alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PEOPLE ex rel. SMITH v. WEEKES, Town Clerk.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

September 28, 1903.)

Proceéding by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of Charles Smith, against H. Luther Weekes, town clerk of the town of Hempstead.

Argued before GOODRICH, P. J„ and BARTLETT, JENKS, WOODWARD, HIRSCHBERG, and HOOKER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Order affirmed,.on authority of In re Seaman, 175 N. Y. 506, 67 N. E. 1090, without costs.
|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 1 | The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2019, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2019 (“accompanied report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|   |
|---|
|   |  |
| 2 | The information contained in the accompanied report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition and results of operations of Capital Southwest Corporation. |

|                            |
|----------------------------|
|                            |  |  |
|                       |   |   |
| Date:  August 6, 2019 | By: | /s/ Michael S. Sarner |
|                       |   | Michael S. Sarner |
|                       |   | Chief Financial Officer |
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES WILLIAM ROBINSON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of

Oregon; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-35254

D.C. No. 6:06-cv-01705-AA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 8, 2011** 

Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

James William Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force in the course of a

detention arising out of a traffic stop, and state law claims of defamation. We have

FILED

MAR 25 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-35254

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Luchtel v. Hagemann,

623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Officers Crino

and Blalack based on qualified immunity because Robinson failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers used excessive force in

subduing and handcuffing him, and “a reasonable officer could have thought that

the force used was needed.” Id. at 980-83 (granting summary judgment for

officers where the plaintiff had actively resisted arrest and the “officers applied the

least amount of force necessary to subdue [the plaintiff] by pinning her to the

ground and handcuffing her”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City of

Beaverton and Washington County because Robinson failed to demonstrate any

constitutional violation and failed to allege that any policy, practice, or custom by

the municipalities caused the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for all defendants on

the state law defamation claims because Robinson did not allege that defendants

made any false or defamatory statements. See Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of

Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1583 (9th Cir. 1996).
3 09-35254

Robinson’s remaining contentions, including those regarding additional

Beaverton police officers who were not involved in the detention, are

unpersuasive. 

AFFIRMED.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00232-CR

Armando Napoles, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

NO. CR-19-0547-A, THE HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Armando Napoles was charged with the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a 

child. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02. The indictment included an enhancement allegation 

alleging that Napoles had previously been convicted of the felony offense of sexual assault of a 

child. See id. § 22.011. Following a trial, the jury found Napoles guilty. The trial court found 

the enhancement allegation to be true and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole. See id. § 12.42(c); Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.145(a). Napoles appealed 

his conviction.

Napoles’s court-appointed attorney on appeal filed a motion to withdraw 

supported by an Anders brief contending that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967). Napoles’s court-appointed attorney’s brief 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit meets the requirements of Anders by 

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating that there are no arguable 
2

grounds to be advanced. See id.; Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); 

see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1988) (explaining that Anders briefs serve purpose 

of “assisting the court in determining both that counsel in fact conducted the required detailed 

review of the case and that the appeal is . . . frivolous”). Napoles’s counsel represented to the

Court that he provided copies of the motion and brief to Napoles; advised Napoles of his right to

examine the appellate record, file a pro se brief, and pursue discretionary review following the 

resolution of the appeal in this Court; and provided Napoles with a form motion for pro se access 

to the appellate record along with the mailing address of this Court. See Kelly v. State, 

436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Napoles has not filed a pro se brief

challenging his conviction, and the deadline for filing a pro se brief has expired.

We have independently reviewed the record and considered appellate counsel’s 

brief, and we have found nothing that might arguably support the appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. 

at 744; Garner, 300 S.W.3d at 766. We agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous and 

without merit. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: December 8, 2023

Do Not Publish
# Jornal Oficial C 330A/7 de

| | ISSN 1977-1010 |
| --- | --- |
| Jornal Oficial
  da União Europeia | C 330A |
| | |
| Edição em língua portuguesa | Comunicações e Informações | 58.° ano7 de outubro de 2015 |

ISSN 1977-1010

Jornal Oficial

da União Europeia

C 330A

Edição em língua portuguesa

Comunicações e Informações

58.° ano7 de outubro de 2015

---

| Número de informação | Índice | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Avisos |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Serviço Europeu de Seleção do Pessoal (EPSO) |
| 2015/C 330A/01 | Anúncio de anulação | 1 |

Número de informação

Índice

Página

V   Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Serviço Europeu de Seleção do Pessoal (EPSO)

2015/C 330A/01

Anúncio de anulação

1

---

| PT | |
| --- | --- |

PT

---

V Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Serviço Europeu de Seleção do Pessoal (EPSO)

| 7.10.2015 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | CA 330/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.10.2015

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

CA 330/1

---

ANÚNCIO DE ANULAÇÃO

(2015/C 330 A/01)

A publicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia
   (1) do concurso geral EPSO/AD/321/15 — Administradores no domínio da auditoria (AD 5/AD 7) é anulada.

---

(1)  JO C 316 A de 24.9.2015, p. 1.

---
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 29, 2017

s1120

Order 

Clerk

November 29, 2017

153216

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 153216

COA: 323979

Macomb CC: 2014-001628-FC

DENNIS ROBERT SHEPLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________/

By order of September 6, 2016, the application for leave to appeal the December 

29, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in 

People v Steanhouse (Docket No. 152849) and People v Masroor (Docket Nos. 152946-

8). On order of the Court, the cases having been decided on July 24, 2017, 500 Mich 453 

(2017), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of 

granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing pursuant to People v Steanhouse, 313 

Mich App 1 (2015), and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary 

review of whether the defendant’s sentence was disproportionate under the standard set 

forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636 (1990). See People v Steanhouse, 500 

Mich at 460-461. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

CLEMENT, J., did not participate.
#### 215.371 Only one offer.
Exhibit
      32(e)








**CERTIFICATION
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO**




**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**




**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**




**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report
      on Form 10-Q of Florida Power Corporation (the “Company”) for the period ending
      June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
      hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey J. Lyash, President and Chief Executive
      Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)           the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)           the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/
      Jeffrey J. Lyash


Jeffrey
      J. Lyash


President
      and Chief Executive Officer


August
      8,
      2007








This
      certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company
      for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Exchange Act
      of
      1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
#### 1852.227-85 Invention Reporting and Rights—Foreign.

As prescribed in 1827.303(e)(1), insert the following clause:

# Invention Reporting and Rights—Foreign (APR 2015)

(a) As used in this clause, the term “invention” means any invention, discovery or improvement, and “made” means the conception or first actual demonstration that the invention is useful and operable.

(b) The Contractor shall report promptly to the Contracting Officer each invention made in the performance of work under this contract. The report of each such invention shall:

(1) Identify the inventor(s) by full name; and

(2) Include such full and complete technical information concerning the invention as is necessary to enable an understanding of the nature and operation thereof.

(c) The Contractor hereby grants to the Government of the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration the full right, title and interest in and to each such invention throughout the world, except for the foreign country in which this contract is to be performed. As to such foreign country, Contractor hereby grants to the Government of the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration an irrevocable, nontransferable, nonexclusive, royalty-free license to practice each such invention by or on behalf of the United States of America or any foreign government pursuant to any treaty or agreement with the United States of America, provided that Contractor within a reasonable time files a patent application in that foreign country for each such invention. Where Contractor does not elect to file such patent application for any such invention in that foreign country, full right, title and interest in and to such invention in that foreign country shall reside in the Government of the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(d) The Contractor agrees to execute or to secure the execution of such legal instruments as may be necessary to confirm and to protect the rights granted by paragraph (c) of this clause, including papers incident to the filing and prosecution of patent applications.

(e) Upon completion of the contract work, and prior to final payment, Contractor shall submit to the Contracting Officer a final report listing all inventions required to be reported under this contract or certifying that no such inventions have been made.

(f) In each subcontract, the Contractor awards under this contract where the performance of research, experimental design, engineering, or developmental work is contemplated, the Contractor shall include this clause (suitably modified to substitute the subcontractor in place of the Contractor) and the name and address of the Contracting Officer.

(End of clause)

[80 FR 12951, Mar. 12, 2015, as amended at 80 FR 50212, Aug. 19, 2015]
#### Winn, administrator, *v.*Bridges.

November 14, 1912.

Complaint for land. Before Judge Edwards. Polk superior court. December 15, 1911.

*J. S. James,*for plaintiff.

17. *T. Roberts*and *J. R. Hutcheson,*for defendant.

Lumpkin, J.

The suit in this case having been brought by one alleging himself to be administrator of a decedent, and the defendant claiming by purchase under one of the heirs of such decedent, the evidence did not so clearly demand a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, at least as to the entire interest in the land, as to require the reversal of a first grant of a new trial after the rendition of such a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### In the Matter of David P. Kiddie, Respondent, v James Melton, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of New York, Appellant.

Order unanimously reversed, without costs, and petition dismissed (See *Matter of Giambra v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of State of N. Y.,*59 AD2d 648). Motion to dismiss appeal as moot denied. (Appeal from order of Monroe Supreme Court-art 78.) Present-Moule, J. P., Cardamone, Simons, Dillon and Hancock, Jr., JJ..
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

November 26, 2014

No. 04

- 14

- 00735

- CV

Brian C. SIMCOE

, Appellant

v.

Thomas CHRISTOPHER and Catrina Christopher,

Appellees

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012

- CI

- 15519

Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, this appeal is

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

It is so ORDERED on November 26, 2014.

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the

said court on this 26th day of November, 2014.

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DRL ENTERPRISES, INC., and ) 

REPUBLIC TOBACCO L.P., ) Case No. 12-cv-1385 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) Honorable Ruben Castillo 

GREEN PLANET, INC., ) 

 ) 

Defendant ) 

 

STIPULATED REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

FOR DEFENDANT TO RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT 

Defendant, Green Planet, Inc. by and through their undersigned attorney, note that the 

deadline for Defendant to answer or otherwise plead in response to the Complaint is: 

• Currently set at Friday March 23, 2012; and 

• Extended by agreement of the parties to Friday March 30, 2012. 

Plaintiff, DRL Enterprises and Republic Tobacco, LP, by and through its attorney, Tony 

McShane of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP, has stipulated to this extension and authorized the 

undersigned to make this representation to the Court. 
2 

 Respectfully submitted 

DATED: March 16, 2012 

By: s/Sarah E. Fendrick 

Sarah E. Fendrick (06299754) 

MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & 

BERGHOFF LLP 

300 South Wacker Drive 

Chicago, IL 60606 

Tel: (312) 913-0001 

Fax: (312) 913-0002 

Email: fendrick@mbhb.com 

Attorney for Defendant, Green Planet, Inc. 
3 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on March 16, 2012 I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk 

of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the 

following persons at the given e-mail addresses: 

Antony J. McShane 

Katherine Dennis Nye 

NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP 

Two North LaSalle Street, Suite 1700 

Chicago, Illinois 60602 

Telephone: (312) 269-8000 

Facsimile: (312) 269-1747 

amcshane@ngelaw.com 

knye@ngelaw.com 

 s/Sarah E. Fendrick
Failing

Passing

0

5 10 15 20 Annual D/E Rate (2015)

0 2

University X

The solid line (D/E=8) denotes the pass threshold. The dashed line (6.01) is the weighted average of D/E rates across program

(an approximation of the institution level D/E rate). Note the INSTITUTION D/E is passing, but 31 of 97 PROGRAMS are failing

Data are from DMYR 2015 Final GE rates available at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/school/ge.

An illustration of one way institution level data can be misleading:

Annual D/E Rates for Institution X (97 programs)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1998
<CASH>                                         956,765
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               143,646
<PP&E>                                      28,352,075
<DEPRECIATION>                              12,020,027
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              17,432,459
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          416,331
<BONDS>                                      8,151,572
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,864,556
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                17,432,459
<SALES>                                      3,671,959
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,692,714
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,004,326
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             723,420
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (35,032)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (35,032)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (35,032)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.43)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.43)
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, Respondent-Appellant, v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, Appellant-Respondent.

Order, entered on or about May 6, 1959, modified on the law and on the facts by reducing the total assessment on petitioner’s property to $11,000,000 of which $1,400,000 is for land and $9,600,000 for building; and as thus modified, affirmed, without costs. In the last prior proceeding decided in 1957 by this court relating to the same property (3 A D 2d 830) it was determined that for the years 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 an assessment of $1,345,000 for the land and $9,600,000 for the building, a total of $10,945,000 was justified. In the present proceeding, covering the years immediately following the last period examined and through 1958-1959, the respondent had each year assessed the land at $1,400,000 and the building at $10,100,000, making a total assessment of $11,500,000. The court at Special Term reduced these assessments to $1,345,000 for the land, the same amount affirmed by this court on the last review; and to $9,100,000 for the building, which was $500,000 less than the amount affirmed ¡by this court and $1,000,000 less than the assessment made by the respondent. We are of opinion that the building should be assessed at the same amount affirmed on the last appeal, but that the judgment of the respondent Tax Commission that there has been an increase in the land value since 1952-1953, as reflected in the relatively small increase in the land assessment, should 'be confirmed. Not only is there no credible showing of facts which would rebut this conclusion of the assessor that there has been some increase in land value in the area which would ordinarily he accepted by the court prima facie, but the proof of respondent in support of the assessment more than sustains the land value as assessed. Although both experts were of opinion that the land value was constant through the period in issue, as the respondent itself found, they differed sharply about what the value was. The proof offered by the respondent was that the value of the land through the period here in issue was $1,635,000. Although there is proof that the value of the building has also increased as the basis of the reasonable cost of replacement; the maintenance of fire insurance of $11,400,000; the actual earnings, and the total book values including a reserve for depreciation of $11,467,904, we are of opinion that on balance the value of the building found in the prior proceeding of $9,600,000 should be applied also in these proceedings rather than $10,100,000 fixed by respondent. 'Concur — Rabin, J. P., Bergan and Bastow, JJ.; Stevens and Eager, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm. Settle order on notice.