alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Assistant Secretary for Special Education

 and Rehabilitative Services

FROM: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority

I. DELEGATION

Under the authority vested in me by Section 412 of the Department of Education 

Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3472, and in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 763, I hereby 

designate you and delegate to you, and to anyone serving for you in an acting capacity, the 

authority to represent the Secretary of the Department of Education as a member of the 

Interagency Committee on Disability Research. In this capacity, the Assistant Secretary for 

Special Education and Rehabilitative Services is authorized to exercise the Secretary’s 

authority as set forth in 79 U.S.C. §763, including making designations of additional or 

alternate Department of Education representatives as necessary.

Unless otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, amendments to the authority 

delegated herein are included within the scope of this delegation.

II. RESERVATIONS

None.

III. REDELEGATION

This authority may be redelegated.

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department’s Principal Delegation 

Control Officer.

_____________/s/_________ 

 Margaret Spellings

OGC Clearance and Date: /s/ David Berthiaume

Certified Date: 5/12/2008

Departmental Delegations Control Officer: /s/ Naty G. Beetle

Control Number: EA/EH/91
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

219 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

MICHAEL W. DOBBINS

 CLERK (312)435-5699

November 4, 2011

David A. Novoselsky

David A. Novoselsky & Associates

120 North LaSalle Street

Suite 1400

Chicago, Il 60602 

Re: Doctor John Doe et al v. Google Inc

Case: USDC No. 11-cv-07814

Dear Counsel:

The records of this office indicate that on 11/03/2011, a notice of removal pursuant to 28 USC 1441 et

seq. was filed with this court in connection with the above referenced matter. The notice lists the

circuit court case number as 2011 L 9024. The documents filed with the notice of removal list you as

counsel for the plaintiff and/or defendant. 

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Local General Rules of this Court require that an

appearance form be filed by an attorney who intends to represent a party in any proceeding before this

Court. For your convenience, a copy of the Attorney Appearance form is available on our website under

Online forms: www.ilnd.uscourts.gov 

Sincerely yours,

 Michael W. Dobbins, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Susan McClintic

Deputy Clerk

Case: 1:11-cv-07814 Document #: 5 Filed: 11/04/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:24
Case: 1:12-cv-01422 Document #: 13-1 Filed: 06/18/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:61
#### 1513.505 Purchase order and related forms.

Contracting Officers may use the EPA Form 1900-8, Procurement Request/Order, in lieu of Optional Forms 347 and 348 for individual purchases prepared in accordance with the instructions printed on the reverse thereof (see 1553.213-70).

[61 FR 57338, Nov. 6, 1996. Redesignated at 62 FR 33572, June 20, 1997]
1/4/13 page of



### POST FOCUS EXPOSURE REPORT

Chemical ID: P-13-0071 Reviewer: Tobias/SS

Results Table: Dose, Concentration, and Days Exceeded Results Summary

Exposure Scenario 1 Water Landfill Stack Air Fugitive Air Drinking Water Fish Ingestion
ADR LADD ADR LADD 7Q10 4
CC = 1 PDM Days Exceede d LADD ADR LADD ADR LADD

Release activity(ies) 2 ; exposure calculation(s) 3 mg/kg/day mg/kg/day mg/kg/day mg/kg/day μg/l # Days mg/kg/day mg/kg/day mg/kg/day mg/kg/day mg/kg/day

max acute eco --- --- --- --- 5.70E-01 --- --- --- --- --- ---

1 Exposure scenario titles consist of release activity followed by exposure calculation abbreviation. 2 Release activities are from engineering report's Manuf acturing (Mfg), Processing (Proc) and Use release activity labels. Multiple release activities are combined in one exposure scenario if their releases occur at same location. 3 Exposure calculations are Acute Dose Rate (A DR), Lifetime Average Daily Dose (LADD), and Probabilistic Dilution Model (PDM). There may be one, two, or all three exposure calculations per exposure scenario. CC is the aquatic concentration of concern. 4 This column displays concentration values for the 7Q 10 streamflow, which is defined as the average daily streamflow of the seven consecutive days of lowest flow within a ten year period.

Remarks:1/4/13 page of

POST FOCUS EXPOSURE REPORT

Chemical ID: P-13-0071 Assessor: Tobias/SS

ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES

Scenario#:1 Number of Release Sites: Release Activity: Max ADR
Release Description: WATER LANDFILL Non-sludge/Sludge STACK FUGITIVE

Total Releases: (kg/yr) (kg/yr) (kg/yr) (kg/yr)

Non-sludge/Sludge Release Days/yr:

Per Site Release: (kg/site/day) (kg/site/day) (kg/site/day) (kg/site/day)

Remarks:1/4/13 page of

POST FOCUS EXPOSURE REPORT

Chemical ID: P-13-0071

SIC-CODE BASED HUMAN AND AQUATIC EXPOSURES TO SURFACE WATER RELEASES

SCENARIO #: 1 Number of Sites: RELEASE ACTIVITY: Max ADR

SIC-CODE DESCRIPTION: POTW's (All facilities) SIC-CODE (S): 4952 EX POSED POPULATION: Adult

WWT REMOVAL (%) RELEASE DAYS PRETREATMENT RELEASE (kg/site/day) POSTTREATMENT RELEASE (kg/site/day) DWT (%) BCF (L/kg)

0.00 0.00

AQUATIC EXPOSURE ESTIMATES - SURFACE WATER

PLANT TYPE % ILE FACILITY STREAM FLOW (MLD) STREAM CONC. ( μ g/l)

Harmonic

Mean 30Q5 7Q10 1Q10 Harmonic Mean 30Q5 7Q10 1Q10

ALL 50 125.56 44.02 26.80 22.53 4.78E-03 1.36E-02 2.24E-02 2.66E-02

ALL 10 11.11 1.94 1.06 0.96 5.40E-02 0.31 0.57 0.63

DRINKING WATER AND FISH IN GESTION EXPOSURE ESTIMATES

Exposure Units Drinking Water Results Drinking Water Units Fish Ingestion Results Fish Ingestion

Units 50% 10% 50% 10%

Cancer

LADD pot 1.02E-10 1.15E-09 mg/kg/day 0.00 0.00 mg/kg/day

LADC pot 5.24E-09 5.92E-08 mg/L 0.00 0.00 mg/kg

Acute

ADR pot 1.14E-06 2.58E-05 mg/kg/day 0.00 0.00 mg/kg/day

SIC Code Comments:
Exhibit 10.21.1
                                    AMENDMENT
                                     to the
                                ALBERTSON'S, INC.
               NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS' DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN

     This Amendment is made by Albertson's,  Inc., a Delaware  corporation  (the
"Corporation").
                                    RECITALS:

     A.  The  Corporation   established  the  Albertson's,   Inc.   Non-Employee
Directors' Deferred Compensation Plan effective January 1, 1990 (the "Plan");

     B. The  Corporation,  pursuant to Section  10.1 of the Plan,  retained  the
right to amend the Plan;  Section 10.1  provides that the Plan may be amended by
the Non-Employee  Directors'  Deferred  Compensation  Committee appointed by the
Board of Directors of Albertson's,  Inc.; and the Committee has been granted the
authority to amend the Plan by the Non-Employee Directors' Deferred Compensation
Committee so long as such amendments do not materially alter benefits; and

     C. The Committee has  determined  that it is advisable to amend the Plan in
the manner  hereinafter  set forth and that such  amendments  do not  materially
alter benefits.

