other consequences. Coleman has included with his Petition an In
Forma Pauperis Application (“Application”) and a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (“Motion”), each employing a printed form
made available by this District Court’s Clerk’s Office. In light
of the current dismissal, the Motion is of course denied as moot.
But as for the Application, Coleman knows better--his filing back
in 2008 was accompanied by a payment of the modest $5 filing fee
applicable to Section 2254 petitions, but he has not tendered
even that small payment this time. This Court is therefore
transmitting a copy of this Opinion to the authorities at Menard
Correctional Center, where Coleman is in custody, and that
facility is ordered to pay the $5 fee out of Coleman’s trust fund
account and to remit it (with a notation referring to this case
number, 11 C 7869) to:

Clerk, United States District Court

219 South Dearborn Street, 20th Floor

Chicago IL 60604
Attention: Financial Department

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: November 8, 2011



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ex rel. DANIEL COLEMAN #N84660, }
Petitioner,

ve. No. 12 C 7869
DAVID REDNOUR, WARDEN, }
Respondent. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Daniel Coleman (“Coleman”) seems to think that his lack of
funds, or perhaps the special solicitude ordinarily accorded pro
se litigants (see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972) (per curiam)), entitles him to abuse the justice system by
advancing an endless series of collateral attacks on his July
1999 murder conviction and the life sentence that he has been
serving since then. Thus after a series of unsuccessful state
court efforts to undo the conviction and sentence, at the
beginning of 2008 Coleman turned to this District Court to seek
federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254.' This Court’s brief
January 31, 2008 memorandum opinion and order (“Opinion”), to
which it attached a photocopy of the Illinois Appellate Court's
June 22, 2007 order affirming the summary dismissal of Coleman’s
pro se petition for relief under the Illinois Post-Conviction

Hearing Act, rejected his federal effort because he had

+ All further references to Title 28's provisions will
simply take the form “Section--.”



procedurally defaulted his claims: All of the state courts had
dispatched those claims on an independent and adequate state
ground.

Nothing daunted, Coleman again returned to the state courts.
On November 30, 2009 he filed a document captioned “Motion to
Dismiss” in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which was rejected
by that court in a brief January 21, 2010 order, and he then
pursued that dismissal up the line--once again unsuccessfully.
Just as it had done with Coleman’s direct appeal and then with
his post-conviction petition, the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment of dismissal in a brief
unpublished October 7, 2010 order, after which the Illinois
Supreme Court denied Coleman’s motion for leave to file a state
habeas corpus petition on May 20, 2011.

Now Coleman has knocked again at the federal courthouse
door, seeking entry via a second Section 2254 petition. It is
unnecessary to explore the legal frivolousness of the current set
of Coleman's contentions, such as his bizarre assertion at this
belated date that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking over
his original criminal case and that his defense counsel were
constitutionally deficient because of a failure to advance that
argument.

And the reason that none of those substantive and procedural

deficiencies needs to be explored is because Coleman’s current



filing carries its own death warrant in federal habeas terms: In
the many years that have passed since his “judgment [of
conviction] became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review” (Section
2244 (d) (1) (A)), far more than a year has elapsed during which
Coleman had no “properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment” (Section 2244(d)(2)). Hence his
extraordinarily late present effort is not saved by the last-
quoted tolling provision.?

Accordingly Coleman himself has established that his current
filing, even apart from its other substantive and procedural
defects, is clearly out of time. And that being so, it is once
again true (just as it was the last time around nearly four years
ago--see Opinion at 3) that “it plainly appears from the petition
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court” (Section 2254 Rule 4). Hence the
current Petition by Coleman is also dismissed (id.).

This dismissal of the Petition also carries with it some

2 All of the factual background referred to here has been
drawn directly from Coleman’s own statements in his petition and
the attached exhibits, which are photocopies of various of the
state court filings and orders. That being so, this Court’s
preliminary review pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“Section
2254 Rules”) suffices for a dispositive resolution, without any
need to order the respondent Warden to file anything in response
(as Rule 4 permits).