UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) P AT RI CI A A . P OWE RS- BU NC E , ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 06-1586 (RM C) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al . , ) ) Defendan ts. ) ) M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Tere nce Anthony Powers hang ed himself in a holding cell at the Third Di s t ri ct prec inct of the District of Columbi a Metropolitan Police Depa rtment (“MPD”) shortly

afte r he w as

arr ested by

the United States Secr et S ervic e. Mr. Power s’ mother, Patricia Powers-B unce sue d the District of Columbi a and several individual MPD and Secr et Service office rs, for he rself a nd as persona l repre sentative of Mr. Powers’ e state, see king to hold them leg ally acc ountable for

her son’ s suicide. D.C. is the sole re maining D efe ndant. Pending befor e t h e Court is D.C.’s moti on for judgme nt on the pleading s, or i n the alternative, for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. # 89]. For the re asons explained here in, the Court will gra nt D.C.’s alternative motion for summ ary judgme nt on Plaintiff’s fede ral lawclaim (Count I ), and w ill decline to exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over t h e r emaining local law c laims (Counts I I -I V). Plaintiff’s loca l law claims will be dismissed without prejudice. I. F AC TS At approximately

12:40 a.m. on J uly

15, 2004, S ec ret S ervic e Of fice r Michae l Bur dy n observe d a vehic le run a red light at t he int erse ction of Massachusetts Avenue and Dupont Circle in Northwe st W as h i n gt o n , D.C. He stopped the ve hicle. The vehicle w as driven by Mr.There was a passeng er in the ve hicle with Mr. Power s. The passe ng er w as not arr ested. 1 -2- Pow e rs . Af

te r Of fi c e r B ur dy

n fo un d fi ve sma ll pla sti c pa c ke ts of wh a t a pp e are d to be c oc a ine in 1

a c ig are tte bo x, Mr . Po we rs wa s r e mov e d f ro m th e ve hic le and

tol d to sit on the sid e wa lk a g a ins t a sto ne wa ll. Mr . Po we rs “ ke pt g e tti ngup and do wn and tr y ing to wa lk ar ound .” Pl. ’s Op p’ n to Mo t. for Summ. J

. [Dkt. # 91] (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), E x . 2 (B urdy n Dep.) at 64. Mr. Power s appea red “ nervous and jittery at the sce ne.” Id. When the t ests confirme d that the s ubstance in the packe ts was coc aine, Offic er B urdy

n arr ested Mr. Powe rs for possession with intent to di stribute coca ine and tra nsported Mr. Powers to the MPD’s Third D istrict prec inct for pr ocessing

.

Upon arr ival at the Third District prec inct cellblock, Offic er Bur dy n sear ched M r. Powers’ pe rson and r ecove red a nother small plastic pac ket of c ocaine from Mr. Power s’ front jea ns p o c k e t

. U n l i k e t h e o t h e r p a c k e t s , t h i s p a c k e t w a s o n l y h a l f

f u l l

. A tt h a tp o i n t , O f

f i c e r B u r dyn suspected that Mr. Powers might have be en under the influenc e of c ocaine

. Id. at 68. This suspicion

wa s b a se d o n th e ha lf

-f ull pa c ke t of co c a ine re c ov e re d f ro m Mr . Po we rs ’ p e rs on

and Mr . Po we rs ’ “ner vous attitude, jitt ery

attitude.” Id. at 68-69. Af ter c ompleting his sea

rch of Mr. Powers, Of

fice r Bur dy n transfe rre d custody

of Mr. Power s to MPD Officer s Rhonda W inters, the ce llblock technicia n, and Chery

l McClaine, the station cler k. Neither Offic er Winters nor Of fice r McClaine wi tne sse d O ff

ic e r B ur dy

n s e arc h M r. P owe rs. Pl .’ s O pp ’n , E x. 6 ( Wint e rs De p. ) at 59 ; id. , Ex . 8 (McClaine D ep.) at 71. Nor had e ither MPD officer b ee n t ra ined to identify persons unde r the i n f l u e n c e o f n ar c o t i c s . W i n t e r s D e p . a t 6 5 ; M c C l a i n e D e p . a t1 8

. A tn o t i m e d i d O f f i c e r B u r dyn inform Off

icer Wint ers or

Offic er Mc Claine of his observations of Mr. Powers’ be havior. De f.’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts ¶ 12; Pl’s Resp. to Def’s Stateme nt of Mater ial Fa cts ¶ 12.There wer e no other detainee s in cellblock 6. 2 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 Offic er Wint ers testified that prior to this incident she was ne ver instruc ted or re primanded 4 for f ailing to pe rfor

m or document the r equire d visits. W inters Dep. at 72. -3- M r . P o w e r s w a s p l a c e d

i nc e l l b l o c k

6 a ta p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 : 0 0 a . m . O f f i c e r B u r dyn 2

re a d M r. Pow e rs his Miranda ri g hts a t a pp ro xima te ly

2:1 0 a .m. Of

fi c e r B ur dy

n r e tur ne d to 3

c e llb loc k 6 a t a

pp ro xima te ly

2:3 0 a .m. to o bta in g e ne ra l in fo rm a tio n f ro m Mr. P owe rs. De sp ite MPD Ge ne ra l O rd e rs and Stand ard Ope rat ing Pr oc e dure s r e qu ir ingc e llb loc k o ff ic e rs to v isi t a ll persons de tained in the ce llblock at half hour inter vals and to re cord the visits i n a logbook, no one 4 chec ked on Mr. P ower s betwee n approximately 2:30 a.m. and 4:15 a.m. I n addition, no logbook wa s maintained and the video surveillanc e sy ste m was not recording . At approximately 4:15 a.m., Offic er B urdy

n returne d to ha

ve Mr. Powers sign two notices of infr action. He found Mr. Power s “sitting on the f

loor up ag ainst the bars fac ing the wall away from the ha llway

. . . .” B urdy

n Dep. at 105. Mr. Power s had hang ed himself with his tube socks. Off icer Bur dy n g ave Mr . Powers “a nudg e to see if he wa s responsive or conscious” but rec eived “[n] o response .” Bur dy n Dep. at 105. Of fi c e r B ur dy

n a le rt e d O ff

ic e r Wi nte rs . Whe n Of fi c e r Winte rs arr ive d, Of

fi c e r B ur dy

n “ tr ie d to un tie the so c ks , b ut t he y jus t, th e y c ame r ig h t o f

f

. T h e y s o rt o f u n r a v e le d.” Id. Of fi cer Wint ers then f

elt Mr. Powers’ neck, be hin d h is e ar, se arc hin g fo r a pul se bu t she did no t fe e l one

. Wint e rs De p. a t 98- 99

. At that po int , Of fi c e r Wi nte rs a le rt e d Se rg ean t Re g ina Ga mbl e , w ho su mmo ne d e me rg e nc y me dic a l pe rs on ne l. No offic er attempted to r esuscitate Mr. Powers. The medical examiner deter mined that Mr. Powers d i edb y h an gi n g.-4- II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Rule 56 of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, summary judgme nt must be g rante d when “ the pleading s, depo s it io n s , a n s w e r s to in

te r r o g atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fa ct and that the

mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to a

ju dg me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6 ( c ); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 47 (1 98 6) ; se e als o Ce lot e xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1 98 6) ; Diamond v. Atwood , 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 ( D.C. Cir. 1995)

. Moreove r, summary judgme nt is p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d ag a ins t a par

ty that “a ft e r ad e qu a te tim e fo r dis c ov e ry and up on mot ion

. . . f a ils to make a show ing suf

ficient to establish the e x istence of an element essential to that party ’s ca se, and on which that party

will bear th e b u rd en o f proof at trial.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322. To de te rm ine wh ic h f

a c ts a re “ ma te ri a l,” a

c ourt mus t loo k to the su

bs tanti ve law on wh ic h e a c h c la im rests. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248. A “g enuine issue ” i s o n e whose resolution could establish an element of

a cla im or defe nse and, there fore , aff ect the outcome of the a ction. Id. ; Celotex , 4 77 U. S. at 322. I n r

uli ngon a mot ion f or su mma ry jud g me nt, the c ourt

mus t dr aw a ll j us tif

ia ble infere nces in the nonmoving party ’s favor and a cce p t t h e nonmoving party ’s evidenc e as true

. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. A no n m o v i n g p ar ty , howeve r, must establish more than “ the mere exis tence of a sc intill a of e vidence ” in support of its position. Id. at 252. To prevail on a motion for summary judgme nt, the mov i n g p ar t y m ust show that the nonmoving pa rty “fa il[ ed] to make a sh o w in g s u f

f ic ie n t to e s ta

b li s h th e e xis te n c e o f an e le me n t e s s e n ti a l to th a t p arty ’ s c a s e , an d on which that par

ty will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322. By pointing to the absenc e of e vidence proff ere d by the nonmoving pa

rty , a moving p ar t y m ay

succe ed on summaryD. C

. is considere d a “pe rson” f or purpose s of § 1983. See, e .g. , B es t v . D is trict of 5 Col um bia , 743 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D .C. 1990). -5- judgme nt. Id. I n addition, the n o n m o v i n g party may not rely solely on alleg ations or conc lusory statements. Gree ne v. D alton , 1 64 F .3 d 6 71 , 6 75 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 9) ; Harding v. Gray , 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Rather , the nonmoving pa rty must present spec ific fa cts t hat would ena ble a

rea sonable jury

to find in its favor. Gree ne , 164 F.3d at 675. I f the e vidence “is mere ly colora ble, or is not signific antly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). III . A NA LY SIS

I n Count I of her

Second Amende d Complaint Plaintiff seeks to hold D.C. liable for Mr . Po we rs ’ s uic ide , a lle g ingvio la tio ns of his “ c ivi l r ig hts .” 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 p ro vid e s: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinanc e, re g ulation, custom, or usag e, of a

ny State or Ter

ritory o r t h e Dist rict of Columbi a, subjec ts, or cause s t o be subjec ted, any citizen of the United States or other p er s o n within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep ri v ati on of any

rig hts, privilege s, or immuniti es sec ured by the Constit ution a

nd laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an a ction a t la w, su it i n e qu ity , o r o the r p ro pe r p ro c e e din g fo r r e dr e ss. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “In order to hold a municipality

liable for c ivil rights violations of its employ ees 5 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the m unicipality must have a cted in ac corda nce w ith a ‘g overnme nt policy

or c us tom , w he the r m a de by its lawm a ke rs or

tho se who se edi cts or

a c ts m ay fa ir ly be sa id t o repr esent officia l policy .’” Sa nd e rs v . D ist

ric t of Col um bia , 522 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2007) (q u o t i n g Mo ne ll v . D e

p’ t of So c ial Se rv s. , 4 36 U. S. 6 58 , 6 94 (1 97 8) ). I t is a pla int if f’ s “ burd e n to establish that a municipality has a c ustom or prac tice abr idgingher c onstitut ional or statutory rig hts.” B. R. v . D ist

ric t of Col um bia , 5 2 4 F. S u

p p . 2 d 3 5 , 4 0 (D

. D. C

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Mo ne ll , 436 U.S. at 694);“Individuals suing the District for c onstitut ional due proc ess violations must do s o under 6 the F if th A me ndme nt, and

no t th e F ourt e e nth , a s th e Di str ic t — w hic h is no t a state — is su

bje c t to the Due Process Cl ause of the Fif th Amendment.” Es tat e of Ga ith e r v . D ist ric t of Col um bia , Ci vil Ac tio n N o. 03 -1 45 8, 20 09 WL 29 16 43 0, a t *1 3 n. 10 (D .D .C. Se pt. 8, 20 09 ); see also Powers-Bunc e v . D ist ric t of Col um bia , 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (“ the Four teenth Amendme nt applies only to the States; it does not a pply to the Fe dera l G overnme nt or the District of Columbia”).

-6- se e als o F e irs on v . D ist

ric t of Col um bia , 5 06 F .3 d 1 06 3, 10 66 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 7) (“ To imp os e lia bil ity

on the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [pl aintiff] must s how not only a violation of his rig hts under the Constitut ion or fede ral law , but also that the [Dist rict’s] custom or policy cause d the violation.”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). “At the very least there must be an af firmative link betwee n the policy

and the pa

rticular c onstitut ional violation alleg ed.” City of O kl a h oma City v. Tut tle , 471 U.S. 808, 818 ( 1985). “ Re sp on de at s up e rio r or vi car ious liability will not attach unde r § 1983, and ther efor e, a municipa lity cannot be held liable solely beca use it employ s a tortfe asor.” Burnett v. Sharma , 511 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2007) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted). Pla int if

f a lle g e s th a t D .C. vio la te d the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F if

th A me ndme nt. 6 “[C] ourts have he ld that pretrial de tainees” such as Mr. Powe rs have a “due- proce ss rig ht under the F if th a nd F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts to be fr e e fr om pr iso n of fi c ia ls’ ‘d e lib e ra

te ind if fe re nc e ’ t o th e ir substantial medical nee ds.” Powers-Bunce , 4 7 9 F. S u p p . 2 d at 1 5 3 (c i t i n g O

. K

. v . B u sh , 3 44 F. Sup p. 2 d 4 4 , 6 1 n . 2 3 ( D

. D

. C

. 2 0 0 4 ) )

. “ C o u rt s h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t th i s r i g h t b e l o n g i n g to pretria l detainee s is ‘at least as g reat as’ the a nalog ous Eighth Ame ndment rig ht and, there fore , g ener ally treat the t wo claims as analy tically identical.” Id. (c i t i n g Barber v. City of Salem , 953 F.2d 23 2, 23 5 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 2) ); see also City of Reve re v. M ass. Gen. Hosp. , 463 U.S

. 2 3 9 , 244 (1983) (“the due proc ess rig hts of a [pretrial de tainee] are at least a s g reat as the Eight h Amendment-7-

pr ote c tio ns a va ila

ble to a c on vic te d p ri so ne r” ). “ B e c a us e a pr e tr ia l de ta ine e ’s ri g hts un de r t he F if th Am e ndme nt a

re a t le a st a s g re a t a s t ho se un der the Ei g hth Am e ndme nt, a

pp lyingthe Ei g hth Amendment ‘de liberate indiffer ence ’ standar d to measure whether ” Plaintiff has shown a violation of Mr. Power s’ “c lear ly

established F ifth Amendment rig hts is a p p ro p ri at e.” Hardy v . District of Col um bia , 601 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (D.D .C. 2009).

I n o rd e r t o s ur

viv e su mma

ry jud g ment, Pl a int if

f m us t sh ow(1 ) “ a

pr e dic a te constitutional viol ation” and ( 2) “that a custom or pol icy of the municipality

cause d the violation.” Ba k e r v . D ist ric t of Col um bia , 32 6 F. 3 d 1 3 0 2 , 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “U nder the first prong ,” Plaintiff must show “a pre dicate c laim of deliberate indiffer ence by prison officia ls . . . .” Id. “To show deliberate indiffer ence ,” Plaintiff must establish “ that officia ls ha d subjective knowle dg e of the serious medic al nee d and re cklessly disreg arde d the excessive risk to i nmate hea lth or safe ty from that risk.” Id. “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under t he Eighth Amendment for denying

an inma te humane c on dit ion s un le ss t he of fi c ia l kn ow s o f a

nd dis re g ard s an e xce ssi ve ri sk to i nmate health or sa fety ; the officia l must bot h be aw are of fa cts from which the i nfer ence could be dr awn t h at a substantial risk of ser ious harm exist s, and he must also dra w the infe renc e.” Farmer v

. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[ A] n o fficial’s failure to alleviate a signific ant risk that he should have pe rce ived but did not, while no cause for c ommendation, cannot . . . be condemne d as the infliction of punishment” prohibited by the Eig hth Amendment. Id. at 838. Establishing a

predic ate c laim of deliberate indiffer ence by prison officia ls where the harm at issue is a prison suicide “re quires a dual showing that the defe ndant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner

was at a substantial ris k o f committing suicide a nd (2) intentionally

disreg arde d the risk.” Colli ns v. See man , 462 F .3 d 757 , 761 (7 th Cir . 200 6)

. “ With re sp e c t to the fi rs t show ing , it-8-

is no t e no ug h that the re wa s a da ng e r of wh ic h a pr iso n o ff ic ia l should have be en awa re, r ather , the of fi c ia l mu st bo th be awa

re of fa c ts f ro m w hic h th e inf

e re nc e c ou ld b e dr awn

that a su bs tanti a l r isk of ser ious harm exist s , and he must also dra w the infe renc e.” Id. (quotation marks a nd citation omitted) (emphasis in orig inal). “In other wor ds, the defe ndant must be cog nizant of the sig nificant likelihood that an inmate may imminently

seek to take his own life.” Id. “L iability cannot attach wher e the de fenda

nts simpl y

were n o t al er t ed to the likelihood that the prisoner was a g enuine suicide risk.” Id. (quotation marks, a lterations and c itation omit ted).

Ju d g e d a g a i n s t t h i s s t an d ar d , i t i s c l e ar t h a t P l a i n t i f f h a s f a i l e d t o s h o w a pr e dic a te constitutional violation with respe ct t o D.C.’s failure to preve nt Mr. P ower s from hang ing himself. The re cord is ber eft of a

ny evidenc e that either MPD Offic er Winters or MPD Off icer McClaine had

su bje c tiv e kn ow le dg e of

Mr . Po we rs ’ s uic ida l ten de nc ie s. Dr awi nga ll j us tif ia ble inf e re nc e s in P l a i n t i f f ’ s f a v o r , a tm o s tt h e f

a c t s a d d u c e d b y P l a i n t i f

f e s t a b l i s h t h a t S e c r e t S e r

v i c e O f f i c e r B u r dyn should have known that Mr. Powers wa s a s u i ci d e ri sk, g iven his suspicion that Mr. Powers wa s under the influence of coc aine a nd his observation of Mr. Powers’ jittery behavior . But e ven that infere nce is a

g iant leap. Plaintiff has proff ere d no evidenc e that coca ine-user s are a g reater suicide risk or that jittery behavior is a warning sign of impending suic ide. I n any event, ther e is no evidenc e that O ff ic e r B ur dy

n c omm un ic a te d e ith e r h is s us pic ion of Mr . Po we rs ’ c oc a ine us e or his ob se rv a tio n o f M r. Pow e rs ’ j itt e ry be havio r t o e ith e r O ff

ic e r Wi nte rs or

Of fi c e r Mc Cla ine

. No r i s there e v id e n c e th a t e it

h e r O f f ic e r Wi n te r s o r

O f f ic e r M c Cl a in e w a s aw ar e th a t M r . Po w e r s mig ht have be en under

the influenc e of c ocaine . Eac h testified to not having witnessed Of fice r B urdy

n’s

se arc h o f M r. Pow e rs . Fi na lly , ev e n ass umi ng tha t O ff ic e r Wi nte rs and

/or Of fi c e r M c Cla ine sh ou ld have been awar e of Mr. P ower s’ cocaine use, there is no evidenc e that either office r ac tually

drew-9-

the inf e re nc e that Mr . Po we rs wa s a su ic ide ri sk . T he re fo re , Pl a int if f’ s § 19 83 c la im a g a ins t D .C. for f ailing t o p re vent Mr. Power s’ hang ing c annot survive summary judgme nt. See id. (af

firming

su mma ry jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ants be c a

us e “ the re c or d is de vo id o f a ny e vid e nc e fr om wh ic h it

c ou ld be infe rre d that they wer e aler ted to the likelihood that Colli ns was at substantial risk for committing suicide”)

. Plaintiff also seeks to hold D.C. liable under § 1983 for failing to attempt to revive Mr. Powers a fter he was discove red unc onscious in the holding cell. She relies on Brad ic h v . Ci ty of Chicago , 4 13 F .3 d 6 88 (7 th Cir

. 20 05 ), bu t that c a se is dis tin g uis ha ble

. Th e re , th e Se ve nth

Cir c uit

re ve rs e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of su mma

ry jud g me nt in f

a vo r o f t he ind ivi du a l “ loc ku

p k e e pe rs ” beca use there wer e g enuine issues of material fa ct about whe ther the loc kup k ee p er s wer e deliberately indiffer ent i n their response t o discovering a hanging prisoner. See 415 F.3d at 690-92. The c ourt aff

irmed the district cour

t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt in favor of

the City of Chicag o, finding that the plaintiff’s argument “that Chicag o did not ensure that all of its employ ees f ollowed all of i ts policies all of the time” to be “ incompatible with Mo ne ll .” Id. at 690. The c ourt explained:

T h e E s t a t e d o e s n o t ar g u e t h a t t h e C i t y sy ste ma tic all

yfails to enfor ce its written policies and instead maintains infor mal p o l i cies that violate the Constituti on. The rec ord does not contain data implying th a t th e s u ic id e r a te in Ch ic a g o ’ s lo c k u p s is a b n o r ma ll y h igh. T he Estate conc entrates on the fa cts of this case , and the e mploy ment history of the lockup ke eper s on duty , rathe r than a ny thing f rom which an inf

ormal policy

of g ener al applica

bility could be infe rre d. That one l o ck up keepe r wa s not retra ined ac cordingto the City ’s policies is a shortcoming in t he enf orce ment of sound policies, not an independe nt violation of the Consti tution. Id. (empha sis in original).

So too here

. Plaintiff’s argument that “the Gene ral Orde rs of the MPD re quir[e] that-10-

the offic er attempt to restore consciousness” proves the point that no D.C. custom or policy cause d the failure to r evive Mr. Powers. Pl.’s Opp’ n at 40. I ndeed, Plaintiff c oncede s that Offic ers Winters and McClaine “ fail[ed] to follow the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment’s Ge nera l Order s and Policies and Proce dures whic h wer e desig ned to protec t persons in custody of the M P D fr o m the risk of suicide, amongother risks.” Id. at 42. Mo ne ll e sta bli sh e d th a t “ mun ic ipa lit ie s a re no t vi c ari ou sly liable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their employ ees’ err ors” an d “a re l i able only for their own policies.” Bradich , 4 13 F .3 d at 69 0. Th e re fo re , Pla int if f’ s § 19 83 c la im a g a ins t D. C. fo r fa ili ngto attempt to revive Mr . Powers ca nnot survive summary

judgme nt. See id. Plaintiff argues t hat “liabili ty may be im posed on a muni cipality upon a showing of deliberate indiffer ence exhibi ted by a patter n of inadequate training , supervision and discipline of p o l i ce o ff i ce rs . ” P l

. ’s Op p ’n at 4 6 (q u o t i n g Pa rk e r v . D ist ric t of Col um bia , 850 F .2 d 708 , 712 (D .C. Cir. 1988)). Whil e true, Plaintiff ove rlooks that “[o] nly wher e a f ailure to tra in refle cts a ‘de liberate ’ or ‘c onscious’ choic e by

a municipality

— a ‘policy ’ as de fined by our prior c ases — c an a c ity be liable for such fa ilure under § 1983.” City

of C an ton v . H

arris , 48 9 U. S. 3 78 , 3 89 (1 98 9) . A t mo st, the fact s a d d

u c e d h e r e s h o w th a t O f

f ic e r s Wi n te r s an d

M c Cl a in e w e r e in a d e qu a te ly tr a in e d a nd

su pe rv ise d. Th a t f

a lls fa r s ho rt of show ingthat “ su c h in a de qu ate tr a ini ng. . . r e pr e se nt[s ] ‘c ity policy .’” Id. at 390. I n o t h er words, even dra wing all infere nces in Plaintiff’s fa vor, it cannot be fai r ly s a id th a t “ th e f

a il u r e to p r o v id e p r o p e r tr a in in g ” to O f

f ic e r s Wi n te r s an d

M c Cl aine

“ re pr e se nt[s ] a p oli c y

fo r w hic h the c ity is re sp on sib le , an d for wh ic h the c ity may be he ld l ia ble if it actually cause s injury .” Id. ; se e als o D or ma n v . D ist

ric t of Col um bia , 888 F.2d 159, 165 ( D.C. Cir. 19 89 ) ( mun ic ipa lity

no t li a ble a s a ma tte r o f l aw f

or ina de qu a c y

of po lic e tr a ini ng wh e re “ the re isFor the same r easons, Plaintiff ca nnot hold D.C. liable under § 1983 for a ny MPD office r’s 7 failure “to per form CPR,” “to expeditious ly obtain assistance from Emer g ency Medica l Services,” or “to maintain a

nd operate the video surve illance s y s t em.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2. Plaintiff has not proff ere d evidenc e that any

one of those f

ailures is attributable to a consc ious choice or a policy of de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e on

D. C.’ s p art . Ind e e d, a t le a st wit h re sp e c t to the fa ilure to p e rf or m CPR, Plaintiff acknowle dg es that the off icer s did not act in acc ordan ce “w i t h the Gene ral Or ders of the MPD.” Id. at 2. Whil e Plaintiff is a re sident of M ar y l an d , M r. P ower s was a D .C. resident and Plaintiff 8 br ing s th is a c tio n o n b e ha lf of he rs e lf ind ivi du a lly and a s the pe rs on a l re pr e se ntativ e of Mr . Po we rs ’ estate. A ccor dingly , the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter

. See 28 U. S.C. § 1 33 2( c )( 2) (“ the le g a l r e pr e se ntativ e of the e state of

a de c e de nt sha ll be de e me d to be a c iti zen on ly of the same State as the de cede nt”). -11- no evidenc e of a conscious choic e or a policy of deliber ate indiffe renc e”) (empha sis in original). 7

Ea c h o f P la int if

f’ s r e ma ini ngc la ims , in te nti on a l in fl ict io n of e mot ion a l di str e ss (Count I I ), g ross neg lige nce ( Count I I I ), and ne g lige nt supervision and training(Count I V), a ssert vio la tio ns of D. C. law. 28 U. S.C. § 136 7( c )( 3) pr ov ide s tha t a distr ic t court may de c lin e to e xer c ise

su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r no n- fe de ra l law c la ims if “ the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha s d ism iss e d a ll c la ims

over w hich it has orig inal jurisdiction.” “A dist ri ct co u rt ’s decision whether to exerc ise that 8 jur isd ic tio n a ft e r d ism iss inge ve ry c la im o ve r w hic h it

ha d o ri g ina l juri sd ic tio n is pure ly discretionar

y .” Carlsbad T

ech., I nc. v. H IF Bio, Inc

. , 1 29 S. Ct . 1 86 2, 18 66 (2 00 9) . T he Sup re me Court has instructed that “[c]ertainly , if the fede ral c laims [ supporting supple mental jurisdiction] are dis mis se d b e fo re tr ia l, e ve n tho ug h no t ins ub sta nti a l in a jur isd ic tio na l se ns e , the state c la ims sh ou ld be dismissed as well.” United Mine W orkers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). That being the

case here , the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s r emaining local law cla ims. P laintiff’s loca l law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.-12- IV . C ON CL USI ON For th e f o r e g o ingrea sons, the Court will gra nt D.C.’s alternative motion for summary judgme nt [ Dkt. # 89] on P laintiff’s § 1983 cla im ( Count I ), and will de cline to e x erc ise supplemental jurisdiction over the re maining loc al l aw claims (Counts I I -I V). P laintiff’s loca l law claims will be dismiss ed without pr ejudice. D.C.’s motion for judg ment on the pleading s [Dkt. # 89] will be denied as moot. A memorializing Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date : O c tob e r 5 , 2 00 9 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct J u d ge