IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

NAEEM COPELAND, on my own )

behalf, etc., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 177

)

ILLINOIS TROOPER missing unit, )

etc., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court has just had assigned to its calendar a newlyfiled 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983”) Complaint, prepared on the

Clerk’s-Office-provided printed form, with handwritten inserts by

plaintiff Naeem Copeland (“Copeland”). Although the case caption

is less than clear in what it conveys, it is at least readable. 

Copeland sues “on my own behalf and on behalf of a class of all

Copeland and Moore family members,” while defendants are listed

as “Illinois Trooper-missing unit, Chicago Police Department

missing persons unit and Social Security.gov.south side divoffices.”

But when it comes to Copeland’s text, this Court finds it

both unreadable in part and, as to what he claims to be

constitutional deprivations actionable under Section 1983,

unintelligible. To the extent that this Court can penetrate 1

 What is clear is that units of the federal government 1

are, by definition, not “state actors” suable under Section 1983. 

So whatever Copeland’s grievances against the Social Security
what Copeland has said, it seems that his mother is missing (and

has been for several years) and that he is unhappy with the

inability of “Illinois Trooper” (whoever that may be) and of the

Chicago Police Department (not a legal entity, and hence not

suable as such) to help him in his search.

To complicate matters even further, Copeland is in custody

in Phoenix, Arizona, so that 28 U.S.C. §1915 requires him to pay

the $350 filing fee in installments if he cannot do so in

advance. In that respect Copeland has submitted an In Forma

Pauperis Application (“Application”), but without the printout

covering transactions in his trust fund account at the custodial

institution as required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). Moreover, both

Copeland’s custodial status and his distant location render much

more difficult the provision of legal services by pro bono

counsel, members of this District Court’s trial bar who are

obligated to render services to pro se prisoners (in-person

consultation is obviously unavailable).

This Court is loath to impose a $350 filing fee burden on

Copeland without any sense of whether he has even a colorable

claim. Because Copeland has also submitted a Motion for 2

Administration may be, they cannot be asserted in this lawsuit.

 True enough, both Complaint ¶I and some Complaint 2

exhibits refer to three lawsuits that Copeland has brought last

year in the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, so he is already familiar with the requirements of 28

U.S.C. §1915. This Court nevertheless finds that the procedure

2
Appointment of Counsel (“Motion”), however, this Court will

pursue the following unusual course here:

1. To spare Copeland (at least for now) another $350

obligation to pay a filing fee, this action is dismissed

without prejudice.

2. Despite such dismissal, this Court has obtained the

name of this member of the trial bar to assist Copeland in

the possible assertion of an arguably viable claim:

William Michael LeCrone, Esq. 

Charysh & Schroeder, Ltd. 

33 North Dearborn Street, Suite 1300 

Chicago IL 60602 

Counsel is respectfully requested to communicate with

Copeland in an effort to make some sense out of what he has

submitted and, if successful, to seek to file a new action

accompanied by an Affidavit and the required trust fund

printout.

If counsel is unsuccessful in that effort, he is further

requested to file a statement to that effect (in that instance,

under the rubric of this Case No. 12 C 177).

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: January 17, 2012

next stated in the text is most reasonable.

3