alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### 17.801 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

*Government data* means any information, document, media, or machine-readable material regardless of physical form or characteristics, that is created or obtained by the Government, in the course of official Government business.

*Government-related data* means any information, document, media, or machine-readable material regardless of physical form or characteristics that is created or obtained by a contractor through the storage, processing, or communication of Government data. This does not include a contractor's business records (*e.g.,* financial records, legal records, etc.) or data such as operating procedures, software coding, or algorithms that are not uniquely applied to the Government data.

*Reverse auction service provider* means a commercial or Government entity that provides a means for conducting reverse auctions when acquiring supplies or services to be used by the Government.
habeas corpus, 2 and it constituted an abuse of the writ because he raised a

claim that was new and different from the claims raised in his first petition. See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(2). Therefore, Malone's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Malone claimed that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional, provided good cause to file a post-conviction petition challenging his two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole.

Even assuming that Miller provided good cause for the delay and for filing a successive petition, that Malone's additional delay after Miller was decided on June 25, 2012, was not unreasonable, see Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-53, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (stating that, to constitute good cause, a claim cannot itself be procedurally defaulted), and that Miller applies where, as here, the life-without-parole sentence was
not mandatory, see NRS 200.030(4), we conclude that this appeal has been rendered moot by the recent enactment of A.B. 267. With A.B. 267, the Legislature has made Malone eligible for parole on the murder conviction regardless of the life-without-parole sentences imposed, after he "has served 20 calendar years of incarceration, including any time served in a county jail." 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 152, §§ 3(1)(b), 5(2), at 618-19. Because A.B. 267 provides Malone with any relief Miller even arguably affords in

2 Malone v. State, Docket No. 57222 (Order Dismissing Appeal, December 20, 2010).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A etc)J. Douglas

,J. his case, this appeal is moot. See Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev., Adv. Op. 56, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). We therefore

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 3 

# 4 :21631

, 1 H LL

Cherry

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge Deangelo Maron Malone Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

sIn light of this disposition, we deny as moot Malone's motion for appointment of counsel. We have reviewed all documents that Malone has submitted in proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent that Malone has attempted to present claims or facts in those submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 3 (01 1947A 

### e
### §7332. Risk management education

In consultation with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Secretary shall provide such education in management of the financial risks inherent in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities as the Secretary considers appropriate. As part of such educational activities, the Secretary may develop and implement programs to facilitate the participation of agricultural producers in commodity futures trading programs, forward contracting options, and insurance protection programs by assisting and training producers in the usage of such programs. In implementing this authority, the Secretary may use existing research and extension authorities and resources of the Department of Agriculture.

(Pub. L. 104–127, title I, §192, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 942.)
### §75b. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, Pub. L. 101–624, title XX, §2002, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 3928, provided for establishment of Committee on Grain Quality and Grain Quality Coordinator, established duties of Coordinator with respect to grain quality and competitiveness, and provided for termination of section on Jan. 1, 2001.
#### 1436.602-2 Evaluation boards.

HCAs shall establish procedures for providing permanent or ad hoc architect-engineer evaluation boards. Bureau procedures shall provide for the appointment of private practitioners of architecture, engineering, or related professions when such action is determined by the HCA to be essential to meet the Government's minimum needs.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Gregory McLean Ford, Appellant, v Roy F. Bombard, as Superintendent of the Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

— In a habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dated August 10, 1976, which dismissed the petition. Judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements (see *Matter of Jackson v Bombard,*62 AD2d 1000; *Matter of Eckhart v Bombard,*59 AD2d 783; *People ex rel. Davidson v Henderson,*54 AD2d 602). Titone, J. P., Suozzi, Gulotta and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-07-424-CR

TOBE C. NWIGWE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 3 OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered the “Appellant’s Withdrawal Of Notice Of Appeal

(Pursuant to Texas Rule Of Appellate Procedure 42.2)” filed by appellant Tobe

C. Nwigwe, pro se. The motion complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of

appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). No decision of this court having

been delivered before we received this motion, we grant the motion and dismiss

the appeal. See id., Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 2, 2009
Office of the Clerk
Phone: (312) 435-5850
www.ca7-uscourts.gov

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse
Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Mlinois 60604

PLRA C.R. 3(b) FINAL ORDER F I L E D
July 6, 2012
JUL 0-9 2012
ANTHONY OLIVE,
aan . THOMAS G.

Plaintiff - Appellant CLERK US. DISTRICT ouRT
No.: 12-1944 v.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees
“Originating Case Info: ion: : : a
District Court No: 3:12-cv-50065
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division
District Judge Philip G. Reinhard

The pro se appellant was DENIED leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis by the
district court on April 23, 2012. The pro se appellant has neither paid the $455.00 appellate
fees nor filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis in the Appellate
Court, as prescribed in Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED for failure to pay the required docketing
fee pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellant pay the appellate fee of $455.00 to the clerk

of the district court. The clerk of the district court shall collect the appellate fees from the

prisoner's trust fund account using the mechanism of Section 1915(b). Newlin v. Helman, 123
F.3d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1997).

CERTIFIED COPY

S G

form name: c7_PLRA_3bFinalOrder(form ID: 142)

z
a 2
of th6Uniteds Oy
Court afAppeals fork °

Seventh Citeue +



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Office of the Clerk
Phone: (312) 435-5850
www.ca7 uscourts gov

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse
Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Mlinois 60604

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF MANDATE
July 6, 2012

Thomas G. Bruton

To: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILED

Northern District of Illinois JUL 0.9 2012

327 S. Church Street

Rockford , IL 61101-0000 THOMAS G. BRUTON
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

ANTHONY OLIVE,
Plaintiff - Appellant

No.: 12-1944 v.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INCORPORATED, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information: l ae

District Court No: 3:12-cv-50065
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division
District Judge Philip G. Reinhard

Herewith is the mandate of this court in this appeal, along with the Bill of Costs, if any. A
certified copy of the opinion/order of the court and judgment, if any, and any direction as to
costs shall constitute the mandate.

CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING: no record to be returned

DATE IFP DENIED: 04/23/2012



NOTE TO COUNSEL:

If any physical and large documentary exhibits have been filed in the above-entitled cause, they are
to be withdrawn ten (10) days from the date of this notice. Exhibits not withdrawn during this period
will be disposed of.

Please acknowledge receipt of these documents on the enclosed copy of this notice.

Received above mandate and record, if any, from the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.

Date: Received by:

form name: c7_Mandate(form ID: 135)
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1035

ALBERT M. HARGROVE, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus DOCTOR DETLEF STEINER, individually and professionally, Clarendon National Insurance Company; MIDWESTERN INSURANCE ALLIANCE, INCORPORATED; CATHY ANN NEW, individually and professionally, Midwestern Insurance Alliance, Incorporated; NORMAN E. RISEN, individually and professionally, Midwestern Insurance Alliance, Incorporated; BATTS TEMPORARY SERVICE, INCORPORATED, a/k/a Labor Works Source, Incorporated; CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY; THE CLARENDON GROUP, Clarendon National Insurance Company, Redland Insurance Company, Harbor Speciality Insurance Company; HANNOVER LIFE REASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; HANNOVER RUCKVERSI CHERUNGSAKTIENGESELL-SCHAFT; GEORGE T. GLENN, Deputy Commissioner, individual and official capacity, and the North Carolina Industrial Commission by and through the North Carolina Department of Commerce; BUCK LATTIMORE, individual and official capacity and the North Carolina Industrial Commission by and through the North Carolina Department of Commerce, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge. (CA-04-304-5-FL)- 2 - Submitted: March 24, 205 Decided: March 31, 2005 Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Albert M. Hargrove, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer Susan Jerzak, HEDRICK, EATMAN, GARDNER AND KINCHELOE, Raleigh, North Carolina; Perry Cleveland Henson, Jr., HENSON & HENSON, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina; Robert Thomas Hargett, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: Albert Hargrove appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his complaint alleging violations of state and federal law in connection with the denial of his claim for state workers’ compensation benefits. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. SeeHargrove v. Steiner , No. CA-04-304-5-FL (E.D.N.C. Dec. 23, 2004). We further deny Hargrove’s motion for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2553(c) as unnecessary to this appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 775.12 Delegation of authority. ( a ) The ASN (I&E) may delegate his/her responsibilities under this instruction for review, approval and/or signature of EISs and RODs to appropriate Executive Schedule/Senior Executive Service civilians or flag/general officers. ASN (I&E), CNO, and CMC may delegate all other responsibilities assigned in this instruction as deemed appropriate.
( b ) The ASN (RD&A) delegation of authority for approval and signature of documents under NEPA is contained in SECNAV Instruction 5000.2 series, which sets out policies and procedures for acquisition programs.
( c ) Previously authorized delegations of authority are continued until revised or withdrawn.
[69 FR 8112, Feb. 23, 2004]
#### 1552.209-73 Notification of conflicts of interest regarding personnel.

As prescribed in 1509.507-2(b) insert the following clause:

# Notification of Conflicts of Interest Regarding Personnel (MAY 1994)

(a) In addition to the requirements of the contract clause entitled “Organizational Conflicts of Interest,” the following provisions with regard to employee personnel performing under this contract shall apply until the earlier of the following two dates: the termination date of the affected employee(s) or the expiration date of the contract.

(b) The Contractor agrees to notify immediately the EPA Contracting Officer's Representative and the Contracting Officer of (1) any actual or potential personal conflict of interest with regard to any of its employees working on or having access to information regarding this contract, or (2) any such conflicts concerning subcontractor employees or consultants working on or having access to information regarding this contract, when such conflicts have been reported to the Contractor. A personal conflict of interest is defined as a relationship of an employee, subcontractor employee, or consultant with an entity that may impair the objectivity of the employee, subcontractor employee, or consultant in performing the contract work.

(c) The Contractor agrees to notify each Contracting Officer's Representative and Contracting Officer prior to incurring costs for that employee's work when an employee may have a personal conflict of interest. In the event that the personal conflict of interest does not become known until after performance on the contract begins, the Contractor shall immediately notify the Contracting Officer of the personal conflict of interest. The Contractor shall continue performance of this contract until notified by the Contracting Officer of the appropriate action to be taken.

(d) The Contractor agrees to insert in any subcontract or consultant agreement placed hereunder, except for subcontracts or consultant agreements for well drilling, fence erecting, plumbing, utility hookups, security guard services, or electrical services, provisions which shall conform substantially to the language of this clause, including this paragraph (d), unless otherwise authorized by the Contracting Officer.

*Alternate I* (JAN 2015). Contracts for other than Superfund work shall include Alternate I in this clause in lieu of paragraph (d).

(d) The Contractor agrees to insert in each subcontract or consultant agreement placed hereunder provisions which shall conform substantially to the language of this clause, including this paragraph (d), unless otherwise authorized by the Contracting Officer.

(End of clause)

[59 FR 18620, Apr. 19, 1994, as amended at 79 FR 76241, Dec. 22, 2014; 82 FR 33021, July 19, 2017]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S YEAR END FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND NOTES.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,195
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,338
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               139,889
<PP&E>                                       1,060,749
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,062
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,200,638
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,269,567
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        15,284
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,200,638
<SALES>                                         10,193
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                12,193
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  548,201
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               547,536
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              2,930,134
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,819,540
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .14
        

</TABLE>
#### ROGERSON FRUIT & COLD STORAGE CO., Respondent, v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 27, 1903.)

Action by the Rogerson Fruit & Cold Storage Company against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company.

PER CURIAM.

Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion granted, upon payment by the defendant of all costs, except those upon this appeal, subsequent to the service of the original answer, with leave to the plaintiff to discontinue the action without costs. In case of such discontinuance, the plaintiff to recover costs as stated. Held that, the laches being sufficiently excused and it appearing that the plaintiff will not lose any right existing at the time of the commencement of the action by the proposed amendment, it must be regarded as in furtherance of justice to permit the defendant to set up the terms of the contract under which the goods were shipped.

STOVER, J., not voting.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7275

WILLIAM TERRENCE CROSS,

 Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

ERIC D. WILSON, Warden,

 Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:11-cv-00332-RBS-DEM)

Submitted: November 15, 2011 Decided: November 18, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Terrence Cross, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

William Terrence Cross, a federal prisoner, appeals 

the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) petition. We have reviewed the 

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for 

the reasons stated by the district court. Cross v. Wilson, No. 

2:11-cv-00332-RBS-DEM (E.D. Va. July 1, 2011). We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# GA Volume

# Quarterly Cumulative

# Historical
1452.228-7 Insurance—Liability to Third Persons. ( a ) As prescribed in 1428.311-1, the clause at FAR 52.228-7, Insurance—Liability to Third Persons, shall be modified before insertion into solicitations and contracts by: ( 1 ) changing the title of the clause to read: “INSURANCE—Liability to Third Persons (APR 1984) (Deviations)”; and
( 2 ) changing the first sentence in subparagraph (c)(2) of the clause to read: “For certain liabilities (and expenses incidental to such liabilities) to third persons not compensated by insurance or otherwise but subject to the ‘Limitation of Cost’ or ‘Limitation of Funds’ clause of this contract.”
( b ) As prescribed in FAR 52.103(a) and 52.107(f), the clause at FAR 52.252-6, Authorized Deviations in Clauses, shall be inserted into solicitations and contracts containing the clause in paragraph (a) of this section.
[75 FR 19829, Apr. 15, 2010, as amended at 76 FR 50142, Aug. 12, 2011]
1204.801 General. ( a ) The COCO is designated as the head of each office performing contracting and contract administration functions. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the OA is designated as the head of the office performing paying functions.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anibal Flores, Appellant.

— Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered June 27, 1977, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, petit larceny, resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of petit larceny, and the sentence imposed *686thereon, and the said count is dismissed. As so modified, judgment affirmed. Under the facts of this case, defendant could not have been guilty of robbery in the first degree without having also been guilty of petit larceny. Therefore, the guilty verdict on the robbery count requires dismissal of the lesser inclusory offense of petit larceny (see *People v Grier,*37 NY2d 847). We have considered defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., O’Connor, Rabin and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William A. Jackson, Appellant.

Motion to prosecute appeal as a poor person, and for other relief, denied on the ground that the papers fail to show merit to the appeal.