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*********************************************** 
STRATEK PLASTICS, LIMITED v. JEAN PIERRE IBAR

(AC 39520)

Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a judgment lien on certain real property

owned by the defendant. On the day evidence was scheduled to commence, the plaintiff’s counsel requested to have fourteen premarked

exhibits moved into evidence as full exhibits and informed the court

that the parties had reached a number of stipulations, including the

amount of the debt, that the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney’s

fees in connection with the prosecution of the action in an amount to

be determined, if necessary, at a later hearing before the court, that the

plaintiff would be due an appraisal fee and that a judgment of strict

foreclosure would enter in favor of the plaintiff. The parties did not

stipulate to the fair market value of the subject property, which the

court determined after an appraisal was entered into evidence. The

court then rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure and set the law

day in accordance with the stipulation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a

motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to statute (§ 52-249 [a])

and an affidavit, which was accompanied by copies of billing records,

biographies of the attorneys who had worked on the matter and a

spreadsheet organizing the time entries from the billing records. After

a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff

was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and certain costs. On the

defendant’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in

awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees pursuant to § 52-249 (a) because

it did not conduct a hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation

of time for redemption, as required by the statute, that court having had

the authority to award attorney’s fees under the statute; the proceeding

before the trial court constituted a hearing within the meaning of § 52-

249 (a) and satisfied that statute’s requirement that a hearing be held

as to the form of the judgment, as exhibits were entered into evidence,

counsel for both parties had the opportunity to address the court during

the proceeding, and because the parties did not stipulate to the fair

market value of the property, they submitted the question to the court,

which made a factual finding as to the value of the property on the

basis of the property appraisal submitted into evidence.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in

awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees because, at the time of the foreclosure proceeding, the plaintiff failed to present a statement of the fees

requested and a description of the services rendered, the defendant

having waived that claim; his counsel expressly agreed during the subject

proceeding to a consideration of the question of attorney’s fees at a

subsequent hearing, the parties’ stipulation stated that the plaintiff was

entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and that the amount of those fees

would be determined, if necessary, at a later hearing before the court,

and after the plaintiff’s counsel had represented at the proceeding that he

would present the amount of fees claimed at a later date, the defendant’s

counsel did not object, nor did he insist on a presentation at that time

of the fees requested and a description of services rendered, and he

further consented to the court’s suggestion that the attorney’s fees issue

could be heard on a short calendar day if the parties were unable to

resolve the matter themselves.

Argued November 15, 2017—officially released February 20, 2018

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a judgment lien on certain of the

defendant’s real property, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New

Haven, where the court, Agati, J., rendered judgment
of strict foreclosure in accordance with the parties’

stipulation; thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for attorney’s fees, and the defendant appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Jeffrey Hellman, for the appellant (defendant).

Thomas J. Rechen, with whom were Charles D. Ray,

and, on the brief, James E. Regan, for the appellee

(plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this action for the foreclosure of a

judgment lien, the defendant, Jean Pierre Ibar, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion

for attorney’s fees filed by the plaintiff, Stratek Plastics,

Ltd. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

erred in awarding attorney’s fees because (1) there had

been no hearing as to the form of the judgment or the

limitation of time for redemption as required by General

Statutes § 52-249 (a);1 and (2) the plaintiff failed to present a statement of the fees requested and services

rendered at the time of the trial. We disagree that the

award of attorney’s fees was improper. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to the

resolution of the issues on appeal. On April 9, 2014, the

plaintiff filed this action seeking to foreclose a judgment

lien in the amount of $139,800.93 and costs of $444.

The plaintiff filed an amended complaint dated May 28,

2014. The matter was scheduled for trial on February

23, 2016. Although the trial did not go forward on that

date, counsel premarked certain exhibits and evidence

was rescheduled to begin the following day, February

24, 2016. On the afternoon of February 24, counsel for

both parties appeared before the court, Agati, J., and

at that time the plaintiff’s counsel informed the court

that the parties had stipulations that they wanted to

put on the record. Before turning to the stipulations, the

plaintiff’s counsel requested to have fourteen exhibits,

which had been premarked the day before, moved into

evidence as full exhibits.

The plaintiff’s counsel then informed the court of the

stipulations reached by the parties. He first represented

that the parties had stipulated to the debt in the amount

of $171,701.01, which accounted for interest as of that

date and a credit to the defendant. He then stated that

the parties stipulated that at the time of the deficiency

judgment hearing, the interest would be updated to the

relevant date at a rate of 10 percent. Third, the plaintiff’s

counsel noted the parties’ stipulation that ‘‘the plaintiff

. . . is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this prosecution . . . in an amount to be

determined at a hearing before this court if necessary,

such hearing to take place sometime between today

and the date of the deficiency hearing . . . .’’ The parties also agreed that the plaintiff would be due an

appraisal fee of $1000. Lastly, the plaintiff’s counsel

represented that the parties had stipulated that a judgment of strict foreclosure would enter in favor of the

plaintiff, to become effective on February 29, 2016, with

a law day of June 29, 2016. The court inquired as to

whether the parties had anything further to add to the

hearing, to which the defendant’s counsel replied: ‘‘Yes,

Your Honor . . . . That . . . accurately states our

agreement. I want to just add two additional points
maybe by way of clarification. Mr. Ibar is very interested

in having a hearing, an opportunity for a hearing on the

attorney’s fees, so . . . we would at some point be

requesting that before the deficiency date enters so

there is definitely some interest in determining what is

reasonable; so that issue is still in play, understanding

the plaintiff is making a claim for attorney’s fees and

there’s a statutory basis for that, but, nonetheless, we

hope to challenge what is reasonable.’’ The court

inquired of the plaintiff’s counsel: ‘‘I assume you’re

going to provide them with some amount of attorney’s

fees that you are going to be claiming?’’ The plaintiff’s

counsel replied: ‘‘We will present the amount we are

claiming. Counsel and I will make an effort to work

that out by agreement, if we are unable to do so, we

will contact the court.’’ The court suggested that the

attorney’s fees calculation issue could be scheduled

on a short calendar day, and the defendant’s counsel

responded, ‘‘[t]hat’s fine,’’ and also stated that the parties would stay in communication with the court if a

hearing was needed.

After addressing a few outstanding issues, the court

noted that representatives of the plaintiff were present

in the courtroom and inquired of the plaintiff’s counsel

whether the plaintiff had authorized him to enter into

the agreement just placed on the record. The plaintiff’s

counsel responded that he did have authority, and the

defendant’s counsel represented that he had been in

telephone and e-mail communication with the defendant, and that he also had authority to enter into the

agreement. The court, noting that there had been an

appraisal, then inquired whether the parties were stipulating to the fair market value of the property. The

parties did not stipulate to the fair market value, the

appraisal was entered into evidence, and the court then

found the value of the property to be $515,000. The

court told the parties to ‘‘let me know in the meantime

on the scheduling of the attorney’s fee issues,’’ and

concluded the matter. The court rendered a judgment

of strict foreclosure on February 29, 2016, and set the

law day for June 29, 2016.

On May 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 52-249. The plaintiff

also filed an affidavit accompanied by copies of billing

records, biographies of the attorneys who had worked

on the matter, and a spreadsheet organizing the time

entries from the billing records. The defendant, citing

Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 839 A.2d 589 (2004),

objected on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim for

attorney’s fees was ‘‘barred by its failure to present

evidence concerning those fees at trial.’’ In the alternative, the defendant argued that the fees claimed were

excessive. On July 8, 2016, the plaintiff filed a supplemental affidavit, seeking a total award of fees and costs

in the amount of $279,890.77.2 On July 13, 2016, the

defendant, citing Burns v. Adler, 158 Conn. App. 766,
807–808, 120 A.3d 555 (2015), rev’d in part, 325 Conn.

14, 155 A.3d 1223 (2017), filed a supplemental objection,

arguing that the statutory requirements of § 52-249 had

not been met because the court did not conduct a hearing as to the form of the judgment and the time for

redemption. The plaintiff replied that a hearing had

been held as to the form of the judgment and that the

defendant had stipulated to the plaintiff’s entitlement

to attorney’s fees, with only the reasonableness of the

fees left to be decided.

After a hearing on July 11 and 13, 2016, the court

issued an order on August 1, 2016, granting the plaintiff’s

motion for attorney’s fees. The court found that the

plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to § 52-249. The court multiplied 125 hours by the

blended rate of $411 per hour to arrive at a reasonable

attorney’s fees award of $51,375. The court also

awarded costs in the amount of $6799.77 for a total

award of $58,174.77. This appeal followed.3

I

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the court

erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to § 52-249 because the court had not conducted a

hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation of

time for redemption as required by § 52-249. He argues

that ‘‘[w]hile the statute is far from clear on this particular point, in light of the holding in Burns . . . the

proper reading of the statute requires [the] defendant

to contest the form of the judgment or the manner of

foreclosure for [the] plaintiff to recover its attorney’s

fees.’’ We conclude that the statutory hearing requirement was satisfied.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and

relevant legal principles. ‘‘Connecticut adheres to the

American rule regarding attorney’s fees under which

successful parties are not entitled to recover attorney’s

fees in the absence of statutory or contractual authority

to the contrary. . . . Thus, a specific contractual term

may provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and

costs . . . or a statute may confer such rights.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Clem Martone Construction, LLC v.

DePino, 145 Conn. App. 316, 326–27, 77 A.3d 760, cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013). Section 52-

249 (a) provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff

in any action of foreclosure of a mortgage or lien, upon

obtaining judgment of foreclosure, when there has been

a hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation

of time for redemption, shall be allowed the same costs,

including a reasonable attorney’s fee, as if there had

been a hearing on an issue of fact. . . .’’ ‘‘The question

of whether a particular statute . . . applies to a given

state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation

. . . . Statutory interpretation presents a question of

law for the court. . . . Our review is, therefore, ple-
nary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo Roofing, Inc. v. Rottman, 86 Conn. App. 767, 775, 863 A.2d

713 (2005).

We next consider the meaning of the term ‘‘hearing.’’

This court has consistently ‘‘acknowledged the definition of a hearing provided in Black’s Law Dictionary,

as [a] proceeding of relative formality . . . generally

public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried,

in which witnesses are heard and evidence presented,

and in which parties to a dispute have a right to be

heard. . . . Our Supreme Court has stated that [a] hearing can be a proceeding in the nature of a trial with

the presentation of evidence, it can be merely for the

purpose of presenting arguments, or, of course, it can

be a combination of the two.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Bridgeport, 134

Conn. App. 422, 427–28, 39 A.3d 771 (2012).

This court also has recognized that ‘‘[n]ot only does

a hearing normally connote an adversarial setting, but

usually it can be said that it is any oral proceeding

before a tribunal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 428. The term has further been described as ‘‘capable of considerable broadness’’; Kendall v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn. App. 23, 38, 130 A.3d

268 (2015); and ‘‘a verbal coat of many colors.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Willimantic Car Wash, Inc.

v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 247 Conn. 732, 738, 724

A.2d 1108 (1999).

The defendant relies primarily upon Burns v. Adler,

supra, 158 Conn. App. 766, in support of his contention

that the hearing requirement has not been met in the

present case because the parties stipulated to the

amount of the debt, the judgment of strict foreclosure,

and the law day. Burns involved a foreclosure of a

mechanic’s lien on the defendant’s property. Id., 768.

In the present case, the parties stipulated to the debt

owed in the amount of $214,039.09, that the fair market

value of the defendant’s interest in the property was

greater than $500,000, that a judgment of strict foreclosure should enter with a law day of August 14, 2012,

to the plaintiff’s entitlement to a title search fee in the

amount of $225, that the plaintiff was not entitled to

an appraisal fee, and ‘‘that the issue of the plaintiff’s

right to attorney’s fees [was] left for the court to

resolve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 790.

Thus, the only issue remaining for the court in Burns

to resolve after approving the stipulation was the plaintiff’s entitlement to statutory attorney’s fees pursuant

to § 52-249 (a). Id., 790. The trial court explained that

the statute permitted an award of attorney’s fees only

when there has been a hearing on the mechanic’s lien

and concluded that because there had been no hearing,

the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney’s fees. Id., 806.

This court affirmed the judgment, noting that the parties

had ‘‘stipulated that there would not be a hearing on the
terms of the judgment of foreclosure of the mechanic’s

lien.’’ Id., 807. The stipulation was ‘‘submitted to, and

approved by, the court without a hearing.’’ Id.

We conclude that Burns is distinguishable and that

the proceeding held on February 24, 2016, constituted

a hearing within the meaning of § 52-249 (a). In the

present case, exhibits were entered into evidence and

counsel for both parties had the opportunity to address

the court. Unlike the parties in Burns, the parties did

not stipulate to the fair market value of the property,

and, accordingly, they submitted the question to the

court for decision. Although neither party in this matter

sought foreclosure by sale, this court has explained that

‘‘[t]he determination of value is a major factor in the

decision whether to allow a foreclosure by sale rather

than a strict foreclosure.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) SKW Real Estate Ltd. Partnership v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 56 Conn. App. 1, 7,

741 A.2d 4 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 931, 746 A.2d

793 (2000). In the present case, to assist the court in

deciding the fair market value, the plaintiff entered into

evidence the property appraisal. The court then made

a factual finding as to the fair market value of the

property.4 Under these circumstances, we conclude that

the proceeding satisfied the requirement found in § 52-

249 (a) that a hearing be held as to the form of the

judgment. Thus, the court had authority pursuant to

§ 52-249 (a) to award attorney’s fees and costs.5

II

The defendant next claims that the court erred in

awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff because, at the

time of the trial, the plaintiff failed to present a statement of the fees requested and a description of the

services rendered. The plaintiff claims that the defendant waived this claim when, during the February 24

hearing, he agreed to consideration of the question of

attorney’s fees at a later date. We agree with the

plaintiff.

We review a trial court’s rulings as to attorney’s fees

for an abuse of discretion. Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn.

App. 34, 59, 925 A.2d 334 (2007). ‘‘Under the abuse of

discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every

reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial

court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse

of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings

is limited to the questions of whether the trial court

correctly applied the law and reasonably could have

reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

The defendant relies solely upon Smith v. Snyder,

267 Conn. 456, 839 A.2d 589 (2004), in support of his

claim. In Smith, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘when a

court is presented with a claim for attorney’s fees, the

proponent must present to the court at the time of trial
. . . a statement of the fees requested and a description

of services rendered. Such a rule leaves no doubt about

the burden on the party claiming attorney’s fees and

affords the opposing party an opportunity to challenge

the amount requested at the appropriate time. . . .

Parties must supply the court with a description of the

nature and extent of the fees sought, to which the court

may apply its knowledge and experience in determining

the reasonableness of the fees requested.’’ (Footnotes

omitted.) Id., 479. In Smith, our Supreme Court affirmed

the award of attorney’s fees on the ground that the

defendants had not opposed the plaintiff’s request for

fees. Id., 480. Our Supreme Court explained that had

the defendants objected to the request, the trial court

would have been required to provide the defendants an

opportunity to be heard on that issue. Id., 481. Because

the defendants failed to object and consequently ‘‘effectively acquiesced in that request,’’ they could not challenge the award on appeal. Id.

It is well established that ‘‘[w]hen a party consents

to or expresses satisfaction with an issue at trial, claims

arising from that issue are deemed waived and may

not be reviewed on appeal.’’6

(Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter, 131

Conn. App. 371, 387, 27 A.3d 384, cert. denied, 303 Conn.

902, 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). In Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC,

the defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court

had improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.

Id., 383. Specifically, he claimed that the court erred

when it precluded him from cross-examining the plaintiff’s counsel concerning his affidavit of attorney’s fees.

Id., 383–84. During the hearing on damages, however,

the defendant’s counsel told the court: ‘‘I don’t think

that he is going to have to testify to [the affidavit].’’ Id.,

384. The defendant did not claim that testimony was

required until after his request for a continuance was

denied, at which time the court advised him that the

hearing was over. Id., 386. On appeal, this court concluded that he had expressly waived the issue. Id., 384,

386–87; see also Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Corp.

v. Stephenson, 86 Conn. App. 126, 135–37, 860 A.2d 751

(2004) (rejecting defendants’ claim that the court could

not have assessed the reasonableness of fees because

of improperly admitted hearsay documents, agreeing

with the plaintiff that the defendants had stipulated that

testimony beyond an affidavit was unnecessary).

As in Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC, we conclude that

the defendant waived his challenge pursuant to Smith.

First, not only was the defendant on notice at the time

of the February 24, 2016 hearing that the plaintiff was

seeking attorney’s fees, but his counsel expressly

agreed on that date to adjudicate the reasonableness of

the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees at a subsequent

hearing. In his brief to this court, the defendant concedes that he ‘‘agreed to consideration of the question

of attorney’s fees at a later date . . . .’’ Second, the
stipulation presented to the court on February 24

included recognition that the attorney’s fees, to which

the plaintiff was entitled, would be in ‘‘an amount to

be determined at a hearing before this court if necessary, such hearing to take place sometime between

today and the date of the deficiency hearing . . . .’’

Third, after the plaintiff’s counsel represented, in

response to a question from the court, that he would

present the amount of fees claimed, presumably at a

later date, the defendant’s counsel did not object, nor

did he insist on a presentation at that time of the fees

requested and a description of services rendered. When

the plaintiff’s counsel represented that the parties

would contact the court if they were unable to agree

and the court suggested it could be heard on short

calendar day, the defendant’s counsel responded,

‘‘[t]hat’s fine.’’7 Because the defendant expressly consented to these procedures, we conclude that he has

waived any challenge to the plaintiff’s claimed failure

to produce a statement of fees requested and services

rendered at the time of the February 24, 2016 hearing.

Although we decide the claim on the ground that

the defendant waived his objection, we note that the

defendant subsequently was afforded ample opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the fees

requested, which was the concern underlying the rule

expressed in Smith. See Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267

Conn. 479 (‘‘[s]uch a rule . . . affords the opposing

party an opportunity to challenge the amount requested

at the appropriate time’’). The plaintiff filed an affidavit

of attorney’s fees accompanied by copies of billing

records, biographies of the attorneys who worked on

the matter, and a spreadsheet organizing the time

entries from the billing records. The court held a hearing

over two days, during which the parties submitted evidence and presented argument to the court. On appeal,

the defendant does not challenge the reasonableness

of the fees awarded.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded

for the purpose of setting a new law day.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 52-249 (a) provides: ‘‘The plaintiff in any action of

foreclosure of a mortgage or lien, upon obtaining judgment of foreclosure,

when there has been a hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation of

time for redemption, shall be allowed the same costs, including a reasonable

attorney’s fee, as if there had been a hearing on an issue of fact. The same

costs and fees shall be recoverable as part of the judgment in any action

upon a bond which has been substituted for a mechanic’s lien.’’

2 At the time the plaintiff filed its motion for attorney’s fees, the foreclosure

had been pending for over two years, and the court record included discovery

practice, briefing on multiple motions, including the defendant’s motion to

dismiss, and pretrial submissions. The court, in its order granting the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, noted that a review of the court record

showed that the defendant had ‘‘vigorously defend[ed]’’ the case, and that

the ‘‘case was scheduled to proceed as a contested trial until the day of

commencement of evidence . . . .’’

3 The plaintiff filed a cross appeal, which it subsequently withdrew.

4 General Statutes § 52-249 (a) provides for attorney’s fees in the event a

hearing is held ‘‘as to the form of judgment or the limitation of time for
redemption . . . as if there had been a hearing on an issue of fact.’’ We

note that in making a finding as to the fair market value of the property,

the court clearly decided an issue of fact on the basis of evidence presented

during the February 24 hearing.

5 We note that the defendant’s counsel represented to the court that he

recognized that statutory authority for an award of attorney’s fees existed

when he stated during the February 24 hearing that ‘‘the plaintiff is making

a claim for attorney’s fees and there’s a statutory basis for that, but, nonetheless, we hope to challenge what is reasonable.’’

6 Similarly, where a party fails to object to a request for attorney’s fees,

that party is deemed to have waived its objection. See Florian v. Lenge, 91

Conn. App. 268, 286, 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (‘‘The defendant was not prevented

from raising an objection [to the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees] but

instead waived that claim by failing to object. By failing to object, the

defendant effectively acquiesced in that request.’’); Avery v. Medina, 174

Conn. App. 507, 524, 163 A.3d 1271, (‘‘[a]n appellate court will not reverse

an award of attorney’s fees if the defendants fail to object to a bare request

for attorney’s fees’’), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 927, 171 A.3d 61 (2017).

7 Months later, after the plaintiff filed its motion for attorney’s fees, the

defendant changed his position and claimed that the plaintiff was barred

from claiming attorney’s fees on the ground that it had failed to present a

statement of the fees requested at the time of trial.