IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ROBERTO MATA (#R-41813), ) 

 ) 

Petitioner, ) 

 ) No. 12-cv-01376 

v. ) 

 ) Judge Andrea R. Wood 

CHRISTINE BRANNON, Warden, ) 

Hill Correctional Center, ) 

 ) 

Respondent. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 Petitioner Roberto Mata, a prisoner at Hill Correctional Center proceeding pro se, 

initiated this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2012, challenging his 

state court convictions for murder and aggravated battery. The case was subsequently stayed 

while Mata exhausted the state court remedies for one of his claims. Following the conclusion of 

state court proceedings for that claim and briefing by the parties, Mata’s petition is now ripe for 

ruling. For the reasons below, the Court denies Mata’s amended § 2254 petition and declines to 

issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND

 A. Facts1

 In 2005, Mata was convicted of the first-degree murders of Adrian Padilla and Sander 

Mosqueada, and the aggravated battery with a firearm of Edwin Delgado. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 1) 

 

1

 This Court looks to the state appellate court decisions in Mata’s direct appeal and two state postconviction proceedings for the background facts. See People v. Mata, No. 1-05-0527 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) 

(Dkt. No. 20-2 at 1); People v. Mata, 1-09-0657, 2011 WL 9684766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. June 17, 

2011); People v. Mata, 2016 IL App (1st) 122408-U; see also Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307, 309 

n.1 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We take the facts from the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinions because they are 

presumptively correct on habeas review.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The state appellate court 

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(People v. Mata, No. 1-05-0527 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)). At trial, Mata did not contest that he shot 

Padilla, Mosqueada, and Delgado. Instead, he argued that his actions were justified to protect his 

friend, Reynaldo Mares, who was being beaten. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 1–2.) Mata also argued, in the 

alternative, that if his belief in the need to use deadly force was unreasonable, he was guilty of 

only second-degree murder.2 (Id.) 

Delgado, the State’s only eyewitness, testified at trial as follows. He claimed that during 

the early morning hours on March 16, 2002, he, his friend Padilla, and another man (William 

Rivera) were in Padilla’s car drinking beer on the 2000 block of 18th Place on Chicago’s 

southside. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 2.) The area was in the territory of the Satan Disciples, a street gang 

to which Padilla and Delgado belonged. (Id.) Rivera left the car to go to a party, and Delgado 

and Padilla left to go home. (Id.) 

As Delgado and Padilla were walking, Delgado saw two women, followed by two men 

(Mata and Mares) enter 18th Place from a gangway. (Id. at 3.) Mares was wearing a Houston 

Astros baseball cap with a cracked five-point star. (Id.) While the cracked five-point star was a 

symbol of the Folks Nation, a gang to which the Satan Disciples belonged, an Astros cap was 

not. (Id.) The Astros cap, according to Mares’ statement to officers later, was a symbol of the 

Latin Kings, a rival gang of the Satan Disciples. (Id. at 8.) 

Delgado testified that Padilla asked Mata and Mares who they were, to which Mares 

responded “fuck off” and then ran toward Delgado, striking him in the chest. (Id. at 3.) Delgado 

 

opinion on direct appeal discusses the facts more thoroughly than the other decisions, so this Court draws 

the background facts mainly from that decision. 

2

 Under Illinois law, a defendant may be found guilty of second-degree murder when first-degree murder 

has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant then proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he was acting under sudden passion from serious provocation or he unreasonably believed 

that circumstances existed justifying the killing. See 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1)-(2). 

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was able to pin Mares to the ground. Mares called for help to Mata, who was about eight feet 

away. (Id.) Mata drew a gun and pointed it at Delgado. (Id.) Delgado testified that, when he saw 

the gun, he let go of Mares and began backing away. (Id.) Delgado attempted to run away but, 

before he could do so, he was shot in the buttocks. (Id.) He testified that he heard six shots fired 

at that time, and he saw that Padilla had also been shot. (Id.) Still attempting to flee, Delgado and 

Padilla began running down the middle of the street. While doing so, Delgado fell. (Id. at 3–4.) 

He then saw Mata walk around a parked car and begin firing at another man who Delgado could 

not see, but who he later learned was Mosqueada. (Id. at 4.) According to Delgado, he and 

Padilla then began running, and Mata shot at both of them. (Id.) The shots missed Delgado but 

hit Padilla, who “fell like a brick.” (Id.) 

Two days after the incident and a day after his arrest, Mata gave a videotaped statement, 

which the State played at trial. (Id. at 5–6.) In the statement, Mata explained that he and his 

girlfriend, Esmerelda Herrera, went to a housewarming party on March 15, 2018. (Id. at 6.) He 

met several friends there, including Mares, Chad Cruz, and Karina Pinedo. (Id.) Mata was 

carrying a loaded semi-automatic gun at the time. (Id.) Two Hispanic men, who nobody knew, 

arrived at the party, smoked marijuana, and then left. (Id.) Soon after, Mata, Herrera, Mares, 

Pinedo, and Cruz left the party. (Id.) 

According to Mata’s statement, he and Herrera were walking in front of the others when 

he heard Mares call out. (Id.) Mata looked behind him and saw the two men from the party 

holding Mares by his arms while two other Hispanic men surrounded him. (Id.) Mata took out 

his gun and fired one shot in the direction of the four men, who then backed away from Mares. 

(Id.) Mata said in his statement that, as he was going toward Mares to help him up, he saw one of 

the men reach toward his pocket. (Id.) Believing the man was reaching for a weapon, Mata fired 

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five more shots in the direction of the men. (Id.) Mata stated that he never actually saw a weapon 

and none was found on the victims. (Id.) 

Mata also testified at trial. There, he testified, contrary to his videotaped statement, that 

Mares was being beaten and kicked by the men. (Id. at 7.) He further testified that he fired one 

shot in the air to stop the men, who backed away but did not leave. (Id.) Similar to his videotaped 

statement, Mata claimed that as he went to assist Mares off the ground, he saw one of the men 

reach toward his waist, at which time Mata fired his gun several more times. (Id.) Mata and 

Mares then ran to Herrera’s car parked nearby. (Id.) As they ran, Mata heard gunfire, and after 

they were in the car, he saw a man running down the street shooting. (Id.) 

Mares, Herrera, Pinedo, as well as two more people with Mata on the night of the 

shooting (Sandy Diz and Nicole Bell), testified on Mata’s behalf at trial. (Id. at 7.) Each stated 

they left the party together shortly after 2:00 a.m. (Id.) Herrera and Mares stated that, after the 

shooting started, they saw an unknown man running in the street firing a gun. (Id.) Both 

acknowledged on cross-examination, however, that neither of them mentioned the other gunman 

to officers after the incident. (Id. at 8.) Mares additionally identified a photograph of himself 

taken on March 18, 2002 and acknowledged that the picture showed no visible injuries to his 

face. (Id.) 

The jury was instructed on first-degree murder as well as second-degree murder based on 

an unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect another. (Dkt. No. 20-1 at 14–

15.) The jury convicted Mata of two counts of first-degree murder for Mosqueada’s and Padilla’s 

deaths and of aggravated battery with a firearm for the shots fired at Delgado. (Dkt. No. 20-2, at 

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7.) Mata was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment for the murders and a ten-year 

consecutive sentence for the aggravated battery. Id.

B. Direct Appeal 

Mata appealed his trial convictions, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective for 

failing to impeach Delgado’s testimony about his whereabouts before the shooting, who 

instigated the events just before the shooting, how many shots were fired, and the significance of 

Mares’s Astros cap. (Id. at 9.) Mata also argued on appeal that the imposition of two life 

sentences and a consecutive ten-year sentence was in error. (Id. at 15.) The state appellate court 

rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, agreed with Mata’s sentencing argument, 

and corrected his mittimus so that his sentences all ran concurrently. (Id. at 15–16.) Mata did not 

file a petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) with the Illinois Supreme Court. 

 C. Mata’s Post-Conviction Petition

Mata filed a post-conviction petition, in which he argued that his trial attorney was 

ineffective for failing to follow through with a motion to suppress the videotaped statement and 

for failing to call William Rivera to testify at trial, and that his counsel on direct appeal was 

ineffective for failing to argue these grounds for finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel.3

(Dkt. No. 20-3 at 5–6.) The state trial court summarily dismissed the petition at the first stage of 

post-conviction review as frivolous or patently without merit. (Id. at 6.) 

 

3

 Neither Mata’s first state post-conviction petition nor the state trial court’s dismissal of it is in the record 

before this Court. The above description of claims is thus taken from People v. Mata, 2011 WL 9684766, 

at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. June 17, 2011), and People v. Mata, 2016 IL App (1st) 122408-U, ¶ 11. Both decisions 

discuss the first post-conviction petition’s claims, but neither decision lists all the claims. The Court has, 

as best as possible, pieced together the claims from these decisions and from a letter from Mata’s state 

appellate defender in his first post-conviction case. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) Although the Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases direct respondents to supply relevant transcripts and appellate briefs with their answers, see

Rule 5(b)–(d), the Rules do not require that post-conviction petitions and trial court rulings regarding 

those petitions be included. Nonetheless, when a respondent argues procedural default, as is the case here, 

including the post-conviction petition and the trial court’s ruling would assist the Court. 

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Mata appealed the decision and was appointed counsel for the appeal. The appointed 

appellate attorney argued only the claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the 

abandoned motion to suppress. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 18–56.) The state appellate court first 

determined that the claim had been waived under state law because it could have been raised on 

direct appeal. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 6–7.) The court then addressed the claim’s merits when 

addressing Mata’s claim that his attorney on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the 

claim, which the court acknowledged was not argued in the post-conviction appellate brief. (Id.

at 7 (“although postconviction appellate counsel has failed to argue ineffective assistance of 

direct appeal counsel, based on defendant's [post-conviction] petition, we proceed in our 

review.”).) 

With respect to the merits, the state appellate court determined that the voluntariness of 

Mata’s videotaped statement was evident not only from the trial testimony of two police 

detectives and an assistant state’s attorney—all of whom stated that Mata received and waived 

his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)—but also from the statement itself. 

(Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7–9.) According to the state appellate court, the video statement showed that 

Mata received, stated he understood, and waived each Miranda right; he said he was giving his 

statement voluntarily and not because of any threat or promise; and he said officers had treated 

him well. (Id. at 8.) The state appellate court found “there [wa]s no reason to believe [Mata]’s 

motion to suppress would have been granted,” “presume[d] defense counsel intended to abandon 

the motion as part of sound trial strategy,” and concluded that “appellate counsel c[ould not] be 

faulted for failing to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective.” (Id. at 8–9.) 

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Mata filed a PLA and argued that the appellate court incorrectly applied the state law 

standard when affirming the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition. 

(Dkt. No. 20-3 at 10–23.) The Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA. (Id. at 25.) 

 D. Mata’s Successive Post-Conviction Petition 

Mata then filed a successive state post-conviction petition arguing: (1) his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call as a trial witness Rivera, who allegedly saw Mares being 

beaten; (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim based on the failure to call Rivera; (3) his trial counsel failed to request a jury 

instruction on second-degree murder under 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1)’s sudden passion element; and 

(4) evidence existed establishing that Mata was guilty of only second-degree murder under this 

element, which the State failed to disprove. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 27–93.) The state trial court denied 

the petition upon determining that Mata had not met procedural requirements and that his claims 

were without merit. (Id. at 94–102.) 

Mata appealed, asserting the ineffective assistance claims about Rivera not being called 

to testify. (Dkt. No. 42-1.) The state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s procedural 

dismissal of these claims. People v. Mata, 2016 IL App (1st) 122408-U. And the Illinois 

Supreme Court denied Mata’s PLA. People v. Mata, 60 N.E.3d 879 (Ill. 2016). Mata then filed 

an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. 

II. MATA’S AMENDED § 2254 PETITION

 Mata’s amended § 2254 petition lists only two grounds for relief; but each ground asserts 

multiple claims, which the Court numbers below. Ground One focuses on the voluntariness of 

Mata’s videotaped statement and argues: 

(1) his videotaped statement was involuntary (Dkt. No. 41 at 8–15) (Claim One); 

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(2) his arrest was made without probable cause and his video statement given 26-27 

 hours later was fruit of the illegal arrest (id. at 15–21) (Claim Two); 

(3) trial counsel was ineffective for not following through with the motion to suppress 

 the statement (id. at 7, 13–15) (Claim Three); and 

(4) counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for not arguing trial counsel’s 

 ineffectiveness for abandoning the motion to suppress, and the state appellate 

 court on post-conviction review considered only some factors when determining 

 the statement’s voluntariness, contrary to Illinois’ standard of review for a trial 

 court’s summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition (id. at 7–14) (Claim 

 Four). 

Ground Two concerns whether trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Rivera to testify 

at trial and whether Mata should have been found guilty of only second-degree murder, and argues: 

(5) trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Rivera as a trial witness, and 

 appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert trial counsel’s 

 ineffectiveness on appeal (id. at 22–28) (Claim Five); and 

 (6) trial evidence—Mata’s testimony, his girlfriend’s testimony, 

 Rivera’s purported testimony, and Dr. Denton’s testimony about some 

 victims being shot from the front—supported a defense of sudden passion, 

 and an instruction on this element of second-degree murder should have 

 been given (id. at 28–30) (Claim Six). 

 For the reasons stated below, Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Six (all but Claim Four) 

are procedurally defaulted. Claim Four lacks merit under § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of 

review that this Court must afford the state appellate court’s resolution of the claim. 

 A. Procedural Default

 A § 2254 claim may be procedurally defaulted in two ways. The first occurs when a 

prisoner fails to exhaust fully state court remedies for his federal claim and no longer has the 

ability to do so under the state’s procedural laws. Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384 (7th 

Cir. 2016). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), state prisoners must “exhaust[] the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” A prisoner must “give the state courts a full and fair 

opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the 

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federal courts,” which is accomplished “by invoking one complete round of the State’s 

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). State 

courts, like federal courts, must apply constitutional law, and thus “[c]omity . . . dictates that 

when a prisoner alleges that his . . . state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts 

should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.” Id. at 

844. 

 The second type of procedural default “comes from the independent and adequate state 

ground doctrine.” Thomas, 822 F.3d at 384 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 

(1991)). Federal habeas review is precluded “where the state courts declined to address a 

petitioner’s federal claims because the petitioner did not meet state procedural requirements.” Id.

at 384. “‘A state law ground is independent when the court actually relied on the procedural bar 

as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.’” Thompkins v. Pfister, 698 F.3d 976, 986 

(7th Cir. 2012) (quoted case omitted). “‘A state law ground is adequate when it is a firmly 

established and regularly followed state practice at the time it is applied.’” Id. Again, “principles 

of comity and federalism dictate” that federal claims denied by state courts because they were 

not presented pursuant to state laws be considered procedurally defaulted. Thomas, 822 F.3d at 

384. 

 1. Failure to Exhaust Claims One, Two, and Six

With respect to the voluntariness of the video statement (Claim One), Mata presented the 

issue only as part of his claims that trial counsel abandoned the motion to suppress and that 

appellate counsel failed to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 5–6; Dkt. No. 

20-2 at 17–56; Dkt. No. 20-3 at 10–24.) Neither on direct appeal nor in his post-conviction 

appeals did Mata argue the involuntariness of his video statement as its own claim independent 

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of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. “[A]n assertion that one’s counsel was ineffective 

for failing to pursue particular constitutional issues is a claim separate and independent of those 

issues.” Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004); see also McGhee v. Watson, 900 

F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2018); Howard v. O’Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1999) (a 

constitutional claim presented to the state courts only as part of an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim does not satisfy § 2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement for the underlying 

constitutional claim). This Court, like the state appellate court on post-conviction review, may 

address the voluntariness of the video statement when addressing Mata’s ineffective assistance 

claim (Claim Four). But as its own claim, Mata’s contention that his statement was involuntary 

was not fairly presented to the state courts and is unexhausted. 

