J-S29014-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHAHEED WILLIAMS,

Appellant No. 2510 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003684-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019

Appellant, Shaheed Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court’s 

August 24, 2018 order dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends that his trial 

counsel acted ineffectively by erroneously advising him that if he testified on 

his own behalf, he could be impeached with his prior, non-crimen falsi 

convictions for gun-related offenses. After careful review, we affirm.

We need not set forth the complex factual history underlying Appellant’s 

convictions for purposes of addressing the issue he raises on appeal.1 In 

regard to the procedural history of this case, the PCRA court stated:

____________________________________________

1 For a detailed summary of the facts, see PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 

10/29/18, at 2-6.
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On February 28, 2014, ... [Appellant], along with his codefendant[,] Aki Jones, was arrested and charged with Attempted 

Murder, Aggravated Assault, Intimidation of a Witness, 

Conspiracy, and Possession of a Firearm Prohibited (“VUFA 

6105”). Co-defendants Charles Alexander and Troy Cooper were 

subsequently arrested and charged in connection to the instant 

offenses. On June 8, 2015, Alexander and Cooper entered into 

open guilty pleas.1

1 On September 21, 2015, Alexander was sentenced to time 

served to twenty-three months imprisonment, plus five

years of probation for Intimidation of a Witness and 

Conspiracy. On the same date, Cooper was sentenced to 55 

to 120 months of imprisonment for Conspiracy.

On June 15, 2015, a jury convicted ... [Appellant] of Attempted 

Murder, Aggravated Assault, Intimidation of a Witness, 

Conspiracy, and “VUFA 6105.” On September 21, 2015, after 

completion of Presentence and Mental Health Reports, this [c]ourt 

sentenced ... [Appellant] to twenty to forty years[’] imprisonment 

for Attempted Murder,2 concurrent terms of five to ten years for 

Conspiracy and “VUFA 6105,” and a consecutive term of eight to 

sixteen years for Intimidation of a Witness, for a total sentence of 

twenty-eight to fifty-six years of imprisonment.3

2 The Aggravated Assault count merged with [the]

Attempted Murder charge. 

3 Jones was convicted of Attempted Murder, Aggravated 

Assault, Intimidation of a Witness, and Conspiracy. Jones

received twenty to forty years for Attempted Murder, a 

concurrent term of five to ten years for Conspiracy, and a

consecutive term of five to ten years for Intimidation of a 

Witness for a total sentence of 25-50 years[’] imprisonment. 

These sentences were imposed consecutive to a three-tosix year sentence that Jones was currently serving for

Possession of a Firearm Prohibited.

On October 13, 2015, this [c]ourt denied ... [Appellant’s] timely 

Post-Sentence Motion. ... [Appellant] appealed and on December 

16, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. 

[Commonwealth v. Williams, 159 A.3d 1005 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum)]. On July 27, 2017, the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 

[Commonwealth v. Williams, 169 A.3d 1071 (Pa. 2017).] 
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On December 8, 2017, ... [Appellant] filed a timely[,] pro se

[]PCRA[] petition, his first. On May 2, 2018, appointed PCRA 

counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to [Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and] Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)[,] and a Motion 

to Withdraw. On May 4, 2018, after independent review, this 

[c]ourt agreed that the instant petition was meritless and issued 

a Notice of Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.[2] On 

June 20, 2018, [Appellant] filed a pro se 907 Response, raising 

four new issues.4 On August 2, 2018, ... [Appellant], through 

counsel, filed an Amended Petition. On August 24, 2018, after an 

evidentiary hearing, this [c]ourt dismissed the Petition.

4 ... [Appellant] requested permission to proceed pro se and 

requested a forty-five day continuance to respond to the

[c]ourt’s 907 Notice. This [c]ourt granted a thirty-day 

continuance.

PCO at 1-2.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. It does not appear that the 

PCRA court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but it filed a 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 29, 2018. Herein, Appellant states one issue 

for our review: “Was trial counsel ineffective for giving inaccurate advice that 

vitiated Appellant’s waiver of his fundamental and personal right to testify in 

his own defense?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

To begin, we note that:

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of petition for 

relief is well-settled. We review an order of the PCRA court to 

determine whether the record supports the findings of the PCRA 

court and whether its rulings are free from legal error. To be 

eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

____________________________________________

2 While the court noted in the Rule 907 notice that Appellant’s counsel had 

filed a petition to withdraw, the court did not rule on counsel’s motion.
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resulted from one or more of the reasons set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[]

§ 9543(a)(2). 

***

In order to obtain relief under the PCRA premised upon a 

claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish 

beyond a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that 

no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. When considering such a claim, courts presume that 

counsel was effective, and place upon the appellant the burden of 

proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failure 

to assert a baseless claim.

To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective, [the 

a]ppellant must demonstrate that: (1) the claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced 

him. 

Furthermore:

to demonstrate prejudice, [the] appellant must show there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. When 

it is clear the party asserting an ineffectiveness claim has 

failed to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness 

test, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone, 

without a determination of whether the first two prongs 

have been met. Failure to meet any prong of the test will 

defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Counsel is not ineffective for 

failing to raise meritless claims.

Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned 

up). Additionally, 

[a]s our Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Nieves,

... 746 A.2d 1102 ([Pa.] 2000):

The decision of whether or not to testify on one’s own behalf 

is ultimately to be made by the defendant after full 

consultation with counsel. In order to sustain a claim that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of 
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his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate 

either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that 

counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a 

knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.

Michaud, 70 A.3d at 869 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, Appellant claims that his trial counsel acted 

ineffectively by advising him that if he testified on his own behalf at trial, he 

could be impeached with his two prior convictions for gun-related offenses. 

He contends that his firearm offenses are not crimen falsi crimes and, thus, 

they are not admissible as impeachment evidence. See Pa.R.E. 609 (“For the 

purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness 

has been convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere, must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.”). 

Appellant insists that “[h]e wanted to testify in his own defense, and ... he 

would have testified that he was innocent of the crimes charged, but for trial 

counsel’s erroneous legal advice that he would be subject to crossexamination and impeachment for prior arrests and/or convictions not 

involving crimen falsi.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Consequently, Appellant 

claims that his counsel acted ineffectively and he is entitled to a new trial.

We disagree. In rejecting this claim, the PCRA court reasoned:

At the August 24, 2018 evidentiary hearing, ... [Appellant]

testified that trial counsel advised him that if he testified, his prior 

convictions for firearms offenses would be introduced to the jury. 

N.T.[ PCRA Hearing,] 8/24/2018[,] at 22-24. This [c]ourt found 

... [Appellant’s] testimony incredible. As a preliminary matter, 

this [c]ourt notes that [Appellant] had a juvenile conviction for 

Receiving Stolen Property, which is a crime of crimen falsi, 

pursuant to Pa.R.E. 609, and [Appellant] could have been 
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impeached if he testified at trial.[3] [Additionally,] [a]t the 

evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he advised ... 

[Appellant] not to testify as a matter of strategy, based off the 

belief that he could effectively cross-examine the Commonwealth 

witnesses. Id. at [37-40]. Trial counsel properly advised ... 

[Appellant] that if he testified, he risked “opening the door” to his 

prior [firearm] convictions being admitted. 

PCO at 8. The court also stressed that, at trial, it had conducted a thorough 

colloquy of Appellant regarding his waiver of his right to testify. Appellant 

indicated that he understood the implications of that waiver, and that he had 

no questions for the court or counsel. See id. at 9-11.

Clearly, the PCRA court made a credibility determination to believe trial 

counsel’s testimony that he advised Appellant not to testify as a matter of 

strategy, and to protect against Appellant’s ‘opening the door’ to the evidence 

of his prior gun-related offenses. The court did not believe Appellant’s claim 

that counsel told him that his firearm offenses would be automatically 

admissible for impeachment purposes. We cannot reverse the PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations, which are supported by the record. See 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 305 (“[W]here the record supports 

the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, such determinations are binding 

on a reviewing court.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, we agree with the court 

____________________________________________

3 Rule 609(d) states that, “[i]n a criminal case only, evidence of the 

adjudication of delinquency for an offense under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 6301 et seq., may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness if 

conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 

adult.” Pa.R.E. 609(d). Receiving stolen property is recognized as a crime 

involving dishonesty for which an adult defendant can be impeached. See

Commonwealth v. McEnany, 732 A.2d 1263, 1270 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1999) 

(citations omitted).
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that counsel’s advice was legally sound and reasonable. See 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 182 A.3d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(“Evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible may be introduced for some 

other purpose, particularly where [the defendant’s] own testimony ‘opens the 

door’ for such evidence to be used for impeachment purposes.”) (citation 

omitted). Consequently, we discern no error in the court’s rejecting 

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim and dismissing his petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/19