alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-5034

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARISTEO MELGAREJO LOPEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (1:06-cr-00330-JAB)

Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 15, 2008

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David B. Freedman, CRUMPLER FREEDMAN PARKER & WITT, Winston-Salem,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
 2 

PER CURIAM:

Aristeo Melgarejo Lopez pled guilty to conspiracy to

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. He was sentenced to

144 months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that

there are no meritorious claims on appeal but raising the issue of

whether his sentence was reasonable. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm. 

This court reviews the sentence imposed by the district

court for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); see United

States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). When

sentencing a defendant, a district court must: (1) properly

calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range; (2) treat the Guidelines

as advisory; (3) consider the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. §

3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); and (4) explain its reasons for

selecting a sentence. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473. We presume that a

sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is

reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.

2007); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007)

(upholding application of rebuttable presumption of correctness of

within-Guidelines sentence).
 3 

Here, the district court followed the appropriate

procedures and sentenced Lopez within the middle of his advisory

sentencing range. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in its

imposition of the 144-month sentence, and therefore find that

Lopez’s sentence is reasonable. In accordance with the

requirements of Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case

and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United

States for further review. If the client requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a

copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

 AFFIRMED
- 24-01073-F
- 'U of Michigan' of 'Extra docs March 19'
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edwin W. Ashby, Appellant.

Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Ulster County, denying application to set aside judgment of conviction in dismissing petition for writ of error *coram nobis.*Defendant was convicted in Ulster County of perjury, second degree, on February 14,1959, upon an indictment returned in the Supreme Court on December 11, 1958. The judgment of conviction was reversed here (9 A D 2d 464) but on reversal of this court by the Court of Appeals (8 N Y 2d 238) the judgment was reinstated. Application to the Supreme Court for writ of *coram nobis*was made July 22, 1960; and the writ has been denied. The basis for the writ, as alleged in the petition, is that the indictment was based on testimony given before the Grand Jury on two occasions, October 2 and October 27, 1958; and that at those hearings defendant was “a target of the investigation” in which the Grand Jury was then engaged; that he was compelled to testify on both occasions; that this was an invasion of his constitutional rights; and that therefore he could not be charged with perjury as the result of testimony on either appearance because the oath administered to him “ was void and a nullity.” The conviction for perjury, second degree, resulted from inconsistency between the testimony given by defendant at the two different hearings before the Grand Jury. (See 9 A D 2d 466, 467.) We go directly to the availability of the writ of error *coram nobis*to reach this question. We hold that it is not available. Although the precise limits of the writ of *coram nobis*have not been fully defined (Fuld, J., concurring in *People*v. *Sullivan,*3 N Y 2d 196, 200) it is reasonably clear that the right to it usually rests upon the need to provide a remedy against injustice not otherwise available to the defendant in the criminal action against him. The petition in this case makes it clear that the invasion of constitutional rights of which defendant complains is not an infirmity or irregularity in the procedure followed in this criminal action against him. Nothing was concealed, or placed in the action beyond his reach or ability to assert and litigate. He complains, rather, that his constitutional rights were invaded in the very substance of the crime; that when he testified in two different ways no crime was committed because no valid oath could have been administered to him since he was the “ target ” or object of the investigation in the matter in which the oath was administered. This is another way of saying that as a matter of fact and of law the crime had not been committed and that defendant should have been discharged at the trial of this indictment. The infirmities in the constituent elements of the crime were fully known to the defendant and his counsel when the case was tried, and the substantive issue whether the crime was or was not committed must necessarily have been raised upon the trial of the question whether he could or could not have been guilty as a matter of fact and law. The writ of error *coram nobis*does not lie. Order unanimously affirmed.
# 2014 FOIA Log
**Exhibit 18.0**

BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION 

Form 10-Q for Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2007

LETTER FROM PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP RE: 

CHANGE IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE 

 

October 31, 2007 

Board of Directors 

Briggs & Stratton Corporation 

12301 W. Wirth Street 

Wauwatosa, Wisconsin 53222 

Dear Directors: 

We are providing this letter to you for inclusion as an exhibit to your Form 10-Q filing pursuant to Item 601 of RegulationS-K. 

We have been provided a copy of the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007. The footnotes thereindescribe a change in accounting principle from one method of computing market-related value of pension plan assets to another method of computing market-related value of pension plan assets. It should be understood that the preferability of oneacceptable method of computing market-related value for a company’s pension plan assets over another method of computing market-related pension plan assets has not been addressed in any authoritative accounting literature, and in expressing ourconcurrence below we have relied on management’s determination that this change in accounting principle is preferable. Based on our reading of management’s stated reasons and justification for this change in accounting principle in theForm 10-Q, and our discussions with management as to their judgment about the fact that the new method will generate a market-related value that will be closer to fair value, we concur with management that such change represents, in theCompany’s circumstances, the adoption of a preferable accounting principle in conformity with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards *No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections.*

We have not audited any financial statements of the Company as of any date or for any period subsequent to July 1, 2007. Accordingly, our comments are subject tochange upon completion of an audit of the financial statements covering the period of the accounting change. 

Very truly yours, 

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                          $       237
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                        10,681
<ALLOWANCES>                              0
<INVENTORY>                          10,994
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     23,289
<PP&E>                               75,375
<DEPRECIATION>                       44,603
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       62,778
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                10,053
<BONDS>                                 800
<COMMON>                              1,087
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<OTHER-SE>                           33,862
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         62,778
<SALES>                              47,465
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     47,465
<CGS>                                41,306
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        43,990
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      275
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       3,200
<INCOME-TAX>                          1,088
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   2,112
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                          2,112
<EPS-PRIMARY>                          1.94
<EPS-DILUTED>                          1.94
        

</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Current Report on Form 10-Q of Claires Stores,
Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended May 1, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Bonnie Schaefer, Acting Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ E. Bonnie SchaeferE. Bonnie SchaeferJune 10, 2004
    Co-Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 12
 RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
 
 Fiscal Year2010
    
    
    2009
    
    
    2008Computation of Earnings:Income before income taxes
    
    $
    61,191
    
    
    $
    57,124
    
    
    $
    19,877Add:Interest expense
    
    
    32,831
    
    
    
    35,176
    
    
    
    37,231Amortization of debt
premium/discount and expenses
    
    
    2,330
    
    
    
    2,303
    
    
    
    2,449Interest portion of rent expense
    
    
    1,656
    
    
    
    1,496
    
    
    
    1,325Earnings as adjusted
    
    $
    98,008
    
    
    $
    96,099
    
    
    $
    60,882Computation of Fixed Charges:Interest expense
    
    $
    32,831
    
    
    $
    35,176
    
    
    $
    37,231Capitalized interest
    
    
    148
    
    
    
    103
    
    
    
    375Amortization of debt premium/discount and expenses
    
    
    2,330
    
    
    
    2,303
    
    
    
    2,449Interest portion of rent expense
    
    
    1,656
    
    
    
    1,496
    
    
    
    1,325Fixed charges
    
    $
    36,965
    
    
    $
    39,078
    
    
    $
    41,380Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
    
    
    2.65
    
    
    
    2.46
    
    
    
    1.47
#### State of Connecticut *v.*Salvatore Annunziato

*Howard A. Jacobs,*in support of the motion.

Submitted September 18

decided October 24, 1974

The defendant’s motion to expedite the appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County having been rendered moot by the adoption of the amendments to the rules of practice, effective October 15, 1974, is dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This restated financial data schedule contains summary financial information
extracted from The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company's
Consolidated Financial Statements and is qualified in its entirety to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<CIK> 0000015511
<NAME> THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                              95
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      760
<ALLOWANCES>                                        84
<INVENTORY>                                        244
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,383<F1>
<PP&E>                                          25,641
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,037
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  22,751<F1>
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,201<F1>
<BONDS>                                          4,788
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       8,228
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    22,751<F1>
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,936
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,781
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 293
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,939
<INCOME-TAX>                                       733
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,206
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,206
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Restatement reflected herein is the result of reclassifications to prior
periods' financial statements to conform to the current period presentation.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
### §5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire

If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.

(July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 671.)

#### Derivation

Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §5, 43 Stat. 884.
#### 1309.206-1 General.

When the designee authorized in CAM 1301.70 determines that an emergency exists, or elects before or after award not to enforce a qualification requirement it had established, the qualification requirement may not be thereafter enforced unless the agency complies with FAR 9.202(a).
400 MARYLAND AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20202-2600

www.ed.gov

The Department of Education’s mission is to promote student achievement and preparedness for global competiveness by 

fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES

AUGUST 27, 2018 

Honorable Lamont Repollet 

Commissioner of Education 

New Jersey Department of Education

100 Riverview Plaza, P.O. Box 500, Route 29 

Trenton, New Jersey 08625 

Dear Commissioner Repollet: 

The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) is planning 

to conduct an on-site to the New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) on September 20–21, 

2018. 

