alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

KV/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL A. WESBECHER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

STEPHEN D. LANDAKER; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-17051

D.C. No. 2:01-cv-02410-FCDDAD

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Frank C. Damrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2010** 

Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Paul A. Wesbecher appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. 

FILED

MAR 25 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
KV/Research 2 08-17051

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Whitaker v.

Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wesbecher’s

excessive force claim because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his convictions, and Wesbecher offered no evidence that his

convictions have been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994).

Defendant Landaker’s motion to supplement the record and motion for leave

to file a late brief are granted.

AFFIRMED.
#### 1844.204 Contract clauses.
Connecticut Department of



### ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

March 5, 2012
David M. Webster Chief, Industrial Permits Branch Office of Ecosystem Protection U.S. EPA, Region 1 5 Post Office Square, Suite 100 Boston, MA 02109-3912 Re: Vessel General Pe~anit (VGP) and Small Vessel General Permit (sVGP) Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMA) Consistency Determination
Dear Mr. Webster: The Office of Long Island Sound Programs has reviewed your request for federal consistency concurrence with the proposed general NPDES permits for discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels pursuant to Section 307(c)(I) of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended, and Subpa~’t C of 15 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Pa~ 930. As you have pointed out, we are concurrently reviewing these draft permits for compliance with Connecticut’s water quality standards under Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 303, since they are subject to State water quality certification under CWA Section 401. Therefore we have elected to waive our consistency review under CZMA Section 307(c)(1), since any considerations pe~’taining to the enforceable polices of the approved Connecticut Coastal Management Program would be subsumed within our review of the draft permits under the applicable provisions of the Connecticut Water Quality Standards, effective February 25, 201 i. We will be submitting to you our determination on the 401 Water Quality Certification by the extended deadline of June 30, 2012. Thank you for providing consistency determinations and supporting information for our revie~v. Should you have any questions regarding these consistency determinations or any other coastal management matter, please contact DeAva Lambert of my staff at (860) 424-3207. Sincerely,

~. Thompson, Director Office of Long Island Sound Programs Bureau of Water Protection and Land Reuse

BPT/dkl Enc. cc: Fred Anders, NY DOS Betsey Wingfield

79 Elm Street ° Hartford, CT 06106-5127 www.ct.gov/deep Affirmative Acfion/Equal Opportunity Employer
#### The People of the State of New York v. Christopher Romano.

Motion for leave to appeal as a poor person denied. Concur — Botein,- P. J., Breitel, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kareem Bellamy, Appellant.

[831 NYS2d 914]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision *659and order of this Court dated February 2, 1998 *(People v Bellamy,*247 AD2d 399 [1998]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered January 16, 1996.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Prudenti, P.J., Miller, Schmidt and Florio, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Richmond Minor, Petitioner, v. Joseph P. Kelly, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Motion to dismiss proceeding granted, by default, without costs.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 7, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
128017 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 128017 COA: 257718 Wayne CC: 03-004734 KEITH LASHOUN WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 20, 2005 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

K ELLY , J., would hold this case in abeyance for People v Drohan , lv gtd 472 Mich 881 (2005).

s1003 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 7, 2005

Clerk
#### In the Matter of Edward Gordon et al., Appellants, v. Paul D. McGinnis, as Commissioner of Correction, Respondent.

Motion for leave to dispense with printing and for assignment of counsel granted to the extent of dispensing with printing, and otherwise denied. The appeal will be heard on the original papers and on a typewritten brief. The appellant is directed *1044to file five copies of his brief and to serve one copy on the Attorney-General. Nolan, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.2

                           STATMON TECHNOLOGIES CORP.

           AMENDMENT TO NOTE PURCHASE AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AGREEMENT

This  Amendment to the Note  Purchase and  Shareholder  Rights  Agreement  dated
November  3rd, 2000 (the  "Amendment")  is entered into this 23rd day of August,
2001 by and among (i) Statmon Technologies Corp., a Delaware  Corporation,  with
its main office at 114 North Doheny Drive, Suite 201, Los Angeles, CA 90048 (the
"COMPANY"),  (ii)  John  Hoff  (the  "Purchaser")  and this  Agreement  shall be
effective as of the date of execution hereof by the above named parties.

                                   AGREEMENT

A.    In  connection  with  the  moneys  the  Purchaser  has  advanced  to date,
      Purchaser has arranged for an additional $10,000, currently in hand, to be
      advanced to the Company.  Such  advancement made to aid the Company in its
      initial and ongoing  sales  specific  operating  costs.  The Parties  have
      agreed that the additional  $10,000  advanced be on the same the terms and
      conditions described in the Note Purchase and Shareholder Rights Agreement
      dated November 3rd, 2000; including 10,000 shares and

B.    the  Company  has   executed  the  attached   Promissory   Note   (Exhibit
      B)("Promissory   Note").  The  parties  agree  that  the  Promissory  Note
      principal  amount be increased by $10,000 and that interest  accrues as of
      May 26th, 2001.

IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the parties  hereto have executed this Agreement as of the
date first set forth above.

"THE COMPANY"

STATMON TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,
a Delaware corporation


By: /s/ Geoffrey P. Talbot
    -----------------------------
    Geoffrey P. Talbot, President


"THE PURCHASER"


/s/ John Hoff
---------------------------------
John Hoff
#### William Bertram, Respondent, v. New York City Transit Authority et al., Appellants-Respondents. J. G. White Engineering Corp., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. General Electric Company et al., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

Appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of plaintiff, entered August 14,1961 in New York County, upon a decision of the court at a Special and Trial Term without a jury. Defendants New York City Transit Authority and J. G. White Engineering Corp. also appeal from the dismissal of their cross complaints.

*Per Curiam.*

This is an appeal by General Electric Company (herein GE) from a judgment entered August 14, 1961, in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $17,715.25 against GE, New York City Transit Authority (herein Authority) and J. G. White Engineering Corp. (herein White). Authority and White appeal from so much of said judgment as dismissed their cross claim over against GE.

*780Briefly, plaintiff, an electrician-employee of a subcontractor, Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., sustained personal injuries in an accident which occurred February 13, 1957, while plaintiff was cutting through a live cable. Authority had refused to de-energize or cut off current in the cable, though the reason therefor does not clearly appear in the record. GE was the general contractor and White the engineer on the job for which Authority had contracted.

While some of us feel that GE was properly held liable, the majority are of the opinion that plaintiff’s complaint against GE must he dismissed because plaintiff failed to show that GE had improperly increased the risk in a concededly hazardous undertaking.

No serious question having been raised by White or Authority that the increasing of the risk by these defendants in their several roles was a fair issue of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts, the complaint as to them should be sustained. We do not find the award excessive so as to warrant reduction.

Authority and White, however, are entitled to judgment over against GE on their respective cross complaints by reason of GE’s contract which provides an absolute liability for indemnity on this project *(Jordan*v. *City of New York,*3 AD 2d 507, affd. 5 NY 2d 723; *O’Brien*v. *City of New York,*11 A D 2d 666).

Accordingly, the judgment appealed from should be modified on the law and the facts to reverse and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as to GE, and to reverse the dismissal of the cross complaints of Authority and White against GE, and by granting judgment to Authority and White on such cross complaints against GE, without costs.

Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, Stevens and Steuer, JJ., concur.

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and the facts to reverse and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as to General Electric, and to reverse the dismissal of the cross complaints of Authority and White against General Electric, and by granting judgment to Authority and White on such cross complaints against General Electric, without costs. Settle order on notice.
EXHIBIT 15










ENSERCH Corporation:


We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited condensed
consolidated interim financial information  of ENSERCH Corporation and
subsidiaries (the "Corporation") for the three-month and six-month periods
ended September 30, 1998 and the period from the acquisition (August 5, 1997)
through September 30, 1998 (Successor Company Operations), and  three-month,
nine-month  and  twelve-month  periods  ended  September 30, 1997  and the
period from July 1, 1997 through the acquisition date (Predecessor Company
Operations) as indicated in our report dated November 12, 1998; because we did
not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in the
Corporation's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September
30, 1998, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
333-43811 and 333-43811-01 on Form S-3, of ENSERCH Corporation.