Claim Two, in which Mata contends that his arrest was illegal and affected the 

voluntariness of his statement, was not presented in any of his state court appeals—either on 

direct or post-conviction review. (Dkt. No. 20-1 at 1–43; Dkt. No. 20-2 at 17–56; Dkt. No. 20-3 

at 10–24; Dkt. No. 42-1.) This claim is thus unexhausted as well. 

Claim Six—that Mata’s jury should have received a jury instruction on Illinois’s seconddegree murder, sudden-passion element and that the State failed to prove the absence of such a 

defense—was argued in his successive post-conviction petition, but not in his successive postconviction appeals. (See Dkt. No. 42-1.) The claim was not presented at every level of state court 

review and is also unexhausted. 

Bringing these claims now in another successive post-conviction petition to exhaust state 

remedies, like the successive petition already attempted, would result in the claims’ dismissal on 

procedural grounds. Claims One, Two, and Six are thus unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. 

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 2. Independent and Adequate State Law Ground for Claim Three 

Claim Three, which asserts that Mata’s trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the 

motion to suppress as its own claim separate from the claim that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to assert it, is also procedurally defaulted for a different reason. 

The state appellate court in Mata’s first post-conviction appeal determined that the claim 

was procedurally barred because “[t]he motion to suppress and defendant’s videotaped 

confession . . . were matters in the trial record, such that [Mata] could have raised the [ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel] claim on direct appeal.” (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7.) “Failure to raise a claim 

which could have been addressed on direct appeal is a procedural default which results in a bar 

to consideration of the claim’s merits in a post-conviction proceeding.” Sturgeon v. Chandler, 

552 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting People v. Erickson, 641 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ill. 1994)). 

“A finding of waiver by the state postconviction court is enough to establish an adequate and 

independent state ground.” Sturgeon, 552 F.3d at 611 (citing Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 

431 (7th Cir.2007); see also Krol v. Calhoun, No. 16 CV 11595, 2019 WL 5592757, at *11 

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2019).4

 

Even though the state appellate court went on to consider the merits of the ineffective 

effective assistance of trial counsel claim in the context of the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel claim (as will this Court), it is clear that the state appellate court relied on Illinois’s 

waiver rule as a ground for denying the claim. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) 

(“a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding”); 

 

4

 This Court notes Mata’s contention in his § 2254 petition that several factors relating to the 

voluntariness of the statement were not in the trial court record, suggesting that he could not have raised 

his ineffective assistance claim until his post-conviction petition. (Dkt. No. 41 at 12–15.) But the state 

courts determined that this claim could have been raised on direct appeal and was thus waived under state 

law. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 6–7.) “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 

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Bivens v. Rednour, 428 Fed. Appx. 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2011) (where state courts dismiss a federal 

claim on procedural grounds and then addresses the merits in the alternative, “we still honor the 

adequate and independent determination”). Claim Three is thus procedurally defaulted. 

 3. Independent and Adequate State Law Ground for Claim Five

 

Claim Five—regarding trial counsel not calling Rivera to testify and appellate counsel 

not arguing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness—according to the state appellate court in Mata’s 

successive post-conviction appeal, was not presented in accordance with Illinois’s procedural 

rules. Although Mata argued this claim in his first post-conviction petition, he did not raise the 

claim in his post-conviction appeal. And his successive post-conviction petition, according to the 

state appellate court, asserted no grounds to excuse Illinois’s procedural default. See Mata, 2016 

IL App (1st) 122408-U, ¶¶ 18-21. 

The failure to satisfy “[t]he state procedural rule” setting forth the requirements for 

bringing a successive state post-conviction petition, 725 ILCS 5/122–1(f), “is an adequate and 

independent state ground precluding federal habeas review of [Mata’s] claim raised in his second 

state petition.” Thomas, 822 F.3d at 385; see also Chapman v. Jones, No. 17 C 9190, 2020 WL 

3892986, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2020). Claim Five is procedurally defaulted. 

 4. Presence of Cause and Prejudice or a Fundamental Miscarriage of 

 Justice 

For the above-stated reasons, Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Six are procedurally 

defaulted. Federal habeas review of those claims “is barred unless [Mata] can demonstrate cause 

for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

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justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006). Mata 

demonstrates neither exception. 

Mata contends that the ineffectiveness of his attorneys in his post-conviction proceedings 

caused the procedural defaults. (Dkt. No. 53 at 4–6.) Ineffective assistance of post-conviction 

counsel, however, does not satisfy the cause requirement in Illinois. While post-conviction 

counsel’s ineffectiveness can amount to cause to excuse a procedural default in some cases, such 

occurs only in states that either prevent or discourage ineffective assistance claims on direct 

appeal. Crutchfield v. Dennison, 910 F.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (addressing the exceptions 

recognized by the Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 

569 U.S. 413 (2013)). As explained by the Seventh Circuit, “Illinois law gives prisoners a 

meaningful opportunity to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct 

review.” Crutchfield, 910 F.3d at 978. Thus, the Martinez/Trevino exception allowing for 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to serve as cause for a procedurally defaulted 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim does not “extend . . . to Illinois prisoners.” Id. 

Nor has Mata shown that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if his 

defaulted clams are not reviewed on the merits. This exception is reserved for the “exceptional 

case” where “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 

actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). “[T]he petitioner [must] make a convincing showing of actual 

innocence.” Jones v. Calloway, 842 F.3d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 2016). He “must have ‘new reliable 

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial’ . . . and must persuade the district 

court that it is ‘more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of 

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the new evidence.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327). Mata points to no new reliable 

evidence not presented at trial demonstrating that he is actually innocent. 

Accordingly, all but one of Mata’s claims are procedurally defaulted because the claims 

either were not presented in one full round of state court review or were dismissed on 

independent and adequate state law grounds. Mata has not demonstrated cause and prejudice or 

actual innocence as necessary to excuse the defaults. Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Six are 

thus denied. 

 B. Merits of Claim Four 

 Mata’s claim that his attorney on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to argue his trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness for abandoning the motion to suppress the video statement was not 

dismissed on procedural grounds and was addressed on the merits by the state post-conviction 

appellate court.5

 (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7–9.) This claim, however, warrants no § 2254 relief. 

 Federal habeas relief is available for federal claims addressed on the merits by a state 

court only if Mata demonstrates that the state court’s resolution of the claim: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

 Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

 the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 

5

 Most of the amended § 2254 petition’s discussion of this issue contends that the state appellate court 

erroneously applied Illinois’s review standard for a trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction petition at 

the first stage. But as previously stated several times in this opinion, this Court reviews only 

constitutional issues and does not reexamine state courts’ application of state law. Though focusing on 

state law, the amended § 2254 petition seeks federal habeas review of the state appellate court decision 

wherein the only claim addressed on the merits was the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

(Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7–9.) To the extent the amended petition may be liberally construed as asserting a 

constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which Mata asserted in his original 

§ 2254 petition (Dkt. No. 1 at 5), this Court so construes and addresses this claim. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law ‘if it 

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth’ in Supreme Court decisions or 

‘confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from’ a Supreme Court decision but 

comes out differently.” Valle v. Butler, 707 Fed. Appx. 391, 398 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown 

v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005)). For a state court’s application of federal law to be 

unreasonable, it must be “more than incorrect; it must have been objectively unreasonable.” 

Felton v. Bartow, 926 F.3d 451, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 

(2003)). “‘Unreasonable’ in [this] context . . . means something . . . lying well outside the 

boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.” McGhee v. Dittmann, 794 F.3d 761, 769 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2015)). As long as this Court 

is “satisfied that the [state appellate court] took the constitutional standard seriously and 

produce[d] an answer within the range of defensible positions, we will affirm the district court’s 

decision to deny the writ.” Felton, 926 F.3d at 464. “The petitioner bears the burden of showing 

that the state court’s decision was unreasonable.’” Valle, 707 Fed. Appx. at 398 (quoting

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 

With respect to Mata’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, the state 

appellate court cited the familiar two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687–88, 694 (1984). The state court stated that Mata had to “show both deficient performance by 

counsel and resultant prejudice.” (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7.) The state court further noted that 

“[a]ppellate counsel need not raise every conceivable argument, and counsel’s assessment of 

what to argue will not be questioned unless his judgment was patently erroneous,” and that 

“[u]nless the underlying issues are meritorious, defendant obviously suffered no prejudice due to 

appellate counsel’s failure to raise the arguments on appeal.” (Id.) 

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This Court concludes that the state appellate court followed the correct legal standards. 

“The general Strickland standard governs claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as 

well as trial counsel.” Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 897 (7th Cir. 2015). To establish such a 

claim, a petitioner must show that: (1) his appellate attorney’s performance was constitutionally 

deficient, i.e., “that his counsel was objectively unreasonable,” and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced the petitioner’s appeal, i.e., a reasonable probability exists “that, but for his counsel’s 

unreasonable failure to [raise a claim], he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259, 285–86 (2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91, 694). “Appellate counsel is 

not required to present every non-frivolous claim on behalf of her client.” Makiel, 782 F.3d at 

897. “[A]ppellate counsel’s performance is deficient under Strickland only if she fails to argue 

an issue that is both ‘obvious’ and ‘clearly stronger’ than the issues actually raised.” Id. “Failure 

to raise a losing argument, whether at trial or on appeal, does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel.” Stone v. Farley, 86 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687). 

Addressing the merits of Mata’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, the 

state appellate court explained as follows: 

Turning to the underlying merits, in order to sustain a claim of 

ineffectiveness based on failure to litigate a motion to suppress, a defendant must 

establish that the motion would have been granted, thereby assuring a different 

trial result. (citations omitted). 

Defendant contends he has established just that. Defendant contends his 

motion to suppress correctly states that he was not given Miranda warnings and 

his statement was involuntary based on physical and mental abuse by the police. 

Defendant's contentions, however, are contradicted by the trial record. 

Detective Bor, Detective Smith, and [Assistant State’s Attorney] Mojica all 

testified that at separate times following defendant's arrest, they advised him of 

his Miranda rights and, in each instance, he stated he understood them. In the 

videotaped statement played at trial, [Assistant State’s Attorney] Mojica again 

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advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and he stated he understood each one as 

she read them. Defendant acknowledged [Assistant State’s Attorney] Mojica was 

not his attorney, but stated that he wished to make the videotaped statement 

anyway. Defendant further stated that the police detectives and [Assistant State’s 

Attorney] had treated him well, providing him with sustenance, and that he was 

making the statement freely and voluntarily absent threat or promise in exchange. 

Defendant, in fact, elected to praise Detective Smith for treating him fairly while 

in custody. Because the record flatly contradicts defendant’s claims of abuse, and 

defendant has not pointed to any evidence outside the trial record or affidavits in 

support of his claims, there is no reason to believe defendant’s motion to suppress 

would have been granted. 

Given this record, we can also presume defense counsel intended to 

abandon the motion as part of sound trial strategy. (citations omitted) This is 

especially true where counsel successfully argued a motion to suppress evidence 

seized at the time of defendant’s arrest and zealously represented defendant at 

trial by presenting the testimony of a number of witnesses involved in the incident 

on the evening in question. 

Because we may presume trial counsel abandoned the motion as part of 

sound trial strategy and, most importantly, because defendant’s motion had no 

likelihood of success, appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to argue on 

direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for not litigating the motion to 

suppress. Defendant’s Strickland claim has no arguable merit, and the circuit 

court therefore properly dismissed his petition at the first stage of proceedings. 

(Dkt. No. 20-3 at 7–9.) 

Mata does not contest the state appellate court’s description of what he said in the 

statement. Instead, he contends the state court did not consider all the factors, such as police 

officers’ physical and mental abuse of Mata before his statement. (Dkt. No. 41 at 7–15.) 

According to Mata, officers threw him against a wall, dragged him down stairs, pushed him, and 

threatened that his fiancé would be arrested and the Department of Child and Family Services 

would be contacted to take his daughter if he did not give a statement. (Id. at 8–10.) He further 

states that he was handcuffed to a wall in a small room during much of the time before his video 

statement, was sleep deprived, and was not read his Miranda rights during every interrogation 

between the time of his arrest and the statement. (Id. at 9–11.) He contends that “[g]iven these 

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facts that transpired prior to and leading up to the making of Mata’s oral/video statement, it can 

be inferred that he was in fact coerced by Chicago detectives.” (Id. at 11.) According to Mata, 

the state appellate court did not consider all factors when determining that the motion to suppress 

the statement was a meritless motion his trial attorney chose not to pursue. (Id. at 12–14.) 

When determining the voluntariness of a statement, a court must “evaluate the ‘totality of 

the circumstances’ surrounding it.” Carter v. Thompson, 690 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (noting various factors to 

consider)). Some factors weigh more than others in each case, but ultimately the voluntariness 

inquiry asks whether the statement is “the product of a rational intellect and free will and not the 

result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have 

overcome the defendant’s free will.” United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotes and citations omitted). 

Prior to the above-quoted discussion about Mata’s videotaped statement, the state 

appellate court noted factors listed in his motion to suppress: “he stated that he was held by 

police for two days without Miranda warnings; he was ‘poked and profaned,’ kept in solitary 

confinement, forced to stand handcuffed to cell walls for hours, and threatened by police 

officers.” (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 2); see also (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 39–40). That the state appellate court 

focused on the video statement itself when ultimately deciding it was voluntary does not mean 

the court did not consider other factors. Given the evidence in the record—testimony from two 

police detectives and an Assistant State’s Attorney to the effect that Mata understood his 

Miranda rights, waived them, and wanted to make the statement, and the video statement itself, 

wherein Mata stated he understood and waived each Miranda warning and that he was 

voluntarily giving the statement free of threats and promises—the state appellate court’s 

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determination that the motion to suppress was meritless and would not have succeeded was not 

unreasonable. 

Nor was the state appellate court unreasonable when it determined that trial counsel 

presumably abandoned the motion to suppress as part of sound trial strategy. “[A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). As the state appellate court noted, Mata’s trial attorney 

successfully litigated a motion to suppress evidence from a search conducted at the time of 

Mata’s arrest and “zealously represented [him] at trial by presenting the testimony of a number 

of witnesses” to the shooting incident. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 8–9); see also (Dkt. 20-2 at 7–8) (on 

direct appeal, the state appellate court listed five fact witnesses, other than Mata, called to testify 

on his behalf); see also Carter v. Duncan, 819 F.3d 931, 950 (7th Cir. 2016) (Easterbrook, 

concurring) (“Strickland directs a court to examine the totality of counsel’s performance, not to 

concentrate on a supposed error while losing sight of what the lawyer did for his client.”) 

(emphasis in original). 

Considering the abundance of evidence demonstrating that Mata voluntarily gave his 

video statement, this Court cannot conclude that the state appellate court’s determinations—that 

a motion to suppress the statement would not have succeeded, that trial counsel presumably 

abandoned the motion, and that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the motion—were unreasonable. Mata has 

not made the requisite showing under § 2254(d) to warrant federal habeas relief for this claim. 

For this reason, Claim Four is without merit and denied. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, none of Mata’s claims warrant relief under § 2254 and his 

petitions for federal habeas corpus relief (Dkt. Nos. 1, 40, 41) are denied. The Court declines to 

issue a certificate of appealability, as Mata cannot make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right or that reasonable jurists would debate, much less disagree, with this Court’s 

resolution of his claims. Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Any pending motion is 

denied as moot. The Clerk is directed enter judgment in favor of the respondent and against 

Mata. 

 Mata is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If he wishes to 

appeal, he must file a notice of appeal in this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). He need not bring a motion to reconsider this Court’s ruling to preserve 

his appellate rights. However, if he wishes the Court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a 

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed 

within 28 days of the entry of judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and suspends the deadline for 

filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). A 

Rule 60(b) motion must be filed within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 

60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the 

Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Neither the time to file a Rule 59(e) motion nor the time to file a Rule 

60(b) motion can be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). 

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 ENTERED: 

____________________________ 

 Andrea R. Wood 

 United States District Judge 

Date: September 21, 2020 

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