T hi s opi ni on i s s ubj e ct t o r e vi s i on b e f or e f i nal p u bli ca tion i n th e P ac i

f i c R ep orter 20 15 UT 7

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

S TA TE O F U T AH , Pe ti ti o ner ,

v. D US T I N L Y NN B I RD , Respo nde nt

. No. 20120906 Filed January 23, 2015

On Cer tior ari to the Ut ah Courtof Appeals

Th ird D is tric t, S al t La ke Th e H ono rab le Wi ll ia m W . B arre tt

No. 091908403

Att or neys: Sean D . Reyes, At t’y Gen., Karen A. K lucznik, Asst. Att ’y Gen.,

S al t La ke C ity, fo r pe titi one r Linda M. Jones, Noella A. Su dbury, Salt Lake City , for r espondent
J UST I CE P ARRIS H authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , J UST I CE D UR HAM , and J UDG E E L I Z A B E T H H RUBY -M I LLS joined. J UST I CE L EE authore d a diss enting opinion. Having r ecus ed hims elf, A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG doe s not par ticipate herein; J UDG E E L I Z A B E T H H RUBY -M I LLS s at.
J UST I CE P ARRIS H , op inion of the Cou rt: INTRODUCTION ¶1 On certio rar i, we are asked to rev iew the court o f appeals ’

r uli ng t ha t th e tri alc ou rt erre d b y no t provi di ng ame ns reaj ury instruction for the charge of failure to respond to an offic er’s signal to s top u nd er Uta h C ode s ec tion 41 -6a-2 10

. We are al s o as ked to deter mine w hether t he court o f appeals err ed by failing to pr ov ide gu id anc e on

rem an d re gard in g a c orrec t j uryin s tru c tion . W e a ffirm the court o f appeals , but exer cis e our discretio n to pr ov ide suc h gu id anc e.S TATE v. B I RD Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

2 BACKGROUND ¶2 On th e e ve n i n g o f

Oc to b e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 9 , S a l t L a ke C i ty police officer Alma Sw eeny was patro lling the Glendale area in an

unma rked pol ic e veh ic le

. O ffic er Sw een y drove pa s t a b lu e Ford Mustang and observe d th a t the dr iver , Dus tin Lynn Bird, and the pass enger look ed “nerv ous” and appeared to be “duc king down in the ve hicle.” Offi ce r Sweeny decided to follo w the Mustang and observe d the driv e r and the pass enger leaning ove r, causin g the vehicle to swerv e. The Mustang approached a stop sign and slowl y
ro lled thro ugh it w ithout comin g to a complete stop. Officer Sw eeny there after a ct i v a t e d the lights in his p olice vehicle. The Mus tang immediately slowed in s peed but did not pull ov er. O ffic er Sweeny testified that “[t]here were several safe places” t o pull ov er, but the Mu s tan g c ont inue d d rivi ng an d tu rne d ont o a d iffe rent s tree t. A ft er
ma kin g th e tu rn, the Mu s tan g s low ed dow n an d pu ll ed to the c urb as though i t we r e goingto sto p, but then quic kly pulled away and

c ont inu ed dri vin g f or ap proxi ma tel y ha lf a b loc k b ef ore s topp in g. Wh il e th e M ust an g w as s til l rol li ng t o a s top, the pa s s en ger e xite d the ve hicle an d began running. Officer Sw eeny stopped his vehicle be hi nd the Mu s tan g, s tep pe d ou t, a nd w al ked tow ard the Mu s tan g. After seeing the passenger flee, he ret urned t o hi s v ehicle w ithout saying anything t o Mr . Bird. He then dro ve past t he M ustangand

arou nd the c orne r, w he re h e p arke d th e poli c e vehi c le an d p urs ue d the pa s s en ger on

fo ot. ¶3 After a ppre he ndi ngt he pa ssen g er , O ffic er Sween y ob s erved the Mu s tan g pu llqu ic kly a w ay fromthe c urb an d d rive off. Offi c er Sw een y c al le d fo r ba c ku p. S hort ly th erea ft er, an oth er offi c er l oc ate d the Mu s tan g an d a c tiva ted his lig hts. Th e s ec ond offi c er te s tifie d tha t Mr. B ird s topp ed “i mm ed ia tel y.” Mr. B ird w as the n take n i nto

c us todyan d l ate r c ha rged w ith fa il ure to resp ond to an offi c er’s

s ign a l t o s t o p ( f a i l u r e t o r e s p o n d ) , a t h i r d d e g r e e f e l o ny un de r section 41-6a-210 of the Utah Code. Th at s tatut e pro vides that “[a]n ope rator w ho re c ei ves a vi s ua l or a ud ib le s ign al fro m a p ea c e offi c er to b rin g th e veh ic le to a s top ma y not : .

. . atte mp t to fle e or e lu de a peace o fficer by v ehicle or ot her means.” U T A H C ODE § 41-6a210(1)( a). ¶4 Mr. B ird ’s c as e w as trie d to aj ury . At the c los e of evi de nc e, the tr i a l co ur tp r e se nt e d t he p r o p o se d ju r y i ns t r uc t i o ns to t he parties. After rev iewing the instructions, defense couns el objected to t he elements ins tr uction for t he failu re-to -respond charge on t he gr ounds that it did no t “outlin[e] t he mental state” re quired for t he offen se and tha t th e requi s ite me nta l s tate “n eed [e d] to b e d efin edCite as: 2015 UT 7 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

3 for the jury.” The trial court disagreed, asserting, “I think it’s go t the elements here.” Defens e counsel c ontinued to pr ess f or an in s tru c tion

tha t inc lu de d ame nta l s tate of ei t he r w il lful ly or

rec kle s s ly. Al tho ugh th e S t at e c onc ed ed to a “ lowkno w in gly”

me nta l s tate , th e c ou rt di s agre ed , e nd in g th e c oll oqu y b y s tati ng t o defense c ou n s e l , “ Yo u ’v e m a d e yo u r r e c or d , I’ ve d e n i e d i t. ” T he court t hereafter adopted t he fo l l o wi ngi ns t r uc t i o n, wh i cht r a ck e d the statuto ry language:
Th e d ef en da nt, D us tin L ynn Bi rd i s c ha rged w ith Fai lu re to R es pon d to O ffice r ’s S ign alto S top. You cannot convict hi m of this offens e unless you find be yon d areaso na bl e d ou bt, b as ed on t he evi de nc e, each of the following elements:
1. That on or about Octo ber 12th, 2009; 2. the defendant, Dus tin Lynn Bird; 3. did operat e a moto r v ehicle, and ; 4. ha vin g rec ei ved a vis ib le or au di bl e s ign alfro m a peace offic er t o bring t he vehicle to a sto p; 5. di d a ttempt to fl ee o r el ud e ape ac e offi c er by vehicle or o ther means.
In its c los in g, th e p ros ec ut ion argu ed tha t the j ury “[ di d] notha ve to looki n to t he defendant’s m ind” to dete rmine his c ulpabi lity. The j uryretu rne d agu il ty verd ic t. ¶5 Mr. B ird tim el y ap pe al ed hi s c onv icti on t o th e c ou rt of ap pe al s w he re h e a rgu ed tha t th e tri alc ou rt erred “w he n it f ai le d to in s tru c t th e j uryon t he me nta l s tate req ui red fo r c onvi c tion of fa il ure to respond to an offic er’s signal to sto p.” Sta tev. Bi rd, 2012 UT App 239, ¶ 8, 286 P.3d 11, cer t. gra nted, 29 8 P .3 d 69 (U tah 20 13 ). Th e c ou rt of appeals agreed with Mr

. B i r d, rev ersing the t rial court

. Id. ¶ 17. Although t he court o f appeals remanded Mr

. Bird’s case to the tr ial

c ou rt f or a n ewtria l, it d id notprovi de gu id anc e f or t he tria l c ou rt on remand. It asked the trial court “t o dete rmine in the first instance what the contents of an y requested mental state ins tr uction should be.” Id. ¶ 17 n.6. ¶6 We granted the State ’s pe titi on f or c erti orari . W e h ave jurisdi ction pursuant to Ut ah Code section 78A-3-102(3) (a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 “On certio rar i, we review the decision of the court of appeals for cor rectness” and m ay affir m its deci sion “on any gr oundS TATE v. B I RD Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

4 supp or ted in the r ecord.” Co lli ns v . Sa ndy Cit y B d. o f A dju stment

, 2002 UT 77, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267 (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d).
AN AL YSI S
I. MR . BIRD PRESE RVED HISOBJECTION TO THE

JU RY IN S TR UCT ION ¶8 The S tate first arg ue s that the court of appeals erred in fi nd in g th at Mr. Bir d p res erved hi s ob j ec tion . It c ont en ds tha t Mr. Bird did no t p r e ser ve his mens rea ar gument becaus e his only req ue s t to the tria l c ou rt w as “th at th e m entals tate s [i nte nti ona ll y, knowingly, o r r ecklessly] b e added to t he elements ins tr uction,”

w he rea s on ap pe al , Mr. Bi rd a rgu es tha t th e tri alc ou rt s hou ld ha ve de fi ne d t he term s “re c ei ve” an d “ atte mp t.” In res pon s e, Mr. B ird asserts that his argument on appeal is not t hat the t rial courtshould ha ve d efin ed “re c ei ve” an d “a ttempt, ” bu t rath er tha t it s hou ld ha ve id entifie d th e requ is ite me nta l sta te for th e j urybe c au s e th e m en s rea impl ic ati ons of the term s “re c ei ve” an d “ atte mp t” a re u nc le ar. Mr. Bir d also argues that cont inuin g to pursue his objection in the trial

c ou rt w ou ld ha ve be en fu til e in li ghtof the c ou rt’s c om me nt t o Mr. Bi rd th at “ [h e h ad ] m ad e [ hi s] rec ord. ” W e a gree w ith the c ou rt of ap pe al s an d h old tha t Mr. B ird s uf fi cie nt ly pre s erved hi s j ury instruction objection. ¶9 First, t he State miscons tr ues Mr. Bird’s arg ument on appeal. Although his brief inc ludes a disc uss ion of the ter ms “receive” and “atte mpt,” the essenc e of his argument on ap peal is that t hese terms inc orpora te a me ns rea el em ent into the f ai lu re- to- res pon d offe ns e. Mr. Bird ha s not argu ed tha t “re c ei ve” an d “atte mp t” s hou ld ha ve be en de fi ne d to the j ury , b utin s tea d th at th e j urys hou ld ha ve b een in s tru c ted on t he me nta l s tate s embo di ed bythe s e te rms . In s hort, Mr . Bird’s arg ument o n appeal is t he same ar gument he made to t he tria l c ou rt. ¶10 Second, Mr

. Bird p resented his arg ument to t he trial court in

a clear manner. To preserv e an iss ue, couns el mus t r aise the iss ue in the tria l c ou rt “i n s uc h a w ay th at th e tri alc ou rt ha s an opp ortu ni ty to rule on that issue.” Pratt v. Nelson , 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366. We lookto t hree factor s to dete r mine whether t he trial court had

s u c h a n op p or tu n i ty : ( 1 ) w h e th e r th e i s s u e w a s ra i s e d i n a timely fash ion, (2) whether it was raised speci fical ly, ( 3) and wh e t he r the party “intro duce[ d] su pport ing evidence or relev ant legal authorit y.” Id.Cite as: 2015 UT 7 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

5 ¶11 In thi s c as e, Mr. Bi rd’ s ob

j ec tion w as tim el y. D ef en s e c ou ns el rai s ed the ob

j ec tion at her fi rs t opp ortu ni ty to obj ec t to th e p ropos ed j uryin s tru c tion s . T he ob j ec tion w as al s o s pe c ific . T he S tate atte mp ts to c ha rac teri ze Mr. B ird ’s ob j ec tion as overl y na rrow . B utc ou ns el objected on the gr ounds that she did n ot “see anyt hing outlining the

me nta l s tate ,” an d argu ed tha t “th ere ne ed s to be [a n] e xpl an ati on tha t [M r. Bird ac ted ] . . . reck le s s ly or w il lful ly. ” In s hort, Mr. Bi rd spec i f i c a l l y ob

j e c te d to th e l a c k of a m e n s re a i n s tr u c ti on f or the failure-to-respond offense as a w hole. Finally, alt ho ug h defense

couns el did not intr oduce rele v ant legal author ity, counsel was give n only a brief moment to rev iew t he statute-based language in the jury instructions and make her objection. Where t here was not an opp ortu ni ty to ga the r rel eva nt le g alau tho rity, it i s s uf fi c ie nt— fo r pre s erva t ion p urp os es —th at c ou ns el rel ie d on the s tatu tory language in making her o bjec tion. ¶12 In sum , we conc lude the iss ue was preserv ed for appeal becau se Mr. Bir d presented his argument to the tr ial court in a way tha t gave the c ou rt an

opp ortu ni ty to ru le on t he is s ue . T hu s , w e tu rn to t he merits.
II. THE TRIAL COU RT SHOULD H AVE INSTRUCTED THE

JURY ON THE REQUI RED MENS REA ¶13 Th e c ou rt of

ap pe al s he ld t ha t th e tri alc ou rt erre d b y no t de fi ni ng the req ui red me nta l s tate fo r ea c h e le me nt o f t he fa il ure to

res pon d c ha rge u nder Ut ah C o de sect io n 41 -6a -21 0(1) (a ). The fai lu reto- res pon d s tatu te p rovid es , “ An ope rator w ho re c e ive s a vis ua l or audibl e signal from a peace offic er t o bring t he vehicle to a sto p may
no t :

. . . attempt t o f l e e o r e l u d e a p e a c e o ff i c e r b y v e h i c l e o r oth er means.” U T A H C ODE § 4 1- 6a -2 10 (1 )( a) (e mp ha s is ad de d)

. Th e c ou rt of ap pe al s exp la in ed tha t th e te rms “re c ei ve” an d “ atte mp t” i nd ic ate tha t t h e o ff e n s e “ i n c o r p o r a t e s i t s o w n s e t o f m e n t a l s tate requirements on which [ Mr .] Bir d was entitled t o a jury instruction.” S ta tev. Bi rd, 2 0 1 2U TA p p 2 3 9 , ¶ 1 5 , 2 8 6 P

. 3 d 1 1

. I ta c k n o w le dge d that t hese are common terms, but reasoned t hat “the criminal law

mens re a i mplic ations of those t erms would [ not] necess arily be obvio us to a jury.” Id. ¶ 16 n.5. We agr ee w ith the co ur t o f a p peals and hold that the t rial courterr ed in not ins tr ucting the j ury on the

me ns reareq ui rem ent f or th e f ai lu re- to- res pon d c ha rge.

