PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 736–761 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 23, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
736 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the ninth circuit 

No. 22–105. Argued March 21, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 

Abraham Bielski fled a putative class action on behalf of Coinbase users 

alleging that Coinbase, an online currency platform, failed to replace 

funds fraudulently taken from the users' accounts. Because Coinbase's 

User Agreement provides for dispute resolution through binding arbitration, Coinbase fled a motion to compel arbitration. The District 

Court denied the motion. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal 

to the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 16(a), 

which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to 

compel arbitration. Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its 

proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The District Court denied Coinbase's stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit likewise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings pending appeal. 

Held: A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory 

appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 740–747. 

(a) Section 16(a) does not say whether district court proceedings must 

be stayed pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal. But Congress 

enacted the provision against a clear background principle prescribed 

by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, 

“divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case 

involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 

459 U. S. 56, 58. The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the 

question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead 

in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the appeal,” id., at 58, and Griggs dictates that the district court stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. 

Most courts of appeals to address this question, as well as leading treatises, agree with that conclusion. 

The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the 

pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under § 16(a) refects common 

sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial 

proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many 

of the asserted benefts of arbitration (effciency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the 

court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in 

arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to 

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Syllabus 

settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and 

trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs 

rule avoids these detrimental results. 

Congress's longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given 

Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and 

to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, 

Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast, 

when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to 

automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of 

appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “nonstay” provisions. Pp. 740–744. 

(b) Bielski's arguments to overcome the Griggs principle are unpersuasive. First, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to prevent 

unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals that an automatic stay might otherwise encourage. Second, Congress included 

explicit stay requirements in two other statutory provisions for reasons 

particular to those statutes, not because Congress thought that an interlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceedings. 

Third, the result here does not create a special, arbitration-preferring 

procedural rule, but simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same 

stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts where an 

interlocutory appeal is authorized. Fourth, experience shows that ordinary discretionary stay factors would not adequately protect parties' 

rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. In 

any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of how often 

courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary discretionary 

stay factors. Fifth, while the Court has recognized that questions of 

arbitrability are severable from merits questions, the sole issue here is 

whether the district court's authority to consider a case is “involved in 

the appeal” when an appellate court considers the threshold question of 

arbitrability, Griggs, 459 U. S., at 58. The answer is yes. Pp. 744–747. 

Reversed and remanded. 

Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 

C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., fled 

a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined in full, 

and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV, post, p. 747. 

Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Jessica L. Ellsworth, Jo-Ann 

Tamila Sagar, William E. Havemann, Nathaniel A. G. Ze-
738 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

Opinion of the Court 

linsky, Michael G. Rhodes, Kathleen Hartnett, Bethany 

Lobo, and Adam M. Katz. 

Hassan A. Zavareei argued the cause for respondents. 

With him on the brief for respondent Abraham Bielski were 

Glenn E. Chappell, Spencer S. Hughes, Sabita J. Soneji, 

Wesley M. Griffth, and Matthew D. Carlson. David J. Harris, Jr., fled a brief for respondents David Suski et al.* 

Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. 

When a federal district court denies a motion to compel 

arbitration, the losing party has a statutory right to an interlocutory appeal. See 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). The sole question 

here is whether the district court must stay its pre-trial and 

trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing. The answer is yes: The district court must stay its 

proceedings. 

I 

Coinbase operates an online platform on which users can 

buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued currencies. When creating a Coinbase account, individuals agree 

to the terms in Coinbase's User Agreement. As relevant 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal 

Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner, John F. Querio, and Scott P. Dixler; 

for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by 

Mark A. Perry, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Elizabeth Milito; for the Civil 

Justice Association of California by Fred J. Hiestand and Benjamin G. 

Shatz; for the National Retail Federation by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. 

Parasharami, and Kevin Ranlett; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews and John M. Masslon II. Sarah Elizabeth 

Spencer fled a brief for the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy as 

amicus curiae urging vacatur. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American 

Association for Justice by Deepak Gupta, Matthew W. H. Wessler, Jennifer 

Bennett, and Tad Thomas; for the Constitutional Accountability Center 

by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; and for Public Justice by 

Karla Gilbride. 

Jason D. Russell, Deborah R. White, Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Meredith 

C. Slawe, and Lara A. Flath fled a brief for the Retail Litigation Center, 

Inc., as amicus curiae. 

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Opinion of the Court 

here, the User Agreement contains an arbitration provision, 

which directs that disputes arising under the agreement be 

resolved through binding arbitration. 

This case concerns a putative class action fled against 

Coinbase in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Abraham Bielski sued on behalf of Coinbase users who allege that Coinbase failed to replace funds 

fraudulently taken from the users' accounts. 

The District Court denied Coinbase's motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal to the 

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under 9 U. S. C. 

§ 16(a).1 Section 16(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal 

from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 

Coinbase also moved to stay District Court proceedings 

pending resolution of the arbitrability issue on appeal. The 

District Court declined to stay its proceedings. After receiving Coinbase's motion for a stay, the Ninth Circuit likewise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings. The 

Ninth Circuit followed its precedent, under which an appeal 

from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration does not 

automatically stay district court proceedings. See Britton 

v. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F. 2d 1405, 1412 (1990). By 

contrast, however, most other Courts of Appeals to address 

the question have held that a district court must stay its 

proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the question 

of arbitrability is ongoing. E. g., Bradford-Scott Data Corp. 

v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F. 3d 504, 506 

(CA7 1997). 

1 As relevant, the text of § 16(a) provides: 

“An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . 

“(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, 

“(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration 

to proceed, 

“(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel 

arbitration, 

“(D) confrming or denying confrmation of an award or partial award, or 

“(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award.” 

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To resolve that disagreement among the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2022). 

II 

The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agreements. In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan 

signed an amendment to the Act; the amendment is codifed 

at 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). Under § 16(a), when a district court denies a party's motion to compel arbitration, that party may 

take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare 

statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not 

appeal before fnal judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. 

v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108–109 (2009). Notably, Congress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders 

denying—but not of orders granting—motions to compel 

arbitration. 

The sole question before this Court is whether a district 

court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes. 

Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court proceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted § 16(a) 

against a clear background principle prescribed by this 

Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982). That 

Griggs principle refects a longstanding tenet of American 

procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 157 

(1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) 

(Thomas, J., joined by Alito and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring 

in denial of certiorari) (describing Griggs principle as “well 

settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic 

Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 379 (1985) (“In general, fling of a 

notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals 

and divests the district court of control over those aspects of 

the case involved in the appeal”). 

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The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the 

question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration 

or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially 

“involved in the appeal.” 459 U. S., at 58. As Judge Easterbrook cogently explained, when a party appeals the denial 

of a motion to compel arbitration, whether “the litigation 

may go forward in the district court is precisely what the 

court of appeals must decide.” Bradford-Scott Data Corp. 

v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F. 3d 504, 506 

(CA7 1997). Stated otherwise, the question of whether “the 

case should be litigated in the district court . . . is the mirror 

image of the question presented on appeal.” Id., at 505. 

Here, as elsewhere, it “makes no sense for trial to go forward 

while the court of appeals cogitates on whether there should 

be one.” Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 

1989). In short, Griggs dictates that the district court must 

stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing.2 

Most courts of appeals to address the question in the 

§ 16(a) context have reached that same conclusion. E. g., 

Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F. 3d 1249, 1253 

(CA11 2004) (“[I]t makes little sense for the litigation to continue in the district court while the appeal is pending”).3 

Leading treatises agree that a district court should stay its 

proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is 

2 Coinbase concedes that the district court may still proceed with matters that are not involved in the appeal, such as the awarding of costs and 

attorney's fees. Brief for Petitioner 21; see also 16A C. Wright, A. Miller, 

E. Cooper, & C. Struve, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1, pp. 68– 

69 (5th ed. 2019). 3 See also Levin v. Alms & Assoc., Inc., 634 F. 3d 260, 266 (CA4 2011); 

Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F. 3d 207, 215, n. 6 (CA3 2007); 

McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F. 3d 1158, 1162–1163 

(CA10 2005); Bombardier Corp. v. National R. Passenger Corporation, 

333 F. 3d 250, 252 (CADC 2003); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician 

Computer Network, Inc., 128 F. 3d 504, 505–507 (CA7 1997); but see, e. g., 

Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F. 3d 904, 907–910 (CA5 2011). 

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ongoing. For example, Moore's treatise states that a “stay 

in these circumstances” is “the sounder approach” and “is 

consistent with the general [Griggs] principle that a district 

court should not exercise jurisdiction over those aspects of 

the case that are involved in the appeal.” 19 J. Moore, 

D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Federal Practice § 203.12[3][a] (3d ed. 2022). Similarly, the 

Wright and Miller treatise endorses the automatic stay requirement in arbitration cases. The treatise explains that a 

“complete stay of district-court proceedings pending appeal 

from a refusal to order arbitration is desirable” because 

“[c]ontinued trial-court proceedings pending appeal could 

lead to an entirely wasted trial if arbitration is ordered on 

appeal.” 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3914.17, p. 7 (2d ed., Supp. 2022). 

In the Circuits that have considered the issue in the analogous contexts of qualifed immunity and double jeopardy, 

moreover, district courts likewise must automatically stay 

their proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing.4 

Similarly, as Bielski acknowledges, courts have held that the 

Griggs principle applies to those aspects of the case involved 

in a certifed interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b).5 

The common practice in § 16(a) cases, therefore, is for a 

district court to stay its proceedings while the interlocutory 

appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. That common practice 

4 E. g., United States v. Montgomery, 262 F. 3d 233, 239–240 (CA4 2001) 

(double jeopardy); United States v. LaMere, 951 F. 2d 1106, 1108 (CA9 

1991) (same); United States v. Grabinski, 674 F. 2d 677, 679 (CA8 1982) 

(same); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F. 2d 985, 988–989 (CA5 1980) (en 

banc) (same); Chuman v. Wright, 960 F. 2d 104, 105 (CA9 1992) (qualifed 

immunity); Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F. 2d 444, 448–449 (CA6 1991) (same); 

Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1989) (same); Stewart v. 

Donges, 915 F. 2d 572, 575–576 (CA10 1990) (both). 5 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 60–61; see also Green Leaf Nursery v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F. 3d 1292, 1309 (CA11 2003); Los Angeles 

v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F. 3d 882, 885–886 (CA9 2001); Dayton 

Independent School Dist. v. U. S. Mineral Prods. Co., 906 F. 2d 1059, 1063– 

1064 (CA5 1990). 

