[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-12061

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:06-cr-80070-DMM-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLTON POTTS,

a.k.a. Pep, 

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(May 19, 2021)

Before LAGOA, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge: 

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Carlton Potts appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence 

reduction pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 

5194. After a careful review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Initial Sentencing

In 2006, Potts entered guilty pleas in two consolidated criminal cases

pursuant to a written plea agreement. In Case No. 06-cr-80070, Potts pled guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. 

In Case No. 06-cr-80081, Potts pled guilty to drug and firearm offenses:

(1) conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute at 

least 50 grams of crack cocaine and at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, in 

violation of §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846; and (2) being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 

924(e). 

At sentencing, the district court calculated Potts’ advisory guidelines range 

of 360 months to life for his two drug convictions. The district court granted Potts 

a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 downward departure for substantial assistance and imposed 

concurrent 240-month sentences on each drug case, followed by concurrent 

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supervised release terms of 10 years in Case No. 06-cr-80070 and 5 years in Case 

No. 06-cr-80081. For his § 922(g) firearm conviction in Case No. 06‐cr‐80081, 

Potts received a third concurrent 240-month prison sentence and a concurrent 5-

year term of supervised release. 

B. First Step Act Motion

In March 2019, Potts filed a pro se “Motion for Appointment of Counsel and 

Motion for Reduction of Sentence” under the First Step Act.1 Potts’ motion argued 

he was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and should receive 

one. 

At the district court’s direction, the government and the probation officer

filed responses to Potts’ First Step Act motion for a sentence reduction. The 

government opposed Potts’ motion, arguing that: (1) Potts was ineligible for a First 

Step Act reduction because he was not convicted of a “covered offense”; and (2) in 

any event, even if he was eligible, such relief was not warranted based on the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the facts and circumstances of Potts’ case. The 

government addressed certain § 3553(a) factors and why a reduction was not 

1

Potts’ motion for a sentence reduction also cited 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, this 

Court has now held that a motion brought under the First Step Act need not be paired with a 

request for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(B) because the First Step Act is self-contained and selfexecuting. See United States v. Edwards, ___ F.3d ___, 2021 WL 1916358, at *2 (11th Cir. May 

13, 2021).

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warranted. In particular, the government emphasized Potts’ extensive criminal 

history and the seriousness of his offenses. 

The probation officer, however, filed a memorandum that determined that 

Potts was eligible for relief under the First Step Act. As a result, the memorandum 

calculated a new advisory guidelines range of 292 to 356 months after Amendment 

782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The probation officer also advised the district 

court what Potts’ new mandatory minimum and maximum penalties would be with 

retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. In particular, the probation 

officer’s memorandum advised that Potts’ minimum supervised release term on his 

drug conviction in Case No. 06‐cr‐80070 was reduced from 10 years to 8 years 

under the Fair Sentencing Act. As to Case No. 06-cr-80081, the probation 

officer’s memorandum stated that his minimum supervised release term on his 

drug conviction was 5 years and the minimum supervised release term on his 

firearm conviction remained at 5 years. 

In a May 7, 2019 order, the district court denied Potts’ First Step Act 

motion, “[a]fter consideration of the government and probation’s responses.” The 

court concluded that: (1) Potts was ineligible because he was not sentenced for a 

“covered offense” within the meaning of the First Step Act; and alternatively (2) 

“even if legally eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act, the 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) indicate that a sentence reduction is 

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unwarranted under the facts and circumstances of this case.” Potts filed this 

appeal, and this Court appointed him counsel. 

C. Compassionate Release to Time Served

On September 14, 2020, while Potts’ appeal was pending, the district court 

granted Potts’ motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

After analyzing the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded that there were

compelling reasons to grant relief. Potts’ serious medical conditions rendered him 

uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19 and that outweighed his extensive criminal 

history. The district court reduced Potts’ prison term to time served on his two 

drug convictions and his firearm conviction and ordered him released immediately.

As a special condition of compassionate release, the district court imposed 

an additional 37-month supervised release term—the unserved portion of his 

original prison sentence—to be served on “home confinement” before serving his 

original, concurrent supervised release terms of 10 years and 5 years. 

II. DISCUSSION

After supplemental briefing, the parties agree that Potts’ compassionate 

release renders his appeal moot as to his prison terms but not as to his 

undischarged supervised release terms. The parties also agree that, in light of this 

Court’s decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020), Potts’ 

crack cocaine offenses qualify as “covered offenses” under the First Step Act, 

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making him eligible for a reduction of his supervised release terms on his two drug 

convictions. However, the First Step Act did not change his 5-year concurrent 

supervised release term on his firearm conviction. So, no matter the drug 

convictions, Potts still has a 5-year supervised release term on his firearm 

conviction. 

Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in 

declining to reduce Potts’ (1) 10-year supervised release term on his drug 

conviction in Case No. 06-cr-80070, and (2) his 5-year supervised release term on 

his drug conviction in Case No. 06-cr-80081.

2

 As to Case No. 06-cr-80081, as 

noted above, Potts has a 5-year supervised release term for his firearm conviction 

in the same case. Thus, the more important supervised release term for Potts is his 

existing 10-year supervised release term on his separate drug conviction in Case 

No. 06-cr-80070.

Although the district court was authorized to reduce Potts’ prison terms and 

his supervised release terms, it was not required to do so. See United States v. 

Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2020); Jones, 962 F.3d at 1304. Indeed, 

the district court has “wide latitude to determine whether and how to exercise [its]

2

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of an eligible movant’s First 

Step Act motion and “must affirm unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or 

applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.4 (11th Cir. 

2020).

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discretion in [the First Step Act] context.” Id. In its alternative ruling, the district 

court concluded that a reduction under the First Step Act was unwarranted in light 

of “the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and “under the facts and 

circumstances of this case.” It is undisputed that Potts had an extensive criminal 

history and qualified as both a career offender and an armed career criminal under 

the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the district 

court’s refusal to reduce Potts’ supervised release terms was an abuse of its 

discretion. 

Potts argues we must remand because we cannot discern from the district 

court’s alternative ruling which § 3553(a) factors it considered, making it 

incapable of meaningful appellate review. At the outset, this Court recently held 

that “the First Step Act does not mandate consideration of the statutory sentencing 

factors set forth in § 3553(a)” United States v. Stevens, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-

12858, slip op. at 15 (11th Cir. May 19, 2021) (explaining that to hold otherwise 

“would impermissibly hamper and cabin [the] wide discretion that Congress 

expressly afforded district courts”). Thus, a district court may, but is not required 

to, consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to exercise its discretion and 

reduce a sentence under the First Step Act. See id.: Jones, 962 F.3d at 1304.

That said, the district court’s decision whether to reduce a defendant’s 

sentence under the First Step Act “must adequately explain its sentencing decision 

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to allow for meaningful appellate review.” Stevens, ___ F.3d at ___, No. 

19‐12858, slip op. at 16. As with an initial sentencing, the district court should 

set forth enough to demonstrate it “considered the parties’ arguments and has a 

reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. at ___, 

No. 19-12858, slip op. at 16 (alteration in original) (citing Rita v. United States, 

551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007), and Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 50, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)); see also United States v. Russell, 994 

F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2021). How much explanation is required “depends . . . 

upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585

U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018); see also Stevens, ___ F.3d at ___, No. 19-

12858, slip op. at 16 (acknowledging that the explanation “need not necessarily be 

lengthy” so long as it makes clear the district court’s reasoned basis for its 

decision). “In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review 

that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has 

considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the §3553(a) factors, 

among others.” Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1965; see also United 

States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding district 

court’s explanation for denying a § 3582(c)(2) reduction sufficient where it stated 

it had reviewed the government’s brief in opposition that set out and addressed the 

pertinent § 3553(a) factors). 

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Here, the district court stated it had reviewed the government’s response, 

which set out and addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and the probation officer’s 

memorandum. And, as noted above, as to Potts’ drug conviction in Case No. 

06‐cr‐80070, the probation officer’s memorandum not only indicated Potts was 

eligible for a sentence reduction but also set forth the fact that his minimum 

supervised release term was reduced from 10 years to 8 years. As to Case No. 

06‐cr‐80081, Potts had a 5-year supervised release term on his firearm conviction, 

no matter the supervised release term on his drug conviction in that case.3

 The 

district court stated that, after reviewing the government’s response and the 

probation officer’s memorandum, it had determined the § 3553(a) factors indicated 

that a reduction was not warranted under the facts and circumstances of Potts’ 

case. The district court’s explanation, while brief, was sufficient, and a remand for 

a more complete explanation is unnecessary. And, the district court’s decision not 

to reduce Potts’ supervised release terms under the First Step Act was not an abuse 

of discretion.

Finally, we note this case is materially different from our recent decision in 

Russell for several reasons. First, the defendant in Russell merely wrote a letter 

3

While Potts’ counsel does not raise this issue, the probation officer’s memorandum said 

the new supervised release term on the drug conviction in Case No. 06-cr-80081 was 5 years 

when it was 4 years. That seems to be a typo. But, we conclude any error in the probation 

officer’s memorandum was harmless, as Potts had 5 years of supervised release on his firearm 

conviction anyway.

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asking the district court to appoint counsel to assist him in filing a First Step Act 

motion. Russell, 994 F.3d at 1234. The district court sua sponte converted his 

request into a motion for a sentence reduction although the defendant did not 

request a sentence reduction in his letter. Id. at 1240 & n.9. In contrast, Potts filed 

a combined motion for appointment of counsel and for a sentence reduction in 

which he argued that he was both eligible for and deserved a sentence reduction

under the First Step Act. 

Second, in Russell the district court ordered the probation officer to file a 

response, but that response was never made part of the record. Id. at 1235 n.3. 

Here, unlike in Russell, the district court’s order expressly referenced the probation 

officer’s memorandum, which advised that Potts was eligible for a sentence 

reduction. Further, the government’s response alternatively assumed Potts was 

eligible and addressed whether the district court should exercise its discretion and 

reduce Potts’ sentences. In doing so, the government reviewed the facts and 

circumstances of Potts’ case, addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and stressed his 

extensive criminal history and the seriousness of his offenses. 

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the record in Potts’ case is not 

ambiguous as to the district court’s alternative ruling denying Potts a sentence 

reduction as a matter of discretion. In its alternative ruling, the district court stated 

that “even if [Potts was] legally eligible,”—meaning the court accepted for 

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purposes of its alternative ruling that it had the authority to grant Potts’ motion—it 

would not reduce Potts’ sentence as a matter of discretion in light of the § 3553(a) 

factors and the facts and circumstances of Potts’ case. The district court did not 

include any “ambiguous” language like that found in the district court’s 

reconsideration order in Russell. See id. at 1239. Rather, here we are fully able to 

discern the district court’s two alternative bases for denying Potts’ motion for a 

sentence reduction. 

In short, we find the district court’s brief explanation for that alternative 

ruling adequate for meaningful appellate review, and a remand is not required

here.

4

AFFIRMED.

4

For completeness and clarity, we point out that the district court in Stevens said only 

“[e]ven if the First Step Act applied, the Court would still impose a sentence of five (5) years of 

supervised release.” Stevens, ___ F.3d at ___, 19-12858, slip op. at 6 (quotation marks omitted, 

alteration in original). Here though, the district court said more, as outlined above, and we are 

able to conduct meaningful appellate review under the facts and circumstance of this case.

The government argues that a remand is not required because we can look to the district 

court’s compassionate release order to conclude that it would be futile to remand, as the district 

court reaffirmed the same terms of supervised release in that order. In effect, the government 

says remand is unnecessary because any alleged error was harmless. We need not address this 

argument given our holding above. Further, we note that Potts is not only now released but also 

has a mandatory 5-year concurrent term of supervised release on his firearm conviction that is 

not impacted by the First Step Act.

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