Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/csce

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2000

58-816CC

KOSOVOS DISPLACED

AND IMPRISONED

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

FEBRUARY 28, 2000

[CSCE 106-2-3]

 
KOSOVOS DISPLACED AND IMPRISONED

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2000

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

WASHINGTON DC

The Commission met at 2:00 p.m. in room B318, Rayburn House

Office Building, the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman; Hon.

Steny H. Hoyer, Ranking Member; Hon. Frank R. Wolf, Commissioner.

Witnesses present: John Menzies, Deputy Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Kosovo Implementation, U.S. Department of State; Bill Frelick, Director of Policy, U.S. Committee for Refugees; His Grace Artemije, Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Prizren and Raska;

ndrzej Mirga, Co-Chair of the Council of Europe Specialists Group on

Roma and Chairman of the Project on Ethnic Relations Romani Advisory Board; Susan Blaustein, Senior Consultant, International Crisis

Group; Ylber Bajraktari, Political Analyst from Kosovo.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order. Good afternoon. Today the Helsinki Commission is returning its focus to the Balkans, a

region which has dominated our agenda. More specifically, well look at

the current situation in Kosovo and the prospects for addressing outstanding human rights issues.

People from all ethnic groups in Kosovo continue to be displaced. Large

numbers of Serbs and Roma, in particular, have had to flee Kosovo.

Most Albanians have returned in their forced displacement last year,

but some cannot return to their own villages and towns or have to contend with survival on property that was destroyed during the conflict.

Finally, many Kosovar Albanians languish in Serbian prisons seemingly for no other reason than Milosevics regime well document desire

to inflict pain on as many innocent people as possible.

Much of our discussion today will be on the situation in Kosovo itself,

but we know all too well that few efforts to build democratic and tolerant societies in Kosovo or anywhere else in the region can succeed without addressing the role of Slobodan Milosevic and the need for democratic change in Serbia itself.

Until that occurs, the international community will continue to be

challenged in the region. There will continue to be friction spilling over

into violence. Here in Washington and capitals across Europe there will

be differing views on how to respond, especially in the deployment of our

own forces and the rules of their engagement. Mitrovica is the only

most recent hot spot over there.

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We heard in our hearings just a few weeks ago that Montenegro might

well be next on the list. Clearly we have an active interest in addressing

the source of Balkan instability for the sake of your national interests

and for the well being of the peoplethat is to say, all people who live in

the region. We have a very distinguished set of witnesses today and we

look forward to hearing their views.

Our first panel will consist of Ambassador John Menzies, Deputy

Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Kosovo implementation. He will present the views of the Department of State. We

know Ambassador Menzies very well here at the Commission, going

back to his days at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, to his work on

humanitarian questions and then as U.S. Ambassador in Sarajevo during the Bosnian conflict, his post-Dayton work at the U.S. Institute for

Peace and his current position. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador, to the Commission.

The next panel will consist of five experts. First, we will have Bill

Frelick of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. A well-known advocate of

people in need who will give us a quantitative and qualitative overview

of the situation for the displaced in Kosovo.

Next, we will have His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who will present his views on what can be done to help the

Serb community. We have Andrzej Mirga, currently a visiting Professor and Kosciuszko Fellow at Rutgers University and an expert for the

Project on Ethnic Relations, and who will address the situation on the

Roma. Finally, we have Susan Blaustein of the International Crisis

Group, and Bajraktari, a student from Kosovo, who will address the

issues of those Albanians imprisoned in Serbia and highlight the importance of resolving that issue.

I just want to say for the record for those who will view these proceedings, that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is an

independent U.S. government agency. It was created in 1976, to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other

OSCE commitments. The Commission consists of nine members from

the United State Senate, nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and

Senate and rotate every two years. This year I serve the Congress as

the Chairman, and Ben Nighthorse Campbell, the distinguished Senator from Colorado, serves as the Co-Chairman. The Commission contributes to the formulation of U.S. policy on the OSCE and takes part in

its execution, including through member and staff participation on U.S.

delegations to the OSCE meetings and in certain OSCE bodies.

Members of the commission have regular contact with Parliamentarians, government officials, NGOs and private individuals from other

OSCE participating states. The Commission convenes public hearings

and briefings with expert witnesses, like were doing today, on OSCErelated issues. It issues reports concerning implementation of those OSCE

commitments in participating states. It publishes a monthly CSCE digest with up-to-date information on OSCE developments and Commission activities and organizes official delegations to participating states

and OSCE meetings to address democratic, economic and human rights

developments firsthand.
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That being said, I would like to welcome the Ambassador again. I

notice Mr. Wolf, a Commissioner, has joined us. Mr. Wolf, do you have

any opening comments? I want to thank you, Mr. Wolf, for being here

and yield the floor to Ambassador Menzies.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JOHN MENZIES, DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR KOSOVO IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amb. MENZIES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind words of

welcome. Its a real pleasure to be here with you today. Ive submitted a

copy of my full remarks. Id like to offer an abbreviated statement.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your comments will be made a part of

the record.

Amb. MENZIES. During the war hundreds of thousands of Kosovar

Albanians and minority groups found a safe haven in neighboring Albania, Macedonia and in other countries. Hundreds of thousands also fled

their homes for the uncertainties of internal displacement elsewhere in

Kosovo. In the almost eight months since the war ended, more than

800,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes in

relative safety and security.

And the efforts of the international community over the course of the

winter have ensured that no one was without shelter or food. This is a

major accomplishment in and of itself. Gradually, peace is taking hold

and resolution of the questions posed by the displaced and imprisoned

are important factors in building that peace.

The key to the return of all citizens of Kosovo is security and economic development. The international communities efforts at ensuring

a secure environment for all people of Kosovo include the Kosovo Implementation Force, the United Nations International Police Force, the

Indigenous Kosovo Police Service and a renewed judiciary system.

Progress is also being made on the economic front. Economic assistance will play an important and crucial role in providing citizens with

the jobs and hope for the future that will turn them away from thoughts

of violence and revenge and allow absorption of additional returns. A

postal and telecommunications system is in place. Power plants are

being rehabilitated to provide energy and a commercial bank has opened

and will begin providing credit to small businesses within the next three

months. We have begun talking with our allies about restarting parts

of the vital Trepca mining complex. In the context of this progress on

security and economic development, the U.S. has promised to work with

Kosovo Serb leadership on the realization of a pilot program to begin to

promote the return of Serb refugees under conditions of safety and dignity, in coordination with UNMIK, KFOR and other donors. This program could be an important first step for returns.

The continued detention of Albanians in Serbia remains a tragic and

acutely vexing issue for the international community. Given our lack of

diplomatic relations with Belgrade, it is difficult for the U.S. government to directly pressure the Milosevic regime on this issue. Since last

summer, however, the State Department has consistently worked to

raise the public and diplomatic profile of this issue and to leverage key

players inside Serbia who can make a difference.

Were supporting indigenous human rights non-governmental organizations working in this area, such as the Humanitarian Law Center.

We have provided $350,000.00 to the United Nations High Commis-
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sioner for Human Rights Mission in the FRYthat is Serbia and Yugoslaviawhich was appointed by Bernard Kouchner to lead the international effort to secure the release of the detainees.

We are pleased that through the work of the High Commissioner on

Human Rights and the Humanitarian Law Center, some women and

children have been released for humanitarian reasons. We have also

repeatedly raised the matter diplomatically with UNMIK, with the ICRC,

the International Commission on Missing Persons and bilaterally with

NATO member states.

In addition, the U.S. has begun a dialogue with the community of St.

Egidio to engage the FRY government on this issue. Others in the international community are also making efforts to promote release of these

prisoners. For example, the Finnish government has negotiated with

Belgrade for their release. The truth is that European nations are in a

better position than the U.S. to take the lead on the issue. Some of our

European Allies like Italy, have representation in Belgrade and can

pressure the Milosevic regime. Canada and Japan also have representation in Belgrade. It may be possible to encourage greater Russian

participation in this effort.

Let me also touch briefly on the situation in Mitrovica. First of all,

KFOR dealt with the recent unrest in Mitrovica quickly and decisively.

Indeed, there have been no serious confrontations between Serbs and

Albanians since February 13, when KFOR responded to the upsurge of

violence there. We hope that no additional outbreaks will occur as a

result of the bombing this morning.

That said, Mitrovica remains a potential flashpoint. Serbs from all

over Kosovo fled to Mitrovica as KFOR deployed and Serb Security Forces

left. They drove thousands of Albanians out of their homes in North

Mitrovica and have been trying ever since to develop an enclave that is

ruled by Serbs controlled by Belgrade, a place where the authority of

UNMIK does not reach. Indeed, Serb hardliners in Mitrovica effectively

scuttled an earlier attempt to bring Serbs into UNMIKs interim administrative council.

While many of the Serbs in North Mitrovica have security concerns,

those concerns are not justification to drive people out of their homes or

to partition northern Kosovo from the rest of the province. Ethnic Albanians are understandably frustrated by what they see as a hardening of

the occupation of their homes in North Mitrovica. Extremists on both

sides are willing to exploit the exasperation of the Albanians and the

fears of the Serbs for their own nefarious purposes.

In order to resolve the problem, UNMIK and KFOR are working closely

together to eliminate the bars to freedom of movement by both communities across the Ibar River, to insulate the north from troublemakers,

to provide security for Serbs in the north, and facilitate two-way returns of Albanians back to the north and Serbs to the south.

Additional efforts to revitalize viable local industries are underway,

as are efforts to develop Serb media independent of Belgrades control.

But ensuring a secure environment is a sine qua non for progress in all

other areas. Some additional troops have been deployed to the city and

the police presence greatly increased with both elements conducting

visible joint security operations.

UNMIK is appointing international judges and prosecutors to make

sure that malefactors are tried and detained as per the law. This concludes my brief prepared remarks and I would be happy to address any

questions.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Just let me ask

you, is there a Reuters report on the wire right now for today that there

was a Serbian bus that was blown up in Mitrovica? There are also

reports of the celebration of the KLA coming into being in 1996, also

slated for today. Ceremonies apparently will take place, which obviously could act as a touchstone for more violence.

What has been done or what is planned by KFOR and by all of the

interested parties, in these circumstance to mitigate the possibility of

violence? And are we talking about more powder keg situations in the

near future?

Amb. MENZIES. Well certainly Mitrovica is one of the flashpoints

that we must watch very carefully. It has been the focus of great attention from all parties. We were saddened by the reports of the bus and

yet encouraged by the fact that no lives were lost. It was a bus heading

northward out of Mitrovica this morning and was blown up, as I understand it, by a mine.

The KLA anniversary is a potential point of rallying from some elements, but Im encouraged by the fact that they do not necessarily represent the majority of the Albanian population even. We have noted

with great satisfaction the continuing support from moderates among

the Albanian community. We hear about the trouble spots and about

the activities of extremists, but the broad sweep of the people is opposed

to that.

They, as the other minorities and as the Serbs in the region know,

they are all familiar with thuggery and they know it and they know

what they dont like. And so were encouraged by that. We do think that

KFOR has certainly the force that it needs to stop this from getting out

of hand. That is in fact their job to assure that there are no returns to

open conflict. We believe they have the power to do so.

The infusions of police, the beefing up of the international police force

there will also go a long way. We also were talking to the people on the

different parties to encourage them to use what influence they have to

prevent outbreaks of violence in this area as in others.

Mr. SMITH. Just let me ask you in terms of Mitrovica and also northern Kosovo, does our intelligence pick up any indications that Milosevic

is sending in paramilitaries or is supporting it in any material way? Or

are these local, truly indigenous uprisings or acts of violence that were

seeing?

Amb. MENZIES. I think it is safe to say that there is a good degree of

control emanating from Belgrade. The authority that is extended by

Milosevic is not always clear to follow. Its almost like following a money

trail, you cant always say that paramilitaries have been sent in or ununiformed MOP forces, thats Ministry of Interior Police, or other elements like that.

But his authority does extend and is clear to us. The exact nature of

that, that authority though is a little harder to pin down. But its clearly

not strictly an indigenous uprising or something like that. In fact, we

think that most of the Serbs of the region probably oppose his influence.

Mr. SMITH. You point out in your testimony and follow up with that

comment that KFOR is seeking to insulate the northern troublemakers. How is that accomplished?

Amb. MENZIES. It is accomplished by them taking charge of the situation, by not allowing things to get out of hand, by paying closer attention to the international boundary. I think this is something that UNMIK
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is working on together with KFOR, to try to gain a sense of who is

coming in and who is going out. It is in the interest of all parties to have

that sort of a sense.

We dont want problems elsewhere back in Serbia that might, for example, be exported by extremist elements among the Albanians as well.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, there was a report today on Radio Free

Europe that the Yugoslav military was building itself up in Montenegro

and just as I pointed out in my opening comments, we had a hearing

and heard some very distressing early warning signals about what appears to be happening in Montenegro. What is your take on that and

what can we do, again, to try to lessen or mitigate that flashpoint?

Amb. MENZIES. The U.S. is providing a good deal of assistance to

Montenegro, both in this fiscal year and in fiscal year 1999. If a supplemental comes forward then that will be covered also in the supplemental and expansion of our efforts there. We believe its terribly important

to stabilize Montenegro, to preserve it in the course that it has chosen

for itself. We believe it is a positive influence back on Belgrade and on

Serbs who live in other regions.

And we do not support the idea of them moving toward independence

at this point. We dont want to see them pushed in that direction. We

want to see them stabilized and their economy brought back into life

and made much more vibrant.

Mr. SMITH. Could you speak to the issue of the Roma? We sent a

letter on July 14, pointing out that even the UNHCR thought it was

incapable of protecting them and we raised concerns that the Roma

continue to be persecuted and killed. What specific proactive measures

are being taken to protect the Roma?

Amb. MENZIES. First of all, we recognize this is a serious problem.

There are about 20,000 Roma still in Macedonia who need to return,

just as there are Serbs who have fled Kosovo as well. We want the Serbs

and the Roma both to return. We did not conduct the bombing campaign so that it would be a Serb-free zone or a Roma-free zone, but so

that all the peoples of Kosovo could live in security and peace. With that

as background, we have been working with the OSCE, with UNMIK

and with KFOR to assure first that the security is taken care of.

That is truly the most important issue on the ground. And we have

the different elements which are slowly coming on to line. We only have

2,300 international police there of the 4,718 that I think have been

requested. The Kosovo Police Service, which is a very neutral organization is not yet stood up in the way that it needs to be. The training

program is thorough but it is putting insufficient numbers through at

the moment.

Were looking at ways of expanding that. The OSCE has offices which

focus on the needs of minority groups and seeks to address them directly. Well be working with them. But again we are working generally through the security apparatus, to first create the environment

that makes return safe for all of the peoples of Kosovo.

Mr. SMITH. Let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Wolf.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF,

COMMISSIONER

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Smith. I appreciate Mr. Smith having

the hearings and welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Im certainly not an expert on Kosovo although I read every article I can get my hands on and
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I was there in February before the fighting broke out. And then I went

back in April during the fighting and was up on the border in Kukes for

a good while and then went back to Kosovo in late August and early

September of last year.

There are a couple of recommendations that I made, I wanted to ask

you about it, but your testimony triggered a couple of points that Id

just like to speak and Im just speaking for myself. You mentioned bringing in Russian soldiers. I would not bring in Russian soldiers. I think

theyve done enough damage down in Chechnya with all of the brutalities that have been done. So I think to bring in the Russian military

would be a destabilizing thing and Im quite frankly glad that they are

not there in great numbers and dont think they should be invited in.

Secondly, I think its important for our government to speak out boldly,

with compassion, but forcefully to the KLA. I was one of the Republicans that voted in support of the bombing. There were only a handful of

us. I didnt vote to bomb over there to have the KLA turn around and do

the same thing that the Serbs were doing to them.

There were not many in the Congress, frankly, on either side who

wanted to do this. But for the KLA to be doing to the Serbs what was

done to them certainly violates the golden rule. Christ said, do unto

others as you would have them do unto you. The golden rule does not

say, Do to them what you didnt want them to do to you. I think we

should make it absolutely clear that it is unacceptable for any of these

activities to be taking place, be it Serbs targetting Albanians, or Albanians targetting Serbs, but particularly now with what we see with the

Kosovo Albanians. I dont know if you want to make a comment about

that, but I think its important that we speak out. And frankly Im

really not hearing the President speak out very much on this issue.

This issue seems to be drifting off his radar screen to some respects.

Obviously it is not drifting off of yours and the State Departments,

but its off of his. I think he has to speak out. He gave us all the rhetoric

and all the talk, much of what I agreed with during the period, but he

has been relatively silent since that time. He has to use the bully pulpit

of the presidency of the United States to say to the KLA, we were there

when you needed us, but now it is inappropriate, it is unacceptable and

we will not stand by to allow this to be done to the Serbs. You agree with

that?

Amb. MENZIES. Well, I agree with much of what you said, or almost

all of it. Let me just say that we have regularly made the point to the

KLA or former KLA, let me put it that way, because the KLA is out of

business now. There may be some residual longing for it and there may

be other extremist elements that are arising that emanate from former

members of the KLA, but it is gone as far as were concerned.

As we have, however, addressed many Kosovo leaders at many avenues and at numerous times urging restraint, urging participation

with the structure and urging them to turn away from violent acts and

to turn toward the legal processes that are slowly evolving. We have

made those points consistently and frequently to the people on the

ground. And let me come back to a point that I think is

Mr. WOLF. At what level?

Amb. MENZIES. At

Mr. WOLF. What level of our government has

Amb. MENZIES. Well, certainly its taken place at every level I know

of that communicates with Albanian leaders.
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Mr. WOLF. When the President was there during that period of time

he went to Macedonia, did he meet with any of the leaders of the socalled former KLA to express his strong feelings with regard to this?

Amb. MENZIES. Im sorry, Im just not informed as to exactly whom

he met with or I dont recall exactly whom he met with. Maybe one of

my colleagues can

Mr. WOLF. Has General Clark been down there to meet with

Amb. MENZIES. He had met with them Im certain, as have many

other of the NATO Commanders on the ground frequently. And these

meetings take place regularly. But I want to point out that there is one

Kosovo leader who is a figure of passive resistance, who was the leader

throughout the period of oppression before the war broke out and thats

Mr. Rugova. Rugova, no one would call him an extremist, I think, today. And he still enjoys overwhelming support among the populous.

As I suggested, the people of this region know thuggery when they see

it and they turn away from it. And so I think thats a very hopeful sign.

We are making those points and we make them constantly, and whenever we feel that there is a potential for something to go wrong. But it is

a constant theme and it is having some results on the ground, which I

cant really get into in this context.

Mr. WOLF. Would they be considered a war criminal for their actions

if theyre caught? If we find somebody who has been active in doing

this, is he then subject to severe punishment?

Amb. MENZIES. To severe punishment, but under civil law. Now there

is a legal code which is operative. It is the law of 1989, as opposed to the

later law. So as the court systems come on line, they will be held accountable for criminal acts. Im told that the President, in his November speech, did condemn ethnic cleansing.

Mr. WOLF. But I think he has to speak out much more forcefully, and

he has to continually speak out. Those of us who supported him in this

effort are demanding that he speak out. He cannot be silent on this

issue. This Administration does not have the greatest record on human

rights. They should have spoken out with regard to the Russian troops

down in Chechnya.

The pictures on the tv the other day, the brutality that took place

down thereI think he has to personally speak out on this issue, publicly. I think its one thing to say privately, but the more that comes out

of the bully pulpit, the presidency, I think is good. The questions I would

ask you, are in the recommendations that I put in my trip report and I

believe I sent a copy to you and to the State Department.

The first recommendation was, I said Rugova seems to be the best

hope for unifying Kosovo at this time and we should encourage him. He

has a lot of residual respect among the people for his years of speaking

up for them. He is committed to non-violence and is a known commodity to the west. Are we siding with him? Are we encouraging him?

Whats wrong with doing it, after all the effort that we put into it. Are

we standing with somebody like that?

I believe that it should be the policy of the United States Government

to stand with somebody like that.

Amb. MENZIES. Its difficult for us to always pick winners that we

want to back exclusively over others. Do we support what he stands

for? Of course we support what he stands for. But we support other

moderate voices and there are many on the ground. We do not support

the extremist voices, and we will not.
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Mr. WOLF. The other recommendation, I said there should be psychological help for the physical rebuilding. And then I said there needs to

be a spiritual dimension involved. If youre talking about reconciliation

and bringing people together, it isnt just bricks and mortar. Is there

any major effort of bringing, from a spiritual point of view, of bringing

together the Serbs and the Albanians with regard to reconciliation, other

than loans and things like that? Is there any special effort being made

from a spiritual point of view?

Amb. MENZIES. Perhaps not quite that directly. But in many ways it

is something that underlies a lot of what we do. For example, the Archbishop is here with us today, as is Father Sava and their colleagues. We

have worked with them to try to work on a common purpose for the

future. We have reached several agreements of areas we would like to

cooperate in and where we think we can work together to promote peace

in the region.

This is based on the spiritual and moral leadership which is being

shown by the gentlemen that are here today to speak to you. So it is

underlying what were doing. Weve given five million dollars for psychosocial programs in the region which do have a spiritual component to

them. But for most of us the work were engaged in is a good cause in

which we are anxiously engaged trying to do something which we think

is certainly spiritual in its nature.

Mr. WOLF. Well, I would say that I understand, but even to this day

there has not been healing and reconciliation in Bosnia Herzegovina. If

you go to Sarajevo there are not a lot of Moslems in downtown Sarajevo

going on to Banja Luka to buy shirts. Nor are there many Moslems

going to Mostar. I think the healing and the reconciliation hasnt really

taken root in Bosnia. I worry that there was not five years ago and now

we have such a short time that I dont really see it. So my own sense is,

and again I speak for myself, I believe it will be helpful to have different

religious denominations and people to come together in a sense of healing and bringing people together for reconciliation. The best thing that

you could do for the Albanian Kosovo family or Serb family is to bring

them together and bring that healing. It took a while, even if you recall

in our country, after a civil war. But you have to begin to heal and it

takes leaders and the spiritual leaders to come together and love one

another and really model the healing.

Otherwise, I think the thing will be a failure. I have two other questions and then Ill just kind of end. One of the concerns that I expressed,

I said the whole region could be become a center of organized crime

activity involving drugs, prostitution and smuggling. Where is the organized crime effort and what are we doing in the western countries

with regard to that? How bad is the organized crime effort now or is it

improving? And is there any special effort being done with regard to

that?

Amb. MENZIES. Before I turn to that, Id like to come back to your

final point. Because I think the effort you have described would be extremely welcome. But it is difficult for the U.S. government to lead that

particular effort. NGOs can best do that kind of work, in my experience

and I would encourage that, that kind of work on the ground. But let

me turn to organized
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Mr. WOLF. Did the government help fund, what if we were to bring

all sides together in Macedonia for a three or four days of sitting down

together, breaking bread together, talking with each other, arguing

with each other, getting to know one and one another? Would the governments support an effort?

Amb. MENZIES. Wed have to look at a proposal, but I think that you

would find a good deal of interest in that kind of a proposal. But again,

I cant commit to it. Well, well try to get somebody to make the proposal. My last comment, unless you wanted to make a comment.

I was going to address organized crime, thats fine.

Mr. WOLF. Okay. Well, Id like you to do that and then I have one last

question with regard to organized crime. You were going to comment on

the organized crime.

Amb. MENZIES. Organized crime, yes. We are working on organized

crime. The British have a proposal to provide an organized crime or to

develop an organized crime unit. Were in close consultation with the

British, French and other potential donors to see exactly what the dimensions of such a unit will be and well be moving very swiftly forward

on this as part of the United Nations International Police Force.

So we take this very seriously as well. And were concerned about it.

Its the greatest threat to democracy. And lastly, its not a question, its

a statement. I think there has to be a major effort with the young people.

The number of young people that are just hanging around, doing nothing, sitting in coffee shops and just doing nothing, and idle hands and

nothing, after what theyve been through. So I think a major effort and

somehow the young have not been quite so hardened.

A major effort with both the Serb population and the Albanian population, particularly the young people to really engage them. Whether it

is, you know, the rebuilding or whether it is soccer, sports and activities. But to bring the young together, I think, would be helpful. With

that, I may submit some other questions but I appreciate, you have a

very tough job and well try to put together a proposal and maybe working with Mr. Smith and others and see if you would be willing to fund

it.

And it would be under the category of reconciliation, bringing people

together to learn to get along. I thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolf, and let me ask you a

few follow up questions with regards to organized crime. Our Commission intervened just a few weeks ago on behalf of a number of Ukrainian women. La Strada, an NGO, made us aware of the fact that they

had been trafficked into Montenegro for the purposes of prostitution. As

you may know, Ive introduced what I consider to be sweeping, landmark legislation.

It has been co-sponsored in a bi-partisan way by many members of

Congress to impose a life imprisonment on those who are involved with

trafficking, mostly of women exploited for prostitution purposes. But

also to try to go after those countries that are not doing all they could

possibly do. The Organized Crime Unit, the Strike Unit, and the like,

will that put a major emphasis on the trafficking of women?

Amb. MENZIES. I certainly hope that will be part of its focus. Were

hearing more and more stories about this and theres more and more

evidence emerging that this is going on in Kosovo and its something

that we would like to see stopped. So I hope that this will be one of
11

Mr. SMITH. For what its worth, whatever you could do to try to, I

mean its a matter of enforcement even of existing law, albeit its weak

in some cases, but to really crack down on those who are involved in

these heinous acts.

Amb. MENZIES. We also hope, through the Department, to work with

the NGO sector as well, on identifying some of the potential means of

combating this through cultural and social approaches.

Mr. SMITH. In February, Human Rights Watch came out with a very

strong statement with regards to innocents who had been killed as a

result of the Kosovo bombing.

This study by Human Rights Watch rejected any notion that NATO

committed war crimes. But it did argue that in waging a war to stop

Serbs from killing or driving out Kosovo Albanians, 90 percent of the

pre-war population of the ethnic Serbian province, NATO officials themselves violated the Geneva Convention both in the selection of targets

and the use of cluster bombs. After a six-month investigation including

three weeks of interviewing witnesses, the Human Rights Watch Team

determined that one-third of the number of the lethal episodes and half

the casualties could have been avoided if NATO forces had strictly followed the rules.

Now many good people that I know and respect supported the bombing. I was against it, but reasonable men and women can disagree. This

goes to the nature of how the bombing was actually prosecuted. What is

your take on that, and secondly, what is being done regarding this report which tries to bring some kind of harmony, some kind of conclusion to the state of hostility, especially the state of mind where people

are still at each others throats?

Amb. MENZIES. Well, we fundamentally disagree with some of the

conclusions of that report which tend to deprecate NATOs efforts to

preserve life and not to destroy it. Of course we deplore the loss of innocent life. That was not what this campaign was about, at all, but to

preserve life. We had seen some of the worst atrocities Europe has seen

since the second World War, take place in Kosovo. We had seen a population movement such as we have not seen in Europe since people were

expelled from regions in the mid 50s.

And so we were responding to a very pressing series of events. I cant

really speak for the Department of Defense on the details of each one of

the findings of the report. But I would simply say that it has always

been our policy to try to preserve life.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Any further comment for the record

that could be made, we would appreciate that, because it is something

that

Mr. WOLF. Before you goI just want to make one, no, after you

finish, thats all right.

Mr. SMITH. Well, Ill yield and then I have one final

Mr. WOLF. Well, I just wanted to raise, I felt a moral obligation here.

A number of the families talked about their loved ones that are in prison

in Serbia, and I know you cover it adequately in your testimony, but I

believe the U.S., the U.N and everybody else should really press the

issue of missing Albanians held in Serbia. I know you care deeply about

it and I know its in your testimony, but I just want the record to show

that its an issue we care about. Thank you.
12

Mr. SMITH. I thank the gentleman. Before you answer, I ,too, have

concerns about that as well. We have a Kosovar Political Prisoner List

that has 1,100 people on it. You mentioned a 1,300 to 5,000 guesstimate

as to how many. There have been some rather scathing criticisms of

the ICRC and its handling of the prisoners. When the bombing was

stopped, what were the conversations, what was the state of play with

regards to getting a full and total accounting and hopefully the release

of those individuals who were and still remain behind bars in Serbia?

Why was that not part of the bombing exchanges in terms of diplomatic traffic?

Amb. MENZIES. I think because it wasnt included in the previous

discussions between Ahttisari and the Serbs. I think that is the fundamental reason that it was excluded in the end. Again, Im not the expert

on that, but that has certainly been my impression. Let me just say

there was no deal made on this side at all that I am aware of, or anything else that would lead to a nefarious interpretation of that.

It is lamentable that these people are still held. It is an outrage that

they are still being held and sold and their freedom is purchased by

families sometimes. Thats about the only way to get them out. We will

continue to push this issue. We have young people in our Department,

like Albert Sovalos (phonetic), who is here with me today, who are absolutely dedicated to that purpose. And we will continue to press.

Mr. SMITH. What leverage do we have and is there any evidence of

torture?

Amb. MENZIES. Certainly there is evidence of beating. There are reports of that. As far as torture goes, I dont have specifics at hand at the

moment. Our leverage is limited, but we are able to stimulate a lot of

concern for the issue among, first of all, our allies. And weve been

working carefully through various angles. I wanted to come back to a

point, because it was in this context that I mentioned the Russians.

And it was to provide diplomatic pressure on the Serbs to release

these people, and in various contexts, that has come up, and it will

continue to do so. We will first work through those angles. We will

work through the NGO community, which has had some success. NGOs

have been effective in monitoring trials, in even defending people who

are accused, and pursuing the interests of all of those who are still

detained.

The U.S. has put about half a million dollars into these efforts and

will continue to do that kind of work, you can be sure. Were not going

to forget these people.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have an estimate as to how many of the people

have been visited and is it a one-time visit or do they get frequent visits?

We have some information that suggests that ICRC is visiting some

1,700 prisoners in Serbia, and that was January 12, 2000. But I dont

know if that is accurate. What is the Departments take on how many

people have actually been visited, the frequency of visits and what is

being gleaned as to their state of health or lack of it?

Amb. MENZIES. I dont know the frequency of the visits but I believe

that many of them have been visited certainly more than once. Theyve

been visited by the ICRC, but they cannot visit all of them. Some of

them may be in military prisons, some of them may be moved from one

place to another. So I dont have accurate figures on how often theyve

been visited. We think that most of the 1,700 that they cite, certainly

have been visited.
13

Mr. SMITH. If you could, for the record, provide that, it would just

help

Amb. MENZIES. We would be glad to provide that to you.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Mr. Hoyer.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STENY H. HOYER

Mr. HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, Mr.

Ambassador, for missing the majority of your statement and unfortunately I cant stay long. But we all share the concern and I think we

also share the outrage that this continues, the kind of activity that Mr.

Milosevic has been conducting for the past decade.

So I thank the Chairman for this hearing and I would ask that my

testimony be included in full at this point in time in the record. Obviously there is no objection to that, so it will be done, Im sure, by the

Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I want to also say that I have been a very

strong supporter of the Administrations policy, and this Commission

has been a very strong supporter of the War Crimes Tribunal in The

Hague.

I am very concerned about the ongoing violence perpetrated by Albanians now against Serb minorities. The basic premise of course is that

until we stop the cycle of violence, we will be expending an awful lot of

both psychological effort and real assets effort without a lot of success.

Clearly, the continued imprisonment of these Albanians whose sole crime

was speaking out for justice in their country, adds to the violent cycle.

The United States and its western allies need to escalate the pressure

that we have available to us to resolve this prisoners issue.

We must also to bring to a halt the violence perpetrated in Kosovo

itself. They both feed on one another and the United States needs to be

perceived as very genuine when it seeks to end the cycle of violence,

whoever perpetrates that violence. Doing so I think will enhance our

ability to succeed. So I want to thank the Chairman for having this

hearing. The subject matter is critical and we need to continue to raise

this issue.

Unfortunately, when we go off the television screen, many people forget. And one of the purposes of the Helsinki Commission, of course, is to

continue the focus on human rights abuses so that we will remember,

act and hopefully ameliorate those situations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoyer. And your statement,

without objection, will be made a part of the record. Bob Hand, who is

the Staff Specialist, Id like to yield to him for any questions he might

have?

Mr. HAND. I just have one question. Earlier this year, in January,

there were elections in Croatia, which has produced an enormous political change in that country. They have increased the prospect, not only

for cooperation in Dayton implementation and cooperation with the Tribunal, but also, at long last, the return of large numbers of Serbs to

Croatia that were displaced in 1991, and again in 1995.

I hope that happens very quickly and that these people can come back

to their homes. But in terms of our hearing here, I was wondering if

you could comment on the implications of the fact that Serbs will finally

be able to go back to Croatia. What implications does that have on Serbia itself, but then also what implications might that have in terms of

returning populations in Kosovo?
14

We also have in Montenegro and Macedonia, multi-ethnic governments that seem to be working together now. Maybe there is a positive

trend here in the midst of all the gloom. I was wondering if you could

just comment on that as it relates to Kosovo and Serbia?

Amb. MENZIES. Let us hope that Mesics call to his people over television, saying that all are welcome to return, is the beginning of an avalanche of returns. I hope thats the case because, as you know, and have

stated, throughout the region, return has been one of the critical issues

and one of the critical stumbling blocks to enduring peace, to reconciliation, and to the democratic future of the region.

We think this is an extremely positive move that seems to be indicated in Croatia. We hope that it will be the beginning of a process that

will prevail in the region. We have a long way to go, but I think this is

a very good place to start.

Mr. HAND. But if it does, could you just say a little bit more; will it

have any implications on Kosovo or are Serbia and Kosovo isolated from

these other developments taking place?

Amb. MENZIES. I would hope that it would have some, some impact,

but I think it will be more suasive than real. I think the real power,

that will prevent returns at least on one side. is still in Belgrade. And

until that power is removed or replaced by something more benign, that

it reflects more of the popular will rather than a limited sociopath, then

I think were going to have trouble.

I would hope that on the other side that when that change takes place

there will be softening of positions. An American philosopher once said

that those who do not remember the past are doomed to repeat it. Well,

in the Balkans you find that may not be truethat often those who

remember too much of the past in the wrong way are doomed to repeat

it.

There is something to be said for forgiving and possibly forgetting. I

think that we will see a change but its not going to be affected in Kosovo because of Croatia. It will have a positive influence, but not as

directly as we might wish.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Hand. Mr. Ambassador

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, to reiterate, Mr. Ambassador, I think

forgiving and forgetting is a fine principle. But like the Hatfields and

the McCoys, if you dont bring the violence to a stop, there is no time for

forgiving or forgetting. I know you know that, and that its our policy.

The reason this Commission so strongly supports the War Crimes Tribunal, and the reason were so intent on resolving the prisoners issue

and the violence issue in Kosovo, is because forgiving and forgetting

will not be possible until people believe that justice is prevailing at least

to some degree. That they do not have to personally seek vengeance and

retribution. I think that is the cycle that you refer to in your comment.

Amb. MENZIES. Congressman, I couldnt agree with you more. One

of my favorite

Mr. HOYER. I know that.

Amb. MENZIES. But one of my favorite Historians put it this way: to

do justice to the living, however belatedly, should matter.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And just let me again thank you for your

testimony. I just want to say and you might want to comment on this.

About a month from now will be the anniversary date of the initiation of
15

the bombing. I have some concerns because anniversary dates need to

be watched very carefully and some caution must be exercised to ensure

that there are no unintended actions that happen.

I would hope that there would be a mutedcelebration would be the

wrong wordbecause again I didnt support the bombing, but many do

believe that were at the current situation because of the bombing, to

ensure that there are precautions taken, that we are proactive in ensuring that the anniversary date does not become something that we

would not want or might not have anticipated.

So I just hope that every single anniversary date is looked at, including the initiation of bombing, because again, today, were seeing some

action and maybe there is just one mind that was preset and could not

have been anticipated but I think we have to proceed with caution, as

we moved into those dates.

Amb. MENZIES. I appreciate your

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, we look forward

to working with you in the near future.

Amb. MENZIES. Thank you very much. It has been a pleasure to be

here with you. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Id like to ask our next panel if they would proceed to the

witness table. I had previously introduced him, but Ill take just a brief

moment to welcome Mr. Bill Frelick of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and

we also have Andrzej Mirga, currently a visiting Professor at Rutgers

University. We will also hear from Susan Blaustein of the International Crisis Group, and finally Ylber Bajraktari, a student from Kosovo who will speak to us at this session.

I would ask that our witnesses do keep their statements between five

and seven or eight minutes, enough to really get across their point, and

then we will proceed to questioning. Mr. Frelick.

TESTIMONY OF BILL FRELICK, DIRECTOR OF POLICY,

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. FRELICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate

the opportunity to testify today. I do have fairly extensive written remarks which I would like to have submitted for the record and will

keep my comments primarily to some of the recommendations in the

paper, which start basically on Page 13, and therefore skip over some of

the descriptive matters.

I traveled extensively in Serbia and Montenegro, outside of Kosovo, in

December. I was in opposition and government-controlled municipalities. I spoke to local NGOs, international representatives, and government officials at every level. I primarily spoke to displaced people and

refugees in the region. There are about 240,000 people displaced into

Serbia and Montenegro from Kosovo. Its very hard to distinguish them

or separate them in terms of a needs assessment from nearly a half

million refugees that have come in, primarily from Croatia, but also

from Bosnia.

The needs vary quite a bit from group to group and I wont dwell on

it, but certainly the lack of jobs, the lack of purchasing power income is

an overwhelming problem that they have. I visited a variety of collective centers, many of them were quite dreary. These people have been

in collective centers since 1995, or earlier among the refugee population.
16

The group that was the worst off, unquestionably, was the Roma,

known as Gypsies by many. They were, across the boards, much worse

off than the Serbs. In many cases they were living in abandoned buildings, squatting, with no assistance whatsoever from any quarter. Looking at some of the recommendations that I make in the paper, I grapple

with really two sides. One is the humanitarian assistance side and the

other is the protection and durable solutions side. I wanted to touch on

both of those.

In terms of humanitarian assistance, we are really faced with the

quandary of having an economic sanctions regime in place to isolate

Milosevicappropriately so. And yet at the same time we want to avoid

the humanitarian consequences to the civilian population, and in particular the most vulnerable elements of that populationthe elderly, the

sick, and refugees and displaced people. Thus far, I dont think that

weve succeeded very well in helping to maintain an adequate level of

humanitarian assistance in the face of the sanctions regime.

We are left with a particularly difficult situation because the essential monopoly on humanitarian assistance is in the hands of the Yugoslav

Red Cross. And the Yugoslav Red Cross, particularly at its upper echelons, has close links with the government or with the elites that run

the country. Whether there is a direct governmental connection or not

is hard to prove. We talked about the money trail earlier. Its hard to

make those exact links.

The U.S. government has earmarked its humanitarian funding in

such a way that money that touches on the Serbian Commissioner for

Refugees and the Yugoslav Red Cross should not be coming from U.S.

coffers. And that puts the onus on the humanitarian arms of the international community to come up with alternative distribution networks.

And I support the development of those alternative distribution networks. I think it is a healthy thing. It will help the civil society to grow.

But its not going to be easy, its not going to be inexpensive, and its not

going to happen quickly. In the meantime, we are likely to see a great

deal of suffering for people who are caught in the gap. We need to think

about our multi-lateral assistance in ways that set actual markers where

we can see that the earmark thats been placed is used to leverage some

reforms that will help to do a better job of actually meeting these humanitarian needs and not have money diverted in ways that would be

inappropriate.

So I suggest six conditions that should be set, that would have to be

met before multi-lateral assistance could go back through the Yugoslav

Red Cross. I list those in my testimony. I think they are all doable, in

fact theyve all essentially been agreed to in principle, they just havent

been implemented. This includes:

1. an international independent audit of the Yugoslav Red Cross;

2. independent registration of internally displaced people and refugees;

3. access for international monitors;

4. accurate and complete beneficiary lists;

5. a legal framework for NGOs operating in the country; and

6. direct access for NGOs operating in the country.
17

I also suggest that UNHCR, in its negotiations with the government

over payments for the running of collective centers, should make its

own earmark to ensure that the unofficial collective centers, those abandoned buildings that I talked about are also included and that the Roma

get the support and the attention that they desperately need.

On the protection side and the durable solution side, I am also encouraged, as Mr. Hand had mentioned, about the elections in Croatia. I

hope that there will be significant repatriation. However, I think we

need to recognize that the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced people are not going to be able to return to Croatia, Bosnia, and

Kosovo. I think that we need to work to fund local integration projects

so that they can begin to renew their lives in Serbia and Montenegro.

For those who cannot remain in Serbia and Montenegro and who

cannot repatriate or return, I identify eight groups who I think we should

consider for resettlement. These are particularly vulnerable groups who

basically fall between the various parties to the conflict. The first group

would be Roma, out of Kosovo, particularly Albanian speakers who dont

have a place in Serbia.

We need to recognize that the Roma in Kosovo were largely sedentary

people. They were not nomads. Secondly, would be ethnic Albania collaborators who fear for their lives in Kosovo and more recently in the

Albanian areas of Serbia such as Presevo, that have had to flee out of

the Albanian-speaking areas and into Serbian-speaking areas.

The third group would be Serbian draft evaders. There is an Amnesty

International Report that I would recommend to all of you. Some of

these young men have received prison sentences of up to five years for

their conscientious objection to the war.

The fourth group would be Slavic Muslims from Kosovo. I think its

very instructive to see one of the most recent groups that has fled Kosovo is the Gorani. These are people for whom there was never any

suggestion that they collaborated. What we see is ethnic cleansing, pure

and simple, directed against people because they are Slavic-speaking.

The fifth group would be people, a fairly small number, who are still

refugees, mostly from the Krajina region of Croatia who are still living

in collective centers in Kosovo.

The sixth group is, again, probably a relatively small group of people,

but people that would be in Albanian-Serbian mixed marriages. We

have a category like that for resettlement out of Bosnia, as many of you

know.

The seventh group would be ethnic Albanians from Serbia proper, of

Presevo in particular, who are now in Macedonia. Finally, the eighth

group would be other minorities. There are small minorities of Jews, of

Turkish-speaking people, and some within the broad Gypsy community

that dont want to be referred to as Roma or some of the other groups.

Some that call themselves Egyptians in fact. So that, those would be

the groups that I would suggest have particular vulnerability. And the

difficulty for the United States is that most of these people are internally displaced.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees will only refer for resettlement people who are refugees, who have crossed an international border. We do have within the Refugee Act of 1980, the power to resettle

people directly from within their country of origin. I think it would be
18

well within reason for President Clinton to issue a Presidential Determination that would allow in-country processing and I think we could

do it out of Podgorica, Montenegro very easily, in fact.

I think doing that would set up a mechanism that would allow us to

reach many of these highly vulnerable people that otherwise are still in

considerable danger. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Frelick, for your very extensive and comprehensive testimony and series of recommendations. I

think you give us a great deal to look at and for the Administration and

all interested parties and were very grateful for that, as usual. The

U.S. Committee for Refugees is providing an enormous amount of leadership and we do thank you for that.

Id like to ask our next very distinguished speaker, Bishop Artemije,

if he would proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HIS GRACE ARTEMIJE, SERBIAN ORTHODOX

BISHOP OF PRIZREN AND RASKA

INTERPETER. His Grace Bishop Artemije will say a few introductory

words in Serbian and I will continue reading the English text.

His Grace ARTEMIJE(speaking in Serbian through an interpreter unless otherwise noted). Mr. Chairman, respected members of Congress,

ladies and gentlemen. It is my distinct pleasure and privilege to be here

with you today and speak about the latest developments in Kosovo. The

last time I spoke here was in February, 1998, just before the war in

Kosovo began, and on that occasion I strongly condemned both Milosevics

regime and Albanian extremists for leading the country into the war.

Unfortunately, the war came and so many innocent Albanians and

Serbs suffered in it. Many times we have strongly condemned the crimes

of Milosevics regime in Kosovo while our church in Kosovo supported

suffering Albanian civilians and saved some of them from the hands of

Milosevics paramilitaries. After the end of the Kosovo war and return

of Albanian refugees, the repression of Milosevics undemocratic regime

was supplanted by the repression of extremist Kosovar Albanians against

Serbs and other non-Albanian communities in full view of international

troops.

Freedom in Kosovo has not come for all equally. Therefore, Kosovo

remains a troubled region even after eight months of international peace.

Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian groups in Kosovo live in ghettos

without security, deprived of basic human rightsof life, free movement, and work. Their private property is being usurped. Their homes

burned and looted, even eight months after the deployment of KFOR.

Although Kosovo remained more or less multi-ethnic during the ten

years of Milosevics repressive rule, today there is hardly any multiethnicity at all, in fact the reverse is true. Ethnic segregation is greater

now than almost at any other time in Kosovo Serbian history. Not only

are Serbs being driven out from the province, but also the Roma, Slav

Muslims, Croats, Serb-speaking Jews and Turks.

More than 80 orthodox churches have been either completely destroyed

or severely damaged since the end of the war. These ancient churches,

many of which has survived 500 years of Ottoman Muslim rule, could

not survive eight months of the internationally-guaranteed peace. Regretfully, all this happens in the presence of KFOR and the UN. Kosovo

more and more becomes ethnically clean while organized crime and

discrimination against a few non-Albanians is epidemic.
19

Two-thirds of the pre-war Serb population, about 200,000 people fled

the province under the Albanian pressure. In addition, more than 50,000

Roma, Slav Muslims, Croat Catholics and others were also cleansed

from Kosovo. More than 400 Serbs have been killed and nearly 600

abducted by Albanian extremists during this same period of peace. Tragically, the suffering of Serbs and other non-Albanians proportionately,

with respect to population, represents more intensive suffering in peace

time than the Albanians suffered during the war.

This is a tragic record for any post-war peace mission, especially for

the mission in which the western governments and NATO have invested so much of their credibility and authority. Despite sympathy for

all of the suffering of Kosovo Albanians during the war, their post-war

indiscriminate retaliation against innocent civilians cannot be justified

in any way. It is becoming more and more a well-orchestrated nationalist ideology directed toward achieving the complete ethnic cleansing of

the province.

The extremists believe that without Serbs and their holy size in Kosovo, independence will then become a fait du complete. The present

repression against non-Albanians is carried out with the full knowledge

of the Albanian leaders. Sometimes these leaders formally condemn repressive actions, but in reality havent done anything to stop the ongoing ethnic violence and discrimination.

Even more, some of them are instigating rage against Serbs developing the idea of collective Serb kills and branding all remaining Serb

civilians as criminals. There is much evidence that the KLA leaders

bear the direct responsibility for most of the post-war crimes and acts of

violence committed in Kosovo. As soon as KFOR entered the province,

KLA gunmen took over the power in the majority of the cities and towns

and immediately organized illegal detention centers for Serbs, Roma

and Albanian collaborators.

They began killing people listed as alleged criminals and seized a

large amount of property previously owned by Serbs and other nonAlbanians. KLA groups and their leaders are directly linked with Albanian Mafia Clans and intelligence officers for Tirana, as Mr. Bukoshi

(phonetic) said recently and have developed a very sophisticated network of organized crime, drug smuggling, prostitution, white slavery

and weapons trading.

According to the International Press, Kosovo has become the Columbia of Europe and a main gateway for western Europe. The strategy

behind the KLA purges of Serbs was very simple. Quarter by quarter, a

city would be cleansed of Serbs and their property would be either burned

or sold for a high price to Albanian refugees, including Albanians from

Albania and Macedonia who flowed into the province through unprotected borders along with hundreds of thousands of Kosovo refugees.

The KLA, although officially disbanded, is still active and their secret police, the PU, are continuing their intimidation and executions.

Now, more and more of their victims are disobedient Kosovo Albanians

who refuse to pay their taxes and protection money to extremists. The

Albanianization of Kosovo is proceeding in a way many ordinary Albanians did not want. The gangsters have stepped into a vacuum left by

the slowness of the west to adequately instill full control over the province.
20

Kosovo is becoming more like Albania, corrupt and archaic and ruled

by the gun and the gang. Serbs and many non-Albanians still do not

have access to hospitals, the university and public services simply because they cannot even freely walk in the street. They are unemployed

and confined to life in poverty within the rural enclaves out of which

they can travel only under KFOR military escort.

The Serbian language is completely banished from public life. All

Serb inscriptions, road signs and advertisement have been systematically removed and the usage of the Serbian language in Albanian-dominated areas is reason enough for anyone to be shot right on the spot.

Thousands of Serb books in public libraries have been systematically

burned, while all unguarded Serb cultural monuments and statutes

have been torn down and destroyed.

The Serbs who remain in major cities are in the worst situation of

all. Out of 40,000 pre-war Serb population of Pristina, the Capital, today there remain only 300 elderly people who live in a kind of house

arrest. They cannot go into the street with military protection and only

thanks to KFOR soldiers and humanitarian organization do they receive food and medicines which they are not allowed to buy in Albanian

shops. Almost all Serb shops are now in Albanian hands.

In other areas, Albanians are greatly pressing Serbs to sell their property under threats and extortion. Those who refuse usually have their

houses torched or are killed as an example to other Serbs. Grenade

attacks on Serb houses and the few remaining Serb shops and restaurants force more and more Serbs to leave Kosovo. If this suppression

and persecution is continued unabated it is likely that soon most of the

remaining Serbs will also be forced to leave Kosovo.

On the other hand, KFOR presence in Kosovo, presence in Kosovo

has given Albanian extremists free hands to do what they want because

one of the KFOR priorities has been thus far to avoid direct confrontation with the extremists in order to escape possible casualties. On the

other hand, we cannot but say that if KFOR had not been in Kosovo

during this rampage of hatred, not a single Serb or Serb church would

have survived.

We sincerely appreciate the efforts of many men and women from all

over the world who are trying to bring peace to Kosovo, even within a

rather narrow political framework in which KFOR must act. An especially volatile situation is in Kosovos Mitrovica, the only major city

where a substantial number of Serbs remain. During the most intensive wave of ethnic cleansing in June and July, many Serb IDPs, internally displaced persons, from the south, found refuge in the north of the

province in the Mitrovica area.

In order to survive they organized a kind of self-protection network in

preventing KLA Mafia to enter the northern fifth of the city. KFOR,

aware that the free access of Albanian extremist groups to Mitrovica

would cause a Serb exodus, blocked the bridge connecting the southern

and northern part of the city. Albanian extremists have since then made

many attempts to make their way into the northern part of the city

saying that they wanted an undivided and free city.

Serbs on the other hand state that they are ready for a united city

only if Serbs would be allowed to go back to their homes in the south

and elsewhere in Kosovo. Serbs also hold that only Kosovo residents be

allowed to return to their homes. A few weeks ago, after two terrorist

attacks against a UNHCR bus and a Serb café, in which a number of
21

Serbs were killed an injured, radicalized Serbs began retaliatory actions against Albanians in the northern part of the city, causing the

death of several innocent Albanian citizens, and served to broaden the

crisis.

The Mitrovica crisis is not playing out in a void by itself and must be

approached only in the context of the overall Kosovo situation. The fact

remains that after the war extremist Albanians have not been fully

disarmed and have continued their repression and ethnic cleansing of

Serbs and other non-Albanians, wherever and whenever they have had

an opportunity to do so.

Unfortunately, such a situation as we have now in Kosovo has opened

the door for the Belgrade regime which is now trying to profit from this

situation and consolidate a division of Mitrovica for their own reasons.

Each Serb victim in Kosovo strengthens Milosevics position in Serbia.

Albanian extremists, on the other hand, want to disrupt the only remaining Serb stronghold in the city in order to drive the Serbs completely out of Kosovo.

Regretfully, the international community seems not to be fully aware

of the complexity of the Mitrovica problem and has, despite all Albanian

crimes and terror in the last eight months, one-sidedly condemned the

Serbs for this violence. This skewed view of the problem will only serve

to encourage Albanian extremism, confirm Milosevics theory of antiSerb conspiracies that he uses to solidify his holding power and will

eventually lead to the exodus of the Serb community in Kosovo.

Milosevic obviously remains at the core of the problem, but hes not

the greatest cause of the current round of violence and purges. The

international community therefore must find ways of controlling the

Albanian extremists. We maintain our belief that the present tragedy

in Kosovo is not what Americans wanted when they supported the policy

of the Administration to intervene on behalf of suffering Albanians. In

fact, the international community now faces a serious failure in Kosovo

because it has not managed or marginalized extremist Albanians while

at the same time Milosevic has been politically strengthened by bombing and sanctions which ordinary Serbs understand as directed against

innocent civilians.

Therefore, we expect from the international community and primarily from the United States to show the same determination that was

shown during the war in now protecting and supporting Kosovo Serbs

and other ethnic groups who suffer under ethnic Albanian extremists.

A way must be found to fully implement UN Resolution 1244 in its

whole. We have a few practical proposals for improving the situation in

Kosovo.

One, KFOR should be more robust in suppressing violence, organized

crime and should more effectively protect the non-Albanian population

from extremists. This is required by the UN Resolution. Two, more

international police should be brought to Kosovo. Borders with Macedonia

and Albania must be better secured and UNMIK should establish local

administration with Serbs in areas where they live as a compact population.

A Judicial system must become operational as soon as possible. International Judges must be recruited at the stage when Kosovo Judges

cannot act impartially due to political pressures. Three, the interna-
22

tional community must build a strategy to return displaced Kosovo Serbs

and others to their homes soon by providing better security for them

and their religious and cultural shrines.

Post-war ethnic cleansing must not be legalized nor accepted. Private

and church property has to be restored to rightful owners and law and

order must be established and fully enforced. Without at least an initial

return of Serbs, Roma, Slav Muslims and others, Kosovo elections would

be unfair and unacceptable. Four, the international community, especially the United States, should make clear to Kosovo Albanian leaders

that they cannot create an ethnically cleansed state under the protectorate of the western democratic governments. Investment policy and

political support must be conditioned to full compliance by Albanian

leaders with a UN Resolution 1244.

KLA militants must be fully disarmed. The ICTY should launch impartial investigations of all criminal acts, both by Serbs and Albanians.

Five, the international community should also support moderate Serbs

in regaining their leading role in the Kosovo Serb community, and thus

provide for the conditions for their participation in the interim administrative council structure, since the cooperation of moderate Serb leaders with KFOR and UNMIK has not brought visible improvement to

the lives of Serbs and their remaining enclaves.

Milosevic supporters are gaining more supporters among besieged

and frightened Serbs and this can seriously obstruct the peace process.

Moderate Serbs gathered around the Serb National Council need their

own independent media, better communication between enclaves and

other forms of support to make their voice better heard and understood

within their own community. International humanitarian aid distribution in Serb inhabited areas currently being distributed more or less

through Milosevics people who have used this to impose themselves as

local leaders, has to be channeled through the church and the Serb

National Council Humanitarian Network.

Six, last but not least, the issue of the final status of Kosovo must

remain frozen until there is a genuine and stable progress in eliminating violence and introducing democratization, not only to Kosovo but

also to Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is our firm

belief that the question of the future status of Kosovo must not be discussed between Kosovos Albanians and Serbs only, but also with the

participation of the international community and the future democratic

governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in

accordance with international law and the Helsinki Final Act.

We believe in God and his providence, but we hope that the United

States Congress and Administration will support our suffering people

which want to remain where we have been living for centuries in the

land of our ancestors. Thank you.

INTERPETER. We would only ask, the Bishop respectfully requests

that his prepared statement and publication listing of the destroyed

churches in Kosovo through October, be accepted and entered into an

official record of this hearing.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. And without objection, we will

put the report into the record. Let me thank you for your very strong

statement. I wish I had this earlier. I would have posed a few questions

from it to Ambassador Menzies. Especially what I perceive to be almost

an indictment of the international communitys lack of protection for

Serbs.
23

The destruction or near destruction of 80 Orthodox churches, as you

point out, 400 Serbs have been killed and nearly 600 abducted. And

then I think, as many people know, and this Commission certainly

knows, you were one of the early Serb Orthodox leaders to speak out

and speak out strongly against Slobodan Milosevic. And you reiterate

that he is at the core, but there are other people, extremists that are

causing terrible deeds to occur in Kosovo. So I want to thank you for

you even-handedness because we have this, this Commission has benefitted from your guidance in the past.

I will have some questions later on, but I do thank you, Bishop. Id

like to, Mr. Mirga, if you would proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ANDRZEJ MIRGA, CO-CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL

OF EUROPE SPECIALISTS GROUP ON ROMA AND CHAIRMAN

OF THE PROJECT ON ETHNIC RELATIONS ROMANI ADVISORY

BOARD

Mr. MIRGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and respected members of

Commission. I would like to start my testimony. First, I would like to

note that I am Roma as well. During a recent field trip of the Project on

Ethic Relations to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, I went to Stankovic

II Refugee camp in Macedonia, where there were nearly 3,000 Roma

refugees. On that day, the Roma refugees started a hunger strike in the

camp.

One of their demands was to have free access to the media. They built

a pyramid of stoves in several places in the camp and hung up a sign

with a handmade inscription, no comment? In that action there was

something, there was something tragic and at the same time grotesque.

Tragic, because they did it in desperation and grotesque because no

media came to report it.

On their behalf and behalf of many others who had no chance to

make their voice heard, I am bringing their grievances, their tragic

experience and their claims to share with you at this hearing. For the

Roma of Kosovo caught in the ethnic war between Serbs and Kosovo

Albanians, there was no right choice to be made. Whatever choices they

made were wrong. The position of Roma reflects the dilemma of the

minority that has no reason whatsoever to be involved in an open conflict but is used and forced into by both sides.

Either choice that is to be loyal to Serbs or to the Kosovo Albanians

brought subsequent retaliations for the Roma. Serbs were using the

Roma in Kosovo for their political objectives to prove that Kosovo is

multi-ethnic and to show that there are fewer Albanians, whereas Albanians tried to push the Roma to identify as Albanians and demanded

loyalty to them and their cause. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs encouraged the cultural revival of the Roma in Kosovo

starting in the 70s. Prizren and Pristina emerged as centers of cultural and political life of the Romani community, and some Romani

activists became public and political figures.

The majority of the Romani population remained however politically

unengaged. In fact, it was not their alleged involvement in crimes and

atrocities against ethnic Albanians but rather the political standpoint

of Romani leaders concerning the status of Kosovo prior to the NATO

attack on March 24, 1999, that contributed to the Kosovo Albanians

retaliation against the Roma.
24

The Kosovo Albanian retaliation against the Roma community is more

a policy than an action of vengeful neighbors. That conduct aims at

raising fear among the Roma to such a level that they will see no alternative but to leave. Setting Romani houses on fire, looting or expelling

the Roma, involved a group of young men motivated as much by vengeful feelings against the collaborators as by the KLA extreme nationalists instigation to force out those minorities who politically sided with

the Serbs.

This policy seems to work. In November 1999, the United Nations

special representative on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Mr.

Jiri Dienstbier reported that, the spring ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians accompanied by murders, torture, looting and burning of houses

has been replaced by the fall ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Bosniacs

and other non-Albanians accompanied by the same atrocities.

Contrary to widespread belief that the Romani community began to

flee Kosovo just after the NATO bombing halted and the ethnic Albanians returned in large numbers and therefore they remained and sided

with the Serbs, the evidence proves otherwise. They fled Kosovo following the escalation of clashes in early June of 1998, and I may not cite

here all the data which I gathered in my statement.

What is the future for the Romani minority in and outside of Kosovo?

To answer it first we have to know what kind of Kosovo will there be in

the future. Building a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo seems to be difficult and a long-term process. Taking into consideration the level of societal hatred, ethnic resentments, and attempts to cleanse out minorities

by ethnic Albanians, one can wonder if it is possible at all.

Bosnia serves here as an example. A multi-ethnic society seems nonexistent on the ground and its prospect remains undetermined.

Cantonization or partition of the Kosovo is excluded by the international institutions at this time. The ethnic Albanians aim at having

their own nation state so they will do everything to accomplish that

goal. In such a Kosovo overtaken and run by extreme nationalism, the

remaining Romani communities will be forced to hid e their identity

and to prove their loyalty to the Albanian cause.

Those unwilling to do so will be threatened, exposed or persecuted.

Since the majority of them are displaced and their houses and property

burned out, destroyed or taken by Albanians, their reintegration in the

original communities will be extremely difficult. The extent of the problems to be solved reveals, for example, the case of Kosovska Mitrovica.

Out of seven to ten thousand Roma, some 200 remained and the entire

settlement is burned out.

The most devastating effect on minds and feelings of those belonging

to minorities is the fact that the same atrocities which were associated

with Serbs during the conflict are taking place now in the presence of

international forces. Much effort and real commitment is needed to

improve the situation there to change these feelings. Until civil society,

rule of law, and moderation are achieved it is hard to believe that these

minorities will feel secure.

Even then, however, without real investment in reconstruction that

would animate the local economy and provide jobs, not much would

change. To be in camps as displaced with limited freedom of movement,

with no access to basic services like schools, health, work, to be con-
25

demned to live on humanitarian aid is a devastating experience that

cannot be prolonged forever. Most of the Romani community that remains in Kosovo faces such a reality.

If multiethnic society in Kosovo is the only prospect to be defended

and accepted by the international institutions, then the Romani community and other minorities should be encouraged to remain there.

Much more concerted action, however, and pressure on ethnic Albanian

leadership should be exerted to promote tolerance and peaceful co-existence rather than to resting with politically correct statements.

The moderate forces within ethnic Albanian leadership should be

strengthened and encouraged. At the same time the impact of its extreme nationalists should be limited. Particular attention should be

paid to forthcoming local elections to enable those displaced to vote, to

create an environment for participation of minorities and to counter the

danger of ethnic violence that can evolve during the elections.

It seems unlikely that the Romani refugees and IDPs who are outside

Kosovo province will voluntarily seek to return back soon. First, they

have nothing to return to. Second, out of fear of persecution they would

prefer to stay somewhere else, including even Serbia proper if the possibility for receiving asylum in the west will be closed.

Third, they do not see any conditions for a safe and decent life in

Kosovo. Those remaining in Montenegro and Macedonia, as IDPs or

refugees, strongly object to the prospect of being returned back to Kosovo out of reasonable fear of persecution. Therefore, the international

community should consider the possibility of their integration into those

societies supposing that substantial financial support for such solution

would follow.

Otherwise, the possibility of their resettlement in the west or providing them with temporary refugee status, as it was during the Bosnian

war, should be considered. For the largest group of Romani IDPs that

stay in Serbia proper and who live there under precarious conditions,

the necessity of humanitarian aid reaching them should be examined.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Mirga, thank you very much for your testimony and

for your recommendations. Id like to ask Ms. Blaustein to proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SUSAN BLAUSTEIN, SENIOR CONSULTANT,

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, Im honored to be here today to speak

about a matter of such critical importance to the future stability of

Kosovo and Im particularly honored, Mr. Chairman, to be asked to

address someone such as yourself, who has demonstrated time and time

again your commitment to the furthering of human rights throughout

the Balkans.

Youve asked me to speak about the particular set of issues regarding

the more than 1,600 Albanian prisoners who, a full 8 months after the

Kosovo conflict ended, remain in Serbian custody, in clear violation of

International Humanitarian Law.

This unfinished business of the Kosovo war rankles deeply within

Kosovar society. The prisoners continued detention, the risks taken and

bribes paid simply to visit them, and the exorbitant ransoms demanded

by Serb lawyers for their release, all have put a tremendous emotional

and financial strain on one in 100 Albanian families. Moreover, the
26

weak response thus far on the part of the international community has

fostered profound cynicism among Kosovars regarding the prospects for

realizing other western promises, such as self-governance or real peace.

Who are these prisoners and how many are there? The Albanian prisoners in Serbia fall into several categories.

The overwhelming majority of them are men of fighting age, that is,

wage-earners who have much to contribute to the rebuilding and future

governance of Kosovo. There are a number of women, as well, and all

but ten of the children are believed to have been among the 415 people

released so far by the Serbian authorities.

Hundreds of these men, women and children were arrested by Yugoslav

and Serbian forces and civilians in the course of last years NATO air

campaign. Most of these have yet to be formally charged with any crime.

Their arrests are abductions, if explained at all, were justified by Serbian

authorities as part of legitimate sweeps, a term understood throughout the former Yugoslavia to connote ruthless, state-sponsored searches

for weapons and/or terrorists.

Some 2,200 prisoners were arrested prior to the internationalization

of the conflict. Among these are an estimated 200 who had already been

convicted of these crimes in Kosovos Serbian-run courts and were serving sentences inside Kosovo; but most, like those picked up in the course

of the NATO intervention, have yet to be charged or tried.

All prisoners detained in Kosovo under Serbian custody were hastily

trucked or bused out of Kosovo and into Serbia proper as soon as the socalled Military-Technical Agreement was signed last June 10, which

brought an end to the conflict and arranged for the withdrawal of Serb

forces.

The question comes, how was this allowed to happen? It was U.S.

officials in Washington who allowed the issue of the Albanian prisoners

to be dropped from the negotiating table. According to senior NATO and

U.S. government officials, a provision demanding the prisoners release

had been included in early drafts of the agreement, but the Yugoslav

Commanders negotiating the agreement objected. NATO Commanders

consulted with Washington where the Clinton administrations interagency team, eager to end the air campaign and fearful of casualties

and of the collapse of the seriously fraying Atlantic Alliance, readily

acceded to Serb demands to remove this and other issues from the table

and to limit negotiations to the immediate task of replacing one military force by anotherthat is, getting the Serbs out and NATO in.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, it is my view, and more to the point, it

is the view of many experts in international humanitarian law, that

the pragmatic omission of the prisoner issue from the Military-Technical Agreement does not in any way relieve the parties to that conflict of

the obligation to release, immediately upon the cessation of hostilities,

all prisoners of war and civilians detained in the course of the armed

conflict.

This obligation is incumbent upon all signatories to the Third and

Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the accompanying Protocol

II of 1978, all of which were drafted expressly with an eye toward protecting combatant and civilian detainees in situations such as this one;

where, for political or other reasons, the armistice or peace agreement

drawn up between warring parties does not explicitly provide for the

prisoners release or general amnesty.
27

It follows, Mr. Chairman, that the Yugoslav government continues to

hold those prisoners detained in the course of the international armed

conflict in flagrant violation of well-established tenets of international

humanitarian law. This finding does not apply to those apprehended

prior to the internationalization of the conflict or to those already charged

and tried, whom, as the Geneva Conventions make clear, states are

well within their authority to hold until their sentences have been discharged. But it does apply to the conditions of detention and the conditions under which the prisoners trials are conducted, both of which, in

the Serbian case, are also believed to violate explicit provisions of international humanitarian law.

It is not surprising, Mr. Chairman, that a government which would

forcibly expel close to a million of its own citizens by systematically

burning their villages and massacring thousands of civilians would show

as little regard for individual human rights in the manner in which it

has apprehended, detained, maltreated, tried and sentenced 100 more.

The conditions of detention are reprehensible. The released prisoners

and prisoners families I have interviewed all reported that they or their

family member had been repeatedly tortured, beaten, starved, and kept

in unheated cells without winter clothing. Summary trials are being

held as we speak, resulting in speedy convictions won often on the basis

of fabricated evidence of forced confessions obtained through intimidation and torture.

Defendants are regularly assigned counsel who, in case after case,

have not met with their clients or even reviewed their files prior to

trial, have been observed holding ex parte hearings with judges, and,

upon conviction, have quickly waived their clients rights to appeal.

However, the alacrity with which, since October, the Serbian authorities appear to have been ratcheting up the wheels of Serbian-style

justice by finally charging, trying and sentencing prisoners, suggests

the states sensitivity, at least, to the argument that its prolonged detention of people who have yet to be charged is a violation of Serbias

own criminal code, which permits authorities to detain someone for up

to six months without charging them with any crime.

The recently accelerated sentencing rate also suggests that the Serbian

justice ministry is well aware that the Geneva Conventions permits

states to retain custody over convicted prisoners for the duration of their

sentences. By imposing sentences of as long as ten and 12 years, the

regime in Belgrade can hope to destabilize Kosovo for some time to come.

The international communities response to date.

This issue, Mr. Chairman, as the UN Special Representative to the

Secretary General, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, recently put it, has become

an open wound for Kosovo, a wound with enormous repercussions for

the success or failure of the international mission there. In recent months

Albanians have grown increasingly frustrated by the absence of productive advocacy on or involvement in this issue by international actors.

First, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has consistently refused to advocate for the prisoners release, because its legal

advisors maintain that for such advocacy to fall within the organizations

mandate, the issue ought to have been included in the peace agreement.

Second, UNMIK head Bernard Kouchner says he has repeatedly called

for the detainees release immediately and without conditions and that

he raises the missing persons issue with every foreign government he

visits. But his initial response last July to the question of the detainees
28

and the missing was merely to appoint a sub-commission, chaired by

the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Special Envoy to the

Balkans, Barbara Davis.

But with no resources, no professional staff, no legal team and no

forensic experts, the UNMIK Sub-commissions well-intentioned but

highly inadequate efforts have finally led Kosovars to conclude that the

international community has little interest in resolving this issue and

that they should take matters into their own hands. In recent months,

prisoners families and their advocates have staged a series of hunger

strikes and peaceful demonstrations calling upon the international community to mount a systematic campaign to achieve the prisoners release. So far these protests have yielded only promises.

What the U.S. Congress can do: Mr. Chairman, as you well know,

this situation is not news. It has been going on for some eight months

now, with the international community admittedly able to do very little

about it, given its lack of leverage or influence over Belgrade. However,

there are a few things that western nations should not do and that the

west and the U.S. Congress in particular can do to address this egregious, outstanding humanitarian crisis left over from the Kosovo war.

First, the Congress should pass a resolution, as the European Parliament recently did, calling for the release of the Albanian prisoners in

conformity with international law. A House Resolution to this effect

has been drafted by Congressman Engel of New York that Commission

members might consider co-sponsoring. And the Commission is uniquely

positioned to win passage of a joint resolution that would draw attention to this issue and reassure the Albanian community that these prisoners have not been completely abandoned or forgotten.

In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will submit for the record my

suggestions as to what might be included in such a resolution. And

second, this Congress might urge its Ambassador to the United Nations to introduce a UN Security Council Resolution to the same effect.

Lastly, there are things that this Congress and other western governments ought not to do. The sanctions against Serbia should not be

lifted until such time as the Albanians prisoners detained during the

Kosovo conflict are freed and returned home. The European Unions

recent decision to lift the flight ban, ostensibly to make it easier for

ordinary Serbs to travel, has had the unfortunate side effect of signaling to the indicted President Milosevic that if he only waits out the

west, the remaining sanctions will be lifted, as well, without his having

to turn himself over the Hague as warranted, to leave office, or even to

show the slightest inclination to abide by international law.

Finally, neither this Congress nor any other western government

should allow this issue to drop from public view. Without the carnage

and destruction we all saw on our television screens last year at this

time, it is easy to understand that most Americans believe the Kosovo

conflict has long since ended. It is important that U.S. citizens remember that the reasons American troops went to fight in Kosovo was to

stop the Yugoslav government from committing gross human rights

abuses there.

Tragically, that same government continues, even to this day, to commit similar gross violations inside their own prisons against at least

1,600 of those same Yugoslav citizens, the Albanian citizens of Kosovo,

that our soldiers and those of 18 other nations intervened almost a year

ago now to protect.
29

Once again, I would like to thank you and the members of the Commission for this opportunity to speak today and to submit my testimony

and supporting materials for the record.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Blaustein, for your excellent

testimony and for the information of Mr. Engels resolution of which I

am one of the co-sponsors. Hopefully well receive a favorable and expeditious review by the international relations committee and then by the

full House. So I do thank you for that fine testimony. Id like to, Mr.

Bajraktari, if you could proceed.

TESTIMONY OF YLBER BAJRAKTARI, POLITICAL ANALYST

FROM KOSOVO

Mr. BAJRAKTARI. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith, distinguished

members of Congress. First of all I would like to thank you and the

Commission members for the opportunity to testify on the ongoing crisis of Albanian prisoners considered to be one of the most serious threats

to the peace process in Kosovo. I would like to focus today on some

specific cases of the Kosovars who are held hostage in Serbia, what the

prisoners issue means to the Kosovars and especially, how this issue

impacts Kosovos future.

The latest report of the International Committee of the Red Cross

that came out recently, on February 24, confirms frightening figures of

4,400 missing persons from Kosovo. According to the Red Cross, only

1,400 are known to be held as prisoners in Serbia, while the destiny of

the rest of the 3,000 remains unknown. But who are in fact these prisoners?

I would like to focus on some specific names and individuals and hopefully you can have a better understanding of the importance and the

urgency of their release. I would like to start with Albin Kurti, a 24-

years old Kosovar who was abducted during the NATO bombing campaign. Mr. Kurti was a former leader of the nonviolent student movement in October, 1997, one of the most prominent political activists in

Kosovo and most recently acted as spokesperson for the political representatives of the KLA in Pristina.

Mr. Kurti was criminally involved and a terrorist, Mr. Chairman, as

much as I am testifying here in front of you today. There is no official

confirmation by Belgrade that he is alive, but human rights organizations have traced him and have determined that hes being held in the

prison of Nis in Serbia. According to some reports, he has been savagely

beaten and as a result of the beatings has suffered extremely serious

damage to his kidneys.

The second case that I would like to emphasize today is the case of

Flora Brovina, a prominent pediatrician and a human rights activist.

Mrs. Brovina was actively involved in organizing non-governmental

organizations aimed on offering medical assistance to the displaced

Kosovars during the conflict in 1998. She was also actively involved in

helping Kosovars who were denied of rights to health care because of

the discriminatory laws adopted by the Belgrade regime.

Mrs. Brovina, who has a heart condition, has been sentenced to 12

years in prison under charges of terrorism. The case of Mrs. Brovina

shows that Serbia remains the only country in Europe that considers

doctors to be terrorists and helping children as a threat to national

security. The third case is equally important as the first two. Mr. Ukshin
30

Hoti, one of the most prominent Albanian intellectuals, a Harvard graduate, was arrested in 1994, and sentenced to five years imprisonment on

fabricated charges of conspiracy against the state.

Although he was supposed to be released last summer, his whereabouts remain unknown. Mr. Hoti is well respected in Kosovo and he

enjoys a great support among the Kosovar Albanians and was considered as a possible future leader. The last case that I would like to present

to you today, distinguished members of Congress, from the endless list

of the Kosovar hostages kept in Serbia, includes Mr. Bardhyl Caushi,

the Dean of the School of Law of the Pristina University.

There have been no reports confirming that Mr. Caushi is still alive,

but his family has reported him being abducted by the Serbian troops

during the bombing campaign. Mr. Caushi has been an active participant of the negotiating training program organized by the Congressmandated U.S. Institute of Peace. This case is also important because

of the fact that Mr. Caushi has been abducted in town of Gjakova, which

is in western Kosovo, an area that has been one of the main targets of

the abduction campaign conducted by Mr. Milosevics troops.

Gjakova is a town with a 95 percent Albanian population and is home

to a considerable number of Kosovar intellectuals and professionals.

This clearly shows that the apprehensions of Albanians in Kosovo was

not random and unplanned. This was a well-prepared operation and

was done as a matter of policy. But what does all this mean for the

Kosovars future? The issue of the Albanian prisoners in Serbia continues to keep tensions high in Kosovo and to maintain a high level of

radicalization.

No Kosovar family can work on building a peaceful and democratic

future while their family members are being held hostage in Serbia.

Therefore, this ongoing crisis is one of the most serious threats to the

stability of Kosovo. It seriously undermines the process of democratic

institution building and makes the reconciliation between Albanians

and Serbs in Kosovo practically impossible.

On the other hand, by keeping thousands of Albanians as prisoners,

Mr. Milosevic retains another instrument that he can use to increase

tensions. Mr. Milosevic should not be allowed to have in his hands another weapon with which he can destabilize the region. In summary,

the issue of Albanian prisoners held in Serbia is likely to jeopardize the

mission of the international community in Kosovo.

It makes lasting peace impossible and shuts the door to any exit strategy for NATO allies. This situation makes it extremely necessary for

the international community and the United States, in particular, to

take specific measures that will help resolve this issue. There are several things that can be done. One, although the Serbia is facing international isolation, the United States should put pressure on Belgrade

by making the case of Albanian prisoners a precondition for any lifting

of sanctions.

Second, the United States should lead the initiative in forming an

International Commission for Missing Persons in Kosovo, authorized

by the UN Security Council, to conduct a thorough investigation of

Albanian prisoners in Serbia. Third, some of the prisoners are being

held in districts that are administered by the Serbian opposition, especially Nis municipality that is a recipient of the Energy for Democracy

Program.
31

The Serbian opposition must be pressured to clearly state its position

on the issue of Albanian political prisoners and denounce the Serb

regimes policy of holding Albanians captive in Serbia. Fourthly and

the more important, this policy should also be firmly denounced by the

leaders of Kosovos Serbs. This would be a first and important step toward confidence building, a crucial ingredient of reconciliation.

In the end, please let me emphasize that this crisis needs serious

attention and should be a part of any future dealings with Belgrade.

Albanians want their fathers, mothers, brothers and prominent figures

back so they could move on with their reconciliation process, a critical

element for Kosovos multi-ethnic future. A positive step in resolving

this issue would also give momentum to the international presence in

Kosovo and would make its long-term success more likely. Thank you

very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Bajraktari, and just let me

ask some opening questions. Mr. Blaustein, in your testimony in the

section where you said, how was this allowed to happen, speaking of the

prisoners. You really, at least on the surface, seem to completely contradict what Ambassador Menzies has said or perhaps he only gave half

of what or a portion of what actually occurred, in response to my question that I posed about why wasnt it not part of the negotiation to end

the bombing campaign.

Ambassador Menzies said it was not part of Ahttisaris agreement,

which may have some superficial ring to it. That may have been part of

it, but as you point out, dig a little deeper, according to senior NATO

and U.S. government officials, a provision demanding the release of the

prisoners had been included in early drafts of the agreement, but the

Yugoslav Commanders negotiating the agreement objected.

Then you went on to say that NATO Commanders consulted with

Washington where the Clinton Administrations inter-agency team, eager

to end the air campaign, fearful of casualties and of the collapse of the

seriously fraying alliance, readily acceded to Serb demands to remove

this and other issues from the table and to limit negotiations to the

immediate task of replacing one military force by another, getting the

Serbs out and the NATO in.

Could you elaborate on that? I mean it would seem that we only got

half the story or at least a portion of it from the Administration. Ahttisari

certainly was an agent that was acting with the collaboration of many

others, including Washington. Why, in your view, is that? Is that the

reason why it was not part of the agreement? They just wanted to end it

and end it quickly and therefore we just bumped it off the table?

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. This administration wanted to end the conflict and

what the Pentagon has said is that all other issues should have been

addressed in other fora. And what the Yugoslav commanders objected

to was anything that was not in the body of the G-8 Agreement, which

was signed on the 8th of June. The G-8 Agreement and the AhttisariTalbot-Chernomyrdin Agreement are pretty much the same thing, had

the same points involved, and those were supposed to include all political matters.

What the inter-agency process did was to limit the discussions to

purely military and technical agreements, just as the document signed

at Kumanovo was entitled. When I have asked Pentagon and other

officials in the Administration whether the prisoner issue came up, it

was said to me, Well, these are political and they will be handled else-
32

where. And when I have asked whether it was said, Well, these are

covered in the Geneva Conventions and they need not be included here,

the answer was no.

The answer is that they wanted to end the war. And when one looks

a little farther, Mr. Chairman, at the inter-agency process and who is

involved in that process, it is remarkable that there is no one there

from the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department. The interests

represented there are security interests, intelligence interests, State

and Defense Departments, and administration interests. And perhaps

a recommendation might be that in the future someone is present whose

explicit brief is to hold the human rights portfolio, to say, What about

the people who get lost in the cracks here, that perhaps human rights

should be represented in such deliberations in the future.

Mr. SMITH. Earlier I asked Ambassador Menzies about whether or

not torture was being employed against those in those prisons. It is

your testimony that torture is being used and Mr. Bajraktari just gave

us some very extreme examples of that occurring.

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. Yes, torture is in fact being used. I spoke to family

members of prisoners who had been rendered impotent, insane, who

had suffered renal failure. I spoke with three former prisoners who had

lost a third to a half of their body weight, who had been beaten. The

hazing ritual as you enter the prison in Lipljanthat was inside Kosovo under the Serbsthen it was repeated in some of the detention

centers in Serbia, was to have to pass through a 100-meter corridor

where you were beaten every meter by either a Serb criminal, that is, a

common criminal or a Serb prison guard. So this sort of thing was

going on, is in fact still going on.

Mr. SMITH. Why would the Administration not be able to provide us

with that information? Ambassador Menzies is, you know, a very honorable and distinguished individual. In response to a very specific question regarding that, he was not forthcoming with that information.

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. There has been information available, in particular

from the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade. Then there is IGCs

paper, which came out a month ago. My only answer would be that

Ambassador Menzies has an enormous number of things to handle, its

quite a complex set of problems, and as with many of those who are

quite concerned about the future of Kosovo, the Albanian prisoners in

Serbia is something we have so little leverage over, the thing there is so

little we can do about.

As Jack Covey, the Deputy Head of the UN Mission in Pristina, said,

This is the thing about which more people knock at our door, bang at

our door, is what he said, than any other. Its the thing which we have

the least power to change. So I understand why the Ambassador might

not know exactly....you know, I interviewed prisoners and some journalists have, as well, but that doesnt mean that everyone should

Mr. SMITH. Let me just say in response to your call, as a matter of

fact we have already. The Commission did sponsor a resolution at the

OSCE Parliamentarian Assembly in St. Petersburg, and it was part of

the final St. Petersburg Declaration which was agreed to by all of the

participating states which called for the release of all the prisoners and

access, immediate access by the ICRC and again their quick release

was asked for.
33

We will continue, by way of Resolution, by admonishing the Administration and Belgrade, demand Belgrade to release these prisoners. But I

think, as youve indicated, the opportunity to make a decisive comment

on that, perhaps past when it was not part of the negotiations and the

bombing. But we will continue and I know everyone on the Commission, Democrat and Republican are united in trying to immediately

secure the release of those prisoners.

Id like to ask Bishop Artemije, if you could tell us what your view is

on the prisoners?

His Grace ARTEMIJE. Thank you. You know, from the very beginning we thought that to be a very important issue. At a meeting of the

Transitional Council of Kosovo on July 2, together with Albanian leaders we signed a document which requested all prisoners to be released

who were detained in prisons in Serbia, but also kidnaped Serbs in

Kosovo during the peace time and there are 600 of them.

But there should be an international commission which would make

an assessment of their responsibility. And those who are found without

any guilt should be set free. And those who are found to be responsible

for any criminal acts or crimes, must be brought to justice according to

international laws. That request of ours was reiterated many times in

international contacts we had and we asked that the international community should mediate in this issue of freeing of detained persons. We

share the opinion that it is a very important problem, not only for Albanians, whose relatives are in prisons, but also for the Serbs whos family members have been abducted in the times since the deployment at

KFOR.

And for 8 months, for many of them, we dont know whether they are

alive or where they are at the moment. Even a few of my monks have

been abducted in the very beginning and we dont have any information

about their whereabouts, although they obviously were not responsible

at all for any criminal acts, because our church has always supported

the democratic position which we usually do. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Bishop. Mr. Frelick, let me ask

you, Amnesty International has reported that there may be thousands

of individuals who fled Serbia and Montenegro to evade being pressed

into military service during the Kosovo conflict. Some may have been

conscientious objectors to such service, regardless of the circumstances,

but NATO had urged Yugoslav soldiers to defect or face the consequences

and called on Yugoslav citizens, generally, to refuse to support Milosevics

policies.

Given this fact, have measures been taken by anyone in the international community to assist those who fled to other countries rather than

participate in the ethnic cleansing?

Mr. FRELICK. I am not aware of any efforts whatsoever. The Amnesty International Report, which I have a copy of right in front of me,

is a very compelling document and I do recommend it to the Commission maybe to even read into the record. They talk about 23,000 cases

on the dockets in Serbia of men who either evaded conscription or deserted the armed forces. As you say, NATO leaflets were encouraging

them to do just that.

In the UNHCR handbook on refugee status there is a whole section

on conscientious objection, which ordinarily does not give you refugee

status, but it says in the case of a war thats international condemned

on its face, such conscientious objection would seem to constitute
34

grounds for giving refugees status. Of the groups that I identified in my

testimony, this is one of those groups. I would urge the U.S. government to consider Serbian and Montenegrin men for resettlement.

In fact, I revised my statement from an earlier draft because I found

that Montenegro was not as forgiving as I initially had found in my

field work. But Amnesty corrected that point in my earlier testimony,

and I revised it. So I think that this is a vulnerable group and they are

congregated in places like the Hungarian border and I think that they

deserve the support of the international committee.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Mirga, I understand you recently met

with members of the Albanian leadership, including Mr. Rugova, in

Kosovo. How would you assess their attitudes toward the particular

problems of the Romani minority?

Mr. MIRGA. To answer this question, Mr. Chairman, I have to distinguish between politically correct statements and real concerns and their

acknowledgment of the situation. So first I would like to refer to these

politically correct statements. When we talk with people from the leadership of the KLA, they were very politically correct. They acknowledged that the Roma are a part of a multi-ethnic society and that they

are devoted to have such a society rebuilt, but behind these statements

there is no concrete action supporting them

In the field, on the ground what you can see is contrary to what they

pretend to implement as a policy. As regards Mr. Rugova, I can say that

he was more open, more sincere, acknowledging that he feels betrayed

by Roma. He himself believes, as do many Albanians, that, in fact,

Roma collaborated with Serbs and this legitimizes the action of Albanians. At the same time, however, I can say hes moderate and hes

ready for dialogue with Roma either if they will appeal and will demand

for such.

Mr. SMITH. Id like to yield to Erika Schlager who is our expert on a

number of issues, including the Roma, for any questions she might

have.

Ms. SCHLAGER. Thank you. Mr. Mirga, the Helsinki Commission

held a hearing in 1998, on the situation of Roma in European countries

in general. And the witnesses at that hearing portrayed a situation

which was not very good across the board. A number of European countries, including many countries that have now become a place of refuge

for Roma from Kosovo were identified as having consistent problems,

discrimination, violence against Roma. This includes Macedonia, Hungary, Italy, just to name a few.

Can you speculate on what the reaction may be or what may occur

between the Roma who are already living in those countries and the

majority populations now that there are these additional Roma coming

in as refugees or asylum-seekers, or would-be refugees from Kosovo.

Mr. MIRGA. First let me say that there is such a belief that once a

significant number appears in such countries as Hungary, Italy or even

Macedonia, it will cause some problems and it will raise the level of

anti-Roma feelings in majority society.

We have some evidence that supports this view, as in the case of

Italy. In some other countries, like Macedonia, we dont have much of

that kind of evidence. There, however, we have a significant Romani

community that is closely related by language, culture and religion to

the Roma refugees from Kosovo and due to that there exists a chance of

their integration, assuming that the government could get substantial
35

financial support to implement such a project. Other Central-East European countries that have their own significant Romani populations,

have no tradition of receiving refugees or asylum-seekers and have financial shortcomings will rather oppose receiving Kosovo Roma. Therefore the only option is to have them received in Western countries that

have such a traditionalthough there are anti-Gypsy feelings on the

part of society in those countries as well.

Much depends on how the process of receiving Romani refugees proceeds, how it is explained to society, and what will be the prospective

status of Romani refugees. In any case, such a process should be organized and Roma should receive training in camps to be able to integrate

with the society. The worst situation would be to keep them in camps

for some time without determining what their status will be later on.

I would not be too afraid, in advance, about possible conflicts in the

countries they would be received. What is more important is the decision of the international community to find a solution to those Kosovo

Roma who need to be resettled or granted asylum status. Here I would

encourage states to take the risk and go ahead

Mr. SMITH. Bishop Artemije, to what extent are Serbs in Mitrovica

and northern Kosovo supported materially by the Milosevic regime and

is Belgrade sending in para-militaries or instigators to thwart the efforts of moderates like yourself to find a solution?

His Grace ARTEMIJE. I wouldnt say that they are actually supported

by Milosevic, but Milosevic is trying to continue manipulation of these

Serbs. It is possible his people there and in other parts of Kosovo are

actually acting as his extended hand. But it cannot cover completely

the responsibility of the other side for the riots in Kosovo Mitrovica,

especially having in mind what happened in other cities in Kosovo, not

the cities which have been previously naughty, I think have become

completely Albanian cities.

Therefore, it is easy to understand the fear of the Serbs in Mitrovica

and that they dont want to go through the same things as Serbs in

Pecs and other cities. I think they have tried to protect themselves and

their families but it is possible to believe that Milosevic is using that to

strengthen his propaganda. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask Mr. Bajraktari and anyone else who would

like to comment, what do you think the interests are of Belgrade in

keeping the prisoners, and torturing those prisoners? Does Milosevic

expect to get something in return or is this another case of unmitigated

cruelty?

Mr. BAJRAKTARI. Well, I think this case is more than clear, because

if we view the policy that Mr. Milosevic has run over the last years we

can clearly see that the de-stabilization is something that creates power

for him, a foundation to rule. So in this specific case I also think that

keeping Albanian hostages in Serbia is clearly an attempt by Mr.

Milosevic to de-stabilize Kosovo and further to prove a failure of the

international communitys investments in Kosovo.

So this is dangerous because it empowers the radicals within Kosovo

society, meaning within the Albanian community, because they obviously want their loved ones back. By empowering the radicals it further

endangers any processing of reconciliation that is necessary right now

in Kosovo. That is why I emphasize the importance that the Kosovo

Serbs should not only denounce, but they should also demand the release of the Kosovars.
36

Because this will make the process of forgiving much easier and the

process of reconciliation and the multi-ethnic future of Kosovo more

possible.

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. I have just one thing to add to what Mr. Bajraktari

said, with which I think I can concur. I think also that keeping the

prisoners incarcerated was one of Belgrades ways of establishing proof

of Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo. It was a way of saying, Yes, Resolution 1244 does give us our sovereignty, we are able to save face. In

fact there is the territory integrity of Yugoslavia, of Serbia and Kosovo,

and these prisoners are our prisoners.

If you look at the way the prisoners were transferred, it gives you

some insight into the legalistic bent of this society in which there is

absolutely no rule of law. They transferred not only the prisoners, but

the prison wardens from one jurisdiction in Kosovo to a parallel jurisdiction in Serbia. They transferred the judges as well, so that, for instance, you couldnt appeal a conviction on the grounds that the jurisdiction was improperly held.

But after that, it became clear that there would be no prisoner exchanges, that this was not some sort of strategic tool for the ending of

the conflict. The prisoners became effective hostages, and they are now

a bargaining chip. And you have to look at the way Milosevic has operated in the course of the past decade. He always gets some of what he

has wanted by upping the ante: He does something bad; the west complains. He does something worse; the west makes threats. He backs

down on the thing that he did that was worse; and the west forgets

about the first thing that he did that was bad. So he has moved ahead

one-half step. And this is the kind of game that he has played.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just say one of the principal reasons for having

this hearing is the fact that the prisoners have lacked his ability. You

might recall when American POWs were being held by Milosevic, Jesse

Jackson received a tremendous amount of visibility while campaigning

on their behalf, and the next thing you know there was a release.

Would that kind of undertaking be fruitful or prudent given the circumstances were dealing with now?

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. I think that kind of intervention would be, could be

very effective. I have to say in this regard that the U.S. State Department has been probably the most proactive on this issue, despite whatever qualms we may have with how the Ambassador had been briefed.

The State Department has actually put its money where its mouth is.

Unfortunately, the receptacle of those funds has not been particularly

effective, that is, the High Commissioner for Human Rights Office.

But the State Department has spoken out again and again. Theyve

put someone, at least one person, full-time on this, and to raise the

profile of the issue, as Congressman Wolf said, with an explicit presidential advisory, making it more public, could certainly do no harm.

INTERPRETER. Excuse me.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

INTERPRETER. If I could say something just in the name of the Bishop,

we were just consulting now. On our proposal, Mr. Landrum Bolling

(phonetic) from Air Mercy Corps (phonetic), he actually was ready to

mediate on the question of detained persons and prisoners in Serbia and

they were supporting that. We contacted with Mr. Kouchner and he
37

agreed that he could go and do that and of course try to have an influence on Kosovo Albanians as well to try to find the missing Serbs. But

unfortunately he was denied a visa for Serbia.

So we would like to reiterate that we would like the Albanian prisoners who are proven not guilty by an international commission and the

political prisoners especially, who are there for political convictions to

be free, because that is, as Mr. Bajraktari said, it is endangering and

making the reconciliation process in Kosovo very difficult. We support

it very much and well continue making statements in that direction.

Mr. SMITH. Its most appreciated and not unexpected especially giving the moderating attempts youve made over the years. I think it is

very important that you have, Bishop, reminded the Commission with

the stark reality of eight months of so-called NATO protection. The fact

is, and I repeat it, 80 Orthodox churches have been either completely

destroyed or severely damaged and the fact that you pointed out 400

Serbs have been killed.

How do we break this cycle of violence? Because even-handedness and

a multi-ethnic society is what we all aim for. It seems that if there is

one cycle and it was whos ever turn it is to do the killing persists, well

just see more killing in perpetuity.

His Grace ARTEMIJE. In our meetings with the officials of the international community, both in Kosovo and here, have always indicated

that the only way to stop this vicious cycle of violence is that the international community shows more resolute position towards their criminals because it is the fact that in the course of eight months not a single

perpetrator has been brought to justice in Kosovo.

And that is as astute as a green light for the criminals to continue

their crimes. A few days ago, a grenade attack was made against a

church in Gujilane U.S. Sector. Yesterday, a respected Serb doctor was

killed or shot in Gujilane and he died and he gave medical assistance in

one tent near the church to all needed people. He was killed in the

center of Gujilane. If it continues in this way, that there is no one held

responsible for these crimes, it will never stop.

Yes, and I would only like to add that in todays New York Times

article by Steven Erlanger, I think there is a very indicative sentence

which Ill try to paraphrase, that the basic problem in Kosovo according

to one UN official is that the international community should, is not

showing real willingness to face the troublemakers in the KLA because

of possible casualties which might occur in NATO, among the NATO

peacekeepers.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hand.

Mr. HAND. Thank you. Mr. Frelick, in your testimony I liked very

much the way you categorize the various groups of vulnerable people,

because I know from following the Bosnian conflict that there is always

so heavy a focus on the main groups; they get all the attention. And

there are a lot of people who do not belong to those groups and fall

between the cracks.

In Bosnia there were a lot of mixed marriages and, as you indicate for

Kosovo, thats not necessarily a very large group. But you point out

some other ones, the draft evaders being one of them. I wanted to ask

you, but also maybe Mr. Bajraktari, if you would want to comment on

the situation for some of these other groups, in particular the Slavic

Muslims that live in Kosovo and are sort of caught between a rock and

a hard place.
38

I can remember from when I lived in Novi Pazar in 1993, for a few

months, that there was a large group that lived in Mitrovica. But even

at that time a lot of them were moving into the Sandjak region because

they felt a little bit safer there. I was wondering if you might be able to

comment a little bit on that group, as well as the ethnic Albanians that

are from Serbia proper in southern Serbia.

You had given one quick sentence of them having a well-founded fear

of persecution. I was wondering if we could elaborate a little bit more

and talk about what their situation is in the post-Kosovo conflict situation.

Mr. FRELICK. I actually became aware of both groups during my

visit to Novi Pazar, so both groups are appearing in that area. There is

the Sandjak area which is a heavily Slavic Muslim region of Serbia,

some of which goes into Montenegro as well. The ethnic Albanians who

are in there are particularly vulnerable because they are largely overlooked by the international community. These are people who are considered to be collaborators, basically, in the same way that perhaps

Roma have been accused of being collaborators, but these are ethnic

Albanians themselves.

Oftentimes those are people who, as early as 1998, were taking a

moderating role and were being threatened by members of the KLA at

that time. I spoke to a local Muslim Red Cross official in Novi Pazar

who told me the story of a Professor, a University Professor who is an

ethnic Albanian, from one of the cities in Kosovo, who had to flee for his

life in 1998, and he is still in Novi Pazar.

He doesnt belong there. He doesnt. Hes Albanian-speaking. He has

no future in Serbia or Montenegro. Hes a fish out of water. I mean his

water, his pool was Kosovo and its no longer there for him. And he

needs to be resettled. Its a classic case of the kind of person who cant

return, cant be locally integrated, and for whom thats the only protection and the only durable solution.

Now the other, the other instance that you asked me about is, perhaps, the next blow up that we are going to be seeing. Its blowing right

about now. And this is Presevo. This is the ethnic Albanian enclave in

southern Serbia where there is a huge cold war, which is getting hotter

by the minute. There appears to be infiltration of extremist elements

from the Kosovo side trying to provoke a response, as well as the predictable repressive apparatus of the Serbian authorities.

I was not in Presevo myself, but I was well aware of a number of

those reports that were coming out Presevo at the time that I was there

which included burning of villages in the area, the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia proper. There were three villages that

were burned shortly before my visit. And again, it was hard from where

I was in Serbian-speaking Serbia, shall I say, to assess what the conditions for those people were.

But I did speak to some of the human rights monitors who had made

missions to that area and they talked of a highly militarized zone, very

high tensions. Although I didnt talk to any individuals themselves who

were ethnic Albanians fleeing from that area, there were people reported

to me, by name, who were accused of being collaborators with the Serbian

authorities and who were being threatened as well.

And so they again had no place else to go and they had to flee. But its

a very hot situation right now.
39

Mr. BAJRAKTARI. Unfortunately in Kosovo there has been a lot of

suffering during the war and also in the aftermath of war, especially

due to the lack of justice and the lack of rule of law. As a result of this,

many of the ethnic minorities have been exposed to enormous pressures

due to their ethnic backgrounds. But also what I think what the problem is that the ethnic minorities in Kosovo and the Albanians also,

have to realize that their way to Europe leads through Pristina.

And then once they realize that and once the ethnic minorities in

Kosovo start running an independent and separate policy and very proKosovo oriented policy, that will make chances for the reconciliation

much higher. Meaning that the Serbs should clearly state and that

they do not identify their policy with Milosevics policy and they do see

their future in Kosovo.

And in the eyes of Albanians, many of these ethnic minorities unfortunately are seen as a people who have been utilized by Milosevic during the bombing campaign and they are identified as perpetrators. What

I found critical is that the ethnic minorities should clearly state that

they do run an independent policy from Belgrade and their policy is to,

that they see Kosovo as their own future country.

Concerning Presevo, Bujanoc and Medvegje (phonetic) area, the three

municipalities in Southeastern Serbia, in this case there has been a

clear violation of the UN Resolution 1244 and the military political agreement reached by NATO and VJ (Yugoslav army) forces. Belgrade is not

supposed to keep its troops in a five-kilometer border strip close to Kosovo. That has been a part of an agreement that has been clearly violated by Belgrade.

Milosevic is usually playing with the uniforms of his policemen. The

agreement provides for the local police to patrol this area, but as we

well know there is no clear distinction among Milosevics forces who is

a local policeman and who is paramilitary or who is indicted by The

Hague Tribunal. There has been enormous pressure on the Albanians

in southeastern Serbia and some of them have already fled the area,

moved to Macedonia, further creating an imbalance in the ethnic stability of Macedonia.

But also most of these Albanians have fled toward Kosovo, where the

lasting peace is in the process of being rebuilt. And the recent reports

have shown that the Yugoslav troops are concentrating in this area

that can further give the indication that Milosevic is getting ready for

another ethnic cleansing policy or campaign against these Albanians.

So having in mind this crisis and having in mind the crisis in Mitrovica,

its clear that Milosevic remains an important player in the Kosovo

crisis and in the aftermath of war.

And I think that there should be a more serious condemnation of the

repressive policy that is conducted in southeastern Serbia. But also that

the United States should emphasize that there could be no violation of

the technical agreement that was reached and that the five-kilometer

border strip should be protected.

INTERPRETER. Yes, just to add one sentence more, if its possible.

Yes, of course it is absolutely possible that Milosevic is trying to profit

from this situation and it is true that there is a build up of Yugoslav

forces there. But also of course we must be aware of the other part of the

truth that there is an attempt of Albanian action, especially of certain

splinter groups of KLA to export the conflict into the southeastern Serbia in order to suck in or somehow to involve NATO into a new conflict.
40

So it is very important to have that in mind, because in the recent

reports by press and especially by Ambassador Holbrook, we must say

that we have seen a relatively one-sided approach where the only problem is, Mr. Milosevic, he is a problem, but not the only one. So if we

approach the problem really evenhandedly, we can probably find a solution. But if it goes only one-sidedly, I think there will always be problems. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. I thank you for that because I do think it is important

that any extremist who commits barbaric or cruel act needs to be condemned. Were going to be very careful about provocations that are done

with the intent of trying to bring a certain response from NATO and

from the international community. I think all heinous acts need to be

condemned equally and I think your point is very well taken, Bishop.

Id like to yield to Erika Schlager for any questions she might have.

Ms. SCHLAGER. Thank you. I wanted to ask one additional question,

Mr. Mirga. We have heard reports that Roma who are internally displaced in Kosovo, as well as refugees elsewhere in the region, are not

getting full access to humanitarian assistance the same way that other

people in the area are. Weve heard this is primarily because the aid

agencies, both non-governmental aid agencies as well as those run by

the international community, hire primarily ethnic Albanian interpreters

and drivers who are unwilling to go into the Romani communities.

Weve also heard, at the same time, that Roma are unwilling to act as

interpreters and drivers in many instances because they are afraid if

they leave their communities theyll be subjected to violence or kidnaping. This lack of humanitarian assistance may contribute to the very

grim situation that Mr. Frelick describes in his testimony. Im wondering if this is consistent with what you understand to be the case and if

so, do you have any suggestions on how this problem could be addressed?

Mr. MIRGA. Yes, in general I can confirm that this is consistent with

what this report states. Just to share with you my own experience in

Stankovic II. When I visited in the fall, there were only Roma, all the

Albanians left already for Kosovo. They complained that they are afraid,

for example, of medical service which was provided by ethnic Albanians

to them in the camp.

So in many cases they were refusing to go to ask for medical help and

instead they were trying to get to the city and to ask the Roma who live

in one of the quarters of Skopje to provide them help and to help them.

To other extent it is imaginary fear, I cant say, but such a fear existed

among these Roma in Stankovic II. As regard to access to the health, to

the other aid, like food, like schooling, like public service buses and so

on, here I think we know that there is very limited access.

And Roma are really afraid to leave, for example, camps or place for

internal displaced people

and what is even more disturbing, in some cases Roma ask for protection and they do not receive protection. The KFOR forces are not ready

or willing to follow such a request. So here I think we should demand

improvement from the KFOR forces as well. Now as regards, especially

those internally displaced Roma like in Montenegro, which is part of

Yugoslavia, and in Yugoslavia proper, here I think is the worst situation.

And somehow those Roma who are there, especially in Serbia proper,

they are suffering because of no access to any humanitarian aid. And

the reason can be violence, but also one is that they are hated and
41

despised and many people dont want to go to them. Aid is provided

along ethnic lines and distributed by ethnic organizations that dont

want to serve to Roma. Since Roma are less organized, they have, in

general, less access to humanitarian aid. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Before we conclude the hearing, would any of our witnesses like to make any final comment? Yes, Ms. Blaustein.

Ms. BLAUSTEIN. This is an afterthought, Mr. Chairman, in response

to your question about putting a higher profile on the prisoner issue.

For many months the American and European NGOs didnt know

whether to advocate hard on this or not because there were rumors and

some information from the Red Cross in Geneva that independent advocacy could harm their access to the prisoners and they wanted their

ability to negotiate freely with Belgrade.

In fact, I have checked this with International Committee for the Red

Cross officials and they, although they feel very much hamstrung by

their legal advice, that they cannot advocate this issue, they do have

access, (although they are not pressing for access to the military prisons the way they might). But they didnt see that the access they have

now would be jeopardized in any way, and they were basically asking

for other actors on the international stage to advocate on this issue.

Your analogy to the Jesse Jackson intervention, I think a high-profile

negotiation is in order but one should take care not to emulate the meetings that have been held by emissaries of some western and non-western governments, that is, by meeting with indictees. One must, in this

case, of course, take care to negotiate only with unindicted representatives of the regime for the complete and unconditional release of the

prisoners.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Mr. Mirga.

Mr. MIRGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to stress that

there are still Roma in Kosovo. Kosovo is not only about Albanians and

Serbs.. Maybe Roma are politically unimportant, but they are humans,

and we should be aware that those Roma who remain there and there

are still several thousand of them, they choose to stay there. And we

should not forget to talk about them as a part of this community or

future community of Kosovo.

Any efforts at reconciliation should include not only Serbs and Albanians, but also Roma and other minorities who are there, and who may

be not strong or represented by their own states, but nevertheless they

are part of the problem of Kosovo and important part to its solution.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that wise admonition and for the record,

this Commission has tried to remember the disenfranchised and those

who make up a smaller but often forgotten minority. And Roma has

been among those, not just in the former Yugoslavia, but elsewhere in

Europe where the Roma continue to suffer profound discrimination even

by some so-called enlightened governments. So thank you for that comment. Mr. Frelick.

Mr. FRELICK. Yes, I wanted to make two final remarks. One is about

the Roma and it was to address the question that you had addressed to

Ambassador Menzies about the letter you had written in July to the

State Department and the response from that letter. I have a copy of

that letter and I just wanted to mention that I found it quite lacking as

a clear response of what U.S. policy was with respect to the Roma in the

region.
42

There are three points in the letter that I think are

Mr. SMITH. Is it the Administrations letter back to us?

Mr. FRELICK. The Administrations letter to you of November 3. And

there are three points in the letter that I think are quite questionable,

and Ill just mention the three. The first point is that, the letter states

the United States has processed more than 50 Roma for refugee admission in the past six months. The implication certainly is that theyre

talking about the Roma who have fled from Kosovo.

Ive checked with every resettlement agency in the United States,

none of them are aware of any Roma that have been resettled from

Kosovo. There are some Bosnian Roma who have been resettled in the

United States, but I dont think that was what your letter was questioning and I think that it was unresponsive to the point that you had

raised.

The second point in the letter that I think is questionable is that they

imply that those who fled to other countries, including Hungary, should

contact the UNHCR regarding protection assistance, and if needed, the

possibility of resettlement in a third country. The fact of the matter is

that UNHCR regards Hungary as a country of asylum and will not

refer Europeans for resettlement from Hungary.

As this Commission knows, Hungarys own record with respect to

the Roma minority is less than desirable and the conditions of Roma

seeking protection and resettlement out of Hungary is something that

should really be given much more careful consideration than this brush

off of a response.

And finally, the letter states, and I quote, that the Roma receive significant aid from the international community inside Serbia. And thats

just, from my eyewitness account, blatantly untrue. They receive virtually no aid from anyone inside Serbia. You know from previous times

Ive testified before this Commission and your other hearings, that Ive

visited refugee camps all over the world.

The Roma conditions in Kursumlija, for example, were among the

worst that Ive seen anywhere. People living in filth, in raw human

sewage, in abandoned buildings without so much as plastic sheeting.

No evidence whatsoever of any food or blankets from any source. And so

for the State Department to say that they are receiving significant aid

from the international community, its really quite distressing.

I also wanted to address the question that you had raised generally

about what can be done for peace and reconciliation in Kosovo itself. I

take to heart what Mr. Wolf was asking earlier about what really, fundamentally is involved with reconciliation. But before you can reach

Mr. Wolfs spiritual reconciliation, you have to talk about physical safety

and security. The head of UNMIK, Mr. Kouchner, has pleaded for 6,000

international police to provide the minimum level of security to just

keep people from killing each other.

To keep those murders from continuing. At last count, I heard 1,400

was the contingent of international police in Kosovo. For the international community to have put the human resources, the financial resources, the munitions resources into the bombing campaign and then

to turn its back at this point, is just ludicrous and inhumane, I might

add.

The other point I would make is that there is really no overall policy.

We dont know what the west wants for Kosovo, it hasnt been stated.

And until there is clarity about what the future of Kosovo is going to be,
43

there is going to be guerrilla warfare of one sort or another by all the

parties to the conflict to try to create the fait accompli, to try to create a

new reality because the international community waffles every way.

We need clarity about what the policy is that this government and

that the western alliance is trying to follow and where they are going in

Kosovo. And without that, without that kind of direction, its anybodys

guess and theyre going to keep vying for power, territory, an inch here,

an inch there, a cut throat here, you name it. Its just, were waffling

and we need clear direction. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Father Sava.

INTERPRETER. Just a last remark, I would like to follow up to Mr.

Frelicks point which he made on the international police. It is very

important to deploy more policemen, but we mustnt also disregard the

spiritual dimension and I have good news to tell you. That we at least

have some progress in interreligious dialogue in Kosovo. The religious

leaders of Kosovo first met just before the bombing campaign in Vienna.

It was, the meeting was hosted by the Austrian government in Vienna,

and it was also organized with the help of Rabbi Arthur Schneier (phonetic) from New York.

And there for the first time a very strong and clear declaration and

commitment for peace and reconciliation was made. We met also, not

recently, in Amman in December where we also reiterated our strong

position that it was not a religious war, it was not the war between

Christianity and Islam and we must be very careful not to allow this

dimension of conflict is broadened. Although there are certain elements

of that, we hope that it will not become a religious conflict, but it should

be resolved completely in the political terms.

And the last meeting between the religious leaders for Kosovo and

Mr. Boya (phonetic) for the Islamic community and Bishop Marcsolpi

(phonetic) and Bishop Artemije was in Sarajevo on the eighth of February. The meeting was hosted by WCRP, World Conference of Religious

for Peace and interreligious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they

made a very strong statement. Im sorry I dont have it here to share it

with you. Ah, its here, okay.

And the next meeting is scheduled for April, so I think were going to

have more and more progress on this and at least between religious

leaders and communities. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Father Sava, thank you very much. Let me just, if theres

no further comments, Id like to just point out for the record that the

Commission invited this extraordinary panel of six men and women

individually who have committed themselves to the pursuit of peace,

the provision of humanitarian assistance, ethnic reconciliation and the

rule of law to present their insights and observations. Each of you has

done so with clarity, with precision, and with an enormous amount of

heart this afternoon.

The Commission is very grateful for your leadership, which you have

shown over the course of many years, your counsel and your recommendations which will be acted upon and we will encourage others within

the Administration and other foreign governments to do likewise. I want

to thank you very sincerely for your tremendous testimony and above

all for the work that you do each and every day. This hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 4:52 p.m.)
44

APPENDICES

WITTEN STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,

CO-CHAIRMAN

Dramatic developments in Kosovo are once again hitting the headlines. Renewed violence in Kosovo brings new threats to peace in the

region, and a new challenge for the United States and its friends and

allies who are trying to maintain peace in that extremely difficult

environment.

I remain deeply concerned about the situation there. I recently visited Kosovo and heard from our military personnel based there about

what they are being tasked to do. I learned that it is virtually impossible for many people in Kosovo to carry on even the basic routines of

everyday life. People from one group or another, depending on where

in Kosovo you look, cannot leave their homes without military escort,

for fear of being attacked by those from another group. Others cannot

even get back to their homes, which, I understand, is the basis for the

current standoff in the north. And, of course, some cannot leave the

prisons of Serbia.

Other solutions need to be found, rather than simply deploying more

forces to stand between angry crowds. Such a deployment alone does

little to address the legitimate grievances of many of the people, from

all ethnic groups, and it likewise does little to stop the human rights

violations which take place with virtual impunity. People need to get

out of the refugee camps and prisons and get back to their homes as

soon as possible.

I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Menzies what the Administration plans to do in Kosovo this year, and the views and suggestions of our expert panel. I hope, that by focusing on these issues,

the Helsinki Commission will contribute to the formulation of sound

policies in Kosovo. While our focus today is on the human dimension

of Kosovo we must not lose sight of the security and economic dimensions of the situation in Kosovo. Corruption has been identified as

one of the major obstacles to OSCE efforts in Bosnia and I understand that organized crime elements are extremely active in Kosovo

and elsewhere in Serbia. The prospects for democracy, human rights

and the rule of law in Kosovo are not promising and the approaching

spring could usher in more conflict in this troubled part of the OSCE

region.
45

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STENY H. HOYER,

RANKING MEMBER

Mr. Chairman, the subject of our hearing todayKosovos displaced

and imprisonedis one we urgently need to address. One may ask

those who, in some far off distant land, have been forced from their

homes, separated from their families and, in the case of the Albanian

prisoners, deprived of their freedom? To me, having served on this

Helsinki Commission now for 15 years, the answer is clear. We should

care, because only with respect for human rights can there be true

peace, and the violation of human rights in one country is a legitimate concern to all as a source of instability. The principles of the

Helsinki final act are not merely negotiated cold war rhetoric. They

have real meaning, probably nowhere more so than in this country,

given our own democratic ideals and our sacrifices during the world

wars of the early and mid-20th century.

It is my hope, as we address the current crisis in Mitrovica and

elsewhere in Kosova, Bosnia and throughout southeastern Europe,

that we not lose sight of our principles. People who want to return to

their homes are not the source of instability; the thugs who forced

them from their homes are. The people who languish in Serbian prisons are not the cause of ethnic tensions; the war criminals who took

them as they fled Kosovo are. So-called lame for rape, torture and

wanton destruction; Milosevic and his murderous minions are. In saying these things, I dont mean to simplify an admittedly complex situation. I urge those in the international community dealing with these

issues not to get lost in the complexities and use them as an excuse

for inaction. The current violence in Kosova must be condemned, Mr..

Chairman, and all those responsible for criminal behavior, regardless of ethnic background, must be brought to justice.

Many of us here on the Helsinki commission were in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly session last July,

where we took the initiative to raise the need to protect the minority

population in Kosovo, to get the displaced back home, and to make

the Milosevic regime release those Albanians who are unjustly imprisoned in Serbia. Since then, these issues have come up in our legislative work, and Chairman Smith, Commissioners Lautenberg and

Cardin, with Representative Eliot Engel and others, have been particularly active in four areasrefugee questions, war crimes prosecution,

Serbian democratization, and the incarceration of Kosovar Albanians

in Serbia. I joined you in these efforts in the past and, as we begin a

new session of congress, I hope that we can maintain momentum here

in the congress that will lead to and support stronger action in the Balkans.

I wish to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by noting my particular interest

in the release of the Albanian prisoners in Serbia. We have seen pictures

of Flora Brovina and Albin Kurti; some have even met them. Whether

the number of such prisoners is 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000, behind the numbers

are real people, innocent people who took the risk of getting involved in

activities to improve the lives of others. It is unfortunate that their

release was not part of the agreement concluding the conflict in Kosova, and I urge President Clinton and the leaders of other countries

not to allow this issue to drop in determining policies toward Belgrade. These people must be released. Period.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
46

PREPARED SUBMISSION OF JOHN MENZIES

I am happy to address the Commission today on the topic of the

Displaced and Imprisoned of Kosovo.

During the war, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and

minority groups found safe haven in neighboring Albania, Macedonia,

and in other countries. Hundreds of thousands also fled their homes

for the uncertainties of internal displacement elsewhere in Kosovo.

In the almost eight months since the war ended, over 800,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes in safety

and security, and the efforts of the international community over the

course of the winter have ensured that no one was without shelter or

food. This is a major accomplishment in and of itself.

Gradually, peace is taking hold, and resolution of the questions

posed by the displaced and imprisoned are important factors in building that peace.

The key to the return of all citizens of Kosovo is security. There are

four key elements of the international community's efforts on this

front.

1. The Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) bears primary responsibility for assuring that hostilities do not re-ignite.

2. The United Nations International Police (UNIP) are to provide

security within communities until they are relieved by local

police. The police are armed and have executive authority to

detain suspects. Currently there are some 2,300 officers out of

the requested 4,718.

3. Training has begun for a local police force, the Kosovo Police

Service (KPS), which over time will assume police responsibility. The training academy is open in Vucitrn (Vushtri), and two

classes have already graduated almost 500 trainees. We are

trying to expand the training effort in order to speed up deployment of this much-needed law enforcement mechanism.

4. A functioning judiciary is crucial to the rule of law. The courts

are being reestablished through the efforts of UNMIK [United

Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo] and the

OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]

with the assistance of the U.S. and its Allies.

Economic assistance will also play an important role in providing

citizens with the jobs and hope for the future that will turn them

away from thoughts of violence and revenge and allow absorption of

additional returns. The U.S. and its allies are working with UNMIK

and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] to provide the resources

needed to establish a banking and regulatory system, to encourage

micro-enterprise, to start large-scale infrastructure projects and identify quick-turn-around projects for job creation.

We are beginning to see results. A post and telecommunications

system is in place, power plants are being rehabilitated to provide

additional energy, and a commercial bank has opened and will begin

providing credit to small businesses within the next three months.

We have begun talking with our Allies about re-starting parts of the

Trepca mining complex. Efforts are continuing to provide temporary

housing and materials for warm, dry shelter during the winter for

those internally displaced. UNMIK plans to issue a temporary travel

document to Kosovar residents as part of the voter registration process to begin in April, allowing for greater freedom of movement.
47

However, without Kosovar participation, international efforts to

rebuild the society will fail. To draw Kosovars into the civil administration process, UNMIK has created an Interim Administrative Council (IAC). This will enable Kosovars to work with UNMIK to decide

key administrative issues. A Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), has

also been created to provide a forum for Kosovars from all ethnic

groups to discuss issues of importance with UNMIK, and make their

voices heard in decisions on the future of their province. Ultimately

elections to decide the future of the province will influence returns.

Provisional municipal elections are scheduled for this Fall. In addition, the U.S. has promised to work on the realization of a pilot project

to begin to promote the return of Serb refugees under conditions of

safety and dignity, in coordination with UNMIK, KFOR, and other

donors.

The continued detention of Albanians in Serbia remains a tragic

and acutely vexing issue for the international community.

 Given our lack of diplomatic relations with Belgrade, it is difficult

for the U.S. Government to directly pressure the Milosevic regime on

this issue.

However, the State Department has, since last summer, consistently

worked to raise the public and diplomatic profile of this issue, and to

leverage key players inside Serbia who can make a difference.

To this end, we are supporting indigenous human rights NGOs

working in this area such as the Humanitarian Law Center and others who are monitoring and in some cases defending these prisoners

in sham court proceedings.

Meanwhile, we have provided $350,000 to the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) mission in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], which was appointed by SRSG [Special

Representative of the Secretary-General Bernard] Kouchner to lead

the international effort to secure the release of the detainees. These

funds are directly supporting UNHCHR efforts to monitor trials and

secure the release of all detainees.

According to the Humanitarian Law Center, there are at least 1300

persons illegally held in Serbian prisoners, including women and children. It should be noted however that there may be more than 1300

detainees in Belgrade-controlled prisons, indeed some estimates are

as high as 5000.

We are pleased that through the work of the High Commissioner

on Human Rights and the Humanitarian Law Center, some women

and children have been released for humanitarian reasons.

Regrettably, the five to six hundred released to date have secured

their freedom through Kosovar Albanian families paying ransoms to

corrupt Serbian officials. In some cases, as much as DM 50,000 has

been paid for a single prisoneran average detainee currently costs

DM 10,000.

We have also repeatedly raised the matter diplomatically with

UNMIK, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), the

International Commission on Missing Persons, and bilaterally with

NATO member states. We have made it emphatically clear that there

can be no reintegration of the government of Serbia into the international community without prior release of these prisoners.
48

We have publicly registered our concern in these cases over the

apparent lack of due process, condemning Serbia's actions as an example of their disregard for international norms of behavior.

Others in the international community are also making efforts to

promote release of these prisoners. For example, the Finnish government has negotiated with Belgrade for the release of prisoners.

Many international, as well as U.S., NGOs are active on the issue.

The UK and Belgium offices of Amnesty International and Pax

Christie, along with the Association of Political Prisoners in Kosovo,

continue to advocate tirelessly for the release of prisoners. Courageous NGOs in Serbia are also working this; the Belgrade-based NGOs

Humanitarian Law Center, with a staff of only three lawyers, and

the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights continue to defend Albanian prisoners.

The truth is that European nations are in a better position than the

U.S. to take the lead on this issue. Some of our European allies, like

Italy, have representation in Belgrade and can pressure the Milosevic

regime. Canada and Japan also have representation in Belgrade. It

may also be possible to encourage greater Russian participation.

In addition, the U.S. has begun a dialogue with the Community of

St. Egidio to engage the FRY government on the issue. Let me touch

briefly on the situation Mitrovica. First of all, KFOR dealt with the

recent unrest in Mitrovica quickly and decisively. Indeed, there have

been no serious confrontations between Serbs and Albanians since

February 13, when KFOR responded to the upsurge of violence there.

That being said, Mitrovica remains a potential flashpoint. Serbs

from all over Kosovo fled to Mitrovica as KFOR deployed and Serb

security forces left. They expelled thousands of Albanians from their

homes in north Mitrovica and have been trying to develop an enclave

that is ruled by Serbs controlled by Belgrade, a place where the authority of UNMIK does not obtain. Indeed, Serb hard-liners in

Mitrovica effectively scuttled an earlier attempt to bring Serbs into

UNMIK's interim administrative council.

While many of the Serbs in north Mitrovica have security concerns,

those concerns are not justification to drive people from their homes

or to dismember northern Kosovo from the rest of the province. The

ethnic Albanians are understandably frustrated by what they see as

a hardening of the Serb occupation of their homes in north Mitrovica.

Extremists on both sides are willing to exploit the exasperation of the

Albanians and the fears of the Serbs for their own nefarious purposes. In that regard Serb extremists can be expected to continue to

try to strengthen their position and numbers in northern Mitrovica

in the coming months in order to achieve a permanent division of the

city. That cannot be allowed to happen, and the emerging division

that is now underway must be reversed.

In order to resolve the problem, UNMIK and KFOR are working

closely together to eliminate the bars to freedom of movement by both

communities across the Ibar River, insulate the north from troublemakers, provide security for Serbs in the north, and facilitate twoway returnsof Albanians back to the north, and Serbs to the south.

Additional efforts to revitalize viable local industries are also underway, as are efforts to develop Serb media independent of Belgrade's

control.
49

But ensuring a secure environment is a sine qua non for progress

in all other areas. Some additional troops have been deployed to the

city, and the police presence greatly increased, with both elements

conducting visible joint security operations. UNMIK is appointing

international judges and prosecutors to make sure that malefactors

are tried and detained as per the law. As many of you know, last

week the Secretary met with Bishop Artemije, after which she announced our support for a pilot project to begin returning Serbs to

their homes.
50

PREPARED SUBMISSION OF BILL FRELICK, DIRECTOR OF

POLICY, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

 Thank you, Chairman Smith, for the opportunity to testify regarding the humanitarian needs of displaced persons from Kosovo. The

U.S. Committee for Refugees is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, which for 42 years has defended the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons in this country and throughout

the world. Our organization has been documenting the conditions of

refugees and displaced persons in former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the conflict, as indicated, in part, by our publications and previous testimony before this Commission and other congressional panels:

Yugoslavia Torn Asunder: Lessons for Protecting Refugees from Civil War

(1992)

Croatia's Crucible: Providing Asylum for Refugees from Bosnia and

Hercegovina (1992)

"'Preventive Protection' and the Right to Seek Asylum: A Preliminary Look

at Bosnia and Croatia," International Journal of Refugee Law (1992)

Human Rights and Humanitarian Needs of Refugees and Displaced

Persons in and outside Bosnia and Hercegovina, Helsinki Commission

testimony (January 25, 1993)

"Civilians, Humanitarian Assistance Still Held Hostage in Bosnia,"

Refugee Reports (February 1993)

Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies (1993)

Last Ditch Options on Bosnia (1993)

East of Bosnia: Refugees in Serbia and Montenegro (1993)

"No Escape: Minorities under Threat in Serb-Held Areas of Bosnia,"

Refugee Reports (November 1994)

"War and Disaster in the Former Yugoslavia: The Limits of Humanitarian Action," World Refugee Survey (1994)

"The Death March from Srebrenica," Refugee Reports (July 1995)

Bosnian Refugees, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International

Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives (September 25, 1995)

Germany to Begin Returning Bosnians, Refugee Reports (September 1996)

Bosnian Minorities: Strangers in Their Own Land, Refugee Reports

(October 1997)

State Department Welcomes, Then Backs Off, Serbian Humanitarian

Centers in Kosovo, Refugee Reports (September 1998)

Shaky Ceasefire in Kosovo; Displaced People Come Out of Woods, Fears

Remain, Refugee Reports (November 1998)

Fighting Heats Up Kosovo Winter, Refugee Reports (February/March 1999)

"Kosovo: The Outpouring of Misery," Refugee Reports (March/April 1999)

"The Kosovo Refugee Crisis," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration, (April 14, 1999)

"Here Come the Kosovars," Refugee Reports (May 1999)

Destination Unknown: From Kosovo to No-man's Land (January 2000)

"Reversal of Fortune: Serbia's Refugee Crisis," Refugee Reports (January

2000)

I traveled extensively in Serbia and Montenegro from December 3

to December 18, 1999, visiting municipalities near Kosovo, including

the Sandjak regions, as well as in the Belgrade area and Vojvodina,

near the Croatian border. The trip included visits to both govern-
51

ment-controlled municipalities and opposition municipalities. I met

with federal and local government officials, representatives of international humanitarian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs). Mostly, however, I met with refugees and displaced people.

The focus of my trip was on the needs of an estimated 200,000 people,

mostly Serbs and Roma (Gypsies) newly displaced from Kosovo, as

well as the conditions for some 500,000 mostly ethnic Serb refugees

from Croatia (mainly from the Krajina region) and Bosnia (from Federation areas).

GENERAL CONDITIONS

In Serbia, looks can be deceiving. The Serbs are a proud people,

and do not want to show a foreigner, particularly an American, that

they are suffering.They are also a society used to a relatively high

standard of living.Their needs, therefore, are not always immediately

obvious. Generally (the notable exception being Roma), refugees and

internally displaced people appear to be in good health, to have clean

accommodations, and to be adequately clothed. Yet, current estimates

place unemployment in Serbia at more than 30 percent, and joblessness among refugees and displaced people is likely to be at least twice

that percentage. Many factories were damaged or destroyed by NATO

bombing, and in many cases were functioning poorly before being

knocked out of commission. Agricultural production is also down by

about 30 percent. As is true of the population generallyÑand particularly true of its vulnerable segments, such as the elderly, the infirm,

and single women with childrenÑthe main problem for refugees and

displaced people is the lack of jobs and income. They simply have no

earning power. A person who earns the average Serbian income of 80

Deutsche marks (DM) (about $40) per month cannot afford 150 to 250

DM (between $75 and $125) per month for food. Although needy refugees are receiving food aid, the problem is not principally a lack of

food; food assistance, in effect, serves as an income supplement, saving money that would otherwise be spent on food. The capacity for

food production in Serbia has not diminished, according to a World

Food Program (WFP) official, but because the government has set

prices for staples at a low level, producers of sugar, vegetable oil, and

milk have either stopped production or sell their products elsewhere

or on the black market (at prices that the poor cannot afford). The

Yugoslav government is often late in paying retirees their pensions,

stretching out the pay periods, or missing pension checks entirely.

Elderly refugees from Croatia have not been able to claim their pensions from the Croatian government, despite having paid into the

Socialist Federal Republic of YugoslaviaÕs (SFRY) social security

system during their working lives, before the break up of Yugoslavia

and Croatian independence. In actuality, even if retirees did receive

their pensions on a regular basis, that would not cover living expenses.

Some pensioners have received coupons for firewood, for example,

but lack the money to hire someone to transport the wood to their

homes. The governments social welfare system has essentially collapsed, and the rolls of social cases continue to grow. Some 33 percent of the population is reportedly living below the poverty level.

The percentage among the uprooted is undoubtedly higher. Although

health care is supposedly free, decent and timely health care usually

comes at a high (bribed) price. There is a critical shortage of pharma-
52

ceuticals. The problem stems, in part, from President Slobodan

Milosevics takeover of the countrys leading pharmaceutical firm, ICN,

and a near monopoly of the pharmaceutical industry by the JUL party,

the extreme nationalist party headed by Mira Markovic, President

Milosevics wife. Some economists predict either more price fixing and

malnutrition or another round of hyperinflation and heightened economic instability. Some predictions are dire, including warnings that

the death rate among vulnerable groups, such as pensioners, could

increase sharply.

 CONDITIONS FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE

It is hard to distinguish between conditions for the old caseload

refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and those for the newer arrivals

from Kosovo. In both cases, the quality of their living conditions is

dictated less by their length of stay or by their status as refugees or

internally displaced persons, than by their own resources, including

the precious existence of relatives in Serbia or Montenegro willing

and able to help. Another obvious factor is whether the displaced

person is an ethnic Serb the overwhelming majority or a Roma. Collective Centers. In general, people living in collective centers are worse

off than those living in private accommodations. They lack the means

job, savings, or family that would enable them to live in a private

home. Often, they are elderly or lacking the skills in demand in an

economy where jobs are scarce.

Although people in collective centers generally live in poorer conditions than those I visited in private accommodations, collective centers have an advantage: residents pay no rent or utilities and receive

food and other humanitarian assistance regularly. On the other hand,

most collective centers are grim. They often lack privacy, and the

people living in them, especially the refugees from Bosnia and Croatia,

tend to be elderly. Heating is sometimes poor, in part, because the

centers were not constructed for residential purposes. Collective centers vary widely in quality and population density. Some, including

converted schools and hospitals, are not especially overcrowded and

provide separate rooms for families. Others, often former cultural

centers, are dismal, drafty, and crowded. The main difference between

collective centers for refugees and those for the newly displaced from

Kosovo is the contrasting demographics of the residents themselves.

Refugees who, often after five years are longer, still remain in collective centers, tend to be elderly and feeble. They often appear listless.

Collective centers for the internally displaced, on the other hand, tend

to have more families, more children, and include men and women in

the prime of their working years. They appear less passive, and are

more likely to express anger or make demands. Whether one lives in

a decent collective center or a bad one seems to be a matter of dumb

luck. I visited a relatively nice collective center on the Avala mountain outside Belgrade, a former psychiatric hospital. Just down the

road, I dropped in on another collective center, a converted restaurant, now home to 129 people from the same village in Kosovo as

those in the neighboring collective center. Cots were crowded together

with no partitions separating them. The residents wore their winter

coats indoors. Because of a three-way dispute between the Serbian

Commissioner for Refugees, the owner of the restaurant, and the UN

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over the rent for the facility, the heat was turned off. (It is not a privately owned facility,
53

but socially owned, so ownership is at least indirectly governmental,

yet the problem apparently stems, in part, from a disagreement between the restaurant owner and the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees.) The residents were angry, suspicious. They said that the people

in the collective center just down the road were receiving more food

and warmer winter clothing. They said that the Red Cross, which

had supplied canned food, had stopped. They accused the Red Cross

of delivering old clothes in bad condition. The residents expressed

anxiety that the winter cold would intensify and that the building

would not provide sufficient protection from the falling temperatures.

Some were sleeping in the restaurant porch, cots flat against plate

glass windows. They asked for wood planks to cover the drafty windows. I had seen other collective centers where the residents had

built partitioned "rooms" using planks supplied by local municipalities. In this case, however, the municipality had not agreed to provide boards, and no one else had responded to their request. The

residents said that ten of the children had contracted pneumonia.

Private Accommodations. Although the overwhelming majority of refugees and internally displaced personsÑabout 90 percentÑare living in private accommodations, the lack of housingÑalong with the

lack of jobsÑremains a principal obstacle to local integration. Refugees living in private accommodations divide into three groups:

 1) The majority of the refugees and displaced people are living

with family or friends, and may or may not be paying rent, depending

on their ability to pay.

 2) Many refugees (fewer among the displaced) have moved out of

the homes of family and friends, and are now paying rent. In order to

afford to rent, such persons usually have jobs or other sources of income.

 3) Finally, a relatively small, but not insignificant, portion of refugees and displaced people live in homes they have constructed themselves. In the case of the internally displaced from Kosovo, some

built homes (or partially built them) in Serbia proper in advance of

their flight. Even if the people renting privately are supposedly better off than those in collective centers, it is clear that their existence

is also often precarious. I spoke with refugees and displaced people

living in overcrowded conditions in private homes who were worried

that their relatives would tell them to leave. I visited with a family in

a collective center in Smederevo who had been living with relatives

but moved into the collective center when the relatives could no longer

support them. The refugees who are able to make an income, pay

rent, and live in a home not shared with local residents, often complain of the high rental costs, as well as the costs of utilities and firewood. Nevertheless, some refugee families I visited appeared virtually indistinguishable from the local community and appear to be fully

integrated.

 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PIPELINE

The existing network for distributing humanitarian aid in the FRY

operates almost exclusively through the Yugoslav Red Cross (YRC).

The Red Cross system has had a virtual monopoly, and no other agency

comes close to it in terms of a national network for aid distribution,
54

particularly at the local level. When the new influx from Kosovo

erupted in the summer, the YRC did not have the capacity to deliver

humanitarian assistance. Through the help of international agencies, including the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC),

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, and

WFP, it significantly improved its capacity to deliver aid. From delivering 3,000 metric tons of aid in August, the YRC delivered 20,000

metric tons in November, and plans to continue at that level through

2000. Nevertheless, the YRC has proven controversial. During the

conflict in Kosovo, it was exclusively associated with the Serb community. Its critics have accused it of wrongful conduct from corruption to participation in ethnic cleansing. Its defenders in Serbia say

it is the only effective humanitarian organization capable of delivering the quantity of assistance demanded by the humanitarian needs

of the country. In late 1999, allegations surfaced that the YRC branch

in Zemun, a Belgrade municipality, had diverted hygiene packets and

rice intended for refugees. The European Community Humanitarian

Office (ECHO) and IFRC investigators confirmed the allegations. As

it turned out, however, the diversion was neither surreptitious nor

for profit in the local market. On the contrary, the board of the Zemun

Red Cross branch voted on October 18 to make a one-time grant of

hygiene parcels and rice to school employees in the municipality because of their irregular and low incomes and very bad living standard. According to the local Red Cross branch, the school employees

had not been paid since May 1999. The schools are used for distributing Red Cross aid to its beneficiary lists. Additional parcels were distributed to 250 employees of the Teleoptik factory in Zemun and to

300 employees of a shoe factory there. The Red Cross reportedly used

warehouses located at both factories to store humanitarian assistance.

ECHO visited 13 Red Cross branches in the Belgrade area, and found

that similar diversion had occurred in 8 of the 13. This suggests that

the problem is systemic and not limited to Zemun. All branches in

question were temporarily closed, according to ECHO. The Yugoslav

Red Cross has agreed, in principle, to an independent audit. In a

December 2 memo to all Red Cross municipal branch offices, the Secretary General of the YRC, Dr. Rade Dubajic, summarized the YRC

executive boards November 25 decisions. On the one hand, the board

stated that aid cannot be distributed to persons who do not fit the

criteria. It said, We have received some serious complaints by the

donors in regard to the obvious cases of disrespecting the set criteria

in certain municipal Red Cross branches and distributing the assistance to the people that cannot be the beneficiaries of the international humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the same memorandum

directed local branches not to cooperate with international humanitarian organizations in their monitoring efforts. It prohibited international humanitarian organizations from obtaining lists of beneficiaries, from meeting with municipal Red Cross branches without prior

YRC permission, and prohibited local branches from filling out forms

or questionnaires from international humanitarian organizations

without consulting with the YRC or the Serbian Red Cross.
55

ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS?

In December, the U.S. government restricted its humanitarian funding in FRY to ensure that U.S. funds do not directly or indirectly

support the Milosevic regime. The earmark specifically prohibits U.S.

funds from being used in support of activities and operations of the

YRC or the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees (the government refugee agency) without congressional notification. This meant that

UNHCR's FRY budget would be reduced by 20 percent that part of its

costs associated, particularly, with renting socially owned collective

centers, as well as its more limited use of the YRC in distribution of

non-food items. The WFP, on the other hand, uses the YRC for 100

percent of its food warehousing and distribution, and the IFRC and

ICRC are similarly tied to the YRC as their local partner. Although

U.S. AID funds food assistance elsewhere in the Balkans, it has cut

its funding of WFP in the FRY entirely. U.S. bilateral assistance is to

be directed to international NGOs with the intention of creating an

alternative network for distributing humanitarian assistance. The

U.S. government is encouraging partnerships with UNHCR that can

distribute directly to beneficiaries. During my visit, I examined the

capacity of NGOs in Serbia to develop alternative distribution avenues. I met with a number of NGOs already operating in Serbia,

including Caritas, CARE, International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC, which works with the Serbian Orthodox Church), the International Rescue Committee, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

All showed potential for increased involvement, depending on donor

interest. Some of the NGOs have had major humanitarian assistance

operations in Kosovo that could be replicated in Serbia proper. Thus

far, however, none has a network that could effectively reach beneficiaries nationwide. Such international NGOs could coordinate their

activities, however, and provide direct assistance to collective centers. But, in the short term at least, they would have great difficulty

in reaching most of the refugees and displaced persons in private accommodations without using local Red Cross branches. They would

also have difficulty finding appropriate warehouse space and in renting that space. Clearly, the cheapest avenue is to rent space from

"socially owned" facilities rather than privately owned ones. But this

presents another roadblock. In addition to higher costs for privately

owned warehouses, if an international NGO locates a cheaper "socially owned" warehouse, it runs into the same difficulty UNHCR has

had with paying "rents" to socially owned collective centers: the money

paid to socially owned facilities ultimately reaches the coffers of the

government and other elites closely tied to the Milosevic regime. Despite problems associated with some local Red Cross branches, I found

that the local branches often operate independently of central authorities and seem to have good rapport with the local beneficiary

populations. I visited key opposition municipalities in various parts

of the country Kraljevo, Nis, Cacak, Novi Pazar, Sombor and found

that all had good relations with their local Red Cross branches. Although opposition municipality officials complained about the higher

echelons of the Yugoslav and Serbian Red Cross, they had only praise

for the local branches, and interacted collegially with them. Most often, local opposition officials complained of actions at the government

level. For example, Sombor, an opposition municipality in Vojvodina

bordering Croatia, has attempted a local integration project to help
56

refugees construct private homes. Sombor has not received any support for infrastructure development, roads, water lines, sewage, or

electricity from the federal Yugoslav or Serb republic authorities to

support this initiative. Despite other problems opposition municipalities have, I found no substantiation of the charge that food and humanitarian assistance per se are being manipulated in ways that deny

such aid to needy populations in these municipalities or that direct

the aid into opposition municipalities in order to draw more uprooted

people into them.

POSSIBILITIES FOR RETURN

The most noticeable difference in attitudes toward return is not

between refugees from Bosnia or Croatia and the displaced from Kosovo or between men and women, but rather between generations.

Older people, generally, seem more interested in return. Younger ones,

on the other hand, tend not only to see greater obstacles to return,

but perhaps to see greater opportunity in not returning.

 a) Return to Croatia? My visit was prior to the election in Croatia

and coincided with President Tudjman's death. Attitudes might well

have changed since these occurrences in Croatia. At the time of my

visit, however, refugees I spoke with (particularly men of military

age) said that fear for their personal safety was the major obstacle to

return. Several refugees expressed concern that they might be falsely

charged with war crimes if they returned. They all denied having

been involved in any criminal activity, but all men of military age

from the Krajina, in particular are presumed to have played some

role in the military or in civil defense forces. A bearded refugee from

Knin, the capital of the Krajina region of Croatia, perhaps in his 30s,

living in a dismal one-room collective center in Subotica near the

Hungarian border, told me, I cant go home. There is no work. I

wouldnt be safe. They have lists of war criminals. I worked for the

railroad. I never hurt anyone, but I could be accused. Even those

who take active steps to return often find their way blocked. An 80-

year-old refugee from Lika, a town in the Krajina, now a resident of a

collective center in Kraljevo, told me that he had applied to the

Croatian authorities four times to repatriate. He said that he had

filled out the various forms, but never received a reply.

b) Return To Kosovo? Internally displaced persons are generally

less concerned than refugees about war crimes accusations per se.

Their greater concern is the general level of danger for non-ethnic

Albanians in Kosovo. I often heard refugees say that they feared

returning to Kosovo as it is now, but that they would return if the

Yugoslav army and police went back. People displaced from Kosovo

accuse the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of committing crimes

against them. Many said that they would not feel safe unless the Serb

police and army returned in force, punished those who had committed crimes, and removed "the immigrants from Albania out of Kosovo, the people with blood on their hands. Among both refugees and

internally displaced persons are people, usually the elderly, who express intense feelings of connection to their lost properties. Many

people insisted that they were interested only in returning to their

original homes, and categorically rejected relocating. I was born in

the same house as my father, my grandfather, and my great grandfather, said a man displaced from Musutiste, a mixed Serb and Alba-
57

nian village in Kosovo. I do not think we stand a chance here. There

is no money. We cant earn a living. I asked him if he would you go

anywhere else. I would never move to another part of Kosovo, he

said, only to the place where my fathers and grandfathers graves

are. A young man also living in the collective center (perhaps the old

mans son) had been listening quietly to the interview. But hearing

this, he spoke: Id go to Australia. Id go to any country that would

take me.

 INTEGRATING LOCALLY

Citizenship for Refugees Although the prospects for refugee repatriation may have improved somewhat since the death of President

Tudjman, the election of Stipe Mesic as president, and the dawn of a

new political landscape in Croatia, real progress toward significant

repatriation has yet to occur. In the past, hopeful rhetoric from Croatia

has not been matched by positive action. It remains likely that the

majority of Croatian refugees will not go back. Sharing language, culture, and ethnic identity with the local Serb population, the overwhelming majority of refugees ought to be able to integrate in Serbia.

The obstacles, however, are both economic and legal. FRYs citizenship law did not come into effect until June 1997. So far, about 42,000

refugees have become naturalized FRY citizens, and another 41,000

have applied for citizenship. Although no refugee applicants have

been denied outright, the grant of citizenship is not automatic. Furthermore, the government suspended the processing of citizenship

applications during the NATO bombing. Government officials said

that FRYs citizenship application records were destroyed in the bombing. By the end of 1999, it had not resumed processing applications.

FRY does not permit dual citizenship. Many refugees who still have

property claims in Croatia are particularly reluctant to surrender their

Croatian citizenship, fearing they might forfeit the chance to be compensated for their losses. Some of the younger Croatian refugees have

another reason for not wanting to surrender their Croatian passports

for FRY ones. Many want to leave Yugoslavia, and visa-free travel

from FRY is not open to the more attractive countries of preferred

destination, such as Germany, which does not require visas from persons traveling on Croatian passports.

DOCUMENTS FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE

Unlike refugees, the people displaced from Kosovo are already Yugoslav citizens. That does not mean, however, that they have no problem with documents. In fact, many of the internally displaced cite

lack of residence documents as their chief complaint. Such documents

are routinely issued by ones local municipality, and have generally

been required for health care, education, drivers licenses, and passports. In general, people moving from one municipality to another

are expected to de-register from the place they are leaving before

registering in a new location. This was not possible for people fleeing

Kosovo on short notice, however. Retrieving personal documents has

been very difficult. In seven Kosovo municipalities, these documents

are completely missing. The need for documents to gain access to

health care was quickly resolved when the Ministry of Health waived

the requirement to show such documents. Although the Ministry of

Education was slower to respond, it has now allowed displaced chil-
58

dren to register for school without the proper residence documents.

These ad hoc, temporary arrangements were made as winter approached and the authorities recognized that displaced people would

not be able to return to Kosovo quickly. However, the Serbian authorities are not resigned to losing Kosovo and insist that the durable

solution for the displaced is to return to Kosovo. They may be reluctant, therefore, to issue permanent documents that will enable the

displaced to integrate completely in their new local Serbian communities outside Kosovo. This problem is likely to be even more intense

for Roma and other non-Serb minorities, as local Serb authorities and

populations have already demonstrated strong resistance to their local integration.

 ROMA IN SERBIA: A DIFFERENT STORY

Roma and gypsies were caught in the middle of the ethnic conflict

in Kosovo. Neither Serb nor Albanian, the Roma in Kosovo, as elsewhere, tended to adapt to the ethnic group they perceived as dominant, learning that language and trying to accommodate themselves

with that group. Kosovos swift reversal of fortune, therefore, proved

disastrous for many of Kosovos Roma, as the returning ethnic Albanians often perceived them as Serb collaborators. There are currently

between 40,000 and 50,000 displaced Roma in FRY. About 15,000 to

20,000 are in the central and southern areas bordering Kosovo. Another 15,000 are in the Belgrade area. The other 10,000 are living in

Montenegro. Although the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo may have perceived the Roma as being aligned with the Serbs, that has hardly

made them welcome to local communities in Serbia. Pre-existing Roma

communities in Serbia occupy the lowest rungs of the socio-economic

ladder. They appear at night as street cleaners and live in squalid

slums in industrial sectors or in makeshift encampments under bridges

or in abandoned buildings. The new arrivals from Kosovo often gravitate to local Roma settlements, making it difficult to distinguish the

displaced from the general, and also destitute, Roma communities. I

visited a Roma family living in such a pre-existing Roma settlement,

a tightly packed ghetto in the Mali Leskovac industrial outskirts of

Belgrade. The slum is called Deponija, which translates to garbage dump. Their home, a small dwelling with concrete walls, a

rusted tin roof, and windows made from plastic sheets, is set in a

muddy, potholed alley. They borrowed the equivalent of $200 for the

downpayment on the place, and pay about $25 monthly in rent. They

huddle around a stove provided by UNHCR, supplementing their

meager diet with staples (flour and oil) provided by the Red Cross,

and other humanitarian goods provided by a Roma association. Despite the assistance, a nine-year-old boy is obviously malnourished,

looking the size of an American child half that age. We owned three

large houses in Kosovo in the town of Srbica, a young man, who heads

the household, told me. There is no work, no way to earn money to

pay the rent, he said. It takes money to make money. He added,

There is no glass for the window, no door, no wood for heat, not enough

food. His elderly father started to say that he was afraid to leave the

house. Four days ago, skinheads came into the neighborhood and

killed a "Shiptar," the word for an Albanian. The son hushed him,

saying, "We don't want to talk about that. We feel free to walk outside. We have no problems." Yet, he refused to have his picture taken.
59

The children speak only Albanian. They cant go to school now,

their father explains, because they dont speak Serbian. We have

had enough of this misery, he said. We want to return to our home

in Kosovo. He showed as much attachment to his home and property in Kosovo as any displaced Serb. He said he would only return to

his own home. Nowhere else would do. But, We will remain here

until the army or the police return to Kosovo. Only the Serb police

and military would make us feel safe. Local municipalities often turn

a cold shoulder to the Roma, hoping that if they refuse to provide

shelter or assistance, the Roma will move on. I saw this situation in

Kursumlija, a municipality that borders Kosovo, which has struggled

generally with the influx of displaced people. A group of Roma took

over a semifinished, large concrete structure in the center of the town.

The building had no windows, not even plastic sheeting to break the

gusts of frigid wind whipping through. The muddy ground was strewn

with litter. A basement with standing water of indeterminate depth

appeared to be filled with sewage and trash. An oily liquid dripped

from ceilings throughout the structure. There was no evidence of

humanitarian assistance of any kind. The structure was teeming with

people. Dirty, poorly clothed children crowded about. Each family

had fashioned its own living space. Those places protected from the

elements had no light. I went into one small space, picked at random.

It was dark, dank, and dirty. A woman and three children were

huddled by an old stove. She told me that her husband had been

taken by the KLA on June 15. They dragged him out of their house in

Kosovo Polje, and then set the house on fire. She and her children

were still in the house. She turned to what appeared to be a pile of

blankets. She lifted the top blanket, and exposed a baby of indeterminate age. The child scrawny, malnourished had severe scarring

covering her legs. The mother said that the baby was caught in the

burning house. She said that she knew nothing of the whereabouts of

her husband. She was unaware that the International Committee of

the Red Cross has a family tracing service. No one from the Red

Cross had been there. She said she that believes her husband is dead.

She appeared passive, fatalistic, expecting nothing.

ROMA IN MONTENEGRO: YET A DIFFERENT STORY

 I also visited a large Roma settlement in Montenegro, known as

Konik, built on a large, pre-existing Roma settlement near the garbage dump on the outskirts of the capital, Podgorica. Konik held about

1,600 people in August. No census had been taken, and the count

fluctuated daily, but the camp population had reached about 2,800 by

December, an average increase of 300 people per month. Although

local officials there were no less unwelcoming toward the Roma, another element had markedly improved their conditions compared with

what I saw in Serbia: the presence of international NGOs. I participated in a meeting with a group of international NGOs and the mayor

of Podgorica. They were having a heated debate about whether or

not to construct a water pipe to serve the camp or to keep trucking

water in. It was a debate almost unthinkable in the current Serbian

context. Who in Serbia would advocate on behalf of the Roma? Who

would build and service camps for them despite resistance from local

officials? The Roma in Kursumlija were not receiving water, trucked

or otherwise. But in Montenegro the question of how to deliver water
60

was open to debate. No one suggested that piping in water would be

difficult. Doing so, however, would suggest another step toward permanency, and the mayor was insistent that the Roma have to leave,

that they must go back to Kosovo. (His unstated concern appeared to

be that conditions should not be better in Konik than other places in

FRY for fear that this would attract more displaced Roma to the

Podgorica area.) A similar controversy has raged regarding shelter.

Italian NGOs (with generous support from an Italian government

that does not want the Roma to move on to Italy) built sturdy, highquality wooden barracks when the influx first started. They were

willing to expand on them for new arrivals. However, the local authorities insisted that the new arrivals be placed in tents. Therefore,

NGOs constructed "Konik II," a tent encampment next to the "Konik

I" barracks. Konik is located in a valley surrounded by hills. As such

the ground tends to be damp and muddy; also, it is subject to high

winds that funnel down from the hills. Trying to create a more sanitary environment for the tents in Konik II, humanitarian agencies

first put down a layer of stone and gravel. Shortly before my visit, a

night of swirling winds blew the tents away. Konik II looked devastated. About 1,000 of its residents abandoned the tent encampment

and piled into the barracks and a community center in Konik I, creating overcrowded conditions in any hard-shelter structure. Ironically,

except for a handful of UNHCR tents that survived the wind storm,

most of the tents that remained standing in Konik II were makeshift

ones built in traditional style in the mud. The mud held the poles

down in the harsh wind, whereas the tents built on gravel could not

be firmly anchored. Both Konik camps were beset with problems. But

international NGOs, UNHCR, and other players, including the municipal authorities, were on hand working to solve them. Nothing

comparable currently exists in Serbia to help displaced Roma..

 RESETTLEMENT

Relatively few refugees from Bosnia and Croatia have been resettled

from Serbia to third countries. Since 1992, about 15,000 refugees

have been resettled out of UNHCR's Belgrade office in FRY. Under

the current procedures, to be considered for U.S. resettlement, the

principal applicant of a family must first establish his or her refugee

claim. In the FRY context, this means that the person has fled from

another country, almost always Bosnia or Croatia; internally displaced

people from Kosovo are not eligible. The United States resettled 2,149

refugees from FRY in 1999, fewer than anticipated. During the first

four months of 1999, UNHCR conducted no status determination interviews because of the emergency. At that time, UNHCR and the

International Organization for Migration (IOM) were able to move

some refugees already in the resettlement pipeline via Hungary. Since

then, however, the process of interviewing and moving refugees has

become more complicated. Because the United States and FRY have

severed diplomatic relations, U.S. officials are no longer conducting

refugee status interviews in Serbia or Montenegro. As before, IOM

prepares cases for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS). Now, however, the INS interviews take place just across the

border, in Timisoara, Romania, and refugees approved by the INS for

U.S. resettlement fly to the United States from there. By the end of

1999, UNHCR and IOM had arranged for about 4,000 resettlement

interviews in Timisoara. At the present time, all candidates for U.S.
61

resettlement must be referred by UNHCR, which in doing so follows

strict criteria for priority one (P-1) cases set forth by the U.S. government. These are cases of compelling concern, such as torture victims,

persons at risk of refoulement or otherwise in danger in their first

asylum country, and persons in urgent need of medical care. Once a

refugee leaves Serbia under UNHCRs auspices, the governments of

FRY and Romania consider him or her to be wholly UNHCRs responsibility. Romania will not allow refugees to remain, nor will Serbia

allow them to return. If, for any reason, the INS rejects the applicant, UNHCR is duty bound to find another country willing to resettle the refugee. Places are not readily available, and other countries the Nordics, in particular, which are usually generous in offering

resettlement places are sensitive about serving as a back up for cases

rejected by the United States. Since the bombing campaign, the U.S.

program has largely been confined to two groups of refugees. The

first group, most of whom originally fled from the Krajina region of

Croatia in 1995, are double refugees. In 1995, the FRY authorities

placed thousands of newly arriving refugees in Kosovo, putting about

14,000 of them in collective centers, as part of an effort to alter the

demographic composition of Kosovo by introducing more ethnic Serbs

into the province. Many of the refugees living in these collective centers were in grave danger when tensions and violence escalated in

1998 and 1999. UNHCR and the U.S. government had already identified them as being in need of resettlement before all but about 600

of them fled from Kosovo following the entry of KFOR and the return

of the ethnic Albanian refugees. The others still being resettled in the

United States are ethnic Serb refugees originating from the Bosnian

Federation, the predominantly Muslim and Croat part of Bosnia, who

meet the criteria established as priority two (P-2) by the U.S. government (including former detainees, members of ethnically mixed marriages, victims of torture, and surviving spouses of persons killed in

detention) whose status UNHCR has upgraded to P-1. UNHCR has

converted about 20 percent of the existing P-2 caseload into the P-1

category. In theory, a third group would be eligible: refugees originating from Bosnia who have close relatives from the United States

(spouses, unmarried children, and parents) who submit Affidavits of

Relationship (AORs) on their behalf. However, because no refugee

processing post exists within the FRY and because UNHCR is unwilling to be responsible for non P-1 cases in Romania, potential priority

three (P-3) cases (like P-2 cases) cannot gain access to the system.

Furthermore, Beginning on April 1, 2000, Bosnians will no longer be

eligible for P-3 processing. Because UNHCR considers those persons

who arrive from Muslim or Croat-controlled regions of Bosnia and

Croatia as prima facie refugees, its protection officers do not conduct

individual refugee status determination interviews. However, if making a P-1 resettlement referral, they must do so. Before referring

such cases to the INS in Romania, UNHCR must also be virtually

certain that the INS will agree with its assessment and grant the

case. Consequently, UNHCR has converted relatively few P-2 or P-3

refugee cases into P-1s.

PROSPECTS FOR LOCAL INTEGRATION

Assessing realistically their prospects for return or resettlement,

many refugees are reconciled to staying in Serbia. Even so, they need

help in integrating. A middle-aged refugee from Croatia in a collec-
62

tive center in Pancevo told me, I wont return. My house was destroyed. It's not so much a safety issue. It would be difficult to start

from scratch. He added that his son, who lost a leg in the war, would

never go back. Despite severe unemployment among refugees in

Serbia, he thought he had a better chance in Serbia than back in the

Krajina. I can get seasonal agricultural work, and some temporary

construction work. He said, I would prefer to be relocated somewhere else in Serbia where I could have land to build a house and

farm. If hes lucky, he may get his wish. Some refugees have been

able to build their own homes. I visited with a few of these families

both in Montenegro and Vojvodina. In some cases, homes were well

furnished with telephones, televisions, refrigerators, etc. In agriculturally rich Vojvodina, a region bordering Croatia and Hungary with

a large concentration of refugees of Croatian origin, some municipalities are cooperating with international humanitarian organizations

to provide building materials to refugees who have decided to integrate locally. The program is open to certain refugees who apply for

Yugoslav citizenship. The municipality promises a job to one member of the family and the family members build a home on land provided by the municipality. After they build the house, they are required to turn in their refugee cards, rendering them ineligible for

humanitarian assistance. After ten years' occupancy, they will be considered co-owners of the property with the municipality. Although

this is still a modest program, the refugees who participate in it seem

to be delighted with the chance to establish new roots, and it appears

to provide a good model for others who see no prospects for return. I

am more than happy with this situation, a refugee from Banovici,

Bosnia, who had been living with a family in Kula municipality since

1992, told me.

CONCLUSIONS

While the international community, including our own government,

has good reason to isolate the Milosevic regime, it also needs to recognize that isolating the Serbian people hurts the most vulnerable elements of its society, including the elderly, people with disabilities,

refugees, and displaced people. Weakening the weakest elements of

this society does not necessarily weaken the regime. Paradoxically,

it might even strengthen Milosevic's hand, giving him a convenient

scapegoat for the many ills confronting Serbia. Humanitarian assistance, therefore, has both a direct benefit in keeping people from hunger, disease, and exposure, as well as an indirect political benefit in

making the society more open. The contrast between Serbia and

Montenegro helps to illustrate this. International NGOs play an active role in Montenegro, bringing direct benefits as the deliverers of

humanitarian assistance. But they also bring that nettlesome, but

oh-so-healthy trait peculiar to NGO's advocacy. Serbia is not monolithic. International NGOs will find local partners. Together, they

might go a long way toward building a more tolerant and committed

civil society. But NGOs will also need to tread carefully. There is a

great deal of sensitivity right now in Serbia toward the international

community. Serbs feel stigmatized, misunderstood, resentful. These

are sentiments expressed among the refugees and the displaced, as

well as in the local community. If NGOs do their job right, they will

reduce xenophobia and establish inroads of dialogue and understanding. Although there are still groups and individuals in need of third
63

country resettlement from among both the "old caseload" of refugees

from Bosnia and Croatia and the newly displaced from Kosovo, and

although political changes in Croatia suggest that it is too early to

give up on repatriation, nevertheless, the mostly likely outcome for

the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced people is not to

return to Bosnia, Croatia, or Kosovo. International humanitarian

agencies and NGOs should recognize that most refugees and displaced

people will remain in Serbia and Montenegro, and should work to

facilitate their local integration. Integrating refugees and displaced

people assumes that there is an economy and a society capable of

absorbing them. Given the international economic sanctions on Serbia,

direct reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country's economic infrastructure appears not to be an option. However, at the micro-level,

even at the municipal level, the limits of the sanctions should be tested.

It is an ancient axiom of charitable giving that it is better to give a

man a portion of a field to till himself than to give him food outright.

Continuing to provide only basic humanitarian goods to refugees and

displaced people might keep them from becoming cold, malnourished,

and ill (all good things), but, after a time, it also breeds dependency,

passivity, and hopelessness. The international community needs to

think about, and work toward, real and sustainable solutions. With

some important exceptions, focusing on local integration would be

the most realistic, cost effective, and beneficial approach for most refugees and internally displaced people. If helping them to integrate in

Serbia and Montenegro also helps the larger society there to heal, so

be it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. The U.S. government and other donors should direct bilateral

funding to international nongovernmental organizations to develop alternative networks to deliver humanitarian assistance

in Serbia.

The U.S. government is already committed to this course of

action. The U.S. government, ECHO, and other donors should,

indeed, encourage NGOs to develop partnerships inside Serbia,

as well as Montenegro. This will not only establish alternative

networks for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, thus

breaking the Yugoslav Red Cross's monopoly and introducing

healthy competition that will hopefully make the YRC more

accountable as well, but will also encourage the development

of an active and vibrant local NGO sector in the FRY.

2. The U.S. government and ECHO should establish a set of conditions that the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees (the government entity) and the Yugoslav Red Cross need to meet in

order for donors to restore, or continue, multilateral aid funding that involves the Yugoslav Red Cross.

These conditions (which have been agreed to in principle but

have not been fully implemented) should include:

1) The successful completion of a full, independent audit by

international auditors of the Yugoslav Red Cross, the Serbian Red Cross, and local Red Cross branch offices in the
64

Serbian Republic. The audit should not be limited to specific allegations that have already been raised. The audit

should include an examination of the beneficiary lists to

ensure that the lists are accurate and that beneficiaries

meet the stated criteria for receiving aid.

2) A full and complete registration of internally displaced persons and refugees. The registration exercise should be independently funded and conducted jointly by Red Cross and

UNHCR field staff, supervised by UNHCR and monitored

by the Swiss government.

3) Ongoing access at all levels of the YRC of its operation for

international monitors.

4) Accurate and complete lists of registered refugees, internally displaced persons, and other aid beneficiaries to

UNHCR, ICRC, IFRC, ECHO, and WFP, updated regularly.

5) A legal framework for the work of international NGOs in

FRY, allowing NGOs to import the finances, goods, and

services needed to provide humanitarian assistance in FRY

without interference.

6) Direct access for international NGOs, operating as implementing partners of recognized donors and international

humanitarian organizations, to beneficiary populations.

3. WFP and other international humanitarian agencies that use

YRC warehouses and delivery systems should reassess the fees

that YRC charges for distribution and warehousing on a quarterly basis, and seek to reduce these fees to the actual costs.

WFP reports that the $70 flat-rate fee per ton of humanitarian

assistance charged by the YRC until recently has now been reduced to $64, but that it could (and should) be reduced further.

Economies of scale suggest that per ton rates should be reduced

as the quantity increases.

4. UNHCR should more strictly and systematically monitor the

fee it pays to the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees for the

cost of collective centers to ensure that payments made at the

federal and republic level actually reflect real costs and that

these fees are, in fact, being allocated fairly by the authorities

to those who administer the collective centers locally.

UNHCR should seek to minimize any funds that are not used

for expressly humanitarian purposes directly related to the running costs of the collective centers themselves and basic assistance for collective center residents. Currently, payments are

made on a formula of 70 cents per day per refugee or displaced

person in a collective center, currently amounting to about $10

million to support refugees and displaced persons in more than

600 collective centers. UNHCR field offices in Serbia need to

monitor these payments carefully to ensure that collective center residents are, in fact, receiving a level of assistance consistent with this payment and that the central authorities allocate these payments on a regular and nondiscriminatory basis

according to the actual number of residents in particular localities.
65

Ultimately, UNHCR has no choice but to work with the governing authorities in Serbia if it is to serve 40,000 of the most

vulnerable refugees and displaced people who comprise the

collective center population. UNHCR's involvement is essential to ensure that this vulnerable population is cared for appropriately, and not subject to manipulation. UNHCR's monitoring is critically important to holding the Serbian authorities

accountable to maintain satisfactory standards of responsible

treatment for these people.

5. UNHCR should earmark a portion of its fee to the Serbian government for collective center support to reflect the number of

internally displaced Roma who live in "unofficial" collective

centers.

With no support from Serbian authorities at the municipal, republic, or federal level, displaced Roma from Kosovo are squatting in abandoned buildings and other sites "unofficial" collective centers. After UNHCR conducts its census of the refugee

and displaced population in Serbia, it should demand equal

treatment for displaced Roma. The Roma cannot remain invisible and unassisted. They must be counted, acknowledged, and

helped. UNHCR needs to use every carrot and stick at its disposal to pressure the authorities to assist them. International

NGOs seeking to work in Serbia should also focus their attention on this vulnerable and needy population.

6. Donors should support local integration projects that work directly with local municipalities in Serbia.

Most refugees and displaced people will not return to their original homes in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Local municipalities should be encouraged to integrate them and make them

contributing members of their communities. UNHCR and

NGOs, if adequately funded, have been able to enter into agreements with certain municipalities whereby the municipality

provides land, primary infrastructure (such as roads, sewage

and water lines), and a job to a refugee family. In return,

UNHCR and its implementing NGO partners provide building

materials for self-help construction of homes, secondary infrastructure, farming equipment, and other transitional assistance.

Although initially expensive, such projects create self-sufficiency, productivity, and stability.

II. RESETTLEMENT

Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons in and around Serbia and Montenegro, there are

smaller subgroups who cannot integrate locally in the area of first

asylum and who cannot return to their places of origin on account of

a well-founded fear of persecution. Ordinarily, such persons might be

considered for resettlement to third countries. However, most of these

people are displaced internally, and, thus far, UNHCR has not interpreted its guidelines on internally displaced people to include referring them to third countries for resettlement.

1. The United States should institute refugee processing out of

Podgorica, Montenegro.
66

Prospective applicants from Serbia are able to cross into Montenegro without having to obtain a visa, since Montenegro is

still officially part of the FRY. It would also be easy to transport recognized refugees in Montenegro via Croatia. A nongovernmental organization in Podgorica could prepare cases in the

same way that IOM does in Belgrade (the Joint Voluntary

AgencyJVAmodel). INS officers could conduct circuit rides to

Montenegro where they would conduct interviews. Montenegro would be safe and relatively friendly toward U.S. officials.

There are precedents for this: in both Vietnam and Cuba, in

the absence of diplomatic relations, the INS has conducted refugee status interviews. This would introduce much needed flexibility into the program. Not only would it enable UNHCR to

refer cases, but it would also allow a JVA to generate cases by

making an initial assessment that an applicant meets the U.S.

government's P-2 or P-3 criteria.

The most important advantage of processing out of Montenegro is that the INS would have the flexibility to reject cases

without creating a demand that UNHCR seek other countries

to resettle rejected cases. This would give UNHCR greater latitude to refer cases that it is not absolutely convinced the INS

will accept, avoiding the present problem in Romania where it

is seeking a 100 percent approval rate (the approval rate currently stands at 98 percent).

2. President Clinton should issue a presidential determination permitting the United States to consider admitting certain categories of internally displaced persons in FRY as refugees for purposes of the U.S. resettlement program.

The Refugee Act of 1980 allows the United States to accept as

refugees people departing directly from their country of origin.

This requires a presidential determination a formal notice in

the Federal Register and has been used to admit as refugees

people arriving directly from Vietnam, Cuba, the former Soviet Union, and for a short time, Haiti and Romania.

In many respects, persons fleeing from Kosovo to Serbia proper

appear more like refugees than internally displaced people.

Kosovo is presently outside the control and jurisdiction of the

central authorities in Belgrade. It is ruled by the international

UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) administration and de facto

by ethnic Albanian authorities. Although in the abstract Kosovo is still under FRYs ultimate sovereignty, this distinction

has no meaning on the ground for the foreseeable future. In

effect, Serbia and Montenegro function very much like countries of first asylum for persons seeking refuge from Kosovo. If

such asylum seekers are unwelcome in Serbia and Montenegro, few other options are currently available to them. Because

of this reality, and because IDPs who have fled from Kosovo to

Serbia proper or Montenegro would have a well-founded fear

of persecution if returned to Kosovo, internally displaced people

fleeing from Kosovo ought to be considered as refugees for purposes of the U.S. resettlement program.
67

3. To facilitate the processing of refugees of special humanitarian

concern to the United States, the U.S. government ought to

expand P-2 criteria to include refugees from Croatia who meet

the same criteria that now apply for P-2 category refugees from

Bosnia.

4. The United States should also provide P-3 processing for refugees from Croatia.

5. The U.S. government should consider creating a P-2 category

for double refugees who had resided in collective centers in

Kosovo in order to expedite their processing.

Many of the uprooted in Serbia have been displaced multiple

times. Among the people recently displaced from Kosovo are

thousands who were already refugees from Croatia or Bosnia,

known locally as had been placed in collective centers in Kosovo, part of Belgrades effort to alter Kosovos ethnic demography. Ethnic Albanian nationalists saw the settlement of ethnic Serb refugees in Kosovo as a provocation; they became a

target of ethnic Albanian anger. Often, Serbian police or military were quartered in these same collective centers, making

the refugees living in them even more vulnerable to attack.

6. The P-2 criteria for double refugees should be limited to those

who resided in collective centers in Kosovo. There are other

refugees who chose to live in Kosovo, had good jobs there and

nice houses. Such people have more resources and less need for

resettlement.

7. The following vulnerable groups who are unable to integrate

locally in the area of first asylum and who cannot return to

their places of origin on account of a well-founded fear of persecution should be considered for the U.S. resettlement program:

a) Roma and Hashkalija (Gypsies) who fled from Kosovo to

Serbia proper, Montenegro, or Macedonia who led a sedentary life in Kosovo prior to their departure, who are Albanian speaking, and who would have a well-founded fear of

persecution if returned to Kosovo.

Roma, and other ave been particularly scapegoated, accused

by ethnic Albanian nationalists as having collaborated with

the Serbian regime that controlled Kosovo until June 1999.

In many cases, they have experienced severe persecution.

Some do not speak Serbian, making their integration in

Serbia or Montenegro all the more difficult, and making it

impossible for their already disadvantaged children to go

to school. Contrary to popular belief that all Roma are nomadic, most of the Roma living in Kosovo were homeowners.

b) Ethnic Albanians from Kosovo who have fled from Kosovo

to Serbia proper or Montenegro who have a well-founded

fear of persecution if returned to Kosovo.

A relatively small number of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo

because of threats or persecution at the hands of ethnic

Albanian nationalists who accuse them of collaborating with
68

the Serbian regime ruling Kosovo until June 1999. As ethnic Albanians, they are not welcome in Serbia or Montenegro, and have no opportunity for meaningful integration.

c) Serbian draft evaders or deserters who had a conscientious

objection to serving in Kosovo.

Thousands of Serbian draft evaders and deserters live in

precarious conditions, mostly along the Hungarian border,

as well as in Montenegro, Macedonia, and in other parts of

Europe. There is no amnesty on their behalf, and some have

been arrested, tried, and sentenced to five-year prison sentences, a very harsh penalty.

Although draft evaders are not normally recognized as refugees, the UN Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for

Determining Refugee Status includes a section devoted to

conscientious objectors (paragraphs 167-174), which concludes that ich with the individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as

contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for

desertion or draft evasion could, in the light of all other

requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as

persecution.demned the Yugoslav armys actions in Kosovo,

objectors to serving with that army in Kosovo appear to

meet the criteria set forth in UNHCRs Handbook.

Special consideration for resettlement could be given to

refugees from Croatia or Bosnia who refused to be conscripted into the Yugoslav army to fight in Kosovo.

d) Gorani, Slavic Muslims who fled Kosovo into Serbia proper

or Montenegro.

This group of about 20,000 are continuing to leave Kosovo

today. They speak Serbian (or a Slavic dialect that is closely

related), making them stand out in Albanian-speaking

Kosovo. Gorani living outside areas of Gorani concentration have become internally displaced within Kosovo into

the areas where they still represent a majority. It is not

clear whether those who have fled to the Sandjak region of

Serbia and Montenegro (which is predominantly Slavic

Muslim) will be tolerated there.

e) The refugees who continue to live in collective centers in

Kosovo.

An estimated 600 refugees are believed still to reside in

collective centers in Kosovo. Their safety, health, and welfare could be assessed, and those expressing an interest in

resettlement could be evacuated from Kosovo and resettled

to the United States or another third country.

f) Members of Albanian-Serbian mixed marriages.

This is probably an extremely small minority. However,

persons in such marriages would not be able to live in either Kosovo or Serbia proper.

g) Ethnic Albanians from Serbia proper (mostly Presevo) who

have fled into Macedonia.

These are classic refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution fleeing an international border who are not welcome in the country of first asylum.

h) Other ethnic and religious minorities from Kosovo.
69

As stepped up repression of the Gorani indicates, even

groups that are not accused of collaboration with the Serbs

are now under threat in Kosovo. Jews, Turks, tians Egypt),

and other small minority groups could be considered for

resettlement.
70

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF BISHOP ARTEMIJE

 Mr. Chairman, respected members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen. It is my distinct pleasure and privilege to be here with you today and speak about the latest developments in Kosovo. The last time

I spoke here was in February 1998, just before the war in Kosovo

began and on that occasion I strongly condemned both Milosevics

regime and Albanian extremists for leading the country into the war.

Unfortunately the war came and so many innocent Albanians and

Serbs suffered in it. Many times we have strongly condemned the

crimes of Milosevics regime in Kosovo while our Church in Kosovo

supported suffering Albanian civilians and saved some of them from

the hands of Milosevics paramilitaries.

After the end of Kosovo war and return of Albanian refugees the

repression of Milosevic's undemocratic regime was supplanted by the

repression of extremist Kosovo Albanians against Serbs and other

non-Albanian communities in full view of international troops. Freedom in Kosovo has not come for all equally. Therefore Kosovo remains a troubled region even after 8 months of international peace.

Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian groups in Kosovo live in ghettoes, without security; deprived of basic human rightsthe rights of

life, free movement and work. Their private property is being usurped;

their homes burned and looted even 8 months after the deployment

of KFOR. Although Kosovo remained more or less multiethnic during

the ten years of Milosevics repressive rule, today there is hardly any

multiethnicity at allin fact the reverse is true. Ethnic segregation

is greater now than almost at any other time in Kosovos turbulent

history. Not only are Serbs being driven out from the Province but

also the Romas, Slav Moslems, Croats, Serb-speaking Jews and Turks.

More than 80 Orthodox churches have been either completely destroyed or severely damaged since the end of the war. The ancient

churches, many of which had survived 500 years of Ottoman Moslem

rule, could not survive 8 months of the internationally guaranteed

peace. Regretfully, all this happens in the presence of KFOR and UN.

Kosovo more and more becomes ethnically clean while organized crime

and discrimination against the non-Albanians is epidemic.

Two thirds of the pre-war Serb population (200.000 people) fled the

Province under Albanian pressure. In addition more than 50.000

Romas, Slav Moslems, Croat Catholics and others have also been

cleansed from Kosovo. More than 400 Serbs have been killed and

nearly 600 abducted by Albanian extremists during this same period

of peace. Tragically, this suffering of Serbs and other non-Albanians

proportionally (with respect to population) represents more extensive suffering in peacetime than the Albanian suffering during the

war. This is a tragic record for any post war peace mission, especially

for this mission in which the Western Governments and NATO have

invested so much of their credibility and authority.

Despite the sympathy for all of the suffering of Kosovo Albanians

during the war, retaliation against innocent civilians cannot be justified in any way. It is becoming more and more a well-orchestrated

nationalist ideology directed towards achieving the complete ethnic

cleansing of the Province. The extremists believe that without Serbs

and their holy sites in Kosovo independence would then become a fait

accompli. The present repression against non-Albanians is carried

out with the full knowledge of the Albanian leaders. Sometimes these
71

leaders formally condemn repressive actions but in reality have not

done anything to stop the ongoing ethnic violence and discrimination. Even more, some of them are instigating rage against Serbs developing the idea of collective Serb guilt and branding all remaining

Serb civilians as criminals. There is much evidence that the KLA leaders bear direct responsibility for the most of the post-war crimes and

acts of violence committed in Kosovo. As soon as KFOR entered the

Province KLA gunmen took over the power in majority of cities and

towns and immediately organized illegal detention centers for Serbs,

Romas and Albanian ople listed as alleged criminals and seized a

large amount of property previously owned by Serbs and other nonAlbanians. KLA groups and their leaders are directly linked with Albanian mafia clans and have developed a very sophisticated network

of organized crime, drug smuggling, prostitution, white slavery, and

weapons trading. According to the international press Kosovo has

become Columbia of Europe and a main heroin gateway for Western

Europe. The strategy behind the KLA purge of Serbs was very simple

quarter by quarter of a city would be cleansed of Serbs and their

property would be either burned or sold for a high price to Albanian

refugees (including Albanians from Albania and Macedonia who flowed

into the province through unprotected borders along with the hundreds of thousands of Kosovo refugees). The KLA, although officially

disbanded is still active and their secret police are continuing their

intimidation and executions. Now more and more of their victims are

disobedient Kosovo Albanians who refuse to pay their son of Kosovo

is proceeding in a way many ordinary Albanians did not want. The

gangsters have stepped into the vacuum left by the slowness of the

West to adequately instill full control over the Province. Kosovo is

becoming more like Albania: corrupt, anarchic, and ruled by the gun

and the gang.

Serbs and many non-Albanians still do not have access to hospitals, the University and public services, simply because they cannot

even freely walk in the street. They are unemployed and confined to

life in poverty of their rural enclaves out of which they can move only

under the KFOR military escort. The Serbian language is completely

banished from the public life. All Serb inscriptions, road signs and

advertisements have been systematically removed and the usage of

Serbian language in Albanian dominated areas is reason enough for

anyone to be shot right on the spot. Thousands of Serb books in public

libraries have been systematically burned while all unguarded Serb

cultural monuments and statues have been torn down and destroyed.

The Serbs who remain in major cities are in the worst situation of

all. Out of 40.000 pre-war Serb population in Pristina today there

remain only 300 elderly people who live in a kind of house arrest.

They cannot go into the street without military protection and only

thanks to KFOR soldiers and humanitarian organizations do they

receive food and medicines, which they are not allowed to buy in Albanian shops. Almost all Serb shops are now in Albanian hands. In

other areas Albanians are greatly pressuring Serbs to sell their property under threats and extortion. Those who refuse usually have their

houses torched or are killed as an example to other Serbs. Grenade

attacks on Serb houses; on few remaining Serb shops and restau-
72

rants force more and more Serbs to leave Kosovo. If this repression

and persecution is continued unabated it is likely that soon most of

the remaining Serbs will also be forced to flee Kosovo.

On one hand, KFORs presence in Kosovo has given Albanian extremists free hands to do what they want because one of KFOR priorities has been so far to avoid direct confrontation with the extremists in order to escape possible casualties. On the other hand we cannot

but say that if KFOR had not been in Kosovo during this rampage of

hatred, not a single Serb or Serb church would have survived. We

sincerely appreciate the efforts of many men and women from all

over the world who are trying to bring peace to Kosovo even within a

rather narrow political framework in which KFOR must act.

An especially volatile situation is in Kosovska Mitrovica the only

major city where a substantial number of Serbs remain. During the

most intensive wave of ethnic cleansing in June and July many Serb

internally displaced persons from the south found refuge in the north

of the province in the Mitrovica area. In order to survive they organized a kind of self-protection network and prevented the KLA and

mafia to enter the northern fifth of the city together with civilian

Albanian returnees. KFOR, aware that the free access of Albanian

extremist groups to Mitrovica would cause a Serb exodus, blocked

the bridge connecting the southern and northern part of the city. Albanian extremists have since then made many attempts to make their

way into the northern part of Mitrovica saying that they wanted undivided and free city. Serbs on the other hand state that they are

ready for a united city only if Serbs would be allowed to go back to

their homes in the south and elsewhere in Kosovo. Serbs also hold

that only Kosovo residents be allowed to return to their homes. A few

weeks ago, after two terrorist attacks against a UNHCR bus and a

Serb cafe, in which a number of Serbs were killed and injured, radicalized Serbs began retaliatory actions against Albanians in the northern part of the city causing the death of several Albanian innocent

citizens and served to broaden the crisis.

The Mitrovica crisis is not playing out in a void by itself and must

be approached only in the context of the overall Kosovo situation.

The fact remains that after the war extremists Albanians have not

been fully disarmed and have continued their repression and ethnic

cleansing of Serbs and other non-Albanians wherever and whenever

they have had opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, such a situation

as we have now in Kosovo has opened a door for the Belgrade regime,

which is now trying to profit from this situation and consolidate the

division of Mitrovica for their own reasons. Each Serb victim in Kosovo strengthens Milosevics position in Serbia. Albanian extremists

on the other hand want to disrupt the only remaining Serb stronghold in the city in order to drive the Serbs completely out of Kosovo.

Regretfully, the international community seems not to be fully aware

of the complexity of the Mitrovica problem and has despite all Albanian crimes and terror in the last 8 months one-sidedly condemned

Serbs for this violence.

This skewed view of the problem will only serve to encourage Albanian extremism, confirm Milosevics theory of anti-Serb conspiracies

that he uses to solidify his hold on power and will eventually lead to

final exodus of the Serb community in Kosovo. Milosevic obviously
73

remains at the core of the problem but he is not the greatest cause of

the current round of violence and purgesthe international community must find ways for controlling Albanian extremists.

We maintain our belief that the present tragedy in Kosovo is not

what Americans wanted when they supported the policy of the Administration to intervene on behalf of suffering Albanians. In fact

international community now faces a serious failure in Kosovo because it has not managed to marginalize extremist Albanians while

at the same time Milosevic has been politically strengthened by the

bombing and sanctions (which ordinary Serbs understand as being

directed against innocent civilians). Therefore we expect now from

the international community and primarily from United States to show

more determination in protecting and supporting Kosovo Serbs and

other ethnic groups who suffer under ethnic Albanian extremists. A

way must be found to fully implement UNSC Resolution 1244 in its

whole.

We have a few practical proposals for improving the situation in

Kosovo:

1. KFOR should be more robust in suppressing violence, organized

crime and should more effectively protect the non-Albanian population from extremists. This is required by the UNSC Resolution.

2. More International Police should be deployed in Kosovo. Borders with Macedonia and Albania must be better secured, and

UNMIK should establish local administration with Serbs in areas where they live as compact population. Judicial system must

become operational as soon as possible. International judges

must be recruited at this stage when Kosovo judges cannot act

impartially due to political pressures.

3. International community must build a strategy to return displaced Kosovo Serbs and others to their homes soon while providing better security for them and their religious and cultural

shrines. Post war ethnic cleansing must not be legalized nor

accepted - private and Church property has to be restored to

rightful owners. Law and order must be established and fully

enforced. Without at least an initial repatriation of Serbs,

Romas, Slav Moslems and others Kosovo elections would be

unfair and unacceptable.

4. The International Community, especially US, should make clear

to Kosovo Albanian leaders that they cannot continue with the

ethnic cleansing under the protectorate of Western democratic

governments. Investment policy and political support must be

conditioned to full compliance by ethnic Albanian leaders with

the UNSC Resolution 1244. KLA militants must be fully disarmed. The ICTY should launch impartial investigations on all

criminal acts committed both by Serbs and Albanians.

5. The international community should also support moderate

Serbs in regaining their leading role in the Kosovo Serb community and thus provide for the conditions for their participation in the Interim Administrative Kosovo Structure. Since the

cooperation of moderate Serb leaders with KFOR and UNMIK

has not brought visible improvement to the lives of Serbs in

their remaining enclaves, Milosevics supporters are gaining

more confidence among besieged and frightened Serbs, which
74

can seriously obstruct the peace process. Moderate Serbs gathered around Serb National Council need their own independent media; better communication between enclaves and other

forms of support to make their voice better heard and understood within their own community. International humanitarian aid distribution in Serb inhabited areas currently being distributed more or less through Milosevics people who have used

this to impose themselves as local leaders, has to be channeled

through the Church and the Serb National Council humanitarian network.

6. The last but not least, the issue of status must remain frozen

until there is genuine and stable progress in eliminating violence and introducing democratization not only in Kosovo but

also in Serbia proper and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is our firm belief that the question of the future status of

Kosovo must not be discussed between Kosovos Albanians and

Serbs only, but also with the participation of the international

community and the future democratic governments of Serbia

and FRY and in accordance with international law and the

Helsinki Final Act.

We believe in God and in His providence but we hope that US Congress and Administration will support our suffering people, which

want to remain where we have been living for centuries, in the land

of our ancestors.
75

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF ANDRZEJ MIRGA

THE OTHER KOSOVO DISASTER: THE PLIGHT OF THE ROMA

During a recent field trip of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER)

to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, I went to the Stankovec II refugee camp in Macedonia where there were nearly 3000 Roma from

Kosovo. On that day, the Roma refugees started a hunger-strike in

the camp. One of their demands was to have free access to the media.

They built a pyramid of stoves in several places in the camp and hung

up a sign with the hand-made inscription "NO COMMENT?" In that

action there was something tragic and, at the same time, grotesque.

Tragic, because they did it in desperation, and grotesque, because no

media came to report it.

On their behalf, and on behalf of many others who had no chance to

make their voice heard, I am bringing their grievances, their tragic

experience and their claims to share with you at this hearing. Not

having a political lobby, not having an influential Romani intellectual class who could make the case for the Roma, not having a state

to stand by them, the Roma are at the mercy of others. Feeling abandoned by all, unable to attract public attention to their cause and

fate, foreseeing no hope for the future, these are feelings as destructive as the Romas war experience. Therefore, I am here to raise your

awareness and concern, to lobby for subsequent action that will give

the Roma of Kosovo hope and prospects for the future.

For the Roma of Kosovo, caught in the ethnic war between Serbs

and Kosovo Albanians, there was no right choice to be made. Whatever choices they made were wrong. The position of the Roma reflects

the dilemma of a minority that has no reason whatsoever to be involved in an open conflict but is used and forced into it by both sides.

Either choice that is to be loyal to Serbs or to the Kosovo Albanians

brought subsequent retaliations for the Roma. Serbs were using the

Roma in Kosovo for their political objectives - to prove that Kosovo is

multi-ethnic and to show that there are fewer Albanians, whereas

Albanians tried to push the Roma to identify as Albanians and demanded loyalty to them and their cause.

In the context of the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs encouraged the

cultural revival of the Roma in Kosovo starting in the 70s. Prizren

and Pristina emerged as centers of cultural and political life of the

Romani community, and some Romani activists became public and

political figures. The majority of the Romani population remained

however, politically unengaged. In fact it was not their alleged involvement in crimes and atrocities against ethnic Albanians, but rather

the political standpoint of the Romani leaders concerning the status

of Kosovo prior to the NATO attack on March 24, 1999 that contributed to the Kosovo Albanians retaliation against the Roma.

 In 1989 some Roma in Belgrade demonstrated under a banner stating "We are behind you, Slobo" in support of abrogation of the autonomy of the Kosovo province. The Roma and other small Kosovar

minorities like Turks, Gorani and "Egyptians" were involved in peace

negotiations on the initiative of the Serbian government. The Temporary Executive Council for Kosovo and Metohija, founded by the Serbs

on October 3, 1998 included a Romani Secretary for Information -

Bajram Haljiti, editor of the Roma program on Radio-Television Pristina. The Draft of the Framework for Political Self-governance in
76

Kosovo prepared by the Serbian government instantly rejected by

Kosovo Albanians has been supported, among others by the Roma in

a declaration signed on November 25, 1998 in Pristina. One of the

signatories was Koka Ljuan, representative of the National Community of Roma in Kosovo. Mr. Koka later attended the negotiations

over the status of Kosovo in Rambouillet, France as a member of the

Serbian delegation. These facts contributed to the building up of an

image of the Roma as loyal to the Milosevic regime, therefore, to be

regarded as enemies of the Albanians. Feeling of betrayal, accusation

of collaboration and of large-scale involvement in Serbs atrocities

against ethnic Albanians during the NATO bombing were the result

of this image.

Basic work of documentation has to be done to reach a just assessment of the extent to which the Roma were involved voluntarily in

atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. While there is evidence

that some of them were involved in such actions, there is also evidence that they were forced by the Serbian military and paramilitary

forces to cooperate. Being citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Roma did not have any choice in avoiding forced conscription

into the army or the police forces. However, many tried to do so by

simply escaping to neighboring republics or countries. I met a few

men in the Stankovec II camp who bribed doctors and obtained medical certificates proving that they are unable to serve in the army. As

those testimonies reveal, the Roma were used to bury the corpses of

ethnic Albanians or were forced to burn and loot their property on

behalf of the Serbs. With the withdrawal of the Serb forces, ethnic

Albanians retaliated against the Roma. Their involvement was

equated with that of the Serbs, irrespective of the fact, that the Roma

were far fewer in inflicting atrocities against the Albanians, and in

most cases, were forced to do so. The stand-point of the Roma on this

issue is clear - those who did, or were involved in committing crimes

and atrocities against Albanians of their own free will should be subjected to a fair trial and punishment. However the entire Romani

community should not be held responsible and bear the stigma of

collective guilt and thus be subjected to violence and expulsion.

The Kosovar Albanians retaliation against the Romani community

is more a policy than the actions of vengeful neighbors. In a number

of testimonies the Roma reported that those involved in committing

atrocities against them were predominantly members of the KLA

forces. Reported cases of killings of Romani men, rapes of Romani

women, kidnapping, detention and torture confirm the same fact.

Those detained by uniformed KLA members were forced by beating

and torture to acknowledge what kind of atrocities they committed

against the ethnic Albanians, whom they killed, whose houses they

looted or burned. They were forced to confess that they took part in

the ethnic cleansing of Serbs during the war, that they were part of

Serbian forces and police units and even to provide the names of other

Roma who took part in such actions. In several cases the detained

Roma were questioned about the Romani political leaders, especially

Mr Koka Luljan. Eventually they were liberated but also warned not

to report to KFOR forces. Finally they were told that they should

leave Kosovo.

That conduct aims at raising fear among the Roma to such a level,

that they will see no alternative but to leave. Setting Romani houses
77

on fire, looting or expelling the Roma involves groups of young men

motivated as much by vengeful feelings against the collaborators as

by KLA extreme nationalists' instigation to force out those minorities

who politically sided with the Serbs. This policy seems to work. In

November 1999, the United Nations' special representative on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Jiri Dienstbier reported

that " the spring ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians accompanied

by murders, torture, looting and burning of houses has been replaced

by the fall ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Bosniaks and other nonAlbanians accompanied by the same atrocities" (New York Times,

Monday, November 22, 1999).

Contrary to the widespread belief that the Romani community began to flee Kosovo just after the NATO bombing halted and the ethnic Albanians returned in large numbers and therefore, they remained

and sided with thy Serbs, the evidence below proves otherwise. They

fled Kosovo following the escalation of clashes in early June of 1998.

As early as June 12, they were reported in central Serbia (ten families from Drenica and Decani), and in Novi Sad - at least 1,500. In

Montenegro the local Red Cross organization reported 2,142 Romani

refugees on July 21, 1998. In mid-August, in Podgorica there were

around 1,700 Roma IDPs in the Romani neighborhoods of Konik and

Rybnicka Vela. It can be estimated that at least some 6,000 Roma left

Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999. The major influx of Romani refugees

into Serbia proper occurred in late March and early April of 1999,

that is the first phase of the NATO bombing campaign and by the end

of May there were already around 20,000 Romani IDPs. In April,

around 2,500 Roma were reported in Skopje, Macedonia. In the Republic of Montenegro, by June 1, 1999 - 7,800 Romani refugees were

officially registered as IDPs. Some larger groups of Romani refugees

appeared also in Banja Luka and Mostar (Bosnia) in April 1999. The

early wave of Kosovo refugees to Albania included also 860 Roma.

The Romani community in Kosovo has been estimated up to 150,000

before the conflict erupted. According to current estimates there are

up to 30,000 Roma left in Kosovo. From this figure those who are

internally displaced are in a majority. Significantly, many of the Roma

contest being categorized as being anything other than ethnic Albanian. A survival strategy for others is to claim an r ethnic Albanians

they remain Maxhupet, that is - Gypsies. Both groups are Albanian

speaking and of Islamic faith. Among those who remain in Kosovo

the Ashkaelia are dominant. At the moment their survival depends

on the protection of the KFOR forces. The Romani refugees and IDPs

are located mainly in Serbia proper, at least 20,000; in Montenegro -

up to 10,000; in Macedonia - at least 6,000 (in the Stankovec II camp

alone there are around 3,000); Italy - several thousands. These data

are far from complete. Out of fear of persecution many Romani refugees pass themselves off as Albanians and don't want to reveal their

identity. Some did not register their status as displaced persons or

refugees and stay among the Romani families, as for example in Serbia

proper. How many of them reached Western countries is unknown,

however, many of those who tried were unsuccessful since they were

holding passports from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and they

were refused entry visas.
78

What is the future for the Romani minority in and outside of Kosovo? To answer it first we have to knowwhat kind of Kosovo will

there be in the future? Building a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo seems

to be difficult and a long-term process. Taking into consideration the

level of societal hatred, ethnic resentments, and attempts to cleanse

out minorities by ethnic Albanians, one can wonder if it is possible at

all. Bosnia serves here as an example; a multi-ethnic society seems

non-existent on the ground and its prospect remains undetermined.

ded by the international institutions at this time. The ethnic Albanians aim at having their own nation-state so they will do everything

to accomplish that goal. In such a Kosovo overtaken and run by extreme nationalism, the remaining Romani communities will be forced

to hide their identity and to prove their loyalty to the Albanian cause.

Those unwilling to do so will be threatened, expelled or persecuted.

Since the majority of them are displaced and their houses and property burned out, destroyed or taken by Albanians, their reintegration

in the original communities will be extremely difficult. The extent of

the problems to be solved reveals, for example, the case Kosovska

Mitrovica: out of 7,000 to 10,000 Roma, some 200 remained and, the

entire settlement is burned out.

The most devastating effect on minds and feelings of those belonging to minorities is the fact that the same atrocities which were associated with Serbs during the conflict are taking place now in the presence of international forces. Much effort and real commitment is

needed to improve the situation there to change these feelings. Until

civil society, rule of law, and moderation are achieved it is hard to

believe that these minorities will feel secure. Even then however,

without real investment in reconstruction that would animate the

local economy and provide jobs, not much would change. To be in

camps as displaced with limited freedom of movement, with no access to basic services like schooling, health, work, to be condemned to

live on humanitarian aid is a devastating experience that can not be

prolonged forever. Most of the Romani community that remains in

Kosovo faces such a reality.

If the multiethnic society in Kosovo is the only prospect to be defended and accepted by the international institutions, then, the Romani community and other minorities should be encouraged to remain there. Much more concerted action, however, and pressure on

ethnic Albanian leadership should be exerted to promote tolerance

and peaceful coexistence rather than resting with or accepting its

"politically correct" statements. The moderate forces within ethnic

Albanian leadership should be strengthened and encouraged. At the

same time, the impact of its extreme nationalists should be limited.

Particular attention should be paid to forthcoming local elections; to

enable those displaced to vote, to create an environment for participation of minorities and to counter the danger of ethnic violence that

can evolve during the elections.

It seems unlikely that the Romani refugees and IDPs who are outside Kosovo province will voluntarily seek to return back soon. First,

they have nothing to return to. Second, out of fear of persecution they

would prefer to stay somewhere else, including even Serbia proper if

the possibility for receiving asylum in the West will be closed. Third,

they do not see any conditions for a safe and decent life in Kosovo.

Those remaining in Montenegro and Macedonia as IDPs or refugees
79

strongly object to the prospect of being returned back to Kosovo out of

a reasonable fear of persecution. Therefore, the international community should consider the possibility of their integration into those

societies supposing that substantial financial support for such solution would follow. Otherwise, the possibility of their resettlement in

the West or providing them with temporary refugee status, as it was

during the Bosnian war, should be considered. For the largest group

of Romani IDPs that stay in Serbia proper and who live there under

precarious conditions the necessity of humanitarian aid reaching them

should be examined.
80

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF SUSAN BLAUSTEIN,

SENIOR CONSULTANT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Mr. Chairman and Honored Members of the Commission:

I am honored to be here today to speak about a matter of such

critical importance to the future stability of Kosovo and to the success of the international mission there as the fate of the thousands of

missing and detained.

Today, Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to address the particular

set of issues regarding the more than 1,600 Albanian prisoners who,

a full eight months after the Kosovo conflict ended, remain in Serbian prisons, penitentiaries, and military detention centers, in clear

violation of international humanitarian law.(1)

This unfinished business of the Kosovo war rankles deeply within

Kosovar society. The prisoners' continued detention, the risks taken

and bribes paid simply to visit them, and the exorbitant ransoms demanded by Serb lawyers for their release, all have put a tremendous

emotional and financial strain on one in 100 Albanian families. Moreover, the weak response thus far on the part of the international community has fostered a profound cynicism among Kosovars regarding

the prospects for realising other Western promises such as self-governance or real peace.

Who are these prisoners and how many are there?

The Albanian prisoners in Serbia fall into several categories. The

overwhelming majority of them are men of fighting age -- that is,

wage-earners who have much to contribute to the rebuilding and future governance of Kosovo. There are a number of women, as well

(including the respected pediatrician and poet, Dr. Flora Brovina).

All but 10 of the children are believed to have been among the 415

people released so far by the Serbian authorities.(2)

Hundreds of these men, women and children were arrested by Yugoslav Army personnel, Serbian police, paramilitary forces, and civilians in the course of last year's NATO air campaign. Most of these

have yet to be formally charged with any crime. Their arrests or abductions, if explained at all, were justified by Serbian authorities as

part of legitimate "sweeps," a term understood throughout the former

Yugoslavia to connote ruthless, state-sponsored searches for weapons and/or "terrorists."

Some 2,200 prisoners were arrested prior to the internationalisation

of the conflict, again, for alleged activities constituting terroristic or

treasonous crimes against the state. Among these are an estimated

200 who had already been convicted of these crimes in Kosovo's Serbian-run courts and were serving sentences inside Kosovo; but most,

like those picked up in the course of the NATO intervention, have yet

to be charged or tried. (3)

All prisoners detained in Kosovo under Serbian custody were hastily trucked or bused out of Kosovo and into Serbia proper as soon as

the so-called military-technical agreement was signed last June 10

and the withdrawal of Serb forces began.

How was this allowed to happen?

It was U.S. officials in Washington who allowed the issue of the

Albanian prisoners to be dropped from the negotiating table. According to senior NATO and US government officials, a provision demanding the prisoners' release had been included in early drafts of the

agreement, but the Yugoslav commanders negotiating the agreement
81

objected.(4) NATO commanders consulted with Washington, where the

Clinton administration's inter-agency team,(5) eager to end the air

campaign, fearful of casualties and of the collapse of the seriously

fraying Atlantic alliance, readily acceded to Serb demands to remove

this and other issues from the table and to limit negotiations to the

immediate task of replacing one military force by another: getting

the Serbs out and NATO in.(6)

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, it is my view, and, more to the point,

it is the view of many experts in international humanitarian law,

that the pragmatic omission of the prisoner issue from the militarytechnical agreement that brought the conflict to a much-desired close

does not in any way relieve the parties to that conflict of the obligation

to release, immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, all prisoners

of war (POWs) and civilians detained in the course of armed conflict.

This obligation is incumbent upon all signatories to the Third and

Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the accompanying Protocol

II of 1978, all of which were drafted expressly with an eye toward

protecting combatant and civilian detainees in situations such as this

one: where, for political or other reasons, the armistice or peace agreement drawn up between warring parties does not explicitly provide

for the prisoners' release or general amnesty.

It follows, Mr. Chairman, that the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues to hold those prisoners detained in the

course of the international armed conflict in flagrant violation of wellestablished tenets of international humanitarian law. This finding

does not apply to those apprehended prior to the internationalisation

of the conflict,(7) or to those already charged and tried, whom, as the

Geneva Conventions make clear, states are well within their authority to hold until their sentences have been discharged. But it does

apply, Mr. Chairman, to the conditions of detention and the conditions under which the prisoners' trials are conducted, both of which,

in the Serbian case, are also believed to violate explicit provisions of

international humanitarian law.

THE CONSEQUENCES

It is not surprising, Mr. Chairman, that a government which would

forcibly expel close to a million of its own citizens by systematically

burning their villages and massacring thousands of civilians would

show as little regard for individual human rights in the manner in

which it has apprehended, detained, maltreated, tried, and sentenced

hundreds more. The conditions of detention are reprehensible. The

released prisoners and prisoners' families I have interviewed all reported that they or their family member had been repeatedly tortured, beaten, starved, and kept in unheated cells without winter clothing. Summary trials are being held as we speak, resulting in speedy

convictions won often on the basis of fabricated evidence or forced

confessions obtained through intimidation and torture. Defendants

are regularly assigned counsel who, in case after case, have not met

with their clients or even reviewed their files prior to trial, have been

observed holding ex parte hearings with judges, and, upon conviction,

have quickly waived their clients' rights to appeal.(8)

However, the alacrity with which, since October, the Serbian authorities appear to have begun ratcheting up the wheels of Serbianstyle justice by finally charging, trying, and sentencing prisoners sug-
82

gests the state's sensitivity, at least, to the argument that its prolonged detention of people who have yet to be charged is a violation of

Serbia's own criminal code, which permits authorities to detain someone for up to six months without charging them with any crime.(9) The

recently accelerated sentencing rate also suggests that the Serbian

justice ministry is well aware that the Geneva Conventions permit

states to retain custody over convicted prisoners for the duration of

their sentences. By imposing sentences of as long as 10 and 12 years,

the regime in Belgrade can hope to destabilise Kosovo for some time

to come.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO DATE

This issue, Mr. Chairman, as the UN's Special Representative to

the Secretary-General, Dr. Bernard Kouchner recently put it, has

become "an open wound" for Kosovo, a wound with enormous repercussions for the success or failure of the international mission there.

In recent months Albanians have grown increasingly frustrated by

the absence of productive advocacy on or involvement in this issue by

international actors:

 The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has consistently refused to advocate for the prisoners' release because its legal

advisors maintain that for such advocacy to fall within the

organisation's mandate, the issue ought to have been included in the

peace agreement;

 UNMIK head Bernard Kouchner says he has repeatedly called for

the detainees' release "immediately and without conditions" and that

he raises the missing persons issue with every foreign government he

visits. But his initial response last July to the question of the detainees and the missing was merely to appoint a sub-commission of concerned Albanians, Serbs, and Roma, and chaired by the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights Special Envoy to the Balkans, Barbara Davis. But with no resources, no professional staff, no legal team,

and no forensic experts, the UNMIK sub-commission's well-intentioned but highly inadequate efforts have finally led Kosovars to conclude that the international community has little interest in resolving this issue and that they should take matters into their own hands.

In recent months prisoners' families and their advocates have staged

a series of hunger strikes and peaceful demonstrations calling upon

the international community to mount a systematic campaign to

achieve the prisoners' release. So far, these protests have yielded only

promises.

WHAT THE U.S. CONGRESS CAN DO

Mr. Chairman, this situation is not news. It has been going on for

some eight months now, with the international community admittedly able to do very little about it, given its lack of leverage or influence over Belgrade.(10) However, there are a few things that Western

nations should not do, and that the West, and the United States Congress in particular, can do to redress this egregious, outstanding humanitarian crisis left over from the Kosovo war.

First, the U.S. Congress should pass a resolution, as the European

Parliament recently did, calling for the release of the Albanian prisoners in conformity with international law.(11) A House resolution to

this effect has been drafted by Congressman Engel of New York that
83

Commission members might consider co-sponsoring, and the Commission is uniquely positioned to win passage of a joint resolution

that would draw attention to this issue and reassure the Albanian

community that these prisoners have not been completely abandoned

or forgotten.

This resolution should urge that European nations which maintain

ties with Belgrade, in consultation with the UN, the ICRC, and other

appropriate international agencies, use their respective diplomatic

channels to press the Belgrade authorities for the prisoners' release,

and, pending release, for access to medical treatment, family visits,

defence counsel of their own choosing, and for international monitoring of their trials. In addition, the resolution should urge NATO's

Kosovo Force (KFOR) to assist in the releasees' timely return to Kosovo by preparing facilities in which the alleged criminals among them

can be properly detained while their cases are reviewed by KFOR's

legal advisors to ascertain whether or not prosecutions are warranted.(12)

Second, this Congress might urge its ambassador to the United

Nations to introduce a UN Security Council resolution to the same

effect.(13)

Lastly, there are things this Congress and other Western governments ought not to do: The sanctions against Serbia should not be

lifted until such time as the Albanian prisoners detained during the

Kosovo conflict are freed and returned home. The European Union's

recent decision to lift the flight ban, ostensibly to make it easier for

ordinary Serbs to travel, had the unfortunate side-effect of signaling

to the indicted President Milosevic that if he only waits out the West,

the remaining sanctions will be lifted, as well, without his having to

turn himself over to The Hague as warranted, to leave office, or even

to show the slightest inclination to abide by international law.

Finally, neither this Congress nor any other Western government

should allow this issue to drop from public view. Without the carnage

and destruction we all saw on our television screens last year this

time, it is easy to understand that most Americans believe the Kosovo conflict has long since ended. It is important that U.S. citizens

remember that the reasons American troops went to fight in Kosovo

was to stop the Yugoslav government from committing gross human

rights abuses there. Tragically, that same government continues, even

to this day, to commit similar gross violations inside their own prisons, against at least 1,600 of those same Yugoslav citizens -- the Albanian citizens of Kosovo -- that our soldiers and those of 18 other

nations intervened, almost a year ago now, to protect.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the members of the Commission for this opportunity to speak today and to

submit my testimony and supporting materials for the Congressional

Record. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

ENDNOTES

1

 The International Committee for the Red Cross publication issued on 24

February 2000 reports that, as of 1 February 2000, of the 4,434 persons

formerly listed as unaccounted, 102 have been confirmed dead, 1,345 confirmed alive, and 1,297 have been visited in prison. (This list includes not

only Albanians but people of all ethnicities, under both Serbian and NATO

detention.) Of the 2,987 who still remained unaccounted for, 1,875 persons

were reportedly arrested by Yugoslav and Serbian authorities and civilians
84

in the course of the Kosovo conflict, and 346 were reportedly abducted by the

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or Kosovar civilians, which number that includes the alleged 39 Yugoslav army soldiers reported as missing in action.

There was no information at all regarding 766 persons. The Serbian authorities have released 415 persons, for whom ICRC has provided transport

to Kosovo.

I have submitted the ICRC's report of 24 February 2000 for the record. It

is important to realise, when reading these figures from the ICRC, that their

list has been derived from the list made available by the Serbian Ministry of

Justice. Lists compiled by Albanian human rights monitoring groups arrive

at far higher numbers of suspected prisoners, including many reported to be

detained inside Serbia at military prisons about whom no one has any information. Many of these reports come from released prisoners and are believed to be credible; however, in the absence of confirmation from the Serbian authorities, visits by the ICRC, or other proof of prisoners whereabouts,

these higher numbers cannot be confirmed. 2

 International Committee for the Red Cross report, 24 February; the 415

prisoners have been released largely as the result of interventions made by

Belgrade- and Pristina-based lawyers from the Humanitarian Law Center. 3

 Still another category of prisoner consists of those Albanians who allegedly committed crimes inside Serbia proper, where they were arrested,

charged, tried, and where they are serving their sentences. Some of these,

presumably, are common criminals; it is believed that others have been arrested simply because they are Albanian. My testimony today does not address their plight, just as it refrains from considering that of all other unjustly detained persons inside Serbia, whether they be independent

journalists, student activists, draft resisters, or non-Serbs. 4

 According to Western officials present at the talks, the Yugoslav commanders insisted that they were authorised to negotiate only those items

spelled out in the text of the 8 June "G-8 agreement," which became the

basis two days later for the UN Security Council Resolution #1244, the

authorising resolution that gave legal force to NATO's 12 June intervention

to secure Kosovo and to the temporary, international administration of Kosovo by the United Nations. 5

 Consisting of officials from the White House and Old Executive Office

Building, the State Department, and the Pentagon. 6

 Another issue dropped early on was the still unresolved question of how

many uniformed Serbs would eventually be allowed back into Kosovo. 7

 That is, to the time when the conflict was purely an internal one, not

involving more than one state. 8

 Still, the Serbian government has shown an attention to legalistic detail

not typical of all authoritarian regimes. Belgrade took care to insure that

not only the prisoners were transferred into Serbia in mid-June, when Yugoslav and Serbian forces pulled out, but the Serb prison wardens, and even

the judges were transferred from their jurisdictions in Kosovo to designated

spots inside Serbia proper, apparently in the interest of preserving intact

jurisdictions so that convictions could not be challenged on that ground. 9

 In their haste to dispose of so many un-adjudicated cases, the Serbian

authorities have tried Albanian defendants in both small and large groups

that correspond to the alleged crimes, with minors sometimes being tried

with adults, in violation of the Serbian criminal code. The sentencing patterns would appear to have been somewhat capricious, as well: in the southern town of Leskovac, sentences for convictions on charges of "terrorism"

have recently been imposed that range from 10 months to 15 years. 10 As deputy head of UNMIK Jock Covey recently told a visitor, "There is

no issue about which we get more knocks on our door, and no issue about

which we have so little influence." 11 The European Parliament issued a strong resolution on 17 February

2000, calling upon the EU Council of Ministers to launch "a new initiative to

put strong pressure on Belgrade and to obtain the release of the ethnic Albanian prisoners."
85

In addition to the resolution taken by the European Parliament, the EU

has taken other actions. The Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, has repeatedly asked the FRY to guarantee the

ICRC full access to the prisoners still in detention and for the immediate

release of those prisoners held without charges. "There can be no

normalisation of relations with the European Union or eventual lifting of

sanctions before there is a return to democracy in Serbia, with all that that

entails in terms of democratic freedoms and respect for the rights of minorities," Secretary-General Solana recently wrote, resolving to "remain engaged

on this issue." 12 KFOR commanders should also be urged to exploit their regular military-to-military contacts with Yugoslav commanders to obtain information

as to the identity and whereabouts of those prisoners detained in military

facilities and for access to those prisoners. 13 The Security Council has taken an interest in this issue, having heard

UN Assistant-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations Hedi Annani

report to them on 17 February that there are "approximately 3,000 missing

persons from the NATO bombing period and 400 to 500 persons missing

since mid-June 1999," when KFOR entered Kosovo. Mr. Annani also told

the Security Council that the UN high Commissioner for Human Rights was

considering "the appointment of a special envoy to deal with the issue of

detainees and the missing." Moreover, the U.S. ambassador, Richard C.

Holbrooke, is extremely interested in this issue, according to his aides, arising as it does out of the Kosovo conflict, which, as U.S. Special Envoy to the

Balkans, he attempted for so long to resolve through diplomatic means.
86

WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF YLBER BAJRAKTARI

Mr. Chairmen,

Distinguished Congressmen,

I would like to thank you and the Helsinki Committee for the opportunity to testify on the ongoing crisis of Albanian prisoners, considered to be one of the most serious threats to the peace process in

Kosova.

 I would like to focus today on some specific cases of the Kosovars

who are held hostage in Serbia,

 What the prisoners' issue means to the Kosovars and, especially,

 How this issue impacts Kosova's future.

The latest report of International Committee of Red Cross, that

came out on February 24, confirms frightening figures of 4.400 missing persons from Kosova. According to The Red Cross only 1,400 are

known to be held as prisoners in Serbia, while the destiny of the rest

of 3,000 remains unknown.

But who are in fact these prisoners?

I would like to focus on some specific names and individuals, and

hopefully you can have a better understanding of the importance and

the urgency of their release.

I would like to start with Albin Kurti, a 24 year old Kosovar who

was abducted during the NATO bombing campaign. Mr. Kurti was a

former leader of the nonviolent student movement in October 1997;

one of the most prominent political activists in Kosova; and most recently a spokesperson for the political representative of the KLA in

Prishtina; Mr.Kurti was criminally involved and a terrorist as much

as I am, testifying here in front of you today. There is no official confirmation by Belgrade that he is alive, but human rights organizations have traced him and have determined that he is being held in

the prison in Nish, in Serbia. According to some reports, he has been

savagely beaten, and as a result of the beatings has suffered extremely

serious damage to his kidneys.

The second case that I would like to emphasize is the case of Flora

Brovina; a prominent pediatrician and a human rights activist. Mrs.

Brovina was actively involved in organizing Nongovernmental Organizations aimed on offering medical assistant to the displaced Kosovars

during the conflict in 1998. She was also actively involved in helping

Kosovars who were denied of rights to health care because of the discriminatory laws adopted by the Belgrade regime. Mrs. Brovina, who

has a heart condition, has been sentenced to 12 years in prison, under

charges of terrorism. The case of Mrs. Brovina shows that Serbia remains the only country in Europe that considers doctors to be terrorists and helping children as a threat to national security.

The third case is equally important as the first two.

Mr. Ukshin Hoti, one of the most prominent Albanian intellectuals, a Harvard graduate, was arrested in 1994 and sentenced to five

years imprisonment on fabricated charges of conspiring against the
87

state. Although he was supposed to be released last summer his whereabouts remain unknown. Mr. Hoti is well respected in Kosova and he

enjoys a great support among the Kosovar Albanians, [and was considered as a possible future leader of Kosova].

The last case that I would like to present to you today distinguished

Congressmen, from the endless list of the Kosovar hostages kept in

Serbia, includes Mr. Bardhyl Caushi, the dean of the School of Law at

the University of Prishtina. There have been no reports confirming

that Mr.Caushi is still alive, but his family has reported him being

abducted by the Serbian troops during the bombing campaign. Mr.

Caushi has been an active participant of the negotiation training program organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace.

This case is also important because of the fact that Mr.Caushi has

been abducted in the town of Gjakova, in western Kosova, an area

that has been one of the main targets of the abduction campaign conducted by Mr. Milosevic's troops.

Gjakova is a town with a 95 percent Albanian population and is

home to a considerable number of Kosovar intellectuals and professionals.

This clearly shows that the apprehension of Albanians in Kosova

was not random or unplanned; this was a well-prepared operation

and was done as a matter of policy.

But what does all of this mean for the future of Kosova?

The issue of the Albanian prisoners in Serbia continues to keep

tensions high in Kosova and to maintain a high level of radicalization.

No Kosovar family can work on building a peaceful and democratic

future while their family members are being held hostage in Serbia.

Therefore, this ongoing crisis is one of the most serious threats to

the stability of Kosova.

It seriously undermines the process of democratic institution-building and makes the reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs practically impossible.

On the other hand, by keeping thousands of Albanians as prisoners, Mr. Milosevic retains another instrument that he can use to increase tensions. Mr. Milosevic should not be allowed to have in his

hands another weapon with which he can destabilize the region.

In summary, the issue of Albanian prisoners held in Serbia is likely

to jeopardize the mission of the international community in Kosova.

It makes lasting peace impossible and shuts the door to any exit strategy for NATO allies.

This situation makes it extremely necessary for the international

community, and the United States in particular, to take specific measures that will help resolve this issue.

There are several things that can be done.

 Although Serbia is facing international isolation, the United

States should put pressure on Belgrade, by making the case of

Albanian prisoners a precondition for any lifting of sanctions.

 The United States should lead the initiative in forming an International Commission for Missing Persons in Kosova, authorized by the UN Security Council, to conduct a thorough investigation of Albanian prisoners in Serbia.
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 Some of the prisoners are being held in districts that are administered by the Serbian opposition, especially Nis municipality that is a recipient of the Energy for Democracy program. The Serbian opposition must be pressured to clearly state

its position on the issue of Albanian political prisoners and denounce the Serb regime's policy of holding Albanians captive in

Serbia.

 This policy should also be firmly denounced by the leaders of

Kosova's Serbs.

This would be a first and important step towards confidence building, a crucial ingredient of reconciliation.

In the end, please let me emphasize that this crisis needs serious

attention and should be a part of any future dealings with Belgrade.

Albanians want their fathers, mothers, brothers, and prominent figures back, so they could move on with the reconciliation process, a

critical element for Kosova's multiethnic future. A positive step in

resolving this issue would also give momentum to the international

presence in Kosova, and would make its long-term success more likely.

Thank you.