alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

 

Certification of the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

 

I, Michael S. Sarner, Chief Financial Officer of Capital Southwest Corporation, certify that, to my knowledge:

|  | 1. |  | The Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2017, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 6, 2018 (“accompanied report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--|----|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | 2. |  | The information contained in the accompanied report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition and results of operations of Capital Southwest Corporation. |
|--|----|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

|                         |   |                    |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| Date:  February 6, 2018 | By:    | /s/ Michael S. Sarner   |
|                         |   | Michael S. Sarner       |
|                         |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
**To:**Distance Learning and Educational Innovation Subcommittee

**From:**Jessica Ranucci, New York Legal Assistance Group

	Amanda Martinez, Student

**Date:**February 13, 2019

**Re:**Proposed Language on Incarcerated Students

**Background:**

The Education Department has proposed revisions to the definition of incarcerated students in 34 CFR 600.2. The proposed definitiona adds students in a “youth correctional facility” to the definition of “incarcerated student.” When addressed at the first subcommittee meeting, the Department suggested that this was a technical change to reflect existing policy.

However, Department guidance (DCL GEN-14-21[footnoteRef:1]) explains that “juvenile justice facilitiies . . . are not considered to be Federal or State penal institutions under the Higher Education Act. . . . Therefore, students who are confined or incarcerated in juvenile justice facilities and who otherwise meet applicability criteria, are eligible for Federal Pell Grants. [1:  U.S. Department of Education. DCL GEN-14-21. “Federal Pell Grant Eligibility for Students Confined or Incarcerated in Locations That Are Not Federal or State Penal Institutions.” December 8, 2014. https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/correctional-education/pell-letter.pdf.] 

**Proposal:**

We propose language to clarify that the principle expressed in the Dear Colleague Letter still applies. The text that appears in red is proposed by the Department. The additional text we propose is in green.”

34 CFR 600.2 

*Incarcerated student:* A student who is serving a criminal sentence in a Federal, State, or local penitentiary, prison, jail, reformatory, work farm, **youth correctional facility**, or other similar correctional institution. A student is not considered incarcerated if that student is in a half-way house or home detention or is sentenced to serve only weekends. **For the purposes of Pell eligibility per 34 CFR 668.32(b)(2)(ii), youth correctional facilities are not considered Federal or State penal institutions regardless of the incarcerated student’s age and whether it was a Federal, State, or juvenile court that convicted and sentenced them or adjudicated and committed the incarcerated student.**

***

***Penal Institution:* A facility as defined under 28 CFR 115.5. For the purposes of 34 CFR 668.32(b)(2)(ii), youth correctional facilities are not considered Federal or State penal institutions regardless of the incarcerated student’s age and whether it was a Federal, State, or juvenile court that convicted and sentenced them or adjudicated and committed the incarcerated student.**

***

***Youth Correctional Facility:* A juvenile facility as defined in 28 CFR 115.5. For the purposes of 34 CFR 668.32(b)(2)(ii), youth correctional facilities are not considered Federal or State penal institutions regardless of the incarcerated student’s age and whether it was a Federal, State, or juvenile court that convicted and sentenced them or adjudicated and committed the incarcerated student.**
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

STEVEN RENE GUZMAN-RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 774 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### 2022.901-70 Contract provisions.

The contracting officer shall insert the provision found at 2052.222-70, Nondiscrimination Because of Age, in all solicitations.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TONY RAY PLUMLEE,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§ 

No. 08-13-00033-CR

Appeal from the

355th Judicial District Court 

of Hood County, Texas 

(TC#CR 12202) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the judgment of 

conviction should be reformed to reflect a $10,000.00 fine. We therefore affirm the judgment of 

the trial court as reformed. This decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2013.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
(October 10, 1963)

#### In the Matter of Howell Realty Corp. David L. Sprung, Respondent; Benjamin G. Ellman, Appellant.

Order, entered on February 7, 1963, as resettled by order entered on April 24, 1963, granting petitioner’s application to entertain a petition for corporate dissolution and directing a hearing before a Special Referee, unanimously modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, to eliminate the provision for the reference and to provide that the matter proceed before the court, and as so modified, affirmed, with costs to abide the event. It does not appear that the issues involved are complex or that their resolution will require protracted hearings. In such a situation, and in the light of the statutory directive that the Referee hear and determine, *“*the better practice is for the court to try the issue and refrain from referring the matter” *(Matter of Sutter French Confections,*17 A D 2d 610). We conclude that such procedure should have been followed here. Order, dated on May 8, 1963, as resettled by order entered on June 24, 1963, providing for a hearing before the Referee at a specified time and place, and the order, entered on June 24, 1963, directing the Attorney-General and interested parties to show cause before the Referee at such hearing, unanimously reversed, without costs, and the orders vacated. In the light of our determination that the reference was inappropriate these orders entered in furtherance of the reference may not stand. That portion of the order of June 24, 1963 denying vacatur of the order of April 24, 1963 (on the ground the order was null and void for failure to give the Attorney-General notice of its submission) unanimously affirmed, without costs. The appeal from the balance of the order of June 24, 1963 as denied vacatur of the order of May 5, 1963 (for failure to comply with section 106 of the General Corporation Law) and as refused to disqualify the Referee is dismissed as being academic. The order entered on April 24, 1963 is not null and void. The order to show cause initiating the proceeding was served upon the Attorney-General who indorsed the same with a waiver of notice. That constituted sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 137 of the General Corporation Law to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The failure to serve the Attorney-General with subsequent proposed orders is a procedural irregularity and does not oust the court of jurisdiction over the proceeding. In addition, there is no showing of any prejudice to the respondent-appellant by reason of such omission nor does the Attorney-General complain thereof. In view of our vacatin' of the order of May 5, 1963 on other grounds the appeal from that portion of the order entered on June 24, 1963, as denied vacatur of that order, is dismissed as being academic. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

RONALD A. GUZMÁN Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 2014 DATE 3/23/2012

CASE

TITLE

William L. Hinton (#K-52122) vs. James O’Halloran, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [#3] is denied, without prejudice. The plaintiff is directed

to submit a renewed i.f.p. petition that is certified by a trust fund officer; he must also attach copies of his prison

trust fund ledgers showing his income for the six months preceding the filing of this action [that is, from

September 20, 2011, through March 20, 2012]. Failure to comply within thirty days of the date of this order will

result in denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis and summary dismissal of this case. The Clerk is directed

to provide the plaintiff with a blank i.f.p. petition along with a copy of this order. The plaintiff is reminded that

he must provide the court with the original plus a judge’s copy of every document filed.

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The plaintiff claims that Will County Sheriff’s Deputies wrongfully arrested him in 2008, and that the

State’s Attorney’s Office maliciously prosecuted him for violating an order of protection. 

The Clerk has accepted this pro se civil rights complaint for docketing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(e)

even though it was not submitted in compliance with the rules of this court. An incarcerated person seeking leave

to proceed in forma pauperis must obtain a certificate from a prison official stating the amount of money the

prisoner has on deposit in his or her prison or jail trust fund account. To enable the court to make the necessary

assessment of an initial partial filing fee, the prisoner must also “submit a certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing

of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner

is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s i.f.p. petition is not certified, and

the plaintiff has failed to include copies of his prison trust fund ledgers. 

In short, if the plaintiff wants to proceed with this lawsuit, he must submit a certified i.f.p. petition, along

with copies of trust fund ledgers showing his income for the six months preceding the filing of this lawsuit [that

CONTINUED)

mjm

Page 1 of 2
STATEMENT (continued)

is, from September 20, 2011, through March 20, 2012]. The Clerk will provide the plaintiff with a blank i.f.p.

application. Failure to comply [or, in the alternative, to submit the statutory filing fee of $350.00] will result in

summary dismissal of this suit. See Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1980). 

Page 2 of 2
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection

          - 12 CFR Part 1026
          - [Docket No. CFPB-2020-0028]
          - RIN 3170-AA98

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

# ACTION:

Final rule; correction.

# SUMMARY:

                        The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) recently published “Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z): Seasoned QM Loan Definition,” which appeared in the                         **Federal Register**                         on December 29, 2020. This document corrects a scrivener's error in an amendatory instruction in that document.                    

# DATES:

Effective March 1, 2021.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Amanda Quester, Senior Counsel, Office of Regulations, at (202) 435-7700. If you require this document in an alternative electronic format, please contact                         *CFPB_Accessibility@cfpb.gov*.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    In FR Doc. 2020-27571 appearing on page 86402 in the                     **Federal Register**                     of Tuesday, December 29, 2020, the following correction is made:                

§ 1026.43 

On page 86452, in the second column, in amendment 2, the instruction “Amend § 1026.43 by revising paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) introductory text and adding paragraph (e)(7) to read as follows: ” is corrected to read: “Amend § 1026.43 by revising the headings for paragraphs (e) and (e)(1) and paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and (e)(2) introductory text and adding paragraph (e)(7) to read as follows:”.

Dated: January 15, 2021.

Grace Feola,

Federal Register Liaison, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

[FR Doc. 2021-01387 Filed 2-4-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P
1409.404 Excluded Parties List System (EPLS). ( a ) PAM is responsible for accomplishing the actions required in FAR 9.404(c).
( b ) COs should access the EPLS online at *http://www.epls.gov .*
18.201 Contingency operation. ( a ) *Contingency operation* is defined in 2.101.
( b ) *Micro-purchase threshold.* The threshold increases when the head of the agency determines the supplies or services are to be used to support a contingency operation. (See 2.101 and 13.201(g).)
( c ) *Simplified acquisition threshold.* The threshold increases when the head of the agency determines the supplies or services are to be used to support a contingency operation. (See 2.101.)
( d ) *SF 44, Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher.* The normal threshold for the use of the SF 44 is at or below the micro-purchase threshold. Agencies may, however, establish higher dollar limitations for purchases made to support a contingency operation. (See 13.306.)
( e ) *Simplified procedures for certain commercial products and commercial services.* The threshold limits authorized for use of this authority may be increased for acquisitions to support a contingency operation. (See 13.500(c)).
[71 FR 38248, July 5, 2006, as amended at 38312, July 2, 2015; 86 FR 61027, Nov. 4, 2021]
#### 209.106 Preaward surveys.

When requesting a preaward survey, follow the procedures at PGI 209.106.

[69 FR 65089, Nov. 10, 2004, as amended at 88 FR 67609, Sept. 29, 2023]
1816.405-271 Base fee. ( a ) A base fee shall not be used on CPAF contracts for which the periodic award fee evaluations are final (1816.405-273(a)). In these circumstances, contractor performance during any award fee period is independent of and has no effect on subsequent performance periods or the final results at contract completion. For other contracts, such as those for hardware or software development, the procurement officer may authorize the use of a base fee not to exceed 3 percent. Base fee shall not be used when an award fee incentive is used in conjunction with another contract type (*e.g.,* CPIF/AF).
( b ) When a base fee is authorized for use in a CPAF contract, it shall be paid only if the final award fee evaluation is “satisfactory” or better. (*See* 1816.405-273 and 1816.405-275) Pending final evaluation, base fee may be paid during the life of the contract at defined intervals on a provisional basis. If the final award fee evaluation is “unsatisfactory”, all provisional base fee payments shall be refunded to the Government.
[76 FR 6697, Feb. 8, 2011]
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 1264

_____________________________
L AWRENCE A. B ETHEL ,
Petitioner
,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Respondent

.

_____________________________

Petition Alleging Ineffective A ssistance of Appellate Counsel

— Original Jurisdiction

.

July 19, 2018

P ER C URIAM

. The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

R OBERTS , W ETHERELL , and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Lawrence A. Bethel, pro se
, Petitioner

. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Respondent

.
Race (by percent of persons) Within 0.5 Miles of 

Facility Within 1 Mile of Facility Within 3 Miles of Facility

White 90.7% 58.5% 35.1%

African-American 9.3% 39.8% 60.3%

Asian/ Pacific Islander 0.0% 0.0% 1.3%

American Indian 0.0% 0.5% 0.4%

Other race 0.0% 0.7% 0.8%

Multiracial 0.0% 0.5% 2.1%

Hispanic-Origin* 0.0% 1.4% 2.1%

*not included in total that adds to 100%

(by percent of persons) Within 0.5 Miles of 

Facility Within 1 Mile of Facility Within 3 Miles of Facility

Percent below Poverty Level 10.5% 26.6% 32.7%

Income Breakdown by

Household

Households within .5 

Miles (%)

Households within 1 

Mile (%)

Households within 

3 Miles (%)

Less than $15,000 10.4% 26.7% 34.1%

$15,000 - $25,000 11.7% 14.8% 17.1%

$25,000 - $50,000 40.3% 31.0% 29.1%

$50,000 - $75,000 16.9% 10.7% 11.2%

Greater than $75,000 16.9% 15.3% 8.3%

Income

Race

34%

17%

29%

11%

8%

Income of households within 3 mile of the facility 

Less than $15,000

$15,000 - $25,000

$25,000 - $50,000

$50,000 - $75,000

Greater than $75,000

1.3% 0.4% 0.8% 2.1%

Race of residents within 3 miles of the 

facility

White
35.1%

60.3%

White

African-American

Asian/ Pacific Islander

American Indian

Other race

Multiracial
Within 5 Miles of 

Facility Illinois US

38.0% 73.5% 75.1%

56.1% 15.0% 12.3%

2.3% 3.4% 3.7%

0.4% 0.2% 0.9%

1.0% 5.8% 5.5%

2.3% 2.0% 2.4%

2.4% 12.3% 12.5%

Within 5 Miles of 

Facility Illinois

30.2% 10.7%

Households within 

5 Miles (%)

Illinois US

33.4% 13.8% 15.8%

18.2% 11.3% 12.8%

28.8% 28.1% 29.3%

11.5% 20.7% 19.5%

8.0% 26.0% 22.5%
#### Edna Lankes, Appellant, v. Loyal Order of the Moose, Buffalo Lodge Number Eight, Respondent.

Order reversed on the law and facts and verdict reinstated, with costs. Memorandum: The Trial Judge unequivocably charged the jury that the question to be determined by them was “Did the defendant in this particular case use reasonable care in lighting this stairway ”, Although erroneous under the facts here presented *(Kimbar*v. *Estis,*1 N Y 2d 399, 403) this charge became the law of the case by reason of the failure to take exception thereto (Civ. Prac. Act, § 446; *Brown*v. *Du Frey,*1 N Y 2d 190, 196). The jury resolved the question of negligence as it related to the duty to light the stairway in plaintiff’s favor and the verdict should not have been set aside. All concur, except MeClusky and Henry, JJ., who dissent and vote for affirmance. (Appeal from order of Erie Trial Term, granting motion by defendant to set aside the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff and for a new trial, in a negligence action.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
#### 1852.219-84 Limitation of the principal investigator—STTR program.

As prescribed in 1819.7302(e), insert the following clause:

# Limitation of the Principal Investigator—STTR Program (OCT 2006)

(a) The primary employment of the principal investigator (PI) identified in paragraph (b) of this clause is with the small business concern (SBC)/Contractor or the research institution (RI). Primary employment means that more than one-half of the principal investigator's time is spent in the employ of the SBC/Contractor or RI.

(b) The PI is considered to be key personnel in the performance of this contract. The SBC/Contractor, whether or not the employer of the PI, shall exercise primary management direction and control over the PI and be overall responsible for the PI's performance under this contract. Deviations from these requirements must be approved in advance and in writing by the Contracting Officer and are not subject to a change in the firm-fixed price of the contract. The PI for this contract is (*insert name*).

(End of clause)

[71 FR 61688, Oct. 19, 2006]
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 13, 2018

No. 04-18-00114-CR

Kristi COLLINS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16-09-180-CRW

The Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

After we granted the court reporter’s first two requests for extensions of time to file the 

reporter’s record, the reporter’s record was due on June 8, 2018. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.1. Three 

days after the extended due date, court reporter Leticia M. Escamilla filed a third notification of 

late reporter’s record. The notification included a status report indicating the number of pages 

completed and remaining. The court reporter states she has two other court reporters helping her 

edit and proof the record; she requests an additional thirty days to complete the record.

The request is GRANTED. We ORDER Leticia M. Escamilla to file the reporter’s 

record not later than July 9, 2018. 

NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO FILE THE REPORTER’S RECORD 

WILL BE GRANTED. 

If the reporter’s record is not filed as ordered, a SHOW CAUSE ORDER shall issue 

directing Leticia M. Escamilla to appear on a day certain and show cause why she should not be 

held in contempt for failing to file the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(c); see also TEX. GOV’T 

CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 2004) (authorizing contemnor punishment up to “a fine of not more 

than $500 or confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or both such a fine and 

confinement in jail”); Johnson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 193, 195–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting 
the court’s previous action holding a court reporter in contempt for “repeatedly fail[ing] to 

prepare and file the record” and “order[ing] him incarcerated . . . until the record was finished”).

The clerk of this court shall cause a copy of this order to be served on Leticia M. 

Escamilla by certified mail, return receipt requested, with delivery restricted to addressee only, 

or give other personal notice of this order with proof of delivery.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 13th day of June, 2018.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court