Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC20-676

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MICHAEL D. SPEAR,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

June 16, 2022

LABARGA, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the 

Fifth District Court of Appeal in Spear v. State, 294 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2020). In its decision, the district court certified a 

question of great public importance,1 which we rephrase as follows:

1. The district court certified the following question of great 

public importance:

ONCE A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IS FINAL, DOES A 

TRIAL COURT HAVE THE INHERENT AUTHORITY AT 

ANY TIME TO SUA SPONTE CORRECT SENTENCING 

DOCUMENTS THAT OVERREPORT THE AMOUNT OF 

JAIL TIME SERVED BY A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO 

SENTENCING OR THE AMOUNT OF JAIL TIME AND 
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DOES A TRIAL COURT HAVE THE INHERENT 

AUTHORITY TO SUA SPONTE CORRECT SENTENCING 

DOCUMENTS THAT OVERREPORT THE AMOUNT OF 

JAIL TIME SERVED BY A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO 

SENTENCING OR THE AMOUNT OF JAIL TIME AND 

PRISON TIME SERVED BY A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO 

RESENTENCING?

Id. at 1003. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Because we hold that subject to the procedural constraints

established by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), the trial 

court does have the authority to sua sponte correct such sentencing 

errors, we answer the rephrased certified question in the

affirmative. However, because the sentencing corrections in Spear’s 

cases were untimely, we remand Spear for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael Spear was convicted of three felony counts of forgery 

and three felony counts of uttering a forged instrument, for which 

he was sentenced to community control followed by drug offender 

PRISON TIME SERVED BY A DEFENDANT PRIOR TO 

RESENTENCING?
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probation. Spear, 294 So. 3d at 997. Spear subsequently violated 

community control by committing new law violations of felony false 

imprisonment and misdemeanor domestic violence battery, and the 

State charged him with both crimes in a separate prosecution. Id.

Spear and the State reached a plea agreement to resolve the 

violations of community control in the forgery case and the new law 

violations in the false imprisonment case. Id. The trial court 

accepted the plea agreement and released Spear pending 

sentencing. Spear’s release was subject to a Quarterman2

agreement, which provided that Spear would face the statutory 

maximum sentences for his offenses if he failed to appear at 

sentencing. 294 So. 3d at 997.

Spear failed to appear at sentencing and was later arrested 

and returned to court for sentencing. Id. At sentencing, the trial 

court revoked Spear’s community control, adjudicated Spear guilty 

of the failure to appear, and found that Spear violated the 

Quarterman agreement. See id. Spear was then sentenced to the 

2. Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. 1988) 

(holding that a trial court may depart from sentencing guidelines if 

the defendant violates a plea agreement to appear in court).
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maximum five-year sentence for each of the six counts in the 

forgery case, and all sentences were to run consecutively. See id. 

The trial court awarded Spear 163 days of jail credit on the first 

count only. Id. Spear was also sentenced to the maximum fiveyear sentence for false imprisonment with 139 days of jail credit, 

and time served on the battery. Id. The false imprisonment

sentence was to run consecutively to the sentences in the forgery 

case, resulting in a total of thirty-five years of imprisonment. See 

id.

Spear appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which 

reversed Spear’s sentences and remanded for an evidentiary 

hearing to determine whether Spear willfully failed to comply with 

the Quarterman agreement. See Spear v. State, 244 So. 3d 421, 

421 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). On remand, the trial court found a willful 

violation and resentenced Spear in a hearing on October 4, 2018.

It is the October 2018 resentencing that is the basis for the 

issues before this Court.3 As the district court explained: “Pertinent 

3. We note that although Spear was resentenced for the same 

crimes, upon resentencing, the trial court ordered count six in the 

forgery case to run concurrently to count five, and it ordered the 

sentence in the false imprisonment case to run concurrently to the 
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here, after the trial court pronounced Spear’s respective prison 

sentences, the deputy clerk then proceeded to compute Spear’s jail 

credit in each case. While arguably unnecessary, the deputy clerk 

also computed Spear’s prison credit.” Spear, 294 So. 3d at 998. 

The clerk advised that Spear was originally given 163 days of jail 

credit in the forgery case, and 139 days of jail credit in the false 

imprisonment case. The clerk then asked whether the court was 

“now adding the additional 493 days [of prison credit] from the date 

of sentencing to today as his credit.” The trial court answered, 

“Well, he’s been in custody, yes.” The public defender asked for the 

total amount of credit for time served; the clerk responded, “Hold 

on. I’m like her [the judge], I don’t know math in my head.” The 

clerk erroneously calculated the time served in the forgery case as 

686 days, and in the false imprisonment case as 932 days, 

resulting in thirty additional days of credit for time served in the 

forgery case, and 300 additional days of credit for time served in the 

sentences in the forgery case. As a result, Spear’s cumulative 

prison sentence was reduced from thirty-five years to twenty-five 

years. Here, however, our focus is the erroneous amount of credit 

for time served that Spear was awarded in both cases, and the trial 

court’s subsequent attempt to fix those errors.
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false imprisonment case. “The trial court did not thereafter 

separately announce the jail or prison credit awarded prior to 

entering the written sentencing documents in each case containing 

these incorrect credit figures . . . .” Spear, 294 So. 3d at 998.

The written sentencing documents did not distinguish between 

jail and prison credit. Rather, the documents described the entire 

amount of credit as “original jail credit.” Id. In addition to the

inaccurate credit totals, Spear was awarded credit for time served 

on all six counts in the forgery case instead of only the first count.

Two months later, in a letter dated December 7, 2018, the 

Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) sent a letter to the trial 

court advising that there were possible errors in the amount of 

credit for time served awarded to Spear that resulted in him being 

awarded too much credit. Spear, 294 So. 3d at 998.4 However, 

before the trial court addressed the errors, the district court per 

curiam affirmed Spear’s sentences and issued its mandate. See

Spear v. State, 267 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

4. The DOC letter also stated that Spear was entitled to 492 

days, not 493 days of prison credit for time served.
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After the mandate issued, the trial court sua sponte ordered 

that the judgments and sentences in Spear’s cases be amended to 

reflect the correct amounts of credit for time served as calculated by 

DOC. Spear, 294 So. 3d at 998.

Spear appealed the amended judgments and sentences. While 

the district court ultimately affirmed the trial court, the district 

court certified a question of great public importance and certified 

conflict with multiple decisions from the First and Second District 

Courts of Appeal. Id. at 1003-04. Because the rephrased certified 

question is determinative in this case, we decline to address the 

certified conflict. We now turn to the rephrased certified question.

ANALYSIS

As we begin, we emphasize that the sentencing errors in this 

case were avoidable. After pronouncing at the resentencing hearing 

that Spear would receive jail credit and prison credit on the 

appropriate counts, rather than defer to DOC the calculation of 

Spear’s prison credit (as is standard practice), the clerk erroneously 

calculated the totals of jail and prison credit in each case. The trial 

court relied on those totals, resulting in sentencing documents that 

overreported the amount of Spear’s credit for time served. 
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Complicating the matter even further, the sentencing documents 

did not distinguish between jail credit and prison credit; they 

erroneously combined the two into a single category of “original jail 

credit.”

We recognize that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801

permits a trial court to correct the underreporting of jail credit 

within one year after a judgment and sentence becomes final. 

However, the case before us involves the overreporting of credit for 

time served, not underreporting. Further, this case involves the 

correction of jail credit and prison credit. Given these distinctions, 

we do not rely on rule 3.801.

Spear concluded—and the State urges this Court to 

conclude—that Spear’s sentences were illegal sentences subject to 

correction by a trial court at any time pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). However, we reject this

characterization of Spear’s sentences. This Court has explained 

that the policy behind rule 3.800(a) “includes concerns that a 

defendant not be subject to punishment or imprisonment beyond 

that which was lawfully imposed.” Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 

600, 604 (Fla. 2007). In this case, Spear’s sentences did not 
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subject him to imprisonment beyond that which was lawfully 

imposed. Instead, Spear received too much credit for time served, 

which, to Spear’s benefit, reduced the amount of time he would 

serve on his sentences.

Given the facts before us, where a trial court sua sponte 

corrected the overreporting of jail and prison credit for time served 

after Spear’s judgments and sentences became final, our analysis is 

guided by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), “Motion to 

Correct Sentencing Error,” which provides in relevant part:

(b) Motion to Correct Sentencing Error. A motion 

to correct any sentencing error, including an illegal 

sentence or incorrect jail credit, may be filed as allowed 

by this subdivision. This subdivision shall not be 

applicable to those cases in which the death sentence 

has been imposed and direct appeal jurisdiction is in the 

supreme court under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the 

Florida Constitution. The motion must identify the error 

with specificity and provide a proposed correction. A 

response to the motion may be filed within 15 days, 

either admitting or contesting the alleged error. Motions 

may be filed by the state under this subdivision only if 

the correction of the sentencing error would benefit the 

defendant or to correct a scrivener’s error.

(Emphasis added.)
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Rule 3.800(b) limits the time during which a motion to correct 

a sentencing error may be filed; it only permits the filing of a motion 

before an appeal has been filed or while an appeal is pending:

(1) Motion Before Appeal. During the time allowed 

for the filing of a notice of appeal of a sentence, a 

defendant or the state may file a motion to correct a 

sentencing error. . . .

(2) Motion Pending Appeal. If an appeal is pending, 

a defendant or the state may file in the trial court a 

motion to correct a sentencing error. The motion may be 

filed by appellate counsel and must be served before the 

party’s first brief is served. A notice of pending motion to 

correct sentencing error shall be filed in the appellate 

court, which notice automatically shall extend the time

for the filing of the brief until 10 days after the clerk of 

circuit court transmits the supplemental record under 

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)(6).

Moreover, the procedures set forth in rules 3.800(b)(1)(A)-(B)

and 3.800(b)(2)(A) make clear that any rule 3.800(b) motion to 

correct sentencing error must be fully resolved before an appeal 

proceeds. Thus, the sua sponte corrections to Spear’s sentencing 

documents, which the trial court made after Spear’s appeal was 

over, were untimely and cannot stand.

Rule 3.800(b) expressly permits the State in certain 

circumstances to file a motion to correct a sentencing error, but the 

State did not do so in this case. In the absence of a motion by the 
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State, the trial court could only have corrected the errors on its own 

motion within the framework of and in compliance with rule 

3.800(b). Moreover, a correction of the errors would have been 

appropriate only if the errors constituted scrivener’s errors. Here, 

however, we address only the untimeliness of the trial court’s 

corrections, which is determinative in this case.

Because Spear’s sentencing documents were amended after 

his sentences were affirmed on appeal and became final, the trial 

court’s sua sponte correction of the sentencing errors occurred far 

outside of the time frames set forth in rule 3.800(b), and the trial 

court did not have the authority to correct the errors.

CONCLUSION

We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative 

and hold that subject to the procedural constraints of rule 3.800(b),

a trial court has the inherent authority to sua sponte correct 

sentencing documents that overreport the amount of jail time 

served by a defendant prior to sentencing or the amount of jail time 

and prison time served by a defendant prior to resentencing. We 

quash the Fifth District’s decision in Spear, and we remand this 

matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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It is so ordered.

POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., concurs in result only.

GROSSHANS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

GROSSHANS, J., concurring in result only.

Because the trial court lacked the authority—inherent or 

otherwise—to make the challenged corrections after the judgments 

and sentences became final, I agree with the majority that the Fifth 

District’s decision should be quashed. However, I would have 

answered the certified question (as originally phrased) in the 

negative and refrained from deciding whether a rule of criminal 

procedure—inapplicable to the facts before us—defined the scope of 

the court’s inherent authority.

Accordingly, I concur in result only.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal

Certified Great Public Importance/Certified Direct Conflict of 

Decisions

Fifth District – Case No. 5D19-1747

(Brevard County)
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Matthew Metz, Public Defender, and Glendon George Gordon, Jr., 

Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona 

Beach, Florida,

for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Rebecca 

Rock McGuigan, Bureau Chief, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant 

Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Respondent