IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SHEILA J. O’CONNOR, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. ) No. 12 C 2082

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting ) Magistrate Judge Finnegan

Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sheila J. O’Connor seeks to overturn the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her

application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security 

Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 

416, 423(d), 1381a. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United 

States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment. After careful review of the record, the Court now denies 

Plaintiff’s motion, grants the Commissioner’s motion, and affirms the decision to 

deny benefits.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on March 26, 2008, alleging that she 

became disabled on August 13, 2007 due to a “[l]eft femur fracture which caused 

 1 Ms. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 

2013, and is substituted in as Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

25(d)(1).
2

lower back misalignment and additional back surgery needed,” and degenerative 

osteoarthritis in the spine and knees. (R. 185, 190, 226). The Social Security 

Administration denied the applications initially on May 23, 2008, and again upon 

reconsideration on November 13, 2008. (R. 85-88, 92-96, 100-02, 105). Plaintiff 

filed a timely request for hearing and appeared before Administrative Law Judge 

Sherry Thompson (the “ALJ”) on February 19, 2010. (R. 37). The ALJ heard 

testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, as well as from 

Plaintiff’s adult daughter, Shanice Brown, and vocational expert Thomas A.

Grzesik (the “VE”). Shortly thereafter, on October 20, 2010, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff is not disabled because there are a significant number of light jobs she 

can perform. (R. 19-29). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review on September 13, 2011, (R. 1-3), and Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of 

the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.

In support of her request for remand, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ: (1) 

failed to properly accommodate her moderate limitation in concentration, 

persistence or pace; (2) erred in weighing the opinion of her treating physician; 

(3) made a flawed credibility assessment; (4) improperly discounted her stated 

need to lie down during the day; (5) failed to properly consider the testimony of 

her daughter; and (5) wrongly ignored the fact that she was found disabled by 

another government agency. As discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and there is no basis for a remand 

in this case.
3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on January 29, 1966, and was 44 years old at the time 

of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 40, 222). She has a high school diploma and spent 23 

years working as a case processor/tax examiner for the IRS. (R. 41, 227).

A. Medical History

Plaintiff has a history of back pain dating to March 2000. In January 2002, 

she had a surgical laminectomy that enabled her to continue working for the next 

5 1/2 years. (R. 737). A knee fracture in June 2007, however, caused her back 

problems to resurface.

1. 2007

On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff went to her primary care physician, Rita D. 

Woods, M.D., complaining of constant, throbbing left knee pain lasting 4 or 5 

days. Dr. Woods observed effusion (fluid build-up) in the knee at that time. (R. 

411). Four days later, on June 29, 2007, Plaintiff had a radiograph and 

ultrasound of her left knee at St. James Hospital. The tests were unremarkable, 

showing the knee to be “[n]ormal.” (R. 352-54, 445-46). An MRI taken on July 

20, 2007, however, revealed a lateral posterior femoral condylar fracture with 

bone edema, as well as degenerative changes of the posterior and medial 

menisci. (R. 447).

Plaintiff stopped working on August 13, 2007, and one week later, on 

August 20, 2007, she started treating with orthopedic surgeon William K. Payne, 

M.D., of Well Group Health Partners. Dr. Payne indicated that Plaintiff was likely 

suffering from a stress fracture and put her in a range of motion brace to stabilize 
4

the knee. (R. 640). At a follow-up visit on August 30, 2007, Dr. Payne referred 

Plaintiff for physical therapy (“PT”) to help with range of motion, strength and 

ambulation. (R. 466). Three radiographs of the left knee taken on October 9, 

2007 revealed no evidence of a fracture, dislocation or significant “bony 

abnormality.” (R. 644). By November 1, 2007, Plaintiff reported a 90-95% 

improvement in her knee pain and exhibited increased functional abilities. (R. 

383). Dr. Payne confirmed that Plaintiff was “doing well” on November 6, 2007, 

though she still displayed some tenderness. (R. 634). An MRI taken the next 

day showed “[d]ecreased bone edema” compared to the July 29, 2007 test, 

which was deemed “a favorable change suggesting some interval healing.” (R. 

453, 503, 608). When Plaintiff returned to Dr. Payne later that month on 

November 29, 2007, however, she still had some pain and difficulty with her 

knee, as well as mild effusion and tenderness. Dr. Payne gave her a cortisone 

shot and referred her for more PT.

2

 (R. 632).

At an appointment with Dr. Woods the next day, Plaintiff reported that she 

had been suffering from severe back pain for the previous week. Dr. Woods’s

treatment notes are difficult to read, but it appears that Plaintiff was in obvious 

physical distress at that time. (R. 401, 575). Plaintiff was still complaining of 

back pain when she returned to Dr. Woods on December 10, 2007, and was 

walking with an antalgic gait. Dr. Woods noted that Plaintiff was unable to obtain 

relief from her pain medication and muscle relaxers, and exhibited radiculopathy

 2 As discussed infra, Plaintiff did not obtain approval for additional knee PT until 

March 2008.
5

(nerve root impingement). The doctor prescribed Norco, Vicodin and Motrin, and 

referred Plaintiff for PT. (R. 402, 576, 577). A radiogram of the lumbar spine 

taken on December 12, 2007, showed “[s]tatus post laminectomy changes L5-S1 

vertebral body level,” and “mild diffuse osteopenia.” (R. 371-72, 455).

2. January through April 2008

On January 2, 2008, physical therapist Jake Darragh, MPT, conducted an 

initial evaluation of Plaintiff’s low back pain, noting that it was “secondary to gait 

deviations associated with” the knee fracture. Mr. Darragh indicated that Plaintiff

would benefit from various therapies and strength exercises to increase 

endurance and postural awareness, and decrease pain. (R. 387-90). Plaintiff 

completed six PT sessions over the next few weeks, but was still complaining to 

Mr. Darragh of persistent back pain as of January 21, 2008. (R. 392). In the 

meantime, Plaintiff told Dr. Payne on January 17, 2008 that her knee pain 

occasionally reached a level of 8 out of 10 even though she was taking Vicodin 

and Flexeril for her back. Dr. Payne instructed her to continue with her 

medication while she waited for approval for more PT on her knee. (R. 395, 

630). On January 24, 2008, Plaintiff called Dr. Woods’s office complaining that 

the Norco and Motrin were not controlling her pain. (R. 407). At an office visit six 

days later, Plaintiff’s lower back pain was at a level of 8 out of 10 and Dr. Woods 

observed that she was in obvious pain and crying. (R. 403).

Plaintiff’s back pain became so bad that on January 31, 2008, she was 

admitted to St. James Hospital in obvious physical distress. (R. 505, 507). 

Patrick Sweeney, M.D., was called in for a consultation the next day and he 
6

ordered an MRI of the lumbar spine to determine whether there was any 

herniation at L4-L5. (R. 508). Plaintiff’s February 1, 2008 MRI showed 

postoperative changes at L5-S1, including discogenic endplate changes, disc 

space narrowing and disc desiccation (dryness). The test confirmed, however, 

that there was no significant disc bulge, herniation, central canal stenosis or 

neural foramen narrowing. (R. 346, 456, 458). Plaintiff was discharged from the

hospital on February 2, 2008 with prescriptions for Flexeril and a Medrol Dose 

Pack. (R. 506).

When Plaintiff returned to Dr. Woods on February 6, 2008, her pain was at 

a level of 5 out of 10 and she was doing much better than the previous week. (R. 

406). The knee pain persisted, however, and on February 14, 2008, Dr. Payne 

sent her for x-rays while she continued to wait for approval for more PT. (R. 

440). The same day, Plaintiff saw Dr. Sweeney for a follow-up examination at 

the offices of Minimally Invasive Spine Specialists, S.C. She reported that 

ongoing back pain was interfering with her sleep even though she was taking 

Flexeril, ibuprofen, and the Medrol Dose Pack. Dr. Sweeney responded by 

referring her for a bone scan. (R. 514). Plaintiff had the test on February 20, 

2008, and was diagnosed with “[f]ocal tracer accumulation . . . involving L5-S1 

region most likely due to active degenerative osteoarthritis.” (R. 345, 348, 374, 

457).

At a follow-up appointment with Dr. Sweeney on February 28, 2008, 

Plaintiff reported that her symptoms were getting progressively worse, including 

sporadic sharp pains in her back. Dr. Sweeney instructed Plaintiff to return on 
7

March 6, 2008 to give him a chance to further review her bone scan. (R. 513). 

At that visit, Dr. Sweeney recommended that Plaintiff consider revision of her 

spinal fusion surgery. (R. 396, 513). On March 13, 2008, Dr. Payne sent Plaintiff 

for another series of radiographs of her left knee. The tests were once again

essentially negative, showing no fracture or lesions. (R. 643). The next day, 

Plaintiff was finally able to resume PT on her knee with a goal of strengthening 

the relevant musculature to decrease gait deficits. (R. 524-26). Shortly 

thereafter, on March 26, 2008, she filed her claim for disability benefits.

The following month, on April 3, 2008, Plaintiff told Dr. Payne that she did 

not wish to pursue a second spinal fusion as recommended by Dr. Sweeney. 

Straight leg raise tests were negative at that time, and she exhibited strength of 

5/5 in her leg and hip. Dr. Payne diagnosed Plaintiff with “[d]isk degeneration L5-

S1 and low back pain,” instructed her to continue with PT, gave her a prescription 

for Ultram, and suggested that she pursue pain management and possible facet 

blocks. (R. 626).

When Plaintiff returned to Dr. Payne on April 10, 2008, she complained of 

occasional but not constant pain. She was taking Lyrica, Ultram, ibuprofen and

Flexeril at that time, and Dr. Payne referred her to Rajiv K. Adlaka, M.D., of Pain 

Control Associates, L.L.C., for pain management. (R. 624). Additional 

radiographs of Plaintiff’s knee taken the same day were all normal. (R. 642). 

Plaintiff asked Dr. Payne to give her a second opinion on the need for back 

surgery, so he ordered a CT of her lumbar spine. That April 12, 2008 test 

revealed postsurgical changes at L5 and S1 and “[m]ild circumferential disc 
8

bulges” at L3-L4 and L4-L5, but “[n]o significant neuroforaminal narrowing or 

central canal stenosis.” (R. 441-42, 620, 688).

On April 16, 2008, Plaintiff started seeing Dr. Adlaka for management of 

her low back pain. She said that her “constant” pain was aggravated by sitting 

and relieved by standing, and listed her medications as including Flexeril, Ultram, 

ibuprofen and Lyrica. (R. 688). Dr. Adlaka noted that Plaintiff’s straight leg raise, 

Gaenslen’s, Patrick’s and Faber’s tests, which test for musculoskeletal 

abnormalities and hip joint pathology, were all negative, and that she was able to 

walk within normal limits. Flexion and extension, however, were both moderately 

painful. (Id.). Dr. Adlaka indicated that he would assume responsibility for all of 

Plaintiff’s medication going forward. In that regard, he increased her Ultram 

dosage, prescribed Klonopin for sleep, and instructed her to discontinue the 

ibuprofen while staying on the Flexeril and Lyrica. (R. 689).

The next day, on April 17, 2008, Plaintiff went to the St. James Hospital 

emergency center complaining of lower back pain she described as constant and 

throbbing. (R. 667, 670). Her pain decreased to a level of 4 or 5 out of 10 in 

response to Dilaudid, Valium and Vicodin, and she was discharged in stable 

condition. (R. 667-68). Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Woods on April 21, 2008, 

receiving prescriptions for clonazepam (a muscle relaxer), Ultram and Motrin. 

(R. 404). She also had an appointment with Dr. Payne on April 22, 2008, at 

which time she reported that her pain was “a lot better.” Based on the April 12, 

2008 CT scan of the lumbar spine, Dr. Payne diagnosed pseudoarthrosis and 
9

back pain, and suggested that Plaintiff work with Dr. Adlaka to see if a spinal 

cord stimulator or morphine pump might be effective options. (R. 697).

Plaintiff discussed these alternatives with Dr. Adlaka on April 30, 2008 but 

decided she wanted to “consider further.” In the meantime, given Plaintiff’s 

report that she “has not seen significant improvement in her pain,” Dr. Adlaka

increased her Ultram and Klonopin dosages. (R. 687).

3. May through August 2008

At a two-week follow-up appointment on May 14, 2008, Plaintiff told Dr. 

Adlaka that the Ultram and Klonopin were not helping her pain and sleep 

problems. Dr. Adlaka switched her to Duragesic patches along with 

hydrocodone (Vicodin) for breakthrough pain. He also indicated that she would 

be a good candidate for a transforaminal epidural steroid local anesthetic 

injection. (R. 686).

The next day, on May 15, 2008, Virgilio Pilapil, M.D., completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“RFC”) of Plaintiff for the Department 

of Disability Determination Services (“DDS”). (R. 645-52). Dr. Pilapil found that 

Plaintiff can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and/or carry 10 

pounds; stand, walk and sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. 

(R. 646, 649). Her ability to push and/or pull with her lower extremities is limited 

and she must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards due to “low back pain that 

radiates down the right leg” and “numbness/tingling of right leg, mostly in right 

thigh.” (R. 646, 649). Dr. Pilapil noted that Plaintiff complained of dizziness and
10

drowsiness associated with her medication, but found her only “partially credible”

regarding the severity of her symptoms. (R. 650).

On May 21, 2008, Dr. Adlaka gave Plaintiff an epidural steroid and local 

anesthetic injection. (R. 684). She was doing well with Duragesic patches at 

that time, “reporting no side effects.” (R. 685). By June 11, 2008, the injection 

had produced a “moderate degree” of pain reduction, but the Duragesic patches 

were not working well and were causing “some side effects.” (R. 683). Dr. 

Adlaka switched Plaintiff to MS Contin (morphine) and indicated that she might 

be a good candidate for a repeat injection. (Id.). Plaintiff underwent the second 

injection on June 25, 2008, and two weeks later, on July 9, 2008, she was doing 

“much better” and had reduced her use of hydrocodone. Dr. Adlaka continued 

Plaintiff on the MS Contin, which provided a “significant reduction in her overall 

pain,” and recommended that she receive intermittent injections along with 

medication management. (R. 680).

The next day, on July 10, 2008, Plaintiff went to Dr. Woods seeking a 

referral for a psychologist, explaining that she was feeling depressed about the 

need for a second surgical procedure. (R. 381). A few days later, on July 15, 

2008, she told Dr. Payne that she was still having “a lot of pain” despite the two 

epidural injections, and felt her symptoms had “continued to get worse.” Dr. 

Payne scheduled Plaintiff for a discogram, EMG and nerve conduction study for 

further assessment. (R. 270, 694).

Plaintiff spoke with Dr. Adlaka about a provocative cervical discography on 

August 6, 2008, (R. 678), and he performed the procedure on August 13, 2008. 
11

(R. 656-57, 676-77). Plaintiff exhibited “normal controlled disk at L3-L4,” but 

there was “reproduction of her usual low back pain” at L4-L5. (R. 677). A CT 

scan of the lumbar spine taken the same day showed “[p]ostsurgical changes 

from posterior fusion and laminectomy at L4-L5 and L5-S1”; “widespread annular 

tearing of the L4-L5 disk”; and “[m]ild bilateral neural foramen narrowing at the 

L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels.” (R. 269, 674).

Shortly thereafter, on August 18, 2008, Plaintiff’s attorney received an 

undated and unsigned letter from Dr. Woods stating that Plaintiff “remains in 

significant pain and unable to return to work.” (R. 737-38). Dr. Woods 

diagnosed Plaintiff with L5-S1 fusion failure with intractable back pain, and 

opined that she: must change positions every 30 minutes with no prolonged 

sitting, standing or walking; cannot lift more than 5 pounds; and must exercise 

caution in operating machinery, driving, or performing work requiring 

concentration “secondary to the pain meds.” (R. 738).

4. September through December 2008

When Plaintiff saw Dr. Adlaka again on September 3, 2008, she reported 

that Dr. Woods had prescribed Effexor for her depression, but she had stopped 

taking it because it caused a “significant amount of nausea.” (R. 672, 760). Dr. 

Adlaka advised Plaintiff to take an increased dosage of hydrocodone in place of 

the MS Contin in case that was contributing to the nausea. He also instructed 

her to discuss possible surgical management with Dr. Payne, which she did the 

following day. Though Plaintiff was still having a lot of back pain, she told Dr. 

Payne that she was not mentally prepared to undergo surgery again. He referred 
12

her for continued pain management with Dr. Adlaka, as well as psychological 

counseling. (R. 692). A radiograph of the lumbar spine taken the same day 

showed posterior fusion of L5-S1 but was otherwise normal. (R. 701).

On October 15, 2008, Plaintiff informed Dr. Adlaka that her nausea had 

subsided after stopping Effexor, and she was experiencing “significant 

improvement in overall pain with MS Contin.” At most times, her pain was a level 

4 to 5 out of 10. Dr. Adlaka advised Plaintiff to follow-up with Dr. Woods 

regarding her depression and return to see him in one month. (R. 759).

Later that month, on October 25, 2008, Alan W. Jacobs, Ph.D., performed 

a Psychological Evaluation of Plaintiff for DDS. (R. 703-05). Plaintiff said that 

her pain was at a level of 5 out of 10 with medication, causing her most 

discomfort at night and making it difficult for her to sleep. She explained that she

had not scheduled surgery because she was “advised that the outcome . . .

would not be statistically in her favor.” (R. 703). As for her mental state, Plaintiff 

described it as “not good,” noting that she became depressed “when they told me 

about my back in January.” (R. 704). When she took Effexor, she did not get 

upset as easily or cry as much, but she stopped taking it two months prior due to 

side-effects. The worst depression started when she quit working, and at least 

twice a month she goes to her room and cries. Plaintiff said that she is irritable; 

her appetite varies with the pain; she occasionally tries to cook; she enjoys 

occasional visits with her sister; and she spends most of her waking hours 

reading or working on the computer. (Id.). Dr. Jacobs observed that Plaintiff’s

depression became more apparent as the interview went on, “with eyes
13

becoming red and wet.” (Id.). He diagnosed her with dysthymia and “depressive 

disorder not otherwise specified (depression associated with chronic pain).” (R. 

705).

On October 30, 2008, Terry Travis, M.D., completed a Psychiatric Review 

Technique of Plaintiff for DDS. (R. 706-18). Dr. Travis found that Plaintiff suffers 

from dysthymia, (R. 709), which causes moderate limitation in her activities of 

daily living and ability to maintain concentration, persistence or pace. (R. 716). 

The same day, Dr. Travis completed a Mental RFC Assessment of Plaintiff. (R. 

720-22). He determined that she is moderately limited in the ability to maintain 

attention and concentration for extended periods; to perform activities within a 

schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary 

tolerances; and to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism. (R. 

720, 721). She is not significantly limited, however, in the ability to complete a 

normal workday and workweek, or to get along with coworkers or peers without 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (R. 721). Dr. Travis 

concluded that Plaintiff suffers from a “mild affective disorder in response to 

chronic pain,” but she is cognitively intact, she can learn instructions and adapt to 

circumstances, she can relate appropriately and “function consistently at a 

reasonable rate within a schedule within her pain limitations,” and she is “able to 

do multistep tasks that can be learned in 1-6 months in a routine work setting 

within her pain constraints.” (R. 722).

On November 3, 2008, Bharati Jhaveri, M.D., affirmed Dr. Pilapil’s May 

15, 2008 assessment that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. 724-26). Shortly 
14

thereafter, on November 12, 2008, Plaintiff told Dr. Adlaka that her pain remained

mostly at a level of 4 to 5 out of 10, and that the MS Contin was still providing 

“significant improvement in overall pain” with no reported side effects. (R. 758).

5. 2009

Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr. Adlaka and Dr. Woods throughout

2009. At an appointment with Dr. Adlaka on January 7, she reported that she 

had “excellent function, improved overall daily function, and a reduction in her 

pain” to a level of 3 out of 10. (R. 757). Plaintiff believed the MS Contin was 

“very effective for her,” though she continued to have trouble sleeping at night. 

Dr. Adlaka noted that Dr. Woods wanted him to continue managing Plaintiff’s 

medication, and instructed her to start taking Klonopin again and return in a few 

weeks. (Id.). Plaintiff appeared depressed and tired during a visit with Dr. 

Woods on January 12, 2009, (R. 782), and on February 4, 2009, she told Dr. 

Adlaka that she still had to use hydrocodone on a daily basis. (R. 756). 

Nevertheless, her pain level remained at a 3 out of 10 and she was doing “fairly 

well.” Dr. Adlaka prescribed Ambien to help with Plaintiff’s ongoing sleep 

problems and instructed her to schedule a follow-up visit. (Id.).

On February 26, 2009, Dr. Woods observed that Plaintiff appeared 

fatigued. (R. 772). At a visit with Dr. Adlaka on March 4, 2009, Plaintiff reported 

that she was still having trouble sleeping and had experienced a flare-up of her 

pain in the previous weeks due to stress at home. Nevertheless, she had cut 

back on the hydrocodone. Dr. Adlaka instructed Plaintiff to stop taking Ambien 
15

and try Klonopin again, and to continue taking MS Contin and try to avoid using 

hydrocodone. (R. 754).

When Plaintiff saw Dr. Adlaka again on April 29, 2009, she continued to 

do “relatively well on her MS Contin” with no reported side effects. Her function 

remained “good on a daily basis,” and Dr. Adlaka recommended that she have 

an SI joint injection. (R. 753). The following month, on May 27, 2009, Plaintiff 

was still experiencing “excellent function” with the MS Contin, along with “a 

significant reduction in her pain over the last several weeks.” In light of the 

improvement she felt in her SI joint, Plaintiff decided not to proceed with an 

injection at that time. Nevertheless, Plaintiff asked Dr. Adlaka for a letter saying 

that she is disabled. Dr. Adlaka told her that he “cannot put her at full disability. I 

would think that she could do light duty but I am not a disability expert, so . . . she 

should consider seeing a disability doctor if she is looking for some type of fulltime disability.” (R. 752).

At her next visit with Dr. Adlaka on July 1, 2009, Plaintiff reported a flare of 

her pain over the previous several weeks, rating it at a level of 6 out of 10. She 

remained uninterested in “interventional management” so Dr. Adlaka instructed 

her to continue taking MS Contin and add Limbrel to help with inflammation and 

pain. (R. 751). Approximately one month later, on July 29, 2009, Dr. Adlaka 

noted that Plaintiff had experienced improvement in her activities of daily living, 

and suggested that she consider having a sleep study. (R. 735). Soon 

thereafter, on August 17, 2009, Plaintiff went to see Dr. Woods after she fell and 

hurt her back, knee and shoulder. Dr. Woods’s treatment notes are difficult to 
16

decipher, but it appears that Plaintiff was not getting relief from the morphine. (R. 

770). By August 24, 2009, however, Plaintiff told Dr. Woods that she was feeling 

“much better” and her back was “not hurting too bad.” (R. 769).

On August 26, 2009, Dr. Adlaka observed that Plaintiff was walking with 

an antalgic gait secondary to leg pain as a result of her recent fall. The treatment 

note indicates that Dr. Woods had contacted Dr. Adlaka to say that she believed 

Plaintiff’s sleep problems were “mainly related to the pain issues” and did not 

warrant a sleep study. Dr. Adlaka stated that he would defer to Dr. Woods and 

“continue to control as best as we can.” In that regard, he prescribed Plaintiff 

Mobic in addition to the MS Contin. (R. 734, 749).

Plaintiff next saw Dr. Adlaka on September 23, 2009, at which time she 

was responding well to the MS Contin but still having some breakthrough pain. 

Plaintiff did not report any side effects from the Mobic and said that she thought it 

was helping to reduce her overall pain. Dr. Adlaka instructed her to continue with 

both medications. (R. 729, 744). Also on September 23, 2009, Plaintiff had an 

MRI of the left knee. The test showed “[m]inimal chondromalacia within the left 

knee” but was “otherwise unremarkable.” (R. 739, 768).

On October 15, 2009, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Woods seeking refills of 

Effexor and Ultram, and complaining of a tremendous amount of stress. She 

displayed a flat affect at that time, which Dr. Woods described as “unusual.” (R. 

771). When Plaintiff saw Dr. Adlaka on October 21, 2009, she reported 

“significant improvement in her overall pain” with the MS Contin and Mobic. Her 

pain at most times was at a level of 2 out of 10, and she remained unwilling to 
17

consider interventional management options. (R. 728, 743). By November 18, 

2009, Plaintiff was using Mobic “only on [an] as needed basis.” The MS Contin 

continued to be very effective, keeping her pain at about a level of 3 out of 10, 

and she “ha[d] been showing increased activity level with the medication.” (R. 

742). The last treatment note from Dr. Adlaka is dated December 9, 2009, and 

states that Plaintiff’s pain had increased slightly to a level of 5 out of 10, likely 

due to the weather. He instructed her to continue taking Mobic and MS Contin, 

and gave her a home exercise program. (R. 741).

6. 2010

On January 11, 2010, Plaintiff went to Dr. Woods for a general physical 

examination. (R. 767). The notes are difficult to read, but it appears that Plaintiff 

said she “feels better.” She also indicated that she was upset about her pain 

doctor, likely referring to the fact that her insurance would no longer cover visits 

with Dr. Adlaka. (R. 42, 767). Another undated note from around that time

(possibly January 27, 2010) states that Plaintiff was struggling with insomnia and 

wanted an increase in her pain medications. It does not appear that Dr. Woods 

agreed to the increase at that time. (R. 766).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

In an April 2008 Function Report completed in connection with her

application for disability benefits, Plaintiff stated that she spends most of the day 

in bed reading, watching television and talking on the phone, though she is able 

to shower and dress herself. (R. 234, 238). She can use the microwave to 

prepare soups and “TV dinners” 2 or 3 times per week, and she can wash 
18

dishes, clean, and do laundry as long as her son carries the clothes for her. (R. 

236). Plaintiff stated that she is able to walk and drive a car, and gets out of the 

house about 4 or 5 times per month for doctor appointments and PT. She shops 

for food once a month, using a motorized scooter if it takes longer than 30 

minutes, but she cannot carry any heavy items. (R. 237). The pain in her back 

makes her unable to lift more than 5 pounds, sit for more than an hour, or bend, 

stand, reach and walk for more than 10 to 15 minutes. (R. 239). In addition, her 

medications make her dizzy and sleepy, which affects her concentration. (R. 

240, 241).

Plaintiff completed a second Function Report and Physical Impairments 

Questionnaire on October 4, 2008. (R. 258-68). She reiterated that she spends 

most of the day in bed reading and watching television due to pain and 

drowsiness from her medication. (R. 258, 262). She has trouble sleeping, but 

can still make TV dinners and sandwiches 2 or 3 times per week, dust, clean the 

bathroom and wash a few dishes. (R. 259, 260). Plaintiff stated that she goes 

outside once or twice per week, including shopping for food once a month and 

going to the doctor twice a month. She also calls her sisters and checks email 

twice per week. (R. 262). Her lifting ability remains at 5 pounds, and she can 

walk for about 30 minutes before needing to rest for 15 minutes. (R. 263). 

Plaintiff would like to return to work, but she cannot concentrate for more than 30 

minutes at a time. (R. 263, 265).

At the February 19, 2010 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she 

stopped working for the IRS in August 2007 after she fractured her left femur, 
19

which in turn “threw off [her] back.” (R. 41). Most of her pain is in the lower back 

and radiates down the left leg, and her doctors told her she needs a second 

fusion surgery. (R. 42-44). Plaintiff said the pain varies throughout the day, 

starting as an aching in the morning and becoming more of a stabbing sensation 

if she walks or drives too far, meaning more than 15 or 30 minutes. (R. 45). Her 

pain medication makes her very drowsy and affects her ability to focus, but she 

also has trouble sleeping due to back discomfort. (R. 47, 49). The most 

comfortable position is lying down with a pillow between her legs, and she 

spends at least 60 to 70% of the day in bed. (R. 49, 55).

With respect to activities, Plaintiff testified that she can only sit for 15 to 30 

minutes before needing to get up due to pain, and she tries not to lift more than 5

or 10 pounds. (R. 46). Around the house, she tries to “do little things” like 

straightening up the bed, vacuuming hard floor surfaces, washing dishes and 

doing laundry. (Id.). She also watches television and reads, but finds it hard to 

concentrate sometimes. (R. 50). Plaintiff stated that she can access the internet

from her cell phone for 15 to 30 minutes at a time, and she shops for groceries 

as long as someone goes with her. (Id.).

In addition to her physical pain, Plaintiff also suffers from depression. She 

has crying spells two or three times per week, “space[s] out,” and becomes 

irritable, even when taking Effexor. She does not, however, receive any therapy 

or related counseling. (R. 51-52).
20

C. Testimony of Shanice Brown

Plaintiff’s daughter, Shanice Brown, accompanied Plaintiff to the hearing 

and testified on her behalf. Ms. Brown confirmed that her mother has constant 

pain and cannot sit or stand for more than 5 or 10 minutes. (R. 60). Her 

medication makes her groggy and she spends a lot of time in bed, generally

unable to function on a daily basis. As a result, Ms. Brown said, she has to do 

“[p]retty much everything” for her mother. (R. 60-61, 63). Ms. Brown also 

testified that Plaintiff is depressed about her inability to be more active in the 

family, noting that “there’s a lot of things she can’t do.” (R. 61-63).

D. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Mr. Grzesik testified at the hearing as a VE. The audio recording was 

turned off shortly after the testimony began, cutting off both the ALJ’s 

hypothetical questions to the VE and the VE’s answers. (R. 66). Based on 

testimony later in the proceeding, it appears that the first hypothetical question

involved a person who can: occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch and crawl; learn instructions, relate appropriately and adapt to 

circumstances; “function consistently at a reasonable rate within a schedule, 

within her pain limitations”; and “do multi-step tasks that can be learned in one to 

six months in a routine work setting”; but who can never climb ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds; and must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. (R. 70). A second 

hypothetical applied the same limitations to a person who can only perform 

sedentary, as opposed to light work. (R. 71-72).
21

When the recording resumed, the ALJ was asking about a third

“hypothetical that [Plaintiff’s] treating physician gave.” (Id.). From the context, it 

appears that the ALJ was referring to Dr. Woods’s 2008 opinion that Plaintiff 

must change positions every 30 minutes with no prolonged sitting, standing or 

walking; cannot lift more than 5 pounds; and must exercise caution in operating 

machinery, driving, or performing work requiring concentration “secondary to the 

pain meds.” (R. 67, 738). The VE stated that a person with those limitations 

could perform “the same sedentary jobs” that he identified for the first 

hypothetical involving work at a light exertion level, including order clerk, 

information clerk and callout operator. (R. 66, 68).

In response to questioning from Plaintiff’s attorney, the VE testified that no 

jobs would be available to a person who has to walk away from her work station 

for up to 30 minutes at a time. (R. 72, 73). Nor can an individual remain 

employed if she has to take breaks that keep her off-task for more than 10% of 

the workday. (R. 76-77).

E. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine and depression are severe impairments, but that they do not meet or equal 

any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 

21-22). After discussing the medical and testimonial evidence in detail, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff has the capacity to perform light work with the following 

restrictions: she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs; she can never 

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, 
22

crouch and crawl; she must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards; she can 

learn instructions, adapt to circumstances, and relate appropriately; she can

“function consistently at a reasonable rate within a schedule within her pain 

limitations”; and she can “do multi-step tasks that can be learned in 1-6 months in 

a routine work setting within her pain constraints.” (R. 22).

In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff has received 

“essentially routine and/or conservative” treatment for her back pain, which “has 

been generally successful in controlling [her] symptoms.” (R. 26). In that regard, 

the ALJ found it significant that Plaintiff engages in a variety of activities of daily 

living, including personal grooming, light cooking, simple cleaning, light 

vacuuming, washing dishes, watching TV, grocery shopping, reading, and using 

the internet. (R. 27). As for Plaintiff’s depression, the ALJ emphasized that she 

never sought or received treatment from a mental specialist, and that “all 

treatment has been rendered by a general practitioner.” (R. 26). Though Ms. 

Brown generally corroborated her mother’s testimony regarding pain and 

depression, the ALJ concluded that their close relationship “cannot be entirely 

ignored in deciding how much weight it deserves.” (R. 27).

With respect to the opinion evidence, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Woods’s 

2008 letter requiring Plaintiff to change positions every 30 minutes, lift no more 

than 5 pounds, and exercise caution in operating machinery, driving or doing 

work requiring concentration “secondary to pain medications.” (R. 27). The ALJ 

declined to give the opinion controlling weight, however, because Dr. Woods is a 

general practitioner who did not treat Plaintiff’s knee and back, and who “just 
23

recently started managing her medication.” (Id.). In the ALJ’s view, “the doctor’s 

own reports fail to reveal the type of significant clinical and laboratory 

abnormalities one would expect if [Plaintiff] were as limited as the doctor has 

opined.” (Id.). Moreover, Dr. Adlaka’s treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff was 

obtaining good relief from her pain medication and could do light work. (Id.).

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she suffers various side effects from those

medications, but the ALJ concluded that the treatment notes “do not corroborate 

those allegations.” (Id.).

Based on the stated RFC, the ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony that 

Plaintiff remains capable of performing a significant number of unskilled light or 

sedentary jobs available in the national economy, including sales attendant 

(32,000 jobs available), cashier (40,000 jobs available), officer helper (12,000 

jobs available), call out operator (8,000 jobs available), information clerk (7,500 

jobs available), and order clerk (1,000 jobs available). (R. 28-29). The ALJ thus 

concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act, and is not entitled to benefits.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is authorized by 

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing 

this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether Plaintiff is 

severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. 

Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Nor may it 
24

“displace the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making 

credibility determinations.” Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007)). The court’s task 

is to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, 

which is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841).

In making this determination, the court must “look to whether the ALJ built 

an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ from the evidence to [his] conclusion that the 

claimant is not disabled.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008)). Where the 

Commissioner’s decision “‘lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as 

to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. 

Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 

936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002)).

B. Five-Step Inquiry

To recover DIB or SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, a 

claimant must establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act.3

 

Keener v. Astrue, No. 06-CV-0928-MJR, 2008 WL 687132, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 

10, 2008). A person is disabled if she is unable to perform “any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental 

 3 The regulations governing the determination of disability for DIB are found at 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1501 et seq., and are virtually identical to the SSI regulations set forth at 20 

C.F.R. § 416.901 et seq.
25

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Crawford v. Astrue, 633 F. Supp. 2d 618, 630 (N.D. Ill. 

2009). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the ALJ 

conducts a standard five-step inquiry: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or equal 

one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the 

claimant unable to perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable 

to perform any other work? See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Clifford v. 

Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff identifies several errors supporting her request for a remand, 

arguing that the ALJ: (1) failed to properly accommodate her moderate limitation 

in concentration, persistence or pace; (2) erred in weighing the opinion of her 

treating physician; (3) made a flawed credibility assessment; (4) improperly 

discounted her stated need to lie down during the day; (5) failed to properly 

consider the testimony of her daughter; and (6) wrongly ignored the fact that she 

was found disabled by another government agency.

1. Limitation in Concentration, Persistence or Pace

Plaintiff first objects that the ALJ’s RFC does not properly account for her 

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace. (Doc. 18, at 6; Doc. 

