Slip Op. 23-60

UNITED STATES 

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Court No. 20-00109 

DALIAN MEISEN WOODWORKING CO, LTD., 

Plaintiff, 

and 

CABINETS TO GO, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Intervenor, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant, 

and 

AMERICAN KITCHEN CABINET ALLIANCE, 

Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge 

OPINION 

[The court denies the motions for judgment on the 

agency record filed by Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor, grants judgment on the agency record to Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor, and sustains the Department of Commerce’s remand results.] 

Dated: April 24, 2023 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 2 

Jeffrey S. Neeley and Stephen W. Brophy, Husch Blackwell, LLP, of Washington, DC, on the papers for Plaintiff. 

Mark Ludwikowski, R. Kevin Williams, and William 

Sjoberg, Clark Hill, PLC, of Washington, DC, on the 

papers for Plaintiff-Intervenor. 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; Tara K. 

Hogan, Assistant Director; and Ioana Cristei, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice of Washington, DC, on the 

papers for Defendant. Of counsel for Defendant was W. 

Mitch Purdy, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel for 

Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of 

Commerce of Washington, DC. 

Luke A. Meisner, Schagrin Associates of Washington, 

DC, on the papers for Defendant-Intervenor. 

Baker, Judge: In this antidumping case, the court 

sustains the Department of Commerce’s application of 

total facts otherwise available with an adverse inference as to a Chinese producer of wooden cabinets and 

vanities. 

I 

This is the sequel to Dalian Meisen Woodworking 

Co. v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (CIT 2021), 

where Commerce punished Plaintiff and antidumping 

investigation respondent Dalian Meisen for false 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 3 

advertising by imposing the steepest possible antidumping rate, 262.18 percent. Holding that “the Department lacks jurisdiction to police false advertising 

violations,” id. at 1368, the court granted judgment on 

the agency record to Meisen and its supporting Plaintiff-Intervenor, Cabinets to Go. The accompanying remand instructions directed Commerce to 

reconsider its application of facts otherwise 

available with an adverse inference, including 

whether and to what extent it will use Plaintiff’s 

submitted information in its antidumping calculations. Insofar as Commerce chooses to use 

Plaintiff’s information, it must then undertake 

verification. Insofar as the Department recalculates Plaintiff’s antidumping rate, it must also 

recalculate the rate for Plaintiff-Intervenor’s 

suppliers accordingly. 

ECF 72, at 1–2.1

II 

On remand, Commerce “re-examined” Meisen’s 

original responses and “issued four supplemental 

questionnaires to Meisen identifying deficiencies in, 

and requesting clarification regarding, its previous 

1 “[T]he rate for Plaintiff-Intervenor’s suppliers” refers to 

the statutory mechanism for calculating antidumping margins for successful separate-rate applicants in non-market 

economy proceedings. See Dalian Meisen, 571 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1374–75 & n.7. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 4 

responses.” ECF 80-1, at 6. The Department then verified the company’s new responses by issuing another 

questionnaire, which requested “documentation to 

support Meisen’s record submissions.” Id. at 6–7.2

In reviewing the company’s responses, Commerce 

concluded that Meisen may have failed to disclose U.S. 

affiliates in Florida and New York. The Department 

then placed “new factual information” on the record 

and allowed the parties to comment. Id. at 7. 

After receiving the parties’ comments, Commerce 

issued a thorough 147-page remand determination reaffirming the imposition of the 262.18 percent antidumping duty. See ECF 79-1 (confidential), ECF 80-1 

(public). The Department again applied total facts otherwise available with an adverse inference (total 

AFA),3 but for reasons unrelated to false advertising. 

The Department found that Meisen’s reported information could not be verified and was so unreliable 

that it could not be used to calculate a dumping margin. ECF 80-1, at 7. Commerce further found that 

Meisen failed to provide “critical information” in its response to the verification questionnaire—including 

source documentation the Department expressly 

2 Normally, Commerce conducts verification on site in the 

exporting country. In this case, pandemic travel restrictions required verification via written questionnaire. 

3 For background on AFA, see Dalian Meisen, 571 F. Supp. 

3d at 1370–71. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 5 

requested—and that the submission also revealed 

“significant, and pervasive, problems throughout 

Meisen’s reported data, including the fact that 

Meisen’s U.S. sales database contains many errors.” 

Id. at 7–8. The Department also found that Meisen 

had failed to disclose all of its U.S. affiliates. Id. at 8. 

Based on these findings, Commerce concluded that 

Meisen withheld requested information, significantly 

impeded the proceeding, and reported data that could 

not be verified, thus requiring use of facts otherwise 

available under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A), (C), and 

(D). Id. The Department also determined that 

Meisen’s failure to cooperate to the best of its ability 

warranted application of an adverse inference under 

§ 1677e(b). Id.

III 

The court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). 

In 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) actions such as this, 

“[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, 

finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by 

substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 

That is, the question is not whether the court would 

have reached the same decision on the same record—

rather, it is whether the administrative record, taken 

as a whole, permits Commerce’s conclusion. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 6 

Substantial evidence has been defined as more 

than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion. To determine if substantial evidence exists, we review the record as a 

whole, including evidence that supports as well 

as evidence that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence. 

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 

In addition, Commerce’s exercise of discretion in 

§ 1516a(a)(2) cases is subject to the default standard 

of the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes 

a reviewing court to “set aside agency action, findings, 

and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Solar World Americas, Inc. v. United States, 962 F.3d 1351, 1359 n.2 

(Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that in § 1516a cases, i.e., 

cases brought under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 

1930, APA “section 706 review applies since no law 

provides otherwise”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b)). 

IV 

In substance, Meisen challenges the Department’s 

final determination on three grounds: (1) Commerce 

erred in finding that Meisen failed to provide requested source documents, ECF 95, at 16–18; (2) the 

Department should have issued a supplemental 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 7 

verification questionnaire, id. at 14–16; and (3) in any 

event, the deficiencies Commerce identified did not 

warrant the application of total AFA, id. at 13–14, 19–

32. Related to the third ground, Cabinets to Go asserts 

that even if the Department correctly applied total 

AFA, the rate Commerce selected was too high and 

was not supported by adequate explanation. ECF 99, 

at 6–10. 

A 

For verification purposes, the Department selected 

two of Meisen’s U.S. resellers—J&K Georgia and J&K 

Illinois—“and requested that Meisen provide source 

documentation supporting the worksheets it used to 

reconcile the total sales by these resellers during the 

[period of investigation] to their tax returns.” ECF 

80-1, at 12. Specifically, Commerce directed Meisen to 

submit “screenshots from [its] accounting system” to 

support every step of the reconciliation process, as well 

as other supporting documents to include “printouts 

and Excel versions of each companies’ [sic] profit and 

loss statements, trial balances, and sales ledgers.” Id.

at 12–13 (emphasis removed). The Department also 

requested “[a] detailed narrative explaining how all 

worksheets and supporting documentation tie together.” Id. at 13 (emphasis removed). 

Commerce’s remand determination explains that 

Meisen did not produce any of the requested screenshots or printouts from its accounting system, nor any 

source documentation to verify the figures provided in 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 8 

its Excel worksheets. Id. at 14–15 (J&K Georgia), 23–

24 (J&K Illinois). The Department noted that without 

source documentation, “the source of the data in each 

of these Excel files is unclear,” id. at 20, and explained 

that it was impossible to reconcile the numbers seen 

in the Excel worksheets with other numbers in, for example, the company’s profit and loss statements, id. at 

17–18. 

The Department emphasized that “Meisen failed to 

provide the requested source documentation necessary 

to verify that Meisen accurately and completely reported J&K [Georgia]’s total U.S. sales, as well as individually-selected sales made by J&K [Georgia] in 

November 2018 and J&K [Illinois] in October 2018.” 

Id. at 27. Commerce further found that the record was 

clear that both companies had the necessary information available to them such that they could have 

produced it. Id. As a result, the Department found, citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(D), that it was necessary to 

resort to facts otherwise available because all of J&K 

Georgia’s and J&K Illinois’s sales were unverifiable 

because of the lack of source documentation, and the 

Department also elected to apply an adverse inference 

because Meisen “failed to act to the best of its ability 

by failing to provide source documentation that it had 

in its possession.” Id. at 28.4

4 Elsewhere, Commerce noted that the record showed that 

(1) the J&K Companies could have provided screenshots 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 9 

Meisen’s challenge to these findings is unavailing. 

The company first argues that it submitted over 5000 

pages of material in response to the verification questionnaire and had previously submitted copious 

amounts of other material. ECF 95, at 16. That begs 

the question whether any of those materials were responsive to the Department’s questionnaire. 

Meisen also calls Commerce’s concern about the 

company’s provision of Excel spreadsheets instead of 

the requested screenshots unfounded: “[T]he [E]xcel 

files were in fact extracts from Quickbooks, the accounting system used by the companies. Given that it 

was providing such extracts, Meisen reasonably believed that there was no need for the companies to also 

submit a screenshot of the computer screen which 

could only show parts of the information in the [E]xcel 

files.” Id. at 17. There are two problems with that argument. 

To begin with, Commerce instructed Meisen to provide screenshots. If a respondent cannot provide the requested material, that party must notify Commerce, in 

advance, that it is “unable to submit the information 

from the Quickbooks software they used for accounting 

purposes and (2) the feature allowing for such screenshots 

was distinct from the feature Meisen used to export data to 

Excel spreadsheets, thus confirming that “Meisen could 

have supplied other information, outside of Excel reports 

and worksheets, such as the screenshots or printouts we 

requested, but it decided not to do so.” Id. at 80. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 10 

requested in the requested form and manner.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1). It must provide “a full explanation and suggested alternative forms in which the 

party is able to submit the information” so that the Department can consider modifying its instructions. Id. 

The company admits it failed to do that: “Commerce 

argues that Meisen should have contacted Commerce 

for instructions, but it is simply not reasonable for [the 

company] to contact Commerce and wait for a reply for 

each and every product where there are complications 

given the sheer number of product variations and the 

limited time available to respond to the questionnaires.” ECF 95, at 23. But the statute itself requires 

that a party either respond as Commerce directs or 

else ask permission to proceed differently—a party 

cannot unilaterally decide that it will provide something different. In sum, a respondent cannot simply 

make up its own preferred way to respond and then 

say, “It’s Commerce’s problem to figure it out.” 

Moreover, while Meisen contends that its Excel 

spreadsheets are its source documentation, the following admission in its post-remand comments before this 

court undercuts that argument: “To the extent that 

Meisen added additional cells and formulas to the 

[E]xcel file, it was merely to ensure that the Department understood Meisen’s calculations.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Meisen admits it modified what it calls 

its “source documentation”—meaning, in turn, that it 

was no longer source documentation at all. That is 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 11 

exactly why Commerce can insist on screenshots and 

other actual source documentation: The agency is entitled to (indeed, needs to) review something the respondent has not (and cannot have) modified. “As the 

Federal Circuit has noted, Commerce is entitled to insist on the original records because ‘failure to submit 

primary source documentation’ means that Commerce 

is ‘unable to verify the accuracy of the information submitted.’ ” Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, 483 

F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1349 (CIT 2020) (quoting Thyssen 

Stahl AG v. AK Steel Corp., No. 97-1509, 1998 WL 

455076, at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 27, 1998)). 

Meisen’s failure to produce the required screenshots therefore supports Commerce’s findings that the 

company withheld requested information and provided information that could not be verified. Either of 

those findings was a sufficient reason to resort to facts 

otherwise available. Meisen’s admissions that it disregarded Commerce’s instructions and deliberately modified the Excel spreadsheets it did submit support the 

Department’s finding that the company did not act to 

the best of its ability to cooperate, thereby allowing the 

use of an adverse inference. 

B 

Meisen asserts that once Commerce found its verification response inadequate, the Department was obligated to issue a supplemental verification questionnaire. The company argues that “[i]n an in-person verification, questions and follow-up questions would 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 12 

have been raised verbally and answers would have 

been provided along with supplemental documentation if needed.” ECF 95, at 14. The company contends 

that the Department may not dispense with such “follow-up” procedures. Id. Relatedly, Meisen argues that 

not issuing a supplemental verification questionnaire 

violated 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d), which requires that if 

Commerce determines that a “response to a request for 

information” is deficient, it must give the respondent 

notice and an opportunity to cure. 

The Federal Circuit has held that Commerce has 

the authority “to derive verification procedures ad 

hoc,” Goodluck India Ltd. v. United States, 11 F.4th 

1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2021), and that the statute gives 

the Department “wide latitude in its verification procedures,” Stupp Corp. v. United States, 5 F.4th 1341, 

1350 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Thus, there is no requirement 

for any sort of “give-and-take” in verification. 

And more specifically, when a respondent fails to 

provide requested substantive information during an 

investigation, at verification Commerce has the discretion to decline to accept the late submission of that information. See Goodluck India, 11 F.4th at 1342–43 

(upholding Commerce’s practice “to accept corrective 

information at verification only for minor corrections 

to information already on the record”) (cleaned up). It 

necessarily follows that if the Department need not accept corrective substantive information at verification 

as to deficiencies in a respondent’s original 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 13 

submissions, it need not seek corrective substantive information when verification responses are deficient. 

Thus, the Department had no duty to issue a supplemental verification questionnaire to Meisen.5

C 

1 

Meisen argues that the various errors the Department found were not enough to warrant total AFA and 

that “Commerce should have considered alternatives, 

5 Hitachi Energy USA Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1375 

(Fed. Cir. 2022), does not support Meisen’s argument. 

There, “Commerce changed the way it was evaluating the 

data” and “found Hyundai’s original submissions inadequate to determine the service-related revenue in this adjusted manner.” Id. at 1380. The Department, however, rejected Hyundai’s § 1677m(d) request to submit additional 

information. The Federal Circuit noted inconsistencies in 

Commerce’s analysis. The Department at first found that 

Hyundai reported its data properly but then reversed 

course, found Hyundai uncooperative, and blamed Hyundai for not submitting—during the original proceeding under the old protocol—information compliant with the Department’s new protocol. Id. at 1383–84. The court found 

that “the statutory entitlement to notice and opportunity 

to remedy any deficiency is unqualified in the circumstances of this case.” Id. at 1384, as amended on denial of 

reh’g, No. 2020-2114, Dkt. #77, Order, at 2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 

23, 2022) (emphasis added). The court construes the words 

“in the circumstances of this case” as limiting Hitachi’s 

holding to its facts. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 14 

. . . including the use of partial facts available, with or 

without an adverse inference.” ECF 95, at 13. 

The company fails to specify what sort of “partial 

facts available” it contends Commerce should have 

employed but argues that any errors “have to be considered in light of the unsophisticated accounting system employed by Meisen’s U.S. affiliates and the number of sales that they had to report.” Id. at 19. It claims 

that “Commerce does not establish that any errors resulted in a lower dumping margin than otherwise 

would have been calculated or benefited Meisen in any 

way.” Id. The company, however, cites no authority to 

establish that the Department needed to make such a 

finding. 

Meisen further says it provided source documentation of sales terms, so Commerce was wrong in saying 

the company failed to do so. Id. at 20. But the Department actually found that Meisen failed to show that 

the information submitted was accurate. ECF 80-1, at 

30–34. 

Meisen then disputes Commerce’s finding that for 

five of nine sales selected for verification, the ZIP Code 

in the database did not match the ZIP Code in the 

sales invoices provided, sometimes in very significant 

ways, and argues that any error was de minimis. ECF 

95, at 21–22. But the Department found that the information could not be verified because the many glaring errors—including one example in which the database gave a ZIP Code about 1500 miles away (by road) 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 15 

from the ZIP Code listed on the sales invoice—left 

Commerce with “no confidence” that Meisen correctly 

reported the information for the non-examined sales 

in its U.S. sales database. ECF 80-1, at 37. That conclusion is plainly reasonable. 

Next, Meisen asserts that Commerce didn’t give the 

company sufficient instructions on how to develop its 

list of consolidated customer codes, such that any errors in that respect were the Department’s fault and 

not Meisen’s. ECF 95, at 22–23. Again, that argument 

fails to address the company’s statutory obligation to 

ask Commerce for help if instructions are unclear. As 

a matter of law, it is unacceptable for a respondent to 

guess at how to respond and then blame the Department if that guess is wrong. 

Meisen contends that its method of reporting control numbers reflecting its product characteristics was 

reasonable and Commerce’s method was not. Id. at 23. 

That argument is much like one the court rejected in 

Hung Vuong, where the plaintiff argued that it had 

“devised a completely new and more precise methodology.” 483 F. Supp. 3d at 1362. The court found that to 

be a concession that the company ignored instructions, 

justifying the noncooperation finding. Id.

As to two other issues (calculation of price adjustments and freight expenses), Meisen states that neither it nor its affiliates record data in the way Commerce wanted information reported, so the Department cannot complain about their responses. ECF 95, 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 16 

at 27–28, 30. But again, Meisen fails to demonstrate 

that it contacted Commerce in advance to explain the 

difficulty and to request permission to report data via 

different means. The company’s argument boils down 

to, “Commerce didn’t ask us the question in the way 

we wanted it asked, so we win.” It doesn’t work that 

way. 

Finally, Meisen admits that it failed to report all its 

U.S. affiliates but quibbles about whether it matters. 

Id. at 31 (“The failure to report this affiliate sooner 

was clearly a minor oversight resulting from the fact 

that the company was not involved in the sale of subject merchandise.”). Commerce noted, however, that 

the company acknowledged in its questionnaire responses that it had to report all affiliated companies, 

regardless of their involvement in the sale of subject 

merchandise. ECF 80-1, at 57 (citing Appx083309, on 

which Meisen quoted Commerce’s instructions). 

Meisen therefore admits that it withheld requested information. Moreover, as to finding a lack of cooperation, Commerce aptly explained, “Rather than clearly 

identifying all companies involved in the sale and/or 

distribution of subject merchandise (affiliated or not) 

and clearly identifying all customer relationships, 

Meisen put forth a Gordian knot of information regarding its relationships and left it for Commerce to 

unravel.” Id. at 130. 

The government correctly summarizes the problem: 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 17 

Meisen’s arguments minimize the impact of the 

errors by taking them out of context, or by ignoring large portions of Commerce’s analysis regarding each error in the remand results. . . . For 

many of the individual errors and omissions addressed in its comments, Meisen does not even 

dispute the fact that it made the errors and 

omissions. Instead, Meisen simply argues that 

these errors are too minor or insignificant to justify total AFA. 

ECF 98, at 23–24. The issue is not any one individual 

error. The issue is the errors in their totality, which 

the Department reasonably determined warranted the 

application of total AFA. 

2 

Meisen does not challenge the 262.18 percent adverse inference rate Commerce selected for the company, but Cabinets to Go contends that “Commerce 

failed to articulate any rationale for why the highest 

transaction-specific margin on the record was an appropriate AFA rate.” ECF 99, at 6. It further argues 

that the rate was “unduly punitive,” although its rationale is that Meisen was responsive and was “trying 

to cooperate with Commerce.” Id. Because the court 

sustains the finding that Meisen was not cooperative, 

the sole issue remaining is whether the Department 

sufficiently explained its choice of rate. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 18 

Commerce’s explanation mainly consists of the following paragraph: 

In deciding which facts to use when determining 

the AFA rate, section 776(b) of the Act [i.e., 19 

U.S.C. § 1677e(b)] and 19 CFR 351.308(c)(1) authorized Commerce to rely on information derived from: (1) the petition; (2) a final determination in the investigation; (3) any previous review or determination; or (4) any information 

placed on the record. In the underlying investigation, we determined that the Petition dumping margin of 262.18 percent, which was the 

highest corroborated dumping margin on the 

record, was the most appropriate margin to select for the application of adverse inference. 

Therefore, in this final remand determination 

we continue to find 262.18 percent to be the appropriate margin to assign as AFA. 

ECF 80-1, at 75. 

In commenting on the draft remand results, Meisen 

argued—as Cabinets to Go does here—that the rate 

was too punitive. Commerce responded that no interested party had suggested that a different margin 

would be appropriate and that the 262.18 percent margin was “the AFA-margin already selected for the 

China-wide entity.” Id. at 144. “[T]he assignment of 

the Petition dumping margin as the total AFA rate to 

Meisen, as a result of significant pervasive discrepancies and errors discovered in sampled sales of Meisen’s 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 19 

[verification questionnaire response], Meisen’s failure 

to tie sales data to its books and records, and the finding that Meisen failed to identify all of its U.S. affiliates involved in the sale and/or distribution of subject 

merchandise, is not overly punitive, but is supported 

by record information, Commerce’s practice, and court 

precedent.” Id. at 144–45 (emphasis in original). Commerce also explained—though not as part of its discussion of the selected rate—that Meisen’s failing verification “resulted in the finding that its U.S. sales database is entirely unusable. Without a U.S. sales database, we cannot calculate a dumping margin.” Id. at 

143. 

The court has found an explanation of that sort satisfactory because the Federal Circuit has emphasized 

that “there is no one fixed single formula Commerce 

must use in deciding what rate is appropriate for an 

uncooperative respondent.” Hung Vuong Corp. v. 

United States, Ct. No. 19-00055, Slip Op. 21-142, at 15, 

2021 WL 4772962, at *6 (CIT Oct. 12, 2021) (citing Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. v. United States, 58 F. App’x 843, 849–

50 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting claim that partial cooperation meant Commerce could not apply highest possible margin)). Because the Federal Circuit has sustained the highest possible rate as to a partially cooperative respondent, it must be permissible for the Department to apply such a rate to a totally uncooperative respondent. 
Ct. No. 20-00109 Page 20 

Commerce may use “any dumping margin from any 

segment of the proceeding under the applicable antidumping order,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(d)(1)(B), and may 

apply “the highest such rate or margin based on the 

evaluation by [Commerce] of the situation that resulted in the [Department] using an adverse inference,” id. § 1677e(d)(2). That is what Commerce did 

here. The 262.18 percent rate has been applied to the 

China-wide entity, so “Commerce acted within its discretion in its selection of that AFA rate.” Hung Vuong, 

Slip Op. 21-142, at 16, 2021 WL 4772962, at *7 (quoting Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V. v. United States, 996 F.3d 

1283, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). As a result, the court sustains the Department’s rate selection. 

* * * 

For all these reasons, the court SUSTAINS Commerce’s remand results insofar as they relate to 

Meisen. Doing so resolves the outstanding issues in 

this case, so the court will enter judgment on the 

agency record for the government and the Alliance. See

USCIT R. 56.2(b). A separate judgment will issue. See

USCIT R. 58(a). 

Dated: April 24, 2023 /s/ M. Miller Baker

 New York, New York Judge