CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the case is remanded to the U.S. Bankruptcy

Court, Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) for further proceedings consistent with the

ME
JOHN W. DARRAH (S04
United States District Court Judge

enclosed Order.

Date: G-20-12_



§ 362(d)(1). ‘Cause’ as used in § 362(d) has no clear definition and is determined on a
case-by-case basis.” In re Fernstrom Storage & Van Co., 938 F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir.
1991) (Fernstrom) (citations and quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has adopted a
three-part test that is to be used in determining whether “cause” exists to lift a stay: (1)
“[a]ny great prejudice to either the bankrupt estate or the debtor will result from
continuation of the civil suit”; (2) “the hardship to the [non-bankrupt party] by
maintenance of the stay considerably outweighs the hardship of the debtor”; and (3) “the
creditor has a probability of prevailing on the merits.” /d.

In its oral ruling to modify the stay, the Bankruptcy Court did not state the factors
and the grounds causing the stay to be modified. Nor do the orders signed by the
Bankruptcy Court articulate the factors or grounds upon which the Bankruptcy Court
based its findings. Therefore, the Court is unable to determine whether the Bankruptcy
Court abused its discretion in modifying the automatic stay to allow Toerpe and Federal
Credit Union to proceed with the state-court proceedings. Accordingly, the case is
remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for these findings. See In re Quay Corp., Inc., No. 05-
ev-7235, 2006 WL 931734, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2006) (remanding for written findings
due to bankruptcy court’s failure to clearly articulate its findings or the grounds upon
which it based its findings); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jackson, 99 C 3176, 1999 WL

3176, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1999) (same).



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF )
GLORIA JEAN SYKES, )
Debtor/Appellant. }
} Case No. 12 C 198
} Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s
modification of the automatic stay: (1) in favor of Carolyn Toerpe (“Toerpe”), as Trustee
of the Mary G. Sykes Trust and as Guardian of Mary G. Sykes, a disabled adult, in
relating to two state-court proceedings pending between the debtor, Gloria J. Sykes
(“Sykes”), and Toerpe and (2) in favor of Federal Credit Union, permitting it to comply
with any orders entered in a state-court probate proceeding. For the reasons that follow,
the case is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court.

BACKGROUND
State-Court Proceedings

Sykes and Toerpe are sisters. Their mother, Mary G. Sykes (“Mary”), was
adjudicated a disabled adult by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Probate Division.
Toerpe and Sykes both filed petitions for guardianship, and Toerpe was appointed as
Guardian for the person and estate of Mary.

The property is owned by the Mary G. Sykes Trust (“Trust”). Toerpe is named as

the Successor Trustee in the Trust. Mary, prior to her adjudication, resided on the first



floor and Sykes resided on the second floor of a building located at 6014 N. Avondale,
Chicago, IL (the “Property”). Mary now resides with Toerpe at Toerpe’s residence.
Toerpe desired to sell the Property in order to pay for the costs of caring for Mary.

In 2010, Toerpe filed a forcible-detainer action against Sykes in the Circuit Court
of Cook County. Sykes entered into an Agreed Order for Possession in the Circuit Court
of Cook, directing her to vacate the Property by October 1, 2011. On
September 27, 2011, Sykes filed an appeal of the Agreed Order of Possession. On
September 28, 2011, Sykes filed her chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. She also filed an
emergency motion to stay the Agreed Order of Possession in the Circuit Court of Cook
County.

On Match 29, 2012, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order, directing
that Sykes not access funds in a certain account, and another order, directing Federal
Credit Union to freeze funds in a certain account, until further order of court. In addition,
there were additional matters pending in the guardianship case in the Probate Division of
Cook County.

A Motion to Stay

Sykes filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 28, 2011. On October 8, 2011,
Toerpe filed a motion to modify the automatic stay, to allow Toerpe to proceed with and
abide by orders entered in two matters pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Federal Credit Union also filed a motion to modify the stay to allow it to comply with

orders entered in probate court in Cook County.



The Bankruptcy Court conducted a status hearing regarding the two motions to
modify the stay on October 25, 2011. After hearing argument from the parties, the
Bankruptcy Court granted both of the motions to stay, stating: “I will lift the stay and I
will allow counsel to challenge whatever void orders he thinks are in bankruptcy court.
We are not going to play games here with a bankruptcy to try to second guess the state
court. If you think the order is void, go over there and challenge it.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 52-
53.) The Bankruptcy Court then signed two separate orders, provided by counsel for
Toerpe and Federal Credit Union, granting the motions to stay. (See id. at 37-38.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The bankruptcy court’s grant of relief from the automatic stay is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Colon v. Option One Morg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing Jn re Williams, 144 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1998)). The reviewing court
examines the “bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.” Freeland y. Enodis Corp., 540 F.3d 721, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing In re
Rivinius, Inc., 977 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 1992)).

ANALYSIS

The automatic stay provision of Section 362 provides for a stay against “the
commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Section 362(d)
provides that the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the stay for “cause, including the

lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.” 11 U.S.C.