F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A ME R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

D O R O T E O R O C H A -A L

V A R A D O , Defendant-Appellant. N o. 15-10517

D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00507- J AS-B PV-1

OPI NI ON

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na J ames. A Soto, District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted October 21, 2016 * San F rancisco, California

F iled December 12, 2016

B efore: Carlos T. B ea and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es, and J a ne A. Restani, J u dg e. * *

Opinion by

J udg e Restani

* T h e p an el un an i m o u sly c o n clu d es th at th is case i s su itab le f or d ecisio n w ith o u t o ral arg um en t. Fed . R. A p p . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab le J an e A

. Restan i, J u d g e f o r th e Un ited S tates Co urt

o f In tern atio n al T rad e, sittin g b y d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 2

SUMMARY * * *

Crim inal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s application of a

s i xt e e n

- l e v el sentence enhancement to the defendant’s i l l e g a l

reentry sentence on the g round that his prior con v i c t ion for

a t t e mpted sex ual abuse in the first deg ree under Oreg o n Revised Statutes § 163.427 qualified as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

B e cause, as the parties a g re e d
, § 163.427 is a d ivisible statute, the panel applied the modified c ateg orical approach
to determine which of two different crimes defined b y §§ 163.427(1)(a) a

nd 163.427(1)(b) was the defendant’s crime of conviction. And because, as the parties ag reed, the defendant’s conviction patently falls under subsection (1)(a), the panel proceede d to consider whether his crime o f conviction under that subsection is a categ orical match to the federal g eneric offense of “crime of violence.”

The panel held that because a conviction pursuant to any of the three further subdivisions o f ( 1 ) (a) f alls under the
g eneric federal definition of a c rime of violence, either a s “sex ual abuse of a minor” or a “forcibl e s ex o ffense,” the defendant was necessarily convicted of the same elements a s the g eneric federal definition. The panel ex p l ained that it is irrelevant that the sex ual conduct that le d to the defendant’s conviction occurred “outside of the clothes.”

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co urt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 3

COUNSEL

F lorence M. B ruemmer, L aw Office of Fl orence M. B ruemmer P.C., Anthem, Ariz o na, for Defendant-Appellant.

Rosaleen O’Gara, Assistan t United States A ttorney ; Robert L

. Miskell, Appellate Chief; J ohn S. L e onardo, United States Attorney ; United States Attorney ’s O ffice, Tucson, Ariz o na; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

RESTANI
, J udg e :
Defendant-Appellant Doroteo Rocha-Alvarado appeals the d istrict c o u r t ’ s imposition o f a six teen-level sentencing enhancement to his conviction o f illeg al reentr y a fter deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. W e conclude that the district court did not err in apply ing the six teen-level enhan c e ment because, under the modified categ orical approach, Rocha-Alvarado’s prior conviction for a t tempted

sex ual abuse in the first deg ree purs u an t t o Oreg on Revised Statutes § 163.427(1)(a) q ualifies as a “ c rime of violence” for the p urposes of the U.S. Sentenc i n g Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) § 2L 1.2. According ly
, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Rocha-Alvarado is a citiz en of Mex ico and had resided in Oreg on prior to his deportation on May 13, 201 3

. O n September 4, 2012, Rocha-Alvarado w as charg ed with three
counts of attempted sex ual abuse in the first d eg ree, alleg ing that on or b etween March 24, 2 012, and Aug ust 29, 2012, heU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 4

subjected a nine- y e a r

- o ld g irl to sex ual contact by touching her vag ina, breast, and lips. The prosecutor’s sta t e ments at the chang e-of-plea hearing further c larified th at RochaAlvarado effected the sex ual contact “ o utside of the clothes.” 1 ER 34. Rocha-Alvarado p l ed no contest to three counts o f attempted sex ual abuse in the first degree in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427 and was then deported to Mex ico.

