[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 12164 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13

- cv - 22992

- CMA

ALBERT CAMPBELL, Petitioner

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (July 23, 2015) Before WILSON , MARTIN, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM:

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 1 of 72 Albert Campbell, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s “saving s clause.” Campbell appeals the district court’s dismissal of his § 2241 peti tion for a lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. Campbell argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the judge, not the jury , determine d the specific quantity of drugs to be attributed to him , which violated his constitutional rights

. In support , Campbell relies on Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which he argues is a new rule of constitutional law to be applied retroactive ly on collateral review. However, b ecause we conclude that Alleyne does not apply retro actively on collateral review, Campbell is foreclosed from proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Campbell’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction

. I. The following factual synopsis is undisputed

. Over twenty years ago, Campbell was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with conspiring to possess cocaine and cocaine base with the intent to distribute. After a jury found Campbell guilty of the charged offense, Campbell received a sentence of 420

- months’ imprisonment. Subsequently, Campbell appealed his sentence. On direct appeal, Campbell raised a number of issues, none of which challenged the enhancements he received for the qu antity of drugs attributed to him. W e affirmed

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 2 of 73 Campbell’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Butler , 102 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1997). Thereafter, Campbell filed a motion to vacate and correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several ways, includ ing that his trial counsel faile d to object to the quantity of drugs attributed to Campbell

. Campbell’s § 2255 motion and his Certificate of Appealability (COA) were denied by the district cour t. Treating Campbell’s COA as a timely notice of appeal, this Court denied Campbell’s COA as well. Several y ears later, however, Campbell filed a motion for reconsideration of his § 2255 motion, but the district court conclud ed that his motion for

recons ideration was the equivalent of a successive § 2255 motion that required prior permission from this c ourt , which Campbell never obtained . Concluding also that the cases Campbell relied on were not retroactively applicable, the district
court denied his mo tion for reconsideration . Campbell again appealed that decision to this c ourt, but we refused to grant hi m a COA. Campbell has since then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 , which was subsequently dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction

. I I . We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the savings clause of § 2255(e). Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman

- Medium , 738 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013 ). “ The applicability of the s avings clause is a threshold

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 3 of 74 jurisdictional issue , and we cannot reach questions that the district court never had jurisdiction to entertain

. ” Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitt ed) , cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Hastings , 135 S. Ct. 52 (2014). If the savings clause permits Campbell’s § 2241 petition, then we may decide the substantive issue of whether his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to the trial judge’s determin ation of the specific quantity of drugs to be attribut ed to him. See id

. III. Generally, a collateral attack on the validity of a federal sentence must be brought under § 2255. See Sawyer v. Holder , 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003)

. Under circumstances such as this, w here a prisoner has previously filed a § 2255 motion, he must apply for and receive permission from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § § 2244(b)(3) (A) , 2255(h) . A successive motion must contain “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id

. § 2255(h) (2 )

. However, “[u] nder the savings clause of § 2255 [(e)] , a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if an otherwise available remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention .” Sawyer , 326 F.3d at 1365

. Section 2255(e) applies by its own terms irrespective of whether a prisoner failed to seek § 2255 relief or whether the trial

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 4 of 75 court has previously denied him such relief; what is significant is whether § 2255 relief would not have adequately or effectively tested the legality of his imprisonment. See Bryant , 738 F.3d at 1263. T he burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that § 2255 relief was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention for purposes of § 2255(e).” Id

. at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that in order for a petitioner to establish that a § 2255 motion was inadequate or ineffective to test whether his detention was lawful , he must demonstrate th at : (1 ) throughout the petitioner’ s sentencing, direct appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding, this Court ’ s precedent had specifically and squarely foreclosed the claim raised in the § 2241 pet ition; (2) after the petitioner’ s first § 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court overturned that binding precedent; (3) that Supreme Court decision applies retroactively on collateral revie w; (4) as a result of that Supreme Court decision applying retroactively, the petitioner ’ s current sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; and (5) the savings clause of § 2255(e) reaches his claim. Jeanty v. Warden, FCI

- Miami , 757 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ; see also Bryant , 738 F.3d at 1274 ( synthesizing circuit precedent for purposes of interpreting § 2255(e) in a manner that “does not eviscerate or undermine § 2255(h)’s restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions”)

. It is u nnecessary for the court to a ddress all five requirements if the petitioner fails to satisfy any one requirement. See Jeanty , 757 F.3d at 1285.

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 5 of 76 Here, Campbell could not bring his Alleyne claim under § 2255, as he previously filed a § 2255 motion and did not obtain this c ourt’s permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). Thus, in order for the district court to have had jurisdiction over Campbell’s § 2241 petition , he was required to establish , through the lense of § 2255(e)’s savings clause, that his prior § 2255 motion was “inadequate o r ineffective

. ” See § 2255 (e)

. Campbell fails to fulfill his burden of demonstrating one of the necessary requirement s to show that § 2255 relief would have been in adequate or ineffective, and, consequently , there is no need for this court to address the remaining four. See Jeanty , 738 F.3d at 12 85

. Particularly, Campbell fail s to establish that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne applies retroactively. See id

. We acknowledge that i n Alleyne , the Supreme Court held that any fact that aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, including a fact that increases the statutory minimum, is an element of the offense that must be
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at ___, 133
S. Ct. at 2162

– 63. However , we have held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collat eral review for the following reasons: 1) the Supreme Court ha s not held that Alleyne ’s application is retroactive ; 2) the Supreme C ourt explained that Alleyne is an application of the rule established in

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 6 of 77 Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) , which is not retroactive ly applicable ; and 3) our sister circui ts ( that have had the opportunity to consider whether Alleyne applie s retroactively on collateral review in a published decision ) have concluded that it did not

. See Jeanty , 757 F.3d at 1285. B ecause

we have held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review, Campbell is foreclosed from proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause.
IV . The refore, we conclude that district court did not err in dismissing Campbell’s § 2241 petition . Campbell’s § 2241 petiti on fail s to recapture the jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to § 2255(e)’s savings clause because Campbell’s § 2 241 petition relies on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne , which is not retroactively applicable. To the extent that Campbell seeks to rely on Alleyne for the proposition that the facts of his prior convictions should have been submitted to a jury before his sentence could be enhanced, his reliance here is also misguided. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. 466, 1 20 S. Ct. 2348 (holding that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, is required to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt); see also United States v. Harris , 741 F.3d 1245, 1249

– 50 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, t he di strict court’s dismissal of Campbell’s § 2241 habeas petition is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 7 of 7