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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAMS, on

behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

E-BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM, INC. d/b/a

BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM

Defendant.

Case No.: 12-cv-00190

DEFENDANT¶S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER TO THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

 BGC¶s motion to transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas stems from this

case¶s straightforward, uncontroverted facts. Specifically, this case involves a Defendant

(incorporated and headquartered in Texas) that followed (in Texas) policies and procedures

(developed in Texas) to prepare an employment background check for a non-party, Express

Employment Professionals (located in Texas), that in turn provided the background check to an

employer, Goodwill Industries of East Texas (located in Texas), which made the decision (in

Texas) not to hire an Illinois Plaintiff, who was applying for a job (in Texas). Besides Plaintiff,

there is neither party nor non-party witnesses in Illinois who have information relevant to this

putative nationwide class action.

Plaintiff cannot refute that the foregoing points weigh strongly in favor of transfer. 1

Instead, Plaintiff¶s Response Brief relies on misdirection, and dwells on a handful of non-parties

1

 Plaintiff understatedly concedes that 3some events may have occurred in Texas, ́ and then

incorrectly states that 3many of the relevant events took place in Illinois ́ such as 3all of

Mr. Williams¶s actions, as well as the inaccurate information in his report. ́ (Pl¶s Br. at 6 n.3).

That statement is incorrect. The relevant events took place entirely in Texas, as described above.

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located in states other than Illinois and Texas whose relevance Plaintiff cannot articulate. In any

event, the location of those non-parties does not speak to whether Illinois or Texas is the better

forum for this case. BGC¶s Opening Brief details that the witnesses, documents, events, and

pertinent non-parties (e.g., the prospective employer) in this case are concentrated in Texas.

By contrast, Plaintiff cannot identify a single relevant witness in Illinois. Apart from

Plaintiff himself (who was applying for a job in Texas), the only Illinois witness Plaintiff

suggests may exist is a corporate representative of non-party TransUnion. (Pl¶s Br. at 7).

Plaintiff¶s suggestion is meaningless because TransUnion contributes nothing to this case. This

civil action arises out of a criminal background report, not a credit report. (See Compl. ¶¶ 11-19;

Foster Email, Ex. 2 to Pl¶s Br.). As BGC¶s President made unmistakably clear in his deposition,

BGC only works with TransUnion in connection with credit reporting, and does not do anything

with TransUnion in connection with criminal reporting. (Kessler Dep., Ex. 1 to Pl¶s Br., at

126:3-14).

In short, Plaintiff has failed to show that Illinois has any connection to this dispute other

than the fact that he still lives there because he did not get the job he applied for in Texas. Tong

v. Direct Trading Corp., No. 02 C 8331, 2003 WL 22282466, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2003)

(Norgle, J.) (3[T]his Court¶s relationship to [Defendant¶s] claims arise only because she resides

here. The vast majority of conduct giving rise to [Defendant¶s] claims, as well as the witnesses

and sources of proof and other evidence, bear relationship to the Northern District of Texas. ́)

(emphasis added).2

2

 Courts have consistently recognized that it is appropriate to transfer FCRA cases, including

class actions, to the defendant¶s home district. See, e.g., Barela v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.,

No. 04-5144, 2005 WL 770629, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2005) (noting that the nature of an FCRA

case points to the defendant¶s place of business as the appropriate venue); Smith v. HireRight

Solutions, Inc., No. 09-6007, 2010 WL 2270541, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2010) (3Multiple courts

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ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY

I. The Motion to Transfer is Ripe.

Plaintiff suggests that although the parties have been engaged in discovery related to the

motion to transfer for almost six months, the Court should now start the process anew with

unspecified discovery3 and briefing on BGC¶s pending motion to dismiss and motion to strike.

The Court should reject Plaintiff¶s attempt to further delay adjudicating the now fully-briefed

motion to transfer on which Plaintiff has already been afforded discovery.4 Indeed, courts in this

Circuit have rejected the path Plaintiff now urges. See, e.g., D & G, Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., No.

08-cv-761-slc, 2009 WL 1110412, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 24, 2009) (rejecting Plaintiff¶s

attempts to open discovery and consider a motion to dismiss instead of a motion to transfer and

stating that 3[b]ecause I have decided that the case should be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

considering § 1404 transfer motions in FCRA cases have noted that the situs of the material

events, and thus the appropriate venue, is generally the place where the defendant credit

reporting agency conducted its business. ́); Roe v. Intellicorp Records, Inc., No. 12-CV-02567,

2012 WL 3727323 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012) (3[A]ll employees who could testify regarding

[defendant]¶s practices and procedures work and reside in [Ohio]. On the other hand, Plaintiff . .

. would be more inconvenienced by a transfer to Ohio . . . . However, as noted above, Plaintiff

filed this lawsuit as a nationwide class action . . . . ́); Bogollagama v. Equifax Info. Servs., No.

09-1201, 2009 WL 4257910, at *3 (finding that operative facts in an FCRA case arose in the

forum where credit reports were compiled and issued); Klingensmith v. Paradise Shops, Inc., No.

07-322, 2007 WL 2071677, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. July 17, 2007) (noting that an FCRA class action

focuses on the defendant¶s conduct); Ayling v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., No. 99-3243, 1999

WL 994403, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1999) (3Where plaintiff¶s cause of action arises from

strategic policy decisions of a defendant corporation, the defendant¶s headquarters can be

considered the place where events giving rise to the claim occurred. ́); Murphy v. Trans Union,

LLC, No. 12-499, 2012 WL 3536322 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (transferring to the defendant

CRA¶s home district because relevant employees lived and worked in that district).

3

 Importantly, such discovery would take place almost entirely in Texas.

4

 Judge Nolan recognized that the motion to transfer is ripe when she terminated her referral,

stating: 3Limited discovery on the motion to transfer issue is now complete. The motion to

transfer, which is a dispositive motion, is now ready for the District Court to set briefing. ́ (Dkt.

No. 49).

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1404(a), it would not be proper to consider the merits of the motion to dismiss or make decisions

about the scope of allowable discovery . . . . ́).

The Northern District of Texas is well-positioned to decide the pending dispositive

motions. Courts across the country have recognized that dispositive motions should be handled

by the transferee court. See, e.g., Howard v. Viking Ranches, Inc., No. 86 C 9830, 1987 WL

16896, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 9, 1987) (3This Court declines, therefore, to rule on any of

defendants¶ pending motions to dismiss and reserves those rulings for the transferee court. ́);

Daniell v. Mohsin, No. 2:07-CV-438, 2009 WL 674358, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009) (3In light

of the transfer of venue . . . all pending motions are deferred to the transferee court. ́); Moore v.

McKibbon Bros., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1357-58 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (transferring a case and

3declin[ing] to rule on other pending motions, . . . finding that it is more appropriate for the trial

judge in the transferee district to do so ́); Tillotson v. City of El Paso, No. CIV 09-0963 JB/CG,

2010 WL 597993, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 29, 2010) (collecting cases).

Further, Plaintiff¶s arguments in favor of delaying the motion to transfer mistakenly

assume that if this Court were to first consider the motion to eliminate class claims and granted

that motion, he would succeed in opposing transfer. Plaintiff¶s argument ignores that his choice

is not dispositive but is instead just one of the nine factors in the overall analysis. See Mitchell v.

First N. Credit Union, No. 07 C 1891, 2007 WL 2948374, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2007) (Norgle,

J.) (3A plaintiff¶s choice of forum is usually not the determinative factor. ́). The Court should

reject Plaintiff¶s attempts to further delay resolution of this case through costly and needless

discovery occasioned by his decision to bring a nationwide class action in a forum with no

connection to his dispute. Briefing on the motion to transfer is now complete and it is ripe for

adjudication.

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II. The Private Factors Favor the Northern District of Texas

A. The Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses Favors Texas.

BGC¶s Brief explains in detail why Plaintiff¶s putative nationwide class action is better

addressed in Northern District of Texas, where witnesses and information relevant to Plaintiff¶s

claims are concentrated. (See BGC¶s Br. at 5-11). Conversely, Plaintiff offers nothing to show

that Illinois is a better forum than Texas, arguing instead that Texas is supposedly not as good as

BGC states. Plaintiff¶s misplaced argument stems from Plaintiff¶s repeated assertion of an

unremarkable point: namely, that some tangential non-party discovery in this case may take

place outside Texas. That is true of many, if not most, cases. But Plaintiff¶s emphasis on nonparties of minor importance misses the central point of this transfer motion, which is to weigh

the efficiencies of proceeding in Texas versus Illinois. Plaintiff¶s argument is also factually

incorrect because the bulk of both party and key non-party witnesses in this case are located in

Texas and Plaintiff¶s proposed sources elsewhere are largely irrelevant.

In this regard, although Plaintiff extensively quotes from Landis v. Warner Chilcott (US),

LLC, No. 10-cv-5283, 2010 WL 5373664 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2010), to argue that BGC has not

met its burden of providing specific examples of information and witnesses in Texas, the Landis

case actually supports BGC. Plaintiff elected not to quote Landis¶s critical point, replacing it

instead with asterisks. (See Pl¶s Br. at 5). Specifically, the Landis court observed that 3Plaintiff

on the other hand, identifies nine Illinois residents by name and identifies generally the

substance of their expected testimony. ́ Id. at *4 (emphasis added). By comparison, Plaintiff

here cannot identify a single relevant witness in Illinois.5 BGC, on the other hand, has identified

5

 As explained herein, although Plaintiff identifies Trans Union as a potential witness, Trans

Union has nothing relevant to contribute regarding the claims that Plaintiff brings in this case.

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the categories of persons and documents in Texas necessary to address Plaintiff¶s allegations in

the Complaint based on its preliminary and ongoing investigation of this matter.6

1. Relevant Evidence is Concentrated in Texas.

As Plaintiff himself recognizes, this is a case about BGC¶s policies and procedures in

complying with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (3FCRA ́). (Pl¶s Br. at 11) (3Indeed, this case

turns on the legal question of whether Defendant has complied with the FCRA . . . . ́). As such,

the relevant information is concentrated in Texas.

Plaintiff was given the opportunity to engage in discovery related to the motion to

transfer, and to that end conducted a searching deposition of BGC¶s President, Craig Kessler.

After discovery, the key facts pertinent to this motion remain uncontroverted:

· BGC is a Texas company with a single office in Dallas, Texas. (Kessler Decl. ¶

4, Kessler Dep. at 19:14-20).

· Plaintiff¶s two claims directly implicate how BGC handles background reports,

which it does from Dallas. (Kessler Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9-11). All of BGC¶s employees

responsible for responding to and fulfilling requests for consumer background

reports are located in Dallas. (Kessler Dep. 19:10-20).

· BGC¶s written policies regarding the production of consumer background reports

are located in Dallas. (Kessler Dep. 25:20-25).

· All data acquisition for instant searches is handled through Genuine Data Services

3GDS ́), a BGC subsidiary in Texas. (Kessler Dep. 75:18-22 ± 76:2-9; 118:1).

6

 Defendant¶s reliance on Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Rubloff Oakridge Algonquin, L.L.C.,

No. 03 C 3063, 2003 WL 22382999 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2003) is similarly misplaced. Clear

Channel involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant trying to transfer between divisions in

the same district where the Plaintiff had sued in the division where all of its relevant evidence

was located. None of those factors exists here.

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· BGC¶s internal data acquisition team, which processes data to ensure FCRA

compliance, is located in Dallas. (Kessler Dep. 29:19 ± 30:5; 93:10-14).

· The majority of BGC¶s key management personnel related to Plaintiff¶s claims

are located in Texas. (Kessler Dep. 37-38).

· BGC maintains its database in Dallas, with a redundant center in South Carolina.

(Kessler Decl. ¶¶ 18-19).

· Plaintiff¶s own claims relate exclusively to Texas: his claims concern a job

application with Goodwill Industries of East Texas. (Compl. ¶ 11).

2. The 3Sources Throughout the Country ́ Plaintiff Points to are

Irrelevant to this Lawsuit.

Plaintiff argues that BGC 3uses sources that are located throughout the country, ́ as a

reason why the Court should deny BGC¶s motion. (Pl¶s Br. at 6). Many of Plaintiff¶s proposed

avenues for discovery, however, are based on Plaintiff¶s misunderstanding about how BGC

performs background screening, despite the fact that BGC has explained its process to Plaintiff

and his counsel in the Kessler deposition. (Kessler Dep. 69:1-14; 76:4-20; 105:21 ± 106:5;

117:5-6). BGC also explained the process in detail in the email to Plaintiff¶s counsel that is

annexed to Plaintiff¶s opposition as Exhibit 2. (Foster Email at 1). BGC performs consumer

background checks in two distinct ways: (1) using an instant database search, or (2) using

3traditional search, ́ in which BGC sends individuals to a courthouse to research information.

Plaintiff¶s report was produced from the former method ± an instant search of the BGC

database. BGC did not perform a 3traditional search ́ about Plaintiff. (Kessler Dep. 127:1-6)

3Q: To obtain the information [in Plaintiff¶s report] would someone have to physically go to a

courthouse? . . . A: No. ́). This is an important distinction in considering potential relevant third

party witnesses. For example, Plaintiff has no basis to claim that he will need to depose the

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individual researchers 3spread out around the country ́ who perform traditional manual searches,

(Pl¶s Br. at 8), because Plaintiff¶s background report did not involve a traditional search (and, by

corollary, neither did the reports of class members).

Plaintiff is therefore mistaken in asserting that there is relevant information in the

following locations:

· Illinois: Plaintiff identifies only a single purported non-party witness in Illinois:

a designated corporate representative of TransUnion. (Pl¶s Br. at 7).7

TransUnion, however, is not relevant to this case because TransUnion does credit

reporting and this case is about criminal background reporting, not credit

reporting:

Q What sort of background check is run ± is this ± does this

[Plaintiff¶s background report] reflect?

A It reflects a criminal background screen.

Q Which type of BGC¶s searches does it reflect?

A The US OneSEARCH.

Q Is there any credit information in the US OneSEARCH?

A There is no credit information in the US OneSEARCH.

Q So for this sort of search, you would not have gotten

information from TransUnion?

A That is correct.

(Kessler Dep. 126:3-14) (emphasis added). A review of Plaintiff¶s Complaint

reveals no allegations related to any credit information provided by BGC.

Counsel for BGC clarified this same point in a follow up e-mail to Plaintiff¶s

counsel:

Some clients order more extensive reports on their job applicants.

These reports are not like the one provided on Mr. Williams.

Although this information is irrelevant to the report provided on

7

 Even if TransUnion were relevant, its witness would be located in California. (See Foster

Email at 1) (explaining that BGC deals with TransUnion in California); (Pl¶s Br. at 7) (3[T]hat

person would likely be located in Chicago or Orange County, California ́) (emphasis added).

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Mr. Williams, BGC will explain these searches for clarity¶s sake. .

. . A few BGC clients ask for credit information on their job

applicants. BGC fulfills these requests by getting information

from TransUnion.

(Foster Email at 1) (emphasis added). As such, TransUnion is not a relevant

source of information for Plaintiff¶s claims.

· Florida: Plaintiff identifies two potential sources of information in Florida.

o Ray Conrad: Mr. Conrad is the owner of BGC. However, as explained

at length in Mr. Kessler¶s deposition, Mr. Conrad is not involved in

BGC¶s day-to-day operations. (Kessler Dep. 40:10-15). Instead, he

receives periodic telephone updates on the business generally, in his

capacity as an owner. (Id. at 42:13-15). Mr. Conrad does not have

information about the details of BGC¶s FCRA compliance, and Plaintiff

does not explain Mr. Conrad¶s relevance to this lawsuit beyond the

proposition that he exists and lives in Florida. (Pl¶s Br. at 9).

o The Last Option: BGC uses a company called The Last Option (3TLO ́)

occasionally to provide basic name and address histories for consumers.

(Kessler Dep. 102:1 ± 103:22). There is no suggestion that BGC used

TLO data in preparing Plaintiff¶s report. The mere fact that BGC does

occasional business with TLO unrelated to the underlying facts of this

lawsuit is not sufficient to warrant discovery from TLO.

· California: Plaintiff identifies Court Ventures, a non-party California company

from which BGC indirectly acquires information that ultimately becomes part of

BGC¶s database. Court Ventures is substantially removed from this dispute and it

is unlikely that it has witnesses with relevant information. Instead, BGC¶s own

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witnesses, and employees of GDS (a Texas company that coordinates with Court

Ventures in supplying information to BGC), are more likely to have relevant

information about how data acquired from Court Ventures is integrated into

BGC¶s database in compliance with the FCRA because all of BGC¶s instant

database data is processed through GDS in Texas. (Kessler Dep. 76:2-9).

· India: Plaintiff identifies Bright Corner as a potential source of information in

India. Bright Corner, like Court Ventures, is a remote third party that provides

data that ultimately becomes part of BGC¶s database through processing by GDS

and BGC¶s own employees. Representatives of BGC and GDS are thus the

relevant witnesses.

· Virginia: Plaintiff identifies NAPBS, a trade group of background reporting

companies, as a potential relevant source of information in Virginia simply

because Mr. Kessler testified that BGC sometimes uses NAPBS 3as a resource. ́

(Kessler Dep. 112:22). Again, NAPBS is irrelevant because this case turns on

whether BGC¶s internal policies and actions are FCRA compliant.

· South Carolina: Plaintiff also dwells on the fact that BGC has some staff and

redundancy in South Carolina. Plaintiff¶s focus on South Carolina is only further

proof that Illinois is disconnected from this dispute. Regardless, BGC¶s presence

in South Carolina is comparatively far less than BGC¶s presence in Texas.

Plaintiff¶s unremarkable point that BGC has some presence in South Carolina

does not diminish BGC¶s central point that the persons and information most

relevant to this case¶s underlying facts are concentrated in Texas.

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Put simply, the convenience of witnesses favors Texas. The possibility of some

witnesses outside of Texas is the same whether this case stays in Illinois or moves to Texas. As

such, transfer to the Northern District of Texas will reduce inconvenience and expense and foster

efficiency. See Mitchell, 2007 WL 2948374, at *3 (Norgle, J.) (observing that transfer will

necessarily inconvenience one party but is appropriate where it results in less overall

inconvenience).

B. Access to Sources of Proof is Easier in the Northern District of Texas.

Plaintiff argues that access to sources of proof does not favor transfer because

technological innovations have minimized many concerns about transporting documents. (Pl¶s

Br. at 11-12). BGC does not contest that technology has decreased the importance of this factor.

It is, however, incontrovertible that the relevant documents are concentrated at BGC¶s

headquarters in Dallas. (Kessler Decl. ¶¶ 15-16, 18-20). As this Court has recognized, the

concentration of relevant documents in a single location counsels in favor of transfer, even if that

factor is not paramount in light of technology. See Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp. Emerson Climate

Techs. Braeburn Sys., LLC, No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011)

(Norgle, J.) (transferring a case to the defendant-corporation¶s headquarters because 3the place

where the defendant¶s documents are kept weighs in favor of transfer to that location ́)

(quotation marks omitted). Further, the nature of the information in this case ± sensitive private

consumer information about individuals who may be unaware that they are part of a proposed

class ± warrants minimizing any risk of data exposure by, for example, doing in-person delivery

of physical documents at their source, which is Texas. Thus, while this factor may not be of

substantial importance in modern analysis, it weighs in favor of transfer.

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C. Costs of Obtaining Attendance of Witnesses are Lower in the Northern

District of Texas.

Plaintiff effectively concedes that the costs of obtaining the attendance of witnesses are

lower in the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiff¶s only rejoinder is that BGC¶s employees are

presumed to attend because they are under the control of BGC, and that the Court should instead

focus on non-party witnesses with little or no relevance to the claims in this case.

Plaintiff ignores, however, that this factor considers the costs of such attendance.

Plaintiff¶s position would require numerous BGC employees to travel from Texas to Illinois, a

consideration that this Court has found instructive on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Marvel

Group, Inc. v. Modular Interiors, No. 01 C 6577, 2002 WL 1052043, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 24,

2002) (Norgle, J.) (transferring a case from Chicago to Texas and noting that requiring witnesses

to travel from Texas to Illinois for trial would 3impose [an] undue hardship ́); BGC¶s Br. at 8-9.

Further, BGC has already identified the two most relevant non-party witnesses: Goodwill

Industries of East Texas and Express Employment Professionals, both of which dealt with

Plaintiff¶s job application and both of which are Texas companies within the subpoena power of

the Northern District of Texas. (See BGC¶s Br. at 14) (discussing the limits of a court¶s

subpoena power). The costs and difficulty of securing the attendance of witnesses for

proceedings in Illinois weighs in favor of transfer.

D. Plaintiff¶s Choice of Venue is Entitled to Minimal Deference

Plaintiff does not address any of the cases that BGC cited in its Brief in which courts ±

including this Court on repeated occasions ± have recognized that the traditional deference

afforded to a plaintiff¶s choice of venue is substantially weakened in nationwide class actions.

(BGC¶s Br. at 10-11) (collecting cases).

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Instead of distinguishing BGC¶s authority, Plaintiff cites a single case for the proposition

that this Court has denied a motion to transfer where the plaintiff alleged a nationwide class

action. (See Pl¶s Br. at 3) (citing Gueorguiev v. Max Rave, LLC, 526 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Ill.

2007)). Plaintiff¶s reliance on Gueorguiev is misplaced. Guergouiev was not a nationwide class

action, but instead a class of persons affected in Illinois. Id. at 857-58 (3The receipts at issue in

this case were distributed in defendant¶s Illinois stores and this district has a relationship to the

dispute. ́). Furthermore, unlike BGC in this case, the defendant in Guergouiev had stores and

operations in Illinois. Id.; cf. (Kessler Dep. 86:8-9) (3[I]t wouldn¶t be an employee of BGC

because we have none in Illinois. ́). Finally, Judge Bucklo found it important that the defendant

in Guergouiev was not trying to transfer to the district of its headquarters, but to a district where

a similar case was pending. Guergouiev, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 858.

