In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3406

Donald R. Wild and Diana H. Wild,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Subscription Plus, Inc., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 00 C 67--Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

Argued April 18, 2002--Decided May 31, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Harlington

Wood, Jr., and Posner, Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. This is a

personal injury suit brought by the

parents of a young man killed in an

accident in Wisconsin. Federal

jurisdiction is based on diversity of

citizenship. The suit was filed

originally in a federal district court in

Louisiana, but the judge there

transferred the case to a federal

district court in Wisconsin, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. sec. 1406(a), because he

determined that Louisiana was not a

proper venue for suing all--or in fact

any--of the defendants. The district

judge in Wisconsin denied the plaintiffs’

motion to retransfer the case to

Louisiana and later granted motions to

dismiss or for summary judgment filed by

several of the defendants. The other

defendants having settled, the district

court entered a final judgment

terminating the litigation and sparking

this appeal. The principal though not

only issue is the lawfulness of the

transfer from Louisiana to Wisconsin; if

as the plaintiffs contend it was

unlawful, the motion to retransfer should

have been granted.

 We note initially a serious deficiency

in the jurisdictional statement in the

plaintiffs’ brief that went unnoticed in

the four briefs filed by defendants. With
regard to the insurance-company

defendants, the allegation of citizenship

takes the following form: "Progressive

Northern Insurance Company, a citizen of

the State of Wisconsin, with its

principal place of business in the State

of Ohio." (The allegations regarding the

other insurance companies are identical

except for name and states.) The

diversity statute states that a

corporation is a citizen of both the

state in which it is incorporated and the

state in which its principal place of

business is located. 28 U.S.C. sec.

1332(c)(1). If a firm is not a

corporation, its citizenship is

determined by the citizenship of its

proprietor, partners, members, or other

principals. Carden v. Arkoma Associates,

494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990); Cosgrove v.

Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.

1998); Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,

141 F.3d 314, 316 (7th Cir. 1998);

Herrick Co. v. SCS Communications, Inc.,

251 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2001);

Schiavone Construction Co. v. City of New

York, 99 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1996).

The plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statement

does not allege that Progressive

Insurance Company or any of the other

insurance-company defendants is a

corporation--though inquiry of counsel

revealed that they are and that the

requirement of complete diversity of

citizenship is satisfied, with two

possible exceptions:

 The corporate charter of one of the

defendants had been revoked before this

suit was brought; and though the charter

was later restored, jurisdiction is

normally determined as of the date of the

filing of the suit. The only case we can

find on the precise question, and it

happens to be a decision by this court,

allows retroactive reinstatement to

confer jurisdiction, Costain Coal

Holdings, Inc. v. Resource Investment

Corp., 15 F.3d 733, 734 and n. 3 (7th

Cir. 1994), contrary to (and without

discussing) the general principle (an

exception is discussed below) that

jurisdiction is determined as of the date

of the suit; and on that date, before

reinstatement, the corporation had no

corporate charter.

 An approach consistent with the general

principle, but which leads to the same

result in this case as the approach in
Costain would, makes the question of what

state a corporation is a citizen of if

its corporate charter has been revoked

depend on the status of such an entity

under the law of the state that granted

(and later revoked) the charter. Most

states sensibly permit a corporation

whose charter has been revoked to

continue nevertheless to operate as

acorporation, specifically for purposes

of suing and being sued, until it is

actually dissolved. See, e.g., Paper

Systems Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 193

F.R.D. 601, 607-08 (E.D. Wis. 2000);

Clipper Air Cargo, Inc. v. Aviation

Products Int’l, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 956,

958-59 and n. 3 (D.S.C. 1997); Illinois

Central Gulf R.R. v. Arbox Three Corp.,

700 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (N.D. Ill.

1988). Oklahoma, the state of

incorporation of the defendant in

question (Subscription Plus), is one of

those states. 18 Okla. Stat. sec. 1099;

Polk v. Unknown Trustees, Successors &

Assigns of Three-In-One Oil & Gas Co.,

298 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Okla. 1956) (per

curiam). And, for icing on the cake,

Oklahoma also has a statute making

reinstatement of a corporation’s charter

retroactive. 18 Okla. Stat. sec. 1120(E).

We conclude that the revocation of

Subscription Plus’s corporate charter did

not affect its status for diversity

purposes.

 The complaint describes another

defendant, Mutual Fire and Automobile

Insurance Company, as a "foreign insurer

authorized to conduct business in

Louisiana"--which says nothing about

where its principal place of business is

(or its state of incorporation, but we

have learned that it is Ohio, an answer

that does not destroy complete

diversity). In the plaintiffs’ brief on

appeal, Mutual is described as "a citizen

of a state other than Louisiana, with its

principal place [of business?] in a State

other than Louisiana." But how can the

plaintiffs know that the company’s

principal place of business is not in

Louisiana if they don’t know where its

principal place of business is? We doubt

that the plaintiffs conducted a census of

all businesses whose principal place of

business is in Louisiana and discovered

that Mutual Fire and Automobile Insurance

Company is not one of them. No matter.

The company was later dropped as a party,

and under Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989), a want

of complete diversity can be cured by

dropping the party that made diversity

incomplete.

 With subject-matter jurisdiction secure,

we turn to the transfer issue and the

merits, first sketching in the factual

background.

 Subscription Plus, owned and operated by

a woman named Karleen Hillery, is engaged

in the business of processing magazine

subscriptions. It contracted with

Y.E.S.!, a sales agency, to secure

magazine subscriptions for Subscription

Plus. The Wilds’ son Joseph was a

salesman employed by Y.E.S.! The Wilds

live in Louisiana, and Joseph Wild was

hired there.

 The salesmen would travel in groups in

vans to various states to sell

subscriptions. Y.E.S.!’s owner, Lane,

bought a green van and employed a man

named Holmes to drive it. (The color

turns out to be relevant, as we’ll see

later but can ignore for now.) While

driving the sales crew in Wisconsin after

a day of door-to-door subscription

selling, Holmes, noticing that he was

being pursued by a police car and not

having a valid driver’s license, tried to

switch seats with one of the passengers,

lost control, and crashed the van. Seven

members of the sales crew, including

young Wild, were killed and the others

injured. Suits were brought on behalf of

all the victims except Wild in a

Wisconsin state court, where the suits

were consolidated and are pending.

Besides suing Hillery, Lane, Holmes,

Subscription Plus, Y.E.S.! and the

dealership that sold the van, the Wilds

sued the liability insurers of these

defendants; it could do this because

Louisiana, like Wisconsin, is a directaction state, meaning that a tort

plaintiff can sue his injurer’s liability

insurer as well as the injurer.

 Section 1406(a) of the Judicial Code

provides that if a suit is brought in a

district that is not a proper venue under

28 U.S.C. sec. 1391, the judge can

transfer it to any district "in which it

could have been brought." The district

judge in Louisiana found that venue in

this diversity suit was not properly laid

in Louisiana because none of the
defendants resided there or could be

served there (or elsewhere under

Louisiana’s long-arm statute) and "a

substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim" had

not taken place there either. 28 U.S.C.

sec. 1391(a)(2). There is no serious

contention that the judge erred in this

ruling or that the Western District of

Wisconsin is not a district in which

venue can be laid, at least with regard

to most of the defendants (and possibly

all, as we’re about to see). The accident

occurred there, and it is clearly the

most convenient site for the litigation.

All the other suits growing out of the

accident have been consolidated there,

and while there is no procedure for

consolidating those suits with the Wilds’

suit because those suits are in state

court and the Wilds’ suit is in federal

court, at least the defendants--who are

the same in all the suits, including the

Wilds’ suit--can localize their defense

efforts to one state, minimizing travel

time for their lawyers.

 The only basis for the motion to

retransfer the case was that the district

judge had ruled that Hillery could not be

served under Wisconsin’s long-arm

statute, thus forcing the Wilds, unless

the case was retransferred, to split

their suit between Wisconsin (all the

defendants except Hillery) and Louisiana

(Hillery). After the judge ruled, the

Wilds did bring a suit against Hillery in

Louisiana, but it was promptly

transferred to Wisconsin (and is pending

before the same district judge), because

in the interim a Wisconsin state court

ruling in one of the cases arising from

the accident interpreted Wisconsin’s

long-arm statute in a way that makes

clear that Hillery is within the

statute’s reach after all. Forgues v.

Heart of Texas Dodge, Inc., No. 99CV0952,

slip op. at 2 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5,

2001). Although an unpublished opinion of

a trial court, and so hardly an

authoritative guide to the law of

Wisconsin, the parties do not question

its soundness.

 It is very difficult in these unusual

circumstances to get excited about the

prospect of bouncing this three-year-old

case back to Louisiana, but cf. Shutte v.

Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d

Cir. 1970), even apart from the fact
that, since venue cannot be laid in

Louisiana, the case would have to be

dismissed or transferred elsewhere.

Supposing the district judge had gotten

Wisconsin law right when she ruled on

Hillery’s motion to dismiss for want of

personal jurisdiction (that is, supposing

she had anticipated the decision in

Forgues), Hillery would be a party to the

present case and the claim against her,

which is indistinguishable from that

against her company, Subscription Plus,

would have gone down the drain with that

claim. As it is, the claim against her

remains alive in the district court--if

barely, since the defendants have moved

to dismiss it as barred by res judicata.

Still, the plaintiffs are no worse off,

or, in any practical sense, differently

situated, than if the district judge had

not mistakenly dismissed Hillery, thus

raising the retransfer issue.

 But in any event we do not agree with

the plaintiffs that a transfer under

section 1406(a) (or the closely parallel

section 1404(a), which, under the same

conditions as section 1406(a), see Van

Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 and

n. 13 (1964); Ellis v. Great Southwestern

Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1104 n. 5 (5th Cir.

1981), permits transfers for the

convenience of the parties even if venue

is proper in the district in which the

suit was originally filed) is invalid

just because one defendant in a

multidefendant case (there were 13

defendants before Hillery was dismissed)

cannot be served either directly or under

a long-arm statute in the transferee

district. Were there only one defendant

and he or she could not be served there,

it would be plain that the suit "could

not be brought" there and so transfer

would be improper. Van Dusen v. Barrack,

supra, 376 U.S. at 621; Ellis v. Great

Southwestern Corp., supra, 646 F.2d at

1107; 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal

Practice & Procedure sec. 3827, pp. 274-

75 and n. 30 (2d ed. 1986). For consider

the implications: A sues B in a district

in which venue is improper, meaning

(among other things) that B does not

reside and cannot be served there, and

the court transfers the case to another

district in which B does not reside (in

which event B could be served) and cannot

otherwise be served; it would be absurd

to permit such a transfer. The suit
should instead be dismissed and A forced

to sue B somewhere B can be served.

 A multidefendant case, this

multidefendant case in any case, is

different. The 13 defendants are

scattered all over the United States.

There is (or so the district judge

believed when she denied the retransfer

back to Louisiana) no federal district in

which all could be served. If the case

could not have been transferred from

Louisiana to Wisconsin, it could not have

been transferred anywhere, which means it

would have had to be dismissed in its

entirety because Louisiana was not a

proper venue for any of the defendants,

and the Wilds forced to sue maybe in 13

different districts or states. This

result would be contrary to the purpose

of section 1406(a), which introduced

transfer as an alternative to dismissal.

As the Supreme Court explained in

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463,

466 (1962), "the problem which gave rise

to the enactment of the section was that

of avoiding the injustice which had often

resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of

their actions merely because they had

made an erroneous guess with regard to

the existence of some elusive fact of the

kind upon which venue provisions often

turn. Indeed, this case is itself a

typical example of the problem sought to

be avoided, for dismissal here would have

resulted in plaintiff’s losing a

substantial part of its cause of action

under the statute of limitations . . . .

The language and history of sec. 1406(a)

. . . show a congressional purpose to

provide as effective a remedy as possible

to avoid precisely this sort of

injustice." That is the result for which

the Wilds (paradoxically and

opportunistically, since they are the

plaintiffs) contend.

 It is a bad result, not contemplated by

Congress; and we conclude that there is

no absolute bar to the transfer of a

multidefendant suit to a district in

which one of the defendants cannot be

served. But that leaves the question

whether a defendant in a multidefendant

suit who cannot be served can be forced

to defend in the transferee district or,

as most cases hold, must be severed from

the rest of the suit and the suit against

him either dismissed or (better, to avoid

the running of the statute of
limitations) transferred back to the

district in which the suit was first

filed or to a district in which service

upon him is possible. Liaw Su Teng v.

Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140,

1148 (5th Cir. 1984); Sharp Electronics

Corp. v. Hayman Cash Register Co., 655

F.2d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per

curiam); Relf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804,

807-08 and n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Shutte

v. Armco Steel Corp., supra, 431 F.2d at

24; 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra,

sec. 3845, pp. 351-53 (2d ed. 1986 & 2002

Supp.). The argument for the latter

course, nowhere made in the notably

sparse discussions in the cases, is that

the transfer statutes do not purport to

alter the rules governing personal

jurisdiction; and of course the outer

bounds of those rules are set by the

Constitution. At all events, by

dismissing Hillery from the suit, the

district judge did what the case law

permits.

 We move on to the merits, where we can

be brief. The nonsettling defendants are

Subscription Plus, the dealership that

sold the van to Lane, and several of the

insurance companies. Since Y.E.S.! was an

independent contractor of Subscription

Plus, the Wilds could not impute the neg

ligence (or worse) of Holmes, Y.E.S.!’s

employee, to Subscription Plus. Wagner v.

Continental Casualty Co., 421 N.W.2d 835,

844 (Wis. 1988); Snider v. Northern

States Power Co., 260 N.W.2d 260, 261

(Wis. 1977); Giffin v. Poetzl, 634 N.W.2d

901, 905 (Wis. App. 2001); Sullivan v.

Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir.

1991). There are a number of exceptions

to the rule that a principal is not

liable for the torts of his independent

contractors, but, as explained at length

by the district judge, none of them is

applicable to this case. And anyway if

Holmes had been an employee of

Subscription Plus, he would be subject to

Wisconsin’s workers’ compensation law,

which preempts tort claims by employees

against their employers.

 The claim against the dealership is

completely frivolous. Lane when he bought

the van showed the dealer a valid

driver’s license and proof of insurance.

The dealer had no reason to think Lane

would entrust the van to a person who did

not have a valid driver’s license and was

reckless; and so no negligence can be
attributed to the dealer. Bankert by

Habush v. Threshermen’s Mutual Ins. Co.,

329 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Wis. 1983);

Halverson by Boles v. Halverson, 541

N.W.2d 150, 153 (Wis. App. 1995); Joyce

v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir.

1992).

 That leaves only the insurance

companies. Two of them, Acceptance and

Scottsdale, were the liability insurers

of Subscription Plus and of Hillery,

respectively. Wisconsin permits a direct

action regardless of whether the insured

is a party, but only if the insurance

policy was issued or delivered in

Wisconsin, Kenison v. Wellington Ins.

Co., 582 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Wis. App. 1998);

Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc.,

165 F.3d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1999)

(Wisconsin law), which neither of these

policies was. Otherwise the direct action

can be maintained only if and so long as

the insureds remain parties. See Wis.

Stat. sec.sec. 631.01(1), 632.24; Kenison

v. Wellington Ins. Co., supra, 582 N.W.2d

at 73. Both Subscription Plus and Hillery

were properly dismissed, and out with

them went their two insurers.

 Progressive was Lane’s insurer; Lane,

remember, owned the van that crashed as

well as owning and controlling Y.E.S.!,

which operated the van. But here is where

color becomes significant. The van was

green; but the policy was written to

cover a white van that had been purchased

earlier but was out of service. The green

van was bought in January 1999; the

policy on the white van became effective

on March 5; and the accident occurred on

March 25. The policy provides coverage

for replacement vehicles but only "for a

period of not greater than 30 days

without notification to us." The purpose

is to enable the policy holder to obtain

coverage without having to buy a separate

policy while enabling the insurance

company to adjust the premium

retroactively to reflect any greater risk

created by the substitution. Lewis v.

Bradley, 97 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Wis. 1959);

Rabatie v. U.S. Security Ins. Co., 581

So. 2d 1327, 1329-30 (Fla. App. 1989) (en

banc) (per curiam). The plaintiffs argue

that the 30 days did not begin to run

until March 5, even though the

replacement vehicle had been in service

for more than a month before then. We

think that either the green van was never
covered, either because it was acquired

before the policy took effect, see United

Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Elder, 427

N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. 1981); Patrick v.

Thines, 590 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ohio App.

1990); cf. Offerdahl v. Glasser, 93

N.W.2d 362, 363 (Wis. 1959), or because

it was in service for more than 30 days

without notification to the company; or

that, at the very least, notification was

due at the time the policy took effect.

An insurance company does not want to

insure indefinitely a vehicle of which it

has no knowledge whatever.

 The deficiency in the parties’

jurisdictional statements is inexcusable,

just as in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Eastern

Atlantic Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 742, 747-48

(7th Cir. 2001), where we reprimanded the

lawyers for both sides. As in that case,

so in this one, the lawyers disregarded

an utterly clear jurisdictional

provision, here regarding the citizenship

of corporations, and are hereby

reprimanded.

Affirmed.