IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Michelle Roberts, )

on behalf of M.R. )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 12 cv 1935

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) 

Commissioner of )

Social Security )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Michelle Roberts (plaintiff or “Ms. Roberts”) has

filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judicial review of

the final decision of the Commissioner for Social Security

(“Commissioner”). Ms. Roberts seeks Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on behalf of

her minor child (“M.R.”). The parties consented to the

jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and

have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons

set forth below, Ms. Roberts’ motion for summary judgment is

denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is

granted. The Social Security Administration’s November 17, 2009,

decision is affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 26, 2006, M.R.’s mother, Ms. Roberts, applied

for SSI disability benefits on behalf of her minor child, 

alleging disability since her birth, on January 2, 1997, due to
bipolar disorder, psychosis and attention deficit/hyperactivity

disorder (ADHD). (R. 178-83). The claim was denied on February 7,

2007, and upon reconsideration on May 17, 2007. (R. 109; R. 115).

Thereafter, Ms. Roberts filed a written request for hearing by an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. 121-22). An initial hearing

was held on April 27, 2009, in Oak Brook, Illinois, before ALJ

Steven H. Templin. (R. 68, 131). The ALJ continued the case for

submission of updated records. A supplemental hearing was held

October 2, 2009. (R. 19, 154). M.R., Ms. Roberts, and Medical

Expert (ME) Kathleen O’Brien testified at the hearing. M.R. was

represented by an attorney at both hearings. (R. 19).

On November 17, 2009, the ALJ denied Ms. Robert’s claim for

benefits and found the minor child not disabled under the Social

Security Act. (R. 93-104). Ms. Roberts appealed, and on March 17,

2011, the Appeals Council denied her request for review, causing

the ALJ’s decision to constitute the final decision of the

Commissioner. (R. 6). The final decision of the Commissioner is

reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. M.R.’s HISTORY

A. Medical Evidence

M.R. was born on January 2, 1997. On April 19, 2006, Dr.

Mohammed Ahmed conducted a psychiatric evaluation on M.R. Ms.

Roberts reported disorganization and disruptive behaviors. M.R.

was said to be failing all subjects in the second grade and, at

the age of 9, was diagnosed with ADHD and oppositional defiant

2
disorder. (R. 259-60). On September 14, 2006, M.R. was admitted

to Streamwood Hospital, following bouts of extreme aggression

towards her siblings. (R. 282). At an initial psychiatric

evaluation on September 16, 2006, M.R. made very poor eye contact

and had “very poor focus and concentration ... Her thoughts were

very disjointed and at times [she] answered questions in

inappropriate ways”. (R. 280). M.R. was admitted to Streamwood

Behavioral Health Center for demonstrating “very aggressive

behavior,” and for evaluation and diagnosis of her emotional

functioning for the purpose of treatment. (R. 264; R. 269.) 

On September 21, 2006, M.R. underwent another psychological

evaluation to assess her current level of cognitive functioning

and personality dynamics. (R. 263). This evaluation was conducted

by Clinical Psychologist, Michael Di Domenico. (R. 263-70). M.R.

had been reportedly isolating herself and hearing multiple

voices. She was observed to have underlying anxiety. (R. 264).

M.R. obtained a full scale I.Q. score of 89, placing her in the

low average range of intelligence. (R. 265). She was noted to

have difficulty with mathematical concepts and a “learning

disability for arithmetic.” (R. 267). M.R. presented as depressed

and there appeared to be “a significant amount of turmoil and

unrest in her life.” (R. 269). Psychological testing strongly

suggested that she lacked insight into her behaviors and that she

was easily stressed with limited coping skills. (Id.). M.R. was

“easily distracted and hyperactive.” (Id.). She was diagnosed

3
with bipolar disorder with psychotic features, ADHD, and a

mathematics disorder, and assigned a Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) of 40. (R. 270). The GAF is a subjective

scale that measures a person’s social, occupational, and

psychological functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n 1994). The

scale ranges from zero to one hundred, and a lower score

indicates more difficulty with social, occupational, or

psychological functioning. Id. A GAF of 50 indicates either:

“serious symptoms” or “any serious impairment in social,

occupational, or school functioning.” Id. M.R. was started on

the following medications: Risperdal and Concerta. (R. 316). M.R.

was discharged on October 13, 2006. (R. 303). 

 On January 15, 2007, Joseph M. Nemeth, M.D. performed a

psychiatric evaluation of M.R. for SSA. (R. 315-16). M.R. and her

mother reported visual and auditory hallucinations, impulsivity,

irritability, and difficulty concentrating (R. 316). Dr. Nemeth

diagnosed a psychotic disorder. (R. 317).

Jerrold Heinrich, Ph.D., a non-examining reviewer, completed

a childhood disability evaluation form for SSA on January 30,

2007. (R. 320). He found less than marked impairments in

attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with

others, and caring for herself. (R. 321-22). 

M.R. was diagnosed as myopic in a vision examination report

dated February 20, 2007. (R. 313). On April 25, 2007, M.R. was

4
seen by Dr. Sivakumar for medication management. (R. 360). Dr.

Sivakumar noted reports of rage and increased anger. (Id.). Dr.

Sivakumar ordered the decrease of Risperdal, and M.R. was started

on Depakote. (Id.). 

On May 5, 2007, Julio Pardo, M.D., and Margaret Wharton,

Psy.D., completed a childhood disability evaluation form for SSA.

(R. 331-36). They found less than marked limitations in attending

and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, and

in health and physical well being. (R. 333-34). 

On May 16, 2007, M.R.’s mother reported to Dr. Sivakumar

that M.R.’s behavior had gotten worse on Depakote. (R. 361).

Depakote was discontinued and M.R.’s dose of Risperdal was

increased. (Id.). On June 13, 2007, Dr. Sivakumar wrote that Ms.

Roberts had been unable to comply with increased dose of

Risperdal and that M.R.’s behavior was unchanged. (R. 362). When

she returned on July 18, 2007, Ms. Roberts noted improvement in

M.R.’s condition with the increased dose of Risperdal. (R. 364). 

On August 15, 2007, Ms. Roberts reported that M.R. had been

compliant with her medication and was taking Risperdal three

times a day. (R. 363). Ms. Roberts described problems with focus

and aggressive behavior. (Id.). Dr. Sivakumar diagnosed ADHD,

intermittent explosive disorder, and bipolar disorder and

increased her dose of Risperdal.(Id.). 

M.R. did not show for her appointment on September 19, 2007.

(R. 365). On October 17, 2007, Dr. Sivakumar wrote that M.R. was

5
not doing well in school. (R. 366). On November 21, 2007, Ms.

Roberts told Dr. Sivakumar that M.R. was getting out of control

at school. (R. 367). M.R. had told her mother that she was

hearing voices again. (Id.). M.R. was noted to be in a trance and

unable to speak. (Id.). Dr. Sivakumar changed the dosages of

M.R.’s medications. (Id.). 

On December 26, 2007, Ms. Roberts reported that M.R. was

doing well, but that she was concerned that M.R. was not

functioning at a fourth grade level. (R. 370). Dr. Sivakumar

instructed that M.R’s therapist be contacted about the school

issues. (Id.). M.R. did not show for her scheduled appointments

with Dr. Sivakumar in January and March. (R. 371-72). On April

16, 2008, Ms. Roberts told Dr. Sivakumar that M.R. was doing well

in terms of her mood and at school. (R.373). 

On June 11, 2008, Dr. Sivakumar noted that M.R. was becoming

increasingly aggressive towards noon and into the evening. (R.

375). Dr. Sivakumar increased her Risperdal dose. (Id.). On July

23, 2008, Ms. Roberts claimed that increase of Risperdal had

helped calm M.R. down. (R. 377). Dr. Sivakumar’s notes from

September 10, 2008, describe Ms. Roberts’ frustration with M.R.’s

school’s failure to initiate an IEP due to multiple absences (R.

379). Dr. Sivakumar decreased M.R.’s afternoon Risperdal dose on

December 3, 2008. (R. 380). On February 4, 2009, M.R. was noted

to be doing well overall, but worse in school. (R. 381). 

B. Therapy Treatment

6
M.R. took part in regular therapy sessions through the

Gateway Foundation from January 18, 2007, through the date of her

hearing. (R. 398- 483). These sessions took place at her school.

(R. 428). Progress notes from the Gateway foundation, dated

February 15, 2007, state that M.R. was doing well overall, but

had recently attacked her two-year-old sister. (R. 410). On

November 11, 2007, Ms. Roberts called the Gateway Foundation to

report increasingly aggressive behavior, dropping grades and

psychotic features. (R. 423). On November 20, 2007, Melissa A.

Hogan, M.P.H., wrote that Ms. Robert’s concern for the mental

health of M.R. appeared genuine and that she expressed

frustration with the school for not creating an IEP. (R. 424). On

December 14, 2007, Ms. Hogan wrote that M.R. appeared not to

understand simple questions and was unable to make eye contact.

(R. 428). 

On June 27, 2008, M.R.’s therapist Kurrum M. Butt met her at

her home and noted that M.R. seemed to get confused when asking

for more than one piece of information, but otherwise exhibited

good cognitive functioning. (R. 442). On September 24, 2008, Ms.

Roberts described her frustration with M.R.’s school over the

IEP. (R. 457). Mr. Butt noted that M.R. seemed “very frustrated

when talking about her problems with math; it appeared that she

[was] really motivated to learn but [was] genuinely facing

difficulty. (R. 458). 

On October 8, 2008, Mr. Butt wrote that “most of [M.R.’s]

7
stresses emanate from her difficulties with mathematics.” (R.

467). He noted that M.R. got frustrated even when she talked

about math (Id.). Ms. Roberts expressed her frustration with the

lack of support M.R. was receiving from her school on October 8,

2008. (R469). 

On October 15, 2008, Mr. Butt again noted that M.R. “gets

frustrated when she does not understand mathematics.” (R. 470).

On October 29, 2008, Mr. Butt observed that M.R. was very

concerned about her studies and making real efforts at home with

her home work. (R. 474). On May 4, 2009, Mr. Butt wrote that

“M.R. seemed very frustrated during the session when talking

about her performance in school and especially her ongoing issues

with math.” (R. 483). 

In a letter dated May 26, 2009, Mr. Butt wrote:

[M.R.] frequently fails to follow the cognitive flow of a

conversation. She displays problems with memory. [M.R.]

expresses a significant amount of frustration during her

therapy sessions centering on her school work. The efforts

she puts in her work do not yield corresponding grades.

[M.R.] displays aggressive ‘acting out’ behaviors at home.

She might be exhibiting similar behaviors at her school.

However, as is sometimes the case with many children, [M.R.]

might be exhibiting aggressive behavior at home as a

consequence of her experiences at school. In [M.R.’s] case,

this is a very strong possibility as counseling sessions

with [M.R.] predominantly focus on her struggles at school

and difficulties with getting through her school work. 

(R. 398). 

C. School Records

On June 27, 2007, Ms. Roberts received a letter from her

daughter’s school regarding M.R.’s “excessive absences/tardies.”

(R. 486). On October 17, 2008, M.R.’s principal wrote Ms. Roberts

8
a letter regarding her attempts to have M.R. tested for special

education eligibility. (R. 487). The letter states that the

school did not consider testing necessary, because M.R. did not

usually wear her glasses, she was near grade level in all

subjects except for math, and that her missed assignments were to

blame for her math struggles. (Id.). The letter also notes that

M.R.’s teacher reported that M.R. was doing well and had no

concerns.( Id.). On March 27, 2009, Ms. Roberts received another

letter from her daughter’s school regarding M.R.’s “excessive

absences/tardies.” (R. 488). 

A questionnaire completed by M.R.’s teacher, Colleen Zaresh,

on May 14, 2009, notes multiple moderate difficulties in school.

(R. 390- 95). Another questionnaire completed by M.R.’s teacher,

Lisa Hylles, on May 12, 2009, notes a few moderate difficulties

in school. (R.383-88). 

M.R. received no failing grades in the third grade and was

enrolled in regular classes. (R. 489). In fourth grade, she

received Fs in mathematics and science/health, and Ds in social 

studies, reading, and language. (R. 492). M.R.’s standardized

test scores in reading, mathematics, and science were “below

standards.” (R. 494). In fifth grade, she received a D in

mathematics and Cs in social studies, science/health, and

reading. (R. 495).

