IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01376-COA DANNY P. HICKS, II APPELLANT

v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DENISE OW ENS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHESTER RAY JONES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW GARRETT CLARK NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANT’S PETITION TO DISESTABLISH PATERNITY AND TERMINATE CHILD SUPPORT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 12/06/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Danny Hicks had sex with Jakeida Carter one tim e bef ore she gave birth to Janiy ah in January 2007. O n October 5, 2007, Hicks a greed t o be nam e d as Janiy ah’s legal f ather on her birth certif

icate. About one y ear later, Hicks entered into a stipulated agreem ent with the Mississippi Departm ent of Hum an Services in which he adm itted paternity and a greed to pay $202 a m onth in child support. T he agreem ent was later approv e d b y t h e Hinds County Chancery Court. In 2015, a DNA test revealed that Hicks was not the biological f ather. ¶2. Hicks f

iled a Petition to Disestablish Paternity and T erm inate Child Support, askingthe court to term inate any f uture child-support pay

m ents and to reim

burse him f

or the
pay m ents m a d e bef

ore the D NA test ($1,800). T he court held a hearing and later denied Hicks’s p etition u nder M i ssiss i p pi Code A nnotated s ection 93-9-10(3)(c) (Rev. 2013). 1 Hicks appealed. Finding no error, we af f irm

. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶3. “W hen reviewing a chancellor’s d e c i s i o n , a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t w i l l accept the chancellor’s f

indings of f

act as long as the evidence in t he record reasonably supports those f indings.” B rown v
. W

eatherspoon , 101 So. 3d 173, 176-77 (¶9) (Miss. C t

. App. 2012) (quoting Lee v. Lee , 12 So. 3d 548, 550 (¶9) (Miss. C t. A pp. 2009)). “W e will [ o nly ] disturb the chancellor’s f

i ndings if the chancellor was m anif estly wrong; the chancellor’s f indings

are not s upported by substantial, credible evidence; or the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard.” I

d

. DISCUSSION

1 T h is statu te p ro v id e s: (3 ) N o tw ith stan d in g su b sectio n ( 2 ) o f th is sectio n , a co u rt sh a l l n o t s et a sid e th e p atern ity d eterm in a tio n o r ch ild su p p o rt o r d er i f th e leg a l f ath er en g ag ed in an y o f th e f o l lo w in g co n d u ct:

. . . . (c) S ig n ed a s tip u lated ag reem en t o f p atern ity th at h as b een ap p ro v ed b y o rd er o f th e co u rt[

. ]
M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3 -9 -1 0 (3 )(c). 2¶4. In 2011 t he Legislature e nacted section 9 3-9-10 of the Mississippi Code Annotated,

aptly entitled “Disestablishm ent o f P aternity .” It specif ically descri b e s and a

pplies to the circum stances of this case. Hicks’s reliance on M.A.S. v. Mississippi Department of Human Services , 842 So. 2 d 527 (Miss. 2003), is m isplaced, as t hat case was decided bef ore section 93-9-10 was enacted. 1. The Stipulated Agreem ent of Paternity ¶5. H i cks claim s the c hancellor erred in r ef using to disestablish his paternity

. In Jone s

v. M allett , 125 So. 3 d 6 50, 651 ( ¶¶5-7) (Miss. 2013), the c hancery c ourt s i m ilarly relied on section 93-9-10(3)(c) to deny the plaintif f ’s p etition to d isestablish paternity

. Our suprem e

c o u r t af f irm ed the chancellor because the plaintif f h ad signed a stipulated agreem ent o f paternity that was approved by

the chancery c ourt over a decade prior to the f ather’s f iling f or disestablishm e nt. Id

. at (¶10). Thus, here we f ind the chancellor d id not err by deny ing Hicks’s petition. 2. Carter’s Testim o ny ¶6. H i c k s argues that the court’s f ailure to swear i n C a r t e r a t t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e questioning am o unts to reversible error. Hicks d id not object at trial, and the f ailure to of

f er

a contem poraneous objection waived this issue f o r appea l

. See Harbit v
. Harbit , 3 So. 3d 156, 160 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the h usban d w a i v e d the issue of the court’s f ailure to initially swear i n the witness because he f ailed to tim ely object). Theref ore, Hicks’s argum ent is procedurally barred.

33. Rule 60(b) Motion

¶7. H i c k s n e x t claim s that he is entitled to relief u nder Miss i s s i p p i R u l e o f C i v i l Procedure 60(b)(1) because Carter com m itted f raud by f ailing to disclose Hicks w as not the f ather. ¶8. Because Hicks never f iled a Rule 60(b) m otion with the trial court, he is barred f rom

m aking this argum e nt on a ppeal. In any event, there is no e vidence in the r ecord to support Hicks’s claim

that Carter acted f

raudulently . So Hicks’s claim is without m erit. 4. Best Interest of the Child ¶9. Hicks also argues that disestablishme n t of p aternity would be in the best interest of Janiy ah. The testim ony at the h earing showed t hat Hicks has been involved in J aniy ah’s lif e since birth. Janiy ah even c alled him “Daddy

. ” Carter testif ied that H i cks was a good f ather. And Hicks testif

ied that he was actively

involved in her schooling. ¶10. Af ter caref u l review of the record, we cannot s ay t he chancellor abused her discretion in deny ing Hicks’s petition. Theref ore, we af f irm

. ¶11. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E CHANCERY COURT OF H INDS C O U N T Y , F I R S T J U D I C I A L D I STRICT, IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS OF T HIS APPE A L A R E ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND G R I F F I S, P.JJ., BARNES, I SHEE, CARLTON, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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