IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCCOA-528

No. COA20-800

Filed 5 October 2021

Mecklenburg County, No. 19-CvS-18345

NATION FORD BAPTIST CHURCH INCORPORATED d/b/a Nations Ford 

Community Church, Plaintiff,

v.

PHILLIP RJ DAVIS, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH DIXON, CHARLES ELLIOT and DOUGLAS WILLIE, Third-Party 

Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant from order entered 22 July 2020 by 

Judge Carla N. Archie in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court 

of Appeals 10 August 2021.

Knox, Brotherton, Knox & Godfrey, by Lisa G. Godfrey, H. Edward Knox, and 

J. Gray Brotherton, for the Plaintiff- and Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.

Nexsen Pruet, PLLC, by James C. Smith and Nicholas T. Pappayliou, for the 

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Nation Ford Baptist Church Incorporated (the “Church”) and ThirdParty Defendants Joseph Dixon, Charles Elliot, and Douglas Willie (together, the 

“Elders”) appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss and granting 
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Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Phillip R.J. Davis’s (“Davis”) motion to amend 

his counterclaim and third-party complaint. The Church and the Elders argue the 

trial court erred in denying their motion, granting Davis’s motion, and concluding 

Davis had standing to bring the claims asserted in his counterclaim and third-party 

complaint.

¶ 2 The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether the resolution of Davis’s 

claims would require our Courts to interpret religious matters in violation of the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine which stems from the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. We hold that there is no guarantee that our Courts will 

be forced to weigh ecclesiastical matters at this stage of the proceedings. We affirm 

the decision of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶ 3 The Church was incorporated as a North Carolina nonprofit corporation in 

1988. At the Church’s time of incorporation, the Elders acted as the Board of 

Directors for the Church. On 31 March 2016, the Elders hired Davis to serve as 

Senior Pastor for the Church. Davis was employed on an “‘at-will’ basis.” The 

employment agreement letter signed by Davis on 31 March 2016 set out his terms of 

employment, in pertinent part, as follows:

An “at-will” employment relationship has no specific 

duration. This means that an employee can resign their 

employment at any time, with or without reason or 
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advance notice. The [C]hurch has the right to terminate 

employment at any time, with or without reason or advance 

notice as long as there is no violation of applicable state or 

federal law.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 4 The Record in this case contains two different sets of bylaws, and the parties 

disagree which bylaws governed the Church’s operations during the time relevant to 

this case. The Church adopted a set of bylaws (“the First Bylaws”) on 8 January 1997. 

On or about April 2008, the Church applied for a bank loan, and incorporated another 

set of bylaws (“the Second Bylaws”) as part of its loan application.

¶ 5 Effective 17 June 2019, the Elders unanimously decided to terminate Davis’s 

employment at the Church. Despite his termination, Davis ignored the instructions 

of the Church and continued to conduct religious activities at the Church.

¶ 6 The Church initiated this action on 17 September 2019 seeking, inter alia, a 

preliminary injunction to prohibit Davis from accessing the Church. In response, 

Davis filed an answer, counterclaim, third-party complaint, and motion for injunctive 

relief on 24 October 2019. Davis’s claims are centered around an employment dispute 

for which the remedy is dependent upon determining which bylaws governed the 

Church’s actions. An order granting the Church’s motion for a preliminary injunction 

was entered on 30 October 2019. 

¶ 7 On 22 April 2020, the Church and the Elders filed a motion to dismiss Davis’s 
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counterclaim and third-party complaint. Davis moved to amend his answer, 

counterclaim, and third-party complaint on 6 May 2020. The court entered an order 

(“the Order”) granting Davis’s motion to amend and denying the Church and the 

Elders’ motion to dismiss on 22 July 2020. According to the Order,

The [c]ourt finds and concludes that (i) this [c]ourt has 

subject matter jurisdiction over the matters and claims 

asserted in [Davis]’s Counterclaim and Third-Party 

Complaint, (ii) [Davis] has standing to bring the claims 

asserted in his Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, 

and (ii) [Davis]’s Motion to Amend should be granted.

The Church and the Elders timely appeal.

II. Analysis

¶ 8 The Church and the Elders raise three issues on appeal. First, they contend 

the trial court erred in concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the 

matters asserted in Davis’s amended counterclaim and third-party complaint. 

Second, they argue the trial court erred in concluding that Davis has standing to 

bring the claims asserted in his amended counterclaim and third-party complaint. 

Third, they assert the trial court erred in granting Davis’s motion to amend the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint. We address each issue in turn.

A. Interlocutory Jurisdiction

¶ 9 We acknowledge that this appeal is interlocutory. An interlocutory order is 

“made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires 
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further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the rights of all the 

parties involved in the controversy.” Flitt v. Flitt, 149 N.C. App. 475, 477, 561 S.E.2d 

511, 513 (2002) (citation omitted). There is generally no right to immediately appeal 

from an interlocutory order. Id. Immediate appeal of an interlocutory order is, 

however, appropriate when “the challenged order affects a substantial right that may 

be lost without immediate review.” McConnell v. McConnell, 151 N.C. App. 622, 624, 

566 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2002) (citation omitted). 

¶ 10 A “substantial right” is “a right materially affecting those interests which a 

man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.” Oestreicher 

v. Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The appellant has the burden of establishing that a substantial right will 

be affected unless they are allowed to immediately appeal from an interlocutory 

order. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 

252, 253 (1994). 

