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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC., 

Plaintiff,

vs.

PANTCHO PANTCHEV, individually and d/b/a ELPA, 

INC. d/b/a CHICAGO BY NIGHT, and ELPA, INC. 

d/b/a CHICAGO BY NIGHT,

Defendants.

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12 C 1647

Judge Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

J&J Sports Productions, Inc., alleges that Pantcho Pantchev and Elpa, Inc. (together, 

“Pantchev”), exhibited without authorization J&J’s television broadcast, “The Event”: Manny 

Pacquiao v. Joshua Clottey, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program, at their 

restaurant. Doc. 1. The complaint advances claims under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 

U.S.C. § 605 et seq., the Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 

1992 (“CTCPCA”), 47 U.S.C. § 553 et seq., and the Illinois common law of conversion. 

Patchev moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) 

and 12(b)(6). Doc. 16. The court denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and granted the 12(b)(5) 

motion, but gave J&J an opportunity to effect proper service. Docs. 32, 34-35. J&J did so, 

Docs. 36-37, the parties engaged in discovery, Docs. 40-41, 45, 49.

Now before the court is J&J’s motion for summary judgment on the Communications Act 

claim. Docs. 52, 54. Because the record would permit a reasonable jury to find that Pantchev 

was authorized to exhibit the broadcast at the restaurant, and therefore that Pantchev did not 

violate the Communications Act, J&J’s motion is denied.

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Background

The facts are stated as favorably to Pantchev as the record and Local Rule 56.1 allow. 

See Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2012). The court notes that J&J did not file a 

Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) response to Pantchev’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional 

facts. Doc. 57 at pp. 7-9. Accordingly, the facts set forth in Pantchev’s Local Rule 

56.1(b)(3)(C) statement are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. See N.D. Ill. 

L.R. 56.1(a)(3) (“If additional material facts are submitted by the opposing party pursuant to 

section (b), the moving party may submit a concise reply in the form prescribed in that section 

for a response. All material facts set forth in the statement filed pursuant to section (b)(3)(C) 

will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the moving party.”).

J&J, a distributor of viewing rights to televised sporting events, contracted for and was 

granted exclusive nationwide television distribution rights to “The Event”: Manny Pacquiao v. 

Joshua Clottey; WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program (“the Program”), which took 

place on March 13, 2010. Doc. 57 at pp. 2-3, ¶ 4; Doc. 62 (the contract). Pantchev’s Local Rule 

56.1(b)(3)(B) response acknowledges the existence of the contract granting J&J exclusive 

distribution rights, but disputes its legality. Doc. 57 at pp. 2-3, ¶ 4. Because “[i]t is 

inappropriate to make legal arguments in a Rule 56.1 statement” or response, Judson Atkinson

Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008), the court 

will disregard the legal argument in Pantchev’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response. See Sys. 

Dev. Integration, LLC v. Computer Scis. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 

(“the purpose of Rule 56.1 statements is to identify the relevant evidence supporting the material 

facts, not to make factual or legal arguments, and thus the Court will not address the parties’ 

arguments made in their Rule 56.1 statements and responses”) (citation omitted).

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Pantchev owns and manages Chicago By Night, a restaurant located at 5600 West 

Belmont Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Doc. 57 at pp. 1-3, ¶¶ 2-3, 5. The restaurant has a 

maximum occupancy of 98 people. Id. at pp. 6-7, ¶ 26. Dish Network, the provider of satellite

television services to Chicago By Night, installed the cables and other equipment that allowed 

the restaurant to receive satellite television services. Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 3, 4. Pantchev received the

Dish Network bills for Chicago By Night at his home in Mettawa, Illinois; he had a separate 

Dish Network account for his home. Id. at p. 7, ¶¶ 5-6. 

