No. 179, April 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

P

reparing to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) has

been the standard used to design U.S.

defense policy and force structure since

1993. But with a broader spectrum of challenges looming, the threat of concurrent wars

in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula appearing less likely, and the emergence of China as a potential rival, a new

approach is needed. Without a new standard,

the Armed Forces will transform themselves

using a rigid and outdated strategic model. 

The standard put forth herein combines

attention to peacetime needs with a fresh

interpretation of wartime requirements. For

peacetime, it would create force packages

for regional commanders to perform deterrent, theater engagement, routine operational, and minor crisis management missions. In wartime, it would create a powerful

joint force for handling one conflict which

may be larger than a MTW, plus forces for

two medium-sized operations elsewhere.

This amounts to a new strategic calculus of

one plus one-half plus one-half contingencies to determine U.S. force requirements. 

This new standard aims to make defense plans not only responsive to real-world

events, but also flexible and adaptable. It

judges that preparing U.S. forces to handle a

wide spectrum of events—big and small, in

peace and war—may be more important than

optimizing them for one canonical wartime

scenario. It calls for a force structure that is

large and adaptable enough to maintain core

military capabilities in order to perform

diverse strategic missions.

One of the toughest challenges facing the

Department of Defense (DOD) is translating

strategic policy into concrete guidelines for

preparing U.S. military forces. A defense planning standard is a set of judgments and directives for performing this key function. Normally this standard has three associated roles:

to determine the size of forces and their main

missions; to establish program and budgetary

priorities; and to inform the Congress and the

public of the rationale behind the defense

strategy and force posture. For example, the

Kennedy administration standard was a two

and one-half war strategy, and the Nixon

administration had a one and one-half war

strategy. To guide its planning, the Carter

administration used the standard of multitheater war with the Soviet Union in Europe

and the Persian Gulf. The Reagan administration applied an Illustrative Planning Scenario

that contemplated global war with the Soviet

Union and the Warsaw Pact.

When the Cold War ended, it swept away

the Soviet threat and the old bipolar order,

leaving a number of turbulent regions in its

wake. The Bush administration responded with

a Base Force that created general capabilities

without regard to specific scenarios, though it

did hedge against a Soviet resurgence. The

Clinton administration, in its Bottom-Up

Review of early 1993, crafted a standard which

called upon U.S. forces to be constantly ready

to fight two major regional conflicts (MRCs) in

widely separated theaters and overlapping time

frames. This approach reflected an effort to

balance military requirements with budgetary

constraints, and to link U.S. force levels to

credible foreign threats in direct ways. The

1997 Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed

this standard (changing the terminology from

MRCs to MTWs or major theater wars) and

noted that forces would also be called upon to

deal with smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs).

In the years since its adoption, the two-MTW

standard has had a profound impact on how

the Department of Defense has carried out

business. It has affected not only force levels

and the activities of the unified commanders in

chief (CINCs), but also manpower policies,

readiness standards, improvement efforts,

program priorities, and budgeting. 

The Two-MTW Standard

The many positive features of the twoMTW standard have helped it endure for the

last 8 years. At the time it was created, both

Iraq and North Korea had large conventional

forces and bellicose intentions toward their

weaker neighbors. By committing major forces

to defend against these threats, the two-MTW

standard signaled the seriousness of U.S. strategic intentions, warned adversaries, and reassured allies in the Persian Gulf and Northeast

Asia. Moreover, it helped ensure that a decisive

U.S. military response in one theater would not

open the door to aggression in another. The

deterrent effect of the strategy had a salutary

effect as the 1990s wore on. While U.S. forces

never fully met the goals of the two-MTW

standard, they came close enough to ensure

that if war had broken out, the United States

ultimately would have prevailed.

The two-MTW standard also had a positive

effect on the U.S. policy process. It set limits on

post-Cold War reductions, while creating a

credible rationale for today’s posture of 13

active Army and Marine divisions, 20 Air Force

Revising the Two-Major Theater

War Standard

by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

No. 179

April 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
active and Reserve fighter wings, and 12 Navy

carrier battle groups (CVBGs). In calling for a

rapid capacity to project large forces overseas, it

mandated high readiness rates for all active

forces and selected Reserve component units. It

created incentives for improvements in such

key areas as mobility, logistic support, modern

munitions, and war reserve stocks. It encouraged the services to pursue joint operations,

information-age innovations, force transformation, and new doctrines. It directed that U.S.

forces must have the capacity to act unilaterally, but it also called for multilateral cooperation and improved interoperability with allied

forces. While allocating virtually the entire

combat posture to two MTW contingencies, it

left room for some forces to be used for other

purposes—for example, either small crises or

peacekeeping operations—when global conditions made such diversions safe.

Drawbacks 

Recent trends suggest that the two-MTW

standard is significantly less credible than it

was 8 years ago. A key reason is diminishing

concern that MTWs against Iraq and North

Korea might erupt at the same time. Although

Iraq and North Korea are unpredictable and

dangerous, they present less serious conventional military threats than they did a decade

ago. Iraq’s military has never recovered from

Operation Desert Storm; its defense budget is

estimated to be about 20 percent of the preDesert Storm level; and Operations Northern

Watch and Southern Watch have helped to

contain Saddam. If sanctions unravel, however,

Iraqi military spending could increase again. 

The North Korean military remains large

and forward deployed, but South Korean military modernization efforts have created a more

stable balance on the peninsula. While Seoul

remains vulnerable because of its location,

there is little doubt that U.S. and Republic of

Korea (ROK) forces would prevail in any conflict. North Korea is impoverished and seeks

international support to avoid its own political

collapse. North-South reconciliation, while

slowed somewhat, remains on track. 

Sooner or later, both of these political

confrontations may mutate to the point where

neither is capable of producing an MTW, much

less two MTWs at once. Should either Iraq or

North Korea attack U.S. or allied forces, the

result would be sure defeat for the attacking

forces, so there is little incentive for either

rogue state to try to take advantage of conflict

elsewhere. Other threats may take their place,

and MTW conflicts will remain a factor in the

strategic calculus. But the notion that two

MTWs will still be the main danger to world

peace seems increasingly a stretch. As in the

past, MTWs likely will occur one at a time, not

in bunches. If the United States were engaged

in one major theater war, its current posture

would provide sizable precision strike assets

and strong allies to deter a second adversary

from taking advantage. 

As the risk of nearly simultaneous wars

with Iraq and North Korea wanes, a broader

spectrum of threats is emerging. China is a

growing military power in Asia, and a new

standard must take into account the possibility

of an unwanted but large conflict over Taiwan.

As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) accelerates, smaller powers may

feel emboldened to risk confrontation with the

United States. The recent Kosovo conflict was a

medium-sized war, and it was fought in Europe

—a theater ignored by the two-MTW standard.

It is increasingly clear that U.S. forces must

operate actively in at least three theaters, not

two. Elsewhere, failing states in several regions

continue to be ravaged by ethnic or religious

conflict that may necessitate the use of U.S.

and allied forces. The spectrum of military

conflict is steadily widening and expanding to

new geographical locations, creating the potential for wars that are greater than MTWs, less

than them, and above all, radically different in

conduct from them. 

Recent years also have brought major

changes to U.S. national security strategy that

further erode the appeal and staying power of

the two-MTW standard. Such concepts as

peacetime strategic shaping, homeland defense, theater engagement, alliance enlargement, peace operations, counterproliferation,

counternarcotics operations, asymmetric warfare, and ballistic missile defense have become

key parts of the modern strategic lexicon. None

of them finds a home in the two-MTW standard. This problem seems destined to worsen in

the coming years. The two-MTW standard is

anchored in the premise of U.S. forces carrying

out traditional border defense commitments to

allies against classical invasion threats. The

future norm may be quite different from this

model, involving a mix of power projection

missions, expeditionary strike operations,

informal coalitions of the willing, and security

assurances in the face of WMD proliferation. 

An additional drawback is that the twoMTW standard has started eroding the strategic

flexibility and responsiveness of the U.S. military. Faced with the overwhelming need to

prepare to win two theater wars nearly simultaneously, most of America’s military assets are

tied to that mission. For example, one MTW

might require 6–7 ground divisions, 7–11 air

wings, and 3–6 carriers. At the same time, there

is high day-to-day demand for other skills that

are in low supply. The result is a high operations tempo for units not dedicated primarily to

fighting a major conflict while warfighting

units are underutilized. The U.S. military is

caught between competing priorities, lacking

flexible assets for unexpected operations, and

hard-pressed to handle the transition from

peace to war. Having insurance against the

improbable event of two MTWs makes sense,

but not at the expense of insufficient forces for

other missions that are already occurring.

Setting a new standard may help reverse these

imbalances and remove the rigidity.

The rigidity of current defense planning

especially affects U.S. European Command

(EUCOM), which lacks any officially sanctioned

contingency to assess its force needs. As a result,

it must meet U.S. military commitments to the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with

forces that are assigned to other theaters in

wartime—even though 109,000 troops are

stationed in Europe in peacetime. The effect is

to leave EUCOM requesting forces every time a

2 Strategic Forum No. 179, April 2001

Hans Binnendijk holds a chair in national security and technology at the National Defense University. 

He may be contacted at (202) 685–2557 or binnendijkh@ndu.edu. Richard L. Kugler is a distinguished

research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and may

be contacted at (202) 685–2328 or kuglerr@ndu.edu.

the notion that two

MTWs will still be the

main danger to world

peace seems increasingly

a stretch
contingency arises in its area of responsibility.

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) benefits from

large wartime allocations, but because its forces

are earmarked for defense of South Korea, they

are not readily available for other security

missions in East Asia and Southeast Asia. While

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) can call

on large forces for defending the Persian Gulf,

few forces are available for crisis missions

elsewhere in its area. Overall, current U.S.

defense plans blanket Northeast Asia and the

Persian Gulf with large forces, but leave the rest

of the huge southern belt—the endangered

zone stretching from the Balkans to the Asian

crescent—uncovered in the absence of special

decisions to divert forces for this purpose. 

As the Kosovo conflict showed, U.S. forces

can be diverted from MTW plans in extremis,

but only temporarily. Fixation on MTWs can

result in failure to create the operational plans

needed swiftly to deploy forces for such missions. It also can result in neglect of programs

and capabilities that might be uniquely critical

for such conflicts. A posture optimized to send

large forces to the Persian Gulf and Korea

might not be well suited to fight a larger war in

other places. To be sure, the growing plethora

of new-era missions creates the risk that U.S.

forces will be overstretched and diverted from

their central defense priorities. But there is an

equal risk that if defense planning remains

locked in the comfortable past, it will neglect

the need for flexibility in a changing world, the

imperatives of new missions, and the dangers

posed by new threats. 

A New Standard 

Tomorrow’s dangers range from the

prospect of fighting a larger foe to managing

the chaos that exists in the vast regions outside

the democratic community. In this fluid setting, major regional actors like Russia, China,

and Iran will seek to dominate security affairs

in their part of the world. Some medium-sized

powers will continue to act like rogues, willing

to challenge the status quo through WMD

proliferation and aggression. Failing states and

ethnic violence will continue coupled with such

transnational threats as terrorism, drug trafficking, and other types of organized crime.

The dangers ahead will arise in the near to

mid-term, not just in the distant future.

In determining how to deal with this

global milieu, a new defense planning standard must be strongly connected to national

security strategy, not separate from it. While the

Bush administration strategy is not yet clear, it

likely will embody a combination of enhanced

homeland defense, reinvigorated alliances,

resolve toward adversaries, selective military

commitments, and decisive force operations in

event of war. In order to support this agenda, a

new planning standard cannot be narrowly

military, but also must make political and

strategic sense. It must articulate a theory of

force needs for peacetime and wartime, so that

the U.S. military is instructed on how to deal

with both settings and how to make the difficult transition from the former to the latter.

The peacetime component must provide guidance on the forces and other assets needed to

pursue such goals as reforming alliances,

creating new partnerships, fostering regional

stability, deterring aggression, and resolving

crises. The wartime component must provide

equally clear guidance on how U.S. forces are

to be organized, allocated, and employed in

combat, including situations demanding

simultaneous force operations.

Peacetime missions are important because

they occupy most of the military’s attention,

consume large funds, and provide the setting

in which key CINCs must prepare for war.

Gauging force needs for them is more complicated than meets the eye, and likely will necessitate calculations different from those of the

1990s. Clearly a strong defense posture can

help preserve peace and underwrite U.S. foreign

policy in many places. But being powerful in

the abstract is not enough for a global superpower facing difficult challenges in multiple

regions. The forces and activities employed in

each region must be carefully tailored to ensure that they produce the desired strategic

consequences. If the coming decade mandates

change in the U.S. overseas presence and

engagement patterns, the new planning standard should point the way. 

The best way to assess normal peacetime

needs is to examine the strategic agendas and

priorities of the three key overseas commands:

EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM. An appropriate sizing standard is to equip the key regional

commanders with a force package that would

allow them to perform their deterrent, theater

engagement, routine operational, and minor

crisis management missions. Each package

would consist of a combination of overseasdeployed forces augmented by some homebased units that are assigned to these commands and are readily available to them when

the need arises. To meet these four peacetime

missions, each command’s package might

include up to 100,000 troops, with contributions from all three services. Remaining forces

stationed primarily in the continental United

States (CONUS) would be held as a large,

flexible strategic reserve for use by the regional

CINCs. Additional equipment pre-positioning

would be required to assure rapid deployments

to more diverse regions.

As a replacement for the two-MTW construct, the wartime standard put forth here is a

three-package posture for one plus one-half

plus one-half contingencies. The one force

would be composed of sufficient combat formations to wage not only a standard MTW, but

also a somewhat bigger larger theater war

(LTW) against a coalition of adversaries or a

big power (for example, China). This force

would require joint assets, including ground,

air, and naval forces for both close combat and

long-range fires. The exact composition of this

force, however, would not be fixed in concrete.

Instead, its makeup could be varied by drawing

selectively upon the overall force posture,

thereby gaining the capacity to fight a wide

spectrum of LTW conflicts, depending upon the

region and enemy forces. The first one-half

force would be a high-technology, mediumsized posture for expeditionary and strike

missions, endowed with ample long-range

strike capability. Oriented to waging a small

theater war (STW), it would be capable of

Kosovo-like operations, counter-WMD strike

missions, reinforcement of allies, and halting

or delaying major aggression. The second onehalf force would also be capable of traditional

combat operations, but it would be tailored for

operations in mountainous terrain and urban

areas, special operations, low-intensity combat,

and peace operations. It would have an overall

capacity for a STW, but its assets could be

parceled out among multiple smaller missions. 

No. 179, April 2001 Strategic Forum 3

a new planning standard

cannot be narrowly

military, but also must

make political and

strategic sense
4 Strategic Forum No. 179, April 2001

These three different wartime force packages would provide considerable strategic

flexibility for dealing with all three key theaters

at once. They would provide the core military

capabilities needed for new strategic missions

and for commitments to U.S. allies. They

would require a force structure roughly comparable to today’s, with modifications for the new

missions. They would allow the U.S. military to

wage a large war, while still having significant

forces for limited contingencies in the other

two theaters. These force packages would be

flexible constructs, not rigid organizations.

They would allow for maximum reorganization of the services to meet new challenges.

They would create a framework for drawing

selectively from the overall posture, whose

diverse portfolio of assets could be combined

and recombined as the situation warrants.

Together, the combination of peacetime packages assigned to the regional CINCs and these

three CONUS-based wartime packages would

provide a better capacity to make the transition

from peace to war, and to tailor responses to

individual or multiple events. 

How might these three packages be employed in a setting requiring use of all of them?

Illustratively, the LTW force might be used to

wage a large war in the Persian Gulf, the hightechnology strike force might be used in Asia to

help halt a North Korean attack, and the lowintensity force might be used for peacekeeping

on Europe’s periphery. Alternatively, the LTW

force might be used in an Asian confrontation

with China, the strike force might be used to

suppress WMD threats in the Persian Gulf, and

the low-intensity force might support United

Nations operations in Africa. The key point is

that this one plus one-half plus one half posture would provide three different, valuable

strategic assets, plus considerable agility and

versatility. It would permit U.S. forces to handle

a wider range of challenges than a posture

organized rigidly into two large MTW packages,

each of them tailored for a similar type of war.

In the event of two MTW conflicts, these three

packages could be combined to comprise two

packages, one for each conflict. Thus a great

deal of the deterrent power offered by the twoMTW standard would be retained. 

The DOD planning standard for the coming years is an issue that warrants careful

thought, not only because the Bush administration may want change, but also because the

two-MTW standard has run out of gas. The new

standard put forth here does not necessarily

increase or shrink the size of U.S. military

forces. Nor is it a panacea. Rather, it provides a

model and stimulus for change. It does makes

U.S. defense strategy more credible by focusing

on emerging security missions. Implemented

properly, it would make forces more effective by

broadening their response options in peace and

war. Provided the defense budget is adequate

and priorities are set wisely, this standard will

help strengthen the ability of U.S. forces to keep

the peace and win our country’s wars.

The new force packages envisioned in 

this standard will provide greater flexibility

and adaptability—characteristics that will be

vital even for a military posture that remains

the world’s best. Future U.S. forces will need to

react to an ever-shifting array of missions,

operations, crises, and wars. They may also

need to adapt gracefully to periodic shifts in

U.S. strategy and policy in a world where

dynamic change, rather than continuity,

marks the early 21st century.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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Director Director of Publications

these three different

wartime force packages

would provide considerable strategic flexibility

for dealing with all three

key theaters at once

Table 1. Two-Major Theater War Standard: Wartime Allocations (Illustrative)

First MTW Second MTW Reserve

Army/Marine Divisions 76 9

Air Force Fighter Wings 11 9 –

Navy Carrier Battle Groups 55 2

Table 2. New Standard: Peacetime and Wartime Allocations (Illustrative)

Assigned in Peacetime

EUCOM PACOM CENTCOM

Force Level 100,000 100,000 40,000

Assigned in Wartime

High-technology Low-intensity

LTW STW STW Reserve

Army/Marine Divisions 91 3 9

Air Force Fighter Wings 12 5 3 –

Navy Carrier Battle Groups 63 1 2