alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.12.2

[EXULT LOGO]

MEMORANDUM

To:      Steven Unterberger

From:    James McLelland

Date:    02/29/00

Re:      Compensation

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This memorandum is to confirm the consensus recommendation made by the
compensation committee. Effective January 1, 2000 your base compensation
increased to an annual $400,000. The bonus target amount will remain at 50% or
$200,000 payable at the fiscal year end.

JM/rma
#### 1252.242-71 Contractor Testimony.

As prescribed in 1242.270(b), insert the following clause:

# Contractor Testimony (NOV 2022)

All requests for the testimony of the Contractor or its employees, and any intention to testify as an expert witness relating to: (a) any work required by, and/or performed under, this contract; or (b) any information provided by any party to assist the Contractor in the performance of this contract, shall be immediately reported to the Contracting Officer. Neither the Contractor nor its employees shall testify on a matter related to work performed or information provided under this contract, either voluntarily or pursuant to a request, in any judicial or administrative proceeding unless approved, in advance, by the Contracting Officer or required by a judge in a final court order.

(End of clause)
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10(a)




                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


     We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" and to
the use of our report dated February 9, 2000 with respect to the financial
statements of Separate Account VA-1 of The American Franklin Life Insurance
Company and our report dated February 18, 2000, with respect to the financial
statements of The American Franklin Life Insurance Company, in this Post-
Effective Amendment No. 6 to the Registration Statement on Form N-4
(No. 333-10489) under the Securities Act of 1933 and Registration Statement
(No. 811-7781) under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and related Prospectus
and Statement of Additional Information of Separate Account VA-1 of The American
Franklin Life Insurance Company


                                    /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
                                    ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Chicago, Illinois
April 24, 2000
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20549
 FORM 10-KSB/A
  þ
    
    ANNUAL REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR
15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:For the fiscal year ended August 31, 2008
  o
    
    TRANSITION REPORT UNDER SECTION 13
OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:For the transition period from ____________to ____________
 
  
 GOLF
ROUNDS.COM, INC.(Name of Small Business Issuer in Its Charter)
 
 Delaware
    
    59-1224913(State or Other Jurisdiction of 
Incorporation or Organization)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer
Identification No.)
 111 Village Parkway, Building #2, Marietta, Georgia
    
    30067(Address of Principal Executive Offices)
    
    (Zip Code)
  
  Title of Each Class
    
    Name of Each Exchange on Which RegisteredNone
    
    None
  Common Stock, par value $0.01 per share




---



##### 



þ o
 þ
 þ
    o þ
   
    
    The Cover Page to the Annual Report
 
    
    Exhibit 31.1
 1




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
  Dated: February 18, 2009
    GOLF ROUNDS.COM, INC.
(Registrant)By:
    /s/ Robert H. DonehewName:
    Robert H. DonehewTitle:
    President, Treasurer and Secretary  /s/ Robert H. Donehew

Robert H. Donehew
    
    President, Treasurer, Secretary and
Director
(Principal Executive and Principal Accounting and
Financial Officer)
 /s/ Anthony Charos

Anthony Charos
    
    Director
 2
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 13 (Friday, January 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 6650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-01321]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD


Notice of Board Meeting

DATES: January 26, 2021 at 10:00 a.m.

ADDRESSES: Telephonic. Dial-in (listen only) information: Number: 1-
415-527-5035, Code: 199 601 5134; or via web: https://tspmeet.webex.com/tspmeet/onstage/g.php?MTID=e84524dda563a8355830b6e7b51e26b53.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kimberly Weaver, Director, Office of 
External Affairs, (202) 942-1640.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Board Meeting Agenda

Open Session

    1. Approval of the December 21, 2020 Board Meeting Minutes
    2. Monthly Reports
    (a) Participant Activity Report
    (b) Legislative Report
    3. Quarterly Reports
    (c) Investment Policy
    (d) Budget Review
    (e) Audit Status
    4. Internal Audit Update
    5. Annual Expense Ratio Review
    6. Multi-asset Manager Update
    7. Recordkeeping Services Acquisition (RKSA) Update

Closed Session

    8. Information covered under 5 U.S.C. 552b (c)(9)(B).

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552b (e)(1).

    Dated: January 14, 2021.
Dharmesh Vashee,
Acting General Counsel, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board.
[FR Doc. 2021-01321 Filed 1-21-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-02-1999
<CASH>                                           2,595
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,924
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,109
<INVENTORY>                                    109,199
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               212,675
<PP&E>                                         410,216
<DEPRECIATION>                                 253,751
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 411,948
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,130
<BONDS>                                         17,905
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        22,511
<OTHER-SE>                                     200,310
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   411,948
<SALES>                                        221,834
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               221,834
<CGS>                                          172,577
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  212,214
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (252)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   280
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,784
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,808
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,089
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,719
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,719
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.35


</TABLE>
#### Pioneer Mounting *&*Finishing Co., Appellant, v. Shelley Graphics, Ltd., et al., Respondents.

Order, entered on August 14, 1963, unanimously reversed on the law and the motion to vacate the warrant of attachment denied, without costs. We find that the papers on which the motion was granted are insufficient in that there was no dear averment of facts to support the contentions of the movant. In view of this disposition, it is not necessary to consider the motion addressed by respondent to the record, as the matter claimed to be incorporated improperly could and did have no bearing on the result. The motion is denied as academic. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Raibin, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### 1303.804 Policy.

The original OMB Form LLL, Disclosure of Lobbying Activities, shall be retained in the contract file and a copy shall be submitted to the Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Administration, Ethics Law and Program Division.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Robert Campbell, Appellant, v. Wilfred L. Denno, as Warden of Sing Sing Prison, Respondent.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, relator appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated November 20, 1961, which dismissed the writ after a hearing, and remanded him to the custody of respondent. Order affirmed. No opinion. Ughetta, Acting P. J,, Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Cornelius Du Bois, Petitioner, v State Tax Commission, Respondent.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the State Tax Commission, which sustained an unincorporated business tax deficiency assessment for the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, under article 23 of the Tax Law. The petitioner earned income through self-employment as a research consultant in the field of market and opinion research. He reported his self-employment on his personal income tax returns (IT-208) for the years 1969-1972, but filed *no*unincorporated business tax returns. He did attach to each personal income tax return a note or statement to the effect that he was engaged in a profession and disclaimed liability for the unincorporated business tax on that ground. The petitioner contends that as to the years 1969 and 1970 the three-year period within which a tax could be assessed had run and the assessment for those years was barred (Tax Law, § 683, subd [a]). However, it is well established that the three-year period does not run until the unincorporated business tax return is filed *(Matter of Hewitt v Bates,*297 NY 239). *Assuming*that the Form IT-208 might contain such a full disclosure as to be the equivalent of the filing of an unincorporated business tax return, the present returns were inadequate as they did not detail the nature of the business activity *(Matter of Arbesfeld, Goldstein v State Tax Comm.,*62 AD2d 627). The petitioner’s attempts to distinguish the *Hewitt*case are unpersuasive. The petitioner further contends that he is exempt from the unincorporated business tax because he is engaged in a profession. It is well established that the burden of proving an exemption is upon the petitioner and he does not meet the judicially established tests for a profession as set forth most recently in *Matter of Perlman v State Tax Comm.*(63 AD2d 762). Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Kane, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MILAGRAS RAMOS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 1114

)

TARGET CORPORATION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This sua sponte memorandum order is triggered by some

fundamental flaws in the Answer of Target Corporation (“Target”)

to the personal injury Complaint brought against it by Milagras

Ramos. Although this Court has frankly been sorely tempted to

expand at some length with its criticism of the quality (or more

accurately the lack of quality) of the work product submitted by

Target’s counsel, it will content itself by simply identifying

some obvious defects:

1. Answer ¶2 reflects an inexplicable failure to

follow the clear roadmap prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P.

(“Rule”) 8(b)(5) -- see App’x ¶1 to State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill.

2001). It is stricken.

2. Answer ¶3 is nonresponsive to the

corresponding allegations of Complaint ¶3 and thus
fails to comply with Rule 8(b)(1)(B). It too is

sticken.

3. Because every affirmative defense (“AD”) must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint to

which it responds (see App’x ¶5 to State Farm), the

portions of Target’s first two ADs that speak of Ramos’

asserted contributory negligence as being the sole

cause of his injuries are also stricken.

4. Counsel Mark McAndrew’s Affidavit of

Insufficient Knowledge is defective in no fewer than

four respects: (a) It cites to an Illinois statute,

which of course has no application to this federal

case, (b) it repeats the same blunder referred to above

in paragraph 1, (c) it is signed by Target’s lawyer,

even though of course it is only the client’s

disclaimer that would be relevant and (d) it is stated

to the best of the lawyer’s knowledge and belief, which

is never adequate where an actual affidavit is called

for (as is not the case here). That “affidavit” must

be omitted the next time around.

Accordingly Target must file either an amendment to its

Answer or a self-contained Amended Answer on or before April 9,

2012. No charge is to be made to Target for the added work and

expense incurred in correcting counsel’s own errors. Target’s

2
counsel are ordered to apprise their client to that effect by

letter, with a copy to be transmitted to this Court’s chambers as

an informational matter (not for filing).

___________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: March 26, 2012

3
#### 1850.102-2 Contract adjustment boards.

14 CFR part 1209, subpart 3, Contract Adjustment Board, establishes the Contract Adjustment Board (CAB) as the approving authority to consider and dispose of requests from NASA contractors for extraordinary contractual actions.
First Department,

October, 1964

(October 1, 1964)

#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Joseph Tuzzino et al., Respondents, and Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant.

Order entered April 13, 1964, denying respondent’s motion for a stay of arbitration, unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, with $30 costs and disbursements to the appellant, and the motion granted, with $10 costs. Section 617 of article 17-A of the Insurance Law provides, in part, as follows: “ The protection provided by this article shall not apply * * * unless the bodily injury to the insured or qualified person arose out of physical contact of the motor vehicle causing such bodily injury”. There was an absence of physical contact between the offending vehicle and that of claimants. Hence, respondent-appellant is entitled to a stay of arbitration. *(Matter of MVAIC [Stern],*21 A D 2d 856; *Matter of MVAIC [Lupo],*18 A D 2d 717, affd. 13 N Y 2d 1017). Concur — Breitel, J. P.,

Valente, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ. [42 Misc 2d 786.]
**Issue Paper 8**

**Session 1:  November 13-15, 2017**

**Issue:**	Whether to recalculate a borrower’s Subsidized Usage Period and interest accrual, if applicable, when the borrower receives a discharge of a loan for which he or she has not received all or part of the educational benefit of the loan

**Statutory cite:**§****455(q) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA)

****

**Regulatory cite:**34 CFR****685.200(f)

**Summary of issue:**

Section 455(q) of the HEA provides that a first-time borrower on or after July 1, 2013, is not eligible for additional Direct Subsidized Loans if the borrower has received Direct Subsidized Loans for a period that is equal to or greater than 150 percent of the length of the borrower’s current program of study. In addition, some borrowers who are not eligible for Direct Subsidized Loans because of the 150 percent limit become responsible for the interest that accrues on their loans when it would otherwise be paid by the government. Neither the statute nor regulations issued prior to the delayed 2016 regulations address what effect a discharge of a Direct Subsidized Loan has on the 150 percent limit. They also do not address whose responsibility it is to pay the outstanding interest on any remaining loans that have not been discharged, but have previously lost eligibility for interest subsidy.

Currently, the Department does not include in the calculation of a borrower’s subsidized usage period, the subsidized usage period associated with a Direct Subsidized Loan or the portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan that repaid a Direct Subsidized Loan if the borrower receives a discharge that demonstrates the borrower did not receive all or part of the educational benefit of the loan. The discharges that meet this description are: closed school, false certification, unpaid refund, and borrower defense. 

As a part of the November 1, 2016, final regulations, the Department reflected this practice by amending 34 CFR 685.200(f)(4)(iii) to specify that a partial or full discharge based on school closure, false certification, unpaid refund, or borrower defense would result in the elimination or recalculation of the subsidized usage period associated with the loan(s) discharged in calculating a borrower’s subsidized usage period. The Department also amended 34 CFR 685.200(f)(3)(v) to provide that if all or part of a Direct Subsidized Loan (or applicable portion of a Direct Consolidation Loan) is discharged such that a borrower has a remaining eligibility period, the Department reinstates the interest subsidy on any eligible loans and refunds applicable amounts already paid by the borrower. 

Questions for consideration by the committee include:

· Should the Department recalculate or eliminate the applicable subsidized usage period from calculation of the borrower’s subsidized usage period and reinstate interest subsidy (if applicable) when a borrower receives a loan discharge?

· If so, to which discharges should recalculation or elimination of subsidized usage periods apply?

1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Clifford Thomas, Appellant.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed.
#### Edmund B. Murry et al., Plaintiffs, v. Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant.

Submission of a controversy under section 546 of the Civil Practice Act, to be determined in the first instance by this court. Judgment on the submission is directed to be entered in favor of defendant, without costs, to the effect: (1) that the motor vehicle liability insurance policy in question was effectively terminated as of the date set forth in the notice of cancellation which defendant had sent to its insureds, namely, September 14, 1959; and (2) that said termination of insurance was unaffected by the defendant’s failure to file the notice of the cancellation with the Commissioner of Motor *959Vehicles within 30 days after said effective date of cancellation, as required by section 313 (formerly § 93-e) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see *Kyer*v. *General Cas. Co. of America,*14 A D 2d 649). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

Form 10-Q for Quarterly Period Ended
September 28, 2008

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Briggs & Stratton Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 28, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John S. Shiely,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ John S. Shiely     
|John S. Shiely         
|Chief Executive Officer
|November 5, 2008       

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NOS. AP-76,203 & AP-76,204

EX PARTE BRENT EDWARD CARNEY, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NOS. 053234 and 053235 IN THE 336th DISTRICT COURT

FROM GRAYSON COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court these applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex

parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession

of chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance and possession of methamphetamine.

He was sentenced to ninety nine years’ imprisonment in each cause. 

Applicant contends that he was deprived of his meaningful right to a direct appeal because

notices of appeal were not timely filed in these causes. 

The trial court has determined that timely notices of appeal were not filed through no fault
2

of the Applicant. We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file out-of-time

appeals of the judgments of conviction in Cause Nos. 053234 and 053235 from the 336th Judicial

District Court of Grayson County. Applicant is ordered returned to that time at which he may give

a written notices of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain meaningful appeals.

All time limits shall be calculated as if the sentences had been imposed on the date on which the

mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Applicant desire to prosecute any appeals, he

must take affirmative steps to file a written notices of appeal in the trial court within 30 days after

the mandate of this Court issues.

Delivered: August 26, 2009

Do Not Publish