UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DARLENE SHEILS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GATEHOUSE MEDIA, INC., GATEHOUSE 

MEDIA SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, INC.

and SHAW SUBURBAN MEDIA GROUP,

INC., 

Defendants. 

No. 12 CV 2766 

Judge Manish S. Shah 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants GateHouse Media, Inc., 

and GateHouse Media Suburban Newspapers, Inc., on plaintiff Darlene Sheils’s 

Family Medical Leave Act interference claim and in favor of Sheils on her claims for 

FMLA retaliation (based on a demotion), FMLA retaliation (based on her 

subsequent firing), Illinois retaliatory discharge, and overtime (under the Fair 

Labor Standards Act and Illinois Minimum Wage Law). The jury also found that 

GateHouse Media, Inc., and GateHouse Media Suburban Newspapers, Inc., were 

joint employers. The jury awarded Sheils: $3,637 in back pay for FMLA retaliationdemotion, $62,036.01 in back pay for FMLA and Illinois retaliatory discharge, 

$60,000 for emotional distress for retaliatory discharge, and $125,000 in punitive 

damages for retaliatory discharge. The jury also found that GateHouse’s violation of 

the Fair Labor Standards Act was willful and that Sheils worked 37.5 hours of 

unpaid overtime in 2010. 

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GateHouse now moves for judgment as a matter of law on all of Sheils’s 

claims or, in the alternative, for a new trial or reduction of damages through 

remittitur. Sheils moves for entry of judgment and full relief and moves for entry of 

judgment against Shaw Suburban Media Group, Inc., under successor liability. For 

the following reasons, GateHouse’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is 

denied, GateHouse’s motion for a new trial is granted in part, denied in part, and 

Sheils’s motion for entry of judgment and full relief is granted in part, denied in 

part. Sheils’s request for a finding of successor liability as to Shaw is granted. The 

entry of judgment must await the resolution of all claims. 

I. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial 

GateHouse moves for judgment as a matter of law on all of Sheils’s claims, 

arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding in favor of 

Sheils. In the alternative, GateHouse moves for a new trial or remittitur of 

damages. 

A. Background

Darlene Sheils worked as graphic designer in creative design work for local 

suburban newspapers published by GateHouse Media Suburban Newspapers, Inc. 

She developed carpal tunnel syndrome and filed a workers’ compensation claim in 

June 2009. Sheils took two FMLA leaves for surgery. Her first FMLA leave was 

during August to September 2009 and December 2009 to January 2010. During her 

FMLA leave, the company started downsizing. Upon returning from leave in 

January 2010, Sheils was reclassified from a salaried employee with the title of 

creative director to an hourly employee with reduced pay. Then, while out on a 

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second FMLA leave in January 2011, she was fired. Her position was outsourced to 

India. Other positions, such as Ad Traffic Coordinator and Senior Production 

Coordinator, remained at GateHouse. Sheils applied for these two positions but did 

not get them. 

GateHouse Media Suburban Newspapers, Inc., was a subsidiary of 

GateHouse Media, Inc. In October 2012, Shaw Suburban Media Group, Inc., bought 

GateHouse Suburban in an asset purchase, with all proceeds retained by 

GateHouse Media. GateHouse Media is currently an operating business supporting 

subsidiary newspaper companies. 

Sheils filed two claims under the FMLA based on her demotion after 

returning from her first FMLA leave: an FMLA interference claim and an FMLA 

retaliation claim. She also pursued claims for retaliation under the FMLA and 

Illinois common law based on her discharge. Finally, she alleged that she worked 

overtime for which she was not compensated in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act and Illinois Minimum Wage Law. 

A. Legal Standards 

On a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, “the 

question is not whether the jury believed the right people, but only whether it was 

presented with a legally sufficient amount of evidence from which it could 

reasonably derive its verdict.” Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ill., 226 F.3d 922, 

924 (7th Cir. 2000). A court must determine whether the evidence presented at 

trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient 

to support the verdict. Id. A “mere scintilla” of evidence is not sufficient to sustain a 

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verdict, id., but judges are not to substitute their view of the contested evidence in 

place of the jury’s determination. Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 

2004) (“We will not set aside a jury verdict if a reasonable basis exists in the record 

to support the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, and leaving issues of credibility and weight of evidence to the 

jury.”). In other words, the test is whether “no rational juror could have found for 

the prevailing party.” Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Under Rule 59, a new trial may be granted after a jury trial “for any reason 

for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal 

court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). “A new trial is appropriate if the jury’s verdict is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial was in some way unfair to 

the moving party.” Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A new trial based on 

inconsistent verdicts is warranted only when a jury’s verdict cannot be reconciled 

with the evidence at trial.” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 844 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006)). “Any plausible explanation 

for the verdict precludes reversal.” Id. (citing Carter v. Chicago Police Officers, 165 

F.3d 1071, 1081 (7th Cir. 1998)). Also, “the consistency of the jury verdicts must be 

considered in light of the judge’s instructions to the jury.” Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 

1146, 1151 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 

118–22 (1963)). 

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B. FMLA Demotion Claims (Interference and Retaliation) 

GateHouse seeks judgment as a matter of law on Sheils’s FMLA interference 

and retaliation claims for her January 2010 demotion upon returning from her 

FMLA leave. GateHouse admits that some negative comments relating to Sheils’s 

June 2009 workers’ compensation claim allegedly made by GateHouse employees—

including Carol Gilbert (Sheils’s direct supervisor), Caroll Stacklin (GateHouse’s 

publisher), and Don Stamper (GateHouse’s production director)—were offered at 

trial, but believes these are irrelevant to the FMLA claims. The only other evidence, 

GateHouse maintains, is the timing of Sheils’s demotion immediately after her 

FMLA leave, which GateHouse argues is insufficient by itself to establish a 

retaliatory motive. And GateHouse also contends that Sheils’s position was 

eliminated during outsourcing of several positions, so she could not have been 

returned to her previous position. There was evidence, however, to support a jury 

verdict for Sheils on both claims. For the interference claim, Sheils only needed to 

prove that she was not reinstated to her former position and (for statute of 

limitations purposes) that GateHouse knew or was indifferent to violating the 

FMLA. For the retaliation claim, Sheils needed to prove that she was demoted in 

retaliation for her FMLA leave. At trial, Sheils presented evidence that she was 

demoted because upon returning from leave, she was reclassified from the salaried 

position of creative director to an hourly-rate position laying out ads. In addition to 

the negative comments her supervisors made relating to her workers’ compensation 

claim (involving the same injury for which Sheils requested FMLA leave) and the 

timing of her demotion after returning from leave, Sheils also presented evidence 

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that her pay was cut more significantly than other employees who did not take 

leave and that her supervisor Gilbert’s behavior toward Sheils changed after her 

FMLA leave. 

GateHouse also seeks a new trial on the FMLA retaliation-demotion claim. 

GateHouse believes the evidence presented to the jury did not justify divergent 

verdicts between the FMLA interference-demotion and FMLA retaliation-demotion 

claims because the two claims are coextensive and required the same finding as to 

knowledge and intent. Sheils argues that although similar, the FMLA interferencedemotion and retaliation-demotion claims are based on two separate causes of 

action and do not require identical findings.1 

Jury verdicts are “inconsistent” only if there is no plausible explanation for 

the verdict, considered in light of the jury instructions. Fox, 600 F.3d at 844 (citing 

Pearson, 471 F.3d at 739); see Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422 F.3d 611, 617 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (“If possible, this court must reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts, 

rather than overturn them.”) (citing Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Reg’l 

Transp. Auth., 125 F.3d 420, 431 (7th Cir. 1997)); Bates, 745 F.2d at 1151 (“Of 

course, the consistency of the jury verdicts must be considered in light of the judge’s 

instructions to the jury.”) (citing Gallick, 372 U.S. at 118–22). A new trial, not 

judgment as a matter of law, is the appropriate remedy for inconsistent verdicts 

 

1 Sheils argues that GateHouse waived this argument by failing to make a 

contemporaneous objection at the time the jury rendered its verdict but acknowledges that 

the Seventh Circuit has never decided whether the failure to contemporaneously object 

constitutes a definitive waiver. Carter, 165 F.3d at 1079–80. Given this open question, I 

address the merits. 

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because “[t]here is no priority among inconsistent verdicts.” Gordon v. Degelmann, 

29 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Am. Cas. Co. v. B. Cianciolo, Inc., 987 F.2d 

1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1993)); Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 617 (“A new trial on all claims 

is the appropriate remedy (rather than judgment as a matter of law) in a case in 

which the jury has returned inconsistent verdicts.”). 

The FMLA interference-demotion verdict for GateHouse and the FMLA 

retaliation-demotion verdict for Sheils are inconsistent, requiring a new trial on 

both claims. Both the interference claim and retaliation claim are based on the 

same underlying event, Sheils’s January 2010 demotion. Both claims required the 

jury to assess whether Sheils was reinstated to an equivalent position or demoted. 

The interference instruction required Sheils to prove that she was not reinstated to 

an equivalent position in 2010 after returning from her FMLA leave, or GateHouse 

to prove that it would have demoted Sheils anyway after returning from her FMLA 

leave. So the verdict for GateHouse on the interference claim means that the jury 

either found that Sheils was reinstated to an equivalent position or found that she 

would have been demoted regardless of her FMLA leave. In contrast, the verdict for 

Sheils on the retaliation claim means that the jury found that GateHouse demoted 

Sheils in 2010 because of her FMLA leave. Logically, under the instructions 

provided to the jury, Sheils could not have been reinstated to an equivalent position 

(or demoted regardless of her FMLA leave) while she was demoted in retaliation for 

her FMLA leave. 

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To reconcile the divergent verdicts, Sheils tries to distinguish between “a 

failure to reinstate to a former or equivalent position” (the materially adverse 

employment action required for FMLA interference) and “a demotion” (the 

materially adverse employment action required for FMLA retaliation). [129] at 19. 

Sheils asserts that the jury could have concluded that while Sheils was reinstated 

to an equivalent position for the interference claim, she was still “demoted” in 

retaliation for exercising her rights under the FMLA because it was still a lesser 

position in some respects. But the jury instructions precluded finding both that 

Sheils was reinstated to an “equivalent” position while being demoted. Specifically, 

the jury instruction defined an “equivalent position” as “one that is virtually 

identical to the employee’s former position in terms of pay, benefits and working 

conditions, including privileges, perquisites, and status” and which involves “the 

same or substantially similar duties and responsibilities.” [100] at 19. Sheils could 

not have been reinstated to a “virtually identical” position while being demoted. In 

addition, the FMLA interference-demotion jury instruction referenced both the 

failure to reinstate Sheils to her former position and her demotion as the same 

event at issue. [100] at 18. Similarly, Sheils argued in closing that both of these 

claims related to the demotion and pay cut and that the facts surrounding the 

demotion were the same for both claims. 

For interference and retaliation claims premised on the same underlying 

conduct, “[t]he difference between a retaliation and interference theory is that the 

first ‘requires proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent while [an interference 

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theory] requires only proof that the employer denied the employee his or her 

entitlements under the Act.’” Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting in part Kauffman v. Fed. Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th 

Cir. 2005)). Sheils’s interference and retaliation claims are based on the same 

alleged demotion and require essentially the same proof, with only a higher level of 

proof required for retaliation. Therefore, the verdict for Sheils on the retaliation 

claim, which requires more proof, is inconsistent with a verdict for GateHouse on 

the interference claim. See, e.g., Harris v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 F.3d 

592, 599 (2d Cir. 2001) (where employer replaced employee supervisor positions 

with “team leader” positions, jury finding that plaintiff’s termination was 

retaliatory was irreconcilable with jury finding that employer’s decision not to 

rehire plaintiff as a “team leader” was not retaliatory).

Because the FMLA interference-demotion and retaliation-demotion verdicts 

were inconsistent, a new trial on both claims is necessary because “[t]here is no 

priority among inconsistent verdicts.” Gordon, 29 F.3d at 298 (citing Am. Cas. Co.,

987 F.2d at 1305). But the jury verdicts on Sheils’s other claims need not be 

disturbed because there is no such inconsistency among them. “Partial trials are 

proper if ‘it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable 

from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.’” McClain v. 

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 139 F.3d 1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting in 

part Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931)). In 

particular, Sheils’s retaliatory discharge claims are based on a distinct underlying 

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event—Sheils’s 2011 termination, not her 2010 demotion—and required different 

elements of proof. See, e.g., Bankcard Am., Inc. v. Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 

F.3d 477, 485 (7th Cir. 2000); McClain, 139 F.3d at 1128; Harris, 252 F.3d at 599. 

GateHouse’s motion for a new trial on liability and damages for the FMLA 

interference-demotion and FMLA retaliation-demotion claims is granted. 

C. Retaliatory Discharge Claims 

GateHouse moves for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a 

new trial on Sheils’s retaliatory discharge claims under the FMLA and Illinois law 

for her 2011 termination. GateHouse’s arguments for both judgment as a matter of 

law and a new trial are the same and are addressed as one. 

1. FMLA Retaliatory Discharge 

The FMLA retaliation claim required Sheils to prove that GateHouse 

discharged her in 2011 because of her FMLA leave. GateHouse asserts that there 

was not enough evidence to support the jury’s verdict in favor of Sheils. 

