Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Board of Education, Kewanee School District 229 v. Regional Board of School 

Trustees, Bureau, Henry & Stark Counties, 2019 IL App (3d) 170638

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, KEWANEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 

229, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL

TRUSTEES, BUREAU, HENRY AND STARK COUNTIES; 

ANGIE ZARVELL, Regional Superintendent of Schools; JEREMY 

S. HELTON, KATIE MARIE HELTON, CHAD J. JOOS, JOANNA 

R. JOOS, CAROL S. KERSEY, KEVIN W. ROSE, LAURA M.

ROSE, CONNIE SUE STETSON, MARK J. STETSON and 

MICHAEL J. STETSON, in Their Capacities as Attorneys-in-Fact;

CONNIE SUE STETSON, Individually; LAURA M. ROSE, 

Individually; STEVEN ENDRESS, Superintendent of Bureau Valley 

School District 340; and BUREAU VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT 

340, Defendants (Connie Sue Stetson and Laura M. Rose, DefendantsAppellants).

District & No. Third District

No. 3-17-0638

Filed September 4, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 16-MR-73; the 

Hon. Terence M. Patton, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Jacob J. Frost, of Spring Valley, for appellants.
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Appeal Allen Wall, Caitlyn R. Culbertson, and Scott E. Nemanich, of Klein, 

Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Lytton concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendants Jeremy S. Helton, Katie Marie Helton, Chad J. Joos, Joanna R. Joos, Carol S. 

Kersey, Kevin W. Rose, Laura M. Rose, Connie Sue Stetson, Mark J. Stetson, and Michael J. 

Stetson (collectively, the petitioner defendants) filed a petition to detach 2010 acres of 

Kewanee Community Unit School District 229’s (District 229) boundary and annex it to 

Bureau Valley Community Unit School District 340 (District 340). In October 2015, a hearing 

on the petition was held, and defendant, the Regional Board of School Trustees, Bureau, Henry 

and Stark Counties (Board), issued a denial of the petition. Defendants Connie and Laura 

(collectively, the individual defendants) submitted a petition for rehearing and placed a notice 

of public hearing in the local newspaper. In December 2015, the Board granted the petition for 

rehearing. In January 2016, a rehearing was held, and District 229 filed a motion to dismiss, 

claiming that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the petition for rehearing, which the 

Board denied. Ultimately, the Board granted the detachment petition despite District 229’s 

objections. In March 2016, District 229 filed a complaint for administrative review. The trial 

court found that it could not review the Board’s decision on the petition for rehearing because 

it failed to keep a record of the proceedings in accordance with the Administrative Review 

Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)) and reversed the Board’s grant of the petition for 

detachment. The individual defendants filed a motion for vacation or modification of 

judgment, which the trial court denied. The individual defendants appealed, and we affirm. 

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The petitioner defendants and two other individuals filed a petition for school district 

boundary change to detach 2010 acres of land from District 229 and annex it to District 340. 

All 12 individuals were registered voters and residents in District 229. In compliance with 

statutory requirement, the petition identified a “committee of [10]” of the 12 individuals to act 

for the petitioners. Before a hearing on the petition occurred, two of the petitioner defendants 

moved outside of District 229. 

¶ 4 In October 2015, a hearing was held, which Connie, Michael, Laura, and Carol attended. 

The Board voted to deny the petition for detachment. 

¶ 5 Before the Board issued its written decision, the individual defendants submitted a petition 

for rehearing. In November 2015, the Board issued a written order denying this initial petition 

for rehearing. 

¶ 6 Subsequently, the individual defendants submitted a second petition for rehearing, alleging 

that (1) counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, (2) the Board’s denial of the detachment 
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petition based on the individual defendants’ failure to provide notice to property owners was 

error because notice was not statutorily required, and (3) the individual defendants were not 

statutorily required to obtain signatures from all owners in the territory proposed to be 

detached. A notice of public hearing on the request for rehearing was published in the 

newspaper. The notice stated: 

“NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING 

Notice is hereby given that the Regional Board of School Trustees for Bureau, Henry, 

and Stark Counties will conduct a public meeting on Wednesday, December 9, 2015 

commencing at 1:00 p.m. The purpose of the meeting is to consider a request for a 

rehearing. The meeting will be held at Regional Office of Education, 107 S. State 

Street, Atkinson, Illinois.”

District 229 claims that its superintendent, Dr. Chris Sullens, did not receive notice of the 

public hearing until he discovered the notice in the newspaper three days before the scheduled 

public meeting date. 

