alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1515.408 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses. ( a ) In addition to those provisions and clauses prescribed in FAR 15.408, when an exception to FAR 15.403-1 does not apply and no other means available can be used to ascertain whether a fair and reasonable price can be determined, the contracting officer may insert in negotiated solicitations the provisions at— ( 1 ) 1552.215-72 when requesting information other than cost or pricing data, for cost-reimbursable, level-of-effort-contracts. Use Alternate I for cost-reimbursable, level-of-effort contracts when the Government's requirement is for fully dedicated staff for a twelve month period(s) of performance and performance is on a Government facility; Alternate II for acquisitions for cost-reimbursable, level-of-effort contracts when the Government's requirement is for fully dedicated staff for a twelve month period(s) of performance and performance is not on a Government facility; and Alternate III if the Government's requirement is for the acquisition of supplies or equipment. The contracting officer may make revisions, deletions, or additions to 1552.215-72 and its Alternates I-III as needed to fit an individual acquisition, and
( 2 ) 1552.215-73, General Financial and Organizational Information.
( b ) If uncompensated overtime is proposed, the resultant contract shall include the provisions at FAR 52.237-10 and include the provision at 1552.215-74. The contracting officer may use provisions substantially the same as 1552.215-74 without requesting a deviation to the EPAAR.
#### 1652.249-70 Renewal and withdrawal of approval.

As prescribed in 1649.101-70, the following clause shall be inserted in all FEHBP contracts:

# Renewal and Withdrawal of Approval (JAN 1991)

(a) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 8902(a), the contract renews automatically for a term of 1 year each January 1st, unless written notice of intent not to renew is given either by OPM or the Carrier not less than 60 calendar days before the renewal date, or unless modified by mutual agreement.

(b) This contract also may be terminated at other times by order of OPM pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 8902(e). After OPM notifies the Carrier of its intent to terminate the contract, OPM may take action as it deems necessary to protect the interests of members, including but not limited to—

(1) Suspending new enrollments under the contract;

(2) Advising enrollees of the asserted deficiencies; and

(3) Providing enrollees an opportunity to transfer to another Plan.

(c) OPM may, after proper notice, terminate the contract at the end of the contract term if it finds that the Carrier did not have at least 300 enrollees enrolled in its plan at any time during the two preceding contract terms.

(End of clause)

[52 FR 16044, May 1, 1987, as amended at 55 FR 27418, July 2, 1990; 57 FR 19388, May 6, 1992]
Exhibit
32(c)








CERTIFICATION
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO




18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report
on Form 10-Q of Carolina Power & Light Company (the “Company”) for the
period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lloyd M. Yates, President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




(1)           the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)           the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/ Lloyd M.
Yates


Lloyd M.
Yates


President
and Chief Executive Officer


May 9,
2008








This
certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company
for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended.
17.000 Scope of part. This part prescribes policies and procedures for the acquisition of supplies and services through special contracting methods, including— ( a ) Multi-year contracting;
( b ) Options;
( c ) Leader company contracting; and
( d ) The use of reverse auctions to obtain competitive pricing.
[48 FR 42231, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 89 FR 61330, July 30, 2024]
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 9, 2021

No. 04-21-00180-CR

IN RE Martin BALLEZA, Relator

Original Proceeding1

ORDER

The petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. 

It is so ORDERED on June 9, 2021.

_____________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 9th day of June, 2021.

_____________________________

Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court

1

This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2017CR12645, styled State v. Balleza, pending in the 399th Judicial District 

Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Frank J. Castro presiding.
1946.704 Authority for use of warranties. ( a ) The procurement request initiator is responsible for preparing a written recommendation for those purchases deemed to be appropriate for application of warranty provisions. The recommendation shall state why a warranty is appropriate by specifically addressing the criteria set forth in FAR 46.703. The recommendation shall also identify the specific parts, subassemblies, assemblies, systems, or contract line items to which a warranty should apply.
( b ) Prior to solicitation of the requirement, the contracting officer shall make a written determination when a warranty provision is to be included.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JONAS JACKSON, JR., ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-3883 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ________________________________ ) Opinion filed October 5, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Margaret O. Steinbeck, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. NORTHCUTT, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
#### Sophie Hines, Appellant, v. Ruby Chinn, Respondent.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and facts and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. Memorandum: We find no evidence to sustain the factual findings of the Referee (contained in the conclusions of law) that the deed “was drawn by over persuasion and undue influence” upon the defendant and that the plaintiff failed to show any consideration for the execution and recording of the deed “and failed to explain the failure of said consideration, there being clear proof of the unfairness of the transfer.” Upon the present record it is impossible to determine upon what basis the Referee concluded that plaintiff should be required to convey her interest as a joint tenant in the realty to defendant. A new trial is required. Upon such trial it would seem that the attorney Schaffer might well be a key witness. The defendant testified that when the deed was prepared he explained the “whole situation” to this attorney. Similarly, from plaintiff’s testimony and the documentary evidence it appears that Mr. Schaffer might have helpful proof as to when and under what circumstances the deed was recorded. For some unexplained reason neither party saw fit to call the attorney as a witness. (Appeal from judgment of Erie Supreme Court dismissing the complaint and directing plaintiff to convey all of her interest in the property, in an action for partition of realty.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
Exhibit 99.1


                    Certification Pursuant to 18 USC ss.1350,
      as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Tomahawk  Industries,  Inc. (Company) on
Form  10-KSB  (Report)  for the year  ended  April 30,  2003,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof. I, Glenn A. Little, Chief
Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify to the best of my
knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 /s/ Glenn A. Little
-----------------------
Glenn A. Little
Chief Executive and
Chief Financial Officer

Dated: May 15, 2003
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-2316

JAMES MERCADO, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus WILLIAM S. COHEN, Secretary of Department of Defense (Defense Mapping Agency aka National Imagery and Mapping Agency), Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CA-98-521-A) Submitted: November 5, 1998 Decided: November 18, 1998 Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Mercado, Appellant Pro Se. Leslie Bonner McClendon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: James Mercado appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his complaint alleging employment discrimination. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). Because Mercado may be able to save this action by amending his complaint, the district court’s order is not an appealable final order. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 , 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993) (a dismissal without prejudice is not reviewable unless the reasons stated for the dismissal clearly disclose that no amendment to the complaint couldcure its defects). We therefore dismiss the appeal without prejudice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### William F. Reiber, Appellant, v. Walter F. Roberts, Respondent.

— Upon the oral stipulation of respective counsel made in open court, action remitted to Special Term for the purpose of making a decision in conformity with section 440 of the Civil Practice Act; and the parties are then to make and file with this court a supplemental record containing such decision which shall be incorporated as a part of the original record. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe Equity Term dismissing plaintiff’s complaint in an action to reform a deed.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Halpern, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
#### Leah Mandel et al., On Behalf of Themselves and all Other Lot Owners of Putnam Park Colony, Respondents, v. Pearl Oremland, Appellant.

In an injunction action by three property owners in Putnam Park Colony, at Lake Hollowbrook in the Town of Cortlandt, Westchester County, against defendant, another such property owner, to compel her to remove a. garage which she erected upon her property in violation of a uniform restrictive covenant contained in all deeds to lots within the Colony, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered February 14, 1964 after a non jury trial, upon the court’s written decision in plaintiffs’ favor, granting the injunction and directing removal of the garage, (if not entirely demolished) to a location on defendant’s lot in conformity with the terms of the covenant. Judgment, reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and complaint dismissed, without costs. Findings of fact contained in the decision of the trial court which may be inconsistent herewith are reversed *795and new findings are made as indicated herein. It appears that the restrictive Covenant in question will expire on January 1, 1965 — about two months from the date of this decision; that immediately thereafter the garage could be lawfully restored to its present position; and that the injury to plaintiffs by reason of the location of the garage in its present position is not serious or substantial, whereas to now compel the defendant to remove the garage to another location or to demolish it would subject her to great inconvenience and loss. Under the circumstances, an injunction should not be granted, despite the clear violation of the restrictive covenant *(Forstmann*v. *Joray Holding Co.,*244 N. Y. 22). Nor, under the circumstances here, is a new trial required with respect to the plaintiffs’ damages. Plaintiffs made no attempt to prove any monetary damages suffered by them by reason of the location of the garage in violation of the restrictive covenant, although under the allegations of their complaint and prayer for relief they were entitled to claim such damages. Hence, another trial to give plaintiffs a further opportunity to establish damages, which are not substantial in any event, is not justified and the complaint should be dismissed. (For prior related appeals, see *Mandel*v. *Oremland,*18 A D 2d 1139; *Matter of Mandel [Hollowbrook Lake Assn.],*9 N Y 2d 821.) Beldoek, P. J., ICleinfeld, Christ, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
§ 720.5 Authority of the Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel. ( a ) *Authority of the Judge Advocate General.* The Judge Advocate General, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, and the Assistant Judge Advocates General are authorized to act for the Secretary of the Navy in performance of functions under this chapter.
( b ) *Authority of the General Counsel.* The authority of the General Counsel of the Navy is prescribed by Navy Regulation (32 CFR 700.203 (a) and (g)) and by appropriate departmental directives and instructions (e.g., SECNAVINST 5430.25D).[1] The principal areas of responsibility of the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) are commercial law, including maritime contract matters; civilian employee law; real property law; and Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act matters as delineated in 32 CFR part 701. The Office of the General Counsel shares responsibility with the Judge Advocate General for environmental law cases.
( c ) *Points of contact.* Commanding officers are advised to contact their local area judge advocates for assistance in referring matters to the appropriate office of the Judge Advocate General or General Counsel.
( d ) *Coordination with the Commandant of the Marine Corps.* Marine Corps commands shall inform the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) of all matters referred to the Judge Advocate General or the Office of General Counsel. Copies of all correspondence and documents shall also be provided to CMC. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant (CMC (JAR)) shall be advised of all matters referred to the Judge Advocate General. Counsel to the Commandant shall be advised of matters referred to the Office of General Counsel.
Footnotes -
720.5
[1] Copies may be obtained if needed, from the Commanding Officer, Naval Publication and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120.
In The Matter Of: 

### SERVED: May 10, 2016
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC

DocketNo. FAA-2013-1082 Ridan Investments, Inc. ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 201280700133 Respondent

ORDER SETTING PREHEARING CONFERENCE
On April 4, 2016, the undersignedjudge issued an Order Directing the Parties to Meet and Confer Regarding Litigation and Scheduling Issues inthe above captioned case. On May 4, 2016, the parties submitted ajointreport to the undersignedjudge reporting on the results oftheir meeting. Inthe report, the parties suggested a telephonic pre hearing conference be held after July 31,2016.
Pursuantto 14 C.F.R. § 13.205(a)(l) and (7), itis hereby ORDERED: 1. The parties shall appear bytelephone for a prehearing conference withthe undersigned judge onAugust 16,2016 at 3pm Eastern time. 2. The parties shall access the conference by dialing telephone number 888-204-5984 and then inputting access code 6392406 when prompted. 3.- During the conference, the parties shall be prepared to discuss the issues in dispute, the proposed litigation schedule, the status ofany settlementnegotiations, and any other related matters.



# ~--- DOUGLAS M. RAW ALD Administrative LawJudge

Attachment: Service List :.JSERVICE LIST ORIGINAL & ONE COPY Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000 1

President, Ridan Investments, Respondent 1340 North Melrose Vista, CA 92083 TEL: NOT PROVIDED FAX: NOT PROVIDED ONE COPY

Lawrence M. Burek, Respondent's Counsel 550 North Parkcenter Drive, Suite 204 SantaAna, CA 92705 TEL: 714-564-9033 FAX: NOT PROVIDED Tammy Leach P.O. Box 891324 Temecula, CA 92589 TEL: 951-970-6762 FAX: NOT PROVIDED Glenn H. Brown, Complainant's Counsel Enforcement Division, Western Team Federal Aviation Administration 222 W. 7th Avenue, Box 14 Anchorage, AK 99513-7587 TEL: 907-271-5271 FAX: 907-271-2800 DocketNo. FAA-2013-1082 (Civil Penalty Action)

I Service was by

### u.s. Mail. For service in person orby expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite2Wl000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.• The Honorable Douglas M. Rawald,AdministrativeLawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJerseyAvenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-5121 StaffAssistant FAX: 202-366-7536
#### John Molinari, Respondent, v. Garden Party House, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Motion granted and time for filing appellant’s brief extended to November 5, 1960.
P i o P i c o E ne r g y C en t e r PS D - M ee t

i ng C on f i rm a t i on
W

. Da v i d J en k i n s t

o: Amy Z i m p f

e r , G e r a r do R i o s , Roge r K ohn

, C l e v e l and Ho ll ada y , J u li e W a l t e rs 03 /

05 / 2012 12 : 44 PM

C c: " 'F o s t

e r , M e li ss a A

. ' "