Acknowledging that evidence was introduced to show Sheils’s supervisors’ negative 

comments relating to her workers’ compensation claim, GateHouse argues that this 

evidence is irrelevant to the FMLA claim and that the only evidence offered to show 

her termination was retaliatory were: the coincidental timing of department-wide 

layoffs, GateHouse’s decision not to hire Sheils for either of the post-reorganization 

positions to which she applied, and GateHouse’s later advertisements for these postreorganization positions. According to GateHouse, its witnesses’ testimony 

explaining why Sheils was not rehired and why these ads were posted was 

unrebutted, and therefore must be credited by the fact-finder. 

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The jury was presented with a legally sufficient amount of evidence to find 

that Sheils was terminated in 2011 in retaliation for exercising her rights under the 

FMLA. The evidence offered to show retaliation included: Sheils and a former coworker, Maggie Grover, testified that Sheils’s supervisor Gilbert made negative 

comments about Sheils’s need for FMLA leave, the timing and length of her FMLA 

leaves, and how the work would get done in Sheils’s absence; Sheils’s supervisor 

testified that she took Sheils’s FMLA leave into account when rating her on 

attendance and other categories in considering whether to terminate her; Stacklin 

inquired about Sheils’s FMLA leave prior to Sheils’s termination; GateHouse 

decided not to hire Sheils for either post-reorganization position to which she 

applied; and GateHouse advertised for these positions after Sheils was not selected. 

Taken together, this was “a legally sufficient amount of evidence from which [the 

jury] could reasonably derive its verdict” in favor of Sheils. Massey, 226 F.3d at 924. 

GateHouse argues that its witnesses provided various, uncontradicted explanations 

for its actions, so the jury was required to credit their testimony, but “[i]t is the 

prerogative of a jury or other trier of fact to disbelieve uncontradicted testimony 

unless other evidence shows that the testimony must be true.” E.E.O.C. v. G-K-G, 

Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (citing Masciale v. 

United States, 356 U.S. 386, 388 (1958)). Under the evidence presented in this case, 

the jury was not required to believe the explanations proffered by GateHouse’s 

witnesses. GateHouse’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the 

FMLA retaliatory discharge claim is denied. 

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2. Illinois Law Retaliatory Discharge 

GateHouse also seeks judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on Sheils’s 

Illinois common law retaliatory discharge claim. This retaliation claim required 

Sheils to prove that her exercise of rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Act was a proximate cause of her discharge in 2011. GateHouse acknowledges that 

evidence was introduced regarding Sheils’s supervisors’ alleged negative comments 

relating to her June 2009 workers’ compensation claim, which suggested that 

Sheils’s supervisors were angry with her for filing the workers’ compensation claim 

and implied that she should not have hired a lawyer. Even so, GateHouse points out 

that, on the stand, these witnesses denied making these comments. GateHouse also 

argues that a jury could not find proximate cause between the 2009 workers’ 

compensation claim and her termination in 2011, eighteen months later. However, 

evidence was also introduced during trial to show that Sheils’s FMLA leaves were 

related to her workers’ compensation injury and that GateHouse considered Sheils’s 

workers’ compensation claim and subsequent FMLA leaves to be related. For 

example, evidence was introduced showing that Stacklin inquired about the status 

of Sheils’s workers’ compensation claim when Sheils was considered for 

termination. Taken together, this evidence was legally sufficient for a jury to find a 

proximate cause between Sheils’s workers’ compensation claim in 2009 and her 

discharge eighteen months later. GateHouse’s motion for judgment as a matter of 

law or a new trial on the workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim is 

denied. 

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3. Back Pay 

GateHouse moves to overturn the jury’s award of $62,036.01 in back pay for 

Sheils’s 2011 retaliatory discharge. Back pay is an available remedy for retaliatory 

discharge under the FMLA and Illinois law. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(1)(A); Kritzen v. 

Flender Corp., 226 Ill.App.3d 541, 557–58 (2d Dist. 1992). GateHouse offers several 

arguments for why it believes this award was not supported by the evidence. 

First, GateHouse argues that the evidence showed that Sheils would not be 

able to perform the physical requirements of either available job with one hand 

upon returning from her FMLA leave. A plaintiff’s inability to perform the essential 

functions of her job bars recovery of back pay for retaliatory discharge under both 

the FMLA and Illinois law. Franzen v. Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Dale v. S. Cent. Ill. Mass Transit Dist., 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, ¶¶ 33–34. 

GateHouse believes the evidence at trial showed that Sheils could not perform 

either available post-reorganization job upon returning from her FMLA leave. 

Specifically, Stacklin (GateHouse’s publisher) testified that Sheils would not be able 

to perform the physical requirements of either job with the use of only one hand. In 

turn, Sheils testified that she had been practicing typing with one hand and 

believed that she could perform the job requirements. GateHouse argues that 

Sheils’s testimony was entirely speculative, because she had never seen either job 

performed, and was less “persuasive” than Stacklin’s testimony, which was the 

“best evidence” because it was based on her firsthand knowledge of the job 

requirements. Sheils’s testimony on this point was not entirely speculative, 

however, because Sheils presented evidence that her doctor released her to return 

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to work prior to expiration of her FMLA leave, that she was willing to return to 

work despite having a restriction on the use of her right hand, and that she knew 

the job duties of the two positions for which she had applied because she had been 

given the job descriptions as part of the application process and had performed most 

of those job functions during her prior employment. As evidenced by GateHouse’s 

own arguments about the persuasiveness of Stacklin’s versus Sheils’s testimony, 

this issue was ultimately a credibility determination for the jury based on 

competing testimony regarding Sheils’s ability to perform either job upon returning 

from leave. “[T]he jury [was] entitled to weigh the evidence presented to it and to 

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” Kapelanski, 390 F.3d at 531. 

Second, GateHouse asserts that introduction of its policies for ADA 

reasonable accommodation and light duty prejudicially confused the jury regarding 

whether Sheils was able to work after her FMLA leave and whether GateHouse 

would have terminated her anyway after her FMLA leave. GateHouse argues that 

these policies—on their face and as interpreted and explained by Stacklin 

(GateHouse’s publisher) and Laura Williams (GateHouse’s Vice President of Human 

Resources)—did not show that GateHouse would have accommodated Sheils’s 

physical restrictions or offered her an extended leave, even if these witnesses 

testified that each situation is considered on a case-by-case basis. Rather, 

GateHouse argues that their testimony established that GateHouse would have 

terminated Sheils’s employment at or shortly after her leave expiration because of 

GateHouse’s policies and business conditions at the time, which would not have 

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allowed Sheils to return to work with restrictions on the use of one arm. GateHouse 

insists this testimony was more persuasive than Sheils’s introduction of 

GateHouse’s policies regarding additional leave and light duty options and more 

persuasive than Sheils’s testimony that she could perform the post-reorganization 

job requirements with the use of one hand. Sheils argues that she presented 

evidence that GateHouse would have accommodated her short-term restriction on 

use of her right hand and that the introduction of GateHouse’s policies was not 

prejudicial because the issue was not whether the FMLA legally obligated 

GateHouse to provide Sheils with an accommodation, but whether GateHouse 

would have attempted to accommodate her pursuant to their internal policies 

instead of terminating her for her FMLA leave. 

At the end of the day, GateHouse’s arguments about the persuasiveness of 

Stacklin and Williams’s testimony about policy implementation versus the written 

policies themselves goes to the weight and credibility determinations entrusted to 

the jury. Kapelanski, 390 F.3d at 531. These policies were relevant to the issue of 

whether GateHouse would not have terminated Sheils upon the expiration of her 

FMLA even if she did not have the use of one hand, since it had flexible policies for 

accommodating employees for ADA and light-duty. Introduction of these ADA and 

light-duty policies was not unduly prejudicial (even in the absence of jury 

instructions clarifying that under the FMLA, there is no right to accommodation) 

because GateHouse was allowed to present witnesses to explain these policies and 

GateHouse’s general policies regarding FMLA leave. GateHouse was also permitted 

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to (and did) argue to the jury that the FMLA did not require accommodation of an 

employee’s illness. 

Third, GateHouse concludes that the jury must have been confused because it 

chose to award a lesser amount of back pay damages than any of the options listed 

in a damages chart used by both parties during closing arguments. In turn, Sheils 

argues that the jury was not required to adopt the damages chart created by the 

parties and that the jury was instructed on how to calculate back pay—broken down 

by category, position, and year—so that it could determine back pay as it deemed 

appropriate. 

Under Illinois law, “where the existence of damages is established, ‘the 

evidence need only tend to show a basis for the computation of damages with a fair 

degree of probability.’” Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 106 F.3d 

1388, 1398 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting in part In re Busse, 124 Ill.App.3d 433, 439 (1st 

Dist. 1984)). The law does not require that a jury verdict must match the damages 

figures provided by either party, or even a combination of the figures; “[r]ather, all 

the law requires is that the evidence tend to establish, with a fair degree of 

probability, a basis for the assessment of damages.” Id., (quoting F.L. Walz, Inc. v. 

Hobart Corp., 224 Ill.App.3d 727, 733 (3d Dist. 1992)). A jury can also reduce 

damage calculations, even if from an expert, without invalidating the verdict. Id., 

(citing F.L. Walz, 224 Ill.App.3d at 733). Here, the back pay award of $62,036.01 

was less than the back pay damages suggested by the parties ($0, $75,159.58, or 

$101,669.70), which were based on the post-reorganization positions for which 

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Sheils applied. But the jury was instructed on how to calculate back pay, and the 

amount awarded is not so far off from either parties’ suggestions that a court could 

conclude it had no basis in fact. For example, the jury could have believed that if 

Sheils had received the Ad Traffic Coordinator position, her salary might not 

perfectly match Sue Kirsch’s (perhaps because Sheils would have been legitimately 

placed on reduced hours, additional unpaid leave, or light duty compensated at a 

lower rate), and therefore Sheils was not entitled to all the back pay she requested. 

GateHouse also seeks remittitur. In considering a motion for remittitur, the 

jury’s verdict must be given “proper deference.” Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust 

of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2006). In deciding whether a damages award 

is excessive, a court considers the following factors: “whether (1) the award is 

monstrously excessive; (2) there is no rational connection between the award and 

the evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the jury’s fevered imaginings 

or personal vendettas; and (3) whether the award is roughly comparable to awards 

made in similar cases.” Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting G.G. v. Grindle, 665 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2011)). Remittitur is not 

appropriate here. There was a sufficient basis for the award, based on the evidence 

presented at trial. And the award is not “monstrously excessive” but in fact is less 

than, but comparable to, the amount the parties expected the jury to award for back 

pay if they believed Sheils would have been hired for either position to which she 

applied. 

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GateHouse’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, or 

remittitur on the back pay damages is denied. 

4. Emotional Distress Damages 

The jury awarded $60,000 in damages for emotional distress for Sheils’s 

Illinois retaliatory discharge claim. GateHouse moves to strike the award, for a new 

trial, or for remittitur, arguing that there is no rational connection between the 

jury’s award of $60,000 because Sheils’s emotional distress was only “garden 

variety” since she was never diagnosed with depression or anxiety and never 

received mental health treatment. GateHouse also argues that Sheils’s testimony 

about her emotional distress is not itself evidence that Sheils suffered tangible 

emotional distress. In turn, Sheils argues that evidence of medical or professional 

treatment or expert testimony is not necessary to prove emotional distress damages 

and that the jury’s award of $60,000 is in line with decisions in similar cases. 

An emotional distress damages award can be supported solely by a plaintiff’s 

testimony about his or her emotional distress. Tullis v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 

243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Sheils and her husband testified that 

Sheils experienced emotional distress after her termination, including feeling 

devastated, depressed, and humiliated, having difficulty socializing or enjoying 

former pastimes, and experienced physical symptoms including stomach spasms, 

difficulty sleeping, and grinding teeth. Sheils was not required to present medical or 

expert testimony or show that she sought medical or mental health treatment. See 

Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1068; see also Drakeford v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 2013 IL App 

(1st) 111366, ¶ 61, appeal denied, 996 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 2013) (“The fact that a plaintiff 

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testifies only briefly about an injury does not necessarily lessen the severity of the 

injury.”). Considering the factors for determining whether an award is excessive, 

see Adams, 798 F.3d at 543, new trial or remittitur is not appropriate. Based on the 

evidence at trial from Sheils and her husband regarding the emotional impact of the 

retaliatory discharge on Sheils, the jury’s award of $60,000 was perhaps generous, 

but not excessive. It is also in line with emotional distress damages awarded in 

other actions for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law.2 

The emotional distress award will stand. 

5. Punitive Damages 

The jury awarded $125,000 in punitive damages for Sheils’s Illinois 

retaliatory discharge claim. GateHouse argues that this award was not based on 

evidence of willful and wanton conduct because GateHouse witnesses testified that 

Sheils was terminated in a general layoff and that there were plausible reasons for 

hiring others in the positions for which Sheils applied. 

Under Illinois law, punitive damages may be awarded in cases of retaliatory 

discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim because otherwise there would be 

 

2 Although Illinois courts have traditionally declined to compare damages awarded in other 

cases in determining whether a particular award is excessive, Drakeford, 2013 IL App (1st) 

111366, ¶ 62, Sheils’s emotional distress damages award of $60,000 is not out of line when 

compared with other actions for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law. See, e.g., Holland 

v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶¶ 218–21, reh’g denied (July 1, 

2013), appeal denied, 996 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. 2013) (emotional distress award of $400,000 not 

excessive where plaintiff testified about his embarrassment and sense of failure, his 

subsequent house foreclosure for failure to make payments, his anxiety from losing his 

medical insurance for his son, and where his wife testified to his difficulty socializing and 

managing his anger); Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1067–69 (emotional distress award of $80,000 was 

“generous” but not excessive where plaintiff testified that he felt low, degraded, and backstabbed and experienced financial difficulties providing for his family while without work 

for several months). 

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little deterrent preventing employers from terminating employees and paying a 

small fine for violating the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. Kelsay v. Motorola, 

Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 186 (1978). Once a court has determined as a matter of law that 

punitive damages can be awarded for a particular cause of action, it is for the jury 

to decide based on the evidence presented whether the defendant’s conduct was 

sufficiently willful or wanton to warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 

Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill.2d 109, 116 (1998). Punitive damages may be 

awarded where retaliatory discharge was “committed with fraud, actual malice, 

deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such 

gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.” Kelsay, 

74 Ill.2d at 186. Evidence of willfulness can include: discharging an employee for 

suspected laziness or malingering relating to their workers’ compensation claim, 

Hollowell v. Wilder Corp. of Del., 318 Ill.App.3d 984, 989–90 (5th Dist. 2001); failing 

to rehire or recall an employee, Heldenbrand v. Roadmaster Corp., 277 Ill.App.3d 

664, 673 (5th Dist. 1996); threats, fabricated complaints, false evaluations of job 

performance, and other coercive tactics, Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. 

Associates, Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 946–47 (7th Cir. 2002). 

During trial, Sheils presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could 

have concluded that GateHouse discharged Sheils because it was unhappy she filed 

a workers’ compensation claim. Sheils presented evidence at trial indicating that 

she was employed for several years at GateHouse with a good record prior to her 

termination, that her pay was cut more than other employees’ pay shortly after she 

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filed her workers’ compensation claim, that her supervisors commented that 

GateHouse was unhappy she filed a claim and implied that she should not have 

hired a lawyer, and that GateHouse failed to rehire Sheils when additional 

positions became available after her termination. Although Sheils did not present a 

compelling tale of wanton animosity, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to make 

the call. 

The amount of punitive damages awarded was not legally excessive. “The 

amount of a punitive damages award will not be reversed unless it is so excessive 

that it must have been a result of passion, partiality, or corruption.” Blount v. 

Stroud, 395 Ill.App.3d 8, 22 (1st Dist. 2009). In reviewing a jury’s award of punitive 

damages, relevant circumstances to consider include, but are not limited to, the 

nature and enormity of the wrong, the financial status of the defendant, and the 

potential liability of the defendant. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill.2d 192, 204 (1989). Each 

case must be assessed in light of the specific facts and circumstances involved, and 

the underlying purpose of a punitive damage award must be satisfied. Deal, 127 

Ill.2d at 204. GateHouse Media has an estimated worth of over $500 million.3 An 

award of $125,000 (0.025% of GateHouse’s net worth) is not conscience-shocking. 

See, e.g., Holland v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 2013 IL App (5th) 110560, ¶¶ 252–

254 (in retaliatory discharge action, punitive damages award of $3.6 million, or 1% 

of defendant’s net worth, was not excessive), reh’g denied (July 1, 2013), appeal 

denied, 996 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. 2013); Blount, 395 Ill.App.3d at 23 (in retaliatory 

 

3 This figure was presented in Sheils’s brief ([129] at 8) and was not disputed by 

GateHouse. 

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discharge action, punitive damages award of $2.8 million, or 3% of defendant’s net 

worth, was not excessive); Hollowell, 318 Ill.App.3d at 990 (in retaliatory discharge 

action, punitive damages award of $50,000 against defendant worth $150 million 

was not excessive). And the punitive damages award need not be tied to Sheils’s 

back pay award because, under Illinois law, “there is no requirement that the 

amount of punitive damages imposed on a defendant bear any particular proportion 

to the size of the plaintiff’s compensatory recovery.” Blount, 395 Ill.App.3d at 23 

(citing Deal, 127 Ill.2d at 204). 

D. Overtime 

GateHouse also seeks judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the 

award of overtime pay to Sheils under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois 

Minimum Wage Act. The jury calculated a total of 37.5 hours in uncompensated 

overtime (9.5 hours from January 18 to April 15, 2010, and 28 hours from April 16, 

2010, to January 18, 2011) and found that GateHouse’s violation of the FLSA was 

willful. GateHouse argues that Sheils cannot meet her burden of proof on her FLSA 

overtime claim because there were no timecards in evidence showing that Sheils 

worked more than forty hours per week and because GateHouse’s witnesses 

testified that the workload of the department as a whole was diminished. There was 

however, more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence in support of plaintiff’s claim; 

Sheils presented evidence to show that her direct supervisor, Gilbert, made Sheils 

change her times or changed them herself and knew that Sheils had worked 

overtime without payment. The jury could sufficiently base its verdict on this 

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evidence, and the motion for a new trial or matter of law on the overtime award is 

denied. 

E. Joint Employers 

GateHouse moves for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the jury’s 

finding that GateHouse Media and GateHouse Suburban were joint employers. The 

ultimate determination of whether a joint-employer relationship exists varies 

depending on the specific facts of each case. Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. 

Commc’ns Ctr., 536 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2008). For a joint-employer relationship 

to exist, each alleged employer must exercise control over the working conditions of 

the employee. Id. (citing Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 408 

(7th Cir. 2007); 29 C.F.R. § 825.106). In assessing the amount of control an 

employer exercised over an employee, factors considered by courts include, but are 

not limited to, whether the alleged employer: (1) had the power to hire and fire 

employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of 

payments, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained 

employment records. Moldenhauer, 536 F.3d at 644. 

Although Stacklin (the GateHouse publisher) was technically a GateHouse 

Media employee when she was involved in the decision to terminate Sheils, 

GateHouse argues this was irrelevant and that there is no evidence that GateHouse 

Media controlled or had any involvement in the day-to-day activities of GateHouse 

Suburban employees, that GateHouse Media controlled rates of pay for GateHouse 

Suburban employees, or that GateHouse Media maintained the personnel files of 

GateHouse Suburban employees. The jury, however, was presented with sufficient 

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evidence to find that GateHouse Suburban and GateHouse Media shared control 

over Sheils’s working conditions. GateHouse Media decided that GateHouse 

Suburban would do outsourcing, which led to the elimination of Sheils’s job, and 

GateHouse Media declined to award Sheils one of the new positions for which she 

applied following her termination. Sheils was subject to GateHouse Media’s 

handbook and code of conduct, and Sheils was covered by GateHouse Media’s 

benefits, human resources, payroll processing, FMLA leave processing, and 

severance policy. In addition, GateHouse Media did not contest that it was Sheils’s 

employer in the workers’ compensation claim. These factors were sufficient for the 

jury to find that GateHouse Media exercised significant control over the terms and 

conditions of Sheils’s employment and therefore that it was a joint employer. 

II. Judgment and Relief 

Sheils moves the Court to enter judgment awarding Sheils the back pay, 

emotional distress damages, and punitive damages as determined by the jury. 

Sheils also seeks prejudgment interest, liquidated damages under the FMLA and 

FLSA, a statutory penalty for unpaid wages under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 

an award for the adverse tax consequences on her back pay, and attorney’s fees and 

costs. Since the defendants’ motion for a new trial has been granted in part, an 

entry of final judgment will not be entered. But most of the issues raised in 

plaintiff’s motion are suitable for resolution, and are addressed below. 

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A. Retaliatory Discharge (FMLA and Illinois Law) 

1. Back Pay 

As previously addressed, the Court denies GateHouse’s motion for judgment 

as a matter of law and for a new trial on the back pay award for the FMLA 

retaliation-discharge and Illinois law retaliatory discharge claims. Accordingly, at 

the appropriate time, the court will enter judgment for $62,036.01 in back pay for 

Sheils’s retaliatory discharge. 

2. Prejudgment Interest 

Prejudgment interest on back pay is appropriate under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii); Ryl-Kuchar v. Care Ctrs., Inc., 565 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 

2009) (prejudgment interest is “the norm in FMLA cases”) (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)). The FMLA does not provide a statutory rate of prejudgment 

interest, and in such circumstances, “the best starting point is to award interest at 

the market rate, which means an average of the prime rate for the years in 

question.” Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 1111, 1114 

(7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 31 

F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 1994)); First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & 

Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1999). Sheils was terminated on February 17, 

2011; since that date, the prime rate has remained at 3.25%.4 Compound 

prejudgment interest “is the norm in federal litigation.” Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. ex 

rel. Tabacalera Contreras Cigar Co. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 325 F.3d 924, 937–

38 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 (1987)). 

 

4 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/default.htm (last checked Oct. 27, 2015). 

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Sheils will be awarded prejudgment interest on her $62,036.01 in back pay from 

February 17, 2011 to the date judgment is entered, compounded monthly. 

Sheils will also receive postjudgment interest on her overall award under 28 

U.S.C. § 1961. 

3. Liquidated Damages 

Sheils seeks liquidated damages under the FMLA, arguing that liquidated 

damages are mandated unless there is a finding of good faith and that defendant 

cannot show good faith because the jury found that GateHouse acted willfully in 

violating the FMLA and the FLSA,. GateHouse argues that liquidated damages are 

discretionary and that the evidence showed that it acted in good faith. 

Under the FMLA, liquidated damages are presumed unless the employer 

demonstrates that it acted reasonably and in good faith. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii); Holder v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 

2014). The FMLA provides for liquidated damages equal to the amount awarded for 

compensatory damages and prejudgment interest. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii); 

Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 125 Fed. App’x 704, 705 (7th Cir. 2004) (awarding 

liquidated (doubled) damages under the FMLA). 

GateHouse has not met its burden of establishing that it acted reasonably or 

in good faith in discharging Sheils in retaliation for exercising her rights under the 

FMLA and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. Evidence was presented at trial 

showing that GateHouse knew that it would violate the FMLA to use FMLA leave 

as a negative factor in making an employment decision, but that Sheils’s FMLA 

leave (and its effect on Sheils’s attendance) was taken into account when 

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GateHouse decided to terminate Sheils. GateHouse’s evidence of its legitimate 

business motives does not overcome this specific instance of intentional use of 

FMLA leave to take an adverse employment action. Because GateHouse has not 

established that it acted reasonably and in good faith, the imposition of liquidated 

damages is mandatory under the FMLA. The back pay award of $62,036.01 plus 

prejudgment interest will be doubled. 

4. Reinstatement 

Sheils also moves for reinstatement to the position of Senior Production 

Coordinator at Shaw or, in the alternative, front pay for three years. Sheils argues 

that her request for reinstatement or three years front pay is reasonable in light of 

her qualifications, long-term history of employment with GateHouse, commitment 

to continued employment, and established earnings. Defendants argue that 

reinstatement to a position at Shaw would be inequitable to Shaw—who did not 

discharge Sheils—and that it is not feasible considering that the position with Shaw 

is located in Crystal Lake, Illinois, approximately 60 miles from Sheils’s home. 

Defendants also argue that Sheils is not entitled to reinstatement or front pay 

because she was unable to perform her job at the return of her FMLA leave, because 

her former position at GateHouse was outsourced to India, and because she has 

never performed the job of Senior Production Coordinator. Defendants also point to 

discord between Sheils and some of the former GateHouse employees now working 

at Shaw. 

The FMLA permits appropriate equitable relief, including reinstatement. 29 

U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B). “Although reinstatement is the preferred remedy, it is not 

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always appropriate.” Downes v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1141 (7th 

Cir. 1994) (citing McNeil v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986). “The 

court has discretion to grant or deny reinstatement and it may consider a number of 

factors in exercising that discretion, including hostility in the employment 

relationship and the lack of an available position to which to reinstate the plaintiff.” 

Id. (citing McNeil, 800 F.2d at 118). “The effect of equitable remedies on third 

parties, not to mention on the courts that must take the time to supervise them, is 

the practical reason why there is no ‘right’ to an equitable remedy, why the 

plaintiff’s claim to such a remedy may have to yield to competing considerations.” 

Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231–32 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1995)). Considering these factors, 

reinstatement to the position of Senior Production Coordinator is not appropriate in 

this case. 

There were two positions to which Sheils applied in 2011, and Sheils has not 

explained why the Court should choose reinstatement for the Senior Production 

Coordinator position (which pays approximately $5,000 more per year than Sheils 

currently makes), when Sheils also had applied to the Ad Traffic Coordinator 

position (which makes less than Sheils’s current job). Instead, Sheils proposes 

reinstatement or front pay for only the Senior Production Coordinator position, 

without explanation. Sheils obtained gainful employment in 2012 as a graphic 

artist, and her current pay is greater than the Ad Traffic Coordinator pay. Although 

Sheils said that she considers her current position less desirable than that of the 

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Senior Production Coordinator, the fact that she has for the past three years been 

gainfully employed in her field of work at a pay greater than one of the positions she 

sought at GateHouse weighs in favor of finding that reinstatement is not 

appropriate in this case. McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th 

Cir. 1992). 

Importantly, Sheils has also offered no evidence that a Senior Production 

Coordinator position (or an Ad Traffic Coordinator position) is currently available at 

Shaw or that an innocent employee would not be harmed by Sheils’s reinstatement. 

See Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1231 (reinstatement would have required employer to “bump” 

an innocent employee because there were no vacancies). Reinstatement is not 

appropriate. 

5. Front Pay 

In the alternative to reinstatement, Sheils requests three years of front pay 

of the difference between her current earnings and those of a Senior Production 

Coordinator as of 2014. “[W]hen reinstatement is infeasible, the plaintiff is free to 

seek in lieu of that remedy an award of ‘front pay,’ designed to put him in the 

identical financial position that he would have occupied had he been reinstated.” 

Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1231 (citing McNeil, 800 F.2d at 118). “Front pay is the difference 

(after proper discounting to present value) between what the plaintiff would have 

earned in the future had he been reinstated at the time of trial and what he would 

have earned in the future in his next best employment.” Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1231. 

“[W]hen a party fails to provide the district court with the essential data necessary 

to calculate a reasonably certain front pay award, the court may deny the front pay 

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request.” McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372. “Such information includes the amount of the 

proposed award, the length of time the plaintiff expects to work for the defendant, 

and the applicable discount rate.” Id. “Moreover, front pay awards, while often 

speculative, cannot be unduly so. The longer a proposed front pay period, the more 

speculative the damages become.” Id. (citing Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 

1056 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

Again, Sheils does not explain why front pay for the Senior Production 

Coordinator position would be appropriate when the Ad Traffic Coordinator 

position—to which she had also applied—pays less than Sheils’s current job. 

Sheils’s current gainful employment, at a greater pay rate to one of the positions 

she formerly sought, makes an award of front pay inappropriate. See, e.g., 

McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372. 

And, although there is “no rule against awarding both double [liquidated] 

damages and front pay in the same case,” the Seventh Circuit has cautioned trial 

judges to “be careful to make sure that the award of both sorts of relief does not 

result in overcompensation.” Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1232. “A substantial liquidated 

damages award only makes front pay less appropriate if a front pay award would be 

highly speculative due to the lengthy period for which damages are sought and the 

lack of certainty that plaintiff would have remained employed during such a lengthy 

period.” Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989). 

Given the generous liquidated damages that Sheils has been awarded, she would be 

overcompensated with an award of both front pay and liquidated damages, 

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especially when she is currently employed at a similar pay rate in a comparable 

field. Given the uncertainty over the nature of viable positions at Shaw, and the 

uncertainty over what Sheils’s performance in the GateHouse-Shaw environment 

would have been like for three years, it would be too speculative to fix any amount 

of front pay. 

Sheils’s front pay request is also denied because she failed to provide the 

appropriate discount rate. Front pay is defined as “the discounted present value of 

the difference between the earnings [an employee] would have received in his old 

employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive in his present and 

future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment.” Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 

F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Downes, 41 F.3d at 1141 n. 8). Without 

sufficient information to calculate front pay, it should be denied. See, e.g., 

McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372; Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 863 (7th 

Cir. 2001). For these reasons, Sheils’s request for front pay is denied. 

6. Award for Adverse Tax Consequences 

Sheils also seeks an award to offset the tax burden that she will incur as a 

result of her lump-sum back pay award. The Seventh Circuit, joining other circuits, 

recently adopted the availability of such an offset in discrimination cases. E.E.O.C. 

v. Northern Star Hosp., Inc., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015). Sheils has been 

awarded $62,036.01 in back pay for her retaliatory discharge. By receiving the 

wages now, in a lump sum added to her existing income, Sheils will be bumped into 

a higher tax bracket than if she had received the same amount of unpaid wages 

spread out from her termination in 2011, and she would undoubtedly have paid less 

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in taxes than she will have to now. Although disputing the amount of the 

underlying back pay award, GateHouse did not dispute an award to offset Sheils’s 

tax burden. Sheils maintains that the back pay award would place her in the 25% 

tax bracket, as opposed to the 15% tax bracket under her current salary,5 and she 

requests a 10% tax-component award on the back pay and front pay to account for 

the difference. [111] at 15–16. Sheils will be awarded $6,203.60 (10% x $62,036.01) 

to offset Sheils’s back pay award. 

B. Overtime (FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage Law) 

The jury found that Sheils worked 37.5 hours of unpaid overtime. Sheils’s 

hourly rate was $20, meaning her overtime hourly rate was $30. Her total unpaid 

overtime is $1,125 ($30 x 37.5). At the appropriate time, the court will enter 

judgment for $1,125 in unpaid wages for Sheils. 

1. Liquidated Damages and Illinois Minimum Wage 

Statutory Penalty 

Sheils also seeks liquidated damages under the FLSA. Liquidated damages 

are presumed under the FLSA unless the employer establishes that they acted 

reasonably and in good faith. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260; Jackson v. Go-Tane Servs., 

Inc., 56 Fed. App’x 267, 273 (7th Cir. 2003). The employer bears the burden of 

proving both good faith and reasonable belief to prevent the imposition of 

“mandatory” liquidated damages. Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 

729, 733 (7th Cir. 1998). The FLSA provides for liquidated damages in an equal 

amount to the unpaid wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Shea, 152 F.3d at 733 (There is a 

 

5 See Internal Revenue Service, Revenue Procedure 2014-61, available at 

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-14-61.pdf (last checked Oct. 27, 2015). 

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“strong presumption under the statute in favor of doubling,” which is “the norm, not 

the exception.”).6 

GateHouse has not carried its burden that it acted reasonably and in good 

faith in violating the FLSA through its failure to pay Sheils’s overtime. Evidence 

was presented at trial to show that Sheils’s direct supervisor, Gilbert, made Sheils 

change her times or changed them herself and knew that Sheils had worked 

overtime without payment.7 Sheils is entitled, therefore, to liquidated damages.

Sheils also seeks a statutory penalty under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 

which provides for a statutory penalty in the form of a 2% monthly charge on wages 

left unpaid. 820 ILCS 105/12(a) (providing for “damages of 2% of the amount of any 

such underpayments for each month following the date of payment during which 

such underpayments remain unpaid”). After prevailing on her overtime claim, 

Sheils is entitled to the 2% penalty provided for the in the statute.8

 

6 Prejudgment interest is not awarded with liquidated damages for an FLSA violation. 

Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 1999). The FMLA specifically 

provides for both prejudgment interest and liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 

2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). 

7 The Seventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether a jury’s finding of willfulness 

precludes a court from finding “good faith” that bars liquidated damages, but other circuits 

have held that a jury’s finding of willfulness precludes a finding of good faith. See Jackson 

v. City of Hot Springs, 751 F.3d 855, 867 (8th Cir. 2014); Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 

492, 501 (5th Cir. 2013); Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 

1150, 1166–67 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Byrne, 125 Fed. App’x at 705 (liquidated damages 

“follow automatically” if special verdict that employer had not acted in good faith was 

“supported by the evidence”). Ordinarily, a jury verdict “binds the judge with respect to any 

factual issues common to the jury- and judge-tried claims.” McKnight v. General Motors 

Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 113 (7th Cir. 1990). Whether or not the jury verdict precludes a goodfaith finding, I conclude that GateHouse has not carried its burden. 

8 GateHouse raised the question of whether this 2% penalty is duplicative and improper 

with an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA, but did not offer case law or 

argument on this point. Where two statutory regimes provide for separate causes of action, 

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C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

Sheils seeks attorneys’ fees and costs for prevailing on her FMLA, FLSA, and 

Illinois Minimum Wage Law claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 

820 ILCS 105/12(a). GateHouse concedes that Sheils’s attorneys may petition the 

Court for such an award under these statutes if her claims are upheld in the Court’s 

post-trial rulings. [121] at 3. Accordingly, Sheils should submit a fee petition no 

later than 91 days after entry of judgment. See Local Rule 54.3(b). 

III. Successor Liability 

Sheils moves for entry of judgment against Shaw Suburban Media Group, 

Inc., under a theory of successor liability. In October 2012, Shaw purchased 

GateHouse Suburban from GateHouse Media. Previously, Shaw’s motion for 

summary judgment—claiming it was not an appropriate defendant under the 

theory of successor liability—was denied. [47]. Before the trial, the parties agreed to 

submit evidence on successor liability, in writing, if the jury found for Sheils. 

In a case involving multiple corporate entities, “successor liability is ‘the 

default rule . . . to enforce federal labor or employment laws.’” Northern Star, 777 

F.3d at 901 (quoting in part Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Sols., LLC, 711 F.3d 

763, 769 (7th Cir. 2013)). Without successor liability, “the victim of the illegal 

employment practice is helpless to protect his rights against an employer’s change 

 

contain clear remedies, and are not mutually exclusive, they can and should both be given 

effect. Even if the purposes of the remedies are shared, there is no reason to conclude that 

the FLSA’s liquidated damages provision preempts Illinois’s decision to impose a 2% 

penalty. In the absence of a compelling argument from GateHouse for not awarding the 2% 

penalty provided by statute, the Wage Law statutory penalty will be permitted in addition 

to FLSA liquidated damages. 

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in the business” because “the predecessor’s illegal act may have left the employee 

without a job, promotion, or other employment benefits that he cannot now obtain 

from another employer, but that he might have received from the successor had the 

predecessor not violated the employee’s rights.” Northern Star, 777 F.3d at 901–02 

(quoting in part Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1985). 

There is a five-factor test for successor liability in the federal employment-law 

context: (1) whether the successor had notice of the pending lawsuit; (2) whether the 

predecessor could have provided the relief sought before the sale or dissolution; (3) 

whether the predecessor could have provided relief after the sale or dissolution; (4) 

whether the successor can provide the relief sought; and (5) whether there is 

continuity between the operations and work force of the predecessor and successor. 

Northern Star, 777 F.3d at 902 (citing Teed, 711 F.3d at 765–66). “Where the 

successor has notice of a predecessor’s liability, there is a presumption in favor of 

finding successor liability.” Id. 

In Shaw’s prior briefing on its motion for summary judgment regarding 

successor liability, Shaw did not dispute that the successorship elements as set 

forth in Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2013), 

are met under the circumstances in this case. This was a reasonable concession 

because the factors all weigh in favor of finding successor liability. 

First, Shaw had notice. As evidenced by GateHouse’s answer to Sheils’s 

Amended Complaint and the Asset Purchase Agreement, Sheils’s lawsuit was 

communicated to Shaw prior to its acquisition of GateHouse Suburban. [32] ¶ 15; 

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[108-1] at ¶ 4.15 & Schedule 4.15; [108-4] at 41; [38-4]; [47] at 3–4. This factor 

creates “a presumption in favor of finding successor liability.” Northern Star, 777 

F.3d at 902. 

Second, defendants have not denied that, prior to Shaw’s purchase, 

GateHouse Suburban would have been able to satisfy a judgment. And because 

Shaw purchased all of GateHouse Suburban’s assets and the proceeds of the sale 

were retained by GateHouse Media ([108-2] ¶¶ 3–5), the third factor—whether 

GateHouse Suburban could have provided relief after the sale—weighs in favor of 

successor liability. After Shaw’s purchase, GateHouse Suburban could not have paid 

any judgment obtained against it. [47] at 4; [38] at 4. Northern Star, 777 F.3d at 

902. 

Shaw could provide the relief sought by Sheils, which is a monetary award 

and reinstatement to the Senior Coordinator Position, which went to Shaw 

(although I have found reinstatement inappropriate in this case). Defendants do not 

dispute this. Also, Shaw substantially continued the prior business operations of 

GateHouse Suburban, and retained the majority of GateHouse Suburban’s 

employees. [47] at 4; [38] at 4; [108-4] at 19–20; [108-7]. There is continuity between 

the operations and work force of the GateHouse Suburban and Shaw. See Northern 

Star, 777 F.3d at 902. 

Despite this presumption of successorship liability, Shaw argues that it 

would be unnecessary and inequitable to find successor liability under the 

circumstances of this case because an award of reinstatement or front-pay would be 

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inequitable, GateHouse Media would be able to satisfy any monetary judgment, and 

Shaw was an innocent party. I disagree. 

First, successor liability may be imposed even when an employee does not 

seek reinstatement, G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d at 748. Second, even though Shaw was an 

innocent party, successor liability does not require discriminatory intent—rather, it 

“is imposed on the successor for the acts, intentional or otherwise, of a predecessor 

solely because the policies of the laws at issue are substantially promoted.” 

Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 747. Although it would be inequitable to impose 

successor liability upon an innocent purchaser who did not have notice, Tsareff v. 

ManWeb Services, Inc., 794 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2015), when a successor has 

notice, the remedy for successor liability is the “opportunity to protect itself by 

obtaining indemnification or negotiating a lower purchase price.” Id. (quoting

Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750). Prior to its acquisition of GateHouse Suburban, 

Shaw had notice of Sheils’s lawsuit and therefore had the opportunity to consider 

the effect of a judgment in Sheils’s favor and negotiate accordingly. 

Finally, while not dispositive, “a creditor’s ability to recover against the 

predecessor is a factor of significant weight in deciding whether to allow successor 

liability.” Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) 

Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1995). GateHouse 

Suburban is no longer in business, but GateHouse Media is a viable company able 

to satisfy the judgment. This cuts in favor of Shaw, but on balance, its notice of 

Sheils’s claim before its acquisition of GateHouse Suburban’s assets and the 

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continuity of operations between Shaw and GateHouse Suburban persuade me that 

successor liability is warranted here.

At the appropriate time, judgment will be entered against Shaw based on 

successor liability. 

IV. Conclusion 

Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and for 

remittitur [97, 114] are granted in part, denied in part. A new trial is ordered on 

plaintiff’s FMLA-interference and FMLA-retaliation claims based on her demotion. 

Sheils’s motion for entry of judgment and full relief [111] is granted in part. 

Reinstatement and front pay will not be awarded, but the other aspects of relief 

requested will be entered. Sheils’s motion for entry of judgment against Shaw under 

successor liability [108] is granted. The entry of final judgment is deferred until the 

remaining claims are resolved. 

ENTER: 

 ___________________________ 

 Manish S. Shah 

 United States District Judge 

Date: 10/27/15 

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