Panel 5—Short —8 7

⁄16” x 11”

A good example of the technology-based approach is the DOD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program.

Essentially, this program allows the scientist and the customer to

insert a technology into an experimental operational environment

and to see how it functions. These demonstrations evaluate the military utility of a particular technology to determine if it should be

further developed or fielded and initiate the development of desired

characteristics. This program is helping pursue several nonlethal

capabilities today.

JNLWP also investigates promising technologies outside the

ACTD process and helps explore new opportunities for their use.

Current investigations include evaluation of previously mentioned

technologies, such as the pulsed

energy projectile, a nonlethal round

for the new Objective Individual

Combat Weapon, and a breakable

mortar munition that could be used

to deliver nonlethal payloads.

The central issue regarding

nonlethal counterpersonnel capabilities is understanding their

human effects. These capabilities

must have reliable and repeatable effects. The resulting target

response must also be predictable. Quantifying these two parameters—effect on target and target response—is essential so that field

commanders have full confidence in calling for their use.

In addition, the real challenge for nonlethal weapon program

managers is designing a weapon that will be both effective and primarily nonlethal against the span of the human population. Meeting

this challenge has required breaking new ground in defense acquisition processes. A Human Effects Center of Excellence has been

established at Brooks Air Force Base to serve as a central repository

for nonlethal human effects data and to support DOD nonlethal

weapon program managers in human effects analysis. A pilot process

has also been implemented in which JNLWP managers have their

human effects analyses reviewed by an independent Human Effects

Review Board (HERB). This board, consisting of representatives

from the Armed Forces medical branches, assists and advises nonlethal weapon program managers in regard to planning and conducting target human effects evaluations. As a complement to the

HERB review, a nongovernmental Human Effects Advisory Panel,

consisting of experts from academia, may be convened to provide an

opinion. This second review is intended to support customer confidence and to facilitate public acceptance as we move forward in

fielding new and potentially controversial technologies.

Acceptance of nonlethal capabilities will depend heavily on

education and training. Both critics and supporters of nonlethal

capabilities within DOD must be educated to understand what these

capabilities provide. This education begins with instruction at all

levels in service and joint schools. It also includes combatant commander awareness regarding existing and emerging capabilities.

After education has provided awareness of the contributions of

nonlethal capabilities, training will be needed to build confidence in

their employment. In tactical situations, commanders must quickly

decide which options in the force continuum to use. They must

understand and have confidence in the effectiveness of these systems and must intrinsically understand how targets might respond

once engaged. The Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons

Instructor Course helps build this confidence by preparing trainers

to educate units and to insert nonlethal capabilities training into

recurring unit and individual training events.

Realizing new nonlethal capabilities also will require acceptance by policymakers. This, too, demands education. All policymakers must be made aware of the capabilities that exist, and they must

be comfortable with how we propose to employ them. More importantly, military leaders must demonstrate how these capabilities

meet tactical and operational

requirements placed on their

forces. We must demonstrate how

these capabilities enhance our

ability to accomplish the full spectrum of missions assigned in the

face of new realities.

To convince policymakers to

support the procurement and

employment of nonlethal capabilities, we need to do more than just

assert that our forces need these

capabilities. Policymakers often must weigh public acceptance of a

program before providing support. Educating the public on nonlethal

capabilities is critical because most of these capabilities are relatively

new to domestic and international publics. Yet not everyone will

accept these capabilities solely because they are intended to be nonlethal. Some will argue that these capabilities, if misused or in the

wrong hands, may have catastrophic results. Some have called on the

United Nations to scrutinize them. The process of educating the

domestic and international public should include making a strong

case not only for our need but also of our intent and what these capabilities can realistically accomplish. To be effective, we will need to

demonstrate that tests of the human effects of these capabilities produce reliable results—a major effort of the JNLWP.

Appropriately, policymakers also want the assurance that

these new capabilities comply with our domestic and international

legal obligations, including those under the Law of War. DOD

Instruction 5000.2 requires that all weapons, weapon systems, and

munitions undergo a legal review to ensure that they comply with

these legal obligations. DOD Directive 3000.3 subjects all nonlethal

weapons and weapon systems to the same scrutiny. Crucial to the

legal review is whether the weapon is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering—whether its normal and expected use would cause

injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to the military

necessity of using the weapon. Nonlethal capabilities generally are

designed to minimize injury and do not run afoul of this proscription. In addition, the legal review examines whether the weapon can

be used in such a way as to discriminate between legitimate targets

and innocent civilians. All nonlethal capabilities will be designed to

pass this test, also. Finally, the legal review examines whether any

specific treaties or agreements, such as arms control agreements,

March 2002 Defense Horizons 5 

the real challenge for nonlethal

weapon program managers is

designing a weapon that will be

both effective and primarily

nonlethal against the span of

the human population
Panel 2—8 

1

⁄2” x 11” 

commanders. They can help save the lives of all service members.

They can break the cycle of violence by offering a more graduated

response. They may even prevent violence from occurring if the

opportunity for early or preclusionary engagement arises. Realizing

the full potential of nonlethal capabilities means harnessing and

directing existing technologies as well as developing future ones. It

means educating policymakers about the best use of these technologies. It also means creating and sustaining a balance among

the operational, technical, and policy tenets of these new battlespace effects.

Tremendous misperceptions exist about nonlethal capabilities.

Some view them as substitutes for lethality. Others see them as

symptoms of a softer military. However,

nothing could be further from the truth.

Nonlethal capabilities were designed

to alleviate operational deficiencies. American forces found themselves inadequately

equipped to handle the situations of the

chaotic post-Cold War world. Armed only

with lethal options, U.S. troops were limited in what they could do to stop masses of

refugees from storming food supplies,

interrupting military operations, or intermingling with hostile

threats. In such situations, lethal force alone has not been—nor will

it ever be—the best option.

A vulnerability gap also exists between military presence and

lethal force—a gap that has been readily exploited in unconscionable ways throughout the past decade. In Somalia, for example,

armed clansmen used women and children for cover as they maneuvered against U.S. troops. Iraq often placed human shields at key

facilities to deter air attacks. In Kosovo, Serbian forces herded

Albanian refugees around military targets and then blamed allied air

strikes for their deaths. The perception in the United States is that

the American people have long been averse to unnecessary casualties in conflict. Within a crisis region, sole reliance on lethal force

may do more to strengthen resistance than weaken it, and thus harm

our strategic interests. The new precision, accuracy, and duration of

effect offered by nonlethal capabilities will aid future commanders

in such complex and highly charged political environments.

This growing interest in nonlethal weapons is a logical response

to the changing global security environment. The world population is

expected to exceed 8 billion within 3 decades. Most of the growth is

expected to occur in less developed regions, with the greatest growth

concentrations in urban areas. Given this change in demographics,

America and its allies could find themselves in volatile situations,

confronting seemingly faceless enemies who operate in the midst of

vulnerable groups of noncombatants. Nonlethal capabilities are certain to become increasingly relevant in this nascent environment.

Policy and Technologies

The Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) has grown out

of the need to address emerging threats. In the aftermath of Somalia, Congress mandated a nonlethal weapons program with

“improved budgetary focus and management direction.” In July 1996,

the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its policy on nonlethal

weapons, designating the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the

executive agent for the DOD program.

The DOD policy provided the initial program framework. First,

it defines nonlethal weapons as being designed and primarily

employed so as to incapacitate personnel and materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property

and the environment. It also states that

nonlethal weapons are intended to have

relatively reversible effects on personnel

and equipment.

Furthermore, the DOD policy

addresses many misperceptions about nonlethal weapons. Specifically, it states that

these weapons do not guarantee zero probability of fatality or permanent injury prevention. They are designed

to minimize fatalities and permanent injuries. The policy also

emphasizes that nonlethal weapons do not preclude the first use of

lethal force when appropriate. It highlights that the weapons may be

used in conjunction with lethal force. Additionally, the policy states

that nonlethal weapons do not limit authority to use all necessary

means of self-defense.

Since its establishment in 1997, JNLWP has sought to meet commanders’ needs with respect to the new reality of asymmetric

warfighting. Initially, JNLWP assessed the many existing technologies

that have become nonlethal capabilities. These capability sets as

fielded by the services are characterized by relatively low-end technologies—pepper spray, blunt impact rounds, and protective riot control equipment. Most munitions in the present capability sets are

based upon current law enforcement needs—all of which are principally designed for close-in (5–15 meters) engagement.

