COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges B eales, Decker and AtLee Argued at Salem, Virginia

ROSENDO E. JUAREZ MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0113-14-3 J UDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER FEBRUARY 16, 2016 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY Victor V. Ludwig, Judge Marvin D. Miller (Law Office of Marvin D. Miller, on briefs), for appellant. Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rosendo E. Juarez appeals his conviction for rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61. He challenges the circuit court’s rulings on two discov ery issues. He argues that the court erred by failing to conduct an in camera review of certain documents that he alleged were in the possession of the Commonwealth to de termine whether they were exculpat ory and should have been produced in discovery. He further asserts that th e court erred by quas hing his subpoena duces tecumto a third party, the Collins Center, which provided therapy serv ices to the victim. We hold that review of these assignments of error is barred based on the r ecord before this Court on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the appellant’s conviction. I. BACKGROUND The appellant was accused of raping J.J., hi s thirteen-year-old daughter. The day after the rape, Maria Marlenys Garcia—the appellant’ s wife and the victim’s stepmother—questioned

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - J.J., who tearfully admitted that the appellant had engaged in “sexual relations” with her. Garcia reported the incident to staff at J. J.’s school, who cont acted the police. In a recorded forensic interview at the Valley Children’s Advocacy Center (Advocacy Center), J.J. reiterated that the appellant had “sex” or “sexual intercourse” with her. 1 Police recovered a bed sheet from the victim’s room , and DNA testing proved that the appellant’s semen was on the sheet. A key issue in the case was whether the pene tration necessary to prove rape occurred. Prior to trial, the appellant soughtto obtain discovery fr om two different sources that he believed might prove that the victim had made conflicting statements on the subject. He sought discovery from the Commonwealth of records from the Advo cacy Center. He also sought, directly from the Collins Center through a subpoena duces tecum , records of treatment th at J.J. received there from therapist Ana Arias. The Commonwealth and the Collins Center objected, and after a hearing, the circuit court denied both motions. At trial, J.J. testified without equivocation that the appellant put his penis “in” her vagina. She also testified that when inte rviewed at the Advocacy Center, she told the forensic interviewer “exactly what [she] told th[e] jury ” at trial. When Garcia testif ied, counsel for the appellant was unable to elicit any testimony indicating that J.J. had made inconsistent statements about whether

1 The prosecutor and witnesses explained that a forensic interview typically occurs in “a neutral location” and involves a specially trained individual “ask[ing] questi ons” of the victim in an age-appropriate, “non-leading way” in order to “collect evidence” about the alleged abuse. It is designed to be a single inte rview that is recorded so that the victim is not subjected to additional trauma by “retelling the story over and over again.” See generally State v. Carrion, 100 A.3d 361, 369 & n.11 (Conn. 2014) (discussing multiple forensic interview protocols); State v. Cameron M., 55 A.3d 272, 277-78 & nn.6-7 (Conn. 2012) (detailing witness testimony describing the features and uses of forensic interviews), overrul ed in part on other grounds, State v. Elson, 91 A.3d 862, 873-80 & n.14 (Conn. 2014).- 3 - penetration had occurred. 2 The appellant also did not elicit any such testimony from Deputy Wayne Surface or Investigator George Cox, witnesses w ho had observed the forens ic interview on closed circuit television as it occurred. 3 The appellant called Arias, the Collins Center therapist named in the subpoena duces tecum , to testify at trial. Ar ias testified that she did not attend the forensic interview but viewed the recording before she met with J.J. Arias further testified that, “to [her] knowledge,” J.J. did not, “[a]t any time in [Arias’] interaction with [J.J.,] . . . give a version [of the crime] that in any way differed from the forensic interview.” 4 The appellant did not dispute that DNA ev idence linked him to semen found on J.J.’s bed sheet. However, he claimed that the semen was from an erotic dream he had while asleep in another room and that he accidentally transferred it to his daughter’s sheets when he attempted to give her a massage in her own bed. He said th at she objected to the massage and pushed him off the bed, causing his semen-stained underwear to come in contact with her sheets. The appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison.

2 Counsel tried to elicit testimony regarding a conversation that Garcia had with J.J. about sexual intercourse. When Garcia attempted to state what J.J. said, the Commonwealth objected on hearsay grounds, asserting that J. J. denied having such a conversat ion. The circ uit court ruled that Garcia could “testify that the conversati on occurred,” but it sustained the objection to the extent that the appellant sought to elicit J.J.’s alleged response to Garcia. The appellant, on appeal, does not assign error to the circuit court’s ruli ng excluding this testimony.

3 The court limited the prosecutor’s questioni ng of Surface and Cox to “recent complaint” evidence as permitted by Code § 19.2-268.2. Howe ver, on cross-examination of Surface, who testified first, the court ruled that the proscription of Code § 19.2-268.2 is “more directed to the Commonwealth than the defense” and that the appe llant’s counsel was “welcome” to “get [into] the contents” of any statements th at J.J. made. Despite this invi tation, counsel did not attempt to do so with Surface or Cox.

4 The appellant’s counsel did not specifically address the issue of penetration in his examination of Arias.- 4 - II. ANALYSIS The appellant argues that the circu it court erred by failing to conduct an in camera review of “documents” that he alle ges were in the possession of th e Commonwealth to determine whether they were exculpatory an d should have been produced in di scovery under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He further asserts that the court erred by quashing his subpoena duces tecumto a third party, the Collins Center, whic h provided therapy serv ices to the victim. We hold that our consideration of these issues is procedurally barred.

A. Refusal to Conduct In Came ra Review of Documents in the Possession of the Commonwealth Prior to trial, the court entered an order permitting the appellant to engage in discovery pursuant to Rule 3A:11(b). In conjunction with the order, the appellant asked the Commonwealth to produce any written reports and a digital recording of a “mental examination” of the victim made by Janet Flavin of the Advocacy Ce nter. The Commonwealth replied that the only record from the Advocacy Center was a DVD of the fo rensic interview. The prosecutor further represented that he “[knew] of no inconsistent statements or excu lpatory information in the DVD” and “ha[d] no evidence affecting the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.” Ac cordingly, he refused to provide a copy of the DVD to th e appellant’s counsel. Subsequently, the appellant filed a motion pursu ant to Rule 3A:11 and Brady to compel the Commonwealth to provide the digital recording of th e forensic interview. At oral argument, the circuit court treated the motion as seeking not only the digital re cording but also “any relevant written reports of a physical or mental examination of the alle ged victim.” The prosecutor represented that the interview of the victim was a forensic interview, no t a “mental examination” under Rule 3A:11. He also reiterated that th e only product of the interview was the digital recording. The appellant acce pted these representations.- 5 - The parties then turned to wh ether the appellant wa s entitled to view the digital recording of the forensic interview. The appellant’s counsel contended that Garcia, a witness for the Commonwealth, had alerted counsel that J.J. had made inconsistent statements about whether penetration had occurred. Counsel also proffered that J.J. told Garcia that she had reported to the police that no penetration had occurred. The appe llant asked the court to order the Commonwealth to produce the recording or, altern atively, to revi ew the recording in camera

. The Commonwealth described the DVD as “our working docu ment from which we try the case” and indicated unequivocally that “no [exculpatory] information [was] on the tape.” The prosecutor further represente d that J.J.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was “totally consistent with what [was] on that tape.” 5 The judge accepted the prosecutor’s representati ons as an officer of th e court regarding what was recorded on the DVD. The judge further noted that it was not the court’s practice to conduct an
in camera review in the face of every such motion to determine whether the prosecutor was telling the truth. Ul timately, the judge told the a ppellant’s counsel, “[I]f you th ink I’m wrong as a matter of . . . law” and that “I am obliged to go further than I have just gone [regarding the digital recording] in ascertaining compliance with Br ady, let me know.” Counsel resp onded that he would do so, but he took no further action regarding the motion in the twenty-one days between the date of the court’s denial of the motion and the date of trial. Nor did he raise any such concerns on the record at trial. Finally, at no point dur ing the hearing on the mo tion to compel or at tr ial did the appellant’s counsel request any other records in the possession of the Commonwealth or its agents, or argue that any such records existed or were discoverable.

5 The prosecutor also proffered, without objection, that at the time Garc ia suggested that J.J. made inconsistent statements about whether pene tration occurred, Ga rcia was “in dire straits” and was “withholding from the child any affection an d support.” Garcia’s testimony at trial provided greater context for the prosecutor’s assertion: Garc ia indicated that, at some point, she asked J.J. to “drop the charges” against the appellant b ecause she was having great difficulty managing the children while he was incarcerated.- 6 - Brady provides a due process right to ex culpatory evidence, in cluding impeachment evidence, that is material to gu ilt or punishment. Lo we v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239 S.E.2d 112, 118 (1977); see Robinson v. Common wealth, 231 Va. 142, 15 0, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986). In order to esta blish a Brady violation on appeal, a defe ndant must prove that the failure to produce the evidence caused him prejudice. E.g., Robinson, 231 Va. at 150-52, 341 S.E.2d at 163-65. However, Brady does not provide a general right of discovery in crimin al cases. Lowe, 218 Va. at 679, 239 S.E.2d at 118. Additionally, “[w]hether eviden ce is material an d exculpatory and, therefore, subject to disclosure under Brady is a decision left to the pr osecution.” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1994) (citing Pennsyl vania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987)). Mere possibility or specul ation that material sou ght in discove ry “might contain ‘potentially exculpatory evidence’ imposes neither a duty of disclosure upon the Commonwealth nor a duty of inspection in camera by the court.” Ramdas s v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 420-21, 43 7 S.E.2d 566, 57 0-71 (1993) (citation omitted) (q uoting Lowe, 218 Va. at 679, 239 S.E.2d at 118) , vacated and remanded on other grounds, 5 12 U.S. 1217, orig inal judgment adhered to on remand, 248 Va . 518, 521, 450 S. E.2d 360, 361 (19 94). A motion for in camera review of material alleged to be exculpator y pursuant to Brady is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard . See Bowman, 248 Va. at 135-36, 445 S.E.2d at 113. The appellant makes multiple arguments in support of his appe llate challenge to the circuit court’s refusal to review “documents in the possession of the Commonwealth” in camera . He contends that the refusal was error because th e prosecutor “asserted th ere was no exculpatory evidence” but did not proffer that he had revi ewed “all of the Commonw ealth’s evidence.” Additionally, the appellant argues that the c ourt admitted having a policy not to conduct in camera review simply because it believe d that doing so in every case would be too time consuming.- 7 - Finally, he argues that the record establishes a “like lihood or possibility of a different result” if the complaining witness’ statements were disclosed. We hold first that the scop e of the appellant’s assignmen t of error challenging the Commonwealth’s failure to produce “documents in the possession of the Commonwealth” is much broader than the scope of the error that he preserved below. Rule 5A:18 provides in relevant part that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be c onsidered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” Additi onally, “[n]ot just any objection will do.” Thomas v. Commonwealth , 44 Va. App. 741, 750, 607 S. E.2d 738, 742, adopted on reh’g en banc , 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 87 0 (2005). Instea d, the rule requires a litigant to articulate an objection with specificity “so that the trial judge . . . know[s ] the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id.; see Ed wards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) ( en banc ), aff’d by unpub’d order, No . 040019 (Va. Oct. 15, 2004). Here, the appellant moved be low to compel the production, at most, of a mental examination and a digital recordin g of a forensic interview conduc ted at the Advocacy Center. At the motion hearin g, the appellant’s counsel accepted the prosecutor’s representations that the only thing created by the Advocacy Cent er was a digital recording and th at the recording was not subject to discovery under Rule 3A:11 as a mental examination. See, e.g., Alford v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 706, 709, 696 S.E.2d 266, 267 (2010) (holding that a criminal defendant “cannot ‘approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually cont radictory’” (quoting Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 502, 675 S.E. 2d 161, 164 (2009))). The appellant’s ar gument after that concession referenced only the digital recording and whether it contained an y material that was excu lpatory under Brady. Consequently, the appellant, at trial, preserved on ly his challenge to the Commonwealth’s failure to- 8 - produce the digital recording of the forensic interview conducted at the Advocacy Center. Because of the narrow scope of the argumen t presented at the moti on hearing, the appell ant’s claim that the prosecutor failed to attest that he reviewed “all of the Commonwea lth’s evidence” is simply not cognizable on appeal. Further, we conclude that the appellant’s failu re to ask the circuit co urt to include a copy of the digital recording in th e record constitutes a waiver of the right to appellate review of the narrow issue he preserved in the circuit c ourt. This is so because in or der to prove a Brady violation, a defendant must establish prejudice. See Robinson, 231 Va. at 150-52, 341 S.E.2d at 163-65. Prejudice requires proof of “a reasonable probabi lity that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclo sed to the defense. A ‘reasonable probability’ is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Bowman, 248 Va. at 133, 445 S.E.2d at 112 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). Here, we are unable to assess whether any inform ation contained in the di gital recording rendered its nondisclosure prejudicial because the appellant failed to ask that the recordin g at issue be included in the record. 6 See Garnett v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 397, 409-10, 657 S.E.2d 100, 108 (2008) (following the in camera review of statements on appeal , concluding that the summary of the statements disclosed by the Commonwealth was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s claim of prejudice); Bowman, 248 Va. at 136 & n.*, 445 S.E.2d at 113-14 & n.*

6 Additionally, the only information on this issue contained in the appellate record indicates that the nondisclosure was not prejudicial to the appellant. First, the prosecutor represented unequivocally that the recording did not contain an y indication that J.J. had made inconsistent statements about whether penetration occurred and th at her testimony at the preliminary hearing was “totally consistent with what [was] on [the] tape.” Second, as detailed supra in Part I, none of the witnesses who testified at trial— including J.J., Garcia, Arias, and two law enforcement officers who observed the forensic interview—provided any indicatio n that J.J. had made inconsistent statements about penetration. Cf . Moreno v. Commonwealth , 10 Va. App. 408, 41 9, 392 S.E.2d 836, 843 (1990) (holding that wh ere an accused receives exculpatory information “ at trial ,” is “able to use it effectively,” and “is not otherwis e able to demonstrate prejudice from the late disclosure,” any discovery violation “has not deprived him of a fair trial” (emphasis added)).- 9 - (concluding that the trial court erred in refusi ng the defendant’s requestto seal allegedly exculpatory evidence and make it part of the record to ensure availability for in camera review on appeal ); Ramdass, 246 Va. at 419-21, 437 S.E.2d at 570-71 (upholdi ng the trial court’s refusal to review in cameracertain transcripts for im peachment evidence because “the mere po ssibility that an item of undisclosed informat ion might have helped the defens e, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘mater iality’ in the constitutional sense” (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-10 ( 1976))); cf. Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. ix, ix, 396 S.E.2d 675, 675 (1990) (requiring harmless erro r review in all cases); Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195, 767 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2015) (recognizing the need for a proffer when evidence is excluded so that th e appellate court may determine whether the exclusion was harmless). Consequently, the appellant’s failure to have the digital recording sealed and placed in the record for purposes of appeal prevents the Court from assessing whet her prejudice occurred. Accordingly, our review of this assignment of e rror is barred. B. Quashing of Subpoe na Duces Tecum for th e Victim’s Records fr om the Collins Center The appellant also contends that the circu it court erred in granti ng the Collins Center’s motion to quash his subpoena duces tecumfor records of J.J.’s treatment there. We hold that the appellant waived his right to co ntest the circuit court’s ruling. The appellant had multiple subpoenas duces tecum issued for those records, both in the juvenile and domestic relations di strict court (the J&DR court) an d the circuit court. The Collins Center moved to quash the J&DR subpoena, and in January 2013, the J&DR court granted the motion to quash. Arou nd the same time, 264 pages of “sub poena duces tecum returns” were- 10 - submitted to the J& DR court under seal, but no evidence in the record establishes what those documents were. 7 In February 2013, after the gr and jury had indicted the appellant for rape and the matter had been transferred to the circuit court, the appell ant requested the issuance of another subpoena duces

