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36–736PS 2008

TRACKING THE STORM AT THE

NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND

OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 19, 2007

Serial No. 110–47

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. NICK LAMPSON, Texas, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director

SHIMERE WILLIAMS Democratic Professional Staff Member

TARA ROTHSCHILD Republican Professional Staff Member

STACEY STEEP Research Assistant

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BART GORDON, Tennessee

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

TOM FEENEY, Florida

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member

STACEY STEEP Research Assistant

(V)

C O N T E N T S

July 19, 2007

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 7

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 9

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11

Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 12

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13

Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on

Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................. 14

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Prepared Statement by Representative Ron Klein from the State of Florida,

22nd District ......................................................................................................... 18

Panel I:

Mr. William Proenza, Director, Tropical Prediction Center

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24

Biography .......................................................................................................... 26

Discussion

NOAA Assessment Team ..................................................................................... 27

Media Exposure .................................................................................................... 27

Staff Dissatisfaction ............................................................................................. 28

QuikSCAT ............................................................................................................. 29

Hurricane Season: 2007 ....................................................................................... 30

More on QuikSCAT .............................................................................................. 30

Integrating Research at the Hurricane Research Center and the National

Hurricane Center .............................................................................................. 30

Director Proenza’s Tenure at the National Hurricane Center ......................... 31

More on Media Exposure ..................................................................................... 33

More on Director Proenza’s Tenure at the National Hurricane Center .......... 35

Legal Obligations ................................................................................................. 37

The Role of Congress ........................................................................................... 37

More on QuikSCAT .............................................................................................. 38

Director Proenza’s Comments on QuikSCAT ..................................................... 39

Future of QuikSCAT ............................................................................................ 40

Director Proenza’s History .................................................................................. 43

Concept of Operations Plan ................................................................................. 43

Criticisms and Shortcomings of the National Hurricane Center ..................... 44

Hurricane Center Personnel ............................................................................... 46

Hurricane Center Science and QuikSCAT ......................................................... 46

Page

VI

Panel II:

Dr. Robert M. Atlas, Director, Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological

Laboratory, Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research, National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 49

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 51

Biography .......................................................................................................... 54

Mr. Donald L. McKinnon, Director, Jones County Emergency Management

Agency, Laurel, Mississippi

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 55

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 57

Biography .......................................................................................................... 60

Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of Security and Emergency Management

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 60

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 62

Biography .......................................................................................................... 65

Discussion

Director Proenza’s Tenure in the Southern Region ........................................... 65

Hurricane Research Division and Hurricane Center Collaboration ................ 66

Hurricane Research ............................................................................................. 66

More on the Hurricane Center Personnel .......................................................... 67

Improving Hurricane Forecasting ....................................................................... 67

Alternatives to QuikSCAT ................................................................................... 68

More on Hurricane Research .............................................................................. 69

Director Proenza’s Relationship With Witnesses .............................................. 69

Returning Dirrector Proenza to His Former Position ....................................... 71

Investigating Personnel Problems ...................................................................... 71

Panel III:

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Under Secretary

of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; Administrator, National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 73

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 75

Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director, National Institute of Standards and

Technology

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 112

Discussion

NOAA’s Reaction to the Problems With Director Proenza ............................... 114

The Proenza Plan ................................................................................................. 115

NOAA Documents ................................................................................................ 116

The Management Assessment ............................................................................. 116

Course of Action Taken With Director Proenza ................................................ 117

Witness Background ............................................................................................ 119

Responsibilities as a Supervisor ......................................................................... 119

Admiral Lautenbacher’s Actions ......................................................................... 120

More on QuikSCAT .............................................................................................. 121

Next Generation Forecasting Tools .................................................................... 123

Additional Witnesses Would Have Been Useful ................................................ 124

More on State of Hurricane Forecasting ............................................................ 125

Role of the Committee ......................................................................................... 126

(1)

TRACKING THE STORM AT THE NATIONAL

HURRICANE CENTER

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nick Lampson

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tracking the Storm at the

National Hurricane Center

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2007

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight will meet on July 19, 2007, to evaluate recent events at the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tropical Prediction Center (TPC/NHC).

Upon the orders of NOAA’s Administrator, Conrad Lautenbacher, an assessment

team was formed to review the operations of the tropical prediction center. In response to the Assessment Team’s preliminary reports, the Vice Admiral placed Center Director X. William (Bill) Proenza on administrative leave. NOAA Administrator

Lautenbacher stated that ‘‘. . .current conditions at the TPC pose an obstacle to the

Team’s completion of its work, as well as the Team’s concern that, as expressed by

many of you, there currently exists a level of anxiety and disruption that threatens

the TPC’s ability to fulfill its mission to protect the American people. . ..’’ This

hearing will explore the process that culminated in Mr. Proenza’s removal.

Witnesses

Panel I

1. Mr. X. William Proenza, Director, Tropical Prediction Center, National

Hurricane Center, National Centers for Environmental Prediction, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has been invited to discuss his

service as Director of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center and his experiences during the recent events that led the NOAA Administrator to place him on leave.

Panel II

2. Dr. Robert Atlas, Director of the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Dr. Atlas’s laboratory is part of the Hurricane Research Division, which works with

the Tropical Prediction Center to improve tools and techniques in hurricane

forecasting. He has been asked to focus on the use of QuikSCAT data in the

forecasting process.

3. Mr. Don McKinnon, Director, Jones County (MS) Emergency Management

Agency, will testify regarding services the National Weather Service (NWS)

provides to emergency management offices. Mr. McKinnon dealt extensively

with Mr. Proenza during his service as Director of the Weather Service

Southern Region Office.

4. Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of Security and Emergency Management, is testifying on behalf of the Emergency Management

Association of Texas regarding the service provided to the emergency management community in Texas by the National Weather Service (NWS)

through the Southern Region Office during the period of Mr. Proenza’s tenure as its Director.

4

Panel III

5. Hon. Conrad Lautenbacher, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Administrator, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has been asked to describe how he

decided to dispatch an assessment team to the Tropical Prediction Center

and, as a result of a preliminary report from that team, to place Mr. Proenza

on leave. The team was directed to submit a report on the situation at the

Center on Friday, July 20, 2007.

6. Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director of National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST), led the Assessment Team at the request of Admiral

Lautenbacher and will testify on the assessment and the findings of the Assessment Team’s report.

Background

The National Hurricane Center (NHC) is publicly known as the unit of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration responsible for tracking and forecasting of tropical storms and hurricanes. Organizationally, the Center is a branch

of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) of the National Center for Environmental

Prediction (NCEP) and Mr. Proenza’s actual title is Director of the Tropical Prediction Center. The Center assists emergency management agencies in the coastal

states by providing information on the development of storms, their likely track

across the ocean and their probable point of landfall on the U.S. coast. With this

information, State and local officials make decisions about whether to evacuate

threatened areas.

Mr. Proenza became Director of the Tropical Prediction Center in January 2007,

succeeding Max Mayfield. In his previous post as Director of the NWS Southern Regional Office, he managed some 1,000 employees from New Mexico to the Virgin Islands between 1998 and 2006. An employee of the Service for 35 years, he began

at the National Hurricane Center as a flight meteorologist aboard the ‘‘hurricane

hunter’’ aircraft that support Center operations. Among his awards during his service was recognition as Manager of the Year from the National Weather Service Employees’ Organization.

On March 16, Mr. Proenza gave an interview to the Associated Press. That article

described him seeking ‘‘hundreds of millions of dollars for expanded research and

predictions.’’ It then described his ‘‘immediate concern’’ to be the QuikSCAT satellite, specifically the age of the satellite, the lack of any replacement if it failed,

and the potential cost and time needed to for replacement. He stated that

QuikSCAT’s failure would reduce the accuracy of their two-day predictions by 10

percent and 16 percent for three-day forecasts.

In a telephone interview with Committee staff, Mr. Proenza was asked how

QuikSCAT had come to his attention. He responded that while he was visiting the

Center to discuss transition issues in December 2006, he had been approached by

Senior Hurricane Specialist Richard Knabb and Michael Brennan, who was affiliated with both the Center and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research. Both had participated in a June 2006 Center workshop on requirements for

ocean surface vector winds (which QuikSCAT measures). Mr. Proenza told staff he

had read the report, and noted the statements there by both Mr. Knabb and Hugh

Cobb, lead forecaster in the Center’s Tropical Forecast and Analysis Branch about

QuikSCAT’s value. Proenza told Committee staff that he had discussed the workshop report with his managers in the Weather Service two days after assuming his

job. Proenza also said that, while on the way to the AP interview, he had called

Center Deputy Director (now Acting Director) Dr. Edward Rappaport and received

the figures quoted in the interview.

In his presentation at the National Hurricane Conference in April, Mr. Proenza

again expressed concern over QuikSCAT. His presentation chart called for ‘‘a nextgeneration QuikSCAT on an accelerated timetable (consistent with recommendation

by the NRC Decadal Survey). Estimated cost: $375–400 million.’’ He said that issues

like this demonstrated that more funding needed to be devoted to improving hurricane research and forecasting. An article in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel quoted

Senior Specialist Knabb at the same conference saying that the satellite had

‘‘. . .helped the National Hurricane Center [achieve] record accuracy in predicting

the path of 10 systems.’’

On June 11, NOAA’s Assistant Administrator for Program Planning and Integration, Mary Glackin, became acting Director of the National Weather Service after

D.L. Johnson’s retirement. On June 14, she visited with Mr. Proenza at his office

in Miami and delivered a memorandum entitled ‘‘Operating Procedures/InstrucVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tions.’’ The memorandum listed cases when ‘‘you [Mr. Proenza] may have disregarded the direct instructions of your supervisor. . . or have made decisions on

your own which you had no authority to make.’’ The memorandum also discussed

Mr. Proenza’s interactions with the news media. He was instructed to conform to

the procedures in the new Department Order on ‘‘Public Communications’’ (which

had only become effective in May), and was told that ‘‘your recent statements. . .

may have caused some unnecessary confusion about NOAA’s ability to accurately

predict tropical storms,’’ and commented about ‘‘unnecessary detrimental effects on

our organization, for example: requiring me to spend a disproportionate amount of

time to correct any confusion; causing undue concern and misunderstanding among

your staff, and; taking valuable time away from your public role as the NOAA official responsible for instilling confidence in our tropical storm predictions. . ..’’

Staffs of the Science and Technology Committee and the Energy and Commerce

Committee met with Ms. Glackin and with Louis Uccellini, Director of the National

Centers for Environmental Prediction (and Mr. Proenza’s immediate supervisor) on

July 12. Ms. Glackin stated that the memorandum was not intended as a reprimand. She stated it was prepared after she talked to Mr. Uccellini and came to

believe Mr. Proenza was not following procedures. The items cited in the memorandum were drawn from incidents recorded by Mr. Uccellini: one case where Mr.

Proenza signed a promotion form for an employee (Mr. Uccelini’s responsibility, a

second case was stopped before it completed processing) and a case where Mr.

Proenza approved change-of-station expenses outside the procedure approved by the

NOAA Corporate Board. Mr. Uccellini said that he had only learned about the incident where Mr. Proenza’s change of name to ‘‘National Hurricane Center’’ set off

warning alarms after the fact, and that the change occurred without necessary notification to Congress and a 60-day waiting period. At this meeting, Mr. Uccellini also

characterized Mr. Proenza—whom he had worked with in the past—as a dedicated

employee, with a reputation for going around channels and being disruptive. Ms.

Glackin described Proenza as receptive and cooperative, but she notes that the

memo was in the press by the next day and she believes that Mr. Proenza must

have leaked his own ‘‘repremand’’ memo to the press—though there is no convincing

proof of that.

‘‘A couple of days’’ after delivering this memorandum to Mr. Proenza, Ms. Glackin

says she received a call (at another point, she said she received an e-mail) from

Ahsha Tribble, the Executive Officer (who came to the position just last September

after serving as Technical Chief of Staff to James Mahoney—now retired, but she

is seen also as being close to Admiral Lautenbacher and/or his staff) at the Center.

Ms. Tribble apparently indicated there were a number of employees who wanted to

bring their concerns to the attention of management. In a call with multiple employees arranged by Ms. Tribble, Ms. Glackin says the employees expressed discomfort

with the work environment at the Center, felt that their opinions were being misrepresented, and that the Center would not be ‘‘cohesive’’ in a hurricane situation.

Ms. Glackin said she raised these concerns ‘‘vigorously’’ with her superiors. It was

sometime after this point that the ‘‘Operational Assessment Team’’ was formed at

the direction of Admiral Lautenbacher. The team was headed by the Deputy Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, James Turner, and including John Guenther, an attorney from the Employment and Labor Law Division

of the Department of Commerce Office of General Counsel. The charge to this group

was issued on July 29, 2007—approximately 10 days after Ms. Glackin had received

allegations from NHC staff.

On July 2, Mr. Proenza told Committee staff he received a call from Admiral

Lautenbacher that the Team had been dispatched; they arrived at his office while

the call was still in progress. It seemed apparent to him that others in the Center

were already aware that the Team was coming. Mr. Proenza met with Turner, and

an ‘‘all-hands’’ meeting with the Center staff followed.

On July 4, the Miami Herald reported that Senior Specialists Richard Knabb and

James Franklin—along with a third, Richard Pasch—believed that Mr. Proenza had

damaged public confidence in the Center and should be removed. Mr. Franklin was

quoted as saying ‘‘. . .the hurricane specialists, by and large, do not agree with

much of what he has done;’’ the article also stated that ‘‘shouting matches’’ had occurred between staffers supporting and opposing Mr. Proenza. On July 5, an e-mail

was distributed to the Center staff inviting them to a meeting ‘‘to openly discuss

recent events.’’ At that meeting, attendees were invited to go to a second room in

a campus building owned by Florida International University to view and sign the

statement that was released to the media. It is also at this point that concerns are

raised about the possibility that funds supporting aircraft flights would be reprogrammed to build a replacement QuikSCAT. As far as staff can determine, that proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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posal had never been made by any Member and would be unlikely given the vast

difference in the financial scope of the two programs.

Ms. Glackin told staff that a call was received on July 6 indicating that the Assessment Team felt Mr. Proenza’s actions were inhibiting the ability of the Team

to conduct their review. Admiral Lautenbacher discussed the situation with the

Team. On July 7, Admiral Lautenbacher sent a memorandum to the Center staff

indicating Mr. Proenza was placed on leave and named Mr. Rappaport as acting Director. Mr. Proenza received the letter informing him he was on leave until August

9 as he arrived at Miami airport July 9. He was also told that he should not go

to the Center offices without permission from Mr. Uccellini and that he should not

contact members of the Center staff.

A document request was sent to NOAA July 12 from Chairman Gordon, Chairman

Lampson, and Chairman Miller of this committeee, and Chairman Dingell and

Chairman Stupak of the Energy and Commerce Committeee, asking for records covering Ms. Glackin’s June 14 memorandum and communications between various

NOAA officials concerning Mr. Proenza.

At this point, a number of important questions remain:

• Why was Proenza chosen to be Director of the highest profiled Center at

NOAA?

• Beyond the items listed in the Glackin memorandum—which NOAA stresses

was not a reprimand document and was not placed in Mr. Proenza’s personnel file—are there any other actions that better justify the action to place

Proenza on leave?

• Why was there such a depth of dissatisfaction over Proenza’s focus on a particular satellite?

• What is needed to properly equip the Tropical Prediction Center, and are

those resources available at this time?

• Was the Tropical Prediction Center incapable of carrying out its core task of

identifying, tracking and predicting hurricanes before the evaluation team

was dispatched by Admiral Lautenbacher?

7

Chairman LAMPSON. The hearing will come to order. I wish you

all a good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing which we have entitled ‘‘Tracking the Storm at the National Hurricane Center.’’

We are here today to examine the situation that has developed

over the past few weeks at the National Hurricane Center. Things

may be relatively calm over the Atlantic but it has been somewhat

stormy at the Center, and this is a situation that must be resolved

so this organization can do its important work for the public, forecasting hurricanes and issuing warnings to the emergency management community and to the public. They have been an extremely

important part of my life for many, many years that I have lived

on the Gulf Coast of this country where we have had some fairly

serious storms, as you all know.

Today we will hear from Mr. Bill Proenza, who was asked by Admiral Lautenbacher to become the Director of the Hurricane Center

in December of last year. Mr. Proenza did not apply for this job or

ask to be considered for the opening created by the retirement of

Mr. Max Mayfield. Mr. Proenza was well known to the Southern

Region and by his superiors at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) headquarters. He led the Southern

Region Office of the National Weather Service for the past seven

years, and due to that position served on the NOAA corporate

board. By all accounts, he has a reputation for speaking his mind

and occasionally ruffling feathers in an effort to change the way

things are done inside the National Weather Service when he believed that it was in the public interest to do so. So NOAA leadership selected an experienced and dedicated NWS—National Weather Service—manager to be the new Director of the Hurricane Center. Now, before he had been in the position for even a single hurricane season, NOAA dispatched an assessment team to the Center.

A number of employees at the Center have become upset enough

to call for Mr. Proenza to step down and Admiral Lautenbacher has

placed Mr. Proenza on temporary leave from the position he asked

him to accept just seven months ago.

In the background, we have some other controversies. Shortly

after his appointment to the Hurricane Center, Mr. Proenza drew

attention to the fact that a satellite, QuikSCAT, that provides data

used in forecasting, was beyond its design life and if it failed, forecasts could be degraded, and as I understand it, he wanted NOAA

to prepare for this possibility and have a plan to replace it. His

statements to the press about this issue clearly made NOAA headquarters uncomfortable, uncomfortable enough that Acting Director

of the Weather Service, Mary Glackin, issued Mr. Proenza a memo

on June 14 stating the belief that Mr. Proenza’s statements were

undermining confidence in the Center’s forecasting abilities.

What is going on? That is all we would like to know. This is a

hurricane season. The only storms the Center should be dealing

with are those that form out in the ocean. I still don’t fully understand why Admiral Lautenbacher believed that dispatching an assessment team with little experience or knowledge of the National

Weather Service or forecasting to the Center was the appropriate

way to deal with staff complaints about Mr. Proenza. It seems the

arrival of the Assessment Team exacerbated problems with the

staff and has left the National Hurricane Center without a director.

8

Is this the case of a disruptive renegade manager that has mistreated and alienated the staff at the National Hurricane Center

and has put its forecasts and warning mission in jeopardy or has

NOAA leadership helped to foster staff resentment of Mr. Proenza

and used this resentment to justify removing a career employee

who embarrassed NOAA’s leadership by pointing out the shortcomings in the agency budgets and their failure to plan for future

replacement of essential forecasting equipment? I don’t know but

we are going to try to figure it out and to figure out what has happened.

At a minimum, NOAA leadership has made at least two bad decisions. First, either Mr. Proenza was the wrong choice to lead the

Hurricane Center in December or it was premature to send in an

assessment team and remove him in July. The second bad decision

was the Admiral’s failure to inform me and two other Members of

this committee that he met with on June 27 of the potential problems at the Hurricane Center or his plan to send an assessment

team there on July 2. It is clear from the documents we received

last night that Admiral Lautenbacher not only was aware of the

problems but had already set the plans in motion to dispatch the

Assessment Team to Miami.

We cannot afford any more bad decisions. It is hurricane season,

and if we want to make it personal, I can. I live there, where we

have been displaced multiple times from our homes, damage to our

homes, fright to our children. The people at the Center need to

work together to perform the essential task this nation needs: providing forecasts and warnings of hurricanes. The Center needs

strong, competent leadership to serve the public. This is serious

business and we need to straighten this out before we are in the

midst of a real storm.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Lampson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN NICK LAMPSON

Good morning. We are here today to examine the situation that has developed

over the past few weeks at the National Hurricane Center.

Things may be relatively calm over the Atlantic, but it has been stormy at the

Center and this is a situation that must be resolved so this organization can do its

important work for the public—forecasting hurricanes and issuing warnings to the

emergency management community and the public.

Today, we will hear from Mr. Bill Proenza, who was asked by Admiral

Lautenbacher to become the Director of the Hurricane Center in December of last

year. Mr. Proenza did not apply for this job or ask to be considered for the opening

created by the retirement of Mr. Max Mayfield.

Mr. Proenza was well-known to the Southern Region and by his superiors at

NOAA Headquarters. He led the Southern Region Office of the National Weather

Service (NWS) for the past seven years and, due to that position, served on the

NOAA Corporate Board.

By all accounts he has a reputation for speaking his mind and, occasionally ruffling feathers in an effort to change the way things are done inside the NWS when

he believed it was in the public interest to do so.

So, NOAA leadership selected an experienced and dedicated NWS manager to be

the new Director of the Hurricane Center.

Now, before he has been in the position for a single hurricane season, NOAA has

dispatched an assessment team to the Center, a number of employees at the Center

have become upset enough to call for Mr. Proenza to step down, and Admiral

Lautenbacher has placed Mr. Proenza on temporary leave from the position he

asked him to accept just seven months ago.

In the background, we have some other controversies. Shortly after his appointment to the hurricane center, Mr. Proenza drew attention to the fact that a satVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ellite—QuikSCAT—that provides data used in forecasting was beyond its design-life

and, if it failed forecasts could be degraded.

As I understand it, he wanted NOAA to prepare for this possibility and have a

plan to replace it. His statements to the press about this issue, clearly made NOAA

Headquarters uncomfortable—uncomfortable enough that Acting Director of the

Weather Service, Mary Glackin issued Mr. Proenza a memo on June 14 stating the

belief that Mr. Proenza’s statements were undermining confidence in Center’s forecasting abilities.

What is going on? That’s what we’d all like to know. This is hurricane season.

The only storms the Center should be dealing with are those that form out in the

ocean. I still do not fully understand why Admiral Lautenbacher believed that dispatching an assessment team with little experience or knowledge of NWS or forecasting to the Center was the appropriate way to deal with staff complaints about

Mr. Proenza. It seems the arrival of the Assessment Team exacerbated problems

with the staff, and has left the NHC without a Director.

Is this the case of a disruptive, renegade Manager that mistreated and alienated

the staff of the National Hurricane Center and has put its forecast and warning

mission in jeopardy? Or has NOAA leadership helped to foster staff resentment of

Mr. Proenza and used this resentment to justify removing a career employee who

embarrassed NOAA leadership by pointing out shortcomings in the Agency budgets

and their failure to plan for future replacement of essential forecasting equipment?

I don’t know, but we are going to try to figure out was has happened. At a minimum, NOAA leadership has made at least two bad decisions. First, either Mr.

Proenza was the wrong choice to lead the Hurricane Center in December or, it was

premature to send in an assessment team and remove him in July. The second bad

decision was the Admiral’s failure to inform me and two other Members of this committee he met with on June 27 of potential problems at the Hurricane Center or

his plan to send an assessment team there on July 2.

It is clear from the documents we received last night, Admiral Lautenbacher not

only was aware of the problems, but had already set the plans in motion to dispatch

the Assessment Team to Miami.

We cannot afford any more bad decisions. It’s hurricane season. The people at the

Center need to work together to perform the essential task this nation needs—providing forecasts and warnings of hurricanes. The Center needs strong, competent

leadership to serve the public. This is serious business and we need to straighten

this out before we are in the midst of a real storm.

Chairman LAMPSON. I will call on the Chairman of our Oversight

Subcommittee, the distinguished Mr. Miller.

Chairman MILLER. I thank Chairman Lampson. I also don’t

know what is going on here but I would like to know and I think

it merits a closer look by these two subcommittees and by Congress, and I agree with Mr. Lampson that the work of TPC, the

Tropical Prediction Center, is important to a lot of Americans, important to Mr. Lampson in his district. It is important to me in

North Carolina. In the last 11 years, North Carolina has been

badly damaged by a number of storms, particularly Floyd and Fran

have done a great deal of damage, and it is important that we have

the best forecasting of those storms that we possibly can so that

we can be prepared to minimize the damage.

On first impression of what has happened at the Tropical Prediction Center, the TPC, sounds like office politics, particularly bad

office politics, particularly vicious office politics, but office politics,

something that happens every day all across America. There are

disgruntled employees who are having trouble adjusting to a new

manager, not getting along with the new manager. There is a new

manager or new director who is trying to adjust to a new set of employees, to a new chain of command, but on closer look there are

certainly parts of this that don’t appear to add up, facts that don’t

quite add up, something doesn’t seem quite right and it certainly

merits a closer look by Congress to see if it is just particularly toxic

office politics or something that should concern us more than that.

10

We know that Mr. Proenza, Bill Proenza, before being named Director of the Tropical Prediction Center, the TPC, in Miami had

been a strong, well-regarded leader through seven years as head of

the National Weather Service in the Southern Region. By all reports, Mr. Proenza had a strong relationship with the Weather

Service union. He was seen by line employees as one of their

staunchest advocates, staunchest supporters. The contrast to the

apparently toxic relationship to the employees at TPC could not be

stronger, could not be more striking. We would assume that if Admiral Lautenbacher was convinced that Mr. Proenza would be the

right replacement for Max Mayfield, he must have thought that

Mr. Proenza was a competent leader and manager. He would not

have called Mr. Proenza to ask him to take that position if he did

not think that. It doesn’t make sense. That is why we are here

today trying to understand why an apparently proven leader with

a known track record has come to find himself in such grave trouble with his own employees and his own managers.

But once you look past the apparently spontaneous rebellion by

employees at the lab at the TPC and look at what has happened

at the management level above Mr. Proenza in the chain of command, not below him, there are further questions about what the

real reason is for what has gone wrong. The question becomes

whether Mr. Proenza was pushed out or is being pushed out because he was a critic within NOAA, not because of his difficulties

in dealing with his employees. Is it because he is a whistleblower,

because he was willing to stand up to the people who are higher

than him in the hierarchy, not because of his relationship with the

people below him in the hierarchy?

Mr. Proenza called attention to the failure of NOAA to take aggressive steps to find a replacement for QuikSCAT. I don’t claim

to know all the technical details of QuikSCAT and that is something that Mr. Proenza has talked about again and again. Some

have criticized his criticisms, his comments and the science for the

basis for some of his observations, but Mr. Proenza, like all of us,

has had to rely on staff for information, so if he is wrong about

that, there is certainly blame to go around. It is not all his fault

and it certainly is not his fault for raising those questions, questions that many within NOAA and the Weather Service are raising.

And it is hard to argue that the degradation of QuikSCAT or one

model matters more than another, well, all that misses the point

that virtually everyone in the meteorological community, all the

people who really do know what they are talking about when it

comes to this agree that they do need QuikSCAT, so the loss of

QuikSCAT is a real problem. The source for Mr. Proenza’s information shows up in NOAA presentations to the National Research

Council in April, in February’s interagency strategic research plan

for tropical cyclones produced by the Office of Federal Coordinator

of Meteorology. To argue about the projected degradation or whether one model matters more than another just misses the point. He

has called attention to the amount of money that NOAA has spent

on celebrating its 200th anniversary, an amount that appears to be

more than $4 million over fiscal year 2006–2007, this fiscal year,

if you include the cost of employees working on the issue. He is opposed to Weather Service downsizing, which had been one of the

11

hallmarks of Mr. Johnson’s tenure at the Weather Service, but for

that he has earned the gratitude of Congress and of the employees’

union. Not every manager welcomes a critic within the agency but

Congress certainly does. It is certainly easier for us to do our job

in oversight if we did not face a smooth wall of unanimity, of one

opinion without variation, and Mr. Proenza has certainly been willing to be a critic and to raise questions that has helped us do our

job.

So Chairman Lampson, I look forward to the questions. I look

forward to finding out more about whether this is simply a case of

office politics or it is the case of an agency not welcoming criticisms

of Mr. Proenza.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

On first impression, what’s been unfolding at the Tropical Prediction Center

(TPC), it sounds like office politics, something that happens every day at workplaces

all across America. Certainly, there are disgruntled employees having difficulty adjusting to a new manager and a new Director trying to adjust to a new chain of

command. But on a closer look, something just doesn’t seem quite right, the facts

don’t quite add up.

We know that Bill Proenza, before being named Director of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in Miami, had demonstrated that he was a strong, well-regarded leader throughout his seven years as head of the National Weather service

Southern Region. We know that by all reports, Mr. Proenza had a strong relationship with the Weather Service union, and was seen by line-employees as one of their

staunchest supporters.

We would assume, that if Admiral Lautenbacher was convinced that Mr. Proenza

would be a superb replacement for the retiring Max Mayfield, he must have also

thought that Mr. Proenza was a competent leader and manager.

What doesn’t make sense is why we are here today, trying to understand why a

proven leader with a known track-record has come to find himself in grave difficulties with his own employees and managers.

If you look past the apparently spontaneous rebellion by employees in the lab, and

look past what has unfolded at the managerial level of NOAA, the question arises

whether Mr. Proenza was pushed out because he was a whistle blower, a truth teller.

Mr. Proenza called attention to the failure of NOAA to take aggressive steps to

find a replacement for QuikSCAT. That has come to be a major talking point for

Mr. Proenza in recent months. Some have criticized his comments and the science

underlying his observations. To these critics I would note that Mr. Proenza had been

relying on staff for this information and so the blame, if there is any, should be

spread widely. In addition, to argue about the projected degradation or whether one

model matters more than another misses the point that virtually everyone in the

meteorological community agrees they need QuikSCAT. Finally, the source for Mr.

Proenza’s information shows up in NOAA presentations to the National Research

Council in April and in February’s ‘‘Interagency Strategic Research Plan for Tropical

Cyclones’’ produced by the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology. To

argue about the projected degradation or whether one model matters more than another misses the point.

He also called attention to the amount of money being spent by NOAA to celebrate its 200th Anniversary—an amount that appears to exceed $4 million over FY

2006–2007 if one includes the costs of employees working on the issue.

Finally, Mr. Proenza opposed the weather service ‘‘down-sizing’’ efforts that had

been the hallmark of Mr. Johnson’s tenure at the National Weather Service. For

that he earned the gratitude of many in Congress and in the Union.

Not every manager would welcome Mr. Proenza’s willingness to speak out. Some

would see him as an annoyance. In addition to the possible motive of silencing an

internal critic, the actions of the NOAA management suggest that something isn’t

right here, that this isn’t about Mr. Proenza’s deficiencies as a manager. The chronology of events just doesn’t fit.

• By the spring of 2007, Louis Uccellini, Proenza’s immediate supervisor and

head of the NECP, began keeping a file on Mr. Proenza containing apparently

12

minor administrative violations by Proenza. It should be noted that while Mr.

Uccellini was Mr. Proenza’s superior, he was Mr. Proenza’s junior in the

weather service and he and Mr. Proenza had been essentially of equal rank

when Proenza was head of the Southern Region of NWS.

• In April of 2007, senior staff at NOAA met at the Admiral Lautenbacher’s direction to work on something labeled in an e-mail as the ‘‘Proenza plan.’’ This

plan was to have five steps and be run by legal for review. . . It was shared

with D.L. Johnson, then head of the National Weather Service and Jack

Kelly, Deputy Under Secretary at NOAA.

• On June 14, three days after being named as Acting Director of the Weather

Service, Ms. Mary Glacken approved a memo that listed Mr. Proenza’s minor

administrative violations that Mr. Uccellini had collected and urged Mr.

Proenza to work through the chain of command and adhere more strenuously

to new NOAA media policy.

• On June 21 or 22, TPC senior forecasters—going against the chain of command—complained to Ms. Glacken about Bill Proenza’s leadership. The call

was organized by the Executive Officer in the Center, Dr. Ahsha Tribble, who

was seen by many at the TPC to be a ‘‘headquarters person.’’ Dr. Tribble had

arrived at the Hurricane Center just last September after working as Technical Chief of Staff to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and

Atmosphere.

• By June 26, Admiral Lautenbacher assembled a team to be dispatched from

Commerce to the Center to evaluate its operations. The team did not include

any management or weather experts. Rather than turn to outside parties

with expertise in the relevant areas—administration (National Association of

Public Administration) or meteorology (National Academy of Science)—the

Admiral selected people from within Commerce who had no background in

weather service forecast office issues and little expertise in the science. The

team’s preparation included meeting with the senior management figures who

had played a role in preparing Mr. Proenza’s June memo and in launching

the ‘‘Proenza plan.’’

• On July 2, the Team arrived on site. Mr. Proenza learned that this team was

being sent by a telephone call from the Admiral that was designed to be

timed with their arrival. While Mr. Proenza was unaware that a team was

being dispatched to the Center of which he was Director, other people at the

center knew of their pending arrival. Ahsha Tribble, apparently was assigned

to greet the Team and take them to Proenza’s office.

I hope that our witnesses today can explain some of this. I look forward to hearing

Mr. Proenza’s side of the story. I look forward to hearing from Admiral

Lautenbacher on his management of NOAA and of the TPC.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Chairman Miller.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Inglis, Ranking Member of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, for an opening statement.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Great nations have governments that ask questions of themselves so we are here to ask some questions. The loyal opposition

to the Administration, that would be my colleagues to my left, naturally smell rats from time to time and it could be that there is

a rat. The two Chairmen have just spoken about how perhaps this

is a critic who is being silenced. I think the evidence may show

here today that it is equally plausible that what we have here is

a mismatched manager and a personnel matter and nothing more.

So we have a hearing. Great nations have governments that ask

questions of themselves and we are here to ask questions, and we

have heard some speculation about some real rats out there. It may

be a fairly straightforward personnel matter. It appears that the

Administration put a highly recommended and well-qualified director into the office of the hurricane director and thereafter about

half of the staff at that Center signed a letter asking that Mr.

Proenza to be removed. Perhaps they are acting on some personal

13

vendetta, that may be shown here today, or perhaps they just

didn’t like his management style. In any event, the administrator

clearly did the right thing by appointing an independent panel to

investigate the situation. That panel was chaired by Dr. Jim Turner, who will testify here today.

Chairman Lampson mentioned that this fellow may not have expertise in hurricane forecasting, and I would ask, if you think it is

a management matter, why would you care if the fellow had expertise in hurricanes? The question is management if it is a personnel

matter in which case you could hire a consulting firm to go and ask

questions. It happens all the time. Consultants don’t necessarily

know how to make a chemical product in a chemical factory. They

don’t have to. They are asking management questions and so if

that is what it was, it is pretty clear that it is appropriate to form

a panel and go ask management-related questions.

We can agree that Mr. Proenza has a distinguished resume and

a history of positive performance reviews. Because of his success as

Southern Regional Director of the National Weather Service he appeared qualified for the NHC Director position. In his new role, he

became concerned about the potential loss of the QuikSCAT satellite. Some, as I understand it, would agree with Mr. Proenza that

QuikSCAT helps forecasters better understand the behavior of

tropical storms. Others would assert that Mr. Proenza exaggerated

the impacts of the potential loss of the QuikSCAT.

Mr. Proenza’s management style will be discussed here today.

Surely we need a steady and reliable hand at the wheel of the National Hurricane Center. With the peak of hurricane season fast

approaching, Admiral Lautenbacher was told that Mr. Proenza had

become so disruptive that forecasters were saying they could no

longer do their jobs. We will hear today that Mr. Proenza’s management style became such an issue that his immediate supervisors lost confidence, his employees lost confidence and the independent operational Assessment Team lost confidence in his ability

to manage the Center. We will hear that Admiral Lautenbacher decided that Mr. Proenza, as qualified as he had been at the outset,

was perhaps miscast as a director of the Center. I hope my colleagues in the press will stay around to hear the testimony of Admiral Lautenbacher and Dr. Turner to hear, as Paul Harvey says,

the rest of the story. Although it seems odd not to accord a senior

Administration official the courtesy of testifying at the outset of

this hearing today, and the Chairman and I have had discussions

about that, I trust that we will all wait to form conclusions until

all the witnesses have testified.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BOB INGLIS

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

For my home State of South Carolina and many others in coastal areas, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) is a critical national resource. The lives of individuals and families depend on the information the Center provides. Given the NHC’s

importance for protecting our citizens, we should carefully protect the integrity of

the National Hurricane Center.

We may find that we are here today discussing a fairly straightforward personnel

matter. It appears that the Administration put a highly recommended and well

qualified director into the office of Hurricane Director. Thereafter, about half of the

14

staff at the Hurricane Center signed a letter asking that Mr. Proenza be removed.

Perhaps they were acting on some personal vendetta. Perhaps they just didn’t like

his management style.

In any event, the Administrator did the right thing by appointing an independent

panel to investigate the situation. That panel was chaired by Dr. Jim Turner, who

will testify here today.

We can agree that the Mr. Proenza has a distinguished resume and a history of

positive performance reviews. Because of his success as Southern Regional Director

of the National Weather Service, he appeared qualified for the NHC Director position. In his new role, he became concerned about the potential loss of the QuikSCAT

satellite. Some would agree with Mr. Proenza that QuikSCAT helps forecasters better understand the behavior of tropical storms; others would assert that Mr.

Proenza exaggerated the impacts of a potential loss of QuikSCAT.

Mr. Proenza’s management style will be discussed here today. We need a steady

and reliable hand at the wheel at the National Hurricane Center. With the peak

of hurricane season fast approaching, Admiral Lautenbacher was told that Mr.

Proenza had become so disruptive that forecasters were saying they could no longer

do their jobs.

We will hear today that Mr. Proenza’s management style became such an issue

that:

• his immediate supervisors lost confidence,

• his employees lost confidence,

• and the independent operational Assessment Team lost confidence in his ability to manage the Center.

We will hear that Admiral Lautenbacher decided that Mr. Proenza, as qualified

as he had been at the outset, was miscast as the Director of the Center.

I hope that my colleagues and the press stay around to hear the testimony of Admiral Lautenbacher and Dr. Turner. Although it seems odd to not accord a senior

Administration official the courtesy of testifying at the outset of this hearing today,

I trust that we will all wait to form conclusions until all of the witnesses have testified. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Inglis, and the Chair will

now recognize Mr. Sensenbrenner, the Ranking Member on the

Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, for an opening statement.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In December of 2006, Mr. Bill Proenza was announced as the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center. In July of 2007, after his

superiors, employees and an independent assessment team questioned his management of the TPC, the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration placed Mr. Proenza

on temporary leave pending the final recommendation of an assessment team. The independent Assessment Team unequivocally

found that the TPC could not operate effectively under Mr.

Proenza’s leadership. Our country is in the middle of a hurricane

season. After Hurricane Katrina, everyone is aware of how dangerous this season can be.

The Tropical Prediction Center compiles data about ocean temperature, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure and other

factors and uses this data to forecast hurricanes. When a storm is

within three days of a potential landfall, the TPC issues official

forecasts and warnings every six hours. As the storm gets closer to

land, the forecasts are updated even more frequently. Lives depend

on the work at the TPC.

Last month in the midst of an investigation of NASA’s Inspector

General, I warned that we risk creating a culture of overzealous

oversight. I reiterate that point today. There is a fine line between

good oversight and harmful interference. Playing politics with hurricane forecasters endangers the lives of people the TPC works to

15

protect. Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, replaced Mr. Proenza because

he was an ineffective director. In the spring of this year, Mr.

Proenza made several exaggerated and inaccurate public statements complaining about a lack of resources and funding at the

TPC, the potential failure of one of the TPC satellites and NOAA’s

use of funds for the 200th anniversary celebration of the Coastal

Survey. In an independent assessment of the TPC performed by

the National Institute of Standards and Technology, reviewers observed that Mr. Proenza made statements about the limited lifetime of the QuikSCAT satellite and the resulting impact on forecasts ‘‘without context or caveat.’’ The reviewers further reported

that many staff believe that Mr. Proenza intentionally misrepresented their views and repeated certain false claims even after he

was corrected. On June 18, Mary Glackin, the Acting Director of

the National Weather Service, received phone calls from 11 employees of the TPC including seven out of the nine hurricane forecasters raising concerns about Mr. Proenza’s leadership. The employees complained that Mr. Proenza interfered with their ability

to do their jobs. On June 19, Ms. Glackin communicated her fears

to Admiral Lautenbacher. The Admiral then sent an independent

assessment team to report on the situation. Meanwhile, staff discontent was increasing. Three senior forecasters called for Mr.

Proenza’s removal and nearly half of the 46 staff members at the

TPC signed a petition demanding his removal because according to

the Center staff, the effective functioning of the Center was at

stake with Mr. Proenza as its director. On July 6, the Assessment

Team requested that Mr. Proenza be placed on leave because he

was jeopardizing the Center’s ability to do its job. Three days later,

Admiral Lautenbacher informed Mr. Proenza that he was being

placed on leave.

Upon completion of its report, the independent team’s recommendation was unequivocal: ‘‘The current TPC director should

be reassigned and not allowed to return to his position at the Center. This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership within the TPC.’’ Such substantial questions were raised

about Mr. Proenza that a failure to replace him would have been

irresponsible. During this subcommittee’s investigation of NASA’s

Inspector General, the Majority continuously objected to having an

inspector general in place who did not have the confidence of his

staff. In the present situation, employees have made similar complaints and raised the same concerns about Mr. Proenza’s leadership. I have no doubt that if Mr. Proenza was still serving as the

Director of the TPC, this subcommittee would be waving the employee petition in front of Admiral Lautenbacher demanding that

he take action. Mr. Proenza’s name would have been added to the

growing list of personnel decisions demanded of the Administration

by Congress.

Instead, the Majority is questioning the veracity of the employee’s complaints. In a July 12 letter to Admiral Lautenbacher, five

Democratic Congressmen wrote that ‘‘It is alleged that staff was

pressured to sign onto what became a well-publicized letter of complaint against Mr. Proenza.’’ I have no idea who made this allegation. According to the Orlando Sentinel, staffers at the TPC angrily

16

objected to suggestions that some were pressured into signing the

letter. The Center’s Administrative Officer said ‘‘no one was pressured to sign that letter but they aren’t calling the people who

signed it to find it. Why not? I smell politics at work here.’’ Conspicuously, none of the employees who worked under Mr. Proenza

at the TPC are here to testify today. Instead, the Majority invited

two Emergency Management officials who worked with him when

he served in his former position as Southern Regional Director for

the Weather Service. No one has raised any issues about Mr.

Proenza’s effectiveness in that role. The complaints here have all

been about his ability to lead the TPC. It appears that the Majority

has held today’s hearing and questioned the independence of the

Center’s staff without even talking to the staff that made the complaints.

Dr. James Turner is here to testify about the findings of the

independent Assessment Team but he is here because he was invited by the Republicans. The Majority was prepared to hold a

hearing investigating the replacement of Mr. Proenza without inviting the independent assessors who reported on the management

of the TPC or the TPC employees whose recommendations and

complaint lead to Dr. Proenza’s replacement. No wonder the Center’s administrative officers smelled politics.

None of us are strangers to politics but to disregard our country’s

readiness to obtain a political advantage extends beyond recklessness. I am disappointed that I have to state what should be the obvious, that unwarranted interference with the operation of the

small hurricane center at its most critical time can only cause more

harm than good. The Tropical Prediction Center should be allowed

to focus on the hurricane season instead of being forced to weather

this Congressional storm.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.

In December, 2006, Mr. Bill Proenza was announced as the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC). In July 2007, after his superiors, employees, and an

independent assessment team questioned his management of the TPC, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) placed Mr.

Proenza on temporary leave pending the final recommendation of the Assessment

Team. The independent Assessment Team unequivocally found that the TPC could

not operate effectively under Mr. Proenza’s leadership.

The United States is in the middle of hurricane season. After Hurricane Katrina,

everyone is aware how dangerous this season can be. The Tropical Prediction Center

(TPC) compiles data about ocean temperature, wind speed and direction, barometric

pressure, and other factors, and uses this data to forecast hurricanes. When a storm

is within three days of potential landfall, the TPC issues official forecasts and warnings every six hours. As a storm gets closer to land, the forecasts are updated even

more frequently. Lives depend on the work at the TPC.

Last month, in the midst of an investigation of NASA’s Inspector General, I

warned that we risked creating a culture of overzealous oversight. I reiterate that

point today: There is a fine line between good oversight and harmful interference.

Playing politics with hurricane forecasters endangers the lives of the people the TPC

works to protect.

Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and

Atmosphere, replaced Mr. Proenza because he was an ineffective director. In the

spring of this year, Mr. Proenza made several exaggerated and inaccurate public

statements complaining about a lack of resources and funding at the TPC, the potential failure of one of the TPC’s satellites, and NOAA’s use of funds for the 200th

Anniversary celebration of the coastal survey. In an independent assessment of the

17

TPC performed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), reviewers observed that Mr. Proenza made statements about the limited lifetime of

the QuikSCAT satellite and the resulting impact on forecasts ‘‘without context or

caveat.’’ The reviewers further reported that many staff believed that Mr. Proenza

intentionally misrepresented their views and repeated certain false claims even

after he was corrected.

On June 18, Mary Glackin, the Acting Director of the National Weather Service,

received phone calls from 11 employees of the TPC, including seven out of the nine

hurricane forecasters, raising concerns about Mr. Proenza’s leadership. The employees complained that Mr. Proenza interfered with their ability to do their jobs. On

June 19, Ms. Glackin communicated her fears to Admiral Lautenbacher. Admiral

Lautenbacher then sent the independent Assessment Team from NIST to report on

the situation.

Meanwhile, staff discontent was increasing. Three senior forecasters called for Mr.

Proenza’s removal and nearly half of the 46 staff members at the TPC signed a petition demanding his removal because, according to Center staff, the ‘‘effective functioning’’ of the Center was at stake with Mr. Proenza as its director. On July 6, the

NIST Assessment Team requested that Mr. Proenza be placed on leave because he

was jeopardizing the Center’s ability to do its job. Three days later, Mr.

Lautenbacher informed Mr. Proenza that he was being placed on leave.

Upon completion of its report, the independent team’s recommendation was unequivocal:

The current TPC director should be reassigned and not be allowed to return to

his position at the center. This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate

leadership within the TPC. . .

Such substantial questions were raised about Mr. Proenza, that a failure to replace him would have been irresponsible. During this subcommittee’s investigation

of NASA’s Inspector General, the Majority continuously objected to leaving an inspector general in place who did not have the confidence of his staff. In the present

situation, employees have made similar complaints and raised the same concerns

about Mr. Proenza’s leadership. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Proenza were still serving as the Director of the TPC, this subcommittee would be waiving the employee

petition in front of Admiral Lautenbacher demanding that he take action. Mr.

Proenza’s name would have been added to the growing list of personnel decisions

demanded of the Administration by Congress.

Instead, the Majority is questioning the veracity of the employees’ complaints. In

a July 12 letter to Admiral Lautenbacher, five Democratic Congressman wrote that

‘‘it is alleged that staff was pressured to sign on to what became a well-publicized

letter of complaint’’ against Mr. Proenza. I have no idea who made this allegation.

According to the Orlando Sentinel, staffers at the TPC ‘‘angrily objected to suggestions that some were ‘pressured’ into signing the letter.’’

The Center’s Administrative Officer said, ‘‘No one was pressured to sign that letter, but they aren’t calling the people who signed it to find it. Why not? I smell politics at work here.’’

Conspicuously, none of the employers who worked under Mr. Proenza at the TPC

are here to testify today. Instead, the Majority invited two emergency management

officials who worked with Mr. Proenza when he served in his former position as the

Southern Region Director for the National Weather Service. No one has raised any

issues with Mr. Proenza’s effectiveness in that role. The complaints have all been

about his ability to lead the TPC. It appears that the Majority has held today’s

hearing and questioned the independence of the Center’s staff without even talking

to the staff that made those complaints.

Dr. James Turner is here to testify about the findings of the independent Assessment Team, but he is here because he was invited by the Minority. The Majority

was prepared to hold a hearing ‘‘investigating’’ the replacement of Dr. Proenza without inviting the independent assessors who reported on management of the TPC or

the TPC employees whose recommendations and complaints lead to Dr. Proenza’s

replacements. No wonder the Center’s Administrative Officer smelled politics.

None of us are strangers to politics, but to disregard our country’s readiness to

obtain a political advantage extends beyond recklessness. I am disappointed that I

have to state what should be obvious, that unwarranted interference with the operation of a small hurricane center at its most critical time can only cause more harm

than good. The Tropical Prediction Center should be allowed to focus on the hurricane season instead of being forced to weather this Congressional storm.

18

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Sensenbrenner. Just for the

record, staff has talked both to signers and non-signers of the petition.

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening

statements for the record, your statements will be added to the

record at this point.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RON KLEIN

I want to thank my good friend, the distinguished Chairman of this subcommittee,

along with the Ranking Member for holding this hearing and allowing me to participate. I can think of only a handful of issues as important as keeping the American

public safe from hurricanes and other deadly storms. It’s a fundamental duty of the

Federal Government that I and all Americans take very seriously. That’s why I have

taken a high level of interest in the health of our weather satellites, and in particular, the Quick Scatterometer, otherwise known as QuikSCAT.

On June 5, 2006, NOAA convened a workshop with other federal agencies to assess, among other things, the impact of satellite surface wind speed and direction

measurements. QuikSCAT, one of two weather satellites at the heart of the workshop’s assessment, received several eye-catching quotes in support of its usefulness.

Rick Knabb, senior hurricane specialist at the National Hurricane Center, said,

‘‘When QuikSCAT is gone, it will be like going back seven years in tropical cyclone

analysis.’’ He also added, ‘‘Losing QuikSCAT would be like losing a limb, especially

for Tropical Analysis and Forecasting Branch.’’

I’ve heard similar comments during my many meetings with NOAA officials, including from General David Johnson, former Director of the National Weather Service. And during my recent visit to the National Hurricane Center, several forecasters independently verified to me the value of QuikSCAT’s data when detecting

and analyzing hurricanes and tropical storms. They showed me how the cone used

to predict the path of a storm may be altered when QuikSCAT’s data is incorporated, making the cone narrower and the timing of landfall more precise.

Now, in the midst of the controversy surrounding Mr. Proenza’s dismissal as director of the Center, I’m hearing comments that essentially retreat from the earlier

support of QuikSCAT. There are accusations that Mr. Proenza misrepresented or

overstated the science when saying two-day and three-day forecasts would be adversely affected by the loss of QuikSCAT, and one senior forecaster at the Hurricane

Center even compared the loss of QuikSCAT to ‘‘driving a BMW with cloth rather

than leather seats.’’

This sudden retreat concerns me. While I recognize that there may be disputes

over Mr. Proenza’s management or administrative style, I am not in a position to

evaluate his employment status. However, while I recognize that disagreements

over scientific studies can occur among reasonable and reputable scientists, my fear

is that this retreat may be born out in part by political motivations.

Such actions may have distracted us from legitimate inquiries into QuikSCAT

along with NOAA’s other weather satellites. Fortunately, this committee has taken

its oversight responsibilities seriously and convened this hearing, inviting me to participate. I’m very grateful because from the very beginning of my interest in

QuikSCAT, I’ve been asking two very simple questions to NOAA. How did we get

to this point where a useful weather satellite is on its last legs with no replacement

set to launch, and what are NOAA’s short-term and long-term contingency plans to

replace the loss of its data. I should add that we also now need to inquire whether

the QuikSCAT retreat is legitimate and if this once-praised satellite has value. But

if it does, I feel it is imperative that we find out what are the backup plans, when

it fails, to replace the data and other information it provides in the evaluation of

hurricanes and tropical storms.

I sincerely hope at the end of this hearing that I can leave and say that we have

logical, supportable answers. But if I’m not satisfied, I intend to keep pressing to

ensure that our forecasters have the best resources and technology available to help

them keep the American public safe from hurricanes and other deadly storms. I look

forward to the outcome and the responses of the distinguished panelists and Subcommittee Members, and thank the esteemed Chairman and Ranking Member for

their leadership on this issue.

Chairman LAMPSON. I ask unanimous consent to enter into the

record selected materials that have been provided to the SubVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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committees by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Is there any objection? So ordered.

[The information follows:]

20

21

22

Chairman LAMPSON. At this point to mention, and I will talk

with Admiral Lautenbacher in just a few minutes regarding this,

but we did ask two members of the NOAA management chain to

be here this morning. We expected them to be. We were notified

at around 9:00 that they would not be here.

At this point, I would ask unanimous consent to allow Representative Ron Klein to join us here on the dais and to be allowed to

participate in this committee hearing. Is there objection?

Mr. INGLIS. Reserving the right to objection—hold on a second.

Chairman LAMPSON. Without objection, so ordered. Representative Klein, you are welcome to join us.

At this point I would like to introduce our first panel. Mr. William Proenza is the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center, the

National Hurricane Center, National Centers for Environmental

Prediction, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He

will discuss his service as director of the Tropical Prediction Center, the National Hurricane Center, and his experiences during the

recent events that led the NOAA administrator to place him on

leave.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. Is it not the practice of this committee to require witnesses

to file their written testimony 24 hours in advance so that the

Members and the staff of the Committee can review that testimony

and draft appropriate questions?

Chairman LAMPSON. We did not ask for testimony, which I understand is common practice. With circumstances like this, we did

ask for his biography and it was submitted.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. A further parliamentary inquiry. Has written testimony been submitted in a timely manner by all of the

other witnesses on the other two panels?

Chairman LAMPSON. Yes. Written testimony of everyone has

been submitted.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Further parliamentary inquiry. I am referring to the Committee rules governing procedure of the Committee

on Science and Technology that says insofar as is practical, each

witness who is to appear before the Committee shall file no later

than 24 hours in advance of his or her appearance both a statement of the proposed testimony and a CV in printed copy and electronic form. Why was it not practical for Mr. Proenza to file his

statement pursuant to the rules when it was practical for all of the

other witnesses to do so?

23

Chairman LAMPSON. He submitted his bio, which is what we

asked him for.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Further parliamentary inquiry. Then why

did not the Chair ask for the proposed testimony, which is also required under the rules, since apparently all of the other witnesses

were able to submit proposed testimony?

Chairman LAMPSON. I think there is a difference between the

two types of information that was coming. I think that it is traditional when persons who could be considered whistleblowers are

coming before a panel that they not be asked to submit written testimony.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, a further parliamentary inquiry. It is

also traditional that Administration witnesses appear first on the

first panel rather than being forced to wait around, and that was

my practice when I was the Chair of the Committee and the Clinton Administration was in office. Why was not Admiral

Lautenbacher given the same courtesy that tradition has allowed

Administration witnesses for as long as I have been on this committee?

Chairman LAMPSON. I made the determination as the Chairman

to the order that we would have our witnesses come. That is at the

discretion of the Chair and that was the decision that I made.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would then ask unanimous consent pursuant to the tradition of this committee that Admiral Lautenbacher

be allowed to testify first as an Administration witness.

Chairman LAMPSON. I object.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would further ask unanimous consent

that Mr. Proenza be excused because he has not filed his testimony

24 hours in advance as all the other witnesses have.

Chairman LAMPSON. He is not required to be, and I might add

also that even your own actions for the Committee that you chaired

are different than what you are asking right now, Ranking Member. And at this point our witnesses should know.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would ask unanimous consent that Mr.

Proenza be excused until he files the written testimony as all of the

other witnesses have.

Chairman LAMPSON. We have heard enough and we will go forward with this witness, and as you know, the witnesses.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I object.

Chairman LAMPSON. And we will go forward with this plan with

our committee as planned.

And as our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited

to five minutes each. It is also the practice of the Subcommittee to

take testimony under oath. Do you have objections to being sworn

in? You also have a right to be represented by counsel. Is anyone

represented by counsel? Are you represented by counsel at this

hearing? Please stand and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn]

24

Panel I

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM PROENZA, DIRECTOR,

TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER

Mr. PROENZA. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking

Member Inglis, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, Committee Members, thank you for inviting me here this morning.

Although for the position of National Hurricane Center I was not

a candidate as was mentioned, I was really happy to accept as a

lateral career movement in my senior executive service that reassignment. I fully felt the weight of this position and I dedicated

myself to its mission, the mission which boils down to the highest

calling in government, the protection of life. I took over on January

3 as my predecessor retired on the same day.

A quick background on me. I am a meteorologist. I started my

National Weather Service career in the mid 1990s with two hurricane seasons at the National Hurricane Center and then another

three seasons flying into the hurricanes with the Hurricane Hunters. However, a lot of my leadership experience was gained heading

the Weather Services for one of the world’s most severe weather active areas, the Southern Region, since actually January of 1998, an

area that extends from New Mexico, includes Oklahoma and Texas

eastward to include all of the Gulf states, Georgia, Florida, Puerto

Rico, the Virgin Islands, and hydrologic services include South

Carolina, North Carolina and into Virginia as well. This region has

nearly 90 percent of the U.S. landfalling hurricanes. Our nation in

an average year has an active enough hurricane threat in the Atlantic basin, no question about it, but since 1995 we have been in

what we call a more active, multi-decadal in length, period in

which hurricanes are especially major. During this active cycle, our

nation’s average annual losses jump from $4 billion per year to nearly $19 billion per year. Furthermore, our culture has our people liking to live near the coast. In fact, our census shows us that

about 53 percent of the Nation’s total population lives within the

first 50 miles of the coastline, an important consideration as we

face the challenges of the future for the Hurricane Center so we

can easily see why building the preparedness of our nation, of our

people, building our partnership with emergency management,

local government officials and Homeland Security, local and State

government and the media is so important to the National Weather

Service and a major activity for me, especially before the normal

season begins in June.

Another major concern during this preseason time for me that I

have spent in this position was assessing our readiness to maintain

our mission delivery to the American public, and while the National Hurricane Center has never been, has never been more

ready for a season, we still had some potential problems. But already we have dealt with four tropical storms and dealt with them

without any problem. One was what we called—one of the problems that we had and one of the potential problems, what we call

the ocean sector surface vector winds which really is the wind field

above the ocean that is so important for hurricane analysis. It is

vital data that we get from the NASA satellite that was launched

in 1999, QuikSCAT, with an estimated lifespan of three, sometimes

25

people will say five years, three to five years, but it is now in its

eighth year, and it is on its backup transmitter. Two days after I

entered the National Hurricane Center on January 5, my staff

briefed NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher, NWS Director Johnson

and my then new immediate supervisor, Director Uccellini, on this

problem. A critical satellite on borrowed time and no plans, no

plans to replace it. That presentation from January 5 stated how

important this ocean surface wind field is from the everyday users

of this particular service, and I have quotes such as, from the senior hurricane specialists that are on my staff now, ‘‘When

QuikSCAT is gone,’’ and I quote exactly, ‘‘It will be like going back

seven years in tropical cyclone analysis.’’ ‘‘Losing QuikSCAT will be

like losing a limb, especially for tropical analysis and forecasting.’’ The Navy says QuikSCAT plays a critical role in our analysis of

short-term warnings and forecasts. That is the Joint Typhoon

Warning Center in Pearl Harbor.

NHC has many facts that we look at, many sources of data but

one thing is apparent to us all the time is that over the ocean we

have a tremendous sparsity of data. We have some buoys, we have

some satellites that look over the cloud features across the ocean,

we have some ship reports, but when it comes to the sparsity of

data, no single source of data adds more information to us for the

analysis than QuikSCAT. The fact that this is a little known recent

NOAA publication that came out officially stated very clearly seven

years of QuikSCAT dependence and we don’t have plans in our government to replace it with a new generation version. It will take

five years to develop and send up a new generation of satellite but

it will have great new benefits. But don’t take my word for it. Dr.

Robert Atlas is here this morning, an expert on QuikSCAT from his

days at NASA and now one of our leading NOAA ocean and atmospheric research scientists. This is not about having a satellite

version that we could call a Chevy or a Cadillac. It is about having

one reliable latest science, what we call ocean surface vector wind

satellite that will help us protect life in the oceans and on land.

Despite what I thought was a reasonable approach to

QuikSCAT’s advocacy, I have asked myself why all this resistance.

The fact is, NOAA is one of the U.S. departments struggling right

now with huge overruns, billions of dollars in its polar orbiting environmental satellite system and still nowhere in there, nowhere in

their design is there a new generation listed QuikSCAT replacement until the year 2016. An oversight? We are all concerned about

the protection of life of our people. Perhaps it was a way to cut

costs, whatever. I dared to call attention to it. I dared to call attention to it, and by golly, I am going to pay the price for bringing this

to the attention of the American people.

On another matter.

Chairman LAMPSON. Can you wrap up because your time?

Mr. PROENZA. Sure. Another matter, the $200,000 that was diverted for the Joint Hurricane Test Bed. It was used for one- to

two-year projects translating science into operations. That was removed this year, and I simply pushed to have it restored when my

deputy, my deputy in January said it would hurt the success of improving our hurricane monitoring and forecasting. In addition, I

called attention to the fact that it was over $4 million in NOAA reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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sources for celebration of an alleged 200-year anniversary of NOAA

when it was a bit of a stretch, since NOAA was formed in 1970.

Most important, I didn’t feel in my opinion that self-promotion was

an acceptable way to use funds, especially when funds are tight. So

I shared all of this early on with my chain of command, with my

partners and later brought it to the attention of the country and

I have been chastised, threatened, investigated, recommended for

reassignment, discredited after more than 40 years of dedicated

service to my country. The investigation was extraordinarily disruptive that came in to us that Monday and a surprise from Washington which triggered a frenzy of concern for mission delivery and

employee careers. I am still the Center’s Director. I need to go back

to work. I am ready to repair bruised relationships wherever they

may be with whatever mediators and things that we feel may be

the best way to move forward. That is what we have to do in this

year’s hurricane season.

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for these five minutes. I am

at your Committee’s disposal.

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM PROENZA

Bill Proenza is the Director of the National Hurricane Center (NHC) in Miami,

part of the National Weather Service (NWS), an agency of the Department of Commerce bureau, NOAA.

A 1967 meteorology graduate of The Florida State University, Proenza served two

hurricane seasons in ’63 & ’64 at NHC and then three hurricane seasons as an assistant flight meteorologist (’65–’67) on the ‘‘hurricane hunter’’ aircraft. He continued his career within the National Weather Service for more than 40 years receiving numerous performance commendations and awards, including recognition from

the NWS Employees’ Organization as the NWS Manager of the Year for 1998 for

his collaborative leadership.

Proenza has held a diverse array of field and leadership positions and his meteorological experience ranges from leadership in the modernization of weather services as well as managing weather forecasting and severe weather warning services

as well as climate services. He rose through the ranks of the NWS and held the

position of Director of the most severe weather-active area of our nation, the Southern Region, encompassing one-fourth of the Nation from New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma eastward all the way to Florida and on across the Caribbean to include Puerto

Rico and the Virgin Islands from 1998 through the end of 2006 (acting in ’98).

Through his experience in the southern, north-central and eastern portions of the

Nation, Bill has gained a unique familiarity with many types of weather from tropical to intense winter weather and severe local storms.

Proenza is a long standing member of the American Meteorological Society, the

National Weather Association, the International Association of Emergency Managers and the National Emergency Management Association. In 2001, the American

Meteorological Society (AMS) recognized him with its prestigious ‘‘Francis W.

Reichelderfer Award’’ for outstanding environmental services to the Nation and in

2003, he was conferred the prestigious status of ‘‘Fellow of the AMS.’’ Just recently

in 2006, he was elected by his peers to the leadership board of the American Meteorological Society as a Counselor.

Proenza is an internationally recognized meteorologist and has represented the

U.S. Government across the Caribbean Basin. In 2006 and 2007, he headed the

United States Delegations to United Nations (UNESCO) meetings on tsunamis and

the oceans. Proenza is also the chairman of the United Nation’s World Meteorological Organization’s Hurricane Committee, which supports 26 member nations in the

hurricane threatened nations of the Americas.

DISCUSSION

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Proenza.

It is time now for our first round of questioning, and the Chair

will recognize himself for five minutes.

27

NOAA ASSESSMENT TEAM

Mr. Proenza, when were you notified that NOAA was sending an

assessment team to the Hurricane Center?

Mr. PROENZA. I received a call from Conrad Lautenbacher, an

Administrator at NOAA, at 9:00 that Monday morning, then they

showed up knocking at my door. I did not know before then.

Chairman LAMPSON. Was anyone else on your staff aware that

the Team was arriving?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir. I talked to my deputy and I asked him

if he knew anything about it. He said yes, he was instructed from

Washington by Louis Uccellini that this team was coming down to

the Hurricane Center but he was told not to tell me.

Chairman LAMPSON. Did anyone from NOAA come with the

Team to the Center?

Mr. PROENZA. Two people from NOAA came. One was a senior

executive service person from the satellite service of NOAA, another one was an administrative support person from NOAA, and

then three people from the Department of Commerce.

MEDIA EXPOSURE

Chairman LAMPSON. We have the review team’s report, and I

want to ask you a few things about it that are in it. Page 3 of the

report indicates that you asserted to the review team that you

didn’t want anyone going to the media about the assessment. Is

that true?

Mr. PROENZA. That is correct. We were in the midst of the hurricane season. I wanted to have a minimal exposure to what was

going on in the Hurricane Center.

Chairman LAMPSON. The report goes on to say, ‘‘Nevertheless,

the next day he held media interviews on the forecast operations

floor about the assessment while the hurricane specialists were

performing their duties analyzing tropical activity.’’ Is this true?

Mr. PROENZA. That is correct again. Essentially those interviews

were set up by NOAA public affairs. A NOAA public affairs person

came down with the Team in addition to our NOAA public affairs.

They coordinated on all of my interviews for the day and I just simply conducted the interviews I was instructed to conduct.

Chairman LAMPSON. And you just answered my next question,

did you arrange those interviews. And who arranged them? Would

you tell me again?

Mr. PROENZA. The NOAA public affairs people there. There were

two of them, a Dennis Feltgen, who is normally the NOAA public

affairs person for the Hurricane Center, and the person that came

down with the Team, Greg Romano, who is also a NOAA public affairs person.

Chairman LAMPSON. The way the report is written, it implies

that you were being disingenuous with the assessment team, that

although you told them you didn’t want media attention on the assessment, you actually did want media present and that you arranged for the media to be at the Center. So you didn’t want the

media there and you did not arrange those interviews, correct?

Mr. PROENZA. That is correct, sir.

28

Chairman LAMPSON. I will turn to another example in the report.

Again on page 3, it states, ‘‘One specialist reported that the Director disrupted his ability to track tropical storms. We had Barbara

and Barry. He kept bringing the media over onto the operations

floor to show QuikSCAT while I am trying to put out a forecast.

It was hard to get the job done.’’ Do you remember that incident?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, I do.

Chairman LAMPSON. Do you want to tell me a little more—— Mr. PROENZA. Certainly. It was a case where we had Barbara

and we had Barry. I was on duty for both of those storms with the

two hurricane specialists and we had examples where we could

show that the sparsity of data that we were experiencing over the

ocean where these storms were located, and what we could show

was the QuikSCAT coming over and giving us the data that we

needed. It was certainly momentary and it was always with the full

knowledge of knowing what was going on at the time.

Chairman LAMPSON. You asked if the media could be brought

over to—— Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON.—see that and he agreed?

Mr. PROENZA. I asked if we could show them what was going on

and how we were using analysis of QuikSCAT.

Chairman LAMPSON. And—— Mr. PROENZA. And they even demonstrated it themselves.

Chairman LAMPSON. And the response from him was?

Mr. PROENZA. ‘‘Yes, and I will demonstrate it,’’ and it let them

do the demonstration.

Chairman LAMPSON. Is it unusual for the media to be present on

the operations floor of the Hurricane Center? I was of the impression that it is set up for media presence during storms. Am I

wrong?

Mr. PROENZA. Off and on for special circumstances, I see it happening. I don’t think it is that unusual but I don’t have enough

time there to say.

STAFF DISSATISFACTION

Chairman LAMPSON. You were the director for the Southern Region Office of the National Weather Service for seven years. During

that time, did NOAA ever send an assessment team to the regional

office?

Mr. PROENZA. No, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. Prior to the arrival of this team, were you

aware that members of the staff were dissatisfied with your management and leadership of the Center?

Mr. PROENZA. No, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. Was there any resistance to change and

concern about any public statements?

Mr. PROENZA. There was resistance to change as far as what we

were trying to do. One of the objectives that we had as we entered

the season and looked at the fact that we had growing challenges

on the horizon for the Nation’s hurricane warning program, I simply wanted to get the research community more attuned to the

needs of what the operational community needed, and so we were

working together with the NOAA side of the research group that

29

is there in Miami in the South Florida area and we had a great

cooperation working and they objected to that.

Chairman LAMPSON. My time has expired. I will now recognize

Chairman Miller. I am going to relinquish the chair to Mr. Miller

for five minutes.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Proenza, how are you this morning?

Mr. PROENZA. Good. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MILLER. The last questions from Chairman Lampson

that there was some resistance to change by various employees of

the Center, did you think that there were any problems or differences between you and the staff that could not be worked out,

that were so serious that they were beyond a solution?

Mr. PROENZA. No, not at all. It’s just the normal course of events

and how we implement change and we are doing it all the time in

the scientific environment.

QUIKSCAT

Chairman MILLER. You talked a good deal about QuikSCAT. I

would like to talk about that a little more. Did you ever advocate

for cutting the funding for the hurricane aircraft to fund

QuikSCAT?

Mr. PROENZA. Not at all.

Chairman MILLER. How are those two projects comparable?

Mr. PROENZA. First of all, the QuikSCAT project itself when it

was asked what we wanted to do there, I said that indeed the

NOAA requirements report asked for something to be started immediately or the replacement with a new generation of satellite. I

said I concurred with that. I said also though I wanted to make

sure that we had support for the aircraft and for the later model

developments we were seeking for the Doppler radar we wanted for

the Air Force, a whole slew of items that we feel are important for

the future our capability protecting the people. But in addition to

that, when they said well, which one do we have to start on, well,

I said we need to start on the QuikSCAT because that is going to

take five to six years to get it going to the point that we can have

a possible launch and so I said that we needed to start immediately

on that and so I emphasized that.

Chairman MILLER. Also, the funding level required for the hurricane planes versus the QuikSCAT satellite.

Mr. PROENZA. For the plane, it is about $50 million. For the satellite, it is $500 million.

Chairman MILLER. Some of the senior forecasters at the Center

apparently believe that your comments about QuikSCAT were undermining public confidence in the Center’s forecast ability. Why

did you continue to talk about QuikSCAT and the failure to have

a satellite ready replacement?

Mr. PROENZA. Because I had the scientific community, I had my

own hurricane specialists telling me in their quotes how important

QuikSCAT was to them and I certainly wanted to make sure that

I advocated their positions operationally.

30

HURRICANE SEASON: 2007

Chairman MILLER. How well prepared are we for the current

hurricane season?

Mr. PROENZA. We are absolutely as prepared as we have ever

been. We have a new model on board. We are excited about that.

We have had some graphic changes that we put into the web site.

We have an option where the cone of uncertainty has been redefined by one of the hurricane specialists. We feel that that would

be more accurate and we are also having a toggle where the user,

whoever that may be, can actually take a little black line that Max

used to say don’t focus in on. They can take it off and put it back

on. We are doing that and we have an experimental tropical weather outlook graphic that is going out that will show the user, the

public, a better concept of where the active areas of disturbed

weather are right now.

Chairman MILLER. Did you ever think that advocating for better

equipment for future forecasting in any way undermined the forecasting or the confidence of the forecasts now?

Mr. PROENZA. No, absolutely not.

MORE ON QUIKSCAT

Chairman MILLER. Did anyone superior to you at NOAA, the Department of Commerce ever tell you to stop talking about

QuikSCAT?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. Who were they? And what did they say?

Mr. PROENZA. I had a call on Friday, April 13, and it was from

my immediate supervisor, and the statements were, ‘‘You better

stop these QuikSCAT NHC funding associated with the Joint Hurricane Test Bed complaints. I am warning you. You have NOAA,

DOC, OMB, the White House’’—excuse me—‘‘pissed off.’’ Chairman MILLER. I am sorry. Was that an oral statement or an

e-mail?

Mr. PROENZA. That was an oral statement and I just put it contemporaneously in my calendar.

Chairman MILLER. And you said your immediate superior. Was

that Mr. Uccellini?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. How about Mary Glackin? Did you ever hear

from her?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes. She came on board in June, June 11, I believe. She came to visit us at the end of that week and she said

in her time that she has been on board as the Acting Director of

the National Weather Service, that she felt she was spending an

inordinate amount of time handling QuikSCAT questions and

wanted me to cease and desist.

INTEGRATING RESEARCH AT THE HURRICANE RESEARCH

CENTER AND THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER

Chairman MILLER. I understand you advocate for more closely

integrated research done at the Hurricane Research Division with

the operational forecasting done at the Center, the National Hurricane Center. Have those organizations worked together historiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
31

cally? Why did you want them more closely linked? And was there

any resistance to having a closer relationship between—— Mr. PROENZA. The resistance I was told about and advised about

by my senior staff was that there had been a barrier, so to speak,

between the two operations in the past and I said I understand but

I felt that it was compelling upon all of us based on the challenges

that those barriers were no longer to exist and we needed to bring

together all of the resources that we had in NOAA into one operation that would challenge the researchers to meet the needs of the

operational forecasters.

Chairman MILLER. And my time is also expired, Mr. Proenza. I

think we would now turn to Mr. Inglis for five minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIRECTOR PROENZA’S TENURE AT THE NATIONAL

HURRICANE CENTER

Mr. Proenza, this Administration was bitten badly by Katrina.

The theory of the case for you brought forward by the majority is

that you are being punished for being a critic. If this Administration, having been bitten by Katrina, were interested in not developing the best technology, it would be surprising to me. Is it surprising to you that the Administration, having been bitten by

Katrina, would not want the very best technology and would see

it as a crucial priority of this Administration?

Mr. PROENZA. Congressman, even if—if I can point to a publication from NOAA that looked at our requirements and said that we

needed to do this, I can assure you, at the time that I brought the

need for the QuikSCAT replacement with the new technology to my

superiors, there was no plans to replace this particular satellite

and only later this year did they mention that they would have

something for us possibly by 2016.

Mr. INGLIS. The government is very good at reacting. That is

what we do very well and so if this Administration is reacting to

the stimulus, the very unfortunate stimulus of Katrina, doesn’t it

stand to reason that they would react and say whatever it takes,

get it quickly?

Mr. PROENZA. I totally embrace that any way that I can work towards getting that a reality.

Mr. INGLIS. The thing is, that undermines your whole theory of

this case. It undermines the Majority’s theory of the case because

their theory is, you are being punished for being a critic. You would

be the hero for pointing out some better technology if the Administration had been so bitten, wouldn’t it?

Mr. PROENZA. I am trying to point out that we need to work immediately to begin bringing the latest science and technology to the

forefront and the design of a new instrument that would be able

to replace QuikSCAT whenever it is possible.

Mr. INGLIS. Let me ask you this. Can you give me the names of

three people at the Center who I could call who would say that you

are a good leader?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes.

Mr. INGLIS. Will you give me their names?

Mr. PROENZA. Chris Landsea.

Mr. INGLIS. Let me get this down. Chris Landsea, L-a-n-c-e-y?

32

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, L-a-n-d-s-e-a. You know, Congressman, just a

moment. I don’t want to put words or expectation in any employee

of mine’s mind and I want them to feel free to say whatever they

want to say. I would just suggest that there are employees there

that would feel that way. I just don’t want to invade their privacy

and say—and put words in their mouth that they—— Mr. INGLIS. I am just interested in talking with them to see who

you think at the Center would say you are a good leader?

Mr. BAIRD. Would the gentleman yield for one moment, if I may?

Mr. PROENZA. Would I—— Mr. BAIRD. I am not asking the witness. I am asking my colleague to yield for just a moment.

Mr. INGLIS. I don’t have enough time, I don’t think.

Mr. BAIRD. Well, I understand that, but there are procedural

legal issues that the gentleman may be treading upon here.

Mr. INGLIS. Am I yielding? I guess I was yielding, but I consumed some of the time. I suppose I can get the time back, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. Proenza, the third one.

Mr. PROENZA. I just feel awkward about, there are all sorts of

people, sir, that I don’t want to make them, invade their privacy

by bringing their names up, and giving them the expectation that

I feel——

Mr. INGLIS. Let me ask you this. Why do you think 23 people

signed a letter saying you should be removed, 23 out of the 46.

That is about half, isn’t it?

Mr. PROENZA. Sir, I wasn’t there when they held the meeting,

and several people stood before the rest of the employees, and

asked them to sign, and the reasons why, I didn’t hear those argument. It would be hard for me to judge—— Mr. INGLIS. Let me ask you this. If you, even if you were certain

that somebody said before them, I would be really concerned about

signing such a letter, because I would be afraid that maybe you

were going to get me after I signed the letter, so there is a real

resistance to me signing the letter, right?

So, if I sign the letter, 23 people overcoming that natural resistance, again, it cuts against the theory of the majority here. The 23

had to overcome enormous resistance to sign the letter, to put their

name to it. Now, I am asking you for three people that I can call,

and ask who would say that you are a good leader.

Mr. PROENZA. I understand, sir.

Mr. INGLIS. And you wouldn’t have any trouble coming up with

three more names.

Mr. PROENZA. No, it isn’t that at all.

Mr. INGLIS. And then, you are trying to stop me from calling

them.

Mr. PROENZA. No, no. You, sir, you have whatever authorities

you have to do whatever you want to do. I am just saying upon

thinking of your question, with all respect, I just feel that it would

be wrong of me to list names of some of the people that I supervise,

or I am in the chain of command, and say that they are going to

say something about me.

Mr. INGLIS. Yes, I understand. You said that before. And let me

ask you this, because my time is running out. You have spoken

33

here a lot today about QuikSCAT, and you spoke about the importance of the work of the Center, but I notice you never spoke about

the dedication of the people and their expertise. Would you describe

yourself as a people person?

Mr. PROENZA. Sir, I said that the Hurricane Center has never

been more ready than it is this year—— Mr. INGLIS. I understand, but you have never mentioned the people, and it seems to be a manager’s crucial question here, if you

take my theory of the case, this may just be a personnel matter,

is that you would mention people if you were an effective manager,

rather than simply technology, and it could be that you are on a

hobbyhorse of a technology, and the people are being ignored, and

perhaps, that is why the assessment team made the recommendation they made. Is that possible?

Mr. PROENZA. They are not being ignored. Absolutely not. And in

fact, the assessment is based on our people, and I am a people person, and I have a thousand employees, just under a thousand employees in my previous responsibility. And also in the Center. I

work with professionals, and even though they may have said what

they have said, I have said also that they are all professionals, and

I don’t expect any of them to do their job at any lower performance

level than they are capable of doing now. I really believe in that,

and that is why I believe that the Center is in the best ever condition to deliver the mission to the American people this year.

Chairman MILLER. All right. We are well now past the five minutes, plus a very generous allowance for that interruption. Mr. Sensenbrenner for five minutes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Proenza.

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

MORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. On June 14, your supervisor, Mary

Glackin, gave you a memo outlining procedures and expectations.

Could you please tell us who else on your staff you gave this memo

to?

Mr. PROENZA. I shared this memo with, first of all, I had a meeting with my staff, and I shared what was in the memo with them.

I handed out a few copies of the memo at that time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Did you release this memo to the press, or

leak the memo to the press in any regard?

Mr. PROENZA. No, sir.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Then, fast forward to after the assessment

team paid a visit to the National Hurricane Center. Did you ask

your staff not to discuss the assessment team with the media, the

assessment team and its investigation to the media?

Mr. PROENZA. I remember talking to the investigators, hoping

that this could all be processed in a way that it would be low key,

and not disruptive to the operations at the Center.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Later on, when the media came on one of

their regular calls, did you bring the assessment team’s presence

and investigation up to them?

Mr. PROENZA. Not that I remember. I remember that all of the

interviews that I had went through the NOAA public affairs people

that were there, and that they, indeed, knew at that time that the

34

group was there, investigating. I don’t know if they picked it up

while they were there, or they knew before they got there. All I did

was I conducted my interview and answered the questions.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Now, I have got the assessment

team’s report here, and about two-thirds of the way down, on page

3 of the report, it says: ‘‘Separately, the assessment team witnessed

similar behavior. In the Team’s initial meeting with the Director,

he asserted he wanted the assessment to be least disruptive as possible to our operations, and to be low key. He told the Team he did

not want anyone going to the media, otherwise, that will engage a

lot of explanation on our part to them. Nevertheless, the next day,

he held media interviews on the forecast operations floor about the

assessment, while the hurricane specialists were performing their

duties, analyzing tropical activity.’’ This is a report of the assessment team. It is at variance with the testimony that you just gave

under oath. Which is correct?

Mr. PROENZA. My testimony is correct. When they came in, and

they were interviewing me, that is when those questions came up.

I simply answered those questions. The interviews were set up

where they normally are set up, at the briefing desk, and I conducted and answered accordingly. I did not set up those interviews.

Those interviews were set up by the NOAA public affairs people.

Is the question, sir——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The reason the interviews were set up by

the NOAA public affairs people, was that relating to the activities

of the assessment team, or was that relating to the normal operations of the Hurricane Forecasting Center?

Mr. PROENZA. The person that came down with the Team, Greg

Romano, was especially for the purposes of monitoring the assessment team’s impact on the office, and whatever went on between

NOAA public affairs, the two people, it was coordinated among

themselves, and I was strictly just brought out to the floor to answer them.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Then, are you saying that Dr. Turner’s report, that I just quoted, is inaccurate, where he said that you

were holding media interviews on the forecast operations floor

about the assessment, while the hurricane specialists were performing their duties analyzing tropical activity?

Mr. PROENZA. If I was on the forecast floor, it was the desk that

I conduct my briefings from, and should questions have come up

in the media about the assessment team, I would have answered

them at that time, but I did not in any way invite those questions.

They were set up——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Did it ever occur to you that the word no

comment, words no comment might have been a more appropriate

response?

Mr. PROENZA. It did not, because I was answering honestly.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Well, all I can say is, is that you

know, this is a personnel problem, which in my opinion, should

have been handled internally, rather than being tried in the newspapers, and ended up being elevated to a Congressional hearing. I

don’t think it is our job as Congresspeople to deal with personnel

problems.

35

Mr. Proenza, you have got a problem down there that half your

employees say they don’t have any confidence in you, and if the

NOAA management, and particularly, the NOAA Administrator,

didn’t deal with the fact that you had an employee revolt on your

hands, for whatever reason it was, I think that they could have

been justifiably accused of being negligent, you know, to a ticking

time bomb that apparently has gone off.

Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Ms. Johnson for five minutes.

Diaz-Balart for five minutes.

MORE ON DIRECTOR PROENZA’S TENURE AT THE NATIONAL

HURRICANE CENTER

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you,

Mr. Proenza. As many of you know, I represent and live in the area

where the Hurricane Center is located, and I have actually gone

to—I know Mr. Proenza, and frankly, he is a very likable guy. I

have gotten to like him, but I do have some questions that I think

need to be answered.

Mr. Proenza, when you joined the Hurricane Center, and you

said in a lateral position, so it is not like you did it for the money,

I imagine one of the reasons you did it is because, frankly, as people were saying here, because of the great job that the people in

the Hurricane Center do, and also, the important responsibility

that they have.

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And obviously, you follow a group of very distinguished professionals. Max Mayfield, you mentioned, Jerry

Jarrell, Bob Sheets, Neil Frank. Some of the people that are in the

Hurricane Center worked with a lot of these people before.

I think we would all agree, everybody here on the dais and you,

that the people that work in the Hurricane Center like you, have

a very distinguished track record. I am a little worried, however,

when you answered a question from the Chairman, I believe, and

he asked you, and I am paraphrasing, but did you know that the

people that worked with you in the Hurricane Center had a problem, and you, in essence, said I didn’t think there was a problem

with the staff. And then, subsequent to that, half of the staff publicly writes a letter with some pretty strong statements. If I may

quote: ‘‘The Center needs a new Director, and with the heart of the

hurricane season fast approaching, urges the Department of Commerce to make this happen as quickly as possible.’’ How is it possible to have almost half of the people, including

your secretary, senior hurricane specialists, people that have an incredible track record, how is it possible that you would not know

that they had a problem, if they got to the point of, shortly afterwards, going out and writing a letter, not just saying they have got

issues, but asking for you to be removed? Is that, were you disconnected entirely with your staff?

Mr. PROENZA. Congressman, there is always a few that may resist some changes.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. This is half of them.

Mr. PROENZA. Let me just evolve what I would like to say.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Sure. Sure.

36

Mr. PROENZA. A few that may resist some changes. I know that

there were some that resisted some of the graphic changes, some

of the other changes associated with the research community, giving the leadership for part of the hurricane forecast research to the

Hurricane Research Division, and so forth, as part of a total one

NOAA type of approach, but nevertheless, I felt that those were

best.

But when the Team came in, what happened with that letter

being signed was after the Team came in. When the Team came

in, that was so extraordinarily disruptive. We had already had four

storms. We have had no problems in dealing with the four storms,

but it was extraordinarily disruptive. There was a surprise inspection. It was unprecedented. It triggered, because I heard some of

the concerns, it triggered a frenzy of concern for people’s careers

and the mission.

And I understand that, and I respect their concerns. They were

popped in with this investigation, and they were concerned, and of

course, at that time, after the investigation was started, and the

meeting that was held, that was called for by some of the leaders,

by some of the leaders of the group that wanted to do something.

That particular time is when they got the signatures together.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. But Mr. Proenza—— Mr. PROENZA. It was after the Team investigation began.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Okay. Now, again, because I have had contact

with these, they were constituents of mine. They have contacted

me as well, and some of them have said that a group of ten of them

initiated the call—— Mr. PROENZA. Okay.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART.—to your supervisors. They were the ones who

initiated the calls. Now, again, that is what they said. I don’t know

if that is factual or not, but here is the question. You said you did

not know there was a problem with the staff. I don’t know, you obviously had a problem, and maybe it was a problem with one or

five or ten, but you had a problem, because some of them initiated

this letter. But you said that you did not know there was a problem. I mean, it just, it is hard to believe that you would, did you

not know, or did you not think it was a big enough problem?

Mr. PROENZA. Perhaps they should have come to me.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Perhaps, but let me ask you this now, because

you have been a very successful supervisor. If you, in one of your

previous positions, have a group of highly respected professionals

wrote to you, and say our direct boss has real problems, and it is

making our job impossible, would you think, would you have not

done anything?

Mr. PROENZA. I would have——

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Or would you have tried to, in the best way

possible, tried to figure out what the problem was, and maybe sent

in a group of impartial people to find out if there was a problem?

Or would you have done absolutely nothing? Because this is my

problem. If you have people that you and I have both said, and everybody here respect, say that the Director of the Hurricane Center

must go, and if NOAA would have not done anything, if a group

of highly regarded professionals calls their supervisors, as they

have said they did on their own, and said our boss is a major probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
37

lem, and is not allowing us to do our job, which may not have been

the case, but that call took place, it seems like. If NOAA would

have not done anything, do you think that would have been responsible? And in your case, if that would have happened in your case,

would you have done nothing? Would that have been responsible?

Mr. PROENZA. No, I would have called the Supervisor, first thing.

I have had 45 such supervisors under my responsibility, and the

first thing I would have done is called the supervisor, explain what

I have heard is a problem, and explain to them what can we do

to help out. But I would have at least enlisted them first, to find

out what we could do at that level first.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Now, it seems to me that——

Chairman MILLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. We will

have a second round of questions.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Baird for five minutes.

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

Mr. BAIRD. I don’t particularly have questions. I just would suggest that as the Committee inquires about this, that we be cognizant that there are legal matters pertaining to employment

issues. I personally asked the gentleman to yield previously, because I think to ask a supervisor to identify personnel in a Congressional forum in the manner that was asked is really not fair,

and is not respectful of his certain legal obligations, and I think we

have to respect.

However, I really don’t have a dog in the fight, except that I

think there is politicization. If the gentleman is doing his best to

protect his country from hurricanes, I certainly worked in organizations, where sometimes, change is resisted. And I think it is problematic to say to a gentleman, whichever side you are on on this,

would you identify staff members on one side or the other in this

public forum, and I would urge this committee to refrain from that,

out of respect not only for the gentleman here, but for the employees themselves, and for legal issues that may pertain to employee

hiring and promotion and other decisions. And that was the point

I was trying to make earlier.

Yield back.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Feeney for five minutes.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Mr. FEENEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think the

gentleman’s comments are well taken. I mean, personnel decisions

are always tough. I was Speaker of the House, I had 900 employees, and whether you are managing two people or 900. The real

question for me is why Congress is involved in this one. The right

decision or wrong decision may have recently been made, but you

know, not long ago, I sat in a joint hearing of the House Science

Committee and our corollary on the Senate side, and we had a supervisor that was accused of being too popular for his bosses, and

so, we had to have a full joint hearing of the House and Senate.

Now, we have got one who is accused of being too unpopular with

some of his bosses and his employees, and so, we have got to have

38

a full hearing. We have got admirals and other leaders waiting in

the background. We are going to have a series of questions. And

so, what Congress is going to do is to micromanage personnel decisions. We have had close to 400 investigations in the first six

months, and I guess I should have expected, coming to work today,

that I would be busy, because I am running from here to the Judiciary Committee, where we are fighting with the White House over

personnel decisions. And so, as Congress, 535 of us, try to micromanage decisions that the Administration make, as we are trying

to micromanage, in some cases, the war, it is useful to remember

why we have a chief executive. Somebody has to call the runner out

or safe at home base, and you can’t have 15 umpires. You have got

to have one, and the President of the United States has to make

this decision.

And with all due respect, like Congressman Diaz-Balart said, you

may have been the greatest supervisor in the world, and maybe

just bad luck, bad timing, wrong place, wrong time, personality differences, for whatever reason, we have half your employees calling

for your removal because of lack of confidence. It may not be your

fault. They may have exercised misjudgment.

Secondly, we have got your supervisor saying that in order to restore confidence in the TPC, that we need to have your removal,

and finally, we have an independent investigative body saying the

same thing. And it may not be fair at all to you, sometimes, life

isn’t fair, but nobody has a right to a job, especially when it is an

appointment by the President of the United States.

