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S. HRG. 110–471 

UTAH MINE DISASTER AND PREVENTING FUTURE 

TRAGEDIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SPECIAL HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 5, 2007—WASHINGTON, DC 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

CHARLES KIEFFER, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND

EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES

TOM HARKIN, Iowa, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, (ex officio) 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

Professional Staff 

ELLEN MURRAY

ERIK FATEMI

MARK LAISCH

ADRIENNE HALLETT

LISA BERNHARDT

BETTILOU TAYLOR (Minority) 

SUDIP SHRIKANT PARIKH (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

TERI CURTIN

JEFF KRATZ (Minority) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening statement of Senator Tom Harkin .......................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Opening statement of Senator Arlen Specter ........................................................ 4 

Opening statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd ..................................................... 6 

Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch .................................................................... 7 

Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett ............................................................... 8 

Statement of Hon. Richard E. Stickler, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Mine 

Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, Washington, DC .. 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement of Senator Patty Murray ....................................................... 30 

Statement of J. Davitt McAteer, esquire, vice president of sponsored programs, Wheeling Jesuit University, Shepherdstown, West Virginia ............... 42 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Statement of Cecil E. Roberts, international president, United Mine Workers 

of America, Fairfax, Virginia .............................................................................. 49 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51 

Statement of Bruce Watzman, vice president, safety, health and human resources, National Mining Association, Washington, DC ................................... 62 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64 

Questions submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye ............................................... 76 

Questions submitted by Senator Patty Murray .................................................... 77 

Questions submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd .................................................. 79 

Questions submitted by Senator Robert F. Bennett ............................................. 81 

(1) 

UTAH MINE DISASTER AND PREVENTING 

FUTURE TRAGEDIES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:32 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Harkin (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Harkin, Murray, Byrd, Specter, and Bennett. 

Also present: Senator Hatch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM HARKIN

Senator HARKIN. Good morning. The Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 

will come to order for this hearing on the Utah mine accident and 

improving mine safety. 

As you all know, last month an underground collapse in the 

Crandall Canyon Mine in Utah trapped six miners. All of our 

hearts and prayers go out to the families of those six missing miners. Three rescue workers died trying to save the trapped miners. 

One of these brave men, Gary Jensen, was an MSHA employee. 

Mr. Stickler, I understand how difficult this must for you personally, and I offer my condolences to you and all of the MSHA family 

for the loss of Mr. Jensen. 

Our hearing today will address what we know so far about why 

the accident happened and what we can do to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. One thing that my chairman 

and I share is that we both come from coal-mining families. My father started mining coal in Iowa, oh, about 1910. A lot of people 

don’t know that Iowa was one of the most prolific coal-mining/producing areas of the country at that time. He mined coal for over 

20 years. I can—now, that was long before I was born, but I can 

remember, as a kid, growing up, my father telling me the stories 

about those years in the mines, when they would go down the shaft 

before the sunrise and come up after the sunset. They would go 

weeks without ever seeing the sun, air being pumped down by men 

that would operate the pumps and pump the air down into the 

mines, and how many people were always getting killed. Always 

getting killed. 

I came across an interesting figure the other day. More than 

104,000 people have died in our Nation’s coal mines over the last 

century—104,000. Hundreds of thousands more, like my own fa-
2 

ther, succumbed to black lung disease—hundreds of thousands 

more. 

So, when this accident happened, I remembered the stories of my 

father, telling me about what happened to them. You wonder, with 

all of this wonderful technology we have today, with the Mine 

Health and Safety Act of 1952, which mandates inspections—you 

wonder why this continues to happen like this. This is what we 

want to look into. 

As I said, a lot’s changed since the days my father mined coal, 

but I am concerned and disappointed that MSHA’s not been able 

to approve the use of better communications and tracking systems, 

and that mine operators are not employing the best technology currently available to protect their employees. 

Our hearing today will focus on what this subcommittee and 

agencies under its jurisdiction—MSHA and NIOSH—are doing to 

make mining as safe as possible. We also need to understand 

MSHA’s actions leading up to the accident in the Crandall Canyon. 

I have one basic question, Mr. Stickler—I’ll get to that one with 

our opening questions—What did MSHA know about the so-called 

‘‘bounces’’ or ‘‘bumps’’—they’re called ‘‘bounces’’ in the East, and 

‘‘bumps’’ in the West, I guess; I call ’em cave-ins, that’s really what 

they are—what about the bounces that occurred in March before it 

approved the plan to mine in the area of the accidents, 900 feet 

away—900 feet away—what did MSHA know about that? Is the approval process for this type of mining rigorous enough—this type 

of retreat mining? Is the inspection process identifying everything 

it should when miners are pulling pillars of coal 2,000 feet beneath 

the earth? 

I have the report of the engineering company. Well, I have it 

someplace here, reading it last night. The report of the engineering 

company that went out and—after the first bounce in March, and 

then recommended the subsequent bigger pillars 900 feet to the 

south. What did MSHA know about this? I want to find out the answer to that question. 

We also need to know how the rescue operation was developed. 

Did we get the best thinking and technology available, to the table? 

What did we learn about what other countries are doing in effective mine rescue operations that can be adopted here? MSHA sponsored the Third Annual International Mine Rescue Conference, just 

last week. What are we learning? Most importantly, why do we 

continue to have these hearings? We had ’em under Senator Specter, when he was chair. We had one earlier this year. Here we are 

again. Eighteen months since the hearing after the Sago disaster 

in West Virginia, Senator Byrd’s home. 

This Congress has taken significant steps to give the administration the resources and tools it needs to work toward zero fatalities 

and serious injuries in underground coal mines. The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriations bills included $25 million to 

hire more mine inspectors. Well, what happened, Mr. Stickler? The 

2007 appropriations bill included more than $300 million for 

MSHA, $14 million more than the President requested in his budget. What’s happened? 
3 

The administration must respond by effectively spending these 

substantial resources in delivering the kind of results that mining 

families across the country expect and deserve. 

Now, I’m told that—actually, it’s the Salt Lake Tribune really 

has done, I think, a superb job in investigative reporting on this, 

and uncovered a memo revealing that there had been serious structural problems at the Crandall Canyon Mine in March, 900 feet 

away; pointed out there had been 324 violations attributed to this 

company and its subsidiary, of which 107 were considered, in the 

words of a Federal mine safety agency spokesman, quote, ‘‘significant and substantial.’’ Yet I think the total amount of fines to that 

company was about $19,000. These are serious allegations. We 

need to know what MSHA’s doing, and we need to get to the bottom of this, and quit having these kind of hearings every time we 

have a disaster. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

I know mining’s unsafe. I know it is a hazardous occupation. But 

new technologies, new procedures, inspections, should reduce, to 

the minimum possible, these kinds of accidents. I don’t think that’s 

happening right now. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM HARKIN

Good morning, the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human 

Services, and Education will now come to order for this hearing on the Utah mine 

accident and improving mine safety. 

As we all know, last month, an underground collapse in the Crandall Canyon 

mine in Utah trapped 6 miners. My heart goes out to the families of the 6 missing 

miners. 

Three rescue workers died trying to save the trapped miners. One of those brave 

men, Gary Jensen, was an MSHA employee. Mr. Stickler, I understand how difficult 

this must be for you personally and I offer my condolences to you for the loss of 

Mr. Jensen. Our hearing today will address what we know so far about why this 

accident happened and what we can do to prevent similar accidents from recurring 

in the future. 

I come from a coal mining family, so I appreciate the risks involved in mining. 

My father was a coal miner, starting around 1910. Not many people are aware that 

Iowa was a coal producing State in the early 20th century. In fact, my father mined 

coal there for 23 years. 

Not only was Iowa an active coal State, it also is home to the great labor leader, 

John L. Lewis. Lewis was born February 12, 1880, to Welsh immigrant parents, in 

the coal mining camp of Cleveland, Iowa—one mile east of Lucas. Now, Lucas is 

home to a museum in his honor. 

Anyhow, I’ll never forget the stories my dad told me about how they used to pump 

air down into the mines, and ride rickety old elevators down the mine before sunrise 

and come back up after the sun had set. He and his fellow miners would describe 

the cave-ins and other tragic losses of their friends. The bravery of these men really 

left an impression on me. It’s also why I believe we need to do all we can to protect 

workers who operate in dangerous settings like these. 

A lot has changed since my father started mining in Iowa, almost 100 years ago. 

That’s why I continue to ask why we don’t have better systems for communicating 

safely and effectively with miners underground after an accident, or at least knowing where they are through some tracking technology. I am disappointed that 

MSHA has not been able to approve the use of better communication and tracking 

systems and that mine operators are not employing the best technology currently 

available to protect their employees. 

Our hearing today will focus on what this subcommittee and agencies under its 

jurisdiction—MSHA and NIOSH—are doing to make mining as safe as possible. We 

also need to understand MSHA’s actions leading up to the accident in Crandall Canyon. What did MSHA know about the bounces that occurred in March before it ap-
4 

proved the plan to mine in the area of the accident? Is the approval process for this 

type of mining rigorous enough? Is the inspection process identifying everything it 

should when miners are pulling pillars of coal 2,000 feet beneath the earth? 

We also need to know how the rescue operation plan was developed. Did we get 

the best thinking and technology available to the table? I know MSHA sponsored 

the third annual International Mine Rescue Conference just last week. What did we 

learn about what other countries are doing in effective mine rescue operations that 

can be adopted here? 

Most importantly, why do we continue to have these hearings? Its been more than 

18 months since the hearing after the Sago disaster in West Virginia. 

This Congress has taken significant steps to give the administration the resources 

and tools it needs to work toward zero fatalities and serious injuries in underground 

coal mines. The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriations bill included $25 million to hire more mine inspectors. The 2007 appropriations bill included more than 

$300 million for MSHA, almost $14 million more than the President requested in 

his budget. The administration must respond by effectively spending these substantial resources and delivering the kind of results that mining families across the 

country expect and deserve. 

Before we hear from our witnesses, I would like to recognize Senator Byrd and 

Senator Specter for their vital role on mine safety issues. Senator Specter and I continue the seamless passing of the gavel for this subcommittee and both had a great 

interest in calling for this hearing. He is a true friend to miners in Pennsylvania 

and the United States. His legislation was crucial in forging the bipartisan MINER 

Act, which was passed last June. 

Senator HATCH. With that, I would defer to Senator Specter, 

then Senator Byrd, for opening statements. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This subcommittee is convened, again, to look into another tragedy, a coal-mining disaster taking the lives of six miners, the lives 

of three rescue workers, another great tragedy. Again, the question 

is, Why? Beyond the generalized question of why, there are many 

specific questions, which this subcommittee will inquire into. 

At the outset, let me note the presence of our two colleagues from 

Utah: Senator Hatch, who had been the chairman of the Committee on Labor, in years gone by, going back to the 97th Congress, 

and Senator Bennett, who is on the full committee; and to note 

that Secretary of Labor Chao has appointed an independent team 

of mine safety experts, and that Governor Jon Huntsman, of Utah, 

is very deeply involved in the inquiry. But this subcommittee has 

been especially vigilant in this area for my tenure in the Senate, 

which goes back to the 1980 election. As Senator Harkin noted, we 

have been on these matters, regardless of who chaired the subcommittee, and the special diligence of the chairman of the full 

committee, Senator Byrd, who has a very deep interest in these 

subjects from his experience in West Virginia, which is a big coalmining State. 

The questions begin with the sale of the Crandall Canyon Mine 

from—UtahAmerica, Incorporated, purchased the mine from 

Andalex Resources on August 9, 2006, because Andalex declined to 

do any further mining at Crandall Canyon, because it was too risky 

for worker safety. Well, if it’s too risky for worker safety, why do 

the mine operations go on? 

Then there was a bump, or bounce. That’s an expression which 

is used to describe a situation where, as here, you have 1,500 to 

2,000 feet of coal—of mountain on top of coal pillars. When the 

mountain settles, there’s pressure on the coal pillars, and the coal 
5 

explodes and fills the mine and coal with debris. There, on March 

12 of this year, you had this kind of an occurrence. So, how could 

Mine Safety, your department, Mr. Stickler, authorize mining only 

900 feet away from the mine collapse? Our inquiries have raised 

a question as to whether it was even known to MSHA. Hard to see 

how that would not be known, but that’s a matter we’re going to 

be pursuing here. 

Then you have the issue of violations, which Senator Harkin 

commented about, 67 citations issued at Crandall Canyon since Mr. 

Murray purchased the mine. Twenty-one were, ‘‘serious and substantial,’’ only fines of $19,662. The proposed penalty for 10 of 

those ‘‘serious and substantial violations’’ was zero. My experience 

as an enforcer has been that it takes tough penalties to deter misconduct. The question here, that looms over the entire proceeding 

with these nine deaths, is whether there was criminal negligence 

involved here, knowing that these risks were involved. We’ve got 

to get into the details as to what occurred here. 

Your predecessor, Assistant Secretary David Lauriski, initiated a 

‘‘new compliance assistance,’’ as opposed to the greater emphasis on 

penalties, leading the United Mine Workers’ testimony, ‘‘chilled enforcement efforts at the mine level had allowed operators essentially to negotiate workplace health and safety matters’’. So, we’re 

really looking at a situation as to whether we have a license to ignore the law. Those are all major matters, which we have to look 

into. 

Then you have the rescue operations, where—the incident was on 

August 6. On August 11, there was a significant bump. On August 

15, there were three significant bumps. Then another bump on August 16, resulting in the death—two miners and an inspector. Well, 

what was the quality of the safety precautions taken with all of 

these bumps lined up? You have the testimony of a group of experts, Robert Ferriter, director of the Colorado School of Mines, 27- 

year veteran of MHSA, highly critical of the decision to allow retreat mining of the southern tunnel because of—the weight of the 

mountain above would not have been sufficient from the weight in 

the northern tunnel, which collapsed only 900 feet away from the 

operations. Similar comments made by Dr. Larry Grayson, head of 

the Penn State University Mining and Engineering Program, and 

Tony Opachar, former MSHA inspector. 

Then you have the activity of Mr. Robert Murray, the owner, taking over on the relations with the media and with the families, 

leading to a situation where you, Mr. Stickler, had to ask the sheriff to keep Robert Murray out of the meeting. Robert Murray said 

there was an earthquake, tried to represent that it was an act of 

God and no fault on the part of the mine owners, Mr. Murray being 

the mine owner. A little surprised to find out, yesterday, that Mr. 

Murray is not here today, was given adequate notice to come. First 

he said he was too busy, and now he says he’s too sick, but he 

hasn’t given us any doctor certification as to his problem. We had 

not issued a subpoena. Wherever he has a colorable reason, we 

would be inclined to honor it, but a little peremptory on his part 

just to tell us he’s not coming. I’ve discussed with the chairman the 

issue of a subpoena, and I am personally convinced we need, and 

will issue, a subpoena here. We will not allow him to avoid answer-
6 

ing questions from this subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over 

this very important matter. 

So, we will be pursuing this matter with real intensity, Mr. 

Stickler, to find the answers to these questions, and to give assurances to the families of these nine men who lost their lives, and 

to give assurances to the miners who risk their lives, day in and 

day out, that this subcommittee and the Senate and the Congress 

will be vigilant finding the answers and moving to impose sanctions, where appropriate, and to do our best to ensure safety in the 

future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

Senator Byrd. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Harkin. Thank you, Senator 

Specter. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. Thank you for everything you do on behalf of America’s coalminers. 

When disaster struck at the Sago Mine last year, it was described by some as an anomaly. There were even suggestions that 

the 12 fatalities at that mine should not reflect upon the actual 

performance of MSHA, which, it was claimed, is improving now. In 

the short span of 12 days between August 4 and August 16, seven 

miners were killed, six more presumed dead. Two days ago, another miner was killed in Mingo County, West Virginia, bringing 

the total number of fatalities this year to 24, which more than doubled the total number of fatalities for 2007, compared to 1 month 

ago. 

More worrisome is the article in today’s Charleston Gazette, reporting that MSHA, this year, has not yet performed a regular full 

inspection of the Bronzite Mine in Mingo County, West Virginia, 

where the fatality occurred on Monday. It should be clear now— 

and I hope and pray that it is clear to the officials at the Department of Labor—that these tragedies are certainly not anomalies. 

To claim that they are is an insult to the families of the deceased. 

That claim is a shallow attempt to deny that something has gone 

terribly wrong within the agencies and offices charged with the 

safety and health of our Nation’s coalminers. 

Since the tragedy at Crandall Canyon, there has been a lot of 

talk about the dangers of retreat or secondary mining, and whether 

that practice ought to be prohibited. That is as it should be. But 

let us not obscure the larger questions about MSHA’s role at 

Crandall Canyon. While there is enough blame to go around, 

MSHA clearly had the final responsibility for approving or disapproving the mining operation at the Crandall Mine. Why did 

MSHA approve such a dangerous method of mining in such an unstable location in the first place? MSHA was intended to be a 

strong Federal agency with the authority to investigate, penalize, 

and, when necessary, shut down a coal mine for safety violations. 

It is infuriating to watch MSHA, even after the tragedy at Sago, 

continue a tepid, disjointed, and minimalist approach to mine safety. What the hell does it take to shake up that agency? 

Mr. Stickler, you were appointed to head MSHA, last year. I like 

you very much. But the buck, as they say, stops with you. In the 
7 

aftermath of Sago last year, the Congress gave you the authorities 

you requested as part of the MINER Act. The Appropriations Committee gave you the funding to hire the additional safety inspectors. The Appropriations Committee increased the budget for coal 

enforcement so that you could expedite the implementation of the 

MINER Act. Yet, such tragedies are continuing to happen, claiming 

the lives of a dozen miners at a time. What is the problem at 

MSHA? What the hell is the problem at MSHA? It’s no secret that 

I have a hold on your nomination, yeah, like that. I have a hold 

on your nomination. We have met several times to discuss your efforts at the agency, and I’ve enjoyed meeting with you, and I respect your sincerity. But, Mr. Stickler, it is past time—way past 

time—to take the gloves off, take charge of the agency you have 

been entrusted with managing, crack some heads—yes, crack some 

heads, get rid of the political deadweight now, and empower your 

inspectors to go after recalcitrant coal operators who are daily putting the lives of our miners at risk. These miners are brave men 

and women. They toil in the darkness of the earth and in danger. 

They have families, friends, lives they want to live. Show us that 

you’re going to do whatever it takes to protect them. 

Thank you. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Chairman Byrd. 

Normally, I—we have always operated this way, that the chairman and ranking member makes opening statements. Of course, 

out of respect for the full chairman or full ranking member, if 

they’re here, we let them making opening statements. But, since 

this did occur in the States represented by two of the Senators who 

are here, I would respectfully request any opening statements or 

remarks that they might have at this time, and I would go first to 

Senator Hatch the ranking Senator from Utah, if you had any 

opening remarks at all. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, it’s so nice of 

you to do that. I hadn’t planned on making any opening statement, 

but both Senator Bennett and I are very pleased that you and Senator Specter have invited us to participate in this hearing today, 

because we’re very concerned. 

Let me just, if I can, take a few moments, and congratulate those 

who tried to save the six trapped miners, and express my heartfelt 

gratitude to the three brave rescuers who gave their lives in an attempt to rescue the six trapped miners in the Crandall Canyon 

Mine. I am honored to serve the people of Utah—as is Senator Bennett—who are among the most selfless individuals in the country. 

Mr. Brandon Kimber, Mr. Dale Black, and Mr. Gary Jensen, the 

three rescuers that bravely gave the ultimate sacrifice in an attempt to free their six trapped colleagues, are all examples of the 

best Utah has to offer, and our thoughts and prayers continue to 

be with their families at this difficult time, as well as with the families of the six miners who were lost in the tragedy and others who 

have been injured. On behalf of all of our fellow Utahans, I’d like 

to say thank you to the thousands of people who have expressed 

kind words, thoughts, and prayers on behalf of these affected by 

the accident. 
8 

I also would like to extend some praise to the officials, who responded so aptly to the crisis immediately following the mine collapse. Like only Utahans can do, we came together as a community 

to respond as one, leaving aside title and agency designations. We 

had Federal, State, and local officials working seamlessly together 

to do all they could to rescue the six trapped miners. 

Personally, I’d like to publicly thank Mr. Richard Stickler, who 

joins us today, for traveling to Utah almost immediately after the 

collapse, and remaining at the mine site for most of the days that 

this went on. Utah’s able Governor, Jon Huntsman, was there 

every day, and his dedicated team of professionals. They deserve 

special recognition for their immediate response to the mine collapse. I’d also like to thank the mayor of Huntington, Mayor Hilary 

Gordon, as well as the mayor of Price, Joe Piccolo, and the hard 

work of Sheriff Lamar Guyman and his team of law enforcement 

officials, who continue to secure the mine site. These are people 

that are heroes, in my eyes. 

Mr. Stickler, I was there with you a number of times, and all I 

can say is that what I saw from you was as much caring and consideration as I’ve ever seen in any of these situations, so I want 

to personally express my gratitude to you again. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for being so kind to us. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Bennett. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the opportunity of being here. 

Like Senator Hatch, I want to express my condolences to the 

families who have lost loved ones in both the initial accident and 

the rescue operation. I have deep respect for the Utah miners and 

all those who toiled with respect to this tragic event. I’ve discovered again how tightly knit the mining communities in central 

Utah really are, and this is not just a tragedy for the families, it’s 

a tragedy for all of those who are part of that particular culture 

in that part of our State. Coal mining is a dangerous operation. 

We can take some comfort in the statistical fact that, if I might, 

Mr. Chairman, going back to your father’s day, in the 1920s the annual fatality rate was 3.36 miners per 1,000 per year, and today 

it’s .2 per 1,000 per year. So, as a Nation, we have made a great 

deal of progress from the days that you talk about. 

But, as Senator Byrd has reminded us, the tragedies of the last 

30 to 60 days indicate that we must continue to make progress and 

not be lulled into a sense of security by the progress that has been 

made. 

Now, I’m looking forward to the testimony of Mr. Stickler. I was 

at the mine with him a day after the initial accident. Remember 

very clearly the briefing that we received and the assurances, that 

were very firm and across the board—from local officials, from the 

operator, and from MSHA officials—that there would be no further 

rescue operations until the seismic activity in the mountain had 

stopped. There had been initial rescue operations that stopped because of seismic activity, feeling that they were endangering those 

who were—those who were involved. There was some impatience, 
9 

on the part of people who don’t understand mining, that the rescue 

operations had stopped. But it was clearly understood that we’re 

not going to resume any rescue operations until the seismic activity 

within the mountain had ceased. So, it was with great pit—feeling 

in the pit of my stomach when I heard, later, that rescue operations had begun again, and that three more individuals were 

killed. 

So, I would look forward to a discussion with Mr. Stickler on the 

question of why the rescue operations were resumed, what information they had with respect to the state of the mountain and with 

the state of security or protective measures that might have been 

taken. I think that’s clearly something that we need to get into, in 

some greater detail. 

Now, I’m pleased that Secretary Chao has initiated an independent investigation into the role of MSHA with respect to this 

disaster, along with the Governor of the State of Utah, who has his 

own investigation, going forward. I look forward to the time when 

we have the results of those investigations, so that we can then 

make whatever public policy decisions we need to make as to what 

needs to be done, further. 

So, I look forward to a productive hearing. I welcome Mr. Stickler 

here, as I welcomed him to our State. We have unique topography, 

and it may be that solutions that are effective in other parts of the 

country are not effective in Utah. I hope we can use this tragedy 

as an opportunity to find out exactly what it is we need to do to 

make mining as safe as possible in the future, not only for my own 

State, but for all miners everywhere. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening the hearing and for allowing Senator Hatch and me to participate. 

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESS

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Senator Bennett. Senator Hatch, thank you for being here today. 

Well, we’ll turn now—Mr. Richard Stickler, our first panel—then 

we’ll move on to our second panel—Assistant Secretary of Labor for 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. Prior to his appointment, 

director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Deep Mine Safety, from 

1997 to 2003. Mr. Stickler is a native of West Virginia, received his 

BA from Fairmont State University, and is certified as a mine safety professional by the International Society of Mine Safety Professionals. 

Mr. Stickler, we welcome you, again, to the subcommittee. I have 

your statement; it’ll be made a part of the record in its entirety. 

I’d ask you to summarize it within, well, 7 to 10 minutes, and then 

we’ll get to questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD E. STICKLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. STICKLER. Thank you. Good morning. Chairman Harkin, 

Chairman Byrd, ranking member Specter, Senator Hatch, Senator 

Bennett, and members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you 

for the invitation to appear here today. 
10 

The professionals that comprise the Mine Health and Safety Administration, many of whom are former miners, feel profound sadness over the accidents at Crandall Canyon Mine. 

As a third-generation coalminer, I have worked in the mining industry nearly 40 years. I know firsthand that every fatality, serious 

injury, and occupational illness and disease is devastating for the 

miners, their families and the communities they live in. That is 

why I’m deeply saddened by the tragic accident at Crandall Canyon 

Mine that occurred on August 6 involving Manual Sanchez, Brandon Phillips, Alonso Hernandez, Don Erickson, Carlos Payan, and 

Kerry Allred, and the subsequent accident, during the rescue effort, 

that claimed the lives of the heroic rescue workers, Brandon 

Kimball, Dale Black, and Gary Jensen, who was one of MSHA’s 

own safety professionals. These events underscore the importance 

of MSHA’s mission to protect the health and safety of the Nation’s 

miners. 

In the wake of this accident, my resolve and MSHA’s commitment to enforcing the mine safety and health laws have never been 

stronger. We will not know the cause of these tragedies until 

MSHA completes its accident investigation, but I assure you we’ll 

expeditiously act on the findings to help prevent similar accidents 

in the future. 

MSHA’s accident investigation team will meet with the family 

members today and will begin their accident investigation onsite at 

the mine. In addition, Department of Labor has taken the unprecedented step of appointing an independent review team of outside 

mine safety experts to review the actions of MSHA relative to the 

Crandall Canyon Mine accident. 

What we currently know is that, at approximately 2:50 a.m. 

mountain time on August 6, a mountain bump occurred at the 

Crandall Canyon Mine located near Huntington, Utah. The force of 

this bump registered 3.9 on the Richter scale. Seismologists with 

the U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center have since stated that the seismic event was the result of a 

mine collapse. Inside the mine, the force of the bump was so intense that it blew out the ventilation walls more than a half a mile 

from the bump area. In my nearly 40 years of working in the mine 

industry, I have never seen a catastrophic mountain bump of this 

magnitude. 

One of the most difficult and longstanding engineering problems 

associated with mining is the catastrophic failure of mine structures, known as ‘‘bumps.’’ Coal and rock outbursts caused by 

bumps have presented serious mining problems for decades, in 

metal, nonmetal mines, and also coal mines, and have occurred as 

the result of all types of mining systems, including longwall mining, room-and-pillar developed mining, room-and-pillar retreat mining, and pillar splitting. While ground control experts have determined methods to minimize the results of—and the occurrence of— 

mountain bumps, they cannot always accurately predict when they 

will occur, nor can they design mining plans that will guarantee 

that they will not occur. 

After we learned of the six miners who were missing, the rescue 

attempt within the mine moved very slowly, because we required 

the installation of rib supports, consisting of 40-ton water jacks, 
11 

chain-link fence, and heavy steel rope cables in front of the water 

jacks in order to protect the rescue workers from further mountain 

bumps. These safety precautions, which were recommended by experts from MSHA and outside the agency, proved to be inadequate 

to prevent the second bump from fatally injuring three rescue 

workers. 

At that point, MSHA suspended the rescue attempts inside the 

mine, while continuing rescue work from the surface of the mine. 

In all, seven bore holes were drilled, but rescuers have not been 

able to determine the location of the miners. In every bore hole, the 

rescuers attempted to lower a microphone and a camera to see if 

they could hear or see the trapped miners. However, none of these 

communication efforts have been successful. Last week, we informed the families that we had exhausted all known rescue options and were forced to suspend the rescue operation. 

MSHA has and continues to be responsive to the families. MSHA 

provided interpreters for the Spanish-speaking families and encouraged members of the clergy to participate in the family briefings. 

I spent several hours every day with the families of the trapped 

miners, doing whatever I could to be responsive to their needs, to 

answer all the questions they had, and provide what information 

we could to them. 

Our personnel continue to provide information through counseling and our family liaisons that MSHA has onsite, and will continue to do so throughout this accident investigation. We will work 

hard to make sure that the family members are communicated 

with, the lead investigator will update the family members, follow 

up on any questions and concerns that they have throughout the 

course of this accident investigation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

We, at MSHA, work hard every day to ensure that every miner 

returns home safely to his family after every shift, and the events 

of those—at Crandall Canyon affect us greatly, because our goal is 

to prevent all fatalities. I thank you for inviting me here today, and 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD E. STICKLER

Chairman Harkin, Chairman Byrd, Senator Specter, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. 

As a third-generation coal miner, I have worked in the coal mining industry for 

more than 40 years. My experience includes working shifts in underground coal 

mines, serving as the captain of a mine rescue team, and working in and around 

mine sites and mining communities every day. I know firsthand that every fatality, 

injury, and illness is devastating for miners, their families, and the communities 

they live in. That is why I am deeply saddened by the tragic accident resulting in 

6 missing miners that occurred at the Crandall Canyon mine on August 6, 2007, 

and the subsequent accident during the rescue effort that claimed the lives of three 

rescue workers, including one Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) employee on August 16, 2007. 

These events underscore the importance of the agency’s mission to protect the 

safety and health of the Nation’s miners. In the wake of this accident, my resolve 

and MSHA’s commitment to enforce the Nation’s mine safety and health laws have 

never been stronger. We will not know the cause of these tragedies until MSHA 

completes its accident investigation. The Crandall Canyon mine accident investigation team is presently at the mine to conduct their onsite investigation activities. 
12 

The Department has named an independent review team to look at MSHA’s actions 

at the Crandall Canyon Mine before August 6, 2007. 

