UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4197

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ZONTA TAVARAS ELLISON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00404-FDW-DSC-1)

Submitted: November 25, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

A jury convicted Zonta Tavaras Ellison on three counts 

of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). On appeal, Ellison 

contends that the district court erred by (1) determining that 

he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel; and (2) failing to grant him a 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.

I.

A defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as 

he is competent and the waiver is made intelligently. Faretta 

v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). We review de novo a 

district court’s determination that a defendant has waived his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Singleton, 

107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). “An assertion of the 

right of self-representation . . . must be (1) clear and 

unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent and voluntary; and (3) 

timely.” United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th 

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

“[W]e review the sufficiency of a waiver of the right 

to counsel by evaluating the complete profile of the defendant 

and the circumstances of his decision as known to the trial 

court at the time.” Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1097. A defendant 
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“should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows 

what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. However, this court does not require 

“[a] precise procedure or litany for this evaluation.” 

Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1097.

Our review of the record demonstrates that Ellison 

clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to selfrepresentation. Ellison’s election to proceed pro se also was 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record reflects that, 

at the time he waived his right to counsel, Ellison understood 

the legal proceedings and was aware of the nature of the charges 

against him and the penalties he faced. We conclude that the 

district court did not err in granting Ellison’s request to 

waive counsel and proceed pro se. 

II.

For the first time on appeal, Ellison argues that, 

even though he went to trial, the district court should have 

awarded him a two-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. We review for plain error. See United States 

v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish 

plain error, an appellant must show “(1) that the district court 

erred, (2) that the error is clear or obvious, and (3) that the 
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error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it affected 

the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the appellant 

meets his burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error 

and may grant relief only if the error “seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted) (alteration in original).

We find no reversible error in the district court’s 

failure to credit Ellison with a reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. Ellison argues that the assertion of an 

affirmative defense, such as entrapment, does not preclude a 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Although some 

courts have adopted this position, see, e.g., United States v. 

Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1172-74 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming 

reduction), Ellison has not shown that the district court erred, 

much less that the error was clear or obvious.

Ellison’s entrapment defense was directly related to 

factual guilt and was inconsistent with acceptance of 

responsibility insofar as it was an attempt at minimizing his 

culpability. See United States v. Holt, 79 F.3d 14, 17 (4th 

Cir. 1996) (holding district court did not clearly err in 
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denying adjustment because defendant’s meritless affirmative 

defense was “attempt to minimize his culpability”). This is 

clearly demonstrated by Ellison’s objections to his presentence 

report, in which he stated that, although he transacted with the 

confidential informant, he lacked “the intent to sell and 

distribute cocaine.” Finally, to the extent Ellison contends 

that the district court erred in adopting the presentence

report, which stated that the reduction did not apply, we find 

this argument unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED