1



### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON

ERN EST A ND ERS ON v. D AV ID M ILLS, WAR DEN

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Laud erdale County No. 5964 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2005-01403-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled October 18, 2005

This matter is befor e the Court upon the State’s m otion to aff irm the j udg ment of t he trial court by opinion pur suant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the tr ia l c ou rt ' s de nia l of ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f. A r e vie w o f the re c or d r e ve a ls t ha t th e Pe tit ion e r i s not entitled to habeas c orpus relief

. Acc ording ly , the State' s motion i s g rante d and the judg ment of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed P ursuan t to Rule 20, Rules of th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Ernest Ande rson, pro se.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Rep orte r; B ri a n Cl a y John so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

The Petitioner, Ernest Ander son, was convicted, on J uly 10, 1989, of one count of sec ond deg ree murder. F or this offense , Petitioner was sente nced to thirty (30) y ear s in the Depa rtment of Cor re c tio n. As a lle g e d by the Pe tit ion e r, he wa s re le a se d o n p aro le in 1 99 5. He vio la te d th is r e le a se by a su bs e qu e nt a

rr e st a ndc on vic tio n a nd wa s inc arc e rate d. Pe tit ion e r wa s, a g a in, re le a se d o n p aro le2

in 1 99 7. He wa s a

rr e ste d in 20 00 a s a re su lt of a do me sti c dis pu te . H e wa s a lso arr e ste d f or pu bli c intox ication for w hich he wa s convicted a nd sentenc ed to two day s in jail. P etitioner’s pa role wa s revoke d as a result of his misdemeanor c onviction. Petiti oner w as subseque ntly denied pa role ba sed upon finding s that “[t] here is substantial risk that the offende r will not conform to the c onditions of rele ase,” “[t] he re lease from custody at this tim e would depr ecia te the seriousness o f t h e crime of wh ic h th e of

fe nd e r s ta nd s c on vic te d o r p ro mot e dis re sp e c t f or the la w, ” a nd“ du e to parole

v i o l at i o n s

. ” P et i t i o n er i s cu rr en t l y co n fi n ed at t h e W es tT en n es s ee S t at e P en i t en t i ar y i n He n n i n g, Tenne ssee.
On May 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a h ab ea s corpus pe tition i n the Circuit Court for L auder dale County

. As g rounds for relief
, Petitioner asserted t hat he is being unlaw fully restra ined of his liberty

by the S tate of Tenne ssee’ s Parole and Probation Boa rd. S pecif

ically , he complaine d that, h e is b e ing ill e g a lly re str a ine d by th e pa

ro le bo ardin v iol a tio n o f the ir pa ro le g uid e lin e s. Petitioner further

alleg ed that he ha s a liberty interest t o wa rd p ar o l e and suc h liberty may not be denied without due pr ocess. I n support of his immediate re lease from conf inement and not anothe r parole hearing, Petitioner r elied upon W ilkinson v. Dotson
, – U. S

. – , 1 2 5 S. Ct . 1242 (2005). The trial court r eviewe d the petition and, on May 27, 2005, denied the sa me, finding that the Petitioner’s challeng e to the actions of the Boa rd of Probation and Parole was not c og nizable in a habea s corpus proce eding . Petitioner timelyappea led the lower court’s de cision.

A wr i t o f h ab eas corpus may be g rante d only

when the pe titioner has established lac k of jurisd ic tio n f

or the or de r o f c on fi ne me nt o r tha t he is o the rw ise e nti tle d to imm e diate re le a se be c a us e of the e x piration of his sentenc e. See Ussery v. Av ery, 22 2 Te nn . 50, 43 2 S.W.2 d 6 56 (1 96 8) ; Sta te

ex re l. W ad e v . No rv e ll, 1 T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 4 4 7
, 4 4 3 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 9 ( 1 9 6 9 )

. Th e Pe tit ion e r i n t h i s c a se does not arg ue that his sentenc e has expired nor does he arg ue that his judg ment or sentenc e is void. Ra the r, Pe tit ion e r c ha lle ng e s th e a c tio ns of the B oa rd of Pr ob a tio n a ndParo le . A c tio ns by the Paro le Boa rd are revie wable by the common law wr it of certiorari, see Thandi we v. Traugher , 909 S.W .2d 802, 803 (Tenn. A pp. 1994), and must be f iled in chanc ery

court. Te nn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. T he Pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s, ho we ve r, that the Un ite d Stat e s Su pr e me Cou rt re c e ntl y he ld tha t a

pr iso ne r s ho uld pr os e c ute a

writ o f h abe a s c or

pu s if he se e ks imm e diate re le a se fr om c us tod y a nd no t a no the r p aro le hearing. In W

ilkinson v. Dotson,

--- U.S. ---- , 125 S.Ct . 1242 (2005), the Supre me Court held that pr iso ne rs c a nn ot u se a

se c tio n 1 98 3 a c tio n to c ha lle ng e th e fact or du ratio n o f h is c on fi ne me nt. Rather, suc h actions must be broug ht unde r the fe dera l habea s corpus statutes or ap prop ria te sta te relief

. Id. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. W h i l e i t i s t ru e t h a t P e t i t i o n e r s e e k s “ i m m e d i a t e r e l e a s e ” f r o m c u s t o d y, the basis of his r elief is not that his s entenc e has e x pired or tha t the judgme nt ag ainst him is voi d. Rather, his c omplaint c halleng es the Parole B oard’ s denial of pa role, including the unconstitutional application of the Boa

rd’s g uidelines. Such complaints are not a cog nizable gr ound for state habea s corpus r elief.

Additionally , Petitioner asserts that the rig ht to parole is a protec ted liberty interest, entitling him to due proce ss of law. Te nnessee courts have consi s t en t l y i n terpre ted Tenne ssee law as not

cre ating a liberty

interest in par ole dec isions. See, e .g., W e lls v . Ten ne sse e Bd

. o f P arole s, 909 S.W .2d 826 (1995) ; K

a yl o r v. Bradley, 912 S.W .2d 728, 733 (Tenn. A pp. 1995). Ther e is no3

constitutional or inherent rig ht to b e conditionally rele ased be fore the expiration of a prison sente nce. State v. Sutton, 1 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 8 6
, 6 9 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Gree nholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Pe nal and Corr. Complex, 44 2 U .S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct . 2 10 0 ( 19 79 ); Da nie ls v . Tr au gh be r, 984 S.W .2d 918, 92 4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e als o Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -5 03 (b ) (2 00 3) (s ta tin g that " [r]e le a se
on parole is a privileg e and not a rig ht") )

. Although a state may establish a parole sy stem, it has no duty to do so, and thus, the prese nce of a par ole sy stem by

itself does not g ive rise to a constitutionally -protec ted liberty interest in pa

role rele ase. Id. a t 7; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373, 107 S.C t. 2415 (1987). Rather , a liberty interest is prese nt only if state law e ntitles an inm ate to re lease on parole

. Sutton , 1 66 S.W. 3da t 69 1; se e als o In ma te s o f O rie nt Cor r. In st. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 ( 6th Cir. 1991). There fore, Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-501 ( 2003), the statute a ddressing parole elig ibilit y dates, doe s not provide

a c e r ta in ty o f p ar o le f o r s e n te n c e s g r e a te r

than t wo y ear s. Sutton , 1 66 S.W. 3da t 69 1. Ra the r, it si mp ly"pro vi des no mo re t han a me re ho pe tha t th e ben efi t w il l b e ob tai ned ." Id. (c i t i n g Gre e nh olt z, 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S.Ct . 2100).

I f ah ab e a s c o rp u s p e t i t i o n f a i l s t o s t a t e a

c o g n i z ab l e c l a i m f

o r r e l i e f
, i tm a y

b e s u m m a ri ly dismiss ed. Pa ssa re lla v . S tat e , 891 S.W .2d 619, 6 2 7 (T en n

. Crim. App. 1994). The Petitioner’s challeng es to the Parole B oard’ s denial of pa ro l e and to t he constitutionalityof the B oard’ s g uidelines are not claims rec og nized in a st ate habeas corpus proceeding as they do not result in a void judgment. Thus, the tr ial court prope rly dismiss ed the pe tition.

Acc ording ly , it is ordered tha t the State’s m otion is g rante d. The judgment of the trial court is a ff ir me d in a c c or da nc e wi th R ule 20 , Ru le s o f the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls.



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J.C . MCLIN, JUDGE