alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

-i^^-l m - y P 2^ 1^' OFFICE OF HEARINGS FFD o o ,« « 

WASHINGTON, DC. . rcD Z 5 ISlU 

Er 

IN THE MATTER OF 

FLEET AVIATION, LLC 

Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan 

AGENCY'S REQUEST FOR TWO-WEEK EXTENSION FOR RULE 26m 

SUBMISSION AND TWO-WEEK POSTPONEMENT OF RULE 16 UTTGATTON 

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 

COMES NOW the Agency, by and through its designated representative, the 

Regional Counsel for the Eastern Region and his duly designated agents, and moves for a 

two-week extension for the Rule 26(f) planning and submission, which is currently due 

Febnaary 22, 2011, and a two-week postponement of the Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling 

Conference, which is currently scheduled for February 29, 2012. 

The basis for this request is that the parties are engaged in serious settlement 

discussions and if the case does settle, it appears that it will do so within about two 

weeks. 

Agency counsel has attempted to contact counsel for Respondent to determine if there 

would be any objection to this motion, but has received no reply. 

WHEREFORE the Agency requests that the date for the Rule 26(f) submission be 

extended to March 7, 2012 and the date for the Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference 

be postponed to March 14, 2012 or thereabouts. 

:T 
Respectfully submitted, 

ALFRED R. JOHNSON, JR. 

REGIONAL COUNSEL 

Zachary ivi. Berman 

Attorney 

Office of the Eastern Regional Counsel (FAA) 

1 Aviation Plaza 

Jamaica, NY 11434 

Phone: (718)553-3258 

Telefax: (718)995-5699 

Date : ^4i4 • - • (' ^ i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing AGENCY'S REOUEST FOR TWOWEEK EXTENSION FOR RULE 26(0 SUBMISSION Af^D TWO-WEEK 

POSTPONEMENT OF RULE 16 LITIGATION SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 

Has been sent via first class mail and facsimile to the following: 

The Honorable J.E. Sullivan 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

Telefax: (202)366-7536 

Gregory S. Winton, Esq. 

The Aviation Law Firm 

One Research Court, Suite 450 

Rockville, MD 20850 

Telefax: (301)294-8550 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing AGENCY'S REOUEST FOR TWOWEEK EXTENSION FOR RULE 26(0 SUBMISSION AND TWO-WEEK 

POSTPONEMENT OF RULE 16 LITIGATION SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 

Has been sent via first class mail to the following: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, Wilbur Wright Building, Suite 2W10000 

Date: FEB 2 1 2012 

Marianna Perero 

Paralegal Specialist 

1 Aviation Plaza 

Jamaica, NY 11434
#### 17.502 Procedures.
**Exhibit32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Dynamic Materials Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Yvon Pierre Cariou,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

(i)             The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(ii)          The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

November 2, 2006
|        | /s/ Yvon Pierre Cariou                |   |
|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Yvon Pierre Cariou                    |
|   | President and Chief Executive Officer |
|   | of Dynamic Materials Corporation      |

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to Dynamic Materials Corporation and will be retained by DynamicMaterials Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.

1

----
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 11, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50959 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE HUMBERTO RAMIREZ-ROSAS, also known as Jose Humberto, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:05-CR-37-ALL

-------------------- Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jose Humberto Ramirez-Rosas pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and was sentenced to 70 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Ramirez-Rosas argues on appeal that his sentence was unreasonable because his sentence was greater than necessary to meet the sentencing goals under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He does not challenge the district court’s calculation of his guidelines sentencing range.No. 05-50959 -2- Because Ramirez-Rosas’s sentence was within a properly calculated guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, we infer that the district court considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. See United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). “[A] sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Ramirez-Rosas has failed to demonstrate that his properly calculated guidelines sentence was unreasonable. See id. ; Mares , 402 F.3d at 519. Ramirez-Rosas also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). His constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Ramirez-Rosas contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi , we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that AlmendarezTorres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Ramirez-Rosas properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
#### Blanche B. Rodenbeck, Appellant, v. Michael Bekasinski et al., Respondents.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe Equity Term dismissing the complaint in an action for an injunction.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Halpern, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
Stalking Subcommittee1/29/2014

**CALL NOTES**

**Counting Stalking Incidents**

Counting

Question of how to count stalking given the definition of “continuous course of conduct”?

Review Stalking Scenario 1:  is this multiple stalking incidents or one? Recommendation that it should be counted as one

· issues are that sometimes its hard to identify certain behavior as stalking until a sufficient pattern arises (victims many may not even realize first few behaviors at all)

· Given the difficulty of identification of stalking from initial behaviors there will be a high need for training of law enforcement officials

· scenario raised the question of whether there are two victims of stalking or only one given the perpetrator’s intention? 

· Recommended to count by victims as consistent with UCR and because purpose of perpetrator not necessary to defining crime of stalking for VAWA/Clery purposes

If count multiple behaviors as one stalking, than is there ever a time to count it again as a second crime?

· Example:  stalking during victim’s sophomore year stops during the summer than resumes during victim’s junior year

· Possible separation between one stalking incident and another may be by time and space

· Strong suggestion that an intervention may separate one incident from another incident for counting purpose

· Need definition of intervention  

Geography

Suggestion that when there is a course of conduct off campus only one may need to occur within the Clery geography to count as one incident stalking  

· this may be preferable to the alternative of requiring more than one behavior within Clery geography to qualify as stalking incident

Discussion raised about whether the unique nature of the crime of stalking (the “course of conduct” language) justifies its detachment from the campus geographic for reporting requirements 

· Example: if multiple behaviors over time count as one stalking incident, than how do you determine where the single Clery crime is reported?

· Question for DOE: are we have the authority to step outside the campus geography reporting?

· Benefit is that it may better address electronic stalking behaviors

· Example:  multiple texts sent by off campus perp while victim is off campus, but victim did not read them until on campus – how would that be counted if we keep the geography?

· If stuck with campus geography, the mobility of electronics may justify counting the harassment as on campus if it is moved onto campus

**NEW ISSUE TO CONSIDER**

Given that stalking has a significant correlation with homicide and other crimes of violence, how would the hierarchical rule apply? 

Threshold question though is whether the hierarchical rule should apply at all
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FIRSTMERIT BANK, N.A., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 887

)

TRINITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, )

L.P., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This action has come to the calendar of this Court by random

assignment after the untimely death of its friend and former

colleague Honorable William Hibbler. When this Court’s

consequent review of the docket reflected that two of the

pleadings were not part of Judge Hibbler’s chambers file, this

Court’s minute clerk printed out copies of the missing documents. 

This Court’s review of those pleadings has revealed defects in

the Answer filed by defendants Trinity Management Associates,

L.P. and three individual codefendants, and those errors have

triggered this sua sponte memorandum order.

For one thing, the several paragraphs that seek to invoke

the disclaimer provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8(b)(5)--

Answer ¶¶7, 12, 15, 19, 39 and 47--inexplicably depart from the

plainly-marked-out roadmap prescribed by that rule. Then, as if

to compound that error, each of those paragraphs impermissibly

goes on to say “therefore deny the same.” That is of course

oxymoronic--how can a party that asserts (presumably in good
faith) that it lacks even enough information to form a belief as

to the truth of an allegation then proceed to deny it in

accordance with Rule 11(b)? Accordingly the quoted phrase is

stricken from each of those paragraphs of the Answer.

Next, Answer ¶¶22, 24, 38, 42, 46 and 50 fail to provide

responses to the corresponding allegations of the Complaint, as

required by Rule 8(b)(1)(B), on the premise that those

allegations “contain a legal conclusion and not a fact.” That

notion is misguided--see App’x ¶2 to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Accordingly

defendants cannot simply deny those Complaint allegations.

Finally, it appears that the Answer has overused the tactic

of repeated denials in some other respects. Just to choose a

single example, it is difficult to square the flat-out denial in

Answer ¶21 with the express terms of the Guaranty that is part of

Complaint Ex. C.1

Accordingly the existing Answer is stricken in its entirety,

but with leave granted to file a self-contained Amended Answer on

or before May 14, 2012. No charge is to be made to defendants by

their counsel for the added work and expense incurred in

correcting counsel’s errors. Defendants’ counsel are ordered to

 What is said in the text is merely exemplary. When 1

defense counsel return to the drawing board as they must, they

will be expected to limit outright denials to allegations that

really call for such a response.

2
apprise their clients to that effect by letter, with a copy to be

transmitted to this Court’s chambers as an informational matter

(not for filing).

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: April 26, 2012

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CHASE GENERAL CORPORATION CONTAINED IN ITS QUARTERLY
REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         375,073
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  147,330
<ALLOWANCES>                                    16,394
<INVENTORY>                                    261,860
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               770,314
<PP&E>                                         948,405
<DEPRECIATION>                                 692,900
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,025,819
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          190,258
<BONDS>                                        208,947
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,361,440
<COMMON>                                       969,834
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,704,660)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,025,819
<SALES>                                      1,795,953
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,797,336
<CGS>                                        1,278,330
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  274,531
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 3,210
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,580
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                233,685
<INCOME-TAX>                                    81,970
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            151,715
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   151,715
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:415
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:416
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:417
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:418
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:419
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:420
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:421
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:422
Case: 1:12-cv-01795 Document #: 44 Filed: 11/26/12 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:423
#### 2001.101 Purpose.

This subpart establishes Chapter 20, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Acquisition Regulation (NRCAR), and provides for the codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisitions by the NRC. The NRCAR is not, by itself, a complete document. It must be used in conjunction with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (48 CFR chapter 1).
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

 

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

 

**(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

 

 

In connection with the Annual Report ofBancTec, Inc, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the yearending December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (the “Report”), I, Brian R. Stone, Senior Vice President and Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company. 

 

 
| / s /   Brian  R. Stone             |   |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                               |
| Brian R. Stone                                     |
| Senior Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer |
|                                               |
| April 2, 2004                                 |

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by 18 USC Section 1350 has been provided to the Company and willbe retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

1

----
#### Marion L. Siko, Respondent, v Augustus J. Siko, Appellant.

In a divorce action, the defendant husband appeals, as limited by his notice of appeal and brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, entered May 1, 1978, as required him to pay alimony, child support and the carrying charges on the marital home, on the ground that the total amount of the awards was excessive. Judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. On this record, we agree with the trial court that the defendant’s total income is in excess of his reported income, and that the support provisions reflect the actual needs of the wife and the two children, based upon their preseparation marital *818standard of living, and are justified by the facts adduced at the trial. Latham, J. P., Rabin, Cohalan and Hargett, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 23**

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENTREGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

 

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report (From 10-K) ofTellabs, Inc. of our reports dated February 28, 2006, with respect to theconsolidated financial statements of Tellabs, Inc., Tellabs, Inc. management’sassessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting,and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Tellabs,Inc., included in the Tellabs 2005 Annual Report to shareholders.

 

Ouraudits also included the financial statement schedule of Tellabs, Inc. listedin Item 15(a). This schedule is the responsibility of Tellabs, Inc.’smanagement. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our audits. Inour opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to above, whenconsidered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,presents fairly in all material respects the information set forth therein.

 

Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (FormS-8 No. 33-45788, 33-48972, 33-55487,333-49557, 333-83509, 333-87637, 333-95135, 333-56546, 333-81360, 333-107457,333-122712 and 333-128076, and Form S-4 No.333-116794) of our reports dated February 28, 2006, with respect to theconsolidated financial statements and schedule of Tellabs, Inc., Tellabs Inc.management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reportingof Tellabs, Inc. included and incorporated by reference in this Annual Report(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 30, 2005.

 

Ernst & Young LLP

 

Chicago,IllinoisMarch 10, 2006

 

----
February 7, 1975.

M. P. No. 74-325.

#### State *v.*Leonard Jefferson.

*Julius C. Michaelson,*Attorney General, *John A. Murphy,*Special Asst. Attorney General, for plaintiff. *William F. Reilly,*Public Defender, *Carmine A. Rao,*Asst. Public Defender, for defendant.

Motion of defendant to be admitted to bail pending appeal denied.
U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation

DEPARTMENT ACTION ON APPLICATION IN DOCKET DOT

- O ST

- 20 13

- 0094

(Filed May 3, 2013 )

A pplic ation of EVA Airways Corporation (EVA) f or a statement of authorization to display the ( FX *) designator code of Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) and block cargo space to FedEx on EVA flights between Taipei and Seattle, and between Taipei and Los Angeles

.

The applicant further request s a waiver of the 45

- day advance filing requirement under 14 CFR

Part 212.

* Approved under assigned authority (14 CFR §385.13).

Date of Action: May 1 4 , 201 3 1

This action is subject to the conditions attached. Persons entitled to petition the Department for review of this action under the Department’s regulations, 14 CFR §385.30, should file their petitions within seven days of the date of this action. This action is effective immediat ely, and the filing of a petition for review

will not alter its effectiveness.

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.regulations.gov

1 The Department is acting on the request prior to the expiration of the seven

- day answer period with the consent of all parties served.The operations authorized here are subject to the following conditions:

(a) The statement of authorization w ill remain in effect only as long as (i) EVA and FedEx continue to hold the necessary underlying authority to operate the code

- share/blocked space services at iss ue, and (ii) the agreement providing for the code

- share/blocked space operations remains in effect.

(b) EVA and/or FedEx must promptly notify the Department if the agreement providing for the code

share/blocked space operations is no longer effective or i f the carriers decide to cease operating all or a portion of the approved code

- share/blocked space services. Such notices should be filed in Docket DOT

OST

- 2013

- 0094

. 1

(c) Notwithstanding any provisions in the contract between the carriers, our approval here is expressly conditioned upon the requirements that the subject foreign air transportation be sold in the name of the carrier holding out such service in the computer reservation systems and elsewhere; that the carrier selling such transportation ( i.e

., the carrier shown on the waybill ) accept responsibility for the entirety of the

code

- share journey for all obligations established in its contract of carriage with the shipper ; that the

cargo liability of the operating carrier be unaffected

. (d ) The authority granted here is specifica lly conditioned so that neither EVA nor FedEx shall give any force or effect to any contractual provisions between themselves that are contrary to these conditions.

(e) We may amend, modify, or revoke the authority gran ted at any time without hearing at our discretion.

1 We expect this notification to be received within ten (10) days after such non

- effectiveness or of such decision.
----

----

|   | GENENTECH,      INC. |
|--------|----------------------|
|   | By:                  |  /s/      David Ebersman |
|   | Title:               |  Senior      Vice President andChief      Financial Officer |
|   | Dated:               |   9/13/05 |
|   |                 |   |
|   | And      by:         |  /s/      Denise Smith-Hams |
|   | Title:               |  Vice      President Human Resources |
|   | Dated:               |   9/13/05 |

----