1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $574,840;

FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $63,184; 

FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,000; 

FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $856; and 

FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,100, 

Defendants.

______________________________________/

STEPHEN UNSWORTH, and

RACHEL PILLSBURY,

Claimants.

______________________________________/ 

No. 1:11-cv-7803

Judge Milton I. Shadur

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION OF CLAIMANTS 

TO STAY CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDING 

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2)

MOTION AND INTRODUCTION

Claimants hereby move to stay theses civil forfeiture proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

981(g)(2), on the grounds that the forfeiture proceedings will burden the right of the claimants 

against self-incrimination in the related and pending criminal prosecutions, and ask that these 

civil forfeiture proceedings be stayed until the conclusion of their pending related criminal 

prosecutions in Cook County. People of the State of Illinois v. Unsworth and Pillsbury, Circuit 

Court of Cook County Case No. 11 CR 11190.

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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The essential facts are brief and undisputed1: in or around May 2011, DEA agents began 

investigating Claimant Stephen Unsworth and his girlfriend and roommate, Claimant Rachel 

Pillsbury, for involvement in drug trafficking.

On June 20, 2011, agents surveilled Claimants going to and from their residence in 

Chicago, Illinois, and Unsworth at a storage facility in West Ogden, Cicero, Illinois. The 

investigation eventually led to searches of Claimants’ residence, their vehicles, storage lockers 

associated with their name/s, and to the seizures of the five defendant properties in this case. 

Defendant $63,184 was seized from Claimants’ residence, $30,000 of which was “found in the 

blue backpack that agents observed Pillsbury carrying into the residence earlier” (see Doc. # 1 at 

p. 5 ¶ 16); defendant $856 was found and seized “[d]uring the search of Pillsbury’s Audi” (Id. ¶ 

18), defendant $2,000 was found and seized “[d]uring the search of Unsworth’s Caravan” 

vehicle (Id. ¶ 19); defendant $21,100 was found in and seized from “Pillsbury’s Access storage 

locker” in Denver, Colorado (Id. ¶¶ 21-23); and the defendant $574,840 was seized from the 

storage unit in Cicero rented by Pillsbury, where Unsworth was observed (Id. ¶¶ 6, 17).

In connection with the facts described above, Unsworth and Pillsbury were 

indicted for the offenses of (i) possession with the intent to deliver more than 30 

grams but less than 500 grams of marijuana and, (ii) possession with the intent to 

deliver psilocyn in Cook County, case number 11 CR 11190. Pillsbury was also 

indicted with the offenses of (i) possession with the intent to deliver in excess of 

500 grams of marijuana and, (ii) possession with the intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, MDMA in Cook County, case number 11 CR 11221.

Doc. # 1 at p. 7 (emphases added).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

A stay of this civil forfeiture is authorized and warranted by 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2). That

 1

 The facts are derived from the government’s allegations in its complaint for forfeiture: Doc. #1.

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statute provides:

Upon the motion of a claimant, the court shall stay the civil forfeiture proceeding

with respect to that claimant if the court determines that—

 (A) the claimant is the subject of a related criminal investigation or case;

 (B) the claimant has standing to assert a claim in the civil forfeiture

proceeding; and

 (C) continuation of the forfeiture proceeding will burden the right of the

claimant against self-incrimination in the related investigation or case.

§ 981(g)(2). Claimants satisfy each prong, which will now be addressed in turn.

I. Claimants Are Each The Subject of A Related Criminal Case 

As noted, Claimants have each been “indicted for [drug trafficking] offenses” in Cook 

County in “connection with” the identical “facts” that underlie this civil forfeiture proceeding. 

Thus, each claimant is “the subject of a related criminal ... case” and it cannot reasonably be 

disputed that Claimants have satisfied the first prong of § 981(g)(2). 

II. Each Claimant Has Standing to Assert a Claim in this Civil Forfeiture

Proceeding

Each Claimant has standing in this civil forfeiture action, as the government admits 

Claimants’ relationship to the defendant properties in its complaint for forfeiture; and in fact, it is 

Claimants’ relationship to the defendant properties which forms the alleged basis for forfeiture 

here.

Claimants have Article III standing, otherwise known as the Constitutional “case or 

controversy” requirement2. In this circuit, establishing standing in a civil forfeiture action is 

 2 See e.g. Baaske v. City of Rolling Meadows, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2002): “[T]o 

satisfy the standing requirements of Article III of the Constitution, [one] must allege: (1) a 

personal injury, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) which 

is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 887 (7th 

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"undemanding" and a claimant need “not own or control” the defendant property, she only “must 

allege [ ] an immediate threat of injury” if the property “is forfeited”. United States v. 5 S 351 

Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000). See also e.g. United States v. $ 4,224,958.57, 

392 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Cal. 2004) (citing United States v. One Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d 

1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2003) ("In a forfeiture case, a claimant's Article III standing turns on 

whether the claimant has a sufficient ownership interest in the property to create a case or 

controversy. This threshold burden is not rigorous.") 

To demonstrate Article III standing in a civil forfeiture action, a claimant must 

have "a sufficient interest in the property to create a case or controversy." Id. at 

1191. This burden is not a heavy one, at least at the initial stages of a 

forfeiture suit. Id. A "claimant need demonstrate only a colorable interest in the 

property, for example, by showing actual possession, control, title, or financial 

stake." Id. To do so at the motion to dismiss stage, "a claimant must allege that he 

has an ownership or other interest in the forfeited property." United States v. $ 

191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded on 

other grounds as stated in United States v. $ 80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 

F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). In their pleadings, the Kim Claimants 

specifically alleged an ownership interest in the May 2004 properties, which 

was sufficient at the initial stages of the litigation to establish that they had 

standing to challenge the civil forfeiture action.

United States v. Real Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(emphases added.)

Here, Claimants have each alleged (under oath) an ownership and possessory interests in 

the defendant properties, which is more than enough to give them standing in this action. See 

 

Cir. 2001) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315 

(1984)). The personal injury must be an actual or imminent injury that is concrete and 

particularized. Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)). This means that mere 

indignation does not suffice to establish standing. United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 

1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000).”

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Amended Verified Claim of Stephen Unsworth, filed 1/11/12; Amended Verified Claim of 

Rachel Pillsbury, filed 1/11/12. 3

Given that all of the defendant properties were taken from Claimants’ immediate 

possession and control, there can be no doubt that they have standing to contest this forfeiture

action. The dominion and control Claimants had over the seized currency is also strong evidence 

of ownership and standing in a forfeiture case and all circuits are in accord. See e.g. United 

States v. $ 38,570 in U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d 1108, 1113 (5th Cir. 1992); $ 191,910.00 in U.S. 

Currency, 16 F.3d at 1058; see also United States v. $ 148,840.00 in United States Currency, 

521 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008).

As noted, defendant $63,184 was seized from Claimants’ residence and $30,000 of that 

property was “found in the blue backpack that agents observed Pillsbury carrying into the 

residence earlier” (see Doc. # 1 at p. 5 ¶ 16). In other words, agents observed Claimant Pillsbury 

exercise possession, dominion and control over a portion of the defendant property. Defendant 

$856 was found and seized “[d]uring the search of Pillsbury’s Audi” (Id. ¶ 18), and defendant 

$2,000 was found and seized “[d]uring the search of Unsworth’s Caravan” vehicle (Id. ¶ 19); 

which when coupled with each Claimant’s respective assertion of ownership as to those 

properties is clearly enough to establish standing in any circuit. Cf $ 148,840.00 in United States 

Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1277 (claimant established constitutional standing when the currency 

 3

 At the status hearing on 9 January 2011, the issue of Claimants’ standing was discussed with 

the Court, which led to a continuance of the status hearing to 19 January 2012 (Doc. #19, Docket 

Entry). Both the issue of the sufficiency of Claimants’ previously filed claims and the 

anticipated responses of Claimants to the government’s special interrogatories were discussed. 

Claimants have concluded that the proper way to now proceed in this litigation is to firmly 

establish their standing with the filing of their amended claims and then seek to stay any further 

proceedings in this court pending the resolution of the related criminal case.

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was seized from the vehicle claimant was driving and claimant subsequently asserted ownership 

of the currency and had obvious possession and control over the currency when it was taken). 

In cases in which a person has asserted an ownership interest, our sister courts 

have not required the claimant to present the type of explanatory evidence urged 

by the government to establish his or her standing. See $ 38,570 in U.S. Currency, 

950 F.2d at 1112; see also $ 191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d at 1058 ("[A] 

simple claim of ownership will be sufficient to create standing to challenge a 

forfeiture."); cf. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d at 1206 (recognizing, in a Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 41(e) case, that "proof of ownership, as opposed to lawful possession, is . 

. . not required [to establish Article III standing] . . . even at a later stage in the 

proceedings such as a summary judgment or trial"). Rather, "courts have held that 

an allegation of ownership and some evidence of ownership are together 

sufficient to establish standing to contest a civil forfeiture." United States v. 

United States Currency, $ 81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). The 

required ownership interest can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, "including 

showings of actual possession, control, title and financial stake." United States v. 

1998 BMW "I" Convertible, 235 F.3d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 2000) (quotation 

omitted). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that, given the claimant's assertion of ownership, 

it was of no moment that he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination at his 

deposition, when asked to explain his interest in detail. $ 191,910.00 in U.S. 

Currency, 16 F.3d at 1057, 1058 n.13. It was enough that he claimed to own the 

money taken from his possession. Id.

$ 148,840.00 in United States Currency, 521 F.3d at 1274-1275 (10th Cir. 2008)4. In $ 38,570 

supra, the court explained that no additional evidence was necessary because, like here, the 

forfeiture complaint alleged that defendant property was taken from claimant’s possession:

Flores need not have supplemented his claim with additional evidence, 

because the government had admitted Flores' relationship to the currency in 

its complaint. We recognize that ownership can be evidenced in a variety of 

ways. Courts generally look to indicia of dominion and control such as 

 4

 See, also, United States v. $ 85,668.00 in United States Currency, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

45064 (D. Utah 2009) (claimant's unequivocal claim of ownership over seized currency, coupled 

with undisputed evidence that money was taken from his possession and control, was sufficient 

to confer constitutional standing), citing United States v. $148,840.00, 521 F. 3d 1268, 1276-77 

(10th Cir. 2008)

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possession, title, and financial stake. [citation omitted] Here, the government 

admitted, and the district court explicitly found, facts indicating Flores' 

involvement with the currency. The district court noted Flores' presence at the 

scene of the seizure and the circumstances surrounding Flores' alleged 

relationship to the currency, and the government's complaint clearly specified 

that Flores exercised some form of dominion over the currency. While Flores' 

claim itself did not provide evidence of his ownership interest, we hold that in 

this case, Flores' claim of ownership, coupled with the government's 

allegations of Flores' involvement with the seized res, are sufficient to 

establish standing.

Id, at 1113 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphases added).

To be sure, to establish Article III standing, a claimant “need not prove the merit of his 

underlying claim. He must, however, be able to show at least a facially colorable interest in the 

proceedings sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement." United States v. $ 

9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphases added.)

 "In order to contest a forfeiture, a claimant need only have some type of property interest 

in the forfeited items. This interest need not be an ownership interest; it can be any type of 

interest, including a possessory interest." United States v. $ 191,910.00, 16 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th 

Cir. 1994)

In United States v. United States Currency, $ 81,000.00, 189 F.3d 28, 39 (1st Cir. 1999), 

the court noted that for standing, “the claimant need not prove the full merits of her underlying 

claim” and only needs show “a facially colorable interest in the proceedings sufficient to satisfy 

the case-or-controversy requirement”, that “[a]n owner or possessor of property that has been 

seized necessarily suffers an injury that can be redressed, at least in part, by return of the seized 

property” (189 F.3d at 35) (bold added), and ultimately reversed the district court’s finding 

that the claimant there lacked standing:

The cases cited by the district court rejecting standing for the legal title holder of 

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the res almost all invariably have one theme in common: a lack of involvement by 

the legal title holder with the res. In United States v. Vacant Land Located at 10th 

Street & Challenger Way in Palmdale, California, 15 F.3d 128 (9th Cir. 1993), 

the claimant had made no payments on the mortgage or taxes due on the property 

and did not even have a key necessary to enter it. See id. at 130. In 526 Liscum 

Drive, the claimant held title to the property in Ohio where her father lived, but 

she herself lived in California and had only visited the property once. See 526 

Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d at 215. In One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, although the claimant 

held legal title to the car and the automobile was kept at the father's house, it was 

doubtful that the seventy-two year old claimant with a heart condition would have 

driven the car. See One 1981 Datsun 280Z X, 563 F. Supp. at 475. Finally, in 

United States v. Certain Real Property Located at River Road, Eliot, York County, 

Maine, 839 F. Supp. 1 (D. Me. 1993), aff'd without published opinion, 23 F.3d 

395 (1st Cir. 1994), although the claimant had legal title to the property, his 

father, who had transferred the property to him, continued to live on the property 

and pay all the necessary taxes and upkeep, and the claimant had no knowledge 

about the property. See id. at 3. John Bulger's involvement with the joint 

account was far greater than that of the claimants cited above. He acted as a 

joint owner would, writing checks and withdrawing money, and exercised 

dominion and control over the account.

$ 81,000.00, 189 F.3d at 39.

Here, if the defendant properties here are forfeited, Claimants, as even mere possessors of 

any part of the defendant properties, will certainly “suffer an injury that is more than intellectual, 

psychological or ideological”, they “will lose the opportunity to receive” the property to continue 

their possession, which “is more than enough to give [them] an actual stake in the outcome of the 

suit, and to make [their] dispute with the government a genuine ‘case or controversy’ ”. 5 S 351 

Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d at 1022.

A fortiori, it must be noted that the Tuthill court expressly recognized that it was holding 

contrary to “some sister circuits” that had required more of drug asset forfeiture claimants than 

of other litigants to establish standing, and rejected the " ‘dominion and control’ formulation” 

whereby other courts had thrown out a claimant for a supposed lack of standing when the 

claimant was claimed to be “a strawman holding nominal title as a subterfuge for a drug 

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trafficker, rather than being a true owner of an interest in the property." 233 F.3d at 1022 

(disapproving of United States v. Vacant Land, 15 F.3d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Tuthill

court was unequivocal:

As a matter of public policy, we can see the reason for closing courts to these 

claims of nominal owners, because they are in furtherance of an illegal and 

socially destructive purpose. But the social imperatives at work in these cases 

hardly justifies characterizing the problem as one of constitutional standing.

We require a plaintiff to demonstrate standing in order to assure that we are 

refereeing an actual, rather than a hypothetical, dispute. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560-61. Indeed, we police a plaintiff's standing precisely to ensure that we are 

acting as a court, rather than as "ombudsmen of the general welfare," a role more 

properly ascribed to Congress. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United 

for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 

102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). It seems to us that in scrutinizing a would-be forfeiture 

plaintiff's interest for evidence of straw ownership, courts are not policing 

their own exercise of power, but policing those whom they perceive to be 

doing the bidding of drug traffickers, by refusing to provide an avenue of legal 

redress. One might call it judicial abdication in the service of judicial 

activism. Cf. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 

(7th Cir. 1984) (dissenting opinion).

...

So we will hew to the traditional "actual stake in the outcome" test in 

analyzing whether Bochnewych has standing to challenge the government in 

this case. The facts suggest that he does have a sufficient interest in the land to 

give him an actual stake in the outcome of this dispute, even though he may not 

own, dominate or control the land.

5 S 351 Tuthill Road, supra, 233 F.3d 1017, 1022-1023 (emphases added). Tuthill found 

standing for its claimant based on him being a mere “beneficiary of a land trust” Id. at 1021. 

Courts should not [ ] conflate the constitutional standing inquiry with the merits 

determination that comes later. See United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 

F.3d 1017, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 2000) (criticizing tests of straw ownership that 

deny standing rather than denying claims on their merits).

At the initial stage of intervention, the requirements for a claimant to 

demonstrate constitutional standing are very forgiving. In general, any colorable 

claim on the defendant property suffices.

United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass 

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Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). Even the government’s 

own forfeiture expert agrees with this view:

Although [standing and ownership] are sometimes blurred in reported decisions, 

they should properly remain separate because they pertain to different stages of 

the forfeiture case. See Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United 

States 332 (2007) ("Standing and ownership are separate concepts that are often 

confused in the case law. . . . [S]tanding and ownership come into play at 

different stages in the civil forfeiture case and are governed by different bodies 

of law.").

...

"[a] person with standing to contest the forfeiture can engage in pre-trial 

discovery, file dispositive motions, put the Government to its proof in the first 

phase of the forfeiture trial . . . , and otherwise litigate the forfeiture case 

whether or not he ever asserts innocent ownership as an affirmative defense 

to the forfeiture." Cassella, supra, at 334.

U.S. v. Assets Described in “Attachment A”, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 48794 *9-10, (M.D.Fla. May 

6, 2011) (emphasis added).

Here, as noted in the factual statement, and as the government concedes, all of the 

properties were seized from either Claimants’ immediate possession and control, or from 

locations which the government concedes Claimants exercised dominion and control over.

Therefore, it cannot be reasonably disputed that Claimants each have Article III standing here. 

It should be noted that Claimants have also established what has been called by some 

courts, statutory standing. A claimant may meet its burden of statutory standing by complying 

with the provisions of Rule G(5) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims 

and Asset Forfeiture Actions, which in relevant part provides that “[t]he claim must: (A) identify 

the specific property claimed; [and] (B) identify the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in 

the property [ ]”. See e.g. $148,840.00, supra, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) 

(noting that Article III standing requires the existence of a case or controversy, whereas statutory 

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standing requires procedural compliance).

Claimants’ amended verified claims each meet the requirements of Rule G(5). They each 

identify the specific amounts of currency in question which they claim, the case number, and 

state that they each “claim[] an ownership and possessory interest in, and the right to exercise 

dominion and control over, all of the” specific defendant property to which they claim an 

ownership interest in.

Claimants have each met their burden as to the standing requirement of § 981(g)(2)(B).

III. Continuation of the Forfeiture Proceeding Will Burden the Right of the

Claimants Against Self-Incrimination in the Related Investigation or Case

On or about December 8, 2011, Plaintiff served UNITED STATES' SPECIAL 

INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO CLAIMANT, “pursuant to 

Rule G(6)(a)' and (6)(b) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime and Asset 

Forfeiture Claims, and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33” (“The Discovery Requests”) on 

each Claimant.

The Discovery Requests, among other inquiries, ask Claimants to identify their current 

address and all addresses for the last five years and require that Claimants list the inclusive 

months and years lived at each address (Special Interrogatory 1), require Claimants to identify 

which of the five properties they each claim and to “state with particularity your current interest 

in each of the specified properties and “the full circumstances under which that interest arose” 

and to state “others[’]” interest is one is known If others also have an interest, please state their 

interest (see Id. at pp. 2-3, Special Interrogatory No. 3), and all persons who know about 

Claimants’ interest/s in the defendant properties and whether they have ever declared the 

defendant properties on tax returns. Id. at pp. 4-5, special interrogatories numbered 8 and 9.

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Additionally, interrogatories numbered 4-6 read as follows:

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

For each of the five specifies properties named in the verified complaint 

that you have claimed, if you have any records, documents, or tangible items that 

reflect or are relevant to your interest in the defendant property or your claim to 

the defendant property, please identify each piece of evidence with specificity, 

including the name, address, and telephone number of its custodian.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Please list each and every source from which you claim that the defendant 

property, for each of the properties you are claiming a property right in, was 

derived, including the exact amount of money derived from each source. Your 

answer should also include: the date the currency, or any portion of the money, 

was obtained, and from whom (name, address, and telephone number) the

currency was obtained and the reason you obtained the currency. If the currency, 

or any portion of the currency, was obtained by you in the form of a check and 

converted to cash, list the payer and payee of the check(s), the amount thereof, 

and the approximate date thereof. If you originally received any portion of the 

defendant property in some other form besides cash or check, list the form of 

payment, the amount of the payment, the date, and the reason such payment was 

made to you or to such other person or organization. Please identify each witness 

(by name, address, and telephone number) and each document (and the name, 

address, and telephone number of the custodian of the document) that supports 

your answer.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

State if you place, or caused to be placed, any or all of the $574,840 

United States currency and $21,000 currency inside the storage units where it was 

discovered by law enforcement officers, and identify the amount of currency you 

placed or caused to be placed inside either the Chicago unit or the Denver storage 

unit, when that was done, and why that was done. If you did not place the 

defendant property inside the storage units, identify by name, address, and 

telephone number the person(s) who placed the defendant property inside the 

storage lockers.

See United States’ Special Interrogatories at pp. 3-4.

The Fifth Amendment "not only protects the individual" in a criminal prosecution, but 

also privileges him to "not answer official questions put to him in any proceeding, civil or 

criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 

proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 

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441, 445 (1972). 

The general standard for a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self‐incrimination is well established...to assert the privilege, respondents 

must show that their testimony would 'support a conviction under a ... criminal 

statute or furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute [them] for a 

... crime. 'Indeed, it is enough if the responses would merely provide a lead or 

clue to evidence having a tendency to incriminate. The privilege is validly 

invoked ... where there are substantial hazards of self‐incrimination that are real 

and appreciable, not merely imaginary and unsubstantial. Finally, the existence of 

such a hazard is generally determined from examination of the questions, 

their setting, and the peculiarities of the case. 

United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934-935 (1996) (emphases added). Here, the context 

and content of the government’s discovery requests make clear that responses would 

unquestionably provide explicit evidence that could be used to incriminate Claimants in their 

criminal trial, and would or could also provide a lead or clue to evidence having a tendency to 

incriminate each Claimant.

Any further advancement of this forfeiture proceeding will burden each Claimants’ 

absolute right against self-incrimination in the related criminal prosecutions of each of them, 

which are ongoing. Therefore, it cannot reasonably be disputed that this civil forfeiture action, 

and civil discovery which has already been served, will burden each Claimant’s Fifth Amendmet 

rights, and each Claimant has met the last and final element of 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2), 

warranting an order staying the forfeiture proceedings. This action must be stayed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, civil discovery will inappropriately provide evidence that the 

state would otherwise not be entitled to in Claimants’ criminal prosecutions, and Claimants’ 

rights against self-incrimination will be burdened if this proceeding is permitted to advance any 

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further. Claimants respectfully request that the Court order a stay of this civil forfeiture 

proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(2).

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated: 11 January 2012

s/David M. Michael__________________

DAVID M. MICHAEL

Law Offices of David M. Michael

101 California Street, Suite 2450

San Francisco, CA 94111

Telephone: (415) 946-8996

Facsimile: (877) 538-6220 

david@davidmichaellaw.com

Attorney for Claimant

STEPHEN UNSWORTH

Dated: 11 January 2012

/s/Michael J McDermott

Michael J McDermott

Law Offices of Michael James McDermott 

53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1615 

Chicago, IL 60604 

Telephone: (312)697-0022 

Email: mmcdermott50@hotmail.com

Attorney for Claimant

RACHEL PILLSBURY

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CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on 11 January 2012, I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing 

with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic 

filing to the following:

AUSA Daniel E. May

Office of the U.S. Attorney

Northern District of Illinois

219 S. Dearborn Street, 5th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60604

daniel.may@usdoj.gov

s/David M. Michael__________________

DAVID M. MICHAEL

Case: 1:11-cv-07803 Document #: 21 Filed: 01/11/12 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:107