If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 4, 2021

v Nos. 351751; 351752

Macomb Circuit Court

DAVID TRAMELL WALKER, LC Nos. 2019-001499-FH;

2019-001495-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K.F. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, David Tramell Walker, appeals his jury trial convictions of delivery of less than 

50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL 

333.7403(2)(a)(v), and fourth-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 257.602a(2), in 

Docket No. 351751, and delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and 

maintaining a drug vehicle, MCL 333.7405(1)(d), in Docket No. 351752. Walker was sentenced 

to 365 days in jail and to two years of probation. We affirm Walker’s convictions and sentences

but remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2019, a confidential informant introduced Walker to Detective Bridget Lines, who 

worked in the Special Investigation Division of the Roseville Police Department. On April 15,

2019, Detective Lines purchased crack cocaine from Walker. On April 18, 2019, Detective Lines 

text messaged Walker and asked to buy $40 worth of crack cocaine. Walker agreed. Although 

they originally agreed to meet at a mall in Macomb County, Walker later changed the location of 

the meeting to a Texas Roadhouse parking lot in Roseville. The transaction was completed shortly 

thereafter. Walker was not arrested at that time. On April 22, 2019, Detective Lines again sent 

Walker a text message, asking to buy $40 worth of crack cocaine. Walker again agreed. Although 

they originally agreed to meet at a Walmart, Walker later told Detective Lines to meet him in the 

parking lot of a Days Inn in Roseville. Detective Lines complied, completed the transaction, and 

left the scene. Sergeant Jason Otto, Detective Michael Saier, and Detective Joseph Trombley

continued to surveil Walker, who got into his vehicle and left the Days Inn.
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The surveillance team saw Walker commit a traffic violation. Officer Samantha Pelt, who 

was on patrol at the time, was instructed to conduct a traffic stop of Walker’s vehicle. Although 

Officer Pelt got behind Walker’s vehicle and activated her vehicle’s lights and sirens, Walker did 

not pull his vehicle over. Instead, Walker sped up and “began to weave in and out of” traffic, 

which was heavy at the time, in order to “evade” Officer Pelt. Walker later drove through a 

construction zone. Sergeant Otto instructed Officer Pelt to stop pursuing Walker because it was a

safety hazard for Officer Pelt and for other drivers and pedestrians. 

Soon thereafter, Walker was located by law enforcement, and other members of law 

enforcement traveled to that location. Once there, Detective Saier observed Walker exit his 

vehicle, jump a fence, and run through a cemetery. Walker was ultimately arrested by Sergeant 

Otto and Detective Trombley. Shortly before Walker was arrested, Detective Saier saw Walker

drop a bag onto the ground. The substance in that bag, as well as the substances that Walker sold 

to Detective Lines, contained cocaine. Sergeant Otto testified that the amount of cocaine that was 

contained in the bag was not consistent with personal use; rather, Sergeant Otto opined that Walker 

intended to sell it.

Sergeant Otto led searches of two hotel rooms in the Thirteen Mile Road and Gratiot Road

area where Walker had been staying.1 The police recovered two swords, a large knife, two cell

phones, sandwich bags, and a digital scale. They also recovered $6,000 in cash from a backpack 

in Walker’s vehicle and more than $300 in cash from Walker’s person, including the $40 in 

prerecorded bills that Detective Lines had given Walker on April 22, 2019. In a postarrest 

interrogation, Walker told Sergeant Otto that he sold about two ounces of crack cocaine per week. 

With respect to the April 15, 2019 transaction, Walker was charged with delivery of less 

than 50 grams of cocaine. With respect to the April 18, 2019 and April 22, 2019 transactions, 

Walker was charged with two counts of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, one count of 

possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), one count 

of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, and one count of maintaining a drug vehicle.

Prior to trial, Walker moved to dismiss the charges on the ground of entrapment and for

production of the confidential informant. On the day that trial was scheduled to commence, the 

trial court held a hearing on the motions. At the beginning of the hearing, the prosecutor indicated 

that she was dismissing the case regarding the transaction that occurred on April 15, 2019. Because 

the April 15, 2019 transaction was the only transaction that the confidential informant was 

involved in and because the trial court found that the confidential informant’s testimony was not 

relevant to the remaining charges, the trial court denied Walker’s motion to produce the 

confidential informant. The trial court then moved on to Walker’s motion to dismiss based on 

entrapment. After hearing the testimony of Detective Lines and Sergeant Otto and reviewing the

 

1 The April 18, 2019 and April 22, 2019 transactions both occurred near 13 Mile Road and Gratiot 

Road.
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text messages that were exchanged between Detective Lines and Walker, the trial court denied 

Walker’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges. The trial court stated as follows:

Even though Detective Line[s] indicated she made first contact, there does 

appear to be some prompting of [Walker’s] own in some of the texts. He’s the one 

who ultimately picked the locations or changed them from where they were 

suggested by the detective.

I don’t think there’s anything to suggest that the behavior is so reprehensible 

or that it caused [Walker] to do anything he was otherwise unwilling to do. So, I’m 

going to deny defense’s motion on entrapment. 

Trial then commenced. Detective Lines, Sergeant Otto, Detective Saier, Detective 

Trombley, and a representative from the Michigan Forensic Laboratory testified for the 

prosecution. Walker testified on his own behalf. The jury did not hear evidence concerning the 

April 15, 2019 transaction. Walker was convicted of all the charged crimes, except for possession 

with intent to deliver cocaine as to the bag he dropped upon arrest. Walker was instead convicted 

of possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine. Walker was sentenced as described above, and 

these appeals followed.2

II. ANALYSIS

A. ENTRAPMENT

Walker argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on his 

argument that he was entrapped. We disagree.

“Whether entrapment occurred is determined by considering the facts of each case and is 

a question of law for this Court to decide de novo.” People v Fyda, 288 Mich App 446, 456; 793 

NW2d 712 (2010). “The trial court must make specific findings regarding entrapment, and this 

Court reviews its findings” for clear error. Id. “The findings are clearly erroneous if this Court is 

left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id.

The “[d]efendant ha[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

was entrapped.” People v Vansickle, 303 Mich App 111, 115; 842 NW2d 289 (2013). 

“Entrapment is not a defense that negates an essential element of the charged crime. Instead, it 

presents facts that are collateral to the crime and that justify barring the defendant’s prosecution.” 

People v Jones, 203 Mich App 384, 386; 513 NW2d 175 (1994). Thus, “[t]he defendant’s guilt or 

innocence is irrelevant.” People v Forrest, 159 Mich App 329, 334; 406 NW2d 290 (1987) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). “Michigan courts use the objective test of entrapment. 

The objective test focuses on the propriety of the government’s conduct that resulted in the charges 

 

2 On January 7, 2020, this Court consolidated the two appeals. People v Walker, unpublished order 

of the Court of Appeals, entered January 7, 2020 (Docket Nos. 351751 and 351752).
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against the defendant rather than on the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” People 

v Hampton, 237 Mich App 143, 156; 603 NW2d 270 (1999).

Entrapment occurs if (1) the police engage in impermissible conduct that 

would induce an otherwise law-abiding person to commit a crime in similar 

circumstances or (2) the police engage in conduct so reprehensible that the court 

cannot tolerate it. [Vansickle, 303 Mich App at 115 (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).]

The mere furnishing of an opportunity to commit a crime is not entrapment. People v 

Akhmedov, 297 Mich App 745, 752; 825 NW2d 688 (2012). This Court considers several factors 

under the inducement prong of the entrapment test:

(1) whether the police appealed to the defendant based on friendship, (2) whether 

the defendant had been known to commit the charged crime, (3) whether there was 

a time lapse between the investigation and the arrest, (4) whether there was an 

inducement that would make the crime unusually attractive to a law-abiding citizen, 

(5) whether excessive consideration was offered to the defendant, (6) whether the 

police guaranteed that the acts were not illegal, (7) whether the government 

pressured the defendant to commit the crime, (8) whether sexual favors were 

offered to the defendant, (9) whether the defendant was threatened with arrest 

unless he or she complied, (10) whether the government acted to escalate the 

defendant’s criminal culpability, (11) whether the police had control over the 

informant, and (12) whether the investigation targeted the defendant. [Akhmedov, 

297 Mich App at 753.]

In these cases, there is no evidence that Detective Lines established and exploited a 

relationship with Walker or that she targeted any other vulnerability in a way that induced Walker

to commit an offense that he was not already prepared to commit. Although Detective Lines 

initiated communication with Walker before each undercover drug buy, she did so in a 

transactional, unemotional fashion. Her short communications with Walker concerned the time 

and place of the drug transactions and nothing more. Each time, Walker moved the meeting to a 

location that he preferred and conducted the transaction in a swift, business-like fashion. Indeed, 

$40 was exchanged for the crack cocaine without further discussion. Although Walker was not 

arrested after the April 18, 2019 transaction, Detective Lines did not pressure Walker to sell her a 

larger amount of crack cocaine in the April 22, 2019 transaction. Furthermore, only one week 

elapsed between Detective Lines’s first contact with Walker and his arrest. 

Detective Lines did not offer Walker sexual favors or an exorbitant amount of money, and 

there is no evidence that he showed a reluctance to participate. Detective Lines testified that 

Walker did not exhibit any signs of discomfort during either transaction, and the record evidence 

supports that Walker was an experienced narcotics dealer who understood that he controlled the 

circumstances of the transactions. Indeed, during the April 18, 2019 transaction, Walker placed

the crack cocaine on his lap near his penis instead of handing it to Detective Lines. While law 

enforcement was aware that Walker had sold narcotics in the past, there is no reason to believe 

that Walker was induced to do something he otherwise would not have done by Detective Lines’s 

phone calls and text messages or the prospect of obtaining $40. In other words, Detective Lines 
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presented Walker with nothing more than the opportunity to commit the crimes. See Akhmedov, 

297 Mich App at 752.

However, even when a defendant cannot establish improper inducement under the first 

prong of the entrapment test, he “may prove police entrapment solely through reprehensible 

conduct[.]” Id. at 754. Reprehensible conduct entrapment occurs when the police “commit certain 

criminal, dangerous, or immoral acts.” People v Connolly, 232 Mich App 425, 429; 591 NW2d 

340 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[U]ndercover drug sales conducted by the 

police do not constitute entrapment per se.” Id. at 429. “Reprehensible conduct by an informant 

may be attributed to the police if a sufficient agency relationship exists between the informant and 

the police.” Akhmedov, 297 Mich App at 754. 

We conclude that there was nothing morally reprehensible or unlawful about Detective 

Lines’s conduct in these cases. While Walker is correct that Detective Lines lied when she told 

Walker that she was not a police officer, Walker cites no authority for the proposition that an 

undercover officer acts reprehensibly if she does not reveal her identity as a police officer to a 

suspect. Furthermore, although Walker refers to the actions of law enforcement in connection with 

the confidential informant, the prosecutor dismissed the case relating to the April 15, 2019 

transaction. Walker was convicted on the basis of the transactions that occurred after the 

confidential informant introduced Walker to Detective Lines. Even reprehensible conduct by law 

enforcement, which we do not find this conduct to be, “will not support a finding of entrapment 

unless it induced or instigated the crime [or crimes] at issue.” People v Crawford, 143 Mich App 

348, 353; 372 NW2d 550 (1985). See also Akhmedov, 297 Mich App at 753 (“[i]nitial entrapment 

does not immunize a defendant from criminal liability for subsequent transactions that he readily 

and willingly undertook.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). As 

already explained above, there is no evidence that Walker was induced to commit the crimes at 

issue. Indeed, he controlled the circumstances of the April 18 and April 22, 2019 transactions, and 

there is no evidence that the confidential informant was involved beyond introducing Detective 

Lines and Walker on April 15, 2019. Rather, after the introduction, Detective Lines communicated 

with Walker on her own. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying 

Walker’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.

B. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

Walker argues in a cursory manner that his constitutional right to confrontation was 

violated because he was unable to question the confidential informant at the entrapment hearing.3 

We disagree. The prosecutor did not offer the confidential informant’s testimony against Walker

at the entrapment hearing. Rather, the prosecutor dismissed the charge related to the only 

 

3 Walker also argues that “[t]he trial court’s denial of [Walker’s] motion to subpoena the 

confidential informant for trial denied [Walker the] right to confrontation of the witnesses against 

him and to question the reliability of the confidential informant.” In so arguing, however, Walker 

fails to explain or rationalize his argument in a meaningful manner. Consequently, Walker’s 

argument that his right to confrontation was violated because he was unable to question the 

confidential informant at trial is abandoned. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 

NW2d 411 (2001). 
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transaction in which the confidential informant was involved. Therefore, because there were no 

testimonial statements made by the confidential informant offered against Walker at the 

entrapment hearing, Walker did not have a right to confront the confidential informant at the 

hearing. Cf. People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 361-366; 478 NW2d 901 (1991).

C. SHACKLES

Walker argues that he was denied a fair trial and due process because he was placed in foot 

shackles during trial. “We review issues of constitutional law de novo,” People v Benton, 294 

Mich App 191, 203; 817 NW2d 599 (2011), and “[w]e review a trial court’s decision to shackle a 

defendant for an abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances,” People v Payne, 285 

Mich App 181, 186; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an 

outcome that does not fall within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Yost, 

278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).

