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Filed 7/31/23 Las Lomas v. Madison CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

LAS LOMAS LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HUEY P. MADISON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A162046 & A162826

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG20070955)

In this lawsuit between the owners of neighboring commercial 

properties, Huey P. Madison (Defendant) appeals two trial court orders. We 

affirm both orders.

BACKGROUND1

In August 2020, respondent Las Lomas LLC (Plaintiff) sued Defendant, 

alleging claims for breach of contract, specific performance of contract, 

intentional interference with contract, and declaratory relief. The complaint 

alleged the following facts: Plaintiff owns commercial property operating as a 

restaurant (Restaurant), which it leases to a third party tenant (Tenant), and 

1 We recite only the background facts necessary to our resolution of 

these appeals.
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a nearby parking lot (Parking Lot), which is used by Tenant for employee and 

patron parking. Defendant owns an office building and an adjacent driveway

(the Office), which are located in between the Restaurant and the Parking 

Lot, where he operates a dental practice. 

The complaint further alleged a prior owner of the Office granted an 

easement in favor of the Restaurant and Parking Lot, providing for access 

between the Restaurant and Parking Lot through an accessway located on 

the Office property. Prior owners also entered into a deed restriction 

agreement prohibiting the Office owners from blocking the accessway. The 

deed restriction provides it runs with the property. 

The complaint alleged Defendant violated the deed restriction by 

building a storage shed blocking the accessway between the Restaurant and 

Parking Lot; and by locking a gate to the driveway and refusing to provide 

access to Plaintiff and Tenant, including access Tenant needs to bring a 

dumpster stored in the back of the Restaurant to the street for pickup. The 

breach of contract, specific performance of contract, and intentional 

interference with contract causes of action all alleged injury caused by this 

allegedly wrongful conduct. The declaratory relief claim seeks a declaration 

of Plaintiff’s “entitlement to an easement over the driveway area located on 

the [Office].”

Defendant filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.2 Defendant’s 

motion argued Plaintiff’s complaint was filed in retaliation for (1) complaints 

Defendant made to the Alameda County Department of Health about waste 

storage at the Restaurant, (2) fliers Defendant circulated asking community 

2 All undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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members to contact Tenant about the alleged unsanitary conditions, and (3) 

communication that Defendant intended to sue Plaintiff. After briefing and a 

hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion, finding, among other 

grounds, “the claims in this case do not arise from any act of [Defendant] in 

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech in connection with 

a public issue. The claims are based on disputes over real property. [¶] The 

lawsuit chronologically followed [Defendant’s] complaints to the Health 

Department about food waste at the restaurant, but the claims are not based 

on and do not arise out of the complaints to the Health Department.” 

Defendant appealed.

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DISCUSSION

“ ‘[S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a two-step process 

when determining whether a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be 

granted. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a 

threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one “arising from”

protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing 

has been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated 

3 Defendant also appealed a temporary restraining order the trial court 

issued against Defendant. We consolidated the appeals and granted 

Defendant’s petition for a writ of supersedeas with respect to the temporary 

restraining order. In his briefs on appeal, Defendant claims our writ of 

supersedeas rendered his appeal of the temporary restraining order “moot,”

apparently construing our order as a decision that the temporary restraining 

order standards had not been met. Defendant is incorrect: our writ found 

only that the temporary restraining order was a mandatory injunction and 

was therefore stayed by Defendant’s appeal. Because Defendant makes no 

argument that the trial court erred in issuing the temporary restraining 

order, we will affirm that order. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 

240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 (Tellez) [“An appellant has the burden to 

demonstrate reversible error with reasoned argument and citation to 

authority.”].)
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a probability of prevailing on the claim.’ ” (Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 

45 Cal.4th 467, 477.) “We review de novo the grant or denial of an antiSLAPP motion.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)

This appeal is resolved at the first step.4 “A claim arises from protected 

activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. 

[Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of 

action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or 

free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after 

protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity 

for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is 

on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her 

asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or 

petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which 

a moving defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to 

demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have 

been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision 

(e) . . . .’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts 

should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the 

defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for 

liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063; see also Episcopal 

Church Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 477 [“ ‘[T]hat a cause of action arguably 

may have been “triggered” by protected activity does not entail that it is one 

arising from such.’ ”]; Callanan v. Grizzly Designs, LLC (2022) 

4 We therefore need not and do not decide whether Plaintiff 

demonstrated a probability of prevailing, or whether Defendant’s anti-SLAPP 

motion was properly stricken as untimely.
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81 Cal.App.5th 517, 529 [“[A] party’s subjective intent or motivation for filing 

a lawsuit is not relevant to determining whether that lawsuit arose from an 

act in furtherance of the right to petition for free speech.”].)

Plaintiff’s claims all arise from Defendant’s conduct of blocking 

Plaintiff’s access to property Plaintiff claims it is entitled to access. 

Defendant’s complaints to local health authorities and other protected 

conduct are not the wrongful conduct alleged to supply the elements of the 

property claims asserted in the complaint. “The additional fact that 

protected activity may lurk in the background—and may explain why the rift 

between the parties arose in the first place—does not transform a property 

dispute into a SLAPP suit.” (Episcopal Church Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 

pp. 477–478.)

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DISPOSITION

The orders denying Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and issuing a 

temporary restraining order are affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded its costs on 

appeal.

5 For the first time in his reply brief, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s 

claims arise from Defendant’s protected activity defending himself in a 

previous lawsuit brought by prior owners of the Restaurant and Parking Lot, 

which is alleged in the complaint. The contention is both forfeited (Tellez, 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [“points raised in the reply brief for the 

first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to 

present them before”]) and unavailing: Defendant’s conduct in the prior 

lawsuit is not the basis for Plaintiff’s claims. 
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SIMONS, J.

We concur. 

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J. 

(A162046 & A162826)