alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILMER AUGUSTO PALACIOSGONZLAEZ, AKA Wilmer Augusto 

Palacios-Gonzalez, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71277 

Agency No. A095-321-321 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 16, 2021**

Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. 

Wilmer Augusto Palacios-Gonzlaez1(“petitioner”), a native and citizen of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 Although petitioner’s name appears as Wilmer Augusto Palacios-Gonzlaez

in the orders issued by the agency, the petition for review and opening brief filed in 

this court show his name as Wilmer Augusto Palacios-Gonzalez.

FILED

MAR 18 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-71277 

Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 

order denying his motion to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings. We 

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the 

denial of a motion to reopen, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 

2010), and the denial of a motion to terminate, Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 

734 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to 

reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 10 years after the order of 

removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioner has not 

established changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory 

exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. 

Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material 

evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had 

changed).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion 

to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to establish 

that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To qualify 

for equitable tolling on account of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 

must demonstrate ... due diligence in discovering counsel’s fraud or error....”);
3 19-71277 

Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (listing factors relevant to 

the diligence inquiry).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to 

reopen and terminate his proceedings where petitioner’s contention that the 

immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his proceedings is foreclosed by Aguilar 

Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (“the lack of time, date, and 

place in the NTA sent to [petitioner] did not deprive the immigration court of 

jurisdiction over her case”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
_______________________________________ __ _____________ _______________ _____________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

August 14, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 130194(59)(60)(61) Maura D. Corrigan 13096(47) Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman,
Justices

THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, SC: 130194 v COA: 250863 Jackson CC: 01-003614-AS CITY OF JACKSON, JACKSON PLANNING COMMISSION, and JACKSON CITY COUNCIL, Defendants-Appellants.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion under State Bar Rule 15, sec 2 for temporary permission for Davi d Shelton Parkhurst to appeal for amicus National League of Cities is GRANTED. The motion by th e National League of Cities
for leave to file a brief amicus curiae is considered and it is GRANTED. The motions by defendants-appellants for extension to July 10 , 2006 of the time for filing their briefs on appeal are GRANTED.

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

August 14, 2006

Clerk
<PAGE>                                                         EXHIBIT 23(b)

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


    We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements (Forms S-3 Nos. 333-01599, 333-24091, and 333-41003 and Forms S-8
Nos. 33-79462, 333-02565, and 333-30089) of First Commercial Corporation of
our report dated January 31, 1997, with respect to the consolidated balance
sheet of Southwest Bancshares, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996,
and the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and
cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 1996,
which report is included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of First Commercial
Corporation for the year ended December 31, 1997.


/s/ Kemp & Company

Little Rock, Arkansas
March 27, 1998
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Andrew P. Blocher, the Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Federal Realty Investment Trust (the
Company), has executed this certification in connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 (the Report).
The undersigned hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|            |  |                                                             
|----------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------
|May 4, 2010 |  | /s/    Andrew P.
Blocher                                    
|            |  | Andrew P. Blocher,                                          
|            |  | Senior Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
|            |  | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)                



33
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20202

TO: Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education 

FROM: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Authority to Designate a Department Employee to Serve as the Designated Federal 

Officer for the National Advisory Council on Indian Education 

I. DELEGATION

By the authority vested in me by Section 412 of the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 

U.S.C. § 3472, I hereby delegate to you, or anyone serving for you in an acting capacity or 

delegated to perform the functions and duties of your position, the authority to designate a 

Department employee to serve as and carry out the duties of the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) 

for the National Advisory Council on Indian Education (NACIE), as set forth in 41 C.F.R. §§ 102-

3.25 (definition of the term “Designated Federal Officer”), 102-3.105(i), and 102-3.120 and 

Sections 1009(e) and (f) of 5 U.S.C. Chapter 10 (Federal Advisory Committees). 

Unless otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, amendments to the existing authorities 

delegated herein are included within the scope of this delegation. 

II. RESERVATIONS

Unless otherwise noted in existing or future delegations of authority, the following is not 

delegated: 

The authority to fix the compensation of NACIE members.

III. REDELEGATION

Subject to the requirements of law, you may redelegate any of the authority delegated to you in 

this delegation and authorize further redelegation. Any redelegation must be done in accordance 

with the Administrative Communications System directive, ACSD-OFO-015, Delegation of 

Authority, dated August 26, 2016. 

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE 

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department's Principal Delegations Control 

Officer. I ratify actions within the scope of this delegation taken by you prior to the date of 

certification.

_____________/s_________ 

Miguel A. Cardona, Ed.D. 
OGC Clearance: /s/ Lauren Friedrich, 02/08/2023 

Certified Date: 2/15/2023

Delegations Control Officer: Jim Clemmens

Control Number: EA/ES/110
1239.7001 Definitions. As used in this subpart— *Adequate security* means protective measures that are commensurate with the consequences and probability of loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to, or modification of information.
*Contractor attributional/proprietary information* means information that identifies the contractor(s), whether directly or indirectly, by the grouping of information that can be traced back to the contractor(s) (*e.g.,* program description, facility locations), personally identifiable information, as well as trade secrets, commercial or financial information, or other commercially sensitive information that is not customarily shared outside of the company.
*Contractor information system* means an unclassified information system that is owned, or operated by or for, a contractor and that processes, stores, or transmits DOT sensitive information.
*Cyber incident* means actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information residing therein.
*DOT sensitive data* means unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with law, regulations, and Governmentwide policies, and is— ( 1 ) Marked or otherwise identified in the contract, task order, or delivery order and provided to the contractor by or on behalf of DOT in support of the performance of the contract; or
( 2 ) Collected, developed, received, transmitted, used, or stored by or on behalf of the contractor in support of the performance of the contract.
*Rapidly report* means reporting within two (2) hours of discovery of any cyber incident.
*Technical information* means recorded information, regardless of the form or method of the recording, of a scientific or technical nature (including computer software documentation). The term does not include computer software or data incidental to contract administration, such as financial and/or management information. Examples of technical information include research and engineering data, engineering drawings, and associated lists, specifications, standards, process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, catalog-item identifications, data sets, studies and analyses and related information, and computer software executable code and source code.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dynamic Materials Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Richard A. Santa, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(i)                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)               The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | April 28, 2011                                 |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |                                                |   |
|   |                                                |   |
|   | /s/   Richard A. Santa                              |   |
|   | Richard   A. Santa                                  |   |
|   | Senior   Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |   |
|   | of   Dynamic Materials Corporation                  |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Dynamic Materials Corporation and will be retained by Dynamic Materials Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
1422.807 Exemptions. ( a ) The Director, PAM shall make the determination that a contract is essential to the national security and that the award of the contract without complying with one of the requirements of FAR 22.8 is necessary to national security.
( b ) Requests for exemptions shall be submitted in writing by the CO, through the HCA, to the Director, PAM.
#### In the Matter of Leonard J. Eisenberg, an Attorney, Respondent. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner.

First Department,

February 27, 1979

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Alan S. Phillips*of counsel *(Nicholas C. Cooper,*attorney), for petitioner.

*Joel A. Brenner*for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

*Per Curiam.*

Petitioner moves for an order pursuant to section 90 of the Judiciary Law striking respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys on the ground that respondent is subject to auto*498matic disbarment following a Federal felony conviction. On July 13, 1978, respondent was convicted following trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiring to commit offenses against the United States and unlawfully transporting counterfeit securities in interstate commerce consisting of 90 official checks in violation of sections 2 and 2314 of title 18 of the United States Code. Respondent’s conviction of a crime amounting to a Federal felony carries with it automatic disbarment pursuant to subdivision 4 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law *(Matter of Thies,*45 NY2d 865; *Matter of Chu,*42 NY2d 490). Contrary to respondent’s contention, a hearing is unnecessary. Nor is it at all relevant that respondent has appealed the Federal conviction. In the event of reversal of that conviction, respondent is not without available remedy to move upon proper papers for his reinstatement to the Bar.

Accordingly, the application by petitioner for an order directing respondent’s disbarment should be granted and the clerk directed to strike respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in the State of New York.

Birns, J. P., Evans, Fein, Sullivan and Bloom, JJ., concur.

Respondent’s name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in the State of New York.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Herman Edward Floyd, Respondent, v. Daniel E. Damon, Jr., as Superintendent of the Elmira Reformatory, Respondent. The People of the State of New York, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chemung County, granting relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing his release from custody at the Elmira Reformatory. On August 10, 1959 relator was declared in violation of parole. However, on October 6, 1959, before he was apprehended for such violation, relator was arrested by the New York City Police for new crimes. Subsequently relator plead guilty to a violation of section 1751-a of the Penal Law as a misdemeanor, and on February 3, 1960 was sentenced to an indefinite term in the New York City Penitentiary pursuant to article 7-A of the Correction Law. Thereafter, relator established that this sentence was erroneous, and on August 16, 1961 the original sentence was vacated and relator sentenced to a term of one year in the city penitentiary. Under this sentence relator’s maximum sentence expired on October 6, 1960. Relator claims, and the court below has upheld his contention, that he is entitled to credit against his prior unexpired sentence for the period between October 6, 1960, the date his corrected sentence expired, and March 7, 1961, the date the parole detainer warrant became effective. The court below based its determination on the provisions of section 2193 of the Penal Law, particularly subdivision 3, and on the grounds that “ with a parole violation warrant out against him, relator was in the constructive custody of the respondent during the period he was wrongfully detained in the New York City Penitentiary.” We cannot agree. First we see no basis for holding that relator was in *“*constructive custody ” of the Board of Parole while he was wrongfully detained by the city authorities. During the entire period in dispute complete custody at all times was in the city authorities (see *People ex rel. Leibowitz*v. *La Vallee,*17 A D 2d 887, mot. for lv. to app. den. 12 N Y 2d 645, cert. den. 373 U. S. 946). The board at no time had even the semblance of custody and its parole detainer warrant had absolutely no effect on relator’s confinement during this period. Secondly we do not find section 2193 applicable to the instant situation. Subdivisions 1 and 2 dealing with confinement prior to conviction and sentence and detention for parole violation respectively cannot apply here. Similarly subdivision 3 has no applicability since relator’s detention did not result from charges of new crimes which charges were ultimately dismissed or relator acquitted thereof. Rather relator was convicted of such charges, and his improper detention was solely the result of an error in the sentencing procedure (see *People ex rel. Valentino*v. *Conboy,*12 A D 2d 706). Order reversed, on the law and the facts, and petition dismissed, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Taylor and Aulisi, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Dempsey, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered April 4, 1975 (the date on the clerk’s extract is May 22, 1975), convicting him of robbery in the second degree, assault in the second and third degrees and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment modified, on the law, by reversing the convictions of assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, and the sentences imposed thereon, and the said counts are dismissed. As so modified, judgment affirmed. On the facts of this case, assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree are inclusory concurrent counts of the robbery count. Accordingly, the judgment is modified by reversing the convictions of those crimes and dismissing the said counts (see CPL 300.30, subd 4; 300.40, subd 3, par [b]). Latham, J. P., Rabin, Cohalan and Margett, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                          2,261
<SECURITIES>                    28,525
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                32,361
<PP&E>                          2,500
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  34,861
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           0
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        605,840
<OTHER-SE>                      (278,452)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    34,861
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                0
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   9,636
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (9,633)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (9,633)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
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<NET-INCOME>                    (9,633)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.004)
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</TABLE>
Appeal No. 75-18.

#### William Granger *et al. v.*Walter Johnson.

*Blais, Cunningham, Thayer, Gagnon & Ross, Ronald R. Gagnon,*for plaintiffs. *Francis J. O’Brien,*for defendant.

Motion of plaintiffs to reconsider the granting of the defendant's motion to stay judgment and injunction of the Superior Court is denied.
#### 1452.215-70 Examination of Records by the Department of the Interior.

As prescribed in 1415.209-70, insert the following clause:

# Examination of Records by the Department of the Interior (APR 1984)

For purposes of the Examination of Records by the Comptroller General clause of this contract (FAR 52.215-1), the Secretary of the Interior, the Inspector General, and their duly authorized representative(s) from the Department of the Interior shall have the same access and examination rights as the Comptroller General of the United States.

(End of clause)
#### 1239.7403 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1239.239-91, Records Management, in all solicitations and contracts involving services where contractors or subcontractors and their employees or associates collect, access, maintain, use, disseminate, or otherwise handle Federal records.
### §246. Maintenance of records

To facilitate the administration of this chapter, the following persons shall maintain such records and make such reports, as the Secretary may by regulation require:

(1) A warehouse operator that is licensed under this chapter.

(2) A person operating a system for the electronic recording and transfer of receipts and other documents that are authorized under this chapter.

(3) Any other person engaged in the issuance of electronic receipts or the transfer of documents under this chapter.

(Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, §7, as added Pub. L. 106–472, title II, §201, Nov. 9, 2000, 114 Stat. 2065.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 246, acts Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, §25, 39 Stat. 490; Mar. 2, 1931, ch. 366, §8, 46 Stat. 1465, related to suspension and revocation of license, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 106–472. See section 252 of this title.

A prior section 7 of act Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, was classified to section 249 of this title, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 106–472.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of George Allen, Appellant-Respondent, and Kenneth A. Fisher, et al., Appellants-Respondents, against New World Building Corporation et al., Respondents. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Motion to resettle order denied, without costs. The moving party appeared upon the appeal and filed a brief in support of the determination of the board and that determination having been reversed it was proper that such a party share the costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
### §110. Repealed. June 27, 1952, ch. 477, title IV, §403(a)(25), 66 Stat. 279, eff. Dec. 24, 1952

Section, acts Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 364, title IV, 43 Stat. 1049; Aug. 7, 1946, ch. 768, 60 Stat. 865; Mar. 20, 1952, ch. 108, §2, 66 Stat. 26, related to arrest of aliens without warrant. See section 1357 of this title.
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Hilda D. Lincoln, Deceased.

Motion for an extension of time granted insofar as to extend the time for contestants-appellants-respondents to procure the record on appeal and points to be served and filed on or before August 14, 1962, with notice of argument for the September 1962 Term of this court, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. The order of this court entered on March 15, 1962 is amended accordingly. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, McNally and Eager, JJ.