IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex

rel WILLIAM LYLES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIKE ATCHISON, Warden, Menard

Correctional Center,

Defendant.

Case NO. 12 C 2099

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is William Lyles’ (hereinafter, “Lyles” or

“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is

denied and the Court declines to issue a Writ on any of the issues

raised in the petition. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2004, a Cook County jury found Petitioner guilty

of first degree murder for shooting and killing Bobby Roberts. On

April 5, 2004, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to a twentythree-year term of incarceration on the first degree murder

conviction and a consecutive twenty-five year term of incarceration

enhancement for discharging a firearm that caused the death of

another person pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(d)(iii). Petitioner
is currently serving his forty-eight-year sentence at the Menard

Correctional Center in Menard, Illinois. 

In the instant Petition, Lyles seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus

on the following six grounds: (1) his due process rights were

violated because one of the jurors in his murder trial expressed

uncertainty regarding the guilty verdict, and trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object; (2) appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial

court should have granted petitioner’s motion to quash arrest; (3)

his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers detained

him for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause

hearing, and his confession should have been suppressed on that

basis; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach

officers at the suppression hearing with police reports; (5)

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the prior

two arguments (Claims (3) and (4)) on direct appeal; and (6) his

due process rights were violated by prosecutorial error during the

opening statement and closing argument. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the Court presumes that the

state court’s factual determinations are correct for purposes of

habeas review. The facts relevant to Lyles’ petition follow. On

November 18, 2001, Petitioner shot and killed Bobby Roberts, a

rival gang member, outside a video store at 51st Street and Wood in

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Chicago. The shooting occurred in front of Roberts’ mother,

Luwanda Smith (“Smith”), and two other women. 

During Lyles’ trial, Smith and one of the other women

identified Petitioner as the shooter. The mother of two of

Petitioner’s children, Sheree Murdock (“Murdock”), also testified

and said that Petitioner told her that he killed someone in front

of the video store on November 18, 2001. 

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge

polled the jurors. The following colloquy occurred with juror

Ralph Buford (“Buford”):

“CLERK: Ralph Buford, was it then and is it now your

verdict?

BUFORD: I’m slow about answering because I didn’t

agree. I had to agree because it was ten

against two. That’s the way it was.

COURT: All right. Is this your verdict though?

BUFORD: Yes.” 

After polling the remaining jurors, the trial judge returned

to Buford and had the following colloquy:

“COURT: Just one –- you said that this is your

verdict, is that correct now?

BUFORD: I have no choice.

COURT: All right. But nobody forced you to make that

verdict?

BUFORD: We would be here all night.

COURT: Sir, what I’m asking you, did anybody force

you –- 

BUFORD: No.

COURT: -- to make that verdict?

BUFORD: No.” 

Petitioner’s post-trial motion seeking a new trial was denied. The

state appellate court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal, and the

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Illinois Supreme Court denied his Petition for Leave to Appeal (the

“PLA”). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction

petition, and appointed counsel filed an amended post-conviction

petition. The trial court dismissed the amended post-conviction

petition on January 6, 2010. Petitioner appealed that dismissal,

but his appointed counsel was granted leave to withdraw under

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). The Illinois Supreme

Court denied his post-conviction PLA, and Petitioner filed the

instant habeas petition. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2254 limits the ability of federal courts to grant

habeas relief to state prisoners. In order to present a viable

claim for federal habeas review, Petitioner must establish that he

(1) exhausted all applicable state court remedies and (2) his

claims are not procedurally defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted all available

state court remedies, but argues that Claims 4, 6 and a portion of

Claim 5 were procedurally defaulted.

A federal court is precluded from reaching the merits of a

claim in a § 2254 petition based on procedural default if the claim

“was presented to the state courts and the state court ruling

against the petitioner rests on adequate and independent state-law

procedural grounds,” or the claim “was not presented to the state

courts and it is clear that those courts would now hold the claim

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procedurally barred.” Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th

Cir. 2004) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 & n. 1

(1991). “Thus, when the habeas petitioner has failed to fairly

present to the state courts the claim on which he seeks relief in

federal court and the opportunity to raise that claim in state

court has passed, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted that

claim.” Id. There is a limited equitable exception to a procedural

default if the petitioner can demonstrate that an external

impediment blocked him from asserting his federal claim in the

state court and actual prejudice resulted. Perruquet, 390 F.3d at

514-15.

“Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (the “AEDPA”), a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief when

a decision of the state court is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable

application of’ clearly established federal law as determined by

the United States Supreme Court.” Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828,

2008 WL 4569900 at *2 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)). “A decision is ‘contrary to’ Supreme Court

precedent when it relies on a rule that conflicts with that

precedent or reaches a different result in a similar case.” Burr,

546 F.3d 828, 2008 WL 4569900 at *2. “A state court unreasonably

applies clearly established law if it ‘identifies the correct

governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Burr, 546 F.3d

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828, 2008 WL 4569900 at *2 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 413 (2000)). Error alone is not sufficient. Burr, 546 F.3d

828, 2008 WL 4569900 at *2. The state court’s decision must be

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims 4, 6 and a portion of Claim 5

Respondent argues that Petitioner procedurally defaulted

Claims 4, 6 and a portion of Claim 5. Petitioner raised Claim 6,

that his due process rights were violated by prosecutorial error

during the opening statement and closing argument in his criminal

trial, on direct appeal. However, Petitioner did not raise that

argument in his PLA to the Illinois Supreme Court. Because

Petitioner failed to raise this issue in a full round of appellate

review, it is procedurally defaulted. Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d

374, 383 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 845-46, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999)). 

Further, Petitioner cannot cure this procedural default

because he has not shown good cause for the default, actual

prejudice from the alleged error, or that failure to consider this

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman v. Thomson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Dellinger v. Bowen,

301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Claim 6 is denied.

In Claim 4, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to impeach officers at the suppression

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hearing with police reports. Petitioner further argues in Claim 5

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

this issue on direct appeal. 

Petitioner did not raise either of these issues in his postconviction petition, or in his objection to his post-conviction

appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Petitioner did raise these issues in

his post-conviction PLA, however, as the Court stated above, claims

are procedurally defaulted if they are not raised in a full round

of appellate review. Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir.

2010) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-46, 119

S.Ct. 1728(1999)); White v. Godinez, 192 F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir.

1999) (holding that Boerckel applies with equal force to the state

post-conviction process). Additionally, Petitioner has not shown

good cause for the default, actual prejudice from the alleged

error, or that failure to consider these claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thomson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th

Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Claim 4 and the portion of Claim 5

related to Claim 4 are denied.

B. Claim 1

The Court will address Petitioner’s remaining claims,

Claims 1, 2, 3, and the portion of Claim 5 related to Claim 3, on

the merits. In Claim 1, Petitioner argues that his due process

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rights were violated because juror Buford, when polled, expressed

uncertainty regarding the guilty verdict, rendering the verdict not

unanimous. Petitioner further argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the non-unanimous verdict. 

“[A] state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases,

has no federal right to a unanimous jury verdict[.]” Schad v.

Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.5 (1991) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana,

406 U.S. 356, 359-62 (1972)). Further, “only noncompliance with

federal law renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to

collateral attack in federal courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131

S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). Because Petitioner does not have

a federal Constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, he

cannot show that the state court’s resolution of this claim was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established”

Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner also cannot establish that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the unanimity of the jury

verdict. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that but

for counsel’s deficient performance, there was a reasonable

probability of a different result. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Stallings v. United States, 536 F.3d 624, 627

(7th Cir. 2008). When considering an ineffective assistance of

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counsel claim on habeas review, this Court must not only defer to

counsel’s reasonable choices, but also to the state court’s

evaluation of the issue. Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 625

(7th Cir. 2011). 

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential,” and “a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Knowles v. Mizrayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129

S.Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

“The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it

deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). “For the second element,

[Petitioner] must show that ‘counsel’s errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 434 (7th Cir.

2007)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

When juror Buford expressed uncertainty regarding the guilty

verdict during polling, the trial judge questioned him thoroughly.

There is nothing in the record before this Court that suggests that

an objection from trial counsel regarding that issue would have led

to further questioning. The state appellate court conducted a

fourteen-page analysis of whether the criminal verdict was

unanimous and concluded that the trial judge’s finding of unanimity

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was reasonable. Petitioner cannot establish either deficient

performance or prejudice stemming from trial counsel’s decision not

to object to the verdict. Accordingly, Claim 1 is denied. 

C. Claim 2

In Claim 2, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial

court should have granted his motion to quash the arrest. Claims

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are subject to the

same standard as those challenging trial counsel. See Martin v.

Evans, 384 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2004); Suggs v. United States,

513 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008). Appellate counsel “is not

required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal.” Martin,

384 F.3d at 852. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, Petitioner must show that appellate counsel

“fail[ed] to argue an issue that is both obvious and clearly

stronger than the issues raised.” Id. at 851. Petitioner must also

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s

deficient performance, the result of the appeal would have been

different. Suggs, 513 F.3d 675, 678.

Resolution of the motion to quash arrest was based on a

credibility determination by the trial court. Credibility

determinations are particularly difficult to reverse on appeal.

See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 512 (Ill. 2009)

(“[f]indings of fact and credibility determinations made by the

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circuit court are accorded great deference and will be reversed

only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence”). 

The trial court’s denial of the motion to quash arrest was not

clearly stronger than the other issues raised on direct appeal.

Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable probability

that his direct appeal would have been granted if it included this

issue. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that his

appellate counsel was ineffective and Claim 2 is denied. 

D. Claim 3 and the Remaining Portion of Claim 5

In Claim 3, Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated when officers detained him for more than forty-eight

hours without a probable cause hearing, and his confession should

have been suppressed on that basis. In the remaining portion of

Claim 5, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise Claim 3 on direct appeal. 

“As long as a habeas petitioner enjoyed an ‘opportunity for

full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim’ in state

court, federal habeas review of the claim is barred.” Ben-Yisrayl

v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)). Even though the state court

found that Petitioner was not detained for more than forty-eight

hours without a probable cause hearing, according to the record in

this case, Petitioner had the opportunity to fully and fairly

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litigate the issue. Therefore, habeas review of the issue is

barred under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)).

Further, even if Petitioner had experienced an

unconstitutional delay in receiving a probable cause hearing, the

remedy is not suppression of his confession. See Lawhorn v. Allen,

519 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008) (remedy for unlawful detention

was not suppression of evidence); United States v. Fullerton, 187

F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1999) (remedy for delay in probable cause

determination was Section 1983 claim, not suppression of evidence).

For these reasons, Claim 3 is denied. 

Similar to Claim 2, Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. The

timing and circumstances of Petitioner’s detention were credibility

determinations, and as discussed above, would have been

particularly difficult to reverse on appeal. Further, this issue

was not clearly stronger than the other issues raised on direct

appeal, and Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that his direct appeal would have been granted if it

included this issue. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established

that his appellate counsel was ineffective and the remaining

portion of Claim 5 is denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner

must make a “substantial showing of the denial of [a]

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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically,

Petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether

. . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner

or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Resendez v. Knight, 653 F.3d 445, 446 (7th

Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J. in chambers) (citations omitted). 

The claims raised in the instant petition do not deserve

encouragement to proceed further and would not garner debate

between reasonable jurists as to whether they should have been

resolved differently. Accordingly, Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing that his constitutional rights were denied and

his request for a certificate of appealability is denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is denied and the

Court declines to issue a Writ on any of the issues raised in the

petition. The request for a Certificate of Appealability is also

denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

DATE:1/31/2013

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