United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-2202 

MICHAEL GOULD, et al., 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

MARK MORGAN, in his Official Capacity as Acting Chief of the 

Brookline Police Department; WILLIAM G. GROSS, in his Official 

Capacity as Commissioner of the Boston Police Department; and 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Defendants, Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson, Selya, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

David H. Thompson, with whom Peter A. Patterson, John D. 

Ohlendorf, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, David D. Jensen, and David Jensen 

PLLC were on brief, for appellants. 

Stephen P. Halbrook, John Parker Sweeney, James W. Porter, 

III, T. Sky Woodward, and Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP on brief 

for National Rifle Association of America, Inc., amicus curiae. 

  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), 

Commissioner William G. Gross has been substituted for former 

Commissioner William B. Evans as respondent.
Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Oramel H. (O.H.) 

Skinner, Chief of Government Accountability & Special Litigation, 

Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General, and Angela Kebric Paton, 

Assistant Solicitor General, Arizona Attorney General's Office, on 

brief for states of Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, 

Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 

Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West 

Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, amici curiae. 

 Matthew M. McGarry, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of 

Boston Law Department, with whom Peter M. Geraghty, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, Office of Legal Advisor, Boston Police 

Department, was on brief, for appellee Evans. 

 Jonathan E. Taylor, with whom John Buchheit, Office of Town 

Counsel, Deepak Gupta, and Gupta Wessler PLLC were on brief, for 

appellee Morgan. 

 Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Government 

Bureau, with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General, was on brief, 

for appellee Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General. 

 Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrew J. 

Bruck, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, 

Assistant Attorney General, Claudia Joy DeMitro and Adam D. Klein, 

Deputy Attorneys General, on brief, for states of New Jersey, 

California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 

Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia, and District of 

Columbia, amici curiae. 

 E. Ross Cohen, Mark C. Fleming, Tasha J. Bahal, and Wilmer 

Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP on brief for Everytown for Gun 

Safety, amicus curiae. 

Ira M. Feinberg, Shaun M. Donnelly, and Hogan Lovells US LLP 

on brief for various Professors of History and Constitutional Law, 

amici curiae. 

Simon J. Frankel, Nandini Singh, Allison M. Whelan, Covington 

& Burling LLP, J. Adam Skaggs, and Hannah Shearer on brief for 

Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, amicus curiae. 

Antonio J. Perez-Marques, David B. Toscano, Kevin Osowski, 

Sushila Rao, Anne Burton-Walsh, and Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP for 

Prosecutors Against Gun Violence, amicus curiae. 

November 2, 2018 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This case involves a 

constitutional challenge to the Massachusetts firearms licensing 

statute, as implemented in the communities of Boston and Brookline. 

All of the individual plaintiffs sought and received licenses from 

one of those two communities to carry firearms in public. The 

licenses, though, were restricted: they allowed the plaintiffs to 

carry firearms only in relation to certain specified activities 

but denied them the right to carry firearms more generally. 

The plaintiffs say that the Massachusetts firearms 

licensing statute, as implemented in Boston and Brookline, 

violates the Second Amendment. The district court disagreed, and 

so do we. Mindful that "the right secured by the Second Amendment 

is not unlimited," District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 

626 (2008), we hold that the challenged regime bears a substantial 

relationship to important governmental interests in promoting 

public safety and crime prevention without offending the 

plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendants. In 

the last analysis, the plaintiffs simply do not have the right "to 

carry arms for any sort of confrontation" or "for whatever purpose" 

they may choose. Id. at 595, 626 (emphasis omitted). 

I. BACKGROUND 

We start by rehearsing the applicable statutory and 

regulatory scheme and then recount the travel of the case. In 
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Massachusetts, carrying a firearm in public without a license is 

a crime. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10(a); see also Hightower 

v. City of Bos., 693 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2012). The Massachusetts 

firearms licensing statute "is part of a large regulatory scheme 

to promote the public safety." Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 

847, 849 (Mass. 1976). Under its current incarnation, Mass. Gen. 

Laws ch. 140, § 131, an individual may request a license to carry 

a firearm in public by submitting an application to the appropriate 

licensing authority, which is defined as either the applicant's 

local "chief of police or the board or officer having control of 

the police in a city or town, or persons authorized by them." Id. 

§ 121; see § 131(d). Such a license allows the holder to: 

purchase, rent, lease, borrow, possess and 

carry: (i) firearms, including large capacity 

firearms, and feeding devices and ammunition 

therefor, for all lawful purposes, subject to 

such restrictions relative to the possession, 

use or carrying of firearms as the licensing 

authority deems proper; and (ii) rifles and 

shotguns, including large capacity weapons, 

and feeding devices and ammunition therefor, 

for all lawful purposes; provided, however, 

that the licensing authority may impose such 

restrictions relative to the possession, use 

or carrying of large capacity rifles and 

shotguns as it deems proper. 

Id. § 131(a). For this purpose, a firearm is defined as "a stun 

gun or a pistol, revolver or other weapon of any description, 

loaded or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can be discharged 

and of which the length of the barrel or barrels is less than 16 
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inches or 18 inches in the case of a shotgun as originally 

manufactured." Id. § 121. 

The Massachusetts statute describes the circumstances in 

which a license to carry may be granted, denied, revoked, or 

restricted to particular uses. See id. § 131. Pertinently, a 

local licensing authority "may issue [a license] if it appears 

that the applicant is not a prohibited person . . . and that the 

applicant has good reason to fear injury . . . or for any other 

reason, including the carrying of firearms for use in sport or 

target practice only." Id. § 131(d). An applicant is a 

"prohibited person" if the licensing authority determines, inter 

alia, that he is a convicted felon, that he is younger than twentyone years of age, or that he is otherwise unsuitable (by reason 

of, say, mental illness or involvement in domestic violence) to 

receive a license to carry. Id.; see generally Chief of Police of 

Worcester v. Holden, 26 N.E.3d 715, 724 (Mass. 2015) (discussing 

"suitable person" standard). 

Once the licensing authority satisfies itself that the 

applicant is not a prohibited person, it may issue a license to 

carry as long as "the applicant can demonstrate a 'proper purpose' 

for carrying a firearm." Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of Bos., 464 

N.E.2d 104, 107 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). Refined to bare essence, 

the statute identifies two pillars upon which the granting of a 

license to carry may rest: (1) good reason to fear injury, and 
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(2) other reasons (such as sport or target practice). See id. 

Municipalities differ in their requirements for an applicant to 

establish eligibility based on the first pillar. Boston and 

Brookline have both promulgated policies requiring that an 

applicant furnish some information to distinguish his own need for 

self-defense from that of the general public. This requirement — 

which is the focal point of the plaintiffs' challenge — means that 

the applicant must identify a specific need, that is, a need above 

and beyond a generalized desire to be safe. Cf. id. at 108 (finding 

insufficient applicant's statement that he had no intention of 

"spend[ing] his entire life behind locked doors [and was] a 

potential victim of crimes against his person"). 

An applicant who does not demonstrate a good reason to 

fear injury either to himself or to his property may still receive 

a license to carry a firearm; subject, however, to such 

restrictions as the licensing authority deems meet. See Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(a), (d). The statutory scheme vests in 

the licensing authority discretion to decide, on a case-by-case 

basis, whether and to what extent a restricted license should be 

issued. See id. Under this arrangement, a licensing authority 

may issue a restricted license that permits the carrying of a 

firearm only when the applicant is engaged in the particular 

activities specified in his application. See Ruggiero, 464 N.E.2d 

at 107 & n.5. 
- 7 - 

Not all communities offer the same types of restricted 

licenses. Boston offers licenses restricted to employment, 

hunting and target practice, or sport. For its part, Brookline 

offers licenses subject to restrictions for employment, hunting, 

target practice, sport, transport, domestic (use only in and around 

one's home), or collecting. A license restricted to employment 

allows the licensee to carry a firearm for all employment-related 

purposes, that is, while working and while traveling to and from 

work. A license restricted to hunting allows the licensee to carry 

a firearm for lawful hunting of game and fowl. Similarly, a 

license restricted to sport allows the licensee to carry a firearm 

while partaking in hunting, target practice, and a wide variety of 

outdoor recreational activities (such as hiking, camping, and 

cross-country skiing). 

In Boston, slightly more than forty percent of all 

licenses are issued without restrictions of any kind. In 

Brookline, the number shrinks to approximately thirty-five 

percent.1 Every such license (whether or not restricted) permits 

the licensee to keep and carry firearms for personal protection in 

the home. 

 1 Boston and Brookline are not the only communities that make 

prolific use of restricted licenses. In 2015, fourteen communities 

(including Springfield, Lowell, New Bedford, Newton, and Medford) 

imposed restrictions on more than half of the licenses that they 

issued. Eleven other communities imposed restrictions on more 

than one-third of the licenses that they issued. 
- 8 - 

Once issued, a license may be revoked or suspended "upon 

the occurrence of any event that would have disqualified the holder 

from being issued such license or from having such license renewed" 

or "if it appears that the holder is no longer a suitable person 

to possess such license." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). Any 

person "aggrieved by a denial, revocation, suspension or 

restriction placed on a license" may seek judicial review. Id.; 

see Hightower, 693 F.3d at 67. Such redress must be sought within 

ninety days when challenging a denial, revocation, or suspension. 

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(f). In contrast, judicial 

review may be sought at "any time" when challenging a restriction. 

Id. 

Against this backdrop, we turn to the particulars of the 

case at hand. The individual plaintiffs (none of whom is a 

prohibited person) all reside in either Boston or Brookline. In 

each community, the local licensing authority is the chief of 

police. 

For present purposes, the firearms licensing policies of 

the two communities are not materially different. Both police 

departments review applications for firearms licenses 

individually, giving careful attention to each applicant and to 

his stated reasons for wanting a license. Each police chief has 

promulgated a policy to the effect that a generalized desire to 

carry a firearm for self-defense, without more, will not constitute 
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"good reason" sufficient to warrant the issuance of an unrestricted 

license. Instead, Boston and Brookline require an applicant to 

articulate a reason to fear injury to himself or his property that 

distinguishes him from the general population. Applicants who are 

employed in certain vocations (specifically, physicians, 

attorneys, and police officers) are more likely to be granted 

unrestricted licenses in both communities.2 

The individual plaintiffs all sought and obtained 

licenses to carry firearms, but those licenses were issued with a 

variety of restrictions: 

 Plaintiff Michael Gould is a professional 

photographer who lives in Brookline. In 2014, the 

Brookline Police Department granted him a license 

to carry firearms, restricted to employment and 

sport. These restrictions allow him to carry 

firearms on his person at home and whenever he is 

working with his high-priced photography equipment 

or when engaged in a range of recreational 

activities. 

 Plaintiffs Christopher Hart, John Stanton, Danny 

Weng, and Sarah Zesch live in Boston. Each of them 

 2 Boston (but not Brookline) also will grant unrestricted 

licenses to applicants who already have been issued unrestricted 

licenses by some other community in Massachusetts. 
- 10 - 

applied for an unrestricted firearms license but 

received a restricted license (containing hunting 

and target-practice restrictions). 

The complaint alleges that each of the individual plaintiffs seeks 

an unrestricted license to carry firearms in public for the purpose 

of self-defense. 

The individual plaintiffs are joined by plaintiff 

Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. (Comm2A), a non-profit 

organization dedicated to advancing the right to keep and bear 

arms. All of the individual plaintiffs are members of Comm2A. 

Although all of the individual plaintiffs wish to have 

unrestricted firearms licenses for personal protection, none of 

them has tried to show that his or her fear of injury is in any 

way distinct from that of the general population. Thus, none of 

them has been able to satisfy Boston's or Brookline's "good reason" 

standard. 

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs brought suit 

in the United States District Court for the District of 

Massachusetts against the chiefs of police of Boston and Brookline. 

They alleged that these officials, acting under color of state 

law, infringed their Second Amendment rights. To remedy this 

infringement, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the 

Massachusetts firearms licensing statute, as administered in 

Boston and Brookline, transgressed the Second Amendment by 
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allowing licensing authorities to deny unrestricted licenses to 

otherwise qualified individuals who lack a particularized reason 

to fear injury. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. They also sought 

injunctive relief directing the defendants to remove all 

restrictions from the licenses held by the individual plaintiffs 

and barring the defendants from issuing restricted licenses in the 

future. 

On motion, the district court allowed the Office of the 

Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to join the 

fray as an intervenor-defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). 

After the close of discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary 

judgment. The district court, in a thoughtful rescript, granted 

summary judgment for the defendants. See Gould v. O'Leary, 291 F. 

Supp. 3d 155, 174 (D. Mass. 2017). In its ruling, the district 

court first assumed (without deciding) that the challenged 

statutory and regulatory scheme burdened the Second Amendment 

right to bear arms. See id. at 169. Next, it determined that 

intermediate scrutiny comprised the appropriate lens through which 

to view the constitutionality of the challenged law. See id. at 

170. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged statutory 

and regulatory scheme passed intermediate scrutiny: it bore a 

substantial relationship to the important governmental interests 

of promoting public safety and preventing crime. See id. at 173. 

In reaching this conclusion, the court ceded some deference to the 
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predictive judgments of the legislature "regarding matters that 

are beyond the competence of" courts. Id. at 171 (quoting 

Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012)). 

This timely appeal ensued. The parties have filed 

exemplary briefs, and those submissions have been supplemented by 

a myriad of helpful amicus briefs. 

II. FRAMING THE ISSUE 

Before plunging into the merits of the plaintiffs' 

claims, we pause for some additional stage-setting. To begin, we 

note that the plaintiffs' appeal hinges on the answers to two 

central questions: Does the Second Amendment protect the right to 

carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense? And if they 

prevail on that question, may the government condition the exercise 

of the right to bear arms on a showing that a citizen has a "good 

reason" (beyond a generalized desire for self-defense) for 

carrying a firearm outside the home? Undergirding the plaintiffs' 

proposed answers to these questions is their claim that the manner 

in which Boston and Brookline have interpreted the Massachusetts 

"good reason" requirement offends the Second Amendment. 

Importantly, though, the plaintiffs do not challenge the 

Massachusetts firearms licensing statute as a whole, nor do they 

challenge the Commonwealth's requirement that an individual must 

have a license to carry firearms in public. 
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Because the plaintiffs' appeal is based exclusively upon 

the Second Amendment, our analysis follows suit. Consequently, we 

do not consider — let alone foreclose — any other potential 

challenges to the manner in which Boston and Brookline have chosen 

to exercise their discretion under the Massachusetts firearms 

licensing statute. By the same token, even though we recognize 

that the majority of Massachusetts communities have firearms 

licensing policies that are more permissive than those adopted in 

Boston and Brookline, we do not regard those policies as relevant 

to our analysis. 

Next, we think it is useful to draw a distinction between 

two types of firearms licensing regulations. Location-based 

regulations limit where firearms may be carried. In contrast, 

applicant-based regulations identify prohibited persons (such as 

felons) who may be barred from carrying firearms anywhere. The 

policies at issue here fall into the former category. Thus, we do 

not pass upon the validity of "prohibited person" regulations. 

After all, the plaintiffs have not challenged the Commonwealth's 

requirement, followed fastidiously in Boston and Brookline, that 

a license to carry firearms may be issued only to a suitable 

person. 

Finally, we deem it helpful to offer a glossary of sorts, 

defining certain terms as those terms are used in this opinion. 
- 14 - 

 When we say the "Massachusetts statute," we mean 

(unless otherwise indicated) the "good reason" 

requirement of the Massachusetts firearms licensing 

statute. 

 When we refer to the "Boston and Brookline 

policies," we mean the administration and 

implementation of the "good reason" requirement by 

those two municipalities. 

 When we say "firearm," we mean a conventional 

handgun. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121 

(defining "firearm" as "a stun gun or a pistol, 

revolver or other weapon of any description, loaded 

or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can be 

discharged and of which the length of the barrel or 

barrels is less than 16 inches or 18 inches in the 

case of a shotgun as originally manufactured"). We 

do not use this term to refer to assault weapons, 

which have a separate definition under 

Massachusetts law. See id. 

 When we say in "public," we mean outside of one's 

home, excluding "sensitive places such as schools 

and government buildings," where the Supreme Court 

has cautioned that the regulation of firearms is 
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"presumptively lawful." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-

27 & n.26. 

 The terms "carry" and "carriage" refer to 

"wear[ing], bear[ing], or carry[ing]" a firearm 

"upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, 

for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for 

offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict 

with another person." Id. at 584 (quoting 

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 

(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Unless 

otherwise specified, we use these terms to include 

both open and concealed carriage. We caution, 

however, that laws restricting concealed carriage 

alone may call for a somewhat different analysis. 

See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 73-74 (finding 

"[l]icensing of the carrying of concealed weapons" 

to be "presumptively lawful"). 

III. ANALYSIS 

The plaintiffs mount two principal claims of error. 

First, they contend that the right to carry firearms in public for 

self-defense lies at the core of the Second Amendment and, thus, 

admits of no regulation. Second, they contend that the Boston and 

Brookline policies fail under any level of scrutiny that might 

arguably apply. We approach these claims of error mindful that 
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our review of the district court's entry of summary judgment is de 

novo. See id. at 70; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of 

N.Y., Inc. v. Sagardía de Jesús, 634 F.3d 3, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) 

(reviewing constitutional challenge to state law de novo). This 

standard is unchanged where, as here, an appeal follows the 

district court's disposition of cross-motions for summary 

judgment. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 720-21 (1st Cir. 

1996). The task at hand is simplified by the parties' agreement 

that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the 

critical constitutional questions are purely legal inquiries. 

A. Legal Framework. 

The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated 

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 

of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. 

Const. amend. II. For over two centuries, the Supreme Court said 

very little either about the meaning of these words or about the 

scope of the guaranteed right. In 2008, though, the Court made 

pellucid that the Second Amendment protects the right of an 

individual to keep and bear arms (unconnected to service in the 

militia). See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. Two years later, the Court 

confirmed that the Second Amendment applies with full force to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of 

Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784-85 (2010). 
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These decisions merely scratched the surface: they did 

not provide much clarity as to how Second Amendment claims should 

be analyzed in future cases. In Heller, for example, the Court 

considered the District of Columbia's near-complete ban on keeping 

operable handguns in the home. See 554 U.S. at 574-75. The Court 

concluded that this law infringed "the right of law-abiding, 

responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home" — 

an interest that the Court described as "elevate[d] above all other 

[Second Amendment] interests." Id. at 635. The Court observed 

that "[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to 

the severe restriction of the District's handgun ban." Id. at 

629. Starting from this premise, the Court decided that the 

challenged law was so restrictive of the Second Amendment right 

that it would fail to pass muster "[u]nder any of the standards of 

scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 

rights." Id. at 628-29. 

In the plaintiffs' view, it follows directly from Heller 

that the Second Amendment guarantees them an unconditional right 

to carry firearms in public for self-defense. On this basis, they 

urge us to find that the Boston and Brookline policies are 

unconstitutional. We are not so sanguine: Heller simply does not 

provide a categorical answer to whether the challenged policies 

violate the Constitution. Put another way, nothing in Heller 

"impugn[s] legislative designs that comprise . . . public welfare 
- 18 - 

regulations aimed at addressing perceived inherent dangers and 

risks surrounding the public possession of loaded, operable 

firearms." Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir. 2015). 

This conclusion is reinforced by McDonald — a case in which the 

Court plainly read Heller in this way, observing that Heller "does 

not imperil every law regulating firearms." 561 U.S. at 786. 

Indeed, Heller itself made precisely this point. The 

majority opinion there stated that "[l]ike most rights, the right 

secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited" and thus does 

not protect "a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 

any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose" or "for any sort 

of confrontation." 554 U.S. at 595, 626 (emphasis omitted). The 

Court went on to provide a non-exhaustive list of "presumptively 

lawful regulatory measures," including "longstanding prohibitions 

on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," 

"laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 

as schools and government buildings," and "laws imposing 

conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." 

Id. at 626-27 & n.26. 

Even so, the Heller Court never presumed "to clarify the 

entire field" of permissible Second Amendment regulation. Id. at 

635. Of particular pertinence for present purposes, Heller was 

silent about both "the scope of [the Second Amendment] right beyond 
- 19 - 

the home and the standards for determining when and how the right 

can be regulated by a government." Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89. 

In the decade since Heller was decided, courts have 

adopted a two-step approach for analyzing claims that a statute, 

ordinance, or regulation infringes the Second Amendment right. 

See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018); 

Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. 

Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874-75 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n 

of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of ATFE (NRA), 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); 

Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 

(D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701-04 

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th 

Cir. 2010); see also Powell, 783 F.3d at 347 n.9. Under this 

approach, the court first asks whether the challenged law burdens 

conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment's 

guarantee. See NRA, 700 F.3d at 194. This is a backward-looking 

inquiry, which seeks to determine whether the regulated conduct 

"was understood to be within the scope of the right at the time of 

ratification." United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th 

Cir. 2010). Because the challenge here is directed at a state 

law, the pertinent point in time would be 1868 (when the Fourteenth 
- 20 - 

Amendment was ratified).3 See Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518. If the 

challenged law imposes no such burden, it is valid. If, however, 

it burdens conduct falling within the scope of the Second 

Amendment, the court then must determine what level of scrutiny is 

appropriate and must proceed to decide whether the challenged law 

survives that level of scrutiny. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 429; 

Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875. 

Although we have not yet explicitly adopted this twostep approach,4 we do so today. This approach results in a workable 

framework, consistent with Heller, for evaluating whether a 

challenged law infringes Second Amendment rights. 

B. Scope of Second Amendment Right. 

The framework requires that we start by pondering 

"whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope 

 3 This date contrasts with the date of ratification of the 

Second Amendment itself (1791). It is not at all clear to us that 

the scope of the Second Amendment should be different when 

analyzing a federal law than when analyzing a state law. Here, 

however, we need not probe this point: our conclusion with respect 

to the historical record would be the same regardless of which 

ratification date was used. 

4 On occasion, though, we have employed an analysis that 

resembled some part of the framework. Thus, in United States v. 

Rene E., we traced the historical roots of laws prohibiting minors 

from possessing firearms from the founding era through the early 

twentieth century and concluded that the challenged law was of a 

type historically understood to be consistent with the Second 

Amendment. See 583 F.3d 8, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2009). So, too, in 

United States v. Booker, we employed a form of means-end scrutiny 

to find the law at issue substantially related to an important 

governmental interest. See 644 F.3d 12, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2011). 
- 21 - 

of the right at the time of ratification." Woollard, 712 F.3d at 

875 (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 680). After a diligent search 

for the answer to this question, we find — as have several of our 

sister circuits — that there is no national consensus, rooted in 

history, concerning the right to public carriage of firearms. See 

Drake, 724 F.3d at 431; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91. The available 

guideposts point in conflicting directions and leave the indelible 

impression "that states often disagreed as to the scope of the 

right to bear arms." Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91. Courts that have 

found the history conclusive relied primarily on historical data 

derived from the antebellum South. See, e.g., Young, 896 F.3d at 

1054-57; Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 660-61 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017). But we find it unconvincing to argue that practices 

in one region of the country reflect the existence of a national 

consensus about the implications of the Second Amendment for public 

carriage of firearms. After all, our nation is built upon its 

diversity — and there is no principled way that we can assume that 

practices in one region are representative of all regions. We 

must use a wider-angled lens. 

The view through this wider-angled lens tells a 

different tale. A comprehensive survey of the historical record 

— including the laws of Massachusetts, which "first adopted a good 

cause statute in 1836" — reveals that "states and their predecessor 

colonies and territories have taken divergent approaches to the 
- 22 - 

regulation of firearms." Young, 896 F.3d at 1076, 1078 (Clifton, 

J., dissenting). 

The short of it is that the national historical inquiry 

does not dictate an answer to the question of whether the Boston 

and Brookline policies burden conduct falling within the scope of 

the Second Amendment. Since we have previously exhibited 

considerable hesitancy to extend the Second Amendment right beyond 

the home, see Powell, 783 F.3d at 348; Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72 

n.8, this phase of our inquiry brings us into uncharted waters. 

The Supreme Court's seminal decision in Heller guides 

our voyage. The Heller Court left no doubt that the right to bear 

arms "for defense of self, family, and property" was "most acute" 

inside the home. 554 U.S. at 628. If the right existed solely 

within the home, the Court's choice of phrase would have been 

peculiar. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935-36 (7th Cir. 

2012). So, too, the Heller Court stated that prohibitions on 

carrying firearms in "sensitive places" are "presumptively 

lawful," 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26 — a pronouncement that would 

have been completely unnecessary if the Second Amendment right did 

not extend beyond the home at all. Reading these tea leaves, we 

view Heller as implying that the right to carry a firearm for selfdefense guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not limited to the 

home. 
- 23 - 

Withal, Heller did not supply us with a map to navigate 

the scope of the right of public carriage for self-defense. For 

example, Heller did not answer whether every citizen has such a 

right, or whether (as Boston and Brookline have concluded) the 

right is more narrowly circumscribed to those citizens who can 

establish an individualized reason to fear injury. In the absence 

of such guidance, we decline to parse this distinction today and 

proceed on the assumption that the Boston and Brookline policies 

burden the Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for selfdefense. 

C. Level of Scrutiny. 

This conclusion brings into sharp relief the next step 

in our inquiry, which requires us to evaluate the challenged 

policies under an appropriate level of scrutiny. The plaintiffs 

argue that any law regulating the carriage of firearms for selfdefense should be subject to strict scrutiny because the Second 

Amendment right is specifically articulated in the Constitution. 

This argument bites off more than the plaintiffs reasonably can 

expect to chew. Strict scrutiny does not automatically attach to 

every right enumerated in the Constitution. See, e.g., Kelo v. 

City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (refusing to apply 

strict scrutiny in Takings Clause context); Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny 

to content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction challenged 
- 24 - 

on First Amendment grounds). Even though the Second Amendment 

right is fundamental, the plaintiffs have offered us no valid 

reason to treat it more deferentially than other important 

constitutional rights. Consequently, we decline the plaintiffs' 

invitation to take a one-size-fits-all approach to laws that burden 

the Second Amendment right to any extent. See NRA, 700 F.3d at 

198; see also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256 ("The [Supreme] Court 

has not said, however, and it does not logically follow, that 

strict scrutiny is called for whenever a fundamental right is at 

stake."). 

In our judgment, the appropriate level of scrutiny must 

turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core 

of the Second Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that 

right. See NRA, 700 F.3d at 195; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. A law 

or policy that burdens conduct falling within the core of the 

Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of 

scrutiny, whereas a law or policy that burdens conduct falling 

outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires a less 

demanding level of scrutiny. 

This gets us to the heart of the matter: whether public 

carriage of firearms for self-defense is a core Second Amendment 

right? In an earlier case, we identified the core of the Second 

Amendment right as "the possession of operative firearms for use 

in defense of the home" by responsible, law-abiding individuals. 
- 25 - 

Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72. We went on to hold "that the interest 

. . . in carrying concealed weapons outside the home is distinct 

from th[e] core interest emphasized in Heller." Id. As the court 

below observed, "[a]lthough Hightower did not consider the 

constitutionality of regulating the open carrying of weapons 

outside the home, the authority it cited did not distinguish 

between [concealed and open carry], suggesting that the operative 

distinction [between the core and the periphery of the Second 

Amendment] was whether the individual asserted his Second 

Amendment right outside or inside the home." Gould, 291 F. Supp. 

3d at 169. 

We make explicit today what was implicit in Hightower: 

that the core Second Amendment right is limited to self-defense in 

the home. This holding finds support in a number of out-of-circuit 

cases. See, e.g., United States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1285 

(11th Cir. 2017); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 

F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; 

Wollard, 712 F.3d at 876; NRA, 700 F.3d at 206; Kachalsky, 701 

F.3d at 93; Reese, 627 F.3d at 800. 

To be sure, some courts have formulated broader 

conceptions of the core of the Second Amendment — conceptions that 

include carrying firearms in public for self-defense. See Young, 

896 F.3d at 1070; Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661. Each of these decisions, 

though, was reached by a divided panel over a cogent dissent. See 
- 26 - 

Young, 896 F.3d at 1074 (Clifton, J., dissenting); Wrenn, 864 F.3d 

at 668 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 

We think that the weight of circuit court authority has 

correctly identified the core of the Second Amendment, and our own 

precedent fits comfortably within those boundaries. We think, 

too, that this configuration of the Second Amendment's core 

interest is consistent with Heller, in which the Court declared 

that the home is where "the need for defense of self, family, and 

property is most acute," such that the Second Amendment "elevates 

above all other interests the . . . defense of hearth and home." 

554 U.S. at 628, 635; see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 

F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Heller Court 

"went to great lengths to emphasize the special place that the 

home — an individual's private property — occupies in our 

society"). 

Societal considerations also suggest that the public 

carriage of firearms, even for the purpose of self-defense, should 

be regarded as falling outside the core of the Second Amendment 

right. The home is where families reside, where people keep their 

most valuable possessions, and where they are at their most 

vulnerable (especially while sleeping at night). Outside the home, 

society typically relies on police officers, security guards, and 

the watchful eyes of concerned citizens to mitigate threats. This 

same panoply of protections is much less effective inside the home. 
- 27 - 

Police may not be able to respond to calls for help quickly, so an 

individual within the four walls of his own house may need to 

provide for the protection of himself and his family in case of 

emergency. Last — but surely not least — the availability of 

firearms inside the home implicates the safety only of those who 

live or visit there, not the general public. 

Viewed against this backdrop, the right to self-defense 

— upon which the plaintiffs rely — is at its zenith inside the 

home. This right is plainly more circumscribed outside the home. 

"[O]utside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, 

because public safety interests often outweigh individual 

interests in self-defense." United States v. Masciandaro, 638 

F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). These truths are especially evident 

in densely populated urban areas like Boston and Brookline. See 

Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. 82, 108 (2013) 

(explaining that "American cities have traditionally had much more 

stringent gun control than rural areas"). 

This sort of differentiation is not unique to Second 

Amendment rights. Many constitutional rights are virtually 

unfettered inside the home but become subject to reasonable 

regulation outside the home. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 

U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); 

see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596 (1980) (declaring 

that "a man's house is his castle"). 
- 28 - 

To sum up, we hold that the core right protected by the 

Second Amendment is — as Heller described it — "the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 

home." 554 U.S. at 635. Public carriage of firearms for selfdefense falls outside the perimeter of this core right. 

This holding does not end our journey. Heller left open 

— and we have yet to address — what level of scrutiny applies to 

laws that burden the periphery of the Second Amendment right but 

not its core. For the reasons that follow, we decide today that 

intermediate scrutiny supplies the appropriate test. 

To begin, our decision in Booker points us toward this 

conclusion. There, we applied an unnamed level of scrutiny in 

evaluating the constitutionality of a law prohibiting domestic 

violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms. See 644 F.3d at 

13, 25-26. Although we abjured any label, the standard that we 

articulated was indistinguishable from intermediate scrutiny. 

Compare id. at 25 (requiring "a substantial relationship between 

the restriction and an important governmental objective"), with 

Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that "[t]o 

withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must 

be substantially related to an important governmental objective"). 

Other courts have not minced words but, rather, have affixed the 

label of "intermediate scrutiny" to the level of scrutiny employed 

in Booker. See, e.g., Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. 
- 29 - 

Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 n.17. Nor have our sister 

circuits shied away from a conclusion that intermediate scrutiny 

is the appropriate test for evaluating firearms regulations that 

burden conduct falling outside the core of the Second Amendment 

(including "good reason" laws similar to the Massachusetts 

statute). See Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 

(10th Cir. 2015); Drake, 724 F.3d at 435; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 

876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; NRA, 700 F.3d at 196; Ezell, 651 

F.3d at 708; see also Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692 (noting "near 

unanimous preference for intermediate scrutiny" in such cases). 

Finally, our conclusion that intermediate scrutiny is 

appropriate to evaluate firearms regulations that burden rights on 

the periphery of the Second Amendment fits comfortably in the 

lacuna left by Heller. The Heller Court found that the District 

of Columbia's ban on handguns in the home failed under "any of the 

standards of scrutiny" historically applied by the Court "to 

enumerated constitutional rights." 554 U.S. at 628-29. This 

statement implies that there is a role for some level of scrutiny 

less rigorous than strict scrutiny. Even so, the Court made clear 

that rational basis review would not be sufficient. See id. at 

628 n.27. 

Here, all roads lead to Rome. Following this roadmap, 

we find that a law or policy that restricts the right to carry a 

firearm in public for self-defense will withstand a Second 
- 30 - 

Amendment challenge so long as it survives intermediate scrutiny. 

To pass constitutional muster in this case, then, the defendants 

must show that the Massachusetts firearms licensing statute, as 

implemented by the Boston and Brookline policies, substantially 

relates to one or more important governmental interests. It is to 

this question that we now turn. 

D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny. 

The Massachusetts firearms licensing statute allows (but 

does not compel) local licensing authorities to issue licenses to 

applicants who "ha[ve] good reason to fear injury to [themselves] 

or [their] property." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(d). It also 

allows local licensing authorities to issue licenses "for any other 

reason," with such restrictions as those authorities "deem[] 

proper." Id. § 131(a), (d). The legislative purpose behind the 

statute is twofold: to promote public safety and to prevent crime. 

See Chardin v. Police Comm'r of Bos., 989 N.E.2d 392, 403 (Mass. 

2013); Commonwealth v. Seay, 383 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Mass. 1978). In 

fashioning this regime, Massachusetts endeavored "to prevent the 

temptation and the ability to use firearms to inflict harm, be it 

negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself." 

Commonwealth v. Lee, 409 N.E.2d 1311, 1315 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 

It cannot be gainsaid that Massachusetts has compelling 

governmental interests in both public safety and crime prevention. 

See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 
- 31 - 

376 (1997). In point of fact, few interests are more central to 

a state government than protecting the safety and well-being of 

its citizens. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 

(1987); Watchtower Bible, 634 F.3d at 12; see also United States 

v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("Indeed, we can think of no 

better example of the police power . . . than the suppression of 

violent crime . . . ."). Given the obvious importance of the 

Commonwealth's governmental interests, the question before us 

reduces to whether the "good reason" requirement is substantially 

related to those interests. 

In answering this question, we start with the premise 

that courts ought to give "substantial deference to the predictive 

judgments" of a state legislature engaged in the enactment of state 

laws. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 

195 (1997). This degree of deference forecloses a court from 

substituting its own appraisal of the facts for a reasonable 

appraisal made by the legislature. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law 

Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010). 

We caution, however, that deference should not be 

confused with blind allegiance. There must be a fit between the 

asserted governmental interests and the means chosen by the 

legislature to advance those interests. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 

878. In assessing this fit, a perfect match is not required. See 

id. Put another way, a legislature's chosen means need not be 
- 32 - 

narrowly tailored to achieve its ends: the fit between the 

asserted governmental interests and the means chosen by the 

legislature to advance them need only be substantial in order to 

withstand intermediate scrutiny. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97; 

cf. Booker, 644 F.3d at 26 (upholding law that "substantially 

promote[d] an important government interest"). Courts have 

described this requirement in various ways. A typical formulation 

— with which we agree — describes it as "a reasonable fit . . . 

such that the law does not burden more conduct than is reasonably 

necessary." Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; see Woollard, 712 F.3d at 

878. 

Here, the fit between the asserted governmental 

interests and the means chosen to advance them is close enough to 

pass intermediate scrutiny. The challenged regime does not 

infringe at all on the core Second Amendment right of a citizen to 

keep arms in his home for the purpose of self-defense. Outside 

the home, the regime arguably does burden a citizen's non-core 

Second Amendment right. See supra Sections III.B, III.C. But in 

allocating this burden, the Massachusetts legislature was 

cognizant that firearms can present a threat to public safety. 

Striving to strike a balance, the legislature took note that some 

individuals might have a heightened need to carry firearms for 

self-defense and allowed local licensing authorities to take a 

case-by-case approach in deciding whether a particular "applicant 
- 33 - 

has good reason to fear injury." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 

131(d). In addition, the legislature made appropriate provisions 

for restricted licenses, thus ensuring that individuals may carry 

firearms while engaging in hunting, target-shooting, and a host of 

other pursuits. Those same protections extend to individuals who 

need to carry firearms for work-related reasons. 

Nor do the Boston and Brookline policies result in a 

total ban on the right to public carriage of firearms. In this 

respect, the policies coalesce with the Massachusetts statute to 

form a regime that is markedly less restrictive than the regimes 

found unconstitutional by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The 

Illinois ban on public carriage struck down by the Seventh Circuit 

did not give the slightest recognition to the heightened need of 

some individuals to arm themselves for self-protection, see Moore, 

702 F.3d at 940 (noting that "[n]ot even Massachusetts has so flat 

a ban as Illinois"), and the Hawaii law struck down by the Ninth 

Circuit created a regime under which not a single unrestricted 

license for public carriage had ever been issued, see Young, 896 

F.3d at 1071 n.21. The Ninth Circuit took pains to distinguish 

the Hawaii law from laws in which the "good cause" standard "did 

not disguise an effective ban on the public carry of firearms." 

Id. at 1072. 

The Massachusetts regime is more akin to those regimes 

upheld in the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. See Drake, 724 
- 34 - 

F.3d at 428-29, 439-40; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868-70, 882; 

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 85-87, 101. Those regimes — like the regime 

at issue here — "provided for administrative or judicial review of 

any license denial, . . . a safeguard conspicuously absent from 

Hawaii's laws." Young, 896 F.3d at 1072. 

The sockdolager, of course, is that the defendants have 

forged a substantial link between the restrictions imposed on the 

public carriage of firearms and the indisputable governmental 

interests in public safety and crime prevention. Massachusetts 

consistently has one of the lowest rates of gun-related deaths in 

the nation, and the Commonwealth attributes this salubrious state 

of affairs to its comprehensive firearms licensing regime. To 

buttress this point, the defendants have cited several studies 

indicating that states with more restrictive licensing schemes for 

the public carriage of firearms experience significantly lower 

rates of gun-related homicides and other violent crimes. See, 

e.g., Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Association Between Firearm 

Laws and Homicide in Urban Counties, 95 J. Urban Health 383 (2018); 

Michael Siegel et al., Easiness of Legal Access to Concealed 

Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates in the United States, 107 Am. 

