COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Baker 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TAMMY LYNN ROHE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0779-98-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 APRIL 27, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KING WILLIAM COUNTY 

Thomas B. Hoover, Judge 

(Anne H. Harris; Harris & Harris, on brief), 

for appellant. Appellant submitting on 

brief. 

Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 Tammy Lynn Rohe (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

for an attempted breaking and entering, with intent to commit 

larceny. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the conviction. Finding no error, we disagree 

and affirm the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

The credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded testimony, 

and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters to be 

determined by the fact finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. 

App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment of the 

trial court will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without 

support in the evidence. See Code § 8.01-680. 

I. 

 The record discloses that, on July 7, 1997, Geraldine 

Overstreet was ill and had remained home from her regular 

employment. In the early afternoon, Mrs. Overstreet “was in the 

bathroom washing clothes . . . [and] heard this bumping noise.” 

She “went up the hallway[,] . . . heard something . . . cracking 

or . . . popping,” and suddenly the front door, which had been 

“closed and locked,” “came open.” Mrs. Overstreet “scream[ed], 

you can’t come in here,” and “pulled [the door handle] in, because 

the person had something . . . to break the chain” restraint 

remaining on the door. During the commotion, the curtain fell 

from the doorway window, and Mrs. Overstreet recognized her niece, 

defendant, “standing there with a long screwdriver.” 

 Mrs. Overstreet had not seen defendant since December, 1996, 

and she did not have permission to enter her home. When Mrs. 

Overstreet asked, “why are you doing this?,” defendant answered 

that she “came to turn [herself] in” and requested that Mrs. 

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Overstreet “call her mother.” Instead, she telephoned the 

“courthouse” and reported to a deputy sheriff that “[defendant] 

just tried to break in. Can you come and get her?” 

 When Mrs. Overstreet would not permit defendant to enter her 

home, which contained substantial furnishings and other items of 

value, defendant “put the screwdriver down,” and declared that 

“she had two brown envelopes she wanted [Mrs. Overstreet] to 

have.” Mrs. Overstreet instructed defendant to “[l]eave it on the 

picnic table,” later discovering that one envelope contained an 

operational cellular telephone. Shortly thereafter, police 

arrived and arrested defendant for attempting to break and enter 

the Overstreet residence, with the intent to commit larceny, the 

subject offense. 

 Woodrow Overstreet, Mrs. Overstreet’s husband, testified that 

he had spoken with his sister, Frieda Thornton, defendant’s 

mother, several days prior to the offense and was advised that 

defendant “was to turn herself in to family,” “supposed to turn 

herself in [at the church]; so [they] were looking for her.” 

Defendant objected to the court’s inquiry into the meaning of Mr. 

Overstreet’s reference to “turn herself in.” Mr. Overstreet had 

not seen or spoken with defendant in “four or five years” but had 

“told her before, if she needed to come [to his home], she could 

come there when somebody was there, and [he] didn’t want her to 

break in.” 

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 Defendant moved the court to strike the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, arguing that it did not sufficiently prove that 

defendant attempted to break and enter the home with the requisite 

larcenous intent. Defendant’s counsel hypothesized that defendant 

“was knocking on the door with a screwdriver, trying to knock 

louder so that somebody would answer, so that she could turn 

herself in.” Finding this argument incredible, the court denied 

the motion and convicted defendant of the instant charge, noting 

that the evidence “shows only that [defendant] had the intent to 

break into the house, and that there were items of value there for 

her to steal.” 

II. 

 “An attempt to commit a crime consists of (1) the specific 

intent to commit the particular crime, and (2) an ineffectual 

act done towards its commission.” Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. 

App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991) (citation omitted). 

Intent is a state of mind that may be shown by the circumstances 

surrounding the offense, including defendant’s words and 

conduct. See Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 16, 174 

S.E.2d 779, 781 (1970). Thus, 

“[w]hen an unlawful entry is made into a 

dwelling, the presumption is that the entry 

was made for an unlawful purpose. And we 

think it likewise correct that the specific 

purpose, meaning specific intent, with which 

such entry is made may be inferred from the 

surrounding facts and circumstances.” 

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Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 840, 284 S.E.2d 608, 609 

(1981) (citations omitted). “In the absence of evidence showing 

a contrary intent, the trier of fact may infer that a person’s 

unauthorized presence in another’s house was with the intent to 

commit larceny.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 

138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995) (citation omitted). 

 The Commonwealth “‘is not required to disprove every remote 

possibility of innocence, but is, instead, required only to 

establish guilt of the accused to the exclusion of a reasonable 

doubt.’” Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 289, 373 

S.E.2d 328, 338 (1988) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 496 

U.S. 911 (1990). “The hypotheses [of innocence] which the 

prosecution must reasonably exclude are those ‘which flow from 

the evidence itself, and not from the imagination of defendant’s 

counsel.’” Black, 222 Va. at 841, 284 S.E.2d at 609 (citation 

omitted). 

 Here, defendant, in possession of a screwdriver, forcibly 

opened the locked front door of the Overstreet residence, during 

a time when the house was customarily unoccupied. Mr. and Mrs. 

Overstreet had not been in contact with defendant for a 

substantial time and had not given permission for her to enter 

their home, which contained personalty of significant value. 

The evidence provided no explanation for defendant’s unlawful 

conduct, and the hypothesis offered by defense counsel was 

without support in the record. 

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 Thus, the evidence clearly established that defendant 

attempted to break and enter the residence, then intending to 

commit larceny, and we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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