DEBORAH O'CONNOR,

Appellant,

v.

NORTH OKALOOSA 

MEDICAL CENTER AND 

GALLAGHER-BASSETT 

SERVICES, INC.,

Appellees.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-0623

_____________________________/

Opinion filed December 12, 2014.

An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.

Nolan S. Winn, Judge.

Date of Accident: November 10, 2004.

John W. Wesley of Wesley, McGrail & Wesley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.

Cindy R. Galen and Barbara J. Glas of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman & 

Waters, LLC, Pensacola, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals the judge of 

compensation claims’ (JCC) denial of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for 
a defined period, based on his ruling that the benefits at issue were barred by res 

judicata. Because we conclude that the JCC erred by applying the doctrine of res 

judicata in this case, we reverse.

The facts in this case are undisputed. In 2004, Claimant sustained a 

compensable injury to her right, dominant hand, which ultimately resulted in a 

diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy/ complex regional pain syndrome of the 

right hand and wrist. This condition was accepted as compensable by the 

Employer/Carrier (E/C) and it provided extensive medical treatment, including 

injections from an authorized anesthesiologist. On January 14, 2011, following over 

six years of medical treatment, Claimant’s authorized treating anesthesiologist 

placed her at maximum medical improvement (MMI); the doctor also opined that 

Claimant was unable to work. The E/C acted on this MMI date by suspending all 

temporary disability benefits, as is required by section 440.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes 

(2004); Claimant had not exhausted here entitlement to 104 weeks of temporary 

benefits when this suspension occurred.

In September 2011, by which time all Claimant’s other treating medical 

professionals had also placed Claimant at MMI, Claimant filed a petition for 

permanent total disability (PTD) benefits based on the January 14, 2011, date of 

MMI; the petition necessarily, under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes (2004), 

averred that Claimant had reached MMI. The E/C contested Claimant’s entitlement 

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to PTD benefits, but not on the ground she had not reached MMI; to the contrary, in 

the pretrial stipulation pertaining to Claimant’s PTD claim, both parties stipulated 

that Claimant reached MMI on January 14, 2011. On March 1, 2012, the JCC 

entered an order (the prior order), the decretal portion of which reads (all emphasis 

from the original): “Claimant’s claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits 

from 01-14-11 is not ripe for adjudication and is therefore DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.” The body of the order explains that the JCC reached this disposition 

based on his finding that Claimant had not reached MMI, making the claim 

“premature.” The JCC did not base his finding regarding MMI on a statement of 

such from a medical professional, but rather based on his interpretation of the 

anesthesiologist’s testimony, which established that Claimant’s medical recovery 

had plateaued but there was a possibility of further recovery once Claimant received 

additional treatment for a non-compensable neck injury, which treatment was on 

hold pending a dispute with another carrier. In the prior order, the JCC also found 

that Claimant was totally disabled from January 14, 2011, and thereafter. The prior

order was not appealed by either party.

After her claim for PTD benefits was denied “without prejudice” and without 

an adjudication thereon, Claimant then filed a petition seeking TTD benefits from 

January 14, 2011, and continuing. The E/C raised the defense of res judicata against

Claimant’s entitlement to TTD benefits from January 14, 2011, through February 

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14, 2012, the date of the hearing that gave rise to the prior order. In the order on 

appeal, the JCC accepted the E/C’s defense, reasoning that Claimant “could have”

pled a claim for TTD benefits as an alternative to the PTD claim addressed in the 

prior order, in the “event that the facts were not determined to be as Claimant 

perceived.” The JCC awarded, however, TTD benefits beginning on February 15, 

2012 (the day after the hearing giving rise to the prior order), through September 19, 

2012 (when Claimant reached MMI). This appeal followed, challenging only the 

denial of TTD benefits that the JCC concluded were barred by res judicata. 

A lower court’s ruling that bars relief on the grounds of res judicata is 

reviewed de novo. See Felder v. Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 993 So. 2d 1031, 1034 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Campbell v. State, 906 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2004)). The doctrine of res judicata can be applicable to workers’ compensation 

cases. See Buena Vista Constr. Co. v. Capps, 656 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1995). The general principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is that a final 

judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and puts to rest every 

justiciable, as well as every actually litigated, issue. See Caron v. Systematic Air 

Servs., 576 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 

2d 40 (Fla. 1952)). However, this principle only applies when the elements of res

judicata are present and the doctrine properly applied. See id. Here, the doctrine was 

not properly applied.

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The very foundation of the doctrine of res judicata is the existence of a “final 

judgment” on the merits in a previous action. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 

So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006); see also Smith v. Time Customer Servs., 132 So. 3d 

841, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Thus, where there is an absence of a prior final 

adjudication on the merits, res judicata does not apply. In the instant case, the prior 

order expressly withholds adjudication on the entirety of Claimant’s claim for PTD 

benefits from January 14, 2011, and continuing, with no portion of the claim being 

adjudicated with finality because the JCC concluded the claim was premature; 

further, the denial of the entire claim was expressly made “without prejudice.” The 

dismissal of a prematurely filed claim does not bar a subsequent action, under the 

doctrine of res judicata. See Shuck v. Bank of Am., N.A., 862 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2003). Although it could be argued that the JCC could or should have 

adjudicated some portion of the PTD claim with finality in the prior order, he did 

not. Hence, under the particular facts of this case, res judicata does not operate to 

bar Claimant’s subsequent claim for TTD benefits – or in fact any other claim.

Based on the foregoing, the appealed order is AFFIRMED in part (relative to 

the TTD benefits awarded), REVERSED in part (relative to the TTD benefits 

denied), and REMANDED for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., CONCUR.

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