IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 1764

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., ) The Honorable Charles R. Norgle

) Judge Presiding

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO THE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Peter V. Bustamante

17 North State Street - Suite 1550

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 346-2072

pvbust@bustamantelaw.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

a. The Standard upon Motion for Summary Judgment -------------------------------------------- 1

Fed Rule Civ. P. 56(a) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Holliman v. Thompson, 2019 WL 1354377 *1 (N.D. Ill. 2019)---------------------------------------- 1

b. Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

U.S. DOJ Report, January 13, 2017, at justice.gov/opa/file/925846 at 79 ---------------------------- 2

People v. George Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 ¶¶ 38, 59 ---------------------------------------- 2

Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2012) ----------------------------------------------- 2

Cole v. Beck, 765 Fed. Appx. 127, n.1. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

c. Statement of Facts---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

d. Argument--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10

1. George was Wrongfully Detained for 334 Days, in Violation 

of his 4th Amendment Right to be Free from Unlawful Detention ---------------------- 10, 11

Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 918-20 (2017)------------------------------------------------10

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F. 3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019)------------------------------------------10

People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 at ¶¶ 16, 31-37, 57 --------------------------------------11

2. George’s Pretrial Detention was Unlawful --------------------------------------------------------12

Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, ¶ 41 -------------------------------------------------------------------12

Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F. 3d 667, 660670 (7th Cir. 2018)---------------------------------------12

Lewis, 814 F. 3d at 476-77 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12

Hardy v. City of Milwaukee, 88 F. Supp. 3d 852, 878-79 (E.D. Wisc. 2015) -----------------------12

720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13

People v. Jones, 245 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304 (2nd Dist. 1993)--------------------------------------------13

People v. Johnson, 94 Ill. 2d 148, 154-160 (1983)------------------------------------------------------13

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People v. Holdman, 73 Ill. 2d 213, 221 (1978) ----------------------------------------------------------13

3. There is Evidence that Lopez and Moussa Fabricated Evidence------------------------------13

Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2018 WL 124037 (N.D. Ill.) * 5-6--------------------14

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F. 3d 472, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2019)--------------------------------------14

Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F. 3d 433, 439-40 (7th Cir. 2017)-----------------------------------14

Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 at ¶¶ 16; 31-38; 57 --------------------------------------------------14

4. George was Harmed as a Result of Fabricated Evidence, as 

well as Lopez’ and Moussa’s Other Actions------------------------------------------------------15

Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025--------------------------------------------------------------------------15

Manuel, 903 F. 3d at 668-70--------------------------------------------------------------------------------15

5. Moussa and Lopez are Not Immune from Their Actions---------------------------------------16

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-40 (1983)---------------------------------------------------------16

Whitlock v. Brueggmann, 682 F. 2d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012)------------------------------------- 16, 17

Starks v. City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788-89 (N.D. Ill. 2012)--------------------------16

Phillips v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL 1309811 (N.D. Ill.) *25----------------------------------------17

Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, ¶ 38 -------------------------------------------------------------------17

6. Contrary to their Assertions, the Defendants’ Actions

Constitute Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)-----------------------------17

Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 269-75 (2003)--------------------------------------------- 17, 19

Guerra v. Hunger, 1998 WL 246399 * 1, 4-5 (N.D. Ill. 1998)----------------------------------- 17, 19

Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 326 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736-38; 743-46 (2nd Dist. 2001)------------------------18

Pilotto v. Urban Outfitters West, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 16044, ¶ 17-------------------------------18

Weston v. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr., 2016 IL App (1st) 150935-U----------------------------------18

Ill. S. Ct. Rule 23(e)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------18

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7. Lopez and Moussa Assaulted George---------------------------------------------------------------19

Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 760-61 (N.D. Ill. 2015)-----------------------------19

Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------20

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a. The Standard upon Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment should only be granted when no material fact is genuinely disputed 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed Rule Civ. P. 56(a); Holliman 

v. Thompson, 2019 WL 1354377 *1 (N.D. Ill. 2019). When the facts are analyzed here, it is evident 

that genuine issues of material fact exist and the Defendants’ Motion must be denied, in its entirety.

b. Introduction

At deposition, Officer Lopez testified that the only reason he stopped George Brown was 

because his SUV did not have its headlights on. (Ex. 3 at 81). Lopez’s statement is in the arrest 

report was attested under penalty of perjury by Officer Moussa. (Ex. 15). Lopez also testified that 

George punched him in the face with a closed fist, (Ex. 3 at 48:16-18) so hard that he was stunned, 

(Ex. 3 at 49:3-5) and made him step back a couple of feet. (Ex. 3 at 49:11-17; see, also, Ex. 16, 

Tactical Response Report). (Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts “PS” ¶ 1).

Lopez’s statements are fabrications. A Police Observation Device (“POD”) video shows 

that George’s SUV has its headlights on. (Ex. 7). He had no reason to stop George, much less to 

arrest him. The emergency room doctor that examined Lopez testified that there was no indication 

of injury on Lopez’s face. (Ex. 20 at 106:13-23). (PS ¶ 2).

Lopez filed a criminal complaint, falsely charging George with aggravated battery to a 

police officer. (Exs. 8, 9). As a result his, bail was set at $100,000.00. (Exs. 17, 19). George spent 

334 days in jail waiting for trial, where he was found not guilty of aggravated battery. (Ex. 5 at 

79). (PS ¶ 3).

The reason for the fabrications is that, after George was detained, the defendants exacted 

some “street justice” by punching George, choking him, and tasing him four times. When a 

policeman uses excessive force and then covers his violence with false criminal charges, the false 

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charges are commonly known as “cover charges.” (See, e.g., U.S. DOJ Report, January 13, 2017, 

at justice.gov/opa/file/925846 at 79). That is the situation here. That is why in its opinion 

remanding for a new criminal trial, the Illinois Appellate Court stated: 

¶38. So there were a lot of considerations that militated in favor of quashing the 

arrest. The significant inconsistencies in the testimony, especially in how the 

narrative of the arrest evolved after the POD camera video was discovered, raise 

some significant red flags. Viewing the video in conjunction with all the testimony 

in the record, there are reasons to believe that the first car the officers confronted 

was defendant’s car with its lights on and, therefore, that the officers lacked a legal 

basis to arrest defendant. 

¶59. While our precedent demands that we remand this case for a new trial based 

on the above-asserted problems with defendant’s prosecution, we urge the State to 

consider whether retrial is really worthwhile. . . . This opinion is not vindication of 

the defendant in any way, but it is clear that there are a number of problems with 

the case.

People v. George Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 ¶¶ 38, 59, emphasis added.1 As the Illinois 

Appellate Court noted, Lopez’s and Moussa’s accounts of what happened in their encounter with 

George on March 10-11, 2011, are riddled with inconsistencies. (Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, 

¶¶ 16; 31-38; 57). Indeed, the POD video belies their accounts of this encounter. (See, Ex. 7). Thus, 

the Defendants’ statement that “George cannot show that evidence has been fabricated or that he 

was deprived of liberty as a result,” ignores the facts. (Defendants’ Memo at 5). (PS ¶¶ 5-7).

c. Statement of Facts

On March 10, 2011, at about 11:50 p.m., George Brown, driving a black SUV, picked up 

his friend, Grover Tucker, at Quincy Street, near the intersection with Laramie Avenue.

2

 (Exs. 1 

at 50, 6b at 24, 25). The vicinity of Quincy and Laramie is a high-crime area. (Exs. 2 at 11, 3 at 

 

1 This Court can take judicial notice of the state court criminal proceedings. Ennenga v. Starns,

677 F.3d 766, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2012); Cole v. Beck, 765 Fed. Appx. 127, n.1.

2

In his deposition, George refers to Grover Tucker by his nickname, “Wee Baby.” (See, e.g., . 

Ex. 1 at 48).

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8). Quincy is a narrow, one-way eastbound street with cars parked on both sides. (Exs. 1 at 64, 2 

at 28). (PS ¶ 8).

The headlights to George’s SUV were on. (Ex. 1 at 50, 52-3; 117). The headlights came 

on automatically. (Ex. 1 at 52-3; 117; see also, POD video, Ex. 7). As George was driving east on 

Quincy, a car made a right-hand turn from Laramie, going in the wrong direction onto Quincy; it 

stopped in front of George’s SUV. (Ex. 1 at 53-5). This car blocked George’s SUV; there was no 

way to get around it. (Ex. 1 at 57). The car beamed a bright light partially blinding George. (Ex. 

6b at 8, 27). George could not see much with that light shining on him. (Ex. 6b at 7). According to 

Lopez, he aimed spotlights at the front windshield of George’s SUV. (Ex. 6a at 132). (PS ¶ 9).

Lopez’s car did not have its Mars Lights3on. (Ex. 6a at 167-70; Ex. 7). George did not see 

any Mars Lights or any police markings on the car. (Ex. 5 at 61; see, also Ex. 7). A man waved 

his hand, directing him to get out of the way, so, George backed up his SUV. (Ex. 1 at 57, 59, 61). 

His SUV could not back up very far on such a narrow street. (Ex. 1 at 63). Two men hopped out 

of the car with guns drawn, pointing straight at George. (Ex. 1 at 64). One of the men was 

screaming, “Get the fuck out of the car.” (Ex. 1 at 64-6). These men did not appear to be police 

officers. (Exs. 1 at 66; 5 at 62). George did not realize that they were police officers until later, 

when he was at the hospital. (Ex. 1 at 178). (PS ¶ 10).

George panicked, jumped out of his car, and ran west on Quincy, away from the two men. 

(Exs. 1 at 58, 67; 4 at 62). Grover was snatched from the car, slammed to the ground and feet were 

placed on his back. (Ex. 18 at 42-43, 45). When he was on the ground, a police officer threatened 

to tase Grover. (Ex. 18 p. 65). At the criminal trial, Grover testified that when he first saw the car 

 

3 Mars Lights are signal-safety lights used in the United States and built by Mars Signal Light 

Company. (wikipedia.org/wiki/Mars_Light).

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going the wrong way on Quincy, he did not realize they were police because they shined a bright 

light on the SUV and the men that jumped out of the car were dressed in black. (Ex. 6b, pp. 7-8).

(PS ¶ 11).

George did not get very far because a blue and white police car was stopped in front of him

as he was running west. (Ex. 1 at 72). When George saw the blue and white police car, he put a 

joint4in his mouth and chewed it. (Ex. 1 at 73, 77). Uniformed police officers got out of that police 

car. (Ex. 1 at 73, 77). (PS ¶ 12).

George was tackled; he landed on his side and balled up, i.e., curled into a fetal position. 

(Ex. 1 at 74-5; 78-79). Someone punched him in the head several times and choked him. (Ex. 1 at 

79, 80-82, 83, 86). The person punching George was dressed in black; at the time George did not 

think he was a police officer. (Ex. 1 at 81). No one told him to stop resisting. (Ex. 1 at 94). A man 

pressed on George’s windpipe “real tight.” (Ex. 1 at 86). George started to black out. (Ex. 1 at 87, 

118). Then, George was tased four times. (Ex. 1 at 88, 95). As he was being tased, George was 

unable to move. (Ex. 1 at 91). He heard someone say, “the fucker is going to die,” and the tasing 

stopped. (Ex. 1 at 91). (PS ¶ 13).

Before he was tackled, George never touched any of the officers. (Ex. 1 at 178). He did not 

say anything to them. (Ex. 1 at 178). The policemen handcuffed George and picked him up off the 

ground. (Ex. 1 at 95). When the ambulance came to take him to the hospital, George was not able 

to speak with the paramedics. (Ex. 1 at 106). In the hospital, George could not stop shaking. (Ex. 

1 at 140, 152). His left hand was numb for a month. (Ex. 1 at 156). At the hospital, a policeman 

told him, “We thought you was gonna (sic) die.” He also told George that the Taser used on 

George was “up to the max.” (Ex. 1 at 127-8). The policemen, including Lopez, were not 

 

4 A “joint,” in this context, is a marijuana cigarette. Merriam-Webster.com.

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concerned about the fact that the Taser was up to the max; they were laughing and joking. (Ex. 1 

at 128-9). (PS ¶ 14).

The Taser left a hole in George’s back. (Ex. 1 at 132). He had puncture wounds from being 

tased. (Ex. 1 at 173). He had scabs on his head. (Ex. 1 at 147). George could not feel his legs; he 

was shaking, his throat hurt for two weeks. (Ex. 1 at 151). Loretto Hospital did a charcoal wash 

of George’s stomach. No narcotics were recovered. (Ex. 5 at 46). Later, George was transported 

to Cook County Jail. There, he sweated for three days and sought medical treatment for a sharp 

pain on his left side. (Ex. 1 at 145). (PS ¶ 15).

Lopez and Moussa claim that their actions occurred only because George’s SUV did not 

have its headlights on, a non-violent traffic offense. (Exs. 3 at 81; 4 at 11). Yet, the POD video 

shows that George’s headlights were on when Lopez’ car approached George’s SUV. (Exs. 7, 4 at 

14-15). (PS ¶ 16).

In March of 2011, Moussa and Lopez were assigned to the Chicago Police “mobile strike 

force” patrolling high-crime areas. (Exs. 2 at 11-12; 3 at 7-8). Lopez testified that, at 11:50 p.m. 

on March 10, 2011, he was in a patrol car going south on Laramie. (Ex. 3 at 18). Sgt. Cannon was 

driving and Lopez was in the front seat. Officers Pruger and Keaney were in the back seat. (Ex. 3 

at 15-16). In another car directly behind them were Officers Moussa, Rashon and Bracho. (Ex. 3 

at 16). (PS ¶ 17).

Lopez could not see around the corner as his car approached Quincy, as a building blocked 

his view. (Ex. 3 at 19). Nevertheless, he testified that he saw a black SUV with no headlights 

halfway down the block on Quincy. (Ex. 3 at 19, 20-21). According to Lopez, there was not enough 

room for two cars to traverse Quincy between the two rows of parked cars. (Ex. 3 at 23). (PS ¶

18). 

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Lopez’s car made a right turn onto Quincy and stopped, with the front of his car facing the 

front of the SUV. (Ex. 3 at 27, 28). The SUV went in reverse. (Ex. 3 at 25:24-26:4, 27:14). Lopez 

and Cannon jumped out of their car with weapons drawn; Lopez yelled “Stop the car.” (Ex. 3 at 

28, 29, 31). (PS ¶ 19).

After Lopez’s car made a right turn onto Quincy, Moussa’s car followed behind it. (28:14-

17). Moussa testified that Lopez’s car abruptly made a right turn onto Quincy. (Ex. 2 at 26-27). 

Lopez’s car was about two car lengths into Quincy when it stopped. (Ex. 2 at 32). It was totally 

blocking the SUV. (Ex. 2 at 32). After turning onto Quincy, Moussa’s car went about 10 to 15 feet 

and stopped. (Ex. 2 at 28-29). Moussa was sitting behind the driver, so, his vision of Quincy was 

partially blocked. (Ex. 2 at 28-29). (PS ¶ 20).

The only other vehicle Moussa saw in the driving lane of Quincy was “the top of a black 

SUV that the sergeant’s car was in front of.” (32:15-20). The sergeant’s car was completely

blocking the bottom of that black SUV; Moussa could only see the back of the sergeant’s car and 

the top of the SUV. (32:21-33:3). Moussa was not able to see whether that black SUV had its

headlights on. (33:4-7). (PS ¶ 21).

