Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

SHARON JOHNSON

COLEMAN

Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 2710 DATE July 9, 2012

CASE

TITLE

Johnnie Stallings (#2012-0106225) vs. Correctional Officer Mirchev, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [#3] is denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and

the complaint is summarily dismissed with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff to advise the court that his action

is barred under the statute. The case is terminated. Having brought this action, the plaintiff nevertheless remains

obligated to pay the full filing fee. Before pursuing any future litigation, the plaintiff must pay any outstanding

fees. 

O [For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections, has brought this

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that the defendants, correctional

officers at the jail, violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using unjustified force against him. 

The plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The motion must be denied because the plaintiff

has accumulated at least three “strikes.” The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), enacted on April

26, 1996, provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

“if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action

or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

At least three of the plaintiff’s previous actions have been dismissed in this district on the grounds that

they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Stallings

v. Norris, Case No. 11 C 7350 (N.D. Ill.), dismissed on preliminary review by Minute Order of January 17, 2012

(Coleman, J.); Stallings v. Rhodes, Case No. 11 C 8141 (N.D. Ill.), dismissed on preliminary review by Minute

Order of November 18, 2011 (Bucklo, J.); and Stallings v. Bishop, Case No. 12 C 0959 (N.D. Ill.), dismissed on

(CONTINUED)

mjm

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STATEMENT (continued)

preliminary review by Minute Order of February 22, 2012 (Coleman, J.). In fact, the court expressly advised the

plaintiff in Bishop that he had “struck out.” See Minute Order of February 22, 2012, at pp. 1 and 2.

Notwithstanding his knowledge that he is barred from doing so, the plaintiff has nevertheless sought leave

to proceed in forma pauperis, and without disclosing his 1915(g) status to the court. Consequently, the plaintiff’s

effective “fraud” on the court must “lead to immediate termination of the suit.” Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859

(7th Cir. 1999). The complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice. 

As an additional concern, the court notes that the plaintiff made material omissions in his complaint. The

civil rights complaint form the plaintiff used instructed him to list all previous lawsuits. (Complaint, p. 3.) The

plaintiff, however, disclosed only one pending lawsuit, failing to mention at least seven others, including the three

in which he was assessed strikes. The plaintiff’s effective “fraud” on the court offers an independent justification

for “immediate termination of the suit.” Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999). The U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has affirmed dismissal for failure of an inmate plaintiff to fully divulge his

litigation history. See Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543-44 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff is cautioned to be

honest, accurate, and complete in any court future filings he submits.

Finally, the plaintiff is advised that the PLRA contains a comprehensive administrative exhaustion

requirement. Under that statute, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner ...

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Massey v.

Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000); Booth v. Churner, 531 U.S. 956 (2001). “[I]f a prison has an

internal administrative grievance system through which a prisoner can seek to correct a problem, then the prisoner

must utilize that administrative system before filing a claim [in federal court].” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727,

733 (7th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2001). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before

administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the

claim on the merits....” Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). The court questions

whether the plaintiff could have exhausted grievance procedures in the short time between the occurrence of the

events giving rise to this action and the initiation of the lawsuit (the complaint is dated and signed six days after

the alleged assault).

Having brought this action, the plaintiff remains obligated to pay the full filing fee. See 28 U.S.C.

§1915(b)(1); Sloan, 181 F.3d at 859. Before pursuing any future litigation, the plaintiff must pay any outstanding

fees. Id. 

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