IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CYNTHIA RIMMER, M.R., a minor by and through )

his mother CYNTHIA RIMMER and ) No. 11 C 7848

QUANEESHA RIMMER )

) JUDGE MANNING

Plaintiff(s), )

) Magistrate Judge Valdez

CITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago Police Officers )

MAURICE ANDERSON, Star #11348, BRIAN )

MELSON, Star No. 11579, DALE CARRIDINE, )

Star No. 17263, MARK RICHARDS, Star No. 830, and )

ROBERT WHEELER, Star No. 1995, )

)

Defendants. )

DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants CITY OF CHICAGO (“City”) and DEFENDANT OFFICERS MAURICE 

ANDERSON, Star #11348, BRIAN MELSON, Star No. 11579, DALE CARRIDINE, Star No. 

17263, MARK RICHARDS, Star No. 830, and ROBERT WHEELER, Star No. 1995, 

collectively referred to here as “Defendants,” by one of their attorneys, Andrea Cook, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, for their joint answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint, affirmative defenses and jury demand, state as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This action arises under the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 

1871 [42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985]. This court has jurisdiction under and by virtue of 28 

U.S.C. Sections 1343 and 1331. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit jurisdiction is proper.

2. Venue is founded in this judicial court upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1381 as the acts 

complained of arose in this district. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit venue is proper.
PARTIES

3. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff CYNTHIA RIMMER was and is now a 

citizen of the United States. 

ANSWER: Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 

4. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff M.R., a minor, by and through his mother 

CYNTHIA RIMMER, was and is now a citizen of the United States. 

ANSWER: Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

5. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff QUANEESHA RIMMER was and is now 

a citizen of the United States. 

ANSWER: Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

6. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Maurice Anderson, Star No. 

11348 ("ANDERSON") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under 

color of state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police 

Department. This Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant 

Anderson was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state 

law. Defendants further admit that Defendant Anderson is being sued in his individual capacity. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

7. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Brian Melson, Star No. 

11579 ("MELSON") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under 

color of state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police 

Department. This Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant 

Melson was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state 

law. Defendants further admit that Defendant Melson is being sued in his individual capacity. 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

8. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Dale Carridine, Star No. 

13333 ("CARRIDINE") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under 

color of state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police 

Department. This Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant 

Carridine was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state 

law. Defendants further admit that Defendant Carridine is being sued in his individual capacity. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

9. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Carlton Cook, Star No. 

17263 ("COOK") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under color 

of state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police Department. This 

Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant 

Cook was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state law. 

Defendants further admit that Defendant Cook is being sued in his individual capacity. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

10. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Mark Richards, Star No. 830 

("RICHARDS") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under color of 

state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police Department. This 

Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant 

Richards was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state 

law. Defendants further admit that Defendant Richards is being sued in his individual capacity. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

11. At all times herein mentioned Chicago police officer Robert Wheeler, Star No. 

1995 ("WHEELER") was employed by the Chicago Police Department, and was acting under 

color of state law and as the employee, agent or representative of the Chicago Police 

Department. This Defendant is being sued in their individual capacity. (ANDERSON, 

MELSON, CARRIDINE, COOK, RICHARDS, and WHEELER are referred to herein as the 
"Individual Defendants") 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that, at all times relevant to plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendant 

Wheeler was employed by the Chicago Police Department and was acting under color of state 

law. Defendants further admit that Defendant Wheeler is being sued in his individual capacity. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

12. At all times herein mentioned, the City of Chicago was a political division of the 

State of Illinois, existing as such under the laws of the State of Illinois. At all relevant times, the 

City of Chicago maintained, managed, and/or operated the Chicago Police Department. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

13. On or about July 8, 2011, Plaintiffs resided in their home located at 7038 S. 

Harper, Chicago, Illinois. 

ANSWER: Upon information and belief, Defendants admit the allegations contained in 

paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

14. At that time and place the Individual Defendants entered and searched the 

Plaintiffs' home located at 7038 S. Harper, Chicago, IL. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit Defendant Anderson entered and searched the basement of 

Plaintiffs’ home located at 7038 S. Harper, Chicago, IL. Defendants admit that Defendants 

Wheeler and Richards entered the home located at 7038 S. Harper. Defendants deny the 

remaining allegations contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 

15. None of the Individual Defendants knocked and announced their office or 

indicated they had a search warrant prior to forcibly entering Plaintiffs' home on July 8, 2011. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint.

16. There was no legal cause to search the Plaintiffs' home on July 8, 2011. 
ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint.

17. The Individual Defendants caused excessive and unnecessary property damage 

while searching the Plaintiffs' home on July 8, 2011. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint.

18. Plaintiffs did not consent to their home being searched on July 8, 2011. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that Plaintiffs did not consent to their home being searched on 

July 8, 2011 because Plaintiffs’ home was entered pursuant to a valid search warrant.

19. During the course of the search on July 8, 2011, the Individual Defendants drew 

their weapons and pointed them at Plaintiffs. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint.

20. During the course of the search on July 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs were forced into 

physical restraints. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that the Plaintiffs were placed into physical constraints, but 

deny all wrongdoing. 

21. During the course of the search on July 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs were all forced into 

a police wagon and were forced to remain there for an unreasonable amount of time. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that Plaintiffs were placed into a police wagon, but deny the 

remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

22. By reason of the above-described acts and omissions of defendants, Plaintiffs 

sustained injuries, including but not limited to, property damage, humiliation and indignities, and 

Plaintiffs suffered great mental and emotional trauma, pain and suffering all to their damage in 

an amount to be ascertained. 

ANSWER: Defendants lack knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to 
Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries, but deny Defendants’ acts or omissions caused plaintiffs’ claimed 

injuries.

23. The aforementioned acts of defendants were willful, wanton, malicious, 

oppressive and done with reckless indifference to and/or callous disregard for Plaintiffs' rights 

and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be ascertained 

according to proof at the time of trial. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

24. By reason of the above-described acts and omissions of the Defendants, and each 

of them, Plaintiffs were required to retain an attorney to institute, prosecute and render legal 

assistance to her in the within action so that they might vindicate the loss and impairment of their 

rights. By reason thereof, Plaintiffs request payment by Defendants, and each of them, of a 

reasonable sum for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, the Equal Access to 

Justice Act or any other provision set by law. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

COUNT I

Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants For Unreasonable Search and Seizure 

25. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege paragraphs one (1) through twenty-four 

(24) hereafter as though fully set forth at this place. 

ANSWER: Defendants re-state and incorporate here their answers to paragraphs 1 through 24 

as fully set forth above.

26. By reason of the Individual Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs were deprived of 

rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of 

the Constitution of the United States and laws enacted thereunder. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

27. The arbitrary intrusion by Individual Defendants, into the security and privacy of 

Plaintiffs' home was in violation of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights and not authorized by law. 

The defendants violated the Plaintiffs' rights in the following manner on July 8, 2011: (1) The 

forcible entry and search of Plaintiffs' home; (2) Forcibly entering the home without first 

knocking and announcing their office; (3) Causing excessive and unnecessary property damage 

to the Plaintiffs' home and personal property contained therein; and (4) Placing Plaintiffs in 

restraints and leaving them in restraints for an unreasonable and unnecessary period of time. 

These acts were in violation of the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the 

Individual Defendants, and each of them, in their individual capacity are liable to plaintiffs 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

COUNT II 

Plaintiffs against Defendant Anderson for Unreasonable Procurement of a Search Warrant 

28. Plaintiffs hereby incorporates and realleges paragraphs one (1) through twentyfour (24) hereat as though fully set forth at this place. 

ANSWER: Defendants re-state and incorporate here their answers to paragraphs 1 through 28 

as fully set forth above.

29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant Anderson may have procured a 

search warrant on or about July 7, 2011, identifying Plaintiffs' home as the premises to be 

searched and indicating that Plaintiff Quaneesha Rimmer resided in the home. 

ANSWER: Defendants admit that Defendant Anderson procured a search warrant on or about 

July 7, 2011, identifying Plaintiffs’ home as the premises to be searched and indicating that 

Plaintiff Quaneesha Rimmer resided in the home. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or 

information to form a belief as to the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 29 of 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

30. Procurement of the search warrant was unreasonable and unconstitutional for one 

or more of the following reasons: 

a. relied upon a confidential informant who had not previously provided reliable 

information in order to obtain the warrant; 

b. failed to independently verify information provided by the confidential informant 

prior to obtaining the warrant; 

c. failing to advise the Assistant State's Attorney approving the warrant application 

and the judge issuing the warrant of all available relevant information related to 

Plaintiffs' home, Quaneesha Rimmer, the alleged burglaries referenced in the 

search warrant, and Plaintiffs. 

d. failing to conduct a search of available databases for any information connecting 

Quaneesha Rimmer to the alleged burglaries alluded to by the confidential 

informant; 

e. failing to be truthful with the Assistant State's Attorney approving the warrant 
application and the judge issuing the warrant regarding all information provided 

by any alleged confidential information and corroboration of that information or 

lack thereof; 

f. failing to conduct a search of available databases for information related to the 

identity of the owner and occupants of the residence located at 7038 S. Harper 

Ave., Chicago, Illinois. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

31. No reasonably well trained police officer in the position of Anderson would have 

applied for the search warrant obtained by Anderson and it was done intentionally or with 

reckless disregard to the rights of Plaintiffs. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

32. As a result of Anderson's unreasonable procurement of the search warrant, 

plaintiffs sustained damages including but not limited to property damage, property loss, and 

emotional distress. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

33. The procurement of the search warrant was in violation of Plaintiffs' 

Constitutional Rights and not authorized by law. The foregoing was unnecessary, unreasonable 

and excessive, and in violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. 

Constitution. Therefore, Anderson, in his individual capacity is liable to Plaintiffs pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

COUNT III

Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants for Excessive Force 

34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege paragraphs one (1) through twenty-four 

(24) here at as though fully set forth at this place. 

ANSWER: Defendants re-state and incorporate here their answers to paragraphs 1 through 24 

as fully set forth above.

