1000 Abernathy Rood NE 

Suite 1200 

Atlanta, GA 30328 

Via Electronic Submission 

OSWER Docket, 

EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822-lT, 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., 

Washington, DC 20460 

RE: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 

Section 112(r)(7); Request for information. 

Docket ID No. EPA-HQ--QEM-2014-0328. 

To the Docket: 

Axiall Corporation is pleased to respond to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Request for 

Information (RFI), Docket No., EPA-HQ--QEM-2014-0328 published in the Federal Register on July 31, 

2014 at 79 Fed. Reg. 44604-44633. 

Axiall Corporation is a leading integrated chemicals and building products company. Axiall, 

headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, has manufacturing facilities located throughout North America and 

in Asia to provide industry-leading materials and services to customers. For more information, visit 

www.axiall.com. 

Summary 

Axiall Corporation supports the goal of EPA's RMP regulations which includes reducing chemical risk at 

the local level by providing information to help local fire, police, and emergency response personnel 

along with providing information to the members of the public to help in understanding the chemical 

operations taking place in their community. Axiall believes that process safety standards in the United 

States, currently implemented through the Program 3 requirements in the EPA RMP rule and the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) process safety management of highly hazardous 

chemicals (PSM) standard, are strong and effective because they are performance-oriented. A flexible, 

performance-oriented approach to process safety best protects workers from risk of harm, including risk 

of accidental chemical release. Each employer is in the best position to make site-specific and processspecific process safety decisions by evaluating its own equipment, onsite materials and chemicals, 

expertise, organizational structure, and operations. Axiall is concerned that many of the options under 

consideration by EPA would, in practice, weaken the highly effective performance-oriented approach 

that is currently provided for process safety and chemical management under existing EPA and OSHA 

programs. lit is unclear how the potential modifications contained in the RFI will enhance chemical 

facility safety. Our specific concerns are provided below. 
Harmonization of the PSM and RMP Standard 

Axiall is concerned with the timeline presented by EPA in its RMP revision process. Executive Order 

(EO) 13650 was specifically created to encourage agency coordination and improve the exchange and 

sharing of information. There is an EO 13650 Action Plan "requirement" that EPA and OSHA 

"harmonize" their regulations. However, EPA has committed, in the EO Working Group Action Plan, to 

releasing a proposal for the revised RMP in one year and finalizing the rule within two years. OSHA is on 

a seven-year rulemaking timeline for their PSM regulation while EPA is on a two-year track. Given the 

approach of both the EPA and OSHA, agency coordination will be challenging which could significantly 

impact the regulated community. 

Axiall recommends that EPA and OSHA work as closely together as possible to coordinate both oftheir 

review and rulemaking activities so that the regulated community will be able to effectively execute a 

strong, stable and consistent, chemical safety program. 

Updating the List of Regulated Substances- Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards 

As a general statement, Axiall is not aware of any significant changes that would justify the revision of 

the RMP Standard in updating the list of regulated substances. 

To respond to EPA's specific question of listing chemicals based on the hazards of their reaction 

byproducts, we believe it is not a feasible approach. It is virtually impossible for national listing 

decisions to take into account process-and site-specific factors, which can vary widely due to the lack of 

a strong risk assessment methodology to screen reactive hazards. The number of chemicals that can 

experience adverse reactions with others, or with water or air, is very large, and the possible 

combinations of these materials makes trying to designate which chemicals represent reactive hazards 

and which do not is a task and one which should not be taken without identifying a valid and consistent 

methodology to identify threshold hazard quantities or concentrations. Any chemical, which is benign at 

normal conditions, may become violent in presence of other chemicals or extreme process conditions 

(changes in operating conditions, etc.). A list does not in any way solve the problem and in many 

respects may introduce other unintended consequences (i.e., facilities may think that if something is not 

on the list, there is no hazard or risk). 

Revising Additional RMP Elements 

The RFI states that EPA is interested in receiving and reviewing information regarding the management 

system elements that were identified in the OSHA RFI, but with a focus on the applicable RMP 

requirements. U.S. EPA is considering incorporating three (3) elements taken from the Risk Based 

Process Safety Program by the Center for Chemical Process Safety: 

(1) Measurements and metrics, 

(2) Management review and continuous improvement, and 

(3) Process safety competency. 
Axiall believes that incorporating these elements into the RMP standard blurs the jurisdictional line 

between the RMP and PSM programs which has already created confusion in the regulated community. 

There has not been reasoning or information put forth by any agency indicating that the existing PSM 

regulation does not adequately include the process safety elements necessary to develop an effective 

performance-based PSM system. 

The management system currently under the RMP rules is essentially a system defined by facility 

managers for integrating the implementation of the risk management program elements and assigning 

responsibility for that implementation. The extent of the management system will depend on the size 

and complexity of the source. At many small sources, the appointment of a person or position that has 

the overall responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the risk management 

program elements, may satisfy the management system requirement. For larger sources, separate 

divisions may be responsible for overseeing different elements of the risk management program. 

An effective management system helps to document the integration of facility operations and provides a 

way to ensure that each department involved in the process understands its responsibilities and who 

should be contacted when changes or other concerns arise. As the rule currently stands an operating 

entity has the flexibility to design and manage the management system in a way that works best for that 

operation. 

Axiall certainly supports the use of metrics as part of a safety program and there is great value in 

measuring certain process safety activities. However, we do not support the requirement of lagging 

PSM metric indicator collection and evaluation via regulation. While lagging indicators may provide 

insight into an organization's past process safety performance, there are limits to how this data can be 

utilized as a meaningful measurement and comparison point. 

In addition, leading PSM metrics cannot be effectually regulated. Leading metrics simply do not lend 

themselves to standardization and cannot be successfully employed across organizations or industries, 

as they tend to be very specific to an organization and often to an individual site, and level of risk. 

The second element, management review and continuous improvement, which focuses on the "due 

diligence" of management reviews that fill the gap between day-to-day work activities and formal audits 

is clearly a subjective standard, where standards or requirements would be difficult to develop and even 

more difficult to enforce. Ultimately, this could only be measured by the number of management 

reviews which then becomes just a record keeping requirement with limited value. While management 

reviews are a tool used by many in industry the use of that tool is best left to the implementing 

organization to best manage its program to its specific operations and company culture. 

EPA is also requesting comments on including three interrelated activities: (1) continuously improve on 

knowledge and competency, (2) ensure appropriate information is available to those who need it, and 

(3) consistently apply lessons learned. The main focus of this competency element is organizational 

learning so that process knowledge can be applied to situations in order to manage risk effectively. 

Axiall agrees with the concept and value of operating entities sharing lessons learned. However, such 

elements are not well-suited to prescriptive regulation or to consistent, rational enforcement by 

government agencies. In essence they are best used through trade associations. They should not be 

added to the current regulations. 
Expanded Incident Investigation/Accident History 

Under the existing PSM and RMP requirements regulated facilities are required to investigate incidents 

that resulted in, or "could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release of a hazardous chemical." 

However, EPA is now considering an additional requirement to have facilities report near misses in 

addition to reporting their five-year history of accidents from covered processes resulting in death, 

injury or significant property damage. EPA is also asking whether companies should be required to 

conduct a root cause investigation, complete their investigations by certain deadlines and share 

information with the public about incidents and near misses. 

Axiall supports near miss reporting and the use of root cause investigations where it is clear that an 

incident could have reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release as is required per the existing 

PSM Standard and RMP regulation. The term "near miss incident" is difficult to define across the board 

at a national level because what might be considered a near miss incident at one location may not be a 

near miss at another location due to the specifics of the operation. 

Third Party Compliance Audits 

Axiall believes that audits are an integral part of a strong process safety program but it is unfamiliar with 

any data that demonstrate or even strongly suggest that those third-party auditors are more effective 

overall than any other form of audit. We do believe that the mandated use of third-party auditors 

would be overly burdensome and unjustified given the lack of reliable data in this area. Employers 

should be afforded the discretion to choose the audit method best suited to their unique operations 

including self-audits, second-party audits, or third-party audits. 

Define and Require Evaluations of Updates to RAGAGEP 

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEPs) are engineering, operation, 

or maintenance activities based on established codes, standards, published technical reports or 

recommended practices or a similar document. RAGAGEPs detail generally approved ways to perform 

specific engineering, inspection or mechanical integrity activities, such as fabricating a vessel, inspecting 

a storage tank, or servicing a relief valve. RAGAGEP also recognizes that there is not one way to solve a 

given problem that provides similar levels of risk reduction for a diverse set of chemical processes. 

Axiall does not believe that RAGAGEP can be a single document, code, standard or practice. Covered 

employers must be able to utilize consensus guidance to the specific situation in each individual 

workplace. Also, EPA should recognize that employers with the support of technical experts and 

professionals are in the best position to analyze the specific conditions and concerns at a facility and to 

decide what is recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices since they are most 

familiar with the ongoing operations at that workplace 

Emergency Planning and Coordination with local Emergency Response Authorities 

Axiall believes that the requirement for coordination with local emergency responders is already 

adequately addressed in the multiple interconnected standards as well as OHSA's 29 CFR 1910. 38. This 

particular OSHA regulation provides the minimum requirements for an emergency action plan including 

that a facility must have procedures in place for reporting a fire or other emergency information to local 

responders. An additional reporting requirement will not provide an improved level of workplace safety. 

Axiall already provides information to various regulatory agencies and organization as part of other 

regulatory requirements including EPA's Risk Management Plan, EPA's SARA reporting requirements, 
and the DHS's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard (CFATS) program. Prior to adding an additional 

facility reporting requirement EPA and OSHA should instead look to how it can best coordinate and 

harmonize the already established emergency response planning information that exists within other 

regulatory agencies. 

Mechanical Integrity of Any Safety-Critical Equipment 

Axiall believes that the existing six categories currently listed in Paragraph (j) of the existing PSM 

standard sufficiently cover safety critical equipment involved in the handling of highly hazardous 

chemicals. And EPA has not provided any reasoning or examples in the RFI to explain how the existing 

standard is not adequately addressing safety critical equipment or how chemical safety would be 

improved by the options presented by EPA in the RFI. 

As previously identified, Axiall believes that a risk-based approach already exists in the current PSM 

standard and is adequate to address mechanical integrity safety concerns. Any additional listing of 

covered equipment, which is not risk-based, could result in stretching facility resources to cover less 

critical equipment taking away from critical site-specific equipment. 

Promoting Inherently Safety Technology (1ST) 

In its original RMP rulemaking EPA acknowledged that it did not believe that an 1ST requirement would 

produce additional benefits beyond those existing under the general program structure. EPA 

acknowledged that assessment of inherently safer design alternatives has the greatest benefit in the 

development of new processes. Industry generally examines new process alternatives to avoid the 

addition of more costly administrative or engineering controls in order to mitigate a design that may be 

more hazardous in nature. Although some existing processes may be misconceived as being inherently 

less safe than other processes, EPA believed these processes could be safely operated through 

management and control of the hazards without spending resources searching for unavailable or 

unaffordable new process technologies. 

Inherently safer approaches or safer alternatives have been and will continue to be considered by 

facilities as a matter of course. Chemical facilities consider 1ST in preparing Process Hazard Analyses 

(PHAs) that are required for both the PSM and RMP standards. As EPA has acknowledged previously, 

PHA teams regularly suggest viable, effective (and inherently safer) alternatives for risk reduction which 

may include features such as inventory reduction, material substitution and process control changes. 

These changes are made as opportunities arise, without regulation or adoption of completely new and 

unproven process technologies. 

Analyzing process changes requires considerable judgment by facility personnel with expertise in 

process safety, operations, health, environmental issues and security because the benefits of potential 

risk reduction measures must be balanced against a host of other factors such as employee safety, 

public safety, environmental impact and ongoing operation and maintenance costs. 

Consequently, it is still the facility operator who is in the best position to have a comprehensive picture 

of what may or may not be feasible and how the facility environment will be impacted by process 

changes. Companies must be permitted to continue to use all risk management tools and options at 

their disposal, and the consideration of available options must be placed in the context of the 

complexities of their unique operating environments. Because of these complexities, regulating the use 

of safer alternatives is not practicable. 
Conclusion 

As stated in the beginning of our comments, Axial! believes that compliance with the existing RMP 

standard already in place is effective in reducing chemical risk at chemical facilities. Compliance with 

already existing regulations is more likely to contribute to the reduction of process hazards and chemical 

incidents than the promulgation of additional requirements for facilities. 

Additionally, Axial! is concerned with the timeline presented by EPA in its RMP revision process. Axial! 

recommends that EPA and OSHA work as closely together as possible to coordinate both their review 

and rule making activities so that the regulated community will be able to effectively utilize existing 

resources while building a strong, chemical safety program which is the goal for all RMP stakeholders. 

Axial! respectfully requests that EPA take into careful consideration the points provided in this 

correspondence prior to moving forward with any changes to the RMP standard. 

Tim R. Cobaugh 

Vice President, EHS&S