alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: Lauren Kuzara <lkuzara@ridley.edu>

Sent: Monday, March 12, 2018 4:22 PM

To: OM Information Quality

Cc: Lauren Weymouth

Subject: Information Quality Request

Hi – 

I am the director of Ridley‐Lowell Business & Technical Institute in Danbury, CT (OPE ID # 02112303) 

I am requested an information change to our school’s address as it is listed incorrectly on your website. 

Please change our address to:

44 Shelter Rock Road

Danbury, CT 06810 

For verification of our address, you can see it is properly listed on our website. http://www.ridley.edu/location/danbury

and in our course catalog http://www.ridley.edu/sites/default/files/Danbury%20Catalog 0.pdf

If you have any questions, or need further verification, please contact me at the number or email below.

Lauren Kuzara 

Senior Director

lkuzara@ridley.edu

Ridley-Lowell Business & Technical Institute

44 Shelter Rock Road, Danbury, CT 06810

Phone: 203-797-0551; Fax: 203-797-0552

www.ridley.edu

YouTube: Ridley-Lowell YouTube

Facebook: Ridley-Lowell Facebook

Twitter: @ridleylowell

Instagram: #ridleylowelldanbury 

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

219 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

THOMAS G. BRUTON

 CLERK

October 18, 2012

Clerk

Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse

255 East Temple Street, Room 181

Los Angeles, CA 90012-3332

RE: Jones et al v. Capital Grille Holdings, Inc. d/b/a The Capital Grille, GMRI, Inc. and Darden 

Restaurants, Inc.

Case No: 12cv660

 

Dear Clerk:

Pursuant to the order entered by Judge Gary Feinerman, on October 15, 2012, the above record 

 

# was electronically transmitted to the USDC Central District of California. 

Please acknowledge receipt of any paper documents on the enclosed copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk 

By: Lisa K. Provine 

 Deputy Clerk

Enclosures

New Case No. ____________________________ Date _____________________

cc: Non-ECF Attorneys and Pro se Parties

Case: 1:12-cv-00660 Document #: 77 Filed: 10/18/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:576
EXHIBIT
10.23
 
 Subsidiaries
of Security National
 Financial
Corporation
 as of
March 31, 2009
 
 
 Security
National Life Insurance Company
 
 SecurityNational
Mortgage Company
 
 Memorial
Estates, Inc.
 
 Memorial
Mortuary
 
 Paradise
Chapel Funeral Home, Inc.
 
 California
Memorial Estates, Inc.
 
 Cottonwood
Mortuary, Inc.
 
 Deseret
Memorial, Inc.
 
 Holladay
Cottonwood Memorial Foundation
 
 Holladay
Memorial Park, Inc.
 
 Greer-Wilson
Funeral Home, Inc.
 
 Crystal
Rose Funeral Home, Inc.
 
 Insuradyne
Corporation
 
 Security
National Funding Company
 
 Security
National Life Insurance Company of Louisiana (Formerly Paramount Security Life
InsuranceCompany)
 
 Security
National Capital, Inc.
 
 Memorial
Insurance Company of America
 
 Capital
Reserve Life Insurance Company
 
 C & J
Financial, LLC
 
 Southern
Security Life Insurance Company (a Mississippi domiciled Company)
 
 Marketing
Source Center, Inc. dba Security National Travel Services
 
 Security
National Reverse Mortgage of Utah
Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge

Joan H. Lefkow Sitting Judge if Other

than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 1486 DATE 6/5/2012

CASE

TITLE

Unified Messaging Solutions, LLC vs. CareerBuilder, LLC

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Pursuant to Plaintiff Unified Messaging Solutions, LLC and Defendant CareerBuilder, LLC’s Stipulation of

Joint Dismissal without Prejudice [29], enter Order. All claims between the Plaintiff and Defendant

CareerBuilder, LLC are hereby dismissed without prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs and

expenses. Case dismissed with prejudice. Status hearing of 6/7/2012 stricken. Civil case terminated.

O [ For further detail see separate order(s).] Notices mailed by Judicial staff.

 Courtroom Deputy

Initials:

MD

12C1486 Unified Messaging Solutions, LLC vs. CareerBuilder, LLC Page 1 of 1

Case: 1:12-cv-01486 Document #: 30 Filed: 06/05/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:383
EXHIBIT 32

                            Certified Services, Inc.;
                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Orion Diversified Technologies,  Inc.
on Form 10-Q for the quarterly  period ended January 31, 2005, as filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on March  21,  2005 (the  "Report"),  the
undersigned,  in the capacities and on the dates  indicated  below,  each hereby
certify  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of
Certified Services, Inc.

Date: March 21, 2005

/s/  Irwin Pearl
-----------------------
Chief Executive Officer

Date: March 21, 2005

/s/  Irwin Pearl
-----------------------
Chief Financial Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 28, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 134421 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 134421 COA: 274566 Muskegon CC: 01-046785-FC DEYONTA R. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to ap peal the May 21, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, a nd it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

d1217 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 28, 2007

Clerk
NO. 07-01-0505-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL E

	OCTOBER 4, 2002

	______________________________

	JOYCE C. AND LOUIE J. CORDOVA,

			Appellants

	v.

	JOEL C. OSBORN, M.D., 

			Appellee

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

	NO. 89,189-A; HON. DAVID L. GLEASON, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

Before QUINN and JOHNSON, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.*

	Joyce C. Cordova and Louie J. Cordova (the Cordovas) appeal from a purported summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Joel C. Osborn, M.D. (Osborn).  In  three issues, the Cordovas contest whether 1) the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Osborn, 2) they produced more than a scintilla of evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding their supplemental response and evidence from the summary judgment record.  We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

	The order from which appeal was attempted simply states that the no-evidence motion for summary judgment filed by Osborn “is well taken and should be granted,” that “IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED  that the No-Evidence Motion . . . be and the same is hereby granted,” and that “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that all costs attendant to said motion be taxed against the party incurring said cost.”  (Emphasis added.)  There is no statement within the document declaring the decision of the law upon the matter at issue.  Such is a requisite of a final judgment.  Disco Mach. of Liberal Co. v. Payton, 900 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1995, no writ); Chandler v. Reder, 635 S.W.2d 895, 896-97 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1982, no writ).  Without it, the decree is not final.  Id.  More importantly, the requirement is not satisfied by simply stating that a motion for summary judgment is granted.  Id.  In that situation, the court merely grants a motion; it does not pronounce any ultimate decision in its official capacity or ultimate sentence of the law.  Consequently, the order before us is not final, and we have no jurisdiction over the cause other than to dismiss it.

	Accordingly, the cause is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

									Per Curiam

Do not publish.
M. P. No. 74-325.

#### State *v.*Leonard Jefferson.

*Julius C. Michaelson,*Attorney General, for plaintiff. *William F. Reilly,*Public Defender, *Walter R. Stone,*Asst. Public Defender, for defendant.

Motion of defendant to be admitted to bail pending appeal is assigned to the calendar of February 7, 1975 for oral argument on the motion.

Paolino and Joslin, JJ. not participating.
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Synthetic Blood International, Inc.(the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended July 31, 2002, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert W. Nicora, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/S/ ROBERT W. NICORA





Chief Executive Officer


September 12, 2002
#### 1303.101-3 Agency regulations.

The Department has issued rules implementing Executive Order 11222 prescribing employee standards of conduct (*see* DOC Office of General Counsel Web site).
No. 8204.

#### The Wellston Coal Co. *v.*Smith.

(Decided October 13, 1903.)

Error to Circuit Court of Jackson county.

*Mr. J. M. McGillivray,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. E. C. Powell; G. G. McCormick*and *E. E„. Eubanks,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Burket, C. J., Davis and Price, JJ., concur.
Submitted on record and briefs February 6,

reversed March 10, 2004

#### In the Matter of Steven Bunting, Alleged to be a Mentally Ill Person. STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*STEVEN BUNTING, *Appellant.*

0205-64249; A118414

86 P3d 99

Paul L. Breed filed the brief for appellant.

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Michael C. Livingston, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Wollheim and Schuman, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*486PER CURIAM

In this mental commitment case, appellant argues that the trial court erred in committing him because there was not clear and convincing evidence that he was unable, due to his mental disorder, to provide for his basic needs. ORS 426.005(d)(B). The state concedes that the record fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, because of appellant’s mental disorder, he is unable to provide for his basic needs. On *de novo*review, *State v.*O’Neill, 274 Or 59, 61, 545 P2d 97 (1976), we accept the state’s concession.

Reversed.
##### 



Exhibit 31.3
 
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 December 7, 2005
    
    /s/ Ira D. Kaplan

    Ira D. KaplanChief Financial Officer
 23
#### City Wide Sewer & Drain Service Corp., Appellant, v Stephen S. Carusone, Respondent.

[834 NYS2d 283]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract which was settled by a so-ordered stipulation dated December 2, 2004, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), dated August 13, 2006, which, in effect, denied its motion to hold the defendant in contempt based upon alleged violations of the so-ordered stipulation.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

On December 2, 2004 the parties placed a stipulation on the *688record in open court in settlement of this action, in which the defendant agreed, inter alia, to neither directly nor indirectly solicit the plaintiffs past or present customers. Alleging that the defendant violated the subject stipulation, the plaintiff moved to hold the defendant in contempt.

“ ‘To sustain a finding of either civil or criminal contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order it is necessary to establish that a lawful order of the court clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect’ ” *(Gerelli Ins. Agency, Inc. v Gerelli,*23 AD3d 341, 341 [2005], quoting *Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y.,*70 NY2d 233, 240 [1987]). Here, by, in effect, denying the plaintiffs motion to hold the defendant in contempt, the Supreme Court implicitly concluded that the subject stipulation was not enforceable because it failed to include temporal and geographical limitations. Given that the subject stipulation was negotiated between represented parties as part of a settlement of the underlying action and the prohibition against restraint on an individual’s ability to earn a livelihood is not implicated, the Supreme Court improperly concluded that an unequivocal order of the court was not enforceable *(see Chernoff Diamond & Co. v Fitzmaurice, Inc.,*234 AD2d 200, 201 [1996]; *see also Mitchell v New York Hosp.,*61 NY2d 208, 214 [1984]). Thus, the Supreme Court improperly, in effect, denied the plaintiffs motion. Accordingly, we remit this matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the defendant solicited the plaintiffs customers, thereby violating the court-ordered stipulation *(see Harvey v Blumenstein,*285 AD2d 581, 581-582 [2001]; *Mulder v Mulder,*191 AD2d 541 [1993]).

The parties’ remaining contentions either need not be addressed in light of our determination or are without merit. Miller, J.E, Spolzino, Goldstein and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
#### Charles A. Page, Appellant, v Deborah A. Page, Respondent.

[834 NYS2d 764]—

*1205Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Erin M. Peradotto, J.), dated March 30, 2006. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiffs motion seeking, inter alia, to modify a qualified domestic relations order dated April 25, 2001.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed in the exercise of discretion and in the interest of justice without costs, that part of the motion seeking to amend the qualified domestic relations order is granted in part and that order is amended by providing that the numerator of the fraction used to calculate the retirement benefits shall be 183 months and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: The parties were divorced in 1999, and plaintiff moved, inter alia, to modify a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) entered in 2001. Plaintiff objected to the provisions in the QDRO granting survivor benefits to defendant because the stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce except with respect to maintenance, did not provide for those benefits. Plaintiff also objected to the provision in the QDRO that calculated his retirement benefits by using 198 months as the numerator of the fraction rather than the correct figure of 183 months. In responding to the motion, defendant admitted that the QDRO listed an incorrect number of months in calculating the retirement benefits, but she asserted that she was entitled to the survivor benefits. Supreme Court denied that part of plaintiffs motion seeking to amend the QDRO on the ground that plaintiff either consented to the QDRO or did not raise any objection at the time it was signed by the court and therefore was precluded from raising his present objections.

We conclude that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that part of the motion to amend the QDRO to reflect the proper number of months in calculating plaintiffs retirement benefits. A court has the discretion to cure a mistake or defect in a judgment or an order that does not affect a substantial right of a party *(see*CPLR 5019 [a]; *Kiker v Nassau County,*85 NY2d 879, 881 [1995]). A court also has the inherent power upon an application for sufficient reason, in the furtherance of justice, “to relieve from judgments taken through ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect’ ” *(Ladd v Stevenson,*112 NY 325, 332 [1889]). We agree with the parties that this was merely a ministerial error and thus that the court had the authority to amend the QDRO *(see Kiker,*85 NY2d at 881). We further conclude that the court, in the furtherance of *1206justice, should have addressed the merits of plaintiffs contention that the QDRO improperly provided for survivor benefits (see *generally Ladd,*112 NY at 332), and we therefore remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine that issue following a hearing, if necessary. Present—Martoche, J.P., Centra, Lunn and Green, JJ.
**Race (by percent of persons)**  **Within 0.5 Miles of Facility**  **Within 1 Mile of Facility Within 3 Miles of**  **Facility** 

### White 90.7% 58.5% 35.1% 

### African-American 9.3% 39.8% 60.3% 

### Asian/ Pacific Islander 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 

### American Indian 0.0% 0.5% 0.4% 

### Other race 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 

### Multiracial 0.0% 0.5% 2.1% 

### Hispanic-Origin* 0.0% 1.4% 2.1% *not included in total that adds to 100%
**(by percent of persons)**  **Within 0.5 Miles of Facility**  **Within 1 Mile of Facility Within 3 Miles of**  **Facility** 

### Percent below Poverty Level 10.5% 26.6% 32.7%
**Income Breakdown by Household**  **Households within .5 Miles (%** **) Households within 1**  **Mile (% )**  **Households within 3 Miles (%** **)** 

### Less than $15,000 10.4% 26.7% 34.1% 

### $15,000 - $25,000 11.7% 14.8% 17.1% 

### $25,000 - $50,000 40.3% 31.0% 29.1% 

### $50,000 - $75,000 16.9% 10.7% 11.2% 

### Greater than $75,000 16.9% 15.3% 8.3% **Income** 

### Race

34%

17% 29% 11% 8% 

## Income of households within 3 mile of the facility

Less than $15,000 $15,000 - $25,000 $25,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $75,000 Greater than $75,000

1.3% 0.4% 0.8%2.1% 

# Race of r**esidents within 3 miles of the** 

**fa cility** 

White

### 35.1%

60.3% White African-American Asian/ Pacific Islander American Indian Other race Multiracial**Within 5 Miles of**

**Facility Illinois**  **US** 38.0% 73.5% 75.1% 56.1% 15.0% 12.3% 2.3% 3.4% 3.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.9% 1.0% 5.8% 5.5% 2.3% 2.0% 2.4% 2.4% 12.3% 12.5%

**Within 5 Miles of Facility**  **Illinois** 30.2% 10.7%

**Households within 5 Miles (%** **) Illinois**  **US**

33.4% 13.8% 15.8% 18.2% 11.3% 12.8% 28.8% 28.1% 29.3% 11.5% 20.7% 19.5% 8.0% 26.0% 22.5%
<PAGE>

Exhibit 21(a)
PPL Corporation
Subsidiaries of the Registrant
As of December 31, 2000

Company Name                                      State or Jurisdiction of
Business Conducted under Same Name                Incorporation/Formation
---------------------------------------           ---------------------------

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation                Pennsylvania
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101

PPL Transition Bond Company, LLC                  Delaware
Two North Ninth Street, GENA92, Room 3
Allentown, PA 18101

PPL Montana, LLC                                  Delaware
303 North Broadway
Suite 400
Billings, MT 59101

PPL Energy Funding Corporation                    Pennsylvania
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101

PPL Generation, LLC                               Delaware
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101

PPL Global, LLC                                   Delaware
11350 Random Hills Road
Suite 400
Fairfax, VA 22030

PPL Montour, LLC                                  Delaware
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101

PPL Susquehanna, LLC                              Delaware
Two North Ninth Street
Allentown, PA 18101
(October 16, 1963)

#### In the Matter of the Application of Norman Cooper Frost for Admission to Practice as an Attorney. (From the State of Georgia.)

—-Application granted. Beldoek, P. J., Christ, Brennan, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Walter Moravsky, Appellant, v. Charles L. Curran et al., Constituting the Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of Yonkers, Respondents.

In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review a determination of the respondent City Manager of the City of Yonkers, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated February 10, 1959, dismissing his petition and the proceeding. Petitioner, a World War II veteran, alleges that he had been passed over or rejected for appointment to the position of Patrolman in the Bureau of Police in the City of Yonkers, even though : (a) his name appeared on the list of those eligible for such appointment; (b) he had successfully passed the competitive and other examinations; and (c) he had been certified as eligible and qualified by the respondent Municipal Civil Service Commission. Order affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.