* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50712

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LOUIS ALFONSO KREZDORN

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:04-CR-290

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Louis Alfonzo Krezdorn (Krezdorn) appeals his conviction, following a jury

trial, of various offenses arising out of payments he made to obtain illegal access

to the Eagle Pass port of entry computer database. Krezdorn contends that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his March 12, 2003 sworn

confession because law enforcement failed to inform him of his rights under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). He alternatively argues that his

confession was not voluntary.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 31, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-50712

2

“We have long pitched the standard of review for a motion to suppress

based on live testimony at a suppression hearing at a high level.” United States

v. Randall, 887 F.2d 1262, 1265 (5th Cir. 1989). “In reviewing the denial of the

defendant’s motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings,

including its credibility choices, for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo.”

United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2002). “A factual finding is not

clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.”

United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). Suppression

hearing evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party.” Id.

A person subject to interrogation by government agents need be

Mirandized “only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom

as to render him in custody.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).

A person not formally arrested is deemed to be in custody “when a reasonable

person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to

constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law

associates with formal arrest.” UnitedStates v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A confession is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the

statementis the product ofthe accused’s free and rational choice.” UnitedStates

v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). The Government

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a

challenged confession was voluntary. Id.

Although signed atthe United States Customs Office, Krezdorn’s affidavit

states that his confession was given voluntarily and that he understood that he

was notin custody. At the hearing, agents testified that they told Krezdorn that

he was free to leave at any time. The agents also testified that that they were

neither armed nor in uniform when they met with Krezdorn, that they neither

threatened him nor promised him leniency, that they neither frisked nor
No. 06-50712

3

handcuffed him, that he did not ask to speak to a lawyer or stop the interview

at any point, and that he contributed to and reviewed the affidavit prior to

signing. Although Krezdorn contradicted most of the agent’s assertions, the

district court did notfind him credible, and he makes no showing thatthe court’s

credibility determination was clearly erroneous. Under these circumstances, the

district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. See Courtney, 463

F.3d at 337 (5th Cir. 2006); Bell, 367 F.3d at 461.

AFFIRMED.