[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Family , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4054.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -4054
C OLUMBUS B AR A SSOCIATION v. F AMILY
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Family , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4054.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Ru les of Professional Conduct, including failing to properly maintain and use a client trust account, charging a clearly excessive fee and sending mi sleading communication regarding a fee, and failing to act with reasonable diligence and to keep client informed about the status of a legal matter—Eighteen-month suspension, with the final 12 months stayed on conditions, eff ective when or if license to practice
law is restored to active status. (No. 2021-0978—Submitted September 8, 2021—Decided November 17, 2021.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professiona l Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2020-076.

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2 Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Christian Manning Family, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0074728, w as admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2002. On November 26, 2019, we accepted a consent-to-disciplin e agreement in which Family admitted that she had misused her client trust acc ount and committed professional mis conduct in a client matte r. We suspended Famil y’s license for one year with the entire suspension stayed on conditions, including that she serve a oneyear term of monitored probation focusing on compliance with th e client-trustaccount requirements in the Rul es of Professional Conduct. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Family , 159 Ohio St.3d 1221, 2019-Ohio-5514, 149 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 2. {¶ 2} On December 22, 2020, relator, the Columbus Bar Association, fi led a new complaint against Family charging her with misusing her c lient trust account and mishandling two client matte rs as well as other misconduct. Family stipulated to some of the charges. After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of
Professional Conduct found that Family had e ngaged in the stipu lated misconduct, dismissed other charges, and r ecommended that we suspend her li cense for 18 months with 12 months conditionally stayed and impose condition s on her
reinstatement. The board issued a report adopting the panel’s findings of
misconduct and recommended sanc tion. Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V( 17)(B)(3), the parties filed a joint waiver of objections. {¶ 3} Based on our review of the recor d, we adopt the board’s finding s of
misconduct and recommended sanc tion, with two modifications to the sanction.
Misconduct
Client-trust-account violation {¶ 4} In May 2020
, disciplinary counsel received notice from Family’s bank that she had overdrawn her client trust account. In respo nse to an inquiry from disciplinary counsel, Family c laimed that she had register ed her license as inactive and that in the proce ss of closing her law practice, s he accidentallyJanuary Term, 2021

3 overpaid a refund to one client, which caused her bank to disho nor a refund check
issued to a different client. Although Family ultimately close d her client trust account with a zero balance, the p arties stipulated that relato r was not satisfied that she had properly reconciled t he funds in the account. {¶ 5} Based on this conduct, t he parties stipulat ed and the board fou nd that Family violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15( a) (requiring a lawyer to hol d property of clients in an interest-bearing client t rust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property,
and to maintain certain record s for the account and perform and retain a monthly
reconciliation of the fund s in the account).
The Ahmed matter {¶ 6} In May 2019, Muna Ahmed retained Family to represent her in a domestic-relations matter. In their written fee agreement, Ahm ed agreed to pay Family a $1,500 retainer and $500 per month for the life of the case—a fee structure that Family described as a “subscription” model. The agreement further provided that all payments were “earned upon receipt,” although Family f ailed to advise Ahmed in writing that if Family did not complete the representa tion for any reason, Ahmed may be entitled t o a refund of all or of a portion of the fees paid. {¶ 7} Notwithstanding the terms of the fee agreement, Family advised Ahmed that she would charge h er $250, rather than $500, per mon th. Ahmed thereafter paid Family $1,500 in May 2019 and $250 in June. Bu t in July, Family sent Ahmed an invoice showing charges based on a $350 hourly ra te for attorney work and a $150 hourly rate for paralegal work. Family had nev er advised Ahmed that there might be additional hourly charges associated with t he representation, and the invoice itself noted that subscription clients were bil led at a flat rate each
month. {¶ 8} In August, Family sent Ahmed a nother invoice showing charges based on an hourly rate. In addition, the August invoice noted that all of Family’s clients were “being transiti oned to hourly,” even though Family never sought orS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 obtained Ahmed’s consent to modify the terms of their fee agree ment. In September and October, Family a gain sent Ahmed invoices showing charges based on hourly rates. But inexplicab ly, those invoices also include d the language that Family’s subscription clients were billed at a flat rate each m onth. Despite the confusing invoices, Ahmed conti nued making $250 monthly payment s. However,
an October invoice failed to show a credit for Ahmed’s payment. {¶ 9} After Ahmed questioned the accura cy of her bill, Family schedul ed a meeting with her. When Ahmed arrived for the meeting, she foun d Family’s office door locked, even though Ahmed could hear Family inside on the telephone. Ahmed called and emailed Family to let her know she was outside , but Family
refused to meet with her. {¶ 10} Family later admitted that her fee agreement with Ahmed was deficient, her invoices were “extr emely confusing,” and she had breached the fee agreement by unilaterally changing the payment terms. Family a lso agreed to refund $500 to Ahmed. Based on th is conduct, the parties stipu lated and the board found that Family violated Prof .Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a l awyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee) and 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer f rom charging a fee denominated as “earned upon receipt” without simultaneously a dvising the client in writing that the client may be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer do es not complete the representation).
The Sutton matter {¶ 11} In April 2018, Kimberly Sutton reta ined Family to represent her in a
domestic-relations matter. In N ovember 2018, Family notified S utton that an associate, Doug Kutsko, would a ttend a December hearing and tha t he would meet
with Sutton beforehand. Sutton expressed concer n about paying Kutsko to get up to speed on her case, considering that she had already paid Fam ily to familiarize herself with the matter. In an email, Family indicated that Ku tsko’s meeting withJanuary Term, 2021

5 Sutton would be at “no cost” to her. Family, however, billed S utton $125 for the meeting with Kutsko. Family later admitted that it was imprope r to bill Sutton for a meeting that she had previous ly indicated would be at no char ge to Sutton. {¶ 12} In July 2019, Family was served with discovery requests in the Sutton matter. Sutton sent Family draft responses and indicate d that she objected to some of the requests, including those seeking personal ident ifying information. Family promised to remove any such personal information and add objections to Sutton’s responses, but she produced Sutton’s draft responses w ithout removing the personal information or making any objections. Opposing counse l filed a motion to compel discovery, arguing that Sutton’s responses were incom plete. The court granted the motion, and after Fa mily failed to comply with the court’s order, opposing counsel moved for sancti ons against Sutton. Family fa iled to inform Sutton about the motion to compe l, the court’s order, or the mo tion for sanctions.
After Sutton discovered the fili ngs on the court’s online docke t, she terminated the representation. {¶ 13} Based on this conduct, the partie s stipulated and the board fou nd that Family violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (re quiring a lawyer to act wit h reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a law yer to reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s o bjectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter), and 1.5(a). {¶ 14} We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct. We also dism iss any other rule violati ons alleged in relator’s complaint that w ere not expressly dismissed by the hearing panel.
Sanction {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider al l relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the attorne y violated, theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. {¶ 16} As for aggravating factors, the board found that Family has pri or disciplinary offenses for simila r misconduct, exhibited a selfi sh motive, and engaged in a pattern of misconduc t over two disciplinary cases, committing some
of the misconduct in t his matter while under the stayed suspens ion imposed in her prior case. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (2), and (3). In mitigation, the board found that Family made restitution, submitted evidence of good charac ter, and acknowledged the wrongful n ature of her misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(3) and (5). {¶ 17} The board recommends that we suspend Family for 18 months with 12 months conditionally stayed, impose conditions on her reinst atement, and order her to work with a monitoring attorney for a two-year period af ter her reinstatement. In crafting its recommendation, the board found most instructiv e cases involving attorneys with previous discipline who engaged in misconduct co mparable to Family’s. For example, in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Thomas , 154 Ohio St.3d 57, 2018-Ohio-3267, 110 N.E.3d 1271, we accepted a consent-to-d iscipline agreement in which the attorney admitted that he had failed to diligently represent clients in a matter and had charged them an improper nonrefunda ble fee. Only one aggravating factor—the attorney’s prior discipline—was present and weighed against multiple mitigating factors, including the attorney’s l ack of a dishonest or selfish motive and the fact that he had instituted office-manag ement practices to prevent similar misconduct in the future. We imposed a one-yea r suspension stayed on conditions, including that the attorney serve a period of mo nitored probation and complete continuing legal educa tion (“CLE”) on law-practice man agement. {¶ 18} The board also cited Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson , 152 Ohio St.3d 222, 2017-Ohio-8856, 94 N.E.3d 551, in which an attorney violat ed the rule regulating client trust accounts, charged a fee denominated as “earned on receipt”January Term, 2021

7 without simultaneously advising th at the client may be entitled to a refund, failed to promptly refund a client’s un earned fee, failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, and failed to no tify a client that he lacked mal practice insurance. Although the attorney argued for a fully stayed suspension, we concluded that an actual suspension was necessary to protect the public. We note d that he had violated one of the same profe ssional-conduct rules that he had violated in his first disciplinary matter and that after his first case, he failed to implement the procedures necessary to ensure compliance with the rule. Id. at ¶ 22-23. We imposed a two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stay ed and ordered him to complete CLE on law-offic e management and serve a period of monitored probation upon his reinstatement. {¶ 19} In addition, the board cited Columbus Bar Assn. v. Watson , 144 Ohio St.3d 317, 2015-Ohio-4613, 42 N.E.3d 752, in which an attorney charged a client a clearly excessive fee and twice failed to deposit clients’ ad vanced legal fees into his client trust account. Because we had previously discipline d the attorney for similar misconduct, we noted that he had engaged in a pattern o f misconduct in two separate disciplinary cases and “even worse, when he engaged in the misconduct [in the second case], his prior disciplinary case was either pe nding or he had already been placed on probation.” Id. at ¶ 10. We indefinitely s uspended the attorney, in part based on the board’s expr ession of “serious doubts about [ the attorney’s] ability to effectively and et hically practice law.” Id. at ¶ 10. {¶ 20} Family’s misconduct here was more egregious than that in Thomas
and closer to the misconduct in Nelson and Watson . And like the attorneys in
Nelson and Watson , Family has been previously disciplined for some of the same
misconduct. Unlike Watson , however, the board has not expressed doubts about Family’s ability to practice law effectively and ethically in t he future. Thus, we agree that the sanction reco mmended by the board is commensurat e with Family’s misconduct, the other circumstances of this case, and our prece dent. We alsoS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 conclude that the recommended conditions on reinstatement will help to protect the public if Family is reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio. We modify the conditions by directing the monitoring attorney to focus on Fam ily’s practice of law, use of her client trust account, and fee agreements. And because Family is currently registered as an inactive attorney, her suspension sh all not commence
unless and until she restores he r license to active status.
Conclusion {¶ 21} Christian Manning Family is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for 18 months, with the final 12 months stayed on t he conditions that
she refrain from further misconduc t and pay the costs of these proceedings. If Family fails to comply with either condition of the stay, the s tay will be lifted and she will serve the entire 18-month suspension. In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(24), Family’s reinst atement shall be conditioned u pon her providing proof that she (1) completed at least two three-hour CLE course s on law-office management—approved in advance by relator—as part of her CLE re quirements for a suspended attorney and (2) submitted to an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and complied with any treatment or counselin g recommendations resulting from th e evaluation. Upon reinstatem ent to the practice of law, Family shall be required to work with a monitoring atto rney appointed by relator for a two-year period. The monitoring attorney shall f ocus on Family’s practice of law, use of her client trust account, and fee agree ments. Because Family is currently registered as an inactive attorney, this sanction has no effect unless and
until she restores her license to active status. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________January Term, 2021

9 Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Ru ssell J. Kutell; Bradley Frick & Associates and Bradley Frick; and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel, and Thomas E. Zani, Deputy Bar Couns el, for relator. Ulmer and Berne, L.L.P., and Alvi n E. Matthews, for respondent.

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