alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Joseph A. Serra, Appellant, v. Helen L. Serra, Respondent.

In an action by a husband to declare void his marriage to defendant because of the invalidity of the Mexican divorce decree which she had obtained from her former husband, in which defendant has interposed a counterclaim for separation on the ground of abandonment, the plaintiff husband appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered June 15, 1959, dismissing his complaint and granting a separation to defendant wife on her counterclaim. Judgment modified on the law and the facts: (a) by striking out its first three decretal paragraphs; and (b) by substituting therefor a provision declaring that the marriage between plaintiff and defendant is void on the ground that at the time defendant contracted such marriage she was lawfully married to one Daniel O’Connor, from whom she had failed to obtain a valid decree of divorce; a provision declaring that on May 21, 1939, at the time defendant married plaintiff, she did not have the legal capacity to enter into such marriage; and a provision dismissing defendant’s counterclaim for separation on the ground of plaintiff’s abandonment. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs. The following inconsistent formal findings of fact are reversed: 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th. The following new findings of fact are hereby made: (1) that defendant never resided in the State of Coahuila, Mexico, from whose court she purportedly obtained a decree on December 22, 1938, divorcing her from her first husband, Daniel O’Connor; (2) that defendant never appeared in any court in the State of Coahuila, Mexico, in connection with any divorce action between her and her said first husband; (3) that the courts in the State of Coahuila, Mexico, did not have jurisdiction of the matrimonial *res*between defendant and her said first husband and did not acquire jurisdiction over either of them in any action for divorce between them; (4) that the said purported decree of divorce, dated December 22, 1938, between defendant and her said first husband, is void. The Mexican divorce decree should not have been admitted in evidence because it was not authenticated as required by section 395 of the Civil Practice Act. If we give defendant the full benefit of this exhibit, however (ef. *Flora*v. *Garbean,*38 H. T. Ill), the evidence is nevertheless insufficient to establish a valid decree of divorce. Defendant admitted that she did not appear in Mexico and did not testify in .the Mexican court when the decree was issued. *700She was in New York at the time the decree was obtained for her by her sister who lived in California. Defendant’s former husband testified that he “signed papers” for her, but there is no proof that what he signed was a notice of appearance, nor does the decree recite his appearance. *(Alfaro*v. *Alfaro,*7 N Y 2d 949.) Nolan, P. J., Beldoek, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
### From: Steward, Rosalyn C. [ mailto:Rosalyn.Steward@sba.gov ]

Sent: Tuesday, February 03, 2015 3:48 PM

To: HearthHeatingProd2014STD0036

Subject: public meeting postponement



### Hi John,

Left you a voicemail but wanted to email as well in case it’s easier. HBPA has reached out to my office

they’re having a trade association meeting the week of the public meeting for the hearth rule. I know

they have a lot of members that want to participa te and could provide information and insight that

would be extremely helpful for DOE. What are the chances of postponing the meeting by one week?

Thanks,

Rosalyn Steward | Assistant Chief Counsel | SBA Office of Advocacy | 409 3 rd St. SW,

Washington, DC 20416 |

p 202/205

- 7013 | f 202/481

- 6298

rosalyn.steward@sba.gov | website | news | research | regulation | blog | facebook | twitter |
# ACG-Table 101
##### 



Exhibit 31.2
 
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 June 7, 2006
    /s/ E. Bonnie. SchaeferE. Bonnie  SchaeferCo-Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         63,533
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  667,433
<ALLOWANCES>                                   40,000
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,001,560
<PP&E>                                         274,805
<DEPRECIATION>                                 159,450
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,133,893
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,495,258
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       498,827
<OTHER-SE>                                     (2,128,717)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,133,893
<SALES>                                        2,307,754
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               4,729,318
<CGS>                                          1,650,605
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  2,894,192
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,753,867
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             252,530
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (171,145)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (171,145)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (171,145)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.05)


</TABLE>
### **CHAPTER 2—ELECTIVE FRANCHISE**
17.109 Contract clauses. ( a ) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.217-2, Cancellation Under Multiyear Contracts, in solicitations and contracts when a multiyear contract is contemplated.
( b ) *Economic price adjustment clauses.* Economic price adjustment clauses are adaptable to multiyear contracting needs. When the period of production is likely to warrant a labor and material costs contingency in the contract price, the contracting officer should normally use an economic price adjustment clause (see 16.203). When contracting for services, the contracting officer— ( 1 ) Shall add the clause at 52.222-43, Fair Labor Standards Act and Service Contract Labor Standards—Price Adjustment (Multiple Year and Option Contracts), when the contract includes the clause at 52.222-41, Service Contract Labor Standards;
( 2 ) May modify the clause at 52.222-43 in overseas contracts when laws, regulations, or international agreements require contractors to pay higher wage rates; or
( 3 ) May use an economic price adjustment clause authorized by 16.203, when potential fluctuations require coverage and are not included in cost contingencies provided for by the clause at 52.222-43.
[61 FR 39204, July 26, 1996, as amended at 72 FR 63078, Nov. 7, 2007; 79 FR 24202, Apr. 29, 2014]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David Amesse, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County, rendered July 7, 1961 after a jury trial, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed *(People*v. *Brasch,*193 N. Y. 46; *People*v. *Reade,*13 N Y 2d 42). Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan ad Hopkins, JJ., concur.
CANISCO RESOURCES, INC. 
	
SCHEDULE II Valuation and Qualifying Accounts

March 31, 1997 and 1996 and September 30, 1995 and 1994
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

	                              Additions				
	                  Balance at  Charged to                          Balance
	                  beginning   operating                           at end of
	                  of period   expense       Other      Deductions	period  
<S>                <C>       <C>         <C>           <C>         <C>
Description

Allowance for
doubtful accounts
deducted from
accounts
receivable in
the consolidated
balance sheets:
March 31, 1997       $760,965   265,360       --         827,275    199,050
March 31, 1996        585,941	  233,121	      --          58,097    760,965
September 30, 1995    784,330	  572,096       --         770,485(1) 585,941
September 30, 1994	   107,606 1,359,415    276,434(2)    959,125(1) 784,330

Inventory reserves
deducted from
inventories in the
consolidated balance
sheets:

March 31, 1997       $800,000        --         --       750,000(3)  50,000
March 31, 1996        800,000        --         --           --     800,000
September 30, 1995	   300,000    500,000        --           --     800,000
September 30, 1994    150,000    100,000      50,000(2)      --     300,000


(1)	Write-off of uncollectible accounts.

(2)	Increase from acquisition of subsidiaries.

(3)	Decrease from disposition of subsidiary.


	Exhibit 99.3

 






</TABLE>
# DL_Volume

# Sheet1
1

Subject: RE: Proposal from the Working Group on prior approval

________________________________________

From: Chip Cameron [fxcameo@ ]

Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2013 6:19 AM

To: Kolotos, John; Rory O'sullivan; Angela Peoples; Eileen Connor; Whitney Barkley; Tom Tarantino; Kevin Jensen; Mohr,

Rhonda (rmohr@ ); Warner, Jack; Sandra Kinney; Justice, Della (KYOAG); Libby DeBlasio; Ted Daywalt; Tom

Kriger; Helga Greenfield; rhiggs ; Richard Heath; Glen Gabert; Nassirian, Barmak; Barbara Hoblitzell; Jenny

Rickard; tdalton@ ; Brian Jones; Raymond Testa; Marc Jerome; JBerkowitz@ ; Belle

Wheelan Private; nharvison@

Cc: Margaret Reiter; Mahaffie, Lynn; Wilson, Amy; charlie pou

Subject: Re: Proposal from the Working Group on prior approval

here is the proposal

On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:18 AM, Chip Cameron <fxcameo@ <mailto:fxcameo@ >> wrote:

Negotiators:

Attached is a proposal from the Working Group on prior approval that came in early this morning.  I have included,

below, the transmittal message from Margaret Reiter because it contains an explanation of the proposal.

Chip

"Hi Chip,

Here is the proposal from an informal working group on prior approval.

It is a work in progress.  We tried to be comprehensive and specific.