, " ' G a r

y R

. C hand l e r ' "

, " ' G a r

y R uben s t

e i n ' "

,

" ' S t e v e H ill '"

All,

I w o u l d li k e t o c o n f i r m o u r m ee t i n g s

e t f o r 11:00 a m P T t h i s W e dn e s d a y , M ar c h 7t h a t E P A R e g i o n 9

. H e r e ar e t h e i t e m s t h a t t h e PP E C

t e a m w o u l d li k e t o d i s c u ss w i t h y o u :

1

. S D C A P C D upd a te 2

. C E C W

o rks h o p a nd p r

o c e ss upd a te 3

. PP E C R

e s p o n s e t o U SF W S L e tt e r a nd E S A p r o c e ss upd a te 4

. G H G B

A C T A n a l y s i s upd a te 5

. D a t a R e qu e s t s t a t us 6

. P S D p r o c e ss upd a t e a nd a n t i c

i p a t e d D raf t P e r m i t d a te

Gar y C h a nd l e r , M i ss

y F o s t e r , S t e v e Hill

, Gar y R ub e n s t e i n , a nd I p l a n

t o a tt e nd

. I a pp r

e c i a t e y o u r
c o n t i nu e d e ff

o r t s o n t h e PP E C P

S D p e r m i t a nd y

o u r w illi n g n e ss t o m ee t w i t h u s

.

B e s t r e g ar d s,

D a ve

D a v i d J e n k i n s 317

. 431

. 1004 d j e n k i n s @ a p e x p o we r g r o up

. c om
#### John Doe, Respondent, v Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of Health of State of New York, et al., Appellants.

[834 NYS2d 603]—

Appeal from an order (denominated judgment) of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John V Centra, J.), entered May 19, 2006. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied and the preliminary injunction is vacated.

*1169Memorandum: Plaintiff, a physician who was the subject of a professional misconduct proceeding pursuant to Public Health Law § 230, commenced this action seeking to enjoin defendants from using his medical records in connection with the proceeding, after the Administrative Hearing Officer ruled that they were admissible. By order to show cause, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction with respect to defendants’ use of those records. We note that, although Supreme Court issued a “judgment” that, inter alia, granted the relief sought in the order to show cause, i.e., a preliminary injunction, we treat the judgment as an order granting the preliminary injunction *(see generally Ryan v McLean,*209 AD2d 913, 914 [1994]). With respect to the merits of the appeal, the Administrative Hearing Officer had determined that the records were admissible, and plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the professional misconduct proceeding. It is well settled that “one who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law” (Watergate *II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth.,*46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]). Even assuming, arguendo, that this action had been properly commenced as a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition, we would conclude that such relief would not be warranted. “That extraordinary remedy is available only where there is a clear legal right, and only when an officer acts without jurisdiction or in excess of powers in a proceeding over which there is jurisdiction ‘in such a manner as to implicate the legality of the entire proceeding’ ” *(Matter of Doe v Axelrod,*71 NY2d 484, 490 [1988], quoting *Matter of Rush v Mordue,*68 NY2d 348, 353 [1986]). Here, as in *Doe,*“[t]he writ of prohibition does not lie as a means of seeking collateral review of a mere error of law in the administrative process, no matter how egregious that error might be” *(id.).*Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Gorski, Fahey, Peradotto and Green, JJ.
#### Commissioner of Public Welfare of the City of New York, Respondent, v. Steven Still, Appellant.

Order unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Valente and Bastow, JJ.
#### 1501.401 Definition.

A deviation to the EPAAR is defined in the same manner as a deviation to the FAR (see FAR 1.401).

[49 FR 8835, Mar. 9, 1984; 49 FR 24734, June 15, 1984]
#### 204.606 Reporting data.

In addition to FAR 4.606, follow the procedures at PGI 204.606 for reporting data to FPDS.

[74 FR 37644, July 29, 2009]