J. Pub. Health 1923, 1923-29 (2017); John J. Donahue et al., Rightto-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using 

Panel Data, the LASSO, and a State-Level Synthetic Controls 

Analysis, 3, 63 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
- 35 - 

23510, 2018). They also cite statistics indicating that gun owners 

are more likely to be the victims of gun violence when they carry 

their weapons in public. See Charles C. Branas et al., 

Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99 

Amer. J. Pub. Health 2034 (2009). Finally, the defendants have 

expressed a credible concern that civilians (even civilians who, 

like the plaintiffs, are law-abiding citizens) might miss when 

attempting to use a firearm for self-defense on crowded public 

streets and, thus, create a deadly risk to innocent bystanders.5 

Several other courts of appeals have conducted similar 

inquiries and have concluded that "good reason" laws are 

substantially related to the promotion of public safety and the 

prevention of crime. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 439-40; Woollard, 712 

F.3d at 879-80; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98-99; see also Peruta v. 

Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 942-45 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(Graber, J., concurring). Emblematic of these decisions is the 

series of conclusions reached by the Fourth Circuit, which found 

that such laws "protect[] citizens and inhibit[] crime by . . . 

[d]ecreasing the availability of handguns to criminals via theft"; 

reduce "the likelihood that basic confrontations between 

 5 In support of this stated concern, the defendants cite a 

study finding that highly trained New York City police officers 

had an average accuracy rate of only eighteen percent in gunfights. 

See Bernard D. Rostker et al., RAND Ctr. on Quality Policing, 

Evaluation of the New York City Police Department Firearm Training 

and Firearm-Discharge Review Process 14 (2008). 
- 36 - 

individuals would turn deadly"; deter "the 'potentially tragic 

consequences' . . . that can result from the presence of a third 

person with a handgun during a confrontation between a police 

officer and a criminal suspect"; "[c]urtail[] the presence of 

handguns during routine police-citizen encounters"; decrease "the 

number of 'handgun sightings' that must be investigated"; and 

"[f]aciliat[e] the identification of those persons carrying 

handguns who pose a menace." Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879-80 

(citations omitted). We agree. 

Withal, there are two sides to the story. Fairly viewed, 

the defendants' judgments about whether reasonable restrictions on 

the public carriage of firearms advance public safety and prevent 

crime are plausible, but not infallible. In short, those judgments 

are open to legitimate debate. 

To this end, the plaintiffs present a profusion of 

countervailing studies and articles. Drawing on these materials, 

they argue that the increased presence of firearms on public 

streets would act as a deterrent to criminals, not as a menace to 

public safety. They also laud the perceived benefits attendant to 

the defensive use of firearms. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed 

Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense 

With a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 150, 164 (1995). Several 

amici add their voices to the chorus, debating the findings and 
- 37 - 

credibility of a kaleidoscopic array of studies and articles. Some 

support the plaintiffs; others support the defendants. 

Taken in the ensemble, the disparate views expressed in 

these studies, articles, and other submissions aptly illustrate 

that we are dealing with matters of judgment, not with matters of 

metaphysical certainty. To a large extent, choosing among these 

disparate views is like choosing from a menu at a popular 

restaurant: something can be found to suit every palate and the 

diner's choice is more likely to reflect her particular taste than 

the absolute quality of the dish. In the process of crafting sound 

policy, a legislature often must sift through competing strands of 

empirical support and make predictive judgments to reach its 

conclusions. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 

U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). This is plainly an 

inexact science, and courts must defer to a legislature's choices 

among reasonable alternatives. Institutionally, a legislative 

body is better equipped than a court to assess the compendium of 

data bearing upon a particular issue and to reach predictive 

judgments about what those data portend. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 

at 195. This is especially true of fraught issues, such as gun 

violence: "when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing 

factual inferences in this area, 'the lack of competence on the 

part of the courts is marked' and respect for the Government's 
- 38 - 

conclusions is appropriate." Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 

at 34 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)). 

We conclude that this case falls into an area in which 

it is the legislature's prerogative — not ours — to weigh the 

evidence, choose among conflicting inferences, and make the 

necessary policy judgments. In dealing with a complex societal 

problem like gun violence, there will almost always be room for 

reasonable minds to differ about the optimal solution. It follows, 

we think, that a court must grant the legislature flexibility to 

select among reasonable alternatives. It would be foolhardy — and 

wrong — to demand that the legislature support its policy choices 

with an impregnable wall of unanimous empirical studies. Instead, 

the court's duty is simply "to assure that, in formulating its 

judgments, [the legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based 

on substantial evidence." Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (opinion of 

Kennedy, J.). 

Let us be perfectly clear. The problems associated with 

gun violence are grave. Shootings cut short tens of thousands of 

American lives each year. Massachusetts has made a reasoned 

attempt to reduce the risks of gun violence on public streets: it 

has democratically adopted a firearms licensing statute that takes 

account of the heightened needs of some individuals to carry 

firearms for self-defense and balances those needs against the 
- 39 - 

demands of public safety. The Boston and Brookline policies fit 

seamlessly with these objectives. 

To cinch the matter, the defendants have adduced 

evidence sufficient to show a substantial relationship between the 

challenged regime and important governmental interests. Though 

not incontrovertible, this evidence has considerable force — and 

the legislature was entitled to rely on it to guide its policy 

choices. The upshot is a "measured approach" that "neither bans 

public handgun carrying nor allows public carrying by all firearm 

owners . . . [leaving] room for public carrying by those citizens 

who can demonstrate" good reason to do so. Drake, 724 F.3d at 

440. Consequently, we hold that the Massachusetts firearms 

licensing statute, as implemented by the Boston and Brookline 

policies, passes muster under the Second Amendment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor 

of the defendants. 

Affirmed.