24, at 1-2). At step three of the analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff “able to function 

consistently at a reasonable rate within a schedule within her pain limitations; 
26

and . . . able to do multi-step tasks that can be learned in 1-6 months in a routine 

work setting within her pain constraints.” (R. 22). Plaintiff characterizes this as 

essentially a limitation to simple, unskilled work, noting that at step 5 of the 

analysis, the ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony that she is capable of performing 

a variety of unskilled jobs. (Doc. 18, at 6). Plaintiff then argues for remand 

based on the Seventh Circuit’s repeated admonition that a limitation to unskilled 

work is insufficient to account for mental deficiencies. Stewart v. Astrue, 561 

F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2009); Masood v. Astrue, No. 11 C 7551, 2013 WL 

1093098, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2013).

The flaw in Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ’s language is taken directly 

from Dr. Travis’s October 30, 2008 mental RFC assessment. Dr. Travis found 

Plaintiff moderately limited in the ability to “maintain attention and concentration 

for extended periods,” and to “perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances.” (R. 720). He 

then concluded that despite these limitations, Plaintiff can “function consistently 

at a reasonable rate within a schedule” and “do multistep tasks that can be 

learned in 1-6 months in a routine work setting.” (R. 722). Where, as here, “a 

medical expert ‘translated an opinion of the claimant’s medical limitations into an 

RFC assessment’ an ALJ may rely upon that translation.” Adams v. Astrue, 880 

F. Supp. 2d 895, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Milliken v. Astrue, 397 Fed. Appx. 

218, 221-22 (7th Cir. 2010)). See also Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 

(7th Cir. 2002) (no error where physician translated moderate mental limitations 
27

into a specific RFC assessment that the plaintiff could still perform low-stress, 

repetitive work).

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Travis’s RFC is of no help to Defendant in this 

case because the ALJ “did not state that she was adopting” it. (Doc. 24, at 1). 

Given that the ALJ quoted the RFC word-for-word, however, it is clear that she

both adopted that opinion and gave it full weight. Indeed, Plaintiff points to no 

contrary RFC in the record. The ALJ’s RFC determination sufficiently accounts 

for Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace as set 

forth by Dr. Travis, and Plaintiff’s request for remand on this basis is denied.

2. Weight of Treating Physician Testimony

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. Woods’s August 

2008 opinion that she is disabled. A treating source opinion is entitled to 

controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial 

evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Scott v. Astrue, 647 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 

2010). An ALJ must offer “good reasons” for discounting a treating physician’s 

opinion, Scott, 647 F.3d at 739, and then determine what weight to give it 

considering (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of 

examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the 

degree to which the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory 

findings, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and (5) 
28

whether the opinion was from a specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(5). See, 

e.g., Simila, 573 F.3d at 515.

Dr. Woods opined in or around August 2008 that Plaintiff “remains in 

significant pain and is unable to return to work.” (R. 738). She further stated that 

Plaintiff must change positions every 30 minutes with no prolonged standing, 

sitting or walking; cannot lift more than 5 pounds; and must exercise caution in 

operating machinery, driving, or performing work requiring concentration 

“secondary to pain meds.” (Id.). As the ALJ fairly noted, Dr. Woods failed to 

identify any clinical or laboratory findings indicative of such limitations.

4

 (R. 27). 

The only test she mentioned is the July 2007 MRI relating to Plaintiff’s knee, (R. 

737), and her treatment notes do not reflect that she performed any other 

examinations or evaluations, though Plaintiff certainly complained of knee and 

back pain on numerous occasions.

Plaintiff insists that Dr. Woods did evaluate her functioning, directing the 

Court to a December 2007 note stating that Plaintiff was moving with great 

difficulty, exhibited an antalgic gait with tenderness in the lower back, and had 

“radiculopathy.” (Doc. 18, at 13 (citing R. 402); Doc. 24, at 7 (citing R. 402)). As 

a preliminary matter, the purported radiculopathy diagnosis appears nowhere 

else in the record, and there is no indication as to how Dr. Woods, a primary care 

physician, formulated this opinion. Significantly, Plaintiff’s April 2008 straight leg 

raise tests were all negative, and her MRI tests and CT scans all showed either 

 4 The ALJ did agree that Plaintiff must exercise caution around hazards, a finding 

confirmed by Dr. Pilapil. (R. 22, 646).
29

no or mild neuroforaminal narrowing, with no other evidence of nerve root 

compression. See Benford v. Astrue, No. 11 C 4, 2011 WL 4396921, at *4 n.4 

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Lumbar radiculopathy is typically caused by a 

compression of the spinal nerve root.”).

In any event, Plaintiff’s reliance on records from December 2007 ignores 

the ALJ’s discussion of more recent treatment notes from Dr. Adlaka, the pain 

specialist. Throughout 2009, Dr. Adlaka found that Plaintiff’s pain level was 

generally rated at a level of 3 out of 10 with medication. (R. 25, 27, 728, 752, 

753, 756, 757, ). And on May 27, 2009, he told Plaintiff that he “cannot put her at 

full disability” because “I would think she could do light duty.” (R. 27, 752).

Plaintiff characterizes this statement as “cursory, unsupported, and indefinitive

[sic],” (Doc. 18, at 14), but it is entirely consistent with Dr. Adlaka’s treatment 

notes from that time period, as well as Dr. Pilapil’s May 2008 assessment that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work, which was affirmed by Dr. Jhaveri in 

November 2008. (R. 646, 724-26). Plaintiff’s only response to this evidence is a 

claim that the ALJ should have noted that Dr. Jacobs (the consulting

psychologist) agreed with Dr. Woods’s assessment that Plaintiff needs to change 

positions. (Doc. 18, at 14; Doc. 24, at 8). A review of Dr. Jacobs’s notes, 

however, reflects that he merely observed Plaintiff changing positions during the 

course of his one-time examination in October 2008. (R. 704). Dr. Jacobs did 

not “agree” that Plaintiff must change positions for medical reasons.

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ should have re-contacted Dr. Woods “to 

determine the basis for her opinion, rather than simply rejecting it.” (Doc. 18, at 
30

14). “An ALJ need recontact medical sources only when the evidence received 

is inadequate to determine whether the claimant is disabled.’” Skarbek v. 

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)). 

Here, the ALJ had all of Dr. Woods’s treatment notes, the results of Plaintiff’s 

diagnostic tests, and the reports from other treating and consulting physicians, 

including Dr. Adlaka, Dr. Pilapil, Dr. Payne, and Dr. Sweeney. In other words, 

“[t]his was not a case in which the basis of the medical opinions required 

explication.” Masek v. Astrue, No. 08 C 1277, 2010 WL 1050293, at *17 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 22, 2010). The ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Woods’s opinion was not 

supported by the record evidence, and did not err in failing to re-contact her for 

further information.

For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s request for remand based on the ALJ’s 

decision to reject Dr. Woods’s August 2008 opinion is denied.

3. Credibility Assessment and Need to Lie Down

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ made several errors regarding her 

credibility, including her stated need to lie down. In assessing a claimant’s 

credibility, an ALJ must first determine whether the symptoms are supported by 

medical evidence. See SSR 96-7p, at *2; Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 822 

(7th Cir. 2007). If not, SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider “the entire case 

record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual’s own statements 

about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or 

examining physicians or psychologists and other persons about the symptoms 

and how they affect the individual, and other relevant evidence in the case 
31

record.” Arnold, 473 F.3d at 822. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Carradine v. 

Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 775 (7th Cir. 2004). Because hearing officers are in the 

best position to evaluate a witness’s credibility, their assessment should be 

reversed only if “patently wrong.” Castile, 617 F.3d at 929; Elder v. Astrue, 529 

F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008).

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the ALJ included the 

following language in her credibility analysis: “After careful consideration of the 

evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the [stated] residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 26). 

The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly criticized this template as “unhelpful” and 

“meaningless boilerplate,” but ALJs continue to use it in their decisions. Shauger 

v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012). Each time they do so, plaintiffs and 

their counsel seize on the language as evidence that the credibility finding is 

backwards and defective. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 

2012) (the template “implies that ability to work is determined first and is then 

used to determine the claimant’s credibility. That gets things backwards.”).

The Court agrees that the “hackneyed language seen universally in ALJ 

decisions adds nothing” to a credibility analysis. Shauger, 675 F.3d at 696. 

Where, as here, however, the ALJ provides a detailed discussion of the plaintiff’s 

symptoms and testimony, and the reasons she did not find the plaintiff’s 
32

statements fully credible, the use of the boilerplate template does not alone 

provide a basis for remand. See, e.g., Richison v. Astrue, 462 Fed. App. 622, 

625 (7th Cir. 2012) (the boilerplate language is “inadequate, by itself, to support a 

credibility finding,” but decision affirmed where “the ALJ said more.”). Plaintiff’s 

argument to that effect is rejected.

Turning to the ALJ’s substantive analysis, she first observed that Plaintiff’s 

complaints of disabling pain and limitations “are not substantiated by the 

objective medical . . . evidence.” (R. 27). Plaintiff’s most recent back problems 

began after she fractured her left femur in June 2007, which affected her gait. A 

December 12, 2007 radiogram showed changes at L5-S1 relating to her 2002 

laminectomy, and “mild diffuse osteopenia.” (R. 23, 455). Despite starting 

physical therapy and taking Norco, Vicodin and Motrin, Plaintiff was admitted to 

the hospital on January 31, 2008 with intractable back pain. (R. 23, 505). A 

February 1, 2008 MRI of the lumbar spine again showed postoperative changes 

from the prior surgery at L5-S1, including disc space narrowing and disc 

desiccation. However, there was no significant disc bulge, herniation, stenosis or 

neuroforaminal narrowing. (R. 23, 356). An April 12, 2008 CT scan of the 

lumbar spine likewise showed postsurgical changes at L5 and S1 and mild 

circumferential bulges at L3-L4 and L4-L5, but no significant neuroforaminal 

narrowing or central canal stenosis. (R. 24, 441-42).

On May 15, 2008, Dr. Pilapil found Plaintiff capable of standing, walking 

and sitting for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally climbing ramps 

and stairs; and occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and 
33

crawling. (R. 24, 646, 649). An August 2008 CT scan showed widespread 

annular tearing at L4-L5, but confirmed the presence of only mild bilateral neural 

foramen narrowing at L4-L5 and L5-S1. (R. 269). In October 2008, Plaintiff told 

Dr. Adlaka that she was experiencing “significant improvement in overall pain 

with MS Contin.” (R. 24, 759). Indeed, throughout January and February 2009, 

Plaintiff’s pain was at a level of 3 out of 10, and she continued to do “relatively 

well” in April. By May 27, 2009, she showed “excellent function” and a 

“significant reduction in her pain.” (R. 24-25, 756-57). Plaintiff experienced a 

setback in August 2009 following a fall, but by October 21, 2009 her pain was 

mostly at a level of 2 out of 10. (R. 25, 728). She had another flare in December 

2009, taking her pain to a level of 5, but Dr. Adlaka determined that it was likely 

due to the weather. (R. 25, 741).

Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s alleged “focus on objective medical evidence,” 

noting that “an ALJ cannot disregard subjective complaints of disabling pain just 

because a determinable basis for pain of that intensity does not stand out in the 

medical record.” (Doc. 18, at 8) (quoting Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th 

Cir. 2009)). This argument is unavailing because the ALJ went on to consider 

other factors that affect credibility as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ 

stated, for example, that the treatment Plaintiff has received “not only has been 

essentially routine and/or conservative in nature, but it has been generally 

successful in controlling [her] symptoms.” (R. 26). Plaintiff claims that “[t]his 

statement is wholly unsupported by the record,” (Doc. 18, at 10), but Dr. Adlaka 

recorded her pain at a level of 2 or 3 out of 10 throughout much of 2009, and 
34

regularly noted that she obtained significant relief from MS Contin. Donahue v. 

Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s estimate that “his pain 

reaches a level of 3 on a scale of 0 to 10 . . . does not sound disabling.”).

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living “are not limited to 

the extent one would expect” given her complaints of disabling pain. (R. 27). In 

that regard, Plaintiff remains capable of engaging in personal grooming, light 

cooking, simple cleaning (such as light vacuuming, washing dishes, and a little 

laundry if her son carries the loads up and down the stairs), and grocery 

shopping. She also watches TV, reads magazines, and uses the internet on her 

cell phone for 15-20 minutes. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that this discussion 

constitutes reversible error because “the Seventh Circuit has roundly condemned 

ALJs relying on activities as militating against a claim of disability.” (Doc. 18, at 

9). This is not entirely accurate. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “it is 

appropriate for an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating 

their credibility, SSR 96-7p, at *3.” Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 

2013). This “must be done with care,” however, because “a person’s ability to 

perform daily activities, especially if th[ey] can be done only with significant 

limitations, does not necessarily translate into an ability to work full-time.” Id.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, the ALJ did not simply conclude that her 

activities of daily living translate into an ability to engage in full-time employment. 

Rather, the ALJ cited this as one of several factors that undermined Plaintiff’s 

claim of disabling pain. In that regard, Dr. Adlaka not only stated that Plaintiff’s 

pain was at a level of 2 or 3 out of 10 throughout most of 2009, but he also 
35

repeatedly observed that she exhibited “excellent function,” improvement in 

activities of daily living, and “increased activity level.” (R. 25, 27, 728, 735, 752, 

753). And he expressly opined that Plaintiff is capable of light work, an opinion 

confirmed by Dr. Pilapil. (R. 752). On this record, the ALJ did not err in 

concluding that Plaintiff’s description of her daily activities provides further 

evidence that she is not as limited as she claims. These facts distinguish this 

case from Roddy, where the ALJ completely ignored a treating physician’s

opinion that the plaintiff could not work,

5 “misunderstood or mischaracterized the 

results of [an] MRI,” and then concluded that the plaintiff’s complaints were not 

credible because she “was able to remain self-sufficient and complete household 

chores, albeit by taking longer to do so.” 671 F.3d at 636, 637, 639.

Trying another approach, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to properly 

take into account the limitations on [her] activities,” noting that she “would lie 

down to lessen her pain exacerbations after activities and needed to take 

breaks.” (Doc. 18, at 10; Doc. 24, at 5). The ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s 

stated need to lie down for 60 to 70% of the day, (R. 26), but clearly did not 

accept this testimony as credible.6

 Cf. Shauger, 675 F.3d at 697 (ALJ erred in 

completely ignoring the plaintiff’s testimony that he dealt with pain by lying down). 

The ALJ could have done a better job of explaining this decision, but she did 

 5 As noted, the ALJ here acknowledged Dr. Woods’s opinion that Plaintiff is unable 

to work, but reasonably rejected it on the grounds that it is not supported by objective 

medical evidence and is contradicted by subsequent treatment notes from Plaintiff’s pain 

specialist. 6 If the ALJ had credited the testimony, she also would have had to find Plaintiff 

disabled. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 646 (“One does sedentary work sitting . . . but not 

lying down.”).
36

thoroughly address the medical record, which reveals that none of Plaintiff’s 

doctors ever indicated that she needs to lie down on a regular basis, much less 

for most of the day. Nor do the treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff told her 

physicians that she was spending so much time in bed. Compare Bjornson, 671 

F.3d at 647 (plaintiff’s assertion that she must lie down to alleviate pain was 

supported by her pain specialist, who stated that she “must sit or lie down several 

times per day to control pain.”). Viewed together with Dr. Adalaka’s opinion that 

Plaintiff’s pain is well controlled with medication and she can perform light work, 

the ALJ’s decision to reject Plaintiff’s stated need to lie down all day is not 

patently wrong.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ still erred in discounting her testimony that the 

pain medications make her drowsy, which could affect her ability to work. (R. 26, 

27). In support of this position, Plaintiff cites Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471 (7th 

Cir. 2009), where the court observed that “some patients may not complain 

because the benefits of a particular drug outweigh its side effects.” Id. at 477. 

The problem for Plaintiff is that she did report “some side effects” relating to the 

Duragesic patches, (R. 683), as well as nausea from Effexor, (R. 672), but she 

never mentioned dizziness or drowsiness. Moreover, the treatment notes reflect 

that on multiple occasions she “report[ed] no side effects from the medication” at 

all. (R. 729, 753, 758, 759).

In sum, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s complaints of 

disabling pain and limitations are not supported by the objective medical tests or 
37

the findings of her pain specialist. This credibility determination is not patently 

wrong and will not be reversed here.

4. Testimony of Shanice Brown

Plaintiff’s next argument for remand – that the ALJ improperly weighed

testimony from her daughter, Shanice Brown – fares no better. The regulations 

provide that in evaluating opinions from non-acceptable medical sources such as 

family members, ALJs are to “apply the same criteria listed in [20 C.F.R.] § 

404.1527([c])(2).” Phillips v. Astrue, 413 Fed. Appx. 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Relevant factors include “the nature and extent of the relationship, whether the 

evidence is consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to 

support or refute the evidence.” See SSR 06-03p, at *6.

The ALJ discussed Ms. Brown’s testimony that she has to do everything 

for her mother, who experiences a lot of pain and “sleeps all the time.” (R. 26). 

The ALJ also acknowledged Ms. Brown’s statement that Plaintiff “was unable to 

function on a regular basis and . . . has been depressed because she is unable 

to do a lot of things with her family.” (Id.). Later in the decision, the ALJ 

confirmed that Ms. Brown’s testimony “was generally corroborative of [Plaintiff’s] 

allegations, and has been duly considered,” but observed that “the close 

relationship between the witness and [Plaintiff] and the possibility that the 

testimony was influenced in favor of [Plaintiff] by a desire to help [her] cannot be 

entirely ignored in deciding how much weight it deserves.” (R. 27).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have more clearly articulated the 

specific weight she afforded Ms. Brown’s testimony, and that her failure to do so 
38

constitutes reversible error. (Doc. 18, at 15-16; Doc. 24, at 9-10). The Court 

disagrees. Given that the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled, it is evident that she 

declined to give Ms. Brown’s testimony full weight. This is not surprising since

Ms. Brown’s testimony essentially mirrored her mother’s allegations that she 

spends most of the day in bed, she feels sleepy and depressed, and she needs 

her family to help her do things. (R. 27, 46, 47, 49, 55). As discussed earlier, the 

ALJ reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s statements in that regard, and her failure to 

assign a specific weight to Ms. Brown’s largely redundant testimony does not 

require a reversal in this case. See Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th 

Cir. 1993) (ALJ was not required even to discuss wife’s testimony that 

“essentially corroborated [the plaintiff’s] account of his pain and daily activities” 

and thus “was essentially redundant.”).

5. Disability Finding from Another Government Agency

Plaintiff finally argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to 

mention the fact that she was found disabled by the Federal Employees 

Retirement System (“FERS”) in January 2009. (R. 324-26). Plaintiff concedes 

that pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, the FERS decision is not binding in this 

case. See Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Determinations 

of disability by other agencies do not bind the Social Security Administration.”). 

She claims, however, that the ALJ was not free to ignore this “significant 

evidence” because “the Agency’s own policy mandates that it be considered and 

weighed.” (Doc. 18, at 18) (citing SSR 06-3p).
39

There is no dispute that the ALJ’s decision says nothing about the FERS 

disability finding. This omission was arguably improper since “even though the 

ALJ is not bound by the disability determinations of other government agencies, 

the ALJ should explain the consideration given to those decisions in her opinion.” 

Dykes v. Astrue, No. 1:12-CV-00370-MJD-RLY, 2013 WL 125164, at *7 (S.D. 

Ind. Jan. 8, 2013). But see Clifford, 227 F.3d at 874 (“[T]he ALJ is not required to 

(but may) consider the disability finding of other agencies.”). Regardless, the 

Court agrees with Defendant that any such error was harmless in this case. See 

Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2003) (A[T]he doctrine of harmless 

error . . . is fully applicable to judicial review of administrative decisions.@); Scott

v. Astrue, 730 F. Supp. 2d 918, 935 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (AHarmless errors are those 

that do not affect the ALJ=s determination that a claimant is not entitled to 

benefits.@).

To qualify for disability benefits under FERS, a person “must have become 

disabled, . . . because of a disease or injury, for useful and efficient service in 

your current position,” and “[y]our agency must certify that it . . . has considered 

you for any vacant position in the same agency at the same grade/pay level, 

within the same commuting area, for which you are qualified for reassignment.” 

(http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers-information/eligibility/, last viewed 

on April 15, 2013) (emphasis added). The IRS determined that Plaintiff meets 

that definition because she is incapable of performing her work as a tax 

examiner, and her condition “precludes reassignment to another position” in the 
40

agency “at the same grade or pay level in the same commuting area.” (R. 331, 

332).

The definition of disability under the Social Security Act is much more 

restrictive, requiring that an individual be unable to perform “any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In other words, an ALJ must look 

beyond a claimant’s ability to perform a past or comparable job (the standard 

under FERS) and additionally consider her ability to perform any other jobs 

available in the regional economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (“Your impairment(s) 

must prevent you from making an adjustment to any other work.”) (emphasis 

added). Here, the ALJ expressly agreed that Plaintiff is unable to perform her 

past relevant work as a tax examiner with the IRS. (R. 27-28). The ALJ then 

accepted the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff is nonetheless capable of working in a 

variety of other positions, including sales attendant, cashier, office helper, call out 

operator, information clerk and order clerk. (R. 28-29). On the record presented, 

the ALJ’s failure to mention the FERS disability finding is at most a harmless 

error and does not support a remand in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 17) is denied and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 22) is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of 

Defendant.
41

ENTER:

Dated: April 30, 2013 _____________________________

SHEILA FINNEGAN

United States Magistrate Judge