alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 831 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.831

                     One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and eighteen

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
   120 West Pike Street in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, as the ``Police 
             Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. POLICE OFFICER SCOTT BASHIOUM POST OFFICE BUILDING.
    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 120 West Pike Street in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Police Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Police 
Officer Scott Bashioum Post Office Building''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### 1901.602 Contracting officers.
Appeal No. 74-201.

#### Kents Corners Congregational Church *v.*Charles O’Connell *et al.*

*George Ajootian, Charles J. Ajootian,*for plaintiff. *Joseph T. Little,*Asst. City Solicitor, for defendants.

Motion of plaintiff for a temporary injunction is denied as being moot.
#### Sherman, administrator, *v.*Lane.

April 18, 1913.

Hill, J.

1. In a suit brought against an administrator upon an open account, to recover the value of lumber alleged to have been contracted for by the administrator’s intestate with the plaintiff, and to have been delivered but not fully paid for, it is error to allow an employee of the plaintiff who witnessed the contract of purchase and sale of the lumber to testify for the surviving party as to the contract. Civil Code, § 5858 (5).

2. But where, in such a case, the original books of account of the plaintiff are admitted in evidence, after proper foundation laid in accordance with the Civil Code, § 5769, and no evidence is offered by the defendant, a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount shown by such books to be due is demanded, and the illegal admission of other testimony is harmless error. See *Bailey*v. *Barnelly,*23 *Ga.*582.

3. The other grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*782. Complaint. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. July 13, 1912.

*Bambo & Wright,*for jolaintiff in error.

*B. II. Sheffield,*contra.
§ 1903.10 Weapons. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited.
( b ) Knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, incident to hunting or other lawful purposes is prohibited.
( c ) This section does not apply: ( 1 ) To any person who has received authorization from the CIA Director of Security, or from his or her designee, to possess, carry, transport, or use a weapon in support of the Agency's mission or for other lawful purposes as determined by the CIA Director of Security; or
( 2 ) To the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law.
[63 FR 44786, Aug. 21, 1998, as amended at 88 FR 20763, Apr. 7, 2023]
#### Lincoln County, Plaintiff in Error, *v.*Loyd B. Magruder, Defendant in Error.

February 6, 1877.

1. A county is a *quasi*corporation, capable of suing and being sued; and may purchase and hold real estate.

2. A county may maintain ejectment for lands which it owns and of which it is entitled to possession; and where it holds lands to the use of a township it may maintain ejectment in its name to the use of the township.

Error to Lincoln Circuit Court;

*Reversed and remanded.*

*Dryden <& Dryden,*with *W. G. McFarland,*for plaintiff in error,

cited : Wag. Stat. 1014,. sec. 6, p. 1018, sec. 20, p. 1258, secs. 81, 82, 83, p. 408, sec. 5; City of Hannibal *v.*Draper, 15 Mo. 634.

*Martin <& Lackland,*for defendant in error,

cited: Ray County *v.*Bentley, 49 Mo. 236; Holt County *v.*Harmon, 59 Mo. 165 ; Sess. Acts 1874, p 161.

Bakewei¡l, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a petition in ejectment for certain land in Lincoln County. The caption of the petition is: “ Lincoln County, to the use of Township 48, Range 1 west, and Township 48, Range 2 west, and Township 51, Range 2 west, *v.*Loyd B. Magruder.” The petition is in the usual form.

A demurrer was interposed below, on the ground that there was a misjoinder of parties by suing to the use of the different townships ; and also on the ground that Lincoln County has no power given it by statute to sue for and recover lands, or to take and hold lands, for the use of the *315school townships, or for any other purpose. The demurrer was sustained, and there was judgment for defendant.

The law of 1874 (Stat. 1874, p. 161, sec. 62) expressly provides that, whenever property mortgaged to secure the payment of a loan of school funds shall be sold, the County Court may bid it in and purchase it for the county, to the use of the township whose school funds were secured by the mortgage, or in the name of the county if the money loaned belongs to the general school fund; and that the County Court of the county holding such real estate may appoint an agent to manage the same until it shall be resold.

We see no reason why the county of Lincoln should not bring ejectment for any real estate which it owns and holds, and of which it is entitled to possession. The law provides (Wag. Stat. 408, sec. 5) for actions, either local or transitory, in which a county is plaintiff. A county is a *quasi*corporation, and is capable of suing and being sued, as has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court of this State. If it may hold lands and may sue, we cannot conceive why it may not bring ejectment; and nothing is suggested by counsel for defendant in error from which we can conjecture on what theory this demurrer was sustained. We think it should have been overruled.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded.

All the judges concur.
2009.570-1 Scope of policy. ( a ) It is the policy of NRC to avoid, eliminate, or neutralize contractor organizational conflicts of interest. The NRC achieves this objective by requiring all prospective contractors to submit information describing relationships, if any, with organizations or persons (including those regulated by the NRC) which may give rise to actual or potential conflicts of interest in the event of contract award.
( b ) Contractor conflict of interest determinations cannot be made automatically or routinely. The application of sound judgment on virtually a case-by-case basis is necessary if the policy is to be applied to satisfy the overall public interest. It is not possible to prescribe in advance a specific method or set of criteria which would serve to identify and resolve all of the contractor conflict of interest situations that might arise. However, examples are provided in the regulations in this chapter to guide application of this policy guidance. The ultimate test is as follows: Might the contractor, if awarded the contract, be placed in a position where its judgment may be biased, or where it may have an unfair competitive advantage?
( c ) The conflict of interest rule contained in this subpart applies to contractors and offerors only. Individuals or firms who have other relationships with the NRC (e.g., parties to a licensing proceeding) are not covered by the regulations in this chapter. This rule does not apply to the acquisition of consulting services through the personnel appointment process. NRC agreements with other Govern ment agencies, international organizations, or state, local, or foreign Governments. Separate procedures for avoiding conflicts of interest will be employed in these agreements, as appropriate.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
applicable SEC Form and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          13,270
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,836
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<INVENTORY>                                      1,328
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                18,552
<PP&E>                                          20,162
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,280
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  30,843
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,587
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<OTHER-SE>                                      18,159
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    30,843
<SALES>                                          9,281
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,281
<CGS>                                            5,650
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,650
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,914
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (324)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     41
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (78)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                      (78)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
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</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

January 30, 2012 

ERRATA 

_____________________ 

2010-1526 

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

NOVA CHEMICALS CORPORATION (CANADA) 

and NOVA CHEMICALS INC. (DELAWARE), 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

______________________ 

Decided January 24, 2012 

Precedential Opinion 

______________________ 

Please make the following change: 

Page 1, correct name “Henry J. Roper” to “Harry J. 

Roper”.
Case: 1:11-cv-07934 Document #: 76 Filed: 11/02/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:286
#### 2052.214-73 Timely receipt of bids.

As prescribed at 2014.670(b), the contracting officer shall insert the following provision in all invitations for bids:

# Timely Receipt of Bids (OCT 1999)

Sealed offers for furnishing the services or supplies in the schedule are due at the date and time stated in block 9 of Standard Form 33, Solicitation, Offer and Award. Offers sent through the U.S. Mail (including U.S. Postal Service Express Mail Next Day Service—Post Office to Addressee) must be addressed to the place specified in the solicitation. All hand-carried offers including those made by private delivery services (e.g., Federal Express and Airborne Express) must be delivered to the NRC loading dock security station located at 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 and received in the depository located in Room T-7-I-2. All offerors should allow extra time for internal mail distribution or for pick up of hand-carried deliveries. The NRC is a secure facility with perimeter access-control and NRC personnel are only available to receive hand-carried offers during normal working hours, 7:30 AM-3:30 PM, Monday through Friday, excluding Federal holidays.

(End of provision)
#### 1852.242-78 Emergency Medical Services and Evacuation.

As prescribed in 1842.7003, insert the following clause:

# Emergency Medical Services and Evacuation (APR 2001)

The Contractor shall, at its own expense, be responsible for making all arrangements for emergency medical services and evacuation, if required, for its employees while performing work under this contract outside the United States or in remote locations in the United States. If necessary to deal with certain emergencies, the Contractor may request the Government to provide medical or evacuation services. If the Government provides such services, the Contractor shall reimburse the Government for the costs incurred.

(End of clause)

[66 FR 18054, Apr. 5, 2001]
#### BACKER v. UNITED STATES GAS FIXTURE CO. OF CITY OF NEW YORK.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 22, 1903.)

1. Corporations—Officers—Authority to Contract.

In an action against a corporation for a percentage of certain claims collected by defendant, a paper bearing the corporate seal, and signed by the treasurer, agreeing that, in event the company should collect certain claims, they would pay the plaintiff one-third of the proceeds, was not admissible in evidence, in the absence of any showing of special authority given the treasurer for entering into such agreement, he having no general authority so to do.

Appeal from' Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.

Action by George Backer against the United States Gas Fixture Company of the City of New York. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

J. A. Seidman, for appellant.

Jacob Gordon, for respondent.

MacLEAN, J.

On April 4, 1902, the plaintiff, then or theretofore president of the defendant company, executed to that company under seal, and in consideration of $1 and other valuable considerations, a general release of all claims which he then had or ever had against it, excepting certain, commissions, not shown to be material in this action. Later in the same day, and apparently in an individual transaction, he was given a paper, sealed with the seal of the company, and signed by Badanes as its treasurer, reciting that in consideration of $1 it was agreed that, in the event the company should collect claims against five persons therein named, it would pay the plaintiff one-third of the proceeds realized upon collection of the claims. This paper was received in evidence upon proof of the signature and the authenticity of the seal. It should have been excluded upon the de*150fendant’s objection and proper exception. Nothing was shown or offered to prove that the signer had special or apparent authority to so act, and, as his office was not one attended with inherent general executive authority for the conduct and management of the corporate business, the paper signed, sealed, and delivered by him did not afford even presumptive evidence of an obligation on the part of the defendant. It was attempted to prove, but abortively, that the corporation had ratified the agreement by collecting two of the claims mentioned in it by showing that some check had been given to the company’s attorney for one .of the claims, and that something had been received by the same attorney in settlement of another, but it was not shown that the company had realized anything. The jury found, and was allowed to find, against objection and exception, for the full amount demanded in the complaint, which, in view of the evidence, was excessive. Judgment should be reversed.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.
203.171-4 Solicitation provision and contract clause. ( a ) Use the clause at 252.203-7000, Requirements Relating to Compensation of Former DoD Officials, in all solicitations and contracts, including solicitations and contracts using FAR part 12 procedures for the acquisition of commercial products and commercial services.
( b ) Use the provision at 252.203-7005, Representation Relating to Compensation of Former DoD Officials, in all solicitations, including solicitations using FAR part 12 procedures for the acquisition of commercial products and commercial services and solicitations for task orders and delivery orders.
[76 FR 71829, Nov. 18, 2011, as amended at 78 FR 37983, June 25, 2013; 88 FR 6580, Jan. 31, 2023]
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Catherine Mannix, Respondent, v. Park & Tilford Distillers et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from decision of Workmen’s Compensation Board that determined work stoppage of the claimant was solely associated with the accident of November 24, 1952 and discharged the Special Fund for Reopened Cases. Claimant first suffered from dermatitis in 1946 while working for McCall Corporation when she was exposed to benzol, turpentine and ink. Thereafter in January, 1951, while working for Huyler’s she developed a skin irritation and a subsequent test determined she was allergic to chocolate to which she was exposed in the course of this employment. This *559condition was reportedly cured and the case closed on July 20, 1951. Subsequently while working in the employ of Park and Tilford she became disabled on November 24, 1952 from exposure to Tintex. Compensation was paid by the appellants from the above date until June 4, 1958 when a hearing was held at their request to determine whether the disability was associated with the prior exposures. The board determined there was no such association. The claimant testified when she went to work for the employer herein she had recovered from the prior attacks of dermatitis and worked for approximately seven months before it “flared up again”. Medical reports were filed monthly from December 12, 1952 until May 27, 1958 which showed a continuing condition of dermatitis. The doctor for the Special Fund testified in his opinion there was no relationship as to the different exposures as the condition in each claim was due to a different product. He expressed some uncertainty that Tintex alone was causing the rash to last seven years after exposure. Claimant’s physician testified in June, 1958, and stated .that he had treated claimant continuously since October, 1955 for contact dermatitis and which condition was related to her employment with Park & Tilford and that she became hypersensitized due to her previous exposures. Another doctor produced by the carrier was unable to express an opinion as to the relationship of the prior attacks but agreed that each attack added to this hypersensitivity and that the condition might be permanent. The medical testimony is pretty much in agreement that each claim was independent of the others as each exposure was associated with a different product. The board’s determination that the Special Fund should be discharged, each incident being separate of the others, was fully justified. The medical testimony as to the long duration of disability resulting from the last exposure was close but the record as a whole was sufficient to sustain this finding by the board. Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs to be divided between Workmen’s Compensation Board and Special Fund for Reopened Cases.
#### In the Matter of Clearview Gardens Fifth Corporation et al., Appellants, v. Harris M. Murdock et al., Constituting the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York, et al., Respondents and Harry Berger et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

In a proceeding to review and annul a determination of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York, which granted an application under subdivision (e) of section 7 of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York for a variance so as to permit the erection and operation of a gasoline service station in a Residence Use District for a period of 15 years, subject to express safeguards and conditions imposed by the board, the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated November 30, 1959, which grants the motion of the respondent board to dismiss the petition and to affirm the board’s determination, and which denies the petitioners’ cross motion for the relief demanded in the petition. Petitioners contend that the board exceeded the powers granted to it by subdivision (e) of section 7 of the Zoning Resolution; and that its determination is void because of procedural defects, particularly in that there was a vacancy in the five-member board at the time some of the proceedings upon the variance application were held (citing: New York City Charter, § 661; General Construction Law, § 41). Order affirmed, with costs. The decision in *Matter of Gray*v. *Maislen*(17 Misc 2d 161) is not applicable to this case, since here the board’s determination was finally made upon the votes of all its five members. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, J.J., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raymond Freeman, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously modified, on the law and facts, and, as modified, affirmed in accordance with the same memorandum ' as in *People v Thomas*(66 AD2d 1001). (Appeal from judgment of Monroe *1002County Court—assault, second degree, and other charges.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Moule, Dillon, Schnepp and Witmer, JJ.