alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RANDALL W. SYLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 12 C 1408

) (USCA No. 13-1593)

COUNTY OF WILL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Although this Court has issued a host of opinions in connection with this action brought 

by pro se plaintiff Randall Syler ("Syler"),1 there is no need to review the bidding in those 

respects. Instead the issue now before this Court is whether Syler, whose case was ultimately 

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is 

entitled to supplement the record on appeal with documents never presented to this Court.

In that respect this Court's January 17, 2014 memorandum order ("Order") stated, on the 

basis of uniform caselaw from our Court of Appeals that rejects such efforts (see, e.g., United 

States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F. 3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)), that such cases appear to call for 

the denial of Syler's pro se motion. Nonetheless the January 17 Order concluded in this fashion:

But because he has not had the opportunity to provide any input in reply to 

defendants' January 14, 2014 Response, this Court will grant him the opportunity 

to do so by a submission on or before January 28, 2014.

On February 3 this Court received the chambers copy of Syler's "Reply to Defendants 

Response," which was accompanied by a certificate that entitled him to a January 30 filing date 

1

 Based on this Court's threshold review of Syler's Complaint, it provided him with pro 

bono representation by counsel drawn from this District Court's trial bar. At a later point, 

however, Syler and his counsel parted company, and he has been proceeding pro se since then.

 
under the well-known "mailbox rule."2

 That filing does not appear to take Syler's case outside of 

the consistent caselaw holdings exemplified by Elizalde-Adame -- or at least if those consistent 

holdings are to be overridden by a court-created exception, it would be for the Court of Appeals 

and not for a District Court ruling to do so. Accordingly this Court denies Syler's motion, 

without prejudice of course to his opportunity to present the issue to the Court of Appeals for its 

ultimate resolution.

__________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: February 10, 2014

2

 Needless to say, given the short timetable involved and Syler's pro se status, this Court 

is treating his submission as a timely filed. 

- 2 -
#### 14.404 Rejection of bids.
#### The People of the State of New York v. Francisco Gruz.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, unless the appellant procures the record on appeal and appellant’s points to be served and tiled on or before December 5, I960, with notice of argument for the January 1961 Term of this court, said appeal to be arg.-ed or submitted when reached. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rauin, Valente and McNally, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 99(b)


                                 TXU GAS COMPANY


                       Certificate Pursuant to Section 906
                         of Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002


     The undersigned, Erle Nye, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of TXU
Gas Company (the "Company"), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:

1. The  Company's  Quarterly  Report  on Form  10-Q for the  quarter  ended
   September 30, 2002 (the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements of
   section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
   and

2. Information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
   respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

     IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the  undersigned  has caused  this  instrument  to be
executed this 14th day of November, 2002.


                                     /s/ Erle Nye
                                ---------------------------------
                                Name:   Erle Nye
                                Title:  Chairman of the Board and
                                        Chief Executive
Lisa Bowlin Hobbs | Lisa@KuhnHobbs.com

3307 Northland Drive, Suite 310 | Austin, Texas 78731

Tel 512.476.6003 | Fax 512.476.6002

December 29, 2015

Jeffrey D. Kyle, Clerk via e-filing

Third Court of Appeals 

209 West 14th Street, Room 101

Austin, Texas 78701

Re: Nos. 03-15-00085-CV & No. 03-15-00280-CV; DeLitta v. Schaefer

Dear Mr. Kyle, 

On November 3, 2015, the Court abated the two above-referenced appeals to 

allow the parties to proceed with settlement negotiations. The Court requested that, if 

the parties had not finalized a settlement by December 29, 2015, the parties file a 

report informing the Court of the status of the settlement negotiations. 

On October 20, 2015, the parties entered into a binding Rule 11 agreement that 

resolved the litigation. Unfortunately, a significant dispute has arisen concerning the 

agreement. A hearing is scheduled in the trial court on Schaefer’s Motion to Enforce 

for February 17, 2016. 

Counsel suggests the case remain abated to allow the enforcement hearing to 

proceed and requests until March 1, 2016 to further update the Court on the matter. I 

have conferred with opposing counsel, and, though this letter was not prepared 

jointly, they agree that continued abatement is warranted under the circumstances. 

Kindest Regards,

Kuhn Hobbs PLLC

By: __________________________ 

Lisa Bowlin Hobbs

c: Douglas R. Drucker & Kirby D. Hopkins, DRUCKER | HOPKINS (via e-service) 

ACCEPTED

03-15-00085-CV

8395085

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

12/29/2015 2:42:15 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/29/2015 2:42:15 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
#### Georgitsa Tagalis et al., as Distributees in the Estate of Socrates Moscahlades, Deceased, and on Behalf of All Other Distributees in the Estate of Socrates Moscahlades, Deceased, Respondents, v. Theodore Moscahlades, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Socrates Moscahlades, Deceased, et al., Appellants.

Orders, entered on October 2, 1961, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondents. No opinion. Concur — Botein, P. J., Stevens, Eager, Steuer and Bergan, JJ.
#### 1532.201 Statutory authority.

Authority for making the determination under FAR 32.201 is delegated to a level above the Contracting Officer.

[61 FR 57339, Nov. 6, 1996]
#### 1505.202 Exceptions.

The Contracting Officer need not submit the notice required by FAR 5.201 when the Contracting Officer determines in writing that the contract is for the services of experts for use in preparing or prosecuting a civil or criminal action under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.

[60 FR 38505, July 27, 1995]
### §113. Repealed. June 27, 1952, ch. 477, title IV, §403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 279, eff. Dec. 24, 1952

Section, act Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §11a, 39 Stat. 882, related to detail of inspectors on vessels.
#### Joseph Santangelo, Jr., Respondent, and Joseph Santangelo, Respondent-Appellant, v City of New York, Appellant-Respondent, et al., Defendant.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the cross appeals are from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered July 22, 1977, which, after a jury trial on the issue of liability only, was in favor of (1) Joseph Santangelo, Jr., against the City of New York and (2) the City of New York against Joseph Santangelo, Sr. Interlocutory judgment modified, on the law, by deleting the second decretal paragraph thereof. As so modified, interlocutory judgment affirmed and new trial granted as to the derivative cause of action of Joseph Santangelo, Sr., with costs to plaintiff to abide the event. Plaintiff Joseph Santangelo, Jr., was injured while attending an ice hockey clinic conducted by defendant the Greater New York City Ice Hockey League, Inc. (league). The clinic was held in a skating rink owned by defendant the City of New York. The city charged each participant an admission fee to enter the rink. The jury found that the injury resulted from an improperly supervised hockey drill. The city claims that it had no control over the ice hockey drill. A municipality, however, has the duty to provide general supervision to *881protect park invitees from foreseeable dangers while using park facilities *(Caldwell v Village of Is. Park,*304 NY 268). The city and the league shared responsibility for supervision over the ice hockey players. The city was properly found liable to Joseph Santangelo, Jr., for his injury resulting from the city’s failure to properly provide general supervision over the hockey drill. Trial Term dismissed the derivative cause of action of Joseph Santangelo, Sr., because he had signed a release on behalf of his son exempting the city and the league from liability. The release stated: "Acknowledging that the sport of ice hockey is a hazardous activity, I agree that neither The Greater New York City Ice Hockey League, Incorporated nor The City of New York, Department of Parks, Recreation And Cultural Affairs Administration shall be liable to me for any injury or damage resulting directly or resulting indirectly from my participation in the * * * program, whether incurred on the ice or otherwise.” Joseph Santangelo, Jr., being a minor, was not bound by the release. His father is also not bound by the release. His cause of action is derivative and "draws its life from the existence of the cause of action which inures to the benefit of the infant” *(Kotary v Spencer Speedway,*47 AD2d 127, 129). Moreover, the release only pertains to an injury resulting from participation in the ice hockey clinic and not to a derivative cause of action based on the father’s loss of services. Accordingly, the derivative cause of action should be reinstated. Martuscello, J. P., Damiani, Hawkins and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
Dismiss and Opinion Filed July 30, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00590-CV

JOYCE NEMONS, Appellant

V.

JULIUS EKHATOR, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-55250-2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang

Appellant’s brief was originally due March 1, 2015. On March 16, 2015, this Court 

granted appellant an extension until March 31, 2015 file her brief. The extension order warned 

appellant that if she did not file her brief by that date, the appeal would be dismissed without 

further notice. To date, appellant has neither filed a brief nor communicated with the Court 

regarding the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 

42.3(c).

140590F.P05

/Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JOYCE NEMONS, Appellant

No. 05-14-00590-CV V.

JULIUS EKHATOR, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-55250-2012.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices 

Bridges and Schenck participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. We 

ORDER that appellee Julius Ekhator recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Joyce 

Nemons.

Judgment entered this 30th day of July, 2015.
#### State of Connecticut *v.*Philip Brooks

House, C. J., Shapiko, Loiselle, MacDonald and Bocdanski, Js.

Argued October 10

decision released October 22, 1974

*John B. Williams,*for the appellant (defendant).

*William F. Gallagher,*special assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were *Arnold*
      *282
      *Maride,*state’s attorney, *John J. Kelly*and *Ernest J. Diette, Jr.,*assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee (state).

Pee Curiam.

The defendant, Philip Brooks, was

convicted in a jury trial of a sale of narcotics in violation of § 19-480 (a) of the General Statutes. He has appealed from the judgment rendered.

The sole ground of appeal briefed by the defendant was the claim that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that possession of heroin was a lesser included offense of the crime of sale of heroin. Of necessity, the defendant admits that unless this court reverses its decision in *State*v. *Brown,*163 Conn. 52, 301 A.2d 547, he cannot prevail on this appeal. We adhere to our previous decision in *State*v. *Brown,*supra.

There is no error.
Optional Point - of- Service Online Customer Satisfaction Survey for Accenture Use with School Services’ an d Applicant Services’ C ustomer s : January 2013 

### 1
Fiscal Year 2014 Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies - UTAH

FY 2014 Title I

LEA ID District Allocation*

4900030 Alpine School District 9,646,941

4900060 Beaver School District 166,534

4900090 Box Elder School District 1,068,140

4900120 Cache School District 1,421,657

4900142 Canyons School District 4,161,675

4900150 Carbon School District 599,337

4900180 Daggett School District 17,547

4900210 Davis School District 7,564,941

4900240 Duchesne School District 470,079

4900270 Emery School District 342,135

4900300 Garfield School District 134,914

4900330 Grand School District 302,605

4900360 Granite School District 18,307,131

4900390 Iron School District 2,048,025

4900420 Jordan School District 4,965,163

4900450 Juab School District 342,108

4900480 Kane School District 179,729

4900510 Logan School District 1,607,476

4900540 Millard School District 451,291

4900570 Morgan School District 124,233

4900600 Murray School District 798,277

4900630 Nebo School District 3,244,386

4900660 North Sanpete School District 344,849

4900690 North Summit School District 154,996

4900720 Ogden School District 4,166,676

4900750 Park City School District 215,874

4900780 Piute School District 103,588

4900810 Provo School District 3,565,830

4900840 Rich School District 51,037

4900870 Salt Lake City School District 7,149,138

4900900 San Juan School District 931,033

4900930 Sevier School District 788,029

4900960 South Sanpete School District 638,628

4900990 South Summit School District 164,792

4901020 Tintic School District 46,179

4901050 Tooele School District 1,245,725

4901080 Uintah School District 843,879

4901110 Wasatch School District 465,349

4901140 Washington School District 6,635,371

4901170 Wayne School District 128,231

4901200 Weber School District 2,918,674

4999999 PART D SUBPART 2 0

* Actual amounts received by LEAs will be smaller than shown here due to State-level adjustments to Federal Title I allocations. States adjust

 allocations, for example, to reflect LEA boundary changes or the creation of new LEAs, including charter school LEAs, that are not accounted

 for in the statutory calculations. States also are permitted to reserve, for administration, up to 1 percent of the allocations they would receive

 if $14 billion were appropriated and generally must reserve 4 percent in fiscal year 2014 for school improvement activities. These 

 adjustments will reduce the actual amounts available.
#### 1845.107 Contract clauses.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1535

In Re: MUHAMMED MAHDEE ABDULLAH,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(5:04-CR-00371-F-1)

Submitted: June 17, 2010 Decided: June 25, 2010

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Muhammed Mahdee Abdullah, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Muhammed Mahdee Abdullah petitions for a writ of 

mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to 

correct an alleged clerical error in an order. We conclude 

Abdullah is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used 

only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States 

Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. 

Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, 

mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a 

clear right to the relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Mandamus may not be 

used as a substitute for appeal. In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 

503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). 

The relief sought by Abdullah is not available by way 

of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### In the Matter of Christopher C. McGrath, Jr., an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

March 29, 1979

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Saxe, Bacon & Bolán, P. C.,*for respondent.

*Oscar J. Cohen*of counsel *(Nicholas C. Cooper,*attorney), for petitioner.

OPINION OF THE COURT

*Per Curiam.*

The respondent was admitted to practice by the Appellate Division, First Department, on December 11, 1961. Upon the conclusion of a hearing on charges of professional misconduct *110before a hearing panel, pursuant to subchapter C of chapter 111 of the Rules and Procedures of the Committee on Grievances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, respondent was found to have violated DR 6-101 (A) (3) and 9-102 (B) (3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility in that he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to respond to numerous requests from his client and from a fellow attorney who she desired to be substituted as her attorney and by failing to maintain complete records of all properties of his client which had come into his possession by losing his client’s case file.

Petitioner, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department moves for an order confirming the hearing panel’s conclusions and recommendation that respondent be censured. In opposition, respondent admits the loss of the file, but avers that the prejudice to his client was minimal and consequently takes issue only with the penalty recommended. The fact that respondent has twice before been admonished, coupled with the demonstration made on the instant motion and papers in opposition, mandates granting the petitioner’s motion.

Accordingly, the report of the hearing panel should be confirmed and respondent should be censured for his misconduct.

Kupferman, J. P., Lane, Markewich, Lupiano and Bloom, JJ., concur.

Respondent censured.
#### Eric C. Grossman, as Administrator of the Estate of Robert L. McElheny, Deceased, Respondent-Appellant, v. State of New York, Appellant-Respondent.

(Claim No. 36237.)

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with

costs to claimant. (Cross appeals from judgment of Court of Claims for claimant on a claim for damages for the death of claimant’s intestate alleged to have resulted by reason of negligent construction of State highway and insufficient warning signs.) Present — Williams, P. J., Goldman, Halpern, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
16.603-2 Application. ( a ) A letter contract may be used when ( 1 ) the Government's interests demand that the contractor be given a binding commitment so that work can start immediately and
( 2 ) negotiating a definitive contract is not possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement. However, a letter contract should be as complete and definite as feasible under the circumstances.
( b ) When a letter contract award is based on price competition, the contracting officer shall include an overall price ceiling in the letter contract.
( c ) Each letter contract shall, as required by the clause at 52.216-25, Contract Definitization, contain a negotiated definitization schedule including ( 1 ) dates for submission of the contractor's price proposal, required certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data; and, if required, make-or-buy and subcontracting plans,
( 2 ) a date for the start of negotiations, and
( 3 ) a target date for definitization, which shall be the earliest practicable date for definitization. The schedule will provide for definitization of the contract within 180 days after the date of the letter contract or before completion of 40 percent of the work to be performed, whichever occurs first. However, the contracting officer may, in extreme cases and according to agency procedures, authorize an additional period. If, after exhausting all reasonable efforts, the contracting officer and the contractor cannot negotiate a definitive contract because of failure to reach agreement as to price or fee, the clause at 52.216-25 requires the contractor to proceed with the work and provides that the contracting officer may, with the approval of the head of the contracting activity, determine a reasonable price or fee in accordance with subpart 15.4 and part 31, subject to appeal as provided in the Disputes clause.
( d ) The maximum liability of the Government inserted in the clause at 52.216-24, Limitation of Government Liability, shall be the estimated amount necessary to cover the contractor's requirements for funds before definitization. However, it shall not exceed 50 percent of the estimated cost of the definitive contract unless approved in advance by the official that authorized the letter contract.
( e ) The contracting officer shall assign a priority rating to the letter contract if it is appropriate under 11.604.
[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 60 FR 48248, Sept. 18, 1995; 62 FR 51270, Sept. 30, 1997; 75 FR 53148, Aug. 30, 2010]