J

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NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K. F. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1093 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0001899

- 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: K. F. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1094 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- AP

- 0000316

- 2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M. I. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1101 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0002632

- 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: M. I. C., A MINOR : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIAJ

- S30031

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- 2

-

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : No. 1102 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- AP

- 0000466

- 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: J. H. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1103 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0001227

- 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: J. H. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1104 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- AP

- 0000465

- 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: D. G. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIAJ

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- 3

- : : : No. 1105 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0001396

- 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: D. G. C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.C., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1106 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- AP

- 0000315

- 2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2022
In these consolidated cases, D.C. (Father) appeals from the d ecrees

entered in the Court of Common Pleas o f Philadelphia County Juvenile Division
(juvenile court) involuntarily terminating his parental rights to four of his

children : M.C. , born in April 2014 ; J.C. , born in May 2016 ; K.C. born in August

20 18 ; and D.C. born i n August 2019 ( c ollectively, Childre n) as well as the

o rders changing the permanency goal of Children to adoption. Father claims

that termination of his parental rights constit utes an abuse of discretion

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cou rt.J

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because he has substantially complied with all of his case objectives and

shares a stro ng parent

- child bond with Children . We affirm. 1

I.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Because of reports of truancy, t he Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(DHS) has been involved with the family since the fall of 2015. Concerns grew
to include inappropriate housing conditions , P a rents ’ drug use and their

mental health issues

. M.C. and J.C

. came into care in June 2018 and K.C. and

D.C. were put into placement in August 2019 , when Mother and Father tested
positive for cocaine upon D.C. ’s (child’s) birth. DHS filed petition s seeking

termination of Parent s ’ parental rights to Children in Decem ber 2020 and June

2021.
At the March 29, 2022 hearing , it was stipulated that William Russell,

Ph.D. , was qualified as an expert in the area of parental capacity

. Dr. Russell

conducted parental capacity evaluations of P arents in January 2019 because

of reports of truancy, injuries to the Children, sexual abuse allegations and
inappropriate housing conditions

. Dr. Russell testified that Father receives

s ocial s ecurity disability income of $800 per month and Parents were residing
with paternal grandmother in her three

- bedroom home at the time of the

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 The parental rights of T.G. (Mother) to Children were also involuntarily terminated. She has not filed an appeal. Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) have eight children together, none of whom are in their care.J

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evaluation

. Both P arent s have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and Dr.

Russell opined that long

- term treatment would be necessary for Father
because “he was already receiving medication and trea tment [and] the
psychiatrist who evaluated him noted the ongoing presence of mania,
hallucinations[.]” (N.T. Hearing, 3/29/22, at 33 ).

Dr. Russell also noted that although Father acknowledged during the

evaluation that the family’s living situation was un suitable for his eight

children , he nonetheless took no steps to change the se circumstances

. I n
light of the sexual abuse allegations, Dr. Russell found it particularly
concerning that a 15

- year old teenager was in the same room as a 5

- year old

child

. Dr. Russell concluded that “Father was not able to provide a safe

environment for the children.” ( Id. at 3 6 ).

DHS s ocial w orker Sayeeta Fowler testified that she became involved
with the family in April 2018 becau se of allegations of child abuse and neglect.
( See id. at 45)

. Among other incidents, one of the older siblings sustained
two black eyes and Mother was indicated as the perpetrator of the abuse.

Case m anager Denia Jones testified that she was involved wi th the
family from 2016 until 2022

. While t he initial involvement was due to truancy ,
that changed in 2018 when th ere was a report that a sibling was hit in the eye

with a broom. During a visit to the residence, Ms. Jones observed black mold
and “the ceiling was coming apart, coming down in the kitchen. There were
plumbing issues in the home.” ( Id. at 56). Although P arents made someJ

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initial progress regarding truancy, they often did not go to C hildren’s medical
appointments. Pa rents discontinued compli ance with monthly safety visits in

June 2018 when M.C. and J.C. were committed into placement

. The initial
goal for the family was reunification if mental health, housing, parenting,

Children’s medical issues and domestic violence concerns were addressed.

Ms. Jones recounted that the youngest two children , K.C. and D.C. , were
put into placement in August 2019 after Mother and D.C. (child) tested
positive for cocaine when she gave birth to D.C. At that point, because they

were livi ng in the same home, both Parents were asked to submit to random
drug screens. Because of their long

- standing non

- compliance with screening,

Parents were ordered to submit to testing at a n October 14, 2021 hearing and
they tested positive for cocaine. At the next hearing on October 21, 2021,

another test was ordered and P arents again tested positive for cocaine.
Ms. Jones explained that Father did complet e a parenting course and his
income is comprised of disability benefits as well as “working under the table. ”
( Id. at 76). Although Father reported that he was receiving mental health

treatment, Ms. Jones was not able to obtain verifying documentation and

Father did not provide any

. In January 2022, when Ms. Jones departed from
the case, the family resided i n a two

- bedroom Philadelphia Housing Authority
(PHA) apartment that was not large enough to accommodate Children

. Father
was not attending drug and alcohol treatment , he did not submit to random
drug screens , and Ms. Jones had no documentation indicating Father hasJ

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received mental health treatment. Ms. Jones testified that although Parents

were affectionate with Children , this does not necessarily translate into a

parent

- child bond, and that Children are resilient and would not suffer
irreparable harm if Parents ’ rights were terminated. ( See id. at 89, 105).
She also noted that Children would look to their foster parents for guidance.

Case m anager Tyeesha Grasty testified that she ha d been providing case
management for the family for about eight weeks since January 2022 , and

that she believes that termination of parental rights and a goal change to
adoption is in Children ’s best interests. Although Parents have supervised

visitation w ith Children for one hour per week , they often arrive 15

- 20 minutes
late, leaving them with just the remainder of the one

- hour time period.
With regard to K.C. and D.C., they have reside d in a pre

- adoptive home
since D.C.’s birth in August 2019 when K

. C. w as one - year old

. They “look to
their resource parent s as their parents and the people who provide and meet

their basic needs.” ( Id. at 120) Ms. Grasty opined that Children would not
be irreparably harmed if Parents ’ parental rights were terminated , and that

r eunification is not a viable option “because of the inconsistency of the parents
meeting their objectives for the single case plan through out the life of this

case.” ( Id. at 121).

On cross

- examination , Ms. Grasty acknowledged that Father was
compliant when she asked him to sign releases for mental health recor ds.J

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However, she specifically informed Father that it is his responsibility to provide

DHS with his own records , which he failed to do.

Father testified that he has part icipated in therapy and completed
parenting classes. H e receives two monthly disability payments in the
amounts of $188 and $673 due to his bipolar disorder. As to his current
therapy regimen, he explained , “I’m really not going now

. I go for therapy on
the phone once a week and I go every three months for meds.” ( Id. at 130).

Father described typical visit s with Childre n as follows : “when they see us,
they just run to us and they almost knock us down. And they always want to
play with my wife’s or m y phone. We watch movies with them.” ( Id. at 131)

. Father generally denied arriving late to visits with Children, and he explained
that any lateness was caused by traffic

. Regarding the family living situation ,
Father explained that although he and Mother spent one year homeless, they

were ab le to secure a two

- bedroom PHA apartment and would be able to
obtain a larger unit upon reunification with Children

. Father testified that he

has a strong parental bond with Childre n , and t hat he and Children would be
devastated if his parental rights were terminated. Father also indicated that

he attend s drug and alcohol treatment once every 2

- 3 weeks and that he takes

suboxone

. At the conclusion of the proceeding , the juvenile court noted its
familiarity with the DHS witnesses because of their participation in several

other cases before i n which they demonstrated consistent high level s ofJ

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credibility and knowledge about their cases. In contrast, t he juvenile court

found Parents ’ testimony “self

- serving” and observed that while they testified

to their love for Children , they failed to take meaningful step s to address the
mental health, drug or housing issues that led to Children’s placement. ( Id.

at 146). The juvenile court determined that considering the testimony as a

whole , all elements for termination of Parents ’ rights under Section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) of the Adoption Act were met and that termination

would serve Children’s best interests

. 2 The court entered d ecrees involuntary
terminating the rights of Parents to Children pursuant to Section 2511 (a) and
(b) and entered o rders changing Children’s p ermane ncy goal to adoption.
Father timely appealed and he and the juvenile court complied with Rule 1925.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)

- (ii).

II.

Father first challenge s the juvenile court ’s decision to terminate his
parental rights to Children and its finding that termination is in their best

interests. 3 The following legal principles guide our review.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)

- (b).

3 Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
co urts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse (Footnote Continued Next Page)J

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S ection 2511 governs termination of parental rights and requires a
bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent . The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the trial court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants ter mination of his or her parental rights does the trial court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re S.C. , 247 A.3d 1097, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2021) (ci tation omitted).
“A child has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which
to grow, and the child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the
parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id.
(ci tation omitted). When a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to
conduct his life in a manner conducive to providing a safe environment for a
child, and the behavior is irremediable as supported by clear and competent
evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified. See id. at 1105.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

- will. The trial
cou rt’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first

- hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

Interest of D.R.
- W. , 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).J

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In this case, the juvenile court terminated Father’s rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a) (1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.
— The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing par ental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot o r will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of ti me and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child c ontinue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *J

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(b) Other considerations.
— The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physic al and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of th e parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the f iling of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) (1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

A

.
Father contends that termination of his parental rights constituted an

abuse of discretion because he has t aken steps to maintain his relationship
with Children, has visited them consistently , and “did not miss a visit with the

Children . . . even for a time that he was homeless.” ( Father’s Brief, at 18).
According to Fathe r, Dr. Russel l ’s 2019 evaluation is outd ated and failed take

into his consideration his completion of parenting classes and a domestic
violence program as well as disregarded his testimony that PHA would provide
larger housing to the family upon his reunification with Children. ( See id. at

1 9 ). Father also contends that DHS did not establish “any nexus between the
fact that he tested positive for cocaine and his ability or willingness to parent
the Children.” ( Id. at 22).

T he juvenile court found, however, that termination was warranted

under Section 2511(a)

. It explained its rationale as follows:J

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- Though [a different juvenile court judge] started out with this case, I took over two years ago [] , and have had the benefit of exposure to the parents throughout that period of time.

As I mentioned earlier, the last hearing I observed what appeared to be two parents under the influence. I stopped the hearing and ordered them to go and get a drug test, and they tested positive for cocaine. And this is a continuation of a four

year cocaine dependency for which they, for the most part, declined therapy and treatment.
Father says he’s getting some type of treatment. He’s getting suboxone. I wasn’t aware that suboxone was an antidote to cocaine; but be that as it may, father presents no rec ords.

* * *
I heard the testimony. I’m familiar with the history of the case and the attempts we’ve tried, the services we’ve offered, the requirements we set forth as clearly as we can set forth those requirements─ and that is, provide evidenc e that you’re receiving mental health treatment, that you’ve remedied bipolar issues for which you’re receiving benefits. I see nothing and I heard nothing to indicate that was occurring.

* * *
Taking all the evidence as a who le . . . I resolve any conflict in the testimony in favor of the D epartment . . . who have had the ability to monitor these cases going back to the older children 41 months. The two younger children don’t even know who you are.

. . . Mother was positive with cocaine when the last child was born.
(N.T. Hearing, at 145 , 147

- 48 ).

We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in this assessment

.
D espite th e well

- known issue of substance abuse in this case and the
requirement that Parents resolve it , Father has resisted compliance w ith drug
screenings and ha s not provide d any documentation demonstrating hisJ

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treatment or sobriety . As far as housing, Father fails to recognize the

se riousness of placing Children at differing ages and developmental stages in
shared bedrooms, even after allegation s of sexual abuse

. Father also does

not appear to recognize that his current income , derived primarily from

disabil ity payments , in combination with PHA housing, cannot adequately
sustain a family of this size. Additionally, Father’s bipolar disorder is
purportedly treated with phone calls and medication pick

- ups rather than by
more intensive therapy , and he has not p rovided documentation to

substanti ate that his mental health is a priority. Simply put, Father appears
willfully blind to the reality of what i s required to raise Children and the

evidence amply supports the juvenile court’ s decision to terminate his pare ntal
rights.

B

. Father also disputes the juvenile court’s finding that termination of his
parental rights would serve Children’s best interests under Section 2511(b).
In doing so, he maintains that he “shares a bond with Children [and] has
consistently vi sited them for years and has remained a presence in their lives.”
( Id. at 24).
In considering S ection 2511(b), we are guided by the following tenants:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, ph ysical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,J

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if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best

- int erest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, an d should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent

- child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

D.R.
- W. , supra at 914 (citations omitted).

In this case , the record support s the juvenile court’s conclusion that “ the
testimony is clear and convincing that it would be in the best interests of the
children that parents’ rights be terminated at this point.” (N.T. Hearing, at
149). The court observed with regard to M.C. and J.C. that Parents offered
them rewards during their supervised visits instead of paren ting them, and
that K.C. and D.C. do not know who Father is given their early placement. As
detailed above, Father has minimal contact with Children and fails to take full
advantage of that time, as he arrives late and watches movies with them

rather than interacting in a meaningful fashion. Although Father testified that
both he and Children would be devastated if his parental rights were

term inated, Ms. Grasty and Ms. Jones testified to the contrary that termination

would serve Children’s bests interest s and would not cause them to suffer
irreparable harm. Children look to their resource parents as their parents and
the people who pro vide t hem with guidance and meet their basic needs. WeJ

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discern no abuse of discretion concerning the juvenile court’s be st interests
analysis.

III.

Father next claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
changing Children’s placement goal to adoption. ( See Father’s Brief, at 26

- 28). Father maintains that he “spent years being f u lly compliant with his
objectives” and the only reason reunification was not accomplished was
because of positive drug screens. ( See id. at 27 )

. However, because we have concluded that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the petition to terminate Father’ s parental
rights, this issue is moot. See Interest of A.M. , 256 A.3d 1263, 127 2 (Pa.
Super. 202 1) (effect of decision to affirm juvenile court’s termination decree
necessarily renders moot court’s decision to change Child’s goal to adoption).

Even i f we were to reach the merits of this issue, we would conclude

that no relief is due. When deciding whether to change a child’s permanency

go al , the trial court must conside r: “ (1) the continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family
service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the
appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the children;
(5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the

child ’ s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at leastJ

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fifteen of the last twenty

- two months. ” Id. at 1273 (citation omitted). A court

must also provide compe lling reasons why it is not in the best interest of a
child to return to his or her parents and to instead be placed for adoption

.
See id.

Here , as detailed above, several credible DHS witnesses testified to

Father’s lack of progress towards alleviating the circumstances necessitating

Children’s placement in the first place , as well as to his inability to provide a

safe and appropriate living environment for them after many years of available

services and intervention

. In short, the evidence supports the conclusion that

reunification of Father with Children is not a viable option and that the juvenile

court did not abuse its discretion in changing Children’s permanency goal to
adoption. Accordingly, we affirm the d ecree s involuntarily terminating

Father’s parental right s to Children and the o rders changing their p ermanency
goal to adoption.

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed

. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2022