alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      32(a)








**CERTIFICATION
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO**




**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**




**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**




**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Progress Energy, Inc.
      (the
“Company”) for the period ending March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert B. McGehee,
      Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:




(1)  the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)  the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/
      Robert B. McGehee


Robert
      B.
      McGehee


Chairman
      and Chief Executive Officer


May
      8,
      2007








This
      certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company
      for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Exchange Act
      of
      1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Terry Earnheart, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) No. 12 C 1619

)

Zimmer Inc., et al, ) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

) 

)

Defendants. ) 

ORDER

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), the case is dismissed in its entirety

with prejudice. Each party is to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees.

ENTER:

Dated: September 25, 2014 _________________________________________

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER

United States District Judge
#### Thomas J. Nelson, Appellant, v Edward A. Hanna, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Utica, et al., Respondents

— Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: We affirm for the reason, as noted by Special Term, that section 20 of the Utica City Charter (L 1862, ch 18, as amd by L 1876, ch 371, § 7; L 1899, ch 282, § 1; L 1953, ch 878, § 301) limits the rights of the boards, departments, and officers who are to be advised by the Corporation Counsel to employ outside counsel, but does not limit the right of the Corporation Counsel to do so. Section 20, therefore, does not conflict with or limit section 201 of the Second Class Cities Law (L 1906, ch 473, § 201, as amd by L 1921, ch 363, § 1), which grants to the Corporation Counsel the right to employ outside counsel with written consent of the Mayor. The two statutes may be harmonized and read together as limiting the rights of those boards, departments, and officers advised by the Corporation Counsel to employ outside counsel but granting to the Corporation Counsel himself the power to do so. The subsequent enactment of section 201 of the Second Class Cities Law, which clearly distinguishes the powers of the Corporation Counsel from the powers of those whom he advises, confirms our conclusion that the Legislature intended in section 20 of the Utica City Charter to exclude the Corporation Counsel from the group of those who are required by section 20 to obtain permission from the city council before hiring outside counsel. A subsequent statute *in pari materia*with an earlier one may be considered as an aid in the construction of the earlier statute (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 223). (Appeal from order of Oneida Supreme court — summary judgment.) Present —Moule, J. P., Cardamone, Simons, Dillon and Hancock, Jr., JJ.
#### 1336.609 Contract clauses.
#### Brooks *v.*Winkles.

April 18, 1913.

Eish, C. J.

1. In an action on a general warranty of title to land against the claims of all persons, an eviction or equivalent disturbance by an outstanding paramount title must be shown, to entitle the plaintiff to recover. *Darley*v. *Mallary,*136 *Ga.*345 (71 S. E. 471).

2. If in such a case the plaintiff relies upon ouster in consequence of legal proceedings, it must appear that the warrantor had notice thereof and an opportunity to defend. Civil Code, § 4197. See *Clements*v. *Collins,*59 *Ga.*124; *Haines v. Fort,*93 *Ga.*25, 28 (18 S. E. 994).

3. The defendant in execution is not a party to a statutory claim case, where the only issue made is the ordinary one between the plaintiff in execution and the claimant. *Anderson*v. *Wilson,*45 *Ga.*27; *Central Bank*v. *Georgia Grocery Co.,*120 *Ga.*883, 884 (48 S. E. 325). Not being a party himself, he can not vouch his warrantor in such a case so as to give him an opportunity to defend his title, and conclude him by a verdict and judgment that the property is not subject to the execution.

4. Where an ordinary execution against two or more defendants is levied upon land, and the entry of levy does not show as whose property the land was levied on, the levy is insufficient, and, unless amended, a sale made thereunder will not divest the title of the real owner of the land. *Cooper v. Yearwood,*119 *Ga.*44 (45 S. E. 716).

5. Accordingly, on the trial of an action for alleged breach of a general warranty of title to land, the refusal to grant a nonsuit was error, where the only evidence in behalf óf the plaintiff, the warrantee, showed the following facts, viz.: An execution in favor of the officers of court and against the warrantee and another was levied upon the land purchased by the warrantee from his warrantor with a covenant of general warranty—the levy, however, not stating as whose property the land was le.ied on; a statutory claim was filed thereto by a third person; the warrantor was subpomaed by the warrantee as a witness for the plaintiffs in execution, and, on the trial of the usual issue in the claim case, testified in their behalf; and a verdict was rendered finding the property not subject, and a judgment in accordance therewith was entered.

(a) It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the facts that a warrantor is subpcenaed by his warrantee in a case *to*which the latter is a party, and appears and testifies therein, constitute, without more, sufficient notice to vouch the warrantor so as to require him to defend his title.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*733Action foi breach of warranty. Before Judge Edwards. Haralson superior court. January 18, 1912.

*Griffith & Matthews,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. S. Edwards*and *W. P. Robinson,*contra.
**U.S. Department of Education**

**Negotiated Rulemaking**

**Team II – Student Loan Program Issues**

**1990 K Street, NW, 8th Floor Conference Center**

**Washington, D.C.**

**February 13, 2012, 12:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

**February 14-16, 9:00 am – 5:00 pm**

**February 17, 2012, 9:00 am – 12:00 pm**

**Agenda**

Introduction

Agenda

Meeting Summary for Prior Session

Housekeeping and Other Issues

Review of Issues and Proposed Regulatory Language

1. Changes to Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan 

--Process for Receipt of Cancellation

2. Changes to Income-Based (IBR) Repayment Plan 

--New Borrower Notification for Annual IBR Evaluation 

--Annual IBR Income Verification 

--Borrower Repayment After Leaving IBR 

--Process for Receipt of Forgiveness 

3. FFEL Repayment Disclosures: Borrowers Who Are Having Difficulty Making Payments and Borrowers Who Are 60-Days Delinquent 

4. Forbearance Provisions for Borrowers Receiving Department of Defense Student Loan Repayment Benefits

5. Borrowers Who Are Delinquent when Authorized Forbearance is Granted

6. Forbearance for Post 270-Day Defaulted Loan Borrowers Prior to Lender Claim Payment or Transfer to ED Default Collections 

7. Minimum Loan Period for Transfer Students in Non-Term and Certain Non-Standard Term Programs 

8. “Reasonable and Affordable” Payment Standard for Rehabilitation of Defaulted Direct Loans and FFEL Program Loans 

9. Rehabilitation of Defaulted Direct Loan and FFEL Program Loans Treatment of Borrowers Subject to Administrative Wage Garnishment

10. Participation Rate Index Appeal for Single Cohort Default Rate Loss of Eligibility to Participate in the Direct Loan Program 

11. Repeal of Unnecessary FFEL Program Regulations 

12. Modification of Direct Loan Program Regulations 

13. Total and Permanent Disability Discharge – Single Application Process 

14. Total and Permanent Disability Discharge – Borrower Notification of Denial 

15. Total and Permanent Disability Discharge – Post-Discharge Monitoring of Employment Earnings 

16. Title IV Closed School Loan Discharge 

17. Satisfactory Repayment Arrangements on Defaulted Title IV Loans for Borrowers who also Rehabilitate the Loan 

18. School Enrollment Status Reporting Requirements 

19. Federal Perkins Loan Graduate Fellowship Deferment Eligibility 

20. Social Security Number Requirement for Assignment of Federal Perkins Loans to Department of Education 

21. Federal Perkins Loan Cancellation Rate Progression Across Cancellation Categories 

22. Federal Perkins Loan Economic Hardship deferment Debt-to-Income Ratio Provision 

23. Federal Perkins Loan Break in Cancellation Service Due to Condition Covered Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (20 U.S.C. 2601 et. seq.) 

24. Standard for On-Time Rehabilitation Payments in the Federal Perkins Loan Program 

25. FFEL Program Administrative Wage Garnishment (AWG) Hearings for Defaulted Borrowers 

Next Steps

Revised Regulatory Text

Agenda for Session 3

Other

� Time will be made available for public comment during the meeting.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23 - 0211 CITY OF MISSOULA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SCOTT ANTHONY CHARLIE,

Defendant and Appellant .

