UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

JEREMY SCHOLL, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 

CARPENTERS, an unincorporated association,

Defendant.

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Case No. 12-cv-01806

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jeremy Scholl, proceeding pro se, has filed a Second Amended Complaint

against Defendant Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters (“the Union”), asserting six claims 

against the Union. The Union has filed a Motion to Strike and Dismiss Scholl’s Second 

Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Union’s Motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2013, this Court dismissed Scholl’s First Amended Complaint (the 

“FAC”) without prejudice and granted Scholl leave to file a second amended complaint in 

accordance with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 10, and 11.1 (Dkt. No. 

117.) On March 11, 2013, Scholl filed his Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”), with five 

supplemental documents attached.

2 (Dkt. No. 123.)

 1 In the same opinion, this Court denied Scholl’s Motion to Dismiss the Union’s 

Counterclaim against Scholl for collection of the fine the Union “Delegate Body” imposed 

against Scholl. On March 7, 2013, the Union voluntarily withdrew its Counterclaim. 

2 Scholl filed motions to add Daniel L. Langreder and Rich Morrow as plaintiffs, but 

neither party has appeared in person or by formal appearance. For that reason, there is no 

in personam jurisdiction over either Langreder or Morrow, and Scholl has no standing to raise 

their claims. G&S Holdings LLC v. Continental Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 2012)

(“plaintiffs must assert their own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest their claims to relief 

on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”). 

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The SAC purports to assert six claims against the Union that appear to center on Scholl’s 

dispute with a Union business representative named Cory Zimmerly. The Union argues that the 

SAC should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Scholl has failed to respond 

to the Union’s Motion. Instead, Scholl has filed numerous documents purporting to be a 

“Response,” but none of those documents addresses the arguments raised by the Union. (See, 

e.g., Dkt. Nos. 132, 134, 136, 139, 140.) Furthermore, in direct violation of the Court’s Orders, 

Scholl has repeatedly filed numerous extraneous motions and sent various letters and documents 

to this Court.

3

 (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 127, 128, 129, 138 and 148 (motions) and Dkt. Nos. 145, 

146 and 147 (correspondence from Scholl to Judge Darrah)). As he has done in the past, Scholl 

has repeatedly demonstrated his utter disregard of the Court’s directive that the parties obtain 

leave of court prior to filing any documents and of the Court’s warnings regarding violations of 

the Court’s Order. (See Court’s October 31, 2012 and November 14, 2012 Orders.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. 

Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). The federal notice pleading 

 3 Specifically, as noted in the Union’s Reply Brief, Scholl has filed numerous documents 

without leave. (See e.g., Motion to Strike Memorandum and Seeking Discipline Towards 

Attorneys Filing Motion (Dkt. No. 132); Letter to Richard Schmack (State’s Attorney for 

DeKalb County) (Dkt. No. 133); Letter to Richard Schmack (Dkt. No. 134); Letter from the FBI 

to Scholl (Dkt. No. 135); A Questionnaire from Langreder (Dkt. No. 136); Statements for the 

Record by Langreder (which is a blank document) (Dkt. No. 136-1); Evidence of Service (Dkt. 

No. 137); Motion to Request Removal of Whitfield, McGann and Ketterman (Dkt. No. 138);

Motion for Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 139); Supporting Documents for Removal 

and Discipline (Dkt. No. 140); Letter to Langreder from Terrance B. McGann (Dkt. No. 140-1); 

Portion of Collective Bargaining Agreement (Dkt. No. 140-2); Motion for Second Amended 

Complaint (Dkt. No. 141); Motion to Add Permissive Joinder of Rick Marrow (Dkt. No. 141-1);

Letter from Rick Marrow (Dkt. No. 141-2); Letter from the State’s Attorney for DeKalb County 

(Dkt. No. 142); and Fed Ex Customer Receipt (Dkt. No. 143).) After the Union filed its reply 

brief, Scholl filed additional documents without leave. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 145, 146, 147, 148.) 

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standards do not demand a high level of specificity or sophistication; the complaint “need only 

provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, 

sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo v. 

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Courts construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff when considering a 

motion to dismiss, which means that all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and all reasonable 

inferences are construed in favor of the plaintiff. Id. However, the complaint must allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff 

must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” in order for the claim to be facially plausible. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In accordance with this principle, “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Id. 

The pleadings standards are more lax for pro se litigants. The pleadings of pro se

litigants are to be liberally construed, which is a lower standard than that applied to formally 

trained attorneys. Wilson v. Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988). Despite the 

deferential standard for pro se litigants, the pleadings still must comply with the procedural rules 

governing them, and the complaint still must be “otherwise understandable.” Hudson v. 

McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 

(7th Cir. 2001).

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ANALYSIS

As with his FAC, Scholl’s SAC is extremely difficult to decipher and understand.4

 The 

SAC purports to assert the following six claims: (1) violation of the National Labor Relations 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (the “NLRA”); (2) defamation of character per se; (3) intentional infliction 

of emotional distress; (4) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (the “RICO Act”); (5) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964; and (6) violation of “the Taft hartley act [sic] or amended NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141.”5 The 

SAC fails to state a plausible claim for relief on any of these claims.

Violation of the NLRA

Scholl’s first claim alleges the Union violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158. (SAC p.2.) 

In support, Scholl states several legal conclusions but provides very few factual assertions. 

Applying a liberal standard to his allegations, Scholl’s factual assertions appear to boil down to: 

(1) the Union acted in bad faith with respect to the “process of discipline” because the “union’s 

action resulted in suspension . . . after scholl [sic] notified the committee of his resignation”; and 

(2) the “union obstructed justice by insinuating and misleading the delivery of fine, (over 6 

months after trial and only upon request.).” (Id.) 

Scholl has not stated a claim in this count. He has not provided sufficient information to 

provide the Union with “fair notice of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. After 

citing to the NLRA, and without identifying in this count which subsection of the NLRA he 

 4 Scholl attached as an exhibit to his SAC a document entitled “Memorandum of Law” 

that purports to further explain his claims, but it is similarly unhelpful. (See SAC, Exh. 1.) 

5 Scholl has dropped from his SAC some of the claims that were deemed insufficiently 

pled in the first opinion dismissing Scholl’s Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 117.)

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bases his claim, Scholl only gives legal conclusions that the Union has violated the statute.

6

 

Despite Scholl being held to a lower standard due to his pro se status, he has not alleged enough 

facts to state a facially plausible claim for violation of the NLRA. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570. Therefore, Scholl’s violation of the NLRA claim is dismissed.

Defamation of Character Per Se

Scholl next claims the Union has committed defamation per se against him. (SAC pp. 2-

3.) His allegations center around Zimmerly, including that Zimmerly called Scholl “a Rat while 

taking a photograph,” that Zimmerly made “undisputable Verbal [sic] statements to members of 

local [sic] 790 of which [sic] had no authority or capacity,” and that Zimmerly “sought 

statements from previous employers encouraging negative comments and statements”. (Id. p. 3.) 

 6 Scholl alleges that Union imposed a fine more than four months after his hearing and 

that this constitutes a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411. Scholl’s allegation is unfounded, and he 

misunderstands 29 U.S.C. § 411. 29 U.S.C. § 411 prohibits the Union from limiting a member’s 

right to sue, except that a member may be required to exhaust reasonable Union hearing 

procedures not to exceed four months. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). The Union’s alleged late 

imposition of a fine to Scholl does fall within the statute’s protection and does not impede 

Scholl’s right to sue. 

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For the same reasons discussed in the Court’s February 6, 2013 Order, dismissing 

Scholl’s FAC, Scholl has failed to state a claim for defamation per se.

7

 As with his FAC, Scholl 

has failed to allege Zimmerly was acting within the scope of his Union employment, as required 

for the Union to be vicariously liable for Zimmerly’s actions. Su Heon Kim v. Eiu Soeb Kim, 

360 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Furthermore, Scholl has not sufficiently alleged facts 

to meet the elements of a defamation claim. See Brennan v. Kadner, 814 N.E.2d 951, 956-57 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Calling someone a “rat” is not defamatory; furthermore, Scholl still has not 

made any connection between the alleged actions of Zimmerly and any “prejudice . . . in [his] 

trade, profession, or business.” Muzikowski, 322 F.3d at 924. Moreover, there is no allegation 

that the statement that Scholl was a “rat” was made to anyone other than Scholl; therefore, there 

is no allegation of publication of that statement. For these reasons, the defamation per se claim 

is dismissed.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Scholl next alleges the Union is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) based on several incidents: the Union did not allow Scholl to record a pre-committee 

 7 As stated in the February 6, 2013 opinion, to state a claim for defamation under Illinois 

law, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the defendant made a false statement concerning the 

plaintiff; (2) there was an unprivileged publication of the defamatory statement to a third party 

by defendant; and (3) publication of the defamatory statement damaged the plaintiff.” Brennan, 

814 N.E.2d at 956-57 (citations omitted). Further, “[a] statement is defamatory per se if the 

words used are so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to the plaintiff's 

reputation may be presumed.” Id. at 957. Illinois recognizes five categories of statements that 

constitute defamation per se: “(1) commission of a criminal offense; (2) infection with a venereal 

disease; (3) inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of public office; 

(4) fornication or adultery; or (5) words that prejudice a party in her trade, profession, or 

business.” Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Illinois law). 

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meeting and threw him out of the meeting; the Union falsely accused Scholl of soliciting and 

punished him for this offense; an official in the Union (presumed to be Zimmerly) allegedly 

witnessed Scholl’s violating the Union’s rules; the Union set “a trial date without proper 

notification lead time and without a preponderance of evidence for both parties”; the Union sold 

union cards to persons completing the apprenticeship program; and all of the allegations 

previously made for defamation per se. (SAC pp. 2-3.)

The required elements of an IIED claim are: “(1) that the defendant’s conduct was 

extreme and outrageous; (2) that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result; and 

(3) that the defendant knew or should have known that such distress was substantially certain to 

occur from the conduct.” Curcio v. Chinn Enters., 887 F. Supp. 190, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing 

McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988)). Scholl has neither alleged that he suffered 

the required severe emotional distress as a result of the actions alleged, or that the Union “knew 

or should have known that such distress was substantially certain to occur.” Id. For these 

reasons, Scholl’s claim for IIED is dismissed.

Violation of the RICO Act

Scholl next claims the Union is guilty of violating the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. 

The RICO Act provides, “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a 

violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Section 1962 contains 

three substantive subsections, each of which share two things in common: requisite existence of 

an “enterprise” and a “pattern of racketeering.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A “pattern of racketeering” 

requires, within a ten-year span, two predicate actions as enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 

28 U.S.C. § 1961(5); DeGuelle v. Camilli, 664 F.3d 192, 199 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining the 

RICO Act’s requirements). Furthermore, in a civil RICO action, a plaintiff must allege, with 

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some specificity, the damages that occurred to either his “business or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 

1964; Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 n.11 (1992); Evans v. City of 

Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2006) (“In order for [a plaintiff] to secure standing to 

sue under RICO, he must first present the court with evidence that he incurred an injury to his 

‘business or property’ within the meaning of § 1964.”).

Scholl has failed to state a claim under RICO. He has not sufficiently alleged two 

predicate actions to qualify as a “pattern of racketeering.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Although the SAC 

mentions mail fraud, Scholl fails to plead fraud with the requisite specificity. See Pirelli 

Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441-41 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (explaining that fraud claims require a certain amount of specificity). Scholl also has 

not sufficiently established standing to bring a RICO claim because he has not alleged damages 

under the RICO Act. For these reasons, the SAC’s claim for violation of the RICO Act is 

dismissed.

Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Scholl next alleges the Union violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), by retaliating against him and for age discrimination. Scholl 

has failed to allege that he submitted a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged 

unlawful employment practice to exhaust his administrative remedies, as is required in order to 

pursue a Title VII discrimination or retaliation claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). For this 

reason alone, Scholl fails to state a claim under Title VII. 

Furthermore, even if he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Scholl’s claim for 

age discrimination would fail on the merits because he has not made any allegations in support of 

that claim. Likewise, as was the case with his FAC, Scholl’s claim for retaliation fails on its 

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merits because he has not alleged the required causal connection between a protected activity and 

a materially adverse employment action or that a similarly situated employee was treated more 

favorably than him. See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 307 (7th Cir. 2012). 8 The 

SAC’s Title VII claim is dismissed. 

Violation of the Taft-Hartley Act

Scholl’s final claim is the Union violated the Taft-Hartley Act. As with his FAC,

Scholl cites to 29 U.S.C. § 411 and alleges that the Union administered an unfair trial. (Id.) 

Scholl recites similar allegations as those found in his FAC: (1) one of the trial board members 

is the brother of the business representative to the Local Union to which Scholl transferred, (2) 

Scholl was not given adequate time to “complete a detailed inspection or acquire all evidence for 

inspection let alone contact witness[es],” and (3) Zimmerly arrived in the same car to the hearing 

as two of the trial board members. (SAC pp 5-6.)

Scholl’s SAC fails on this claim for the same reason his FAC was dismissed; Scholl 

has made no effort to identify which section of the Taft-Hartley Act he intends to invoke or how 

he is entitled to relief under the Taft-Hartley Act. See Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081 (complaint 

must provide a short and plain statement “sufficient to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice’ of 

the claim and its basis”). For these reasons, the SAC’s claim for a Taft-Hartley Act violation is 

dismissed.

 8 Scholl has provided no information indicating his actions were protected under Title 

VII. Scholl implies his actions were opposing an unlawful employment practice, as this is his 

citation to Title VII; but he provides no information to establish the Union was engaged in an 

unlawful employment practice. He alleges the retaliation was in response to his asking questions 

about the Union’s relationship with Cedar Creek carpentry, but there is no indication the Union 

was engaged in an unlawful employment practice when it interacted with Cedar Creek carpentry.

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Union’s Motion to Strike

The Union’s Motion also asks that Scholl’s Second Amended Complaint be stricken. 

(Dkt. No. 129.) That request is denied, as it was in the previous decision by this Court regarding 

Scholl’s FAC, for the same reasons. (Dkt. No. 117.) Motions to strike are generally not favored, 

and “pleadings are generally not stricken unless the moving party will be prejudiced otherwise.” 

Burke v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 169 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Once 

again, the Union will not be prejudiced, as all of Scholl’s claims in his SAC are dismissed in 

their entirety; and, therefore, the Motion to Strike is denied.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Union’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended 

Complaint [129] is granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Scholl’s Second Amended Complaint is 

dismissed with prejudice; Scholl has been given leave to file a second complaint, and it is 

obvious that granting him leave to file a third amended complaint would be futile. See Stanard 

v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to deny 

leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.”) 

(internal citations omitted). Indeed, Scholl failed to properly respond to the Union’s Motion and,

instead, continued to file motions without permission and to send the Court correspondence, in 

direct violation of the Court’s Order. Scholl’s Motions [127, 128, 138, 148], which were 

improperly filed without leave of Court, are also denied. Civil case is terminated.

Date: 8/15/13 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge

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