**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 4197** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ZONTA TAVARAS ELLISON , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Charlotte
. Frank D. Whitney , Chief District Judge. ( 3:11

- c r - 00404

- FDW

- DSC

- 1 )

Submitted : November 25, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD , and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney , Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Zonta Tavaras Ellison on three counts of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012)
. On appeal, Ellison contends that the d istrict court erred by (1) determining that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (2) failing to grant him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.
**I.** A defendant may waive his righ t to counsel so long as he is competent and the waiver is made intelligently. Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975 ). We review de novo a district court’s determination that a defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United St ates v. Singleton , 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). “An assertion of the right of self

- representation
. . . must be (1) clear and unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent and voluntary; and (3) timely.” United States v. Frazier

- El , 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000) (cita tions omitted). “[W]e review the sufficiency of a waiver of the right to counsel by evaluating the complete profile of the defendant and the circumstances of his decision as known to the trial court at the time.” Singleton , 107 F.3 d at 1097. A defendant3 “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self

representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835 . However, this c ourt does not require “[a] precise procedure or litany for this evaluation.” Singleton , 107 F.3d at 1097. Our review of the record demonstrates that Ellison clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self

representation. Ellison’s election to proceed p ro se also was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record reflects that, at the time he waived his right to counsel, Ellison understood the legal proceedings and was aware of the nature of the charges against h im and the penalties he faced. We concl ude that the district court did not err in granting Ellison’s request to waive counsel and proceed pro se.
**II.** For the first time on appeal, Ellison argues that, even though he went to trial, the district court should have awarded him a two

- level reduc tion for acceptance of responsibility. W e review for plain error. See United States v. Strieper , 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish plain error, an appellant must show “(1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error is clear or obvio us, and (3) that the4 error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Webb , 738 F.3d 638, 640

- 41 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the appellant meets his burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and may grant relief only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks and citation

om itted) (alteration in original). We find no reversible error in the district court’s failure to c redit Ellison with a reduction for acceptance of responsibility . Ellison argues that the assertion of an affirmative defense, such as entrapment, does not p reclude a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Although some courts have adopted this position, see, e.g. , United States v. Garcia , 182 F.3d 1165 , 1172

- 74 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming reduction), Ellison has not shown that the district court erred, much less that the error was clear or obvious. Ellison’s entrapment defense was directly related to factual guilt and was inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility insofar as it was a n attempt at minimizing his culpability. See United States v. Holt , 79 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding district court did not clearly err in5 denying adjustment because defendant’s meritless affirmative defense was “attempt to minimize his culpability”). This is clear ly demonstrated by Ellison’s objections to hi s presentence report, in which he stated that, although he transacted with the confidential informant, he lacked “the intent to sell and distribute cocaine.” Finally, to the extent Ellison contends that the district court erred in adopting the presentence report , which stated that the reduction did not apply, we find this argument unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affir m the district court’s judgment
. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the ma terials before this court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED