UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

ERICK FIELDS and URSULA PEPIN, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

vs. ) No. 12 CV 1306

)

) Judge

The CITY OF CHICAGO, Illinois, a municipal )

corporation, and Chicago Police Officers ) Magistrate Judge 

PETAIN NAVEZ (#19113), JOSE LOMELI )

(#19363), STEVEN RIVERA (#15920), )

MANUEL GUZMAN (#9798), ROGELIO )

PINAL (#18585), ROBERT CAVAIANI ) JURY DEMAND

(#12062), BRIAN SPRENG (#5688), MICHAEL)

GRAF (#11571), MICHAEL BURKE (#4359), )

NICHOLAS ORLANDO (#12756), FRANK )

PIERRI (#2550), KENNETH BARNAS (#70), )

BRIAN TEDESCHI (#20243), ALBERT )

PEREZ (#20733), DONALD FALK (#20409), )

ANTHONY NORADIN (#21252), RONALD )

BANAS (#21007) and other UNKNOWN )

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, )

)

Defendants. )

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, ERICK FIELDS and URSULA PEPIN, through their attorney, Torreya L. 

Hamilton, of The Hamilton Law Office, LLC, make the following complaint against Defendants 

The CITY OF CHICAGO (“Defendant CITY”) and Chicago Police Officers PETAIN NAVEZ, 

JOSE LOMELI, STEVEN RIVERA, MANUEL GUZMAN, ROGELIO PINAL, ROBERT 

CAVAIANI, BRIAN SPRENG, MICHAEL GRAF, MICHAEL BURKE, NICHOLAS 

ORLANDO, FRANK PIERRI, KENNETH BARNAS, BRIAN TEDESCHI, ALBERT PEREZ, 

DONALD FALK, ANTHONY NORADIN, RONALD BANAS, and UNKNOWN CHICAGO 

POLICE OFFICERS (“Defendant OFFICERS”):

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 to address the deprivation, under 

color of law, of the Plaintiffs' rights under the United States Constitution and under the common 

law of Illinois.

2. This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.

3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All parties reside in this judicial district and the 

events pertaining to the claims made in this complaint occurred within this district.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff FIELDS is a thirty-one year old small business owner and a life-long resident of 

Chicago, Illinois.

5. Plaintiff PEPIN is a thirty-five year old lab technician and also a life-long resident of 

Chicago, Illinois.

6. At all relevant times, Defendant OFFICERS were Chicago police officers, employed by the 

Defendant CITY, and were acting within the scope of their employment, under the color of law.

7. Defendant CITY is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the laws of the State of 

Illinois, and at all relevant times, was the employer and principal of Defendant OFFICERS.

FACTS

8. Plaintiff FIELDS and PEPIN have been together for eight years and they live in a single 

family home owned by Plaintiff FIELDS, located at 2210 North Keystone, in Chicago, Illinois.

9. Plaintiffs’ home sits on a double lot, which is surrounded on all sides by a tall wooden fence. 

10. In the back of Plaintiffs’ property they have a detached two-car garage. Plaintiffs’ garage

opens via an overhead door into an alley behind Plaintiffs’ home. Their garage also has a side door 

which opens into their back yard well inside the fence.

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Police Officers Shoot Plaintiff FIELDS In The Stomach While He Is Working 

On His Own Car In His Own Garage

11. On the evening of February 24, 2011, around 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff PEPIN was inside the 

house and Plaintiff FIELDS was in the garage removing a license plate from one of his cars.

12. Plaintiff FIELDS was using a small, ten-millimeter socket wrench to remove his license 

plate, and he had a wrench set open on the floor of the garage next to the car. 

13. The overhead door to the garage was closed and the garage was well lit so that Plaintiff 

FIELDS could see what he was doing as he worked on his car.

14. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff FIELDS, Defendants NAVEZ and LOMELI entered Plaintiffs’

backyard with their guns drawn, and quietly made their way to the side door of Plaintiffs’ garage. 

15. Hearing footfalls in his backyard, Plaintiff FIELDS stood up to investigate. 

16. Defendant NAVEZ entered Plaintiffs’ garage holding a handgun with Defendant LOMELI 

one to two feet behind him.

17. Without provocation, Defendant NAVEZ shot Plaintiff FIELDS in the abdomen.

18. The bullet from Defendant NAVEZ’s gun pierced Plaintiff FIELDS' liver and exited the

right side of his body.

19. Plaintiff FIELDS fell immediately to the ground asking, “Why did you shoot me?” or words 

to that effect.

20. Instead of administering first aid or calling for an ambulance immediately, Defendant 

NAVEZ swore, and then turned and left the garage.

The Shooter And His Fellow Officers Discuss What To Do Next 

Instead Of Immediately Calling For An Ambulance

21. Defendants RIVERA, GUZMAN, and PINAL were the first officers to arrive on the scene 

either before, or just after, Defendant NAVEZ shot Plaintiff FIELDS. On information and belief, 

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these officers conferred with NAVEZ and LOMELI outside the garage, while Plaintiff FIELDS lay 

bleeding on the ground inside the garage.

22. Defendant NAVEZ returned to the garage and searched Plaintiff FIELDS, finding him 

unarmed. Defendant NAVEZ then left the garage again, leaving Plaintiff FIELDS lying on the 

ground, bleeding.

23. On information and belief, Defendants NAVEZ, LOMELI, RIVERA, GUZMAN and 

PINAL delayed making a call for emergency assistance for Plaintiff FIELDS while they considered 

what to do.

Plaintiff PEPIN Is Physically Removed From Her Own Property 

While Plaintiff FIELDS Calls For Help

24. Meanwhile, Plaintiff PEPIN, looked out her window and saw several police officers in her 

backyard talking with each other near the garage.

25. Plaintiff PEPIN went outside in her pajamas to see what was happening, and was met by 

Defendant OFFICERS who refused to let her into her garage, and refused to tell her what had 

happened.

26. When Plaintiff PEPIN attempted to walk towards her own garage Defendant OFFICERS 

prevented her from entering.

27. One of Defendant OFFICERS then physically removed Plaintiff PEPIN from her own 

property depositing her in the alley and causing a bruise on her upper arm. 

28. Meanwhile, alone inside the garage and afraid he was dying, Plaintiff FIELDS used his cell 

phone to call Plaintiff PEPIN. When she did not answer (because she was already outside), Plaintiff

FIELDS called his mother and told her the police had just shot him and he needed help. 

29. While Plaintiff FIELDS was on the phone with his mother, Defendant LOMELI entered 

the garage and took his phone away from him, terminating his call with his mother.

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30. On information and belief, only after Plaintiff FIELDS was observed talking on his cell 

phone, did one of the Defendant OFFICERS summon an ambulance for him.

31. One or more of Defendant OFFICERS then opened the overhead door of the garage, 

allowing Plaintiff PEPIN to see, from her position in the alley, that Plaintiff FIELDS was lying on 

the floor of the garage with three police officers standing over him. 

32. One of the Defendant OFFICERS told Plaintiff PEPIN that Plaintiff FIELDS was fine and 

could get up and walk if he wanted to, but he just chose not to, or words to that effect.

33. When an ambulance arrived on the scene, it could not get close to Plaintiff FIELDS because 

police cars were blocking the alley. 

34. Defendant OFFICERS did not allow the ambulance personnel into the garage where 

Defendant NAVEZ had shot Plaintiff FIELDS. Instead, Defendant OFFICERS carried him out of 

the garage. 

Plaintiff PEPIN Is Detained in A Squad Car While Chicago Police Officers Ransack 

Plaintiffs’ Home Looking For Something To Justify The Shooting 

35. While refusing to answer Plaintiff PEPIN’s questions, Defendants TEDESCHI and PEREZ 

led Plaintiff PEPIN away from her home and put her into a squad car. These Defendants 

interrogated Plaintiff PEPIN and then caused her to be detained inside the squad car against her will 

for more than two hours.

36. While Plaintiff PEPIN was forcibly kept away from her home, UNKNOWN OFFICERS 

entered and searched Plaintiffs’ home without a search warrant or any other legal justification to do 

so.

37. On information and belief, during the approximately three to four hours following the 

shooting, as many as seventy-five Chicago police officers, and perhaps more, were either inside or 

outside Plaintiffs’ home and/or garage at various times. 

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38. UNKNOWN OFFICERS conducted an exhaustive search of Plaintiffs’ home. They 

searched storage boxes, drawers and cabinets, and the pockets of clothing, which was hanging in 

closets. UNKNOWN OFFICERS even removed insulation and pieces of drywall to look inside the 

walls of Plaintiffs’ home. 

39. On information and belief, Defendants PIERRI and BARNAS were two of the supervisors 

directing the investigation that night, and they were aware of, and condoned, the search of Plaintiffs’ 

home without a search warrant or probable cause. 

40. Defendant PIERRI and BARNAS also authorized the use of a Chicago Police Department 

canine unit to search the inside of Plaintiffs’ home and garage. 

41. There was nothing illegal in either Plaintiffs’ home or their garage.

42. During this illegal search, UNKNOWN OFFICERS stole United States’ currency from the 

pocket of shirt hanging in Plaintiffs’ bedroom closet.

43. During this illegal search, UNKNOWN OFFICERS also stole expensive food items from a 

freezer in Plaintiffs’ basement, including packages of jumbo shrimp and filet mignon. 

44. After being held in a squad car against her will for more than two hours, Plaintiff PEPIN 

was finally escorted back to her home by three police officers. 

45. As they arrived at her front door, one of the Defendant OFFICERS informed Plaintiff 

PEPIN for the first time, that Plaintiff FIELDS had been shot, but they did not tell her a police 

officer shot him. 

46. Plaintiff PEPIN returned to her home and discovered it had been thoroughly searched and 

was in total disarray.

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Plaintiff FIELDS Fights For His Life And Both Plaintiffs Suffer Emotionally

47. Plaintiff FIELDS, was rushed into surgery that night in an attempt to repair the damage 

done by the bullet fired from DEFENDANT Navez’s gun. During surgery, approximately 90 

percent of Plaintiff FIELDS' liver had to be removed due to damage from the bullet.

48. Plaintiff FIELDS required multiple blood transfusions to replace the blood he lost on the 

floor of his garage and during surgery.

49. Sometime that night, Defendants FALK, NORADIN and BANAS questioned Plaintiff 

FIELDS while he was still in the emergency room and later conveyed false information about this 

interview to other detectives.

50. Plaintiff FIELDS was gravely ill for several weeks and remained in the hospital for nearly a 

month. 

51. When Plaintiff FIELDS was finally released from the hospital, he left with several holes in 

his torso, which operated as drains.

52. Plaintiff FIELDS subsequently developed a severe infection and had to return to the 

hospital for a week in order to treat the infection.

53. Upon his release the second time, Plaintiff FIELDS had to self-administer intravenous 

antibiotics for several weeks. 

54. Plaintiff FIELDS has lost 30-40 pounds as a result of his injuries and he has been unable to 

gain it back. 

55. Defendant NAVEZ and LOMELI caused Plaintiff FIELDS to suffer severe pain as well as 

long-term disability and permanent disfigurement.

56. As a result of Defendant OFFICERS’ misconduct, Plaintiff FIELDS has suffered serious 

emotional damages, and he will continue to suffer indefinitely, both physically and emotionally.

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57. Plaintiff FIELDS has hundreds of thousands of dollars of medical bills and this debt has 

affected his credit and his financial stability.

58. Plaintiff PEPIN has also suffered physical and emotional damages, including anxiety, as a

result of Defendant OFFICERS’ actions.

COUNT I

 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Excessive Force- Plaintiff FIELDS)

59. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

60. As described above, the intentional conduct of the Defendant NAVEZ and LOMELI 

toward Plaintiff FIELDS was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, and thus 

constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

61. Defendant LOMELI was aware of the misconduct of his fellow police officer, had a 

reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent the misconduct and the damages suffered by Plaintiff

FIELDS, but failed to do so.

62. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant NAVEZ and LOMELI’s excessive use of 

force, Plaintiff FIELDS suffered both physical and emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff FIELDS prays for a judgment against Defendants NAVEZ and 

LOMELI in a fair and just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiff FIELDS for the severe injuries 

he has suffered, plus a substantial sum in punitive damages, as well as court costs, attorney’s fees, 

and such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT II

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure To Provide Timely Medical Care - Plaintiff FIELDS)

63. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

64. Defendants NAVEZ, LOMELI, RIVERA, GUZMAN and PINAL’s failure to immediately 

call for an ambulance for Plaintiff FIELDS, and their failure to allow the paramedics immediate 

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access to Plaintiff FIELDS in the garage, were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States' Constitution. 

65. Defendant OFFICERS failure to provide timely medical care to Plaintiff FILEDS 

proximately resulted in additional physical and emotional harm to Plaintiff FIELDS. 

66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant OFFICERS’ acts or omissions, Plaintiff 

FIELDS suffered severe physical, emotional and financial damages, which will be proven at trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff FIELDS prays for a judgment against Defendants NAVEZ, 

LOMELI, RIVERA, GUZMAN, and PINAL, in a fair and just amount sufficient to compensate 

Plaintiff FIELDS for the severe injuries he has suffered, plus a substantial sum in punitive damages, 

as well as court costs, attorney’s fees, and such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT III

 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 --Unlawful Seizure – Plaintiff PEPIN)

67. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

68. As described above, one or more of Defendant OFFICERS and Defendants TEDESCHI 

and PEREZ unlawfully detained Plaintiff PEPIN, or caused her to be unlawfully detained, without a 

warrant, probable cause, and without any other legal justification to do so. These Defendant 

OFFICERS' actions were objectively unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution.

69. One or more of Defendant OFFICERS were aware of the misconduct of his fellow police 

officers, had a reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent their misconduct and the damages 

suffered by Plaintiff PEPIN, but failed to do so.

70. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful search and seizure, Plaintiff PEPIN

suffered damages, including both physical and emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PEPIN prays for a judgment against Defendant OFFICERS in a 

fair and just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiff PEPIN for the injuries she has suffered, plus 

a substantial sum in punitive damages, as well as court costs, attorney’s fees, and such other relief as 

is just and equitable.

COUNT IV

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Excessive Force- Plaintiff PEPIN)

71. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

72. As described above, the intentional conduct of one of the Defendant OFFICERS toward 

Plaintiff PEPIN was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, and constituted excessive 

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

73. One or more Defendant OFFICERS were aware of the misconduct of his fellow police 

officer(s), had a reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent the misconduct and the damages 

suffered by Plaintiff PEPIN, but failed to do so.

74. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant OFFICERS’ excessive use of force, 

Plaintiff PEPIN suffered both physical and emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PEPIN prays for a judgment against one or more of Defendant 

OFFICERS in a fair and just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiff PEPIN for the injuries she 

has suffered, plus a substantial sum in punitive damages, as well as court costs, attorney’s fees, and 

such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT V

 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Unlawful Search of Plaintiffs’ Home)

75. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

76. As described above, Defendants PIERRI and BARNAS and other UNKNOWN

OFFICERS searched Plaintiffs’ home without a warrant, probable cause, and without any other legal 

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justification to do so. Thus, Defendant OFFICERS’ actions were in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

77. One or more Defendant OFFICERS were aware of the misconduct of his fellow police 

officers, had a reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent the misconduct and the damages 

suffered by Plaintiffs, but failed to do so.

78. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful search, Plaintiffs suffered pecuniary and 

emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment against Defendants PIERRI and BARNAS 

and other UNKNOWN OFFICERS in a fair and just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for 

the injuries they have suffered, plus a substantial sum in punitive damages, as well as court costs, 

attorney’s fees, and such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT VI

 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Unlawful Entry/Search of Plaintiffs’ Backyard & Garage)

79. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

80. As described above, Defendants NAVEZ and LOMELI entered Plaintiffs’ backyard and 

garage without a warrant, probable cause, and without any other legal justification to do so. 

Moreover, the scope and manner of this search was objectively unreasonable under the 

circumstances, and thus, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution.

81. Each of these Defendant OFFICERS was aware of the misconduct of his partner, had a 

reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent the misconduct and the damages suffered by 

Plaintiffs but failed to do so.

82. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful search, Plaintiffs suffered physical and 

emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment against Defendants NAVEZ and LOMELI

in a fair and just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered, plus a 

substantial sum in punitive damages, as well as court costs, attorney’s fees, and such other relief as is 

just and equitable.

COUNT VII

 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights)

83. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

84. As described more fully above, the Defendant OFFICERS reached an express or implied 

agreement to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as described in the preceding paragraphs. 

85. One or more of Defendant OFFICERS further conspired to cover up their own, and each 

others’ misconduct with respect to Plaintiffs. 

86. In furtherance of the conspiracy, each of the co-conspirators committed overt acts or 

omissions and was an otherwise willful participant in joint activity.

87. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and 

reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs.

88. As a result of the Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs suffered damages, which will be proven at 

trial.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant OFFICERS in a fair and 

just amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered, plus a substantial 

sum in punitive damages, as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and such other relief as is just and 

equitable.

COUNT VIII

(Illinois Battery Claim- Plaintiff FIELDS)

89. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

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90. As described above, Defendant NAVEZ willfully and wantonly and without legal 

justification used physical force upon Plaintiff FIELDS.

91. As a direct and proximate result of this intentional misconduct, Plaintiff FIELDS was 

physically and emotionally harmed.

92. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are required to pay any 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

93. At all relevant times, Defendant NAVEZ was acting as an agent of Defendant CITY, and 

was acting within the scope of his employment as a Chicago police officer. Defendant CITY, 

therefore, is liable as a principal for the tortious conduct of Defendant NAVEZ towards Plaintiff

FIELDS.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff FIELDS prays for judgment against Defendant NAVEZ and 

Defendant CITY in a fair and just amount that is sufficient to compensate Plaintiff FIELDS for the 

injuries he has suffered, as well as for such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT IX

(Illinois Battery Claim- Plaintiff PEPIN)

94. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

95. As described above, one of the Defendant OFFICERS willfully and wantonly and without 

legal justification used physical force upon Plaintiff PEPIN.

96. As a direct and proximate result of this intentional misconduct, Plaintiff PEPIN was 

physically and emotionally harmed.

97. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are required to pay any 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

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98. At all relevant times, Defendant OFFICERS were acting as agents of Defendant CITY, and 

acting within the scope of their employment as Chicago police officers. Defendant CITY, therefore, 

is liable as a principal for the tortious conduct of each Defendant OFFICER.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PEPIN prays for judgment against the UNKNOWN Defendant 

Officer and Defendant CITY in a fair and just amount that is sufficient to compensate Plaintiff 

PEPIN for the injuries she has suffered, as well as for such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT X

(Illinois False Imprisonment Claim-Plaintiff PEPIN)

99. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

100. As described above, one or more UNKNOWN OFFICERS and Defendants 

TEDESCHI and PEREZ, unlawfully seized and detained Plaintiff PEPIN without a warrant, 

without probable cause, and without any other legal justification to do so.

101. These Defendant OFFICERS acted willfully and wantonly, in that they intended to 

violate, or were recklessly indifferent to violating, Plaintiff PEPIN’s rights.

102. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant OFFICERS’ misconduct, Plaintiff PEPIN

suffered physical and emotional damages, which will be proven at trial.

103. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are required to pay 

any compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope 

of his or her employment.

104. At all relevant times, these Defendant OFFICERS were acting as agents of Defendant 

CITY, and were acting within the scope of their employment as Chicago police officers. Defendant 

CITY, therefore, is liable as a principal for the tortious conduct of Defendant OFFICERS towards

Plaintiff PEPIN.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PEPIN prays for judgment against UKNOWN OFFICERS, 

Defendants TEDESCHI and PEREZ and Defendant CITY in a fair and just amount that is 

sufficient to compensate Plaintiff PEPIN for the injuries she has suffered, as well as such other 

relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT XI

(Illinois Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim- Plaintiff FIELDS)

105. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

106. As more fully described above, Defendant OFFICERS engaged in conduct with respect to 

Plaintiff FIELDS which was extreme and outrageous. 

107. Defendants acted willfully and wantonly in that they intended, or were recklessly 

indifferent towards, causing Plaintiff FIELDS severe emotional distress, knowing that there was a 

high probability that their behavior would cause Plaintiff FIELDS severe emotional distress and 

mental anguish.

108. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff FIELDS has, in fact, 

suffered severe emotional distress. 

109. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are liable for 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

110. At all relevant times, Defendant OFFICERS were agents of Defendant CITY and 

employees of the Chicago Police Department acting within the scope of their employment. 

Defendant CITY, therefore, is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agents, Defendant

OFFICERS.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff FIELDS prays for judgment against Defendants in a fair and just 

amount sufficient to compensate him for the injuries he suffered, plus, all such other relief as this 

Court finds just and equitable.

COUNT XII

(Illinois Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim- Plaintiff PEPIN)

111. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

112. As more fully described above, Defendant OFFICERS engaged in conduct with respect to 

Plaintiff PEPIN, which was extreme and outrageous. 

113. Defendants acted willfully and wantonly in that they intended, or were recklessly 

indifferent towards, causing Plaintiff PEPIN severe emotional distress, knowing that there was a 

high probability that their behavior would cause Plaintiff PEPIN severe emotional distress and 

mental anguish.

114. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff PEPIN has, in fact, 

suffered severe emotional distress. 

115. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are liable for 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

116. At all relevant times, Defendant OFFICERS were agents of Defendant CITY and 

employees of the Chicago Police Department acting within the scope of their employment. 

Defendant CITY, therefore, is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agents, Defendant

OFFICERS.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff PEPIN prays for judgment against Defendants in a fair and just 

amount sufficient to compensate her for the injuries she suffered, plus, all such other relief as this 

Court finds just and equitable.

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COUNT XIII

(Illinois Trespass Claim)

117. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

118. As more fully described in preceding paragraphs, UNKNOWN OFFICERS entered and 

searched Plaintiffs’ home without a legal justification to do so. This constituted an unwanted and 

uninvited invasion into Plaintiffs’ exclusive possession of their home, in violation of Illinois 

common law.

119. This unwarranted invasion into Plaintiffs’ home proximately caused damages to Plaintiffs’ 

home and caused an interference with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their home.

120. On information and belief, Defendants PIERRI and BARNES were two of the supervisors 

in charge of the scene that night, and either participated in, or condoned this unlawful trespass into 

Plaintiffs’ home.

121. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are required to pay any 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

122. At all relevant times, Defendant OFFICERS were acting as agents of Defendant CITY, 

and were acting within the scope of their employment as Chicago police officers. Defendant CITY, 

therefore, is liable as a principal for the tortious conduct of Defendant OFFICERS towards

Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against UKNOWN OFFICERS, Defendants

PIERRI, BARNAS and Defendant CITY in a fair and just amount that is sufficient to compensate 

Plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered, as well as such other relief as is just and equitable.

COUNT XIV

(Illinois Conversion Claim)

123. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated as if fully restated here.

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124. As more fully described above, Plaintiffs had an absolute and unconditional right to the 

specific amount of United States’ currency and the food items inside their home, and one or more 

UNKNOWN OFFICER(S) wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion or 

ownership over the currency and the food items belonging to Plaintiffs.

125. UNKNOWN OFFICER(S) acted willfully and wantonly in that they intended, or were 

recklessly indifferent towards Plaintiffs’ absolute right to possess their currency and property.

126. As a proximate result of UNKNOWN OFFICER(S’) conversion of Plaintiffs’ currency 

and property, Plaintiffs suffered pecuniary loss.

127. Illinois law provides that public entities, such as Defendant CITY, are liable for 

compensatory damages on a tort judgment against an employee who was acting within the scope of 

his or her employment.

128. At all relevant times, UNKNOWN OFFICER(S) were agents of Defendant CITY and 

employees of the Chicago Police Department acting within the scope of their employment. 

Defendant CITY, therefore, is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agents, UNKNOWN 

OFFICERS.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for restitution from Defendants CITY and UNKNOWN 

OFFICERS for the fair market value of the items taken in addition to the actual amount of United 

States currency, which UNKNOWN OFFICERS unlawfully converted, plus, all such other relief as 

this Court finds just and equitable.

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND TRIAL BY JURY.

Respectfully Submitted, 

ERICK FIELDS and URSULA PEPIN, Plaintiffs,

By: /s/ Torreya L. Hamilton

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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HAMILTON LAW OFFICE, LLC

11 South LaSalle St., Suite 1000

Chicago, IL 60603

312.726.3173

tlh@thehamiltonlawoffice.com

Attorney No. 6229397

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