SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2738-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN LOWNEY, a/k/a

SEAN LOWMEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued telephonically March 10, 2020 –

Decided July 20, 2020

Before Judges Fisher and Accurso.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 17-07-

1541.

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel 

and on the briefs).

Daniel A. Finkelstein, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, 

Attorney General, attorney; Daniel A. Finkelstein, of 

counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in a 

warrantless search, defendant Sean Lowney entered a guilty plea in a 

negotiated agreement to third-degree possession with intent to distribute

heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), and second-degree unlawful possession of a 

handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, and was sentenced to a prison term of five years, 

with a mandatory forty-two month period of parole ineligibility. Defendant 

appeals, raising the following issues:

POINT I

THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE 

BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE CONSENT TO 

SEARCH THE HOTEL ROOM WAS THE FRUIT OF 

AN UNLAWFUL DETENTION WITHOUT 

REASONABLE SUSPICION.

A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the

Police did not Detain Co-Occupant [] Because No 

Reasonable Person Would Feel Free to Terminate the 

Encounter With the Police Under the Circumstances of

This Case.

B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding That

Detective Corcoran had Reasonable and Articulable 

Suspicion to Detain Co-Occupant [] Prior to Asking 

for her Consent to Search the Hotel Room for Victims 

of Human Trafficking.
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POINT II

BECAUSE THE POLICE FAILED TO OBTAIN 

LOWNEY'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE HOTEL 

ROOM EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ON SCENE AND 

SUSPECTED OF WRONGDOING, THE SEARCH 

OF THE HOTEL ROOM WAS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND THE EVIDENCE 

SEIZED SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

POINT III

EVEN IF THE POLICE VALIDLY OBTAINED 

CONSENT FROM CO-OCCUPANT [], THE 

EVIDENCE SEIZED SHOULD HAVE BEEN 

SUPPRESED BECAUSE THE POLICE EXCEEDED 

THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO SEARCH FOR 

VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING.

Detective Sergeant Corcoran, supervisor of the vice unit in the Atlantic 

City Police Department testified at the suppression hearing to the 

circumstances giving rise to defendant's arrest. He explained he was 

dispatched to a local hotel known for its "high incidence" of prostitution, and 

where his department had only recently completed a human trafficking case, 

on a report of an altercation between two women. 

When he arrived, the desk clerk claimed a guest at the hotel, later 

identified as defendant, had threatened to punch her in the face when she tried

to break up the fight between the two women. The clerk provided him with an 
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identification card defendant had deposited with the hotel, which the detective 

immediately recognized as a fake document. As the detective walked toward 

the room where the fight was happening, he saw the two women and 

defendant. He recognized one of the women based on prior arrests for 

prostitution. The other woman, he shortly learned, was with defendant.

As defendant walked toward the detective, the detective directed him to 

stop, and that he needed to speak to him. Defendant stated he didn't need to 

talk to the detective and went by him into the lobby. The detective followed 

and told defendant he needed to detain him until he could figure out what was 

going on. When defendant used profanity and threatened to harm the 

detective, the detective placed defendant in handcuffs and advised him he was 

under arrest.

Defendant and the woman the detective did not know told the officer 

they were married, and the woman produced the same sort of fake I.D. 

defendant had provided the hotel, bearing defendant's last name. Suspicious 

that the woman could be a victim of human trafficking, Detective Corcoran 

testified he determined to separate the two in order to speak to the woman 

alone. 
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While another officer escorted defendant to a squad car, the detective 

spoke to defendant's companion. The detective claimed the woman had been 

agitated, but calmed down once defendant was no longer present. She told the 

detective her name, and that she and defendant were not married. The 

detective testified that heightened his concern because false claims of marriage 

is "a tactic commonly used by pimps." In response to the detective's questions, 

the woman claimed defendant was not her pimp, and, indeed, had taken her 

away from her pimp, which the detective observed was "what pimps typically 

do." 

The woman admitted to having been arrested for prostitution the year 

before but claimed she was no longer involved. When the detective asked how 

she and defendant were paying for the room registered to her, she claimed she 

was working as a stripper. When the detective asked her where she was 

working, the woman couldn't answer.

The detective testified he told the woman he "believed that she could be 

a victim of human trafficking," that he spent every day investigating those 

crimes, and "all the signs were there." The woman denied being a victim. 

When the detective asked whether she would mind if he "took a look in her 

room and made sure whether there was anybody else in there that could 
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possibly be victims," the woman signed a consent to search form. The 

detective testified he handed her the form, read it to her, and explained that she 

could refuse consent or withdraw it at any time. She told the officer he was 

free to look around, and that he "might just find some weed," but that would be 

all. Officers recovered a handgun from under the mattress, a bag of hollowpoint bullets, a couple of bundles of heroin, a digital scale and glassine

baggies.

After hearing the testimony, the judge denied the motion. The judge 

found Detective Corcoran a credible witness, who provided clear answers

without hesitation to all questions, whether posed on direct or crossexamination. The judge rejected defendant's claim that the detective had 

unlawfully detained his companion. The judge found the detective had not 

"seized" his companion within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but was 

merely asking her questions to ascertain whether she was a victim of human 

trafficking. The judge also found that even if the detective had seized 

defendant's companion, that the detective's experience and the circumstances 

gave him reasonable suspicion that she was involved in prostitution, making 

any detention lawful.
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The judge also rejected defendant's claim that his consent was required 

to search the hotel room registered to his companion. Relying on Fernandez v. 

California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014) (holding "an occupant who is absent due 

to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is 

absent for any other reason"), the judge found defendant's lawful arrest 

rendered him absent, making his companion's consent all that was necessary 

for a lawful search of the motel room without a warrant. See United States v. 

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1974) (holding a cohabitant with common 

authority over the premises may consent to its lawful search).

Finally, the judge rejected defendant's claim that even if his companion's 

consent was lawfully obtained, police exceeded the scope of her consent to 

search for victims of human trafficking. The judge found defendant's reliance 

on the detective's statement that he sought permission to "look for human 

trafficking victims" was not reflective of the officer's whole testimony. The 

judge acknowledged the detective's statement relied on by defendant, but noted

throughout the remainder of his testimony the detective credibly explained he 

sought the opportunity "to look for other indicia of human trafficking," such as 

ledgers, I.D.s, a computer or the like. Further, the judge found the consent 

form defendant's companion signed, which gave police express permission to 
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search for and remove letters, documents, papers and other materials, made her 

"fully aware of what's going to be searched for when they go into this room." 

Defendant reprises the same arguments he made to the trial court on this 

appeal. 

Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is limited. State v. 

Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). "Appellate courts reviewing a grant or 

denial of a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the 

trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014). 

"Deference to these factual findings is required because those findings 'are 

substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and 

to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" 

Gamble, 218 N.J. at 424-25 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 

(1964)). Our review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts, of 

course, is plenary. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015). 

Having reviewed the motion transcript and the governing law, defendant 

has given us no cause to disturb the judge's factual findings or legal 

conclusions here. The only issue defendant raises requiring any discussion is 

whether his companion was unlawfully detained, arguably vitiating her 
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voluntary consent to search. His remaining issues are without merit. See R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

Based on the detective's description of his interaction with defendant's 

companion, which the judge determined was credible, he concluded the 

encounter was no more than a field inquiry that is a voluntary conversation 

between a citizen and a police officer. See State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 

247, 252 (App. Div. 2001). As the judge correctly noted, "a field [inquiry] is 

not a Fourth Amendment event 'so long as the officer does not deny the 

individual the right to move.'" State v. Egan, 325 N.J. Super. 402, 409 (Law 

Div. 1999) (quoting State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447 (1973)); see also State 

v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 273-74 (2017). 

Of course, whether a police/citizen encounter is only a field inquiry or 

something more "is always fact-sensitive and similar facts, when mixed and 

matched with other circumstances, will produce varying legal conclusions." 

Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. at 252. Here, only the detective testified, and it

was his version of the encounter that the judge was called to evaluate. The 

officer's demeanor is always relevant to the analysis, and here, the judge 

found, based on the detective's testimony, that his "questions were put in a 

conversational manner," were not "overbearing or harassing," and he "did not 
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make demands or issue orders" to defendant's companion. State v. Rodriguez, 

172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497 n.6 

(1986)). The judge specifically found the woman "had the ability to leave and 

stop the questions." As all of those findings have adequate support in the 

record, they are binding on this appeal, see Lamb, 218 N.J. at 13, and establish 

the encounter as a field inquiry, not an investigative detention, see Rodriguez, 

172 N.J. at 126. 

Because we agree with the trial court that the vice detective did not 

unlawfully detain defendant's companion, we have no cause to question the 

judge's finding that her consent to search the hotel room was voluntary. See

State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 101 (1998) (holding "[a] consent to search that is 

attributable to police misconduct involving the violations of constitutional 

rights may be regarded as the product of that unconstitutional conduct and an 

invalid basis on which to justify a search"). We also agree that as defendant 

does not challenge the legality of his arrest, Fernandez makes plain his 

companion's consent to search their hotel room was sufficient. See Lamb, 218 

N.J. at 320 (noting Fernandez recognized that "an occupant who is absent due 

to a lawful detention or arrest is in the same position as an occupant who is 

absent for any reason"). His claim that the scope of the search exceeded his 
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companion's consent is wholly belied by the terms of the consent form she

signed.

Affirmed.