35. During and after the forcible entry of plaintiff's home on July 8, 2011, Defendants 

used excessive force against Plaintiffs by withdrawing their guns and pointing their guns at 

Plaintiffs. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
36. There was no legal cause for defendants to use force against Plaintiffs. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

37. By reason of defendants conduct, Plaintiffs were deprived of their right, privileges 

and immunities secured to them by the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 

of the United States and laws enacted thereunder. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

38. The physical force inflicted upon Plaintiffs was unnecessary, unreasonable, and 

excessive, and was therefore in violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Rights. Therefore, 

defendants are liable to plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Count IV

All Plaintiffs against Individual Defendants for the State Supplemental Claim of Trespass 

39. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs one (1) through twenty-four 

(24) hereat as though fully alleged at this place. 

ANSWER: Defendants re-state and incorporate here their answers to paragraphs 1 through 24 

as fully set forth above.

40. The Individual Defendants committed the tort of trespass when they entered 

Plaintiffs' home without permission or authority on July 8, 2011. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

41. The City of Chicago is liable to Plaintiffs for the acts of the Individual Defendants 

pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

ANSWER: Defendants state that the allegations of this paragraph contain a vague, 

incomplete, and/or incorrect statement of Illinois law, and are therefore denied. 
Count V 

All Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants for the State Supplemental Claim of 

Assault 

42. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs one (1) through twenty-four 

(24) here at as though fully alleged at this place. 

ANSWER: Defendants re-state and incorporate here their answers to paragraphs 1 through 24 

as fully set forth above.

43. During the course of the search of the Plaintiffs' home on July 8, 2011, Individual 

Defendants committed the Illinois tort of assault when they intentionally and without legal cause 

pointed their guns at Plaintiffs without justification, and thereby placed plaintiffs in reasonable 

apprehension of receiving a battery. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

44. The City of Chicago is liable to Plaintiffs for the acts of the Individual Defendants 

pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

ANSWER: Defendants state that the allegations of this paragraph contain a vague, 

incomplete, and/or incorrect statement of Illinois law, and are therefore denied.

45. As a result of these acts and/or omission plaintiffs were damaged, and the 

Defendants are all liable under the state supplemental claim of assault. 

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The Individual Defendants are government officials, namely police officers, who 

performed discretionary functions. At all times material to the events alleged in Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint, a reasonable police officer objectively viewing the facts and circumstances that 

confronted Defendants could have believed their actions to be lawful, in light of clearly 

established law and the information that the Individual Defendants possessed. The Individual 

Defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

STATE TORT IMMUNITY ACT 745 ILCS 10/2-202

The Individual Defendants were working as police officers at the time of this incident. 

Therefore, as to all claims, under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, the Individual Defendants are 

not liable for any of the claims alleged because a public employee is not liable for his or her acts 

or omissions in the execution or enforcement of any law, unless such acts or omissions constitute 

willful and wanton conduct. 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2008).

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

STATE TORT IMMUNITY ACT 745 ILCS 10/2-204

The Individual Defendants are not liable for any of plaintiffs’ alleged claims because a 

public employee, as such and acting within the scope of their employment, is not liable for an 

injury caused by the act or omission of another person. 745 ILCS 10/2-204 (West 2008).

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

STATE COMPARATIVE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE LAW

That any injuries or damages claimed by the Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants

and Defendant City of Chicago were caused, in whole or in part, by negligent, willful and 

wanton, and intentional conduct of the Plaintiffs. Even if Defendants are liable in damages, the 

total amount of damages to which Plaintiffs would otherwise be entitled must be reduced by 

application of principles of comparative fault in proportion to the amount of the negligent, 

willful and wanton and intentional conduct of Plaintiffs which were the proximate cause of his 

injuries. In addition, at the time of the actions alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Illinois statute 

735 ILCS 5/2-1116 (West 2008) was in effect and reduces a plaintiff’s recovery according to his 

contributory negligence and bars his recovery entirely when a plaintiff is more than fifty percent 

(50%) of the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

To the extent Plaintiffs failed to mitigate any of their claimed injuries or damages, any 

verdict or judgment obtained by Plaintiffs must be reduced by application of the principle that 

Plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate their damages, commensurate with the degree of failure to 

mitigate attributed to plaintiffs by a jury in this case.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

CITY NON-LIABILITY

Defendant City of Chicago is not liable to plaintiffs if its employees or agents are not

liable to the Plaintiffs. 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (2008).

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: 

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

. Under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, Defendant City of Chicago is not required to pay 

punitive or exemplary damages in any action brought directly or indirectly against it by the 

injured party or a third party. 745 ILCS 10/2-102 (West 2007). 

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendants City of Chicago and Defendant Officers Anderson, 

Carridine, Melson, Cook, Wheeler and Richards respectfully request that judgment be entered in 

their respective favors and against all plaintiffs in this matter, including for costs of defending 

this suit, and any other relief this Court deems necessary and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Defendants demand a jury trial for all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrea E. Cook

ANDREA E. COOK

Assistant Corporation Counsel

30 North LaSalle Street

Suite 900

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 742-7042 Office

(312) 744-6566 Fax

Attorney No. 06288085