alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:172
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:173
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:174
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:175
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:176
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 6 of 23 PageID #:177
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 7 of 23 PageID #:178
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:179
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 9 of 23 PageID #:180
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 10 of 23 PageID #:181
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 11 of 23 PageID #:182
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 12 of 23 PageID #:183
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 13 of 23 PageID #:184
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 14 of 23 PageID #:185
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 15 of 23 PageID #:186
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 16 of 23 PageID #:187
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 17 of 23 PageID #:188
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 18 of 23 PageID #:189
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 19 of 23 PageID #:190
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 20 of 23 PageID #:191
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 21 of 23 PageID #:192
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 22 of 23 PageID #:193
Case: 1:12-cv-02009 Document #: 37-2 Filed: 08/28/12 Page 23 of 23 PageID #:194
#### Taylor Company *et al. v.*Williams.

Atkinson, J.

1. Where an insolvent person files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and prays that property be set apart to him as exempt under homestead laws of this State, and upon such petition is adjudged a bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed, who sets apart to the bankrupt property as prayed, and duly files his report thereof in the court of bankruptcy, to which no exception is filed, the bankrupt has an assignable interest in the property so set apart, and it is lawful for him to assign the property in good faith for application to preexisting debts, although the assignment be made before expiration of the twenty days allowed under General Order No. 17 (Collier on Bankruptcy, 1067), within which to file exceptions.

2. In such a case, where creditors holding homestead-waiver notes of the bankrupt, relying on the validity of the homestead exemption, sought in a court of equity to enjoin the bankrupt from receiving the property so set apart and to have a receiver appointed, to the end that the property might be applied to the payment of the homestead-waiver notes, and on interlocutory hearing it appeared that the exempted property *582had been assigned in the manner indicated in the preceding note, there was no error in denying the application for injunction and receiver.

March 1, 1913.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. April 9, 1912.

*H. M. Holden*and *P. 0. O’Gorman,*for plaintiffs.

*8. H. Myers*and *W. K. Miller,*for defendant.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
EXHIBIT 99.1
 AXCESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER
 Organization
  Statement of Policy
  Responsibilities and Processes
   
    
    The committee shall have a clear understanding with management and the independent
auditors that the independent auditors are ultimately accountable to the board and the
audit committee, as representatives of the Companys shareholders. The committee shall
have the ultimate authority and responsibility to evaluate and, where appropriate,
recommend the replacement of the independent auditors. The committee shall discuss with
the auditors their independence from management and the Company and the matters included
in the written disclosures required by the Independence Standards Board. Annually, the
committee shall review and recommend to the board the selection of the Companys
independent auditors, subject to shareholders approval.
 
    
    The committee shall discuss with the internal auditors and the independent auditors
the overall scope and plans for their respective audits including the adequacy of
staffing and compensation. Also, the committee shall discuss with management, the
internal auditors, and the independent auditors the adequacy and effectiveness of the
accounting and financial controls, including the Companys system to monitor and manage
business risk, and legal and ethical compliance programs. Further, the committee shall
meet separately with the internal auditors and the independent auditors, with and
without management present, to discuss the results of their examinations.
 
    
    The committee shall review the interim financial statements with management and the
independent auditors prior to the filing of the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q.
Also, the committee shall discuss the results of the quarterly review and any other
matters required to be communicated to the committee by the independent auditors under
generally accepted auditing standards. The chair of the committee may represent the
entire committee for the purposes of this review.
 
    
    The committee shall review with management and the independent auditors the financial
statements to be included in the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K (or the annual
report to shareholders if distributed prior to the filing of Form 10-K), including their
judgment about the quality, not just acceptability, of accounting principles, the
reasonableness of significant judgments, and the clarity of the disclosures in the
financial statements. Also, the committee shall discuss the results of the annual audit
and any other matters required to be communicated to the committee by the independent
auditors under generally accepted auditing standards.
#### Williams *et al. v.*The State.

Evans, P. J.

1. Where two defendants are on trial-for murder, testimony of a witness that he overheard one of the defendants, in conversation with his wife, admit the killing of the deceased is not inadmissible on the ground that the conversation between the defendant and his wife was a privileged communication. *Knight*v. *State,*114 *Ga.*48 (39 *592S. E. 928, 88 Am. St. R. 17). Nor is it inadmissible because the other defendant was not present at the time of the conversation; the court fully instructing the jury that as to such other defendant the testimony was not to be considered in determining his guilt.

March 11, 1913.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Walker. Warren superior court. November 29, 1912.

*W. M. Hawes, E. P. Davis,*and *E. T. Shurley,*for plaintiffs in » error. *T. 8. Felder, attorney-general, Thomas J. Brown, solicitor-general,*and *M. L. Felts,*contra.

2. In so far as the requests to charge stated apt and pertinent principles, of law, they were covered by the general charge.

3. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bech, J., absent. The other Justices concur.*
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

        As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation of our reports dated February 3, 1999, included in this Form 10-K,
into the Company's previously filed Registration Statement Form S-3 (No. 33-
28942); Registration Statement Form S-8 (No. 33-28939); Registration Statement
Form S-8 (No. 33-29163); Registration Statement Form S-8 (No. 33-32824);
Registration Statement Form S-3 (No. 33-35988); Registration Statement Form S-8
(No. 33-37377); Registration Statement Form S-3 (No. 33-49918); Registration
Statement Form S-8 (No. 33-71114); Registration Statement Form S-8 (33-58335);
Registration Statement Form S-4 (33-60391); Registration Statement Form S-8 (33-
63699); Registration Statement Form S-8 (333-25509); Registration Statement Form
S-8 (333-25667); Registration Statement Form S-8 (333-29835); Registration
Statement Form S-8 (333-68295); and Registration Statement Form S-4 (333-
956497).


                                           ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Dallas, Texas
March 31, 1999
217.7303 Solicitation provision. ( a ) Use the provision at 252.217-7026, Identification of Sources of Supply, or one substantially the same, in all solicitations for supplies when the acquisition is being conducted under other than full and open competition, except when— ( 1 ) Using FAR 6.302-5;
( 2 ) The contracting officer already has the information required by the provision (e.g., the information was obtained under other acquisitions);
( 3 ) The contract is for subsistence, clothing or textiles, fuels, or supplies purchased and used outside the United States;
( 4 ) The contracting officer determines that it would not be practicable to require offerors/contractors to provide the information, e.g., nonrepetitive local purchases; or
( 5 ) The contracting officer determines that the exception at 217.7302(b) applies to all items under the solicitation.
( b ) If appropriate, use the provision at 252.217-7026, Identification of Sources of Supply, or one substantially the same, in service contracts requiring the delivery of supplies.
#### DENENHOLZ v. KELLY et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

January 17, 1906.)

Physicians and Surgeons—Contract for Compensation.

Where, after a physician had rendered services at defendants’ request for an employé whose hand was crushed, and his bill had run up to $100, the question of fixing a sum for the entire services was considered, and, on the physician saying that the treatment might still continue seven or eight weeks, a sum was agreed on. *Held,*that the statement of the physician was a mere expression of opinion, and that he could recover the amount agreed on, though the treatment, which continued for some weeks thereafter, did not continue for as much as seven or eight weeks.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fourth District.

Action by Aaron Denenholz against Edward J. Kelly and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and BLANCHARD and DOW-LING, JJ.

Jacob H. Denenholz, for appellant.

Andrew F. Van Thun, Jr., for respondents.

SCOTT, P. J.

This is a very simple case, and the material facts are practically undisputed, although a great quantity of irrelevant testimony was taken. A boy in defendants’ employ had his hand crushed and severely injured. Defendants employed plaintiff, a physician, to care for him. No agreement was at first made about compensation, *390but''after a timé defendants wished-to limit their probable'liability, and agreed to pay plaintiff $175 for his services in the case, and $20, the fee of a consultant. They have only paid $100, and this action is for the balance due.

The defendants display more anxiety to find- some ground to escape liability than they show caution in their statements excusing nonpayment. When asked for payment before suit, they replied that the agreement was- to pay when the treatment was concluded, and that they were informed that it had not yet been finished. In their verified answer in this action they categorically deny having made the agreement, and upon the stand they admit the agreement, and seek to avoid compliance with it because, as they say, the treatment did not continue so long as they had been led to believe it would. Thus on June 16th they refused to pay because the -treatment was still going on, and they now defend because, as they say, no treatment was had after the middle of April. But, even if it were possible to believe the defendants, they make out no defense. They say that after the plaintiff’s bill had run up to $100 the question of agreeing upon a sum was broached, and that $175 was agreed upon after the doctor had said that the treatment might still continue “six, seven, or eight weeks—quite indefinite.” This, of course, was not a representation that the case would take any definite time, but merely the expression of an opinion. In point of fact the treatment did continue for some weeks thereafter. Upon the case the plaintiff was clearly entitled) to the sum sued for. .

Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
19.1304 Exclusions. This subpart does not apply to— ( a ) Requirements that can be satisfied through award to— ( 1 ) Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (see subpart 8.6); or
( 2 ) AbilityOne participating non-profit agencies for the blind or severely disabled (see subpart 8.7);
( b ) Orders under indefinite-delivery contracts (see subpart 16.5). (But see 16.505(b)(2)(i)(F) for discretionary set-asides of orders);
( c ) Orders against Federal Supply Schedules (see subpart 8.4). (But see 8.405-5 for discretionary set-asides of orders);
( d ) Requirements currently being performed by an 8(a) participant or requirements SBA has accepted for performance under the authority of the 8(a) program, unless SBA has consented to release the requirements from the 8(a) program; or
( e ) Requirements for commissary or exchange resale items.
[63 FR 70272, Dec. 18, 1998, as amended at 76 FR 68035, Nov. 2, 2011; 79 FR 24202, Apr. 29, 2014; 82 FR 4731, Jan. 13, 2017; 87 FR 58236, Sept. 23, 2022]
M. P. No. 75-4.

#### In re Gerard Ouimette.

*Bevilacqua & Cicilline, John F. Cicilline,*for petitioner. *Julius C. Michaelson,*Attorney General, *William G. Brody,*Special Asst. Attorney General, for respondent.

This is a petition for habeas corpus the thrust of which seeks the release of petitioner on bail pending a review by way of certiorari of his 1972 conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. The record indicates that in July of 1972, a justice of the Superior Court set bail in the amount of $25,000 pending petitioner’s appeal of his conviction to this court. The petitioner’s statutory right to prosecute such an appeal was never taken. The writ of certiorari previously issued by this court affords a review of the conspiracy conviction by way of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, it is ordered that this petition for habeas corpus is denied and dismissed. The petitioner’s writ of certiorari is assigned specially for hearing to the May 1975 calendar.
#### Frances Gentile, Respondent, v. Vittorio Gentile, Appellant.

Order, entered on August 16, 1963, awarding plaintiff temporary alimony and counsel fee, unanimously modified, on the law and on the facts, to the extent of reducing the counsel fee to the sum of $1,000, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs. The award of $1,750 in our opinion was excessive. This case should be -brought to trial -by defendant without further delay. The best protection to both parties against any unfairness in the fixing of temporary alimony on the basis of affidavits is a speedy trial rather than an appeal. *(Bleiman*v. *Bleiman,*272 App. Div. 760.) *(Weisner*v. *Weisner,*19 A D 2d 788; *Rosen*v. *Rosen,*4 A D 2d 756; *Yudell*v. *Yudell,*282 App. Div. 649; *Amos*v. *Amos,*282 App. Div. 692; *Tee*v. *Ghay,*277 App. Div. 782.) Concur — Rabin, J. P., Valente, McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
**Exhibit32.1**

Certification Pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I,William L. Bridgford, Chairman of Bridgford Foods Corporation (the “Company”),certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, that:

(1)                                  theQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period endedJuly 7, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or780(d)); and

(2)                                  theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:August 21, 2006
|        |   | /s/   William L. Bridgford |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|   |   | William L. Bridgford, Chairman            |
|   |   | (Principal Executive Officer)             |

 

1

----
(May 26, 1964)

#### Elizabeth Kuzmak, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Kuzmak, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Atlantic Cement Company, Inc., et al., Appellants. Elizabeth Kuzmak, as Administratrix of the Estate of John Kuzmak, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Eimco Corporation, Respondent.

Motion for reargument granted, without costs, and upon reargument decision amended so that the ninth paragraph thereof is deleted with the following to take its place: “ The order, however, must be modified by deleting the provision for examination of the former employees since at this time such relief is premature.” Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:1
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:2
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:3
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:4
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:5
Case: 1:12-cv-03072 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/25/12 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:6
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,317
<SECURITIES>                                   719,567
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               727,652
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 900,402
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    109,356
<COMMON>                                         4,851
<OTHER-SE>                                      86,773
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   900,402
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               236,032
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,580
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,580
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              (169,781)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (158,201)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)


</TABLE>
#### 209.571-5 Lead system integrators.

For limitations on contractors acting as lead systems integrators, *see* 209.570.

[75 FR 81913, Dec. 29, 2010]
#### Daniel *v.*Reeves.

April 15, 1913.

Action for breach of contract. Before Judge Daniel. Upson superior court. November term, 1911.

P. G. Daniel instituted an action for damages against T. J. *647Beeves. The petition as amended declared upon the following written instrument:

*646Atkinson, J.

In view of the allegations of the petition relative to the attendant circumstances when the contract was made, and the recitals of the contract in regard to actual delivery of the cotton, the petition was not subject to demurrer on the ground that it showed on its face that the contract was void as a gambling contract. *Forsyth Mfg. Co.*v. *Castlen,*112 *Ga.*199 (37 S. E. 485, 81 Am. St. R. 28); *Kilpatrick*v. *Richter,*ante, 643 (77 S. E. 1065).

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*647“Jany. 19, 1909. I hereby agree to sell to P. G. Daniel 50 bales of cotton delivered at Thomaston between the first and 30th days of October next. The delivery is to be made at such time at seller’s option in lots of not less than fifty bales. Cotton to' average 500 pounds per bale. If cotton does not average 50Q pounds per bale I willt deliver a sufficient number of bales to bring up the average to 500 pounds per bale. The cotton to be of any grade between strict ordinary and fair, inclusive, at the price of 10.27/100 cents per pound for Inman, Akers & Inman 4s. Said grade being good middling American Standard classification, with deduction and addition for other grades according to Inman, Akers & Inman’s difference in effect on the day of delivery. It is fully understood and expressly agreed by the parties to this contract that same can be settled by payment of money upon failure to delivery of the actual cotton in square mercantile bales weighing an average of 500 pounds, as aforesaid. T. J. Beeves.

“We accept the above contract, with its conditions and obligations. P. G. Daniel.”

It was alleged that at the time of the making of the contract the plaintiff had made other contracts for sale of cotton to be delivered to other persons, including manufacturers, and desired the cotton to fill his own contracts; that the defendant was a farmer engaged in raising cotton; and that in making the contract both parties contemplated actual delivery of the cotton contracted to be sold. After the petition had been amended to meet the grounds of special demurrer (which were, that there was no cause of action set forth, and that the petition was defective because of a failure to attach a copy of the contract sued on), the defendant renewed his demurrer, with the additional grounds, that the contract showed upon its face that it was a gambling transaction, and for that reason, illegal and void; that it was unilateral; and that the amendments offered sought to alter and change the terms of the written contract sued on, by adding other and different stipulations and agreements not embraced or contained in the original contract. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case, and the plaintiff excepted.

17. *7. Allen*and *B. L. Berner,*for plaintiff.

*J. 7. Allen*and *M. H. Sandwich,*for defendant.
#### James Dinallo, an Infant, et al., Appellants, v. Samuel Weiner et al., Respondents.

Motion by respondent Weiner to dismiss appeal denied on condition that appellants argue or submit the appeal at the November 1960 Term, beginning October- 31, 1960, for which term the appeal is ordered to be placed on the calendar. The record and appellants’ brief must be served and filed on or before October 17, 1960.
(May 11, 1962)

In decisions Nos. 1-21: Present — Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John David Poster, Appellant.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied.