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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDI VANGJELI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 216 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002651-2016

*****

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDI VANGJELI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 217 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002655-2016

*****

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDI VANGJELI 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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Appellant

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: No. 218 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002658-2018

*****

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDI VANGJELI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 219 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004509-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2019

Andi Vangjeli appeals from the judgments of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following a nonjury trial which 

consolidated four docket numbers,

1

resulting in the following convictions: on

____________________________________________

1 Vangjeli filed a single brief, as the matters and issues across the four docket 

numbers are interrelated. See Pa.R.A.P. 2138. For the same reason, we 

consolidate his appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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docket number 2651—terroristic threats2 and harassment;3 on docket number 

2655—terroristic threats and simple assault;4 on docket number 2658—carrying 

a firearm without a license,5 carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia,6

terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person 

(REAP);

7 and on docket number 4509—intimidation of a witness,8 stalking,9

harassment, and criminal use of a communication facility.10 After careful review, 

we affirm in part, and vacate in part.

From 2012 until July of 2014, K.O. dated Vangjeli’s younger brother 

Emiliano. K.O. discovered she was pregnant on November 5, 2014, and

suspected Emiliano was the father. The relationship fell apart after two paternity 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701.

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108.

7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. 

8 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952.

9 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1.

10 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512.
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tests confirmed otherwise. Subsequently, Vangjeli initiated a series of personal

confrontations and social media attacks against K.O. that continued into 2016.

On November 1, 2015,

11 Vangjeli approached K.O. from behind at a gas 

station. After a verbal exchange, Vangjeli lifted his shirt, exposing the handle

of a black gun in his waistband. K.O. feared for her safety and left. Vangjeli did 

not have a license to possess a firearm. However, he lived in the same house as 

Emiliano and had access to the .9mm pistol Emiliano kept under his bed. 

On November 20, 2015,12 K.O. was leaving a local bar when she 

encountered Vangjeli and several of his friends. After turning to walk to her car, 

K.O. was interrupted by a glass bottle thrown at her head. Vangjeli then 

approached K.O., tore her cross-body bag from her person and spat on her face.

Vangjeli told K.O. he wanted to hit her and attempted to do so. Though he

missed, K.O. was fearful. 

On November 25, 2015,13 Vangjeli, along with a group of his friends, 

approached K.O. in public and again threatened to hit her. Vangjeli struck K.O. 

____________________________________________

11 The November 1, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket 

number 2658. 

12 The November 20, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket 

number 2655. 

13 The November 25, 2015 incident forms the basis for charges filed under docket 

number 2651. 
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and spat on her. K.O. told Vangjeli she would go to the police if he did not leave 

her alone. On December 1, K.O. filed a police report after Vangjeli posted photos 

of her on his social media websites. 

Beginning on December 9, 2015,14 Vangjeli published a series of Twitter 

posts, calling K.O. derogatory names and openly wishing for her to suffer 

physical harm. Several of these posts, made immediately prior to K.O.’s 

testimony at Vangjeli’s preliminary hearing, called for K.O.’s death. Vangjeli

continued publishing tweets directed at K.O. after her testimony, often 

characterized by overtly racist, misogynist, or sexually explicit content. 

On March 25, 2016, K.O. encountered Vangjeli at a store, where he took 

three video recordings of K.O. over her protests. She told the police the incident 

made her feel as if she could encounter Vangjeli anywhere and be subject to 

emotional, mental, or physical abuse. See N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 87

(recounting, at trial, that by the time this incident took place, “[Vangjeli] had 

already been taken into custody and it was an ongoing matter and he sees me 

in public and still continues to act the way he was. It was concerning to me that 

it wasn’t going to end.”). 

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14 The incidents that occurred after December 9, 2015 form the basis for charges 

filed under docket number 4509. 
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After a non-jury trial held on April 21, 2017, the Honorable Edward Wright 

imposed a total of two to five years’ incarceration, followed by five years of 

probation on October 27, 2017.

15

 Vangjeli filed timely post-sentence motions, 

which were denied on December 8, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal under each docket number, after which he filed timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statements. 

On appeal, Vangjeli challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his convictions for harassment, intimidation of a witness, criminal use of a 

communication facility, terroristic threats, carrying a firearm without a license, 

carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and REAP. He also challenges the 

weight of the evidence underpinning his convictions for carrying a firearm 

without a license and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia.

Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled: 

____________________________________________

15 Judge Wright sentenced Vangeli as follows: on docket number 2651, three 

years’ probation for terroristic threats, and no further penalty for harassment; 

on docket number 2655, three years’ probation for terroristic threats, and two 

years’ probation for simple assault; on docket number 2658, two to five years’ 

incarceration for carrying a firearm without a license, two years’ probation for 

carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, two years’ probation for terroristic 

threats, two years’ probation for simple assault, and two years’ probation for 

recklessly endangering another person; and on docket number 4509, five years’ 

probation for intimidation of a witness, three years’ probation for stalking, one 

year’s probation for harassment, and five years’ probation for criminal use of a 

communication facility. His conviction for carrying a firearm without a license is 

the sole basis for his sentence of incarceration. On all other convictions, Vangjeli 

received sentences of probation, consecutive to his sentence of incarceration, 

and concurrent to one another. 
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In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the 

offense. . . . When performing this review, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and 

quotation omitted). 

Vangjeli challenges his harassment conviction under docket number 

2651,

16 averring the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he acted with the necessary intent to harass. 

The Crimes Code defines harassment, in relevant part, as follows: 

§ 2709. Harassment

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of harassment 

when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person:

(1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other 

person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the 

same

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). The intent to harass “may be inferred from the 

totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 961 

____________________________________________

16 Vangjeli’s statement of questions lists separate challenges to the sufficiency 

of “the harassment charges” and the harassment charge under docket number 

4509. Brief of Appellant, at 3. His argument, however, only challenges the 

harassment conviction under docket number 2651, submitting no argument 

whatsoever related to his harassment conviction under docket number 4509. 

Id. at 19–23. His challenge to the harassment conviction under docket number 

4509, therefore, is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 
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(Pa. Super. 2002). Such an inference can be drawn from testimony indicating a 

victim was subjected to unwanted physical contact by another. See 

Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 319 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding 

valid inference of intent to harass when child grabbed by arm and dragged to 

house by grown woman). 

Vangjeli avers his behavior on November 25, 2015, which began with

yelling obscenities at K.O., escalated to spitting on K.O., and ultimately ended 

with striking K.O, “was intended to address what was being relayed to him by 

[K.O.] and not intended to annoy or harass her.” Brief of Appellant, at 22; 36-

37. He, however, offers no legal justification as to why K.O.’s alleged 

provocation undermines an inference of an intent to harass drawn from clear

evidence of unwanted physical contact. Subjecting K.O to such clearly unwanted 

contact provides a proper basis for inferring an intent to harass. See Blackham, 

supra, at 319. 

Vangjeli further submits that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 

charge for intimidation of witnesses because the Commonwealth failed to prove 

that he intentionally intimidated K.O. or attempted to dissuade her from 

reporting a crime or presenting testimony related to the commission of a crime. 

Brief of Appellant, at 36. 

The Crimes Code defines intimidation of witnesses or victims, in relevant 

part, as follows:
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§ 4952. Intimidation of witnesses or victims

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, with the intent 

to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, 

impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal 

justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or 

victim to:

(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law enforcement 

officer, prosecuting official or judge concerning any 

information, document or thing relating to the commission of 

a crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(1). The intent requirement has been explicated as 

follows:

[A]ctual intimidation of a witness is not an essential element of the 

crime. The crime is committed if one, with the necessary mens rea, 

‘attempts’ to intimidate a witness or victim. . . . The trier of the 

facts, therefore, could find that appellant attempted to intimidate his 

accuser and that he did so intending or, at least, having knowledge 

that his conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice. . . . The Commonwealth is not 

required to prove mens rea by direct evidence. Frequently such 

evidence is not available. In such cases, the Commonwealth may 

rely on circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Collington, 615 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

This Court, therefore, must examine whether the record supports an 

inference that Vangjeli acted to interfere with “the administration of the justice 

system by convincing [the victim] to withhold testimony.” Commonwealth v. 

Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 48 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding defendant’s YouTube rap 

video, threatening police officers scheduled to testify, furnished sufficient 

evidence for inference of intent to interfere with administration of justice). There 
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need not be a specific threat connecting a defendant’s behavior to a victim’s trial 

testimony—the contents and timing of an action, taken in conjunction with the 

surrounding circumstances, is sufficient, if believed by the finder of fact, to 

permit an inference that a threat was made with the purpose of intimidating a 

witness whose testimony is critical in the impending trial. See Collington, 

supra at 770 (finding defendant’s letter, which did not specifically refer to 

upcoming rape trial, provided sufficient basis for inferring it was sent to victim

with intent to impede justice). 

Vangjeli claims, in order to sustain his conviction, this Court would need 

to conclude that communicating to a victim a desire to cease prosecution 

constitutes a per se violation of the law. See Brief of Appellant, at 37. This 

assertion is as irrelevant as it is inapposite—not only does screaming, spitting, 

and striking an individual go a great deal farther than merely communicating a 

desire to cease prosecution, our case law demands no such bright line rule. See,

e.g., Collington, supra at 770.

Vangjeli further argues that evidence adduced at trial fails to suggest an 

intent to prevent K.O. from testifying. See id. at 39–42 (citing absence of 

threats connected to K.O.’s testimony and indirect manner in which Vangjeli’s 

social media posts threatened K.O.). While we agree that Judge Wright’s Rule 

1925(a) opinion cites instances of intimidation without offering a clear 

connection to the conclusion that Vangeli intended to discourage K.O.’s 
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participation in the legal process, we disagree with the assertion that the facts

of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, preclude

a logical inference that Vangeli’s conduct constituted witness intimidation.

17

Judge Wright’s Rule 1925(a) opinion cites Vangeli’s conduct on March 25, 

2016, where he taunted K.O., recorded her on his cell phone, and referenced 

the ongoing case against him. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 10–12. 

However, by that time, K.O. had also previously endured Vangjeli’s calls for her 

death on social media—messages which directly referenced her impending

testimony at his preliminary hearing.18 After the incident on March 25, 2016,

less than one month before trial, K.O. felt as if Vangjeli’s threatening behavior 

“wasn’t going to end.” See N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 87. This unbroken pattern of 

behavior, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, affords a 

clear inference that Vangjeli intended to keep K.O. from testifying. Proving the 

required mental state for intimidation of a witness is not an issue of whether the

defendant’s threats were clear, or whether the threats were received by the

victim in a timely fashion—the decisive question, rather, is whether the facts 

____________________________________________

17 This court is free to affirm Vangjeli’s conviction on grounds other than those 

discussed by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 

593 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2012).

18 In the twenty-four hours preceding Vangjeli’s preliminary hearing, K.O. was 

aware of at least four posts on social media where Vanjgeli expressed his desire 

for K.O.’s death in conjunction with her role as a witness. See N.T. Trial,

4/19/17, at 57–58. 
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permit an inference of intent to intimidate. See Beasley, supra at 39; see 

also Collington, supra at 770. Vangjeli’s statements, desirous of K.O.’s death, 

in conjunction with his menacing online and in-person behavior throughout the 

trial process, permit the inference that Vangjeli acted with a desire to instill fear, 

so as to discourage K.O. from offering testimony. 

Vangjeli also asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for criminal use of a communication facility because the Commonwealth failed 

to prove that he used a communication facility to commit or attempt a crime 

graded as a felony. 

The Crimes Code defines criminal use of a communication facility as 

follows:

§ 7512. Criminal use of communication facility

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the third degree 

if that person uses a communication facility to commit, cause or 

facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any crime which 

constitutes a felony under this title or under the act of April 14, 1972 

(P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device 

and Cosmetic Act. Every instance where the communication facility 

is utilized constitutes a separate offense under this section.

. . . . 

(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term “communication 

facility” means a public or private instrumentality used or useful in 

the transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or 

intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part, including, 

but not limited to, telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic, 

photoelectronic or photo-optical systems or the mail.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. 7512(a), (c). Under this section, therefore, the Commonwealth 

must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(1) Appellant [] knowingly and intentionally used a communication 

facility; (2) Appellant [] knowingly, intentionally or recklessly 

facilitated an underlying felony; and (3) the underlying felony 

occurred. . . . Facilitation has been defined as any use of a 

communication facility that makes easier the commission of the 

underlying felony.

Commonwealth v. Moss, 852 A.2d 374, 382 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted). 

As discussed above, the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Vangjeli intentionally used the internet to voice his desire to see K.O. 

dead before his preliminary hearing, and he used his cellular telephone to record 

K.O. in a manner that made her feel threatened. Both are communication 

facilities within the meaning of the statute. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(c). Vangjeli’s 

use of these devices in a clearly threatening manner supports an inference that 

he knowingly used the aforementioned communication facilities to intimidate a 

witness, and we have concluded that such conduct was a felony under section 

4952(a)(1). Vangjeli’s conviction for criminal use of a communication facility is, 

therefore, supported by sufficient evidence.

Vangjeli asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

convictions for terroristic threats under docket numbers 2651, 2655, and 2658 

because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Vangjeli threatened, at any 

point, to commit a crime of violence against K.O. Brief of Appellant, at 25–26.
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The Crimes Code defines terroristic threats, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2706. Terroristic threats

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of terroristic 

threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a 

threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize 

another

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth need not prove any 

of the following: (1) communication of an express or specific threat, 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2016); (2) 

direct communication of a threat, Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123, 

127 (Pa. Super. 1995); (3) the ability to carry out a threat, Commonwealth v. 

Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 1996); or (4) a belief by the person 

threatened that the threat will be consummated, id. The Commonwealth must, 

however, prove the following elements: 1) the defendant threatened a crime of 

violence, id.; and 2) the threat was made with either the intent to terrorize, or 

reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror. Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684

A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 1996). These elements are rooted in the need to 

protect individuals from “the psychological distress that follows from an invasion 

of another’s sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 

A.2d 720, 729 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Vangjeli’s terroristic threats conviction on docket number 2658 stems from

his actions on November 1, 2015, where he approached K.O. at a gas station, 
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engaged in a verbal altercation, and lifted his shirt to expose a handgun. See 

N.T. Trial, 4/21/17, at 84–85 (closing argument by Commonwealth stated, “it’s 

terroristic threats and not attempted murder” because Vangjeli brandished 

handgun intending to frighten K.O., not to kill her). Vangjeli argues the 

November 1, 2015 incident fails to furnish a basis for terroristic threats, owing 

to the absence of any evidence indicating he “said anything that could be 

considered a threat.” Brief of Appellant, at 27 (emphasis added). 

We find this argument unavailing. The record supports the trial court’s 

finding19 that K.O “saw the black handle of a firearm in [Vangjeli’s] waistband. . 

. . Therefore, it can be inferred that [Vangjeli] was attempting to intimidate [K.O] 

with a firearm.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 15. On this basis, we find 

the evidence supports an inference that Vangjeli threatened a crime of violence, 

and that he made that threat with the intent to terrorize. See Tizer, supra. 

Exposing a gun to K.O., in the context of an unprompted argument, 

indirectly communicated the threat that she would be shot. See in re Maloney, 

636 A.2d 671, 676 (Pa. Super. 1994) (pointing gun at victim, while telling victim 

to leave, suggested victim would be shot if he did not comply). Vangjeli’s 

gesture—exposing a concealed gun to another individual immediately following 

an argument—would naturally induce terror. His intent to terrorize, therefore, 

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19 Discussed further, infra, in the context of Vangjeli’s convictions of carrying a 

firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia.
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can be inferred from his actions. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 

1153, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“Intent . . . is a subjective element. . . . Generally 

speaking, one is presumed to intend the normal consequences of one’s 

actions.”). The Commonwealth, therefore, proved both elements required to 

sustain Vangjeli’s conviction of terroristic threats under docket number 2658.

See Tizer, supra. 

Vangjeli’s terroristic threats conviction under docket number 2655 stems 

from his actions on November 20, 2015, when Vangjeli encountered K.O at a 

bar and tore her bag from her person, spat on her face, and menaced her with 

a balled fist, before taking a swing at her and missing. N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 

114–17. K.O. described the encounter to the police as follows: “[Vangjeli said] 

I wish I could hit you so bad with his fist balled up and [Vangjeli said] as a matter 

of fact I can, and Vangjeli swung at [K.O.]” Id. at 117. Vangjeli argues that 

this behavior lacks “anything . . . that could be construed as a threat.” Brief of 

Appellant at 27. As previously discussed, clear physical manifestations of 

violence sufficiently communicate a specific threat of violence. See Martinez, 

supra; see also Kelly, supra. Viewing the record in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, we find the court properly inferred Vangjeli 

communicated a threat of violence with the intent to terrorize, or with reckless 

disregard for the risk of terror that would result from threatening to throw a 

punch at K.O. after spitting on her, and tearing her bag away. 
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Vangjeli’s final conviction for terroristic threats on docket number 2651 

stems from his conduct on November 25, 2015. The court stated Vangjeli 

committed the crime of terroristic threats when “he stated that he had ‘nothing 

to live for’ and that he would ‘knock out’ [K.O.] if she continued to look at him,”

finding this situation involved Vangjeli “directly threatening to strike [K.O.], 

causing her fear.”20 Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 13–14.

Vangjeli avers the statements underpinning his conviction of terroristic 

threats were made by Dan O’Connor, not Vangjeli himself, and highlights the 

following testimony by K.O.:

Q. Do you know Dan O'Connor?

A. That’s his best friend.

Q. Do you know him?

A. Not personally, I know of him.

Q. Would you recognize him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see him that night?

A. Yeah, outside.

Q. And you tell him to leave him alone and he tells you don’t look 

at him or he’ll knock you out. And then you tell Detective Allen he 

____________________________________________

20 The Rule 1925(a) Opinion addresses terroristic threats in the context of the 

November 25, 2015 incident, but fails to mention Vangjeli’s other terroristic 

threats convictions. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 13–14. 
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has nothing to live for and nothing lose, and then he spits in your 

face; is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So for him to spit in your face you would have been pretty 

close, wouldn't you?

A. Correct.

Q. And how come he got that close to you?

A. As we were inside in the basement of the bar there were easily 

200 people there. I wasn’t sure where And[i] went after he walked 

away from me, but when me and my friend went outside to the 

food truck they had in the parking lot, I came in contact with 

And[i] again sitting along the bar outside with his friends.

N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 120. 

This testimony quoted above features vague pronouns which could lead 

one to believe either that O’Connor or Vangejli made the threatening statements. 

This Court is not bound by a trial court’s findings of fact which are flagrantly 

contrary to the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dunklin, 280 A.2d 629, 631 

(Pa. Super. 1971) (discarding lower court’s finding of fact when interpretation of 

appellee’s testimony went against “[t]he only conclusion which can be drawn 

from [the] testimony”). However, short of the extraordinary, it is not the 

position of this court to “reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment 

for that of the fact finder.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. 

Super. 2011)
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While on direct examination, K.O. offered a clearer picture of the events 

on November 25, 2015, when she stated

I proceeded to walk towards my car and the defendant and 

[Vangjeli’s] friends continued to follow me. I had a cross body 

bag, he ripped the bag off of me and broke it. For whatever was 

going on at the bar at that time, they were already on their way. 

So we stopped at the corner next to the corner store, we had 

words. The defendant spit on me a few times, and then I 

approached the cop, and asked him to do something and the cop 

told me to just go home.

N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 35. The second statement provides a basis, in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, for inferring that Vangjeli alone made the 

threatening statements to K.O. We, therefore, cannot find that Judge Wright’s 

interpretation of the trial testimony was “flagrantly contrary to the evidence.” 

Dunklin, supra, at 631. Vangjeli’s threat to knock K.O. out, made in close 

proximity to ripping K.O.’s bag away and spitting on her, furnishes the necessary 

basis for finding a threatened crime of violence and an intent to terrorize. See

Tizer, supra. 

Vangjeli argues that his convictions of carrying a firearm without a license 

and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia rest on insufficient 

evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Vagnjeli was, in fact, carrying a genuine firearm as defined by the Uniform 

Firearms Act.21 See Brief of Appellant, at 29. 

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21 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101–6127.
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Possession of a firearm is an integral element of both carrying a firearm 

without a license and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, which 

are defined as follows:

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

(a) Offense defined.--

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who 

carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a 

firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place 

of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully 

issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the third 

degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). 

§ 6108. Carrying firearms on public streets or public property 

in Philadelphia

No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon 

the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first 

class unless:

(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or

(2) such person is exempt from licensing under section 

6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried 

without a license).

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(1), (2). 

Under both sections, the Commonwealth must establish that an individual 

either had actual physical possession of a firearm, or had the power of control 

over a firearm with the intent to exercise control. See Commonwealth v. 

Carter, 450 A.2d 142, 146–47 (Pa. Super. 1982) (requiring, under section 6106, 
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physical or constructive possession of firearm without license); see also

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833–34 (Pa. 2009) (requiring, 

under section 6108, possession of firearm without license in public in 

Philadelphia). Possession may be shown entirely through circumstantial 

evidence. Id. A witness’s assertion, if credible, is all that is needed to prove 

possession of a firearm in violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, even in instances 

where the police have not recovered a weapon. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 

817 A.2d 1153, 1161–62 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[The victim] testified that all three 

attackers possessed handguns. This is all that is necessary.”). 

Both sections 6106 and 6108 prohibit individuals from possessing objects

that could be made to fire a shot. See Commonwealth v. Gainer, 7 A.3d 291, 

299 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating correct question under current statutory 

framework as “whether [a] pistol could be made to shoot a bullet”). Though the 

statutory definition of a firearm has changed since our Supreme Court decided 

Commonwealth v. Layton, 307 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1973), Layton and its progeny 

still require the Commonwealth to present evidence of whether a pistol is 

“capable of being converted into an object that could fire a shot.” Gainer, 

supra, at 299. “A reasonable fact finder may, of course, infer operability from 

an object which looks like, feels like, sounds like or is like, a firearm. Such an 

inference would be reasonable without direct proof of operability.” 

Commonwealth v. Layton, 307 A.2d 843, 844 (Pa. 1973) (emphasis added).
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At trial, Vangjeli contested whether the Commonwealth presented 

evidence of an operable firearm. See e.g. N.T. Trial, 4/19/17, at 111 

(questioning whether K.O. could tell difference between BB guns, water pistols, 

or real firearms). K.O. asserted she knew it was a real handgun from the black 

handle she saw in Vangjeli’s waistband. Id. at 112. Acting as the finder of fact, 

the court credited K.O.’s testimony, specifically highlighting her description of 

Vangjeli displaying “the firearm in a prominent way.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion

4/13/18, at 15–16. The court further found Vangjeli knew of and had access to 

his brother’s handgun. Id. at 16. In light of the facts and relevant law, the 

Commonwealth furnished a proper basis for inferring Vangjeli had access to a 

firearm and possessed that firearm on a public street in Philadelphia. See 

Robinson, supra at 844 (allowing testimony alone to serve as basis for finding 

possession of firearm). 

As the record further indicates Vangjeli lacked a valid license to possess a 

firearm, N.T. Trial 4/21/17, at 4, and the incident occurred in public in the city 

and county of Philadelphia, id., at 26, we find the Commonwealth provided a 

sufficient basis for Vangjeli’s convictions under both sections 6106 and 6108.

Vangjeli argues that his conviction for REAP rests on insufficient evidence 

because the Commonwealth failed to prove Vangjeli intentionally placed K.O. in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury. 

The Crimes Code defines REAP as follows:
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§ 2705. Recklessly endangering another person

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another 

person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. REAP is distinguished from the firearms charges discussed 

supra by the added requirement that the Commonwealth demonstrate the victim 

was in actual danger. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 91, 915–16 (Pa. 

Super. 2000). To sustain a conviction under this section,

[T]he Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual 

present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to 

do so. Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger, must be 

created. The mens rea for REAP is a conscious disregard of a known 

risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.

Id. (citation omitted). When the charge of REAP involves a firearm, the

Commonwealth can prove the ability to inflict harm by showing either “that the 

gun was loaded or the surrounding circumstances were inherently dangerous.” 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Super. 1981); compare

Commonwealth v. Gouse, 429 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1981) (“the 

pointing of an unloaded weapon, without more, does not constitute recklessly

endangering”), with Commonwealth v. Rivera, 503 A.2d 11, 12–13 (Pa. 

Super. 1985) (en banc) (finding evidence sufficient for inference of ability to 

inflict death or serious bodily injury without proof gun was loaded when 

defendant tied victim up in her own home at gunpoint and demanded 

combination to safe). 
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The trial court found Vangeli’s act of raising his shirt and exposing the gun 

in his waistband to K.O. was “in and of itself” enough to sustain a conviction for 

REAP as “a firearm is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, and the 

firearm was located where [Vangjeli] could easily access it." Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion, 4/13/18, at 18. This conclusion is not borne out by the case law; the 

Commonwealth must prove an actual present ability to inflict harm, not merely 

the apparent ability to do so. Hopkins, supra. There is no evidence Vangjeli’s 

gun was loaded, or that brandishing a gun without pointing it at K.O., in the 

absence of clear, verbal threats, created a set of circumstances that would allow 

this Court to infer Vangjeli possessed the ability to inflict death or serious bodily 

injury. Consequently, the Commonwealth failed to prove that Vangjeli had the 

“actual present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do 

so.” In re Maloney, 636 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 1994). We, therefore,

vacate Vangjeli’s judgment of sentence for REAP on docket number 2658. 

Next, Vangjeli claims that the verdict on the firearms charges is against 

the weight of the evidence22 because “the testimony regarding what the 

complainant observed in appellant’s waistband was a firearm as defined in the 

Uniform Firearms Act was inconsistent, contradictory, and convoluted given that 

____________________________________________

22 Vangjeli preserved his weight claim by including it in his timely post-sentence 

motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607.
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K.O. candidly admitted that she was not familiar with firearms and that what she 

saw in his waistband could have been a BB gun.” Brief of Appellant, at 44.

When a defendant challenges the weight of the evidence, relief in the form 

of a new trial may be granted only where the verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice. This Court reviews the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on the 

weight claim, not the underlying question of whether the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(Pa. 2003). It is not our role, as a reviewing court, to reweigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 

902 A.2d 430, 449 (Pa. 2006). 

As discussed supra, the evidence was sufficient to support Vangjeli’s 

convictions. Moreover, the trial court, acting as the finder of fact, found credible 

K.O.’s sworn testimony stating she saw the black handle of a firearm in the 

waistband of Vangjeli’s pants. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 4/13/18, at 2. This 

testimony, alongside evidence of Vangjeli’s access to his brother’s firearm, 

provided the trial court’s basis for convicting Vangjeli under Sections 6106 and 

6108. Simply put, the trial court was free to evaluate those statements and 

“believe all, part of none of . . . [the] testimony.” Mitchell, supra at 902. It is 

not our role, as a reviewing court, to reweigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we find this 

claim meritless.
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“If our disposition upsets the overall sentencing scheme of the trial court, 

we must remand so that the court can restructure its sentence plan.”

Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

omitted). “By contrast, if our decision does not alter the overall scheme, there 

is no need for a remand.” Id. (finding no need to remand because vacating 

DUI conviction did not disturb sentencing scheme where DUI sentence was 

concurrent with other terms and did not increase aggregate length of 

incarceration). 

Here, the trial court imposed a term of probation for REAP to be served 

consecutively to Vangjeli’s term of incarceration, and concurrently to the 

remaining sentences of probation. Vacating the REAP conviction and its 

attendant sentence does not affect the length of Vanjeli’s aggregate term of 

imprisonment or the overall sentencing scheme. Hence, we conclude it is 

unnecessary to remand the matter for resentencing.

Judgment of sentence vacated with respect to Vangjeli’s REAP conviction 

and affirmed on all other counts.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/28/19