### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON M OTI ON F OR

RE CO NSI DE RA TIO N EN BANC

NO. 03-0 5 -00 585 -CR NO. 03-05-00586- CR
Ex pa r te Ja m e s W . El lis

NO. 03-05-00589- CR NO. 03-05-00590- CR NO. 03-05-00591- CR NO. 03-05-00592- CR NO. 03-05-00593- CR NO. 03-05-00594- CR NO. 03-05-00595- CR NO. 03-05-00596- CR NO. 03-05-00597- CR NO. 03-05-00598- CR NO. 03-05-00599- CR NO. 03-05-00600- CR NO. 03-05-00601- CR NO. 03-05-00602- CR NO. 03-05-00603- CR
Ex parte John Dom inick Colyan dro

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NOS. 90 4056 4, 9040 565, 90 4056 6, 9040 567, 90 4056 8, 9040 569, 90 4057 0, 9040 571, 90 4057 2,

9040 573, 90 4057 4, 9040 575, 90 4057 6, 9040 577, 90 4059 8, D-1-D C-20 05-90 4121 , & D-1-D C-20 05-90 4122 HO NORAB LE BO B PERK INS, JUDGE P RESIDING2 D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
Idissent to the overrulingof t he S tate’s motion for r econside ration en ba nc. I ag ree with a portion of the or igina l panel o p i n i o n d ated August 22, 2008, ex plaining w hy the per tinent elec tion c o d e p ro v isions are not unconstitutionally vag ue or ove rbroa d. Ialso ag ree with that op ini on ’s c on c lus ion

that th e mon e y

la un de ri ngsta

tut e is n ot u

nc on sti tutio nal ly

va g ue . I do no t, howeve r, ag ree with that opinion’s discussion of the money launder ing issue. I believe that the Court should gr ant the State’s motion for r econside ration en ba nc to re visit t hat issue.
1. The contention that the m oney laun dering statute is unco ns t it ut io na lly v a g uea s a ppl ied is no t p r ope r ly b e for e us. I n their brief

s to this Court, Ellis and Coly andro c ontend that the money launder ing statut e fa ils to g ive c on sti tut ion a lly a de qu a te no tic e of wh a t it p ro hib its “ if mon e y la un de ri ngc ou ld be committed by

chec k prior to the 2005 amen d m en t .” As this quote demonstrate s, Ellis and Coly andro do not distinguish be tween the alleg ed cr iminal procee ds and the tra nsaction involving those proce eds that constitutes the alleg ed money launder ing. The definition of “funds” i n p enal
c od e se c tio n 34 .0 1( 2) a

pp lie s on ly

to t he c ri min a l pr oc e e ds , th a t is , to the “ dir ty ” mon e y

a lle g e dly “launde red.” See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 34.01(4) ( West S upp. 2008) (de fining “proc eeds” ). The definition of “f

unds” does not apply

to the “tra

nsaction involving the proce ed s ” cr iminaliz ed by pe na l c od e se c tio n 3 4. 02 (a )( 2) , that is, to the tr ans a c tio n by wh ic h the “ dir ty ” mon e y wa s a lle g e dly launder ed. Se e id . § 34.02(a) (2). F or this rea son, it is i rre levan t t h at t h e t ra nsfer of money

from3

TRMPAC t o the R epublican National State Elec tions Com mittee, one of the “tra nsactions involving the proce eds” that constitute the alleg ed money launder ing, was alleg ed to have been ma de by chec k. Ellis and Coly andro’ s r e a l c o nte nti o n is th at the 2002 ver sion of the money launder ing statut e c a nn ot c on sti tut ion a lly

b e a p p lie d to the m if

the c on tr ibutio ns to T RMPA C th a t th e y a lle g e dly launder ed we re ma de by

chec k. I n other wor ds, they ask this Cou rt to assume the existence of
c e rt a in hy po the tic a l and

lim ite d f a c ts— name ly , th a t the a lle g e d unla wf ul c or po ra te c on tr ibutio ns to TRMPAC, t he “proce eds of criminal ac tivity ” they alleg edly launder ed, we re ma de by chec k—and to iss ue an a dv iso ry op ini on on the c on sti tut ion a lity of a pp lying the mon e y la

un de ri ng statut e to those fac ts. I n essenc e, Ellis and Coly andro make an “ as applied” vag ueness c halleng e to the money launder ing statute befor e the statute ha s been a pplied. Whatever the meaningof the wor d “funds” in 2002—a question that we need not a nd sh ou ld n ot a dd

re ss at th is t ime —th e c on sti tut ion a lity of a pp lying t he mo ne y

la un de ri ngstatut e to Ellis and C o l y an d ro ’s activities ca nnot be deter

mined in advanc e of tria l before all the evidenc e concerning those ac tiviti es has be en adduc ed. The re is no evide ntiary basis for this “a s applied” challeng e bec ause the se ar e pre trial proce eding s and the fa cts have not been de veloped. Contrar y to statements made in the pa nel’s supplementa l opinion a nnounced toda y overr uling the State’ s motion for rehe aring , there is no evidence in the rec ord that the corpor ate c ampaig n contributions to TRMP AC that Ellis and Coly andro a re a ccuse d of launde ring wer e made by chec k. An ac cused may not seek the dismissal of a prosec ution pr ior to tr ial on a g round that ca n be re solved only

by evidenc e adduc ed at tria l. Fl or es v. S tat e , 245 S.W .3d 432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);For

a more rele vant discussion of void-for -vagueness in the c ontext of a c riminal statute, see 1 City of Chi cago v. M

orales , 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1 9 99) (Stevens, J.) (plurality op.) (e ncapsulating longsta nding test for vag ueness e mploy ed by Supreme Court in context of criminal statute). Se e als o Hill v. Colorado , 5 30 U. S. 7 03 , 7 32 (2 00 0) ; Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 4 se e Ex pa rteSm ith , 1 85 S.W. 3d

88 7, 89 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) (d e c lin ing to de c ide in pari ma te ri a claim in advanc e of tria l, without complete fac tual rec ord).

The su p p le me nta l o p in io n

e mp h a s iz e s th e Su

p r e me Co u

r t’ s statement in Hoffman that
we a re to “ examine the complainant’s c onduct.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). But in these cases we have no e vidence of what the rele vant “complaina

nt’s conduct” was, so ther e is nothing to e x amine.
2. The m oney laun dering statute is not unconstitution ally vague on i ts face.

I nsofar as Ellis and Coly andro make a f acia l v aguene ss challeng e to the money lau n d e r in g s tatute , it f

a il s . I t is a b a s ic p r in c ip le o f d u e p r o c e s s th a t an e n a c tm ent is void for vag ueness if its prohibitions are not c lear ly define d. Gray ne d v . Ci ty

of R oc k for d , 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1 97 2) . I f F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts are no t imp lic a te d, a va g ue ne ss c ha lle ng e wi ll b e su sta ine d o nly if the statute is vague in all its applications. Hoffman , 455 U.S. at 495. 1

El lis and Col y and ro do no t c on te nd that the mon e y la un de ri ngstatut e imp lic a te s F ir st Amendment fr eedoms, a

nd there for e t h ey m ust show that there is no set of c ircumstance s under which the statute would be va lid. United States v. Salerno , 48 1 U. S. 73 9, 74 5 (1 98 7)
. I n th e ir br ie fs , El lis and Col y and ro c on c e de tha

t th e pe rt ine nt d e fi nitio n of “fund s” inc lud e s c a sh . In f a c t, t he ir
c h a ll e n g e to th e mo n e y

la u n d e r in g s tatute is p r e mi s e d o nth e a s s e rti o nth a t t

h e r e le v an t d e finition of “f unds” incorpor ates only

cash. A s Irea d the orig i n al o p i n i o n , which the pa nel does not5

wi thd ra w, it a g re e s th a t th e de fi nit ion of “ fu nd s” c ov e rs c a shand

c a shequ iv ale nt s. Thus , E lli s, Coly andro, a

nd the panel majority

acknow ledg e that the money launder ing statute may constitutionally

be applied to a

person who, at the rele vant time, eng ag ed in a tra nsaction involving the ca sh proce eds of c riminal activity
. There fore , Ellis and C oly andro ha ve not demonstrate d that the statut e is v a g ue in a ll i ts a pp lic a tio ns , a

nd the ir fa c ia l c ha lle ng e fa ils
. 3. It is un necessar y to dete rm ine the m eaning of “fu nds .” As the di s cussion above de monstrates, it is unnecessa ry and er roneous to construe the 2002 definition of “f

unds” in order

to properly

dispose of Ellis and Coly andro’s ch alleng es to the money launder ing statute. I n its original opinion, t h e p an el erred in its strained discussion of an irrele vant issue.

The Court should g rant the State’ s motion for rec onsideration en banc, w ithdraw the orig inal opinion’s discussion of Ell is and C oly andro’ s vag ueness c halleng e to the money launder ing statute, and ove rrule that challeng e on the g rounds outlined above. Be cause the Court does not do thi s, I mus t di sse nt.

___________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Filed: Mar ch 17, 2009 Pub lis h