GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

WARFIGHTER 

SUPPORT 

DOD Needs to 

Improve Its Planning 

for Using Contractors 

to Support Future 

Military Operations 

March 2010 

GAO-10-472 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2010

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using

Contractors to Support Future Military Operations

Highlights of GAO-10-472, a report to 

congressional committees 

Contractors provide a broad range 

of support to U.S. forces deployed 

to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the 

number of contractors at times 

exceeding the number of military 

personnel in each country. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) has 

acknowledged shortcomings in 

how the role of contractors was 

addressed in its planning for Iraq 

and Afghanistan. In its report 

accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009, the Senate Armed 

Services Committee directed GAO 

to assess DOD’s development of 

contract support plans. This report 

examines (1) what progress DOD 

has made in developing operational 

contract support annexes for its 

operation plans, (2) the extent to 

which contract requirements are 

included in other sections of 

operation plans, and (3) DOD’s 

progress in establishing a long-term 

capability to include operational 

contract support requirements in 

operation plans. GAO reviewed 

DOD policies, selected operation 

plans and annexes, and interviewed 

officials at the combatant 

commands, the Joint Staff, and 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making a number of 

recommendations aimed at 

improving the ability of combatant 

command planners to identify 

contract support requirements in 

their operation plans and ensuring 

the department effectively 

institutionalizes its organizational 

approach to addressing contractors 

in its plans. DOD agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations. 

Although DOD guidance has called for combatant commanders to include an 

operational contract support annex—Annex W—in their operation plans since 

February 2006, we found only four operation plans with Annex Ws have been 

approved and planners have drafted Annex Ws for an additional 30 plans. 

According to combatant command officials, most of the annexes drafted to 

date restated broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of 

contractors to support deployed forces. Several factors help explain the 

difficulties planners face in identifying specific contract support requirements 

in Annex Ws. For example, most operation plans contained limited 

information on matters such as the size and capabilities of the military force 

involved, hindering the ability of planners to identify detailed contract support 

requirements. In addition, shortcomings in guidance on how and when to 

develop contract support annexes complicate DOD’s efforts to consistently 

address contract requirements in operation plans and resulted in a mismatch 

in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant command 

planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws will contain specific 

information on contract support requirements. Senior decision makers may 

incorrectly assume that operation plans have adequately addressed contractor 

requirements. As a result, they risk not fully understanding the extent to 

which the combatant command will be relying on contractors to support 

combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary 

management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. 

According to combatant command officials, detailed information on 

operational contract support requirements is generally not included in other 

sections or annexes of the operation plans. Although DOD guidance 

underscores the importance of addressing contractor requirements 

throughout an operation plan, including the base plan and other annexes as 

appropriate, GAO found that nonlogistics personnel tend to assume that the 

logistics community will address the need to incorporate operational contract 

support throughout operation plans. For example, combatant command 

officials told GAO that they were not aware of any assumptions specifically 

addressing the potential use or role of operational contract support in their 

base plans. Similarly, according to DOD planners, there is a lack of details on 

contract support in other parts of most base plans or in the nonlogistics (e.g., 

communication or intelligence) annexes of operation plans. 

DOD has launched two initiatives to improve its capability to address 

operational contract support requirements in its operation plans, but these 

initiatives are being refined and their future is uncertain. DOD has placed joint 

operational contract support planners at each combatant command to assist 

with the drafting of Annex Ws. In addition, the department has created the 

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to help ensure that contract 

support planning is consistent across the department. For both initiatives, a 

lack of institutionalization in guidance and funding and staffing uncertainties 

have created challenges in how they execute their responsibilities. 

View GAO-10-472 or key components.

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-472 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7 

DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Operational 

Contract Support Annexes and Faces Challenges Identifying 

Detailed Contractor Requirements in These Annexes 11 

Detailed Information on Operational Contract Support Generally 

Not Included in Other Sections or Annexes of Operation Plans 20 

The Future of DOD’s Initiatives to Improve Identification of 

Operational Contract Support Requirements Is Uncertain 

Because of Guidance and Funding Challenges 27 

Conclusions 34 

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48 

 

Related GAO Products 49 

 

Table 

Table 1: Status of Annex W Development and Approval by 

Combatant Commands as of February 2010 12 

Figure 

Figure 1: Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and 

Products 10 

Warfighter Support 
Abbreviations 

ADUSD(PS) Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program 

Support) 

DOD Department of Defense 

JCASO Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 

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Page ii GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Page 1 GAO-10-472 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 30, 2010 

Congressional Committees 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long used contractors to provide 

supplies and services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale and 

scope of contract support the department relies on today in locations such 

as Iraq and Afghanistan have increased considerably from previous 

operations. According to DOD, in September 2009 the number of 

contractor personnel working for the department in Iraq and Afghanistan 

was about 218,000, with the number of contractors at times exceeding the 

number of military personnel in each country. By way of contrast, an 

estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the 

1991 Gulf War. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors provide traditional 

logistical support, such as base operating support (food and housing) and 

maintaining weapons systems, but also nonlogistical support, such as 

providing intelligence analysts and interpreters who accompany military 

patrols. DOD expects to continue to rely heavily on contractors for future 

operations. 

It is important to note that the increased use of contractors at deployed 

locations, which DOD refers to as operational contract support, is the 

result of thousands of individual decisions rather than comprehensive 

planning across the department.1

 The department has acknowledged 

shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its planning 

for Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the Secretary of Defense has stated 

that the growth of contractor services in Iraq in many respects happened 

without a coherent strategy.2

Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the 

oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces and 

has identified the need to ensure that specific information on the use and 

roles of contract support to deployed forces is integrated into DOD’s plans 

1

 DOD defines operational contract support as the process of planning for and obtaining 

supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint 

operations along with the associated contractor management functions. 

2

 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee (Jan. 27, 2009). 

Warfighter Support 
 

for future contingency operations.3 We also suggested that DOD conduct a 

comprehensive reexamination of its use of contractors to determine the 

appropriate balance of contractors and military personnel and ensure that 

the role of contractors is incorporated into its planning efforts.4

 Congress 

has expressed concerns regarding the department’s use of contractors to 

support deployed forces and has directed DOD to develop joint policies 

for requirements definition, contingency program management, and 

contingency contracting during combat operations and postconflict 

operations.5

DOD guidance has long recognized the need to include the role of 

contractors in its operation plans. For example, joint guidance states that 

military commanders must ensure that requisite contract planning and 

guidance are in place for any operations where significant reliance on 

contractors is anticipated, and planning for contractors should be at a 

level of detail on par with that for military forces.6

 To provide greater 

details on contract services needed to support an operation and the 

capabilities that contractors would bring, DOD’s guidance for contingency 

planning was revised in February 2006 to require planners to include an 

operational contract support annex—known as Annex W—in the 

combatant commands’ most detailed operation plans.7

 In addition, joint 

guidance gives the combatant commanders the discretion to require 

Annex Ws for additional, less detailed plans. 

In its report accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,8

 the Senate Armed Services 

 

3

 See the related GAO products list at the end of this report. 

4

 GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Overcome Long-standing Challenges 

with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract Management, GAO-09-362T 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2009), and Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its 

Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, 

GAO-08-572T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). 

5

 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 

§ 854 (2006). 

6

 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008). 

7

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats (Feb. 28, 2006). Superseded by 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats (Aug. 17, 2007). 

8

 S. Rep. No. 110-335, at 317 (2008). See also S. Rep. No. 111-35, at 116 (2009). 

Page 2 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

Committee directed us to conduct an assessment of the implementation of 

DOD guidance on including contract support plans in contingency 

operation plans.9

 The committee also asked us to look across DOD’s plans 

and evaluate each plan’s assumptions, comprehensiveness, feasibility, 

adequacy of executable detail, resources required and available, 

contracting-related operational risk at each phase of the plan, and any 

other aspect of contracting support planning. In designing and conducting 

our assessment, our objectives were to determine (1) what progress DOD 

has made in developing operational contract support annexes for its 

operation plans, (2) the extent to which operational contract support 

requirements are included in other sections of operation plans, and 

(3) what progress the department has made in establishing a long-term 

capability to ensure the inclusion of operational contract support 

requirements in operation plans. 

To address our objectives, we met with and obtained documentation from 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to 

review key guidance on how contingency operation plans are drafted and 

reviewed and obtain an understanding of how operational contract 

support is addressed in this guidance. We visited all of the geographic 

combatant commands as well as U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. 

Joint Forces Command, and some combatant command service 

components to discuss their roles in drafting contingency operation plans, 

how operational contract support was addressed in those plans, and other 

related efforts to improve the preparation and planning for working with 

contractors in future operations. We reviewed some base plans and 

annexes at the combatant commands, comparing them to DOD’s guidance 

on plan development as well as its operational contract support guidance 

in order to determine how well these documents incorporated contract 

support. Specifically, we reviewed 7 of the 34 Annex Ws drafted or 

approved as of February 2010, 3 base plans, 4 Annex Ds (logistics), and 

contractor-related excerpts of a base plan and Annex D. However, because 

DOD limited our access to its operation plans, we were unable to provide 

a comprehensive assessment of each plan’s assumptions, 

comprehensiveness, feasibility, adequacy of executable detail, and other 

aspects of operational contract support as directed in the mandate. 

Nevertheless, we believe that the excerpts of plans and annexes DOD 

 

9

 Operation plan refers to any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in 

response to actual and potential contingencies. It also refers to a complete and detailed 

joint plan with all annexes and time-phased force and deployment data. We use the term to 

refer to all plans developed through DOD’s contingency planning process. 

Page 3 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

allowed us to see, along with in-depth conversations with planners and 

other officials responsible for drafting or reviewing base plans and 

annexes, gave us adequate information with which to assess DOD’s 

progress in incorporating operational contract support into its plans. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through 

February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our 

scope and methodology are contained in appendix I. 

Although DOD guidance has called for the integration of an operational 

contract support annex—Annex W—into combatant command operation 

plans since February 2006, the department has made limited progress in 

meeting this requirement. Planners identified 89 plans that may require an 

Annex W. As of February 2010, only four operation plans with Annex Ws 

have been approved by the Secretary of Defense or his designee, and 

planners have drafted Annex Ws for an additional 30 plans. According to 

combatant command officials, most of the draft Annex Ws developed to 

date restated broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of 

contractors to support deployed forces but included few details on the 

type of contractors needed to execute a given plan, despite guidance 

requiring Annex Ws to list contracts likely to be used in theater. Several 

factors help explain the difficulties planners face in identifying specific 

contract support requirements in Annex Ws. For example: 

Results in Brief 

• According to combatant command planners, in order to identify the 

details on contracted services and capabilities needed to support an 

operation, planners need to know the size and capabilities of the 

military force involved and how the plan envisions that force being 

employed. However, most operation plans lack this level of detail, 

hindering the ability of the planners to include details on contract 

support requirements in Annex Ws. 

• Current guidance complicates DOD’s efforts to consistently address 

contract support requirements in Annex Ws across the department. 

According to planning officials, the current Annex W template was 

created with DOD’s most detailed plans in mind even though less than 

10 percent of the combatant commands’ operation plans are at this 

level of detail. Some planners told us that the template’s one-size-fits-all 

Page 4 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

approach makes it harder for them to meet the current Annex W 

requirements. Further, while DOD’s guidance requires Annex Ws for 

the combatant commands’ most detailed plans, the guidance leaves it 

to the combatant commanders to determine which additional, less 

detailed operation plans require an Annex W. However, there is no 

specific guidance to guide the combatant commanders in determining 

which plans should include an Annex W. As a result, we found that 

some combatant commanders took a more expansive view than others 

regarding which plans require the annex. 

The one-size-fits-all approach to Annex Ws and the lack of specific 

guidance regarding which plans require an Annex W has resulted in a 

mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant 

command planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws will contain 

specific information on contract support requirements. Senior decision 

makers may therefore assume that the combatant commands have 

adequately addressed contractor requirements in a plan, even though 

many plans do not contain Annex Ws or lack the expected details on the 

anticipated contractor support needed to execute the mission. As a result, 

they risk not fully understanding the extent to which they will be relying 

on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to 

provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor 

personnel. 

In discussions with combatant command officials responsible for 

developing operation plans, we found that detailed information on 

operational contract support requirements is generally not included in 

other sections or annexes of these plans. Although the Annex W is 

intended to be the focal point within an operation plan for discussing 

operational contract support, DOD guidance underscores the importance 

of addressing contractor requirements throughout an operation plan, 

including the base plan and other annexes as appropriate. However, we 

found that nonlogistics personnel tend to assume that the logistics 

community will address the need to incorporate operational contract 

support throughout operation plans. We also found the following: 

• Base plans generally lack information or assumptions on operational 

contract support, according to DOD planners. Base plans are important 

because most people reviewing an operation plan will look only at the 

base plan and, in some cases, annexes for which they are responsible. 

As a senior official responsible for logistics planning at one combatant 

command remarked, if something is not in the base plan, it might as 

well not be in the plan. If the base plan contains only limited 

information on the use and role of contractors, this will restrict the 

Page 5 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

level of information available to senior DOD leadership in assessing the 

potential risks associated with reliance on contractors. For example, 

combatant command officials told us that they were not aware of any 

assumptions specifically addressing the potential use or role of 

operational contract support in their base plans. Assumptions are used 

to focus attention of senior DOD leadership on factors that could 

present risks to mission success. 

• DOD has made limited progress in incorporating operational contract 

support information in nonlogistics annexes of operation plans, such as 

the intelligence annex and the communications annex, based on our 

discussions with officials responsible for writing these annexes. DOD 

guidance for these annexes directs planners to identify the means or 

capabilities necessary for meeting mission requirements. Although this 

guidance does not specifically mention contractors, contractors 

provide significant support in these areas. The failure to include 

contract support requirements in nonlogistics annexes makes it more 

difficult for combatant commanders to understand their total reliance 

on contractors to execute a mission. 

Without better integration of operational contract support throughout 

operation plans, it will be more difficult for combatant commanders to 

understand the extent to which their plans rely on contractors. 

DOD has launched two initiatives in response to congressional direction to 

improve its capability to ensure that the operational contract support 

requirements are addressed in its operation plans, but these initiatives are 

still being refined and their future is uncertain. First, each combatant 

command has been allocated joint operational contract support planners 

to assist the combatant command in drafting Annex Ws. However, the 

concept of the contract support planners has not yet been institutionalized 

in DOD’s operational contract support guidance. Additionally, funding and 

staffing issues remain, creating uncertainty regarding the long-term vision 

for the program. According to officials responsible for the contract 

support planners, the planners were expected to be provided by 

contractors through September 2009, at which time the services were to 

provide a mix of military and civilian personnel to serve as planners. 

However, DOD declined to provide funding for these positions in the fiscal 

year 2010 budget, believing that the combatant commands could provide 

the planners using existing personnel, but several combatant command 

officials told us that the combatant commands would be unlikely to 

dedicate their own resources to operational contract support planning. As 

a result, the planners continue to be contractors who are funded under 

supplemental appropriations. According to officials responsible for the 

contract support planners, DOD has funded the planners in the fiscal year 

Page 6 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

2011 budget. However, the budget does not provide additional resources 

to fund the contract support planners and they are working with the DOD 

Comptroller to find an alternative funding source. Second, DOD has 

created the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), among 

other things, to look across DOD’s operation plans to ensure that planning 

for the use of contractors in future contingencies is consistent throughout 

the combatant commands. However, guidance for this office, including its 

role in reviewing plans, is still being developed. We found that the lack of 

specific guidance has led to confusion regarding the JCASO’s role in the 

requirements definition process. In addition, according to JCASO officials, 

the JCASO concept calls for a staff of about 30 people, but as of December 

2009, the JCASO consisted of only 5 individuals. As a result of these 

staffing challenges, the JCASO has been limited in its ability to execute its 

responsibilities. 

We are making a number of recommendations aimed at better enabling 

senior DOD leadership to determine the department’s reliance on 

contractors to execute future operations by improving the ability of 

combatant command planners to effectively identify contract support 

requirements in Annex Ws and throughout their operation plans and 

ensuring that the department effectively institutionalizes its organizational 

approach to addressing operational contract support in its plans. In 

written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations and identified additional actions the department 

believes are needed to address our recommendations. We agree that these 

actions are important steps toward addressing our recommendations. The 

full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. 

An operation plan describes how DOD will respond to a potential event 

that might require the use of military force. It is a foundation for an 

operation order, which entails the execution of an operation plan by a 

combatant commander. An operation plan is used to deal with a wide 

range of events, such as terrorism, hostile foreign nations, and natural 

disasters. An operation plan consists of a base plan and annexes. The base 

plan describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment 

concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. Base plans 

are written following a five-paragraph structure—Situation, Mission, 

Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Control. 

Plans will include assumptions that are relevant to the development or 

successful execution of the plan and the concept of operation that the 

commander plans to use to accomplish the mission, including the forces 

involved, the phasing of operations, and the general nature and purpose of 

Background 

Page 7 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

operations to be conducted. In addition to the base plan, operation plans 

include annexes that provide further details on areas such as intelligence 

(Annex B), operations (Annex C), logistics (Annex D), personnel (Annex 

E), communications (Annex K), and operational contract support (Annex 

W). 

Operation plans are broken into four levels of detail, ranging from the least 

detailed, level 1, to the most detailed, level 4, as described below: 

• Level 1, the commander’s estimate, has the least amount of detail and is 

focused on developing the combatant commander’s course of action to 

meet a mission. 

• Level 2, the base plan, describes the concept of operations, major 

forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing 

the mission. 

• Level 3, the concept plan, is an operation plan in an abbreviated format 

that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into 

a full operation plan or order. It includes a base plan and some 

annexes, such as those for intelligence (Annex B), logistics (Annex D), 

and communications (Annex K). It can also include time-phased force 

and deployment data, which describe the military forces and 

transportation assets required by phase of operation. 

• Level 4, the fully prepared operation plan, contains the above details as 

well as any remaining annexes and time-phased force and deployment 

data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources 

required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their 

flow into the theater. It can be quickly converted into an operations 

order. 

DOD has an established a joint operation planning process to develop 

plans in response to contingencies and crises, including the contingency 

planning process for developing and reviewing operation plans. The 

department uses contingency planning to develop its operation plans, and 

Joint Publication 5-0 is DOD’s keystone guidance for joint operation 

planning.10 The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals 

provide more detailed guidance on the format of plans, including 

templates for the base plan and annexes.11 Contingency planning begins 

 

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006). 

11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures (Sept. 29, 2006) 

and CJCSM 3122.03C. 

Page 8 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

with broad strategic guidance provided by the President of the United 

States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. This strategic guidance includes DOD documents, such as the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Guidance for the Employment of the 

Force, which tell combatant commanders what to plan for within their 

areas of responsibility. Combatant commanders can also initiate 

contingency planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but 

considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities. Based on the 

strategic guidance, combatant command planners write an operation plan. 

During this stage, a combatant commander can also task and provide 

guidance to the component commands to develop supporting plans for an 

operation plan. As a plan is developed, DOD guidance calls for frequent 

dialogue between planners and senior DOD leadership to ensure that 

results are sufficient and feasible to meet mission objectives. DOD 

guidance also identifies three distinct areas for in-progress reviews with 

the Secretary of Defense or other senior DOD leadership during plan 

development: (1) the commander’s mission analysis of strategic guidance, 

(2) the commander’s concept of operations for the mission, and (3) the 

combatant command’s operation plan.12 The Joint Planning and Execution 

Community, which is made up of a broad range of military leadership and 

DOD agencies, reviews all level 3 and level 4 plans prior to the final inprogress reviews and when requested to do so by a combatant 

commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development, the J-7, works with the combatant 

command to determine when an in-progress review of a plan will take 

place. Based on a plan’s priority, the Secretary of Defense may delegate 

plan approval authority to other DOD senior leadership. Plans that do not 

require in-progress reviews can be approved by the combatant 

commanders. After a plan is approved, it is supposed to go through 

periodic reviews that are initiated by the Joint Staff J-7, which maintains 

the department’s plan review schedule. For top-priority plans, guidance 

calls for reviews every 9 months; other plans are to be reviewed every 12 

months. When DOD decides to execute a plan, the combatant commander 

issues an operation order that has been sent to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff for approval by the Secretary of Defense or the President. 

The joint operation planning activities, functions, and products are 

illustrated in figure 1. 

 

12 A fourth in-progress review is held within a year of a plan’s review and approval. At this 

time, the plan will be refined, adapted, terminated, or executed. 

Page 9 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

Figure 1: Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products 

Planning

functions

Strategic

guidance

Concept

development

Plan

development

Plan assessment

(refine, adapt, terminate,

execute)

Products

Alert

order

Planning

order

Warning

order

Approved

mission

Approved

plan

Approved

concept

IPR IPR IPR

Operation

order

Six month review cycle

Deployment

order

Execute

order

Concept plan 

Operation plan 

Base plan 

Source: Joint Publication 5-0.

Legend: IPR = in-progress review. 

Page 10 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

DOD Has Made 

Limited Progress in 

Developing 

Operational Contract 

Support Annexes and 

Faces Challenges 

Identifying Detailed 

Contractor 

Requirements in 

These Annexes 

Few Approved Operation 

Plans Include an 

Operational Contract 

Support Annex 

Although the requirement for the Annex W—the operational contract 

support annex—has been in DOD’s guidance since early 2006, we found 

that few of the operation plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or 

his designee as of February 2010 included an Annex W. Starting in 

September 2007, each of the six geographic combatant commands has 

been allocated joint operational contract support planners (hereafter 

referred to as contract support planners) to assist them in drafting these 

annexes. These contract support planners have been reviewing existing 

operation plans to determine the extent to which they address operational 

contract support. Based on their review, the planners have identified 89 

plans—varying from level 1 to level 4 plans—that may require an Annex W. 

Specifically, the contract support planners found 

• two level 4 operation plans that require Annex Ws in accordance with 

joint guidance; 

• in some cases, combatant command officials determined that certain 

level 2 and 3 operation plans should also have Annex Ws; 

• in other cases, combatant command officials determined that 

operational contract support issues should be addressed in the logistics 

annexes (Annex D) of less-detailed plans rather than developing standalone Annex Ws; and 

• two Annex Ws were developed and approved prior to the arrival of the 

contract support planners, but were later determined insufficient to 

meet the requirements for the Annex W. 

According to combatant command planners, four operation plans with 

Annex Ws have been approved by the Secretary of Defense or his 

Page 11 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

designee, although the contract support planners determined two of these 

annexes were insufficient. In addition, the contract support planners have 

drafted Annex Ws for 30 of these plans to date. Planning officials at the 

combatant commands told us that several plans with draft Annex Ws are 

currently in the plan review process and are expected to be approved over 

the next year. Table 1 summarizes the development of Annex Ws by 

combatant commands as of February 2010. 

Table 1: Status of Annex W Development and Approval by Combatant Commands as of February 2010 

Combatant command 

Number of Annex Ws 

drafted by contract 

support planners

Number of Annex Ws 

currently in the plan 

review process 

Number of Annex Ws in plans 

approved by the Secretary of 

Defense or his designee

U.S. Africa Command 6 5 0

U.S. Central Command 6 1 2a

U.S. European Command 8 5 2

U.S. Northern Command 4 2 0

U.S. Pacific Command 2 1 0

U.S. Southern Command 4 1 0

Source: GAO analysis of information from geographic combatant commands. 

a

Contract support planners at U.S. Central Command told us that two Annex Ws had been completed 

prior to their arrival, but they subsequently determined that these annexes were not sufficient. The 

officials told us that these annexes will be revised when the plans are updated in fiscal year 2010. 

Most Annex Ws Developed 

to Date Lack Specific 

Information on Contract 

Support Requirements 

Although contract support planners have been working to develop Annex 

Ws, we found that those annexes provide little insight into the extent to 

which DOD will need to rely on contractors to support contingency 

operations. According to combatant command planning officials, most of 

the draft Annex Ws restate broad language from existing operational 

contract support guidance. Similarly, we reviewed two draft Annex Ws at 

U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command and found that they 

consisted largely of language drawn from DOD’s high-level guidance on 

operational contract support: Joint Publication 4-10, DOD’s doctrine for 

planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support in joint 

operations, and DOD Instruction 3020.41, the source of DOD’s policy and 

procedures concerning operational contract support.13

 

13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (Oct. 17, 

2008), and DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the 

U.S. Armed Forces (Oct. 3, 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

Although this reference to guidance is an improvement over how 

contractors were previously addressed in the contingency planning 

process, DOD’s planning guidance includes an Annex W template that 

requires the annex to include a list of contracts likely to be used in theater 

and the capabilities they would provide. Moreover, Joint Publication 4-10 

states that in developing Annex Ws, planners should identify military 

capability shortfalls that require contract solutions and ensure that 

combatant commanders are aware of the general scope and scale of 

contracted support to be utilized for an operation. We reviewed seven 

draft Annex Ws at various combatant commands and found that the 

annexes contained general information on what should be done in 

contingency operations, such as considering the use of external support 

contracts for logistics and selected nonlogistics support. However, those 

Annex Ws did not generally identify specific steps to be taken to 

determine when to use such contracts or who is responsible for making 

those determinations. We found that six of the seven Annex Ws we 

reviewed lacked details on contract support requirements, such as the 

number and type of contractors that would be needed to execute any 

given plan. For example: 

• One combatant command had a level 3 plan that provided details on 

the military forces expected to be used to support various aspects of 

the operation. However, the draft Annex W for this plan consisted 

largely of information from other DOD guidance and did not clearly 

spell out expected contract support for the operation or define specific 

contractor-related responsibilities. 

• The draft Annex W for a level 4 plan with time-phased force and 

deployment data at another combatant command also consisted largely 

of references to existing guidance and lacked specific information on 

contract support needed to execute the mission.14 Planners 

acknowledged that while the plan provides details regarding military 

forces, they have not developed the same level of detail regarding 

contractors. 

With regard to the broader set of draft Annex Ws, including but not limited 

to the annexes we were able to review, several planners told us that there 

is not much variance across the annexes they have developed or reviewed 

to date. Moreover, several combatant command officials stated that for 

almost all of their plans, the level of detail on operational contract support 

 

14 The time-phased force and deployment data describes force requirements, how and when 

those forces are to be deployed, and the transportation assets needed to deploy them. 

Page 13 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

contained in an Annex W would not enable a combatant commander to 

identify for senior DOD leadership the extent to which an operation relied 

on contractors. As our previous work has shown, DOD’s lack of 

understanding of its reliance on contractors can hinder its ability to 

effectively manage and oversee contractors, raising the risks of fraud, 

waste, and abuse and potentially resulting in negative impacts on military 

operations and unit morale.15

In contrast, a few draft Annex Ws contain a detailed discussion of contract 

support. For example, we reviewed a detailed Annex W that U.S. Southern 

Command had developed for one operation plan that lays out expected 

contractor support by phase of operation and identifies several existing 

contracts that could be used to support the operation. According to 

officials at U.S. Southern Command, this detailed Annex W is useful to 

them because it helps them identify existing capabilities and shortfalls and 

to consider where contracts should be augmented or added. In addition, 

U.S. Central Command officials told us that they were identifying more 

detailed contract support requirements in the draft Annex W of one of 

their operation plans. 

Limited Information 

Hinders DOD’s Ability to 

Include Details on 

Contract Support 

Requirements in Annex Ws 

Combatant command planners told us that they are unable to identify 

specific contract support requirements as called for in Annex W guidance 

because of the limited amount of information contained in most operation 

plans. In order to identify the details on contracted services and 

capabilities needed to support an operation, planners need to know the 

size and capabilities of the military force involved and how the plan 

envisions that force being employed. For example, in order to make 

reasonable judgments on the contractor support required for base 

operating support (e.g., food and housing), planners told us that they 

would need to know the number of personnel to be supported and the 

base operating support capabilities the military force would provide. 

Engineers at U.S. Southern Command told us that the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers has developed standards for housing, latrines, dining facilities, 

 

15 GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other Actions 

Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future 

Operations, GAO-08-436T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2008); Military Operations: HighLevel DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and 

Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 18, 2006); and Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed 

Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 24, 2003).

Page 14 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

and other structures used to construct a base camp, and they look at the 

force structure and units coming in to build the support structure. 

Similarly, planning officials at U.S. European Command told us that if a 

plan has force packages in it, they would identify what will be provided by 

the military and what will be provided by contractors for things such as 

housing, food services, and other support. 

However, most operation plans address broad missions but do not contain 

details on specific courses of action or identify the specific military forces 

required to meet the mission. For example, combatant commands have 

plans to evacuate U.S. citizens or provide humanitarian assistance, but 

these plans do not provide details on the size of the mission, such as the 

number of people to be evacuated or assisted. Additionally, operation 

plans lay out key tasks for accomplishing the mission, but these tasks may 

also lack specific details needed to identify potential contract support 

requirements. For example, a key task in one operation plan could be to 

provide precision strike capability within 72 hours. Combatant command 

officials noted that this is a description of a capability rather than a 

specific description of the number or type of units required. Therefore, a 

response to this task could involve 2 aircraft or 100 aircraft. Planners told 

us that the lack of information on military forces and the capabilities they 

bring makes it difficult for them to identify specific contract support 

requirements as called for in Annex W guidance. 

There are a few operation plans that contained sufficient details on the 

scale of effort involved and the size and capabilities of the military force to 

enable contract support planners to develop more detailed Annex Ws that 

identify capabilities that could reasonably be expected to be provided by 

contractors. For example, we reviewed one operation plan at U.S. 

Southern Command that contains significant details regarding the size of 

the military operation and the capabilities needed to execute the plan. As a 

result, as discussed earlier, planners were able to develop a more detailed 

Annex W that describes expected contractor support by phase of 

operation and identifies existing contracts that could be used to support 

the operation. The annex also outlines the staffing for a Joint Theater 

Support Contracting Command to support theater contracting efforts. 

However, this is a plan for a highly defined operation of limited scope, 

which enabled planners to more readily develop a detailed Annex W that 

identifies specific contract support requirements. Similarly, U.S. Central 

Command officials told us that they were making progress in identifying 

contractor support in one of the command’s operation plans. Contract 

support planners said that the plan identifies the military forces coming in 

to execute the operation, which helps them identify gaps in needed 

Page 15 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

capabilities that contractors could potentially fill. However, we found 

other cases where combatant commands had developed detailed 

operation plans, including time-phased force and deployment data, but 

lacked specific contract support information in their draft Annex Ws. For 

example, the draft Annex W we reviewed for one combatant command’s 

level 4 plan with time-phased force and deployment data lacked details on 

the expected contractor support requirements needed to execute the 

mission. Similarly, we found that one combatant command has developed 

an operation plan for an ongoing operation. However, while considerable 

information is known about the mission, time frames, and force structure, 

the plan’s Annex W focuses on contracting policies and lacks specific 

information on contract support requirements needed to facilitate the 

operation. 

In addition, several combatant command planning officials told us that 

they expected to draw on contract support requirements identified in the 

component commands’ supporting plans to develop Annex Ws.16

Disagreements exist regarding the level of detail on contract support that 

should be included at the combatant command versus the component 

command level. For example, U.S. Pacific Command planners told us that 

they view the Annex W as providing a broad discussion of contract 

support and that detailed information on contract support requirements 

would be found at the component level. Conversely, senior DOD officials 

told us to expect to see specific information on contractor support 

requirements in the combatant command Annex Ws. Joint Publication 4-10 

states that the service components must ensure that operational contract 

support requirements are identified and incorporated into operation plans. 

However, we found that few service components had developed 

supporting plans that provide detailed information on contract support 

requirements. We identified several factors that hinder the ability of 

service components to identify contract support requirements in the 

Annex Ws of their supporting plans. For example: 

• Combatant commands were still developing their Annex Ws for most 

operation plans and had not yet shared them with their components. In 

some cases, service components were in the process of developing 

inputs that could be used to identify contractor support requirements 

in their supporting plans. 

 

16 According to Joint Publication 5-0, service components prepare supporting plans for 

operation plans when tasked to do so by the combatant commander. 

Page 16 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

• Annex W guidance does not identify how information at the service 

component level should be integrated into the Annex W or how to 

balance the levels of detail between a combatant command’s and a 

service component’s plans. 

Several combatant command planners told us that as a result of limited 

information from the component commands, they were unable to provide 

details in their combatant command plans on the specific roles of 

contractors. 

Shortcomings in Guidance 

Complicate DOD’s Efforts 

to Consistently Address 

Contract Support 

Requirements in Annex Ws 

across the Department 

Shortcomings in guidance on how and when to develop Annex Ws have 

also complicated the ability of contract support planners to consistently 

address contract support requirements across DOD. According to planning 

officials, the current Annex W template was created with DOD’s most 

detailed plans in mind—level 4 plans or level 3 plans with time-phased 

force and deployment data. However, less than 10 percent of the 

combatant commands’ operation plans are at this level of detail. We found 

that the one-size-fits-all approach of the Annex W template makes it 

difficult for contract support planners to meet the current Annex W 

requirements for operation plans that are less detailed. This one-size-fitsall approach also contributes to a mismatch in expectations between 

senior DOD leadership and combatant command planners regarding the 

degree to which the Annex W should contain specific information on 

contract support requirements. We found that several senior DOD officials 

have the expectation that most combatant command plans should at least 

identify the capabilities that contractors may provide, regardless of the 

level of plan. For example: 

• Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program 

Support) (ADUSD(PS)) officials told us that the Annex W should 

provide details on the numbers and roles of contractors required to 

support an operation. 

• Other senior DOD officials involved in reviewing plans for contract 

support requirements told us that they expected that planners could 

figure out the major force elements needed under a plan and then 

determine the contractor support required. 

However, the contract support planners and other officials responsible for 

developing the Annex Ws disagreed, stating that given the limited amount 

of information on military forces in most operation plans, the expected 

level of detail was difficult if not impossible to achieve. Senior DOD 

officials acknowledged these challenges but continue to believe that 

regardless of the level of detail of a plan, there should be some level of 

Page 17 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

discussion on what capabilities contractors might reasonably be expected 

to provide during an operation. Moreover, DOD has acknowledged that the 

department is highly likely to continue to rely on contractors to provide 

base operating support, maintenance for certain pieces of equipment, and 

communications support, underscoring the importance of a more detailed 

discussion of contract support in all of the department’s plans. 

ADUSD(PS) and Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) officials told us that as part of 

the ongoing revision of the Annex W template, they are considering 

including additional information in the guidance to determine the amount 

of information required based on the level of detail of the plan. In addition, 

Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) has created a task force to examine ways to 

improve operational contract support planning. According to officials 

responsible for this effort, the Annex W template is a good start, but 

additional tools and guidance are needed to ensure that contract support 

planners have the information they need to meet the requirements 

established in the template. For example, officials noted that planning 

factors might be developed to assist planners with estimating the number 

of contractor personnel needed to provide base support in a contingency. 

Until such actions are taken, senior DOD officials may continue to assume 

that contractor requirements are adequately addressed in a plan even 

though most Annex Ws lack this level of detail. 

Further, DOD’s planning guidance leaves it to the combatant commanders 

to determine if certain annexes are required for their operation plans, 

including the Annex W.17 However, there is no specific guidance to guide 

the combatant commanders in determining which plans should include an 

Annex W. As a result, we found that some combatant commanders took a 

more expansive view than others regarding which plans require the annex. 

For example: 

• U.S. European Command officials decided to develop Annex Ws for as 

many plans as they could. 

• U.S. Pacific Command officials are developing Annex Ws only for their 

level 4 operation plans. 

• U.S. Central Command officials are developing Annex Ws for their 

operation plans on a case-by-case basis for their levels 2 and 3 plans. 

 

17 As discussed in the Background section, the most detailed operation plans, level 4 plans, 

are required to have all annexes, including the Annex W. For all other plans, DOD’s 

planning guidance leaves it to the combatant commander to determine if a plan should 

include an Annex W. 

Page 18 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

In addition, DOD’s guidance on Annex Ws and operational contract 

support continues to evolve, resulting in inconsistencies in how contract 

support requirements are addressed in Annex Ws, depending on when an 

annex was written. Officials from ADUSD(PS) and the Joint Staff J4 

(Logistics) have been working with the contract support planners over the 

past 2 years to develop a more detailed Annex W template that provides 

more specific guidance for planners developing these annexes. The 

current Annex W template requires planners to detail the contracted 

services and capabilities desired in theater, including a list of contracts 

likely to be used in theater, but it provides no additional guidance on how 

this information should be captured in the annex. The draft guidance, on 

the other hand, requires planners, among other things, to outline how 

contracting will support the operation, address how various contracts are 

integrated into each phase of the operation, and address the contract 

management command and control structure. However, DOD leadership 

has not yet finalized the revisions, which are expected to be completed 

sometime in fiscal year 2010, and therefore the current template remains 

in effect. Contract support planners told us that they are using both the 

existing template as well as different versions of the revised template 

based on when an Annex W was being written. As a result, we found that 

combatant command plans vary in how they present information on the 

potential use of contractors in executing those plans. For example, in 

describing two Annex Ws that they had prepared, planning officials at U.S. 

Pacific Command told us that many changes were made to the template 

after they drafted their first annex. As a result, their second Annex W was 

substantially different from the first and increased from about 7 to about 

26 pages. In addition, contract support planners at U.S. Central Command 

told us that they considered the Annex Ws that were developed prior to 

their arrival to be insufficient in providing information on operational 

contract support. In DOD’s July 2009 Strategic Management Plan, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense identified developing adequate Annex W 

guidance as a key initiative to ensure effective logistics support for current 

major contingency operations.18 Until the department finalizes the Annex 

W template, these varying formats for developing Annex Ws will continue 

to complicate efforts to ensure that operational contract support is being 

addressed consistently across the combatant commands. This will make it 

difficult for senior DOD leadership to acquire an overall view of the extent 

to which successful execution of DOD’s plans rely on contractors, which 

 

18 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Strategic Management Plan 

(July 31, 2009). 

Page 19 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

could also limit the department’s ability to provide congressional decision 

makers with information on DOD’s reliance on contractors to support 

future operations. 

As with the one-size-fits-all approach to Annex Ws discussed above, a lack 

of specific guidance regarding which plans require an Annex W has 

resulted in a mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership 

and combatant command planners regarding the level of detail the Annex 

W will contain. In most cases, we found that Annex Ws did not contain the 

level of detail expected by senior DOD leadership and envisioned in 

current guidance, limiting the utility of the Annex W as a planning tool to 

assess and address contract support requirements. Senior decision makers 

may assume that the combatant commands have adequately addressed 

contractor requirements in a plan, even though many plans do not contain 

Annex Ws or lack the expected details on the anticipated contractor 

support needed to execute the mission. As a result, they risk not fully 

understanding the extent to which they will be relying on contractors to 

support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary 

management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. 

Detailed Information 

on Operational 

Contract Support 

Generally Not 

Included in Other 

Sections or Annexes 

of Operation Plans 

Nonlogistics Personnel 

Tend to Assume That 

Operational Contract 

Support Planning Will Be 

Addressed by the Logistics 

Community 

We found that nonlogistics personnel tend to assume that the logistics 

community will address the need to incorporate operational contract 

support throughout operation plans. Although the Annex W is intended to 

be the focal point within an operation plan for discussion of operational 

contract support, DOD guidance underscores the importance of 

addressing contractor requirements throughout an operation plan, 

including the base plan and other annexes as appropriate. The 

department’s primary guidance for joint operation planning, Joint 

Publication 5-0, states that for any operation in which significant reliance 

Page 20 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

on contract support is anticipated, commanders must ensure that requisite 

planning is completed. This includes complying with other DOD 

operational contract support guidance, such as requirements to ensure 

continuation of essential contractor services and to identify specific 

contractor policies and requirements in the operation plan, such as 

contractor-related deployment and accountability reporting, force 

protection, and medical support. In addition, Joint Publication 5-0 includes 

specific references to contract support. For example, in determining 

personnel requirements for supporting a mission, planners are expected to 

identify and address known or anticipated factors that may influence 

potential courses of action, including the anticipated use of civilian, 

contract support, or host nation personnel. The guidance also states that 

the administration and logistics section of the base plan should address 

contract support. Other DOD guidance also addresses the importance of 

incorporating operational contract support throughout the combatant 

commands’ operation plans. For example, Joint Publication 4-10 states 

that planning for contractor personnel integration should be addressed in 

either a contractor management plan appendix or in appropriate sections 

of operation plans. Similarly, Joint Publication 3-33 identifies contractorrelated considerations, such as medical, legal, and personnel 

considerations, for personnel outside of the logistics community.19

Although the guidance above discusses the importance of incorporating 

contract support throughout an operation plan, it is generally at a high 

level and does not provide direction on how to incorporate contractors 

into specific segments of plans. 

In our discussions with planning officials outside of the logistics 

community within the Joint Staff and at the combatant commands, we 

found a tendency to assume that contractor-related matters will be 

managed by logistics personnel. For example, officials responsible for the 

overall plan writing process at one combatant command did not see much 

value in placing contractor-related information in operation plans because 

they believed contractor issues would be addressed by the logistics 

community once a plan is being executed. However, DOD has 

acknowledged that inadequate planning for contractors for Iraq 

contributed to the significant challenges the department has encountered 

there. In addition, our review of the operation order for the drawdown of 

 

19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Feb. 16, 

2007). 

Page 21 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

U.S. forces in Iraq found that planners failed to identify the contract 

support required to facilitate drawdown. 

According to ADUSD(PS) and Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) officials, the Annex 

W contains the overarching operational contract support plan, but 

contract support requirements should be discussed throughout the plan. 

As Joint Publication 4-10 states, planners often develop a mind-set that 

contracting is inherently a combat service support function. However, 

contract support for military operations not only includes logistics, but 

also may include combat support functions such as engineering, 

intelligence, and signal/communications. Similarly, several combatant 

command logistics officials voiced the opinion that given the department’s 

extensive reliance on contractors to provide a broad range of both 

logistics and nonlogistics services, it is important that operational contract 

support considerations be discussed both within and outside of the 

logistics community. ADUSD(PS) officials stated that taking the 

discussion of operational contract support beyond the logistics 

community will require a fundamental cultural change for DOD. They 

added that the department’s ongoing efforts to reform how it approaches 

operational contract support are, for the logistics community, as complex 

as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms were for training and other areas.20 As 

we have previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have 

identified regarding the oversight and management of contractor support 

to deployed forces stem from DOD’s reluctance to plan for contractors as 

an integral part of the total force.21

Base Plans Generally Lack 

Information on 

Operational Contract 

Support 

In discussions with combatant command officials responsible for 

developing operation plans, we found that base plans generally lack 

information on operational contract support, limiting DOD’s ability to 

identify contract support requirements for future operations. The base 

plan establishes the combatant commander’s concept for how an 

operation will be executed and includes essential tasks to be 

accomplished, assumptions, major forces, and a discussion of the 

operation by phase. The base plan also serves as the foundation for 

 

20 The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was, in part, to reorganize DOD into a 

more unified military structure. Within that act, Congress included several provisions that 

specifically address the education of officers in joint matters, their assignment to joint 

organizations, and the promotion of officers serving in joint positions. 

21 GAO-08-436T. 

Page 22 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

developing the annexes of an operation plan. According to several 

combatant command planning officials, base plans are important because 

most people reviewing an operation plan will look only at the base plan 

and, in some cases, annexes for which they are responsible. If the 

discussion of operational contract support is limited to the Annex W, 

awareness of contractor-related issues will be limited to those individuals 

who develop or review the annex. As a result, officials responsible for 

operational contract support planning told us that it is important that the 

base plan address the use and role of contractors. As a senior official 

responsible for logistics planning at one combatant command remarked, if 

something is not in the base plan, it might as well not be in the plan. 

According to officials responsible for developing operation plans at the 

combatant commands, the base plans for their operation plans lack 

assumptions regarding the potential use or role of contractors. Joint 

Publication 5-0 states that plans are derived from the best available 

information and rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances 

that will exist when a crisis arises. Assumptions are intrinsically important 

factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based. They provide 

suppositions about the current situation or future course of events, 

assumed to be true in the absence of facts, and are necessary to enable the 

commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select the course 

of action. Base plan assumptions are important because they are signed off 

on by the combatant commander and are reviewed by the Secretary of 

Defense. As a result, assumptions are used to focus attention of senior 

DOD leadership on factors that could present risks to mission success. 

DOD acknowledges that contractors will likely play a significant role in 

support of future operations and has long recognized the risks inherent in 

its use of and reliance on contractors. However, combatant command 

officials responsible for writing operation plans told us that they were not 

aware of any assumptions specifically addressing the potential use or role 

of operational contract support in their base plans. Moreover, of the three 

base plans we were able to review, we found that there were base plan 

assumptions regarding critical factors such as sustainment and support of 

military forces. For example, one plan assumed sufficient strategic lift 

assets would be available to execute the mission. Another base plan 

contained assumptions regarding the availability of host nation or 

interagency support. However, none of the base plans we reviewed 

addressed contractor support requirements in their assumptions. Some 

combatant command officials noted that DOD’s planning guidance for 

base plans does not specify the need to develop assumptions on the 

potential need for contract support. According to these officials, modifying 

Page 23 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

this guidance to address the need to include such assumptions would be 

helpful in developing contractor-related assumptions in base plans. 

Despite this lack of guidance, planning officials at some combatant 

commands acknowledged the value in having such assumptions and told 

us that they were considering adding contractor-related assumptions to 

some of their base plans. For example: 

• A senior official at U.S. Southern Command endorsed the idea of 

including contractor-related assumptions in base plans and stated that 

the command would take steps to do this. 

• Planning officials at U.S. Pacific Command told us that they were 

considering adding a contractor-related assumption to the base plan of 

one of their level 4 plans. 

• U.S. Central Command contract support planners saw value in 

including operational contract support assumptions in their base plans. 

Moreover, the command included a contractor-related assumption in 

its Iraq drawdown plan. 

In discussions with combatant command planning officials, we also found 

there is a lack of details on operational contract support in other parts of 

most base plans, although a few plans did contain such details. For 

example, planners at one combatant command told us that base plan 

references to operational contract support were mostly limited to 

designating component command responsibilities for command and 

control of contracting efforts. Similarly, officials at another combatant 

command told us that the extent to which operational contract support is 

discussed in base plans sometimes does not go beyond the word 

“contracting” in the section describing logistics and administration 

responsibilities. In addition, we found a similar lack of contractor-related 

details in the base plan section that describes the friendly forces that the 

commander anticipates relying on to execute the operation. DOD has long 

considered contractors part of the total force and recognized the 

importance of planning for contractors to the same level of detail it plans 

for military forces. However, the friendly forces sections of the three base 

plans we were able to review did not mention contractors, even though 

some of these plans did include other non-U.S. military sources of support, 

such as nongovernmental organizations. 

As discussed above, the base plan establishes the combatant commander’s 

concept for how an operation will be executed and serves as the 

foundation for developing the rest of the operation plan. As a result, if the 

base plan contains only limited information on the use and role of 

contractors, this will restrict the level of information available to senior 

DOD leadership in assessing the potential risks associated with reliance on 

Page 24 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

contractors. Senior DOD officials, including the Secretary of Defense, have 

acknowledged that the department has not thought holistically or 

coherently about its use of contractors in combat areas such as Iraq and 

that the failure to anticipate or plan for the heavy reliance on contractors 

has led to oversight and management challenges. Officials at some 

combatant commands recognized the potential value in having more 

information on contractors in their base plans. For example, U.S. Southern 

Command officials told us that they have included a discussion of 

contractor support in the concept of operations sections of three of their 

base plans, and we found that contract support information had been 

integrated throughout one of the base plans we reviewed. Planning 

officials at several other combatant commands were also open to 

expanding the discussion of operational contract support in their base 

plans. 

Limited or No Discussion 

of Operational Contract 

Support in Nonlogistics 

Annexes 

We found that DOD has made limited progress in incorporating 

operational contract support into annexes that cover nonlogistics areas, 

based on our discussions with officials responsible for writing these 

annexes. Our previous work has described how DOD’s reliance on 

contractors has moved beyond traditional logistics areas.22 Similarly, DOD 

reported that as of September 2009, over 30 percent of contractor 

personnel in Iraq were performing nonlogistics functions, such as linguist 

support and security. This broader use of contractors is reflected in DOD 

guidance, such as Joint Publication 4-10, which highlights key contract 

management planning considerations, noting that these considerations 

cross all lines of responsibility of combatant command directorates. For 

example: 

• The J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) and J-3 (Operations) directorates 

are responsible for publishing operation-specific security screening and 

badge issuance policies and procedures. 

• The J-2 (Intelligence) directorate is responsible for assisting other 

directorates in areas such as vetting and badging procedures and force 

protection and security plans. 

• The J-3 (Operations) directorate is responsible for ensuring that 

contractor personnel who require access to military facilities are 

incorporated into force protection and security plans. 

 

22 GAO-09-362T. 

Page 25 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

• The J-5 (Plans) directorate is responsible for taking steps to mitigate 

the risks associated with contractor support. 

• The J-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems) 

directorate is responsible for assisting the J-3 (Operations) directorate 

in developing workable and reliable information-sharing and 

communication mechanisms. 

In addition, although DOD’s planning guidance establishes Annex W as the 

focal point for operational contract support within an operation plan, this 

guidance requires other directorates to identify in their annexes the 

capabilities required to perform the mission described in the plan. For 

example, guidance for preparing the intelligence and communications 

annexes directs planners to identify the means or capabilities necessary 

for meeting mission requirements. Although this guidance does not 

specifically mention contractors, contractors provide significant 

capabilities in these areas in current operations. However, several 

planning officials responsible for the intelligence and communications 

annexes told us that they did not identify contract support requirements in 

their annexes. For example: 

• Officials responsible for the intelligence annexes at several combatant 

commands told us that they assume contractors will be used but do not 

identify them in the annex. At one combatant command, intelligence 

planning officials noted they had not received any training to direct 

them to include contractor-related issues or requirements in their 

annexes, adding they thought such training would be useful. 

• One official responsible for writing communications annexes told us 

that because he already knew which contractors would be needed for 

the early phases of the operation, he did not include them in the annex. 

He acknowledged that additional operational contract support may be 

required in later phases of an operation, but that this was also not 

included in the annex. Similarly, officials responsible for developing 

the communications annexes at another combatant command told us 

that they did not include contract support requirements in their 

annexes and were not aware of any guidance requiring them to identify 

the use and role of operational contract support in their annexes. 

According to Joint Publication 4-10, a key contract management area of 

concern is whether the combatant commanders and their staffs are aware 

of the general scope and scale of contracted support to be utilized for the 

operation. Although J4 (Logistics) is the lead directorate responsible for 

assembling this information, the other directorates are required to assist it. 

In our discussions with combatant command logistics planners, they 

stressed that this information should be in all appropriate annexes, not 

just the Annex W. As a result, the lack of information on contract support 

Page 26 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

requirements in nonlogistics annexes could hinder the ability of combatant 

commanders to understand the extent to which their plans rely on 

contractors. 

The Future of DOD’s 

Initiatives to Improve 

Identification of 

Operational Contract 

Support Requirements 

Is Uncertain Because 

of Guidance and 

Funding Challenges 

DOD Has Launched Two 

Initiatives to Address 

Contract Support 

Requirements in Its 

Operation Plans 

In response to congressional direction, DOD has launched two initiatives 

to improve its capability to ensure that operational contract support 

requirements are addressed in its operation plans, but these initiatives are 

still being refined and funding and guidance challenges remain. In 2006, 

Congress mandated that DOD, among other things, develop joint policies 

to provide for an organizational approach to operational contract support 

requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, 

postconflict operations, and contingency operations.23 Congress defined 

requirements definition as the process of translating policy objectives and 

mission needs into specific requirements, the description of which will be 

the basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be 

accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered. 

As we reported in 2008, DOD’s organizational approach to requirements 

definition and coordination is a two-step approach to identify contract 

 

23 Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854. 

Page 27 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

support requirements and integrate them into the combatant commands’ 

operation plans.24

• First, DOD has allocated joint operational contract support planners to 

each geographic combatant command as well as U.S. Special 

Operations Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command. These contract 

support planners are tasked with assisting the combatant command 

with identifying military capability shortfalls and the contract 

capabilities necessary to meet these shortfalls and defining these 

requirements in the combatant commander’s operation plans. 

• Second, DOD has established the JCASO, which will be responsible for, 

among other things, performing an independent review of the 

combatant commanders’ operation plans to ensure early identification 

and inclusion of contract requirements. This office will also lead the 

integration and synchronization of contract support in operation plans 

across combatant commands and U.S. government agencies. 

Joint Operational Contract 

Support Planners Face 

Challenges in Executing 

Their Responsibilities and 

Their Future Is Uncertain 

DOD has deployed contract support planners to the combatant commands, 

but a lack of institutionalization has created challenges in how the 

planners execute their responsibilities. As discussed above, there have 

been long-standing requirements to integrate contractor support into 

operation plans, including the development of Annex Ws. In determining 

how to meet these requirements, ADUSD(PS) and senior leadership at the 

combatant commands recognized that there was a significant shortfall in 

the combatant command planning processes regarding the contractorrelated portions of operation plans. As a result, ADUSD(PS) agreed to 

initially fund contract support planners to supplement the staffs of the 

combatant commands and give the commands the ability to ensure that 

operational contract support considerations are adequately factored into 

their plans. 

In an October 2007 memo, ADUSD(PS) defined the broad responsibilities 

of the planners to include 

• developing the contracting support plans and contractor integration 

plans that constitute the Annex W; 

• standardizing contract management business practices; 

 

24 GAO, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational Contract 

Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements, GAO-09-114R (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 20, 2008). 

Page 28 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

• ensuring that contracting requirement and capabilities are 

synchronized; 

• ensuring contracted unity of effort; and 

• avoiding contracting duplication and competition for limited resources. 

In addition to this memo, ADUSD(PS) has signed memorandums of 

understanding with the combatant commands to define the general roles 

and mission of the contract support planners. For example, the contract 

support planners (except for the planner at U.S. Joint Forces Command, 

who is primarily supporting training and exercises) are assigned 

responsibility for developing Annex Ws and assisting combatant 

commanders in identifying the requirements for contractor services. We 

found that the contract support planners’ roles had not yet been 

institutionalized in DOD’s higher-level operational contract support 

guidance. We reported in November 2008 that the contract support 

planners, as part of DOD’s organizational approach to requirements 

definition, had not been institutionalized in DOD joint policies.25 We also 

reported that DOD, the Joint Staff, and some combatant commands were 

unclear on who should be identifying and defining requirements for 

contractor support and what level of detail should be included in the 

combatant commanders’ plans. The department is in the process of 

revising joint policies to provide some additional direction on planning 

operational contract support. For example, the department is revising 

DOD Instruction 3020.41—DOD’s comprehensive policy document on the 

management of contractors supporting deployed U.S. forces—to include a 

requirement that military planners develop orchestrated, synchronized, 

detailed, and fully developed contractor support and contractor 

integration plans as components of feasible operation plans and operation 

orders. However, the roles and responsibilities of the contract support 

planners are not identified or described in the draft instruction. Similarly, 

the roles and responsibilities of the contract support planners are not 

discussed in Joint Publication 4-10. Several officials voiced concerns that 

until the contract support planners’ roles and responsibilities are 

institutionalized in DOD guidance, their ability to influence those outside 

of the logistics community will be limited, hindering their ability to 

effectively integrate operational contract support across operation plans. 

We found uncertainty in how the contract support planners program will 

be institutionalized with regard to funding and staffing. As stated above, 

the contract support planners were allocated to the combatant commands 

 

25 GAO-09-114R. 

Page 29 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

to address a significant shortfall in the commands’ ability to incorporate 

operational contract support into their planning processes. According to 

ADUSD(PS) officials, when the contract support planner concept was 

developed, the services were to provide a combination of military and 

civilian personnel to serve as the planners. It was anticipated that the 

services would be able to provide these individuals by 2010. In order to 

jump-start the process and get the planners in place earlier, ADUSD(PD) 

agreed to provide the combatant commands with contractors to provide 

an immediate planning capability. The planners came on contract in 

September 2007 and were originally expected to stay through September 

2009, at which time the services were expected to institutionalize the 

program by providing one military and one civilian billet to each 

combatant command to become part of the command’s staff. 

DOD’s April 2008 report to Congress stated that DOD’s budget guidance 

included the permanent resourcing of the contract support planners with 

the goal of filling these positions by military personnel as soon as 

possible.26 ADUSD(PS) officials told us that they requested funding for one 

military and one civilian planner at each combatant command in the fiscal 

year 2010 budget submission. However, senior DOD leadership declined to 

provide this funding during the budget review process within DOD. 

According to ADUSD(PS) officials, DOD leadership believed that the 

combatant commands could meet this requirement without additional 

resources. As a result, the expected transition from contractors to a mix of 

military and civilian personnel has been delayed. In the meantime, the 

contract support planners currently at the combatant commands continue 

to be contractors who are funded out of appropriations provided for 

overseas contingency operations. We have previously reported the risks in 

relying on supplemental appropriations to fund long-term capabilities.27

According to ADUSD(PS) officials, DOD has funded the contract support 

planners in the fiscal year 2011 budget. However, the budget does not 

provide additional resources to fund the contract support planners but 

requires the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics to pay for the program using existing funds. 

 

26 Department of Defense, Report to the Congress of the United States, Department of 

Defense Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting for Contractor Services and 

Contractor Personnel during Contingency Operations (April 2008). This report was issued 

by DOD in response to the congressional mandate in section 854(c) of the John Warner 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364. 

27 GAO, Supplemental Appropriations: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency 

and Provide Additional Controls, GAO-08-314 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2008). 

Page 30 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

According to the officials, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics lacks the funds to pay for this 

program, and the officials are working with the DOD Comptroller to find 

an alternative funding source. In addition, these funding uncertainties have 

also complicated the ability of the contract support planners to carry out 

their responsibilities. For example, although the contract support planner 

memorandums of understanding call for ADUSD(PS) to fund travel to the 

semiannual operational contract support conferences, a lack of funding 

led to delaying the second 2009 conference to 2010. 

Furthermore, we found concerns that changing who funds the contract 

support planners in the future may erode the department’s ability to retain 

a long-term organizational approach for requirements development. 

Currently, ADUSD(PS) provides the planners to the combatant commands 

to supplement their staffs. As described above, the expectation has been 

that the planners would become part of combatant command staff. 

However, several combatant command planners and officials responsible 

for the contract support planners told us that the combatant commands 

would be unlikely to dedicate their own resources to carry out the tasks 

currently being executed by these planners. For example, J4 (Logistics) 

officials from U.S. Pacific Command were concerned that if the funding 

for contract support planners was forced to come out of the combatant 

command budget, there was a danger that the planners would be 

redirected from the operational contract support focus to deal with other 

issues because of the manpower shortages the command faces. The 

officials added that unless the combatant command staff is expanded to 

add the planners, it is important that the planners retain their independent 

funding source so they can remain focused on contractor-related issues. 

The officials hoped ADUSD(PS) would continue to fund the planners 

through 2012. Nevertheless, officials at several combatant commands 

stated that the contract support planners provided valuable support and 

indicated that losing this planning capability would reduce the commands’ 

ability to ensure that operational contract support requirements are 

sufficiently incorporated into operation plans. According to ADUSD(PS) 

officials, the current plan is for the contract support planners to transition 

to military and civilian billets and become part of the JCASO while 

continuing to be under the operational control of the combatant 

commands as supplements to the commands’ staffs. This will enable the 

planners to retain their focus on operational contract support. 

Page 31 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

Uncertainty also exists regarding the roles and responsibilities of the 

JCASO—the second element of DOD’s organizational approach to 

requirements definition. The JCASO was established by the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness in a July 2008 

memo, among other things, to review the combatant commanders’ 

operation plans continually to ensure early identification of and inclusion 

of contractor requirements. The JCASO will also lead the integration and 

synchronization of contract support in operation plans across the 

combatant commands. JCASO officials told us the JCASO is expected to 

maintain situational awareness of all combatant command operation 

plans, work closely with the contract support planners as they conduct 

operational contract support planning, and collect lessons learned from 

contingency operations to identify improvements. The JCASO is also 

expected to play a role in exercises and ensuring that operational contract 

support-related issues are incorporated in those exercises. 

Uncertainty regarding the 

Roles and Responsibilities 

of the Joint Contingency 

Acquisition Support Office 

However the department has made little progress in finalizing JCASO 

guidance since we first reported on the JCASO’s planning roles in 

November 2008.28 Guidance for this office is still being developed, and 

existing guidance contains few details on the JCASO’s planning roles. For 

example: 

• The July 2008 memo establishing the JCASO did not discuss the 

organization’s planning responsibilities. 

• The JCASO is only briefly identified as a future organizational option in 

Joint Publication 4-10, which establishes DOD’s doctrine for planning, 

conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and 

contract management functions in support of joint operations. 

• The JCASO is not mentioned at all in DOD Instruction 3020.41, the 

source of DOD’s policy and procedures concerning operational 

contract support. 

• The planning responsibilities of the JCASO are only briefly mentioned 

in the draft concept of operations for operational contract support, one 

of the documents intended to explain how the department plans to 

implement the policies it is developing to meet congressional intent for 

an organization approach to requirements development. 

The lack of specific guidance regarding the JCASO’s roles and 

responsibilities has led to confusion regarding the JCASO’s role in 

requirements definition. We found significant confusion among the 

 

28 GAO-09-114R. 

Page 32 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

combatant command planners regarding what the JCASO was intended to 

do. For example: 

• U.S. European Command planning officials stated that it was not clear 

what the JCASO’s role would be, how it would fit into the broader plan 

development and review process, or how the contract support planners 

would interact with the JCASO. 

• U.S. Central Command logistics planners stated they do not have a 

good understanding of what the JCASO concept is. They were familiar 

with the draft concept of operations but remained unsure as to how the 

JCASO would work with or for the combatant command and were 

waiting to see how the concept evolves. 

• U.S. Northern Command planning officials were unclear as to what the 

JCASO’s roles would be and how the JCASO would support their 

efforts. The officials believed additional information was needed in the 

JCASO concept of operations to define how the JCASO would fit into 

the combatant command’s efforts. 

• U.S. Southern Command planners saw the JCASO more as a body to 

coordinate contract support-related policy and doctrinal changes, 

noting that the JCASO was still being developed and that more 

coordination with the planners would be helpful in defining the 

JCASO’s role in plan development and review. 

• U.S. Special Operations Command planners thought the JCASO could 

deploy in support of the geographic combatant commands but were 

unsure what support, if any, the JCASO could provide to U.S. Special 

Operations Command. 

JCASO officials acknowledged that they were still building processes to 

validate the JCASO concept. According to these officials, the contract 

support planners are their entrée to raise these questions in the planning 

process. Further, the draft concept of operations states that the JCASO 

and the contract support planners are key contributors to integrating 

operational contract support in exercises and plans. Although the draft 

concept of operations does not describe how the two should work 

together, it does indicate that the contract support planners are to become 

part of the JCASO. According to ADUSD(PS) and JCASO officials, aligning 

the contract support planners within the JCASO will enable contingency 

response and contract planning functions to be under one operational 

management staff and to share lessons learned. We found one case where 

the lack of management of the contract support planner program led to 

the failure to share best practices. Planners at U.S. Southern Command 

developed a detailed checklist for reviewing plans to track progress and 

ensure that each plan was reviewed in a consistent manner, but did not 

Page 33 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

share this checklist with contract support planners at the other combatant 

commands. 

In addition to challenges arising from the lack of detailed guidance, the 

JCASO has not been fully staffed, further limiting its ability to execute its 

responsibilities. The JCASO concept calls for a staff of about 30 people 

drawn from disciplines such as finance, law, and engineering as well as a 

liaison from the Defense Contract Management Agency. According to the 

memo establishing the JCASO, the office was to achieve an initial 

operational capability by fiscal year 2009. However, as of December 2009, 

the JCASO consisted of only 5 individuals, primarily contractors. 

According to ADUSD(PS) officials, DOD included funding for a 28-person 

JCASO as part of DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget that was submitted to 

Congress. DOD now has the funds in its approved budget, but the JCASO 

is not expected to be fully staffed until late 2010. 

As a result of these staffing challenges, the JCASO has been limited in its 

ability to carry out the broad responsibilities described above. We found 

that the JCASO’s interactions with the combatant commands thus far have 

not dealt with the JCASO’s role in reviewing and assessing the discussion 

of operational contract support in operation plans. Rather, the focus of the 

JCASO has been on integrating itself into combatant command exercises 

in order to demonstrate and refine the JCASO concept. According to 

ADUSD(PS), a U.S. European Command exercise in 2008 was used to 

conduct a pilot implementation of the JCASO concept, with additional 

JCASO participation in U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific 

Command exercises in 2009. Similarly, JCASO officials stated that these 

exercises have been helpful in developing a better concept for the JCASO’s 

potential role in providing or supporting contingency contract 

management during an operation. However, JCASO and ADUSD(PS) 

officials acknowledged that the JCASO has not yet reviewed any operation 

plans. 

While DOD has recognized its reliance on contractors to support 

operations both now and in the future, the department continues to face 

challenges in integrating the potential use and role of contractors into its 

operation plans. The introduction of the Annex W requirement and the 

deployment of contract support planners to the combatant commands has 

raised awareness of the importance of operational contract support and 

led to some improvement in planning for contract support. Despite these 

actions, the combatant commands have not fully identified for senior DOD 

leadership the extent to which their plans rely on contractors. As 

Conclusions 

Page 34 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear, failure to adequately 

plan for the use and role of contractors can impede the department’s 

ability to identify and mitigate the risks associated with relying on 

contractors. In addition, as our previous work has shown, DOD’s lack of 

understanding of its reliance on contractors can hinder the effective 

management and oversight of contractors, potentially resulting in negative 

impacts on military operations and unit morale. Further, the failure to fully 

identify contract support requirements in operation plans limits DOD’s 

ability to provide congressional decision makers with information on the 

department’s reliance on contractors to support future operations. 

DOD’s challenges to integrating the potential use and role of contractors 

into its operation plans are exacerbated by shortcomings in guidance and 

a lack of institutionalization of the department’s organizational approach 

to requirements definition for contractors and developing and funding 

personnel with clear roles and appropriate expertise. A one-size-fits-all 

approach to defining Annex W requirements has contributed to an 

expectations mismatch between senior DOD leadership and combatant 

command planners regarding the level of information the annexes should 

contain. Similarly, a lack of specific guidance has enabled combatant 

commands to choose varying approaches with regard to what plans 

require Annex Ws. As a result, DOD senior leadership is unable to look 

across the combatant command plans and assess or address the 

department’s overall reliance on contractors to execute future operations. 

Similarly, the limited discussion of operational contract support in other 

sections of operations plans, including the base plan, limits the ability of 

combatant commanders and senior DOD leadership to evaluate and react 

to the potential risks of reliance on contractors. With contractor personnel 

equaling or at times outnumbering military personnel in current 

operations, the failure to include the likely use of contractors among base 

plan assumptions or the lack of discussion of the role contractors may 

play in the various phases of an operation could create significant risks in 

executing plans. In addition, with over 30 percent of contractor personnel 

in Iraq performing nonlogistics functions, the department must take steps 

to ensure that contract support considerations are addressed across the 

combatant command directorates. Furthermore, if the department fails to 

institutionalize and fund its initiatives to address contract support 

requirements in its operation plans, it will fail to meet the congressional 

mandate to develop an organization approach to requirements definition. 

Until such actions are taken, DOD will continue to struggle to recognize 

the centrality of operational contract support to the effective execution of 

its missions and will therefore be at risk of repeating the contractorrelated problems it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 35 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

To better enable senior DOD leadership to assess the department’s 

reliance on contractors to execute future operations and to improve the 

ability of combatant commanders to effectively identify contract support 

requirements in their operation plans, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take the following 

two actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• As part of the ongoing revision of the Annex W template, clarify and 

specify the appropriate level of detail that should be included in an 

Annex W based on the degree to which the plan provides details on the 

size and capabilities of military forces and how the plan envisions 

those forces being used. The revised template should be completed 

consistent with the transition of the funding of the contract support 

planners from appropriations provided for overseas contingency 

operations to the defense budget. 

• Update DOD’s guidance for contingency planning to clarify and specify 

the level of plans that require an Annex W or similarly detailed 

discussion of operational contract support requirements. 

To improve the integration of operational contract support requirements 

throughout combatant command operation plans, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take the 

following two actions: 

• Require all base plans to include an assumption on the potential use 

and role of contractors. 

• Require the base plans and nonlogistics annexes of operation plans to 

address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate 

(e.g., intelligence and communications annexes). 

To ensure that the department effectively institutionalizes the required 

organizational approach to addressing operational contract support in its 

operation plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and 

the Joint Staff Director for Logistics to take the following three actions: 

• Clarify the roles and missions of the joint operational contract support 

planners and the JCASO and the relationship between both functions. 

• Take steps to ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and 

funded to meet their missions. 

• Incorporate both of these initiatives in DOD’s operational contract 

support guidance. 

Page 36 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of our 

recommendations. In agreeing with our recommendations, DOD identified 

additional actions the department believes are needed to address our 

recommendations. We agree these actions are important steps toward 

addressing our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix II. DOD also provided several technical comments, which we 

considered and incorporated where appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

With regard to the Annex W, DOD agreed with our recommendation to 

clarify and specify the appropriate level of detail that should be included 

in an Annex W based on the degree to which the plan provides details on 

the size and capabilities of military forces and how the plan envisions 

those forces being used. In its comments, DOD described the progress the 

department has made in developing an Annex W template, but 

acknowledged that the level of operational contract support detail should 

be tailored to match the degree to which the plan provides details on the 

anticipated size of capabilities of military forces to be used. DOD added 

that the operational contract support community of interest is designing a 

contract support estimator tool that will help planners determine 

operational contract support requirements, particularly the contractor 

footprint anticipated for an operation. We agree that such a tool will 

facilitate the commander’s ability to integrate operational contract support 

in the overall operation. DOD also agreed with our recommendation to 

update DOD’s guidance for contingency planning to clarify and specify the 

level of plans that require an Annex W or similarly detailed discussion of 

operational contract support requirements. In its comments, DOD stated 

that the Annex W is as important as the logistics annex (Annex D) and that 

whenever an Annex D is required by joint planning guidance, the Annex W 

should also be required. The department added that joint planning 

guidance should dictate that operational contract support be included in 

the base plan. We agree that both of these actions would clarify the 

requirement for where and how to include operational contract support 

requirements in operation plans. 

With regard to the need to improve the integration of operational contract 

support requirements throughout combatant command operation plans, 

DOD agreed with our recommendations to require all base plans to include 

an assumption on the potential use and role of contractors and to require 

the base plans and nonlogistics annexes of operation plans to address the 

potential need for contractor support where appropriate (e.g., intelligence 

and communications annexes). In its comments, DOD stated that the base 

plan at the operational or component level should also address the 

requisite assumptions and roles of contractors and the use of contractor 

Page 37 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

support in the appropriate annexes where the plan determines a valid 

requirement for support. The department added that major operational 

contract support functions that will have a significant impact upon a 

mission should be included in the base plan concept of operations. We 

agree with DOD’s comments as well as the department’s observation that 

joint planning guidance should be modified to incorporate these 

requirements. 

Lastly, with regard to effectively institutionalizing the required 

organizational approach to addressing operational contract support in 

operation plans, DOD agreed with our recommendations to clarify the 

roles and missions of the joint operational contract support planners and 

the JCASO and the relationship between both functions, take steps to 

ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and funded to meet their 

missions, and incorporate both of these initiatives in DOD’s operational 

contract support guidance. In its comments, DOD further stated that 

funding for these positions be centralized rather than placed with each 

combatant command. As noted in the report, there are concerns that 

funding the contract support planners out of the combatant command 

budgets could cause the planners to be redirected to focus on issues other 

than operational contract support. We agree that it is important that the 

planners retain their operational contract support focus and that their role 

needs to be institutionalized in operational contract support guidance. We 

also agree with DOD’s comment that the department should consider 

contract support planners at the service component and combat support 

agency levels. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. The report also is available at no 

charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 38 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

William M. Solis 

of this report. Key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 39 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
 

List of Committees 

evin 

Chairman 

in 

ember 

te 

 K. Inouye 

Chairman 

ember 

ropriations 

elton 

Chairman 

uck” McKeon 

ember 

tatives 

 Dicks 

Chairman 

ember 

ropriations 

The Honorable Carl L

The Honorable John McCa

Ranking M

Committee on Armed Services

United States Sena

The Honorable Daniel

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking M

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on App

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Sk

The Honorable Howard P. “B

Ranking M

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Represen

The Honorable Norman D.

The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young 

Ranking M

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on App

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

In designing and conducting our assessment, our objectives were to 

determine (1) what progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made 

in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation plans, 

(2) the extent to which operational contract support requirements are 

included in other sections of operation plans, and (3) what progress the 

department has made in establishing a long-term capability to ensure the 

inclusion of operational contract support requirements in operation plans. 

To address our objectives, we met with and obtained documentation from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to review key 

guidance on how contingency operation plans are drafted and reviewed 

and to obtain an understanding of how operational contract support is 

addressed in this guidance. We visited all of the geographic combatant 

commands as well as U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, and some combatant command service components to discuss 

their roles in drafting contingency operation plans, how operational 

contract support was addressed in those plans, and other related efforts to 

improve the preparation and planning for working with contractors in 

future operations. We reviewed some base plans and annexes at the 

combatant commands, comparing them to DOD’s guidance on plan 

development as well as its operational contract support guidance in order 

to determine how well these documents incorporated contract support. 

Specifically, we reviewed 

• 7 of the 34 Annex Ws drafted or approved as of February 2010, 

• 3 base plans (1 base plan for a level 4 plan and 2 base plans for level 3 

plans), 

• 4 Annex Ds (logistics), and 

• contractor-related excerpts of a base plan and an Annex D (logistics). 

However, because DOD limited our access to its operation plans, we were 

unable to provide a comprehensive assessment of each plan’s 

assumptions, comprehensiveness, feasibility, adequacy of executable 

detail, and other aspects of operational contract support as directed in the 

mandate. Nevertheless, we believe that the excerpts of plans and annexes 

DOD allowed us to see, along with in-depth conversations with planners 

and other officials responsible for drafting or reviewing base plans and 

annexes, gave us adequate information with which to assess DOD’s 

progress in incorporating operational contract support into its plans. 

Following our site visits to the combatant commands, we requested 

updated information on each command’s number of plans, by plan level, to 

determine the total number of plans for which they were including 

operational contract support in an Annex W or D or in other sections of 

Page 41 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

their plans. We also requested from the Joint Staff J-7 an updated list of 

DOD plans required under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. We 

compared these two groups of information to ensure consistency in the 

number of high-level plans that require the Annex W. We also visited select 

DOD components with some responsibilities for contract management, 

such as the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense 

Logistics Agency, to discuss their roles in contingency operations planning 

and efforts to improve the inclusion of operational contract support in 

plans. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Department of Defense 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 

Support), Washington, D.C. 

• Defense Contract Management Agency, Springfield, Virginia 

• Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

• Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, McLean, Virginia 

• U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany 

• U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida 

• U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and its following service 

components: 

• Special Operations Command Europe 

• U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

• U.S. Army Europe 

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe 

• U.S. Naval Forces Europe 

• U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia 

• U.S. Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

• U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, and its following service 

components: 

• Pacific Air Forces 

• Special Operations Command, Pacific 

• U.S. Army Pacific 

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific 

• U.S. Pacific Fleet 

• U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida 

Page 42 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

• Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) Directorate, Washington, D.C. 

• Joint Staff J7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development) 

Directorate, Washington, D.C. 

Department of the Army 

• Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through 

February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 43 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 48 GAO-10-472 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov GAO Contact 

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 

contributions to this report: Carole Coffey, Assistant Director; Karyn 

Angulo; Noah Bleicher; Gabrielle Carrington; Laura Czohara; Susan Ditto; 

James Leonard; and James A. Reynolds. 

Acknowledgments 

Warfighter Support 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational 

Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements. 

GAO-09-114R. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2008. 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and 

Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19. Washington, 

D.C.: October 1, 2008. 

Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and 

Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency 

Operations. GAO-08-1087. Washington, D.C: September 26, 2008. 

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight 

and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further 

Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. GAO-08-966. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2008. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance 

on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. 

GAO-08-572TT. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective 

Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance 

Contract in Kuwait. GAO-08-316R. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to 

Better Control DOD’s Acquisition of Services. GAO-07-832T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2007. 

Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Longstanding Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors 

Supporting Deployed Forces. GAO-07-145. Washington, D.C.: December 

18, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract 

Management Challenges. GAO-06-1130T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 

2006. 

Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees 

Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. 

Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose. 

GAO-06-999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006. 

Page 49 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
Related GAO Products 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private 

Security Providers. GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security 

Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to 

Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 

2005. 

Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further 

Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328. 

Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005. 

Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on 

Department of Defense Service Contracts. GAO-05-274. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2005. 

Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support 

Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. Washington, 

D.C.: July 19, 2004. 

Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed 

Forces but Are not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695. 

Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003. 

Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost 

in the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD-00-225. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2000. 

Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 1997. 

(351275) Page 50 GAO-10-472 Warfighter Support
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