IN THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DUSTIN CLAY (R -23623), ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Case No. 12 C 1593 

v. ) 

 ) Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

OFFICER CHARLES DOWNS, et al. ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Dustin Clay, an Illinois prisoner confined at Stateville Correctional Center, filed 

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Stateville Correctional Officer Charles Downs, Officer Charles 

Wright, Sergeant Encarnacion, Dr. Partha Ghosh and Wexford Health Sources (the Pennsylvania 

corporation that provides medical services to Illinois inmates). According to Clay, on December 1, 

2010, Officer Downs placed his forearm on Clay’s neck and choked him for no reason other than to 

demonstrate to another officer how to harass an inmate. Wright and Encarnacion allegedly ignored 

Clay’s complaints about Downs’ harassment of Clay. Dr. Ghosh allegedly ignored Clay’s requests 

for medical attention for his injuries from the December 1, 2010, incident, and Wexford allegedly 

has an unwritten policy encouraging its physicians to provide the least possible amount of medical 

care to inmates. 

Pending before this Court is Dr. Ghosh and Wexford’s (“Defendants”) motion for summary 

judgment. They contend that Clay cannot establish deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

Clay has responded. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment and dismisses the claims against them. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2012). All facts and reasonable 

inferences drawn from the facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 

566. However, once the moving party demonstrates the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, 

“the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine 

dispute.” Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The non-movant must go beyond the 

pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Hannemann v. 

Southern Door County School Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material 

fact exists only if there is evidence “to permit a jury to return a verdict for” the nonmoving party. 

Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2010). 

When addressing a summary judgment motion, this Court derives the background facts from 

the parties' Local Rule 56.1 Statements, which assist the Court by “organizing the evidence, 

identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a 

disputed fact with admissible evidence.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 

524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000). 

In accordance with N.D. Ill. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement 

“consist[s] of short numbered paragraphs [with] specific references to the affidavits, parts of the 

record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in [each] paragraph.” 

Defendants complied with N.D. Ill. Local Rule 56.2 by forwarding to Clay a “Notice to Pro Se

Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” that explained how to respond to a summary 
3 

judgment motion and to the factual assertions set out in a Rule 56.1 Statement. (R. 101.) Clay 

responded to Defendants’ summary judgment motion but not their Rule 56.1 Statement. (R. 120). 

Although pleadings from pro se litigants are liberally construed, they must still comply with 

the Court’s local procedural rules. Dale v. Poston 548 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2008); Cady v. 

Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006). Previously in this case, Clay responded to a different 

Rule 56.1 Statement filed by Defendants Downs, Encarnacion, and Wright for their motion for 

summary judgment, (R. 50), and the Court even noted that Clay complied with Rule 56.1(b) when it 

denied that summary judgment motion. (R. 58 at 4.) Despite Clay’s proper response to a prior Rule 

56.1 Statement and the Rule 56.2 Notices he received, he filed no response to the Rule 56.1 

Statement of defendants Ghosh and Wexford. Accordingly, this Court deems Defendants’ Rule 

56.1 factual statements admitted, to the extent they are supported by the record. Raymond v. 

Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006). The Court also notes that, in any event, 

Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statements are based primarily on Clay’s deposition testimony and Dr. 

Ghosh’s affidavit, neither of which Clay challenges in his response to the summary judgment 

motion. (R. 120.) With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the facts of this case.

FACTS 

On December 1, 2010, Clay was let out of his cell by Stateville Correctional Officer Downs, 

who was training a new officer. (R. 99, Defs. SOF ¶ 18.) According to Clay’s deposition and 

complaint, as soon as he exited his cell, Officer Downs placed his forearm on Clay’s neck, forced 

him up against a wall, and pressed using all of his weight. (Id.) After the incident, Clay experienced 

neck pain, right shoulder pain, and numbness and tingling in his index, middle, and pinky fingers of 

his left hand. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The health care unit (“HCU”) was not contacted that day about Clay’s 
4 

injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) The next day, December 2, 2010. Clay was examined by Physician 

Assistant LaTanya Williams. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Williams provided Clay with Motrin, Robaxin, and an 

analgesic balm, which helped relieve his symptoms. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 32.) Clay acknowledged that this 

prescribed treatment “helped a lot,” but he was given only a two week supply. (R. 99, Exh. A. Pl. 

Depo. at 80-81.) Plaintiff continued to experience periodic back pain for three months, and his neck 

pain and numbness in his fingers continued for three months. (R. 99, Defs. SOF ¶ 22.) Clay’s pains 

and numbness stopped after three months and have not returned. (Id.) Clay states he lifts weights to 

exercise. After the December 1, 2010, incident, he did not lift weights for approximately three 

months, but was then able to do so to his full potential. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Clay sometimes wakes up with 

numbness in his shoulders and neck, which he attributes to the mattress and pillow in his cell. (Id. at 

¶ 24.) He requested a double mattress and extra pillow permit on December 2, 2010, but was 

refused. (Id.) 

Clay’s claims against Dr. Ghosh and Wexford are that he did not receive follow up care after 

the December 2, 2010, examination. Clay expected to see Dr. Ghosh after Williams’ exam. (Id. at 

¶25.) Clay does not recall being told or seeing a medical record stating that he needed or would 

receive a follow up exam with Dr. Ghosh (id.); nor does he recall seeing a policy stating that follow 

up care was required. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Rather, he assumed follow up care was the standard procedure. 

(Id.; see also R. 99, Exh. A, Clay Depo. at 54-56.) He further believed that only Dr. Ghosh could 

conduct a follow up exam. (R. 99, Defs. SOF ¶ 25, citing Exh. A, Clay Depo. at 94.) Clay’s 

symptoms subsided and resolved even without receiving follow up care. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

Dr. Ghosh was Stateville’s medical director from June 18, 2003, to March 31, 2011. (Id. at 

¶ 27.) In addition to providing medical services to inmates, Dr. Ghosh reviewed records of medical 
5 

services provided by other Stateville health care providers and determined whether any necessary 

course of treatment was needed. (Id. at ¶ 28-29.) Other health care providers, such as physician 

assistants, would refer a patient’s record to Dr. Ghosh if the required treatment was outside of the 

services the physician assistant could provide. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

Having reviewed Clay’s medical records, Dr. Ghosh states in his affidavit that Clay 

requested emergency care on December 2, 2010, and that he was examined that day by Physician 

Assistant Williams. (Id. at ¶ 31.) Clay reported that he was involved in a maneuver by an officer the 

day before that resulted in a stiff, sore neck; right shoulder pain; and numbness in the fingers of his 

left hand. (Id.) Williams examined Clay; assessed that he was experiencing an alteration of comfort 

in the soft tissue area of the neck, cervical spine, and right shoulder; and prescribed an analgesic 

balm, Motrin, and Robaxin. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 39.) Williams noted on Clay’s chart that he was to return 

to sick-call for follow up care if needed. (Id.) (the Court is unable to find Williams’ December 2, 

2010, Progress Notes in the record; however, Clay, Dr. Ghosh, and Dr. Saleh Obaisi all similarly 

describe Williams’ notes and there is no dispute as to the contents of the notes, see id. at ¶¶ 32 and 

39; R. 120, Pl. Resp. at 2-3.) After review of Clay’s medical records, Dr. Ghosh determined to a 

degree of medical certainty that Clay did not suffer an objectively serious medical condition, and 

thus needed neither a referral for additional medical care by another physician nor a follow up 

exam. (R. 99, Defs. SOF at ¶ 33.) Although Clay alleges he sent Dr. Ghosh a letter on December 

17, 2010, requesting a follow up exam, Dr. Ghosh has no recollection of receiving such a letter. (Id.

at ¶ 34.) However, if Clay wanted additional medical attention, he could have submitted a sick call 

request, a procedure well known by Stateville inmates. (Id.) Clay never returned to the HCU 
6 

between December 2, 2010, and March 31, 2011, which is when Dr. Ghosh retired his position from 

Stateville. (Id. at ¶ 35.) 

There is no written or unwritten policy to provide minimal medical services for cost saving 

reasons. (Id. at ¶ 36.) According to Dr. Ghosh and Dr. Saleh Obaisi, Stateville’s current medical 

director, if an inmate had a serious medical condition requiring treatment, such treatment would be 

provided regardless of financial implications. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 44.) Decisions as to what treatment 

inmates receive are based upon the inmate’s medical needs, not any financial concerns allegedly 

instituted by Wexford. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 44.) 

Dr. Obaisi’s review of Clay’s medical records shows that Clay was treated on December 2, 

2010, for neck and shoulder pain and for numbness in his left hand. Although Clay returned to the 

HCU several times in 2011, he never complained about these symptoms until March 12, 2012, after 

he filed this suit. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41.) Further, Clay never returned to the HCU with these complaints 

after the March 12, 2012, visit. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Dr. Obaisi’s conclusion from review of Clay’s medical 

record is that he suffered no objectively serious medical condition. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue the following: (1) Clay’s injuries did not rise to the level of an objectively 

serious medical condition; (2) there is no evidence that Dr. Ghosh acted with deliberate indifference 

to Clay’s injuries; and (3) there is no evidence that Wexford created or condoned an 

unconstitutional policy or custom with providing inadequate medical care to inmates. 

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty prohibiting prison officials, officers, and physicians 

from acting with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). A deliberate indifference claim consists of objective and subjective 
7 

elements. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To establish such a claim, an inmate must 

be able to prove both: (1) he suffered an objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the 

defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that condition. Id. 

As to the first prong, a condition is sufficiently serious if it “has been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the 

need for a doctor's attention.” Roe v. Elyea 631 F.3d 843, 857-58 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Greeno v. 

Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). A condition may also be considered sufficiently serious if 

“failure to treat [it] could result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 

1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)). “[T]he presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain” qualifies as an 

objectively serious medical condition. Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522-23 (chronic spasms on one side of 

inmate’s scrotum about once a day were considered sufficiently serious to trigger Eighth 

Amendment concerns), citing Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373 (painful back pilonidal cyst was a serious 

medical condition); see also Dobbey v. Liping Zhang, No. 11 C 2374, 2013 WL 4838916 at *6 

(N.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2013) (an inmate’s “throwing out” his back causing chronic pain for periods of 

time was a serious medical condition). However, “[a] prison's medical staff that refuses to dispense 

bromides for the sniffles or minor aches and pains or a tiny scratch or a mild headache or minor 

fatigue–the sorts of ailments for which many people who are not in prison do not seek medical 

attention–does not by its refusal violate the Constitution.” Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1372. 

The record indicates that a jury could conclude that Clay’s injuries amounted to a serious 

medical condition. Clay testified in his deposition that, after the December 1, 2010, incident, he 
8 

experienced back, neck, and right shoulder pain, as well as tingling and numbness in his left hand 

for an extended period of time. According to Clay, for three months his neck and shoulder was 

constant, while his back pains continued off and on. Letters or memos Clay wrote to Dr. Ghosh on 

December 17, 2010, and January 10, 2011, stated that he was still experiencing back and shoulder 

pain, as well as tingling in his right hand. The December 17, 2010, letter states that Clay was 

requesting a follow up exam “because I have been in so much pain since this injury happened.” 

(Compl. at 14-15.) The Court notes that the pain medication and analgesic balm Clay received from 

Physician Assistant Williams on December 2, 2010, as well as Tylenol Clay later obtained from 

other inmates, significantly relieved his pain, (R. 99, Exh. A, Pl. Depo. at 31, 34), which arguably 

indicates that his pain was not serious. Nevertheless, the record contains sufficient evidence that 

Clay experienced constant shoulder and neck pain and chronic bouts of back pain for three months. 

There is thus at least an issue of triable fact as to whether his condition was more than the sort of 

mild aches and pains described in Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1372. Defendants are not entitled to 

summary judgment on this issue. 

Although Clay may be able to establish that he suffered a serious medical condition, he has 

not and, given the evidence of record, cannot establish that Dr. Ghosh acted with deliberate 

indifference. According to the record, Dr. Ghosh neither examined Clay, nor did he receive Clay’s 

letters or grievance requesting an exam. (R. 99-2, Exh. B, Dr. Ghosh’s Aff. ¶ 9.) And even had Dr. 

Ghosh received Clay’s requests, the record reflects no basis to conclude that an examination by Dr. 

Ghosh was required. Physician Assistant Williams’ December 2, 2010, exam–where she assessed a 

soft tissue injury to Clay’s neck and shoulder, prescribed Motrin, Robaxin, and an analgesic balm, 

and told him to seek a follow up if needed—substantially alleviated Clay’s pain and suggests no 
9 

reason to refer him for further treatment. There is no indication that Clay’s condition was outside 

Williams’ expertise or that she was not competent to provide further treatment to Clay were it 

needed. Furthermore, Williams told Clay to return for a follow up exam if needed, but he did not do 

so. Clay himself acknowledges that the medications Williams prescribed “helped a lot,” further 

demonstrating that Williams was capable of treating his condition, such that she would not have 

referred him to Dr. Ghosh for review or additional treatment. (R. 99-1, Exh. A, Pl. Depo. at 80-81.) 

Without a referral from Williams, the only evidence that Dr. Ghosh knew about Clay’s 

condition or his complaints of pain are the two letters Clay wrote to Dr. Ghosh and a grievance Clay 

filed. Dr. Ghosh, however, states he never received the letters or grievance and that, if Clay wanted 

a follow up exam, he should have submitted a sick call request, a procedure plainly known to Clay, 

who used it to secure his initial treatment and for other unrelated complaints. Clay does not dispute 

that Dr. Ghosh never received the letters or grievance or that he could have submitted a sick call 

request. Rather, Clay contends that Dr. Ghosh created or allowed a procedure where others read 

medical requests and grievance seeking medical attention and then report to Dr. Ghosh. Clay argues 

that, to the extent this process does not provide required medical care, Dr. Ghosh is responsible for 

knowingly allowing ineffective procedures to continue. (R. 120 at 3-4.) The problem with this 

argument is that the evidence of record establishes that he received adequate care with respect to his 

injuries and that Dr. Ghosh had no contrary information. Moreover, while Clay, like other 

prisoners, has the right to receive medical treatment to address serious medical needs; he does not 

have the right to see a physician for any and all medical issues. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 

1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners receive ‘unqualified 

access to health care.’ Rather, they are entitled to only ‘adequate medical care’”). There is nothing 
10 

inadequate per se about the establishment of procedures that permit treatment by medical personnel 

other than physicians that is consistent with prevailing medical standards. See id.; see also Forbes v. 

Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997) (an inmate “is not entitled to demand specific care. [H]e is 

not entitled to the best care possible. [H]e is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial 

risk of serious harm to h[im]”). Clay makes no argument that prevailing medical standards do not 

permit physician assistants to provide treatment for the sort of injuries he allegedly incurred, and he 

does not contend that Williams’ treatment of his injuries was insufficient. 

Based on the record, Dr. Ghosh’s lack of knowledge as to Clay’s complaints of pain during 

the three months after the December 1, 2010, incident is undisputed and there is no evidence 

indicating that Dr. Ghosh created or allowed a procedure intentionally keeping him uninformed of 

inmates’ serious medical conditions. Summary judgment is thus granted for Dr. Ghosh.1

For similar reasons, the Court comes to the same conclusion for the claims against Wexford. 

Clay claims that Wexford had a policy or practice not to provide adequate health care to inmates. 

To establish a constitutional violation against Wexford, Clay must be able to prove that there was an 

express policy; a widespread practice so entrenched and well-known that it carries the same force as 

a policy, or actions of an individual who possesses the authority to make final policy decisions. 

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). According to Clay, 

medical personnel initially provide minimal care, enough only to satisfy any legal requirements, and 

 

1 The plaintiff purports to sue Dr. Ghosh in both his individual and official capacities. A suit 

against Dr. Ghosh in his official capacity is no different than a suit against Wexford, see Holloway 

v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012) (suing an employee in his official 

capacity is the same as suing the organization that employs him); Echezarreta v. Kemmeren, No. 10 

C 50092, 2013 WL 4080293 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2013) (suing a Wexford doctor in his official 

capacity was considered the same as suing Wexford), and fails for the same reasons, set forth 

below, that the claim against Wexford fails. 
11 

then ignore inmates’ requests for medical attention in the hopes that they tire of asking for 

treatment. Apart from the implicit and presumably unintentional admission in this argument that he 

has no claim (if medical personnel provide sufficient treatment to satisfy legal requirements, then 

Clay cannot have a claim based on a failure to provide treatment in accordance with legal 

requirements), Clay presents no evidence to support such allegations, which, like his claim against 

Dr. Ghosh, appear to be based upon Clay’s assumptions as to how medical care is provided at 

Stateville. “There is not one ‘proper’ way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of 

acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 

(7th Cir. 2008). 

The treatment Clay received demonstrates no custom or policy with deliberately providing 

insufficient care for an inmate’s medical condition. He was seen by a physician assistant the day 

after he sustained his injuries. The physician assistant assessed soft tissue injuries, prescribed pain 

medication and an analgesic balm, and told Clay to return to sick call if he needed additional 

medical attention. Clay’s assumption that follow up exams are the standard practice and his writing 

of letters and grievances, but not sick call requests (the procedure set out for obtaining an 

appointment with a medical person), cannot establish an unconstitutional policy or custom by 

Wexford to ignore inmates’ medical needs. 

The only indication that someone in the medical department was aware of Clay’s pain and 

requests for additional medical care is Clay’s 1/31/11 grievance, to which an HCU employee 

responded that Williams’ 12/2/10 exam stated no need for follow up care. (R. 1, Compl. at 22-23.) 

Even if this response from the prison’s medical department was not appropriate, one inappropriate 

response is insufficient to establish an unconstitutional practice of denying medical care for 
12 

inmates. “Although the Seventh Circuit has ‘not adopted any bright-line rules for establishing what 

constitutes a widespread custom or practice, it is clear that a single incident—or even three 

incidents—do not suffice.’” Rouei v. Village of Skokie, No. 12 C 6622, 2014 WL 3725872 at *8 

(N.D. Ill. July 28, 2014) (Kennelly, J.), quoting Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 

2014), but see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997) (the 

Supreme Court has noted that proof a single incident of a constitutional violation may demonstrate 

an unconstitutional policy or custom where there is also evidence of a failure to train; the evidence 

in this case, however, reveals no wrongdoings other than one HCU person’s denial of one 

grievance). The record thus demonstrates that Clay cannot establish an unconstitutional policy or 

custom by Wexford. 

The Court notes that the lack of any evidence demonstrating deliberate indifference by Dr. 

Ghosh or an unconstitutional custom or policy with medical care at Stateville does not appear 

related to any limitations on Clay’s ability to conduct discovery. The Court instructed Clay to 

forward discovery requests to counsel for Defendants, which Clay did. (R. 76, 85.) The Court 

notes that Clay’s requests for counsel have been denied; however, it appears clear from the record 

that additional discovery would not alter the outcome of Clay’s claims against Dr. Ghosh and 

Wexford. Dr. Ghosh swears in his affidavit that he never received letters or a grievance from Clay; 

that Physician Assistant Williams’ December 2, 2010, exam indicated no need for follow up care; 

and that, if Clay wanted another medical examination, he should have submitted a sick call request. 

Although Clay successfully asserted claims of deliberate indifference against Dr. Ghosh and 

Wexford, after discovery, it is clear that there is no evidence to prove the claims. Given the record, 

there is no “reasonable likelihood that the recruitment of counsel would have made a difference in 
13 

the outcome of the litigation.” Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3686080 at *2 (7th Cir. 

July 25, 2014). 

Furthermore, Clay’s competence to represent himself is well demonstrated in the record. He 

completed two years of college; he forwarded discovery requests and sought to compel responses 

when needed; he successfully challenged the Court’s dismissal of Wexford on initial review; and he 

successfully defended against Defendants Downs, Wright, and Encarnacion’s motion for summary 

judgment. (R. 99, Exh. A, Clay Depo. at 7; R. 7, 29, 50, 58, 80, 85, 88.) The Court makes no 

determination now whether Clay will need counsel for any further discovery on the remaining 

claims against the Downs, Wright, and Encarnacion; however, as to the claims against Dr. Ghosh 

and Wexford, the record reveals that representation by an attorney was unnecessary. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

(R. 98). The Court dismisses Dr. Ghosh and Wexford as defendants in this matter, and pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), certifies that there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment against 

these defendants and enters such final judgment. (Plaintiff is therefore advised that his time to 

appeal the Court’s judgment as to defendants Ghosh and Wexford begins to run from the entry of 

the Judgment Order with regard to those defendants.) Plaintiff may proceed in this Court with his 

claims against Officers Downs, Wright and Encarnacion. 

 ENTER: _____________________________ 

 John J. Tharp, Jr. 

 United States District Court Judge 

DATE: _8/20/14