help us understand the Sun’s 

influence on the Earth and near-Earth space by 

studying the planet’s radiation belts at various scales 

of space and time. This insight into the physical 

dynamics of the Earth’s radiation belts will provide 

scientists data to make predictions of changes in this 

critical region of space. Understanding the radiation 

belt environment has practical applications in the 

areas of spacecraft system design, mission planning, 

spacecraft operations, and astronaut safety. The 

two spacecraft will measure the particles, magnetic 

and electric fields, and waves that fill geospace 

and provide new knowledge on the dynamics and 

extremes of the radation belts. 

Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP)
Page 56 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: RBSP

Detailed Project Discussion

Project officials reported that there are no new critical technologies for RBSP. They did identify two 

heritage technologies---the chip-to-board bonding techniques on the integrated circuits for the spacecraft 

transceiver and the method used to measure secondary particles in the Helium-Oxygen-Proton-Electron 

(HOPE) instrument---both of which the project assessed as mature at the mission preliminary design review 

in October 2008. Project officials indicated that one of the primary challenges for RBSP is developing a 

spacecraft capable of withstanding high levels of radiation that it will encounter during the mission. They 

added that RBSP is incorporating other heritage technologies developed for the Juno mission—which has an 

even tougher radiation environment—and they are confident RBSP will be able to withstand high radiation 

levels. 

The project reported potential delays in procuring detectors from a project contractor, which could delay 

the delivery of two instruments—the Magnetic Electron Ion Spectrometer, and the Relativistic Electron 

Proton Telescope. NASA is monitoring the progress of the flight detectors to ensure timely delivery. In 

addition, project officials identified a project risk concerning the four wire booms that protrude from each 

spacecraft since the project will not be able to test them in the deployed configuration; however, they also 

indicated that they have extensive experience with similar booms. 

Additionally, the project reported that NASA recently provided instructions that prohibited the use of certain 

connectors as part of their ongoing monitoring of quality parts and qualification standards, which caused the 

project to review the type of connectors used in the observatory and replace the connectors as applicable. 

Although the project classifies the likelihood of an in-flight failure due to the prohibited connectors as very 

small, possible consequences include loss of the spacecraft or an instrument. 

The RBSP project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability. As of September 

2009 project officials plan on releasing 87 percent of design drawings by the critical design review in 

December 2009. In mid-2009, the project reported that some spacecraft subsystems were behind schedule 

because of delays in drawing releases and lack of available resources. The project took several steps to get 

back on schedule, including the addition of personnel for subsystem schedule management. Subsequently, 

the project has released engineering model drawings for three of the four subsystems that were behind 

schedule, and plans on releasing drawings for the fourth subsystem in September 2009. 

The project established a baseline of $685.8 million and a May 2012 launch date in January 2009. This 

included the addition of seven months to the project’s schedule and $54 million to the life-cycle cost at 

project confirmation to ensure the project entered implementation with a higher confidence of mission 

success. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The RBSP project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. In addition, the RBSP project office commented that they have made significant 

progress in development of engineering models for spacecraft subsystems and science instruments, delivery 

of key parts, and release of flight model drawings, which is expected to continue through the mission critical 

design review.

Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP)
Page 57 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: SDO

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Design Stability

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Development Partner Performance

➢ Funding Issues

➢ Launch Manifest

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Stanford University, Lockheed Martin 

Solar Astrophysics Laboratory, University of Colorado

Projected Launch Date: February 3, 2010

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 

Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal)

Source: SGT Inc.

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $785.5 $867.6 10.5%

Formulation Cost $78.0 $84.9 8.8%

Development Cost $623.7 $682.6 9.4%

Operations Cost $83.8 $100.1 19.5%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 8/2008 2/2010 18 months

Project Status

The project’s inability to meet the August 2008 launch 

date has resulted in cost increases and additional 

schedule delays prompting NASA to report to the 

Congress that the SDO project exceeded its development 

schedule baseline. Due to a crowded launch manifest, 

the next available launch date for SDO is February 2010, 

resulting in an 18-month schedule delay.

NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) will 

investigate how the Sun's magnetic field is structured 

and how its energy is converted and released into 

the heliosphere in the forms of solar wind, energetic 

particles, and variations in solar irradiance. The 

primary goal of the SDO mission is to understand 

the solar variations that influence life on Earth and 

humanity’s technological systems. It seeks to do 

this by determining how the Sun’s magnetic field 

is generated and structured, and how this stored 

magnetic energy is released. Analysis of data from 

SDO’s three instruments—Atmospheric Imaging 

Assembly (AIA), Extreme Ultraviolet Variability 

Experiment (EVE), and Helioseismic and Magnetic 

Imager (HMI)—will improve the science needed to 

enable space weather predictions.

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(6/04)

Critical design

review

(4/05)

Preliminary

design review

(3/04)

Formulation

start

(12/01)

Launch

readiness date

(2/10)

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO)
Page 58 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: SDO

Detailed Project Discussion

The SDO project reported that its only critical technology—a 4K x 4K array of charge-coupled devices 

(CCD) to be used in both the HMI and AIA instruments—was mature at the project’s preliminary design 

review. The United Kingdom originally led development of the CCD camera systems, but dropped out of the 

project before the preliminary design review. Project officials stated that SDO was purposefully designed to 

use existing technology components, but said they also recognized that some technologies—such as the Kaband transmitter, high-speed bus, and high-gain antenna system—required modifications to be used on SDO. 

For example, the existing technology for the Ka-band transmitter, which the project assessed as immature 

at the preliminary design review, required a new design for integration with SDO. Project officials told us 

that Northrop Grumman originally was to build the Ka-band transmitter, but its development was brought in 

house after contractor performance issues arose. 

SDO’s design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). Following this review, the project 

experienced nearly a 1,200 percent overall increase in the number of releasable drawings expected. Project 

officials said only drawings for in-house structures, such as propulsion systems, electronics, instrument 

ports, the high-gain antenna system, and the spacecraft, were considered at CDR. Drawings for the 

instruments were not included and flight drawings were only in draft form at CDR. The project estimated 

it released less than 63 percent of engineering drawings at each of their instrument-level CDRs. Project 

officials indicated that flight drawings did not need to be ready so far in advance of the project’s launch 

readiness date since there was enough time to build these components.

SDO also experienced several problems during testing of flight hardware. The project suffered a technical 

setback in 2007 when the thermal vacuum chamber being used to test the high gain antenna overheated, 

resulting in the need to completely rebuild the antenna. Several risks to the project were identified during 

testing. For example, testing identified a part on the spacecraft’s high-speed bus that, under certain 

circumstances, could cause the spacecraft to reset itself, which could mean failure to meet science data 

quality and completeness requirements. Project officials indicated that a software update to the high-speed 

bus should correct this issue.

At the time of CDR in April 2005, the SDO project budget was reduced by one-third for fiscal year 2005 

because of other funding priorities. As a result, the project underwent a re-plan that delayed the project’s 

launch readiness date from April 2008 to August 2008. Subsequent scheduling issues for testing of the AIA 

instrument and other spacecraft parts problems caused further delays and cost increases and the launch 

date slipped to December 2008, resulting in a cost increase of $18.1 million. Because of launch manifest 

issues, SDO’s launch date has since slipped to February 2010 and approximately $50 million was added to 

the project’s life-cycle costs from the previous year, which is largely attributable to keeping project staff 

longer than expected and conducting additional spacecraft tests. As required by law, NASA has reported to 

the Congress that the SDO project has exceeded its development schedule baseline by more than 6 months. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The SDO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate. Project officials also commented that the crowded launch manifest has been the single 

reason for the delays that have occurred since December 2008 and since that time the project has waited 

for a firm launch slot. The officials added that the observatory was shipped to Florida in July 2009 and is on 

track for a February 2010 launch opportunity. In addition, NASA officials state that an independent review 

team determined that SDO’s critical design review was successful and that the technical baseline was solid.

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO)
Page 59 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: SOFIA

Project Challenges

➢ Complexity of Heritage Technology

➢ Contractor Performance

➢ Funding Issues

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Dryden Flight Research Center

International Partner: German Space Agency (DLR)

Major Contractors: L3 Communications, MPC Products 

Corporation, University Space Research Association

Projected Operational Capability: March 2010

Aircraft: Modifi ed 747SP

Sortie Location: Dryden Flight Research Center, Calif.

Mission Duration: 20 years of science mission fl ights

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Formulation

start

(10/91)

Full operational

capability

(12/14)

Initial operational

capability

(3/10)

Source: SOFIA Program Office. 

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2007) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $2954.5 $2960.2 0.0%

Formulation Cost $35.0 $35.0 0.0%

Development Cost $919.5 $1081.8 17.7%

Operations Cost $2000.0 $1843.4 -7.8%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 12/2013 12/2014 12 months

Project Status

Initial science flights have slipped from August 2009 to 

no earlier than March 2010. SOFIA’s current development 

costs are estimated to be about $1.08 billion, 

representing a more than 300 percent increase from the 

original estimate of $251 million in 1997. This includes a 

$400 million cost increase from fiscal year 2009, which 

project officials said is due primarily to NASA choosing 

not to secure additional international partners for the 

project. NASA has reported to the Congress that SOFIA 

exceeded both its cost and schedule baselines.

SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the 

German Space Agency (DLR) to install a 2.5 meter 

telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP 

aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to 

provide routine access to the visual, infrared, farinfrared, and sub-millimeter parts of the spectrum. Its 

mission objectives include studying many different 

kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, 

including star birth and death; the formation of 

new solar systems; planets, comets, and asteroids 

in our solar system; and black holes at the center 

of galaxies. Interchangeable instruments for the 

observatory are being developed to allow a range of 

scientific measurement to be taken by SOFIA.

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)
Page 60 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: SOFIA

Detailed Project Discussion

We could not assess the technology maturity or the design stability of the overall project as NASA did not 

provide information related to the aircraft modification. Data provided for development of the instruments 

that will fly on SOFIA generally indicates a high level of technology maturity. Many of these technologies 

have already been used on ground-based telescopes, and the early instruments are essentially finished and 

are waiting for the observatory to be completed. Of the eight first-generation science instruments, three are 

ready for installation, one will be ready for installation upon completion of airworthiness documentation, 

and the others are scheduled to be ready between 2010 and 2012. Similarly, we were unable to determine 

design stability of the instruments since the drawings were still preliminary at the critical design review. 

Design work on SOFIA is 97 percent complete, but several subsystems will still be in design into 2011. 

The SOFIA project experienced problems related to the original prime contractor’s performance early in 

development. At this time, the contract required the contractor to perform significant project management 

activities. According to project officials, that contractor had neither the project management experience 

nor the design-build expertise necessary for the project. Consequently, NASA reduced the contractor’s 

management role for both development and operations of SOFIA and subsequently utilized government 

personnel to perform these functions in-house. The contractor also experienced challenges with 

modification of the aircraft used for SOFIA, which led to significant cost overruns. Project officials said this 

contractor, who was also responsible for the aircraft’s modification and integration, had limited experience 

with this type of work and did not fully understand the statement of work, which resulted in cost overruns. 