The current capability sets are intended to provide U.S. forces

with an initial, albeit interim, nonlethal capability. Although they are

considered interim capabilities, they have nonetheless proven effective. The U.S. Army 709th Military Police (MP) Battalion used them

near Sevce, Kosovo, in April 2000, when faced with large crowds

throwing rocks and sticks, blocking the only egress road. The MPs

seized the initiative, using nonlethal 40-millimeter sting balls and

sponge grenades. The crowds dispersed, and the MPs departed. In

February 2001, another incident in Kosovo resulted in the use of

items from nonlethal capability sets. The incident was resolved without casualties after several volleys of nonlethal munitions.

Of particular interest in this engagement were the tactical

adaptations made by young leaders on the ground. Limited by short

range, they intuitively adjusted their movement and fire techniques.

Employing volley fires and rushing tactics, the initiative was gained

and maintained, forcing the hostile agitators to disperse. These

engagements are clear examples of how nonlethal capabilities can

March 2002 Defense Horizons 2 

this growing interest in

nonlethal weapons 

is a logical response 

to the changing global

security environment

Lieutentant General E. R. Bedard, USMC, is currently the Deputy Commandant,

Plans, Policies, and Operations, of the United States Marine Corps. Additionally,

he serves as Chairman of the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program Integrated

Product Team of the Department of Defense.
Panel 2—8 

1

⁄2” x 11” 

commanders. They can help save the lives of all service members.

They can break the cycle of violence by offering a more graduated

response. They may even prevent violence from occurring if the

opportunity for early or preclusionary engagement arises. Realizing

the full potential of nonlethal capabilities means harnessing and

directing existing technologies as well as developing future ones. It

means educating policymakers about the best use of these technologies. It also means creating and sustaining a balance among

the operational, technical, and policy tenets of these new battlespace effects.

Tremendous misperceptions exist about nonlethal capabilities.

Some view them as substitutes for lethality. Others see them as

symptoms of a softer military. However,

nothing could be further from the truth.

Nonlethal capabilities were designed

to alleviate operational deficiencies. American forces found themselves inadequately

equipped to handle the situations of the

chaotic post-Cold War world. Armed only

with lethal options, U.S. troops were limited in what they could do to stop masses of

refugees from storming food supplies,

interrupting military operations, or intermingling with hostile

threats. In such situations, lethal force alone has not been—nor will

it ever be—the best option.

A vulnerability gap also exists between military presence and

lethal force—a gap that has been readily exploited in unconscionable ways throughout the past decade. In Somalia, for example,

armed clansmen used women and children for cover as they maneuvered against U.S. troops. Iraq often placed human shields at key

facilities to deter air attacks. In Kosovo, Serbian forces herded

Albanian refugees around military targets and then blamed allied air

strikes for their deaths. The perception in the United States is that

the American people have long been averse to unnecessary casualties in conflict. Within a crisis region, sole reliance on lethal force

may do more to strengthen resistance than weaken it, and thus harm

our strategic interests. The new precision, accuracy, and duration of

effect offered by nonlethal capabilities will aid future commanders

in such complex and highly charged political environments.

This growing interest in nonlethal weapons is a logical response

to the changing global security environment. The world population is

expected to exceed 8 billion within 3 decades. Most of the growth is

expected to occur in less developed regions, with the greatest growth

concentrations in urban areas. Given this change in demographics,

America and its allies could find themselves in volatile situations,

confronting seemingly faceless enemies who operate in the midst of

vulnerable groups of noncombatants. Nonlethal capabilities are certain to become increasingly relevant in this nascent environment.

Policy and Technologies

The Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) has grown out

of the need to address emerging threats. In the aftermath of Somalia, Congress mandated a nonlethal weapons program with

“improved budgetary focus and management direction.” In July 1996,

the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its policy on nonlethal

weapons, designating the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the

executive agent for the DOD program.

The DOD policy provided the initial program framework. First,

it defines nonlethal weapons as being designed and primarily

employed so as to incapacitate personnel and materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property

and the environment. It also states that

nonlethal weapons are intended to have

relatively reversible effects on personnel

and equipment.