We note that DE's prior regulation on prior approval included a number of requirements to describe things.  We have

not included those, in the interest of keeping this list as short, as little burden, and as brightlined as possible, but we

don't necessarily object to additional descriptive requirements being added as DE sees fit, as we may not be seeing

issues it believes need to be covered."
17.206 Evaluation. ( a ) In awarding the basic contract, the contracting officer shall, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, evaluate offers for any option quantities or periods contained in a solicitation when it has been determined prior to soliciting offers that the Government is likely to exercise the options. (See 17.208.)
( b ) The contracting officer need not evaluate offers for any option quantities when it is determined that evaluation would not be in the best interests of the Government and this determination is approved at a level above the contracting officer. An example of a circumstance that may support a determination not to evaluate offers for option quantities is when there is a reasonable certainty that funds will be unavailable to permit exercise of the option.
[53 FR 17858, May 18, 1988]
#### 1514.201 Preparation of invitations for bids.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Mary Polubatko, Deceased. Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf *&*Jokes et al., Respondents; Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, Appellant.

Appeal unanimously dismissed, without costs as academic. (Appeal by Comptroller from order of Monroe Surrogate’s Court denying motion to vacate a decree entered December 5, 1961.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Henry and Noonan, JJ.
Devany, Dennis (OSn . 

From: JOHN MC GAULLEY [jmcgauly@verizon.net] 

Sent: . Monday, February 15, 2010 3:13 PM . To: ' Devany, Dennis (OST) 


Cc: Swanson, Brian (OST) 


Subject: Cape Air vs. Colgan C!inton Co. 

. . ..' !.:: 

Gentlemen;' please undo the shenanigans of the Clinton County board of Legislators in cahoots with Garry Douglas, 

. President of. the NCC of Commerce (and possibly Senator Shumer». if no shenanigans how come Garry Douglas knew 

the results before the vote? CAPE AIR is THE airline for Clinton County - with lower fares & morefrequent !'lights to name 

a few advantages. overlook the usual Albany politics &decide for the. people of Clinton County. 

Thank you for your consideration 

John H. McGaulley, Private Citizen 

1.
#### 1552.242-70 Indirect costs.

As prescribed in 1542.705-70, insert the following clause in all cost-reimbursement and non-commercial time and materials type contracts. If ceilings are not being established, enter “not applicable” in paragraph (c) of the clause.

# Indirect Costs (SEP 2017)

(a) In accordance with paragraph (d) of the “Allowable Cost and Payment” clause, the final indirect cost rates applicable to this contract shall be established between the Contractor and the appropriate Government representative (EPA, other Government agency, or auditor), as provided by FAR 42.703-1(a). EPA's procedures require a Contracting Officer determination of indirect cost rates for its contracts. In those cases where EPA is the cognizant agency (see FAR 42.705-1), the final rate proposal shall be submitted to the cognizant audit activity and to the following designated Contracting Officer: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Manager, Financial Analysis and Oversight Service Center, Mail Code 3802R, Policy, Training Oversight Division, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20460.

Where EPA is not the cognizant agency, the final rate proposal shall be submitted to the above-cited address, to the cognizant audit agency, and to the designated Contracting Officer of the cognizant agency. Upon establishment of the final indirect cost rates, the Contractor shall submit an executed Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data (see FAR 15.406-2) applicable to the data furnished in connection with the final rates to the cognizant audit agency. The final rates shall be contained in a written understanding between the Contractor and the appropriate Government representative. Pursuant to the “Allowable Cost and Payment” clause, the allowable indirect costs under this contract shall be obtained by applying the final agreed upon rate(s) to the appropriate bases.

(b) Until final annual indirect cost rates are established for any period, the Government shall reimburse the contractor at billing rates established by the appropriate Government representative in accordance with FAR 42.704, subject to adjustment when the final rates are established. The established billing rates are currently as follows:

| Cost center | Period | Rate | Base |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | |
| | | | |

These billing rates may be prospectively or retroactively revised by mutual agreement, at the request of either the Government or the Contractor, to prevent substantial overpayment or underpayment.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this clause, ceilings are hereby established on indirect costs reimbursable under this contract. The Government shall not be obligated to pay the Contractor any additional amount on account of indirect costs in excess of the ceiling rates listed below:

| Cost center | Period | Rate | Base |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | | |
| | | | |

(End of clause)

