alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Thomas Montgomery, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant Montgomery from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered January 4, 1963 after a jury trial, convicting him of conspiracy, as a felony (Penal Law, § 580-a) and of carrying a dangerous weapon, as a felony (Penal Law, § 1897) and imposing sentence. This defendant was indicted and tried jointly with one Harvey Shaw, whose appeal has been decided herewith (21 A D 2d 908). Judgment affirmed. On this record, we find: (1) that both the defendants Montgomery and Shaw were lawfully arrested at Fulton Street and Bedford Avenue; (2) that the search of the ear in question started at the time and place of the arrest; (3) that there was a brief, reasonable suspension of the search because of a situation which arose at the scene of the arrest and which made completion of the search at that place inadvisable; and (4) the search at the station house, immediately following such brief suspension, was merely a *continuation*of the search initiated at the time and place of the arrest. Hence, we hold that the search was incidental to and contemporaneous with a lawful arrest; that the search was valid; and that the guns discovered by the search were properly admitted into evidence. While we do not approve of the prosecutor’s comment, in summation, that “ in his opinion ” the evidence conclusively showed defendants’ guilt (cf. *People*v. *Lovello,*1 N Y 2d 436), we believe the trial court’s prompt instructions to the jury relative to such remark effectively eliminated any possible prejudice to the defendants. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Brennan JJ., concur.
#### 1852.215-84 Ombudsman.

As prescribed in 1815.7003, insert the following clause:

# Ombudsman (NOV 2023)

(a) An ombudsman has been appointed to hear and facilitate the resolution of concerns from offerors, potential offerors, and contractors during the preaward and postaward phases of this acquisition. When requested, the ombudsman will maintain strict confidentiality as to the source of the concern. The existence of the ombudsman is not to diminish the authority of the contracting officer, the Source Evaluation Board, or the selection official. Further, the ombudsman does not participate in the evaluation of proposals, the source selection process, or the adjudication of formal contract disputes. Therefore, before consulting with an ombudsman, interested parties must first address their concerns, issues, disagreements, and/or recommendations to the contracting officer for resolution.

(b) If resolution cannot be made by the contracting officer, interested parties may contact the installation ombudsman, whose name, address, telephone number, facsimile number, and email address may be found at *https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/procurement/regs/Procurement-Ombuds-Comp-Advocate-Listing.pdf.* Concerns, issues, disagreements, and recommendations which cannot be resolved at the installation may be referred to the Agency ombudsman identified at the above URL. Please do not contact the ombudsman to request copies of the solicitation, verify offer due date, or clarify technical requirements. Such inquiries shall be directed to the Contracting Officer or as specified elsewhere in this document.

(End of clause)

[62 FR 3484, Jan. 23, 1997, as amended at 65 FR 38777, June 22, 2000; 68 FR 62023, Oct. 31, 2003; 76 FR 72329, Nov. 23, 2011; 88 FR 80639, Nov. 20, 2023]
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Larry E. Finger, the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Federal Realty Investment Trust (the Company), has executed this certification in connection with the filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005 (the Report). The undersigned hereby certifies that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                 |  |                                                                                                   
|---------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                 |  | /s/    LARRY E.
FINGER                                                                            
|October 31, 2005 |  | Larry E. Finger, Executive Vice President andChief Financial Officer(Principal Accounting Officer)
#### Garland E. Huntsman, Respondent-Appellant, v. Margaret B. Henry et al., Respondents, and Floyd Stark, Appellant-Respondent. Garland E. Huntsman, Respondent-Appellant, v. Delaware *&*Hudson Railroad Corporation, Appellant-Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, without costs, on the opinion of Mr. Justice Simpson at Special Term. (42 Misc 2d 951.) Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
#### 1552.215-74 Advanced understanding—uncompensated time.

As prescribed in 1515.408(b), insert the following provision or one substantially the same as the following provision:

# Advanced Understanding—Uncompensated Time (AUG 1999)

(a) The estimated cost of this contract is based upon the Contractor's proposal which specified that exempt personnel identified to work at the Contractor's facilities will provide uncompensated labor hours to the contract totaling ____ percent of compensated labor. (Note: the commitment for uncompensated time, and the formula elements in paragraph (b) below, apply only to exempt personnel working at the Contractor's facilities and does not include non-exempt personnel or exempt personnel working at other facilities.) Uncompensated labor hours are defined as hours of exempt personnel in excess of regular hours for a ____ pay period which are actually worked and recorded in accordance with the company policy, entitled, ____________________.

(b) Recognizing that the probable cost to the Government for the labor provided under this contract is calculated assuming a proposed level of uncompensated labor hours, it is hereby agreed that in the event the proposed level of uncompensated labor hours are not provided, an adjustment, calculated in accordance with the following formula will be made to the contract amount.

Formula:

Adjustment equals estimated value of uncompensated time hours not provided.

Target uncompensated time percent minus ____ percent.

Shortage of uncompensated time percent minus actual cost percent.

Estimated value of uncompensated time hours not provided equals shortage of uncompensated time percent times total exempt applicable direct labor costs (including applicable indirect costs).

(c) Within three weeks after the end of the contract, the Contractor shall submit a statement concerning the amount of uncompensated time hours delivered during the contract. In the event there is a shortage of uncompensated time hours provided, a calculation, utilizing the above formula will be made and this calculation will be the basis for an adjustment in the contract amount.

(d) In the event adjustments are made to the contract, the adjusted amounts shall not be allowable as a direct or indirect cost to this or any other Government contract.

(End of clause)

[64 FR 47418, Aug. 31, 1999]
#### Joseph Gurell et al., Appellants, v. Horace Gioia et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Rochester, Respondents, and James R. Hall et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

Order unanimously reversed and determination of Zoning Board of Appeals annulled, with costs, without prejudice to a reapplication. Memorandum: The evidence presented was insufficient to empower the board to grant a variance. *(Matter of Otto*v. *Steinhilber,*282 N. Y. 71; *Matter of Crossroads Recreation*v. *Broz,*4 N Y 2d 39; *Matter of Gerling*v. *Board, of Zoning Appeals,*6 A D 2d 247.) (Appeal from order of Monroe Special Term denying motion of petitioners to annul determination of Zoning Board.) Present Williams, P. J., Bastow, Henry, Noonan and Del Vecchio, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MICHAEL ANDREW NOLL,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 11 MM 2019

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2019, the Application for Leave to File Petition 

for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED.
#### In the Matter of Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., Appellant, v. Caroline K. Simon, as Secretary of State, Respondent.

Order, dated April 1, 1960, denying petitioner’s motion for an order of mandamus, pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act and dismissing the petition, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Motion for leave to file copies of article in *Howard Law Journal*and for other relief denied. The court has, however, considered the article in arriving at its decision. Concur — Botein, P. J., Rabin, Valente, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

In connection with the Annual Report of BancTec, Inc, a Delawarecorporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K/A for the year ending December 31,2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, J.Coley Clark, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that tomy knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/   J. Coley Clark    |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                                   |
| J. Coley Clark                         |
| President and Chief Executive  Officer |
|                                   |
| June 26, 2007                          |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by 18 USC Section1350 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 27

THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CAL-MAINE
FOODS, INC.'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES THERETO INCLUDED IN
THE FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1996
<CASH>                                           9,033
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,014
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     42,919
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                72,520
<PP&E>                                         146,505
<DEPRECIATION>                                  62,848
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 162,491
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           41,398
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           170
<OTHER-SE>                                      54,712
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   162,491
<SALES>                                        144,192
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               144,192
<CGS>                                          116,495
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  130,737
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,298
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,556
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,528
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,028
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,028
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .61
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .61
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATMENTS OF BRIDGFORD FOODS CORPORATION FOR THE THIRTEEN WEEKS
ENDED JANUARY 31, 1997, AS SET FORTH IN ITS FORM 10-Q FOR SUCH QUARTER,
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1997
<CASH>                                      11,220,277
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,097,240
<ALLOWANCES>                                   533,238
<INVENTORY>                                 11,889,623
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            40,286,413
<PP&E>                                      41,134,160
<DEPRECIATION>                              23,420,923
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              57,999,650
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       17,228,657
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,453,816
<OTHER-SE>                                  31,317,177
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                57,999,650
<SALES>                                     31,669,311
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            31,669,311
<CGS>                                       20,753,461
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,753,461
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             9,175,732
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                31,038
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              59,237
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,740,118
<INCOME-TAX>                                   661,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,079,118
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,079,118
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .11
        

</TABLE>
Case: 1:11-cv-07934 Document #: 22 Filed: 12/07/11 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:59

Case: 1:11-cv-07934 Document #: 22 Filed: 12/07/11 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:60

Case: 1:11-cv-07934 Document #: 22 Filed: 12/07/11 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:61
#### Edna R. Denberg, Appellant, v. Jerome A. Denberg, Respondent.

Order, entered on April 29, 1964, denying plaintiff’s motion to punish defendant for contempt of court, unanimously reversed, on the law, the facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and plaintiff’s motion to punish defendant for contempt of court granted unless within 15 days from the date of entry of the order hereon the defendant discharges all liens against Prudential Life Insurance Company policy No. 13921017, the granting of the motion for contempt to be conditioned upon the plaintiff executing all necessary consents required by the Prudential Life Insurance Company to create as primary beneficiaries of the said policy the children of the marriage, to wit, William I., Marcia and Gail. By order of Mr. Justice Backer dated October 11, 1962, the defendant was ordered to execute all necessary consents to the Prudential Life Insurance Company policy so that the plaintiff would become an irrevocable beneficiary and owner of the sa-'d policy. The defendant refused to comply with the order and, on Febrnazy 13, 1964, Mr. Justice Hbllman adjudged him in contempt for failure to execute the said forms. The plaintiff was remarried on January 26, 1964, although knowledge of her remarriage was kept secret for more than three months and, by reason of her remarriage, pursuant to agreement the three infant children of the marriage were to become the primary beneficiaries of the said policy. After defendant was jailed on April 1, 1964, he finally executed the required forms at which time plaintiff discovered that defendant had borrowed the full cash value of the policy from the company in the sum of $2,201.11 rendering it valueless. The order upon which this motion to punish for contempt is based, in addition to directing the execution of the consents, also provides that such consents be executed pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement and in compliance with the order of Backer, J. The separation agreement, in addition to requiring the execution of the consents, provides that the policy is to be delivered “free of all liens and encumbrances.” As a result, the defendant’s execution of the required consents, after he had rendered the policy valueless, is not in compliance with but rather is in direct conflict with the separation agreement and, therefore, with the order which embodied the same. Inasmuch as the wife has since remarried, she too should be required to comply with the provisions of the separation agreement by executing the necessary consents to effectuate a change of beneficiary from herself to the children of the marriage. Settle order on notice. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Yalente, Stevens and Staley, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of William Kastenhuber, Respondent, v. Irwin & Leighton, Inc., et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal by an employer and its insurance carrier from a decision and award under the Disability Benefits Law (Workmen’s Compensation Law, art. 9). Appellants contend that the finding of disability commencing September 18, 1958 or at any time within four weeks of the last day of employment (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 203) is unsupported by substantial evidence; but the uncontroverted medical proof, supplied by two treating physicians, was that claimant was disabled from the time that he left the job on September 17, 1958, because of severe chest pain attributed to angina pectoris; and the board was, of course, under no compulsion to reject or to discount the evidence merely because claimant’s first medical examination (following initial treatment by a chiropractor) was had some weeks after the first onset of pain and more than four weeks after he last worked or because no objective symptoms were apparent, as was said to be not unusual in angina eases. The remaining contentions advanced in appellants’ brief were not specified in the application to the board for review and hence are not available to appellants here. (Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 23, 224; *Matter of La Barge*v. *Mercy Gen. Hosp.,*12 A D 2d 689, 690, motion for leave to appeal denied 9 N Y 2d 610; *Matter of Braune*v. *Haas,*13 A D 2d 875, 876.) Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Present — Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
BD Data Sheet C

Estimated Interest Accrued 	Office of Postsecondary Education	

January 2018	 U.S. Department of Education

The data presented here describe the interest accrued on loans associated with borrower defense claims.  The data were compiled by the U.S. Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid (FSA).  Loan data are current as of November 2017, and underlying borrower defense claims are current as of October 2017.

**Table C.1: Estimated Interest Accrued**

Assumptions

· Year—this is the year in which the borrower defense claim was submitted.

· Loan attribution—loans were associated to a claim if they matched on OPEID and on either the loan's borrower Social Security Number (SSN) or student SSN.  When two claims matched to a single loan, the loan data was allocated on the borrower SSN.

· Consolidated loans—were de-consolidated to link them to borrower defense claims.

· Interest accrued—estimated interest was computed as (current outstanding principal balance) x (actual daily interest rate) x (number of days between the submission of the claim and the earlier of the date the loan closed or the current date)

DRT 1852.1	PUBLIC	1
#### In the Matter of Lem Kehrley, Petitioner, v. John J. J. McGough, Individually and as County Superintendent of Highways of the County of Sullivan, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review a determination of the County Superintendent of Highways of Sullivan County. Petitioner, an employee in the Highway Department of Sullivan County, and a veteran, was removed from his position by the respondent County Superintendent of Highways on charges after a hearing. The procedures followed by the respondent at the hearing require us to annul the determination and to remit the charges to the Superintendent for further consideration at a new hearing. Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the hearing before the respondent and it followed an entirely informal course. In effect the Superintendent read the charges and asked the petitioner what he had to say about them. The petitioner’s superiors were then asked for their comments on the petitioner’s explanations as they were given, and the hearing became a general discussion between petitioner and his superior officers. None of the officers who discussed the matter before the respondent and on the basis of whose statements of fact petitioner -was removed from his position, was sworn. In this respect the hearing failed to meet the standards set up by *People ex rel. Kasschau*v. *Police Comrs. of City of N. Y.*(155 N. Y. 40) and by *Matter of Hecht*V. *Monaghan*(307 N. Y. 461). Although perhaps if the witnesses against the petitioner had been sworn and their testimony justified the discipline imposed, we would not annul the determination alone because of the informality of procedure, it is the preferred procedure in hearing such a charge to take the proof first in support of the charge and then hear respondent’s explanation of the *934charge. Determination annulled, with $25 costs and charges remanded to the respondent to conduct a new hearing. Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.