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including December 6 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 30 2023

10/30/2023
Case Number: DA 23-0211
1817.7000 Definitions. ( a ) *Down-selection.* In a phased acquisition, the process of selecting contractors for later phases from among the preceding phase contractors.
( b ) *Phased Acquisition.* An incremental acquisition implementation comprised of several distinct phases where the realization of program/project objectives requires a planned, sequential acquisition of each phase. The phases may be acquired separately, in combination, or through a down-selection strategy.
( c ) *Progressive Competition.* A type of down-selection strategy for a phased acquisition. In this method, a single solicitation is issued for all phases of the program. The initial phase contracts are awarded, and the contractors for subsequent phases are expected to be chosen through a down-selection from among the preceding phase contractors. In each phase, progressively fewer contracts are awarded until a single contractor is chosen for the final phase. Normally, all down-selections are accomplished without issuance of a new, formal solicitation.
[61 FR 55753, Oct. 29, 1996. Redesignated at 80 FR 68778, Nov. 6, 2015]
1823.570-3 Suspension of payments, termination of contract, and debarment and suspension actions. The contracting officer shall comply with the procedures of FAR 23.506 regarding the suspension of contract payments, the termination of the contract for default, and debarment and suspension of a contractor relative to failure to comply with the clause at 1852.223-74. Causes for suspension of contract payments, termination of the contract for default, and debarment and suspension of the contractor are the following: ( a ) The contractor fails to comply with paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of the clause at 1852.223-74; or
( b ) Such a number of contractor employees in sensitive positions having been convicted of violations of criminal drug statutes or substantial evidence of drug or alcohol abuse or misuse occurring in the workplace, as to indicate that the contractor has failed to make a good faith effort to provide a drug- and alcohol-free workforce.
[61 FR 55757, Oct. 29, 1996. Redesignated and amended at 69 FR 21765, Apr. 22, 2004]
1817.208 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses. (NASA supplements paragraph (c)) ( c ) ( 3 ) The contracting officer shall insert a provision substantially the same as FAR 52.217-5 in cost reimbursement contracts when the other conditions of FAR 17.208(c) are met.
#### Mercedes Gil, Respondent, v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants. McGuire Service Corp., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[833 NYS2d 634]

*704In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (David Schmidt, J.), dated December 23, 2005, as, upon reargument, adhered to a prior determination in an order dated June 9, 2005, denying those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for summary judgment on its third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action after allegedly falling on snow and ice in the parking lot of a bank branch of the defendants third-party plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively the bank). The bank asserted a third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification against McGuire Service Corp. (hereinafter McGuire), its snow removal contractor.

Contrary to the bank’s contention, the court properly denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In slip-and-fall cases involving snow and ice, a property owner is not liable unless he or she created the defect, or had actual or constructive notice of its existence *(see Carricato v Jefferson Val. Mall Ltd. Partnership,*299 AD2d 444 [2002]; *Voss v D&C Parking,*299 AD2d 346 [2002]). Here, the bank failed to establish as a matter of law that its snow removal procedures for its branch parking lots did not create the condition which caused the plaintiffs injuries *(see Petrocelli v Marrelli Dev. Corp.,*31 AD3d 623, 624 [2006]; *Giamboi v Manor House Owners Corp.,*277 AD2d 201, 202 [2000]). In support of its motion, the bank submitted deposition testimony of a McGuire representative who indicated that the bank had instructed McGuire to plow snow into rear parking spaces in the branch lots and the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, whose description of the location of the snow on which she fell was consistent with where McGuire was instructed to plow. Accordingly, the bank failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Additionally, the court properly denied that branch of the bank’s motion which was for summary judgment on its third-*705party cause of action for contractual indemnification. Because the bank failed to establish as a matter of law that it was free from any negligence with regard to the plaintiffs accident, summary judgment on its third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification is premature *(see Watters v R.D. Branch Assoc., LR*30 AD3d 408, 409-410 [2006]; *State of New York v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.,*280 AD2d 756, 757 [2001]). Schmidt, J.P., Mastro, Garni and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ATTORNEY APPEARANCE FORM

NOTE: In order to appear before this Court an attorney must either be a member in good standing of this 

Court’s general bar or be granted leave to appear pro hac vice as provided for by Local Rules 83.12 through 

83.14.

In the Matter of Case Number: 1:12-cv-00750

Bob-Manuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.