On F ebruary 22, 2015, United States B order Patrol ag ents apprehended Rocha-Alvarado n e ar Vamori, Ariz o na as he

was attempting to reenter the United States. Rocha-Alvarado admitted that he was i l l e ga lly present in the U nited States. On April 24, 2015, Rocha-Alvarado pled g uilty t o a n ind i c t ment charg ing him with illeg al reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

The district court accepted the final presentence report’s recommendation of a six teen-level enhancement, finding that Rocha-Alvarado’s prior conviction const i tuted a crime o f violence under the Guidelines § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Thus, the presentence report calculated a Guidelines rang e of forty -six
to fifty -seven months of incarceration and recom m e n ded a sentence of forty -six months. T he district court applied a downward variance because Rocha-Alvarado had n o other previous criminal or immig ration history and because RochaAlvarado r eentered the c o untry for a “compell ing reason.” Rocha-A l v arado had stated that h e returned to the United

1 T h e p ro secu to r q u alif

ied h is statem en t. W h en ask e d b y t h e co urt

w h eth er th e to u ch in g o ccu rred o v er th e clo th es, th e p ro secu to r resp o n ded b y statin g , “ [t]h at i s m

y un d erstan d in g , a l t h o u g h th e L i b erty Ho u s e ( i n d iscern ib le) h ad so m e q u estio n s, w h eth er o r n o t th at w as w h at h a d h ap p en ed .” ER 3 4

. A s d iscu ssed b elo w , h ow ev er, w h eth er th e to u ch in g

o ccu rred o u tsid e o f

th e clo th es is n o t

o u tco m e- determ in ativ e.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 5

States in order to f

i n d work that would enable him to buy medicine f

or his son’s kidney transplant. The dist ri ct court sentenced Rocha-Alvarado to thirty months of incarcerat i on with three y ears of supervised release. Rocha-Alvarado n ow appeals.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REV IEW

W e have jurisdiction pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e review questions of law de n ovo, including the district court’s interpretation of the Guide l i nes and w hether a prior convict i o n q ualifies as a “ crime of violence” under the Guidelines. United States v. Grajeda
, 581 F

. 3 d 1 1 86, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Esparza-Herrera , 557 F .3d 1019, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

DISCUSSION

Rocha-Alvarado contends that his p rior c onviction under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427 for attempted s e x ual abuse in the first deg ree does not qualify as a “ cr i m e of violence” under the modified categ orical approac h

. See U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 ( b ) ( 1 )(A)(ii). He argu es that, because the plea transcript states t hat the sex u al c ontact occurred outside the victim’s clothing
, his prior conviction is n o t a crime o f violence because it does n ot meet the g eneric federal definition of “sex ua l a b u s e of a minor” as defined b y 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a) and 2246(2)(D). W e disag r ee.

I n order to determine whether a state statute of conviction qualifies as a g eneric federal crime, we apply the categ orical approach outlined by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990). U nder this approach,

we compare only the e l e m e n t s of the state statute o fU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 6

conviction with the g eneric federal d efinition. See id. The
statute of c o n v i ction must criminaliz e the same or less conduct than the federal g e neric o ffense in order to q ualify a s a categ orical match. United States v. Villavicencio-Burruel
, 608 F .3d 556, 561 ( 9th C i r

. 2 0 1 0 )

. B ut if the statute o f conviction criminaliz es more conduct than the g eneric federal off e n s e, then the prior conviction d oes not qualify as a categ orical match to the federal offense, and therefore cannot

serve as a sentencing p r edicate. Descamps v. United States
, 1 3 3 S. Ct. 2276, 2281, 2283–85 (2013); United States v. Jennings , 515 F .3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2008).

I f a crime of convict i o n d o e s not qualify as a predicate offense unde r t he categ o rical approach, it may still qualify under the modified categ orical approach. Q u intero-Salazar v. Keisler , 506 F .3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2007). The modified categ orical approach applies where a statute “ list[ s] potential offense elements in the alternative” rather than means o f commission and is, therefore, d ivisible. Descamps
, 1 33 S. Ct.

a t 2283; see Mathis v. U nited States
, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251–53 (2016). Under the modified cate go r i cal approach,

we may ex amine certain documents to d etermine what part o f the divisible statute formed the basis of conviction. Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. Spe c ifically
, we may r eview the terms of “the statutory d efinition, charg ing document, written plea a gr eement, transcript of plea colloquy
, and any

ex p licit factual finding by the trial judg e to w hich the defendant assented.” P a rrilla v. Gonzales
, 414 F .3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shepard v. U nited States
, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)); see also U nited S t a t e s v. Lee
, 704 F .3d 785, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2012). I n so doing
, w e are to evaluate whether the d efendant “necessarily admitte d ” the elements of the particula r s t atutory a lternative that is aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 7

categ orical match to the g eneric federal offense. Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2284 (quoting Shepard , 544 U.S. at 26).

The Guidelines recommend a six teen-level enhancement if a defendant, who has unl a wfully reentered the United States, also has a prev i o u s felony conviction for a “crime o f violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Gui d e lines define a “crime of violence” to include a l i s t of enumerated offenses, which relevant to this appeal include: “forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is n ot g iven

or is not leg ally valid, such as where c o n sent to the conduct is involuntary
, incomp e t e n t, or coerced),

. . . [ and] sex ual abuse of a minor. ” U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iii). The enumerated “crimes of vi olence” also include attempts to commit those crimes. U .S.S

. G

. § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.5. These listed offenses are per se crimes of violence. United States v

. Rodriguez-Guzman
, 506 F .3d 738, 7 4 1 (9th Cir. 2007). I n addition to the enumerated offenses, the Guid e l i n es include in the definition of “crime of violence” “ a n y o ther offense under federal, state, or local law that has as a n element the
use, a ttempted use, or threatened use of phy sical force ag ainst the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iii).

Under the Oreg on statute f or sex ual abuse in the first d e gr e e , s u b s e c t i o n ( 1 )( a ) i n c l udes three additiona l subdivisions that allow for conviction whe n the sex ual
contact occurs with: (A) a victim “less than 14 y ears o f a g e”; (B ) a victim w ho “is subjected to forcible compulsion” by the defendant; or (C) a victim wh o “is incapable of consent b y

reason of” a mental defect, mental incapacitation, or phy sical helplessness. Or

. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a). Alternatively
, subsection (1)(b) prohibits “[ i] n tentionally caus[ ing ] a person under 18 y ears of a g e to touch or contact the mouth, anus or

sex o rg ans o f an animal for the purpose of a r o u s i n g o rU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 8

gr a t i fying the sex ual d esire o f a person.” Or. Rev. Stat

. § 163.427(1)(b). As the Oreg o n statute of c o n v i c t i on is overinclusive of the federal crime with reg ard to the bestiality component and as (1)(a) is divisible from (1)(b), we apply the modified categ orical approach here. 2

The Ore go n state court convicted Rocha-Alvarado o f attempted sex ual abuse in the first deg r ee under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427. I n his plea of no contest, Rocha-Alvarado admitted specifically that, “[ o] n or between March 24, 2012 to Aug u st 29, 2012, in Polk County
, Oreg on, [ he] unlawfully and knowing ly attempted to subj e c t [the victim] ([ Date o f B irth] . . . [ 2 0] 03), to sex ual contact, by touching her vag ina

. . . breast

. . . and lips, a sex ual or intim a t e p a r t of [ the victim] .” E R 33. Rocha-Alvarado’s conviction patently f alls under subsection (1)(a) of the Oreg on statute, and both parties
ag ree to this matter. W e theref o re p roceed to consider whether Or. Rev. Stat. § 1 63.427(1)( a )
, Rocha-Alvarado’s crime of conviction, is a categ orical m a t c h t o the federal
g eneric offense of “crime of violence” f o r purposes of the Guidelines § 2L 1.2.

B e cause a conviction pursuant to any of the three f urther subdivisions of (1)(a) falls u n der the g eneric federal definition of a crime of violence, either as “sex ual abuse of a

2 B oth p arties ag ree th at Or

. Rev

. Stat. § 1 6 3 .4 2 7 i s a d iv isib le
statute, in th at su

b sectio n s (1 )(a) an d (1 )(b ) d ef in e tw o d if

f eren t crim es. S ee Ma th is
, 1 3 6 S. Ct. at 2 2 49

. In d eed
, th at is co rrect. B ecau s e

su b sectio n s (1 )(a) an d (1 )(b ) p ro v i d e altern ativ e elem en ts n eed ed f or

co n v ictio n o f t w o d if

f eren t crim es, rath er th an altern ativ e m ean s of f u lf illin g th e elem en ts o f a sin g l e c r im e, th e s tatu te is d iv isib le. A cco rd i n g ly
, w e m

u st ap p ly th e m o d i f

ied categ o rical ap p ro ach to d eterm in e w

h i c h o f th e tw o crim es w as Ro ch a- A l v arad o ’ s crim e of

co n v ictio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 9

minor” or a “forcible sex o ff e n s e,” Rocha-Alvarado was necessarily convicted o f t he same elements as the g eneric f e d eral definition. T hus, we hold that a conviction un d e r subsection (1)(a) nece s s arily entails conviction of the elements of a crime o f v i olence under the g eneric federal definition.

A. Sexual A b u s e of a Minor and Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(A)

Rocha-Alvarado submits that because the sex ual conduct that led to his conviction under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a) occurred outside of the clothes, the Oreg o n sta t ute criminali z e s more conduct than the federal definition provided within 18 U.S.C. § 2243, which specifically

ex c ludes touching over the c lothing in d e fining sex ual abuse of a minor. See 1 8 U.S.C. § 2246 ( 2 ) (D )

. Our precedent, however, p reviously established that 1 8 U.S.C. § 2243 does
not fully define the universe o f sex ual offenses contemplated by U.S.S.G

. § 2L 1.2’s term “sex ual abuse of a minor.” United States v. Medina-Villa
, 567 F .3d 5 07, 5 14–16 (9th Cir. 2009). I n Medina-Villa
, we recogniz ed that the label “sex ual abuse o f a minor” ex tends to statutes which criminaliz e conduct that (1) is se x u a l
, (2) involves a minor, and (3) is abusive. Id. at 5 13, 51 6 ; s e e also United States v. BaronMedi n a , 1 87 F .3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999). W e f urther defined “abuse as phy sical or p sy c holog ical harm in lig ht o f the ag e of the victim in question.” Medina-Villa
, 5 67 F .3d at 513 (internal quotations omitted).

W e conclude that Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(A)

con s t i t u t e s a crime of violence because it falls within the
ge n e r i c f ederal definition of sex ual abuse of a minor. F irst
, a conviction under subdivision ( 1)(a)(A) of the O reg o n statuteU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 10

necessarily involves conduct that is “sex ual.” Contrary to Rocha-Alvarado’s arguments, touching over th e clothes is irrelevant. The Oreg on statute requires simply that the touching was done f

or the p urpose of sex ual g ratificat ion, placing the focus o n the inten t r ather than the manner of the touching

. Or. Rev. Stat § 163.305(6) (defining “[ s] ex ual contact” as “touching of the sex ual or other intimate parts o f

a person

. . . for the purpose of arousing o r gr atifying the

se x ual desire of e ither party ” (emphasis added)). I ndeed, in evaluating a comparable Californ ia statute, w e held that the defendant’s c onvictio n under the California statute categ or i c al ly constituted “sex ual abuse of a minor” a nd qualified as a “crime of violenc e ” for federal sentencing
purposes. B a r o n -Medina
, 187 F .3d at 1147. There, the California statute in question prohibited c onduct that i n v o lves “the touching of an underag e ch ild’s body ” where the
t o u ching is done “with a sex ual intent.” Id. ; see Cal. P en

. Code § 2 88 ( a) (1987). W e ex plained that, under the California statute, “the character of t he touching
, thoug h perhaps c ircumstantially r elevant to prove intent, is otherwise immaterial.” Baron-Medina
, 187 F

. 3d at 1147. Here, reg ardless of the manner of touching
, i.e., outside o r inside o f the clothes, the Oreg on statute similarly c riminaliz es conduct that is sex ual as it ex p ressly d efines “sex ual contact” throug h its relation to sex ual g ratification.

Second, subdivision (1)(a ) (A ) of the Oreg on statute pertains to minors as it specifically requires the victim to be

“ l e s s t h a n 1 4 y ea r s o f a ge

. ” O r

. Rev

. S t a t

. § 163.427(1)(a)(A). Third, it satisfies the last element o f “sex ual abuse of a minor,” as our precedent est a b lishes that

sex ual contact with a child below the ag e of fourteen is per se abusive. United States v. Valencia-Barragan
, 608 F .3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). Rocha-Alvarado, rely i n g o n onlyU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 11

18 U.S.C. §§ 2243 and 2246(2)(D), has failed to address the broader definition o f “sex ual abus e o f a minor” included in

our precedent. I nstead, a violation of subd i v ision (1)(a)(A) requires a conviction of all three elements included within the
g eneric federal definitio n o f s ex ual abuse of a minor. Any conviction under subdivision (1)(a)(A) o f the Oreg on statute, therefore, qualifies as a crime of violence bec a u se it f alls within the federal definition of “sex ual abuse of minor.”

B. F orcible Sex Of

f e nse and Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(B) and (C)

A conviction u nder either subdivisions (1)(a)(B ) or (C) would als o c o n s titute a “crime of violence” as both subdivisions fall wit h i n t h e g eneric federal definition of a “forcible sex offense.” Under the Guidelines, a forcible sex offense includes crimes in which “consent to the c onduct is
not g iven o r is not leg ally v alid, such as where the consent is involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced.” U

. S .S.G. § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iii). Prior to a 2008 amendment, the Guidelines simply listed “forcible sex offense” as a n ex ample of a “ crime of violence” and did not specifically define a “forcible sex offense” as a situation in w hich consent is lacking

. The 2008 amendment broadened the meaning of “forcible sex offense” such that an “ ind i c i a o f additional f orce or violence are no long er required for the forcible sex offense enhancement so long as consent to the sex offense is shown to be lac k i n g. ” 3

3 W e clarif

y th at th e 2 0 0 8 am en d m en ts t o th e Gu id elin es ab ro g ated

o ur h o ld in g in U

n ited S ta tes v. Beltra n -Mu ng uia
, 4 8 9 F.3 d 1 0 4 2 (2 0 0 7 ), b y ex p an d in g th e g en eric f

ed eral d ef in i tio n o f “ f o rcib le sex o f

f en se.” In th at case, w e h eld th at sex u al ab u se in th e seco n d d eg ree u n d er Or. Rev

. Stat. § 1 6 3 .4 2 5 is n o t categ o rically a crim e o f v io len ce. Beltra n -Mu n g u ia
, 4 8 9 F.3 d at 1 04 4
, 1 0 5 3

. W e ex plain ed th at th e Oreg o n statute at issu e

“ co n stitu t es a ‘ crim e o f v io len ce’ o n ly if : (1 ) th e crim e co n stitu

tes aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 12

United States v. Quintero-Junco
, 754 F .3d 746, 7 53 ( 9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Gallegos-Galindo , 704 F .3d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Sub d i v ision (1)(a)(B ) of the Oreg on statute f or sex ual abuse in the first degree falls within the federal definition of “forcible sex offense,” i.e., an enumerated crime of violence. The statute r equires the victim to be subj e c t ed to “forcible compulsion.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 1 63.427(1)(a)(B )

. Under Oreg on law, forcible compulsion is f orce that is (1) “g reater in deg ree o r different in kind” f rom the simple act of touching the intimate part of another and (2) “sufficient to ‘compel’ the victim, ag ainst the victim’s will, to submit to or e ng ag e in the

sex u a l c ontact, but it need not rise to the level of v iolence.” State v

. Marshall
, 253 P.3d 1 017, 1027 (Or. 2011). B ecause this section of the Oreg on statute requires that the touching be
ag ainst the victim’s will, it me et s the g eneric federal d efinition o f a forcible sex offense as provided in t h e 2 0 0 8 amendments and, therefore, is a crime of violence.

Subdivision ( 1)(a)(C) of the Oreg on statute also constitutes a forcible sex offen s e. I t requires that sex ual
contact be made with a victim “inca pable of consent.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)(C). Thus, it definitively meets the

‘ fo r c i b le s ex o f

f en se,’ a term left un defin ed b y th e gu id

elin es ; or (2 ) co n v icti o n o f th e crim e req u ires p ro o f o f ‘ th e u se, attem p ted u se, or th reaten ed u s e o f p h y sical f o rce a g a i n s t th e perso n of an o th er.’ ” Id

. at 1 0 4 4 (em p h asis ad d ed ). A lth o u g h

w e reco g n ized th at “ th e v ictim ’ s lack

o f co n sen t is th e d ef

in i n g ch aracteristic” o f sex u al ab u se in th e sec o n d d eg ree un d er t

h e Oreg o n statut e, w e un d ersto o d “ f o rcib le sex o f

f en se” to req u ire “ th e u se of f

o rce.” Id

. at 1 0 4 5
, 1 0 5 1

. As d iscu ssed
, th e 2 0 0 8

am en d m en t, h o w ev er, h as d ef in ed “ f o rcib le sex o f

f en se” an d b ro ad e n ed th e m ean in g of th at term b y n o lo n g er req u irin g f o rce if co n s en t is lack in g

. Qu in tero -Ju n co , 7 5 4 F.3 d at 7 5 3

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R O C H A -A L V A R A D O 13

g eneric federal definition of forcible sex offense, as amended in 2008, which includes situations where “consent . . . is not
g iven or is not leg all y v a lid,

. . . [ e.g .,] involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced[ .] ” U.S

. S.G. § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1 ( B) ( i ii). B oth subdivisions (1)(a)(B ) and (1)(a)(C), thus, constitute crimes of violence under the applicable Guidelines.

CONCLUSION

A conviction under any o ne o f Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.427(1)(a)’s three sub d i visions, therefore, necessarily
enta i l s a conviction of the elements of the g eneric federal definition of a crime of violence, whether it be sex ual abuse of a minor or a forcible s e x offense. F or the foreg oing
reasons, the district court ’ s judg ment of conviction a nd
sentence are

AF F IRMED.