[Cite as Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper, 133 Ohio St.3d 253, 2012-Ohio-3907.] 

HOLLINGSWORTH v. TIMMERMAN-COOPER, WARDEN. 

[Cite as Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper, 

133 Ohio St.3d 253, 2012-Ohio-3907.] 

Criminal law—Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2)—Admissibility of nocontest plea in subsequent proceeding—No-contest plea is admissible in 

habeas corpus action in which petitioner collaterally attacks the criminal 

conviction that resulted from his no-contest plea.

(No. 2011-1095—Submitted April 3, 2012—Decided September 4, 2012.) 

ON ORDER from the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 

Western Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. 1:08-CV-00745. 

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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

Neither Crim.R. 11(B)(2) nor Evid.R. 410(A)(2) prohibits the use of a defendant’s 

no-contest plea in a subsequent proceeding in which the defendant 

collaterally attacks the criminal conviction that resulted from the nocontest plea. 

__________________ 

PFEIFER, J. 

{¶ 1} Petitioner, Ernest Hollingsworth, filed a habeas corpus action in 

federal district court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of 

counsel at his criminal trial. Respondent, Deb Timmerman-Cooper, warden of the 

London Correctional Institution, countered that Hollingsworth’s plea of no contest 

in the underlying criminal case constituted a waiver of his right to the effective 

assistance of counsel. Hollingsworth objected, arguing that under Ohio law, the 

state may not use his no-contest plea and resulting conviction against him, 
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including using the plea as evidence that he waived his right to effective 

assistance. 

{¶ 2} Finding that there was no controlling precedent on the 

admissibility of a no-contest plea in a habeas proceeding, the federal district court 

certified the following question for our resolution: 

Do Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(B)(2) and Ohio R. Evid. 

410(A)(2), which prohibit the use of a defendant’s no contest plea 

against the defendant “in any subsequent civil * * * proceeding” 

apply to prohibit the use of such a plea in a subsequent civil 

proceeding which is a collateral attack on the criminal judgment 

which results from the no contest plea, such as a petition for postconviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21, or a federal 

habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254? 

(Ellipsis sic.) 

{¶ 3} Today we answer the question in the negative. 

Analysis 

Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2) 

{¶ 4} Crim.R. 11(B)(2) states, “The plea of no contest is not an 

admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged 

in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not 

be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” 

{¶ 5} Evid.R. 410(A)(2) states that evidence of a plea of no contest “is 

not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the defendant who 

made the plea.” 

{¶ 6} In Elevators Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. Patrick O’Flaherty’s, Inc., 125 

Ohio St.3d 362, 2010-Ohio-1043, 928 N.E.2d 685, at ¶ 14, we stated: 
January Term, 2012 

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The purpose behind the inadmissibility of no-contest pleas 

in subsequent proceedings is to encourage plea bargaining as a 

means of resolving criminal cases by removing any civil 

consequences of the plea. [State v.] Mapes, 19 Ohio St.3d [108] at 

111, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140 [1985]; Rose v. Uniroyal 

Goodrich Tire Co. (C.A.10, 2000), 219 F.3d 1216, 1220. The rule 

also protects the traditional characteristic of the no-contest plea, 

which is to avoid the admission of guilt. Id. The prohibition 

against admitting evidence of no-contest pleas was intended 

generally to apply to a civil suit by the victim of the crime against 

the defendant for injuries resulting from the criminal acts 

underlying the plea. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Simansky (1998), 45 

Conn.Supp. 623, 628, 738 A.2d 231. 

{¶ 7} The purposes served by these two rules are of limited applicability 

in the present case. The present case involves a habeas action, not a civil suit by a 

victim. In postconviction proceedings, there is no risk of subsequent civil liability 

or even of enhanced criminal liability. The worst-case scenario for a defendant in 

a postconviction proceeding is the status quo. 

Application of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 in Other Cases 

{¶ 8} In State v. Mapes, 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 484 N.E.2d 140 (1985), the 

defendant, on trial for an Ohio murder, had pled “non vult,” the equivalent of no 

contest, to an earlier murder charge in New Jersey. Id. at 111. In the Ohio 

proceeding, the trial court allowed police officers from New Jersey to testify that 

the defendant had been convicted of a murder in that state. Id. This evidence was 

introduced to establish a death specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). Id. 

This court stated: 
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Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 prohibit only the 

admission of a no contest plea. These rules do not prohibit the 

admission of a conviction entered upon that plea when such 

conviction is made relevant by statute. The trial court was correct 

in admitting the evidence of the prior conviction as it was not 

equivalent to the admission of the no contest plea and it was not 

introduced by the prosecution for any purpose other than 

establishing the specification. 

Id. 

{¶ 9} In Elevators Mut. Ins. Co., a business was damaged by fire. 125 

Ohio St.3d 362, 2010-Ohio-1043, 928 N.E.2d 685, ¶ 3. One of the owners pled 

no contest to arson and insurance fraud and was convicted. Id. at ¶ 5. The insurer 

brought an action seeking a declaration of no coverage and recovery of $30,000 

advanced on the owners’ claim. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court refused to allow the 

insurer to use the owner’s plea of no contest against him on the basis that doing so 

would contradict the goal of Evid.R. 410. But the court held that the convictions 

based on the no-contest plea were admissible to prove that the owner had 

intentionally set the fire. 

{¶ 10} The court of appeals reversed and remanded, rejecting the trial 

court’s distinction between a no-contest plea and a conviction based on that plea. 

The court further held that the limited exception to inadmissibility in Mapes did 

not apply. The plea was inadmissible. This court affirmed. 

{¶ 11} Elevators Mut. illustrates perfectly the intended application of 

Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2). The result is in keeping with the goal of 

removing the civil consequences of a no-contest plea, thereby encouraging plea 

bargaining as a means of resolving criminal cases. It also preserves the traditional 
January Term, 2012 

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characteristic of the plea, which is to avoid an admission of guilt. Admission of 

the no-contest plea against the defendant in that case would have thwarted both 

goals. 

Application of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 to This Case 

{¶ 12} We turn now to a consideration of the applicability of the general 

rule barring the use of no-contest pleas in habeas corpus proceedings. 

{¶ 13} Respondent argues that a no-contest plea is admissible in the 

context of habeas corpus. She contends that a habeas action is not a “subsequent 

civil or criminal proceeding” within the meaning of Crim.R. 11(B)(2). Nor is it a 

proceeding distinct from the proceeding at which the petitioner pled no contest. 

Citing State v. Lloyd, 8 Ohio App.2d 155, 156, 220 N.E.2d 840 (4th Dist.1966), 

respondent asserts that a habeas action is instead a collateral proceeding, a 

“continuation of the criminal action itself.” 

{¶ 14} Hollingsworth argues that the rules are unambiguous and therefore 

not susceptible of interpretation. Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 

413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus (“An unambiguous statute is to be 

applied, not interpreted”). He asserts that the language of the two rules is 

sweeping and absolute and that Elevators Mut. controls the issue before us. Thus, 

neither the plea nor the resulting conviction is admissible in habeas as evidence of 

waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel. 

{¶ 15} At its core, a habeas action is a collateral attack on the underlying 

conviction. Wall v. Kholi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1278, 1284, 179 L.Ed.2d 

252 (2011). In the instant case, the conviction was the result of a no-contest plea. 

To prohibit the state from using the no-contest plea to defend the validity of the 

conviction that resulted from the plea would render the state mute. The state has 

no defense if the no-contest plea is not in play. As noted earlier, the clear 

purposes of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2) are to encourage the use of 

plea bargaining by removing the civil consequences of the plea and to avoid an 
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admission of guilt. Prohibiting the state from introducing evidence of a nocontest plea in a habeas action to show that the petitioner has waived his claim of 

ineffective counsel does nothing to advance those purposes, and permitting use of 

the plea does not frustrate them. The plea is not being used to impose liability on 

the petitioner or to prove his guilt. There is no risk of subsequent civil liability or 

even of enhanced criminal liability. The worst-case scenario for a defendant in a 

postconviction proceeding such as habeas corpus is the status quo. As we stated 

in Mapes, the purposes of the two rules “are not disserved” here. 19 Ohio St.3d at 

111, 484 N.E.2d 140. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 16} We conclude that neither Crim.R. 11(B)(2) nor Evid.R. 410(A)(2) 

prohibits the use of a defendant’s no-contest plea in a subsequent proceeding in 

which the defendant collaterally attacks the criminal conviction that resulted from 

the no-contest plea. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the 

negative. 

So answered. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER,

CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

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Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for petitioner. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 

General, David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, and M. Scott Criss, Assistant 

Attorney General; and Lauren S. Kuley, for respondent. 

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