[82 FR 33023, July 19, 2017]
15.606-2 Evaluation. ( a ) Comprehensive evaluations shall be coordinated by the agency contact point, who shall attach or imprint on each unsolicited proposal, circulated for evaluation, the legend required by 15.609(d). When performing a comprehensive evaluation of an unsolicited proposal, evaluators shall consider the following factors, in addition to any others appropriate for the particular proposal: ( 1 ) Unique, innovative and meritorious methods, approaches, or concepts demonstrated by the proposal;
( 2 ) Overall scientific, technical, or socioeconomic merits of the proposal;
( 3 ) Potential contribution of the effort to the agency's specific mission;
( 4 ) The offeror's capabilities, related experience, facilities, techniques, or unique combinations of these that are integral factors for achieving the proposal objectives;
( 5 ) The qualifications, capabilities, and experience of the proposed principal investigator, team leader, or key personnel critical to achieving the proposal objectives; and
( 6 ) The realism of the proposed cost.
( b ) The evaluators shall notify the agency point of contact of their recommendations when the evaluation is completed.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Estate of Frank H. Galik, Deceased

Appellate case number: 01-12-00087-CV

Trial court case number: 36727

Trial court: 82nd District Court, Falls County, Texas

On August 15, 2013, appellee, Clifton Galik, filed “Appellee’s Agreed Motion to 

Expedite the Mandate,” noting that appellants, Hazel Galik Dutka and Gerald Galik, did not 

intend to file a petition for review of our July 16, 2013 opinion and requesting that we issue our 

mandate immediately.

We GRANT appellee’s motion to expedite issuance of the mandate and direct the clerk of 

this Court to issue the mandate for the above-captioned case immediately. See TEX. R. APP. P.

18.1(c) (“The mandate may be issued earlier if the parties so agree . . . .”).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

Acting Individually Acting for the Court

Date: August 16, 2013
### SUBCHAPTER VI—NATURALIZATION OF PERSONS SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II
# TEACH Grant - 2011-12
[Cite as State ex rel. Salim v. Betleski, 2019-Ohio-3982.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE EX REL. RYAN SALIM 

 Relator 

 v. 

HON. JUDGE MARK A. BETLESKI 

 Respondent 

 C.A. Nos. 19CA011530 

 19CA011537 

 

ORIGINAL ACTION IN 

PROCEDENDO

Dated: September 30, 2019 

 

 PER CURIAM. 

{¶1} Relator, Ryan Salim, has petitioned this Court for a writ of procedendo to 

compel Respondent, Judge Mark Betleski, to rule on a motion for summary judgment 

pending in Mr. Salim’s underlying civil case. Judge Betleski has moved to dismiss the 

complaint as moot because he has ruled on the motion. Because the motion has been 

ruled on, Mr. Salim’s claim is moot, and this Court dismisses his petition. 

{¶2} To obtain a writ of procedendo, Mr. Salim must establish that he has a clear 

legal right to require the judge to proceed, that the judge has a clear legal duty to proceed, 

and that there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. 

Ward v. Reed, 141 Ohio St.3d 50, 2014-Ohio-4512, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462 (1995). Procedendo is 
C.A. Nos. 19CA011530, 19CA011537 

Page 2 of 3 

the appropriate remedy when a court has refused to render a judgment or has 

unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. See, e.g., State ex rel. CNG Financial 

Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-5344, ¶ 20. It is well-settled that 

procedendo will not “compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed.” 

State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel, 84 Ohio St.3d 252, 253, 1998-Ohio-541. 

{¶3} Mr. Salim sought a writ of procedendo to order the judge to rule on the 

pending motion for summary judgment. This Court may consider evidence outside the 

complaint to determine that an action is moot. State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo, 89 Ohio 

St.3d 227, 228 (2000). According to Judge Betleski’s motion to dismiss, and a review of 

the trial court docket, Judge Betleski ruled on the motion for summary judgment that was 

the subject of this complaint. Accordingly, this matter is moot. 

{¶4} Because Mr. Salim’s claim is moot, his complaint is dismissed. Costs are 

taxed to Mr. Salim. The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon all parties not in 

default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R. 58(B). 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

HENSAL, J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

 
C.A. Nos. 19CA011530, 19CA011537 

Page 3 of 3 

APPEARANCES: 

ROBERT E. JORDAN, JR., Pro se, Relator. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and CHRIS A. PYANOWSKI, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Respondent.