tecumto the Collins Cent er. The Collins Center filed a motion to quash the subpoena, contending in part that it sought the disclosureof protected health informatio n for which J.J. ’s consent was required under Code § 32.1-127.1:03. The appellant then prep ared a new subpoena duces tecum for the Center’s records. The requ est was identical to the earlier oneexcept that the cover letter indicated that the appellant’s counsel had also mailed a copy of the subpoena request to J.J. in care of the Department of Social Servi ces. In response, the Center noti fied the circuit court that it had “previously supplied” the records “under seal on February 27, 2013, in res ponse to the subpoena duces tecum issued February 12, 2013.” The record on appeal, however, contains no documents submitted under seal by the Collins Cent er or anyone else on or about February 27, 2013 , and no other mention of any such documents. At the hearing on the Collin s Center’s motion to quash, th e court found no “substantial basis” for concluding that the information was material and granted the mo tion to quash. In the course of that hearing, counsel for the Center re presented that the records “have been provided to [the court].” The judge indicated that he had not “looked at the reco rds.” Nothing in the transcript indicates when the records were submitted, and no e xhibits were admitted or filed unde r seal at the motion hearing.

7 The circuit court record transmitted to this Court also reflects that on the day that the sealed records were filed, the Department of Social Services move d to quash a subpoena duces tecumissued to it that was similar to the subpoena served on the Collins Center. The transmitted record does not indicate whether the subpoenaed documents submitt ed under seal came from the Collins Center, the Department of Soci al Services, or some other entity.- 11 - In this Court, after the appellant’s petition for appeal had been granted in part, a dispute arose between the parties regarding whether any documents produced by th e Collins Center in response to the subpoena duces tecum were part of the record for purposes of appeal. The senior assistant attorney general, repr esenting the Commonwealth , maintained that he consulted with the circuit court clerk’s office and was told that most of the documents submitte d in January 2013 and contained in the sealed material retained in th e circuit court “were provided in response to a subpoena duces tecum the [appellant] issued requesting records from the Collins Center.” The senior assistant attorney general filed a petition for certiorari in this Court asking that the circuit court be directed to transmit the sealed material as part of the record on appeal . The appellant objected, contending that the origin of the seal ed material retained by the circuit court was “unknown.” He further argued that the statute pr otecting health records, Code § 32 .1-127.1:03, required the circuit court, upon gr anting the motion to quash, to retu rn the records to the Center and that this Court must presume co mpliance with that requirement. This Court issued an order directing the ci rcuit court to determin e whether the sealed documents were part of the record. 8 In a letter opinion and order, the circuit court did not expressly rule regarding whether the docu ments at issue were the record s submitted by th e Collins Center under seal. It ruled ex pressly only that the documents s ubmitted in response to the quashed subpoena duces tecum to the Collins Center “are not part of th e record.” It found that the appellant never asked to have the documents made part of th e record for any purpose. It further found that

8 The appellant argues on brief that this C ourt may not consider “[w]hat happened” when we directed the circuit court “t o determine if the unknown documents were part of the record.” However, the parties filed numerous motions an d responses regarding th e issue in this Court during the pendency of the present appeal. Additionally, the circuit court issued the opinion and order at issue specifically in response to the orde r of this Court requiri ng clarification of the contents of the record. Consequently, the motions , responses, and order are part of the record in this Court and may be considered in resolving the appeal. Se e, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 407, 413, 551 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2001) (noting that an appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in a case).- 12 - “there was no proffer of evidence as to [the documents’] contents”; no reference was made to them after the hearing; and none of them were introduced at trial. The court recognized that documents offered at trial but rejected on some evidentiary basis are sometim es “marked as ‘offered but not admitted,’” but it st ated that this did not occur with regard to the disputed documents. When a defendant seeks the disclosu re of evidence through a subpoena duces tecum , the standard for determining the materiality of the evid ence sought is “whether ‘a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists.’” Cox v. Commonw ealth, 227 Va. 324, 328, 315 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1984) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106). A subpoe na should not be issued for use as “a ‘fishing expedition’ in the [mere] hope of uncovering information material to the defendant’s case.” Farish v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 627, 630, 346 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1986). Add itionally, this Court may not reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s re fusal to grant a subpoena unless the defendant proves prejudice. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 728, 589 S.E.2d 23, 29 (2003), aff’d, 268 Va. 665, 604 S.E. 2d 76 (2004). Finally, review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecumis conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 407, 450, 611 S.E.2d 631, 652 (2005). We hold that this assignment of error is procedur ally barred. As stated , part of the test for determining whether the ci rcuit court committed revers ible error by granting the motion to quash requires an evaluation of whether th e appellant suffered any prejudice from the claime d error. See Nelson, 41 Va. App. at 728, 589 S. E.2d at 29; cf., e.g., Ferguson, 24 0 Va. at ix, 396 S.E.2d at 675 (requiring harmless error review in all cases). Here, the appellant failed to ask the circuit court to make the documents at is sue part of the record for purposes of appeal. Se e, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993) (noting an appell ant’s burden to present an adequate record); see also Garnett, 275 Va. at 410, 6 57 S.E.2d at 108 (affirming after in

camera review on appeal of allegedly exculpatory statements of the victim that were withheld from- 13 - the defendant based on a determination that they were not material). Additionally, when the Commonwealth sought to clarify whet her the documents were, in fact, part of the record on appeal and warned the appellant about his duty to provide a complete record for that purpose, the appellant steadfastly maintained that the documents were not made part of the reco rd below and, therefore, are not part of the record before this Court. In part as a result of that argument, when this Court asked for a determination regarding the status of the document s, the circuit court ruled that the Collins Center documents are not part of the record. Alford, 56 Va. App. at 709, 696 S.E.2d at 267 (holding that a criminal defend ant may not take inco nsistent positions in the course of a prosecution); see also Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. Ap p. 168, 172 n. 4, 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 n.4 (2005) ( en banc ) (noting that an appellant’s concession of law, even if erroneous, may qualify as a Rule 5A:18 waiver or withdrawalof an appellate ch allenge and that the Court may accept the concession “as a basis for not decidi ng [the issue]”). Finally, nothing suggests that the circuit court erred in its determination th at the documents are not pa rt of the record below. Based on these facts, the records at issue ar e not available for this Court’s review, and we cannot determine whether the claimed error in gran ting the motion to quash was prejudicial. That analysis is necessary under the la w. Consequently, the Court’s revi ew of the issue is procedurally barred. III. CONCLUSION We hold that the appellant waived his claim that the circui t court erred by refusing to conduct an in camera review of items in the possessi on of the Commonw ealth, including a recording of a forensic in terview of the victim. We further hol d that the appellant waived his claim that the court erred by quashing a subpoena duces tecum . Therefore, we affirm the appellant’s conviction. Affirmed.