UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SYLVESTER BONNER, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case. No. 12 C 981

v. )

 ) Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

DANIEL O’TOOLE, et al., ) 

) Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

 Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sylvester Bonner has sued the City of Chicago and

various police officers in connection with what he claims was an

illegal search of his home on February 12, 2010. Although it is

undisputed that the officers who entered Mr. Bonner’s home did so

pursuant to a warrant, Mr. Bonner claims that the warrant was

procured by fraud – either through the deliberate use of false

information or the deliberate use of an unreliable confidential

informant. Mr. Bonner alleges that the City, through explicit or

implied policies and practices, condones the procurement of

warrants by such means. Mr. Bonner’s complaint, filed on

February 12, 2012, alleges violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, as well as a Monell claim, see Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); in the

latter, he alleges that the City failed to train its officers in

the use of informants and maintains a code of silence that allows

officers to obtain warrants by using fraudulent information. 
The case is again before the Court on a motion to compel. 

Mr. Bonner seeks to compel the City to produce discovery relating

to six searches he claims occurred in the same apartment building

where his incident occurred; he also seeks to compel discovery

relating to eleven lawsuits in which Officer O’Toole is named as

a defendant. Turning to the former, the City has represented

that, of the six searches, four took place on or before the date

of the search of Mr. Bonner’s apartment and two took place after

the search of Mr. Bonner’s apartment. The City has further

represented that it has produced documents relating to the four,

but not the latter two. The Court agrees that searches that

happened after Mr. Bonner’s apartment was searched cannot

possibly be relevant to this case. To prove his Monell claim,

Mr. Bonner will have to show that the City’s custom or policy

caused the deprivation of his rights; evidence that the policy

existed after the fact would have no bearing on the issue. E.g.,

Mayer v. Edwards, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1041, (N.D. Ill. 2008)(citing

Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Woodward v. Correctional Med. Servs. of

Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004)). See also Acuna

v. Rudzinski, No. 00 C 5635, 2001 WL 1467529, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill.

Nov. 16, 2001)(emphasizing that prior incidents may be compelled

as relevant under a Monell theory). Accordingly, the Court

agrees with the position the City has taken on the matter; to the

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extent additional discovery exists concerning the four searches,

it should be produced; the motion to compel is denied as to the

other two searches. 

In its most recent discovery rulings, the Court determined

that the City 

should not be required to produce discovery relating to

search warrants where Officer O’Toole was not the

affiant, did not himself seek and obtain the warrant at

issue. The Court does not see – and Mr. Bonner has not

explained – how such discovery is relevant to the

claims alleged in this lawsuit. In response to the

defendants’ relevance argument, Mr. Bonner simply

asserts that discovery should be broad and that the

defendants should not be permitted unilaterally to

determine what is and what is not relevant. Both of

those assertions are true. But they do nothing to

establish the relevance of the documents requested. 

Memorandum Opinion and Order dated December 18, 2012, pp. 6-7. 

Before turning to the merits of the motion to compel discovery

relating to the eleven cases identified by Mr. Bonner, the Court

notes that this finding applies with equal force today. 

Discovery is broad, but counsel is not entitled to discovery that

can have no possible relevance to the claims her client has

alleged in this case; that is true whether the discovery pertains

to search warrants or to lawsuits. 

Turning to the eleven cases identified by Mr. Bonner, the

City has produced for in camera inspection its files relating to

those cases and the Court has now reviewed those files page by

page, as well as the pleadings and other materials available

through the Court’s electronic docket management system. After

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reading everything, the Court finds that the vast majority of the

materials are not relevant and need not be produced.

Gooden v. City of Chicago, No. 05 C 5663, is a case having

nothing to do with warrants or illegal searches; the same is true

of Sims v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 1707; Jackson v. Mack, No.

08 C 556; and King v. O’Toole, No. 08 C 4358. The materials

relating to these cases are not relevant and need not be

produced. See, e.g., Acuna, 2001 WL 1467529, at *1-2 (evidence

relating to “a charge of a completely different kind of

misconduct than alleged against the officer in the federal

complaint would ordinarily be irrelevant for any purpose, and its

production in discovery would not be compelled”). 

McCadd v. Murphy, 09 C 1958, does involve an illegal search

claim, but the case does not involve a warrant or any allegations

concerning the procurement of a warrant using improper means; the

same is true of Matthews v. Matthews, 10 C 8173; and Pinex v.

City of Chicago, No. 11 C 3896. These last two cases also

involve searches that took place after the incident involving Mr.

Bonner’s home, making them irrelevant for that additional reason

as well. 

Martinez v. Montacor, No. 06 C 696, does involve an illegal

search claim and a warrant, but Officer O’Toole was not the

affiant on the warrant. The same is true of Walker v. City of

Chicago, 12 C 1422; additionally, the search in Walker occurred

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after Mr. Bonner’s home was searched. 

In Echevarria v. City of Chicago, No. 11 C 7171, the

plaintiff alleges both an unreasonable search claim and a claim

based upon the unreasonable procurement of a search warrant

against O’Toole. But, again, the allegedly unconstitutional

activity all took place after the incident involving Mr. Bonner’s

home; it can have no possible relevance to this case.

Dew v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 981, on the other hand, is

relevant and Mr. Bonner is entitled to discovery relating to that

case. In Dew, the plaintiffs alleged that Officer O’Toole and

other officers entered their residence without consent; they

alleged illegal search and seizure and excessive force in

violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The allegations are similar in

that the warrant involved, on which Officer O’Toole served as the

affiant, identified the subject property as Apt. 1A, while the

plaintiffs lived in Apt. 1C. And the incident occurred prior to

the incident involving Mr. Bonner’s apartment.

The City produced to the Court its Law Department files,

which include the Complaint Register file stemming from the

incident. And it has represented that the CR file has already

been produced to Mr. Bonner. After reviewing the remainder of

the materials, the Court finds that they are not discoverable,

either because they are not relevant (the plaintiffs’ health

records and criminal history reports, for example) or because

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they are privileged (attorney work product). Thus, although Mr.

Bonner is entitled to discovery concerning the Dew case, he has

already been provided with all relevant discovery in the City’s

possession. The motion to compel is denied as to the 11 cases

identified by Mr. Bonner. 

Finally, at the hearing on Mr. Bonner’s most recent motion

to compel, counsel for Mr. Bonner represented that, with respect

to the 45 warrants on which Officer O’Toole served as the

affiant, the City had not produced certain categories of

documents (including photographs, arrest reports and records from

the Office of Emergency Management and Communication). The City

represented that such discovery had not been produced because it

had not been requested. And, based upon what is included in the

motion to compel, it appears that may be the case. But, in the

interest of avoiding the need for further court intervention on

the issue, to the extent requested, it must be produced for those

45 warrants within seven days of the date of this decision.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part

and denies in part Mr. Bonner’s Motion to Compel [#124]. 

Dated: February 6, 2013

E N T E R:

______________________________

ARLANDER KEYS

United States Magistrate Judge

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