alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000
       
<S>                                <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                     JUN-1-1996
<PERIOD-END>                       FEB-28-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      9-MOS
<CASH>                                             485
<SECURITIES>                                        0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                   23,505
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,917
<INVENTORY>                                         0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    0 
<PP&E>                                         286,258
<DEPRECIATION>                                 134,198
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 181,373
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               0 
<BONDS>                                             0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0 
<PREFERRED>                                         0 
<COMMON>                                         9,985
<OTHER-SE>                                          0 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   181,373
<SALES>                                         16,045
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               112,926
<CGS>                                           15,409
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   80,201
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 705
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 32,020
<INCOME-TAX>                                    13,127
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             18,893
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0 
<CHANGES>                                           0 
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,893
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.52
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.52
        

</TABLE>
§ 536.39 Use of experts, consultants and appraisers. ( a ) ACOs or CPOs will budget operation and maintenance (O&M) funds for the costs of hiring property appraisers, accident reconstructionists, expert consultants to furnish opinions, and medical specialists to conduct independent medical examinations (IMEs). Other expenses to be provided for from O&M funds include the purchase of documents, such as medical records, and the hiring of mediators. See § 536.53(b). Where the cost exceeds $750 or local funds are exhausted, a request for funding should be directed to the Commander USARCS, with appropriate justification. The USARCS AAO must be notified as soon as possible when an accident reconstruction is indicated.
( b ) Where the claim arises from treatment at an Army MTF, the MEDDAC commander should be requested to fund the cost of an independent consultant's opinion or an IME.
( c ) The use of outside consultants and appraisers should be limited to claims in which liability or damages cannot be determined otherwise and in which the use of such sources is economically feasible, for instance, where property damage is high in amount and not determinable by a government appraiser or where the extent of personal injury is serious and a government IME is neither available nor acceptable to a claimant. Prior to such an examination at an MTF, ensure that the necessary specialists are available and a prompt written report may be obtained.
( d ) Either an IME or an expert opinion is procured by means of a personal services contract under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), part 37, 48 CFR 37.000 *et seq.,* through the local contracting office. The contract must be in effect prior to commencement of the records review. Payment is authorized only upon receipt of a written report responsive to the questions asked by the CJA or claims attorney.
( e ) Whenever a source other than claims personnel is used to assist in the evaluation of a claim in which medical information protected by HIPAA is involved, the source must sign an agreement designed to protect the patient's privacy rights.
#### Margaret Barish v. David B. Carmel.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with $10 costs, unless the appellants procure the record on appeal and appellants’ points to be served and filed on or before May 17, 1962, with notice of argument for May 29, 1962, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Valente, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
### §3332. Program; development, purposes, scope, etc.

The Secretary may develop and implement a cooperative rangeland research program in coordination with the program carried out under the Renewable Resources Extension Act of 1978 [16 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.], to improve the production and quality of desirable native forages or introduced forages which are managed in a similar manner to native forages for livestock and wildlife. The program shall include studies of: (1) management of rangelands and agricultural land as integrated systems for more efficient utilization of crops and waste products in the production of food and fiber; (2) methods of managing rangeland watersheds to maximize efficient use of water and improve water yield, water quality, and water conservation, to protect against onsite and offsite damage of rangeland resources from floods, erosion, and other detrimental influences, and to remedy unsatisfactory and unstable rangeland conditions; (3) revegetation and rehabilitation of rangelands including the control of undesirable species of plants; and (4) such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(Pub. L. 95–113, title XIV, §1479, as added Pub. L. 97–98, title XIV, §1440(a), Dec. 22, 1981, 95 Stat. 1318.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Renewable Resources Extension Act of 1978, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 95–306, June 30, 1978, 92 Stat. 349, which is classified generally to subchapter III (§1671 et seq.) of chapter 36 of Title 16, Conservation. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1978 Amendments note set out under section 1600 of Title 16 and Tables.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Dec. 22, 1981, see section 1801 of Pub. L. 97–98, set out as a note under section 4301 of this title.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6838

LARRY ARNOLD YOUNG,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Chief

District Judge. (1:88-cr-00112; 1:04-cv-1282)

Submitted: August 31, 2006 Decided: September 8, 2006

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Arnold Young, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Larry Arnold Young seeks to appeal from the district

court’s order construing his motion for modification of his

sentence as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), and denying

relief because this was a successive motion for which authorization

had not been obtained. We find that the district court properly

construed the motion as one under § 2255. See Raines v. United

States, 423 F.2d 526, 528 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1970); see also

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2647 (2005) (where a motion is

“in substance a successive habeas petition,” it “should be treated

accordingly”). 

Because Young’s motion was properly construed as a § 2255

motion, the order denying the motion is not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683 (4th

Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent

“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard

by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the

district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is

debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the

district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001).
- 3 -

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Young

has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### 1352.271-90 Insurance requirements.

As prescribed in 48 CFR 1371.121, insert the following clause:

# Insurance Requirements (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor shall procure and thereafter maintain the following insurance:

(1) Ship contractor's legal liability insurance to insure the risks described in paragraph (b) of clause 1352.271-79. This insurance shall be for $1,000,000.00.

(2) Comprehensive general liability insurance and automobile insurance to insure the risks described in paragraph (c) of clause 1352.271-79. This insurance shall be for $1,000,000.00 on account of any one accident or occurrence with respect to each vessel, boat, and/or barge upon which work is performed. The contractor shall cause the Government to be named as an additional insured under any and all liability insurance policies.

(3) Full coverage in accordance with the State Worker's Compensation law; and

(4) Full coverage in accordance with the United States Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act.

(b) As evidence that it has obtained the insurance specified in paragraph (a) of this clause, the contractor shall furnish the Contracting Officer with a certificate or certificates executed by an agent of the insurer authorized to execute such certificates. Such certificates shall be furnished prior to commencement of the work. Each certificate shall state that (name of insurer) has insured (name of contractor) awarded contract number ____________ for repair/alteration of (name of vessel) in accordance with the Liability and Insurance clause and the Insurance Requirements clause contained herein. Each certificate shall set forth that each policy of insurance represented thereby will expire on (APR 2010) and that each such policy contains the following clause:

“It is agreed that in the event of cancellation or any material change in the policy adversely affecting the interest of the Government in this insurance, 30 days prior written notice will be given to the Contracting Officer.”

(End of clause)

[75 FR 10570, Mar. 8, 2010; 75 FR 14496, Mar. 26, 2010]
1

The Honorable Mary Ann L. Medler, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1136

___________

Jennifer Miles, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Bellfontaine Habilitation Center, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: May 7, 2009

Filed: May 21, 2009

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jennifer Miles appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in her employment-discrimination action. Judgment was entered on December 10,

2007, and Miles filed her notice of appeal 31 days later on January 10, 2008. The

notice of appeal was thus untimely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (in civil cases,

notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of judgment or order); Dill

v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 525 F.3d 612, 619-20 (8th Cir. 2008) (timely notice of
-2-

appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction.

______________________________
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           1,462
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   21,935
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    355,044
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               379,994
<PP&E>                                         231,530
<DEPRECIATION>                                 231,383
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 390,065
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          901,285
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        97,014
<OTHER-SE>                                    (608,234)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   390,065
<SALES>                                         99,930
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               100,081
<CGS>                                           90,205
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   90,205
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,130
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (254)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (254)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (254)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.00)
        


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edward Martinez, Appellant.

[832 NYS2d 807]—

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrero, J.), dated February 28, 2005, which, after a hearing to redetermine the defendant’s sex offender risk level pursuant to the stipulation of settlement in *Doe v Pataki*(3 F Supp 2d 456 [1998]), designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention on appeal, the People proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was armed with a dangerous instrument (a knife) during the commission of the underlying crime *(see People v Overman,*7 AD3d 596 [2004]; *People v Burgess,*6 AD3d 686 [2004]; *People v Oquendo,*1 AD3d 421 [2003]). Thus, the defendant was properly assessed points in the risk assessment instrument for such conduct, making him a presumptive level two sex offender. Further, the defendant failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the existence of special circumstances warranting a downward departure from his presumptive risk level *(see People v Williams,*34 AD3d 662 [2006]; *People v Guaman,*8 AD3d 545 [2004]). Thus, the defendant was properly adjudicated a level two sex offender. Miller, J.E, Ritter, Covello and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
. :· 

May 30,2012 •'. ' '. 

Docket Management Facility 

US Department of: Transp6rtation 

1200 New.Jersey Avenue, SE 

West Building Ground Floor 

Room.W12-i 40 

Washington, D.E 20590 

Your Way to Fly 

.... ' 

. . . 

PETITION FOR EXEMPTION 

Company Identification 

Tulip City Air Service, Inc. 

Ronald Ludema President 

1581 S Washington Ave 

Holland, Ml 49423. 

Anti-drug and Alcohol Plan Number E-EA-0001 0-U 

·;. 

; ..:· 

Exemption is requested within 14 CFR Part 120, Drug & Alcohol Testing. 

.~ 1: 5b 

Specifically, identical but separate entries in the table in Section 120.117 specify 

that an FAA approve.d drug testing program must be implemented for Part 135 

and Part 91.147 operations. 

Our family company which only has 24 employees including myself, my wife and 

my daughter have implemented an approved program for our Part 91.147 

operations and the FAA provided us with an Antidrug and Alcohol Misuse 

Prevention Program Operations Specifications (Opspec) as part of the process to 

approve our Part 135 operations. Our Part 135 operations was active 15 years 

before the Drug and Alcohol Testing Program was initiated. 

We initially had our own program in 1993(8-GL-00113-S) and then joined a 

consortium in 1999 (NADE) and were issued program number (E-EA-00010-U). 

One person handles all our 91 and 135 operations (myself). Therefore for the 

following_reasons we request that we have our program under one operation. 

1. Relief: The relief we seek is acceptance of our existing program for both 

above operations, in order to avoid redundant effort and expense. 

1581 S. Washingto1, Holland, Ml 49423 

1.800.748.0515 or 616.392.7831 • Fax: 616.392.1841 • e-mail: charter@tulipcityair.com • www.tulipcityair.com 
2. Public Interest: Reducing our cost helps us maintain the lowest possible rates 

for our services, as well as minimizes the effort that the FAA must expend 

managing our drug and alcohol program. Both are in the Public Interest. 

3. Safety: The existing program approved for 135 passenger flights is both 

adequate and appropriate for our Part 91 .147 operations. 

4. Federal Register Summary: Request to allow existing FAA approved Drug 

Testing Program to be used for both Part 135 and Part 91.147 operations for a 

small family owned company with only 24 employees and only 14 in a safety 

sensitive position for both 135 and 91 operations. 

5. Summary: Our company has been in operation for over 40 years with no 

accidents and only one drug/alcohol issue over 6 years ago. 

Thank you for your consideration is this important matter. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Ludema 

President 

Drug and Alcohol program manager 

Phone: 616-392-781 

Fax: 6 1 6-392-8280 

Email: rludema@tulipcityair.com 

2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Harry Waddell, Appellant.

by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered December 14, 1977, upon resentence, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law, plea vacated, and case remitted to Criminal Term for further proceedings consistent herewith. Defendant’s statement at the time he entered his plea of guilty, that the crime had been committed with a "toy gun”, suggested the existence of an affirmative defense (see Penal Law, § 160.15, subd 4), and cast doubt on his guilt of robbery in the first degree. This event should have triggered further inquiry by the court to determine whether the defendant was aware of the significance of his statement (see *People v Serrano,*15 NY2d 304). No such inquiry was forthcoming here. Since defendant’s admissions did establish the crime of robbery in the second degree, the judgment here could be *808modified with the District Attorney’s consent to a conviction of the lesser crime (cf. *People v Williams,*58 AD2d 859). In the absence of such consent, however, justice requires that the conviction be vacated and the case remanded to permit the defendant to replead to the indictment. Gulotta, J. P., Cohalan, Margett and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
#### Clarence Seward, Appellant, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John R. Motz, as Administrator of the Estate of Helen G. Motz, Deceased, Respondent.

Judgment insofar as appealed from and order unanimously reversed on the law and facts and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, unless the defendant shall, within 10 days, stipulate to increase the verdict to the sum of $25,000, as of the date of the rendition thereof, in which event the judgment is modified accordingly and, as so modified is, together with the order, affirmed, with costs to the appellant. Memorandum: The verdict of the jury was so inadequate as to shock judicial conscience. (Appeal from part of a judgment of Niagara Trial Term for plaintiff in an automobile negligence action; also appeal from order denying a motion for a new trial.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Henry, Noonan and Del Veeehio, JJ.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 23
- 00232
- CR

Armando Napoles , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. CR
- 19
- 0547
- A , THE HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Armando Napoles w as charged with the of fense of continu ous sexual abuse of a child

. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02. The indictment included an enhancement allegation allegin g that Napoles had previously been convicted of the fe lo ny offense of sexual assault of a child. See id. § 22 .011 . Following a trial, the jury fou nd Napoles guilty . The trial court found the en h ancement allegation to be true and assessed his punishment at life imprisonment wi thout the possibility of parole

. See id. § 12.42 (c) ; Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 508.145(a)

. Napoles appealed his convi ction.
N apoles ’ s court

- appointed attorney on appeal filed a motion to wit hdraw supported by an Anders br ief contending that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See
A nders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744

- 45 (1967). Napoles ’ s court

- appointed attorney ’ s brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit meet s the requirements of Anders by
p resenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating that there are no arguable2 grounds to be advanced. See id. ; Garner v. State , 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 81

- 82 (1988) (explaining tha t Anders briefs serve purpose of “assisting the court in determinin g bot h that counsel in fact conducted the required detailed review of the case and that the appeal is .

. . frivolous”). Napoles ’ s counsel represented to the Court that he provided copies of the motion and brief to Napoles ; advised Napoles of his right to

exam ine the appellate record, file a pro se brief, and pursue discretionary review following the resolution of the appeal in this Court; and provided Napoles with a form motion for pro se access
t o the appellate record along with the mailing address of th is Co urt. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

- 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Napoles has not filed a pro se brief challengin g his conviction , and the deadline for filing a pro se brief has expired

. We have independently reviewed the record and consi dered appe llate counsel ’ s brief , and we have found nothing that might arguably support the appeal. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744; Garner , 300 S.W.3d at 766. We agree with c ounsel tha t the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We grant counsel ’ s mo tion to withd raw a nd affirm the trial court ’ s judgment of conviction.

__________________________________________ Thomas J. Baker , Justice Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith Affirmed Filed: Decem ber 8, 2023 Do Not Publish
M. P. No. 75-104.

#### Estate of Massimina Ventriglia *v.*Jessie I. Masi.

*John A. O’Neill, Jr.,*for petitioner. *Aram A. Arabian,*for respondent.

Petition for leave to prosecute an appeal out of time is denied.

Joslin, J. not participating.