This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1655

In re the Estate of: Barbara Jean LaPoint, Deceased.

Filed July 6, 2015

Affirmed

Hudson, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court

File No. 56-PR-13-1016

Steven R. Peloquin, Peloquin Law Office, P.A., Perham, Minnesota (for appellants Kevin 

LaPoint and Monica LaPoint)

Graham Butler, Graham Butler Legal Services, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for 

respondent Darrin LaPoint)

Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Smith, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Judge

In this probate appeal, appellants challenge the district court’s order denying their 

claim against an estate for satisfaction of a promissory note signed only by the decedent 

in connection with a mortgage on appellants’ home. They argue that they were thirdparty beneficiaries of the note and therefore entitled to enforce the note against the estate; 

that any agreement that they pay the mortgage following the decedent’s death was not 
2

enforceable based on the credit-agreement statute of frauds; and that they should be 

indemnified for their payment of the mortgage after her death. We affirm.

FACTS

In May 1985, decedent Barbara LaPoint executed a will, leaving her estate in three 

equal shares to her three sons, Darrin, Kevin, and Kurtis.1 In December 2005, Barbara, 

Kevin, and Kevin’s wife, Monica, as listed mortgagors, executed a $52,000 mortgage to 

refinance Kevin and Monica’s home in Lake Park. At the same time, by warranty deed, 

Barbara received one-half interest in the property; Kevin and Monica received one-half 

interest as joint tenants. Barbara alone, however, signed the note relating to the 

mortgage.

By agreement, during Barbara’s life, Kevin paid the mortgage on the property. 

But after Barbara died in 2012, appellants Kevin and Monica petitioned the district court 

for a claim against her estate to pay the $46,096 balance remaining on the mortgage, as 

well as to reimburse them for $11,773 they paid on the note after Barbara’s death. They

maintained that Barbara, the only named borrower on the note, intended that the balance 

of the note be paid from her estate on her death. They argued that the mortgage did not 

personally obligate them to pay the secured sum, that the purpose of the warranty deed 

was to give the lender security in the home refinanced by the note, and that the lender had 

required Barbara to become an owner of the property for refinancing purposes. They 

alleged that Barbara had informed them that she wished to treat all of her sons equally 

and that paying the balance of the note from her estate would equalize this contribution, 

 

1

For clarity, the parties are referenced by their first names. 
3

particularly because she had paid for basement remodeling at Kurtis’s home, where she 

lived for several years before her death. 

The estate, by respondent Darrin as personal representative, argued in response 

that Barbara had expected repayment of loans that she made to all three sons and that 

appellants had produced no evidence to prove that she intended the mortgage payments to 

be a gift to them. They also argued that appellants’ and Barbara’s subsequent conduct 

supported the existence of an equitable mortgage in favor of Barbara’s estate. 

Without objection, the district court notified the parties that it would be 

considering the matter on written submissions. After reviewing memoranda and 

affidavits, the district court issued its order denying appellants’ claim. The district court 

concluded that, because the joint debt of Barbara and appellants benefitted property 

belonging to appellants, they had no right to contribution from Barbara’s estate unless 

they could establish, by another independent basis, that the balance on the note was part 

of Barbara’s fair share of that obligation. Acting as fact-finder, the district court found 

that appellants had failed to sustain their burden to show that Barbara made a definite 

promise to them for purposes of establishing promissory estoppel or an equitable claim 

for contribution. The district court declined to reach respondent’s argument on an 

equitable mortgage. 

Appellants requested reconsideration, arguing that the district court had 

mischaracterized their petition as seeking contribution, rather than indemnity. The 

district court denied reconsideration, concluding that, whether the claim was 
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characterized as one for contribution, indemnity, or equitable subrogation, based on the 

facts previously found, it would reach the same result. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N 

A district court exercises its discretion when considering claims made against a 

decedent’s estate. In re Estate of Hoppke, 388 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. App. 1986). 

This court will not overturn the district court’s findings on claims against an estate 

unless, on a review of the entire record, we are “left with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” In re Estate of Beecham, 378 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Minn. 

1985). “If there is reasonable evidence to support the district court’s findings, we will 

not disturb them.” Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999). When a 

district court’s decision is based on equitable considerations, we review that decision for 

an abuse of discretion. Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 483 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Minn. 1992). 

Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that they were entitled to have the 

debt underlying the mortgage paid by Barbara’s estate because they were intended thirdparty beneficiaries on the note between Barbara and the lender bank. See Caldas v. 

Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 2012) (providing that it is 

appropriate to recognize a party’s rights as a third-party beneficiary if that party was an 

intended beneficiary of another’s contract under the duty-owed or intent-to-benefit test). 

They argue that, based on the language of the note and mortgage, the district court should 

have determined as a matter of law that they had third-party-beneficiary rights.

Generally, this court does not review issues not raised before and considered by 

the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). “[O]n rare 
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occasions,” we will exercise discretion to allow a party to proceed on a theory not raised 

before the district court. Roth v. Weir, 690 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn. App. 2005) 

(quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (stating that appellate courts 

“may” review “any” matter “as the interest of justice may require”). Appellants assert

that their argument falls within a “well-established” exception to the general rule, which 

applies when “the question raised for the first time on appeal is plainly decisive of the 

entire controversy on its merits and where, as in [cases] involving undisputed facts, there 

is no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party in not having had a prior ruling 

by the [district] court on the question.” Roth, 690 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting Watson v. 

United Servs. Auto Ass’n., 566 N.W.2d 683, 687–88 (Minn. 1997)). This court is more 

likely to exercise its discretion to review the issue if it is “a novel issue of first 

impression,” it “was raised prominently in briefing,” it was “implicit in or closely akin to 

the arguments below,” and “the issue is not dependent on any new or controverted facts.” 

Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 688 (quotations omitted). 

We conclude that appellants’ third-party beneficiary argument does not meet the 

requirements for the exception under Watson. It does not present a novel issue for this 

court’s review. See id. And we reject appellants’ contention that the issue could have 

been determined as a matter of law without reference to disputed facts. The district court 

first examined the note, warranty deed, and mortgage to discern Barbara’s intent relating 

to the refinancing transaction.

2

 Cf. In re Estate and Trust of Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 682, 

 

2 When attempting to ascertain Barbara’s intent, the district court did not consider the 

language in her will directing that her executor “pay all [her] legal debts.” The 
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687 (Minn. App. 2002) (construing documents together as part of an estate plan), review 

denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003). Because these documents are inconsistent with each other, 

they are ambiguous, and the district court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to assist in 

reviewing appellants’ claim against the estate. See In re Estate of Arend, 373 N.W.2d 

338, 342 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that a document is ambiguous if it suggests more 

than one reasonable interpretation); In re Estate of Rock, 612 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Minn. 

App. 2000) (“If a writing is ambiguous, . . . extrinsic evidence may be admitted to resolve 

the ambiguity.”). In doing so, the district court considered the parties’ numerous 

affidavits reciting different versions of events, which supported opposing inferences as to 

Barbara’s intent. Therefore, resolution of the matter was dependent on controverted 

facts, Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 688, and this is not the “rare occasion[]” on which we will 

address an issue not presented to the district court. Roth, 690 N.W.2d at 413.

Similarly, we decline to consider appellants’ additional argument, also raised for 

the first time on appeal, that any agreement for them to pay the mortgage following 

Barbara’s death was unenforceable because it did not meet the requirements of the credit 

agreement statute of frauds. See Minn. Stat. § 513.33, subd. 2 (2014) (precluding an 

action on a credit agreement unless that agreement is in writing, sets forth relevant terms 

and conditions, and is signed by both parties). Although that issue was raised 

 

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that when used in a will or trust document, the phrase 

“pay . . . my legal debts” has a “well-understood technical meaning” and “does not 

authorize a testator’s personal representative or executor to pay the testator’s secured 

obligations.” In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 503 (Minn. 

2012). We also note that the district court did not consider the issue of Barbara’s estate 

acquiring an interest in the subject property by warranty deed at the time of refinancing. 

We therefore do not address or comment on this issue. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
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prominently in briefing before this court and does not depend on disputed facts, it does 

not present an issue of first impression, is not “plainly decisive of the entire controversy 

on its merits,” and was not “implicit in” or “closely akin” to arguments raised before the 

district court. Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 688 (quotations omitted). 

Appellants argue that a remand is necessary for the district court to consider these 

issues and, if necessary, to conduct an evidentiary hearing to elicit testimony on 

Barbara’s intent. But appellants have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that 

the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim against a decedent’s estate. 

See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-804 (2014) (stating requirements for presentation of claims 

against a decedent’s estate); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-806 (2014) (stating procedure for 

allowance or disallowance of claim). Appellants neither requested such a hearing nor 

objected to the district court’s procedure of submitting written arguments with supporting 

affidavits. The district court was not required sua sponte to order an evidentiary hearing. 

When documents are ambiguous and the district court relies on extrinsic evidence, 

we defer to the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re 

Trust of Hill, 499 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. July 15, 

1993) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01). Here, the district court made extensive findings, 

including that respondent was more credible than appellants. We decline to disturb the 

district court’s assessment of credibility. In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 N.W.2d 96, 102 

(Minn. App. 1989). In rejecting appellants’ claim, the district court found that it was not 

clear that Barbara would have understood the loan documents to have the effect of 

causing her estate to pay off the mortgage balance on her death and that it is more likely 
8

that she understood that appellants would continue to make payments on the note to 

safeguard their equity in their property. In support of its determination, the district court 

found that the record showed that Barbara did not question the effect of the note, nor did 

she take other measures such as altering her will, documenting the existence of a gift in 

writing, or informing all of her children of such an intent. The district court’s findings of 

fact are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous, and we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting appellants’ claims against Barbara’s 

estate. 

II

Appellants argue that they are entitled to indemnity from Barbara’s estate for the 

payments that they made on the note after her death. The district court’s initial order 

denied their claim of contribution, but did not address indemnity. In denying 

reconsideration, however, the district court concluded that neither theory would afford 

appellants relief. 

“Contribution is an equitable remedy that allows one who has discharged more 

than his fair share of a common liability or burden to recover from another who is also 

liable the proportionate share which the other should pay or bear.” In re Individual 35W 

Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Indemnity does 

not require common liability, but secures a right to reimbursement when one party has 

discharged the whole of a debt or burden that another party has a duty or liability to pay. 

Hendrickson v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 371, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847 

(1960), overruled in part on other grounds by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus. Inc., 255 N.W.2d 
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362 (Minn. 1977). Indemnity can arise from a contractual obligation or may be awarded 

in equity when a party’s obligation to indemnify arises from equitable principles. United 

Prairie Bank v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 56 n.2 (Minn. 2012). 

We afford a deferential standard of review to a district court’s balancing of the equities, 

but review de novo the district court’s legal conclusion on whether a claim for equity or 

contribution fails as a matter of law. Brown v. Lee, 859 N.W.2d 836, 839–40 (Minn. 

App. 2015). 

The district court concluded that neither the doctrine of contribution nor indemnity 

allowed appellants to recover their payments made on the mortgage from Barbara’s estate 

because the mortgage obligation benefitted only their own property. We agree. 

Appellants presented no contract requiring Barbara or her estate to indemnify them for 

paying the mortgage. And we have held, on equitable principles, that even though a

husband and wife co-signed promissory notes benefitting the husband’s business, his 

estate was liable after his death on all of the notes because they benefitted only his 

separate property. See In re Estate of Sjerven, 370 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1985) (“It 

would not be equitable, looking to the underlying facts, to require [the decedent’s] estate 

to share in the legal liability, which benefited only [the survivor’s] property”), review

denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1985). Appellants argue that, unlike in Sjerven, only Barbara 

signed the promissory note. But that distinction does not negate the district court’s 

application of equity, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that 

Barbara’s estate had no equitable obligation to indemnify appellants for mortgage 

payments made on their own property. See id. 
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Because we affirm the district court’s denial of appellants’ claim against Barbara’s 

estate, we need not consider respondent’s additional argument that the transaction 

between appellants and Barbara amounted to an equitable mortgage, which should be 

satisfied by appellants’ immediate payment of the full remaining mortgage obligation to 

the estate. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. 

Affirmed.