When Moussa’s car stopped, Moussa saw Sgt. Cannon get out of the car and onto the 

sidewalk with his gun drawn. (30:2-17). After Cannon exited his car, there immediately came a 

flash message that a male black was running westbound on Quincy. (33:8-15). As soon as that 

flash message came out, Moussa’s car backed out to Laramie to go around the block to pick up 

that pursuit. (35:1-5). There was no traffic; they proceeded quickly. (Ex. 2 at 36). Moussa’s car 

stopped at the end of the block and all the officers got out. (Ex. 2 at 38). (PS ¶ 22).

Moussa ran down the middle of Quincy (Ex. 2 at 39). He went about 15 to 25 feet when he 

saw George running west on Quincy on the north sidewalk. (Ex. 2 at 38, 40). Lopez was running 

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right behind George. (Ex. 2 at 41). According to Moussa, as Lopez went to grab George, George 

turned around and punched Lopez in the face. (Ex. 2 at 43). George ran south to the opposite side 

of the street. (Ex. 2 at 43). Lopez grabbed George and the two went down on the sidewalk. (Ex. 2 

at 49). George was lying on his stomach. (Ex. 2 at 51). Moussa then tased George. (Ex. 2 at 53). 

(PS ¶ 23).

Lopez chased George down Quincy. (Ex. 3 at 37). According to Lopez, when he was 

halfway down the block, George went toward the north curb. (Ex. 3 at 42-43). Lopez saw Bracho, 

Rashon and Moussa at the end of Quincy, at the south sidewalk. (Ex. 3 at 45, 47). He testified 

that, as he was trying to grab George, George turned around and punched him in the face with a 

closed fist. (Ex. 3 at 45, 48-49). The blow stunned Lopez and made him step back a couple of feet. 

(Id.). After striking Lopez, he pushed Lopez away, and ran across the street. (Ex. 3 at 48, 49). (PS 

¶ 24).

Lopez testified that he and George “tousled” and eventually fell to the ground. (Ex. 3 at 

54). Lopez yelled out that George put something in his mouth. (Ex. 3 at 56). He stated that he did 

not use force and that George was flailing on the ground. (Ex. 3 at 60). George maintains that he 

was balled up and he was being punched, choked and tased. (Ex. 6b at 26). Lopez said that he 

never used force on George. (Ex. 3 at 60). However, in his tactical response report, Lopez stated 

that he used an open-handed strike on George, which is a use of force. (Ex. 3 at 63). (PS ¶ 25).

Lopez testified that Moussa told George to stop resisting and then Moussa tased George.

(Ex. 3 at 63). Then, he told George to “stop moving.” After Moussa “drive stunned”

5 George, 

Lopez grabbed George’s other arm and handcuffed him. (Ex. 3 at 71). (PS ¶ 26).

 

5 A drive stun is where the Taser is held against the body without firing the projectiles. (Ex. 22, 

Cancel Dep. 17:21-23). Officer Moussa used the term “dry stun.” The correct term is “drive 

stun” (Id. 17:13-18).

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When Moussa tased George, he was four to five feet away from George. (Ex. 2 at 54). 

After tasing George three times, Moussa removed the cartridge from his Taser and did a “drive

stun,” where the Taser came into contact with George’s flesh. (Ex. 2 at 67-9). The tasings 

paralyzed George. (Ex. 2 at 66-67). Lopez denied that he: put his hands on George’s throat; struck 

George; hit George on the side of the head or choked George. (Ex. 3 at 67-68). (PS ¶ 27).

Moussa testified that the Taser’s voltage was approximately 50,000 volts. (Ex. 2 at 55). A 

Taser tenses a person’s muscles up; it renders a person incapacitated. (Ex. 2 at 56, 57). In police 

training, Moussa learned that tasing is appropriate when a person is an assailant or an active 

resistor. (Ex. 2 at 59). Moussa’s training included being tased. (Ex. 2 at 66). (PS ¶ 28).

Moussa charged George with operating a car without the authority to do so, however those 

charges were dropped. (Ex. 2 at 90-92). He also charged George with reversing his car “nearly 

striking pedestrians and parked cars and then fleeing from a moving car.” (Ex. 2 at 92). He 

admitted, however, that there were no pedestrians on Quincy that night and he knew that George’s 

car was stopped when George left it. (Ex. 2 at 92-5). (PS ¶ 29).

Lopez filed criminal complaints against George alleging aggravated battery to a police 

officer (Exs. 8, 9) and resisting arrest. (Ex. 10). Moussa filed criminal complaints against George 

alleging reckless conduct nearly striking pedestrians (Ex. 11), criminal trespass to motor vehicle 

(Ex. 12), resisting arrest (Ex. 13) and a traffic ticket for no headlights. (Ex. 14). On March 24, 

2011, a preliminary hearing was held based on these charges. (Def. Ex. I). Bail had been previously 

set at $100,000.00. (Ex. 17). These complaints were superseded by an Information dated March 

28, 2011, wherein, the State charged George with aggravated battery of a police officer. See, e.g., 

Brown, 2011 IL App (1st) 160025, at ¶ 7. (PS ¶¶ 30-31).

On February 7, 2012, George went to trial on the charge of aggravated battery. The court 

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found him not guilty of aggravated battery, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of 

resisting arrest. Thus, even though George was only charged with aggravated battery, George was 

found guilty of resisting arrest and sentenced to 300 days, time served. (Id. at ¶ 9). He spent 11 

months in Cook County Jail awaiting trial on the aggravated battery charge. (Ex. 1 at 146). If 

George had not been stopped for the false reason of “no headlights” or if George had not been 

falsely charged with aggravated battery, he would not have spent 11 months in jail. (See, Ex. 19, 

Chicago Police Bail Bond Manual). (PS ¶ 32).

Based on the POD video, George petitioned to vacate his conviction, which was granted 

and a new trial was ordered. (Brown, 2011 IL App (1st) 160025, at ¶ 11; see also, Exs. 7, 21). 

George moved to quash his arrest based on the fact that it was illegal because the only reason given 

for stopping him was no headlights. (Brown, 2011 IL App (1st) 160025, at ¶ 12). At the hearing, 

Lopez testified that, when he turned down Quincy, there were two black SUVs; the first one had 

its headlights on, the second one did not. (Ex. 4 at 13-15). Despite the fact that at deposition, Lopez 

testified that there was not enough room for two cars to traverse Quincy between the two rows of 

parked cars (Ex. 3 at 23), at the motion to quash, Lopez testified that his car went around the first 

SUV and proceeded to George’s SUV, which did not have its headlights on. (Id. at 12; see also,

Ex. 4 at 15). Based on Lopez’s testimony, the trial court found that the video did not establish that 

George’s headlights were on. (Id. at 53-55). (PS ¶ 33).

On re-trial, the State never amended the Information, even though George was acquitted 

of aggravated battery and, the State proceeded to try George for resisting arrest. (Id. at ¶ 13). 

George moved to dismiss, on the basis that the State never amended the Information and the statute 

of limitations had run. Also, the Information only charged him with aggravated battery for striking 

Lopez in the face, from which he was acquitted. The trial court denied this motion. (Id. at ¶ 15).

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(PS ¶ 34).

At the second trial, neither officer testified about encountering two black SUVs as the trial 

judge had ruled that the stop was no longer at issue. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17). Lopez did not recall whether 

he identified himself as a police officer. (Ex. 6a at 83). George filed a motion for a directed verdict, 

again contending that he could not be convicted of striking Lopez, the only charge in the 

Information, because he was acquitted of that offense. Nevertheless, the jury was instructed on the 

elements of resisting arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17). (PS ¶ 35).

In reversing the trial court, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that George went to trial 

on the only charge that he could never be convicted of committing, to wit, aggravated battery, 

noting that the State never amended the Information and George was never re-charged. (Id. at ¶¶

46, 47). It also concluded that the jury should have been instructed on self-defense, as, an 

instruction on self-defense is required in a resisting arrest or battery case when the defendant 

presents some evidence of excessive force on the part of the arresting officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-54).

After the Appellate Court remanded the matter, on September 15, 2017, the State nolle prossed it. 

(Defendants’ Statement of Facts, Ex. H)). (PS ¶ 36).

d. Argument

1. George was Wrongfully Detained for 334 Days, in Violation of his 4th Amendment 

Right to be Free from Unlawful Detention.

The Defendants maintain the because George’s Complaint invokes both the 4th and 14th

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the 14th Amendment claim fails because a constitutional 

injury from a wrongful pretrial detention is only a 4th Amendment claim. See, Manuel v. City of 

Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 918-20 (2017); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F. 3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(Defendants’ Memo at 5-7). However, George’s Complaint was filed in 2012. Manuel, cited 

above, was decided in 2017. In any case, George’s Complaint invokes the 4th Amendment. (See

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Doc. 89, ¶ 68), which is violated when pretrial detention precedes or follows the start of legal 

process in a criminal case, as it prohibits governmental officials from detaining a person without 

probable cause. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 918. 

The Defendants argue, that the “undisputed facts” establish that there was probable cause 

for George’s pretrial detention. They thus seek to negate George’s ability to state a 4th Amendment 

claim. (Defendants’ Memo at 8). But, the only cause to stop George in the first place was the 

fabricated story that his SUV did not have its headlights on. One merely has to glance at the 

Appellate Court opinion in George’s criminal case to know that, not only are there disputed facts, 

but, Lopez’ and Moussa’s accounts of what happened on March 10-11, 2011 are highly 

questionable. See, People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 at ¶¶ 16, 31-37, 57. In fact, the 

Appellate Court concluded that “[T]here are reasons to believe . . . that the officers lacked a legal 

basis to arrest defendant.” Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 at ¶ 38. 

At a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact here. George testified that the 

headlights to his SUV were on when it was blocked by Lopez’ car. (Ex. 1 at 50-3; 117). The POD 

video corroborates George. (Ex. 7). Therefore, Lopez had no reason to stop George. (See, Ex. 3 at 

81). 

And, while George did run from Lopez, there is no evidence that the men in Lopez’ car

identified themselves as police officers. Indeed, Lopez could not state that he identified himself as 

a police officer. (Ex. 6a at 83). It was not until George was at the hospital that he discovered that 

Lopez was a police officer. (Ex. 1 at 178). Lopez’ car did not have its Mars Lights on (Exs. 8 at 

83; 167-70; 7). And, the men that jumped out of the car were dressed in black. (Ex. 6b, pp. 7-8).

The men in car beamed a blinding light on George, hampering his ability to see; George 

did not see Mars Lights or police car markings. See, e.g., (Exs. 1 at 66; 6 at 7, 8; 5 at 62). The men 

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in Lopez’s car drew guns on George, in a crime-ridden neighborhood and yelled, “Get the fuck 

out of the car.” (Ex. 1 at 64-66). 

And, while Lopez testified, on the motion to quash arrest, that there was another SUV that 

went around his car, (at midnight on a narrow one-way street) with its lights on, he also testified 

that it was not possible for two cars to traverse that street. (Exs. 3 at 23; 4 at 5). Further, Lopez 

was in the passenger seat of his car that night; he could not see around the corner when his car 

proceeded down Laramie St. (Ex. 3 at 19). Yet, he claims to have seen a black SUV on Quincy

with no headlights on halfway down the block. (Ex. 3 at 19, 20-21). At a minimum, genuine issues 

of material fact exist. Summary judgment must be denied.

2. George’s Pretrial Detention was Unlawful.

The Defendants argue that, because George was charged with resisting arrest, a 

misdemeanor, George’s pretrial detention for 11 months was lawful. They assert that, because 

George admitted that he ran from Lopez, Lopez and Moussa had probable cause to arrest, charge, 

prosecute and detain George for resisting arrest. (Defendant’s Memo at 7-8). This argument 

ignores the law and the facts. 

The charge for which George spent 11 months in Cook County Jail was aggravated battery. 

See, e.g., Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, ¶ 41. The initial charge of resisting arrest was 

dismissed and never re-charged. Id. The Defendants cite no law indicating that detention pending 

false charges is not actionable when it is established to be falsified. Indeed, they could not. See, 

e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F. 3d 667, 660670 (7th Cir. 2018); Lewis, 814 F. 3d at 476-77. 

And, flight from an illegal stop does not relieve the Defendants from liability for the harm 

caused from the illegal stop. See, e.g., Hardy v. City of Milwaukee, 88 F. Supp. 3d 852, 878-79 

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(E.D. Wisc. 2015). Further, absent from this discussion is any liability for the physical and 

emotional harm that Lopez and Moussa caused. Lopez and Moussa remain liable for this harm. 

Moreover, resisting arrest is defined by law as: 

A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the 

person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any 

authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor. 

720 ILCS 5/31-1(a); emphasis added. The problem with the Defendants’ argument is that George 

did not know these men were policemen. See, e.g., (Exs. 5 at 61, 63; 1 at 178). Indeed, Lopez could 

not say that he identified himself as a police officer. (Ex. 8 at 83). And, although at the first 

criminal trial George testified that a police car and police officers turned the wrong way into 

Quincy, this statement must be put into the context of the trial, as prior testimony had already 

identified that car as a police car and the men as police officers. George was not asked if he knew 

at the time the car came around the corner that it was a police car or that the men dressed in black 

were police officers.

The case law cited by the Defendants does not aid them. In People v. Jones, 245 Ill. App. 

3d 302, 304 (2nd Dist. 1993), officer Houde identified himself as a police officer. In People v. 

Johnson, 94 Ill. 2d 148, 154-160 (1983), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the police did not 

have probable cause to arrest Johnson. And, in People v. Holdman, 73 Ill. 2d 213, 221 (1978), the 

Illinois Supreme Court ruled that “flight from a clearly identifiable police officer may, dependent 

upon the circumstances, be sufficient probable cause for arrest.” (Emphasis added).

The Defendants’ arguments lack a legal or factual basis. Summary judgment must be 

denied. 

3. There is Evidence that Lopez and Moussa Fabricated Evidence. 

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The Defendants argue that George cannot prove that Lopez and Moussa fabricated 

evidence. (Defendants’ Memo at 9). It is axiomatic that, upon summary judgment, a litigant need 

not prove his or her case. See, e.g., Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2018 WL 124037 

(N.D. Ill.) * 5-6. The Defendants, however, ignore the facts. Evidence fabrication implicates the 

4

th Amendment to the U.S Constitution when that fabrication is used to deprive a person of his or 

her liberty. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F. 3d 472, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2019); Avery v. City of 

Milwaukee, 847 F. 3d 433, 439-40 (7th Cir. 2017). Lopez’ and Moussa’s “cover charges” for their 

unprovoked violence resulted in George being incarcerated for 11 months, (Ex. 1 at 146) thus, 

there is a deprivation of liberty. 

There is direct evidence that Lopez fabricated the reason he stopped George, from George 

and from the POD video, (Ex. 7). George testified that he had his headlights on. (Ex.1 at 50, 52-

3). According to Lopez, the only reason he stopped George was because his SUV did not have his 

headlights on. (Ex. 3 at 81). 

Additionally, as the Appellate Opinion in George’s criminal case makes clear, Lopez’s and 

Moussa’s testimony as to what happened on the night of March 10-11, 2011 is implausible. Brown,

2017 IL App (1st) 160025 at ¶¶ 16; 31-38; 57. While Lopez testified that there was another black 

SUV with its headlights on going down Quincy, late at night, on a narrow, one-way street, which, 

his car went around, he also testified that there wasn’t room for two cars on Quincy. (Ex. 3 at 23, 

4 at 15). Also, Moussa testified that Lopez’ car totally blocked George’s SUV, making it highly 

unlikely that another black SUV would be able to get around Lopez’s car. (Ex. 2 at 32). The 

Defendants’ own testimony is evidence of fabrication. While Moussa’s and Lopez’ testimony at 

George’s criminal trial may not subject them to liability (see, Section 5 herein), they certainly can 

be impeached with that testimony. Summary judgment must be denied. 

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4. George was Harmed as a Result of Fabricated Evidence, as well as Lopez’ and 

Moussa’s Other Actions. 

The Defendants next argue that George did not suffer any harm resulting from Moussa’s 

and Lopez’s fabricated evidence because, according to the Defendants, George was found guilty 

of resisting arrest and not guilty of aggravated battery. They argue that because George was never 

convicted of aggravated battery, his claim of fabricated evidence regarding aggravated battery 

fails. They also assert that it is “undisputed” that George resisted arrest, so, his claim of fabrication 

with regard to the resisting arrest charge also fails. (Defendants’ Memo at 9-11). This argument 

ignores the facts.

George has not been convicted. The first conviction for resisting arrest was vacated. Brown, 

2017 IL App (1st) 160025 ¶ 11. The second conviction was set aside by the Illinois Appellate Court 

and remanded for a new trial. Id. at ¶¶ 59, 60. Instead of re-trying George the State’s Attorney 

dismissed the case via a nolle prosequi.

6 There is no conviction for resisting arrest.

Pretrial detention based on false evidence violates the 4th Amendment, even when the 

criminal charges are dismissed. Manuel, 903 F. 3d at 668-70. Lopez not only lied about the 

headlights in the SUV, he also lied about being punched in the face. If Lopez had not lied, George 

would not have been charged with aggravated battery to a police officer and his bail would not 

have been $100,000.00. (See, Ex. 19, Chicago Police Department Bail Bond Manual). According 

to Ex.19, George would have received either a $1,500.00 bond or an I-Bond.

As is set forth in Section 3 herein, George spent 11 months in Cook County Jail as a result 

of in illegal stop, as George’s SUV had its lights on and other fabricated evidence. As a result, 

George could not work, and, he lost his ability to be free in society. As the Illinois Appellate Court 

 

6 Latin for "we shall no longer prosecute." A declaration made to the judge by a prosecutor in a 

criminal case, meaning the case against the defendant is being dropped. dictionary.law.com

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noted, it is highly doubtful that Lopez had any reason to stop George. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 

160025 at ¶ 38.

Also, the Defendants overlook the fact that there is evidence here that Lopez and Moussa 

harmed George in addition to the fabricated evidence. George was tackled, punched and choked. 

(Ex. 1 at 78-79). He was punched in the head and choked several times. (Ex. 1 at 78: 80-82; 83, 

86). His windpipe was pressed “real tight.” He started to black out as a result of this violence. 

(Ex. 1 at 86, 87, 118). Then, Moussa tased George four times. (Ex. 1 at 88, 95). Moussa used the 

maximum voltage on George, and a policeman told George when they were at the hospital “We 

thought you was gonna (sic) die.” (Ex.1 at 127-8). Indeed, when George was being tased, an officer 

said “the fucker is going to die.” (Ex. 1 at 91). The Defendants’ argument fails, thus precluding 

summary judgment. 

5. Moussa and Lopez are Not Immune from Their Actions. 

The Defendants argue that Moussa and Lopez are absolutely immune for liability for their 

false testimony in George’s criminal trials, citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-40 (1983). 

(Defendants’ Memo at 11-12). However, a police officer who manufactures false evidence against 

a criminal defendant violates the U.S. Constitution, if that evidence is used to deprive that person

in some way of his liberty. Whitlock v. Brueggmann, 682 F. 2d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012); Starks v. 

City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788-89 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 

The Complaint here alleges, among other things, that: Moussa used excessive and 

unnecessary force on George by repeatedly discharging a Taser on George and he illegally stopped 

and seized George without probable cause of legal justification by discharging a Taser on him. (2

nd

Am. Complaint, Doc. 89, ¶¶ 70(a) and (b)); Lopez falsely charged George with aggravated battery; 

illegally stopped seized, searched and arrested George without probable cause or legal 

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justification; he carried out an illegal arrest and/or detainment of George; and, he had a reasonable 

opportunity to intervene and failed to intervene to stop Moussa from repeatedly tasing George. (Id.

at ¶¶ 71(b), (d), (e) and (f)). 

Lopez and Moussa charged George with criminal complaints for aggravated battery (Exs. 

8, 9), criminal trespass to motor vehicle (Ex. 12), reckless conduct nearly striking pedestrians (ex. 

11), resisting arrest (Exs. 10, 13). Even though these complaints were superseded by the 

Information charging aggravated battery to a police officer, these complaints led to the initial bond 

set at $100,000 and later to the Information. The false statement that George’s car did not have its 

headlights on (Ex. 15, arrest report), and the false charge of aggravated battery to a police officer, 

initially made by Lopez resulted in George being incarcerated for almost one year. Therefore, the 

Defendants are not immune from liability.

Additionally, police officers are not immune from liability for withholding evidence. 

