PRELIMINARY PRINT 

## Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 **Pages 736–761** 

# OFFICIAL REPORTS

**OF** 

# THE SUPREME COURT

**June 23, 2023**

**REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions** 

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.736 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 Syllabus **COINBASE, INC.** v . **BIELSKI**
**certiorari to the united states court of appeals for**  **the ninth circuit** No. 22–105. Argued March 21, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 Abraham Bielski fled a putative class action on behalf of Coinbase users

alleging that Coinbase, an online currency platform, failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from the users' accounts. Because Coinbase's User Agreement provides for dispute resolution through binding arbi

tration, Coinbase fled a motion to compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 16(a), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The Dis

trict Court denied Coinbase's stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit like

wise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings pending appeal. Held : A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory

appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 740–747.

(a) Section 16(a) does not say whether district court proceedings must be stayed pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal. But Congress enacted the provision against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. , 459 U. S. 56, 58. The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the ap

peal,” id. , at 58, and Griggs dictates that the district court stay its pro

ceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. Most courts of appeals to address this question, as well as leading trea

tises, agree with that conclusion.

The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under § 16(a) refects common sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefts of arbitration (effciency, less expense, less intru

sive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced toCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 737 Syllabus settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs rule avoids these detrimental results.

Congress's longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given Griggs , when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Con

gress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non

stay” provisions. Pp. 740–744.

(b) Bielski's arguments to overcome the Griggs principle are unper

suasive. First , the courts of appeals possess robust tools to prevent unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals that an au

tomatic stay might otherwise encourage. Second , Congress included explicit stay requirements in two other statutory provisions for reasons particular to those statutes, not because Congress thought that an in

terlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceedings. Third , the result here does not create a special, arbitration-preferring procedural rule, but simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts where an interlocutory appeal is authorized. Fourth , experience shows that ordi

nary discretionary stay factors would not adequately protect parties' rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. In any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of how often courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary discretionary stay factors. Fifth , while the Court has recognized that questions of arbitrability are severable from merits questions, the sole issue here is whether the district court's authority to consider a case is “involved in the appeal” when an appellate court considers the threshold question of arbitrability, Griggs , 459 U. S., at 58. The answer is yes. Pp. 744–747. Reversed and remanded.

**Kavanaugh** , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which **Roberts** , C. J., and **Alito** , **Gorsuch** , and **Barrett** , JJ., joined. **Jackson** , J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which **Sotomayor** and **Kagan,** JJ., joined in full, and in which **Thomas** , J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV, post , p. 747. Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jessica L. Ellsworth, Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar, William E. Havemann, Nathaniel A. G. Ze

-738 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Opinion of the Court linsky, Michael G. Rhodes, Kathleen Hartnett, Bethany L obo, and Adam M. Katz. Hassan A. Zavareei argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Abraham Bielski were Glenn E. Chappell, Spencer S. Hughes, Sabita J. Soneji, Wesley M. Griffth, and Matthew D. Carlson. David J. Har

ris, Jr., fled a brief for respondents David Suski et al.* **Justice Kavanaugh** delivered the opinion of the Court. When a federal district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the losing party has a statutory right to an inter

locutory appeal. See 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). The sole question here is whether the district court must stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongo

ing. The answer is yes: The district court must stay its proceedings. I Coinbase operates an online platform on which users can buy and sell cryptocurrencies and government-issued curren

cies. When creating a Coinbase account, individuals agree to the terms in Coinbase's User Agreement. As relevant

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner, John F. Querio, and Scott P. Dixler; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Mark A. Perry, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Elizabeth Milito ; for the Civil Justice Association of California by Fred J. Hiestand and Benjamin G. Shatz ; for the National Retail Federation by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, and Kevin Ranlett ; and for the Washington Legal Founda

tion by Cory L. Andrews and John M. Masslon II. Sarah Elizabeth Spencer fled a brief for the DRI Center for Law and Public Policy as amicus curiae urging vacatur.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American Association for Justice by Deepak Gupta, Matthew W. H. Wessler, Jennifer Bennett, and Tad Thomas ; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod ; and for Public Justice by Karla Gilbride

.

Jason D. Russell, Deborah R. White, Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Meredith C. Slawe, and Lara A. Flath fled a brief for the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., as amicus curiae.Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 739 Opinion of the Court here, the User Agreement contains an arbitration provision, wh ich directs that disputes arising under the agreement be resolved through binding arbitration. This case concerns a putative class action fled against Coinbase in the U. S. District Court for the Northern Dis

trict of California. Abraham Bielski sued on behalf of Coinbase users who allege that Coinbase failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from the users' accounts. The District Court denied Coinbase's motion to compel ar

bitration. Coinbase then fled an interlocutory appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). 1 Section 16(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase also moved to stay District Court proceedings pending resolution of the arbitrability issue on appeal. The District Court declined to stay its proceedings. After re

ceiving Coinbase's motion for a stay, the Ninth Circuit like

wise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings. The Ninth Circuit followed its precedent, under which an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration does not automatically stay district court proceedings. See Britton v. Co-op Banking Group , 916 F. 2d 1405, 1412 (1990). By contrast, however, most other Courts of Appeals to address the question have held that a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. E. g. , Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. , 128 F. 3d 504, 506 (CA7 1997).

1 As relevant, the text of § 16(a) provides: “An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . “(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, “(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,

“(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,

“(D) confrming or denying confrmation of an award or partial award, or “(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award.”740 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Opinion of the Court To resolve that disagreement among the Courts of Ap

pea ls, we granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2022). II The Federal Arbitration Act governs arbitration agree

ments. In 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed an amendment to the Act; the amendment is codifed at 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). Under § 16(a), when a district court de

nies a party's motion to compel arbitration, that party may take an interlocutory appeal. Section 16(a) creates a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before fnal judgment. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108–109 (2009). Notably, Con

gress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders denying—but not of orders granting—motions to compel arbitration. The sole question before this Court is whether a district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory ap

peal on arbitrability is ongoing. The answer is yes. Section 16(a) does not say whether the district court pro

ceedings must be stayed. But Congress enacted § 16(a) against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court's precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory ap

peal, “divests the district court of its control over those as

pects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provi

dent Consumer Discount Co. , 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982). That Griggs principle refects a longstanding tenet of American procedure. See Hovey v. McDonald , 109 U. S. 150, 157 (1883); see also Price v. Dunn , 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) ( **Thomas** , J., joined by **Alito** and **Gorsuch** , JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) (describing Griggs principle as “well settled”); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 470 U. S. 373, 379 (1985) (“In general, fling of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal”).Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 741 Opinion of the Court The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the questi on on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the appeal.” 459 U. S., at 58. As Judge East

erbrook cogently explained, when a party appeals the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, whether “the litigation may go forward in the district court is precisely what the court of appeals must decide.” Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. , 128 F. 3d 504, 506 (CA7 1997). Stated otherwise, the question of whether “the case should be litigated in the district court . . . is the mirror image of the question presented on appeal.” Id. , at 505. Here, as elsewhere, it “makes no sense for trial to go forward while the court of appeals cogitates on whether there should be one.” Apostol v. Gallion , 870 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1989). In short, Griggs dictates that the district court must stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbi

trability is ongoing. 2 Most courts of appeals to address the question in the § 16(a) context have reached that same conclusion. E. g. , Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F. 3d 1249, 1253 (CA11 2004) (“[I]t makes little sense for the litigation to con

tinue in the district court while the appeal is pending”). 3 Leading treatises agree that a district court should stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is

2 Coinbase concedes that the district court may still proceed with mat

ters that are not involved in the appeal, such as the awarding of costs and attorney's fees. Brief for Petitioner 21; see also 16A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & C. Struve, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1, pp. 68– 69 (5th ed. 2019).

3 See also Levin v. Alms & Assoc., Inc. , 634 F. 3d 260, 266 (CA4 2011); Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc. , 482 F. 3d 207, 215, n. 6 (CA3 2007); McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. , 413 F. 3d 1158, 1162–1163 (CA10 2005); Bombardier Corp. v. National R. Passenger Corporation , 333 F. 3d 250, 252 (CADC 2003); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. , 128 F. 3d 504, 505–507 (CA7 1997); but see, e. g. , Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F. 3d 904, 907–910 (CA5 2011).742 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Opinion of the Court ongoing. For example, Moore's treatise states that a “stay i n these circumstances” is “the sounder approach” and “is consistent with the general [ Griggs] principle that a district court should not exercise jurisdiction over those aspects of the case that are involved in the appeal.” 19 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Fed

eral Practice § 203.12[3][a] (3d ed. 2022). Similarly, the Wright and Miller treatise endorses the automatic stay re

quirement in arbitration cases. The treatise explains that a “complete stay of district-court proceedings pending appeal from a refusal to order arbitration is desirable” because “[c]ontinued trial-court proceedings pending appeal could lead to an entirely wasted trial if arbitration is ordered on appeal.” 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.17, p. 7 (2d ed., Supp. 2022). In the Circuits that have considered the issue in the analo

gous contexts of qualifed immunity and double jeopardy, moreover, district courts likewise must automatically stay their proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing. 4 Similarly, as Bielski acknowledges, courts have held that the Griggs principle applies to those aspects of the case involved in a certifed interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). 5 The common practice in § 16(a) cases, therefore, is for a district court to stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. That common practice

4 E. g. , United States v. Montgomery , 262 F. 3d 233, 239–240 (CA4 2001) (double jeopardy); United States v. LaMere , 951 F. 2d 1106, 1108 (CA9 1991) (same); United States v. Grabinski , 674 F. 2d 677, 679 (CA8 1982) (same); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F. 2d 985, 988–989 (CA5 1980) (en banc) (same); Chuman v. Wright , 960 F. 2d 104, 105 (CA9 1992) (qualifed immunity); Yates v. Cleveland , 941 F. 2d 444, 448–449 (CA6 1991) (same); Apostol v. Gallion , 870 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1989) (same); Stewart v. Donges , 915 F. 2d 572, 575–576 (CA10 1990) (both).

5 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 60–61; see also Green Leaf Nursery v. E. I. Du

Pont De Nemours and Co. , 341 F. 3d 1292, 1309 (CA11 2003); Los Angeles v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F. 3d 882, 885–886 (CA9 2001); Dayton Independent School Dist. v. U. S. Mineral Prods. Co., 906 F. 2d 1059, 1063– 1064 (CA5 1990).Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 743 Opinion of the Court refects common sense. Absent an automatic stay of district court proceedings, Congress's decision in § 16(a) to afford a right to an interlocutory appeal would be largely nullifed. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongo

ing, then many of the asserted benefts of arbitration (eff

ciency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to set

tle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discov

ery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitra

tion. That potential for coercion is especially pronounced in class actions, where the possibility of colossal liability can lead to what Judge Friendly called “blackmail settlements.” H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973). As Judge Easterbrook stated, continuation of proceedings in the district court “largely defeats the point of the appeal.” Bradford-Scott , 128 F. 3d, at 505. A right to interlocutory appeal of the arbitrability issue without an automatic stay of the district court proceedings is therefore like a lock without a key, a bat without a ball, a computer without a keyboard— in other words, not especially sensible. From the Judiciary's institutional perspective, moreover, allowing a case to proceed simultaneously in the district court and the court of appeals creates the possibility that the district court will waste scarce judicial resources—which could be devoted to other pressing criminal or civil mat

ters—on a dispute that will ultimately head to arbitration in any event. That scenario represents the “worst possible outcome” for parties and the courts: litigating a dispute in the district court only for the court of appeals to “reverse and order the dispute arbitrated.” Id. , at 506. The Griggs rule avoids that detrimental result. Importantly, Congress's longstanding practice both re

fects and reinforces the Griggs rule. When Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically744 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Opinion of the Court stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Con

gress need not say anything about a stay. At least absent contrary indications, the background Griggs principle al

ready requires an automatic stay of district court proceed

ings that relate to any aspect of the case involved in the appeal. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-stay” provisions. 6 Indeed, Congress enacted a “non

stay” provision the day before enacting § 16(a) in 1988. See 102 Stat. 4120 (“Neither the application for, nor the granting of, an appeal . . . shall stay proceedings in the Court of Veter

ans Appeals”). In short, the Griggs rule requires that a district court stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the ques

tion of arbitrability is ongoing. III To overcome the Griggs principle, Bielski advances fve main arguments. None is persuasive. First , Bielski contends that an automatic stay would en

courage frivolous appeals that would improperly delay dis

trict court proceedings. To begin with, Bielski has not es

tablished that frivolous appeals frequently occur in the

6 Act of Apr. 3, 1926, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233–234; Act of Feb. 28, 1927, ch. 228, id. , at 1261; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72 Stat. 1770; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 125, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U. S. C. § 1292(d)(3); Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1558, 100 Stat. 2757–2758, 26 U. S. C. § 7482(a)(2)(A); Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 102 Stat. 4120, as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 7292(b)(1); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con

sumer Protection Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 203, 28 U. S. C. § 158(d)(2)(D); Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, § 306, 130 Stat. 582, 48 U. S. C. § 2166(e)(6); see also Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 828; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660–661; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(f).Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 745 Opinion of the Court Circuits that have long applied the Griggs principle in arbi

trati on cases. Cf. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. , 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Nor does Bielski argue that Coinbase's appeal in this case is frivolous. Importantly, moreover, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to pre

vent unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory ap

peals. For example, a party can ask the court of appeals to summarily affrm, to expedite an interlocutory appeal, or to dismiss the interlocutory appeal as frivolous. In addition, nearly every circuit has developed a process by which a dis

trict court itself may certify that an interlocutory appeal is frivolous. Brief for Petitioner 51; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle , 556 U. S. 624, 629 (2009) (“Appellate courts can streamline the disposition of meritless claims and even authorize the district court's retention of” a case “when an appeal is certifed as frivolous”). Finally, a court of appeals may impose sanctions where appropriate; the possibility of sanctions also helps deter frivolous appeals. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 38; Arthur Andersen , 556 U. S., at 629. Second , Bielski contrasts § 16(a) with two other statutory provisions that contain an explicit stay requirement—§ 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act and § 1292(d)(4) of Title 28. Bielski suggests that Congress would not have included those explicit stay requirements in § 3 and § 1292(d)(4) unless Congress thought that an interlocutory appeal did not ordi

narily stay district court proceedings. Bielski is wrong. Section 3 of the Act provides for a stay of court proceed

ings pending arbitration , not pending an appeal. That situ

ation does not fall within the Griggs rule. No background principle requires automatic stays of district court proceed

ings pending arbitration . In order to automatically stay court proceedings pending arbitration in those cases, Con

gress therefore affrmatively codifed a stay requirement. As to § 1292(d)(4): When Congress added § 1292(d)(4)'s stay requirement in 1988, the relevant subsection already con

tained a provision, § 1292(d)(3), that expressly made stays of746 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI Opinion of the Court proceedings in certain courts discretionary rather than man

datory . To avoid any misinterpretation of § 1292(d)(4) be

cause of that preexisting language in § 1292(d)(3), Congress specifed the right to an automatic stay pending appeal in § 1292(d)(4). That unusual circumstance does not diminish the operation of the Griggs rule in the context of arbitrabil

ity appeals. Third , Bielski contends that requiring an automatic stay would create a special, arbitration-preferring procedural rule. That is incorrect. In fact, Bielski's proposed ap

proach would disfavor arbitration. Applying the Griggs rule here simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts where an interlocutory appeal is authorized, including quali

fed immunity and double jeopardy. Bielski further points to forum selection clauses as an analogy. But unlike § 16(a) arbitrability appeals, Congress has not created a right to an interlocutory appeal for cases involving forum selection clauses. So a stay in the forum selection context could be required only in those cases where there is a certifed § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal of the forum selection issue. Fourth , Bielski suggests that there is no need for an auto

matic stay because the ordinary discretionary stay factors would adequately protect parties' rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. To begin with, ex

perience shows that Bielski is incorrect. District courts and courts of appeals applying the usual four-factor standard for a discretionary stay often deny stays in § 16(a) appeals because courts applying that test often do not consider litigation-related burdens (here, from the continued District Court proceedings) to constitute irreparable harm. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434–435 (2009); FTC v. Stand

ard Oil Co. of Cal. , 449 U. S. 232, 244 (1980) (“Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a (District Court in Biel

ski stating that “[m]ere litigation expenses do not generallyCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 747 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting constitute irreparable injury” for purposes of stay pending appea l). In any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of how often courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary discretionary stay factors. Fifth , Bielski relies on this Court's statement that ques

tions of arbitrability are “severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U. S. 1, 21 (1983). But the sole issue here is whether the district court's authority to consider a case is “involved in the appeal” when an appel

late court considers the threshold question of arbitrability. Griggs , 459 U. S., at 58. The answer is yes, and Moses H. Cone says nothing to the contrary. * * * We conclude that, after Coinbase appealed from the denial of its motion to compel arbitration, the District Court was required to stay its proceedings. On remand, we anticipate that the Ninth Circuit here, as we anticipate in § 16(a) ap

peals more generally, will proceed with appropriate expedi

tion when considering Coinbase's interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 7 It is so ordered. **Justice Jackson** , with whom **Justice Sotomayor** and **Justice Kagan** join, and with whom **Justice Thomas** joins as to Parts II, III, and IV, dissenting. When a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory re

view of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at the trial court level. Usually, the trial judge then makes a particularized determination upon request, based on the

7 The Court's judgment today pertains to respondent Abraham Bielski. The writ of certiorari as to respondents David Suski et al. is dismissed as improvidently granted.748 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting facts and circumstances of that case, as to whether the re

mai ning part of the case should continue unabated or be paused (stayed) pending appeal. This discretionary deci

sionmaking promotes procedural fairness because it allows for a balancing of all relevant interests. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009). Today, the Court departs from this traditional approach. It holds that, with respect to an interlocutory appeal of a trial court order denying arbitration, a trial court must al

ways “stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the inter

locutory appeal is ongoing.” Ante , at 738. In other words, in this context, the Court sees ft to impose a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings. This mandatory-general-stay rule for interlocutory arbi

trability appeals comes out of nowhere. No statute imposes it. Nor does any decision of this Court. Yet today's major

ity invents a new stay rule perpetually favoring one class of litigants—defendants seeking arbitration. Those defend

ants will now receive a stay even when, according to the usual equitable analysis, there is no good reason for one. And, in reaching this result, the Court concludes for the frst time that an interlocutory appeal about one matter (arbitra

bility) bars the district court from proceeding on another (the merits). That logic has such signifcant implications for federal litigation that the majority itself shies away from the Pandora's box it may have opened. I see no basis here for wresting away the discretion tradi

tionally entrusted to the judge closest to a case. I respect

fully dissent. I Congress did not impose the mandatory-general-stay rule that the majority adopts today. Start with the governing statute. Congress addressed the kind of interlocutory appeals at issue here in 9 U. S. C. § 16—the section of the Federal Arbitration Act it enacted to govern “Appeals.” 102 Stat. 4671 (amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. ). Section 16 providesCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 749 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting that “[a]n appeal may be taken from” specifed orders and decisi ons, and “an appeal may not be taken from” others. The appeals that § 16 authorizes include interlocutory appeals of orders denying requests for arbitration. §§ 16(a)(1)(A)–(C). But nowhere did Congress provide that such an interlocu

tory appeal automatically triggers a general stay of pre-trial and trial proceedings. As the majority opinion admits, § 16 never even mentions a stay pending appeal. Ante , at 740. Even beyond that, related provisions confrm that Con

gress imposed no mandatory general stay in § 16 appeals. “Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken , 556 U. S., at 430 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Congress did that here—twice. First, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocu

tory stay in another provision of the same 1988 law that enacted § 16. See 102 Stat. 4652, 4670–4671. Like § 16, that other provision—codifed at 28 U. S. C. § 1292(d)(4)—au

thorizes interlocutory appeals. See § 1292(d)(4)(A). But unlike § 16, the text of that other provision specifes that, upon an interlocutory appeal, “proceedings shall be . . . stayed until the appeal has been decided.” § 1292(d)(4)(B). This resembles the rule the majority adopts today for § 16 appeals. Yet Congress omitted it from § 16, while simulta

neously imposing it in § 1292(d)(4). Second, Congress expressly mandated a general interlocu

tory stay in another provision of the Federal Arbitration Act. Section 3 pertains to a circumstance in which the trial court is “satisfed” that an issue should be referred to arbitration. 9 U. S. C. § 3. In such a case, the statute expressly provides that the trial court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Again, the contrast with § 16 is stark. Congress specifed a mandatory general stay750 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting of trial court proceedings in § 3 (when the trial court deter

mi nes that arbitration is warranted) but not § 16(a) (when the court determines that arbitration is unwarranted). The majority opinion waves away these mandatory

general-stay provisions by jerry-rigging explanations for why Congress mandated those stays expressly without doing so in § 16. Ante , at 745–746. But the point remains: Con

gress focused on stays when crafting the 1988 law and the Federal Arbitration Act. And when it intended to mandate interlocutory stays, it said so expressly. Nothing stopped Congress from doing so in § 16—yet it chose not to. This underscores that § 16 does not mandate a stay. 1

1 The majority's explanation for why Congress mandated a stay in 28 U. S. C. § 1292(d)(4) also makes no sense. According to the majority, Con

gress usually remains silent when it intends to mandate a stay. Ante , at 743–744, 745–746. Congress expressly imposed a mandatory stay in § 1292(d)(4), the majority says, only because a pre-existing provision, § 1292(d)(3), would otherwise have made stays in § 1292(d)(4) appeals dis

cretionary. Ante , at 745–746.

But that last point holds no water. Paragraph (3) has no bearing on paragraph (4), because these two provisions govern different kinds of appeals.

Specifcally, paragraph (3) governs certain appeals by permission , while paragraph (4) governs a separate set of appeals as of right . Paragraph (3) addresses events unique to permissive appeals: “Neither the applica

tion for nor the granting of an appeal” stays trial court proceedings. § 1292(d)(3) (emphasis added). Paragraph (3) thus corresponds to para

graphs (1) and (2), which authorize permissive appeals “if application is made” and granted. §§ 1292(d)(1)–(2). Meanwhile, paragraph (4) sepa

rately authorizes certain as-of-right appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(A), and it im

poses mandatory stays in such appeals, § 1292(d)(4)(B). In an appeal as of right under paragraph (4), paragraph (3) never kicks in, because there is no “application for” or “granting of” an appeal, § 1292(d)(3).

Thus, the majority's story—that Congress needed express stay language to avoid overlap with paragraph (3)—turns on a red herring. There is no such overlap. Instead, only the more straightforward explanation re

mains: Congress imposed a mandatory general stay in § 1292(d)(4)—but not 9 U. S. C. § 16—because it intended such a stay under the former but not the latter.Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 751 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting Given all this, it is no surprise that Congress's enactments barely fgure into the majority opinion. The mandatory

general-stay rule is so untethered from § 16 that the statu

tory text has no role in the Court's reasoning. And when Congress's work fnally does take the stage near the end of the Court's analysis, it plays a minor part. See ante , at 743–744. The Court notes that other statutes ex

pressly provide that appeals do not automatically stay dis

trict court proceedings. Ante , at 744, and n. 6. From this, the Court tries to draw an across-the-board inference that, unless Congress expressly disavows the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule, that rule applies. The Court's inference fails. The statutes that the major

ity points to have nothing to do with arbitration or § 16 (un

like the two provisions discussed above, which were enacted in the same 1988 law as § 16 and codifed alongside § 16 in the Federal Arbitration Act, respectively, supra , at 749). Moreover, and in any event, the majority's cited statutes do not support the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. The majority invokes statutes that expressly preclude auto

matic stays of all trial court proceedings. But if the major

ity is correct that Congress intended the opposite when a statute is silent, then stays of all trial court proceedings would be required. Yet, the majority's own holding does not go that far. See ante , at 741, n. 2. Instead, the majority requires stays for some proceedings (those related to the merits) but not others (those related to costs and fees), ibid. —a line that appears nowhere in the majority's cited statutes. At the end of the day, the best the majority can do is point to a smattering of provisions that do not contain the rule that the majority adopts. And those provisions do not even relate to § 16 or the majority's rule (staying litigation gener

ally but not proceedings on costs and fees). Neither those statutes, nor any other, imposes on arbitrability appeals the stay rule that the Court announces.752 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting II Unable to locate its rule in a statute, the majority opinion pivots to “background principle[s].” Ante , at 740. But there is no background mandatory-general-stay rule. To the contrary, the background rule is that courts have case-by-case discretion regarding whether or not to issue a stay. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket.” Landis v. North American Co. , 299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936). That power is discretionary—it “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh com

peting interests” in each particular case. Id. , at 254–255. One key to this discretionary-stay tradition is its “suppleness of adaptation to varying conditions.” Id. , at 256. A stay “is not a matter of right” and cannot be imposed “refex

ively.” Nken , 556 U. S., at 427 (internal quotation marks omitted). That has long been the default rule. A court's discretion “to grant a stay pending review” is “frmly imbedded in our judicial system, consonant with the historic procedures of federal appellate courts.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is “a power as old as the judicial system of the nation.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) (All Writs Act, originally enacted in 1789, 1 Stat. 81–82). Signifcantly for present purposes, discretionary stays are the default for interlocutory appeals in particular—and this dates back to the frst federal interlocutory-appeal statute in 1891. Judiciary Act of 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 828; see 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce

dure § 3906, p. 346 (3d ed. 2022). There, Congress estab

lished that “proceedings . . . in the court below shall not be stayed unless otherwise ordered by that court during the pendency of such appeal.” § 7, 26 Stat. 828 (emphasis added). That statute cemented a background discretionary-stay rule that governed even where Congress was silent—as thisCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 753 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting Court has repeatedly recognized. Shortly after the 1891 Act, a case arose under conditions in which the Act was silent about whether a stay should issue. In re Haberman Mfg. Co. , 147 U. S. 525, 530 (1893) (fnding “no express provision” on point). This Court applied the background rule: “[T]he Circuit Court had a discretion to grant or refuse” a stay. Ibid. Another case of statutory silence arose a few years later. In re McKenzie , 180 U. S. 536, 550–551 (1901). Again, this Court reiterated federal courts' “inherent power . . . to stay or supersede proceedings on appeal” from an interlocutory order. Id. , at 551. As this Court summarized in yet another case, the rule is that the trial court has “au

thority” during an interlocutory appeal “to take further pro

ceedings in the cause, unless in its discretion it orders them to be stayed, pending the appeal.” Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works , 165 U. S. 518, 525 (1897). That authority is “recog

nized” by the 1891 Act but existed already as a traditional matter, “often exercised by other courts of chancery.” Ibid. This was the background against which Congress enacted § 16. And—importantly—courts understood stays as discre

tionary with respect to interlocutory appeals concerning ar

bitrability. Before Congress enacted § 16, parties brought interlocutory arbitrability appeals under other sources of ap

pellate jurisdiction, and courts treated stays as discretionary, not mandatory. 2 Yet, according to the majority, Congress sought to displace that common understanding when it enacted § 16—without saying anything at all about stays pending appeal. Even setting all that aside, the majority opinion's reliance on a “background” rule, ante , at 740, still fails. The major

ity has not shown that its own rule (the mandatory-general

2 See, e. g. , Pearce v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc. , 828 F. 2d 826, 829 (CADC 1987); Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp. , 779 F. 2d 974, 977 (CA4 1985); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp. , 727 F. 2d 629, 630 (CA7 1984); Lum

mus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refning Co. , 273 F. 2d 613, 613–614 (CA1 1959) ( per curiam); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. , 235 F. 2d 209, 211 (CA2 1956) ( per curiam).754 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting stay rule) existed as a background matter when Congress enacted § 16 in 1988. Indeed, the majority opinion does not identify a single case in which this Court imposed a manda

tory general stay of pre-trial and trial proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal. Not in an arbitration case. Not in an analogous case about the proper adjudicatory forum for a dispute. Not in any interlocutory appeal at all. III Because neither the statute nor any background law states that an interlocutory appeal over arbitrability triggers a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings, the ma

jority opinion resorts to spinning such a rule from a single sentence in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. , 459 U. S. 56 (1982) ( per curiam). But Griggs expresses a far narrower principle, and is thus insuffcient to support the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. Griggs stands for a modest proposition: Two courts should avoid exercising control over the same order or judgment simultaneously. The problem Griggs identifes is the “dan

ger a district court and a court of appeals would be simulta

neously analyzing the same judgment.” Id. , at 59. The cure Griggs prescribes is that “[t]he fling of a notice of ap

peal . . . divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Id. , at 58. And the reason is simple. Two courts simultaneously ana

lyzing the same judgment could step on each other's toes. It would interfere with the appellate court's review of an order if the district court modifed that order mid-appeal. Instead, an order should be reviewed by one court at a time. This notion of “one order, one reviewing court” is all that was at issue in Griggs

. Griggs concerned a party that tried to appeal a judgment while the District Court was still con

sidering whether to alter that same judgment. Id. , at 56. The Court held that the appeal needed to wait until after the District Court's work on that judgment was done. Id. , atCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 755 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting 60–61. This result, which followed from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, was necessary to “avoi[d]” the situa

tion “in which district courts and courts of appeals would both have had the power to modify the same judgment .” Id. , at 60 (emphasis added). Properly understood and applied here, Griggs divests the district court of control over only a narrow slice of the case. The interlocutory appeal addresses an order declining to compel arbitration. Griggs merely prevents the district court from modifying that order—i. e. , Griggs prevents the district judge from revisiting whether to compel arbitration while the appeal is pending. Griggs does not stop the dis

trict court from proceeding on matters other than arbitrability. The majority opinion, however, transmogrifes Griggs into a sweeping stay of “pre-trial and trial proceedings” on not just arbitrability, but also the merits. Ante , at 738. Ac

cording to the majority, if the question on appeal is “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court,” then the district court loses control over “ the entire case .” Ante , at 741 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). That rule far surpasses the statement in Griggs—the sole statement on which the majority relies—that a district court loses “control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 459 U. S., at 58; ante , at 740. Only the arbitrabil

ity order is on appeal, not the merits. And those matters are distinct. As this Court recognized (before Congress enacted § 16), “arbitrability” is “easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memo

rial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U. S. 1, 21 (1983). The majority cannot justify why it treats these “easily sev

erable” matters as intertwined in an arbitrability appeal. “[T]he question on appeal,” as the majority opinion correctly identifes, is “whether the case belongs in arbitration.” Ante , at 741. But the questions remaining before the dis

trict court are different: whether the claims have merit,756 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting whether the parties are entitled to the discovery they seek, and so on. Proceedings on those questions would not inter

fere with the appellate court's review of the arbitrability order. Those proceedings, in other words, do not implicate the Griggs principle, which addresses the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyz

ing the same judgment.” 459 U. S., at 59. The Court today expands Griggs beyond what the Con

gress that enacted § 16 could have foreseen, let alone silently incorporated. Indeed, the majority can identify no other time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of all mer

its proceedings just because a distinct procedural question was on appeal. In fact, the majority's supercharged version of Griggs con tradicts its own account of Congress's intent. Consider the statutes that the majority points to as models of how Con

gress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule. Ante , at 743–744, and n. 6; see supra , at 750–751. Under those stat

utes, the majority says, Congress intends that an interlocu

tory appeal does “not . . . automatically stay district court proceedings.” Ante , at 744. Yet, the majority also seem

ingly accepts that under those statutes, “the Griggs principle applies.” Ante , at 742. And per “the Griggs principle” as the majority sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal does automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante , at 741–742. So a mandatory general stay is thus both prohib

ited (by the statutory text) and required (by the majority's view of Griggs ). 3 As this contradiction underscores, the ma

3 This contradiction arises, for example, under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), one of the statutes that the majority cites as prohibiting mandatory general stays. See ante , at 744, n. 6 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codifed at § 1292(b))). Section 1292(b) authorizes permissive interlocutory appeals from a wide range of orders involving “controlling question[s] of law”—including rulings on arbitrability. Arbitrability ap

peals under § 1292(b) were commonplace when Congress enacted 9 U. S. C. § 16 in 1988. See, e. g. , Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F. 2d 454, 457 (CA9 1973) (“Since 1958 interlocutory arbitration orders have been reviewableCite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 757 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting jority's holding is untethered from any statute and any exist

i ng conception of Griggs

. IV To justify its new mandatory-general-stay rule, the major

ity ultimately rests on its assessment of what is “sensible.” Ante , at 742–743. But even the majority's policy concerns do not support its rule. The dispute here turns on a subset of cases—those in which a stay is not warranted under the usual discretionary standard. See Nken , 556 U. S., at 434. All agree that an interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likeli

hood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. See ibid. The majority offers no good reason for that result. The majority says that an automatic stay protects the party seek

ing arbitration and conserves resources in case the dispute “ultimately head[s] to arbitration” after appeal. Ante , at 743. But the concern fades if that scenario is unrealistic— i. e. , if the party seeking arbitration is unlikely to succeed on appeal. The majority's concern is even weaker when a stay would harm the opposing party and the public interest much more than it would protect the party seeking arbitration. Take, for example, a case in which crucial evidence would be lost if discovery is delayed. Say a witness is on her deathbed. Under the majority's rule, if an interlocutory arbitrability appeal under § 16(a) is pending, discovery must be stayed in accordance with the procedures prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)”). And in a § 1292(b) arbitrability appeal, the majority's reading of § 1292(b) would prohibit a mandatory general stay, while the majority's view of Griggs would require one.758 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting and the evidence must be lost. That is apparently so even i f the parties agree they wish to proceed with discovery. The majority's rule also prevents courts from crafting case-specifc solutions to balance all the interests at stake. Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance, a judge could allow the parties to conduct only the forms of discovery that would also be permitted in arbitration. That would save time and leave nobody worse off even if, as the majority fears, the dispute ultimately heads to arbitration. But this kind of equitable resolution, which the court and the parties might consider “sensible,” ante , at 743, is forbidden under the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. In addition, for each of the majority's concerns favoring a mandatory stay, there are countervailing considerations. The majority professes interest in “effciency.” Ibid. But forcing district court proceedings to a halt—for months or years while the appeal runs its course—is itself ineffcient. The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefts of ar

bitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party opposing arbitration loses the benefts of immediate litiga

tion. A plaintiff's request for injunctive protection against imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the ma

jority's rule. Similarly, while the majority laments settle

ment pressure on parties seeking arbitration, ibid. , the rule it announces imposes settlement pressure in the opposite di

rection. With justice delayed while the case is on hold, par

ties “could be forced to settle,” ibid. , because they do not wish—or cannot afford—to leave their claims in limbo. In

congruously, the majority inficts these burdens on the party that won the arbitrability issue before the district court (the party opposing arbitration). In categorically resolving these conficts in favor of the pro-arbitration party, the majority's analysis comes down to this: Because the pro-arbitration party gets an interlocutory appeal, it should also get an automatic stay. Ibid. ; see L. Numeroff, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie (1985). But Con

-Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 759 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting gress was entitled to give one without the other. And the right to interlocutory appeal is valuable on its own. It is, as the majority explains, “a rare statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before fnal judg

ment.” Ante , at 740. Even without a stay, if the interlocu

tory appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish and the dispute goes to arbitration. Perhaps for those reasons, real-life parties do not agree with the majority that an interlocutory arbitrability appeal is pointless without an automatic stay. No stay was issued in this case, for example, yet Coinbase still pursued its inter

locutory appeal. Nor did other parties stop bringing inter

locutory arbitrability appeals in the Circuits that had inter

preted § 16 to impose no automatic stay. 4 Yet this Court steps in to give the pro-arbitration party the additional right to an automatic stay that Congress with

held. Now, any defendant that devises a non-frivolous argu

ment for arbitration can not only appeal, but also press pause on the case—leaving plaintiffs to suffer harm, lose evidence, and bleed dry their patience and funding in the meantime. To confer that power on a class of litigants, based on blanket judgments resolving competing policy concerns, is Con

gress's domain, not ours. And where Congress is silent, the

4 For over a decade, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that a § 16(a) appeal triggers no mandatory general stay. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan , 388 F. 3d 39, 53–54 (CA2 2004); Britton v. Co-op Banking Group , 916 F. 2d 1405, 1412 (CA9 1990); Weingarten Realty In

vestors v. Miller, 661 F. 3d 904, 907–910 (CA5 2011). And those Circuits face no shortage of interlocutory § 16(a) appeals. See, e. g. , Palacios v. Alifne Dining, Inc. , 2023 WL 2469765 (CA2, Mar. 13, 2023); Laurel v. Cintas Corp. , 2023 WL 2363686 (CA9, Mar. 6, 2023); NATS, Inc. v. Radia

tion Shield Technologies, Inc. , 2023 WL 2416160 (CA2, Mar. 9, 2023); Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F. 4th 457 (CA9 2023); Johnson v. Walmart Inc. , 57 F. 4th 677 (CA9 2023); Noble Capital Fund Mgmt., LLC v. US Capital Global Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 31 F. 4th 333 (CA5 2022); Forby v. One Technologies, LP , 13 F. 4th 460 (CA5 2021); Soliman v. Subway Franchi

see Adv. Fund Trust, Ltd. , 999 F. 3d 828 (CA2 2021); Polyfow, LLC v. Specialty RTP, LLC, 993 F. 3d 295 (CA5 2021).760 COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI **Jackson, J.** , dissenting job of managing particular litigation, in light of the concrete circumst ances presented, belongs to the judge closest to a case. V The Court today ventures down an uncharted path—and that way lies madness. Never before had this Court man

dated a general stay simply because an interlocutory appeal poses the question “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court.” Ante , at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted). And a wide array of appeals seemingly fts that bill. Indeed, any appeal over the proper forum for a dispute would arguably raise the same question. After all, “an arbi

tration agreement is `a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.' ” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana , 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. , 417 U. S. 506, 519 (1974)). If arbitration appeals require stays of all pre-trial and trial proceedings, why not all appeals about forum-selection agreements? And why not appeals over non-contractual disputes over the proper adjudicator, like venue, personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens , federalcourt jurisdiction, and abstention? For that matter, “virtually every right that could be en

forced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a `right not to stand trial.' ” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. , 511 U. S. 863, 873 (1994). “Such motions can be made in virtually every case.” Ibid. Does every interlocutory appeal concerning a case

dispositive issue now trigger a mandatory general stay of trial court proceedings? Taken that broadly, the mandatory-general-stay rule the Court adopts today would upend federal litigation as we know it. Aware that any interlocutory appeal on a disposi

tive issue grinds the plaintiff's case to a halt, defendants would presumably pursue that tactic at every opportunity. This would occur, for example, in interlocutory appeals avail

Cite as: 599 U. S. 736 (2023) 761 **Jackson, J.** , dissenting able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) from orders g ranting preliminary injunctions. Any defense lawyer worth her salt would invoke the right to take that appeal and throw up some objection—to venue, jurisdiction, or a dispositive element of the merits—to trigger a mandatory stay. For plaintiffs, then, every preliminary-injunction mo

tion becomes a trap: Even if the motion is granted, the de

fendant can take that opportunity to stop the trial court pro

ceedings in their tracks. Facing these destabilizing consequences, the majority stops short of following its own reasoning to that ominous conclusion. Today's holding reaches only arbitration appeals under § 16(a). Ante , at 738, 744. And it might well be that the concerns motivating today's mandatory-general-stay rule do not extend beyond arbitration. So the majority will notcommit, for example, to concluding that appeals over nonarbitration forum-selection clauses warrant the same manda

tory stay. Ante , at 746. I agree with that hesitation—even one step further down this path is much too far. The mandatory-general-stay rule that the Court manufactures is unmoored from Congress's commands and this Court's precedent. And the windfall that the Court gives to defendants seeking arbitration, pre

ferencing their interests over all others, is entirely unwar

ranted. The Court now mandates that result no matter how unjust that outcome is, according to traditional equitable standards, in a given case. This endeavor is unfounded, un

wise, and—most fundamentally—not our role.**Reporter’s Note** The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None