1

Filed 12/7/22 P. v. Maneewong CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KHAM MANEEWONG,

Defendant and Appellant.

C094737

(Super. Ct. No. 20FE012101)

On August 2, 2020, during a clash that erupted in front of a local market, 

defendant Kham “Peter” Maneewong’s partner, codefendant Pailynn “Mina” Lansing, 

stabbed defendant’s sister V.M. in the stomach. Defendant stabbed V.M. in the back 

three times. Defendant was holding his 15-month-old daughter at the time. Defendant 

then charged at another sister, N.M., with his knife. A jury found defendant guilty of two 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of felony child endangerment, and

the jury found true the allegation that, in the assault of V.M., defendant personally 

inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 

11 years in prison.
2

On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of 

proving the absence of self-defense or defense of others beyond a reasonable doubt and 

the jury’s verdicts on counts one and three were not supported by substantial evidence, 

(2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to 

request certain bracketed language in the self-defense jury instruction, (3) the matter must 

be remanded for resentencing based on changes made to Penal Code section 654,1 and, in 

supplemental briefing, that (4) the matter must be remanded based on recent changes to 

section 1170.2

We conclude the prosecution satisfied its burden of disproving self-defense and 

defense of others beyond a reasonable doubt and that substantial evidence supports the 

jury’s verdicts. Even if counsel was ineffective for failing to request the bracketed 

language for the jury instruction on self-defense, defendant was not prejudiced as a result. 

Finding merit to defendant’s contentions concerning sections 654 and 1170, we will 

remand for resentencing. Otherwise, we affirm defendant’s convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An information charged defendant in count one with assault with a deadly weapon 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); victim V.M.), in count two with assault with a deadly weapon 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); victim N.M.), and in count three with felony child endangerment 

(§ 273a, subd. (a)). Lansing was charged in counts one and three. The information 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Defendant asserts these changes were enacted by Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-

2022 Reg. Sess.). However, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 731, § 1.3) was enacted after Assembly Bill No. 124 and incorporated Assembly Bill 

No. 124’s amendments to section 1170. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 3(c).) Senate Bill 

No. 567 takes precedence because it was enacted last. (Gov. Code, § 9605.) We address 

defendant’s claims as raised under Senate Bill No. 567.
3

further alleged that, in the commission of count one, defendants personally inflicted great 

bodily injury on V.M. within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). It was 

further alleged defendant had a sustained petition in juvenile court for a crime that 

constituted a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and 

that he thus came within the provisions of section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).

The Prosecution’s Case

V.M. and N.M. were defendant’s sisters and the sisters lived with their mother. 

The house was directly across the street from a local market. On August 2, 2020, 

defendant, Lansing, who was his girlfriend, and defendant’s three daughters came over to 

his mother’s house.

3

 V.M.’s mother went outside when defendant and his family arrived.

However, V.M. did not talk to defendant because she did not have a good relationship 

with him. Nor did V.M. talk to Lansing because they “don’t talk.” V.M. estimated she 

had only seen Lansing four times prior to trial.

Around the same time, N.M. was walking to her mother’s house with J.C., her

niece. They ran into defendant and his two teenage daughters who, by this time, were in 

front of the market across the street. J.C. asked defendant if they were having any 

problem or if she did something to upset him because he had been ignoring her. 

According to J.C., defendant pulled out a knife, flicked it open, and started screaming. 

J.C. was shocked. She and defendant argued.

From her mother’s house, V.M. heard shouting or arguing. She was still inside her 

mother’s house when she heard the screaming. V.M. and her son went outside and V.M. 

3 Defendant testified he and Lansing were married through “Laos tradition” but not 

“in American custom.”

Two of defendant’s daughters were teenagers and were from a prior relationship. 

The youngest, defendant and Lansing’s daughter, was 15 months old.
4

saw Lansing in front of the house, holding a baby in her arms. Defendant was across the 

street. V.M. heard defendant and J.C. screaming. Lansing, still holding the baby, crossed 

the street towards the market and V.M. followed “right behind her.”

According to J.C., Lansing already had a knife in her hand as she approached the 

market. As Lansing approached, J.C. screamed at Lansing to “put the baby down.” J.C. 

was concerned for the child’s safety because Lansing had a knife. J.C. was not trying to 

start a fight with Lansing.

Lansing handed the baby to defendant. Everyone “was screaming and yelling.” 

Lansing then turned around and tried to hit V.M. as V.M. stood against the wall. V.M. 

moved back and felt only a “little nick” or a brush against her chin. V.M. testified she 

had not touched Lansing at all before Lansing swung at her and that she did not see 

anyone else touch Lansing either. She also did not shout at Lansing, call her any names, 

or threaten her.

V.M. grabbed Lansing and tried to hold her and then she and Lansing were 

swinging at each other. They were “just battling.” At this time, they were both up

against the wall. J.C. tried to break up the fight.

N.M. saw Lansing stab V.M. in the stomach. J.C. testified Lansing stabbed V.M. 

“in the front,” but she subsequently testified she “did not see who stabbed her in the 

front.” However, she did see Lansing’s knife covered in blood.

Defendant came up behind V.M. so V.M. was between Lansing and defendant. 

N.M. and J.C. both saw defendant stab V.M. in the back. J.C. saw defendant stab V.M. 

twice in the back. Defendant was still holding his baby when he stabbed V.M.

According to J.C., after stabbing V.M., Lansing was “hopping around, asking . . . , 

Who wants it? Who wants it?” and “Who wants it next?”

V.M. did not realize she had been stabbed until she heard someone say she had 

been. V.M.’s son pulled her away. V.M. then noticed defendant and Lansing each had a 

knife.
5

V.M.’s son became upset and said, “You stabbed my mom.” Defendant came

towards V.M.’s son pointing his knife at him. V.M. shielded her son to protect him. She

then started to panic as she saw that blood was “pouring out.” Defendant’s mother 

arrived and calmed defendant down. However, defendant then walked towards N.M. 

pointing his knife at her. N.M. backed up and threatened to hit defendant with her water 

bottle. Defendant’s mother continued to try to calm him down.

During the entire incident, V.M. never saw anyone hit or touch defendant. V.M., 

N.M., and J.C. each testified they did not have weapons and they did not see anyone else 

with weapons other than defendant and Lansing. N.M. did not pull Lansing’s hair or 

punch her, and she did not see anyone try to hit defendant. V.M. never hit Lansing and 

did not pull her hair. J.C. did not see V.M. punch or attack Lansing. Rather, Lansing 

instigated the fight. J.C. never saw anyone try to hit defendant or Lansing.

The prosecution played People’s exhibit 4, a video recording of the skirmish in 

front of the market recorded on a video camera at defendant’s mother’s home.4 V.M. 

identified Lansing in the video carrying a child and herself following behind Lansing. 

J.C. testified that, in the events occurring five seconds into the video, she saw that 

Lansing had a knife. V.M. testified that Lansing could be seen throwing a punch in the 

video. V.M. again testified she never touched Lansing or pulled her hair before Lansing 

threw a punch at her, and no one else did either. The prosecution also played People’s 

exhibit 3, a video recording from another camera at defendant’s mother’s house. This 

video shows the events at a greater distance or less zoomed in, and with a more 

obstructed view, but this video includes sound.

4 Defense exhibit A was also played at trial. It is a zoomed-in version of People’s 

exhibit 4.
6

At some point, J.C. called 911. Arriving at the scene, Officer Katie Rappazzo 

located Lansing approximately 20 feet from the market returning to the scene. She had a 

folding pocketknife. The knife appeared to have been recently wiped down, but there 

was still wet blood on it. Lansing also had a case of four throwing knives in her purse. 

The throwing knives did not have blood on them. Rappazzo testified Lansing had a little

bruise and a small scratch on her bicep and a faint bruise on her right forearm. Defendant 

had very small scratches on either side of his neck. Rappazzo did not observe injuries to 

defendant’s or Lansing’s faces.

Officer Corey Stackhouse approached defendant at the market and defendant, 

unprompted, put his hands in the air. Defendant had a beer bottle in one hand and a 

folding knife in the other. Defendant said, “I stabbed her.” This statement is 

memorialized in body camera footage, People’s exhibit 50, discussed further post. 

Eventually, Stackhouse noticed defendant’s blade appeared as though blood may have 

been wiped from it, but some blood remained and appeared to still be wet.

EMT’s treated V.M. and took her to the hospital. She had four stab wounds. She 

had wounds to her upper stomach, on her “left lower butt,” on the lower left side of her 

back, and underneath her shoulder blade. People’s exhibits 28 and 29 were photographs 

that showed the stab wound to her stomach. Lansing inflicted that wound. People’s 

exhibits 30, 31, 32, and 33 showed a stab wound to V.M.’s back. Defendant inflicted this 

wound. Another wound to her back was visible in People’s exhibits 33 and 34. 

Defendant also inflicted that wound. People’s exhibit 35 showed one of the wounds to 

her back as well as a wound below her buttocks. Defendant inflicted that wound as well.

Officer Lucas Copp took a statement from V.M. at the hospital. She was fairly 

coherent at the time. Unlike her trial testimony, in which she testified she was inside the 

house immediately after defendant’s arrival, V.M. told Copp she had been on the front 

porch. V.M. could not hear the conversation between defendant and her mother, so she 

sat and watched. At some point, an argument escalated near the market. V.M. saw 
7

Lansing move towards her niece, so V.M. grabbed Lansing because she did not want 

Lansing to hurt her niece. Lansing started hitting her. V.M. told Copp she did not realize 

she had been stabbed until someone told her. V.M. told Copp she had not had any 

physical altercation with defendant. However, Copp did not ask her if defendant had 

stabbed her.

Evidence Presented by Lansing

Lansing testified she was with the baby and defendant’s mother when defendant 

and his two older daughters walked to the market. At some point, she heard yelling. 

Defendant’s mother told Lansing to go across the street. Lansing, carrying the baby and 

a soda can, went across the street. She had a knife clipped onto her hip because it was “a 

bad neighborhood.” V.M. followed right behind her.

Lansing arrived in front of the market where people were yelling. J.C. was there, 

and she started yelling at Lansing, “Put the baby down.” J.C. called her “[b]itch,” 

“[w]hore,” and “[s]lut.” N.M. was screaming at everybody. Lansing handed the baby to 

defendant. Lansing testified that, at this point, she did not have a knife in her hand. The 

next thing Lansing remembered was being grabbed. She turned around and punched 

V.M., who had grabbed her. Lansing testified that V.M., J.C., and K.C., who was J.C.’s 

sister, pushed her against a wall. She testified she was “surrounded.” V.M. and J.C. both 

pulled Lansing’s hair and hit her on the head, and K.C. held onto her right side.

Lansing managed to get her hand free, grabbed her pocketknife, and flipped it 

open. Lansing “was just stabbing trying to get people away from me.” At some point, 

she realized she had stabbed V.M. Then, everyone moved away from her.

Lansing walked away to compose herself, but then circled back. She did not clean 

her knife. When she returned to the market, she gave officers the knife.

Lansing testified the throwing knives in her purse belonged to defendant. She did 

not get them out that day. In her culture, throwing knives keep bad spirits away.
8

Lansing testified there had been prior acts of violence between her and defendant’s 

sisters. These events occurred when defendant still lived at his mother’s house. In April 

2018, N.M. followed Lansing and defendant as they went to the market. At the market, 

N.M. screamed at Lansing, placed her hands around Lansing’s neck, and squeezed. 

Defendant made her stop. Defendant immediately decided to move out of his mother’s 

house. As he was loading the car, Lansing was in defendant’s room and N.M., V.M., and 

another sister jumped her. One sister took Lansing to the ground and N.M. and V.M. 

kicked Lansing. Again, defendant stopped the attack. Lansing did not fight back during 

this incident.

Officer Mark Haynes interviewed K.C. She told him she saw V.M. push Lansing 

against a wall. That is when Lansing pulled out a knife. K.C. saw Lansing stab V.M. 

K.C. told Haynes that defendant did not stab V.M. and that he had not been close enough 

to V.M. to stab her.

In her trial testimony, K.C. stated that, when she arrived at the scene, she 

encountered V.M. hunched over and she saw blood on the ground. Lansing had a knife. 

K.C. remembered Lansing saying, “Who wants it, who wants it.” Additionally, she saw 

defendant lunging at N.M. with a knife. She did not see anyone else with a weapon. 

K.C. testified she did not tell Officer Haynes that V.M. pushed Lansing against a wall. 

She acknowledged telling officers that defendant did not stab V.M. She testified, 

“[t]hat’s what I thought I had seen . . . .” K.C. testified she was not present for the 

argument and was not involved in the altercation at all.

Evidence Presented by Defendant

Defendant did not like his sisters. He had not spoken with them for four to five 

years. Defendant testified that, other than his mother, no one in his family liked Lansing.

On August 2, 2020, defendant called his mother and they agreed he would come 

over. When they arrived, defendant called his mother and told her he was outside. 

Defendant’s two older daughters were thirsty, so defendant took them to the market. 
9

Lansing and the youngest daughter stayed behind and played with defendant’s mother in 

the front yard. At the time, defendant had a knife clipped onto his pocket. He testified he 

used it for fishing.

At the market, defendant was confronted by J.C., who was being aggressive, and 

N.M. J.C. asked him if there was a problem between them. Defendant said, loudly, he 

did not “want to deal with this right now.”

Defendant then noticed Lansing walking towards the market holding the baby and 

a soda can. V.M. was right behind her. J.C. dashed towards Lansing and yelled, “Put the 

baby down, bitch. Put the baby down, ‘ho.” Defendant grabbed the baby.

A scuffle broke out between Lansing and V.M. V.M. pulled Lansing’s hair and, 

with her other hand, hit Lansing on the shoulder. Lansing was surrounded by defendant’s 

sisters, and they had Lansing and defendant pinned against the wall. Defendant moved 

away and grabbed his knife. He warned everyone to get away and flicked the knife open. 