CRANDALL CANYON MINE ACCIDENT

On August 6, at approximately 2:50 a.m. Mountain Daylight Time, a mine bump 

occurred at the Crandall Canyon mine, located near Huntington, Utah. The force 

of this mine bump was registered by seismographs, and the U.S. Geological Survey 

National Earthquake Information Center initially reported that an earthquake with 

a magnitude of 3.9 on the Richter Scale occurred near the mine. Seismologists with 

the U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center in Colorado 

and the University of Utah have since stated that the seismic event was a mine collapse, not an earthquake. Inside the mine, the force of this bump was so intense 

that it blew the ventilation stoppings out through cross-cut 95—more than a mile 

from the area where the miners were working. Since the event, six miners—Manuel 

Sanchez, Brandon Phillips, Alonso Hernandez, Don Erickson, Carlos Payan, and 

Kerry Allred—have been missing. The subsequent rescue attempt within the mine 

moved slowly, because safety dictated the installation of rib supports consisting of 

40-ton rock props, chain-linked fence and steel cables to protect the rescue workers 

from further mine bumps. These safety precautions—which were recommended by 

experts from MSHA and outside the agency—proved to not be strong enough to prevent a second burst from fatally injuring three rescue workers, Brandon Kimber, 

Dale Black, and Gary Jensen, who worked for MSHA. At that point, MSHA halted 

the rescue attempts inside the mine, while continuing the rescue work from the surface. 

In order to understand how we arrived at the events of August 6, I want to provide the committee with the background of the mine. Mining began at Crandall 

Canyon mine in 1981. According to MSHA records, Murray Energy Corp. became 

the mine’s controller on August 9, 2006. Since Murray Energy took ownership of the 

operation last year, MSHA has issued 67 violations against the mine, plus the section 103(k) order issued immediately after the accident on August 6, 2007. 

MSHA INSPECTION ACTIVITY AT CRANDALL CANYON

Under the Mine Safety and Health Act, MSHA is required to inspect all underground coal mines four times a year. Since the purchase of the Crandall Canyon 

mine by Murray Energy, MSHA has performed 5 regularly scheduled inspections, 

two spot inspections, responded to a complaint from a whistleblower, and performed 

a roof control technical inspection. One of the regularly scheduled inspections was 

occurring when Murray Energy Corp. purchased the mine. A total of 73 citations 

were issued during these inspections with proposed penalties of $19,662. 

CRANDALL CANYON EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

Under the MINER Act, all underground coal mines are required to develop and 

adopt a written emergency response plan (ERP) that provides for the safe evacuation of miners and the maintenance of miners trapped underground. The ERP for 

Crandall Canyon mine was approved on June 13, 2007. The Crandall Canyon mine 

was in compliance with the SCSR requirements, the lifeline requirements, the communications requirements, the tracking, training, post-accident logistics, and local 

coordination requirements. The mine had elected to use refuge shelters comprised 

of oxygen cylinders and pre-packaged soda lime cartridges to meet its breathable air 

requirement and had placed a purchase order but had not received the refuge shelter. Finally, the mine used personal emergency devices (PEDs)—which are not required under the ERP—in addition to its redundant communications systems. 

RETREAT MINING AT CRANDALL CANYON MINE

MSHA’s records indicate the first plan for retreat mining at Crandall Canyon 

Mines was approved on September 27, 1989. Prior to Murray Energy taking control, 

all longwall mining was completed and room and pillar mining was conducted at 

various locations. Since August 2006, MSHA has approved two amendments to the 

Crandall Canyon roof control plan that allowed for pillar extraction in both the 

North Barrier of Main West and in the South Barrier of Main West of the mine. 

The first plan for retreat mining under Murray Energy Corp.’s ownership was approved on February 2, 2007. The roof-control plan for the mine was amended to 

allow retreat mining of the North Barrier of the Main West and was signed by the 

District Manager. A second amendment to the roof control plan was approved on 

June 15, 2007, for retreat mining of the South Barrier of the Main West. The accident on August 6, 2007, occurred in the South Barrier of Main West. 
13 

As part of the operator’s submission for roof control approval, two geotechnical reports by Agapito Associates, Inc. (Agapito) were provided to MSHA for review and 

consideration. Agapito concluded that retreat mining could be conducted safely in 

that area of the mine. Prior to the approval of the plan, a MSHA roof control supervisor and specialist visited Crandall Canyon to assess the conditions in the North 

Main Barrier and based on their observations in that area, required amendments 

to the roof control plan for additional roof supports. In addition, MSHA required 

Crandall Canyon to install additional roof support for retreat mining in the North 

Main Barrier. 

Mining took place on the North Main Barrier until March 2007, when a mountain 

bump occurred. MSHA was not notified about this bump or the magnitude of the 

bump when it occurred. The accident investigation team will determine whether the 

incident was required to be reported to MSHA as part of its work. After the bump, 

mining was abandoned in that section and Crandall Canyon submitted another 

amendment to its roof control plan asking for permission to use retreat mining in 

the South Main Barrier. It again commissioned Agapito to evaluate the stability of 

that section of the mine. While Agapito again concluded that retreat mining could 

be conducted safely, it also suggested extending the remaining coal pillars that were 

left to support the roof from 80 by 92 feet to 80 by 129 feet. A MSHA roof control 

supervisor and a roof control specialist were underground in the South Barrier Section on May 22, 2007, to evaluate the operator’s submitted plan to retreat mine. The 

retreat mining plan with the increased pillar dimensions was approved on June 15, 

2007. 

RETREAT MINING OF PILLARS

Much has been made in the media about retreat mining. Retreat mining is a common practice where coal is mined from coal pillars. When this coal is mined the roof 

normally falls in a structured manner to relieve the pressure placed on the underground mine workings. As of August 21, 2007, 223 underground coal mines had approved roof control plans that allow for pillar-removal. This represents 48 percent 

of all active underground coal mines. Retreat mining can be conducted safely, especially with today’s technological advances that include mobile, remote controlled roof 

supports, if the roof control plans are adhered to. Overall, the roof fall fatality rate 

in U.S. underground mines has averaged 0.001 per 200,000 hours worked (or 1 per 

100,000 full time miners) in recent years (prior to the Crandall Canyon incident), 

down significantly from its average in the past. 

MINE BUMPS

One of the most difficult, longstanding engineering problems associated with mining is the catastrophic failure of mine structures known as bumps. Coal and rock 

outbursts caused by bumps or bounces have presented serious mining problems for 

decades in metal, non-mental, and coal mines. Fatalities and injuries have resulted 

when these destructive events occur. 

Bumps have been categorized as either pressure or shock bumps. A pressure 

bump occurs when a pillar in a developed area is statically stressed past the failure 

strength of the pillar. A shock bump is caused by dynamic loading of the pillar 

through dramatic changes in stress distribution within the overlying strata as the 

result of breaking of thick, massive strata. In many cases bumps are the result of 

the combination of both pressure and shock forces. Bumps occur when complex arrangements of geology, topography, in situ stress and mining conditions interact to 

interfere with the orderly dissipation of stress. Strong, stiff roof and floor strata not 

prone to failing are also contributing factors when combined with deep overburden. 

Questions about the influence of individual factors and interaction among factors 

arise, but are difficult to answer owing to the limited experience at a given mine. 

Bumps have occurred in all types of mining systems. A United States Bureau of 

Mines report that reviewed bumps that occurred between 1936 and 1993 found that 

pillar retreat mining accounted for 35 percent of the bumps, pillar splitting for 26 

percent, long-wall mining for 25 percent, and development mining for 14 percent. 

Long-wall mining methods have increasingly replaced pillar retreat mining since the 

1960’s and would most likely account for a higher percentage of bumps today. 

With more mining operations moving into reserves under deeper overburden and/ 

or below previously-mined areas, there is a need to understand methods to prevent, 

and, in the event they do occur, to mitigate the consequences of, bumps in such new 

circumstances. For this reason, MSHA is already reviewing operators’ ground control plans to ensure operators minimize the dangers associated with bumps. In addition, MSHA is in consultation with the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
14 

and Health (NIOSH), in the Department of Health and Human Services, about appropriate research focusing on the danger of bumps in those circumstances. 

CRANDALL CANYON ACCIDENT OUTLINE

On the early morning of August 6, 2007, a ground failure occurred at the Crandall 

Canyon Mine in Huntington, Utah, that, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, 

registered 3.9 on the Richter Scale, and was initially reported by the Associated 

Press as an earthquake. MSHA’s call center was subsequently notified and MSHA 

quickly dispatched an inspector to the mine site. Before arriving on site, MSHA 

issued a section 103(k) order over the phone which required workers to evacuate the 

mine and effectively secure the site. 

Shortly after arriving on site, the MSHA inspector contacted the MSHA Field Office to report that a six-man crew was working in the South Barrier section (where 

the accident occurred) when a bounce occurred that extensively damaged the mine’s 

ventilation controls. These individuals were unaccounted for, but they were believed 

to be working approximately four miles from the mine’s entrance. 

On the afternoon of August 6, 2007, with MSHA’s approval, Murray Energy Corp. 

began mucking out the Number 4 entry at crosscut 120. Meanwhile, a mine rescue 

team had breached the Number 1 seal in Main West, hoping to be able to get behind 

that seal and clear an easier pathway to crosscuts 138 and 139 to more expeditiously reach the trapped miners. Unfortunately, the rescue team encountered significant amounts of coal blocking its pathway, and then had to withdraw altogether 

from the sealed area because another bounce occurred. 

Mucking or clearing out the fallen coal from the main entry was a time-consuming 

process and Murray Energy and MSHA believed that we needed to more quickly 

reach the trapped miners to save their lives, if they survived the initial collapse. 

Thus, following the first day of the rescue operation, Murray Energy decided, with 

MSHA’s consultation and approval, to drill bore holes into the mine from the surface 

in an attempt to establish contact with the miners and to assess the conditions in 

the area where they were believed to be. 

By August 7, drilling had begun on the first borehole, which was a two-inch hole 

at crosscut 138. The mine operator selected all of the borehole locations with input 

and approval from MSHA. These locations were based upon the probable locations 

of the missing miners after the first bounce occurred on August 6. The first set of 

boreholes was drilled to intersect the mine at the location where the miners were 

last thought to be working at the time of the accident. Mine survey coordinates were 

used to pinpoint specific drilling locations. 

In all, seven boreholes have been drilled (the rest being 85⁄8 inches in diameter) 

but rescuers have not found the location of the miners. In every borehole, rescuers 

attempted to insert a microphone and camera to either hear or see the trapped miners. Rescue workers also tapped repeatedly on the drill steel to signal to the trapped 

miners; miners are trained to reply by tapping below the surface. However, none 

of these communication efforts have been fruitful. 

As the rescuers continued to drill boreholes from the mine’s surface, another 

group continued the mucking and clearing efforts in the mine’s entry until another 

bounce occurred on August 16, which claimed the lives of three of the rescuers and 

injured six others. Since that bounce occurred, mucking efforts within the mine have 

been suspended indefinitely. Neither MSHA, nor the outside experts brought to the 

mine site to review the mining conditions and rescue plan could devise a way to 

stabilize and reenter the mine. MSHA believed the plan it approved for the rescue 

operations prior to August 16 provided the maximum amount of protection to the 

rescuers possible, but it was not enough. 

Since August 16, Murray Energy—with MSHA’s approval—has continued to drill 

boreholes. There is also a rescue capsule on the mine site if the trapped miners are 

found alive, but using the capsule would involve extraordinary risk. This risk cannot 

be taken if there are no signs of life because the danger is too great that more lives 

will be lost. 

MSHA FULFILLED ITS MINER ACT RESPONSIBILITIES AT CRANDALL CANYON

Immediately after MSHA was notified of the Crandall Canyon accident, MSHA 

began fulfilling its responsibilities as the primary communicator with the families, 

policymakers, the public and the media a responsibility which MSHA takes very seriously after the Sago Mine accident. 

On the morning of August 6, 2007, MSHA dispatched three family liaisons to the 

location where the family members were gathered to begin regularly updating them 

on the rescue operation. MSHA also provided interpreters for the Spanish speaking 
15 

families. Clergy and counselors were also available. MSHA’s family liaisons continue 

to honor these responsibilities today. 

On Wednesday, August 8, 2007, I began participating in these briefings and spent 

nearly 6 hours every day providing updates and answering family members’ questions. 

MSHA also acted as the primary communicator with the media. Although news 

outlets sometimes chose to broadcast parts of the briefings conducted by the mine 

operator instead of MSHA, the Agency never failed to be the primary communicator. 

During the first week of the rescue operation, MSHA held regular briefings every 

day for reporters off of the mine site at the sheriff’s command center. During these 

briefings, we provided detailed updates regarding the rescue effort and answered reporters’ questions. MSHA also provided regular updates on the Agency’s website regarding the rescue effort and issued media advisories concerning our updates at the 

mine site. 

In addition, MSHA personnel regularly updated Utah’s governor and congressional delegation on the status of the rescue operations, both on and off-site. Kevin 

Stricklin, MSHA’s Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health, also briefed the 

Utah Legislature at an open public forum on August 29, 2007, in Salt Lake City. 

All of these actions underscore how seriously MSHA takes its responsibility to be 

responsive to the families and to be the primary communicator. 

CONCLUSION

I cannot fully express my personal disappointment and the overwhelming sadness 

I feel regarding the Crandall Canyon accident and rescue efforts during this last 

month. I know that words alone cannot and will not provide comfort to the families, 

friends, and communities of the miners and rescue workers who lost their lives or 

were injured at Crandall Canyon mine. We commend the heroic efforts of these individuals who put their lives on the line in the effort to rescue the trapped miners. 

Each and every individual at MSHA remains dedicated and focused on our core 

mission: to improve the safety and health of America’s miners and to work toward 

the day when every miner goes home safe and healthy to family and friends, after 

every shift of every day. MSHA cannot do this alone. The entire mining community—mine operators, miners, and health and safety professionals included—must 

also do their part to improve mine health and safety. Working together, MSHA, 

mine operators and miners can achieve this important goal. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions and to working with this committee to continue to improve mine safety. 

APPENDIX 1.—ACCIDENT TIMELINE

August 7, 2007 

—In the early morning hours, repairs to damaged ventilation systems continued. 

MSHA’s roof control personnel traveled into the mine to evaluate conditions to 

help determine whether or not clearing this entryway could resume safely. 

—The drilling equipment used to drill the first 2 inch borehole was put in place 

at crosscut 138 approximately where the miners were believed to be the evening 

before and drilling began. 

August 8, 2007 

—In the morning, MSHA approved a new mine rescue plan presented by Murray 

Energy to allow clearing the Number 1 entry, but with extensive rib support. 

—In the evening, drilling of the second borehole began. This borehole was drilled 

with an 85⁄8 inch bit. 

August 9, 2007 

—In the evening, the drill for the first borehole broke through the mine cavity 

and a microphone was lowered in to determine whether or not any underground 

activity could be heard. No activity was detected and rescuers continued drilling 

the second borehole. 

August 10, 2007 

—An analysis of the atmosphere in the first borehole revealed low oxygen readings, but a 3.5 foot void was detected in the bored area in the mine. 

—In addition, a two-man team tried to advance in the Number 1 entry but to no 

avail. 

August 11, 2007 

—Early in the morning, the second borehole (85⁄8 inches) broke through the mine 

cavity, but no communication was detected from underground. A roof height of 
16 

eight feet was detected and a camera was lowered into the cavity but only wire 

mesh in the roof was detected. 

August 12, 2007 

—In the evening, another camera was lowered into the number 2 borehole and 

compressed air began to be pumped in. No response from the trapped miners 

was detected. 

—In addition, a pad for a third borehole began to be constructed. 

August 13, 2007 

—Early in the morning a third camera was lowered into the second borehole, and 

again no sign of the miners was detected. 

—In addition, the drilling equipment was moved from the second to the third 

borehole and drilling began in the evening. 

August 14, 2007 

—Drilling of the third borehole continued while a drill pad began to be constructed for a fourth borehole. 

August 15, 2007 

—Mid-morning, the third borehole broke through the mine cavity. A microphone 

was lowered into the hole but no communication with the trapped miners resulted. Seismic equipment, however, picked up an unidentified noise that was 

not heard again. A camera was subsequently lowered into the hole, but nothing 

of note was seen. 

August 16, 2007 

—In the early morning, the drilling equipment was moved to the site of the fourth 

borehole and drilling began. 

—Later in the evening, a significant bounce occurred in the mine and several rescuers were covered up by coal. In the end, six rescuers were injured and three 

were killed, including one MSHA employee. 

—As a result, rescue efforts proceeding inside of the mine were halted indefinitely 

after advancing over 900 feet. These have not resumed because no way to proceed safely has been identified by either MSHA or outside ground control experts. 

August 18, 2007 

—In the morning, the fourth borehole broke through the mine cavity. No response 

from the trapped miners was detected. 

—In the evening a camera was lowered into the hole and nothing was detected. 

Nothing was detected with seismic equipment. 

August 19, 2007 

—In the evening, rescuers began drilling a fifth borehole. 

August 22, 2007 

—Drilling in the fifth borehole broke through the mine cavity. Rescuers could not, 

however, get a camera into the hole because the hole became blocked. 

August 23, 2007 

—Rescuers began drilling a sixth borehole in the evening. 

August 25, 2007 

—Drilling in the sixth borehole broke through the mine cavity. A camera was lowered into this hole in the early morning of August 26, but there was no sign 

of the trapped miners. On August 27, rescuers also attempted to lower a robot 

into this hole, but were unable to complete this task because there was too 

much debris in the area. 

August 28, 2007 

—In the early morning, rescuers began drilling a seventh borehole, which broke 

through the mine cavity on August 30, 2007. 

APPENDIX 2.—MSHA ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINER ACT

Increased Enforcement 

Enforcement of the Nation’s mining laws is a key component to protecting the 

health and safety of miners, and continues to be a top priority at MSHA. In 2006, 

MSHA issued more citations and orders than in any year since 1995—and there 

were almost 3,000 coal operations in 1995 compared to just over 2,000 in 2006. 
17 

The number of unwarrantable failure citations and orders issued in 2006 was the 

highest since 1995. To date this year, MSHA has issued more unwarrantable failure 

citations and orders than in any full year between 1995 and 2005. The percentage 

of unwarrantable failure issuances in 2007 (to date) is the highest since 1994. 

The total fines assessed against coal operators and contractors increased 46 percent in 2006 compared to the previous year and were the highest total dollar assessments since 1994. As of the 1-year anniversary of the MINER Act, MSHA issued 

12 citations for flagrant violations, including three of the largest proposed penalties 

in the history of the agency. Year-to-date penalties have increased from $22.1 million in CY 2006 to $41.5 million in CY 2007. The average penalty for each violation 

increased by 29 percent in 2006 compared to 2005—and the average penalty for 

each violation has more than doubled so far in 2007—with the full impact of the 

increased penalties that became effective in April yet to be realized. The fatality 

rate has decreased 70 percent at coal mines and 45 percent overall from CY 2001 

to CY 2007. 

Implementing the MINER Act of 2006 

MSHA’s full commitment to protecting the health and safety of miners is further 

demonstrated by the timely and successful implementation of MINER Act provisions—often ahead of schedule. Moreover, MSHA has imposed requirements that go 

beyond the requirements of the Act. Significant accomplishments over the past 12 

months include: 

New Penalties for Late Accident Notification and Unwarrantable Failure Violations 

Upon the signing of the MINER Act of 2006, MSHA immediately implemented 

new minimum penalties for late accident notification and ‘‘unwarrantable failure’’ 

violations. 

New Penalties for Flagrant Violations 

MSHA issued a Procedure Instruction Letter (I06–III–04) to implement the new 

‘‘flagrant violation’’ maximum penalty of up to $220,000. 

Secretarial Order to Improve Post-Accident Communication with Families 

The Secretary of Labor signed an Order creating the Family Liaison and Primary 

Communicator positions that are filled by specially trained MSHA employees at 

emergency sites. MSHA, with the assistance of the National Transportation Safety 

Board and the American Red Cross, has trained 15 family liaisons to date. Four 

more MSHA employees are scheduled for family liaison training in November 2007. 

Strengthening Evacuation Practices 

MSHA issued a final rule to strengthen mine evacuation practices in underground 

coal mines. The rule included: 

—Self-Contained Self Rescue (SCSR) Devices.—The rule requires coal mine operators to provide additional SCSRs for each miner underground in areas such as 

working places, mantrips, escapeways, and other areas where outby crews work 

or travel. The rule also requires that SCSRs be readily accessible in the event 

of an emergency. 

—Multi-Gas Detectors.—The rule goes beyond the requirements of the MINER Act 

by requiring coal mine operators to provide multi-gas detectors to each group 

of underground miners and each miner working alone. 

—Lifelines.—The rule requires coal mine operators to install directional lifelines 

in all primary and alternate escape routes out of the mine. Lifelines help guide 

miners in poor visibility conditions toward evacuation routes and SCSR storage 

locations. Lifelines must be flame-resistant by June 15, 2009. 

—Training.—The rule requires coal mine operators to conduct quarterly training 

sessions instructing miners how to don SCSRs and, in particular, how to transfer from one SCSR to another. The training provisions in the mine emergency 

evacuation rule go beyond the requirements of the MINER Act by requiring ‘‘expectations training,’’ providing miners with simulated conditions they would encounter using a SCSR during an emergency. SCSR training units to simulate 

breathing resistance and heat for annual expectations training have now been 

developed. 

—Accident Notification.—The rule requires all mine operators to contact MSHA 

within 15 minutes of an accident. MSHA also implemented a nation-wide single 

call-in number (1–800–746–1553) for accidents and hazardous condition notifications to ensure an immediate, consistent and effective response by MSHA. 
18 

Requiring Breathable Air for Trapped Miners 

MSHA issued a Program Information Bulletin (PIB) (No. P07–03) that gives mine 

operators a range of options, including boreholes and oxygen supplies, to provide 

breathable air to miners who are trapped underground. The use of state-approved 

refuge chambers is acceptable as a means of meeting the requirements of the PIB 

for breathable air. 

New Civil Penalties for Safety and Health Violations 

MSHA published a final rule to increase civil penalty amounts for mine safety and 

health violations. Issuance of this rule goes beyond the requirements of the MINER 

Act. The new rule provides for a general increase in civil penalties for violations and 

is applicable to all mines and contractors. The new penalty schedule: 

—Increases penalties.—Increases civil penalties overall, targeting the more severe 

health and safety violations. 

—Addresses repeat violations.—Adds a new provision to increase penalties for operators who repeatedly violate the same MSHA standards. 

—Eliminates single penalties.—Non-significant and substantial (non-S&S) violations formerly processed as $60 single penalties are now processed as higher 

regular formula assessments. 

Enforcing Safety Device Requirements 

MSHA published a notice in the Federal Register notifying mine operators that 

SCSR training units were available. Mine operators were required to possess these 

training units, or provide a purchase order, by April 30, 2007, and conduct expectations training with them within 60 days of receipt of the units. 

Tracking Inventory of Safety Devices 

MSHA implemented a system for coal mine operators to electronically submit 

their inventories of SCSRs—a requirement of the emergency mine evacuation rule 

that went beyond the mandates of the MINER Act. 

Protecting Miners Near Abandoned Areas 

On May 22, 2007, MSHA published an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) 

that increased the protections for miners working near sealed areas in underground 

coal mines. This final rule was ahead of the December 2007 date required in the 

MINER Act. The ETS significantly increases the strength standard for mine seals 

from 20 pounds-per-square-inch (psi) set in 1992, to 50psi, 120psi, or more than 

120psi when conditions exist that may create pressures in excess of 120psi. The ETS 

includes additional requirements not provided in the MINER Act: (1) approval of 

seal designs and mine-site installation designs; (2) provisions for sampling the atmosphere behind seals; (3) training for persons who sample, and construct and repair seals; (4) removal of insulated cables from areas to be sealed and metallic objects that enter the sealed area; and (5) prohibition of welding, cutting and soldering 

using arc or flame within 150 feet of a seal. 

Developing New Communications Technologies 

MSHA has conducted meetings with representatives of 58 communications and 

tracking system companies, observed the testing and/or demonstration of 23 postaccident communications and tracking systems, and approved 23 systems, including 

seven new devices. 

Approval of Emergency Response Plans 

MSHA has fully approved all of the Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) for active 

producing mines in this country with the exception of 2 partially approved plans. 

Full approval of these plans is pending review by MSHA of one recently submitted 

plan by a mine operator and the other entering into the dispute resolution process. 

In addition, MSHA is using all available tools—enforcement, education and training, rulemaking, and evaluating/recognizing new technology, to achieve its goal of 

safer and healthier mines. For example, MSHA is using its statutory authority 

under the pattern of violations provision in the Mine Act of 1977 to identify mine 

operators who habitually violate MSHA standards and view penalties as the cost of 

doing business. In selecting potential pattern mines, MSHA developed a database 

to provide a more objective analysis of accident trends and enforcement results to 

better identify persistent repeat violators. 

Proposed Rulemaking 

MSHA has proposed revised and new standards for certification and availability 

of mine rescue teams for underground coal mines. MSHA has also proposed updated 
19 

standards for mine rescue team equipment at mine rescue stations. These standards 

would apply to all underground mines: metal and nonmetal mines and coal mines. 

REPORT FROM AGAPITO ASSOCIATES

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stickler. 

Start a round of questions now. I spoke, earlier, Mr. Stickler, 

about a letter, which I would ask to be inserted in the record in 

its entirely. It’s a letter dated April 18, 2007. It’s addressed to Mr. 

Lane Adair, the general manager of UtahAmerican Energy, Incorporated. It’s from Agapito Associates, Incorporated, mining and 

civil engineers, and geologists of Grand Junction, Colorado. 

[The information follows:] 
20 
21 
22 

Senator HARKIN. This letter states that a large bump occurred in 

early March 2007 and resulted in heavy damage. As a result, the 

remaining north panel was abandoned, in favor of a proposal to 

mine the south barrier. That’s about 900 feet to the south, where 

the accident we’re talking about today occurred. 
23 

First of all, Mr. Stickler, have you read this letter? Do you have 

it in your possession? 

Mr. STICKLER. I have it here now, yes. 

Senator HARKIN. When did you first receive this letter? 

Mr. STICKLER. Sometime after I returned back to Washington— 

I spent 17 days there in Utah—and, after I returned back to Washington, I obtained a copy of the Agapito reports. 

Senator HARKIN. This report, this Agapito report to Mr. Lane 

Adair—was a copy submitted to MSHA at that time for their review, do you know that? 

Mr. STICKLER. I cannot confirm that at this time. I’m sure accident investigation will be able to answer that question. 

Senator HARKIN. Is there a requirement in MSHA for such reports as this, if they’re made to a mine operator, to also be sent 

to MSHA at the same time? 

Mr. STICKLER. There is not a requirement, but most mine operators that do these kind of geotechnical analysis through consulting 

companies, submit that information to MSHA to support their case 

and their plan that they intend to have MSHA review and approve. 

NEW PLAN FOR CRANDALL CANYON MINE

Senator HARKIN. Okay. Now, as I understand it, there was a new 

plan. There had been this bump in March, they had closed down 

that part of the mine. I’ve looked at the maps of the mines. We 

have—partway. All—we don’t have the whole map—well, we have 

it over here, I guess. They closed down a part of the mine, and then 

a new plan came in to do retreat mining 900 feet to the south. 

MSHA approved that plan, am I not correct? 

MSHA APPROVAL OF NEW PLAN

Mr. STICKLER. That’s correct. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, my question, again, Mr. Stickler, is: If 

MSHA approved the plan, did they have this letter of April 17 in 

their possession before they approved the plan? If you don’t know 

at this point, I would ask that you find out for the committee and 

let us know if your MSHA inspectors had this letter in their possession at the time they approved the new plan. 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, as I read through this, I see the recommendations here, that the consulting engineering company 

made, to increase the size of the pillars from 80 feet by 92 feet, to 

increase those pillars to 80 by 129 feet. 

Senator HARKIN. Yes. 

Mr. STICKLER. So, I have been told that MSHA was aware of that 

information, and that was part of the basis for MSHA’s approval 

of the plan, was that the consulting engineering company recommended increasing the size of the coal pillars. Those are the 

blocks of coal that support the earth above, and, along with other 

recommendations, to improve the ground control conditions in that 

southern area. It states here in the recommendation from the professional engineers at Agapito—it says, ‘‘The size of the pillars expected to provide a reliable level of protection against problematic 

bumping for retreat mining under cover reaching 2,200 feet.’’ 
24 

AGAPITO ASSOCIATES

Senator HARKIN. But, Mr. Stickler, it’s also a fact, is it not, that 

Agapito Associates, this same engineering company, approved the 

plan for the north section, that had the bump in March? They approved that—they—they were the same engineering company. 

Mr. STICKLER. They recommended approval. They—— 

Senator HARKIN. That’s—— 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Did not—— 

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. The one that had the bump. 

Mr. STICKLER. That’s correct. 

Senator HARKIN. So, you go back to the same engineering company and say, ‘‘Well, now you can just improve the size of the pillars and it’ll be okay.’’ It raises a question in my mind as to whether or not MSHA really took a solid look at what their earlier recommendations were, why that failed, and whether their secondary 

recommendations were adequate. 

Mr. STICKLER. Well—— 

Senator HARKIN. Obviously, this engineering company was wrong 

in their first plan, because they sealed off that whole north section 

after that big bump occurred. So, they were wrong then. What 

made us think that they would be right the second time? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, my understanding is MSHA’s engineers in 

the Denver office, which covers all the mines west of the Mississippi River, reviewed the computer model that was used to do 

the mine design and the pillar size. They also went underground 

and made investigation of the conditions in the south area, where 

the pending plan approval was to be applied. They reviewed the 

history of retreat mining in this mine. I can point out to you, on 

this map—just prior to Murray Energy purchasing the—prior to 

Murray Energy purchasing the operation, the previous owner had 

retreat mined this area called the south mains. This is very similar. It’s between two gob areas, or areas that have been longed out 

with—this left side, with longwall mining, and the right side—part 

of it was longwall, part of it was continuous miner retreat mining. 

But the previous owner had retreat mined up to about this location. Murray Energy continued. They had good results in that area. 

During the last 5 years, there has been one miner injury at this 

mine, due to a—anytime of roof or rib roll—an individual had a 

broken foot, with rock that rolled off on the foot. So, based on the 

fact of successful mining that occurred in the past in similar conditions, based on the successful retreat mining in that area and the 

engineering report from Agapito, along with MSHA’s own underground investigation—the supervisor for the roof control group at 

Denver is a certified professional engineer; he and the roof control 

specialist went underground and made visual observations. 

