History of the

Air Corps Tactical School

1920 - 1940

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Robert T. Finney

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Finney, Robert T.

History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940/Robert T. Finney

p. enm. - (USAF historical studies; no 100)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States/Army Air Corps Tactical School-History

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UG633.A37784 no. 100 1993

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14. ABSTRACT

Originally published: Research Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1955.

(USAF historical studies; no. 100)

In the 1930s the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, was the nurturing ground for American air doctrine. Those

who studied and taught there were the same individuals who prepared America for war, and then led its airmen into combat.

145 pp., photos, index

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Foreword

In the 1930s the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field,

Alabama, was the birthplace and nurturing ground for American air doctrine. The work undertaken at the school became manifest in the skies

over Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific in the Second World

War. Those who studied and taught there were the same individuals who

prepared America for war, and then led its airmen into combat. This band

of men spawned and shaped the independent United States Air Force in

the postwar era. Their influence is still felt today, for they developed the

airpower doctrines and institutions that enabled the United States to

prevail in the Cold War. Their strategic vision, evolved from the thoughts

of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, is now embodied in the Air Force's

notion of Global Reach-Global Power. The legacy of the Air Corps

Tactical School continues on with the comprehensive programs of the Air

University, the world's premier airpower training institution. From flight

within the atmosphere to flight within space, American airmen fly their

missions based on principles enunciated in the lecture halls of Maxwell Air

Force Base.

Dr. Richard P. Hallion

Air Force Historian
Air Service Tactical School Quarters, Langley Field, Virginia

Note: the cover painting depicts the school at Maxwell Field, Alabama
Introduction

The air experience of World War I demonstrated, among other things,

the need for officers trained in the employment of military aircraft. Hence,

in 1920, concurrently with the recognition of the Air Service as a combatant arm of the Army, the professional education of air officers was

provided for by the creation of the new arm's own special and general

schools. Among the schools established was the Air Service Field Officers'

School at Langley Field, Virginia. This school was subsequently redesignated Air Service Tactical School (1922), and later Air Corps Tactical

School (1926). In 1931 the school was moved from Langley to Maxwell

Field, Alabama.

Throughout the decades between world wars, the Tactical School

served as the highest educational establishment within the air arm. Its

basic mission was to train air officers (and selected officers of the other

arms and services) in the strategy, tactics, and techniques of airpower.

Although the school never lost sight of this function, in its considerations

of employment of the air weapon it was confronted by the hard fact that,

unlike the other arms and services, it had no long precedent or body of

doctrine on which to base instruction. Therefore, the school became

inextricably involved in developing air doctrine.

In 1929 the Tactical School adopted as its motto: Proficimus More

Irretenti. (We Make Progress Unhindered by Custom). It was singularly

appropriate. For the record of airpower in World War I was one of

promise rather than solid achievement, and the Air Corps Tactical School

was more concerned with the promise than with the limited record, with

tomorrow than with yesterday. Indeed, the impact of airpower on future

wars became the very heart of the instruction given at the school. Admittedly, much of what was taught was based only on theory, but the

significance of the Tactical School lies primarily in the fact that it forged

an integrated body of concepts for the employment of airpower. It was in

its extra-legal role as the doctrinal center for the Air Corps that the school

made its most valuable contribution, not only to the air arm, but to the

nation.

v
Contents

Foreword iii

Introduction v

1. Early Military Education 1

Development of Military Educational System 1

The Impact of World War I 3

Establishment of Schools for Air Officers 7

Air Service Field Officers' School at Langley Field 9

2. The Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field 11

Establishment of the Air Service Tactical School 11

Air Corps Board at Langley 15

Staff and Faculty, 1920-1931 15

Students, 1920-1931 18

Curriculum Changes 20

Demonstrations and Exercises 21

Plans for the Move of the School to Maxwell Field 23

3. The Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field 27

Expansion of the School 27

The Air Corps Board at Maxwell 28

23d Composite Group 32

Demonstrations and Exercises 33

The Academic Department 34

Staff and Faculty, 1931-1940 38

Students, 1931-1940 41

4. Development of Doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School 55

The School as the Air Corps Doctrinal Center 56

Observation Aviation 59

Doctrine of Air Force Employment, 1920-1926 61

vii
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Evolution of the Theory of Daylight, High-Altitude Precision

Bombardment of Pinpoint Targets 62

Conflict with the War Department General Staff 68

Clarifying and Refining the Bomber Concept 70

Air-Ground Cooperation 72

Impact of Bomber Concept on Theory of Air Superiority 73

Changing Concept of Pursuit Employment 75

5. Discontinuance of Air Corps Tactical School 79

Planning for Short Courses 79

Suspension of the School 81

Establishment of AAF School of Applied Tactics 83

Establishment of the Air University 84

Notes 87

Appendices

1. Academic Department, Air Corps Tactical School 97

2. Staff and Faculty, Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1942 99

3. Air Corps Tactical School Graduates, by Class, 1920-1940 115

Index 143

Photographs are found on pp. 44-53.

viii
1

Early Military Education

Development of Military Educational System, 1802-1914

The United States government has always been concerned with the

professional education of its military men. At the conclusion of the

Revolutionary War, Maj. Gen. Henry Lee commented that "a government

is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed

and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength,

mechanized by education and discipline for battle."' Other Revolutionary

War figures who remembered vividly the weaknesses and inefficiencies of

an army without trained officers went beyond Lee's general condemnation.

In the period immediately following the war, Washington, Hamilton, Knox,

and Pickering all urged the establishment of a military academy to provide

a hard core of professionally trained officers to command in any future

emergency. 2 Washington, in particular, writing just before his death,

supported a proposal to establish an academy:

The Establishment of an Institution of this kind on a respectable and extensive basis has ever been considered by men an Object of

primary importance to this country; and while I was in the Chair of

Government I omitted no proper opportunity of recommending it

in my public Speeches and other ways, to the attention of the

Legislature.3

Shortly thereafter, James McHenry, Secretary of War, also recommended

the founding of a military academy, arguing, in part, that "no sentiment is

more just than this, that in proportion as the circumstances of a people are

opposed to the maintenance of a large military force, it is important that

as much perfection as possible be given to that which may at any time

exist.4

This early interest in the professional education of military leaders

resulted in the opening of the United States Military Academy at West
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Point on 4 July 1802. Thus established, the policy of having the government provide professional military training was strengthened and broadened in the following years. The United States Naval Academy was

founded at Annapolis in 1845, and in 1876, the Coast Guard Academy was

established in New London, Connecticut.

The three academies, whose graduates were to constitute the backbone of the military establishment, provided the basic professional education for officers of the various services. But while the Military Academy

would furnish the Army with the nucleus of the officer corps required in

an emergency, the Army very soon felt a need for specialized training of all

officers-Academy graduates and nongraduates alike. As early as April

1824 an Artillery School of Practice was established at Fortress Monroe,

Virginia, where newly commissioned second lieutenants received a year of

practical and theoretical training. At first the student body was made up of

those West Point graduates who upon graduation were assigned to the

Artillery, but later the course was changed so as to give advanced training

to experienced officers.5 Although the school underwent numerous changes,

it set the pattern for future schools in other arms. In 1827 an informal

Infantry School of Practice was established at Jefferson Barracks, but

advanced training for the various arms did not gain momentum until the

last two decades of the nineteenth century. Then, in rapid succession,

came the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth in 1881 and the

Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley in 1887. By 1904 there

were seven special schools for officers of the arms and services: the

Artillery School, the Engineer School, the School of Submarine Defense,

the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, the Army

Medical School, the Signal School, and the Infantry and Cavalry School.

At the turn of the century the Army felt the need for even more

advanced training for its officers. What was needed was an educational

system within the service which would go beyond Academy and special

school training in the fields of command and staff duties and provide an

opportunity for senior officers to retire temporarily from the pressing

demands of staff and command duties to consider the serious problems of

the nature of war, American theories and doctrines of warfare, and the

whole broad question of American national defense. These needs for

advanced education of officers were filled in 1901 by the creation of the

General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War

College Washington, D.C. The former underwent numerous redesignations, becoming eventually the Command and General Staff School. This

school served, in substance, as the stepping stone between the special

schools and the War College, the capstone in the Army's educational

system, where courses in military strategy prevailed and where new ideas

2
EARLYMILITARYEDUCA TION

were tested for the General Staff. Hence, by the beginning of the twentieth century provision had been made not only for the education of Army

officers on a graduate level but also for their specialized training and

education in the arms and services.

When the Army acquired its first airplane in 1909, it took the first step

in the development of yet another arm of the service. For several years

however, Army aviation remained as an adjunct to the Signal Corps. From

the creation of the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps in 1907

(redesignated the Aviation Section in 1914) until the entry of the United

States into World War I, the formal professional training provided for

officers was in no way comparable to that furnished officers of other arms

and services, such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, and signal. In 1911 a flying

school was established at College Park, Maryland, and continued in

operation until near the end of 1912. In January 1913 a second flying

school was opened at North Island, San Diego, California. By 1914 this

school was offering not only pilot training but also ground-school instruction in various subjects, such as mapping, navigation, aeronautical engineering, meteorology, topography, and internal combustion engines. Instructors and students at the College Park and San Diego schools were

intensely interested in the military possibilities of the airplane. They,

together with interested civilians and civilian agencies, went far beyond the

scope of the formal school curriculum by experimenting with-among

other things-machine guns on airplanes, communications equipment for

aircraft, bomb sights and bombing, aerial photography, and cooperation

with the infantry. Nevertheless, formal training continued to stress the

technical aspects of flying and maintenance. Because of the very newness

of the airplane the curriculum at the flying schools could not include, as

the courses of study at the older schools did for their various weapons,

instruction in the tactics, techniques, and employment of the air weapon.6

The Impact of World War I

After the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, nothing substantial was

done toward increasing the size of the Aviation Section or broadening the

scope of training given to aviation personnel. When the United States

entered the war in 1917, time would not permit the establishment of a

comprehensive educational system for air officers. Indeed, there were not

enough people, within the Army or without, with adequate knowledge of

military aviation to inaugurate a full-blown educational system for aviation

personnel. Under the circumstances, the military had to improvise and, to

a considerable extent, to depend on the Allies for advanced training of the

Air Service.

3
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Experiments in the United States between 1911 and 1916 indicated

that American airmen foresaw that the airplane would be not merely a

means of collecting intelligence information, but that it would be a weapon

of war. When the United States entered the conflict in April 1917, war

experience had proved the point. By that time, in fact, certain principles

for the employment of airpower already had been well established by the

Allies: 1) aerial superiority was prerequisite to successful air operations;

2) the only truly effective means of establishing and maintaining control of

the air was through a determined offensive against the hostile air force;

3) when air attacks, both against hostile air forces and vital rear areas,

were carried out in depth, enemy reconnaissance and pursuit action

against friendly front lines decreased; 4) limiting the air services to

reconnaissance and observation failed to utilize to full advantage military

aircraft which could take the war to the enemy by bombing and strafing;

and 5) in battle the air arm was more effective if concentrated under a

single command.

Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William Mitchell, who arrived in Paris

shortly after the United States entered the war and who was, at the time,

the ranking American air officer in Europe, was impressed with the

theories held by Allied air officers. Echoes of their ideas on the employment of airpower began to dot Mitchell's diary: "The only real defense

against aircraft is other aircraft"; 7 again, "a very significant thing to me

was that we could cross the lines of these contending armies in a few

minutes in our airplanes whereas the armies have been locked in the

struggle, immovable, powerless to advance, for three years ... They get

nowhere, as far as ending the war is concerned." By observing and actually

experiencing German bombing attacks, Mitchell learned to respect the

effects which bombardment could have on material and morale, and he

came to believe firmly that "airplane bombing.., will have a great effect

on all the operations, if efficiently carried out." In May 1917, on a visit to

Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, Mitchell was profoundly impressed with

the Royal Flying Corps commander's advanced ideas on airpower, especially with the view that "an airplane is an offensive and not a defensive

weapon" and with the ideas of behind-the-line bombardment and a unified

air command.

Although the American Air Service did not play a major role in World

War I, Mitchell was able to give convincing demonstrations of the effectiveness of the mass employment of military aviation. The American Air

Service learned at Chiteau-Thierry in July 1918 the first real lesson in the

use of organized air units; it was a severe and costly lesson. Flying, for the

most part, defensive missions against a numerically superior enemy air

force cost the Americans a substantial portion of their meager force.

Nevertheless, the campaign served to confirm many of Mitchell's earlier

4
EARLYMILITARYEDUCA TION

beliefs. He saw at firsthand the necessity for aerial superiority; he realized

that "spreading out or disseminating our air force in small detachments

spelled entire defeat for us."8 He came to see that engaging enemy air

units as far as possible from the front and threatening vital rear areas

forced the enemy to concentrate his pursuit in the threatened sector; thus,

enemy air action at the front against Allied observation planes and against

the infantry was reduced and Allied air forces were enabled to concentrate

their own air strength.9

In only two battles of the war-Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne

-was Mitchell able to test with a sizable force the theories he had formed

on the basis of what he had learned from the Allies and from the

American experience at Chateau-Thierry. In September 1918 the Americans were given the task of eliminating the Saint-Mihiel salient. Elevated

to the position of Air Service Commander, First Army, in the reorganization following Chateau-Thierry and given the responsibility for the air

phase of the battle, Mitchell persuaded Allied high commanders to permit

him to bring together under his control the largest air force yet assembled,

totaling 1,481 aircraft, mostly American and French, but including units of

all the Allies.1 °

Perhaps the most important consideration that prompted Mitchell to

request such a large force was his awareness of the necessity for aerial

superiority. His plan was to assemble a force as large as that of the

Germans and to strike first, thus wresting the initiative from the enemy. In

order that the plan might not be divulged the force was assembled without

decreasing air action in other sectors and without any preliminary air

attacks in the assault area. Surprise seems to have been achieved; the

enemy initially had only 295 aircraft available to oppose the First Army's

1,481 and Mitchell quickly won aerial superiority. When on the battle's

third day (14 September) German aircraft began to appear in increasing

numbers, Allied pursuit turned almost exclusively to aerial combat, maintaining effective local control of the air for the last two days of the ground

advance. Moreover, the vigorous offensive of the Allied air force forced

the enemy airmen to remain on the defensive.

In addition to maintaining control of the air, the air force, divided into

two air brigades, struck alternately at the right and left flanks of the salient

and at communications and supplies in the enemy's rear. Pursuit pilots

trained in aerial combat applied themselves, especially during the first two

days of the battle, to long-range visual reconnaissance and strafing. Although inclement weather hampered daylight bomber operations, every

day missions were dispatched, forcing enemy air the defensive and drawing

it away from the front lines, so that Allied observation operated almost

unopposed near the front. Taking advantage the better night weather,

British, French, and Italian bombers attacked command posts near the

5
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

front, and points along the rail line over which the enemy was bringing up

reserves.

The air battle at Saint-Mihiel was costly to Allied air units but it paid

large dividends. While the German armies were largely denied the advantages of aerial reconnaissance and observation and suffered at the hands

of Allied aircraft, the American infantry "was kept informed of developments practically hourly" and was relatively immune from attacks by

hostile aircraft." The road attacks had blocked the enemy's principal

avenue of escape and had increased considerable the number of prisoners

taken (over 15,000) and materiel captured when Allied infantry finally

pinched off the salient. The success attending the employment of so large

and heterogeneous a force demonstrated the validity of Mitchell's contention that the air force should, and could, be massed under one commander for successful operations and set the pattern for Air Service

operations for the last two months of the war.

Although never again able to mass as large a force as he had at

Saint-Mihiel, Mitchell employed the same principle of concentration during the more extended Meuse-Argonne offensive, 26 September to 11

November. Thus, when the German air service struck at the Americans on

the flanks of the Meuse-Argonne salient to "make our infantry insist on

splitting up our pursuit aviation so as to give local protection everywhere,"

Mitchell refused "to spread a thin veneer of airplanes along the front

through which the enemy air could break easily at any point with a large

group formation."'' 2 Throughout this last Allied operation, Mitchell's pursuits remained on the offensive, searching out and attacking hostile aircraft and airdromes, maintaining local air superiority, and continuing their

strafing attack; bombers worked largely on communications and troop and

supply concentrations.

The operations of the Air Service, AEF were almost entirely tactical,

but if the war had lasted for a few more months the Americans almost

certainly would have participated in a projected strategic air war against

Germany. German bombing of London and creation by the British in

October 1917 of a striking force designed specifically for strategic attacks

against Germany had indicated an awareness of the strategic potentialities

of the air weapon. Moreover, in November 1917 Lt. Col. E. S. Gorrell of

the American Air Service had prepared an amazingly comprehensive plan

for "strategical bomb dropping" (defined as bomb-dropping against "commercial centers") against Germany."3 Although the Gorrell plan was never

implemented, before the end of the war the British had established an

independent air force within the RAF for such operations. Of perhaps

greater significance was the fact that plans were on foot to create an Allied

strategic air force, but the war ended before such a force could be set up.

6
EARLYMILITARYEDUCA TION

Although observation undoubtedly remained the dominant role for

aviation throughout World War I, the air combat of that war and the

limited bombardment operations were portents to Mitchell and the rank

and file of the flying personnel. Mitchell, through the medium of both the

written and spoken word, argued ceaselessly in the postwar period for

recognition of the principles which, in his opinion, had been clearly

demonstrated during the war: the air force should be an independent arm;

there was an independent air mission; air units should be commanded by

airmen; airpower to be effective had to be concentrated; and bombardment was the most important element of the air force. Other airmen,

although expressing themselves in somewhat milder terms-and tonesrecognized that airpower should be centralized under an air commander

and that airpower did have an independent mission.

Establishment of Schools for Air Officers

The introduction of the air weapon in World War I and the faith of

airmen in its future led to endless squabbles in the postwar period. The

Army recognized that the Air Service would play a useful role in future

warfare, but how was the air weapon to be fitted into the over-all structure

of national defense? Could aviation best serve the interests of the nation

as an entirely separate, independent branch of the military establishment,

or should it remain integral to the Army and the Navy? The question of

the organization of the air arm became inextricably interwoven with the

question of its employment. The two defied easy solution. Although

bitterly opposing any proposal to establish an independent air arm, the

War Department General Staff (WDGS), which provided the key spokesmen for the ground arm's position, gracefully acceded to the creation of

the Air Service as a combatant arm of the Army in the Army Reorganization Act of 1920.*

In keeping with the long precedent of professional education for the

arms and services, the Air Service formulated plans for its own educational

system. An early plan called for an Air Service academy, which the

Director of Air Service suggested would be the best way to obtain the 300

or 400 officers who would have to be replaced annually in the Army's air

arm.14 Although the suggestion does not seem to have been pushed, it

clearly indicates that immediately after the war the Air Service not only

* The legality of the Air Service before 1920 rested on a series of executive orders, dating

from May 1918.

7
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

considered itself a permanent member of the military establishment but

that it considered itself such a specialized arm that there was "no way of

training officers, even in part, for the Air Service, except in the Air Service

itself."'15

In addition to an Air Academy the Air Service sensed the need for its

own service school. Although junior officers learned the fundamentals of

drill, discipline, routine, and subordinate administrative and staff work

through experience, and although they could acquire technical knowledge

through specialized training, there was still a need for indoctrinating

officers in the duties of squadron and higher air unit commanders and in

the tactical employment of military aviation. Accordingly, in October 1919

the Director of Air Service sought permission to establish an Army Air

Service School of Application at Langley Field, Virginia, to develop and

standardize the instruction and training of officers in the tactics and

techniques of the Air Service.' 6 It was contemplated that any officer of the

Air Service might be detailed as a student and that graduation from the

school would be prerequisite to assignment of an officer to command of

"larger units, or to higher staff work." All students were to have completed

pilot training (or balloon and airship pilot training) and to have had at

least one year's service with an Air Service organization.

Academically, the proposed course of study was be divided into three

departments: the Department of Military Art (Tactical); the Department

of Aeronautical Engineering (Technical): and the Department of Administration (Administrative). Of the three, the Department of Military Art

would be the most important and would be allotted 600 of the scheduled

1,200 hours of instruction; the remaining 600 hours would be divided

equally between the other two departments. That the curriculum would

emphasize Air Service matters was reflected in the fact that of the 600

hours allotted to the Tactical Department, 250 were to be devoted to

tactics of air fighting. The other 350 hours would be divided among seven

courses: Tactics of Other Arms (Including Navies) and Combined Tactics

of All Arms would each have 100 hours; 50 hours were to be devoted to

Military History and Strategy and Methods of Liaison, 30 hours each to

Conduct of War and Troops in Campaign, and 20 hours each to Weapons

and Munitions of War and to Current Military Events. The 300 hours

devoted to the Technical Department were to be divided between courses

in Aircraft Construction (85 hours), Aircraft Accessories (70 hours), Power

and Its Transmission (80 hours), Navigation (50 hours), and Meteorology

(15 hours). These courses were not designed to produce specialists in the

fields covered but were to qualify squadron and balloon commanders and

Air Service officers of higher commands for their duties. The 300 hours in

the Administrative Department were to be divided between Administra8
EARLYMILITARYEDUCA TION

tion (150 hours), Elements of Law, International Law, and Military Application of Principles of Law (50 hours each).17

On 25 February 1920 the War Department authorized the establishment of 11 special service schools for the Air Service, including the Air

Service School, Langley Field, Virginia. The field officers course of the Air

Service School* followed in organization and purposes the previous year's

recommendations of the Director of the Air Service."8 The letter of

authorization for the course stipulated: "instruction which will fit the

graduates thereof for the performance of duties that devolve upon officers

of the Air Service as such reducing the instruction in the tactics of other

arms and in combined tactics to that necessary to qualify an Air Service

officer to function as an Air Service officer."'19

Air Service Field Officer's School, Langley Field

Shortly after the authorization of the Air Service schools, the field

officers course became the Air Service Field Officers' School. In July Maj.

Thomas DeW. Milling was ordered to Langley to organize this school,

which was to open that fall. 20 The task was formidable. Not only was

equipment lacking, but officers with Air Service experience who would be

suitable as instructors were scarce. Finally, 17 officers, in addition to

Milling, were made available. Nine of them were designated as instructors:

Majs. Frederick L. Martin and Davenport Johnson; Capts. Joseph T.

McNarney, Gerald E. Brower, John H. Jouett (for lecture purposes only),

Harry C. Drayton, and Clearton H. Reynolds; 1st Lt. Ralph B. Bagby; and

2d Lt. Jacob M. Woodard (school armament officer). Eight were designated as students: Maj. Leo A. Walton, Capts. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., and

Louis R. Knight, and 1st Lts. Thomas N. Blackburn, Chester P. Dorland,

Arthur E. Easterbrook, Edwin J. House, and Walter R. Lawson. In making

these assignments of staff and students the Chief of Air Service notified

the commandant of the school that the services of these officers were to be

used in the manner the school commander deemed most appropriate, and

some of the officers assigned as students actually became instructors and

vice versa. For example, Hanley served as an instructor rather than as a

student, and Reynolds became a student instead of an instructor.t Apparently neither Dorland nor House attended this session, their places being

* Other courses at the Air Service School were 1) "an Airship School," 2) an enlisted

men's aerial and photography course, and 3) an enlisted men's balloon-mechanics course. 1 Some members of the faculty apparently doubled as instructors and students, for

Hanley, Johnson, McNarney, and Milling are listed as 1921 graduates of the school.

9
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

taken by Lieutenant Bagby, who originally was assigned as an instructor,

and 1st Lieutenant Clayton Bissell. Bagby resigned from the Army on 10

May 1921 and was not included among the graduates of that year.2

'

Although not assigned initially Maj. William C. Sherman, who served as

Milling's assistant, was an important addition to the faculty.

During the summer a program of instruction was prepared and

received War Department approval. Pressed for time and hampered by the

limited Air Service precedent and doctrine, instructors were unable to

prepare in detail the various courses scheduled; nevertheless, the school

opened on 1 November 1920.22

Although planned on a nine-months basis, the first session was cut

short. In the spring of 1921 both faculty and students were absorbed by the

First Provisional Air Brigade which had been organized under Brig. Gen.

William Mitchell to carry out bombing experiments against ex-German

war vessels. School authorities felt that their work under Mitchell was

excellent practice and that the course in Combined Aerial Tactics and

Staff Duties was much more practical than the ordinary course would have

been, but the exercise caused the suspension of all class work until the

following October; consequently, the school opened for its second session

without adequate preparation having been made.23

Although courses were not completely rounded out during the first

two years, the school made a creditable record. Lectures were given in the

majority of the subjects scheduled: Observation, Pursuit, Bombardment,

and Attack, Troops in Campaign and Tactics, and Staff Duties in the

Tactical Department; Navigation and Meteorology, Communications, Photography, Armament; and Engineering in the Technical Department; and

History of Air Service, Army Regulations, Hygiene and Sanitation, Field

Service Regulations, and Law in the Administrative Department. 24 Equally

important, Major Milling and his associates by the end of the second year

had established a sound administrative and instructional system that was

to provide the basis for the future expansion of the school.

10
2

The Air Corps Tactical School at

Langley Field

Establishment of the Air Service Tactical School

The Field Officers' School had been established to prepare senior

officers for higher Air Service command duty, but it soon became apparent

that there was a shortage of field grade officers in the Air Service.* In fact,

in 1921 the Chief of Air Service, noting the shortage, had reminded Major

Milling that, although the name of the school at Langley implied that only

field officers would attend, junior officers had been and would continue to

be sent to the school.1 Moreover, in the spring of 1922 it was evident to a

board charged with the work of reorganizing the Army school system that

the Air Service Field Officers' School was performing functions that in the

other arms and services were handled by two or more schools. Because the

only other schools provided for the Air Service were designed to give

technical training only, the board felt that every air officer, regardless of

rank, should be given an opportunity to attend the school at Langley.

Hence, in November 1922 the name of the school was officially changed to

the Air Service Tactical School (ASTS) and in 1926, when the Air Service

became the Air Corps, to the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS).2

In the summer of 1922 the scope of the school was broadened to

cover the tactics and techniques both of the Air Service and of the other

branches of the Army and the Navy.3 The course was still to last 9 months

and was to consist of 1,345 hours of instruction, divided among 20 subjects.

Several new courses were added to its curriculum: Combat Orders, Staff

Duties, Supply, Antiaircraft Defense, and Employment with Associated

* See below, p. 18

11
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Units.4 That air tactics and techniques were to be emphasized was evidenced by the fact that 160 hours of instruction were to be devoted to each

of the following subjects, Observation, Bombardment, and Pursuit (60

hours were allotted to Attack Aviation); 136 hours were to be given to

Combined Air Tactics; 76 hours were scheduled for Aeronautical Engineering; and 200 hours were designated for Employment with Associated

Units, described as "a study of the employment of units to which squadrons

or groups of the Air Service are attached." 5 The time schedule for other

subjects included Armament and Gunnery, 60 hours; Supply, 60 hours;

Navigation, 40 hours; Meteorology, 40 hours; Organization of the Army, 36

hours; Balloons and Airships, 36 hours; Staff Duties, 30 hours; Photography, 24 hours; Combat Orders, 24 hours; and Antiaircraft Defense, 12

hours.

In the summer of 1923 the program of instruction underwent several

alterations. One change was the inclusion of a course in practical flying

(126 hrs.). This had not been included in the curriculum initially, for all

students were to be trained pilots. It was discovered, however, that officers

had become out of touch with flying and its peculiar demands and that

students were far from satisfactory as pilots. It was also felt that the actual

flying of and familiarity with the various types of service planes were

necessary in producing a "polished" Air Service officer. The new course

required each student to fly not less than two afternoons per week.6 The

practical flying course became increasingly important as the school developed, for many of the school's problems were solved in the air.

Other alterations involved the reduction of the total number of hours

in the program of instruction to 845 and the addition of two new courses.

Although all courses were shortened to some degree the reduction was

made largely by shortening the Employment of Associated Units from 200

to 48 hours, Combined Arms from 136 to 54, Bombardment from 160 to

56, Pursuit from 160 to 84 and Observation from 160 to 118; Stable

Management (25 hours) was eliminated. The two new courses added were

the History of the Air Service (9 hours) and Military Map Reading and

Sketching (24 hours).

The school organization and methods of instruction were developed

during the first few years. In accordance with Army regulations, the

commanding officer of the base on which the school was located automatically became commandant, a principle which was followed throughout the

school's history, both at Langley and Maxwell Field to which the school

moved in the summer of 1931.7 Maj. William N. Hensley, Jr., who assumed

command of Langley Field on April 1920, became the first commandant of

the school. For all practical purposes, however, direction of school affairs

at first fell to the "Officer in Charge." Major Milling headed the school

under this designation until the 1923-1924 session, when his title became

12
LANGLEYFIELD

assistant commandant. During this same period Milling's immediate assistant Maj. William C. Sherman, was designated as "Assistant to'the Officer

in Charge" but when Milling became assistant commandant, Capt. Earl L.

Naiden, who replaced Sherman, became director of instruction. As such,

Naiden's tasks consisted of "coordinating the instruction of the school as

well as adjusting the courses with those of General Service School at Fort

Leavenworth, and in preparation of Air Service officers for attendance at

that school."8 This particular position within the faculty remained in force

while the school was at Langley. After the move to Maxwell Field there

was a slight curriculum readjustment which was accompanied by the

consolidation of the duties of the assistant commandant and director of

instruction and the appointment of a director for each department. Another minor administrative change occurred in 1923 when school adjutant

became the school secretary. Although both the faculty and curriculum

expanded, the basic administrative organization of the school remained the

same: the commandant served in dual role of post commander and head of

the school; the assistant commandant was responsible for the smooth

functioning of the Academic Department of the school; in performing

his duties the assistant commandant was assisted by the secretary, the

director of instruction, the directors of the departments,* and the various

instructors.

Instruction was both theoretical and practical. Normally, morning

periods were devoted to classroom instruction, consisting of lectures,

conferences, and illustrative problems. The method of instruction in most

subjects followed a definite pattern. During classroom conferences, instructors described the principles of the subject and their applications,

study assignments from the text having been previously given. After several

conferences an illustrative problem was worked in class. In the Bombardment course, for example, after lectures and conferences on characteristics

of bombardment aircraft and the employment of bombardment aviation,

each student would be designated a group commander and would be

ordered to attack a certain objective with his group. After taking into

consideration the theoretical opposition imposed by enemy antiaircraft

artillery and pursuit aviation, the nature of the objective, support by

friendly aircraft (pursuit and perhaps attack), and such other factors as

reconnaissance reports and the results desired, each student made his

basic decisions for the attack and produced the over-all plan. This plan

included the time and general method of attack, bombs and fuzes to be

used, type of formation and routes to be flown, direction and altitude of

* Beginning with the 1934-1935 session of school.

13
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

attack, method of bombing, and all other details necessary for the proper

execution of the mission. Almost all courses culminated in one or more

examinations, called "map problems," in which students were given a

situation and each worked out his solution alone. Subjects that did not

lend themselves to map problems ended in regular examinations.9

In general, the afternoons were reserved for flying and the practical

application, insofar as possible, of classroom theories of air tactics and

techniques.

Although the parsimony of Congress retarded the development of the

Air Service in general in the period immediately after World War I, in

some respects the physical plant of the school at Langley rather quickly

reached a satisfactory state. A library, which had been established with the

founding of the school, grew steadily. For example, during the 1922-1923

school year, 1,983 new books and pamphlets were added; by the same year

the subscription list to periodicals had been increased to 31, including

foreign and domestic magazines covering both technical and general Air

Service information.'" Major Naiden, assistant commandant, reporting in

1926 on the progress of the library, recommended "that the present

generous policy towards the library be continued." He noted that more use

was being made of the library each year, and he considered that fact alone

as good evidence of both its value and growth." From the first year, maps

and certain other classroom equipment had been made available to the

school.12 By 1926 Major Naiden could report that the miscellaneous

equipment of the school was in a satisfactory condition and sufficient to

meet most needs.' 3

Nevertheless, throughout its stay at Langley Field the school labored

under various handicaps. Quarters were inadequate for the number of

officers assigned; a building specifically designed for the school was

needed.* Nor were there ever enough airplanes available to demonstrate

as thoroughly as school authorities desired the principles in techniques

being taught. More serious, however, than the physical shortcomings at

Langley, were the lack of an adequate staff and the very limited amount of

Air Service precedent and doctrine. Adequate funds and labor could

provide the physical foundation, but only time, experience, and careful

study by dedicated men could add the intellectual superstructure.' 4

* Before 1930, Langley Field personnel and equipment were housed principally in

temporary buildings. Permanent structures consisted of officer's quarters, the administration

buildings, boat house, balloon hangar, two brick airplane hangars (constructed in 1918), and a

few miscellaneous small buildings. Many commissioned officers of the higher grades were on commutation and lived in the adjoining community. (Hist. Langley Fid., Inception to I Mar.

1935.)

14
LANGLEYFIELD

Air Corps Board at Langley

The problem of maintaining an adequate staff was aggravated by the

fact that faculty members were burdened with additional post duties and

were frequently called upon to serve on various boards and committees.

One particular board which diverted the attention of a portion of the

faculty should be mentioned. In 1922 there had been established at

Langley Field an Air Service Board which was to consider such subjects as

might be referred to it by the Chief of Air Service and "to originate and

submit ... recommendations looking to the improvement of the Air Service."15 Its membership was to consist of the commandant and assistant

commandant of the Air Service Tactical School and from two to five other

officers, at least one of whom would be relieved of all duties other than

those pertaining to the board. Despite the provision for personnel, the

board continually suffered from the lack of an adequate staff. In 1924 the

commandant of the school, although recognizing that the board, when

properly organized and operating, could be of great assistance to both the

Air Service at large and to the school in particular, reported that since no

officer had been assigned as a working member, the board had not as yet

functioned. 6

Although the board had "working members" in 1925,* it still was not

handling the service problems for which it had been established. To the

contrary, Maj. Oscar Westover, commandant of the school, reported that

he, Major Milling, assistant commandant, and Major Naiden, director of

instruction, had functioned throughout the year as members of the Air

Service Board, personally reviewing, correcting, and criticizing correspondence courses prepared by the working members. Indeed, despite its broad

directive and the original intent, the Air Service Board (redesignated Air

Corps Board in 1926) throughout its existence at Langley Field functioned

only as an auxiliary of the Tactical School, handling correspondence

courses. 17

Staff and Faculty, 1920-1931

In addition to the extracurricular duties which absorbed much of the

time of the officers, the problem of obtaining and maintaining an adequate

staff of competent instructors was further complicated by the fact that air

officers with combat experience were limited in number, and few could be

* Available records do not give the names of these "working members."

15
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

made available to serve as instructors.* A further handicap was the fact

that during the first three years there was a rapid turnover of instructor

personnel. For example, of the original staff, only three (Milling, Sherman,

and McNarney) were on hand during the second year. To make matters

worse, no policy had been set for filling vacancies. Moreover, although as

early as 1923 a director of instruction was appointed for the primary

purpose of coordinating the various courses, the incumbent of that office

was forced to serve in the dual role of instructor and director.

For several reasons the Tactical School especially needed competent

instructors. In the place, it was the most advanced Air Corps school. Thus,

courses in all aspects of the air arm-technical, tactical, and administrative-were included in the school curriculum. Secondly, ACTS served

within the Army's educational system as an Air Corps preparatory school

for the Command General Staff School. Finally, school authorities, mindful of the prejudice against the Air Corps in numerous other branches of

the Army and keenly aware of the lack of appreciation of the potentialities

of airpower on the part of the rank and file of ground officers, were

determined that before Air Corps officers attended the Command and

General Staff School, they should be well trained in and thoroughly

familiar with all aspects of their own arm.

In June 1924 Tactical School authorities recommended to the Chief of

Air Service that specific steps be taken to eliminate many of the instructor

personnel problems. Instructors should be assigned for at least two years,

and longer if possible. There should be an overlap of at least four months

between the arrival of a newly appointed instructor and the departure of

his predecessor. Perhaps of more importance was the recommendation

that there be established a policy of drawing future instructors from

graduates of ASTS and the General Service Schools; at least one graduate

of the latter should be ordered to the Tactical School every year. It was

believed that such a policy would eventually result in uniform instruction

and close coordination with the other branches. 8

In August the Office of the Chief of Air Service approved the school

recommendations with only minor reservations. Instructors would be drawn

from graduates of the ASTS or the General Service Schools; officers

assigned to the school would, in the future, be ordered to report "sometime" prior to the departure of their predecessors; and officers ordered to

duty at the school would be allowed to remain for "extended tours of

duty."' 9 This policy tended to stabilize the Tactical School, giving it early

direction and continuity.

*For a complete list of the staff and faculty see Appendix 2.

16
LANGLEYFIELD

The shortage of instructors, however, continued to plague the school.

In 1925 Major Naiden, director of instruction, noted that many desirable

undertakings had to be foregone because of this situation, which he

considered the school's greatest weakness. Not only did the staff remain

small but the handful of instructors continued to be called on to perform

duties outside the school. School officials granted that much of this

extracurricular work was beneficial because it kept instructors abreast of

the latest technical developments and air force thinking, but as long as

there was only one instructor available for each course, such added duties

not only hampered the preparation of classroom presentations, but if such

duty occurred during the school year, it caused a shortening of the course

given by the instructor involved. Moreover, as interest in the military use

of aviation grew and as literature representing every shade of civilian and

military opinion on the subject increased, it became increasingly difficult

for the small staff at the school to keep up with all, or even an acceptable

part, of what was being written and said on the subject in which they as

individuals and the school in general were vitally interested. As late as

1930, Maj. Walter H. Frank, assistant commandant, in requesting the

assignment of additional instructors, noted that although the library had

been considerably enlarged, making available a large amount of aviation

data, an "untold amount" of research remained to be done before the

school would derive any benefit from it.20

It was fortunate for the school and for the air arm that the staff and

faculty, though small in number, were composed for the most part of

farsighted, capable men who were convinced that the advent of the

military airplane had revolutionized the art of war. Throughout the nineteen-twenties officers in responsible posts at the school were for the most

part veterans of World War I, and their combat experience influenced

them in teaching the tactics and techniques of the various classes of

aviation. With only the experience of the war to serve as a guide with too

little time to give to new thoughts and ideas in the preparation of the

courses, they used, during the early years of the school, the air operations

of World War I as illustrations of the employment of airpower. Their

dependence upon World War I was, however, an expedient, intended to

serve only until time could be found to analyze and evaluate the air

experience of that war and from the premises thus established to theorize

on the probable impact of airpower on the nature of future war. For

instructors at the Tactical School were convinced (as were airmen in

general), that airpower would be a vitally important element in future

conflicts, and their greatest achievement at the school was the sifting and

selection-and sometimes conceiving-of ideas on the crucial issue of the

employment of airpower in war. The list of instructors at the Tactical

17
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

School during its years at Langley included the following names of officers

who were in later years substantial contributors to air thought in the

period between wars and as air leaders during World War II:

Brig. Gen.* Thomas DeW. Milling, Assistant Commandant, 1920-1925

Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Instructor, 1920-1925

Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnson, Instructor, 1920-1921; 1926-1928

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., Instructor, 1920-1921

Brig. Gen. Earl L. Naiden, Director of Instruction, 1923-1925; Assistant

Commandant, 1925-1926

Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, Commandant, 1924-1926

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Instructor, 1924-1925

Maj. Gen. Edwin J. House, Secretary" 1925-1929

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Assistant Commandant, 1926-1930

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Instructor, 1926-1931

Gen. George C. Kenney, Instructor, 1927-1931

Brig. Gen. Robert C. Candee, Instructor, 1928-1932

Maj. Gen. Robert Olds, Instructor, 1928-1931

Brig. Gen. Kenneth N. Walker, Instructor, 1929-1933

Maj. Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, Instructor, 1929-1930

Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, Director of Instruction, 1929-1931

Students, 1920-1931

During the early years of the school the student body, like the faculty,

was small. Only seven students were graduated the first year.t Classes for

the next several years were only slightly larger: 12 were graduated in the

1922 class, 17 in 1923, 14 in 1924, 13 in 1925, and 16 in 1926. The small

number in each class was due in part to the fact that the Air Service itself

was small and in part to the lack of an adequate staff to care for more

students. In 1924 Major Milling recommended that since it was difficult to

obtain an adequate number of competent instructors for the school, the

classes should be held to a maximum of 25 students. 21

Following the limited expansion of the air arm after the creation of

the Air Corps in 1926, classes at the school became somewhat larger

* Rank given is the highest rank achieved.

t Although, only seven students completed the course, four of the instructors, Milling,

Hanley, Johnson, and McNarney, were awarded certificates. Hence, the list of graduates for

the first year includes 11 names. See Appendix 3 for graduates by year.

18
LANGLEY FIELD

although the faculty was not appreciably increased. There were 20 graduates in 1927, 24 in 1928, 24 in 1929, 31 in 1930, and 39 in 1931. In all, 217

officers completed the course while the school was at Langley.

Although the school at first was called "Field Officers' School," field

grade officers never predominated. In the first four graduating classes

ranks ranged from one lieutenant colonel in 1923-1924 to a liberal

sprinkling of first lieutenants. Of the first 50 graduates, less than one-fourth

were of field grade: 1 lieutenant colonel and 10 majors, compared with 27

captains and 12 first lieutenants. In 1924 the Office of the Chief of Air

Service approved a recommendation from school authorities that student

officers be selected from field officer grade pilots of average age, rank, and

experience, but because of the relatively few field grade officers in the air

arm, company grade officers continued to predominate. Nevertheless,

thereafter greater care was taken in selecting students, and in 1925 Major

Naiden reported:

The students of last year's class were for all practical purposes of

uniform rank, age, and experience. They were easy to handle and

worked well together. The undesirable element of overly keen

competition was practically eliminated, notwithstanding the fact

that the students as a whole applied themselves diligently. All of

these things resulted in a class of very high morale, something

which should be striven for at all costs. It is therefore recommended that in the future every effort be made to send classes here

of a similar nature to the past one. 22

The standard of admission established for air arm officers applied

equally to officers of other branches who attended ASTS. Although the

first three classes were composed solely of Air Service officers, an infantry

officer attended the 1923-1924 class. Only Air Service officers were

present for the 1924-1925 session, but in his annual report for that year

Maj. Oscar Westover, commandant, indorsed a suggestion that officers

from other branches be detailed to the school the following year. He

cautioned, however, that such officers should be of approximately the same

age, rank, and experience of Air Service students and that they should be

placed on flying status while at the school, because of the nature of the

instruction. This recommendation was eventually approved.2 3

There were two particular reasons for desiring the presence of officers

of other branches. As early as 1921 the Chief of Air Service had expressed

the desire to invite representatives of other arms to attend the school as a

practical means of disseminating Air Service doctrine throughout the

Army and also as a means of bringing about a better understanding and

closer spirit of cooperation between the Air Service and other arms. 24

School authorities agreed, and it was that thought which lay behind Major

19
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Westover's recommendation in 1925. In 1927 Major Frank, assistant commandant, pointed out that attendance of officers of other arms might also

serve the useful function of destroying prejudices that existed against the

Air Corps.25

One officer each from the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery,

Infantry, and Signal Corps and three Marine Corps officers attended the

1926-1927 session. Thereafter, the other arms and services were represented in each class.

Curriculum Changes

For the first few years of the school so little material was available,

indeed so little was known on the subject of the military application of

airpower, that a considerable amount of time was spent on ground tactics,

techniques, and strategy. In fact, the courses in the various phases and

types of aviation were concerned primarily with the contribution that

aviation could make to the ground campaign. The first textbook for air

subjects was written in 1921 by Maj. William C. Sherman and was issued in

mimeographed form by the office of the Chief of Air Service as Training

Regulations 440-15, Air Tactics. This text consisted of six sections, Characteristics of Aircraft, Fundamental Doctrine of the Air Service, Observation, Attack, Bombardment, and Pursuit Aviation. Although at many

points revealing the author's far-ranging concepts of the proper employment of airpower, the text's main emphasis was on the human element in

war and the morale and psychological effect of airpower on surface

troops.

26

By the mid-nineteen-twenties considerable progress had been made in

the development of courses in air tactics. The progress was due in part to

the appointment in 1923 of a director of instruction. Capt. Earl L. Naiden,

who was assigned to this position immediately following his graduation

from the Command and General Staff School in 1923, was able to effect a

greater coordination of the courses than had theretofore been possible.

Naiden also devoted much time to consideration of the mission of the

Tactical School and the means by which it could best meet its responsibilities. He soon decided that the courses in Aeronautical Engineering and

Administration which absorbed time and energy of both the faculty and

students, were hindering the development of courses dealing with the

tactics and techniques of the various classes of aviation. 27 At the close of

the 1923-1924 session, he recommended that the technical subjects included in the curriculum be considerably shortened and the time thus

gained be applied to the tactical courses. He maintained that the Tactical

School should consider students proficient in the technical aspects of

20
LANGLEYFIELD

aviation when they arrived and that in that field they should be given only

brief refresher courses, sufficient to cover only the general principles and

to take care of any relation that existed between the technical and tactical

aspects of aviation. In May 1925 the school received War Department

approval of changes in the curriculum which were designed to place

greater emphasis on the tactical subjects, and Aeronautical Engineering

was dropped from the curriculum. 8

Increased emphasis on air matters was made possible, in part, by the

steady accumulation of information on the military use of airpower. In the

summer of 1923 instructors for the first time were permitted to devote

themselves to the preparation of their courses for the following fall,

instead of engaging in other duties such as attending exercises. Thus, from

1923 on, faculty members during the summer lull reworked their lectures

in the light of new ideas and technical developments and prepared texts

for their respective courses. By 1924 printed texts, far more explicit on

tactics, techniques, and employment than those first used, were available

for the Pursuit, Bombardment, Attack, Observation, and Combined Arms

sections.

29

As the courses in air matters became more fully developed, not only

was the curriculum shifted to permit more time to be devoted to them, but

a constant effort was made to present every subject, including ground

subjects, from "an air point of view." For example, from 1920 through 1927

lectures on the employment of airpower in World War I merely recited the

operation record. For the 1928 class, however, these lectures were modified so as to stress the use to which an air force might have been put in the

various World War I. The next year the textbooks for Bombardment,

Attack, Pursuit, and Observation were so as to include only the method of

operating the various types of aviation. But superimposed on these courses

was a new one, The Air Force, which, coming at the end of the year,

consolidated and coordinated all that had come before in Air Corps

subjects. The text for this new course included the tactics and strategy

incident to the combined operations of the various classes of aviation.'

With the growth of air arm courses, the time devoted to ground subjects

was substantially reduced; but sufficient attention continued to be given to

courses in the other arms and services to enable the air officers to become

familiar with the tactics, techniques, and doctrines of each.

Demonstrations and Exercises

In addition to receiving the regular academic instruction, students

participated in exercises and maneuvers, attended demonstrations, and

made inspection trips. Such activities began with the school's participation

21
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

in the bombing experiment against the ex-German war vessels in the

summer of 1921. By 1923 the practice had been established of making

inspection trips to the Engineering Division installations at Wright and

McCook Fields to enable students to familiarize themselves with the latest

technical developments. These inspection trips were repeated yearly, with

few exceptions, through the school year 1931-1932.

A close association between the Tactical School and the Infantry

developed very early. Each year troops at nearby Fort Eustis gave special

demonstrations of Infantry units with supporting weapons in an attack. Of

special interest were the exercises conducted in 1930-1931, in which the

school cooperated with Fort Eustis troops in attempts to determine the

vulnerability of ground troops to air attack. In 1930, the year before the

school moved to Maxwell Field, close relations between the Infantry

School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and ACTS were established when the

Air Corps students visited Benning to witness a demonstration of a

war-strength infantry regiment in an attack.3"

Another form of training was participation in the annual Army War

College maneuver, and this event soon pointed up some of the sharp

differences between the air and ground views on the proper employment

of the air weapon. At first school authorities were enthusiastic over the

prospect of using the maneuvers to disseminate school concepts throughout the service, and in 1926 (the third year in which the school had

participated) the assistant commandant reported that War College authorities had permitted Air Service officers on the various staffs to operate

their arm in conformity with the principles taught at the Tactical School, a

practice that in the past had not been followed. Major Naiden believed

that if such a procedure was continued for a few years the principles of air

force employment being taught at the school would be well understood by

a majority of the graduates from the War College. 32 Two years later

reports were not so optimistic. It was the opinion of the school in 1928 that

in drawing up the basis for the maneuver, planners at the War College did

not give proper consideration to the influence that the Air Corps would

have in the problem. Consequently, during the maneuver it was necessary

to restrict Air Corps operations in order to allow the ground situation to

develop. Conditions that prevailed tended to create erroneous impressions

in the minds of ground officers both as to what the Air Corps could do and

what might be expected of it. In order to avoid compounding such

misconceptions, school officials urged that in planning future maneuvers

proper consideration be given to the air arm as a powerful combat

weapon.33 Despite the school's recommendations, the War College maneuver continued to be unsatisfactory from the Air Corps point of view, and

criticisms were repeated for several years. In 1930, for example, the

Tactical School reported that as in the past the War College had not given

22
LANGLEYFIELD

the Air Corps proper consideration in the planning phase and that when

air operations were introduced they were so artificial as to lead to a

misconception of the employment of aviation.3 4

The efforts of the Tactical School to participate in the planning of the

War College maneuver in order that realism in air operations might be

added finally bore fruit when, as a result of conferences between the War

College and the Tactical School, the setup for the exercise for 1931 was

altered to inject more aviation into the situation. Tactical School students

were assigned as commanders and staff of the air forces involved. Nevertheless, from the airman's point of view, results were still not satisfactory.

For although the exercise showed an improvement in staff work, in actual

operations virtually the entire air effort was applied in the combat zone at

the expense of suitable rear area targets such as concentrations of supplies

and troops. Therefore, in the opinion of the Tactical School, the true

effect of an air force was not demonstrated. So concerned were school

officials over the repeated misuse of airpower that in 1931 Maj. John F.

Curry, assistant commandant, suggested that unless future maneuvers

permitted the air element to pay more attention to rear areas, the value of

the maneuver either to the students of the War College or Tactical School

was not commensurate with the effort and expense involved in the Air

Corps participation.3 ' This was particularly true since the Tactical School

was to move to Maxwell Field that summer, and the expense of transporting personnel and equipment from Alabama to Fort DuPont, Delaware,

where the War College maneuver was usually held, would be considerably

more than from Langley.

Plans for the Move of the School to Maxwell Field

Langley Field figured prominently as a base for forming new units in

the five-year expansion program which followed the creation of the Air

Corps in 1926. Facilities there, however, were inadequate to house both

the Tactical School and the prospective new units envisaged in the field's

new mission; moreover the increased activity at the field would be detrimental to the smooth functioning of the school. Consequently, from the

summer of 1927 until 1928 the Office of the Chief of Air Corps (OCAC)

contemplated moving the school to Miller Field, Staten Island, New York,

although school authorities raised strong objections to this new location as

a backward step and as "totally unsatisfactory as a site for the school."'3 6

Lt. Col. C. C. Culver, commandant of the school, recommended as more

suitable sites the vicinities of Richmond, Virginia; Washington (in connection with an extension of, or new site for, Bolling Field); "the present

23
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

establishment at Montgomery, Alabama";* the Air Corps Training Center

near San Antonio, Texas; Fort Riley, Kansas; or the lighter-than-air

section of Langley Field itself. Nevertheless, well into 1928 OCAC persisted in its plan to move the school to Miller Field. But before the end of

that year, Maxwell Field at Montgomery, Alabama, replaced Miller Field

as the future location of the school.37

In January 1929 OCAC appointed a board of officers to plan the

expansion of Maxwell Field to a size suitable for the school. Basing its

considerations on estimated future requirements, the board recommended

that the field be expanded so as to provide for 1) a Tactical School of 75

students; 2) a squadron officers course of 50 first lieutenants and captains;

and 3) a composite group, consisting either of one squadron each of attack,

pursuit, bombardment, and observation aviation. To comply with these

needs, the board advocated that the government purchase approximately

1,000 acres of land at a cost of some $320,000 and accept 75 acres of land

which was being offered by the city of Montgomery. However, Congress,

acting on the last day of its 1930 session, authorized only the sum of

$200,000 for the purchase of 750 acres.3

Between 1918 and 1927, there had been virtually no new construction

at Maxwell. In May 1928, 13 sets of noncommissioned officers' quarters

and barracks to house 163 men were completed, construction having

started the previous fall as a part of the Air Corps expansion. But these

Corps buildings, plus those dating from World War I, were far from

adequate to meet the needs of the school. 39 Therefore, planning for

additional construction was begun shortly after it was decided to transfer

the ACTS to Maxwell. Congress on 4 March 1929 appropriated $100,000

for a building for ACTS.'

By July Congress had authorized $689,000 for new construction. In

addition to the school building, hangars, warehouses, a headquarters and

operations building were to be built and the landing field was to be

improved. Funds had also been requested for the construction of quarters

for officers and enlisted men, and for other buildings.41

Of all the new facilities the Air Corps Tactical School building itself

was given the most careful consideration, and its construction did not

commence until the fall of 1930. Because of the care taken in laying out

the field, particularly with a view toward further expansion, construction of

the headquarters, operations and parachute building, nine noncommissioned officers barracks, four steel hangars, and a few smaller buildings did

Maxwell Field, at this time, was a depot and a base for observation units.

24
LANGLEY FIELD

not begin until that same fall.4

" Delay in acquiring title to the additional

750 acres until August 1932 postponed construction of the officers' quarters, which were to be built on the new tract.43

It had been planned to move the school to Maxwell in the summer of

192944 but delays in preparing the field to receive the school caused the

move to be postponed first until 1930 and finally until the summer of 1931.

By January 1931 it was assumed that by summer Maxwell would be ready

for occupancy, less officer's quarters, and preparations for the move began.

On 15 April 1931 The Adjutant General issued the necessary orders

transferring the school, and on the same day Maxwell Field was designated, effective 1 July, an exempted station as a special service school.

Between 25 June and 15 July 1931 the school moved to its new location.45

25
3

The Air Corps Tactical School at

Maxwell Field

Expansion of the School

The school prospered after its move to Maxwell. The construction

program begun in 1930 was constantly added to in the next few years, the

school profiting no little from the appropriation of WPA and PWA funds.

Before the end of March 1934, 63 sets of officers' quarters had been built,

and by the end of that year 24 more had been completed, as well as

noncommissioned officers' quarters, a quartermaster warehouse, garages, a

water tank, and other buildings.

By the end of 1938 Maxwell Field had become a large, fully developed

air installation. At that time for school and field administration and

maintenance purposes, it had a large school building for the Tactical

School, an operations and headquarters building, four quartermaster warehouses, a quartermaster office and a commissary, a quartermaster garage,

and a quartermaster maintenance and utilities building. For aircraft maintenance purposes, it had six hangars, an engineering building, an airplane

assembly building, and an air corps supply building. The field was being

serviced by its own electrical and gasoline distribution systems, telephone

and water systems, fire department, post exchange, a filling station, and a

30-bed hospital. Quarters consisted of 99 sets of officers' quarters, 77 sets

of NCO quarters, 3 enlisted men's barracks capable of housing 489 men,

and bachelor officers' quarters for 18 officers. Extensive recreational

facilities had been provided: 2 swimming pools, 3 volleyball courts, a

bowling alley, a cinder track, a baseball diamond, a football field, 6 tennis,

courts, a skeet range, a squash court, an 18-hole golf course, a theater of

300 seats, an officers' club, and an NCO club. There were also a guard

house, 11 buildings for the federal prison located on the field, stables, and

27
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

many subsidiary buildings such as storage vaults, and bomb cellars. Most of

the sidewalks and the streets were paved.'

In addition to improvements in the physical plant, existing divisions

within the school were expanded and new ones created. The library

continued to show a remarkable growth. The book department continued

to make books available to the students and to provide a medium for the

dissemination of Air Corps texts to the services. By 1934 this department

also administered the book fund for the library, providing the prompt and

direct purchase of books chosen by a book committee made up of faculty

members. An extension course section was created, relieving the school

faculty of most of the detailed work connected with this duty. Since its

inception the school had been responsible for preparing extension courses

for the Air Service and Air Corps, and the work involved in preparing texts

and other aspects of the courses had been a strain on school personnel.*

Other additions to the school included a reproduction department,2 and a

bombing and gunnery range at Valparaiso, Florida.'

The Air Corps Board at Maxwell Field

The Air Corps Board did not move to Maxwell concurrently with the

Tactical School and, for all practical purposes, temporarily ceased functioning since its membership was composed largely of school faculty

members who were now at Maxwell.* There was agitation in the Office of

the Chief of Air Corps, however, for an early re-establishment of the

board, and in 1933 both the Training and Operations (T&O) and Plans

Divisions made recommendations to the Chief of Air Corps to that effect.

Plans Division in particular recommended that the board be set up

alongside the Tactical School at Maxwell.4

On the basis of these recommendations, on 17 August 1933 the War

Department published a revised AR 95-20 which stated that the board

would be permanently located at Maxwell Field. The purpose of the board

remained that of considering such subjects as might be referred to it by the

Chief of Air Corps and of submitting to OCAC recommendations for

improvements in the Air Corps. Its membership was to consist of the

commandant and assistant commandant of the school, from two to five

* Actually this work had been done by the Air Service Board, redesignated Air Corps

Board in 1926, but the board itself at this time was composed of faculty members.

1AR 95-20, 1 August 1922, which established the Air Service Board, stipulated that it

would be permanently stationed at Langley Field.

28
MAXWELL FIELD

other officers from the school (to be named by the commandant), and such

additional officers as the Chief of Air Corps might designate. When no

action was taken to constitute the board, in October Maj. Hume Peabody,

assistant commandant, suggested to the commandant, Lt. Col. John F.

Curry, that the board be put on an active operating basis with the school

providing the personnel.5 Apparently on the basis of this recommendation,

in January 1934 Curry, Peabody, and six instructors held "the initial

meeting of the Air Corps Board" at Maxwell.* But since OCAC had

neither assigned full-time members to the board nor issued a directive for

its functioning, the board still was not an effective Air Corps agency.

In July the Tactical School's efforts to organize an active Air Corps

Board received considerable impetus from recommendations made by the

Baker Board. The report of the Baker group stated that, although an Air

Corps Board had been authorized, it had not been properly organized and

had not properly functioned. Noting the absence of uniform Air Corps

doctrine and a consequent unsatisfactory state of unit training within the

Air Corps, the Baker Board recommended an early "creation" of the Air

Corps Board which, when established, should give prompt attention to the

formulation of uniform tactical doctrines for all types of Air Corps units. It

also recommended the creation at the Tactical School of a model Air

Corps unit which could assist in training student officers and could

cooperate with the Air Corps Board in the development of tactical

doctrines.6

On the basis of the Baker Board recommendation, in August 1934 the

War Department directed the Chief of Air Corps to complete the reorganization of the Air Corps Board as rapidly as possible. Its first order of

business would be the formulation of uniform tactical doctrines for all

types of Air Corps units.7 In September, The Adjutant General notified

the Chief of Air Corps that AR 95-20 had again been modified and the

reorganization of the Air Corps Board would follow its provisions. 8 The

revised AR 95-20 named the commandant and assistant commandant of

the Tactical School ex-officio members of the board; five to eight officers

were to be designated by the Chief of Air Corps as permanent members.'

* The six instructors were Majs. William Ord Ryan and Donald Wilson and Capts.

Arthur K. Ladd, Charles McK. Robinson, Claire L. Chennault, and Harold L. George. See

ltr., to the Chief of the Air Corps signed by all eight officers, in 2-2565-48.

1 For the purpose of reviewing all phases of Air Corps activities, on 17 April 1934,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the War Department Special Committee on Army

Air Corps, commonly referred to as the Baker Board in recognition of its chairman, former

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.

29
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Steps were immediately taken to set up the board. In December 1934

Maj. William 0. Ryan and 1st Lt. Gordon P. Saville, both of whom were at

Maxwell, the former serving as executive officer of the field and the latter

as an instructor at the school, were relieved of their previous assignments

and were assigned as director and secretary respectively of the Air Corps

Board. They, together with the two ex-officio members, the commandant

and assistant commandant of ACTS, comprised the board until June 1935

when Lt. Col. Jacob H. Rudolph and Capt. Samuel C. Skemp were

assigned as additional working members."0 Thus, although still short one

of the five members AR 95-20 specified as a minimum by the summer of

1935 the Air Corps Board was a small working entity.

After its reorganization, the Air Corps Board continued to draw on

ACTS for assistance. Indeed, the board had been located at Maxwell in

order to effect a better coordination between the two. For example, in

clearing up the mistaken idea on the part of the War Department that the

Air Corps Board would not only formulate a uniform tactical doctrine but

would also prepare school textbooks in which this doctrine would be

,incorporated, OCAC explained that although it was the function of the

board to formulate uniform tactical doctrine, it was the function of the

Tactical School to revise texts. OCAC pointed out that there would be very

close coordination between the two, and any revision of texts made by the

school would reflect the uniform tactical doctrine formulated by the

board." Moreover, Plans Division, which had been instrumental in bringing about the reorganization of the Air Corps Board, noted that the board

had both the experienced personnel and facilities of the Tactical School

available to assist it in its work.12

Although the Tactical School cooperated fully with the board, the

school faculty and staff were relieved of the detailed work. To be sure, the

commander of Maxwell Field, who was also commandant of the school,

acquired a third hat, for in his capacity as ex-officio member of the board

he served as its president. However, his duties in this capacity were chiefly

to assure coordination between the school and the board, for neither the

commandant nor the assistant commandant were burdened with the board's

day-to-day activities. In the internal organization of the board the senior

regular member was named Director, Air Corps Board. An assistant

director performed such special duties as were required of him by the

director and served as director in the absence of the senior regular

member. The junior regular member was secretary or recorder. It was

anticipated that the regular members would be assigned functional duties

with the board, but as matters turned out, it was found more satisfactory

for the regular members to pool their abilities, especially on major projects. Despite the appointment of permanent members to the board, the

30
MAXWELL FIELD

Tactical School faculty continued to be called on for advice and for review

of projects under consideration. In fact, for several years the concurrence

or nonconcurrence of ACTS was required in each letter of transmittal

forwarding the final report of an Air Corps Board study to the Chief of Air

Corps.'3 Moreover, in correspondence with Maxwell Field dealing with

matters of doctrine, OCAC frequently did not differentiate between the

school and the board. The two worked in harmony; occasions when they

differed were rare.

Initially, matters brought to the attention of the board by an individual, group of individuals, organization or agency, or by a board member

became projects by a majority vote of the board. However, the practice of

submitting all such ideas, proposals, or recommendations to the Chief of

Air Corps for consideration was early adopted, and they became projects

only upon his direction. Projects for the most part involved the preparation

or review of tactical doctrine and tables of organization, and to a minor

extent consisted of tests of various weapons and equipment. By mid-summer

of 1935, the board had undertaken eight projects, including a study on

tactical doctrine which had been called for by the Chief of Air Corps. By

the close of that year, of 27 projects started 12 had been completed. In all,

the Air Corps Board undertook 77 projects between 1935 and May 1942, at

which time the board was inactivated. The projects may be classified

roughly as 25 dealing with tactics, 17 with publications, 16 with armament

and chemical matters, 13 with equipment, 5 with aircraft, and 1 with

communications. Of these, publication activities included the preparation

or review of manuals, training texts, tables of organization, a study of the

Air Corps in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, and plans for M-day and for

Air Corps expansion.' 4

A steadily increasing workload, a personnel shortage, and the absence

of an adequate testing agency placed a heavy burden on the regular

members of the Air Corps Board. Indeed, the board reached its full

complement of eight officers only after the suspension of ACTS classes in

June 1940 when several instructors became available for this duty.

Although the school staff and faculty were considerably reduced

following the suspension of classes, collaboration between the school and,

the board continued until the summer of 1941 * when the board was moved

to the Air Corps Proving Ground at Eglin Field. This move brought to an

* Such collaboration was one of the assigned missions of the school for the period of its

suspension.

31
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

end the close association during which the board had proved to be a

valuable adjunct to the school, for it was largely through the medium of

the board that much of what was being taught at the school was disseminated through the service.

23d Composite Group

The Practical Flying course, although continued after the school

moved to Maxwell, underwent a change. The practice of requiring students

to fly many of the types of missions and sometimes, the actual missions

which had been presented in class was discontinued as impracticable and

unsafe; moreover, the students as a group were comparable to a number of

squadron and group commanders without the leavening of junior officers

who would be in a wartime combat unit. Throughout the thirties attempts

were made to have tactical units demonstrate tactics and techniques, but

the difficulties encountered in having the units at the school at the right

time and in finding units which were fully indoctrinated with the latest

teachings of the school led in 1932 to a recommendation by school

authorities for the creation of a composite group, to be composed of one

squadron each of pursuit, bombardment, attack, and observation, each

equipped with the latest types of service aircraft. OCAC, however, disapproved the recommendation on the basis that neither personnel nor

equipment was available for the purpose.

The situation was not substantially improved after the creation in

1935 of the GHQ Air Force which had the responsibility, among others, of

furnishing combat units for demonstration purposes. Close liaison was

maintained between the Tactical School and GHQ Air Force headquarters. Nevertheless, there could be no assurance that demonstrations by

GHQ Air Force units would represent the latest school concepts because

of other demands upon training time and because of the various views or

interpretations of unit commanders. Despite perennial recommendations

of the school, it was not until 20 February 1939 that General Arnold called

for a study to determine the advisability of organizing three demonstration

squadrons-one each of attack, pursuit, and bombardment-at Maxwell.

Even then, the main purpose was to take the demonstration exhibition

load off the GHQ Air Force and provide the Air Corps with units which

could be sent to various service schools, maneuvers, tactical exercises, and

the National Air Races.15

On the basis of subsequent studies, the War Department ordered the

creation of the 23d Composite Group, with date of activation set at 1

August 1939. The group consisted of the 1st Pursuit Squadron, the 54th

32
MAXWELL FIELD

Bombardment Squadron (Medium), and the 24th Attack-Bombardment

Squadron. It had the three fold mission of:

"* Providing a tactical service test of airplanes and auxiliary equipment,

such as machine guns, cannon, ammunition, bombsights, chemical

apparatus, radio and oxygen equipment, and flying clothing.

"* Developing and testing new aerial techniques and tactics.

"* Demonstrating these techniques and tactics at the various Army

Service Schools and General Headquarters, and Air Corps stations.

More particularly, the group was organized as an experimental unit to

operate in connection with tactical projects being worked on at the ACTS

and by the Air Corps Board.16 However, the Tactical School suspended

classes in June 1940; consequently, the 23d Composite Group was available for school purposes for only a very brief period.

Demonstrations and Exercises

Many aspects of training begun at Langley were continued at Maxwell.

Inspection trips to the Engineering Division installations at Wright Field

were provided for but were put on a voluntary basis. Relations with the

Infantry became steadily closer and efforts were made to familiarize air

officers more thoroughly with ground force officers' problems. More detailed instruction in ground force matters and coordination in the development of air ground tactics were made more practical by the proximity of

the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. There were yearly visits

between the schools. However, the student body of the Tactical School did

not always visit the Infantry School merely to observe ground force

demonstrations; on occasion there were combined exercises. In 1934, for

example, during the Infantry course at the ACTS, the entire class was

flown to Fort Benning to witness a demonstration of an infantry battalion

in attack and to participate in an infantry terrain exercise. In the spring of

the following year the historical section of the Infantry School presented a

two-hour lecture on particular ground battles to the Air Corps students,

and the Tactical School reciprocated during the closing maneuvers at

Benning by furnishing its students to participate in an exercise involving

the attack on ground forces by attack aviation.17

For two years after the move to Maxwell the Tactical School participated in the Army War College maneuvers at Fort DuPont, Delaware. In

1933, the last year in which the exercise took place, the maneuver was

more satisfactory from the air point of view than in any previous year.

33
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Representatives from the Tactical School, headed by Maj. Hume Peabody,

were allowed to use the air elements involved in a manner more nearly in

conformity with their own concepts than had been permitted in earlier

years. The air effort was centered on rear-area lines of communications,

accumulations of supplies and troops, and depots rather than in the

immediate area of the front lines. Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, commandant of the Army War College, noted that the air phase of the maneuver

was carried out that year in accordance with the desires of the Air Corps

representatives and that the instruction was much improved. Lt. Col. John

F. Curry, commandant of the Tactical School, was also encouraged by the

results and pointed out that if future War College exercises were conducted on the same basis, it would do much toward teaching ground

officers the effect of the proper employment of airpower. Unfortunately, in

the next year funds for the War College were so restricted as to allow only

a limited exercise by Army War College personnel alone.1 8

The Academic Department

After the school moved to Maxwell, increasing emphasis was placed

on air matters. There were two reasons for this significant development. In

the first place, a far greater volume of material on military aeronautics was

now available so that the courses in tactics and technique of the various

classes of aviation grew steadily and the course in the employment of

airpower, which in the early years had been shallow at best, expanded into

a vitally important part of the year's study. Secondly, although following

the creation of the Air Corps in 1926, the expansion of the air arm,

together with enlarged school facilities at Maxwell, had resulted in larger

classes at the Tactical School, there was not a proportionate increase in

the number of Air Corps officers admitted to the Command and General

Staff School. Because a smaller percentage of Tactical School graduates

would attend the Leavenworth institution, school authorities by the midthirties had ceased to think of the Tactical School as a preparatory school

for the C&GSS, but considered it instead as the most advanced school that

most air officers were likely to attend. Therefore, they constantly readjusted the schedule in order to increase the amount of time available for

the most important air matters. For example, they eliminated some less

important air subjects, including mapping and sketching, and cut down

such others as balloons and airships. Only sufficient instruction in ground

subjects to acquaint air officers with the very basic fundamentals of other

arms was retained. 19

34
MAXWELL FIELD

By the mid-thirties more than 50 percent of the school year was given

over to instruction in air subjects. Percentages over the five-year period,

1930-1935, indicate the increasing emphasis being placed on air matters. 20

1930- 1931- 1932- 1933- 1934-

1931* 1932 1933 1934 1935

Air subjects 43.6 48.8 46.3 50.9 52.9

Ground subjects 29.8 33.6 31.9 26.6 25.4

General subjects 26.5 17.6 21.8 22.5 21.7

That air subjects were given primary consideration at the school is also

evidenced by the fact that in determining final grades, air subjects far

outweighed the others.2 '

Instruction in air subjects was not merely by rote. Frequently lectures

lasted for not more than 20 to 25 minutes, the remainder of the 50-minute

class period being devoted to ideas proposed by instructors. Thus ideas

were subjected to the probing inquiry of the students, who often offered

new ideas. From the class discussions, coupled with endless disputes and

discussion in faculty meetings and coffee-shop seminars, there emerged a

stabilized body of concepts concerning the employment of airpower.t In

keeping with the practice of rearranging the curriculum to meet more fully

the mission of the Air Corps Tactical School, the academic division

underwent frequent reorganization. By the time the school moved to

Maxwell, instruction in engineering and administration had been dropped.

In place of the three departments originally making up the academic

division, the school was organized into four sections, each with a director.

For example, for the 1933-1934 session, the first section, headed by Maj.

Donald Wilson, included all air subjects: Air Force, Air Navigation, Attack

Aviation, Balloons and Airships, Bombardment Aviation, Combat Orders,

International Air Regulations, Observation Aviation, Pursuit Aviation, and

Refresher Flying. The second section, under Maj. Vernon G. Olsmith,

included Antiaircraft, Cavalry, Chemical Warfare, Coast Artillery, Combined Arms, Field Fortifications, Field Artillery, Infantry, Medical Corps,

and Troop Leading. The third section, directed by Maj. Hume Peabody,

(who was also assistant commandant) covered Logistics (Air), Logistics

(Ground), Military Intelligence, Signal Communications, and Staff Duties.

* It may be noted that percentages for this year total 99.9%. No explanation for this

discrepancy has been found.

See Ch. 4, below.

35
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

The fourth section, with Maj. R. R. Welshmer as director, was made

up of Extension Courses, Maps and Photographs, Military Geography and

Strategy, Military Organization, Mobilization, Naval Operations, and

Orientation. 22

During the school year 1934-1935, the academic division began to

take the form it was to keep throughout the remainder of the school's

existence. In that year the academic division's four sections were given

titles: Department of Air Tactics, Department of Basic and Special Instruction, Department of Ground Tactics, and Department of Flying

Instruction. Under the Department of Air Tactics were grouped the Air

Force, Attack, Bombardment, Observation, Pursuit, and Balloons and

Airships Sections. Under the Department of Basic and Special Instruction

came the Logistics, Combat Orders, Communications, Maps and Photographs, Staff Duties, and Extension Course Sections. The Department of

Ground Tactics was made up of Combined Arms, Infantry, Cavalry, Field

Artillery, Chemical Warfare, and Antiaircraft. The Department of Flying

Instruction included Practical Flying and Air Navigation. Other courses,

such as Military Intelligence and Naval Operations, were fitted into the

departments in accordance with the qualifications of the instructors.23 In

addition to the establishment of the various departments, by the midthirties, the following permanent faculty committees had been created:

schedule committee, editing and coordinating committee, library committee, and book department council.

In October 1935 the Department of Air Tactics was redesignated the

Department of Air Tactics and Strategy and the Department of Basic and

Special Instruction became the Department of Command, Staff, and

Logistics. Some reshuffling of courses accompanied the redesignation of

the two departments. The Naval Operations course was assigned to the

Department of Air Tactics and Strategy. The Balloons and Airships course

was made a part of the Observation course. Military Intelligence absorbed

the Maps and Photographs course and was assigned to the Department of

Command, Staff, and Logistics. The Extension Course section, which in

1934 had been placed under the Department of Basic and Special Instruction, was made a separate section directly under the assistant commandant. There were no changes in the other two departments, Ground

Tactics and Flying Instruction. Each of the four departments was headed

by a director and each section within a department was controlled by a

chief, with an additional instructor to assist, insofar as instructors were

available.*

* The organization chart is Appendix 1.

36
MAXWELL FIELD

The next significant change in the academic structure occurred in

March 1938 when the Department of Flying Instruction was discontinued.

Flying instruction was handled thereafter by the chiefs of the various air

sections (Air Force, Bombardment, Pursuit, Attack, and Observation),

each taking charge during the period his course was being taught. The

Meteorology Section, which had been added to the Department of Flying

Instruction in 1936, was reassigned to the Department of Command, Staff,

and Logistics. The Air Navigation Section was made a part of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy.

The most important department was Air Tactics and Strategy. Its

principal subdivision was the Air Force Section. Initially concerned primarily with the combined employment of the various types of aviation, it had

dealt only with large units and had covered command and staff work. As

the course developed, the interdependence of pursuit, bombardment,

attack, and observation aviation continued to be stressed, but by the

mid-thirties the Air Force course, as the capstone in air instruction and as

the course in which the theories of the impact of air power on war were

expounded, had become the most important course in the curriculum. 24

The Attack and Bombardment Sections covered in detail organization,

destructive agencies, materiel, methods of bombing and bombing accuracy,

and formations; the tactics and techniques of groups and lower units, in

daytime and at night, at both low and high altitudes, were discussed; the

principles taught were applied and illustrated. The Pursuit course differed

somewhat from Attack and Bombardment. In addition to covering the

functions, organization, training, weapons, equipment, and tactics and

techniques of pursuit units, this section also included discussions of gunnery principles-as they influenced the tactics and techniques of pursuit

aviation-and the aircraft reporting net for pursuit operations. The Observation section stressed the contribution of aerial observation to ground

forces. Instruction in the Aerial Navigation course was limited primarily to

the principles of the subject.

The Naval Operations course grew steadily. Almost from the beginning of the school, lectures on naval operations had been given each year

by a guest speaker from the Navy or by a member of the staff. In

1934-1935, Maj. Herbert A. Dargue who was a graduate of the Naval War

College, inaugurated a full-scale, 8-hour course in Naval Operations. The

course included lectures and naval tactics demonstrations in a game room

with aircraft carriers to simulate fleet disposition models of the principal

classes of surface vessels and naval battles. In 1936 a naval officer was

detailed to the school as a full-time instructor, and by 1938, 25 hours were

devoted to this section, conferences and problems having been added to

the lectures and practical demonstrations.

37
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Although instruction in air subjects became dominant, instruction in

the departments of Ground Tactics, and Command, Staff, and Logistics, as

well as in the Naval Operations course, demonstrated that the ACTS

curriculum was not limited to air matters.21 Usually courses in the departments of Ground Tactics, and Command, Staff, and Logistics were presented first in the school year in order to prepare the student for the

instruction given in air tactics and strategy. Moreover, instruction in these

subjects was given "to round out his complete education as an Air Corps

officer trained to fill a command or staff assignment in almost any capacity,

especially where he will have close relations with other branches and arms

of all the armed services as well as positions other than those dealing

directly with air tactics and strategy." 26 In 1936 Maj. Ira C. Eaker gave a

student's appreciation of the curriculum:

The course is designed, apparently with two primary purposes: one

as a preparatory course to the Command and General Staff School,

at Leavenworth; the second for the education of the Air Corps

officer in his own arm-the Air Force. During the first half of the

school year the student gets the impression that he is attending a

service school of one of the other arms or, rather, a combination of

all the service schools of the other arms. During this time he is

turned over to the tender mercies of Field Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, and Chemical Warfare officers who teach the precepts of

modern warfare as fought by those arms . . . . After Christmas

vacation, the student begins to find that this is, after all, an Air

school. Bombardment, Attack, Observation, Pursuit and Air Force

are then thrown at the student with bewildering rapidity. There is a

text for each subject; there are lectures in class, illustrative problems, and the much dreaded map problem.27

Staff and Faculty

Several members of the staff and faculty moved with the school to

Maxwell. These included the former assistant commandant at Langley,

Maj. John F. Curry, who became commandant of the school and commanding officer of Maxwell; 1st Lt. John DeF. Barker, secretary; Maj. Robert

C. Candee, Capts. David S. Seaton, James T. Curry, Jr., and Charles

McK. Robinson, and 1st Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, Air Corps instructors,

and Capts. George H. Weems and Charles W. Walton, instructors in

ground arms. In addition, two officers, Capt. Donald Wilson and Claire L.

Chennault, who had been students at the school during its last year at

Langley, became instructors. In the summer of 1931 two more Air Corps

officers jointed the faculty: Maj. Hume Peabody as assistant commandant

and Capt. Edmund W. Hill as an instructor. At the same time three more

38
MAXWELL FIELD

ground arms officers became members of the faculty. Even with these

additions, in the school's first year at Maxwell its faculty comprised only 16

officers, 2 less than had been present the previous year at Langley.

t Although four more instructors were added for the 1932-1933 session

the faculty still was not adequate. The larger student body permitted by

the facilities at Maxwell demanded a further increase in the number of

instructors; moreover, although the faculty was relieved of the distractions

of post duties experienced at Langley, individual members continued to be

required to serve on boards and committees. Requesting additional instructors in 1933 the Commandant pointed out that the extracurricular

activities, such as the preparation of and review of tactical studies, work in

connection with various maneuvers and exercises, and detail to various

boards, were increasing. 28 He emphasized that the school had no desire to

be relieved of these extra duties, for they benefited both the Air Corps and

the school, but he urged that at least four additional instructors be added

to the staff in order that the school might perform its function in a

satisfactory manner. Finally, he insisted that until two instructors were

available for each major course, specified as Air Force, Attack, Bombardment, Observation, Pursuit, Logistics, Staff Duties, Combat Orders, and

Military Intelligence, the school would be operating with an insufficient

number of instructors. By the mid-thirties this last requirement-which

school authorities had long insisted was the minimum-had been met.

For some time, too, school authorities had urged that the faculty be

composed of graduates of service schools and that the minimum requirement for faculty members should be graduation from ACTS. They also

advocated graduation from the Command and General Staff School at

Fort Leavenworth, and recommended that the commandant and assistant

commandant, at least, be graduates of the Army War College. By the

mid-thirties the staff and faculty were well above the minimum requirements in training. Of the 17 Air Corps officers on duty at the school, 16

were graduates of ACTS; four were graduates of C&GSS, Lt. Col. Herbert

A. Dargue,* assistant commandant, was a graduate of C&GSS, the Army

War College, and the Naval War College. All five faculty members who

represented the other arms and services were graduates of the C&GSS; in

addition Lt. Col. Vernon G. Olsmith was a graduate of the Army War

College, Lt. Col. William N. Porter was a graduate of the Army Industrial

College, and Lt. Col. Robert R. Welshmer was a graduate of ACTS. Thus,

by 1935, in a staff and faculty of 22 there were 17 graduates of the Air

Corps Tactical School, 9 graduates of the Command and General Staff

* The only Air Corps officer not a graduate of ACTS.

39
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

School, 2 graduates of the Army War College, 1 graduate of the Army

Industrial College, and 1 graduate of the Naval War College.

Despite the steady improvements in the quantity and quality of the

staff and faculty, the instructional staff at the school was never as large as

school authorities desired. In 1938 Brig. Gen. H. C. Pratt, who had become

commandant of the school the year before, recommended that the faculty

be increased by five air officers during the following three years. 29

The disadvantages of the small faculty were offset to a considerable

degree by the high caliber of the commandants, assistant commandants,

directors, and, in many instances, the individual instructors. Like their

predecessors at Langley, officers in responsible posts at the school at

Maxwell were, by and large, men of discerning minds and possessed a keen

curiosity regarding the impact of airpower on war. Profiting from the work

accomplished at Langley, they added the final touches to the slowly

emerging concepts of air warfare.

Many of the faculty members in time rose to the rank of general

officer and played prominent roles in the development of American

airpower during World War II. Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, USAF Ret., had

a longer direct association with the school than any other officer: he served

as instructor in 1929-1930, attended as a student in 1930-1931, served

again as an instructor from 1931 to 1934, and after spending two years at

the Command and General Staff School, returned to the school in 1936 as

director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, a position he held

until January 1940. 1st Lt. John DeF. Barker continued to serve as school

secretary until 1934, when he was replaced by Capt. Julian B. Haddon,

Maj. Hume Peabody served as assistant commandant from 1931 through

1934. Capt. Claire L. Chennault headed the Pursuit Section from 1931

through 1935, and taught the next year, 1935-1936, in addition to other

post duties. Capt. Harold L. George joined the faculty as an instructor in

1932 and in 1934, became director of the Department of Air Tactics and

Strategy, a post he held until 1936. Maj. Grandison Gardner and Capts.

Robert M. Webster and Gordon P. Saville were added to the faculty in

1934, Gardner as chief of the Air Navigation Section, and Webster and

Saville as instructors in the Air Force and Maps and Photographs section

respectively. 1st Lts. Haywood S. Hansell and Laurence S. Kuter joined the

faculty in 1935 as instructors in the Air Force section and Bombardment

section, respectively, Kuter serving as chief of his section for the 1936-1937

session. Capt. Hoyt S. Vandenberg became an instructor in the Pursuit

section in 1936, and Maj. Muir S. Fairchild in the following year replaced

Captain Webster as chief of the Air Force section, serving until 11 July

1940. Col. Millard F. Harmon in 1938 became assistant commandant,

continuing in the post with one brief interruption until after classes were

suspended in 1940. For the most part, these men served four-year tours at

40
MAXWELL FIELD

the school, remaining there long enough not only to be influenced by but

also to exert an influence on the doctrine of the employment of airpower

which was slowly developing at the school.* 30

Almost without exception, other arms and services also appointed

capable officers as their representatives to the school. Until 1924 all

instruction had been presented by Air Service officers but Capt. W. W.

Wise from the Chemical Warfare Service joined the faculty for the

1925-1926 session and, thereafter, representatives from other arms and

services were gradually added to teach ground force subjects. By 1935, the

Infantry, Cavalry and Field Artillery, as well as Chemical Warfare had

representatives at the school on a fulltime basis. Finally, in 1936 the

faculty was rounded out by the addition of a naval representative, Lt.

Bennett W. Wright.31 Maj. Ira C. Eaker noted in the same year that it was

"apparent that the other branches have selected their instructors with

great care, as the type of instruction is of a high order." This was shown by

the presence as instructors of such men as Lt. Cols. Charles P. Hall and

Vernon G. Olsmith, Lt. Comdr. M. R. Browning, and Majs. Courtney

Hodges, George H. Weems, Laurence B. Glasgow, and Benjamin F.

Harmon. 32

Students, 1931-1940

By the mid-thirties the standard followed in the selection of students

had been altered. Earlier standards required that officers attending the

school be of average grade, age and experience; but by 1935 the requirement was that officers should be above the grade of second lieutenant, and

to have an efficiency rating of not less than excellent; furthermore, not

more than 14 percent of the quota of students were to come from the field

officer grades and not more than 60 percent from the grade of captain.t All

officers of the various eligible grades were placed annually on a list in

accordance with their general average efficiency ratings; then within the

various percentages in grade, the officers having the highest rating were

assigned to the school by the Chief of Air Corps.33

In the meantime, the size of the classes had risen steadily. Facilities

and a small staff had kept the classes relatively small as long as the school

was at Langley, only 221 officers (including instructors given credit for the

course) being graduated in 11 years. After the move to Maxwell expanded

facilities, coupled with the steady increase in the size of the Air Corps and

* See Ch. 4 below.

t In the 20-year history of the school, the average rank of the students was captain.

41
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

a steady but still incommensurate growth in the size of the faculty, resulted

in larger classes. Between 1931 and 1940, 870 officers were graduated from

the school. It should be noted, however, that of this number 400 were

graduated from a series of four 12-week courses which were conducted

between June 1939 and June 1940.

Of the 1,092 graduates of the school during its entire existence, 916

were air officers. Of the remainder, 158 were officers from the other arms

and services graduated as follows:

Cavalry 16 Infantry 28

Chemical Warfare 15 Medical Corps I

Coast Artillery 20 Ordnance 3

Corps of Engineers 2 Signal Corps 11

Field Artillery 22 U.S. Marines 35

U.S. Nav.y 5

In addition, 1 air reservist and 17 foreign officers completed the

course.

The Air Corps' expressed belief that attendance at ACTS by officers

of other arms might help to dispel the prejudice against the air arm

seemed to be sound. One infantry officer who attended the Tactical School

reported:

My tour as a student at the Air Corps Tactical School has been an

un~usually pleasant and profitable one. It has given me an insight

into, and an appreciation of, the problems, of the Air Corps. My

appreciation of the airplane as a valuable weapon has been considerably increased and, contrary to the belief of some, and in keeping

with the majority of the ground officers, I have a high regard for the

professional attainments of the officers of the Air Corps and a

strong belief in the capabilities of the airplane. 3 4

For the most part, graduates of the Tactical School furnished the

leadership of the American air arm during World War 11. On 7 December

1941 by far the larger portion of the 916 air officer graduates of the school

were still on duty, because almost two-thirds of the total number of

graduates had completed the school during the final five years of its

existence. In fact, 380 Air Corps officers had graduated from the 4 short

courses conducted during 1939-1940. Thus, the bulk of air officers attended ACTS after it had moved beyond the groping and indecision of

earlier years to the formulation of a clear and decisive concept of the

proper employment of airpower.

42
MAXWELL FIELD

That the graduates of the Tactical School were rank of the leaders of

the AAF during the years when the theories were being hammered into

established doctrine is attested to by the fact that of 320 general officers

on duty with the AAF at the close of World War II, 261 were Tactical

School graduates. Of even more significance is the fact that the 3 fourstar generals--McNarney, Kenney, and Spaatz-and 11 of the 13 three-star

generals-Emmons, Brett, Yount, Eaker, Giles, George, Cannon,

Vandenberg, Stratemeyer, Twining, and Whitehead-were graduates of

the school. But the list of general officers on duty at the close of the war

does not include many other eminent Tactical School alumni who served

with distinction during the war and who made significant contributions to

the development of American airpower. Nor does the list include casualties. In addition to General Westover, who was killed in an airplane crash

in 1938, there were many other general officers who were war casualties,

among them Asa N. Duncan, Frank M. Andrews, Harold H. George,

Kenneth N. Walker, Clarence L. Tinker, Nathan B. Forrest, and Howard

K. Ramey. Nor does the list at the war's end include such outstanding

airmen as Brig. Gen. Earl L. Naiden, who, though not a graduate of the

school, performed a great service in stabilizing the Academic Department

while serving as director of instruction, and Maj. Gen. Robert Olds and

Brig. Gen. Frank D. Lackland, all three of whom died during the war.

Another group not in the list is composed of those general officers who

retired before the end of the war, including Follett Bradley, Harvey S.

Burwell, Rush B. Lincoln, Delmar H. Dunton, Henry B. Claggett, and

others.

43
Air Corps Tactical School

Birthplace of

American Air Doctrine
A sampling of the texts used for the Air Corps Tactical School
Air Corps Tactical School

Maj. Orvil A. Anderson Lt. Clayton L. Bissell

ACTS Class 1936-37 ACTS Class 1920-21

ACTS Staff 1926-30

Maj. Lewis Brereton Maj. George H. Brett

ACTS Staff 1924-25 ACTS Class 1927-28

Capt. Claire L. Chennault Maj. John F. Curry

ACTS Class 1930-31 shown as 1st Lt.

ACTS Staff 1931-36 ACTS Class 1927-28

ACTS Staff 1930-35
Graduates and Staff

Maj. Ira C. Eaker 1st Lt. Frederick W. Evans

shown as Lt. Col. shown as Capt.

ACTS Class 1935-36 ACTS Class 1933-34

ACTS Staff 1934-37

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild Maj. Walter H. Frank

ACTS Class 1934-35 ACTS Class 1924-25

ACTS Staff 1937-41 ACTS Staff 1926-30

Capt. Harold L. George 2nd. Lt. Davenport Johnson

ACTS Class 1931-32 shown as Maj.

ACTS Staff 1932-36 ACTS Class 1920-21

ACTS Staff 1920-21, 1926-28
Air Corps Tactical School

Capt. George C. Kenney Maj. William E. Kepner

ACTS Staff 1927-31 ACTS Class 1935-36

Maj. Hugh J. Knerr Capt. Lester J. Maitland

ACTS Class 1925-26 shown as Lt.

ACTS Class 1934-35

Maj. Joseph T. McNarney

ACTS Class 1920-21

ACTS Staff 1920-25
Graduates and Staff

Lt. Elwood R. Quesada 1st Lt. Charles McK. Robinson

ACTS Class 1935-36 ACTS Class 1929-30

ACTS Staff 1930-34

Maj. Ralph Royce Maj. Carl Spatz

ACTS Class 1926-27 (later Spaatz)

ACTS Class 1924-25

Brig. Gen. Walter R. Weaver

ACTS Staff 1938-41
Opening exercises, Maxwell Field, 1931

Classroom, Air Corps Tactial School, Maxwell Field
ACTS students attack a captive balloon, Langley Field

Capt. Guy H. Gale and Maj. Spencer A. Townsend practice aerial photography at Langley Field, 1931

Gen. Mason M. Patrick

presents diplomas to

Air Service Tactical

School's class of 1923,

Langley Field
4

Development of Doctrine at the

Air Corps Tactical School

In 1936, the infantry officer who reported his experience at the

Tactical School* criticized some of the instructors for "apologizing and

making excuses for the lack of conclusive proof to bear out their theories

regarding tactics and technique (particularly the former)." Admittedly

instruction as to just how the air force and its constituent parts were to

fulfill their missions was sometimes indecisive. But by the mid-thirties,

though developing slowly, the concepts that the air force was an indispensable part of the military establishment and that an air war, separate and

distinct from surface engagements, would characterize future warfare had

become firmly entrenched in ACTS literature.

Throughout the post-World War I period there was a variance between the concepts of airmen and the War Department General Staff

(WDGS) on the proper employment of airpower. Basically, the General

Staff view was that the airplane was simply a valuable adjunct to ground

armies and that its principle function would be to assist ground forces.

Even as late as 1935, after the creation of the GHQ Air Force, the

General Staff considered the air force "a highly mobile and powerful

combat element which ... conducts the operations required for carrying

out army missions."' Airmen, on the other hand, were convinced that

warfare in the future would be increasingly dependent upon airpower,

which they regarded as a major offensive striking arm. A few even went so

far as to proclaim that aviation represented a third and equal, or perhaps

even superior, branch of warfare. And all airmen agreed that the air

weapon should be considered as more than a mere auxiliary to the ground

forces. Although the experience of the Air Service in World War I was

* See above, p. 42

55
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

limited, nevertheless, it had inculcated in airmen the following specific

beliefs: control of the air is mandatory for successful surface or air

operations; to be effective, airpower should be employed in mass; air units

should be commanded by competent airmen who understand not only the

capabilities and limitations of the air weapon but also personnel problems

peculiar to flyers.

The School as the Air Corps Doctrinal Center

Despite the firm conviction of airmen on these points, the Office of

the Chief of Air Service (Air Corps after 1926) was faced with the stern

realities both of the budgetary deficiencies under which the service operated and the subordinate place of the air arm within the military establishment. Moreover, in view of the isolationist philosophy which prevailed in

the United States in the two decades after World War 1, OCAC found

itself forced into the position of delineating the role of aviation within the

framework of the national policy of defense against hostile attack. It is not

to be inferred that responsible airmen surrendered their firm convictions

that airpower to be effective had to be concentrated and that by its very

nature it was an offensive instrument, even when used for defense.

Nevertheless, OCAC could find little time to consider fully the impact of

airpower on war with its resultant ramifications. Accordingly, it called

upon subordinate agencies to consider such problems in detail. Matters

relating to technical and tactical aspects of airpower were handed to such

organizations as flying training schools, the Materiel Division at Wright

Field, and the GHQ Air Force. Logically, the Tactical School, with the

assistance of the Air Corps Board, became the agency which developed air

doctrine. Although its mission was the training of air officers for higher

staff duties, the chief value of the school to the Air Corps lay in its

extra-legal function of serving as a sounding board for ideas concerning

the critical issue of the role of airpower in war.

If one person were to be singled out as having had the most decided

influence on the school, it would probably be Brig. Gen. William Mitchell.

One of the first Americans to champion an independent air mission,

Mitchell was also among the first to recognize bombardment as the basic

arm of the air force.* After his court-martial in 1925 it would have been

decidedly impolitic for airmen at the Air Corps school to indorse openly

*See above, p. 42

56
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

Mitchell's views or to include reference to his writings in school literature.

Thus, when the host of ideas on airpower were being synthesized into a

body of fully developed concepts, the influence of "Billy" Mitchell was not

as direct as might have been expected. Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, in an

interview in 1942, reflected on Mitchell's influence at the school:

Notes on the Multi-Motored Bombardment Group, Day and Night

by Brigadier General William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of Air

Service, 1922 . . . was the basis of instruction in the Air Corps

Tactical School from its inception .... In 1932, the then Lieutenant K. N. Walker, who was one of General Mitchell's several

very capable aides, became instructor in bombardment aviation at

the Air Corps Tactical School .... Captain Robert Olds, another

of Mitchell's aides, became responsible for extensive courses of

bomber instruction. Between the two Mitchell's work has continued, expanded, augmented, and separated into its several components, including tactics and techniques of attack aviation, tactics

and techniques of bombardment aviation, and the employment of

air forces.2

When instructors at the school began to graft the concept of the primacy

of the bomber onto the concept of air warfare and strategic air operations,

they were consciously or unconsciously providing the covering for the

skeleton built by Mitchell.

Another person who could have had an influence on the Tactical

School was the great Italian exponent of airpower, Giulio Douhet. But it is

doubtful that he had any profound influence on the thought at the school.

Although Douhet's writings began to appear in Italy in the early 1920's,

they do not seem to have found their way immediately to American

publications. At ACTS only an imperfect translation was available and this

not until about 1933. By that time school concepts had begun to take

shape. However, there were points where Douhet and American theorists

coincided, and for a time lecturers at the school cited "the Italian authority" as further evidence of the soundness of their views. His concepts of

the "air cruiser" and large formations of unescorted bombers were approved by the school theorists, who also agreed with his over-all concept of

air warfare-the totality of the next war, the interdependence of the

segments of national structures, and the possibility of airpower upsetting

the delicate balance, thereby breaking the civilian morale. Douhet also

sensed the necessity first for gaining control of the air, presumably by

using bombers since he thought that other types of aviation, save reconnaissance, could be ignored. Once control of the air was established,

bombers could go unmolested about their business of disrupting vital

57
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

industries and thereby bringing the war to a quick decision. But Douhet

was never really in vogue at the Tactical School. His advocacy of mass area

bombing at night was at variance with the ACTS concept of daylight

precision bombardment of pinpoint targets. By the late thirties, when this

concept had become firmly entrenched in the school, references to Douhet

became less frequent. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter and Maj. Gen. Haywood S.

Hansell, Jr., USAF Ret., both have stated that Douhet had little influence

at ACTS. Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, USAF Ret., one of the leading

theorists at Maxwell during the thirties, has said that he had never read all

of Douhet, and, in any case, disagreed with his idea of mass bombing.3

Actually foreign influences seem to have had little effect on the evolution

of American air thought from the close of World War I until its final

crystallization in the late thirties.

Ideas concerning airpower in war automatically gravitated toward the

ACTS where they underwent a variety of tests, analyses, and comparisons.

Those that successfully ran the gantlet were adopted to fill gaps in the

slowly accumulating body of school concepts; those that fell were discarded. Too, out of the clash of ideas there merged new thoughts within

the school itself. In handling ideas, the school was unencumbered by the

restraining factors surrounding the OCAC. For experimental and theoretical purposes, the offensive use of aircraft could be visualized and the

diminutive air force in being could be supplanted by vast air armadas. Also

at the school, faculty and students alike had an opportunity-very probably for the first and only time in their military careers-to analyze their

own thoughts on the matter of the employment of airpower; of equal

importance, officers were exposed to the stimuli of other thoughts. But the

faculty and students did not confine themselves to a consideration of the

application of the air weapon to traditional concepts of surface engagements; rather, they explored the whole theory of warfare to discover

whether or not this new, relatively untried weapon had altered the nature

of war. Maj. Harold L. George, while director of the Department of Air

Tactics and Strategy, explained the problem to the student body at the first

session of the Air Force course in 1935:

From today on much that we shall study will require us to start

with nothing more than an acknowledged truth and then attempt,

by the utilization of common sense and logic, to evolve a formula

which we believe will stand up under the crucial test of actual

conditions. We shall at tempt to develop logically, the role of air

power in future war, in the next war. We are not concerned with

fighting the past war;-that was done 18 years ago. We are concerned, however, in determining how air power shall be employed

in the next war and what constitutes the principles governing its

58
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

employment, not by journeying into the hinterlands of wild imaginings but by traveling the highway of common sense and logic.

In pursuing this purpose, we realize that air power has not

proven itself under the actual test of war. We must also realize that

neither land power nor sea power has proven itself in the face of

modern air power.

The question for you to consider from today on war, to have

constantly before you as you continue your careers, is substantially

this:

Has the advent of air power brought into existence a method for

the prosecution of war which has revolutionized that art and given

to air forces a strategical objective of their own independent of

either land or naval forces the attainment of which might, in itself,

accomplish the purpose of war; or has air power merely added

another weapon to the waging of war which makes it in fact only an

auxiliary of the traditional military forces?4

Students were urged to inquire "into the very depths of the philosophy of

war." They were to determine: What is war? Why does war occur? What is

the object of war? How has it been waged in the past and why has it been

waged in that manner? Is it to the advantage of civilization to change the

methods of waging war if such change is possible? Has modem civilization

reduced or increased the vulnerability of nations? Consideration of the

central issue of the role of airpower in war was influenced by technological

developments in aeronautics. From the close of their World War I, airmen

envisaged eventual production of aircraft possessing far greater destructive

powers range than those used in that war, and many of their concepts of

the future of airpower were rooted in their faith that before another war

occurred such aircraft would be available. The appearance of the B-10,

B-12, and, more important, the B-17 by the mid-thirties served to solidify

those concepts. As a result of the technological advances and the serious

study and thought given to the question of the employment of airpower in

war the Army Air Corps at the outbreak of World War II had both the

nucleus of a modem air force and a body of concepts to guide its use.

The long-range bomber and the concepts of its truth employment

were 15 years in evolution. During the Tactical School's early years, such a

weapon and such concepts were beyond the ken of the instructors. Only

with time could the air experience of World War I be analyzed and its

portents the future be determined. Hence, however great their faith in the

future of airpower, because they had so little precedent or doctrine to

guide them into and so little time to contemplate the future potentialities

of the air weapon, instructors at first were forced to draw on the limited

experience of the war just ended as the basis for their discussion of the

employment of airpower.

59
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Observation Aviation

Instruction at the Tactical School from its beginning was based on the

belief that the air arm should be divided into two distinct classes: the air

service, which was made up of observation, and forces, the air force, which

consisted of the remaining branches of aviation and which constituted "a

true arm." 5

On the basis of "the heritage of our proving ground-the World War,"6

and throughout the 20-year history of the school, observation was considered as an integral part of armies, corps, and divisions, and worked with

the infantry like any other auxiliary. By the mid-thirties the need for

reconnaissance within the air force was recognized, but instruction in

observation continued to be based on World War I situations. In view of

the mechanization of armies, which began in the mid-thirties and obviously

quickened the pace and widened the scope of ground force operations, and

in view of the striking advances made in pursuit aircraft, it should have

been apparent that observation based on World War I standards would be

completely inadequate in another war. Unfortunately, thinking on the

employment of observation did not keep pace with the steadily expanding

concepts of the employment of the elements of the air force. As late as

February 1941 Col. Robert M. Goolrick, commanding Air Corps Troops,

IX Corps, called attention to the lack of progress in observation:

I had not served with Observation Aviation for nine or ten years

until returning to this station. I find, after all these years, practically

no change in the basic theories of the branch and very little change

in the equipment assigned . . . . This important branch of the Air

Corps has stagnated for the past fifteen years . ...

A short time later Goolrick wrote that

there has been little change in the technique of employment of the

equipment of observation for many years, though conditions under

which Observation Aviation is employed have undergone radical

and revolutionary changes.7

Had the Tactical School sensed the need for modernizing observation

aviation, conceivably the doctrine for the command and employment of

this important branch of the air arm and the question of the types of

planes essential to its functioning would have been determined before a

crisis arose. As it was, when the United States entered the war observation

60
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

was undergoing a reorganization* which was not completed until mid-1943

when observation units were redesignated reconnaissance units.

Doctrine of Air Force Employment, 1920-1926

The World War I experience which so influenced the teaching of

observation throughout the history of the school was an important factor

for only five or six years in the instruction given in the employment of the

elements of the air force (which excluded observation). During this early

period, school instructors expressed few advanced ideas on the employment of the air force. Air operations were closely related to surface

strategy, with the air arm considered a vital element in winning the ground

objective. Because the first duty of pursuit aviation was the gaining of air

superiority which was a prerequisite to successful surface and air operations, pursuit was regarded as the most important element of the air force.

Pursuit was to achieve its mission by offensive actions against the hostile

air force and not by such defensive operations as close protection of

observation planes or bombers by a flight of pursuit aircraft, and aerial

barrage, in which friendly aircraft set up a barrage over the front lines to

serve as a barrier to hostile aircraft. Both close protection and aerial

barrage techniques had been tried and proved unsound during the war,

asserted the 1922 school text for air subjects. The successful employment

of pursuit not only would protect surface forces from attacks by hostile

aircraft, but would also permit the other elements of the air force and

observation to accomplish their missions.8

From the time of its establishment the school recognized bombardment as a potentially powerful weapon. It visualized two kinds of bombardment, tactical and strategical. Both types were to be planned on the basis

of their ultimate effect on the ground campaign. For several years instruction in bombardment was imprecise; targets were vaguely described as

communications and troop concentrations. This same general approach

was followed for the next few years and as late as 1926 the Bombardment

text noted that the course was to deal primarily with operations in support

of, or in conjunction with large forces of ground troops rather than with

"what may be termed independent air force operations." 9

Despite the absence of concrete evidence of the capabilities of the air

weapon, the school early gave thought to the possibilities of airpower in

* For a comprehensive account of the observation problem, see Air Historical Study 24,

Command of Observation Aviation: a Study in Control of Tactical Air Power, 1952.

61
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

the future. The 1922 air subjects text challenged "the professed doctrine of

the military world of today" that the success or failure of the army

depended on the success or failure of the infantry and that all other arms

were auxiliary and of value in proportion as they rendered aid to the

infantry. Thinking on air matters was not then far enough advanced for

airmen to advocate a strategic air war but this text suggested that airplanes

might possibly be decisive against infantry. It noted that a disparity in the

effectiveness of weapons did exist between the infantry and the airplanes

that, although the airplane could easily close in to the attack at will, the

infantry would be unable to come to grips with airpower.* These conditions, said the text, clearly indicated that the doctrine that "the success or

failure of the infantry determines the success or failure of the army" could

not be "called a true and unalterable fundamental," and suggested that

the doctrine "may be altered at some future time."'' Summing up the

impact of the air weapon on surface warfare, the 1922 text asserted that

the air force assisted the infantry, in the same broad sense that the Navy

assisted the infantry. The text then warned that in deriving the doctrine

that must underlie all principles of employment of the Air Force, we must

not be guided by conditions surrounding the use of ground troops, but

must seek out our doctrine, as with the Navy, in the element in which it

operates.""

Evolution of the Theory of Daylight, High-Altitude Precision

Bombardment of Pinpoint Targets

By 1926 a concept of warfare differing from the traditional one had

begun to take form. Heretofore, military doctrine had been in terms of

surface engagements. The Clausewitzian principle on which War Department doctrine was based was set forth in the Field Service Regulations of

1923: "The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction

of the enemy's armed forces by battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the

* Antiaircraft fire was expected to continue "to be what it is-a very troublesome thing

to the inexperienced, a source of mild annoyance to the veteran, never a formidable enemy."

The school believed that the speed and altitude of aircraft and the immensity of the sky

would afford protection to the aircraft from ground fire. In recalling the lack of emphasis

placed on antiaircraft artillery, Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody USAF Ret., stated in 1954: "I

believe we missed the boat in the '30's in another field, also. Too little attention was given to

the possible developments in A.A. Artillery. I have always had the feeling that we treated the

A.A. people too much as we ourselves had been treated by the earthbound General Staff. I

believed then and still believe that A.A. should be an integral part of the Air Force." (See

Memo for The Director, RSI, from Hume Peabody, 19 April 1954).

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace." Achieving the

objective demanded the combined employment of all arms, for no one arm

won battles. Nevertheless, the infantry was still the "Queen of Battle" and

the "coordinating principle which underlies the employment of the combined arms is that the mission of the infantry is the general mission of the

entire force. The special missions of other arms are derived from their

powers to contribute to the infantry mission." The 1926 Tactical School

text, Employment of Combined Air Force, deviated slightly from the

Clausewitz theory. It asserted that in the past, except in most unusual

circumstances, an enemy's capital, commerce, industrial centers, or resources had not been considered proper military objectives because of the

limited mobility and striking power of surface forces. But the air force

operated in three dimensions and could terrorize the whole population of

a belligerent country while at the same time conserving life and property

of both friend and foe to the greatest possible extent. In short, using

airpower to strike heavily at the vital points of a nation's structure rather

than conducting exhausting wars of attrition was a means of achieving the

military objective with the least possible cost.

Authors of the manual frankly admitted that because of lack of

experience any statement on the influence of strategic air operations on

future warfare was a matter of conjecture. They declared, however, that by

virtue of its mobility and range of action, the air force exceeded any other

means available to a commander for striking quickly and decisively at an

enemy's bases and centers of concentration. When friendly ground forces

were on the defensive, strategic air operations could and should be

continued; even when ground elements were engaged in important tactical

operations, air forces should be used extensively in strategic operations. A

cardinal principle in the strategic employment of the air force was voiced

in the warning that once an element of the enemy's economic structure

was singled out for attack that particular element should be completely

destroyed before the main action shifted to some other objective.12

If the destruction of the enemy's morale was not possible at the

outbreak of hostilities, then the air force objectives should be selected with

the view of destroying the enemy's military strength. The most suitable

objectives for this purpose were listed as: the hostile air force; troops,

supplies, and lines of communication in the combat zone; concentration

centers and lines of communication in the communications zone; and

industrial and transportation centers in the Zone of Interior. If a ground

campaign developed, tactical air operations (defined as "those missions

which are conducted for the purpose of having an immediate effect on

operations in the combat zone,") might be carried out by the entire air

force. However, the belief was expressed that only rarely would all the air

force be engaged in work of a tactical nature;13 normally, a portion of the

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AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

air force would continue to carry on strategic operations. Stress was laid on

a GHO Air Force which not only could be shifted in strength to different

sectors within a particular theater but also could be moved from one

theater of operations to another with comparative ease thus fully exploiting the inherent flexibility of the air weapon. With such a force it would be

possible to concentrate superior numbers where and when necessary to

assume and maintain offensive action. Thus was emphasized the necessity

for centralized control of airpower.

The text also reflected a new emphasis on bombardment aviation.

Heretofore, because pursuit was the particular branch charged with gaining and maintaining air superiority through air combat, it was considered

the backbone of the air force. The 1926 text maintained that it was futile

to attempt to stop hostile aerial activity through aerial combat alone; once

airborne an air attack was virtually impossible to stop. The only effective

method of gaining and maintaining air superiority was to destroy hostile

aircraft before they could get into the air in force. Therefore, the mission

of bombardment and attack aviation, particularly during the initial stages

of hostilities, was to attack grounded hostile aircraft. Thus, although

pursuit continued to be viewed as valuable for air combat and for escorting

the other elements of the air force, by 1926, bombardment (including

attack) was coming to be considered the most important element of the air

force."4

By 1930 the concept of the primacy of bombardment was firmly

established at the Tactical School. That year the authors of the text for the

Air Force course left no doubt that in their opinion pursuit could not

guarantee immunity from hostile air attack, and consequently that the only

way to gain control of the air was through a determined bomber offensive.

They asserted that an air force preponderantly pursuit could not materially

affect the ground situation except through the indirect method of destroying hostile aircraft. But an air force preponderantly bombardment and

attack could affect the ground situation not only indirectly by participating

in the counter-air campaign but directly by attack against ground targets.' 5

In their discussion of attacks against ground targets, the authors of the

manual emphasized the strategic employment of bombardment. They

wrote that, excepting operations against an enemy air force, by far the

greater portion of the operations of an air force would be strategic. An air

force was viewed as a tremendously powerful agency of war whose chief

characteristics were intensity and volume of fire, speed, flexibility, long

range, and, when in flight, independence of the terrain. The concept that

the air force would not attack objectives on or in the immediate vicinity of

the battlefield except in the most unusual circumstances was expressed far

more positively than in earlier school manuals. The manual recognized

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

that the air force on occasion would be required for direct support of the

infantry, but warned that even an army was too small a unit to utilize to

the maximum the great range and flexibility of an air force. As the bomber

grew in importance in the minds of the Bombardment and Air Force

instructors at the school, increasing emphasis was placed on its use against

targets in rear areas and in the interior of enemy nations. Nevertheless, in

1930, and for the next two years, the strategic employment of bombardment still hinged on surface strategy; for targets were vaguely defined as

those whose destruction would impede military operations.,6

In 1933 when Maj. Donald Wilson was assigned the task of preparing

the Air Force course, he reasoned that far more specific targets in the

interior of an enemy's country should be designated as the objectives for

bomber operations. The problem, as Wilson saw it, was to select targets

whose destruction would disrupt the entire fabric of an enemy's economy

and thereby to discommode the civilian population in its normal day-to-day

existence and to break its faith in the military establishment to such an

extent that public clamor would force the government to sue for peace.

From his experience as a civilian with American railroads, Wilson was

aware that the destruction of a few vital links would disrupt an entire

railroad system. If this was true ofrailroads, might not the same be true

for other industries? Wilson's general idea of applying pressure to a few

vital links in the enemy's economic structure received a tremendous boost

in the thirties by a classic example which emphasized the possibilities of

selective bombardment: it was discovered that the lack of a particular

highly specialized spring, manufactured by one particular firm and essential to the functioning of the controllable-pitch propellers nullified, to all

intents and purposes, a very large portion of the aircraft production in the

United States. Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, USAF Ret., has said that

this practical example set the pattern for the selection of ideal precision

targets; items of similar criticality for basic industries were sought.'1

7

By 1933, instruction in the employment of the air forces centered on

the interdependence of the segments of the economic structure of a

nation. The farmer depended upon industrial centers for clothing, tools,

and machinery; the city dweller depended upon the farmer for food; the

miner depended upon the farmer for his food and upon the industrial

laborer for other necessities and luxuries. Moreover, the producer and

consumer frequently were brought together only through the medium of

intricate transportation systems. The school, therefore, viewed transportation, steel, iron ore, and electric power complexes as the most likely

objectives for the air force. Since the purpose of military operations was to

bring about the submission of the enemy, it was maintained that the

creation of an imbalance in the intricate economic structure which rested

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AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

on these basic industries could defeat any modern industrial nation by

bringing about a collapse of morale and by denying the nation the

economic factors essential to waging the war. The interruption of this

closely-knit web by destroying one or more of its threads was considered

the primary objective for an air force. Not only were such concepts being

taught at the school but they also served as the basis for the testimony of

school representatives before the Federal Aviation Commission in 1934.18

At about the same time that Wilson began to broach his ideas, the

school was moving toward the concept of daylight bombardment. As far

back as 1926 the Bombardment text had noted that small targets which

were difficult to see from the air and which required precision bombing

would best be destroyed in daylight attacks. However until about 1930,

night bombing was emphasized. Tactical targets, which were only lightly

protected by pursuit and which called for only shallow penetrations, might

be attacked by day, but targets requiring deep penetration would be

bombed at night. The 1931 Bombardment text noted that day bombardment was stressed in the training of light bomber units. Nevertheless, the

1931 text gave increased attention to day bombardment of strategic targets

in the statement that heavy bomber units not only would be required to

perform day missions in coastal defense operations, but, because of the

greater accuracy of day bombing, would also in may instances operate by

day against difficult precision targets. By 1932, the school had indorsed

explicitly the concept of daylight bombardment, and during the 1932-1933

session a lecturer in the Air Force course stated:

The Italians are exponents of large formations at night .... However, we do not subscribe to this idea, at present. We want to

transport our mass to the objective. If we can, it is that much

simpler. When we arrive at our objective, the better the visibility, the better our chance of accomplishing our desired destruction.' 9

Airmen, too, had long valued altitude, and at the Tactical School,

instructors had constantly stressed the necessity for raising the ceiling of

service aircraft. The Bombardments text for 1931, for example, maintained

that a high ceiling and rapid rate of climb not only would increase the

difficulty of location and interception of bonibers by enemy pursuit aviation, but would also decrease the effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery. This

manual called for a service ceiling of 15,000 feet for light bombers and

18,000 feet for heavy bombers.20

Instructors had also begun to indorse the theory of bomber invincibility. In 1931 the Bombardment text guardedly expressed this theory in the

statement that bombers could operate either by day or by night, singly or

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

in mass, with or without support of other aviation. Bomber defense against

hostile pursuit was based on the mutually supporting fire of machine guns

of airplanes flown in close formation.2 ' As the speed of bombardment

aircraft approached that of pursuit, the difficulty of interception by the

latter would be increased and the time interval during with pursuit might

attack bombers after interception would decrease.22

With the appearance of the B-9 and B-10 airplanes in the early

thirties, the competition between bomber and pursuit seemed so even that

it appeared that bombers would be relatively safe from fighter interception. The production of a bomber equal to-with promise of a bomber

superior to-pursuit in speed and range presented school theorists with a

complicated problem; for their concept of employing bombers tended

more and more toward that of attacking the interior of a hostile nation

immediately upon outbreak of hostilities. But if pursuit lacked both the

range and speed necessary to accompany bombers, obviously the latter

could not depend on the former for protection. Moreover, if pursuit

aircraft were not capable of accompanying bombers, it was anticipated that

nations would concentrate their pursuit around their most vulnerable

targets as a defense against attacking bombers. However, instructors

believed that pursuit would have difficulty in intercepting bombers. For

example, Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, in a lecture in the Bombardment course,

asserted: "Military airmen of all nations agree that a determined air

attack, once launched, is most difficult, if not impossible to stop."

From the beginning instructors had been forced to admit that because

of lack of experience much of their instruction was pure theory. But their

theory was made even more abstract by the stubborn fact that no aircraft

existed with the range and destructive capacity necessary to test it. Undoubtedly the operational capabilities of the B-9, B-10, and B-12 aircraft

in the early thirties served as a stimulus to the theorists at the Tactical

School; certainly the development of these greatly improved bombers and

of more advanced views at the school coincided. As encouraging as the

new bombers must have been, instructors at the school were thinking in

terms of even more advanced aircraft with unprecedented range and

destructive capacity. In pointing out to the Federal Aviation Commission

the reasonableness of the school view that the defense of the United

States could best be assured by attacking an enemy at the source of his

power, Capt. Harold L. George, in 1934 noted that the aeronautical

industry could, within two years, provide aircraft with a range of 3,000

miles.3

Less than a year later, the XB-17, a four-engine bomber of revolutionary design, flew its initial test flight. The B-17 was not an intercontinental bomber; it still would need forward bases for employment against,

67
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

the interior of probable enemy nations. But its range, bomb-carrying

capacity, armament, service ceiling, and rate of climb were impressive by

comparison with earlier models. Its potential for attacking targets in the

interior of a hostile nation was far greater than that of any previous

plane.24

With the appearance of the B-17 many bomber enthusiasts declared

that nothing could stop the bombers and that escorts were unnecessary.

The B-17 not only outperformed any known pursuit, but it was generally

believed at the Tactical School that any pursuit designed to keep pace with

the new bomber would have to sacrifice its fundamental pursuit characteristics to the point that it would be virtually useless for air fighting.

Although the employment of the B-17 could be planned-at least insofar

as its characteristics of speed, range, and service ceiling were known-any

concept that entailed the bomber's being escorted by pursuit would have to

be based on aircraft that did not exist, and as far as the majority of the

instructors were concerned, could not be produced for engineering reasons. Therefore, instructors, forced to make a virtue of necessity embraced

whole-heartedly the concept of bomber invincibility.

The impact of the B-17 on thought at the Tactical School was

profound, and was made more so by another technological development

which strengthened the formula for successful strategic air operations.

Virtually from the close of World War I, airmen had recognized the need

for improvements in bombsight equipment. In the school's consideration

of air attacks on communication targets, the point was continually made

that the bombing inaccuracy of World War I against such targets as

bridges would be offset in another war by improved sights. The 1931

edition of the Bombardment text noted that because the bombsight was

the most important part of the fire control system of the bombardment

airplane every effort should be made to develop the most efficient bombsight possible if the full powers of bombardment were to be realized.2

Finally, in 1933 orders were place for improved models of the Sperry

bombsight and for a new and more advanced piece of equipment, the

Norden Mark XV. This, with the successful test of the B-17 in 1935, it

appeared that the Air Corps had the plane and the bombsight which would

accurately place heavy destructive loads on small, distant targets. 26

By 1935 the full-blown theory of high-level, daylight precision bombardment of pinpoint targets was being taught at the Tactical School.

From the early days when teaching was limited to the air experience of

World War I, the school had given purpose and direction to the steadily

accumulating body of ideas on the employment of airpower in war. It had

consolidated these ideas into an integrated body of concepts and had

added to them. And from this synthesis came the capstone of the

theory-the selectivity of targets.

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

Conflict with the War Department General Staff

The Tactical School's concept of employing the heavy bomber in

daylight against critical pinpoint targets in the interior of a hostile nation

was contrary to the views of the War Department General Staff (WDGS).

In fact, before World War II the WDGS would never have approved a

long-range bomber solely for eventual employment in a strategic role.

Throughout the controversy over the development and procurement of

heavy, long-range bombers (even after the B-17 was developed, the

General Staff hesitated to purchase it in quantity), responsible airmen

were careful to avoid the advanced concepts of the ACTS in their arguments favoring the new plane.2 7 Hence, officially, the long-range bomber

was developed as a defensive weapon, and from 1935 (which marked not

only the appearance of the B-17 but also the creation of the GHQ Air

Force [GHQAF]) until the outbreak of war in Europe, the WDGS, OCAC,

and GHQAF were concerned with the problem of how the Air Corps

could best assist in the defense of the United States.

Official planning for the future employment of the air force was based

on the 1935 version of Training Regulation 440-15, Employment of the

Air Forces of the Army, which governed the use of the air forces of the

Army and constituted the basis for their training. Although this regulation

clearly indicated that the General Staff still considered airpower to be

mainly a valuable means of influencing ground strategy, in some minor

respects it was a compromise between air and ground concepts. It stated,

for example, that the power of air forces had not yet been fully tested, nor

had the effect they might produce or the extent to which they would

influence warfare yet been determined. At the same time the regulation

admitted that skillful use of air forces would greatly affect operations in

future wars. It also made a slight concession to the necessity for counter-air

operations by agreeing that such operations were "generally of primary

importance." But if the document admitted that warfare of the future

might give airpower a larger role, it also revealed that as far as the

General Staff was concerned the primary function of the air force still was

support of ground operations. In brief, "Air operations, like many other

military operations, are governed by the same fundamental principles that

have governed warfare in the past," and consequently, "Air Forces constitute a highly mobile and powerful element which conducts the operations

required for carrying out the Army mission.'"28

In 1938, when Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt, commandant of the Tactical

School, ventured to suggest that the ACTS texts dealing with air subjects

were accepted throughout the Air Corps as the guiding doctrine of tactical

units, he was reminded by The Adjutant General that school texts were in

no way to be considered an announcement of the official tactical doctrine

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AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

or procedure; such official announcement appeared only in the field

service regulations, training regulations, and field manuals.2 9 As late as

1940, when the first Air Corps field manual FM 1-5, Employment of

Aviation of the Army, finally appeared, the General Staff concept of the

employment of airpower still prevailed; air operations were to be planned

and executed in accordance with the over-all strategic plan for the surface

campaign. The nearest the manual came to making a concession to the

airmen's view that airpower could break the will of a hostile nation was the

statement that the strategic air operations conducted by bombardment

aviation are undertaken "to nullify the enemy's war effort or to defeat

important elements of the hostile military forces.""3

Clarifying and Refining the Bomber Concept

Regardless of War Department official doctrine, the Tactical School,

stimulated by the existence of the B-17, continued to expound its own

concept of air warfare.* For the immediate future, airpower was the

primary weapon of destruction in war. By quickly and efficiently disrupting

national life, it could achieve war's basic purpose-the submission of the

hostile nation. Because airpower could leap over armies and navies to

strike at the economic and social life of an enemy nation was obvious that

war had changed its form. No longer did war need to consist of surface

force against surface force. Since the tactics for precision bombing demanded accurate bombsights and daylight visibility, the school, emphasizing the value of the new bombsights, in the last five years of its existence

switched whole-heartedly to the concept of daylight bomber operations.

For defense against hostile pursuit attacks and for concentrated effect

upon the target, tactics required formation flying; for protection in daylight

against antiaircraft artillery, high-altitude operation was necessary. These

concepts became standard for instruction purposes. Moreover, centralized

control of airpower continued to be stressed. Concentrated action, independent of surface operations, was regarded as the most appropriate use

of military aviation.

As for primary air force objectives, emphasis continued to be placed

upon dislocating the enemy nation's structure through precision attacks

against vital points. Creation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935 presented the

school theorists with an offensive air striking force in being for whose

* This basic concept, which by 1935 was well established, remained firm throughout the

remainder of the school's existence.

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

employment they could plan. And despite the fact that national policy

remained one of defense, and although the GHQ Air Force was viewed

officially as a means of implementing that policy, instructors at the Tactical

School proceeded to refine their theories and tactics of strategic attacks on

the theoretical basis of eventually sending the GHQ Air Force against the

interior of a hostile nation. Most instructors were convinced that the

extreme accuracy required for knocking out small targets could be achieved

with the improved planes and bombsights. They were just as firmly convinced that airpower should be employed against small vital targets during

the initial phase of hostilities, because only in this way could a long costly

surface war be avoided. Between 1935 and 1940 Lt. Cols. Harold L.

George and Donald Wilson (who returned to the school in 1936), Majs.

Muir S. Fairchild and Robert M. Webster, Lts. Haywood S. Hansell and

Laurence S. Kuter, and other instructors attempted to determine just what

those targets should be.

The Air Force text for 1935 noted that interlaced social, economic,

political, and military divisions made up a national structure and that

dislocation in one of these divisions would produce sympathetic disturbances of varying intensity in all of the others. The 1935 text emphasized

target selection within the various systems be made on the basis of

scientific advice. Such selection was essentially a problem for in economists,

but there were no such specialists at the Tactical School, nor was money

available to hire them. It was assumed, however, that the industrial

structure of any great power would parallel that of the United States, and

that conclusions drawn from an analysis of American industry might apply

to any other highly industrialized nation. Therefore, instructors at the

school, especially Fairchild and Webster, undertook an analysis of the

American industrial structure with a view toward determining the geographic centralization of industry, the component parts of industry, the

importance of the various parts, and the vulnerability to air attack of the

most critical elements.31 In short, during the years 1935-1940, instructors

at the Tactical School surveyed American industry with the object of

determining the points of vulnerability of industrial systems in general. In

the course of conducting this survey, they not only established a method to

be used in determining the vulnerability of industrial targets and selecting

critical targets within a specific industrial complex, but they also considered the results desired in the light of the capability of available weapons.

The significance of the Tactical School's insistence on developing and

teaching a concept of strategic air warfare is readily apparent. Although,

from a practical point of view, American planes did not have sufficient

range to reach the vitals of any major industrial nation, careful analysis

was given to the whole broad field of strategic airpower. School instructors

developed a doctrine of air employment in terms of general capabilities of

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the air weapon; they did not restrict themselves to the expressed national

strategic policy, probable combinations of allies, or existing aircraft equipment. It was fortunate that the small group at the Tactical School did not

allow themselves to be swayed either by the popular disillusionment with

World War I or the strongly-held public view that American military

strength should be designed solely for defense. Had air concepts been

limited to defense of the American coast line, the Army Air Forces would

not have had the theory, organization, or planes necessary for the planning

and execution of the strategic air war of World War II.

Air-Ground Cooperation

With the increase in emphasis on the strategic employment of the

bomber, there was a decline in attention paid to air support of surface

operations. Nevertheless, this phase of air force activities was never

completely neglected; throughout the history of the school, instructors

recognized that air operations in support of ground forces might be

required. But by 1935 the Tactical School had adopted some advanced

ideas of what constituted air support of ground operations. In reviewing a

G-3 paper which set forth the General Staff concept that since success on

the battlefield was the decisive factor in war all elements of the air force

had important ground-support functions, ACTS took occasion to state its

position on this point. The school held that whether it was a question of

how the Army could best obtain security from enemy air operations or of

how GHQ Air Force could furnish the Army with the greatest possible

degree of support, the answer in either case must inevitably be by defeating the hostile air force. Any deviation from this line of action would invite

disaster. To be sure, in any war against an enemy with an air force both

the ground forces and the GHQAF would have the common purpose of

defeating that enemy; but each had a distinct and separate objective and

only by concentrating all the resources of each upon its proper objective

could victory be assured. The idea of employing both ground forces and

the GHQAF only against oppressing ground forces, and thereby defeating

the enemy in detail, was viewed as an alluring but false doctrine. Once the

air force had defeated the hostile air arm, its subsequent operations, by

denying tactical concentration to the enemy, would automatically support

the ground forces.32

This probably represented the most extreme school view on this

subject. It is true that as concepts moved away from those derived from

World War I experience toward the idea of an independent air mission,

less emphasis was placed on aviation in support of ground troops: Nevertheless, a subsection of the Air Force course was entitled Aviation in

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DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

Support of Ground Forces, in which by the mid-thirties, the concept was

taught that gaining air superiority was the most valuable contribution the

air force could make to the ground campaign; next in importance was

attacking enemy lines of communications. Except in unusual situations,

airpower was not to be employed against targets within range of friendly

artillery; in an emergency, all or part of the air force might be diverted to

support of ground troops. A cardinal point in the air philosophy expounded at the school was that airpower had to be centralized to be

effective either in a close-support or strategic role. The school opposed,

vigorously and vociferously, the assignment of combat elements of the air

force to Army formations. It held that even when a segment of the air

force was allotted to the task of close support it should be retained under

the centralized control at theater level in order that its inherent flexibility

might be exploited. Only under such a system could airpower in the proper

amount be employed at the right place at the right time.

Impact of Bomber Concept on Theory of Air Superiority

SAlthough instructors continued to stress the importance of air superiority over surface operations the basic assumptions underlying the school's

concept of the changed nature of warfare were in conflict with the

earlier-held tenet of school instruction that air superiority was also a

prerequisite to successful air operations. By 1935 ACTS had adopted the

view that airpower, judiciously employed, could defeat an enemy nation.

That year one lecturer in the Air Force course, in which the thoughts and

ideas at the school were synthesized, made the point-blank assertion that

.the airplane was a weapon which could immediately reach the economic

and political heart of a nation and thereby defeat that nation.33 In short,

airmen became obsessed with the idea that airpower could leap over

opposing armies and navies and strike at the interior of a hostile nation

without first having overcome the enemy's air force. The very nature of the

air weapon, the vastness of the medium in which operated, and the

invulnerability of the bomber (protected from pursuit by the mutual

supporting fire from the close formation and greater speed-and from

ground fire, and to a limited extent from pursuit, by altitude) precluded

any pitched air battle. This fallacy, together with an overrating of the

destructive power of the bomb, led them to the conclusion that airpower

would force quick decisions in war without having to go through the

time-consuming process of eliminating an opposing force. For a time there

was recognition of the obvious conflict between the view that strategic

airpower could be applied immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities

and the view that air superiority was a prerequisite to successful air

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AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

operations and therefore the first-priority mission of the air force. Authors

of the counter-air section of the Air Force text noted that many authorities

maintained that Clausewitz's principle that the defeat of the enemy armed

forces was the only sure method by which one nation could impose its will

on another was just as applicable to air as to surface forces; other

authorities believed that the development of military aviation had provided

the practical means of applying pressure against the nation itself. The

latter group held that where the economic life of a nation was within the

range of an enemy air force, no reason existed to doubt the ability of that

air force to attack with devastating results. The authors listed as "the point

at controversy" the question of whether the enemy air force should first be

defeated, thus removing the only force that could successfully oppose the

air offensive and permitting the unhampered application of pressure

against the nation, or whether that pressure should be applied in the first

instance, to the neglect of the hostile air force as an object of other than

casual concern.34

Instructors at the Tactical School never fully resolved the issue. The

increased range and performance of bombardment aircraft had convinced

them that control of the air, in the sense that control of the air was

maintained by one side or the other in World War 1, would be impossible

in future warfare. Since it would seldom be practicable to clear the air of

enemy pursuit before driving home the offensive of the striking force,

control of the air was considered a defensive operation. The battle for air

mastery, to the extent that any such battle might be fought, was to be a

battle of pursuit vs. bomber over friendly territory.35 From about 1935

until 1937 or 1938, instructors recognized that the limited range of aircraft

and lack of "properly placed" strategic air bases precluded an immediate

attack by American airpower against the interior of any probable enemy

nation. As long as that condition obtained, the American air arm would

not be faced with the problem of making a choice between attacking a

hostile nation's air force and mounting an offensive against that nation's

economic structure. An aggressor nation was expected to direct initial

attacks against the industry of the United States and thus to place the

United States air arm on the strategic defensive.

As to the all-important question of whether the strategic campaign

should be directed first against the hostile air force or against a hostile

nation's economy, it is certain that by 1939 the consensus at the Tactical

School favored the latter course. By that time it was assumed that the

United States would engage in the next war in a coalition with other

nations which might furnish the American air arm with the bases required

for carrying out the strategic air campaign.6 If such conditions prevailed

there was no doubt that attacks against an enemy's economic structure

should take precedence over counter-air force operations. Friendly nations

74
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

might suffer initially from the enemy's forces in being, but a strategic air

offensive directed against vital industrial targets combined the advantages

of striking the enemy national structure objectives and the armed force

objective. Since no nation could afford to maintain in reserve the supplies,

munitions, replacement equipment, and the like to offset the consumption

demanded by war, a strategic air offensive designed to destroy "machines

that make the machines and so destroy whole generations of machines"

not only would render the armed forces in being ineffectual but would also

have repercussions on the civilian population. The industrial capacity

which provided the means of war to the armed forces and the industrial

capacity which provided the means of sustaining normal civilian life were

not separate, disconnected entities, but were joined at many vital points.

Elements common to both, such as electric power, might be rendered

inoperative at a single blow. Major Fairchild noted in 1939: "The nationwide reaction to the stunning discovery that the sources of the country's

power to resist and to sustain itself are being relentlessly destroyed, can

hardly fail to be decisive.",37 Instructors believed that this could be

accomplished without first having to win air superiority.

The concept that the strategic air war against the industrial fabric of a

nation could and should begin immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities at the expense of a counter-air campaign was based on pure theory.

Air operations in Ethiopia, China, or Spain had little to offer in the way of

experience in strategic air warfare; the Battle of Britain had yet to be

fought when classes at the Tactical School were suspended. The falseness

of the theory would be proved only through actual experience in a war

against a highly developed industrialized nation.

Changing Concept of Pursuit Employment

The changing concept of pursuit employment was closely parallel to

and vitally affected by the changing concept of air superiority. Because its

primary mission was to gain and maintain air superiority, until about 1926

pursuit was considered the basic arm of the air force. Although at this time

replaced in importance by bombardment, pursuit continued to be considered an important offensive weapon. Its chief value still lay in its ability to

operate against the hostile air force either on offensive sweeps or while

accompanying friendly bombers and attack aircraft. As late as November

1933 the school announced that it would continue to recommend the

development of a fighter capable of accompanying bombers and furnishing

protection from hostile pursuit.38

After 1932, however, pursuit went into a decline. Pursuit instruction

reached its all-time low during the period from 1934 to 1936.39 The sudden

75
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

decline in pursuit is accounted for chiefly by the appearance of the B-9,

B-10, and B-12 high speed bombers in 1933 and 1934. Moreover, in 1933

proposals were distributed among manufacturers for a multi-engine bomber

even more advanced than the current models. During the same year Col.

John F. Curry gave concise expression to the problem which improvements

in bombers presented to the Tactical School:

... the more important our targets are the more determined will be

their defense and we can expect to have our formations opposed by interceptor pursuit. This opposition will be encountered beyond the

radius of our present single-engine pursuit unless we are willing to

confine our operations to that limited radius. It is probably impossible to determine accurately how much pursuit opposition will be

encountered, and it is most difficult to determine from the effort so

far expended, how much of such opposition a defensive formation

can withstand. But it is unthinkable to confine our aerial operations

to the limited range of present pursuit aviation. Furthermore, it is

obvious that we must return a large proportion of our formation

from any particular mission, so that it will be available for further

operations. The questions to be determined are: is protection of

our formation necessary, and (if so) what should be the proportion

between a given number of planes available, how can we deliver the

greatest amount of high explosives? 4

"

The first thing to decide, according to Colonel Curry, was the mission

of pursuit. If it was decided that bombers would require pursuit escort,

then pursuit would have two functions: protection of bombers and interception of hostile formations. At that time the possibility of developing a

multi-seat pursuit aircraft was under consideration, but it was immaterial,

thought Curry, what form the airplane took so long as it was the most

efficient for the jobs. And the school commandant made the observation,

which was contrary to the belief of many of his colleagues, that once

pursuit's function had been definitely determined, it should not be difficult

to produce the most efficient aircraft for the accomplishment of that

function.4'

Despite Curry's optimistic view, interest in pursuit was already on

the decline. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, USAF Ret., who as a captain

taught pursuit at the school from 1931 through 1936, quotes an air umpire

of the 1933 exercises at Wright Field as having said that "due to increased

speeds and limitless space it is impossible for fighters to intercept bombers

and therefore it is inconsistent with the employment of air force to develop

fighters."'42 Moreover, in the same year Pacific coast maneuvers (which

Chennault charged at the time with being rigged in favor of the bomber)

indicated to many that available pursuit aircraft were no match for the

bombers, the test having been between the P-26 pursuit (the Air Corps'

76
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

earliest and already outmoded standard all-metal monoplane fighter) and

the B-12 (the Air Corps' most modern bomber). At the Tactical School

the bomber enthusiasts had begun to consider pursuit simply a defensive

weapon."*'

The decline of interest in pursuit was accelerated by the appearance

of the B-17 in 1935. To be sure, Captain Chennault, as long as he remained at the school, fought stubbornly to maintain pursuit as a vitally

important element in the air force. But Chennault's arguments paled

before the impact of the B-17. Given the proper strategic bases, B-17's

could strike within the interior of a hostile nation, and attack either the air

force or vital industrial targets, preferably the latter. No pursuit existed

that could keep pace with the bombers in the execution of such missions;

as far as most instructors were concerned, because of engineering reasons,

none could be produced. t Hence, pursuit instructors following Chennault

tended to define the role of pursuit in terms of the capabilities of existing

aircraft.

Although relegated to an inferior place in the scheme of air force

employment, pursuit continued to be taught at the school. Its chief

function, however, had been altered from that of gaining air superiority to

one of defending civilian and military centers and aircraft in flightinterception and escort. Because of pursuit's limited range, however, its

operations would consist almost wholly of interception missions, and even

there, range limitations would force pursuit to await the enemy bombers,

not seek them out. "In a word it becomes a defensive force."' Although,

more actual hours were devoted to pursuit each year after 1937 than in

any of the previous three years,45 the basic concept of pursuit as a

defensive force continued to be stressed through the last session of the

school. Instructors at ACTS have been criticized for not sensing the need

for a long-range escort plane. From an over-all point of view the lag in

pursuit development can be accounted for, in part by the shortage of funds

for aircraft development and the belief that bombardment should be given

priority and in part by the generally held belief that a long range pursuit

plane would lose the necessary air fighting characteristics. As late as May

1939 the Air Corps Board indorsed this view in a study of the employment

* See above, p. 67, for school view of the improbability of engineers being able to

produce a pursuit equal to the bomber. tAn unidentified instructor took issue with this view. In reviewing a paper prepared by

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, in which the latter attempted to set forth a basis for pursuit

instruction, this critic wrote: "The school seems to feel that accompanying pursuit is not

practicable, Again I do not concur." (See, memo for Harmon from Wilson, 1 May 1939, and

attached papers.)

77
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

of aircraft in the defense of the United States. Such reasons, however, do

not explain why school theorists did not see the requirement. Possibly had

they insisted that the strategic air war would be dependent on fighter

escort for the bombers, the engineering difficulties in producing such a

plane would have been overcome sooner. It seems that their lack of

emphasis on fighter escort was due in large measure to the fact that they

did not know exactly how the air phase of the next war was going to be

fought. They visualized masses of bombers flying over hostile territory to

vital targets within the interior; they noted that pursuit probably would be

concentrated around certain targets; they hoped that, because of the

vastness of the air, bombers might cover a considerable amount of the

distance to a target without being detected, or if detected might avoid

combat; but on the crucial issue of what happened when a bomber

formation was opposed by hostile pursuit, it can only be concluded that

there was some sketchy thinking.

78
5

Discontinuance of Air Corps

Tactical School

Planning for Short Courses

Because the Air Corps Tactical School was limited to a yearly capacity

of 60 to 70 students by the mid-thirties the feeling was growing that it was

not reaching a sufficient number of Air Corps officers. Late in 1938, Maj.

Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Chief of Air Corps, directed that a study be made

to determine whether it would be feasible to suspend the regular ninemonth course and institute a series of short courses in order to permit a

greater number of officers to attend the school. A study incident to this

directive revealed that in the Air Corps there were 425 officers over the

age of 32 who were not graduates of ACTS. Since officers 32 years of age

and over constituted the group of senior officers who were becoming

eligible for responsible assignments, it was considered highly desirable to

give all suitable officers in this category an opportunity to attend the

school. In view of the large number of officers already in this age bracket

who were not Tactical School graduates-a number which would be

increased yearly-it was felt that a scheme should be adopted to train

these officers in the shortest possible time. Accordingly, the Tactical

School recommended that the regular course be discontinued for the

school year 1939-1940 and that there be substituted three special 12-week

classes, each with 100 Air Corps students drawn from the current list of

officers over 32. The advantages were numerous. In one year a majority of

all suitable officers over the age of 32 would have been given at least a

short course at the school; by the end of that year no more than 100 Air

Corps officers in this age bracket would remain as nongraduates, and these

could be given training within three years after the school resumed its

79
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

normal course.* The maximum number of officers removed from their

regular duties at any one time would be 100; the faculty would require no

increase in order to operate efficiently; facilities were sufficient to care for

100 students.' Only one year would elapse between the discontinuance and

resumption of the regular course.

School authorities recognized that such a plan had certain disadvantages. A limited 12-week course could not give the students the detail

included in the regular course. Suspension of the regular course for a year

would cause some loss of efficiency when it was resumed. Nevertheless,

school authorities felt that if the faculty were left intact for the short

courses and its members had no other responsibilities, if the curriculum

were adjusted in some slight particulars and advantage taken of Saturday

mornings, and if classroom instruction continued throughout the afternoon

in lieu of flying, a good, sound course could be given during the abbreviated period.' In considering the proposal, Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, director

of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, noted that "The Air Force

picture for a fundamentally sound basis of employment" should be the chief

emphasis of the courses. He considered this "the only thing we can give

which can be obtained at no other place." He noted, too, that faculty

personnel was the most critical issue and that the transfer of some

instructors, notably Muir S. Fairchild and Laurence S. Kuter, might be a

serious blow to the short-course program.'

The school recommendations were approved with the modification

that there should be four rather than three short courses. The four courses

of 12-weeks each were conducted from 1 June 1939 through 30 June 1940,

during which time officers were graduated: 380 Air Corps officers, 16

officers of other branches of the Regular Army, 1 Marine Corps officer, 1

Naval officer, and 2 foreign officers.4

The curriculum for the short sessions was substantially the same as

that for the regular nine-months session but the total number of hours was

reduced from 712 hours to 298 hours. The abbreviated courses consisted of

the Air Force, Attack,* Bombardment, Pursuit, Reconnaissance, and Naval

Operations in the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy; Combat Orders, Communications, Logistics, Military Intelligence, Staff Duties, and

Observation (which was transferred from Air Tactics and Strategy) in the

*The study assumed that the number of 125 would be reduced to less than 100 by

retirement, resignation, etc. SIn December 1939 in compliance with a minor recommendation of an Air Board

appointed by the War Department to study the entire field of military aviation, the Attack

Section was renamed the Light Bombardment section. (See, ACTS School Circular No. 10, 1

Dec. 1939, in 248. 125, 1935-1940.)

80
DISCONTINUANCE OF A. C. T. S.

Department of Command, Staff, and Logistics; Antiaircraft, Cavalry,

Chemical Warfare, Ground Tactics, Field Artillery, Infantry, and Map

Reading in the Department of Ground Tactics.5

Suspension of the School

Early planning for the short courses was based on the assumption that

the regular nine-month course would be resumed immediately upon their

completion. Before plans for the short courses had been consummated,

however, the Tactical School was asked to make a study of possible

reduction of its activities during the initial phases of the Air Corps

expansion program which began in January 1939. The Air Corps was faced

with the problem of providing qualified officers for responsible positions

during the period of expansion and at the same time of continuing its

normal administrative and operating functions. Obviously, faculty members at the school and school graduates were particularly well equipped to

fill special assignments in the expansion program. It was equally obvious

that if the school were closed completely for one year, several years would

be required to rebuild it to its current efficient status. The problem posed,

therefore, was how the school could make a substantial contribution of

experienced, well-trained officers to the expansion program and at the

same time maintain a staff large enough to keep current all phases of

school activities. The school study concluded that the school should not

cease to function altogether. The course should continue to be 9 months

long, but the faculty should be reduced by 6 members and classes should

be reduced from the current 60 Air Corps officers to 20, thereby freeing 46

Air Corps officers from school duty.6

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 sealed the fate of the Tactical

School. Requirements for officers in the tremendous expansion program

which followed that event were far too great to permit the experienced,

well-trained officers who were the framers of air force concepts at the

Tactical School to follow their academic pursuits. The series of 12-week

courses were allowed to reach completion, but on 13 June 1940 OCAC

directed that instruction at the school be suspended as of 30 June and the

staff and faculty be reduced to five Air Corps officers and two from either

branches. During the suspension, the skeleton staff was to be concerned

with:

* Preparation, revision, and editing of Army Extension Courses in

accordance with approved War Department programs.

* Continuation of collaboration with the Air Corps Board.

81
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

"* Continued research in tactical air doctrine and the employment of air

forces, with a view to keeping abreast of modern developments and

applications of air power.

"* Maintenance of files in a manner to facilitate prompt institution of

courses at such time as it is decided to open the school.

"* Preparation of specialized correspondence courses on tactical subjects

for the instruction of junior Air Corps officers.

"* Continued operation of the reproduction plant as required to meet

the demands of the service for Air Corps Tactical School publications. 7

When classes were suspended, it was assumed, both by the skeleton staff

and the OCAC that instruction would be resumed as soon as possible. In

fact, in June 1941 when the school was placed under the jurisdiction of the

Southeast Air Corps Training Center, the commanding general of the

center was directed to complete a study of the ways and means by which

the school could be re-opened with a minimum of delay.8 This study,

submitted to the Chief of Air Corps on 29 July 1941, reflected a somewhat

changed concept of the school. The course to be established was to be

known as the Basic Course, Air Force Tactical School. Its purpose was to

train flight and squadron leaders, squadron staff officers and junior group

staff officers in tactical duties incident to combat operations. On the basis

of a 10-week course, instruction was planned for 2,000 junior grade officer

pilots per year, with provision for increasing this number to 5,000 per year

by September 1942. The course would include instruction in tactics of each

type of combat aviation staff duties, administration and logistics of the

group and smaller units, tactics of air force units in support of ground

forces, and tactics of the air forces in independent offensive and defensive

operations. In short, the old mission of the school of training senior

officers for high command and the acquired mission of serving as a

doctrinal center for the air arm had been lost.9

In the summer of 1941 the final disintegration of the school occurred.

Before the end of the summer, the Air Corps Board had been moved to

Eglin Field to become a part of the Proving Ground. The school also lost

its reproduction department and training film preparation unit.

The skeletonized academic section was moved to Washington and

placed under the Directorate of Individual Training. Because the library

did not move, the staff was deprived of its facilities. Despite this and a

shortage of personnel the staff produced training literature urgently needed

by the AAF, maintained the school files, and tried to keep the courses of

instruction in such condition as to facilitate preparation of lectures in the

82
DISCONTINUANCE OF A. C. T. S.

event the school should be reopened. In June 1942 Lt. Col. John A.

Greene, acting commandant, urgently recommended the reopening of the

school at the earliest practicable moment.10

Establishment of AAF School of Applied Tactics

In the meantime there had been a trend away from the Tactical

School idea. As early as 1933 the commandant of the school, Lt. Col. John

F. Curry, urging the establishment of a real tactical center, had written:

The present system of tactical research in our Air Corps seems

to be trying out of ideas in a particular unit and the formulation of

a particular doctrine for that unit. As there are many different

commanders, the doctrine varies throughout the service, and in the

same units may change when commanders are changed. Much of

this doctrine is founded on the particular ideas of an individual

man and not based on the research and study from which should

grow such doctrine. There should be in the Air Corps some clearing-house into which tactical ideas can flow where they can be tried

and where the doctrine can go out to the service to be put into

practice and be evaluated. It is clearly recognized that there can be

no fixed solution to the problems involved in air warfare, and that

changing conditions will result in frequent modifications. This emphasizes the necessity for establishing a research center."

Colonel Curry believed that with the physical plant already established and

the faculty gathered, the Tactical School might well serve as the nucleus

for the center. This idea gained momentum over the years. Col. Walter R.

Weaver, commandant of the school during its last year at Maxwell, made a

similar recommendation, and with the outbreak of war the idea gained

favor in AAF headquarters. There obviously was a need for one center at

which the thousands of totally inexperienced future combat leaders could

be trained in all aspects of air warfare. Therefore, instead of reopening the

Air Corps Tactical School, AAF headquarters on 9 October 1942 authorized the establishment of the new AAF School of Applied Tactics, which

was activated on 27 October at Orlando, Florida.

The new school did not completely fill the gap left by the passing of

the Tactical School. True, the AAF Board was established at Orlando as

an adjunct to the school (but under the jurisdiction of the Commanding

General, Army Air Forces). And undoubtedly the school considered many

of the same types of problems as had been handled by the Tactical School.

But the new organization was a wartime agency concerned chiefly with -the

multitude of problems connected with global air war; theories of the

83
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

employment of airpower were less important than the evaluation and

analysis of current combat experiences as a means of determining the

method of future operations. Only at the end of the war would airmen be

able to resume the process of theorizing.

Establishment of the Air University

Just as had been the case at the close of World War I, immediately

after the end of World War II airmen began planning for a thorough

professional education for air officers. Air leaders of the future very

obviously would be needed. More important, World War II had pointed far

more clearly than had World War I to the potentialities of the air weapon

and to the need for a careful analysis of the war experience, and, in the

light of that experience, for a reinvestigation and reevaluation of the whole

broad question of military aviation in the national defense structure, both

in peace and in war. In considering the requirements for an Air Forceeducational system, airmen took note of the pre-World War II Air Corps

problems which resulted from the absence of separate facilities for training

junior and senior officers and the division of doctrinal, educational, and

various agencies. Thus, when the Air Force set up its post-World War II

educational system, it established a unique military educational institution,

the Air University, which within one integrated school system presented a

coordinated program of professional education for United States Air

Force officers. The Air University fell heir to the purpose and tradition of

the old "Tac School." Like its predecessor, the new institution's program

was "planned to equip officers with the knowledge and skills necessary for

assuming progressively more important assignments in command and staff

paositions through the Air Force;" and its motto, Proficimus More Irretenti,

was adopted from the Tactical School.

There are notable differences between the Tactical School and the

Air University. ACTS was a single institution which offered instruction in

command and staff functions, intelligence, logistics, the tactics and techniques of the various classes of aviation, theories of the employment of the

air force, and the tactics, techniques and doctrines of the other services,

plus many other subjects; at the Air University the fields of study are

divided among its various colleges. Except during the four short courses

which were attended by 100 officers each, classes at ACTS never exceeded

60 students; students numbering in the thousands pass through the Air

University's colleges and special courses each year. But aside from the

difference in the size and scope, another significant difference between the

two institutions lies in the fact that while the Tactical School's work in

84
DISCONTINUANCE OF A. C. T. S.

developing a concept of air force employment lay outside the pale of its

official function, the Air University since its inception has been recognized

as the doctrinal, educational, and research center of the Air Force.

The air experience of World War II presented instructors at the Air

University with more definite ground on which to base their judgments of

the employment of the air weapon than their counterparts at the Air

Corps Tactical School had enjoyed yet when the time came to resume the

process of theorizing and of determining doctrine for air force employment, the value of that experience diminished before the impact of new

types of aircraft and new weapons. Thus, the faculty of the Air University

has had to be just as much concerned with the theory of war, the problems

of bomber versus fighter, the effectiveness of bombs, and the question of

air superiority as were instructors at ACTS.

85
Notes

Chapter 1

1. William A. Ganoe, History of the United States Army (New York, 1942), p, 78.

2. Ibid., Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, 1917), p. 90.

3. Ltr, George Washington to Maj. General Alexander Hamilton, 12 Dec 1799, in John C.

Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources,

1745-1799 (Washington, 1931-44), XXXVII, 473.

4. Quoted in Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. 90; Col. Oliver L.

Spaulding, in The United States Army in War and Peace (New York, 1937), p. 122 states

that General Knox proposed the establishment of a military academy as early as 1776.

5. Spaulding, The United StatesArmy, p. 154.

6. Charles DeF. Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings (New York,

1943), pp. 194-243; 259-75; Interview with Brig Gen Thomas DeW. Milling, USAF

Ret, by author 29 Jun 54.

7. Quotations in this paragraph cited in Isaac D. Levine, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power

(New York, 1943), pp. 92-97.

8. Ibid., p. 129.

9. Ibid., pp. 128-29.

10. Final Report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF to the Commander in Chief, AEF, p. 11;

Levine, Mitchell, p. 132; Clayton Bissell, Brief History of the Air Corps and its Late

Developments, 1 Jan 27, pp. 55-60; Craven and Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in

World War H, I (Chicago, 1948), 14.

11. Final Report, Chief of Air Service, pp. 9-13; Bissell, Brief History of Air Corps, pp.

61-63; ACTS text, Attack Aviation, History and Development, 12 Dec 1935; GHQAEF

2d Sec, General Staff Summaries of Air Info 47, 17 Sep 18, and 68, 8 Oct 18.

12. AAF in World War I, 1, 14.

13. Col E. S. Gorrell, Early History of the Strategical Section, Air Service, n.d., in History

of the Air Service, AEF, Vol 6B, pp. 371-400, in National Archives.

14. It was believed at the time that in the lower commissioned grades the Air Service

would be composed of personnel whose period of active duty would be limited to about

three or four years and there would be 300 to 400 of such officers to be replaced each

year. (see WD, Off. Direc. of Air Service, Pamphlet 12, Comments on Strength,

Organization and Training of the Air Service, 19 Oct 19, in 167.41-3) [except where

otherwise noted, all file numbers refer to the Archives of the USAF Historical Division,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.]

15. Ibid.

16. Air Historical Study 13, The Development of Tactical Doctrines at AAFSAT and

AAFTAC, p. 6; The Army Air Service School of Application. in 167.4-5. Internal

evidence indicates that this is a copy of the 1919 proposal made by the Director of Air

Service for the establishment of an Air Service School. AHS-13 cites a letter, Director

87
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

of the Air Service to TAG, 21 Oct 19 (AAF 352.9 Tactical School), in which the

director requested authority to establish the school.

17. The Army Air Service School of Application.

18. The other schools were: two Air Service Pilot Schools (one at Carlstrom Field, Arcadia,

Fla., and the other at March Field, Riverside, Calif.); Air Service Pursuit School, Air

Service Bombardment School, Air Service Observation School (a course for communication personnel was also authorized for this school); Air Service Engineering School

(a course for enlisted storekeepers also authorized for this school); Air Service

Mechanics School for enlisted men; two Balloon Schools (one at Ross Field, Arcadia,

Calif., and one at Lee Hall, Va., with a course for enlisted balloon-mechanics authorized for each); and an Airship School (a course for enlisted balloon-mechanics also

authorized for this school). See ltr, TAG to Director of Air Service, 25 Feb 20.

19. Ibid.

20. Maj T. D. Milling, The Air Service Tactical School, Its Function and Operation. Sep 24

(in writer's possession). Although originally designated as the Field Officers' Course,

before the school opened in the fall of 1920, the name Field Officers' School was in

use. On 3 Apr 20, Brig Gen William Mitchell, in a letter to the commanding officer,

McCook Field, referred to "the Air Service Field Officers' School." See ltr, Mitchell to

CO McCook Field, 3 Apr 20, in 203.6 v.2, 1916-1947.

21. Ltr, C/AS to CO Langley Fid., 30 Oct 20; ltr, C/AS to Comdt. Air Service Schools,

Langley Fid., 15 Jun 21, and 1st ind thereto, Comdt. Air Service Schools to C/AS, 17

Jun 21; Army Register, 1921.

22. John D. Barker, History of the Air Corps Tactical School; Milling, The Air Service

Tactical School.

23. One source indicates that classroom instruction stopped "early in the spring"; others

indicate the classroom work continued until May. All agree that the school year was

cut short. See, Milling, The Air Service Tactical School; ltr and ind, cited in n. 19;

Barker, ACTS, pp. 5-6; Lt Col J. W. S. Wuest, History of Langley Fid., Va., 1916-31

Dec 29, p. 16.

24. Barker, Hist. ACTS, pp. 45.

Chapter 2

1. Ltr, OCAS to Capt T. D. Milling, 21 Feb 21, in 248.192, 1921; ltr, Milling to Comdt., 20

Jun 23.

2. John D. Barker, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, p. 7; Wuest, History of

Langley FId., p. 21; Milling, The Air Service Tactical School. Official change of the

name was reported in AR 350-105, 8 Nov 22 and OCAS Cir. 101, 20 Nov 22.

3. These changes were incorporated in a course of instruction drawn up by a War

Department board appointed to prepare programs of instruction for the general and

special service schools. The board was composed of representatives from the General

Staff, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, and Air Service. Maj William C.

Sherman, assistant to the officer in charge, ASFOS, represented the Air Service. See

Report of Board of Officers Appointed to Prepare Programs of Instruction for the

General and Special Service Schools, n.d., in 248.122-7.

4. Ibid. The course of instruction approved by the War Department was for the Air

Service Tactical School, not Air Service Field Officers' School. Interestingly a course in

equitation was added, because "every officer of the Army is a potential commander or

staff officer...." See ltr, Earl L. Naiden to Asst. Comdt, ASTS, 30 Jun 24.

5. Rpt cited in n. 3.

88
NOTES

6. Ltr, TAG to Chief of all WD Branches and Bureaus and others, AG 352.01 (7-17-23

and 7-19-23) (Misc.) M-C, subj. Program of Instruction of Air Service Special Service

Schools, 24 Aug 23, in 248.192; ltr, T. D. Milling to Comdt. ASTS, 30 Jun 23, in 245.111.

7. As long as the school remained at Langley, having the post commander be the school

commander caused considerable confusion, since school matters were frequently

handled by the post adjutant, or in the office of the commanding officer, without

reference to the school proper. See ltrs, Earl L. Naiden to Asst. Comdt. ASTS, 30 Jun

24; T. D. Milling to Comdt. ASTS, 30 Jun 24; OCAS to Comdt. ASTS, 27 Aug 24, all in

245.111, 1923-24; memo for Comdt. ASTS from T. D. Milling, 20 Jun 24, in 248.12602;

Wuest, History of Langley Field.

8. Ltr, Milling to Comdt. ASTS, 30 Jun 24, in 245.111.

9. Annual Rpts, ACTS, 1921-40, in 245.111; The Air Corps Tactical School, an unsigned

and undated brief history of the school from 1920 through 1940, in 245.01B; A History

of Maxwell Field, 20 Feb 1910-31 Dec 1938 (in a History of Maxwell Field, Third

Installment, Appendixes I and It, in 286.263, Vol. III), 571-72.

10. Ltr, H. F. Rouse, librarian to officer in charge, 30 Jun 23, in 245.111. See also Books

and Publications on File in Field Officers; School Library, 1 Feb 21, in 248.161.

11. Ltr, Naiden to Comdt., 23 Jun 26.

12. 1st ind (ltr, C/AS to Comdt., Air Service Schools, 15 Jun 21) Comdt. to C/AS, 17 Jun

21.

13. Ltr, Earl L. Maiden to Comdt., 26 Jun 26, in 245.111.

14. History, Langley Fld., Inception to 1 March 35; 1st ind (ltr, ODAS to Comdt., Air

Service Schools, 15 Jun 21) Comdt. to C/AS, 17 Jun 21. See also, ltr, Lt Col C. C.

Culver to C/AC, 30 June 29.

15. Quoted in History of the Army Air Forces Board, Pt. I, p. 1, in 246.6-1.

16. Ltr, Comdt. to C/AS, 30 Jun 24.

17. OCAS stated in 1924 that "the first and ... most important duty of the Board is the

preparation of Air Service Correspondence Courses and Training Regulations which

are used as texts in these courses. For the purpose of accomplishing the correspondence school work, a Correspondence Section will be formed within the Board.... (See

ltr, Maj W. G. Kilner, exec. OCAS to CG Langley Fld., 15 Sep 24; OCAS Personnel

Orders 28, 15 Sep 24; Memo for Lt Burt from Maj 0. Westover, 17 Sep 24, all in

3-2580-3. See also, ltr, Maj 0. Westover to C/AS, 14 Jul 24, in 245.111; Hist. AAF

Board, Pt. I, pp. 1-2).

18. Ltrs, Earl L. Naiden to Asst. Comdt., 30 Jun 24; T. D. Milling to Comdt., 30 Jun 24;

Comdt. ASTS to C/AS, 30 Jun 24, all in 245.111, 1923-24.

19. Ltr, OCAS to Comdt., ASTS, 27 Aug 24, in 245.111.

20. Ltrs, Maj Earl L. Naiden to Comdt., 30 Jun 25; Maj W. H. Frank to Comdt., 30 Jun 30,

both in 245.111. In his Annual Report of the year before, Major Frank had pointed out

that "The number of instructors required depends not so much on the size of the

student body as upon the amount of instruction to be given, the number of problems to

be prepared, and most of all upon the amount of work and research necessary for

preparation of courses." (See ltr, Frank to Comdt., 26 Jun 29, in 245.111.)

21. Ltr, Milling to Comdt., 30 Jun 24, in 245.111.

22. Ltr, Naiden to Comdt., 30 Jun 25, in 245.111.

23. Annual Rpts, ACTS, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, in 245.111.

24. Annual Rpt C/AS for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 Jun 21, 4 Oct 21, p. 17.

25. Ltr, Frank to Comdt., 30 Jun 27, in 245.111.

26. Interestingly, the chapter on attack aviation was reviewed and amended in certain

particulars by Maj G. C. Marshall, Jr., Infantry. (See ltr, Marshall to Maj William C.

Sherman, 20 Jan 22, in 248.101-4A Draft).

27. See lecture, Aeronautical Engineering by Prof. F. H. Norton, NACA presented during

the Engineering course, Air Service Field Officers' School in 1922, in 248.2002-3, 1922.

28. Ltrs, Naiden to Asst. Comdt., 30 Jun 24; Comdt., ASTS, to C/AS, 10 Feb 24; and WD

[probably TAG to C/AS], 13 May 25, cited in htr, Naiden to Comdt., ASTS, 30 Jun 25.

89
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

29. Milling, The Air Service Tactical School; Barker, Hist. ACTS, p. 9; ltr, Comdt. to

C/AS, 30 Jun 24.

30. See Annual Rpts, Comdt., Asst. Comdt., and Direc. of Instr., ASTS, 1923-31, in

245.111.

31. Ltrs, Maj W. H. Frank, Asst. Comdt., to Comdt., ACTS, 30 Jun 30; Maj John F. Curry,

Asst. Comdt. to Comdt. ACTS, 30 Jun 31, in 245.111.

32. Ltrs, Earl L. Naiden to Comdt., 30 Jun 25 and 23 Jun 26, both in 245.111.

33. Annual Rpt, ACTS, 1928, in 245.111.

34. Annual Rpt, ACTS, 1930, in 245.111.

35. Ltr, Maj John F. Curry, Asst. Comdt. to Comdt. ACTS, 30 Jun 31, in 245.111.

36. School authorities objected because 1) the fog on New York harbor would make flying

impossible during more than half the winter; 2) flying was made hazardous by real

estate developments on three sides of the field and by Rariton Bay on the fourth side;

3) no suitable site for a bombing and gunnery range existed in the vicinity; 4) there

were no Air Corps tactical units nearby with which the school could cooperate in

carrying out its tactical instruction; 5) construction estimated in the neighborhood of

$500,000 would be required to provide facilities for the school and its equipment. (See

Itrs, OCAC to Comdt. ACTS, 15 Aug 27; OCAC to Comdt. ACTS, 21 Jun 28, and 1st

ind thereto, ACTS to OCAC, 26 Jun 28, all in 248.12606, 1927-31.)

37. The exact date on which Maxwell Field was chosen as the new site for the school has

not been determined. Hist. Maxwell Fld., 20 Feb 10-31 Dec 38, states that the decision

was made in 1929. This obviously is in error, for in Dec 28 Maj Walter R. Weaver,

commanding officer at Maxwell, wrote Maj Walter H. Frank at the school at Langley:

"I believe with some money you could patch things up around here so as to move in

this summer." (See ltr, Weaver to Frank, 17 Dec 28, in 248.12606, 1927-31). Moreover

on 18 Jan 29 OCAC appointed a board of officers to take "the necessary steps to

arrange for the donation of additional ground required for the Air Corps Tactical

School at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama." (See OCAC Personnel Orders 15, 18

Jan 29, in 248.12606.) Untitled and undated report of Board Appointed by OCAC

Personnel Orders 15, 18 Jan 29, sgd Majs Frank M. Kennedy and Walter R. Weaver

and Capt W. D. Farthing; ltrs, OCAC to CG ACTS, 15 Jul 30; Walter EWeaver] to Jack

[Maj John F. Curry], 3 Apr 31, all in 248.12606. Apparently the tract amounted to 737

acres. See A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938, p. 512.

39. In Dec 28 Major Weaver wrote Major Frank at Langley that there was one large

building with approximately 70,000 square feet of floor space, the aero repair building,

which although in a dangerous condition "could be jacked up" and be repaired.

Another building, formerly an enlisted men's club, with 5,000 square feet of floor space

was available as were "five vacant hangars, two vacant Barracks, and one vacant Mess

Hall." Major Weaver conceded, however, that "it would be very much better if funds

could be secured and new buildings put up." (See Itr, Maj Walter Weaver to Maj W. H.

Frank, 17 Dec 1928, in 248.12606.)

40. WD Bul. 5, 3 Apr 1930.

41. Maj Walter R. Weaver, commanding officer at Maxwell, and Maj John F. Curry,

assistant commandant of the school at Langley and who was to become commanding

officer of Maxwell and commandant when the school moved, during 1929-1931 carried

on steady correspondence regarding both the construction program and the layout of

the field. A file containing many of these letters, as well as many others dealing with

construction at Maxwell for the school is in 248.12606, 1927-31. See also A History of

Maxwell Field, 1910-38; ltr, OCAC to CO ACTS, 15 Jul 30.

42. See correspondence and papers relating to the Maxwell construction program in

248.12606 and A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-38.

43. See n. 41.

44. Ltr, Lt Col C. C. Culver to C/AS, 19 Apr 29, in 248.12606; Annual Rpt of the C/AC,

1929, 19 Aug 29, p. 42; Itr, Lt Col C. C. Culver to C/AC, 30 Jun 29, in 245.111.

45. Ltrs, TAG to CG 3d Corps Area, 15 Apr 31, and TAG to CG 4th Corps Area, 15 Apr

31; A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-38; Wuest, Hist. Langley FId.

90
NOTES

Chapter 3

1. A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938, pp. 555-66.

2. Annual Rpts, ACTS, 1929 through 1941, in 245.111; Geraldine V. Carlisle, The Air

Corps Tactical School Library, Maxwell Field, Alabama, paper read before the

Alabama State Library Association at Birmingham, Ala., 27 April 1934, in 248.111.

3. In the summer of 1935 a bombing and gunnery range was established near Valparaiso,

Florida. Each autumn thereafter, through 1939, the entire student body spent two or

more weekends at the range to engage in bombing and gunnery exercises. For the next

three years the students spent an entire week in April or May at the range to carry out

exercises which included field training in the courses on staff duties and navigation.

Ltr, Lt Col Win. Ord Ryan to CG 4th Corps Area, 17 Jun 35, and 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th

inds, in 145.91-367; A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938, pp. 166-67; Annual Rpts,

ACTS, 1936-39.

4. Memo for C/AC from Lt Col J. E. Chaney, 21 Oct 32; memo for C/Plans Div. from

Maj W. H. Frank, C/Sec. III, Plans Div., 16 Mar 33; memo for AC/AC from Maj. A.

N. Duncan, 13 Feb 1933; memo for AC/AC from Lt Col Chaney, C/Plans Div., 20

Mar 33, all in 145.91-409.

5. Memo for The Commandant from Maj Hume Peabody, 1-3 Oct 34, in 3-2565-48.

6. Final Report of War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps, pp. 44-72.

7. Ltr, TAG to C/AC, 14 Aug 34, in 145.91-409.

8. Ltr, TAG to C/AC, 28 Sep 34, in 145.91-409.

9. Hist. AAF Bd, Pt. I, p. 5; A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938, p. 79.

10. Ltr, TAG to CAC, 28 Sep 34, and 1st ind thereto, C/AC to TAG, 15 Nov 34; ltr, Lt Col

John F. Curry to OCAC, 5 Feb 35; 1st ind (ltr, Brig Gen F. M. Andrews to OCAC, 25

Apr 35), OCAC to CG GHQ Air Force, 4 May 35; Memo for Gen Westover from Col

A. G. Fisher, 5 Oct 36, all in 3-2565-52; WD Special Orders 58, 11 Mar 35, in

3-25803; ltr, Lt Col John F. Curry to Chief of Air Corps, n.d., and 1st ind OCAC to the

President, Air Corps Board, 13 Mar 35, in 3-2565-48.

11. Memo for C/AC from Col Arthur G. Fisher, C/Plans, 24 Aug 34; ltr, TAG to C/AC,

28 May 35, with 2d wrapper ind, Pres., ACB to C/AC, 2 Jun 35, and 1st ind, OCAC to

TAG, 10 Jun 35, all in 145.91-409.

12. Memo for C/Plans Div. from Maj R. C. Candee, 6 Mar 35, in 145.91-409.

13. Hist, AAF Board, Pt. I, pp. 58, Pt. II, p. 4; A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938, pp.

579-91.

14. Monthly Status of Studies of the Air Corps Board, Jan 36 through May 40, in 167.5. For

files of correspondence and papers concerning Study No. 3, see 167.5-3 and 167.5-3A.

For another valuable collection dealing with the Air Corps Board, see 145.91-409.

15. R & R, H. H. Arnold to C/Plans Sec., 20 Feb 39; memo for C/AC from Lt Col Hume

Peabody, acts. C/Plans Sec., 6 Mar 39, both in 145.91-328.

16. Ltr, TAG to Comdt. ACTS, 20 Jul 39; memo for Gen W. R. Weaver from Col Edgar P.

Sorensen, 11 Dec 40. Both of these documents are in 145.91-328, which is an extensive

file on the creation of the 23rd Composite Group. See also History of Maxwell Field, 1

Jan 39-Dec 41, pp. 60-69, for a brief account of the group while it was stationed at

Maxwell Field.

17. Annual Rpts, ACTS, 1921 through 1940, in 245.111; ltrs, Maj Vernon G. Olsmith to

C/Inf., 2 Jun 34; Maj L. B. Glasgow to C/Inf., 15 Jun 36, both in 245.111.

18. Ltrs, Curry to Comdt. AWC, 17 Feb 33; Maj Gen G. S. Simonds, Comdt. AWC to

Comdt. ACTS, 26 Jun 33; Curry to C/AC, 13 Jul 33; OCAC to Comdt. ACTS, 17 Apr

34," all in 248.12601, 1933.

19. Program of Instruction for the ACTS for the Years 1931-1932 through 1939-1940, in

248.192; ltr, Lt Col Donald Wilson to Asst. Comdt., 20 Jan 38, in 248.12601.

20. Ltr, Lt Col John F. Curry to TAG, 22 May 34.

21. ACTS Instructors Memo 3, 19 Sep. 33, and 1 Jul 34.

22. ACTS Instructors Memo 10, 12 Feb 35; ACTS School Order 1, 1 Jul 34; School Order

No. 1, n.d.

91
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

23. ACTS School Order 6, 29 Mar 35; ACTS School Order 2 (Rev.) 10 Oct 35.

24. Memo for Director Dept of AT& S from Lt Col H. A. Dargue, 20 Jun 36; ltr, All

Instructors from Harold L. George, n.d., both in 248.126, 1935-36.

25. The Air Corps Tactical School [1920-1940] in 245.01B; ACTS School Order 2 (Rev.),

10 Oct 35; memo for Dept. of Air Tactics and Strategy from Lt Col H. A. Dargue, 28

Sep 35, in 248.126, 1935-36.

26. The Air Corps Tactical School [1920-1940]; Brig Gen H. C. Pratt, "Air Tactics," in

Western Flying, Jan 38, quoted in A History of Maxwell Field, 1910-1938.

27. The Air Corps Tactical School (As Seen by an Air Corps Student), in Air Corps News

Letter, 15 Apr 36.

28. Ltr, Lt Col John F. Curry to TAG, 11 Jul 33.

29. Ltr, Brig Gen H. C. Pratt to TAG, 11 Jun 38, in 245.111.

30. Annual Rpts of the various commandants, 1920-40, in 245.111; ACTS School Orders 2

(Rev.), 10 Oct 35; 4, 15 Feb 35, 1, 1 Jul 36, 1, 1 Jul 37, 2, 16 Apr 37, 1 Jul 38, I-A, 20

Sep 38, 4, 19 Jun 39, 6, 8 Jan 40, all in 248.125.

31. Annual Rpts of the various commandants of the Tactical School, 1920-40, in 245.111.

32. Ira C. Eaker, "The Air Corps Tactical School (As Seen by an Air Corps Student)" in

Air Corps News Letter, 15 Apr 36; Annual Rpts of the various commandants, 1934-40.

33. "The School Situation for Air Corps Officers," in Air Corps News Letter, 1 Sep 35;

interview with Brig Gen Hume Peabody, USAF Ret. by writer, 25 Mar 54.

34. Maj M. F. Lindsey, Inf., "A Doughboy at an Air Corps School," in Air Corps News

Letter, 15 Apr 36.

Chapter 4

1. WDTR 440-15, 15 Oct 1935.

2. Draft, interview with Brig Gen Laurence S. Kuter by Maj C. W. Williams, 21 Oct 42, in

101-10A.

3. General Hansell also noted that the translation of Douhet at the school was of little

value, since it was a poor translation from French. Interview with Maj Gen Haywood S.

Hansell, Ret., by author, 5 Feb 54. See also Air Historical Study 89, Development of

Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941.

4. ACTS Lecture, An Inquiry into the Subject of "War," 1935, in 248.11-9.

5. Air Service Field Officer School, Training Regulations No. 440-15, Air Tactics, 1922,

sec. 2, pp. 7-8.

6. kbid.

7. Ltrs, Col R. M. Goolrick to CG IX Corps, 25 Feb 41 and 17 Mar 41, 145.91-303.

8. ASFOS TR 440-15, 1922, passim.

9. kbid.; ASTS, Bombardment, 1924-1925, pp. 76-77; ACTS, Bombardment, 1925-1926.

10. ASFOS TR 440-15, 1922, sec. 2, pp. 4-7.

11. kbid., p. 8.

12. ACTS, Employment of Combined Air Force, 1926.

13. kbid., p. 13.

14. Ibid., pp. 91-1, 23-24.

15. ACTS, The Air Force, 1930, pp. 23-26.

16. kbid.

17. Air Historical Study 89, Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941,

p. 207.

18. ACTS, Air Force Principles, 1933-1934, in 248.21015A-1; Testimony presented by

Major Wilson, et al, before the Federal Aviation Commission, Wash., D. C., nd in

248.121-3.

19. ACTS, Bombardment, 1926 and 1931; ACTS, The Air Force, 1931; ACTS, Lecture, Air

Force, 1932-1933, in 248.2014A-3.

92
NOTES

20. ACTS, Bombardment, Feb 31, p. 26.

21. ACTS, Bombardment, p. 70.

22. Ibid., p. 25.

23. A Brief of Testimony Presented by Capt Harold L. George, Air Corps, United States

Army, to the Federal Aviation Commission, pp. 2, 7, in 248.121-3.

24. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War 11, 1 (Chicago,

1948), 65-66.

25. ACTS, Bombardment, Feb 31, pp. 13-14.

26. AHS-89, p. 146.

27. For a detailed account of the problem, see AHS-6, The Development of the Heavy

Bomber, 1918-1944.

28. TR 440-15, 15 Oct 35.

29. Ltr, OCAC to TAG, 18 Jun 38, and 1st ind thereto, TAG to C/AC, 16 Jun 38, in

145.95-116.

30. FM 1-5, p. 29.

31. AHS-89, pp. 206-7.

32. Memo for Asst. C/S G-1 and others from Brig Gen Charles E. Kilbourne, AC/S

WPD, 21 Dec 34, w/incl., Doctrines of Army Air Corps; A Study of Proposed Air

Corps Doctrine, Made by the Air Corps Tactical School, Based Upon Information

Furnished by the War Plans Division, General Staff, in memo, dtd 21 Dec 34, 31 Jan

35, in 145.93-116.

33. ACTS, Lecture-The Air Force, General, p. i, in The Air Force, 1934-1935, in

248.101-1.

34. ACTS, Air Force, Counter Air Force Operations, 1934-1935, p. 1.

35. Ibid., pp. 3-4; Memo for Col Harmon from Lt Col Wilson, 1 May 39, w/attached

comments, in 248.282-21.

36. Maj Muir S. Fairchild, Primary Strategic Objectives of Air Forces, Lecture, Air Force

Course, 11 Apr 39, in 248.2020A-14.

37. Ibid.

38. ACTS, Instructor's Memo 6, 21 Nov 33. See also ACTS Pursuit texts for 1926, 1929,

and 1933.

39. Ltr, Harmon to Brig Gen B. K. Yount, 25 Nov 39, in 145.91-456.

40. Ltr, Curry to C/AC, 14 Jul 33, in 2015A-6.

41. Ibid.

42. Quoted in AHS-89, p. 150.

43. Interview by the author with Maj Gen Donald Wilson, USAF Ret, and Maj Gen H. S.

Hansell, Jr, USAF Ret; ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, 1937, 1938, 1939; memo for Col

Harmon from Lt Col Wilson, 1 May 39, w/attached comments, 248.282-21.

44. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Oct 37, p 65. The same statement is repeated in the Pursuit

texts dated Oct 38 and Sep 39.

45. Ltr, Harmon to Yount, 25 Nov 39.

Chapter 5

1. Report of the Air Corps Tactical School on Plans for the Conduct of a Special

Abbreviated Course for the Regular Air Corps Officers over 32 Years of Age Who

Have Not Attended the Air Corps Tactical School, 8 Nov 38, in 248.121-4B.

2. Ibid.; memo for Col Harmon from Col Donald Wilson, 23 Mar 39, in 248.121-4B.

3. Memo for Harmon from Wilson, 23 Mar 39.

4. Memo for Commandant ACTS from Col M. F. Harmon, 26 Jul 39, in 248.121-4B; ltr,

Col W. R. Weaver to TAG, 5 Jul 40, in 245.111.

5. ACTS School Order 4, 19 Jun 39; Program of Instruction for ACTS, 1939-1940, 14 Jul

39. For comparison with long course curriculum see Program of Instruction for ACTS,

1937-1938, all in 248.192-40.

93
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

6. 1st ind (basic ltr unidentified) Comdt. ACTS to OCAC, 25 Jan 39, w/incl, Study on

Reduction of Activities of the Air Corps Tactical School During Period of Proposed

Air Corps Expansion, in 248.121-4B.

7. Ltr, Lt Col Ira C. Eaker, OCAC to Comdt. ACTS, 13 Jun 40.

8. Ltr, Brig Gen Davenport Johnson, C/T & 0 Div to CG Southeast Air Corps Training

Center, 26 Jun 41.

9. Study on Reopening of the ACTS and the Establishment of a Course of Instruction for

Junior Officers to be Called The Basic Course, Air Force Tactical School, 29 Jul 41.

10. Ltr, Green to TAG, 30 Jun 42, in 245.111.

11. Ltr, Curry to C/AC, 8 Apr 32, in 248.12601, 1932.

94
Appendices
Appendix 1

Air Corps Tactical School

1936

Commandant

Col A. d. Fisher

I

Asst. Commandant

Col H. A. Dargue

Library Committee Administration Section Schedule Committee

Major L B. Glasgow Lt. Col' W. N. Porter

Major F. W. Evans Secretary Lt Col *D. Wilson

Capt P. Birnn Capt. J. B. Haddon Major E H. DeFord

Capt. J. E. Parker Major G. Gardner

Capt. J. B. Haddon Capt. J. B. Haddon

Book Dept. Council aditing Committee

Major F. von H Kbmble Lt. Col. W. N. Porter

CatL2 hrnBook Dept. Lt. Cl .Wlo Capt. L. Eo Sham . l BokReproution LD Wlo

pst I H. S. Hanserl Reproduction Major E. H. DeFord Supply Major G. Gardner

Dept. of Air Tactics and Sbtraeg Dept of Comstassd, Staff& A:sie Dept. of Flying Dept. of Groud Tactics

Director Lt Col D. Wilson Director Major E. H. DeFord Director Major G. Gardner Director Lt. Col. W. N. Poter

AIR FORCE SECTION COMBAT ORDERS SECTION PRACTICAL FLYING SECTION ANTIAIRCRAFT SECTION

Chi Capt. R.M. Webster Chief Major F. vo Kimble Chief. CapL J.E. Parker Chief MajorF.G.Epling

ine loo t lt . S. Haml lost Capt tit S. Vandenbers lint Capt R. F. Stearey

ATTACK SECTION COMMUNICATIONS SECTION AIR NAVIGATION SECTION CAVALRY SECTION

Chief Major L A. Soith Chief. MajorG. Gardner Chier. Major G. Gardner Chief. Major R. L Creed

hot Capt. I F. Sterley Inst. Capt M. T. Hardnr Capt. ot Parker M. 1L 

BOMBARDMENT SECTION lnst: Capt K p.uT. awk- MEtEOROLOGY SECTION CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION

Chiefot IA.LN S, Kuer LOGISTICSSECTION Chief CaptG M. T. a•dTI Chief, LtCol. W.N. Porter

ost lot Lt. IS. Hantse Chirf Major A. W..Mortenstet

OBSERVATION SECON lot Capt. LA. Sharon COMBINED ARMS SECTION

ChTief MajorF.W. Evans MILITARYp ITELUGENCE Chief EL Cot. W. N. Poster

loot Capt M E. GatnE SECTION

PURSU•T•t CTION Chire Major E. K DeFord FIELD ARTILLERY SECTION

ief. Capt. . K Parker hint. Capt K Eir EXTENSIONCOURSE Chirf Major KL H RiatoN

lot Capt K S. Vandenberg STAFF DUTIES SECTION NAVAL OPERATIONS Chief Capt IL Bisn INFANTRY SECTION

SECTION hite Major H. DeFord EXTENSION COURSE SECTION Cdef. Major L & Glasgow Chirf Col. K A. D"'u Chief Major B. T. Burt

but Major F. von H. Kimboe

o Post Officer not asigned to Staff and Faculty
Appendix 2

Staff and Faculty, Air Corps Tactical School,

1920-1942

1920-1921*

Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling, AS, Officer in Charge

Maj. William C. Sherman, AS, Assistant to Officer in Charge

Capt. Gerald E. Brower, AS, School Adjutant

Maj. Davenport Johnson, AS, Director

Maj. Joseph T. McNarney, AS, Director

Maj. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., AS, Director

Capt. Harry C. Drayton, AS, Commanding School Detachment

1st Lt. George C. McDonald, AS, Duty with School Detachment

1st Lt. Jacob M. Woodard, AS, Armament Officer

1921-1922

Lt. Col. Charles H. Danforth, AS, Commandant

Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling, AS, Officer in Charge

1st Lt. Harold R. Rouse, AS, Adjutant

Maj. William C. Sherman, AS, Director

Maj. John H. Jouett, AS, Instructor

Capt. Louis R. Knight, AS, Instructor

Capt. Joseph T. McNarney, AS, Instructor

* In only a few instances do available sources for the period 1920-1934 designate specific

instructors for a course. It is known, for example, that McNarney taught observation, Kenney

taught the Attack course, Bissell Pursuit, and Walker taught Bombardment. But because so

few of the specific assignments are known, no attempt is made here to designate particular

fields of interest for the instructors for this period.

99
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

1922-1923

Lt. Col. Charles H. Danforth, AS, Commandant

Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling, AS, Officer in Charge

1st. Lt. Harold R. Rouse, AS, Adjutant

Maj. William C. Sherman, AS, Director

Maj. John H. Jouett, AS, Instructor

Capt. Louis R. Knight, AS, Instructor

Capt. Joseph T. McNarney, AS, Instructor

Capt. Arthur R. Brooks, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Floyd N. Shumaker, AS, Instructor

1923-1924

Lt. Col. Charles H. Danforth, AS, Commandant

Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling, AS, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. Harold R. Rouse, AS, Secretary.

Capt. Earl L. Naiden, AS, Director of Instruction

Maj. John H. Jouett, AS, Instructor (until 10 March 1924)

Maj. Joseph T. McNarney, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Horace N. Heisen, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Walter J. Reed, AS, Instructor (reported on 17 March 1924)

1st Lt. Harvey W. Cook, AS, Instructor

1924-1925

Lt. Col. Harry Graham, AS, Commandant (until 11 September 1924)

Maj. Oscar Westover, AS, Commandant

Maj.Thomas DeW. Milling, AS, Assistant Commandant (until 18 June

1925) (Attached Hqs. 2d Wing from 9 January 1925)

1st Lt. Harold F. Rouse, AS, Adjutant and Secretary (Attached 50th

Observation Squadron from 3 Dec. 1924)

Capt. Horace N. Heisen, AS, Detachment Commander (Attached 58th

Service Squadron)

Maj. Earl L. Naiden, AS, Director of Instruction

Maj. Lewis H. Brereton, AS, Instructor (from 16 September 1924 to 15

June 1925)

Maj. Joseph T. McNarney, AS, Instructor (attached Hqs. 2d Wing from

1 March 1925)

Maj. Edwin B. Lyon, AS, Instructor

Capt. Harvey W. Cook, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Walter J. Reed, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles B. Austin, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Rex K. Stoner, AS, Instructor (attached 50th Observation

Squadron)

100
APPENDIX 2

1925-1926

Maj. Oscar Westover, AS, Commandant

Maj. Earl L. Naiden, AS, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. Edwin J. House, AS, Secretary

Maj. Henry W. Harms, AS, Instructor

Maj. Edwin B. Lyon, AS, Instructor

Capt. Francis M. Brady, AS, Instructor

Capt. Harvey W. Cook, AS, Instructor

Capt. William W. Wise, CWS, Instructor

1st Lt. Walter J. Reed, AS, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles B. Austin, AS, Instructor

1926-1927

Lt. Col. Clarence C. Culver, AC, Commandant

Maj. Walter H. Frank, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Edwin J. House, AS, Secretary

Maj. Courtney Hodges, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Davenport Johnson, AC, Instructor

Maj. Francis T. Armstrong, FA, Instructor

Maj. Spencer B. Akin, SC, Instructor

Maj. John D. Kelly, Cav, Instructor

Capt. Francis M. Brady, AC, Instructor

Capt. Laurence F. Stone, AC, Instructor

Capt. William W. Wise, CWS, Instructor

1st Lt. Clayton Bissell, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles B. Austin, AC, Instructor

1927-1928

Lt. Col. Clarence C. Culver, AC, Commandant

Maj. Walter H. Frank, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Edwin J. House, AC, Secretary

Maj. Davenport Johnson, AC, Instructor

Maj. Michael F. Davis, AC, Instructor

Maj. Francis T. Armstrong, FA, Instructor

Maj. Howell M. Estes, Cav, Instructor

Maj. Courtney Hodges, Inf, Instructor

Capt. George C. Kenney, AC, Instructor

Capt. Laurence F. Stone, AC, Instructor

Capt. William W. Wise, CWS, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles B. Austin, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Clayton Bissell, AC, Instructor

Capt. Francis M. Brady, AC, Instructor

101
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

1928-1929

Lt. Col. Clarence C. Culver, AC, Commandant

Maj. Walter H. Frank, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Edwin J. House, AC, Secretary

Maj. Follett Bradley, AC, Director

Maj. Francis T. Armstrong, FA, Instructor

Maj. Robert C. Candee, AC, Instructor

Maj. Courtney Hodges, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Michael F. Davis, AC, Instructor

Capt. George C. Kenney, AC, Instructor

Capt. Daniel S. Seaton, AC, Instructor

Capt. Robert Olds, AC, Instructor

Capt. William W. Wise, CWS, Instructor

Capt. Laurence F. Stone, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Clayton Bissell, AC, Instructor

1929-1930

Lt. Col. Jacob W. S. Wuest, AC, Commandant

Maj. Walter H. Frank, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. William V. Andrews, AC, Secretary

Maj. Follett Bradley, AC, Director of Instruction

Maj. Francis T. Armstrong, FA, Instructor

Maj. Robert C. Candee, AC, Instructor

Maj. Howell M. Estes, Cav, Instructor

Maj. Percy E. Van Nostrand, AC, Instructor

Maj. Lyman S. Frasier, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Vincent B. Dixon, AC, Instructor

Capt. George C. Kenney, AC, Instructor

Capt. Daniel S. Seaton, AC, Instructor

Capt. George H. Weems, AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles W. Walton, CWS, Instructor

Capt. Robert Olds, AC, Instructor

Capt. Donald Wilson, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Clayton Bissell, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles C. Chauncey, AC, Instructor

1930-1931

Lt. Col. Roy C. Kirtland, AC, Commandant

Maj. John F. Curry, AC, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. John D. Barker, AC, Secretary

Maj. Follett Bradley, AC, Director of Instruction

Maj. Francis T. Armstrong, FA, Instructor

102
APPENDIX 2

Maj. Lyman S. Frasier, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Percy F. Van Nostrand, AC, Instructor

Maj. Robert C. Candee, AC, Instructor

Maj. Howell M. Estes, Cav, Instructor

Capt. George H. Weems, Inf, Instructor

Capt. Daniel S. Seaton, AC, Instructor

Capt. George C. Kenney, AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles W. Walton, CWS, Instructor

Capt. Robert Olds, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Charles McK. Robinson, AC, Instructor

1931-1932

Lt. Col. John F. Curry, AC, Commandant

Maj. Hume Peabody, AC, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. John D. Barker, AC, Secretary

Maj. Vernon G. Olsmith, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Harry A. Flint, Cav, Instructor

Maj. Vernon E. Prichard, FA, Instructor

Maj. Robert C. Candee, AC, Instructor

Maj. Donald Wilson, AC, Instructor

Capt. George H. Weems, Inf, Instructor

Capt. Charles W. Walton, CWS, Instructor

Capt. David S. Seaton, AC, Instructor

Capt. Edmund W. Hill, AC, Instructor

Capt. Claire L. Chennault, AC, Instructor

Capt. James T. Curry, Jr., AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles McK. Robinson, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, AC, Instructor

1932-1933

Lt. Col. John F. Curry, AC, Commandant

Maj. Hume Peabody, AC, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. John D. Barker, AC, Secretary

Maj. Robert R. Welshmer, CAC, Instructor

Maj. Vernon G. Olsmith, Inf, Instructor

Maj. Harry A. Flint, Cav, Instructor

Maj. Vernon E. Prichard, FA, Instructor

Maj. Donald Wilson, AC, Instructor

Capt. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles W. Walton, CWS, Instructor

Capt. Edmund W. Hill, AC, Instructor

Capt. John I. Moore, AC, Instructor

103
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Capt. Claire L. Chennault, AC, Instructor

Capt. Arthur K. Ladd, AC, Instructor

Capt. James T. Curry, AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles McK. Robinson, AC, Instructor

Capt. Harold L. George, AC, Instructor

1st Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, AC, Instructor

1933-1934

Lt. Col. John F. Curry, Commandant

Maj. Hume Peabody, Assistant Commandant

1st Lt. John D. Barker, Secretary

Capt. James T. Curry, AC, Instructor

Maj. Vernon G. Oldsmith, AC, Instructor

Maj. Donald Wilson, AC, Instructor

Maj. George H. Weems, Inf, Instructor

Lt. Col. Robert R. Welshmer, CAC, Instructor

Maj. William N. Porter, AC, Instructor

Capt. Harold L. George, AC, Instructor

Capt. Grandison Gardner, AC, Instructor

Capt. Arthur K. Ladd, AC, Instructor

Capt. Edmund W. Hill, AC, Instructor

Capt. Charles McK. Robinson, AC, Instructor

Capt. Emil Kiel, AC, Instructor

Capt. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Instructor

Capt. Claire L. Chennault, AC, Instructor

Capt. John I. Moore, AC, Instructor

Capt. Odas Moon, AC, Instructor

Lt. Warren R. Carter, AC, Instructor

Capt. Walter G. Layman, AC, Instructor

Maj. Vernon E. Prichard, AC, Instructor

1934-1935"

School Staff

Col. John F. Curry, AC, Commandant

Lt. Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Julian B. Haddon, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

* Annual Reports of the School for the period 1934-1938 give complete listings of duty

assignments of staff and faculty.

104
APPENDIX 2

Instructors

Directors

Lt. Col. Harold L. George, AC, Department of Air Tactics

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Department of Basic and Special Instruction

Lt. Col. Vernon G. Olsmith, Inf, Department of Ground Tactics

Chiefs of Sections (Air)

Lt. Col. Harold L. George, AC, Air Force Section

Maj. Warren R. Carter, AC, Air Intelligence Section

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Attack Section

Maj. Odas Moon, AC, Bombardment Section

Maj. Frederick W. Evans, AC, Observation Section

Maj. Claire L. Chennault, AC, Pursuit Section

Maj. Raymond E. O'Neill, AC, Balloons and Airships Section

Maj. Austin M. Martenstein, AC, Logistics Section

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC Combat Orders Section

Maj. Emil C. Kiel, AC, Communications Section

Maj. John I. Moore, AC, Extension Course Section

Maj. Grandison Gardner, AC, Air Navigation Section

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Staff Duties Section

Maj. Warren R. Carter, AC, Practical Flying Section

Chiefs of Sections (Ground)

Lt. Col. Vernon G. Olsmith, Inf, Combined Arms Section

Lt. Col. Vernon G. Olsmith, Inf, Infantry Section

Maj. Richard L. Creed, Cav, Cavalry Section

Maj. Vernon E. Prichard, FA, Field Artillery Section

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWA, Chemical Warfare Section

Lt. Col. Robert R. Welshmer, CAC, Antiaircraft Section

Other Instructors

Capt. Robert M. Webster, AC, Air Force

Capt. Gordon P. Saville, AC, Maps and Photographs

The following instructors were transferred during the academic year: Capt.

Edmund W. Hill, AC; Maj. Arthur K. Ladd, AC; Maj. Eugene

L. Eubank, AC.

1935-1936

School Staff

Col. Arthur G. Fisher, AC, Commandant

Lt. Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Julian B. Haddon, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

105
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Instructors

Directors

Lt. Col. Harold L. George, AC, Department of Air Tactics and Strategy

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Department of Command, Staff and Logistics

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Department of Flying

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Department of Ground Tactics

Chiefs of Sections (Air)

Lt. Col. Harold L. George, AC, Air Force Section

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Attack Section

Maj. Odas Moon, AC (relieved 29 January 1936), Bombardment Section

Maj. Robert M. Webster, AC (appointed 7 March 1936), Bombardment

Section

Maj. Frederick W. Evans, AC, Observation Section

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC, Pursuit Section

Lt. Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Naval Operations Section

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Combat Orders Section

Maj. Emil C. Kiel, AC, Communications Section

Maj. Austin W. Martenstein, AC, Logistics Section

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Air Intelligence Section

Maj. Frederick I. Eglin, AC, Staff Duties Section

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Practical Flying Section

Maj. Grandison Gardner, AC, Air Navigation Section

Maj. John I. Moore, AC, Extension Course Section

Chiefs of Sections (Ground)

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Combined Arms Section

Maj. Lawrence B. Glasgow, Inf, Infantry Section

Maj. Richard L. Creed, Cav, Cavalry Section

Maj. Harold H. Ristine, FA, Field Artillery Section

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Chemical Warfare Section

Maj. Benjamin F. Harmon, CAC, Antiaircraft Section

Other Instructors

1st Lt. Haywood S. Hansell, AC, Air Force Section

1st Lt. Laurence S. Kuter, AC, Bombardment Section

Capt Gordon P. Saville, AC, Maps and Photographs*

Capt Milton T. Hankins, SC, Meteorology*

Maj. Claire L. Chennault, AC, Pursuit Section*

* Not assigned to Staff and Faculty. Due to shortage of instructors it was necessary to

utilize the services of these post officers.

106
APPENDIX 2

1936-1937

School Staff

Col. Arthur G. Fisher, AC, Commandant (from 1 September 1936 to 5

March 1937)

Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt, USA, Commandant (reported: 14 March

1937)

1st Lt. Dwight B. Schannep, AC, Aide-de-Camp (reported: 25 March

1937)

Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Assistant Commandant

Capt. Julian B. Haddon, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

Instructors

Directors

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, AC, Department of Air Tactics and Strategy

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Department of Command, Staff and Logistics

Maj. Grandison Gardner, AC, Department of Flying

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Department of Ground Tactics

Chiefs of Sections (Air)

Capt. Robert M. Webster, AC, Air Force Section

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Attack Section

1st Lt. Laurence S. Kuter, AC, Bombardment Section

Maj. Frederick W. Evans, AC, Observation Section

Capt. James E. Parker, AC, Pursuit Section

Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Naval Operations Section

Maj. Grandison Gardner, AC, Communications Section

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC, Combat Orders Section

Maj. Austin W. Martenstein, AC, Logistics Section

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Military Intelligence Section

Capt. Roland Birnn, AC, Staff Duties Section

Capt. James E. Parker, AC, Practical Flying Section

Maj. Grandison Gardner, AC, Air Navigation Section

Capt Milton T. Hankins, SC, Meteorological Section*

Maj. Byron T. Burt, AC, Extension Course Section

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Combined Arms Section

Maj. Lawrence B. Glasgow, Inf, Infantry Section

Maj. Richard L. Creed, Cav, Cavalry Section

Maj. Harold H. Ristine, FA, Field Artillery Section

Post officer not assigned to staff or faculty.

107
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Lt. Col. William N. Porter, CWS, Chemical Warfare Section

Maj. Fenton G. Epling, CAC, Antiaircraft Section

Other Instructors

1st Lt. Haywood S. Hansell, AC, Air Force Section

Capt. Ralph F. Stearley, AC, Attack Section

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC, Observation Section

Capt. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, AC, Pursuit Section

Lt. Bennett W. Wright, USN, Naval Operations Section

Maj. Leon E. Sharon, AC, Logistics Section

1937-1938

School Staff

Brig. Gen. Henry C. Pratt, USA, Commandant

1st Lt. Dwight B. Schannep, AC, Aide-de-camp

Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Assistant Commandant

Maj. Harland W. Holden, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

Instructors

Directors

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, AC, Department of Air Tactics and Strategy

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Department of Command, Staff and Logistics

Lt. Col. Charles P. Hall, Inf, Department of Ground Tactics

Chiefs of Sections (Air)

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, AC, Air Force Section

Maj. Lotha A. Smith, AC, Attack Section

Capt. R. A. Snavely, AC, Bombardment Section

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC, Observation Section

Capt. James E. Parker, AC, Pursuit Section

Lt. Comdr. M. R. Browning, USN, Naval Operations Section

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC, Combat Orders Section

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Communications Section

Maj. Leon E. Sharon, AC, Logistics Section

Maj. Earl H. DeFord, AC, Military Intelligence Section

Capt. Roland Birnn, AC, Staff Duties Section

Capt. Ralph A. Snavely, AC, Air Navigation Section

Capt. Benjamin Stern, SC, Meteorological Section*

Maj. Byron T. Burt, AC, Extension Course Section

* Post officer not assigned to staff or faculty.

108
APPENDIX 2

Chiefs of Sections (Ground)

Lt. Col. Charles P. Hall, Inf, Combined Arms Section

Maj. Lawrence B. Glasgow, Inf, Infantry Section

Maj. Richard L. Creed, Cav, Cavalry Section

Maj. Harold H. Ristine, FA, Field Artillery Section

Maj. Alden H. Waitt, Inf, Chemical Warfare Section

Maj. Fenton G. Epling, CWS, Antiaircraft Section

Other Instructors

1st Lt. Haywood S. Hansell, AC, Air Force Section

Capt. Ralph F. Stearley, AC, Attack Section

Capt. Augustine F. Shea, AC, Observation Section

Capt. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, AC, Pursuit Section

Col. Herbert A. Dargue, AC, Naval Operations

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC

Maj. Charles E. Thomas, AC, Logistics Section

Maj. Harland W. Holden, AC, Staff Duties Section

Capt. Robert C. Oliver, AC, Extension Course Section

1938-1939

School Staff

Col. Albert L. Sneed, AC, Acting Commandant (from 19 September

1938 to 21 November 1938)

Col. Millard F. Harmon, AC, Commandant (from 22 November 1938 to

31 March 1939)

Col. Walter R. Weaver, AC, Commandant (from 1 April 1939)

Col. Millard F. Harmon, AC, Assistant Commandant (from 1 April

1939)

Maj. Harland W. Holden, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

Col. Millard F. Harmon, AC, Assistant Commandant (from 19 September 1938 to 21 November 1938 and from 1 April 1939)

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, AC, Assistant Commandant (from 22 November

1938 to 31 March 1939)

Maj. Harland W. Holden, AC, Secretary and Officer Librarian

Instructors

Department of Air Tactics and Strategy

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, AC, Director

Lt. Comdr. William H. Buracker, USN*

* Annual Reports for the years 1938-42 do not specify the exact course taught by the

individual instructor.

109
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, AC

Maj. Frederick M. Hopkins, Jr., AC

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC

Maj. Charles E. Thomas, Jr., AC

Maj. James E. Parker, AC

Maj. Augustine F. Shea, AC

Maj. Ralph F. Stearley, AC

Capt. Ralph A. Snavely, AC

Capt. Earl E. Partridge, AC

Capt. Earl W. Barnes, AC

Capt. Laurence S. Kuter, AC

Department of Command, Staff and Logistics

Lt. Col. Leo A. Walton, AC, Director

Maj. Harland W. Holden, AC

Maj. John Y. York, Jr., AC

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC

Maj. Leon E. Sharon, AC

Maj. Roland Birnn, AC

Capt. Robert C. Oliver, AC

Department of Ground Tactics

Lt. Col. Charles P. Hall, Inf, Director

Lt. Col. John C. Mullenix, Cav

Lt. Col. Harold H. Ristine, FA

Maj. Allison J. Barnett, Inf

Maj. Fenton G. Epling, CAC

Maj. Alden H. Waitt, CWS

Extension Course Section

Maj. Byron T. Burt, AC, Director

Capt. Robert C. Oliver, AC

1939-1940

School Staff

Col. Walter R. Weaver, AC, Commandant

Col. Millard F. Harmon, AC, Assistant Commandant

Lt. Col. Harland W. Holden, AC, Secretary

Lt. Col. Harland W. Holden, AC, Officer Librarian (from 5 June 1939 to

30 December 1939)

Maj. John M. Davies, AC, Officer Librarian (from 30 December 1939 to

19 April 1940)

Lt. Col. David S. Seaton, AC, Officer Librarian (from 19 April 1940 to

29 June 1940)

110
APPENDIX 2

Instructors

Department of Air Tactics and Strategy

Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, AC, Director (from 5 June 1939 to 8 January

1940)

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, AC, Director (from 8 January 1940 to 29 June

1940)

Lt. Comdr. Joseph L. Kane, USN

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, AC

Maj. Frederick M. Hopkins, Jr., AC

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC

Maj. Charles E. Thomas, Jr., AC

Maj. Randolph P. Williams, AC

Maj. James E. Parker, AC

Maj. Ralph F. Stearley, AC

Maj. Ralph A. Snavely, AC

Maj. Earl E. Partridge, AC

Capt. Earl W. Barnes, AC

Department of Command, Staff and Logistics

Col. Leo A. Walton, AC, Director

Lt. Col. Harland W. Holden, AC

Lt. Col. John Y. York, Jr., AC

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC

Maj. Roland Birnn, AC

Maj. Augustine F. Shea, AC

Maj. Robert C. Oliver, AC

Department of Ground Tactics

Lt. Col. Charles P. Hall, Inf, Director (from 5 June 1939 to 2 January

1940)

Lt. Col. Sidney Erickson, Inf, Director (from 2 January 1940 to 29 June

1940)

Lt. Col. John C. Mullenix, Cav

Maj. Allison J. Barnett, Inf

Maj. Fenton G. Epling, CAC (from 5 June 1939 to 2 April 1940)

Maj. George W. Ricker, CAC (from 5 December 1939 to 29 June 1940)

Maj. Alden H. Waitt, CWS

Capt. Stephen C. Lombard, FA

Extension Course Section

Lt. Col. Byron T. Burt, AC, Director

Lt. Col. Harvey H. Holland, AC, Assistant Director (from 2 May 1940 to

29 June 1940)

111*
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

1940-1941

School Staff

Brig. Gen. Walter R. Weaver, AC, Commandant (from 1 July 1940 to 7

August 1940)

Col. Edgar P. Sorensen, AC, Commandant (from 8 August 1940 to 30

June 1941)

Col. Millard F. Harmon, AC, Assistant Commandant (from 1 July 1940

to 1 July 1940)

Lt. Col. Harland W. Holden, AC, Secretary (from 1 July 1940 to 8

September 1940)

Maj. Robert C. Oliver, AC, Secretary (from 9 September 1940 to 30

June 1941)

1st Lt. Thomas B. DeRamus, AC, Assistant Secretary (from 13 May 1941

to 30 June 1941)

Col. David S. Seaton, AC, Officer Librarian (from 16 August 1940 to 30

June 1941)

1st Lt. Thomas J. Taylor, AC, Assistant Officer Librarian (from 26 April

1941 to 30 June 1941)

1st Lt. Merrill W. Doss, AC, Assistant Officer Librarian (from 6 June

1941 to 30 June 1941)

1st Lt. George N. Robinson, Jr., AC, Officer in Charge, Reproduction

(from 26 May 1941 to 30 June 1941)

Instructors

Academic Department

Maj. Robert C. Oliver, AC (entire period)

Lt. Col. John Y. York, Jr., AC (until relieved 14 July 1940)

Lt. Col. Allison J. Barnett, Inf (until relieved 13 August 1940)

Maj. George W. Ricker, CAC (until relieved 16 August 1940)

Maj. Alden H. Waitt, CWS (until relieved 17 July 1940)

Maj. Muir S. Fairchild, AC (until relieved 10 July 1940)

Maj. Frederick von H. Kimble, AC (until relieved 12 July 1940)

Maj. Byron E. Gates, AC (until relieved 10 July 1940)

Maj. Charles E. Thomas, Jr., AC (until relieved 21 March 1941)

Maj. Randolph P. Williams, AC (until relieved 7 July 1940)

Maj. James E. Parker, AC (until relieved 9 July 1940)

Maj. Augustine F. Shea, AC (until relieved 25 July 1940)

Maj. Ralph A. Snavely, AC (until relieved 9 July 1940)

Capt. Stephen C. Lombard, FA (until relieved 2 July 1940)

Capt. Earl W. Barnes, AC (until relieved 13 August 1940)

Training Literature Unit

Lt. Col. Byron T. Burt, AC (until relieved 21 September 1940)

Lt. Col. Harvey H. Holland, AC (entire period)

112
APPENDIX 2

Lt. Col. Elmer J. Bowling, AC (entire period)

1941-1942

School Staff

Commandant

Col. Edgard P. Sorensen, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 16 July 1941)

Col. David S. Seaton, AC (from 17 July 1941 to 19 August 1941)

Col. William D. Wheeler, AC (from 20 August 1941 to 2 November

1941)

Col. Elmer J. Bowling, AC (from 3 November 1941 to 5 January 1942)

Lt. Col. John A. Greene, AC (from 6 January 1942 to 30 June 1942)

Assistant Commandant

Col. David S. Seaton, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 16 July 1941)

Lt. Col. Harvey H. Holland, AC (from 17 July 1941 to 12 August 1941)

Lt. Col. Elmer J. Bowling, AC (from 13 August 1941 to 2 November

1941)

Maj. Robert C. Oliver, AC (from 3 November 1941 to 8 November 1941)

Maj. John A. Greene, AC (from 9 November 1941 to 5 January 1942)

Maj. Hyter H. Ruggles, AC (from 6 January 1942 to 18 April 1942)

Capt. Arthur D. Etienne, AC (from 19 April 1942 to 19 May 1942)

Capt. George N. Robinson, Jr., AC (from 20 May 1942 to 31 May 1942)

Maj. Guy R. Windrom, AC (from 1 June 1942 to 30 June 1942)

Secretary

Maj. Robert C. Oliver, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 8 November 1941)

Capt. Thomas B. DeRamus, AC (from 9 November 1941 to 15 May

1942)

1st Lt. Stuart A. Warren, AC (from 16 May 1942 to 30 June 1942)

Assistant Secretary

Capt. Thomas B. DeRamus, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 8 November 1941)

Capt. George N. Robinson, Jr., AC (from 9 November 1941 to 15 May

1942)

Officer Librarian

Col. David S. Seaton, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 30 July 1941)

Capt. Merrill W. Doss, AC (from 31 July 1941 to 22 April 1942)

Capt. George N. Robinson, Jr., AC (from 23 April 1942 to 30 June 1942)

Officer in Charge, Reproduction

Capt. George N. Robinson, Jr., AC (from 1 July 1941 to 28 January

1942)

Maj. Hyter H. Ruggles, AC (from 29 January 1942 to 18 April 1942)

113
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

Instructors

Training Literature Unit

Lt. Col. Harvey H. Holland, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 12 August 1941)

Lt. Col. Elmer J. Bowling, AC (from 1 July 1941 to 3 November 1941)

Lt. Col. John A. Greene, AC (from 18 August 1941 to 5 January 1942)

Maj. Guy R. Windrom, AC (from 17 July 1942 to 30 June 1942)

Maj. John F. McNeill, AC (from 22 September 1941 to 30 June 1942)

Capt. Arthur D. Etienne, AC (from 8 December 1941 to 30 June 1942)

Capt. Clyde S. DeMonbrun, AC (from 21 August 1941 to 14 May 1942)

Capt. Nathan M. Faulk, AC (from 4 September 1941 to 30 June 1942)

Capt. Vincent S. Lamb, AC (from 3 July 1941 to 30 June 1942)

Capt. John S. Scott, AC (from 15 September 1941 to 30 June 1942)

Capt. William S. Chambers, AC (from 10 October 1941 to 30 June 1942)

1st Lt. Wayne E. Scrivener, AC (from 21 July 1941 to 15 May 1942)

1st Lt Milton M. Norton, AC (from 7 August 1941 to 30 June 1942)

1st Lt. Joseph P. Sell, Jr., AC (from 20 August 1941 to 30 June 1942)

1st Lt. Stuart A. Warren, AC (from 27 August 1941 to 30 June 1942)

1st Lt. Lawrence H. Haskins, Jr., AC (from 11 September 1941 to 30

June 1942)

1st Lt. Walter M. Fenner, Jr., AC (from 4 October 1941 to 14 May 1942)

1st Lt. Maurice R. Demers, AC (from 21 August 1941 to 29 May 1942)

1st Lt. Francis B. Alexander, AC (from 11 August 1941 to 28 April 1942)

1st Lt. Joseph R. Lloyd, AC (from 11 August 1941 to 6 May 1942)

1st Lt. John A. Dilworth, III, AC (from 7 September 1941 to 16 May

1942)

(Detached Service from 7 January 1942 to 16 May 1942)

Academic Department

Classes were suspended during the school year 1940-1941, and no

officers were on duty at the Army Air Forces Tactical School as

instructors.

114
Appendix 3

Air Corps Tactical School Graduates, By Class,

1920-1940

Class & Name Rank Branch

1920-1921

BISSELL, Clayton L. 1st Lt. Air Service

BLACKBURN, Thomas W. 1st Lt. Air Service

EASTERBROOK, Arthur E. Captain Air Service

HANLEY, Thomas J., Jr. Major Air Service

JOHNSON, Davenport Major Air Service

KNIGHT, Louis R. Captain Air Service

LAWSON, Walter R. Captain Air Service

McNARNEY, Joseph T. Major Air Service

MILLING, Thomas DeW. Major Air Service

REYNOLDS, Clearton H. Captain Air Service

WALTON, Leo A. Major Air Service

1921-1922

BROOKS, Arthur R Captain Air Service

BROWER, Gerald E. Major Air Service

COLGAN, John G. Captain Air Service

DRAYTON, Harry C. Captain Air Service

HALE, Frasier Captain Air Service

HEISEN, Horace N. Captain Air Service

HOUGH, Romeyn B. Captain Air Service

HOUSE, Edwin J. Captain Air Service

PARKS, Victor, Jr. Captain Chemical Warfare

PHILLIPS, Charles T. Captain Air Service

STURCKEN, Harold E. Captain Air Service

VOSS, Thomas S. Captain Air Service

115
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

1922-1923

BEAM, Rosenham Captain Air Service

BRADY, Francis M. Captain Air Service

CLAGETI, Henry B. Major Air Service

COKER, Robert Major Air Service

FORD, Christopher 1st Lt. Air Service

GATES, Warner B. Captain Air Service

GUIDERA, Albert Captain Air Service

HILL, Edmund W. Captain Air Service

HOPKINS, Hubert V. Captain Air Service

HOUGHLAND, Howard J. Captain Air Service

HUNTER, Frank O'D. 1st Lt. Air Service

JACOBS, Lynwood B. Captain Air Service

JOHNSON, George P. 1st Lt. Air Service

JOUETT, John H. Major Air Service

McCHORD, William C. Major Air Service

WARREN, George S. Captain Air Service

WHEELER, Chilion F. 1st Lt. Air Service

1923-1924

AUSTIN, Charles B. 1st Lt. Air Service

BROOKS, John B. Major Air Service

BURROWS, Paul E. 1st Lt. Air Service

DAVIES, Isaiah 1st Lt. Air Service

DAVIES, John M. 1st Lt. Air Service

GRAHAM, Harry Lt. Colonel Air Service

GRISHAM, James L. 1st Lt. Air Service

HARDEE, David L. 1st Lt. Infantry

HARMS, Henry W. Major Air Service

LYND, William E. Captain Air Service

LYON, Edwin B. Captain Air Service

REYNOLDS, John N. Major Air Service

SNEED, Albert L. Major Air Service

WOOTEN, Ralph H. Captain Air Service

1924-1925

BENEDICT, Charles C. Major Air Service

BOLAND, Thomas Captain Air Service

CHANEY, James E. Major Air Service

DUTY, William B. Major Air Service

FICKEL, Jacob E. Major Air Service

FISHER, Arthur G. Lt. Colonel Air Service

FRANK, Walter H. Major Air Service

116
APPENDIX 3

MARTIN, Frederick L. Major Air Service

QUINN, Orlo H. Captain Air Service

SEATON, David S. Captain Air Service

SPATZ, Carl Major Air Service

TINKER, Clarence L. Major Air Service

VAN NOSTRAND, Percy E. Major Air Service

WHITESIDES, John G. Captain Air Service

1925-1926

BOURNE, Louis M., Jr. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

COLEMAN, Fred H. Major Air Corps

DAVIS, Michael F. Major Air Corps

DUNCAN, Early E. W. Captain Air Corps

FARTHING, William E. Captain Air Corps

GEIGER, Harold Major Air Corps

HARVEY, Lloyd L. Captain Air Corps

HEFFERNAN, Leo G. Major Air Corps

HICKAM, Horace M. Major Air Corps

KENNEY, George C. Captain Air Corps

KNERR, Hugh J. Major Air Corps

LUTZ, Charles A. Major U.S. Marine Corps

MOTLEY, L. W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

ROGERS, Ford 0. 1st Lt. U.S. Marine Corps

SARTORIUS, Carlos Captain Spanish Army

STREETT, St. Clair 1st Lt. Air Corps

1926-1927

AKIN, Spencer B. Major Signal Corps

ARMSTRONG, Francis T. Major Field Artillery

BRADLEY, Follett Major Air Corps

BUBB, Charles B. B. Captain Air Corps

CANDEE, Robert C. Captain Air Corps

CHESTER, Einar W. Captain Infantry

EPLING, Fenton G. Captain Coast Artillery

FARRELL, Walter G. 1st Lt. U.S. Marine Corps

GOOLRICK, Robert E. M. Major Air Corps

HAINES, Oliver L. Captain Cavalry

LOHMAN, Eugene A. Major Air Corps

MITCHELL, Ralph J. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

RADER, Ira A. Major Air Corps

REEL, Gordon Major Air Reserve

ROYCE, Ralph Major Air Corps

SINHASENI, M. 1st Lt. Siamese Air Service

117
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

STENSETH, Martinus 1st Lt. Air Corps

SVASTI, V. L. 1st Lt. Siamese Air Service

TURNER, T. C. Lt. Colonel U.S. Marine Corps

WESTOVER, Oscar Major Air Corps

1927-1928

ANDREWS, Frank M. Major Air Corps

ARNEMAN, George E. Major Field Artillery

BALLARD, Richard H. Captain Air Corps

BLATT, Raymond C. Lieutenant Cavalry

BONNET, E. Lieutenant Argentine Navy

BRETT, George H. Major Air Corps

BROWN, Roy S. Major Air Corps

CUNNINGHAM, Charles H. Major Corps of Engineers

CURRY, John F. Major Air Corps

CUTLER, Stuart Captain Infantry

DAVIS, J. E. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

EVANS, Francis T. Major U.S. Marine Corps

HALE, Willis H. Major Air Corps

JONES, Junius W. Major Air Corps

KROGSTAD, Arnold N. Major Air Corps

MORALES, Oscar Major Guatemalan Army

MULCAHY, Francis P. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

OLDS, Robert Captain Air Corps

PHILLIPS, Thomas R. Captain Coast Artillery

RICHARDS, Harrison H.C. Major Air Corps

SCANLON, Martin F. Major Air Corps

STONE, Laurence Captain Air Corps

WALSH, Robert LeG. Major Air Corps

WISE, William W. Captain Chemical Warfare

1928-1929

ANDRUS, Burton Captain Calvary

BORDEN, Fred G. Captain Signal Corps

CAMPBELL, Harold D. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

CHAPIN, Frank K. Major Calvary

COLE, Ross F. Captain Air Corps

CONNELL, Carl W. Captain Air Corps

CORDERO, Mario Captain Coast Artillery

DeFORD, Earl H. Captain Air Corps

DIXON, Vincent B. Major Air Corps

DUNCAN, Asa N. Captain Air Corps

FERSON, Oliver Captain Air Corps

118
APPENDIX 3

FRASIER, Lyman S. Major Infantry FREAR, Seth H. Major Signal Corps

JOHNSTON, Douglas Captain Air Corps LACKLAND, Frank D. Major Air Corps

MANGAN, Walter D. Major Field Artillery

PEABODY, George H. Major Air Corps

PEEK, Norman W. Major Air Corps

REARDAN, John D. Major Air Corps ROBINS, Augustine W. Major Air Corps ROWELL, Ross E. Major U.S. Marine Corps

RUDOLPH, Jacob H. Major Air Corps

WALKER, Kenneth N. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WALTON, Charles W. Captain Chemical Warfare

1929-1930

AMARA, Luang Lt. Colonel Siamese Air Service

BARKER, John D. 1st Lt. Air Corps

BASSICH, Cyril Captain Field Artillery

BLACK, Percy G. Captain Field Artillery

BRANSON, Harry L. Captain Cavalry BROWN, Robert J., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

CURRY, James T., Jr. Major Air Corps DEVES, Luang Major Siamese Air Service

EGLIN, Frederick I. Captain Air Corps

FITZ, Harold G. Major Field Artillery

FLICKINGER, Harrison W. Captain Air Corps

HODGES, James P. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HOYT, Ross G. Captain Air Corps LADD, Arthur K. Captain Air Corps

LEWIS, John E. Major Field Artillery

MAJOR, Harold C. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

METZGER, Earl H. Major Coast Artillery MILEY, William M. 1st Lt. Infantry

MILLER, Henry J. F. Major Air Corps MOORE, James T. Captain U.S. Marine Corps MOORE, J. Merriman Major Infantry

MOORE, John I. Captain Air Corps

QUESENBERRY, Marshall H. Major Infantry ROBINSON, Charles McK. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SHUFELT, James V. V. Captain Cavalry

STRATEMEYER, George E. Major Air Corps

SZILAGYI, Nicholas Captain Infantry

TYNDALL, Frank B. 1st Lt. Air Corps

119
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

WEIR, Benjamin G. Major Air Corps

WOODS, Louis E. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

YOUNT, Barton K. Major Air Corps

1930-1931

ANDREWS, William V. Captain Air Corps

BEATON, Harold W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

BOONE, Abbott Lt. Colonel Field Artillery

BREENE, Robert G. Captain Air Corps

BROWNE, Harrison C. Major Infantry

CADAVAL, F. J. 1st Lt. Argentine Navy

CHAUNCEY, Charles C. 1st Lt. Air Corps

CHENNAULT, Claire L. Captain Air Corps

COLLAR, Gilbert T. Captain Air Corps

COUSINS, Ralph P. Major Air Corps

EDWARDS, Idwal H. Captain Air Corps

EUBANK, Eugene L. Captain Air Corps

FITZGERALD, Shepler W. Major Air Corps

FLANIGEN, Barrington L. Major Coast Artillery

FLINT, Harry A. Major Cavalry

FRENCH, Charles A. Major Coast Artillery

GLESSNER, Hamilton H. T. Captain Signal Corps

GRAVELY, William S. Captain Air Corps

HARRINGTON, Arthur S. Major Field Artillery

HARRIS, Field Captain U.S. Marine Corps

HERMAN, Harrison Major Cavalry

HYDE, James F. C. Captain Corps of Engineers

JONES, William H., Jr. Major Infantry

LARSON, Westside T. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McDONALD, George C. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McHENRY, George A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McKIERNAN, William J., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MEDARIS, Lester N. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

MERRITT, Lewie G. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

MILLER, Lester T. Captain Air Corps

MOON, Odas 1st Lt. Air Corps

OLDFIELD, Charles B. Major Air Corps

PURSLEY, Charles A. Captain Air Corps

REED, Walter J. Captain Air Corps

STROM, Gustaf Q. Captain Swedish Royal AF

WHEELER, William D. Captain Air Corps

WHITEHEAD, Ennis C. Captain Air Corps

120
APPENDIX 3

WILSON, Donald Captain Air Corps

YOUNG, Harry H. Captain Air Corps

1931-1932

ADLER, Elmer E. Captain Air Corps

BOND, Oliver J. Major Chemical Warfare

BURWELL, Harvey S. Major Air Corps

BUTLER, William 0. Captain Air Corps

CHANDLER, Clark P. Lt. Colonel Cavalry

CRAIG, Howard A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

CROM, William H. Major Air Corps

CUMMINGS, Charles M. 1st Lt. Air Corps

EASTERDAY, George W. Major Coast Artillery

ECHOLS, Oliver P. Major Air Corps

EMMONS, Delos C. Major Air Corps

ENNIS, Arthur I. 1st Lt. Air Corps

EVANS, William T. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

GALE, Guy H. Captain Air Corps

GEORGE, Harold L. Captain Air Corps

GILKESON, Adlai H. Major Air Corps

HAYNES, Caleb V. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HICKEY, Lawrence P. Captain Air Corps

KAUCH, Robert Captain Air Corps

KENNEDY, Frank M. Major Air Corps

KIEL, Emil C. Captain Air Corps

KIRK, James Major Ordnance

KOENIG, Theodore J. Captain Air Corps

LOVELL, George E. Jr. Major Air Corps

McKINNON, Morton H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McREYNOLDS, Edwin R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MULLINS, Charles L., Jr. Captain Infantry

MUSE, Donald P. Major Air Corps

NETHERWOOD, Douglas B. Major Air Corps

PEABODY, Paul E. Major Infantry

PEEK, William H. Lt. Colonel Field Artillery

RALEY, Edward W. Captain Air Corps

REID, Walter H. Captain Air Corps

RISTINE, Harold H. Major Field Artillery

STRAHM, Victor H. Captain Air Corps

TOWNSEND, Spencer A. Major Cavalry

WALLER, Alfred E. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WASH, Carlyle H. Major Air Corps

WELSHMER, Robert R. Major Coast Artillery

121
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

1932-1933

ANDERSON, Glenn P. Major Coast Artillery

BARNES, Theodore Major Chemical Warfare

BARRETT, Henry L. Captain Infantry

BEVERLY, George H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

BOBZEIN, Edwin B. 1st Lt. Air Corps

CARTER, Warren R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

CORKILLE, John D. 1st Lt. Air Corps

DAVIDSON, Howard C. Major Air Corps

ELLIS, Sam L. Captain Air Corps

GALLOWAY, Floyd E. Captain Air Corps

GARDNER, Grandison Captain Air Corps

HADDON, Julian B. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HARMON, Hubert R. Major Air Corps

HAYES, Wolcott P. Captain Air Corps

HINE, Virgil Captain Air Corps

HORNSBY, Aubrey Captain Air Corps

JOHNSON, Byron F. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

JOHNSON, Harry A. Captain Air Corps

KASE, John A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

KING, Clifford B. Major Field Artillery

KRAUS, Walter F. Captain Air Corps

LAYMAN, Walter G. Captain Infantry

McCLELLAN, Hez 1st Lt. Air Corps

McCOY, Wendell B. Captain Air Corps

McDONNELL, John C. Major Air Corps

MERRICK, Louis M. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MILLS, Harry H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MILLS, Samuel P. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MORGAN, John R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

OLDFIELD, Homer R. Major Coast Artillery

PATRICK, Frederick 1. 1st Lt. Air Corps

PAUL, Frank M. Captain Air Corps

PETZING, Edwin R. Captain Signal Corps

PIERCE, John T., Jr. Major Cavalry

PI'TTS, Younger A. Captain Air Corps

PRIME, Charles P. Captain Air Corps

RYAN, William Ord Major Air Corps

SMITH, Lowell H. Captain Air Corps

SULLIVAN, Charles W. Captain Air Corps

TRIGG, Otto B. Major Cavalry

WOOD, Myron R. Captain Air Corps

122
APPENDIX 3

1933-1934

AUSTIN, Thomas A., Jr. Captain Infantry

BANFILL, Charles Y. Captain Air Corps

BARNETT, Allison J. Major Infantry

BEAU, Lucas V., Jr. Captain Air Corps

BEVERIDGE, John, Jr. Captain Air Corps

BIRNN, Roland 1st Lt. Air Corps

BOND, Carlton F. 1st Lt. Air Corps

BURT, Byron T., Jr. Captain Air Corps

DAWSON, Leo H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

DAY, Robin A. Captain Air Corps

EATON, Samuel C. Captain Air Corps

EVANS, Frederick W. Captain Air Corps

GARDNER, John H. Captain Air Corps

GOODRICH, David W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

GOTHLIN, Oliver P., Jr. Captain Air Corps

HAMILTON, Arthur G. Captain Air Corps

HICKS, Ronald A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HOWARD, Charles H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

KENNEY, Cornelius J. Captain Air Corps

LARKIN, Claude A. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

LIGGETT, Arthur G. Captain Air Corps

MARTENSTEIN, Austin W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McDANIEL, Arthur B. Captain Air Corps

McMULLEN, Clements Captain Air Corps

McNEIL, Guy L. Captain Air Corps

MELOY, Vincent J. Captain Air Corps

MUHLENBERG, H. C. Kress Lt. Colonel Air Corps

PALMER, George M. Captain Air Corps

PATRICK, John B. Captain Air Corps

PECK, Walter R. Captain Air Corps

RAMEY, Howard K. Captain Air Corps

SAVILLE, Gordon P. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SCHILT, Christain F. 1st Lt. U.S. Marine Corps

SHEARER, Thomas R. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

SMITH, Lotha A. Captain Air Corps

SWEELEY, William R. Captain Air Corps

THOMAS, Arthur Captain Air Corps

THOMPSON, Bernard S. Captain Air Corps

WATSON, Dayton D. Captain Air Corps

WEBSTER, Robert M. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WHITTEN, Lyman P. 1st Lt. Air Corps

123
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

WILLIAMS, Robert B. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WILSON, Joseph A. Captain Air Corps

1934-1935

ABBEY, Evers Captain Air Corps

AMIS, William N. Captain Air Corps

BRANSHAW, Charles E. Captain Air Corps

BROWN, Raymond R. Captain Air Corps

BURGE, Vernon L. Major Air Corps

CHAPMAN, Thomas H. Captain Air Corps

CRUMRINE, Clarence E. Captain Air Corps

DOUGLAS, Charles Captain Air Corps

DOUGLASS, Robert W., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

EDWARDS, Sheffield 1st Lt. Field Artillery

FAIRCHILD, Muir S. Captain Air Corps

FLOOD, William J. Captain Air Corps

GATES, Byron Captain Air Corps

GILES, Barney M. Captain Air Corps

GILES, Benjamin F. Captain Air Corps

GLASGOW, Lawrence B. Major Infantry

GLENN, Edward E. Captain Air Corps

GONZALEZ, Javier G. 1st Lt. Mexican Army

GUYMON, Vernon N. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

HANSELL, Haywood S., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HARMON, Benjamin F. Captain Coast Artillery

HEWITT, Leland R. Captain Air Corps

HOOD, Reuben C., Jr. 2d Lt. Air Corps

KENNEDY, Emile T. 1st Lt. Air Corps

KENYON, Horace S., Jr. Captain Air Corps

KILNER, Walter G. Major Air Corps

KIMBLE, Frederick von H. Captain Air Corps

KINCAID, Alvan C. Captain Air Corps

KUTER, Laurence S. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MAITLAND, Lester J. Captain Air Corps

MATHENY, William A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McCULLOCH, John M. Captain Air Corps

McCUNE, Milo Captain Air Corps

MURPHY, William H. Captain Signal Corps

OLIVER, Robert C. 1st Lt. Air Corps

OWENS, Ray L. Captain Air Corps

PROPST, Rudolph W. Captain Air Corps

RICHTER, John P. Captain Air Corps

ROBBINS, Oliver K. Captain Air Corps

124
APPENDIX 3

RODIECK, Leonard H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SANDERSON, Lawson H. M. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

SCHRAMM, Ned Captain Air Corps

SKANSE, Peter E. Captain Air Corps

SKEMP, Samuel C. Captain Air Corps

STEARLEY, Ralph F. 1st Lt. Air Corps

STROH, Claire 1st Lt. Air Corps

TALBOT, Clarence P. Captain Air Corps

TEVFIK, Mohmet Captain Turkish Army

UMSTEAD, Stanley M. Captain Air Corps

UPSTON, John E. Captain Air Corps

VANAMAN, Arthur W. Captain Air Corps

VANCE, Reginald F. C. 1st Lt. Air Corp

VANDENBERG, Hoyt S. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WALLACE, William J. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

WEDDINGTON, Harry Captain Air Corps

WEIKERT, John M. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WHEELER, Walter L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WRIGHT, William B. Major Air Corps

ZIYA, Mustafa Captain Turkish Army

1935-1936

BAYLEY, Eugene B. Captain Air Corps

BEERY, Levi L. Captain Air Corps

BIVINS, Hugh A. Captain Air Corps

CALDWELL, Charles H. Captain Air Corps

CANNON, John K. Captain Air Corps

CHIDLAW, Benjamin W. Captain Air Corps

CLARK, Harold L. Captain Air Corps

CLARK, John M. Captain Air Corps

CONNELL, Samuel M. Captain Air Corps

CRAWFORD, Alden R. Captain Air Corps

CUMBERPATCH, James T. Captain Air Corps

CUSHMAN, Thomas J. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

DAVIDSON, Joseph H. Major Air Corps

DAYTON, Lewis A. Captain Air Corps

DULLIGAN, John H. Captain Air Corps

DUNCAN, Claude E. Captain Air Corps

EAKER, Ira C. Major Air Corps

ELY, Louis B. Captain Field Artillery

FAIR, Ford L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

FERGUSON, Homer W. Captain Air Corps

FERRIS, Carlisle I. 1st Lt. Air Corps

125
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

FITZGERALD, Donald D. Captain Air Corps

FOSTER, Thad V. Captain Air Corps

GAFFNEY, Dale V. Captain Air Corps

GLENN, Albert F. Captain Air Corps

HALVERSON, Harry A. Captain Air Corps

HOAG, Earl S. Captain Air Corps

HODGE, John R. Major Infantry

HOFFMAN, Edward L. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

HOPPOUGH, Clay I. Major Signal Corps

HORN, Charles A. Captain Air Corps

JOHNSON, Cortlandt S. Captain Air Corps

JONES, Aaron E. Captain Air Corps

KELLOGG, Crawford M. Captain Chemical Warfare

KEPNER, William E. Major Air Corps

LANGMEAD, Edmund C. Captain Air Corps

LINDSEY, Malcolm F. Major Infantry

LONGFELLOW, Newton Captain Air Corps

LOWE, Thomas M. Captain Air Corps

LYON, Alfred J. Captain Air Corps

MAGEE, Richard H. Captain Air Corps

MANN, Merrill D. Captain Air Corps

MAUGHAN, Russell L. Captain Air Corps

MAYHUE, Don W. Captain Air Corps

McCATTY, Kenneth Major Coast Artillery

McCLELLAND, Harold M. Major Air Corps

McGINNIS, Harold A. Captain Air Corps

McKITTRICK, William L. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

McPIKE, George V. Captain Air Corps

MILLER, Leland W. Captain Air Corps

MOON, Ernest S. Captain Air Corps

MORRIS, William C. Captain Air Corps

OLD, William D. Captain Air Corps

O'NEILL, Raymond E. Major Air Corps

PARKER, James E. Captain Air Corps

PHILLIPS, Donald B. Captain Air Corps

POWERS, Edward M. Captain Air Corps

QUESADA, Elwood R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

RIDDERHOF, Stanley E. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

SCHNEIDER, Max F. Captain Air Corps

SHARON, Leon E. Captain Air Corps

SHEA, Augustine F. Captain Air Corps

SNAVELY, Ralph A. Captain Air Corps

SORENSEN, Edgar P. Major Air Corps

126
APPENDIX 3

THOMAS, Charles E., Jr. Captain Air Corps

TOOHER, Bernard J. Captain Air Corps

TWINING, Nathan F. Captain Air Corps

WOLFE, Kenneth B. Captain Air Corps

WRIGHT, Bennett W. Lieutenant U.S. Navy

1936-1937

ANDERSON, Orvil A. Major Air Corps

BACKES, Charles Captain Air Corps

BARNES, Earl W. Captain Air Corps

BARTRON, Harold A. Major Air Corps

BEVANS, James M. Captain Air Corps

BLAIR, Shiras A. Major Air Corps

BOYDEN, Hayne D. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

BRICE, William 0. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

CARR, Lawrence J. Captain Air Corps

CASTOR, Bernard T. Major Air Corps

CHAMBERS, William E. Major Infantry

DAHLQUIST, John E. Major Infantry

DAVIES, Clinton W. Captain Air Corps

DICE, Fay 0. 1st Lt. Air Corps

DUNN, Ray A. Major Air Corps

ENT, Uzal G. Captain Air Corps

EVEREST, Frank F., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

FINTER, Clyde V. Major Air Corps

FRITCH, Donald F. Captain Air Corps

GEORGE, Harold H. Major Air Corps

GILLESPIE, James M. Major Air Corps

GIVENS, James D. Major Air Corps

GRANT, David N. W. Lt. Colonel Medical Corps

GREGG, Kirtley J. Captain Air Corps

HACKETT, Frank D. Major Air Corps

HARPER, Robert W. Captain Air Corps

HARVEY, Alva L. Captain Air Corps

HAWKINS, John R. Captain Air Corps

HERRICK, Hugh N. Major Coast Artillery

HOLDEN, Harlan W. Major Air Corps

HOPKINS, Frederick M., Jr. Major Air Corps

HOPKINS, Joseph G. 1st Lt. Air Corps

IGNICO, Robert V. Major Air Corps

JONES, Edward D. Major Air Corps

JONES, Ulysses G. Major Air Corps

KEESLING, Lloyd N. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

127
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

KINNISON, Henry L., Jr. Captain Cavalry

LAIRD, John A., Jr. Major Air Corps

LAWTON, Malcolm S. Major Air Corps

LINGLE, David G. Captain Air Corps

LOUTZENHEISER, Joe L. Captain Air Corps

LYNCH, Edmund C. Captain Air Corps

McBLAIN, John F. Captain Air Corps

McCOY, George, Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MEGEE, Vernon E. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

MONAHAN, John W. Major Air Corps

NISSLEY, John K. Captain Air Corps

NOWLAND, Bob E. Major Air Corps

PARKER, Elton C. Lieutenant U.S. Navy

PARTRIDGE, Earle E. Captain Air Corps

PEASLEE, Budd J. 1st Lt. Air Corps

POLK, George W., Jr. Major Air Corps

PORTER, William N. Lt. Colonel Chemical Warfare

RIVES, Tom C. Major Signal Corps

ROBERTSON, William A. R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

ROBINSON, Frank H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

ROSS, Morrill Major Field Artillery

SCHLATTER, David M. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Joseph Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Wallace G. Major Air Corps

STOWELL, James S. Captain Air Corps

TAYLOR, Yantis H. Captain Air Corps

TOURTELLOT, George P Major Air Corps

WAITT, Alden H. Major Chemical Warfare

WELSH, William W. Major Air Corps

WHITSON, Wallace E. Captain Air Corps

WILLIAMS, Paul L. Major Air Corps

WILSON, Harry E. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WILSON, Russell A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WOLFINBARGER, Willard R. Captain Air Corps

ZANE, Robert T. Major Air Corps

1937-1938

ALEXANDER, Edward H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

ALLAN, Carlisle V. Captain Infantry

BOYD, William L. Major Air Corps

BRADLEY, Clifford P. Captain Air Corps

BURKE, Lawrence T. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

CARROLL, Franklin 0. Major Air Corps

128
APPENDIX 3

COATES, Philip D. 1st Lt. Air Corps

COOK, Orval R. Captain Air Corps

CRAW, Demas T. Captain Air Corps

CROCKER, Harrison G. Major Air Corps

CULLEN, Paul T. 1st Lt. Air Corps

DAVASHER, Glenn L. Captain Air Corps

DAVIS, Everett S. Captain Air Corps

DOWMAN, Charles H. Major Air Corps

DUNTON, Delmar H. Major Air Corps

ELLINGER, David J. Captain Air Corps

ENGLER, Howard E. Captain Air Corps

EVANS, Bryan Captain Field Artillery

FISHER, Ralph E. Captain Air Corps

FORSYTH, Andrew E. Captain Cavalry

GOODRICH, Donald R. Captain Air Corps

GROSS, Mervin E. Captain Air Corps

HANSEN, George W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HARDY, Wilfrid H. Captain Air Corps

HEGENBERGER, Albert F. Major Air Corps

HELMICK, Charles G. Lt. Colonel Field Artillery

HENRY, Cecil E. Captain Air Corps

KAYE, Minton W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

KIMES, Ira L. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

KNAPP, Robert D. Major Air Corps

KREUTER, Robert H. Captain Coast Artillery

KYLE, Reuben, Jr. Captain Air Corps

LANDERS, Sigmund F. Major Air Corps

LAWRENCE, Charles W. Captain Air Corps

MARRINER, Alfred W. Major Air Corps

MAXWELL, Warren A. Major Air Corps

McCORMICK, Harlan T. Captain Air Corps

McDUFFIE, Jasper K. Major Air Corps

McGREGOR, Kenneth C. Major Air Corps

McLEAN, Gordon A. Lieutenant U.S. Navy

MESSER, Herbert G. Captain Signal Corps

MOFFAT, Reuben C. Major Air Corps

MYERS, Charles T. Captain Air Corps

NIERGARTH, Omer 0. Major Air Corps

NUGENT, Richard E. Captain Air Corps

NUTr, Clifford C. Major Air Corps

RICH, Clyde K. Captain Air Corps

RIDENOUR, Carlyle H. Major Air Corps

ROBBINS, Edward M. Major Air Corps

129
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

SAVAGE, Mills S. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SCHOENLEIN, Robert L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SCHOW, Robert A. Captain Infantry

SCHULGEN, George F. Captain Air Corps

SELZER, Edgar T. Captain Air Corps

SHIVELY, James C. Major Air Corps

SMITH, Paul R. Captain Chemical Warfare

SPARHAWK, George H. Captain Air Corps

STARKEY, Benjamin T. Captain Air Corps

TIMBERLAKE, Patrick W. Captain Air Corps

TOWLE, Stewart W., Jr. Captain Air Corps

WARREN, John W. Captain Air Corps

WASSER, Lee Q. Captain Air Corps

WATNEE, Lloyd H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WEDDINGTON, Leonard D. Major Air Corps

WEYLAND, Otto P. Captain Air Corps

WHITE, Thomas B. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

WHITE, Thomas D. Captain Air Corps

WHITELEY, John F. Major Air Corps

WILLIAMS, John G. Major Air Corps

WIMSATr, Robert W. C. Captain Air Corps

WINN, Raymond L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

YEAGER, Hobart R. Captain Air Corps

1938-1939

ALMOND, Edward M. Lt. Colonel Infantry

ARNETT, Charles T. 1st Lt. Air Corps

BAXTER, Henry R. Captain Air Corps

BLESSLEY, Rowland C. W. Major Air Corps

BRYTE, Walter G., Jr. Captain Air Corps

BUMP, Arthur L., Jr. Captain Air Corps

BURWELL, James B. Captain Air Corps

CABELL, Charles P. Captain Air Corps

CHOATE, Robert E. L. Captain Air Corps

CLUCK, James C. Major Air Corps

COLEMAN, Frank J. Captain Air Corps

CRANE, Carl J. Captain Air Corps

DALY, Maurice F. Captain Air Corps

DeARMOND, James K. Captain Air Corps

DEICHELMANN, Matthew K. Captain Coast Artillery

DOYLE, John P., Jr. Captain Air Corps

DU'TTON, Donald L. Major Coast Artillery

GAINES, Edmund P. Major Air Corps

130
APPENDIX 3

GERHARD, Frederick W. Captain Chemical Warfare

GIBBS, David R. Captain Air Corps

GRIFFISS, Townsend Captain Air Corps

HARMAN, Leonard F. Captain Air Corps

HARRIS, Ray G. Major Air Corps

HARRIS, Samuel R., Jr. Captain Air Corps

HOLLAND, Harvey H. Major Air Corps

JAMISON, Glen C. Captain Air Corps

JEROME, Clayton C. Major U.S. Marine Corps

JOHNSON, Alfred H. Captain Air Corps

JONES, John N. Captain Air Corps

KELLY, Oakley G. Major Air Corps

KIEFER, Homer W. Captain Field Artillery

KINGMAN, Allen F. Lt. Colonel Infantry

LANAGAN, William M. Major Air Corps

LEE, Walter S. Captain Air Corps

LOBER, Clarence B. Major Air Corps

LYNCH, Frederick D. Major Air Corps

MALONE, A. J. Kerwin Captain Air Corps

MARTIN, Darwin D. Captain Coast Artillery

McCORMICK, John H. Captain Air Corps

McGREGOR, George W. Captain Air Corps

McNAUGHTON, Kenneth P. Captain Air Corps

MINTY, Russell J. Captain Air Corps

MOLLISON, James A. Major Air Corps

MOORE, Aubry L. Captain Air Corps

MORRIS, Edward M. Major Air Corps

MUDGETT, Gilman C. Captain Cavalry

NELSON, Fred C. Major Air Corps

NICHOLSON, Arthur B. Captain Coast Artillery

OVERFIELD, David B. Lieutenant U.S. Navy

PEARCY, Charles G. Captain Air Corps

PERRIN, Elmer D. Major Air Corps

PERSONS, John W. Captain Air Corps

PERSONS, Wilton B. Major Signal Corps

POST, Leo F. Major Air Corps

REILY, Henry H. Major Air Corps

RITCHIE, William L. Captain Air Corps

ROBINSON, Stanley K. Captain Air Corps

RUSH, Hugo P. Captain Air Corps

SAMS, William C. Captain Air Corps

SHELTON, Cyrus Q. Captain Coast Artillery

SMITH, Archibald Y. Captain Air Corps

131
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

SMITH, Joe N. Major U.S. Marine Corps

SMITH, Milton J. Captain Air Corps

SOUZA, William B. Major Air Corps

SPRINGER, Allen R. Captain Air Corps

STACE, Donald F. Major Air Corps

STORRIE, Carl R. 1st Lt. Air Corps

STRAUBEL, Austin A. 1st Lt. Air Corps

TRUNK, Otto G. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

VITZTHUM, Harry L. Major Signal Corps

WALKER, Ralph B. Major Air Corps

WARBURTON, Ernest K. Captain Air Corps

WEIR, Frank D. Captain U.S. Marine Corps

WHITE, Walter C. Captain Air Corps

WILLIAMS, Randolph P. Major Air Corps

WOODRUFF, James A. Major Air Corps

1939-1940 (1)

AKRE, Roland 0. S. Captain Air Corps

ALKIRE, Darr H. Captain Air Corps

ASP, Melvin B. Major Air Corps

ATKINSON, Joseph H. Captain Air Corps

BAISLEY, Herbert K. Captain Air Corps

BARCUS, Glenn 0. Captain Air Corps

BLACK, Edward C. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

BODLE, John E. Captain Air Corps

BORN, Charles F. Captain Air Corps

BOWLING, Elmer J. Major Air Corps

BRIDGET, Bernard A. Captain Air Corps

BRIGGS, James E. Captain Air Corps

BUSHEY, Orin J. Major Air Corps

CASSIDAY, Benjamin B. Major Air Corps

CHEATLE, F. Edgar Captain Air Corps

CLARK, Milo N. Major Air Corps

COFFEY, John W. Major Ordnance

CONWAY, Eugene T. Major Coast Artillery

DeROSIER, Leo W. Captain Air Corps

DORR, Henry W. Captain Air Corps

EDDY, George G. Captain Ordnance

EGAN, John F. Captain Air Corps

FERGUSON, Thomas D. 1st Lt. Air Corps

FISHER, Dale D. Captain Air Corps

FITZMAURICE, James M. Captain Air Corps

FLOCK, Julius T. Captain Air Corps

132
APPENDIX 3

FOULK, Albert C. Major Air Corps

FREEMAN, Richard S. 1st Lt. Air Corps

FRIERSON, Samuel G. Major Air Corps

GORDON, John C. 1st Lt. Air Corps

GUILLET', John F. Captain Air Corps

HANNA, Archibald J. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HART, John V. Major Air Corps

HENRY, Draper F. Captain Air Corps

HEYDUCK, Lawrence E. Captain Field Artillery

HILLERY, Edward A. Major Air Corps

HUGHES, Clayton E. Captain Air Corps

HUGLIN, Harold Q. Captain Air Corps

JOHNSON, Leon W. Captain Air Corps

JOHNSTON, Gerald G. Captain Air Corps

JORDAN, James B. Major Air Corps

KIRBY, John W. Captain Air Corps

KISSNER, August W. Captain Air Corps

KOON, Ralph E. Captain Air Corps

KUNISH, Lester L. H. 1st Lt. Air Corps

LAUBACH, David P. Captain Air Corps

LAUER Ford J. Captain Air Corps

LeMAY, Curtis E. 1st Lt. Air Corps

LINDEBURG, Alfred Major Air Corps

MACNAIR, George H. Captain Air Corps

MALLORY, Louie C. Major Air Corps

MAVERICK, William H. Captain Air Corps

McCAULEY, James W. Captain Air Corps

McDANIEL, Carl B. Captain Air Corps

McGUIRE, George F. 1st Lt. Air Corps

McLENNAN, Stuart G. Captain Air Corps

MEEHAN, Arthur W. Captain Air Corps

MESSMORE, Waldine W. Captain Air Corps

MOWER, Clarence T. Captain Air Corps

MUNDY, George W. Captain Air Corps

MUSSETT, Eugene P. 1st Lt. Air Corps

MUSTOE, Anthony 1st Lt. Air Corps

NELSON, Morris R. Captain Air Corps

O'CONNOR, Cornelius E. Major Air Corps

O'DONNELL, Emmett, Jr. Captain Air Corps

OLDS, Thayer S. Captain Air Corps

OTT, Isaac W. Captain Air Corps

OVERACKER, Charles B., Jr. Captain Air Corps

PAUL, Wilfred J. Captain Air Corps

133
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

PIRTLE, Robert E. L. Captain Air Corps

PRATT, James G. Captain Air Corps

PRENTISS, Paul H. Major Air Corps

PROSSER, Harvey W. Major Air Corps

PRUDHOMME, Shelton E. Captain Air Corps

PYLE, Carl W. Major Air Corps

RANDALL, Russell E. Captain Air Corps

RICE, Eugene H. Captain Air Corps

RUNDQUIST, Elmer T. Captain Air Corps

SAUNDERS, LaVerne G. Captain Air Corps

SCOTT, Russell Captain Air Corps

SILLIN, Norman D. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SKOW, Charles T. Major Air Corps

SMITH, Edwin A. Major Infantry

SMITH, Stanton T. Major Air Corps

STINSON, David R. Major Air Corps

STONE, John N. Captain Air Corps

STRICKLAND, Auby C. Major Air Corps

TAYLOR, Willis R. Major Air Corps

TIBBETTS, Kingston E. Captain Air Corps

TINDAL, Lorry N. 1st Lt. Air Corps

TUCKER, Edwin L. Captain Air Corps

TURNBULL, William Major Air Corps

UPTHEGROVE, Fay R. Captain Air Corps

VALENTINE, Francis B. Major Air Corps

WALLACE, James H. Captain Air Corps

WELCH, Clarence H. Major Air Corps

WILSON, Roscoe C. Captain Air Corps

WOOD, Jack W. Captain Air Corps

WRISTON, Roscoe C. Major Air Corps

WURTSMITH, Paul B. Captain Air Corps

1939-1940 (2)

ALLISON, Dixon M. Captain Air Corps

ARMSTRONG, Frank A., Jr. Captain Air Corps

BAEZ, Raphael, Jr. Major Air Corps

BALL, William Captain Air Corps

BENSON, Joseph W. Major Air Corps

BENTLEY, William C., Jr. Captain Air Corps

BISSON, Maurice C. Captain Air Corps

BLAIR, William P. Captain Field Artillery

BULGER, Joseph A. Captain Air Corps

BUNDY, John H. Captain Air Corps

134
APPENDIX 3

BUNKER, Howard G. Captain Air Corps CARLMARK, Carl W. 1st Lt. Air Corps CARLSON, Oscar F. Captain Air Corps CARROLL, James B. Major Air Corps CLIFTON, Ray W. 1st Lt. Air Corps COBB, Richard E. Captain Air Corps CRONAU, Robert T. Major Air Corps CROSS, Thomas J. Captain Infantry DANIEL, James L., Jr. Captain Air Corps DAVIES, John H. 1st Lt. Air Corps DAVIES, Ward J. Captain Air Corps DENNISTON, Joseph C. A. Captain Air Corps DUNLAP, Lionel H. Major Air Corps EARECKSON, William 0. Captain Air Corps EGAN, John W. 1st Lt. Air Corps FEAGAN, John A. 1st Lt. Air Corps FITE, John H. Captain Air Corps FORREST, Nathan B. Captain Air Corps GARRISON, Flint, Jr. Captain Air Corps GEER, George R. Captain Air Corps GEORGE, Otto C. Captain Air Corps GIFFIN, Calvin E. Lt. Colonel Air Corps GOSS, Wentworth Captain Air Corps GREELEY, Leonard J. Captain Chemical Warfare GRISWOLD, Francis H. 1st Lt. Air Corps GROVER, Orrin L. Captain Air Corps HALL, William E. Captain Air Corps HARDING, Neil B. Captain Air Corps HOLMES, Ralph E. Captain Air Corps HOWARD, Dudley B. Lt. Colonel Air Corps HOYLE, Gerald 1st Lt. Air Corps ISRAEL, Robert S., Jr. Captain Air Corps JEWETT, Alfred L. Major Air Corps JOHNSON, Bayard Major Air Corps JOHNSTON, Paul H. Captain Air Corps JOHNSTON, Robert D. Captain Air Corps KENNEDY, John C. Major Air Corps KESSLER, Alfred A., Jr. Captain Air Corps LACEY, Julius K. 1st Lt. Air Corps LANDON, Truman H. Captain Air Corps LAUGHINGHOUSE, Newman R. Major Air Corps LAWSON, Ernest H. Captain Air Corps LEE, Richard H. Captain Air Corps

135
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

LEE, William L. Captain Air Corps LYNCH, Thomas R. Captain Air Corps MACRUM, Robert S. 1st Lt. Air Corps MALLORY, Joel E. Captain Air Corps McHUGO, Michael E. Major Air Corps MELVILLE, Phillips Major Air Corps MILLS, John S. Captain Air Corps MORRILL, Phineas K., Jr. Captain Air Corps MORRISON, Raymond Major Air Corps NORSTAD, Lauris 1st Lt. Air Corps NORTHRUP, George G. Captain Air Corps O'CONNOR, Charles W. Captain Air Corps OFSTHUN, Sidney A. Captain Air Corps OLIVE, James F., Jr. Captain Air Corps OTT, Frederick W. Captain Air Corps PARKER, Hugh A. Captain Air Corps PENNINGTON, Hansford W. Captain Air Corps PHILLIPS, James F. Captain Air Corps PII'S, Albert B. Major Air Corps REED, Allen W. Captain Air Corps RICE, Herbert E. Captain Air Corps RICKER, George W. Major Coast Artillery ROGERS, Elmer J., Jr. Captain Air Corps RONIN, James A. Captain Air Corps ROSE, Elmer P. Captain Air Corps SAMFORD, John A. Captain Air Corps SCHANNEP, Dwight B. Captain Air Corps SELWAY, Robert R. Captain Air Corps SHEPHARD, Willard R. Captain Air Corps SIRMYER, Edgar A., Jr. Captain Air Corps SPRAGUE, John T. Captain Air Corps STEED, Thomas W. Captain Air Corps STEEL, George H. Captain Air Corps STEELE, Wycliffe E. Captain Air Corps STEWART, Malcolm N. Major Air Corps SUTrON, James S. 1st Lt. Air Corps TALLY, Fred 0. Captain Air Corps TITUS, Donald W. Captain Air Corps TUNNER, William H. Captain Air Corps WALKER, Ronald R. Captain Air Corps WALTHALL, LeRoy A. Major Air Corps WARREN, Max H. Captain Air Corps WATKINS, Dudley W. Captain Air Corps

136
APPENDIX 3

WEBSTER, Lewis S. Major Air Corps WOOD, Floyd B. Captain Air Corps WRIGHT, Stuart P. 1st Lt. Air Corps ZIMMERMAN, Don Z. Captain Air Corps

1939-1940 (3) ANDERSEN, James R. Captain Air Corps ANDERSON, Frederick L., Jr. Captain Air Corps ANDREW, James W. Captain Air Corps ARNOLD, Donald D. Captain Air Corps BAILEY, Henry M. Captain Air Corps BAILEY, Joseph P. Major Air Corps BEAL, Oscar L. Major Air Corps BELL, William J. 1st Lt. Air Corps BENNER, Donald W. Captain Air Corps BOATNER, Bryant L. Captain Air Corps BOGERT, Howard Z. Major Air Corps BOOTH, Charles L. Captain Field Artillery BRADLEY, Mark E., Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps BRANDT, Carl A. 1st Lt. Air Corps BROWNFIELD, Ralph 0. Captain Air Corps BURGESS, Walter K. Major Air Corps BURLINGAME, Paul, Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps CALLAWAY, Lambert S. Captain Air Corps CLARK, Ray H. Major Air Corps COLMAN, William T. Captain Air Corps COOK, Frank L. Major Air Corps COUTLEE, Melie J. Captain Air Corps CRAIGIE, Laurence 'C. Major Air Corps CROSTHWAITE, John C. Captain Air Corps DARROW, Don 0. 1st Lt. Air Corps DAY, Edwin M. Captain Air Corps DEERWESTER, Charles H. Captain Air Corps DENSFORD, Charles F. 1st Lt. Air Corps DOLAN, William C. Captain Air Corps DOWNEY, Hugh C. Major Air Corps DU BOSE, Thomas J. Captain Air Corps DUKE, James E., Jr. Major Air Corps EARLY, James F. J. Major Air Corps EASTON, Robert L. Captain Air Corps FARNUM, William C. Major Air Corps FREDERICK, Linus D. Captain Air Corps GIBSON, Richard W. Major Air Corps

137
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

GILGER, Chester P. Captain Air Corps

GLASCOCK, John R. Major Air Corps GODDARD, George W. Major Air Corps

GRAVES, Davis D. Captain Air Corps GRIFFITH, John S. Major Air Corps GRUSSENDORF, Richard A. 1st Lt. Air Corps HAMLIN, Winfield S. Major Air Corps HAMPTON, Ephraim M 1st Lt. Chemical Warfare

HAMPTON, Thomas K. 2d Lt. Air Corps HANLON, William J. Major Air Corps

HEROLD, Armin F. Lt. Colonel Air Corps HOLLOMAN, George V. Captain Air Corps

HORTON, Clarence F. Major Air Corps HOUSER, March H. Major Chemical Warfare

HOVEY, Burton M., Jr. Captain Air Corps

JACOBS, Paul M. Captain Air Corps JORDAN, Howell H. Captain Infantry KANE, Joseph L. Lt. Comdr. U.S. Navy KEILLOR, Russell Captain Air Corps

KELLY, Archibald M. Captain Air Corps

KENNY, John P. Captain Air Corps

KOONTZ, Leonidas L. Major Air Corps LADD, Joseph J. Captain Air Corps LAWSON, Lawrence A. Major Air Corps

LEE, Robert M. 1st Lt. Air Corps LEHMAN, Arthur J. Captain Air Corps

LEWIS, Mark K., Jr. Captain Air Corps

LINDSAY, Richard C. Captain Air Corps LUNDBERG, George G. Major Air Corps

LYON, Donald R. Captain Air Corps McALLISTER, Charles D. Major Air Corps MEISENHOLDER, Philo G. Captain Air Corps

MELANSON, Arthur J. Lt. Colonel Air Corps MENESES, Arturo Major Chilean Air Force

MEYER, Walter T. Major Air Corps

MILLER, Paul G. 1st Lt. Air Corps MORRIS, Joseph T. Major Air Corps NAPIER, Ezekiel W. Captain Air Corps NEWBERRY, James P. Captain Air Corps NOYES, Edgar T. Captain Air Corps

PARKER, Lewis R. Captain Air Corps PORTER, Edward H. Captain Air Corps REEVES, Dache McC. Major Air Corps

138
APPENDIX 3

RICH, Arnold H. Major Air Corps

ROGERS, Oscar L. Major Air Corps

SALISBURY, Glenn C. Major Air Corps

SALSMAN, John G. Major Air Corps

SELBY, Irving R. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Arthur LaS. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Donald B. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, George F. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Harold D. Major Air Corps

SMITH, Harold L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

TARRO, John A. Captain Air Corps

THORPE, Clarence S. Captain Air Corps

TRUESDELL, Karl, Jr. 1st Lt. Air Corps

TURNER, Howard M. Major Air Corps

WAINER, Perry Lt. Colonel Air Corps

WEST, Casper P. Captain Air Corps

WETZEL, Emery L. Captain Air Corps

WILLIAMSON, Russell L. Major Air Corps

WISEHART, Harry C. Major Air Corps

WOODBURY, Murray C. Captain Air Corps

YORK, John Y., Jr. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

1939-1940 (4)

AGEE, Walter R. Captain Air Corps

ANDERSON, Alvord Van P., Jr. Captain Air Corps

ANDERSON, Edward W. Captain Air Corps

BASSETT, Charles A. Captain Air Corps

BASSETT, Harold H. Captain Air Corps

BAER, Thurston H. Captain Air Corps

BROWNFIELD, Leon R. Captain Air Corps

BRYAN, Thomas L., Jr. Captain Air Corps

CARPENTER, Earle J. Captain Air Corps

CARR, Harold H. Major Air Corps

CARTER, Merlin I. Captain Air Corps

CHANDLER, Homer B. Major Air Corps

CHEYNEY, Sam W. Captain Air Corps

CHIANG, Wego 2d Lt. Chinese Army

COTE, Narcisse L. Captain Air Corps

COVINGTON, John C. Captain Air Corps

CRESSEY, George G. Major Air Corps

DAVENPORT, Robert B. Captain Air Corps

DAVIDSON, Rufus B. Major Air Corps

DOUBLEDAY, Daniel C. Captain Air Corps

139
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL

DRAKE, Alonzo M. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

DYER, Harvey F. Captain Air Corps

EASTON, R. Loyal Captain Air Corps

ELLISON, James A. Captain Air Corps

FATOR, Lilburn D. Captain Air Corps

FOWLER, John G. Captain Air Corps

GAVIN, Edward M. 1st Lt. Air Corps

GERHART, John K. Captain Air Corps

GOODRICH, Charles G. Captain Air Corps

GRANT, Harold W. Captain Air Corps

GREENE, Carl F. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

GROSS, Walter W. Captain Air Corps

HALE, Dudley D. Captain Air Corps

HAMMOND, James W. Major Air Corps

HARDY, Donald L. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HARPER, Earle G. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

HEBER, Reginald Captain Air Corps

HILDRETH, Edward E. Major Air Corps

HOCKENBERRY, Earle W. 1st Lt. Air Corps

HOLCOMB, Leslie P. Major Air Corps

HOUGHTON, Junius H. Colonel Air Corps

HUTCHISON, John J. 1st Lt. Air Corps

JOHNSON, Arnold T. 1st Lt. Air Corps

KOENIG, Ira R. Lt. Colonel Air Corps

LEE, Morris J. Captain Air Corps

LEWIS, Millard Captain Air Corps

MARTIN, Pardoe Major Air Corps

McCOY, Howard M. Captain Air Corps

MEYER, Trenholm J. Captain Air Corps

MILLER, Joseph A. Captain Air Corps

MILLIS, William C. Captain Air Corps

MOODY, George P. Captain Air Corps

MOORE, Howard Captain Air Corps

MOORE, John G. Major Air Corps

MORROW, John J. Captain Air Corps

MORSE, Winslow C. Captain Air Corps

MOSLEY, Thomas L. Captain Air Corps

NEWSTROM, Herbert M. Captain Air Corps

OFFUTT, William B. Captain Air Corps

OLSEN, Norman B. Captain Air CorpsO'NEAL, Joel G. Captain Air Corps

PERRIN, Edwin S. Captain Air Corps

POWER, Thomas S. Captain Air Corps

140
APPENDIX 3

PRINDLE, Hoyt L. Captain Air Corps

PRITCHARD, Frank H Lt. Colonel Air Corps

REED, Minthome W. Captain Air Corps

RENSHAW, Harry N. 1st Lt. Air Corps

ROBEY, Pearl H. Captain Air Corps

RYAN, Llewellyn 0. Captain Air Corps

ST. JOHN, Adrian Lt. Colonel Chemical Warfare

SANDERS, Homer L. Captain Air Corps

SIMENSON, Edwin G. 1st Lt. Air Corps

SIMS, Turner A., Jr. Captain Air Corps

SMITH, Luther Stevens Major Air Corps

STEWART, Robert W. Captain Air Corps

STONE, Charles B., III Captain Air Corps

STRADER, Ralph B. Captain Air Corps

STRANATHAN, Leland S. Captain Air Corps

STROHBEHN, Edward L. Captain Field Artillery

SWOFFORD, Ralph P., Jr. Captain Air Corps

SWYTER, Carl 1st Lt. Air Corps

TATE, Robert F. Captain Air Corps

TAYLOR, Robert K. Captain Air Corps

THOMPSON, James McK. Captain Air Corps

TODD, Edgar R. Captain Air Corps

TULL, Lloyd H. Captain Air Corps

VAN MET1ER, Samuel W. Captain Air Corps

WADMAN, John F. Captain Air Corps

WALKER, Thomas J., Jr. Major U.S. Marine Corps

WELLS, Harold R. Major Air Corps

WHATLEY, George Major Air Corps

WHITE, Daniel B. Captain Air Corps

WHITE, Edward H. Major Air Corps

WILLIAMS, Gerald E. 1st Lt. Air Corps

WILLIAMS, Roger V. Captain Air Corps

WITIKOP, Hilbert M. Major Air Corps

WOODWARD, Henry G. Major Air Corps

WRIGHT, Roy T. Captain Air Corps

YOST, Emmett F. Captain Air Corps

141
Index

AAF Board, 83 also Milling, Naiden, Frank, Peabody,

AAF School of Applied Tactics, 83 Dargue, Harmon.

Adjutant General, The, 25, 29, 69 Attack Aviation, 12, 33, 35, 57, 64. See

Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps, 3 also Courses.

Air Corps, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20-24, 27-35, Aviation Section, Signal Corps, 3

38, 39, 41, 42, 55-57, 59, 60, 68, 69,

76, 77, 79-85 Baker Board, 29

Air Corps Board, 15, 28-31, 33, 56, 77, Bissell, Clayton, 9, 18

81, 82 Brereton, Lewis H., 18

Air Corps Proving Ground, 31 Brett, George H., 43

Air Corps Tactical School, see also

Appendix 1. Chiteau-Thierry, battle of, 4, 5 as Air Corps doctrinal center, 56-59 Chennault, Claire L., 29, 38, 40, 76, 77

and Air University, 84-85 Chief of Air Corps, 23

and Army's educational system, 16 Chief of Air Service, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19,

assistance of, to Air Corps Board, 20, 56, 57

29-32 Clausewitz, Karl von, 62, 73

building for, 14-24 Command and General Staff School, 2,

and Composite Group, 32-33 16, 20, 34, 38-40

established, 11 Commandant, 9, 12-15, 17-20, 22, 23,

graduates of, 42-43 28-30, 34-36, 38-40, 69, 76, 83. See

move of, 23-25 also Hensley, Culver, Curry, Pratt,

organization of, 12, 34-37 Weaver, Westover.

plans to reopen, 82-83 Courses

relations with Infantry School, 22 Aeronautical Engineering, 3, 8, 12,

replaced by AAFSAT, 83 20, 21

short course program recommended, Antiaircraft Defense, 11

79-80 Armament, 10, 67

suspends classes, 81-82 Army Regulations, 10

War College maneuvers, 33-34 Attack Aviation, 35

and WDGS, 68-69 Balloons and Airships, 12, 35

Air Service (AEF), 3-16, 18-20, 22, 28, Bombardment Aviation, 35

41, 55-57. See also ChAteau-Thierry, Cavalry, 3, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, 81

Meuse-Argonne, Mitchell, St. Mihiel. Chemical Warfare, 35, 36, 81

Air Service Board, 15 Coast Artillery, 20, 35, 42

Air Service Tactical School Combat Orders, 11, 12, 35, 36, 39,

and Air Service Board, 15 80

established, 11-12 Combined Arms, 12, 35

and faculty, 15-18 Communications, 3, 10, 36, 80

and Infantry and Infantry School, Employment of Combined Air

22 Force, 62

organization of, 12-13 Field Artillery, 20, 35, 36, 42, 81

and students, 19 Field Fortifications, 35

War College maneuvers, 23 Field Service Regulations, 10

Air University, 84 Ground Tactics, 36, 81

Army Air Forces, 71, 83 Hygiene and Sanitation, 10

Army War College, 2, 22, 33, 34, 39, Infantry, 20, 35, 36, 38, 42, 62, 81

40 International Air Regulations, 35

Arnold, H. H., 32, 79 Logistics, 35, 39, 80, 84

Assistant Commandant, 13-15, 17, 18, Maps and Photographs, 36

20, 22, 23, 28-30, 35, 36, 38-40. See Medical Corps, 35, 42

143
INDEX

Meteorology, 3, 12 General Service & Staff College, 2

Military Geography and Strategy, George, Harold H., 43

36 George, Harold L., 29, 40, 58, 67, 71

Military Intelligence, 35, 36, 80 GHQ Air Force, 32, 55, 56, 63, 69, 70, 72

Military Organization, 36 Gorrell, E. S., 6

Mobilization, 36 Graduates, see also Appendix 3.

Naval Operations, 36 of arms and services (other than

Navigation 3, 18, 10, 12 air), 42

Observation Aviation, 35, 59 contribution of, to World War II,

Organization of the Army, 12 42-43.

Photography, 10, 12 foreign officer, 42

Pursuit Aviation, 35 from Langley, 19, 41

Reconnaissance, 80 from Maxwell, 42

Stable Management, 12 total number of, 42

Staff, 11, 12

Supply, 11, 12 Haddon, Julian B., 40

Troops in Campaign and Tactics, 10 Hall, Charles P., 41

Culver, Clarence C., 23 Hanley, Thomas J., Jr., 9, 18

Curriculum Hansell, Haywood S., Jr., 40, 58, 65, 71

broadened, 11-14 Harmon, Benjamin F., 41

at flying schools, 3 Harmon, Millard F., 40

of Field Officers' School, 9-10 Hensley, William N., Jr., 12

increase of air subjects in, 35 Hill, Edmund W., 38

ground force subjects in, 38 Hodges, Courtney, 41

proposed for Air Service School of House, Edwin J., 9, 18

Application. 7-8

Curry, John F., 23, 29, 34, 76, 83 Infantry, 2, 3, 5, 6, 19, 20, 22, 33, 35,

36, 38, 41, 42, 55, 60-62, 64, 81. See

Dargue, Herbert A., 37, 39 also Courses.

Doctrine, 10, 14, 19, 20, 29-31, 41, 43, Infantry School, 2, 22, 33

55, 56, 59-62, 69-72, 82, 83, 85 Infantry School of Practice, 2

Dorland, Chester P., 9 Instructors, 3, 9, 10, 13, 15-18, 21, 29,

Douhet, Giulio, 57, 58 31, 35, 36, 38-41, 55, 57, 59, 61, 64,

Drayton, Harry C., 9 66-68, 70-75, 77, 80, 85. See also

Duncan, Asa N., 43 Staff and Faculty.

Dunton, Delmar H., 43

Johnson, Davenport, 9, 18

Eaker, Ira C., 38, 41, 43 Jouett, John H., 9

Easterbrook, Arthur E., 9

Emmons, Delos C., 43 Kenney, George C., 18, 43

Knight, Louis R., 9

Fairchild, Muir, 40, 71, 75, 80 Kuter, Laurence S., 40, 57, 58, 71, 80

Federal Aviation Commission, 65, 67

Field Manual 1-5, 69 Ladd, Arthur K., 29

Field Service Regulations of 1923, 62 Langley Field, Va., 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15,

Flying Schools 23, 24, 28

College Park, Md., 3 Lawson, Walter R., 9

North Island, San Diego, Calif., 3 Lee, Henry, 1

Forrest, Nathan B., 43 Library, 14, 17, 28, 36, 82

Fort Benning, Ga., 22, 23; see also Lincoln, Rush B., 43

Infantry School.

Fort Eustis, Va., 22 McHenry, James, 1

Frank, Walter H., 17, 18, 20, 43 McNarney, Joseph T., 9, 16, 18, 43

144
INDEX

Martin, Frederick L., 9 revise courses, 20-21

Maxwell Field, Ala., 12, 13, 22-25, shortage, 14, 39, 82

27-28, 30, 31 work with Mitchell, 10

Meuse-Argonne, battle of, 5, 6 Stratemeyer, George E., 43

Miller Field, N. Y., 23, 24 Students, see also Appendix 3.

Milling, Thomas DeW., 9-13, 15, 16, 18 admission of, at Langley Field,

Mitchell, William, 4-7, 10, 56, 57 18-20

admission standards revised, 41

Naiden, Earl L., 13-15, 17-20, 22, 43 arms and services (other than air),

Naval War College, 37, 39, 40 20-21

Navy (U.S.), 42 doctrine, 35, 59

first class and 1921 exercises, 9

Observation Aviation, 24, 35, 37, 59, 60. Infantry School, 33 See also Courses. and Maxwell Field, 41-42.

Olds, Robert, 18, 43, 57 War College maneuvers, 22-23, 33

Olsmith, Vernon G., 35, 39, 41

Textbooks, 21, 30

P-26, 76 Tinker, Clarence L., 43

Peabody, Hume, 29, 34, 35, 38, 40, 62 Training Regulations 440-14

Porter, William N., 39 of 1922, 20

Pratt, Henry C., 40, 69 of 1935, 69

Pursuit Aviation, 6, 13, 20, 35, 37, 61, Trenchard, Hugh M., 4

66, 76. See also Courses. 23d Composite Group, 32, 33

Ramey, Howard K., 43 24th Attack-Bombardment Squadron, 33

Reynolds, Clearton H., 9 Twining, Nathan F., 43

Robinson, Charles McK., 29, 38

Rudolph, Jacob H., 30 Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 40, 43

Ryan, William, 29, 30

Walker, Kenneth N., 18, 38, 43, 57, 67

Saint Mihiel, battle of, 5, 6 Walton, Charles W., 9, 38

Saville, Gordon P., 30, 40 War Department, 7, 9, 10, 21, 28-30,

School of Application for Cavalry and 32, 55, 62, 68, 70, 80, 81

Field Artillery, 2 Washington, George, 1,2

Seaton, David S., 38 Weaver, Walter R., 83

Sections. See Courses. Webster, Robert M., 40, 71

Sherman, William C., 10, 13, 16, 20 Weems, George H., 38, 41

Simonds, George S., 34 Welshmer, R. R., 36, 39

Skemp, Samuel C., 30 Westover, Oscar I., 15, 18-20, 43

Spaatz, Carl, 43 Whitehead, Ennis C., 43

Staff and Faculty, see also Appendix 2. Wilson, Donald, 29, 35, 38, 40, 58, 65,

and Air Corps Board, 28-32 71, 77, 80

and Air Service Board, 15 Wise, W. W., 41

at Air University, 84. Woodard, Jacob M., 9

caliber of, 16 World War I, 3, 4, 7, 14, 17, 21, 24,

committees, 36 55, 56, 58-61, 68, 71, 72, 74, 84

impact of World War I on, 17-18 World War II, 18, 40, 42, 43, 59, 68,

initial, 9-10 71, 84, 85

at Maxwell Field, 38-41 Wright, Bennett W., 22, 33, 41, 56, 76

recommendations for, 16

recommends composite group, 32 Yount, Barton K., 43

145