On or about March 13, 2010, Pantchev called Dish Network to order the Program for 

Chicago By Night’s service address at 5600 West Belmont Avenue; Dish Network charged 

Pantchev $49.95, the residential rate. Id. at p. 6, ¶ 23; id. at p. 7, ¶ 7. The commercial rate for an 

establishment of Chicago By Night’s size would have been $1800. Id. at pp. 3-4, ¶ 8; Doc. 53-3. 

(The court will set aside Pantchev’s hearsay and authentication objections to the consideration of 

this fact because it is contextually important to understanding J&J’s theory of the case and also 

because J&J’s motion is denied even though the fact is being considered.) The Program was 

broadcast on Chicago By Night’s five televisions on March 13, 2010. Doc. 57 at pp. 2-4, 6, ¶¶ 4, 

9, 25. Over forty patrons watched the Program at the restaurant. Id. at pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 6, 10.

J&J’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement asserts that Elpa and Chicago By Night are “not 

listed or referenced anywhere in the invoice” that Dish Network sent Pantchev for the Program. 

Doc. 53 at ¶ 22. Pantchev’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response disputes that assertion, 

maintaining that the service address listed at the top right corner of the invoice is the address for 

Chicago By Night. Doc. 57 at p. 6, ¶ 22. The invoice lists Pantchev as the account holder and 

lists his mailing address in Mettawa, but it also lists the “Service Address” as 5600 West 

Belmont Avenue in Chicago, which is Chicago By Night’s address. Doc. 53-4 at 1. 

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Accordingly, resolving the dispute in Pantchev’s favor, the invoice sent by Dish Network for the 

Program lists the “Service Address” as Chicago By Night’s address in Chicago. Pantchev duly 

paid the invoice. Doc. 57 at pp. 7-8, ¶ 8.

Discussion

The complaint alleges that Pantchev violated the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605, 

by “unlawfully publish[ing], divulg[ing] and exhibit[ing] the Program” at Chicago By Night,

“[w]ith full knowledge that the Program was not to be intercepted, received and exhibited by 

entities unauthorized to do so.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 13. At bottom, J&J’s claim is that Pantchev acted 

unlawfully because he paid only the $49.95 residential rate for the Program when, given that he 

displayed the Program at Chicago By Night, he should have paid the $1800 commercial rate.

The key issue here is whether Pantchev was authorized to display the Program at Chicago 

By Night for the price that he was charged. Section 605 states that “no person receiving ... any 

... communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 

purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or 

reception.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (emphasis added). Although § 605(a) refers to “communication 

by wire or radio,” the statute was amended to cover satellite cable programming. See 47 U.S.C. 

§ 605(d)(6); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 912 (6th Cir. 2001). In 

evaluating a § 605(a) claim, the court “looks at the relationship between the original sender and 

the ultimate receiver in determining whether the communication is authorized.” Nat’l Satellite 

Sports, 253 F.3d at 917.

The original sender here was J&J, the ultimate receiver was Pantchev, and their 

intermediary was Dish Network. The summary judgment record, viewed with all factual 

disputes resolved and reasonable inferences drawn in Pantchev’s favor, would allow a reasonable 

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jury to conclude that Pantchev was authorized to show the Program at Chicago By Night upon 

paying the $49.95 rate charged by Dish Network. The pertinent facts and inferences are these: 

(1) Pantchev had a commercial account with Dish Network for the restaurant; (2) by virtue of 

having installed the cables and other equipment at the restaurant, Dish Network knew that the 

restaurant was a commercial establishment, not a residence; (3) Pantchev ordered the Program 

from Dish Network on the commercial account for the restaurant; and (4) Dish Network charged 

Pantchev $49.95, and did not instruct Pantchev that he had to pay $1800 to either Dish Network 

or to J&J directly if he wanted to display the Program at the restaurant. Because a reasonable 

jury could find that Pantchev was authorized to show the Program at the restaurant for the price 

he paid, it could find for Pantchev on J&J’s § 605(a) claim. See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

Gidha, 2011 WL 3439205, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (vacating a default judgment on the

plaintiff’s § 605(a) claim where the defendants, restaurant owners who broadcasted a televised 

boxing match in their restaurant, “argue[d] that they maintained a commercial account with 

DirecTV and legally purchased the Program” and that “DirecTV improperly billed them for the 

residential rate as opposed to the commercial rate”); J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 4326 Kurz, Ltd., 

2009 WL 1886124, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2009) (suggesting that the defendant restaurant 

could have prevailed on the plaintiff’s § 605(a) claim had the defendant ordered the boxing 

match “using a commercial DirecTV account”).

J&J might have argued in support of summary judgment that it did not authorize Dish 

Network to sell the Program to commercial establishments, and that Dish Network’s lack of 

authorization defeats Pantchev’s submission that it was authorized by J&J—the “original 

sender,” Nat’l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 917—to show the Program at the restaurant. See J&J 

Sports Prods., Inc. v. Phelan, 2009 WL 3748107, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“Defendant 

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posits that Comcast gave its ‘consent’ to Defendant’s reception of the Boxing Program signal, 

and this consent means that Defendant’s subsequent ‘divulg[ing] or publish[ing]’ of the Boxing 

Program, by exhibiting it to her patrons, was done ‘through authorized channels of transmission 

or reception.’ Defendant’s argument fails to address Comcast’s inability to consent to the 

transmission of the Boxing Program to commercial establishments. If [J&J] had the exclusive 

right to license the transmission of the Boxing Program to commercial establishments such as 

Frankie’s, and if Comcast did not acquire the right or permission to do so [from J&J], then 

Comcast could not have consented to and authorized Defendant’s reception of the Boxing 

Program at Frankie’s. In that case, Defendant’s airing of the Boxing Program at Frankie’s could 

not have been ‘through authorized channels of transmission or reception.’”). J&J did not make 

that argument, thereby forfeiting the point for purposes of summary judgment; in any event, the 

summary judgment record provides no basis to conclude that J&J did not authorize Dish 

Network to transmit the Program to commercial customers, either at all or for $49.95. This line 

of argument will be open to J&J at trial, and the argument’s merits can be considered then. Also 

open to J&J at trial will be any other lines of argument that it did not press on summary 

judgment. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Jorkay, LLC, 2013 WL 2447867, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 

June 5, 2013) (“Although defendants purchased the event from DirecTV, they do not avoid 

liability for broadcasting the event at their establishment without the authorization of the 

exclusive licensee.”); Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Vinson, 2003 WL 22077958, at *2 (N.D. 

Tex. Sept. 3, 2003) (“The fact that [the owner of the bar] may have purchased and lawfully 

received the Lewis-Tyson fight from DirecTV does not immunize her from liability [under § 

605(a)] for then broadcasting the event to patrons at her bar without obtaining authorization from 

plaintiff, the exclusive licensee.”); Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Duermeier, 24 F. Supp. 2d 

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1179, 1181 (D. Kan. 1998) (“The local cable provider, TCI, had the right to provide the [boxing 

match] to residential cable customers but it did not provide live pay per view programming to 

commercial establishments. Therefore, for a commercial establishment to lawfully receive the 

[boxing match], it had to contract with Kingvision [the exclusive licensee].”).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, J&J’s summary judgment motion is denied. Because summary 

judgment is denied on the ground that a reasonable jury could find that Pantchev was authorized 

to show the Program at the restaurant, there is no need to consider Pantchev’s alternative grounds 

for defeating J&J’s motion. Pantchev’s opposition brief purports to cross-move for summary 

judgment. Doc. 59 at 2-8. The “cross-motion” is denied; it fails to comply with Local Rule 

56.1, as it was not accompanied by a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, and it was untimely in any 

event, coming four weeks after the dispositive motion deadline, Doc. 51.

November 15, 2013 

United States District Judge

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