RESULTS OF MSHA INSPECTIONS

Senator HARKIN. So, would you provide, Mr. Stickler, for this 

subcommittee, for our staff and for me to review—you said, in your 

testimony, that, since the purchase of the Crandall Canyon Mine 

by Murray Energy, MSHA has performed five regularly scheduled 

inspections, two spot inspections, responded to a complaint from a 

whistleblower and performed, as you just said, a roof control tech-
25 

nical inspection. Could the results of those be given to us? I’d like 

to know what was the complaint from the whistleblower. I’d like 

to know what the spot inspections and the roof control technical inspection showed. 

Mr. STICKLER. Yes, we can provide those. My understanding of 

the whistleblower complaint was relative to the mine operator providing the required mine rescue-team service, and MSHA investigated that and issued an order requiring to—the operator to 

abate that violation. 

[The information follows:] 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—This information is available at http:// 

www.msha.gov/drs/drshome.htm] 

WIRELESS TRACKING TECHNOLOGY

Senator HARKIN. The rescue plan that was developed required 

drilling bore holes approximately 1,500 feet into the earth. The 

seven holes drilled ranged over several thousand feet in area, because we didn’t know where the miners were. My question is, Mr. 

Stickler, is there a tracking technology available and approved by 

MSHA that could have told us where the miners were? 

Mr. STICKLER. I wish there were. MSHA has spent thousands of 

man hours reviewing what’s available around the world in the way 

of wireless tracking systems and wireless communications systems. 

We have not been able to identify any two-way wireless systems 

that will work in a mine such as this without some type of antenna 

or backbone wire going through the mine. This mine had what’s 

been referred to as the PED system, the Personal Emergency Device, where they could send the wireless signal from the surface via 

an antenna through the mine to the miners that had cap lamp batteries that would receive text messaging, and also, when they received the message, their cap light would blink to signal them that 

they had a message. That system was deployed at this mine, as 

well as redundant hardwire communication systems in two separate entries. But the forces of the mountain bump—to try to illustrate—on the roof or the ceiling of the mine, they had bolted heavy 

steel mesh wire, similar to the reinforcing wire that’s used in concrete—the diameter wire’s about an eighth of an inch—the force of 

the coal exploding off of the walls of the tunnel ripped that wire 

off of the roof. So, naturally, it ripped out all the hardwire redundant communications systems, and it ripped out the antenna for 

the wireless Personal Emergency Device system at the mine. 

Senator HARKIN. I have a couple more questions, but I’ll yield 

now to Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to note that 

we have families here today from the Sago Mine disaster, from the 

Jim Walters mine disaster. Miners are here from Pennsylvania, 

Ohio, and West Virginia, to observe these hearings. 

BUMPS (SEISMIC ACTIVITY)

Mr. Stickler, as I review the uncontradicted evidence, it appears 

conclusive that MSHA, your Department, was not paying adequate 

attention to these bumps, which caused catastrophic results. Senator Harkin has gone into the letter, but, in addition to that, independently, the timeline from MSHA admits that MSHA received 
26 

information that pillar mining in the north main west barrier had 

stopped, due to ground stability problems. That is 900 feet away. 

Then you had other bumps. After the accident on August 6, when 

the rescue operations were undertaken, there was another bump, 

which buried equipment being used to clear the entry, and rescue 

teams were pulled out of the mine. Now, on August 11 a significant 

bump occurred, and all rescuers again were removed from the 

mine. Then, on August 15 there were three significant bumps between 1:15 and 1:40. Then, on August 16, another bump, resulting 

in the death of three men. 

Now, with all of these bumps and what it demonstrates is the 

unsafe conditions, two questions. How could MSHA approve allowing the mining to go on 900 feet away, notwithstanding all of these 

fancy recommendations you have, and, in the light of these bumps 

on the rescue operations, how could MSHA pursue those rescue efforts in the face of these recurrent bumps? You know there’s going 

to be another, on the laws or probability, resulting in the deaths 

of three more men? Isn’t there just blatant failure by MSHA to recognize a fundamental problem which is caused by these bumps? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, your first question, I partially answered 

when Senator Harkin asked me. I walked through the—— 

Senator SPECTER. No, but you didn’t—— 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Process—— 

Senator SPECTER [continuing]. You didn’t—you didn’t answer it, 

in the context of the other—— 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, let me finish my answer—— 

Senator SPECTER. Wait, wait, wait—— 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. If I could, please. 

Senator SPECTER [continuing]. A minute. You have the bumps— 

we’re laypeople here, but he asked you about the bumps on March 

12, but then we have all of these other bumps. We’re trying to understand the significance of these bumps. It appears to me conclusive that these bumps shows there’s a tremendous danger, notwithstanding your pinpoint light and what the experts may tell you. 

Isn’t it perfectly apparent that these bumps tell you that something 

disastrous is about to happen? 

BUMPS AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

Mr. STICKLER. The fact is that an increase in seismic activity 

cannot be used to predict a pending bump, nor can a silent period, 

where there is no seismic activity, be concluded that there will not 

be a pending or future bump. 

But, getting back to the other question that you asked me regarding the rescue operation—and Senator Bennett mentioned 

this—when we referred to postponing the rescue activity of the 

mine rescue teams during the seismic activity, that was different 

than the rescue activity that was being done by the crew that was 

operating the continuous mining machine in the equipment in 

number-one entry to rehabilitate number-one entry. Initially, mine 

rescue teams tried to advance on top of the rubble, by crawling 

through spaces as low as 24 inches, to explore to see if there was 

any way that they could find an opening to get back to where the 

miners were trapped. That went on for several hours the first day 

of the accident. That was the activity that we determined that was 
27 

not prudent to continue without any kind of protection—a groundcontrol protection—for the members of the mine rescue team that 

was trying to find the route to travel to reach the trapped miners. 

The second issue regarding the rehabilitation and the cleanup of 

the rubble in number-one entry. That operation advanced a little 

over 900 feet before the accident occurred, on the 16th. During that 

time, we had several bumps, but the ground support that was 

being installed protected the miners and was secure, and there 

were no injuries. You mentioned withdrawing miners from the 

mine. To my knowledge, that never occurred. When there was a 

bump—and what we’ve learned, going in to the process, is that, 

while many of the experts believe that the initial bump—the 

weight of the mountain would be redistributed, and there would be 

less stress after that initial bump. That was partially true. But 

what we learned is that the rubble in the entry—number-one 

entry—provided lateral support to the coal walls. As we used the 

continuous mining machine to load out that rubble, we removed 

the lateral support. Without that support, we were getting additional bumps on the coal walls of the tunnel right in the immediate 

area where the continuous mining machine was working. But during no time prior to the 16th did any of these bumps dislodge any 

of the heavy ground support that was put in to protect the miners 

along the walls of the entry. 

MSHA VIOLATIONS

Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Stickler, I have to tell you that that 

elongated answer, which has consumed all of my remaining time, 

doesn’t answer, for me, the very basic and obvious conclusion, that 

we have these bumps, and you have the tragic consequences, that 

MSHA was on notice to function very differently, and not to allow 

the mine to be activated 900 feet away from a bump which was 

very dangerous, and that you were on a lot of notice on these 

bumps, that the rescuers were in a very precarious position. I’m 

going to ask you to answer, for the record, because we have a lot 

of witnesses and a lot of Senators—but answer, for the record, the 

question about these serious and substantial violations—21—with 

fines of less than $20,000, and 10 of these serious and substantial 

violations with fines of zero, and to respond to the United Mine 

Workers’ testimony that: ‘‘chilled enforcement efforts at the mine 

level and allowed operators to essentially negotiate workplace and 

safety matters,’’. 

[The information follows:] 

MINE SAFETY CITATIONS ISSUED TO CRANDALL CANYON MINE

At the time of the hearing, MSHA had issued 67 citations and orders at the mine 

since Murray Energy, Inc. purchased the mine in August 2006. Two of these were 

a type of withdrawal orders that do not receive civil penalties under the Mine Act. 

Of the remaining 65 citations and orders, 42 had already been assessed civil penalties in the amount of $22,483 and 20 citations and orders were not corrected until 

after June 18, 2007, and had therefore not been assessed. The three remaining actions were either in the review process for a ‘‘Special’’ assessment, pending a conference with the MSHA District Manager, or awaiting referral for assessment from 

the enforcement office. 

Since the hearing, 15 of those 20 citations have been assessed. For this citations, 

MSHA assessed a total of $21,582 in September 2007. The remaining five are still 

in the process of being assessed. 
28 

A delay in assessment is not unusual. On average, a civil penalty notice is sent 

to the operator 80 days after the citation or order was corrected, that is, after the 

operator corrects the conditions that resulted in the citation or order. This timeframe is 61⁄2 months for ‘‘Special’’ assessments. This year, 70 percent of the citations 

have been assessed within 90 days from the date the conditions cited were corrected, and 90 percent have been assessed within 4 months. 

The time needed to assess civil penalties is dictated in large part by the due process afforded to mine operators and miners’ representatives in the Mine Act. Mine 

operators and miners’ representatives have the right to request a conference with 

the MSHA District Manager on any citation or order. Violations for which enforcement personnel recommend ‘‘Special’’ assessments are reviewed through the enforcement management chain and finalized by staff in MSHA headquarters. Special assessments are generally those enforcement personnel recommend in extraordinary 

circumstances such as fatalities that warrant a civil penalty outside of the regular 

formula used to determine penalty amounts. 

Under the Mine Act all violations must receive a civil penalty. In fact, this administration has significantly increased civil penalties, going beyond the increases Congress passed last year in the MINER Act. Civil penalties increased from $25 million 

in 2005 to $35 million in 2006, and to $41.5 million through August 2007, with four 

months remaining in the calendar year. 

With regard to the United Mine Workers’ testimony that MSHA created an atmosphere that ‘‘chilled enforcement efforts at the mine level and allowed operators 

to essentially negotiate workplace and safety matters,’’ there are other indicators beyond the increase in fines that contradict the notion that MSHA has relaxed its enforcement efforts. 

—The number of violations MSHA inspectors have cited has increased in each 

year since 2003. 

—In 2006, MSHA issued more citations and orders than in any year since 1995— 

and there were almost 3,000 coal operations in 1995 compared to just over 2,000 

in 2006. 

—The number of violations cited per inspection hour is at an all-time high— 

MSHA inspectors issued the most citations and orders per inspection hour in 

both 2005 and 2006 than in any year since these records have been kept (beginning in the 1980s). 

—The percentage of unwarrantable failure orders cited is higher this year than 

in any year since 1994. 

—The rate at which inspectors have used the most severe enforcement actions 

(i.e. citations and orders issued as ‘‘unwarrantable failure’’ on the part of the 

operator, or issued for failure to abate previously cited conditions or for imminent danger conditions per inspection hour) has also increased in each year 

since 2003. 

—MSHA has taken the first steps to identify mines exhibiting a ‘‘Pattern of Violations’’ as described under section 104(e) of the Mine Act, an enforcement tool 

never before used. 

By virtually any measure, MSHA is vigorously enforcing the mine health and 

safety laws. The Mine Act provides three main tools that MSHA uses to help the 

mining industry provide safer, more healthful work environments: enforcement, 

technical assistance, and education and training. Enforcement is at the heart of this 

three-pronged approach to mine safety and health. MSHA’s enforcement record 

clearly illustrates its commitment to this belief. 

PRESS CONFERENCE

Senator SPECTER. But I would like to ask you about one more 

subject, which is very important. How could you permit Mr. Murray to take over with the press and to stand by and allow him to 

be on the scene—I know you’ve explained to me, in our private 

meeting, that he starts the press conference before you get there, 

and you have to take action with the sheriff to keep him out of advising the families, because he gives them misinformation, and he 

makes the preposterous statement about an earthquake to try to 

make it an act of God. You have the statutory authority to banish 

the guy, and he’s a real troublemaker on the scene, which you observed, and you say his conduct was unacceptable. But can’t you 
29 

do something in a more forceful way, to stop him from disrupting 

the activities with the news media and the families, than you did? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, I’ll take your last question first. In regard 

to the press conference, when I arrived, the day after the accident, 

I first attended a briefing for the family members, and I stayed 

there with the family members, allowing them to ask individual 

questions. Some individuals were not comfortable in asking questions in a group. We had 40, sometimes 70, family members there 

at the briefings. I was there, briefing the families and answering 

their individual questions. I got to the press conference, and it had 

already been started. Mr. Murray had preempted me in that press 

conference. After that press conference, I explained to Murray Energy officials that that was unacceptable, that, in the future, that 

MSHA would lead off all press conferences, that we would take the 

responsibility of providing an update and the factual information, 

that we would make sure that we would not communicate anything 

to the press that had not been previously communicated to the 

families. That was what we tried to do in all the following press 

conferences for the 17 days I was there. 

I’ve been told by people—I didn’t see any of the broadcasts, but 

people in MSHA have advised me that what the news media did 

was, even though I led off the press conference and gave the information, they wouldn’t—the news media did not broadcast that, 

they waited until a mine official, either Bob Murray or Rob Moore, 

spoke, and then they would cut in, and that’s what they showed 

the American public. Now, you know, if we can figure out a way 

to control the news media and control what people say to the news 

media, I don’t know what that is yet. I tried, I advised, I coached, 

I lectured. We met, before the press conference, to make sure that 

we were on script, as far as the facts, make sure the facts the company had and MSHA had were the same. But I could not control 

the ad-lib and what other individuals want to speak to the press. 

I have no authority to stop them and control what the press does. 

PENALTIES

In regard to your other question on the zero penalties, I think 

many of the violations that you’re looking at there have not yet 

been sent to assessment to be assessed penalties. The process, 

when MSHA writes a violation, a mine operator has the right to 

contest—well, first of all, they have a right for a conference with 

the district manager. That takes some time. After the violation is 

conferenced, then the mine operator has the right to contest it before an administrative law judge, and that delays the assessment 

of the penalties. But I can assure you that the—— 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Stickler, we’re not interested in all the 

procedures. We know there are appeals. You’re not telling us the 

facts when you say that the penalties haven’t been assessed. Twenty-one ‘‘serious and substantial’’ penalties were assessed, at 

$19,662; and 10 of these, serious and substantial violations, the 

penalty was zero. That’s done. 

Mr. STICKLER. No, you’re misinterpreting what you’re reading 

there, Senator. What that means, by zero, is that the penalty has 

not yet been assessed. We assess a minimum penalty for every violation. In March of last year, MSHA published a final rule that sig-
30 

nificantly increased the violations across the board. For the entire 

mining industry, the fines were increased from approximately $24 

million to $68 million a year. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Stickler, that’s not relevant to here, and 

I can read English. It says ‘‘proposed penalty,’’ and it says zero. 

Mr. STICKLER. That means because it has not yet been assessed. 

Senator SPECTER. January 3, 2007, proposed penalty zero? Mr. 

Stickler, if the English language does not mean ‘‘proposal penalty, 

zero,’’ that that’s the proposed penalty, we’re going to have to look 

even with a sharper microscope on everything you’ve told us. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take more time here, so I yield 

back to you. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

Yield to Senator Byrd, who has graciously asked that we yield 

a bit of time to Senator Murray, who has to go preside on the floor. 

TIMELY INFORMATION FOR VICTIM’S FAMILIES

Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do have to go preside on the floor. I do have a number of questions I’ll submit for the record. 

But I did want to follow up on Senator Specter’s comments regarding the information that was given from the site. It was very 

confusing to all of us, whether Bob Murray was primary spokesman, or who was speaking, or how that was being handled. I just 

wanted to suggest to this committee, from my experience, chairing 

the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee on the National 

Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, that they have a far more effective model in making sure that victims’ families receive timely 

information from the government first, and that it is accurate, and 

that no one speaks on behalf of the government investigators at an 

aviation accident site. I would suggest to this committee—I’d like 

to work with you—that perhaps we can put that model in place for 

mine safety. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

I do have a number of questions I would like to submit for all 

of our people here, as chairman of the Employment Safety Subcommittee. We’ve worked on mine safety in the past, worked with 

Senator Byrd. We’ll continue to work with all of you to do the best 

we can to answer these questions and keep moving forward so that 

we can assure the families of the miners that we are taking the 

proper steps to assure that we are doing everything to protect their 

safety. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing to help us begin to understand 

the tragic events surrounding the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster. 

I would also like to thank Senator Byrd for his unwavering commitment to America’s miners; they have a true long-standing champion in the Senator from West Virginia. 
31 

PAIN OF FAMILIES

As I know many of my colleagues and the witnesses have done, I have talked with 

the families who’ve lost their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons to mining tragedies. The pain I saw in their eyes is something very few of us have had to endure. 

And, it’s something we’ll never forget. 

After the tragedies in West Virginia last year, Senators from both sides of the 

aisle quickly worked together toward the same goal—passing bi-partisan legislation 

designed to improve mine safety in the hope that tragedies like Sago and Alma 

would never be repeated. 

The MINER Act was a landmark piece of legislation and an important first step 

in meeting our goals but, clearly, we still have work to do. 

As was the case in Sago, we can’t undo what happened and we can’t take away 

the pain. But we can resolve to work together to give miners better protection. And 

that’s why we’re here today. 

MINER HEALTH AND SAFETY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2007

That’s also why I, along with Senators Kennedy and Byrd, introduced the Miner 

Health and Safety Enhancement Act of 2007 earlier this year. 

This bill makes five critical improvements to last year’s bill. 

—First, it speeds up the date by which mine operators must install improved underground communication systems and refuge chambers. 

One of the questions I have asked myself this month is whether refuge chambers were ever considered for use at Crandall Canyon, given the dangerous nature of the retreat mining that was going on there. 

—Second, our new bill enhances MSHA’s enforcement authority. I’m particularly 

pleased that this bill establishes an independent ombudsman to ensure that 

miners’ concerns are heard and protects whistleblowers from unfair retaliation. 

—Third, it improves rescue, recovery and accident investigation authority. 

—Fourth, it reduces miners’ exposure to coal dust; and 

—Finally, it addresses other critical hazards in the mines including asbestos exposure by requiring MSHA to adopt the current OSHA asbestos standard to better 

protect miners. 

Tragedies like the one at Crandall Canyon focus our government’s attention on 

the thousands of brave men who enter our coal mines every day to produce the energy our Nation relies on. 

GETTING FAMILIES ACCURATE INFORMATION

It also reminds us that there are families who anxiously await word on their loved 

ones during times of disaster, and that they deserve honest and clear answers from 

their government. 

We need to do more to make sure that if there is a mining incident they have 

access to accurate and consistent information from officials. 

As Chair of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, I am very familiar 

with the model used by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to ensure 

families have the best information first in the aftermath of an accident. I believe 

we should look to incorporate elements of this highly effective model in any new 

mine safety legislation that is developed in the HELP Committee. 

We also need to make sure that if promising technologies are available, they’re 

implemented sooner rather than later. 

As I’ve said before, I hope that as we move forward, we will not allow the perfect 

to be the enemy of the good. We know that every technology has limits, and nothing 

is foolproof, but if there are steps we can take to make progress—we shouldn’t hold 

back. 

So, we have an important mission, Mr. Chairman. As Chairman of the Employment and Workplace Subcommittee, I look forward to working with my colleagues 

here and in the HELP Committee to identify what went wrong at Crandall Canyon 

and how we can prevent similar mining tragedies in the future. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Murray. 

Senator Byrd. 

BRONZITE MINE IN WEST VIRGINIA

Senator BYRD. Mr. Stickler, the Charleston, West Virginia, Gazette reported, this morning, that MSHA has not conducted, this 

year, a regular quarterly inspection at the Bronzite Mine in Mingo 
32 

County, West Virginia, where a miner died on Monday. According 

to MSHA’s Web site this morning, the article is correct. MSHA has 

performed only three spot inspections, not one regular inspection. 

How do you explain that? 

Mr. STICKLER. At this point, I have not had an opportunity to 

fully evaluate that. I was told, this morning, that the spot inspections that MSHA conducted, one each quarter, were what MSHA 

refers to as enhanced spot inspections. They were not referred to 

as full regular inspections, because they did not cover every area 

of the mine, but they went beyond the normal spot inspection. 

MSHA INSPECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

Senator BYRD. I was under the impression that, in the aftermath 

of the Alma tragedy, MSHA had instructed its inspectors to go into 

every mine, which they were supposed to be doing anyway, and not 

simply rely upon spot checks and the paperwork submitted by the 

mine operators. I’m absolutely flabbergasted—flabbergasted—I’m 

at a loss—how can we have any faith that things at MSHA are actually improving as you contend, if you’re not even fulfilling these 

basic inspection responsibilities? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, we have communicated with all of our inspectors the requirement to conduct the spot inspections in the underground area of the mine, as opposed to just the surface area, including the mine ventilation fans on the surface. I believe that that 

is being implemented. During the internal reviews last year of the 

Aracoma/Alma Mine and Sago and Darby Mine disasters, we identified 153 corrective actions that the agency is in the process of implementing to prevent some of the deficiencies that occurred and 

were brought to light during those internal reviews that MSHA 

completed this year. 

CRANDALL CANYON MINE

Senator BYRD. Well, for God’s sake, let’s fulfill the basic inspection responsibilities. When and how did you become aware of the 

bump that occurred in March 2007? 

Mr. STICKLER. I heard some discussion at the mine. During the 

first few hours I was at the mine, I reviewed the mine plan, the 

mine map, and asked several questions. I think it was during that 

period that I asked the question, ‘‘Why did mining stop in the 

north area and west mains?’’ I was not told that there was a bump, 

I was told it was because of deteriorating mining conditions. I 

think, later, I picked up, through a question from the press, about 

a bump. Since I returned to Washington, I’ve read the Agapito report, which indicates that there had been a bump. 

Senator BYRD. What other geological disturbances, if any, was 

MSHA aware of prior to August 6? 

Mr. STICKLER. Geological events, seismic events, I think, is the 

question. During the last 2 years, there have been over 150 seismic 

events recorded by the University of Utah in and near—around the 

area of the Crandall Canyon Mine. Seismic events are—can be 

picked up—just a roof-fall in the mine, a small area; it can be 

picked up by a longwall mining activity, continuous miner retreat 

mining activities. There’s a lot of sources for creating the seismic 

events. It can be movement in the mountain that occurs from pre-
33 

vious years of mining. You know, it’s interesting, the coal pillars 

that are designed yield over years, and they fail over years. I know 

I had a lot of experience in Pennsylvania, where coal pillars that 

had been developed, and the mine was shut down, and, 50 years 

later, after developers developed housing projects over these areas 

that had been mined out—50 years later, the pillars fail. So, the 

pillars in all mines fail. It may be 50 years, it may be 100 years. 

But the event that happened here at Crandall Canyon, the majority of the failure occurred in less than 4 minutes. 

Senator BYRD. But did anybody in MSHA learn about the March 

bump before August 6? 

Mr. STICKLER. The roof control specialists, the ground control supervisor in Denver, was aware of that bump when they reviewed 

the roof control plans for the south area to be retreat-mined. 

WARNINGS AT CRANDALL CANYON MINE

Senator BYRD. In July 2007, MSHA was conducting a quarterly 

inspection that was ongoing at the time of the mine collapse on August 6. Did that inspection reveal any signs or warnings that a collapse may be imminent? 

Mr. STICKLER. I don’t know of anyone that can go into an underground mine and, based on visual observation, predict that there 

will, or there will not, be a mountain bump. The coal walls of the 

tunnels yield, and that’s a normal process. Really, if you have significant yielding and gradual slow yielding, you don’t have the violent outburst of coal that you do with a mountain bump. It’s when 

the coal walls are standing solid, and they take on so much stress, 

without yielding, and then they abruptly dislodge the coal all at 

one time—it’s quite a different event. 

Senator BYRD. I don’t think I quite got your answer. 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, my answer is that no one has the ability to 

go into a coal mine and predict whether there will, or will not, be 

a mountain bump. So, our inspectors underground traveled through 

the areas of the mine. They did not see any condition that would 

warn them that a mountain bump was pending. 

Senator BYRD. So, you’re saying that the inspection did not reveal any signs or warnings that a collapse may be imminent. 

SPECIAL ROOF CONTROL INVESTIGATION

Mr. STICKLER. Correct. 

Senator BYRD. In May 2007, MSHA conducted a special roof control investigation that, according to MSHA’s Web site, lasted only 

1 day, with no violations cited. Now, what triggered that investigation? 

Mr. STICKLER. That was part of the normal process to review the 

operator’s plan to retreat-mine the south barrier west mains. The 

engineers review the computer models, the calculations, but the supervisor for the ground control/roof control group, and one of the 

specialists, went underground, spent a day in that section looking 

at the conditions, evaluating the roof support, make sure that the 

pillars were developed according to the plan, the proper size, the 

proper roof support was installed. That’s the kind of observations 

they conducted that day that they went underground in May. The 
34 

purpose of that was to gather information to be used in evaluating 

the approval of the ground control plan. 

Senator BYRD. Why did that investigation last only 1 day? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, that’s the normal time it would take for two 

people to travel—there’s only four entries in that section, four tunnels, for a distance of about 2,500 feet. 

Senator BYRD. That inspection did not reveal any signs or warnings that a collapse may be imminent? 

Mr. STICKLER. That’s correct. 

COMPLAINTS FROM MINERS

Senator BYRD. MSHA records indicated that a 103(g) inspection 

resulting from a miner’s complaint occurred in February 2007, revealing a serious violation of mine rescue team regulations. What 

other complaints or warnings did MSHA receive from miners prior 

to August 6? 

Mr. STICKLER. That one that you mentioned, Senator, is the only 

one that I’m aware of. 

Senator BYRD. So, what enforcement actions, if any, then, did 

MSHA take in response? 

Mr. STICKLER. MSHA issued an order requiring the mine operator to abate the violation. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Stickler. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Byrd. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Do you mind if we ask a couple of questions? 

Senator HARKIN. Please. Please. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. 

HISTORY OF SEISMIC EVENTS/BUMPS

Mr. Stickler, if I recall this correctly, between 1992—there were 

seismic events around there, but, between 1992 and this tragedy, 

there were a limited number of bumps—with some small injuries, 

but there weren’t any major injuries. Am I correct on that? 

Mr. STICKLER. That’s correct. As I—— 

Senator HATCH. If I recall correctly, there were only about eight 

bumps in the—— 

Mr. STICKLER. Right. 

Senator HATCH [continuing]. In the mine itself. 

Mr. STICKLER. That’s right. The majority of those that resulted 

in injury occurred on a longwall mining section. 

Senator HATCH. And this was not a longwall—— 

Mr. STICKLER. That’s correct. 

CRANDALL CANYON MINE RESCUE

Senator HATCH [continuing]. Mining section. I see. Now, I know 

that you and your team responded quite quickly to the events regarding the Crandall Canyon Mine. Can you please just run 

through the major events that you oversaw, upon arriving in Utah? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, like you said, I believe MSHA did respond 

very quickly. 

Senator HATCH. Good. 
35 

Mr. STICKLER. Within 2 hours of when we received the call, we 

had a mine inspector onsite. Prior to the mine inspector arriving 

at the mine site, he verbally issued a K-order, which ensures the 

safety of the people at the operation and puts control on the activity of the mine operator to ensure that MSHA approve any activity 

the mine operator takes after that K-order has been put in place. 

It’s about 45 minutes from the Price field office to the mine, so, 

when you take that into consideration, the response, I think, was 

very timely, from MSHA. 

Also, the mine rescue teams arrived there very quickly. The first 

two teams were from Murray Energy and also the neighboring 

mine, Deer Creek Mine, which was an adjoining mining operation, 

responded. The first two teams went underground at a little after 

6 o’clock in the morning. So, I don’t have the time they arrived on 

the mine site, but I’m sure they were briefed. I think that response 

was also very timely. 

But when I arrived at the mine, the first thing I did was meet 

with MSHA’s folks that had been on the ground. Our district manager—his office is in Denver—took him approximately 6 or 7 hours 

to arrive at the mine. So, they provided me a briefing of everything 

they knew about the situation. I arrived at the same time as our 

administrator that’s in charge of coal mine safety and health, 

Kevin Stricklin. So, we jointly reviewed what everyone knew about 

the situation. We looked at what was going on at the operation, the 

plans for the rescue effort. The mine operator had already made arrangements to drill the first hole in the surface. That hole was 

started 1 day after the accident occurred. There were no roads 

within 8,000 feet of the surface area where the drilling had to take 

place, so the mine operator arranged for a helicopter to bring the 

first drill unit in, and it started drilling on the 7th, the day after 

the accident. 

That was a small-diameter hole. We could not guide that hole— 

the driller could not guide that hole, and we were lucky that it 

drilled into an open entry, because it drifted 87 feet from where it 

was intended to drill into the mine. 

The second hole was started the following day, on the 8th. It was 

within about 130 feet of the first hole, but it was 85⁄8 inches in diameter, which would provide enough space that we could drop a 

camera into the mine and get pictures of the underground operation. The drilling process on the surface was conducted in a manner that I think was expedient, considering what had to be done 

to get started. 

The second hole could not be started until an 8,000-foot road was 

built. In the Rocky Mountains, that’s quite a challenge, to carve out 

a road for 8,000 feet to get a large drill rig in. 

But the holes that were drilled followed a priority basis. The first 

two holes were located in this area outlined here. That’s where we 

thought the miners were working. There was an electrician in this 

section, just a couple of hours before the event, and he had traveled 

out of the mine. He was able to give people on the ground information, and his indication was that the miners were working at the 

crosscut 139. The belt tail where the coal was dumped to transport 

it out of the mine was located at crosscut 138. So, that, generally, 

would be where the miners’ normal activity would be located. The 
36 

first hole went in crosscut 138. The second hole went in at 137. 

When we got the air analysis of 7.5 percent oxygen, that was certainly a blow to everybody’s hope, because, at that level of oxygen, 

it would not sustain life. 

So, the planning process was to determine, well, what area could 

we look? Perhaps the miners would have survived. Whenever the 

bump occurred, we believe it breached this barrier between the 

sealed area to the north and the active section, and the oxygen in 

that area was less than 1 percent. That air was blown into the active section. It traveled out by—out of the mine, and dislodged the 

ventilation walls for several thousand feet out to crosscut 95. But 

when we looked at this area of the mine, there’s a solid barrier of 

coal, and the belief was that fresh air would have been trapped in 

this area. So, the third hole was drilled here, and it did, in fact, 

verify that we had 16 percent oxygen, which would support life. 

Again, we dropped cameras in; there was no indication of life. 

