This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 MICHELLE THORNE, 2 Worker-Appellee, 3 v. No. 35,786 4

NMIMT and RISK MANAGEMENT 5 DIVISION, 6 Employer/Insurer-Appellants. 7 APPEAL FROM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 8 Leonard Padilla, Workers ’ Compensation Judge 9 Dunn Law Offices 10 Rod Dunn 11 Rio Rancho, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Doughty, Alcaraz & deGraauw, P.A. 14 Robert M. Doughty, III 15 Philip B. Hunteman 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 HANISEE, Judge. 192 {1} Employer/Insurer has appealed from an aw ard of attorney fees. We previously 1 issued a notice of proposed summary dis position in which we proposed to uphold the 2 WCJ’s determination. Employer/Insurer has filed a memorandum in opposition, and 3 Worker has filed a memorandum in support. Af ter due consideration, we adhere to our 4 initial assessment. We therefore affirm. 5
{2} The only issue on appeal concerns the application of the statutory fee-shifting 6 provision. [DS 6; MIO 2] SeeNMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4) (2013) (providing that the 7 worker may serve upon the employer an offer, and if the worker’s offer was less than 8 the amount ultimately awarded by the compen sation order, “the employer shall pay 9 one hundred percent of the attorney fees to be paid the worker’s attorney”). 10 Employer/Insurer does not dispute that Worker’s offer of judgment is lower than the 11 award ultimately rendered. [MIO 1-2, 5- 6] Instead, Employer/Insurer asserts that 12 Worker’s offer of judgment failed to address “critical issu es[,]” [MIO 2, 5] including 13 Worker’s average weekly wage, date of maximum medicalimprovement (MMI), and 14 impairment rating (specifically, residual phys ical capacity). [MIO 4-5] In light of 15 these alleged deficiencies, Employer/Insurer contends thatthe WCJ erred in shifting 16 Worker’s attorney fees. [MIO 5-10] See Leonard v. Payday Prof’l , 2007-NMCA-128, 17 ¶¶ 25-26, 142 N.M. 605, 168 P.3d 117 (indicati ng that an offer of judgment which 183 leaves critical issues unresolved does not s upply an appropriate basis for fee shifting). 1 We remain unpersuaded. 2
{3} As we observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, Worker’s offer 3 of judgment unambiguously addressed all of the critical issues relating to 4 Employer/Insurer’s liability: namely, Worker’s entitlement to temporary total 5 disability (TTD), permanent partial di sability (PPD), and entitlement to ongoing 6 medical treatment. [CN 2-3; RP 191] The various sub-issues upon which 7 Employer/Insurer focuses are all rationally subsumed within these subjects. See 8 generally NMSA 1978, § 52-1-25.1(B) (2005, amended 2017) (addressing TTD 9 benefits and MMI); NMSA1978, §52-1-26(C) (1990, amended 2017) (providing that 10 PPD is determined by calculating impairment as modified by various factors including 11 residual physical capacity); § 52-1-26(D) (addressing PPD and MMI); NMSA 1978, 12 § 52-1-41(A) (1999, amended 2015) (describing calculation of total disability benefits, 13 as a function of average weekly wage); and NMSA 1978, § 52-1-42(A) (1999, 14 amended 2015) (describing calculation of PPD benefits as a function of the total 15 disability calculation). Accordingly, Worker’s offer cannot be said to have left those 16 matters unaddressed. We therefore remain unpersuaded that the principle for which 17 Leonard has been cited is applicable to th e situation presented in this case. 184 {4} We understand Employer/Insurer to further argue that information obtained as 1 a result of an IME (performed at Employer/Insurer’s request [RP 66-67]) after Worker 2 submitted her offer of judgment should be regarded as a “significant development” 3 which “alter[ed] the scope of the issues presented” such that her offer of judgment 4 should be deemed incomplete. [MIO 6-10] On ce again, we disagree. The scope of the 5 issues ( i.e. , Worker’s entitlement to TTD, PPD, and ongoing medical care) did not 6 change after the IME. The IME merely supplemented the available information 7 bearing upon those issues. Insofar as Employer/Insurer was at liberty to incorporate 8 that information when submitting its own s ubsequent offer of judgment, [CN 3-4] we 9 remain unpersuaded that Employer/Insurer was unfairly disadvantaged by the course 10 of the proceedings. 11
{5} Finally, in its memorandum in opposition Employer/Insurer seeks to analogize 12 to an unreported decision. [MIO 8-9] Howe ver, that case is readily distinguishable. 13 It addressed a scenario in which multip le offers of judgment were made. We 14 concluded that the initial offer (upon whic h the appellant relied) did not supply an 15 appropriate basis for fee shifting in part because it would have left questions 16 surrounding the worker’s entitlement to additional, post-operative scheduled injury 17 benefits wholly unaddressed. Insofar as Worker made only one offer of judgment, and 185 insofar as that offer addressed all of the critical issues, a different result is warranted 1 in this case. 2
{6} In closing, we acknowledge that the information available to the parties 3 developed over time. However, we reject Employer/Insurer’s suggestion that this 4 predictable evolution rendered Worker’s offer of judgment obsolete. What is 5 controlling, is the fact that Worker’s o ffer of judgment addressed all of the critical 6 issues ultimately resolved by the compensation order. If Employer/Insurer had 7 accepted that offer, the dispute would haveexpeditiously conc luded at terms less 8 favorable to Worker than the award ultimately provided by the compensation order. 9 Under these circumstances, f ee shifting is appropriate. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Bumper to 10 Bumper Auto Salvage, 2005-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 18-19, 137 N.M. 800, 115 P.3d 816 11 (observing that “the purpose of Section 52-1- 54(F) [i]s to encourage settlement[,]” and 12 holding that the WCJ did not err in shifting attorney fees where the worker submitted 13 an unambiguous and reasonable offer which attempted to settle the case, where the 14 employer rejected that offer, and where the final compensation order exceeded the 15 worker’s offer). 16
{7} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed summary 17 disposition and above, we affirm. 18
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 196 ____________________________________ 1 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2

WE CONCUR: 3

_________________________________ 4 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 5

_________________________________ 6 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 7