alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7332

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. ANTHONY REID , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston

. David C. Norton , District Judge. ( 2:14

- cr - 00212

- DCN

- 2 ; 2:17

- cv - 01588

- DCN )

Submitted : January 21, 20 20 Decided: January 24, 2020

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Anthony Reid , Appellant Pro Se

. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Reid s eeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 (201 8 ) motion . The order is no t appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)( B ) (201 8 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (201 8 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.
D avis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reid has not made the re quisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### 2009.570-8 Subcontracts.

The contracting officer shall require offerors and contractors to submit a representation statement from all subcontractors (other than a supply subcontractor) and consultants performing services in excess of $10,000 in accordance with 2009.570-4(b). The contracting officer shall require the contractor to include contract clauses in accordance with 2009.570-5 in consultant agreements or subcontracts involving performance of work under a prime contract.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB (the "Report") of Colorado Wyoming Reserve Company (the "Company") for the year ended June 30, 2002, I, Kim Fuerst, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date:  June 29, 2005

/s/ Kim Fuerst



Kim Fuerst



Chief Executive Officer
#### 1809.507-2 Contract clause.

The contracting officer may insert a clause substantially the same as the clause at 1852.209-71, Limitation of Future Contracting, in solicitations and contracts.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

M EMORANDUM O RDER

Appellate case name: Clifford K. Phillips v. Barbara J. Copeland

Appellate case number: 01

- 12

- 00492

- CV

Trial court case number: 617651

Trial court: 412th Judicial District Court of Brazoria County , Texas

On May 8, 2012, appellant, Clifford K. Phillips , filed an affidavit of indigence in the trial

court in the above

- referenced matter , and n o contest to the affidavit of indigence was filed or sustained

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 20.1 (a)(2), ( f ). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that appellant is allowed to proceed on appeal without advance payment of appellate costs and that the Clerk of this Court shall make an entry in her records to that effect. 1

A clerk’s record complying with Te xas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5(a) has been

filed in this Court.

It is ORDERED that Court Reporter file with this Court, within 30 days of the date of this order and at no cost to ap pellant, the reporter’s record.

A ppellant ’ s brief is ORDERED filed with this Court within 30 days of the date the complete reporter’s record is filed in this Court . Appellee’s brief, if any, must be filed 30 days of the date appellant’s brief is filed

.

It is so ORDERED.

1 Because appellant’s claim is governed by Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, appellant does not need to meet the requirements of Section 13.003 of the Civil

Practice & Remedies Code in ord er to be entitled to a free record on appeal. See T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. § 13.003 (listing requirements for appellant to be entitled
to a free record on appeal) (West 2002), § 13.004 (Chapter 13 does not apply to claims
governed by Chapter 14) ( West 2002); see generally T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE C h.

14 ( West 2002) ( governing inmate litigation).Judge’s signature: /s/ Ju stice Rebeca Huddle  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: August 2, 2012
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         138,635
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          12,292
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               151,940
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    299,506
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         419,269
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           427,295
<LOANS>                                      1,641,596
<ALLOWANCE>                                     22,048
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,777,233
<DEPOSITS>                                   2,358,939
<SHORT-TERM>                                   101,251
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             25,577
<LONG-TERM>                                     16,673
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        43,756
<OTHER-SE>                                     231,037
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               2,777,333
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 73,820
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               21,049
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 3,831
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                98,700
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              38,953
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,435
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           57,312
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,380
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 193
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 46,048
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 27,174
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      27,174
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    17,681
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.80
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.68
<LOANS-NON>                                     18,366
<LOANS-PAST>                                     3,019
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   509
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 14,223
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                21,690
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    1,255
<RECOVERIES>                                       233
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               22,048
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            22,048
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
II 

Calendar No. 122 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 782 

To reauthorize the National Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force 

Program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 30, 2017 

Mr. CORNYN (for himself, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. HELLER, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, 

Mr. HATCH, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, Mr. COONS, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. 

GRASSLEY, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. 

KENNEDY, and Mr. CRUZ) introduced the following bill; which was read 

twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

JUNE 8, 2017 

Reported by Mr. GRASSLEY, without amendment 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the National Internet Crimes Against 

Children Task Force Program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Providing Resources, 

5 Officers, and Technology To Eradicate Cyber Threats to 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 782 RS

1 Our Children Act of 2017’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT Our Chil2 dren Act of 2017’’. 

3 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL INTERNET 

4 CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN TASK FORCE 

5 PROGRAM. 

6 Title I of the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 

7 (42 U.S.C. 17601 et seq.) is amended— 

8 (1) in section 105(h) (42 U.S.C. 17615(h)), by 

9 striking ‘‘2016’’ and inserting ‘‘2022’’; and 

10 (2) in section 107(a)(10) (42 U.S.C. 

11 17617(a)(10)), by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2018’’ and 

12 inserting ‘‘each of fiscal years 2018 through 2022’’. 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS

rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 122 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 782 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the National Internet Crimes 

other purposes. Against Children Task Force Program, and for 

JUNE 8, 2017 

Reported without amendment 


rfrederick on DSKBCBPHB2PROD with BILLS
---

EXHIBIT 13.2

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                     
|----------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Transition
Report of Avino Silver & Gold Mines Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 20-F for
the eleven months ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"). I, Lisa Sharp, Principal
Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge and belief:

| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of
      section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                   
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.

|Date: July 14, 2008 | /s/
      Lisa Sharp                   
|------------------- | ---------------------------------------
|                    | Lisa Sharp, Principal Financial Officer

---
#### Nina Tutarashvili, Plaintiff, v Avraham Barzilay et al., Defendants. Steven V. Podolsky, P.C., Nonparty Appellant; Napoli Bern Ripka, LLP, et al., Nonparty Respondents.

[832 NYS2d 810]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the nonparty Steven *Y.*Podolsky, PC., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated January 18, 2006, as, in effect, denied that branch of its motion which was to award it an attorney’s fee pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion which was to award Steven *Y.*Podolsky, P.C., an attorney’s fee pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of the fee to be awarded to Steven V Podolsky, EC.

As the plaintiffs initial attorney of record, the appellant has a statutory lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 against the settlement reached in this action *(see Russell v Zacearia,*8 AD3d 255 [2004]). In this fee dispute with the plaintiffs new attorneys, the appellant elected to receive a contingent percentage fee based on the proportionate share of the work it performed on the entire case *(see Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell,*81 NY2d 655, 658 [1993]; *Matter of Gary E. Rosenberg, P.C. v McCormack,*250 AD2d 679, 679-680 [1998]). Therefore, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of the fee to be awarded to the appellant *(see Smerda v City of New York,*7 AD3d 511, 512-513 [2004]). Mastro, J.P., Ritter, Skelos, Carni and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
#### Liza Negron et al., Appellants, v Franklin Plaza Apartment Complex, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[831 NYS2d 901]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Norma Ruiz, J.), entered December 20, 2005, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly granted the property defendant’s motion for summary judgment for lack of evidence to support plaintiffs’ theory, as argued in counsel’s affirmation, that the security guards had created a dangerous situation by ejecting from the apartment complex two nonresident teenagers who were threatening a younger boy *(Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Concur—Saxe, J.P., Williams, Buckley, Catterson and Malone, JJ.
On petitioners’ petition for reconsideration filed December 23, 2003;

reconsideration allowed; former disposition (191 Or App 212, 82 P3d 1035 (2003)) withdrawn; reversed and remanded with instructions to enter order holding petitioner responsible for chiropractic treatment on and after January 1, 2001; otherwise affirmed February 18, 2004

#### SAIF CORPORATION and Terminal Transfer, Inc., *Petitioners, v.*Paul E. ROSS and Department of Consumer & Business Services, *Respondents.*

H00-111 and H01-041; A118745

84 P3d 823

Jerome P. Larkin for the petition.

Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Wollheim and Schuman, Judges.

SCHUMAN, J.

*202SCHUMAN, J.

In *SAIF v. Ross,*191 Or App 212, 82 P3d 1035 (2003), we held that the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) did not err in interpreting *former*OAR 436-010-0230(3)(a) (1999), *renumbered as*OAR 436-010-030(4)(a) (2003), which provides, in part:

> “[S]ervices * * * by a medical service provider other than the attending physician shall not be reimbursed unless carried out under a written treatment plan prescribed * * * and approved by the attending physician * * *. The treatment plan shall include objectives, modalities, frequency of treatment and duration. The treatment plan may be recorded in any legible format including, but not limited to, signed chart notes. A copy of the signed treatment plan shall be provided to the insurer by the attending physician * * * »

The board held that claimant satisfied this rule when his attending physician submitted, over a period of time and in different documents, the information required by the rule, even if it did not all appear in a single signed document. We upheld the board’s interpretation, finding it not implausible. *Don’t Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy Facility Siting,*320 Or 132, 142, 881 P2d 119 (1994). Petitioners now ask us to reconsider our opinion. Their request asserts three errors. The first two simply reargue issues that we decided in the original opinion and we reject them without discussion. The third points out that we affirmed the board’s order finding SAIF Corporation “liable for chiropractic treatment provided by Dr. Watts after March 3, 2000.” The signed letter from claimant’s attending physician containing the last elements listed in *former*OAR 436-010-0230(3)(a) was dated January 31, 2001. Petitioner argues that we “should therefore remand the case to the director with instructions to modify the final order so that SAIF Corporation is liable only for chiropractic treatments provided by Dr. Watts on and after January 1, 2001.” That position is correct. We therefore revise our disposition of the case as follows: We remand to the board with instructions to hold SAIF liable for claimant’s chiropractic treatments provided by Dr. Watts on and after January 1, 2001.

*203Reconsideration allowed; former disposition withdrawn; reversed and remanded with instructions to enter order holding petitioner responsible for chiropractic treatment on and after January 1, 2001; otherwise affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Jacob Berkowitz, Petitioner, v. Thomas E. Rohan et al., Constituting the State Liquor Authority, Respondents

Appeal dismissed unless printed records and briefs are filed and served on or before March 1, 1961. Respondent’s brief must be filed and served on or before March 16, 1961 if appeal is to be argued at March 1961 Term.
2009.100 NRC policy. ( a ) It is NRC policy that only competitively awarded contracts shall be placed with an individual who was employed by the NRC within two years from the date of the Request for Procurement Action. This policy also applies to: ( 1 ) The noncompetitive award of contracts to organizations where former NRC employees have dominant ownership interests in the organization, such as partners or majority stockholders;
( 2 ) The noncompetitive award of contracts to organizations where former NRC employees have dominant management interests, such as principal officers, or where the organization is predominantly staffed by former NRC employees; and
( 3 ) The noncompetitive award of contracts, task orders or other NRC work assignments where the particular assignment is to be performed by designated former NRC employees, including principal investigators, key personnel, and others who will perform more than a nominal amount of the work in question.
( b ) The following procurement actions are considered noncompetitive for the purposes of this policy: ( 1 ) Contracts awarded noncompetitively under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) Program;
( 2 ) Individual task orders if the former employee was not identified as “key personnel” in a proposal which was evaluated under competitive procedures;
( 3 ) Unsolicited proposals;
( 4 ) Subcontracts that require review for the purpose of granting consent under NRC prime contracts.
( c ) The term *NRC employee* includes special Government employees performing services for NRC as experts, advisors, consultants, or members of advisory committees, if— ( 1 ) The contract arises directly out of the individual's activity as a special employee;
( 2 ) The individual is in a position to influence the award of the contract; or
( 3 ) The Contracting Officer determines that another conflict of interest exists.
( d ) A justification explaining why it is in the best interest of the Government to contract with an individual or firm described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section on a noncompetitive basis may be approved by the Senior Procurement Executive after consulting with the Executive Director for Operations. This is in addition to any justification and approvals which may be required by the FAR for use of other than full and open competition.
( e ) Nothing in this policy statement relieves former employees from obligations prescribed by law, such as 18 U.S.C. 207, Restrictions on Former Officers, Employees, and Elected Officials of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

Certificate No. 5742

#### *In re*Harold Henderson voluntary surrender of his certificate to practice law in the State of Kansas

Opinion canceling certificate filed January *16,*1974.

*Per Curiam:*

On January 15, 1974, Harold Henderson voluntarily surrendered his certificate admitting him to practice law in the courts of the State of Kansas, and it is By Order of the Court Considered and Accepted.

The Clerk of this Court is Ordered and Directed to mark the certificate Void and to Strike Harold Hendersons name from the roll of attorneys.
#### 1622.103-70 Contract clause.

The clause at 1652.222-70 shall be inserted in all FEHBP contracts.

[55 FR 27415, July 2, 1990]
#### 204.270 Electronic Document Access.

[75 FR 59102, Sept. 27, 2010, as amended at 80 FR 58631, Sept. 30, 2015]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
The Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway company's Consolidated Financial 
Statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial 
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
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<CASH>                                             118
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<RECEIVABLES>                                      838
<ALLOWANCES>                                        71
<INVENTORY>                                        219
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<PP&E>                                           22714
<DEPRECIATION>                                    4474
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             2260
<BONDS>                                           1335
<COMMON>                                             0
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       769
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Vincent Zelnick, Appellant, v. Donald Pantoliano, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of a motor vehicle, the plaintiff: appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated September 10,1959, denying his motion for summary judgment. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Beldoek, Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Christ, JJ., concur.