* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 See 21 U.S.C. § 841.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-10487

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JEROME EUREESE BAKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(2:96-CR-50-J)

November 13, 1997

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jerome Eureese Baker appeals h is conviction for possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base. 2 He argues that the

e vidence was insufficient to prove that he knowing ly and

co nstructively possessed the contraband. We will not disturb a3 Guzman v. Lensing, 934 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1991)

4 The housekeeper testified that she presumed the room was

vacant, as it contained no luggage, clothing, or toiletries.

2 conviction attacked on the basis of evi dence sufficiency if,

viewing the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the

prosecution , any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 3

The key evidence can be summarized as follows: Baker rented a

motel room in his hometown of Amarillo, Texas for the night of

September 7, 1996. He specifically requested room 159, the most

distant room from the front desk. The manager of the motel, Trent

Dixon, had instructed his desk clerks not to rent room 159 unless

a guest specifically requested it.

On the morning of September 8, 1996, an individual telephoned

Dixon and stated that some of his items were missing from room 159.

Dixon subsequently learned that a housekeeper, Selma Hutchens, had

discovered a scale and plastic sa ndwich bags on a table when she

entered the room to strip the linens. 4 Dixon instructed Hutchens

to return the items to the guest. On her way back to the room,

Hutc hens encountered a man whom she presumed to be the guest in

room 159. She then handed him the scale.

Suspecting drug activity, Dixon had summoned the police to

the motel. Corporal Dennis Rhyne of the Amarillo Police Department

arrived shortly thereafter. While proceeding toward room 159,

Rhyne observed a vehicle, occupied by two black males, leaving the3

deserted parking lot near the room. Rhyne followed the vehicle and

subsequently made a traffic stop. Baker was the driver, and he

consented to a search of the vehicle. Officers discovered an

electronic scale that had been concealed behind the vehicle’s

console. Baker then consented to a search of room 159, even though

he claimed to have checked out of the motel.

Inside the room, police officers discovered several items: (1)

a box of plastic baggies hidden in the toilet tank, (2) three razor

blades (one of which had a powdery white substance on it) in the

trash bin, (3) a baggie with powdery residue on the table, and (4)

a towel hidden in the heating/cooling unit. Wrapped in the towel

were nine rocks of a substance that subsequent analysis revealed to

be crack cocaine. A scuffle occurred when the police placed Baker

under arrest, but officers were ultimately able to subdue him.

At trial, DEA agent Lonny Watson testified that razor blades

and baggies are used in drug trafficking, and that th e amount of

crack seized from room 159 had a street value of approximately

$10,000. He also testified that it is not uncommon for drug

traffickers to rent rooms in their own hometown for the purpose of

conducting business in a secluded area.

Barron Walker, a friend of Baker’s, testified for the defense.

He told the jury that he and Baker, both married, used the motel

for socializing with their girlfriends. Walker stated that he was

with Baker when Baker rented the room o n September 7, and that

Baker’s intention was to use the room to entert ain a woman named5 United States v. Skipper , 74 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 1996)

6 United States v. Steen , 55 F.3d 1022, 1031 (5th Cir. 1995)

7 Since the razor blades and baggie were in plain sight within

the room, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the items

4 Demetrius Jones. He also testified that he and Baker returned to

the motel the next morning so that Baker could retrieve his missing

scale. Walker stated that they left the key inside the room, but

he could not explain why th e police were unable to locate it.

Jones testified that Baker had planned the tryst that occurred

at the motel during the daylight hours of September 7. She stated

that she left the room later that e vening, and that she had no

knowledge of Baker’s subsequent activities. Finally, she told the

jury that she knew Baker to sell “junk jewelry” to pawn shops, but

that she had only seen him with a scale on one occasion.

Because Baker did not actually possess the crack cocaine when

he was arrested, the government pro ceeded on a constructive

possession theory. We have defined constructive possession as

ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband. 5

Circumstantial evidence may support a finding of constructive

possession. 6 In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented

at trial would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that

Baker knowingly and constructively possessed the crack found in the

motel room. First, Baker deliberately rented the most secluded

room in the motel. Second, he retrieved a scale from a room that

was later found to contain both drugs and drug paraphernalia. 7belonged to Baker, the most recent occupant.

5 Third, police found a scale deliberately concealed in the console

of a vehicle Baker drove away from the motel. Sufficient evidence

supports the jury’s verdict.

AFFIRMED.