NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

TEIXIDOR ENTERPRISES INC., et al.,

Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0342 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-001973

The Honorable James D. Smith, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED

COUNSEL

Christian Dichter & Sluga, PC, Phoenix

By David M. Bell, JP Harrington Bisceglia, Gena L. Sluga

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Dixon Law Offices, PLC, Phoenix

By Thomas B. Dixon

Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Richard A. Dillenburg, PC, Tempe

By Richard A. Dillenburg

Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees

FILED 8-24-2021
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Teixidor Enterprises, Inc. dba La Patisserie Bakery 

("Patisserie") appeals the superior court's orders granting partial summary 

judgment and a new trial on damages to Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck 

Insurance"). Truck Insurance cross-appeals the denial of its motions for 

directed verdict and the denial of its request for attorney fees. For the 

following reasons, we vacate and remand the court's attorney-fee order.

We affirm all other orders of the superior court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Patisserie operated a commercial bakery that sold bread to 

another company, Strictly from Scratch ("SFS"), which in turn supplied 

bread to Walmart. In May 2014, Walmart discovered that 75 pallets of 

Patisserie's bread, delivered by SFS, were contaminated by metal flakes. 

SFS paid Walmart $240,084 to settle the resulting dispute ("Walmart 

Settlement").

¶3 In June 2014, SFS sued Patisserie for negligence and breach of 

contract ("Underlying Litigation"). SFS claimed losses for the Walmart 

Settlement and additional costs incurred to replace the bread. In 2015, the 

superior court entered verdicts in favor of SFS and against Patisserie for 

$674,000 in damages and $514,645 in fees and costs. Later, SFS seized assets 

from Patisserie's bakery to partially satisfy the judgment.

Current Lawsuit

¶4 In 2014, Patisserie filed a liability insurance claim with its 

insurance provider, Truck Insurance, arising out of the Underlying 

Litigation ("Third-Party" claim). Truck Insurance denied coverage and 

refused to defend the Underlying Litigation, claiming that SFS was not 

seeking damages covered under Patisserie's policy. Patisserie reasserted its 

claim in 2015 but Truck Insurance, again, denied coverage.
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 In 2016, Patisserie filed a separate property claim relating to 

unsold bread contaminated by metal shavings, and various consequential 

damages ("First-Party" claim). The First-Party claim eventually included a 

proof of loss with schedules of damages. Schedule A included a $1,074,370 

"loss that would have been incurred if the first-party claim was promptly

adjusted and paid." Schedule B included $8,728,169 of actual losses.

Schedule C included $98,940,884 in damages allegedly caused by the 

purported breach of the insurance contract. Truck Insurance denied 

coverage.

¶6 In March 2016, Truck Insurance sought a declaratory 

judgment confirming that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Patisserie 

in the Underlying Litigation. Patisserie counterclaimed for breach of 

contract, bad faith, and punitive damages. Patisserie also included a claim 

for negligence against its insurance agent, Kara Anspach.

2017 and 2018 Motions for Summary Judgment

¶7 Between 2017 and 2018, the parties filed four motions for 

summary judgment. The superior court delayed some of the briefing after 

Patisserie sought Rule 56(D) relief and an "opportunity to complete 

discovery as to [Truck Insurance's] knowledge of the underlying facts in" 

the Underlying Litigation. After briefing concluded, the court heard oral 

argument and issued a ruling in July 2018 ("2018 MSJ Order").

¶8 Regarding the Third-Party claim, the superior court held that 

Truck Insurance did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Patisserie in 

the Underlying Litigation. The court assumed that Third-Party coverage 

would exist "regarding damage to Walmart's products (i.e., sandwiches 

made using the non-conforming bread)." But the court held that it could 

not find competent evidence that the jury in the Underlying Litigation 

awarded damages for discarded sandwiches.

¶9 Regarding the First-Party claims, the court denied most of 

Truck Insurance's motion, holding that disputed issues of fact existed 

regarding possible claims arising from damage to Patisserie's property from 

defective bread pans. But the court also held that Patisserie did not offer 

"admissible evidence to support its burden regarding whether coverage 

extended to" its Schedule B & C damages and granted Truck Insurance 

summary judgment on those claims. 

2019 Motions for Summary Judgment
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

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4

¶10 The parties asserted renewed summary judgment motions in 

2019. Patisserie also sought reconsideration of the 2018 MSJ Order based 

on newly discovered evidence. The court heard argument on all the 

motions and issued a ruling in June 2019 ("2019 MSJ Order").

¶11 The court granted Truck Insurance summary judgment on: (a) 

Third-Party claims for bad faith, (b) promissory estoppel, (c) reasonable 

expectations of coverage beyond the policy, and (d) punitive damages. The 

court also held that only Patisserie, not its individual officers, could pursue 

claims against Truck Insurance because the corporate officers were not 

parties to the insurance agreement. The court, again, denied Truck 

Insurance's motion for summary judgment regarding First-Party claims.

¶12 Regarding the motion for reconsideration, the court found 

that Patisserie "did not show that it could not earlier obtain the newlydiscovered evidence with reasonable diligence." But the court also 

addressed the merits. The court found that none of the newly discovered 

evidence was admissible to establish that Walmart sought payment from 

SFS for destroyed sandwiches—thus, SFS's damages in the Underlying 

Litigation arising from the Walmart Settlement were not covered.

Trial and Post-Trial

¶13 The First-Party claims were tried to a jury in September 2019. 

After a 13-day trial, the jury found in favor of Truck Insurance on the issue 

of bad faith but found in Patisserie's favor on the breach-of-contract claim. 

The jury awarded $6,296,753.76 in damages. The jury also found against 

Anspach (the insurance agent) on Patisserie's negligence claim, awarding 

$2,616.80 in damages.1 The court denied both parties' requests for attorney 

fees but awarded Patisserie $33,143.77 in costs.

¶14 In May 2020, the court denied Truck Insurance's motions for 

directed verdict but ordered a new trial on the issue of contract damages.

Patisserie timely appealed and Truck Insurance cross-appealed. This Court 

has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5)(a).

DISCUSSION

¶15 In this appeal we address: (1) summary judgment on ThirdParty coverage for sandwich damages (and related claims), (2) the new trial 

order on First-Party damages, (3) Truck Insurance's denied motion for a 

1 Anspach and Patisserie settled after trial and Anspach is not a party 

to this appeal.
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

directed verdict on First-Party coverage, and (4) the denial of Truck 

Insurance's request for attorney fees. 

I. Third-Party Coverage and Sandwich Damages.

¶16 Patisserie appeals the superior court's grant of summary 

judgment to Truck Insurance on the issue of whether it had a duty to 

investigate, defend, and indemnify the Underlying Litigation. Patisserie 

also appeals the related issues of promissory estoppel, a "2018 claim," the 

dismissal of Patisserie's officers, punitive damages, and attorney fees.

¶17 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. United 

Bank of Ariz. v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 195 (App. 1990). Summary judgment 

should be granted "if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense 

have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that 

reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the 

proponent of the claim or defense." Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 

(1990). "We view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party." Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 194 Ariz. 206, 

208, ¶ 6 (App. 1999) (as corrected). But we will affirm the grant of summary 

judgment if the trial court was correct for any reason. Federico v. Maric, 224 

Ariz. 34, 36, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶18 "To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the 

[movants] need only demonstrate an absence of evidence for an essential 

element of the complaint." Aranki, 194 Ariz. at 209, ¶ 12. Evidence used to 

oppose summary judgment "must be based on personal knowledge and 

must be admissible at trial." Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 502 (1981); 

Villas at Hidden Lakes Condos. Ass'n v. Geupel Constr. Co., 174 Ariz. 72, 81 

(App. 1992); see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(5); see also Jabczenski v. S. Pac. Mem'l

Hosps., Inc., 119 Ariz. 15, 18 (App. 1978) (noting a trial court should not 

consider hearsay in addressing a motion for summary judgment). We will 

uphold a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence in 

summary judgment proceedings absent an abuse of discretion. Mohave Elec. 

Coop., Inc. v. Byers, 189 Ariz. 292, 301 (App. 1997). 

A. Duty to Indemnify the Underlying Judgment. 

¶19 In the 2018 MSJ Order, the superior court granted summary 

judgment on Truck Insurance's duty to indemnify. The court then 

considered new evidence and arguments presented in the motion for 

reconsideration. The court assumed that any damage to destroyed 

Walmart sandwiches ("Sandwich Damages") were covered under the 

property damage provision of Patisserie's liability insurance policy. But the 
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

superior court found no admissible evidence that SFS sought recovery for 

Sandwich Damages. Without evidence that the judgment in the Underlying 

Litigation contained a covered claim, Truck Insurance owed no duty to 

indemnify. See Nucor Corp. v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 231 Ariz. 411, 

414, ¶ 11 (App. 2012) (noting "the duty to indemnify arises from proven, 

adjudicated facts" (quoting Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Mittlestadt, 109 

S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. App. 2003)).

¶20 In opposing summary judgment, Patisserie relied on the 

testimony of SFS's owner, Rodolfo DePaola, documents he produced, and 

exhibits admitted during the Underlying Litigation. Patisserie asserts that 

SFS sought $103,684 in reimbursements for destroyed sandwiches. Truck 

Insurance objected to DePaola's testimony as hearsay and lacking 

foundation. See Ariz. R. Evid. 602 (requiring that a witness have "personal 

knowledge of the matter"); Ariz. R. Evid. 802 (precluding hearsay absent an 

exception). The superior court agreed, finding that DePaola lacked 

personal knowledge of the disputed damages.

¶21 The alleged $103,684 for Sandwich Damages arose from SFS's 

asserted damages for: "Charges Related to Wal-Mart's Disposal Costs: 

$60,850 [and] Loss of Sales Charges: $42,834." DePaola explained that the 

figures were "detailed and sent to us by Walmart" and included "the 

product that Wal-Mart had us withdraw and all the charges that they 

tacked on, for lack of a better word, for this withdrawal."

¶22 DePaola admitted at his first deposition that he had "no idea" 

how Walmart came up with the "Disposal Cost" amount. When asked at 

his second deposition if he had "personal knowledge as to specifically what 

[the] figures [were]," DePaola answered that he did not recall. When asked 

whether the $42,834 "was solely for the destruction of sandwiches," DePaola 

answered that he was "not sure" and that "[i]t appears not." He admitted 

"[i]t could have been bread included in that number; just bread, not 

sandwiches."

¶23 DePaola also stated several times that he either received 

information about the damage amounts from Walmart employees or that 

Walmart would have more information. Critically, DePaola conceded that 

he did not have personal knowledge of the information Walmart included 

in its emails, and that several of his statements were just assumptions. See 

Allyn, 167 Ariz. at 195 ("Mere speculation . . . as to the facts will not suffice" 

to defeat a motion for summary judgment.); see also Carmen v. S.F. Unified 

Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is not enough for a witness 

to tell all she knows; she must know all she tells."). 
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

¶24 On appeal, Patisserie fails to challenge the superior court's 

evidentiary finding. We find no abuse of discretion. See Mohave Elec., 189 

Ariz. at 301. DePaola's testimony and the Walmart emails are not 

competent evidence to support a claim that the Underlying Litigation

included any covered damages. See Portonova, 128 Ariz. at 502; Villas at 

Hidden Lakes, 174 Ariz. at 81-82. Accordingly, summary judgment on this 

issue was proper. 

B. Duty to Defend the Underlying Litigation. 

¶25 The superior court also granted summary judgment to Truck 

Insurance on its duty to defend the Underlying Litigation. "[A] liability 

insurer's duty to defend is separate from, and broader than, the duty to 

indemnify." Quihuis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 Ariz. 536, 544, ¶ 

27 (2014); see also Steven Plitt, Arizona Liability Insurance Law § 2.2, at 70-71 

(1998) (discussing insurer's duty to defend groundless, false, or fraudulent 

suits, or if the insured ultimately prevails). But the "duty to defend 

ordinarily is correlative with [the] duty to pay a judgment which might be 

obtained against the insured." Paulin v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1 Ariz. App. 

408, 411 (1965) (quoting 7 John Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4684, 

at 448), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Hagen v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 

Ins. Co., 138 Ariz. 521, 524 n.5 (App. 1983). Thus, if the "insurer was correct 

in its conclusion that there was no coverage then it was not liable to pay the 

judgment and there was no contractual obligation to defend." Manny v. 

Estate of Anderson, 117 Ariz. 548, 550 (App. 1977). But if the insurer "guesses 

wrong it must bear the consequences of its breach of contract." Kepner v. W. 

Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 332 (1973).

¶26 Here, Truck Insurance was correct. Based on the information 

presented, Truck Insurance is not required to indemnify Patisserie for the

judgment in the Underlying Litigation. Thus, it was not required to defend 

Patisserie and did not breach that duty. See Transamerica Ins. Grp. v. Meere, 

143 Ariz. 351, 360 (1984) (noting that when facts "take the case outside policy 

coverage, there is no duty to defend"). Accordingly, summary judgment on 

this issue was proper. 

C. Duty to Investigate the Sandwich Damages. 

¶27 Patisserie separately asserts that the superior court erred in 

granting summary judgment to Truck Insurance on the duty to investigate 

the insurance claim. 

¶28 "An insurance contract is not an ordinary commercial 

bargain; 'implicit in the contract and the relationship is the insurer's 
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

obligation to play fairly with its insured.'" Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 196 Ariz. 234, 237, ¶ 20 (2000) (quoting Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 

Ariz. 149, 154 (1986)). When an insurer fails to process a claim reasonably, 

it breaches the duty of good faith and can be held liable in a bad-faith tort 

action. Noble v. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 190 (1981). But the duty 

to investigate is not identical in the first- and third-party contexts. See 

Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 164 Ariz. 256, 260 (1990) 

("[B]ecause the risk to the insured and the responsibilities of the insurer are 

distinguishable in first- and third-party claims, the applicable standard of 

conduct is necessarily different.").

¶29 In the third-party liability context, insurers first look to the 

complaint. See Teufel v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ariz. 383, 385, ¶ 11 

(2018) (noting the duty to defend "generally arises if the complaint filed 

against the insured alleges facts that fall within the policy's coverage"). "[I]f 

any claim alleged in the complaint is within the policy's coverage, the 

insurer has a duty to defend the entire suit . . . ." W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Int'l 

Spas of Ariz., Inc., 130 Ariz. 76, 79 (App. 1981). "[B]ut if the alleged facts fail 

to bring the case within the policy coverage, the insurer is free of such 

obligation." Kepner, 109 Ariz. at 331 (quoting C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, 

Allegations in Third Person's Action Against Insured as Determining Liability 

Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 464 (1956)). 

1. Allegations in the Underlying Complaint. 

¶30 The first issue is whether SFS's complaint in the Underlying 

Litigation alleged damages covered by Patisserie's policy. In the 2018 MSJ 

Order, the superior court found that the complaint did not. We agree.

¶31 The policy at issue essentially covers Patisserie for "those 

sums that [Patisserie] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because 

of . . . 'property damage' . . . to which this insurance applies." The "insurance 

applies: (1) To . . . 'property damage' only if: (a) The . . . 'property damage'

is caused by an 'occurrence' that takes place in the 'coverage territory;' and 

(b) The . . . 'property damage' occurs during the policy period."

¶32 The SFS complaint did not allege facts that would result in a 

covered claim. The six-count complaint asserted breach of contract, unjust 

enrichment, and three theories of negligence. SFS claimed damages that 

included the cost to move, store, dispose, and replace the rejected product.

Although the complaint also references damages relating to "[d]eductions 

and offsets Wal-Mart claimed for rejected products," the complaint 

previously referred to Walmart rejecting the food products (i.e. bread) and 
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

9

refusing to pay SFS because the product was contaminated. There is no 

suggestion in the complaint that Walmart utilized the contaminated food, 

thereby damaging its own property, and thus no suggestion of Sandwich 

Damages or a covered claim. 

2. No Facts Were Presented to Truck Insurance to 

Trigger an Investigation. 

¶33 The second issue is whether Patisserie provided sufficient 

facts outside the underlying complaint to require Truck Insurance to 

investigate the claim. 

¶34 Facts outside the complaint can change a coverage 

determination. In Kepner, our supreme court held that there is no absolute 

duty to defend if "alleged facts ostensibly bring the case within the policy 

coverage but other facts which are not reflected in the complaint plainly 

take the case outside the policy coverage." Kepner, 109 Ariz. at 331; see 

Teufel, 244 Ariz. at 386, ¶ 11 ("The insurer may investigate the matter, 

however, and refuse to defend based on facts discovered outside the 

complaint that take the case outside coverage."). Conversely, even if the 

allegations in the complaint do not bring the suit within the policy, "once 

an insured makes some factual showing that the suit is actually one for 

damages resulting from events that fall under policy terms, an insurer has 

a duty to investigate those facts and provide a defense when indicated." 

Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 214 Ariz. 255, 264, ¶ 31 (App. 2007) 

(citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp. v. Advance Roofing & Supply Co., 163 Ariz. 476, 

480 (App. 1989)). 

¶35 Patisserie repeatedly asserts that Truck Insurance's 

investigator failed to determine what damages Walmart had asserted 

against SFS before issuing the first denial letter in July 2014. But once the 

complaint was filed, it was Patisserie's burden to assert facts that would 

bring the Underlying Litigation within the policy's coverage. See id.; 

Advance Roofing, 163 Ariz. at 480; see also Salvatierra v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 133 

Ariz. 16, 19 (App. 1982) ("[A]n insurer must be given notice of an amended 

pleading which would impose a duty to defend, and a failure to give notice 

will relieve the insurer of liability under the policy."). Patisserie failed to 

meet that burden. 

¶36 None of the facts alleged in the underlying complaint put 

Truck Insurance on notice of a claim within the policy coverage. Supra ¶ 

32. Nor is there evidence in the record that Truck Insurance was aware of 

any alleged claim for damage to Walmart's property prior to denying 
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

10

coverage. Truck Insurance's coverage-denial letter notes that "[t]he bread 

was not accepted by the plaintiff's customer, Wal-mart[,] and was 

destroyed." Patisserie's 2015 follow-up letter to Truck Insurance did not 

disclose any new facts or even suggest that the Underlying Litigation 

included a claim for Sandwich Damages. Without such evidence, Patisserie 

failed to make a "factual showing" to Truck Insurance that the Underlying 

Litigation "was actually one for damages" covered by the policy. See Lennar 

Corp., 214 Ariz. at 264, ¶ 31.

¶37 Admittedly, Patisserie provided Truck Insurance additional 

information over the course of discovery in this lawsuit, see supra ¶¶ 19-23, 

after judgment was entered in the Underlying Litigation. There may be a 

point in time after which an insured can no longer trigger an insurer's duty 

to investigate. See Ventana Med. Sys. Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 

709 F.Supp.2d 744, 754 (D. Ariz. 2010) ("Where an insured has not made 

some factual showing, and an insurer has not investigated, it is simply not 

reasonable to consider additional information at a later time to determine 

whether there has been a breach."), aff'd, 454 F. App'x 596 (9th Cir. 2011).2

We need not decide this issue here because Patisserie failed to produce

admissible evidence at summary judgment to confirm that the Underlying 

Litigation contained a covered claim. See supra ¶¶ 20-24. "An insurance 

company's failure to adequately investigate only becomes material when a 

further investigation would have disclosed relevant facts." Aetna Cas. & 

Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 437, 440 (App. 1989) (finding summary 

judgment appropriate for insurer on first-party bad-faith claim). Without a

covered claim, Patisserie cannot establish that Truck Insurance breached its

duty to investigate and thus summary judgment was appropriate. See 

Advance Roofing, 163 Ariz. at 481 (affirming summary judgment on duty to 

investigate when insured "did not come forward and appropriately 

demonstrate that the [underlying plaintiff] was seeking damages within the 

coverage of" the insured's policy); cf. Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 33

(noting that insured's factual showing triggering the duty to investigate 

was "more than speculation"). 

2 In Advance Roofing, we noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court's 

"formulation of the insurer's duty to investigate [was] sound." 163 Ariz. at 

480 (citing Johnson v. Aid Ins. Co. of Des Moines, Ia., 287 N.W.2d 663, 665

(Minn. 1980)). The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently held there was

no breach of the duty to investigate "beyond the four corners of the 

complaint" when an insured failed to inform its insurer of facts learned 

during discovery in the underlying litigation. Garvis v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. 

Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 258-59 (Minn. 1993).
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

11

3. No Independent Duty to Investigate. 

¶38 Finally, Patisserie argues that Truck Insurance had an 

independent duty to investigate facts beyond the complaint. This argument 

fails. In Advance Roofing, the insured argued the insurer had a duty to 

investigate the factual basis of the complaint's allegations before declining 

to tender a defense. 163 Ariz. at 480. We disagreed, concluding that the 

insured failed to present evidence demonstrating that the underlying 

plaintiff had sought property damages in its breach-of-contract claim. Id.

at 481. Patisserie cites no Arizona authority, and we are aware of none, 

creating an independent duty for a third-party insurer to investigate 

beyond a complaint, absent the factual showing required by Lennar Corp.

and Advance Roofing. Cf. Labertew v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co., 363 F. Supp. 3d 

1031, 1046-48 (D. Ariz. 2019) (reviewing Arizona law and holding 

"[a]dditional investigation was not required to deny coverage" when 

complaint did not assert covered claim and other evidence "did not 

contradict this assertion").

¶39 In sum, Patisserie presented no facts from which a reasonable 

jury could conclude that Truck Insurance violated the duty to investigate. 

The court did not err in granting summary judgment to Truck Insurance on 

this issue. 

D. Promissory Estoppel. 

¶40 Patisserie also appeals the 2019 MSJ Order rejecting its 

promissory estoppel claim. Patisserie alleged that one of Truck Insurance's 

adjusters promised Patisserie's owner that she would review Walmart's 

damage documents for potential coverage. The court held that promissory 

estoppel was not available because the parties had an express contract on 

the subject.3 We agree. 

¶41 "Promissory estoppel provides an equitable remedy and is 

not a theory of contract liability." Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State 

Constr., 210 Ariz. 503, 511, ¶ 45 (App. 2005). But "[t]here can be no implied 

contract where there is an express contract between the parties in reference 

to the same subject matter." Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 35 (1977); see 

also Bowman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 438 F. App'x 613, 615 (9th Cir. 2011) 

("Arizona law prohibits an action based on the promissory estoppel theory 

3 The court noted that the affidavit on which Patisserie relied 

conflicted with the affiant's prior deposition testimony and that the asserted 

promise was insufficiently definite to support a promissory estoppel claim.
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

12

of liability if there is an express, written contract on the same subject 

matter.").

¶42 Here, the parties had an express written contract. The 

insurance contract contained certain duties to investigate. The adjuster's 

alleged promise was part of Truck Insurance's contractual investigation 

duties. The superior court found no admissible evidence that Truck 

Insurance breached its contract and we affirm that decision. Supra ¶¶ 19, 

24, 39. Patisserie cannot use promissory estoppel to end run this 

conclusion.

E. Duty to Indemnify the "2018 Claim."

¶43 In July 2018, counsel for Patisserie sent SFS an inquiry 

regarding the outstanding judgment from the Underlying Litigation. SFS 

responded by emailing counsel for both Patisserie and Truck Insurance that 

Patisserie owed SFS approximately $1.6 million and asserted a lien on any 

proceeds or settlement in the lawsuit to satisfy the unpaid portion of the 

judgment in the Underlying Litigation. In December 2018, Patisserie sent 

the email to Truck Insurance, asserting that it constituted a new Third-Party 

claim.

¶44 In 2019, Patisserie moved for summary judgment regarding 

coverage for the alleged claim set forth in the July 2018 email ("Patisserie's 

5th MSJ"). At oral argument, Patisserie's counsel admitted to the superior 

court that the motion did not raise a new "claim" against Truck Insurance

and that the asserted damages were the same as the ones encompassed in 

the 2018 MSJ Order. Counsel asserted the motion was filed as a 

precautionary measure in the event the court denied the motion for 

reconsideration of the 2018 MSJ Order. The superior court found that "[i]n 

essence, it is the same argument that [] Patisserie raised in its motion for 

reconsideration" and denied Patisserie's 5th MSJ. Patisserie appeals this 

order.4

¶45 As we addressed earlier, the superior court granted summary 

judgment to Truck Insurance on Patisserie's suit for breach of contract and 

denied Patisserie's motion for reconsideration. The court noted Patisserie's 

5th MSJ raised the same argument as its motion for reconsideration of the 

2018 MSJ Order. We agree with that assessment. See Hegel v. O'Malley Ins. 

4 Truck Insurance did not address this issue in its answering brief. In 

our discretion, we decline to regard this as a confession of error. See Nydam 

v. Crawford, 181 Ariz. 101, 101 (App. 1994).
TRUCK v. TEIXIDOR, et al.

Decision of the Court

13

Co., 117 Ariz. 411, 412 (1977) (holding that a motion should be considered

according to its substance, rather than its title). We review the court's denial 

of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Tilley v. Delci, 

220 Ariz. 233, 238, ¶ 16 (App. 2009). Patisserie does not cite, and we are not 

aware of, any authority for its position that an insured can resurrect a claim 

for breach of an insurance contract after summary judgment has been 

granted to the insurer. The superior court did not abuse its discretion. 

F. Remaining Third-Party Issues. 

¶46 Patisserie appeals several ancillary Third-Party rulings, 

including the dismissal of punitive damages claims, claims asserted by the 

individual officers, and a claim for attorney fees. These arguments are 

conditioned on the reversal of the superior court's summary judgment

order. Because we affirm, we need not consider these issues. 

II. New Trial Order.

¶47 Patisserie also appeals the court's order granting Truck 

Insurance a new trial on the issue of contract damages.

¶48 We review a ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of 

discretion. Androit Supply Co. v. Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 385, 389 

(1975). Although trial courts must "sparingly exercise discretion in 

modifying a jury's verdict, we recognize that a trial judge plays a role akin 

to a 'thirteenth juror' (a ninth juror in a civil case) when ruling on a motion 

for new trial, including motions based on excessive or insufficient 

damages." Soto v. Sacco, 242 Ariz. 474, 478, ¶ 8 (2017) (quoting State v. 

Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 49, ¶ 14 (2017)); see also Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 

163 (1978) (noting trial judges have "a special perspective of the relationship 

between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a 

reviewing court from the printed record"). Because of a trial judge's unique 

position to prevent unjust verdicts "we grant significant latitude to trial 

courts in ruling on new trial motions." Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 8. A court 

may grant a motion for new trial when the verdict is "excessive or 

insufficient," "the result of passion or prejudice," or "not supported by the 

evidence or is contrary to law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(E), (G), (H).

¶49 As an initial matter, we conclude that the superior court

sufficiently explained its reasoning for granting a new trial. See Soto, 242 

Ariz. at 480, ¶¶ 14-15 (discussing particularity requirement for a new trial 

order). "Whenever a new trial order is justified by any of the grounds cited 

in the order, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's exercise of 

its discretion." Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 163. Here, the order granting a new trial 
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states "that the $6.3 million in damages for breach of contract are excessive, 

not justified by the evidence, and contrary to law." The court noted the 

award for contract damages was twenty-five times greater than the 

$250,000 Patisserie's counsel requested during closing argument. The court 

also noted that counsel did not argue for consequential contract damages.

¶50 The court found a "substantial risk of error because of 

evidence about the product recall endorsement."5 The court noted that 

evidence of the endorsement was relevant for Patisserie's claim for bad faith

against Truck Insurance and for the negligence claim against its insurance 

agent, for failing to offer the endorsement. At trial, when Patisserie 

introduced testimony of consequential damages, Patisserie intertwined the 

failure to receive the amounts allegedly owed under the insurance policy 

with the lack of product-recall coverage. In his closing argument, 

Patisserie's counsel told the jury that "you can award consequential 

damages that you find flow from the breach of contract. But we think in this 

case that it makes more sense to look at the consequential damages and to 

think about them as to what flows from the bad faith claim." But as the 

superior court accurately noted, the jury could not award contract damages 

relating to the recall endorsement because the recall endorsement was not 

part of Patisserie's insurance policy in 2014. Patisserie concedes the 

endorsement was not relevant for its breach-of-contract claim against Truck 

Insurance.

¶51 Patisserie challenges the factual premise of the court's new 

trial order, asserting that its counsel "asked the jury to award $8,466,677 for 

the recoverable elements of consequential damages—the 'building, 

equipment and real property.'" But Patisserie's counsel prefaced its

summary of consequential damages to the jury by stating that "when you 

go to the verdict forms as to both the bad faith claim against Truck and the 

professional negligence claim against Anspach, these are the elements of 

damage that we're asking you to consider."

¶52 The superior court's concern that the jury awarded damages 

based on irrelevant evidence is supported by the record and is a proper 

basis for a new trial order. See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 

190 Ariz. 6, 38 (App. 1996) (as corrected) ("Confusion of the jury is a proper 

basis for concluding that a verdict 'is not justified by the evidence or is 

5 The product recall endorsement was provided by Truck Insurance 

to Patisserie retroactively in 2016, was not part of the insurance policy in 

2014, and provided $100,000 in coverage for expenses incurred for certain 

product recalls.
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contrary to law.'" (quoting Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8) (1996))). The court did 

not abuse its direction. 

III. Truck's Motion for Directed Verdict.

¶53 Truck Insurance cross-appeals the denial of its motion for a 

directed verdict on Patisserie's First-Party property claim. We review the 

superior court's ruling de novo. Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 95, ¶ 

25 (App. 2007). 

¶54 The superior court denied Truck Insurance's motions for 

summary judgment on the First-Party claim in both the 2018 and 2019 MSJ 

Orders. During trial, Truck Insurance moved for a directed verdict and for 

judgment as a matter of law. The court denied these motions. After the 

jury's verdict, Truck Insurance renewed the motions, the court heard 

argument, and again denied the motions.

¶55 On appeal, Truck Insurance raises three issues: (A) the 

applicability of policy exclusions, (B) claims under the product recall 

endorsement, and (C) the availability of consequential damages absent a 

finding of bad faith. 

A. Directed Verdict Under the Policy Exclusions.

¶56 First, Truck Insurance asserts that damage to Patisserie's 

bread was not covered by the insurance policy because the claim was 

subject to a policy exclusion. The interpretation of an insurance contract is 

a question of law reviewed de novo. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Action 

Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394, 397, ¶ 8 (2008). "[T]he insurer bears the 

burden to establish the applicability of any exclusion." Keggi v. Northbrook 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 199 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 13 (App. 2000). When two risks 

constitute concurrent proximate causes of an accident, the insurer is

responsible for coverage if the policy covers one of the causes, even if the 

other cause is subject to a policy exclusion. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Van 

Nguyen, 158 Ariz. 476, 477-79 (App. 1988); see also Steven Plitt, Arizona 

Liability Insurance Law § 1.16, at 49 (1998). Arizona recognizes contract 

provisions limiting concurrent causation. Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 

Co., 167 Ariz. 93, 97 (App. 1990); see also Liristis v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 

204 Ariz. 140, 144, 146, ¶ 23 (App. 2002) (as amended) (noting policy's 

inclusion of a "concurrent causation" clause). But "[a]bsent limiting 

language in the policy . . . [an insured] is entitled to recover if a [covered 

event] was the proximate cause of his loss, even 'though there may have 

been other contributing causes.'" Koory v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 153 Ariz. 412, 
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414 (1987) (quoting 5 John Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 3142, at

445 (1970)).

¶57 Patisserie's insurance policy included several exclusion 

sections. One section excluded losses "caused by or resulting from . . . (1) 

Wear and tear; (2) Rust, corrosion, fungus, decay, deterioration, hidden or 

latent defect or any quality in property that causes it to damage or destroy 

itself; . . . (7)(c) Marring or scratching." (collectively "Wear and Tear 

Exclusions"). Truck Insurance asserts that these exclusions apply, arguing 

any damage to Patisserie's bread resulted from wear and tear to the bread 

pans.6 We assume, without deciding, that the Wear and Tear Exclusions 

apply to the facts of this case. Cf. Meridian Leasing, Inc. v. Associated Aviation 

Underwriters, Inc., 409 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing ambiguity of 

"wear and tear" exclusions). A separate section of the insurance policy 

contains a "concurrent causation" clause that excludes coverage for 

damages "regardless of any other cause or event that contributes 

concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." But the concurrent-causation 

clause does not apply to the Wear and Tear Exclusions in Patisserie's policy.

¶58 Truck Insurance's expert's report, admitted into evidence at 

trial, stated that the aluminum pans "were defectively designed and/or 

manufactured since they are highly susceptible to producing metal 

shavings if pulled/dragged across another metal surface that is harder 

and/or rougher in texture." The expert also noted that the "visible surface

wear/abrasion strongly indicated that the source of the aluminum flakes 

was the bottom outer surface of the baking pans" caused by "the action of 

sliding the baking pans onto the mobile pan racks, resulting in abrasion to 

the metal."

¶59 Because the evidence from Truck Insurance's expert 

established that any damage to Patisserie's property (the bread) was caused

by both a covered cause of loss (the defective design of the pans) and an 

excluded cause of loss (wear and tear), the damage was not subject to the

exclusion. See Liristis, 204 Ariz. at 144, 145, ¶¶ 16-17, 21, 22 (concluding that

mold damage, caused by water used to extinguish a fire, could be covered 

under fire coverage even though coverage for loss due to mold itself was 

6 Truck Insurance also briefly asserts that the "faulty workmanship" 

exclusion applies due to Patisserie's "faulty workmanship" in baking the 

bread. The superior court found that "Patisserie's alleged harm to its bread 

. . . due to the defective pans is not this type of excluded injury." Truck 

Insurance asserts the court erred, but did not develop this argument or cite 

evidence in the record and thus we reject it.
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excluded under the policy); see also Stankova v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 

788 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding loss caused by fire and 

resulting mudslide could be covered, notwithstanding policy's mudslide 

exclusion). Thus, the court did not err in denying Truck Insurance's motion 

for a directed verdict on the exclusion issue. 

B. Product Recall Endorsement. 

¶60 Second, Truck Insurance also asserts that the "trial court erred 

in not entering directed verdict as to the PR Endorsement breach of contract 

claim." In its answering brief, Patisserie argues it never asserted this claim 

and that the issue is moot. In its order denying the renewed motion for 

directed verdict, the superior court noted that the "jury could not award 

contract damages for failing to pay the product recall benefits" and that 

"Patisserie agreed [it] related only to non-contract tort claims." Indeed, part 

of the court's reasoning for granting a new trial was its concern that this 

non-contract evidence impermissibly contributed to the jury's award for 

contract damages. See supra ¶ 50. Given the jury's verdict for Truck 

Insurance on the bad faith issue, and our decision affirming the court's new 

trial order on contract damages, supra ¶ 52, we conclude this issue is moot. 

C. Consequential Contract Damages. 

¶61 Finally, Truck Insurance argues it was prejudiced by the 

inclusion of Revised Arizona Jury Instructions ("RAJI") (Civil) Contract 18

(consequential damages). Truck Insurance asserts that consequential 

contract damages are unavailable as a matter of law in insurance cases and 

that if the superior court had granted a directed verdict on the issue it 

"would have avoided the jury's confusion and erroneous award." But we 

need not reach this question because the superior court vacated that award 

and ordered a new trial on the issue of contract damages. We affirmed that 

order. Supra ¶ 52. Truck Insurance now asks that we "instruct the trial court 

as to the appropriate jury instructions" for the new trial. We decline to do 

so. See Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 143 Ariz. 547, 

548 (App. 1985) (noting that appellate courts should not give advisory 

opinions or decide issues other than those required to dispose of appeal 

under consideration); see also Allen v. Graham, 8 Ariz.App. 336, 338 (1968) 

("Appellate review is circumscribed by the posture of the case in the lower 

court."). 

¶62 We likewise decline to consider Patisserie's eight arguments 

that Truck Insurance waived this issue through its conduct at the first trial. 

At a new trial, parties may "make new motions, raise new objections, and 
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present additional evidence." Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 206 Ariz. 424, 

427, ¶ 12 (App. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 1397 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1991)).

IV. Requests for Attorney Fees.

A. Trial.

¶63 At trial, both parties sought an award of fees under A.R.S. § 

12-341.01. After considering the history of the case, and the parties' various 

successes and failures, the court denied both fee requests. Truck Insurance 

cross-appeals the denial of its request for attorney fees. We review the 

denial of an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See Associated 

Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570-71 (1985). "We must uphold the 

trial court's exercise of its discretion if the record contains a reasonable basis 

for the court's denial of fees." Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep't, 177 Ariz. 322, 

326 (App. 1993). 

¶64 We see no abuse of discretion in the court's well-reasoned 

decision. However, the court issued its order prior to granting a new trial 

on the issue of contract damages. Cf. Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 

153 Ariz. 95, 110 (App. 1986) (vacating award of attorney fees when trial 

court had subsequently granted a new trial on one issue). The 

approximately $6 million jury award for Patisserie was an important factor 

in the court's decision on the fee requests. Cf. Palmer v. Palmer, 217 Ariz. 67, 

73, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (vacating and remanding fee award where reversal on 

an issue had the potential to change the trial court's analysis regarding 

attorney fees). Although best practice may have been to seek 

reconsideration of the court's denial of attorney fees on this basis, Truck 

Insurance adequately preserved the issue through its initial request for fees. 

See Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 Ariz. 575, 580, ¶ 12 n.1 (App. 2003) 

(noting issue raised and ruled upon was preserved for review). 

¶65 Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's order denying 

either party an award of attorney fees and leave the issue open to the court's 

reconsideration following the new trial. 

B. Appeal.

¶66 Patisserie and Truck Insurance seek an award of their 

attorney fees incurred in the appeal and cross-appeal under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01. After consideration of the briefing and the issues presented, we 

exercise our discretion and decline to award fees to either party.
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CONCLUSION

¶67 The order denying attorney fees is vacated and that matter is 

remanded to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this 

decision. All other judgments and orders of the superior court are affirmed.