UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

ADAM ROTHEIMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC KALATA, STEPHEN SCHELLER, 

DAN BROWN, MICHAEL J. WALLER, 

PAUL WARNER, WILLIS S. WERNER, 

and MARK CURRAN,

Defendants.

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Case No. 12-CV-1629

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Adam Rotheimer has brought a five-count Third Amended Complaint against 

former Lake County State’s Attorney Michael J. Waller; Assistant State’s Attorneys Eric Kalata, 

Stephen Scheller and Dan Brown; Lake County Sheriff Mark Curran; and former Lake County 

Sheriff’s Office employees Paul Warner and Willis S. Werner, relating to Plaintiff’s arrest and 

prosecution for allegedly threatening an Illinois state court judge in March 2010.1 Defendants 

have moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. For the reasons presented below, Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss [79] is granted. 

BACKGROUND

In March 2010, Plaintiff, a hospital patient receiving mental health treatment, allegedly 

made threatening statements against a state court judge during a session with Plaintiff’s social 

worker. (TAC ¶ 21.) After the social worker reported the alleged threat to law enforcement, 

1 Plaintiff’s current Complaint is titled “Second Amended Complaint” but is actually his 

Third Amended Complaint. 

 
Plaintiff was arrested and jailed for over a month. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 31.) Plaintiff was declared unfit to 

stand trial, and the case was dismissed in July 2010. (Id. ¶ 34.)

Plaintiff initiated this suit on March 6, 2012. On November 19, 2012, he amended his 

Complaint to allege five separate counts, including claims for violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to due process, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, respondeat superior, and 

indemnification. On April 17, 2013, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 

dismissed some counts with prejudice and some without, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. 

Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint, alleging two counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against Defendants Warner and Werner, in their individual capacities. 

On November 6, 2013, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 

Amended Complaint and granted Plaintiff final leave to amend his claims within thirty days. 

Soon after the dismissal, Plaintiff’s attorney withdrew, indicating that he did not want to pursue 

Plaintiff’s case. The matter was continued several times to give Plaintiff an opportunity to find 

new counsel and amend his claims. 

At one status, Plaintiff’s sister, Denise Rotheimer, appeared and asked to represent 

Plaintiff. The Court informed Ms. Rotheimer that she could not represent Plaintiff because she is 

not authorized to practice law and does not have standing to pursue Plaintiff’s claims on his 

behalf. On October 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Despite the 

Court’s clear instruction, the TAC states that it was “prepared by Denise Rotheimer on behalf of 

her brother, Adam Rotheimer.” 

2
The TAC repeats essentially the same claims as those found in the previously dismissed 

Complaints.2 In short, Plaintiff alleges improper conduct by Defendants related to the “initiation 

and continuation of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff,” including causing “material 

exculpatory evidence to be withheld from the presiding judges and grand jury” associated with 

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case. (TAC ¶ 36(d)). Plaintiff has asserted the following claims 

against all Defendants: § 1983 due process claim (Count I); § 1985 civil conspiracy claim (Count 

II); a purported federal law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count III); a state 

law negligence claim (Count IV); and a purported federal law negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claim (Count V). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, the 

complaint must provide a defendant “with ‘fair notice’ of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo v. 

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded factual 

allegations as true and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo, 526 

F.3d at 1081. 

2 A full recitation of Plaintiff’s factual allegations can be found in the November 18, 2013 

Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

3

 
ANALYSIS

Unauthorized Practice of Law

As a preliminary matter, the TAC must be dismissed because Ms. Rotheimer, in 

preparing the TAC, has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The Court has the inherent 

authority to impose sanctions for practicing law without a license, including striking pleadings. 

See United States v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2003) (federal court has inherent 

authority to impose sanctions for the unauthorized practice of law); Robinson v. Belom, 

No. 03 C 1, 2003 WL 21183916, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2003) (striking submissions prepared

by non-attorney and ordering non-attorney to show cause in writing why he should not be held in 

contempt of court); see also N.D. Ill. Local Rule 83.12(a) (“only members in good standing of 

the general bar of this Court may . . . file pleadings, motions or other documents”). 

Accordingly, the TAC is stricken. 

Failure to State a Claim

Furthermore, even if the TAC was not stricken as improperly prepared and filed, Plaintiff 

has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In its April 17, 2013 Order, this Court held that 

the one-year statute of limitations, found in the Illinois Local Government and Governmental 

Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (“the Illinois Tort Act”), barred Plaintiff’s 

state law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, asserted in Counts III through 

V of the TAC, are also barred by the statute of limitations found in the Illinois Tort Act.3

3 In Counts III and V, respectively, Plaintiff purports to bring federal claims for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff 

has cited to federal statutes for those claims; however, no such causes of action exist. Therefore, 

the Court has interpreted these claims to be brought under state law. 

4

 
In April 13, 2013 Order, this Court also held that Defendants Waller, Kalata, Scheller and 

Brown, who are all State’s Attorneys, had absolute prosecutorial immunity from Plaintiff’s 

claims because their alleged actions were taken within the scope of their duties as prosecutors. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts that would fall outside these duties. Consequently, 

Plaintiff’s claims asserted in the TAC against Waller, Kalata, Scheller and Brown must be 

dismissed.

Likewise, as stated in both the April 13, 2013 and November 6, 2013 Orders, the only 

allegations pertaining to Defendant Warner concern his role as a witness testifying before a 

grand jury. As such, Warner is protected by absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim. See 

Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1505 (2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Warner 

are dismissed.

In its November 6, 2013 Order, the Court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against 

Defendant Curran because there were no specific allegations about Curran’s role in the 

investigation, arrest or prosecution of Plaintiff. In the TAC, Plaintiff has not added any new 

allegations about Curran’s involvement and therefore, has again failed to state a claim against 

Curran. The claims against Curran are therefore dismissed. 

Finally, as stated in the April 13, 2013 Order, Defendant Werner, a lieutenant with the 

Lake County Sheriff’s Office, has qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. An officer is 

subject to § 1983 liability only where he violates clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights that a reasonable officer would know. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). None of Plaintiff’s allegations against Werner in the TAC establishes that Werner 

violated Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, the claims against Werner are 

dismissed. 

5
Plaintiff has been given several opportunities to amend his claims, and it is clear that 

future amendments will be futile. Consequently, dismissal of the TAC is with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6) [51] is granted. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The 

civil case is terminated. 

Date: March 3, 2015 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge

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