15-2862 

Cruz v. Lynch 

BIA 

Verrillo, IJ 

A088 428 634

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

28th day of February, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

JUAN CARLOS CRUZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-2862 

 NAC 

JEFF SESSIONS, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.* 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Elyssa N. Williams, New Haven, CT. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Janette 

L. Allen, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

Lauren E. Fascett, Trial Attorney; 

 

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney 

General Jeff Sessions is automatically substituted for former 

Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
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Abigail E. Leach, Law Clerk, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 

 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Juan Carlos Cruz, a native and citizen of 

Guatemala, seeks review of an August 14, 2015, decision of the 

BIA affirming a February 11, 2014, decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”) denying Cruz’s application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Juan Carlos Cruz, No. A088 428 634 (B.I.A. Aug. 

14, 2015), aff’g No. A088 428 634 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Feb. 11, 

2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” 

Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency 

concluded that Cruz failed to sufficiently corroborate his 

claim. In particular, Cruz based his claims for relief on a 

2011 massacre committed by the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel, 

at a ranch in northern Guatemala purportedly owned by Cruz’s 
3

brother, but did not present evidence establishing that he was 

related to the ranch’s owners or residents. 

 We review the agency’s factual findings, including its 

corroboration determination, for substantial evidence. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. I.N.S., 445 F.3d 

554, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ may require an asylum 

applicant to provide evidence that corroborates otherwise 

credible testimony in order to meet the applicant’s burden of 

proof for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). “[A] 

failure to corroborate can suffice, without more, to support 

a finding that an alien has not met his burden of proof.” Liu 

v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2009). When an IJ 

determines that corroborating evidence is necessary, the 

applicant must provide the evidence “unless the applicant does 

not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the 

evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). We may reverse the 

IJ’s determination that corroborating evidence is or is not 

available only if “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 

conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). 

While the agency must identify what reasonably available 

evidence should have been provided and must assess the 

applicant’s explanations for any missing evidence, it is the 
4

applicant’s burden to provide the evidence or an adequate 

explanation for any failure to obtain it. See Liu, 575 F.3d 

at 198-99. To overcome the need to corroborate, the 

applicant’s explanations must compel a conclusion that the 

requested evidence is not reasonably available. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4); Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d 

Cir. 2011); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d 

Cir. 2005) (holding, in credibility context, that explanations 

for inconsistent statements must be compelling rather than 

merely plausible). 

The record here is, at best, mixed regarding the 

availability of the relevant evidence. Cruz’s 

country-conditions evidence suggests that official corruption 

and ineffectiveness are widespread in Guatemala and that Petén 

province, where the massacre occurred, is a remote and lawless 

region. Such conditions might have made it difficult for Cruz 

to obtain official documentation regarding the massacre or his 

family’s ownership of the ranch. However, Cruz testified that 

the police helped his family flee after the massacre and he 

submitted news articles reflecting that Guatemalan officials 

took the massacre very seriously. And while Cruz’s testimony 

that his family could not access the ranch to obtain the physical 

deed to the property or other evidence is plausible, Cruz did 
5

not adequately explain his inability to obtain other records. 

Nor did Cruz provide affidavits from his family members 

documenting their efforts to obtain this evidence. Thus, the 

agency was not compelled to conclude that this evidence was 

unavailable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). 

The agency was also not required to credit an unsworn letter 

from Cruz’s purported brother that gave the wrong year for the 

massacre and stated that the perpetrators were “BSZ” (and did 

not mention the Zetas). See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 

(2d Cir. 2013) (noting that we generally “defer to the agency’s 

determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s documentary 

evidence”). Aside from this letter, the record is devoid of 

any corroborating evidence linking Cruz to the ranch where the 

massacre occurred. Indeed, even if considered part of the 

record, the birth certificates Cruz submitted to the BIA on 

appeal do not establish his family’s ownership of the ranch or 

Cruz’s relationship to Otto Salguero, the ranch’s reported 

owner. 

 Accordingly, given the lack of materiality and 

reliability of the evidence Cruz presented and his failure to 

produce property records, government reports, or affidavits 

from his family members, the agency’s corroboration ruling is 

supported by substantial evidence. This ruling is dispositive 
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of Cruz’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. 

We thus need not reach the agency’s alternative internal 

relocation ruling. As for Cruz’s application for relief under 

CAT, Cruz failed to establish that he would likely be tortured 

by or with the acquiescence or willful blindness of the 

government if removed to Guatemala. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk