Designation of Interpol as a

Public International Organization Under the

International Organizations Immunities Act

The International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL, qualifies for designation by the 

President as a “public international organization” under the International Organizations 

Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (IOIA), entitled to enjoy certain privileges, exemptions, and 

immunities under United States law. INTERPOL is composed exclusively of states as members and the United States participates in INTERPOL pursuant to statutory authority.

Statutory protection is limited to international organizations that can demonstrate a particularized need for such protection. INTERPOL’S contacts with the United States are sufficient to 

demonstrate a need for protection, notwithstanding its lack of an office and permanent staff in 

the United States. Because INTERPOL does not have an office or staff in the United States, 

however, several of the specific privileges, exemptions and immunities available under the 

IOIA may be inapplicable. In an executive order designating INTERPOL as a public international organization, the President could limit the privileges, exemptions, and immunities 

accorded to INTERPOL to those necessary to carry out its essential functions in the United 

States.

January 12, 1983

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e C h i e f , In t e r p o l

U n i t e d S t a t e s N a t i o n a l C e n t r a l B u r e a u

This responds to your request for our opinion whether the International 

Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) qualifies for designation as a “public 

international organization” under the International Organizations Immunities 

Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (IOIA or Act). The IOIA provides certain privileges, 

exemptions, and immunities under United States law to eligible public international organizations designated by executive order. For the reasons set forth 

below, we conclude that INTERPOL meets the threshold legal requirements 

for designation under the IOIA. The most important immunity available to 

INTERPOL by virtue of such designation would be immunity of INTERPOL 

and its officers, employees, and representatives from suit or legal process with 

respect to acts performed within the scope of the functions of INTERPOL. 

Because INTERPOL does not maintain any office or permanent staff in the 

United States, many of the other privileges, exemptions, and immunities afforded by the IOIA may be irrelevant or unnecessary to protect the functioning 

of INTERPOL in the United States. We suggest, therefore, that the privileges, 

exemptions, and immunities available under the Act could be limited by

1
executive order to those necessary for INTERPOL to carry out its essential 

function, i.e., the coordination and exchange of police information among its 

member states.

At the outset, we note that our advice here is limited to the threshold legal 

considerations raised by the possible designation of INTERPOL under the 

IOIA. INTERPOL has not yet applied for designation, although we understand 

an application will be filed with the Department of State in the near future. We 

therefore cannot comment specifically on the details of the designation. This 

Office will, of course, review for form and legality the draft executive order 

designating INTERPOL, if the decision is made to proceed. We also do not 

address policy questions raised by INTERPOL’s possible designation under 

the IOIA. You may wish to pursue those questions through appropriate channels within this Department, the State Department, and the White House.

I. Background

The IOIA authorizes the President to designate “public international organizations” in which the United States participates as being entitled to enjoy 

certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities under United States law. 22 

U.S.C. 288. These privileges, exemptions, and immunities include: (1) the 

capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of real and personal property, and 

to institute legal proceedings; (2) immunity from suit and legal process for the 

organization; (3) immunity of the organization’s property and assets from 

search and confiscation, and inviolability of its archives; (4) exemption from 

customs duties and internal revenue taxes on goods imported by the organization, exemption from registration requirements for foreign agents, and inviolability of official communications; and (5) exemption from property taxes. Id.

§§ 288a(a)-(d), 288c. The Act also provides certain immunities and exemptions for officers and employees of the organization and for foreign representatives to the organization including, most importantly, immunity from suit and 

legal process with respect to “acts performed by them in their official capacity 

and falling within their functions.” Id. § 288d(b).' Section 288 authorizes the 

President to withhold, withdraw or condition any of the specific privileges, 

exemptions, and immunities “in light of the functions performed by the organization,” and to revoke the designation if the organization or its officers or 

employees abuse those privileges, exemptions, and immunities.

INTERPOL has not previously sought designation as an international organization under the IOIA, even though the organization has existed since 1923

1 The Act also provides for exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue taxes on baggage and 

effects o f the organization’s officers, employees and representatives, and their families and households, id.

§ 288b, and exem ptions for such individuals from laws regulating entry into or departure from the United 

States, alien registration and fingerprinting requirem ents, and requirements for registration as foreign agents. 

Id. § 288d(a). Unlike the immunity from suit and legal process afforded by § 288d(b), which is available to 

citizens o f the United States who serve as officers or employees o f the organization, the exemptions provided 

by §§ 288b and 288d(a) are not available for United States citizens.

2
and, since 1938, the United States has participated on a formal or informal 

basis pursuant to the authority provided to the Attorney General in 22 U.S.C. 

§ 263a.2 We understand the Secretary General of INTERPOL has decided to 

seek designation under the IOIA primarily because of the recent decision by the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Steinberg v. 

International Criminal Police Organization, 672 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In 

that decision the court ruled that in personam jurisdiction exists over INTERPOL 

under § 13423(a)(4) of the District of Columbia’s long arm statute, which 

authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident “who caus[es] 

tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the 

District” if the nonresident “regularly does or solicits business, engages in any 

other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods 

used or consumed or services rendered in the District of Columbia.” 672 F.2d 

at 930. We also understand that an additional consideration relevant to the 

Secretary General’s decision is the negotiation by INTERPOL and the French 

Government of a new Headquarters Agreement, which will provide INTERPOL 

with expanded privileges and immunities under French law.3 INTERPOL 

anticipates that the new Headquarters Agreement could serve as a model for 

similar grants of privileges and immunities in other countries, by agreement or 

by statute, if it becomes advisable or necessary to seek such protections.

II. Analysis

The threshold issue is whether INTERPOL qualifies for designation by the 

President under the IOIA. To qualify for designation, the organization must be 

a “public international organization,” i.e., it must be “composed of governments as members.” See H.R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (House 

Report). The United States must participate in the organization pursuant to 

treaty or “under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.” 22 U.S.C. § 288. 

Although the statute itself does not impose any requirement that the organization have particular contacts with the United States, the House Report notes,

2 22 U.S.C. § 263a authorizes the Attorney General “to accept and maintain, on behalf of the United States, 

membership in the International Criminal Police Organization.” The purposes of INTERPOL, as set forth in 

its Constitution, are:

(a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police 

authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the 

“Universal Declaration o f Human Rights;” [and]

(b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention 

and suppression of ordinary law crimes.

Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization, Art. 2. The primary function of INTERPOL is to 

coordinate the exchange of information relating to crimes and criminal investigations and of certain humanitarian 

information among the member states, each of which is represented by a designated national central bureau.

3 You have informed us that the Headquarters Agreement and the Exchange o f Letters were approved by the 

INTERPOL General Assembly at its annual meeting in October 1982, and have been signed by the President 

o f INTERPOL and by a representative o f the Government o f France. The one remaining step is subm ission o f 

the Agreement and Exchange of Letters to the French Parliament for ratification, which we understand will 

take place this spring.

3
“as a practical matter, the bill will not be applicable to public international 

organizations to which the United States does belong but which do business 

entirely outside of the United States and which will therefore have no need for 

protection under the legislation.” House Report, supra, at 1-2.

Under Executive Order No. 9698, 3 C.F.R. 508 (1946), the Secretary of State 

is charged with reviewing applications and proposing organizations to be 

designated pursuant to the Act. The Department of State, elaborating on the 

substantive criteria for eligibility under the Act, has established the following 

threshold requirements:

(1) The applicant organization, and its officers and employees, must be doing sufficient business in the United States to 

warrant granting them the privileges of the legislation, and their 

activities must be such as reasonably to require the said privileges. In general, this will mean that the organization must have 

an office and staff located within the United States.

(2) The Government of the United States must be a participating member of the applicant organization.

(3) The participation of the Government of the United States 

must be pursuant to a treaty or under the authority of an Act of 

Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.

(4) The applicant organization must be composed principally 

of governments, as distinguished from private organizations, as 

members.

(5) The applicant organization must not be scheduled for 

liquidation in the immediate future.

Bulletin of the Department of State, No. 128 (Feb. 20,1946) (State Department 

Bulletin). We believe INTERPOL satisfies the threshold legal requirements for 

designation under § 288 and the State Department’s guidelines. First, although 

there has been some confusion in the past about characterization of INTERPOL 

as a “public” or “private” organization, we are satisfied that INTERPOL would 

be considered a “public international organization” for the purposes of the 

IOIA.4 INTERPOL is composed exclusively of states as members; each national central bureau responsible for liaison with INTERPOL’s General Secretariat is an official law enforcement agency within its country’s government; 

and INTERPOL’s officers and Executive Committee members are elected by 

government officials from all member states. Second, although INTERPOL 

was not set up by treaty, convention, or executive agreement, the United States 

participates in INTERPOL pursuant to specific statutory authority. See 22

4 A 1976 C om ptroller G eneral's Report on the United States' participation in INTERPOL noted, “various 

terms have been used to describe INTERPOL’s status. The United Nations, the General Secretariat, and U.S. 

Treasury officials refer to it as intergovernmental; others call it a private or nongovernmental organization, 

and many perceive it as an organization in the m old of a United N ations.” Report o f the Comptroller General 

o f the U nited States, “United States Participation in INTERPOL, The International Criminal Police Organization” 25 (Dec. 27, 1976).

4
U.S.C. § 263a.5 Moreover, Congress has repeatedly authorized and appropriated funds for payment by the United States of dues to INTERPOL.6 The only 

question that gives us some pause is whether the lack of any office or permanent staff in the United States precludes INTERPOL, as a matter of law, from 

eligibility for designation under the IOIA. The legislative history of the Act and 

the implementing State Department Bulletin suggest the statute is intended 

primarily to meet the needs of international organizations that have offices and 

staff in the United States. We have been told informally by the State Department that all of the organizations that have been designated under the IOIA to 

date have some permanent facilities and/or staff in the United States.7 To our 

knowledge, however, no organization has requested and been denied designation on the ground that the statute applies only to organizations with offices or 

staff in the United States.

We do not believe the IOIA requires that an international organization 

seeking designation have offices, facilities, or permanent staff in the United 

States. The focus of the Act, as reflected in the Department of State’s guidelines, is on the need of the international organization for the particular privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided by the Act, in order to carry out 

the organization’s legitimate functions. Although the House Report recognizes 

that “as a practical matter” the statute would not apply to organizations that do 

business entirely outside of the United States, it does not suggest that an 

organization must have offices or staff in the United States in order to have 

sufficient contacts to warrant the protection of the Act. See House Report, 

supra, at 1. Similarly, the statement in the State Department Bulletin that “in 

general” an organization must have an office and staff in the United States is 

only an elaboration on the requirement that the organization “be doing sufficient business in the United States to warrant granting them the privileges of 

the legislation, and their activities must be such as reasonably to require the 

said privileges.” Thus, the State Department Bulletin does not rule out the 

possibility that an organization with no office or staff located within the United

5 The primary constitutive document ofJN TERPOL is its Constitution. The currently effective Constitution 

was adopted by the INTERPOL General Assembly in 1956. It provides that all countries then participating in 

the organization were deemed to be members unless they declared within six months of the effective date of 

the Constitution that they would not accept the Constitution. The United States has never subm itted a 

declaration of non-acceptance.

6 The current version of § 263a provides that dues and expenses for the membership o f the United States in 

INTERPOL “shall be paid out of sums authorized and appropriated for the Department o f Justice.*’ Pub. L. 

No. 95-624, § 21(a), 92 Stat. 3459, 3466 (1978).

7 A wide variety of organizations, with differing structures, membership requirements, and functions, has 

been granted designation under the IOIA. These include, for example, the African Development Fund, the 

Food and Agriculture Organization, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 

Commission, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Coffee Organization, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the International M aritime Satellite Organization, the 

International Pacific Halibut Commission, the International Telecommunications Union, the International 

Wheat Advisory Committee, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization o f American States, the 

United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the W orld Meteorological Organization. Most recently, 

the President has designated the M ultinational Force and Observers and the International Food Policy 

Research Institute as public international organizations for purposes o f the IOIA. See Exec. Order No. 12359, 

3 C.F.R. 180(1982).

5
States may nonetheless be able to demonstrate a nexus with the United States 

that creates a reasonable need and basis for receipt of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided by the Act.

Therefore, we believe the lack of an office and permanent staff in the United 

States does not make INTERPOL ineligible as a matter of law for designation 

under the IOIA. The clear legislative intent of the statute, however, is to limit 

the protection afforded by the Act to international organizations that can 

demonstrate a particularized need for such protection. We thus must consider 

whether the contacts INTERPOL has with the United States, which consist 

primarily of frequent communications by radio, teletype, and mail to the 

USNCB and occasional visits by INTERPOL officials or employees to consult 

with appropriate U.S. law enforcement personnel, provide a sufficient nexus to 

trigger designation under the IOIA.

We believe INTERPOL’s contacts are sufficient, particularly in light of the 

Steinberg decision, to satisfy the threshold legal requirements for designation 

under the IOIA. The essential function of INTERPOL and its primary usefulness to United States law enforcement efforts lie in the exchange of information with the national central bureaus, including the USNCB. The ruling in the 

Steinberg case potentially exposes INTERPOL to suit in the United States, at 

least within the District of Columbia, for performance of that function.8 It is not 

clear at this time how substantial that exposure is, or how the risk of suit will 

affect INTERPOL’s ability or willingness to continue the exchange of information with the USNCB.9 We are satisfied nonetheless that the Steinberg ruling 

demonstrates INTERPOL’s need for at least some of the protections afforded 

by designation under the IOIA, and therefore we conclude INTERPOL would 

satisfy the minimum threshold legal requirements for such designation.

You have also asked us to consider whether the privileges, exemptions and 

immunities available to INTERPOL under the IOIA should be limited or 

conditioned, if a decision is made to grant INTERPOL designation as a public 

international organization. That decision rests ultimately on policy considerations that are not appropriately addressed by this Office. As a matter of legal 

analysis, however, we note that § 288 gives the President the authority to place 

conditions or limitations on the available privileges, exemptions, and immunities, “in light of the functions performed by the organization.” Although we do 

not interpret this language to impose any mandatory obligation upon the 

President to limit the designation of organizations in any specific manner, we 

believe it would be appropriate in light of INTERPOL’s specific and somewhat 

limited need for immunity for the President to limit the privileges, exemptions, 

and immunities accorded to INTERPOL to those that are necessary to preserve 

and protect the functions performed by INTERPOL in the United States.

8 In practical term s, suits in the District of C olum bia would be INTERPOL’s primary concern, since most of 

the inform ation transm itted to the United States by INTERPOL is sent to the USNCB in the District of 

Colum bia. Consequently, most plaintiffs alleging injury from such transmissions could probably establish 

jurisdiction and venue within the District.

9 It is certainly relevant that the Secretary G eneral o f INTERPOL deems the Steinberg ruling of sufficient 

concern to w arrant application for designation under § 288 of the IOIA.

6
Because INTERPOL does not have an office or staff in the United States, 

and therefore has no property, assets, archives, or permanent employees located in the United States, several of the specific privileges, exemptions, and 

immunities available under the IOIA may be inapplicable or irrelevant to 

INTERPOL.10 These include the following:

(1) capacity to acquire and dispose of real and personal property;11

(2) immunity of property and assets from search and inviolability of archives;12

(3) exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue 

taxes with respect to goods or articles imported into the United 

States by the organization;13 and

(4) immunity of the organization from property taxes.14

Several other privileges, exemptions and immunities specified in the IOIA 

could, however, be considered critical to preservation of INTERPOL’s functions in the United States, and therefore should be specifically included in the 

designation order. These would include the following:

(1) immunity of the organization from suit and judicial 

process;15

(2) privileges for official communications;16 and

(3) immunity of representatives of foreign governments in or 

to the organization and officers and employees of the organization from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by 

them in their official capacity and falling within their functions 

as representatives, officers or employees.17

10 This conclusion is based on the facts available to us with respect to INTERPOL'S contacts with the 

United States. It may be that additional considerations exist or may exist in the future that would warrant 

application o f the particular privileges, exemptions, or immunities listed in the text. We do not suggest that, 

as a matter of law, the President must limit INTERPOL’s designation to exclude those privileges, exemptions 

and immunities.

1122 U.S.C. § 288a(a). That section also provides that a designated international organization shall have the 

capacity to contract and to institute legal proceedings. Although we are not aware of any particular need for 

INTERPOL to be able to enter into contracts or to institute legal proceedings in the United States, that 

authority is not as clearly unrelated to INTERPOL’s activities within the United States as is the authority to 

acquire and dispose of property.

12 22 U.S.C. § 288a(c). We understand the term “archives” to mean permanent files maintained by the 

organization. To our knowledge, the only archives maintained by INTERPOL are located in France. The 

protection for archives of international organizations available under the IOIA would not extend to inform ation within the possession, custody, or control of a United States citizen or agency that may have originated in 

the archives o f the international organization. Thus, even if it is deemed appropriate to provide in the 

executive order for the inviolability of INTERPOL’s archives, that protection would not extend to information maintained by the USNCB that originated with INTERPOL. As the USNCB’s Privacy Act Notice points 

out, the records maintained by the USNCB are separate and distinct from records maintained by INTERPOL. 

See 46 Fed. Reg. 60328 (1981). In the hands of the USNCB, those records are clearly subject to all applicable 

federal laws and regulations.

13 22 U.S.C. § 288a(d).

14 22 U.S.C. § 288c.

15 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).

16 22 U.S.C. § 288a(d).

17 22 U.S.C § 288d(b).

7
Finally, it is not clear to us whether the exemptions and immunities from 

import taxes, entry and exit regulations, alien registration and fingerprinting 

requirements, and foreign agent registration requirements provided in §§ 288b 

and 288d(a) of the Act for alien officers, employees, and representatives of 

designated organizations would be necessary or appropriate to preserve and 

protect the functioning of INTERPOL in the United States. We understand that 

officials and employees of INTERPOL travel to the United States with some 

frequency for consultations with the USNCB or other United States law enforcement personnel, and that meetings or conferences of INTERPOL may be 

held in the United States in the future. If INTERPOL and the Department of 

State believe some or all of the exemptions provided by §§ 288b and 288d(a) 

are necessary or advisable to facilitate such visits, the designation order could 

appropriately include those exemptions and immunities.

If the designation order is limited as we discuss, the privileges and immunities afforded INTERPOL under United States law would be considerably more 

narrow than those afforded INTERPOL under French law pursuant to the new 

Headquarters Agreement. The breadth of the privileges and immunities provided by the Headquarters Agreement reflects that INTERPOL maintains its 

headquarters and staff in France and therefore needs additional protections 

under French law that would not be necessary in the United States, as we have 

discussed. With one exception, the privileges and immunities we suggest may 

be critical to INTERPOL’s functions in the United States, i.e., immunity of 

INTERPOL and its officers, employees and representatives from suit and legal 

process, and privileges for official communications, are comparable in scope to 

analogous privileges and immunities provided in the Headquarters Agreement.18 The one exception is the provision in the Headquarters Agreement for 

full diplomatic privileges and immunities for the Secretary General of 

INTERPOL. Under the IOIA, the privileges and immunities accorded to officials or employees of designated international organizations must be limited to 

the specific privileges and immunities set out in the Act, and cannot extend to 

full diplomatic privileges. Section 288e(c) provides that:

No person shall, by reason of the provisions of this subchapter, 

be considered as receiving diplomatic status or as receiving any 

of the privileges incident thereto other than such as are specifically set forth herein.

22 U.S.C. § 288e(c). Therefore, the Secretary General of INTERPOL could not 

be accorded full diplomatic privileges under United States law.19

18 W e understand that the Headquarters A greem ent provides, inter alia, for limited immunity from legal 

process for the O rganization, inviolability o f official correspondence, and immunity from legal process for 

representatives, officials, and members of the Organization's staff with respect to acts performed in connection with their official duties.

19 The prim ary practical effect of this lim itation is to restrict the immunity of the Secretary General from 

suit and legal process under United States law to acts performed in his official capacity or within his functions 

as Secretary General. The House Report notes this limitation was intentional:

Continued

8
In addition to the specific privileges and immunities provided in the Headquarters Agreement, the accompanying Exchange of Letters between 

INTERPOL and the French Government requires INTERPOL to establish a 

Supervisory Board to verify the accuracy of personal information maintained 

by INTERPOL in its internal archives in France and to supervise INTERPOL’s 

collection, maintenance, and dissemination of such information. We understand agreement on such a Supervisory Board was a precondition imposed by 

the French Government for its assent to the specific privileges and immunities 

set out in the Headquarters Agreement. We believe the creation of the Supervisory Board, although not legally relevant to the question of INTERPOL’s 

eligibility for designation under the IOIA, could be advantageous in dispelling 

concerns that may exist both within and outside the federal government about 

the possibility of abuse by INTERPOL of its ability to collect and exchange 

personal information outside the reach of any nation’s laws.20 The Steinberg

litigation demonstrates that some concern exists about the possibility of injury 

to innocent individuals by INTERPOL’s dissemination of erroneous information linking those individuals with criminal investigations, concerns that could 

be exacerbated if INTERPOL seeks immunity from suit under U.S. law. We 

believe those concerns could be alleviated somewhat once the Supervisory 

Board is in operation.

Because we do not believe the existence or operation of the Supervisory 

Board is a legal prerequisite to designation of INTERPOL under the IOIA, we 

do not suggest the designation be conditioned on the existence of the Board. 

However, it may be advisable to describe, either in the executive order itself or 

in an accompanying statement, the operation of the Supervisory Board and the 

protections afforded by the Board for United States citizens.

R a l p h W . T a r r

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

19 (. . . continued)

[T]he immunity from suit to be extended to officers and employees of international 

organizations is limited to immunity for acts performed by them in their official capacity 

whereas diplomatic officers enjoy full immunity from legal processes in this country.

House Report, supra, at 6.

20 Nothing in the IOIA or its legislative history suggests Congress contemplated that the privileges, 

exemptions, or immunities available under the Act should be conditioned on the existence o f some alternative 

form of redress for harms caused to United States citizens by activities of designated international organizations. Insofar as we are aware, no such conditions have been placed on other designated organizations.

9