IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-31030

MARY BOTSAY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:14-CV-2573

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and PRADO and SOUTHWICK, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Social Security Administration concluded Mary Botsay was not 

entitled to disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. 

The district court affirmed the decision. We also AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mary Botsay filed an application for disability benefits and supplemental 

security income, asserting that her disability began in August 2011. At the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 4, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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onset of her alleged disability, Botsay was 57 years old. Botsay, who is highschool educated, had a long employment history as a customer service 

representative and data entry clerk. She contended she was no longer able to 

work due to osteoarthritis in her right knee, a mild hallux valgus deformity in

her left foot, bilateral hand pain, and possible nerve damage in her right 

shoulder. Several doctors treated Botsay over a three-year period, with others 

reviewing her case on a consultative basis. 

On September 24, 2013, Botsay’s initial application for benefits was

denied by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Botsay requested a 

hearing, at which she successfully moved to amend her disability onset date to 

August 1, 2012. In May 2014, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined

Botsay was not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity for 

sedentary work as a customer service representative or data entry clerk with 

some limitations. The Appeals Council denied Botsay’s request for review of 

the ALJ’s decision. Botsay then filed suit against the SSA Commissioner 

seeking to overturn the ALJ’s disability determination. The district court, 

adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, concluded the 

ALJ committed harmless error in explaining the outcome of one medical test. 

Otherwise, the district court held substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s

assessment of Botsay’s capacity for work. Botsay timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

We do not “reweigh the evidence or substitute [our] judgment for the 

Commissioner’s” in reviewing the denial of benefits. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 

F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). Instead, we are restricted “to two inquiries: . . . 

whether the [administrative] decision is supported by substantial evidence on 

the record as a whole, and . . . whether the Commissioner applied the proper 

legal standard.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial 

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evidence “is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance.” Perez, 

415 F.3d at 461 (quotation marks omitted).

Relevant regulations establish a “five-step analysis” to determine 

whether a claimant is eligible for benefits: (1) the claimant is not engaged in

“substantial gainful [work] activity”; (2) the claimant’s impairment is “severe”; 

(3) the impairment “meets or equals . . . an impairment” listed in Appendix 1 

of the SSA regulations; (4) the claimant lacks the residual functional capacity 

to perform “past relevant work”; and (5) there is no other substantial gainful 

activity that the claimant would be able to perform. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). Through step four, the burden of proof rests upon the 

claimant to show she is disabled. Id. At the last step, “the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner” to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is 

capable of performing despite her existing impairments. Id. 

Here, the ALJ resolved Botsay’s case at the fourth step, concluding that 

Botsay’s impairments could cause some of the symptoms she alleged, but that 

Botsay’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of [those] symptoms are not entirely credible . . . .” Thus, the ALJ determined 

Botsay was capable of performing past relevant sedentary work as a customer 

service representative and data entry clerk. 

On appeal, Botsay argues that her case “hinge[s]” on the assessment of 

her dominant right upper extremity limitations because her past jobs involved 

typing and other computer and office tasks. At the administrative hearing, a 

vocational expert agreed with the following hypothetical posed by the ALJ: if 

Botsay could “frequently perform overhead reaching with the dominant right 

upper extremity and . . . frequently handle, finger, and feel with” the same, 

Botsay could continue working as a customer service representative or data 

entry clerk. (emphasis added). If Botsay could only “occasional[ly]” engage in 

those activities, though, the expert agreed that Botsay would not be able to 

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engage in past relevant work. (emphasis added). Botsay contends the ALJ’s 

decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ

mischaracterized objective medical evidence showing the severity of her upper 

extremity limitations and incorrectly found Botsay’s testimony about the 

intensity and effects of her symptoms not credible. 

Botsay specifically points to two medical evaluations. First, she asserts 

that a February 2014 MRI revealed chronic tendinitis of the supraspinatus, a 

small muscle in the upper back that affects the shoulder blade; a tear in her 

coracoclavicular ligament, which also affects the shoulder; moderate chronic

degenerative changes in her acromioclavicular joint, which is at the top of the 

shoulder; and subacromial bursitis, or a condition caused by inflammation of 

one of the tendons in her rotator cuff. Thus, Botsay argues, the ALJ erred in 

finding that the MRI showed “no tendonitis” and in characterizing her 

diagnosis as a “mere[] . . . sprain.” 

Second, Botsay claims that the ALJ’s assessment that a July 2013 exam 

was “within normal limits” was “clearly wrong.” Botsay emphasizes that the 

doctor noted positive full can, Whipple, and Hawkins tests, indicating pain or 

weakness in her shoulder. The exam also revealed crepitus, or cracking when 

moving the joint, in the thumb and bilateral thumb arthritis. Botsay argues 

these assessments are corroborated by past positive tests used to diagnose 

carpal tunnel syndrome or nerve issues in the hands. 

Botsay is correct that the ALJ misread the February 2014 MRI. 

Although, as the magistrate judge noted, the copy of the MRI results in the 

record is very unclear, the notation is of “rc tendonitis” and not “no tendonitis.” 

We have held, though, that a mistake in an ALJ’s decision does not 

automatically render the entire decision unsupported by substantial evidence. 

See Qualls v. Astrue, 339 F. App’x 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing the effect 

of an ALJ’s mischaracterization of an annular tear in the ALJ’s denial of 

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disability benefits). For that outcome, a claimant must “show that the ALJ’s 

disability determination would have been different if the ALJ had not” made 

the mistake. Id. We do not find Botsay successful in that regard.

As an initial matter, the Government is correct that, despite the

mistaken reading of the MRI, the ALJ acknowledged that other previous tests 

showed Botsay has tendonitis and other shoulder problems. The ALJ’s 

discussion of Botsay’s “sprain,” moreover, was consistent with Botsay’s medical 

records. Dr. Mae Ewing Young, who examined Botsay in March 2014 after the 

MRI, diagnosed Botsay with a “[r]otator cuff . . . sprain.” The ALJ categorized 

both Botsay’s sprain, tendonitis, and carpal tunnel diagnoses as “severe.” 

Furthermore, as to the July 2013 exam, Dr. Edward Lee Smith noted 

that Botsay had “[f]ull abduction and flexion with” average range of motion in 

Botsay’s right shoulder, as well as “[g]ood strength with internal and external 

rotation.” Therefore, while the July 2013 exam revealed Botsay was 

experiencing some shoulder pain and crepitus and arthritis in her thumbs, it

also showed that some of Botsay’s diagnoses were within a normal range. 

Other previous examinations corroborate Dr. Smith’s report. For 

example, in a consultative exam in October 2012, Dr. Miljana Mandich 

provided that Botsay “has full range of motion of all joints including both 

shoulder[s] and both knees[,]” and “normal gripping, grasping and dexterity 

bilaterally.” Notes from a January 2013 exam with Dr. Sohale Sadeghpour 

reflect a similar assessment, and that Botsay wanted to continue “conservative 

treatment for” her hand pain. Other medical records indicate that, at least as 

of March 2014, Botsay had never received physical therapy or shots for her 

shoulder pain. At the administrative hearing, Botsay reported that she had 

never received any treatment for her hand pain. 

Aside from misreading the MRI, the ALJ fairly summarized the 

available medical evidence. More importantly, the ALJ reviewed and weighed 

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that evidence to discern the extent of Botsay’s impairments and symptoms and 

their impact on her capacity for work. “Under the regulations and our case 

law, the determination of residual functional capacity is the sole responsibility 

of the ALJ.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir. 2012). 

Botsay next asserts that, in light of the objective medical evidence, the 

ALJ “grossly mischaracterize[d]” her testimony and function report in “giving 

the mistaken impression that she is fully and independently functional with 

respect to” her daily activities. Specifically, Botsay points to her allegations

that pain in her arm and hands makes it impossible for her to cook large meals, 

do laundry, hold a hose, or operate her computer for longer than 15 minutes. 

Botsay also contends the ALJ erred in failing to consider her lengthy prior 

work history in his credibility determination. 

Our review of the record shows that the ALJ acknowledged most of the 

limitations Botsay emphasizes in her brief, and acknowledged that Botsay 

received assistance with some household chores from her sister. The ALJ also 

properly took into account, though, Botsay’s admissions that she lives alone, 

drives, executes some chores, waters small plants, visits with neighbors, and 

goes out to lunch. We have held that activities such as these can negatively 

impact credibility when the claimant’s contention is that her disabilities are so 

severe so as to eliminate the possibility of even sedentary work. See Anthony 

v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295–96 (5th Cir. 1992). As to Botsay’s employment, 

the ALJ noted that Botsay “ha[d] a lengthy history of clerical work . . . .” 

Regardless, as the magistrate judge pointed out, the ALJ’s credibility 

determination seemingly had nothing to do with Botsay’s work history; it 

related to Botsay’s testimony about her alleged pain in light of her daily 

activities and the objective medical evidence. 

 In sum, the ALJ found that Botsay’s various medical examinations 

revealed some discomfort in Botsay’s shoulder and hands. Those examinations

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also demonstrate, though, that Botsay could engage in nearly a full range of 

motion without significant tenderness, had normal grip and dexterity, had

received no physical therapy or shots for her shoulder pain, and had received 

no treatment for her hand pain. Despite some limitations, moreover, the record 

demonstrates that Botsay admitted that she is able to engage in a wide variety 

of daily activities. “At a minimum, objective medical evidence must 

demonstrate the existence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to 

produce the level of pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 296. The ALJ’s 

finding that Botsay is capable of working as a customer service representative 

or data entry clerk, or engaging in other similar sedentary work with some 

limitations, is supported by substantial evidence.

AFFIRMED.

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