UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TONYA S. IZZARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1315

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.

(CA-95-1101-A)

Argued: January 30, 1997

Decided: March 17, 1997

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and

MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Diane Bodner, SWICK & SHAPIRO, P.C., Washington,

D.C., for Appellant. Christopher Paul Spera, FEDERAL HOME

LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, McLean, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: David H. Shapiro, SWICK & SHAPIRO,

P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Diane M. Ennist, Rufus Meyers, FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Tonya Izzard appeals the award of summary judgment to her former employer, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie

Mac), on her claims of race discrimination and retaliatory discharge.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Finding no

error, we affirm the district court.

I.

In October 1992 Freddie Mac hired Tonya Izzard, who is AfricanAmerican, as manager of technical writing in its marketing and sales

division at its headquarters in Fairfax County, Virginia. Izzard was

supervised by Bruce Wood until March 1993, when her unit was

placed in another section. After the realignment Izzard reported to

Sara Leonard. Izzard accuses Leonard of race discrimination.

While under Wood's direction Izzard received a generally favorable work appraisal. However, Wood did note that Izzard needed to

improve her interpersonal skills. Specifically, Wood suggested that

Izzard concentrate on better understanding the views of those she

managed and that she "open listening channels further."

After Izzard began reporting to Sara Leonard in March 1993, Leonard observed the same weaknesses mentioned by Wood. Leonard

informed Izzard that several employees were afraid of her. A fellow

employee said that during this period there was tension between

Izzard and certain clients. In September 1993 Leonard sent Izzard a

memorandum that clarified the effectiveness ratings on her "progress

review." The memorandum revealed that Izzard's lowest ratings

related to her interactions with supervisors, peers, and clients.

Leonard thought the human resources department might be able to

improve Izzard's skills by conducting a "team building" program.

 2
Human resources representatives Cathy Moore and Linda Medlock

began talking with Izzard, Leonard, and employees who reported to

Izzard. As a result of these discussions, both Moore and Medlock recommended against the initiation of a team building program. Neither

Moore nor Medlock mentioned race discrimination as a problem in

Leonard's section.

In March 1994 Leonard again told Izzard that she possessed considerable technical skills but that she still lacked necessary interpersonal skills. In April 1994 Moore and Medlock asked Tonya Jackson,

an African-American director at Freddie Mac, to act as Izzard's mentor. After working with Izzard, Jackson suggested to both Izzard and

Leonard that Izzard might do better if she remained in the communications section but relinquished her managerial duties.

In late April 1994 Izzard was involved in a car accident. Freddie

Mac placed her on short-term disability. After her request for an

extension on her short-term disability was denied, Izzard applied for

and was given leave under the Family Medical Leave (FML) Act.

Pursuant to Freddie Mac's policy, as explained on the FML application, FML was not to exceed twelve weeks. Izzard's FML period

began on April 18, 1994, and was due to expire on July 8, 1994.

In May 1994, while still on FML, Izzard received a letter from

Leonard stating that Izzard would be moved from her manager position into a staff job. The reassignment would downgrade Izzard from

Grade 31/Manager to Grade 28/Technical Editor. In response to this

demotion, Izzard filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)

complaint on June 20, 1994, alleging race discrimination. Izzard's

demotion was never put into effect because she was terminated immediately following the expiration of her FML.

Before the expiration of the FML period Cathy Moore telephoned

Izzard, informed her that the FML period would expire on July 8,

1994, and told her that she was expected to be at work on Monday,

July 11. In addition, Moore informed Izzard that she had to obtain

medical clearance from her doctor before she could return to work.

Izzard did not return to work on July 11, and she was terminated. On

that same day Izzard filed her second EEO complaint, alleging that

she had been terminated in retaliation for her first EEO complaint.

 3
Izzard sued Freddie Mac in district court, claiming that Freddie

Mac discharged her because of her race and her prior protected EEO

activity. The district court granted Freddie Mac's motion for summary

judgment, concluding that Izzard was terminated not because of racial

animus, but because she failed to return to work when her FML

period expired. Izzard appeals.

II.

We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Jackson v.

Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1322 (4th Cir. 1993). If there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases may avoid summary judgment by satisfying the

burden-shifting method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In an action alleging retaliatory

discharge, a plaintiff must meet her initial burden under the

McDonnell Douglas scheme by establishing a prima facie case. A

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that (1) she

engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse employment action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Williams v.

Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989). "Once this

prima facie case is established, it must be rebutted by legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse action." Id. If the employer provides a legitimate nonretaliatory reason, "the burden of proof lies with

the plaintiff to establish by preponderance of the evidence that the

proffered reasons are pretextual." Id.

The district court did not state explicitly that Izzard failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. However, our review

of the record and briefs leads us to conclude that Izzard failed to meet

all elements of her initial burden. Izzard did meet the first two

requirements because she had filed an EEO complaint just weeks

before her termination. However, she failed to establish a causal connection between the filing of her EEO complaint and her termination.

Pursuant to a policy predating Izzard's first EEO complaint, Freddie Mac grants its employees twelve weeks of FML. Izzard does not

allege that the policy itself is discriminatory. Instead, she alleges that

 4
Freddie Mac applied the FML policy in a discriminatory manner

against her because it required her to obtain medical clearance before

returning to work. Izzard asserts that Moore and Leonard were upset

by her prior EEO complaint. Therefore, Izzard argues, they created

the medical clearance requirement so as to provide a seemingly neutral reason for termination. Izzard's argument does not hold up for

several reasons. First, Izzard's FML expiration date was set, pursuant

to Freddie Mac policy, before Izzard filed her first EEO complaint.

Second, Izzard offered no evidence that medical clearance was not

required of other employees on FML. Third, there was no way for

Moore, Leonard, or even Izzard to know that Izzard's doctor was not

going to grant her medical clearance. Fourth, Leonard, against whom

Izzard attributes the bulk of the racial animus, had minimal involvement in administration of the FML program. As the FML expiration

date neared, Moore called Leonard and asked whether Izzard could be

given a medical leave extension. Leonard responded that she could

wait no longer for Izzard's return because a backlog of work had

developed and she needed someone to perform Izzard's job. Izzard

offered no evidence that Leonard learned of the first EEO complaint

and then made up the medical clearance requirement with the expectation that Izzard would be unable to satisfy it, thereby providing a

basis for her discharge. We are thus persuaded that Izzard failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because she did

not establish a causal connection between her EEO complaint and her

termination.

Even if Izzard could establish a prima facie case, she has offered

no evidence that the proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. Izzard failed to comply with Freddie Mac's FML policy and was

terminated. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err

when it granted Freddie Mac summary judgment on Izzard's claim of

retaliatory discharge.*

_________________________________________________________________

*Izzard also brought a claim alleging that her demotion was the product of Leonard's intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Because

Izzard was on medical leave when she was notified of her demotion and

was terminated before her return, the demotion never actually took

effect. We therefore agree with the district court that Izzard has no independent cause of action with regard to the demotion. We have, of course,

taken into account the fact of Izzard's demotion. Her first EEO complaint

was filed in response to the demotion and it is that EEO complaint,

Izzard contends, that prompted Freddie Mac to terminate her. As noted

above, Izzard's retaliatory discharge claim is not sustainable.

 5
III.

The district court's award of summary judgment to Freddie Mac is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

 6