IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ANDREA TORRES,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF 

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

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No. 12 C 01318 

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

The plaintiff, Andres Torres, alleges that her former employer, the State of Illinois 

Department of Employment Security, (“IDES” or the “Agency”) violated Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) by discharging her from 

employment based on her national origin, her sex, and in retaliation for filing a charge with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). IDES now moves for summary judgment. 

For the following reasons, IDES’s motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND1

IDES is a state agency organized under the law of the state of Illinois. ISOF ¶ 2. The 

Agency provides unemployment insurance and employment services for workers, job seekers, 

 1

 The Court takes the following facts from the IDES’s Statement of Material Facts (Dkt. 

51) (“ISOF”), where undisputed, Torres’s Response to IDES’s Statement of Material Facts and 

Statement of Additional Material Facts (Dkt. 52-2) (“TSOF”), and IDES’s Response to Torres’s 

Statement of Additional Facts (Dkt. 54) (I Resp.). 
2 

and employers. ISOF ¶ 2. Torres is a female whose national origin is Mexico. ISOF ¶ 1. She has 

worked for IDES since March 2002 until the present.2

 ISOF ¶ 1. 

The IDES Procedures Manual contains a Code of Ethics, applicable to all IDES 

employees. ISOF ¶ 7. Subsection 1019.505 relates to “Personal Profit/Prestige,” and states, 

“Department employees are not to use their official position and/or status to exert influence to 

obtain monetary or non-monetary consideration, profit, or prestige for themselves or for others.”

ISOF ¶ 8. Subsection 1019.551, entitled “Courtesy: The Public, Co-Workers and Supervisors,” 

states, “All IDES employees shall conduct themselves in a courteous and professional manner 

when dealing with the general public and with co-workers . . . , and shall at all times conduct 

themselves so as not to bring IDES into disrepute.” ISOF ¶ 7. The following section, “Personal 

Conduct/Workplace Violence,” notes, “Physical attacks, threats, intimidation, or harassment are 

expressly forbidden and will not be tolerated. Employees who commit such acts will be subject 

to discharge.” ISOF ¶ 11; see also Dkt. 51-1, Ex. C at 1019.552. 

IDES employees are also subject to the Illinois Department of Central Management 

Services’ (CMS) Personnel Rules. ISOF ¶ 13. The section on “Progressive Corrective 

Discipline” explains:

Unless grounds clearly are present warranting immediate discharge 

or suspension pending decision on discharge, employees shall be 

subject to corrective discipline progressively utilizing counseling, 

warnings, and/or suspension, as the facts and circumstances 

dictate, prior to discharge. If an employee’s work or work-related 

conduct remains unacceptable after the application of progressive 

corrective discipline, such employee may be discharged in 

accordance with the appropriate rules. 

 2

 IDES terminated Torres on May 23, 2008. In March 2009, the Illinois Civil Service 

Commission reversed the discharge and reduced the discipline to a 60-day suspension. ISOF 

¶ 69. 
3 

ISOF ¶ 13. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees’ (AFSCME) 

contract with the state of Illinois (to which Torres is subject as a union member) also requires 

progressive discipline: “include[ing] only the following: a) Oral reprimand [ ]; b) Written 

reprimand; c) Suspension (notice to be given in writing); and d) Discharge (notice to be given in 

writing).” ISOF ¶ 14. 

Over the course of her employment with IDES, Torres worked at three different office 

locations. She began at the Addison office in March 2002 as an Employment Security Program 

Representative. ISOF ¶ 15. While working at the Addison office, Torres received an oral 

reprimand for unprofessional conduct “on numerous occasions throughout the day on Thursday 

February 19, 2004, creating disharmony and dissension amongst [her] coworkers, disrupting the 

workflow and failing to provide service to the claimants.”3

 TSOF ¶ 16. The oral reprimand was 

later reduced to documented counseling through a grievance resolution process. ISOF ¶ 16. 

A few months later, IDES issued Torres a written reprimand for violating the Code of 

Ethics section on Personal Conduct/Courtesy and for unauthorized use of the Agency’s email 

system for non-work related purposes.4

 TSOF ¶ 19. Torres accidentally copied a co-worker, 

 3

 Torres does not dispute that she received an oral reprimand but disputes “the veracity of 

the claims purported by the document.” TSOF ¶ 16. IDES argues that the veracity of the various 

disciplinary documents and witness statements are not at issue because these documents “are not 

offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but because of the effect they had on Defendant.” 

Reply at 3 n.2, Dkt. 53. The Court agrees. As discussed further infra, where Torres disputes the 

facts of a particular incident but does not dispute that the report was made or disciplinary action 

was taken, she has not pointed to a genuine factual dispute preventing summary judgment. 

Moreover, Torres fails to cite support for her disagreements with IDES’s Statement of Facts as 

required under LR 56.1(b)(3)(B). Her failure to cite any support is therefore considered assent to 

IDES’s statement of that fact. See Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 788 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763 

(N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Drake v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998)) 

(“An adequate rebuttal requires a citation to specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated 

denial is not adequate.”).

4 Torres disputes that she used the Agency’s email system for non-work related purposes 

but does not cite any support for this disagreement. TSOF ¶ 19. 
4 

Chaquita Harris, on an email Torres sent to another co-worker from her IDES email account. 

ISOF ¶ 20. The email stated that Torres’s manager and supervisor were “UP TO NO GOOD 

TRYING TO COVER THERE SELVES. THIS HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH MY 

COMPLAINT WITH HR.” ISOF ¶ 20. When she realized her mistaken inclusion of Harris, 

Torres sent Harris an email stating, “THE EMAIL THAT WAS MISTAKENLY MAILED TO 

YOU IS CONFIDENTIAL AND A PRIVATE CONSERVATION (sic) BETWEEN DEWITT 

AND MYSELF SHOULD YOU USE IT IN ANY WAY SHAPE OR FORM YOU WOULD BE 

INVADING MY PRIVACY. YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED!!” ISOF ¶ 21. After receiving this 

email, Harris contacted the manager of Labor Relations, explaining via email: 

I was threatened by a co-worker. I go to lunch alone mostly and 

leave alone in the evening. Since these events occurred, I ask 

people to go with me to the bathroom and lunch area. The person 

in question appears to be very volatile. I also know that she 

falsifies things. I am extremely uncomfortable and concerned 

about my safety-both inside the office and the parking lot.5

TSOF ¶ 22. The written reprimand Torres received for this incident noted, “As a matter of record 

you received a counseling for unprofessional conduct issued on March 4, 2004. If there are 

similar occurrences, you will be subject to more severe disciplinary actions, up to and including 

your discharge from employment.” ISOF ¶ 23. 

In 2004, Torres requested and received a transfer to the Maywood IDES office. ISOF 

¶ 24. While working at the Maywood office, Torres received counseling from her supervisor for 

failing to service a client.6

 TSOF ¶ 25. Shortly thereafter, in December 2005, Torres bid on a 

 5 Torres does not dispute the content of Harris’s email to management but disputes, 

without record support, that she threatened Harris, that she is volatile, and that she has falsified 

things. TSOF ¶ 22. In her deposition, Torres admitted that her email to Harris was not an 

appropriate way to communicate with a co-worker. ISOF, Ex. B. 100:14-17. 

6

 Torres does not dispute that she received counseling but disputes, without record 

support, that she did not service a client. TSOF ¶ 25. 
5 

position in the Bolingbrook office and transferred to that office in January 2006. ISOF ¶ 27. At 

the Bolingbrook office, Torres reported directly to her supervisor, Art Welch, and reported 

indirectly to the office manager, LouDawn Howard. ISOF ¶ 29. 

Torres received an additional written reprimand for events that occurred on October 27, 

2006. The notice of the disciplinary meeting that Torres received on December 19, 2006 stated: 

[O]n October 27, 2006 at about 12:00 p.m., you approached your 

supervisor, Mr. Welch, and informed him that you were about 

finished with your work. Mr. Welch informed you that he was 

going to lunch at 1:00 p.m. and upon his return, he would give (sic) 

appeals to process for the rest of the day. After Mr. Welch left, you 

approached another supervisor, Mr. Bojansky around 1:00 p.m. 

and asked him for work. Mr. Bojansky informed you that you 

needed to wait until your immediate supervisor returns from lunch. 

You then left the office and did not return that day. Further, you 

did not contact your supervisor prior to leaving the office nor did 

you receive any management approval for your absence. 

Therefore, your absence was unauthorized.7

TSOF ¶ 30; see also Torres Dep. at 136:7-10, Dkt. 51, Ex. B. The written reprimand stated that 

Torres had violated the IDES Code of Ethics section on Failure to Follow Supervisory Directives 

and Insubordination. 8 TSOF ¶ 31. 

On November 14, 2006, Torres emailed Howard that she wished “to file a grievance 

against Art Welch for harassment 11/04/2006 during non working hours @ life time health 

club.” ISOF ¶ 32. Torres stated that she also informed Laura Crivlare, the manager of Labor 

Relations, about her complaints against Welch on December 4, 2006. ISOF ¶ 32; I Resp. ¶ 92.9

 7

 Torres does not dispute that she received a written reprimand but disputes, without 

record support, the facts underlying the reprimand. TSOF ¶ 30. 

8

 Torres does not dispute that she received a written reprimand but disputes, without 

records support, the facts underlying the reprimand. TSOF ¶ 31. Torres received the written 

reprimand for this incident on April 2, 2007. TSOF ¶ 101. 

9

 The majority of Torres’s citations in her Statement of Additional Facts are to 

inadmissible evidence (unauthenticated documents, hearsay, etc.) that cannot be considered in a 

summary judgment motion. See Visser v. Packer Eng’g Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th 
6 

Welch denied Torres’s allegations. ISOF¶ 33. That same day, Beth Denault, Acting Regional 

Manager, directed Torres to report to Welch (Torres had temporarily been reporting to Howard 

for the previous two weeks). I Resp. ¶ 92. Torres also reported to Howard and Crivlare that 

Welch “threatened her with discipline” for speaking to IDES’s EEO office, Carlos Charneco. 

I Resp. ¶ 93. 

In December 2006, Crivlare emailed Torres regarding the tone of emails Torres had sent 

to her supervisor, Welch. TSOF ¶ 34. Crivlare stated: 

During work time, Art can ask you what you are doing/working on 

at any time. If you cover the material or computer screen or turn 

off your monitor, Art can ask or direct you to show him what you 

are covering. If you refuse you can be held accountable for your 

insubordination. Once again, the computer, phone, etc. (including 

the email system) is not your personal property, it is the property 

of the State of Illinois . . . Further the tone of your email is 

disrespectful. Again, Art has the right as well as the responsibility 

to remind you of the proper/permissible use of the computer. 10

TSOF ¶ 34. 

On January 26, 2007, Torres received a notice for a pre-disciplinary meeting regarding 

incidents that occurred on January 17, 2007. The notice stated: 

On January 17, 2007, at approximately 2:45 p.m., you displayed 

disruptive, discourteous and unprofessional conduct when you 

approached your supervisor, Mr. Welch, and in a loud and 

confrontational manner questioned the location of the claimant, 

Maureen A.’s file. . . . At that point, you began swinging your 

hands and in an extremely loud and angry tone yelled, “You guys 

do not follow rules and you have no right taking any files off my 

desk – those are my documents.” Mr. Welch explained to you that 

the adjudication files were not your property, but rather the 

 

Cir. 1991) (“[I]f not admissible at trial neither is it admissible in an affidavit used to support or 

resist the grant of summary judgment.”). Because the Court is granting summary judgment for 

IDES regardless of the veracity of these additional statements, however, it will note Torres’s 

additional factual assertions. 

10 Torres does not dispute the content of Crivlare’s email but disputes, without record 

support, the truth of the matter asserted in the email. TSOF ¶ 34. 
7 

property of the State of Illinois . . . . Following his explanation, 

you continued yelling “You have no right to take any files from my 

desk.” On the same business day, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Mr. 

Welch received a call from claimant Maureen A. in regards to her 

scheduled adjudication interview at 2:45 p.m. Mr. Welch placed 

the (sic) Maureen A. on hold and approached you for an 

explanation as to why you failed to contact the client as scheduled. 

. . . [Y]ou again in the presence of co-workers and the public 

became very angry and hostile, while swinging your arms wildly 

you yelled, “You do it – I’m not doing it. . . . You get out of my 

face.”11

TSOF ¶ 35. Welch and three of Torres’s co-workers who witnessed the incident wrote statements 

accompanying the meeting notice. TSOF ¶ 36. Sandra Lichner’s statement noted that “Andrea 

began to yell at Art and started waiving material in her hands” and that “this has happened at

least twice before with Andrea yelling at Art.”12 TSOF ¶ 37. Heather Allen’s statement read, 

“Andrea Torres, out of nowhere, starting (sic) screaming at our adjudication supervisor, Art 

Welch . . . She then rudely and aggressively yelled at a claimant on the phone a short time later 

. . . And, she verbally attacked Art again the same day, around 3:10pm. It was so shocking . . . 

She was of a violent like nature, swinging her arms as if she was going to assault the supervisor. 

Unfortunately, this has happened before.”

13 TSOF ¶ 38. Garry Wilson wrote that Torres’s 

manner “was extremely adversarial and much more vociferous than was necessary in light of 

their relative proximity.”14 TSOF ¶ 39. Labor Relations Manager Crivlare issued Torres a threeday suspension in March 2007 for this incident. ISOF ¶¶ 40-41. Suspension is the next level of 

 11 Torres does not dispute the contents of the notice but disputes, without record support, 

the characterization of her actions. TSOF ¶ 35. 

12 Torres does not dispute the contents of Lichner’s statement but disputes, without record 

support, the facts underlying the statement. TSOF ¶ 37. 

13 Torres does not dispute the contents of Allen’s statement but disputes, without record 

support, the facts underlying the statement. TSOF ¶ 38. 

14 Torres does not dispute the contents of Wilson’s statement but disputes, without record 

support, the facts underlying the statement. TSOF ¶ 39. 
8 

progressive discipline after written reprimands, of which Torres had previously received two. 

ISOF ¶ 41. 

On May 29, 2007, Torres filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that 

IDES had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and national origin, and retaliation. 

ISOF ¶ 44. Torres’s retaliation claim in this lawsuit is based on her filing of this 2007 EEOC 

charge. Compl. ¶¶ 9(h), 12(g). Torres’s 2007 EEOC charge recounted alleged instances of sexual 

harassment by Welch in 2006: 

[O]n September 23, 2006, Arthur Welch approached me near the 

hot tub in Life Time Health Club, started to talk about personal 

information such as who am I with, while staring at my breasts in 

my bathing suit during non-working hours. His penis gets raised 

through his bathing suit. 

On October 29, 2006 Arthur Welch harassed me during nonworking hours at the Life Time Health Club. He approached me 

and stated to talk about work related issues and kept asking me 

where I was going on October 30, 2006, the day I was preapproved on a day off, prying into my personal life. 

ISOF ¶ 44 n.5. Torres’s retaliation charge claimed that Welch assigned her more work than her 

co-workers, once refused to give her the over-time sign in sheet, required Torres to provide 

verification of her sick leave since she had exhausted all of her time off, and altered her 

performance evaluation from “meets expectations” to “needs improvement” on productivity and 

use of time. I Resp. ¶¶ 84, 88, 90, 103. The EEOC eventually issued a notice of right-to-sue 

letter, “determining it was unable to conclude that the evidence established violations of Title 

VII.” ISOF ¶ 44 n.5. 

In June 2007, IDES received a letter from claimant “Nancy J.” complaining about 

Torres’s behavior during an interview conducted on May 29, 2007. The letter stated: 
9 

I am writing regarding a very degrading experience I have had to 

go through during my unemployment with one of your 

adjudicators, Ms. Andrea Torres. . . . She was loud and shouting 

into the phone . . . . She was just so nasty, rude, pushy and it made 

me cry for hours after her put down and dehumanizing session.15

TSOF¶ 45. The letter further noted that Nancy J. called to talk to a supervisor and spoke to 

Welch and that “[he] reviewed my claim, called me and released the payment the next day. I had 

to wait longer than anyone else due to Ms. Torres who is a very angry person with a lack of 

professionalism.”16 TSOF ¶ 46. 

On August 20, 2007, LouDawn Howard took a statement from claimant “Marva B.” 

TSOF ¶ 47. The statement noted that Torres had called Marva to discuss her claim. TSOF ¶ 47. 

When Marva asked Torres “to hold so [she] could get rid of [another incoming] call,” she “heard 

Ms. Torres make a statement ‘That’s why you lost your last job, placing calls on hold,’” then the 

call disconnected.17 TSOF ¶ 47. Marva further explained that she called back to speak to Torres 

about her claim, but Torres kept asking her to fax a letter or to send an email about what had 

happened on the first call that morning.18 TSOF ¶ 48. 

Torres received a notice of a pre-disciplinary meeting on November 15, 2007, regarding 

the complaints from Nancy J. and Marva B. ISOF ¶ 49. Crivlare approved a seven-day 

suspension for Torres, noting the increasingly progressive discipline Torres had already 

received—written reprimand followed by a three-day suspension—and that “[a]ny similar 

 15 Torres does not dispute the contents of Nancy J.’s letter but disputes, without record 

support, the facts underlying the letter. TSOF ¶ 45. 

16 Torres does not dispute the contents of Nancy J.’s letter but disputes, without record 

support, the facts underlying the letter. TSOF ¶ 46. 

17 Torres does not dispute the contents of Marva B.’s statement but disputes, without 

record support, the facts underlying the statement. TSOF ¶ 47. 

18 Torres does not dispute the contents of Marva B.’s statement but disputes, without 

record support, the facts underlying the statement. TSOF ¶ 48. 
10 

conduct in the future will result in more-severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge 

from employment.” ISOF ¶ 50. 

The incident leading to Torres’s termination took place on December 28, 2007. Torres 

went to the Bolingbrook Currency Exchange to have her divorce papers notarized. ISOF ¶ 51. 

Because Torres was “driving on a ticket,” she was unable to provide photo identification when 

asked for it at the Currency Exchange. ISOF ¶ 51. Instead, Torres handed the Currency Exchange 

employees, Rosa Rodriguez and Esmerelda Carrera, her IDES business card. ISOF ¶¶ 51-52. The 

employees later contacted IDES and provided a written statement of what next occurred at the 

Currency Exchange. TSOF ¶ 56. The statement read: 

On Friday December 28, 2007 Andres Torres came into the 

Currency Exchange in Bolingbrook to request notarization of a 

document. When we advised her that we would need some 

identification with a picture on it, she got very belligerent and 

hostile telling us we should notarize the document anyway. When 

we refused, she insisted on speaking to the supervisor who told her 

that a picture identification was necessary. At that point she 

threatened that if any of us ever came to the unemployment office 

in Bolingbrook we would be in trouble and that she was a 

supervisor there. I don’t think that a State Employee should be 

threatening other people like that.19

TSOF ¶ 57. Upon learning of the statement, Torres went to the Bolingbrook Currency Exchange 

on at least two occasions to talk to the women and to bring them a dozen roses. ISOF ¶ 59. 

On February 27, 2008, the women from the Currency Exchange wrote a statement that 

they were withdrawing their complaint against Torres “with the understanding that is (sic) would 

be over and done with and nothing else comes of this. Against us.”20 TSOF ¶ 60. Welch spoke 

 19 Torres does not dispute that the Rodriguez and Carrera’s statement was attached to the 

pre-disciplinary meeting notice but disputes, without record support, the facts underlying the 

statement. TSOF ¶ 57. 

20 Torres does not dispute the content of Rodriguez and Carrera’s statement but disputes 

“any construction or meaning of said statement that infers or suggests that she threatened the 
11 

with Rodriguez about withdrawing the complaint and documented their conversation. The 

statement, which Rodriguez signed, explained, “Andrea had come to see them several times to 

ask them to withdraw their complaint . . . Andrea told them that she was having a very hard time 

and was going through a divorce and had filed complaints against people and this would not look 

good . . . Rosa did affirm the fact that Andrea did threaten to deny them benefits if ever they 

were to come to the unemployment office and file for benefits and that Andrea was a supervisor 

at the Bolingbrook office.”21 TSOF ¶ 62. 

On April 16, 2008, Crivlare sent Torres a notice of pre-disciplinary meeting for Torres’s 

conduct after the Currency Exchange incident. TSOF ¶ 64. The notice cited “Gross Misconduct 

Intimidating a Witness, Impeding an Investigation” and stated that Torres “harassed the 

complaining witness in attempt to further influence her to withdraw her complaint.”22 TSOF 

¶ 64. After the pre-disciplinary meeting, IDES recommended to CMS that Torres be discharged 

for cause based on her violation of the IDES Code of Ethics. ISOF ¶ 66. Crivlare had the 

“ultimate say” with respect to terminating Torres. ISOF ¶ 67. IDES officially discharged Torres 

on May 23, 2008. TSOF ¶ 123. 

Torres filed a charge of discrimination against IDES with the Illinois Department of 

Human Rights (IDHR) (Charge No. 2009CF1286) on October 30, 2008. ISOF ¶ 4. The charge 

alleged: (1) IDES discharged Torres based on her national origin (Mexico); (2) IDES discharged 

Torres based on her sex (female); and (3) IDES discharged Torres in retaliation for filing a 

 

women from the Bolingbrook Currency Exchange in any manner.” TSOF ¶ 60. Again, Torres’s 

disagreement does not cite to any record support as required per LR 56.1(b)(3)(B). 

21 Torres disputes these facts but offers no record support. TSOF ¶ 62. 

22 Torres disputes that she harassed the complaining witness but offers no record support. 

TSOF ¶ 64. 
12 

sexual harassment claim with the EEOC in January 2007.23 ISOF ¶ 5. More than three years 

later, on November 21, 2011, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue based on the 2008 IDHR 

charge. Compl. at 7, Dkt. 1. On February 24, 2012, Torres filed a complaint in this Court against 

IDES alleging the same three charges of employment discrimination enumerated in her IDHR 

charge.24 ISOF ¶ 3. She attached a copy of the IDHR charge to her complaint, incorporating the 

narrative as the factual allegations supporting her discrimination and retaliation claims.25 TSOF 

¶ 4. 

DISCUSSION

Torres’s Title VII claims are based on her 2008 charge of discrimination filed with 

IDHR, in which she alleges discrimination based on national origin and sex and retaliatory 

discharge. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding 

IDES’s motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all facts and inferences in favor of 

the nonmoving party. Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2015). If the 

moving party has demonstrated the absence of a disputed material fact, then the burden shifts to 

the nonmoving party to “provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute.” Carroll 

v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). Based on the undisputed facts in the record, Torres 

 23 Torres’s IDHR charge underlying the complaint states that she filed the EEOC charge 

alleging sexual harassment in January 2007. IDHR Charge ¶ III.B.1. However, she actually filed 

the charge on May 30, 2007. TSOF Ex. I. 

24 Any judicial claim covered by an EEOC charge must be filed within 90 days of receipt 

of the right-to-sue letter. The complaint alleges that Torres received the letter, which was dated 

November 21, 2011, on November 26, 2011. IDES does not challenge this allegation or the 

timeliness of the complaint. 

25 Torres disputes, without any support, that the “narrative of the Charge [contains] the 

sole factual allegations supporting her discrimination and retaliation claims.” TSOF ¶ 4. 
13 

has not met her burden to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute. Summary 

judgment is therefore granted to IDES. 

I. National Origin Discrimination 

Torres has conceded that her claim for discrimination based on national origin should 

have been a claim for discrimination based on race. Resp. at 9, Dkt. 52-1. She admits that she did 

not make a timely amendment of the Complaint to address this error and provides no argument 

on this claim. Id. Summary judgment is therefore granted to IDES on this claim. 

II. Sex Discrimination 

Before addressing the merits of the sex discrimination claim, the Court notes limitations 

on filing Title VII claims. To bring an action under Title VII, a person must first file a charge 

with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1)(A). Generally, a 

plaintiff “may not bring claims under Title VII that were not originally included in the charges 

made to the EEOC.” Moore v. Vital Products, Inc., 641 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003)). There is an exception for 

charges that are “reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge and growing out of 

such allegations.” Moore, 641 F.3d at 256. To be sufficiently related, the relevant claim and 

EEOC charge “must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same 

individuals.” Id. at 257 (quoting Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 

1994)). Allowing a complaint to include allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC 

charge would frustrate the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory role. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. 

Whether the claim is within the scope of the EEOC charge is a question of law. Conner v. Illinois 

Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005). 
14 

The IDHR charge underlying Torres’s complaint alleges discharge based on “sex, 

female.” IDHR Charge ¶ II.A, Dkt. 1. The relevant factual narrative for this charge states: 

1. My sex is female. 

2. I began my employment with Respondent on March 2, 

2002. My job performance met Respondent’s legitimate 

expectations. 

3. On May 23, 2008, I was discharged by Art Welch, 

Supervisor. The reason Welch gave for discharging me was 

that I intimidated an individual to withdraw her complaint 

against me. 

4. Similarly situated male employees, Joe Campbell and Gary 

Wilson, were treated differently under similar 

circumstances. 

IDHR Charge ¶¶ II.B.1-4. The language of the IDHR charge tracks the elements of an indirect 

method of proving a prima facie case of sex discrimination: (1) plaintiff was a member of a 

protected class (i.e. female); (2) plaintiff was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; 

(3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) at least one similarly situated 

employee not in plaintiff’s protected class was treated more favorably. See, e.g., Wyninger v. 

New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004).

Torres’s complaint similarly alleges discrimination based on sex. Compl. ¶ 9(g). In her 

response to IDES’s summary judgment motion, however, Torres solely argues sexual harassment 

based on a hostile work environment. See Resp. at 9-16. It is true, as Torres maintains, that a 

plaintiff “may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has

created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895 

(7th Cir. 2005). But Torres did not allege sexual harassment in the IDHR charge underlying this 

complaint and “[o]rdinarily, a claim of sexual harassment cannot be reasonably inferred from 

allegations in an EEOC charge of sexual discrimination.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 503. As the Seventh 

Circuit explained in Cheek, 
15 

As a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that 

are not included in her EEOC charge. . . . For allowing a complaint to 

encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge 

would frustrate the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as 

deprive the charged party of notice of the charge. . . . Because an employer 

may discriminate on the basis of sex in numerous ways, a claim of sex 

discrimination in an EEOC charge and a claim of sex discrimination in a 

complaint are not alike or reasonably related just because they both assert 

forms of sex discrimination. 

31 F.3d at 500-01. See also, e.g., Vela v. Village of Sauk Village, 218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 

2000) (rejecting sexual harassment claim not fairly presented in EEOC charge); Jayne v. ABF 

Freight System, Inc., 202 F.3d 273, 1999 WL 1075159 (7th Cir. 1999) (same). The inverse is 

also true: an EEOC charge based on sexual harassment does not permit a judicial claim asserting 

sexual discrimination in the termination of employment. See Moore v. Vital Products, Inc., 641 

F.3d 253, 256-57 (7th Cir. 2011). 

It cannot be said that Torres’s sexual harassment claim is sufficiently related to the claim 

of sex discrimination described in the IDHR charge, nor can her claim be described as “growing 

out of the allegations” set forth there. The conduct alleged in Torres’s summary judgment 

response—that Welch invited her on his boat, approached her twice at the Life Time Fitness 

facility, and stood too close to her on three occasions—is entirely unrelated to the facts asserted 

in her IDHR charge. See Resp. at 9 (argument heading: “Sexual Harassment Based on Hostile 

Environment”); 10, 13-14; cf. Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A] 

plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion 

for summary judgment.”). The only reference to “sexual harassment” in the IDHR charge is part 

of Torres’s retaliation claim, alleging that she was discharged for filing a previous EEOC charge 
16 

of sexual harassment in 2007. Torres never pursued that claim,26 and her subsequent 2008 IDHR 

charge presented no claim that she was subject to sexual harassment after the incidents she 

reported in her original claim. 

As a matter of law, then, Torres’s sexual harassment claim is outside the scope of her 

2008 IDHR charge. Torres has therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with 

respect to her claim of sexual harassment, and it is not properly before the Court. Because Torres 

made no other arguments regarding her sex discrimination claim, the Court grants IDES’s 

motion for summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim. 

III. Retaliatory Discharge 

Torres claims that she was discharged in May 2008 in retaliation for filing an EEOC 

charge of sexual harassment in May 2007. IDHR Charge ¶ III. Title VII prohibits retaliation 

against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff may use either the indirect or 

direct method of proof. Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A. Indirect Method of Proof 

Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

discrimination by showing that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an 

adverse employment action; (3) no other similarly situated employees who engaged in the 

protected activity suffered adverse employment actions; and (4) she was performing her job 

 26 Although Torres did receive a notice of right-to-sue from the EEOC on September 28, 

2009 for the 2007 sexual harassment charge, the 90-day limit in which she could have filed suit 

for that charge expired long ago. See Reply, Ex. A, Dkt. 53. 
17 

satisfactorily. See Treadwell v. Office of Ill. Sec’y of State, 455 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Torres does not attempt to establish her retaliation claim under the indirect method. See Resp. at 

16 (reciting elements of direct method only). Accordingly, Torres has waived this argument. See

Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an 

argument—as the [plaintiff has] done here—results in waiver.”).

B. Direct Method of Proof 

To establish retaliation under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must provide 

evidence that (1) “[she] engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) that the defendants 

subjected [her] to an adverse employment action and (3) that a causal connection exists between 

the two events.” Gates, 513 F.3d at 686 (quoting Treadwell, 455 F.3d at 781) (brackets in 

original). To establish a causal link, the plaintiff must show that her protected activity “was a 

but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). That means that Torres must adduce evidence sufficient to 

convince a reasonable trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she would not have 

been terminated had she not alleged that Welch sexually harassed her. Id. at 2525. 

Torres satisfies the first two requirements of this standard but fails the third. Complaining 

to an employer about sexual harassment is a protected activity under Title VII. See Bernier v. 

Morningstar, Inc., 495 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Tomanovich v. City of Chicago,

457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 

satisfies the first element of the direct method of proof). And IDES does not contest, of course, 

that Torres’s ultimate termination was an adverse employment action. As to the third element, 

causation, however, Torres has failed to prove a genuine dispute of material fact. 
18 

Establishing a causal link may be done “via direct evidence, which would entail 

something akin to an admission by the employer (‘I’m firing you because you had the nerve to 

accuse me of sex discrimination!’).” Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 388 

(7th Cir. 2012). Torres has provided no such direct evidence here. Causation also may be 

established via circumstantial evidence, however, such as (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous 

statements oral or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the 

protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of causation might be drawn, 

(2) evidence showing that the employer systematically treated other, similarly situated . . . 

employees better, or (3) evidence that . . . the employer’s justification [for the adverse action 

was] pretextual.” Id. at 388-89 (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 637 F.3d 

729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011)). These evidentiary categories are not exclusive; the point is that there 

must be sufficient evidence from which it would be reasonable to infer that the adverse 

employment action would not have been taken if the plaintiff had not engaged in the protected 

action. 

To establish causation, Torres relies almost entirely on the timing of her complaints of 

sexual harassment in 2006 and her termination in May 2008. See IDHR Charge ¶ III.B.3 (“The 

adverse action followed my protected activity within such a period of time as to raise an 

inference of retaliatory motivation.”). Torres explains that she reported Welch to her supervisors 

on December 4, 2006, was disciplined seven times thereafter, and ultimately discharged on May 

23, 2008. Resp. at 17-18. A mere temporal link—especially one attenuated over almost a year 

and a half—is not sufficient to establish the causal connection between the protected act and the 

adverse employment action. See, e.g., Garcia v. U.S. Postal Serv., 414 F. App’x 855, 858 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that a year between the adverse action and the protected 
19 

activity—without something more—cannot establish a causal connection.”); Everroad v. Scott 

Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] year is too long in the absence of any 

other evidence tying the protected activity to the adverse action, [thus plaintiff] has failed to 

establish the requisite causal connection.”); Clay v. Interstate Nat. Corp., 900 F. Supp. 981, 993-

94 (N.D. Ill. 1995) aff’d, 124 F.3d 203 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If temporal proximity were per se

sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection, [employers] would be effectively 

straightjacketed by [an employee’s] decision to file a charge of discrimination . . . The law does 

not require this.”). 

While Torres notes that she was disciplined a number of times after she reported Welch’s 

alleged harassment, and she denies that she engaged in any misconduct that warranted the 

disciplinary actions taken, she identifies no evidence other than timing to suggest that any of 

these disciplinary episodes were the product of retaliatory animus rather than genuine 

disapproval of Torres’s conduct. Timing is an insufficient basis to infer causation for many 

reasons, and Torres’s situation highlights several in particular. The sheer number of disciplinary 

incidents cuts against her; plainly, IDES did not terminate her at the first opportunity but rather 

applied progressive discipline consistent with its internal policies. record that shows restraint, 

rather than alacrity, in responding to continued misconduct provides no support to a claim that 

the discipline is the product of retaliatory animus. Further highlighting her failure to adduce any 

evidence of causation is the fact that she also had been disciplined for similar behavior numerous 

times before reporting the alleged sexual harassment. In 2004, while working at the Addison 

office, Torres was disciplined twice, receiving an oral reprimand (later reduced to counseling) 

for unprofessional conduct and a written reprimand for personal conduct and unauthorized use of 

the Agency’s email system. TSOF ¶¶ 16, 19. While at the Maywood office in 2005, Torres 
20 

received counseling for not servicing a client. TSOF ¶ 25. This disciplinary history preceding 

any claim of sexual harassment by Torres undercuts Torres’s theory that she was disciplined in 

retaliation for complaining about Welch; this record provides no basis to infer that the cause of 

the disciplinary actions that followed Torres’s harassment report were simply trumped up 

excuses to retaliate against her. 

Torres also ignores that Welch, the object of her sexual harassment claims, did not issue 

her discipline and that Crivlare, the Labor Relations Manager, had the “ultimate say” with 

respect to her termination. ISOF ¶ 67. Although Welch filed a statement reporting the January 

2007 incident that resulted in Torres’s three-day suspension in March 2007, so did three coworkers who witnessed the incident and confirmed Torres’s unprofessional behavior. ISOF 

¶¶ 36-41. It was Crivlare, moreover, not Welch, who suspended Torres. Crivlare also approved 

the seven-day suspension in response to the complaints from claimants Nancy J. and Marva B. 

ISOF ¶¶ 49-50. In the accompanying suspension memorandum, Crivlare reminded Torres of the 

IDES Code of Conduct and progressive discipline policy, stating “any similar conduct in the 

future will result in more-severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge from 

employment.” ISOF ¶ 50. Torres does not explain why Crivlare would retaliate against Torres 

for reporting sexual harassment by Welch, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that 

Welch influenced Crivlare to discipline Torres or to terminate her because of Torres’s 

complaints about Welch. See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 309 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(no circumstantial evidence of retaliation where manager other than plaintiff’s direct supervisor, 

about whom plaintiff had complained, made the termination decision); Ripberger v. Corizon, 

Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 2014) (insufficient evidence of retaliation where plaintiff failed 

to establish that alleged retaliator was involved in decision not to hire her for new position). 
21 

Torres cites a number of emails to support her assertion that Welch “had the cooperation 

and assistance of his superiors” in retaliating against her. Resp. at 18. However, none of these 

emails are to or from Crivlare nor do they even copy her on the message. Because this evidence 

does not involve the decision-maker responsible for issuing Torres’s discipline, it does not 

support Torres’s theory that Welch influenced management to retaliate against her. Rather, each 

time Crivlare disciplined Torres, including her discharge, Crivlare acted in response to 

complaints or statements of third parties—other IDES workers who witnessed Torres’s 

unprofessional conduct, the letters from the claimants complaining about Torres’s service, and 

the statement of the Currency Exchange employees. 

That Torres disputes the veracity of the incidents recorded in her disciplinary notices and 

of the complaints lodged against her by IDES claimants and the workers at the Bolingbrook 

Currency Exchange does not change the analysis. As an initial matter, Torres offers no factual 

support or citations to the record to support her disagreements with these statements of fact as 

required by Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). In 

opposing a summary judgment motion, it is not enough to say in your brief, “I dispute that.”

Under the applicable federal and local rules, the non-movant must identify evidence that creates 

a material dispute of fact. As the Seventh Circuit has very recently reiterated: 

[T]he obligation of the party opposing summary judgment is to demonstrate 

that there are one or more such factual disputes . . . by identifying 

admissible evidence that would permit the trier of fact to make a finding in 

the non-movant’s favor as to any issue as to which it bears the burden of 

proof. . . . Toward that end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 demands 

that the non-movant “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” in 

order to show that there is a genuine dispute of fact between the parties on a 

relevant point. Rule 56(c)(1)(A) (emphasis ours). Local rules . . . make the 

particularity requirement even more explicit . . . . We have long sustained 

“the exacting obligation” such rules impose on the party contesting 

summary judgment to identify and guide the court to the specific evidence 

on which it is relying to show that a trial is required. 
22 

Packer v. Trustees of Indiana Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 15-1095, 2015 WL 5063202, at *3-4 (7th 

Cir. Aug. 28, 2015). 

 Notwithstanding these requirements to identify specific evidence that establishes a 

material fact dispute, Torres’s response fails to cite to record evidence to establish that she did 

not engage in the misconduct for which she was ostensibly disciplined. To illustrate, IDES SOF 

¶ 47 alleges that Howard received a complaint from a claimant named “Marva B.” about how 

Torres treated her during a telephone interview. According to Marva B., when she asked Torres 

if she could put her on hold briefly to “get rid” of an incoming call, Torres responded by saying, 

“That’s why you lost your last job, placing calls on hold,” and then hung on Marva B. In 

response, Torres does not point to record evidence that disputes this claim; instead, she recites 

what seems to be her mantra in responding to IDES’s Statement of Facts: “Plaintiff does not 

dispute Facts [sic] #47 to the extent that the above-named claimant provided a statement to 

LouDawn Howard. Plaintiff disputes the remainder of Facts 47.” See also, e.g., Plaintiff’s 

responses to IDES SOF ¶¶ 16, 19, 22, 25, 30, 34, 38-39, 45-46, 48, 56, 60 (conceding existence 

of complaints concerning her conduct but disputing facts asserted in those complaints without 

citation to contrary record evidence). 

In any event, even if Torres had adduced admissible evidence sufficient to create one or 

more fact disputes about whether she engaged in the misconduct on which the disciplinary action 

was ostensibly based, those fact disputes would not save her claim because they would not be 

material to the question of whether IDES’s reasons for disciplining Torres were pretexts for 

retaliation. The discipline that Torres received while working in the Bolingbrook office was not 

predicated on complaints lodged by Welch, or Howard, or other IDES supervisors—it was 

predicated on complaints lodged against Torres by other employees and third parties. These 
23 

complaints consisted of the statements of the three IDES co-workers who witnessed Torres’s 

unprofessional conduct, the two letters from claimants Nancy J. and Marva B. complaining about 

Torres’s service, and the statement of the two Currency Exchange employees. The veracity of 

these third-party statements is not material (no claim is asserted that IDES knew that the claims 

were false, and the evidence of record uniformly suggests that they were accurate); their 

relevance lies not in their truth but in the effect they had on IDES. Whether the information 

IDES relied on is accurate is beside the point. In evaluating pretext, “[t]he question is not 

whether the employer’s stated reason [for taking an adverse employment action] was inaccurate 

or unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the 

discharge.” Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2015). 

To sum up: Torres cannot create a fact dispute about why she was discharged without 

adducing evidence that IDES would not have credited the accounts of the Currency Exchange 

workers unless it was seeking to retaliate against her for reporting harassment by Welch. She has 

not produced a shred of evidence to support such an inference. To the contrary, the only 

reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence is that IDES acted with restraint and 

diligence in addressing complaints about Torres’s conduct. Each time Crivlare received another 

third-party complaint about Torres alleging a violation of the IDES Code of Ethics, Crivlare 

followed the IDES policy on progressive discipline, starting with a written reprimand, then the 

three- and seven-day suspensions, and concluding with Torres’s termination. See ISOF ¶¶ 7, 11, 

13-14. 

* * * 
24 

Because Torres has failed to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute, 

IDES is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such, IDES’s motion for summary judgment 

is granted in its entirety and judgment will be entered in its favor. 

Dated: September 2, 2015 John J. Tharp, Jr. 

 United States District Judge