alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §207. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; proceeding

Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.

(Added Pub. L. 91–368, §1, July 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 693.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective upon the entry into force of the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards with respect to the United States (Dec. 29, 1970), see section 4 of Pub. L. 91–368, set out as a note under section 201 of this title.
Fiscal Year 2002 Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Maximum Required

Expenditures For 

Choice-Related Maximum Per-Child

Transportation Expenditure For

FY 2002 Title I And Supplemental Supplemental

LEA ID District Allocation * Educational Services** Educational Services ***

1100030 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 34,870,179 6,974,036 1,514.05

1199999 PART D SUBPART 2 0 0 0.00

* Actual amounts received by LEAs will be smaller than shown here due to State-level adjustments to Federal Title I allocations. States adjust

 allocations, for example, to reflect LEA boundary changes or the creation of new LEAs, including charter school LEAs, that are not accounted

 for in the Department's calculations. States also are permitted to reserve up to 1 percent of allocations for administration and must reserve

 2 percent of allocations (rising to 4 percent in fiscal year 2004) for school improvement activities. These adjustments will reduce the actual

 amounts available under all three columns of the table.

** An LEA must use up to an amount equal to 20 percent of its Title I, Part A allocation (the “20-percent reservation”) received from the State 

 to cover choice-related transportation costs for students who exercise a choice option and to pay for supplemental educational services for

 students whose parents request such services. The 20-percent reservation may include Title I, Part A funds or funding from other Federal,

 State, local, and private sources. The amount shown in this column is the Department’s estimate of the amount that affected LEAs - those

 with schools identifed for improvement, corrective action, or restructuring - may have to spend to meet this requirement. Actual 

 expenditures will depend on such factors as the number of students exercising either a choice option or supplemental educuational services and

 the costs of satisfying these requests. An LEA has discretion to determine the allocation of these funds between choice-related transportation

 and supplemental educational services, except that it must spend at least one-quarter of the 20-percent reservation - or an amount equal to

 5 percent of its Title I, Part A allocation - on each activity if there is demand for both from students and their parents.

*** An LEA that must arrange for supplemental educational services is required to pay, for each child receiving services, the lesser of the actual cost

 of the services or an amount equal to the LEA’s Title I, Part A allocation received from the State divided by the number of poor students in the

 LEA, as determined by estimates produced by the US Bureau of the Census. Thus the amount shown in this column reflects the statutory “cap”

 on per-child expenditures for supplemental educational services.
Exhibit
18.1


December 14, 2010
 
 
 Composite Technology
Corporation
 2026 McGaw Avenue
 Irvine, California
92614
 
 
 We have audited the financial statements
as of September 30, 2010 and 2009, and for each of the three years in the period
ended September 30, 2010, included in your Annual Report on Form 10-K to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and have issued our report thereon dated
December 14, 2010.  Note 1 to such financial statements contains a
description of your adoption during the year ended September 30, 2010, of the
change in method of depreciation related to certainproduction machinery
and equipment from the straight-line method to the units-of-production
method.  In our
judgment, such change is to an alternative accounting principle that is
preferable under the circumstances.
 
  /s/SingerLewak
LLP
 
 SingerLewak
LLP
Order entered October 7, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 13
- 00430
- CR DAVID CARL SWINGLE, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court

Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2
- 06
- 16 

### O RDER
The Court REINSTATES the appeal. On September 12, 2013, we denied appellant’s September 10, 2013 second motion to extend time to file his brief and ordered the trial court to make findings. On October 1, 2013, we received a

ppellant’s brief, together with an extension motion. Therefore, in the interest of expediting the appeal, we VACATE the September 12, 2013 order to the extent it requires the trial court to make findings.
We GRANT the October 1, 2013 extension motion and ORDER appellant’s brief filed
as of the date of this order.We DENY appellant’s September 25, 2013 pro se motions to dismiss counsel and

proceed pro se and to extend time to file his brief. See Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. , 528 U.S. 152 (2000).

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
#### In the Matter of Kevin T., Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated April 10, 1978 which, upon a fact-finding adjudication that the appellant is a juvenile delinquent, placed him with the Division for Youth, Title III, for a period not to exceed 18 months. Order reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and proceeding remanded to the Family Court, Queens County, for a *de novo*dispositional hearing and determination. The appellant argues and the respondent correctly concedes that the dispositional hearing in this case did not comply with the provisions of the Family Court Act. Therefore, a new dispositional hearing is required. Because of our decision in this case, we have not considered the other issues raised by the appellant. Latham, J. P., Titone, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.
-84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72 -70

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18 12 06 00

05/30

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 30 May 06

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.86 N 77.06 W Meters AGL
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS AMENDED SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FAIR GROUNDS CORPORATION AS AT AND FOR THE QUARTER ENDED
APRIL 30, 1999, AS RESTATED, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                           4,496
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,983
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        128
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,482
<PP&E>                                          52,212
<DEPRECIATION>                                  16,888
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  47,370
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,355
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,525
<OTHER-SE>                                      31,020
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    47,370
<SALES>                                         24,652
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                29,435
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,787
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,127
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  10
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,635
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,175
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,460
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  2,390
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,850
<EPS-BASIC>                                       8.22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     8.22


</TABLE>
#### Conrad Frutos, Respondent, v. Samuel Shapiro et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

Order, entered May 18, 1960, granting plaintiff summary judgment in personal injury negligence action, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-respondent. On this record the order was properly granted. It appears, however, from the briefs submitted on appeal, that defendants may be in a position to interpose issues of fact which would *1006require a trial. Consequently, in the interest of justice, defendants are entitled to move at Special Term to vacate the order granting the motion for summary judgment upon such terms and conditions as the court may require. It is only in the extraordinary ease, however, that such a failure to raise the issues of fact timely and properly should entitle a party to receive a further opportunity. Such circumstances are found to be present here, because of the possible presence of a substantial issue of contributory negligence, and defendants’ lack of familiarity with the facts of the accident, which unfortunately were not developed in the affidavits. Concur — • Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, McNally and Noonan, JJ.
##### 



Exhibit 32.3 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Current Report on Form 10-Q of Claires Stores, Inc. (the Company)
for the quarterly period ended April 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ira D. Kaplan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Ira D. KaplanIra D. KaplanChief Financial Officer June 8, 2005
Case: 1:12-cv-00201 Document #: 32 Filed: 07/02/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:240
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APRIL 10, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-14802

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 07-20759-CR-AJ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALBERTO GONZALEZ,

a.k.a. Huevo,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(April 10, 2009)

Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Neal Gary Rosensweig, appointed counsel for Alberto Gonzalez in this
direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of

appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.

1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Because independent examination of the entire

record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is

GRANTED, and Gonzalez’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-31136 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus KIBIBI NAYO DAVISON, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 98-CR-0070-B-ALL

- - - - - - - - - - July 7, 1999 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Kibibi Nayo Davison appeals her jury conviction for conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery and solicitation of robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 373, 1951. Her unopposed motion to supplement the record is GRANTED. Davison contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of her alleged involvement in a drug conspiracy and another planned robbery as other acts evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because the evidence ofNo. 98-31136 -2- Davison’s $6000 loan to Terrance Williams and her involvement with another planned robbery which was not charged was relevant to her motive and intent in the charged conspiracy to commit robbery and solicitation of robbery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence. See United States v. Misher , 99 F.3d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beechum , 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc). Davison argues that the district court clearly erred in increasing her offense level by two points for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on her alleged perjury at trial. The district court made sufficient findings that Davison committed perjury when she testified that she loaned $6000 to Williams for various personal reasons, based on the testimony of Aqui Simpson and Nicole Pope presented by the Government that Davison loaned $6000 to Williams to purchase heroin and “flip” or double the money for her. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in increasing her offense level by two points for obstruction of justice based on Davison’s perjury. See United States v. Storm , 36 F.3d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994). Davison contends that the district court clearly erred in increasing her offense level by two points under § 2B3.1(b)(4) of the Guidelines based on its finding that she and her coconspirators intended to use physical restraint of the robbery victim. Because the Government presented a recorded telephone conversation between Williams and Simpson in which they specifically discussed using physical restraint against theNo. 98-31136 -3- robbery victim, the district court did not clearly err in holding that a two-level increase was warranted under § 2B3.1(b)(4) because she and her coconspirators specifically intended to use physical restraint against the robbery victim. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4).
MOTION GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Case: 1:12-cv-01555 Document #: 20 Filed: 03/22/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:32
15.405 Price negotiation. ( a ) The purpose of performing cost or price analysis is to develop a negotiation position that permits the contracting officer and the offeror an opportunity to reach agreement on a fair and reasonable price. A fair and reasonable price does not require that agreement be reached on every element of cost, nor is it mandatory that the agreed price be within the contracting officer's initial negotiation position. Taking into consideration the advisory recommendations, reports of contributing specialists, and the current status of the contractor's purchasing system, the contracting officer is responsible for exercising the requisite judgment needed to reach a negotiated settlement with the offeror and is solely responsible for the final price agreement. However, when significant audit or other specialist recommendations are not adopted, the contracting officer should provide rationale that supports the negotiation result in the price negotiation documentation.
( b ) The contracting officer's primary concern is the overall price the Government will actually pay. The contracting officer's objective is to negotiate a contract of a type and with a price providing the contractor the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance. The negotiation of a contract type and a price are related and should be considered together with the issues of risk and uncertainty to the contractor and the Government. Therefore, the contracting officer should not become preoccupied with any single element and should balance the contract type, cost, and profit or fee negotiated to achieve a total result—a price that is fair and reasonable to both the Government and the contractor.
( c ) The Government's cost objective and proposed pricing arrangement directly affect the profit or fee objective. Because profit or fee is only one of several interrelated variables, the contracting officer shall not agree on profit or fee without concurrent agreement on cost and type of contract.
( d ) If, however, the contractor insists on a price or demands a profit or fee that the contracting officer considers unreasonable, and the contracting officer has taken all authorized actions (including determining the feasibility of developing an alternative source) without success, the contracting officer shall refer the contract action to a level above the contracting officer. Disposition of the action should be documented.
### §6920. Office of Energy Policy and New Uses

The Secretary shall establish for the Department, in the Office of the Secretary, an Office of Energy Policy and New Uses.

(Pub. L. 103–354, title II, §220, as added Pub. L. 105–185, title VI, §602, June 23, 1998, 112 Stat. 585.)
#### 1427.306 Licensing background patent rights to third parties.

Any proposed determination to be made to require third party licensing shall be submitted by the HCA through the Assistant Solicitor for Acquisitions and Intellectual Property for signature of the AS/PMB. The contractor may request a public hearing on the record prior to the above determination. In such cases, the proposed determination and the contractor's request for a hearing shall be referred to OHA. OHA shall conduct public hearings as set forth in 1427.304-1(a)(4) and shall forward its findings and recommendations to the AS/PMB for a final determination. The final determination shall inform the contractor of the right to judicial review within sixty (60) days of the AS/PMB determination.
<PAGE>

POLYDEX PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                    421 COMSTOCK ROAD
                                                    TORONTO, ONTARIO
                                                    CANADA M1L 2H5
                                                    TELEPHONE:  (416) 755-2231
                                                    FAX:  (416) 755-0334
                                                    WEBSITE:  www.polydex.com

                                                    BAHAMAS OFFICE:
                                                    284 BAY STREET,
                                                    NASSAU, BAHAMAS


                            AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYEE CONTRACT

To:       Mr. George G. Usher
From:     Ms. Sharon Wardlaw
Date:     February 4, 1999
Subject:  Employment Contract
Number of Pages: 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dear Sir,

Please be advised that your employment contract that commenced on February 1,
1994, expiring on January 31, 1999, has been extended, as of February 1, 1999,
for a further period of five years as agreed by the Board of Directors at our
recent meeting January 29-30, 1999.  The conditions remain the same for this
extension.





Yours Sincerely,


/s/ Sharon Wardlaw                           /s/ George G. Usher

Sharon Wardlaw                               George G. Usher
CFO                                          President, CEO
#### Elaine Sutherland, Appellant, v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester et al., Respondents.

[833 NYS2d 819]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered December 2, 2005. The order granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified on the law by denying the motion in part and reinstating the amended complaint insofar as it alleges that defendants subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment for the period prior to and including July 27, 1999 and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for pervasive sexual harassment by a coworker that allegedly created a hostile work environment (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; *see generally Vitale v Rosina Food Prods.,*283 AD2d 141, 142-143 [2001]). Plaintiff further alleges that defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination by retaliating against her after she complained that a coworker had sexually harassed her prior to August 1999 *(see*Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]).

*1152Supreme Court properly granted that part of defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as it alleges that defendants acquiesced in or condoned the alleged sexual harassment by the coworker following plaintiffs complaint in August 1999 and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff after she made that complaint. With respect to defendants’ alleged conduct in acquiescing in or condoning the sexual harassment, defendants met their burden by establishing that they “took immediate and adequate measures to ensure that the alleged offensive behavior would cease” *(Pace v Ogden Servs. Corp.,*257 AD2d 101, 103-104 [1999]). With respect to their alleged retaliation, defendants met their burden by establishing that plaintiff was not subjected to any disadvantageous employment action following her complaint *(see id.*at 104). In response, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting that part of defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as it alleges that defendants subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment for the period prior to and including July 27, 1999, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their initial burden, we conclude that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact whether the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiffs] employment” *(Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights,*221 AD2d 44, 50 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 809 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and whether defendants were aware of and acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct of plaintiffs coworker (see *Vitale,*283 AD2d at 143). Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Fahey and Green, JJ.