RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4188-16T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

G.G.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

A.W. and J.T.L.,

Defendants.

IN THE MATTER OF J.L., N.G. 

and N.G.,

Minors.

Submitted April 23, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic

County, Docket No. FN-16-0014-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

July 9, 2018
2 A-4188-16T3

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Kathryn A. 

Kolodziej, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minors (Nancy P. Fratz, 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant G.G,1 appeals from an April 27, 2017 Family Part 

order terminating litigation after a fact-finding hearing that 

determined he sexually abused or neglected J.L., the thirteenyear-old daughter of his paramour, A.W. Because the court's 

decision was largely based on inadmissible hearsay statements that 

were later recanted, we reverse.

I.

We derive the following facts from the record developed at 

the fact-finding hearing. On May 13, 2015, the Division received 

a referral from J.T.L., the putative father of J.L., reporting 

that J.L. said defendant "tried to rape her in February, touched 

her butt, and tried to kiss her." J.L. also said defendant 

threatened to kill her if she told anyone and that "nobody wants 

 

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties. See R.

1:38-3(d)(12).
3 A-4188-16T3

to believe [her]." Except for one time shortly before he made the 

referral, J.T.L. had not seen J.L. in several years. 

The next day, the caseworker met with J.L. and pointedly 

asked if defendant attempted to rape her. J.L. "shook her head 

in a yes motion." Asked to elaborate, J.L. explained, "one time 

[defendant] walked inside her bedroom and exposed himself and 

touched her butt over her clothing and tried to kiss her, but she 

told him to get out." J.L. said she disclosed that incident to 

A.W., but her mother did not believe her. J.L. claimed that on 

another occasion, defendant asked J.L. to expose herself to him, 

or he would not buy her a new phone. A.W. told the caseworker 

"she is not dismissing what her daughter is saying, but she knows 

that either her father or aunt put her up to this, because they 

have been trying to screw her and [G.G] over for the longest time."

At some point, the Division caseworker learned J.L. did not 

disclose the allegations directly to J.T.L. Rather, J.L. told her 

cousin, B.M., who in turn told her mother.

2 Apparently, B.M.'s 

mother told J.T.L. The caseworker did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s 

 

2 The record is unclear whether B.M.'s mother was the sister of 

A.W. or J.T.L.
4 A-4188-16T3

mother.3 The Division referred the case to the Passaic County 

Prosecutor's Office ("PCPO"). 

Six days later, a PCPO detective advised the caseworker that 

J.L. recanted her accusations against defendant. The PCPO 

detective and the caseworker then met J.L. at her school. J.L. 

indicated to the caseworker that defendant did not touch her or 

expose himself. She claimed she made the initial allegations 

because she disliked defendant and wanted him to leave their home.

A few days later, the Division and the PCPO interviewed 

defendant. He denied the allegations and claimed he was never 

alone with J.L. The PCPO did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s mother. 

The PCPO declined to criminally charge defendant.

The Division referred J.L. to the Audrey Hepburn Children's 

House ("AHCH") for a psychosocial evaluation, which was conducted 

on June 9, 2015 by Kirsten Byrnes, Psy.D., a staff psychologist. 

Dr. Byrnes authored a report that was countersigned by her 

supervising psychologist, Anthony V. D'Urso, Psy.D. 

In the sexual abuse assessment portion of her report, Dr. 

Byrnes noted a "marked change" in J.L.'s demeanor. In particular, 

 

3 Although B.M. was identified by name in a psychological report 

furnished to the Division, the caseworker testified at the hearing

that she did not know the cousin's name. 
5 A-4188-16T3

"[J.L.] was much less engaged, her mood dampened, she demonstrated 

ruptured eye contact, preferring instead to look at the couch." 

During the interview, J.L. disclosed that, while at their 

grandmother's home, B.M. asked if defendant "had ever touched her 

inappropriately, to which [J.L] 'said yeah . . . I wanted him to 

leave my home.'" However, J.L. again denied defendant had touched 

her inappropriately, reiterating she told her cousin about the 

alleged abuse because she wanted defendant out of the house. 

In addition to interviewing J.L., Dr. Byrnes interviewed the 

caseworker and A.W. Dr. Byrnes did not interview B.M. or B.M.'s 

mother. Dr. Byrnes concluded "sexual abuse is clinically supported 

and [J.L.'s] statement should be perceived as a recantation rather 

than false allegation[]." 

On July 9, 2015, the Division filed a verified complaint and 

order to show cause against defendant, seeking care and supervision 

of J.L. and defendant's three-year-old twin daughters with A.W.4 

The judge interviewed J.L.5 in camera, but in the presence of her 

law guardian. J.L. told the judge she had lied about the 

 

4 The complaint named A.W. and J.T.L. for dispositional purposes. 

As such, they are not parties to this appeal. Although the twins 

also were named in the complaint, they were not part of the abuse 

and neglect finding. Their law guardian filed a letter brief 

taking no position regarding this appeal. 

5 J.L. was fourteen years old when she testified.
6 A-4188-16T3

allegations against defendant "[s]o he could just leave and get 

away from [her]." The judge indicated he did not interview J.L. 

long enough to determine whether or not she had lied when 

disclosing the allegations against defendant. The judge granted 

the Division's application. 

A fact-finding hearing was conducted on three non-consecutive 

days in March, April and June 2016 before another judge. The 

Division presented J.L.'s statements through the testimony of the 

caseworker and sought to corroborate them through the testimony 

of Dr. D'Urso. Defendant and J.L. did not testify, nor call any 

witnesses. The Division entered into evidence, without objection, 

documents, including its summary reports and Dr. Byrnes'

psychosocial report. The law guardian entered into evidence 

therapy reports regarding J.L. and the draft psychosocial report, 

which differed in some respects, including the clinical 

impression, from the report introduced by the Division. 

Before Dr. D'Urso testified, defendant and the law guardian 

objected to his testifying about the contents of the psychosocial 

report prepared by Dr. Byrnes, in particular, because Dr. D'Urso

did not observe J.L. They also objected to "the failure to notify 

J.L. of the true purpose of the evaluation: to determine whether 

she was actually sexually abused or not." Following voir dire, 

the trial judge qualified Dr. D'Urso as an expert "with respect 
7 A-4188-16T3

to issues of child sexual abuse, and specifically the clinical 

signs of child sexual abuse." 

At the outset of his testimony, Dr. D'Urso described the 

"team approach" employed at AHCH:

So, we have in our center[,] triage conducted 

by nurses for the appropriateness of 

evaluations and to establish questions that 

we can answer from either a medical or 

psychological perspective. Once those 

evaluations are reviewed by myself, or . . . 

[the] medical director, the evaluations are 

scheduled, clinicians are assigned, we have 

an early morning meeting to go over referral 

questions to make sure everybody is clear 

about what we [are] answering. They then 

conduct the evaluations, and on a weekly basis 

we have rounds. At the end of the evaluation 

period we go over the assessments. The 

clinicians then provide reports, the 

clinicians and I go over those reports, and 

then those reports are finalized, sent out.

. . . . 

So, we have standardized protocols relative 

to questions, inquiries during the 

psychological assessments. We have them for 

adults, we have them for kids. And so the 

evaluation is meant to cover a series of 

areas, not only general history and background 

and developmental functioning, but also 

specific functioning relative to the 

allegations, in this case . . . allegations 

of sexual abuse. . . . 

Apparently, after Dr. Byrnes met with J.L., she reviewed her 

findings with Dr. D'Urso and they finalized her report. Dr. D'Urso
8 A-4188-16T3

agreed with Dr. Byrnes' conclusion that inappropriate sexual 

boundaries or contact was clinically supported. 

To support his findings, Dr. D'Urso testified that J.L. 

disclosed "information of discomfort"; lacked A.W.'s support; was 

confronted by defendant; and felt responsible for reporting the 

abuse. Further, J.L. "was [not] a particularly sophisticated 

child[;] . . . she was [not] engaging in Conduct Disorder or any 

antisocial behavior or any sophisticated methods of lying."

Dr. D'Urso determined J.L.'s initial allegations were 

consistent and detailed, and the disclosure to her cousin on the 

playground was "not a purposeful disclosure." In this regard, he

testified that 

the tipping point was that we saw this not as 

a false allegation where she was able to 

manipulate people or she did [not] have that 

kind of background necessarily. All kids 

certainly tell non-truths, but to come up with 

this entire story, to be on a playground, or 

be crying, have her cousin come to her . . . 

it seemed like a pretty far plot.

Dr. D'Urso also cited the observations Dr. Byrnes made during 

the interview. He noted the change in J.L.'s demeanor when the 

topic turned to the sexual assault allegations. Specifically, 

J.L. became withdrawn, whereas she was upbeat and forthright on 

other topics. He conceded on cross-examination, however, that the 
9 A-4188-16T3

"sexualized topic" of conversation might have caused that change 

in demeanor. 

Ultimately, Dr. D'Urso agreed with Dr. Byrnes that J.L.'s 

subsequent denial of the allegations was a recantation and the 

original disclosure was not a false statement. Dr. D'Urso

explained a recantation is "a phenomen[on] that happens in child 

abuse cases, when kids make allegations about abuse that are true 

. . . and take back those allegations." 

Following closing arguments on June 17, 2016, the trial judge 

commenced his oral decision, summarizing the legal principles and 

testimony. Among other things, he noted his concerns about the 

caseworker's interviewing techniques, "introduc[ing] the concept 

of rape." Specifically, "we have a child who was interviewed by 

a caseworker, who asked in essence whether it was true that she 

was raped." The judge also was concerned that J.L. "after having 

given a statement supporting the sexual contact and the 

inappropriate exposure then recanted the testimony." Shortly 

thereafter, he reserved decision.

On June 23, 2016, the judge continued his oral decision. He 

found credible the testimony of the caseworker and Dr. D'Urso. 

The judge acknowledged Dr. D'Urso did not interview J.L., nor had 

he ever met her, and "that should be grounds for discrediting or 

giving sufficiently light weight to the report." However, the 
10 A-4188-16T3

judge was persuaded by the protocol in place at AHCH, including 

the "team approach" as explained by Dr. D'Urso. He also discounted 

discrepancies in the report regarding the lack of interviews of 

J.L.'s relatives, ultimately finding the report "credible and 

weighty . . . corroborating . . . the clinician's conclusion that 

this is a case involving inappropriate boundaries and contact." 

In sum, the trial court found the Division proved, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that J.L. was abused or neglected, 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3) and (4)(b), through "the 

child['s] statements, in conjunction with the [AHCH] report." This 

appeal followed. 

II.

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's decision was 

not supported by sufficient, credible evidence. Defendant 

primarily claims the trial court abused its discretion by finding 

J.L.'s statements were sufficiently corroborated by Dr. D'Urso. 

In her merits brief, the law guardian joined defendant in urging 

us to reverse the trial court's finding of abuse or neglect. 

Following our decision in New Jersey Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency v. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513 (App. Div. 
11 A-4188-16T3

2017), defendant filed a letter brief, pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d).6 

Defendant cites N.B. for our observation that "[o]ur courts have 

rejected the concept that mental health professionals may opine 

about the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay statements." Id.

at 523 (citation omitted). Defendant claims that concept applies 

with equal force, here, where the trial court inappropriately 

relied on Dr. D'Urso's "unsupported belief" that J.L.'s 

recantation "was not a true denial." 

In its responding letter, the Division attempts to 

distinguish N.B., arguing the supervising psychologist did not 

opine about the trustworthiness of J.L.'s statements. Instead, 

he was "offered as an expert to explain why the [AHCH] team found 

that the child's statements of sexual abuse were clinically 

supported." The Division also argues that the findings of the 

supervising psychologist were based on clinical support, including 

her "change in affect when speaking about the conduct."

 

6 Rule 2:6-11(d) provides in pertinent part that "A party may 

. . . without leave, serve and file a letter calling to the court's 

attention, with a brief indication of their significance, relevant 

published opinions issued . . . subsequent to the filing of the 

brief."
12 A-4188-16T3

After consulting with J.L.7 on April 18, 2018, the law 

guardian changed her position and moved to withdraw her initial 

brief and file a substituted brief. We granted the motion. 

On April 19, 2018, the law guardian responded to defendant's 

Rule 2:6-11(d) letter, now contending J.L.'s statements were 

sufficiently corroborated by substantial evidence "and more than 

mere consistency" to satisfy N.B. In her April 25, 2018 

substituted brief, other than summarizing the facts and procedural 

history, the law guardian "makes no further legal argument after 

consultation with the minor child. The family is reunified, and 

all look forward to closure. [J.L.] begs this court that 

regardless of whether the judgment under review is affirmed or 

reversed, that the litigation not be remanded and reopened."

III.

We begin our analysis of the legal issues raised on appeal 

by reaffirming the applicable standard of review. Generally, our 

review of the trial judge's decision is limited. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). "To the 

extent the appellate issues concern a trial court's findings of 

fact or credibility determinations, we accord substantial 

deference and defer to the factual findings of the Family Part if 

 

7 J.L. was seventeen years old at the time of the consultation. 
13 A-4188-16T3

they are sustained by 'adequate, substantial, and credible 

evidence' in the record." N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521 (quoting 

R.G., 217 N.J. at 552). 

Here, the trial court based its abuse or neglect finding, in 

part, on J.L.'s initial allegations that defendant sexually abused 

her when she was thirteen years old. The court also found Dr. 

Byrnes' psychosocial report corroborated J.L.'s statements 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). 

Where, as here, "the trial court's rulings 'essentially 

involved the application of legal principles and did not turn upon 

contested issues of witness credibility' we review the court's 

corroboration determination de novo." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. A.D., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2018) 

(slip op. at 11) (quoting N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521) 

(conducting a de novo review of the trial court's determination

whether a child's statements were corroborated pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)).8 Accordingly, we owe no deference to 

the trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal 

consequences that flow from established facts." Manalapan Realty 

LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). 

 

8 While the trial court did not have the benefit of our decisions 

in N.B. and A.D., these cases clarified legal principles but did 

not enunciate a new rule of law. See State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 

51, 57 (1997).
14 A-4188-16T3

Abuse and neglect cases are fact sensitive and "[e]ach case 

requires careful, individual scrutiny" as many cases are 

"idiosyncratic." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 

205 N.J. 17, 33 (2011). In a Title 9 action, the Division must 

prove by a preponderance of "competent, material and relevant 

evidence" that a child is abused or neglected. N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(b). In making that determination, the court should base its 

decision on the totality of the circumstances. N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 329 (App. Div. 2011). 

Pertinent to this appeal, where the trial court found J.L. 

was abused or neglected pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(3) and 

(4)(b), an "abused or neglected child" finding is appropriate if 

a parent or guardian:

(3) commits or allows to be committed an act 

of sexual abuse against the child; (4) or a 

child whose physical, mental, or emotional 

condition has been impaired or is in imminent 

danger of becoming impaired as the result of 

the failure of his parent or guardian, as 

herein defined,[9] to exercise a minimum degree 

of care . . . (b) in providing the child with 

proper supervision or guardianship, by 

unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be 

inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof,

including the infliction of excessive corporal 

punishment; or by any other acts of a 

 

9 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(a) provides, in pertinent part, a "[p]arent or 

guardian" means "any . . . paramour of a parent, or any person, 

who has assumed responsibility for the care, custody, or control 

of a child or upon whom there is a legal duty for such care." 
15 A-4188-16T3

similarly serious nature requiring the aid of 

the court[.]

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), an uncorroborated 

statement of sexual abuse by a child is admissible in an abuse or 

neglect proceeding. However, "an uncorroborated statement . . . 

is not alone 'sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or 

neglect.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.A., 436 

N.J. Super. 61, 66-67 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(a)(4)). "Stated another way, 'a child's hearsay statement 

may be admitted into evidence, but may not be the sole basis for 

a finding of abuse or neglect.'" Id. at 67 (quoting P.W.R., 205 

N.J. at 33). Corroborative evidence is therefore required. Ibid.

"The most effective types of corroborative evidence may be 

eyewitness testimony, a confession, an admission or medical or 

scientific evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 

357 N.J. Super. 155, 166 (App. Div. 2003). We have also 

recognized, "Such evidence has included a child victim's 

precocious knowledge of sexual activity, a semen stain on a child's 

blanket, a child's nightmares and psychological evidence." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436 

(App. Div. 2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

Expert witnesses may testify about facts or data that inform 

their analyses and opinions, as long as that information is "of a 
16 A-4188-16T3

type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 

forming opinions or inferences upon the subject[.]" N.J.R.E. 703. 

An expert witness need not have personal, first-hand knowledge of 

a case. "Indeed, an expert's testimony may be based on the work 

done or even hearsay evidence of another expert, particularly when, 

as here, the latter's work is supervised by the former." State 

v. Dishon, 297 N.J. Super. 254, 281 (App. Div. 1997); accord State 

v. Stevens, 136 N.J. Super. 262, 264 (App. Div. 1975). 

As previously stated, however, "mental health professionals 

may [not] opine about the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay 

statements." N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523 (citing State v. J.Q., 

130 N.J. 554, 582-83 (1993)). Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), 

hearsay statements of opinions and diagnoses are further subject 

to N.J.R.E. 808, which states, in pertinent part: 

Expert opinion which is included in an 

admissible hearsay statement shall be excluded 

if the declarant has not been produced as a 

witness unless the trial judge finds that the 

circumstances involved in rendering the 

opinion, including . . . the complexity of the 

subject matter, and the likelihood of accuracy 

of the opinion, tend to establish its 

trustworthiness.

However, "The evidence must be independently admissible for a 

court to deem it corroborative of a child's statement." A.D., 

(slip op. at 12) (citing N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 524-26). 
17 A-4188-16T3

Here, Dr. D'Urso testified that he based his expert opinion 

on the Division's screening summary, AHCH's intake form completed 

by the Division caseworker, "collateral contacts" with the 

caseworker and A.W., and Dr. Byrnes' clinical evaluation of J.L. 

Dr. D'Urso also reviewed and approved the psychosocial evaluation 

authored by Dr. Byrnes whom he supervised at AHCH. Because he was 

duly qualified as an expert witness by the trial judge, and 

supervised Dr. Byrnes in this matter, we find no error in Dr. 

D'Urso's testifying about the facts contained in Dr. Byrnes'

written reports. See N.J.R.E. 703 ("The facts or data in the 

particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 

may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before 

the hearing."). 

We part company with the trial judge, however, in permitting 

Dr. D'Urso to testify about Dr. Byrnes' findings concerning J.L.'s 

change in demeanor during the sexual abuse assessment of her 

evaluation. Dr. D'Urso did not observe J.L. during the evaluation. 

Nor is there any indication in the record that Dr. Byrnes disclosed 

to Dr. D'Urso her specific line of questioning that prompted J.L.'s 

change in demeanor. Because the report does not cite Dr. Byrnes'

inquiry in question and answer format, it is unclear whether J.L.'s 

affect changed when the topic of sex was raised by Dr. Byrnes, 

generally, or specifically as to J.L.'s allegations against 
18 A-4188-16T3

defendant. As Dr. D'Urso candidly admitted, J.L.'s change in 

demeanor could have been prompted merely by Dr. Byrnes' switching 

the topic of discussion to sex. Similarly, the report does not 

describe J.L.'s affect when she acknowledged the allegations 

against defendant compared with her demeanor when she denied the 

abuse to Dr. Byrnes.

Because Dr. D'Urso was not present during the interview of 

J.L., "the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion" concerning J.L.'s 

change in demeanor is not trustworthy. N.J.R.E. 808. As the 

trial judge aptly observed, Dr. D'Urso did not evaluate J.L., nor 

did he meet her. While, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702, Dr. D'Urso was 

permitted to testify about the facts contained in the AHCH report, 

his opinion about whether her recantation was truthful was 

improper. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523. Thus, in this particular 

case, the Division should have called Dr. Byrnes, instead of Dr. 

D'Urso, to testify specifically about how and when J.L.'s demeanor 

shifted during the interview. 

Moreover, based on our de novo review of the record, we 

discern no other "psychological evidence" corroborating J.L.'s 

allegations. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. at 436. As Dr. Byrnes

observed, "There was no evidence of suicidal ideation or psychotic 

processes." J.L. "denied any experiences of enuresis, nightmares, 

auditory or visual hallucinations, suicidal ideation or ever 
19 A-4188-16T3

engaging in self-harming behaviors." She denied using substances 

and also "earns As and Bs" in school. See N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 

at 522. Further, J.L. consistently denied the allegations after 

her initial disclosure. 

Without behavioral corroboration, Dr. D'Urso's remaining 

findings supporting his opinion that J.L.'s recantation was false 

either impermissibly opine about her trustworthiness, or are not 

supported by the record. Although we recognize Dr. D'Urso was 

qualified by the court as an expert in "the clinical signs of 

child sexual abuse," his finding, in part, that J.L. did not engage 

in "any sophisticated methods of lying" transgressed from a 

clinical finding to "truth-telling." See J.Q., 130 N.J. at 582. 

Nor are we persuaded by his finding that J.L.'s initial disclosure 

was consistent. See N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 523 (recognizing 

"consistency alone does not constitute corroboration" pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)). 

Further, it is unclear from the record whether J.L. 

spontaneously disclosed the allegations to B.M. in the playground 

when B.M. found her crying, or whether B.M. directly asked J.L., 

when they were at their grandmother's home, if defendant had 

touched her. Although the location of disclosure is not 

dispositive, both accounts were contained in Dr. Byrnes' report. 

Yet, Dr. D'Urso found, as a reason to support his opinion that the 
20 A-4188-16T3

recantation was false, "her cousin asked her a broad question, and 

she answered with specific responses." His finding, however, is 

inconsistent with one version of J.L.'s disclosure.10 Moreover, 

he mistakenly believed B.M. had been interviewed. 

We also find disconcerting that none of the investigating 

authorities, i.e., the Division, the PCPO, and AHCH, interviewed 

B.M., the first person to whom J.L. reported the allegations. See

State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 455 (2015) (recognizing, the freshcomplaint doctrine "allows the admission of evidence of a victim's 

complaint of sexual abuse, otherwise inadmissible as hearsay, to 

negate the inference that the victim's initial silence or delay 

indicates that the charge is fabricated"). Although the PCPO 

determined rather quickly it would not prosecute defendant, the 

statement of B.M. may have assisted the Division and AHCH in its 

evaluation and assessment of J.L., and may have corroborated J.L.'s 

statement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). See also Biunno, 

Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, cmt. 4 on 

N.J.R.E. 607 (2018) (permitting fresh complaint testimony to 

support the credibility of a witness). 

 

10 We find troubling, as did the trial judge, the method of inquiry 

employed by the caseworker when initially questioning J.L. See

State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 622 (App. Div. 1993) 

(recognizing, in child sexual assault investigations, "the 

possibility of distorting recollections by suggestive or leading

questions"). 
21 A-4188-16T3

In sum, we are constrained to find J.L.'s statements were not 

sufficiently corroborated, and as such, the trial court's 

determination that defendant abused or neglected J.L. "was not 

sufficiently supported by competent, admissible evidence." N.B., 

452 N.J. Super. at 527. In light of our ruling, we need not reach 

defendant's remaining claims. Accordingly, we vacate the June 23, 

2016 order, and direct the Division to remove defendant's name 

from the Child Abuse Registry, regarding this incident, within 

thirty days.

Reversed and remanded for the sole purpose of carrying out

the directives of this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.