“Included within the right to a fair trial, absent extraordinary circumstances, is the right to 

be free of shackles or handcuffs in the courtroom.” Payne, 285 Mich App at 186. Although “this 

right is not absolute, a defendant may be shackled only on a finding supported by record evidence 

that this is necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom or to maintain order.” 

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

On the second day of trial, before the jury was brought into the courtroom, defense counsel 

noted that Walker’s legs were shackled even though they had not been shackled on the first day of 

trial. Defense counsel asked that the shackles be removed. Although defense counsel admitted 

that the jury could not “technically see the shackles,” she argued that the jury might hear them. 

Defense counsel further argued that the shackles affected Walker’s “movement” and “his ability 

to talk to [counsel] and help [counsel] with [Walker’s] defense.” The trial court noted for the 

record that Walker’s arms were not restrained and that the jury could not see the shackles because 

the front of the defense table was “completely covered, all the way down to the ground[.]” The 

trial court also indicated that there was “no reason” the shackles “should make any noise unless 

[Walker] intentionally cause[d] them to make noise.” The trial court also stated as follows:

I don’t know if there’s any prejudice, partly because your client has made it 

blatantly obvious that he’s a prisoner because he chose, all day yesterday, to wear 

his prisoner uniform that says prisoner right on it, and we made a record of that.

The trial court further noted that Walker had been charged with “fleeing the police.” Based on 

this, the trial court concluded that the shackles were appropriate. 

The trial court was correct that Walker was charged with fourth-degree fleeing and eluding 

a police officer, and testimony at trial supported that Walker had led the police on a dangerous car 

chase and then fled on foot. However, there was no evidence on the record that Walker was a 

flight risk at the time of trial. Rather, the evidence only supported that Walker had fled from law 

enforcement and eluded arrest months before trial was held. Importantly, Walker was not shackled 

on the first day of trial, and defense counsel noted that there were “no incidents . . . when he wasn’t 

shackled” on the first day of trial. The record supports defense counsel’s argument. Because there 

was no evidence to suggest that Walker was a flight risk, that he was likely to attempt to escape, 
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or that shackles were needed to maintain order in the courtroom, the trial court abused its discretion 

by ordering Walker’s legs to remained shackled. See Payne, 285 Mich App at 186-187.

However, “even if a trial court abuses its discretion by requiring a defendant to wear 

restraints [without justification], the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice as a result of 

the restraints to be entitled to relief.” Id. at 186. In this case, Walker cannot show that he was 

prejudiced by the shackles. At trial, defense counsel was unable to articulate how the shackles 

impaired Walker’s ability to communicate with her given that his arms were not restrained. 

Additionally, defense counsel conceded that the shackles would not be visible to the jurors, and 

Walker does not argue on appeal that the jury was able to see or hear his shackles. It is well settled 

that “a defendant is not prejudiced if the jury was unable to see the shackles on the defendant.” 

People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 36; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).

In addition, the jury was well aware that Walker was in custody because of Walker’s 

decision to wear jail attire during the trial. On the first day of trial, shortly before jury selection, 

defense counsel stated to the trial court, “I have had discussions with [Walker] about potentially 

wearing street clothing or normal clothing instead of the jail garb, and he is refusing. I know that 

was offered by your court personnel, as well as I’ve offered to contact a family member for them 

[sic] to bring him clothing.” The trial court asked Walker whether he would prefer to wear street 

clothing or to stay in his “jail blues.” Walker responded, “Stay in blues.” The trial court stated, 

“Well, usually, we go out of our way to make sure it does not appear that you are in custody. Do 

you understand that?” Walker confirmed that he understood. The trial court asked him, “So you’re 

insisting on wearing the jail blues, correct?” Walker answered, “Yes.” The trial court informed 

Walker that clothing was available if he changed his mind.

On the second day of trial, the trial court again asked Walker if he would like to change 

out of his jail attire. Walker answered that he had changed his mind, and that he would like new 

clothing if he could get out of the shackles, which irritated his foot. The trial court stated that 

Walker would still be shackled even if he elected to change his clothing. Walker stated, “Oh, 

never mind.” The trial court informed Walker that, if he changed his mind, clothing would be 

made available to him. Consequently, because the jury did not see or hear the restraints, and 

because the jury was aware that Walker was in custody due to his decision to wear jail attire during 

trial, we conclude that Walker was not prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to keep Walker’s 

legs shackled for part of the trial.

D. COURT COSTS

Walker argues that he is entitled to a remand so that the trial court can establish a factual 

basis for the $1,200 in court costs it imposed. The prosecutor concedes that remand is appropriate, 

and we agree for the following reasons.

Walker did not object to the trial court’s imposition of court costs at sentencing, thereby 

rendering the issue unpreserved. People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 197; 889 NW2d 513 

(2016). We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id. “In order 

for a defendant to establish plain error, he must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was 

plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id.
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“[C]ourts may impose costs in criminal cases only where such costs are authorized by 

statute.” People v Cunningham, 496 Mich 145, 149; 852 NW2d 118 (2014). MCL 769.1k 

provides trial courts with the authority to impose “any cost reasonably related to the actual costs 

incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular 

case[.]” MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). Actual costs include:

(A) Salaries and benefits for relevant court personnel.

(B) Goods and services necessary for the operation of the court.

(C) Necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court buildings and 

facilities. [MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).]

“Under this statute, trial courts must establish a factual basis from which this Court can 

determine whether the costs imposed were reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the 

trial court.” People v Stevens, 318 Mich App 115, 121; 896 NW2d 815 (2016) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). When a trial court fails to follow that procedure, the defendant is entitled to 

a remand for the trial court to establish a factual basis for the costs it imposed, “or to alter that 

figure, if appropriate.” People v Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich App 345, 360; 869 NW2d 651 

(2015).

At sentencing, the trial court imposed $600 in court costs in each case against Walker. The 

trial court did not provide a factual basis for its assessments. We note that, in People v Posey, ___ 

Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket Nos. 345491, 351834, and 346039), slip op 

at 12, lv pending, this Court held that the defendant’s unpreserved challenge to the imposition of 

court costs did not require a remand, even though the trial court failed to establish a factual basis 

for the court costs it had imposed. In reaching that conclusion, this Court reasoned that the 

prosecution had, on appeal, produced information from the State Court Administrative Office 

(SCAO) estimating the average cost of a criminal case in Wayne Circuit Court. Id. In Posey, the

trial court’s remarks as to a codefendant made it clear that the court was relying on the SCAO 

information to calculate court costs. Id. In this case, however, the prosecution has not provided a 

SCAO estimate on appeal, and there is nothing in the record to verify that the trial court utilized 

such an estimate when calculating court costs. We therefore remand to the trial court so that the 

court can establish a factual basis to justify its imposition of $600 in court costs in each case or to 

alter those figures as necessary. See Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich App at 360.

E. ATTORNEY FEES

Walker argues that the trial court erred by imposing attorney fees at sentencing because he 

is indigent and because the trial court did not assess his ability to pay the fees. We disagree.

Walker did not object to the trial court’s imposition of attorney fees at sentencing, thereby 

rendering the issue unpreserved. People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271, 292 n 18; 769 NW2d 630 

(2009). We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights. Johnson, 315 

Mich App at 197.

We conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error by imposing $3,912.50 in fees 

for Walker’s court-appointed attorney. MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) provides that, at sentencing, “[t]he 
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court may impose . . . [t]he expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.” In Jackson, 

483 Mich at 275, our Supreme Court held that a trial court was not constitutionally required, before 

imposing a fee for a court-appointed attorney on a criminal defendant, to make an “ability-to-pay”

determination—i.e., to “make a presentence articulation of its conclusion that the defendant has a 

foreseeable ability to pay the fee.” Rather, “such an analysis is only required once the imposition 

of the fee is enforced.” Id. Our Supreme Court explained, “[T]he state should not be forever 

precluded from seeking repayment from a defendant who has later gained the ability to pay, simply 

because at the time of sentencing it wrongly concluded that the defendant would never rise above 

indigency.” Id. at 290.

In this case, the trial court imposed $1,137.50 in court-appointed attorney fees in Docket 

No. 351751, and $2,775 in court-appointed attorney fees in Docket No. 351752. Although the 

trial court did not address Walker’s ability to pay at the time it imposed the fees, it was not required 

to do so because a defendant “is not entitled to an ability-to-pay assessment until the imposition 

of the fee is enforced.” Id. at 292. Although Walker argues that the trial court has acted to enforce 

the fee, there is no evidence on the record that it has done so. When the trial court initiates 

enforcement, Walker will be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to whether he “is 

indigent and unable to pay at that time or whether forced payment would work a manifest hardship 

on [him] at that time.” Id. at 292-293. Therefore, the trial court did not commit plain error by 

failing to conduct an ability-to-pay analysis at the time it imposed the fees. Id. at 292.

Affirmed as to Walker’s convictions and sentences and the imposition of attorney fees, but

remanded for the trial court to establish a factual basis for the imposition of $600 in court costs in 

each case. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron