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41–206 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–452

NOMINATION OF DR. DONALD M. KERR

TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 1, 2007

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

(II)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BILL NELSON, Florida

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island

JOHN WARNER, Virginia

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk

(III)

CONTENTS

August 1, 2007

Page

Hearing held in Washington, DC, August 1, 2007

Statement of:

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri 1

Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from Maryland .............................. 20

Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from New Mexico ............................... 2

Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ........................................ 4

Kerr, Dr. Donald M., Nominee for the position of Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence ......................................................................... 6

Supplemental Material:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for completion

by Presidential Nominees ............................................................................. 28

Pre-Hearing Questions for Donald M. Kerr ................................................... 54

Glynn, Marilyn L.; General Counsel, Office of Government Ethics Leter

to The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV .................................................. 96

Financial Disclosure Report of Donald M. Kerr ............................................. 101

Letter to Robert Cusick, Director, Office of Government Ethics from Corin

R. Stone, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of the Director

of National Intelligence ................................................................................ 97

Letter to Corin R. Stone, Designated Agency Ethnics Official, Office of

the Director of National Intelligence from Donald M. Kerr ...................... 100

(1)

NOMINATION OF DR. DONALD M. KERR TO BE

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

AUGUST 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Christopher

Bond (Vice Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Bond, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida,

Whitehouse, Chambliss, Snowe, and Warner.

Also present: Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Vice Chairman BOND. This hearing will come to order. Chairman

Rockefeller regrettably is unable to be here today due to an unavoidable conflict and he has asked me to preside over the hearing,

pursuant to the Committee rules and practice.

I ask unanimous consent that any opening statements that Members may have or that the witness may have may be included in

the record in full. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.

Dr. Kerr, I welcome you today for the Committee’s hearing on

your nomination to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I appreciate having an opportunity to meet your

wife Alison and welcome her and other family members.

As we know, in May 2006, General Hayden resigned this position

to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and since

then, in spite of the importance of this Principal Deputy position

for the IC, there had not been an urgency to fill this vacancy permanently. Earlier this year the Committee held a hearing on the

nomination of Admiral Mike McConnell to be DNI. At that time we

asked if he would make finding a new Principal Deputy a priority.

We were assured it would be, and Director McConnell has been

good to his word. I’m pleased we’re finally able to consider Dr. Kerr

to fill this key post.

While a lot of focus is necessarily placed on the DNI, the role of

Principal Deputy is no less essential to the success of the intelligence community and to its continued transformation. I expect

that, should Dr. Kerr be confirmed by the Senate, his background

in technology and science can be extremely useful.

2

He comes before the Committee having spent most of his professional career in Government service. He has served in various positions at Los Alamos National Laboratory and at the Department of

Energy. More recently, he was Assistant Director of the Laboratory

Division at the FBI, and then the Deputy Director for Science and

Technology at the CIA. For the past 2 years, he has served as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, which unfortunately

is one of the more troubled and poorly performing agencies within

the intelligence community. In addition to his Government service,

Dr. Kerr has held several executive management positions in the

private sector.

These experiences collectively and separately give Dr. Kerr a

unique perspective in assessing the technology and science challenges lying ahead for the intel community.

I would say that one of the most important things he can do is

use the best science and technology to engineer an effective structure in the intelligence community. We gave a massive charge to

the DNI and did not give him the tools to accomplish that task. So

we look to the new Principal Deputy and the Director to give us

a road map for next year on how we can assure that the community operates as we expected but regrettably did not give it the

tools to do.

There are going to be some questions about programmatic decisions Dr. Kerr made as a Director of the NRO, some we consider

missteps at the NRO prior to his tenure. That testimony will have

to be taken in closed session. But I must say in open forum that

there had been a disturbing lack of accountability at the NRO for

actions that have resulted in the loss to the taxpayers of, inappropriately enough, an astronomical amount of dollars. The Committee

and the full Senate will have to understand the reasons for this

lack of accountability, and we look forward to pursuing this in

closed session.

Before concluding, I add a very special word of thanks for Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, who has filled in as the Acting

Principal Deputy for much of the past year. We are grateful for his

service and applaud his continued dedication to the intelligence

community.

With that, we are pleased to be joined by two distinguished

Members of the Senate who are at the table with Dr. Kerr, I assume for the purposes of commenting about Dr. Kerr. And I start

over here with a Member of the Committee, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we extend

a courtesy to our distinguished colleague so that he can proceed

since I will join you for the balance of the hearing? So I’m going

to stay.

Vice Chairman BOND. Senator Bingaman, equally distinguished

Senator from New Mexico.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM NEW MEXICO

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Bond. It’s

a pleasure to be here to introduce to the Committee and to endorse

the nomination of Don Kerr for this important position.

3

I became acquainted with Don when I first was elected to the

U.S. Senate and he was the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and he remained in that position until 1985. While there,

he established a very distinguished record of service. He established a variety of innovative programs, one of which I’ll just mention to the Committee—the Laboratory-Directed Research and Development Program, which was and continues to be a mechanism

at the laboratory that has allowed for some of the very best of the

research that is done at not only Los Alamos but all of our national

laboratories to occur.

So I admired his work as head of Los Alamos, and I’ve admired

his service to the country in many capacities since then. You went

through that list of positions that he has held, some in the private

sector, some in the public sector.

But I feel strongly that he is extremely well-qualified for this important position. I know that the Committee has a much clearer

view than I do as to all the responsibilities that attach to this position that he has been nominated for, but I’m confident that you’ll

not find anybody who’s better qualified by experience or training or

capability to do the work.

So I would recommend that Don Kerr be approved and recommended to the full Senate for confirmation.

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, thank you very much, Senator

Bingaman. We will, of course, give your comments and support

great weight and we appreciate your taking the time to be with us.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Vice Chairman BOND. Now I will turn to a fellow Member of our

Committee, the other distinguished Senator at the table, Senator

Warner from Virginia.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would invite the nominee to introduce his family.

Vice Chairman BOND. Please, Dr. Kerr.

Dr. KERR. Well, it will be a very short and brief introduction. My

wife, Alison, with whom I’ve been living, working and doing everything else one can do for the past 46 years, is here behind me. Here

she is.

Vice Chairman BOND. Welcome, Mrs. Kerr.

Senator WARNER. That was brief.

Dr. KERR. I’m sorry I couldn’t do better, sir.

[Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Well, my brief sheet says that there’s a daughter, Margo, and she’s not with us today.

Dr. KERR. Well, we do have a daughter, Margo. She’s a practicing

veterinarian in Denver and was here just a week or so ago with

the two little girls she and her husband are adopting. But now she

has to help support them.

Senator WARNER. I think it’s important that the record reflect

that family.

Mr. Chairman, you’ve given a very complete briefing on the

nominee’s distinguished background, as supplemented by our colleague Senator Bingaman. So I just want to add a few words and

put my statement into the record.

Vice Chairman BOND. Please.

4

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. I always like to start with the law, and that

is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the

law served as the most dramatic reform of our Nation’s intelligence

capabilities since Harry S. Truman signed the National Security

Act of 1947. The 2004 law provides that the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence—the nominee now before us—shall

assist the Director in carrying out these duties. Together they are

the principal advisers to the President of the United States and the

National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for

intelligence matters related to national security and the head of

the United States intelligence community and overseeing and directing the national intelligence program of our Nation.

Now, despite what I have to say and what others have to say,

the most important endorsement, I think, of this nominee, next to

that of the President in selecting him, is that the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, has complete confidence in

this nominee’s abilities to serve as his Principal Deputy.

We’ve all seen Admiral McConnell in action, and yesterday was

a clear example of his extraordinary abilities as he appeared here

in the Senate on some very important matters. And I can only add

to this, Mr. Chairman, that—I added it up here quickly—38 years

ago I walked into the Pentagon, in the Navy Under Secretary’s office. And I’ve been dealing with intelligence matters for 38 years.

And I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a more qualified individual

than Don Kerr to entrust our Nation’s intelligence to.

Good luck to you.

Dr. Kerr. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Vice Chairman Bond and distinguished colleagues; it is my pleasure to introduce

to you today an outstanding intelligence professional, public servant and Virginian—Dr. Donald M. Kerr—who has been nominated to serve as our second Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

FAMILY

I would like to recognize Don’s wife, Alison, who is in attendance today, and to

thank her, along with their daughter Margot, for their steadfast support and sacrifice not only in support of Don, but also our nation.

ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE DNI

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This law serves as the most dramatic

reform of our nation’s intelligence capabilities since President Harry S. Truman

signed the National Security Act of 1947, and provides that the Principal Deputy

Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in

carrying out his duties as:

• The principal advisor to the President of the United States, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to

national security and the head of the of the United States Intelligence Community.

• And in overseeing and directing the national intelligence program of the

United States.

Director of National Intelligence McConnell has confidence in Don’s abilities to

serve as his Principal Deputy.

5

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

The 2004 Act also requires that any individual nominated as Principal Deputy

shall have extensive national security and management experience. Don has just

that, having served in four agencies with intelligence responsibilities, including as:

• Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology and the Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Defense Programs at the Department of Energy.

• Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Assistant Director in Charge, Laboratory Division.

• Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the Central Intelligence Agency.

• Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, where he currently serves.

Don began his government career at the Los Alamos National Lab in 1966 and

worked his way up through the Lab and the Department of Energy, eventually becoming Director of Los Alamos in 1979.

PRIVATE SECTOR SERVICE

Don has been equally successful in more than a decade of experience in private

sector leadership and management as:

• President and Director of EG&G.

• Corporate Executive Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Virginia.

• Executive Vice President of Information Systems Laboratories, Inc.

AWARDS AND RECOGNITION

In addition to earning numerous awards throughout his career for meritorious

service, Don was awarded the impressive Director’s Award from the Director of Central Intelligence in 2004 and the CIA Distinguished Intelligence Medal in 2005.

ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS

Don earned his undergraduate degree in electrical engineering and advanced degrees in microwave electronics and plasma physics from Cornell University.

SUMMARY

In short, Dr. Donald Kerr has a long and distinguished record of service to the

intelligence mission of this country, and I am very pleased to introduce him to the

Committee today.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

We appreciate very much our distinguished colleagues joining us.

And now, before I ask the witness some questions, I want to add,

for my colleagues, following up on what Senator Warner just described, we have an urgent request before not just this Committee

but the entire Congress.

We haven’t been able to act on the DNI’s initial proposal 3

months ago to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

But the threats are mounting, and we cannot leave the intelligence

community blind or, you might say, deaf in some significant areas.

I’ve been excluded from much of the negotiations that the majority has had with the Administration on this issue, but I am now

involved in the issue and have talked with the DNI, as I believe

it should be at the table. And I urge my colleagues to consider a

revised proposal that the DNI is making that he says will keep the

country safe.

I’d be interested if Dr. Kerr has any comments on modernizing

FISA. If you were already the Principal Deputy, then you would be

spending your days and nights tending the shop while the DNI has

been camped out on the Hill on this urgent matter, and as Senator

Warner said, doing an excellent job.

There are a series of questions that are standard procedure, and

let me ask you those.

6

First, as the nominee to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Dr. Kerr, do you agree to appear before the

Committee here or in other venues when requested?

Dr. KERR. Yes, I do.

Vice Chairman BOND. Do you agree to send officials from the

ODNI or the intelligence community to appear before the Committee and designated staff when requested?

Dr. KERR. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Vice Chairman BOND. Do you agree to provide documents and

any material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Dr. KERR. Yes, subject only to the caveat, when restricted by law.

Vice Chairman BOND. Will you ensure that the ODNI and the intelligence community provide such material to the Committee when

requested?

Dr. KERR. Yes.

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. Well, thank you very much, Dr.

Kerr.

Now if you would like to offer your opening statement, we would

be happy to receive that.

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD M. KERR, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE

Dr. KERR. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you,

and with particular thanks to Senator Warner and Senator Bingaman for introducing me.

I’m pleased to appear before you to discuss my credentials as the

nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Indeed, it is an honor to have been selected by the President and Director McConnell, and if I’m confirmed it will be a privilege to

serve.

Based on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,

and the intelligence community Directive No. 1, as has been pointed out, the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy are substantially the same as for the DNI. However, the DNI, I think, will

serve, as he has been, as principal adviser to the President and

other senior officials. So I expect the Principal Deputy will be focused as much as possible on coordinating and integrating the activities and products of the 16 organizations that comprise the intelligence community.

Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior level public and private sector positions and have learned a few things along

the way. In five areas, I think I can bring strength and experience

to this job, such as an ability to identify and deal effectively with

troubled components, which I have done in at least two Government agencies to this point; a strong technical and management

background; coalition-building skills; the ability to drive organizational change; and a strongly held belief that an effective planning

system, coupled with strong financial management, can achieve superior results. While I learned this latter lesson in the private sector, I’ve applied the model to all my subsequent Government jobs.

I’ve been both personally and professionally committed to national security throughout my career. I’ve had direct responsibility

for intelligence and defense activities in four different Government

7

agencies—the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, and the NRO—and I have supported intelligence programs in private industry and as a staff member and later as Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

This has provided me opportunities to work on a wide variety of

intelligence issues, including nuclear proliferation, treaty monitoring, nuclear test detection and analysis, and development of future air and space reconnaissance systems.

I’m particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement challenges. My

commitment to countering terrorism began with activities in 1978

and 1979 when I was the Department of Energy member of the

NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism.

This commitment was substantially reinforced by direct responsibilities investigating the East African embassy bombings of 1998

and the attack on the USS COLE in 2000, and certainly refocused

tremendously by 9/11 and the efforts of the past 6 years.

I’d like to take a minute to talk about my vision for the intelligence community, as well as several goals I believe are critical for

more effectively focusing the community in the challenging post-9/

11 environment. I’d also like to share my philosophy about the role

of intelligence in our national security construct.

A popularly held contention is that the role of intelligence is to

protect the Nation from all harm. Well, this is a succinct way to

talk about an ultimate goal. I think the situation is substantially

more complicated than that. One academic I think got it about

right, describing the role of intelligence as extracting certainty

from uncertainty, and facilitating coherent decisionmaking in an

incoherent environment.

These are not activities that lend themselves to guarantees or

perfect scores as we would like, but they reflect the reality in which

we operate. If I were to state what I believe the essence of national

intelligence is, I would say that the primary goal is to reduce the

risks our Nation faces today and in the future.

These challenges not only require our ongoing dedication and

commitment to the national intelligence mission but, more importantly, new and innovative approaches to the work we do, the operations we plan and carry out, the collection assets we design, build

and operate, the analyses we produce, and the strategic partnerships we make across traditional and nontraditional boundaries.

Each era has its seemingly impossible challenges. We all know

the future is unpredictable, and trends hard to predict. The elements that could significantly transform the geopolitical landscape

include nuclear and biological weapons proliferation, catastrophic

terrorism, and even pandemic disease.

The intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure that the

capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and ofttimes explosive issues are available to the analyst, policymaker, operations

officer and warfighter when they are needed.

This is all the more difficult, because the threat is no longer predictable and confined to specific geographic areas. It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic and distributed. Intelligence problems are also developing at a much more rapid pace than ever before. We need to

posture ourselves to deal in that environment.

