United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 2011 Decided July 15, 2011

No. 10-7062

SONYA PETTAWAY,

APPELLANT

v.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY 

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-01721)

Denise M. Clark argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. 

Andrew M. Altschul argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellees Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and

Standard Benefit Administrators. 

Karla Grossenbacher was on the brief for appellee National

Academy of Sciences Group Total Disability Insurance Plan. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and GARLAND,

Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Chief Judge: After injuring her back in a car

accident, Sonya Pettaway filed for and received long-termdisability benefits from the insurance plan sponsored by her

employer. After providing benefits to Pettaway for several

years, the claims administrator of that plan determined that

Pettaway no longer qualified under the plan and terminated her

benefits. Pettaway brought suit pursuant to the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 against her employer

and the administrators and underwriters of her employersponsored long-term-benefit disability insurance policy. 

Finding no violation of law, the district court granted the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Pettaway

appealed. Because the district court properly granted summary

judgment, we affirm the district court’s decision.

I.

Plaintiff-appellant Sonya Pettaway was employed by the

National Academy of Sciences (“the Academy”) for seven years

and participated in the National Academy of Sciences Group

Total Disability Insurance Plan (“the Plan”), provided as a

benefit for employees by the Academy. The Academy Plan was

created pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and was

governed by three separate documents. The first document was

the Academy Total Disability Insurance Plan description (the

“Plan Document”), a document created by the Academy which

outlined general aspects of the Academy Plan. The second

document was the Total Disability Insurance Plan Summary (the

“Summary Plan Description”), a plain language summary of the

participants’ rights and obligations under the Academy Plan. 

The last document was the Group Total Disability Insurance

Certificate (the “Policy Document”), a document created by
3

Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (“TIAA”), the

Academy Plan’s underwriter and claims administrator, which

described the main features of the insurance under the group

policy that TIAA issued to the Academy. At some time in or

around the year 2003 (the record is unclear as to the exact date),

Standard Benefit Administrators took over administration on

behalf of TIAA. As there appears to be no legal distinction

between the two entities relevant to this litigation, we will refer

to TIAA and Standard jointly and separately as “TIAA.”

The Academy Plan provided disability benefits to eligible

participants who qualified as “totally disabled” under the terms

of the plan. The plan employed two different definitions of

totally disabled, one concerning the first twenty-four months

during which a participant received benefits and a more rigorous

definition after that twenty-four month period. During the initial

two-year period, the Academy Plan defined totally disabled as

“being completely unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or

pregnancy to perform the material and substantial duties of [the

participant’s] Normal Occupation.” Policy Document at 8.1. To

continue to qualify as totally disabled after the initial period, the

Academy Plan required participants to be unable “to perform the

material and substantial duties of any occupation for which [the

participant is] reasonably qualified by education, training, or

experience.” Id. (emphasis added). During both periods, the

plan also required that participants be under the “Regular Care”

of a physician, defined as “regular in-person visits with [the

participant’s] Physician as frequently as required under standard

medical practice to effectively manage and treat [the

participant’s] disabling sickness or injury.” Id. “Regular Care”

also required participating in “a reasonable program of care and

treatment that is, in accordance with accepted medical practice,

expected to enhance your ability to work . . . .” Id. In

accordance with ERISA’s statutory requirements, the Academy

Plan provided participants with the opportunity for a “full and
4

fair” internal administrative review of any denial of participant

benefit claims.

In January of 2000, while employed by the Academy and

while participating in the Academy Plan, Pettaway suffered a

back injury in an automobile accident. The injury, which

required back surgery, prevented Pettaway from performing her

usual duties, so Pettaway filed the total disability claim

underlying the present litigation. Agreeing that Pettaway

qualified as “totally disabled” as defined by the Academy Plan

for the first twenty-four months, TIAA approved Pettaway’s

claim and began providing disability benefits effective August

1, 2000. In September 2001, in preparation for the end of the

initial two-year benefits period, TIAA began reviewing

Pettaway’s file and requesting additional medical information

from Pettaway to determine if she would qualify for benefits

under the Academy Plan’s more rigorous definition of total

disability. After performing an independent medical

examination and assessing Pettaway’s medical record, TIAA

concluded that Pettaway did not qualify for benefits beyond the

initial twenty-four month period and notified her that it would

cease paying benefits after December 2002.

Pursuant to the Academy Plan’s administrative review

provisions, Pettaway requested an internal review of TIAA’s

decision to terminate her benefits. Pettaway failed, however, to

provide TIAA with any new evidence to support her total

disability claim. Noting that it had “no diagnostics or physical

exam findings on file” to support Pettaway’s complaint, TIAA

affirmed its decision to cease paying benefits after December

2002. Letter from Iserdai Burston, Group Benefits Analyst,

TIAA, to Sonya Pettaway (Jan. 14, 2003). TIAA notified

Pettaway of the results of the administrative review, informed

her that she still had 180 days to submit another written request

for further review, and recommended that any future request
5

should be accompanied by relevant medical documentation that

would support her disability claim.

Over the course of the next six months, a series of events

caused TIAA to reconsider its decision to cancel Pettaway’s

benefits. First, Pettaway returned to the “Regular Care” of her

back surgeon, whom she had not seen for over two years. This

was significant because, as discussed above, by resuming

medical treatment and monitoring of her disability by her

physician, Pettaway satisfied a significant condition of her longterm-disability policy. Furthermore, Pettaway aggravated her

back injury twice, once during a slip-and-fall accident in January

2003 and again during a second car accident in April 2003. As

a result of the additional injuries, Pettaway’s back surgeon

recommended that Pettaway undergo a second back surgery. In

light of Pettaway’s new injuries, her pending back surgery, and

her return to the “Regular Care” of her surgeon, TIAA reinstated

Pettaway’s long term disability benefits in August 2003,

requesting that she provide TIAA with an update of her medical

condition after her back surgery.

Beginning in November 2003, TIAA began requesting from

Pettaway updates on her medical status. In January 2004,

Pettaway’s back surgeon sent TIAA a brief letter stating his

opinion that Pettaway could not “return to any type of gainful

employment.” Letter from Bernard Stopak to Whom It May

Concern (Jan. 23, 2004). In June 2004, Pettaway’s surgeon,

Doctor Stopak, sent a brief report to TIAA in which he

explained that Pettaway had not yet undergone her second back

surgery and that she was unable to “return to any type of work

whatsoever at [that] time.” Bernard Stopak, Supplemental

Neurological Report (June 24, 2004). The surgeon did not

provide TIAA with any medical data or test results with either

the letter or the report. Hoping to obtain objective medical data,

TIAA scheduled an independent medical examination and a
6

functional capacity examination for Pettaway, but she did not

attend either test. On August 12, 2004, lacking “objective

medical documentation to support [Pettaway’s] inability to

perform any occupation,” TIAA terminated Pettaway’s benefits

effective August 31, 2004. Letter from Carmen Lourensz,

Senior Disability Benefits Analyst, Standard Benefit

Administrators, to Sonya Pettaway (Aug. 12, 2004). As before,

TIAA informed Pettaway that she had 180 days to request an

internal administrative review of the termination decision and

suggested that she include any new medical evidence with her

request for review.

Pettaway wrote to TIAA in October 2004 requesting an

administrative review of its decision to terminate her disability

benefits. In response to TIAA’s statement that it lacked

independent medical evidence to support Pettaway’s disability

claim, Pettaway included with her request two additional

medical reports from her surgeon. TIAA forwarded Pettaway’s

file and the new medical reports to its Quality Assurance Unit,

a separate in-house group that, according to TIAA, exists

specifically to assure that each claim receives a fair and

objective review by individuals who were not involved in the

original determination. In addition to reviewing Pettaway’s

existing file, the Quality Assurance Unit took several actions to

develop its own evidence. First, it offered Pettaway another

opportunity to attend the previously requested independent

medical and functional capacity examinations. Although it

made three attempts to contact Pettaway to schedule the

examinations, Pettaway never responded and the tests were not

performed. The Quality Assurance Unit also hired a consulting

physician to review all of the medical records in Pettaway’s file. 

The reviewing physician disagreed with Pettaway’s back

surgeon’s conclusions regarding Pettaway’s disability, stating

“the medical information provided does not support that the

claimant has limitations and restrictions due to her back
7

condition that would preclude her from performing any gainful

employment.” Mary Lindquist, Physician Consultant Memo

(Mar. 2, 2005). Finally, based on the reviewing physician’s

assessment of Pettaway’s ability to work, the Quality

Assessment Unit performed a “transferable skills assessment” to

determine whether Pettaway would be able to find comparable

work in her labor market. That assessment indicated that

positions were available in six different comparable occupations

in sufficient numbers to allow Pettaway to reenter the

workforce. In March 2005, based on the consulting physician’s

review of Pettaway’s medical file, the results of the transferable

skills assessment, and the lack of objective medical data to

support Pettaway’s claim, the Quality Assurance Unit upheld the

termination of Pettaway’s long-term-disability benefits.

While the administrative appeal process was ongoing,

Pettaway had also filed a complaint with the District of

Columbia Department of Insurance and Securities Regulations

(“DOI”). In May 2005, two months after the close of the TIAA

administrative process, the DOI contacted TIAA to inform them

that Pettaway was attempting to schedule the previously

requested independent medical and functional capacity

examinations at her own expense and asked if TIAA would be

willing to pay for the examinations. TIAA agreed to reopen the

Quality Assurance Unit’s review and to arrange and pay for

Pettaway’s examinations. The examinations were finally

conducted in June and July of 2005.

The physical therapist who performed the functional

capacity examination concluded that Pettaway was capable of

sedentary work. The therapist noted, however, that “[d]ue to the

extent of self-limiting on the endurance tasks of the test, it is

difficult to predict whether [Pettaway] can sustain the Sedentary

level of work for the 8 hour day.” Christian Wheeler, Physical

Work Performance Evaluation Summary (July 5, 2005). The
8

therapist observed inconsistencies in Pettaway’s performance,

which combined with Pettaway’s self-limiting behavior, heavily

influenced the outcome of the functional capacity examination.

The doctor who performed the independent medical

examination also observed inconsistencies in Pettaway’s

capabilities and limitations. He stated that “there are gross

inadequacies between what the claimant can perform when she’s

not on the exam table versus what she does on the exam table,”

and that his “objective findings do not correlate with the

claimant’s stated diagnosis and findings.” Letter from John

Hennessey, Associated Neurologist, P.C., to Laura Mizner,

MedReps (July 21, 2005). The doctor concluded that Pettaway

“is ready for sedentary activity” and recommended that she

begin with four-hour days and then transition into full-time work

“within a month or two of starting half a day work cycles.” Id.

After the completion of the independent medical and

functional capacity examinations, the Quality Assurance Unit

obtained another independent medical review from a new

consulting physician. That physician diagnosed Pettaway with

mechanical back pain and concluded that Pettaway’s record

indicates that “she cannot perform full-time sedentary level

work.” Ronald Fraback, Physician Consultant Memo (Aug. 25,

2005). The physician offered to consult directly with the doctor

who performed the July independent medical examination, but

he doubted that the consultation would result in that doctor

changing his conclusion.

Based on the results of the independent medical and

functional capacity examinations, the results from the

transferable skills assessment, and the independent medical

review of Pettaway’s file, the Quality Assurance Unit concluded

that Pettaway was capable of returning to part-time employment. 

Because the Academy Plan covered only total disability, and not
9

partial disability, the Quality Assurance Unit concluded that

Pettaway did not qualify under the terms of the plan and again

upheld TIAA’s decision to terminate Pettaway’s long-termdisability benefits. In a September 2005 letter notifying

Pettaway of the results of the administrative review, TIAA

informed Pettaway that her right to an administrative review had

been satisfied and that, therefore, TIAA was closing her claim.

In March 2006, Pettaway sent additional documents to

TIAA in an attempt to supplement her claim for long-termdisability benefits. TIAA returned the materials stating that

Pettaway’s administrative review had been completed and that

her claim was closed. In September 2007, Pettaway filed suit in

the district court, claiming that the Academy and TIAA violated

ERISA by wrongfully terminating her benefits and by failing to

follow the proper procedures while administering her claim. 

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment and the district

court granted TIAA’s motion, upholding TIAA’s termination of

Pettaway’s benefits. Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n

of Am., 699 F. Supp. 2d 185, 209 (D.D.C. 2010).

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in an ERISA denial-of-benefits case de novo. Heller v. Fortis

Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 487, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Pettaway challenges three aspects of the district court’s opinion. 

First, she argues that the district court applied the wrong

standard of review when it considered whether TIAA

wrongfully terminated her benefits. Second, Pettaway argues

that the district court misapplied the requirement, contained in

ERISA and Department of Labor regulations promulgated

thereunder, that she receive “full and fair review” of her appeal

of TIAA’s termination of her benefits. Finally, Pettaway argues

that the district court violated its local rules by failing to require
10

the filing of the entire administrative record in connection with

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

A.

Pettaway argues that the district court erred when it applied

a deferential standard of review to the court’s review of TIAA’s

decision to terminate her benefits. See Pettaway, 699 F. Supp.

2d at 201 (holding that the district court “must employ a

discretionary, or ‘reasonableness’ review to the eligibility

determination”). Pettaway asserts that a de novo standard

should have been applied for two reasons: because the Policy

Document did not grant discretionary authority to TIAA to

interpret the terms of the group policy; and because the

Academy, as fiduciary of the Academy Plan, limited its own

fiduciary duties to determining eligibility and therefore had no

discretion to delegate interpretation authority to TIAA.

We review a denial of benefits challenged under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(1)(B), under a de novo standard, rather than under the

more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, “unless the

benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary

authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the

terms of the plan.’” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489

U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Fitts v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 236

F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The key dispute between the parties

in this appeal is to which of the three Academy Plan

documents—the Plan Document, the Summary Plan

Description, or the Policy Document—the court may look to

determine whether “the benefit plan gives the administrator or

fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for

benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Pettaway argues

that only the Policy Document is legally relevant. TIAA and the

Academy argue that all three documents must be considered

together. Although the question is one of first impression in this
11

circuit, we agree with the district court that in this case all three

documents should be examined to determine the appropriate

standard of review.

Our decision to look at all of the Academy Plan documents

is supported both by the text of ERISA and by the weight of

authority from the other circuits that have considered this

question. First, ERISA’s statutory text suggests that multiple

plan documents can be legally relevant. ERISA requires that a

“summary plan description of any employee benefit plan shall

be furnished to participants and beneficiaries” and specifies that

it “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by

the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate

and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and

beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.” 29

U.S.C. § 1022(a). The statute further requires that the summary

plan description contain, inter alia, “the plan’s requirements

respecting eligibility for participation and benefits” and the

“circumstances which may result in disqualification,

ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits.” 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). 

Far from being an irrelevant piece of human resources material,

the Summary Plan Description is the ERISA-mandated, plainlanguage document upon which plan participants may rely to

understand their benefits. 

Furthermore, the ERISA sections on fiduciary

responsibilities imply that there will be multiple legally

important plan documents. The section defining “fiduciary

duties” states that the plan fiduciary—in this case the

Academy—“shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan . . .

in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the

plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). The

ERISA section governing reporting and disclosure also

references multiple documents. It requires the administrator of

a benefits plan to “furnish to the Secretary [of the Department of
12

Labor], upon request, any documents relating to the employee

benefit plan, including but not limited to, the latest summary

plan description (including any summaries of plan changes not

contained in the summary plan description), and the bargaining

agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instrument under

which the plan is established or operated.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1024(a)(6). Far from suggesting that one plan document must

contain all the legally relevant terms and language, the statutory

text clearly contemplates multiple relevant documents. 

Other circuit courts that have considered this question have

also generally concluded that multiple plan documents are

legally relevant. For example, in Young v. Verizon’s Bell Atl.

Cash Balance Plan, the Seventh Circuit held that because both

a “summary plan description” and a “summary of any material

modification” are ERISA-required writings, each should be

given primary effect and strictly enforced. 615 F.3d 808, 817-

18 (7th Cir. 2010). Relying on the text of 29 U.S.C.

§ 1024(a)(6), the Eleventh Circuit recognized that many

documents control the operation of a benefits plan under ERISA,

including the summary plan description, the bargaining

agreement, the trust agreement, the contract, and other

instruments. Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc.,

443 F.3d 1330, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit

recognized the importance of the summary plan description,

concluding that “statements in a summary plan are binding and

if the statements conflict with those in the plan itself, the

summary shall govern.” Yolton v. El Paso Tennessee Pipeline

Co., 435 F.3d 571, 582 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Similarly, many circuits have recognized the legal significance

of summary plan descriptions. See, e.g., Bergt v. Retirement

Plan for Pilots Employed by MarkAir, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139, 1143

(9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he SPD is a plan document and should be

considered when interpreting an ERISA plan.”); Hughes v. 3M

Retiree Medical Plan, 281 F.3d 786,790 (8th Cir. 2002) (same);
13

Fallo v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 141 F.3d 580, 583-84 (5th

Cir. 1998) (same); Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1511

(10th Cir. 1996) (same).

Based on the text of ERISA we hold, consistent with the

decisions of the other circuits, that the district court properly

considered the Plan Document, the Summary Plan Description,

and the Policy Document to determine the appropriate standard

of review to apply in this case.

Having so concluded, the remaining analysis is

straightforward. As stated in the Plan Document, the “Academy

shall be the Plan Administrator and the ‘Named Fiduciary’” with

the “absolute power, authority and discretion to administer the

[Academy] Plan.” Plan Document at 3.1, 3.2. “All

interpretations of the Plan, and questions concerning its

administration and application, shall be determined” by the

Academy, which has the authority to “appoint such accountants,

counsel, specialists, and other persons as it deems necessary or

desirable in connection with the administration of the Plan.” Id.

at 3.2. Furthermore, the Summary Plan Description grants

TIAA “full power and discretionary authority under the group

policy to control and manage the operation and administration

of the group policy, subject only to the participant’s rights of

review and appeal under the group policy.” Summary Plan

Description at 8. The Summary Plan Description further

explains:

TIAA has all powers necessary to accomplish these

purposes in accordance with the terms of the group policy

including, but not limited to, the following: (1) determining

the benefits and amounts payable therefor to any

participant or beneficiary; (2) establishing and

administering a claims review and appeal process; and (3)

interpreting, applying, and administering the provisions of
14

the group policy.

Id. (emphasis added).

This language establishes that, under the Academy Plan,

denial-of-benefits determinations by TIAA qualify for

deferential review under the Supreme Court’s test in Firestone

Tire & Rubber. See Fitts, 236 F.3d at 5 (quoting 489 U.S. at

115). The Academy Plan reserved for the Academy “absolute

power, authority and discretion to administer the Plan” and also

the ability to delegate specific powers to TIAA as the plan

administrator. The Academy Plan entrusted TIAA with “full

power and discretionary authority” to both determine eligibility

for benefits and to construe the terms of the plan. We conclude,

therefore, that the district court did not err by employing a

deferential standard of review to TIAA’s eligibility

determination.

 “This court has defined the Firestone deferential standard

as one of ‘reasonableness,’” Wagener v. SBC Pension Benefit

Plan-Non Bargained Program, 407 F.3d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (quoting Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1452

(D.C. Cir. 1992)), so we must decide whether TIAA acted

reasonably when it denied Pettaway’s benefits claim. 

Pettaway’s case presented TIAA with conflicting evidence. 

Pettaway’s back surgeon determined that Pettaway was unfit to

work, but TIAA’s own doctors found that Pettaway could return

to part-time employment. TIAA’s doctors also disagreed with

Pettaway’s surgeon on his interpretation of Pettaway’s medical

records. The Supreme Court has held that in the ERISA context,

“courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically

to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s

physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a

discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable

evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation.” 
15

Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834

(2003). Faced with contradicting opinions and with no

requirement to prefer one opinion over another, we cannot

conclude that TIAA acted unreasonably when it valued the

opinion of its own personnel over that of Pettaway’s surgeon. 

TIAA offered a rational explanation for its decision, which was

reasonably derived from the medical evidence in the

administrative record. TIAA did not “arbitrarily refuse to

credit” Pettaway’s evidence, see id., but credited one medical

opinion over conflicting evidence. Because TIAA acted

reasonably, we conclude that TIAA’s termination of Pettaway’s

benefits complied with federal law.

B.

Pettaway next argues that the district court erred when it

held that the TIAA’s administrative review of her claim satisfied

ERISA’s “full and fair review” requirement. Pettaway asserts

that TIAA’s appeal process was unlawful due to a variety of

procedural flaws, the most serious of which was TIAA’s alleged

failure to give Pettaway the opportunity to challenge TIAA’s

September 2005 decision to uphold its August 2004 terminationof-benefits determination. Although Pettaway contends that the

September 2005 decision was a second “adverse determination”

from which she should have had the opportunity to appeal, we

disagree.

Under ERISA, the Department of Labor requires every

employee benefit plan to “establish and maintain a procedure by

which a claimant shall have a reasonable opportunity to appeal

an adverse benefit determination to an appropriate named

fiduciary of the plan, and under which there will be a full and

fair review of the claim and the adverse benefit determination.” 

29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (emphasis added). Beyond specific

procedural requirements specified in the regulations, see 29
16

C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(h)(1) to (4), none of which is alleged to

have been violated in this case, the administrative review

process need only be reasonable and afford the participant a

“full and fair review.”

Pettaway suffered an adverse determination in August 2004

when TIAA determined that she was no longer eligible for longterm-disability benefits. This adverse determination triggered

her right under ERISA to a full and fair administrative review,

which TIAA initially conducted between October 2004 and

March 2005. TIAA then voluntarily reopened its review in May

2005 to permit Pettaway to undergo the independent medical

and functional capacity examinations that she had previously

failed to attend. In September 2005, after both of those

examinations and an independent physician review, TIAA

issued its final decision upholding the August 2004 denial of

long-term-disability benefits. We conclude that TIAA satisfied

its obligation to provide Pettaway with “a reasonable

opportunity to appeal an adverse benefit determination.” 29

C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h).

 We draw this conclusion for several reasons. First,

contrary to Pettaway’s assertion, TIAA’s September 2005

decision was merely confirmatory of its early determination that

Pettaway did not qualify for long-term-disability benefits. 

Although TIAA had new information to consider during the

administrative review—the results of the independent medical

and functional capacity examinations, the results from the

transferable skills assessment, and the independent medical

review of Pettaway’s file—its conclusion was the same: that

Pettaway did not qualify as totally disabled under the Academy

Plan. The results of the additional tests and reviews did not

provide a new basis for terminating Pettaway’s benefits, but

merely supplemented its initial reasoning. Second, we will not

punish TIAA for voluntarily reopening its administrative review
17

process. As Pettaway conceded at oral argument, “there was no

reason for [TIAA] to reopen it” and nothing in ERISA

compelled TIAA to do so. Or. Arg. at 24:56–25:04. TIAA

reopened Pettaway’s review solely to give her an additional

opportunity to prove her claim. We cannot hold that this

benevolent act made Pettaway’s review any less reasonable, full,

or fair. Finally, as other circuits have noted, even though new

medical reports were generated during TIAA’s administrative

review, the regulations provide for the “opportunity to appeal an

adverse benefit determination,” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1),

and not for the opportunity to engage in a continuous cycle of

appeals from appeals. See, e.g., Midgett v. Washington Group

Intern. Long Term Disability Plan, 561 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir.

2009) (“[R]equiring a plan administrator to grant a claimant the

opportunity to review and rebut medical opinions generated on

administrative appeal ‘would set up an unnecessary cycle of

submission, review, re-submission, and re-review.’”) (quoting

Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1166

(10th Cir. 2007)); Glazer v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524

F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11t h Cir. 2008) (same). Limiting Pettaway

to a single administrative review of the original adverse benefit

determination when the review upheld the denial on the same

basis as the initial decision does not violate the requirement that

the review be “full and fair.”

Finding none of Pettaway’s procedural claims persuasive,

we conclude that the district court did not err when it held that

the TIAA did not violate Pettaway’s right to a full and fair

review of her adverse eligibility determination.

C.

Finally, Pettaway argues that the district court violated the

district court’s local rule 7(h) by failing to require the filing of

the entire administrative record in connection with the appellees’
18

motion for summary judgment. Because Pettaway failed to

make this argument before the district court, we would normally

reject it now. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d

1500, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Ordinarily, in reviewing motions

for summary judgment, the appellate court considers only those

matters presented to the district court, disregarding additional

allegations raised for the first time on appeal.”), vacated on

other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); District of Columbia v.

Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tarpley

v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 7 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Pettaway offers

no compelling reason why we should deviate from our normal

policy in this case. Finding none ourselves, we will not do so.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly granted

the Academy and TIAA’s motion for summary judgment. We

affirm the decision of the district court.

So ordered.