UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

THE GENERAL COUNSEL

400 MARYLAND AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202-1100

www.ed.gov

The Department of Education’s mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global 

competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.

TO: Miguel A. Cardona 

Secretary of Education 

FROM: Lisa Brown

General Counsel

DATE: August 23, 2022 

SUBJECT: The Secretary’s Legal Authority for Debt Cancellation 

Introduction

For the past year and a half, the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”), in consultation with our 

colleagues at the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, has conducted a review of the 

Secretary’s legal authority to cancel student debt on a categorical basis. This review has included 

assessing the analysis outlined in a publicly disseminated January 2021 memorandum signed by 

a former Principal Deputy General Counsel. As detailed below, we have determined that the 

Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students (“HEROES”) Act of 2003 grants the 

Secretary authority that could be used to effectuate a program of targeted loan cancellation 

directed at addressing the financial harms of the COVID-19 pandemic. We have thus determined 

that the January 2021 memorandum was substantively incorrect in its conclusions. 

Given the significant public interest in this issue, and the potential for public confusion caused 

by the public availability of the January 2021 memorandum, I recommend making this 

memorandum publicly available and publishing it in the Federal Register, so as to provide the 

general public with notice of the Department’s interpretation of the HEROES Act, consistent 

with statutory requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).1

I. The Secretary’s HEROES Act Authority

The HEROES Act, first enacted in the wake of the September 11 attacks, provides the Secretary 

broad authority to grant relief from student loan requirements during specific periods (a war, 

other military operation, or national emergency, such as the present COVID-19 pandemic) and 

for specific purposes (including to address the financial harms of such a war, other military 

operation, or emergency). The Secretary of Education has used this authority, under both this and 

1 The Office of Legal Counsel has made its own analysis of the Secretary’s authority, which will be published in 

tandem with this memorandum’s recommended publication. 
2 

every prior administration since the Act’s passage, to provide relief to borrowers in connection 

with a war, other military operation, or national emergency, including the ongoing moratorium 

on student loan payments and interest.2

Specifically, the HEROES Act authorizes the Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or 

regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs” if the Secretary 

“deems” such waivers or modifications “necessary to ensure” at least one of several enumerated 

purposes, including that borrowers are “not placed in a worse position financially” because of a 

national emergency. 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(1), (2)(A). 

Several provisions of the HEROES Act indicate that Congress intended the Act to confer broad 

authority under the circumstances, and for the purposes, specified by the Act. First, the Act 

grants authority “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, unless enacted with specific 

reference to this section.” Id. § 1098bb(a)(1). Second, the Act authorizes the Secretary to waive 

or modify “any” statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance 

programs. Id. § 1098bb(a)(1), (a)(2). Third, the Act expressly authorizes the Secretary to issue 

such waivers and modifications as he “deems necessary in connection with a war or other 

military operation or national emergency.” Id. § 1098bb(a)(1). The Supreme Court has 

recognized that, in empowering a federal official to act as that official “deems necessary” in 

circumstances specified by a statute, Congress has granted the official broad discretion to take 

such action.3

 This authority is not, however, boundless: it is limited, inter alia, to periods of a 

war, other military operation, or national emergency (id. § 1098bb(a)(1)), to certain categories of 

eligible individuals or institutions (id. § 1098ee(2)), and to a defined set of purposes (id.

§ 1098bb(a)(2)(A)–(E)). 

In present circumstances, this authority could be used to effectuate a program of categorical debt 

cancellation directed at addressing the financial harms caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The 

Secretary could waive or modify statutory and regulatory provisions to effectuate a certain 

amount of cancellation for borrowers who have been financially harmed because of the COVID19 pandemic. The Secretary’s determinations regarding the amount of relief, and the categories 

of borrowers for whom relief is necessary, should be informed by evidence regarding the 

financial harms that borrowers have experienced, or will likely experience, because of the 

2 See Federal Student Aid Programs (Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, 

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and Federal-Work Study Programs), 85 Fed. Reg. 79,856, 79,856

(Dec. 11, 2020) (“Secretary [DeVos] is issuing these waivers and modifications under the authority of the HEROES 

Act[.]”); Federal Student Aid Programs (Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, 

Federal Family Education Loan Program, and the Federal Direct Loan Program), 77 Fed. Reg. 59,311, 59,312 (Sept. 

27, 2012) (“In accordance with the HEROES Act, . . . Secretary [Duncan] is providing the waivers and 

modifications of statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to the student financial assistance programs[.]”);

Federal Student Aid Programs (Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal 

Direct Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program and the Federal Pell Grant Program), 68 Fed. Reg. 

69,312, 69,312 (Dec. 12, 2003) (“Secretary [Paige] is issuing these waivers and modifications under the authority of 

section 2(a) of the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students (HEROES) Act of 2003[.]”).

3 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (statute authorizing action when an agency head “shall deem such 

[action] necessary or advisable” “fairly exudes deference” to agency head and “strongly suggests that its 

implementation was ‘committed to agency discretion by law’” (second emphasis added) (some quotation marks 

omitted)).
3 

COVID-19 pandemic. But the Secretary’s authority can be exercised categorically to address the 

situation at hand; it does not need to be exercised “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. § 1098bb(b)(3). 

That is, he is not required to determine or show that any individual borrower is entitled to a 

specific amount of relief, and he instead may provide relief on a categorical basis as necessary to 

address the financial harms of the pandemic. 

II. The January 2021 Memorandum 

On January 7, 2021, Secretary DeVos resigned from her position as Secretary of Education, 

effective January 8, 2021. On January 13, a news outlet published a memorandum signed 

January 12 by the then-Principal Deputy General Counsel, addressed to “Betsy DeVos[,]

Secretary of Education.”4 Two substantively identical versions of that memorandum were posted 

to the website of the Office of Postsecondary Education, dated January 12 and January 18 

(collectively, the “January 2021 memorandum”). Having reviewed the memorandum in 

consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel, we have determined that although it accurately 

describes the core features of the HEROES Act, its ultimate conclusions are unsupported and 

incorrect.

5 As such, it should be rescinded. 

As an initial matter, the bulk of the January 2021 memorandum’s discussion of HEROES Act 

authority describes and quotes the key provisions of the HEROES Act. The memorandum 

explains that the HEROES Act provides the Secretary “authority to provide specified[6] waivers 

or modifications to Title IV federal financial student aid program statutory and regulatory 

requirements because of the declared National Emergency,” identifies that declared emergency 

as the COVID-19 national emergency declared on March 18, 2020, and characterizes this 

authority as “narrowly cabined” to achieving five enumerated purposes, including “ensur[ing] 

that . . . recipients of student financial assistance under title IV of the Act who are affected 

4 Michael Stratford, Trump Administration Tries to Hamstring Biden on Student Loan Forgiveness, Politico (Jan. 

13, 2021).

5 In addition to determining that the conclusions contained in the January 2021 memorandum were substantively 

incorrect, we have determined that the memorandum was issued in contravention of then-effective Department 

processes for issuing significant guidance. An Interim Final Rule issued by the Department on October 5, 2020, 

pursuant to Executive Order 13,891, established additional procedures for the issuance of guidance documents. See

Rulemaking and Guidance Procedures, 85 Fed. Reg. 62,597 (Oct. 5, 2020); see also Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 

Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019). That rule established new requirements for the issuance of guidance and 

“significant guidance,” defining the latter term to include guidance documents that “[r]aise novel, legal, or policy 

issues arising out of legal mandates [or] the President’s priorities.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 62,608. The public dissemination 

of the January 2021 memorandum violated a number of provisions of this rule, including that guidance must be 

“accessible through the Department’s guidance portal,” and that, barring compelling cause, all significant guidance 

may be published only after a 30-day public comment period and review by the Office of Management and Budget 

under Executive Order 12,866 of September 30, 1993. Id. That rule was rescinded in September 2021, 86 Fed. Reg. 

53,863 (Sept. 29, 2021), but it was in effect at the time of the January 2021 memorandum’s publication. Thus, OGC 

has determined that the January 2021 memorandum was not properly promulgated.

6 We read the term “specified” as acknowledging statutory limits on HEROES Act authority, including the 

enumerated purposes of 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(b)(1), and not as suggesting any atextual limitations on the Act’s clear 

grant of authority to waive or modify “any” statutory or regulatory provision applicable to student aid programs, 

provided other HEROES Act requirements are met.
4 

individuals are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance 

because of their status as affected individuals.” Jan. 2021 Mem. at 5–6. 

The memorandum goes on to read in purported limitations on the scope of relief that may be 

afforded that are contrary to the clear text of the Act. The memorandum advances three primary 

arguments in support of a conclusion that “Congress never intended the HEROES Act as 

authority for mass cancellation, compromise, discharge, or forgiveness of student loan principal 

balances, and/or to materially modify repayment amounts or terms.” Jan. 2021 Mem. at 6. 

First, the memorandum recites certain statutory limits on the Secretary’s authority, including the 

HEROES Act’s statutory definition of individuals eligible for relief, 20 U.S.C. § 1098ee(2), and 

the enumerated purposes for which waivers or modifications may be issued, id. § 1098bb(a)(2). 

The memorandum is correct that such statutory provisions exist but provides no support for the 

suggestion that these provisions impose limitations beyond their clear terms. See Jan. 2021 

Mem. at 6. 

Second, the memorandum points to the HEROES Act’s references to avoiding “defaults” and a 

“cross-cite” to a separate provision of the Higher Education Act relating to the “return” of 

student loan funds, concluding that these provisions “provide a strong textual basis for 

concluding Congress intended loans to be repaid.” Id. But these provisions—which identify as 

allowable purposes issuing waivers or modifications to avoid defaults and granting relief from 

certain requirements that borrowers return certain payments—in no way impose a requirement 

that any exercise of HEROES Act authority must ensure that every borrower is left with a 

remaining balance on their loan. The reference to “defaults” authorizes the Secretary to “avoid” 

defaults; it does not require that he preserve their possibility. And the Higher Education Act 

provisions regarding the “return” of overpayments relate only to specific processes and 

calculations under which students are required to return grant and loan assistance if they 

withdraw from their school, see 20 U.S.C. § 1091b; there is no conceivable reading of this 

provision that reflects a congressional intent that all borrowers, including those not covered by 

the section 1091b overpayment provisions, are required to repay their loans in full. 

Third, the memorandum concludes that the authority to “waive or modify any statutory or 

regulatory provision” is limited to the definition of “modify” that was adopted for an unrelated

telecommunications statute, and “does not authorize major changes.” Jan. 2021 Mem. at 6. The 

memorandum draws its definition of modify from MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & 

Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994). In that case, the statutory provisions under review 

applied no clear limiting principle to a grant of modification authority to the FCC; the statute

allowed modifications “in [the FCC’s] discretion and for good cause shown.” Id. at 224 (quoting 

47 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV)). Here, the HEROES Act itself clearly speaks to the 

scope of modification authority: the Secretary may make those modifications as may be 

“necessary to ensure” specific enumerated purposes. 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb. The Secretary may not 

make modifications going beyond that limit, but nor is he restricted to a degree of modifications 

that would fall short of “ensur[ing]” the enumerated purposes are achieved. Moreover, the 

HEROES Act broadly authorizes the Secretary to act as he “deems necessary” to “waive or 

modify” any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student aid program. The January 

2021 memorandum’s interpretation of “modify” would read the Act to authorize the Secretary to 

waive entirely or to make non-major changes in the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions, 
5 

but not authorize the Secretary to do anything in between. That interpretation is illogical, and 

nothing in the HEROES Act’s broad grant of authority supports such a reading. 

We have discussed these and other aspects of the January 2021 memorandum with the Office of 

Legal Counsel, and we further find persuasive the discussion of the January 2021 memorandum 

offered in the Office of Legal Counsel’s memorandum, which will be published in tandem with 

this memorandum’s recommended publication. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons detailed above, I recommend that you (1) determine that the January 2021 

memorandum is formally rescinded as substantively incorrect and (2) authorize publication in the 

Federal Register and public posting of this memorandum as the Department’s interpretation of 

the HEROES Act.