Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Charles P. Kocoras Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 11 C 9278 DATE January 4, 2012

CASE

TITLE

D’Andre Howard (#2009-0024976) v. C/O Maselko, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc [3]) is granted. The Court authorizes and orders Cook

County Jail officials to deduct $1.20 from Plaintiff’s account and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance

with this Order. The Clerk shallsend a copy of this Order to the Supervisor of Inmate Trust Fund Accounts, Cook County

Dept. of Corrections Administrative Office, Division V, 2700 S. California, Chicago, IL 60608. Additionally, Defendants

Moreci and Dart are dismissed as Defendants. The Clerk is directed to issue summonses for Defendant Maselko and the

U.S. Marshal is directed to serve him. The Clerk is also directed to send Plaintiff a Magistrate Judge Consent Form and

filing instructions along with a copy of this Order. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc [4]) is denied.

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff D’Andre Howard has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff claims that on October 21, 2011 he was assaulted by other inmates at the Cook County Jail and was

injured. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officer Maselko (“Maselko”) left the control area

for Tier 2E and a fight broke out between other inmates. Maselko watched and did not intervene as Plaintiff was

hit in the head with a dinner tray. When Plaintiff asked Maselko for assistance, Maselko closed a door in

Plaintiff’s face, after shoving him to the ground. Defendant Maselko then watched as other inmates stomped,

kicked, and hit Plaintiff with a “soap sock.” Plaintiff also names Tom Dart and Superintendent Moreci as

Defendants, seemingly in their supervisory capacities.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1),

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $1.20. The supervisor of inmate trust accounts at the Cook

County Jail is authorized and ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from Plaintiff’s trust fund

account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the trust fund

officer at Plaintiff’s place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from Plaintiff’s trust fund

account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. Monthly payments

collected from Plaintiff’s trust fund account shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, attn: Cashier’s

Desk, 20th Floor, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, and shall clearly

identify Plaintiff’s name and the case number assigned to this action. The Cook County inmate trust account

office shall notify transferee authorities of any outstanding balance in the event Plaintiff is transferred from the

jail to another correctional facility. 

(CONTINUED)

AWL

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STATEMENT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt initial review of prisoner complaints

against governmental entities or employees. Here, accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the Court finds 

that the complaint states a colorable cause of action under the Civil Rights Act as to Defendant Maselko for

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005)

(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). While a more fully developed record may belie the

Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant Maselko must respond to the complaint.

However, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against Defendants Dart and Moreci. Section 1983

creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under Section

1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village

of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Section 1983 does not create collective or

vicarious responsibility. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Supervisors cannot be held

liable for the errors of their subordinates. Birch v. Jones, No. 02 C 2094, 2004 WL 2125416, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sep.

22, 2004) (citing Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992)). “Supervisors who are merely negligent in

failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612,

651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). To be held liable under Section 1983, supervisors “must know about the

conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in

other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Id. In short, some causal connection

or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued is necessary for recovery under

Section 1983. Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff makes

his claims against Defendants Dart and Moreci in their supervisory capacity. Plaintiff has alleged no facts

suggesting their direct, personal involvement, as required by J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 793 (7th

Cir. 2003), inter alia. Nor has Plaintiff indicated that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights occurred at

their direction or with their knowledge and consent. Id. The mere fact that Defendants Dart and Moreci hold

supervisorypositions is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine of respondeat superior(blanket supervisory

liability) does not apply to actions filed under Section 1983. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th

Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff has failed to state any facts suggesting that Defendants Dart and Moreci were

personally involved in–or even aware of–the alleged circumstances giving rise to the complaint, he has failed to

state a claim against them.

The Clerk shall issue summons for service of the complaint on Defendant Maselko. The Clerk shall also

send Plaintiff a Magistrate Judge Consent Form and Instructions for Submitting Documents along with a copy of

this Order. 

The United States Marshals Service is appointed to serve Defendant Maselko. Anyservice forms necessary

for Plaintiff to complete will be sent by the Marshal as appropriate to serve Defendant Maselko with process. The

U.S. Marshal is directed to make all reasonable efforts to serve Defendant Maselko. If Defendant Maselko cannot

be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the Cook County Jail shall furnish the Marshal with Defendant

Maselko’s last-known address. The information shall be used onlyfor purposes of effectuating service [or for proof

of service, should a dispute arise] and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal. 

Address information shall not be maintained in the Court file or disclosed by the Marshal. The Marshal is

authorized to mail a request for waiver of service to Defendant Maselko in the manner prescribed by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) before attempting personal service. 

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT

Plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of the

Prisoner Correspondent. Plaintiff must provide the Court with the original plus a complete judge’s copy, including

any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, Plaintiff must send an exact copy of any Court filing to

Defendant Maselko [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of Defendant

Maselko]. Every document filed with the Court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact copies

were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or that otherwise fails to comply

with these instructions may be disregarded by the Court or returned to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has submitted a motion for appointment of counsel. The motion is denied, without prejudice to

later renewal. Civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel. See Johnson v. Doughty,

433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has alleged no disability that might preclude him from pursuing the

case adequately on his own. Neither the legal issues raised in the complaint nor the evidence that might support

Plaintiff’s claims are so complex or intricate that a trained attorney appears to be necessary, at least not at this time. 

The Court also notes that judges give pro se litigants wide latitude in handling their lawsuits. Plaintiff may renew

his request, if he wishes, after Defendant Maselko responds to the complaint.

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