alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           3,196
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,840
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,124
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                29,259
<PP&E>                                         509,361
<DEPRECIATION>                                  33,561
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 505,059
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,666
<BONDS>                                        184,324
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           217
<OTHER-SE>                                     300,852
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   505,059
<SALES>                                         22,855
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                23,181
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,401
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,035
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,650
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,924
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              8,924
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     8,924
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .41
        

</TABLE>
# July 2019 FOIA Log
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinoisȱȱ60604

February 14, 2014

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, District Judge*

No. 13Ȭ2307

JUSTIN D. REED, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

PlaintiffȬAppellee,

v.

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY

COMPANY, a Virginia corporation,

doing business as NORFOLK

SOUTHERN RAILWAY,

DefendantȬAppellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:12ȬcvȬ00873

Sharon Johnson Coleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc

filed by the appellant in the above case on January 28, 2014, no judge in active service

has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original panel have voted to

deny the petition.ȱȱThe petition is therefore DENIED.

___________________

*The Honorable Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

Case: 13-2307 Document: 00712176900 Filed: 02/24/2014 Pages: 1

Case: 1:12-cv-00873 Document #: 61 Filed: 02/24/14 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:419
# Issue Paper 10

# Session 1:  January 12 -14, 2015

**Issue:**Revise 34 CFR 682.410(b), regarding the charging of collection costs by a guaranty agency to a defaulted borrower who responds within 60 days to the initial notice sent by the guaranty agency after it pays a default claim and acquires the loan from the lender.      

**Statutory cites:**§§428F(a) and 484A(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended

**Regulatory cites:**34 CFR 682.410(b)

**Summary of issue:**

Recently the Department of Education (Department) learned that some guaranty agencies in the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program were improperly charging collection costs to defaulted borrowers who promptly enter into a repayment agreement, including a loan rehabilitation agreement, and who honor that agreement.  In Dear Colleague Letter GEN-15-14 (July 10, 2015), we addressed this issue and clearly explained that the Department’s regulations do not allow guaranty agencies to charge collection costs to a defaulted borrower who enters into a repayment agreement (including a loan rehabilitation agreement under 34 CFR 682.405) with the guaranty agency within 60 days of receiving the agency’s initial notice.  In DCL GEN-15-14, we restated the Department’s longstanding interpretation that the regulations bar a guaranty agency from charging collection costs to a defaulted borrower who responds within 60 days to the initial notice sent by the guaranty agency after it pays a default claim and acquires the loan from the lender; who enters into a repayment agreement, including a rehabilitation agreement; and who honors that agreement.

To codify the Department’s longstanding interpretation of the regulations, we propose revising 34 CFR 682.410(b), regarding the charging of collection costs by a guaranty agency to a defaulted borrower who responds within 60 days to the initial notice sent by the guaranty agency after it pays a default claim and acquires the loan from the lender.      

Section 682.410(b) was adopted in 1992 and has remained substantially unchanged since then.  We propose this revision to reflect the Department’s clear and consistent position that 34 CFR 682.410(b) directs and permits the guarantor to charge collection costs only to a defaulter who fails, within the initial “notice and opportunity to resolve” period, to enter into a repayment agreement and honor that agreement.  As explained in DCL GEN 15-14, the Department itself charges collection costs only to those defaulted borrowers whose loans it places with collection agencies and the Department places debts with collection contractors, with minor exceptions, only after the defaulter has failed to enter into a repayment agreement within the initial notice and opportunity to resolve period.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently upheld the Department’s interpretation of these regulations; the interpretation is being challenged in a separate lawsuit, now pending.  This change will further clarify and codify the Department’s existing position.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-15-00014-CR

Felix Villarreal

v.

The State of Texas

On appeal from the

156th District Court of Bee County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. B-14-2057-0-CR-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED IN PART, 

REVERSED IN PART, and RENDERED IN PART, and the case should be REMANDED

to the trial court. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, and RENDERED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

December 8, 2016
#### Frank Hennessy, as Administrator v. 18 Minerva Place, Inc.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with $10 costs, unless the appellant procures the record on appeal and appellant’s points to be served and filed on or before August 30, 1962, with notice of argument for September 11, 1962, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Concur— Breitel, J. P., Valente, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Joseph Murano, Respondent, v. Chrysler Corporation et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Claimant, employed as a maintenance man, was required to use a company ear to take mail from the plant to the post office, some three miles distant. On the day of the accident, he performed this duty and then bought bread which he intended to take to his home, about two miles away, before returning to the plant; and while on the way to his home and off the return route to the plant, the car was involved in an accident, whereby he was injured, after which he returned to the plant. There is substantial evidence, which the board was entitled to accept, that claimant’s use of the automobile, an instrumentality of the employment, was with the permission, general or implied, of the employer. Claimant testified: “ I had previous conversations with Mr. Farrell to the effect that he gave me permission that at any time I was near the house or out that I was welcome to stop at the house because he done it himself on his way out.” He had done so, he said, a “ dozen times ” before and had not asked Mr. Farrell (his superior) each time because Mr. Farrell had given him “general permission”. On cross-examination, claimant referred to his permissive use as in “emergency” situations but this occasion appeared such to him, with “five children at home with hardly anything in the house and the stores close at six o’clock”; and, indeed, Mr. Farrell seemed to use the term in much the same sense, in characterizing as an emergency an occasion when claimant was given permission to take the car home because a washing machine had broken down. The testimony of another witness — the plant manager — that he could use the ear assigned to him in his discretion, even to go on vacation, is cited to us as illustrative of the employer’s liberal policy. There seems a surprising dearth of decisional law as to the precise factual issue here presented but, quite aside from the general permission to which claimant testified, there is ample precedent for the implication of permission from an employer’s acquiescence in a custom or practice; as in the horseplay eases (e.g., *Matter of Ognibene*v. *Rochester Wf9* Go.,*298 N. Y. 85); the coffee-break cases (e.g., *Matter of Bodensky*v. *Royaltone, Inc.,*5 A D 2d 733); eases of other personal errands *{Matter of Redfield*v. *Boulevard Gardens Housing Corp.,*4 A D 2d 906, mot. for iv. to opp. den. 3 N Y 2d 710); and those involving recreational and athletic activities *{Matter of Motto*v. *Cosmopolitan Tourist Co.,*278 App. Div. 597, mot. for iv. *943to opp. den. 302 N. Y. 950; *Matter of Bowen,*v. *Saratoga Springs Comm,.,*267 App. Div. 928). Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Bergan, P. J., and Gibson, J., concur; Herlihy, J., concurs in the result solely on the ground that the present record, when read as a whole, justifies the board’s decision. Reynolds, J., dissents, on the ground that the claimant’s accidental injuries did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.
#### Arleamon Sadler, Respondent, v. J & J Bar & Grill, Inc., Appellant.

Order, entered on January 15, 1964, denying the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to CPLR 3216, unanimously reversed, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, and the motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with $10 costs. In this January, 1962 action for alleged assault committed in May, 1960, the brief and conclusory affidavit of merits is insufficient to justify the leisurely course of the action and the 11-month delay since the last activity (see *Sortino*v. *Fisher,*20 A D 2d 25). Concur—Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, Stevens and Staley, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
Exhibit 3.1
First Amendment to Employment Agreement between PH Group Inc. and Charles T.
Sherman


                               FIRST AMENDMENT TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


         THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the "Amendment") is
entered into this __ day of _________, 1999 between PH GROUP INC., an Ohio
corporation with a place of business at 2365 Scioto Harper Drive, Columbus, Ohio
43204 (the "Company"), and CHARLES T. SHERMAN of Powell, Ohio (the "Executive").

         WHEREAS, the parties hereto have entered into an Employment Agreement
dated as of January 23, 1997 (the "Employment Agreement"); and

         WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Employment Agreement in
certain respects;

         NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein
contained, the parties, hereto, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as
follows:

         SECTION 1. AMENDMENT.

                  1.1 Section 2 of the Employment Agreement is hereby deleted in
its entirety and the following substituted therefor:

                  Section 2. TERM. Subject to Sections 4 and 5 hereof, the term
         of this Agreement shall be for a period commencing September 1, 1999,
         and terminating on August 31, 2003 and shall continue thereafter on a
         year-to-year basis unless either party hereto gives written notice to
         the other at least six months prior to August 31 of the year in which
         such party intends to have this Agreement terminate that such party
         does not intend to renew this Agreement (the "Term").

         SECTION 2. CONTINUING VALIDITY. Except as amended hereby, all terms and
provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect as
though this First Amendment were a part of the original Employment Agreement.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed and delivered this
Agreement as of the date first written above.


PH GROUP INC.                               EXECUTIVE

By:                                         By:
   ---------------------------------           ---------------------------------
      Michael Gardner, Vice President             Charles T. Sherman
#### 19.502 Setting aside acquisitions.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>

     THE SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE
EQUITY  OIL  COMPANY  FORM  10-Q FOR THE  PERIOD  ENDED  JUNE  30,  2000 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

</LEGEND>



<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                              SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                      2,188,734
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                               3,966,258
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            6,419,923
<PP&E>                                    105,304,081
<DEPRECIATION>                             65,719,526
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             46,393,247
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       2,318,528
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                   12,811,040
<OTHER-SE>                                  3,719,932
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               46,393,247
<SALES>                                    16,818,425
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           18,244,465
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              11,716,057
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            885,183
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             5,643,225
<INCOME-TAX>                                2,067,666
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         3,575,559
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                3,575,559
<EPS-BASIC>                                       .28
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .28



</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of David Sable, an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner.

First Department,

June 25, 1963.

*John G. Bonomi*of counsel *(Michael Branch*with him on the brief), for petitioner.

*David Sable,*respondent in person.

*Per Curiam.*

Respondent was admitted to practice June 3, 1931, in the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department.

Six charges of professional misconduct were brought against respondent. These charges involved conversion, fraud, the wrongful obtaining of money from a client by misrepresentation, and the habitual issuance of bad checks. These checks were issued against various accounts and were, returned because of insufficient funds. In some instances merchandise or cash was obtained. The issuance of such checks in substantial number constitutes professional misconduct *(Matter of Healy,*11 A D 2d 4; *Matter of Portnick,*5 A D 2d 16). Respondent obtained at least $14,000 from the afore-mentioned client upon false representations.

*89The Referee found that all of the charges were established, and the record amply supports such finding.

Respondent filed no written answer to the charges and failed to submit any papers in opposition to the motion to confirm the Referee’s report. Respondent’s conduct has demonstrated his unfitness to remain a member of the legal profession. Respondent should be disbarred.

Botein, P. J., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Stetjeb, JJ., concur.

Respondent disbarred.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

RICKY TEJADA,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 45 MM 2023

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 2

nd day of August, 2023, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for 

Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED.
Exhibit 32.2

                     CERTIFICATIONS OF ANNUAL REPORT

I, Frank W. Backes, Principal Accounting Officer of 3Si
Holdings, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the
best of my knowledge:

the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the annual
period ended June 30, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

Dated: September 24, 2004.

/s/ FRANK W. BACKES
Frank W. Backes
Chief Financial Officer and
Principal Accounting Officer
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 14

- 00011

- CV

VICKI MCPHERSON AND TIMOTHY MCPHERSON

, Appellant

v.

TEXAS FOREST SERVICE

, Appellee

From the 85th District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 13

- 001728

- CV

- 85

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Vicki McPherson and Timothy McPherson appealed the trial court’s order

granting Texas Forest Service’s plea to the jurisdiction. The appeal was referred to

mediation on July 31, 2014. The Court was informed by the mediator by letter dated

October 31, 2014 that the parties have settled the case. As of this date, we have not

receive d any disposition documents or requests by the parties.

By letter dated December 5, 2014, the Clerk of this Court notified the McPhersons

that they must provide a status report to the Court within 14 days of the date of theMcPherson v. Texas Forest Service Page 2

letter as to a specific date whe n this proceeding would be disposed, or the appeal would

be dismissed for want of prosecution. Fourteen days have passed and no status report

has been provided.

This appeal is dismissed. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3(b).

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

B efore Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed January 15, 2015

[CV06]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FIRSTMERIT BANK, N.A., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 12 C 887

)

TRINITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, )

L.P., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Although codefendant Carsten Franck, II (“Franck”) in this

mortgage foreclosure action tendered several filings in midMarch, this Court’s heavy involvement in other cases on its

calendar (including a whole set of new case reassignments

following the untimely death of its good friend and colleague

Honorable William Hibbler) prevented it from reviewing those

pleadings until now. One of them--Franck’s Answer to the

Complaint--has occasioned the issuance of this sua sponte

opinion.

In a number of paragraphs of that Answer (Answer ¶¶14, 19,

20, 22, and 24, plus Answer ¶¶26, 27.D and 27.J to Complaint

Count I and Answer ¶31 to Complaint Count II), Franck’s counsel

has provided what purport to be (but are not) Fed. R. Civ. P.

(“Rule”) 8(b)(5) disclaimers (see App’x ¶1 to State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). 

Then, having done so, counsel compounds the error by always

adding the language “and, therefore denies same.” That is of

Case: 1:12-cv-00887 Document #: 23 Filed: 04/05/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:138
course oxymoronic--how can a party that asserts (presumably in

good faith) that he lacks even enough information to form a

belief as to the truth of an allegation then proceed to deny it

in accordance with Rule 11(b)? Accordingly the quoted phrase is

stricken from each paragraph of the Answer.

Because the filing of an amendment to the Answer to cure

each of the defective responses described here would create the

need to go back and forth between pleadings to see just what is

and what is not at issue, Franck’s entire Answer is stricken. 

Leave is of course granted to file a self-contained Amended

Answer on or before April 18, 2012.

Finally, counsel is ordered to make no charge for the work

and expenses involved in repleading--work that is attributable to

counsel’s own errors. As a purely informational matter and not

for filing, counsel is directed to transmit to this Court’s

chambers a copy of counsel’s letter to Franck advising him of the

directive in the preceding sentence.

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: April 5, 2012

2

Case: 1:12-cv-00887 Document #: 23 Filed: 04/05/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:139
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-15-00185-CV

A. R., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-FM-13-005220

THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

The reporter’s record in this appeal was originally due to be filed on April 3, 

2015. To date, the reporter’s record has not been filed, nor has LaSonya Thomas responded to 

our recent attempts to communicate with her about this cause.

Accordingly, Ms. Thomas is hereby ordered to file the reporter’s record in this 

case on or before May 4, 2015. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.4(b)(2) (cumulative extensions of time 

for filing of reporter’s record in termination case may not exceed 30 days); id. R. 35.3(c) (in 

accelerated appeal, extensions of time to file reporter’s record limited to 10 days). If the record 

is not filed by that date, Thomas may be required to show cause why she should not be held in 

contempt of court.

It is ordered on April 27, 2015.

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Bourland