1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 2

- 1 7 45

___________ THOMAS I. GAGE ,

Appellant v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA AS ; FRANK J. PROVENZANO, SOMERSET COUNTY SHERIFF

____ ________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3

- 11

- cv - 0 0862 ) District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to T hird Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 12, 2013 Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : March 28, 2013 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Thomas I. Gage filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for t h e District of New Jersey against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Sheriff Frank J. Provenzano challenging a foreclosure judgment entered in state court and Wells Fargo‟s subsequent2

purchase of the foreclosed property

. Gage claims that the foreclosure on his re sidential property violated his federal rights

. In brief, Gage defaulted on his mortgage, and Wells Fargo subsequently filed a foreclosure complaint in state court. Gage did not file a responsive pleading, and a final judgment of foreclosure was entered by the state court in April 2010. Shortly thereafter, the Somerset County Sheriff‟s Office adverti s ed the sale of the property and posted a notice regarding it on the front door. The property was sold to Wells Fargo in July 2010. Gage refused to leave, and he and his family were ultimately evicted in August 2011.
In February 2011 , Gage filed the aforementioned complaint in federal court challenging the foreclosure judgment and sale. Shortly after the eviction, Gage filed an “emergency motion” that esse n tially requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the d efendants from taking further action with regard to the property . The District Court denied the motion on September 9, 2011 , and we affirmed. Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank , N.A. , 450 F . App‟x 121, 123 (3d Cir. 2011). At the same time as it denied the emergency motion, the District Court granted Wells Fargo‟s motion to dismiss the claims against it
as barred under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. By order entered March 5, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendant, Sheriff
Provenzano , and denied summary judgment to Gage. T his appeal followed.
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the District
Court ‟s orders dismissing the complaint as to Well s Fargo and granting summary3

judgment to Sheriff Provenzano

. See Barefoot Archite c t, Inc. v. Bunge , 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). Pursuant to the Rooker

- F eldman doctrine , federal courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appella te review of state court determinations. See Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P. , 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Four requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injury caused by th e state court judgment; (3) th e st at e court judgment was rendered before the f e deral suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff invites the district court to review and re ject the state court judgment. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). All four requirements are met with respect to Gage‟s claims against Wells Fargo

. Gage cannot evade Rooker

- Feldman by arguing on appeal that he was not injured by the foreclosure judgment, but rather b y W ells Fargo‟s purportedl y fraudulent actions

. The complaint reveals the nature of Gage ‟s claims against Wells Fargo : that the bank had no right to foreclose on the property and therefore committed “ criminal acts ” by enforcing the foreclosure judgment ( Counts I and IV ). These claims are in essence an attack on the state court judgment of foreclosure. Furthermore, a n aspect of t he relief that Gag e request s

– to have the dee d to the property restored to him

– makes it abundantly clear that he seeks to ov erturn the foreclosure judgment. Accordingly, the claims against Wells Fargo were properly dismissed under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine.4

Turning to the claims against Sheriff Provenzano, Gage claims that the Sheriff failed to protect Gage‟s constitutional rights, apparently by enforcing the foreclosure judgment and conducting the sale of the property. The District Court concluded that Sheriff Provenzano i s entitled to qualified immunity. This doctrine “ protects government officials „ from liability for ci vil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‟” Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) ( quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1 982)). The District Court correctly found that the sale of the property did not violate any clearly established rights because the Sheriff acted pursuant to a valid state court judgment

. T he District Court also properly refused to consider the

a rguments regarding damage to personal property as a result of the sale because Gage did not include those allegations in his complaint. Similarly, the District Court properly refused to consider the allegations that Sheriff Provenzano violat ed certain federal crim inal statues because criminal prosecution is not with in the scope of Gage‟s civil suit. 1
For these reasons , we will affirm the judgment of the District Court

.

1 Gage asks us to take “judicial notice” of several documents. Although the material is inapp ropriate for such notice, we note that we have reviewed all submissions to this Court. Similarly, we have considered his allegations regarding the District Court Judge, but find them without merit. Implicit in our decision to affirm is the conclusion tha t the District Court did not act erroneously or improperly in the disposition of this matter.