Filed 9/10/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT ANTHONY 

CHAVEZ,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B303298

(Super. Ct. No. 2018033279)

(Ventura County)

Does Penal Code1 section 1538.5 require the trial court to 

hold an evidentiary hearing when the defendant’s stated issue to 

be decided is not relevant to the motion to suppress? The answer 

is no. The order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.

FACTS

Robert Anthony Chavez was charged with misdemeanor 

resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer in violation of 

section 148, subdivision (a)(1). Chavez moved to suppress all 

tangible and intangible evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 on 

the ground that his initial detention was unlawful. 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated. 
2

The People asked the trial court to deny the motion without 

a hearing. The People reasoned that even assuming the initial 

detention was unlawful, it would not be a basis for suppressing 

evidence of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The 

court agreed, and denied the motion without a hearing. 

Chavez appealed to the appellate division of the superior 

court. The appellate division reversed. The court held that 

section 1538.5 always requires an evidentiary hearing absent a 

stipulation of facts. (Citing People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

717, 728.) The court ordered its opinion published. We ordered 

the appeal transferred.

DISCUSSION

Section 1538.5, subdivision (c)(1) provides, “Whenever a 

search or seizure motion is made in the superior court as 

provided in this section, the judge or magistrate shall receive 

evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion.”

The People argue that here there is no issue of fact 

necessary to determine the motion. They cite In re Richard G.

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1262 (Richard G.) for the 

proposition that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a new 

and distinct crime, even if it occurred during or immediately after 

an unlawful detention. 

In Richard G., police officers received a radio call that two 

males outside a residence were causing a disturbance. The 

officers saw two males fitting the description given in the radio 

dispatch walking near a park. The officers ordered the males to 

stop and sit on the ground. The defendant refused and 

threatened the officers. One of the officers grabbed the defendant 

to place him in a control hold. The defendant resisted and 
3

punched the officer. The defendant was charged with a violation 

of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). 

The defendant moved to suppress his statements and 

conduct during the detention on the theory that the detention 

was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion. We affirmed, 

stating: “An individual’s decision to commit a new and distinct 

crime, even if made during or immediately after an unlawful 

detention, is an intervening act sufficient to purge the ‘taint’ of a 

theoretically illegal detention . . . [T]he defendant’s new criminal 

behavior breaks the causal link between any constitutional 

violation and evidence of the new crime.” (Richard G., supra, 173 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.)

At oral argument on the suppression motion, Chavez

asserted that the issue was the lawfulness of the initial police 

contact with Chavez. But the lawfulness of the initial contact is 

irrelevant to the suppression of evidence under the circumstances 

here. Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) 

Section 1538.5, subdivision (c)(1) requires the trial court to 

receive evidence on “any issue of fact necessary to determine the 

motion.” The lawfulness of the initial contact is not an issue of 

fact necessary for a determination of the motion. 

Chavez distinguishes Richard G. and similar cases on the 

ground that in each case the defendant had an evidentiary 

hearing on his motion to suppress. But the question whether an 

evidentiary hearing was required was not considered in any of

those cases. A case is not authority for propositions not 

considered. (People v. Hatt (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 321, 326.) 

Similarly, in People v. Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 728, a 

case relied on by the appellate panel, the question was whether 

the People could proceed at a section 1538.5 hearing by affidavits. 
4

There was no question whether an evidentiary hearing was 

required. 

Here, Chavez was not entitled to such hearing. The trial 

court properly rejected his argument that he was entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on any issue. The language of section 1538.5 

limits the scope of such a hearing.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.
Ronda J. McKaig, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Todd W. Howeth, Public Defender, and Michael C. 

McMahon, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Gregory Totten, District Attorney, and Thomas Frye, 

Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.