The Honor able James G. Carr , Chief J udg e of the Norther n District of Ohio, sitting by * desig nation.
1

NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

File Na me: 09a0790n.06 No. 07-4161 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. JESSI E M ON GH AM , De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO
OPI NI ON
Before: G RIF F IN and KETHL EDGE, Circ uit Jud ges; and CARR, Distr ict Judge. * JAM ES G. C A R R , D I S T RI CT JUD GE . J essie Mong ham appe als his conviction and sentenc e followinga jury

trial on multipl e cha

rg es of a rmed ba nk robber y and bra ndishing a

firea rm while committing those robbe ries. Specif ically , he ar g ues: 1) he is e ntitled to a new trial beca use on redi re ct ex amination of a g overnme nt witness and in rebuttal c losing a rg ument the prosec utor eng ag ed in improper vouc hing; 2) his sentence is s ubstantively unrea sonable; and 3) the district court shou ld n o t h a v e im

p o s e d th e s tatuto r il y

ma n d a te d tw e n ty
- f iv e y e ar c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c e f

o r the second f irearm co nviction. For the rea sons below, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment and sentenc e.No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

2 Bac kgr ound A s ix-c ount i nd ic tme nt c ha rg e d Jes sie Mo n gh a

m a n d t w o c o - d e f e nd ants , Ro na ld a

nd Rand a ll S u t t o n , wi t h t h re e a rm edb an k ro b b er i es , i nv i o l at i o n

o f 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 2 1 1 3 (a ), an d b ra n d i s h i n g a firea rm during the commi ssion of each robbery , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . Ronald Sutt on enter ed into a plea ag ree ment, admitting that he and his br other, Randall took pa rt in severa l bank
ro bb e ri e s w ithMo ng ham. R on a ld S utt on te sti fi e d f

or the g ov e rnme nt at Mo ng ham’ s tr ia l. The robbe ries occ urre d on September 1, 2005, Septe mber 16, 2005, a nd Octo b er 4, 2005. Two t ellers identified Mongha m as one of the robber s in the September 1, 2005, r obbery ; one teller identified Mong ham as one of t he robbers i n the Octobe r 4, 2005, robbe ry . Ronald Sutt on testified that Mong ham was involved in a ll three robbe ries and w as the g et-a way driver in the September 16, 2005, robber

y . On cr oss-examination of Ron al d S u t t on, defe nse counse l questioned him about his plea
a g re e me nt. Sutton

re sp on de d a ff

ir mativ e ly to d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s q

u e s t i o n : “ B y

your t e sti fy

inga g a ins t J essie, y ou are g oing to r ece ive or y ou hope to re ceive favor able se ntencing ; is that corre ct? ” [Trial Tr. at 1- 171]. After this exchang e, the pa rties jointly

moved the plea

ag ree ment into evidence
. The plea ag ree ment Sutton s igne d provided, inte r a lia : [Sutt on ] ag re e s to c o- op e rate fu lly wi th the Un ite d St a te s, its a g e nts and e mpl oy e e s, in pr ov idi ng tr

uth fu l and

c omp le te ans we rs to a ll i nq uir ie s r e g ard ing

the fa c ts o f t

his c a se . . . . I f r e q

u e s t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y , s u c h c o o p e r a t i on sh a ll inc lud e a pp e ara nc e s b y [Sutt on ] as a

wi tne ss b e fo re a

F e dera l Gr and

Jury , St a te Gr an d J u ry , at an y

t ri al an d at an y o t h er co u rt p ro ce ed i n g. [D e f
. D is t. Ct
. T r . E x. 2 ].No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

3 On re -direc t examination, t he prose cutor questioned Sutton about t he terms of the a g ree ment
an d h i s p r o m i s e t o t e s t i f

y t r u t h f u l l y: Q. An d d e fe ns e ke pt re fe rr ing to your a g re e me nt t o te sti fy a g a ins t J.D . D o you

re c a ll that, h is q ue sti on s? A. Ye s. Q. An d, in f

a c t, you we re tol d s pe c if

ic a lly that y ou we re to t e sti fy

tr uth fu lly , c or

re c t? A. Yes, sir. Q
. A n d c o mp l e t e l y? A. Ye s. Q. Whate ve r t

hat w a s? A. Ye s. Q. Okay . Nobody

ever told y ou to testify

ag ainst J .D. o r R andall, jus t testify t r u t h f u l l y? A. Yes, sir. Q. Ok ay . In f

a c t, w e re n’ t y ou tol d sp e c if ic a lly that if

y ou fa ile d to te sti fy

tr uth fu lly I’ d p r o s e c u t e yo uf

o r p e r j u r y? A. Yes, sir. Q. I s y our testimony

today here befor e this jury , is that the truth? A. Yes, sir. The district court overr

uled defense counsel’s obj ection at the end of this ex chang e. [Trial T r . a t1

- 1 8 1 ]
. A tt h e e n d

o f S u t t o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y, t h e c o u rti n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y: L adies a nd g entlemen, you have he ard the testimony of Ronald Sutton. He is alleg ed to h a ve be e n invo lve d in the same c ri me t hat the de fe nd ant Je ssi e Mo ng ham isNo. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

4 char g ed with committing. You should consider th is te stimony

with more ca

ution than othe r w it n e s s e s . Y o u

a ls o h e ar d

th a t R o n a ld

Sutt o nh a s p le d

g u il ty to a c r im e . T he fac t that Mr. Sutton has pled guilt y i s not evidence of Jessie Mongham’s g uilt and cannot be considere d ag ainst him. The evidenc e of the Plea Ag ree ment is admitted to allow y ou to c onsider the testimony and Mr. Sutton’s credibility . At the end of the c a se , I wi ll g ive y ou mor e de fi nit e ins tr uc tio n a bo ut ho w that te sti mony fi ts i n. Ijus t wanted to g ive y ou that limit ed instruction at this point in t ime. [T r ia l T r . a t 1

- 1 8 2 ]. Duri ng his c los ingre bu tta l argume nt, the pr os e c uto r s tate d to the jur y ,“ [y ]ou s e e k th e tr

uth throug h the evidenc e y ou’ve heard, assessing the credibility of the witnesse s, and following the law, looking at the i n s t ru ct i o n s that the Court will give, listeningclosely .” [Trial Tr. at 3-171]. The prosec utor additionally

said: I ’m not evidenc e. What I believe doesn’t matter . Icannot stand up he re a nd tell y ou what I believe. I can tell you what Ibelieve the evidenc e shows. My persona l opinion, Mr. B utler’s [gove rnment co- counsel], Mr. Mear an’s [defe n s e counsel] have absolutely n o b u s i n ess i n that jury box . We cannot spea

k for the c redibility

of any witness. That’s up to y ou. [Trial Tr. at 3-173]. Th e pr os e c uto r a g a in r e fe rr e d to Sutton ’s te sti mony and ple a a g re e me nt: Ron a ld S utt on , h is c re dib ili ty . H e te sti fi e d, and he ’s g ot a

Ple a Ag re e me nt. He is ho pin g fo r t

he be st, and

I ’m no t g oin g to t e ll you

that he ’s no t ho pi ng fo r t he be st beca use that would be

— n o b o d y woul d believe that. He also told y ou that his Pl ea Ag ree ment—and I

think y ou will see it. Ithink it’s actuall y b ee n m arke d by Mr. Mear an. L ook at it. I t say s, “truthful testimony and sentenc e to be de termined by the Court.” I t ha s in there that if he cooper ates fully and truthfully , we will ask the Court fo r a re du c tio n. Th a t’ s o ur

so le dis c re tio n. B ut t

he Court do e sn ’t hav e to g ra

nt i t. N o w h e r e in

th a t P le a A g r e e me n t w il l yo us e e th e w o r d s “ ma k e th e g o vernme nt ha pp y .” I t’ s a

bo ut the tr

uth . T his ha s a lw ay s b e e n a bo ut t he tr uth . T his a lw ay s w ill be a bo ut t he tr uth . I t ha s to be . T hat’ s th e on ly wa y it w or ks
. [T r ia l T r . a t 3

- 1 7 7 ].No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

5 On Fe bruar

y 23, 2 0 0 7 , a jury

convicted Mong ham of the r obberie s on September 1, 2005, and Oc tober 4, 2005, a

nd related fire arms counts. The jury acquitted Mong ham of the bank robbe ry on September 16, 2005, a nd associate d brandishing char g e. On Aug ust 29, 2007, the district c ourt sentenc ed Mong ham to a total te rm of imprisonment of 482 months. The cour

t sentence d Mong ham to 98 months on the two bank r obbery convictions to b e se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y , a nd 84 mon ths and 30 0 mont hs re sp e c tiv e ly

on the br and ish ingc ha

rg e s, to b e se rv e d, a s r e qu ir e d b y statut e , c on se c uti ve ly

to a ll o the r t e rm s o f i mpr iso nme nt. Mong ham appe als his conviction and sente nce. Discussion A. Cl aimof Im pr ope r Vo uc hing for G ov e r nm e nt Wit ne ss M o n gh am ar gu es t h e p ro s ec u t o r i mp ro p er l y v o u ch edfo r R o n al d

S u t t o n ’s cr ed i b i l i t y

t h ro u gh his questions on re- direc t examination about the ter ms and meaningof the “ truthfulness” pr ovision of his p l ea agr ee ment and by his comments about the ag ree ment during rebuttal a rg ument. The g ov e rn me nt co n t e n d s t h a tt h e s t a t e m e n t s ar e n o ti mp r o p e r , o r ar e a t l e a s tn o ts o f

l a g r an tt o m e r it
re ve rs a l. As discussed below, w e hold that the comments, even if improper, are not flag rant and thus do no t r e qu ir e re ve rs a l. 1. Stand ard of Review We r e vie w “ the qu e sti on

of wh e the r p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du ct requi re s r e ve rs a l de novo .” United States v. Stove r , 474 F.3d 904, 914 ( 6th Cir. 2007).No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

6 Be cause defe nse counse l did not object to the rebuttal ar g ument at the time, we r eview that claim of improper vouching for plain err or. Un ite d S tates v . Ca rro ll , 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 ( 6th Cir. 1994). To establish plain err or, Mon gh am m u s t s h ow: 1) an e rror , 2) that is plain, 3) that substantially

aff ects h i s ri g hts; and 4) that substantially aff ects the f airne ss and integ rity

of the pr oc e e din g s. F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 2( b) ; United States v. Leac hman , 309 F.3d 377, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2002). 2. Ana lys is We first consider “ whether the prosec utor ’s conduct a nd rema rks wer e improper .” United States v. Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001)
. “Improper vouching occur s when a prosec utor
s u p p o rt s t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f

a w i t n e s s b y i n d i c a t i n g a

p e r s o n a l b e l i e f

i nt h e w i t n e s s ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y, there by placingthe prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness.” United Sta te s v . F ra nc is , 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1999). Comments constitut e improper vouching if they
are “blunt . .
. or . . . imply that the prosec utor has specia l know ledg e of f acts not in front of the jury .” Id. I f we find the prose cutor’s a ctions improper, we then deter mine whether

the improprieties
wer e fla g rant, re quiring re v er sal. To deter mine whether

improper pr osecutoria l remar ks were flag rant, we consider “ ‘(1) whether the conduc t and remarks of the prosecutor t ended to mislead the jury or pre judice the de fenda

nt; (2) whethe r the c onduct or re marks wer e isolated or extensive; (3) wh e the r t he re mark s w e re de lib e rate ly or a c c ide nta lly ma de ; and (4 ) whe the r t he e vid e nc e a g a ins t the def endant wa s strong .’” United States v. Mode na , 302 F.3d 626, 635 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (q uoting Carter , su pra , 23 6 F .3 d a t 78 3 (6 th Cir . 2 00 1) ); se e als o United States v. Monus , 128 F.3d 376, 394 (6th Cir. 1997).No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

7 I f re marks ar e improper

but not flag rant, reve rsal is a ppropriate only if proof of defe ndant’s g uilt was not overw helming, the defe ndant objecte d to the improper r emar ks, and “the court fa iled to cure the er

ror with an a dmonishment to t he jury .” Stover , su pra , 474 F.3d at 915. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , the re we re e y e wi tne ss i de nti fi c a tio ns fo r e a c h o f t he c on vic te d c ha

rg e s, and the tria l judg e made eff orts to limit the eff

ect on the jury
. We thus rever se only if the re marks
are bo th i mpr op e r a

nd fl a g ra nt. A prosecutor m ay proper ly ref er to a plea a g ree ment of a te stify ing w itness. United States v. Owens , 426 F.3d 800, 806 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) (“ When a def endant attacks the c redibility of a g overnme nt witness for sig ning a plea ag ree ment, the prosecution is entitled to ref er to the a g ree ment in rebuttal . . . . Even where the def ense did not mention the plea ag ree ment, this Court condones its reasona

ble use by

the prosec ution.”). The prose c u to r

ma y “ e li c it te s ti mo n y

a b o u t [ th e p le a

a g r e e me n t’ s ] t e r

ms , a tt a c k

the
c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne ss b e c a

us e of it an d ev e n re fe r to the ple a a g re e me nt o f a

g ov e rnme nt w itn e ss in an attempt to defle ct def ense c ounsel’s use of the a g ree ment to attack the w itness’s cre dibilit y .” Un ite d S tat es v . F ra nc is , 170 F.3d 546, 550 ( 6th Cir. 1999). The prose cutor may

not, however , “explain[ ] t hat there is to be a re commendation to the witness’s sentenc ing c ourt [reg arding ] whe ther the terms of the ple a ag ree ment have be en adhe red to.” Id. This is so “[b]ecause that rec ommendation is depende nt upon whether the witness testifies truthfully ,” so “it is easy

for a prosec utor to imply , either intentio n al l y o r i nadver tently , that the prosec utor is in a specia l positi on to determine w hether the witness was, i n fa ct, testifyingNo. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

8 truthfully .” Id. Statements are improper whe n “a jur y could reasonably believe that the prosec utor [i s], i nstead, e x pressinga per sonal opinion as to the witness’s cr edibility .” Id. at 551. I n the p re s en t case , we f ind that although the prosec utor’s questioning on re- direc t
exa m i n at i o n was improper , it was not flag rant, a nd as such, doe s not require reve rsal. See Stover , su pra , 4 74 F .3 d at 91 5; Modena , su pra , 302 F.3d at 634-35. I n addition, the p rosec utor’s
r e m ar k s i nr e b u t t a l c l o s i n g ar g u m e n tw e r e n o t i mp r o p e r . E v e na s s u m i n g i mp r o p r i e t y arguendo , the statements ar e not flag rant a nd cer tainly do not rise to the leve l of plain err or re quired to re verse an unprese rved a ssertion o f error. Ac cording ly , no prosec utorial misconduct occ urre d which entitles Mo ng ham to a

ne w tri a l. Duringcross-e x amination, defe nse counse l sought to attac k Sutton’s cre dibilit y by ref ere nce to the plea a g ree ment. I n response , the prosec utor questioned Sutton about the provisions i n his plea
a g r e e m e n tr e qu i r i n g h i m t o t e s t i f y t r u t h f u l l y. Mong ham assig ns as err or questions a sked by the prosec utor on re- direc t examination. The pr os e c uto r’ s q

ue sti on on re -d ir e c t, “ we re n’ t y ou

tol d s pe c if

ic a lly that if y ou fa ile d to te sti fy tr uth fu lly I ’d pr os e c ute y ou

fo r p e rj ur y ? ” , w a s im

pr op e r. Al tho ug h r e fe re nc e to a p le a a g re e me nt i s n ot i n it se lf impro p er v o u ch i n g, Fran c is , 170 F.3d at 550, by stating the question in the first person ( “I ’d prosec ute y ou for perjury”), the prosec utor implied that he had independe nt know ledg e of whe ther Sutton’s testi mony

was truthful. Thi s q u es tion was, there fore , improper. As discusse d below, ho we ve r, the imp ro pe r q

ue sti on wa s n ot f la g ra nt. Mong ham contends a lso that the statements in the prosec utor’s re buttal argument, “[i] t’s
a bo ut t he tr uth . T his ha s a lw ay s b e e n a bo ut t he tr uth . Thi s alw ay s will be a bo ut t he tr uth . I t ha s toNo. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

9 be.” c rossed the line. [Trial Tr. a t 3-177]. Taken in context, these statements wer e not i mproper. T he prosec utor also stated in re buttal a rg ument, “[y ]ou see k the truth throug h the evidenc e y ou’ve he ard, assessing the cr edibility of the witnesses, and following the law, looking at the instructions that the Court wi ll g ive , li ste nin g c los e ly .” [Tr ia l T r. a t 3- 17 1]. Th e pr os e c uto r ad dit ion a lly e mph a size d to the jur y that it a lon e wa s c ha

rg e d w ithmakin g c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns : I ’m not evidenc e. What Ibelieve doesn’t matter. I cannot stand up he re a

nd tell y ou what I believe. I can tell y

ou what I believe the evidenc e shows. My persona l opinion, Mr. B utler’s [gove rnment co- counsel], Mr. Mear an’s [defe nse cou n sel] have absolutely

no business in that jury

box . We cannot spea

k for th e cr ed i b i lity

of any witness. That’s up to y ou. [Trial Tr. at 3-173]. The c ourt in Un ite d S

tates v . Tr uji llo , 3 76 F .3 d 5 93 , 6 08 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) , h e ld t hat a prosec utor’s statements in re buttal argument that “[the witnesses] promised to be truthful and pr ov ide c omp le te inf

or matio n. Tr

uth fu l and

c omp le te inf

or matio n co nc e rn ing a ll i nd ivi du a ls w ith wh om t he y c on sp ir e d to dis tr ibute mari jua na . . . . T hat’ s w hat th e y tol d you duri ngthe ir examination,” was not improper. The statement wa s not improper bec ause “ the prosec utor did not offe r any persona l observations or o p i n i o n s reg ardingthe ver acity of [the witnesses], nor did she place the pre stige of the Gove rnment behind their c redibility .” Id. at 608-09. By contra st, in Fran c is , su

pra , a prose cutor’s ope ning statement that “i f [t h e w it n e s s ] t estifies i n t h i s court truthfully , it’s my intent to, as a g overnme nt repre sentative, to re commend a 15 year sentenc e for

him,” was improper . 170 F.3d at 550. This statement was improper beca use the prosec utor’s wording“made i t cl ea r that her rec ommendation would depend on whether she persona lly

believed [the witnesses] told the truth.” Id. at 551.No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

The de termination of whether a pr osecutor’ s behavior c onstitut es pre judicial err or must be 1 made in the c ontext of the whole trial. United States v. Y oung , 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 10 T he prose cutor’s state ments in the prese nt case are closer to those uphe ld in T r u j i llo . The pr os e c uto r d id n ot o ff

e r a ny pe rs on a l obse rv a tio n re g ard ingSutton ’s ve ra c ity , b ut r a the r r e fe rr e d to the fa ct that the plea

ag ree ment has a pr ovis ion requiringtruthful testimony . Def ense c ounsel and the prosec utor had jointly enter ed the plea

ag ree ment at issue into evidence . The stateme nt, “[i] t’s about the truth. This has alwa y s been a bout the truth
. T h i s al wa y s will be about the truth,” w hen taken in conte x t, is not i mproper. Even if the p ro s ec u t or’s a rg ument in rebuttal wa s improper, it does not rise to the leve l of plain err or nec essar

y to overc ome the lac k of objec tion. Nor do the state ments, when take n t o gether , even a ssuming impropriety of the c losing 1

re bu tta l arg ume nt arguendo , re qu i re re v er s al , b ec au s e t h e s t at em en t s we re n o tfl agr an t
. Al t h o u gh
a patte rn of imp ro pe r state me nts may re qu ir e re ve rs a l e ve n wh e re no ind ivi du a l st a te me nt b y its e lf is suf ficiently prejudicia l , see U

.S. v. Tocco , 200 F .3 d 401 , 420 (6 th Cir . 200 0) , that is no t th e c a se here
. First, the “ rema

rks of the pr osecutor” did not “tend[] to misl ead the jury or pre judice the defe ndant.” Modena , su

pra , 3 0 2 F. 3 d

at 6 3 5 (q u o t i n g Carter , su pra , 2 3 6 F
. 3 d

a t7 8 3 )
. T h e j u r

y,
moreove r, ac quitted Mong ham of the only count as to which Sutton was the sole w itness. This shows that the jury was able to ba se its verdict on a ll the evidence despite the prose cutor’s c omments, and did no t re ly so le ly on Sutton ’s te sti mony . The jur y , mor e ov e r, ha d b e fo re it i n e vid e nc e the joi ntl y introduced ple a ag ree ment to which the prose cutor re fer red.No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

Se e Un ite d S

tates v . Ca rro ll , 26 F.3d 1 3 8 0 , 1 3 8 8

- 8 9 (6th Cir. 1994) (re commending that trial 2 jud g e s g ive a

c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n s imi lar t o th a t su g g e ste d b y Judg e F ri e nd ly in Un i t ed Stat es v. Arro y o- An gu lo , 5 80 F .2 d 1 13 7, 11 50 (2 d Ci r. 19 78 ) ( F ri end ly , J ., c on c ur ri ng ), in r e sp on se to improper vouc hing) : [T] he judg e should have instructed that the pr omise i n t h e cooper ation ag ree ment adds little to the tr u t h -telling obligation impos ed by the oath; that the prose cutor often ha s no way

of knowing whether

the witness is telling the truth or not; that the books are not filled with perjury indictments of Gover

nment witnes s es who have g on e be y on d the fa c ts; and that an a c qu itt a l w ou ld n ot m e an th a t a s a matte r o f c ours e the Gover nment would seek such an indictment or even fail to make i t s p romised rec ommendation of lenienc y . 11 The trial judg e additionally g ave a c a uti o n a r y instruction following the defe ndant’s over ruled objection to the prosec utor’s questions on re -d i re ct . Thoug h the instruction was not in the for m pref err ed by this c ourt, it none theless told the jury to view Sutton’s testim ony “with more c aution 2 than other w itnesses,” and that “evide nce of the Plea Ag ree ment is admitted to allow y ou to consider th e te s ti mo n y

an d M r . Sutt o n ’ s c r e d ib il it

y . ” [T r ia l T r . a t 1

- 1 8 2 ]. Th e se c on d a

nd thi rd c on sid e ratio ns fo r d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a n im pr op e r s tate me nt i s flag rant a lso weig h ag ainst finding f lagr ancy . The improper

rema rks wer e isolated, a

nd nothing sug g ests they

wer e deliber ately

made. Modena , su

pra , 302 F.3d at 635. The remarks do not appe ar to be intended to pre

judice Mong ham, but wer e rather intended to contradic t defe nse impeac hment of a g overnme nt witness. Id. F ina lly , th e re wa s ampl e e vid e nc e of de fe nd ant’ s g uil t. Alt ho ug h d e fe ns e c ouns e l im pli c itl y and indirec tly impugne d the g ener al re liability of ey ewitness testimony , the jury clea rly found that testimony to be cr edible. Having done so, it could rationally convict re g ardle ss of the prose cutor’sNo. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

12 qu e sti on s and

c omm e nts . T he pr os ecut or’ s rem ark s, the re fo re we re no t f la g ra nt a nd do no t me ri t
re ve rs a l. B. Sentencing Iss ues 1. Subst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss M ong h a m a ls o c o n te n d s th a t h is 4 8 2

- mo n th s e n te n c e is s u

b s ta n ti v e ly u n r e a s o n a

b le
. We revie w s entenc es for rea sonablene ss under a defe rential a buse-of -discre tion standard. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007). A s e nte nc e wi thi n a pro pe rl y c a lc ulate d advis or y Gu ide lin e ra

ng e is e nti tle d to a

re bu tta ble presumption of re asonable ness on re view. United States v. Se xton , 512 F.3d 326, 3 3 2 (6th Cir. 2007).The de fenda

nt must demonstrate that the sentenc e is unrea sonable. Un ite d States v . Cr owe ll , 493 F.3d 744, 751 ( 6th Cir. 2007). T h e p r e s u mp t i o no f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s c an n o tb e o v e r c o m e b y a
mere alleg ation that the sentenc e is gr eate r than ne cessa ry . United States v. Brogdon , 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2007). A sentenc e may

be subst anti vely

unrea sonable if the district c ourt “sele ct[s] the sentenc e arbitra rily , bas[es] t he sente nce on imper missibl e fa ctors, fa il[ s] t o consider pe rtinent § 3553(a) fac tors, or g iv[ es] a

n unrea sonable amount of we ight to any pertinent fa ctor.” United St ates v. W ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 385 ( 6th Cir. 2005). The district cour

t acc urate ly

calc ulated the advisory Guideline rang e for c ounts one and five of the c on vic tio n [th e ba

nk ro bb e ri e s] a s 8 7- 10 8 mo nth s. Ad dit ion a lly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl yNo. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

Ti tle 18 , U nit e d St a te s Co de Se c tio n 9 24 (c ) p ro vid e s: 3 (1)( A) Except to the extent that a g reater minimum sentence is otherwise provide d by thi s su bs e c tio n o r b y

any other pr ov isi on

of law, any pe rs on wh o, duri ngand

in re la tio n to any c ri me of vio le nc e . . . fo r wh ic h the pe rs on may be pr os e c ute d in a cour t of the Unit ed S tates, uses or carrie s a firear m, or who, in furtheranc e of a ny such cr ime, possesses a f irea rm, shall, in addition to th e punis hment provided for such cr ime of violence . . .— (ii) if the fi rea

rm is brandished, be sentenc ed to a ter m of imprisonment of not less than 7 y ear s . . .

. . . (C) In the ca se of a second or subs equent conviction under this subsection, the per son shall— (i) be sentenc ed to a term of i mprisonment of not less than 25 y ear s

. . . 13 applied the statutory

require ment of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to impose sente nces of 84 months and 300
m o n t h s f o r c o u n t s t w o an d

s i x , r e s p e c t i v e l y. 3 Mong ham has not offere d sufficie nt evidence to rebut the pre sumption of reasona bleness and show the district court a

bused its discretion. He argues that the g overnme nt ove rcha rg ed him and the sentenc e imposed is g reater than ne cessa ry . He c ontends that a sente nce of 384 months was require d under § 924(c) for the brandishing char g es and that the 98 months imposed for the bank robbe ries
wa s gre at er

t h an n ec es s ary

t o ac co mp l i s h t h e p u rp o s es o f s en t en ci n g. Mong ham has fa iled to point to any fac tor raise d befor e the district co u rt t h at the district court fa iled to consider. Rathe r, he c ontends g ener ally th at t h e d istrict court did not look at the sentenc e as a

whole. This amounts to a g ener al asser tion that the di strict court should have rea ched a diffe rent c onclusion. Under the circ umstances of this case, that is not s u ff i ci en t to vacate the sentenc e.No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

14 F ina lly , M on g ham argue s th a t Kimbrough v. United States , 55 2 U .S. 85 , 1 07 -0 8 ( 20 07 ), c a lls into question thi s court’s de cision in Un ite d S tates v . F ra nk lin , 499 F.3d 578, 583- 85 (6th Cir. 2007). The c ourt in Fran k

lin held that a sentenc ing court may not r educe an otherwise a ppropriate sentenc e to nullify the ef fec t of a c ount of conviction requiring a consecutive, m andator y minimum term. Id
. at 584. I n Fran k

lin th e s e n te n c in g ju d g e s tate d , “ to s o me e xte n t b e c a u s e I f e e l th a t a d d in g on a mandatory

seven y ear s truly

inflates the se ntence ”, id. , and var ied downwa rd. He re, in c ontrast, the senten c in g ju d g e g a v e n o in d ic a ti o n o f a d e s ir e to nu ll if y th e e f f e c t o f th e ma

n d a to r y minimum sentenc es on the § 924(c ) cha rg es. Thus, we need not e x amine the e ffe ct of Kimbrough on Fran k lin
. Th e di st ri ct c ou rtcon si dere d t he re lev ant 18 U.S .C . § 35 53 (a) f a c tor s. A f t e r c on sid e ri ngtho se fac tors, the cour

t stated, “[b] ased upon a ll that, Ithink I ’m g oing to pr onounce a sentenc e which I believe to be fair a

nd rea sonable a

nd sufficie nt to comply

wi th what justice re quires but not too
s e v e r e to b e mo r e th anth a t. ” [S e n t. T r . a t 1 8

- 1 9 ]. Mong ham’s ar g uments might persuade a differ ent di strict judge to impose a lesser sentenc e, but that argument is unavailing here
. Un ite d S tates v . E ly , 468 F.3d 399, 404 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur appellate revie w . . . looks to whether the se ntence is reasona ble, as opposed to whe ther in the first instance w e would have imposed the same se ntence .”). I f a district c ourt “c onsider[s] all the rele vant sentenc ing fac tors, and impose[s ] a sentenc e of rea sonable leng th, w e aff irm
. . . .” Id. After revie wing the re cord a

nd finding s of the district cour t at sentenc ing, w e conc lude that Mo ng ham’ s se nte nc e wa s su bs tanti ve ly

re a so na ble and the district cour

t did not abuse its discretion.No. 07-4161

United States v. Mongham

15 2. Consecutive Sente nces M o n g h a m a l s o o b

j e c t s t o t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s i mp o s i t i o no f t h e s t a tu t o r i l y m an d a t e d

t w e n t yfive y ear consec utive sentenc e on his second § 924( c) c onviction. As he c oncede s, howeve r, under Deal v. U nited States, 508 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1993), w hen a def endant is cha

rg ed with and c onvi cted of multi ple § 924(c ) off enses in the same ca se, ea ch additional conviction is a “se cond or subse quent conviction” within the pl ain meaningof the statute,
re qu ir inga

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e of

tw ent y -five y e ars on

the su bs e qu e nt c ounts . D e fe nd ant a lso
rec og ni z es t h at we a

re, of course , without authority to disreg ard c ontrolling Supreme Court pr e c e de nt. The district cour

t properly

applied pre vailing Supre me Court p recede nt in sentencing Mong ham and its application of the twenty -five year sentenc e on the se cond § 924(c ) count wa s not
e rr on e ou s. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM Mong ham’s convic tion and sentenc e.