In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-3503

JONATHAN CHAMBERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KUL B. SOOD,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 2545 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 28, 2020

____________________

Before FLAUM, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Chambers, an Illinois prisoner, sued a prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accusing 

him of deliberate indifference to his medical needs—

specifically, his need for medication to treat a flare-up of a 

painful chronic condition. The doctor had examined him 

during the intake process at the Stateville Correctional 

Center, which serves as the reception unit for new Illinois 

prisoners. Chambers was housed there for a few weeks 
2 No. 17-3503

when he was processed into state custody, and he filed a 

grievance with the Stateville grievance office protesting the 

doctor’s failure to prescribe medication.

But Chambers was transferred to a different prison before the grievance was investigated, so a grievance officer

returned it to him unreviewed and invited him to take the 

matter to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB” or “the 

Board”). The ARB normally serves in an appellate capacity 

reviewing decisions of grievance officers, but the operative 

regulations also specified that grievances pertaining to 

problems at an earlier-assigned prison must be filed directly 

with the Board. Chambers skipped this step and instead 

brought this lawsuit in district court.

The judge dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and we affirm. Under the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA” or “the Act”), prisoners must

pursue their complaints about prison conditions through all 

levels of the relevant administrative-review system before 

bringing a lawsuit in federal court. Chambers did not do so. 

Though he eventually submitted a grievance to the ARB after

he filed suit, that step did not satisfy the PLRA. The Act

requires pre-suit exhaustion; pursuing administrative remedies while litigation is underway does not suffice.

I. Background 

On February 27, 2014, Chambers was processed into the 

custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections at the 

Stateville Northern Reception and Classification Center, 

located in the Stateville prison. During his intake medical 

examination, Chambers told the nurse that he was suffering

from a herpes outbreak and needed medication. The nurse 
No. 17-3503 3

told him that a doctor would see him in the next two or three 

days. On March 1 Chambers was examined by Dr. Kul B. 

Sood, who reviewed his medical history—including his 

history of herpes outbreaks—and instructed him to put in a 

“sick call” request for a follow-up appointment. Chambers 

did so but received no response. In the meantime he continued to suffer pain from his herpes flare-up.

On March 9 Chambers submitted a grievance to his inmate counselor at Stateville protesting the doctor’s failure to 

give him medication for his herpes. He sought $60,000 for 

pain and suffering and asked to be “seen by a Doctor as of 

today.” The counselor responded to Chambers in writing on 

March 13, advising him that she had forwarded the grievance to the healthcare unit and to the Stateville grievance 

office and that he would receive a decision from that office 

after the healthcare unit responded to the inquiry.

Under the Illinois Administrative Code, a grievance officer must investigate a grievance and report findings and a 

recommendation in writing to the Chief Administrative 

Officer within two months “when reasonably feasible under

the circumstances.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.830(e)

(2014). The Chief Administrative Officer then reviews the 

findings and recommendation and notifies the offender of 

his decision in writing. Id. That process did not run its 

course while Chambers remained at Stateville. On March 21, 

just eight days after his counselor forwarded the grievance 

to the Stateville grievance office, Chambers was transferred 

to the Western Correctional Center.

Accordingly, on April 3 a grievance officer returned the 

grievance with a memo explaining that it was not reviewed 

prior to his transfer. The memo advised Chambers that “[i]f 
4 No. 17-3503

you want to appeal, you may forward this grievance along 

with this memo attached to the ARB.”

Chambers did not submit the issue to the ARB. Instead, 

on April 7 he filed a pro se complaint in district court asserting a § 1983 claim and seeking damages for the failure to 

provide medication for his herpes outbreak while he was at 

Stateville. The complaint named multiple defendants:

“Stateville Medical Staff/Healthcare Services, Nurse Tiffany, 

Nurse Megan, Unknown Physician #1,” four unknown 

nurses, and the Stateville counselor. A week later a district 

judge screened and dismissed the complaint, noting that 

Chambers had not exhausted his administrative remedies as 

required by the PLRA. Although the dismissal was without 

prejudice, the judge terminated the case, explaining that 

Chambers “must file a new suit that postdates the full 

administrative exhaustion procedure.”