As the cases cited throughout BGC¶s Brief and Plaintiff¶s own opposition brief all

acknowledge, a nationwide class action is not afforded the same deference that Plaintiff now

seeks. (See BGC¶s Br. at 10-11). Plaintiff¶s failure to address those authorities is telling and

reveals that the well-established case law in this District weighs in favor of transfer.

III. The Interests of Justice Favor Transfer

Plaintiff fully concedes that local interests favor resolving this dispute in Texas because

of its connection to the facts and to BGC. (See BGC¶s Br. at 15). Plaintiff¶s only challenge to

the interests of justice is to dispute the administrative efficiency of resolving this dispute in the

Northern District of Texas. BGC does not disagree that the Northern District of Illinois is an

efficient district capable of resolving this matter, but the statistics discussed at length BGC¶ Brief

illustrate that the Northern District of Texas has a lighter caseload, shorter median time to trial,

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and smaller number of cases pending more than three years, which are relevant considerations in

deciding which venue is most efficient. (See BGC¶s Br. at 13-14).

Plaintiff cites Rana v. College Admissions Assistance, LLC, No. 11 C 4280, 2012 WL

1245674 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2012), as support for the notion that the Court ought not find these

statistics persuasive. Although the Rana8 court concluded that relative caseloads of this District

and the Northern District of Texas did not 3strongly favor ́ transfer, this Court has recognized

that statistics ± such as time to trial ± play an important role in considering the interests of

justice. See Mitchell, 2007 WL 2948374, at *4 (Norgle, J.); Amorose v. C.H. Robinson

Worldwide, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 731, 737 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (considering case management

statistics in deciding to transfer). Sister courts outside this District have similarly found such

statistics helpful in determining whether to transfer FCRA class actions. See, e.g., Smith, 2010

WL 2270541, at *9 (transferring a nationwide FCRA class action to the defendant CRA¶s home

state and considering, among other things, administrative court statistics).

In sum, Plaintiff has not advanced a reason why the interests of justice favor denying

BGC¶s motion. Texas has a local interest in overseeing cases against its corporate citizens. And,

although both districts are capable of efficiently handling this dispute, the statistics explained in

BGC¶s Brief illustrate why the Northern District of Texas is well positioned to adjudicate this

dispute quickly and effectively.

CONCLUSION

 The facts underlying this case occurred in Texas, and consequently the convenience of

parties and witnesses as well as the interests of justice favor transfer to the Northern District of

8

 Plaintiff¶s repeat citations to Rana are unavailing. Rana, like the other cases cited by Plaintiff,

did not involve a nationwide class action and, indeed, the Rana court recognized that Plaintiff¶s

choice of forum was entitled to deference only because he was bringing a state resident class

action rather than a nationwide class action. 2012 WL 1245674, at *5.

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Texas. Plaintiff has failed to show why this case ought to proceed in Illinois, and instead

muddies the waters by pointing to irrelevant non-party witnesses found in neither Illinois nor

Texas. Put differently, Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence that Illinois is a more

convenient forum than Texas, which is the undisputed location of the underlying events as well

as numerous party and non-party witnesses. Accordingly, the Court should grant BGC¶s motion

and transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of September, 2012.

 s/ Nabil G. Foster

Nabil G. Foster (Atty. No. 6273877)

HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP

222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300

Chicago, Illinois 60601-1081

(312) 704-3000

(312) 704-3001 (facsimile)

nfoster@hinshawlaw.com

Cindy D. Hanson

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &

 STOCKTON LLP

1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Telephone: (404) 815-6500

Facsimile: (404) 541-3240

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT BGC

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130434407v1 0932177

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on September 21, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing

DEFENDANT¶S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION

TO TRANSFER TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically

send email notification of such filing to all attorneys of record:

Keith J. Keogh

Craig M. Shapiro

Timothy J. Sostrin

KEOGH LAW, LTD.

101 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 605

Chicago, IL 60606

 s/ Nabil G. Foster

Nabil G. Foster (Atty. No. 6273877)

HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP

222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300

Chicago, Illinois 60601-1081

(312) 704-3000

(312) 704-3001 (facsimile)

nfoster@hinshawlaw.com

Cindy D. Hanson

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &

 STOCKTON LLP

1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

(404) 815-6500

(404) 541-3240

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