Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

CHARLES P. KOCORAS Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 1994 DATE April 2, 2012

CASE

TITLE

United States ex rel. Craig Armstrong (#00125673) vs. Alan Angus, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc [3]) is granted. However, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is summarily dismissed on preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) and 2243 as well

as in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The case is terminated. Dismissal is without prejudice

to seeking federal habeas review in the event that the petitioner is ultimately convicted. The petitioner’s motion

for appointment of counsel (Doc [4]) is denied as moot.

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Craig Armstrong, a detainee at the DuPage County Jail, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, presumably pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petitioner challenges a pending prosecution, arguing that:

(1) he has been denied a speedy trial; (2) he is being subjected to double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court erred

in allowing prosecutors to re-indict him rather than dismissing the charges altogether based on a defective

indictment. 

Petitioner filed a motion to pursue his habeas petition in forma pauperis and a motion for appointment

of counsel. Having shown that he is indigent, the petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted. However, the habeas petition is summarily dismissed on preliminary review for failure to exhaust state

court remedies prior to filing suit, as well as pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. 

Although federal district courts have jurisdiction over pretrial habeas petitions, they grant such relief

sparingly. Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979); Thomas v. Cook County Corrections, No. 10

C 4484, 2010 WL2990178, *2 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 22, 2010) (Bucklo, J.). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie, absent 

‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a

judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489

(1973) (citation omitted); Thomas, 2010 WL 2990178, at *2 . Furthermore, while applicants for habeas relief

under Section 2241 are not subject to the statutory requirement of exhaustion of remedies, “federal courts

(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)

nevertheless may require, as a matter of comity, that such detainees exhaust all avenues of state relief before seeking

the writ.” United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine requires a

petitioner to use available state procedures to pursue his or her claim before seeking federal habeas corpus relief,

“therebygiving the State the opportunityto pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’federal rights.” 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2005) (citations omitted). 

To provide the State with the necessary “ opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his or her claim

at each level of review in the state court system (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary

review) so that the state courts are alerted to the federal nature of the claim. Id. In most cases, courts will not

consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceedings. Here, the petitioner admits that he

has not exhausted state court remedies. As the petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies, his federal habeas

petition is not ripe for review.

Furthermore, irrespective of exhaustion concerns, federal courts are largely prohibited from interfering in

pending state criminal proceedings in deference to principles of equity, comity, and federalism. See Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Village of Depue, Illinois v. Exxcon

Mobile Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2008). In determining whetherto apply abstention principles sua sponte,

a court considers three factors: (1) whether judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) whether the judicial proceedings

implicate important state interests; and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding

to raise constitutional challenges. Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 1996). This case appears

to meet the criteria for Younger abstention, as petitioner’s case is still pending in state court and he therefore has

an adequate opportunity in the those proceedings to raise his constitutional challenges. Additionally, the Court

is not satisfied that any “extraordinary” circumstances, such as official bad faith or harassment involved in the

enforcement of state laws, exist so as to justify an exception to the abstention rule. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 4;

Arkebauer v. Kiley, 985 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1993); Lamar Whiteco Outdoor Corp. v. City of West Chi., No.

00 C 1994, 2001 WL 476596, *1 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2001) (Grady, J.). Under the facts of this case, the Court

discerns no basis for intervening in petitioner’s ongoing state criminal proceedings. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is summarily dismissed on preliminary

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) and 2243. The petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies, and the

Court further finds that the petition must be dismissed pursuant to Younger. The case is terminated. Dismissal is

without prejudice to seeking federal habeas review in the event that the petitioner is convicted (and has exhausted

available state court remedies). 

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