AN APPEARANCE IS HEREBY FILED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY FOR:

(In the space below, enter the name of the party or parties being represented)

Tubonimi Bob-Manuel

NAME (Type or print)

Thomas F. Padgett

SIGNATURE (Use electronic signature if the appearance form is filed electronically)

 s/ Thomas F. Padgett

FIRM

The Coffey Law Office PC

STREET ADDRESS

351 West Hubbard Street, Suite 602

CITY/STATE/ZIP

Chicago, IL 60654

ID NUMBER (SEE ITEM 3 IN INSTRUCTIONS)

6306692

TELEPHONE NUMBER

312-627-9700

ARE YOU ACTING AS LEAD COUNSEL IN THIS CASE? (Enter “Y” or “N”) N

ARE YOU ACTING AS LOCAL COUNSEL IN THIS CASE? (Enter “Y” or “N”) N

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THIS COURT’S TRIAL BAR? (Enter “Y” or “N”) N

IF THIS CASE REACHES TRIAL, WILL YOU ACT AS THE TRIAL ATTORNEY? (Enter “Y” or “N”) N

IF THIS IS A CRIMINAL CASE, USE AN “X” TO DESCRIBE YOUR STATUS IN THIS CASE.

RETAINED COUNSEL APPOINTED COUNSEL

Case: 1:12-cv-00750 Document #: 11 Filed: 04/19/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:26
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
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<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          13,054
<SECURITIES>                                   150,881
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


Name                                                 State of Formation
------------------------------------------------     ------------------
Connecticut Storage Fund........................         California
Diversified Storage Venture Fund................         California
PS Co-Investment Partners.......................         California
PS Insurance Company, Ltd.......................          Bermuda
PS Orangeco Holdings, Inc.......................         California
PS Orangeco, Inc...............................          California
PS Partners IV, Ltd.............................         California
PS Partners V, Ltd..............................         California
PS Partners VI, Ltd.............................         California
PS Partners VIII, Ltd...........................         California
PS Partners, Ltd................................         California
PSA Institutional Partners, L.P.................         California
PSAC Development Partners, L.P..................         California
Public Storage Institutional Fund...............         California
Public Storage Institutional Fund II............         California
Public Storage Institutional Fund III...........         California
Public Storage Institutional Fund IV............         California
Public Storage Pickup & Delivery, L.P...........         California
Storage Trust Properties, L.P. .................          Delaware

Note: This schedule excludes 12 other wholly-owned subsidiaries which were
excluded in accordance with Reg. S-K, Item 601. All of the entities above
conduct substantially all of their business activities under the name "Public
Storage".
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.40



                          AMENDED SCHEDULE OF ADVANCES

This Schedule supplements the Note dated November 14, 2001 by and between AXCESS
Inc. as Maker and Amphion Ventures as Payee. The Maker hereby acknowledges
receipt of the advances in the amount and on the dates set forth below, all of
which shall be included as "Principal" under, and be governed by the terms and
conditions of, said Note.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Date of Advance            Amount of Advance  % Interest    Receipt Acknowledged
---------------            -----------------  ----------    --------------------
<S>                        <C>                <C>           <C>
12/18/01                           $100,000   4.5%          By: /S/ ALLAN GRIEBENOW
                                                                ------------------------------------
                                                            Allan Griebenow, Chief Executive Officer
</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 3.1(a)

                           CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                      OF

                         CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                      OF

                           SYNERCOM TECHNOLOGY, INC.

                    (Pursuant to Section 242 of the General
                   Corporation Law of the State of Delaware)

  SYNERCOM TECHNOLOGY, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "Corporation"), does
hereby certify as follows;

  1. The Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation is hereby amended to
change the name of the Corporation.

  2. To accomplish the foregoing, Article I of the Certificate of Incorporation
of the Corporation, relating to the name of the Corporation, is hereby amended
to read in its entirety as follows:

    "ARTICLE I. The name of the Corporation is ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES
    GROUP, INC."

  3. The foregoing Amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation has been duly
adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 242 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. The Board of Directors of the
Corporation adopted resolutions setting forth such Amendment, declaring its
advisability and calling for submission of the Amendment to the stockholders of
the Corporation for vote at the Corporation's Annual Meeting of Stockholders.
The stockholders approved such Amendment at the Annual Meeting of Stockholders
on April 19, 1995.

  4. The capital of the Corporation will not be reduced under or by reason of
said Amendment.

  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Certificate to be signed
on behalf of Synercom Technology, Inc. this 19th day of April, 1995.

                                        /s/ Lawrence Butler
                                        ------------------------------
                                        Lawrence Butler, President

ATTEST:

/s/ Johnny Blanchard
-------------------------------
Johnny Blanchard, Secretary