tiffe-j5iWicrEM3Vw-7Y1 I l'" --)ft ' ,TrY-14DIfttrA,- -WitlY1154arM. ; *-Tr, ?Ta.; 

matter of right sufficient cross-examination has been permitted to satisfy 

the sixth amendment." Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 38, 45, 675 P.2d 986, 990 

(1984). Where bias is meant to be shown, the district court's discretion is 

narrower, and an examiner must be allowed to draw out any fact which 

might color the witness's testimony. Bushnell v. State, 95 Nev. 570, 572, 

599 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1979). An accused is given great latitude in crossexamining an accomplice with regard to his or her motives for testifying. 

Eckert v. State, 96 Nev. 96, 101, 605 P.2d 617, 620 (1980); see also 

Bushnell, 95 Nev. at 572, 599 P.2d at 1039. 

Appellant elicited testimony that Shay initially faced multiple 

felony charges and that, after negotiations with the State in which she 

agreed to testify at appellant's trial, she ultimately pleaded guilty to one 

felony count of pandering with the opportunity to reduce it to a gross 

misdemeanor and received probation. Her motive to lie was emphasized 

in appellant's opening and closing statements, as well as in the jury 

instructions, which included a list of Shay's initial charges as well as the 

charge to which she pleaded. Furthermore, Shay testified that she had 

been jailed as a result of the matter and never wanted to have the 

experience again. 1The jury was made fully aware of the legal benefits 

that Shay received by agreeing to testify at appellant's trial. 

The district court sustained respondent's objection to 

appellant's line of questioning which attempted to elicit the fact that Shay 

faced a possible term of life imprisonment, arguing that if the information 

'To the extent that appellant argues that he was prevented from 

demonstrating Shay's motive to lie based on her understanding of 

incarceration as brutal and humiliating, his claim is belied by the record. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 
3 

' 

was disclosed, the jury would know appellant's potential sentence. In 

balancing appellant's right to extract any fact which might color Shay's 

testimony against the concern for an unbiased jury, including one that 

does not consider punishment while considering guilt, see Valdez v. State, 

124 Nev. 1172, 1184, 196 P.3d 465, 473-74 (2008) (explaining that jurors 

should not consider the punishment during the guilt phase of trial), the 

district court allowed appellant to ask Shay if she faced "substantial time" 

prior to striking a deal with the State. We conclude the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in limiting appellant's cross-examination of Shay. 

See Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 72, 17 P.3d 397, 409 (2001) (finding that 

"trial judges 'retain wide latitude' to restrict cross-examination to explore 

potential bias 'based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that 

is repetitive or only marginally relevant" (quoting Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986))). 

Second, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence 

to sustain his convictions for sexual assault with the use of a deadly 

weapon and kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon. In reviewing a 

claim of insufficient evidence, we consider whether the evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier 

of fact. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McNair v. State, 108 

Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). It is for the jury to determine the 

weight and credibility to give conflicting testimony, and a reviewing court 

will not disturb a verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 

Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

LIMENB2W20211 
Appellant claims that because the victim relayed various 

stories to different individuals regarding the sexual assault incident, the 

resulting conviction cannot stand. The jury heard testimony from the 

victim as to the events before, during, and after the alleged sexual assault. 

The victim's uncorroborated testimony alone, if believed by the jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to uphold a conviction. See 

Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 109, 867 P.2d 1136, 1140 (1994) modified 

on other grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275 -76, 130 P.3d 176, 

181 (2006). Nonetheless, the jury also heard corroborating evidence. 

Shay's testimony as to the events before and after the time when 

appellant and the victim were alone supported the victim's testimony. A 

video showing appellant's beating of the victim also supported various 

aspects of her testimony. 2Furthermore, items retrieved from the 

residence served to reinforce the testimony. We conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of sexual assault with the use 

of a deadly weapon. See NRS 193.165(1); NRS 200.366. 

Appellant further contends that he improperly sustained a 

conviction for first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, 

arguing that the victim's movement from one bedroom to another as she 

was being beaten was incidental and did not substantially exceed the 

movement required to complete the associated crime charged or 

2Insomuch as appellant claims that his convictions were the result of 

an emotional response to videotaped evidence and that the district court 

erred in allowing the video to be played, we discern no abuse of discretion 

by the district court in admitting the evidence. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

4 
=.3-74011ASFM.1-I---V-r3,-,Y-• 1):',(`.. 11:11111111=1111 

significantly increase the risk of harm to her. 3On the day of the sexual 

assault, appellant grabbed the victim by the hair and forcibly dragged her 

from her bedroom to the master bedroom where she was beaten with 

objects located in the room and brought into the room by Shay on 

appellant's orders. Appellant held an aluminum bat to her throat as he 

continued to beat her and eventually moved her to the bathroom where he 

sexually assaulted her. The evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant could have committed the 

sexual assault without moving the victim and that the forcible movement 

and restraint created a greater risk of harm to her than was necessary to 

accomplish the crime of sexual assault. Therefore, we conclude that there 

was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction of first-degree 

kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon. 4 See NRS 193.165(1); NRS 

200.310(1); Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 274-75, 130 P.3d at 180-181 (explaining 

that dual convictions for kidnapping and the underlying offense are 

3Appellant argues that his kidnapping for the purpose of committing 

a sexual assault cannot stand because there is insufficient evidence to 

support the sexual assault charge. As we have resolved the insufficiency 

claim against appellant, we conclude that this argument is without merit. 

4To the extent that appellant argues that the victim came to Las 

Vegas voluntarily and had daily access to others through her laptop, 

cellphone, and sporadic public outings, we consider this a sufficiency 

challenge to his conviction of second-degree kidnapping with the use of a 

deadly weapon. The victim testified that she could not leave because 

appellant warned that he would kill her if she tried, a threat corroborated 

by Shay, and that when the victim said she wanted to leave, she was 

beaten by appellant with a bat and chain belt. We conclude that there 

was sufficient evidence to sustain this conviction. See NRS 193.165(1); 

NRS 200.310(2). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A 

5 
El 

appropriate where "movement or restraint serves to substantially increase 

the risk of harm to the victim" or "substantially exceeds that required to 

complete the associated crime charged"). 

Third, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his battery/domestic violence instruction thereby limiting the 

presentation of his theory of the case. The district court enjoys broad 

discretion in settling jury instructions, and we review its decision for an 

abuse of discretion or judicial error. Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 

121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). While a defendant is entitled to a jury 

instruction on his theory of the case if some evidence supports it, Harris v. 

State, 106 Nev. 667, 670, 799 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (1990), a defendant is not 

entitled to instructions that are "misleading, inaccurate or duplicitous," 

Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005), and a request 

for a lesser-included offense instruction is conditioned on that offense 

being necessarily included in the charged offense, see Rosas v. State, 122 

Nev. 1258, 1264, 147 P.3d 1101, 1106 (2006). An instruction on the crime 

of battery/domestic violence would be misleading and inaccurate because 

appellant was not charged with battery/domestic violence and the 

instruction would incorrectly suggest that the jury could find him guilty of 

the uncharged crime. Furthermore, battery/domestic violence is not a 

lesser-included offense of any of appellant's charges. See NRS 33.018(1); 

NRS 193.165; NRS 199.480; NRS 200.310; NRS 200.366; NRS 201.300; 

NRS 201.320; NRS 207.190; NRS 453.337; Smith v. State, 120 Nev. 944, 

946, 102 P.3d 569, 571 (2004) (defining lesser-included offense). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

AY.4\5:4WW1 I LM.-141:10-74,9,1:1 

6 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by refusing to give the proffered instruction. 5 

Having considered appellant's claims and concluded that no 

relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

‘144.41/4, 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre Cherry 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

5We note that, despite appellant's claim that denial of the 

instruction curtailed the presentation of his theory of the case, he 

thoroughly argued the incident as battery/domestic violence in his opening 

and closing statements. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

• =