¶ 11 The trial court’s Order denying the Church and Elders’ motion to dismiss and 

granting Davis’s motion to amend is an interlocutory order. It was made during the 

pendency of the action and it does not dispose of the case. However, the Church and 

the Elders argue that their motion to dismiss should have been granted because 

resolution of Davis’s claims would require the trial court to impermissibly entangle 

itself in ecclesiastical matters in violation of the First Amendment of the United 
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States Constitution. “First Amendment rights are substantial and . . . are implicated 

when a party asserts that a civil court action cannot proceed without impermissibly 

entangling the court in ecclesiastical matters.” Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 

270, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (2007). “When First Amendment rights are asserted, this 

Court has allowed appeals from interlocutory orders.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 12 The Church and the Elders have asserted a violation of First Amendment 

rights. Their appeal is properly before this Court.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Ecclesiastical Abstention

¶ 13 The Church and the Elders contend the trial court erred in concluding that it 

had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in Davis’s amended 

counterclaim and third-party complaint because the court would be forced to 

interpret and resolve ecclesiastical questions to resolve the claims.

¶ 14 The standard of review for a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is de novo. Tubiolo v. 

Abundant Life Church, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 324, 327, 605 S.E.2d 161, 163 (2004)

(citation omitted). When ruling on or reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, 

our courts may “consider and weigh matters outside of the pleadings.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Upon review of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

the trial court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson v. Antioch United Holy 
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Church, Inc., 214 N.C. App. 507, 510, 714 S.E.2d 806, 809 (2011) (citations omitted). 

¶ 15 The trial court properly determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over 

Davis’s claims. “The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a 

civil court from becoming entangled in ecclesiastical matters.” Id. at 510, 714 S.E.2d 

at 810 (citing Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). “An ecclesiastical matter is one 

which concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and 

enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the 

government of membership.” W. Conf. of Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Miles, 

259 N.C. 1, 10–11, 129 S.E.2d 600, 606 (1963) (citations omitted). 

¶ 16 However, civil courts do not violate the First Amendment “merely by opening 

their doors to disputes involving church property.” Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at

449. “And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property 

disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is 

awarded.” Id. “The First Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide 

church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious 

doctrine.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of A. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 

U.S. 696, 710 (1976) (citation omitted). “This principle applies with equal force to 

church disputes over church polity and church administration.” Id. “The dispositive 

question is whether resolution of the legal claim requires the court to interpret or 
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weigh church doctrine.” Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 494, 495 SE.2d 396, 

398 (1998). “If not, the First Amendment is not implicated and neutral principles of 

law are properly applied to adjudicate the claim.” Id (citation omitted). “When a 

party brings a proper complaint, ‘[w]here civil, contract[][,] or property rights are 

involved, the courts will inquire as to whether the church tribunal acted within the 

scope of its authority and observed its own organic forms and rules.’” Harris v. 

Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 274–75, 643 S.E.2d 566, 572 (2007) (quoting Atkins v. 

Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 320, 200 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973)).

¶ 17 Davis’s claims request the following:

(I) Declaratory judgment against the Church and the 

Elders, declaring that: (i) Davis is the “Bishop” and “Senior 

Pastor” of the Church; (ii) Davis was not an “at-will” 

employee of the Church; (iii) the Elders’ attempt to 

terminate Davis’s employment with the Church was 

unauthorized by the then-controlling Second Bylaws; and 

(iv) Davis is entitled to recover back-pay and benefits 

earned since his purported termination;

(II) Preliminary and permanent injunction allowing Davis 

to resume employment with the Church, earning full 

compensation and benefits;

(III) Money damages from the Elders for breach of fiduciary 

obligations owed to Davis and to the Church;

(IV) Money damages from the Elders for wrongful 

interference with Davis’s employment relationship with 

the Church;

(V) Rights (i) to inspect the Church’s financial records, (ii) 
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to receive an accounting from the Elders and the Church of

Church funds or assets the Elders misappropriated, and 

(iii) to impose a constructive trust upon the Elders’ assets 

in an amount equal to any Church funds or assets found to 

have been misappropriated; and

(VI) Money damages from the Elders for civil conspiracy to 

remove Davis from employment with the Church and to 

seize complete control of the Church’s operations.

¶ 18 As Davis asserts, “[t]his is an employment dispute.” The core tenet upon which 

all of Davis’s claims depend is the determination of which bylaws governed the 

Church at the relevant time. Davis was an employee of the Church and now raises 

disputes regarding the Church’s bylaws. His claims do not fall under the protections 

of ecclesiastical matters within the First Amendment. 

¶ 19 Resolving Davis’s claims requires a two-part determination: First, which 

bylaws were the governing authority at the relevant time, and whether Davis’s

termination was in accordance with the proper bylaws? Second, whether the Elders 

properly determined that Davis was unfit to serve as Senior Pastor of the Church? 

¶ 20 The first determination may be made by applying neutral principles of law 

without engaging in ecclesiastical matters. Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 SE.2d 

at 398. The trial court must first determine which set of bylaws controlled at the 

relevant time, based solely on contract and business law. The court will then be able

to assess whether the Church’s procedure for firing Davis complied with the 

requirements of the controlling bylaws. The court may determine that the Church’s 
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method of terminating Davis did not comply with the requirements of the controlling 

bylaws, making Davis’s termination void. In this instance, this dispute would be 

resolved without the necessity of answering the second question—whether Davis was 

unfit to serve—and engaging with ecclesiastical matters. 

¶ 21 If the court determines that the Church’s method of terminating Davis did 

comply with the requirements of the controlling bylaws, then our Courts would be 

required to assess whether the Church, through its Elders, properly determined that 

Davis was unfit to serve as Senior Pastor. That determination cannot be made 

applying only neutral principles of law. Answering this second question may require 

an impermissible engagement with ecclesiastical matters, but there is no guarantee 

at this stage of the proceedings that our courts will be forced to answer this second 

question. 

¶ 22 The first determination required in the present case is analogous to Tubiolo v. 

Abundant Life Church, Inc. The plaintiffs in Tubiolo brought claims against the 

defendant church for wrongful termination, arguing that the persons who sought 

termination of the plaintiffs lacked the requisite authority to do so. Tubiolo, 167 N.C. 

App. at 326, 605 S.E.2d at 163. The Court in Tubiolo was tasked with determining 

what bylaws governed the actions of the defendant church, and whether the actions 

taken by the defendant church were in accordance with the appropriate bylaws. Id.

at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164. The Tubiolo Court noted “the courts do have jurisdiction 
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over the very narrow issue of whether the bylaws were properly adopted by the 

defendant [church].” Id. The Tubiolo Court then held, as this Court has previously 

acknowledged, that it is

proper for a court to address the “very narrow issue” of 

whether the plaintiffs’ membership was terminated in 

accordance with the church’s bylaws—whether bylaws had 

been adopted by the church, and whether those individuals 

who signed a letter revoking the plaintiffs’ membership 

had the authority to do so.

Johnson, 214 N.C. App. at 512, 714 S.E.2d at 811 (discussing the holding of Tubiolo,

167 N.C. App. at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164–65). The present case requires determining 

which bylaws were in effect, whether new bylaws had been adopted by the Church, 

whether the Elders had the authority to terminate Davis, and whether the 

termination was done in accordance with the proper bylaws. “This inquiry can be 

made without resolving any ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters.” Tubiolo, 167 N.C. 

App. at 329, 605 S.E.2d at 164–65. Our courts have jurisdiction over each of these 

determinations.

C. Standing

¶ 23 The Church and the Elders argue that Davis does not have standing to bring 

his claims because they are derivative and brought on behalf of the Church. We 

disagree.

¶ 24 The Church and the Elders specifically argue that Davis does not have 
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standing to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the Church for his first, second, third, 

and fifth claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-7-40(a) outlines derivative actions, providing: 

An action may be brought in a superior court of this State, 

which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over 

actions brought hereunder, in the right of any domestic or 

foreign corporation by any member or director, provided 

that, in the case of an action by a member, the plaintiff or 

plaintiffs shall allege, and it shall appear, that each 

plaintiff-member was a member at the time of the 

transaction of which he complains.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-7-40(a) (2019).

¶ 25 A majority of Davis’s first, second, third, and fifth claims allege injuries 

incurred in his individual capacity, and not on behalf of the Church. However, a 

portion of Davis’s third claim appears to request money damages from the Elders for 

breach of their fiduciary obligations owed to the Church itself. Seeking remedy on 

behalf of the Church for harm done to the Church would be a derivative action. The 

Church and the Elders argue that Davis lacks standing to bring a derivative action 

as a member of the Church because the First Bylaws explicitly state that the Church 

has no members. A determination of which bylaws were the proper governing 

authority of the Church at the relevant time is necessary to the determination of 

whether Davis has standing to bring the derivative action in his third claim. 
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¶ 26 The remainder of Davis’s claims are brought in an individual capacity and are 

not derivative on behalf of the Church. A plaintiff must show the following three 

elements in order to establish individual standing:

(1) ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 

interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the 

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.

McDaniel v. Saintsing, 260 N.C. App. 229, 232–33, 817 S.E.2d 912, 914–15 (2018)

(citation omitted). The alleged wrongful termination of Davis is an “injury in fact”

that satisfies the first element. Davis was terminated by the actions of the Church 

and the Elders. If the court finds in favor of Davis, the injury will be sufficiently 

redressed.

¶ 27 The trial court did not err in determining that Davis had standing to bring the 

claims asserted in his amended counterclaim and third-party complaint at this stage 

of the proceedings. 

D. Motion to Amend

¶ 28 The Church and the Elders assert the trial court erred in granting Davis’s 

motion to amend the counterclaim and third-party complaint under Rule 15 of the 

North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We review a trial court’s decision to grant 

a motion to amend the pleadings for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. Rockingham 
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Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 687, 690, 582 S.E.2d 69, 72 (2003); Mabrey v. 

Smith, 144 N.C. App. 119, 121, 548 S.E.2d 183, 185–86 (2001) (“A motion to amend 

the pleadings is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). “[A] trial judge 

abuses his discretion when he refuses to allow an amendment unless justifying 

reasoning is shown.” Taylor v. Triangle Porsche–Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 714, 

220 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1975) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 

“Generally, Rule 15 is construed liberally to allow amendments where the opposing 

party will not be materially prejudiced.” Delta Envtl. Consultants of N.C., Inc. v. 

Wysong & Miles Co., 132 N.C. App. 160, 165, 510 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1999) (citation 

omitted). 

¶ 29 The Church has not shown reason justifying a denial of Davis’s motion to 

amend or any materially unfair prejudice as a result of the trial court’s decision to 

grant Davis’s motion to amend. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

granting Davis’s motion to amend the counterclaim and third-party complaint.

III. Conclusion

¶ 30 We hold the trial court did not err in determining it had subject matter 

jurisdiction over Davis’s counterclaims and third-party complaint at this stage of the 

proceedings. The Church’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

was properly denied. The trial court did not err in determining Davis had standing 

to bring the counterclaims and third-party complaint. We hold there was no abuse of 
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discretion in the trial court’s decision to grant Davis’s motion to amend the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint. The Order of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judge ARROWOOD concurs.

Judge MURPHY concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
No. COA20-800 – Nation Ford v. Davis

MURPHY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 31 While I concur with the Majority’s analysis regarding our jurisdiction over this 

interlocutory appeal, supra at ¶¶ 9-12, I respectfully dissent from its conclusion that 

we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Supra at ¶¶ 15, 18. I would 

reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, which would render the issue regarding Davis’s standing moot. I would 

also hold the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, 

counterclaim, and amended counterclaim and remand for the trial court to dismiss 

the action with prejudice.1

ANALYSIS

A. Complete Entanglement of the Original Counterclaim

¶ 32 “Civil court intervention into church property disputes is proper only when

‘relationships involving church property [have been structured] so as not to require

the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.’” Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 

271, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007) (emphases added) (marks in original) (quoting 

Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 

Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658, 665 (1969)); Western Conference of 

Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 140, 123 S.E.2d 619, 627 

 

1 For ease of reading, “counterclaim” and “original counterclaim” refer to both the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint filed 24 October 2019. “Amended counterclaim” 

refers to the amended counterclaim and third-party complaint filed 30 July 2020. 
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(1962) (marks omitted) (“The legal or temporal tribunals of the State have no 

jurisdiction over, and no concern with, purely ecclesiastical questions and 

controversies but the courts do have jurisdiction, as to civil, contract and property 

rights which are involved in, or arise from, a church controversy.”). Our Supreme 

Court has defined an ecclesiastical matter as

one which concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of 

the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a 

religious association of needful laws and regulations for the 

government of membership, and the power of excluding 

from such associations those deemed unworthy of 

membership by the legally constituted authorities of the 

church; and all such matters are within the province of 

church courts and their decisions will be respected by civil 

tribunals.

Eastern Conference of Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Piner, 267 N.C. 74, 77, 

147 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1966) (quoting Western Conference of Original Free Will Baptists 

of N.C. v. Miles, 259 N.C. 1, 10-11, 129 S.E.2d 600, 606 (1963)), overruled in part by 

Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973). “When a congregational 

church’s internal property dispute cannot be resolved using neutral principles of law, 

the courts must intrude no further[.]” Harris, 361 N.C. at 271-72, 643 S.E.2d at 570. 

Such judicial intrusion would constitute “impermissibl[e] entangle[ment] in the 

dispute.” Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571.

1. “Spiritual Leader”

¶ 33 Davis’s original counterclaim repeatedly requested judicial recognition that he 
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is “the Bishop, Senior Pastor and spiritual leader of the Church.” (Emphasis added). 

Davis specifically claimed he “is entitled to judgment declaring that [he] is the Bishop, 

Senior Pastor and spiritual leader of the Church[.]” (Emphasis added). The trial 

court stated it had subject matter jurisdiction over the original counterclaim and 

allowed Davis’s motion to amend. Despite stating in his motion to amend that the 

purpose was “to amend the factual allegations of the [original counterclaim][,] . . . add 

a claim for back pay and benefits[,] . . . and . . . add a claim for civil conspiracy[,]”

Davis’s amended counterclaim also removed the “spiritual leader” language 

throughout. The amended counterclaim included a request for a “judgment declaring 

that [Davis] is the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church.” Davis’s requests for 

recognition as the “Bishop” and “Senior Pastor” throughout the amended 

counterclaim included that language, sans the additional term “spiritual leader.” The 

removal of the “spiritual leader” language did not fit the stated purpose for amending 

the counterclaim and suggests an attempt to avoid the prohibition against reviewing 

purely ecclesiastical issues. Further, the removal of “spiritual leader” underscores 

the religious nature of the “Bishop” and “Senior Pastor” terms, as well as the 

similarity and connectedness of all three terms. The original counterclaim required 

impermissible entanglement in ecclesiastical matters and should have been 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 34 Davis’s request for recognition as the “spiritual leader” of the Church was an 
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explicit request for judicial review of his role within the Church. Davis’s request 

would require 

an examination of the church’s view of the role of the 

pastor, staff, and church leaders[.] . . . Because a church’s 

religious doctrine and practice affect its understanding of 

each of these concepts, seeking a court’s review . . . is no 

different than asking a court to determine whether a 

particular church’s grounds for membership are spiritually 

or doctrinally correct[.] . . . None of these issues can be 

addressed using neutral principles of law.” 

Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. 

2. Bylaws–“Special Meeting” and “Congregation”

¶ 35 Even assuming, arguendo, that a later set of bylaws controls the purported 

termination of his role as Bishop, Pastor, and spiritual leader of the Church, as Davis 

claimed, such bylaws would require a special meeting with a specific percentage of 

congregants to vote for his termination. According to both his original counterclaim 

and amended counterclaim, “the New Bylaws expressly provide[] that the Bishop of 

the Church can be dismissed only by a 75% vote of the congregation attending a 

Special General Meeting called for that purpose. No Special General Meeting of the 

congregation was convened[.]” What constitutes such a special meeting to dismiss 

Davis from that role, as well as the definition of congregants or members of the 

Church, are ecclesiastical matters, which courts may not analyze and where we may 

not exercise the authority of the State. See Azige v. Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox 
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MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Tewahdo Church, 249 N.C. App. 236, 241, 790 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2016) (“Membership 

in a church is a core ecclesiastical matter. The power to control church membership 

is ultimately the power to control the church. It is an area where the courts of this 

State should not become involved. This stricture applies regardless of whether the 

church is a congregational church, incorporated or unincorporated, or an hierarchical 

church.”), disc. rev. denied, 369 N.C. 532, 797 S.E.2d 290 (2017); Emory v. Jackson 

Chapel First Missionary Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 493, 598 S.E.2d 667, 671 

(2004) (“As the trial court would be required to delve into ‘ecclesiastical matters’ 

regarding how the church interprets [bylaw requirements such as] types of meetings, 

the trial court [lacked] subject matter jurisdiction.”).

We are prohibited from becoming entangled in 

ecclesiastical matters and have no jurisdiction over 

disputes which require an examination of religious 

doctrine and practice in order to resolve the matters at 

issue. . . . Only when an issue to be determined in 

connection with a party’s claim is a purely secular one, then 

neutral principles of law govern the inquiry and subject 

matter jurisdiction exists in the trial court over the claim. 

. . . Therefore, because a church’s religious doctrine and 

practice affect its understanding of each of the concepts at 

issue, [the trial court’s involvement] is like asking a court 

to determine whether a particular church’s grounds for 

membership are spiritually or doctrinally correct or 

whether a church’s charitable pursuits accord with the 

congregation’s beliefs, which are barred.

Lippard v. Holleman, 271 N.C. App. 401, 408, 410-11, 844 S.E.2d 591, 598-99, 600 

(citations and marks omitted), disc. rev. denied, appeal dismissed, 375 N.C. 492, 847 
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MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

S.E.2d 882 (2020), cert. denied, 594 U.S. __, 2021 WL 2637859 (2021).

¶ 36 The entirety of the original counterclaim should have been dismissed for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction, as it required the trial court to delve into ecclesiastical 

matters. On appeal, judicial analysis of Davis’s original counterclaim requires 

impermissible entanglement in this dispute, as no neutral principles of law can be 

applied to determine whether Davis is the spiritual leader of the Church, whether a 

special meeting was held to dismiss him from that role, and who constituted a 

congregant or member of the Church. The Majority’s approach jeopardizes the 

Church’s “First Amendment values,” as this “church property litigation . . . turn[s] 

on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” 

Harris, 361 N.C. at 271, 643 S.E.2d at 570 (quoting Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 449, 21 

L. Ed. 2d at 665). I would hold the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

Davis’s original counterclaim; we should reverse the order for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and remand to the trial court to dismiss the action with prejudice, 

rendering the issue regarding Davis’s standing moot. See id. at 275, 643 S.E.2d at 

572.

B. The Amended Counterclaim

¶ 37 As previously noted, the original counterclaim should have been dismissed as 

requiring impermissible judicial entanglement in ecclesiastical matters due to 

Davis’s request for judicial recognition as the spiritual leader of the Church, as well 
NATION FORD V. DAVIS

2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

as the requirements under the later set of bylaws. However, even if the original 

counterclaim was overlooked and the amended counterclaim was the sole focus of our 

analysis, the amended counterclaim still requires impermissible judicial 

entanglement in ecclesiastical matters. The following portions of the amended 

counterclaim, which mirror similar requests and references in the original 

counterclaim, are ecclesiastical matters requiring impermissible judicial 

entanglement: 

35. [Davis] is entitled to judgment declaring that: 

(a) [he] is the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church; 

. . . 

(d) [and that his] appearances on Church property to 

conduct church services, minister to the congregation, and 

otherwise perform his duties as Bishop and Senior Pastor 

of the Church were and are lawful[.] 

. . . .

38. . . . [T]he Third-Party Defendants, purporting to act on 

behalf of and in the name of the Church, have unlawfully 

interfered and will continue to interfere with [Davis’s] 

employment relationship with the Church and with his 

performance of duties as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of 

the Church, unless restrained by this Court.

39. [Davis] is entitled to a preliminary and permanent 

injunction enjoining, restraining and directing plaintiff 

and the Third-Party Defendants, as follows: 

(a) to allow [Davis] to resume his role and duties as the 

Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, with full 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

compensation and benefits, until such time as the Church’s 

congregation may vote to remove [him] in accordance with 

the requirements of the New Bylaws of the Church; 

(b) to refrain from excluding [Davis] from the Church 

premises and/or any other Church properties; and 

(c) to refrain from taking any action to interfere with, 

subvert or disrupt [Davis] in the performance of his duties 

as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church. 

. . . .

41. A fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence existed 

between [Davis], as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the 

Church, and the Third-Party Defendants as Elders of the 

Church. 

42. A fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence also 

existed between the Third-Party Defendants as Elders and 

the Plaintiff Church they were supposed to serve.

43. Due to the fiduciary relationship that existed between 

them, the Third-Party Defendants were required in equity 

and in good conscience to act honestly, in good faith and in 

the best interests of the Church and [Davis] as the Bishop 

and Senior Pastor of the Church.

44. . . . [T]he Third-Party Defendants[] have breached their 

fiduciary duties owed to [Davis] and the Church, in that 

the Third-Party Defendants have arrogated to themselves 

the sole management and control of the Church and have 

prevented [Davis] from exercising his rightful role as the 

Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, all in violation of 

the requirements of the New Bylaws of the Church.

45. As a direct and proximate result of the Third-Party 

Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties[,] . . . [Davis] 

has been damaged . . . .
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MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. . . .

49. The Third-Party Defendants intentionally induced the 

Plaintiff church to breach the employment relationship 

that existed between the Church and [Davis], and in so 

doing the Third-Party Defendants acted with malice and 

without justification. 

. . . .

52. . . . [T]he Third-Party Defendants have utilized Church 

assets to fund this litigation against [Davis].

53. Additionally, the Church maintained a “Key Man” 

insurance policy issued by New York Life Insurance 

company on the life of [Davis’s] father [who was] his 

predecessor as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, 

in a benefit amount believed to be several million dollars. 

Upon information and belief, after [Davis’s] father died in 

August of 2015, a majority of the benefit amount of that 

policy was paid to the Church. 

54. Because the Third-Party Defendants arrogated to 

themselves all control and management of the Church’s 

business affairs and activities, to the exclusion of [Davis] 

notwithstanding his status and role as the Bishop and 

Senior Pastor of the Church, [Davis] has been unable to 

determine how those insurance proceeds have been utilized 

by the Third-Party Defendants and whether those proceeds 

have been properly devoted to the Church’s benefit.

55. [Davis], as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, 

is entitled to inspect the books and records of the Church, 

in order to determine how Church assets and funds have 

been utilized and whether any such assets or funds have 

been misused or misappropriated by the Third-Party 

Defendants.

56. [Davis] is entitled to a complete accounting from the 

Church and the Third-Party Defendants for any and all 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

items of Church property and money diverted, 

misappropriated, received, used or expended by the ThirdParty Defendants, or any of them.

57. [Davis] is further entitled to have a constructive trust 

imposed upon the assets of the Third-Party Defendants, for 

the benefit of the Church, in an amount equal to any 

Church money or property found by this Court to have been 

wrongfully misappropriated or taken by the Third-Party 

Defendants, or any of them. 

. . . .

59. The Third-Party Defendants . . . formed an agreement 

among themselves to do unlawful acts or to do lawful acts 

in an unlawful way, resulting in injury to the Third-Party 

Plaintiff, [Davis].

60. After [Davis] discovered the existence of the New 

Bylaws in November of 2017 and demanded the 

resignations of the Third-Party Defendants as Elders of the 

Church, the Third-Party Defendants conspired among 

themselves to oust [him] and his family members from the 

Church and thereby arrogate to themselves full control of 

the Church’s operations and activities.

61. Pursuant to their conspiracy, as described above, the 

Third-Party Defendants committed, or caused to be 

committed, the following overt acts:

. . . .

(b) In January of 2018, the Third-Party Defendants 

submitted to [Davis] a purported “evaluation” of his 

performance. No such “performance evaluation” had ever 

been previously done on the Bishop and Senior Pastor of 

the Church, and the Third-Party defendants had no 

authority under the New Bylaws to conduct such an 

“evaluation.”
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

(c) Throughout 2018 and the first half of 2019, the ThirdParty Defendants refused to meet with [Davis] and instead 

actively worked to undermine [his] leadership role as the 

Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church.

. . . .

WHEREFORE, . . . Davis prays the Court for relief as 

follows:

. . .

3. That the [trial] [c]ourt issue an Order requiring the 

Church and the Third-Party Defendants to appear and 

show cause why [his] Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

should not be granted;

4. That, following a hearing on [Davis’s] Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, the [trial] [c]ourt issue an Order of 

Preliminary Injunction directing, enjoining and 

restraining the Church, the Third-Party Defendants, and 

all other persons or entities acting at their instruction or in 

concert with any of them, as follows:

(a) to allow [Davis] to resume his role and duties as the 

Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, with full 

compensation and benefits, to include back pay from June 

2019, pending further Order of the [trial] [c]ourt or until 

such time as the Church’s congregation may vote to remove 

[Davis] in accordance with the requirements of the New 

Bylaws of the Church;

(b) to refrain from excluding [Davis] from the Church 

premises and/or any other Church properties; and

(c) to refrain from taking any action to interfere with, 

disrupt or subvert [Davis] in the performance of his duties 

as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church.

5. That, following a trial on the merits, the [trial] [c]ourt 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

enter judgment in favor of [Davis] and against the Church 

and the Third-Party Defendants on [Davis’s] Counterclaim 

and Third-Party Complaint as follows:

(a) Declaring that [Davis] is the Bishop and Senior Pastor 

of the Church; that [Davis’s] employment relationship with 

the Church is not an “at-will” employment but instead is 

an employment relationship governed by the New Bylaws 

of the Church; that the purported “termination” of [Davis’s] 

employment with the Church, undertaken by the ThirdParty Defendants acting on behalf of and in the name of 

the Church, was contrary to the New Bylaws and therefore 

unlawful; that [Davis’s] appearances on Church property 

to conduct church services, minister to the congregation, 

and otherwise perform his duties as Bishop and Senior 

Pastor of the Church were and are lawful; and that [Davis] 

is entitled to receive back pay and benefits from the Church 

from the date of the purported termination of his 

employment with the Church.

(b) Entering an Order of Permanent Injunction, directing, 

enjoining and restraining the Church, the Third-Party 

Defendants, and all other persons or entities acting at their 

instruction or in concert with them, to allow [Davis] to 

perform his role and duties as the Bishop and Senior Pastor 

of the Church, with full compensation and benefits, until 

such time as the Church’s congregation may vote to remove 

[Davis] in accordance with the requirements of the New 

Bylaws of the Church; to refrain from excluding [Davis] 

from the Church premises and/or any other Church 

properties; and to refrain from taking any action to 

interfere with, disrupt or subvert [Davis] in the 

performance of his duties as the Bishop and Senior Pastor 

of the Church.

. . . .

(d) Ordering the Church and the Third-Party Defendants 

to [p]ermit [Davis] to inspect the books and records of the 

Church; ordering the Third-Party Defendants to provide a 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

complete accounting for all items of church money or 

property misappropriated, diverted, received, used or 

expended by the Third-Party Defendants, or any of them; 

and imposing a constructive trust upon the assets of the 

Third-Party Defendants, for the benefit of the Church, in 

an amount equal to any Church money or property found 

to have been wrongfully misappropriated or taken by the 

Third-Party Defendants, or any of them. 

1. “Bishop” and “Senior Pastor”

¶ 38 As identified above, Davis still requests a “judgment declaring that [he] is the 

Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church” in Paragraph 35(a) of his amended 

counterclaim, and includes repeated statements that he is “the duly installed Bishop 

and Senior Pastor of the Church.” These requests and references require a court to 

determine what constitutes a “bishop” and a “senior pastor,” and how such a leader 

can be “duly installed.” Such a determination would run afoul of our caselaw 

prohibition against judicial “examination of the church’s view of the role of the pastor, 

staff, and church leaders[.]” Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. The 

ecclesiastical nature of Davis’s requests and references is evidenced by his repeated 

pairing of the positions of “Bishop and Senior Pastor” with “conduct[ing],” 

“resum[ing],” and “perform[ing] his duties,” as well as “exercising his rightful role” in 

the Church. For example, Davis asks for a judicial intervention into the purported 

unlawful interference with his “employment relationship with the Church and with 

his performance of duties as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church[.]” Courts 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

may not define the role, duties, and services of a church’s leader; but, by affirming its 

denial of the motion to dismiss, that is exactly what the Majority has allowed the trial 

court to do. See id.; supra at ¶¶ 14-15.

2. Fiduciary Relationship

¶ 39 Further, Davis claims that “[a] fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence 

existed between [him], as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church, and the ThirdParty Defendants as the Elders of the Church[,]” and that “the Third-Party 

Defendants[] . . . breached their fiduciary duties owed to [Davis] and the Church” by 

“arrogat[ing] to themselves the sole management and control of the Church[.]” 

Davis’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is similar to the plaintiffs’ allegations in Harris. 

Our Supreme Court has already determined that the ecclesiastical entanglement 

doctrine prohibits judicial review of whether a church’s internal governing body 

“breached [its] fiduciary duties by improperly using church funds.” Harris, 361 N.C. 

at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. Such a review required an improper “examination of the 

church’s view of the role of the pastor, staff, and church leaders, their authority and 

compensation, and church management.” Id. We similarly cannot examine the role 

and relationship between the elders and a pastor, as it involves an improper review 

of not only roles, duties, and authority, but also church management.

3. Employment Relationship

¶ 40 Davis also claims “[a] valid employment relationship existed between [him 
NATION FORD V. DAVIS

2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

and] the Church[,] . . . [and] [t]he Third-Party Defendants intentionally induced the 

Plaintiff Church to breach the employment relationship that existed between the 

Church and [Davis], and in so doing the Third-Party Defendants acted with malice 

and without justification.” “[T]he application of a secular standard to secular conduct 

that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution,” and tortious conduct could be 

analyzed if neutral laws could be applied. Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 494, 

495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 284, 501 S.E.2d 913 

(1998). However, “the decision to hire or discharge a minister is inextricable from 

religious doctrine and protected by the First Amendment from judicial inquiry.” Id. 

at 495, 495 S.E.2d at 398. Whether the decision to fire Davis was due to failure to 

perform a religious role or was nefarious would require the examination of religious 

doctrine, and we cannot allow such an examination.

4. “Church’s Benefit”

¶ 41 In his fifth claim for relief in the amended counterclaim, Davis argues “the 

Third-Party Defendants have utilized Church assets to fund this litigation against 

[Davis,]” which entitles Davis “to have a constructive trust imposed upon the assets 

of the Third-Party Defendants” in the amount of funds “wrongfully misappropriated 

or taken[.]” According to Davis, he and, by inference, the trial court, must be allowed 

to inspect Church records to determine whether the portion of a keyman life 

insurance policy paid to the Church has “been properly devoted to the Church’s 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

benefit.” 

Determining whether actions, including expenditures, by a 

church’s [staff and leadership] were proper requires an 

examination of the church’s view of the role of the pastor, 

staff, and church leaders, their authority and 

compensation, and church management. Because a 

church’s religious doctrine and practice affect its 

understanding of each of these concepts, seeking a court’s 

review of the [expenditures] is no different than asking a 

court to determine whether a particular church’s grounds 

for membership are spiritually or doctrinally correct or 

whether a church’s charitable pursuits accord with the 

congregation’s beliefs. None of these issues can be 

addressed using neutral principles of law.

Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571 (emphasis added). What constitutes the 

proper devotion of life insurance proceeds toward the Church’s benefit is an analysis 

inextricably linked to ecclesiastical issues, and we cannot permit such an analysis.

5. Control of the Church

¶ 42 Davis’s civil conspiracy claim is replete with references to the Third-Party 

Defendants attempting to “arrogate to themselves full control” of the Church, acting 

with “no authority,” “actively work[ing] to undermine [Davis’s] leadership role,” and 

terminating Davis without the “75% affirmative vote of the congregation” required 

under the bylaws. Judicial engagement with claims concerning membership, roles, 

and duties within the Church requires an analysis we may not conduct. See id.; 
NATION FORD V. DAVIS

2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Emory, 165 N.C. App. at 492-93, 598 S.E.2d at 670-71.2

6. Injunctive Relief

¶ 43 Finally, Davis’s prayer for relief requests a judicial determination, via 

injunction, that “allow[s] [Davis] to resume his role and duties as the Bishop and 

Senior Pastor of the Church” until another court order or congregational removal via 

“the requirements of the New Bylaws of the Church” takes effect. He also requests a 

judicial declaration “that [he] is the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church[,] . . . 

that the purported ‘termination’ . . . was contrary to the New Bylaws[,] . . . [and] that 

[his] . . . perform[ance of] his duties as the Bishop and Senior Pastor of the Church 

were and are lawful[.]” According to Davis, “the New Bylaws expressly provide[] that 

the Bishop of the Church can be dismissed only by a 75% vote of the congregation 

attending a Special General Meeting called for that purpose. No Special General 

Meeting of the congregation was convened[.]” As previously discussed, the 

ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine prohibits judicial review of roles within a 

church, or of what constitutes an appropriate special meeting or membership within 

a church. See Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571; Emory, 165 N.C. App. at 

492-93, 598 S.E.2d at 670-71. The trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 

 

2 Davis also argues his mother was wrongfully terminated, but he lacks standing to 

bring such a claim. See Munger v. State, 202 N.C. App. 404, 409, 689 S.E.2d 230, 235 (2010) 

(marks omitted) (“The rationale of the standing rule is that only one . . . personally injured . 

. . can be trusted to battle the issue.”), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 3, 705 S.E.2d 734 (2011).
NATION FORD V. DAVIS

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MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

over Davis’s request for a positive injunction in his prayer for relief.

7. Conclusion

¶ 44 Even assuming, arguendo, we should review the amended counterclaim rather 

than the original counterclaim, each of Davis’s claims require judicial review of 

ecclesiastical matters, which runs afoul of the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. 

Davis’s amended counterclaim should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the amended counterclaim 

on appeal. We should remand to the trial court for dismissal of the amended 

counterclaim, with prejudice. Harris, 361 N.C. at 275, 643 S.E.2d at 572.

C. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Complaint

¶ 45 “Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, 

reviewed de novo on appeal. An appellate court has the power to inquire into subjectmatter jurisdiction in a case before it at any time, even sua sponte.” Henson v. 

Henson, 261 N.C. App. 157, 160, 820 S.E.2d 101, 104 (2018) (citation and marks 

omitted). The complaint is properly analyzed within this appeal, Davis’s original 

counterclaim and amended counterclaim included an answer to the complaint, and 

the Majority does not review whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction 

over the matter from the start. See Hayes v. Turner, 98 N.C. App. 451, 454-55, 391 

S.E.2d 513, 515 (1990) (“[The plaintiff’s] complaint in summary ejectment alleges that 

there was no rent and that no lease existed. The record contains neither allegations 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

nor evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and [the plaintiff] also failed to allege 

any of the statutory violations. [The plaintiff’s] amended complaint also fails to assert 

the required allegations for summary ejectment or for any other cause of action. We 

therefore, sua sponte, conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

to hear the summary ejectment action. We therefore vacate the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment for [the] plaintiff on [the] plaintiff’s cause of action and remand 

for dismissal of that action.”). I would review the complaint to see whether it too runs 

afoul of the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine.

¶ 46 The complaint alleges that “[t]he Plaintiff is the owner and lawful possessor of 

the Premises[,]” “[Davis] continues to attempt to hold unauthorized services and 

meetings at Plaintiff’s facilities[,]” “[Davis] has disrupted the ongoing legitimate 

ministries of the Plaintiff and prevented the Plaintiff from carrying on its mission[,]”

and “[Davis], by his unauthorized collection and retention of funds and by his failure 

to return Plaintiff’s property, has committed conversion of Plaintiff’s property.” Much 

like Davis’s counterclaims, these allegations require improper judicial inquiry into 

Church governance and membership as it relates to the appropriate leaders and 

owners of the premises, as well as who has the authority to approve Davis in his 

attempt to hold services and meetings. See Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 

571; Emory, 165 N.C. App. at 492-93, 598 S.E.2d at 670-71. Further, in addition to 

these allegations, the complaint requires impermissible analysis of what constitutes 
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2021-NCCOA-528

MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

the legitimate ministry and mission of the Church: “[Davis] has disrupted the ongoing 

legitimate ministries of the Plaintiff and prevented the Plaintiff from carrying on its 

mission[.]” See generally Piner, 267 N.C. at 77, 147 S.E.2d at 583. Finally, the 

complaint requests judicial analysis of alleged unauthorized conversion of Church 

property, which is similar to Davis’s claims and those of the plaintiffs’ improper 

request in Harris for judicial determination of whether expenditures were proper. 

See Harris, 361 N.C. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571. 

¶ 47 The complaint also requires judicial review of roles within and doctrine of the 

Church, which runs afoul of the ecclesiastical entanglement doctrine. For this reason, 

the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, and we 

must remand to the trial court to dismiss it with prejudice along with the original 

counterclaim and amended counterclaim. See id. at 275, 643 S.E.2d at 572.

CONCLUSION

¶ 48 Our courts may not intrude on church disputes that cannot be resolved via only 

neutral principles of law. Such judicial intrusion constitutes impermissible 

entanglement in ecclesiastical matters and is prohibited by the First Amendment. 

The determination of issues from Davis’s original counterclaim requires judicial 

review of ecclesiastical matters. Even if we were to review Davis’s amended 

counterclaim, each claim still requires judicial review of ecclesiastical matters. 

Finally, the original complaint similarly requires judicial review of ecclesiastical 
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MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

matters. As a result, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 

entirety of this matter.

¶ 49 While I concur that the Order is properly before us as an interlocutory appeal, 

I would reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, rendering the issue regarding Davis’s standing moot. I would 

also hold the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, 

counterclaim, and amended counterclaim and remand for the trial court to dismiss 

the action with prejudice. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.