                                    AMENDMENT

     The Plan is amended, as of December 15, 1998, in the following respects:

         The last two  sentences of Section 6.4 (a) of the Plan shall be deleted
         and the following language shall be substituted in their place:

                    The Participant  may modify the form of the  distribution of
                    all or part of the Participant's Account, provided that such
                    modification is made on a validly  executed and timely filed
                    Deferral Agreement before the end of the calendar year which
                    ends at least  twelve (12) months prior to the date on which
                    any  distribution  of the  Participant's  Account shall have
                    commenced.

     IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  this  instrument  has  been  duly  executed  by  the
undersigned as of December 15, 1998.

                                 ALBERTSON'S, INC.


                                 By:   /s/  Thomas R. Saldin
                                       ---------------------------------------
                                            Thomas R. Saldin
                                            Executive Vice President,
                                            Administration and General Counsel
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED
March 3, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-10771 Summary Calendar

KEVIN BERNARD JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus
NFN NWANKO, Jailer, 1st Watch, Dallas County Sheriff’s Department; NFN SHIDERLY, Jailer, 1st Watch, Dallas County Sheriff’s Department,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Norther District of Texas

(3:02-CV-01736-BF-R)

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendants appeal the denial of summary judgment; they claimed

qualified immunity. Denial of qualified immunity is immediately

appealable only when based on issues of law, rather than on genuine

issues of material fact. S ee Palmer v. Johnson , 193 F.3d 346, 350

(5th Cir. 1999). “[I]f the district court concludes that the

summary judgmen t record raises a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whe ther the defense of qualified immunity is2

applicable, then that decision is not immediately appealable....”

Id . at 351.

The denial of qualified immunity was based on starkly

differing versions of the facts surrounding the altercation between
plaintiff and def endants, which were offered through competent

summary judgment evidence. The denial was based on genuine issues

of material fact as to the threat perceived by defendants, the need

for the application of force, the relationship between the need and

amount of force used, and the e xtent of plaintiff’s injuries.

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

See Palmer , 193 F.3d at 351.

DISMISSED
#### 14.409 Information to bidders.
#### 1342.703 General.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RANDALL W. SYLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 1408

) USCA No. 13-1593

COUNTY OF WILL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court has issued a whole series of opinions in this 42

U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983”) action brought by Randall Syler

(“Syler”), beginning with its threshold determination that

Syler’s pro se Complaint appeared viable on its face (a

determination that, in accordance with this Court’s usual

procedure, carried with it the appointment of pro bono counsel to

represent Syler), but ultimately ending with a dismissal of the

action because factual submissions had shown that Syler had

failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies--a fatal

defect under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). When Syler then sought to take

an appeal from that dismissal, this Court issued its most recent

memorandum order (“Order”) on April 26 of this year, denying in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) status for Syler on appeal because such a

dismissal was mandated by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3).

Now the Clerk’s Office has delivered to this Court’s

chambers a photocopy of a self-prepared handprinted filing by

Syler, captioned “Motion for Relief from Judgement [sic].” In
that filing Syler seeks to invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 60(a)

because, he says, this Court never stated that an appeal from the

dismissal “would not be taken in good faith,” nor did this Court

state that Syler was not certified to pursue an appeal in forma

pauperis. Both of those assertions are dead wrong, for both

subjects were expressly dealt with in this Court’s most recent

memorandum order, issued post-appeal to address Syler’s effort to

appeal IFP.

Thus Order at 1 referred to this Court’s earlier January 24,

2013 memorandum opinion and order, which (as the Order put it)

“determined that Syler’s claim in that respect was bogus--that 1

he had fabricated evidence to mask his nonexhaustion of the

grievance that formed the gravamen of his lawsuit.” Then Order

at 2 went on to say (1) “that Syler clearly flunked the

nonfrivolousness requirement” and (2) that 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)

had therefore called for dismissal of Syler’s action at this

District Court level, so that (as the Order put it) this Court

ultimately “certifie[d] that Syler’s attempted appeal cannot be

taken IFP because such nonfrivolousness equates to an absence of

good faith under Lee v. Clinton.”

 [Footnote by this Court] That reference was to Syler’s 1

failure to have exhausted available administrative remedies,

which 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) established as a precondition to any

“prison conditions” lawsuit by a prisoner.

2
In sum, Syler’s current motion is totally without merit. It

is denied.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 16, 2013

3
#### 1371.119 Guarantees.

Insert clause 1352.271-88, *Guarantees,* in all solicitations and contracts for ship construction and ship repair.
1846.7002 Policy. The government and its contractors and subcontractors at all tiers are required to obtain electronic parts as prescribed in this section, whether the electronic parts are procured as discrete items or contained in an assembly. ( a ) The covered contractor and subcontractors at all tiers shall obtain electronic parts that are in production or currently available in stock from— ( 1 ) The original manufacturers of the parts;
( 2 ) Their authorized dealers; or
( 3 ) Suppliers who obtain such parts exclusively from the original manufacturers of the parts or their authorized dealers.
( b ) If electronic parts are not in production or currently available in stock from suppliers as stated in paragraph (a) of this section, the covered contractor shall obtain electronic parts from NASA identified suppliers or contractor-approved suppliers for which— ( 1 ) The covered contractor assumes responsibility for the authenticity of parts; and
( 2 ) The covered contractor performs inspection, testing and authentication of parts; and
( 3 ) The covered contractor obtains traceability information for the electronic parts (*e.g.,* data code, lot code, serial number) and provides this information to the contracting officer upon request; and
( 4 ) The selection of contractor-approved suppliers is subject to review and audit by the contracting officer.
( c ) The covered contractor, including subcontractors, shall notify the applicable NASA contracting officer in writing not later than 30 calendar days after the date the covered contractor becomes aware, or has reason to suspect, that any end item, component, part or material contained in supplies purchased by NASA, or purchased by a covered contractor or subcontractor for delivery to, or on behalf of, NASA, contains a counterfeit electronic part or suspect counterfeit electronic part.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2017

s1120 

# Order

Clerk November 29, 2017

153216

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 153216

COA: 323979

Macomb CC: 2014

- 001628

- FC

DENNIS ROBERT SHEPLER,

Defendant

- Appellant.

____________________________________/

By order of September 6, 2016, the application for leave to appeal the December

29, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in

People v Steanhouse (Docket No. 152849) and People v Masroor (Docket Nos. 152946

- 8). On order of the Court, the cases having been decided on July 24, 2017, 500 Mich 453

(2017), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of

granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal s

remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing pursuant to People v Steanhouse , 313

Mich App 1 (2015), and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary

review of whether the defendant’s sentence was disproportionate under the standard se t

forth in People v Milbourn , 435 Mich 630, 636 (1990). See People v Steanhouse , 500

Mich at 460

- 461. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C LEMENT

, J., did not participate.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

JOEL MARTINEZ-PEREZ, a.k.a. Joel

Martinez Perez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10438

D.C. Nos. 4:13-cr-00882-CKJ

 4:15-cr-00176-CKJ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 16, 2016** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. 

Joel Martinez-Perez appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the revocation of his term of supervised release. We have

FILED

AUG 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, MartinezPerez’s request for oral argument is denied.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Martinez-Perez’s motion to expand his notice of appeal is granted. 

Martinez-Perez’s pro se notice of appeal identified both judgments from which he

was appealing. Although he indicated that he was appealing only his sentences, we

consider his challenges to his conviction and revocation because the government

has fully briefed those issues. See United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528

(9th Cir. 1997).

Martinez-Perez contends that the district court erred by denying his

counsel’s pre-plea motion to withdraw. He waived his right to appeal this issue in

his illegal reentry case when he entered his unconditional guilty plea.

1

 See United

States v. Foreman, 329 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other

grounds by United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). Martinez-Perez argues that we may consider this issue in his supervised

release case because his admission was not knowing and voluntary. He asserts that

he could not communicate with his counsel and that the magistrate judge violated

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 by failing to advise him of the rights he

1

 In light of this conclusion, we do not reach the government’s alternate

argument that Martinez-Perez waived his right to appeal the court’s denial of the

motion to withdraw in his illegal reentry case pursuant to the appeal waiver in the

parties’ plea agreement.

2 15-10438
was waiving and the penalties he could face by his admission. The record reflects,

however, that Martinez-Perez knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to being in the

United States illegally on December 29, 2014. He was informed of the rights he

was waiving by pleading guilty, that he could receive a sentence up to 78 months,

and that he could receive a concurrent or consecutive sentence for his violation of

supervised release. On this record, we cannot conclude that Martinez-Perez’s

admission to violating supervised release was not knowing and voluntary. 

AFFIRMED.

3 15-10438
# January 2022 FOIA Log
#### 1322.101-4 Removal of items from contractors' facilities affected by work stoppages.

The contracting officer shall obtain approval from the head of the contracting office and seek legal advice before initiating any action in accordance with FAR 22.101-4.
#### 1815.404-472 Payment of profit or fee under letter contracts.

NASA's policy is to pay profit or fee only on definitized contracts.

[65 FR 12485, Mar. 9, 2000]
### §940a. Repealed. Pub. L. 104–127, title VII, §780, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 1151

Section, act May 20, 1936, ch. 432, title III, §311, as added Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. 99–500, §101(m) [title VI, §623], 100 Stat. 1783–308, 1783–333, and Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. 99–591, §101(m) [title VI, §623], 100 Stat. 3341–308, 3341–333; amended Oct. 13, 1994, Pub. L. 103–354, title II, §235(a)(7), (13), 108 Stat. 3221, related to privatization demonstration program.
# Sheet3

# Sheet1

# Sheet2
#### Frank E. Hollins, Appellant, v. City of Lackawanna et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously modified to strike therefrom the first ordering paragraph and, as so modified, affirmed, with $25- costs and disbursements to each respondent. Memorandum: In this article 78 proceeding to set aside the action of the city in designating the respondent The Front Page, Inc., as the official newspaper the petition was properly dismissed. In such a proceeding, however, Special Term was not required to pass directly upon the legality and propriety of such designation. We conclude that subdivision 9 of section 62 of the City Charter is here controlling. The pertinent provision grants to the Council the power to designate an official newspaper to publish “ the proceedings of the common council as furnished by the clerk.” If there could be found to be any conflict between this provision and the requirements of section 33 relating to competitive bidding, the provision in section 62 is controlling. It is a recognized rule of statutory construction that all parts of an act are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent and this rule is applicable to a city charter *(Doonan*v. *Killilea,*222, N. Y. 399). The Legislature has delegated to the council both the authority to designate an official newspaper and the discretion how best to do it. (Cf. *Relihan*v. *Brink,*285 App. Div. 729.) This delegation should not be destroyed in substance by requiring that the proceedings must be published in a newspaper, the owner of which was the lowest bidder for the work. If the official designee could not publish the material except as it might be, by coincidence, the lowest bidder, the designation would be an empty formality. (Appeal from order of Erie Special Term denying petitioner’s application to have alleged contracts between defendants to be declared illegal and void and declaring the action by the Mayor and Common Council of the City of Lackawanna as to designating “ The Front Page, Inc.” as an official newspaper to be legal and proper.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
#### 1404.7001 General.

The DOI Departmental Library is responsible for maintaining a complete collection of Departmental publications. As used in this Subpart, the term “Departmental publication” means any publication or report produced under a DOI contract or Interagency agreement.
#### 1401.670 Contracting officers' representatives.

When a CO elects to appoint an individual to act as an authorized representative in the administration of a contract, the CO must notify the contractor of the COR appointment in writing, and provide the name and contact information of the COR.

[76 FR 50141, Aug. 12, 2011]