1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JONATHAN COLEMAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 952

)

RANDY PFISTER, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, Chief Judge:

Pro se petitioner Jonathan Coleman (“Coleman”) has filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2004 murder conviction in the Circuit 

Court of Cook County. (Dkt. No. 1.) Pending before the court are respondent Randy Pfister’s 

(“Respondent”) “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 10) and Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings 

in Abeyance” (Dkt. No. 20). For the reasons set forth below, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is 

granted and Coleman’s motion to stay is denied as moot. 

BACKGROUND

Respondent generally argues that Coleman’s § 2254 petition must be dismissed with 

prejudice, because it was untimely filed pursuant to the deadlines set forth in the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Accordingly, this background section is 

limited to facts that are relevant to a determination of timeliness.

On December 16, 2004, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 

Illinois, Coleman was convicted of the first degree murder of Ricardo Cabrales. (Dkt. No. 10 

(“Respondent’s Mot.”) ¶ 2.) Coleman was sentenced on January 25, 2005, to serve sixty-five 
2

years of imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 2.) On March 2, 2007, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed 

Coleman’s conviction and sentence. (Id. ¶ 3.) The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Coleman’s 

petition for leave to appeal on May 31, 2007. (Id.)

On May 15, 2007, Coleman placed an unsigned and undated “draft” post-conviction 

petition in the prison mail at Menard Correctional Center, addressed to Coleman’s mother. (Id.

¶ 5.1.) Instead of sending the draft petition to Coleman’s mother, staff at Menard Correctional 

Center mailed the draft petition to the Circuit Court of Cook County, where it was received on 

May 21, 2007 and filed as a pro se post-conviction petition on June 19, 2007. (Id. ¶ 4, 5.2, 5.3.)1 

After a series of subsequent filings and orders, the circuit court eventually corrected this error on 

December 19, 2007, when the court determined that Coleman had withdrawn his May 15, 2007 

submission. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6.) 

On October 24, 2008, Coleman mailed a second2 post-conviction petition to the Circuit 

Court of Cook County. (Id. ¶ 8.) The circuit court denied Coleman’s October 24, 2008 postconviction petition on January 28, 2009. (Id.) The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the 

circuit court’s denial of post-conviction relief on July 22, 2011. (Id. ¶ 9; see also People v. 

Coleman, 956 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011).) On November 30, 2011, the Supreme 

Court of Illinois denied Coleman leave to appeal. (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 9.) 

 1

 Respondent sates that the draft post-conviction petition was “docketed” on May 21, 2007, but also cites 

Coleman’s assertion in state court that the draft post-conviction petition was “received” on May 21, 2007 and “filed”

on June 5, 2007. (See Respondent’s Mot. ¶¶ 4, 5.3.) The record from the state court shows that the draft postconviction petition was received on May 21, 2007 and filed on June 19, 2007. (State Record, Ex. K at C 032.) The

court will refer to the draft post-conviction petition as the “May 15, 2007 submission” in the remainder of this 

opinion for the sake of clarity.

2

 The circuit court’s eleven-page January 28, 2009 order makes no mention of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 

submission, apart from what appears to be an erroneous entry on page 3 of the order, and does not otherwise treat 

Coleman’s October 24, 2008 filing as a second or successive post-conviction petition. (See State Record, Ex. N at 

C:00094-C:00104.) 
3

Coleman’s appellate counsel learned of the Supreme Court of Illinois’s denial of leave to 

appeal on December 6, 2011, and informed Coleman of the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision 

on December 9, 2011. (Dkt. No. 14 (“Petitioner’s Resp.”) ¶ 6.) Coleman’s § 2254 petition was 

post-marked February 7, 2012, and was received by this court on February 10, 2012. 

(Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 10; see also text of Dkt. Entry No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

As noted above, Respondent argues that Coleman’s § 2254 habeas petition was untimely 

filed pursuant to the applicable deadlines set forth in AEDPA. Section § 2244(d) sets forth the 

relevant statutory language:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2).
4

It is undisputed that “the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review” in this case 

was August 29, 2007.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, absent any “impediment to 

filing . . . created by State action” (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)) or tolling for the period in which 

a “properly filed application for State post-conviction” was pending before the state court (28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)), Coleman’s § 2254 petition was due to be filed one year later, on or before 

August 29, 2008. 

Respondent argues that Coleman’s § 2254 petition must be dismissed for failure to meet 

the August 29, 2008 deadline, taking the position that “the limitations period was not tolled . . . 

before it expired on August 29, 2008.” (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 17.) In the alternative, Respondent 

argues that even if the erroneous filing of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission had the effect of 

tolling the limitations period, Coleman’s § 2254 petition would still be considered untimely 

under § 2244(d) when it was mailed on February 7, 2012. (Id. ¶ 18, n.3.) 

Coleman asserts that Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied, because: (1) 

Coleman’s § 2254 petition was timely filed within the one-year deadline, when the deadline is 

appropriately calculated and tolled; (2) Coleman’s lack of access to the prison law library and the 

“inadequate instructions” he received on how to file a § 2254 petition “created an impediment to 

filing an application” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B); and (3) Coleman is entitled to equitable 

tolling, because “extraordinary circumstances outside of petitioner’s control prevented him from 

filing a timely petition.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶¶ 8, 9.) 

Once a respondent “raises an AEDPA statute of limitations defense, the petitioner must 

come forward with some evidence to support his claim that . . . 365 countable days have not 

 3

 This date is ninety days after the Supreme Court of Illinois’s May 31, 2007 order, at which point Coleman’s time 

for petitioning the United States Supreme Court for direct review expired. See Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1003 

(7th Cir. 2012) (calculating limitations period from the date “the time expired for filing a petition for writ of 

certiorari in the Supreme Court for direct review of the state court’s judgment”).
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elapsed.” Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1008 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d 

1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006)). “After the petitioner makes this evidentiary showing, the burden 

shifts to the government to prove that the limitations period has run.” Id. 

ANALYSIS

1. Statutory Tolling and Calculation of Standard One-Year Limitations Period

The parties first dispute whether the erroneous filing of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 

submission tolls the applicable limitations period. Respondent argues that the May 15, 2007 

submission cannot toll the limitations period, because it is not a “properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or collateral review.” (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2)).) Coleman disputes this characterization of the May 15, 2007 submission, noting 

that “when the trial court ruled on the post-conviction [petition] it denied the petition as being 

‘frivolous and patently without merit.’ Not on any other grounds as argued by Respondent.” 

(Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 1.) The problem with Coleman’s argument is that it refers to the disposition 

of his October 24, 2008 post-conviction petition, not the May 15, 2007 submission.

4

 The only 

record evidence regarding the court’s disposition of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission is a 

docket entry on December 19, 2007, stating “POST-CONVICTION PET WITHDRAWN.” 

(State Record, Ex. B at 14.) This docket entry is consistent with the position taken by Coleman 

in State court, that the May 15, 2007 submission was “mistakenly mailed” to the circuit court. 

(State Record, Ex. L at C 306, ¶ 3.) Under these circumstances, the May 15, 2007 submission

cannot be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or collateral review” 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

 4

 Coleman’s statement appears to refer to the circuit court’s January 28, 2009 order denying Coleman’s October 24, 

2008 post-conviction petition, which concluded, “The court finds that the issues raised and presented by petitioner 

are frivolous and patently without merit.” (See State Record, Ex. N at C:00104; see also State Record, Ex. B at 16 

(1/28/09 docket entry stating “PETITION DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS AND PATENTLY WITHOUT 

MERIT”).)
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In the alternative, even if this court were to conclude that Coleman’s May 15, 2007 

submission did toll the limitations period as a “properly filed application for State postconviction or collateral review,” Coleman’s § 2254 petition would still be considered untimely. 

Under those circumstances, the one-year limitations period would begin to run on December 20, 

2007, the day after Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission was officially withdrawn. From 

December 20, 2007 through October 24, 2008, Coleman did not have any properly filed postconviction petitions pending in the State court,

5 and 309 days of the one-year limitations period 

elapsed. The remaining fifty-six days of the limitations period were then tolled from October 24, 

2008 through November 30, 2011, while Coleman’s October 24, 2008 post-conviction petition 

made its way through the State courts. This tolling period ended on November 30, 2011, the date 

the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Coleman leave to appeal. See Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 

F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing § 2244(d)(1)(A) and § 2244(d)(2) and concluding 

that the one-year limitations period is not tolled during the time when a petitioner could have 

filed, but did not file, a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 

regarding the denial of a post-conviction petition); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 

331-36 (2007). Coleman’s § 2254 petition was then due fifty-six days later, on January 25, 

2012.

6 As noted above, Coleman’s § 2254 petition was post-marked February 7, 2012, and was 

received by this court on February 10, 2012.7 

 5

 Coleman’s appointed counsel erroneously filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 2007 pertaining to an alreadyvacated circuit court order. (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 7.) This filing did not toll the one-year limitations period, 

because it was not a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” See Artuz v. 

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000) (“If, for example, an application is erroneously accepted by the clerk of a court lacking 

jurisdiction . . . it will be pending, but not properly filed.”); see also Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191, 

200 (Ill. 1999) (“a final judgment or decision is generally a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction”). The Appellate 

Court of Illinois dismissed the erroneous appeal on April 17, 2008. (See State Court Record, Ex. N at C:00059.)

6 The fact that Coleman did not learn about the November 30, 2011 order until December 9, 2011 does not impact

this calculation, because (1) the nine-day delay in notification does not constitute grounds for statutory tolling under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), see Gutierrez, 233 F.3d at 492 (“Congress explicitly required a ‘properly filed’ pleading to 
7

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Coleman’s § 2254 petition was not 

timely filed within the one-year limitations period.

2. State-Created Impediment

Coleman argues generally that the “inadequate instructions” he received from the Pontiac 

Correction Center’s Max Law Library (“Law Library”) on how to file a § 2254 petition 

“creat[ed] an impediment to filing an application” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). 

(Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.) Specifically, Coleman asserts that, “upon receiving notification of the 

[November 30, 2011] post-conviction PLA denial,” he requested from the Law Library “all 

instructions on how to file a habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” (Id. ¶ 7.) The 

instructions he received, however, did not “explain[ ] that petitioner had any deadline.” (Id.) 

Coleman further contends that “the only way he could of learned of the time limits at issue was 

by writing the Max Law Library as he did,” because he has been in “punitive segregation” since 

June 8, 2011. (Id. ¶ 9; see also Petitioner’s Ex. D ¶ 1.) Because the Law Library “failed to 

notify petitioner as to when his deadline was for filing a Federal Habeas Corpus with this court,” 

Coleman argues that the State created an impediment to him being able to timely file his § 2254 

petition. (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.) Coleman does not identify when, if ever, the alleged 

impediment was removed.

 

toll the statute of limitations”); and (2) the nine-day delay in notification does not constitute an “impediment to 

filing . . . created by State action” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), see Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504, 506-07 

(7th Cir. 2007) (“whatever constitutes an impediment must prevent a prisoner from filing his petition”) and Powell 

v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Without state action, there can be no state-created impediment by the 

public defender agency.”). The nine-day delay in notification also does not constitute grounds for equitable tolling, 

because this type of delay is not “extraordinary” and did not actually prevent Coleman from filing his § 2254 

petition. See Ray, 700 F.3d at 1004, n.3 (the doctrine of equitable tolling “applies only when extraordinary 

circumstances outside of the petitioner’s control prevent timely filing”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 Coleman’s § 2254 petition was signed February 1, 2012, but there is no evidence in the record that the petition 

was mailed any time prior to February 7, 2012, the date it was post-marked. (See Dkt. No. 18 (“Respondent’s 

Reply”) ¶ 7.) Under Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the 

date of “deposit[ ] in the institution’s internal mailing system” generally governs the time of filing. See § 2254 Rule

(3)(d).
8

“The Seventh Circuit has suggested that a prisoner must have access to the habeas corpus 

statute of limitations before it may be used to bar his claim.” United States ex rel. Strong v. 

Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Kennelly, J.) (citing Moore v. Battaglia, 

476 F.3d 504, 507-08 (7th Cir. 2007)). In Strong, District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly relied on 

two key factual findings to conclude that petitioner Strong adequately demonstrated a Statecreated impediment to filing under § 2244(d)(1)(B) because he did not have access to § 2244(d). 

First, Judge Kennelly noted that Menard Correctional Center was on lockdown “for fifteen of the 

twenty-three weeks immediately preceding [Strong’s] filing deadline,” and that Strong “had no 

access at all to law library materials” while the prison was on lockdown. Strong, 530 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1039. Second, Judge Kennelly determined that a prison law clerk’s advice to Strong that “he 

had a year to file” was attributable to the State, and could be reasonably interpreted to mean that 

the law clerk told Strong “he had one year after his post-conviction appeal was concluded to file 

a federal habeas corpus petition.” Id. at 1038. Judge Kennelly concluded that “[t]he 

miscalculation of the due date for Strong’s habeas petition by prison personnel and the resulting

inaccessibility to Strong of the statute of limitations qualifies as state action impeding Strong 

from timely filing his petition within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(B) and/or the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel and/or tolling.” Id. at 1042.8

Coleman’s argument is based almost entirely on his citation to Strong. Even assuming, 

without deciding, that the circumstances as the court originally found them in Strong could 

establish a State-created impediment to filing, the facts in this case are distinguishable. Coleman 

does not contend that he was given erroneous advice by prison officials, or that he was prevented 

 8 Upon reconsideration, and after a further evidentiary hearing, Judge Kennelly concluded that Strong was not given 

erroneous advice from the head law librarian “or anyone else delegated authority by prison personnel to calculate 

filing deadlines,” and that Strong was not denied access to the law library when he failed to request access to the law 

library before or after the four months of lockdown. United States ex rel Strong v. Gaetz, No. 07 C 435, 2009 WL 

3060267, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2009) (Kennelly, J.) (granting motion to reconsider).
9

from asking the Law Library for information about the applicable deadline for his § 2254 

petition. Rather, Coleman bases his argument on what the Law Library did not tell him. As his 

argument makes clear, the materials he was given for the Northern District of Illinois simply do 

not address the applicable filing deadline, (see Petitioner’s Ex. C1 (“Instructions for Filing a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 & § 2254.”)), but this is 

understandable in light of the fact that Coleman did not ask for materials regarding § 2254’s 

statute of limitations. Instead, he asked for “all instructions on how to file a habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 7.)9 Coleman attests that he also received 

the standard form for the Southern District of Illinois in response to his request to the Law 

Library, (Petitioner’s Resp., Ex. C ¶ 3), but he does not include a copy of the form as an exhibit 

to his response brief. A full reading of the Southern District of Illinois’s standard form, 

submitted by Respondent in reply, shows that it includes the full text of § 2244(d). (See

Respondent’s Reply, Ex. DDD.) If Coleman actually received this eighteen-page form from the 

Law Library, a factual determination that the court need not reach, it would significantly 

undermine Coleman’s assertion that the Law Library “failed to notify petitioner as to when his 

deadline was for filing a federal habeas corpus with this court.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.) In any 

event, Coleman has neither alleged nor argued that the Law Library provided him with erroneous

information about the filing deadline for his § 2254 petition or that it otherwise mislead him as to 

the proper statute of limitations.

Coleman also does not contend that the Law Library failed to answer any of his requests

for legal materials, or that the procedures for submitting requests for legal materials prohibited 

 9

 Respondent disputes Coleman’s factual assertions on this point, arguing that “the prison’s library has no record 

that petitioner made the foregoing request or that the library responded in the manner petitioner describes.” 

(Respondent’s Reply ¶ 14 (citing Respondent’s Exs. PP-TT).) The court accepts Coleman’s version of these 

disputed facts for purposes of ruling on the pending motion to dismiss.
10

him from accessing the applicable statute of limitations. On the contrary, Coleman’s affidavit 

suggests that the Law Library responded promptly to both of Coleman’s requests for 

information.

10 The fact that Coleman was limited to submitting his requests in writing does not 

mean, by extension, that he was denied access to the applicable statute of limitations. Although 

Coleman asserts that he has had “extremely limited access to the law library” and that he has 

only been allowed “access to the law library 8-10 times since confined in IDOC,” (Petitioner’s 

Resp. ¶ 5; see also Petitioner’s Ex. A ¶ 5), these statements, when considered in context, appear 

to refer to Coleman’s access to the physical Law Library facility. Because Coleman 

acknowledges that he “could of learned of the time limits at issue . . . by writing the Max Law 

Library,” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 9), his access to the physical Law Library facility is irrelevant. In 

short, there is no indication that there was any impediment to Coleman asking for, and receiving, 

information about the applicable filing deadline for his § 2254 petition. 

In Moore v. Battaglia, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its previous statement that “whatever 

constitutes an impediment must prevent a prisoner from filing his petition.” Moore, 476 F.3d at 

506-07 (quoting Lloyd v. VanNatta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). 

The Seventh Circuit considered the possibility that an “inadequate prison library” could be 

considered a State-created impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B), if the library did not contain a 

copy of § 2244(d) or if the State prevented the petitioner from accessing a copy of § 2244(d), but 

the factual record in Moore was too under-developed for the court to reach this legal question. 

See Moore, 476 F.3d at 508. 

Coleman has not submitted any evidence suggesting that the State prevented him from 

accessing a copy of § 2244(d) or otherwise created an impediment that prevented him from 

 10 After erroneously receiving a copy of the standard form from the Southern District of Illinois, Coleman sent a 

follow-up request for a “proper form” for the Northern District of Illinois, which he then received from the Law 

Library. (Petitioner’s Ex. C ¶ 5.) 
11

timely filing his § 2254 petition. As Respondent notes, Coleman “was able to ultimately file his 

petition without access to the law library and when the alleged impediment still existed.” 

(Respondent’s Reply ¶ 12 (citing Lloyd, 296 F.3d at 633).) It was Coleman’s burden to “come 

forward with some evidence” of a State-created impediment to filing to support his claim that 

“365 countable days have not elapsed.” Ray, 700 F.3d at 1008. Coleman has not met this 

burden. Moreover, Respondent’s evidence in reply makes abundantly clear that the Law Library 

imposed no impediment to filing in this case. (See Respondent’s Reply ¶¶ 13-16, 19-20 (citing 

Respondent’s Exs. PP-VV, XX-YY, AAA, CCC-DDD).) The court therefore declines to find a 

State-created impediment to filing under § 2244(d)(1)(B).

3. Equitable Tolling

Coleman’s arguments in support of equitable tolling also rely on his alleged inability to 

learn of the applicable filing deadline, as well as the fact that Coleman only has an 8th Grade 

education and “[d]oes not understand the law well enough to litigate his case.” (Petitioner’s 

Resp. ¶¶ 5, 9-10, 13.) In 2010, the Supreme Court confirmed that AEDPA’s one-year limitations 

period “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 

2560 (2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and 

prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).) 

“[S]tanding alone, [a petitioner’s] lack of legal expertise is not a basis for invoking equitable 

tolling.” Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008). Additionally, “[m]istakes of 

law or ignorance of proper legal procedures are not extraordinary circumstances warranting 

invocation of the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 

2006). 
12

Coleman did not diligently request information from the Law Library about the filing 

deadline for his § 2254 petition, nor has he demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that 

prevented him from timely filing his § 2254 petition. The court finds no basis for applying 

equitable tolling in this case.

4. Certificate of Appealability

This court will issue a certificate of appealability if it finds that Coleman has made “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy 

this burden, Coleman must demonstrate that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). Because this court finds it is not 

debatable among reasonable jurists that Coleman’s § 2254 petition is untimely under § 2244(d), 

the court denies Coleman’s request for a certificate of appealability.

5. Motion to Stay

Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings in Abeyance” (Dkt. No. 20) addresses his 

interest in filing a successive post-conviction petition in State court, based on the recent Supreme 

Court case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Because Coleman’s § 2254 petition is 

untimely regardless of whether Coleman files a successive post-conviction petition in State 

court, Coleman’s motion to stay is denied as moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, respondent Randy Pfister’s “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. 

No. 10) is granted and petitioner Jonathan Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings in Abeyance” 
13

(Dkt. No. 20) is denied as moot. Coleman’s request for a certificate of appealability is denied. 

Civil case terminated.

ENTER:

_______________________________

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Date: March 29, 2013