Suddenly, defendant was involved in the scuffle. He testified he “probably hit her. I’m 

not sure.” He testified that, if he stabbed V.M., he did not mean to. He did not know 

when he stabbed V.M. or where he stabbed her. He testified he had to defend himself, 

his baby, and Lansing. He emphasized they were outnumbered and people were 

punching and scratching him.

Eventually, everyone separated. Defendant’s mother came over and calmed him 

down. Then N.M. started yelling and coming towards him and he charged towards her 

intending to keep her away. At another point, V.M.’s son was yelling at defendant, and 

defendant walked towards him, although he did not think that he had his knife in his hand

at that point.

Defendant then went into the market, bought a beer, and drank it. He realized he 

must have stabbed V.M. because there was blood on his knife. He waited at the scene 

until police arrived. On cross-examination, defendant testified that, when police arrived, 
10

he admitted he stabbed V.M. not because he recalled doing so, but because there was 

blood on his knife.

Defendant testified Lansing had a knife because his mother lives “in a bad 

neighborhood.” He also testified the throwing knives in Lansing’s purse were his and he 

had them because, when he went fishing, he would practice throwing them at trees.

Defendant acknowledged he did not see V.M., N.M., or J.C. with a weapon. Only 

defendant and Lansing had knives.

During cross-examination, the prosecution played People’s exhibit 50, a body 

camera video recorded as an officer approached defendant at the market. As the officer 

approached, defendant stated “I’m th[e] one that stabbed her.” He repeated, “I stab her.” 

When an officer reported to another officer that “he said he stabbed her,” defendant 

stated, “Yeah, I admit, I admit.” 

Defendant testified he stabbed V.M. “[a]ccidentally.” Asked if he “accidentally 

put your knife into her back three times,” defendant responded that he did. However, 

reversing course, he subsequently testified, “Okay. I stabbed. It’s not an accident.” He 

purposely stabbed V.M. three times. He knew he did it on purpose. However, on 

recross-examination, he again changed course, testifying he did not mean to stab V.M. 

He “[u]npurposely” and “accidentally” stabbed her. He testified he did not intend to 

testify earlier that he stabbed V.M. on purpose.

Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts and found true the allegation 

that, in connection with count one, he personally inflicted great bodily injury on V.M. 

The jury found Lansing not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on V.M. but guilty of 

the lesser included offense of assault. The jury further found her not guilty of felony 

child endangerment but guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child 

endangerment.
11

At a bench trial, the trial court found true the allegation defendant sustained a prior 

strike and the court denied defendant’s motion to strike the prior strike. (See People v. 

Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) The court sentenced defendant to an 

aggregate term of 11 years, consisting of the midterm of three years on count one, 

doubled for his prior strike, plus an additional three-year term for the section 12022.7, 

subdivision (a) great bodily injury enhancement, and two years, one-third the midterm

doubled, on count two. The court imposed four years on count three, the low term of two 

years doubled, and stayed execution of that sentence pursuant to former section 654.5

DISCUSSION

I

Self-defense/Defense of Others and the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant asserts the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the absence 

of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury’s verdicts on counts one and 

three were not supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant asserts the evidence created a 

reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense and/or in defense of Lansing. He 

emphasizes inconsistencies in prosecution witness testimony and their statements to law 

enforcement. He also relies heavily on the video evidence, asserting that it “irrefutably 

shows that the prosecution witnesses repeatedly lied on the stand.”

“In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 

5 Defendant correctly points out that, on the abstract of judgment, the amounts the 

court imposed for the court operations assessment (§ 1465.8) and the conviction 

assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) are reversed. We need not order this error corrected as 

we are remanding for resentencing.
12

determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence 

proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor 

reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.

[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, 

reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also 

reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

616, 638-639 (Jennings).) “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless 

it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)

The evidence establishes, and defendant does not dispute, that, during the scuffle, 

defendant stabbed V.M. in the back three times. When law enforcement approached 

defendant at the scene, defendant stated, “I’m th[e] one that stabbed her” and “I stab her.” 

When one officer reported to another that defendant “said he stabbed her,” defendant 

stated, “Yeah, I admit, I admit.” The evidence further establishes defendant was holding 

his 15-month-old at the time, and that he later charged at N.M. with his knife. We turn to 

whether the prosecution proved the absence of self-defense and/or defense of others 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

“In California we impose only the most minimal burden upon a defendant with 

respect to excuse or justification. All that is required is that there be some evidence 

supportive of excuse or justification or that the defendant in some manner inform the 

court that he is relying upon such a defense. In such a case the jury must be instructed on 

the defense and the prosecution bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (People v. Frye (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1158-1159.) Because defendant

testified he was acting in defense of himself, Lansing, or his daughter, the prosecution 

had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he did not act in self-defense or 
13

defense of others. (People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 988.) However, as 

stated, our review is for substantial evidence. (People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 

79 Cal.App.5th 197, 212.)

“ ‘To justify an act of self-defense for [an assault charge under Penal Code section 

245], the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about 

to be inflicted on him.’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064 (Minifie).) 

“ ‘In other words, the defendant’s belief must both subjectively exist and be objectively 

reasonable.’ ” (People v. Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) “The threat of 

bodily injury must be imminent [citation], and ‘. . . any right of self-defense is limited to 

the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Minifie, at pp. 1064-

1065.) “Although the belief in the need to defend must be objectively reasonable, a jury 

must consider what ‘would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar 

situation and with similar knowledge . . . .’ ” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

1073, 1082-1083.) “It judges reasonableness ‘from the point of view of a reasonable 

person in the position of defendant . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 1083.) “Although the ultimate test 

of reasonableness is objective, in determining whether a reasonable person in defendant’s 

position would have believed in the need to defend, the jury must consider all of the 

relevant circumstances in which defendant found” himself. (Ibid.) A defendant must use 

“no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the threat.” (People v. 

Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 747 (Hernandez), citing CALCRIM No. 3470.)

We conclude the prosecution proved the absence of self-defense and/or defense of 

others beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, we need not explore at length the extent to 

which the evidence established defendant had “ ‘an honest and reasonable belief that 

bodily injury [was] about to be inflicted on him’ ” or his family. (Minifie, supra, 

13 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) This is because we conclude the prosecution established, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that defendant used far greater force “than was reasonably necessary 

to defend against the threat.” (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 747.) Any “ ‘right of 
14

self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the 

circumstances.’ ” (Minifie, at p. 1065.) 

According to J.C., Lansing had her knife out as she approached the location where 

defendant and J.C. were arguing. J.C. yelled at Lansing to put the baby down because of 

the obvious danger to the child’s safety. Lansing handed the baby off to defendant, V.M. 

approached Lansing, and the scuffle erupted immediately. According to V.M., Lansing 

swung at her unprovoked, and they began to struggle with each other. Lansing stabbed 

V.M. in the stomach. Defendant, holding his 15-month-old daughter, came up behind 

V.M. and stabbed her in the back three times. Lansing, with her knife, then asked, “Who 

wants it?” and “Who wants it next?” Moments later, defendant walked towards N.M. 

pointing his knife at her.

Uncontradicted evidence established V.M., N.M., and J.C. were unarmed. Only 

defendant and Lansing were armed. They each had a knife, as well as the four throwing 

knives in reserve in Lansing’s purse. By V.M.’s, N.M.’s, and J.C.’s accounts, no one 

attacked or punched defendant or Lansing or pulled Lansing’s hair, at least before 

Lansing attacked V.M. According to the prosecution evidence, Lansing instigated the 

fight.

Thus, defendant stabbed his unarmed sister V.M. three times in the back after 

Lansing, also armed with a knife, attacked her. Defendant then charged at another 

unarmed sister with his knife. When approached by law enforcement, defendant admitted 

unsolicited that he stabbed V.M.; he did not say he acted in self-defense or in defense of 

anyone else.

Defendant claims it is “irrelevant” that no one had any weapons other than 

defendant and Lansing. According to defendant, the “sheer number of people” involved 

“was enough to deem reasonable the reaction elicited from the defendants.” We cannot 

agree it is irrelevant that no one but defendant and Lansing were armed. Indeed, in 

discussing the verdicts returned for Lansing, which we address post, defendant 
15

acknowledges that, generally, an assault with fists “does not justify the use of a deadly 

weapon in self-defense.” (People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 228, disapproved on 

another ground in People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3.) This undercuts 

defendant’s position. Additionally, to the extent they are even perceptible in

photographs, People’s exhibits 37 to 46, and to the extent they in fact resulted from the 

skirmish, the very minor nature of any injuries to defendant and Lansing further 

undermines the notion that defendant was faced with a threat that justified the use of 

deadly force. 

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, Lansing testified that she 

did not have her knife out when she approached the market. According to Lansing, V.M. 

grabbed her and she turned around and punched V.M. Three much larger women then 

had Lansing surrounded, pulling her hair and hitting her on the head.6 Lansing stabbed 

V.M. Lansing also testified about defendant’s sisters’ alleged attack on her in 2018.

Defendant testified V.M. pulled Lansing’s hair and hit Lansing on the shoulder. 

Defendant testified both he and Lansing were surrounded. He testified that he then 

“probably hit her,” although he also testified that he did not know when he stabbed V.M. 

or where he stabbed her. Defendant testified that, later, N.M. started yelling and coming 

towards him and he charged towards her intending to keep her away.

The evidence presented by the prosecution and that presented by defendant and 

Lansing portrayed conflicting accounts of the events. This gave rise to a question of 

credibility. However, in reviewing the record to determine whether it discloses sufficient 

evidence, we “neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.

6 V.M. was five feet five inches tall and weighed 221 pounds. N.M. was five feet 

four and weighed 210 pounds. According to defendant, V.M., N.M., and J.C. were “quite 

a bit bigger” than Lansing.
16

[Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury 

reasonably could deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably 

justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted 

simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary 

finding.” (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 638-639.) The jury plainly resolved 

credibility issues in favor of the prosecution. 

Even assuming Lansing and defendant were surrounded as they claimed, they 

were surrounded by unarmed family members and they were both armed with knives. 

Additionally, inasmuch as either Lansing or defendant could claim to be surrounded, so 

could V.M., who, at least for some time, was boxed in by defendant on one side, Lansing 

on another, and a wall on a third side. This comports with the stab wounds to her 

stomach, inflicted by Lansing, and to her back, inflicted by defendant.

Here, whatever threat defendant, Lansing, and his daughter did face, the evidence 

established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s response in stabbing his

unarmed sister in the back three times was force far greater than that reasonably 

necessary to defend against the threat. (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 747.) The 

prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s use of force was not 

reasonable under the circumstances (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1064-1065), and 

substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.

Defendant raises a number of issues based on the video recordings, asserting they

furnished objective evidence demonstrating prosecution witnesses “repeatedly lied on the 

stand.” He asserts that, because “vacillating, incomplete, and unreliable story telling 

created the bases for the convictions,” and because the video recordings “support the 

defense’s version of the events, the prosecution failed to prove the absence of 

justification beyond a reasonable doubt.” We have independently reviewed the video 

recordings in our consideration of this appeal.
17

Defendant asserts the videos demonstrate that, contrary to her trial testimony, J.C. 

was “extremely angry when she first confronted” him. Defendant also claims the videos

demonstrate J.C. was “verbally assaultive” and she was screaming at Lansing to put the 

baby down because “she was about to beat the lights out of the much smaller” Lansing,

and she “wanted to be able to beat [Lansing] without having to consider” the baby. The

video recordings demonstrate that, as the encounter began, J.C. walked fairly quickly 

toward Lansing as Lansing approached the market. Defendant walked in the same 

direction as J.C., beside her but under the market’s overhanging roof. J.C. can be seen 

gesturing or pointing in Lansing’s direction. Additionally, on People’s exhibit 3, after 

Lansing crossed the street holding the baby, a voice can be heard yelling, twice, “Put the 

baby down!” J.C.’s purpose in making these statements is not clear from the video 

recordings. She testified she made these statements out of concern for the safety of the 

baby. It appears that she also made other statements, but those, which were not in 

English, were not translated at trial. Based on our review of this evidence, we do not 

conclude that the jury was bound to determine J.C. was “extremely angry,” “verbally 

assaultive,” and, crucially, wanted to beat Lansing and posed a threat to defendant, 

Lansing, or the baby justifying the use of deadly force.

Defendant claims that the video recording showing Lansing holding the baby and 

a soda can in one hand and opening the gate with the other hand before crossing the street 

“completely quashes [J.C.’s] claim that [Lansing] came armed with a knife in her hand 

and ready to fight, and that [J.C.] was screaming ‘Put the baby down’ because [J.C.] was 

worried about the baby.” We are not persuaded. Based upon our review of the video, it 

is entirely possible Lansing pulled out her knife before she reached the location of the 

market near J.C. As she crossed the street and approached the site of the altercation, 

Lansing’s back was to the video camera and, after she was more than halfway across the 

street, it cannot be discerned what was in her hand, if anything. Moreover, as Lansing 

crossed the street, a banner notification obscured a portion of the screen, including 
18

Lansing, for several seconds. After the banner disappeared, it cannot be discerned what, 

if anything, Lansing was holding in her right hand, which cannot be seen in the recording. 

Of course, in reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 638.) The 

video recording by no means precludes a determination that Lansing had a knife in her 

hand as she arrived among the group in front of the market. And, of course, in reviewing 

the record to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, we “presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the 

evidence.” (Id. at pp. 638-639.)

Defendant also asserts the video evidence irrefutably establishes that V.M. “jerked 

[Lansing] backwards” as J.C. approached Lansing from the front. We should state here 

that the video recording focused on the front of the market, People’s exhibit 4, is not 

sharp or of high quality. In any event, based on our review, while it does appear Lansing

moved suddenly and quickly immediately before she turned and took a big swing at 

V.M., it is not clear that V.M. jerked Lansing backwards as defendant contends. Based 

on the video, we simply do not know what happened immediately before Lansing swung 

at V.M.

Defendant asserts the video recordings establish that J.C. was too far from Lansing 

to see if she was holding a “small knife” at the relevant times. Having viewed the video 

recordings, we simply do not agree with defendant’s assertion in this regard.

In addition to emphasizing the video evidence, defendant also emphasizes the 

jury’s verdict finding Lansing not guilty of the greater charge of assault with a deadly 

weapon against V.M. notwithstanding the fact that the evidence indicated Lansing 

inflicted V.M.’s stomach wound. Defendant asserts this demonstrates that the jury found 

Lansing was justified in stabbing V.M. Defendant asserts this evidence gave rise to a 

reasonable doubt as to whether he was justified in stabbing V.M. because he faced the 

same imminent danger as did Lansing. In other words, defendant assumes the jury 
19

concluded Lansing acted with justification, and then asserts that, based on the same facts, 

he must have as well. According to defendant, it “does not make sense . . . that while 

[Lansing] was justified in stabbing [V.M.], [defendant] was not, as both [defendant] and 

[Lansing] were trying to prevent the same imminent danger.” While acknowledging that, 

ordinarily, an assault with fists will not justify use of a deadly weapon in self-defense 

(People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 228), defendant asserts “a reasonable jury 

could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the nature of the attack did not 

justify the resort to deadly force’ ” by defendant “ ‘or that the force used [(three stabs)] 

exceeded that which was reasonably necessary to repel the attack’, because the same jury 

found [Lansing] not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.”

Defendant’s contention is without merit. Had the jury found that the prosecution 

failed to satisfy its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lansing did not act 

in lawful self-defense or defense of another, it should have acquitted her on count one, 

not found her guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault. (See CALCRIM 

No. 3470; cf. People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133-134 [reasonable self-defense 

is a complete justification for a killing and, if believed, such a killing is not a crime].) In 

any event, we cannot know why the jury chose to acquit Lansing of assault with a deadly 

weapon and convict her of the lesser included offense of simple assault. Nevertheless, 

even if we were to find some inconsistency between Lansing’s verdict and defendant’s, 

“[t]he law generally accepts inconsistent verdicts as an occasionally inevitable, if not 

entirely satisfying, consequence of a criminal justice system that gives defendants the 

benefit of a reasonable doubt as to guilt, and juries the power to acquit whatever the 

evidence.” (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860.) Whatever the basis for the 

Lansing verdict, it does not constitute grounds to reverse defendant’s convictions.

The prosecution proved the absence of self-defense or defense of others beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdicts.
20

II

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

At the jury instruction conference, the trial court stated it intended to instruct the 

jury with CALCRIM No. 3470 on self-defense. Defendant’s attorney did not object, 

stated she was satisfied with the jury instruction packet, and expressly stated she had no 

requests for additions. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3470 as 

proposed.

Defendant asserts he received the constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on his trial attorney’s failure to seek certain instructions on self-defense. 

Specifically, defendant faults his attorney for failing to request the bracketed instructions 

for CALCRIM No. 3470 which state: “[If you find that __________ <insert name of 

victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that 

information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]” 

and “[If you find that the defendant knew that __________ <insert name of victim> had 

threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding 

whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]” (CALCRIM No. 3470 

[bracketed instructions].) Defendant asserts that “the only logical explanation for 

[Lansing’s] acquittal and [defendant’s] guilty verdict” on counts one and three “is that 

here the jury was not properly instructed on how to use the prior attack on [Lansing] 

when deciding its verdicts for” defendant.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 

Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 

claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of 

the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court 
21

need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” (Strickland, at 

p. 697.) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

(Ibid.) To show prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would 

have received a more favorable result had counsel’s performance not been deficient.7 

(Strickland, at pp. 693-694; Ledesma, at pp. 217-218.)

Here, even if defendant’s trial attorney was ineffective for failing to request the 

bracketed instructions based on Lansing’s testimony that defendant’s sisters attacked her 

in 2018, defendant cannot establish prejudice. We have concluded, ante, that the 

prosecution proved the absence of self-defense or defense of others beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdicts. Our conclusion is 

predicated on the fact that the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

defendant used far greater force “than was reasonably necessary to defend against the 

threat” (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 747), and that his use of force was not 

“ ‘reasonable under the circumstances’ ” (Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065).

The bracketed instructions would have instructed the jurors that, in deciding 

whether defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable, they were permitted to 

consider whether defendant’s sisters threatened or harmed defendant or Lansing in the 

past, and whether defendant knew that they had threatened or harmed others in the past. 

(CALCRIM No. 3470 [bracketed instructions].) These instructions could have had no

7 Defendant relies on People v. Howard (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 41, 48, which states 

that, “[i]n statistical terms, . . . Strickland requires a significant but something-less-than50 percent likelihood of a more favorable verdict.” In the intervening 35 years, no 

published case has explicitly cited or followed Howard for this numerical, quantitative 

approach. Nor do we do so here.
22

possible effect on the conclusion that defendant’s use of force here—stabbing his 

unarmed sister three times in the back after she became embroiled in an altercation with 

Lansing and was stabbed by Lansing in the stomach—was far greater “than was 

reasonably necessary to defend against the threat” (Hernandez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 

p. 747), and that his use of force was not “ ‘reasonable under the circumstances’ ” 

(Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065). 

Moreover, nothing in the jury instructions precluded the jurors from considering 

Lansing’s testimony about the 2018 incident in evaluating defendant’s self-defense and 

defense-of-others claim and whether defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable. 

Among other things, the court instructed the jury, with regard to self-defense: “When 

deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances 

as they were known to and appeared to the defendant, and consider what a reasonable 

person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed.” (CALCRIM 

No. 3470.) Lansing’s testimony about the 2018 incident indicated defendant intervened 

in both instances. Thus, this would have been a circumstance known to him. The court 

also instructed the jurors they were to decide what the facts were. (CALCRIM No. 200.)

We conclude there is not a reasonable probability defendant would have received a 

more favorable verdict had the jurors been given the bracketed instructions. Thus, 

defendant has not established prejudice.

8

(See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 

at pp. 693-694; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.)

8 At the end of his argument on this issue, defendant raises his trial attorney’s 

failure to marshal the facts concerning the prior attack in addition to counsel’s failure to 

request the bracketed instructions. Even assuming this contention was properly raised, 

and even assuming counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the issue to the jury, for 

the same reasons discussed ante, defendant was not prejudiced as a result.
23

III

Section 654

Defendant asserts the matter must be remanded for resentencing under the newly 

amended version of section 654 so the court may exercise its discretion in sentencing him 

under that section. The Attorney General concedes defendant is entitled to remand for 

resentencing. We agree.

At the time defendant was sentenced, former section 654, subdivision (a) 

provided: “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different 

provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest 

potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished 

under more than one provision.” (§ 654, former subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1997, 

ch. 410, § 1, p. 2753.) As amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 

which went into effect January 1, 2022, section 654 now provides: “[a]n act or omission 

that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under 

either of such provisions . . . .” (§ 654, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, as amended, 

where section 654 applies, that section now authorizes trial courts to exercise their 

discretion in choosing the count for which punishment will be imposed rather than 

requiring the longest potential term of imprisonment.

Defendant contends that, because his case is not yet final, he is entitled to the 

benefits of amended section 654. In In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, the California 

Supreme Court held, “a statute that reduced the punishment for a crime applied 

retroactively to any case in which the judgment was not final before the statute took 

effect.” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303.) “ ‘The Estrada

Additionally, contrary to defendant’s contention, for the reasons discussed in part 

I, ante, Lansing’s verdict does not bolster his argument that counsel’s failure to request 

the bracketed instructions was prejudicial.
24

rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body 

ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as 

possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences 

that are not.’ ” (Id. at p. 308.) 

Assembly Bill No. 518 results in ameliorative changes with potential to impact

defendant’s sentence, it contains no indication the Legislature intended the amendment to 

apply prospectively only, and defendant’s case was not final before amended section 654 

went into effect. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree defendant is entitled to 

resentencing under the newly operative version of section 654 and, accordingly, we will 

remand the matter for resentencing.

IV

Senate Bill No. 5679

In supplemental briefing, defendant asserts the matter must be remanded for 

resentencing based on recent changes made to section 1170. Defendant asserts he is 

entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative changes to section 1170 under Estrada. He 

asserts that the matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether certain 

traumas he experienced were “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense” 

warranting imposition of low-term sentences. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6), added by Stats. 

2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The Attorney General agrees defendant is entitled to the 

ameliorative benefit of the statutory changes and that the matter therefore should be 

remanded for resentencing. We agree.

Senate Bill No. 567 added subdivision (b)(6) to section 1170. (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3.) Insofar as relevant here, section 1170, as amended, provides, in 

pertinent part: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that the 

9 See footnote 2, ante.
25

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the 

lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition 

of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of 

the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood 

trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” 

(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Senate Bill No. 567 “applies retroactively . . . as an ameliorative 

change in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal.” (People v. Flores

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Zabelle (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109.)

We have already determined remand is required for the trial court to resentence 

defendant under the newly operative version of section 654. Accordingly, we need not

also consider defendant’s contentions, and support therefor, concerning the specific 

grounds for his entitlement to resentencing pursuant to section 1170 as amended by 

Senate Bill No. 567. At resentencing, the trial court shall also consider the applicability 

of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) to defendant’s case.

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. The matter is remanded for resentencing in 

conformance with recently amended sections 654 and 1170, subdivision (b)(6).

 /s/

HOCH, J.

We concur:

 /s/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.