MORE ON QUIKSCAT

One of the big things that seems to have generated this dispute,

other than personal issues and interpersonal skills, and who is

mad at whom, is the question over QuikSCAT, and you have made

statements to the press recently that suggest that without a very

rapid replacement of QuikSCAT, essentially, our ability to track

and forecast hurricane paths may be undermined. That is one of

the things that people claim they are concerned about. As recently

as May 22, you were quoted at a NOAA news conference as saying:

‘‘I am encouraged in those conversations that we have had, and discussions we have had, that the Nation will be moving ahead very

constructively in coming up with a design next-generation

QuikSCAT to replace the current, which is still operational

QuikSCAT that we have at this time.’’ You just told this committee that we are more prepared than

ever to track hurricanes. The dispersal of information gathering capabilities is much greater than when we started with QuikSCAT.

For example, aircraft reconnaissance, you started your career. Congressman Diaz-Balart and I recently crawled into one of the NOAA

Hurricane Hunters, so you are very familiar with the, every year,

we are getting better with that sort of equipment, observations

from ocean buoys, ships, Caribbean islands. We have got a European satellite, and in fact, NOAA is now investigating ways that

we can get the necessary information.

So, maybe your press skills aren’t the best. Lord knows, I have

made my mistakes with the press, but for whatever reason, there

is a great difference of opinion amongst the experts of how we need

39

to replace the capabilities of QuikSCAT, and some of your recent

comments have generated concern that we have undermined the

ability to protect Americans with the best information, and if I had

to suggest one thing that probably has led to this whole scenario,

it is the fact that you have made statements, your staff has tried

to either correct you or change those statements, and I will allow

you to respond to that, but I would just tell you, in my view, there

is only one umpire. That decision has been made. I think it has

been verified. It may not be your fault, but you are out.

And with that, I will let you respond to the QuikSCAT capabilities.

Mr. PROENZA. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, on the QuikSCAT program, the statement I made on

May the 22nd, that I was greatly encouraged, was based on Conrad

Lautenbacher, Administrator of NOAA, saying to the press that indeed, that particular project was gaining in the priorities at NOAA,

and was rising in its priority level, and I was encouraged to hear

that. And I also know that we were starting to have a preliminary

meeting with the NASA people, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, on

the concept of how a new instrument would be designed, and again,

I was encouraged. When you mention the aircraft data is valuable

to us. It is essential for us. We use it operationally all the time,

when we have a system.

QuikSCAT is quite different, in that that type of data, we need

QuikSCAT, too. It gives us the wind direction, the wind speed, at

the surface, but it gives us an 1,800 kilometer-wide swath of information across the ocean, and it covers 90 percent of the global

oceans. It is a key piece of data force.

Thank you, Congressman.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Klein.

DIRECTOR PROENZA’S COMMENTS ON QUIKSCAT

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Ehlers and Members of the Committee, if he

wants to go first.

Chairman MILLER. Well, actually, I think in the ordinary rotation of Majority and Minority. Mr. Ehlers, do you care?

Mr. KLEIN. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank you for being here today, and I think the

public is tired of hearing about the debate. I think the public is

much more interested in making sure that public safety is number

one. Those of us who live in Florida or any other part of the country where hurricanes are a factor, and we have lived through some

pretty substantial disasters and loss of life and property, and we

know that this Hurricane Center is very much an important part

of how we plan and deal with the preparation.

So, what was refreshing to me all along was the fact that you

brought something up, and it was a question of let us look into it.

Again, I don’t personally feel qualified to determine whether or not,

you know, you should be the manager or not. I think that if there

is a question, that needs to be looked into. I think this process is

fine, and let it play itself out, and I think none of us support or

endorse the idea of politicization of any kind of job. There is a job

to be done, and this is not any kind of insignificant job. This is a

very important public safety job.

40

Specifically, my question is this. When I went to the Hurricane

Center, as a matter of fact, I was there one of the days Congressman Diaz-Balart was down there, I had the chance to talk to the

hurricane forecasters, and to see QuikSCAT and how it is used. I

was told by the forecasters that, they showed me exactly how the

data is presented, that it is one of many tools. It is not the entire

tool. It is one of many tools that allows them to give a better forecast, allows them to shape the cone. We all know what that cone

looks like, and how we prepare for it. It allows them to establish,

hopefully, a timing element that is better, and knowing when landfall is met, and I saw that.

I read, since then, a number of comments that have come from

different people, Rick Knabb at the Hurricane Center, which said

when QuikSCAT, it will be like going back six years in tropical cyclone analysis. Other people in other positions have said the same

thing, and I guess my question is why is it that some of these people have retracted or retrenched or backed off on some of their comments? I look at these people as professionals. These are scientists.

These are career experts, and just tell me, you know, what your

sense of that is. I understand you stand by your positions, and I

just want to make sure that you still are in that same position, and

you still feel that QuikSCAT is an important part of the data that

is presented to the analysts.

Mr. PROENZA. Absolutely. It is an important part of the data that

is presented for the analysis of tropical oceans, over the tropical

oceans, no question about it. It is data that we vitally look at, and

we need to perform our jobs. We have found a way that we can

mitigate, temporarily, while QuikSCAT is designed, a new generation is designed. But at the same time, it does not equal the quality

of QuikSCAT.

Why people may change their minds, it could be any number of

things. It could be their perspective on an issue might have

changed, evolved. I would rather give them the benefit of the

doubt, and say that they went through an evolution in their thinking, even if they were in the scientific arena, and it happened.

FUTURE OF QUIKSCAT

Mr. KLEIN. And if QuikSCAT were to, and again, its beyond its

useful life, we all understand what that means, it could last another few years.

Mr. PROENZA. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. It could last another week, and since we are in the

middle of the hurricane season, the question I have been asking

and writing and orally all along to you and your managers is, what

is plan B, and I was told that obviously, we are trying to upgrade

the hurricane trackers, which I support. There is a European satellite that everybody has acknowledged that that doesn’t provide

the same level of precise, high definition data.

Mr. PROENZA. Correct.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you comment, tell me what is the difference,

if QuikSCAT goes down, what is the difference in the amount, the

quantity and quality of data, that we will have to work with?

Mr. PROENZA. For example, in the QuikSCAT data, we are getting an 1,800 kilometer swath of information. That is down to a

41

12.5 to 25 kilometer resolution. That means that often we will get

a point where we get that type of data coming in to us. On the

other hand, the ASCAT, and we will just use that comparison to

the coverage, the ASCAT has got two swaths of data that are about

just over 500 kilometers wide, and then, it has got a 700 kilometer

opening in the middle, where it has no data. So, the data is quite

interrupted, and it is not as consistent, and not as relevant to what

we need.

Mr. KLEIN. So, for the layperson, understanding what the technical description you are giving us, what does that mean in terms

of a forecast, for looking at the information presented? If

QuikSCAT is unavailable, and we have the European satellite and

the buoys and other things out there, how does this translate into

the accuracy, the timing, the cone, all those kinds of things that

we are all paying attention to?

Mr. PROENZA. The data is not as good, and accordingly, the analysis that we have will not be as good. A measure of that difference,

the one study that I can remember, and we will have a QuikSCAT

expert coming up here that you may ask that question of, but the

way I understand it, that if we subtract the QuikSCAT data from

the models that were run back in 2003, just to use some comparison, and see what the model forecast, with and without the data,

that we could see some degradation in the outcome of the model.

I think it would be best to ask the expert from that standpoint.

I stand on my position that QuikSCAT is a vitally important tool

for the analysis over the tropical oceans and the rest of the oceans,

for forecasting waves and warnings, winds, and at the same time,

in analyzing tropical storm potential.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, what I would take from all that is

that I think part of the process of what our committee should be

doing and the Committees of Congress, is considering what the

backup plans are, make sure we are supporting backup plans, and

thinking short-term and long-term in this process.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Ehlers, you are

recognized for five minutes.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I agree with

Mr. Sensenbrenner’s earlier comments, that we should not be involving ourselves in a personnel issue. There are procedures within

the administrative bench to handle this. We can provide our input,

but I think we should shift the emphasis away from the personnel

aspects.

I think what we should, as a Science Committee, concern ourselves with is the science involved, and particularly, on the issue

of QuikSCAT, but much beyond that, and to the whole picture of

the weather satellite program that we have. I am a scientist. I can

assure you that every scientist I know wants the maximum amount

of data, and wants the data to be as good as possible. And I understand your desire to that. At the same time, I have some disagreement with your statement that the data from QuikSCAT is both

important and vital. I would agree it is important. I do not agree

that it is vital. I think there are other ways of getting—from my

limited knowledge, I think there are other ways of getting the data

that are necessary. And perhaps not as good, but I just don’t think

the QuikSCAT is vital, but we should be concentrating our efforts

42

on developing better alternatives to QuikSCAT, and do that quickly.

And I am also very disappointed, and have been disappointed for

some time, with the difficulty we have had with the NPOESS satellite program at NOAA, with the huge cost overruns, and we have

spent endless hours trying to straighten that mess out. We got it

back on track, but the price we paid was to give up some of the

sensors on NPOESS, one of which would have provided some of the

data that QuikSCAT provides, and might have done it even better.

I argued against removing those sensors. I felt we should, if necessary, slow the project down a year or two, in order to get the additional money to put the other sensors back on. I lost that battle,

and I think if I had won, we might have had a better handle on

the data sooner than we are going to have now. Whether or not we

need to replace QuikSCAT is another issue. If we do, I certainly

hope that we do not simply run out and have another QuikSCAT

put up there. All the technology has improved. We can certainly do

much better than what we have done in the past, and even if it

takes a few more years to get it done, I think it is worth doing

that.

But I really think, Mr. Chairman, that the responsibility of this

committee has to be a detailed review of the entire weather satellite program, and establishing good priorities for us, as to where

the money should go. I am also concerned that we are not putting

much money into that, when you consider the amount of money the

Federal Government is putting into military satellites of various

types, is putting into the GPS system, is putting into the Shuttle

Program and so forth, I think we have given short shrift to NOAA

and to the weather satellite program. When, I just think, if you

look at the cost of one Katrina, that is far greater than the cost

of the satellites that we need to help predict things better, and help

to prevent things.

So, Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my speech. I don’t have any

questions for you, Mr. Proenza, but I do think we should concentrate on the science, not on the personality aspects, certainly

not on the personalities involved. And I would ask, Mr. Chairman,

that we have a complete review of our weather satellite program.

We have not done it justice in the past, and we have to do a better

job.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.

Ehlers. We will recognize, we will go for our second round of questioning at this point, and I will recognize——

Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, do we really need a second

round? We have got Admiral Lautenbacher waiting, and I think

that we have heard quite a bit. It seems to me that there is no real

value in an additional round here. Couldn’t we go right on to Admiral Lautenbacher?

Chairman MILLER. I have some questions I would like to ask.

Mr. INGLIS. Will you be around later to hear from Admiral

Lautenbacher?

Chairman MILLER. I will.

Mr. INGLIS. Okay. Will everybody be around? I hope so, because

we really—— Chairman MILLER. I am not sure everybody will.

43

Mr. INGLIS.—need the other side of the story.

Chairman MILLER. But I will be, and I have more questions that

I want to ask.

DIRECTOR PROENZA’S HISTORY

Chairman LAMPSON. I recognize myself for five minutes.

Mr. Proenza, I have a series of questions.

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. Here in only five minutes, so please, short.

Yes or nos will be fine. We will be able to get through this hopefully quickly.

Did you apply or seek, in any manner, the position of Director

of the Hurricane Center?

Mr. PROENZA. No.

Chairman LAMPSON. I understand it was D.L. Johnson who first

approached you about the possibility of your taking the position.

Mr. PROENZA. Yes.

Chairman LAMPSON. Who offered you the position, and when was

that made?

Mr. PROENZA. Conrad Lautenbacher, December 1, 2006.

Chairman LAMPSON. And you began as Director of the Center

when?

Mr. PROENZA. I entered on duty on January the 3rd. I was put

on paper as the Hurricane Center Director on the 7th of January.

Chairman LAMPSON. I understand that although the position

Hurricane Director is high profile and prestigious, it is technically

a demotion, as compared to your position as head of the Southern

Regional Office. Is that correct?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. I also understand that your position as

Southern Region Director attached to a position on the NOAA Corporate Board. Is that correct?

Mr. PROENZA. Correct.

Chairman LAMPSON. Accepting your current position means you

are no longer on the Corporate Board. Is that correct?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. Did you ruffle any feathers during your

time on the Board?

Mr. PROENZA. I held positions that I thought were important to

the delivery of the mission to the American people.

Chairman LAMPSON. I am going to take that as a yes. I understand the NOAA Corporate Board is a venue where NOAA-wide

policies are established, and decisions are made about the operation of the line offices, budgets, et cetera. Right?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PLAN

Chairman LAMPSON. NOAA was considering a change in the way

the local Weather Service offices were structured and worked together, the so-called concept of operations plan. CONOPS. Were

you a supporter of that plan?

Mr. PROENZA. No.

44

Chairman LAMPSON. Who were the advocates for the plan on the

Board?

Mr. PROENZA. The leadership, the very high leadership on the

Board.

Chairman LAMPSON. And that would include D.L. Johnson?

Mr. PROENZA. That is correct.

Chairman LAMPSON. Did you believe NOAA leadership supported

the CONOPS plan?

Mr. PROENZA. A mixed bag. Some support and not support.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mostly, more a yes than no.

Mr. PROENZA. More yes than no, absolutely.

Chairman LAMPSON. So, some people might see your departure

from the Corporate Board as, shall we say, a positive step toward

more harmony and tranquility on the Corporate Board? Yes?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes.

Chairman LAMPSON. This committee, I am pleased to say, was

instrumental in halting the plan. We had a GAO team investigate

and assess the plan for several years, and they produced two reports. The second one was released last month. They weren’t very

impressed with the planning effort, and the Admiral has told us

that the plan has been abandoned. Would you tell me some about

that plan, please?

Mr. PROENZA. The concept of operation?

Chairman LAMPSON. Yes.

Mr. PROENZA. Looked at the idea of trying to assign responsibilities at certain times to adjoining office, and allowing some of the

forecast offices around the country to shut down, to be less than

24/7 operations.

Chairman LAMPSON. And they closed it for that reason?

Mr. PROENZA. They would close, because the adjoining office

would be able to pick up the responsibility. The concern was that

emergency management would not be served on a 24 hour by seven

basis. In addition to that, there was concern that we could not open

up an office as fast as would be needed to apply the local expertise

of that particular county warning area, to the issue that might

have developed overnight.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Proenza. I will now recognize Chairman Miller for five minutes.

CRITICISMS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NATIONAL

HURRICANE CENTER

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It certainly is not the role of these two subcommittees to look at

personnel decisions, personnel matters. This appears to be something that goes beyond, well beyond office politics. The question

that I raised in my opening statement. I found out in the same way

most Americans found out about this controversy, by watching the

news a couple of weeks ago. These subcommittees had nothing to

do with this issue coming up in the national news. But when there

is an explosion like what we saw a couple weeks ago, it certainly

is appropriate for this subcommittee to find out what has been

going on, what on Earth happened.

One unchallenged assumption in a lot of the questioning has

been, and I don’t want to ruffle your feathers, or those who work

45

at the Center, has been that this Center does the best work. I have

talked to research scientists, I don’t want to name names in this

setting. Mr. Baird would call me down for that. But the assumption

that the forecasts of the Hurricane Center are really, really good,

are the best, is not what they say at all. In fact, they say the forecasts are so bad, particularly forecasts of inland flooding, and the

vast majority of people who die now from hurricanes die from inland flooding. The forecasts of intensification, whether hurricanes

are going to strengthen or weaken, those are really bad. Virtually

every research university in the country that does atmospheric research, that does meteorological research, disregards the Hurricane

Center’s forecasts. They take the raw data, they run their own forecasts with their own models, which are always better, always more

accurate.

So, I am not sure that I think it is a bad thing that someone

come into that Center and look at whether that Center is doing as

good a job as it should, and whether it is using the best science

that it should be doing. Mr. Proenza, have you heard those criticisms that I just repeated?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. Okay.

Mr. PROENZA. And it was my objective to address those. The

growing challenges of the future, as far as the population centers,

and the growing populations along the coastline, was an absolutely

compelling argument why we had to get more accurate at forecasting intensity changes. I needed to bring all of the forecast capabilities together with the research capabilities of our organization

and the academic community together to address that. Absolutely.

In fact, intensity forecasts had shown very little improvement over

many years.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Your efforts to try to bring together, to

try to meld research and operations, is that, were those efforts addressed to get at the failings of the forecasts of the Hurricane Center?

Mr. PROENZA. Yes, sir. We were trying.

Chairman MILLER. Well, I think, by comparison to FEMA, yes,

the Hurricane Center is top notch. If we compare it to the kind of

emergency management in Katrina, at least we knew there was a

hurricane coming, but from all that I have heard from people who

know this stuff know, the work of the Hurricane Center is not as

good as it should be. It could be better right now, if it paid closer

attention to the science, the best science that is out there, and research universities all across the country are doing better forecasting than the Hurricane Center.

Mr. PROENZA. And yes, Congressman, but I have to say we have

to bring the very best science and tools to the Hurricane Center for

them to get better at what they do. They are top notch group of

professionals doing the best job they can with the information and

the tools that they have.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Inglis, would you like to ask a question

or a comment? You are recognized for five minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. I won’t use that, except to respond to Mr. Miller that

as I understand it, the Hurricane Forecasting Center accurately

46

predicted Katrina’s path, and gave warnings three days in advance

of that storm hitting New Orleans. Pretty impressive work.

Mr. PROENZA. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. INGLIS. By very dedicated people.

Mr. PROENZA. Top notch.

Mr. INGLIS. That work very hard to accomplish the objectives of

the American people. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Mr. Diaz-Balart, you are recognized.

HURRICANE CENTER PERSONNEL

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to

thank Mr. Klein, Congressman Klein, for trying to get us focused

on the one thing that we do do in this committee, which is science,

and not personnel.

Look, it is pretty obvious that despite what I just heard from Mr.

Miller that the Hurricane Center is horrible, and I beg to differ.

And I don’t know how many times he has been there, by the way,

maybe many, and maybe he has met the incredible men and

women in the Hurricane Center that Mr. Proenza says are incredible, and that I know are incredible. So, I just, despite that, I think

everybody here is well-intentioned. I think Mr. Proenza is a decent,

good, professional guy with a great track record.

Nobody can claim that he doesn’t have a great track record, and

I think the people in the Hurricane Center are the same thing. Unfortunately, and I don’t want to, pardon the pun, but unfortunately,

Mr. Proenza has become the lightning rod, from within the staff in

the Hurricane Center and others. And that is unfortunate, and that

has created a problem. I don’t think Mr. Proenza is at fault. I don’t

think the people at the Hurricane Center are at fault. Sometimes,

these things happen, and it is unfortunate. Unfortunately, it has

created a problem.

Now, we shouldn’t be talking about personnel here, because Congress doesn’t do personnel, and even if we decided that Mr.

Proenza is the person to be there, we can’t really do anything about

it anyway, so we are kind of just talking for the sake of talking.

So, I do want to get back to, as Mr. Klein said, the science.

HURRICANE CENTER SCIENCE AND QUIKSCAT

And I do have one piece of good news for Congressman Klein. A

number of us, including Chairman Lampson, Rep. Melancon, and

myself, met with the Admiral, met with the NASA Administrator,

Mr. Griffin. Specifically about this satellite issue, and, because we

were concerned that there was no plan. And I can’t speak for the

other two gentlemen, but I can speak for myself. I am not satisfied

that it has taken this long to come up with a decision as to what

has to go up, but I think we are all, at least I was satisfied, that

at least there is a plan to, and I guess by January, they are supposed to get back us, Mr. Chairman. They are supposed to get back

to NOAA and NASA and everybody else as to what exactly is the

right satellite that has to go up, in order to make sure that we

have not only QuikSCAT but actually, a much better version of it.

So, and by the way, I think Mr. Proenza has got to be given a

lot of credit for bringing up this issue, whether you agree with him

47

that it is less important or more important, the reality, however,

is that now, at least, there is a plan, and I feel good about that.

And I think that is what we, frankly, need to be talking about, because we keep talking about personnel issues, and the reality is,

you know, are we going to have, then, the 20 plus people that don’t

like Mr. Proenza for good reasons or bad, and the 20 plus people

that do like Mr. Proenza for good reason or bad, to come and testify

as well?

You know, we are kind of getting a little trivial here. Those are

important issues. I think we need to get into the science, and when

we get into the science, I think there are much better questions to

ask, and I wish we would kind of focus on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PROENZA. Thank you, Congressman.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I recognize Mr.

Klein.

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And listen, there is a reason, in my view, for Congress to have

oversight, and make sure there is accountability in our systems,

and sometimes, appointments are good, and sometimes, they are

not. We all don’t like, the public doesn’t like cover-ups. The public

does like when someone is straightforward and open and honest,

and brings something forward.

You know, what happens from this point on is going to play itself

out, but most importantly, what I appreciate is Mr. Proenza’s

bringing this issue forward. And I can’t address what happened inside the office there, but I really believe that this Congress today,

and the meetings that you have had, and the meetings I have had

with the Air Force Reserve and with the NOAA representatives,

and forcing people to come forward, and say what is plan B, because America wants to know what plan B is.

If QuikSCAT goes down, and it is even 10 percent of the information that is provided for hurricane forecasting, that is real information. And Mr. Ehlers said it correctly, scientists want to know that

they have got everything on the table to figure that out.

I will tell you also, I participated in the Senate hearing on

QuikSCAT about a couple weeks ago, that Senator Nelson and others participated in, and another fact that we haven’t even brought

up today, is there is no question whatsoever that QuikSCAT has

everything to do with marine forecasting. Nobody has even questioned that. So, if you have got large vessels, small vessels, anywhere around the world, the fact that, you know, the service that

gets this information, QuikSCAT, is providing valuable information

to our shipping, our recreational, all the safety factors that go into

commerce and safety of individuals on the water, QuikSCAT has

a big role. So, even if people are questioning whether it has the

same level of impact on landfall, there is no question that on the

marine side, it does have a big impact.

So, there is a reason to have this conversation. There is definitely

a reason to make sure that our colleagues at NOAA and the National Hurricane Center have the tools, that they are doing whatever they can do to make sure that we are properly protected, and

I do give credit for this conversation coming forward to this point,

and that we stay on top of this, as has been suggested by all the

48

Members of this committee, to make sure that we understand the

total comprehensive picture on our weather satellites and, of

course, QuikSCAT, and anything else that gives us this data to

help best prepare Americans for any kind of—— Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Will the gentleman yield for a few seconds?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. I just want to make sure that, because you have been in the Hurricane Center, like I have, and I

just want to make sure that we don’t scare the American people.

I think you would agree with me that they do an incredible job. Obviously, we need to do everything we can in our power, so that they

have all the technology and the funding, but I just want to make

sure that we don’t scare the American people, because I have heard

some things here today on this dais. Mr. Miller, I think said something which I think was unfortunate. I think you would agree with

me that they do a heck of a job, and they are really good, dedicated

people that are good at what they do.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond. The answer is, of

course. The personnel are highly qualified scientists. The question

that we are grappling with today is making sure that they have all

the tools necessary to get us even better.

I think Mr. Miller’s point is well taken. Can they do better? Can

that cone get narrower? Can the prediction of the landfall get tighter? You bet, and we have made progress over time. But we can do

more, and we should do more. That doesn’t mean America should

be concerned today that we don’t have the necessary good people

in place that are doing it, but this Congress needs to back up the

National Weather Service and the Hurricane Center, and make

sure that they have got what they need to best protect Americans.

Chairman MILLER. I think we are going to thank you very much,

Mr. Proenza——

Mr. PROENZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER.—for coming, and for your comments. The

panel, I mean the Committee, Committees, for their questions and

comments. We will take a short break, and convene our next panel

of witnesses.

Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Panel II

Chairman LAMPSON. I call this meeting of our two subcommittees, Energy and Environment and Investigations and Oversight,

back to order. Witnesses have taken their seats. I will introduce

our panel at this time.

Dr. Robert Atlas is the Director of the Atlantic Oceanographic

and Meteorological Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration. Dr. Atlas’ laboratory is part of the Hurricane Research Division, which works with the Tropical Prediction Center

to improve tools and techniques in hurricane forecasting.

Mr. Don McKinnon is the Director of the Jones County Emergency Management Agency, Jones County, Mississippi. Mr.

McKinnon addresses the weather services the National Weather

Service provides to emergency management offices, and he also

49

worked with Mr. Proenza during his service as Director of the

Weather Service Southern Regional Office.

Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of Security

and Emergency Management is testifying on behalf of the Emergency Management Association of Texas, and he will discuss the

service provided to the emergency management community in

Texas by the National Weather Service, by the Southern Region

Office during the period of Mr. Proenza’s tenure as its Director.

As our witnesses, again, should know, spoken testimony is limited to five minutes. I am going to try to keep you on that, so if

you will pay close attention to it, please, I would appreciate it.

And after which, the Members of the Committee will each have

five minutes to ask their questions, and it is also the practice of

the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do you have any

objections to being sworn in?

You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Is anyone

represented by counsel at today’s hearing?

Then, if you will please stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn]

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT M. ATLAS, DIRECTOR, ATLANTIC

OCEANOGRAPHIC AND METEOROLOGICAL LABORATORY,

OFFICE OF OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Dr. ATLAS. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, and Members

of the Committee, as mentioned, I am Bob Atlas. I am the Director

of NOAA’s Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory

in Miami.

At my laboratory, we do open ocean and coastal ocean research.

We do research on climate, and we have as one of our divisions,

within my laboratory, the Hurricane Research Division of NOAA.

Prior to joining NOAA, I was a NASA scientist for 32 years. I

have helped pioneer many of the satellite systems that are in use

today, and one of them being QuikSCAT, but many others, and I

was a member of the team that developed QuikSCAT, and am still

a member of the team working on the future of such measurements.

The QuikSCAT, as mentioned, is a NASA satellite. It is the third

in a string of satellites that do ocean surface wind, direction and

speed. The first satellite lasted three months. The second satellite

lasted 10 months, and QuikSCAT has been there now for over

seven years. It is a major success, not only in its longevity, but in

the quality of the data that it produces under most atmospheric

conditions, and also, in the amount of data that it provides.

Its advantages are that it has higher resolution than any of the

other datasets available. The normal resolution is 12.5 kilometers

between observations. This is twice as good as the European

ASCAT and twice as good as any of the preceding satellites. And

it is capable, under research conditions, or limited operations, to do

even double that resolution, 6.5 kilometers. It also has disadvantages. The disadvantage is that it does not see very well through

heavy rain, so in heavy rain situations, especially where the wind

isn’t strong, it cannot predict wind direction accurately, and the

50

1 References to the studies can be found on p. 54.

data is not as high quality in heavy rain, high wind situations,

such as exist within hurricanes.

QuikSCAT is used for many applications. It is used in research

of the atmosphere, ocean, and climate. It is now considered an essential climate monitoring dataset. It is used for ocean prediction,

for driving ocean models, and it is used in both numerical weather

prediction and operational prediction. I want to say first about

operational prediction and the Ocean Prediction Center of NOAA,

the Ocean Prediction Center of NOAA forecasts for ships at sea

and other maritime interests.

I asked forecasters at the Ocean Prediction Center if they are

using QuikSCAT many years ago, and they said we depend upon

it. I said how would you rate it. They said it was the most valuable

dataset they had. I heard that from three forecasters of the Ocean

Prediction Center, and I also heard from them that they believe

this data is contributing to saving lives, that ships, some ships are

not sinking in bad weather, and some sailors are not drowning in

bad weather, because we have these kinds of measurements.

For hurricane prediction, it is used directly by the forecasters at

the Tropical Prediction Center and—slash—National Hurricane

Center, and its primary use is for tropical analysis. It enables them

to define what we call the wind radii, the aerial extent of tropical

storm force winds. This is a very useful application of the data. It

also will sometimes show that a storm, a tropical depression, has

formed. It will show the circulation within the winds, on occasion,

before geostationary satellites show it in the clouds.

So, from those two perspectives, it is an extremely valuable instrument, but it is only one of the tools that the Hurricane Center

forecasters use. They have heavy reliance upon the reconnaissance

aircraft, and upon ground-based radar, ships’ buoys, and the numerical models. And the numerical models is the other use of

QuikSCAT that affects hurricane forecasts, and in fact, forecasts

everywhere on the globe.

There are three studies defining what the impact of QuikSCAT

is, one by the Joint Center for Satellite Data Assimilation,1 which

showed a 10 percent degradation at 48 hours, and a 16 percent

degradation at 72 hours, if this data wasn’t there. This study is a

rigorous, scientifically correct study. It is limited in its sample size.

There is a Navy study that has conflicting results, and the authors

of that study have stated that it applies only to the Navy model,

and in fact, the Navy model does not use QuikSCAT as effectively,

because they do something, and they create what is called a bogus

or synthetic hurricane vortex within their analysis. The QuikSCAT

then has to compete with that data, and it is not able to make as

much of an impact.

To sum up, QuikSCAT is an extremely important tool. We need

not another clone of QuikSCAT, but we need a next generation system that will enable us to make the improvements to hurricane

prediction that the Nation deserves, and NOAA is working actively

to pursue both a follow-on to QuikSCAT and has an effective mitigation plan now to deal with a possible demise of QuikSCAT.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Atlas follows:]

51

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. ATLAS

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Dr. Robert Atlas, Director

of the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory in the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR). OAR is a line office of the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, within the Department of Commerce (DOC).

NOAA’s Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane

Research Division

NOAA’s Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory (AOML) is located

in Miami, Florida and specializes in hurricanes and open and coastal ocean research. Scientists at AOML study the relationship between the ocean and atmosphere by conducting research in both near-shore and open ocean environments. This

research includes the dynamics of the ocean, its interaction with the atmosphere,

and its role in climate change. AOML’s research improves the understanding and

prediction of hurricane track and intensity change, and the impacts from wind,

storm surge, waves, and rain. Key to this work is the annual hurricane field program supported by the NOAA Aircraft Operations Center research/reconnaissance

aircraft. AOML scientists cooperate with other federal, State, and local authorities

to maximize research expertise for use in economically and environmentally important projects. AOML also provides and interprets oceanographic data collected via

ships, satellites, aircraft, drifting buoys and floats, and conducts research relevant

to annual-to-decadal climate change, coastal ecosystems and hurricanes.