We drilled the fourth hole in that same entry, since we had a 

good air—good oxygen—well, I shouldn’t say ‘‘good,’’ we had minimal oxygen, at least enough to support life—that the miners may 

have barricaded themselves in this area, and, therefore, the fourth 

hole was drilled at crosscut 142 and number-four entry. Again, we 

did not find any signs of life by either the microphone, the seismic 

equipment or the cameras that were dropped in. 

Then hole number five was drilled in number-one entry, because 

there was some discussion with the families that the miners would 

have tried to escape out the intake escapeway, which was located 

in number-one entry. That hole drilled into mostly rubble. It was 

just a few inches of clearance on top of the coal rubble. So, there 

was not any likelihood that anyone would have survived in that 

area. 

The sixth hole was drilled where the continuous mining machine 

was believed to be located. Again, that hole just verified what we 

already knew. There was rubble almost all the way to the roof. 

Meeting with the families, they felt pretty strong that they would 

like to see a hole drilled at what’s called the ‘‘kitchen.’’ It’s like a 

picnic table where the miners eat their lunch. So, a hole was put 

in at number-three entry, crosscut 137 and a half. The kitchen area 

where the miners would have left their dinner buckets and their 

extra SCSRs, self-contained breathing apparatus, would have been 

located there. None of that was visible, because the entry was 

mostly filled with rubble, and there was only space of a couple of 

feet from the roof. 

That’s a general review of the drilling activity. This map also 

shows the advance that was conducted in number-one entry, from 

crosscut 120 up to crosscut 127, over 900 feet was rehabilitated. 

The heavy ground support was installed in that area. It shows the 

seal that was breached just hours after the initial accident. Mine 

rescue teams under apparatus believed that they could breach a 

seal and find a route through these entries to get down closer to 

where the miners were located. But, again, conditions would not 

allow them to proceed in that area. 

Senator HATCH. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I appreciate 

your kindness in allowing us to ask these questions. Thank you, 

Mr. Stickler. 
37 

Senator HARKIN. Senator Bennett. 

MSHA VIOLATIONS AND FINES

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stickler, let me go back to your exchange with Senator Specter, and see if I can get a little understanding of what you were 

saying and what he was saying. 

He cited a—I want to—don’t quite know—I don’t remember the 

exact—violation, or some kind of difficulty in January 2007, and 

cited the fact that it says ‘‘the proposed fine was zero.’’ You said, 

‘‘That’s just because the fine hasn’t been assessed.’’ All right, without getting into the back-and-forth there, let me ask you: When 

would you expect the fine for that particular item to be assessed? 

From January—we’re now in September. If, in fact, there was a 

fine yet to be assessed there, when do you expect it would come? 

Mr. STICKLER. That depends on whether or not the operator 

asked for a conference on the violation. It also depends on how long 

it takes to schedule that conference and conduct it. 

Senator BENNETT. All right. But is it normal for something of 

this nature to go on for 9 months, or 10 months, or 1 year? Or 

would you say that would be an unusually long period of time? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, 7 months is slightly unusual, but it’s something that I wouldn’t say doesn’t happen. 

WARNINGS OF SEISMIC EVENTS/BUMPS

Senator BENNETT. Okay. Let me go back to further questions relating to your answers to, I think, Senator Byrd. You say the 

amount of mountain bumps, or the lack of mountain bumps, cannot 

provide any predictive power as to what might happen in the future. Do I have that right? 

Mr. STICKLER. I think I referred to seismic activity. 

Senator BENNETT. All right, seismic—— 

Mr. STICKLER. Seismic activity. It’s similar to looking at the seismic activity associated with natural earthquakes. You can have a 

quiet period, and that’s because the platal—the plates are wedged 

and not moving. You can have, then, a large earthquake—— 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Where small movements are picked 

up, but doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a pending—— 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Large quake. 

RESCUE ACTIVITIES

Senator BENNETT. All right. But, back to the point I made in my 

opening statement, I had understood, from that initial briefing, 

that there would be no rescue activity as long as there was seismic 

activity—there would be no rescue effort, or recovery effort, as long 

as there was seismic activity in the mountain. Obviously, there was 

such an effort undertaken while seismic activity was going on. If 

I understood your answer to that question, you said you suspended 

all rescue activity until there was adequate protection against the 

seismic action that was going on in the mountain. In fact, the protection, while it met all previous standards, proved to be inad-
38 

equate, and that’s why the three rescuers were killed. Do I have 

that correctly from your statements? 

Mr. STICKLER. I think you’re close. Really, there’s two different 

types of rescue activity that we’re talking about. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah, forget the drilling of the holes. 

Mr. STICKLER. Right. The first—let’s just stay underground. 

Two—— 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah, because the drilling of the holes didn’t 

endanger anybody. 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Types of rescue activity underground. 

The first was initiated moments after the event. 

Senator BENNETT. Oh, I understand that. But that was—— 

Mr. STICKLER. And—— 

Senator BENNETT [continuing]. Over by the time we had had our 

briefing. 

Mr. STICKLER. Yeah. But I’m trying to tell you the difference between them. 

Senator BENNETT. Okay, all right. 

Mr. STICKLER. So, the one type involved miners using apparatus, 

mine rescue team members trying to probe, crawl over top of rubble in number-one entry, -two entry, -three entry, -four entry. All 

those entries were probed by mine rescue team members trying to 

crawl over top of the rubble, in low conditions, of about 30 inches. 

Wire mesh that had been tore off of the roof was hanging down. 

They also went over to the adjacent mains entry and breached the 

seal. They drilled holes and blasted through the seal area. They 

went through that seal under apparatus, and tried to explore. 

That’s the activity that I think was communicated that would be 

discontinued. As long as we had seismic activity, we felt that that 

kind of exploration, without any kind of protection against a future 

bump, would not continue. So, that was stopped. 

The other type of rescue operation underground was the rehabilitation of number-one entry. That involved using a continuous mining machine that was operated by remote control, diesel coal-haulers that hauled the rubble out and dumped it on the conveyor belt, 

roof-bolting crews that would come in behind the miner and roofbolt the roof, and also crews that would set the 40-ton water jacks, 

install the chainlink fence and the wire cables. 

Senator BENNETT. So—— 

Mr. STICKLER. That activity continued on, because we believed— 

and throughout the subsequent bumps, we didn’t lose any of that 

support, it was still standing, still in place, withstood the bumps, 

until the one that occurred on the 16th. 

Senator BENNETT. So, the second type of rescue effort, or recovery effort, carried out under conditions that previous experience 

taught you would be adequate to protect the miners. 

Mr. STICKLER. All the experts on the ground there—we had our 

tech support people from Pittsburgh, ground control—— 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. Experts, MSHA’s inspection people, 

the mine operator, the engineers—we were confident that the support that was being installed would be adequate. I was underground in the exact area where the accident occurred on the—well, 

about—maybe 50 feet out by—— 
39 

Senator BENNETT. Right. 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. I felt safe. If anyone there would have 

felt that there was imminent danger, those workers would have 

been withdrawn. 

CHANGING RESCUE PROCEDURES

Senator BENNETT. Right. I have one quick question, if I might, 

Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve had an experience with the Forest Service with the disaster 

of a forest fire that threatened my own home and a number of 

homes and structures in the area where I was then living, and 

learned very quickly that when the feds showed up, in the Forest 

Service pattern, nobody else mattered. I learned a new term, that 

I had not known before, called ‘‘the incident commander.’’ The sheriff’s office and the Salt Lake County sheriff, the Salt Lake County 

Police, the Salt Lake County Commission, all the rest of this, they 

were immediately told, ‘‘Everything that has to do with this forest 

fire, the incident commander is king. We know you’re the county 

sheriff, we know you have jurisdiction, but if it’s in the area of the 

fire, the incident commander determines who goes in, who comes 

out, everything relating to the press—the incident commander is 

the only one that gives out any information.’’ 

I just ask you the rhetorical question: Would we be better off if 

MSHA went to a circumstance where you, or your designee, became 

the incident commander, and everything funnels through that, 

rather than the kind of cooperative effort that I ran into when I 

was there at the briefing? Do you have an opinion on that? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, I think it’s important to have a lot of different input. My experience in the past, particularly operations 

that were—represent unions—the union was represented in the 

command center, the mining company, the State Mine Safety Agency, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration. That 

team of four groups would work together cooperatively to come up 

with the best ideas, the best way to deal with these situations. 

There’s no recipe, or no cookbook. Every situation is different. So, 

it’s a matter of having people that have years of mining experience, 

the most knowledge that you can bring there, and resources, and 

work together cooperatively. 

My experience has been that people do work cooperative. I have 

not had a case in a mine emergency where we were fighting among 

ourselves and you had to use force and take control. 

Now, in one respect, if MSHA would take control of a situation 

like that, then you would have to ask the question, well, ‘‘What responsibility does the mine operator have?’’ If the mine operator 

walks away, he takes the personnel and the resources and equipment. It would be a monumental task for MSHA to secure contracts with drilling companies and bring employees in to substitute 

and replace the mine operator. 

I think I would lean toward the cooperative—of teamwork between the State, the labor unions, MSHA, and the mine operator. 

I’ve seen it work successfully. 
40 

CONTROL OF ACCIDENT SITE

As far as the press, you know, I don’t know how to control the 

press. If you’ve got any ideas on that, that can help the agency in 

the future—you know, it’s unfortunate, because things got printed 

in the newspaper. Things are being quoted, even today, from newspaper sources that have not been confirmed and are not known to 

be factual. And some of this information, as it got back to the families, was hurtful to the families. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Senator Bennett. 

But doesn’t MSHA have the authority to approve the entry of 

media to the Crandall Canyon Mine? 

Mr. STICKLER. I didn’t catch your full—— 

Senator HARKIN. Well, didn’t MSHA have the authority to permit 

who got into the mine? In other words, you could have—MSHA 

could have said only certain personnel can go into the mine. But, 

as I understand, media—Mr. Murray took media into the mine. 

But you could have stopped that, couldn’t you have? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well I think our—and I’m not sure, but, as I recall, our K-order limited the number of people in by—I don’t know 

if it was crosscut 119 or 120—— 

Senator HARKIN. Did you approve the entry of media into the 

Crandall Mine? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, we didn’t disapprove it. The mine operator 

has the right to take people into the mine, visitors, provided they 

give them the training, and provided that they don’t go into an 

area that’s unsafe. 

Senator HARKIN. I think we ought to—— 

Mr. STICKLER. We had a Federal inspector traveling with the 

news media when they went underground. My understanding is 

that they were not taken in to an area that interfered or disrupted 

the rescue work or in any way exposed them to an unnecessary 

danger. So, if MSHA would take action to stop that, we would have 

to be able to show that it was unsafe. 

TRACKING TECHNOLOGY

Senator HARKIN. Last, Mr. Roberts, in his testimony, will talk 

about a device that was used to save a Polish miner—track a Polish miner. I asked you, earlier, about tracking devices. I asked you: 

Is there a tracking technology available and approved by MSHA 

that could have told us where the miners were? Your answer was 

no, you wished there were. Are you familiar with what was used 

in the Polish mine? I don’t know much about it, I don’t know how 

deep that mine was, or anything like that. Are you familiar with 

that tracking device that was used there? 

Mr. STICKLER. Well, I don’t know, specifically, which device 

you’re referring to, but—— 

Senator HARKIN. I don’t—— 

Mr. STICKLER [continuing]. I know that MSHA’s folks and 

NIOSH’s people have been working hard, thousands of man hours, 

gathering all the information from around the world. We have tested—at MSHA—we’ve tested numerous systems that people claim 

will perform in a certain way, and we have not yet found a two- 
41 

way wireless communication or tracking system that would work in 

a mine such as the Crandall Canyon Mine. 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Stickler, thank you very much for your testimony here this morning. I think there were a couple of things 

that we had asked for, that I wanted to have you provide for us, 

and that was the MSHA approvals after the letter of April 18, 

2007, the approvals that they gave for the resumption of mining in 

that south area. If you could provide those for us, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. STICKLER. We’ll do so. 

[The information follows:] 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—This information is available at www.msha.gov/ 

genwal/cradallcanyon.asp] 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stickler. Thank you. 

Now we’ll turn to our panel. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator HARKIN. Yes, sir. Do you have a question for Mr. Stickler? 

Senator BYRD. Yes. 

Senator HARKIN. Senator Byrd had another question, Mr. Stickler. 

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Senator BYRD. Mr. Stickler, do you stand behind the mining plan 

that MSHA approved at Crandall Canyon? 

Mr. STICKLER. I think I will have to see the results of the accident investigation team. They will run the computer analysis. They 

will interview the professional engineers from Agapito. They will 

interview the district nine professional engineers that recommended approval of plan. I will wait until I get that information 

to make that decision. 

Senator BYRD. Will we also get the information? 

Mr. STICKLER. Sir, I didn’t hear you. 

Senator BYRD. Will this committee also get the information? 

Mr. STICKLER. That’ll be in our accident investigation report. 

You’ll be provided a copy. It’s posted on our Web site, and all the 

family members will be given a copy. 

Senator BYRD. Very well. 

Senator HARKIN. Can you just give us about—approximate date 

when that might happen? 

Mr. STICKLER. When the accident investigation team—that team 

determines what they look at, how long they take. I would not 

want to preempt them or put any undue pressure on them by giving you a date. 

INTRODUCTION OF OTHER WITNESSES

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stickler. 

Now we’d like to call our second panel, Mr. Davitt McAteer, vice 

president of sponsored programs at Wheeling Jesuit University, 

former Assistant Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health; Mr. 

Cecil Roberts, the international president of United Mine Workers 

of America; Mr. Bruce Watzman, vice president for safety, health 

and human resources for the National Mining Association. 
42 

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here this morning. 

Thank you for your patience. As you can see, we had a lot of questions for Mr. Stickler. I’m sure we’ll have some for you, also. 

All your testimonies will be made a part of the record in their 

entirety. I would ask if you could sum up, again, in 5, 7, 10 minutes, something like that. I’ll get the light at 7 minutes, and if you 

have to go over, we’ll give you a little time over that, but we’d like 

to have time to engage in questions for all of you. 

So, I’ll start in the order in which I brought people up, Mr. 

Davitt McAteer, vice president of the sponsored programs at 

Wheeling Jesuit University, and former Assistant Secretary of 

Labor, Mine Safety, and Health. 

STATEMENT OF J. DAVITT McATEER, ESQUIRE, VICE PRESIDENT OF 

SPONSORED PROGRAMS, WHEELING JESUIT UNIVERSITY, 

SHEPHERDSTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA 

Mr. MCATEER. Chairman Harkin, Chairman Byrd, Senator Specter, Senators Hatch and Bennett, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear here today. 

In order to answer the questions that have been posed earlier to 

Mr. Stickler, I would propose to address three issues. One, the mining plan should not have been approved; it proved to be inadequate. Two, there were indications, prior to the approval of the 

mining plan and during the mining process, that there were difficulties being encountered at the mine, that bumps were occurring, 

and that pressure was building up during the period of time prior 

to the mining. The fact the mine had to move from the north to 

the south section, and that that was not apparently reported to 

MSHA, suggests that there was not an effort to comply with, or coordinate with, MSHA. 

Second, MSHA has, at its resources available, a computer technology called ARPM Analysis of Room and Pillar Method. This 

analysis was not done prior to the incident, and—this analysis is 

a computer modeling system that is particularly useful in determining where the difficulties—where the pressures are going to be 

located. That analysis was done subsequent to the accident, and 

that analysis, according to one newspaper account, has found the 

design by Agapito and submitted by the Murray Company to be inadequate and to be insufficient. 

Next, do we have a way that we can understand the technology 

that provides us with information about these bumps? These 

bumps are not the collapse of the mine, as you traditionally think 

of it, but they are, in effect, the rock bursting out, the coal bursting 

out into the workplace, pressured by the top and the bottom. There 

were, according to press accounts, reports by the miners in the 

days previous to the bumps—to this bump—hooving in the bottom 

and a heating in the bottom, which gives us some indication that 

pressure is building up. Other countries, other parts of this country, other mines in this country, suffer similar kinds of problems. 

It’s related to the weight of the top, the height of the roof above 

ground cover above the mine, and the opening itself. There were 

pressure buildups here. Those pressure buildups were not being 

read and monitored. 

There are systems in use in this country, and there are systems 

in use in South Africa and Poland that have, for the last 20 years, 
43 

been able to build—understand what—these pressure buildups are 

coming. These seismic systems are available, are commercially 

available, and have been in—been used in this country’s mines. 

The Buchanan Mine, in Virginia, used such a seismic device. Other 

companies have used it. MSHA has tested one of these devices. 

NIOSH has tested one of these devices. 

If we are going to permit the mine operator to operate in this 

highly dangerous circumstance, then we must put on that mine operator an obligation to, one, monitor and read the bumps—read the 

pressures, and, two, take steps to diffuse them. That can be done. 

There’s ways to diffuse and to have limited explosions, which decrease the pressures so that you don’t have the creation of a cataclysmic event. 

The mine rescue system is broken, unfortunately, in this country. 

This is not to take away from the valuable and heroic efforts of the 

miners. But, in point of fact, Mr. Stickler suggests that it was expeditious and we got there quickly, given the conditions of the mountains and of the location of this particular mine. It is our suggestion that each mine operator, as part of their emergency plan, have 

a worst-case scenario, because, when you are in those mountains, 

and you know you’re going to have problems, and you know you’re 

going to have difficulties, then you should very well plan ahead; 

much like you plan ahead for the production side, you need to plan 

ahead for an emergency. If we’re going to send people into these 

circumstances, in very difficult terrain, in very difficult locations, 

then we need to be prepared to get’ em out, and get’ em out quickly. 

We are, unfortunately, not using the technologies that are available in other industries, like tunnel boring systems that would 

allow us to penetrate the earth quickly and safely, because it builds 

its own protection as it goes. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

We need to learn from the accident, just like we needed to learn 

from Sago. At Sago, what we learned was to try to provide supplies 

and equipment to the miners to keep alive til we could get to them. 

In this instance, we need to learn how we can get to them faster 

and how we can predict these things from coming to us, and stop 

them from occurring before they occur. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. DAVITT MCATEER

Good Morning, Chairman Harkin and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Davitt McAteer and I wish to thank you for this opportunity 

to appear before you today. I am the Vice President of Wheeling Jesuit University 

where I am responsible for research efforts at the National Technology Transfer 

Center (NTTC) and Center for Educational Technologies (CET). 

In addition, during the past year and one-half, I led investigations into the Sago 

and Aracoma/Alma No. 1 Mine disasters in West Virginia at the request of West 

Virginia Governor, Joe Manchin, III, and issued reports on those disasters in July 

and November of 2006. 

From 1994 to 2000, I served as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Mine Safety 

and Health Administration (MSHA) and also served as Acting Solicitor of Labor 

from February, 1996 to December, 1997. I have been involved in mine safety and 

health issues since 1968 when, following the Farmington Mine disaster in November 
44 

1 Coal Bump: Sudden outbursts of coal and rock that occur when stresses in a coal pillar, left 

for support in underground workings, cause the pillar to rupture without warning, sending coal 

and rock flying with explosive force. A Dictionary of Mining Minerals & Related Terms, Compiled and edited by Paul W. Thrush and the State of the Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department 

of the Interior, 1968, p. 223. 2Mine Safety & Health News; Retsof Salt Mine and Green River Wyoming, Trona Mine Collapse, August 13th Edition. 3 In 1914, E.H. Weitzel, a company executive with the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, testified before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Mines and Mining that in many western 

coalfields the overburden of rock and strata covering the coal seams are very unstable and that 

he considered the Rocky Mountain region to be the most hazardous coal-mining area in the 

country. And in 1926, a U.S. Bureau of Mines representative noted that the practice of pulling 

pillars (unmined coal left standing between room and pillar entries) in worked-out areas—more 

common in the West than in other regions—made unstable roof conditions more dangerous. 

(U.S. Congress, House Committee on Mines and Mining, Investigation of Conditions in Coal 

Mines of Colorado. 63rd Congress, 2d Session, 1914 pp. 1781–1782; Daniel Harrington, Accident 

Record in Western Coal Mining States, Rocky Mountain Coal Institute, Proceedings 1927; 2:11– 

16.). 4 30 CFR Part 50.20–5(a). 

of 1968, I conducted a study and produced a report and book entitled Coal Mine 

Safety and Health—A Case Study of West Virginia. 

Tragically, we are here yet again to attempt to make sense of the events which 

began at 2:48 AM on Monday, August 6, 2007 at the Crandall Canyon Mine near 

Huntington, Utah, where nine men lost their lives. Based on the information I’ve 

reviewed, a massive coal bump 1 violently disrupted the mining operation. The bump 

was of sufficient force to be recorded as a 3.9 magnitude event by the University 

of Utah Seismograph Station in Salt Lake City and lasted 4 minutes. 

The suggestion that this was a naturally-occurring earth quake has been rejected 

by every seismologist who has reviewed the evidence. Moreover, rock bursts of this 

sort are not uncommon in certain U.S. mining regions.2 In fact, the Utah coal field 

where the Crandall Canyon mine is located has been known as an area prone to 

coal ‘‘bumps and bounces’’ for decades.3 There’s no doubt that the violent coal burst 

that occurred on August 6 was directly related to the mining activity at this underground operation. Panels of coal were being extracted in areas where exhaustive 

longwall mining had previously occurred. 

It is my understanding that in February, 2007, the mine operator was mining in 

the North barrier panel, but in March, a large outburst of coal forced the company 

to abandon this section of the mine in favor of mining in the South barrier. Under 

MSHA regulations, a mine operator is required to report to MSHA ‘‘a coal or rock 

outburst that causes withdrawal of miners or which disrupts regular mining activity 

for more than one hour.’’ 4 (It has been reported that the operator failed to file this 

required report to MSHA, and upon learning of the March 2007 rock burst, MSHA 

determined that mine operator had not violated the reporting requirement.) In response to the March 2007 rock burst and after consulting with a mining engineering 

firm, the mine operator submitted a revised mining plan for the Crandall Canyon 

Mine to MSHA on May 23, 2007, and the agency approved it on June 15, 2007. On 

the night of August 6, miners were removing coal from the 158 block when the massive bump and collapse occurred. Sadly, on August 16, during the heroic effort to 

rescue the six trapped miners, another massive bounce occurred. Three individuals 

were killed, including a MSHA inspector, Gary L. Jensen, and six others were seriously injured. 

While it is early in the investigation and much remains to be learned, I would 

like to emphasize two points at this time. First, Prevention. Second, Emergency Answer. Historically, the most effective and proven way to save miners from disasters 

is to prevent them from occurring in the first place, by dealing effectively with 

known risks. Explosions, mine fires, rock bursts, fatal crushing injuries, and black 

lung disease have all been with us a long time, we have not invented new ways to 

kill miners. The same hazards that killed miners 50, 20 and 10 years ago, are the 

same, and the nature of mining—-where the workplace is changing minute-byminute—-requires constant vigilance on the part of miners, foremen, mine superintendents, and mine operators. 

Of course, MSHA also has a critically important role in prevention, by approving 

mine operators’ written plans for ventilation, roof control, etc., and by conducting 

comprehensive inspections and protecting miners’ rights to complain about safety 

and health concerns without fear of reprisal. Lest the public forget, at its core, 

MSHA is a law enforcement agency, but as the law states, it is the responsibility 

of the mine operator to safely operate the mines. It is responsible for enforcing mine 

safety and health regulations which are proven tools to prevent injuries, illnesses, 
45 

5Ward, Ken, Tough Questions, Need Answers, Computer Model Found Mine Plan in Utah 

Lacking; Charleston Gazette, Sept 2, 2007. 6Gehrke R. ‘‘Mountain was buckling months before mine collapse.’’ The Salt Lake Tribune, 

August 31, 2007. 

and deaths. When it comes to protecting our nation’s mine workers, MSHA’s decisions should always err on the side of protecting the miners. 

In this context, what do we already know about the situation at the Crandall Canyon mine? The mine plan was either grossly insufficient and led to the disaster, or 

it was adequate but the mine operator failed to follow it as written. In either case, 

we need to ensure that mining plans include a sufficient margin of safety, so that 

if minor deviations from the plan are made in the course of mining, a catastrophic 

event doesn’t result. The catastrophic event in Utah suggests a serious deficiency 

in the way the plan was approved by MSHA. In the Sago and Aracoma/Alma disasters, the plans submitted by the mine operators and approved by MSHA did not include a sufficient safety factor, and as a result, miners were not protected and many 

perished. The MSHA approval process, a vital part in the prevention system, should 

start with the question: Will this plan provide a high level of safety to the miners 

working in accordance with it? Ultimately, an MSHA plan approval should convey 

to the mine operator, the miners and ultimately their loved ones, that the Agency 

has a high-degree of confidence that the plan, if followed diligently, will provide a 

robust level of safety for the mine workers. 

MSHA’s technical review of plans must certainly rely on the expertise of the agency’s engineering specialists, but the staff also have available to them a computer 

modeling program called the ‘‘Analysis of Room and Pillar Mining Systems’’ or 

‘‘ARPM.’’ This computerized modeling system provides a quantitative measure to assess the engineering adequacy of the plan. The ARPM is especially valuable as it 

relates to pressure risks in coal pillars and ribs. It is my understanding that 

MSHA’s ARPM was not used to evaluate the Crandall Canyon’s mining plan until 

after the disaster occurred. And, it is my understanding that the evaluation found 

that the mining plan was ‘‘lacking and under-designed.’’ 5

This technology was previously used to limit mining in dangerous conditions. In 

1996, following a double fatality at the Harlan Cumberland mine in eastern Kentucky where a violent coal outburst claimed the lives of miners Mark Skidmore and 

Randy Lewis, and injured four other men, MSHA’s district office used the ARPM 

to evaluate the operator’s plan to continue mining in a section near the fall. When 

the ARPM analysis showed continued and heightened danger, the plan was rejected 

and mining was not allowed in that section of the mine. 

MSHA’s approval of the mining plans is a critical component of its prevention responsibility, but this approval must also be integrated into the inspection process. 

The front-line inspectors must be given adequate time to coordinate and consult 

with the technical specialist who reviewed and approved plan. This way, the inspector who will actually visit the mine and see the plan in action, has a thorough understanding of the plan’s unique features, and is aware of areas in the mine that 

should undergo more scrutiny during an inspection. Also, the various divisions of 

MSHA must work together when considering, for example, the demands for appropriate roof control and appropriate ventilation. Each of these safety concerns is 

equally important and must be reviewed as an integrated mine-safety system, not 

as independent factors, as if changes in one (e.g. ventilation controls) couldn’t have 

a profound adverse effect on the other (e.g., ground control). 

In addition, other Federal agencies with responsibilities for safety must be consulted. In the Crandall Canyon disaster, we now understand that Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM) engineers had not seen the mining plan until after the accident 

and were not aware ‘‘how aggressively they were on retreat mining.’’ 6 The chief of 

the BLM’s solid minerals branch said ‘‘I can say with certainty that our mining engineers would have had some questions about it.’’ 6

In the mode of getting ‘‘back to basics’’ on enforcement to enhance prevention, 

more emphasis should be paid to the role of MSHA’s field and district office supervisors, for their support and enhancement of the front-line mine inspectors. Today 

many MSHA supervisors are being called on to take on all sorts of additional responsibilities (e.g., stakeholder meetings, special emphasis programs) which may dilute the principle enforcement mission of the agency. 

Moreover, we know that in certain regions of the county with their unique geological formations, and in particular kinds of mining settings, underground mines are 

prone to rock bursts (i.e., ‘‘bounces’’ and ‘‘bumps’’.) In West Virginia, as well as in 

Utah, the coal seams and related geology is well understood by mining engineers. 

Coal ‘‘bumps and bounces’’ are not limited to western coal mines. At the Consolidation Coal Company’s Buchanan No. 1 mine located in western Virginia, several 
46 

‘‘bounces’’ occurred on July 7, 2007 and they were reported to MSHA. (No injuries 

to miners resulted from this event at the Buchanan mine, which registered above 

3.0 magnitude on the Richter scale at Virginia Tech.) When a mine operator proposes an underground site for secondary mining applications, however, the geologists and mining engineers may know less about how the seams will respond and 

need to plan the mine design accordingly. 

Therefore, I recommend that any mining operation with cover in excess of 1,000 

feet, be required to meet a greater level of review and scrutiny before a plan is approved. Just like the special consideration and oversight of mines that liberate high 

concentrations of methane, we need an additional level of scrutiny for mines with 

more than 1,000 feet of cover. These mine plans must first make a determination 

of whether the mining can be undertaken while ensuring an adequate margin of 

safety for the miners. Then, it must include a description of how pressure buildups 

in the pillars or ribs will be monitored, but also elaborate on the techniques that 

will be used to (1) monitor the build-up of pressure in the strata, and (2) institute 

procedures to the release it. The methods to manage safely the risk of coal or rock 

bursts are well known and have been used extensively in the mines of Poland, 

South Africa, as well as in certain mines in the United States. They have not been 

applied on a large scale in the United States because they are not required by Federal law and interfere with rapid coal production. If day-to-day management of pressure build-ups in the pillars and ribs had been adopted at the Crandall Canyon 

mine, it is likely that miners’ lives may have been saved. 

Seismic monitoring of mining conditions is a well developed science which has 

been available as a tool for measuring and graphing rock pressure build-up in strata 

surrounding the coal seams. In principle, it is a modern version of listening to the 

rock or roof formation, a practice miners have used since ancient times. As the mining creates voids in the subsurface strata, the rock formations above and below will 

begin to adjust, in effect, filling the void (as the old saying goes, Mother Nature 

hates a void). That adjustment results in some cases, roof falls and in other locations in the build-up of pressure in the rock formations above, as well as below the 

coal seam and void. Typically the coal vein is the softest rock formation, thus pressure can cause bursts and bumps which violently cause the coal and surrounding 

rock to explode into the void and into the mine tunnel. This phenomenon occurs as 

well in gold and other metal and nonmetal mines. 

As mentioned, seismic monitoring of the pressure build-ups has been practiced in 

South Africa and Poland for decades, and techniques for diffusing the pressures in 

a controlled manner have been developed and successfully deployed. This technique 

has also been deployed in the United States in the coal mining industry. Consolidation Coal Company deployed seismic monitors in its Buchanan Mine in the last 

twenty years, recently, the practice has been discontinued. The science has advanced to the point it is called ‘‘micro seismic monitoring’’ and portable wireless 

seismographic units have been developed. The U.S. oil industry has employed this 

technique for oil exploration. 

Therefore, I wish to propose that each mine operator of any mine which has experienced pressure buildups, bounces or bumps or which has the potential for such 

events be required to deploy seismic monitoring systems in their mines. Moreover 

they be required to utilize techniques already existing to defuse the pressure buildup. Finally, each such operator should be required to have a procedure to remove 

miners from harm should pressure buildups be detected, and to discontinue mining 

until steps have been taken to release the pressure to a safe level. 

MSHA recently tested a wireless mini-seismic system which according to the manufacturer, the in-mine testing was successful. This portable wireless system could 

also be adapted for mine rescue to listen for miners trapped below ground. 

From a prevention perspective, mining companies and MSHA currently have tools 

available to them that are designed to assess hazards and prevent the kind of catastrophe that occurred at the Crandall Canyon mine. These must be deployed in the 

mines today. 

Second, the mine emergency system in the United States must be overhauled. It 

has failed the miners. Rescues have been few and far between, sadly we are not as 

prepared, quick and nimble as we need to be. The mine rescue operations which 

have taken place in the last few years have certainly demonstrated the heroic efforts on the part of the rescuers, including all the men at Crandall Canyon. However, the system is not accomplishing what it was established to do: rescue miners 

quickly and safely, and with the least amount of risks to those individuals engaged 

in the rescue itself. 

After the mine accident at Sago, a number of State and the Federal governments 

pushed reforms to equip trapped miners with additional breathing devices, and 

other essentials to keep them alive until they could be rescued. Today, more self- 
47 

7 Alliance Resources (NYSE: ARLP), Arch Coal (NYSE: ACI), CONSOL (NYSE: CNX), Foundation Coal (NYSE: FCL), Massey Energy (NYSE: MEE), Murray Energy, Peabody (NYSE: BTW). 

contained self-rescuers are being stored underground than in the past, and that is 

a good, positive first step. But, we should never have been satisfied with that minor 

first step, and I am particularly disturbed at the slow pace of other improvements, 

notably, emergency response plans, communications and tracking, and rescue chambers. 

When the MINER Act of 2006 required mine operators to develop a ‘‘response and 

preparedness plan’’ for mine disasters, it was hoped that mine operators and MSHA 

would have developed and approved plans, respectively, that reflected the letter and 

the spirit of the new law. An emergency preparedness plan should not simply list 

the number of SCSR’s available and report that the underground emergency supply 

skid will contain 1 roll of brattice, 2 lbs. of #8 nails, and 10 gallons of water. Instead, the plan should reflect the mine operator’s planning and preparedness for an 

emergency. Examining the emergency response plan for the Crandall Canyon mine, 

which MSHA approved in June 2007, there is little indication that the operator gave 

serious thought to the types of emergency scenarios likely to occur at his mine. For 

a region of the country notorious for rock bursts, and a mine with a history of them, 

we should expect the mine operator to consider these facts when planning and preparing for an emergency. 

I recommended that each mine operator include in his emergency response at 

least one ‘‘worst case scenario’’ and how they would respond to this event. The plan 

should include how they involved miners, local emergency responders and family 

members in their mock-up exercises, and thoroughly describe the plausible 

eventualities considered in their preparation. 

At Crandall Canyon, we know that precious hours were spent simply getting the 

site ready for the first drill hole. As the mine advances underground, given the requirement that the emergency response plan must be updated at least every 6 

months, an estimated site for emergency response holes or ‘‘rescue boreholes’’ be 

mapped out in advance. In the event of an actual emergency when the command 

center officials determine that a bore hole is necessary, the site would have been 

already planned out. These and other steps that could be taken in advance will expedite the mine rescue process and hopefully buy time for the miners awaiting rescue. MSHA must develop and equip rapid response teams with adequate equipment 

on-hand and ready to transport when notified of about a mine emergency. Technology from other industries (e.g., oil and gas, aerospace) should be examined for 

potential transfer to the mine safety world in order to improve the effectiveness and 

speed with which rescue teams can reach trapped miners. For example, tunnel-boring machines used in the tunneling industry appear to offer significant potential for 

boring quickly and safely into trapped miners. 

At all levels, corporate, State and Federal levels, mine rescue must be modernized 

and made realistic, starting with in-mine rescue exercises in addition to the traditional mine-rescue contests. 

The efforts to improve communications between the mining surface and to the underground miners must be redoubled. There are communication and tracking systems which are manufactured and available today for the mining industry. They 

may not be perfect, and they may not work in every emergency situation, but we 

must short-circuit the endless search for the holy grail of communication devices 

that can be used in every location underground. When the vast majority of nation’s 

electricity is powered by coal, there is no reason that our coal miners don’t have 

access to the best currently-available communication and tracking equipment. We 

must make a commitment that every 3 years or 5 years, existing equipment will 

be replaced with the latest state-of-the-art available technology. 

Economically, the coal industry is well positioned to adopt improved safety technology, as the past several years have been especially profitable, and production is 

concentrated in a small number of companies. 

Of the 612 underground mines that produced coal last year, 81 percent of the coal 

came from just 145 mines. The vast majority of these mines are controlled by the 

Nation’s seven largest coal mining companies.7 I know that some of these firms’ 

mines have begun installing improved communication and tracking systems, however others have not. I recommend that the operators of these 145 top-producing 

mines, provide MSHA with a report on their current state of communication and 

tracking systems, as envisioned by the spirit of the Miner Act. We must help to ensure the continuous improvement and application of communication systems for underground miners by encouraging a new approach to applied mine safety engineering, so that the ‘‘research’’ to ‘‘practice’’ to ‘‘product’’ cycle is accelerated greatly. One 
48 

8 In a report to the then Governor: Report to Governor Robert Wise On Mine Safety and 

Health in West Virginia and Recommendations to make West Virginia Mines the Safest and 

Healthiest in the Nation, Fall 2001, a recommendation was made to Improve and Update Requirements related to Roof and Ground Control Methods and Criteria, including restricting and 

eliminating retreat mining and pillar removal in certain instances. 

suggested method would allow MSHA to provide grants to equipment entrepreneurs, 

inventors and coal operators to establish partnerships and collaborate between 

themselves to test the system components to ensure the equipment is effective and 

intrinsically-safe for use in an underground mine. 

Our failures in the past 2 years are driven by the lack of knowledge of the location and condition of the miners. Systems exist which can enhance that knowledge, 

but they have not been adopted. I do not believe that perfection should be the 

benchmark for mine safety equipment, but rather improvement should be the standard for the deployment of new mine safety equipment, concrete steps to deploy safety equipment should be taken now. 

Retreat mining carries a higher risk than other types of mining. It therefore 

should be looked to only as a mining technique of last resort, and higher safety 

standards be required in particular when exhaustive mining has been previously 

conducted and secondary and tertiary mining cycles are being proposed. In fact, the 

practice of retreat mining in general, and retreat mining in secondary mining situations—as happened at the Crandall Canyon mine—is an issue which should, I believe, be examined in general. In a study conducted in 2001 for the West Virginia 

Governor, I concluded that retreat mining which was done in a small number of 

mines had a disproportionately high rate of fatal and non-fatal accidents.8 In that 

report, I urged the restriction and prohibition in many instances of retreat mining 

as a practice. 

Here, I would like to recommend a suspension of approval for retreat mining plan 

approvals by MSHA until a review of the question of whether retreat mining should 

be permitted; particularly in cases, as in Crandall Canyon, where extensive mining 

has previously occurred and where the cover exceeds 1,000 feet and the area is 

prone to coal bumps and bounces. 

In conclusion, the time for the industry and Federal Government to wait on research before implementing applied engineering improvements is at an end. 

Crandall Canyon signaled loud and clear it is time for action. Mining in the twentyfirst century calls for a new set of criteria, as coal reserves dwindle, as mining conditions change, greater challenges can be expected, and greater scrutiny should be 

forthcoming. The mining industry must consider whether it wishes to continue in 

the mining business or not—-if it does, it must use the technologies available from 

other industries and other mining countries (i.e., tunnel boring machines and seismographs, South Africa and Poland) to protect the men and women we send underground. There is a need to overhaul the technology used to protect and defend miners. The maxim must be if we can’t go get them quickly and safely then we should 

not send them underground! 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. McAteer. 

Now we turn to Mr. Cecil Roberts, president of United Mine 

Workers of America. I have to add, here, I—just parenthetically, for 

my friend Senator Bennett, when you—when you earlier mentioned 

that the level of fatalities in mining—coal mining had gone from— 

in 1920 to 3.6 per 1,000 down to .6, if I got—if I remember 

right—— 

Senator BENNETT. .2. 

Senator HARKIN. .2—I thought about that, and I thought, you 

know, I wonder that was. But one of the reasons was because miners organized and became unionized. My father was never privileged to belong to United Workers, because—but he told me a lot 

of stories about them trying to organize, and what would happen 

to them. He worked in mines, where they brought over people from 

Italy, the Italians, Slovenians, Croatians, Welsh, of course—John 

L. Lewis—Irish—my father—all came over to mine coal. He told 

me about the early days of trying to organize, and what would happen to them, by the mine owners and stuff. But he looked back 

wistfully on that, back in the 1950s, up—1960s, up until the time 
49 

he died, and he thought John L. Lewis was probably one of the 

greatest men who ever lived. He just wished that they had been 

unionized when he was in the mine. So, I think that part of the 

reason that we have that was because miners got organized, they 

demanded these safety things, and—the safety procedures and 

stuff, the—many of which predated the 1952 law—or the 1952 

Mine Health and Safety Act. 

Well, with that—just my way of saying thank you very much, 

Mr. Roberts and all those presidents who preceded you in working 

for the safety and health and benefit of our coalminers in America. 

STATEMENT OF CECIL E. ROBERTS, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, 

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for those 

kind remarks. 

I want to thank this committee, not only for conducting this 

hearing today, but also the interest that you’ve shown, not only last 

year in the wake of all those tragedies, where 47 miners lost their 

lives, but, earlier this year, you called a hearing, in February I believe, to ask about the progress that we were making with respect 

to mine health and safety in the United States of America. I think 

that demonstrated this committee’s very keen interest in protecting 

the coalminers. 

I also want to thank this committee, particularly my friend Senator Byrd, for the nearly $26 million that was appropriated to hire 

an additional 170 Federal inspectors to protect the Nation’s 

coalminers. I think you’ve done some good work. 

I also would like to take this opportunity to express my condolences to those wonderful people in Utah, the families of the six 

trapped miners, the brave efforts of the three miners who were attempting to rescue them. We’re all one family here, whether we’re 

union or nonunion, when it comes to this. 

I come here today with—as has been mentioned—with families 

from Sago and from Jim Walter Resources tragedies, 2001 and 

2006, and we’re all united in the purpose here of making the coal 

mines in this Nation safer. That’s the only purpose that we come 

here, today. 

We would point out that—I was asked a very pointed question 

in February, as to whether, if we had another situation such as 

Sago, would there be much of a difference? The answer to that was 

no, unfortunately, for a variety of reasons. 

I have been very pointed in my comments about this situation, 

that this mining plan, (a) should not have been submitted, and (b) 

should not have been approved. I think it bears a little more conversation here than what’s been given at this point, in why we believe that. I must say, that’s been shared by the Colorado Bureau 

of Mines, the Bureau of Land Management, former employees of 

MSHA, experts at West Virginia University. So, it’s not just the 

union coming in here, suggesting this. 

This area, here, was longwalled. This area, here, is all mined out. 

This area, here, was longwalled. This is where we found our miners 

right now. So, it’s just not the point of—well, was it retreat mining, 

which is really what we call longwall mining, Mr. Chairman, in the 

East—this is what we call pillar work, in West Virginia, and pull-
50 

ing pillars is another common term here. This is the most dangerous type of mining there is. But that’s not the real problem 

here. The problem is, is where we’re doing this type of work—you 

take any expert—don’t take my word for this—don’t take the word 

of Colorado School of Mines, and don’t take West Virginia University’s, and don’t take Mr. McAteer’s word. I’m sure there’s somebody somewhere that you could bring in here that everyone would 

have confidence in. But this mining plan should not have been submitted, and that’s where this problem started. I’m not pointing fingers, but you—I’ve got coalminers with me from West Virginia, 

Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and you lay this map out to them, and 

say: ‘‘We’re going to go in here now, after mining everything to the 

north of where you’re going to pillar, and everything to the south 

of where you’re going to pillar, and everything leading out of this 

mine, and we’re going to have 2,000 feet of mountain above you. 

What do you think?’’ I submit to you, there’s no one going to walk 

in here and sit where I’m sitting right now and say: ‘‘I’m a mining 

expert, and I believe that this type of mining should have been 

done.’’ I think this needs to be made perfectly clear, here. 

I think it’s also important to note, here, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the committee, that there were warning signs here, as Mr. 

McAteer alluded to. Just north—this is a blown-up portion, here, 

of where we believe—a very small area, where we believe these six 

trapped miners happened to be working—just north of there, they 

sealed this area off, when the bump occurred in March, because 

they thought it was too dangerous to be there. Now, you look at 

the map, to the north, to the south, the very exposed area. 

Now, when you say this is mined out, understand what that 

means; there are no roof supports for 4,000 feet north of here, and 

about 5,000 feet south of here. You can look on the map and come 

to the conclusion of how far it would be this way without any roof 

supports. The only roof supports here were in that small area 

where these miners were trying to extract the last of the roof support. 

I submit to you that no one can come in here with a clear conscience and submit to you that this is a plan that should have, (a) 

been submitted, and (b) been approved. There’s something wrong 

with—and I have not heard, by the way, that MSHA believes that 

this plan should have been approved. I think we’re at the point 

where we’ve been told there is a reviewing of this to determine 

what should have happened. 

I must say to you, we talked, here, in the past, about the culture 

that exists—and I’m not blaming Mr. Stickler for this, I think this 

clearly started well before his watch—and, in fairness to him, he’s 

got a tough problem to try to correct—that there’s a culture out 

there that a coal operator believes, in their mind, that they can get 

this plan approved; and, second of all, they can. This plan was in 

the Denver office, the best that we can figure out, a little over a 

week. Now, I ask, and submit, that an operator submitting this 

plan, and this thing being there for a little less—a little more than 

a week—I think there should have been a much closer look at this, 

and an understanding of what happened here. There still is a question, that I don’t think has been answered yet, as to whether or 

not—and I’m—it may not be clear, at this point—whether or not 
51 

MSHA understood that there had been a bump and a damage to 

this mine and a sealing off of this mine before they approved this 

plan. 

Now, I may sound harsh, and I’ve—and please forgive me for 

that—but we do have, here, six families who still have their family 

members in this mine, and we have three brave rescuers who have 

lost their lives, and we need to come to conclusion as to what 

caused this. The other question that I think is probably more important than that is, are there any other plans that exist in the 

United States of America right now, where workers are being exposed to this type of a situation? That is what we can do, here 

today. Let’s not do this again. Let’s determine if this exists anywhere else. If it does exist anywhere else, let’s deal with it. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Now, I just want to make one more point. I know I’ve gone over 

my time. I believe that this Congress, last year, dealt with this 

issue of who was to be in charge of communications. Unless I’m 

reading the MINER Act wrong, unless I misunderstood what Congress did, they said MSHA would be the chief spokesperson on the 

scene, period, and the chief entity dealing with these families. Now, 

I’m going to tell you what, I wish Mr. Murray had come here today, 

because I think there’s a lot of things that need to be answered, 

but I know one thing, if I had been in charge there, you wouldn’t 

have found Mr. Murray out in front of the cameras, and he 

wouldn’t have been dealing with those families, because I would 

have stopped it, and I think that should have happened. 

Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CECIL E. ROBERTS

Chairman Harkin, ranking member Spector, members of this subcommittee, as 

President of the largest Union that represents coal miners, I am honored that you 

have asked me to offer testimony regarding the August 6, 2007 disaster at Crandall 

Canyon Mine in Huntington, Utah, and how to prevent future tragedies. It is with 

a heavy heart that I appear before you to discuss—yet again, and in far too short 

a span of time—the deaths of mine workers. Our hearts and prayers remain with 

the families of the six miners who remain trapped in the Crandall Canyon mine. 

I also wish to express my deep appreciation to everyone who participated in the 

rescue efforts. During these most trying of times, many brave miners demonstrated 

extraordinary courage by contributing to the rescue efforts. Unfortunately, three 

more miners paid the ultimate price as a result of their bravery. We cannot thank 

them enough, and we will keep their families in our thoughts and prayers, too. 

Mr. Chairman, on February 28 of this year I appeared before this subcommittee. 

At that time you asked me about what impact the MINER Act of 2006 had already 

had on the lives of miners in this country. (See attached testimony.) My response 

in February was that conditions were not much different from last year, and that 

miners facing a mine fire or explosion or other accident would face most of the same 

challenges that miners at Sago, Aracoma and Darby faced over one year ago. I am 

so sorry to say that the Crandall Canyon disaster has proved this to be true. 

Just since the Sago explosion, 64 American coal miners have died on the job, and 

that number does not include the six miners still trapped in Utah. This Committee’s 

inquiry into the Crandall Canyon Mine Disaster is terribly important to ensuring 

that miners’ health and safety are protected, so that we do not have to confront 

more needless death and injury. 

My most important message to you today is that the Crandall Canyon disaster 

began on June 3, 2007, not August 6, 2007, because June 3 is the date when the 

mine operator submitted to MSHA a plan to engage in retreat mining at the 

Crandall Canyon Mine. 
52 

Likewise, MSHA’s best chance for saving the miners was on June 15, not August 

6th or 7th. But when MSHA approved the Crandall Canyon mining plan on June 

15, that chance was lost. 

Make no mistake about it, this disaster was not an act of God, but an act of man. 

It was preventable. 

EXPERIENCES AT CRANDALL CANYON

All the factors that lead to the recent disaster at Crandall Canyon may not yet 

be evident. However, it is apparent that the conditions were man-made. The disaster at Crandall Canyon was the result of decisions made by mine management, 

and plans approved by MSHA. Contrary to what some may say, there is little doubt 

that this was a man-made disaster. 

It was because of concerns for worker safety, the prior operator of Crandall Canyon decided not to engage in the type of mining that Mr. Murray’s company was 

engaged in before disaster struck. MSHA should have been aware of those concerns, 

as it should have known about the ‘‘bump’’ that occurred a few months prior, which 

motivated the operator to abandon mining a nearby section. 

At the time Mr. Murray purchased the Crandall Canyon Mine the previous owner 

had partially or completely extracted over 30 coal panels using the longwall mining 

technique. In essence the only coal remaining in the mine was in the barriers and 

pillars necessary to support the roof of the Mine’s main entries. Because extensive 

longwall mining had been done on both sides of the main entries there can be no 

doubt that the mountain over the mine was exerting extreme pressure on the remaining coal, which was supporting the mine roof. Murray Energy was extracting 

that very coal, using the pillar extraction method, at the time of the catastrophic 

collapse. 

The prior operator, Andalex Resources, filed a document with the Utah Division 

of Oil, Gas and Mining in which it stated, ‘‘Although maximum recovery is a design 

criteria, other considerations must be looked at in the final analysis in the extraction of coal. These factors consider the insurance of protection of personnel and the 

environment. Solid coal barriers will be left to protect the main entries from mined 

out panels and to guarantee stability of the main entries for the life of the mine.’’ 

Despite this assessment, Murray Energy submitted the plan to MSHA for approval to mine all the remaining coal reserves including the barrier pillars. The 

agency took just 7 business days to approve the request. 

It is also unfortunate that the management team at this operation has spent so 

much energy trying to deflect blame in this tragedy. It is equally unfortunate that 

MSHA, yet again, ignored the will of Congress in its reaction to this disaster. 

Section 7 of the MINER Act States that MSHA ‘‘shall serve as the primary communicator with the operator, miners’ families, the press and the public.’’ Nevertheless, in Utah MSHA surrendered its role as chief communicator. As a result, a great 

deal of inaccurate and misleading statements and information was allowed to get 

out over the airwaves. The effect has been that millions of Americans were given 

incorrect and misleading information right from the start of this disaster, and 

MSHA allowed it to happen. Here are some examples: 

(1) From the very beginning, Murray Energy’s Owner and Chief Operating Officer, 

Robert Murray, asserted that ‘‘an act of God’’ in the form of a natural earthquake 

caused this catastrophe. He suggested that the ‘‘seismic activity’’ at the mine is uncontrollable and unrelated to his company’s activity. However, from tapes made of 

calls to the local Sheriff’s office that same morning, it is apparent that from the time 

it occurred, University of Utah seismologists believed the activity was the result of 

coal mining. 

(2) Time and time again Mr. Murray emphatically stated that he knew exactly 

where the trapped miners were. Yet many weeks and many boreholes later he still 

has not been able to locate the miners. 

(3) Mr. Murray also strenuously objected to reports that miners were performing 

a final method of mining referred to by the media as ‘‘retreat mining.’’ Again, he 

was not giving true information: from the approved mining plan it is evident that 

this mine was in the process of ‘‘pulling pillars.’’ It is important to note this distinction: There has been a great deal of reporting about Crandall Canyon performing 

‘‘retreat mining.’’ The term retreat mining has different meanings to different people. In fact, this operation was performing a method of mining known in the industry as ‘‘pillar mining’’ or ‘‘pillar extraction.’’ 

(4) Mr. Murray claimed that the mine was perfectly safe when he invited nonessential personnel from the media and families to tour the underground rescue 

work. However, not only did they experience a ‘‘bump’’ while they were under-
53 

ground, but it was in the same vicinity where nine rescuers were injured and killed 

just days later. 

(5) Mr. Murray stated that he had not had any major accidents at any of his 

mines prior to this. The truth is that four miners have been killed at Mr. Murray’s 

mines. Any time a miner is killed, that constitutes a major accident. 

(6) Mr. Murray continually said that the UMWA was trying to organize the 

Crandall Canyon mine, and that somehow meant that nothing we had to say about 

this incident could be trusted. While we strongly believe that all miners should have 

the benefits of a union contract—not the least of which is the enhanced safety language written into our contracts—we were not engaged in an organizing campaign 

at that mine at the time of the incident there, nor had there been any organizing 

activity at that mine for years. 

(7) Mr. Murray also claimed that the UMWA was responsible for the stories about 

the company intending to reopen a part of the mine to production, when in fact it 

was his own Murray Energy Vice President who made those statements to reporters. 

These are but some examples of the inaccurate and misleading statements Mr. 

Murray made that met with no contradiction from MSHA—statements that were 

seen by many as having an ‘‘official’’ stamp of approval since in most cases they 

were made with MSHA officials looking on, making no attempt to correct him. 

What is so astounding about the press conferences at Crandall Canyon is that the 

conduct of Mr. Murray, and MSHA’s indulgence of him, were directly contrary to 

section 7 of the MINER Act, which Congress expressly added to prevent the kind 

of misinformation debacle that occurred at the Sago mine. There, the families were 

first told their loved ones were alive and were leaving the mine, whereas the reality 

was that only 1 of the 13 survived; it was hours before the misinformation was corrected. 

Regardless of whether Mr. Murray may have wanted to convene and conduct 

press conferences, there is no reason, requirement or benefit to the miners, their 

families or the public for MSHA to participate in the events he, as the private operator, staged. As the Federal agency affirmatively charged with communicating with 

the families and press, MSHA should have exercised its power and conducted independent press conferences to provide objective reports of developments at the disaster site. Instead MSHA representatives yielded their authority; at best they stood 

in the shadows as the coal operator spun his story, at worst they cowered out of 

view refusing to correct the half truths and misstatements. Further, it has been 

widely reported that Mr. Murray’s attitude was abrasive and demeaning to these 

grieving individuals. MSHA’s responsibility to serve as the liaison should have protected the families from him. 

HAS THE MINER ACT CHANGED THE POST-ACCIDENT SITUATION?

Miners working today do not have many of the health and safety benefits that 

Congress demanded through the MINER Act in 2006. The additional oxygen devices 

you insisted be available to underground miners are still on back order, effective 

wireless communication or tracking devices have not been installed, and MSHA has 

approved Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) that do not require operators to provide the safety and health protections Congress expected. 

For example, in most instances tracking of miners is still being done today the 

same way it was done before the Sago disaster: operators rely on their dispatcher, 

and only know in which ‘‘zone’’ a miner is assigned to work. As we all know from 

Crandall Canyon, despite assurances that the operator knew exactly where the 

trapped miners could be found, without reliable tracking devices, rescue efforts are 

delayed and mis-directed. 

As Crandall Canyon has revealed, miners caught underground have little better 

chance of survival than did the miners at Sago, Aracoma and Darby in 2006 ( or 

even those who perished in the disaster at Farmington in 1968. Although we have 

advanced the calender some 40 years since the Farmington disaster, in many instances miners are caught in a time warp, still trying to adapt the health and safety 

technology of the 1960’s into today’s mining environment. For example, Congress directed MSHA to consider safety chambers in the 1969 Mine Act, but they still remain largely absent from our mines. Moreover, the regulation MSHA implemented 

requires operators to provide supplies to build a barrier after an accident occurs. 

This was required before the MINER Act, though since the MINER Act operators 

now must provide breathable air and other requirements to sustain life. However, 

having supplies available for construction of a safe haven after an accident will 

often be too late: the post-accident atmosphere can be toxic and so smoky that min-
54 

ers cannot even see their own hands, and they may well be disoriented, making it 

impossible for miners to then construct a safe haven. 

After the three high-profile disasters last year that claimed 19 lives, Congress 

passed the MINER Act. That historic legislation was the first miners’ safety and 

health legislation in 30 years. It placed new requirements on mine owners and operators to improve miners’ safety. Some, like directional lifelines, additional self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) were required 

immediately. Others, including advanced wireless communication and tracking devices were to be phased in over 3 years as they become available. We said then and 

still believe that the MINER Act represented a good ‘‘first step,’’ but so much more 

is required. 

As the MINER Act is being implemented, MSHA has been too tolerant of operator 

delay. While directional lifelines require no new technology, and could be immediately placed into use to guide miners out of a mine during an emergency, MSHA 

is allowing some operators to set their own time frames for meeting this requirement. As for the miners’ need to have supplemental oxygen, though the MINER Act 

required operators to store additional supplies for miners’ use if trapped, MSHA’s 

regulation permits the supplies to be stored in a location that is too remote. Based 

on the existing regulation, if the Crandall Canyon miners survived the initial event, 

they would not have been able to access what oxygen should have been stored because it would have been too far away, on the other side of the collapsed area of 

the mine. Moreover, though the MINER Act required operators to submit their 

ERPs by August 2006, the Crandall Canyon ERP was only approved in June, 2007 

and the supplemental oxygen need only to have been in place 60 days 

later... after the miners were trapped on August 6. Why the operator was given 

60 days to provide the oxygen is puzzling, as the oxygen canisters should be readily 

available and there was no good reason for the delay. 

Some of the MINER Act requirements, including advanced wireless communication and tracking devices were to be phased in within 3 years, as they become available. However, rather than demanding that operators quickly utilize improved 

equipment and technology as soon as it becomes available, MSHA is allowing operators to wait out the clock until the 3-year deadline comes to a close. 

You probably recall the stories last year of the Polish miner pulled from wreckage 

after he was located through use of a tracking device, and that of the Canadian miners trapped underground but safely retrieved from the safety chamber to which they 

had retreated. The Crandall Canyon miners did not have these advantages. However, if other countries’ miners can survive and escape these disasters, then so 

should American miners. We need change, and we need it now. 

We wish to note that some operators have gone beyond the minimum requirements to protect miners, but many more meet only MSHA’s minimum standards. 

MSHA could and should be pushing operators to utilize the best available technology to better communicate with and track miners. We believe that was what 

Congress expected when it enacted the MINER Act last year. Crandall Canyon 

graphically demonstrates the consequences of operators’ and MSHA’s intervening 

complacency. 

CULTURAL PROBLEMS AT THE TOP OF MSHA

The problems within MSHA begin at its highest levels. Indeed, there has developed at MSHA a culture of cooperation rather than enforcement. When then-Assistant Secretary of Labor for MSHA, David Lauriski, initiated a new ‘‘compliance assistance’’ plan, he sanctioned a different way of pursuing the agency’s mission. That 

new program chilled enforcement efforts at the mine level and allowed operators to 

essentially negotiate workplace health and safety matters. 

The notion that MSHA should foster compliance assistance when its first priority 

is supposed to be miners’ health and safety is preposterous. In MSHA’s internal reviews of the three major disasters in 2006 it found plan reviews to be an area where 

better oversight is required. This lack of oversight and accountability played out to 

dire consequences at Crandall Canyon: the mine plan that was submitted should 

never have been submitted; and MSHA should not have approved it. 

The UMWA argued strenuously against MSHA’s policy of compliance assistance 

ever since its inception. Our objections to the culture of cooperation have been dismissed by the agency’s highest officials. It is no consolation to sit before this Committee and remind you of our continuing assertion that MSHA’s effectiveness is 

compromised. The disasters at Sago, Aracoma, Darby—and now Crandall Canyon— 

represent the consequences of agency misdirection and inaction. 

Lessons learned from decade after decade of miners’ injuries, illnesses and deaths 

teach that strict enforcement is needed to protect miners’ health and safety. These 
55 

facts were reinforced by MSHA’s own internal reviews of the tragedies at Sago, 

Aracoma, and Darby. In each instance, the agency discovered significant problems 

of non-accountability and lack of oversight. 

There is a culture at the highest levels of agency that not only ignores the needs 

of miners, but the input and expertise of longtime MSHA field employees and specialists. MSHA’s inspectors and specialists have years of practical experience, they 

work in the same conditions as do miners they seek to protect, they know the laws 

and regulations, and they strive to perform their jobs. However, to successfully protect miners’ health and safety, inspectors must receive uniform direction and support from their superiors. If we are to achieve the health and safety improvements 

anticipated by the Mine Act and the MINER Act, there must first be a cultural 

change within the Mine Safety and Health Administration. I submit to you that the 

reality of this situation is stark. If we fail to force a cultural change at MSHA it 

will continue to decline and eventually implode. We cannot allow that to happen. 

This Congress possesses the power to make vital changes to restore the direction 

of MSHA and ultimately offer miners the health and safety protections they deserve. Congress must require MSHA to focus first and foremost on the health and 

safety of miners. We urge this Congress to move swiftly to require immediate action 

on the mandates contained in the MINER Act and to be prepared to demand 

through appropriate legislative initiatives the next level of protections. 

