MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 66 Docket: Aro

- 19

- 509 Submitted

On	B riefs : May	4 ,	2020 Decided: May	12,	2020

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR
, HUMPHREY , HORTON,	and	CONNORS, JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	STACY	H.

PER	CURIAM
[¶1] Stacy	H.	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	the	District	Court	(Presque	Isle,
Nelson,	J. )	terminating	her	parental	rights	to	her	child. The	mother argues	that

there were	 insufficient	 findings	 and evidence	 to	 support	 the	 court’s

determination	 that	 termination	 of her parental	 rights	was	in	 the	child’s	best

interest. We	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND
[¶ 2 ] The	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 initiated	 child
protection	proceedings against	 the	mother	and	 father	of	 this	child	by	 filing	a
child	 protection	 petition	 on	 December	 12,	 2017, alleging	 that the then
eighteen

- month

- old child had	been taken	to	the	hospital	for	possibly	ingesting
the	 mother’s	 prescribed medication

. 1 See 22 M.R.S.	 §	 4032	 (20 20 )

. The

1 The	Department	did	not	initially	seek	a	preliminary	protection	order	because	it	had	reached	an agreement	with	the	mother	for	her	to	retain	custody	of	the	child	with a	safety	plan in	place.2
Department also alleged	that	the	mother	had	a	long	history	of	substance	abuse
issues,	placing	the	child	at	risk	of	exposure	to	drugs,	drug	paraphernalia,	and
dangerous individuals;	 had	 exposed	 the	 child	 to	 do mestic	 violence;	 and	 had
neglected	her	older	child. 2
[¶ 3 ] On	March	2,	2018,	the	court	( O’Mara,	J. )	entered	a	jeopardy	order

with	the mother’s	agreement ,	finding jeopardy	to	the	child	from	the	mother’s
struggles	with	drug	addiction, her	use	of methamphetamine	and	amphetamines
on	multiple	occasions	during	the	course	of	the	child	protection	proceedings
, the
threat	 of	 neglect	 to	 the	 child
, and	 the	 child’s	 exposure	 to	 domestic	 violence

.
See 22	M.R.S.	§	4035	(20 20 )

. [¶ 4 ] The	 Department sought a preliminary	 protection	 order	 on

August 10,	2018,	alleging	 that	 the	mother was	selling	drugs	out	of	her	home,
was	not	participating	in	substance	abuse	counseling,	was	exposing	the	child	to
potential	abuse	by	 visitors,	had	been	 overheard	 yelling	at	 the	child ,	and	 had
relapsed	 on	 methamphetamine

. See 22	M.R.S.	 §	 4034(1)	 (20 20 )

. The	 court
( Nelson,	J. )	entered	a	preliminary	protection	order	that	day,	placing	the	child	in
the	Department’s	custody. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4034(2)	(20 20 )

. The	mother	waived

2 The	court	later	terminated	the	father’s	parental	rights.		Because	the	father	does	not	appeal	from that	judgment,	we	discuss	the	facts	and	procedure	only	as	they	relate	to	the	mother.3
her	opportun ity	for	a	summary	preliminary	hearing. See 22 M.R.S.	§	4034(4)
(20 20 )

. [¶ 5 ] A	year	later,	on	August	22,	2019,	the	Department	petitioned	for	the
termination	of	the	mother’s	parental	rights. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4052	(20 20 )

. After

a two

- day testimonial	hearing, by	judgment	dated	December	5,	2019, the	court
found	the	following	facts	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence

. 3 See In	re Child	of

Olivia	F. ,	2019	ME	149,	¶ 3 ,	217	A.3d	1106

. This	case	involves	chronic	substance	abuse	problems

.	.	. and significant domestic	 violence	issues	in	 the	 home.

.	 .	 . A	 domestic violence	 incident	 prompted	 Department	 intervention	 with	 the family	in February	of 2017

.	.	.	.
Mother	has	had	a	d r ug	problem	since	she	was	a	teenager. She made	some	progress	in	her late	twenties

.	.	. .	That	progress	came to	an	end	when	 she

.	 .	 . began	using	bath	 salts	approximately	 six years	ago. This caused	her	life

.	.	. to	completely	fall	apa r t. She	has been

.	 .	 . struggling	 with	 her	 addiction	 and	 mental	 health	 issues since	th at	time.
After	 attending	 an	 intensive	 inpatient	 treatment	 program with [the	 child] in	 the	 spring	 of	 2018 following	 the	 entry	 of	 the Jeopardy	Order,	mother	returned	to	the	community	and	again	was using illegal	drugs. She	admitted	to	using	methamphetamin e	while [the	child] was	in	her	care	in	August	of 2018.

.	.	. Rather	than	ta k e responsibility	for	her	slip

- ups,	mother	blamed	the	Department and her	providers.

3 The	court	entered	judicial	review	orders on July	6,	2018	( Soucy,	J. ) ;	October	25,	2018	( Nelson, J. ); and	 February	 28,	 2019,	 maintaining	 the	 Department’s	 custody	 of	 the	 child	 and establishing	 a permanency	 plan	 of	 reunification	 with	 the	 mother. By a judicial	 review	 order entered	 on December 18,	2019,	the	court	established	a permanency	plan	of	adoption for the	child.4

[M] other	 completed	 the	 intensive	 outpatient	 program	 in February	of	2019. It	does	not	appear that	she	gained	any	insight from	 the	 program. In	 May	 of 2019,	 mother	 again	 was	 abusing prescription	 medication	 that	 she	 allegedly	 located	 among	 her things	 when	 she	 was	 moving	 to	 a	 new	 apartment. In	 addition, mother	 was	 using	 methamphetamine again	 as	 well

. She	 was completely	overwhelmed,	even	 though [the	child] was	not	in	her

care. She again	blamed	her	providers	for	failing her

. Despite	the	identification	early	on	in	the	case	of	a	significant need	 for	 mother being mental health	 counseling,	 mother	 did virtually	 nothing	 to	 follow	 up	 and	 engage	 in	 mental	 health treatment services.

.	.	. Without	proper	attention to,	and	treatment of,	her	mental	health	issues,	which	has	not	occurred	to	this	point, mother	will	be unable	 to	effectively	parent [the	child] due	 to	 the

co
- occurrence	of	her	substance	abuse	disorder	and mental	health diagnoses.
When	the	case	hit	its	most	critical	stage,	with	the	prospect	of a	termination	of	parental rights	looming,	mother	failed	to	put	forth much	effort	at	attending	to	her	s ubstance	abuse	treatment needs, attending	 only	 a	 few	 sessions. At	 the	 hearing,	 her	 cu rrent substance	abuse	treatment provider	indicated	that	she	was	again in	the	intensive	outpatient	treatment	program,	which	is	a program for	the beginning	of	the	recovery process

. There	were	many	excuses for	the	lack	of participation	presented	at	the	hearing,	none	of	them credible.
Mother	 has	 exhibited	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 how	 her mental	health	and	substance	abuse issues	have	caused	her	much misery	in	her	life. S he	ta k es	very	little,	if	any	responsibility	for	the way	her	life	is	now. Whenever	she	is	overwhelmed,	which	happens easily,	she	resorts	to	abusing substances.

.	.	.

.	.	.	.5

.	 .	 . The	 court	 finds	 that	 permanency	 is	 important	 for [the child]

. She	 is	 de pendent	 on	 others	 for	 her	 care	 and must	 have consistent	care.
.	.	.	[The	mother	is] not	able	to effectively	manage [her] own care,	 much	 less	 care	 for	 this	 child. [Her] lack	 of	 success	 in addressing	the	domestic	violence	issues,	mental	health	issues, and substance	abuse	issues	as	well as [her] chronic	instability	make	it unlikely	that [she] will	be	able	to	provide	the	child permanency	at any	time	in	the	foreseeable	future,	if	ever. In	light	of	the	child ’ s	age and h er	 need for	 stability,	 predictability and	 adequate	 care,	 she simply	cannot	wait	to	see	if	at	some	point	in	the future [the	mother] makes	sufficient	progress	in	dealing	with [her] issues	to	consider moving forward	 with	 reunification. It	 is	 in [the	 child’s] best interest	 that	 she	 be	 provided	 t hat	 stability, predictability	 and adequate	 care	 now	 by	 way	 of	 a	 termination	 of	 her [mother’s] parental	rights.
The	delay	in	this	case	has	had	a	negative	effect	on	the	child. She	has	been	in	limbo	while her [mother	has] been	given	time	to work	 on [her] own	issues.

.	 .	 . The	child	has	been	living	with	her paternal	aunt	since the	spring	of	2019. The	child ’ s

.	.	. behaviors have	 improved	 in	 her	 new placement. Her	 aunt	 has	 been	 a tremendous	resource	 for	 the	child	and	actively	advocates	 for	her needs. The child	is	thriving	in	her	aunt ’ s	home. The	stability	that	a termination	of	parental	rights would	provide	is	in	the	child ’ s	best interest	so	that	she	can	achieve	permanence.
[¶ 6 ] Based	on	these	findings,	the	court terminated the	mother ’s	parental
rights	to	the	child on	the grounds	that	she is	unwilling	or	unable	to protect	the
child	from	jeopardy	and	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	child

within	 a time	 reasonably	 calculated to	 meet	 the	 child’s	 needs ,	 and	 that

terminati on	is	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest. See 22	M.R.S.	 §	 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),6
(b)(i),	 (ii)	(20 20 )

. The	mother	 timely	appeals. See 22	M.R.S.	 §	4006	 (20 20 ) ;
M.R.	App.	P.	2B (c)(1)

.
II.		DISCUSSION
[¶ 7 ] The	mother	challenges	 the	court’s	 finding that	 termination of	her
parental	rights	was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child .		We	review for	clear	error

the	court’s factual findings supporting	its best	interest determination ,	and	we
will	not	disturb	those	findings	if	there	is	any	competent	evidence	in	the	record

to	su pport	them. In	re Child	of Olivia	F. ,	2019	ME	149,	¶ 5,	217 A.3d	1106 .		We

review	 the	 court’s ultimate best	 interest	 determination	 for	 an	 abuse	 of

discretion. Id.
[¶ 8 ] Contrary	 to	 the	 mother’s	 contention,	 the	 court adequately

considered	the	child’s	b est	interest when	it	terminated	the	mother’s parental
rights.		The	statute	requires	the	court	to consider	“the	best	interest	of	the	child,
the	 needs	 of	 the	 child,	 including	 the	 child's	 age,	 the	 child’s	 attachments	 to
relevant	persons,	periods	of	attachment s	and	separation,	the	child’s	ability	to
integrate	into	a	substitute	placement	or	back	into	 the	parent’s	home	and	 the
child’s	 physical	 and	 emotional	 needs

. ” 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	 (2)
(20 20 ) .		I t	does	not	require	the	court	to issue	written	findings	addressing every
component	of	a best	interest analysis
, see In	re	Jacob B. ,	2008	ME 1 68,	¶¶	13

- 1 9
,7

959	A.2d	734
, nor	was	the	court	bound	to	accept	the	evidence	of	best	interest
offered	 by	 the	 mother
, see In	 re	 Children	 of	 James	 B.
, 2020	 ME	 14,

¶ 10,

--- A.3d

--- . The	 court	 expressly	 made	 several findings	 regarding	 the

child’s	best	interest ,	including	that	the	child	needs predictability and stability
in	her	life,	that	she	is	thriving	and	her	behavioral	issues	have	improved	while

in	h er	aunt’s	care,	and	that	the	aunt provides	tremendous	support	to	the	child

.
See 22	M.R.S.	§	4050(2)

- (3)	(20 20 ) ; In	re	Child	of	Ronald	W. ,	2018	ME	107,	¶	11,

190	 A.3d	 1029 (“[T]he	 court’s	 order	 indicates	 that	 it	 carefully	 and
appropriately	considered	the	c hild’s	needs	for	stability	and	permanency	.	.	.	.”)

. Those	findings were	supported	by	sufficient	record	evidence	presented	at	the
termination	hearing

. 4 See	In	re	Child	of	Sherri Y. ,	2019	ME	162,	¶	7,	221	A.3d

120 (“[A ]	court	may	draw	from	the	same findings	in	making	its	unfitness	and
best	interest	determinations.”)

. The	entry	is:
Judgment affirmed.

4 Although	the	mother	does	not	challenge	the	court’s	findings	regarding	parental	unfitness,	those findings,	too,	are	supported	by	competent	record	evidence. See In	re Child	of Olivia	F. ,	2019	ME	149, ¶ 3,	217 A.3d	1106.8

Allan	Hanson,	Esq,	Caribou,	for	appellant	Mother

Aaro n	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter	C.	Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Presque	Isle	District	Cou rt	docket	number	PC

- 2017

- 30 F OR C L ERK R EFERENCE O NLY