NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ELVIA ESTELA VELASQUEZ

MARTINEZ, Petitioner,
v. MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 19

- 72741 Agency No. A206

- 475

- 836
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted February 2, 2021 San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. D i ssent by Judge IKUTA Elv i a Estela Velasquez

- Martinez , a native and citizen of Honduras , applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The I mmigration Judge (IJ) denied relief , and the Board of Immigration Appeals ( BIA ) dismissed the appea l
. Velasquez

- Martinez now petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we grant

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED
MAR 18 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

the petition and remand for further consideration
. 1. Before the BIA, Velasquez

- Martinez asserted that she should be excused from the one

- year asylum filing deadline at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) as a class member in Mendez Rojas v. Wolf , No. 2:16

- cv - 01024 (W.D. Wash. filed June 30, 2016 )
. Though t he district court’s summary judgment order was stayed when the BIA issued a decision in Velasquez

- Martinez’s appeal, the defendants , including the Executive Office for Immigration Review, had agreed , pursuant to an interim stay agreement, “ to find all clas s members’ asylum applications were timely filed in pending adjudications before . . . the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . during the stay .” See Interim Stay Agreement , Mendez Rojas v. Wolf , No. 2:16

- cv - 01024 , at * 1 (W.D. Wash
. Aug. 2, 2018) , ECF 69

- 1
. 1 Because t he BIA failed to address Velasquez

- Martinez’s assertion of class membership , we remand for consideration of Velasquez

- Martinez’s claim. See Sagaydak v. Gonzales , 405

1 We disagree with the dissent’s view that Velasquez

- Martinez failed to exhaust her Mendez Rojas argument be fore the BIA. Exha u stion requires a legal claim to be sufficiently raised so as “to put the BIA on notice of what was being challenged.” Bare v. Barr , 975 F.3d 952, 96 0 (9th Cir. 2020). Velasquez

Martinez put the BIA on notice that she believed she warranted an exception to the one - year filing deadline under Mendez Rojas
. Because the BIA was on notice, it could not ignore her argument and was required to address it consistently with the binding stay agreement. See Sagaydak v. Gonzales , 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T] he BIA [is ] not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner
. ”).3

F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005 ). 2 2. Velasquez

- Martinez argues that the BIA erred in holding that her proffered particular social group , “fem ale victims of gender

- based violence , ” is impermissibly circular. 3 We review legal questions de novo
. Arrey v. Barr , 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). “[T] he concl usion that a proposed social group is impermissibly circular may not be reached summarily merely because the proposed group mentions harm.” Diaz

- Reynoso v. Barr , 968 F.3d 1070 , 1086 (9th Cir. 2020)
. Instead, the BIA must conduct a “rigorous analysis,” id. at 1079 (quoting Matter of A

- B

- , 27 I
. & N
. Dec. 316 , 340 ( A
. G
. 2018) ), and consider on a
case - by

- case basis “whether [the] group is cognizable if it is defined without reference to the fact of persecution ,” id. at 1080. The BIA’s analysis here suffers from the same flaw as the BIA decision in Diaz

- Reynoso . In one sentence and citing Matter of A

- B

- , the BIA summarily found Velasquez

- Martinez ’s proffered social group not cognizable because it “ does not ‘ exist independent ly ’ of the harm asserted.” Therefore, we remand so the BIA

2 We cannot rely, as the dissent would, “on a ground upon which [ the BIA ] did not rely.” Arrey v. Barr , 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Navas v. INS , 217 F.3 d 64 6 , 658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000).

3 The BIA described this particular social group as “female victims of violence,” but we use Velasquez

- Martinez’s formulation
. Under either formulation, the BIA erred when it failed to consider whether the group was cognizable without referen ce to the harm suffered. See Diaz

- Reynoso , 968 F.3d at 1080.4

can determine in the first instance whether Velasquez

- Martinez ’s proposed social group is cognizable without reference to the persecution. See id. at 1080, 1088. 3. Velasquez

- Martinez next argues that t he BIA erred when it alternatively concluded that she was not harmed on account of her membership in two particular social groups: “female victims of gender

- based violence” and “females in Honduras.” 4 We review factual findings, such as thos e underlying the denial of asylum, withholding, and relief under CAT, for substantial evidence. Arrey , 916 F.3d at 1157. As a threshold matter, and contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Velasquez

Martinez exhausted her nexus argument, including the argum ent that the harm she suffered while captive was on account of a protected ground. Though Velasquez

Martinez did not present an extensive nexus argument before the BIA , she did state that the IJ erred in finding that the persecution she suffered in Hondur as,

“ including being raped ,” was not on account of a protected ground. This put the BIA on notice of the argument that Velasquez

- Martinez was harmed while captive on account of her membership in a protected group. See Martinez v. Barr , 941 F.3d 907, 922 ( “[W]e do not employ the exhaustion doctrine in a formalistic manner, but rather inquire into whether the issue was before the BIA such that it

4 The BIA characterized this particular social group as “females,” but we use the IJ’s formulation
.5

had the opportunity to correct its error.” ) (quoting Figueroa v. Mukasey , 543 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2008))
. On the merits, t he BIA erred by fail ing to consider if the sexual violence Velasquez

- Martinez suffered while captive was on account of a protected ground
. See, e.g. , Barajas

- Romero v. Lynch , 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding nexus dete rmination in a withholding case where the petitioner was initially kidnapped and tortured for extortion, but “ [ t ] he torture became much worse after [he] voiced his anti

- corruption opinion”); cf. Parussimova v. Mukasey , 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ In this case, however, it is simply not clear whether [a protected ground] caused the assailants to initiate their attack or increase its severity once it had begun. ”) (emphasis added). Several pieces of evidence from the time while Velasquez

- Martinez was captive indicate that she was likely persecuted on account of her gender , a key component of both particular social groups
. First, the captors singled out Velasquez

- Martinez and the other female captive for specific form s of harm , including sexual vio lence, abuses that none of the captive men suffered. See, e.g. , Mengstu v. Holder , 560 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009), superseded in part by statute , REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109

– 13 div. B , 119 Stat. 30 2 , as6

recognized in Parussimova , 555 F.3d at 7 40
. 5 Second, o ther than gender, there is no identifiable difference between the captive women and men to account for the fact that the captors committed sexual violence against both women and none of the men. See Li v. Holder , 559 F.3d 1096 , 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (pre

- REAL ID application); Navas v. INS , 217 F.3d 646, 6 60

– 61 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre

- REAL ID application). Third, one of the captors us ed a gender

- based slur while raping Velasquez

- Martinez. See, e.g. , Sinha v. Holder , 564 F.3d 1015, 1021

– 22 (9th Cir. 2009) (pre

- REAL ID application). And f inally, the record document s pervasive violence against women in Honduras , which also supports a ne xus finding. See, e.g. , Ndom v. Ashcroft , 384 F.3d 743, 754

– 56 (9th Cir. 2004) (pre

- REAL ID application)
. Because the BIA failed to consider this “ highly probative [and] potentially dispositive ” evidence, we remand for consideration of whether Velasquez

- Martinez was persecuted while captive on account of her membership in one of the asserted particular social group s . See Cole v. Holder , 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011)
. 4. Finally, Velasquez

- Martinez contests the BIA’s finding that she did not establish that the government was more likely than not to acquiesce in her

5 Though the REAL ID Act, which governs this case, imposed a “more onerous” nexus standard, s ee Parussimova , 555 F.3d at 740 , pre - REAL ID caselaw remains instructive to the extent it shows what evidence is relevant to a persecutor’s motive.7

torture as necessary to qualify for CAT protection. While the Honduran government’s inability to prevent violence against women is not s ufficient to constitute acquiescence, see Garcia

- Milian v. Holder , 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014), the BIA nevertheless erred when it failed to give reasoned consideration to other record evidence , including an expert declaration that indicates the Ho nduran government is not just ineffective at prevent ing this violence but is also complicit in and turns a blind eye to it. For example, the report notes that “police themselves have committed violent and degrading acts against women” and that “Honduran p olice ignore threats made against women
. ” We therefore remand for the BIA to consider Velasquez

- Martinez’s CAT claim in light of this evidence. See Cole , 659 F.3d at 772

– 73 (holding that the BIA “did not evidence reasoned consideration” of the evidence where it failed to address expert testimony). PETITION GRANTED.Ve lasque

z-Martine z v . Garland

, No. 19-72741 IKUTA, C irc uit Judge , disse nting: Ve la sque z -M a rtine z m isse d the sta tutory de a d line for a

pply ing for a s y lum
. And the B IA’ s de te rm ina tion tha t Ve l a sque z -M a rtine z fa ile d to e sta blish tha t she
wa s pe rse c ute d on a c c ount of he r m e m be rship in a

pa rtic ula r soc i a l group (“ fe m a le vic t im s of viole nc e ” ) is le ga lly c orre c t a n d supporte d by

substa n tia l e vide nc e . The
m a jority ba se s its c onc lusion to the c ontra ry on a rgum e nts tha

t a re une xha uste d or
m e ritle s s. The re fore I disse nt. 1 Ve la sque z -M a rtine z wa s thre e y e a rs la te in filing he r a sy l um a pplic a tion. As
re quire d by

sta tute , 8 U.S.C . § 1158(a )(1), the IJ de nie d he r a sy lum a pplic a t ion. At the tim e of the IJ’ s de c ision on Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s a sy lum a pplic a tion,
a c la ss a c tion wa s pe nding in a W a shington distric t

c o urt. Me nde

z Rojas v

. J ohnson , No. 2: 16-c v -0 1024-R SM (W .D. W a s h.). The pla intiffs— c la sse s of
a sy lum se e ke rs who ha d be e n or would be de ta i ne d by

the gove rnm e nt but we re not give n notic e of the one -y e a r de a dline for filing the ir a sy lum
a pplic a tion— c la im e d tha

t the gove rnm e nt wa s le ga lly re quire d to give the m

notic e of the one y e a r de a dline . Ac c ording to the se a lie n s, the gove rnm e nt’ s fa ilure to do so viola te d the ir c onstitutiona

l rights. Som e tim e a fte r the IJ de nie d Ve la s que z -M a rtine z ’ s a sy lum c la i m on 

# FIL ED
MAR 18 2021 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F A PPEALStim e line ss grounds, the distric t c ourt in Me nde

z Rojas he ld tha

t the gove rnm e nt ha d to provide the pla intiffs notic e of the one -y e a r de a dline . Orde r Gra nting M otion for Sum m a ry Judgm e nt, Me nde

z Rojas , EC F No. 64 (M a rc h 29, 2018). The distric t c o urt a lso orde re d the gove rnm e nt “ to a c c e pt a s tim e ly file d a ny a sy lum
a pplic a tion from

a c la ss m e m

b e r” e ve n if it wa s file d a fte r the one -y e a r de a d line , id. a t 17, e ve n though suc h a n orde r is c ontra

ry to the sta tutory re quire m e nt tha

t a n
a lie n m a y a pply for a sy lum

only if the a lie n “ de m onstra

te s by c l e a r a nd c onvinc ing
e vide nc e tha

t the [a s y lum ] a

pplic a tion ha s be e n file d within 1 y e a r a fte r the da te of the a lie n’ s a

rriva l in the Unite d Sta t e s,” 8 U.S.C . § 1158(a )(2)(B ). W hile a n a ppe a l of this ruling wa s pe nding be fore a pa ne l of this c ourt, howe ve r, the pa rtie s a gre e d to sta y the proc e e dings for se ttle m e nt disc ussions a nd a gre e d tha

t c la ss m e m

be rs’ la te -file d a sy lum

a pplic a t ions would be

de e m e d tim e ly

during the sta

y . The distric t c o urt gra

n te d the pa

rtie s ’ joint sta

y m otion. Orde r Gra nting Joint Stipula te d M o t ion to Sta

y Proc e e dings, Me n de

z Rojas , EC F No. 70 (Aug. 2, 2018). Afte r this sta

y took e ffe c t, Ve la sque z -M a rtine z file d a

n a ppe a l brie f to the B IA, re fe re nc ing the now-sta y e d litiga tion. Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s e ntire a rgum e n t on the e ffe c t of this litiga

tion on he r a

ppe a l is c onta ine d in a single se nte nc e :

“ R e sponde nt c o n te nds tha t pursua nt to Me nde

z -Rojas v . J

ohnson , No. 2: 16-c v-0 1024-R SM (W .D. W a sh), the one -y e a r filing de a dline doe s not a pply to he r a nd
2tha t

she qua lifie s for a sy lum .” Ve la sque z -M a rtine z did not distinc tly a rgue tha t she qua lifie d a s a

m e m be r of a ny

of the c la sse s of a lie ns re fe re nc e d in the sta y e d Me n de z-Rojas sum

m a ry judgm e nt orde r. Nor doe s the re c ord c onta i n suffic ie nt
e vide nc e to e sta

blish tha t Ve la sque z -M a

rtine z wa s suc h a

m e m be r, a nd the B IA is pre c lude d from

fa c tfinding. 8 C .F.R . § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (Se pt. 26, 2019). The re fore , the B IA did not e rr in c onc luding tha t Ve la sque z -M a

rtine z wa s not
e ntitle d to a sy lum re lie f. M ore ove r, Ve la sque z -M a rtine z fa ile d to ra ise the ne w a rgum e nt de v e lope d by the m a jority tha t the B IA should ha

ve ta ke n judic i a l notic e of the gove rnm e nt’ s
a gre e m e nt to tre a t c la ss m e m b e rs’ la te a sy l um

a pplic a tions a s tim e ly

during a n inte rim sta y pe riod. C ontra

ry to the m a jority , M a jority a t 2, n.1, Ve la sque z M a rtine z fa ile d to give the B IA a ny notic e of the e xiste n c e of the Inte rim Sta y Agre e m e nt signe d by

the gove rnm e nt pe n ding furthe r litiga tion in M e nde z Rojas
. Suc h a n a rgum e nt, the re fore , is une xha uste d. 1 In holding othe

rwise , the m a

jority le a ps ove r a ll le ga l a

nd fa c tua l insuffic ie nc ie s to a fford Ve la sque z -M a rtine z a
c ha nc e a t re lie f not a llowe d by sta tute
. 2

1 Ve la sque z -M a rtine z did not a sk the B IA to re m a nd or m ove to re o p e n be fore the IJ to re solve he r c la ss m e m be rship c la im
. 3I a lso disa gre e with the m a jority ’ s c o n c lusory

de te rm ina tion tha

t the B IA
e rre d in re je c ting he r c la im

tha t she wa s a

m e m be r of a “ pa rtic u la r soc ia l group,” for purpose s of 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a )(42), whic h she de fine d to the B IA a s “ fe m a le vic t im s of viole nc e .” 2 An a pplic a nt for re lie f from

re m ova l m

ust e sta blish tha t the c la im e d pa rtic u la r soc ia l group is “ (1) c om pose d of m e m

be rs who sha

re a c om m on im m uta ble c ha ra c te ristic , (2) de fine d with pa rtic ula rity , a nd (3) soc ia lly

distinc t within thesoc ie t

y in que stion.” Re

y e s v . Ly nc h , 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th C ir. 2016) (quoting Matte r of M–E–V–G– , 26 I. & N. De c . 227, 237 (B IA 2014)).

“ [T] he foc u s of the pa

rtic ula rity re quire m e nt is whe the r the group is disc re t e ,” id. (c ita tion om itte d), m e a ning tha t it ha s “ c le a r bounda

rie s a nd tha t its c ha ra c te ristic s ha ve c o m m only a c c e pte d de finitions,” id. a t 1135. The B IA m

ust ta ke a n individua liz e d

a pproa c h to de te rm ining whe the r a n a lie n is a m e m be r of a pa rtic u la r soc ia l group. Id. W hile we re c e ntly

re c ogniz e d tha

t the m e re “ m e ntion of fe a re d pe rse c ution” doe s not c a te g oric a lly

disqua l ify

a n “ othe rwise c ogniz a

ble soc ia l group,”

2 C ontra ry to the m a jority ’ s c la im , the B IA de s c ribe d the pa rtic ula r soc ia l group a s “ fe m a le vic tim s of viole nc e ” be c a u se tha t wa s how Ve la sque z -M a rtine z form ula t e d it to the B IA. The m a jority ’ s re fe re nc e to te stim ony be fore the IJ is irre le va nt. 4Diaz-Re

y noso v . Barr , 968 F.3d 1070, 1084–85 (9th C ir. 2020), the B IA did not
m a ke this e rror he re . R a the r, the B IA he ld tha t Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s c la im e d pa rtic u la r soc ia l group of “ fe m a le vic tim s of viole n c e ,” wa s not c ogniz a ble be c a use it doe s not “ e xist inde

pe nde n tly of the ha rm a sse rte d.” W ithout re fe re n c e to

“ viole nc e ,” the propose d group c onsists of fe m a le s, whic h is too a m orphous a

nd ge ne ra l to m e e t the pa

rtic ula rity re quire m e nt. This is c onsiste nt with DiazRe y noso , whic h he ld tha

t “ a pa rtic ula r soc ia l group m

u st e xist inde

p e nde n tly of the ha rm a sse rte d,” id. a t 1080. In re je c ting the B IA’ s c onc lusion, it is the m a jority tha t fa i le d to c o nduc t a

rigorous a

na ly sis. 3 The m a jority a lso e rrs in c onc luding tha t “ the Age nc y

e rre d by fa iling to
c onside r if the se xua l viole nc e Ve la sque z -M a rtine z suffe re d w hile c aptiv e wa s on
a c c ount of” he r m e m

b e rship in a

pa rtic ula r soc ia l group. The m a

jority ba s e s this ruling on its own inve

ntive a rgum e nt tha

t be c a use the m a le kidna

ppe rs ra pe d the
wom e n a n d be a t the m e n, the wom e n we re pe rse c ute d on a c c ount of the ir
m e m b e rship in a

pa rtic ula r soc ia l group. Although this a rgum e nt is ba se le ss, we la c k jurisdic tion to a ddre ss it in a ny e v e n t, be c a

use Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s brie f to the B IA doe s not ra ise the nove l a rgum e nt tha

t a fte r kidna

pping Ve la sque z M a rtine z a nd he r m a l e frie nds, the kidna ppe rs we re m otiva

te d to pe rse c u te he r on
5a c c ount of he r m e m be rship in a

pa rtic ula r soc ia l group of fe m a le vic tim s of viole nc e . The re fore it is not e xha uste d. Se e Barron v . Ashc roft , 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th C ir. 2004) (no subje c t -m a tte r jurisdic t ion ove r le ga l c la im s not pre se nte d in
a dm inistra

tive proc e e dings be low). 4 Fina lly , the B IA did not e rr in re j e c ting Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s C AT c la im
. B a se d on the e vide nc e in the re c ord, substa ntia l e vide n c e supports the B IA’ s de te rm i na tion tha

t the IJ did not e rr in “ c onc l uding tha t [Ve la s que z -M a rtine z ] ha d not m e t he r burde n of proof for prote c tion unde r the C onve ntion Aga inst Torture .” The m a jority c hoose s to foc u s on a

n e x pe rt re port not disc u sse d by Ve la sque z M a rtine z , but tha

t re port foc use s prim a

rily on a rgum e nts tha

t the gove rnm e nt ha s fa ile d to do e nough to prote c t wom e n, a

nd doe s not c om

pe l the finding tha

t the kidna p pe rs’ viole nc e a g a inst pe titione r wa s c a rrie d out “ with the c onse nt or
a c quie sc e nc e of a public offic ia l a c ting in a n offic ia l c a

pa c ity
. ” 8 C .F.R . § 208.18; Garc ia-Milian v . Holde r , 755 F.3d 1026, 1033–35 (9th C ir. 2014). Furthe r, be c a use Ve la sque z -M a rtine z ’ s sole a rgum e nt to the B IA on this point wa s tha t she ha d “ provide d substa

n t ia l e vide nc e of the Hondura n gove rnm e nt’ s ina

bility to prote c t fe m a le vic t i m s of pe rse c ution,” the B IA did not e rr in a ddre ssing this
a rgum e nt; this doe s not sugge st, a s the m a jority c la i m s, tha

t the B IA fa ile d to give
6re a s one d c onside ra tion to othe r re c ord e vide nc e . Se e Larita-Martine z v . IN S , 220 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 (9th C i r. 2000) (holding tha t we pre sum e tha

t the B IA
c onside re d a ll re le va

nt e v i de nc e ). Inste a d of c re a ting a

rgum e nts for pe titione rs, we should ba se our
c onc lusions on the

a rgum e nts tha

t we re be fore the B IA. I the re fore re spe c tfully disse nt.

7