alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,

| 1)     | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and                                 |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                |
| 2)     | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |

| /s/      Greggory      Schneider                  |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Greggory      Schneider                                                                                                                |   |   |
| Chief      Financial and Principal Financial Officer                                                                                   |   |   |

----
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 12 (Thursday, January 21, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 6382]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-01134]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-90916; SR-CBOE-2020-110]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe Exchange, Inc.; Notice of 
Withdrawal of a Proposed Rule Change Amending Rule 5.52(d) in 
Connection With a Market-Maker's Electronic Volume Transacted on the 
Exchange

January 13, 2021.
    On November 13, 2020, Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or 
``Cboe'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a 
proposed rule change to change the electronic volume threshold trigger 
for continuous electronic quoting requirements for Market-Makers from 
one calendar quarter to two consecutive calendar quarters. The proposed 
rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on 
November 30, 2020.\3\ The Commission has received no comment letters on 
the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90482 (November 23, 
2020), 85 FR 76642 (November 30, 2020) (SR-CBOE-2020-110).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 13, 2021, the Exchange withdrew the proposed rule change 
(SR-CBOE-2020-110).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-01134 Filed 1-19-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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Laws & GuidanceELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION
- nv-clarkcountysd-1-complaint
- nv-clarkcountysd-1-compandnotlet
#### Bangor Clothing Co., Inc., Respondent-Appellant, v. Superior Sportswear Corp., Appellant-Respondent.

Order, granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff, and the judgment entered thereon, unanimously modified, on the law and the facts, to the. extent of granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in the full' amount demanded in the complaint, less the sum of $500 paid by defendant on March 30, 1964, and, as so modified, the order and judgment are affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-appellant. We agree with Special Term that defendant failed to raise triable issues as to its defense that a trade custom existed for maintaining an open running account for periodic payments and on the defense that plaintiff, a foreign corporation, was precluded from maintaining the action because it was doing business in this State without having received authorization. However, we additionally find that no triable issue was raised as to defendant’s claimed credit of $2,810 based on alleged damage to 281 suits. The 281 suits were delivered on November 15, 1963. The claim that the suits were defective in that there were oil stains upon each of them and that the lapels were improperly cut and sewn was not made until April 22, 1964 in the answer-served in the instant action. The delay in asserting the claim was unreasonable, as a matter of law. Moreover, despite the alleged knowledge of such claimed defects and improper workmanship, the defendant, nevertheless, continued to make payments on account. Such conduct constitutes a waiver and estoppel to make the claims with respect to the alleged defects and improper workmanship. No credence can be given to the alleged oral agreement with plaintiff’s president to give defendant a credit for $2,810. Apart from the bare and unsupported averment of such an oral arrangement, no factual averments were submitted to indicate any substance to the belated claim. All of the other facts, including plaintiff’s repeated- and uncontroverted demands for payment and the voluntary payments thereafter made by defendant without objection or suggestion that the amount due plaintiff was otherwise than is shown in the regularly submitted invoices and statements, stamp the claim of an oral agreement as a belatedly conceived claim interposed merely for the *865purpose of delay. No- bona fide triable issue was presented. Plaintiff was ■entitled to summary judgment in full. Concur—Botein, P. J. Breitel, Valente, McNally and Stevens, JJ.
2004.404 Contract clauses. ( a ) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 2052.204-70 Security, in all solicitations and contracts under which the contractor may have access to, or contact with, classified information, including National Security information, restricted data, formerly restricted data, and other classified data.
( b ) The contracting officer shall insert the clause 2052.204-71 Site Access Badge Requirements, in all solicitations and contracts under which the contractor will require access to Government facilities. The clause may be altered to reflect any special conditions to be applied to foreign nationals.
#### 1852.214-70 Caution to offerors furnishing descriptive literature.

As prescribed in 1814.201-670(a), insert the following provision:

# Caution to Offerors Furnishing Descriptive Literature (DEC 1988)

Bidders are cautioned against furnishing as a part of their bids descriptive literature that includes language reserving to the bidder the right to deviate from the requirements of the invitation for bids. Statements that “Data are subject to change without notice,” “Prices subject to change without notice,” or words having a similar effect are examples of such reservation. The Government will reject as nonresponsive any bid that incorporates literature containing such language or any bid that must be evaluated by using literature containing such language. Bidders should clearly label any submissions of descriptive literature not intended to form a part of a bid as such in order to preclude any need for the Government to interpret the bidder's intent in submitting descriptive literature. [See FAR 14.202-5.]

(End of provision)

[61 FR 47082, Sept. 6, 1996]
Exhibit
      32(d)







**CERTIFICATION
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO**




**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**




**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**




**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Carolina Power & Light
      Company (the “Company”) for the period ending March 31, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peter
      M. Scott III, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
      Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)  the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)  the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/
      Peter M. Scott III


Peter
      M.
      Scott III


Executive
      Vice President and


Chief
      Financial Officer


May
      8,
      2007








This
      certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed filed by the Company
      for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Exchange Act
      of
      1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CAROLYN RUSIN, individually, and on 

behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE COMPANY, 

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:12-cv-01135

Hon. Edmond E. Chang

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL 

OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff and the Settlement Class, preliminarily approved by this Court in its order dated 

February 5, 2013, ECF No. 30, through their counsel, move this Court to grant final approval of 

the class action settlement reached in this matter. In support of this motion, Plaintiff submits her

Memorandum of Law, and asks that the Court enter the Order Granting Final Approval of 

Settlement.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 19, 2013

s/Maureen A. Salas

One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys

Douglas M. Werman- dwerman@flsalaw.com

Maureen A. Salas –msalas@flsalaw.com

Werman Law Office, P.C. 

77 W. Washington, Suite 1402

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 419-1008

Case: 1:12-cv-01135 Document #: 39 Filed: 06/19/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:187
#### DAVID MAYER BREWING CO., Respondent, v. KREJCI, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 18, 1903.)

Action by the David Mayer Brewing Company against Joseph Krejci. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

E. Herrman, for appellant. W. L. Allen, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

In view of the testimony in the case, we do not think the exception gives ground for reversible error. Judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
#### R. E. DIETZ & CO. v. MILLER, SEARS & WALLING CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 6, 1903.)

1. Appeal—Material Error—Offer of Judgment.

Error in rendering judgment for an amount which the evidence shows cannot’be right is material on the question of costs; the filing of an offer of judgment being indicated, which cannot be assumed to have been invalid, though it is not annexed to the return.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Eleventh District.-

Action by R. E. Dietz & Co. against Miller, Sears & Walling Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, and from an order denying a motion to amend the judgment, defendant appeals." Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and BISCHOFF and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Day, Van Zandt, Walsh & Webb, for appellant.

Baggotts & Ryall, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

In no aspect of the proof can the state of the account between the parties be made to result in the amount for which judgment was rendered, and the question is substantial, because of the offer of judgment, and the consequent difference in costs which must follow from an error in the computation. The justice’s indorsement on the summons shows that the offer of judgment was made, and, if there be any question of its form, that question should be presented by the return,.if we are to pass upon it. The filing of an offer is indicated of record, and, the paper not being annexed to the "return, we cannot assume that the offer ivas invalid, and thus disregard the error in the judgment on the ground of immateriality.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
#### D. Mallory Stephens, Suing as a Stockholder and as a Director of Penn State Fuel Corporation, on Behalf of That Corporation, Respondent, v. John R. Maust et al., Defendants, and Penn State Fuel Corporation, Appellant.

Order unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente and Bergan, JJ.
#### 1371.113 Department of Labor occupational safety and health standards for ship repair.

Insert clause 1352.271-82, *Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Ship Repair,* in all solicitations and contracts for ship repair.
1852.208-81 Restrictions on Printing and Duplicating. As prescribed in 1808.870, insert the following clause: Restrictions on Printing and Duplicating (NOV 2004) (a) The Contractor may duplicate or copy any documentation required by this contract in accordance with the provisions of the Government Printing and Binding Regulations, No. 26, S. Pub 101-9, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, published by the Joint Committee on Printing, U.S. Congress. (b) The Contractor shall not perform, or procure from any commercial source, any printing in connection with the performance of work under this contract. The term “printing” includes the processes of composition, platemaking, presswork, duplicating, silk screen processes, binding, microform, and the end items of such processes and equipment. (c) The Contractor is authorized to duplicate or copy production units provided the requirement does not exceed 5,000 production units of any one page or 25,000 units in the aggregate of multiple pages. Such pages may not exceed a maximum image size of 10-
3 ⁄ 4 by 14-
1 ⁄ 4 inches. A “production unit” is one sheet, size 8-
1 ⁄ 2 × 11 inches (215 × 280 mm), one side only, and one color ink. (d) This clause does not preclude writing, editing, preparation of manuscript copy, or preparation of related illustrative material as a part of this contract, or administrative duplicating/copying (for example, necessary forms and instructional materials used by the Contractor to respond to the terms of the contract). (e) Costs associated with printing, duplicating, or copying in excess of the limits in paragraph (c) of this clause are unallowable without prior written approval of the Contracting Officer. If the Contractor has reason to believe that any activity required in fulfillment of the contract will necessitate any printing or substantial duplicating or copying, it immediately shall provide written notice to the Contracting Officer and request approval prior to proceeding with the activity. Requests will be processed by the Contracting Officer in accordance with the provisions of the Government Printing and Binding Regulations, NFS 1808.802, and NPR 1490.5, NASA Procedural Requirements for Printing, Duplicating, and Copying Management. (f) The Contractor shall include in each subcontract which may involve a requirement for any printing, duplicating, and copying in excess of the limits specified in paragraph (c) of this clause, a provision substantially the same as this clause, including this paragraph (f).
(End of clause) [66 FR 53548, Oct. 23, 2001, as amended at 69 FR 63459, Nov. 2, 2004]
----