On June 2 Chambers filed a grievance with the ARB regarding his medical care for the herpes outbreak he suffered 

while at Stateville. He attached a copy of his March 9 grievance and asked that the culpable Stateville medical staff be 

suspended without pay. The regulations provide that the 

ARB must issue a final decision within six months “when 

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id.

§ 504.850(e). On November 10 the ARB issued its decision,

explaining that Chambers’s complaint about an urgent need 

for medication for his herpes flare-up while he was at 

Stateville “cannot be substantiated as medically necessary.”

Meanwhile, on September 22 Chambers filed a proposed

amended complaint in the terminated district-court case 

naming an “Unknown Doctor” and “Stateville Medical 

Staff” as defendants. On October 23 the judge provisionally 
No. 17-3503 5

determined that the amended complaint adequately pleaded 

that Chambers had been prevented from exhausting administrative remedies. But the amended complaint did not 

identify a suable defendant, so the judge gave Chambers 

30 days to cure the defect. Chambers moved for an extension 

of time on November 3 and submitted with the motion a 

proposed amended complaint devoid of any substantive 

claim. Four days later the judge struck the proposed amended complaint and set a firm December 1 deadline for 

Chambers to file a nondeficient pleading.

Chambers did not comply with the December 1 deadline, 

so the judge dismissed the suit and (again) terminated the 

case. That prompted a flurry of letters and motions from 

Chambers in January and February 2015 trying to revive the 

case. On March 25 the judge issued an order giving him one 

more chance to file an adequate amended complaint. 

Chambers filed a proposed amended complaint on April 3 

asserting a claim for deliberate indifference against an 

unknown doctor for failure to prescribe medication for the

herpes outbreak he suffered while at Stateville. He asked the 

court’s permission to name the warden as a stand-in defendant until the identity of the unknown doctor could be discovered. The judge authorized this procedure and accepted 

the amended complaint.

The case moved forward, and the judge eventually recruited pro bono counsel to assist Chambers. Discovery 

revealed that the unknown Stateville physician was 

Dr. Sood. On February 8, 2016, pro bono counsel sought 

leave to dismiss the warden and file a proposed amended 

complaint naming Dr. Sood, together with the Stateville 

Correctional Center and the Illinois Department of Correc-
6 No. 17-3503

tions, as defendants. The judge granted the motion the next 

day, though the latter two defendants were eventually

dismissed by agreement of the parties.

Dr. Sood moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The judge granted the motion, explaining 

that Chambers did not complete the grievance process 

before bringing suit in federal court, as required by the 

PLRA. Although the dismissal was without prejudice, the 

judge terminated the case, explaining that “this lawsuit was 

filed prematurely.” The judge also permitted pro bono 

counsel to withdraw.

Chambers filed a pro se notice of appeal and sought 

permission to proceed in forma pauperis. The judge denied 

that request, finding that an appellate challenge to the 

exhaustion ruling would be frivolous and thus not brought 

in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Chambers renewed 

his application in this court. We authorized him to proceed 

in forma pauperis and recruited pro bono counsel to assist 

him on appeal.1

II. Discussion 

We review de novo a decision dismissing a prisoner’s suit 

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Barnes v. 

Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2005). The PLRA provides

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

1 David R. Fox and Benjamin C. Mizer of Jones Day accepted the representation and have ably discharged their duties. We thank them for their 

service to their client and the court.
No. 17-3503 7

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies 

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate must 

take each of the steps prescribed by the state’s administrative 

rules governing prison grievances. See Lockett v. Bonson, 

937 F.3d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 2019). The primary justification 

for requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies is 

to give the prison an opportunity to address the problem 

before burdensome litigation is filed. Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006); Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 

995–96 (7th Cir. 2020).

Chambers contends that his March 9, 2014 grievance sufficed for exhaustion purposes. He argues that nothing more 

was required of him after the Stateville grievance officer

returned the grievance unreviewed.

This argument misreads the grievance procedures outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. To recap: an inmate 

begins the process by submitting a written grievance to his 

institutional counselor within 60 days of the incident or 

problem in question. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810(a)

(2014). The counselor then refers the matter to the institution’s grievance office, and a grievance officer “shall consider 

the grievance” and report his findings and recommendation 

“in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer within two 

months after receipt of the written grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id. § 504.830(e). The 

Chief Administrative Officer then “review[s] the findings 

and recommendation and advise[s] the offender of his or her 

decision in writing.” Id. Dissatisfied inmates may appeal to 

the ARB “within 30 days after the date of the decision.” Id. 

§ 504.850(a).
8 No. 17-3503

These are the generally applicable rules. Some grievances, however, must be submitted directly to the ARB. This 

category generally includes grievances regarding matters 

arising at an earlier-assigned prison. At the time of these 

events, the regulations required inmates to file their grievances directly with the ARB when grieving “issues except 

personal property issues that pertain to a facility other than 

the facility where the offender is currently assigned.” Id. 

§ 504.870(a)(4).2

Chambers’s March 9 grievance sufficed to initiate the 

grievance process at Stateville. But the process could not be 

completed there. Chambers was transferred to the Western 

Correctional Facility just eight days after his counselor 

forwarded his grievance to the Stateville grievance office and

before that office could complete an investigation, much less 

propose and implement any remedy. So the grievance officer 

returned the grievance with a memo advising Chambers that 

it had not been reviewed prior to his transfer and if he 

wanted to appeal, he should forward the grievance to the 

ARB with a copy of the memo.

Chambers insists that this action by the grievance officer

was procedurally improper, relieving him of the duty to 

comply with any further steps in the grievance process. We 

disagree. It’s true that the regulations ordinarily call for the 

grievance officer to consider a grievance and forward findings and a recommendation to the Chief Administrative 

2 This provision was amended in 2017. It now requires inmates to file 

grievances directly with the ARB when grieving “issues that pertain to a 

facility other than the facility where the offender is currently assigned, 

excluding personal property and medical issues.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE

tit. 20, § 504.870(a)(4) (2017).
No. 17-3503 9

Officer, who issues a decision to the inmate, which the

inmate may then appeal. But the usual process was interrupted when Chambers was transferred to another prison. 

At that point his problem could no longer be remedied at 

Stateville. With Chambers now at another prison, the grievance officer could do no more than refer him to the ARB for 

relief. Whether by “appeal” or through a fresh grievance 

raising a problem that occurred at an earlier-assigned facility, Chambers needed to submit the matter to the ARB.

We grant that the grievance officer’s use of the word “appeal” was unusual, but the important point is that the regulations required Chambers to take his complaint about his 

medical care at Stateville to the ARB for decision. He did not 

do so. Instead, he went to court. That’s a violation of the 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

Chambers has a fallback argument, raised for the first 

time on appeal. He argues that because he eventually filed a 

grievance with the ARB and later amended his complaint, 

his suit is saved. Setting aside the question of waiver, this

argument is meritless. By its plain terms, the PLRA requires

prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing 

suit; a “sue first, exhaust later” approach is not acceptable.

See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398–400 (7th Cir. 2004). A

premature lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice, and 

the prisoner must file a new suit after fully exhausting 

administrative remedies. Id. at 401.

Our decisions in Cannon v. Washington and Barnes v.

Briley are not to the contrary. Those cases addressed amended complaints raising new claims that the plaintiff had

exhausted while litigation was ongoing. Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 717–19 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Barnes,
10 No. 17-3503

420 F.3d at 678. Chambers’s claim against Dr. Sood is not

new; it’s the same claim he raised in his original pro se

complaint, albeit against “Unknown Doctor #1.” The judge

was right to dismiss this suit.

AFFIRMED