Whitlock, 682 F. 3d at 587-88; Phillips v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL 1309811 (N.D. Ill.) *25. If, 

as the Appellate Court concluded, the POD video reflected the encounter between Lopez’ car and 

George’s SUV, (Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025, ¶ 38) Lopez and Moussa withheld evidence as 

to what truly happened. Finally, nothing argued by the Defendants prevents George from having 

a jury hear Lopez’s and Moussa’s prior testimony and assess their credibility. Summary judgment 

must be denied. 

6. Contrary to their Assertions, the Defendants’ Actions Constitute Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”).

The Defendants argue that their actions were not severe enough to constitute IIED. 

(Defendants’ Memo at 12-14). It is true that, to constitute IIED, a person’s behavior must be 

intentional and extreme. See, e.g., Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 269-75 (2003); Guerra 

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v. Hunger, 1998 WL 246399 * 1, 4-5 (N.D. Ill. 1998). However, the Defendants overlook the facts 

and Illinois law. 

George was tackled, choked and punched. (Ex. 1 at 78-79). He was punched in the head 

and choked several times. (Ex. 1 at 78: 80-82; 83, 86). His windpipe was pressed “real tight;” he

started to black out as a result of this violence. (Ex. 1 at 86, 87, 118). 

Then, Moussa tased George. (Ex. 1 at 88, 95). At that time, George was lying on the 

ground; he was no threat to anyone. (Ex. 2 at 51). Moussa received police training where he was 

tased. (Ex. 2 at 66). He knew the amount of pain he inflicted on George and he tased George four 

times. (Ex. 1 at 88, 95). Moussa used the maximum voltage on George, and a policeman told 

George when they were at the hospital “We thought you was gonna (sic) die.” (Ex.1 at 127-8). 

Indeed, when George was being tased, an officer said “the fucker is going to die.” (Ex. 1 at 91). 

Lopez’ and Moussa’s conduct was severe and it was intentional. 

Much less egregious conduct has been found to constitute IIED. For example, in Pavlik v. 

Kornhaber, 326 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736-38; 743-46 (2nd Dist. 2001), a cause of action for IIED was

found to lie for repeatedly making sexually explicit remarks. In Pilotto v. Urban Outfitters West, 

LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 16044, ¶ 17, the plaintiff’s allegations that she was refused access to a 

public bathroom was found to state a cause of action for IIED. 

The Defendants ignore their conduct and focus, instead, on George’s reactions to their 

conduct at the time of his deposition, which was taken approximately a year and a half after the 

incident. In support, they rely on Weston v. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr., 2016 IL App (1st) 150935-

U. However, Weston, an Illinois case, is an unpublished opinion. As such, pursuant to Illinois law, 

it has no precedential value. Ill. S. Ct. Rule 23(e). Therefore, applying Illinois law, this Court 

cannot consider it. 

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Of greatest importance is that Illinois law provides that it is a defendant’s conduct that is 

important, not whether it left lasting emotional scars. See, e.g., Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at 267-71; 

Guerra, 1998 WL 246399 at *1, 4-5. The Defendants ask this Court to ignore Illinois law. In effect, 

they also ask this Court to assess the amount of damage they caused which is not appropriate for 

summary judgment. This Court must deny summary judgment. 

7. Lopez and Moussa Assaulted George.

The Defendants assert that they never threatened George before they used force on him

and George did not allege that he had an opportunity to apprehend a battery, and thus, according 

to the Defendants, George cannot claim that he was assaulted. (Defendants’ Memo at 14-15). This 

argument distorts the facts. 

An assault occurs when the defendant places the plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of 

being battered. Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 760-61 (N.D. Ill. 2015). When 

Lopez first stopped George by blocking his SUV, the officers beamed a very bright light on 

George; he could not see. (Ex. 6 at 7, 8, 27. They did not identify themselves as police officers and 

they did not activate their car’s Mars Lights. (Exs. 1 at 58; 67; 66, 178; 5 at 63). Indeed, Lopez 

testified at the criminal trial that he could not remember if he identified himself as a police officer.

(Ex. 8 at 83). The officers had their guns drawn, pointed straight at George. (Ex. 5 at 62). Pointing 

a gun at a person is an assault.

George, being in a crime-ridden neighborhood just short of midnight, (Ex. 3 at 11; 1 at 50) 

and unaware of who was yelling at him from the car that blocked his SUV, panicked and ran from 

his car. (Ex. 1 at 58, 67). By pointing his gun at George, Lopez placed George in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent battery. Also, by punching George in the head, battering and choking 

George (Ex. 1 at 78-83, 86), Lopez placed George in fear for his life.

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Additionally, Moussa placed George in reasonable apprehension of battery. While tasing 

George, Moussa placed George in fear for his life. The statement “the fucker is going to die” made 

by a policeman on the scene, (Ex. 1 at 91) is ample evidence that Moussa not only placed George 

in harm, but, he placed George in fear of dying. The Defendants’ argument ignores the facts. 

Summary judgment must be denied. 

Conclusion

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff, George Brown, respectfully 

requests that this Court deny the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 

GEORGE BROWN

s/ Peter V. Bustamante

___________________

Peter V. Bustamante

17 North State Street - Suite 1550

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 346-2072

pvbust@bustamantelaw.com

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