OSEP’s on-site visit will focus primarily on a review of the State’s dispute resolution system. In 

order to obtain the most accurate information, OSEP would like to meet with the NJODE staff 

involved in, and responsible for, the oversight of this area within the State. 

OSEP will work with your staff to develop an agenda for the visit. Following the on-site visit, 

OSEP will issue a letter that described the analysis of the State’s dispute resolution system, any 

findings from the visit, and next steps, as appropriate. If the analysis of the data indicates 

noncompliance or potential noncompliance, OSEP will describe the noncompliance or potential 

noncompliance in the letter and require the State to take appropriate action. 

If you have any questions, please contact Dwight Thomas at 202-245-6238 or by email 

Dwight.Thomas@ed.gov. Thank you for your cooperation and continued work to improve 

results for children with disabilities and their families. 

Sincerely,

/s/

Ruth E. Ryder 

Acting Director

Office of Special Education Programs

cc: Part B State Director
### §1752a. Model ports-of-entry

#### (a) In general

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall—

(1) establish a model ports-of-entry program for the purpose of providing a more efficient and welcoming international arrival process in order to facilitate and promote business and tourist travel to the United States, while also improving security; and

(2) implement the program initially at the 20 United States international airports that have the highest number of foreign visitors arriving annually as of August 3, 2007.

#### (b) Program elements

The program shall include—

(1) enhanced queue management in the Federal Inspection Services area leading up to primary inspection;

(2) assistance for foreign travelers once they have been admitted to the United States, in consultation, as appropriate, with relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities; and

(3) instructional videos, in English and such other languages as the Secretary determines appropriate, in the Federal Inspection Services area that explain the United States inspection process and feature national, regional, or local welcome videos.

#### (c) Additional Customs and Border Protection officers for high-volume ports

Subject to the availability of appropriations, not later than the end of fiscal year 2008 the Secretary of Homeland Security shall employ not fewer than an additional 200 Customs and Border Protection officers over the number of such positions for which funds were appropriated for the proceeding fiscal year to address staff shortages at the 20 United States international airports that have the highest number of foreign visitors arriving annually as of August 3, 2007.

(Pub. L. 110–53, title VII, §725, Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 350.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and not as part of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 which comprises this chapter.
Fiscal Year 2013 Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies - UTAH

FY 2013 Title I

LEA ID District Allocation*

4900030 Alpine School District 8,613,584

4900060 Beaver School District 180,452

4900090 Box Elder School District 988,720

4900120 Cache School District 1,468,944

4900142 Canyons School District 4,426,039

4900150 Carbon School District 560,771

4900180 Daggett School District 10,853

4900210 Davis School District 6,658,252

4900240 Duchesne School District 470,743

4900270 Emery School District 292,627

4900300 Garfield School District 140,010

4900330 Grand School District 332,361

4900360 Granite School District 18,304,883

4900390 Iron School District 2,270,946

4900420 Jordan School District 4,831,765

4900450 Juab School District 315,692

4900480 Kane School District 191,443

4900510 Logan School District 1,354,525

4900540 Millard School District 460,928

4900570 Morgan School District 100,697

4900600 Murray School District 884,275

4900630 Nebo School District 2,811,147

4900660 North Sanpete School District 389,363

4900690 North Summit School District 130,596

4900720 Ogden School District 4,244,661

4900750 Park City School District 249,638

4900780 Piute School District 105,854

4900810 Provo School District 3,213,282

4900840 Rich School District 57,929

4900870 Salt Lake City School District 6,815,950

4900900 San Juan School District 1,033,813

4900930 Sevier School District 693,098

4900960 South Sanpete School District 592,268

4900990 South Summit School District 193,873

4901020 Tintic School District 51,309

4901050 Tooele School District 1,199,213

4901080 Uintah School District 962,538

4901110 Wasatch School District 463,611

4901140 Washington School District 6,057,555

4901170 Wayne School District 112,588

4901200 Weber School District 2,678,220

4999999 PART D SUBPART 2 0

* Actual amounts received by LEAs will be smaller than shown here due to State-level adjustments to Federal Title I allocations. States adjust

 allocations, for example, to reflect LEA boundary changes or the creation of new LEAs, including charter school LEAs, that are not accounted

 for in the statutory calculations. States also are permitted to reserve, for administration, up to 1 percent of the allocations they would receive

 if $14 billion were appropriated and generally must reserve 4 percent in fiscal year 2013 for school improvement activities. These 

 adjustments will reduce the actual amounts available.