J-A25044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: L.A.S, A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 727 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 10A-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: April 5, 2024

T.S. (“Father”) appeals from the May 23, 2023 order of the orphans’ 

court terminating his parental rights to L.A.S., born in 2013 (“Child”). After 

careful review, we affirm. 

Father and C.L. (“Mother,” collectively “Parents”) have a long history 

with Jefferson County Children and Youth Services (“Agency”) involving 

numerous incidents dating back to 2007, but the present case began in April 

2022 when Indiana County Children and Youth Services (“ICCYS”) received a 

report that Parents had violated a safety plan implemented by ICCYS that 

Child should have no contact with her brother, T.S. (“Brother”). ICCYS had 

previously found Brother, who was approximately 23 years old at the time of 

the termination hearing, to be an indicated perpetrator of child abuse, based 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A25044-23

- 2 -

upon the sexual abuse of Child,

1 and reported the violation of the safety plan 

to the Agency. The Agency investigated and discovered that Brother remained 

living in the family home with Child. 

As a result of the investigation, Child was removed on May 28, 2022,

and placed in foster care. In June 2022, a family service plan was 

implemented requiring Parents to address mental health needs, improve 

parenting skills, ensure that Child has no contact with Brother, and maintain 

communication with the Agency. Parents were permitted visitation with Child 

in July 2022, but that visitation was suspended in September 2022. Following 

a permanency review hearing on December 5, 2022, Child’s placement goal 

was changed to adoption. Parents submitted to clinical interviews with Dr. 

Carolyn Menta, a clinical psychologist, in January 2023, and Dr. Menta 

completed psychological assessments of Parents in March 2023. 

On March 23, 2023, the Agency filed termination petitions as to Father

and Mother’s parental rights to Child. A hearing was held before the orphans’ 

court on both petitions on May 9, 2023, at which Joanna Welch, an Agency 

caseworker, and Dr. Menta testified.2 

____________________________________________

1 Under the Child Protective Services Law, an agency may find a report of child 

abuse to be “indicated,” if after an investigation, the agency determines that 

there is substantial evidence of the alleged abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a).

2 Child was represented in these proceedings by a guardian ad litem and 

separate legal interests counsel. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 

1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (appellate courts must engage in sua sponte review to 

determine if orphans’ courts have appointed counsel to represent the legal 

interests of a child in a contested termination proceeding).
J-A25044-23

- 3 -

At the hearing, Welch testified that Parents had not been compliant with 

the family service plan that was put into place when Child was removed from 

the home in May 2022 and that services provided by the Agency have not

been effective in remedying the conditions that led to Child’s removal. N.T., 

5/9/23, at 6-7, 9, 14. The family service plan required Parents to address 

their mental health needs, improve their parenting skills, ensure that Child 

have no contact with Brother, and maintain communication with the Agency. 

Id. at 6. Welch stated that Parents completed their psychological evaluations 

with Dr. Menta in January 2023, six months after they were ordered to do so, 

and as of the date of the hearing, they had not followed through with Dr. 

Menta’s recommendations that they engage in trauma and couples therapy. 

Id. at 9, 13-14, 17, 31. 

Welch stated that visitation between Parents and Child was halted in 

September 2022 due to the abuse investigation, and then in October 2022,

Child’s mental health providers further recommended that no visitation occur; 

the cessation in visitation continued as of the date of the termination hearing. 

Id. at 8-9, 15-16. Welch indicated that Parents have failed to provide Child 

with any resources, such as clothes or other support, since her removal. Id.

at 13, 21. Welch testified that Parents had not completed their required 

parenting skills course, although this was due to the fact that this service 

requires observation of the parent’s interaction with the child, which was 

halted in this case due to Child’s disclosure of abuse. Id. at 9, 32. 
J-A25044-23

- 4 -

Welch explained that Parents had failed to comply with the family 

service plan goal of maintaining regular contact with the Agency since the case 

opened. Id. at 7. She stated that Parents had only sporadically contacted 

the Agency or Child’s foster parents to inquire about Child. Id. at 10, 13, 37. 

Similarly, while the Agency had been informed that Brother had moved out of 

the family home in early May 2023, that was based upon information provided 

by a service provider, rather than a firsthand report from either parent. Id.

at 18-19, 27. Therefore, neither Welch nor any other representative of the 

Agency had been permitted to visit the property to verify that Brother was no 

longer residing there. Id. at 8, 22-23, 37-38. Separately, the Agency has 

been unable to access the family home to ensure that it was a safe and 

appropriate place for Child to live even though a large crack was visible in the 

roof of Parents’ current residence, leading the Agency to have “significant 

concerns about [its] structural integrity.” Id. at 7-8, 14, 28. 

Notwithstanding Brother’s apparent departure from the family home, 

Welch testified that the issue that led to Child’s removal—Parents’ lack of 

protective capacity of Child—continued to persist as of the date of the 

termination hearing. Id. at 9-10, 14, 32-33, 38-39. Welch further opined 

that Parents have failed to “recognize the harm” to Child that resulted from 

Brother’s contact with Child in the past. Id. at 14. Welch noted that the 

issues related to Brother’s abuse of Child existed “way before the filing of” the 

termination petitions or even Child’s removal and therefore, Parents have long 

been on notice of the safety concerns related to Child. Id. at 28, 38-39. With 
J-A25044-23

- 5 -

respect to Father, Welch testified that the Agency was concerned that during 

his interview with Dr. Menta, Father acknowledged that “something happened 

to” Child but did not connect this with Brother’s actions. Id. at 20. 

Welch testified that Child’s foster parents, who had been caring for Child 

for approximately one year as of the date of the termination hearing, were 

ensuring Child’s safety and meeting her physical, developmental, and 

emotional needs. Id. at 6-7, 10-11, 13. Welch stated that Child “is very 

settled and stable[]” and “doing very well” in the foster home and she has 

developed relationships with other children in her new neighborhood. Id. at 

10, 32. Child has also begun to refer to her foster parents as “mom and dad.” 

Id. at 11. 

Welch explained that Child is attending school regularly and “doing the 

best that she can do” in school since her placement. Id. at 10-11. Child has 

an intellectual disability with secondary speech and language impairment, 

which was only diagnosed after she was removed from Parents, and she now 

has an individualized education plan at school that will ensure that her 

instruction is adapted to her capabilities. Id. at 11-12. Welch stated that, 

prior to Child’s removal, she had instable housing—moving multiple times—

and irregular school attendance. Id. at 12.

Welch testified that the foster parents have also ensured that Child 

attends regular counseling sessions to address her sexual assault trauma. Id.

at 12. According to Welch, the therapy has been beneficial to Child, which 

has allowed her to recently step down in the frequency of her treatment. Id. 
J-A25044-23

- 6 -

Welch stated that Child’s “mental health has taken quite [some] time to 

unpack but we are starting to begin to see [Child] . . . make some forward 

progress in her trauma therapy.” Id. Welch further testified that, although 

Child had expressed that she missed Parents to her mental health providers 

in November 2022, Child did not ask about Parents during Welch’s more recent 

meetings with Child, including on the day before the termination hearing. Id.

at 32. Welch further stated that Child had not asked about resuming visitation 

with Parents and she did not indicate a preference for reunification with 

Parents when asked. Id. 

Dr. Menta, who was qualified as an expert in psychological testing, 

testified that she conducted a clinical interview of Father in January 2023 and 

prepared an assessment report of Father. Id. at 41-43; CYS Exhibit 2 at 1. 

She noted that Father had a “very significant mental health history” and was 

on medication for psychosis and schizophrenia. N.T., 5/9/23, at 48. Indeed, 

Father reported to Dr. Menta that he was hallucinating during the clinical 

interview. Id. Father also had a “significant history of trauma,” suffering 

from sexual abuse as a child and neglectful parents. Id. at 49. Dr. Menta 

also reported that Father’s answers to the personality surveys that he was 

asked to complete suggested that he was falsifying his answers to present 

himself in an unreasonably positive light. CYS Exhibit 2 at 7.

Dr. Menta stated that she had significant concerns regarding Father’s 

abilities to set boundaries in family relationships. N.T., 5/9/23, at 48. Dr. 

Menta opined that Father was “internalizing” and “normalizing” his history of 
J-A25044-23

- 7 -

trauma and sexual abuse “which really compromises his ability to set limits 

and boundaries and enforce those limits and boundaries in a protective 

manner.” Id. at 49. She noted that Father acknowledged that Brother told 

him that he “did something while he was drunk and stupid” towards Child, but 

Father still was unsure whether any abuse had occurred. Id. at 48, 50. Father 

also informed Dr. Menta that, when Brother sexually abused Child’s older 

sister, Father hit Brother and “put them in good touch, bad touch treatment.” 

Id. at 50. Father also reported during his interview that, despite undertaking 

some efforts to keep Child apart from Brother, he was thinking about placing 

a trailer on his property for Brother and his partner. Id. at 49, 54-55. 

Dr. Menta opined that Father suffered from schizophrenia, bipolar type 

1, unspecified reaction to severe stress, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 

Id. at 49. Dr. Menta’s recommendations for Father were to undergo therapy 

to address his traumatic personally history and further to participate in couples 

therapy with Mother. Id. at 49. She did not recommend reunification for 

Child “[b]ecause [Father’s] protective capacity is not there.” Id. at 51. 

Following the hearing, on May 23, 2023, the orphans’ court issued an 

order terminating Father’s parental rights and a supporting opinion. On that 

same date, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights.3 

Father filed a timely notice of appeal and concurrently filed a concise 

____________________________________________

3 Mother also filed an appeal from the order terminating his parental rights, 

which is docketed at 726 WDA 2023.
J-A25044-23

- 8 -

statement of errors complained of on appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i).

Father raises four issues on appeal:

1. Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and commit 

a reversible error of law when it held that the statutory grounds 

for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights had been 

established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1), by concluding 

that Father, for a period of at least six (6) months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition for involuntary termination of 

parental rights, had failed or refused to perform parental duties?

2. Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and commit 

a reversible error of law when it held that the statutory grounds 

for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights had been 

established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2), by concluding 

that Father demonstrated a repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal to parent?

3. Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and commit 

a reversible error of law when it held that the statutory grounds 

for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights had been 

established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5), by concluding 

that Father was incapable of remedying the conditions that 

necessitated the child’s removal from his care?

4. Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and commit 

reversible error of law when it held that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs of the child where the 

child has expressed a desire for continued contact with her 

biological parents?

Father’s Brief at 6-7 (suggested answers omitted).

In addressing these issues, we apply the following precepts:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 
J-A25044-23

- 9 -

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa. Super. 

2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts 

in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds 

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary 

termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner 

established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and 

convincing evidence, the court then must proceed to assess the petition under 

subsection (b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 267.
J-A25044-23

- 10 -

Here, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5), and subsection (b). However, this Court 

may affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination 

concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). 

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus 

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. . . . 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; 
J-A25044-23

- 11 -

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa. 

2021). 

[S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the 

child’s present and future need for essential parental care, 

control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be 

read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home 

and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint 

in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so 

where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is 

no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and emphasis 

omitted).

The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited 

to affirmative misconduct, but also include refusal and parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied. Id.; In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. 

Super. 2021). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at 443; 

see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(en banc), affirmed, 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent has an 

“affirmative duty” to work towards the return of her children, which requires, 

at a minimum, that she “cooperate with the Child and Youth Agencies and 

complete the rehabilitative services necessary so that the parent can perform 

[her] parental duties and responsibilities”). “A parent’s vow to cooperate, 

after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability 
J-A25044-23

- 12 -

of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Z.P., 994 

A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a 

continued inability to conduct [her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe 

environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent or not, and 

the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported by clear and 

competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Once a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court turns to Section 2511(b), which 

requires that it “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also In the Interest 

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023). “Notably, courts should consider 

the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296 

A.3d at 1105. 

Our Supreme Court has consistently mandated that any Section 2511(b) 

analysis “requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent 

and child.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 

1993)). Specifically, “[c]ourts must determine whether the trauma caused by 

breaking [the parent-child] bond is outweighed by the benefit of moving the 
J-A25044-23

- 13 -

child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The recognized 

threshold for this required bond inquiry is whether termination will sever a 

“necessary and beneficial relationship,” causing the child to suffer “‘extreme 

emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 

1109-10 (quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484). 

“[A] court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare analysis 

must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from 

severance of the parental bond.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Our Supreme Court 

has explained that the court should consider, as appropriate, the child’s need 

for permanency and length of time in foster care, the child’s placement in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether there is a bond with the foster parents, and 

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs. Id. Nonetheless, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors 

that must be considered by an orphans’ court in this context. Id. at 1113 

n.28. 

We first address the orphans’ court’s determination that termination was 

proper under Section 2511(a)(2). The orphans’ court found that Brother’s 

presence alone did not demonstrate Father’s parental incapacity under Section 

2511(a)(2) but that 

it was instead the mindset that prompted . . . Father to continue 

exposing [Child] to [Brother] even after [Father] knew or had 

reason to know that [Brother] had molested her. Brother’s 

presence was merely emblematic of [Father’s] inability to 

recognize an imminent danger and protect [his] daughter from it. 

“Parental incapacity,” in this case, meant “lack of protective 
J-A25044-23

- 14 -

capacity,” and that was not alleviated by Brother moving to a 

different location [days prior to the termination hearing]. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 6-7. The court explained that Father

evinced parental incapacity based upon his “continual[] prioritiz[ation of his]

adult son[, Brother,] over [his] minor daughter[, Child,] allowing [Brother] to 

live in [his] home, where he would have constant access to” Child. Id. at 7. 

While the court noted that Brother had recently left the home, this fact “did 

not mitigate” Father’s failure to protect Child “because [he] knew Brother’s 

departure was an absolute prerequisite to [Child] returning home.” Id. at 8 

(emphasis in original). 

The orphans’ court noted that although the Agency developed a family 

service plan to assist Father in developing his protective capacity and regain 

custody of Child, Father “continuously made decisions that distanced [him] 

farther and farther from reunification.” Id. at 7. Father’s failures included 

cutting off communication with the Agency, “stubbornly cho[osing] silence,” 

even though “sever[ing] communication with” the Agency meant “sever[ing 

his] remaining avenue of access to” Child. Id. Father also failed to allow the 

Agency access to the family home to verify that it was safe and habitable for 

Child. Id. at 3. 

The orphans’ court recognized that Father did not have a “meaningful 

opportunity to seek the follow-up treatment Dr. Menta recommended” in her 

March 2023 report. Id. at 3. However, the court noted that the failure to 

receive recommendations from Dr. Menta was a consequence of Father’s six-
J-A25044-23

- 15 -

month delay in scheduling the evaluation. Id. at 8. The court observed that 

the scheduling delay, as well as Father’s lack of truthfulness during the 

evaluation, called into question Father’s “willingness to do what was necessary 

to prove that [he] could and would do what was necessary to become [a] fit 

parent[] and regain custody of” Child.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court 

concluded that, based upon Father’s history, his mindset, and Dr. Menta’s 

assessment, it was not expected that Father “will be able to remedy his . . . 

parental shortcomings any time soon.” Id. “Even if [he] did,” the court 

stated, “the journey toward rectifying the causes of [his] parental incapacity 

would leave [Child] without the hope of permanency for an unconscionable 

length of time.” Id. 

Father argues that, while he “may well have demonstrated some 

parental difficulties and parental shortcomings during the dependency 

matter[,]” the orphans’ court’s conclusion “that he has willfully failed to make 

progress on those shortcomings prior to the termination hearing ignores the 

record.” Father’s Brief at 19. Father asserts as evidence of his progress that 

Brother had obtained separate housing outside the family home and that

Father had undergone a psychological evaluation. Father notes that he was 

not provided with Dr. Menta’s recommendations until shortly prior to the 

hearing and thus could not act on them, yet he claims that he had engaged in 

mental health treatment of his own accord. Father notes that while he had 

not complied with the family service plan objectives, including completion of 
J-A25044-23

- 16 -

a parenting skills course, this was because the Agency had ceased providing 

services to Parents in September 2022, rendering compliance impossible. 

We conclude that the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by clear 

and convincing evidence and that the court did not err in determining that 

Father had a continuing parental incapacity to protect Child, that the 

incapacity caused Child to be without essential parental care, and that the 

cause of the incapacity cannot or would not be remedied. 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2); L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600. There was ample testimony at the 

termination hearing establishing that Father lacked protective capacity to care 

for Child and that he was unable to remedy his parental incapacity. Dr. Menta 

opined, following a clinical interview and the preparation of a psychological 

assessment of Father, that he lacked the ability to protect Child. N.T., 5/9/23, 

at 41-43, 48-50; see also CYS Exhibit 2. Father questioned during his clinical 

interview whether what occurred between Child and Brother was abuse and 

he was still considering having Brother remain on his property at that time,

leading Dr. Menta to opine that Father was “internalizing” and “normalizing” 

his history of trauma and sexual abuse, which hindered his ability to set and 

enforce boundaries with his children. N.T., 5/9/23, at 48-49, 50, 54-55. Dr. 

Menta thus concluded that she could not recommend Father’s reunification 

with Child. Id. at 51. 

Moreover, as the orphans’ court stated, Father’s interactions with the 

Agency reinforced that he was incapable of remedying his parental incapacity. 

While the Agency was made aware that Brother did move out of the family 
J-A25044-23

- 17 -

home, he did not do so until after the termination petition was filed and just 

days prior to the hearing, and the Agency only found this information out 

through a third party. Id. at 8, 18-19, 22-23, 27, 37-38. This was illustrative 

of Father’s general inability to maintain regular contact with the Agency: 

Father had only sporadically contacted the Agency and Child’s foster parents, 

he did not provide Child with any resources during the course of the case, and 

he failed to provide the Agency with access to his home to ensure it was safe 

for Child. Id. at 7-8, 10, 13-14, 28, 37. Welch’s interactions with Father led 

her to conclude that Father’s lack of protective capacity of Child continued to 

persist as of the date of the termination hearing. Id. at 9-10, 14, 39.

Although Father contends that Brother’s departure from the family home 

demonstrates that he had taken steps to remedy his parental incapacity, we 

find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s assessment that this action 

on the eve of the termination hearing and after the termination petition was 

filed did not mitigate Father’s refusal to take this necessary step at any point 

before that date. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 7-8; see also Z.P., 

994 A.2d at 1118 (noting that a parent’s vow to cooperate after a long period 

of uncooperativeness may be rejected as untimely or disingenuous). Father 

also argues that he was prevented from fulfilling his obligations under the 

Agency’s family service plan because services were cut off in September 2022. 

However, the record reveals only that visitation with Child was suspended in 

September 2022 due to an allegation of abuse and Parents’ participation in a 

parenting skills course, which required an in-person observation component,
J-A25044-23

- 18 -

was correspondingly cut off at the same time, but the Agency continued to 

provide additional services, including those related to mental health, after 

September 2022. N.T., 5/9/23, at 8-9, 14, 17, 31-32. 

Additionally, while Father contends that he could not comply with Dr. 

Menta’s recommendation that he engage in couples and trauma therapy since 

he did not receive her report until shortly before the termination hearing, the 

record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that the delay in receiving the 

recommendations was only because Father waited six months to submit to the 

interview and testing after being ordered to do so. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

5/23/23, at 8; N.T., 5/9/23, at 24-25, 31. We further note that, although Dr. 

Menta recognized that therapy could assist Father in developing healthier 

boundaries and protective capacity for Child, Dr. Menta also recognized that 

progress was not guaranteed and could require years to occur, which would 

be an unreasonable delay in Child achieving permanence and stability. N.T., 

5/9/23, at 62-65; see also In the Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (stating that a child’s life “cannot be held in abeyance” and her 

“need for permanence and stability” indefinitely subordinated to a parent’s 

“attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities”) (citation omitted). Finally, while Father asserts that he had 

begun therapy on his own by the time of the termination hearing, there was 

no evidence submitted at the hearing to support this claim, and Welch denied 

that the Agency was in possession of any information showing that Father was

engaged in therapy. N.T., 5/9/23, at 18, 20, 30. 
J-A25044-23

- 19 -

We accordingly find that the Father’s appellate claim with respect to 

Section 2511(a)(2) merits no relief. We thus shift our focus to the orphans’ 

court’s determination that termination was appropriate under Section 

2511(b).

Father contends that “it would not be in the best interest of [C]hild to 

permanently sever the relationship with Father and terminate Father’s 

parental rights.” Father’s Brief at 26. However, the bulk of the section of 

Father’s brief devoted to Section 2511(b) relates to Father’s alleged parental 

incapacities, the Agency’s alleged failures in communication with Father, and 

Father’s inability to comply with the Agency’s requests of him due to the 

suspension of visitation and certain additional services. Id. at 23-26. We 

stress that the focus under subsection (b) is on the child’s needs and welfare 

rather than the parent’s or agency’s actions. See In the Interest of K.M.W., 

238 A.3d 465, 475 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc); In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 

349 (Pa. Super. 2020). Nevertheless, we note that Father cites to Child’s 

statement to her mental health care provider in November 2022 that she 

missed Parents and wanted Brother to move out so that she could return 

home, N.T., 5/9/23, at 26, and argues that the Agency “fail[ed] to incorporate 

[C]hild’s wishes and desires into its permanency plan and reunification plan.” 

Father’s Brief at 24.

The orphans’ court concluded that terminating Father’s parental rights 

will not sever a necessary and beneficial bond that would cause Child to suffer 

detrimental consequences. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 8-9. The 
J-A25044-23

- 20 -

court noted that Child’s life before her removal was “punctuated by chaos and 

instability,” as a result of her “transient housing situation” and the “constant 

threat of abuse” that she faced because her caregivers did not protect her 

from Brother. Id. at 4. The court observed that Child “has grown up knowing 

that [P]arents will not keep her safe from Brother” and that this has “create[d] 

conflicting emotions and inflicts further harm” on her. Id. at 9. The court 

added that “[w]hether or not it was once her desire to return home,” the 

evidence at the hearing demonstrated that the bond had diminished as Child 

had ceased asking the Agency caseworker about Parents and did not express 

a preference for reunification when she met with Welch the day before the 

termination hearing. Id. at 5, 9.

The orphans’ court further noted that “[i]n all other respects, 

termination will only benefit” Child. Id. at 9. The court stated that the foster 

parents provide for Child’s physical, emotional, and developmental needs and 

provide her a safe and settled home where she will not be in the presence of 

her abuser. Id. at 4-5, 9. Further, the foster parents capably ensure that 

Child is attending school according to an individualized plan, receiving traumabased mental health therapy, and developing friendships within her new 

neighborhood. Id. The court indicated that the fact that Child refers to foster

parents as “mom” and “dad” demonstrates that she feels safe and loved in 

their care and that they have assumed a primary place in her life. Id. at 5, 

9. The court concluded that “[i]f Mother and Father’s rights are terminated, 

[f]oster [p]arents can then adopt [Child], making her a permanent part of 
J-A25044-23

- 21 -

their family and ensuring that she will continue to receive the care, love, and 

comfort she has received since becoming their foster daughter.” Id. at 9.

Upon review, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights best 

served Child’s needs and welfare under its Section 2511(b) analysis and that 

the court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. While 

Father raises Child’s statement to her mental health providers in November 

2022 concerning her desire to live with Parents, it is clear that the orphans’ 

court did consider this statement by Child. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

5/23/23, at 9. Nevertheless, the court appropriately relied on the testimony 

of Welch, the Agency caseworker, concerning Child’s diminishing attachment 

to Parents over the course of the case in finding that the termination of 

Father’s parental rights will not sever a necessary and beneficial relationship.

See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944-45 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(stating that a formal bonding evaluation is not required under subsection (b) 

and the orphans’ court may rely on the opinion of the agency caseworker 

regarding the parent-child bond); accord Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121; see also

N.T., 5/9/23, at 32. Furthermore, the court acted within its discretion in 

“prioritiz[ing] the safety and security needs of” Child over her bond with Father 

where there was ample evidence regarding Father’s lack of protective capacity 

for Child. Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 839 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also 

L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524; J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 946.
J-A25044-23

- 22 -

Finally, we observe that the orphans’ court’s determination that foster 

parents were attending to Child’s physical, emotional, and developmental 

needs, as well as ensuring that Child was regularly attending school and 

receiving trauma-based mental health therapy, is well-supported by the 

testimony at the termination hearing. N.T., 5/9/23, at 6-7, 10-12, 13, 32; 

see K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. We therefore find that Father’s arguments with 

respect to Section 2511(b) merit no relief. Having rejected Father’s

challenges under both subsections of Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, we 

affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights to Child.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 04/05/2024