8

And so a few of the things I think most important are our need

to seek global situational awareness to the degree we can. We need

to be able to deliver critical information to support timely decisionmaking by both policymakers and our military leadership. We need

to be able to anticipate strategic threats, although that may be the

hardest thing of all to do. Importantly, as a consequence of intelligence reform, we have to learn to operate as a unified, integrated

yet distributed enterprise. We need to adopt technologies and concepts of operations that leverage U.S. advantage. And, finally, we

need to maintain appropriate investment levels for future capabilities.

To do this, I think three elements need to be in place. First of

all, we have the duty to gather critical intelligence, but to do so in

a way that complies with the constitutional and other legal requirements that protect the freedoms and liberties of the American people. There must be proper training and oversight mechanisms for

the intelligence community to ensure that there are clear rules for

their activities.

Second, given the non-public nature of most of the intelligence

community’s work, the DNI and the principal deputy must also ensure that Congress is kept appropriately informed of IC activities

to enable Congress to perform its oversight responsibilities. To exercise such oversight, the Committees must understand the intelligence process, its organizations, policies, funding, and activities.

The DNI and other members of the community must communicate

on a regular and continuing basis to keep the oversight committees

fully and currently informed, consistent with the protection of

sources and methods.

Third, the intelligence community must deliver intelligence information to decisionmakers without bias or prejudice. Intelligence

analysis must be held to the highest standards of integrity and objectivity. It must also be rigorous, timely, and independent from political considerations.

To position ourselves to meet the analytic challenges of today

and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our current jobs

better. We must transform the way our analysts do their work. We

must more effectively leverage new and emerging technologies and

reach out to expertise wherever it resides.

Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our talented

intelligence professionals requires strong and focused leadership. If

confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to a number of areas.

I would focus on effective financial management, including reducing the indirect cost burden on mission wherever possible. This effort speaks to Director McConnell’s goal of modernizing business

practices and developing verifiable metrics. The real challenge is

developing the right balance between tighter controls and mission

effectiveness, and making financial reporting more useful to those

who manage our programs. I believe that continuous improvement

in financial management should be an intelligence community priority.

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in moving the intelligence

community forward from today’s uneven but improving financial

management environment to one characterized by common busiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 04, 2008 Jkt 041206 PO 10000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\41206.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
9

ness processes and integrated systems that adhere to recognized

best business practices across industry and Government.

Accountability is critically important in ensuring that officials

are responsible for their actions. Within the intelligence community, accountability ultimately rests with the DNI and the Principal

Deputy. However, in a Government based upon checks and balances and collective decisionmaking, determining individual accountability is often very difficult.

It has been my experience that most Government employees, regardless of whether they reside in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches, are simply trying to do what is right for the taxpayer. However, there are occasionally egregious exceptions, and

when they occur swift and decisive action must be taken. Each and

every member of the community is responsible for using the resources entrusted to them judiciously. Additionally, all Government

employees are expected to ensure their performance is consistent

with the highest standards of professionalism and integrity. One of

the first items on my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that

each member of the IC is as fully aware of what is expected and

required as practical.

There has been significant discussion about the role of contractors in the intelligence community lately. There are compelling reasons why we use contractors to perform critical functions within

the intelligence community. At the NRO, our industry partners design and build our satellite systems as well as provide 24 by 7

operational and maintenance support. We also rely on contractors

to provide the basic services that we generally take for granted in

the course of our day. These are services that are more economically outsourced and include everything from network maintenance

to janitorial support.

There are also certain exigencies that justify an intelligence

agency’s use of contractors. For example, if an agency has a shortterm project or mission that exceeds the capability of its current

staff, it is sometimes more appropriate for that agency to use contractors to meet that temporary need than to hire and train permanent Federal civilian employees to perform the work. We also employ contractors or employees of federally funded research and development centers to provide specialized capabilities that we do not

find within the Government workforce.

My general philosophy is no contractor should perform inherently

Government work, under no circumstances should a contractor

make policy or investment decisions on behalf of the Government,

and the use of contractors must be more cost effective than using

Government resources. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the

appropriate use of contractors within the intelligence community.

I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce cannot be overstated, either for the NRO or the intelligence community as a whole. While at the NRO I’ve taken a number of steps

to work on that problem, starting with a statement of intent that

I signed with the Air Force Chief of Staff more than a year ago

that made it very clear that the Air Force and the NRO would

work closely together to improve the career development of our

shared workforce. We’ve also teamed with Air Force Space Command to train space professionals across the Government in the

10

new National Security Space Institute at Colorado Springs. I’m

working on similar initiatives with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Currently, the NRO’s Acquisition Center of Excellence is helping

our acquisition professionals complete education requirements leading to advanced degrees in public management and engineering administration. We’ve also partnered with Virginia Tech to provide

an engineering administration Master’s degree program onsite at

the NRO, and we tried to pull together all of the rest of our training in a virtual university construct to benefit all of our employees

and our contractors.

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director McConnell in

his efforts to more closely integrate the intelligence community.

During my tenure, the NRO has been working toward an integrated mix of overhead and ground-based capabilities tailored to

the geographically dispersed and dynamic nature of the current

and projected intelligence problems, as well as the diverse needs of

our many users.

Integration is not only a watchword for technical collection and

operations, but it is imperative that we integrate intelligence collection and analysis more effectively. They are symbiotic disciplines. We can only achieve our goals and objectives by coming

unified in our commitment to the intelligence community’s contribution to the strongest defense possible for our Nation and our

people.

Thank you for the opportunity to share with the Committee my

background and, if confirmed, my vision for my new role and responsibilities. I look forward to answering any questions you may

have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kerr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR DR. DONALD M. KERR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you to

discuss my credentials as the nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence—the PDDNI. Indeed, it is an honor to be asked, and if confirmed it will

be a privilege to serve. In discussions with the Director of National Intelligence

(DNI)—McConnell, we agree that the role of the PDDNI is analogous to that of the

chief operating officer of a public company. While the DNI is chief executive officer

for the Intelligence Community (IC)—and principal intelligence adviser to the President and other senior leaders, the PDDNI should be focused on coordinating and

integrating the day-to-day efforts of the 16 elements that comprise the IC. Before

addressing my vision for the IC, allow me to highlight my background that uniquely

qualifies me to serve as the PDDNI.

Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior-level public and private sector positions, and have obtained a number of critical skills and lessons learned. In

considering the challenges facing the IC, as well as the responsibilities of the

PDDNI, I would ask you to consider five key areas of strength and experience that

are applicable to this position: an ability to identify and deal effectively with troubled components; a strong technical background; coalition-building skills; the ability

to drive organizational cultural change; and a strongly held belief that an effective

planning system coupled with strong financial management can achieve superior results. While I learned this latter lesson in private industry, I have applied this

model in all my subsequent Government assignments. I have also learned that the

tools and techniques, used to integrate acquired companies, can be effectively applied in the Government environment.

As this Committee knows from first-hand experience, I have been both personally

and professionally committed to national security throughout my career. I have had

direct responsibility for intelligence and defense activities in four different government agencies: the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

11

Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, and have supported intelligence programs in private industry, and as a staff member and later

as director of a national laboratory. I have had opportunities to work on a wide variety of intelligence issues, including nuclear proliferation, arms control monitoring,

nuclear test detection, and the development of future air and space reconnaissance

systems. I am particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement challenges. My commitment to countering

terrorism began with activities in 1978–79 as a member of the NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism. This commitment was substantially reinforced by direct responsibilities investigating the East African embassy bombings in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and refocused by 9/11 and the efforts of the past 5

years.

I would like to share my personal vision for the IC, as well as several goals that

I believe are critical for more effectively focusing the Community in the challenging,

post-9/11 environment. I would also like to share my philosophy about the role of

intelligence in our national security construct. A popularly held contention is that

the role of intelligence is to protect the Nation from all harm. While this is a succinct way to state the ultimate goal, I think the situation is more complicated than

that. One academic described the role of intelligence as extracting certainty from

uncertainty and facilitating coherent decisionmaking in an incoherent environment.

These are not activities that lend themselves to guarantees or perfect scores as we

would like, but they reflect the reality in which we operate. If I were to state what

I believe is the essence of national intelligence, I would say that its primary goal

is to reduce the risk our Nation faces today and tomorrow. The National Intelligence

Estimate, ‘‘The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,’’ makes clear that we will face

a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next several years—a threat that

will challenge our current defensive efforts and tools we use to detect and disrupt

plots.

My ‘‘philosophy’’ is not meant to minimize the critical role each and every one of

our intelligence professionals nor the Intelligence Community, as a whole—plays in

warning about current and future threats. The challenges we face not only demand

our ongoing dedication and commitment to the national intelligence mission, but

more importantly new and innovative approaches to the work we do; the operations

we plan and carry out; the collection assets we design, build and operate; the analyses we produce; and the strategic partnerships we make across traditional and

non-traditional boundaries.

Every era has its seemingly impossible challenges. The future is fraught with unpredictable elements and trends. The elements that could significantly transform

the geopolitical landscape include nuclear proliferation, catastrophic terrorism and

even a pandemic disease. The intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure

that the capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and oft times explosive

issues are available to the analyst, policymaker, operations officer, and warfighter

when they are needed. This is all the more difficult, because the threat is no longer

predictable and confined to specific geographic areas. It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic, and distributed. Intelligence problems are also developing at a much more

rapid pace than ever before. We must posture ourselves to adapt and respond quickly, in an integrated fashion, to evolving problems. To that end, I believe there are

a number of goals that capture what we need to excel as a Community in order to

grow our comparative advantage and reduce the myriad risks to our nation:

• Seek global situational awareness

• Deliver critical information to support timely decisionmaking

• Anticipate strategic threats and

• Operate as a unified, integrated—but distributed—enterprise

• Adopt technologies and concepts of operation that cause adversaries to react

in ways that give the US advantage

• Maintain appropriate investment levels for future capabilities

In order to set the Intelligence Community on a path toward achieving these

goals, there are three elements that need to be in place to support the Community.

First, the IC has a solemn duty to gather critical intelligence, but to do so in a way

that complies with the constitutional and other legal requirements that protect the

freedoms and liberties of the American people. There must be proper training and

oversight mechanisms for the IC to ensure that there are clear legal rules for IC

personnel operating in this critical area. Given the non-public nature of much of the

IC’s work, the DNI must also ensure that Congress is kept appropriately informed

of IC activities to enable Congress to perform its oversight responsibilities.

Second, we have a responsibility to provide timely information to Congress to support effective oversight. Congressional oversight plays a key role in ensuring that

the Intelligence Community is performing as envisioned. To exercise such oversight

12

responsibilities, the Committees must understand the intelligence process, its organizations, policies, funding, and activities. The DNI and other members of the Community must communicate on a regular and continuing basis to keep the oversight

committees fully and currently informed, consistent with the protection of sources

and methods.

Third, the Intelligence Community must deliver intelligence information to decisionmakers without bias or prejudice. Intelligence analysis must be held to the highest standards of integrity and objectivity. It must also be rigorous, timely and independent from political consideration. To position ourselves to meet the analytic challenges of today and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our current jobs better. We must transform the way our analysts do their work. We must more effectively leverage new and emerging technologies and reach out to expertise wherever

it resides. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Intelligence Community’s efforts

to measure and, track progress in implementing these analytic standards, including

the use of alternative analysis.

Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our talented intelligence professionals requires strong and focused leadership. If confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to a number of areas. I would look to focus on effective financial

management, including reducing the indirect cost burden wherever possible. This effort speaks to Director McConnell’s goal of modernizing business practices and developing verifiable metrics. My experience at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is that accountability for funds is effective. Although there are always improvements that can be made, the real challenge is developing the right balance between tighter controls and mission effectiveness and making financial reporting more useful to those who manage our programs. I believe that continuous improvement in financial management should be

an Intelligence Community priority.

While at the NRO, I have seen first-hand the added-value in establishing more

effective financial management processes, procedures and management controls to

put us on a path toward an unqualified audit opinion. The DNI recently developed

a unified financial management plan for the IC as part of his 100 day plan to modernize business processes. If confirmed, ’I will assist the DNI in moving the Intelligence Community forward from today’s uneven, but improving, financial management environment to one characterized by common business processes and integrated systems that adhere to recognized best business practices across industry

and government. I strongly support Director McConnell’s emphasis in this area.

Accountability is critically important in ensuring that officials are responsible for

their actions. Within the IC, accountability ultimately rests with the DNI and the

PDDNI. However, in a government based upon checks-and-balances and collective

decisionmaking, determining individual accountability is often very difficult. It has

been my experience that most government employees, regardless of whether they reside in the executive, legislative or judicial branches, are simply trying to do what

is right for the taxpayer. However, there are occasionally egregious exceptions, and

when they occur, swift and decisive action must be taken. Each and every member

of the Intelligence Community is responsible for using the resources entrusted to

them judiciously. Additionally, all government employees are expected to ensure

their performance is consistent with the highest standards of professionalism and

integrity. One of the first items on my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that

each member of the IC is fully aware of what is expected and required. I will take

decisive action wherever and whenever necessary.

There has been much discussion recently about the role of contractors in the Intelligence Community. There are compelling reasons we use contractors to perform

critical functions within the IC. In the NRO construct, our industry partners design

and build our satellite systems, as well as provide 24/7 operational and maintenance

support. We also rely on contractors to provide the basic services that we generally

take for granted in the course of our day. These are services that are more economically outsourced and include everything from network maintenance to janitorial support. There are also certain exigencies that justify an intelligence agency’s use of

contractors. For example, if an agency has a short term project or mission that exceeds the capacity of its current staff, it is sometimes more appropriate for that

agency to use contractors to meet that temporary need than to hire and train permanent Federal civilian employees to perform the work. We also employ contractors

to provide specialized, niche capabilities that we may not be able to perform with

government personnel. In each of these areas, contractors must be used judiciously,

with full oversight from the government to ensure that they provide the services we

need but do not perform work that is inherently governmental. If confirmed, I will

continue to examine the appropriate use of contractors within the Intelligence ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 04, 2008 Jkt 041206 PO 10000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\41206.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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munity. The key to successful partnership with the contractor community is to view

the management of the relationship as an inherently government function.

My general philosophy in evaluating the appropriate use of contractor support is:

no contractor shall perform work that a government person should be doing; under

no circumstance should a contractor make policy or investment decisions on behalf

of the government; and the use of contractors must be more cost effective than using

government resources. For example, to establish a cadre of government network administrators would be more expensive and possibly less effective than to contractout with a telecommunications company to provide the service. It is appropriate to

use contractors when they offer unique, distinct, or ‘‘surge’’ capabilities that may not

be available within the government. Most importantly, all contractors and employees of the Federal Government must comply with the Constitution and laws, as well

as with the governing regulations of the organization they support. If confirmed, I

will continue to examine and enforce the appropriate use of contractors within the

IC.

I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce cannot be overstated,

both for the NRO and the IC. I have taken a number of steps in this area while

at the NRO. First, I signed a Statement of Intent with the Air Force Chief of Staff,

which makes clear that the Air Force and NRO will work together to improve the

career development of our shared workforce. The NRO has also teamed with Air

Force Space Command to train space professionals across the government at the

new National Security Space Institute in Colorado Springs. I am working on similar

initiatives with the CIA. Currently, the NRO’s Acquisition Center of Excellence is

helping NRO acquisition professionals complete education requirements leading to

advanced degrees in Public Management and Engineering Administration. We have

also partnered with Virginia Tech to provide the Engineering Administration degree

program onsite at the NRO. In addition, the NRO is also establishing a virtual University that will provide an integrated, career-focused program that combines specialized training provided by the NRO directorate- and office-based schools with an

NRO-wide curriculum focused on shared context, values, informational needs, and

leadership. These initiatives are in addition to an already robust Systems Engineering Professional Development and Certification program that last year certified 151

systems engineers.

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director McConnell in his effort to more

closely integrate the Intelligence Community. During my tenure, the NRO has been

working toward an integrated mix of overhead and ground-based capabilities tailored to the geographically dispersed and dynamic nature of current and projected

intelligence problems, as well as the diverse needs of our users. Integration is not

only a watchword for technical collection and operations, but it is imperative that

we integrate intelligence collection and analysis more effectively—they are symbiotic

disciplines.

We can only achieve our goals and objectives by becoming unified in our commitment to the Intelligence Community’s contribution to the strongest defense possible

for our Nation and our people. Thank you for the opportunity to share with the

Committee my background and—if confirmed—my vision for my new role and responsibility. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Dr. Kerr. I was

going to ask about your goals and I think you’ve laid them out and

the difficulty of predicting the future. I was reminded of Yogi

Berra’s admonition. He said, ‘‘Never make predictions, particularly

about the future.’’ I’ve always thought that was a sound piece of

advice.

But there’s only 11⁄2 years left in this Administration. Can you

tell us why you took on this job?

Dr. KERR. I thought about it very carefully and had some extensive discussions with Director McConnell, with my wife, and with

others whose judgment I respect.

At the end of the day, in all honesty, I could not continue to be

on the outside expressing views when the proper thing to do was

to try to see if, by joining other seasoned professionals in the leadership, both at the Department of Defense and at the DNI—to see

if we could make this thing work.

14

That includes the responsibility to respond to the comment you

made, which is, the legislation in 2004 was put together, the office

of the DNI stood up; and now, with 3 years behind us, there’s the

opportunity to look back and say, what needs to be changed, either

in legislation or in an Executive order, that would make it work

better?

And I think, between Secretary Gates, Under Secretary Clapper,

Director McConnell, General Hayden, and me, we have the potential—for five people who’ve worked together without friction—to try

to make it work and maybe to pass it on to others in a more institutionalized form than it is today.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, sir.

The next thing I had mentioned, I wanted to find out if you had

any comments on the FISA modernization or if you’ve been involved with the DNI’s very excellent efforts to bring the case onto

the Hill. What advice you can share with us on that?

Dr. KERR. Well, I’ve not been directly party to the discussions

going on between Director McConnell and the Congress. But that

said, I share his view that we do need to do something to modernize FISA. I could speak more extensively in closed session with

you, but suffice it to say, 30 years ago there were certain assumptions about the future and certain realities of the context when the

original legislation was passed.

Those assumptions and realities have changed considerably and,

consequently, the legislation needs to be changed to actually deal

with the way modern telecommunications systems work and allow

the intelligence community to do the things it needs to do to collect

foreign intelligence on foreign individuals outside of the United

States without a warrant. And, of course, at the same time we

should always be in the position of, if the target’s within the

United States, of seeking a warrant to do that.

Those two things are very important, coupled with the concern

for those from which we would get information that they not be at

risk for cooperating with the Government in this very important

endeavor.

Vice Chairman BOND. Let me deal with a point of friction for this

Committee. This Committee came into possession of a point paper

prepared by the NRO relating to commercial imagery. The paper

appeared to be written in the fashion of talking points in opposition

to commercial imagery. When our staff requested to be briefed on

this document, the NRO declined. The NRO Office of Congressional

Affairs advised that you had personally denied the Committee’s

staff access to the requested information.

We could find no information in the point paper that would appear to justify refusing to brief Congress on its content. Are you familiar with that action and did you personally deny this request?

Or did someone on your Congressional liaison staff misrepresent

this?

Dr. KERR. I think it may fall in the latter category. The only

paper I know about is one that my former deputy wrote as a personal thing doing a financial analysis based on public sources. It

was not an official NRO document.

Vice Chairman BOND. No, this was definitely not—I think we

may want to explore later who had the authority to deny a request

15

for the information from Congress—who would, down the line, have

that authority.

Dr. KERR. Well, I think I can help you by telling you what I’ve

said about this subject. Would that be helpful?

Vice Chairman BOND. Sure.

Dr. KERR. I’ll give you a quote. I recommended that the Government purchase geospatial products and services from the commercial remote sensing industry, as well as needed imagery ‘‘to ensure

this information has the highest flexibility and utility for Government users and to encourage new applications of imagery data

from the private sector.’’ I signed that in October 2001 in response

to tasking from the Secretary of Defense and the then DCI, when

I led the remote sensing study panel.

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, we will explore with you later the

other paper.

Dr. KERR. I don’t know what you’re referring to, sir.

Vice Chairman BOND. We will explore that later. Now for the

questions, I turn to Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In listing the five

matters that you felt you had a proficiency in, I would like to suggest a sixth, and that is you have a good grasp of how to work with

the Congress. I’ve had that privilege in the years on the Armed

Services Committee where you’ve testified a number of times before

that Committee, and now on my second term in the Intelligence

Committee.

I’d also like to join the Ranking Member in his commentary with

regard to the contribution of General Burgess filling in for this period of time. He’s held in very high esteem here in the Congress

and we wish him well.

Going back to the definition, as I’ve said, under the law, that you

and Admiral McConnell have as adviser to the President, I hope

I’m not being presumptuous in saying the following. I think that

the intelligence community has got to work with the executive

branch, and most particularly the office of the President, in more

clearly defining the enemy that faces not only the United States,

but much of the free world today.

We use the term ‘‘war on terrorism,’’ and now that seems to be

misunderstood in many parts of the world. Great Britain has

ceased to use that term; some of our colleagues in the House have

ceased. And I must say, that term is not specific. We talk about

‘‘radical Muslims’’ or ‘‘radical jihadists,’’ and it’s difficult for the

general public, which wants to be supportive—and the general public which is deeply concerned after 9/11 about the vulnerability not

only here at home, but of our people, hundreds of thousands of

them that serve abroad, and most notably those in uniform and

members of the intelligence community—the CIA and others, and

the embassies. So I would hope that you could provide here this

morning, and that you and the Admiral can, in working in briefings, try to more clearly define what that enemy is.

In my judgment, it’s clearly a global threat; it’s not just isolated

cells. There is a measure of some coordination. But first, what is

the term that you would describe, generically, who the enemy is?

And with respect to the Muslim world, that’s a long and venerable

and proud culture, and it’s relatively a small number of those that

16

are within that culture that are perpetrating the evil that’s unfortunately spreading into places well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dr. KERR. I think one of the things I need to do, of course, is immediately recognize that I’m not a political and economic analyst

steeped in studying some of these threats around the world. That

said, given the responsibility that I may take on, I’m going to have

to work very much with a very senior analyst, named Director

McConnell, who has been spending his time trying to think about

this very problem and how to properly frame the question.

I think it’s clear at this point that simply using the terms that

go with armed conflict—‘‘war’’ and others—is an insufficient way to

think about the problem. I think we’re at a juncture where we have

to think about the other instruments of American power and how

they join with our incredible military prowess to project what we

as Americans want the rest of the world to see, and for them to

perhaps move away from thinking that the solution to their problems is simply to damage Americans or do worse.

I don’t think it’s restricted to people of Islamic faith. It’s been the

history of this country——

Senator WARNER. I didn’t suggest that, clearly.

Dr. KERR. Yes.

Senator WARNER. But that seems to be a focal point of much of

our attention now in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But what better

evidence of that is our own internal bombing of Oklahoma some

years ago.

Dr. KERR. Exactly.

I think another thing we have to pay a great deal of attention

to—and it’s been in some of the estimates that you have seen—is

that set of countries where the demographics are such that right

now half of the population is male, under the age of 15. And in 10

years, they will be in their early twenties, unemployed, perhaps

without hope and consequently fodder, if you will, to lash out at

America and America’s interests. And so I’m greatly concerned

about that and what we might be able to do as a country to influence those places in the world and how they develop before it becomes something that we would characterize as a conflict.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I just simply wish to first compliment you on

your statement. I thought it was very comprehensive. But back to

my question, I would suggest that I’d invite you to further amplify

your thoughts in the record because it would be of importance to

us to study precisely what those definitions are—particularly why

the term ‘‘global war on terrorism’’ is found to be offensive to many

people who have the best intentions.

One other caution: In this world in which we live, you’ve got to

deal with the split-second answer in today’s rapid media and dissemination of information. So we’ve got to come up with clear, precise definitions and repeat them constantly to the public so they

know more precisely. This country’s making an enormous sacrifice

of life and limb and in every other way to help not only defend ourselves, but other people across this world who stand in fear of the

threats that face us today.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

17

You’ve raised a question that we’ve debated, both in public and

in private hearings, on learning more about the enemy, learning

the terminology. And I think I’ve found a helpful tack, saying that

these radicals are not jihadists, which is a holy spiritual journey

for a believing Muslim. They are mufsidun committing hirabah and

we should not glorify them by calling them jihadists.

With that totally useful piece of information, I now turn to Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Kerr, for your public service.

What would you do as the Deputy Director to get agencies motivated more to invest in research and development?

Dr. KERR. Senator Nelson, thank you for the question. You’ve

struck on a concern that I’ve had for some time, because I’ve actually lived in the best of the intelligence community for investing in

the future, and I have lived in an agency that, in fact, did it the

least.

And I think part of what I might be able to contribute to is a

more general community view of what appropriate levels of investment are needed for the future of our community and our country.

Clearly, there are agencies that require more investment in technology to carry out their mission than others. So it isn’t a case of

just picking a number across the board, but it is appropriate to say

you’ve got to be investing today for your problems 3, 5, and 10

years out.

And I think we have not done that well, particularly with the

pressures of the last few years to support current operations. I

don’t want to take resources from current operations, but if there

are ways we can find to manage the resources we have better to

make room for some future investment, I sorely want to do that.

Senator NELSON. Well, what about the new Intelligence Advanced Research Project Authority—IARPA—which is modeled

after DARPA?

Dr. KERR. That, of course, has just stood up. We have yet to see

whether it can gain the same sort of stature and visibility in the

intelligence community that DARPA has gained with the Department of Defense and the military services.

One of the things noteworthy about DARPA and their major programs today is that every one of them is done in alliance with one

of the services or other Defense agencies. IARPA has not existed

long enough to build those alliances and connections and, to succeed, it will have to.

Senator NELSON. Does the DNI support IARPA?

Dr. KERR. Yes, he does. He’s testified to that effect. And I think

my responsibility will be to work with him so that the actual execution meets his expectations.

Senator NELSON. So what would you do to enhance its stature?

Dr. KERR. I think the first thing I would do would be to improve

the connections with the agencies and the programs they already

have. IARPA has been viewed with suspicion by them, particularly

in instances where it appeared that the funds for IARPA were coming out of their normal operating budgets. That’s not the way to

gain friends. And so somehow there has to be a mechanism that

they become partners rather than competitors for the same resources.

18

Senator NELSON. You have been the head of the National Reconnaissance Office. And there have been some big programs that

have been sole-sourced instead of competed. And of course, the U.S.

policy is that we compete. Can you explain the apparent anti-competition policy?

Dr. KERR. We’re really, in some ways, dealing with a part of the

economy that is different from what I’ll call the competitive private

sector. We’re dealing with a protected sector of the economy, which

has dealt with companies that have chosen to do the majority of

their business with the U.S. Government. In some cases, those

companies have had substantial investment over the years in particular capabilities that exist only within those companies. And so

unless the United States Government is prepared to make comparable investments in prospective competitors, they really don’t

get to the point of competing in a credible way.

So what we have to do, as we look ahead, is ask which parts of

the NRO program are most amenable to competition. For example,

you might argue certain classes of sensors would be, where you

might have three or more competitors available, whereas a certain

other specialized capability would need to go to the company that

had been the beneficiary of the prior Government investment and

had the expertise to do a particular kind of work.

Senator NELSON. So you would want to encourage competition

where there were several vendors that could do the work.

Dr. KERR. Yes, sir.

Senator NELSON. OK. And I realize that you inherited some huge

problems when you came in as the head of NRO. This has been a

concern of this Committee’s, and it’s been a concern of the Armed

Service Committee as well.

There were particularly two huge classified programs within the

bosom of this Committee that were canceled, and as a result there’s

been a lot of money that has gone down the drain. These two programs represented significant new acquisitions undertaken by the

NRO and they were touted by the NRO as examples of excellence

and industry ingenuity, and both of them failed. Who was held accountable for these failures?

Dr. KERR. Well, let me speak to the first of them, because when

I came to the NRO, the so-called red team—the technical review

team—had just completed its work with respect to one of those programs. I had been aware of their work, and in fact had been briefed

on it along the way. And it was in fact after reviewing their recommendations as well as the work of the staff at the NRO that I

went to Director Negroponte and recommended termination of that

program.

The reason I recommended termination of that program was that

I felt there was little to no prospect of that part of the program

being successfully completed. We had managed to lay requirements

on top of requirements. We had managed to change some direction

enough times that we had a system that could not be manufactured

by normal human beings.

Director Negroponte took that recommendation. He spent time

considering it, but within about 3 weeks he directed me to terminate that part of the program, which I did.

19

With regard to how do we protect some of the investment made,

we have in fact funded the continued reduction of technical risk in

some of the specific new technologies that were part of that program. And they’re slated for use in future programs, which I can

talk to you about in a classified session. We think we have done

about as well we can to recover that part of the investment. That

said, we couldn’t recover a significant amount of it, as you’re well

aware.

Vice Chairman BOND. Dr. Kerr, we will go into a classified session, and I think Senator Nelson will and I will and others will

want to follow up.

Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, the question was, in the

public session, who was held accountable?

Vice Chairman BOND. I didn’t hear anybody.

Dr. KERR. Well, I’ll answer that, too.

In fact, the program manager was removed from that program,

as well as the direct reports. The senior leadership at the prime

contractor was changed. The award fees reflected the unhappiness

of the Government with their performance, and they have subsequently been put on the contractor responsibility watch list that

the NRO has, which means that they can only bid on new work if

we grant them a waiver. And they will not come off that list until

they start delivering hardware to us. We’re not satisfied with just

changes in names and particular jobs and reorganization; we want

to see the product that we’ve contracted for.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, if I don’t make it to the classified session, if you would get the details of that, I would appreciate

it.

Vice Chairman BOND. You can be sure we will. Thank you very

much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

Dr. Kerr, thank you for your service. We appreciate you very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, let me just echo the sentiments of you and

Senator Warner relative to General Burgess. Boy, I don’t know a

member of the IC community that has been more direct, more

straightforward and given us better briefings over the years than

General Burgess. I’m sure glad to see he’s going to stay with ODNI.

Dr. Kerr, we have a mutual friend, Steve Van Cleve, who certainly gives you a very high recommendation and sends his best

wishes.

As a Member of the House Intelligence Committee following September 11, we did a significant investigation into the reasons why

September 11 happened. And it was pretty obvious to us then,

there’s been a lot of commentary, a lot written and said about some

of the reasons why, but it comes back to one basic reason, and that

is there was a total lack of information sharing.

Now, you’ve been in the IC community both at CIA, at the FBI,

and now at the NRO, and obviously you’re moving into a much different atmosphere of your intelligence employment history here.

What I want you to comment on is what you’ve seen relative to information sharing, what you think may be done or may have been

done to improve that. Where do you think we still need some imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 04, 2008 Jkt 041206 PO 10000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\41206.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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provement? And in your position as the Deputy Director of the

DNI, I want to hear what you think you might be able to accomplish relative to continuing to help the information sharing issue

spread.

Dr. KERR. I think this is perhaps one of the issues that’s a core

issue of the intelligence reform legislation. I think steps have been

made to have improved the situation from what it was in 2001 before 9/11. And that said, not enough has been done.

And I can simply give you an anecdote to help explain that. And

it goes back to General Burgess, for whom we all have high regard.

He wanted to send an e-mail to all of the 16 agencies in the community to people by name and found that that was impossible at

the present time. And so one of the key things that we have to

work on is we have to provide the infrastructure so that information sharing can be done directly and quickly rather than by working around awkward legacy systems from the past.

But the infrastructure’s only part of it; the attitude is the other

part of it. Now when I was at the FBI, we, in fact, had senior CIA

personnel assigned there in line jobs. They were very effective at

doing it. And there were FBI people assigned to the

Counterterrorism Center at CIA. But the simple exchange of people

isn’t enough either because, the way these organizations work, the

connections have to be made not just at the top, not just at certain

mid-level functions where they decide that swap of people makes

sense, but it has to become a way of doing the work. And I would

say that the real test of the leadership for the DNI and his deputy

is going to be the degree to which we can change some of the attitudes that don’t allow us to have that full connectivity at all levels

between the agencies to focus on very hard problems.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, I think you’re exactly right. Those

stovepipes that we’ve talked about so often unfortunately still

exist—maybe not to the degree that they did prior to September 11,

but certainly there’s some still there. And frankly, going back to

what Senator Nelson asked you about, I have an appreciation for

the fact that you did step into a not-so-good situation at NRO. You

made the changes that were necessary. I fully expect you to do the

same thing here at ODNI, and I have all great confidence that you

will.

So thank you for your willingness to continue to serve your country in this capacity, and we look forward to seeing this confirmation concluded.

Dr. KERR. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Mikulski—OK, she’s gone.

Senator Burr is gone.

[The prepared statement of Senator Mikulski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA A MIKULSKI, A U.S. SENATOR FROM

MARYLAND

• It’s great to welcome Dr. Kerr to this important confirmation hearing. This position, the Deputy Director for National Intelligence, has been vacant for too long,

and DNI McConnell is certainly in need of a permanent deputy.

• Dr. Kerr, you’ve led a distinguished career in the Intelligence Community,

serving in a variety of places. This includes at the Department of Energy, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central IntelVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:25 Aug 04, 2008 Jkt 041206 PO 10000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\41206.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
21

ligence Agency, and now, serving currently as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. • There are five criteria that I use to evaluate all executive branch nominees.

They are (1) Competence, (2) Integrity, (3) Independence, (4) Commitment to the

Constitution, and (5) Commitment to the Core Mission of the Department • First, I believe Dr. Kerr has the experience and background for this important

job. You’ve had success in both the private sector and the Intelligence Community—

serving in your current position as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office

since 2005. The NRO is an important agency in the Intelligence Community. It has

had some successes, as well as a number of problems, too. • Dr. Kerr has also served as a Deputy in CIA’s Science & Technology Directorate. This also highlights his background in science and technology, which I believe is a real plus for a DDNI to have. Our historical technological advantage over

our adversaries is eroding and we need much stronger ties between science and

technology communities and our intelligence agencies. • Dr. Kerr, I think that you will agree with me, that we must regain our technological edge in the world in science and technology. • While I do not know Dr. Kerr personally, we did enjoy a very good, and I

thought, frank conversation. • Dr. Kerr is well-respected both inside and outside the Intelligence Community

and I have no reason to doubt his personal integrity. However, as always, the proof

of his integrity will be in his actions and deeds, if he is confirmed to serve as DDNI. • For me, Integrity and Independence are closely tied. We are in need of independent voices at the ODNI, and not cheerleaders for the Administration. We need

people at the ODNI who can speak truth to power, no matter who is President. We

also need a commitment from the Intelligence Community leadership to provide

timely and frequent notifications to the Intelligence Committees. • As DDNI, Dr. Kerr, you will be forced to make tough choices. This includes

decisions to end controversial programs to financing innovative acquisition projects.

No matter the task, the ODNI needs independent voices, and not rubber stamps for

this administration’s policies. • I’ve been greatly honored to take the oath of office 9 times. Each time, I raise

my right hand and swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United

States of America. We all take that oath—no matter if you serve in Congress, the

Cabinet, or wear a uniform. That oath, however, is not to an administration, a president, or a party. The oath is sworn to the Constitution. • The threats facing the country today are real, and evolving. Terrorists across

the globe have predatory intent and want to harm the American people. Some programs designed to keep the American people safe do need to remain secret. But,

each and every one of these programs must respect the Constitution and what it

stands for.

• The current administration only adheres to the law when it chooses to. It

doesn’t take the commitment to the Constitution seriously. So Dr Kerr, we need a

real commitment from you to uphold the Constitution. This commitment includes

respecting the role of Congress and the need for effective checks and balances.

• There is no question that Dr. Kerr is committed to the mission of the Intelligence Community. He has served the community in a variety of roles, and is a

dedicated public servant.

• As DDNI, Dr. Kerr will need to help strengthen the organization. This includes

achieving the integration that the intelligence community needs, and helping to

minimize and break-down any remaining ‘‘stove pipes’’ in the intelligence community.

• There will also be occasions where Dr. Kerr will have to serve as the Acting

DNI. These are big shoes to fill, and we are all thankful that DNI McConnell has

ably handled this responsibility during the past year.

• In conclusion, this committee has many questions for you, and I look forward

to your answers. Again, I thank you for the service you’ve already provided to the

United States. I hope we have a candid, frank discussion with you about the future

of the DDNI and your thoughts on how you believe the position will develop under

your direction and leadership.

Senator Whitehouse.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman.

Dr. Kerr, welcome. I don’t want to hide the ball in any respect.

I at this point very much anticipate voting for your nomination and

supporting you, but there are a few things I’d like to touch base

with you on at this point in the public hearing.

22

The first is that I’m new in my position; you’re about to be new

in yours. We both have a lot of inherited baggage between our organizations. I hope you will understand that when this Committee

seems perhaps from your point of view to be unduly determined,

unduly persnickety, unduly inquisitive about matters that the recent history has not been very favorable and that our desire to pursue these things and our sense of suspicion, if you will, has been

well-earned. I think it can be earned back, a sense of trust can be

earned back, but I urge you to bend over backwards to accommodate our concerns and questions as we do our oversight job, bearing

in mind that, to a certain extent, here the past is the future.

In that regard, the two big issues that I see are, first, the issue

of intelligence integrity. There have clearly been episodes in which

the intelligence community or elements of the intelligence community have produced the intelligence that principals wanted to support the path that had already been chosen rather than what people might call speaking truth to power. In accounting, people often

talk about a plug number that fits between—we don’t want plug

intelligence around here.

In that vein, you have superior scientific credentials. You have

superior management credentials. Your analytic credentials are not

as strong as your management and scientific credentials, as you alluded to earlier. You are also the Deputy Director, and if the Director is away, you will be the Acting Director. A circumstance could

easily emerge in which you are representing the intelligence community with principals in the White House at times of key decisions. What will your process be for making sure that truth is in

fact told to power and that the real intelligence is what gets to the

decisionmakers, not just what they want to hear?

Dr. KERR. Well, I can tell you first of all that I absolutely support

your point that intelligence needs to be provided to policymakers

and others who need it without bias, without political consideration, and as well-grounded in fact as possible.