III. Hearing Testimony

A. The Initial Hearing

9
At the time of the hearings, M.R. was 12 years old. At the

initial hearing on April 27, 2009, the ME testified that there

was no corroboration of the behaviors described by M.R.’s

therapist with those described by her school. She said that

M.R.’s most recent diagnoses were a mood disorder, not otherwise

specified, and ADHD. The ME believed that M.R.’s symptomology had

improved a “considerable amount” over the course of her therapy.

(R. 74). She noted that a good deal of the reports of her

aggression and difficulties occur at home (R. 75). The ME

considered Listings 12.04 and 12.11, but did not believe that

M.R. equaled either listing. (R. 76-79). With regard to

functional equivalence, the ME described difficulty formulating

an opinion in light of the stark contrast in the difficulties

described at home and the observations of M.R.’s teachers. (R.

80). The ALJ continued the hearing to allow M.R. the opportunity

to get updated individual therapy records. (R. 80-85).

B. The Supplemental Hearing

At the supplemental hearing on October 2, 2009, the ME noted

a primary diagnosis of ADHD and a secondary diagnosis of bipolar

disorder. (R. 20). She did not consider M.R.’s psychotic disorder

a continuing diagnosis. Although the ME considered these

impairments to be severe, she did not believe M.R. met or equaled

a listing. She noted a “very stark difference between the

perception of this child and her behavior at school.” (R. 21).

The ME pointed out that M.R. was not in any special education

10
classes and that her teachers did not rate more than moderate

limitations. (Id.). She accounted for the differences in the

therapist’s opinion and those of her teachers by suggesting that

her therapist was “working with the whole family as opposed to

just the child,” which she thought would indicate “that the

difficulties [the] mother is reporting have to do with family

situations and issues and therefore are not just insidiousness to

the child’s psychopathology.” (R. 21).

Citing a low average I.Q., the ME did not believe that M.R.

had any limitation in age appropriate cognitive functioning. (R.

23). She found a moderate limitation in age appropriate social

functioning, a mild limitation in personal functioning, and

moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or

pace. (Id.). The ME did not see any limitations in acquiring or

using information, caring for herself, or with M.R.’s physical

well being. (R. 23-24). She found less than marked limitations in

attending and completing tasks, and interacting and relating with

others. (R. 24).

On cross examination, the ME was asked about the opinion of

M.R.’s therapist that the difficulties M.R. has at home might be

reflective of problems at school. (R. 24). The ME disagreed,

stating that she believed the opposite, i.e., that when children

act out in school, it can be reflective of things that are going

on at home, but not the converse. (R. 24-25). The ME acknowledged

that M.R. had undergone “quite a bit of therapy,” but she

11
believed that this therapy was geared toward resolving

difficulties that are happening in the household. (R. 25). The ME

claimed that, although the majority of M.R.’s therapy sessions

did not involve her mother, the only thing the therapist had to

go on was M.R.’s mother’s report. (R. 25). 

When asked about M.R.’s poor scores in math, the ME noted a

contradicting letter from M.R.’s principal which said that she

was doing well in math. (R. 30). She noted that M.R. had missed

math assignments and had a problem with truancy. (Id.). The ME

claimed that, although M.R.’s standardized test scores fell in

fourth grade, she did not think that the drop was statistically

significant. (R. 32-34). The ME again attributed M.R.’s failing

grades to poor attendance. (R. 34). 

M.R.’s attorney argued that, in light of M.R.’s multiple

diagnoses and failing grades, her school’s decision not to

evaluate her for an IEP was suspicious. (R. 34-41). The ALJ

stated that he understood the attorney’s point, but there was no

direct evidence of an unremediated set of circumstances at the

school. (R. 40-41).

M.R.’s mother, Ms. Roberts, testified that she rarely sat in

on M.R.’s therapy sessions. (R. 42). Ms. Roberts described M.R.’s

fourth grade teacher’s observations of M.R. kicking chairs and

throwing her fists in the air. (R. 43). She explained that this

teacher, Ms. Elliot, was the one who encouraged her to seek an

IEP. (R. 44). Ms. Roberts said that M.R. has good and bad days.

12
(R. 46). 

When asked whether progress should be expected in the home

setting after a couple of years of therapy, the ME responded that

“all the therapy in the world” would do nothing so long as “the

problems at home that precipitated the behavioral problems” were

not changed. (R. 48). The ME conceded that M.R. was not involved

in family therapy, but insisted that her parents were involved,

because the therapist talked to her parents when they let him

into their home. (R. 49). She noted that the school was concerned

that M.R. was not wearing her glasses, and it was “no wonder she

[could not] complete an assignment.” (R. 50). Ms. Roberts

testified that, aside from the principal’s letter, she had never

heard anyone say that M.R. was not wearing her glasses. (R. 51). 

Ms. Roberts testified that M.R.’s school was denying a lot

of IEP requests and that the principal who wrote the letter had

been fired. (R. 54). Ms. Roberts had taken her complaints about

the school to the local school board. (R. 55). 

M.R. testified that she needs her glasses when she has

trouble reading. She felt that math, science, and social studies

were hard for her. (R. 56). M.R. had recently changed schools and

said that she still had the same difficulties with math, science,

and social studies. (R. 58). M.R. said that she fought with her

sisters at home. (R. 60).

M.R. said that she got in trouble for throwing chairs in

school during the fourth grade. (R. 61-62). She explained that

13
her therapist had taught her to think before she got angry and

ask for help from her teachers when she got frustrated. (R. 63).

M.R. took Concerta and Risperdal. She thought that her

medications helped change her attitude. (R. 65).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Social Security Regulations

1. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is

authorized by § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). In reviewing this decision, the court may not engage in

its own analysis of whether the claimant is severely impaired as

defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart,

362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Nor may it

“displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence

or making credibility determinations.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478

F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.2007). The court's task is to determine

whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence,

which is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Schmidt v. Astrue,

496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Barnett v. Barnhart,

381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir.2004)). 

In making this determination, the court must “look to

whether the ALJ built an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ from the

evidence to [his] conclusion that the claimant is not disabled.” 

Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Craft

14
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.2008)). Where the

Commissioner's decision “‘lacks evidentiary support or is so

poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is

required.” Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 698 (7th

Cir.2009) (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th

Cir.2002)). 

2. Standard for Child SSI Benefits

A child is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act if he or she has a “physical or mental impairment,

which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(C)(I). In determining whether a child meets this

definition, the ALJ engages in a three-step analysis: (1) if the

child is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then his claim

is denied; (2) if the child does not suffer from a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, then his claim is

denied; and (3) the child's impairments must meet, medically

equal, or be functionally equal to any of the Listings of

Impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. 20

C.F.R. § 416.924(b)-(d); see also Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue,

483 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir.2007). 

To determine whether an impairment functionally equals a

listing, the ALJ must assess its severity in six age-appropriate

categories: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending

15
and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others;

(4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for

yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(b)(1). 

Each domain describes what a child should be able to do

throughout five age categories: (1) “newborns and young infants”

(birth to age 1); (2) “older infants and toddlers” (age 1 to age

3); (3) “preschool children” (age 3 to age 6, including children

in kindergarten, but not first grade); (4) “school-age children”

(age 6 to age 12, including children in first grade through

middle school); and (5) “adolescents” (age 12 to age 18). 20

C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(2), (h)(2), (i)(2), (j)(2), (k)(2), (l)(2). 

An impairment functionally equals a listing if it results in

“marked” limitations in two domains of functioning, or an

“extreme” limitation in one domain. The functional equivalence

analysis requires the ALJ to consider how the child functions as

a whole. “[T]his consists of looking at all of the child's

activities, which include everything the child does at home, at

school, and in her community, and evaluating how the child is

limited or restricted in those activities, without cabining the

child's impairments into any particular domain.” Bielefeldt ex

rel. Wheelock, No. 09 C 50302, 2011 WL 3360013, at *4 (N.D.Ill.

Aug.4, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)-(c)).

B. The ALJ’s Decision

16
On November 17, 2009, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for

disability benefits on behalf of M.R. (R. 93-104). After

considering the record, the ALJ found that, during the period

covered by the application, M.R. was a school-aged child and an

adolescent for purposes of disability evaluation and that she has

not engaged in SGA. (R. 96). The ALJ also found that, despite

having at least one severe impairment, M.R.’s impairments did not

meet or equal the Listings or functionally equal the Listings.

(R. 96; 98). He found M.R. had “less than marked” limitations in

the domains of acquiring and using information, attending and

completing tasks and interacting and relating with others, and

had “no limitation” in the domains of moving about and

manipulating objects and caring for herself. (R. 93-104).

In considering the severity of M.R.’s impairments, the ALJ

relied on the opinions of the ME: “the board certified expert in

forensic psychology reviewed all of the medical and educational

evidence of record.” (R. 97). “She [the medical expert] explained

that there was a dichotomy between the claimant and her mother’s

reports concerning the claimant’s behaviors and performance at

school, and the records from the school.” The ALJ also stated in

his opinion that the ME noted that the “clinician’s treatment

records documented consistently normal mental status examinations

of the claimant, with improvement of symptoms reported.” (R. 97). 

In finding that M.R. did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of

17
the listed impairments; did not functionally equal a listing; had

less then marked limitations in acquiring and using information

(R. 98), attending and completing tasks (R. 100), interacting and

relating with others (R. 101); and was not disabled (R. 104), the

ALJ discussed the minor and her mother’s testimony regarding her

difficulty in school. (R. 98-99). In addition to the medical

expert’s opinions, the ALJ also discussed the specific number of

times that M.R. was absent from school, M.R.’s teacher’s

questionnaires, her report cards, and the views of her therapist

in detail. (R. 99-101). 

C. Analysis

In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff claims that

the ALJ erred in denying M.R.’s claim in three ways. Plaintiff

claims that the ALJ erred: 1) in relying on the opinion of the

medical expert; 2) by failing to discuss Dr. Domenico’s report;

and 3) by failing to reach an explicit credibility finding. In

response, the Commissioner filed a motion for summary judgement

requesting that the court affirm the ALJ’s decision. 

1. The ALJ’s Reliance on the Medical Expert’s Opinion

First, Ms. Roberts argues that the ALJ erred in relying on

the ME’s opinion, because the ME disregarded M.R.’s at-home

behavior, and therefore, did not base her opinion on all of the

relevant evidence. Pl.’s Br. at 13. In support of this argument,

plaintiff sets forth that “where there is conflicting medical

evidence, it is the ALJ’s duty to decide which to believe;

18
however, when a medical opinion is internally inconsistent it

should be discounted” citing Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp.

1063, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Pl.’s Br. at 11 (emphasis added by

the court). Ms. Roberts argues that the ALJ erred by not

considering all the evidence in favor of M.R. and by not

discounting the school records, because they are inconsistent

with M.R.’s doctors, therapists, and mother. Id. at 12. First,

the Court must point out that in Sedrak, the case cited by Ms.

Roberts, the Court states: “a medical opinion may be discounted

if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other

evidence.” 987 F. Supp. at 1067 (emphasis added). Therefore, the

ALJ did not err by not discounting the school records in this

case, as he was not required to do so even though plaintiff

viewed them as inconsistent with other evidence in the record. 

In response to plaintiff’s arguments that the ME, and thus

the ALJ, did not consider other contradictory evidence, including

the at-home behavior of M.R., the Commissioner argues that the ME

did properly consider this evidence in making his determination.

Not only did the ALJ consider the school records, but he and the

ME, Dr. O’Brien, considered all the evidence in the record,

specifically: M.R.’s IQ score and a hospital work-up that

indicated M.R. might have a learning disorder in math (R. 79),

M.R.’s diagnosis of ADHD, the fact that M.R. took medication for

ADHD, M.R.’s apparent improvement with medication, the school’s

lack of intervention (R. 79), the dichotomy between M.R.’s

19
mother’s reports and M.R.’s teacher’s report (R. 80), and the

therapist’s records (R. 99-101). 

In addition, Ms. Roberts argues that the ALJ improperly

disregarded the therapist Mr. Butts’ opinion that M.R.’s

impairments are caused by her frustrations at school. Pl.’s Br.

at 12. Ms. Roberts argues that the government, the ME, and the

ALJ all “make the same mistake” by disregarding “M.R.’s behavior

at home and dismiss[ing] it as less relevant than her behavior at

school.” Reply at 3. However, the ME and the ALJ did specifically

consider Mr. Butt’s opinion in considering the denial of social

security benefits. (R. 97.) 

If the evidence was considered, it is not this court’s role

to re-weigh this evidence. This Court is to act as the reviewing

court and in reviewing this decision, the court may not engage in

its own analysis of whether the claimant is severely impaired as

defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young, 362 F.3d at

1001. Nor may it “displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering

facts or evidence or making credibility determinations.” Skinner,

478 F.3d at 841. Therefore, since the ALJ and ME acknowledged and

considered the contradictory evidence regarding M.R.’s at-home

behavior and Mr. Butt’s opinion, the ALJ did not err in coming to

his conclusions. 

2. The ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Discuss Dr.

Domenico’s Report

Next, Ms. Roberts argues that the ALJ erred by failing to

discuss the results of Dr. Domenico’s psychological evaluation in

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his opinion. Pl.’s Br. at 13. In support, she states that an ALJ

“should consider and discuss all credible medical evidence that

is supported by clinical findings and relevant to the question at

hand” citing Connour v. Massanari, 173 F.Supp.2d 785, 799 (N.D.

Ill. 2001). Ms. Roberts argues that, by neglecting to discuss

contradictory evidence in his opinion, the ALJ failed to satisfy

“the most minimal articulation standard.” Pl.’s Br. at 14.

However, as discussed above, the ALJ did set forth in his opinion

the contradictory evidence he considered in coming to his

decision.

In 2006, Dr. Domenico assigned M.R. a GAF score of 40, and

diagnosed a bipolar disorder with psychotic features, ADHD, and a

mathematics disorder. (R. 270). Dr. Domenico observed that M.R.

had anxiety, hyperactivity, distractibility, limited coping

skills and difficulty with math concepts. (R. 264, 269).

Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Domenico’s diagnoses and observations

corroborate the observations of M.R.’s therapists and mother.

Pl.’s Br. at 13. The Court in Connor states, “An ALJ may not

discuss only the evidence that favors his conclusion, but rather

he must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the

evidence to allow a reviewer to trace his path of reasoning.” 173

F.Supp.2d at 799. In addition, “an ALJ need not provide a written

evaluation of each piece of evidence or testimony.” See Orlando

v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1985). 

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In this case, since it was undisputed that M.R. showed

aggression with her sisters at home, it was undisputed that she

was hyperactive and distractible (having ADHD), and it was

undisputed that M.R. had problems with math, Dr. Domenico’s

report was largely repetitious and the ALJ considered the issues

in the report in his opinion, even though he did not state the

report by name. Therefore, the ALJ did not only discuss the

evidence that favored his conclusion, he also addressed the

issues present in the report. Since the ALJ considered and

addressed contradictory evidence similar to that of the report,

he did not err in not including his analysis of the Dr. Domenico

report in his opinion. Ms. Roberts’ request for remand is

denied.

3. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination

Lastly, Ms. Roberts argues that the ALJ failed to make an

explicit finding regarding the testimony provided by Plaintiff

and M.R. Pl. Br. at 14. However, a “formal” credibility finding

is not required. See Arbogast v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1400, 1406 (7th

Cir. 1988) (“[W]here the reasoning of the ALJ is apparent, we do

not require the ALJ to articulate explicitly his credibility

determination.”). Moreover, “an ALJ's credibility findings need

not specify which statements were not credible.” Shideler v.

Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 2012).

Even though the ALJ need not make an express credibility

finding, the ALJ did consider the testimony of Plaintiff and

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M.R., and noted the situations in which Plaintiff’s testimony was

contradicted by, or inconsistent with, the evidence of record (R.

98-103). Thus, by making an implicit, rather than explicit,

credibility finding, the ALJ did not err.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Roberts’ motion for

summary judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment is granted. The Social Security Administration’s

November 17, 2009, decision is affirmed.

Date: May 16, 2013 E N T E R E D:

______________________________

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARLANDER KEYS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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