Furthermore, the DOD policy

addresses many misperceptions about nonlethal weapons. Specifically, it states that

these weapons do not guarantee zero probability of fatality or permanent injury prevention. They are designed

to minimize fatalities and permanent injuries. The policy also

emphasizes that nonlethal weapons do not preclude the first use of

lethal force when appropriate. It highlights that the weapons may be

used in conjunction with lethal force. Additionally, the policy states

that nonlethal weapons do not limit authority to use all necessary

means of self-defense.

Since its establishment in 1997, JNLWP has sought to meet commanders’ needs with respect to the new reality of asymmetric

warfighting. Initially, JNLWP assessed the many existing technologies

that have become nonlethal capabilities. These capability sets as

fielded by the services are characterized by relatively low-end technologies—pepper spray, blunt impact rounds, and protective riot control equipment. Most munitions in the present capability sets are

based upon current law enforcement needs—all of which are principally designed for close-in (5–15 meters) engagement.

The current capability sets are intended to provide U.S. forces

with an initial, albeit interim, nonlethal capability. Although they are

considered interim capabilities, they have nonetheless proven effective. The U.S. Army 709th Military Police (MP) Battalion used them

near Sevce, Kosovo, in April 2000, when faced with large crowds

throwing rocks and sticks, blocking the only egress road. The MPs

seized the initiative, using nonlethal 40-millimeter sting balls and

sponge grenades. The crowds dispersed, and the MPs departed. In

February 2001, another incident in Kosovo resulted in the use of

items from nonlethal capability sets. The incident was resolved without casualties after several volleys of nonlethal munitions.

Of particular interest in this engagement were the tactical

adaptations made by young leaders on the ground. Limited by short

range, they intuitively adjusted their movement and fire techniques.

Employing volley fires and rushing tactics, the initiative was gained

and maintained, forcing the hostile agitators to disperse. These

engagements are clear examples of how nonlethal capabilities can

March 2002 Defense Horizons 2 

this growing interest in

nonlethal weapons 

is a logical response 

to the changing global

security environment

Lieutentant General E. R. Bedard, USMC, is currently the Deputy Commandant,

Plans, Policies, and Operations, of the United States Marine Corps. Additionally,

he serves as Chairman of the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program Integrated

Product Team of the Department of Defense.
Panel 2—8 

1

⁄2” x 11” 

commanders. They can help save the lives of all service members.

They can break the cycle of violence by offering a more graduated

response. They may even prevent violence from occurring if the

opportunity for early or preclusionary engagement arises. Realizing

the full potential of nonlethal capabilities means harnessing and

directing existing technologies as well as developing future ones. It

means educating policymakers about the best use of these technologies. It also means creating and sustaining a balance among

the operational, technical, and policy tenets of these new battlespace effects.

Tremendous misperceptions exist about nonlethal capabilities.

Some view them as substitutes for lethality. Others see them as

symptoms of a softer military. However,

nothing could be further from the truth.

Nonlethal capabilities were designed

to alleviate operational deficiencies. American forces found themselves inadequately

equipped to handle the situations of the

chaotic post-Cold War world. Armed only

with lethal options, U.S. troops were limited in what they could do to stop masses of

refugees from storming food supplies,

interrupting military operations, or intermingling with hostile

threats. In such situations, lethal force alone has not been—nor will

it ever be—the best option.

A vulnerability gap also exists between military presence and

lethal force—a gap that has been readily exploited in unconscionable ways throughout the past decade. In Somalia, for example,

armed clansmen used women and children for cover as they maneuvered against U.S. troops. Iraq often placed human shields at key

facilities to deter air attacks. In Kosovo, Serbian forces herded

Albanian refugees around military targets and then blamed allied air

strikes for their deaths. The perception in the United States is that

the American people have long been averse to unnecessary casualties in conflict. Within a crisis region, sole reliance on lethal force

may do more to strengthen resistance than weaken it, and thus harm

our strategic interests. The new precision, accuracy, and duration of

effect offered by nonlethal capabilities will aid future commanders

in such complex and highly charged political environments.