FAMILIES FACING A MINE DISASTER DESERVE BETTER

Just last year Congress moved to ensure that families facing mining disasters 

would be treated with the dignity they deserve and would be kept abreast of the 

most accurate information available. This did not happen for the families of the 

trapped miners at Crandall Canyon. Like the Sago families in January of 2006, they 

were held almost as captives, awaiting any bits of information (or misinformation) 

delivered by the coal operator. 

How is it possible that MSHA could get it so wrong in Utah? How could it ignore 

the mandates of Congress, which requires the agency to take charge of such accidents and serve as the liaison with the families and press? By allowing this mine 

owner to take center stage, MSHA ignored the directives of the MINER Act. In so 

doing, it failed the families at Crandall Canyon. They deserved—and still deserve— 

much better. If the leadership of MSHA is not willing or able to limit the activity 

of a single mine operator in the face of express authority to take such control, how 

can we expect them to effectively lead the agency that is charged with regulating 

an entire industry? 

On behalf of their loved ones, the families of those trapped at Crandall Canyon 

asked the UMWA to serve as their miners’ representative. This would ensure that 

their designated representative would be able to participate in the accident investigation. However, MSHA has rejected their request, claiming that it would have to 

first verify that the miners themselves made the designations. Obviously, a trapped 

miner cannot provide that assurance. Yet, in denying the families the right to make 

such a designation for their trapped miners, MSHA has prevented those most affected by the tragedy to have a voice at the table during the investigation. 

MSHA’s spokesperson has criticized the UMWA for attempting to serve as the 

trapped miners’ designated representative, claiming that we ‘‘are trying to use a law 

enforcement investigation for its own purposes.’’ We will confirm that the UMWA 

does want to participate in this matter. The reason is simple: we want honest and 

complete information about everything that happened—from before the latest mining plan got prepared, submitted and approved. We want to make sure no more 

miners’ lives are lost. The UMWA is the ONLY organization in this country that 

is dedicated to advocating for miners’ health and safety. We are proud of advancements that have been made at our urging, and we don’t plan to stop anytime soon. 

So yes, the UMWA does have a purpose of our own here: to fight for and improve 

mine safety in America. We invite MSHA to join us in that endeavor, instead of 

casting veiled aspersions on our efforts on behalf of coal miners and their families. 

To the extent that MSHA feels current law does not allow it to recognize the 

UMWA as a miners’ representative absent proof that the miners themselves have 

made the designations—something the trapped miners obviously cannot satisfy—we 

urge Congress to change the law. Family members of those trapped or killed in a 

mine accident should have the right to designate a trusted representative to participate in the accident investigation. 

Further, and as we have written to you, the UMWA feels that it is imperative 

that there be an independent investigation of this tragedy. (Letter attached.) Otherwise, MSHA and the operator will simply be investigating what they themselves 

did. That is not the best way to ask the hard questions or to get the full truth. Our 
56 

goal must be to learn from what went wrong at Crandall Canyon so that no more 

families will suffer such needless loss of life. 

CONTROL OF A MINE POST-ACCIDENT

Since 1977 MSHA has had the right to control all activity at the mine when disasters occur. By issuing a Section 103(j) Order, MSHA could have secured this control. 

Yet, with but one exception at Scotia, MSHA chooses to utilize its authority under 

Section 103(k) which permits the operator greater latitude in directing a rescue operation. 

Under a (k) order, the operator prepares plans and submits them to MSHA, which 

must approve each component before it can then be implemented. That is the procedure that must have transpired when, just days before the rescuers were killed and 

injured, the operator proposed and MSHA approved a plan that permitted non-essential personnel (that is, press and family members) to travel underground with 

Mr. Murray to observe the rescue. 

We understand the curiosity of some within the media and the dire concern of 

family members, however the conditions at the mine were so unstable that some 

workers engaged in the rescue effort requested work away from the mining operation. There is no reasonable explanation for allowing non-essential personnel to be 

subjected to such dangerous conditions. They easily could have confused and hindered the rescue had the ‘‘bump’’ they did experience been larger in scale. While 

we thank God that there was only a minor mountain bump while these individuals 

were underground, we also recognize the situation could have become much more 

disastrous. They could have suffered the same tragic result that rescuers experienced when the large bump caused a cave-in, claiming the lives of three rescuers 

and injuring six others. Mr. Murray should not have submitted a plan to take guest 

travelers into the mine, and MSHA certainly should have known better than to permit it. That incident represented an extraordinary amount of poor judgment by both 

key parties to this rescue and recovery effort. 

MSHA should have brought to the site at a much earlier date experts who could 

address the unique geological conditions to help develop a safe procedure for rescuing the trapped miners. We recommend that there be designated a variety of mine 

emergency response experts who could be immediately called upon to service mining 

emergencies like those at Crandall Canyon, Sago, Aracoma, and Quecreek Even 

now, we call upon Congress to consult with a variety of geological, engineering, and 

other experts, public and private, to determine if the trapped miners can be safely 

recovered. The families deserve to have their loved ones back if that can be accomplished without sacrificing any more lives. 

We also seek an independent investigative body to analyze the rescue process to 

report on how that procedure could have been improved. At the end of the day, the 

most important thing we can take away from such a tragic experience is to learn 

from the mistakes so they will not be repeated. Only an independent investigation 

can hope to uncover the needed truths. 

Since the MINER Act was passed last year, we have heard a lot of operators complain about how much money they have to spend to comply with it. However, let 

me suggest that it is better to invest up front. Mining disasters are very costly— 

first and foremost in lost lives and the destruction of families. But accidents also 

consume huge amounts of time and energy on the part of the particular operator, 

not to mention Federal and State governments, too: first the rescue and recovery 

efforts are expensive, and then the investigation takes another substantial commitment of capital. Wouldn’t we all be so much better served if these resources would 

be dedicated to protecting miners from the problems in the first place? I am certain 

that was your intent when you enacted the MINER Act. Unfortunately, this goal 

has not yet been adequately realized. 

CONCLUSION

How many times must we demand that MSHA’s practices change only to be ignored? How many more times will mine owners and MSHA thumb their nose at 

your mandates? Something must be done to change the status quo. Leaders must 

be held accountable for their actions and inactions. Just as mine operators cannot 

self-regulate, MSHA cannot function without being subject to the routine scrutiny 

of Congress and appropriate sanctions when necessary. 

The miners of this nation can no longer be asked to sacrifice their safety when 

their employers are focused on monetary profit with little regard to their employees’ 

well being. It is time to place effective measures in place so that a miner may engage in his primary job of mining, without jeopardizing his life. 
57 

I thank you for this opportunity to share our on-going concerns about the state 

of miners’ health and safety in this country. I urge you to do all that you can to 

ensure that the investigation of the Crandall Canyon disaster is full and independent and that the families of trapped miners get all the answers they want and 

deserve. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CECIL E. ROBERTS, PRESIDENT, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

AMERICA, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007

IMPROVING MINE SAFETY: ONE YEAR AFTER SAGO AND ALMA

Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to appear before your Committee. As 

President of the United Mine Workers of America (‘‘UMWA’’), I represent the union 

that, for 117 years, has been an unwavering advocate for miners’ health and safety. 

This entire Committee has played a significant role in advancing miners’ health 

and safety. I would like to express my appreciation to the leadership of this Committee for your efforts to protect the health and safety of all miners. Your continued 

oversight is critical to ensuring miners will go home safely at the end of their shift. 

One year ago I testified about miners’ health and safety shortly after the Sago 

and Alma disasters; even after those two dramatic tragedies occurred, 32 more coal 

miners were killed in 2006. 

Following the Sago and Alma disasters and after five more miners were killed on 

May 20, 2006 at the Darby Mine in Kentucky, Congress moved to enact the MINER 

Act. That law includes several important provisions aimed at helping miners after 

a mine emergency develops. It is most appropriate for you to consider whether the 

improvements Congress intended to accomplish through the MINER Act are being 

realized. The Union supports MSHA’s efforts to require substantially more oxygen 

for every miner. The emergency mine evacuation rule also contains a number of important improvements. Having said that, my testimony will focus attention on areas 

that MSHA needs to dedicate additional resources to fully implement the MINER 

Act. 

Some of the inadequacies in implementing the MINER Act may be linked to insufficient resources. However, others can be tracked to decisions made by the Agency. 

In 2001, then Assistant Secretary for Mine Health and Safety, David Lauriski told 

members of the National Mining Association that MSHA would, ‘‘collaborate more 

with mine operators on regulatory initiatives’’ and become ‘‘less confrontational with 

mine operators, in an effort to provide companies with better compliance assistance.’’ At a meeting with mine operators in Hindman, Kentucky, he bragged about 

his diminutive regulatory agenda. He noted, ‘‘if you’ve seen it you noticed its quite 

a bit shorter than some past agendas.’’ These policy statements were accompanied 

by a withdrawal of many proposed regulations by MSHA and a noticeable shift to 

compliance assistance. These compliance assistance programs divert precious resources away from enforcement. Perhaps most tragically, in many cases, MSHA has 

ignored the mandate of Congress by adopting regulations and policies that place 

miners at greater risk. 

MINE INSPECTORS/MINE INSPECTIONS

The agency is experiencing great difficulty in fulfilling the mandatory inspections 

required under the Mine Act. The Union is convinced that the hiring and training 

of more MSHA inspectors must be a top and continuing priority. The agency must 

have a full complement of properly trained personnel if it is to perform its primary 

job of enforcing the Mine Act. The ranks of the inspectors have been diminished 

over the years and we can expect further reductions as more of MSHA’s long-time 

inspectors leave the profession as they reach retirement age. These needs can only 

be filled by hiring qualified individuals from all segments of the industry, including 

rank and file miners. These new inspectors must also be outfitted with state-of-theart equipment for personal protection and to perform their inspection duties. Sufficient monies must be allocated to ensure this equipment is readily available to these 

inspectors. 

As the number of inspectors have decreased, MSHA’s field office specialists, including ventilation specialists and its electrical and roof control support staff, have 

been forced to carry out routine mine inspections. These specialists must be returned to their areas of expertise. The only way to accomplish this is to hire an adequate number of inspectors which will permit the specialists to focus on the job they 

are trained to do. In addition, the Agency must move immediately to train a sufficient number of inspectors to perform these technical tasks in the future. 
58 

I would like to thank Senator Byrd and the other members of the Committee who 

worked to secure $25.6 million to hire an additional 170 mine inspectors and your 

continuing efforts to secure future funding. Congress must ensure that funding levels at the Mine Academy in Beckley, WV remain sufficient to meet future training 

needs for mine inspectors. This facility is used to train mine inspectors and also offers comprehensive training for miners and other health and safety experts. 

SEALS

In 1969 and again in 1977 Congress mandated that ‘‘explosion proof seals or bulkheads’’ be used to isolate abandoned or worked out areas of the mine from active 

workings. However, in the years since, MSHA has promulgated regulations regarding seals that are much less protective than what Congress mandated. The current 

regulation simply requires that seals withstand static pressure of 20 pounds per 

square inch (psi) in order to be approved for installation in the mine. The standard 

was further eroded when MSHA approved the use of Omega Block type seals, such 

as those that were used at Sago. These Omega Block seals catastrophically failed 

as a result of the explosion at Sago and contributed to the deaths of all 12 miners. 

The UMWA urges MSHA to promulgate a regulation that would require the construction of seals that meet the mandates of Congress and the recommendations in 

NIOSH’s draft report on mine seals. 

REGULATIONS

The UMWA believes that MSHA should adopt an aggressive regulatory agenda 

to address important issues in addition to those contained in the MINER Act, including: 

1. Improved Atmospheric Monitoring Systems 

2. Develop a Nationwide Emergency Communication System 

3. Revise MSHA’s Approval and Certification Process for Equipment Approval 

4. Occupational Exposure to Coal Mine Dust (lowering exposure limits) 

5. Collection of Civil Penalties (mandatory mine closures for non-payment) 

6. Air Quality Chemical Substances and Respiratory Protection Standards (update 

personal exposure limits) 

7. Surface Haulage (truck, haul road, train and loadout safety) 

8. Respirable Crystalline Silica Standard (reducing quartz standard) 

9. Requirements for Approval of Flame Resistant Conveyor Belts 

10.Confined Spaces (tight quartered work areas) 

11.Training and Retraining of Miners (revision of Part 48) 

12.Surge and Storage Piles (dozer/feeder safety surface) 

13.Escapeways and Refuges 

14.Accident Investigation Hearing Procedures (make them public) 

15.Verification of Surface Coal Mine Dust Control Plans 

16.Continuous Monitoring of Respirable Coal Mine Dust in Underground Coal 

Mines 

17.Modify Conferencing Process (Appeals of Citations) 

18.Underground Coal Mining, Self-Contained Self-Rescuer Service Life Approval 

and Training. 

RECORDING FATAL ACCIDENTS

Just last week MSHA issued new guidelines for determining what constitutes a 

mine related fatality. The ‘‘Fatal Injury Guideline Matrix’’ narrows the scope of 

what the Agency will define as a fatal accident chargeable to the mine operator. 

This will allow the Agency to report numbers that are artificially low and possibly 

skew the actual health and safety record of the mine and the industry. In addition, 

fatals not listed as mine-related will not get the same scrutiny as a chargeable accident. Without the formal investigation process, lessons learned will not be available 

to prevent similar events in the future. 

The Union also disagrees with the Committee established by the Agency to review 

deaths where chargeability is in question. The Committee is made up of upper-level 

MSHA employees and not open to other agencies, organizations or the public. This 

type of structure does not lend itself to a fair, unbiased review of the situation. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINER ACT

In the MINER Act, Congress mandated timelines for its implementation. In some 

cases, MSHA has failed to meet these deadlines. The Union urges Congress to allocate adequate funding to MSHA so it can fully implement this Act within the timeframes set by Congress. 
59 

The Emergency Mine Evacuation Rule, which is separate from the MINER Act 

but ties into the self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) requirements, was finalized 

and made effective December 8, 2006. However, miners working underground today 

do not have all the protections that Rule addresses. MSHA deems the operator to 

be in compliance with the Rule if it has placed an order for additional SCSRs. Although the Rule requires increased availability and storage of SCSRs, there is a 

backlog of orders for these life-sustaining units. While the Union is extremely frustrated that more than a year after the Sago and Alma disasters, many miners only 

have one additional hour of oxygen, in light of this backlog, the Union supports 

MSHA’s approach to make the additional oxygen units equally available to all miners. In reality, it will still take a number of years before miners receive the protections mandated by Congress. Miners cannot wait for another mine disaster to occur 

to drive new technology, therefore, the Union strongly urges the development and 

approval of the next generation SCSR. 

The Rule also requires ‘‘expectations’’ training on SCSRs. This would allow miners 

to experience the actual effects of donning a unit and attempting an escape. The 

practice units would allow miners to experience the breathing restriction and heating that SCSRs create, without risking their safety. While MSHA claims these practice units are not available for purchase, they are in fact available. The reason these 

devices are not being used by miners today is not availability, it is cost. Many mine 

operators simply do not want to spend the money to buy them. This is unacceptable 

and while we commend MSHA for promulgating a rule that is intended to be ‘‘technology-driven,’’ it must now enforce that rule. 

Moreover, the finality of this emergency response and evacuation rule is somewhat uncertain as the National Mining Association (NMA) filed a court challenge. 

The Union is not certain which aspects of the rule NMA is contesting, but it is certain that such legal maneuvers delays the protections Congress mandated only last 

year. 

Congress understood the importance of requiring that mine operators have comprehensive emergency response plans at all their operations. The MINER Act permitted operators a 60 day period to prepare these plans and submit them to the 

agency for review and approval. However, many of the mine emergency response 

plans that operators submitted were grossly inadequate, and not worthy of approval. 

We are now over 6 months beyond the deadline established by Congress. While we 

commend MSHA for not approving these faulty plans, we do believe it must be more 

aggressive and apply more pressure on the operators to get these plans completed. 

Unless MSHA takes decisive action and resolves all the remaining issues, miners 

will not get the mine emergency response improvements that Congress intended. 

Further, the mine emergency response plans are to be reviewed and re-approved 

by MSHA every six months. We are already 6 months beyond the original plan due 

date. If those first plans are not yet approved and fully implemented, how can we 

expect MSHA to handle these semi-annual reviews? Perhaps MSHA needs more 

manpower to handle this task, but whatever the answer, until every operation has 

an approved plan in place, miners are not getting the protections Congress intended. 

Very little has changed in the last year concerning the ability to communicate 

with and locate trapped miners. While we have learned more about this technology 

and understand that much is available, very few operators have taken advantage 

of it. Communication systems and tracking devices are areas that MSHA must pursue more aggressively. Current communication and tracking technology, including 

one-way text messaging and two-way wireless systems, some of which are available 

now, must be immediately installed in all mines. Any system that can increase the 

ability for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must 

be utilized. The Federal Government, through NIOSH and MSHA, must fund and 

direct continued studies and research to develop the next generation of tracking and 

communication devices. As this newer technology becomes available, mine operators 

must be required to upgrade existing systems at all its operations. 

We are also troubled by MSHA’s failure to undertake action to facilitate the creation and training of additional mine rescue teams. Congress in the MINER Act 

clearly outlined its intent regarding the need for additional mine rescue teams. In 

addition, the language clearly defines how this is to be applied at both large and 

small mines. While Congress allowed MSHA 18 months in which to prepare, finalize, and give effect to rules that increase and enhance mine rescue team requirements, so far MSHA has not addressed this need. The need is real, and it is immediate. In the not-too-distant future MSHA will need additional funding to certify 

that mine rescue teams are qualified, as contemplated by the MINER Act. 

Over the past 20 years MSHA and some operators have weakened the intent of 

the current regulations regarding mine rescue protections. The existing mine rescue 

team structure is spread too thin. It takes a lot of time and much practice for any 
60 

mine rescue team to function well. The UMWA has training facilities and is willing 

to provide mine rescue training and first responder training if we receive the necessary funding. Miners cannot afford to wait any longer for the training of new 

teams to begin. 

COLLECTION OF CIVIL PENALTIES

In the MINER Act, Congress charged MSHA with revising and enhancing its penalty structure. MSHA proposed a revised schedule, but it is not yet final, so it is 

difficult for us to comment about whether it will induce any better compliance by 

operators. 

However, even without a new fine structure, the Agency needs to do a better job 

of tracking and collecting the fines it imposes, and it should escalate the pressure 

when an operator refuses to pay a final penalty. Last year MSHA blamed computer 

problems on its inability to track fines. We understand that it still faces some technological challenges. If that is the case, then MSHA needs to fix the problem. When 

fines go unpaid it not only gives an unfair competitive advantage to the delinquent 

operator, but that operator’s disregard for the mine health and safety laws and regulations imposes excessive risk on its employees. 

To the extent that MSHA takes the position that it cannot close an operation for 

having substantial unpaid fines, we submit that Congress should grant the Agency 

such authority. MSHA’s top personnel claim that if it had that authority the Agency 

would exercise it to close operators who refuse to pay their fines. We would welcome 

that. 

MSHA HOTLINE

The Union has complained for some time that the current hotline system miners 

use to report hazardous conditions is ineffective. Recently, a member of the UMWA 

called the 800 number listed on MSHA’s website to report a problem at the mine 

where he worked and was frustrated by problems he encountered. The individual 

who answered the call, a contract employee, did not have any knowledge of mining, 

making it extremely difficult for the miner to convey the message. Further, the individual at the call center was not remotely familiar with MSHA’s District structure 

and was therefore uncertain which office should receive the complaint. 

The Union has stressed on many occasions that the MSHA hotline should be 

staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by MSHA personnel with an understanding 

of the mining industry and the agency. The current practice of contracting this work 

out to call centers lessens miners’ health and safety. 

BELT-AIR

In keeping with the mandates of Congress in the 1969 Coal Act, and the 1977 

Mine Act, which strictly prohibits the use of belt-air to ventilate working places, the 

Union has historically been opposed to the use of belt-air to ventilate the working 

places. The 2006 Alma disaster is a reminder that there is no safe way to ventilate 

working sections using belt-air. This mine fire was intensified by air from the belt 

entry, and the contaminated air was dumped onto miners working inby. In addition, 

conveyor belts used in the mining industry must be made of non-flammable material. 

In the MINER Act, Congress directed that there be created a Technical Study 

Panel to provide independent scientific and engineering review and recommendations with respect to belt air and belt materials; the Study Panel is then to issue 

a report to the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services, as well as the 

Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the House Committee on Education and Labor. While this Technical Study Panel has been constituted and had its first meetings last month, we harbor reservations about its administration. Congress was silent as to its administration, but MSHA staff is providing the support personnel. If its first meetings are any indication, MSHA seems 

more invested in defending the belt air decisions it has already made, than simply 

servicing the Study Panel. Congress assigned this Study Panel to offer an ‘‘independent’’ review and recommendations, and we hope it can overcome MSHA’s bias 

in favor of belt air. 

FUNDING FOR ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS AND HEALTH AND SAFETY PROTECTIONS

The Union would urge Congress to adequately fund other agencies and programs 

that advance the Health and Safety of the nation’s miners. These include: 

—Pittsburgh Research Center, 

—Lake Lynn Facility, 
61 

—Appalachian Laboratory for Occupational Health and Safety in Morgantown, 

WV, 

—Approval and Certification Center, 

—Personal Dust Monitors (PDM), and 

—Colorado School of Mines. 

CONCLUSION

One year ago many of you were present when I testified before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions to discuss and review the performance of MSHA and the overall state of mine health and safety. That testimony followed the first two disasters of 2006 at the Sago and Alma Mines. At that time, 

I described many of the shortcomings in miners’ health and safety. 

I am sorry to report that MSHA’s efforts over the past year would do little to 

change matters today if a mine were to experience an explosion like the one at Sago, 

or a mine fire like the one at Alma; indeed the underground miners would likely 

fair no better than those who perished over one year ago. Thanks to the MINER 

Act, I can presume that any incident would be reported within the initial 15 minutes. However, there is no reason to expect that a sufficient number of mine rescue 

teams would respond quickly. This is because the last year has seen virtually no 

progress in either expanding the number or improving the proximity of qualified 

mine rescue teams. 

MSHA still allows mine operators to ventilate working sections with belt-air, and 

non-flammable belts are still not required. Today there are no requirements that operators provide systems that would enable miners to communicate with the surface 

or vice versa. There is nothing in place that requires an operator to be able to locate 

trapped miners, and very few could do so. Safety chambers are not required, nor 

are safe havens prescribed. Most operators do not have a complete approved emergency response plan as required by the MINER Act. Many miners caught in a disaster would likely have one additional hour of oxygen as opposed to early 2006, but 

please remember that it took more than 40 hours for the first mine rescue teams 

to reach the miners at Sago. 

We are most appreciative that Congress has worked towards increasing MSHA’s 

budget so more mine inspectors can inspect mines to ensure compliance with the 

Mine Act. We implore MSHA to demonstrate a similar commitment to enforcing the 

Mine Act and to improving miners’ health and safety so that our industry will never 

again experience another mine disaster like Sago or Alma. Technology is progressing on a daily basis and the UMWA urges MSHA to require mine operators 

to employ improvements as they become available. 

LETTER FROM THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

Fairfax, VA, August 21, 2007. 

Hon. HARRY REID, Senate Majority Leader, 

Hon. NANCY PELOSI, Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives, 

United States Congress, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR REID AND REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI: I write to urge Congress to appoint an independent bi-partisan committee of coal mine safety experts to investigate the Crandall Canyon disaster. The public needs a reliable way to obtain 

meaningful information and insights about this horrific tragedy: both the initial 

trapping of six miners and the subsequent rescue efforts, which resulted in three 

deaths last week. I do not believe the American public and our nations’ coal miners 

will be well-served by another instance of MSHA investigating itself in this disaster. 

Just last year this Nation was witness to three dramatic multi-fatal accidents beginning with the Sago mine explosion on January 2, 2006, followed less than three 

weeks later by a mine fire at Aracoma, and then an explosion at the Darby mine. 

Together these three disasters took 19 lives, and devastated entire communities. 

Since the beginning of last year, 64 coal miners have been killed on the job. That’s 

an average of three each month. 

In a demonstration of bi-partisan support for the nation’s coal miners, Congress 

enacted the MINER Act which President Bush signed into law on June 15, 2006. 

The MINER Act served as an important first step for improving miners’ health and 

safety. However, it was the first piece of miners’ safety and health legislation in 

nearly 30 years, and did not address all the shortcomings in the laws that are needed to protect miners. One of the many things that bill did not accomplish was to 

change the way mining accidents are investigated. 
62 

The problem with the status quo is that the Mine Safety and Health Administration (‘‘MSHA’’) investigates mine accidents. However, time and again MSHA’s performance has been found to have had a role in sanctioning the very conduct that 

developed into subsequent disasters. For example, MSHA must approve mining 

plans, ventilation plans and roof control plans, not to mention to ensure through enforcement procedures that each operator adheres to all the plans once the respective 

MSHA District approves them. Yet, after the disasters of 2006, MSHA’s Internal Review determined that: 

‘‘[At] Aracoma... the majority of contributory violations were obvious and 

should have been identified by MSHA inspectors prior to the fatal fire that killed 

two miners. The team determined that inspection personnel failed to exercise their 

authority in a manner that demonstrated an appreciation for the importance of 

strict enforcement of the Mine Act and failed to conduct inspections in a manner 

that reliably detected violations. 

‘‘Inspection personnel also demonstrated a lack of technical know-how necessary 

to effectively evaluate and address complex safety and health conditions, and failed 

to comply with MSHA policies and procedures that, if followed, would have significantly improved the scope, quality and effectiveness of mine inspections. The lack 

of effective management oversight and controls also contributed to enforcement deficiencies at Aracoma. MSHA has referred its findings at Aracoma to the Labor Department’s Office of Inspector General for further investigation of employee misconduct. 

‘‘The Sago internal review found that... failure by personnel to follow inspection procedures, coupled with inadequate managerial oversight, resulted in a number of enforcement deficiencies. Among the areas cited as needing improvement was 

the district’s mine emergency response capabilities. 

‘‘The Darby internal review found that district personnel did not effectively utilize 

the mine operator’s history of repeat violations to elevate the level of enforcement. 

Failure to follow inspection procedures, along with inadequate managerial oversight, 

resulted in many of the deficiencies identified in the report.’’ 

From MSHA press statement 07–975-NAT, dated June 28, 2007. 

Three different MSHA District offices, but all three substantially failed in their 

primary responsibility of protecting the miners. What makes this MSHA statement 

especially frustrating is that the Agency came to the same kind of conclusions following an explosion that took 13 miners’ lives at the Jim Walters Mine #5 in Alabama back in 2001. There is an integral problem at the very heart of the Agency 

where there seems to have developed a culture of accepting the status quo and not 

rocking the boat. 

MSHA has had many opportunities to correct what is wrong; yet it still has not 

arrested its well-documented problems. We need an outside group of experts to analyze what happened at the Crandall Canyon mine in Utah, not only on August 6, 

2007 and during the subsequent rescue efforts, but also the events that set the 

stage for the August 6 disaster. We also would welcome the recommendations such 

independent experts could make about how the Agency should change to better keep 

all miners safer. 

The status quo simply isn’t working to protect miners. Miners at Crandall Canyon 

and their families deserve better. In the same bi-partisan fashion that Congress 

demonstrated on the heels of the three coal mining disasters last year, we urge you 

to appoint an independent committee of experts to investigate what went wrong for 

the Crandall Canyon workers. 

Respectfully, 

CECIL E. ROBERTS. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Roberts. 

Now we’ll turn to Mr. Watzman, vice president for safety, health 

and human resources, National Mining Association. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE WATZMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY, HEALTH 

AND HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WATZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. NMA appreciates the opportunity to appear before you 

to discuss efforts to improve mine safety, progress made since passage of the MINER Act of 2006, and the challenges that remain to 

realize our goal to return every miner home safely after every shift. 
63 

The Crandall Canyon Mine accident has affected everyone in the 

mining community, and we mourn our fallen colleagues. The mining industry is determined to return to the path that it was on for 

much of the past three decades, when it achieved steady reductions 

in fatalities and serious injuries. 

As you know, following last year’s tragic events in West Virginia 

and Kentucky, the coal industry worked with Congress and others 

to pass the most sweeping mine reform legislation in more than 

three decades. The requirements, as implemented through emergency response plans, recognize that good safety practices continually evolve, based on experience and technologic development, and 

that every underground coal mine presents a unique environment, 

and what may work in one mine may well not work in another. 

Since passage of the MINER Act, the industry has moved aggressively to identify technology that satisfies the law’s requirements 

as quickly as possible. Our written submittal details the progress 

that has been made. While more work needs to be done, the industry has made significant investments and progress. I would ask 

that a chart that we prepared on Mine Safety Improvement, 

Progress Facts Since February 2006, be included in the hearing 

record. 

The recent accident at Crandall Canyon spotlighted our continuing challenge to develop reliable two-way devices that could 

help locate and communicate with miners trapped underground. At 

a time when most Americans are well connected with each other 

through cell phones, many wonder why miners cannot communicate from underground to the surface. Intuitively, we understand 

why. Sending a signal through rock deep underground is far more 

challenging than signaling through the air. 

Apart from the most fundamental technologic barriers to in-mine 

and through-the-earth signal propagation, a post-disaster mine environment presents survivability considerations. Explosions, fire, 

and roof falls produce destructive forces that can damage or destroy system components and render the systems inoperable. Despite these daunting challenges, the industry is not sitting idly by 

until a reliable system reaches acceptable functionality under all 

circumstances. 

You’ll recall that last year you were shown a device, a $20 tracking device, we were told, that would enable every miner to receive 

a one-way message from the surface in the event of an emergency. 

Experts, both inside and outside our industry, cautioned that this 

device had limitations. That messaging device was in use in Utah. 

Fortunately, the system survived the bump event and a miner received the message to evacuate the mine. At this point, no one 

knows if others received the message or if the system’s capabilities 

were destroyed in the initial event. 

Today, I’ve brought, to show you, two devices that are in use in 

mines today. The first is a tracking system that was developed by 

Alliance Coal, a member of the National Mining Association. This 

is one of several systems that uses radio frequency identification 

tags, RFID tags, that are worn on the miner’s hat, and 

omnidirectional readers to track miners’ movement throughout the 

mine. This is an improvement over earlier systems, and is considered state-of-the-art. The system currently requires a connective, 
64 

through-the-mine fiberoptic capable, that is vulnerable to damage 

and could potentially render the system useless. 

