between fishing effort and fishing mortality, and catch
and fishing mortality. Clearly. these equations are perti-
nent to the evaluation of the relationship between 2

fisheries management technique and its contro] of
fishing mortality. Equations (1) and (2) will be discussed
further when considering specific management
techniques

Fishing effort is a function of the amount of fishing
gear and the amount of time the gear is used. If only one
type of gear is used (all units of gear assumed to be of
equal efficiency; and fishing practices are relatively
standard. then fishing effort is equivalent to the total
amount of time spent fishing. When a variety of types of
fishing gear or fishing practices is used, then fishing ef-
fort is an additive combination of the amount of time
spent fishing with each gear type or fishing practice.
Coefficients for each term of this combination are used
to account for differences in efficiency between types of
fishing gear and fishing practices. Thus, the amount of
time spent at one type of fishing is expressed in terms of
the amount of time spent at another type of fishing
(defined as the standard) which results in the same
fishing mortality rate. Clearly, effort has many com-
ponents: the amount of gear. the type of gear, how much
it is fished, and how it is fished.

2) Relationship of fisheries management techniques
to other biological impacts: Fisheries management ac-
tions may have more specific biological impacts than
control of fishing mortality. Some fishery management
techniques are effective in restricting the impact of
‘fishing on specific components of the resource. For
example. the techniques may be intended to protect
smal] fish, spawning fish, or fish of a particular species.
Such biological objectives are usually related to implicit
socioeconomic objectives, for instance. the assumption
that protecting small fish will increase vield per recruit
(and revenues): the assumption that protecting spawn-
ing fish will increase the probability of a good recruit-
ment and future productivity (and revenues): and the
assumption that total benefits will be increased by
protecting a particular species from one user group
(foreign fishing for example) in favor of another
(domestic fishery}.

3) Relationship of management action to the natural
functioning of the fishery system: The ability of
fishery managers to influence the future state of the
resource is limited. Total productivity of the system is
ultimately determined by such factors as incident solar
radiation and available nutrients, not by fisheries
management. Fishery managers are more capable of in-
fluencing the structure (species and age distribution) of
the system. but even this ability is limited. Thus, in
evaluating fishery management techniques, the
reasonableness of the goals that the techniques are in-
tended to accomplish should be considered.

Fisheries management serves as an artificial form of
control of system dynamics. There are other mechanisms
which stabilize the system, such as the natural biological

nD

processes which act to compensate for or buffer against
perturbations. and the socioeconomic interrelationships
between fishing activity (commercial or recreational)
and the activities of related industries and markets.
Fisheries management techniques should reinforce the
functioning of these other mechanisms. not interfere
with them

4) Relationship of fishery management techniques to
harvesting efficiency: There are many ways of
expressing the efficiency of fishing activity. It may be
expressed in terms of the proportion of total potential
productivity of the resource (short- and/or long-term)
actually utilized. the cost per unit of catch, the cost per
unit of fishing mortality generated by fishing, the total
income generated per unit of catch. or value of catch per
unit of energy (fossil fuel) used, to give some examples.
The specific measure of efficiency applicable to a par-
ticular fishery management plan depends on the objec-
tives of the plan. However it is defined. the effect of a
management technique on efficiency is an important
criterion for evaluating that technique.

5) Historical precedent for application of the fishery
management technique: In some cases, success of a
fishery management plan will depend on its credibility
with those managed and with society in general.
Therefore, past perceived successes or failures of par-
ticular fishery management techniques should be con-
sidered. The lack of historical precedent for a particular
approach is not necessarily a disadvantage when no pop-
ular alternatives are available.

6) Relationship of the fishery management technique
to cost of enforcement and administration: The net
benefit of fishery management (over that which would
accrue in its absence) must include the cost of ad-
ministering and enforcing the management programs.
Some fisheries management techniques are inherently
more difficult (and costly) to administer and enforce
than others.

7) The relationship of the fishery management
technique to non-target components of the fishery
system: Biological, economic and social objectives of
ery management are often specific to particular com-
ponents of the fishery system , a particular species. a
particular user group or a particular processing segment
of the industry. While a fisheries management technique
may be appropriate for a set of specific objectives, the
impact of its application on non-target components of
the resource should be considered. In the case of species-
specific biological objectives, the effect of management
actions on the capacity of the harvesting, processing, or
related sectors to redirect attention to other components
of the resource is particularly important.

8) Relationship of the fishery management technique
to its scientific basis: The specific application of a
management technique is usually based on scientific
consideration of the expected short- and/or long-term
impact of the action. The cost and feasibility of


more directly in the market-established price because
they directly affect not only the prices received by fish-
ermen, but also the prices paid by processors/whole-
salers to the harvester. The incentive-disincentive plan
attempts to affect only the prices received ex-vessel, and
thus higher market level prices should not be affected
except by conventional market demand and supply
phenomena.

Since the incentive-disincentive plan has actually
been considered as a possible management approach for
groundfish in the northeast and since price controls
operate in a similar manner, a discussion of the
economics and problems of the incentive-disincentive
plan is presented for illustration. As already stated, this
approach attempts to make the price of the overfished
(however this is defined) species less attractive than the
price of the underutilized species by directly influencing
returns to fishermen by means of a pool of funds created
by the landings fees. The relative difference in prices in-
fluences the harvesting activities by redirecting effort
from the overfished species to the underutilized species.

The effectiveness of the incentive-disincentive plan is
predicated on its acceptance by industry and by the
ability of management to incorporate changes in the
bioeconomic environment into the plan. That is,
management must constantly monitor such changes in
order for the incentive-disincentive components to be
determined. This approach, like other regulatory or
management techniques, must be established in accor-
dance with a goal or set of objectives which explicitly or
implicitly sets some desired level of catch and/or effort.

However, of far greater importance to the viability of
the incentive-disincentive approach is the development
of markets for the less desired species. It is often uncer-
tain how such markets will be developed. Currently,
most commercially-viable, underutilized species are
either foreign-caught or exported by the United States.
In order to sustain an expanded fishery for underutilized
species, domestic and/or foreign markets must be
developed, and the on-board quality-control, handling,
and storage of the fish must be improved.

Initially. such a program will require funds for its es-
tablishment. Federal funds could be used for ‘seed’
money or an initial endowment. However. the long-term
solvency of the fund is an important consideration in the
development of such a plan. The cost and source of funds
for market development must also be considered.

Almost all underutilized species are candidates for the
incentive-disincentive program. However, the more
common species with respect to the northeast and mid-
Atlantic areas include silver hake, mackerel. squid,
dogfish, and butterfish.

An incentive-disincentive plan presents certain prob-
lems. It requires an agency or group to administer it; it
may lead to new entrants in the underutilized species
fishery which may dissipate any gains in net benefits;
such a plan requires management to adjust constantly
the incentive-disincentive rates as either abundance or
market conditions change: it also requires information

on harvesting costs which is not generally available, and
extensive information on stocks. This approach would
probably be costly in terms of monitoring and ad-
ministration. However, the program, combined with
other fishery management techniques. could be
beneficial. It would save waste from discards.
Technological innovation, often assumed to remain the
same under many other regulatory approaches, would
not be discouraged. Importantly, effort and therefore
fishing mortality would be reduced on the overfished
species.

As noted above, in principle, price controls work to in-
fluence fishing effort and fishing mortality in a manner
similar to an incentive-disincentive program. However,
price controls are potentially an alternative to species-
specific catch or effort regulations where price is highly
flexible. If price were hell constant {independent of
supply), then the incentive to harvest a resource would
decrease as abundance decreased. Thus negative feed-
back between fishing effort and resource condition would
be established or reinforced, tending toward stability in
the system.

Price controls intended to influence fishing mortality
via the functioning of the socioeconomic sector could be
imposed at the harvester, processor, wholesaler, or
retailer level. Price controls at higher market levels
would affect the derived demand for fish and related
products at all lower market levels, e.g., a price control
at the retail level would affect not only the consumers
demand at the retail level but also the retailer's demand
from wholesalers and the wholesaler's/processor’s de-
mand from harvesters. The specific effects would, of
course. depend also on other factors such as market sub-
stitutability, relative product prices, and export poten-
tial. However, price controls could benefit consumers in
the form of reduced prices, though shortages (or black
markets) for products in high demand could occur.

Agriculture has had a long history of price controls,
and more especially, supports and/or loan programs.
Most price support programs were based on the concept
of parity. the parity price being pegged to the price of
some other products and fluctuating from time to time
with the price of those products. Such programs attempt
to provide a standard of living or minimum income,
while ensuring an adequate supply of agricultural com-
modities and preventing soil depletion. Many of the loan
programs were actually price- or income-support
programs termed ‘“‘non-recourse” loans. They resulted in
payments made to producers when market prices fell
below a specified percent of parity price. However, it
should be realized that these programs were all poten-
tially directed at regulating the market price, and
thereby, affecting the allocation of goods and services.

It is unclear how these programs could be used to help
resolve the problems of managing the fisheries of the
Northwest Atlantic. Fisheries problems are not the same
as those in agriculture. Many of the agricultural
problems resulted in the federal government buying and
storing commodities; fish commodities are not as easily



loss of benefits associated with such a conservative
strategy may be minor. Obviously. where demand for a
resource is low, a more conservative strategy may be
used to reduce the amount of stock assessment informa-
tion necessary to support management decisions.

The relationship of catch restrictions to biological im-
pacts other than fishing mortality is usually unknown.
Where catch is restricted for a group of species about
equally vulnerable to exploitation. the most valuable
species is likely to be caught most: thus. the species com-
position of the resource may change. Catch restrictions
which cause a change in the size and composition of the
resource may indirectly affect recruitment, natural mor-
tality. and growth, but usually such impacts can be fore-
seen only qualitatively.

In general, application of catch restrictions is com-
patible with the dynamics of the fishery system. Catch is
usually reduced during periods of low productivity of the
resource and increased when productivity is high, tend-
ing to stabilize the biological component of the system.
Unfortunately, in some cases catch restrictions may
work to destabilize the system in the short term. This oc-
curs when the scientific basis of the regulation is in error.
When the resource is larger than anticipated, catch is
restricted to unnecessarily low levels and the resource in-
creases. However, when the resource is smaller than an-
ticipated, catch may in effect be unrestricted, resulting
in a further decline in abundance.

There is substantial historical precedent for the
application of catch restrictions, which have been used
for the management of marine commercial fisheries
throughout the world. In general, the success achieved
through application of catch restrictions depends on the
realism of the objectives they serve, and adequacy of the
scientific basis for management action. In the case of
New England groundfish, fishery management objec-
tives have been unclear. and the level of precision of
“state-of-the-art stock assessments” has been un-
satisfactory to those managing this highly-valued
resource. Therefore, application of catch restrictions for
New England groundfish management under the
auspices of FCMA has been controversial and generally
unsatisfactory, establishing a poor precedent for the
future. .

Part of the difficulty associated with catch restrictions
on New England groundfish has been in law enforce-
ment. Special problems arise when specific regulations
are applied to subunits of the resource, because catch
sources are hard to identify and relate to subunit catch
limits.

Desired fishing mortality rates are more directly
achieved by regulation of fishing effort than by regula-
tion of catch. Fishing effort (when standardized to ap-
propriate units) is directly proportional to fishing mor-
tality rate [see Equation (1)]. Therefore, once an ap-
propriate level of fishing effort is determined. this level
may be maintained without dependence on continuing
stock assessment. Stock assessments, in such a case,
would be used to monitor the response of the resource to

regulation. not as a basis for continuous updating of
regulations. Furthermore. there is evidence that fishery
resources during periods of low productivity are less
susceptible to severe reductions in biomass when they
are regulated by a constant fishing mortality (effort)
strategy than by a constant catch strategy. Unfortunate-
ly. fishing effort (in units proportiona! to fishing mortali-
ty) is difficult to measure. It has many components.
Furthermore, the relationship between nominal fishing
effort (raw data before standardization} and fishing mor-
tality changes when fishing practices and gear change.
Therefore, an iterative approach to determine the ap-
propriate fishing effort regulation might be necessary;
possibly using historic data on fishing effort as a basis for
selecting the starting point. Even a preliminary regula-
tion should be adequate to prevent long-term damage to
the resource without excessively sacrificing current
benefits. Trends in fishing mortality of the resource must
be monitored. but it would not be necessary to modify
fishing effort regulations routinely as is the case with
catch regulations. Furthermore, changes would be
modest relative to those necessary with catch
regulations. With catch management, changes in regula-
tion are necessary in response to variability in produc-
tion of the resource. With effort regulation, changes are
usually related to the socioeconomic sector of the system
which is less variable.

Fishing effort regulations are scientifically robust with
respect to stock assessments. The fishing mortality
associated with a particular effort regulation need not be
known precisely so long as trends in abundance and
productivity of the resource can be monitored. The con-
dition of the resource at any particular moment is of lit-
tle importance since catch will respond to stock size
automatically, given constant effort.

Catch and effort regulations will encourage each in-
dividual harvester to maximize efficiency (catch per unit
cost of harvesting) unless catch is limited during each
time unit of harvest. There is a potential for over-
capitalization where fisheries management is based on
catch or effort regulations and marginal profits are
adequate to attract more harvesters than necessary to
utilize the available resource fully. Since effort regula-
tion applies to harvesting units, not particular species
(as is the case with catch regulations), liarvesters are
able to divert effort from one component of the resource
to another, as they wish.

Effort regulation has been applied to marine commer-
cial fisheries less extensively than catch regulation. The
U.S.A. proposed effort regulations for the area off the
northeastern U.S.A. to the International Commission for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in the early
1970’s, but the proposal was rejected. Since then, Canada
has applied effort regulation to inshore fisheries along its
coast. Effort regulation has been applied to the ocean
quahog and surf clam fisheries in the Mid-Atlantic
Region. It is too early to judge the success of these
management actions. Fishing effort regulations are often
associated with such forms of management as limited



developing a scientific basis for the action varies, de-
pending on the technique used and the acceptable level
of risk that objectives will not be achieved. Furthermore,
the robustness of the technique relative to its scientific
basis also varies. To put this another way, given a vague
or imprecise scientific basis for action, some techniques
will nevertheless tend to serve the objectives of manage-
ment while others might suffer in effectiveness.

REGULATIONS APPLIED TO THE
HARVESTING SECTOR ASSOCIATED
WITH THE CONTROL OF FISHING
MORTALITY AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL
IMPACTS

Fishery ina “nent actions are usually in the form of
regulations applied to the harvesting sector. These
regulations are intended either to produce a direct
biological impact on the resource or to influence the dis-
tribution of benefits between users or user groups. The
former type of harvester regulation is discussed in this
section.

As indicated by Equations (1) and (2) in Part 1 of the
previous section, catch and fishing effort are directly
related to fishing mortality. Thus, restrictions on catch
and/or fishing effort are appropriate fishery manage-
ment techniques for “active” or direct attempts at con-
trolling fishing mortality (and accordingly, the short-
term and potentially long-term dynamics of the
resource). The relationship of active or direct fishery
management techniques to fishing mortality is described
by a simple function of socioeconomic variables specified
in the regulation. Other common fishery management
techniques which regulate the harvesting sector may be
termed “passive” since these methods do not directly
relate (by simple functions of socioeconomic variables
specified in the regulation) to fishing mortality although
they usually have some indirect effect. Spatial and tem-
poral restrictions on fishing activity, restrictions on
fishing gear, and restrictions on the nature of catch (as
opposed to the amount) are examples of such passive (or
indirect) management techniques. The effect of such
techniques on fishing mortality cannot be explicitly es-
timated; where effort and catch are unregulated, fishing
mortality remains theoretically unbounded.

Passive methods of regulation affect components of
fishing effort (type of gear used, fishing practices) but
other components are not controlled (the extent to which
each type of fishing gear and practices may be used),
thus the resulting mortality is not explicitly known.
These two types of fishery management techniques
regulating the activity of the harvesting sector are dis-
cussed below, with reference to the evaluation criteria
proposed in the previous section.

Active Regulation: An overall restriction on total catch
(during a specific time period) may be used to achieve a
desired fishing mortality rate. In order to determine the
appropriate restriction on total catch based on Equation

(2), population size must be estimated. Thus, the deter-
mination of the desired catch restriction is strongly
dependent on the accuracy and precision of assessments
of the status of the resource. Catch regulation is scien-
tifically a very demanding form of fishery management.
It is not robust with respect to its scientific basis. The
following example should clarify this point.

Assume that the optimum fishing mortality rate is
known, and that the fishing fleet is of an appropriate size
to generate this amount of fishing mortality on a con-
tinuing basis. Suppose further that the fishery is
managed by an overall annual catch quota and that the
size of the resource is underestimated by 25%; it will
become necessary to close the fishery for the last three
months of the year. Such a closure might have a severe
adverse social, economic, and political impact as well as
resulting in a suboptimum fishing mortality rate. On the
other hand, suppose that the stock is overestimated by
25%; this also will result in suboptimal fishing mortality
and possibly in some long-term adverse social, economic
and political impacts. In most cases, the precision of
stock assessments is such that 25% errors in estimates of
stock size will occur routinely.

Catch regulations designed to accomplish a specific
fishing mortality rate not only require accurate and
precise information on the size of the resource, but that
this information and the regulations based on it be
almost continuously updated. When the condition of the
resource changes rapidly relative to the time required for
collection and analysis of scientific data and revision of
management regulations, it may be impractical to
adjust regulations quickly enough to respond to the con-
dition of the resource.

The application of catch regulations is further com-
plicated for mixed fisheries (where more than one species
is captured by a unit of fishing effort). It may be impossi-
ble to achieve the desired fishing mortality for one
species without exceeding the desired mortality for
another. For two species which are closely associated in
trawl catches (cod and haddock on Georges Bank, for
example), catch regulations which produce significantly
different fishing mortalities for each species may result
in early closure of fishing for one of them followed by
wasteful discarding of catch which cannot be legally
landed and sold. The mixed-fishery problem may in
some cases be mitigated by gear and/or spatial-temporal
regulations (discussed below). There are also analytical
methods for designing an optimal set of species-specific
catch regulations for a mixed fishery (linear program-
ming for example), but the regulations may be subop-
timal with respect to a subset of the species.

Catch regulations may also be applied passively
(without direct consideration of the associated fishing
mortality). For a developing fishery where data and
analysis are minimal, the catch may be restricted as a
precaution, to prevent fishing mortality from becoming
excessive (this is referred to as a preemptive quota). This
form of regulation is most acceptable for resources which
are not in high demand. Thus, the potential short-term


of bottom trawls in the foreign squid fishery reduce the
by-catch of demersal fish.

Gear restrictions may also be used to reduce overall
fishing mortality. In such cases, gear restrictions act to
reduce the efficiency of fishing for some species or some
size groups. To the extent that gear efficiency and the
amount of fishing effort expended with the regulation in
place can be compared with gear efficiency and effort
without regulation. the effect of gear restriction on
fishing mortality can be evaluated. However, as with
temporal and spatial restrictions, the effect of gear
restrictions on fishing mortality will usually only be
known qualitatively. Gear restrictions in themselves are
not capable of providing full control of fishing mortality.
The appropriate set of gear restrictions for ac-
complishing a desired fishing mortality would have to be
determined iteratively. Where fishing effort and efficien-
cy have a significant potential for increase, tuning of the
management system will require periodic assessment of
the status of the resource.

There is considerable scientific knowledge about the
effectiveness of mesh regulations in reducing fishing
mortality as a function of fish length. It is clear that
mesh selection is not very precise. That is, the mesh size
which allows most fish smaller than a particular size to
escape will allow many fish larger than that size to es-
cape as well.

There are several appealing aspects of mesh
regulations. They should be relatively easy to enforce
except where multi-species fisheries require more than
one codend on-board, as in New England. The optimal
mesh regulation for protecting a component of the
fishery resource is relatively insensitive to the current
condition of the resource. Therefore, management by
mesh regulations may reduce the need for ongoing stock
assessments. In fact, if the minimum mesh size were es-
tablished at a level that would allow “adequate oppor-
tunity to spawn” prior to becoming vulnerable to the
fishing gear, no further regulation is likely to be
necessary from a conservation standpoint. But there is
usually no scientific basis for determining the amount
and quality of spawning opportunity which is adequate.
It is noteworthy that, for many fishery resources, post-
poning the age at first capture beyond the age of first
an increased yield per recrnit. Untor-

spawning resul
tun 5 sh selection is species speci
the optimal mesh size for a mixed species fishery will be
based on compromise.

Restrictions on the nature of the catch are sometimes
a means of accomplishing the same biological objectives
toward which gear or spatial-temporal restrictions are
directed. Gear restriction and spatial-temporal restric-
tions may be designed to prevent capture of small fish or
fish of a particular species. As an alternative to these
methods or in conjunction with them, the nature of the
catch may be regulated directly (minimum size regula-
tion or restriction on the taking or landing of specific
species). When the nature of the catch is regulated
without accompanying gear and _ spatial-temporal

herefore,

restrictions. the harvester is responsible for avoiding
specific components of the resource. Nevertheless. some
unwanted fish may be caught and this catch may be dis-
carded at sea with some accompanying mortality. Even
when harvesters can avoid restricted components of the
resource. some unwanted catch (and wasteful discard-
ing) may occur because of the desire to catch other
valuable components. For example. the capture of small
haddock can be avoided by using larger-mesh trawl gear.
but to do so may result in reduced catch rates of larger
haddock and some other species.

The benefits associated with gear restrictions, spatial-
temporal restrictions and restrictions on the nature of
the catch tend to be species specific. Thus, it is necessary
to consider the secondary impact of these fishery
management actions on other species. For example, a
mesh regulation or spawning ground closure appropriate
for one species may eliminate a fishery for another.

SOCIOECONOMIC METHODS FOR
INFLUENCING FISHING EFFORT

In addition to active and passive methods for control
of fishing mortality and the future state of the resource,
management techniques directed at influencing the
socioeconomic sector of the system may be considered.
The distinction between socioeconomic controls and ac-
tive and passive methods is found in the way in which
they attempt to contro] mortality or related components.
All three approaches affect the socioeconomic system.
The socioeconomic methods attempt indirectly to con-
trol mortality by directly influencing the socioeconomic
system toward a desired state of the fishery; the active
and passive methods are more direct attempts at con-
trolling mortality which indirectly influence the socio-
economic system.

Two techniques which can be used to influence fishing
effort and mortality through the functioning of the
socioeconomic sector are incentive-disincentive plans
and price controls. These may be considered as
variations of taxation depending upon how they are im-
plemented. Both techniques influence the ex-vessel
price, and thus revenues, in order to discourage or en-
courage the harvesting of a particular species

Incentive-disincentive plans attempt to redirect
vessels and harvesting from one species to another,
making the price of the first species less attractive (the
disincentive) than the price of the second (the incen-
tive). The incentive is financed by a system of pooled
landings fees. This approach has often been termed a
landings fee scheme, a taxation scheme, or a subsidy
program. Price controls also can function as an
incentive-disincentive plan by establishing a regulated
ceiling price on the more desired species and minimum
prices on the less desired species. However, price con-
trols, unlike the incentive-disincentive plan, do not in-
clude a mechanism whereby pooled funds can be used to
make the prices of the underutilized species more attrac-
tive to harvesters. Moreover, price controls interfere


NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F /NEC -4

This TM series is used for documentation and timely communication of
preliminary results, interim reports, or special purpose information, and

has not received complete formal review, editorial control, or detailed
editing

@
%s

2,

4
Fe
x
$
2

7) GS
PTment or

Noriheast rishery Managemeni
Task Force

Fishery Management Techniques,
A Review

Michael P. Sissenwine and James E. Kirkley

Woods Hole Laboratory, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, MA 02543

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Richard A. Frank. Administrator

National Marine Fisheries Service
Terry L. Leitzell, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries

Northeast Fisheries Center
Woods Hole, Massachusetts

October 1980


abundance. Given this objective, utilization of a vessel
allocation system would have to be extremely flexible to
adjust to changes in stock size and abundance as well as
to changes in market conditions. In addition, a vessel
allocation system, if based on ‘reasonable’ management
criteria such as conservation, would in fact be a form of
controlled access. Only those vessels with allocations
would be allowed to exploit a particular species or
species group.

Controlled Access. Limited entry, controlled entry,
licensing, stock certificates, vessel allocations, and taxa-
tion are all forms of controlled access. All attempt to
limit the level of effort either directly or indirectly, or
when applied in conjunction with catch or effort
regulations, to distribute benefits. Limited entry, licens-
ing, and siack icates grant property rights in the
fishery and thus directly control effort. Taxation
restricts effort by forcing out those vessels which are too
inefficient to pay the tax, i.e., their harvesting costs ap-
proximate their revenues; thus, taxation is an indirect
control on effort. Stock certificates are unusual in that
they are direct allocations of potential income. All of the
schemes are attempts to resolve the problems associated
with common property resources, e.g., dissipation of
rent, inefficient allocation of goods and services, etc.
Their differences are based on the way they operate and
whether or not they directly control productive input or
output.

During the past decade, various controlled access
schemes have been widely discussed. There has not
been, however, a consensus on their applicability. This
has been particularly true for the Northwest Atlantic
fisheries. However, before devoting further attention to
the various forms of limited entry, we will discuss the
reasons why controlled access has been so often ad-
vocated.

It is well documented in the literature on fishery
economics that the unregulated. open-access fishery
results in an inetficient allocation of resources. More, or
less. goods are produced than society requires, or alter-
natively, production is not at minimum cost. The ques-
tion arises. whether the resources used in harvesting
could be better employed in another industry or sector of
the economy with either a corresponding increase in the
aggregate production of goods and services, or a decrease
in the existing overall costs of production.

In the case of fisheries. inefficiency of production and
allocation are considered to follow from their common
property nature, i.e.. resources are commonly owned but
individually exploited. This situation creates a potential
for increasing the harvest (either by expanding fleet-size
or effort) until the market price is equal to average cost;
at this level. pure profit, rent, or producers’ surplus (the
difference between revenue and costs) becomes zero
(“dissipation of rent”). The common property nature of
the resource coupied with economic conditions can
create an environment in which there exists a potential
profit for anyone wishing to seek it. Prospective entrants

enter the fishery in an attempt to realize part or all of
that profit. However, their entry may result in increasing
the costs of production to the point where pure profit or
rent is dissipated, and the number of vessels or units of
effort coincide with the equilibrium between price and
average cost. This is the open access equilibrium in
which resources are misallocated, rent is zero, and net
benefits to society are not maximized.

Since the open access fishery leads to the above
problems, controls on entry or access have often been
recommended to prevent the dissipation of rent and/or
misallocation of resources by forcing some factor inputs
into more productive alternatives. The primary gain to
be expected from controlled entry is increased profit or
other net benefits. It would be expected that any viable
controlled access scheme considered for the groundfish
resources of the Northwest Atlantic would be directed at
preventing any new entrants and/or controlling the
current levels of effort, allowing time to bring stock size
and effort into an equilibrium; over time, changes in
fleet strength, stocks, and economic conditions should
improve the allocation of resources, and thus, economic
etticiency. Working against this argument, however, is
the fact that the current fleet appears capable of over-
fishing; as a result, possible gains by controlled access
schemes may be difficult to realize. It also should be
realized that the alleged misallocation of resources may
not be the “beast” management needs to attack, since
little is known about the size of economic magnitude of
the inefficiencies in the groundfish fishery, and whether
particular remedies are socially desirable. Nevertheless,
controlled access schemes probably offer some potential
for improving efficiency in terms of resource allocation,
prevention of overfishing, and improvements in the
general welfare of society.

A primary problem of most controlled access schemes
is deciding which vessels and/or harvesters will be in-
cluded or excluded. This is particularly true for licensing
and stock-certificate programs. With stock certificates
moreover, appropriate allocations must be determined
and the problems potentially arising from transfer of cer-
tificates must be addressed. It may take several years
before the benefits of controlled access schemes are
realized unless vessels are forced out of the fishery. In ad-
dition, at its present strength, the fleet may be capable
of overfishing in periods of low stock size.

Taxation, another potential management tool,
presents certain problems: it requires legislation; it in-
creases the need for flexibility in management because
taxes have to be adjusted in response to market changes;
finally, taxation requires an organization to appropriate
and distribute tax revenues. However, taxation could
result in a level of effort consonant with maximum net
benefits.

Controlled access schemes, though they are not
without problems, offer a viable approach to managing
fisheries for maximum net benefits. Other types of effort
regulations, which do not require limitations on entry,


stored. In addition. there are still the marketing
problems for the underutilized species. Thus. further
study is needed before serious consideration is given to
using any of the above-mentioned programs as a form or
part of fisheries management.

METHODS OF ALLOCATING
CATCH OR BENEFITS

In addition to influencing the future condition of the
resource and the overall level of short- and long-term
benefits. fisheries management also affects the alloca-
tion or distribution of benefits and income. The primary
fisheries management techniques used to allocate
benefits are trip limits. vessel allocations, and
controlled-access schemes.

Trip Limits. These restrictions limit the catch of a
particular species or group of species on a per-trip basis.
usually expressed in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries as
catch per-vessel-day or per-vessel-week. The purpose
has been to distribute the total allowed catch over the
period during which it was intended to be caught.
However. the use of trip limits has seldom prevented a
fishery from being closed. In fact, the perceived
economic impacts of trip limits low enough to prevent
closures (given the level of effort in the fishery) have
often been so severe that it has been necessary for fishery
managers to raise overall quotas in order to increase trip
limits.

Trip limits may have an effect on the level and dis-
‘bution of gross and net incomes. That is. if catches per
trip are constrained, total revenues may also be con-
strained. However, trip limits not only affect the income
or revenue component. they also may affect the cost
component; this depends on how trip limits are im-
plemented. If trip limits are used in accordance with an
overall quota, and there are no constraints on the
number of trips, fishermen will attempt to increase their
number of trips in order to harvest as much as possible
before the overall quota results in a closure. This in-
creases the cost of harvesting on a per-unit harvest basis
over time. The increased cost per unit harvested results
in decreased net income or profit, and may eventually
force the less efficient vessels (with respect to the trip
limit) out of the fishery.

Trip limits are a method of allocation of income and
benefits to harvesters and other user groups. If they are
set in accordance with an overall quota, they may result
not only in a decrease in revenue per vessel, they may
also increase harvesting costs, thus causing net benefits
to society to decrease. However, more profound are the
potential impacts of trip limits and closed periods on
local communities. They may severely disrupt the
economy of small coastal communities by creating
seasonal unemployment where there are few, if any,
alternative seasonal forms of employment. Such impacts
of management on local communities have sometimes
been overlooked in implementing fishery plans.

Trip limits have another social impact which is dif-
ficult ta quantify. They reduce the level of competition
in the fishing profession. Without trip limits. the best
harvesters (highliners) gain the largest share of the
benetits. With trip limits. the advantage of being a
highliner is reduced. and benefits are more evenly dis-
tributed. This may also prevent financial failures of
some harvesting operations and act to maintain in the
fishery some marginal units (vessels which are inefficient
vessels in the absence of trip limits). This latter concept
illustrates the type of trade-off decisions confronting
management. forcing managers 10 choose among
beneficiaries.

Vessel Allocations. Vessel allocations have certain
effects similar to trip limits. Their primary purposes are
to allocate catches in a manner that gives each vessel the
chance at a sufficient income. and to avoid closures
when used in conjunction with quotas. However. vessel
allocations are different from trip limits in that they
generally do not restrict catch per unit effort, and thus
do not increase the minimum cost of catch per unit ef-
fort, provided additional vessels do not enter the fishery.
It is important to note that vessel allocations do not
necessarily restrict total harvest; they can be im-
plemented without an overall catch quota for the
primary purpose of distributing income. However, if
vessels enter the fishery in anticipation of profits and
allocations remain the same, gross and net incomes per
vessel will fall as a result of lower catches per unit effort
resulting from reduced stocks.

A major problem with vessel allocations is how to
determine the allocation. The use of prior catches results
in the same distribution of income as in the past. i.e.,
those with low incomes remain low while those with high
incomes remain high. New entrants must be controlled
or income per vessel will decrease either as a result of
reduced stock size, or quotas used in conjunction with
the allocation system.

In the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic, the deter-
mination of allocations is made more difficult as a result
of the multiple species nature of the groundfish fishery,
in which the primary species sought are cod, haddock,
and yellowtail flounder. In attempting to develop a
strategy for vessel allocations in-a mixed fishery
necessary to consider an allocation for each species in a
directed fishery and the associated by-catch fisheries
This requires considerably more biological and economic
information if the allocation system is designed to deal
with the problems of income distribution. In addition,
the implementation of a vessel allocation system would
require a substantially greater cost to set up and enforce.

Vessel allocations, like many of the other methods
already discussed, are dependent on biological data. It
would be of little value to implement a vessel allocation
system for the sole purpose of distributing income. Thus,
it may be reasonably assumed that its consideration
would also be predicated on goals of stock management
and conservation; this would require data on stocks and

wis



entry or controlled access (these methods are discussed
in greater detail later). In some regions, this may cause
opposition to effort regulation. In fact, limited entry or
controlled access may be intended to allocate resources
among user groups, not necessarily to regulate fishing
mortality. Limited entry could be used to allocate the
resource to user groups within the framework of either ef-
fort or catch regulation

Passive Regulation: Passive techniques of fishery
management are usually related to specific biological
impacts other than control of fishing mortality. Impact
of these passive methods on fishing mortality cannot be
analyzed by such functional relationships as those shown
in Equations (1) and (2).

Spatial and temporal restrictions on fishing are usual-
ly imposed in order to protect a component of the
resource, perhaps during a vulnerable period such as
spawning. For example, spatial and temporal restric-
tions on fishing are in effect for the Georges Bank area in
order to protect spawning haddock. Since fishing activi-
ty may disperse aggregations of fish necessary for
breeding, spawning ground closures may increase the
likelihood of successful reproduction. In some cases,
spatial and temporal restrictions are intended to
decrease by-catch of particular components of the
resource or to minimize the likelihood of conflicts
between user groups (i.e., gear types). Current restric-
tions on the allowable season and area for foreign fishing
off the east coast of the United States serve both these
purposes. Temporal and spatial restrictions on fishing
may promote inefficiency, since they often result in
fishing being carried out at times and places that yield a
relatively low catch per unit of effort. Thus, some im-
mediate cost is paid in the hope of future benefits (by
protecting spawning aggregations, for example). In the
case of spawning-ground closures, long term benefits are
usually known only vaguely.

Spatial and temporal restrictions could be a means of
reducing total fishing mortality for the resource. This
could be accomplished by reducing the efficiency of each
unit of fishing gear (fishing power) or the total number of
fishing opportunities. The actual reduction in fishing
mortality resulting from any set of spatial and temporal
restrictions cannot be predicted explicitly, and it is for
this reason that these regulations are classified as
passive or indirect. The appropriate set of spatial and
temporal restrictions for achieving some desired reduc-
tion in fishing mortality must be determined iteratively.
Spatial and temporal restrictions alone cannot impose a
ceiling on fishing mortality (except for the trivial special
case where no fishing is allowed), since reduced efficien-
cy due to spatial and temporal restrictions may be offset
by improved technology or increased effort. The overall
impact of fishing reflects both the intensity of fishing ac-
tivity and its efficiency. Consequently, if temporal and
spatial restrictions are the sole means of regulating

ow

fishing mortality, these regulations will have to be
“tuned” routinely to offset changes in fishing intensity
and efficiency.

The scientific bases probably already exist for spatial
and temporal restrictions on fishing aimed at protecting
components of the resource during particularly
vulnerable periods. For example, the areas and times of
spawning of many of the fishery resource species off the
northeastern U.S.A. are known within reasonable limits.
Furthermore, the areas and seasons during which
recruiting fish are particularly vulnerable are usually
known too, from previous catch data and research survey
data. Nevertheless, because of the mixed (multi-species)
fisheries of the region, spatial and temporal closures of a
fishing ground to protect one species may severely
restrict fishing for other species. Further data on the
spatial and tempural distribution of the resources may
help to reduce any unnecessary impact of these restric-
tions on fishing, but the cost (perhaps a re-occurring
cost) of gathering the additional information must be
compared to the potential benefits.

Spatial and temporal restrictions on fishing are easily
administered. Unless such restrictions apply on a fine
scale, they are also easily enforced. Moreover, there is
significant historical precedent for spatial and temporal
restrictions as management tools for marine fisheries.
The virtue of protecting particular components of the
resource (such as spawning fish or young fish) is widely
accepted by both managers and harvesters. Spatial and
temporal restrictions on fishing activity are often widely
supported by the fishing industry itself, notwithstanding
the fact that the long-term potential benefits of such
closures (particularly to protect spawning fish) are
usually unknown.

Spatial and temporal restrictions reduce the flexibility
of the harvesters. In some cases, such restrictions may
preclude development of a fishery for some component of
the resource not addressed in the fisheries management
decision process. These regulations may also affect
(intentionally or unintentionally) the distribution of
benefits between user groups.

Gear regulations are also imposed in order to reduce
fishing mortality on some particular components of the
resource. But again, since these regulations are not
directly tied to fishing mortality by explicit functional
relationships (such as Equations (1) and (2)), gear
regulations may be considered passive.

Mesh regulations are among the most common tools of
marine fishery management. By increasing the size of
the codend mesh of a trawl, the fishing mortality in-
flicted on young or small fish is reduced. Thus mesh
regulations may be an effective means of advancing the
age at which fish are recruited to commercial fisheries,
resulting potentially in an increased yield per recruit
and/or an increased proportion of individuals of each
cohort that survives to spawn, for a given level of fishing
effort.

Gear regulations may be used to reduce undesirable
by-catch. For example, regulations which restrict the use


INTRODUCTION

There is a variety of methods available for the
management of fisheries. In each case, the optimal set of
fishery management techniques will depend on the
objectives of management, the legal authority of the
managers and the information base (scientific and
otherwise) supporting management. Nevertheless, there
are some inherent characteristics ciated with each
technique of fisheries management which are relevant to
the application of the method in general. This paper is
intended to stimulate discussion and consideration of
these characteristics so that better-informed decisions
will be made in the future.

It is often said that “fisheries managers manage
fishermen not fish.” While fisheries management is
usually applied directly to harvesters in the form of
regulations, there are forms of management which are
applicable to other components of the socioeconomic
sector; these may be non-regulatory in nature. Further-
more, while fishery managers cannot “regulate fish,”
there are some forms of fishery management which have
a direct and predictable impact on fish populations,
although the impact of some other forms is more closely
related to the socioeconomic sector.

In the discussion that follows, fishery management
techniques which are applied to harvesters and other
components of the socioeconomic sector are considered.
The expected biological and socioeconomic consequence
of each technique is discussed. Several criteria for
evaluating fishery management techniques are also
proposed.

In addition to the methods of fisheries management
discussed in this paper, there are other methods used to
improve the condition of the resource independent of the
fishery. Resource improvement methods include habitat
protection and stocking. For some anadromous species of
inshore fisheries, resource improvement methods may be
vital to sustaining a viable fishery. For fisheries
significantly affected by human activity other than
fishing, such methods should be seriously considered.

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING FISHERY
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

Ultimately, fishery management techniques must be
evaluated against the objectives of management. Com-
parison of benefits (short- and long-term) associated
with the application of a management technique with
benefits which would accrue without management is in-
herent in the evaluation process. There are several other

more specific criteria which are usually relevant to selec-
tion of a management technique.

1) Relationship of the fishery management technique
to the control of fishing mortality: The linkage
between the resource sector and socioeconomic sector of
the fishery system is fishing mortality. This is the rate
(proportion of the population per unit time) at which
fish are removed as a result of fishing. Thus, man’s abili-
ty to accomplish objectives related to the condition of
the resource depends on controlling fishing mortality.
Fishing and natural mortality (all causes of death other
than fishing) act to reduce the size of the resource while
growth and recruitment (rate at which young fish are
added to the exploited component of the resource) act to
increase it. The secondary impact of fishing mortality on
growth, natural mortality, and recruitment as a result of
its influence on the size and structure of the resource, is
usually known only qualitatively. Nevertheless, the
potential of these secondary impacts is of concern in the
evaluation of fishery management decisions.

The linkage between the resource and the
socioeconomic sector is described by the following
equations:

F =af (y)

c =EN ie (2)

where F is instantaneous fishing mortality rate,

Z is instantaneous total (fishing and natural)
mortality rate,

N is population size in numbers,

fis the rate of expenditure of standard units of
fishing effort,

qis a constant called the catchability coefficient,

C is catch in numbers,

tis time, and

e the natural number 2.71828. ..

These are fundamental equations of fisheries science.
The reader is referred to Ricker* for a detailed discussion
of their application. Equations (1) and (2) are in-
troduced here to establish the direct relationship

“Ricker, W. E. 1975. Computation and interpretation of
biological statistics of fish populations. Bull. Fish. Res. Bd.
Can. 119. 300 pp.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ..... 0... cece eee cece cnet eee ene t ene teas 1
Criteria for Evaluating Fishery Management Techniques .............. 1
Regulations Applied to the Harvesting Sector Associated with

the Control of Fishing Mortality and Other Biological Impacts........ 3
Socioecoremic Methods for Influencing Fishing Effort ...............0¢ 6
Methods ot Allocating Catch or Benefits ...... 0.0.00... c cece eee eee 8
Summary... 0... cence eet nett n rennet nee 10

Acknowledgment ....... 0... cece ccc cece etree eee e nee e eee eee eens 10


PREFACE

This document is the result of studies originating within the North-
east Fishery Management Task Force. The Task Force, organized in 1979
by the New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils and
funded by the NMFS, seeks to promote discussion and dialogue on the
major issues of fishery management and to explore the effects of various
fishery management alternatives.

Composed of representatives from the fishing industry, Regional
Fishery Management Councils, federal and state agencies, academic in-
stitutions, and general public, the Task Force will operate in three phases.
The first phase will assemble background information for identifying and
analyzing management options. The second phase will examine this
background information to determine the data requirements, regulatory
measures, administrative procedures, and enforcement methods
associated with each management option. The third phase will critically
review the various options for application to specific fisheries, particularly
the Atlantic demersal finfish fishery.

This document is one of eight developed under Phase I operations,
all of which are being issued in the NOAA Technical Memorandum
NMES-F/NEC series. This document and six others functionally serve as
appendixes to the eighth and leading document for Phase I operations—
“Overview Document of the Northeast Fishery Management Task Force,
Phase I.””

Jon A. Gibson, Coordinator
NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/NEC series


are not. in general. directed at obtaining maximum net
benefits for society: they are primarily directed at
reducing fishing mortality rather than producing the
best allocation of goods and services.

SUMMARY

The optimal fisheries management technique depends
on objectives of management, the legal authority of
managers. and the information base supporting manage-
ment. Fisheries management techniques should be
evaluated with respect to their (1) effectiveness in con-
trolling fishing mortality; (2) relationship to other
biological impacts: (3) relationship to the natural func-
tioning of the fisheries system: (4) relationship to
harvesting efficiency; (5) historical precedent and public
acceptance: (6) cost of enforcement and administration;
(7) impact on fisheries for nontarget components of the
resource; (8) impact on the distribution of benefits; and
(9) scientific robustness (or how likely is it that the
technique is appropriate given uncertainty in its scien-
tific bases?).

Restrictions on catch and fishing effort are active
methods of controlling fishing mortality by regulating
harvesters. Catch restrictions are less robust scientifical-
ly than effort restrictions. Spatial-temporal restrictions,
gear restrictions, and restrictions on the nature of the
catch are passive with respect to fishing mortality,
although they may be effective methods of protecting
some components of the resource. Fishing mortality is
theoretically unbounded when passive methods of
fisheries management only are applied.

Fishing mortality may be controlled indirectly by
management techniques which influence the socio-

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VERNMENT

10

economic sector of the system. Incentive-disincentive
plans and price controis can be used to control fishing
mortality indirectly. Neither method has been applied
widely. but further analysis may indicate their
usefulness for this purpose.

The allocation of benefits of exploitation is usually a
secondary state of fisheries management, one which
follows attempts to control fishing mortality. Trip limits,
vessel allocations, and controlled access are typically
used for allocation although in some cases they may be
used as passive methods for controlling fishing mortali-
ty.

The primary method of controlling fishing mortality in
the northeast has been catch restrictions. Trip limits
have been used to spread catch over time; this affects the
distribution of benefits. Effort regulation should be con-
sidered as an alternative method of active control of
fishing mortality for the Northeast region. Effort
regulations are more robust scientifically and require
less frequent amendment than catch regulations. Trip
limits promote inefficient harvesting and decrease com-
petition among harvesters. Other methods of allocation
should be considered in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors benefited from the generosity of J.
McHugh, J. Douglas, D. Pierce, J. Lanzillo, and J.
Zuboy. These individuals met with the authors to
develop an outline of the content of this paper. They
offered many useful suggestions. Numerous discussions
with B. Brown and R. Hennemuth greatly influenced the
ideas presented here. I. Strand, J. Graham, L. Smith
and D. Pierce provided constructive criticism of an
earlier version of this paper.