alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Docket No: FAA-2015-0251 Dir ID: 2014-NM-200-AD

. Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization Person Contacted Date Response 

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti 10/9/14

Regional Airline Association 10/9/14

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 10/9/14

Airlines for America Robert Ireland 10/9/14
#### 1910.011 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.

The Contracting Officer shall include the provision at 1952.210-70, Brand Name or Equal, in solicitations for which brand name or equal purchase is used.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40450 Summary Calendar

JOHN JULIAN DAYSE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus JOHN E. STICE et al., Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:95-CV-626

- - - - - - - - - - August 14, 1996 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * John Julian Dayse, #498384, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the relevant portion of which has been redesignated as § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) by § 804 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Dayse contends that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from mentally unstable inmates who are allowed toNo. 96-40450 - 2 - roam freely in general population and allowed access to razor blades. We have reviewed the record and Dayse’s brief and AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for essentially the same reasons set forth by the district court. Dayse v. Stiles , No. 6:95-CV626 (E.D. Tx. April 15, 1996).
# FOIA Log October 2021 (2)

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#### Paul Pollak, Appellant, v. Gus Moundzroukas et al., Respondents.

Order entered March 23, 1964, herein appealed from, denying plaintiff’s application for a re-evaluation of the denial of a general preference and for the granting of a general preference, unanimously reversed on the law, the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with $30 costs and disbursements to abide the event. On this record, in light of the nature and extent of the claimed injuries and the medical reports submitted in support thereof, plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to warrant the granting of a preference *(Williams*v. *Veer,*14 A D 2d 670; *Leibowitz*v. *Rector,*13 A D 2d 734; *Leary*v. *City of New York,*15 A D 2d 480). Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
Exhibit 32

                          ASPEN EXPLORATION CORPORATION

                   Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350
           Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer

     To my knowledge: the annual report on Form 10-KSB for the period ended June
30, 2004, containing financial statements for the period then ended, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Act of 1934;
and the information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Aspen
Exploration Corporation for the periods presented.


September 23, 2004


/s/  Robert A. Cohan
-----------------------------------------
     Robert A. Cohan, Chief Executive
     Officer and Chief Financial Officer
#### Nelson *v.*Mayor and Council of Meansville.

April 15, 1913.

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Daniel. Pike superior court. December 14, 1912.'

*É. G. Armistead,*for plaintiff. *F. F. Dupree,*for defendant.

Fish, C. J.

In view of the pleadings and the evidence, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Ugo Mariani, Respondent, v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., et al., Appellants, and Globe Indemnity Co., Respondent. Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent.

Claimant’s total disablement from pneumoconiosis is undisputed and the controversy is as to the carrier liable for compensation. The board found the date of disablement to be September 13, 1957, that being the date on which claimant last worked. The board found, also, that claimant was exposed to tale dust, the causative agent, until that time. Appellant Hartford, which was on the risk on September 13, 1957, and for seven years prior thereto, contends that liability must be imposed on respondent Globe, which was the carrier when on August 9, 1947 claimant first received medical attention, following which Globe was (in apparent error of law) directed to and did pay medical bills for some time. There was ample evidence of claimant’s injurious exposure to tale dust in the employer’s plant at Long Island City until 1952 and some evidence of continued exposure, which the board was entitled to accept, in the employer’s East Hills plant from 1952 on; and since claimant remained in the same employ and since appellant Hartford was on the risk at all times from 1950 on, it is not particularly important whether or not the exposure at East Hills was injurious, as Hartford’s liability, as the last carrier on the risk, is clear in either case, under section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law *(Matter of Trentin*v. *Civetta Contr.,*10 A D 2d 745), which section is retroactive *(Matter of Mlodozeniec*v. *Worthington Corp.,*9 A D 2d 21, affd. 8 N Y 2d 918, opp. dsmd. and cert, den. 364 U. S. 628). We find nothing in the amendments to the statute by the addition of section 44-a and of paragraph (ee) of subdivision 8 of section 15 to support appellants’ contention that the correct date of disablement is August 9, 1947, when claimant first received medical treatment for pneumoconiosis, as in eases of dust diseases the disability contemplated remains “ total disability” (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 3, subd. 2, par. 28; § 15, subd. 8, par. [ee]; § 44-a; and cf. §§ 39, 49, 49-a [last par.]); and *Matter of By dak*v. *Eastern Precision Besistor*(12 N Y 2d 29), upon which appellants largely rely is not in point, involving, as it did, an occupational dermatitis, not required to be totally disabling (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 3, subd. 2, par. 27), rather than a dust disease. Decision affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents Special Disability Fund and Globe Indemnity Company. Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.
###### Editorial Note on Part 842

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 842 appear at 81 FR 83688, Nov. 22, 2016.

#### § 842.113 Reconsideration of a waiver for undue hardship.

A settlement authority may reconsider its previous action on a request for waiver or compromise whether requested or not. Reconsideration is normally on the basis of new evidence or discovery of errors in the waiver submission or settlement, but can be based upon a re-evaluation of the claim by the settlement authority.

[81 FR 83700, Nov. 22, 2016]
NO. 07-10-00145-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL D MAY 11, 2010

HERBERT PARMER, JR., APPELLANT

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF FREESTONE COUNTY; NO. 22436; HONORABLE LINDA K. GRANT, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Herbert Parmer, Jr. seeks to appeal a judgment convicting him of indecent exposure and imposing on him a sentenc e of 120 days jail time with credit for time served and court costs. The judgment included in the clerk’s record indicates sentence was imposed on August 10, 2009. His motion for new trial and notice of appeal were filed in the trial court on September 11, 2009.2 By letter, this Court informed appellant that the notice of appeal did not appear timely and directed him to file any documen ts or matters considered necessary for the Court to determine its appella te jurisdiction. No response has been received.
Our appellate jurisdiction is triggered through a timely notice of appeal. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex.Cri m.App.1996). Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2(a) requires a notice of appeal be f iled within 30 days after the day sentence is imposed in open court, or within 90 days a fter imposition of the sentence if a timely motion for new trial is filed. The motion for new trial was not timely filed in this case.

The rules of appellate procedure provide for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal if "such notice is filed within fifteen days afte r the last day allowed and within the same period a motion is filed in the court of appeals reasonably explaining the need for such extension." Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. Both the notice of appeal and the extension motion must be filed within the time provided by the rules. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex .Crim.App. 1998); Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at 522. Appellant’s notice of appea l, filed more than thirty days a fter imposition of sentence in open court, without a motion for ex tension, was untimely.
The appropriate vehicle for seeking an ou t-of-time appeal is by writ of habeas corpus from the Texas Cour t of Criminal Appea ls pursuant to Co de of Criminal Procedure article 11.07. Te x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2007); Portley v. State , 89 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex.App.—(Te xarkana 2002, no pet.). Because appellant’s notice of appea l was untimely, this Court has no jurisdiction to take any3 action but to dismiss the appeal. Slaton , 981 S.W.2d at 210; see Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at
522.
Consequently, we dismi ss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

James T. Campbell Justice

Do not publish.
§ 989.28 Airspace and range proposals. ( a ) *EIAP Review.* Airspace and range proposals require review by HQ USAF/XOO prior to public announcement and preparation of the DOPAA. Unless directed otherwise, the airspace proponent will forward the DOPAA as an attachment to the proposal sent to HQ USAF/XOO.
( b ) *Federal Aviation Administration.* The DoD and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that outlines various airspace responsibilities. For purposes of compliance with NEPA, the DoD is the “lead agency” for all proposals initiated by DoD, with the FAA acting as the “cooperating agency.” Where airspace proposals initiated by the FAA affect military use, the roles are reversed. The proponent's action officers (civil engineering and local airspace management) must ensure that the FAA is fully integrated into the airspace proposal and related EIAP from the very beginning and that the action officers review the FAA's responsibilities as a cooperating agency. The proponent's airspace manager develops the preliminary airspace proposal per appropriate FAA handbooks and the FAA-DoD MOU. The preliminary airspace proposal is the basis for initial dialogue between DoD and the FAA on the proposed action. A close working relationship between DoD and the FAA, through the FAA regional Air Force representative, greatly facilitates the airspace proposal process and helps resolve many NEPA issues during the EIAP.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                    5
<MULTIPLIER>                 1
       
<PERIOD-TYPE>                6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>            APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                 OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                       76,111
<SECURITIES>                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                495,158
<ALLOWANCES>                 78,736
<INVENTORY>                  1,389,241
<CURRENT-ASSETS>             2,507,175
<PP&E>                       2,343,211
<DEPRECIATION>               1,162,894
<TOTAL-ASSETS>               10,970,042
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>        1,945,132
<BONDS>                      2,958,058
<COMMON>                     125,557
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>        0
<PREFERRED>                  3,925
<OTHER-SE>                   5,937,370
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY> 10,970,370
<SALES>                      4,237,291
<TOTAL-REVENUES>             4,237,291
<CGS>                        3,493,667
<TOTAL-COSTS>                3,928,462
<OTHER-EXPENSES>             27,604
<LOSS-PROVISION>             259,989
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>           88,228
<INCOME-PRETAX>              21,236
<INCOME-TAX>                 12,317
<INCOME-CONTINUING>          0
<DISCONTINUED>               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>              0
<CHANGES>                    0
<NET-INCOME>                 12,317
<EPS-PRIMARY>                .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                .01
        

</TABLE>
#### WESTERVELT, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

November 20, 1903.)

Action by Susan Westervelt, as administratrix, etc., against New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion denied.
#### Vista Plumbing & Cooling, Inc., Appellant, v Woldec Construction Corp., Respondent. Vista Plumbing & Cooling, Inc., Appellant, v Bethlehem Construction Corp., Respondent.

— Appeals from orders of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered January 26, 1978 in Albany County, which granted defendants’ motions to set aside default judgments. Each matter involves a dispute between these defendants, who were general contractors on construction sites, and the plaintiff, who did the plumbing and heating work as a subcontractor for each of them. Plaintiff served a summons with notice on defendant, Woldec Construction Corporation, pursuant to section 306 of the Business Corporation Law by serving the Secretary of State. Defendant failed to appear and a default judgment was entered against defendant on December 2, 1977 for $1,337.08. On December 15, 1977 defendant obtained an order staying execution and an order to show cause to open the default. In its papers, defendant denies any notice of the commencement of the action. The affidavit of merits alleges a breach of the contract by the plaintiff and failure by plaintiff to perform the contract. Default judgment was ordered opened on January 23, 1978. The action against Bethlehem Construction Company was commenced by service of summons and complaint on the Secretary of State on July 12, 1976. The defendant did not appear in the action and a default judgment was filed in the office of the Clerk of the County of Albany on December 2, 1977 for $9,197.01. Defendant moved to set the default aside on December 22, 1977. The motion was granted on January 23, 1978. The affidavit of merits alleges that defendant was not served with a notice of the action and includes several defenses which, if proven, would be meritorious. The power to open a default judgment is discretionary with the court and an exercise of such power will not be disturbed unless its granting constitutes an abuse of discretion. Special Term properly permitted the opening of both default judgments. Each defendant has demonstrated a lack of willfulness on its part in failing to appear in the action. Each promptly moved to vacate the judgment and each has meritorious defenses, if proven, to the actions. It cannot be said that Special Term abused its discretion *(Machnick Bldrs. v Grand Union Co.,*52 AD2d 655). Orders affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Kane and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 12 CR 167

)
)
v. }
) Magistrate Judge Finnegan
)
)
)

LAWRENCE A. DRAUS and
LAWRENCE E. DRAUS

PROTECTIVE ORDER

Upon the government’s agreed motion for a protective order, it is hereby ORDERED as
follows:

1. All materials produced by the government in preparation for, or in connection with,
any stage of the proceedings in this case (and all copies of such materials) may be utilized by the
defendant and his counsel solely in connection with the defense of this case and for no other purpose
and in connection with no other proceeding. The materials and any of their contents shall not be
disclosed either directly or indirectly to any person or entity other than the defendant, defendant’s
counsel, persons assisting in the defense, persons who are interviewed or consulted during the course
of the investigation of this case or such other persons as to whom the Court may authorize
disclosure. Any notes or records of any kind that defense counsel or the defendant may make
relating to the contents of materials provided by the government shall not be disclosed to anyone
other than the defendant’s counsel, and persons employed to assist the defense, or such other person
as to whom the Court may authorize disclosure, and all such notes and records shall not be disclosed
except as provided by this Order.

2. The materials shall not be copied or reproduced except so as to provide copies of the



material for the use by each defense lawyer and defendant and such persons as are employed by them
to assist in the defense and such copies and reproductions shall be treated in the same manner as the
original matter.

3. Defendant’s counsel may provide copies of the materials to the defendant. However,
the defendant may not photocopy any of these materials, and may not share or disclose the materials
or any verbatim contents of those materials except as provided by the first paragraph of this Order.
Upon conclusion of the trial or the earlier resolution of charges against the defendant, defendant shall
return all such materials to his attorneys.

4. The restrictions set forth in this order do not apply to documents that are public
record, including but not limited to, trial transcripts, documents that have been received in evidence
at other trials, or documents that are otherwise in the public domain.

5, Intentional violation of this Order is punishable as a contempt, and may result in the
imposition of civil and criminal sanctions. However, nothing contained in this protective order shall
preclude any party from applying to the Court for further relief or for modification of any provision
hereof.

Wile Wa bem

Hon, SHEILA FINNEGAN
United States Magistrate Jud;

els [zalz

DATE
#### In the Matter of Eugene Fedele et al., Appellants, v Steven Baruch et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town/Village of Harrison, et al., Respondents.

— In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent zoning board of appeals which, after a hearing, granted an area variance to the respondent property owner, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated December 20, 1977, which, *inter alia,*dismissed the petition. Judgment affirmed, with one bill of costs payable jointly to respondents. We hold under the circumstances present here, that petitioners were not prejudiced by the lack of a transcript or by the zoning board’s refusal to reopen the hearing. The determination must be confirmed because the record supports the view that the respondent property owner would be confronted with practical difficulties unless granted a variance (cf. *Conley v Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals,*40 NY2d 309). Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, Titone and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________ NO. 09-13-00379-CR



### ____________________ OMAR GERARDO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee

________________ __________________ __________________ ___ ______________ On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. CR 30247

________________ __________________ ______________________ _____________ MEMORANDUM OPINION On June 14, 2013, the trial court accepted Omar Gerardo’s guilty plea to burglary of a habitation, deferred adj udication of guilt, and signed a community supervision order. On July 15, 2013, Gerardo filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied in a written orde r signed on August 9, 2013. Gerardo filed a notice of appeal on August 12, 2013. The trial court signed a cer tification in which the court certified that this is a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.2 25.2(a)(2). The district clerk has provided the trial court’s certification to the Court of Appeals. On March 5, 2014, we notified the partie s that we would dismiss the appeal unless the appellant established grounds fo r continuing the appeal. No response has been filed. Because the trial court’s certif ication shows the defe ndant does not have the right of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.

_______ _________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Opinion Delivered April 9, 2014 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kr eger and Horton, JJ.
#### Emba Mink Breeders Association, Respondent, v. Shulof & Co., Inc., et al., Appellants.

Order, entered on April 29, 1963, on plaintiff’s motion addressed to defendants’ notice of examination before trial, unanimously modified, on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the last paragraph and substituting the following: “ The notice of examination is modified to the extent of requiring the production of only such books, records and papers as are presently located in plaintiff’s New York office, without prejudice to an application for the production of other books, records and papers after the examination has proceeded ”; and, as so modified, said order is affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to defendants-appellants. On this record a requirement that an officer of plaintiff travel from Wisconsin to New York for pretrial examination appears to impose no “serious inconvenience or hardship” *(Meinig Co.*v. *United States Fastener Co.,*194 App. Div. 397, 399). More persuasive is plaintiff’s objection to transporting books, records and papers to New York as required by defendants’ comprehensive demand. But the validity of the objection need not be decided now. The examination should proceed, with the production of books, records and papers locally available. If in defendants’ view these should prove insufficient, the court will then be better able to determine whether others should be produced and if so where. Settle order on notice. Concur — Botein, P. J., McNally, Eager, Steuer and Staley, JJ.
Dear Mr. Pierce:

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket 

No. FAA−2015−3861). This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) to process your petition.

 Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) 

which is required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to 

proceed without this manual and remove closed-set filming from your proposed operation 

please inform of us of your intention by the requested response date listed below.

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at 

www.regulations.gov. Once your information has been submitted, please also send a copy of the 

requested information (and any proprietary information), as well as your comment tracking 

number from regulations.gov via e-mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov. If you want us to process 

your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 1/5/16. If we do 

not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-4549.

Sincerely,

/S/

Michael J. Cameron

Program Analyst