We are also aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c)
under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of sections 7 and 11 of that
Act.


DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Dallas, Texas
November 12,1998
### Part I—Selection System
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-3882

_____________________________

JEROME J. FERRIER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

February 27, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, BILBREY, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Jerome Ferrier, pro se, for Appellant.
2

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, for Appellee.
OMB Number: 1894-0017

Expiration Date: 06/30/2026

Page 1 of 1

U.S. Department of Education

 Grant Application Form for Project Objectives and Performance Measures Information

See Instructions. Use as many pages as necessary.

Applicant Information

Legal Name: 

1. Project Objective: 

1.a. Performance Measure Measure Type Quantitative Data

Target

Raw Number Ratio %

/

1.b. Performance Measure Measure Type Quantitative Data

Target

Raw Number Ratio %

/

1.c. Performance Measure Measure Type Quantitative Data

Target

Raw Number Ratio %

/
#### Raymond G. Kuntz, P. C., Respondent, v New York State Emergency Financial Control Board for the City of Yonkers, Appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, *inter alia,*to compel the Emergency Financial Control Board for the City of Yonkers to notify the City School District of the City of Yonkers that it has not disapproved the contract entered into between the petitioner and the school district,' the control board appeals (by permission) from an order of the Supreme Court, *796Westchester County, dated April 14, 1978, which denied its motion to dismiss the petition. The appeal brings up for review so much of a further order of the same court, dated May 23, 1978, as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination. Appeal from the order dated April 14, 1978 dismissed as academic. That order was superseded by the order granting reargument. Order, dated May 23, 1978, affirmed insofar as reviewed. Appellant’s time to answer is extended until 20 days after entry of the order to be made hereon. Petitioner is awarded one bill of $50 costs and disbursements. Upon this appeal the control board’s contention is that the law under which it functions (L 1975, ch 871) requires prior approval of a contract before recovery may be allowed thereon, and that it does not possess the power to approve a contract retroactively. The cases relied on by the control board *(Seif v City of Long Beach,*286 NY 382; *Westgate North v State Univ. of N. Y.*47 AD2d 1004, mot for lv to app den 36 NY2d 647) are inapposite. This is a CPLR article 78 proceeding in which the petitioner seeks a judgment either (1) requiring that the control board notify the school district that it did not disapprove the contract, or (2) annulling any determination which disapproved the contract on the ground that such disapproval is contrary to law, or, in the alternative, is arbitrary and capricious, or (3) for such other relief as the court deems necessary. On the merits, therefore, the issue is not whether the control board should have approved the contract retroactively, but whether it had the power to do so. We hold that it did. Special Term, therefore, properly denied the control board's motion to dismiss the petition. Martuscello, J. P., Titone, Shapiro and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
#### S. Weiner Furniture Co., Inc., Respondent, v Dolphin Equipment Leasing Corporation et al., Appellants.

— Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered March 1, 1978 in Sullivan County, *756which denied defendants’ application to vacate a default judgment. In 1974 plaintiff advanced $4,680 to defendant Dolphin Equipment Leasing Corporation (Dolphin) in connection with a proposed lease between Dolphin and one Brickman House, Inc. However, the proposed lease was never executed or performed by Dolphin and in March of 1976 plaintiff commenced an action by service of a summons with notice to recover the $4,680 "deposit”, with interest thereon from June of 1975. A notice of appearance was never interposed, and, consequently, a default judgment was entered against Dolphin on August 11, 1976. Plaintiff then issued a property execution against Dolphin on or about November 25, 1977, and shortly thereafter defendants moved by an order to show cause to vacate the default judgment. Special Term denied the application and this appeal ensued. A party who seeks relief from a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (subd [a]) must show a valid excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense *(Wall v Bennett,*33 AD2d 827). The affidavit of defendant Shaw, a principal officer of Dolphin and a law school graduate, stating that he was unaware of the consequences of court proceedings and of any defenses to the underlying action is inadequate to excuse the default (see *John Malasky, Inc. v Mayone,*54 AD2d 1059, 1060). Secondly, since the affidavit and proposed answer submitted by defendants are in conclusory form, and are devoid of facts which would support their denials and defenses, a meritorious defense has not been established *(Decapua v Morrissey,*60 AD2d 754; *Wall v Bennett, supra; Investment Corp. of Philadelphia v Spector,*12 AD2d 911). Order affirmed, with costs. Greenblott, J. P., Kane, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. William Blake, Defendant.

Motion by defendant to vacate order dated April 12, 1957, dismissing his appeal from a *coram nobis*application; and for other relief. Motion denied. It appears that prior to such dismissal defendant had not moved to dispense with printing or for leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person (cf. *People*v. *Curry,*14 A D 2d 564). Beldock, P. J., Christ, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
DISMISS; and Opinion Filed October 30, 2013.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-01405-CV

CANDII LAVETTE JACKSON AND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE DOLLARS AND

NO/100 (165.00) IN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CURRENCY, Appellants

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 1

Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 86450CC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Fillmore, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Lewis

By letter dated June 21, 2013, the Court notified appellant Candii Jackson that the time 

for filing her brief had expired. We directed appellant to file, within ten days, both her brief and 

an extension motion. We warned appellant that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the 

appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1). To date, appellant has not filed her brief or an extension 

motion, nor has she communicated with the Court regarding the appeal. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b).

121405F.P05

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

CANDII LAVETTE JACKSON AND ONE 

HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE DOLLARS AND 

NO/100 (165.00) IN UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA CURRENCY, Appellants

No. 05-12-01405-CV V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court At Law 

No. 1, Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 86450CC.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis, 

Justices Bridges and Fillmore participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal for want of 

prosecution. We ORDER that appellee the State of Texas recover its costs of this appeal, if any, 

from appellant Candii Lavette Jackson.

Judgment entered this 30th day of October, 2013.

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
#### (A) The People of the State of New York ex rel. John F. Watson, Appellant, v. J. Edwin La Vallee, as Warden of Clinton Prison, Respondent. (B) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Stanley Eno, Appellant.

[In each action] Time to perfect appeals extended 90 days.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00864-CR

EX PARTE Julian BAZAN

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR1157-W2

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 1, 2023

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Appellant seeks to appeal the trial court’s order recommending the Court of Criminal 

Appeals deny his post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to article 

11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 3. 

Under the exclusive procedure outlined in article 11.07, only the convicting trial court and the 

Court of Criminal Appeals have jurisdiction to review the merits of a felony post-conviction 

habeas petition; there is no role for the intermediate courts of appeals in the statutory scheme. Id. 

art. 11.07, § 5 (providing “[a]fter conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive 

and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner”). 

Only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to grant post-conviction release from 

confinement for persons with a felony conviction. Id. art. 11.07, § 3; Hoang v. State, 872 S.W.2d 
04-22-00864-CR

- 2 -

694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); In re Stone, 26 S.W.3d 568, 569 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, orig. 

proceeding). The intermediate courts of appeals have no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of 

habeas corpus in felony cases. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Boutire, 

No. 04-22-00414-CR, 2022 WL 3639514, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24, 2022) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction).

Accordingly, on January 17, 2023, we ordered appellant to show cause in writing why this 

appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In his response, appellant concedes we do 

not have jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed March 22, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-1431

Lower Tribunal No. 15-14107

________________

Monica Gascon and Alexis Schloeter,

Appellants,

vs.

The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., etc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio 

Arzola, Judge.

Pomeranz & Associates, P.A., and Mark L. Pomeranz (Hallandale), for 

appellants.

Wargo, French & Singer, LLP, and Anthony R. Yanez, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and MILLER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See Roman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 143 So. 3d 489, 490 n.1 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (affirming final summary judgment in favor of the bank 

because the mortgage’s notice provision required only that the bank mail or 

deliver the default letter to the borrower’s notice address, not that the 

borrower receive it); Bank of America v. Nash, 200 So. 3d 131, 135 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2016) (“The fact that the [default] letter may not have been received is 

irrelevant.”).