alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

     THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY and SUBSIDIARIES
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                      (In Millions, Except Ratio Amounts)
                                  (Unaudited)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                Nine Months Ended
                                                                                   September 30,
                                                                        -----------------------------------
                                                                             2000                  1999
                                                                        -------------        --------------
<S>                                                                       <C>                  <C>
Earnings:

  Pre-tax income                                                               $1,335                $1,405

  Add:
    Interest and fixed charges,
      excluding capitalized interest                                              224                   226

    Portion of rent under long-term
      operating leases representative
      of an interest factor                                                       130                   139

    Distributed income of investees
      accounted for under the equity method                                        46                     -

    Amortization of capitalized interest                                            4                     4

  Less:  Undistributed equity in earnings
          of investments accounted for
          under the equity method                                                  15                     9
                                                                        -------------        --------------


  Total earnings available for fixed charges                                   $1,724                $1,765
                                                                        =============        ==============

Fixed charges:

  Interest and fixed charges                                                   $  232                $  236

  Portion of rent under long-term operating
    leases representative of an interest factor                                   130                   139
                                                                        -------------        --------------

  Total fixed charges                                                          $  362                $  375
                                                                        =============        ==============

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                                              4.76x                 4.71x



</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

June 5, 2009 

d0603 

Order 

 

June 5, 2009 

138702 & (17) 

MAXINE HANNERS, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of CHARLES HANNERS, 

Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 138702 

 COA: 287233 

Genesee CC: 03-077550-NH 

SIVA SANKARAN, M.D., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for stay is GRANTED. Trial court proceedings 

are stayed pending the completion of this appeal. The application for leave to appeal the 

January 20, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals remains pending.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  Dec-31-1997
<CASH>                        1,023,370
<SECURITIES>                  000
<RECEIVABLES>                 439
<ALLOWANCES>                  000
<INVENTORY>                   000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              7,359,706
<PP&E>                        11,911,100
<DEPRECIATION>                (6,516,375)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                14,148,393
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         220,073
<BONDS>                       3,930,621
<COMMON>                      000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         000
<PREFERRED>                   000
<OTHER-SE>                    9,918,391
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  14,148,393
<SALES>                       3,144,174
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              3,502,577
<CGS>                         000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 1,915,443
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              817,229
<LOSS-PROVISION>              000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            419,922
<INCOME-PRETAX>               1,693,288
<INCOME-TAX>                  000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           356,500
<DISCONTINUED>                1,336,788
<EXTRAORDINARY>               000
<CHANGES>                     000
<NET-INCOME>                  1,693,288
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 32.89
<EPS-DILUTED>                 32.89


</TABLE>
§ 776.44 Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal. ( a ) A covered attorney shall not: ( 1 ) Seek to influence a judge, court member, member of a tribunal, prospective court member or member of a tribunal, or other official by means prohibited by law or regulation;
( 2 ) Communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law or regulation; or
( 3 ) Engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
( b ) [Reserved]
### Legend Panhandle and Hawthorne Panhandle East Panhandle West 

## Legend Hawthorne Formation Panhandle East Panhandle West
#### In the Matter of the Port of New York Authority, Respondent, Relative to Acquiring Title to Real Property in the Borough of Brooklyn. Manhattan Felting Mills, Inc., Appellant.

Motions by respondent for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and for a stay denied. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Brennan and Hill, JJ., concur.
#### Claire Hoffman et al., Respondents, v. Philip S. Greenberg, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law, the facts, and in the •exercise of discretion, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event. In this personal injury action plaintiff, a passenger in defendant’s car, claimed that her head struck the roof of the car which proceeded over a bumpy road at an exaggerated rate of speed. It is claimed defendant was advised to reduce his speed. In our view the verdict is grossly excessive and the jury failed to evaluate correctly the medical proof. Such failure might well have been the result of the ¡behavior of trial counsel which, in the circumstances of this ease, was improper. Accordingly, a new trial is directed. Concur — Breitel, J. P., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
(May 29, 1962)

#### Judy C. Denig et al., Respondents, v. Irene Seelig et al., Defendants, and Herbert Reed et al., Appellants.

Motion by appellants for stay of order, pending appeal therefrom, granted on condition that appellants perfect the appeal and be ready to argue or submit it at the October Term, commencing October 1, 1962; appeal ordered on the calendar for said term. The appeal record and appellants’ brief are directed to be filed and served on or before August 1, 1962. Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Willie James Robinson, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ernest Jackson, Appellant.

Time for argument of appeals enlarged to include May 1961 Term, without prejudice to the right to renew in view of the existing circumstances.
**Exhibit 10.11**

BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION 

FORM 10-Q for Quarterly Period Ended December 28, 2008

AMENDMENT TO THE DEFERRED 

COMPENSATION PLAN FOR DIRECTORS 

**Amendment to Briggs & Stratton Corporation**

**Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors**

WHEREAS, the Briggs & Stratton Corporation Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors (the “Plan”) provides that if any provision or term thereof would be prohibited by or inconsistent with the requirements ofSection 409A of the Internal Revenue Code, then such provision or term shall be deemed to be reformed to comply with Section 409A of the Code; and 

WHEREAS, the Company’s legal counsel has advised that the disability exception to the five year delay in payment rule resulting from a change in a distribution election would be viewed by the IRS as inconsistentwith the requirements of Section 409A of the Code and, therefore, it is desirable to revise the Plan document to reflect its reformation to eliminate such provision; 

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the action of the undersigned officer, Section 7.2(e) of the Plan is amended by deleting all of the text thereof after the word “death” in the second line thereof and thePlan document shall be restated to reflect this change. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned officer of Briggs & StrattonCorporation executes this amendment on its behalf this 10th day of December, 2008. 

 
BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATIONBy: 
/s/ Thomas R. Savage
Title: Senior Vice President - Administration
 

2
Exhibit
      32.2






**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
      2002**






In
      connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB (the "Report") of Colorado
      Wyoming Reserve Company (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended June 30,
      2006,
      I, Rafiq A. Sayed, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date October 13, 2006
              
              /s/
                Rafiq A. SayedRafiq A. SayedChief Financial Officer
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Richard A. Burnett, the
Principal Financial Officer of EXCO Resources, Inc. certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of EXCO Resources, Inc.; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |                                                                     
|-------------------- |  |  |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 10, 2015 |  |  |  | /s/ Richard A. Burnett                                              
|                     |  |  |  | Richard A. Burnett                                                  
|                     |  |  |  | Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Sylvester J. Brown, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and facts in accordance with memorandum and, as so modified, affirmed. Memorandum: The defendant, wielding a knife, engaged in an altercation with his estranged wife during which she sustained various cuts on her body. Defendant was indicted for the crime of attempt to commit murder in the first degree, contrary to sections 2 and 1044 of the Penal Law. The indictment alleged that *739defendant “wilfully, feloniously and of malice aforethought, and with an intent to kill, attempted to kill Ethel Brown by assaulting her with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife ”. Defendant, was convicted of attempted manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals on the ground there is no such crime. Upon argument of this appeal the Assistant District Attorney stated that he agreed with the defendant’s contention. The trial court charged that the jury might find defendant guilty of attempted murder in the first degree or any lesser degree of -that crime (Penal Law, § 610). The intent to kill which distinguishes murder from manslaughter was explained. The jury was also instructed it might find the defendant guilty of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted manslaughter in the first degree, attempted manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The jury must have concluded defendant lacked intent to kill or they would not have reached a verdict of attempted manslaughter. An attempt to commit a crime consists of (1) the intent to commit the crime; (2) the performance of an act toward the commission and (3) failure to consummate. There must be an intent to commit a specific crime in order to constitute an attempt *(People*v. *Moran,*123 N. Y. 254, 257 ; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 75, subd. [1], pp. 228-229; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 75, subd. [3], p. 233). An attempt to commit manslaughter is apparently a contradiction because the specific crime of manslaughter involves no intent and, accordingly, an intention to commit a crime whose distinguishing element is lack of intent is logically repugnant. We are presented with a situation where one, without .intent to kill, willfully and wrongfully assaulted another by the use of a weapon or other instrument likely to produce grievous bodily harm. Subdivision 4 of section 242 of the Penal Law defines such an act as assault in the second degree. It is well established that under the circumstances here presented we have the authority which we now exercise, to modify the judgment by reducing the crime of which defendant is convicted to assault in the second degree (Code Crim. Pro., § 543, subd. 2; *People*v. *Monaco,*14 N Y 2d 43; *People*v. *Potskowski,*298 N. Y. 299; *People*v. *Rytel,*284 N. Y. 242; *People*v. *Kay,*17 A D 2d 773; *People*v. *May,*9 A D 2d 508). A sentence is imposed of not less than one year or more than five years. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe County Court convicting defendant of attempted manslaughter, first degree.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Henry, Noonan and Del Yeechio, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Gilbert Hersch, an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

May 10, 1979

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Nicholas C. Cooper*for petitioner.

No one appearing on behalf of respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

*Per Curiam.*

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the Second Department in 1966. On or about April 19, 1976, respondent was convicted in the Unitéd States District Court, Southern District, New York, by plea of guilty, of the felony of using the mail in causing and facilitating a Federal felony (US Code, tit 21, §§ 812, 952, subd [a]; § 960, subd [a], par [a], and subd [b], par [1]; § 843, subd [b]; US Code, tit 18, § 2), and sentenced thereon to pay a fine of $5,000 and two years on probation, resulting in his automatic disbarment (Judiciary Law, § 90, subd 4; *Matter of Chu,*42 NY2d 490; *Matter of*
      *570
      *Thies,*45 NY2d 865). The Departmental Disciplinary Committee moves accordingly to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. The application is granted.

Respondent’s name should be stricken from the roll of attorneys.

Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Lane, Markewich and Ross, JJ., concur.

Respondent’s name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in the State of New York.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 3, 2022

No. 04-21-00525-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.R.H, A CHILD

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020PA02064

Honorable Kimberly Burley, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellee’s brief was due February 7, 2022. Neither the brief nor a motion for extension 

of time was filed. We ordered appellee to file its brief, if any, by February 28, 2022. No brief 

was filed. Appellee now seeks leave to file a motion for an extension of time, citing office 

clerical error for its failure to file the brief in a timely manner. Accompanying its leave motion is 

a motion for an extension of time seeking a four-day extension to March 4, 2022.

We grant appellee leave to file a motion for an extension of time and grant the motion 

for an extension of time. We order appellee to file its brief, if any, by March 4, 2022. This is an 

accelerated appeal of an order in a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship that must 

be disposed of by this court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal was filed in the trial 

court. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2. Because of the time constraints governing the disposition of 

this appeal, appellee is advised that no further extensions of time will be granted absent a 

showing of extraordinary circumstances. If the brief is not filed by the date ordered, we may 

submit the case without appellee’s brief. 

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 3rd day of March, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court

FILE COPY
Case: 1:12-cv-01172 Document #: 2 Filed: 02/17/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:41
#### 1252.228-70 Loss of or Damage to Leased Aircraft.

As prescribed in 1228.306-70(a), insert the following clause:

# Loss of or Damage to Leased Aircraft (NOV 2022)

(a) Except normal wear and tear, the Government assumes all risk of loss of, or damage to, the leased aircraft during the term of this lease while the aircraft is in the possession of the Government.

(b) In the event of damage to the aircraft, the Government, at its option, shall make the necessary repairs with its own facilities or by contract, or pay the Contractor the reasonable cost of repair of the aircraft.

(c) In the event the aircraft is lost or damaged beyond repair, the Government shall pay the Contractor a sum equal to the fair market value of the aircraft at the time of such loss or damage, which value may be specifically agreed to in clause 1252.228-71, Fair Market Value of Aircraft, less the salvage value of the aircraft. However, the Government may retain the damaged aircraft or dispose of it in its discretion. In that event, the Contractor will be paid the fair market value of the aircraft as stated in the clause.

(d) The Contractor agrees that the contract price does not include any cost attributable to hull insurance or to any reserve fund it has established to protect its interest in the aircraft. If, in the event of loss or damage to the leased aircraft, the Contractor receives compensation for such loss or damage in any form from any source, the amount of such compensation shall be credited to the Government in determining the amount of the Government's liability.

(e) In the event of loss of or damage to the aircraft, the Government shall be subrogated to all rights of recovery by the Contractor against third parties for such loss or damage and the Contractor shall promptly assign such rights in writing to the Government.

(End of clause)
#### Joseph Andrzejewski, Respondent, v. Dennis J. Kuttruff et al., Appellants. Frederick A. Nudd, Respondent, v. Joseph J. Andrzejewski, Respondent, and Roland W. Kuttruff, Appellant.

Order unanimously reversed, with costs, and motion granted, without costs. Memorandum: In the exercise of a proper discretion, the motion should have been granted. (Cf. *Potter*v. *Clark,*19 A D 2d 585.) (Appeal from order of Monroe Special Term denying motion to try the two actions together.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Henry and Noonan, JJ.
**MEMORANDUM**

DATE: November 24, 2014 TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket I d: OAR

–2013
- 0602 FROM: EPA Region 1 SUBJECT: November 21, 2014 , Presentation at Meeting of Rhode Island Bar Association

Environmental and Energy L aw Committee In clu ding Proposed Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants
**SUMMARY** On November 21, 2014, Regional Administrator Curt Spaldi ng provided a presentation for a Rhode Island Bar Association Environmental and Energy L aw Committee meeting . Curt Spalding’s presentation included an overview of the Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants. **ATTENDEES** Curt Spalding, EPA Approximately

20 people attended this committee meeting . Attendance was not taken by EPA
. Slides attached.
#### In the Matter of Betty V., Respondent, v George V., Appellant.

Appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated January 5, 1977, which granted petitioner’s application for an order of support pursuant to article 4 of the Family Court Act and (2) a further order of the same court, entered March 8, 1978, which denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Orders affirmed, without costs or disbursements. At the hearing, the evidence conclusively established that appellant, petitioner’s second husband, is the child’s father. Although the child was conceived during the time petitioner was married to her first husband, there was uncontradicted testimony that petitioner had previously left him and was having sexual relations with appellant whom she later married. Also, appellant has always acknowledged paternity. Consequently, the Family Court correctly determined that appellant is liable for the child’s support (see Family Ct Act, §§ 413, 417; *Matter of Violet v John,*66 Mise 2d 461). We have considered appellant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Hopkins, J. P., Suozzi, Rabin and Shapiro, JJ., concur.