IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

CARLA RANSOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) No. 11 C 7979 

 ) 

LEVY SECURITY CORP., ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Carla Ransom, a forty-four-year-old African-American woman, has sued her 

former employer, Levy Security Corporation, alleging retaliation for complaining about 

discrimination and for filing worker’s compensation claims. Levy has moved for 

summary judgment. In considering the motion, the Court views the record in the light 

most favorable to Ransom and draws reasonable inferences in her favor. See, e.g., 

Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2010). 

 Ransom worked for Levy as a public safety officer starting in 2005. She suffered 

two knee injuries on the job and went on medical leave beginning July 2008. She also 

filed two worker’s compensation claims. Ransom was cleared to return to work in 

January 2009 with certain restrictions. These restrictions remained in place throughout 

the remainder of her employment. 

 After she returned to work, Ransom filed a number of grievances as a result of a 

number of workplace incidents, several of which she contended amounted to 

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discriminatory treatment. In July 2009, Ransom filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming 

discrimination based on race, sex, age, and disability. 

 Ransom contends that in retaliation for her worker’s compensation claim and her 

grievances and EEOC charge, Levy directed her to undergo a fitness-for-duty 

evaluation in September 2009. Ransom says, and a reasonable jury could find, that 

she complied with Levy’s directions and was given a positive fitness evaluation. Levy 

rejected this evaluation and directed another evaluation by a psychologist of its 

choosing. A reasonable jury could find that this was a departure from Levy’s usual 

practice. The psychologist concluded that Ransom was unfit for duty. As a result, Levy 

put Ransom on unpaid FMLA leave pending a third evaluation. 

 Ransom then obtained an evaluation by a psychiatrist, who concluded that she 

was “stable” and did not present a danger to herself or others. Levy rejected this 

conclusion and directed an evaluation by a psychologist whom it had chosen. This 

psychologist found Ransom unfit for duty. On December 22, 2009, Ransom’s FMLA 

leave expired, and Levy terminated her employment. 

Discussion 

A. Federal retaliation claims 

 Ransom alleges that she suffered adverse employment actions when she was 

required to undergo fitness-for-duty examinations; placed on involuntary, unpaid leave; 

and terminated. Levy argues that the first two of these are not actionable. A plaintiff in 

a retaliation case must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action is such that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co. 

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v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Ransom, a jury reasonably could find that a reasonable employee might be dissuaded 

from complaining about discrimination by the threat of being forced into a mental health 

evaluation as well as by what amounts to an extended suspension without pay. See, 

e.g., Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2012) (forced 

unpaid leave of absence constitutes adverse action). 

 Levy also challenges Ransom’s ability to prove a causal connection between her 

complaints and the claimed adverse actions. There is sufficient direct (including 

circumstantial) evidence of retaliation to permit a reasonable jury to find causation. But 

Levy’s summary judgment memorandum contains a virtual admission that it imposed 

the fitness for duty requirement because of Levy’s grievances, at least some of which 

alleged discrimination. Specifically, Levy says that Ransom engaged in “erratic 

behavior [that] included filing numerous grievances and complaints . . ., including two 

sexual harassment claims” and that “[a]s a result of her erratic and threatening 

behavior, [Ransom] was asked to take a fitness for duty evaluation.” Def.’s Mem. at 2. 

This same connection is drawn in the “to whom it may concern” memo that Levy sent to 

Ransom as part of the direction to undergo a fitness examination. In short, Levy itself 

indicates a connection between Ransom’s complaints and the requirement to undergo a 

fitness for duty exam. To be sure, Levy claims this was entirely justified based on 

factors other than legitimate complaints by Ransom about prohibited discrimination, but 

that involves genuinely disputed fact issues that a jury must decide. 

 A reasonable jury could find that the fitness for duty exam requirement led 

inexorably to Ransom’s termination and that this is what Levy intended. In particular, a 

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reasonable jury could find that Levy rigged the exam requirement by changing the rules 

after the fact, to make sure that it came up with a basis to terminate Ransom. More 

specifically, a reasonable jury could find that Ransom’s first evaluator, chosen in the 

manner Levy directed and in accordance with its written policies, deemed her fit for 

duty, but that Levy, in a variation from those same policies, required a second 

evaluation. Levy says this because the first evaluator, Phillips, was not a psychologist 

and did not unequivocally state that Ransom was fit for duty. But Levy’s letter to 

Ransom directing her to undergo a fitness evaluation did not require her to see a 

psychologist but instead required only that she see a “mental health specialist of her 

choice,” which is what Phillips was. And a reasonable jury could conclude that Phillips’ 

statement that Ransom’s “prognosis to return to work appears favorable” meant that 

she was fit for duty and that by requiring a second examination, Levy made it clear that 

it was going to keep trying until it got a finding of unfitness. Levy can explain all of this 

with evidence a reasonable jury might well accept, but on summary judgment, 

inferences are drawn in in Ransom’s favor, and a jury reasonably could find for Ransom 

on her federal retaliation claims. 

B. Workers’ compensation retaliation claim 

 The Court reaches a different conclusion regarding Ransom’s claim that Levy 

terminated her because she filed workers’ compensation claims. To prevail on this 

claim, Ransom must show that: she was employed by Levy before being injured; she 

exercised a right under the IWCA; and her discharge was causally connected to the 

exercise of her right. Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2012). 

 Ransom relies on the same circumstantial evidence for this retaliation claim as 

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she did for her federal retaliation claims. But unlike those claims, there is no direct or 

even circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between Ransom’s filing or 

prosecution of worker’s compensation claims and the adverse action that Levy took 

against her. To be more specific, although there is evidence suggestive of a causal 

connection between Ransom’s complaints about discrimination and the fitness-for-duty 

examination and Levy’s ensuing actions, there is no evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could find such a connection with her earlier filing of worker’s compensation claims. 

And assuming, for purposes of discussion, that the indirect, burden-shifting approach 

applies to a common law retaliation claim, Ransom has offered no evidence of any 

other employees who did not file worker’s compensation claims, were otherwise 

similarly situated to Ransom, but were treated better. Levy is entitled to summary 

judgment on this claim. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Levy’s motion for summary judgment 

[docket no. 26] as to count 4 of plaintiff’s complaint but denies the motion as to counts 

1, 2, and 3. A status hearing is set for June 25, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of 

setting a trial date and discussing the possibility of settlement. 

 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: June 17, 2013 

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