[Cite as State v. Rodgers, 2020-Ohio-4173.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 CASE NO. 5-20-04 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

WILLIAM E. RODGERS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2019 CR 71 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: August 24, 2020 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Brian A. Smith for Appellant 

Steven M. Powell for Appellee 

 
Case No. 5-20-04 

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WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant William E. Rodgers (“Rodgers”) appeals the 

judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that his sentence 

is not supported by the record. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On September 6, 2018, Rodgers sold 0.39 grams of cocaine to a 

confidential informant who was working with the Hancock County METRICH 

Drug Task Force. PSI. On February 12, 2019, Rodgers was indicted on two counts 

of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A). Doc. 1. On September 

27, 2019, Rodgers pled guilty to one count of trafficking in cocaine, which was a 

felony of the fifth degree. Doc. 29, 31. The second count of trafficking in cocaine 

against Rodgers was dismissed. Doc. 32. At the change of plea hearing, the trial 

court ordered that a presentence investigation (“PSI”) be prepared. Change of Plea 

Tr. 30. 

{¶3} On December 19, 2019, Rodgers appeared before the trial court for 

sentencing. Tr. 1. At this hearing, the trial court considered the PSI. Tr. 3, 11-12, 

17-19. The trial court then ordered Rodgers to serve an eleven-month prison 

sentence. Tr. 21. The maximum prison sentence for this offense was twelve 
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months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). On December 30, 2019, the trial court issued the 

judgment entry of sentencing. Doc. 33. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶4} The appellant filed his notice of appeal on January 28, 2020. Doc. 41. 

On appeal, Rodgers raises the following assignment of error: 

Because the record, as shown by clear and convincing evidence, 

does not support the trial court’s findings, pursuant to R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2), the trial court’s sentence of Appellant was not 

supported by the record. 

Rodgers argues that the trial court did not properly weigh the principles and 

purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 or the seriousness and recidivism 

factors in R.C. 2929.12. 

Legal Standard 

{¶5} In rendering a sentence, “[t]he trial court has full discretion to impose 

any sentence within the authorized statutory range * * *.” State v. Dayton, 3d Dist. 

Union No. 14-16-05, 2016-Ohio-7178, ¶ 15, quoting, State v. King, 2d Dist. Clark 

Nos. 2012-CA-25, 2012-CA-26, 2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45. However, in this process, 

trial courts are to sentence convicted felons in accordance with the overriding 

purposes of felony sentencing, which 

are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and

others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions 

that the court determines accomplish those purposes without 

imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources. * * * 
Case No. 5-20-04 

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R.C. 2929.11. “To effectuate compliance with these overriding purposes, the Ohio 

Revised Code requires the trial court to consider a number of factors listed in R.C. 

2929.12.” State v. Walton, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-55, 2018-Ohio-1680, ¶ 6. The 

R.C. 2929.12 factors direct the trial court to evaluate the seriousness of the offense 

and the likelihood of recidivism. R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶6} “Appellate courts defer to the broad discretion of the trial court in 

matters of sentencing.” State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-19-08, 2019-Ohio4938, ¶ 7.1

 If the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that his or 

her sentence is “(1) contrary to law and/or (2) unsupported by the record,” an 

appellate court has the authority, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “to increase, 

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * *.” State v. McGowan, 147 Ohio St.3d 

166, 2016-Ohio-2971, 62 N.E.3d 178, ¶ 1. 

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof 

which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but 

not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts 

sought to be established. 

State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86 (3d Dist.), ¶ 12, quoting Cross v. 

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954). 

 

 

1

 Trial courts are given discretion in applying the statutory factors in the process of determining an appropriate 

sentence. A misapplication of these factors in sentencing that rises to the level of an abuse of discretion is 

clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Thus, we examine the record to determine whether the trial court 

clearly and convincingly failed to act in accordance with the laws governing the imposition of sentences. 
Case No. 5-20-04 

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Legal Analysis 

{¶7} In this case, the trial court ordered Rodgers to serve a prison sentence 

of eleven months after considering the contents of the PSI. Tr. 11-12. We begin 

our analysis by noting that this prison term falls within the statutory range for a fifthdegree felony. R.C. 2929.14. As to the seriousness factors, the trial court 

considered the factors that are expressly listed in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(C). Tr. 14. The 

trial judge then concluded that, “[b]ased on a consideration of the factors in the 

statu[t]e, I don’t know that I really find anything either way that makes [this offense] 

better or worse than the others * * *.” Tr. 14. However, R.C. 2929.12(B) does not 

limit a trial court’s consideration of the seriousness of an offense to the factors 

expressly listed in the statute. R.C. 2929.12(B). 

{¶8} Rather, R.C. 2929.12(B) directs a trial court to consider “any other 

relevant factors” that “indicat[e] that the offender’s conduct is more serious than 

conduct normally constituting the offense.” R.C. 2929.12(B). In this case, the trial 

court did consider a factor that was not listed in the statute as evidence that the 

offense Rodgers committed was “more serious than [the] conduct normally 

constituting the offense.” R.C. 2929.12(B). The trial court found the fact that 

Rodgers sold but did not use cocaine to be significant. Tr. 17. The trial judge stated 

the following: 

The other part that is of concern regarding substance use history 

is that the offense for which you entered a plea of guilty was 
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trafficking in cocaine. You indicate that you’ve never been a user 

of cocaine, you were only selling it. 

Okay. I think that makes it worse because I understand that it’s 

not uncommon for users to sell. They sell to other users, they fund 

their own habits that way. You’re selling to make money, which

makes you a drug dealer. That’s a problem. 

Tr. 17. The PSI also concluded that none of the R.C. 2929.12(C) factors that 

indicate the offender’s conduct was less serious were applicable in this case. PSI. 

{¶9} As to the recidivism factors, the trial court noted that the PSI indicated 

that Rodgers had “an extensive juvenile record” and “an extensive adult record.” 

Tr. 14. While Rodgers did not previously have any felony convictions, the trial 

court noted that he had previously had several felony charges that resulted in 

convictions for misdemeanor offenses. Tr. 15. The PSI concluded that the previous 

sanctions that Rodgers had received for his criminal behavior had not resulted in his 

rehabilitation as he “continues to engage in criminal behavior.” PSI. Based on the 

PSI, the trial judge stated that he “d[i]dn’t find any factors outlined in the PSI that 

would indicate recidivism is less likely.” Tr. 15. 

{¶10} The trial court also noted that Rodgers had failed to comply with the 

terms of his bond. Tr. 15. The PSI indicated that there were ten instances in which 

Rodgers “failed to call in on the date that [he was] supposed to * * *.” Tr. 16. 

Further, the PSI also indicated that Rodgers reported that he had not used marijuana 

since 2012. Tr. 16. However, he tested positive for marijuana three weeks before 
Case No. 5-20-04 

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the scheduled sentencing hearing. Tr. 16. The PSI also indicated that Rodgers did 

not have any mental health issues or history of substance abuse. Tr. 19, 20. 

{¶11} The trial court found that these facts “complicated” the prospect of 

placing Rodgers on community control instead of placing him in prison. Tr. 18. 

The trial judge concluded his analysis by stating the following: 

I am, however, Mr. Rodgers, going to find, based upon the 

information contained within the presentence investigation, 

again, lengthy adult and juvenile criminal history, failure to 

comply while on bond, again, no diagnosed or reported mental 

health or substance abuse history, I’m going to find that you are 

not amenable to community control, that the imposition of a 

prison sentence is consistent with the principles and purposes of 

sentencing. 

Tr. 20-21. 

{¶12} In the end, it is evident that the trial court considered the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11. The trial court also considered the 

seriousness and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 before ordering a prison 

term that was within the statutory range. Tr. 12-13, 20-21. See R.C. 2929.14(A). 

After reviewing the relevant materials, we conclude that Rodgers’s sentence is 

supported by the facts in the record. Because he did not carry the burden of 

demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that his sentence was not 

supported by the record, Rodgers’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

 
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Conclusion 

{¶13} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas 

is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

PRESTON and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur. 

/hls