UNITED STATES DISTzuCT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRICK B. TARTT,

Defendant.

Case No. l2-cv-1416

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole ("the Report") recommending this Court grant summary judgment

in favor of Plaintiff, the United States of America ("the Government"). Defendant Denick B.

Tartt, proceeding pro se, filed an Objection to the Report and also was granted leave to file a

Supplemental Response. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Report and grants the

Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

On February 28,2012,the Govemment fiIed its two-count Complaint against Tartt,

alleging he had defaulted ontwo Department of Education student loans and seeking to recoverthe

balance owed of more than $775,000. By local internal operating procedure, student loan cases

are automatically assigned to a magistrate judge, see IOP 1l(f), and the matter was assigned to

Magistrate Judge Cole. The Government subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the

matter was fully briefed.

On May 16,2013,by a nine-page Memorandum Opinion and Order, Magistrate Judge

Cole entered summary judgment in favor of the Government and dismissed Tartt's "conspiracy"
counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 22,May 16,2013 Order.)

Magistrate Judge Cole cited to the evidence in the record, which included the copies of two

promissory notes signed by Tartt and two corresponding certificates of indebtedness from the

Department of Education. (Id. at3-5.) Although Tartt disputed a few of the Government's facts,

Tartt did "not cite[] a single piece of evidence to support his contentions" and did "not submit[]

any evidence to the court that in any way casts doubts on his indebtedness and failure to pay." (Id.

at 3, 5.) Therefore, Tartt failed to rebut the Government's primafacie case that he was in default

of the student loans at issue. (Id. at 5.)

Magistrate Judge Cole also dismissed Tartt's counterclaim for $50 to $100 million against

the United States, noting the claim "ha[d] nothing to do with [Tartt's] default on his student loan."

(Id. at 6.) Rather, Tartt's counterclaim concerned a previous lawsuit filed by Tartt against his

former employers, which was eventually dismissed and then affirmed on appeal over six years

ago. See Tartt v. Northwest Community Hosp.,No. 00 C 7960,2004 WL 2254041(N.D. Il1.

Oct. 5, 2OO4) (Norgle, J.); Tartt v. Northwest Comm. Hosp.,453 F.3d 817 , 823 (7th Cir. 2006).r

Magistrate Judge Cole noted that Tartt's claim of a conspiracy, which involved the United States,

BMO Harris Bank, and a plan to torture him, deny him employment, and take away his liberty, was

"implausible on its face." (See Dkt. No. 22, May 16,2013 Order at7-8.) Ultimately,

Magistrate Judge Cole dismissed the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because

claims against the United States exceeding $10,000 must be brought in the United States Court of

1 This was not Tartt's first federal lawsuit. In 1978, while in college, Tartt enrolled in the Army

ROTC pro$am and committedto serve six years inthe Army, includingthree years of active duty.

He sought and received delays in his active duty obligation while he attended medical school and

thereafter. When the Army ordered him to active duty in 1993, he challenged that order with a

petition for habeas corpus, which was ultimately denied. See Tartt v. Secretary of the Army,

No. 93 C 4550,1994WL75121, *1 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 9,1994).
Claims, and Tartt's demands vastly exceeded that amount. (Id. atS.)

Final judgment was entered in favor of the Government on June 3,2013. Tartt then filed

an Objection and questioned Magistrate Judge Cole's jurisdiction since the parties had not

consented. On June 6,20l3,Magistrate Judge Cole agreed, vacated the judgment, and altered the

Memorandum Opinion and Order to be a Report and Recommendation instead.

The matter was subsequently assigned to this Court for ruling on the Report, and an initial

status was set for September 10, 2013. A decision on the merits was delayed after Tartt frled

several motions seeking to add non-parties as plaintiffs and to assert counterclaims against them,

including a request to add BMO Harris Bank as a plaintiff so that he could file an injunction

against them regarding an unrelated foreclosure. The Court denied Tartt's motions and

subsequently ordered that Tarlt seek permission from the Court before filing future motions.2

Tartt was granted leave to file a Supplemental Response in support of his Objection, which he filed

on January 6,2014. The Government declined to file a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, aparty that disagrees with a

magistrate judge's report and recommendations on a dispositive motion must file "specific, written

objections" to the report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Johnsonv. Zema Sys. Corp.,170 F.3d

734,739 (7thCir. 1999). The district court then reviews de novo only those portions of the report

to which the specific written objection is made. Id. The Seventh Circuit has interpreted

o'specific" 

as used in Rule 72(b) to require aparty "only to specify each issue for which review is

' Aft"t his motions to add plaintiffs and assert counterclaims against them were denied, Tartt filed

a new lawsuit naming approximately fifty defendants, including Judges Charles Norgle,

Richard Posner and Kenneth Ripple, as well as various federal and state gor.*-.rt ugencies,

doctors, medical associations and BMO Harris Bank. See Tartt v. Magia Health,Syr., No.

13-cv-8191 . 

n
sought." Johnson,lT0 F.3d at74l. Where no objection or only a partial objection is made, the

district court "reviews those unobjected portions for clear error." Id. at739 (intemal citations

omitted). The district court may accept, reject or modiff, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the

evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 ,323-24 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving

party cannot rest on conclusory pleadings but, rather, o'must present sufficient evidence to show

the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden attrial." Serfecz v.

Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591,596 (7thCir.1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1936). In considering a motion for summary

judgment, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing

all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Abdullahi v. City of Madison,423 F.3d

763,773 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson,477 U.S. at255).

ANALYSIS

In both his fourteen-page Objection and his six-page Supplemental Response, Tartt makes

very few objections to the Report's finding that he defaulted on the two student loans at issue.3

3 Tartt has arguably violated Rule 72(b) by failing to specify the issues for which he seeks review.

SeeJohnson,l70F.3dat74l. However,givenTafit'sprosestatus,theCourthasgivenavery

liberal reading to his Objection and Supplemental Response as an objection to Magistrate Judge

Cole's entire Report.

4
He states that he "agrees that there is indebtedness but does not agree to owing $775,000 or more"

and that he "never stated the loans were secured at Fort Knox (Radcliff[,] KY) but after. The

Plaintiff stated the loans were secured in 1995[,] at which time Defendant was stationed at Fort

Knox." (Obj. at2.)a The rest of his Objection focuses on the dismissal of his counterclaim and

the related failure of his previous lawsuit. Likewise, in his Supplemental Response, Tartt largely

focuses on the alleged misconduct of Judge Norgle in dismissing his previous lawsuit and also

argues that an adverse ruling in the present action would negatively impact Tartt's newly filed

lawsuit, Tartt v. Magna Health Systems,No. 13-cv-8191, in which he has sued Judge Norgle and

approximately fifty other defendants. (See supra, footnote 2.)

The Court has reviewed the evidence in the record and finds that summary judgment in the

Govemment's favor is warranted. Specifically, the Govemment submitted two promissory notes

in favor of the United States Department of Education: the first executed by Tartt on

July 23, 1997, inthe original amount of $325,125.56 (Count I), and the second executed by Tartt

on April 30,1999, in the original amount of $45,863.61 (Count II). (Gov't's Rule 56.1 Statement

of Material Facts, tTfl 6-11, Exhs. A-D.) The Govemment also submitted corresponding

certificates of indebtedness for the two loans. This was suffrcient to establish the Government,s

primafacie case of default. See, e.g., tlS. v. PetroYy1ine,557 F.3d 285, 290 (6thCir. 2009).

As Magistrate Judge Cole correctly noted, Tartt did not submit any evidence that would dispute

a As Magistrate Judge Cole noted, the Government conceded that it made an error in its Rule 56.1

Statement because it mistakenly referred to the note in Count II as executed in 1995 instead of

1999. The corresponding Certificate of Indebtedness, however, correctly states that the note was

executed in 1999. In his Rule 56 Response, Tartt caught the Government's error and stated that

he signed the promissory note in1999,not 1995. Tartt further stated that he was on active duty in

1995 in Radcliff KY, an argument that he repeated in his Objection. However, since Tartt

admiued that he did sign the promissory note in l999,his whereabouts in 1995 do not change his

liability on the 1999 note.

5
that he is in default of the two student loans at issue.

Likewise, dismissal of Tartt's counterclaim is warranted. Even if Tartt could state a claim

against the United States, this Court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over it because

Tartt seeks damages in excess of $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. $ 13a6(a)(2) (district courts have

original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims over civil actions

against the United States oonot exceeding $10,000 in amount"); see also On-Site Screening, Inc. v.

U.5.,687 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir.2012). Therefore, Tartt's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of

subj ect-matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole. Summary judgment is granted in favor of PlaintiffUnited States

of America and against Defendant Derrick B. Tartt. Tartt's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff shall provide a final calculation of the amount due on the

two loans so that final judgment may be entered.

Date: April16.2014

States District Court Judge