Since the December 2007 flight test, testing of SOFIA has stayed mostly on schedule. However, the first 

open-door flight test was delayed 8 months and successfully took place in December 2009. This delay was 

due mostly to the development of the Cavity Door Drive System (CDDS) controller which was lagging due 

to poor performance by the contractor and integration issues. The CDDS contractor experienced problems 

stemming from poor workmanship, which project officials claim is partially attributable to a shrinking 

industrial base. In addition, testing for the High-speed Imaging Photometer for Occultation (HIPO) revealed 

that some activities the project thought could be done in parallel were more difficult than expected and 

must instead be done serially. Subsequently, initial science flights have slipped from August 2009 to no 

earlier than March 2010, and given the various challenges, project officials said that science flights may be 

delayed even further. 

As a result of ongoing cost growth early in development, the SOFIA project was slated for cancellation in 

2006. However, later that year the project was reinstated. It was re-baselined in July 2007. The fiscal year 

2010 budget request showed the project’s life-cycle cost increased by $400 million from fiscal year 2009, 

which project officials said is due primarily to NASA choosing not to secure additional international partners 

for cost-sharing on the project. SOFIA’s current development costs are estimated to be about $1.08 billion, 

representing a more than 300 percent increase from the original estimate of $251 million in 1997. As required 

by law, NASA has reported to the Congress that SOFIA exceeded its development cost baseline by more 

than 15 percent and its schedule baseline by more than 6 months.

Project Offi ce Comments

The SOFIA project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. The project office also commented that the SOFIA project continues to make good progress 

toward science flight operations.

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)
Page 61 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: WISE

Project Challenges

➢ Design Stability

➢ Funding Issues

Project Essentials

NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory

International Partner: None

Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corporation, Space Dynamics Laboratory

Launch Date: December 14, 2009

Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Launch Vehicle: Delta II 

Mission Duration: 9 months

Formulation Implementation

GAO

review

(12/09)

Project

confirmation

(10/06)

Critical design

review

(6/07)

Preliminary

design review

(7/05)

Formulation

start

(3/03)

Launch

readiness date

(11/09)

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech (artist depiction).

Project Performance

(then year dollars in millions)

 Baseline Est. Latest 

(FY 2008) (Oct. 2009) Change

Total Project Cost $311.4 $314.5 0.1%

Formulation Cost $99.5 $99.6 0.1%

Development Cost $192.1 $194.9 1.5%

Operations Cost $19.8 $20.0 1.0%

____________________________________________ 

Launch Schedule 11/2009 12/2009 1 month

Project Status

Wise successfully launched on December 14, 2009 and 

sent its first images back from space in January 2010. 

The WISE mission is designed to map the sky in 

infrared light and search for the nearest and coolest 

stars, the origins of stellar and planetary systems, 

the most luminous galaxies in the universe, and most 

main-belt asteroids larger than 3 kilometers. It is 

also intended to create a catalog of over 300 million 

sources that will be of interest to future infrared 

studies, including the upcoming James Webb Space 

Telescope mission. During its 6-month mission, WISE 

will use a four-channel imager to take overlapping 

snapshots of the sky. The WISE telescope optics will 

be cooled below 20 degrees Kelvin to keep it colder 

than the objects in space it will observe so that WISE 

can see the dim infrared emission from them rather 

than from the telescope itself.

Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE)
Page 62 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

Common Name: WISE

Detailed Project Discussion

WISE project officials identified two mission critical technologies—the solid hydrogen cryostat and the 

long wavelength infrared detector multiplexer—both of which were assessed as mature at the project’s 

preliminary design review. The solid hydrogen cryostat is a modification of a heritage technology. It is of 

similar design and construction and manufactured by the same contractor that produced cryostats for 

previous NASA missions. A project official said the project did not encounter any challenges with the 

development of the cryostat. The WISE project’s design, however, was not stable at the critical design 

review as the project had released only 70 percent of its engineering drawings. A project official stated that 

the drawing count and additional analyses, prototypes, and engineering models were used at the critical 

design review to evaluate the project’s design stability. The project has since released the remainder of the 

engineering drawings. 

The project did encounter some challenges during testing, which had an impact on the spacecraft’s design. 

The Thermal Mass Dynamics Simulator (TMDS), a structural model of the flight cryostat, failed during 

structural testing. According to a NASA official, analyses done by the project office and the cryostat’s 

contractor did not predict this problem, but finding this problem in the engineering model saved at least a 

year delay. To mitigate this problem, the project added a soft-ride system to the launch vehicle to reduce 

loads on the cryostat, which tested successfully in December 2008. The failure also caused the project to 

accept more project risk by de-scoping two test events in order to regain reserve margin. According to the 

project office, the remedy cost $2.6 million, but the overall project schedule was not affected. 

Though the project is currently on track to meet its launch readiness date, the WISE project encountered 

schedule delays early in its life cycle. According to a project official, the project was not initially confirmed 

to proceed because of cost and technical concerns. As a result, the official said the project designed a 

smaller telescope and matured the technology that had concerned the review board. The preliminary design 

review for WISE was held in July 2005 and the project had its initial confirmation review in November 

2005; however, there was a lack of funding in the NASA budget for the WISE project at that time so the 

formulation phase was extended. At this point in the project, the launch readiness date had slipped from 

2008 to June 2009. A second confirmation review was held in November 2006, at which time the launch 

readiness date was set for November 2009. Although the second confirmation review happened one year 

later, the launch readiness date set at the original confirmation review only slipped five months since the 

project was able to make progress during that year. 

Although WISE contractors completed payload and spacecraft development and successfully integrated the 

two, the project faced significant risk as cost reserves were depleted during these activities. To avoid the 

elimination of future testing and staff reductions, an official told us the WISE project received $4 million 

from NASA Headquarters. WISE successfully launched on December 14, 2009 and is currently in operations. 

Project Offi ce Comments

The WISE project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. In addition, project officials commented that they believe design has been 

stable since the Concept Study Review in 2003, which has been a key factor in the excellent cost and 

schedule performance of the WISE mission.

Wide-fi eld Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE)
Page 63 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. In its 

written response, NASA agrees with our fi ndings and states that it will strive 

to address the challenges that lead to cost and schedule growth in its 

projects. NASA agrees that GAO’s cost and schedule growth fi gures refl ect 

what the agency has experienced since the baselines were established in 

response to the 2005 statutory reporting requirements. Importantly, NASA 

has begun to provide more data regarding cost growth prior to these 

baselines, and we look forward to working with NASA to increase 

transparency into cost and schedule information of large-scale projects 

even further in the future. 

NASA noted that its projects are high-risk and one-of-a-kind development 

efforts that do not lend themselves to all the practices of a “business case” 

approach that we outlined since essential attributes of NASA’s project 

development differ from those of a commercial or production industry. We 

agree, however NASA could still benefi t from a more disciplined approach 

to its acquisitions whereby decisions are based upon high levels of 

knowledge. Currently, inherent risks are being exacerbated due to projects 

moving forward with immature technologies and unstable designs and 

diffi culties working with contractors and international partners, leading to 

cost and schedule increase which make it hard for the agency to manage its 

portfolio and make informed investment decisions. 

NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. NASA also provided 

technical comments, which we addressed throughout the report as 

appropriate and where suffi cient evidence was provided to support 

signifi cant changes.

We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offi ces of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 64 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Cristina Chaplain

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 65 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Chairwoman

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Bill Nelson

Chairman

The Honorable David Vitter

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan

Chairman

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Olson

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

Committee on Science and Technology

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 66 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 67 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 68 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Our objectives were to report on the status and challenges faced by NASA 

systems with life-cycle costs of $250 million or more and to discuss broader 

trends faced by the agency in its management of system acquisitions.

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and identifi ed 

challenges for each of 19 major projects.24 We summarized our assessments 

of each individual project in two components—a project profi le and a 

detailed discussion of project challenges. We did not validate the data 

provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

However, we took appropriate steps to address data reliability. Specifi cally, 

we confi rmed the accuracy of NASA-generated data with multiple sources 

within NASA and, in some cases, with external sources. Additionally, 

we corroborated data provided to us with published documentation. We 

determined that the data provided by NASA project offi ces were suffi ciently 

reliable for our engagement purposes.

We developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was 

completed by each project offi ce. Through the DCI, we gathered basic 

information about projects as well as current and projected development 

activities for those projects. The cost and schedule data estimates 

that NASA provided were the most recent updates as of October 2009; 

performance data that NASA provided were the most recent updates as of 

November 2009. At the time we collected the data, 4 of the 19 projects were 

in the formulation phase and 15 were in the implementation phase. NASA 

only provided cost and schedule data for 14 projects in implementation. 

Despite being in the implementation phase, NASA did not provide cost or 

schedule data for the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) project. To further 

understand performance issues, we talked with offi cials from most project 

offi ces and NASA’s Offi ce of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E).

The results collected from each project offi ce, Mission Directorate, and 

PA&E were summarized in a 2-page report format providing a project 

overview; key cost, contract, and schedule data; and a discussion of the 

challenges associated with the deviation from relevant indicators from 

best practice standards. The aggregate measures and averages calculated 

were analyzed for meaningful relationships, e.g. relationship between cost 

growth and schedule slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at 

critical milestones and through the various stages of the project life cycle. 

We identifi ed cost and/or schedule growth as signifi cant where, in either 

24 We originally collected information on 21 projects, but two missions—Dawn and the 

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope—were later excluded since they were both in 

continuing operations and development teams were no longer available to be interviewed.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 69 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

case, a project’s cost and/or its schedule exceeded the baselines that trigger 

reporting to the Congress.

To supplement our analysis, we relied on GAO’s work over the past years 

examining acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These reports 

cover such issues as contracting, program management, acquisition policy, 

and estimating cost. GAO also has an extensive body of work related to 

challenges NASA has faced with specifi c system acquisitions, fi nancial 

management, and cost estimating. This work provided the context and basis 

for large parts of the general observations we made about the projects we 

reviewed. Additionally, the discussions with the individual NASA projects 

helped us identify further challenges faced by the projects. Together, the 

past work and additional discussions contributed to our development of 

a short list of challenges discussed for each project. The challenges we 

identifi ed and discussed do not represent an exhaustive or exclusive list. 

They are subject to change and evolution as GAO continues this annual 

assessment in future years. 

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. In addition, we visited NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in 

Huntsville, Alabama; Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force 

Base in California; and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, 

to discuss individual projects. We also met with representatives from 

NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California and a provider of NASA 

launch services, the United Launch Alliance.

NASA only provided specifi c cost and schedule estimates for 14 of the 19 

projects in our review. For one project, the Magnetospheric Multiscale 

project, NASA will not formally release its baseline cost and schedule 

estimates until the fi scal year 2011 budget submission to Congress, and late 

in our review process agency offi cials notifi ed us that they will not provide 

project estimates to GAO until that time. For three of the projects that had 

not yet entered implementation, NASA provided internal preliminary 

estimated total (life-cycle) cost ranges and associated schedules, from key 

decision point B (KDP-B), solely for informational purposes.25 NASA 

formally establishes cost and schedule baselines, committing itself to cost 

and schedule targets for a project with a specifi c and aligned set of planned 

mission objectives at key decision point C (KDP-C), which follows a nonadvocate review (NAR) and preliminary design review (PDR). KDP-C 

refl ects the life-cycle point where NASA approves a project to leave the 

formulation phase and enter into the implementation phase. NASA 

25 These missions include Ares I, the Landsat Data Continuity Mission, and Orion.

Data Limitations

Page 70 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

explained that preliminary estimates are generated for internal planning and 

fi scal year budgeting purposes at KDP-B, which occurs mid-stream in the 

formulation phase, and hence, are not considered a formal commitment by 

the agency on cost and schedule for the mission deliverables. NASA offi cials 

contend that because of changes that occur to a project’s scope and 

technologies between KDP-B and KDP-C, estimates of project cost and 

schedule can change signifi cantly heading toward KDP-C. Finally, NASA did 

not provide data for the Global Precipitation Measurement mission because 

NASA offi cials said it did not have a requirement for a KDP-B review, 

because it was authorized to be formulated prior to the requirements of 

NPR 7120.5D being in place.

This section of the 2-page assessment outlines the essentials of the project, 

its cost and schedule performance, and its status. Project essentials refl ect 

pertinent information about each project, including, where applicable, the 

major contractors and partners involved in the project. These organizations 

have primary responsibility over a major segment of the project or, in some 

cases, the entire project.

Project performance is depicted according to cost and schedule changes in 

the various stages of the project life cycle. To assess the cost and schedule 

changes of each project we obtained data directly from NASA PA&E and 

from NASA’s Integrated Budget and Performance documents. For systems 

in implementation, we compared the latest available information with 

baseline cost and schedule estimates set for each project in the fi scal year 

2007, 2008, or 2010 budget request. 

All cost information is presented in nominal “then year” dollars for 

consistency with budget data.26 Baseline costs are adjusted to refl ect the 

cost accounting structure in NASA’s fi scal year 2009 budget estimates. 

For the fi scal year 2009 budget request, NASA changed its accounting 

practices from full-cost accounting to reporting only direct costs at the 

project level. The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, 

which is defi ned as the number of months between the project start, or 

formulation start, and projected or actual launch date.27 Formulation 

start generally refers to the initiation of a project; NASA refers to project 

26 Because of changes in NASA’s accounting structure, its historical cost data are relatively 

inconsistent. As such, we used “then-year” dollars to report data consistent with the data 

NASA reported to us.

27 Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for launch sooner than the 

date that the launch authority could provide actual launch services. In these cases, we 

used the actual launch date for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported 

readiness.

Project Profi le Information 

on Each Individual 

Two-Page Assessment

Page 71 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

start as key decision point A, or the beginning of the formulation phase. 

The preliminary design review typically occurs during the end of the 

formulation phase, followed by a confi rmation review, referred to as key 

decision point C, which allows the project to move into the implementation 

phase. The critical design review is held during the fi nal design period 

of implementation and demonstrates that the maturity of the design is 

appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, 

integration, and test. Launch readiness is determined through a launch 

readiness review that verifi es that the launch system and spacecraft/

payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase includes the 

operations of the mission and concludes with project disposal.

We assessed the extent to which NASA projects exceeded their cost and 

schedule baselines. To do this, we compared the project baseline cost and 

schedule estimates with the current cost and schedule data reported by the 

project offi ce in October 2009.

To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a data 

collection instrument to each project offi ce. We also held interviews with 

representatives from most of the projects to discuss the information on the 

data collection instrument. These discussions led to identifi cation of further 

challenges faced by NASA projects. These challenges were largely apparent 

in the projects that had entered the implementation phase. We then 

reviewed pertinent project documentation, such as the project plan, 

schedule, risk assessments, and major project reviews.

To assess technology maturity, we asked project offi cials to assess 

the technology readiness levels (TRL) of each of the project’s critical 

technologies at various stages of project development. Originally developed 

by NASA, TRLs are measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning 

with paper studies of a technology’s feasibility and culminating with a 

technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See appendix IV 

for the defi nitions of technology readiness levels.) In most cases, we did 

not validate the project offi ces’ selection of critical technologies or the 

determination of the demonstrated level of maturity. However, we sought to 

clarify the technology readiness levels in those cases where the information 

provided raised concerns, such as where a critical technology was reported 

as immature late in the project development cycle. Additionally, we asked 

project offi cials to explain the environments in which technologies were 

tested.

Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 

6— demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a relevant 

Project Challenges 

Discussion on Each 

Individual Two-Page 

Assessment

Page 72 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

environment—is the level of maturity needed to minimize risks for space 

systems entering product development. In our assessment, the technologies 

that have reached technology readiness level 6 are referred to as fully 

mature because of the diffi culty of achieving technology readiness level 7, 

which is demonstrating maturity in an operational environment—space. 

Projects with critical technologies that did not achieve maturity by the 

preliminary design review were assessed as having a technology maturity 

project challenge. We did not assess technology maturity for those projects 

which had not yet reached the preliminary design review at the time of this 

assessment.28

To assess the complexity of heritage technology, we asked project offi cials 

to assess the TRL of each of the project’s heritage technologies at various 

stages of project development. We also interviewed project offi cials about 

the use of heritage technologies in their projects. We asked them what 

heritage technologies were being used, what effort was needed to modify 

the form, fi t, and function of the technology for use in the new system, 

whether the project encountered any problems in modifying the technology, 

and whether the project considered the heritage technology as a risk to the 

project. Heritage technologies were not considered critical technologies 

by several of the projects we reviewed. Based on our interviews, review 

of data from the data collection instruments, and previous GAO work on 

space systems, we determined whether complexity of heritage technology 

was a challenge for a particular project.

To assess design stability, we asked project offi cials to provide the 

percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion 

by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our current 

assessment.29 In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage 

of engineering drawings provided by the project offi ce. However, we 

collected the project offi ces’ rationale for cases where it appeared that 

only a small number of drawings were completed by the time of the design 

reviews or where the project offi ce reported signifi cant growth in the 

28 According to NASA offi cials, projects that were in formulation at the time of the agency’s 

2007 revision of its project management policy are required to comply with that policy. 

Projects that had already entered implementation at the time of the revision were directed 

to implement those requirements that would not adversely affect the project’s cost and 

schedule baselines.

29 In our calculation for percentage of total number of drawings projected for release, we 

used the number of drawings released at critical design review as a fraction of the total 

number of drawings projected, including where a growth in drawings occurred. So, the 

denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the critical 

design review. We believe that this more accurately refl ected the design stability of the 

project.

Page 73 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

number of drawings released after CDR. In accordance with GAO’s best 

practices, projects were assessed as having achieved design stability if 

they had released at least 90 percent of projected drawings by the critical 

design review. Projects that had not met this metric were determined to 

have a design stability project challenge. Though some projects used other 

methods to assess design stability, such as computer and engineering 

models and analyses, we did not analyze the use of these other methods and 

therefore could not assess the design stability of those projects. We could 

not assess design stability for those projects that had not yet reached the 

critical design review at the time of this assessment.

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with contractor 

performance, we interviewed project offi cials about their interaction and 

experience with contractors. We also relied on interviews we held in 2008 

with contractor representatives from Orbital Sciences Corporation, Ball 

Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, and Raytheon Space Systems 

about their experiences contracting with NASA. We were informed about 

contractor performance problems pertaining to their workforce, the 

supplier base, and technical and corporate experience. We also discussed 

the use of contract fees with NASA and contractor’s representatives. We 

assessed a project as having this challenge if these contractor performance 

problems—as confi rmed by NASA and, where possible, the project 

contractor—caused the project to experience a cost overrun, schedule 

delay, or decrease in mission capability. For projects that did not have a 

major contractor, we considered this challenge inapplicable to the project.

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with development 

partner performance, we interviewed NASA project offi cials about 

their interaction with international or domestic partners during project 

development. Development partner performance was considered a 

challenge for the project if project offi cials indicated that domestic or 

foreign partners were experiencing problems with project development 

that impacted the cost, schedule, or performance of the project for NASA. 

These challenges were specifi c to the partner organization or caused by 

a contractor to that partner organization. For projects that did not have 

an international or domestic development partner, we considered this 

challenge not applicable to the project. 

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with funding, we 

interviewed offi cials from NASA’s Program Analysis and Evaluation 

Division, NASA project offi cials, and project contractors about the 

stability of funding throughout the project life-cycle. Funding stability 

was considered a challenge if offi cials indicated that project funding had 

Page 74 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

been interrupted or delayed resulting in an impact to the cost, schedule, or 

performance of the project, or if project offi cials indicated that the project 

budgets do not have suffi cient funding in certain years based on the work 

expected to be accomplished. We corroborated the funding changes and 

reasons with budget documents when available. 

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with their launch 

manifests, we interviewed NASA Launch Services offi cials and offi cials 

from one of NASA’s contracted providers for launch services about 

project launch scheduling, launch windows, and projects that missed 

their opportunities. Launch manifest was considered a challenge if, after 

establishing a fi rm launch date, a project had diffi culty rescheduling its 

launch date because it was not ready, if the project could be affected by 

another project slipping its launch, or if there were launch vehicle fl eet 

issues. Projects that have not yet entered into the implementation phase 

have not yet set a fi rm launch date and were therefore not assessed.

In addition, NASA received an appropriation from the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). NASA provided a record of projects 

involved in our review that received ARRA funds. 

The individual project offi ces were given an opportunity to comment on 

and provide technical clarifi cations to the 2-page assessments prior to their 

inclusion in the fi nal product.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to February 2010 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain suffi cient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our fi ndings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives.

Page 75 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
GAO has previously conducted work on NASA’s acquisition policy for spacefl ight systems, and in particular, on its alignment with a knowledge-based 

approach to system acquisitions. The fi gure below depicts this alignment.

Figure 3: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based Approach

Appendix III: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

Concept and technology development Production

Management decision reviews

Pre-NAR = preliminary non-advocate review SDR = system definition review

NAR = non-advocate review PDR = preliminary design review

Techincal reviews

KDP = key decision point CDR = critical design review

KDP E KDP F

CDR

KDP A KDP B KDP D

SDR PDR

KDP C Program start

Knowledge-based approach

NASA’s life cycle for flight systems and ground support projects

Formulation

PreNAR NAR

Implementation

Pre-phase A

Concept

studies

Phase A

Concept

development

Phase B

Preliminary

design and 

technology

completion

Phase C

Final design 

and fabrication

Phase D

System assembly, 

integration and test, launch

Phase E

Operations and 

sustainment

Phase F

Closeout

Product development

Knowledge point 1 (KP1)

Technologies, time, funding, 

and other resources match 

customer needs 

Knowledge point 2 (KP2)

Design performs as expected

Knowledge point 3 (KP3)

Production meets cost,

schedule, and quality targets

Integration Demonstration

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis.

Page 76 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix III: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

As the fi gure shows, NASA’s policy defi nes a project life cycle in two 

phases—the formulation30 and implementation31 phases, which are 

further divided into incremental pieces: Phase A through Phase F. Project 

formulation consists of Phases A and B, during which time the projects 

develop and defi ne the project requirements and cost/schedule basis and 

design for implementation, including an acquisition strategy. During the 

end of the formulation phase, leading up to the preliminary design review 

(PDR)32 and non-advocate review (NAR),33 the project team completes its 

preliminary design and technology development. NASA Interim Directive 

NM 7120-81 for NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space 

Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, specify that the 

project complete development of mission-critical or enabling technology, 

as needed, with demonstrated evidence of required technology qualifi cation 

(i.e., component and/or breadboard validation in the relevant environment) 

documented in a technology readiness assessment report. The project must 

also develop, document, and maintain a project management baseline34 

that includes the integrated master schedule and baseline life-cycle cost 

estimate. Implementing these requirements brings the project closer to 

30 NASA defi nes formulation as the identifi cation of how the program or project supports 

the agency’s strategic needs, goals, and objectives; the assessment of feasibility, technology 

and concepts; risk assessment, team building, development of operations concepts and 

acquisition strategies; establishment of high-level requirements and success criteria; the 

preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules essential to the success of a program or 

project; and the establishment of control systems to ensure performance to those plans and 

alignment with current agency strategies. NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1(a) (Sept. 22, 

2009).

31 The implementation phase is defi ned as the execution of approved plans for the 

development and operation of the program/project, and the use of control systems to ensure 

performance to approved plans and continued alignment with the agency’s strategic needs, 

goals, and objectives. NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1(c) (Sept. 22, 2009).

32 According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-7 (Sept. 22, 2009), the PDR demonstrates that 

the preliminary design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the 

cost and schedule constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. 

It shows that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been identifi ed, 

and verifi cation methods have been described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as 

risk assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented.

33 According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Appendix A (Sept. 22, 2009), a non-advocate review 

(NAR) is comprised of the analysis of a proposed program or project by a (non-advocate) 

team composed of management, technical, and resources experts (personnel) from outside 

the advocacy chain of the proposed program or project. It provides agency management 

with an independent assessment of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into 

implementation.

34 The management baseline is the integrated set of requirements, cost, schedule, technical 

content, and associated joint confi dence level that forms the foundation for program or 

project execution and reporting done as part of NASA’s performance assessment and 

governance process. NID for NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.1.8.2 and Appendix A (Sept. 22, 

2009).

Page 77 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Appendix III: NASA Life Cycle For Flight 

Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based 

Approach

ensuring that resources and needs match, but it is not fully consistent with 

knowledge point 1 of the knowledge-based acquisition life-cycle. Our best 

practices show that demonstrating technology maturity at this point in the 

system life cycle should include a system or subsystem model or prototype 

demonstration in a relevant environment, not only component validation. 

As written, NASA’s policy does not require full technology maturity before a 

project enters the implementation phase. 

After project confi rmation, the project begins implementation, consisting 

of phases C, D, E, and F. During phases C and D, the project performs 

fi nal design and fabrication as well as testing of components and system 

assembly, integration, test, and launch. Phases E and F consist of 

operations and sustainment and project closeout. A second design review, 

the critical design review (CDR),35 is held during the implementation phase 

toward the end of phase C. The purpose of the CDR is to demonstrate that 

the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full 

scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Though this review is not 

a formal decision review, its requirements for a mature design and ability 

to meet mission performance requirements within the identifi ed cost and 

schedule constraints are similar to knowledge expected at knowledge point 

2 of the knowledge-based acquisition life-cycle. Furthermore, after CDR, 

the project must be approved at KDP D before continuing into the next 

phase.

The NASA acquisition life-cycle lacks a major decision review at knowledge 

point 3 to demonstrate that production processes are mature. According to 

NASA offi cials, the agency rarely enters a formal production phase due to 

the small quantities of space systems that they build.

35 According to NID for NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-7 (Sept. 22, 2009), the CDR demonstrates that 

the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, 

assembly, integration, and test, and that the technical effort is on track to complete the 

fl ight and ground system development and mission operations in order to meet mission 

performance requirements within the identifi ed cost and schedule constraints. Progress 

against management plans, budget, and schedule, as well as risk assessments are presented.

Page 78 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Technology readiness level Description Hardware Demonstration environment

1. Basic principles observed 

and reported.

Lowest level of technology 

readiness. Scientifi c research 

begins to be translated into applied 

research and development. 

Examples might include paper 

studies of a technology’s basic 

properties

None (paper studies and 

analysis)

None

2. Technology concept and/or 

application formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic 

principles are observed, practical 

applications can be invented. The 

application is speculative and there 

is no proof or detailed analysis to 

support the assumption. Examples 

are still limited to paper studies.

None (paper studies and 

analysis)

None

3. Analytical and experimental 

critical function and/

or characteristic proof of 

concept.

Active research and development 

is initiated. This includes analytical 

studies and laboratory studies 

to physically validate analytical 

predictions of separate elements 

of the technology. Examples 

include components that are not yet 

integrated or representative.

Analytical studies 

and demonstration of 

nonscale individual 

components (pieces of 

subsystem).

Lab

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. 

Validation in laboratory 

environment.

Basic technological components 

are integrated to establish that the 

pieces will work together. This is 

relatively “low fi delity” compared 

to the eventual system. Examples 

include integration of “ad hoc” 

hardware in a laboratory. 

Low fi delity breadboard. 

Integration of nonscale 

components to show 

pieces will work 

together. Not fully 

functional or form or 

fi t but representative 

of technically feasible 

approach suitable for 

fl ight articles. 

Lab

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

relevant environment. 

Fidelity of breadboard technology 

increases signifi cantly. The basic 

technological components are 

integrated with reasonably realistic 

supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a 

simulated environment. Examples 

include “high fi delity” laboratory 

integration of components. 

High fi delity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent 

but not necessarily 

form and/or fi t (size 

weight, materials, etc). 

Should be approaching 

appropriate scale. May 

include integration of 

several components 

with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems 

to demonstrate 

functionality. 

Lab demonstrating functionality 

but not form and fi t. May include 

fl ight demonstrating breadboard 

in surrogate aircraft. Technology 

ready for detailed design studies.

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 79 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Technology readiness level Description Hardware Demonstration environment

6. System/subsystem model 

or prototype demonstration in 

a relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype 

system, which is well beyond the 

breadboard tested for TRL 5, is 

tested in a relevant environment. 

Represents a major step up in 

a technology’s demonstrated 

readiness. Examples include 

testing a prototype in a high fi delity 

laboratory environment or in 

simulated realistic environment.

Prototype. 

Should be very close 

to form, fi t and function. 

Probably includes the 

integration of many 

new components and 

realistic supporting 

elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate 

full functionality of the 

subsystem.

High-fi delity lab demonstration 

or limited/restricted fl ight 

demonstration for a relevant 

environment. Integration of 

technology is well defi ned.

7. System prototype 

demonstration in a realistic 

environment.

Prototype near or at planned 

operational system. Represents a 

major step up from TRL 6, requiring 

the demonstration of an actual 

system prototype in a realistic 

environment, such as in an aircraft, 

vehicle or space. Examples include 

testing the prototype in a test bed 

aircraft. 

Prototype. Should be 

form, fi t and function 

integrated with other 

key supporting 

elements/subsystems 

to demonstrate 

full functionality of 

subsystem. 

Flight demonstration in 

representative realistic environment 

such as fl ying test bed or 

demonstrator aircraft. 

Technology is well substantiated 

with test data.

8. Actual system completed 

and “fl ight qualifi ed” through 

test and demonstration.

Technology has been proven to 

work in its fi nal form and under 

expected conditions. In almost all 

cases, this TRL represents the 

end of true system development. 

Examples include developmental 

test and evaluation of the system 

in its intended weapon system 

to determine if it meets design 

specifi cations.

Flight qualifi ed hardware Development Test and Evaluation 

(DT&E) in the actual system 

application

9. Actual system “fl ight 

proven” through successful 

mission operations. 

Actual application of the technology 

in its fi nal form and under 

mission conditions, such as those 

encountered in operational test 

and evaluation. In almost all 

cases, this is the end of the last 

“bug fi xing” aspects of true system 

development. Examples include 

using the system under operational 

mission conditions.

Actual system in fi nal 

form

Operational Test and Evaluation 

(OT&E) in operational mission 

conditions

 Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels

Page 80 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
There are 7 NASA projects in our review, including all of those in 

formulation, that are receiving money from the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.36 See table 4 below for the NASA 

projects in our review receiving this funding and the intended use of those 

funds.

Table 4: ARRA Funding for Reviewed NASA Projects

Project

ARRA funds

(in millions) NASA’s Intended use of funds

Aquarius $15.6 Maintain the current workforce through the launch. • 

Ares I $108.9 Manufacture and assemble multiple Ares J2-X engine components and • 

 subsystems for development testing.

• Ares Upper Stage Vertical Assembly Tool materials, test equipment, 

 engineering analysis and manufacturing process development at Marshall 

 Space Flight Center.

• Completion of the Ares A-3 Test Stand and preparation for test operations.

Glory $21.0 Maintain the current contractor workforce through the launch. • 

GPM $32.0 Accelerate construction of the GPM Microwave Imager (GMI) instruments • 

 to ensure successful launch of the mission at the earliest possible 

 opportunity.

JWST $75.0 Spacecraft development activities including design and fabrication of key • 

 component systems to increase the likelihood that JWST will launch on 

 the planned launch date.

LDCM $51.6 Initiate development of the TIRS and integration of the instrument onto • 

 the spacecraft.

Orion $165.9 Reduce schedule risk by initiating purchases of long lead components and • 

 moving forward with the design of Orion Engineering Development Units.

• Reduce technical risk by adding additional fi delity to the Orion Ground 

 Test Articles.

• Technology development testing to improve the crew safety of the Orion

 spacecraft.

 Source: GAO presentation of data provided by NASA.

36 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, Division A, Title II (2009).

Appendix V: NASA Projects Receiving 

Additional Funding

Page 81 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant Director; 

Jessica M. Berkholtz; Greg Campbell; Richard A. Cederholm; Kristine R. 

Hassinger; Jeff R. Jensen; Kenneth E. Patton; Brian A. Tittle; and Letisha T. 

Watson made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

(120820) Page 82 GAO-10-227SP Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and GAO’s Mission investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost Obtaining Copies of is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

GAO Reports and posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, Testimony go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

Order by Phone 	 The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Contact: To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Relations Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 Public Affairs U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548