Within the Hurricane Research Division (HRD) at AOML, scientists conduct research into hurricanes and related tropical weather phenomena, using theoretical

studies, computer models, and an annual field program employing NOAA hurricane

research aircraft. This research has resulted in a deeper, scientific understanding

and in numerous practical applications which have improved forecasts. HRD employs meteorologists, computer scientists, and other professionals, who collaborate

with other governmental and academic scientists worldwide in this on going effort

to advanced scientific knowledge and increase public safety. HRD coordinates parts

of its programs with other NOAA organizations, e.g., the Aircraft Operations Center

and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction, in particular the Environmental Modeling Center and the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane

Center (NHC).

NOAA’s Hurricane Forecasting

NOAA strives to improve the reliability, accuracy, and timeliness of our predictions of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes, to help society cope with these

high impact events. Over the last 15 years, hurricane track forecast errors have decreased by 50 percent, largely due to advances in hurricane modeling, an increased

understanding of hurricane dynamics, improvements in computing and technology,

and increased observations in both the region around the hurricane and in other

data sparse regions. Today’s five-day forecasts of a hurricane track are as accurate

as three-day predictions were 20 years ago. Hurricane predictions are better today

than they have ever been and will continue to improve in the future.

To help guide future research efforts and improvements, NOAA requested that

the NOAA Science Advisory Board commission a Hurricane Intensity Research

Working Group to provide recommendations to the agency on the direction of hurricane intensity research. The Working Group transmitted its final report to the Advisory Board in October 2006 (http://www.sab.noaa.gov/reports/reports.html). The

Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research released

a report in February 2007, Interagency Strategic Research Plan for Tropical Cyclones: The Way Ahead, to provide a strategy for continuing to improve the effectiveness of operational forecasts and warnings through strategic coordination and increased collaboration among the major players in the operational and R&D communities (http://www.ofcm.gov/p36-isrtc/fcm-p36.htm). Both of these reports call for

accelerated research investments and a deliberate focus on moving research results

to operations. In response, NOAA has created a Hurricane Forecast Improvement

Project Team to develop a unified approach to define and accelerate hurricane forecast improvements over the next ten years. Objectives will be focused on improved

tropical cyclone forecasting (intensity, track, precipitation, and uncertainty forecasts), storm surge forecasts, flooding forecasts, and information and tools to support community and emergency planning.

NOAA Hurricane Observations

Before I talk about the QuikSCAT satellite, I wanted to explain the systems

NOAA uses to monitor hurricanes. Over the open oceans, continual images from our

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GOES satellites are the first reliable indicators of any storms or inclement weather.

GOES provides near real-time critical data to help our forecasters determine a

storms location, size, intensity, and movement. These satellites are so important we

keep a spare in orbit. As tropical systems come closer to land, information from

NOAA and Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft and ocean buoys provide real time

direct measurements of the storm. Within 200 miles of the coast, ground-based radars are used to track the storm. Computer models used to predict storm track and

intensity require extensive amounts of data, which are mostly provided by NOAA

and various National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), DOD polar

satellites, and where appropriate foreign environmental satellites. Together these

systems provide the forecasters with layers of information critical to helping them

make their forecast.

What is QuikSCAT?

QuikSCAT is a NASA satellite that has demonstrated the ability to measure

ocean wind speed and direction from space with unprecedented coverage. QuikSCAT

data is used for many applications, including climate monitoring, ocean research

and weather prediction. It can be used to produce improved forecasts of hurricanes

in three ways: its direct use by forecasters, its use as initial conditions for numerical

weather prediction models, and its use as validation data in the development of advanced ‘‘next generation’’ weather prediction models. According to the forecasters at

the National Hurricane Center, ‘‘QuikSCAT has become an important tool, especially for estimating the track, intensity and size of tropical and other strong marine

storms.’’ In most cases, however, QuikSCAT has little demonstrated impact on hurricane intensity forecasts. In hurricanes, winds above 75 miles per hour typically

occur over an area that is smaller than the QuikSCAT measurement resolution and

are usually associated with heavy rain events. Thus QuikSCAT usually cannot distinguish winds above 75 miles per hour in a hurricane due to its lower than desired

resolution and signal attenuation in heavy rain. However, QuikSCAT can distinguish winds above 90 miles per hour in extra-tropical cyclones where strong winds

exist over larger regions of the ocean surface. In addition, until very recently, most

numerical models did not have sufficient resolution to represent key processes leading to rapid intensity changes or the ability to assimilate much of the detailed information contained in the QuikSCAT observations.

QuikSCAT is well past its design life. NASA says QuikSCAT appears healthy and

has fuel to last until 2011. It is not possible to predict how long QuikSCAT will continue to provide data. It could last several more years or cease to provide observations very quickly.

There are three studies that address the potential degradation to computer hurricane forecasts that might result from the loss of QuikSCAT. Each of these studies

has limitations that prevent definitive conclusions, and additional studies are needed. In my opinion, the preponderance of evidence from the three studies indicates

that computer model forecasts of landfalling hurricanes, especially in the 2–5-day

time range, could be degraded if we do not mitigate the loss effectively. Forecasters

at the NHC are able to improve upon the computer forecasts, so that the potential

degradation can be diminished. This is especially true as the storms are approaching land in the shorter time ranges. In addition, NOAA has recently developed an

effective mitigation plan that would make substantial use of other satellites as well

as enhanced aircraft observations.

What are the options to replace QuikSCAT data?

If QuikSCAT were to fail today, the NHC would still receive ocean wind speed

and direction data from space. NOAA is now receiving data from a new instrument

aboard a European satellite, called ASCAT—which has similar technology to

QuikSCAT. ASCAT will not provide the same quality data as QuikSCAT, especially

in terms of coverage and resolution. NOAA is rapidly developing procedures for inserting the data into models and using the visual display of these data in forecasting. We are also examining how to increase the use of our hurricane hunter aircraft through more flight hours and outfitting the planes with more advanced technologies. In addition, we are researching the feasibility of placing scatterometers on

Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

In June 2006, NOAA held a workshop at the National Hurricane Center to discuss the requirements for ocean wind speed and direction. Hurricane forecasters, researchers, and numerical modelers all prefer a next generation QuikSCAT, which

they hope would be able to meet the new requirements. Such a satellite would be

able to provide observations of ocean surface wind that would greatly enhance ocean

surface wind measurements for hurricane intensity forecasting, as well as for

weather, ocean and climate applications. In January 2007, Vice Admiral

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Lautenbacher, the head of NOAA, was briefed on the conclusions of the workshop

and the need to replace QuikSCAT data. After receiving our fiscal year 2007 appropriations, NOAA initiated a study with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which

built the original QuikSCAT, to examine replacement options. Those studies are due

in January 2008 and from these studies, we will determine the best way to provide

ocean surface wind speed and direction to forecasters.

Details on QuikSCAT

1. We now believe that the quality of ocean surface vector wind retrievals in storms

at sea using any passive sensor (such as WindSat, or the Microwave Imager/

Sounder on the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) ) will never be comparable to those retrieved using an active sensor such as QuikSCAT. NPOESS will not provide an acceptable solution for ocean

surface vector winds retrievals, but it will provide many other types of useful

data and imagery.

2. QuikSCAT has provided many benefits but also has significant limitations. While

it provides important additional data for estimating the intensity and size of

tropical storms and other strong marine storms, it cannot be used for measuring

the intensity of most hurricanes.

3. Data from any non-satellite platform could never replicate the coverage provided

by a satellite. Therefore, no non-satellite option exists to replace QuikSCAT for

wide-area measurements of ocean surface vector winds. Satellites are complementary to other data sources, such as aircraft and buoys, which have their

own strengths and limitations. Satellites, aircraft, and surface-based observations

are all critical components of the Nation’s weather monitoring and forecasting

enterprise.

4. Data from the European ASCAT satellite instrument are just now becoming

available to National Weather Service (NWS) forecasters. ASCAT is not a replacement for QuikSCAT, since it provides only about 60 percent of the coverage

and only about half the resolution of QuikSCAT. It will, however, provide partial

mitigation against the eventual loss of QuikSCAT, and it will be fully evaluated

for maximum possible use by NWS operational forecasters and models.

5. Since even QuikSCAT data do not meet NOAA operational requirements for

ocean surface vector winds, serious consideration should be given to a sustained,

more capable, next-generation satellite program for ocean surface vector winds

using already existing technologies. A next-generation capability is needed to

more accurately measure the strength and size of hurricanes and other intense

marine storms, since aircraft data are not always available and only cover a

small portion of the storm circulation. Such a capability would enhance operational NWS forecasts of many weather systems for the United States, and it

would benefit research on the intensity of hurricanes and other marine storms

that occur worldwide.

6. NOAA and NASA are working together during the next several months to examine the costs and benefits of options for what kind of satellite should replace

QuikSCAT: a QuikSCAT copy, or a next-generation sensor. NOAA and NASA engineers will work directly with NWS operational forecasters during this study to

provide recommendations by early 2008 on next steps for an ocean surface vector

winds mission to replace QuikSCAT.

7. Track forecasts for landfalling storms have the added benefit of the national and

international rawinsonde network (sensors to obtain detailed atmospheric profiles

of wind, temperature, and dewpoint information), and from aircraft reconnaissance flights into and around the approaching hurricane. With these data, if

QuikSCAT would fail, the impact on the track forecasts of hurricanes as they approach land would on average be smaller than for forecasts for storms in the

open ocean. Studies on landfalling storms are insufficient to quantify the impacts. However, available experiments show that observations far away from the

location of hurricanes can have a significant impact on model track forecasts. As

such, NOAA’s mitigation plan will attempt to minimize any degradation that

might otherwise occur.

Current Research Studies of QuikSCAT in Models

Studies have shown either negligible or slightly positive impacts of QuikSCAT observations on track. The major drawback of these studies is the small number of

cases examined. A more systematic study using cases from a number of seasons

54

should be performed to clarify the impact. To date there are no studies of the impact

of QuikSCAT data on tropical cyclone intensity forecasts. The main problem is that

until this season models that forecast tropical cyclone intensity relied only upon

coarse resolution global data assimilation system for their initial conditions. The impact on intensity must be tested in the future using very high resolution global and

regional models, where inner core observations can be assimilated.

One study using the NOAA global data assimilation system and global forecast

system tested the impact of QuikSCAT on track forecasts from two months of Atlantic storms in 2003 (Zapotocny et al., 2007). The study, conducted at the NOAA/

NASA/DOD Joint Center for Satellite Data Assimilation, examined storms in August-September 2003 and showed that a degradation in the 48 hour track forecasts

of 10 percent and in the 72 hour track forecast of 16 percent when QuikSCAT was

removed. A drawback of this study was the number of cases (only 25 cases at 48

hours and 19 cases at 72 hours). Nevertheless, this study provides the best available

estimate of the degradation of model track forecasts that might result from a

QuikSCAT failure.

A second study used the Navy Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System

and data assimilation system from two months in the 2004 Atlantic hurricane season (Goerss and Hogan, 2006). This study, using 8–10 times as many cases as the

previous one, found little significant improvement in the track forecasts due to the

inclusion of QuikSCAT observations of ocean surface vector winds beyond that at

24 hours, which showed a three percent improvement (two percent improvement at

48 hours, and slight degradation at 72–120 hours. In my opinion, the impact of

QuikSCAT data in this experiment was limited by the way in which the data was

assimilated, and the results should apply only the Navy model used in the experiment.

A third study by NASA and NOAA (Atlas et al., 2005) using the NCEP forecast

system for two months of forecasts in 1999 showed a meaningful positive impact of

QuikSCAT. In one case (Hurricane Cindy, 1999) the 60-hour forecast intensity and

location with QuikSCAT observations of ocean surface vector winds was more accurate than the 24-hour forecast without them. This study should be considered in the

context of two decades of numerical experiments with NASA models that have consistently shown improved predictions of storms over the oceans (Atlas et al., 2001).

In summary, QuikSCAT provides vital data for a variety of important applications, including weather prediction for ships at sea, hurricane forecasting, atmospheric and oceanic research, and climate monitoring. NOAA has developed an effective mitigation plan that should reduce the impact of a QuikSCAT failure on hurricane forecasting while working with NASA to evaluate an advanced replacement for

QuikSCAT.

LITERATURE CITED

Atlas, R., R.N. Hoffman, S.M. Leidner, J. Sienkiewicz, T.-W. Yu, S.C. Bloom, E.

Brin, J. Ardizzone, J. Terry, D. Bungato, and J.C. Jusem, (2001) The effects of

marine winds from scatterometer data on weather analysis and forecasting.

Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society. 82(9):1965–1990.

Atlas, Robert, Arthur Y. Hou and Oreste Reale. (2005) Application of SeaWinds

scatterometer and TMI–SSM/I rain rates to hurricane analysis and forecasting.

ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing. 59(4):233–243.

Goerss, J. and T. Hogan. (2006) Impact of satellite observations and forecast model

improvements on tropical cyclone track forecasts. 27th AMS Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology, Paper P5.2, available online from http://

ams.confex.com/ams/27Hurricanes/techprogram/paper107291

Zapotocny, T.H., J.A. Jung, J.F. LeMarshall, and R.E. Treadon. (2007) A Two Season Impact Study of Four Satellite Data Types and Rawinsonde Data in the

NCEP Global Data Assimilation System. Submitted for publication in Weather

and Forecasting (available upon request from James Jung, Jim.Jung@noaa.gov)

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBERT M. ATLAS

Dr. Robert Atlas is the former Chief Meteorologist at NASA’s Goddard Space

Flight Center (GSFC), and is currently the Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory in Miami, Fla. Some of the areas he focuses his current research on include

the prediction, movement and strengthening of hurricanes. Atlas has worked with

both satellite data and computer models as a means to study these hurricane behaviors. He is also recognized world-wide as an expert on satellite surface wind data

55

and performed the original research that demonstrated the use of these data to improve weather prediction.

Robert Atlas received his Ph.D. in Meteorology and Oceanography in 1976 from

New York University. Prior to receiving the doctorate, he was a weather forecaster

in the U.S. Air Force where he maintained greater than 95 percent forecast accuracy. He was also a summer intern at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and an instructor of physics for the State University of New York

(SUNY).

From 1976 to 1978, Dr. Atlas was a National Research Council Research Associate at NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, New York, an Assistant Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science for SUNY and Chief Consulting Meteorologist for the ABC television network.

In 1978, Dr. Atlas joined NASA as a research scientist. He served as head of the

NASA Data Assimilation Office from 1998–2003, and as Chief meteorologist at

NASA GSFC from 2003–2005. During this time, he was also an Adjunct Professor

of meteorology, teaching weather prediction to both experienced and inexperienced

weather forecasters.

Dr. Atlas has performed research to assess and improve the impact of satellite

temperature sounding and wind data since 1973. He was the first person to demonstrate the beneficial impact of quantitative satellite data on weather prediction,

for both satellite temperature soundings and satellite surface winds.

He served as a member of the Satellite Surface Stress Working Group, the NASA

Scatterometer (NSCAT) Science Team, the ERS Science Team, the SeaWinds Satellite Team and the Working Group for Space-based Laser Winds. He is also a member of the Scientific Steering Group for GEWEX (the Global Energy and Water

Cycle Experiment), Chairman of the U.S. World Ocean Circulation Experiment

(WOCE) Advisory Group for model-based air-sea fluxes, and is a past member of the

Council of the American Meteorological Society.

From 1974–1976, he developed a global upper-ocean model and studied oceanic response to atmospheric wind forcing as well as large-scale atmospheric response to

sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies (unusual events). In more recent years, his

research concentrated on the role of how the air and sea interacts in the development of cyclones, the role of soil moisture and unusual SST events in the initiation,

maintenance and decay of prolonged heat waves and drought, and most recently on

the modeling and prediction of hurricane formation, movement and intensification.

Atlas was one of the principal investigators of a new hurricane computer model

called the ‘‘Finite Volume General Circulation Model’’ (fvGCM), being run at NASA’s

GSFC and Ames Research Center, Moffitt Field, Calif. The model provides a more

realistic representation of hurricanes and their behaviors, which is enhancing the

state of hurricane forecasting.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Dr. Atlas. Mr. McKinnon, please

proceed for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD L. MCKINNON, DIRECTOR, JONES

COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI

Mr. MCKINNON. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking

Member Inglis, and Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to provide testimony regarding the

service provided by the National Weather Service’s Southern Region during Mr. Proenza’s tenure.

I am Don McKinnon, Director of the Jones County Emergency

Management Agency in Laurel, Mississippi. I am representing the

Mississippi Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association,

which has 300 members across all 82 counties of the State of Mississippi. I have worked in the Emergency Management Agency in

Jones County for 26 years. I have been the Director since 2001.

Current, accurate, and timely weather information plays a significant role in all weather events, as well as other incidents. The

accessibility and the willingness of the National Weather Service to

56

help emergency management are critical in our incident action

plans, as we prepare for and respond to these incidents.

Over the past six years, I have had the opportunity to work with

the Southern Region Director, Mr. Bill Proenza, on many occasions.

At conferences and other meetings, Mr. Proenza would always solicit comments from the emergency managers, and took their concerns to heart. Mr. Proenza convinced me that the National Weather Service could be more than a reactive weather source, and could,

in fact, be a proactive weather resource in the emergency management community.

Mr. Proenza encouraged the local weather offices to involve

emergency managers in their outreach activities. He fostered an

environment within the Southern Region that allowed his personnel to work with and meet the needs of the customers that they

served. Mississippi emergency managers could give you many examples of how Mr. Proenza made a difference in their ability to

protect their citizens. I have listed a few in my written statement.

The Warning Coordinating Meteorologist in San Angelo, Texas

came up with the Turn Around, Don’t Drown Program. Mr.

Proenza recognized the benefit the program could have on saving

lives, and brought the program to the emergency management community. Once he sold the emergency managers on the program, he

promoted it across the United States. The National Weather Service office in Jackson, Mississippi partnered with the Mississippi

Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association to develop

an eight-hour training course geared toward the emergency management community that included the National Weather Service offices in Slidell, Louisiana, Memphis, Tennessee, and Mobile, Alabama. Now, the training is offered annually and available to emergency management and the media.

Without Mr. Proenza to institute changes and growth in the

Southern Region, we may not have had the Radar Integrated Display and Geospatial Elements, or RIDGE System, which provides

area-specific warning information in the form of graphic polygons

and text messages. This allows emergency management to focus on

specific areas of the county, and makes our decision-making process much quicker and more reliable. Now, we do not have to make

broad advisories, but we can focus on a specified area. Mr. Proenza

recognized our need, and worked with his staff to get us a better

tool. The end result is saving lives and property.

Many counties in the State were plagued by inefficient coverage

by the National Weather Service Doppler radar system. Simply

stated, it did not cover the counties the way it was designed to, due

to elevation and geographical location. Mr. Proenza was aware of

this problem, and worked constantly to correct it. Thanks to his

support and tenacity in getting the radar moved, we now have a

more reliable Doppler radar covering our counties.

Recently, NOAA was considering the concept of operations, which

would have resulted in lowering National Weather Service field office staffing and hours of operation of some field offices. Mr.

Proenza defended the much-needed local presence of full-time service, and stood with local emergency managers to question this dangerous concept. We are concerned that Mr. Proenza’s defending the

57

interests of the public safety and the emergency management community may have brought retribution on him.

Mr. Proenza is a dedicated servant of the American people. If you

are uncomfortable with straight, honest, truthful answers to the

hard questions, then don’t ask Mr. Proenza the question, because

that is what you are going to get, the truth.

When I learned that Mr. Proenza had been appointed the Director of the National Hurricane Center, I was extremely happy, and

at the same time, I was sorry to see him leave managing the

Southern Region. We hoped he would have the opportunity to bring

the same innovative approaches to the National Hurricane Center

that we came to expect when he managed the Southern Region.

Mr. Proenza is an advocate for the people he serves, and when

he encounters problems, he faces them head-on. If it is broken, he

wants it repaired. If it is working correctly, he wants it improved.

In my dealings with Mr. Proenza, he has never been one to sit back

and watch things happen. He has always been on the forefront

making things happen. Sadly, it seems that he made the mistake

of trying to improve the National Hurricane Center.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I will be glad

to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKinnon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD L. MCKINNON

Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Inglis, Ranking Member

Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees, I thank you for

the opportunity to come before you today to provide testimony regarding the service

provided by the National Weather Service’s Southern Regional Office during Mr.

Bill Proenza’s tenure.

I am Don McKinnon, Director of the Jones County Emergency Management Agency, Laurel, Mississippi. I am representing the Mississippi Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association (MCDEMA), which has 300 members from all 82

counties in Mississippi. Since 2000 the State of Mississippi has had 11 Presidential

Disaster Declarations, nine Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Declarations and 19 Governor State of Emergencies. I have worked in the emergency management agency in Jones County for approximately 26 years. I have been the Director since 2001. Emergency Management is a coordinating agency responsible for

maintaining emergency plans, preparedness, response, disaster exercises, recovery,

and mitigation projects. We work with all public safety agencies, local, State, and

federal, as well as volunteer and non-emergency agencies. One of our primary missions is to prepare for and respond to weather-related events. We in Jones County

are no strangers to tornadoes, floods and hurricanes. I am responsible for responding to all of them. We also have incidents that are not caused by weather that we

rely on the National Weather Service (NWS) to assist us with. For example, chemical spills, hazardous shipment accidents, bridge collapse, fire, search and rescue,

etc. Current, accurate, and timely weather information plays a significant role in

each of these incidents. The accessibility and the willingness of the NWS to help

emergency management are critical in our Incident Action Plans as we prepare for

and respond to these incidents.

Jones County, Mississippi, is located approximately 100 miles inland from the

Mississippi Gulf Coast. When Hurricane Katrina slammed into Mississippi on August 29, 2005, we suffered everything the Gulf Coast suffered except the storm

surge. We had 130 + mph sustained winds with gusts much greater. We had 250

homes destroyed, 650 homes with major damage and several thousand homes with

minor damage. We suffered seven Hurricane Katrina-related deaths. Remember we

are 100 miles inland from the coast.

Over the past six years in my tenure as the Emergency Management Director I

have had the opportunity to work with the Southeastern Regional Director of the

National Weather Service Mr. Bill Proenza on many occasions. I first met Mr.

Proenza at a Mississippi Civil Defense Emergency Management Association conference. Mr. Proenza was speaking to the conference attendees on the importance

of the National Weather Service and the Emergency Management Community workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
58

ing together to achieve more success in warning our citizens of impending weather

events. Mr. Proenza was passionate about his topic and would later meet with conference attendees to network individually and continue his discussion. Mr. Proenza

would always solicit comments from the local emergency managers and took their

concerns to heart. Mr. Proenza convinced me that the NWS could be more than a

reactive weather source and could, in fact, serve as a proactive weather resource

working with the emergency management community.

Not only did Mr. Proenza come to us, he asked us to come to him. Mr. Proenza

encouraged the local weather offices to involve emergency management in their outreach activities. The National Weather Service Office in Jackson, Mississippi,

partnered with the Mississippi Civil Defense Emergency Management Association

to develop an eight hour training course geared toward the emergency management

community and the interaction with the NWS. Then the NWS offices from Slidell,

LA, Memphis, TN, and Mobile, AL were invited to attend so the emergency management customers they serve could interact with them. Some of the topics included

understanding the Doppler Radar, understanding the products produced and offered

by the NWS and tracking specific events that had occurred. Now the training is offered annually and available to emergency management and the media. Mr. Proenza

recognized that there are, aside from the general public, two core customers, emergency management and the media, that needed personal and daily interaction with

the National Weather Service. He fostered an environment within the Southeastern

Regional NWS that allowed his personnel to work with and meet the needs of the

customers they served.

Mr. Proenza was deeply involved in the development of the NWS Southern Region

program ‘‘Turn Around, Don’t Drown.’’ Flooding is the number one cause of drowning deaths in the United States. Realizing that the National Weather Service could

do more to educate the public on what they should and should not do during a flood

Mr. Proenza solicited information from the NWS Offices in his region. The Warning

Coordination Meteorologist in San Angelo, TX came up with the ‘‘Turn Around,

Don’t Drown’’ theme. Mr. Proenza recognized the benefit the program could have on

saving lives and brought the program to the emergency management community.

Once he sold the EMs on the program he promoted the program across the United

States. The next time you hear that slogan, remember where it came from. Without

Mr. Proenza we would not have it.

Not one to just continue a practice because ‘‘that is the way we have always done

it,’’ Mr. Proenza encouraged the NWS Southern Region Headquarters Staff to develop a computer program that would give a graphic display of severe weather information on the NWS Radar sites on the Internet. Users could already see the weather cells or lines moving into their areas but when a watch or warning was issued

that information was not visible on the Internet site. Mr. Proenza knew that emergency management and the public needed more and that’s what he gave them. Now

when a flood, storm or tornado watch or warning is issued they get a graphic box

showing the area affected simultaneously with the weather on the NWS Radar page

of the Internet. Not only do you get visual representation, if you click on a county/

parish in the box you get the text message associated with the watch or warning.

You will know the program as Radar Integrated Display with Geospatial Elements

or RIDGE. Without Mr. Proenza to institute changes and growth in the NWS Southern Region we may not have the RIDGE System. What we had, worked. Mr.

Proenza knew that it could work better and provide more useful information to a

public who needed it. That’s what we have because Mr. Proenza would accept no

less.

Mr. Proenza was contacted in 2004 by a local emergency management director in

a small rural county about a problem with the NOAA weather radio system in their

area. This is a county with a population of approximately 22,000 people. Mr.

Proenza met with the local officials and listened as they explained their concerns.

Mr. Proenza then went to work for them. In late 2005 the county received equipment to replace the defunct system. The County now has a working NOAA weather

radio system and the citizens of Carthage, Mississippi, can rest easier knowing that

they will get timely weather information that may save their lives. I later learned

that Mr. Proenza had repeated this process in several other counties in Mississippi.

Not only did he follow through with the equipment that he promised, he personally

followed up on the resolution of the problems to ensure that the systems were performing as they should and nothing else was needed. Mr. Proenza was instrumental

in making these systems functional.

Problems are plentiful in the emergency management business. Mr. Proenza is

not afraid to face these problems with us when they concern the National Weather

Service. Jones County as well as many other counties in the state was plagued by

inefficient coverage by the new (1993) NWS Jackson Doppler Radar system. Simply

59

stated, it did not cover my county the way it was designed to. In defense of the NWS

it was designed to give full coverage to the NWS Jackson coverage area of which

my county is a part. But when construction was started on the site, the Federal

Aviation Administration notified the NWS Jackson office that the tower housing the

radar would have to be lowered by 10 meters (30 feet) because of the proximity to

the Jackson International Airport. Having no alternative site the construction had

to proceed. From day one the radar coverage was degraded by approximately 50 percent in the eastern part of the state. This was because of a terrain issue. What did

this mean to the radar coverage? It meant that the forecasters could not accurately

monitor rain data and wind data below six to eight thousand feet. Unless a storm

was well above six to eight thousand feet then the forecasters could possibly miss

it, as was the case in November of 2001 in Jones County. A small tornado touched

down in west Jones County at approximately 7:20 P.M. and destroyed several

homes. The West Jones High School and Middle School received major damage.

NWS officials came to Jones County the next day and explained that they simply

did not see the storm. Mr. Proenza was aware of the Doppler Radar problem and

was working to correct it. He kept me updated. The emergency management community wrote many letters of support in this push to get the radar moved to a more

suitable location. Finally the radar was moved in 2002 to a site in Rankin County,

Mississippi, approximately seven miles from the original site. Coverage has improved tremendously and we have not had any ‘‘surprises’’ since the move. Without

Mr. Proenza’s support and tenacity we may not have achieved the move. He made

it happen and my citizens are safer because of it.

Mr. Proenza asked for my input on an issue concerning the National Weather

Service name and logo a number of years ago. NOAA wanted to change the name

and the logo of the National Weather Service to the NOAA Weather Service. This

came as a surprise to me and quite honestly I was baffled by the proposed change.

The NWS is a national brand name. It is trusted and credible with a history going

back over 130 years. The logo represents quality and knowledge in the weather

service. To change the name for no more reason than to just change the name

doesn’t make sense to me. I understand that this is still an issue.

More recently Mr. Proenza asked me to represent the emergency management

community in the interview process to replace the retiring NWS Jackson Warning

Coordination Meteorologist (WCM). I had worked with the outgoing WCM for many

years and had grown to trust and respect his opinion. Finding a suitable replacement was going to be a challenge. We found a very capable applicant. Before the

applicant was approved for the position Mr. Proenza called me to make sure I was

comfortable with the applicant and that this person would be a good fit in our emergency management programs. I am happy to report that the new WCM has been

well received by emergency management and has brought with him many new and

useful ideas. Mr. Proenza did not have to include the emergency management community in this process. However, he recognized the importance of this position to

emergency management and took the step to include us in selecting the person we

would be working so closely with.

Recently NOAA was considering a ‘‘concept of operations’’ which would have resulted in lowering NWS field office staffing and hours of operation of some field offices. Mr. Proenza defended the much-needed local presence of full time service and

stood with local emergency managers to question this dangerous concept. I know my

meteorologists and they know me. They know where Jones County is and what the

terrain is like here. We work together to inform and protect the public. The meteorologists in NWS Jackson, Mississippi, treat Jones County as more than a statistical spot on a map. We were grateful that as a result of questions raised by Congress and particularly this committee that proposal is on hold. We are concerned

that Mr. Proenza’s defending the interests of public safety and the emergency management community may have brought retribution on him.

Mr. Proenza is a dedicated servant of the American people. If you are uncomfortable with straight, honest, truthful answers to the hard questions then don’t ask

Mr. Proenza the question. Because that’s what you are going to get, the truth. Mr.

Proenza has always been accessible and approachable. He really cares about the

public he represents. When I learned that Mr. Proenza had been appointed the Director of the National Hurricane Center I was extremely happy and at the same

time I was sorry to see him leave managing the Southern Regional Office of the

NWS. However, The NHC is a vital part of Mississippi’s emergency management

program. The information provided to me and the State of Mississippi from the

NHC in times of emergency is critical in the decision-making process of my Emergency Operations Center.

Mr. Proenza is an advocate for the people he serves and when he encounters problems he faces them head on. If it is broken, he wants it repaired. If it is working

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correctly, he wants it improved. In my dealings with Mr. Proenza he has never been

one to sit back and watch things happen. He is on the forefront making things happen. Sadly it seems that he made the mistake of trying to improve the National

Hurricane Center.

It has been an honor and a pleasure to come to our Capitol to meet with distinguished leaders of our nation’s Congress and present this testimony on behalf of Mr.

Proenza’s leadership at the NWS Southern Regional Office. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR DONALD L. MCKINNON

Donald L. McKinnon currently serves as the Director of the Jones County Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security in Laurel, Jones County, Mississippi. Don has held this position since 2001. Jones County consists of approximately 702 square miles with four municipalities and a combined population

of approximately of 68,000 people. Jones County is located 100 miles inland from

the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Prior to becoming Director Don served in various positions within the Emergency Management Agency to include: Search and Rescue Coordinator; Storm Spotter; Administrative Officer; and Operations Officer.

Don is responsible for the Jones County Emergency Operations Center; the Office

of Homeland Security; the 911 Office; the Communications Dispatch Center; the 800

Megahertz Trunked Public Safety Radio System; the Public Safety Paging System;

two 911 Tower Sites; and the Communications Technical Services Staff.

From 1972 until 1978 Don served in the United States Marines Corps. Don held

the rank of Staff Sergeant with a Secret Security clearance and was assigned communications duties. During his service Don spent two terms of duty in Okinawa,

Japan where he was the Communications Center Supervisor for the 1st Marine Air

Wing. Don was later assigned to the Marine Corps Development and Education

Command (MCDEC) in Quantico, VA where he was a communications center shift

supervisor.

Don moved to Laurel, Mississippi in 1979 and took a position with Northern Electric Company as a computer programmer/software analyst.

Don began his service with the Jones County Emergency Management Agency in

1980. It was during this time that Don volunteered to serve the emergency management agency as a dive rescue team member. Don organized and directed the Dive

Team from 1980 until 2000. Don also served as the Jones County Volunteer Fire

Coordinator during this time.

He is the past President and founding member of the Mississippi Chapter of the

National Emergency Number Association (911); active member of the Associated

Public Safety Communications Officers International (APCO); active member of the

Mississippi Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association (MCDEMA);

former Board Member of the MCDEMA; Chairman for Communications and Technology committee of MCDEMA; and active member of the International Association

of Emergency Managers (IAEM).

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. McKinnon. Mr. Robinson,

you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBIE ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, DALLAS

COUNTY OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Mr. ROBINSON. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking

Member Inglis, Members, thank you very much for inviting me;

again, Robie Robinson, Director of Security and Emergency Management, Dallas County. Today, I am speaking on behalf of the

Emergency Managers’ Association of Texas.

As you know, every state in the Nation is at risk to disasters,

and Texas is no exception. Disaster situations occur in our state

practically every day. From ’89 to 2000, floods and flash floods

caused 35 percent of the weather-related deaths in Texas. They are

followed in order by tornadoes, lightning, winter storms, extreme

heat, severe thunderstorms, and finally, hurricanes and tropical

storms.

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As I was preparing this testimony, Texas had 61 counties with

declared disasters going on. We also know that a proactive, robust

emergency management program can reduce risk, property loss,

and even death. A critical component of local emergency management programs is timely, accurate weather data that we can understand.

Bill Proenza has always been an active supporter of local emergency managers. During his tenure as the Southern Director, Bill

ensured that the local emergency managers had ready access to

weather information. He ensured that his folks took the time to understand our weather information needs. He ensured that they

were available during weather events to answer our questions and

provide forecasts. He also ensured that they worked closely with

storm spotters and volunteer weather monitors to improve forecast

models. Bill encouraged his staff to conduct training classes, teach

local emergency managers one on one, and give presentations at

local events and conferences.

Support for local emergency managers was evident in my first

emergency management position in Fisher County, Texas. I had

only been the volunteer EMC for ten days when a tornado struck

the largest town in our community. It was not a large tornado, but

it was not a large town, either, and the warnings given by the National Weather Service and the follow-up concern that they displayed were incredible.

It changed the relationship from Service and County to Robie

Robinson and Buddy McIntyre, who worked at the San Angelo office of the National Weather Service. I went on to learn a lot more

about weather from Buddy, and he hosted the first disaster exercise that I ever participated in as an emergency manager. Now, if

I had never moved from rural West Texas, I would have chalked

that one up to small town hospitality, but now, I am in the ninth

largest county in the Nation, and the relationship that I have with

the people there, Bill and Gary, is the same as it was back in West

Texas. It is clear to me that the commitment of the National

Weather Service personnel that I have worked with is a reflection

of the leadership that they had coming down from the regional

level.

Thanks to Bill’s leadership, we now have a wealth of weather

data available in our emergency operation centers that we did not

have 10 years ago. That data increases the time available for emergency managers and elected officials to consider alternative courses

of action, and choose the appropriate action to take.

Now, some people say that weather has changed, but the weather hasn’t changed. It is the same thing it was when I was Isaac

Cline was watching the clouds over Galveston before the 1900 hurricane that is still the deadliest disaster ever to have struck on

U.S. soil, but there are differences in us. There are different things

that we do. We have more citizens in buildings, more densely populated cities, more people who don’t rely on their own eyes and

wives’ tales, they rely, instead, on reliable forecasts, to safeguard

their families and their businesses.

Thanks to Bill’s leadership, we have a National Weather Service

office in our area with a staff of professionals who keep us informed and answer our questions any time, day or night. Local

62

emergency managers used to only get weather warnings and

watches information by NOAA Weather Radio, phone, or fax. Now,

we get them by Internet, e-mail, and pagers, as well as those other

options. National Weather Service personnel listened to our needs

and met them.

Bill actively pushed for the Warning Coordinating Meteorologist

Program to support local emergency managers. The National

Weather Service has also built, during his tenure, valuable partnerships. Just a couple of years ago, in Galveston, the National

Weather Service opened a joint office with the Galveston County

Emergency Management Agency. This is an innovative, forwardthinking partnership. Now, we all claim that we want to work together in our respective fields, but how many of us voluntarily go

in to share offices on a day to day regular basis?

Jack Colley is the State Director of Emergency Management in

Texas, and he couldn’t be here today, but he asked me to say: ‘‘We

could not operate without the National Weather Service. They are

a key partner in our state, and Bill is an innovator and an advocate for serving the needs of the locals, so that we can protect the

people who rely on us.’’ My county is currently building a new Emergency Operations

Center to help keep our citizens safe. I hope that the National

Weather Service will continue to look toward the future as we are,

and bring new tools and new products to the table. I hope that they

continue the personal contact with emergency managers surrounding their regional offices. I hope their funding will be maintained at a level that we won’t ever question their ability to serve

the emergency management community and protect our people. I

hope I can see and rely on the same enthusiasm and commitment

from the National Weather Service during the last half of my career that I have witnessed during the first half.

In closing, I hope the National Weather Service will continue the

partnerships, energy, and knowledge and innovation that Bill

Proenza fostered. I hope the information sharing will continue to

us at the local level, as we are the conduits through which their

warnings and watches are delivered to the moms and the dads and

the sisters and brothers whose actual literal lives depend on that

information.

Members of the Subcommittees, forecasting the weather requires

courage, because human beings don’t control the weather. But I

hope the leadership of NOAA and the National Weather Service do

not move in this new century by squelching the courage of their

people to speak out when they feel it is important.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIE ROBINSON

Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Inglis, and Ranking

Member Sensenbrenner and Subcommittee Members, thank you for inviting me to

speak to you this morning. My name is Robie Robinson. I am the Director of Security and Emergency Management for Dallas County, Texas, and I am here to speak

on behalf of the Emergency Managers’ Association of Texas.

As you know, every state across the Nation is at risk to some form of disaster.

Texas is no exception. Our state is vulnerable to multiple forms of disaster situations—whether they are triggered by an act of nature, an accident, or man-made.

We know from historical data that disaster situations occur in the state nearly every

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day, and weather threats cause the majority of deaths. From 1989–2000, floods and

flash floods caused 35 percent of the weather-related deaths in Texas. These are followed by tornadoes, lightning, winter storms, extreme heat, severe thunderstorms,

and finally by hurricane/tropical storms. As I was preparing this testimony, Texas

had 61 counties dealing with declared disasters. We also know that a proactive and

robust emergency management program can reduce risk, property loss, and death.

A critical component of a local emergency management program is timely and accurate weather data that decision-makers understand.

Bill Proenza has always been an active supporter of local emergency managers.

During his tenure as the southern regional director, Bill ensured that the local government emergency managers had ready access to weather information. He ensured

his Warning Coordinating Meteorologists took the time to understand our weather

information needs and to explain the impacts and probabilities of weather events

on our local areas. He ensured the Warning Coordinating Meteorologists were available during weather events to answer our questions, provide forecasts, and discuss

the various weather products with us. He also ensured the Warning Coordinating

Meteorologists worked closely with the storm spotters and volunteer weather monitors to improve the forecast models that applied to our most common hazard, flooding.

The Warning Coordinating Meteorologists and National Weather Service forecasters provide valuable training for local emergency managers and weather spotters. Bill supported and encouraged his staff to conduct training classes, teach local

emergency managers one-on-one, and give presentations at local events and professional conferences.

National Weather Service support for local emergency managers was evident in

my first emergency management position in rural Fisher County, Texas. I had only

been the volunteer EMC for 10 days when a tornado struck in the middle of the

largest town in the county. It wasn’t a large tornado, but it wasn’t a large town either. The National Weather Service assistance began with tornado warnings, but it

did not end there. They stayed in touch as we had crews searching through debris

and cleaning up streets over the next several days. The warnings given by the National Weather Service and the follow-up concern that they displayed were incredible. That experience changed the relationship from Service and County, to Robie

Robinson and Buddy McIntyre, Warning Coordination Meteorologist for the San Angelo office of the National Weather Service. I went on to learn more about thunderstorms and weather from Buddy and he hosted the first disaster exercise that I attended as an emergency manager. If I had never moved, I would have put it all off

to small town hospitality, but I am now in the ninth largest county in the Nation

and the relationship that I have with Bill and Gary in the Fort Worth office is the

same. They interact with the emergency managers in our area on a regular basis.

That is how they are able to keep an eye on our needs and modify their efforts to

help us. It is clear to me that the commitment of the National Weather Service personnel with whom I have worked is a reflection of the leadership they had at the

regional level.

Bill’s support of local emergency managers also applied to the River Forecasting

Centers. The Fort Worth River Forecast Center worked closely with local emergency

managers as well as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Texas River Authorities

before, during, and after heavy rainfall and flooding events. This coordination has

been critical in our abilities to protect critical infrastructures, government facilities,

and the public from flooding events.

The new weather products now available are very useful in our planning efforts.

We have various text products, river data, hydrographs, various precipitation images, reports and forecasts. We now have better maps, charts, and tables; weather

forecasts, hydrometeorological data and discussion, climate data, and historical

data. Local emergency managers get the weather information we need in the format

that best meets our needs thanks largely to the programs and the leadership of Bill

Proenza.

The increased variety of weather products, discussions, and graphs, coupled with

probability estimates improved decision-making in our emergency operations centers

before and during extreme weather events. We now have a wealth of weather data

available in our emergency operations centers that did not exist ten years ago. That

data, and our understanding of it, increases the time available for the local emergency manager and the elected officials to consider alternative courses of action and

to select the most appropriate one for the jurisdiction. Bill worked with local emergency managers to ensure we had the data we needed.

There are those who say that technology has changed our world so that the

weather is different or that our dependence on weather has lessened over the years.

I would say that weather is not any different today than what it was back when

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Isaac Cline was watching the clouds in Galveston, Texas before the 1900 hurricane

that is still the deadliest disaster to have struck in the United States. There are,

however, differences in us and how we live. Our vulnerability is even greater than

ever before. We have more citizens, buildings and vehicles at risk, and more densely

populated cities with people who rely, not on their own eyes and wives’ tales, but

instead on reliable scientific forecasts to safeguard their businesses and their families. Thanks to Bill’s leadership, we have a National Weather Service Office with

a staff of professionals who work to keep us informed and to answer our questions

any time, day or night.

We have all learned to listen to forecasts and we have all heard when there were

watches and warnings in our area. Admittedly, I am among the ranks of professional emergency managers who are professional paranoids. It is my job to watch

the weather and plan for disasters but everyone wonders whether it will rain during

the game or if today is a good day to go to the beach or to the lake. We rely on

the National Weather Service for that information.

The National Weather Service distributes weather data based on our needs. Local

emergency managers used to get weather warnings, watches, and information only

by NOAA Weather Radio, phone or fax. Now we get them from the Internet, by email, and by pagers. The Warning Coordinating Meteorologists and other National

Weather Service Personnel listened to the local emergency managers needs for

weather-related information and they met them. Bill Proenza actively pushed for

the Warning Coordinating Meteorologist program and for the National Weather

Service support of local emergency managers. The improvements we experienced

over the last ten years would not have occurred without his leadership in the southern region.

I interact with people all over the state on a regular basis. People from cities,

counties, private industry, health care, transportation, State employees, and federal

personnel. Across the board, they have nothing but positive comments when asked

about the National Weather Service. Under Mr. Proenza’s leadership, the southern

region built this reputation and those in place today are working diligently to maintain it. However, don’t make the mistake of thinking that they are content to stop

there. They are constantly leaning forward in the saddle looking for new, innovative

ways to help us do our jobs better for the people of the Lone Star State. I have attended numerous meetings where I have spoken with National Weather Service representatives who were eager to hear comments from emergency managers about

how we used their products and what we would like to see in the future.

The National Weather Service has also built valuable partnerships. Just a couple

of years ago, they opened a new office jointly with Galveston County Emergency

Management. This is an innovative, forward thinking partnership. We all want to

claim that we can cooperate with others in our respective fields but how many of

us actually go so far as to share our offices daily. Emergency managers and the National Weather Service have a strong tradition of working together but that isn’t

enough. It is more important to look toward the future and to ensure that we are

prepared. That is where the southern region was incredibly effective during Mr.

Proenza’s tenure. When I was fighting wildfires across the state for the Texas Forest Service in 2000, I knew I could and frequently did call the National Weather

Service for spot weather forecasts. This required that meteorologists stop what they

were doing and give me specific information for the very coordinates where property

and lives were hanging in the balance. I needed that information to keep firefighters

safe and to protect the homes and ranches of many of our citizens. These efforts

weren’t required; they were done because the service and the people behind it knew

they needed to be done. I was safer and better able to do my job with the knowledge

that they shared.

In the end, the National Weather Service is not a federal agency with people who

sit in Washington to hand down products, guidelines, and grant funds. It is an agency of people who provide essential services to the emergency management community. Jack Colley, the Texas State Emergency Management Director could not be

here today but he asked me to say, ‘‘We could not operate in Texas without the National Weather Service. They are a key partner in our state. Bill Proenza is an innovator and an advocate for serving the needs of the locals so that we can protect the

people who rely on us.’’

My county is currently building a new Emergency Operations Center with County

funds, not grant funds, to help keep our citizens safe. I hope that the National

Weather Service will continue to look toward the future and bring new tools and

products to the table. I hope that they continue the personal contact with professional emergency managers surrounding their regional offices. I hope their funding

will be maintained at a level such that we won’t ever question their value or their

ability to serve the emergency management community and protect our people. I

65

hope that I see can see and rely on the same enthusiasm and commitment from the

National Weather Service during the last half of my career that I saw and relied

on in the first half. They share in our common goal and our common role as we

work hand-in-hand to protect people.

In closing, I hope that the NWS will continue the partnerships, energy, knowledge

and innovation that Bill Proenza fostered. I hope that the information sharing will

continue to us at the local level as we are the conduits from which the warnings

and watches are communicated to the Moms and Dads and sisters and brothers

whose very lives depend on that information.

Members of the Subcommittees, forecasting the weather requires courage because

human beings can not control what is going to happen. I hope that the leadership

of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Weather

Service do not move into this new century by squelching the courage of their people

to speak out.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBIE ROBINSON

Mr. Robie Robinson is currently the Director of the Dallas County Office of Security and Emergency Management. Dallas County is the ninth largest county in the

United States and is home to over 2.2 million people. Under Robinson’s direction

are Emergency Management, Homeland Security, Fire Marshal, and Security for all

Dallas County buildings, personnel, and operations.

Robinson was previously an Assistant Professor of Emergency Administration and

Planning at the University of North Texas. Prior to joining the UNT faculty, Robinson was employed as Regional Fire Coordinator for the Texas Forest Service where

he responded to disasters across the State of Texas. Robinson has also served as

the elected County Attorney and Emergency Management Coordinator for Fisher

County, Texas.

Robinson completed a B.A. in history from Texas A&M, a Ranch Management

Certificate from Texas Christian University, and a J.D. from Oklahoma City University. In addition, he has completed the Executive Leadership Program from the

Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Robinson serves on numerous

committees at the local, State, and national level and holds certifications from both

the International Association of Emergency Managers (CEM) and Emergency Managers Association of Texas (TEM).

DISCUSSION

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much.

We will move into our first round of questions, and I yield myself

five minutes, as the Chairman.

DIRECTOR PROENZA’S TENURE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

You have commented on, both Mr. Robinson and Mr. McKinnon,

have commented on the work that Mr. Proenza did as Director of

the Southern Region. He met the needs of your offices. Did you

have any concerns about the quality of the products that he would

deliver, or his agency would deliver to your agencies, your offices?

Mr. MCKINNON. On the contrary, no problems with the products

at all, and if he had questions, then he would come to us and ask

if we needed to improve what he was offering to us.

Mr. ROBINSON. Typically, he would ask us if we needed anything

else, and we got what we asked for.

Chairman LAMPSON. Consider him a people person? Did he have

a hard time getting along with people?

Mr. MCKINNON. Very approachable and a very personable person

to me.

Chairman LAMPSON. Did you have any reason to lack confidence

in the forecasts, warnings, data, or other product that you had been

receiving from the Center?

Mr. ROBINSON. None at all.

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Mr. MCKINNON. None, sir.

HURRICANE RESEARCH DIVISION AND HURRICANE CENTER

COLLABORATION

Chairman LAMPSON. Dr. Atlas, did you ever discuss with Mr.

Proenza greater collaboration between the Hurricane Research Division and the Hurricane Center, after he became Director in January?

Dr. ATLAS. Yes, I did. When, immediately after Bill became Director, we were both approached by the NOAA Chief of Staff, and

we were asked to work closely together, to bring research and operations much closer, and to be able to transition more of what we

do in research into the operations of the Hurricane Center.

Chairman LAMPSON. How was that received by people who

worked beneath the two of you?

Dr. ATLAS. The people who worked at AOML, at the Hurricane

Research Division, were extremely pleased. We had been wanting

to do this for many years. It had not been as effective as it could

have been in the past. There are many new developments in research that need to get into operations, and we were working extremely well together to bring that about.

HURRICANE RESEARCH

Chairman LAMPSON. What would a research program look like,

to accomplish the goal of figuring out how to forecast hurricane intensity, if that is the primary question?

Dr. ATLAS. In order to be able to forecast hurricane intensity

well, we need to have numerical models at very high resolution,

that are capable of representing the key processes that go on within the hurricane, including the hurricane core. What this means is

we need to have better and more observations, we need to have

better ways of using that data. We need to have a better understanding, and we must have these new models.

Chairman LAMPSON. What kind of observational data will be

needed to develop our understanding of hurricane intensity, and

what kinds of sensors does that imply, that we will need in the future?

Dr. ATLAS. Well, we need essentially everything we have there

now, but we need more of it, and we need it at higher resolution.

If we are—the models that are being run now were based on observations that were at pretty coarse resolution, and so were the models. Now, as we get down to a few kilometers in scale in our numerical weather prediction models, we must have data that is on a

comparable scale. We need it for the development of the models,

and we need it to provide initial conditions to the models.

Chairman LAMPSON. How would findings from such a research

program be translated into upgrades to models or other tools and

techniques for the staff at the Hurricane Center?

Dr. ATLAS. This is, there is a process in NOAA for transitioning

research, and there are new facilities that will make this go even

better. There is something called the Developmental Test Center,

located in Colorado, which enables researchers to work with the

operational models, and enable us to upgrade them. Ultimately, it

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goes through the Joint Hurricane Testbed at the Hurricane Center,

and if it passes the test, it then goes into operations.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much. I only have a few

seconds left. I am going to yield that back, and I am going to turn

it over to Mr. Diaz-Balart for five minutes.

MORE ON THE HURRICANE CENTER PERSONNEL

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you gentlemen for being here.

Also, I just want to tell the Chairman and others on the Committee, and my dear friend, Mr. Klein, that one thing that is worth

seeing is the operation that Dr. Atlas has down there in South

Florida, incredible people and led very well by Dr. Atlas, and I recently had the privilege to visit with them, and thank you for your

hospitality, sir.

I am glad that we are kind of getting away from personnel

issues, and more on science issues, which is what this committee

knows how to do, and we don’t know how to deal with personnel,

nor do we have the power to, but since a couple of things were

brought up, I very briefly want to address it.

Mr. Robinson, and I think very well, stated that obviously, we

need to make sure that the courage to do the right thing continues,

and I have no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Proenza has had that

courage. But I just want to, you know, there are some incredible

people at the Hurricane Center, and I don’t know if you all have

had, you know, have had a chance to meet with them, but since

I do live and represent that part of town, that part of the country,

you know, you get to kind of know some of them, and you know,

Dr. Avila, James Franklin, so, so many, Richard Knabb, Dr. Knabb,

I should say, Daniel Brown. There are so many incredible leaders.

Obviously, you are not, and I know you are not, but I just want

to make it very clear for the record, you are not implying that the

people in the Hurricane Center don’t have the courage or the expertise to do their job, correct? I mean, I know you are not——

Dr. ATLAS. That is correct.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. But I just want to make sure that, you know,

right.

Dr. ATLAS. That is correct.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I don’t want anybody to ever misinterpret

what you are saying, because I thought you were very positive and

very clear.

IMPROVING HURRICANE FORECASTING

Getting back to the science now. Dr. Atlas, you and I have had

conversations, and you just repeated it now, that one of the areas

that we didn’t need to do much better is in forecasting the

strength, the intensity of a storm, and you have given me some, I

think, very easy to understand in layman’s terms, explanations as

to where we are, and how we can do better, and if you could just

give me a little bit of your outlook. Are you optimistic that we can

do better, and what do we need to do in order to do better?

Dr. ATLAS. When I left NASA to come to NOAA, I did it because

I had a specific goal in mind, and one of those goals deals with the

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improvement of hurricane prediction. I agree wholeheartedly with

every positive statement said about the National Hurricane Center

and its personnel. They do an excellent job. It represents the state

of our science, the state of the art. However, it is still not good

enough for what the Nation needs. We need to narrow the cone of

uncertainty. I believe that if we develop the kinds of models, and

get the kinds of observations, and increased understanding that I

have mentioned to forecast intensity, we will be able to narrow the

cone of uncertainty as well.

We are at a time in hurricane science where resources put into

computing, into research, into model development, and new observations can have tremendous payoff.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I

will recognize Ron Klein for five minutes.

ALTERNATIVES TO QUIKSCAT

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.

Atlas, and gentlemen, for coming today, and being part of our discussion.

I was focusing, in my questions to Mr. Proenza, on the difference

of QuikSCAT and the role that QuikSCAT plays, and the difference

if QuikSCAT is unavailable or in some diminished capacity, on marine forecasting, and of course, hurricane forecasting in general.

Can you give some comment on the quality and quantity of difference, based on what NOAA said, is here—is our, after pushing

them a little bit, but here is the backup on how we are going to

approach this, between the European satellite, and I guess there is

a new Indian satellite that is coming online, or a couple of other

things, plus the other data and resources we have available to us.

Dr. ATLAS. There is actually another American satellite that is

functioning right now called WINDSAT, and I have done numerical

experiments that show that WINDSAT does provide useful data, although not nearly as accurate or as much as QuikSCAT. In general, if we only had WINDSAT to replace QuikSCAT, we would lose

about half of the beneficial effect of satellite surface wind data.

The European scatterometer, ASCAT, is comparable to their earlier scatterometer, in how it senses the surface wind, and does a

little better than QuikSCAT in heavy rain situations, but is much

poorer in terms of resolution and coverage, and does not have the

ability to represent an entire storm circulation within its data coverage.

We believe that we will lose some forecast accuracy. Certainly,

if we do nothing, we will lose forecast accuracy, but the mitigation

plan that NOAA has, to make use of ASCAT, to augment our reconnaissance aircraft, and to potentially put new observing systems

on unmanned aerial systems, could mitigate the loss of QuikSCAT

very effectively. I think that one of the very good things NOAA has

done is to develop this mitigation plan, and it is being thought out

very carefully.

Mr. KLEIN. Okay. And just a followup on your comments on

ASCAT, and your previous comment, the fact that QuikSCAT in its

present form has more of a difficult time in heavy rains and things

69

like that. Are we already currently getting data from ASCAT? Is

that part of our engagement currently, or is that just as a backup

in the event QuikSCAT goes down?

Dr. ATLAS. We just started receiving data from ASCAT very recently. The forecasters are evaluating the quality of the data, and

to what extent they can use it. There are several difficulties in applying the ASCAT data the way they applied QuikSCAT, and so,

there is a learning curve that we need to get over.

Mr. KLEIN. And is there anything else going on in the rest of the

world? I mean, obviously, the Far East has significant storms and

typhoons and a lot of other things, other countries, other technologies, that are currently in place, that we are considering, or

should be considering, or are we at the top of the curve here in

science, and there is nothing for us to grab onto in any other part

of the world?

Dr. ATLAS. Congressman, there are other countries that are developing scatterometers, but we don’t know how good that data will

be, or even whether or not they will make it available to us. There

are other technologies that could also go into space, or be used on

aircraft, that would bring about or contribute to significant further

improvements in weather analysis and prediction.

MORE ON HURRICANE RESEARCH

Mr. KLEIN. Okay. And the last question is, we have heard a

number of times that research, it is not just the satellite or the

buoy, research is a key component of everything from developing

models to, you know, identifying new factors that we should be considering. Are we currently researching or supporting the level of research that you believe is necessary for the future of weather forecasting at this moment, and if not, what do you recommend?

Dr. ATLAS. If I had to answer with a yes or no, I would have to

say no, but that is partially because, as was pointed out earlier, scientists never believe they have, that we have enough resources for

what we want to do.

I think the level of resources that has existed up to this point,

with where we were in the period of less hurricane activity, and

the state of our science, was appropriate. Now, in this period of

very active hurricanes, and the fact that our science is now at a

stage where we can rapidly capitalize upon additional resources,

certainly more would be warranted.

Mr. KLEIN. And if you can get back to us on exactly what, it is

easy to throw a number at something, but I think it would be helpful to this committee to understand what specifics that we could

support, types of research, the amount of support, resources necessary to get you where you need to be. Thank you.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Klein. Mr. Inglis, five minutes.

DIRECTOR PROENZA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH WITNESSES

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McKinnon and Mr.

Robinson, testimony from you is very helpful to establish that Mr.

Proenza is a capable fellow, who did excellent work while he was

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in a liaison role with the two of you. Is that a good way to characterize your testimony?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. It is mine.

Mr. MCKINNON. It is fair enough.

Mr. INGLIS. That he was very effective in working with you, and

a capable fellow. And I think that it is important for all of us to

stipulate that that seems to be the case. You are here saying that,

and apparently, the Administration thought that when they hired

him to go the Center, right? Because they thought he was a very

capable fellow.

I just was out in the hallway with some teachers, and had a little

discussion about how, do you think it is possible that somebody

that is a very good match for the superintendent of schools for a

county is maybe not the best match as the principal of an elementary school? And of course, they immediately were shaking their

heads yes. There is a different role involved. If you were the leader

of a small elementary school, you are rubbing shoulders every day

with the teachers, you are energizing them, you are being enthusiastic about their kids and what they are doing. You are working

with them in their individual lives. Whereas if you are at the ed

shed, the district superintendent, you are basically interacting with

the community and principals, and various, at a different level.

Is it fair to say that your interaction with Mr. Proenza sounds

like it might fit more the model of the ed shed guy, right, the district office person, that was interacting with you as community

members? Is that accurate?

Mr. ROBINSON. I only interacted with him as a local representative. I work on the county level.

Mr. INGLIS. Yeah, so you worked with him in your capacity as

a county employee, right?

Mr. ROBINSON. County emergency management. Right.

Mr. INGLIS. You never worked for him.

Mr. ROBINSON. No, I did not.

Mr. INGLIS. And Mr. McKinnon, you never worked for him.

Mr. ROBINSON. No, sir. I never worked for him.

Mr. INGLIS. So, in that way, you, while your testimony is very

helpful in seeing that he is a very capable fellow, and substantiates

the decision of the Administration to hire him in the first place, to

go to the Center, you really can’t testify as to what it would be like

to work with him in a group of 46 people, sometimes 24 hours a

day, sleeping at the Center when a storm is bearing down. You

really don’t know what it would be like to be there with him in

that environment.

Mr. MCKINNON. And my comment would be, sir, we have worked

very closely over the years, and I found Mr. Proenza to be very approachable, very personable, and an effective leader.

Mr. INGLIS. Yeah.

Mr. MCKINNON. I don’t believe we have had enough time at the

National Hurricane Center to find out exactly, we haven’t even

gone through an entire hurricane season with him at the helm, to

find out exactly how effective he would be at the Hurricane Center.

Mr. INGLIS. Right. And of course, if 23 people of the 46 say that

he is not effective, and hurricane season is coming on, it sort of indicates it is a scary proposition, that 23 say the elementary school

71

teachers don’t have confidence in the elementary school principal,

and think perhaps he or she should go back to the district office.

And of course, I would ask my colleagues to be thinking about

how we have different relationships with our staff, perhaps, than

we do with our constituents. With our constituents, we can be very

friendly. They are out there. With our staff, we might have a very

different relationship. And so, it is a different role, right?

Mr. MCKINNON. Yes, sir, but I think the word be out if your staff

disliked you for that reason, and I have never heard that about Mr.

Proenza.

Mr. INGLIS. You know, I have always been amazed at Members

of Congress getting away with it. But anyway, I have no further

questions. Thank you.

RETURNING DIRRECTOR PROENZA TO HIS FORMER POSITION

Chairman LAMPSON. Just one thing, as we wrap this up. How

would either of you, Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Robinson, react to a

decision that would return Mr. Proenza to his former position as

Director of the Southern Regional Office?

Mr. ROBINSON. I would be very happy to hear that.

Mr. MCKINNON. Let me think about the question a moment, sir.

That is a very good question. I think Mr. Proenza has a lot of potential. I think he has a lot to offer the American public, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and to the National Weather Service. I think he would do the National Hurricane Center and the American public very proud, and I think he

would make it, again, not to say that it has lost its reputation, but

I think he would elevate its reputation back to the premiere hurricane center in the world, given the opportunity to advance the

ideas that he has.

Chairman LAMPSON. Gentleman, thank you. Does anyone else

have any? Mr. Diaz-Balart.

INVESTIGATING PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your

indulgence. And again, sort of speaking hypothetically, but—and

again, as someone who really likes Mr. Proenza, I think he is a

really good, decent man. And I think, not only that, that he is really trying to do the best job he can. And I don’t think, see, I don’t

think there are any evil people here. This is not a conspiracy thing.

I don’t buy that. I think it is what it is.

But let me just ask you this, then, kind of theoretically, as well.

If you all have a number of, you supervise an individual, and that

individual has a number of people that he or she supervises, and

if you get notified by those employees, half of them, the very people

that you really respect, that their supervisor, the person that works

under you, they cannot work with, that they are having major

problems with, and you know that it is a very important job, would

you ignore that request? Will you just say I don’t care what you

say, I am not going to do anything about it? Would you, in one way

or another, and there are different ways of doing that? Or would

you try to see what is actually going on, to make sure that things

are running smoothly?

72

Mr. MCKINNON. Are you directing the question to me, sir?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Whoever, you know, whoever wants to.

Mr. MCKINNON. I believe there is two sides to every story, as you

have said.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Absolutely.

Mr. MCKINNON. And for a matter of record, I do not want to cast

any doubt on the credibility or the professionalism of anyone at the

National Hurricane Center.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Which is what I hope we don’t do.

Mr. MCKINNON. Exactly. Thank you. Certainly not. Certainly

not.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right.

Mr. MCKINNON. I do believe, in this case, opposites do not attract, and we may have some friction there. As with any case, and

to answer your question, I do have people that report to me, and

I do have supervisors that report to me. If there is a problem that

the supervisor cannot resolve, then I do, if the information if

brought to me, I do question the supervisor, and I question the person who has made the allegations, and we try to come to a suitable

conclusion for all the parties that matter.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And I think, again, in a more hypothetical

way, I think that would be the only responsible, what I do now, we

can argue as to what procedure you should take, in order to do

that, but I think it would be, frankly, not reasonable to expect, if

you have people that are well respected, who complain, and maybe

they don’t have good reason to, I think it would be totally irresponsible to not try to find out whether there is something to those complaints. And the reason I mention that is because again, I don’t

think there are, I agree with you, I don’t think there are evil people

here. The people at the Hurricane Center, by the way, who have

not lost their reputation, who are incredible and who are very good,

despite what, again, you know, we all say some things that we

shouldn’t say, I am sure we regret up here, but I am talking about

Members of Congress, not you.

But when you have professionals at the Hurricane Center, with

good or not so good reasons, whether an individual there is making

the job impossible to do, I think it would be irresponsible to not

take measures, whether the right ones are taken or not, to try to

address. So, therefore, I don’t see how NOAA acted wrong. I don’t

see how Mr. Proenza acted wrong. I don’t see how the people in the

Hurricane Center acted wrong. I think what you have here is,

frankly, people that just can’t work together very well. It doesn’t

mean they are evil. It doesn’t mean they are not qualified, because

clearly, Mr. Proenza is qualified, and clearly, the people in the

Hurricane Center are qualified. And clearly, NOAA has tried to address it.

Would you disagree with that kind of general assessment?

Mr. ROBINSON. No, I think that is a reasonable statement. But

I don’t have all the inside knowledge.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Correct.

Mr. ROBINSON. And neither do you.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Correct.

Mr. ROBINSON. I mean, you have said that, and I think that,

given that, all we can do is look at it from the outside and evaluate

73

it. I have given my perspective, and you all will have to work from

your perspective.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And Mr. Chairman, we obviously appreciate

the perspective. Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. Gentlemen,

thank you very, very much for your time, your insight, your answers. May you all have a good day. I hope you make your flight,

and it is a nice one, and we will call you again.

At this point, well, shall we take—stand up, and take a deep

breath as he comes in. Admiral Lautenbacher will be—Vice Admiral Lautenbacher is the next witness.

[Recess.]

Panel III

Chairman LAMPSON. After a very brief recess, we welcome the

next panel, and that includes Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher,

who is the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

And also, Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Dr. Turner led the assessment team, at the request of Admiral Lautenbacher, and will testify on the assessment and the findings of the assessment team’s

report.

Again, as our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited

to five minutes, after which, we will ask, as Members of the Committee, five minutes, and it is also the common practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to being sworn in?

You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Is anyone

represented by counsel today?

So, if you will, please stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn]

Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, gentlemen. If you will have your

seats, and Dr. Lautenbacher, would you please begin?

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER,

JR. (U.S. NAVY, RET.), UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE; ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

(NOAA)

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking

Member Inglis, and distinguished Members of the Committee, and

staff. I am here at your request today to address issues concerning

the Tropical Prediction Center’s National Hurricane Center, and

the decision to place its Director, William Proenza, on leave.

Before I begin, however, I want to make clear to the Committee

and all residents of coastal states in no uncertain terms that

NOAA, the National Weather Service, and the TPC are fully prepared for this hurricane season. Our forecasting ability continues

to improve, and the American people can expect nothing less than

the full capabilities of the National Hurricane Center.

74

The scientists and forecasters at the TPC answer to one of the

highest callings in public service, the protection of life and property. They have dedicated their careers to preparing their fellow

citizens for the dangers brought on by tropical weather. When a

storm is bearing down, they continue to calmly provide accurate

and timely forecasts.

It is for these reasons that we want to provide them with all the

support they need to do their jobs.

In recent weeks, some concerns about operations at the TPC

have come to my attention. When Mary Glackin, a career NOAA

employee with 22 years of experience in the National Weather

Service and 30 in NOAA, became Acting Director of the Service on

June 11, 2007, she was aware of a need to improve managerial

rigor throughout National Weather Service operations. She promptly communicated to all senior staff the need for adherence to organizational policies, procedures, and the chain of command.

In response to information the TPC Director, William Proenza,

may have disregarded direct instructions from his supervisor, Ms.

Glackin specifically counseled Mr. Proenza about these matters on

June 14, 2007. On June 19, Ms. Glackin, responding to a request

of a TPC employee, participated in a conference call with 11 employees at the Hurricane Center, including seven of the nine hurricane specialists.

Despite expressing fear of retaliation for expressing their views,

the participants on the call said that they felt muzzled by Mr.

Proenza, that he lacked the knowledge of the hurricane program

necessary to make informed decisions about the future of the program and hurricane forecasts, and that his actions were generating

turmoil, fear, and a loss of cohesiveness at the Center.

When I was briefed about this call, I felt it was essential to look

into what appeared to be significant employee complaints, questioning whether they could do their job under Mr. Proenza’s leadership. In fact, I felt it would be irresponsible for a senior manager

not to get to the bottom of the issue. Concerned about the ramifications of this discontent during the middle of the hurricane season,

I decided we needed an immediate, fair, and impartial assessment

of these allegations, independent of the National Weather Service.

With lives potentially at stake, inaction was not an option.

Dr. Jim Turner, Deputy Director of the National Institute of

Standards and Technology, agreed to lead a team to assess operations at the TPC. The team was given a broad mandate to address

management, organizational structure, and operations. On Friday,

July 6, Dr. Turner provided preliminary findings. Specifically, the

Team advised that, based on their firsthand observations, ‘‘the continued presence of Director Proenza at the TPC will interfere with

the ability of the assessment team to complete its work.’’ Moreover,

it was the ‘‘unanimous opinion of the assessment team that Mr.

Proenza’s actions during the assessment have not only failed to

calm his staff, but have actually resulted in a level of anxiety and

disruption that threatens the TPC’s ability to fulfill its mission to

protect the American people.’’

The Team cited incidents where Mr. Proenza questioned a senior

forecaster at his workstation about his interview, approached other

staff to ask for their support before they spoke with the Team, and

75

conducted media interviews on the operations floor while hurricane

specialists were attempting to perform their regular duties.

After hearing from the Team, I advised Mr. Proenza on July 9

that he was being placed on leave, based on the Team’s determination that his presence threatened the Center’s ‘‘ability to fulfill its

mission to protect the American people.’’ On Friday, July 13, the

assessment team presented its final report. It found that ‘‘the

short-term ability of the TPC to provide accurate and timely information was put at risk due to the TPC director’s disruptive conduct

and the lack of trust between many staff and the director.’’ More

pointedly, the Team determined that ‘‘the TPC’s ability to achieve

its mission was seriously threatened because of the environment

which had been created by the director’s statements and actions.’’

Citing actions by Mr. Proenza that intimidated and alienated

staff, damaged teamwork, and produced fears of retaliation, the

Team concluded that ‘‘the negative work environment, exacerbated

by the director, has had—and is likely to continue to have—a major

deleterious impact on the center’s ability to fulfill its mission, if he

is allowed to return to his position.’’

The team recommended: ‘‘The current TPC Director should be reassigned and not be allowed to return to his position at the Center.

This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership

within the TPC rather than due to his public statements.’’ The assessment team also included a number of other recommendations

for improving operations at the TPC, the National Weather Service,

and NOAA. I have asked my Deputy Under Secretary to provide

a written review and response to these recommendations within

two weeks time.

Let me say at this point that William Proenza has a long and

distinguished career with the National Weather Services. Any decisions I may make with regard to these recommendations will be

made on the merits of the Team’s assessment of operations at the

National Hurricane Center, and not on any other issues or public

comments Mr. Proenza may have made.

A copy of the Team’s report, along with other relevant documents, has been included with the written testimony I have submitted for the record.

And finally, I would like to note that the official forecasts of the

Tropical Prediction Center do not come out of a computer. They do

not come out of a single satellite. Hurricane forecasting, at its core,

still comes down to a team of specialists coming together to analyze

all available data, and using their best expertise and wisdom to

make a forecast. The American people need to know that when a

storm is bearing down, those forecasters are focused on only one

thing, that they feel free to offer their views, and that they are supported at the very highest levels.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR.

I am here in response to your request for testimony on issues concerning the

Tropical Prediction Center’s National Hurricane Center. The Committee has asked

me to provide an account of events relating to the hiring of and recent decision to

place on leave the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center (‘‘TPC’’), Mr. William

Proenza.

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Before I begin, however, I want to make clear to the Committee and all the residents of coastal states in no uncertain terms that NOAA, the National Weather

Service and the TPC are fully prepared for this hurricane season. Our forecasting

ability continues to improve and the American people can expect nothing less than

the full capabilities of the National Hurricane Center.

The scientists and forecasters at the TPC answer to one of the highest callings

in public service—the protection of life and property. They have dedicated their careers to preparing their fellow citizens for the dangers brought on by tropical weather. When a storm is bearing down, they continue to calmly provide accurate and

timely forecasts.

It is for these reasons that we want to provide them with all the support they

need to do their jobs.

In summer 2006, the then-Director of the TPC, Max Mayfield, informed me of his

decision to retire, and D.L. Johnson, the then-Director of the National Weather

Service, initiated a search for a replacement. In November, General Johnson, with

the concurrence of the Deputy Under Secretary, General (Ret.) Jack Kelly, recommended to me that William Proenza be appointed as Director of the TPC.

Mr. Proenza began employment at the TPC on January 6, 2007. During January

to May 2007, Mr. Proenza made a series of statements to the media regarding the

TPC’s budget and the potential loss of NASA’s QuikSCAT research satellite. The

statements about the budget were not factually accurate and the statements about

the satellite were misleading and potentially detrimental in terms of public confidence in the Center’s forecasts. I felt that some of these statements could have

been the result of Mr. Proenza’s being new to the TPC and not yet up to speed in

terms of his new role. To address these concerns, I instructed senior management

to work with him throughout the spring and to provide him with the necessary information and training to succeed as TPC Director, including detailed budget information relating to TPC operations.

On June 11, 2007, Mary Glackin, a 30-year career NOAA employee with 22 years

of experience in the National Weather Service, became the Acting Director of the

National Weather Service. In assuming her duties, Ms. Glackin was made aware of

the need to improve managerial rigor throughout National Weather Service operations. Accordingly, at the outset of her tenure, Ms. Glackin communicated to senior

staff the need for adherence to organizational policies, procedures, and the chain of

command.

With respect to Mr. Proenza, Ms. Glackin was advised that since January, ‘‘there

[had] been times when [Mr. Proenza] may have disregarded the direct instructions

of [his] supervisor, the Director, National Centers for Environmental Prediction

(NCEP), or [had] made decisions on [his] own which [he] had no authority to make.’’

For example, Ms. Glackin had learned that Mr. Proenza instructed forecasters to

replace the TPC heading with the ‘‘National Hurricane Center’’ label on the March

4 High Seas forecast. Because this action embedded the word ‘‘hurricane’’ in the

forecast, it set off a ‘‘pan pan’’ alarm—a non-life threatening distress call—on every

ship in the Pacific Ocean. To make sure there was no misunderstanding and to clarify management expectations, Ms. Glackin issued a memorandum on ‘‘Operating

Procedures/Instructions,’’ dated Thursday June 14, (attached) and met with Mr.

Proenza in person in Florida the next day, to discuss its contents.

Ms. Glackin’s memo was not a reprimand. After identifying the ‘‘pan pan’’ alarm

and other instances over the past five months that had prompted her to prepare the

memo, it acknowledged that ‘‘[s]ome of this. . .might have resulted from some confusion as to the various roles and responsibilities in the [National Weather Service].’’ Ms. Glackin, however, wanted to reiterate to him her instructions about adhering to organizational policies, procedures and the chain of command, and that going

forward she ‘‘expect[ed] that [Mr. Proenza] and [his] staff will follow the directions

and the policies and procedures developed by NCEP.’’

In particular, Ms. Glackin asked Mr. Proenza to consult on a regular basis with

his direct supervisor on issues concerning ‘‘budget, science, research, and operational or administrative issues’’ that had ‘‘NOAA- or [National Weather Service]-

wide implications or public safety consequences.’’ Ms. Glackin expressly stated that

she was ‘‘available to resolve any disagreements,’’ once the two had discussed the

matter fully, and expressed the intention to ‘‘work together to ensure accurate predictions and to support the work of [the NCEP], [the National Weather Service], and

NOAA.’’

On the evening of June 18, Ms. Glackin received a request from an employee at

the TPC for a conference call. The call took place on Tuesday, June 19, with eleven

TPC employees participating. These included seven of the nine TPC Hurricane Specialists; the TPC Union Steward agreed this meeting was requested by the TPC

77

group and did not constitute a formal meeting requiring official notification to the

union.

During that call, Center employees raised several serious concerns about Mr.

Proenza’s actions, and whether they could do their job under Mr. Proenza’s leadership. These concerns are reflected in a memorandum for the record (attached) including:

• They feared Mr. Proenza would take retaliatory action against them if he

learned they were voicing their views, some stating they ‘‘were scared’’ of Mr.

Proenza and others that they were ‘‘deep[ly] concern[ed] that their future was

at stake if this meeting got out,’’

• They felt ‘‘muzzled’’ by Mr. Proenza, citing as an example the development

of priorities for improving hurricane forecasting agreed to by the hurricane

specialists, ‘‘but not approved by [Mr. Proenza],’’ and therefore not permitted

to go forward to NCEP/NWS,

• They lacked confidence in Mr. Proenza’s knowledge of the hurricane program

and were concerned that Mr. Proenza would make decisions about its future

without the required knowledge or willingness to listen to staff,

• They believed the QuikSCAT issue had been ‘‘overblown’’ and its representation in the media ‘‘is not accurate,’’

• They questioned his ‘‘integrity’’ and were ‘‘outraged’’ at his misrepresenting

the actions and views of his staff in the office and media, and

• They felt Mr. Proenza’s actions were generating ‘‘turmoil,’’ ‘‘anxiety,’’ ‘‘fear,’’ and a loss of ‘‘cohesiveness’’ at the Center.

Ms. Glackin and Dr. Uccellini were gravely concerned by what they had heard,

and communicated to me their conclusion that immediate action was necessary.

Given the fact that seven of the nine TPC Hurricane Center forecasters were expressing these concerns, it was their assessment that if the current situation persisted, the Center would have difficulty fulfilling its life-saving mission. Because of

the serious nature of the situation, I consulted with my chain of command and we

determined we had no other choice but to take action. Had we failed to act, we

would have been derelict in our duties as public servants charged with protecting

people’s lives.

However, in our judgment, the need for prompt action had to be balanced with

making sure we had a clear understanding of the situation and were fair to all concerned. We therefore decided that the right approach was to convene an independent assessment of the Center’s management and operations and its ability to

meet its mission, and to set a fairly short deadline for completion of this assessment.

Accordingly, on June 26, I requested that Dr. James Turner, NIST’s Deputy Director, lead a team to undertake this charge. A copy of my memo to Dr. Turner is attached. On July 2, a memo was distributed to all employees of the Tropical Prediction Center advising them that I had asked for this independent operational assessment (attached). I further stressed that the ‘‘candid views and opinions of the

entire TPC team are extremely important to this assessment’’ and encouraged ‘‘ev- eryone’s engagement, participation, and support of this endeavor without fear of retaliation or criticism.’’ I also advised staff that the Team would be touring the Center and would be available to conduct individual and group interviews.

On Friday, July 6, Dr. Turner and his team provided me with a preliminary assessment and recommendation regarding management of the Center (attached).

Specifically, the Team advised me that, based on their first-hand observations, ‘‘the

continued presence of Director Proenza at the TPC will interfere with the ability

of the assessment team to complete its work.’’ Moreover, it was the ‘‘unanimous

opinion of the assessment team that Mr. Proenza’s actions during the assessment

have not only failed to calm his staff but have actually resulted in a level of anxiety

and disruption that threatens the TPC’s ability to fulfill its mission to protect the

American people.’’ In a series of documented incidents, Mr. Proenza had questioned

a senior forecaster at his work station about his interview, which made the forecaster uncomfortable and upset; he approached other staff and asked for their support before they spoke with the Team; and he held media interviews on the operations floor about the assessment while the hurricane specialists were performing

their duties analyzing tropical activity. The team thus recommended that Mr.

Proenza be ‘‘temporarily removed from active direction of the Center until such time

as the assessment is complete and has been reviewed by NOAA management.’’

On Saturday, July 7, 2007, Ms. Glackin sent me a memo, agreeing with the recommendation of the assessment team, and recommending that Mr. Proenza be

placed on leave (attached).

78

The following Monday morning, July 9, Mr. Proenza was advised that he was

being placed on leave, and that the reason for doing so was based on the preliminary determination of the independent assessment team that his presence was

interfering with the Team’s completing its work, and resulting in a ‘‘level of anxiety

and disruption that threatens the [Center’s] ability to fulfill its mission to protect

the American people.’’ A copy of the memo issued to Mr. Proenza is attached to my

testimony. A memo was then distributed to Center employees advising them that

Mr. Proenza would be on leave until further notice, and that Deputy Director Ed

Rappaport would serve as acting Director of the Center during this period (attached).

On July 13, Dr. Turner and the assessment team completed the report. A copy

of the report is attached to my testimony. The team found that the TPC is technically equipped to continue to provide accurate and timely information regarding

hurricane-related activities. Specifically, the TPC’s readiness has been strengthened

by the addition of four new hurricane specialists in late 2006 (a two-thirds increase

over prior years), the addition of a new hurricane forecast model this year, additional buoys, and a new instrument on the hurricane reconnaissance planes that

will provide surface wind data.

At the same time, the Team found that ‘‘the short-term ability of the TPC to provide accurate and timely information was put at risk due to the TPC director’s disruptive conduct and the lack of trust between many staff and the director.’’ Even

more pointedly. ‘‘the Team concluded that the TPC’s ability to achieve its mission

was seriously threatened because of the environment which had been created by the

director’s statements and actions.’’ The team cited actions by Mr. Proenza that intimidated some staff, alienated others, damaged teamwork, and produced fears of

retaliation. In short, the Team found that ‘‘[t]he negative work environment, exacerbated by the director, has had—and is likely to continue to have—a major deleterious impact on the Center’s ability to fulfill its mission, if he is allowed to return

to his position.’’ Drawing on these findings, the Team recommended immediate action with respect to Mr. Proenza, due to his failure of leadership:

The current TPC Director should be reassigned and not be allowed to return

to his position at the Center. This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership within the TPC rather than due to his public statements

about [the] QuikSCAT satellite or NOAA leadership. A replacement should be

recruited as soon as possible through a nationwide, full and open competition.

I want to note that the report also includes a number of other recommendations

for improvement of the TPC, NCEP, NWS and NOAA. These include better management approaches (e.g., establishing ‘‘clear, written statements of authority for decision-making throughout the management chain at TPC’’), enhanced employee training and leadership development programs (e.g., ‘‘[i]nstitut[ing] formal succession

planning and leadership programs for developing staff from within’’), additional support for identifying and addressing technical needs, tighter linkages with the research and user communities (e.g., establishing a ‘‘user group to provide regular

input’’ to the Center), clearer visioning, improved organizational structure in certain

areas, stronger integration of the TPC into its parent organization, and constantly

improving public education and outreach. I have directed the Deputy Under Secretary, Jack Kelly, to lead a review of the report and provide a response to the

Team’s recommendations within two weeks’ time (attached). Following the same

procedures we have used in responding to GAO reports, General Kelly will comment

on the report’s findings and recommendations and detail the steps to be taken to

address the identified concerns.

Let me say at this point that William Proenza has a long and distinguished career

with the National Weather Service. Any decisions I may make with regard to these

recommendations will be made on the merits of the Team’s assessment of operations

at the National Hurricane Center and not on any other issues or public comments

Mr. Proenza may have made.

And finally, I’d like to note that the official forecasts of the Tropical Prediction

Center do not come out of a computer. They do not come from a single satellite.

Hurricane forecasting, at its core, still comes down to a team of specialists coming

together to analyze all available data and using their best expertise and wisdom to

make a forecast. The American people need to know that when a storm is bearing

down, those forecasters are focused on only one thing, that they feel free to offer

their views and that they are supported at the very highest levels. Again, the scientists and forecasters at the TPC—indeed, employees throughout the National

Weather Service and NOAA, including myself—answer to one of the highest callings

in public service—the protection of life and property, and we are fully prepared for

this hurricane season.

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Chairman LAMPSON. Thank you, Admiral. Dr. Turner, you are

recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES TURNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Dr. TURNER. Thank you, sir. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittees, I am providing information to you today pursuant to

the formal request I received in writing from the Chairman.

I am happy to provide a brief summary statement about the

work at the Tropical Prediction Center of the independent assessment team. Our team was composed of Matthew Heyman, National

Institute of Standards and Technology, John Gunther, Department

of Commerce, Kathy Kelly and Alexis Gutierrez, both of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.

We were charged to do the assessment. When we were charged

to do the assessment, we asked for a written scope. We were asked

to assess: One, the ability of the Tropical Prediction Center to continue to provide accurate and timely information; two, whether the

management and organization structure facilitates TPC achieving

its mission; and three, the extent to which lessons learned from recent hurricanes, including whether the 2005 Gulf Coast events

have been incorporated.

Please note that these are management issues. The assessment

was not intended to be a technical referendum on the efficacy of

the QuikSCAT satellite. Discussion of QuikSCAT was only pertinent to us, insofar as it impacted the three areas the Team was

asked to assess. So that we would be clear on what our mission

was, we also asked that our work be considered independent. We

zealously guarded that independence, and that independence was

scrupulously respected by NOAA management.

Our process involved visiting the Center twice, touring the facilities, and being available to all employees, including the Director,

who wanted to speak with us. We made ourselves available to the

employees at times that would not interfere with their work schedule. In all, 31 of the 46 Center employees voluntarily came forward

to answer the prepared questions we had. Each employee was also

offered the opportunity to comment on any areas they felt pertinent

to our scope, which were not addressed in our questions.

Every employee we interviewed was provided with a written

draft summary of what we thought we heard as their responses.

The employees were free to correct the draft if errors were detected. Using the interviews, as well as our personal observations

and firsthand experience at the Center, we developed a set of findings to address our charge. Where we thought pertinent, we provided recommendations.

The report was delivered to Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher on

July 13, 2007. At this point, sir, would you like for me to provide

a brief summary of the findings and recommendations?

Chairman LAMPSON. Yes, sir. Please.

Dr. TURNER. First, we divided the findings up according to the

three areas we were charged to address. First, the ability of the

TPC to continue to provide accurate and timely information regarding hurricane-related activities. Across the board, staff members of

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the TPC are highly dedicated to achieving the mission of saving

lives and protecting property.

We also looked at the technical capability, as well as the work

environment. And from a strictly technical standpoint, the TPC is

equipped to continue to provide accurate and timely information.

However, the short-term ability of the TPC to provide accurate and

timely information was put at risk due to the Director’s disruptive

conduct, and the lack of trust between many staff and the Director.

The negative work environment, exacerbated by the Director, has

had and is likely to continue to have a major deleterious impact on

the Center’s ability to fulfill its mission, if he is allowed to return

to this position.

By the same token, simply replacing the Director will not resolve

the Center’s workplace issues. If staff morale and longstanding organizational issues are not addressed, they will hinder the Center’s

ability to accomplish its mission. In the longer-term, the TPC faces

some potential degradation of its capabilities, if current data about

wind speed and direction, wind vectors over the oceans, are no

longer available due to the loss of QuikSCAT, before similar or better data are available, through a yet to be designed alternative instrument.

The second charge, whether the management and organizational

structure facilitates their achieving their mission. The lack of effective supervisory oversight from NOAA, the National Weather Service, NCEP, and TPC management, has contributed significantly to

longstanding problems at the Center, as well as the disruption over

the last six months.

And finally, to whether lessons learned were incorporated, we

used as our source document the Service Assessment from Katrina.

We found that the lessons learned were, in fact, incorporated, that

there were several best practices identified, and that there were research challenges remaining, the primary one of which was the

forecast of intensity.

Among our recommendations, the current TPC Director should

be reassigned, and not be allowed to return to his position at the

Center. This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership within the TPC, rather than due to his public statements

about the QuikSCAT satellite, or NOAA leadership. A replacement

should be recruited as soon as possible, through a nationwide full

and open competition. Morale problems and division among staff

must be addressed as a high priority, for the good of the Center,

and to ensure that the organization can perform its mission.

NCEP, the National Weather Service, and NOAA should increase

their focus on the critical technical needs in hurricane forecasting,

including improved Earth ocean surface vector wind data, intensity, understanding and forecasting, and modeling. NOAA leadership at all levels must require the highest level of conduct and performance from its employees and its managers. Supervisors must

know that they will be supported in the management of their operations, and held accountable for failure to manage effectively.

NOAA must communicate aggressively, in plain language, key

facts, and rebut erroneous information about its hurricane to stakeholders, the public, and then, we have a number of things after

that.

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DISCUSSION

NOAA’S REACTION TO THE PROBLEMS WITH DIRECTOR

PROENZA

Chairman LAMPSON. That is fine. We may get to some of those

during our questioning, and I appreciate your testimony. We, at

this time, will go into our rounds of questioning, and I will yield

myself five minutes.

Admiral Lautenbacher, when did you learn of the complaints

from the Center?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I learned about the complaints on June

the 19th, in a phone call from Mary Glackin, who is the Acting Director of the Weather Service.

Chairman LAMPSON. Was it the day before you came to visit me?

Well, actually, the day before you came to visit me, Mr. Proenza

and the Center must have been pretty much on your mind, for on

June 26, you sent a note over to the head of NIST, asking that Dr.

Turner be loaned to NOAA to head up a review team.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. When I came to see you, we were very

concerned about the personnel issue at the Hurricane Center, and

were working on ways to deal with it.

Chairman LAMPSON. Was the communication that you sent on

that day the first communication between NOAA and NIST regarding who might be detailed to such a team?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. The first communication, I think was,

I signed on June 26, and that is the first one that I am aware of

at this point, that we, in order to set in motion the kinds of procedures and process that was necessary, we needed to ensure that we

had the right documents, the right charge, that the Team agreed

with it, people were involved, so that was the beginning of the

process.

Chairman LAMPSON. On that same day, you produced a brief outline of what you wanted the Team to review. When was the first

draft of that produced, and by whom?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I don’t recall. I can try to take that for

the record. It was certainly one of my staff.

Chairman LAMPSON. On June 26 also, you received legal authority to take managerial actions against Mr. Proenza. Do you remember receiving that authority?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, I do. The background on that is

that the Secretary of Commerce holds the authority to reassign and

transfer members of the level of employment at which Mr. Proenza

is at. I can’t overemphasize the extraordinary concerns that I felt

from what Mary Glackin had relayed to me, and when I expressed

that to the Department, they felt that we needed to have a way to

ensure that if there were some immediate problems, that we would

have some way to deal with them. It was clearly a backup mechanism to ensure that we would not undermine the ability of that

team to function to forecast hurricanes.

Chairman LAMPSON. And so, while you were working to put together the team that will get to the bottom of the situation at the

Center, you were also securing the authority to get rid of or reassign Proenza. And yesterday, the staff were told by the head of the

review team, that they were going into their review of the HurriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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2 Inserted in the record on pp. 19–22.

cane Center with no preconceived notions. That doesn’t seem that

you shared that attitude. When did you first meet with the review

team?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I have always been interested in a fair

and impartial review of what was going on at the Hurricane Center, and I would ask you, you can ask Dr. Turner about his feeling

of independence or not, but that was where I was going. I have

never been, I have never publicly stated or been involved in any

issues other than trying to make the situation such that Mr.

Proenza could succeed in his task as the head of the Hurricane

Center. As I said, it was purely a backup to ensure that if there

were some situation that came up, that we could move quickly, and

not undermine the capability of the Center.

Chairman LAMPSON. Did you tell them that you had sought the

authority to transfer or reassign Mr. Proenza?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I don’t recall whether I told them that

or not.

Chairman LAMPSON. What did you tell them about him? What

was your charge to them?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. My charge to them is in the document

that we provided, which indicates the three tasks that we asked

them, and my personal conversations, as far as I can recall, were

in line with the written document that we had provided, and the

charge that we gave to the Team.

Chairman LAMPSON. I am going to yield back my time, and yield

time now to Chairman Miller.

THE PROENZA PLAN

Chairman MILLER. Good afternoon. Admiral Lautenbacher, you

said that you first heard of any problems at the Center on June

19.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. There was an April 21 mail2 that spoke

of a five-step Proenza plan, and it said that you had asked for that.

What is the Proenza plan, what were the five steps? What was the

purpose of it? What was that all about?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. That is a euphemism for us trying to

help Bill to accommodate to his new position. We had asked and

talked about, and I can’t expressly remember who had what idea,

but we felt the following, that first of all, he is in a new position,

and for any employee, and certainly at the SES level, there is a requirement that you have a performance plan, so that their progress

and their expectations of the management can be outlined and

agreed to by the employee.

I wanted to make sure, first of all, confirmation from the chain

of command that that was in place, because he had just come into

a new position from an older position, and that needed to be done.

The next step was that it was time for a mid-year review. You are

required to consult with your employees, and to have a face to face

meeting, in terms of telling them how they have done, where they

are going, and you know, advocating what needs to be done with

them. Those were two.

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Three was, given some of the misleading statements that had

been in the press, that we asked him to, I wanted the chain of command to provide some ethics training. And four was to, and these

are not, there is no five step program. This was designed to give

him the material and tools in order to make him a more effective

Director. Fourth was the information and direct connection with

our budget activities, so that he would have full and free access,

and the information on how much was being spent on various

issues, and particularly, his part of the world. And then, five was

media training. He is responsible for his statements in public, and

is, quite frankly, the most visible spokesman of NOAA, and it is

very important that he do that job well.

So, those were the five kinds of steps. They were designed to provide for him the tools to make him successful in the job.

Chairman MILLER. Why did you ask legal to look at it? The email

says Eddie said he wanted to get legal to look it over.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Because I asked the HR folks, I wanted

to make sure, I am very deferential to protecting the rights, as a

career person myself, I am very deferential to protecting the rights

of career employees, making sure that we do not, management does

not overstep the bounds of what is proper, right and proper, in

order to supervise and maintain adequate control and management

of all employees, so it was a check to make sure that we were not

overstepping any potential bounds.

NOAA DOCUMENTS

Chairman MILLER. There have been no subpoena issues by this

committee. We have described to NOAA what kinds of documents

we want provided. We got 700 pages of documents last night. Excuse me, 284. You have mentioned legal here. Of course, none of

this is subject to a subpoena, but has NOAA provided all the documents that meet the description that we provided you, of the documents that we want? Have any been withheld on any claim of lawyer-client privilege or executive privilege, or decisional process

privilege, or Privacy Act privilege, or any other basis?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. None of that for the documents we provided, and I am certainly going to state, and that your staff knows,

we have not provided, we have not completed the document search.

We are working as quickly as we can to provide all of the information you need. We want to cooperate with your need to review everything, and we are continuing to work on that as fast as we can.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. And we will continue to get documents

from you, then.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, sir. You will continue to get documents from us.

THE MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

Chairman MILLER. Fine. The way that this management assessment was described, or as Mr. Proenza learned of it, was that he

got a call, as they were arriving, from you. So, that was the first

he learned of it, that other employees at that Center knew about

it, knew the Team was coming, but for him, they showed up at his

door, and that seems to be, apparently was intentional, a plan.

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It sounds more like law enforcement serving a search warrant

than a management assessment. Why was it done in that way?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. That was not the intention at all. The

issue was to try to protect the rights of both Mr. Proenza and the

employees. I am not aware of who knew or didn’t know before

whatever, but I know that arrangements were made logistically to

ensure that someone knew that there would be some people coming, so that there would be someone to—— Chairman MILLER. But was there a decision, a conscious decision

that Mr. Proenza would not know that there was a management

assessment team on the way?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. There was a conscious decision to try to

make this as, let us see, what is the right term here, we wanted

to assess the situation as it was. We were very concerned, I was

concerned, based on what I heard from Mary Glackin about reprisals, and the employees’ concerns, so the issue was to try to, to the

best that we could, and this isn’t some big secret operation, this is

just to try to do it as a snapshot of the way this, the way the operation functions, and to do it in a way that didn’t alarm either Mr.

Proenza or the employees. That was the intent.

Chairman MILLER. Have you sent in management teams in similar circumstances, and not told the head of the office that they

were arriving until they were at his doorstep?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I have not done that, have not had the

need to do that in my term as the head of NOAA. I have done it

a number of times in my Navy career, and it is a normal process

to have reviews that are done as daily business is occurring, in

order to not to disrupt the command, which is another issue. We

didn’t want them to spend a lot of time trying to prepare, and create a great deal of, perhaps, consternation, and as I said, concern

about the reaction the employees would have if Mr. Proenza and

they were trying to prepare for some, and again, it was an assessment, a snapshot assessment. It was not designed in any other

way, except to uncover the facts.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. I have more questions, but there will

be an additional round. Mr. Inglis for five minutes.

COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN WITH DIRECTOR PROENZA

Mr. INGLIS. Admiral, Chairman Lampson was concerned in his

questions about why it was that you didn’t mention it, the pending

action involving the Team going in to see Mr. Proenza, at the time

that you met with him, Chairman Lampson. Is that, in retrospect,

a good decision on your part, or——

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I believe so, because at the time, we

had not completed the full discussion and deliberation process to

make a final decision on exactly how it would be conducted, try to

ensure protections if we were to do it, and exactly when we would

do it, and what the results, the plan had not been formulated at

that point, when I saw the Chairman.

Mr. INGLIS. Now, suppose, my take on that if it is a personnel

matter, it is really not ripe for discussion. Is that right? I mean,

in other words, we don’t exactly discuss, you wouldn’t naturally,

you wouldn’t take it upon yourself to discuss personnel matters

that aren’t yet decided.

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Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I would not do that as a normal course

of action. I did advise the Committee, and called, personally called

a number of people on Monday to tell them of what the issue was,

and how we were going to try to deal with it, because I am very

respectful that this committee needs to understand what is going

on at an area as sensitive as the Hurricane Center.

Mr. INGLIS. And you could have simply terminated Mr. Proenza.

Is that correct?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. There is a misunderstanding here

about the authority. I don’t have any authority that is not granted

in the normal personnel regulations, that comes from the laws that

Congress provides, and as are distributed to us from the Office of

Personnel Management. There is a very clear procedure that one

must go through, and I would never, in my wildest imagination,

think of violating any due process and procedures in providing all

the rights that accompany that. So, I was not interested in anything to do with dismissal or removal at that point.

Mr. INGLIS. But sending in a team, was that required? Were you

required to send in an assessment team, or could you have taken

more direct action if you wanted to, against Mr. Proenza?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. If I had wanted to, I could have taken

more direct action. I did not feel it was appropriate to take more

direct action, or I could have instituted more direct action, and

more respectfully. And remember that Mary actually recommended

that more direct action be taken. I wanted to ensure that

everybody’s rights were protected, Mr. Proenza’s, as well as the employees that work for him.

Mr. INGLIS. And Dr. Turner, in retrospect, would you think it is

the right decision to go without notice? Chairman Miller mentioned

that concern, that it was without notice to Mr. Proenza that you

all showed up. Is that, in retrospect, the right thing to do, you

think, or—— Dr. TURNER. I just find it very difficult to answer, because it is

a hypothetical, and I have not thought about that, and I don’t

know. There may have been some other situations and circumstances that I was not aware of, and so, I would certainly not,

you know, based on what I knew, I would certainly not be in a position to second guess decisions made by the Admiral or anyone

else.

Mr. INGLIS. Yeah. Well, it seemed to me that actually, you would

want to go in quickly and without notice. And I know that Chairman Miller seems to think that is untoward, or appears to think

it is untoward. I would think that is exactly what is indicated in

the circumstances, because otherwise, you put everybody on notice,

they are going to go around getting their stories together. They are

going to spend time of the agency developing arguments, rather

than keeping on doing their work, and let us just come in here and

check and see what is happening here. So, it seems to me a rather

reasonable decision.

Also, I am almost out of time, but it appears to me, Admiral, you

have had a lot of experience in the Navy, and I would assume that

the teacher analogy you may have heard, that I used out in the

hallway with some teachers, that the great, that the person that

is best at being the elementary school principal may not be the

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same person that performs well at the district office, and vice

versa.

I suppose that has been your experience, and I hope that somehow, we leave here having delved, unfortunately, rather publicly,

into a personnel matter that may damage the reputation of Mr.

Proenza in the end, but he could be restored as somebody that can

perform well in a number of circumstances, and maybe just didn’t

fit in this. Is that how you think this might, this footnote in history

be written?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Obviously, I can’t describe what actions

I am going to take, because I haven’t gotten the recommendations

that I have asked for from my deputy. But my track record, and

you can ask many people, has been always to try to ensure that

people are in the right billets, that they are given the opportunities

to perform at their highest level. I believe in the inherent dignity

and rights of every individual, and I have always worked to try to

put people in the right jobs, and to ensure their success, and I will

continue to do that.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, how are

you, sir?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I am fine. Thank you, sir.

WITNESS BACKGROUND

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Admiral, just for my information, you know,

we call you Admiral, but, because you were an Admiral, and obviously, you still have the title. How long were you in the Navy?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I was in the Navy for 40 years.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Forty years. That is kind of a small mom and

pop operation, right? The Navy, you didn’t have to supervise a lot

of people then, did you?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I have had experience at all levels in

supervising, small groups to very large groups.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you for your service to the country, that

you continue to do. Mr. Turner, Dr. Turner, I was also, by the way,

it is just when I was looking at your resume, sir, it is pretty impressive. I just think it is good for us to hear this. I might embarrass you, because I know you are, but I just, you know, when you

have got people of this caliber in front of you, I think it is important to say this is a man who has received the U.S. Government

Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Service, three times received the U.S. Department of Energy Exceptional Service Award,

earned the Secretary of Energy Gold Award, and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Gold Medal.

It is a privilege to be in your presence, sir, and to both of your

presence.

Dr. TURNER. Thank you very much, sir.

RESPONSIBILITIES AS A SUPERVISOR

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You know, we have something here that is

kind of almost, I guess, without precedent. I don’t know how many

times, I have never, I have only been in Congress for a few years.

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It is only my third term, but I don’t—Dr. Turner or Admiral, have

you all ever been in a position where half of the staff publicly

manifests itself against a supervisor, publicly, and even with the

press? Is that something normal? Again, as a rookie, I am, you

know, I just, is that something that happens a lot in the Federal

Government?

Dr. TURNER. I have had about 30 years in the Federal Government, and I have not run into that type of situation, where there

has been a public outcry such as that.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Dr. Turner, in your years of being a supervisor, if however something like that would have happened, would

you have thought it would have been responsible to not act and try

to find out what is going on, and kind of ignore the situation, and

not try to come up with a way to try to figure out what is wrong,

or you know, what is going on?

Dr. TURNER. Yes, sir. I think it is part of the responsibility of a

supervisor, and also, I think in some cases similar to this, the difficulty is getting employees to speak on the record. That often is

difficult, because one cannot act unless they go on record, because

it is not fair to the person being accused, and it is also not fair to

the person who ultimately has to make a decision. And it is not fair

to the employees expecting something to happen, but they need to

go on record, and I think these people went on record, and I think,

again——

ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER’S ACTIONS

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. That is pretty clear. Admiral, let me—if I

sound critical, I just learned now that you could have, once you got

the information from Acting Secretary Glackin, you could have, on

your own, acted to, you know, move Mr. Proenza. And yet, what

you did instead is you created this, you asked people to go in and

look at what is going on. Would it not be, frankly, a fair criticism

saying that, knowing of the importance of the Hurricane Center,

that we are now in the middle of a hurricane season, that you

frankly were not aggressive enough, and didn’t act quick enough,

because of what is at stake here? I mean, isn’t that a fair criticism,

to say that maybe you were not aggressive and quick enough?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. That is a fair criticism, and I have

thought long and hard about that, too, and tried to find the right

compromise to ensure rights were protected, and that we were

doing the right thing for the American people. It is a very difficult

decision.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And within that decision, Admiral, so you were

aware of the importance of the Hurricane Center, and the fact that

we are in a hurricane season, and yet, you still thought that you

would be a little bit slower, and I guess a little bit more deliberative, and you actually got this group of individuals, I already mentioned some of the awards that Dr. Turner has earned. So, you obviously found a pretty qualified group of individuals, and you did

not just act, you actually, what, you wanted to make sure that Mr.

Proenza and the individuals, the highly qualified scientists and

others at the Hurricane Center, had the ability to really, what, air

it out without fear of retribution? Is that what you did, even

though, knowing that you would have had to slow down in order

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to do that? Even though we are in the middle of a hurricane season?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. I did, and I felt that if there were any

indications, first of all, I watched the weather situation very closely, because I was not going to do this in a period when we had serious tropical activity, and needed to have full efforts placed on the

hurricane forecasting, so that was part of the decision as well.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Admiral. So again, and I am, you

know, I am not being critical, but I just want to make sure that

it is very clear that you could have done it quicker. You could have

done it without Dr. Turner and other career service, frankly, heroes

to our nation, looking at this, but you didn’t, even though we are

in the hurricane season, and I guess what, and I just want to make

sure I understand this, because you just wanted to make sure that

it was done right, not necessarily done as quickly as possible, but

done right, and even knowing that that, in itself, you could have

been accused, you could be accused, I mean, I guess someone might

say that I am, of not doing it as quick as you could have done,

knowing the fact that it is not usual for people in the Federal Government, half the employees, to publicly say we want this individual to go?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. That is correct.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Klein for five minutes.

MORE ON QUIKSCAT

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,

Admiral, and thank you, Dr. Turner for your service. We appreciate

it.

I am not going to spend my time on the personnel issues, other

than just to say that the reason probably that this is going on right

now is because there are probably some statements made, when

Mr. Proenza brought forth his comments on QuikSCAT from

NOAA. There is probably some personnel management issues within, that certainly have left some smoking guns out there for people

to make these situations.

I have heard what you all said today. I appreciate the process

you went through. It probably stirred some things up down there,

and maybe that was the right thing to do, to get to the bottom of

it. I agree this is the middle of the hurricane season. Those of us

who live in Florida and other places around the country, we are as

concerned, and I appreciate your closing statement there, about the

responsibilities that NOAA and the Hurricane Center and the personnel take extremely seriously, and I appreciate that, because I

don’t question any of that.

I am going to go back to QuikSCAT, and go back to the equipment and the tools and those kinds of things. I am fairly convinced

that there is some relevance to QuikSCAT, based on what I have

heard up to this point, whether it is marine activities, or whether

it is some level of evaluation tool that is used by the forecasters.

When I went down to the Hurricane Center, they specifically told

me that it has some relevance. Whether it is 15 percent, or some

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contribution, I think we all agree that the more tools, and the more

information on the table, the better the analysis can be.

And the question that I asked, you know, your organization early

on, when I started raising some issues about this, is what is the

backup, which I now believe is, you know, being thoroughly evaluated. I was concerned it wasn’t for as long as it should have been,

and I hope that we have all learned that process since then, that

we should be in a better position, and continue to move along, and

I want to encourage that, so that we, if this thing does fail, whenever it fails, that we really have all the tools in place.

We have had some other testimony today about this, and just

give me your sense of, your professional sense of if it does fail, you

know, how far off are we, in terms of you are recognizing yes, we

have most of what we need, but how far off are we, and are you

satisfied that between the various tracking tools we have, that we

are going to be in a sufficient position?

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Yes, thank you, and I appreciate your

comments. First of all, let me caveat. I am trained as a scientist,

and I consider myself a scientist, but in this role, I am a manager,

so I take the advice of my practicing scientists, and so, that is what

you are hearing, that temporized through my interpretation as a

scientist.

But I view the QuikSCAT as a very important instrument, because it brings the surface vector wind field. I won’t say it is the

Holy Grail of forecasting, but it is a really nice thing to have. As

a fluid dynamicist, I would like to have, that is an important variable.

We had planned, obviously, for many years before QuikSCAT

was determined to be so effective, which happened in the last year

or two, that we got into that, to use conical microwave imaging and

sounding to provide those variables, those fields. So, we are at the

cutting edge, kind of, of instrumentation to provide this surface

vector wind field. We have been using the QuikSCAT information,

that is an experimental satellite, that had been built by NASA. It

has been working fine, and we expect it to keep working. I will

keep my fingers crossed, but—and so, I view that, for this season,

we are in good shape.

We have put on, in our partnership with Europe, we have

EUMETSAT, a polar orbiting satellite that has something called

ASCAT on it, which is a scatterometer, an active instrument. It is,

on specs, not quite as good as the QuikSCAT scatterometer, but

that now is operating, and is in place, and it will be here until 2020

continuously. I have directed, and I am sure you are aware of that,

that that be taken into account and looked at, and put into the

models, to see how much of a difference that would make in a

model, and remember, we are talking about a model, not necessarily, remember, forecasts are made by forecasters, not by computers. It is still an art, in a sense.

And so, that system is in place, but in addition to that, we continue to put in place one improvement after another. This year, we

are putting seven new hurricane buoys in place. It will be a ground

truth on the surface of the ocean. Never had that before. We have

more accurate wind measurement instruments going on our Hurricane Hunter aircraft, which are very important for landfalling hurVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Jul 06, 2008 Jkt 036736 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\071907\36736 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ricanes, which is very important. In fact, remember, the

scatterometer is most useful for hurricanes that are away from

land, and for tropical storms, basically, not landfalling hurricanes,

because of the speed limitation on QuikSCAT.

So, there is a number of issues. I can keep going on, but I am

afraid that I am going—— Mr. KLEIN. That is okay, and I am aware of where I am going

with this.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. It is not part of what this hearing is.

NEXT GENERATION FORECASTING TOOLS

Mr. KLEIN. Where I am going with this, and this is part of where

I am interested in, and I think Members of Congress are, is whether we have the adequate tools in place, and you know, there is a

history that, I am a new Member of Congress, but there is a history, apparently, the last number of years, of a lot of money that

was put down the drain, in a technology that has not gotten us

where we wanted to be, and that was sort of going to be the next

generation of where we are going with some of the, you know,

equipment.

So, I want to be supportive. I know Members want to be supportive of giving you the tools, including research, so I am interested in knowing, on the research side, you know, what connects

we need, where do we need to be helpful, but at the same time,

there has got to be a good, frank, honest, and open relationship

with the Congress and the American people, to make sure that, you

know, we have the backing of the taxpayers, to know we are doing

the right thing.

But we have to have this, and it is very important that whether

it is QuikSCAT or anything else, I don’t want to hear a month ago

oh well, it is very important, very important, and all of a sudden,

with Mr. Proenza’s situation in the middle of this, it is not important, it is not important, it is not important. And then, I hear some

backtracking from some folks. That is the credibility gap that has

developed out of this whole dynamic, which I think needs to be

flushed out and gotten off the table, and we need to move on.

Admiral LAUTENBACHER. Can I make just two comments, and I

know Dr. Turner is interested? First of all, I know it was just a

euphemism, but I do not believe money has been poured down a

rat hole on the satellite programs. What we have is a problem

where the technical difficulties involved in creating the next generation of instruments took more time and more money than anybody ever anticipated to deliver, so we have had to reduce some of

the risk on that, so that we have the schedule, and they can be delivered. That has been. That is back on track. So, that is good.

Now, QuikSCAT is a potential filler of this surface vector wind

field, we have pushed money in the direction. We have a study

going. We are trying to look at a replacement for QuikSCAT based

on the renewed, or I would say, probably new interest that it is the

only, or it is the best replacement for that field, as a matter of priority. And we are working on that with a study, and we will make

decisions as quickly as we can make them responsibly, and come

to you as the Oversight Committee, and say this is the right place

to invest money.

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Mr. KLEIN. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Turner, you can respond to that. We are

getting close to the end, but go ahead, Dr. Turner.

Dr. TURNER. Yes, sir. I think the discussion about QuikSCAT has

two dimensions, and certainly, one dimension that has been discussed quite a bit here, and that is the scientific dimension, and

certainly, dialogue and discussion about the science and so forth of

QuikSCAT and its replacement, are certainly ripe fields for people

to talk about.

I think what concerned us in our assessment was the misrepresentation that Mr. Proenza made about the, about what his staff

was telling him about QuikSCAT and its importance to them and

their forecasting. We were told on several occasions that his staff

corrected his statements, told him why they thought that they were

being taken out of context, and he continued to misrepresent their

views, and I think that is the part that made them lose confidence

in his integrity.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman. Just for the record, and I know my

time is up, for the record, I did go down to the National Hurricane

Center, as I said before. I asked two specific forecasters, veteran

forecasters, specifically about the statements that Mr. Proenza was

making, and they validated them independently. It was just a private conversation, but I was interested, and just they showed me,

and they said yeah, this is true, and this is what the value is. So,

I don’t know what has been said since then, but it was a firsthand

expression to me, and I know that was there. Now, what has happened since then, and different people can have different opinions,

but I want to put that on the record.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Turner, you can complete your statement.

Dr. TURNER. It is fine.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. All right. I know that there are further

questions that I have, but we have spent the better part of the day

in this hearing. We have more documents to receive. Mr. DiazBalart.

ADDITIONAL WITNESSES WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And thank you, and Mr. Chairman, you have

been very generous, and also, I will be quick, but I do think it is

one of the things that I wish in hindsight, well, even though we

asked for it, it would have been helpful, in order to clarify some

of these questions, to get others to testify. None of those people

that Congressman Klein and I spoke to on all sides of these issues

were frankly invited to be up here, and I think that is frankly a

little bit of a disservice, but again, I am not here to point a finger.

I just want to make that point, that I think it would have been a

more helpful, since we are, unfortunately, I guess, going to continue to try again to push personnel issues as Members of Congress. If we are going to do that, at least it would have been nice

to have all of the people involved, and not just some.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Well, under our rules, the Minority is allowed

to bring witnesses, and have. I think Dr. Turner is a witness of the

Minority.

125

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We brought him. We,

again—— Chairman MILLER. We will continue to—— Mr. DIAZ-BALART. He would have been good to have—— Chairman MILLER. It is almost certain that we will have another

hearing on this topic, since we still do not have all of the documents. And that is, let me take back the implication that that was

a criticism. I know we have asked, with a very short time, for documents. We do need the documents. We do need to look at this.

Now, the Minority has said that for us to look at this is simply a

personnel issue, but for you to look at was the Lord’s own work,

that you had to look at it, you had to make sure that the National

Hurricane Center, the Hurricane Center was doing its work.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. That is their job.

Chairman MILLER. Well, agreed. It is also our job in exercising

oversight to know what goes on. And they are, I began this hearing, and I know that Mr. Lampson wishes to make a final remark

as well. I began this hearing saying I did not know what had happened at that hearing. Mr. Inglis has used the phrase, the Majority’s theory of the case. This isn’t a case, I don’t have a theory. I

want to know what has happened.

This exploded into national attention a couple weeks ago. I think

we all found out about it at the same time. I think we all see this

as important. It is important. It is important to our role as Members of the Committee that has oversight jurisdiction of NOAA, of

the Hurricane Center, to find out what is going on. And there is

a lot more that I want to know.

There will be other witnesses. As I pointed out earlier this week,

in a hearing of these two subcommittees, I don’t want to hear complaints at the hearing about the procedures that we are using when

there has been ample opportunity, leading up to the hearing, to

talk about it. If there are witnesses that the Minority wishes to

call, let us know about it. Our staffs are in constant contact. The

Members know how to talk to each other as well.

Members can get the cell phone numbers of other Members. My

home telephone number in Raleigh is in the phonebook. I am visible on the floor, we can find each other, and to hear about, hear

complaints of the procedures of the Committee, about who we have

called or not called at the hearing, does make me wonder if the

purpose of the complaints is simply to distract attention from the

subject of the hearing.

There are still questions that I have. The Minority has drawn

out, in its questioning, the question about whether Mr. Proenza

would retaliate against anyone, and that is why this management

team needed to show up unannounced, which I am sure felt, to all

the employees there, like law enforcement serving a search warrant. I do not think that is an ordinary procedure. The ordinary

way that a management team comes in to look at how an office,

a center is being run.

MORE ON STATE OF HURRICANE FORECASTING

There has been disputed question here about how well we are integrating the best science into our forecasting. I have heard, like

Mr. Klein, not in anticipation of this hearing, not with somebody,

126

from someone with any axe to grind, but someone with expertise

in atmospheric research, in meteorological research, who has told

me that the forecasting by the Hurricane Center is not what it

should be. It is not what we should expect with where science is

today, and particularly, as others have pointed out since I raised

the issue, intensification, intensity of hurricanes, forecasting intensity is not what it should be.

I have also heard inland flooding, forecasts of inland flooding is

far short of what it should be. Virtually all the lives lost in my

state from hurricanes in the last few years have been from inland

flooding. If we can be much better at that, as I have been told we

can be, we should be, and I want to make sure yes, there are some

parallels here to the case of Moose Cobb, the Inspector General at

NASA.

When an important agency of government appears to melt down,

it is appropriate for us to look at what has happened. Was it the

case that there was resistance at the Center to changes that needed to happen to improve the science, to do a better job of forecasting? Is that what happened?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman MILLER. Well, in a moment, I will.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, sir.

Chairman MILLER. In a moment.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. We welcome, we depend upon critics within

government to tell us what is going on. Our job of oversight depends upon people within the government, employees speaking

freely to us, to tell us what questions to raise. There is no question

that Mr. Proenza was a critic, was willing to speak his mind, was

willing to stand up to superiors in this department, in NOAA, in

the Weather Service.

We certainly—it is certainly appropriate to look at whether that

is part of what happened here. Was this genuinely a revolt by

those below him, or was this something provoked by those above

him in the hierarchy? Those are all the questions that I still have,

that this hearing has not answered, and we still have a good many

more documents to be provided.

I know Mr. Lampson wishes to be recognized, so let me recognize

Mr. Diaz-Balart first, and then, Mr. Lampson.

ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.

You are very kind to recognize me.

You know, I don’t disagree with a lot of your questions, and I

think the issue, as to whether we are getting the best forecasting

available is something that this committee needs to look at, and

needs to continue to look at. Obviously, I question whether we

should be dealing in the personnel issue, but if we are going to, and

that is okay, because you are Chair of the Subcommittee, so you

can do what you would like.

It would just seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that there are some

things that shouldn’t be partisan. For example, if we are going to

be looking at what happened in this particular case, it would seem

127

to me that the Majority would want to get as many witnesses on

all sides.

Chairman MILLER. Would the gentleman yield on that?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Of course, sir.

Chairman MILLER. Will you have any objection to our bringing

employees of the National Hurricane Center here?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Absolutely not. I don’t think——

Chairman MILLER. Or taking our committee there to, or to take

our committee there to have a field hearing?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If I may, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. It is your time.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. You know, I am not one to object

to what the Majority wants to do. My statement.

Chairman MILLER. Then we will assume that there won’t be an

objection.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, my statement would be, though, however, twofold, that we should clearly not do anything that is going

to jeopardize the ability of the forecasters in the heart of a hurricane season to do their job. I think we are already doing that as

it is, and I think it would be highly irresponsible, borderline negligence for us to continue to ask, not NOAA, continue to ask the

Hurricane Center people to, you know, spend their time doing

things that are not just looking for hurricanes, number one. After

the hurricane season is over, I think we should spend as much

time, that would be a privilege and an honor to have you all in

Miami, and I think you would be highly impressed.

I just do want to mention, though, that, and again, you know, I

am not crying over spilled milk, but we brought this up, but this

was brought up, that we only had, I understand how the rules

work, we had one, to have one witness. It would seem to me that

this should not be partisan, that if the Majority wants to learn the

facts, it shouldn’t have to be a Minority witness. It should be the

witnesses that are available, to find out what the facts are, and it

is just, frankly, a little disheartening that such, and I, look, it may

be a little personal, and please bear with me.

The men and women in the Hurricane Center are incredible professionals, incredible professionals. You don’t know them personally

like I do. And when those people speak out, and then, this committee has a hearing to find out why they spoke out, and what happened, and they are not invited, it is frankly sad. It really is sad,

and again, we had one witness, we got it. It would have been nice

for the Majority to at least have the intention of, if you were trying

to find out what is happening, you had Mr. Proenza. He is a great

guy. I am glad he was here. How is it possible to not call, I am

confused, how is it possible to not call some of those 20 plus people

to have them up here?

Chairman MILLER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes, sir. Of course.

Chairman MILLER. Do you know that we did call the staff, and

that we did speak?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No, actually not at the Hurricane Center.

Chairman MILLER. And called them as——

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Not at the Hurricane Center. And we——

128

Chairman LAMPSON. Well, it is, as Mr. Diaz-Balart, as you have

pointed out, it is the middle of the hurricane season now.

Chairman MILLER. Generally, the Chair welcomes Mr. DiazBalart’s suggestion that this committee have a field hearing in

Miami, and say December or January.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, you are a wise man.

Chairman MILLER. The Chair welcomes bipartisan contributions

such as that. And Mr. Lampson.

Chairman LAMPSON. I think that I got my question answered

about support for the hearing, and your support for having the

right people come up here. That is there or here. Doesn’t matter,

but the point is we—— Mr. DIAZ-BALART. After the hurricane season, right, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LAMPSON. We need to have those things. I would like

to just mention, in my part of closing, that we did ask for some specific staff, high ranking assistants to Admiral Lautenbacher, to attend today. And granted, it was not done by letter. There was an

understanding when staff asked, I think that is an inappropriate

request. In the future, we would like for that certainly to be honored. We don’t, again, don’t think that it is inappropriate to do so,

in matter.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time, and I thank

the panel for being here.

Chairman MILLER. I also thank the panel for being here, and I

appreciate what I expect to be continued cooperation with the Committee on this issue. I thank everyone for being here, and with

that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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