IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MICHELLE HARTLE f/k/a MICHELLE ) 

WHITNEY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 12 C 1096 

 ) 

TIE NATIONAL, LLC, d/b/a TIE NATIONAL ) 

ACCOUNTS, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Michelle Hartle has sued her former employer, Tie National, LLC, for 

discrimination on the basis of gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). She alleges that Tie National terminated her because 

she was pregnant. Tie National has moved for summary judgment on Hartle’s claim. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Tie National’s motion. 

Background 

 As an initial matter, Hartle has asked the Court to strike a number of exhibits 

submitted by Tie National in support of its motion for summary judgment. Specifically, 

Hartle argues that the spreadsheet report of Hartle’s Internet history and the documents 

that Tie National received from BabyCenter LLC—whose website Tie National contends 

Hartle visited while at work—are inadmissible hearsay and the company has not laid a 

sufficient foundation for their admission. Because the Court has not relied on any of 
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these documents in determining Tie National’s motion for summary judgment, the Court 

need not rule on the admissibility of these exhibits. 

 Tie National hired Hartle as a billing analyst in September 2010.1

 As a billing 

analyst, Hartle managed customer invoice data, organizing invoices from 

telecommunication providers into a summary that she sent to Tie National’s customers 

for payment. Hartle reported to Kathy Powell, Internal Operations Supervisor at Tie 

National, who in turn worked for Michael Durante, Vice President of Operations. 

 On December 8, 2010, Hartle received a ninety-day performance evaluation. 

Powell testified during her deposition that she drafted the evaluation, and both she and 

Durante signed the evaluation. The review stated that Hartle performed “[w]ell [a]bove” 

expectations in the area of quality service, and met expectations in every other 

category. Pl.’s Ex. A at 2–3. Powell stated that she initially had given Hartle a less 

favorable evaluation but that Durante felt she was “being too harsh” on a relatively new 

employee. Def.’s Ex. C at 48. Durante stated that he did not remember whether he 

spoke with Powell about Hartle’s evaluation. Based on the evaluation, Hartle received a 

small raise in pay. 

 Powell testified that after completing the evaluation, she began noticing problems 

with Hartle’s work. Specifically, she testified that Hartle was incorrectly entering data, 

failing to meet deadlines, and using the Internet excessively. Powell stated that 

although initially Hartle attempted to hide her Internet usage while Powell was walking 

around the office, eventually “she got to a point where she stopped hiding it and she 

would just leave it up all the time when I came over.” Id. at 78. According to Powell, 

 

1

 At the time that she worked at Tie National, Hartle was known as Michelle Whitney. The Court 

will refer to the plaintiff by her current name to avoid confusion. 
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she told Hartle that “it’s important that she gets her job done. And if the job is not done, 

you know, that’s going to be a problem for us.” Id. at 82. 

 During her deposition, Hartle admitted that she used the Internet for personal 

reasons at work. She testified that she could not remember which websites she visited 

or the amount of time she spent on the Internet for personal reasons. She stated that 

Powell never gave her a verbal warning about her Internet usage. She admitted, 

however, that around January 6, 2011, Powell talked to her about submitting her 

assignments late and that Powell asked about her Internet usage and told her to “keep it 

to a minimum.” Pl.’s Ex. A at 65. Hartle denied any other conversations regarding her 

Internet use. She further denied any other performance issues. It is undisputed that 

Hartle never received a written warning for her Internet usage. 

 Durante testified during his deposition that Powell talked to him about Hartle’s 

Internet use in early January and expressed concern about her ability to perform her job 

responsibilities. According to Durante, Powell asked him “if it would be okay to 

terminate her.” Def.’s Ex. B at 44. Durante told Powell not to fire Hartle and asked her 

to work with Hartle to improve her performance. Id. Durante met with Hartle and Powell 

to look over the data Hartle was organizing and generally help her improve. Durante 

stated that Tie National had recently hired another billing analyst, Doreen Johnson, who 

“was really picking up and running with this stuff a lot better than Michelle was.” Id. at 

49. 

 Durante stated that on January 14, 2011, Tie National began an investigation into 

Hartle’s Internet use. Durante asked Tie National’s IT administrator to access Hartle’s 

Internet history, and when they discovered that the history had been cleared, he asked 
4

the administrator to record the Internet activity from that day forward. According to 

Durante, he and Powell did not receive any report of that history until the evening of 

January 20 or the morning of January 21. 

 At some point during the week of January 17, Hartle told Powell and Durante that 

she was pregnant. Hartle testified that Durante and Powell both offered her 

congratulations. Hartle also told Cassie Jolley, who worked in Tie National’s human 

resources department, and talked with Jolley about what, if any, policy the company had 

for maternity leave. 

 Powell testified that on January 20, she and Hartle left the office for lunch. 

According to Powell, Hartle did not indicate in the company’s time management system 

that she had left the office. Instead, Hartle “logged out and then logged back in a half 

hour later” once she returned, “although [they] took a longer lunch than that.” Def.’s Ex. 

C at 106. According to Powell, Hartle also left before 5 p.m. that day. She stated that 

Hartle was repeatedly failing to work the required forty hours of work each week, and so 

she told Hartle it was necessary to meet this requirement. It is undisputed that all of 

Hartle’s requests for time off were granted. 

 Durante stated that on January 20–21, he and Powell reviewed a report of 

Hartle’s Internet history for the prior week. According to Durante, he considered issuing 

a written warning to Hartle but ultimately decided to terminate her. Durante specifically 

testified that he decided to terminate Hartle because of excessive Internet use, her 

performance problems, her inability to “stay[] on top of her tasks” and the problems she 

had communicating with the company’s customers in a timely manner. Def.’s Ex. B at 

63. 
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 Durante terminated Hartle on January 27, 2011. It is undisputed that Durante 

told Hartle that he was firing her based on performance. Durante contends that he 

further explained that the termination was based on the results of the company’s 

investigation into her Internet use, among her other performance issues. Hartle denies 

that Durante gave her any further clarification. Tie National did not hire a new employee 

to replace Hartle but instead assigned her accounts to Johnson. 

Discussion 

 Summary judgment is proper when “the admissible evidence, construed in favor 

of the non-movant, reveals no genuine issue as to any material facts and establishes 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Berry v. Chi. Transit Auth., 

618 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is 

sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-movant. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2010). In deciding on a motion for summary 

judgment, a court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Groesch v. City of 

Springfield, 635 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2011). 

 Hartle contends that Tie National terminated her based on the fact that she was 

pregnant and thus discriminated against her on the basis of her gender. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e(k) (discrimination against an employee on the basis of pregnancy qualifies as 

sex discrimination for purposes of a Title VII claim). A plaintiff may prove a claim of 

discrimination by either the direct or indirect method. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 
6

F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Hartle pursues her claim under both methods, 

the Court will consider each one in turn. 

A. Direct method

 Under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by 

presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that creates a convincing mosaic of 

discrimination. Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2012). 

“Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would prove 

discriminatory conduct on the part of the employer without reliance on inference or 

presumption.” Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)). In the 

absence of direct evidence, the Title VII plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence, but 

only if that evidence points “directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s 

action.” Good, 673 F.3d at 675; Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(“The focus of the direct method of proof thus is not whether the evidence offered is 

direct or circumstantial but rather whether the evidence points directly to a 

discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 The circumstantial evidence necessary to prevail under the direct method 

typically falls into one of three categories. The first includes “suspicious timing, 

ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other 

employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of 

discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 637 

F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2011). The second consists of “evidence, whether or not 

rigorously statistical, that similarly situated employees outside the protected class 
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received systematically better treatment . . . .” Harris v. Warrick Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 

666 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2012). A third type is “evidence that the employer offered a 

pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860. 

1. Timing

 Hartle contends that the timing of her termination—ten days after reporting her 

pregnancy—is sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

true reason of her termination. Although timing is “often an important evidentiary ally of 

the plaintiff,” Lang v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 

2004), it is rarely sufficient on its own to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

cause of plaintiff’s termination. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860–61; see also Scaife v. Cook 

Cnty., 446 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Close temporal proximity provides evidence 

of causation and may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment provided that there 

is other evidence that supports the inference of a causal link.”). 

 Hartle has provided no other evidence in this regard other than temporal 

proximity. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Powell and Durante had already begun 

to investigate Hartle’s Internet use before learning that she was pregnant, and Durante 

testified that he was waiting for a report on Hartle’s web history when Hartle told him 

about her pregnancy. Additionally, Hartle admitted that Powell had already told her to 

“keep [Internet usage] to a minimum.” Def.’s Ex. A at 65. Given these circumstances, 

the timing of Hartle’s termination by itself would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude 

that Tie National terminated Hartle because of her pregnancy. See Silverman, 637 F.3d 

at 736 (finding a two- to three-week interval insufficient to defeat summary judgment); 

see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861 (“Our cases reject any bright-line numeric rule, but 
8

when there is corroborating evidence . . . an interval of a few weeks or even months 

may provide probative evidence of the required causal nexus.”) (emphasis added). 

2. Similarly situated employees

 Hartle next argues that a similarly situated employee who was not pregnant 

received more favorable treatment. Specifically, Hartle contends that Doreen Johnson, 

who took over Hartle’s assignments following her termination, was treated more 

favorably because she was not fired. Yet Hartle has made no showing that Johnson 

was similarly situated to her in any way. “The purpose of the ‘similarly situated’ 

comparator element is to ensure that all other variables are discounted so that an 

inference of unlawful intent would be reasonable.” Silverman, 637 F.3d at 742. 

Showing that other factors are generally equal among comparators is important 

because it allows courts to exclude differences in behavior as the cause for the 

disparate treatment, supporting the inference that discriminatory motive is at play. Id. 

Although there is no magic formula, courts typically require a plaintiff alleging that a 

similarly situated employee was given better treatment to “at least show that the 

comparators (1) dealt with the same supervisor, (2) were subject to the same standards, 

and (3) engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating 

circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” 

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Although Johnson and Hartle dealt with the same supervisors and were subject 

to the same standards, Hartle has provided no evidence that Johnson engaged in any 

personal Internet use, let alone an amount of personal Internet use comparable to 

Hartle. She instead relies on Powell’s testimony that the Internet usage policy was 
9

relaxed “as long as work was getting done and you were completing your expectations.” 

Def.’s Ex. C at 74–75. Yet the fact that Powell did not enforce a zero-tolerance noInternet policy does not amount to evidence that Johnson used the Internet for personal 

reasons or that she did so at a level that would make her comparable to Hartle. 

Additionally, Hartle testified during her deposition that she could not recall by name any 

employee whom she saw using the Internet for personal reasons while at Tie National. 

Thus there is no evidence to suggest that Hartle and Johnson were similarly situated 

employees. The fact that Johnson was not terminated does not support Hartle’s claim 

of discrimination. 

3. Pretext

 Finally, Hartle argues that Tie National’s purported reason for her termination—

her excessive personal Internet usage—was pretextual. In analyzing pretext, “[t]he only 

concern . . . is the honesty of the employer’s beliefs.” Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 

453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus the question for the Court at summary 

judgment is whether the plaintiff has provided evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could conclude that the defendant’s purported reason for termination was a lie in whole 

or in part. 

 “A plaintiff can establish pretext either directly, with evidence suggesting that 

retaliation or discrimination was the most likely motive for the termination, or indirectly, 

by showing that the employer’s proffered reason was not worthy of belief.” Sanchez v. 

Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1999). Indirect proof of pretext would include 

evidence that Tie National’s explanation has no basis in fact or that the explanation was 

not the real reason for firing her. Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 266 (7th Cir. 2001); see 
10

also Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 526 F.3d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Showing 

pretext requires proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Hartle contends that the facts that Powell and Durante never warned her about 

her Internet usage prior to her termination and that she received a good review in 

December 2010 are evidence that Tie National’s proffered reason for termination is 

untrue. Yet Hartle admitted that she used the Internet for personal reasons while at 

work and that Powell had admonished her regarding her Internet use. It is also 

undisputed that Powell had expressed concern to Hartle about her ability to comply with 

payment deadlines. Additionally, both Powell and Durante stated that they only 

discovered the level of Hartle’s Internet use after her December 2010 review. Finally, 

although Powell testified that in practice Tie National’s Internet usage policy is relaxed, 

it is undisputed that the company did have a policy against using the Internet for 

personal reasons. Given the timeline of events, the mere fact that Hartle received a 

positive evaluation at some point during her employment at Tie National is not sufficient 

to give rise to an issue of fact regarding the veracity of the reason the company gave for 

Hartle’s termination in January 2011. 

 In sum, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Tie National 

discriminated against Hartle under the direct method of proof. 

B. Indirect method

 The indirect method of proving discrimination uses the burden-shifting 

methodology described by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie case under the indirect method, a 
11

plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she 

was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated 

individuals who were not in the protected class. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845. If Hartle 

satisfies the prima facie requirements, the burden shifts to Tie National to articulate a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 

552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009). Hartle must then present evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could find that Tie National’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. 

 Tie National contends that Hartle is unable to show either that she was meeting 

its legitimate expectations at the time of her termination, or that she was treated less 

favorably than similarly situated individuals who were not in the protected class. 

Because Hartle is unable to show the latter requirement, the Court need not address Tie 

National’s first argument. 

 Hartle contends that she does not need to identify any similarly situated nonpregnant employees who were treated more favorably because Johnson, who was not 

pregnant, assumed Hartle’s job responsibilities, thereby effectively replacing her. Hartle 

relies on a rule that the Seventh Circuit has applied to reduction-in-force (RIF) cases—

namely, that instead of identifying similarly situated employees, plaintiffs must show that 

employees outside the protected class absorbed the plaintiff’s job responsibilities after 

termination. Filar, 526 F.3d at 1060. The Seventh Circuit has stated that this 

alternative standard is appropriate even in a single-discharge or “mini-reduction-in-force 

case . . . [w]hen an employee in a unique position is terminated and her position is not 

filled, but employees outside the protected class assume the fired employee’s 
12

responsibilities . . . .” Griffin v. Sisters of St. Francis, Inc., 489 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 

2007). 

 The Seventh Circuit has explained that when a RIF occurs, the company has 

implicitly admitted that one position in the company is fungible with another. Under 

such circumstances, evidence that other employees outside the protected group 

assumed the responsibilities of the now-eliminated position is sufficient to raise an 

inference of discrimination. Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 133132 

(7th Cir. 1995). Additionally, when there are a limited number of employees such that 

there are not multiple workers filling the same job description, identification of other 

employees who are “similarly situated” can be unfairly difficult. Bellaver v. Quanex 

Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 2000). Finally, courts have noted that when an RIF 

occurs, there is a “danger that the employer can hide a discriminatory motive for 

terminating the employee simply by stating that the job was eliminated . . . .” Griffin, 

489 F.3d at 845. 

 Unlike the cases upon which she relies, Hartle did not occupy a unique position 

within Tie National. She was a billing analyst, as was her co-worker Johnson. Although 

Johnson assumed responsibility for Hartle’s accounts after Tie National terminated 

Hartle, Johnson already performed those same general duties prior to the termination. 

Indeed, Johnson’s and Hartle’s job duties were identical at the time of Hartle’s 

termination; Hartle argued, in support of her claim under the direct method, that 

Johnson was a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment. 

Additionally, Tie National has not attempted to justify Hartle’s termination based on any 

reduction in the work force. Its reason for termination was performance issues and 
13

excessive Internet use. Thus Hartle’s termination does not amount to a mini reduction 

in force. 

 For these reasons, it is inappropriate to excuse Hartle from the prima facie 

requirement to show a similarly situated employee who received favorable treatment. 

See Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 494 (prima facie requirements should not be applied rigidly 

and may be adapted “to reflect more fairly and accurately the underlying reality of the 

workplace”). As discussed above, Hartle has not produced any evidence that Johnson 

was similarly situated to Hartle. Thus she cannot meet the prima facie requirements of 

her discrimination claim under the indirect method. Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 602 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2010) (nothing that the “similarly situated” and 

“pretext” analyses are substantially the same under both the direct and indirect method). 

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Tie National’s motion for 

summary judgment [docket no. 27] and directs the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of 

the defendant. 

 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: July 22, 2013