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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 v. 

RONALD MITCHELL 

 

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 12 CR 150 

 Judge Virginia M. Kendall 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Defendant Ronald Mitchell moves to withdraw his plea of guilty. Mitchell pled guilty to 

possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and possession 

of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Mitchell claims that he felt pressured 

to plead guilty, that he did not have sufficient time to review his plea agreement, and that he did 

not have sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney. The Government opposes 

Mitchell’s motion. Mitchell did not file a reply to the Government’s opposition. For the reasons 

stated herein, this Court denies Mitchell’s motion. 

FACTS 

On March 7, 2012, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Mitchell 

charging him with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or 

more of mixtures of a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin and with being a felon 

who knowingly possessed an Armscor model 1911A1-CS PS .45 caliber pistol. (Dkt. No. 2.) 

Mitchell appeared before this Court on April 4, 2012, and entered a plea of not guilty as to all 

counts. (Dkt. No. 6.) Steven Greenberg entered an appearance on Mitchell’s behalf on April 9, 

2012. (Dkt. No. 11.) 
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On October 23, 2012, Mitchell filed a motion to remain on bail or alternatively to 

continue the trial date and set a change of plea. (Dkt. No. 21.) In that motion, Mitchell indicated 

that he intended to plead guilty and sought to remain on bond until sentencing. (Id.) Mitchell 

withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty on February 7, 2013. 

Before accepting Mitchell’s plea of guilty, this Court held a change of plea hearing 

during which this Court determined that Mitchell’s plea was voluntary and did not result from 

force, threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement. (See Dkt. No. 48, Hr’g Tr. 12:14-

15 (Feb. 7, 2013).) After placing Mitchell under oath, this Court determined that he was 

competent to enter a plea of guilty based on his answers to a series of questions asked by this 

Court. (Id. at 5:25-6:3.) Specifically, this Court asked Mitchell about his educational background 

(id. at 3:10-13), whether he had ever been treated for a mental health condition (id. at 4:6-8), 

whether he had ever been treated for substance abuse (id. at 4:9-21), and whether he had any 

alcohol or drugs in the twenty-four hours prior to his change of plea hearing (id. at 4:22-5:2). 

Neither Mitchell’s lawyer nor the Government identified any reason to question Mitchell’s 

competency. (Id. at 5:7-11.) 

After finding Mitchell competent to plead guilty, this Court advised Mitchell on the 

maximum sentence he faced, his rights, his waiver of his rights, and the effects of his waiver of 

his rights. Specifically, this Court explained that Mitchell faced a total potential sentence of fifty 

years in prison, a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison, and an advisory 

sentencing guideline range of 168 months to 210 months in prison. (Id. at 6:6-19, 8:4-7.) This 

Court also explained that Mitchell had a right to a speedy trial by a jury, that the government 

would have to prove Mitchell’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his lawyer could crossexamine any witnesses presented by the Government. (Id. at 9:14-10:8.) This Court further 
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explained that Mitchell could testify at trial if he chose to do so, and that no one could infer guilt 

should he choose not to testify at trial. (Id. at 10:9-12.) After explaining his rights, this Court 

explained that Mitchell would waive those rights, as well as his appellate rights except for 

involuntariness or effective assistance of counsel, by entering a plea of guilty. (Id. at 10:21-12:9.) 

When asked, Mitchell stated that no one forced him to enter his plea of guilty. (Id. at 12:14-15.) 

Mitchell also confirmed that he reviewed his plea agreement with his lawyer. (Id. at 3:14-

21.) Mitchell further confirmed that he asked his lawyer questions about his plea agreement and 

that his lawyer answered his questions. (Id. at 3:22-25.) The plea agreement itself contains many 

of the admonishments this Court gave Mitchell during his plea hearing. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty after a court accepts the plea but before the 

court imposes a sentence if a defendant can show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant’s 

right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing is not absolute. Id. at 606-07. One instance in which 

a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty is where the defendant did not enter the plea 

voluntarily and knowingly. Id.

To ensure that a defendant enters his plea voluntarily and knowingly, a court must 

address the defendant personally in open court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. 

Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 2003). During this exchange, known as a Rule 11 or plea 

colloquy, a court informs a defendant who intends to enter a plea of guilty of various rights 

outlined in Rule 11 to ensure that the defendant understands his rights. Id. But Rule 11 does not 

require rigid adherence. Id. Rather, the validity of a plea colloquy depends on whether the 

defendant understood the charge against him and whether the court informed the defendant of his 
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rights. Id. at 688-89; see also United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1254 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Factors such as the complexity of the charge, the defendant’s level of intelligence, age, 

education, and whether counsel represented the defendant influence the determination as to the 

validity of a Rule 11 colloquy. Blalock, 55 F.3d at 689. 

Substantial compliance with Rule 11 is all that is necessary to ensure that a defendant 

enters his plea voluntarily and knowingly. See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 

(2013); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). Any variance from the 

requirements of Rule 11 is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(h). Whether an error is harmless in the context of Rule 11 depends on “whether the 

defendant’s knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been 

likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty.” United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 618 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

 The record shows that Mitchell entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly. This Court 

determined as much after having conducted an extensive colloquy with Mitchell to ensure that he 

understood the charges against him, his rights, and the effects of his guilty plea on his rights. 

During its colloquy with Mitchell, this Court observed Mitchell’s demeanor as he responded to 

this Court’s inquiries. See United States v. Seavoy, 995 F.2d 1414, 1421 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The 

only rational manner in which a judge may determine whether a plea is knowingly and 

voluntarily made, is to observe the defendant's demeanor and responses to the court's questions 

and to rely on the defendant's sworn answers.”). His demeanor and responses indicated that he 

was competent to plead guilty. Mitchell does not challenge the sufficiency of this Court’s 

colloquy. 
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Rather, Mitchell claims that he did not have sufficient time to review his plea agreement 

and discuss its ramifications with his lawyer. Specifically, Mitchell claims that he did not 

understand that he agreed to having possessed with the intent to distribute approximately nine 

kilograms of cocaine for purposes of computing his sentence under the advisory sentencing 

guidelines. Mitchell also claims that he felt pressured to plead guilty because he believed that he 

would otherwise have to go to trial on the date set by this Court. Mitchell further claims that he 

did not understand that he would waive his right to appeal any sentence imposed by this Court or 

any claims he may have under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Each of Mitchell’s claims is without merit. 

During its colloquy with Mitchell, this Court explained that it must consider the advisory 

sentencing guidelines when determining Mitchell’s sentence. (See Dkt. No. 48, Hr’g Tr. 6:23-7:1 

(Feb. 7, 2013).) This Court then explained how it would use the advisory sentencing guidelines 

to determine the advisory sentence range. (Id. at 7:2-9.) This Court explained that Mitchell 

would be held responsible for at least three kilograms but less than ten kilograms of heroin (id. at 

7:5-9), which is exactly what the plea agreement sets forth (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 9.b.i.). There is no 

mention of cocaine in the plea agreement. And the only mention of cocaine during the plea 

colloquy happened when this Court misspoke—which this Court promptly corrected. (See Dkt. 

No. 48, Hr’g Tr. 7:5-9 (Feb. 7, 2013) (“And that’s because the amount of cocaine that you are – 

heroin, excuse me, that you are being held responsible for is at least 3 kilograms but less than 10 

kilograms.”).) Thus, Mitchell’s claim that he did not understand that he agreed to having 

possessed with the intent to distribute approximately nine kilograms of cocaine for purposes of 

computing his sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines fails because he did not do so. 

Moreover, any claim that he did not understand that he agreed to having possessed with the 

intent to distribute approximately nine kilograms of heroin for purposes of computing his 
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sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines fails because this Court and the plea 

agreement explicitly explained it to Mitchell. 

This Court also explained to Mitchell that he had a right to a speedy trial and a trial by a 

jury of his peers. (See Dkt. No. 48, Hr’g Tr. 9:14-24 (Feb. 7, 2013).) At no time did Mitchell or 

his counsel express any concern as to the timing of the trial or ask for a new trial date. Rather, 

Mitchell stated under oath that he understood that he would waive his trial rights by entering a 

plea of guilty. (Id. at 10:21-23.) The same is true for Mitchell’s appellate rights. This Court 

explained that Mitchell waived his appellate and collateral rights in exchange for the 

government’s dismissal of a sentencing enhancement Mitchell would otherwise face. (Id. at 

10:25-12:9.) This Court’s admonishment in open court repeated to Mitchell what his plea 

agreement contained with respect to his waiver of his trial, appellate, and collateral rights. (See 

Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 19.) For these reasons, Mitchell’s claims regarding the timing of his trial and his 

waiver of his appellate and collateral rights are without merit. 

Tellingly, the record shows that Mitchell did not enter his plea in haste. See United States 

v. McFarland, 839 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea 

of guilty where defendant did not act in haste and was not confused about the plea). Mitchell 

filed a motion on October 23, 2012, indicating his intent to plead guilty. (Dkt. No. 21.) This was 

more than three months before Mitchell appeared before this Court to enter his plea of guilty. 

This afforded Mitchell ample time to discuss whether to plead guilty with his counsel. During his 

plea colloquy, Mitchell acknowledged that he discussed his plea agreement with his lawyer and 

that he was satisfied with is lawyer’s representation. (See Dkt. No. 48, Hr’g Tr. 3:14-4:5 (Feb. 7, 

2013).) Mitchell also acknowledged that no one forced him to enter his plea of guilty. (Id. at 

12:14-15.) “Because the defendant’s statements at the plea colloquy are presumed to be true, the 
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defendant bears a heavy burden of persuasion in showing that such a fair and just reason exists.” 

United States v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Mitchell has not met that heavy burden. At the time of his plea, Mitchell understood the 

nature of the charges against him and even negotiated to have the government dismiss the notice 

of prior conviction related to the defendant filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851 prior to sentencing. (See 

Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 13.) His responses and demeanor during his plea colloquy reflected a voluntary 

plea and knowing waiver of his trial, appellate, and collateral rights. Mitchell has not presented 

any evidence that supports his claims or that otherwise put his sworn statements to this Court 

during his plea colloquy at issue. Consequently, there is no fair and just reason to allow Mitchell 

to withdraw his plea of guilty. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, this Court denies Mitchell’s motion to withdraw his plea of 

guilty. 

 

 ________________________________________ 

Virginia M. Kendall 

 United States District Court Judge 

Northern District of Illinois 

Date: 12/27/13