----

|   | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    | /s/ Stephen M. Sill                          |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Stephen M. Sill                                                                                                                                                           |
|   | Vice President, Treasurer                                                                                                                                                 |
|   | and Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                               |
|   | March 31, 2011                                                                                                                                                            |

----
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 February 4, 2015

p0128

Order 

Clerk

February 4, 2015

149989

WYANDOTTE ELECTRIC SUPPLY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149989

COA: 313736

Wayne CC: 11-003015-CK

ELECTRICAL TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS,

INC.,

Defendant/Cross-Defendant,

and 

KEO & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff- Appellant,

and

WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 15, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall 

include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the plaintiff served on the principal 

contractor the 30-day notice within the meaning of MCL 129.207; (2) whether the 

plaintiff is entitled to damages, if any, that include a time-price differential and attorney 

fees; and (3) whether MCL 600.6013(7) is applicable to the judgment in this case.
#### 1509.000 Scope of part.

This part implements FAR part 9 and provides policy and procedures pertaining to contractor's responsibility; debarment, suspension, and ineligibility; and organizational conflicts of interest.
#### In the Matter of Joseph H. Boardman et al., Respondents, v Town of New Windsor, Appellant.

[835 NYS2d 314]—

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7 to review certain real property assessments for the tax year 2003, and an action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the assessments are illegal and void, the Town of New Windsor appeals from a *854judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Rosato, J.), entered September 26, 2005, which, among other things, declared that the assessments are illegal and void and ordered them stricken from the assessment roll.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

The Town of New Windsor sought to recoup the costs of certain improvements to a water district that serviced land owned by the New York State Department of Transportation (hereinafter the DOT), and imposed a special ad valorem levy on that land in an effort to do so *(see*RPTL § 102 [14]; *Matter of Crandall Pub. Lib. v City of Glens Falls,*216 AD2d 814, 815 [1995]). The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Town did not have a proper basis for imposing the levy. The DOT, whose land is generally exempt from taxation and special ad valorem levies *(see*RPTL § 404 [1]; § 490; *Matter of New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys. v Srogi,*84 AD2d 912, 913 [1981], *affd*56 NY2d 690 [1982]), did not consent to the imposition of the levy *(see Matter of Town of Indian Lake v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment of State of N.Y.,*45 Misc 2d 463, 466 [1965], *mod on other grounds*26 AD2d 707 [1966]). In addition, we agree with the DOT that Public Lands Law § 19, which requires certain notice to be given to the State Comptroller before state-owned land is assessed for any purpose, effectively makes it impossible for a municipality such as the Town to impose a special ad valorem levy on state-owned land to recoup the cost of improvements that specially benefit that land *(see*1953 Ops Atty Gen 133; *see also Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co. v State Tax Commn.,*61 NY2d 393, 404 [1984]). Finally, the Town improperly changed the manner in which it recouped the costs associated with creating and operating the water district *(see*Town Law § 202 [4]; § 202-a [1], [2]; § 202-b [4]; 1986 Ops State Comp No. 86-10).

Under these circumstances, the challenged assessments, which the Town made against the DOT’s land in connection with the imposition of the special ad valorem levy, were “unlawful” (RPTL § 720 [1] [a]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly declared that they are invalid and properly ordered them stricken from the assessment roll *(id.).*

Even if there were a proper basis to impose a special ad valorem levy upon the DOT’s lands, the Town did not provide the notice to the State Comptroller required by Public Lands Law § 19. Thus, the challenged assessments were not “legal” in any event (Public Lands Law § 19). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly declared that the assessments are illegal and void for that additional reason.

*855The Town’s remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Santucci, Florio and Lifson, JJ., concur.