U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

50–173PDF 2010

CONTINUING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF

THE NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND

OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 17, 2009

Serial No. 111–36

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico

PAUL D. TONKO, New York

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM MATHESON, Utah

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

PETE OLSON, Texas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chair

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member

JANE WISE Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

June 17, 2009

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 12

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13

Witnesses:

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17

Biography .......................................................................................................... 22

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Biography .......................................................................................................... 25

Ms. Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere,

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28

Biography .......................................................................................................... 33

Discussion

Ensuring Interagency Cooperation ..................................................................... 34

The Role of OSTP ................................................................................................. 35

Selecting a Management Strategy ...................................................................... 36

Program Cost ........................................................................................................ 37

Coordinating Agencies and Technologies ........................................................... 38

The Keys to Avoiding Future Problems ............................................................. 40

Closing .................................................................................................................. 40

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,

Government Accountability Office (GAO) .......................................................... 44

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT) ........ 47

Ms. Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere,

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce ............................................................................................... 51

Page

IV

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making, Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. Government Accountability Office,

June 2009 .............................................................................................................. 56

NPOESS Independent Review Team, Final Report, June 1, 2009 ...................... 108

(1)

CONTINUING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF

THE NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

1GAO in its report provides a more detailed description of the usefulness of satellites in polar

orbits. 2 In 2005, frustrated by NOAA’s inability to respond to the deteriorating conditions within the

program, Representatives Gordon and Wu called for the removal of NOAA’s Administrator and

his deputy. Then-President Bush declined to take that step. 3 As set forth in the Memorandum of Agreement governing the NPOESS program, the Air

Force is managing the acquisition of the satellites. It is therefore subject to Department of Defense regulations for major defense programs. When such programs exceed approved baseline

costs by more than 25 percent, recertification is required by 10 U.S.C. 2433 et seq.

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Continuing Independent Assessment of

the National Polar-Orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite System

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009

2:00 P.M.–4:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on June 17, 2009, for

further oversight of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The Subcommittee will receive the newest report on the

program produced by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the findings

from the Independent Review Team (IRT) examining the program. NPOESS has

been the subject of sustained oversight as the risk that critical weather data might

be lost has grown. At this hearing, the Subcommittee will consider alternative steps

to limit the continuing deterioration in NPOESS program management and maintain the present schedule of satellite launches.

Program Description

In 1993, the decision was made to bring together the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellites operated by the Air Force and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites run by NOAA, thereby creating the NPOESS program.1 These

satellites were intended to meet needs for weather data by the military services as

well as NOAA’s National Weather Service. NPOESS also offered the opportunity for

NOAA and NASA to assure continuity of the climate data that both agencies are

collecting. The Committee’s work has shown that the benefits expected from

NPOESS have failed to materialize. Instead, the agencies find themselves at risk

of losing the flow of global data on weather conditions and climate change that are

critical to serving the needs of the United States.

The Committee has held five hearings on the NPOESS program since 2003, documenting cost overruns and schedule delays. A recurring issue has been the ineffectiveness2 of the program’s Executive Committee (EXCOM), which consisted of the

heads of the three agencies involved:

• the Administrator of NOAA,

• the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

(who delegated responsibility for EXCOM activities to the Secretary of the Air

Force); and

• the Administrator of NASA.

Below is a diagram of the NPOESS management structure (left column) established in response to the so-called Nunn-McCurdy recertification3 in 2005. A System

Program Director (SPD) was placed in charge of the Integrated Program Office

(IPO) handling the day-to-day program oversight. A Program Executive Officer

4

(PEO) became the direct liaison to the EXCOM. This was to simplify reporting information to the EXCOM and execution of resulting decisions.

With the reassignment of the first PEO, Air Force Brigadier General Susan

Mashiko, the EXCOM sought a replacement and ultimately settled on her System

Program Director, Dan Stockton. In assuming his new position, Mr. Stockton retired

from the Air Force and became a NOAA employee. The new System Program Director, Ed Phillips, also transitioned from the Air Force to a NOAA civil service position. As a result, they also serve within the Department of Commerce management

structure (right column), communicating through the National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Services (NESDIS) division of NOAA.

According to the reports to be presented at this hearing, this management structure is still failing to provide the leadership needed for NPOESS program success.

This leads to the obvious question: Is there hope of repairing the flaws in the organization? If not, what should replace it?

Witnesses

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO team monitoring the NPOESS program since

2001. He will present the latest in the continuing series of reports commissioned by

the Committee on this satellite program. He will also respond to changes that have

occurred in the program’s status since GAO completed work on its review.

Mr. Tom Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT)

Mr. Young served as the president of the Martin Marietta Corporation until its

merger with Lockheed Corporation; he then served as Executive Vice President of

Lockheed Martin until retiring in 1995. Mr. Young also served as Director of

NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center earlier in his career. In recent years, he has

lent his expertise to numerous program reviews and mishap investigations in the

space program. He testifies today as Chair of the Independent Review Team constituted by the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) to offer advice on recovering from the severe technical and managerial problems in the program.

5

Ms Mary Glackin, Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

The NPOESS program is fundamental to NOAA’s weather missions, and was also

expected to contribute to the agency’s monitoring of climate and space weather phenomena. During the transition to the Obama Administration, Ms. Glackin has

served as NOAA representative to the EXCOM, and has been coordinating with representatives of NASA and the Air Force to deal with the problems that continue to

beset the program. Ms. Glackin has been asked to provide NOAA’s responses to the

reports prepared by the previous witnesses. She will also describe the progress of

discussions now underway to plot a future course for the program.

Background

A. Helping NPOESS Succeed

The NPOESS program exists to collect data needed by NOAA, DOD and NASA

to forecast weather, help military units minimize weather impacts on operations,

and understand the influence of Earth’s climate. According to the IRT report, however, the ‘‘customers’’ have very different views on ‘‘how much is enough.’’ DOD is

quite satisfied with the performance of those instruments currently flying and sees

little need for significant investments in improvements. For NOAA and NASA, on

the other hand, such improvements are needed to achieve their mission goals. The

IRT states, ‘‘These differences are straining interagency relationships and are impacting how people do their jobs, even down to the lowest levels of the IPO. The IRT

believes that this program will not survive if this particular problem is not

addressed immediately.’’ [emphasis added] The IRT follows with the statement

that this ‘‘. . . can only be resolved at the White House level.’’

Whatever decision the White House makes on the question of what NPOESS will

do bears heavily on one of the major recommendations the IRT offers as part of its

‘‘Path Forward.’’ The Team states that the program needs support from the space

system experts at either NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center or the Air Force

Space and Missile Command. The team believes that, given the fact that NPOESS

is critical to NOAA’s mission areas, NOAA should recast the program to work with

Goddard much as it is doing with the Geostationary Operational Environmental

Satellite upgrade (GOES–R). However, if the White House defines the NPOESS program to be more in line with the DOD view that NPOESS is little more than a replacement for the current polar-orbiting satellites, then either organization would

be acceptable. Whatever the case, the present Integrated Program Office would continue in some fashion and would be expected to work closely with whichever organization is selected. The Committee’s interest in NOAA and NASA activities argues

for support of the IRT’s preference for a NOAA–NASA partnership. Mr. Young also

emphasizes that full control of the program resources must be vested in the revamped acquisition organization.

The IRT also believes that the current contractors should be retained. In the

Nunn-McCurdy restructuring, studies were begun to determine if the prime contract

with Northrop Grumman should be changed or terminated. These studies criticized

Northrop Grumman and the Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems team building

the Visible/Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) for poor performance. The

Independent Review Team received detailed presentations on the results from these

studies, which concluded that Northrop Grumman, at least, had made progress in

addressing its shortfalls. Therefore, the disruption caused by finding a replacement

was not warranted. The IRT team also recommends retaining Northrop Grumman.

However, the award fee plan for the contract should be changed to focus on mission

success.

The IRT also recommended that the government press forward with Raytheon to

obtain the VIIRS instrument, although it could not determine how much longer it

would take or how much it will ultimately cost. Replacement options should be limited to obtaining another unit of the existing Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) imager now in use should the VIIRS unit fail during its remaining

test or integration processes.

The IRT notes that the program is still operating with insufficient funds to

achieve the outcomes it is pursuing. Correcting this will be another outgrowth of

the White House decision process, in that more funds will have to be found or something will have to be dropped. The IRT estimates that accomplishing the current

program plan will require an additional $1 billion, which matches GAO’s view (see

section C, below).

6

4On March 3, the EXCOM was notified that the accumulation of the most recent technical

trouble with the VIIRS instrument required delays in the predicted launch dates for NPP and

the NPOESS satellites. A new baseline was to be submitted by June 4.

B. What About EXCOM?

Previous hearings have examined the role and performance of the Executive Committee, which serves as the senior level of management for the NPOESS program.

In the Committee’s 2005 hearing, Mr. Gordon (then Ranking Member) had a sharp

exchange with NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher about the flow of information to the EXCOM and the slow pace of EXCOM meetings even as the program

was suffering severe budget problems. In a hearing before the Energy and Environment Subcommittee in 2007, GAO described the laborious process the EXCOM undertook to get concurrence on the set of documents needed to implement the management, technical and budgetary changes resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy recertification decisions in 2006. A year later, Mr. Powner testified that the updated

Memorandum of Agreement and the new program baseline had still not been signed

by all of the three principals.4 The repeated inability to make even basic decisions

led the Committee to ask GAO to focus attention on the EXCOM.

Mr. Powner will testify that, despite the efforts undertaken to repair the weaknesses in the EXCOM, ‘‘. . . it has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and

does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program.’’ Part of the problem involved the fact that

while the Secretary of the Air Force was serving as DOD’s EXCOM representative,

he had no authority to make commitments for DOD. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics had not delegated authority to make

commitments for DOD when reaching procurement milestones. As GAO noted, however, the Under Secretary did not attend EXCOM meetings, which contributed to

the inability to gain approval on the Memorandum of Agreement and the program

baseline.

Thus the situation continues, and indeed has fueled growing friction between the

program participants. GAO’s report illuminates this where it states:

At the conclusion of our review, DOD officials reported that part of the problem

in escalating risks is that, in violation of interagency agreements and inconsistent with DOD acquisition policy, two senior NOAA officials review and limit

what the Program Executive Officer provides to the Executive Committee. NOAA

officials and the Program Executive Officer strongly disagreed with this statement. NASA commented that NOAA’s enhanced oversight provides a healthy set

of checks and balances to the program.

GAO also described in its draft report that the EXCOM fails to make clear decisions and does not regularly determine if progress is being made on the tasks it has

ordered to be accomplished. GAO found no mechanism for tracking EXCOM decision

milestones. Compounding this lack of oversight, the decisions that have been made

often did little to actually resolve the problem. This is most clearly seen in the continuing inability to bring the primary sensor, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), to completion. Despite continued pressure on prime contractor

Northrop Grumman to achieve improved performance from Raytheon, the EXCOM

has not been able to solve this major impediment to NPOESS progress.

Having been constituted by the EXCOM, Mr. Young’s Independent Review Team

proved diplomatic in its comments. Still, it raised concerns similar to those highlighted in GAO’s report. As it concluded:

The EXCOM process is ineffective: The EXCOM is intended to be a decision body

to provide streamlined direction to the PEO. The current DOD EXCOM representative has not been delegated the proper authority from the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), who is also the NPOESS Milestone Decision Authority

(MDA), and decisions require an additional meeting and coordination to be finalized. Additionally, the IRT has observed that many of the topics that are discussed at the EXCOM delve too deeply into program details and many critical

top level issues are left unresolved.

GAO recommends that the Under Secretary for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics be directed to attend EXCOM meetings. It further recommends that the

EXCOM devise a realistic timeline for revising the program baseline, develop a plan

to mitigate data gaps and pay closer attention to the outcome from its decisions.

Mr. Young argues that the EXCOM should play a different role if the NPOESS

program becomes a NOAA–NASA responsibility. In that case, the EXCOM will provide DOD continuing insight into the NPOESS program. While DOD believes its

7

needs are being met by the current generation of instruments, it is also the case

that users often cannot recognize benefits from new technology until they are presented real, not theoretical, products to evaluate. That is very likely to be the case

with NPOESS. Mr. Young believes that the EXCOM will then serve as the forum

by which DOD participates in the continuing evolution of data requirements for future systems.

C. Cost Increases and Schedule Delays

The NPOESS program has changed significantly since its inception in 1994. A fundamental restructuring took place in 2005 and 2006 as a result of the breach

of cost ceilings defined by the so-called Nunn-McCurdy provision of DOD procurement law. The recertified program, announced in June 2006, provided for the following:

• The estimate for acquisition cost rose to $11.5 billion (with an additional

$1 billion to cover operating costs, making the total life cycle cost $12.5 bil- lion).

• Only two satellites were guaranteed to be built, with the first launch

scheduled for 2013.

• A decision to buy two more satellites, and to reconsider the program’s

management structure, was to be made in 2010.

• The capabilities of the satellites were reduced, in that one of the major instruments (the Conical Microwave Imaging Sounder) was removed, to be replaced

with a less-capable instrument on the second NPOESS satellite that would

be launched in 2016. Also removed were instruments intended to extend the

data records for monitoring the Earth’s climate, and to track events on the

Sun that had the potential to disturb the planet’s geomagnetic environment.

In the past seven years, Committee hearings on the NPOESS program have documented a continuing rise in the program’s life cycle cost estimate and repeated

delays in the expected launch dates for the satellites. Using Mr. Powner’s statements at these hearings, the following table demonstrates the growing life cycle cost

and schedule delays:

The $14.9 billion estimate, according to Mr. Powner, includes some $1 billion in

additional costs for the sensor problems, possible information security upgrades and

estimates for the operational costs for the last two years of the program’s life. Thus,

the program has doubled in cost and yet will result in fewer satellites. It should

also be of concern that, despite the effort to reduce or eliminate risk in the NPOESS

program, cost increases on the order of $1 billion per year are continuing to occur.

8

5 NOAA–19 was substantially rebuilt after it was dropped on the floor September 6, 2003 at

the Lockheed Martin production facility. NOAA has regularly assured the Committee that all

damage has been completely repaired. 6The change to operational status affects primarily the ground system, as NPP was originally

intended to provide data only to NOAA and one of three military forecasting centers. The satellite will now serve all four centers.

During the 2005 Nun-McCurdy recertification, continuity of the existing data

streams was the highest priority. As the Independent Review Team report notes,

While continuity of data is a critical priority for all users, it is at extreme risk:

If all satellites are delivered on schedule, launched without incident, and meet

their full design life, there will be no significant gap in capabilities. In keeping

with historical trends, there is a high likelihood of early problems with the first

few satellites. If NPOESS exhibits similar characteristics, there will be a minimum gap of several months. If there is a launch failure—a 41 percent chance

of occurring over the remaining DMSP launches, NPP and NPOESS—there is

a high likelihood of a gap measured in years . . ..

NOAA’s has assured data continuity by its policy of assuring spare satellites

available for launch in case a satellite is lost at launch or fails prematurely. In the

case of the geostationary program, NOAA provides a spare in orbit to reduce the

time needed to respond to failure. This recently proved important when the current

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite covering the eastern United

States (GOES–12) suffered problems. NOAA was able to place the existing spare,

GOES–13, into service until it could restore GOES–12 to duty.

This policy for backup satellites was also provided in the original NPOESS program. Yet by the time NOAA launched the last of its polar satellites, NOAA–19, on

February 6,5 the extreme risk identified by the IRT became concrete. NOAA is now

dependent on NOAA–19 lasting at least for two years without incident, assuming

that NPP achieves its planned launch in January 2011. NOAA has been fortunate

in that it has not lost a satellite in a launch accident for some time. While it has

been clear for some time that the NPP satellite would take on this ‘‘gap-filler’’ operational role, it also is designed for a four- to five-year lifetime. Should the first

NPOESS satellite be lost,6 NPP would be expected to carry on well into the next

decade. The second NPOESS satellite is intended to operate in the morning orbit,

which is of primary interest to DOD. The risk is somewhat lower there as DOD still

has three of its DMSP satellites in reserve.

D. Program Status

The NPOESS program last month completed a Critical Design Review on the

NPOESS system. Northrop Grumman’s program manager commented afterwards

that, ‘‘The team demonstrated that the majority of the detailed design is complete

and meets requirements. NPOESS is at a higher level of design maturity than typical

at this milestone as a result of building sensors and ground elements for the

NPOESS Preparatory Project . . ..’’ The Government’s System Program Director reported to the EXCOM on May 22 that the consensus favored going forward with the

first NPOESS satellite, but with important qualifications:

• NPOESS satellite integration and test schedule is high risk

• Four percent (16/458) of the non-KPP (Key Performance Parameter) attributes

do not meet specification

• Compliance to baseline design depends on unapproved changes

• Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) sensor design insight and maturity

is lacking

Open items from the Review are expected to be resolved by August.

The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument, which has

been the critical pacing item for some time now, is now undergoing critical thermalvacuum testing to determine if it can withstand the conditions it will face during

operation. The Cross-Track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) is progressing through the steps

needed to restore the instrument following failure of the frame during vibration

testing. Screws in one element of the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) will

be replaced to assure they were properly tightened. Funding from the NOAA’s allocation in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act has been used to assure that

the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) and Earth Radiation Budget Sensor

(ERBS) will be able to fly on NPP, thus avoiding gaps in critical climate data collections.

9

The Integrated Program Office has also been contributing to efforts currently underway in the NPOESS agencies to assist the White House in responding to the recommendations from the two reports to be discussed at the Subcommittee’s hearing.

10

Chairman MILLER. Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing, Continuing Independent Assessment of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS.

Today, this subcommittee will receive two reports on the perennially unsettled NPOESS, the National Polar-Orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite System. The Science Committee, under the

Chairmanship of former Chairman Boehlert and our current Chairman Gordon, have devoted years of oversight to this program, and

despite our relentless pressure, our relentless oversight, to get this

program under control, we meet again to learn what is going on,

that the NPOESS satellites are facing another delay, another

schedule slip, and that the total cost expected has grown an additional billion dollars.

The Committee’s first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my

first year in Congress. At that time, the first NPOESS satellite was

projected for launch in 2009, this year. Here we are. Six years of

effort have gained us one year of expected progress. Now we think

that the first NPOESS satellite is likely to fly in 2014.

But if the math is correct and we continue to advance at the rate

that we are advancing, the satellite will not really be ready for

launch until 2039.

That is obviously not acceptable. The delays and cost overruns

we will hear about today are not the most important news from the

hearing. The most important news is what steps need to be taken

to reorganize the management of this program in order to achieve

a successful launch by 2014. We probably can’t manage one this

year at this point.

To help us understand what still needs to be done, two independent groups have given us the results of their recent works. The

Government Accountability Office, GAO, their team represented by

Mr. David Powner, has given the Committee invaluable help overseeing NOAA’s satellite programs. We are also fortunate today to

welcome Mr. Tom Young, who has found it hard to enjoy his retirement with all of the investigations of government space programs

that we have asked him to lead in recent years. He will present

the findings of an Independent Review Team that has just completed its review of the NPOESS program management. Both Mr.

Powner and Mr. Young have recommendations for Congress and

the Administration regarding how to restructure the management

of this program to get it back on track.

And our third witness is NOAA Deputy Under Secretary Mary

Glackin, who has recently taken on this thankless, difficult task of

trying to shepherd NPOESS to a successful conclusion, by which I

assume we mean actually launching one. Serving in her position

since December of 2007 means that she should have some historical perspective on all of the questions facing NOAA and the Administration. Fundamentally, we hope she will help shed light on

why the last Director of OSTP failed to make decisions on this

project that are now left to the new Administration.

I think that Mr. Young, Mr. Powner and Ms. Glackin will all

agree that NPOESS now needs key guidance that only the White

House can deliver. As a project shared among three agencies, the

Department of Defense, NASA and NOAA, NPOESS is cursed by

too many cooks and no agreed-upon recipe for the proper mission

11

for the program. Only the White House can settle those differences

and decide a path forward. The Subcommittee asked OSTP to send

a representative today, but unfortunately a national security exercise has kept all senior OSTP staff occupied today. So instead of

being here at the Rayburn Building, they are presumably at an undisclosed, secure location.

When it comes to NPOESS, it has been years since we had the luxury of time for making decisions. NOAA recently made its last

polar satellite operational. Its predicted lifetime is five years. With

every passing month, GAO reminds us that we get closer to the

probability of a data interruption in weather data as well as the

certain interruption in climate data. NOAA primarily pins its

hopes to avoiding such a data gap by using the NPP satellite,

which was never intended as an operational satellite, as a gapfiller. I would feel much more confident with that plan if the NPP

launch schedule was not also slipping and if we actually knew

whether its main instrument was going to work.

On March 12, speaking to State officials about the Recovery Act,

President Obama said, ‘‘If we see money being misspent, we’re

going to put a stop to it.’’ We have seen money misspent on

NPOESS, but stopping NPOESS is not an option. NPOESS may be

a mess—no real maybe about it—and it may have been mismanaged—not much maybe about that either—but the American

public needs the data produced by NPOESS in order to have accurate weather forecasts, and the world needs the climate data that

would be collected by NPOESS to continue to understand how our

climate is changing. Cancellation of NPOESS is not an option, and

failure is unacceptable. If we do not have NPOESS, we will need

something like it, and we will need it soon.

We will spend our time today trying to deal with the program as

it is, determine where we need to go and decide how we will get

there from here.

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I now

recognize my colleague from Georgia, the Ranking Member, Dr.

Broun.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

Good afternoon.

Today, the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight will receive two reports

on the perennially unsettled National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS). The Science Committee, under the leadership of former

Chairman Boehlert and current Chairman Gordon, has devoted years of oversight

to this program. Despite our relentless pressure to get this program under control,

we meet again to learn that the NPOESS satellites are facing another schedule slip

and that the total expected cost has grown an additional billion dollars.

The Committee’s first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my first year in Congress. At that time, the first NPOESS satellite was projected for launch in 2009.

Here we are in 2009, and six years of effort have gained us only one year of

progress; now the first NPOESS satellite is slated to fly in 2014.

If my math is correct, at this rate we will not get an NPOESS satellite ready for

launch until 2039.

That is obviously unacceptable. The delays and cost overruns we will hear about

today are not the most important news from this hearing; the most important news

is what steps need to be taken to reorganize the management of this program in

order to guarantee a successful launch in 2014.

To help us understand what must be done, two independent groups will give us

the results of their recent work. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) team

12

represented by Mr. David Powner has given the Committee invaluable help overseeing NOAA’s satellite programs. We are also fortunate to welcome today Mr. Tom

Young, who has found it hard to enjoy retirement with all of the investigations of

Government space programs he has been asked to lead in recent years. He will

present the findings of an Independent Review Team that has just completed its review of NPOESS program management. Both Mr. Powner and Mr. Young have recommendations for the Congress and the Administration regarding how to restructure the management of this program to get it back on track.

Our third witness, NOAA Deputy Under Secretary Mary Glackin, has recently

taken on the difficult task of trying to shepherd NPOESS to a successful conclusion.

Serving in her position since December of 2007 means she should have some historical perspective on all of the questions facing NOAA and the Administration. Fundamentally, we hope she will help shed light on why the last Director of OSTP

failed to make decisions on this project that are now left to the new Administration.

I think that Mr. Young, Mr. Powner and Ms. Glackin will all agree that NPOESS

now needs key guidance that only the White House can deliver. As a project shared

among three agencies—the Department of Defense, NASA and NOAA—NPOESS is

cursed by too many cooks and no agreed upon recipe for the proper mission for the

program. Only the White House can settle these differences and carve a clear path

forward. The Subcommittee asked OSTP to send a representative today, but unfortunately a national security exercise has kept all senior OSTP staff occupied today.

When it comes to NPOESS, it has been years since we had the luxury of time

for making decisions. NOAA recently made its last polar satellite operational. Its

predicted lifetime is five years. With every passing month, GAO reminds us that we

get closer to the probability of a data interruption in weather data as well as the

certain interruption in climate data. NOAA primarily pins its hopes to avoiding a

data gap by using the NPP satellite—which was never intended as an operational

satellite—as a gap-filler. I would feel more confident with that plan if the NPP

launch schedule was not also slipping, and if we actually knew whether its primary

instrument was going to work.

On March 12, speaking to State officials about the Recovery Act, President Obama

said, ‘‘If we see money being misspent, we’re going to put a stop to it.’’ Unfortunately, we’ve seen money misspent on NPOESS, but stopping NPOESS is not an

option. NPOESS may be a mess and it may have been mismanaged, but the American public needs the data produced by NPOESS in order to have accurate weather

forecasts, and the world needs the climate data that would be collected by NPOESS

to continue to understand how our climate is changing. Cancellation is not an option

and failure is unacceptable. If we do not have NPOESS, we will need something

very much like it. We will spend our time today trying to deal with the program

as it is, determine where we need to go and decide how we will get there from here.

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee this afternoon and recognize my colleague from Georgia, Ranking Member Broun.

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our

witnesses here today and thank them for participating in this important hearing.

This is the Committee’s sixth hearing on the NPOESS program,

spanning both Democratic as well as Republican controls of the

Committee. This is, however, the first time that this committee, the

Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, has held a hearing,

but we have been actively involved for some time now.

NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost savings by combining the DMSP within the Department of Defense

and the POES system at NOAA. But instead, the program has doubled in cost, shrunk from six to four satellites, degraded its sensor

capabilities, and seen its schedule slip six years. If that wasn’t bad

enough, Mr. Young points out in his testimony that, and I quote

him, ‘‘The current program has an extraordinarily low probability

of success,’’ even after numerous rebase linings and a significant

Nunn-McCurdy recertification.

So how did we get here? After several years of cooperation it has

become clear that the partner agencies had differing priorities and

levels of commitment. This is certainly expected. There are unique

13

missions. But this divergence has ultimately created an untenable

partnership. NOAA is pressured by the scientific community to continue operation of research satellites that feed cutting-edge data

into weather and climate models, while DOD is content to operate

legacy hardware. NOAA doesn’t have any extra POES satellites to

buff its transition, while DOD still has two DMSP satellites on the

ground. This is NOAA’s flagship mission, yet this barely amounts

to a rounding error in the Pentagon’s budget.

Another reason is simply that space acquisition isn’t easy. This

isn’t an excuse, but it is worth noting that we aren’t asking these

agencies to build cardboard boxes. Sure, the government could do

better with cost estimating, with procurement, and contract management. But in the end we are building one-of-a-kind, innovative

hardware and launching it 17,500 miles per hour into the vacuum

of space.

Because of this complexity, we have sought to limit our costs by

putting numerous sensors on fewer spacecraft and launch vehicles,

thereby restricting the opportunities for performance upgrades to

generational timeframes. In doing so, we have created a program

that is essentially too big to fail, a phrase we have all heard lately

to describe another huge fiasco. By placing all of our eggs in one

basket, we have developed an architecture where it seems failure

is not an option. Further compounding the problem are issues of

requirement creeps from climate sensors, schedule pressure because of data continuity concerns, and cost caps from external factors like Nunn-McCurdy.

It really isn’t surprising that the program isn’t run well when the

managers can’t fine tune fundamental program management parameters like cost, schedule and performance.

So where do we go from here? The GAO and the Independent Review Team have offered recommendations, and NOAA has proposed

future management budget and data options. The IRT states that

this program will ultimately require the White House to weigh in.

We certainly have near-term decisions on the horizon as well as

long-term plans to consider.

I look forward to exploring the implications of these options and

proposed directions with the Chairman. NPOESS is a critical national asset that deserves not only this committee’s attention but

also that of all partner agencies, the White House, and the appropriators. Every American is impacted by this program, whether

they know it or not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fishermen, soldiers and sailors, Marines, and everyday commuters continue to receive weather and climate information, but

we must not forget to be good stewards of taxpayers’ money and

to root out waste, inefficiency, and duplication wherever we can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses here today and thank

them for participating in this important hearing. This is the Committee’s sixth hearing on the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

(NPOESS), spanning both Democratic and Republican control of the Committee.

This is, however, the first time the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee has

held a hearing, but we have been actively involved for some time now.

14

NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost-savings by combining the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) within the Department

of Defense (DOD) and the Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite (POES) System

at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Instead, the program has doubled in cost, shrunk from six to four satellites, degraded its sensor capabilities, and seen its schedule slip six years. If that wasn’t bad enough, Mr. Young

points out in his testimony that ‘‘the current program has an extraordinarily low

probability of success’’—even after numerous rebaselinings and a significant NunnMcCurdy recertification.

So how did we get here? After several years of cooperation, it has become clear

that the partner agencies have differing priorities and levels of commitment. This

is certainly expected given their unique missions, but this divergence has ultimately

created an untenable partnership. NOAA is pressured by the scientific community

to continue operation of research satellites that feed cutting-edge data into weather

and climate models, while DOD is content to operate legacy hardware. NOAA

doesn’t have any extra POES satellites to buffer its transition, while DOD still has

two DMSP satellites on the ground. This is NOAA’s flagship mission, yet this barely

amounts to a rounding error in the Pentagon’s budget.

Another reason is simply that space acquisition isn’t easy. This isn’t an excuse,

but it is worth noting that we aren’t asking these agencies to build cardboard boxes.

Sure, the government could do better with cost-estimating, procurement, and contract management, but in the end we are building one-of-a-kind innovative hardware and launching it 17,500 miles per hour into the vacuum of space.

Because of this complexity, we have sought to limit our costs by putting numerous

sensors on fewer spacecraft and launch vehicles thereby restricting the opportunities for performance upgrades to generational timeframes. In doing so, we have created a program that is essentially ‘‘too big to fail’’—a phrase we have all heard lately to describe another fiasco. By placing all of our eggs in one basket, we have developed an architecture where it seems failure is not an option. Further compounding

the problem are issues of requirements creep from climate sensors, schedule pressure because of data continuity concerns, and cost caps from external factors like

Nunn-McCurdy. It really isn’t surprising that the program isn’t run well when the

managers can’t fine-tune fundamental program management parameters like cost,

schedule, and performance.

So where do we go from here? The General Accountability Office (GAO) and the

Independent Review Team (IRT) have offered recommendations, and NOAA has proposed future management, budget, and data options. The IRT states that this program will ultimately require the White House to weigh in. We clearly have nearterm decisions on the horizon, as well as long-term plans to consider.

I look forward to exploring the implications of these options and proposed directions with the Chairman. NPOESS is a critical national asset that deserves not only

this committee’s attention, but also that of all the partner agencies, the White

House, and the Appropriators.

Every American is impacted by this program whether they know it or not. It is

our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fisherman, war-fighters, and everyday

commuters continue to receive weather and climate information. But we must not

forget to be good stewards of taxpayers’ money and root out waste, inefficiency and

duplication where we can.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. I now ask unanimous

consent that all additional opening statements submitted by Members be included in the record, and without objection, it is so ordered.

It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses at this time.

Mr. David Powner is the Director of Information Technology Management Issues at the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Tom

Young is the Chair of the NPOESS Independent Review Team, and

Ms. Mary Glackin is the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and

Atmosphere at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

As our witnesses should know, you will each have five minutes

for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included

in the record for the hearing. When you have completed your spoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 050173 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DWORK\I&O09\061709\50173 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
15

ken testimony, we will begin with questions. Each Member will

have five minutes to question the panel.

It is the practice of the Subcommittee to receive testimony under

oath. Do any of you have any objection to taking an oath? All the

witnesses indicated that they did not. You also have the right to

be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here? All the

witnesses indicated that they did not. If you will now please stand

and raise your right hand? Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? All the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

So the witnesses have now taken the oath.

We will begin with Mr. David Powner. Mr. Powner, please begin.

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and

Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to

testify on our latest NPOESS report being released today. This

afternoon I will discuss NPOESS’s continued problems and our recommendations for improvement, both near- and long-term, so that

our nation will have continued data and imagery essential for

weather forecasting and climate monitoring.

Six years ago I first testified on NPOESS before Chairman

Ehlers’ Subcommittee when NPOESS was a $7 billion program and

the launch of its first satellite was April 2009. Today the cost has

increased $8 billion to at least $15 billion, and the first satellite

launch has been delayed five years to March 2014.

I will briefly discuss these increasing costs, schedule delays, as

well as potential gaps in critical satellite coverage and ineffective

executive management.

The current cost of $14 billion and the various planned launch

schedules are not achievable. Technical problems with two critical

sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, continue to drive up costs and push

launch schedules out. We expect the current $14 billion estimate

to increase at least a billion dollars to cover sensor technical issues,

new security requirements, and additional operations and maintenance costs.

We also need to keep in mind that the integration and testing

of the sensors for the initial satellites has not yet occurred, and

this could be an additional cost driver. The new cost estimates are

scheduled to go to the EXCOM for approval by the end of the

month, and we understand that at least five estimates are being

considered.

Schedules for the demonstration satellite known as NPP, and the

first two satellites have been delayed seven, fourteen, and five

months, respectively. These delays endanger the continuity of

weather and climate data. With the current launch schedule,

should we run into any problems with the satellite launch failure

or operational problems, we will have gaps in satellite coverage. My

written testimony highlights these potential gaps in each of the

three orbits. In fact, a single launch failure of one of the remaining

DOD satellites known as DMSP or of NPP could result in a gap

in satellite coverage of up to five years.

16

NOAA has been plagued by ineffective management over the

years, and today our report highlights that NPOESS’s executive

committee has not been effective in fulfilling its responsibilities,

which has contributed to NPOESS’s problems. Specifically, the

right folks don’t attend the EXCOM meetings. Those that do don’t

effectively manage risks, nor do they make tough decisions when

needed. For example, DOD’s Under Secretary for Acquisition is

DOD’s official EXCOM member as agreed to in official memorandums of agreement. This official whose DOD’s acquisition authority

has never attended an EXCOM meeting and has delegated this role

to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Not having the acquisition

authority attend these meetings has resulted in delays as the

EXCOM decisions have later been overturned by the acquisition

authority.

The bottom line here is that having the right officials attend

could greatly streamline decision making. In addition, although the

EXCOM holds quarterly meetings, they do not routinely track action items and issues to closure. Also, the tri-agency structure creates a situation of differing and competing priorities, and the

EXCOM has not been effective in resolving these differences. In

fact, the EXCOM is about to be presented with differing cost estimates by the end of the month where they will be asked to make

a tough decision on the right program cost and scope, especially

given the fact that NOAA and DOD will likely have differing costs

and program performance that are acceptable.

Before discussing our recommendation, I would like to note a few

areas of progress. The NPOESS program has delivered and integrated three of the five instruments for NPP. The ground station

systems have been installed and tested at both locations, and the

command and control system has passed acceptance testing. However, moving forward, we recommend that in the near-term the

NPOESS program needs to have the right EXCOM members attend and participate in the EXCOM meetings, and this includes

DOD’s Under Secretary for Acquisition. Also, the EXCOM needs to

effectively manage risks and make decisions, starting with approving new program costs and scheduled base lines.

The program also needs to develop mitigation plans to address

potential gaps in satellite coverage, and it needs to seek White

House guidance on a direction forward. These near-term recommendations are essential to keep the acquisition moving forward, to mitigate future cost increases, schedule delays, and gaps

in satellite coverage.

Looking at this from a longer-term perspective, we need to acknowledge this tri-agency experiment has been an epic failure, and

we need an exit strategy to go back to separate satellite acquisitions for the next series of polar orbiting satellites.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for your

leadership and oversight of this acquisition.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]

17

1GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at

Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making, GAO–09–564 (Washington, D.C.:

June 17, 2009). 2Presidential Decision Directive NSTC–2, May 5, 1994.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER

Polar-Orbiting Satellites: With Costs Increasing

and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements

Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the National

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). NPOESS is

expected to be a state-of-the-art satellite system that will replace two existing satellite systems. It is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the

continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events

such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring. Three agencies share responsibility for NPOESS: the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States Air

Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). As requested, this statement summarizes our report being released today that (1) identifies the status and risks of key program components, (2) assesses the NPOESS Executive Committee’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluates efforts to

identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites.1

In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the accompanying

report. That report contains a detailed overview of our scope and methodology. All

of our work for this report was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our

audit objectives.

Background

Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed

by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two

operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they can observe the Earth

in early morning, mid-morning, and early afternoon polar orbits. In addition, the

government is also relying on a European satellite, called Meteorological Operational, or MetOp, in the mid-morning orbit.

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two satellite programs into

a single satellite program capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.2 The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United

States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting

and global climate monitoring. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA

formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA. Within the

program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: NOAA has overall

program management responsibility for the converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into

the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding NPOESS, while

NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In addition, an Executive Committee—made up of the administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—is responsible for providing policy guidance, ensuring agency support and funding, and exercising overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 050173 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DWORK\I&O09\061709\50173 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
18

3The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics delegated the re- sponsibility for attending the meetings—but not the authority to make acquisition decisions—

to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 4 Compared to original program plans, the demonstration satellite has been delayed by ap- proximately four and a half years, while the first two NPOESS satellites have each been delayed

by approximately five years. 5These estimates are subject to further refinement because the Executive Committee has not agreed on a cost estimating methodology and the agencies have not yet agreed to new information security requirements. 6This cost estimate includes launch vehicle costs of approximately $329 million, which are funded outside the program’s baseline.

sight authority.3 The Executive Committee manages the program through a Pro- gram Executive Officer who oversees the NPOESS program office. Since the program’s inception, NPOESS costs have grown to $13.95 billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by up to five years.4 In addition, as a result

of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the agencies reduced the program’s

functionality by removing two of six originally planned satellites and one of the orbits. The restructuring also decreased the number of instruments from 13 (10 sensors and three subsystems) to nine (seven sensors and two subsystems), with four

of the sensors providing fewer capabilities. The restructuring also led agency executives to mitigate potential data gaps by deciding to use a planned demonstration

satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, as an operational

satellite providing climate and weather data. However, even after this restructuring,

the program is still encountering technical issues, schedule delays, and the likelihood of further cost increases.

Progress Made, But Continued Instrument Problems Are Driving Costs Up- ward, Forcing Launch Delays, and Endangering Satellite Continuity

Over the past year, selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress. Specifically, three of the five instruments slated for NPP have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data processing

system has been installed and tested at both of the locations that are to receive NPP

data; and the satellites’ command, control, and communications system has passed

acceptance testing. However, problems with two critical sensors continue to drive

the program’s cost and schedule. Specifically, challenges with a key sensor’s (the

Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) ) development, design, and workmanship have led to additional cost overruns and delayed the instrument’s delivery

to NPP. In addition, problems discovered during environmental testing on another

key sensor (called the Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) ) led the contractor to further delay its delivery to NPP and added further unanticipated costs to the program. To address these issues, the program office halted or delayed activities on

other components (including the development of a sensor planned for the first

NPOESS satellite, called C1) and redirected those funds to fixing VIIRS and CrIS.

As a result, those other activities now face cost increases and schedule delays. Program officials acknowledge that NPOESS will cost more than the $13.95 bil- lion previously estimated, but they have not yet adopted a new cost estimate. Program officials estimated that program costs will grow by about $370 million due to

recent technical issues experienced on the sensors and the costs associated with

halting and then restarting work on other components of the program. In addition,

the costs associated with adding new information security requirements to the program could reach $200 million.5 This estimate also does not include approximately $410 million for operations and support costs for the last two years of the program’s

life cycle (2025 and 2026). Thus, we anticipate that the overall cost of the program

could grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion estimate—especially

given the fact that difficult integration and testing of the sensors on the NPP and

C1 spacecrafts has not yet occurred.6 Program officials reported that they plan to revise the program’s cost estimate over the next few weeks and to submit it for executive-level approval by the end of June 2009. As for the program’s schedule, program officials estimate that the delivery of VIIRS to the NPP contractor will be delayed, resulting in a further delay in the

launch of the NPP satellite to January 2011, a year later than the date estimated

during the program restructuring—and seven months later than the June 2010 date

that was established last year. In addition, program officials estimated that the first

and second NPOESS satellites would be delayed by 14 and five months, respectively, because selected development activities were halted or slowed to address

VIIRS and CrIS problems. The program’s current plans are to launch C1 in March

2014 and the second NPOESS satellite, called C2, in May 2016. Program officials

19

7The 1995 agreement specified that the NASA member would be the Deputy Administrator.

Responsibility was subsequently taken over by the Administrator of NASA.

notified the Executive Committee and DOD’s acquisition authority of the schedule

delays, and under DOD acquisition rules, are required to submit a new schedule

baseline by June 2009. These launch delays have endangered our nation’s ability to ensure the continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. The final POES satellite, called NOAA–19, is in an

afternoon orbit and is expected to have a five-year lifespan. Both NPP and C1 are

planned to support the afternoon orbit. Should the NOAA–19 satellite fail before

NPP is launched, calibrated, and operational, there would be a gap in satellite data

in that orbit. Further, the delays in C1 mean that NPP will not be the research

and risk reduction satellite it was originally intended to be. Instead, it will have

to function as an operational satellite until C1 is in orbit and operational—and if

C1 fails on launch or in early operations, NPP will be needed to function until C3

is available, currently planned for 2018. The delay in the C2 satellite launch affects

the early morning orbit. There are three more DMSP satellites to be launched in

the early and midmorning orbits, and DOD is revisiting the launch schedules for

these satellites to try to extend them as long as possible. However, an independent

review team, established to assess key program risks, recently reported that the

constellation of satellites is extremely fragile and that a single launch failure of a

DMSP, NPOESS, or the NPP satellite could result in a gap in satellite coverage

from three to five years. Although the program’s approved cost and schedule baseline is not achievable and the polar satellite constellation is at risk, the Executive Committee has not yet

made a decision on how to proceed with the program. Program officials plan to propose new cost and schedule baselines in June 2009 and have reported that they are

addressing immediate funding constraints by deferring selected activities to later

fiscal years in order to pay for VIIRS and CrIS problems; delaying the launches of

NPP, C1, and C2; and assessing alternatives for mitigating the risk that VIIRS will

continue to experience problems. Without an executive-level decision on how to proceed, the program is proceeding on a course that is deferring cost growth, delaying

launches, and risking its underlying mission of providing operational weather continuity to the civil and military communities.

Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities

While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the last

several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not effectively fulfilled

its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Specifically, the

DOD Executive Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Committee meetings—and sometimes contradicts the Committee’s decisions, the Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the Committee’s decisions

do not achieve desired outcomes. Independent reviewers, as well as program officials, explained that the tri-agency structure of the program makes it very difficult

to effectively manage the program. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program—and important issues

involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain

unresolved.

Executive Committee Has Responded to Past Recommendations

We and others, including the Department of Commerce’s Inspector General in a

2006 report, have reported that the Committee was not accomplishing its job effectively. However, since then, the Committee has met regularly on a quarterly basis

and held interim teleconferences as needed. The Committee has also sought and reacted to advice from external advisors by, among other actions, authorizing a government program manager to reside on-site at the VIIRS contractor’s facility to improve oversight of the sensor’s development on a day-to-day basis. More recently,

the Executive Committee sponsored a broad-based independent review of the

NPOESS program and is beginning to respond to its recommendations.

Key Acquisition Executive Does Not Attend Executive Committee Meetings

As established by the 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement signed by all

three agencies, the members of the NPOESS Executive Committee are (1) the Under

Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; (2) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and (3) the NASA Administrator.7

Because DOD has the lead responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition, the Under

20

8The 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement differ slightly in this regard. The first agreement stated that DOD’s milestone decision authority will make acquisition decisions with

concurrence of the other Executive Committee members, while the second agreement states that

the DOD authority must consider Committee decisions. The second agreement takes precedence

in the case of a conflict. 9GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO–04–394G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 10GAO–04–394G.

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was also designated

as the milestone decision authority—the individual with the authority to approve

a major acquisition program’s progression in the acquisition process, as well as any

changes to the cost, schedule, and functionality of the acquisition. The intent of the

tri-agency memorandums was that acquisition decisions would be agreed to by the

Executive Committee before a final acquisition decision is made by the milestone

decision authority.8

However, DOD’s acquisition authority has never attended an Executive Com- mittee meeting. This individual delegated the responsibility for attending the meetings—but not the authority to make acquisition decisions—to the Under Secretary

of the Air Force. Therefore, none of the individuals who attend the Executive Committee meetings for the three agencies have the authority to approve the acquisition

program baseline or major changes to the baseline. As a result, agreements between

Committee members have been overturned by the acquisition authority, leading to

significant delays.

Committee Does Not Aggressively Manage Risks

To provide the oversight recommended by best practices,9 including reviewing data and calling for corrective actions at the first sign of cost, schedule, and performance problems and ensuring that actions are executed and tracked to completion, the Executive Committee holds quarterly meetings during which the program’s

progress is reviewed using metrics that provide an early warning of cost, schedule,

and technical risks. However, the Committee does not routinely document action

items or track those items to closure. Some action items were not discussed in later

meetings, and in cases where an item was discussed, it was not always clear what

action was taken, whether it was effective, and whether the item was closed.

According to the Program Executive Officer, the closing of an action item is not always explicitly tracked because it typically involves gathering information that is

presented during later Committee meetings. Nonetheless, by not rigorously documenting action items—including identifying the party responsible for the action, the

desired outcome, and the time frame for completion—and then tracking the action

items to closure, the Executive Committee is not able to ensure that its actions have

achieved their intended results and to determine whether additional changes or

modifications are still needed. This impedes the Committee’s ability to effectively

oversee the program, direct risk mitigation activities, and obtain feedback on the results of its actions.

Committee Decisions Do Not Achieve Desired Outcomes

Best practices call for oversight boards to take corrective actions at the first sign of cost, schedule, and performance slippages in order to mitigate risks and achieve

successful outcomes.10 The NPOESS Executive Committee generally took immediate action to mitigate the risks that were brought before them; however, a majority of

these actions were not effective—that is, they did not fully resolve the underlying

issues or result in a successful outcome. The Committee’s actions on the sensor development risks accomplished interim successes by improving the government’s

oversight of a subcontractor’s activities and guiding next steps in addressing technical issues—but even with Committee actions, the sensors’ performance has continued to falter and affect the rest of the program. Independent reviewers reported that

the tri-agency structure of the program complicated the resolution of sensor risks

because any decision could be revisited by another agency. Program officials explained that interagency disagreements and differing priorities make it difficult to

effectively resolve issues.

Program Has Assessed Alternatives, But Has Not Yet Identified a Viable Al- ternative for Acquiring the Last Two NPOESS Satellites

When NPOESS was restructured in June 2006, the program included two sat- ellites (C1 and C2) and an option to have the prime contractor produce the next two

satellites (C3 and C4). In approving the restructured program, DOD’s decision authority noted that he reserved the right to use a different satellite integrator for the

21

final two satellites, and that a decision on whether to exercise the option was to

be made in June 2010. To prepare for this decision, DOD required a tri-agency assessment of alternative management strategies. This assessment was to examine

the feasibility of an alternative satellite integrator, to estimate the cost and schedule implications of moving to an alternative integrator, and within one year, to provide a viable alternative to the NPOESS Executive Committee.

To address DOD’s requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however, neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing satellite integrator. The Program

Executive Officer plans to conduct a final assessment of alternatives prior to the

June 2010 decision on whether to exercise the option to have the current system

integrator produce the next two NPOESS satellites. Program officials explained that

the program’s evolving costs, schedules, and risks could mean that an alternative

that was not viable in the past would become viable. For example, if the prime contractor’s performance no longer meets basic requirements, an alternative that was

previously too costly to be considered viable might become so.

Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve Management and

Oversight

In the report being released today, we are making recommendations to improve

the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision-making on the NPOESS program. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to attend and participate in NPOESS Executive Committee meetings. In addition, we are recommending

that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five actions: (1) establish a realistic time frame for revising the program’s cost and schedule baselines;

(2) develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; (3) track the

Committee’s action items from inception to closure; (4) improve the Committee’s

ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated

with each of the Committee actions, as well as time frames and responsible parties,

when new action items are established; and (5) improve the Committee’s efficiency

by establishing time frames for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that

they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level.

In written comments on a draft of our report, NASA and NOAA agreed with our

findings and recommendations and identified plans to implement them. DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with our other recommendations. For example, regarding our recommendation to have the appropriate official attend Executive

Committee meetings, the agency partially concurred and noted that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the necessity of attending future Executive Committee meetings. DOD also reiterated that the Under

Secretary of the Air Force was delegated authority to attend the meetings. While

we acknowledge that the Under Secretary delegated responsibility for attending

these meetings, it is an inefficient way to make decisions and achieve outcomes in

this situation. In the past, agreements between Executive Committee members have

been overturned by the Under Secretary, leading to significant delays in key decisions. The full text of the three agencies’ comments and our evaluation of those comments are provided in the accompanying report.

In summary, continued problems in the development of critical NPOESS sensors

have contributed to growing costs and schedule delays. Costs are now expected to

grow by as much as $1 billion over the prior life cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion,

and problems in delivering key sensors have led to delays in launching NPP and

the first two NPOESS satellites—by a year or more for NPP and the first NPOESS

satellite. These launch delays have endangered our nation’s ability to ensure the

continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. Specifically, if any planned satellites fail

on launch or in orbit, there would be a gap in satellite data until the next NPOESS

satellite is launched and operational—a gap that could last for three to five years.

The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for making cost and schedule decisions and addressing the many and continuing risks facing the program has not yet

made important decisions on program costs, schedules, and risks—or identified

when it will do so. In addition, the Committee has not been effective or efficient in

carrying out its oversight responsibilities. Specifically, the individual with the authority to make acquisition decisions does not attend Committee meetings, the Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the Committee’s decisions

do not achieve desired outcomes. Until the Committee’s shortfalls are addressed, important decisions may not be effective and issues involving cost increases, schedule

delays, and satellite continuity may remain unresolved.

22

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our statement.

We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the

Subcommittee may have at this time. Staff Acknowledgments

Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen M. Phillips, Assistant Di- rector; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Kathleen S. Lovett; Lee McCracken; and China

R. Williams.

BIOGRAPHY FOR DAVID A. POWNER

Experience

Twenty years’ experience in information technology issues in both public and private sectors.

Education

Business Administration, University of Denver

Senior Executive Fellows Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of

Government

Director, IT Management Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office

Dave is currently responsible for a large segment of GAO’s information technology

(IT) work, including systems development, IT investment management, health IT,

and cyber critical infrastructure protection reviews.

In the private sector, Dave has held several executive-level positions in the telecommunications industry, including overseeing IT and financial internal audits, and

software development associated with digital subscriber lines (DSL).

At GAO, Dave has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service. These reviews covered many

information technology areas including software development maturity, information

security, and enterprise architecture.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Powner. Mr. Young.

STATEMENT OF MR. A. THOMAS YOUNG, CHAIR, NPOESS

INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM (IRT)

Mr. YOUNG. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and

Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to present a summary

of the NPOESS Independent Review Team report.

We identified 10 findings and recommended corrective actions.

Finding one, the current NPOESS program has an extraordinarily low probability of success. Implementation of the following

recommendations that I will discuss are necessary to address this

finding.

Two, continuity of data, which each user organization identifies

as the number one priority, is at significant risk. The program is

hardware poor with little protection against a launch failure or

early spacecraft failure. Data outages in a particular orbit can be

measured in years with a failure. Corrective action is limited to

moving the third and fourth spacecraft closer to the first and second spacecraft in their development schedules, launching on need

rather than schedule and exploiting NPP data.

Three, NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most important parameter and not mission success. This program cost-focused

culture needs to change to a mission success-focused culture, and

the NPOESS contract award fee criteria needs a similar change in

focus.

Four, NPOESS EXCOM is ineffective. Members must have decision authority. The focus of the EXCOM should be top-level issues

and timely decisions.

23

Five, NPOESS program is not part of a space acquisition organization, which makes program implementation extremely difficult.

NPOESS must be assigned to a space acquisition organization such

as Space and Missiles Systems Center or NASA.

Six, fiscal year funding shortfalls are causing decisions to be

made that are adding risk and increasing cost. Funding shortfalls

must be corrected.

Seven, the highest probability of success is to maintain the current contractor team, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, and the

IRT recommends this action.

Eight, due to potential for coverage gaps, NPP has become a critical asset, and it is recommended that this be recognized and incorporated in program planning.

Nine, priorities of NOAA and DOD/Air Force are not aligned.

DOD/Air Force stated that legacy performance is acceptable and

that they are unwilling to provide additional funding to achieve

above legacy capability. NOAA stated that current weather forecasting utilizes legacy and NASA R&D satellite data. Accepting

legacy capabilities would be a significant step back. This difference

in priorities must be resolved.

Ten, the current budget is inadequate with a shortfall in excess

of $1 billion. Funding the program by fiscal year and through completion to 80 percent confidence, including a management reserve

of approximately 25 percent, is required to have an executable program budgeted at the most likely cost.

The IRT recognizes that NPOESS is a national program with

quality of life, economic, disaster planning, and national security

implications. While the IRT believes the cited recommendations

must be implemented, additional actions are necessary to have a

successful NPOESS program.

The critical issue is the lack of alignment of DOD/Air Force and

NOAA priorities. The IRT believes that the EXCOM will be unable

to resolve this difference, and the White House will be required to

define the NPOESS program that is in the national interest.

Following the NPOESS program decision, the responsibility for

program implementation must be assigned to one organization—

Air Force with SMC having implementation responsibility or

NOAA with NASA having implementation responsibility. Either

can do the job.

The IRT believes that the managing organization must have

total acquisition responsibility, be allocated all currently planned

and programmed budget and be responsible for funding the defined

program at an 80 percent confidence level. The IRT recommends

that responsibility for NPOESS be assigned to NOAA with NASA

acting as NOAA’s acquisition organization. This recommendation is

based upon the recognition that NOAA has a broader responsibility

for weather and climate requirements than any other organization

and is a natural advocate for this program.

Under this construct NOAA/NASA will provide NPOESS data to

DOD and Air Force and establish a process to meet future DOD

and Air Force needs.

The EXCOM concept should continue to assure effective program

implementation. Implementation of the IRT recommendations and

24

additional actions is urgently required. Risk and unnecessary cost

are being realized at an unacceptable rate.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF A. THOMAS YOUNG

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the Subcommittee, I

am Tom Young and I chair the NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT) that was

established by the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) to review the NPOESS

program baseline and the management approach.

After numerous meetings, interviews with Air Force (AF), Department of Defense

(DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) principals, visits to the primary contractors Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, and discussions with contractor Chief

Executive Officers (CEOs), the IRT identified ten findings and recommended corrective actions.

1) The current NPOESS program has an extraordinary low probability of success. Implementation of the following recommendations is necessary to address this finding.

2) Continuity of data, which each user organization identifies as number one

priority, is at significant risk. The program is hardware poor with little protection against a launch failure or early spacecraft failure. Data outages in

a particular orbit can be measured in years with a failure. Corrective action

is limited to moving C3 and C4 closer to C1 and C2, launching on need

rather than schedule and exploiting NPOESS preparatory Project (NPP)

data.

3) NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most important parameter and

not mission success. This Program cost focused culture needs to change to

a mission success focused culture and the NPOESS contract award fee criteria needs a similar change in focus.

4) NPOESS EXCOM is ineffective. Members must have decision authority.

Focus of EXCOM should be top level issues and timely decisions.

5) NPOESS Program is not part of a space acquisition organization which

makes program implementation extremely difficult. NPOESS must be assigned to a space acquisition organization such as Space and Missiles Systems Center (SMC) or NASA.

6) Fiscal year funding shortfalls are causing decisions to be made that are

adding risk and increasing cost. Funding shortfalls must be corrected.

7) The highest probability of success is to maintain the current contractor

team, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon and the IRT recommends this action.

8) Due to potential for coverage gaps, NPP has become a critical asset and it

is recommended that this be recognized and incorporated in program planning.

9) Priorities of NOAA and DOD/AF are not aligned. DOD/AF stated that legacy performance is acceptable and that they are unwilling to provide additional funding to achieve above legacy capability. NOAA stated that current

weather forecasting utilizes legacy and NASA Research and Development

(R&D) satellite data. Accepting legacy capabilities would be a significant

step back. This difference in priorities must be resolved.

10) The current budget is inadequate with a shortfall in excess of $1 billion.

Funding the program by fiscal year and through completion to 80% cost

confidence including a management reserve of approximately 25% is required to have an executable program budgeted at the most likely cost.

The IRT recognizes that NPOESS is a national program with quality of life, economic, disaster planning, and national security implications.

While the IRT believes the cited recommendations must be implemented, additional actions are necessary to have a successful NPOESS program.

The critical issue is the lack of alignment of DOD/AF and NOAA priorities. The

IRT believes that the EXCOM will be unable to resolve this difference and the

White House will be required to define the NPOESS program that is in the national

interest.

25

Following the NPOESS program decision the responsibility for program implementation must be assigned to one organization, AF with SMC having implementation responsibility or NOAA with NASA having implementation responsibility. Either can do the job.

The IRT believes that the managing organization must have total acquisition responsibility, be allocated all currently planned and programmed budget and be responsible for funding the defined program at an 80 percent confidence level.

The IRT recommends that responsibility for NPOESS be assigned to NOAA with

NASA acting as NOAA’s acquisition organization. This recommendation is based

upon recognition that NOAA has a broader responsibility for weather and climate

requirements than any other organization and is a natural national advocate for

this program.

Under this construct NOAA/NASA will provide NPOESS data to DOD/AF and establish a process to meet future DOD/AF needs.

The EXCOM concept should continue to assure effective program implementation.

Implementation of the IRT recommendations and additional actions is urgently

required. Risk and unnecessary cost are being realized at an unacceptable rate.

BIOGRAPHY FOR A. THOMAS YOUNG

A. Thomas Young is the former Director of NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center

and President and COO of Martin Marietta. He retired from Lockheed Martin in

July, 1995. Mr. Young is involved in various advisory and review activities associated with the U.S. Space Program.

He is a Director of the Goodrich Corporation and Science Applications International Corporation. Mr. Young is an Honorary Fellow of the American Institute

of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society, a

Fellow of the royal Astronautical Society and a Fellow of the International Academy

of Astronautics. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the

University of Virginia Raven Society.

Mr. Young began his career with NASA at the Langley Research Center in 1961.

He was a member of the Lunar Orbiter Project Team and was Mission Director for

Project Viking. He became Director of the Planetary Program at NASA Headquarters in 1976 and was appointed Deputy Director of the Ames Research Center

in 1978. Mr. Young was Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center from 1979 to

1982. He joined the Martin Marietta Corporation in 1982 and was subsequently

President of Baltimore Aerospace and the Electronics and Missiles Group. Mr.

Young was President and COO of Martin Marietta from 1990 to 1995.

As a part of his advisory and review activities, Mr. Young chaired a group to assess the continued involvement of U.S. Astronauts with the MIR Space Station. He

was Chairman of an Independent Assessment of Mission Success for Lockheed Martin. Following the Mars 1998 failures, he chaired the Mars Program Independent

Assessment Team. Mr. Young was Chairman of the International Space Station

Management and Cost Task Force. He has been Chairman of the Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. He has chaired NASA’s International Space Station Advisory Group and Space Flight Advisory Group. Mr. Young

is a past member of the NASA Advisory Council. He chaired the National Academy

of Engineering Committee on Technological Literacy. Mr. Young is currently a member of the National Academies Space Studies Board.

Mr. Young has received NASA’s Distinguished Service Medal for his role in the

Viking Project, the Outstanding Leadership Medal for contributions to the Voyager

Project, Presidential Rank Awards of Meritorious Executive and Distinguished Executive, the Public Service Medal for his leadership of the Mars Program Independent

Assessment Team, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal for his leadership of

the International Space Station Management and Cost Task Force. Mr. Young received the National Reconnaissance Office Medal for leadership of the Task Force

on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. He is the recipient of the

AIAA Astronautics Award and the National Space Club Dr. Joseph V. Charyk

Award. Mr. Young was selected as one of nine Outstanding Corporate Directors in

2005. He received the 2006 Bob Hope Distinguished Citizen Award from the NDIA.

Mr. Young earned a Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering degree and a Bachelor

of Mechanical Engineering degree in 1961 from the University of Virginia. In 1972,

he received a Master’s of Management degree from MIT which he attended as a

Sloan Fellow. He also holds an honorary doctor of science degree from Salisbury

State University.

Mr. Young and his wife, Page, reside in Onancock, Virginia. They have a daughter, Blair, and a son, Carter.

26

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Young. Ms. Glackin.

STATEMENT OF MS. MARY M. GLACKIN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Ms. GLACKIN. Chairman Miller, Dr. Broun, and distinguished

Members and staff of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity

to testify about the steps NOAA has taken over the past year to

address the ongoing challenges of this critical program.

While I am a 30-year career employee of NOAA, I have only

served in my current position for the past 18 months. During this

short tenure, I have spent a significant portion of my time learning

about and overseeing the complex management of NOAA’s satellite

programs, especially NPOESS.

The challenges the program faces are substantial, and I am

working closely with both Secretary Locke and NOAA Administrator Lubchenco to address the recommendations presented by

both GAO and the Independent Review Team. Since NOAA’s final

satellite in its current series was launched earlier this spring, the

agency is particularly focused on the threat further delays in this

program may have on crucial weather and climate forecasts NOAA

provides to the Nation.

NOAA is working with its partners, DOD and NASA, to move

quickly to resolve remaining program issues, given their possible

consequences. I would like to highlight two actions we have taken

over the past year on the program and then address the recommendations that we have just heard from my two colleagues

here.

One step that NOAA has taken is that we have advocated with

our tri-agency partners last summer to install a government program manager at the subcontractor facility where the main imaging sensor, known as VIIRS, is being developed. By installing a

government official in plant, an action typically taken by NASA for

complex developments, it has enabled the program to better address the ongoing technical problems. The benefits are not only

providing significant oversight of day-to-day testing and quality assurance processes, but allows the government to anticipate and

react quickly to problems.

The second step, as highlighted by this hearing, is the tri-agency

leadership of the EXCOM called for the high-level, independent review that Mr. Young just provided this committee. When the IRT

findings were initially reported to the EXCOM, they made it very

clear that the NPOESS program has little chance of success as it

is currently structured. NOAA is taking the team’s grim assessment of the program very seriously and is working with DOD and

NASA to respond to the recommendations. Notably, we are actively

working with the leadership of the White House Office of Science

and Technology Policy to resolve the differences that exist among

the agencies and implement actions to respond to the recommendations. We are approaching the responses to the findings and recommendations through three major areas which I will address:

management of the program, satellite coverage and budgeting of

the program.

27

For management, NOAA, DOD and NASA have been developing

and considering four possible options. Option one is to maintain the

existing tri-agency partnership with management improvements

and additional budget reserve. Under this option, the tri-agency

structure would remain in place, but the budget and schedule

would be adjusted to allow the program to continue to address continued technical challenges.

Option two would establish NOAA as the national lead for delivering weather and climate data. Under this option, NOAA, with

NASA as its acquisition agent, would have responsibility for delivering a system that provides weather and climate data required.

DOD would continue to provide funds, and all agencies would still

coordinate on the data needs for their user communities. The

NPOESS program office would be transferred to NASA’s Goddard

Space Flight Facility Center in Maryland.

Option three would be similar, but with DOD as the national

lead for delivering this. Under this option, the NPOESS program

office would be transferred to the Air Force Space and Missile Center in Los Angeles.

Option four would result in a divergence of the NPOESS program into two separate agency programs: one DOD and one NOAA.

Under this option each agency would be responsible for acquisition

of satellites in its own priority orbit, similar to how NOAA and Air

Force currently operate them.

The tri-agency partners are continuing to assess and outline possible implementation approaches for each of these options.

The second area is satellite coverage and continuity. In partnership with NASA and DOD, we have been considering ways to modify the constellation to address the risk of potential gaps. Possible

adjustments here include modifying the undeveloped portions of

the ground system and the one unbuilt sensor, reconsidering the

structure of the primary spacecraft, and use of small satellites or

commercial satellites to help make the program more successful.

Regarding budget, NOAA, DOD and NASA are working to address the budget challenges facing the program. Continued development problems have consumed the program’s resources and forced

the program to make difficult trade-offs. The program will likely require increased budget to meet the Nation’s needs or have the program’s scope reduced to better align with available budget. Cost estimating is underway at this time.

Regarding GAO recommendations, NOAA concurs with all of the

recommendations and is implementing them.

In conclusion, I would just like to state that it is widely acknowledged that satellites are very complicated and difficult systems to

design, build and operate. However, their capabilities play a key

role in NOAA’s mission to observe and predict the Earth’s environment and provide critical information used in protecting life and

property. Based on the steps NOAA has taken in partnership with

NASA and DOD, the program is on an initial path to resolve some

of its current challenges. However, it is clear additional work by

the government is required to fully resolve these issues, and the

program intends to continue to keep this committee apprised of its

developments as we move forward. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glackin follows:]

28

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY M. GLACKIN

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Mary Glackin, the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce (DOC). I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the steps NOAA has taken over the past year

to address the ongoing challenges with the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).

NPOESS—A National Asset for Weather and Climate Data

NPOESS is a tri-agency collaboration involving the NOAA, the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Defense (DOD).

The NPOESS program is designed to deliver four operational satellites that will provide global weather and climate coverage from 2014 to 2026, along with the

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which was originally intended as a risk reduction satellite for the program’s advanced sensor technology, and is now scheduled

to launch in 2011.

The NPOESS program, a pivotal national satellite constellation designed to meet

the Nation’s weather forecasting and some key climate monitoring needs, is at risk.

Should delivery of the NPOESS satellites be delayed or a catastrophic failure occur

on launch or in orbit, NOAA’s forecasting ability would be severely degraded because current forecast models rely heavily on NOAA and NASA’s polar orbiting satellites that will be coming to the end of their useful lives.

• While NOAA’s weather forecasting ability can sustain gaps of less than six

months by relying on older satellites, a larger gap in satellite coverage would

be unacceptable for weather forecasting since NOAA would be unable to

produce useful 4 and 5 day hurricane track forecasts. Overall, weather model

forecast performance would degrade by approximately 10 percent, a regression back to the quality that existed in the late 1990s.

• A gap in satellite coverage of any length would most likely interrupt critical

climate measurements that are needed for the Nation to determine the cause,

magnitude and direction of future climate change.

NOAA’s final satellite in its Polar Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, NOAA–19, was launched in February 2009 and declared operational earlier

this month. NOAA also operates the Air Force’s Defense Meteorological Satellite

Program (DMSP) satellites, a program that continues to have two satellites awaiting

launch. Given that NOAA does not have any further polar satellites remaining to

be launched, the agency is particularly focused on the threat further delays in the

NPOESS program and the threat launch or early-on-orbit failures may have on the

crucial weather and climate forecasts NOAA provides to the Nation.

The NPOESS program has the potential to provide crucial information to our continued monitoring of the climate both nationally and globally. Both Secretary of

Commerce Locke and NOAA Administrator Lubchenco have indicated their commitment to fix this program to better ensure the future of the Nation’s weather forecasting and climate monitoring capability.

Steps Taken to Reduce Risk in NPOESS Program

Since NOAA last testified about the NPOESS program last June, the agency has

taken a series of steps to address the continued technical and management challenges in the program. The following section provides a summary of these steps in

chronological order.

Working in partnership with DOD and NASA, NOAA has begun to address the

challenges facing the program. Given the recent completion of crucial independent

reviews, NOAA is seeking to move quickly to resolve remaining program issues.

A. Government Program Manager Installed at Contractor Facility

To address ongoing technical problems in the development of the Visible/Infrared

Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), the main imaging sensor for the system, the

NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) agreed in August 2008 to have a government program manager with the expertise to oversee its development. Working in

partnership with the existing prime contractor team from Northrop Grumman, as

well as the subcontractor team from Raytheon, the senior NASA engineer and manager was installed on site at the Raytheon plant in El Segundo, California.

Since the government program manager’s start at the facility, she has assessed

the development of the VIIRS sensor being developed for NPP as well as those to

29

be built for NPOESS C1 and later NPOESS spacecraft. She is leading the continued

testing of the VIIRS instrument with a team of government experts, providing significant oversight on day-to-day testing and quality assurance processes.

B. Tri-Agency Joint Assessment Team Established by NPOESS Executive Committee

As a result of the continued VIIRS development difficulties in 2008, the EXCOM

chartered the Tri-Agency Joint Assessment Team (TJAT) last fall to address the impacts to schedule and cost that these ongoing development problems were causing.

Consisting of senior officials from NOAA, NASA, DOD, and Air Force, the TJAT determined the following:

• The best solution to maintain overall program data continuity is to use NPP

data operationally.

Æ NOAA has accelerated the development of additional environmental data

products so NPP is able to produce all of the products that NPOESS C1

was expected to produce (additional 35 data products).

• The program should proceed to plan to procure an Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR), the main imaging sensor on NOAA’s POES satellites, as an option if the program is unable to deliver VIIRS.

Æ The AVHRR does not meet the full set of VIIRS operational requirements. There is also no funding available currently to implement this option.

Æ The VIIRS sensor is currently undergoing thermal vacuum testing that

will continue through August. If the sensor successfully proceeds through

this testing, the option to procure an AVHRR will not be required.

Æ The EXCOM directed the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) to

complete the necessary procurement planning in the event VIIRS thermal vacuum testing problems require the program to proceed to procure

an AVHRR.

C. Alternative Management Studies

The June 2006 Acquisition Decision Memorandum directed NPOESS to ‘‘. . . develop the option for a viable competing management structure . . .’’ to provide the

EXCOM with a possible alternative to be exercised when the decision is made in

FY 2010 on whether to continue with the same contractor team for the production

of NPOESS satellites C3 and C4. The Alternative Management Study (AMS) was

commissioned by the NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) to assess management structure options.

An AMS was conducted in 2008 and made recommendations to improve program

and sensor development oversight, fill key government positions, and implement

contingency planning. It did not identify a viable alternative to the existing satellite

integrator, or prime contractor, on the program. Their program oversight recommendations were addressed by creating an NPOESS Program Executive OfficerProgram Management Council (PEO PMC), a monthly conference of tri-agency officials to support decision-making on the data requirements, acquisition, operations,

and resourcing of the NPOESS program. Likewise, VIIRS oversight recommendations were addressed by deploying a government program manager and government

support team to work on-site at the Raytheon subcontractor facility to provide additional oversight on VIIRS sensor testing and development.

D. Independent Review Team

At the request of the tri-agency leadership of the EXCOM, a high-level Independent Review Team (IRT) composed of senior independent aerospace and science

experts from industry, academia, and government, concluded a comprehensive review of the program this spring. Chaired by Tom Young, the recently released IRT

report provides valuable findings and recommendations regarding the current state

of the program.

When the IRT findings were initially reported to the EXCOM, the IRT was clear

that the NPOESS program ‘‘cannot be successfully executed within the constraints

of cost, schedule, performance, and with the current management construct.’’

NOAA is taking the team’s grim assessment of the program very seriously and

is working with DOD and NASA to respond to the recommendations and make the

changes necessary to improve the management and technical oversight of the program. Since Tom Young is expected to testify in his role as IRT Chairman at this

30

hearing, this testimony will not summarize each of the team’s findings and recommendations.

NOAA, in partnership with DOD and NASA, is approaching the response to the

IRT findings and recommendations through three major areas:

• the management of the program,

• the satellite coverage and data continuity challenges in the program, and

• the budgeting of the program.

The IRT noted they believe some NPOESS issues ‘‘can only be resolved at the

White House level,’’ given the interactions they had with government officials that

indicate the agencies have differences in how they propose to address key challenges

in the program. The Office of Science and Technology Policy has begun to engage

the tri-agency leadership to resolve the differences and implement actions to respond to the IRT’s recommendations.

Management: NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the management challenges in the program through a consideration of all of the IRT’s recommendations, but particularly the following four (out of nine):

• Focus on mission success (not on cost);

• Fix the Executive Committee/oversight structure;

• Assign the development management responsibility of NPOESS to a space acquisition enter; and

• Resolve and establish clear program priorities.

NOAA, DOD and NASA have been developing and considering management alternatives to reformulate the NPOESS tri-agency relationship in response to IRT recommendations. The options being considered include:

a. Maintain the existing tri-agency partnership with management improvements and additional budget reserve.

• Under this option, the current tri-agency program structure would remain in place, but the budget and schedule would be adjusted to allow

the program to address continued technical challenges.

• Under this option, the NPOESS program office could be transferred to

NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland or Air

Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, California, to

enable it to use the resources of one of these renowned space acquisition

centers.

b. Establish NOAA–NASA as national lead for delivering a satellite system

that provides weather and climate data.

• Under this option, NOAA, in coordination with NASA as its acquisition

lead, would have responsibility for delivering a system that fulfills the

NPOESS requirements.

• NOAA and NASA would be responsible for designing and implementing

an improved system to reduce risk of weather and climate data gaps.

• DOD would continue to provide funds at a to-be-determined level, and all

agencies would still coordinate on the data requirements for each agency’s user communities.

• The NPOESS program office would be transferred to NASA’s Goddard

Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, to enable it to use the resources of this renowned space acquisition center.

c. Establish DOD as national lead for delivering a satellite system that provides weather and climate data.

• Similar to the previous option, DOD would have responsibility for delivering a system that fulfills the NPOESS requirements.

• The DOD would be responsible for designing and implementing a system

to reduce risk of weather and climate data gaps.

• NOAA would continue to provide funds, and all agencies would still coordinate on the data requirements for each agency’s user communities.

• The NPOESS program office would be transferred to Air Force’s Space

and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, California, to enable it to use

the resources of this renowned space acquisition center.

31

d. Divergence of the NPOESS program into two separate agency programs (one

DOD, one NOAA)

• Under this option, each agency would be responsible for acquisition of assets supporting its mission in its own priority orbits, similar to how the

NOAA POES and Air Force DMSP programs currently operate.

• Data sharing between the agencies would continue as it does today.

• Existing partnerships for satellite operations, data distribution, and

launch service would be continued.

• While dependent on when such a structural change would occur, this option would require NOAA, DOD, and NASA to negotiate which agencies

would receive the assets that have already been developed by the

NPOESS program.

• New competitive procurements for individual NOAA and DOD systems

may be required shortly after such a divergence decision is made, potentially in FY 2010 or FY 2011 if decision is made in the near-term.

The NPOESS tri-agency partners are continuing to assess and develop cost estimates for these options.

Satellite Coverage and Data Continuity:

NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the challenges of satellite coverage and data continuity in the program through consideration of all of the IRT’s

recommendations, but particularly the following four (out of nine):

• Proactively manage and mitigate the potential gap in continuity of coverage,

• Continue and strengthen the relationship with Northrop Grumman and

Raytheon;

• Use NPOESS Preparatory Project data operationally; and

• Resolve and establish clear program priorities.

NOAA, NASA, and DOD have been considering ways to modify and adjust the

current planned NPOESS constellation of satellites to better mitigate potential gaps

in coverage as well as better address each NPOESS agency’s need for environmental

data. The agencies are examining initially the following areas to adjust the constellation to help make the program more successful:

• Alternatives for the currently undeveloped portions of the ground system;

• Alternative sources for the currently undeveloped Microwave Imager/Sounder

(MIS) sensor;

• Alternatives for the structure of the primary spacecraft; and

• Use of a series of small satellites and inclusion of sensors on commercial

spacecraft, both of which may improve the tri-agency’s ability to recover from

launch or on-orbit failures.

Some of these options would require modifications to contracts and additional resources. Some of the options may reduce the capability of the NPOESS system.

Budget:

NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the budget challenges facing this

program through consideration of all of the IRT’s recommendations, but particularly

the following three (out of nine):

• Proactively manage and mitigate the potential gap in continuity of coverage;

• Increase near-term funding; and

• Fund the program by fiscal year and through the duration of the program at

an 80 percent cost confidence level, including a management reserve of 25

percent.

Continuing development problems have consumed the program’s resources and

forced the program to make difficult trades to preserve schedule and remain within

available annual funding. Unfortunately, these trades have added substantial risk

to the program. In the near-term, the program will likely require increased budget

to meet the Nation’s needs, or have to reduce program scope to better align the program with its available budget.

In response to this concern, NOAA allocated $26 million of American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act funding for NPOESS, including funding above its matching reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 050173 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DWORK\I&O09\061709\50173 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
32

quirement with DOD. This additional funding will allow NOAA to perform critical

NPOESS development activities and address risk mitigation within the program.

Based on the four above major steps the NPOESS program leadership has taken

recently, the program is on an initial path to resolve some of its current challenges.

Additional work by the government is required to resolve the issues and the program intends to continue to keep the Committee apprised of these developments.

Government Accountability Office Recommendations for Executive Action

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided regular reviews of the

NPOESS program and NOAA appreciates the perspective GAO professionals have

provided. NOAA has met with GAO and provided information and feedback on its

most recent report.

GAO made six recommendations that it anticipates will improve the effectiveness

and efficiency of the EXCOM. The first recommendation was directed solely to DOD

and the remaining five recommendations are directed to DOC/NOAA, DOD, and

NASA.

Recommendation 1: To improve the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision making on the NPOESS program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to

attend and participate in NPOESS Executive Committee meetings.

NOAA Response: NOAA defers to the DOD on this recommendation but has no

objection to EXCOM participation by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Recommendation 2: Establish a realistic timeframe for revising the program’s cost

and schedule baselines.

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPOESS Integrated Program Office is developing an updated program office estimate for a revised acquisition program baseline as required by DOD acquisition regulation. However, a revised program cost and schedule estimate will be established later this

year following a robust independent cost analysis of recommended programmatic

and acquisition alternatives that better reflect a budget with appropriate contingency funding to reduce risk. The revised program cost and schedule estimates will

be ready for initial EXCOM review in late summer 2009.

Recommendation 3: Develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity.

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPP sensors are

capable of producing data that meet or exceed the data provided by NOAA–19

(NOAA’s current operational satellite). Accordingly, to mitigate the potential gap in

polar environmental satellite data coverage in the afternoon orbit between NOAA–

19 and NPOESS C1, NOAA plans to make operational use of the data from the NPP

spacecraft and increase the number of products NOAA had planned to generate

from the NPP system as a risk reduction mission to minimize impacts to NOAA’s

National Weather Service and other users.

Specifically, NOAA will accelerate development of 54 polar legacy products. Previously, 19 legacy products were expected from NPP, with an increase to 54 products in the NPOESS C1 era. NOAA will enhance its NPP data processing ground

system with sufficient infrastructure to support the additional 35 products and 24x7

operations and support.

In the mid-morning orbit, NOAA will continue through the next decade to process

and deliver environmental products to its customers from the U.S. and European

instruments on board the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites MetOp series of satellites.

NOAA is assessing the use of additional international and interagency assets as

well as potential development of spare satellites and instruments. The cost and

schedule details associated with these contingency options are currently under review. Any alternative decisions will also take into account the results of the VIIRS

sensor testing currently underway.

Recommendation 4: Track the Committee’s action items from inception to closure.

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task the

NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) to ensure that Executive Committee

(EXCOM) action items are clearly and completely defined, assigned to responsible

parties for completion within a specific timeframe, and tracked to completion, including reporting the results to the EXCOM. NOAA will monitor EXCOM action

33

items through the NOAA Program Management Council, which I chair, and take

corrective actions needed to ensure action item coordination and closure.

Recommendation 5: Improve the Committee’s ability to achieve successful outcomes

by identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the Committee actions, as

well as timeframes and responsible parties, when new action items are established.

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task the

PEO to ensure EXCOM action items and desired outcomes are clearly and completely defined, assigned to responsible parties for completion within a specific timeframe, and tracked to completion, including reporting the results to the EXCOM.

NOAA will monitor EXCOM action items through the NOAA Program Management

Council, which I chair, and take corrective actions needed to ensure successful outcomes.

Recommendation 6: Improve the Committee’s efficiency by establishing timeframes

for escalating risks to the committee for action so that they do not linger unresolved

at the program executive level.

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The PEO will ensure

that risks, resolution plans and schedules are established and tracked at the PEO–

PMC, the PEO’s monthly management council. NOAA will work with NASA and

DOD to ensure the PEO establishes clear criteria and timeframes for elevating risks

to the EXCOM for action. NOAA will monitor PEO action items and issue resolution

through the NOAA Program Management Council and the tri-agency NPOESS

Oversight Council (NOC) to take corrective actions needed to ensure timeliness in

addressing escalating risks.

The NOC, established in the spring of 2009, is the tri-agency council that reviews

the NPOESS program on a more recurrent basis than the senior-level EXCOM. The

NOC, which reports to the EXCOM, is co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary

for Oceans and Atmosphere, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the

Deputy Administrator of NASA. These members are responsible for representing

their agencies and providing a reasonable representation of their EXCOM position

to ensure that issues and actions are responded to in a timely manner.

Conclusion

In conclusion, NOAA appreciates the Committee’s continued interest in the success of the agency’s satellite programs. It is widely acknowledged that satellites are

very complicated and difficult systems to design, build, and operate. However, their

capabilities play a key role in NOAA’s mission to observe and predict the Earth’s

environment and to provide critical information used in protecting life and property.

NOAA is acting quickly to support the important decisions that are likely required

to modify the program to more effectively achieve its objectives in line with the recommendations of key independent reviewers. DOC and NOAA remain committed to

pursuing a program that will provide continuity of data for the Nation’s weather

and climate prediction needs. I would be happy to answer any questions you may

have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MARY M. GLACKIN

Mary M. Glackin has been the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere since December 2, 2007. In this role she is responsible for the day-to-day management of NOAA’s domestic and international operations.

Glackin has more than 15 years of senior executive level experience working in

numerous NOAA line offices. She served as the acting Assistant Administrator for

Weather Services and Director, National Weather Service from June 12, 2007,

through September 15, 2007. Before that, she was the Assistant Administrator for

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Office of Program

Planning and Integration. From 1999 until 2002, she served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information

Service of NOAA. From 1993 to 1999, she worked as the Program Manager for the

Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS) with the National

Weather Service (NWS), NOAA. Prior to this, Ms. Glackin was both a meteorologist

and computer specialist in various positions within NOAA where she was responsible for introducing improvements into NWS operations by capitalizing on new

technology systems and scientific models.

She is the recipient of the Presidential Rank Award (2001), Charles Brooks Award

for Outstanding Services to the American Meteorological Society, the NOAA Bronze

Medal (2001), the Federal 100 Information Technology Manager Award (1999), the

34

NOAA Administrator’s Award (1993), and the Department of Commerce Silver

Medal Award (1991). She is a Fellow of the American Meteorological Society and

a member of the National Weather Association and the American Geophysical

Union.

Ms. Glackin has a B.S. degree from the University of Maryland.

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. It sounds like there will be six more oversight hearings on the NPOESS satellite system.

ENSURING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Mr. Powner, your report, as well as Mr. Young’s testimony, attributed

much of the failure to the inability of the three agencies, NOAA,

DOD, NASA, the tri-agency executive committee, or EXCOM, to

function properly for the different agencies simply to play well with

others. Your recommendation that in the future they should develop their own satellites because they just couldn’t get along

seemed like an extraordinary step when there appear to be some

significant savings or something that should be available if they all

need satellites flying to cooperate. We have got new players on the scene. We have got Dr. Lubchenco at NOAA, Dr. Carter at DOD, Mr. Scolese if I have pronounced it correctly, at NASA in the EXCOM positions. Do you

have access to their report cards from elementary school? Do you

know how well they play with others? Do you think there is any

chance that EXCOM can be made to work as intended with different people in the seats?

Mr. POWNER. I think clearly in the short-term the delivery of the

four satellites as well as the demonstration satellite with NPOESS,

we need to keep the current structure or go to something similar

to what Mr. Young is suggesting with one agency lead. You know,

we are about ready to deliver on the demonstration satellite hopefully and then also with the first satellite, C1. The recommendation

long-term to split it, I think if you look historically, this was intended to save money. It hasn’t saved money. We still haven’t resolved the differing agency missions. I think after these four satellites are delivered, we ought to consider going back to separate

satellite acquisitions. In the interim, our recommendations are

geared toward getting the EXCOM on board. They still have a

management role here to deliver the satellites that are currently

on the table.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Young, do you agree? Is there something

that is just in the system of having these three agencies try to

work together? Is it a personality issue? Is there any possibility

now that we have got different people sitting in the seats at the

EXCOM meetings that we will have better results, it will be less

dysfunctional?

Mr. YOUNG. I don’t think it is a personality issue. I think it really boils down to a couple of factors. One is the priorities of the partners are different, and it is hard to have an integrated management team when the various partners have different priorities. But

I will come back and say, you know, as I mentioned in my testimony, I think even in the revised program that IRT suggested,

35

EXCOM has a role. But it is almost kind of fundamental that the

three parties be the people who have decision-making authority,

you know. As was pointed out in the GAO report, the DOD representative is not the individual decision-making authority. So fundamentally this is an organization that meets some weeks. Afterwards there is some meeting which I am not totally familiar with

where the decision-making authority, the individual who has milestone and acquisition authority, makes decisions. So I think there are ways to make it more efficient, but it is hard to overcome the factor that the three organizations have in our

view different priorities. And by the way, I want to come back and

say it doesn’t mean any of the priorities are wrong. I mean, it is

just that they are different.

THE ROLE OF OSTP

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Young, your testimony embraced the idea that the White House should—ultimately they are all three executive branch agencies. Perhaps OSTP should come in and decide between the priorities. That seems like kind of a big task for a small

office. But am I correct? Is that what you think needs to happen?

OSTP needs to come in and decide, adjudicate the disputes?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, and let me add to that just a little bit. It again is our observation or judgment that the EXCOM cannot come to

resolution on the issue for the reasons we have talked about. So

then as you said, it really has to go to another level. When we really got looking at this, that was kind of beyond where we had expected to go, to tell you the truth. But when we started looking at

this particular program, it becomes very odd—this is a national

program for all the reasons that you folks identified. It is not a program that should be subject to compromise. It is a program that

should be decided on what is in the best interest of the country.

And the right place for that to be done is the White House. So in

our view, the Office of the President has to designate a decisionmaker, underline decision-maker, not a committee chairman, not a

coordinator, but a decision-maker. And that decision maker has to

listen to all of the inputs and decide one, what is affordable, and

two, what is in the best interest of the country. I think it can be

done. We didn’t identify who that should be. It certainly could be

the Director of the Office of Science and Technology and Policy. It

could be Director of the NSC, but I think it is probably in those

two organizations that you would find the right expertise to provide

this leadership.

But again, if you will excuse me, I want to underline, we don’t

need another Committee Chairman and we don’t need another Coordinator. We need someone who is going to listen to all the facts

and decide what is in the best interest of the country.

Chairman MILLER. My time is now expired. Both cloakrooms

have now told us that there will likely be votes shortly. We will try

to go and make a decision about whether we will come back or not

depending on how far we have gone. I think all the Members

should know that if they remain Members of this committee, they

will have many opportunities to ask questions at NPOESS oversight hearings.

Dr. Broun for five minutes.

36

SELECTING A MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Glackin, NOAA

has recommended four different paths toward the resolution as we

go forward in the NPOESS management. Do you all have a preference of one over the other? Would you make that clear to us,

please?

Ms. GLACKIN. Yes, I will. I will speak from a NOAA perspective

here. NOAA believes that we have the broadest mission requirements for this, for both weather and climate, and we also recognize

that this is a critically important program to us. It is really germane to our mission, and NOAA would be prepared to take leadership in this program, I think as we move forward with it. There

are quite a few—I would hasten to say there are quite a few issues

associated with things that have to be worked out, and we are really in the midst of doing that. But Secretary Locke has been actively

engaged in this program and is committed to finding the right solution for the Nation. And if it is going to be right for the Nation,

then I think he would be prepared.

Mr. BROUN. Okay. Would you rank those four options for us in

terms of effectiveness, difficulty in implementing each option, and

the likelihood of it being implemented?

Ms. GLACKIN. All of the options have, I think, pros and cons to

them that are still being evaluated at this point. I think the status

quo does represent some significant challenges for us as Mr. Young

has highlighted for us today. Options two and three, I think, have

a significant pro to them in that there would be a very clear point

for authority, accountability and responsibility for a program there.

To go to option two would obviously be a transition to get there.

Option three would be easier.

In option four which I described as a divergence, I will take another minute to say that there really is still a lot of commonality

in that site. We have a ground system today, and the Committee

may not be aware but NOAA actually operates DOD’s operational

satellites for them today. So NOAA has a very strong role in operations of these satellites.

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Young, would you please comment on those four

options and any other option that you see of the four, as well as

rank them in order of effectiveness and implementation?

Mr. YOUNG. Let me give just a little bit of background. You are

probably familiar, but our particular group, we had a fairly broad

representation. It was nine of us, but if there was any waiting, it

was in the direction of people who had national security space experience. I really highlight that because it was a group that I think

was genuinely looking for what is in the best interest of the country, not what is the best organizational solution.

We debated a fair amount on that subject, and our conclusion is

a little bit as Ms. Glackin said, that NOAA is really the organization that the country looks to to provide weather and climate leadership, and when you’re assigning responsibility for something, I

think you want to assign it to that organization where it is their

number one priority, not their number seven priority. And in that

regard, it is number one priority to NOAA. It was very obvious to

us that NOAA was the organization.

37

NOAA is not a space acquisition organization, so they need NASA to be a partner with them in order to be able to implement

it.

Mr. BROUN. So you basically agree with——

Mr. YOUNG. I do.

Mr. BROUN.—Secretary Glackin. Mr. Powner, would you com- ment, please?

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think in the near-term we have the existing structure to deal with. So that needs to go forward over the next

several months. Hopefully we will have a quick decision if we go

with the one agency. I agree that NOAA would be that agency, because this is not a priority at DOD. The fourth option is clearly a longer-term approach after this constellation of NPOESS satellites would be launched.

Mr. BROUN. Okay, Mr. Chairman. For the sake of time, I am going to yield back. Chairman MILLER. Thank you for that very generous decision. What I would propose is that each of the remaining Members— we have been called for votes. You heard the bells or the horns—

that each of the Members ask one round of questions if they can

keep it below five minutes, maybe more like three-ish. We can complete this sixth hearing on NPOESS and save our questions for the

seventh or eighth hearing. Ms. Dahlkemper for five or less.

PROGRAM COST

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. Mr. Powner, it seems that every time that you have come before this committee, you are reporting cost increases in this program. Yet the entire Nunn-McCurdy process was supposed to stabilize the program. Why haven’t we converged on a stable cost estimate for the pro- gram before this, and can you give me a firm number now?

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think if you look at the history of this pro- gram, the current overrun is primarily due to the technical problems that the program has faced with the VIIRS sensor. I think

there were unforeseen technical problems. You can argue that

maybe those technical problems could have—we should have anticipated those. So in the past, we can go back to—there has been mismanagement across the board on this. We are faulting EXCOM

right now. Historically, you can go back. There was a prime contractor not overseeing subs, there were problems with program offices. So there has been mismanagement throughout, not a single

organization that we can point to say, that is the one organization.

It has been from contractors through program offices, through

PEOs through EXCOM. Everyone is at fault.

I think if you look going forward, the estimate right now of $3.9

billion, it is going to at least grow another billion but likely more

because there also will be integration issues which typically occur

on both NPP and that first satellite. So I would expect at a minimum it will be $1 billion but likely more. So that will place this

in the $15 billion life cycle cost range.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So I am sorry, what was the total?

Mr. POWNER. $15 billion.

38

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. And can you say that that is a stable number?

Mr. POWNER. No, it will be higher than that.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So there is still no firm number?

Mr. POWNER. And I think the program would agree with that, too. That is why they want to have these detailed cost estimates

that they are going to work on. There are five estimates that are

currently in the works right now. We haven’t seen those. Those

have not been disclosed to us. It is going to at least be fifteen.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Mr. Young and Ms. Glackin, would you please

comment on my question?

Mr. YOUNG. I really can’t add to the cost numbers. In our report, the thing that we were really trying—we said greater than a billion

dollars. What we were really trying to do is make sure that everybody understood this wasn’t a fixer-up problem. I mean, it was a

problem of a significant magnitude. I don’t know what the upper

cap, you know, is on that particular number. But it is in excess of

a billion dollars.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Ms. Glackin.

Ms. GLACKIN. I agree with that.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Well, it certainly would be nice to have a sta- ble number. I am new to Congress, so I haven’t been here for all

these other hearings, and I guess I will be here for quite a few

after this.

Mr. BROUN. You hope you are.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. What is that?

Mr. BROUN. You hope you are.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Yeah, I hope I am. But I mean, I hope I am

not. I hope that we can put this problem behind us, you know, just

as a concerned citizen who came into Congress. These are the kind

of things that, you know, just make people back home shake their

heads and wonder what we are doing down here.

Mr. YOUNG. I probably should, if I could add to that, I agree. My personal belief is, it is not necessary to have a seventh hearing.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. We should be able to do this if we get a deci- sion maker in?

Mr. YOUNG. The right leadership and the right corrective actions can prevent a seventh hearing.

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you very much. I will yield back. Chairman MILLER. The record should note that most of these

hearings do predate Ms. Dahlkemper’s service in Congress. Mr. Bilbray for five minutes or such lesser time as he may consume.

COORDINATING AGENCIES AND TECHNOLOGIES

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just as an editorial note, it is

nice to hear about a problem that is only a billion.

Chairman MILLER. No, it is more than that.

Mr. BILBRAY. That was with a B, not with a T, right? Okay. Are

we talking the biggest problem is incompatibility of hardware between the three different choices? Is that a debate over the hardware itself?

Mr. YOUNG. I don’t think so. I think it really—if I could kind

again hit the point I was trying to make in my testimony. The

DOD/Air Force states that they are satisfied with legacy, meaning

39

current weather satellite data. They are satisfied with that capability.

Mr. BILBRAY. Who is?

Mr. YOUNG. The DOD and the Air Force.

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay.

Mr. YOUNG. And they are not willing to provide funding to provide capability beyond that. Now, it has been kind of directed that

the two organizations fund 50–50. Now, NOAA and Ms. Glackin

can say this much better than I, but NOAA states that today they

use all their weather satellites, including theirs and DOD’s. But

they also use some very special capability from NASA R&D satellites that are operating well beyond their designed lifetime. And

it is the combination of those data that gives us the quality of

weather forecasting we have today. To go to legacy capability only

would be a significant step back in the country’s ability to do

weather forecasting. That difference in opinion is big, and when we

would sit in the meetings with the two organizations, good people

on both sides, but you could just sense the edge that that created

because each was trying to be supportive of their respective organization’s priorities, not surprising. Given that large difference, and

it is large, difference in priorities makes any kind of an integrated

implementation for this program—I guess I could say difficult but

I probably should use even a stronger statement than that.

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, let me say, for instance, if somebody has been

in government for over 30 years, I mean, any bureaucracy that is

satisfied obviously doesn’t know what it doesn’t know. I mean, I

think that seriously we need to talk about that. And this whole infighting kind of reminds me of trying to get 18 police agencies to

agree on one communication system——

Mr. YOUNG. That would be right.

Mr. BILBRAY.—and everybody has got their angle to it. And I understand the in-fighting here.

My biggest concern is people thinking they don’t have a vested

interest in the other guy’s agenda. I don’t think that there are very

many people in business who thought the military doing Internet

was going to be a big deal to them, and frankly, I think there is

a whole lot of technology exchange. I don’t think any of us know

in the long run the benefits that may happen through cooperation.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I just think that we have got to approach

this not just over the issues of what is the forecasting that the

three agencies want to look at or data they want to acquire or the

program they want. But the fact of understanding that there are

things out there that if we are going to get a benefit and get problems in that we don’t know about and to approach that.

I mean, how many people in business really saw the Eisenhower

Act, which originally was designed for the military. That really was

a boon for interstate commerce. So I just hope that we approach

this with the attitude that there is a lot more at stake than just,

you know, forecasting the weather we know now, and it just boggles my mind to think that maybe the institutions that think they

have enough data really aren’t aware of just how broad horizons

are. I guess it goes back to the old thing at the turn of the century

when they said we might as well shut down the patents office beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 050173 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DWORK\I&O09\061709\50173 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
40

cause everything that has ever been invented has already been invented.

So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

THE KEYS TO AVOIDING FUTURE PROBLEMS

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Davis has made

our life slightly easier by going to vote and forgoing his round of

questions. Without making this another round of questions, we do

have just a minute or two more. Mr. Young said he did not think

we needed a seventh hearing, or an eighth or a ninth or a tenth

hearing, that there were things that we could do to avoid that necessity, that need. Could each of you give one sentence that you

think is the most important thing to be done to avoid the need for

a seventh, eighth, ninth hearing and further delays and further

cost overruns and further everything that has gone wrong. Mr.

Powner.

Mr. POWNER. There is an EXCOM meeting June 26. We need a

firm decision on program direction which includes scope and cost;

and if we don’t have that decision, I think we do need a hearing.

Chairman MILLER. Does someone need to call the Secretary of

Defense and suggest someone show up? Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. The White House needs to establish the program is

in the best interest of the country, and then we need to budget for

it at the most probable cost which is an 80/20 confidence with a

sufficient amount of contingency.

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Glackin.

Ms. GLACKIN. I think that we need to make adjustments to the

program with respect to management, to have the management

oversight be more effective, and we need to develop realistic cost

and schedules for this program that we can live within.

CLOSING

Chairman MILLER. All right. Any valedictory comments from Dr.

Broun?

Mr. BROUN. I just want to thank Mr. Powner and Mr. Young for

their hard work on this. Hopefully we won’t need another hearing,

hopefully we will get good management in place and we can start

flying birds and get the data that Ms. Glackin and her agency

needs and that this will be a soft problem, and I just want to thank

you all very much. I have tremendous respect for Mr. Young. I

knew him years ago when I was the physician for the Martin Marietta plant in Americus, Georgia. And so I have known him for a

number of years, and I just have tremendous confidence in what

he recommends. And I thank both of you gentlemen, and I thank

you Madam Secretary for coming. Thank you.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

Chairman MILLER. All right. Now we need to sprint to the Floor,

but thank you again. We will bring this hearing to a close. I thank

all the witnesses for testifying. Under the rules, the record will remain open for two weeks for additional statements from the Members and for answers to any follow-up questions the Committee

may have for the witnesses. The witnesses are excused. The hearing is now adjourned.

41

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(43)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

44

1This schedule delays the launches of the NPOESS prototype—called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)—and the first and the second NPOESS satellites by seven, fourteen, and

five months, respectively. 2 A 50 percent level of confidence indicates that a program has a 50 percent chance that the

program will be delivered at the identified cost.

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. There are many different cost estimates for the NPOESS program.

Q1a. What do you know about them?

A1a. Currently, there are at least five different cost estimates for the NPOESS pro- gram. One estimate is the program’s current official cost estimate of $13.95 billion,

which is recognized as no longer being achievable. Agency officials have provided us

an overview of the other four estimates, but not the estimates themselves since they

were still being determined at the time of our review. All of them are based on a

delayed schedule.1 The estimates, as explained by agency officials, are:

• Program officials’ cost estimate at the 50 percent confidence level.2

• The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group’s

independent cost assessment at the 50 percent confidence level.

• Program officials’ cost estimate at the 80 percent confidence level.

• Program officials’ estimate that includes the cost of acquiring the third and

fourth NPOESS satellites as early as possible (as recommended by a recent

Independent Review Team report).

Q1b. Which [cost estimate] do you think the program should use moving forward?

A1b. The recent Independent Review Team (IRT) report recommends funding the NPOESS program at the 80 percent confidence level and including a management

reserve for the program of approximately 25 percent. We agree that, at this stage

of the program, the cost estimate should be at the 80 percent confidence level. Using

an estimate with a higher confidence level and management reserve should help the

program plan for and handle unanticipated issues as it moves from the development

phase to the production phase.

Q2. One of the findings of the IRT was that the Integrated Program Office (IPO) does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and they cited the Goddard

Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.

Q2a. Why can’t the current IPO leverage the expertise of these institutions without actually being co-located?

A2a. The program office currently leverages the expertise of these institutions with- out being co-located. However, key agency officials reported that co-location could

provide a supportive infrastructure, facilitate cooperation, and allow active oversight

by the selected center’s management.

Q2b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?

A2b. Officials from both Goddard Space Flight Center and Air Force Space and Mis- sile Systems Center are members of, and participate in, the Program Executive Officer’s Program Management Council. In addition, many of the program’s and the program executive office’s employees are originally from either NASA or the Air Force,

and both the program and the program executive office work with NASA and the

Air Force to get specific expertise as needed.

Q2c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA programs?

A2c. There is an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA programs. For

example, on the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites–R series

(GOES–R) program, NOAA reimburses NASA for its program office support such as

facilities management and information technology support services, which is calculated by NASA via a general management overhead cost rate.

Q3. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full stand-up of

45

3GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at

Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making, GAO–09–564 (Washington, D.C.:

June 17, 2009).

NPOESS. I understand that we don’t have many options now because of concerns about data gaps, but what are the implications of ‘‘operationalizing’’ NPP?

A3. There are several implications of using NPP data operationally. First, the four central data processing centers (one managed by NOAA, one by the Air Force, and

two by the Navy) will need to ensure that the infrastructure they had planned to

build to handle NPOESS data are in place and that the scientific algorithms are

ready to accept NPP data. Because neither Navy facility will have an NPOESS Integrated Data Processing System until the first NPOESS satellite is operational, they

may also need to make additional accommodations to use NPP data effectively. Second, there are fewer operational ground stations supporting NPP than will support

NPOESS, which means that data will take longer to get to the centers and, therefore, may be less useful. Third, the NPP satellite was only designed to a five-year

mission life, unlike the seven-year mission life of the NPOESS satellites. Thus, if

there are further delays in the launch of C1, NPP may not bridge the gap in satellite data.

Q4. NOAA is responsible for program management and operation, while acquisition authority belongs to DOD.

Q4a. How has this affected the program?

A4a. As outlined in a tri-agency memorandum of understanding, NOAA, DOD, and NASA each have different responsibilities for the NPOESS program and all are represented on a tri-agency Executive Committee. However, we recently reported that

it is difficult for the NPOESS Executive Committee to navigate the three agencies’

competing requirements and priorities.3 We also reported that the Executive Committee has not been effective in fulfilling its responsibilities because the official with

the authority to make acquisition decisions did not attend committee meetings, corrective actions were not identified in terms of desired outcomes, actions were not

tracked to closure, and selected risks were not escalated in a timely manner.

Q4b. Is this relationship unique in the Federal Government?

A4b. The 2008 NPOESS Alternative Management Study team found that the NPOESS tri-agency management approach has no prior model on which to rely.

Other similar programs, including NOAA’s GOES program and Air Force programs,

use management approaches that have been in place for decades. The team noted

that the success of these other programs appears to be attributable, in part, to the

maturity of the government management approach.

Q5. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the Visual/infrared Imager Ra- diometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument, is it time to pursue an alternative instrument?

A5. While the VIIRS instrument has had many serious technical issues, the recent Independent Review Team recommended that the program stay with the current

sensor and contractor teams through the third VIIRS sensor (for NPOESS C2).

However, if problems on VIIRS persist during its current thermal vacuum testing,

the program plans to pursue an alternative to ensure that launch schedules do not

slip any further. The Executive Committee has directed NASA to start the documentation that will be needed to procure an Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) for C1 at the beginning of the next fiscal year (October 1, 2009)—

should VIIRS performance during thermal vacuum testing dictate such a need.

Agency officials have noted that a decision would need to be made by that time in

order to avoid further schedule delays.

Q5a. Is using an AVHRR the only option [for C1]?

A5a. The agencies’ options depend on their goals, such as whether schedule or cost is more important than system performance. Specifically, an AVHRR is cheaper and

easier to build than VIIRS, and is NOAA’s current operational imaging sensor. However, it offers a major step back from NASA’s Moderate Resolution Imaging

Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensor, which NOAA and NASA both consider their

‘‘legacy’’ sensor—and both agencies use MODIS data operationally. As of March 2009, over 80 percent of the parts for the second VIIRS instrument

(currently planned for C1) were in house at the contractor, with plans in place to

acquire the rest. Further, an independent review team chaired by officials from

NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory recently reviewed the contractor’s ability to build

46

4GAO–09–772T and GAO–09–564.

5GAO–09–564.

the second and third VIIRS instruments. The team recommended staying with the

current VIIRS contractor for C1 and C2.

Q5b. When would the [Executive Committee] need to make this decision by?

A5b. The Executive Committee has directed NASA to start the procurement paperwork for an AVHRR for C1 at the beginning of the next fiscal year (October 1,

2009)—should VIIRS performance during its on-going thermal vacuum testing dictate such a need. A decision would need to be made by that time in order to avoid

further schedule delays to the C1 launch.

Q5c. What are the cost and performance implications of making this decision?

A5c. Although building an additional AVHRR appears to be the least costly of the

options for replacing VIRRS on C1—should that be required—the AVHRR sensor

would be a significant step back in terms of performance currently available through

NASA’s MODIS sensor. Further, AVHRR would not meet the key performance parameters required for the NPOESS program.

Q5d. Are there any international implications to this option since we owe an AVHRR

to the Europeans for their MetOp satellite?

A5d. The current direction of the Executive Committee is to plan for the purchase

of an AVHRR for C1 (in the afternoon orbit)—not for NPP—beginning October 1,

2009, if needed. In that event, the program plans to acquire a new AVHRR for C1—

not the AVHRR intended for MetOp. However, there are agreements in place between the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites

(Eumetsat) and NOAA regarding the exchange of NPOESS data. These should be

examined before deciding how to proceed regarding an AVHRR.

In responding to these questions, we relied on information from our recent review

of the NPOESS program.4 The work supporting the report was conducted from October 2008 to June 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in

our report.5

47

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT)

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. Your review found critical flaws in the way the three agencies interact.

Q1a. If you were advising the Office of Science and Technology Policy on how to pro- ceed, what would you suggest?

A1a. Establish a sound program. A program that responds to all requirements and corrective actions needs to be established for NPOESS. This program should provide

the capabilities necessary to meet Level 1 requirements and include all of the IRT

recommendations regarding management structure and data continuity. The resultant funding and schedule for this program should be adjusted to support an 80/20

cost confidence in each fiscal year and for the total program. The affordability of

the resultant program and the associated funding should be assessed. If the resultant program and level of funding are judged to be unaffordable, then the scope of the program should be adjusted such that the reduced program scope

can be accommodated within the level of the available funding at an 80/20 cost confidence level in each fiscal year and for the total program. The acceptability of this

reduced-scope program should be assessed. The IRT believes that, in addition to defining the NPOESS program that meets national interests, responsibility for the program’s execution must be assigned to

one organization (USAF or NOAA). Should the selected NPOESS program option

have requirements consistent with current Level 1 requirements, the logical choice

would be the organization needing the improved capabilities above legacy, i.e.,

NOAA. If the decision is to constrain the program to be consistent with legacy performance and the associated budget, either NOAH or the USAF could be assigned

the responsibility. The organization assigned management responsibility must have total acquisition authority including control and responsibility for all supporting resources and functions such as people, budget, and contracting. Additionally, that organization should

be allocated all currently planned and programmed NPOESS budget and then be

responsible for funding the NPOESS program at an 80–20 cost confidence level.

At the March 4, 2009 EXCOM briefing of the IRT findings and recommendations

regarding NPOESS, the EXCOM requested that the IRT evaluate the organizational

alternatives for the acquisition of NPOESS. The conclusion of this evaluation is that

either organization has the capability to execute the NPOESS program. However,

the IRT recommends that responsibility for NPOESS execution be assigned to

NOAA with NASA acting as NOAA’s acquisition organization. This recommendation

is based on the following two factors: 1) NOAA has the broader responsibility for

weather and climate than any other organization; and 2) this national responsibility

of NOAA aligns well with the national character of the NPOESS program and

makes NOAA the natural national advocate for the NPOESS program.

Under this construct, NPOESS execution is assigned to NOAA with NASA as

NOAA’s acquisition organization, NOAA/NASA will provide all polar data from the

NPOESS program to all users. Additionally, NOAA/NASA, working with DOD, must

establish a process that will ensure that future DOD needs will be satisfied. The

current EXCOM concept should continue as an interagency forum to assure effective

program implementation.

Q2. How much more do you think this program will cost if it is budgeted to 80/

20?

A2. The program is currently funded at less than the 50/50 level which is an insufficient level of funding. At this level of funding the program lacks sufficient management reserve which leads to the program using risk as its management reserve. The

most probable cost is at the 80/20 level including reserves. To fund at the most probable cost, the IRT estimated that the NPOESS budget has a shortfall in excess of

$113 through program completion. Funding the program (by Fiscal Year and

through Estimate to Complete) to 80/20 cost confidence would provide a management reserve of approximately 25 percent.

Q2a. Does this include your recommendation to mitigate the risk of continuity gaps?

A2a. No, it does not. The IRT review of the baseline program highlighted a concern

regarding operational continuity associated with how the baseline program was

structured. Both heritage programs, the DOD’s Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the NOAA Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite

48

(POES) were planned and constructed with spares on the ground to implement a

‘‘launch on need’’ philosophy. Even early NPOESS planning carried this same

launch philosophy to preclude long gaps in coverage. The current NPOESS program

plan does not have that same level of assuredness regarding operational continuity.

Furthermore, the IRT was unable to find Level 1 requirements for operational continuity or constellation availability.

If all satellites are delivered on schedule, launched without incident, and meet

their full design life, there will be no significant gap in capabilities. In keeping with

historical trends, there is a high likelihood of early problems with the first few satellites. They occur across the manufacturing, integration and test, and on-orbit performance phases. If NPOESS exhibits these characteristics, there will be a minimum gap of several months. If there is a launch failure—a 41 percent chance of

occurring over the remaining DMSP launches, NPP and NPOESS there is a high

likelihood of a gap measured in years (note: 41 percent based on the Success Probability used in the Aerospace GAP analysis). If there is a launch failure or an early

spacecraft failure on NPP, C1 or C2, there will be a capability gap of three to five

years. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)—once a key risk reduction activity

for NPOESS—is now a critical asset to help mitigate these potential gaps in operational coverage.

The IRT recommended that steps be taken to proactively manage and mitigate

the potential gap in continuity coverage. The EXCOM must clarify the program priorities and determine if continuity of coverage is a priority. If it is a priority, it

should be clearly captured as a Level 1 requirement. Spare satellites should also

be programmed for launch/early-orbit failure. Ideally, the spacecraft should be available and tested to a common point for either orbit, with payloads available for either

orbit configuration. Move production and launch dates of C3 and C4 closer to C1

and C2. To bolster this fragile constellation, an integrated management approach

is needed for the remaining DMSP, POES, METOP and NPOESS, including NPP.

Modify the launch philosophy of all polar-orbiting environmental assets to launch

on need (or launch on failure). Use the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) data,

originally intended for risk reduction, as an option to mitigate potential data gaps.

This will help but will not compensate for lack of spares in case of launch or early

spacecraft failures.

Information regarding the cost impacts of implementing these actions was not

available when the IRT conducted its review.

Q2b. If the cost is budgeted to an 80/20, what should the program office cut in order

to keep the program from undergoing another Nunn-McCurdy review?

A2b. If the program is budgeted to a cost confidence level of 80/20 this will provide

approximately 25 percent management reserve. If this is done and the other IRT

recommendations (e.g., placing priority on and incentivizing mission success) are implemented, the program has a very good chance of not undergoing another NunnMcCurdy review.

Q3. One of the findings of your team was that the Integrated Program Office (IPO)

does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and you cited the Goddard

Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.

Q3a. Why can’t the current IPO leverage the expertise of these institutions without

actually being co-located?

A3a. Co-location is a secondary implementation issue. The key to the proper implementation of this IRT recommendation is the nature of the association of the program with the space acquisition center and the center to the agency/department responsible for the execution of the program. The arrangement should be one that

holds,the center responsible for the successful acquisition of the program and the

program responsible to the center for the same. However, while co-location is not

essential, it certainly can make the benefits of a space acquisition center for the successful execution of the program easier to achieve. Not only can the program more

effectively draw on the knowledgeable resources of the center but the status reporting from the program to the center and the management oversight of the program

by seasoned senior space acquisition personnel can be more comprehensive, timely,

and effective.

Q3b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?

A3b. Consultation or communications does not meet the requirement. Effective support and oversight of the program by a space acquisition center requires the center

49

to have responsibility for the success of the program and be able to employ its support and oversight expertise, resources, and processes to that end.

Q3c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA programs?

A3c. Certainly. NASA, as the space system acquisition organization for NOAA, would bring the expertise and experience that NOAA does not have that is required

for successful execution of these space system programs. NASA would be responsible

to NOAA for the successful achievement of the space system acquisition objectives.

To accomplish this, NASA would provide implementation as well as support and

oversight resources for the programs.

Q4. You recommended keeping the current contractor team because they represent the highest probability of success at this point.

Q4a. How can the Federal Government continue with the current contractors without

creating a ‘‘moral hazard’’ by seeming to allow poor performance?

A4a. Contractors should be held accountable for poor performance for which they are responsible. With respect to NPOESS, it could be argued that the incentive

structure that placed priority on cost over mission success, the lack of sufficient

funding which lead to the adoption of risk to resolve issues, the lack of space acquisition expertise, and the lack of effective oversight and decision-making have been

principal causes for the poor results so far. Again from a mission success perspective, the continued use of the contractor team that is familiar with the program and

the issues is more likely to achieve successful execution, assuming the other issues

are resolved, than spending the time and money to change contractor teams and

then bring the new team up to the level of knowledge the incumbent team already

possesses.

Q5. Your team believes NPOESS will ultimately end up costing at least another $1

billion.

Q5a. Is this additional cost simply a result of budgeting to 80/20?

A5a. Yes, this is the result of funding the current program to the 80/20 cost confidence level.

Q5b. Where is this additional cost coming from?

A5b. The program is currently funded at less than the 50/50 level which is an insufficient level of funding. At this level of funding the program lacks sufficient management reserve which leads to the program using risk as its management reserve. The

most probable cost is at the 80/20 level including reserves. Funding the program (by

Fiscal Year and through Estimate to Complete) to 80/20 cost confidence would provide a management reserve of approximately 25 percent.

Q6. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full stand-up of

NPOESS.

Q6a. I understand that we don’t have many options now because of concerns about

data-gaps, but what are the implications of ‘‘operationalizing’’ NPP?

A6a. Rather than utilizing NPP and its data in a one-time or short-term proof-ofconcept or risk reduction approach, NPP data would be used over the duration of

the mission to address selected operational polar data requirements. This might require additional processing and dissemination capabilities for the NPP data.

Q7. NOAA is responsible for program management and operations, while acquisition

authority belongs to DOD.

Q7a. How has this affected the program?

A7a. A multi-agency organization is typically more complex and less efficient than

an organization contained within one agency. NPOESS, a tri-agency program, is no

different than many multi-agency organizations, and not surprisingly has a few

built-in challenges:

1. The NPOESS budget is funded 50 percent by the DOD and 50 percent by

the DOC. This split funding requires significantly increased effort and overhead in coordination. As an example, to receive funding, the NPOESS budget

is reviewed by six Congressional committees. Once received, NPOESS must

also use two financial systems to execute the budget.

2. Requirements are also managed through another multi-agency construct

called the Senior Users Advisory Group (SUAG).

50

3. By the Memorandum of Agreement (Dec. 2008), the acquisition reporting

runs from the NPOESS PEO to the EXCOM, of which the DOD EXCOM representative is also the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).

The EXCOM is intended to be a decision body to provide streamlined direction

to the PEO. As currently run, however, the EXCOM is not a decision-making body,

and major program decisions can only be finalized (sometimes weeks) after the

EXCOM. The current DOD EXCOM representative has not been delegated the proper authority from the Defense Acquisition Executive (who is also the NPOESS Milestone Decision Authority) and decisions require an additional meeting and coordination to be finalized. Additionally, the IRT has observed that many of the topics that

are discussed at the EXCOM delve too deeply into program details and many critical

top level issues are left unresolved.

For an EXCOM process to be effective, the EXCOM members must be the decision

makers or have the appropriate authorities delegated to them. When they meet, the

EXCOM should focus on strategic issues and decisions-such as on program priorities, risk to data continuity, or the inadequate budget - not on tactical day-to-day

program development status.

Q7b. Is this relationship unique in the Federal Government?

A7b. Not aware of any other tri-agency arrangements similar to NPOESS. However,

having one agency do acquisition for another is common. In the space systems

arena, the National Reconnaissance Office has been acquiring space systems that

were part of larger NSA and NGA systems and programs for decades.

Q8. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the VIIRS instrument, is it time

to pursue an alternative instrument?

a. Is using the AVHRR the only option?

b. When would the EXCOM need to make this decision by?

c. What are the cost and performance implications of making this decision?

d. Are there any international implications to this option since we owe an

AVHRR to the Europeans for the MetOp satellite?

A8. With a VIIRS Engineering Design Unit (EDU) already through environmental

testing, the recent successful completion of vibration testing for VIIRS F1, and the

planned completion of VIIRS F1 thermal vacuum testing scheduled for the summer

of 2009, there is growing confidence that a VIIRS F1 can be delivered. With the maturity and progress already invested in VIIRS, it is unlikely that a ‘‘new’’ instrument start would be any more cost effective or bring the schedule in any closer. Another new instrument start will only siphon more money away from an already

budget-strapped program.

In addition, there are no apparent, viable, near-term alternatives for VIIRS. The

one remaining legacy sensor—the last Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer

(AVHRR)—is slated for EUMETSAT via an international agreement and will be

used for METOP that supports the mid-morning orbit. Re-opening the production

lines for legacy sensors such as the Operational Linescan System (OLS) and the

AVHRR would not save much, if any, money, nor would they be delivered any earlier or at lower risk. These legacy sensors would also constitute a significant step

back in performance compared to VIIRS. In fact, while perhaps an OLS-like performance would be suitable for some DOD requirements, the AVHRR does not meet

the requirements for NOAA and NASA. Other options, such as starting an alternative VIIRS concept will also contain significant cost and schedule impacts.

However, while not optimal, the IPO should continue to protect AVHRR as an option until VIIRS completes Thermal Vacuum testing. Since there are only minimal

costs to develop and submit the paperwork to potentially acquire an AVHRR (e.g.,

a Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition and/or a Justification and

Approval), the IRT recommends the continuation of this no/low-cost effort until the

VIIRS thermal vacuum data is available in the summer of 2009. If the data is favorable, this AVHRR option can be stopped.

51

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of

Commerce

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. We understand that there are several alternative cost estimates under consideration.

Q1a. What are they?

A1a. The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Integrated Program Office (IPO) submitted a notification letter to the Defense Acquisition Executive indicating that the schedule of the current Acquisition

Program Baseline (APB) was unachievable. As part of that notification process, the

IPO is required by Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition regulations to submit

a revised APB with an updated schedule and cost estimate. Prior to submitting the

revised APB for DOD approval, the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) requires an independent assessment of the schedule and cost estimate.

There will be only one schedule and cost estimate submitted for consideration; however, it will be subjected to two different independent reviews. One review is

being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), using DOD methodology. The other review is being conducted

by NASA and NOAA, consistent with past assessment practices for collaborative

satellite procurements. Both of the independent assessments are proceeding and a

revised program cost and schedule estimate will be ready for review by the EXCOM

in fall 2009.

Q1b. Why is it taking so long to figure out what this program will cost to complete?

A1b. The NPOESS Program has many variables that make cost estimating chal- lenging. It is somewhat premature to determine whether the technical difficulties

with the two primary instrument development programs—the Visible/Infrared

Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) and Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS)—have

been overcome and whether the positive impact of ‘‘lessons learned’’ in the development of the NPOESS Preparatory Project can be incorporated into the next instruments to be developed for the first and second NPOESS satellites (C1 and C2, respectively). The EXCOM has directed a special detailed assessment called a ‘‘deep

dive’’ in order to develop shared agreement on the magnitude of the program’s challenges.

Once the technical challenges are fully identified, a revised program schedule

must be developed before the revised program cost estimates are completed. As the

agencies analyze schedule and cost, they must reconcile the differences in their

standards and approaches, adding to the time required to complete an accurate cost

estimate.

DOD and NOAA have fundamentally different approaches to cost estimating,

which are difficult to reconcile. The White House Task Force led by the Office of

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has a working group focused on determining

the best cost methodology for this program.

Q1c. Is it true that going with the most conservative estimate, using 80 percent confidence level, you would trigger another Nunn-McCurdy breach?

A1c. NOAA’s current estimate for an 80 percent cost confidence NPOESS profile for

FY 2012 and beyond would result in a cost growth of 15.6 percent above the 2006

Nunn-McCurdy certified program budget. A 15.6 percent cost growth would require

a notification to Congress, but not a complete re-certification similar to the one performed in 2006. A recertification is required if cost growth exceeds 25 percent.

Q2. In your opinion, why has the Executive Committee (EXCOM) failed to effectively

oversee the NPOESS Program?

A2. The answer is multifaceted. First, tri-agency management of any program is inherently difficult. Second, the EXCOM should be utilized for strategic direction related to the high-level needs and requirements of the program and establishment

of key budget baselines, not for tactical day-to-day program oversight. The current

structure requires these very high level managers to provide both, which results in

both functions being weakened. It is also essential for the EXCOM to have critical

strategic issues presented at an appropriate level by program staff to facilitate decision-making. Finally, NOAA, DOD, and NASA agree with and have taken action on

52

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding that the EXCOM lacks the

membership and leadership needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and direct

the program. For the past three months, the DOD committee member with acquisition authority has been attending Executive Committee meetings. NOAA also agrees

with GAO that the EXCOM failed to track action items to closure and that many

of the EXCOM decisions did not achieve desired outcomes. The White House Task

Force that is examining the NPOESS program is considering these types of issues,

with the goal of ensuring the most effective possible management structure as we

move forward.

Q3. Because of the continued delays to the NPOESS Program, we have reached the

point where weather and climate data continuity could be at risk if NPP or

NPOESS fail on launch or orbit. What is NOAA prepared to do to ensure weather and climate data continuity?

A3. NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), both the

operational on-orbit and recently launched satellites, are performing well and there

is no immediate risk to data continuity for NOAA’s weather and climate missions.

NOAA is concerned about the fragility of the constellation and the risk to data continuity once the last operational NOAA POES and NASA Earth Observing Satellites

(EOS) missions reach the end of their expected life time by 2013.

For the afternoon orbit, which is most at-risk, NOAA plans to maximize use of

existing NOAA POES satellite assets, use NPP data operationally, leverage data

from other NASA and DOD environmental satellites, and forge partnerships with

international space agencies to acquire data needed to support NOAA’s operational

weather and climate missions.

In the mid-morning orbit, NOAA will continue processing and delivering environmental products for its customers from the U.S. and European instruments on board

the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites

(EUMETSAT) MetOp series of satellites through the next decade.

Q4. How does NOAA plan to ensure that all three agencies individual priorities are

weighed and needs are met?

A4. The NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) was structured to be the key decision-maker on the strategic direction of the program. Though both the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) and NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT) have

noted the EXCOM has not been focused enough on strategic issues, NOAA, together

with DOD and NASA, and more broadly, the White House Task Force, are working

to ensure the program gets restructured in a way that ensures the requirements of

each agency’s mission will be met.

Coordinating with the EXCOM development and sustainment of the program’s

key data needs and priorities is the NPOESS Tri-agency Joint Agency Requirements

Council, along with its subordinate Senior User Advisory Group and Joint Agency

Requirements Group. These tri-agency entities are responsible for developing and

sustaining the Integrated Operational Requirements Document (IORD), which details the data and information priorities for the program. NOAA is engaged in these

working groups to ensure that all NPOESS requirements are accounted for and

traceable to each agency and its customers. The White House Task Force led by

OSTP is examining NPOESS in its requirements working group.

Q5. The CERES instrument which measures Earth’s radiance budget is being put

back on NPP and NPOESS.

Q5a. Does this instrument need a water vapor sensor on orbit to help calibrate it?

A5a. No. CERES does not need a water vapor sensor on-orbit for calibration purposes. The CERES instrument is calibrated using water vapor data from an existing

meteorological model which uses data from multiple sources (sounders, microwave

radiances, etc.). Use of this model eliminates the need to use an additional satellite

instrument for calibration.

Q5b. MODIS has a water vapor sensor, but VIIRS does not. Are we adding an instrument back to NPP and NPOESS that perhaps may not work correctly when

the MODIS mission ends?

A5b. No. Water vapor data is being provided by an existing meteorological model

which uses data from multiple sources (sounders, microwave radiances, etc.) to meet

mission requirements, so it is not a requirement for VIIRS.

Q5c. Is this truly an issue, what is NOAA doing to mitigate this risk?

53

A5c. This is not an issue for NOAA with the use of the existing meteorological

model.

Q6. One of the findings of your team was that the Integrated Program Office (IPO)

does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and you cited the Goddard

Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.

Q6a. Why can’t the current IPO leverage the expertise of these institutions without

actually being co-located?

A6a. It may be possible to better leverage the expertise of the space acquisition centers without being co-located. A White House Task Force led by the Office of Science

and Technology Policy (OSTP), with the participation of NOAA, NASA, and DOD,

is examining ways to strengthen program management, including strengthening the

program’s access to the expertise at the space acquisition centers.

The IPO currently takes advantage of selected technical resources from NASA

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems

Center (SMC). However, having greater access to the expertise and personnel at a

space acquisition center like GSFC or SMC could improve day-to-day management

and oversight by providing a more complete infrastructure of technical and program

staff, policies and procedures, and checks and balances at all levels of management.

For example, a space acquisition center has access to an extensive infrastructure of

engineering and mission assurance experts who can be available on demand to support timely mission support. In addition to timely technical support, this infrastructure provides expert oversight of technical and management activities to ensure that

staff is trained and providing the highest level of performance.

Acquisition centers have a system of independent reviews they perform on all programs throughout the course of their acquisition that ensure they are remaining on

track technically. Subjecting NPOESS to such a system could be optimal for the program given its ongoing technical challenges, especially on sensors, which have not

been noticed early enough in many cases by the program’s current prime contractor

and tri-agency management structure. Such a set of customary independent reviews

would provide higher-level management, especially the EXCOM, an ongoing stream

of management information allowing them to focus on the results and actions required, rather than needing to plan and repeatedly call for future independent tests.

Q6b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?

A6b. The IPO consults with these agencies today as referenced in response 6a

above.

Q6c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA programs?

A6c. If the decision is made by the Executive Office of the President that NASA

would be the acquisition authority for the program, NASA would not run the

NPOESS program, but could act as NOAA’s or DOD’s acquisition agent. There

would be associated overhead costs for NASA support as there currently is for DOD

acquisition support. NASA’s overhead costs associated with individual programs are

clearly identified and tracked in the cost accounts for the program. This practice is

called ‘‘full cost accounting’’ and it provides transparency for all costs associated

with a program.

Q7. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full stand-up of

NPOESS.

Q7a. I understand that we don’t have many options now because of concerns about

data-gaps, but what are the implications of ‘‘operationalizing’’ NPP?

A7a. In order to use the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) data operationally,

NOAA needs to accelerate the installation of an NPOESS Data Exploitation ground

system, which includes critical hardware improvements that will allow the NPP

data to be used for operational weather forecasting and climate monitoring. No NPP

spacecraft design changes are required to implement this.

The benefit of operationalizing NPP will be an expansion in the number of operational environmental products (from 19 to 54) since the instruments on NPP are

capable of producing data that meet or exceed the data provided by NOAA–19, our

current operational afternoon polar-orbiting satellite. The availability of these products will provide additional data that will benefit NOAA’s weather forecasts and

warnings as well as its climate assessments.

54

Q8. NOAA is responsible for program management and operation, while acquisition

authority belongs to DOD.

Q8a. How has this affected the program?

A8a. The tri-agency management structure adds complexity to an already complex

space system acquisition. Since guidance and direction to the program must be coordinated between senior leaders within each agency, program management is inherently more cumbersome and protracted in comparison to major programs being

managed within a single agency.

The White House Task Force led by OSTP is looking at ways to improve the program management.

Q8b. Is this relationship unique in the federal government?

A8b. NOAA and NASA have a history of collaboration in the development of satellite systems since the 1960s. While tri-agency programs are not unique, NOAA is

not aware of a tri-agency management structure involving a program as large or as

complex as NPOESS.

Q9. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the VIIRS instrument, is it time

to pursue an alternative instrument?

A9. VIIRS has satisfactorily progressed through ambient, electromagnetic interference vibration testing. VIIRS has completed the thermal vacuum testing process,

though continued analysis of the results is ongoing. Given that substantial risks

also exist if a new option must be developed in place of VIIRS, both the tri-agency

technical team and independent reviews recommended staying the course with

VIIRS.

The EXCOM did, however, direct the IPO to develop a plan to procure an additional Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) instrument as a contingency option should VIIRS experience additional problems that would drive cost and

schedule to even more unacceptable levels. Given that the instrument has progressed through thermal vacuum testing, it is less likely an AVHRR will need to

be procured.

Q9a. Is using an AVHRR the only option?

A9a. :After studying several options, a tri-agency technical team concluded that

planning for an additional AVHRR in case it was needed was the best option. Given

the status of current testing on VIIRS, it is less likely an AVHRR will need to be

procured.

Q9b. When would the EXCOM need to make this decision by?

A9b. A decision to procure an additional AVHRR instrument will be made in fall

2009 following the completion of VIIRS thermal vacuum testing and analysis of its

results.

Q9c. What are the cost and performance implications of making this decision?

A9c. The cost of procuring a single AVHRR instrument compatible with the

NPOESS C1 spacecraft is estimated to be $60 million. However, AVHRR performance falls short of VIIRS capabilities in important areas including cloud detection,

aerosol monitoring, as well as land, ice and snow products that are routinely used

in numerical weather prediction models. With only AVHRR, rather than a more advanced imaging sensor, weather models could not be improved as rapidly as planned

to enhance environmental predictions.

Q9d. Are there any international implications to this option since we owe an AVHRR

to the Europeans for the MetOp satellite?

A9d. No. The procurement plan for an additional AVHRR instrument allows for

NOAA to meet its delivery commitments to EUMETSAT.

(55)

Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138