With regard to what I would do, while my technical and management credentials are better than my analytic ones, I did, in fact,

serve on the nuclear intelligence panel and chair it for a number

of years within the community—in fact, from roughly 1979 until

1992. And I’ve been a senior reviewer of many of the Estimates

over the years.

So I think what I’m really trying to express is that Director

McConnell and I are complementary in a way. He is an analyst by

training and by profession, and that’s his strongest suit. I have

some other experiences that are complementary to his, and I think

between us we can make a good team.

With regard to how I would deal on the community’s behalf in

advising the President and others, I’ve actually had that opportunity in the past on some particular issues. I was even able on at

least one occasion to suggest to the President there were laws he

could not suspend. These were the laws of physics. But the point

is, I think I have a reputation here with the Congress and with the

Administration of being straight in what I say and bringing integrity when I come to see you.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The other piece of the problem is on the

performance accountability side. In my area, we had the Big Dig

23

which was a tunnel project near Boston that was a huge catastrophic disaster and provided immense news opportunities. When

something goes wrong like that in the intelligence community, because it is covert, there are not those immense news opportunities.

People don’t see how badly things have gone off the rails. And indeed both the contractor who has failed or fouled up the program

and their Government managers have every incentive to paper it

over and have it go away so that nobody notices. But as you know,

there are fantastic, spectacular amounts of money at stake here.

Will you be fully supportive of our efforts in oversight in this respect, including the deployment of what we call TAG groups into

areas where we are really the only oversight that these programs

get?

Dr. KERR. Absolutely. And in fact, in past years I have worked

with members of earlier TAG groups. Ofttimes they include people

with whom I’ve had professional experience in the past. I have no

problem at all expecting to do that in the future.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I could not agree more with the concerns

expressed by Senator Nelson about particular programs that we

should probably discuss more in a classified setting. I want you to

know that many weeks ago I asked for an explanation of what consequences had been applied in those circumstances. I gather that,

because of our recent conversation in our office, I’ve received a classified letter for the first time this morning. But the question that

I asked weeks ago in an open Committee hearing I’ve never received a response to.

So you know, once again, I hope that you—in your role— when

you walk away from a Committee hearing with questions, somebody’s actually tasked to get the answer back because this doesn’t

seem to be a very difficult question. You were actually able to answer it almost spontaneously when we met, and yet for weeks nobody got back to me on this question. And I think this question of

performance accountability for contractors in a covert environment

where nobody knows and huge amounts of money are being spent

and it’s only our oversight that provides any check and balance in

the system—it is really important that you get back to us.

Dr. KERR. Right. Well, I was glad that you asked me the question. And I, in fact, am responsible for what you received. I didn’t

know about the earlier request.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Senator

Whitehouse.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kerr, again, congratulations on your nomination. If you are

confirmed you’ll be coming to this position at a particularly critical

moment.

The country needs the DNI to ask hard questions about the

value, legality, and morality of our intelligence programs and to ensure that our intelligence is accurate, candid, and free of any

politicization, and that’s not an easy task at any time, but particularly in this Administration. But that is what is expected of the

DNI and his Deputy. Of course, we also expect you to level with

the Congress, a topic that you and I discussed yesterday.

24

Let me ask you, Doctor, do you agree that intelligence activities

that have implications for our foreign policy must be briefed to the

full Committee?

Dr. KERR. Just to recall our conversation of yesterday, Senator

Feingold, you made clear your membership here as a crossover

member from Foreign Relations, and one of the points I tried to

make was that ofttimes one of the foreign policy tools available to

the United States is the intelligence community through liaison relationships and other things. My answer to that is I think those responsible for the oversight of U.S. foreign policy need to understand both the front channel and the back channel—what’s going

in both of them, what’s capable of being done—in order to provide

proper oversight of our foreign policy execution.

Senator FEINGOLD. And in this context you’re referring obviously

to the full Committee?

Dr. KERR. Correct.

Senator FEINGOLD. And so this would be particularly relevant to

covert action, wouldn’t it?

Dr. KERR. I think it would be applicable to covert action. I think

generally the full Committee needs to know about covert action

programs, and the only caveat I would add there is that which is

present in the law and really refers to those special cases where

lives are at risk or other very delicate things are hanging in the

balance and where it might be left to the so-called Gang of Eight.

Senator FEINGOLD. And in fact, the only provision in the National Security Act that allows for the so-called limited Gang of

Eight notifications applies to covert action, and, as you’ve indicated, that can never be license to limit information that has implications for our foreign policy. So if confirmed will you review covert

actions or any other intelligence activities that may have been limited to the Gang of Eight to ensure that the provision is not being

abused?

Dr. KERR. I will.

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, do you believe that the laws that

apply to elements of the intelligence community are binding and

cannot be overridden by assertions of Article II authority?

Dr. KERR. Article II, as I understand it, refers to the role of the

President as Commander-in-Chief and the responsibilities he has

for the military services and the Defense Department as a consequence. Some of the intelligence agencies are not, in fact, part of

the Defense Department and so they would not fall within the

ambit of the Commander-in-Chief designation. They would, in fact,

be agencies of the Federal Government and subject to the laws and

regulations that apply.

Senator FEINGOLD. But in any event do you believe that the laws

that apply to the elements of the intelligence community cannot be

overridden by assertions of Article II authority?

Dr. KERR. I’m not a constitutional scholar, as I’m sure you recognize, but I don’t know of any exceptions to the law that, in fact,

any military or civilian employee of the Government is entitled to.

Senator FEINGOLD. So can you think of any laws that apply to

the intelligence community that you believe intrude on the President’s authorities?

Dr. KERR. No, I don’t.

25

Senator FEINGOLD. No?

Dr. KERR. I don’t know of any.

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, as Deputy DNI you’ll be conducting

oversight of an intelligence community whose activities under this

Administration have been justified sometimes by what I consider

to be and others consider to be outlandish legal theories on issues

such as electronic surveillance and interrogation. Even worse, Philip Zelikow, who was counsel to the State Department until last

year, has written that those dubious legal theories have substituted

for moral and policy deliberations. In other words, what some lawyer says the Administration can do precludes consideration of what

it should do.

In my view, the DNI, through its oversight role, can help reverse

this disastrous practice by insisting that our intelligence activities

are truly in America’s interest. One such issue is the DNI’s oversight of the implementation of the President’s new Executive order

on interrogations. I have opposed the Administration’s policies in

this area on legal grounds, but also because they have damaged

our long-term efforts to mobilize our friends and isolate our enemies in the fight against al-Qa’ida. Doctor, as Deputy DNI, how

will you ensure that these strategic issues are given appropriate

weight?

Dr. KERR. I think the fundamental commitment that DNI

McConnell and I would both bring to this is that we do understand

the responsibilities we have under the Constitution, under the law,

and, in fact, the need to secure the liberties for our people. I would,

in fact, try to be very diligent in understanding not only the specific legal argument advanced for a course of action, but try to understand it in a broader context of what the likely effect would be

of that course of action.

Senator FEINGOLD. I think that’s terribly important and is exactly what you should be doing because, again, simply because

something can be done by the executive branch, even if that’s right,

does not mean it’s in the best interests of this country. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold

and Senator Whitehouse. We appreciate very much your staying

with us.

There are a number of things going on that I believe I and other

Members have to attend, so I’m going to propose that the classified

questions be submitted in classified form to the witness and ask

that he respond to them in a classified manner, and I’d also say

you’ve seen we have some healthy disagreements on policy on this

Committee and I would also say that I used to be a lawyer and I

don’t read the President’s Article II powers as confined to the Defense Department, if that was the gist of it. So fortunately, neither

one of us is called on to be counsel to advise either the President

or this Committee, so we will leave those subjects to perhaps people with more active and current knowledge of the law. With that,

I thank the witness and the Members and declare this hearing adjourned. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. KERR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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