IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1621

Filed May 17, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RAY ALEXANDER SANGSTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William P. Kelly, 

Judge.

Ray Alexander Sangster appeals his sentence for the charge of leaving 

the scene of an accident resulting in death. AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.

Ray Alexander Sangster appeals his sentence for the charge of leaving 

the scene of an accident resulting in death, claiming the district court abused its 

discretion in imposing sentence. See Iowa Code § 321.261 (2016). “We review 

sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion or defect in the sentencing 

procedure.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015). When, as 

here, the sentence given “falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is 

valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate 

factors.” Id. at 554. “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts 

on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 553 

(quoting State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Iowa 2006)). “We give 

sentencing decisions by a trial court a strong presumption in their favor.” Id. 

Here, the district court sentenced Sangster to a term of imprisonment for 

no more than five years. In imposing this sentence, the court considered 

Sangster’s relatively young age, his lack of criminal history, his lack of 

substance-abuse history, and his excellent employment circumstances. The 

court also considered the nature of the offense, the presentence investigation 

report recommending incarceration, the need to protect the community, and the 

nature and circumstances of the offense. Before making its decision, the court 

heard victim impact statements from the victim’s mother, the victim’s girlfriend 

and mother of his children, the victim’s father, and the victim’s sister. The court 

also heard the State’s recommendation of incarceration. The court explicitly 

considered the options available: deferred judgment, probation, and 

incarceration. However, the court concluded, based at least in part on the 
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severity of the offense and the way Sangster handled the incident demonstrating 

a lack of responsibility, a five-year sentence of incarceration was warranted to 

protect the community and provide Sangster the maximum opportunity for 

rehabilitation. Under these circumstances, we cannot find the district court 

abused its discretion in imposing sentence.

Sangster also appeals the district court’s imposition of a law enforcement 

initiative surcharge of $125. See Iowa Code § 911.3. The States concedes 

section 911.3 does not apply to violations committed under section 321.261(4). 

See id. (applying the surcharge to offenses committed under chapters 124, 155A, 

453B, 713, 714, 715A, or 716 and sections 719.7, 719.8, 725.1, 725.2, and 

725.3). At sentencing, the district court mistakenly informed Sangster, “You’ll 

have to pay a Law Enforcement Initiative fee of $125.” The plea and sentencing 

order instructed the clerk of court to assess the surcharge “to each applicable 

offense.” “A rule of nearly universal application is that ‘where there is a 

discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written 

judgment and commitment, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls.’” State 

v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995) (citation omitted). The State argues 

there is no evidence in this record the surcharge was assessed by the clerk of 

court, as there is no “applicable offense” to which it should be applied. We find, 

however, on the record before us we have a discrepancy between the oral 

pronouncement and the written judgment, and the controlling oral 

pronouncement was an illegal sentence. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the

sentence that imposed the section 911.3 law enforcement initiative surcharge.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.