alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.34
ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING GUARANTY


THIS ADDENDUM is attached to and made a part of that certain
Continuing Guaranty executed by Robert S. Cope (Guarantor) in
favor of WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (Bank) for all
indebtedness of Auto-Graphics, Inc. (Borrower) to Bank and
dated as of June 30, 1999 (the Guaranty).


The following provisions are hereby incorporated into the
Guaranty as if fully set forth therein:


18.  REDUCTION OF LIABILITY.  Notwithstanding anything in
the Guaranty or the Credit Agreement to the contrary, the
maximum liability of the Guarantor set forth in the first
sentence of Paragraph 2 of the Guaranty shall not exceed at any
one time the sum of $2,187,500.00 for principal, plus interest
thereon and costs and expenses pertaining to the enforcement of
the Guaranty and/or the collection of the Indebtedness of any of
the Borrowers to Bank if the following conditions are met on or
before September 30, 1999: (a) Borrower delivers evidence
satisfactory to Bank in its sole discretion that Borrower has
received New Capital (defined below) in the aggregate amount of
$750,000.00; and (b) at the time of that all evidence necessary
to the satisfaction of subparagraph (a) above has been delivered
to Bank, no default or Event of Default shall have occurred under
any of the documents or instruments evidencing or relating to the
Indebtedness of Borrower to Bank. As used herein, New Capital
shall mean cash and cash equivalents received and deposited by
Borrower on or after June 30, 1999 in the form of a capital
contribution in immediately available funds (prior to the
deduction of any and all selling commissions and other costs and
expenses, including legal fees attributable to the offering).

19.  RELEASE FROM LIABILITY.  Notwithstanding anything in
the Guaranty or the Credit Agreement to the contrary, Guarantor
shall be fully, finally and forever released from all liability
to Bank under the Guaranty or otherwise, if the following
conditions are met on or before the date that all Indebtedness of
Borrower to Bank has been paid in full: (a) Borrower delivers
evidence satisfactory to Bank in its sole discretion that
Borrower has received New Capital in the aggregate amount of
$1,250,000.00 (inclusive of the $750,000.00 referenced in
Paragraph 18 above); and (b) at the time of that all evidence
necessary to the satisfaction of subparagraph (a) above has been
delivered to Bank, no default or Event of Default shall have
occurred under any of the documents or instruments evidencing or
relating to the Indebtedness of Borrower to Bank.


This Guaranty supercedes and replaces in its entirety that
certain Guaranty executed by Robert S. Cope in favor of the Bank
as of May 12, 1997, which is hereby terminated, cancelled and is
of no further force or effect as of the date hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Addendum has been executed as of
the same date as the Guaranty.


WELLS FARGO BANK,                   GUARANTOR
  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION


By:_ ss/Darryl Hallie               ss/Robert S. Cope_
Darryl Hallie                       Robert S. Cope
Vice President
217.701 Definitions. As used in this subpart— *Assisted acquisition* means the type of interagency contracting through which acquisition officials of a non-DoD agency award a contract or a task or delivery order for the acquisition of supplies or services on behalf of DoD.
*Direct acquisition* means the type of interagency contracting through which DoD orders a supply or service from a Governmentwide acquisition contract maintained by a non-DoD agency.
*Governmentwide acquisition contract* means a task or delivery order contract that— ( 1 ) Is entered into by a non-defense agency; and
( 2 ) May be used as the contract under which property or services are procured for one or more other departments or agencies of the Federal Government.
#### 1516.303-71 Definition.

Cost-sharing is a generic term denoting any situation where the Government does not fully reimburse a contractor for all allowable costs necessary to accomplish the project under the contract. This term encompasses cost-matching and cost-limitations, in addition to cost-sharing. Cost-sharing does not include usual contractual limitations such as indirect cost ceilings in accordance with FAR 42.707, or ceilings on travel or other direct costs. Cost-sharing contracts may be required as a result of Congressional mandate.

[61 FR 14504, Apr. 2, 1996]
#### Jon E. Smith et al., Respondents, v. Diane Cudo, Appellant.

Per *Curiam.*

'The verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Taylor, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
#### Lewis Manufacturing Company *v.*Davis & Brandon.

March 11, 1913.

Lumpkin, J.

The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner' of a large tract oi land, brought suit to enjoin certain defendants who were alleged to be trespassing thereon. On the hearing of the application for interlocutory injunction, the plaintiff showed certain grants from the State to various parties, issued many years ago. The plaintiff did not connect its claim of title with any of these grantees from the State, but relied on prescriptive title beginning with a bond for title for the 10,000-acre tract known as the “Colerain tract, except about 400 acres to be given to Mrs. Knight, Casey, and J. Marr, to include the little places where they now live, the 400 acres to be divided between them according to their claims as they now stand, as therein described.” At a later date, in a litigation to which the obligee in the bond was the plaintiff, and the obligor and another were defendants, it was decreed that the title to “10,000 acres of land, more or less, in the counties of Camden and Charlton, State of Georgia, bought of [the obligor] by the said [obligee], said lands lying on the St. Mary’s river and known as ‘the Colerain tract,’ be fully vested in him, the said [obligor], together with all the rights, members, and appurtenances thereto belonging.” It appeared that the State issued in 1908, to a person from whom the defendants claimed to hold a quitclaim deed, a grant to 400 acres lying within the boundaries claimed by the plaintiff. There was some evidence tending to show the working of timber for turpentine upon land claimed to lie within the bounds of the Colerain tract; but there was no evidence to show whether it was upon the 400 acres reserved in the bond' for title under which the plaintiff claimed by prescription, or whether it was upon the 400 acres recently granted by the State, or at what point upon the general tract. *Held,*that there was no error in refusing to grant the injunction.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Beeh, J., absent. The other Justices concur.*

*600Petition for injunction. Before Judge Conyers. Camden superior court. October 5, 1912.

*J. L. Sweat*and *J. T. Myers,*for' plaintiff.

*B, D. Meader,*for defendants.
#### GREGORIO v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

January 17, 1906.)

Carriers—Street Railways—Negligence—Injuries to Passenger.

Evidence that while plaintiff, a passenger on defendant’s street car, started to alight after the car was stopped in response to a signal given by some one, she was thrown down by the car suddenly starting, it not appearing that the conductor knew that she was alighting, or that a signal to start was given by the conductor or any one, established a prima facie case of negligence on defendant’s part.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, § 1286.]

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.

Action by Flora Lorenzo Gregorio against the New York City Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and BLANCHARD and DOW-LING, JJ.

David M. Neuberger, for appellant.

William E. Weaver, for respondent.

SCOTT, P. J.

The evidence justified a finding that plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant’s cars; that the car stopped at or near the intersection of Third avenue and Forty-Sixth street; that it was stopped in response to a signal given by some one; that plaintiff started to alight, and before she had safely done so the car started up and she was, thrown down. It did not appear that the conductor saw her or knew that she was alighting, nor did it appear that a signal to start was given by the conductor or any one. These facts, in our opinion, established a prima facie case of negligence on defendant’s part.

When a street surface car has come to a full standstill, reasonable *374care in its operation' demands that it shall not be started without some effort on the part of the conductor or motorman to determine whether this may be done with safety to passengers or intending passengers, and the question of negligence is one for the jury. Bessenger v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 79 App. Div. 32, 79 N. Y. Supp. 1017. In our opinion the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case, and it was error to dismiss the complaint.

Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Exhibit 32.0

# Written Statement of
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350

Solely for the purposes of complying
with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Cal-Maine
Foods Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on their knowledge, that the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended November 26, 2005 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.

/s/ Fred R. Adams, Jr. Fred R.
Adams, Jr.Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

/s/ Timothy A. Dawson Timothy A.
Dawson  Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary

Date:  January 4, 2006
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHARON ALICIA BURKE ANZALDI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 2987

)

RACHEL MARIE CANNON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Sharon Alicia Burke Anzaldi ("Anzaldi") has continued to demonstrate

throughout her filings in this action that she occupies a fantasy legal world of her own creation. 

This Court might well have terminated this action before now on grounds of its legal and factual

frivolousness (see, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)), but it harbored a

slim hope -- perhaps unrealistically on its own part -- that an identification for Anzaldi of the

potential consequences that she risked by persisting in her bizarre misperceptions might perhaps

shock her back into the real world of the law.1

On August 3 Anzaldi filed a purported "Answer and Response to Memorandum Order"

that is just as bizarre as her earlier submissions, simply advancing her otherworldly views. This

Court is not qualified to engage in the amateur practice of psychiatry, so it will not embark on

 Hence it issued a July 19, 2012 Memorandum Order ("Order") that called for a 1

response by Anzaldi as to "(1) why her filing of the original Complaint and of her current

response have assertedly not violated Rule 11(b) and (2) why any such violations should not

result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions" -- and the Order concluded by setting out a

number of such possible sanctions.
that path. Instead it finds that Anzaldi has demonstrated once again that she is beyond the efforts

of this Court to jolt her out of her fantasies. It orders the following, as forecast by the Order:

1. This action is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Anzaldi is ordered to file a thorough financial statement on or

before September 7, 2012 to enable this Court to determine what

(if any) monetary sanctions may fairly be imposed on her as

permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(B).

3. All of this Court's memorandum orders in this case are referred to

this Court's colleague Honorable Harry Leinenweber for his

consideration, if Anzaldi is convicted in the criminal case before

him, of whether she may be found for Sentencing Guideline

purposes to have attempted to obstruct justice by her actions in this

case.

__________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: August 7, 2012

- 2 -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DEREK J. WIGGINS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 755 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30th day of April, 2018

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Thunder Mountain Gold Inc, (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, E. James Collord, President, Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   /s/ E. James Collord By  __________________________________ E.  James Collord President, Director and Chief Executive Officer Date:   October 20, 2006
(June 15, 1964)

#### Robert Bennett et al., Appellants, v. J. Burch McMorran, as Superintendent of Public Works of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

In an action for a declaratory *judgment and*injunctive relief seeking, in effect, to prevent the New York State Department of Public Works from proceeding with a proposed reconstruction and widening of *the*Sunrise Highway in the County of Suffolk, plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered April 17, 1963 upon the opinion *and*decision of the court (38 Misc 2d 928) after a non jury trial, holding in substance that the proposed reconstruction was not illegal and dismissing the complaint on the merits. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Plaintiffs’ right to relief is predicated upon the claim that the highway, as reconstructed, will be a “ controlled access highway ” within the meaning of the Highway Law, and that the improvement is illegal because defendants have failed to obtain the consent of .the Suffolk County Board of Supervisors, as required by that statute (Highway Law, § 30, suibd. 1, par. [a]). The highway, as contemplated, will consist of 10 lanes. There will be three inner lanes and two outer lanes in each direction. The express lanes will be separated from the outer lanes by fences, and there will be only limited movement between the inner and outer lanes. However, there will be free and unlimited access to the outer lanes by abutting property owners and others. Subdivision 2 of section 3 of the Highway Law provides, among other things, that a controlled access highway is one “to and from which the owners or occupants of abutting property or of any other persons shall have no right of access”. Since there will be unrestricted access to and from the outer lanes, we are of the opinion that the proposed highway will not be a controlled access highway within the purview of subdivision 2 of section 3 of the statute and that the consent of the Board of Supervisors was, therefore, unnecessary. Kleinfeld, Acting P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### 1480.302 Restrictions on the use of the Buy Indian Act.

IA must not use the authority of the Buy Indian Act and the procedures contained in this part to award intergovernmental contracts to Tribal organizations to plan, operate, or administer authorized IA programs (or parts thereof) that are within the scope and intent of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) (Pub. L. 93-638). IA must use the Buy Indian Act solely to award procurement contracts to IEEs. Contracts subject to ISDEAA must follow 25 CFR part 900.
#### 2131.205-70 Major subcontractor service charge.

In a subcontract for enrollment and eligibility determinations, administration of claims and payment of benefits and any other subcontract for which prior approval is necessary, when costs are determined on the basis of actual costs incurred, any amount that exceeds the allowable cost of a major subcontract (whether entitled service charge, incentive fee, profit, fee, surplus, or any other title) is not allowable under the contract. Amounts which exceed allowable costs may be paid to a major subcontractor only from the risk charge or service charge negotiated between OPM and the contractor.
#### Mayor and Aldermen of Milledgeville *v.*Stembridge.

Evans, P. J.

1. Where a plaintiif sues a municipality for negligently diverting water upon premises used by him as a lumber yard and a place for conducting a business of selling lumber and builder’s supplies, and one of the items of damages claimed is a gross sum alleged to have been expended in filling up the ditches caused by the overflow of *693water, so that the premises could be restored to the former condition and use, such allegations are not open to special demurrer on the ground that the character of the washes, the necessity for repairs, and the various items of payment should be more specifically stated.

April 17, 1913.

Action for damages. Before Judge J. B. Park. Baldwin superior court. March 19, 1912. •

*Livingston Kenan,*for plaintiff in error.

*Allen & Pottle,*contra.

2. Where a municipality constructs a sewer in an ope.n drain in a street, which hitherto has been sufficient to carry off the surface-water, and by reason of the construction of the sewer the surface-water is diverted upon the premises of an owner of abutting property, to the injury and damage thereof, a cause of action arises. *Langley*v. *City Council of Augusta,*118 *Ga.*591 (45 S. E. 486, 98 Am. St. R. 133); *Mayor &c. of Albany*v. *Sikes,*94 *Ga.*30 (20 S. E. 257, 26 L. R. A. 653, 47 Am. St. R. 132).

3. In actions ex delicto the jury may allow interest as part qf the damages. If interest is allowed it is not recoverable eo nomine, and the verdict should express the damages in an aggregate sum. But verdicts are to be given a reasonable intendment; and where the jury return a verdict in an ex delicto action for the plaintiff in “the sum of $200 principal, interest $47.82, making principal and interest $247.82,” it will be upheld as a finding for $247.82 damages. *W. d A. R. Co. v. Brown,*102 *Ga.*13 (29 S. E. 130); *T., T. & G. Ry. Co.*v. *Butler, 4 Ga. App.*191 (60 S. E. 1087).

4. The charge of the court was comprehensive, and fairly submitted the issues, and was not open to any of the criticisms made upon it. The evidence authorized the verdict, which has the approval of the trial judge; and no sufficient reason is made to appear why a new trial should be granted.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
### Fw: SO2 briefings? Michael Stewart to: Tricia Crabtree 04/19/2010 04:45 PM Michael J. Stewart, Ph.D. Environmental Protection Specialist Health and Environmental Impacts Division U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 (919) 541-7524 stewart.michael@epa.gov ----- Forwarded by Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US on 04/19/2010 04:45 PM -----

From: Lydia Wegman/RTP/USEPA/US To: "King, Heidi R." <Heidi

_ R.

_ King@omb.eop.gov> Cc: Kristal Mozingo/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Karen Martin/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Date: 04/19/2010 04:41 PM Subject: RE: SO2 briefings? I know that I can't make 3 PM on April 26, as I plan to be out of town, but as long as Mike and Karen are available, I think we should be able to do the initial background briefing. Let me see what they think and get back to you via Kristal. "King, Heidi R." 04/19/2010 04:32:57 PM 4/26 at 3pm would be perfect. Kristal, would that...
From: "King, Heidi R." <Heidi

_ R.

_ King@omb.eop.gov> To: Lydia Wegman/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Cc: Kristal Mozingo/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Date: 04/19/2010 04:32 PM Subject: RE: SO2 briefings?

4/26 at 3pm would be perfect. Kristal, would that work for EPA? Apologies, managing multiple tight schedules on my end, heidi -----Original Message----- From: Wegman.Lydia@epamail.epa.gov [mailto:Wegman.Lydia@epamail.epa.gov] Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:29 PM To: King, Heidi R. Cc: Mozingo.Kristal@epamail.epa.gov; Stewart.Michael@epamail.epa.gov Subject: SO2 briefings?
Hi Heidi, I imagine you're quite busy but wanted to follow-up on the e-mail exchange we had about SO2 briefings. Kristal said she hadn't heard from you yet and I didn't want too much time to go by before we scheduled a meeting on science background, as a refresher, and comments we received for later this week and then for next week or early the following week, a briefing on the package itself. I think you were going to checkschedules and let us know what worked for yo u . L et us know when you have a chance. Thanks a lot. Lydia
#### The People of the State of New York v. Nathaniel Johnson.

Motion for leave to appeal as a poor person granted to the extent and on the terms and conditions contained in the order filed herein. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Yalente and McNally, JJ.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
**564 CAF 11-00659**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF JAZIEL M.

--------------------------------------------- GENESEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; NICOLE R., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. CHARLES N. ZAMBITO, COUNTY ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (PAULA A. CAMPBELL OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. JACQUELINE M. GRASSO, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, BATAVIA, FOR JAZIEL M.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Genesee County (Eric R. Adams, J.), entered March 1, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10. The order adjudged that respondent had neglected the subject child and placed respondent under the supervision of petitioner. It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed without costs. Same Memorandum as in Matter of Romeo M. (___ AD3d ___ [Apr. 20, 2012]).

Entered: April 20, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court