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The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-1287

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Luis A. Arechiga, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: February 1, 2007 

 Filed: February 5, 2007

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Before RILEY, MAGILL, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Luis Arechiga appeals the district court’s1

 imposition of consecutive 120-month

and 96-month prison sentences following his conviction upon a jury verdict on one

count of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) and

1153, and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6) and 1153. The imposition of consecutive sentences resulted in

an upward variance from Arechiga’s Guidelines range. For reversal, he argues that
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the district court erred in considering his juvenile record from more than 10 years

prior to his sentencing, and in treating car theft as a crime of violence.

To begin, we do not believe Arechiga’s juvenile record was a factor in the

formulation of his sentence because, although it was included (without objection) in

the presentence report (PSR), it had no effect on the determination of his criminal

history category, and the district court made only a passing reference to it at the

sentencing hearing. Moreover, even if Arechiga’s juvenile record was a factor in the

court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences, such consideration was not an abuse

of discretion. See U.S.S.G. § 3553(a)(1) (factors to be considered in imposing

sentence include history and characteristics of defendant); United States v. Flores, 9

F.3d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1993) (in absence of objection, court may rely on factual

allegations in presentence report); Swepston v. United States, 289 F.2d 166, 168 (8th

Cir. 1961) (right to impose consecutive sentences is inherent in federal courts); cf.

United States v. Joshua, 40 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1994) (juvenile conduct can be

used as basis for upward departure, particularly if it is similar to conviction offense,

or dissimilar but serious conduct); United States v. Griess, 971 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th

Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (juvenile convictions excluded from defendant’s criminal

history may be considered for upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3). In this

instance, Arechiga’s juvenile offenses are dissimilar from his conviction offenses, but

nonetheless include serious offenses such as aggravated robbery and auto theft.

Because Arechiga did not preserve his challenge to the district court’s

classification of auto theft as a crime of violence, we review that aspect of the district

court’s reasoning only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that

affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the

court’s attention.”); United States v. Jennings, 12 F.3d 836, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1994)

(review is for plain error where issue was not raised at sentencing). We hold that the

district court did not err--plainly or otherwise--as Arechiga’s challenge is foreclosed

by United States v. Barbour, 395 F.3d 826, 827-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
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133 (2005), acknowledging as binding precedent United States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d

578, 580-81 (8th Cir. 2005) (Missouri car theft is crime of violence for purposes of

U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 4B1.2(a)), and United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 752-

53 (8th Cir. 2002) (when thief enters and appropriates vehicle, possible encounter with

returning driver, passenger, passerby, or police officer carries serious risk of violent

confrontation, and risk of high-speed chase with potential for serious harm to others);

see also United States v. Wright, 22 F.3d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1994) (panel of this court

is bound by prior Eighth Circuit decision unless prior decision is overruled by this

court sitting en banc or by Supreme Court). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

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