GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Addressees

AFGHANISTAN 

DRUG CONTROL 

Strategy Evolving and 

Progress Reported, 

but Interim 

Performance Targets 

and Evaluation of 

Justice Reform Efforts 

Needed 

March 2010 

GAO-10-291 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2010

AFGHANISTAN DRUG CONTROL 

Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim 

Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice 

Highlights of GAO-10-291, a report to Reform Efforts Needed 

congressional addressees 

The illicit drug trade remains a 

challenge to the overall U.S. 

counterinsurgency campaign in 

Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces 

over 90 percent of the world’s 

opium, which competes with the 

country’s licit agriculture industry, 

provides funds to insurgents, and 

fuels corruption in Afghanistan. 

Since 2005, the United States has 

allotted over $2 billion to stem the 

production, consumption, and 

trafficking of illicit drugs while 

building the Afghan government’s 

capacity to conduct 

counternarcotics activities on its 

own. 

In this report, GAO (1) examines 

how the U.S. counternarcotics 

strategy in Afghanistan has 

changed; (2) assesses progress 

made and challenges faced within 

the elimination/eradication, 

interdiction, justice reform, public 

information, and drug demand 

reduction program areas; and (3) 

assesses U.S. agencies’ monitoring 

and evaluation efforts. To address 

these objectives, GAO obtained 

pertinent program documents and 

interviewed relevant U.S. and 

Afghan officials. GAO has prepared 

this report under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several 

recommendations to State and 

Defense to improve performance 

measurement of U.S. 

counternarcotics programs and 

evaluate justice reform efforts. 

State and Defense generally 

concurred with our 

recommendations. 

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program 

areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency campaign. 

The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five program areas: 

elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and 

alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) 

policy and rules of engagement were changed to allow greater military 

involvement in Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between 

traffickers and insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy 

has shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by deemphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and increasing 

agricultural assistance. 

The United States’ use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of 

overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture all 

aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the 

administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture overall 

counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies have reported progress within 

counternarcotics program areas, but GAO was unable to fully assess the 

extent of progress due to a lack of performance measures and interim 

performance targets to measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for 

performance management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan 

pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim 

performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack of 

security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have challenged some 

counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and public information 

efforts have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgencydominated provinces. In addition, other challenges affect specific program 

areas. For example, drug abuse and addiction are prevalent among the Afghan 

National Police. 

Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program 

management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are 

implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers 

make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about current 

and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics areas have 

monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency oversight, contractor 

reporting, and/or third-party verification. For example, eradication figures 

were routinely reported by U.S. Department of State (State) officials and 

contractors, and verified by United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 

monitors. U.S. agencies also conducted and documented program evaluations 

to improve effectiveness in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and 

public information program areas. However, State has not formally 

documented evaluations of its justice reform program. 

View GAO-10-291 or key components.

For more information, contact Charles 

Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 

johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-291 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Changing Emphasis Across 

Program Areas to Support Overarching Counterinsurgency 

Campaign 9 

Although Counternarcotics Programs Reported Some Progress, 

They Remain Challenged by Lack of Security, Political Will, and 

Afghan Government Capacity 12 

Monitoring and Evaluation of Most U.S. Counternarcotics 

Programs Under Way 34 

Conclusions 37 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 44 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 47 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50

Tables 

Table 1: U.S. Funding of Counternarcotics-Related Activities in 

Afghanistan 4 

Table 2: DEA Interdiction Data for Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2005 

through Fiscal Year 2009 22 

Table 3: Capability Milestone Criteria 23 

Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation Activities by Program Area 34 

 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Figures 

Figure 1: Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2009 3 

Figure 2: Allotment of U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics Activities 

in Afghanistan by Program Area from Fiscal Year 2005 to 

Fiscal Year 2009 5 

Figure 3: U.S. Agency Involvement in Afghanistan Counternarcotics 

Activities, as of February 2010 8 

Figure 4: Time Line of Counternarcotics Strategies in Afghanistan 10 

Figure 5: Total Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2009 13 

Figure 6: Central Eradication Performance Targets and Results, 

2005-2009 15 

Figure 7: Opium Poppy Being Eradicated 16 

Figure 8: Governor-Led Eradication Performance Targets and 

Results, 2005-2009 18 

Figure 9: Counternarcotics Public Information Materials for 

Schools 30 

Abbreviations 

CM Capability milestone 

CNPA Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan 

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

ISAF International Security and Assistance Force 

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Page 1 GAO-10-291 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 9, 2010 

Congressional Addressees: 

The illicit drug trade undermines virtually every aspect of the U.S. and 

Afghan governments’ efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan and 

remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the 

country. The production of opium competes with the country’s licit 

agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in 

Afghanistan. 

In 2003, the Afghan government adopted a National Drug Control Strategy 

with the goal of eliminating the production, consumption, and trafficking 

of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Since 2005, when it became more involved 

in the counternarcotics effort and developed its first counternarcotics 

strategy, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the 

production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan 

through elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public 

information, and drug demand reduction.1

In this report, we (1) examine how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in 

Afghanistan has changed over time; (2) assess progress made and 

challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice 

reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; 

and (3) assess U.S. agencies’ monitoring and evaluation of 

counternarcotics programs. 

To address these objectives, we obtained information from pertinent 

planning, funding, and program documents detailing U.S. counternarcotics 

efforts and interviewed relevant officials from the U.S. Departments of 

State (State), Defense (Defense), and Justice, including the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. 

To examine how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has 

changed, we reviewed U.S. and Afghan strategy documents and discussed 

recent strategic shifts with relevant U.S. officials, including the Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with the Office of 

1

We will address alternative development, another significant U.S. counternarcotics effort, 

in a subsequent report due out in spring 2010. As part of the recent strategy shift, 

alternative development programs are now classified broadly as agriculture programs. 

 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

National Drug Control Policy. To assess counternarcotics progress and 

challenges, we reviewed planning and reporting documentation and 

discussed performance measures, interim performance targets, and 

ongoing challenges with State, Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and 

contractor officials implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan, as well as 

with officials from the Afghan Ministries of Counter Narcotics, Interior, 

and Justice. To assess U.S. monitoring and evaluation of counternarcotics 

programs, we examined contractor reports, agency documentation, and 

available evaluations conducted by U.S. government agencies and third 

parties such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 

Additionally, we discussed these monitoring and evaluation activities with 

officials from State, Defense, Department of Justice, and DEA. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more complete description 

of our scope and methodology.) 

Page 2 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world’s opium, which is 

refined into heroin in Afghanistan and other countries. According to 

UNODC, in 2008, the value of the illicit narcotics industry equaled as much 

as one-third of Afghanistan’s licit economy—it is a notable source of 

funding for the insurgency, competes with licit development, and 

undermines governance. Processing and transit points for narcotics are 

spread throughout Afghanistan, and finished opiates are smuggled across 

Afghanistan’s borders and into the global market. Of the roughly $3 billion 

dollars generated by the Afghan narcotics trade, UNODC estimates that 

$90-$160 million per year is channeled to the insurgency. 

Background 

Source: State.

Opium Poppy 

Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant 

crop that is easily grown throughout 

Afghanistan’s rugged territory. Opium poppy 

is an annual crop with a 6 to 7 month planting 

cycle. It is planted between September and 

December and flowers approximately 3 

months after planting. After the flower’s petals

fall away, the opium, an opaque, milky sap 

found in the plant’s seed capsule, is

harvested between April and July. The sap 

can then be refined into morphine and heroin.

As figure 1 shows, most opium poppy cultivated in 2009 was in 

Afghanistan’s southern and western regions. These are also the most 

insecure areas with active insurgent elements. 

Figure 1: Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2009 

Herat 

Farah

Helmand

Nimruz

Kandahar

Badakhshan

Zabol

Badghis

Daykondi Oruzgan

Konar

Kabul

Nangarhar

Laghman

TURKMENISTAN

IRAN

PAKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009.

0 100 200

Geographic projection: WGS 84

km

50

Legend

100-999 hectares

Provinces are poppy free

1,000-19,999

hectares

More than 50,000 

hectares

Note: Provinces qualifying as poppy-free are where UNODC estimates there are 100 or fewer 

hectares of poppy cultivated. One hectare equals approximately 2.47 acres. 

Since 2005, the United States has allotted approximately $2.5 billion for 

elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, 

and drug demand reduction activities in Afghanistan. These 

Page 3 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

counternarcotics-related activities are funded through State’s International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, the Global War on 

Terror supplemental funding account, and Defense’s Counternarcotics 

account (see table 1). 

Table 1: U.S. Funding of Counternarcotics-Related Activities in Afghanistan 

Dollars in millions 

Allotments FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 Total

Elimination/eradicationa$258.0 $134 $166.7 $196.4 $237.0 $992.2

Interdiction 213.3 102.5 253.2 204.2 193.0 966.3

Rule of law/justiceb 24.0 26.5 55.5 94.4 182.0 382.5

Public informationc8.4 2.0 6.0 2.0 17.0 35.4

Drug demand reduction 0.0 2.7 2.0 2.0 11.0 17.6

Program development and support 12.2 13.2 23.9 21.2 40.2 110.9

Totald$516.0 $280.9 $507.3 $520.4 $680.3 $2,504.9

Sources: GAO analysis of State and Defense budgetary documents. 

Note: This table excludes alternative development and agriculture programs. Funding allotments for 

U.S. alternative development and agriculture programs, which we will report on separately in spring 

2010, totaled approximately $1.4 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. 

a

While these figures include the full cost of State’s Air Wing fleet in Afghanistan, these aircraft also 

support other counternarcotics programs, as well as other Embassy Kabul activities. 

b

During the course of our review, State was unable to provide a detailed breakout of counternarcoticsspecific activities within the rule of law/justice reform program area. Therefore, this figure includes 

some activities unrelated to counternarcotics programs. 

c

Figures do not include funding for Counternarcotics Advisory Teams, which are counted under 

elimination/eradication. 

d

Numbers may not sum to totals due to rounding. 

As figure 2 illustrates, excluding the U.S. investment in alternative 

development programs, the majority of U.S. counternarcotics-related 

funding has been in the elimination/eradication and interdiction program 

areas. 

Page 4 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Figure 2: Allotment of U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics Activities in Afghanistan 

by Program Area from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2009 

Public

information

Drug

demand

reduction

4.4% 

0.7%

($18)

1.4%

($35)

15.3%

($383)

38.6%

($966)

39.6%

($992)

Elimination/

eradication

Interdiction

Rule of law/

justice

Sources: GAO analysis of State and Defense budgetary documents.

($111)

Program

development

and support

Dollars in millions

Elimination/Eradication The United States has allotted approximately $992 million in support of 

elimination/eradication programs since fiscal year 2005. These programs 

seek to reduce opium poppy cultivation by destroying opium poppy plants 

before farmers are able to harvest their illicit crops (eradication) and by 

providing rewards to provinces for reductions in opium poppy cultivation. 

State has supported an Afghan central eradication force, a governor-led 

eradication program, and an incentive program called the Good 

Performers Initiative, which rewards provinces for reductions in poppy 

cultivation. 

Interdiction State and Defense have allotted approximately $966 million for 

interdiction programs since fiscal year 2005. U.S. interdiction programs 

aim to decrease narcotics trafficking and processing by conducting 

interdiction operations, which include, among other things, raiding drug 

laboratories; destroying storage sites; arresting drug traffickers; 

conducting roadblock operations; seizing chemicals and drugs; and 

conducting undercover drug purchases. The interdiction program also 

seeks to increase the capability of Afghan law enforcement to disrupt and 

dismantle drug trafficking organizations. DEA plays a significant role in 

Page 5 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

the U.S. interdiction effort and is the lead U.S. agency responsible for 

conducting interdiction operations in Afghanistan.2

 DEA works with the 

specialized units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) to

conduct investigations, build cases, and arrest drug traffickers, which we 

discuss in detail later in this report. DEA also works to build Afghan la

enforcement capacity by mentoring CNPA specialized units. D

which also conducts interdiction operations in support of its 

counterinsurgency mission, supports the training, equipping, and 

sustainment of the CNPA specialized un

w 

efense, 

its, as well as the construction of 

CNPA-related infrastructure projects.3

t’s 

on and 

prosecution of mid- and high-level narcotics cases in Afghanistan. 

e 

t 

 as a private security detail for Afghan judges and high-threat 

detainees.4

 

Since fiscal year 2005, State has allotted approximately $383 million to 

support the Afghan government’s efforts to establish counternarcoticsspecific criminal justice institutions and increase the Afghan governmen

capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers. State supports six 

Department of Justice attorneys that train, mentor, and assist prosecutors 

and investigators on the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force (Task Force) 

and the judges on the Afghan Central Narcotics Tribunal (Tribunal). These

institutions have exclusive national jurisdiction over the adjudicati

In addition, Defense constructed the State-funded Counternarcotics 

Justice Center (Justice Center), which serves as a secure facility for th

Task Force and Tribunal to carry out their adjudication missions. The 

Justice Center consists of a detention building and a courthouse; offices 

for judges, investigators, and prosecutors; and barracks for members of 

the protective Afghan Judicial Security Unit. Additionally, the Departmen

of Justice’s United States Marshals Service trains and equips the Afghan 

Judicial Security Unit to provide facility protection at the Justice Center 

and to serve

 

Justice Reform 

2

GAO previously reported on DEA’s overseas activities in 2009, see GAO, Drug Control: 

Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated 

Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 

Responsibilities, GAO-09-63 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2009). 

3

State funds the operation and maintenance of many of these infrastructure projects, as 

well as some training and vetting of the CNPA specialized units. 

4

State plans to continue funding the Counternarcotics Justice Center’s operation and 

maintenance costs, estimated at $3 million per year, until 2011. 

Page 6 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

State and Defense have allotted approximately $35 million to support the 

Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics in developing and disseminating 

counternarcotics messages through nationwide public information 

campaigns and through province-based activities of Counternarcotics 

Advisory Teams (advisory teams).5

 Advisory teams are staffed with two 

contract advisors and eight Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics 

employees that specialize as either public information, gender affairs, 

alternative livelihoods, or monitoring and evaluation officers. Staffed to 

seven provinces,6

 advisory teams work directly with provincial and local 

leaders to implement counternarcotics plans and disseminate 

counternarcotics messages. These messages are for the most part 

developed by State’s other public information contractor, which 

subcontracts with Afghan companies to produce and disseminate 

counternarcotics messages via radio, television, and print materials in 

both Dari and Pashto. These messages are also publicized at community 

events held by advisory teams. State officials report that public 

information enhances other counternarcotics program areas, and its 

success is, therefore, tied to the success of the other program areas. 

Public Information 

Drug Demand Reduction Since fiscal year 2006, State has allotted approximately $18 million to 

address the drug addiction problem in Afghanistan through technical and 

training assistance to the Afghan government in creating national drug 

abuse treatment, intervention, and prevention programs. State’s program 

supports rehabilitation clinics, including clinics exclusively for women and 

children. The program also supports mosque-based drug intervention 

services and trains community and religious leaders on counseling drug 

addicts. 

 

5

Defense was involved in public information activities prior to State taking the lead in 2006. 

6

Advisory teams are located in Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, 

and Oruzgan provinces. 

Page 7 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Overview and 

Coordination of U.S. 

Agency Involvement 

As shown in figure 3, multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. 

counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan. 

Figure 3: U.S. Agency Involvement in Afghanistan Counternarcotics Activities, as of February 2010 

State

• Funds and 

manages program.

• Provided aircraft for 

operations.

Justice (DEA)

• Conducts operations

and mentors

specialized units.

Defense

• Funds Afghan 

interdiction aircraft.

• Conducts operations

in support of 

counterinsurgency.

• Builds and maintains

facilities.

• Conducts police 

training.

State

• Funds operation and 

maintenance costs of 

facilities and provides

aircraft for operations. 

Justice

• Implements 

program.

• Mentors prosecutors

and judges.

State

• Funds program and 

operation and 

maintenance costs of 

facilities.

Defense

• Builds facilities.

State

• Funds and manages

program.

State

• Funds and manages

program.

Sources: GAO analysis of State, Defense, and Justice program documents; (left to right) State, Defense, GAO, State, and State 

(photos).

Interdiction Justice reform Drug demand

reduction

Elimination/ Public information

eradication

U.S. officials involved in Afghan counternarcotics stated that coordination 

between agency partners has been largely successful. Agency partners 

meet regularly through several coordinating bodies in Kabul, such as the 

Eradication Working Group and Counternarcotics Sync Group. 

Page 8 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Additionally, interdiction operations and intelligence are coordinated 

through a variety of mechanisms. The Interagency Operations 

Coordination Center coordinates and analyzes intelligence information in 

Kabul to produce targets for interdiction operations and is jointly led by 

DEA and the United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency. The 

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus established by Defense in 

Kandahar is intended to provide coordination support, intelligence, and 

target packages for DEA interdiction missions as well as International 

Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)7

 counterinsurgency operations that 

target insurgents linked to the drug trade. The Joint Narcotics Analysis 

Center is an intelligence center jointly led by the United States and United 

Kingdom in London that provides strategic analysis and operational 

support to interdiction activities in Afghanistan. Officials involved in the 

Interagency Operations Coordination Center and Combined Joint 

Interagency Task Force-Nexus reported that they are exploring ways of 

formalizing their relationship for enhanced cooperation. Additionally, 

State recently created and filled a position for a Coordinating Director for 

Development and Economic Affairs at Embassy Kabul that oversees all 

U.S. assistance programs, including counternarcotics activities. State also 

hosts meetings of the interagency Counternarcotics Working Group in 

Washington, D.C. According to State, the latest revisions to the U.S. 

Counternarcotics Strategy were coordinated through these working-level 

meetings. 

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan has become more 

integrated with the broader counterinsurgency effort over time, as 

depicted in figure 4. 

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy Changing 

Emphasis Across 

Program Areas to 

Support Overarching 

Counterinsurgency 

Campaign 

 

7

Since 2001, the United States has worked with international partners under a United 

Nations mandate to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment, in part 

through the ISAF. U.S. forces in Afghanistan are deployed either as part of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization-led ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes the 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), in efforts to secure and 

stabilize Afghanistan. 

Page 9 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Figure 4: Time Line of Counternarcotics Strategies in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan 

publishes National 

Drug Control 

Strategy 

concentrating on 

combating illicit 

narcotics production, 

consumption, and 

trafficking.

United States assumes

larger role in and 

develops strategy for 

counternarcotics in 

Afghanistan, which 

introduces

elimination/eradication 

to overall effort.

Defense changes

policy and rules of 

engagement to 

allow greater 

support for 

interdiction 

operations. 

United States begins

development of new 

strategy to align with 

counterinsurgency 

efforts. New approach 

de-emphasizes

eradication, focuses

on interdiction, 

increases assistance 

to farmers, and 

integrates alternative 

development 

programs into general 

agricultural 

assistance.

United States refines

strategy to, among

other things, 

coordinate 

counternarcotics and 

counterinsurgency 

planning and 

operations. However, 

Defense policy at this

time prohibited 

military from directly 

participating in drug

interdiction missions. 

Afghanistan updates

its National Drug

Control Strategy to 

include 

elimination/eradication 

and other program 

areas.

2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: United States and Afghanistan strategies and planning documents; State (photo).

In 2003, Afghanistan adopted a National Drug Control Strategy with the 

goal of eliminating production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs 

in Afghanistan. In 2005, the United States assumed a larger role in the 

counternarcotics effort after several years of increases in opium poppy 

cultivation and developed its first counternarcotics strategy for 

Afghanistan. This strategy concentrated on five program areas: 

elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, 

and alternative livelihoods. The 2005 U.S. strategy introduced 

elimination/eradication, which had not been a major focus of previous 

efforts. The government of Afghanistan added this and other program 

areas to its 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, which it updated and 

integrated into its National Development Strategy in 2008. 

In August 2007, the United States refined its counternarcotics strategy, 

seeking to: (1) increase development assistance to encourage licit 

economic development; (2) amplify the scope and intensity of interdiction 

and eradication operations; (3) encourage consistent, sustained political 

will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, 

coalition partners, and international civilian and military organizations; 

and (4) coordinate counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and 

operations with a particular emphasis on integrating drug interdiction into 

the counterinsurgency mission. At that time, however, Defense policy 

Page 10 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

prohibited the military from directly participating in drug interdiction 

missions. 

According to Defense and DEA officials, this prohibition of military 

involvement in interdiction missions prevented or hampered the ability of 

some missions from occurring in insecure areas and made commanders 

reluctant to provide support to DEA. However, both Defense and DEA 

officials stated that this policy ignored a nexus between the narcotics 

trade and the insurgency. For example, DEA drug raids yielded weapons 

caches and explosives used by insurgents, as well as suspects listed on 

Defense military target lists, and military raids on insurgent compounds 

also yielded illicit narcotics and narcotics processing equipment. 

According to Defense, in November 2008 it changed its rules of 

engagement to permit the targeting of persons by the military (including 

drug traffickers, if appropriate) who provide material support to insurgent 

or terrorist groups. Additionally, Defense clarified its policy, in December 

2008, to allow the military to accompany and provide force protection to 

U.S. and host nation law enforcement personnel on counternarcotics field 

operations, so long as Defense personnel do not directly participate in 

arrests. According to Defense, these changes are also mirrored in North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine, allowing members to participate in 

interdiction operations. Defense and DEA officials stated that these 

changes have benefited interdiction-related programs in Afghanistan. 

In 2009, the U.S. approach shifted again to align more closely with 

counterinsurgency efforts. This programmatic shift de-emphasized 

eradication by ending support for the Afghan central eradication force. 

According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

eradication unduly punished and alienated farmers for making a “rational 

economic decision”8

 while ignoring the profits gleaned by traffickers and 

insurgents from the sale of processed opium and heroin. Therefore, based 

on the reasoning that going after drug labs and traffickers would more 

precisely target the drug-insurgency nexus, the United States is focusing 

more on interdiction efforts. According to the Special Representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Defense and DEA will continue to lead in the 

interdiction program area, with State playing the role of coordinator. In 

addition, this strategic shift increased assistance to farmers and integrated 

alternative development programs into general agricultural assistance. 

 

8

Opium poppy generally yields greater profits per hectare than licit crops such as wheat. 

Page 11 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 

U.S. counternarcotics strategy will be a subcomponent of the broader 

counterinsurgency campaign. 

The United States’ use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of 

overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture 

all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the 

administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture 

overall counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies reported some progress 

within each of the counternarcotics program areas by collecting 

information on program-specific performance measures; however, it is 

difficult to fully assess progress in some areas due to a lack of interim 

performance targets, which can be used to provide decision makers with 

an indication of the incremental progress toward achieving results. In 

addition, challenges, such as lack of security, political will, and Afghan 

government capacity affect progress in all program areas. 

Although 

Counternarcotics 

Programs Reported 

Some Progress, They 

Remain Challenged by 

Lack of Security, 

Political Will, and 

Afghan Government 

Capacity 

Current Measure of Overall 

Counternarcotics Success 

Has Limitations 

Since 2005, the United States has measured overall success through total 

hectares under opium poppy cultivation. Each counternarcotics program 

area has its own program-specific performance measures—which we 

address later in this section. However, opium poppy cultivation continues 

to be tracked by the United States and UNODC as an aggregate measure of 

counternarcotics success.9

 Evidence based on annual UNODC surveys 

indicates a peak in production during 2007 with declines in subsequent 

years. As opium poppy cultivation has declined and more provinces have 

become poppy-free,10 it has become more concentrated in the largely 

insecure south and west of Afghanistan. Changes in poppy cultivation 

since 2005 are shown in figure 5.11

 

9

Other high-level indicators tracked by the United States included provinces reducing 

cultivation and poppy-free provinces. The United States also collected program-level 

performance indicators and targets. 

10In 2006, 6 provinces were poppy-free. In 2009, 20 provinces were poppy-free. 

11The United States uses UNODC data to inform programmatic decisions, such as 

determining Good Performers Initiative rewards. However, the U.S. government also 

independently estimates total opium poppy cultivation to inform policy decisions. U.S. 

government-estimated totals in hectares are as follows: 107,400 (2005); 172,600 (2006); 

202,000 (2007); 157,000 (2008); 131,000 (2009). 

Page 12 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Figure 5: Total Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2009 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Hectares (in thousands)

Sources: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.

104,000

165,000

193,000

157,000

123,000

Confidence interval: displays the upper and lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence

interval for 2005-2008 estimates and 95 percent confidence interval for the 2009 estimate.

However, U.S. officials pointed out that poppy cultivation fails to capture 

all aspects of counternarcotics success. For example, although 20 of the 34 

Afghan provinces are now poppy-free, some of these provinces may still 

contain high levels of drug trafficking or processing. Additionally, 

according to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 

use of opium poppy cultivation as the primary measure of overall success 

led to an over-emphasis on eradication activities, which due to their focus 

on farmers, could undermine the larger counterinsurgency campaign. 

Officials from the Office of National Drug Control Policy also criticized 

using total opium poppy cultivation as the sole measure of success, stating 

that measures of success should relate to security, such as public safety 

and terrorist attacks. Moreover, previous GAO work on U.S. 

counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia indicates that 

government control of drug-growing areas and project sites is essential for 

counternarcotics success.12

 

12GAO, Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in 

Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, GAO-02-291 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2002). 

Page 13 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

According to preliminary documents, the administration is attempting to 

develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. 

Potential measures being considered include interdiction of drugs, volume 

and value of narcotics in Afghanistan, and successful interdiction and 

prosecution of narcotics traffickers. However, at the time of our review, 

no such measures had been finalized. 

Elimination/Eradication: 

Efforts Challenged by 

Political Will, Security, and 

Afghan Capacity 

The goal of elimination/eradication programs is to reduce opium poppy 

cultivation through forced eradication and economic incentives. State 

assisted the Afghan government in selecting, training, and fielding a 

central eradication force13 of Afghan police to destroy poppy crops and 

serve as a deterrent to continued poppy cultivation. The governor-led 

eradication program reimburses governors that self-initiate eradication of 

poppy in their provinces. After the eradication is verified by UNODC, the 

U.S. government transfers funds to the Afghan Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics, which in turn reimburses governors at the rate of $135 per 

hectare eradicated.14 As the elimination component of this program area, 

the Good Performers Initiative annually provides political recognition and 

direct financial incentives to provinces that reduce or eliminate opium 

poppy cultivation. 

State and the Afghan government established annual performance targets 

for central eradication by setting a specific amount of hectares to be 

eradicated. Central eradication did not meet its specific targets, as shown 

in figure 6. 

Central Eradication Force 

Consistently Hindered by 

Political Will and Security 

Challenges That Limited 

Effectiveness and Mobility 

 

13The central eradication force was known as the Central Poppy Eradication Force 

between 2004 and 2005, the Afghan Eradication Force between 2005 and 2007, and the 

Poppy Eradication Force between 2007 and 2009. 

14The United Kingdom also contributes to governor-led eradication reimbursements. 

Page 14 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Figure 6: Central Eradication Performance Targets and Results, 2005-2009 

Year

Hectares

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

2008-

2009

2007-

2008

2006-

2007

2005-

2006

Performance target

Denotes range

Actual hectares eradicated

7,000

7,000

3,000

1,174

2,663 3,149 2,250

5,000

10,000

Sources: GAO analysis of State and UNODC data.

State originally intended a central eradication force comprised of Afghan 

Counternarcotics Police to be augmented by aerial herbicide spraying, a 

method the U.S. government has historically used and supported in 

Colombia.15 However, the proposed aerial spray eradication met heavy 

Afghan and international political resistance and was never authorized by 

the Afghan government. This forced central eradicators to destroy poppy 

crops with such equipment as tractors, all-terrain vehicles, and sticks. In 

2005, State aircraft began supporting the program by transporting 

personnel and equipment and providing reconnaissance and protection for 

the central eradicators. 

 

15GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has 

Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance, GAO-09-71 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2008). 

Page 15 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

This force was heavily dependent on large ground convoys for its 

deployment. For example, during its last eradication season, the central 

eradicators deployed from Kabul to Helmand in an 80 kilometer-long 

convoy. According to State officials, the ground convoys were expensive, 

made the force vulnerable to attack, and caused central eradicators to 

spend more time deploying and less time eradicating. Maintenance and 

readiness of vital equipment proved to be a persistent challenge. 

Additionally, U.S. agency officials and contractors reported incidents of 

equipment sabotage and dismantling for parts. Opium poppy eradication is 

illustrated in figure 7. 

Figure 7: Opium Poppy Being Eradicated 

Source: State.

Another factor that hampered central eradicators was the delay in gaining 

permission to manually eradicate from Afghan governors.16 In 2008, the 

concept for the central eradication force was changed so that central 

eradicators could operate without governor permission in areas where 

governors either would not or could not launch eradication efforts 

themselves. State officials at the time recognized that this forced 

eradication mission would require greater protection for the central 

eradication force, which faced growing resistance as poppy growth 

 

16Prior to 2008, the central eradicators were dependent on governors to approve 

eradication plans and lead them to poppy fields. 

Page 16 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

became more concentrated in less-secure areas. A counternarcotics 

infantry unit from the Afghan National Army deployed with the central 

eradication force during the 2009 season and, although more hectares 

were eradicated than in 2008, State officials reported that this unit was 

unable to provide sufficient force protection. 

As a result of these challenges, State officials in Afghanistan said that the 

central eradication force was not very effective as a large-scale crop 

elimination tool but maintained that it provided a deterrent against poppy 

cultivation. However, in 2009, UNODC surveyed Afghan farmers who had 

stopped growing poppy, and 1 percent of respondents cited fear of 

eradication as a reason for stopping opium poppy cultivation.17

Separate targets were established for governor-led eradication. Governorled eradication met its performance target in 2006-2007, but did not in 

other years, as shown in figure 8. 

Continued Governor-Led 

Eradication Success 

Contingent Upon Adequate 

Security, Political Will, and 

Afghan Capacity 

 

17Farmers reported the following additional reasons why they stopped growing poppy in 

2009. The most significant reasons cited included the Afghan government’s ban on opium 

cultivation (33 percent), low sale price of opium (18 percent), and opium cultivation being 

against Islam (16 percent). No other reason amounted to greater than 6 percent of 

respondents. 

Page 17 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Figure 8: Governor-Led Eradication Performance Targets and Results, 2005-2009 

Year

Hectares

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

2008-

2009

2007-

2008

2006-

2007

2005-

2006

Performance target

Denotes range

Actual hectares eradicated

15,000

2,687

15,000

4,306

13,050 15,898

25,000

15,000

25,000

Sources: GAO analysis of State and UNODC data.

Comparisons of both central and governor-led eradication show that 

substantially more hectares of poppy were eradicated through governorled efforts in years prior to 2009 (see figs. 6 and 8). However, according to 

State, as cultivation becomes more concentrated in areas of poor security, 

and more stable provinces become poppy-free, the opportunities to use 

governor-led eradication have become more limited. In particular, U.S. 

officials note that adequate force protection is essential for eradication in 

the south. Some governors are willing to eradicate, but are constrained by 

poor security, as in insurgency-dominated Helmand in 2009. Protection for 

governor-led eradicators relies upon agreements made between governors 

and local security forces. 

In addition, U.S. officials stated that governor-led eradication efforts were 

challenged by lack of political will among governors. Each autumn, U.S. 

officials and Afghan governors collectively set targets for the upcoming 

year’s eradication work. Nevertheless, even after agreement is ostensibly 

reached with all governors, some governors do not take action in their 

Page 18 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

provinces. A State official noted the case of one governor who was 

unwilling to eradicate even after receiving 10 tractors for this purpose. The 

UNODC recently reported that timely eradication could have caused seven 

more provinces to become poppy-free and directly attributed the absence 

of eradication in two of these provinces to a lack of planning and will to 

eradicate. 

A State official also noted that while political will exists in some cases, 

many governors do not have the capacity or resources to initiate 

eradication. To assist governors with the start-up costs of eradication 

(rental of equipment, hiring of labor, provision of fuel), the United States 

and United Kingdom provide advanced payments to governors against 

future eradication achievements. 

Under the Good Performers Initiative,18 provinces determined by UNODC 

to be poppy-free receive $1 million in development assistance. Provinces 

that reduce poppy cultivation by 10 percent receive $1,000 per each 

additional hectare of reduction up to a maximum reward of $10 million.19

Annual special recognition awards of $500,000 are also given to provinces 

that have taken extraordinary steps to fight narcotics, but which may not 

qualify under the previous criteria. Projects—such as the construction of 

irrigation systems or provision of tractors—are selected and funded 

through a process that includes oversight by both the Afghan Ministry of 

Counter Narcotics and State. To date, the U.S. government has allotted 

over $80 million20 to 33 provinces through the Good Performers Initiative, 

while the United Kingdom has provided approximately $12 million.21 In 

2009, State pledged nearly $39 million to the initiative. As of September 

2009, 7 of 43 projects initiated through Good Performers Initiative were 

complete. 

Thirty-three of 34 Afghan 

Provinces Rewarded through 

Good Performers Initiative 

 

18The Good Performers Initiative began with the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and other donors channeling funding for the program through a trust fund 

administered by the United Nations Development Programme. 

19Nangarhar received the maximum $10 million reward in 2008, and Helmand is projected 

to receive the maximum reward as a result of its 2009 cultivation reduction. 

20USAID allocated $10 million to the Good Performers Initiative prior to State taking over 

funding of the program in 2008. 

21Oruzgan province did not receive Good Performers Initiative funding between 2006 and 

2008. It also does not qualify for 2009 funding. Although UNODC reports that poppy 

cultivation in Oruzgan dropped 7 percent in 2009, this is below the 10 percent reduction 

threshold required by Good Performers Initiative criteria. 

Page 19 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Determining the precise effect of this program on poppy cultivation in any 

given province is a challenge. A State review of the Good Performers 

Initiative found that a combination of variables, including political will and 

security, as well as incentives like development projects, ultimately 

contribute to poppy cultivation reductions across provinces. Afghan 

officials expressed favorable views of the Good Performers Initiative, for 

example identifying it as a main factor in the rising number of poppy-free 

provinces. According to State, the efficiency of disbursements has 

improved with the transfer of the Good Performers Initiative fund and 

administrative responsibilities from the United Nations Development 

Programme-administered Counternarcotics Trust Fund to the Afghan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Inefficiencies at the fund frustrated 

governors with delays in approving and implementing projects, leading the 

Afghan government to recommend a different funding arrangement. Due 

to the slowness of delivery and the high administrative costs of funding 

projects through the trust fund, the United States created a joint bank 

account with the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics to administer 

program moneys more rapidly. 

Interdiction: United States 

Conducting More 

Operations, but Afghan 

Capacity Limited 

U.S. interdiction programs aim to decrease narcotics trafficking and 

processing by conducting operations, as well as increasing the capability 

of Afghan law enforcement to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking 

organizations. DEA is the lead agency for conducting narcotics 

interdiction operations in Afghanistan, and its presence expanded from 13 

to 81 permanently assigned agents during fiscal year 2009.22 DEA agents in 

Kabul and at forward operating bases in Afghan provinces work with 

specialized units of the CNPA to conduct investigations, build cases, and 

arrest drug traffickers. These specialized and vetted units include the 

National Interdiction Unit, a tactical unit intended to conduct raids and 

seizures; the Sensitive Investigative Unit, intended to gather evidence and 

develop cases for narcotics investigations;23 the Technical Investigation 

Unit, a subunit of the Sensitive Investigative Unit intended to collect 

evidence through wiretaps; and the Air Interdiction Unit, a force of eight 

MI-17 helicopters used to transport DEA and National Interdiction Unit 

personnel on air assault operations. DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory 

 

22As of December 2009, DEA had filled 65 of these 81 positions. 

23Sensitive Investigative Units are groups of host-nation investigators that DEA polygraphs, 

trains, equips, and mentors to conduct bilateral drug investigations and collect 

counternarcotics intelligence. 

Page 20 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Support Teams identify, target, and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, 

and conduct affiliated counterinsurgency operations in concert with the 

Afghan National Interdiction Unit, Air Interdiction Unit, and the Britishtrained Afghan Special Narcotics Force.24 Additionally, State’s Air Wing in 

Afghanistan supports interdiction activities on an as-needed and asavailable basis.25

DEA also plays a role in building Afghan law enforcement capacity by 

mentoring CNPA specialized units and deploying with specialized unit 

platoons at forward operating bases. Defense supports the construction of 

these forward operating bases, as well as other infrastructure projects 

such as CNPA training and basing facilities in Kabul. State supports the 

operation and maintenance costs of some of these Defense-built 

infrastructure projects, as well as vetting (through urinalysis and 

polygraphs) of Sensitive Investigative Unit and Technical Investigation 

Unit officers. Defense trains, equips, and sustains the CNPA specialized 

units, including logistics and maintenance support to the Air Interdiction 

Unit helicopter fleet intended to establish an air interdiction capacity for 

the Ministry of Interior. 

As noted earlier, in late 2008, Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization changed their policies to allow the U.S. military and ISAF 

forces to participate in interdiction operations in Afghanistan. DEA and 

Defense officials stated that these changes have enabled higher levels of 

interdiction operations in areas previously inaccessible due to security 

problems. DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan during 

fiscal year 2009 (compared with 42 in fiscal year 2008), often with support 

from U.S. military and other coalition forces. These operations include, 

among other things, raiding drug laboratories; destroying storage sites; 

arresting drug traffickers; conducting roadblock operations; seizing 

chemicals and drugs; and conducting undercover drug purchases. The U.S. 

military and ISAF are also targeting narcotics trafficking and processing as 

part of regular counterinsurgency operations. For example, ISAF Regional 

Commands are expected to submit a counternarcotics campaign plan for 

U.S. Defense Policy Change 

Allowing More Interdiction 

Missions 

 

24The Afghan Special Narcotics Force is a British-supported CNPA paramilitary unit tasked 

with carrying out raids against high-value targets and drug infrastructure, e.g., bazaars, and 

laboratories, with a view to injecting risk into the illicit drugs trade. 

25From November 1, 2008, through August 18, 2009, the Air Wing’s 10 Huey II helicopters 

spent about 20 percent of their flight-time providing overwatch, close air support, and 

casualty evacuation support to DEA-led interdiction operations. 

Page 21 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

2010, and Defense has established a Combined Joint Interagency Task 

Force-Nexus in Kandahar intended to provide coordination support, 

intelligence, and target packages for DEA interdiction missions as well as 

ISAF counterinsurgency operations that target insurgents linked to the 

drug trade.26

One way for U.S. agencies to measure progress in this area is by tracking 

and reporting the results of interdiction operations, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: DEA Interdiction Data for Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2005 through Fiscal Year 

2009 

 2005a

2006 2007 2008 2009

Interdiction operations 33 48 37 42 82

Opium seized (metric tons)b42.9 7.5 0.892 2.442 25

Heroin seized (metric tons) 5.5 1 0.124 4.083 0.593

Hashish seized (metric tons) 142.4 1.3 0.434 238.935 53.133

Clandestine conversion labs destroyed 247 31 1 13 25

Drug-related arrests 32 79 33 48 56

Source: DEA. 

a

According to DEA officials, during 2005 the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams primarily 

engaged in search-and-destroy missions, resulting in extensive narcotics seizures and destruction of 

processing labs. Today, the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams are building evidentiary cases 

for eventual trial at the Criminal Justice Task Force. 

b

One metric ton equals 1,000 kilograms or approximately 2,205 pounds. 

Agreements between the United States and Afghanistan contain interim 

performance targets for interdiction operations. For example, for 2008-

2009, the agreed upon goal was to produce a 10 percent increase from 

2008 of drug and precursor chemical seizures or interception of drug 

traffickers, with 25 percent of drug seizures resulting in arrests. However, 

DEA officials in Afghanistan cautioned that seizure and arrest figures 

alone are not sufficient to show that interdiction operations are having an 

impact on the Afghan narcotics industry. Furthermore, measuring the 

results of drug-control actions is difficult because data on illegal drug 

movements are more difficult to collect than data on most legal 

 

26At the time of our review, plans called for the Combined Joint Interagency Task ForceNexus to include, in addition to military personnel, representatives from DEA, State, and 

other government agencies, including analysts attached to the Interagency Operations 

Coordination Center in Kabul. 

Page 22 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

commodities. Without knowing how much was shipped or what got 

through, the amount of narcotics seized does not yield a meaningful 

measure of effectiveness. As a result, DEA also measures its performance 

through its investigative and enforcement efforts against High Value 

Targets designated by the DEA Kabul Country Office, as well as significant 

Afghan drug organizations identified by the interagency Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Force program. According to DEA, if one of these 

organizations is disrupted or dismantled, it is reflected in the yearly 

evaluation of the region. Additionally, DEA officials in the field stated that 

they attempt to gauge impact of operations on narcotics networks through 

intelligence information. 

With regard to increasing Afghan law enforcement capacity to disrupt and 

dismantle drug trafficking organizations, CSTC-A27 uses capability 

milestones (CM), ranging from CM1 (fully capable) to CM4 (not yet 

capable), as criteria to assess army and police progress in manning, 

training, and equipping. According to U.S. officials, these ratings 

incorporate input from DEA and Defense mentors working with the CNPA 

specialized units. These criteria are summarized in table 3. 

Capacity of Afghan 

Counternarcotics Police to 

Carry Out Interdiction Efforts 

Limited 

Table 3: Capability Milestone Criteria 

Capability 

milestone Description 

CM1 Unit is capable of independently planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with no operational 

coalition support for organic functions. 

CM2 Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency 

operations at the battalion level with coalition support. 

CM3 Unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the 

company level with coalition support. 

CM4 Unit formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational 

missions. 

Source: Defense. 

As of June 2009, CSTC-A rated the CNPA’s specialized units at CM3 

(partially capable) with the exception of the Air Interdiction Unit, which 

 

27Defense’s CSTC-A, in partnership with State, the government of Afghanistan, and 

international partners, trains and equips the Afghan National Security Forces. CSTC-A 

works with the international community to develop a capable Afghan National Army and 

Afghan National Police intended to enhance the security and stabilization of Afghanistan. 

Page 23 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

along with the provincial CNPA, was rated at CM4 (not capable).28 State 

also reports on the capability levels of the CNPA specialized units in its 

yearly International Narcotics Control Strategy Report but does not report 

details that would allow a more accurate assessment of the units’ 

capability. For example, in its January 2009 report, State reported that the 

National Interdiction Unit was capable of conducting its own operations, 

including requesting and executing search and arrest warrants, while the 

Sensitive Investigative Unit was able to independently initiate and 

complete investigative and undercover cases. 

Although U.S. agencies did assess the capabilities of the CNPA and its 

specialized units, we found that these assessments lacked interim 

performance targets, which can enable decision makers to more readily 

understand incremental progress made toward program goals. For 

example, while Defense officials did provide informal performance targets 

for the Air Interdiction Unit, such as Afghan pilots and crews being able to 

conduct transport flights, or flying interdiction missions with mixed 

Afghan/U.S. crews, these targets were not formalized in an overall training 

plan or time line that would allow a program manager to judge whether 

training was on, ahead, or behind schedule. Similarly, while CSTC-A’s CMratings of the CNPA and its specialized units provided a snapshot of 

operational capability, there were no interim performance targets to 

assess what this snapshot means in terms of overall progress. 

Furthermore, the CM ratings do not assess the CNPA’s institutional 

capability to provide logistics and administrative support. A recent 

interagency evaluation identified organizational capacity as a critical 

weakness of the CNPA, and Defense officials stated that Defense is 

working to develop subratings to measure CNPA support functions such 

as logistics support, financial management, administration, and training. 

U.S. and Afghan officials noted the continued development and increased 

operational capacity of the CNPA’s specialized units. For example, DEA 

officials cited the National Interdiction Unit’s ability to conduct smaller 

ground-based interdiction operations on its own, the Sensitive 

Investigative Unit’s ability to conduct simple counternarcotics 

investigations, and the execution of 180 wiretaps by the Technical 

Investigation Unit between October 2008 and June 2009, stating that this 

would not have been possible 2 years ago. 

 

28CSTC-A rated the overall CNPA at CM3 (partially capable). 

Page 24 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

However, a July 2009 interagency evaluation, as well as U.S. and Afghan 

officials we interviewed, identified weaknesses in broader CNPA capacity 

and its training program, including the following: 

• Lack of a comprehensive strategy for CNPA development and no U.S. 

agency with clear responsibility for training, leading to “neglect of the 

force” beyond the specialized units. 

• Lack of structure and integrity of operation in CNPA personnel system, 

causing the exact number of current CNPA personnel, their locations, 

training and equipping status, and current support to be unclear. 

• No institutional capacity within the CNPA to provide daily administrative, 

logistics, finance, and training support to its various components, leading 

to dependency of the specialized units on U.S. support. 

• No institutional plan for equipping or recruitment to the CNPA. 

• Greater lack of priority and logistics support affecting the provincial 

CNPA, along with questions of ownership and authority with provincial 

Afghan National Police. 

According to Defense officials, Defense is refocusing its efforts to train 

and equip the CNPA based on this assessment’s findings and 

recommendations. Since December 2009, Defense has supported the 

deployment of four advisors from the Department of Justice’s 

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program to CSTCA, where they are assessing CNPA training needs, exploring ways to 

reform, and seeking to coordinate CNPA training requirements with the 

larger police training mission. Defense officials characterized this as a first 

step, and the CNPA assessment estimated that it will take at least 3 years 

before the CNPA, beyond the specialized units, is able to conduct targeted 

and coordinated investigations at the national level. 

The objectives of the Air Interdiction Unit29 are to provide operational 

airlift for DEA and National Interdiction Unit-led interdiction missions, as 

well as to build Afghan capacity to conduct such missions autonomously. 

According to DEA officials, airlift support from the Air Interdiction Unit 

Limited Air Assets Force Tradeoff between Interdiction 

Missions and Training of 

Afghans 

 

29The Air Interdiction Unit consists of eight MI-17 helicopters in Afghanistan and, until 

recently, was supported by another four MI-17s used for training pilots, flight engineers, 

and crew chiefs in the United States. 

Page 25 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

allows DEA and the National Interdiction Unit to act swiftly on 

intelligence information and perform air assault operations on targets 

across Afghanistan, including areas that would otherwise be inaccessible 

by ground due to security concerns. According to Defense officials, only 

contractor pilots currently fly during actual interdiction operations due to 

a lack of proficient Afghan pilots. 

One key challenge facing the Air Interdiction Unit, in light of limited air 

assets, is meeting the growing demand for interdiction missions while also 

training Afghan pilots, flight engineers, and crew chiefs to conduct such 

missions themselves. Defense officials training the Air Interdiction Unit 

told us that, because interdiction missions must be flown by contractor 

pilots, this forces a trade-off between conducting interdiction missions 

and training Afghan pilots. According to Defense and DEA officials, 

operations should always take priority over training. Defense is addressing 

this issue by attempting to procure six additional helicopters in fiscal year 

2010 and utilizing flight simulators in Kabul and at its training center in the 

United States.30 Additionally, the United Kingdom has contributed four 

helicopters to the Air Interdiction Unit with plans to contribute two 

more.31 Germany has also provided two helicopters for general Ministry of 

Interior use. 

Defense and DEA officials stated that airlift requirements have grown 

beyond what was originally envisaged for the Air Interdiction Unit, and 

they also stated they expected these requirements to grow further as DEA 

expands into forward operating bases.32 Defense officials told us that they 

expected growing interdiction requirements to continue to compete with 

efforts to train Afghans over the next year. To address limited air assets, 

DEA officials stated that DEA is attempting to procure medium-lift 

helicopters in fiscal year 2011. 

 

30Defense sent Afghan pilots, flight engineers, and crew chiefs to the United States as part 

of the Air Interdiction Unit’s training program. 

31With the inclusion of these helicopters, the Air Interdiction Unit also assumes 

responsibility for supporting interdiction missions of the British-trained Afghan Special 

Narcotics Force. 

32DEA officials expected future air support needs of the expanded DEA presence to grow 

to include medical evacuation services, logistical lift, and convoy support, all of which they 

judged would outstrip the air assets currently available to the Air Interdiction Unit. 

Page 26 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

As noted earlier, the goal of the justice reform program area is to support 

the Afghan government’s efforts to establish counternarcotics-specific 

criminal justice institutions and increase the Afghan government’s 

capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers. According to DEA 

officials, the absence of a bilateral U.S.-Afghan extradition agreement that 

includes narcotics offenses removes a valuable channel for prosecuting 

higher profile drug traffickers. Without a formal extradition option, DEA 

generally must rely on the Afghan justice system to prosecute and 

incarcerate drug violators, which U.S. officials characterized as 

“embryonic” and often subject to political will.33

Justice Reform: While 

Some Progress Reported, 

Extent Is Unclear, and 

Broader Justice SectorRelated Challenges Impede 

Efforts 

2009 Status of Afghan Extradition Law

International extradition is the formal process

by which a person found in one country is

surrendered to another country for trial or 

punishment. This process is regulated by 

treaty between the U.S. government and the 

government of a foreign country and has

been used by DEA in countries such as

Colombia and Mexico to extradite high-level 

drug figures that DEA has determined would 

be more reliably prosecuted and incarcerated 

through the U.S. judicial system. U.S. 

Department of Justice attorneys assisted 

Afghan counterparts in drafting an extradition 

law, which, according to Department of 

Justice officials, is still pending final decision 

with the Afghan parliament. According to 

Department of Justice officials, when the 

Afghan parliament ended session in June 

2009, the extradition law remained in draft 

form and contained three concerns:

(1) a requirement for third party consent for 

the extradition of third party nationals–e.g., 

Pakistan would have to consent to the 

extradition of one of its citizens from 

Afghanistan to the United States; (2) the law 

would not apply to women; and (3) the law 

sets up reciprocity in extradition.

State provides funding for Department of Justice-led mentoring programs 

with the Afghan investigators and prosecutors on the Criminal Justice 

Task Force and Afghan judges on the Central Narcotics Tribunal, as well 

as Department of Justice-led advising activities regarding the development 

of Afghan laws and procedures.34 The 32 Afghan prosecutors and 35 

investigators on the Task Force and 14 Afghan judges on the Tribunal are 

working out of the completed Counternarcotics Justice Center, which 

opened in May 2009 after a multiyear delay.35

While the Task Force and Tribunal are now operating within the Justice 

Center, and laws are being developed as previously noted, the extent of 

progress in U.S. agency programs cannot be fully assessed due to a lack of 

interim performance targets. For example, the fiscal year 2009 work plan 

does not outline interim performance targets that provide specific levels of 

results to be achieved within an explicit time frame. 

In addition, a lack of defined criteria makes it difficult for State and 

Department of Justice officials to ensure that the Task Force, Tribunal, 

 

33The Afghan constitution permits extradition of individuals if pursuant to a multilateral 

convention which allows for extradition, and to which Afghanistan is a party. Afghanistan 

is a party to the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and 

Psychotropic Substances which it has cited to justify a limited number of extraditions the 

United States has requested. Nevertheless, according to State and Department of Justice 

officials, this process may not be efficient or reliable. 

34The arrangement is formalized in an interagency agreement, where Department of Justice 

provides State with a work plan that outlines programmatic goals and objectives, 

performance measures, and activities. 

35Plans to expand the Justice Center have also been delayed because of insufficient funding 

and inadequate utilities. Defense’s U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has indicated it would 

work closely with State to ensure completion of the Justice Center’s expansion. 

Page 27 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

and Justice Center are achieving their intended purposes. The Task Force 

and Tribunal are responsible for narcotics and narcotics-related 

corruption cases against mid- and high-level drug traffickers, and the 

Justice Center was constructed to assist the Afghan government in 

prosecuting and detaining significant or mid- to high-level narcotics 

offenders. Since 2005, the Task Force and the Tribunal have tried and 

convicted approximately 1,550 drug traffickers. However, both State and 

Department of Justice officials acknowledged that the definitions of a 

low-, mid-, or high-level trafficker are not based on any clear criteria. 

Instead, according to a State official, subjective judgments are made based 

on the amount of drugs seized, the extent of a trafficker’s political 

connections, or whether the trafficker is a government official. 

Additionally, according to the Department of Justice, more appropriate 

measures than the current low-, mid-, and high-level traffickers may exist. 

According to U.S. and Afghan officials, deficiencies in CNPA training 

result in inconsistent crime scene investigation, poor evidence gathering, 

and weakened cases brought before the Task Force. For example, a senior 

Afghan Ministry of Interior official stated that provincial CNPA personnel 

often do not correctly follow arrest, reporting, and transfer procedures for 

suspects referred to the Justice Center. Department of Justice officials 

also noted that the widespread illiteracy among the CNPA contributes to 

the poor quality of case documentation. In addition, U.S. and Afghan 

officials observed that CNPA personnel are generally not arresting highlevel traffickers. 

Provincial-Level Capacity and 

Corruption Hinder Successful 

Prosecution of 

Counternarcotics Cases 

State has reported that narcotics-related corruption is particularly 

pervasive at the provincial and district levels of government, where 

officials have been known to facilitate drug activities and benefit from 

revenue streams produced by the drug trade. For example, an Afghan 

Ministry of Justice official noted that police and prosecutors are easy 

targets for bribery because they are reportedly not paid sufficiently. A 

recent Defense-led interagency evaluation also found that CNPA personnel 

are more susceptible to corruption than regular Afghan National Police 

officers due to the lucrative nature of the narcotics trade. For example, 

Department of Justice and Afghan officials noted that, in about one-third 

of cases from provinces, provincial CNPA personnel have submitted drugs 

as evidence to the Justice Center but did not arrest the criminal suspect or 

suspects. 

Operational and security challenges continue to hinder the effectiveness of 

the Justice Center, including the following: 

Counternarcotics Justice 

Center Encounters Operational 

and Security Challenges 

Page 28 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

• Sustainment of operations and maintenance costs. The Justice Center is 

challenged by high operations and maintenance costs of $3 million per 

year, which State will fund through May 31, 2011. While State officials are 

currently working to develop a transition plan, no documented transition 

plan yet exists that addresses how the Justice Center will be handed over 

to the Afghan government in 2011. According to State and Department of 

Justice officials, the Afghan government will not be able to pay for these 

costs after the United States withdraws its support in May 2011. We have 

previously noted that Afghanistan continues to lack the ability to cover its 

government expenditure plans without foreign assistance.36

• Retaining Afghan protective personnel. The Justice Center suffers from 

low retention of trained and vetted marshals who provide judicial security 

for the Tribunal. According to Department of Justice and State officials, 

conditions continue to be extremely unsafe for Afghan judges; the chief 

appellate judge was assassinated in September 2008. We have previously 

reported that trained Afghan staff often leave government or other public 

agencies to work with donors and contractors who can offer better-paying 

jobs, and U.S. Marshals Service officials noted that trained personnel are 

often recruited to Afghan agencies that pay more, resulting in a shortage in 

vetted staff that can provide protection for prisoners, prosecutors, and 

judges. 

Public Information: 

Activities Difficult to 

Measure and Challenged 

by Lack of Security and 

Political Will 

As previously noted, the goals of the U.S. public information program are 

to discourage poppy cultivation and build the capacity of the Afghan 

government to conduct public information activities on its own. However, 

according to State officials, measuring the effectiveness of public 

information campaigns is inherently difficult, as it is impossible to know 

exactly how much opium poppy was not planted due to public information 

efforts. State collects information on the number and type of public 

information activities conducted by Counternarcotics Advisory Teams in 

the provinces and materials produced by public information contractors. 

In 2008, advisory teams worked with local leaders and provincial 

authorities to conduct a total of 413 public information events,37 reaching 

an estimated 79,723 people. From January to June 2009, State’s contractor 

produced more than 80,000 print materials containing counternarcotics 

 

36See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP 

(Washington, D.C.: April 2009). 

37These events included councils with influential community members, sporting events, and 

others held for women, youth, and farmers. 

Page 29 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

messages, from billboards and posters to children’s booklets. These were 

augmented by radio and television programs, news stories, and other 

products that were broadcast nationwide thousands of times. Examples of 

counternarcotics public information materials are shown in figure 9. 

Figure 9: Counternarcotics Public Information Materials for Schools 

Source: GAO.

Despite obtaining information on the number and type of public 

information activities, we were unable to assess the full extent of progress 

since State did not establish performance targets for its public information 

activities. A 2009 Inspector General assessment of State’s counternarcotics 

program in Afghanistan found a lack of meaningful performance measures 

to evaluate public information program effectiveness. While 

acknowledging this lack of performance targets, State officials told us that 

Page 30 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

they make qualitative judgments of the program based on the number and 

type of public information events conducted. They also stated that public 

information’s success is tied to the success of other counternarcotics 

program areas. For example, if governors and the central government 

cannot present a credible threat of eradication, previous messages, which 

warned farmers to switch to wheat or risk destruction of their opium 

poppy crops, lose credibility. Such messaging also loses effectiveness if 

alternative crops are not available. 

State has established a goal of ensuring that the Afghan government is able 

to conduct its own effective public information campaign. Although public 

information campaigns are publicized as originating from the Afghan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics, a State official stated that advisory teams 

and State’s contractor actually carry out most operational activities of the 

public information campaign. Attempts to extend advisory teams’ regional 

reach have been limited by both poor security and the absence of qualified 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics officials in the provinces. 

We were unable to assess Afghan capacity to conduct its own public 

information campaigns due to a lack of capability measures or interim 

performance targets. While advisory teams record the number of working 

group meetings and training sessions they conduct to build Afghan 

capacity, they do not keep records of who attends that would allow followup on the results of this training. Additionally, although State has 

established a benchmark for turning advisory teams over to the Afghan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics, this benchmark is tied only to poppy 

cultivation levels and does not take Afghan capacity to conduct public 

information into account.38 It is not clear how advisory teams intend to 

phase out as poppy cultivation levels decrease, or how the Ministry of 

Counter Narcotics will be able to sustain public information efforts 

without advisory team assistance. 

Poor security, lack of political will, and significant variances between 

provinces challenge efforts to develop and spread appropriate 

counternarcotics messages across Afghanistan. Security concerns largely 

dictate how often and how far advisory teams can travel outside their base 

of operations. For example, in the relatively secure northern regions, 

 

38The benchmark states that advisory teams will be phased out as poppy cultivation levels 

decrease and will be completely turned over to the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics 

when levels reach 25 percent of 2007 levels, or 50,000 hectares. 

Page 31 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

advisory teams are able to travel regularly to neighboring provinces to 

conduct public information events and other outreach. In less secure 

southern areas, like Kandahar, advisory teams’ movements have been 

limited, while some other teams have been compelled to retreat to military 

bases for protection. The advisory team in the western Farah province 

reported its main problem is the lack of security, which restricts it to 

daylight operations in the provincial capital. Any team travel outside the 

city must be under heavy armed protection and with advance permission 

from program officers in Kabul. 

Alongside security, political will has been consistently reported as a factor 

challenging the implementation of public information. In general, State 

officials maintain that the stronger and more active a provincial governor 

is in combating narcotics, the more active the local advisory team will be. 

Currently, the advisory teams in Helmand and Nangarhar are the most 

active since they receive substantial backing from their respective 

governors. State officials further noted that some governors are indifferent 

and at times hostile to public information efforts, making it difficult for 

advisory teams to coordinate official events, access audiences, and get 

buy-in from other government officials. 

According to a State official, public information constitutes its own 

program area due to the difficulty of conducting such activities in 

Afghanistan. This official describes Afghan culture as very interpersonal, 

requiring sustained contact in order for messaging to be fully effective. 

Public information has largely become a substitute for not being physically 

and continuously present in many areas. To account for the lack of 

physical presence, and for some of the variances in language, security, and 

levels of involvement in the narcotics industry, the public information 

program is tailoring messages to specific provinces. Advisory teams work 

with provincial leaders to create public information messages that will 

resonate most in their particular provinces. Messages are translated into 

appropriate local languages and are tailored to be geographically and 

seasonally appropriate as well. Tailoring counternarcotics messages has 

been cited as more effective than blanket messaging throughout the 

country, but it is also more costly and time-consuming. 

Drug Demand Reduction: 

United States Increasing 

Efforts to Address Drug 

Addiction 

The United States has funded drug demand reduction efforts since 2006 

and, in 2009, State increased its funding from $2 million to $11 million to 

support 26 drug treatment clinics, further develop protocols for the 

treatment of addicts, and train Afghan prevention providers and 

counselors. The UNODC and the United Kingdom no longer fund drug 

Page 32 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

demand reduction programs, and State and Afghan officials reported that 

other coalition partners are not supporting such efforts with funding or 

personnel. 

UNODC recently approached State in an effort to fund community-based 

mobile treatment teams that address both drug demand and HIV 

prevention, similar to the type of programming that UNODC discontinued 

2 years ago. State is exploring the possibility of supporting UNODC’s 

village-based treatment model for Afghanistan as one of several modalities 

of treatment in an effort to support comprehensive rehabilitation services. 

State has indicated that the demand for treatment services is increasing. A 

2005 UNODC survey documented approximately 1 million drug users in 

Afghanistan, and the 2010 UNODC National Drug Use Survey is expected 

to report 2 million drug users. According to the Afghan government, drug 

demand reduction activities encounter several challenges that impede 

progress, including the following: 

• A dearth of treatment subcenters in the districts and facilities for district 

outreach programs. 

• A shortage of health professional staff in the treatment centers with the 

capacity to practice addictive and behavioral psychotherapy. 

• A lack of vocational training courses in the treatment centers and work 

opportunities for addicts after the rehabilitation process. 

According to State officials, 12 to 41 percent of Afghan police recruits at 

Regional Training Centers test positive for drugs, depending on the 

province. A State official noted that this percentage likely understates the 

number of opium users because opiates leave the system quickly; many 

recruits who tested negative for drugs have shown opium withdrawal 

symptoms later in their training. A State official also reported that the drug 

demand reduction program is considering the establishment of dedicated 

rehabilitation clinics at the regional police training centers; however, 

because the police recruits leave once they finish their training, these 

clinics will not be able to provide the same long-term inpatient services 

that exist at the 26 clinics. While State recognizes that police addiction 

problems are an issue, a State official said that due to limited State 

financial resources, its U.S. drug demand reduction programs do not 

specifically target police forces. 

Page 33 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Although no U.S. drug demand reduction programs specifically for Afghan 

police existed at the time of our field work, after sending a draft of our 

report to the agencies for comment in February 2010, State and Defense 

informed us of recent efforts by the Afghan Ministries of Interior and 

Public Health to establish a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul for priority 

use by Afghan National Police. Additionally, according to CSTC-A, the 

Ministries of Interior and Public Health signed a memorandum of 

agreement in December 2009 that authorizes Afghan National Police 

access to Ministry of Public Health drug rehabilitation facilities 

nationwide. 

As a component of effective program management, monitoring is essential 

to ensuring that U.S. counternarcotics programs are implemented as 

intended. In addition, evaluation uses routine data collection and analysis 

to provide evidence that can be used to compare alternative programs, 

guide program development and decision making, and reveal effective 

practices.39 As shown in table 4, U.S. agencies monitored counternarcotics 

program progress through direct U.S. agency involvement, contractor 

reporting, and/or third-party verification. Program evaluations were 

completed or under way in four of the five program areas 

(elimination/eradication, interdiction, public information, and drug 

demand reduction), but not for the justice reform program. 

Monitoring and 

Evaluation of Most 

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Programs Under Way 

Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation Activities by Program Area 

Program area Monitoring Evaluation 

Elimination/eradication State program officers deployed with central eradication force 

and performed site visits of Good Performers Initiative 

projects. 

U.S. contractor deployed with central eradication force and 

routinely reported on activities to State. 

UNODC verified number of hectares eradicated by central 

and governor-led eradication programs. 

State completed Good Performers Initiative 

program evaluation in March 2009. 

No documented evaluations for central and 

governor-led eradication programs. 

 

39We utilized as a framework the Government Performance and Results Act, which outlines 

good management practices such as establishing strategic, long-term goals and planning 

and reporting progress toward these goals on an annual basis. We also referenced good 

management practices outlined in previous GAO reports and guidance and considered 

monitoring and evaluation principles established by the American Evaluation Association. 

See Appendix I: Scope and Methodology for more information. 

Page 34 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

Program area Monitoring Evaluation 

Interdiction Defense conducted oversight of building construction and 

monitored development of CNPA and its specialized units 

through training program and logistical support. 

DEA agents monitored CNPA specialized units through direct 

mentoring and joint operations. 

U.S. government completed interagency 

evaluation of CNPA capacity and overall 

training program in July 2009. 

Justice reform Department of Justice attorneys monitored justice sector 

activities through direct mentoring of Afghan prosecutors, 

judges, and investigators on the Criminal Justice Task Force 

and also reported routinely to State. 

None documented. 

Public information State program officers conducted site visits of 

Counternarcotics Advisory Team activities. 

U.S. contractor worked directly with Afghans on advisory 

teams to conduct public information activities and reported 

routinely to State. 

Contractor conducted and documented 

results of provincial focus groups to assess 

effectiveness of public information messages. 

UNODC evaluated various counternarcotics 

media campaigns in October 2008. 

Drug demand 

reduction 

State program officers conducted site visits of Afghan drug 

treatment clinics. 

U.S. contractor visited clinics to monitor the implementation 

and administration of drug treatment centers and prevention 

programs. Contractor also routinely reported on activities to 

State. 

State conducting an evaluation of drug 

demand reduction projects to assess 

progress and impact. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State, Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and UNODC program documents. 

Defense and DEA directly monitored interdiction program activities 

through their training, mentoring, and logistical support efforts for the 

CNPA specialized units. For example, Defense monitored the Air 

Interdiction Unit’s performance by tracking operational readiness rates 

and the number of interdiction operations conducted against missions 

requested. In addition to State’s efforts to directly monitor its 

counternarcotics activities through site visits, State also used contractors 

to directly monitor counternarcotics activities within the 

elimination/eradication, public information, and drug demand reduction 

programs. For example, a State official noted that the agency’s 

relationship with its contractor allows the United States to effectively 

monitor and oversee public information campaigns and drug rehabilitation 

programs in remote areas. In the justice reform area, Department of 

Justice attorneys routinely reported on their mentoring of Afghan judges 

and prosecutors to State. Additionally, State program officers at Embassy 

Kabul routinely documented State’s counternarcotics activities and those 

of its contractors. For example, a June 2009 embassy report detailed a visit 

by State program officers to a public event jointly organized by the central 

eradication force and a Counternarcotics Advisory Team. 

U.S. agencies documented evaluations to improve program effectiveness 

in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information 

Page 35 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

program areas but not for the justice reform program.40 Within the 

elimination/eradication program area, State conducted a March 2009 

evaluation of the Good Performers Initiative that included short-, medium-, 

and long-term recommendations to improve program performance. 

Additionally, State officials told us that central and governor-led 

eradication program performance is evaluated through the annual UNODC 

Afghanistan Opium Survey. However, while UNODC verifies and reports 

the number of hectares eradicated, its surveys do not evaluate or make 

recommendations to improve U.S. program performance. State officials 

stated that eradication program performance was continually reviewed 

and assessed but were unable to provide any documented evaluations of 

eradication programs. 

Within the interdiction program area, State, Defense, DEA, Department of 

Justice, and others completed an interagency evaluation of the CNPA in 

July 2009 that contained judgments and recommendations regarding 

overall capability and the training and equipping effort. According to U.S. 

officials, this evaluation and its recommendations will inform efforts to 

refocus the training program onto the broader CNPA beyond its 

specialized units. For public information, State officials reported that 

evaluating progress in this program area is a persistent challenge. They 

stated that normally some idea of public information effectiveness can be 

gathered from nationwide polling, but poor security prevents extensive 

outreach and the implementation of accurate polling methodology. In the 

absence of a nationwide polling capability, State is relying on provincial 

focus groups conducted by its contractor to assess the effectiveness of 

counternarcotics messaging. An October 2008 UNODC evaluation also 

attempted to measure the effects of public information messaging through 

provincial focus groups. 

Within the drug demand reduction program area, State is currently 

evaluating the long-term impact of the State-funded drug treatment 

assistance programs. This 2009-2011 evaluation is designed to measure 

long-term impact relating to behavior (e.g., reduction in drug use/relapse 

rates, reduction in criminal activity and recidivism rates, reduction in 

intravenous drug use, increase in employment, and mental health). This 

evaluation will also provide critical information on treatment success with 

opium and heroin-addicted women and their children. According to State, 

 

40An evaluation of the drug demand reduction program was under way at the time of our 

review. 

Page 36 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

the results of this evaluation will be used to further improve substance 

abuse treatment services throughout Afghanistan. 

Within the justice reform program area, neither State nor Department of 

Justice was able to provide us with a documented program evaluation. 

While a State official noted that program officers conducted informal 

evaluations of program activities, they did not document any of these 

evaluations. Therefore, we are unable to validate their completion or 

determine whether these informal evaluations informed decisions about 

current and future justice reform programming. 

Despite ongoing challenges, including falling short of poppy eradication 

goals, the United States has reported some reductions in poppy 

cultivation, increases in interdiction operations, the destruction of drug 

labs, and the conviction of drug traffickers in Afghanistan. While these are 

reasonable output measures, absent specific performance targets against 

which to assess them, they do not sufficiently indicate the success of U.S. 

efforts to reduce the threat of illicit drugs to the stability, reconstruction, 

and governance of Afghanistan. As we have previously reported, clearly 

defined performance targets would enable decision makers to more 

readily understand the extent of progress made, as well as which program 

elements are effective and which could be improved. In addition, the 

development of capable Afghan security forces is essential to the U.S. 

counternarcotics effort, as well as the larger counterinsurgency campaign 

in Afghanistan. While capability performance goals have been established, 

the U.S. government lacks interim performance targets for the 

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan. Such performance targets would 

better enable program managers to assess whether the U.S. effort is on 

track or determine if adjustments need to be made. This is particularly 

important given the U.S. ultimate goal is to build Afghan capacity to 

independently carry out counternarcotics efforts. 

Conclusions 

Additionally, best management practices have demonstrated that 

documentation of routine evaluations enables program managers to 

identify program vulnerabilities and implement lessons learned, which we 

found were lacking in some of the U.S. led counternarcotics programs. 

These routine evaluations can help program managers understand 

program weaknesses and make needed improvements. 

As the United States moves forward with implementing its strategy and 

measuring success in Afghanistan, we believe the U.S. government has an 

Page 37 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

opportunity to improve its performance measurement and evaluation 

efforts. 

To improve the U.S. government’s ability to assess progress toward 

counternarcotics goals, we are making the following four 

recommendations: 

• The Secretary of Defense develop performance targets to measure interim 

results of efforts to train the CNPA. 

• The Secretary of State develop performance measures and interim targets 

to assess Afghan capacity to independently conduct public information 

activities. 

• The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of DEA and 

the Attorney General, establish clear definitions for low-, mid-, and highlevel traffickers that would improve the ability of the U.S. and Afghan 

governments to track the level of drug traffickers arrested and convicted. 

• The Secretary of State perform an evaluation of the justice reform 

program. 

The Departments of State and Defense provided written comments on a 

draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendixes II and III, 

respectively. The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy also provided technical comments and 

updates that we have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Defense concurred with our recommendation to develop performance 

targets to measure interim results of efforts to train the CNPA and noted 

that it is in the process of establishing initial and interim program 

performance metrics in accordance with the U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy for Afghanistan. 

State concurred with our recommendation to develop performance 

measures and interim targets to assess Afghan capacity to independently 

conduct public information activities, and noted that it is in the process of 

developing an assessment tool for its counternarcotics public information 

campaign. 

Page 38 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

State deferred to DEA and the Department of Justice concerning our 

recommendation that it establish clear definitions for low-, mid-, and highlevel traffickers in consultation with DEA and Justice to enhance the 

ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to track the level of drug 

traffickers arrested and convicted. While we acknowledge DEA and the 

Department of Justice’s expertise in this area, we believe nonetheless 

because of State’s role in funding and managing the justice reform 

program in Afghanistan, State holds the primary responsibility for 

ensuring that measures to gauge progress exist. Therefore, State should 

remain engaged in the development of more precise definitions for these 

measures. If State or the Department of Justice develops or identifies 

measures that are determined to be more appropriate for measuring 

justice reform progress, then we believe that these would fulfill the spirit 

of our recommendation. 

State concurred with our recommendation to perform an evaluation of the 

justice reform program, and noted that it is an ideal time to evaluate this 

program’s progress using an outside partner. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; and the Office 

of National Drug Control Policy. The report also is available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 39 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
 

List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Flake 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Russ Feingold 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Michael Honda 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To review U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan, we obtained 

information from pertinent planning, funding, and reporting documents for 

U.S. counternarcotics programs and interviewed relevant officials from the 

Departments of State (State), Defense (Defense), and Justice, including 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C., and 

Afghanistan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that it had no 

involvement in U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and is, 

therefore, not a part of our review. Additionally, this review focused 

specifically on the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, 

public information, and drug demand reduction program areas, leaving 

alternative development to be addressed by a later product on broader 

agricultural assistance to Afghanistan. State and Defense were unable to 

provide us with programmatic breakouts of counternarcotics funding 

linked to expenditures within our audit time frames. 

To examine how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has 

changed, we reviewed available U.S. and Afghan strategy and planning 

documents, including the August 2007 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan and the July 2009 Counternarcotics Action Plan for 

Afghanistan. Although the latest U.S. counternarcotics strategy was not 

finalized at the time of our review, we discussed the upcoming strategic 

shifts and their programmatic implications with relevant U.S. officials, 

including the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and 

officials at the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Additionally, to 

understand the resource impact of this strategic shift, we examined 

Congressional Notifications from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement and U.S. agencies’ fiscal year 2010 funding requests. 

To assess counternarcotics progress, we reviewed relevant planning and 

reporting documentation to identify program goals, performance 

measures, and interim performance targets. We based our analysis of 

performance targets on best management practices identified in previous 

GAO work, which states that interim performance targets can be used to 

provide information on interim results when it may take years before an 

agency sees the results of its programs. Such information can also provide 

congressional and other decision makers with an indication of the 

incremental progress the agency expects to make in achieving results.1

 We 

also examined Letters of Agreement between the U.S. and Afghan 

 

1

GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can Improve Usefulness to 

Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: February 1999). 

Page 41 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

governments, contractor reports, agency performance plans and reports, 

and programmatic documentation. In addition, we spoke with State, 

Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and contractor officials 

implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan, as well as with officials from 

the United Kingdom and the Afghan Ministries of Counter Narcotics, 

Interior, and Justice to discuss progress made and ongoing challenges to 

counternarcotics activities. This included site visits to the State Air Wing 

Headquarters, the National Interdiction Unit/Sensitive Investigative Unit 

complex, the Air Interdiction Unit headquarters, the Counternarcotics 

Training Academy, and the Counternarcotics Justice Center in Kabul, as 

well as the border crossing at Islam Qalah in Herat province. We also 

reviewed relevant studies and assessments by the United Nations Office 

on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and relevant think tanks. 

To assess the reliability of UNODC data, we reviewed the statistical 

estimation and survey data methods detailed in UNODC’s annual 

Afghanistan Opium Surveys. Additionally, we did not independently assess 

the reliability of the Afghanistan interdiction data provided by DEA, but 

we considered these data generally acceptable to provide an overall 

indication of the magnitude and nature of interdiction operations from 

fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009. We also reviewed key reports by 

agency inspector generals and the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction. 

To assess U.S. monitoring and evaluation of counternarcotics programs, 

we first utilized, as a framework, the Government Performance and 

Results Act, which outlines good management practices such as 

establishing strategic, long-term goals and planning and reporting progress 

toward these goals on an annual basis. We also referenced good 

management practices outlined within previous GAO reports and 

considered monitoring and evaluation principles established by the 

American Evaluation Association.2

 We then examined contractor reports, 

agency documentation, and available evaluations conducted by U.S 

agencies and third parties such as UNODC. Additionally, we discussed 

these monitoring and evaluation activities with officials from State, 

 

2

For a previous GAO discussion of monitoring and evaluation, see GAO, International 

Food Assistance: USAID Is Taking Action to Improve Monitoring and Evaluation of 

Nonemergency Food Aid, but Weaknesses in Planning Could Impede Efforts, GAO-09-980 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2009). See also An Evaluation Roadmap for a More Effective 

Government (Washington, D.C.: February 2009) issued by the American Evaluation 

Association’s Task Force on Evaluation Policy. 

Page 42 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy. 

The information on foreign law in this report is not the product of GAO’s 

original analysis, but it is derived from interviews and secondary sources. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 43 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 44 GAO-10-291 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 45 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 46 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 

Page 47 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-10-291 

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s 

comment letter dated March 3, 2010. 

1. The draft report we provided the agencies for comment included a 

recommendation that State, in consultation with Defense, develop a 

drug rehabilitation program or other approach to specifically target the 

drug addiction problem within the Afghan National Police. During the 

agency comment period, State and Defense informed us of recent 

efforts by the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Public Health to 

establish a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul for priority use by 

Afghan National Police. Additionally, according to CSTC-A, the 

Ministries of Interior and Public Health signed a memorandum of 

agreement in December 2009 that authorizes Afghan National Police 

access to Ministry of Public Health drug rehabilitation facilities 

nationwide. We, therefore, dropped this recommendation from our 

final report, as these actions fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation. 

GAO Comments 

 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant 

Director; David W. Hancock; Steven J. Banovac; Christina Bruff; Virginia 

Chanley; Carl Barden; Joseph Carney; and Mark Dowling made key 

contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Jena 

Sinkfield, Joyce Evans, and Cynthia Taylor. 

Page 50 GAO-10-291 Afghanistan Drug Control 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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