Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Joan H. Lefkow Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 11 C 7958 DATE 1/6/2012

CASE

TITLE

Byron McClain (#2011-0711244) v. Officer T. Bailey, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. The case is

terminated. All pending motions are denied as moot. 

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections, brings this

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Officer T. Bailey has violated his

rights by denying him access to the law library. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bailey has been unprofessional

and has forged his signature on request slips signifying that he had refused to go to the law library. On

November 14, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff has

submitted the amended complaint, as ordered.

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a suit brought in forma pauperis

at any time if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief. Here, even accepting

Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint fails to state a claim as a matter

of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bailey has been unprofessional, forged his signature on slips indicating

he refused to go to the law library so she could sleep during her workday. He further alleges that because he did

not have access to the law library, he was unable to file a motion to vacate the charges brought against him in

his state criminal case. Plaintiff finally alleges that because he was unable to file the motion, he lost his criminal

case. 

Initially, it is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint whether he was represented by counsel in his state

criminal case. However, if he was, an inmate’s right of access to the courts is generally satisfied if he is

represented by counsel. See, e.g., Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir. 1999); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d

1451, 1456 (7th Cir. 1988). A criminal defendant who is represented by counsel does not have the right to file

his own, pro se submissions. United States v. Williams, 495 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Gwiazdzinski, 141 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1998). 

(CONTINUED)

AWL

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STATEMENT (continued)

To the extent that Plaintiff proceeded in his criminal case pro se, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

held that a defendant who declines appointed counsel and instead invokes his constitutional right to

self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), “does not have a right to access to a law

library.” United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d

706, 743 (7th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 227 (7th Cir. 1983). “The rule is that

[the defendant] has the right to legal help through appointed counsel, and when he declines that help, other

alternative rights, like access to a law library, do not spring up.” U.S. v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 311 (7th Cir. 2010),

citing Byrd, 208 F.3d at 593. So under Seventh Circuit case law, Plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing a claim for

violation of his access to the courts.

Additionally, to succeed on a claim of denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff must be able to establish

“prejudice suffered because of the defendants’ alleged conduct.” Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir.

2006) (quoting Ortloff v. United States, 335 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003)). While Plaintiff has alleged prejudice

relating to any limitations Defendant Bailey placed on his access to the law library, he has failed to state a cause

of action. 

 Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of establishing “prejudice” without showing that his criminal conviction

has been reversed. In Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1999), an inmate sued correctional officials for

violating his constitutional right of access to the courts, claiming that the defendants had hindered his efforts to

litigate a post-conviction petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit on

the basis of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), which bars suits for damages on any theory that implies

the invalidity of a non-reversed conviction. The Court of Appeals held, “In a case such as Heck, where the prisoner

is complaining about being hindered in his efforts to get his conviction set aside, the hindrance is of no

consequence if the conviction was valid, and so he cannot get damages until the conviction is invalidated.” Hoard,

175 F.3d at 534; see also Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[t]he holding of Lewis [v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, (1996)] that a claim based on deprivation of access to the courts requires proof of concrete injury,

combined with the holding of Heck, means that a prisoner . . . must have the judgment annulled before damages

are available”). Plaintiff represents in his amended complaint that he has been convicted of the charges brought

against him, which means that he will have to have his conviction overturned before he can pursue damages on any

claim for violation of his right to access to the courts. 

 For the foregoing reasons, this suit is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this court within 30 days

of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth

the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal,

he will be liable for the $455 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. Lucien v. Jockisch, 133

F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff may accumulate

a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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