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refects common sense. Absent an automatic stay of district 

court proceedings, Congress's decision in § 16(a) to afford a 

right to an interlocutory appeal would be largely nullifed. 

If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and 

trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefts of arbitration (effciency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) 

would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later 

concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration 

all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. That potential for coercion is especially pronounced in 

class actions, where the possibility of colossal liability can 

lead to what Judge Friendly called “blackmail settlements.” 

H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973). 

As Judge Easterbrook stated, continuation of proceedings 

in the district court “largely defeats the point of the appeal.” 

Bradford-Scott, 128 F. 3d, at 505. A right to interlocutory 

appeal of the arbitrability issue without an automatic stay of 

the district court proceedings is therefore like a lock without 

a key, a bat without a ball, a computer without a keyboard— 

in other words, not especially sensible. 

From the Judiciary's institutional perspective, moreover, 

allowing a case to proceed simultaneously in the district 

court and the court of appeals creates the possibility that 

the district court will waste scarce judicial resources—which 

could be devoted to other pressing criminal or civil matters—on a dispute that will ultimately head to arbitration 

in any event. That scenario represents the “worst possible 

outcome” for parties and the courts: litigating a dispute in 

the district court only for the court of appeals to “reverse 

and order the dispute arbitrated.” Id., at 506. The Griggs 

rule avoids that detrimental result. 

Importantly, Congress's longstanding practice both refects and reinforces the Griggs rule. When Congress wants 

to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically 

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stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Congress need not say anything about a stay. At least absent 

contrary indications, the background Griggs principle already requires an automatic stay of district court proceedings that relate to any aspect of the case involved in the 

appeal. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an 

interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district 

court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically 

says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals 

system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory 

“non-stay” provisions.6 Indeed, Congress enacted a “nonstay” provision the day before enacting § 16(a) in 1988. See 

102 Stat. 4120 (“Neither the application for, nor the granting 

of, an appeal . . . shall stay proceedings in the Court of Veterans Appeals”). 

In short, the Griggs rule requires that a district court stay 

its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. 

III 

To overcome the Griggs principle, Bielski advances fve 

main arguments. None is persuasive. 

First, Bielski contends that an automatic stay would encourage frivolous appeals that would improperly delay district court proceedings. To begin with, Bielski has not established that frivolous appeals frequently occur in the 

6 Act of Apr. 3, 1926, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233–234; Act of Feb. 28, 1927, 

ch. 228, id., at 1261; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72 Stat. 1770; 

Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 125, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U. S. C. 

§ 1292(d)(3); Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1558, 100 Stat. 2757–2758, 26 

U. S. C. § 7482(a)(2)(A); Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 102 Stat. 4120, as 

amended, 38 U. S. C. § 7292(b)(1); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 203, 28 U. S. C. § 158(d)(2)(D); 

Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, § 306, 

130 Stat. 582, 48 U. S. C. § 2166(e)(6); see also Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 26 

Stat. 828; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660–661; Fed. Rule Civ. 

Proc. 23(f). 

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Circuits that have long applied the Griggs principle in arbitration cases. Cf. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White 

Sales, Inc., 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Nor does Bielski argue 

that Coinbase's appeal in this case is frivolous. Importantly, 

moreover, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to prevent unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals. For example, a party can ask the court of appeals to 

summarily affrm, to expedite an interlocutory appeal, or to 

dismiss the interlocutory appeal as frivolous. In addition, 

nearly every circuit has developed a process by which a district court itself may certify that an interlocutory appeal is 

frivolous. Brief for Petitioner 51; see also Arthur Andersen 

LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 629 (2009) (“Appellate courts 

can streamline the disposition of meritless claims and even 

authorize the district court's retention of” a case “when an 

appeal is certifed as frivolous”). Finally, a court of appeals 

may impose sanctions where appropriate; the possibility of 

sanctions also helps deter frivolous appeals. See Fed. Rule 

App. Proc. 38; Arthur Andersen, 556 U. S., at 629. 

Second, Bielski contrasts § 16(a) with two other statutory 

provisions that contain an explicit stay requirement—§ 3 of 

the Federal Arbitration Act and § 1292(d)(4) of Title 28. 

Bielski suggests that Congress would not have included 

those explicit stay requirements in § 3 and § 1292(d)(4) unless 

Congress thought that an interlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceedings. Bielski is wrong. 

Section 3 of the Act provides for a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration, not pending an appeal. That situation does not fall within the Griggs rule. No background 

principle requires automatic stays of district court proceedings pending arbitration. In order to automatically stay 

court proceedings pending arbitration in those cases, Congress therefore affrmatively codifed a stay requirement. 

As to § 1292(d)(4): When Congress added § 1292(d)(4)'s stay 

requirement in 1988, the relevant subsection already contained a provision, § 1292(d)(3), that expressly made stays of 
746 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

Opinion of the Court 

proceedings in certain courts discretionary rather than mandatory. To avoid any misinterpretation of § 1292(d)(4) because of that preexisting language in § 1292(d)(3), Congress 

specifed the right to an automatic stay pending appeal in 

§ 1292(d)(4). That unusual circumstance does not diminish 

the operation of the Griggs rule in the context of arbitrability appeals. 

Third, Bielski contends that requiring an automatic stay 

would create a special, arbitration-preferring procedural 

rule. That is incorrect. In fact, Bielski's proposed approach would disfavor arbitration. Applying the Griggs 

rule here simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same 

stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts 

where an interlocutory appeal is authorized, including qualifed immunity and double jeopardy. Bielski further points 

to forum selection clauses as an analogy. But unlike § 16(a) 

arbitrability appeals, Congress has not created a right to an 

interlocutory appeal for cases involving forum selection 

clauses. So a stay in the forum selection context could be 

required only in those cases where there is a certifed 

§ 1292(b) interlocutory appeal of the forum selection issue. 

Fourth, Bielski suggests that there is no need for an automatic stay because the ordinary discretionary stay factors 

would adequately protect parties' rights to an interlocutory 

appellate determination of arbitrability. To begin with, experience shows that Bielski is incorrect. District courts and 

courts of appeals applying the usual four-factor standard for 

a discretionary stay often deny stays in § 16(a) appeals 

because courts applying that test often do not consider 

litigation-related burdens (here, from the continued District 

Court proceedings) to constitute irreparable harm. See 

Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434–435 (2009); FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 244 (1980) (“Mere litigation 

expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not 

constitute irreparable injury” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a (District Court in Bielski stating that “[m]ere litigation expenses do not generally 

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constitute irreparable injury” for purposes of stay pending 

appeal). In any event, the background Griggs rule applies 

regardless of how often courts might otherwise grant stays 

under the ordinary discretionary stay factors. 

Fifth, Bielski relies on this Court's statement that questions of arbitrability are “severable from the merits of the 

underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 

v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 21 (1983). But the 

sole issue here is whether the district court's authority to 

consider a case is “involved in the appeal” when an appellate court considers the threshold question of arbitrability. 

Griggs, 459 U. S., at 58. The answer is yes, and Moses H. 

Cone says nothing to the contrary. 

* * * 

We conclude that, after Coinbase appealed from the denial 

of its motion to compel arbitration, the District Court was 

required to stay its proceedings. On remand, we anticipate 

that the Ninth Circuit here, as we anticipate in § 16(a) appeals more generally, will proceed with appropriate expedition when considering Coinbase's interlocutory appeal from 

the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. We reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor and 

Justice Kagan join, and with whom Justice Thomas joins 

as to Parts II, III, and IV, dissenting. 

When a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory review of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at 

the trial court level. Usually, the trial judge then makes a 

particularized determination upon request, based on the 

7 The Court's judgment today pertains to respondent Abraham Bielski. 

The writ of certiorari as to respondents David Suski et al. is dismissed as 

improvidently granted. 

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facts and circumstances of that case, as to whether the remaining part of the case should continue unabated or be 

paused (stayed) pending appeal. This discretionary decisionmaking promotes procedural fairness because it allows 

for a balancing of all relevant interests. See Nken v. 

Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009). 

Today, the Court departs from this traditional approach. 

It holds that, with respect to an interlocutory appeal of a 

trial court order denying arbitration, a trial court must always “stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing.” Ante, at 738. In other words, 

in this context, the Court sees ft to impose a mandatory 

general stay of trial court proceedings. 

This mandatory-general-stay rule for interlocutory arbitrability appeals comes out of nowhere. No statute imposes 

it. Nor does any decision of this Court. Yet today's majority invents a new stay rule perpetually favoring one class of 

litigants—defendants seeking arbitration. Those defendants will now receive a stay even when, according to the 

usual equitable analysis, there is no good reason for one. 

And, in reaching this result, the Court concludes for the frst 

time that an interlocutory appeal about one matter (arbitrability) bars the district court from proceeding on another 

(the merits). That logic has such signifcant implications for 

federal litigation that the majority itself shies away from the 

Pandora's box it may have opened. 

I see no basis here for wresting away the discretion traditionally entrusted to the judge closest to a case. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Congress did not impose the mandatory-general-stay rule 

that the majority adopts today. 

Start with the governing statute. Congress addressed 

the kind of interlocutory appeals at issue here in 9 U. S. C. 

§ 16—the section of the Federal Arbitration Act it enacted 

to govern “Appeals.” 102 Stat. 4671 (amending the Federal 

Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.). Section 16 provides 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

that “[a]n appeal may be taken from” specifed orders and 

decisions, and “an appeal may not be taken from” others. 

The appeals that § 16 authorizes include interlocutory 

appeals of orders denying requests for arbitration. 

§§ 16(a)(1)(A)–(C). 

But nowhere did Congress provide that such an interlocutory appeal automatically triggers a general stay of pre-trial 

and trial proceedings. As the majority opinion admits, § 16 

never even mentions a stay pending appeal. Ante, at 740. 

Even beyond that, related provisions confrm that Congress imposed no mandatory general stay in § 16 appeals. 

“Where Congress includes particular language in one section 

of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, 

it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken, 

556 U. S., at 430 (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Congress did that here—twice. 

First, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocutory stay in another provision of the same 1988 law that 

enacted § 16. See 102 Stat. 4652, 4670–4671. Like § 16, 

that other provision—codifed at 28 U. S. C. § 1292(d)(4)—authorizes interlocutory appeals. See § 1292(d)(4)(A). But 

unlike § 16, the text of that other provision specifes that, 

upon an interlocutory appeal, “proceedings shall be . . . 

stayed until the appeal has been decided.” § 1292(d)(4)(B). 

This resembles the rule the majority adopts today for § 16 

appeals. Yet Congress omitted it from § 16, while simultaneously imposing it in § 1292(d)(4). 

Second, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocutory stay in another provision of the Federal Arbitration Act. 

Section 3 pertains to a circumstance in which the trial court 

is “satisfed” that an issue should be referred to arbitration. 

9 U. S. C. § 3. In such a case, the statute expressly provides 

that the trial court “shall on application of one of the parties 

stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 

had.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Again, the contrast with 

§ 16 is stark. Congress specifed a mandatory general stay 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

of trial court proceedings in § 3 (when the trial court determines that arbitration is warranted) but not § 16(a) (when the 

court determines that arbitration is unwarranted). 

The majority opinion waves away these mandatorygeneral-stay provisions by jerry-rigging explanations for 

why Congress mandated those stays expressly without doing 

so in § 16. Ante, at 745–746. But the point remains: Congress focused on stays when crafting the 1988 law and the 

Federal Arbitration Act. And when it intended to mandate 

interlocutory stays, it said so expressly. Nothing stopped 

Congress from doing so in § 16—yet it chose not to. This 

underscores that § 16 does not mandate a stay.1 

1 The majority's explanation for why Congress mandated a stay in 28 

U. S. C. § 1292(d)(4) also makes no sense. According to the majority, Congress usually remains silent when it intends to mandate a stay. Ante, 

at 743–744, 745–746. Congress expressly imposed a mandatory stay in 

§ 1292(d)(4), the majority says, only because a pre-existing provision, 

§ 1292(d)(3), would otherwise have made stays in § 1292(d)(4) appeals discretionary. Ante, at 745–746. 

But that last point holds no water. Paragraph (3) has no bearing on 

paragraph (4), because these two provisions govern different kinds of 

appeals. 

Specifcally, paragraph (3) governs certain appeals by permission, while 

paragraph (4) governs a separate set of appeals as of right. Paragraph 

(3) addresses events unique to permissive appeals: “Neither the application for nor the granting of an appeal” stays trial court proceedings. 

§ 1292(d)(3) (emphasis added). Paragraph (3) thus corresponds to paragraphs (1) and (2), which authorize permissive appeals “if application is 

made” and granted. §§ 1292(d)(1)–(2). Meanwhile, paragraph (4) separately authorizes certain as-of-right appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(A), and it imposes mandatory stays in such appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(B). In an appeal as 

of right under paragraph (4), paragraph (3) never kicks in, because there 

is no “application for” or “granting of” an appeal, § 1292(d)(3). 

Thus, the majority's story—that Congress needed express stay language 

to avoid overlap with paragraph (3)—turns on a red herring. There is no 

such overlap. Instead, only the more straightforward explanation remains: Congress imposed a mandatory general stay in § 1292(d)(4)—but 

not 9 U. S. C. § 16—because it intended such a stay under the former but 

not the latter. 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

Given all this, it is no surprise that Congress's enactments 

barely fgure into the majority opinion. The mandatorygeneral-stay rule is so untethered from § 16 that the statutory text has no role in the Court's reasoning. 

And when Congress's work fnally does take the stage near 

the end of the Court's analysis, it plays a minor part. See 

ante, at 743–744. The Court notes that other statutes expressly provide that appeals do not automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante, at 744, and n. 6. From this, 

the Court tries to draw an across-the-board inference that, 

unless Congress expressly disavows the majority's 

mandatory-general-stay rule, that rule applies. 

The Court's inference fails. The statutes that the majority points to have nothing to do with arbitration or § 16 (unlike the two provisions discussed above, which were enacted 

in the same 1988 law as § 16 and codifed alongside § 16 in 

the Federal Arbitration Act, respectively, supra, at 749). 

Moreover, and in any event, the majority's cited statutes 

do not support the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. 

The majority invokes statutes that expressly preclude automatic stays of all trial court proceedings. But if the majority is correct that Congress intended the opposite when a 

statute is silent, then stays of all trial court proceedings 

would be required. Yet, the majority's own holding does not 

go that far. See ante, at 741, n. 2. Instead, the majority 

requires stays for some proceedings (those related to the 

merits) but not others (those related to costs and fees), 

ibid.—a line that appears nowhere in the majority's cited 

statutes. 

At the end of the day, the best the majority can do is point 

to a smattering of provisions that do not contain the rule 

that the majority adopts. And those provisions do not even 

relate to § 16 or the majority's rule (staying litigation generally but not proceedings on costs and fees). Neither those 

statutes, nor any other, imposes on arbitrability appeals the 

stay rule that the Court announces. 

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II 

Unable to locate its rule in a statute, the majority opinion 

pivots to “background principle[s].” Ante, at 740. But 

there is no background mandatory-general-stay rule. 

To the contrary, the background rule is that courts have 

case-by-case discretion regarding whether or not to issue a 

stay. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the 

power inherent in every court to control the disposition of 

the causes on its docket.” Landis v. North American Co., 

299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936). That power is discretionary—it 

“calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests” in each particular case. Id., at 254–255. 

One key to this discretionary-stay tradition is its “suppleness 

of adaptation to varying conditions.” Id., at 256. A stay 

“is not a matter of right” and cannot be imposed “refexively.” Nken, 556 U. S., at 427 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

That has long been the default rule. A court's discretion 

“to grant a stay pending review” is “frmly imbedded in our 

judicial system, consonant with the historic procedures of 

federal appellate courts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It is “a power as old as the judicial system of the 

nation.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 

U. S. C. § 1651(a) (All Writs Act, originally enacted in 1789, 

1 Stat. 81–82). 

Signifcantly for present purposes, discretionary stays are 

the default for interlocutory appeals in particular—and this 

dates back to the frst federal interlocutory-appeal statute in 

1891. Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 828; see 15A C. 

Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3906, p. 346 (3d ed. 2022). There, Congress established that “proceedings . . . in the court below shall not 

be stayed unless otherwise ordered by that court during 

the pendency of such appeal.” § 7, 26 Stat. 828 (emphasis 

added). 

That statute cemented a background discretionary-stay 

rule that governed even where Congress was silent—as this 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

Court has repeatedly recognized. Shortly after the 1891 

Act, a case arose under conditions in which the Act was silent 

about whether a stay should issue. In re Haberman Mfg. 

Co., 147 U. S. 525, 530 (1893) (fnding “no express provision” 

on point). This Court applied the background rule: “[T]he 

Circuit Court had a discretion to grant or refuse” a stay. 

Ibid. Another case of statutory silence arose a few years 

later. In re McKenzie, 180 U. S. 536, 550–551 (1901). 

Again, this Court reiterated federal courts' “inherent power 

. . . to stay or supersede proceedings on appeal” from an 

interlocutory order. Id., at 551. As this Court summarized 

in yet another case, the rule is that the trial court has “authority” during an interlocutory appeal “to take further proceedings in the cause, unless in its discretion it orders them 

to be stayed, pending the appeal.” Smith v. Vulcan Iron 

Works, 165 U. S. 518, 525 (1897). That authority is “recognized” by the 1891 Act but existed already as a traditional 

matter, “often exercised by other courts of chancery.” Ibid. 

This was the background against which Congress enacted 

§ 16. And—importantly—courts understood stays as discretionary with respect to interlocutory appeals concerning arbitrability. Before Congress enacted § 16, parties brought 

interlocutory arbitrability appeals under other sources of appellate jurisdiction, and courts treated stays as discretionary, 

not mandatory.2 Yet, according to the majority, Congress 

sought to displace that common understanding when it 

enacted § 16—without saying anything at all about stays 

pending appeal. 

Even setting all that aside, the majority opinion's reliance 

on a “background” rule, ante, at 740, still fails. The majority has not shown that its own rule (the mandatory-general2 See, e. g., Pearce v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F. 2d 826, 829 (CADC 

1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F. 2d 974, 977 (CA4 

1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 727 F. 2d 629, 630 (CA7 1984); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refning Co., 273 F. 2d 613, 613–614 (CA1 

1959) (per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 235 F. 2d 209, 

211 (CA2 1956) (per curiam). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

stay rule) existed as a background matter when Congress 

enacted § 16 in 1988. Indeed, the majority opinion does not 

identify a single case in which this Court imposed a mandatory general stay of pre-trial and trial proceedings pending 

an interlocutory appeal. Not in an arbitration case. Not in 

an analogous case about the proper adjudicatory forum for a 

dispute. Not in any interlocutory appeal at all. 

III 

Because neither the statute nor any background law states 

that an interlocutory appeal over arbitrability triggers a 

mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings, the majority opinion resorts to spinning such a rule from a single 

sentence in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 

U. S. 56 (1982) (per curiam). But Griggs expresses a far 

narrower principle, and is thus insuffcient to support the 

majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. 

Griggs stands for a modest proposition: Two courts should 

avoid exercising control over the same order or judgment 

simultaneously. The problem Griggs identifes is the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” Id., at 59. The 

cure Griggs prescribes is that “[t]he fling of a notice of appeal . . . divests the district court of its control over those 

aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Id., at 58. 

And the reason is simple. Two courts simultaneously analyzing the same judgment could step on each other's toes. 

It would interfere with the appellate court's review of an 

order if the district court modifed that order mid-appeal. 

Instead, an order should be reviewed by one court at a time. 

This notion of “one order, one reviewing court” is all that 

was at issue in Griggs. Griggs concerned a party that tried 

to appeal a judgment while the District Court was still considering whether to alter that same judgment. Id., at 56. 

The Court held that the appeal needed to wait until after the 

District Court's work on that judgment was done. Id., at 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

60–61. This result, which followed from the Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, was necessary to “avoi[d]” the situation “in which district courts and courts of appeals would 

both have had the power to modify the same judgment.” 

Id., at 60 (emphasis added). 

Properly understood and applied here, Griggs divests the 

district court of control over only a narrow slice of the case. 

The interlocutory appeal addresses an order declining to 

compel arbitration. Griggs merely prevents the district 

court from modifying that order—i. e., Griggs prevents the 

district judge from revisiting whether to compel arbitration 

while the appeal is pending. Griggs does not stop the district court from proceeding on matters other than 

arbitrability. 

The majority opinion, however, transmogrifes Griggs into 

a sweeping stay of “pre-trial and trial proceedings” on not 

just arbitrability, but also the merits. Ante, at 738. According to the majority, if the question on appeal is “whether 

the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then the 

district court loses control over “the entire case.” Ante, at 

741 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 

That rule far surpasses the statement in Griggs—the sole 

statement on which the majority relies—that a district court 

loses “control over those aspects of the case involved in the 

appeal.” 459 U. S., at 58; ante, at 740. Only the arbitrability order is on appeal, not the merits. And those matters 

are distinct. As this Court recognized (before Congress 

enacted § 16), “arbitrability” is “easily severable from the 

merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 21 (1983). 

The majority cannot justify why it treats these “easily severable” matters as intertwined in an arbitrability appeal. 

“[T]he question on appeal,” as the majority opinion correctly 

identifes, is “whether the case belongs in arbitration.” 

Ante, at 741. But the questions remaining before the district court are different: whether the claims have merit, 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

whether the parties are entitled to the discovery they seek, 

and so on. Proceedings on those questions would not interfere with the appellate court's review of the arbitrability 

order. Those proceedings, in other words, do not implicate 

the Griggs principle, which addresses the “danger a district 

court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” 459 U. S., at 59. 

The Court today expands Griggs beyond what the Congress that enacted § 16 could have foreseen, let alone silently 

incorporated. Indeed, the majority can identify no other 

time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of all merits proceedings just because a distinct procedural question 

was on appeal. 

In fact, the majority's supercharged version of Griggs contradicts its own account of Congress's intent. Consider the 

statutes that the majority points to as models of how Congress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule. Ante, at 

743–744, and n. 6; see supra, at 750–751. Under those statutes, the majority says, Congress intends that an interlocutory appeal does “not . . . automatically stay district court 

proceedings.” Ante, at 744. Yet, the majority also seemingly accepts that under those statutes, “the Griggs principle 

applies.” Ante, at 742. And per “the Griggs principle” as 

the majority sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal 

does automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante, at 

741–742. So a mandatory general stay is thus both prohibited (by the statutory text) and required (by the majority's 

view of Griggs).3 As this contradiction underscores, the ma3 This contradiction arises, for example, under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), one 

of the statutes that the majority cites as prohibiting mandatory general 

stays. See ante, at 744, n. 6 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72 

Stat. 1770 (codifed at § 1292(b))). Section 1292(b) authorizes permissive 

interlocutory appeals from a wide range of orders involving “controlling 

question[s] of law”—including rulings on arbitrability. Arbitrability appeals under § 1292(b) were commonplace when Congress enacted 9 U. S. C. 

§ 16 in 1988. See, e. g., Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F. 2d 454, 457 (CA9 

1973) (“Since 1958 interlocutory arbitration orders have been reviewable 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

jority's holding is untethered from any statute and any existing conception of Griggs. 

IV 

To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the majority ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.” 

Ante, at 742–743. But even the majority's policy concerns 

do not support its rule. 

The dispute here turns on a subset of cases—those in 

which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary 

standard. See Nken, 556 U. S., at 434. All agree that an 

interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is 

met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in 

all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if 

none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable 

balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. 

See ibid. 

The majority offers no good reason for that result. The 

majority says that an automatic stay protects the party seeking arbitration and conserves resources in case the dispute 

“ultimately head[s] to arbitration” after appeal. Ante, at 

743. But the concern fades if that scenario is unrealistic— 

i. e., if the party seeking arbitration is unlikely to succeed 

on appeal. 

The majority's concern is even weaker when a stay would 

harm the opposing party and the public interest much more 

than it would protect the party seeking arbitration. Take, 

for example, a case in which crucial evidence would be lost 

if discovery is delayed. Say a witness is on her deathbed. 

Under the majority's rule, if an interlocutory arbitrability 

appeal under § 16(a) is pending, discovery must be stayed 

in accordance with the procedures prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)”). 

And in a § 1292(b) arbitrability appeal, the majority's reading of § 1292(b) 

would prohibit a mandatory general stay, while the majority's view of 

Griggs would require one. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

and the evidence must be lost. That is apparently so even 

if the parties agree they wish to proceed with discovery. 

The majority's rule also prevents courts from crafting 

case-specifc solutions to balance all the interests at stake. 

Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance, a 

judge could allow the parties to conduct only the forms of 

discovery that would also be permitted in arbitration. That 

would save time and leave nobody worse off even if, as the 

majority fears, the dispute ultimately heads to arbitration. 

But this kind of equitable resolution, which the court and the 

parties might consider “sensible,” ante, at 743, is forbidden 

under the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. 

In addition, for each of the majority's concerns favoring a 

mandatory stay, there are countervailing considerations. 

The majority professes interest in “effciency.” Ibid. But 

forcing district court proceedings to a halt—for months or 

years while the appeal runs its course—is itself ineffcient. 

The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefts of arbitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party 

opposing arbitration loses the benefts of immediate litigation. A plaintiff's request for injunctive protection against 

imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the majority's rule. Similarly, while the majority laments settlement pressure on parties seeking arbitration, ibid., the rule 

it announces imposes settlement pressure in the opposite direction. With justice delayed while the case is on hold, parties “could be forced to settle,” ibid., because they do not 

wish—or cannot afford—to leave their claims in limbo. Incongruously, the majority inficts these burdens on the party 

that won the arbitrability issue before the district court (the 

party opposing arbitration). 

In categorically resolving these conficts in favor of the 

pro-arbitration party, the majority's analysis comes down to 

this: Because the pro-arbitration party gets an interlocutory 

appeal, it should also get an automatic stay. Ibid.; see L. 

Numeroff, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie (1985). But Con-
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

gress was entitled to give one without the other. And the 

right to interlocutory appeal is valuable on its own. It is, 

as the majority explains, “a rare statutory exception to the 

usual rule that parties may not appeal before fnal judgment.” Ante, at 740. Even without a stay, if the interlocutory appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish 

and the dispute goes to arbitration. 

Perhaps for those reasons, real-life parties do not agree 

with the majority that an interlocutory arbitrability appeal 

is pointless without an automatic stay. No stay was issued 

in this case, for example, yet Coinbase still pursued its interlocutory appeal. Nor did other parties stop bringing interlocutory arbitrability appeals in the Circuits that had interpreted § 16 to impose no automatic stay.4 

Yet this Court steps in to give the pro-arbitration party 

the additional right to an automatic stay that Congress withheld. Now, any defendant that devises a non-frivolous argument for arbitration can not only appeal, but also press pause 

on the case—leaving plaintiffs to suffer harm, lose evidence, 

and bleed dry their patience and funding in the meantime. 

To confer that power on a class of litigants, based on blanket 

judgments resolving competing policy concerns, is Congress's domain, not ours. And where Congress is silent, the 

4 For over a decade, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all held 

that a § 16(a) appeal triggers no mandatory general stay. Motorola 

Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F. 3d 39, 53–54 (CA2 2004); Britton v. Co-op 

Banking Group, 916 F. 2d 1405, 1412 (CA9 1990); Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F. 3d 904, 907–910 (CA5 2011). And those Circuits 

face no shortage of interlocutory § 16(a) appeals. See, e. g., Palacios v. 

Alifne Dining, Inc., 2023 WL 2469765 (CA2, Mar. 13, 2023); Laurel v. 

Cintas Corp., 2023 WL 2363686 (CA9, Mar. 6, 2023); NATS, Inc. v. Radiation Shield Technologies, Inc., 2023 WL 2416160 (CA2, Mar. 9, 2023); Hill 

v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F. 4th 457 (CA9 2023); Johnson v. Walmart 

Inc., 57 F. 4th 677 (CA9 2023); Noble Capital Fund Mgmt., LLC v. US 

Capital Global Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 31 F. 4th 333 (CA5 2022); Forby v. One 

Technologies, LP, 13 F. 4th 460 (CA5 2021); Soliman v. Subway Franchisee Adv. Fund Trust, Ltd., 999 F. 3d 828 (CA2 2021); Polyfow, LLC v. 

Specialty RTP, LLC, 993 F. 3d 295 (CA5 2021). 
760 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

job of managing particular litigation, in light of the concrete 

circumstances presented, belongs to the judge closest to a 

case. 

V 

The Court today ventures down an uncharted path—and 

that way lies madness. Never before had this Court mandated a general stay simply because an interlocutory appeal 

poses the question “whether the litigation may go forward in 

the district court.” Ante, at 741 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). And a wide array of appeals seemingly fts that 

bill. 

Indeed, any appeal over the proper forum for a dispute 

would arguably raise the same question. After all, “an arbitration agreement is `a specialized kind of forum-selection 

clause.' ” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2022) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 

U. S. 506, 519 (1974)). If arbitration appeals require stays of 

all pre-trial and trial proceedings, why not all appeals about 

forum-selection agreements? And why not appeals over 

non-contractual disputes over the proper adjudicator, like 

venue, personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, federalcourt jurisdiction, and abstention? 

For that matter, “virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be 

described as conferring a `right not to stand trial.' ” Digital 

Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 873 

(1994). “Such motions can be made in virtually every case.” 

Ibid. Does every interlocutory appeal concerning a casedispositive issue now trigger a mandatory general stay of 

trial court proceedings? 

Taken that broadly, the mandatory-general-stay rule the 

Court adopts today would upend federal litigation as we 

know it. Aware that any interlocutory appeal on a dispositive issue grinds the plaintiff's case to a halt, defendants 

would presumably pursue that tactic at every opportunity. 

This would occur, for example, in interlocutory appeals availPage Proof Pending Publication
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) from orders 

granting preliminary injunctions. Any defense lawyer 

worth her salt would invoke the right to take that appeal 

and throw up some objection—to venue, jurisdiction, or a 

dispositive element of the merits—to trigger a mandatory 

stay. For plaintiffs, then, every preliminary-injunction motion becomes a trap: Even if the motion is granted, the defendant can take that opportunity to stop the trial court proceedings in their tracks. 

Facing these destabilizing consequences, the majority 

stops short of following its own reasoning to that ominous 

conclusion. Today's holding reaches only arbitration appeals 

under § 16(a). Ante, at 738, 744. And it might well be that 

the concerns motivating today's mandatory-general-stay rule 

do not extend beyond arbitration. So the majority will not 

commit, for example, to concluding that appeals over nonarbitration forum-selection clauses warrant the same mandatory stay. Ante, at 746. 

I agree with that hesitation—even one step further down 

this path is much too far. The mandatory-general-stay rule 

that the Court manufactures is unmoored from Congress's 

commands and this Court's precedent. And the windfall 

that the Court gives to defendants seeking arbitration, preferencing their interests over all others, is entirely unwarranted. The Court now mandates that result no matter how 

unjust that outcome is, according to traditional equitable 

standards, in a given case. This endeavor is unfounded, unwise, and—most fundamentally—not our role. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None