This growing interest in nonlethal weapons is a logical response

to the changing global security environment. The world population is

expected to exceed 8 billion within 3 decades. Most of the growth is

expected to occur in less developed regions, with the greatest growth

concentrations in urban areas. Given this change in demographics,

America and its allies could find themselves in volatile situations,

confronting seemingly faceless enemies who operate in the midst of

vulnerable groups of noncombatants. Nonlethal capabilities are certain to become increasingly relevant in this nascent environment.

Policy and Technologies

The Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) has grown out

of the need to address emerging threats. In the aftermath of Somalia, Congress mandated a nonlethal weapons program with

“improved budgetary focus and management direction.” In July 1996,

the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its policy on nonlethal

weapons, designating the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the

executive agent for the DOD program.

The DOD policy provided the initial program framework. First,

it defines nonlethal weapons as being designed and primarily

employed so as to incapacitate personnel and materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property

and the environment. It also states that

nonlethal weapons are intended to have

relatively reversible effects on personnel

and equipment.

Furthermore, the DOD policy

addresses many misperceptions about nonlethal weapons. Specifically, it states that

these weapons do not guarantee zero probability of fatality or permanent injury prevention. They are designed

to minimize fatalities and permanent injuries. The policy also

emphasizes that nonlethal weapons do not preclude the first use of

lethal force when appropriate. It highlights that the weapons may be

used in conjunction with lethal force. Additionally, the policy states

that nonlethal weapons do not limit authority to use all necessary

means of self-defense.

Since its establishment in 1997, JNLWP has sought to meet commanders’ needs with respect to the new reality of asymmetric

warfighting. Initially, JNLWP assessed the many existing technologies

that have become nonlethal capabilities. These capability sets as

fielded by the services are characterized by relatively low-end technologies—pepper spray, blunt impact rounds, and protective riot control equipment. Most munitions in the present capability sets are

based upon current law enforcement needs—all of which are principally designed for close-in (5–15 meters) engagement.

The current capability sets are intended to provide U.S. forces

with an initial, albeit interim, nonlethal capability. Although they are

considered interim capabilities, they have nonetheless proven effective. The U.S. Army 709th Military Police (MP) Battalion used them

near Sevce, Kosovo, in April 2000, when faced with large crowds

throwing rocks and sticks, blocking the only egress road. The MPs

seized the initiative, using nonlethal 40-millimeter sting balls and

sponge grenades. The crowds dispersed, and the MPs departed. In

February 2001, another incident in Kosovo resulted in the use of

items from nonlethal capability sets. The incident was resolved without casualties after several volleys of nonlethal munitions.

Of particular interest in this engagement were the tactical

adaptations made by young leaders on the ground. Limited by short

range, they intuitively adjusted their movement and fire techniques.

Employing volley fires and rushing tactics, the initiative was gained

and maintained, forcing the hostile agitators to disperse. These

engagements are clear examples of how nonlethal capabilities can

March 2002 Defense Horizons 2 

this growing interest in

nonlethal weapons 

is a logical response 

to the changing global

security environment

Lieutentant General E. R. Bedard, USMC, is currently the Deputy Commandant,

Plans, Policies, and Operations, of the United States Marine Corps. Additionally,

he serves as Chairman of the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program Integrated

Product Team of the Department of Defense.
Panel 5—Short —8 7

⁄16” x 11”

A good example of the technology-based approach is the DOD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program.

Essentially, this program allows the scientist and the customer to

insert a technology into an experimental operational environment

and to see how it functions. These demonstrations evaluate the military utility of a particular technology to determine if it should be

further developed or fielded and initiate the development of desired

characteristics. This program is helping pursue several nonlethal

capabilities today.

JNLWP also investigates promising technologies outside the

ACTD process and helps explore new opportunities for their use.

Current investigations include evaluation of previously mentioned

technologies, such as the pulsed

energy projectile, a nonlethal round

for the new Objective Individual

Combat Weapon, and a breakable

mortar munition that could be used

to deliver nonlethal payloads.

The central issue regarding

nonlethal counterpersonnel capabilities is understanding their

human effects. These capabilities

must have reliable and repeatable effects. The resulting target

response must also be predictable. Quantifying these two parameters—effect on target and target response—is essential so that field

commanders have full confidence in calling for their use.

In addition, the real challenge for nonlethal weapon program

managers is designing a weapon that will be both effective and primarily nonlethal against the span of the human population. Meeting

this challenge has required breaking new ground in defense acquisition processes. A Human Effects Center of Excellence has been

established at Brooks Air Force Base to serve as a central repository

for nonlethal human effects data and to support DOD nonlethal

weapon program managers in human effects analysis. A pilot process

has also been implemented in which JNLWP managers have their

human effects analyses reviewed by an independent Human Effects

Review Board (HERB). This board, consisting of representatives

from the Armed Forces medical branches, assists and advises nonlethal weapon program managers in regard to planning and conducting target human effects evaluations. As a complement to the

HERB review, a nongovernmental Human Effects Advisory Panel,

consisting of experts from academia, may be convened to provide an

opinion. This second review is intended to support customer confidence and to facilitate public acceptance as we move forward in

fielding new and potentially controversial technologies.

Acceptance of nonlethal capabilities will depend heavily on

education and training. Both critics and supporters of nonlethal

capabilities within DOD must be educated to understand what these

capabilities provide. This education begins with instruction at all

levels in service and joint schools. It also includes combatant commander awareness regarding existing and emerging capabilities.

After education has provided awareness of the contributions of

nonlethal capabilities, training will be needed to build confidence in

their employment. In tactical situations, commanders must quickly

decide which options in the force continuum to use. They must

understand and have confidence in the effectiveness of these systems and must intrinsically understand how targets might respond

once engaged. The Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons

Instructor Course helps build this confidence by preparing trainers

to educate units and to insert nonlethal capabilities training into

recurring unit and individual training events.

Realizing new nonlethal capabilities also will require acceptance by policymakers. This, too, demands education. All policymakers must be made aware of the capabilities that exist, and they must

be comfortable with how we propose to employ them. More importantly, military leaders must demonstrate how these capabilities

meet tactical and operational

requirements placed on their

forces. We must demonstrate how

these capabilities enhance our

ability to accomplish the full spectrum of missions assigned in the

face of new realities.

To convince policymakers to

support the procurement and

employment of nonlethal capabilities, we need to do more than just

assert that our forces need these

capabilities. Policymakers often must weigh public acceptance of a

program before providing support. Educating the public on nonlethal

capabilities is critical because most of these capabilities are relatively

new to domestic and international publics. Yet not everyone will

accept these capabilities solely because they are intended to be nonlethal. Some will argue that these capabilities, if misused or in the

wrong hands, may have catastrophic results. Some have called on the

United Nations to scrutinize them. The process of educating the

domestic and international public should include making a strong

case not only for our need but also of our intent and what these capabilities can realistically accomplish. To be effective, we will need to

demonstrate that tests of the human effects of these capabilities produce reliable results—a major effort of the JNLWP.

Appropriately, policymakers also want the assurance that

these new capabilities comply with our domestic and international

legal obligations, including those under the Law of War. DOD

Instruction 5000.2 requires that all weapons, weapon systems, and

munitions undergo a legal review to ensure that they comply with

these legal obligations. DOD Directive 3000.3 subjects all nonlethal

weapons and weapon systems to the same scrutiny. Crucial to the

legal review is whether the weapon is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering—whether its normal and expected use would cause

injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to the military

necessity of using the weapon. Nonlethal capabilities generally are

designed to minimize injury and do not run afoul of this proscription. In addition, the legal review examines whether the weapon can

be used in such a way as to discriminate between legitimate targets

and innocent civilians. All nonlethal capabilities will be designed to

pass this test, also. Finally, the legal review examines whether any

specific treaties or agreements, such as arms control agreements,

March 2002 Defense Horizons 5 

the real challenge for nonlethal

weapon program managers is

designing a weapon that will be

both effective and primarily

nonlethal against the span of

the human population
Panel 5—Short —8 7

⁄16” x 11”

A good example of the technology-based approach is the DOD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program.

Essentially, this program allows the scientist and the customer to

insert a technology into an experimental operational environment

and to see how it functions. These demonstrations evaluate the military utility of a particular technology to determine if it should be

further developed or fielded and initiate the development of desired

characteristics. This program is helping pursue several nonlethal

capabilities today.

JNLWP also investigates promising technologies outside the

ACTD process and helps explore new opportunities for their use.

Current investigations include evaluation of previously mentioned

technologies, such as the pulsed

energy projectile, a nonlethal round

for the new Objective Individual

Combat Weapon, and a breakable

mortar munition that could be used

to deliver nonlethal payloads.

The central issue regarding

nonlethal counterpersonnel capabilities is understanding their

human effects. These capabilities

must have reliable and repeatable effects. The resulting target

response must also be predictable. Quantifying these two parameters—effect on target and target response—is essential so that field

commanders have full confidence in calling for their use.

In addition, the real challenge for nonlethal weapon program

managers is designing a weapon that will be both effective and primarily nonlethal against the span of the human population. Meeting

this challenge has required breaking new ground in defense acquisition processes. A Human Effects Center of Excellence has been

established at Brooks Air Force Base to serve as a central repository

for nonlethal human effects data and to support DOD nonlethal

weapon program managers in human effects analysis. A pilot process

has also been implemented in which JNLWP managers have their

human effects analyses reviewed by an independent Human Effects

Review Board (HERB). This board, consisting of representatives

from the Armed Forces medical branches, assists and advises nonlethal weapon program managers in regard to planning and conducting target human effects evaluations. As a complement to the

HERB review, a nongovernmental Human Effects Advisory Panel,

consisting of experts from academia, may be convened to provide an

opinion. This second review is intended to support customer confidence and to facilitate public acceptance as we move forward in

fielding new and potentially controversial technologies.

Acceptance of nonlethal capabilities will depend heavily on

education and training. Both critics and supporters of nonlethal

capabilities within DOD must be educated to understand what these

capabilities provide. This education begins with instruction at all

levels in service and joint schools. It also includes combatant commander awareness regarding existing and emerging capabilities.

After education has provided awareness of the contributions of

nonlethal capabilities, training will be needed to build confidence in

their employment. In tactical situations, commanders must quickly

decide which options in the force continuum to use. They must

understand and have confidence in the effectiveness of these systems and must intrinsically understand how targets might respond

once engaged. The Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons

Instructor Course helps build this confidence by preparing trainers

to educate units and to insert nonlethal capabilities training into

recurring unit and individual training events.

Realizing new nonlethal capabilities also will require acceptance by policymakers. This, too, demands education. All policymakers must be made aware of the capabilities that exist, and they must

be comfortable with how we propose to employ them. More importantly, military leaders must demonstrate how these capabilities

meet tactical and operational

requirements placed on their

forces. We must demonstrate how

these capabilities enhance our

ability to accomplish the full spectrum of missions assigned in the

face of new realities.

To convince policymakers to

support the procurement and

employment of nonlethal capabilities, we need to do more than just

assert that our forces need these

capabilities. Policymakers often must weigh public acceptance of a

program before providing support. Educating the public on nonlethal

capabilities is critical because most of these capabilities are relatively

new to domestic and international publics. Yet not everyone will

accept these capabilities solely because they are intended to be nonlethal. Some will argue that these capabilities, if misused or in the

wrong hands, may have catastrophic results. Some have called on the

United Nations to scrutinize them. The process of educating the

domestic and international public should include making a strong

case not only for our need but also of our intent and what these capabilities can realistically accomplish. To be effective, we will need to

demonstrate that tests of the human effects of these capabilities produce reliable results—a major effort of the JNLWP.

Appropriately, policymakers also want the assurance that

these new capabilities comply with our domestic and international

legal obligations, including those under the Law of War. DOD

Instruction 5000.2 requires that all weapons, weapon systems, and

munitions undergo a legal review to ensure that they comply with

these legal obligations. DOD Directive 3000.3 subjects all nonlethal

weapons and weapon systems to the same scrutiny. Crucial to the

legal review is whether the weapon is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering—whether its normal and expected use would cause

injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to the military

necessity of using the weapon. Nonlethal capabilities generally are

designed to minimize injury and do not run afoul of this proscription. In addition, the legal review examines whether the weapon can

be used in such a way as to discriminate between legitimate targets

and innocent civilians. All nonlethal capabilities will be designed to

pass this test, also. Finally, the legal review examines whether any

specific treaties or agreements, such as arms control agreements,

March 2002 Defense Horizons 5 

the real challenge for nonlethal

weapon program managers is

designing a weapon that will be

both effective and primarily

nonlethal against the span of

the human population