*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 15, 2006*

Decided November 15, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2933

MURPHY L. JAMERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK RYAN and MILWAUKEE

COUNTY PROCUREMENT

DIVISION,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin

No. 04-C-0749

William E. Callahan, Jr.,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Murphy Jamerson appeals the magistrate judge’s grant of summary

judgment for the defendants on his racial discrimination and due process claims,

refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract claim under

state law, and denial of his motion for default judgment. We affirm.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-2933 Page 2

In March 2003, Jamerson, doing business as 4 Star Printing (“4 Star”), was

the sole bidder on printing work for Milwaukee County (the “County”). 4 Star

entered a one-year price agreement with the County to print the Milwaukee County

Board’s Journal of Proceedings from May 1, 2003 through April 30, 2004. The price

agreement did not guarantee 4 Star a specific amount of work or compensation. 

Just after the price agreement was signed, Mark Ryan, the Milwaukee

County Clerk, emailed the County’s buyer who had solicited bids for printing the

Journal and the County Purchasing Administrator, who oversaw the County

buyers, asking them to “reject” the 4 Star price agreement and extend a prior

agreement with Voice Printing (a company that had had price agreements with the

County for those services for many years) for six months to allow the County to

investigate electronic methods of producing the Journal. The County extended

Voice Printing’s agreement, though it was not standard procedure to extend a price

agreement to a vendor when a price agreement was already in place with another

vendor. During the term of the agreement, the County did not send 4 Star any

work or purchase orders, but issued Voice Printing both a purchase order and a

check for printing services.

Jamerson sued, alleging that defendants Ryan and Milwaukee County

Procurement Division breached a contract without a prior hearing, depriving him of

his right to procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleged that the defendants interfered with his ability to

make or enforce a contract based on his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After

discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment. 

The magistrate judge, sitting by consent of the parties, granted summary

judgment for the defendants. The judge found no due process violation because

Jamerson had an adequate post-deprivation remedy in Wisconsin state courts for

any breach of contract. The judge also found that, because Jamerson had not shown

he could not obtain employment in his field due to the defendants’ conduct, he had

not been deprived of a liberty interest in pursuing his occupation. The judge denied

the § 1981 claim because Jamerson clarified in a deposition that he did not intend

to base his claim on race, and in any event Jamerson had not presented sufficient

evidence of Ryan’s discriminatory intent. The judge also declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Jamerson’s breach-of-contract claim. Finally, the

judge dismissed as moot Jamerson’s motion for default judgment. 

On appeal, Jamerson first appears to challenge the magistrate judge’s

determination that he was not deprived of due process. However, even if we

assumed that Jamerson has alleged a deprivation of a protectible property

interest—a breach of 4 Star’s price agreement—Jamerson cannot show that he was

deprived of due process. “[W]hen the issue is the meaning of a commercial contract,
No. 06-2933 Page 3

a prior hearing is unnecessary, and the opportunity to litigate in state court is all

the process ‘due’ to determine whether a state has kept its promise.” Mid-American

Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Jamerson next urges that the magistrate judge ignored key evidence and

erred in finding that he had not shown he was deprived of his liberty interest in his

occupation. Jamerson points to a newspaper article that paraphrases Ryan as

saying he did not want to go through the “hassle” of training a new printer when

the office was planning to switch eventually to electronic production. However, the

magistrate judge was correct that this statement does not implicate Jamerson’s

liberty interest in his employment because it did not stigmatize Jamerson or 4 Star,

and thus did not prevent Jamerson from finding employment in his field. See

Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., 233 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Jamerson also claims that the magistrate judge ignored evidence of

discriminatory intent—namely the newspaper article and the fact that the owner of

Voice Printing and most of the county workers involved are white, while he is black. 

However, as the magistrate judge explained, Jamerson cannot make out a prima

facie case of racial discrimination because he did not show that a similarly-situated

non-black contractor was treated more favorably. See Bratton v. Roadway Package

Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1996). Jamerson did not establish that Voice

Printing was “directly comparable [to 4 Star] in all material respects,” Sartor v.

Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Patterson v. Avery

Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)), because unlike 4 Star, Voice

Printing had long experience with printing the Journal.

Jamerson also argues that the magistrate judge should have exercised

supplemental jurisdiction over his breach-of-contract claim because the Wisconsin

statute of limitations on that claim had run. However, as the magistrate judge

stated in his summary judgment order, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) allows a party thirty

additional days within which to file state claims, regardless of whether the state’s

statute of limitations has passed. The magistrate judge did not err by dismissing

Jamerson’s breach-of-contract claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); East-Miller v. Lake

County Highway Dep’t., 421 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2005).

Jamerson’s remaining challenges are frivolous and warrant no discussion. 

 AFFIRMED.