¶ 7 In December 2015, a hearing on whether to grant the second petition and schedule a new 

detachment hearing was held. Minutes were taken at the hearing, which showed that Connie 

had testified in support of a rehearing, that District 229 testified in opposition to rehearing, and 

that the Board had voted to grant the rehearing. 

¶ 8 In January 2016, a new hearing on detachment was convened. District 229 challenged the 

Board’s jurisdiction to engage in the new hearing claiming there was no evidence that the 

individual defendants had requested rehearing within the time period prescribed in section 7-

6(n) of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7-6(n) (West 2016)). After the Board denied that motion 

to dismiss, District 229 raised oral objections, alleging that the Board failed to create a record 

of the proceedings on the petition for rehearing. The following discussion occurred: 

“MS. VANDER BROEK: And then finally as just a matter for the record, because 

there is no record of the rehearing, I would like to file our continuing objection to this 

rehearing with the Board. And I do have copies for all the board members if you would 

like them, or if you just want the one. 

[REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT] ZARVELL: Again, motion denied. The—

There was no obligation to have a hearing to determine if there needs to be a rehearing. 

The Regional Board of School Trustees was required to meet per the Open Meetings 

Act. We met those requirements. The Board met. We took public comment. The Board 

has rendered their decision.” 

Ultimately, the Board reversed its earlier decision and granted the individual defendants’ 

detachment petition. 

¶ 9 In March 2016, District 229 filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. 

District 229 also filed a motion for default judgment against eight of the petitioner defendants, 

Jeremy S. Helton, Katie Marie Helton, Chad J. Joos, Joanna R. Joos, Carol S. Kersey, Kevin 

W. Rose, Mark J. Stetson, and Michael J. Stetson, for failing to file an appearance and against 

the Board and Angie Zarvell, the regional superintendent of schools, for failing to timely file 

a record of the proceedings. The court granted the default judgment against the eight petitioner 

defendants and extended the time of the Board, Zarvell, and District 229 to file pleadings. In 

August 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the briefing schedule to allow the Board 

additional time to file a complete administrative record, which the court allowed. In September 
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2016, the court entered another agreed order in which the briefing schedule was extended again 

to allow the Board additional time to file an administrative record. District 229 filed a brief in 

support of its complaint, and defendants filed a supplemental answer to the complaint. 

¶ 10 A hearing on the complaint was held. The trial court found that, without a written finding 

and record, it could not determine whether the Board’s allowance of the petition for rehearing 

was proper and, consequently, remanded the case for a new hearing. District 229 objected and 

filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the court should reverse the Board’s decision rather 

than remand the case because, under Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Board of Appeals, 411 

Ill. 559, 565 (1952), the Board’s failure to keep a record of the proceedings on the petition for 

rehearing constitutes a reversal of its decision. The court granted District 229’s motion to 

reconsider and, amending its initial order, reversed the Board’s decision on the January 2016 

hearing and the petition for rehearing, thereby reinstating the Board’s earlier decision denying 

detachment. 

¶ 11 The individual defendants filed a motion for vacation or modification of judgment, arguing 

that (1) section 7-6(n) of the School Code did not require the Board to conduct a hearing on 

the petition for rehearing, (2) section 7-6(n) did not require the individual defendants to provide 

notice of the petition for rehearing to District 229, and (3) the Board had jurisdiction to hear 

the claim under section 7-6(n) because the petition for rehearing was filed within 10 days from 

the Board’s November 3, 2015, order. The individual defendants also claimed that the petition 

for rehearing and the transcript of the January 2016 rehearing provided evidence to show the 

Board had sufficient cause to grant rehearing or, in the alternative, remand was the appropriate 

remedy. The individual defendants attached Connie’s affidavit to the motion. In the affidavit, 

she claimed that she had made an audio recording, and subsequently a transcript, of the hearing 

on the petition for rehearing. The court denied the individual defendants’ motion, and the 

individual defendants solely appealed. 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 I. Jurisdiction 

¶ 14 As a preliminary matter, we address District 229’s argument that the Board lacked 

jurisdiction to review the petitioner defendants’ detachment petition because it did not have 

statutory authority to review a petition when the designated committee of 10 fell below the 

requisite number of committee members in violation of section 7-6(c) of the School Code (105 

ILCS 5/7-6(c) (West 2016)). 

¶ 15 A decision rendered by an administrative agency that lacks jurisdiction over the parties or 

the subject matter or that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the decision involved is 

void and may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally. City of 

Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976). As the supreme 

court has explained: 

“An administrative agency is different from a court because an agency only has the 

authorization given to it by the legislature through the statutes. Consequently, to the 

extent an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction. 

[Citation.] The term jurisdiction, while not strictly applicable to an administrative body, 

may be employed to designate the authority of the administrative body to act ***. 

[Citation.] Thus, in administrative law, the term jurisdiction has three aspects: 

(1) personal jurisdiction—the agency’s authority over the parties and intervenors 
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involved in the proceedings, (2) subject matter jurisdiction—the agency’s power to 

hear and determine causes of the general class of cases to which the particular case 

belongs [citation], and (3) an agency’s scope of authority under the statutes. ***

* * *

We acknowledge that, theoretically, anytime an agency makes an erroneous 

decision, it acts without statutory authority because the legislature and the statutes do 

not give an agency the power to make erroneous decisions. [Citation.] We are 

confident, however, that a reviewing court can make the appropriate distinction 

between an erroneous decision and one which lacks statutory authority.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. 

Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243-45 (1989). 

¶ 16 Section 7-6 governs the procedures in detachment proceedings. Specifically, section 7-6(c) 

states: 

“When a petition contains more than 10 signatures the petition shall designate a 

committee of 10 of the petitioners as attorney in fact for all petitioners, any 7 of whom 

may make binding stipulations on behalf of all petitioners as to any question with 

respect to the petition or hearing ***, and the regional board of school trustees *** may 

accept such stipulation in lieu of evidence or ***. The committee of petitioners shall 

have the same power to stipulate to accounting or waiver thereof between school 

districts; however, the regional board of school trustees *** may refuse to accept such 

stipulation. Those designated as the committee of 10 shall serve in that capacity until 

such time as the regional superintendent of schools or the committee of 10 determines 

that, because of death, resignation, transfer of residency from the territory, or failure to 

qualify, the office of a particular member of the committee of 10 is vacant. Upon 

determination that a vacancy exists, the remaining members shall appoint a petitioner 

to fill the designated vacancy on the committee of 10. The appointment of any new 

members by the committee of 10 shall be made by a simple majority vote of the 

remaining designated members.” 105 ILCS 5/7-6(c) (West 2016). 

¶ 17 Petitioner defendants complied with committee of 10 requirements under section 7-6(c). 

That section does not require, as District 229 argues, that all 10 members must be present at 

the hearing, that affidavits of the nonpresent members could not be used to represent the 

committee, or that the committee must provide stipulations that all its members authorized 

defendants to proceed with the petition for detachment. See Gillespie Community Unit School 

District No. 7 v. Wight & Co., 2014 IL 115330, ¶ 31 (“It is improper for a court to depart from 

the plain statutory language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions 

that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent.”). The petitioner defendants initially 

designated a committee of 10 in their petition, stating, “We further pray that Michael Stetson, 

Connie Stetson, Laura Rose, Kevin Rose, Chad Joos, Joanna Joos, Jeremy Helton, Katie 

Helton, Carol Kersey and Mark Stetson be appointed as a Committee of ten to act as attorneyin-fact for us in this matter.” Moreover, there is no evidence that the committee membership 

fell below 10 when 6 members were physically present at the January 2016 hearing and the 

absent remaining 4 members submitted affidavits requesting the court to grant the petition.1

Petitioner defendants initially complied with the section 7-6(c)’s requirement that the petition 

1

This issue may actually be moot in this case.
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designate a committee of 10 when it contains more than 10 signatures and their petition had 

12. This requirement ensures that each member in a large group of signatories is fully 

represented through decisions of 7 out of 10 members of the group acting pursuant to what is 

essentially a statutory power of attorney. When, as here, the number of signatories falls below 

10, the statutory obligation becomes superfluous because the committee of 10 is no longer 

necessary to serve the purpose of the statute. Therefore, we reject District 229’s challenge to 

the Board’s jurisdiction.

¶ 18 II. Record

¶ 19 Next, the individual defendants allege that section 7-6(n) of the School Code, which 

governs petitions for rehearing in detachment cases, does not require the Board to keep a record 

of the hearing on whether to allow rehearing. Furthermore, the individual defendants argue 

that the Board need not file a record of the hearing on the petition for rehearing when the 

petition itself and the transcripts from the October 2015 hearing and the January 2016 hearing 

show the Board had sufficient cause to grant the petition. 

¶ 20 District 229 contends that the Board erred when it did not keep a record of the hearing on 

the petition for rehearing because the trial court can only review the record under the 

Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)) and, without the record, 

the court cannot determine whether the Board had sufficient cause to grant the petition. It 

argues that the petition for rehearing does not show sufficient cause to grant the hearing and, 

even so, the trial court cannot conduct judicial review without a record consisting of the 

evidence presented at the hearing and the Board’s findings. District 229 also claims the Board’s 

failure to show that it published notice to the public, posted an agenda of the hearing, and met 

and approved the meeting minutes in compliance with the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 

120/2.02(a)-(b) (West 2016)) supports its argument that the Board failed to provide a record in 

accordance with the Administrative Law Review. 

¶ 21 The question before us is whether the Board’s failure to provide a record precluded judicial 

review of the petition for rehearing. “[W]here the historical facts are admitted or established, 

but there is a dispute as to whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly 

by the administrative body, the case presents a purely legal question for which our review is 

de novo.” Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 406 (2011). 

¶ 22 The individual defendants are correct that section 7-6(n) is devoid of any requirements that 

the Board must keep a record of the hearing on the petition. However, in Illinois, it is wellestablished that a trial court must not weigh the evidence when reviewing a final administrative 

decision but rather it must determine whether, on the record, the administrative agency’s 

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shallow v. Police Board, 60 Ill. App. 

3d 113, 116 (1978). “An order of an administrative agency must thus contain findings to make 

possible a judicial review of the agency’s decision.” Id. As the Fifth District explained in 

Kozsdiy v. O’Fallon Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 31 Ill. App. 3d 173, 177 (1975): 

“It leaves us in the position of guessing what the Board deemed relevant in deciding to 

discharge the appellant. There can be no decision on constitutional issues when it is not 

clear what evidence was accepted or rejected or what ground the Board relied on in 

reaching its decision. In short, it is impossible for us to fulfill our function under the 
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purpose and policy of the Administrative Review Act[2] without knowing the reasons 

for the appellant’s discharge.”

¶ 23 The Administrative Review Law governs the trial court’s authority to review a final 

decision of an administrative agency. Section 3-108 of the Administrative Review Law (735 

ILCS 5/3-108 (West 2016)) concerns an administrative agency’s record on judicial review. It 

states, in relevant part: 

“(b) Answer. Except as herein otherwise provided, the administrative agency shall 

file an answer which shall consist of the original or a certified copy of the entire record 

of proceedings under review, including such evidence as may have been heard by it 

and the findings and decisions made by it.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 3-108(b). 

¶ 24 As set out in section 3-108, the record of proceedings is the answer of the school district. 

Absent a record, the District has not answered and is technically in default and cannot prevail. 

Section 3-108 derives from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 291(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), which 

states: 

“(e) Record on Appeal. The original copy of the answer of the administrative 

agency, consisting of the record of proceedings (including the evidence and exhibits, if 

any) had before the administrative agency, shall be incorporated in the record on appeal 

unless the parties stipulate to less, or the trial court after notice and hearing, or the 

reviewing court, orders less.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 25 Our supreme court’s decision in Strohl, 411 Ill. at 563, also provides guidance on this issue. 

In Strohl, the defendants challenged the trial court’s reversal of Macon County Zoning Board 

of Appeals’ denial of the plaintiffs’ request to rezone their property. Id. at 560. The trial court 

was not provided with a record. Id. at 561. Instead, the trial court conducted a trial de novo and 

based its determination on the record made during the trial. Id. Our supreme court held that, 

based on the Administrative Review Act and the Illinois Supreme Court rule, the trial court 

failed to comply with the provisions that require the court to review the complete record of the 

administrative proceedings. Id. at 562-63. The supreme court based its decision on the parties’ 

failure to incorporate the record of the proceedings as required by statute and failure to provide 

any stipulation to shorten the record. Id. at 563. In particular, the court noted that the trial court 

did not have a record of administrative proceedings, a written administrative decision, nor a 

transcript or stipulation of the evidence before the administrative agency despite the statutory 

requirement that the trial court must make a judicial review of the administrative decision. Id.

¶ 26 The Strohl court explained that the Administrative Review Act does not give an 

independent remedy or create a new cause of action but denotes “a method of review, whereby 

challenged decisions of the administrative body may be subjected to a review” and provides 

for a review of the board’s decision on the record alone. Id. It further stated that section 3.2 of 

the County Zoning Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 34, ¶ 152k.2) required the zoning board to 

keep minutes of the proceedings, “keep records of its examinations and other official actions,” 

and file any decision of the board. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Strohl, 411 Ill. at 564. 

The court stated that if the zoning board complied with section 3.2, “some record of the board’s 

actions and of its decision must exist and a judicial review of the final administrative decision 

must be predicated upon it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The supreme court stated 

2

The Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, ¶ 264 et seq.) is now known as the 

Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)). 
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that if the procedures that the act established are not applied, the trial court would improperly 

act as the zoning board of appeals and “[s]uch a result is not contemplated by either the 

Administrative Review Act or the County Zoning Act.” Id. at 565. 

¶ 27 Turning to the instant case and looking at the plain statutory language and established case 

law, the Board was required to file an answer consisting solely of the entire record of 

proceedings during the hearing on the petition for rehearing, including the evidence that was 

heard by the Board and the Board’s findings and decisions. Here, no record of proceedings in 

accordance with the statutory provisions stated above was filed with petitioners’ three 

supplemental answers even though District 229 twice requested that the Board attach the 

record. The individual defendants did attach the minutes of the hearing on the petition for 

rehearing in their motion to reconsider. However, the minutes do not comply with the statutory 

requirements that the record include the evidence the Board heard and the findings and 

decisions the Board made (see 735 ILCS 5/3-108(b) (West 2016); Ill. S. Ct. R. 291(e) (eff. Jan. 

1, 2016)) nor did the parties stipulate to less in accordance with Rule 291(e). 

¶ 28 The individual defendants cite Board of Education of Rich Township High School District 

No. 227 v. Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d 478, 486-87 (1999), for the proposition that the board was 

not required to maintain a contemporaneous record of the proceeding. In that case, the plaintiffs 

argued that the board erred in granting the defendants’ motion for rehearing under section 7-

6(n) because the defendants failed to make a showing of sufficient cause. The motion for 

rehearing alleged that the board erred in denying the detachment based on the defendants’ 

failure to prove the number of registered voters in the territory proposed to be detached. The 

First District held that the allegations in the motion were supported by case law and, therefore, 

the board did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. Id. at 487-88. 

¶ 29 However, the court in Brown did not state whether a record of proceedings was available, 

and without this critical information, we decline to extend Brown to this case. Therefore, we 

find that the Board was required to provide a record of proceedings, including any evidence it 

heard and any findings and decisions it made, and that the Board failed to provide an adequate 

record for the trial court to properly review its rehearing determination. Because this issue is 

dispositive of this appeal, we need not address District 229’s arguments that (1) the Board 

violated the Open Meetings Act and (2) that it was not given proper notice of nor afforded an 

opportunity to be heard on the petition for rehearing.

¶ 30 III. Remand

¶ 31 Also, the individual defendants argue that the trial court erred when it reversed rather than 

remanded the Board’s decision. Specifically, the individual defendants allege that remand is 

necessary because it will allow the Board to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. 

The individual defendants also assert that remand is necessary to allow the Board to review 

the audio recording and transcript of the hearing on the petition for rehearing attached to their 

motion for vacation or modification of judgment to determine whether they give a complete 

account of the hearing and, if so, to allow the Board to prepare a memorandum of its findings 

and conclusions based on the recording and transcript. Furthermore, the individual defendants 

contend that reversal would be a harsh outcome because the Board, not the individual 

defendants, was responsible for creating and filing a record of proceedings under section 3-

108(b). 
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¶ 32 In reversing and remanding the zoning board’s decision to determine whether a record of 

the administrative proceedings were kept, the Strohl court noted that, under the Administrative 

Review Act, technical errors in the administrative proceedings do not constitute grounds for 

reversal “unless it appears to the trial court that such error or failure materially affected the 

rights of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Strohl, 411 Ill. at 565; 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2016). It held that “[i]f the board 

failed to keep a record of its proceedings as required, we consider their failure to be beyond 

the scope of a technical error” constituting reversal of the zoning board’s decision. Strohl, 411 

Ill. at 565. In accord with Strohl, we agree with the trial court’s decision that the Board’s failure 

to keep a record in accordance with the Administrative Review Law constituted a reversal of 

its decision. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to reverse the Board’s determination 

on the petition for rehearing.

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is affirmed.

¶ 35 Affirmed.