United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 2021 Decided July 20, 2021

No. 20-5235

ITECH U.S., INC,

APPELLANT

v.

TRACY RENAUD, ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cv-03352)

Geoffrey Forney argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Bradley B. Banias.

Aaron S. Goldsmith, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him 

on the brief were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, and Glenn M. Girdharry, Assistant Director. Kenneth 

A. Adebonojo and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorneys 

entered appearances.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WILKINS and KATSAS, 

Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: iTech US, Inc. (“iTech”) filed an 

I-140 immigrant visa petition on behalf of Vishnu Vardhana 

Reddy Katta Sai Sampoorna (“Reddy”). Approval of an I-140 

petition is one step on an immigrant worker’s long path to 

acquire permanent resident status. United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved the petition,

but revoked its approval three years later. When iTech 

petitioned the District Court for review of that decision, the 

District Court found that Congress placed visa revocation 

decisions within the unreviewable discretion of the executive 

and dismissed iTech’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. We agree. 

Joining nine of our sister Circuits, we affirm. 

I.

This appeal concerns two interlocking provisions of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et 

seq. Some background is necessary to understand how Mr. 

Reddy acquired and lost his non-immigrant status. 

A. 

“The INA allows for a certain number of immigrants to 

receive permanent residency through employer sponsorship.” 

Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 2015); see 8 

U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A) (establishing the percentage of visas 

available to “qualified immigrants who are members of the 

professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent . . . 

and whose services in the sciences, arts, professions, or 

business are sought by an employer in the United States”). 

Immigrant workers and their potential employers must follow

a three-step process. First, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) 

must certify that the “labor market can absorb the immigrant 

without affecting other workers’ wages.” Mantena, 809 F.3d 
3

at 724; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). Once DOL 

certifies the position, USCIS must approve the employer’s I140 immigrant visa petition. Mantena, 809 F.3d at 724–25; see 

also 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (directing that “the Attorney General 

shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are 

true and that the alien . . . is eligible for preference under 

subsection (a) or (b) of section 1153 of this title, approve the 

petition and forward one copy thereof to the Department of 

State”);

1 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)–(c) (establishing Form I-140 as 

the proper vehicle to petition the agency for classification 

under section 1153(b)(2)). Once granted, an immigrant visa 

petition under Form I-140 is valid indefinitely, 8 C.F.R. 

§ 204.5(n)(3), though it may be revoked “at any time,” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1155.

Once USCIS grants the I-140 petition, an immigrant 

worker is eligible to stand in line for an immigrant visa number 

to be issued by the Department of State. United States v. RyanWebster, 353 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2003). “Because there 

are limits on the number of such visas in each category and 

from each country, immigrants must often wait many years for 

a permanent residency visa, especially if they are from a 

country, like India, that sends a large number of immigrants to 

the United States.” Mantena, 809 F.3d at 725. Finally, with 

visa number in hand, the immigrant worker may file a Form I485, his application to have his non-immigrant status adjusted 

to become a permanent resident entitled to live and work in the 

United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(n)(1). 

At any point in this process, a USCIS officer may revoke 

the approval of an I-140 immigrant visa petition “when the 

1 Congress delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security, through 

USCIS, the authority to adjudicate immigrant visa petitions in 2002.

See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 

§ 451(b)(1) (Nov. 25, 2002) (6 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1)).
4

necessity for the revocation comes to [its] attention.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 205.2(a). This statutory authority stems from section 1155, 

which provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

(“Secretary”) “may, at any time, for what he deems to be good 

and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition 

approved by him under section 1154 of this title,” including 

immigrant visa petitions based on Form I-140. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1155.2

 If the officer ultimately decides to revoke a Form I140 petition, the petitioner may file an administrative appeal. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d); id. § 103.3. No party disputes those 

procedures were followed here.

B.

iTech filed an I-140 immigrant visa petition on behalf of 

Mr. Reddy in July 2015. J.A. 1. USCIS approved the petition 

two months later. J.A. 14. In its application, iTech produced 

evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage and evidence 

that Mr. Reddy had obtained a bachelor’s degree, “in the form 

of a degree certificate from the University of Madras along 

with transcripts from 1999 through 2002.” Appellant’s Br. at 

3; J.A. 6–13, 16. A year and a half later, USCIS issued a notice 

of intent to revoke the approved petition. J.A. 14. The agency 

grounded its revocation in the “realization that [the] immigrant 

visa petition was approved in error” and identified 

“inconsistencies in the record calling into question whether the 

beneficiary meets the educational requirements of the labor 

certification” and whether iTech “continues to demonstrate the 

ability to pay the proffered wage.” J.A. 14, 16–17. 

iTech provided additional documentation in response to 

the notice to revoke, J.A. 20–22, but USCIS ultimately decided 

2 The Secretary has delegated his revocation authority to any USCIS 

officer authorized to approve employment-based immigrant visa 

petitions. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 205.2(a).
5

to revoke its approval of the I-140 petition on the basis that 

iTech misrepresented Mr. Reddy’s degree-conferring 

institution and employment qualifications, J.A. 39, 43–45, and 

did not establish its ability to pay the proffered wage, J.A. 48–

51. On August 22, 2018, iTech filed a timely motion to reopen, 

J.A. 54–62, which USCIS denied a year later, J.A. 94. 

This appeal comes to us from the District Court’s July 24, 

2020 grant of the agency’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. iTech US, Inc. v. Cuccinelli, 474 F. Supp. 3d 291, 

292 (D.D.C. 2020). iTech brought suit under the 

Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that USCIS’s decision 

to revoke its I-140 petition was arbitrary and capricious 

because the agency failed “to engage in rational decisionmaking based on the evidence in the record relating to the 

Company’s ability to pay and [Mr. Reddy’s] educational 

credentials.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. The District Court granted 

the agency’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain text of 

the INA preserves “the Secretary’s ability to revoke a I-140 

petition ‘at any time’ and for any reason he ‘deems to be good 

and sufficient cause’ [and] renders USCIS’s revocation 

decision ‘discretionary’ under § 1155.” iTech, 474 F. Supp. 3d 

at 293. A second section, section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), “in turn[]

deprives the Court of jurisdiction to review the decision.” Id. 

These provisions are discussed in detail below.

II.

We review the District Court’s determination that section 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) shields the decision to revoke an I-140 

petition from judicial review de novo. Zhu v. Gonzales, 411 

F.3d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2005). We start from “the 

presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” 

Make the Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 623 (D.C. Cir. 

2020) (quoting Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, — U.S. —, 140 S. 
6

Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020)). “That ‘well-settled’ and ‘strong 

presumption’ in favor of judicial review is so embedded in the 

law that it applies even when determining the scope of statutory 

provisions specifically designed to limit judicial review,” id. at 

624 (citing Guerrero-Lasprilla, 140 S. Ct. at 1068), and when 

considering immigration statutes, including section 1252(a), id. 

The “presumption can be overcome only by ‘clear and 

convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to preclude 

judicial review.” Id.

A.

In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 

Div. C (Sept. 30, 1996), “Congress amended the INA 

aggressively to expedite removal of aliens lacking a legal basis 

to remain in the United States.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 

233, 249 (2010). “Among IIRIRA’s several proscriptions of 

judicial review is the one here at issue, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 

barring review of administrative decisions Congress placed 

within the Attorney General’s discretion.” Id. Section 

1252(a)(2)(B) is titled “Denials of discretionary relief” and 

provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review—

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of 

relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 

1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or

(ii) any other decision or action of the 

Attorney General or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security the authority for 

which is specified under this subchapter 

to be in the discretion of the Attorney 

General or the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, other than the granting of relief 

under section 1158(a) of this title.
7

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). “‘[T]his subchapter’ refers to Title 

8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, of the United States Code, 

codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 and titled ‘Immigration.’” 

Kucana, 558 U.S. at 239 n.3. The question is two-fold. First 

we ask whether an I-140 visa revocation made under section 

1155 could fall under clause (ii)’s umbrella. If so, we ask 

whether section 1155 specifies that visa revocations are in the 

Secretary’s discretion. If the answer to both questions is “yes,” 

these statutory provisions insulate the Secretary’s decision to 

revoke an immigrant visa petition from judicial review.

We focus first on clause (ii), which shields “any other 

decision or action” of the Secretary from judicial review. iTech

contends that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is limited, “as its 

heading indicates, to ‘Denials of discretionary relief,’” which 

the decision to revoke an I-140 petition is not. Appellant’s Br. 

at 25 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)). iTech argues that the 

decision to revoke an approved I-140 petition is not a denial of 

relief because it “pertains only to the issue of whether a foreign 

national has met a preliminary step for obtaining an immigrant 

visa.” Appellant’s Br. at 25, 31. The agency does not dispute,

and we assume for the sake of argument, that revocation of an 

I-140 petition is not “relief.” The agency instead argues that 

the phrase “any other decision or action” in section 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) refers “to all decisions or actions ‘the 

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in 

the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security,’” regardless of whether they deny relief. 

Appellee’s Br. at 18–19 (citing J.A. 101–02). We read the 

statute as the agency does. 

“When called on to resolve a dispute over a statute’s 

meaning,” we “afford the law’s terms their ordinary meaning 

at the time Congress adopted them.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 

— U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021). We exhaust “all the 
8

textual and structural clues” at our disposal to uncover 

Congress’s intended meaning. Id. (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. 

United States, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)). Read 

in isolation, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any 

other decision or action of the Attorney General or the 

Secretary” could be fairly interpreted to encompass only those 

decisions or actions not listed in clause (i) that concern a 

decision whether to grant or deny discretionary relief. But we 

do not read snippets of statutory text in a vacuum. Torres v. 

Lynch, 578 U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1626 (2016) (“[W]e must, 

as usual, ‘interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with 

reference to the statutory context.’” (quoting Abramski v. 

United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014))). “And beyond 

context and structure,” we often look to “‘history [and] 

purpose’ to divine the meaning of language.” Gundy v. United 

States, 588 U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013)).

Taking each in turn, we begin with the text. We ask 

whether “any other decision or action” includes decisions left 

to the Secretary’s discretion that go beyond denying 

discretionary relief. “[U]se of the word ‘any’ will sometimes 

indicate that Congress intended particular statutory text to 

sweep broadly.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 583 

U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018) (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau 

of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 220 (2008)). “But whether it does so 

necessarily depends on the statutory context.” Id.; see also Ali, 

552 U.S. at 243–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 

The reader sees the problem, but perhaps “other” will be of 

more help. “Other” means “distinct from that or those first 

mentioned or implied,” or, more simply, “not the same.” 

WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 823 (10th ed. 

1996); see also X THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 981 (2d 

ed. 1989) (“Existing besides, or distinct from, that already 

mentioned or implied; not this, not the same, different in 
9

identity; further, additional.”). But those definitions tell us 

little because they do not indicate how the “other decision[s]” 

referred to in clause (ii) are “distinct from” the “judgment[s] 

regarding the granting of relief” referred to in clause (i). Are 

the decisions referred to in clause (ii) distinct from those 

referred to in clause (i) because clause (ii) sweeps broadly to 

include any decision Subchapter II “specifie[s]” to fall within 

the Secretary’s discretion, whether or not it involves a denial 

of discretionary relief? Or are they distinct simply because 

they are not made under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 

1229c, or 1255, but nonetheless concern relief from removal? 

“[S]taring at, or even looking up,” Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1626, 

the words “any other” cannot answer whether section

1252(a)(2)(B) is limited to denials of discretionary relief.

We look next to the surrounding text. Section 

1252(a)(2)(B)’s introduction instructs that, “[n]otwithstanding 

any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), 

including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus 

provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, . . . and 

regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made 

in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to 

review” the decisions specified in clauses (i) and (ii). 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B). The modifier “regardless of whether the 

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings” 

conveys that section 1252(a)(2)(B) is not a narrowly cabined 

provision. And Congress’s choice to include the modifier 

“statutory or nonstatutory” and specific call-out to Code 

provisions beyond Title 8 imparts a broad reading of “any other 

provision of law.” “Where, as here, Congress uses similar 

statutory language and similar statutory structure in two 

adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar 

interpretations.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39 (2009); 

see also Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 

(2018) (“[I]t is a normal rule of statutory construction that 
10

identical words used in different parts of the same act are 

intended to have the same meaning.” (quoting Taniguchi v. 

Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 571 (2012))).

iTech pushes an alternative structural reading. It invokes 

the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis to argue 

that because a visa revocation made under section 1155 is “not 

of the same type [of decision] as those specifically mentioned 

in the statutory list of items withdrawn from judicial review, it 

does not fall within Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Appellant’s Br. 

at 28. Under those canons, “where general words follow an 

enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as 

applying only to other items akin to those specifically 

enumerated.” NASDAQ Stock Mkt., LLC v. SEC, 961 F.3d 421, 

428 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 

446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980)). In iTech’s reading, clause (ii) 

serves as a safety net to pull in INA provisions which Congress 

did not explicitly name in clause (i), but which nonetheless 

allow the Attorney General or Secretary to grant or deny 

discretionary relief from removal. But “we do not woodenly 

apply limiting principles every time Congress includes a 

specific example along with a general phrase.” Ali, 552 U.S. 

at 227; see, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Off. of 

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 274 (1980) (“Nor 

are we free to read the subsequent words ‘all other cases’ as 

though they described ‘all of the foregoing’ as well; the use of 

the word ‘other’ forecloses that reading.”).3

3 As in Ali, section 1252(a)(2)(B) is disjunctive: no court has 

jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief 

under [enumerated sections] or,” 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 

(emphasis added), “any other decision or action of the Attorney 

General or the Secretary . . . the authority for which is specified under 

this subchapter to be in [his] discretion,” id. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Ali, 

552 U.S. at 225 (“The phrase is disjunctive, with one specific and 
11

Here, clause (i) concerns “judgment[s] regarding the 

granting of relief” made under specific enumerated provisions, 

and clause (ii) considers “any other decision or action of the 

Attorney General.” Notably, the relevant portion of clause (ii) 

does not repeat the language “regarding the granting of relief” 

included in clause (i). Clause (ii) refers to the granting of relief 

only when carving out a specific decision—“the granting of 

relief under section 1158(a)”—from the scope of the clause’s 

broad catchall. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also 

NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 

(“Where Congress includes particular language in one section 

of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). In other 

words, if Congress intended “any other decision or action” to 

be limited to those actions “regarding the granting of relief,” it 

either would have said so in the relevant portion of clause (ii), 

or left out the limiting language in clause (i).

4

Thus, iTech’s preferred canons come up against another, 

expressio unius est exclusio alterius. That is, reading clause 

(ii) as the catch-all for the specific provisions in clause (i) 

creates inter-canon tension— reading clause (ii) as part of a 

continuing list would require us to read the modifier “regarding 

the granting of relief” across both subsections, despite the fact 

that Congress specifically included that phrase only in clause 

(i) and the carveout to clause (ii). We decline to do so, 

one general category, not—like the clauses at issue in Keffeler and 

Dolan—a list of specific items separated by commas and followed 

by a general or collective term.”).

4 We can imagine the alternative version of clause (i), stripping 

jurisdiction to review “any judgment under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 

1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title.” Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
12

especially where the Supreme Court has read “any other” so 

broadly as to nullify the usefulness of ejusdem generis because 

such “expansive language offers no indication whatever that 

Congress intended the limiting construction” that iTech urges. 

Harrison, 446 U.S. at 588–89.

iTech faults the District Court for concluding that the text 

of section 1252(a)(2)(B) is clear, and its resulting refusal to 

allow the section heading to limit the text’s plain meaning. 

Appellant’s Br. at 29–30. While section headings are 

instructive, section 1252(a)(2)(B)’s heading is of limited use 

where the text itself admits of limited ambiguity. See 2A 

SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:14 (7th ed.

2007) (“[S]ection headings and notes may be another helpful 

resource to interpret an ambiguous statute, but headings and 

notes are not binding, may not be used to create an ambiguity, 

and do not control an act’s meaning by injecting a legislative 

intent or purpose not otherwise expressed in the law’s body.”). 

Nor do we find Kucana controlling on the issue at hand simply 

because the Supreme Court found that “[t]he clause (i) 

enumeration,” was “instructive in determining the meaning of 

the clause (ii) catchall.” 558 U.S. at 247; see Appellant’s Br. 

at 28–29. That observation supported the conclusion that “both 

clauses convey[ed] that Congress barred court review of 

discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the 

Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute,” but 

not when the Attorney General deemed a decision discretionary 

through regulation. Id. Our ruling is not in tension with that 

observation because, as shown in part B below, Congress itself 

“set out the Attorney General’s discretionary authority” in 

section 1155. Id.

Finally, looking to IIRIRA’s purpose, we see little basis 

for claiming that Congress intended to confine this jurisdictionstripping provision to a narrow spectrum of “relief” where 
13

“many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the 

Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can fairly 

be said to be the theme of the legislation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab 

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999). 

Because the tools of statutory interpretation and the plain text 

auger a broad reading bolstered by Congress’s intent in IIRIRA 

to expedite review, we find clear and convincing evidence that 

Congress intended to preclude judicial review of those 

decisions “specified under this subchapter to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary,” whether 

or not those decisions grant or deny an immigrant relief from 

removal.

B.

We are left to determine whether visa revocations under 

section 1155 are “specified . . . to be in the discretion of the 

Attorney General or the Secretary.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 1155 provides that

[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may, at 

any time, for what he deems to be good and 

sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any 

petition approved by him under section 11545

of this title.

Id. § 1155. No statutory gymnastics are necessary here. We 

analyzed an analogous INA provision in Zhu v. Gonzales, 411 

5 Section 1154 directs the Attorney General to approve immigrant 

visa petitions, including those based on Form I-140, “if he 

determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the 

alien . . . is eligible for [an employment-based] preference.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1154(b).
14

F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and our decision there controls our 

holding here. 

In Zhu, four foreign citizens sought review of the Attorney 

General’s refusal to waive the requirement that they obtain a 

labor certification before petitioning for an I-140 immigrant 

visa. Id. at 293. “[T]he Attorney General may” waive that 

requirement “when [he] deems it to be in the national interest.” 

Id. at 293–94 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)). We held the Attorney General’s decision 

to waive, or to decline to waive, that requirement “entirely 

discretionary,” id. at 295 (internal quotation omitted), and

unreviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), id. at 294. Like 

iTech, Zhu argued that decisions “specified . . . to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General” applied only to decisions 

made expressly discretionary by the terms of the authorizing 

statute. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). 

Laboring against our precedent, iTech argues that section 

1155 cannot specify discretion where Congress did not include 

the word “discretion” when it revised section 1155 in 1996 as 

part of IIRIRA, nor in 2004 when it amended section 1155 to 

transfer authority to revoke approved petitions from the 

Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Appellant’s Br. at 19–20. The Zhu Court expressly rejected 

this argument: we held that “a decision may be ‘specified . . . 

to be in the discretion of the Attorney General’ even if the grant 

of authority to make that decision does not use the word 

‘discretion.’” 411 F.3d at 294–95. So too here.

iTech next argues that section 1155 does not contain 

discretionary language because “good and sufficient cause” 

imparts a judicially manageable standard for evaluating the 

agency’s decision which the words “may” and “deem” do not 

diminish. Appellant’s Br. at 31, 38–41. iTech believes that 
15

because the Attorney General interpreted section 1155 to 

require use of the same standards the agency uses for 

determining initial eligibility for immigrant visa petitions to 

revoke approved petitions, those regulations provide the 

meaning of “good and sufficient cause” and import a 

substantive legal standard for evaluating the agency’s decision. 

Appellant’s Br. at 32–33. We need not address this argument, 

since Zhu makes clear that the combination of “may” and 

“deems” is sufficient to render a statutory grant of authority

like the one in section 1155 discretionary.

Zhu interpreted a provision providing that “the Attorney 

General may” waive the requirement for certain DOL

certifications “when [he] deems it to be in the national 

interest.” 411 F.3d at 294–95 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1153(b)(2)(B)(i)). In determining whether the Attorney 

General’s refusal to waive that requirement fell within the 

ambit of clause (ii)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision, the Zhu 

Court assumed that “in the national interest” was a manageable 

legal standard, as we assume for the sake of argument “good 

and sufficient cause” is here. Id. at 295. But we found that 

“may” “suggests not that the Congress expected the Attorney 

General actually to deny a petition the grant of which he deems 

to be in the national interest, but rather that his decision . . . is, 

like ‘Speech or Debate in either House [of the Congress, not 

to] be questioned in any other Place,’ U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, 

and certainly not in a court.” Id. (alterations in original).

iTech attempts to distinguish Zhu by noting that the panel

there suggested that national interest waivers are discretionary 

because they are “unfettered by statutory standards,” whereas 

“good and sufficient cause” imparts a judicially manageable 

standard. Appellant’s Br. at 41. But iTech ignores the fact that 

the Zhu Court held that even if “in the national interest” were a 

manageable standard, it would still find that the provision’s 
16

surrounding text—“the Attorney General may, when the 

Attorney General deems it to be in the national interest,” 8 

U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added)—imparted 

discretion. Zhu, 411 F.3d at 295. Because the text of section 

1155 is functionally indistinguishable—“[t]he Secretary of 

Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be 

good and sufficient cause,” 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (emphasis 

added)—we hold that the Secretary’s decision to revoke an 

approved I-140 petition is similarly “specified . . . to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security,” id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Stitching 

together section 1155 and section 1252(a)(2)(B) at last, we 

conclude that clear and convincing evidence establishes 

Congress’s intent to insulate visa revocation decisions like the 

one revoking approval of Mr. Reddy’s I-140 petition from 

judicial review. 

C.

Our holding is consistent with the conclusions of various 

other circuits. Nine of our sister circuits hold that courts lack 

jurisdiction to consider visa revocations made under section 

1155, and one has said as much in dicta. See Bernardo ex rel. 

M & K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 484 (1st Cir. 

2016); Firstland Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 377 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 

2004) (dicta); Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 

202–05 (3d Cir. 2006); Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377, 

381–83 (4th Cir. 2020); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222, 

224–25 (5th Cir. 2007); Mehanna v. USCIS, 677 F.3d 312, 

314–15 (6th Cir. 2012); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 

568 (7th Cir. 2004); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 

(8th Cir. 2009); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341, 1344–45 

(10th Cir. 2010); Sands v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 308 F. 

App’x 418, 419–20 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). But see 

ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2004). 
17

Granted, in some instances the parties conceded or the

panel assumed that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) encompassed any

decision or action “the authority for which is specified under 

this subchapter to be in the [Secretary’s] discretion,” regardless 

of whether the decision denied relief. See Bernardo, 814 F.3d 

at 484; Jilin, 447 F.3d at 202–03; Ghanem, 481 F.3d at 223; 

Mehanna, 677 F.3d at 314; Sands, 308 F. App’x at 419–20. 

But in other instances, the court reached the issue and decided 

it as we do today. See El-Khader, 366 F.3d at 566 (“[T]he plain 

language of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars courts from 

reviewing any discretionary decisions of the Attorney General 

made under the authority of sections 1151 through 1378 of 

Title 8 of the United States Code.” (emphasis omitted) (citing 

Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2003)));

Polfliet, 955 F.3d at 381 (“On its face, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars 

judicial review of decisions ‘specified’ to be in the ‘discretion’ 

of the Secretary.”); Abdelwahab, 578 F.3d at 820 n.4 (“By its 

plain language, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to discretionary 

action not taken in a removal proceeding.”); Green, 627 F.3d 

at 1345 (“[S]ince a visa revocation decision is a discretionary 

act, our jurisdiction to review it is precluded by the plain 

meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)[ii].” (alteration in original) 

(footnote omitted) (quoting Hamilton v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 

564, 568 (10th Cir. 2007))).

III.

For the reasons above, we conclude that section 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of all decisions the 

authority for which is specified under Title 8, Chapter 12, 

Subchapter II to be within the Secretary’s discretion. And we

hold that the decision to revoke an I-140 immigrant visa 

petition under section 1155 is a “decision or action . . . the 

authority for which is specified under” Title 8, Chapter 12, 
18

Subchapter II to be within the Secretary’s discretion. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered.