IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AARON M. WILLOUGHBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security

Defendant.

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) No. 11 C 7854

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Aaron Willoughby (“Willoughby”) brought this

action against Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), seeking review of

the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. 

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For

the reasons that follow, Willoughby’s motion is granted and this

case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

A. Procedural History 

In January 2009, Willoughby applied for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I), 423. Willoughby contended that he had been
disabled since Aug. 3, 2001, as a result of gastroparesis1 and

pyloric stenonis.2

His claim was denied on April 6, 2009. He filed for

reconsideration, which was denied on Aug. 26, 2009. He then

requested a hearing, which was held on April 8, 2010. 

Administrative Law Judge Marlene R. Abrams issued her ruling

denying Willoughby’s claim on May 15, 2010. Willoughby filed a

request for review, which was denied by the Social Security

Administration’s Appeals Council on Sept. 30, 2011. Accordingly,

ALJ Abrams’ ruling is the final decision in this case.

B. Hearing Testimony

Willoughby is a 39-year-old man who last worked in 2001 as a

self-taught auto mechanic for his father’s business. He also

briefly worked as the manager of a video game store for six

months in 1999 and 2000. He was last insured on Dec. 31, 2006.

Willoughby testified at the April 8, 2010, hearing that he

vomits after eating and that he did so all the time from August

of 2001 to the end of 2006. Although he has been diagnosed with

1

 Gastroparesis is a condition that reduces the ability of

the stomach to empty its contents. It causes nausea, vomiting,

and dehydration and can lead to excessive weight loss. 

Gastroparesis, PubMed Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/

pubmedhealth/PMH0001342/ (last visited July 5, 2012).

2 Pyloric stenosis is the narrowing of the opening from the

stomach into the small intestine. Pyloric stenosis, PubMed

Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001965/

(last visited July 5, 2012). 

2
gastroparesis and pyloric stenois, doctors have not determined

the cause of his inability to keep food down.

Willoughby testified that he weighed about 195 pounds in

2000, but his weight dropped to 160 or 170 pounds in 2001, and

dropped to 135 pounds in 2003, when he had his first feeding tube

surgically inserted. It was removed three or four months later

because of pain. In 2004, Willoughby said, he weighed about 125

to 130 pounds. At the time of the hearing, Willoughby, who is

five feet, nine inches tall, weighed about 130 pounds.

After the feeding tube was removed, Willoughby had a

subclavian mediport implanted to receive IV fluids. He gets

fluids through the tube about once a week, depending on his

potassium levels. Willoughby had another feeding tube inserted

in 2010, but it had to be removed two weeks later because it was

causing him pain.

Describing his symptoms from 2001 to 2006, Willoughby

testified that he usually went all day without eating and ate at

night when his wife got home because he has no sense of taste and

cannot tell if food is rotten. He had a colonoscopy in 2000, and

since then, he is never hungry and will not eat unless someone

tells him to eat. His bowel movements became unpredictable after

his gall bladder was removed in 2001. He said he was extremely

weak and fatigued, and took naps of two to three hours each day.

3
Willoughby said he could walk only about 200 feet before

having to sit down and take a break and he experienced dizziness

upon standing. Although he was fatigued, he was able to take

care of his personal grooming most of the time. There were times

when he became so dehydrated he could not function at all. 

Willoughby said he would not have been able to do a totally

sedentary job for eight hours a day because he was too fatigued

and because if he ate anything, he would be in pain.

The Commissioner’s medical examiner, Dr. Ashok Jilhewar,

testified that he disagreed with the diagnosis of gastroparesis

and pyloric stenosis, and did not believe that any of

Willoughby’s doctors knew what was really causing his symptoms. 

Dr. Jilhewar pointed out that Willoughby had a normal gastric

emptying study on May 10, 2002, which in Dr. Jilhewar’s opinion

ruled out a diagnosis of gastroparesis.

Dr. Jilhewar opined that the cause of Willoughby’s disorders

was psychiatric rather than physical, but his doctors diagnosed

him with physical ailments because insurance companies do not pay

toward treatment for psychiatric diseases. Dr. Jilhewar pointed

out that Willoughby was considered bulimic at one time,

apparently by doctors at the Mayo Clinic. Willoughby testified

that doctors at the Mayo Clinic did suggest that he was making

himself vomit, but he denied being bulimic and said he vomited

because the food in his stomach was causing him pain. Willoughby

4
said he had seen several psychiatrists over the years, but denied

having any psychiatric disorders.

ALJ Abrams inquired of Dr. Jilhewar as to whether

Willoughby’s history of weight loss would meet or equal a

listing. Dr. Jilhewar testified that Willoughby did not fall

under Listing 5.083 for weight loss due to a digestive disorder

because he did not fall below 115 pounds and his body mass index

(“BMI”) did not fall below 17.5.4

 Dr. Jilhewar said that if

Willoughby’s BMI was consistently low, then his opinion would be

different. Dr. Jilhewar testified that beginning in August 2009,

Willoughby experienced persistently low levels of serum

potassium, or hypokalemia, which can cause cardiac arrhythmia. 

The medical records did not reveal the cause of this ailment, Dr.

Jilhewar said. Dr. Jilhewar said that ailment would have equaled

listing 5.08 for malnutrition at that time.

Dr. Jilhewar opined that from 2001 through the end of 2006,

Willoughby was capable of sedentary work with certain

restrictions, including certain postural limitations. Dr.

3

 Listing 5.08 is as follows: “Weight loss due to any

digestive disorder despite continuing treatment as prescribed,

with BMI of less than 17.50 calculated on at least two

evaluations at least 60 days apart within a consecutive 6–month

period.” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 

4 In fact, as will be discussed below, Dr. Jilhewar erred in

determining that Willoughby’s body mass index never fell below

17.5.

5
Jilhewar also opined that Willoughby should avoid machinery and

heights because of his bouts of dizziness.

Thomas Dunleavy, the vocational expert, testified that

Willoughby was not able to perform his past work as an auto

mechanic. ALJ Abrams asked Dunleavy questions based on the

physical residual functional capacity assessment performed by

state agency doctor Solfia Saulog. Dr. Saulog determined that

Willoughby could occasionally lift 20 pounds, could frequently

lift 10 pounds, and could stand or walk for two hours in an

eight-hour workday. Dr. Saulog did not place any postural

limitations on Willoughby’s ability to work. Dunleavy testified

that there were unskilled light or sedentary positions in the

Chicago metropolitan area that Willougby could perform, including

as an assembler, sorter, and visual inspector. Dunleavy

testified that even with the additional limitations suggested by

Dr. Jilhewar, Willoughby could perform these jobs.

Willoughby’s attorney and ALJ Abrams inquired as to some

limitations placed on Willoughby by his treating physician, Dr.

M.K. Harney. Dunleavy testified that if Willoughby would have to

miss two days of work each month, as Dr. Harney predicted, that

would be “inconsistent with the acceptable standards for

unskilled work.” Additionally, if Willoughby was required to

take two 20 minute breaks at unpredictable times, that would

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require a special accommodation. The same was true of

Willoughby’s need for frequent and quick access to a restroom.

C. The ALJ’s Ruling

In ruling on Willoughby’s claim, ALJ Abrams employed the

five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant

is disabled. This requires a determination of: (1) whether the

claimant is presently employed; (2) whether the claimant’s

impairments or combination of impairments are severe; (3) whether

the claimant’s impairments meet or medically equal a listed

impairment that the Social Security Administration has found to

be disabling; and if not (4) whether the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform his past work; and if not

(5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any other work in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). An affirmative

answer at step three or step five results in a finding that the

claimant is disabled. Stein v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 43, 44 n.1

(7th Cir. 1990). A negative answer at any point, other than step

three, ends the inquiry and means the claimant is not disabled. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). The claimant has the burden of

proof through step four; it then shifts to the Commissioner at

step five. Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

ALJ Abrams found that Willoughby was last insured on Dec.

31, 2006. He did not work from the alleged onset date of Aug. 3,

2001, through Dec. 31, 2006. Through his date last insured, he

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had the following ailments: gastroparesis/gastrointestinal

disorder of an unknown cause, pyloric stenosis, and bulimia.

Through the date last insured, ALJ Abrams found, Willoughby

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

the criteria of a listing. ALJ Abrams determined that no

treating or examining physician had found that Willoughby

suffered disorders equivalent in severity to a listed impairment. 

In particular, as to Listing 5.08, weight loss due to any

digestive disorder, ALJ Abrams relied on Dr. Jilhewar’s opinion

that the medical records showed that Willoughby had not had a BMI

of less than 17.5, calculated on at least two occasions 60 days

apart within a consecutive 6-month time period. She also cited

Dr. Jilhewar’s testimony that Willoughby’s BMI was 19.4. It

appears, however, that the ALJ interpreted this testimony to mean

that Willoughby’s BMI was higher than 19.4 throughout the

relevant period, while Dr. Jilhewar based the 19.4 figure on

Willoughby’s weight at the time of the hearing. (Admin R., 21,

95.)

Considering all the evidence in the record, ALJ Abrams found

that Willoughby had the residual functional capacity to lift,

carry, push, and pull 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds

occasionally. He could stand or walk for a total of two hours in

an eight-hour work day, and sit for the remaining hours.

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ALJ Abrams then recounted Willoughby’s testimony and

acknowledged that under Social Security regulations, a claimant’s

statements about the intensity and severity of his ailments could

not be discounted solely because they are not substantiated by

the objective medical evidence. See Social Security Ruling 96-

7p. ALJ Abrams then added:

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are

inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity

assessment.5

(Admin R., 22.)

ALJ Abrams then recounted various portions of the medical

record. These records, essentially, show that Willoughby’s

ailments have puzzled doctors. Although, as Dr. Jilhewar

testified, gastric emptying studies have been normal or borderline

normal, doctors have suggested that Willoughby might be suffering

from idiopathic gastroparesis.6 At other times, however, doctors

5 As will be discussed, this cryptic and unhelpful bit of

boilerplate has been the subject of sharp criticism by the

Seventh Circuit. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645–46

(7th Cir. 2012).

6 On July 8, 2002, Dr. Robert Mosley informed Dr. Harney

that despite the fact that Willoughby’s gastric emptying study

was unremarkable, his symptoms and the endoscopic findings were

highly suggestive of gastoparesis. (Admin. R., 494.)

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suggested the problem might be psychiatric in nature.7 She noted

that Dr. Harney completed an assessment of Willoughby in April

2009. In it, Dr. Harney said that Willoughby suffered from

gastroparesis, which interfered with his ability to perform

routine, repetitive tasks and meet deadlines. Dr. Harney said that

Willoughby could sit for more than two hours at time, stand for one

hour at a time, and perform both activities for a total of about

four hours in a workday. He opined that Willoughby could lift up

to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, but would need

to take about three unscheduled bathroom breaks each day, as well

as two additional twenty minute breaks per day in order to lie down

and rest. 

ALJ Abrams gave “minimal weight” to Dr. Harney’s assessment

because the evaluation form indicated that he began treating

Willoughby on his date last insured, and it was not clear from the

assessment whether Dr. Harney believed that Willoughby had those

limitations from 2001 through 2006. She added, “moreover, the

claimant’s medical records from that time period do not support Dr.

Harney’s findings with regard to the claimant’s mental work

7

 Gastroenterologist Richard Rotnicki, for example,

suggested a “functional” or psychiatric origin for the disorder

in August 2003, given that a physical cause seemed to have been

excluded. (Admin R., 244.) On one of Willoughby’s frequent

emergency room visits, on Feb. 27, 2007, Dr. Paul Toofan

concluded that Willoughby “clearly ha[d] psychiatric issues”

after Willougby told him he was afraid he was going to stop

breathing on his own, so he could not sleep. (Admin. R., 297.) 

10
limitations, and those records do not even clearly establish that

the claimant suffered from gastroparesis, or pyloric stenosis, as

he claims.” (Admin. R., 24.)

ALJ Abrams then summarized Dr. Jilhewar’s testimony and noted

his belief that Willoughby’s symptoms were caused by a

psychological disorder. She noted, however, that there was only

minimal evidence in the record to support this, and “[a]s such I do

not find that the claimant has any medically determinable mental

impairment.” (Admin. R, 25.) The ALJ additionally found, however,

that although Willoughby had consistently complained of abdominal

pain and vomiting from 2001 through 2006, “numerous diagnostic

tests during those years have not yielded especially severe

diagnoses.” (Id.) She noted the unremarkable gastric emptying

studies, and pointed out that Willoughby had instances of noncompliance, which detracted from his credibility.8

ALJ Abrams gave significant weight to the portion of Dr.

Jilhewar’s testimony dealing with the diagnostic findings in the

medical record, although she disagreed with his conclusion that

Willoughby was capable only of sedentary work. Instead, she found

he was capable of light exertion. While he could not longer

perform his past work, there were a significant number of unskilled

8 This is apparently a reference to a treatment note made

by Dr. Joseph Kokoszka, who said Willoughby had exhibited “poor

compliance” because he failed to follow-up with recommended small

intenstine mobility studies. (Admin R., 319.)

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jobs which Willoughby could perform, including as an assembler,

visual inspector, or sorter. Even if Dr. Jilhewar’s suggested

limitations were taken into account, Willoughby would still be able

to perform this jobs, the ALJ found.

II.

In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision, I must

determine whether it is “supported by substantial evidence and

based on the proper legal criteria.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425

F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept

to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1972). The Seventh Circuit applies a deferential standard of

review to the ALJ’s ruling, meaning that I should not substitute

my judgment for that of the ALJ or re-weigh the evidence. Haynes

v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). The ALJ is not

required to address every piece of evidence, but must provide a

“logical bridge” between the evidence and conclusions so that I

may address the validity of the agency's findings and provide

meaningful review. Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th

Cir. 2010).

III.

On appeal, Willoughby argues that ALJ Abrams erred in her

step two finding when she found that he had bulimia, but did not

find that he has hypokalemia or was underweight. He also argues

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that the ALJ erred in not finding him disabled at step three.

Specifically, he asserts that Willoughby should have been

assessed as equaling Listing 5.06 for involuntary weight loss9

and Listing 5.08 for weight loss due to a digestive disorder.

Willoughby additionally argues that the ALJ erred in finding that

he was capable of performing work in the national economy. I

will address each argument in turn.

A. Step Two and Three Findings

Willoughby argues — and the Commissioner agrees — that Dr.

Jilhewar erred when he said that Willoughby never had a BMI of

less than 17.5 on at least two evaluations at least 60 days apart

within a consecutive 6-month period. In fact, Willoughby’s BMI

fell below 17.5 on at least four occasions: on Nov. 25, 2003;

Oct. 22, 2004; Jan. 4, 2005; and Oct. 5, 2006. Willoughby’s BMI

was at 17.0 on Oct. 22, 2004, and at 17.3 on Jan. 4, 2005, and

both sides agree that at that point in time Willoughby satisfied

the requirement for Listing 5.08. Additionally, although Dr.

Jilhewar testified that Willoughby’s BMI was 19.4 based on his

9 Listing 5.06 is for inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) and

can be met in several ways, including by involuntary weight loss

of at least 10 percent from baseline and the need for

supplemental daily enteral nutrition via a gastrostomy or daily

parenteral nutrition via a venous catheter. 20 CFR Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1. Willoughby argues that he equaled this listing

because of his involuntary weight loss and his periodic need for

nutritional supplementation, but he fails to adequately develop

this argument.

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stated weight at the time of the hearing, it was in fact below

19.4 on numerous occasions between late 2002 and mid-2006.

 Nonetheless, the Commissioner contends that Dr. Jilhewar’s

misreading of the record was harmless error. The Commissioner

argues that even if Willoughby met Listing 5.08 as of Jan. 4,

2005, he cannot argue that he met the listing at any time after

that date. This dooms his claim, the Commissioner contends,

because Willoughby must show that he was continuously disabled

from his date last insured, Dec. 31, 2006, until twelve months

before he applied for benefits, or Jan. 27, 2008.10 The

Commissioner, however, does not elaborate on his reasons for

believing that Willoughby cannot meet this requirement.

Willoughby must satisfy several statutory requirements in

order to receive benefits. First, he must show that he was 

disabled prior to the expiration of his coverage on Dec. 31,

2006. Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2011)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.140)). Additionally, the statutory

scheme requires that Willoughby’s condition be continuously

disabling from the time of onset during insured status to the

time of application for benefits, if the individual applies for

benefits for a current disability after the expiration of insured

10 The record is unclear as to Willoughby’s filing date,

but he apparently completed his application for benefits on Jan.

27, 2009. (Admin R., 161).

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status. Flaten v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453,

1460 (9th Cir. 1995); see Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195–96

(6th Cir. 1967). Combined with the rule that benefits may be

paid only for the twelve months immediately before the

application is filed, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.621(a)(1), this means

that Willoughby must show that he was continuously disabled

either before or beginning on Dec. 31, 2006, through Jan. 27,

2008. See Ryan v. Barnhart, No. 04 C 0584, 2004 WL 2038848, at *1

n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2004).

ALJ Abrams, however, did not consider the issue of

continuous disability. Rather, she considered whether Willoughby

could establish that he was disabled prior to his date last

insured. ALJ Abrams focused on Willoughby’s treatment records

from Aug. 3, 2001, through Dec. 31, 2006, and concluded that he

was not under at disability at any time during that time period. 

Based on that conclusion, she denied his application for

benefits. This was, as the Commissioner concedes, error, and

given the significant weight ALJ Abrams placed on Dr. Jilhewar’s

opinion, I cannot find that it was harmless. The doctrine of

harmless error applies only when “it is predictable with great

confidence that the agency will reinstate its decision on remand

because the decision is overwhelmingly supported by the record

though the agency’s opinion failed to marshal that support.” 

Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010). 

15
Here, I am not confident that ALJ Abrams would have found

that Willoughby could not meet the continuous disability

requirement had she properly found that Willoughby met a listing

prior to the expiration of his coverage. The ALJ would have been

required to consider whether Willoughby’s disability ended

because of medical improvement. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)

(noting that medical improvement is a decrease in the severity of

the impairment based on improvements in the symptoms or

laboratory findings); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(listing the

evaluation steps for determining medical improvement). It is not

clear on this record that it did; for example, on Oct. 5, 2006,

Willoughby weighed 118 pounds and had a BMI of 17.4. To the

extent the Commissioner is arguing that Willoughby waived any

argument that he was continuously disabled on or before Dec. 31,

2006, and through Jan. 27, 2008, I cannot make such a finding on

this record. Willoughby’s testimony was that he has not worked

since 2001 and that in 2007 and 2008, he weighed about 115

pounds. He did not contend there had been significant

improvement in his condition since 2005, nor did ALJ Abrams

consider that issue. Further, she may have viewed other

evidence, including Willoughby’s own testimony as to the severity

of his symptoms, differently had she realized that he did in fact

meet a listing during his coverage period. Dr. Jilhewar himself

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testified that if Willoughby’s BMI were consistently low, his

opinion would have been different.

Because ALJ Abrams erred in her step three determination

that Willoughby did not met or equal a listing through his date

last insured, I cannot find her ruling to be supported by

substantial evidence. See Barry v. Barnhart, No. 03 C 7239, 2004

WL 2092005, at **11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2004) (remanding

where the ALJ relied on a medical expert opinion that was based

in part on mischaracterization of the record). Willoughby asks

that I find him disabled and grant him benefits based on the

record. When the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, a remand for further proceedings is the proper remedy

unless the evidence before me compels an award of benefits. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir.

2005) (internal citations omitted). An award of benefits is

appropriate only when all the factual issues have been resolved

and the record can yield but one conclusion. Id. Here,

significant questions remain as to whether Willoughby remained

disabled after meeting Listing 5.08 in early 2005. ALJ Abrams

did not develop the record to address this question because she

erroneously found that Willoughby was never disabled at any time

prior to the expiration of his insurance. As such, remand is

appropriate. 

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B. Residual Capacity Finding

Willoughby makes several contentions of error in regard to

the ALJ’s residual capacity assessment, two of which have at

least some merit and are worth addressing in light of the remand. 

As noted above, ALJ Abrams employed empty boilerplate as

part of her finding that Willoughby was not credible to the

extent his description of his symptoms was “inconsistent with the

above residual functional capacity assessment.” As the Seventh

Circuit has held, this wrongly suggests that the ability to work

is determined first, and then used to assess credibility. 

Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 645–46 (7th Cir. 2012). It also is in

tension with Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which provides that a

claimant’s statements about the intensity and persistence of pain

and symptoms or the effect those symptoms have on the ability to

work cannot be disregarded solely because they are not

substantiated by the medical evidence. Id. at 646. 

ALJ Abrams did support her credibility finding with

citations to the medical record. However, it appears that she

based her conclusion that Willoughby’s descriptions of his

limitations were not credible in part on Dr. Jilhewar’s erroneous

opinion. The ALJ should reevaluate Willoughby’s credibility in

light of the fact that his weight loss was so significant that he

met a listing in early 2005. 

18
Additionally, in reaching her functional capacity

assessment, ALJ Abrams gave little weight to the opinion of

treating physician Dr. Harney, in part because she found, based

on what appears to be an error on a medical assessment form, that

Dr. Harney did not begin treating Willoughby until Dec. 31, 2006. 

ALJ Abrams then concluded that she could not tell whether Dr.

Harney believed that Willoughby had certain limitations during

the relevant time period before his date last insured. In fact,

Dr. Harney had treated Willoughby since 2001. ALJ Abrams

additionally found that the medical records did not support Dr.

Harney’s findings with regard to Willoughby’s mental work

limitations, nor did they clearly establish that Willoughby

suffered from gastroparesis or pyloric stenonis.

The ALJ of course, is not required to accept Dr. Harney’s

suggested limitations if they are inconsistent with the medical

evidence. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to

“controlling weight” only if it is “well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is

not inconsistent with other substantial evidence” in the record.

Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ may discount opinions based solely on

the claimant’s subjective complaints, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue,

550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008), but must minimally articulate

her reasons for doing so. Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503

19
(7th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, given that the ALJ erred in

finding that Dr. Harney had not treated Willoughby during the

relevant time period, and given that she viewed the record

through the lens of Dr. Jilhewar’s erroneous opinion, she should

re-evaluate the credibility of Dr. Harney’s findings.

IV.

For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment (Dkt. No. 22) is denied. Willoughby’s motion

for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19) is granted to the extent this

case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 ENTER ORDER:

 ____________________________

 Elaine E. Bucklo

 United States District Judge

Dated: July 12, 2012

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