IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

NATHANAEL MATTHEWS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 12 C 2698 

 ) 

DAISEY LOPEZ, JOANNE ANDERSON, ) 

LINDA VICK, and WESTSIDE HOLISTIC ) 

FAMILY CENTER, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Nathanael Matthews has sued Westside Holistic Family Center and three of its 

employees (Daisey Lopez, Joanne Anderson, and Linda Vick), for race discrimination 

and religious discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Defendants have moved for summary 

judgment on all of his claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants 

defendants' motion. 

Background1

 Westside Holistic Family Center is a nonprofit that provides a variety of services 

 

1

 Throughout his response to defendants' statement of material facts, Matthews argues 

that "the cited source is not an affidavit as required by Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure." See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 1-3. Aside from 

this conclusory assertion, he does not explain why the defendants' affidavits are invalid. 

All of the affidavits are made under oath, signed, dated, and sealed by a notary. The 

Court therefore considers the affidavits in deciding this motion. 
2 

to the Austin and West Garfield communities in Chicago. Between 1996 and June 30, 

2010, Westside operated and managed the Westside Alternative High School pursuant 

to a contract with Youth Connection Charter Schools (YCCS), which, in turn, had a 

charter with Chicago Public Schools. Matthews, who is African American, was hired to 

teach at the school in 1999. 

 In October 2008, Daisy Lopez was hired as principal of the school. Between 

March 2009 and July 2010, Lopez disciplined Matthews ten times for a variety of 

infractions. The charged infractions included gross insubordination (refusal to comply 

with a directive to assist another teacher with moving classroom items), failing to 

prepare for class, failing to submit lesson plans, turning in lesson plans that were 

missing required elements, screening a film that was unrelated to the lesson plan, failing 

to grade student work, failing to submit grades on time, refusing to submit grades for 

certain students (due to lack of attendance), grading according to subjective criteria, 

failing to take attendance, and playing gospel music in the classroom. 

 In addition, defendants contend that Matthews was unwilling or unable to 

incorporate new teaching methods into his lessons. See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' LR 56.1(a) 

Stmt. ¶¶ 11-17. Shortly before Lopez was hired, her predecessor wrote a memorandum 

to Matthews about this problem, noting, 

Over the years, you have had some difficulties in the areas of instructional 

planning, organizing, and delivery. It appears that it takes you longer than 

reasonably expected to grasp new instructional and curriculum 

approaches. Accordingly, I thought it would be in the best interest of our 

students, your professional growth, and the overall redesign and new 

model development that we will use this upcoming school year to do some 

one-on-one training with you. 

Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Matthews Dep., Ex. 17 at 1. Lopez allegedly encountered 
3 

similar difficulties, describing Matthews as actively resistant to new teaching methods. 

See id., Lopez Aff. ¶ 4 ("Whenever I suggested changes to his teaching style, 

classroom management or approach to discipline . . . he would tell me that his approach 

was 'what these black children need' and not the 'motherly' approach he claimed I was 

promoting."). Matthews himself sent a memorandum to Gale Lindo, president of 

Westside, in which he said that "[b]lack students today . . . don't need experimental 

methods, they need a structured education," and "Ms. Lopez doesn't have enough 

knowledge to be a principal or she has the wrong understanding about what it takes to 

be a principal in a school in the black community." Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Lopez Aff., 

Ex. 1 (Matthews Mem. to Lindo), at 5. 

 Lopez was also critical of Matthews's approach to classroom management. He 

regularly sent students to Lopez's office for minor offenses (such as forgetting their 

school supplies), and on one occasion, he sent his entire classroom to her office. 

Additionally, Lopez observed Matthews using the word "nigger" during class. During his 

deposition, Matthews testified, "Yes. I used the word 'nigger.' . . . I did, most certainly 

did. . . . Can I reiterate? Yes, I used the word nigger." Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., 

Matthews Dep. at 200-01. Asked why he used this word with the students, Matthews 

explained, 

Well, I use it in a very educational manner. A lot of time I use it in a 

humorous manner, not putdown. . . . Black folks use the word nigger all 

the time. . . . I might say to a student, I'd say, "You know what?" I call 

them a negro; okay? I said, "I really, really would like to call you nigger." 

Like that. 

Id. at 201-03. Thus, Matthews contends, he did not use the word in a manner that 

would demean his students. 
4 

 In July 2010, YCCS assumed control of the school. Although all of the teachers 

were laid off, they were allowed to reapply for their positions. Matthews did so but was 

not rehired. A few months later, Matthews showed up to a meeting of the Westside 

board and asked to be placed on the agenda. The board refused his request. 

 Matthews filed this suit in April 2012. He contends that Lopez discriminated 

against him on the basis of race and religion while he was employed by Westside. He 

also argues that her superiors, Joanne Anderson and Linda Vick, tolerated this 

discrimination. 

 It does not appear from Matthews's complaint that he is suing Westside, Lopez, 

Anderson, or Vick for his layoff or his non-rehiring by YCCS. At least Matthews does 

not attempt to support such a claim in his response to defendants' summary judgment 

motion. In his affidavit, Matthews states that he "recall[s] that prior to the end of the 

[2009-10] school year nine of the twelve African American staff and faculty members, 

with the exception of myself and two others, were either discharged from employment, 

or resigned, or were forced into voluntarily terminating their employment with 

defendant . . . due to defendant Lopez's direct and indirect actions." Pl.'s Resp. to 

Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Matthews Aff. ¶ 10. Aside from this statement, he does not 

present any evidence to support the proposition that his or the other employees' 

separation were racially motivated. 

Discussion 

 A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most 
5 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's 

favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Srail v. Vill. of 

Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is inappropriate "if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

A. Race discrimination claims 

 Matthews alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII and section 1981. 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "with respect to 

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The right to make and enforce contracts is defined as "the 

making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of 

all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981(b). In the Seventh Circuit, "the same prima facie requirements [apply] to both 

Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims." Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 

534, 538 (7th Cir. 2007). The Court therefore addresses these claims together. 

 Although Matthews responded to defendants' statement of material facts, his 

one-page brief does not advance a theory of liability or address defendants' substantive 

arguments in favor of summary judgment. His complaint states that he is asserting Title 

VII and section 1981 claims, but he does not specify the nature of his claims there 

either. Thus, as a threshold matter, the Court must pin down exactly what sort of claim 

or claims Matthews is asserting, bearing in mind that "a pro se complaint, however 
6 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

 It appears to the Court that Matthews is asserting two types of race 

discrimination claims: a claim that he was subjected to different terms and conditions of 

employment, and a claim that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. 

Defendants do not directly address the latter sort of claim in their motion, nor does 

Matthews in his responsive materials, but the Court believes these materials, fairly read, 

advance a hostile work environment claim. First, Matthews's complaint alleges that 

defendants failed to "provide a non-discriminatory work environment." Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 43. And Matthews's affidavit, which he submitted in response to the motion 

for summary judgment, repeatedly alleges that Lopez "engaged in unwarranted 

harassment and disrespectful conduct toward me," and that "no action [was] 

taken . . . to bring [her] in line with defendant Westside Holistic Family Services' 

workplace anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy." Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' LR 

56.1(a) Stmt., Matthews Aff. ¶¶ 11-12; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 14 ("Defendant Lopez 

engaged in further unwarranted harassment and disrespectful conduct toward 

me . . . ."); id. ¶ 18 ("I submitted a formal written complaint to defendant Westside 

Holistic Family Services' Human Resource personnel . . . about the ongoing harassment 

and disrespectful treatment that I was being subject to at the hands of defendant 

Lopez."). The Court will address the hostile work environment claim first. 

 1. Hostile work environment claim 

 To establish a race discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment, 

Matthews must point to evidence tending to show that (1) the work environment was 
7 

both subjectively and objectively offensive, (2) the harassment was based on his race, 

(3) the conduct was severe or pervasive, and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. 

See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2010).2

 The Court 

must "consider the totality of the circumstances," including "the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's 

work performance." Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2011). 

 Matthews alleges that Lopez harassed and, as he puts it, "disrespected" him by 

(1) entering his classroom and demanding that he remove a covering from the window 

on his classroom door; (2) removing the covering from the window on his classroom 

door; (3) allowing an intoxicated and belligerent student to enter his classroom; (4) 

loaning his classroom television to another teacher and denying his claim to ownership 

of the television in front of his students; (5) allowing a student to wear headphones 

during class against his wishes; (6) failing to make sufficient efforts to recover a pen that 

was allegedly stolen by a student; (7) failing to take disciplinary action against disruptive 

students; (8) denying him access to student files because he had not filed a written 

request for the files; (9) returning a student to his class, even though the student had 

arrived late and refused to sit in his assigned seat, and asking the student whether he 

would be willing to sit in another seat (Matthews objected to this, and Lopez left with the 

student); (10) assigning students to his class without notice; (11) requiring him to 

provide grades to students who had not attended his class; (12) failing to discipline a 

 

22 The last of these elements would not apply, of course, to a hostile work environment 

claim under section 1981 against an individual defendant, but the Court need not dwell 

on that point here, as Matthews's claim founders on other grounds. 
8 

special education teacher who interfered with his instruction to a student (Matthews 

objected to the special education teacher signing the student's name to a test he had 

administered); (13) requiring him to keep his classroom door open; and (14) requiring 

him to change classrooms two times. 

 Putting aside whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that this conduct, 

taken together, was objectively offensive in the way required to constitute a hostile work 

environment, no reasonable jury could find that it was based on Matthews's race. There 

is no evidence that Lopez ever used a racial epithet towards Matthews (or any other 

teacher) or that she mentioned race in the context of these decisions. That is not the 

end of the story, of course, because conduct need not be overtly racially-based to be 

actionable. But even though conduct does not need to be "explicitly racial" to give rise 

to a hostile work environment claim, Matthews must show that it "ha[d] a racial 

character or purpose." Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). He has offered no evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could make such a finding (such as evidence comparing his treatment 

with that of similarly-situated non-African-American teachers). Defendants are therefore 

entitled to summary judgment on Matthews's hostile work environment claim. 

 2. Terms and conditions claim

 The Court turns next to Matthews's claim that he was subjected to harsher 

conditions of employment due to his race. A plaintiff may establish race discrimination 

by providing direct evidence of discrimination or by proceeding under the indirect 

method of proof. Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2015). Under the 

direct method, a plaintiff must provide "either direct or circumstantial evidence that 
9 

would permit a jury to infer that discrimination motivated an adverse employment 

action." Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014). 

"Circumstantial evidence can take a number of forms, such as suspicious timing, 

behavior or comments directed at members of the protected group, evidence showing 

that similarly-situated employees outside the protected group received systematically 

better treatment, and evidence that the reason the employer gave for the adverse action 

was pretextual." Id. 

Matthews has not presented any direct or circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination. He therefore must proceed under the indirect method of proof. This 

requires him to establish a prima facie case by pointing to evidence tending to show that 

(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he met his employer's legitimate job 

expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly-situated 

employees outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. Moultrie v. Penn 

Aluminum Int'l, LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 2014). If Matthews fails to show that 

there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding any one of these requirements, 

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claim for race discrimination. 

 The Court will begin with the third requirement. An adverse employment action 

is a material change to the terms and conditions of employment. James v. Hyatt 

Regency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2013). To be "material," the change must be 

"more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Id.; 

see also Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that 

"not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action," 

because "[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment actions . . . would form the 
10 

basis of a discrimination suit"). Examples of materially adverse employment actions 

include "a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or 

salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished 

material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation." 

Id. 

 Because Matthews does not clarify which of the actions he describes constitute 

actionable adverse actions under Title VII or section 1981, the Court will assume that he 

views all of them as such. Most of the alleged incidents of harassment are mere 

inconveniences; they could not conceivably be adverse actions because they did not 

involve termination, loss of benefits, demotion, or changes of comparable severity. 

Matthews's allegations regarding unfair reprimands are also not adverse actions. To 

"rise to the level of a material adverse employment action," a reprimand must be 

accompanied by "some tangible job consequence" because "otherwise every reprimand 

or attempt to counsel an employee could form the basis of a federal suit." Lucas v. Chi. 

Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 731 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 

550, 556 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to broaden definition of adverse employment action 

to include unfair reprimands). There is no evidence that any of Lopez's reprimands 

resulted in a tangible job consequence to Matthews. 

 Matthews alleges that the classrooms he was moved to were inferior to his 

original classroom. One might argue, then, that the classroom changes signified a 

constructive demotion. But there is no evidence to support this theory. With regard to 

the move from room 106 to 101, it is undisputed that the change was part of a schoolwide reorganization of classrooms based on subject matter (i.e. science, history, 
11 

mathematics, etc.). With regard to the move from room 101 to 102, it is undisputed that 

the change was intended to assist Matthews with classroom management (unlike room 

102, room 101 had a bathroom, which students had reportedly used for smoking during 

class). Although room 101 was smaller than room 102, Lopez decreased his class size 

from 20 to 10 to accommodate the difference in size. Matthews may have been 

unhappy about the classroom changes, but they do not suggest a constructive 

demotion. 

 Lastly, Matthews alleges that Lopez did not inform him of a June 30 deadline to 

reapply for his position, and that she held a meeting in June 2010 where she told him 

and other teachers that they would not need to reapply for their positions. If there was 

in fact a June 30 deadline, and Matthews missed this deadline because of Lopez's 

conduct, it might be argued that he was constructively terminated. But Matthews 

concedes that he received a letter from Westside on July 7, 2010 that advised him that 

YCCS was assuming control of the school, his position was terminated, and if he was 

interested in reapplying for his position, he was required to contact a woman by the 

name of Yolanda Thomas. The letter did not state that there was a deadline to do so. 

Moreover, Matthews testified that he in fact met with Thomas, she did not inform him of 

a deadline, and he was allowed to reapply for the position. Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., 

Matthews Dep. at 227-32. There is therefore no evidence that any deadline had any 

impact on Matthews's attempt to reapply for his position. 

 In sum, Matthews has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute of fact 

regarding whether he was subjected to an adverse action that is actionable under Title 

VII or section 1981. For this reason alone, defendants are entitled to summary 
12 

judgment on Matthews's claim that he was subjected to race discrimination in the terms 

and conditions of his employment. 

 The Court also concludes that Matthews has failed to show that there is a 

genuine dispute of fact regarding the fourth requirement of a prima facie case. 

Specifically, although Matthews alleges that Lopez treated him less favorably than nonAfrican Americans, he has not identified a similarly-situated non-African-American 

employee who was treated more favorably than he was. 

 For these reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Matthews's 

race discrimination claims. 

 3. Section 1981(a) claim against Anderson and Vick 

 Matthews contends that Anderson and Vick violated section 1981(a) by failing to 

give him "full and equal benefits of proceedings for the security of his employment 

retention" and by refusing to allow him "to exercise his right to air his employment 

termination grievance" before Westside's board. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-52. Asked 

to clarify this claim at his deposition, Matthews testified that Anderson, as Westside's 

executive director, "should have stepped in and stopped [Lopez] and she didn't. So that 

means that she was negligent." Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt., Matthews Dep. at 296. He 

also testified that Vick, as president of Westside's board, had a duty and responsibility 

remedy Lopez's alleged racism. Id. at 293-93. 

 Aside from tolerating Lopez's alleged conduct and denying him the opportunity to 

air his grievances at a board meeting, Matthews does not contend that Vick or 

Anderson participated in or contributed to any other instances of race discrimination. 

Because the Court has already concluded that no reasonable jury could find that 
13 

Matthews suffered race discrimination while employed at Westside, Vick and Anderson 

are entitled to summary judgment on Matthews's section 1981(a) claim. 

B. Religious discrimination claim 

 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because 

of his religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Religion is defined to include "all aspects of 

religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). "These 

provisions of Title VII prohibit an employer from intentionally discriminating against an 

employee based on the employee's religion, and require an employer to make 

reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious practices of employees unless doing 

so would cause the employer undue hardship." Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 

951 (7th Cir. 2012). 

 To sustain a claim of religious discrimination, a plaintiff may proceed under either 

the direct or indirect method of proof, which the Court has described earlier. See 

Martino v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., 715 F.3d 195, 201-02 (7th Cir. 2013). "A plaintiff can also

establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination by showing that the observance 

or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is religious in nature, that she 

called the religious observance or practice to her employer's attention, and that the 

religious observance or practice was the basis for her discharge or other discriminatory 

treatment." Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 As with his race discrimination claim, Matthews does not specify the exact nature 

of his religious discrimination claim. The Court will therefore address each possibility in 

turn, beginning with failure to accommodate. 

 Matthews's only evidence of religious discrimination is the fact that Lopez 
14 

prohibited him from playing gospel music during class.3

 It is undisputed that she did so 

because playing this music during class violated the school's First Amendment policy, 

which barred the school or its teachers from "promot[ing] any particular form of religion." 

Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 36-37. No reasonable jury could find that the 

school was required to accommodate Matthews's desire to play gospel music during 

class, thereby violating its own First Amendment policy and exposing the school to 

undue hardship. Illinois law provides that "[a] charter school shall be a public, 

nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-home based, and non-profit school." 105 ILCS 5/27A-5 

(emphasis added). Accommodating Matthews thus risked revocation of the school's 

charter. Moreover, accommodating Matthews would have exposed the school to First 

Amendment lawsuits from students. "Teachers and other public school employees 

have no right to make the promotion of religion a part of their job description and by 

doing so precipitate a possible violation of the First Amendment's establishment 

clause." Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1097, 1099 (7th Cir. 2007). 

 Matthews also has not presented any evidence that the fact he played gospel 

music during class (or his religious faith generally) resulted in some other form of 

discrimination. He does not contend that he suffered other adverse actions stemming 

from his religious beliefs; his allegations are identical to the race discrimination claim. 

The Court has already concluded that no reasonable jury could find that those 

grievances rise to the level of an adverse employment action. His religious 

 

3

 Whether Matthews was trying to proselytize his students by playing gospel music is 

somewhat unclear. At times, he suggests that the music was intended to induce calm in 

his students. His complaint states, however, that it was for "spiritually [sic] 

enhancement within the minds of the students under his direction and control." Second 

Am. Compl. ¶ 49. 
15 

discrimination claim therefore fails under both the direct and indirect methods. See 

Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Whether the plaintiff 

proceeds by the direct or indirect method of proof, he must show a materially adverse 

employment action."). 

Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary 

judgment [dkt. no. 86] and directs the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants 

Daisey Lopez, Joanne Anderson, Linda Vick, and Westside Holistic Family Center and 

against plaintiff Nathanael Matthews. 

 ________________________________ 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: August 10, 2015