A. Mens Rea Is a Ba sic Elem ent of an Offen se and

Require s an Instruction ¶14 Th e gen era l rul e fo r j ury in s tru c tion s is tha t “a n accurate in s tru c tion

up on t he ba s ic el em ents of an offe ns e i s es s entia l. Fai lu reS TATE v. B I RD Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

6 to so instruct constitutes rev ersible err or .” Sta tev. Bl uff , 2002 UT 66, ¶ 26 , 5 2 P .3 d 1 21 0 ( intern alqu otati on m arksom itt ed ). A men s rea element is an “e ss e ntial element of [an] offen se.” State v. Cob o , 60 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1936). T hus , failure to instruct t he jury as to t he required mens rea, when it is an element of the crime, is rever sibl e
error. ¶15 A tri alc ou rt s hou ld provid e th e j uryw ith a m en s rea instruc ti on

w h e na c ri m i n a l s ta tu te i n c l u d e s te rm s th a t h a ve m ens rea implications. In State v. Stringham , 9 5 7 P

. 2 d 6 0 2 , 6 0 9 ( Uta h C t. Ap p. 19 98 ), fo r examp le , th e d ef en da nt w as c onvi c ted of

commu nications fraud, but the court o f a p p e a ls rever sed and remanded for a new tr ial becau se the tr ial court failed to instr uct the jury on the mens rea element. Id. It explained, “It is too lo ng a reach to sugg est the jury div ined that defendant had to act intentionally be caus e s uc h ale vel of voli tion is inhe rent in

the c onc ep t of ‘devis[ing] a sc heme.’” Id. (alterat ion in orig inal). ¶1 6 Of part i c u l a r c onc e rn i s a ni n s tr u c ti on

th a t l e a ve s the

err oneous impression thata crime is one of strict liability, when it in fact contains a m ens rea element. In State v. Pea rson , the d e fe ndant ha d b een

c o nv ict ed of

fa il ure to di s c los e atran s ac tion to a gov ernment empl o y e r . 1999 UT App 220, ¶ 1, 985 P.2d 919. Th e court o f appeals rev ersed the convictio n, reasoning t hat “[b] y selectively applying t he mens rea t o some, but not al l , o f the el em ents of

the offe ns e, the j uryc ou ld ea s il y ha ve b el ie ved defendant was strictly liable for [t he remaining element].” Id. ¶ 12. ¶17 An appropr iate jury instruction must also distinguis h be tw een the gen era l an d s pe c ific intent requi rem ents of an offe ns e. Sta tev. Po tter

, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). In Po tter , w e rem an de d f or a new trial “[b]ec ause the ins tr uctions given . . . failed to ex plain adequately the distinction between the gener al and sp ecific intent requirements.” Id. Thus , a tr ial c o ur t mus t instruct the jury o n the proper mens rea for the o ffens e charged. And the instruction must identify the mens rea implic ated by t he st a t ut or y language, must inc lu de a m en s reafo r al l e le me nts , a nd mu s t di s tin gu is h b etw een gen era l a nd s pe c ific intent.

B. Th e Re qu ire d M

ens Reafo r Fa ilure to Respo nd ¶18 In this cas e, both part ies agree t hat the fai l ur e-to-re spond offense in cludes a mens rea element. Violat ions of the Utah Traffic Code, such as this, are strict liability o ff e nses “unles s sp ecific ally prov ided by law.” U T A H C ODE § 7 6- 2- 10 1( 2) . In th is c as e, how ever, the t e rms “receive” and “att empt,” whic h are contained in theCite as: 2015 UT 7 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

7 s tatu t o r y l a n g u a g e , i n d i c a t e t h a tt h i s c r i m e i n c l u d e s s o m e l e v e l of

me nta l a pp rec ia tion . W ha t th e p arti es di s pu te is w he the r a j ury instruction that simply lists the statuto ry elements o f t he offense is

s uf fi c ie nt t o al ert th e j uryto th e m en s reael em ent. ¶19 The S tate arg ues that becau se the te r ms “ receive” and “atte mpt” ar e t e r ms o f c o mm o n u sa g e , i twa s u nn e ce ss a r y t o i ns t r uct the jur y as t o the me an in g of the s e te rms . W e a gree tha t th e j ury
w ould ha ve u nd ers tood the pl ai n m ea ni ng o f t he term s “re c ei ve” and “attempt.” But we cannot assu me t hat the jury understo od the

mens r e a implic ations of these ter ms. Indeed, mens rea is a “legal ter m o f ar t” that ought to be ex plicitly explained to a jury

. See S tate
v. Je ffs , 2010 UT 49, ¶ 43, 243 P.3d 1250. ¶20 We c an

exp ec t a l ay jur or to u nd ers tan d th at th e te rm “receive” cont emplates a level of kno wledge. SeeW E B S TER ’ S N EW C OLLEGE D I CT I O NA RY 1195 (2007) ( inclu ding among the definitions of “re c ei ve, ” “ t o ap pre he nd me nta ll y; ge t kn ow le dge of or info rma tion

ab ou t”) . T he ref ore, a j uro r w ou ld li kel y ha ve p erc ei ved tha t th e “ rec ei ves a vi s ua l or a ud ib le s ign alfro m ape ac e of ficer” el em ent of

the offe ns e requi res kno w le dge of the pe ace offic er’s signal. But we c annot assum e that a juro r would recog nize the

s ignific anc e of

thi s kno w le dge req ui rem ent as an es s entia l men s rea el em ent. T hu s , i t w as error f or th e tri alc ou rt no t to i ns tru c t th e j ury that t he charge includ ed a knowingly mens rea element and define

w ha t w ou ld s ati s fytha t el em ent. ¶21 Th e tri alc ou rt’s error i n n ot inc lu di ng ame ns reain s tru c tion is even more apparent in the contex t of t he “attempt t o flee or elude a police offic er” element. The ter m “attempt” carr ies a dis tinct

me an in g in

c rim in alla wtha t w e canno t expec t a l ay j uro r to

un de rs tan d w ith ou t in s tru c tion

. Th e c om mo n d ic tion ary d efiniti on of atte mp t is “to try , s oli c it, ” or “to make an effo rt to d o, ge t, h ave , etc.” Id. at 91. In contrast, the statuto ry definition of attempt means something more than to try or make an effort. As explained in Utah Code section 76-4-101(1) , atte mpt means to “engage[] in conduc t constituting a sub stantial step towar d commis sion of the crime” and t o “i nt en d[ ] t o c om mi t th e c rim e. ” T hu s , th e s tatu tory m ea ni ng o f atte mpt connotes a consc ious deci sion with m or e s p e cifi c action than does the common dictionary definition o f the ter m. ¶22 Al tho ugh th e te rm “ atte mp t” i mp li c ate s a me nta l s tate req ui rem ent, it doe s notne c es s ari ly i nd ic ate the ap pl ic ab le le vel of

mens rea. For example, the crime of assaul t, like failure t o r espond, inclu des attempt as one of its elements. U T A H C ODE § 76-5-10 2(1)S TATE v. B I RD Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

8 (“Ass ault is

. . . an attempt, with unlawful force or v iolence, to do bodily injury to ano t he r

. . . .”). But we have explained that the

as s au lt s tatu te i ts el f d oes notpre s c rib e th e requi s it e men tals tate

. Stat e v

. H u tc hings , 2012 UT 50, ¶ 12, 285 P.3d 1183. In other words, the re quisi te mens rea is not apparentfrom the stat ute’s use of t he term “a ttempt. ” Ut ah

Cod e s ec tion

76 -2 -1 02exp la in s tha t “i nte nt, knowledge, o r r ecklessn ess s hall su ffic e to establish criminal responsibility” “when the definition of t he offense does not speci fy a culp able mental state and the o ffens e does not inv olve strict liability.” Thus , intent, kno wledge, or recklessness mus t “be found to establish

criminal responsibility” in the contex t of assault. Id. ¶ 12. ¶23 In the c ontex t of the f ailure-to-re spond offens e, the “att empt to fle e or el ud e” el em ent impl ic ate s an intention alme ns rea . T o fle e
or elude means something more than to mer ely leav e or depart; t he ter ms in dicate a ct ion with a spec ific purpose. SeeW EBS TER ’ S N EW C OLLEGE D I CT I O NA RY 54 0 ( 20 07) ( de fi ni ng “fle e” as “to ru n a w ay or escape”) ; Id. at 463 (defining “elude” as “to av oid or escape fro m by quic k ness , cunning, etc.”). Becau se the act of fleeing or eluding req u i r e s a c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o nt o e s c a p e o r a v o i d , o n e c o u l d n ot recklessly flee from a peace officer. Although a per son m i g ht act

rec kle s s ly b y de

pa rt ingfro m a pol ic e s top w ith ou t th e p oli c e offi c er’s pe r missi o n, th e p ers on w ou ld notbe fle eing unles s it were his intention to es c ap e or a void the pol ic e offi c er. To atte mp t to fle e or elude, therefor e, r e q ui r es that the acto r leav e in an eff or t to escape or avoi d ape ac e offic er. Thus , th e tri alc ou rt s hou ld ha ve i ns tru c ted t he jury that an “at tempt t o flee or elude” requires an intentional

me nta l s tate

. ¶24 In s um, th e c ou rt of

ap pe al s c orrec tly he ld tha t the tria l c ou rt

err ed in denying Mr . Bird a mens rea jury instructio n be ca us e the in s t r u c t i o n g i v e n t o t h e j u r y d i d n o t s p e c i fy t h e e s s e n t i a l m e ns rea el em ents of

the fa il ure -t o- res pon d c ha rge. III . GUIDANCE FORREMAND ¶25 Th e S tate al s o argu es tha t th e c ou rt of ap pe al s erred bynot provi di ng gui da nc e on rem an d. We di s agre e. Al tho ugh a pp el la te

c ou rts ha ve the di s c reti on to provi degu id anc e on rem an d, the y are
n ot re q u i re d to do so. Comp a re State v. Low , 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61, 192 P.3d 867 (exercising our dis cretio n to pr ov ide guidance) , with State v. Verde , 2 01 2 UT60 , ¶ 6 2, 29 6 P .3 d 6 73 (d ef erri ng to the tria l c ou rt’s

“ superio r positio n” in matters of ev idence and withholding guidance) . Thus , it was not err or for t he court of appeals to ask t heCite as: 2015 UT 7 J UST I CE L EE , diss enting

9 tria l c ou rt to d ete rmi ne , i n th e firs t instanc e, the prop er m en s rea instruction. ¶26 We , h ow ever, c hoo s e to provi de s uc h gu id anc e. If the S tate recharg es Mr. Bir d, we direct the trial court to in struct the jury that Mr . Bird must have knowingly “r eceived a visual or audible signal fro m apolice offi c er” an d mus t ha ve i nte nd ed “to fle e or e lu de a pe ac e offi c er. ” An d th e trial c ou rt s hou ld al s o inc lu de an in s tru c tion definin g the k nowing and intentional mental states.
CONC LUSION ¶27 We affir m t he c ou rt of ap pe al s ’ reve rs alof

Mr. B ird ’s

c onvi c tion

be c au s e th e tri alc ou rt erred in fa il in g to in s tru c t th e j ury on the me ns rea req ui rem ents of s ec tion 41 -6 a- 21 0 of the Uta h C ode

. On re ma nd , th e tri alc ou rt s hou ld in s tru c t the j ury as to the m en s rea req ui red fo r ea c h of

the el em ents of

the fa il ure -t o- res pon d c ha rge.

J UST I CE L EE , d is s entin g: ¶28 I respect ful ly d is s ent fromthe ma j ority ’s de term in ati on o f

revers i b l e e r r o r i nt h e d i s t r i c tc o u r t ’ s f a i l u r e t o g i v e a ni n s t r u c t i on
c la rif yin g th e mens reaimpl ic ati ons of the el em ents of

the offe ns e s et fort h in Utah Code section 41-6a-210(1) (a). P erhaps suc h an instruction would have aided the jury somewhat, by clarifying the import o f the elements o f (a) “receiv[ing] a visual or audible signal from a peace officer,” and (b ) “attempt[ing] to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or o ther means.” U T A H C OD E § 41-6a-210( 1)(a) . But the question presented is not whether the judges of this c ourtwould have accepted a request to give suc h an ins tr uction. It is whether the di s tric t j ud ge’s fa il ure to give th e i ns tru c tion w as error, an d w he the r
any s uc h e rror w ou ld ha ve m ad e a ny d iffe renc e to th e ou tc om e. ¶29 I would affi rm on two g ro unds . First, I would up hold the jury instruction as given o n its own terms, as the or dinary meaning of th e t erms of the instruction adequately conv eyed a fair

un de rs tan di ng o f t he mens rea issues i de nti fi ed bythe ma j ority

. Second, I would hold that any pur port ed err or in the instruction as give n was harmless, having no “‘r easonable likelihood’” of affecting the outcome o f the proceedings. Sta tev. Po we ll , 2007 UT 9, ¶21, 154 P.3d 788. ¶30 It is an ov er-gener alization to say that “[a] tr ial court should provi de the j uryw ith

a men s rea in s tru c tion

w he n ac rimin als tatu te inclu des terms that have mens rea impli cations.” S upra ¶ 15. Our

c as es s eem

to m e to s tan d f or a m ore m ode s t pri nc ip le . In s tea d ofS TATE v. B I RD J UST I CE L EE , diss enting

See S tate v. Maesta s , 2012 UT 46, ¶ 148, 299 P.3d 892 (explainin g 1 tha t w e revi ewj uryin s tru c tion s “i n th eir en t ire ty an d w il l a ffirm when the ins tr uctions taken as a wh ole fairly instr uct the j ury on the law appli cable to the case”); State v. Roberts , 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 19 85 ) ( s tati ng “ the gen era l ru le ” tha t “a n ac c ura te i ns tru c tion up on the basic elements of an offens e is ess ential”). Sta tev. Ja mes , 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991). 2

10 bro ad ly m an da tin g s ep ara te mens reaclarific ations of all “ter ms that ha ve m en s reaimpl ic ati ons ,” w e h ave s impl y requi red tha t th e j ury be fa irl y an d ac c ura tel y in s tru c ted on a llel em ents (w he the r mens rea
or a ct us reus ) of any offense. And we hav e hastened t o add that “t he 1 tr ial court does noterr in refusin g to giv e a requested instruction if the point is pro perly cov ered in other instructions presented to the jury.” 2 ¶31 The ins tr uction given in this cas e easily satisfi ed these

s tan da rds . Fi rs t, th e i ns tru c tion c onve yed the requir em ent of knowledgeof

the pe ac e offi c er’s s ign al . It d id s o b y requi rin g th e j ury to fin d th at th e d ef en da nt “ rec eiv ed a vi s ib le or au di bl e s igna l from a p ea c e offi c er. ” As the ma j orityac kno w le dge s , th e knowl edge req ui rem ent is inhe rent in the c om mo n, ordi na ry u nd ers tan di ng o f the ve rb receive

. Seesup ra¶ 20 (c iti ng W EBS TER ’ S N E W C OLL EG E D I CT I O NA RY 1195 (2007), de fi ni n g “ r e c e iv e” as “a pp reh en d m ental ly; getknowledge o f or infor mation about”). ¶32 S ec ond , th e i ns tru c tion al s o c onve yed t he requi rem ent of intent to flee or evade. Th at requirement w as again inherent in the

c om mo n, ordi na ry m ea ni ng o f t he term s of the di s tric t c ou rt ’s i n s tr u c t i o n

. H e r e th e op era tive term s are “a ttempt, ” w hi c h “ is ‘to try, solicit,’ or ‘to make an effort t o do, g et, have , etc.,” sup ra¶ 21 (citing W EBST ER ’ S N E W C OLLEGE D I CT I O NA RY 91 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ) ; a n d “ f l e e ” or “evade,” which m ean, re sp e ct ively, “r un aw ay or escape,” an d “avo id or escape from b y qu ickness , cunning, etc.,” sup ra¶ 23 (citing W EBS TER ’ S N E W C OLLEGE D I CT I O NA RY 540, 463). ¶33 Th e elem ents of “re c ei v[i ng] ” a s ign alan d of “a ttempt[ in g] to fle e or e lu de a p ea c e offic er” thu s gave the j ury a fai r an d a c c ura te

un de rs tan di ng o f t he mens reael em ents of the offe ns e of

fa il ure to respond u nder Utah Code s ection 41- 6a-210. The maj or ity’ s analysis onl y c onfirm s thi s c onc lu s ion . It d oes s o b y rec iti ng t he ab ove de fi ni tion s of the ope rati ve te rms of the s tatu te— receive , attempt, fle e , and evade —a nd byc onc ed in g th at th es e te rms a c c o r d i ngl y c onve yed the es s entia l n otio n of the knowledgeand intent elements of theCite as: 2015 UT 7 J UST I CE L EE , diss enting

See Philpot v. S tate , 486 S.E.2d 158, 160– 61 (Ga. 1997) (dis miss ing 3 defendant’s arg ument that the trial court improper ly failed to define term s “kn ow in gly” an d “ grea t r isk” be c au s e “ the term s

. . . a re
or dinary t erms found in common usage and understoo d by people of common and or dinary experience

. . . and need not be specifi cally defined in

the charge t o a jury”); P e op lev

. M cC leod, 55 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 1205, 1216 (Cal. Ct

. App. 1997) (u pholding the inclus ion of the common term “re sidenc e” in a ju ry inst r uc t ion without additional el ab orati on, s tati ng t ha t a c ou rt “n eed onl y give exp la na tory instructions wh e n ter ms u sed in an instruction have a te chni cal meaning pecu liar to the law” (internal quotatio n marks omitte d)).

11 offense in

question. Supra ¶ 20 (concedin g that“a juror would likely have per ceived that t he ‘receive s a visual or audible s i g nal from a peace offic er’ e lement of the offense requires knowledge o f the peace officer’s signal”) ; id . ¶ 2 3 ( ac kno w le dgi ng t ha t “th e ‘attempt to fl ee
or elude’ element implic ates an intentional mens rea”). That sh ould be the end of our analysis. The j ury was fairly instr uc t ed, and we should affirm the conviction on t hat basis

. 3 ¶34 The majorit y’s jus tifications for ov ert urning the jury ver dict

are unpe rs ua s ive

. As to th e knowledgeimpl ic ati ons of the in s tru c tion give n to the j ury , I ac c ep t tha t w e do not kno w fo r c erta in w he the r a “ j uro r w ou ld rec ogn iz e th e sig nifi canceof ” th e s tatu tory “knowledge r e q ui r e mentas an es sential mens rea element.” Supra ¶ 20 (emphas is added). But the m ajority has not identified any sens e in whic h t he ordi na ry m ea ni ng o f “ rec ei ve” w ou ld fa lls hortof givi ng the j urya ful l s en s e of the knowledgeelement of the o ffens e in qu es tion

. In s tea d i t ha s vagu el y s ug ges ted tha t th e j ury might no t get it , a nd c onc lu de d th at “ [t ]hus it w as error” notto pro vid e furt he r explanation in a more det ailed ins tr uction. Supra ¶ 20. This turns the oper ative burden of persuasi on on its head. ¶35 T o succ eed in establis hing a basi s for rev ersal, th e defe nda nt be ars thebu rde n of

de mo ns trati ng t ha t th e i ns tru c tion in qu es tion fa ll s s hortof the goalof fa irl y an d a c c ura tel y s tati ng t he la w(a nd of indic ating that t he err or is likely to have made a difference in the outcome, a separa t e pro blem dis cus sed below, infra ¶ 13). Po we ll , 2007 UT 9, ¶ 21. The court invert s t hat standard by rev ersing on t he basis of a vag ue ins istence that thej ury might no t have “r ecognize[d] the signific ance ” of

the i n s tr u c ti on’s refer ence to “r eceiv[ing] a visual

or audibl e signal from a peace offic er.” Supra ¶ 20. I dissent from a de c is io n t hat see ms t o me t o ig no r e o ur case s r eg ar din gt he o pe r ative burden of persuasi on.S TATE v. B I RD J UST I CE L EE , diss enting

12 ¶36 The ma

j ority ’s an al ys is of

the intent i m p l i c a ti on s of the in s tru c tion

in qu es tion

is s im il arl y prob le ma tic . If th e ord in ary
me an in g of

“a ttempt to fl ee o r el ud e .

. . req ui res tha t th e a c tor le ave in a n e ff o r t t o escape or av oid a peace officer,” sup ra¶ 23 , th en defendant Bird has f ailed to carr y his bu rden of pro of that t he in s t r u c t i o na s g i v e nf e l l s h o r to f g i v i n ga f a i r a n d a c c ura te de s c rip tion

of the la w to th e j ury . T ha t is a suffi c ie nt b as is fo r affi rmi ng t he j uryverd ic t in thi s c as e. ¶37 The court does not clear ly identify any pr ecise s hort coming of the intent

implic ations of the instruction in question. But in d i sc us sing the statuto ry ter m attempt, th e c ou rt a p p e a rs to d raw a di st incti on b etw een

(a ) “ [t ]h e c om mo n d ic tion ary d efiniti on o f atte mp t,” as “to try , s oli c it, o r t o m ake an effo rt to d o, ge t, h ave , e t c

. ” ; a n d ( b ) t h e l e g a l s e n s e o f t h e i n c h oa te crime of at tempt, whic h requires “a subs tantial step towar d commis sion o f the crime.” Supra ¶ 21 (internal quotat i on s omi tt e d )

. An d i n disc uss ing this distinc tion, the c ou rt s ug ges ts tha t “th e stat utory meaning of attempt connotes a

c ons c iou s de c is ion w ith mo re s pe c ific ac tion tha n doe s the c om mo n dictionary definition o f the ter m.” Supra ¶ 21 (emphas is added)

. ¶3 8 If th e m a

j or i tyi s s u gg e s ti n g t h a t t h e “ s u b s ta n ti a l s te p” element of the inch oate crime of attempt s hou ld ha ve b een

inc lu de d in the in s tru c tion

as give n, the n I di s s ent fromtha t c onc lu s ion . For one thing, I se e no basis for tr eating t he failu re t o stop o ffens e as inch oate . It is not defined in ter ms of a “sub stantial step” towar d a choate offense. It appears instead to be a crime in itself . So there is no

rea s on t o rea d th e “ s ub s tantia l s t e p” s en s e of an inc hoa te attempt

into this stat e. In any event , that notio n of attempt w as ne ith er p res erved in the district court no r ar gued on ap peal. So if the failu re t o instruct on “subs tantial step ” is the shortcoming thatthe courtsees in the in s tru c tion

in qu es tion

, i t is a d ef ec t of

the c ou r t ’s ow n i ma ginin g. And if that is not the pr oblem, then t he co ur t has f ailed to identify

any di s tinc tion be tw een the c om mo n, ordi na ry s en s e of the te rms of the di s tric t c ou rt’s in s tru c tion an d th e mens rearequireme nts delineated in the majority opinion. ¶39 F ina ll y, e ven

as s umin g s om e m in or, u na rtic ul ate d di s tinc tion

be tw een the ordi na ry me an in g of “re c ei v[i ng] a vi s ua l or

au di bl e s ign al ” a nd the knowledgereq ui red by the ma j ority , or be tw een “a ttempt[ in g] to fl ee or el ud e a pe ac e offi c er” an d th e intent req ui rem ent s et f orthbythe c ou rt, w e s houl d s til l a ffirm Bi rd’ s
c onvi c tion

on h arm le s s error grou nd s

. Un de r s ettl ed la w , Bi rd b ea rs the b urden of establish ing that any err or in the in stru ct i o n in question was reasonably like ly to affec t the o utcome in this c ase. SeeCite as: 2015 UT 7 J UST I CE L EE , diss enting

13 State v. Va rgas , 2001 UT 5, ¶ 39, 20 P.3d 271 (stating that i t i s t he defendant’s bu rden to esta bl i sh thatthe er ro r is harmful) . In my view he has u tte rly failed t o carry that burden. Give n the common,

or dinary sens e of the o perat ive t erms of the instruction giv en to t he jury in this cas e, I would also hold that any ar guable shortcoming in fa il in g to el ab orate on t he mens reaele me nt s o f the offense was harmless.