alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1816.307-70 NASA contract clauses. ( a ) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-73, Estimated Cost and Cost Sharing, in each contract in which costs are shared by the contractor pursuant to 1816.303-70.
( b ) The contracting officer shall insert the clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-74, Estimated Cost and Fixed Fee, in cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
( c ) The contracting officer may insert the clause at 1852.216-75, Payment of Fixed Fee, in cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
( d ) The contracting officer may insert the clause at 1852.216-81, Estimated Cost, in cost-no-fee contracts that are not cost sharing or facilities contracts.
( e ) [Reserved]
( f ) When FAR clause 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, is included in the contract, as prescribed at FAR 16.307(a), the contracting officer should include the clause at 1852.216-89, Assignment and Release Forms.
( g ) As required by section 827 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. L. 112-239), use the clause at 1852.216-90, Allowability of Costs Incurred in Connection With a Whistleblower Proceeding— ( 1 ) In task orders entered pursuant to contracts awarded before September 30, 2013, that include the clause at FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment; and
( 2 ) In contracts awarded before September 30, 2013, that— ( i ) Include the clause at FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment; and
( ii ) Are modified to include the clause at 1852.203-71, Requirement to Inform Employees of Whistleblower Rights, dated June 2013 or later.
[62 FR 3478, Jan. 23, 1997, as amended at 79 FR 43961, July 29, 2014; 80 FR 12937, Mar. 12, 2015; 81 FR 50366, Aug. 1, 2016; 81 FR 63145, Sept. 14, 2016]
**Violence Against Women Act Negotiated Rulemaking Committee**

**Issue Paper #4**

**Issue:**Applicable Jurisdiction

**Statutory Cites:**§485(f) of the HEA, as amended by §304 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013

**Regulatory Cites:**34 CFR §668.41, §668.46, and Appendix A to Subpart D of Part 668

**Summary Question(s):**What is the applicable jurisdiction for purposes of certain disclosures?  

**Summary of Issue:**

Section 304 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA) (Pub. Law 113-4) amended §485(f) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), as amended, otherwise known as the Clery Act. Under new section 485(f)(8)(B)(i) of the HEA, institutions must provide education programs to promote the awareness of rape, acquaintance rape, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking for incoming students and new employees. Among other information these programs must include the definition of the terms “domestic violence,” “dating violence,” “sexual assault,” and “stalking” in the applicable jurisdiction and the definition of “consent,” in reference to sexual activity, in the applicable jurisdiction.  

The statutes’ reliance on the law of the “applicable jurisdiction” raises several implementation issues. First, how can we best ensure that the required disclosures provide students and employees with useful information about the definitions of these terms? Different states have different definitions of the terms “domestic violence,” “dating violence,” “sexual assault” and “stalking,” and some states do not use some or all of these terms. Moreover, states have different definitions of “consent” in reference to sexual activity and, in some cases, the applicable definition relies on the age of the victim, the capacity of the victim, and the particular circumstances of the incident. These varying definitions raise questions about how to make this information as meaningful as possible for students and employees.

Second, the varying definitions pose enforcement challenges for the Department. What rules or guidelines, if any, should the Department establish for institutions to use in determining the applicable jurisdiction for purposes of these definitions? Should the Department require institutions to use a particular circumstance, such as the physical location of the campus where the student is attending or the employee is working, to determine applicable jurisdiction? What documentation should an institution be required to maintain to demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for the jurisdiction it chooses to use as the applicable jurisdiction?  Alternatively, should it be left to the institution’s discretion to determine the applicable jurisdiction that it will use in providing information?
Exhibit 23.2


         CONSENT OF REGISTERED INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


TO: Swiss Medica, Inc.

As registered independent certified public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of Swiss Medica, Inc. for the year ended
December 31, 2004 of our report dated February 23, 2005 and contained in the
Registration Statement NO. 333-115539 of Swiss Medica, Inc. Form SB-2 under the
Securities Act of 1933 insofar as such report relates to the financial
statements of Swiss Medica, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2004.



                                    /s/ RUSSELL BEDFORD STEFANOU MIRCHANDANI LLP
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                    Russell Bedford Stefanou Mirchandani LLP

McLean, Virginia
February 23, 2005
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 24, 2011

t0516 

# Order

May 24, 2011

142699

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142699 COA: 295361 Oakland CC: 2009-225325-FH RICHARD WALTER LAJDZIAK, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 27, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Z AHRA 

### , J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 11 CR 784
v.

EDUARDO TREVINO,

aka, “Aldo,”

)

)

) Hon. William J. Hibbler

)
SALVADOR ESTRADA, )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

US. District Judge
aka, “Socio,”

MIGUEL ARREDONDO,
aka, “El Tio,”

JUAN AGUIRRE,

VICENTE CASARES,

aka “El Cantante,”and
AURELIANO MONTOYA-PENA,

aka, “Jesse Montoya”

ORDER

Upon the motion of the United States for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(d)(1), it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. All Title III applications, affidavits, and orders produced by the
government in connection with this case, and all other investigative materials and
reports disclosed by the government in original or redacted form, may be utilized by
the charged defendants and their counsel solely in connection with the defense of this
case and for no other purpose and in connection with no other proceeding. The
materials and their contents, and any notes, records or copies of any kind that defense
counsel or the charged defendants may make relating to the contents of materials
provided by the government shall not be disclosed either directly or indirectly, verbally

or in writing, to any person or entity other than the charged defendants, their counsel,

such other persons as are reasonably employed by them as may be necessary to prepare



a defense, or such other persons as to whom the Court may authorize disclosure. These
restrictions do no apply to documents or materials that are public record, including, but
not limited to, transcripts of proceedings; documents, recordings and other materials
that have been received in evidence at public hearings or proceedings; or documents
or materials that are otherwise in the public domain.

2. Intentional violation of this Order is punishable as a contempt, and may
result in the imposition of civil and criminal sanctions. However, nothing contained
in this protective order shall preclude any party from applying to the Court for further
relief or for modification of any provision hereof.

ENTER:
Wome f Hh
J.

WILLL HIBBLER
United States District Judge

pare | fer [ir
#### 1845.7101-5 Contractor's privileged financial and business information.

If a transfer of property between contractors involves disclosing costs of a proprietary nature, the contractor shall furnish unit acquisition costs only on copies of shipping documents sent to the shipping and receiving NASA Centers.

[65 FR 54816, Sept. 11, 2000, as amended at 66 FR 41806, Aug. 9, 2001]
#### PEOPLE ex rel. CALDWELL, Relator, v. EUSTIS, Com’r, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 23, 1903.)

Proceeding by the 'people, on the relation of Charles H. Caldwell, against John E. Eustis, as commissioner, etc.

T. Farley, for respondent.

No opinion. Writ dismissed, and proceedings affirmed, with costs.
#### Susan L. Rosenstiel v. Lewis S. Rosenstiel.

Motion fox-resettlement denied. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, McNally and Eager, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5
<MULTIPLIER>             1

<PERIOD-TYPE>            6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>        APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>             OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                   221,008
<SECURITIES>             0
<RECEIVABLES>            721,609
<ALLOWANCES>             68,886
<INVENTORY>              1,662,454
<CURRENT-ASSETS>         3,197,060
<PP&E>                   2,514,124
<DEPRECIATION>           1,383,061
<TOTAL-ASSETS>           10,824,093
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>    2,507,298
<BONDS>                  568,000
<COMMON>                 179,549
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>    0
<PREFERRED>              2,670
<OTHER-SE>               4,711,770
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  10,824,093
<SALES>                       2,799,676
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              2,799,676
<CGS>                         1,924,263
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 3,037,508
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              (19,816)
<LOSS-PROVISION>              189,723
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            147,653
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (218,017)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           0
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  (407,741)
<EPS-BASIC>                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0


</TABLE>
Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Debowes, Mike" **Date:** February 24, 2014 at 11:05:37 AM EST**To:** "Gregory, Dennis E."

**Subject:****RE:  February 24-25, 2014 VAWA Committee Second Session Agenda, Proposed Regulatory Language, and Draft Screen Shots for Reporting VAWA Crimes**

A few quick thoughts to consider sharing today/tomorrow:

Based on pages 20 and 22, it seems that a decision has been made that incidents of DVDVS are NOT subject to the hierarchy rule – is that also your understanding?  “In institution must compile the crime statistics required under paragraphs (C)(1) (i) and (II) of this section...”  Those sections refer to “Primary Crimes” and “Hate Crimes,” respectively.

What is the definition of “official intervention” as it relates to determining whether two independent stalking offenses have occurred?  Draft regs use this language page 21 but there is no corresponding definition.

Regarding the exception to the hierarchy rule for sexual assaults – does this mean if a victim was drinking underage and was assaulted we might count the liquor law violation referral and the assault?  As you know the DOE liberally interprets “referred for disciplinary action” to include even a review of names submitted to an official, as well as amnesty and safe harbor policies – so I think the answer is “yes” here, which is a change from past practice, but that clarification could be helpful.

Advisors on page 35 – the regs say “An institution may not limit the choice of advisor for either party.”  This means that even if lawyers have been prohibited from participating in the student conduct process, these regs will override that institutional prohibition.  However, if limits have been set on what role advisors may play (i.e., they can’t speak) then VAWA Amendments to Clery would still permit institutions to maintain these restrictions – do I have that right?  Sounds reasonable to me, though I wonder if/how that regulatory addition will impact initiatives to allow attorneys to actively be involved in conduct processes.

Page 35 “At a minimum, comply with guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.”  Is this codifying the DCL in its entirety (and any subsequent guidance we receive), or just those aspects that pertain to “disciplinary proceedings” that are discussed on pages 33-35?  And how are institutions expected to resolve any “perceived conflict of interest or bias for or against the accused or the accuser”?  Seems to me a savvy student just keeps alleging bias to stymie the process.  What is the threshold here?  Will institutions have a mechanism (or permission!) to independently evaluate such perceptions and determine whether the officials involved are sufficiently free of any bias or conflict of interest that the proceedings may continue with the assigned officials?  I think some guidance is necessary in the regs.  I would not want to permit spurious allegations of bias and COI (not made in good faith) by any party that serves only to delay the process.  

Kindest Regards,

Mike
Exhibit 24





PPL CORPORATION



2003 ANNUAL REPORT
  TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
  ON FORM 10-K



POWER OF ATTORNEY



The undersigned directors of PPL Corporation, a Pennsylvania
  corporation, that is to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
  D.C., under the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
  its 2003 Annual Report on Form 10-K, do hereby appoint each of William F.
  Hecht, John R. Biggar and Robert J. Grey their true and lawful attorney,
  with power to act without the other and with full power of substitution and
  resubstitution, to execute for them and in their names said Form 10-K Report
  and any and all amendments thereto, whether said amendments add to, delete from
  or otherwise alter said Form 10-K Report, or add or withdraw any exhibits
  or schedules to be filed therewith and any and all instruments in connection
  therewith. The undersigned hereby grant to each said attorney full power and
  authority to do and perform in the name of and on behalf of the undersigned,
  and in any and all capacities, any act and thing whatsoever required or necessary
  to be done in and about the premises, as fully and to all intents and purposes
  as the undersigned might do, hereby ratifying and approving the acts of each
  of the said attorneys.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto set their
  hands and seals this 27th day of February, 2004.





|_______________________________
      Frederick M. Bernthal |  | _______________________________
      Stuart Heydt       
|----------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------
|_______________________________
      John W. Conway        |  | _______________________________
      W. Keith Smith     
|_______________________________
      E. Allen Deaver       |  | _______________________________
      Susan M. Stalnecker
|_______________________________
      Louise K. Goeser      |  |
-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

June 26, 2018

v No. 336229

Wayne Circuit Court

RANDALL LEMONT BEAMON, LC No. 15-010482-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and JANSEN and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

JANSEN, J. (concurring)

I concur in the result only. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Katherine Meehan, Appellant.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 16, 1977, affirmed. No opinion. This case is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (subd 5). Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, Rabin and Margett, JJ., concur.
1480.504 Other circumstances for use of other than full and open competition. ( a ) Other circumstances may exist where the use of an IEE set-aside in accordance with 1480.401(a) and FAR 6.302-5 is not feasible. In such situations, the requirements of FAR subparts 6.3 and 13.5 and DIAR subpart 1406.3 apply in justifying the use of the appropriate authority for other than full and open competition.
( b ) Except as provided in FAR 5.202, all proposed acquisition actions must first be publicized in accordance with the requirements of FAR 5.2 and DIAR 1405.2.
( c ) Justifications for use of other than full and open competition in accordance with this section must be approved in accordance with DIAR part 1406. These approvals are required for a proposed contract or for an out of scope modification to an existing contract.
M. P. No. 73-176.

#### Fernand Plante *et al. v.*Russell Berard *et al.*

*Goldman, Biafore and Hines, John H. Hines, Jr., Dennis H. Esposito,*for plaintiffs-appellees. *M. Durban Cannon,*Asst. City Solicitor, for defendants-appellants, Zoning Board of Review. *Macktaz, Keefer and Kirby, Richard F. Kirby, Howard R. Croll,*for defendant-appellant, New Bocee Club, Inc.

The above-entitled matter, which was assigned to Wednesday, February 5, 1975, is removed from the Continuous Argument List and reassigned to the first week of March 1975.
<PAGE>
<PAGE>
                                                           EXHIBIT 10(i)
 GOLDEN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
                            SURPLUS NOTE

Golden American Life Insurance Company agrees to pay Equitable Life
Insurance Company of Iowa corporation, the sum of $60 million
($60,000,000.00) plus interest at the rate of 7.25%  per annum from the
date hereof, December 30, 1998 until paid.  In any event, this note
will mature on December 29, 2028.

This Surplus Note and accrued interest thereon shall be subordinate to
payments due to policyholders, claimant and beneficiary claims, as well
as debts owed to all other classes of debtors, other than surplus note
holders, of Golden American Life Insurance Company in the event of (a)
the institution of bankruptcy, reorganization, insolvency or
liquidation proceedings by or against Golden American Life Insurance
Company, or (b) the appointment of a Trustee, receiver or other
Conservator for a substantial part of Golden American Life Insurance
Company properties.

Any payments made shall first apply to accrued interest, and the
balance of such payment shall apply to reduce the principal of this
Note.

Any payment of principal and/or interest made shall be subject to the
prior approval of the Delaware Insurance Commissioner.  If the
Commissioner has not approved payment of principal to retire the note
prior to its maturity date, the maturity date will be automatically
extended until such time as the Commissioner authorizes payment of the
final balance of principal.

Golden American Life Insurance Company hereby waives presentment and
notice of dishonor.

In witness whereof, Golden American Life Insurance Company has caused
this Note to be executed and delivered.


                                GOLDEN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

                                By: /s/ Stephen J. Preston
                                   --------------------------------
                                     Stephen J. Preston, Executive
                                         Vice President


Attest by:


/s/ David L. Jacobson
-------------------------
David L. Jacobson
Senior Vice President and
    Assistant Secretary

<PAGE>
<PAGE>
#### Salvatore Greco et al., Appellants, v. Marvin Thompson et al., Defendants, and Antoinette Geisler, Respondent.

Order unanimously reversed, with costs and motion denied. Memorandum: It is not clear from the deposition of the plaintiff Theresa Greco and the affidavit of Antoinette Geisler just how this accident occurred, which of the two drivers was at fault or whether they were both negligent. The issue of negligence should be tried in the normal manner upon oral testimony. While we do not hold that the motor vehicle report of Marvin Thompson is of any evidentiary value, at least it gives notice that had Thompson and Kreger Truck Renting Company been made parties to this motion there would have been a dispute as to who was at fault. Undoubtedly an affidavit of Thompson would have accused Antoinette Geisler of being wholly or partially to blame. While we do not necessarily reach the question, we observe that it would be better practice, if it is not actually necessary, to join all parties who have an interest in the outcome, in a motion of this type. (Appeal from order of Erie Special Term granting motion of defendant, Geisler, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to her.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Henry, Noonan and Del Yecchio, JJ.
16.207-3 Limitations. This contract type may be used only when— ( a ) The work required cannot otherwise be clearly defined;
( b ) The required level of effort is identified and agreed upon in advance;
( c ) There is reasonable assurance that the intended result cannot be achieved by expending less than the stipulated effort; and
( d ) The contract price is the simplified acquisition threshold or less, unless approved by the chief of the contracting office.
[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 75 FR 53133, Aug. 30, 2010; 85 FR 40067, July 2, 2020]
11.503 Contract clauses. ( a ) Use the clause at 52.211-11, Liquidated Damages—Supplies, Services, or Research and Development, in fixed-price solicitations and contracts for supplies, services, or research and development when the contracting officer determines that liquidated damages are appropriate (see 11.501(a)).
( b ) Use the clause at 52.211-12, Liquidated Damages—Construction, in solicitations and contracts for construction, other than cost-plus-fixed-fee, when the contracting officer determines that liquidated damages are appropriate (see 11.501(a)). If the contract specifies more than one completion date for separate parts or stages of the work, revise paragraph (a) of the clause to state the amount of liquidated damages for delay of each separate part or stage of the work.
( c ) Use the clause at 52.211-13, Time Extensions, in solicitations and contracts for construction that use the clause at 52.211-12, Liquidated Damages—Construction, when that clause has been revised as provided in paragraph (b) of this section.