Another is a leaky feeder communication system, a cable that is 

run through the mine and allows the signal to leak from the cable 

so that miners can connect to it via a handheld radio. This, too, unfortunately, is susceptible to damage by destructive forces that will 

affect its functionality. 

We view the development and introduction of new technology as 

a three-prong approach. First, the installation of redundant communication with manual tracking systems, as was required by the 

MINER Act last year. Second, the installation by 2009 of more 

elaborate systems with electronic tracking. Finally, the development of voice communications systems with parasitic capabilities. 

The systems I’ve shown you today move us to the second phase. 

Our efforts under the NIOSH-sponsored Mine Emergency Communication Partnership, that we discussed at the earlier—the hearing 

held earlier this year, is providing the forum and the resources to 

reach these goals, and we thank you for your continued support of 

the efforts. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

To conclude, the mining industry is eager to learn from our experience with implementing the MINER Act and with all who share 

our determination to safeguard our miners. Fatalities are tragic, 

but failing to learn from them, and failing to act on what we learn, 

would be inexcusable. We must not let that happen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d be happy to answer any questions 

you might have. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE WATZMAN

Good morning. My name is Bruce Watzman, and I am the vice president of safety, 

health and human resources for the National Mining Association (NMA). 

NMA appreciates the opportunity to appear before you to discuss efforts to improve mine safety, progress made since passage of the Mine Improvement and New 

Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006 and the challenges that remain to realize 

our goal to return every miner home safely after every shift. 

The Crandall Canyon mine accident has affected our nation’s entire mining community and we mourn our fallen heroes. The mining industry is determined to return to the path it was on for much of the past three decades, when it achieved 

steady reductions in fatalities and serious injuries. That is why we supported strong 

new mine safety legislation last year, established an independent commission to provide recommendations for new safety risk-based systems, and continue to partner 

with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to develop and test 

new safety and communication technology. 

MINER ACT

Following last year’s tragic events in West Virginia and Kentucky, the coal industry worked with Congress to pass the most sweeping mine safety reforms in more 

than three decades. The requirements, as implemented through Emergency Response Plans, recognize the need for a forward-looking risk assessment, that good 

safety practices continually evolve based upon experience and technological development, and that every underground coal mine presents a unique environment and 

what may work in one may not be effective or desirable in another. 

Since passage of the MINER Act the industry has moved aggressively to identify 

technology that satisfies the law’s requirements as quickly as possible. While more 

work needs to be done, the industry has made significant investments and progress. 

Briefly: 
65 

—100,000 additional self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) have been placed into 

service, with an equal number on back order. 

—All underground coal mines have submitted emergency response plans including 

plans to supply breathable air and other supplies to sustain miners trapped underground. Units to meet these requirements are being ordered and installed 

without the normal testing that a device such as these would normally receive. 

—55,000 underground coal miners have received new training and will continue 

to receive quarterly training. 

—Underground coal mines have implemented procedures to track miners underground. 

—Existing communications systems have been hardened and redundant systems 

installed. 

—More than thirty-five new mine rescue teams have or will be added around the 

country. 

This progress is only the beginning of our continued commitment for reaching our 

desired goal to protect our Nation’s miners. 

MINE SAFETY TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING COMMISSION

In January 2006, NMA established the Mine Safety Technology and Training 

Commission, an independent body, to immediately undertake a study of new technologies, procedures and training techniques that can further enhance safety in the 

nation’s underground coal mines. The commission drew upon the knowledge and experience of mine safety and health professionals from academia, government, industry and the United Mine Workers of America to develop a pro-active blueprint for 

achieving zero fatalities and zero serious injuries in U.S. underground coal mines. 

The product of the commission’s deliberations is a peer-reviewed report released in 

December 2006. 

The commission produced many recommendations that are both near-term and 

far-reaching in scope. Many of the recommendations endorse actions taken by Congress in passing the MINER Act. The commission’s recommendations include the 

areas of communications technology, emergency preparedness, response and rescue 

procedures, training, and escape and protection strategies. The central theme of the 

commission’s recommendations is a call for a new paradigm for ensuring mine safety—one that focuses on a systematic and comprehensive risk assessment-based approach toward prevention that serves as the foundation from which all safety efforts 

will flow. This new paradigm will require us to look at mining differently and to 

train miners differently. 

The industry is currently implementing a number of the commission’s near-term 

recommendations and is developing a blueprint for action on the more far-reaching 

items. For example, we are discussing with NIOSH the development of risk-based 

management tools and templates to assist the industry in its implementation of the 

central recommendation of the commission. The use of risk-analysis risk-management is familiar to many companies. Our goal is to create operational tools that will 

help every company identify and address significant hazards before they create situations that threaten life or property. 

We share the commission’s view that ‘‘a comprehensive, risk assessment-based approach toward prevention should significantly increase the odds of survival for miners in emergency situations, [and] also provide a guideline for pursuing zero accidents from all sources.’’ 

MINE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION PARTNERSHIP

The recent accident at Crandall Canyon spotlighted our continuing challenge to 

develop reliable two-way communication devices that could help locate and communicate with miners trapped underground. At a time when most Americans are wellconnected with each other through cell phones, many wonder why miners cannot 

communicate from underground to the surface. Intuitively, we understand why: 

Sending a signal through rock deep underground is far more challenging than signaling through the air. 

Apart from the most fundamental technical barriers to in-mine or through-theearth signal propagation, a post-disaster mine environment presents survivability 

considerations. Explosions, fire and roof falls produce destructive forces that can 

damage or destroy system components and render the system inoperable. At 

present, there is simply no available single system that can withstand all potential 

scenarios while maintaining mine-wide communications. 

Despite these daunting technological challenges, the industry is not sitting idly 

by until a reliable system reaches acceptable functionality under all circumstances. 

You may recall that last year this subcommittee was shown a piece of equipment 
66 

that was touted as a ‘‘$20-device’’ that each miner could carry and would enable him 

or her to receive a one-way message from the surface in the event of an emergency. 

Yet experts both inside and outside our industry cautioned that this device had limitations. That messaging device was in use in Utah. Fortunately, where the system 

survived the bump event a miner received the message to evacuate the mine. At 

this point no one knows if the others received the message, or if the system’s capabilities were destroyed in the initial event. 

Today we have brought a recently approved tracking system that was developed 

by Alliance Coal, a member of NMA. This is one of several systems that use radio 

frequency identification (RFID) tags and bi-directional readers to track miner’s 

movement throughout the mine, pre-event. This is an improvement over earlier systems and is considered state-of-the-art. Yet, it, too, is susceptible to damage by destructive forces that will affect its functionality. The system currently requires a 

connective through-the-mine fiber optic cable that is vulnerable to damage and could 

potentially render the system useless. 

Our commitment to improvement while searching for the best technology is evidenced by the mining industry’s efforts in the Mine Emergency Communication 

Partnership. Following the Sago accident, the NMA joined with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, other State and Federal agencies, equipment manufacturers, system integrators in a collaborative undertaking to facilitate 

the development, evaluation, and deployment of communication and tracking system 

technology. A number of different systems have been tested in our members’ mines. 

Some have not proven to be mine-worthy, meaning they could not hold up to the 

rigors of use in an underground mine environment. Others worked in certain situations, but failed in different conditions. We have learned that mining conditions, for 

example, the depth of cover, mine entry height or the types of rocks above the coal 

seam, affect dependability and operability. 

In sum, there is no silver bullet technology yet available. True ‘‘through-the-earth’’ 

wireless technology does not yet exist. Until we overcome the technical barriers that 

preclude transmission of signals through the earth, the systems will require some 

form of underground backbone and infrastructure, which are susceptible to damage. 

While the perfect solution may still be beyond reach, we will not be deterred in the 

quest to find and deploy it. 

To conclude, the mining industry is eager to learn from our experience with implementing the MINER Act and with all who share our determination to safeguard our 

miners. Fatalities are tragic. But failing to learn from them—and failing to act on 

what we learn—would be inexcusable. We must not let that happen. 

Thank you. I’m happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Watzman. Thank all of you for 

being here. We’ll try to move as rapidly as possible here. 

Mr. Roberts, in your testimony, you pointed out—and I’ll ask Mr. 

McAteer to comment on this also—you pointed out that the previous owner, Andalex, on this mine, had basically decided not to 

engage in the type of mining that Mr. Murray’s company was engaged in, because of concerns for worker safety. You quote in your 

testimony that Andalex Resources filed a document with the Utah 

Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, which—it stated, and I quote, ‘‘Although maximum recovery is a design criteria, other considerations 

must be looked at, in the final analysis, in the extraction of coal. 

These factors consider the insurance of protection of personnel and 

the environment. Solid coal barriers will be left to protect the main 

entries from mined-out panels, and to guarantee stability of the 

main entries for the life of the mine,’’ end quote. 

Then you go on to say, ‘‘Despite this assessment, Murray Energy 

submitted the plan to MSHA for approval to mine all of the remaining coal reserves.’’ Now, would you also enlighten for us—we 

keep hearing that this was retreat mining, but you point out really 

what they were mining were the pillars. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes—— 

Senator HARKIN. Can you elaborate on that? Tell us about that. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
67 

The key here is, as you drive the mine from the very entrance 

to its furthest reaches of the mine, and you branch off, you leave 

what would look like city blocks as you go, only on a very much 

smaller scale. Those city blocks are pillars that hold the roof up. 

You also put roof bolts into the city room bolts into the roof, depending on what type strategy you have, to help support the roof 

and keep the miners from being injured by roof falls. Well, as you 

look at the map, you can tell they’ve longwalled out most of the 

coal that’s in this mine. Then they started the process of removing 

the pillars. Someone described this—I think, our safety director, 

Dennis O’Dell did—as like going in your basement and deciding to 

remove the supports that’s holding your house up. Well, you might 

get away with that for a while, but then the house will fall. Now, 

in pillar work, that’s what is supposed to happen; the roof is supposed to collapse as you pull out the pillars. The problem here— 

that I believe is obvious—that you cannot have this kind of exposure for over 4,000 feet to the north and 5,000 feet to the south 

and—that’s just not in the area where they were working—as you 

go out of the mine and look to the north and the south, they’ve removed all of that coal, too. So, you only had a very limited amount 

of coal pillars remaining. So, what they were doing—and the mountain is sitting on top of all of this exposed area, some 2,000 feet, 

right? So, now, they are pulling out these pillars to basically remove the coal and sell it—— 

Senator HARKIN. Yeah. 

Mr. ROBERTS [continuing]. Which is what coal companies are— 

do. That’s the business they’re in. But you’ve got an extremely dangerous type of mining, to start with, and you’re removing their supports that’s holding the mountain up. 

Senator HARKIN. Now, taking off on that, Mr. McAteer, you said 

that the plans should not have been submitted, nor approved. Now, 

this type of mining is done in other parts of the United States, 

right? Now, I’m told, however, that a lot of this is done in the 

East—West Virginia, Pennsylvania, places like that—where you 

don’t have a couple of thousand—3,000 feet of mountain above it; 

they’re more shallow than that, so they don’t have that stress. 

Could you enlighten us on that aspect of it? 

Mr. MCATEER. Mr. Chairman, it is correct that this type of mining is done in other parts of the country. What Mr. Roberts suggested, and what is factual, is that retreat mining, generally speaking, is the most dangerous type of mining, because, in effect, you’re 

taking the pillars and you’re removing them. 

Senator HARKIN. Right. 

Mr. MCATEER. So, you take the most dangerous type of mining, 

and then you put it in an area that is prone to these bumps and 

outbursts, and those—that prone-ness comes from the fact that 

you’ve got so much cover above it, you’ve got such a heavy weight 

of rock—sandstone rock—and you’ve got all of this pushing down, 

that causes these two factors to come together. So, now you’ve created an ultradangerous circumstance, when you’re trying to use 

this retreat, or pulling pillars, in this location. 

It is that reason that I suggested that it should not have been 

submitted and should not have been approved. 
68 

Senator HARKIN. You also say that these pressure buildups were 

not monitored. 

Mr. MCATEER. That’s correct. I think that’s the most profound inadequacy in our system, is that we know that there are pressure 

buildups that occur. We can see them. They can hear them. Well, 

seismologists have gone a step further and essentially developed 

schemes to monitor, through nodes or through a device, these 

buildups. Other countries have systems in place, and we have used 

systems in place, to, one, suggest that we don’t continue mining in 

an area where pressure is built up, or, two, that we use localized 

explosions to decrease the amount of pressure that is being built 

up in that area. Those devices have been used both in this country 

as well as overseas. 

Senator HARKIN. So, my staff just handed me that instrument, 

I guess. 

Mr. MCATEER. They did, sir. 

Senator HARKIN. They put this up on the surface. 

Mr. MCATEER. That can be used on the surface or underground. 

Senator HARKIN. It can tell you what the stresses are. 

Mr. MCATEER. In effect, what it’s doing is, it’s listening to the 

earth make sounds. Miners, since ancient times, have listened to 

the rock above them, and been able to, kind of, read what is happening. This does this mechanically, and it allows you to gauge and 

grade the buildups, so that in those locations where you have a 

buildup of pressure, you can diffuse that pressure through a couple 

of steps. 

Senator HARKIN. Were these being used at the Crandall Mine? 

Mr. MCATEER. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I’m unaware. 

Senator HARKIN. No one knows. 

Mr. MCATEER. I’m pretty certain they were not. 

Senator HARKIN. Pretty sure they were not. But they could have 

been used. 

Mr. MCATEER. They could have been used. It is my contention 

that, when you put this kind of mining together with this kind of 

geologic conditions, that you, in effect, have to use a higher standard of protection, and that you, in effect, should be using the seismic detection to determine the level of buildup of pressures and to 

determine what steps to take to diffuse them. It is done consistently overseas, in South Africa and in Poland. 

Senator HARKIN. I see Mr. Stickler is still here. Mr. Stickler, I 

don’t know if you heard my question about whether these were 

used. Do you know whether or not these type of devices were used 

at the Crandall Mine? 

Mr. STICKLER. They were not. 

Senator HARKIN. They were not. But you say they’re being used 

in other parts of the world. 

Mr. MCATEER. They have been used in other parts of the world 

for a number of years. They have been used in this country. In the 

Consolidation Coal Company Mine in Virginia, they were used several years ago, because it experiences bumps because of its depth. 

MSHA has tested this device. NIOSH has tested this device in a 

couple of areas. It is not required by the statute, and it, in fact, 

can slow the mining process down. 
69 

Senator HARKIN. Last, let me just ask you, as I’ve taken too 

much time; we’ve got to recognize others, but could, or should, 

MSHA, prior to approving this plan, have demanded that these 

type of devices be used to measure the stresses? 

Mr. MCATEER. I think they should have. I think they should 

have in those mines where you have buildups of pressure, you 

ought to have a way to detect that pressure so you can defeat it. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. McAteer. Thank you all very 

much. 

Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. There’s not a great deal of time, so I’d like to 

ask the three of you a question for a yes-or-no answer. Based on 

the evidence at hand, that one company sells the mine because it’s 

not safe to operate, and you have this bump, which occurred a few 

months earlier, was it a safe plan to authorize the mining 900 feet 

away? 

Mr. McAteer, yes or no? 

Mr. MCATEER. No, it was not. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Roberts? 

Mr. ROBERTS. No. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Watzman? 

Mr. WATZMAN. Senator, I don’t think I’m equipped to answer 

that question, at this point, not having all of the facts. 

Senator SPECTER. Second question. Where you have the bumps, 

which we have heard—we know of the one in March, and then we 

have the incident on August 6, then we have a bump on August 

6, burying the equipment used to clear the entry, rescue teams 

being pulled out of the mine; then, on August 11, a second bump; 

rescuers were removed from the mine; August 15, three significant 

bumps; and then, on August 16, the bump which causes the death 

of three men—now, in the light of the history, especially the bumps 

on August 6, 11, and 15, here again, yes or no, was this a safe rescue plan? 

Mr. McAteer, was this an appropriate rescue plan? 

Mr. MCATEER. Senator, as much as I’d like to answer yes or no, 

I have difficulty with it. When you’re trying to rescue the miners, 

you weigh it as best you can. I think they weighed it as best they 

can and went forward. Would I do differently? I don’t know. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Roberts? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Let me say this. It may surprise you, Senator. 

Given what they had to deal with, I don’t think they could have 

done this any safer than they were doing it. In retrospect, you can 

look back and say, ‘‘Well, we shouldn’t try to save these people, because it was too risky,’’ but I’ve been in this position. I’ve been in 

the position on both sides of this, not to make this too long of an 

answer, but I was just reminded, before I came in here, from one 

of the family members, from Jim Walter Resources, who said, ‘‘I remember when you told us you weren’t going to let anybody else go 

in that mine,’’ and said, ‘‘I’’—said, ‘‘You made the right decision 

then, but I didn’t agree with it.’’ So, these kinds of decisions are 

the hardest decisions to try to be as fair about this as possible, as 

a human being can make. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Watzman, what’s your answer to that 

question? 
70 

Mr. WATZMAN. Senator, I’m not going to second-guess the decision. The decision was made, based upon the facts that were available to the experts onsite. Human nature is that we try to rescue 

and reach our fallen brothers. That is what they attempted to do. 

In retrospect, it’s easy for us to second-guess. But, based on the 

facts, they believed that they had—were undertaking safe activities. 

Senator SPECTER. Let me turn now to the issue of the fines. In 

your prepared testimony, Mr. Roberts, you say that, when Assistant Secretary of Labor of MSHA, David Lauriski, initiated a new, 

quote, ‘‘compliance assistance plan,’’ he sanctioned a different way 

of pursuing the agency’s mission. The new program ‘‘chilled enforcement efforts at the mine level, and allowed operators to essentially negotiate workplace health and safety matters.’’ That’s your 

testimony. What would you recommend as the appropriate course 

of conduct for MSHA with respect to penalties? Should the penalties go so far as to entail jail sentences? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Let me speak to that, if I might. I think it speaks 

to what I said previously, the culture that exists, and was there 

prior, actually, to Mr. Stickler arriving on the scene, and it’s going 

to be a difficult proposition to change. I think we’ve seen that 

throughout these disasters. 

What needs to happen is, the mission of MSHA clearly has to be 

the enforcement of the law. They are the police officers who act in 

behalf of the coalminers in the United States of America. Coal companies have a lot of people who tell ’em how to mine coal and how 

to get it out the most productive way. What coalminers in this 

country need are people going in these mines—and let me say this 

about that. These fine men and women who work for MSHA and 

go in these coal mines right beside these coalminers every day, 

they’re to be commended. But I must submit to you, there’s some 

confusion out there as to what their mission is with respect to the 

top levels of MSHA. I submit to you that there ought to be severe 

penalties, whatever those might be—and I have suggested, previously here, that the closing down and shutting down of these coal 

mines when they’re dangerous is the most effective means to protect the coalminers. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

I’m going to have to excuse myself, at this point, but I want you 

to know that, as far as I’m concerned, we’re going to pursue this, 

and we’re going to have Mr. Murray here, and we’re going to get 

to the bottom of it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

Chairman Byrd. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. McAteer—having been in Mr. Stickler’s shoes, 

Mr. McAteer, can you comment on the Bronzite Mine, in Mingo 

County, West Virginia, and why MSHA would not have conducted 

the regular quarterly inspection this year? 

Mr. MCATEER. Senator Byrd, I learned of that matter this morning. I am at a loss to understand why the regular inspections did 

not occur. 
71 

Senator BYRD. Can you respond to Mr. Stickler’s comments and 

explain the difference between the quarterly inspection, a spot inspection, and a so-called enhanced spot inspection? 

Mr. MCATEER. Senator Byrd, the quarterly inspections are the 

mandated inspections under the statute which require that the 

mine be inspected in its entirety. Spot inspections were to be conducted, or are to be conducted, in an effort to pinpoint and to determine if there are particular types of problems, and they can occur, 

if it’s, for example, an electrical problem or a roof-control problem, 

and they really go to the issue of trying to address a particular 

problem that might come to the information of the inspector, by the 

company, by the miner, by the some individual, telling the inspector. So, they’re to look at individualized things. 

Enhanced spot inspections are new to me, in the sense that 

they’re not part of the statutory provision. They were, as I understand it, from Mr. Stickler’s comments, a spot inspection that’s writ 

large, that is to say, it might go beyond looking at one particular 

condition. 

But the statute mandates, from the 1969 act that you worked so 

hard to pass, that the mines be inspected four times a year in their 

entirety. I am at a loss to understand why this mine had not been 

inspected. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is so nice 

of you to allow us to—let me just say that I’ve appreciated the testimony of all three of you; Mr. Roberts, particularly your testimony. 

All I can say is that it—I may be wrong on this, but my understanding is that almost half of the bumps or bounces that have occurred throughout the country have occurred in Utah. So, it’s something we’re not unfamiliar with, something that has happened, and 

yet, we’ve had some of the very, very effective, both union and nonunion mines in Utah. You know, it’s always easier, after the fact, 

to come in and find fault. On the other hand, we appreciate your 

testimony, because we’ve got protect these miners as best we possibly can. 

Maybe I could just ask Mr. Watzman this. This recent mining 

act, how have the major mining companies implemented that act 

since we passed it? 

Mr. WATZMAN. Senator, I think all of the companies have worked 

aggressively to implement it. And, as I noted earlier, I will submit, 

for the record, a chart that reflects only the member companies of 

the National Mining Association. We conducted a survey of them 

to see what they have done since February 2006. 

Senator HATCH. Do you feel you’re in compliance with the 

act—— 

Mr. WATZMAN. Yes. 

Senator HATCH [continuing]. Throughout the country? 

Mr. WATZMAN. Even predating the act. You know, 125,000 new 

self-contained self-rescuers have been introduced into the mines. 

But we still have a backorder of 100,000 of them. Communication 

technology is being introduced into the mines. But today there’s 

only a leaky feeder system approved by MSHA. The approval process takes some time to get systems to the approval stage. 
72 

So, the technology has not advanced quick enough for any of us— 

none of us are satisfied with that—to allow further enhancements 

and further compliance with the act. But, in those areas where 

companies have been able to, mine rescue teams, SCSRs, breathable-air provisions for 96 hours of breathable air, all of those are 

being met by the industry, to the degree that there is technology 

available that allows us to meet it. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Mr. Roberts, do you agree with that? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think that the MINER Act from last year—in my 

testimony, I point out where there’s been some problems with implementing the full act itself. 

Senator HATCH. Right. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think Mr. Watzman is correct, there’s a 

backorder on the oxygen. There was an—August of last year, 

2006—mandate to get the emergency evacuation plans in place. 

That was not met. It was extended. I think there were both a good 

reason and a bad reason for that. I think most of the companies 

got a plan in, and MSHA rejected many of those plans and forced 

them to go back and re-evaluate those. We still—— 

Senator HATCH. Was that good or bad, that MSHA—— 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think it’s good that—— 

Senator HATCH. Okay. 

Mr. ROBERTS [continuing]. They were forced to go up—go back 

and come forward with a plan that was—that protected the miners. 

Senator HATCH. So, you felt MSHA actually did its job, in that 

instance. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think that we have indicated, and publicly from 

time to time, where we think that MSHA’s done its job, and we’ve 

been critical when we think they haven’t. The 96 hours of oxygen, 

we publicly stated that that was the correct thing to do. The position that MSHA has taken on the seals, we publicly said that was 

the correct thing to do. When they haven’t done what we think 

they should do, we’ve been critical, and we think that’s the role we 

should play. 

Senator HATCH. Well, that’s the role you should play. 

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HARKIN. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Mr. McAteer, you intrigue me about the device 

that can listen to the mountain. As Senator Hatch has indicated, 

we have a lot of bumps, we have a lot of talking mountains, if you 

will, in Utah. Do you have any idea how many people in Utah may 

be using this? 

Mr. MCATEER. Senator, I do not. As we get deeper in our mines 

in this country, this phenomenon of bumps and bursts will increase. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. MCATEER. Geologically, that’s just a fact. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. MCATEER. I mentioned South Africa—their mines, 2 miles, 

3 miles down, they could not operate without the use of seismic detection equipment. 

Senator BENNETT. How long has this equipment been available? 

Mr. MCATEER. Oh, at least 10 to 15 years. 
73 

Senator BENNETT. When you were the head of MSHA, did you 

feel any desire to mandate it anywhere or—— 

Mr. MCATEER. We did not Senator. We had the good fortune of 

not having the Crandall Canyon kind of accident, which demands 

that we look at it. Second, as we increase the coal production and 

increase the demand for coal in this country, we will be going into 

these greater depths, and we’ll be going into these more difficult 

circumstances, as we’ve found here. 

Senator BENNETT. So, you would think, at some future point, it 

should be mandated? 

Mr. MCATEER. It’s my opinion that it ought to be mandated, in 

those mines, particularly, to begin with; and not necessarily mandated, it can be used without the mandate. But I think it can be 

a useful tool to any operator who wants to understand the pressure 

in the mountain, and so that you can diffuse this pressure. But I 

do believe that as we go into mines that have this kind of problem, 

the bump problem that you spoke of, then we ought to mandate 

that, yes, sir. 

Senator BENNETT. So, you would give MSHA the power, at some 

future point, to say, ‘‘This mine should have it, this mine, not necessarily?’’ 

Mr. MCATEER. In the area of gas liberation, there are grades— 

if your mine liberates over x million cubic feet of gas per day, 24- 

hour period, you meet a higher standard, in effect. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. 

Mr. MCATEER. It is our proposal here that such a graded standard—because you do have mines that have that kind of problem— 

if you have a mine with 200 feet of cover, and you don’t have the 

kind of propensity to have bumps, then I wouldn’t think you 

didn’t—necessarily need it. But where you have these factors that 

lead to bumps, you know they’re going to be there, you have a history of bumping, then I think you should have that. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. But do you think—as I say, looking forward, you didn’t feel it necessary to do, while you were there. 

You’re looking forward, you think it would be necessary, at some 

point in the future. Do you think MSHA has the authority now to 

say, ‘‘In mine A we would mandate it, and not mine B?’’ Or do you 

think Congress should act and say, ‘‘It should be mandated under 

these conditions?’’ Or do you think Congress should be—should act 

and say, ‘‘MSHA should have a discretionary authority?’’ 

Mr. MCATEER. MSHA has the authority to promulgate regulations, based upon its general jurisdictional powers. So, yes—— 

Senator BENNETT. So, you’re not—you’re not saying Congress 

needs to act on this—— 

Mr. MCATEER. I don’t believe Congress needs to act. I believe 

MSHA could take it on, yes, sir. 

Senator BENNETT. Well, I have understood, since getting into 

this, that mining is only going to get more and more dangerous, because—to shift the analogy—we’ve picked all the low-hanging fruit. 

Mr. MCATEER. That’s right. 

Senator BENNETT. We have mined the mines that are the easiest 

to mine, the mines that are, by definition, therefore, the safest to 

mine. As we continue to go after the energy that our economy 

needs, until we resolve the problem in some other way, mining is 
74 

going to get more dangerous, and the use of these devices, however 

much you may not have felt it necessary when you were there, you 

now think it is necessary, and, maybe looking ahead to the future, 

it will become even more necessary. Is that a fair assumption? 

Mr. MCATEER. That’s exactly my belief. The process, it doesn’t 

necessarily go into individual mines. In other countries, one of the 

procedures is to do a—in effect, a regional seismic read, so that—— 

Senator BENNETT. I see. 

Mr. MCATEER [continuing]. If you hear of bumps, then I can say 

to you, mine operator A, ‘‘You need to take actions here.’’ That can 

be done in a different kind of way. 

Senator BENNETT. Well, Utah is a region—— 

Mr. MCATEER. Yes, sir. 

Senator BENNETT [continuing]. Where we have these kinds of 

things. Thank you. 

Mr. MCATEER. You certainly do. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask one—— 

Senator HARKIN. Senator Hatch—— 

Senator HATCH [continuing]. Short question of Mr. Watzman? 

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. And then Senator Byrd wanted—— 

Senator HATCH. Over the last year, since the passage of the act, 

how would you characterize MSHA’s enforcement activity? Has it 

been more, less, whatever? 

Mr. WATZMAN. I think, Senator, our members would say that 

their enforcement has been vigorous. 

Senator HATCH. What does that mean? 

Mr. WATZMAN. Their inspection—— 

Senator HATCH. Double the—— 

Mr. WATZMAN [continuing]. Their presence at the mine sites is 

more robust. There are more citations being issued. There is more 

inspector presence at the mines than there was prior to the 

MINER Act. But that is a trend that has been continuing over the 

last several years. It didn’t occur just following the tragic events 

of Sago and Darby and Alma. That was something that had started 

before that, and we’re seeing a continuation of that now. 

Senator HATCH. Compared to before the act was passed, could 

you give a percentage? Is it 25 percent more strict, double, whatever? 

Mr. WATZMAN. I think, Senator—and I may be off by a little bit 

here, not in terms of the number of inspections, but I think that 

the inspection actions—meaning the citations and orders that are 

being issued—is up, I believe, 10 percent or 12 percent, if memory 

serves me correct. So, they’re—they have a bigger presence at the 

mines. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Byrd. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Specter, 

for holding these hearings. 

Mr. Secretary, I have just one final question. You’re not at the 

table, but if you don’t mind: Why were there no quarterly inspections this year at the Bronzite Mine, as required by the Mine Act? 

Mr. STICKLER. What was your question, Senator? 
75 

Senator BYRD. I’ll be happy to repeat it. Why were there no quarterly inspections this year at the Bronzite Mine, as required by the 

Mine Act? 

Mr. STICKLER. Until I investigate that, I cannot give you an answer. 

Senator BYRD. Would you say that again, please? 

Mr. STICKLER. Until I’ve had an opportunity to investigate, I cannot give you that answer. I don’t know the answer, at this time. 

Senator BYRD. All right. Now, when you have an opportunity to 

investigate, will you please report to this committee your response? 

Mr. STICKLER. I will. 

Senator BYRD. I thank you. 

Senator HARKIN. Appreciate that. Thank you. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Chairman Byrd. 

There’s just one other issue that I’m going to just bring up here 

before we all close this down. I’m going to ask Mr. Stickler or if 

any of you have any knowledge of this. 

Arianna Huffington, in an op-ed about this incident, and about 

the whole safety aspect, in general, claims—now, this is what she’s 

claiming, I have no knowledge of this, but I intend to look into this, 

Mr. Stickler and others—claims that Mr. Murray had enough political muscle to get a Mine Safety and Health Administration district 

manager, who had cracked down on safety issues at one of 

Murray’s mines, reassigned. Do you know about this at all, Mr. 

Stickler? 

Mr. STICKLER. I can assure you that nothing similar to that has 

happened since I’ve been in this job. 

Senator HARKIN. Any of you know about—Mr. Roberts? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is absolutely true. 

Senator HARKIN. Pardon? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is absolutely true, but it didn’t happen on Mr. 

Stickler’s watch. That’s been—that’s not the first time that’s been 

published. 

Senator HARKIN. As chairman, I intend to have my staff look into 

this and to get as much information as possible. If you have any 

more information on this, Mr. Roberts, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. ROBERTS. We’ll provide it to you, or the entire committee, or 

whoever. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, just get it to my staff, so that we can look 

into it when we have Mr. Murray here. 

Do any of you have any other statements or any other comments 

or observations you wish to make before we adjourn the hearing? 

If not, again, Mr. Stickler, thank you very much for your patience in being here. Thank all of you for your patience. Thank all 

of the miners, who traveled a great distance to be here. I’m sure 

I can say, on behalf of the sons of two old coalminers—— 

Senator BYRD. Yes, man. 

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. That we appreciate all you do for 

the energy of this—— 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. Thank—— 

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. Of this country. 

Senator BYRD [continuing]. You. 

Senator HARKIN. Thank you all you coalminers. 
76 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator HARKIN. There will be some additional questions which 

will be submitted for your response in the record. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

APPROVAL OF PILLAR EXTRACTION REQUESTS: 

Question. Mr. Stickler, I understand that the mining accident that occurred in 

Crandall Canyon is much different from recent mining accidents that were the result of mine explosions. The Crandall Canyon accident involved mining at extreme 

depths using the process of retreat mining. In the testimony provided by the United 

Mine Workers of America, because of extensive longwall mining performed on both 

sides of the main entries of the mine, the only remaining coal would have been in 

the pillars of the mine. In fact, the UMWA claims that ‘‘there can be no doubt that 

the mountain over the mine was exerting extreme pressure on the remaining coal, 

which was supporting the mine roof.’’ Despite the obvious dangers of pillar extraction at these extreme depths, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 

approved the request from the Murray Energy Company to mine all the remaining 

coal reserves including the barrier pillars. 

Mr. Stickler, under what criteria would the Mine Safety and Health Administration have approved this request? 

Answer. In September 2006, the Crandall Canyon mine provided MSHA with two 

Agapito Associates geotechnical reports, dated July 20, 2006 and August 9, 2006 

that analyzed whether the North and South barriers of Main West could be safely 

retreat mined. Agapito Associates used both the ARMPS (Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar Stability) and LAMODEL (Laminated Model) computer models to conduct 

its analyses. ARMPS is a computer model that bases its output (pillar stability) on 

empirical data received from historical successes and failures of past mining configurations. LAMODEL is a true boundary element, computer model where mine design output (stress and convergence) is generated from input based on the physical 

characteristics of the mine seam and surrounding strata. LAMODEL is software 

that uses boundary-elements for calculating the stresses and displacements in coal 

mines or other thin, tabular seams or veins. It can be used to investigate and optimize pillar sizes and layout in relation to pillar stress, multi-seam stress, or bump 

potential (energy release). 

After an MSHA onsite mine visit and company revisions to the retreat mining 

plan, MSHA subsequently approved the retreat mining plan amendment for the 

North Barrier on February 2, 2007. The plan amendment to develop the South Barrier was approved on March 8, 2007. Agapito Associates visited the North Barrier 

section on March 16, 2007. Based on its observations, Agapito Associates then reran 

the LAMODEL computer model for retreat mining in the South Barrier. Agapito’s 

subsequent recommendations were to increase the pillar length and to slab the barrier pillar on retreat, which Agapito contended would move the stresses to the gob 

areas and promote safe caving. 

On April 18, 2007, Agapito Associates sent a letter to Crandall Canyon with their 

recommendations. Crandall Canyon incorporated the Agapito recommendations in 

the plan amendment to retreat mine the South Barrier. The South Barrier retreat 

mining plan amendment left five pillars around the Main West sump to protect the 

South Barrier bleeder entry. 

Based on onsite observations of development in the South Barrier on May 22, 

2007, MSHA recommended that the bleeder entry for the South Barrier Pillar retreat mining be adequately supported and protected. During the onsite visit, MSHA 

recommended that the company leave an additional three pillars (for a total of 

eight) to establish a clean cave line to prevent a location on the pillar line that could 

burst. 

The mine operator made the recommended changes in a revised drawing dated 

May 23, 2007, and after an additional review, the South Barrier retreat mining plan 

amendment was approved on June 15, 2007. 

Question. Should the Mine Safety and Health Administration approve future pillar extraction requests for other deep mining operations? 
77 

Answer. MSHA will approve future pillar extraction requests for other deep mining operations when mine design and safety procedures are adequate to protect miners. Since the Crandall Canyon incident, MSHA has taken the following actions as 

described below: 

Evaluations are being made of all underground coal mines in the United States 

to identify Crandall Canyon ‘‘type’’ mines that may have bump potential. A list of 

‘‘bump prone’’ deep mines will be compiled. Each of these mines will be visited by 

MSHA’s Technical Support roof control experts. As a result of the site visit to the 

mine, recommendations will be made to ensure that the mine is adequately supported. All recommendations will be presented in memorandum form and given to 

the Coal Mine Safety and Health District where they can be shared with the mine 

operator. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

MSHA AS PRIMARY COMMUNICATOR

Question. During the news coverage of this disaster it appeared to me—and I am 

sure to many of my colleagues—that mine owner Bob Murray was the primary 

spokesperson at the site. In my mind his confusing and conflicting statements and 

his penchant for railing against government regulators were inappropriate at best 

and, by their own admission outraged, the victims’ families. This unfortunate situation should have never been allowed to occur. I know from my experience chairing 

the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee that the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB) offers a far more effective model in making sure that victims 

families receive timely information from their government first, that it is accurate 

and that no one else speaks on behalf of the government’s investigators at an aviation accident site. 

Mr. Stickler, can you tell the subcommittee how you currently interpret the following provision in the MINER Act of 2006? ‘‘The Secretary shall establish a policy 

that requires that MSHA shall serve as the primary communicator with the operator, miners’ families, the press and the public.’’ 

Answer. Section 7 of the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act 

(MINER) Act requires MSHA to be the primary communicator with the mine operator, miners’ families, press and public during a mine disaster. On December 22, 

2006, MSHA issued a Program Policy Letter (No. P06–V–11) which set forth the policy implementing the provisions of section 7 of the MINER Act. Revisions to the 

Headquarters Mine Emergency Response Guidelines Handbook (AH08–III–2) set 

forth specific guidance to be used in applying this policy during a mine emergency. 

Often, the mine operator and State agency may have their independent communicator on the scene. While MSHA is the primary contact for release of official statements regarding rescue and recovery efforts, MSHA’s spokesperson works closely 

with other organizations to ensure the message is clear and accurate. Neither the 

MINER Act nor MSHA’s policy prohibits the mine operator or others from communicating with the families or the public. 

Question. Did you communicate to Mr. Murray that you were to be the primary 

communicator at the site? If so, what was Mr. Murray’s reaction to your role as the 

primary communicator at the site? If not, why not? 

Answer. Yes. Mr. Murray and I discussed the fact that MSHA is the primary communicator. Immediately after MSHA was notified of the Crandall Canyon accident, 

MSHA began acting as the primary communicator with the families, policymakers, 

the public and the media, a responsibility MSHA takes very seriously. MSHA also 

acted as the primary communicator with the media. MSHA held regular briefings 

every day for reporters at the sheriff’s command center. During these briefings, we 

provided detailed updates regarding the rescue effort and answered reporters’ questions. MSHA also provided regular updates on the agency’s website regarding the 

rescue effort and issued media advisories concerning our updates at the mine site. 

In addition, MSHA personnel regularly updated Utah’s governor and congressional 

delegation on the status of the rescue operations, both onsite and offsite. 

MSHA and the operator were present at each of the family briefings. At times, 

representatives of the State of Utah participated as well. In addition to the three 

family liaisons dispatched by MSHA to provide regular updates on the rescue operation, MSHA also provided interpreters for the Spanish-speaking families. In each 

of these briefings, MSHA took the lead as the primary communicator. In some cases 

the media did not show MSHA’s briefings, but elected to broadcast only the mine 

operator’s comments. 
78 

Question. Did MSHA provide Mr. Murray with information on any developments 

at the site before the families were briefed? 

Answer. Yes. Typically there was a pre-meeting held between MSHA and the company prior to meeting with the families. Because of the mine operator participation 

with the rescue effort at the mine site, the operator already knew of developments 

in most cases. 

Question. Did MSHA provide Mr. Murray with any communication techniques or 

strategies on how to best update families and the public on new developments? 

Answer. MSHA did suggest communication techniques or strategies to Mr. Murray and also suggested that Mr. Murray be replaced with someone else from the 

company. As the rescue operation progressed, Mr. Murray was replaced by another 

company spokesman. 

Question. Given the confusing and misleading information that was delivered to 

the families on multiple occasions at this site, does MSHA need more legislative authority to properly secure a mine accident site? 

Answer. In general, MSHA does not feel that the information the agency delivered 

to the families was confusing or misleading. MSHA kept a family liaison representative with family members 24 hours per day. The MSHA liaison representative called 

the command center to get updates on the hour. In addition, the MSHA Assistant 

Secretary briefed the families twice a day (morning and evening) to give them a 

firsthand account of what was taking place during the rescue operation and what 

was being planned. MSHA does not have or need any legislative authority to secure 

a mine accident site. This is best handled by local law enforcement, county, or State 

police. 

Question. I was very concerned to recently learn that MSHA denied the UMWA’s 

petition to be the miners’ representative in the Crandall investigation. 

Mr. Stickler, it would seem to me that in any investigation you would want to 

gather as much information as possible from sources with first hand knowledge and 

experience. The Crandall Canyon miners and families have a unique perspective on 

the safety conditions they work in, yet their opinions and observations are not being 

included in this investigation. 

Mr. Stickler, do you think that the families of the trapped miners should have 

a strong voice in the upcoming investigation? If yes, can you assure me that their 

concerns will be heard? How do you plan to include them? 

Answer. I believe that families must have a strong voice in the investigation, and 

MSHA has worked to keep the families involved. I am personally committed to seeing that MSHA does everything it can, consistent with the requirements of the law, 

to address the concerns of the families and determine the cause of the accident. As 

you may know, immediately after MSHA was notified of the Crandall Canyon accident, MSHA, fulfilling its responsibilities under the MINER Act, dispatched three 

family liaisons to meet with family members and kept them updated on the rescue 

operation. First, early in the investigative process the families were invited to share 

any relevant information that they had with the MSHA investigative team. The 

families were invited to meet either formally or informally with the team to provide 

this information. 

Question. The Miner Health and Safety Enhancement Act of 2007 calls for the establishment of an independent ombudsman to ensure proper attention to miner complaints of unsafe conditions and to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. Do you 

believe that such an office would allow miners, particularly those without union representation, the opportunity to voice their concerns about their safety? 

What procedures at MSHA have you established to ensure the voices of miners 

are heard and respected through the independent ombudsman? 

Answer. MSHA does not believe an independent ombudsman would do more than 

the procedures already in place. MSHA has a well-publicized, national hazardous 

condition complaint hotline that is staffed around the clock with live operators. The 

hotline allows any miner, miner’s family, or member of the public to anonymously 

call or submit a written complaint online regarding concerns about hazardous or unsafe conditions. This Call Center collects relevant information, logs in the complaint 

and notifies the respective MSHA office emergency contact, who then initiates an 

investigation. The complaint is sanitized so mine operators do not know who called 

in the complaint. 

RIGHT TO CONTROL ALL ACTIVITY WHEN DISASTER OCCURS

Question. According to testimony by Mr. Roberts, since 1977, MSHA has had the 

right to control all activity at the mine when disasters occur by issuing a section 

103(j) order, yet MSHA has chosen to use the authority under section 103(k), which 

permits the operator greater latitude in directing a rescue operation. Why did 
79 

MSHA not use this authority, and after misinformation was given to the miners’ 

families and the media by Mr. Murray, why was section 103(j) not ordered? 

Answer. MSHA believes that § 103(k) is a very strong provision of the Mine Act 

relating to rescue activities in that it requires the mine operator to get MSHA’s approval of the mine operator’s plan for its rescue operations. The mine operator is 

the entity in the best position to know the mine, prepare a rescue plan, and engage 

in the activities necessary under the plan. Under § 103(k) the mine operator cannot 

take action without consulting with MSHA (and any State representatives when feasible) to obtain MSHA’s approval of the plan. Further, under § 103(k), MSHA can 

issue any order to the mine operator that the agency deems appropriate to provide 

for the safety of any person in the mine. This section of the Mine Act is a very powerful tool under which MSHA approved all actions by the mine operator before those 

actions were implemented. In addition, MSHA moderated Mr. Murray’s contacts 

with the families. We do not believe that we, or any federal agency, have the power 

to prevent Mr. Murray from talking to the press. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

MINE ACT § 103(K)

Question. Please describe the K order issued at the Crandall Mine? 

Answer. Under Mine Act §103(k), when an accident occurs MSHA may issue any 

orders appropriate to ensure the safety of any person in the mine. In addition, 

under § 103(k) the mine operator, in consultation with any appropriate State representative, must obtain MSHA’s approval of its rescue or recovery plans. Based on 

the information received by the Call Center and forwarded to MSHA District 9, 

MSHA initially issued the 103(k) order over the phone to the mine operator before 

MSHA’s arrival onsite. The § 103(k) order required mine management to evacuate 

the mine and effectively secure the site and was reduced to writing when MSHA 

arrived onsite. 

Question. What parts of the mine were covered by the order? What parts, if any, 

were not covered, and why? 

Answer. The original §103(k) order covered the Main West Pillar section. No other 

parts of the mine were included in the order. MSHA did not feel that miners’ safety 

was at risk in the area out by the Main West Pillar section. 

Question. What modifications to the order, if any, were issued? 

Answer. The order was modified six times in the days following the initial mine 

collapse to allow recovery operations to continue in accordance with the approved 

plans. 

Question. When were those modifications issued? 

Answer. Modifications were issued on: August 6, August 7 (two modifications), August 8, August 16, and September 4. 

Question. What were the reasons for the modifications? 

Answer. MSHA modified the order for the following reasons: 

—Modification No. 1 (6:00 a.m. MDT on August 6, 2007) was made to show the 

correct time of the bounce, allow necessary personnel travel underground to repair damaged ventilation devices, install a belt tailpiece at crosscut 120, and to 

open up the No. 1 seal to explore old Main West entries. 

—Modification No. 2 (1:50 p.m. on August 7, 2007) was made to permit the use 

of cameras underground. 

—Modification No. 3 (6:20 p.m. on August 7, 2007) was made to allow personnel 

to travel underground to make necessary repairs to damaged ventilation devices, clean in and around the feeder breaker, and advance in the No. 1 entry. 

—Modification No. 4 (10:18 a.m. on August 8, 2007) was made to allow the operator to continue recovery operations in accordance with an MSHA-approved 

site-specific plan. 

—Modification No. 5 (11:35 p.m. on August 16, 2007) was made to prohibit anyone 

from traveling in by crosscut 107 of Main West. 

—Modification No. 6 (3:55 p.m. on September 4, 2007) was made to allow work 

in crosscut 90 provided that all entries were continually monitored for O2, CO, 

and CH4. 

Question. Who made the decision to allow the media and others to tour underground during the rescue effort? 

Answer. Typically, the mine operator proposes mine rescue activity and plans for 

MSHA approval. MSHA can deny approval of the proposed plan if MSHA believes 

the plan is unsafe. Mr. Murray proposed that the film crew (media group) be permitted into the mine. 
80 

The highest-ranking MSHA official on site is responsible for MSHA decisions. In 

this case I was on site and take responsibility for final approval. The Coal Mine 

Safety and Health Administrator, District 9 Manager and Assistant District Managers, Field Office Supervisor and other MSHA personnel also were on site. 

No one expressed concern to me that it was unsafe for the film crew to enter the 

mine area in which it was permitted. The film crew was given the usual visitors’ 

safety training before it entered the mine. MSHA officials traveled with the visitors 

and monitored their safety. 

Question. Why was that decision made? 

Answer. At the time the film crew entered the mine, the family members were 

very distraught due to their belief that the rescue effort was moving too slowly and 

not using the most effective methods or equipment. The pictures of the surface and 

underground rescue were valuable in helping the family members understand the 

rescue process and develop confidence that the maximum effort was being made to 

reach their loved ones. 

Question. Was this decision consistent with the K order? 

Answer. The original 103(k) order was modified on at 1:50 p.m., on August 7, 

2007, to permit the mine operator to use a camera underground. 

Question. What communications occurred between the mine operator and MSHA 

relating to the K order? 

Answer. As § 103(k) requires, the mine operator submitted rescue and recovery 

plans and modifications to MSHA for approval. Communication between the mine 

operator and MSHA were continuous and ongoing throughout the rescue effort. 

Question. What modifications, if any, resulted from these communications? 

Answer. After the operator submitted acceptable plans, MSHA modified the order 

to allow the operator to implement the submitted plan. 

BUMP OF MARCH 2007

Question. Mr. Stickler, it has been reported that a bump occurred at the Crandall 

Canyon Mine in March 2007, and that the bump caused the cessation of regular 

mining activity in one area of the mine. When and how did MSHA officials become 

aware of the bump that occurred in March 2007? 

Answer. MSHA was not immediately notified of the March 10, 2007 burst or its 

magnitude. The burst occurred on a Saturday and was not reported to MSHA as 

a 30 C.F.R. part 50 reportable accident. On March 12, 2007, the mine operator notified the district office of ventilation monitoring concerns and to discuss a need to 

abandon the section. It was during this conversation that MSHA was made aware 

that the March 10, 2007 burst had occurred. 

Question. What other bumps and roof control problems was MSHA aware of prior 

to August 6? 

Answer. Since January 2002, MSHA was aware of several injuries at the Crandall 

Canyon mine involving ground control issues. Four injuries occurred due to two 

bursts on the face during longwall mining and one injury occurred from a rib 

sloughing during retreat mining. None of these injuries was life-threatening. However, they resulted in serious injuries. Inspections conducted by enforcement personnel revealed no issues or problems with the roof control plan. 

Question. What enforcement actions, if any, did MSHA take in response? Answer. 

MSHA issued 27 ground control violations to the Crandall mine from 2002 to 2007. 

Question. Has a determination been made about whether the March 2007 bump 

should have been reported to MSHA? If so, what are the facts that led to MSHA’s 

determination? If not, when will a determination be made? 

Answer. The Crandall Canyon Accident Investigation Team will address this in 

its accident investigation report. The team has obtained all available information 

and has interviewed personnel with firsthand knowledge. The investigative report 

will determine if the operator should have reported the March 2007 burst. 

APPROVAL OF THE CRANDALL MINE PLAN

Question. Mr. Stickler, MSHA’s accident report on the Sago disaster acknowledges 

that the agency approved a plan for bottom mining (a kind of secondary mining) 

on the same day that the plan was submitted for review. How long did MSHA consider the plan at the Crandall Mine? 

Answer. The roof control plan amendment to develop four entries in the South 

Barrier was received on February 23, 2007. The amendment was approved on 

March 8, 2007. The District 9 District Manager signed the amendment for the development of the South Barrier Block of Main West. Prior to Crandall Canyon’s submittal of the amendment, there was discussion between MSHA and the company regarding stipulations that should be included in the amendment. 
81 

On May 15, 2007, MSHA received a copy of the Agapito Associates, Inc. report, 

dated April 18, 2007. MSHA received the operator’s plan to retreat mine the south 

Main West barrier on May 17, 2008. Following an onsite evaluation of the ground 

conditions in the south Main West barrier development on May 22, 2007, discussions were conducted with the operator regarding the district’s concerns with the 

plan. On June 15, 2007, MSHA approved the plan to retreat mine the south West 

Main barrier. 

Question. Who was involved in those deliberations? 

Answer. The review of the roof control plan amendments was conducted by the 

District 9 Roof Control Supervisor, with the assistance of the roof control specialist. 

Additionally, a graduate mining engineer assisted in reviewing some of the proposed 

roof control plan amendments (although he did not review the final plan amendment submittals relating to the South Barrier development and retreat mining). 

Question. Who gave the final approval? 

Answer. The District 9 Staff Assistant (who was the acting District Manager that 

day) signed the retreat mining roof control amendment for the South Barrier Block 

of Main West. The Staff Assistant is a certified Civil Engineer. 

Question. It has been reported that a private engineering consultant was retained 

by the mine operator, and that those engineers deemed recovery of coal pillars to 

be safe at this mine under certain circumstances. MSHA concurred in that assessment. Was the full report from the private engineering consultant included in the 

application for plan approval? 

Answer. We believe the full reports from Agapito Associates, Inc. were included 

in the application for plan approval. However, MSHA’s accident investigation team 

also has looked into this matter and the team’s report should indicate whether any 

portions of the Agapito report were omitted. 

Question. Were all of the safety standards in the private engineering report required by MSHA as part of the Crandall operating plan? 

Answer. MSHA’s accident investigation team will address this question in its report (to be published shortly). 

Question. Did MSHA technicians consult with the private engineers prior to approving the Crandall mining operation? 

Answer. No. MSHA personnel discussed the plan submittal with the mine operator. 

Question. What was the substance of those discussions? 

Answer. MSHA had no discussions with the Agapito engineers. 

Question. What negotiations, if any, occurred relating to safety standards? 

Answer. There were no negotiations. MSHA informed the operator about a number of issues that needed to be addressed. The operator addressed those concerns 

and the plan was ultimately approved. 

Question. Did MSHA technicians consult with the MSHA inspectors at the 

Crandall Mine prior to approving the mining operation? 

Answer. Yes. An MSHA District 9 Roof Control Specialist and Roof Control Supervisor were underground in the South Barrier section on May 22, 2007, to evaluate 

the operator’s submitted plan to retreat mine. The Roof Control Specialist worked 

in the Price field office. 

Question. What was the substance of those discussions? 

Answer. The Roof Control Specialist traveled with the District 9 Roof Control Supervisor and agreed with the plan approval. 

Question. What negotiations, if any, occurred relating to safety standards? 

Answer. There were no negotiations between the roof control supervisor and specialist. 

Question. Did the MSHA inspectors at the Crandall Mine consult with the private 

engineers? What was the substance of those discussions? What negotiations, if any, 

occurred relating to safety standards? 

Answer. The MSHA inspectors did not consult with the private engineers. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

RESCUE OPERATIONS

Question. In our meeting at the site—the day after the initial collapse—we were 

informed that rescue operations would not occur inside the mine until the ongoing 

seismic activity had ceased. Following that meeting, the ‘‘bumps’’ continued. Nine 

days later I received the news that three rescuers were killed—one of which was 

an MSHA employee—and six injured. What changed that led you to determine that 

it was safe to put rescuers into the mine? 
82 

Answer. After the accident on August 6, 2007, attempts were made to reach the 

trapped miners. These initial attempts involved rescue team members exploring the 

Main West sealed area and the partially filled entries in the South Barrier section. 

Both of these efforts were suspended because they required miners to travel into 

areas where the burst occurred and where supplemental ground support had not 

been installed. It was decided that the safest way to reach the miners was to clear 

out the rubble in the number 1 entry of South Barrier section and install heavy supplemental ground support. This was the consensus of MSHA personnel (which included our engineers from Technical Support, District personnel, and headquarters 

staff) and the mine operator. 

Question. Who makes those decisions and what seismic expertise, if any, do these 

individuals have? 

Answer. Mine rescue decisions evolve from the combined expertise of all those involved in the rescue effort. While MSHA ultimately approves or disapproves the 

safety aspects of all plans, our preference is to include all input and expertise available and to reach consensus. The decision to continue the rescue efforts was a concerted decision. The mine operator submitted a plan and it was approved by MSHA. 

MSHA does not believe that seismic expertise exists that can determine when a 

burst will or will not occur. MSHA felt the best support available was the system 

discussed in the answer above. We did feel it would be able to protect miners at 

that time. After August 16, 2007, it was apparent that the support was inadequate, 

and the underground rescue operation was ceased. 

Question. Does MSHA have the ability to make rescue operations recommendations, or does it simply approve the plans that are made by the mining operation? 

Answer. After issuing a §103(k) order under the MINE Act, MSHA can approve 

or reject any rescue plan submitted by the mine operator. MSHA also has the authority under §103(j) and §103(k) to issue orders and take actions independently. 

Question. Would safety increase if MSHA took a leading operational role in rescue 

operations? 

Answer. MSHA obtains the best safety results through the issuance of a §103(k) 

order to control the safety aspects of the rescue or recovery operation. The mine operator’s mine specific knowledge of personnel, equipment, and infrastructure is critical to leading the operational role. 

MSHA RESOURCES

Question. Given that this hearing is taking place in an appropriations subcommittee, the first question that comes to mind is: does the Mine Safety and 

Health Administration (MSHA), a government agency, have the necessary resources 

to enforce safety and health standards and promote safety and health conditions? 

Answer. As of September 5, 2007, Coal Mine Safety and Health (CMS&H) had 

744 enforcement personnel, of which 488 were authorized representatives and 256 

were inspector trainees. Each month the number of inspector trainees decrease as 

they progress from the trainee status to the authorized representative ranks. During the supplemental mass hiring, CMS&H’s goal was 757 enforcement personnel, 

which is an adequate number of enforcement resources to enforce safety and health 

standards and promote safety and health conditions. 

Question. The MSHA Price office has jurisdiction over the Crandall Canyon Mine. 

Does the Price office have the necessary resources and staff to effectively do its job? 

Answer. Yes, we believe they do. At the beginning of the supplemental hiring 

process in July 2006, the Price Office consisted of 15 enforcement personnel, which 

included three specialists and three trainees. As of September 5, 2007, that office 

consisted of 17 enforcement personnel (which included one specialist and 7 trainees). 

As long as we continue to be funded for this staffing level, we feel that this is an 

adequate number of enforcement resources for the Price office to enforce safety and 

health standards and promote safety and health conditions. 

BEING NOTIFIED OF AN ACCIDENT

Question. Clearly one of the key questions we should ask is when did MSHA first 

learn of the initial bump and when did it learn that six miners were missing? 

Answer. The mine operator first notified MSHA of the initial August 6, 2007, 

burst via the MSHA toll-free hotline at 3:43 a.m. Mountain Daylight Time (MDT). 

The mine operator did not report death, injuries, or entrapment of miners. The Call 

Center operator notified MSHA at 3:51 a.m. MDT. The MSHA official contacted the 

mine at 4:03 a.m. MDT. During a phone conversation with the mine officials at 4:05 

a.m. MDT, MSHA learned that 6 miners were missing and no contact had been 

made. The MSHA inspector verbally issued the § 103(k) order at 4:41 a.m. MDT. 

Question. How soon after you learned of the collapse was MSHA at the mine? 
83 

Answer. MSHA arrived at the mine at 5:45 a.m. MDT, on August 6, 2007. 

Question. Could you please walk us through the first initial steps MSHA takes 

when confronted with an accident? 

Answer. Title 30 C.F.R. part 50 defines accidents that must be immediately reported to MSHA. When reported, MSHA must promptly inform the operator if it will 

conduct an investigation. During this time, part 50 prevents alteration of the accident scene. If an investigation will be conducted, MSHA may issue a § 103(k) order 

by phone or when arriving onsite. 

Depending on the type and scope of the accident, MSHA management will assign 

one or more investigators. Resources may be deployed based on the operator’s report 

or after an initial onsite contact. Assignments are made considering any necessary 

specialty and the need to provide an independent investigator not responsible for 

inspections at the mine. Assistance is requested from MSHA Technical Support on 

a case-by-case basis. Investigators travel to the accident site, examine the area and 

take measurements, photos, and detailed notes. Physical evidence may be collected 

as necessary for further examination, testing, or other purposes. Related records are 

reviewed—primarily for training and examinations. Witnesses are interviewed. Investigations are conducted in cooperation with the operator, any labor organizations, 

the State, and sometimes manufacturers. A formal report may be produced. 

For mine emergencies, other resources may be requested including the MSHA 

mine emergency unit, MSHA mine rescue teams, gas analysis and monitoring instruments, seismic instruments, satellite communication equipment, robotic equipment, additional personnel external to the district, and other specialists and resources. These resources are deployed in consultation with the headquarters office. 

In cases in which miners are missing or a lengthy rescue/recovery operation is expected, each district maintains at least one trained Family Liaison to furnish information and assist families that could arrive at the mine. MSHA deploys additional 

trained Family Liaisons to ensure 24-hour assistance to the families. 

Similarly, MSHA acts as Primary Communicator to furnish timely information to 

the media and to the public. These procedures fulfill the objectives of section 7 of 

the MINER Act and have been formalized in an MSHA handbook. 

DEEP COVER COAL MINING

Question. Utah’s mountainous regions are the home to many coal mines. Much of 

this mining is conducted under peaks, which creates unique geological challenges 

for the industry. Do we know enough about deep coal mining under peaks for it to 

be safe? Does MSHA have the staff with the necessary expertise to manage such 

mining? If so, could you convey to the subcommittee MSHA’s qualifications in this 

area? 

Answer. MSHA (Technical Support) does have the staff with the necessary expertise to manage deep cover coal mining. MSHA’s Technical Support has an engineer 

on staff with extensive ground control-related industry experience at deep cover coal 

mining operations and another engineer has considerable research experience regarding ground control-related hazards in deep cover coal mines. Since mining in 

Crandall Canyon type conditions is very limited in the United States, Technical 

Support expertise is sufficient to evaluate similar mining conditions and roof control 

plans throughout the country. The two engineers discussed above are nationally recognized experts in deep mining and computer modeling. However, several engineers 

in the Technical Support Roof Control Division are also well versed and respected 

authorities in this area. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator HARKIN. Thank you all very much for being here. That 

concludes our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., Wednesday, September 5, the hearing 

was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 

subject to the call of the Chair.] 

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