alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 10(1)-3

                                AMENDMENT NO. 2

                                      TO

                    PPL OFFICERS DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN

     WHEREAS, PPL Services Corporation ("PPL") has adopted the PPL Officers
Deferred Compensation Plan ("Plan") effective July 1, 2000; and

     WHEREAS, the Plan was amended and restated effective July 1, 2000, and
subsequently amended by Amendment No. 1; and

     WHEREAS, PPL desires to further amend the Plan;

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

I.   Effective December 1, 2000, Articles 2, 5 and 6 are amended to read:

2.   Definitions.

(q)  "Total Amount Payable" means the amount credited to a Participant's Account
     plus the calculated rate of return pursuant to paragraph 5(e).

5.   Account.  PPL shall maintain an Account in the name of each Participant.
Such Account shall be maintained as follows:

     (a)  PPL shall credit the Deferred Cash Compensation to Participant's
Account on a daily basis for each business day as if Cash Compensation that
would have been paid was paid over each business day of the calendar year.

     (e)  Participant's Account shall be credited in substantially equivalent
frequency and with a calculated rate of return substantially equivalent to the
rate of return that would have been realized had the Account been invested in
one or more mutual fund choices offered by the PPL Deferred Savings Plan as of
December 1, 2000. The mutual fund or funds utilized to calculate the rate of
return on the Participant's Account shall be

                                      -1-
<PAGE>

that mutual fund or funds elected by the Participant in writing on an election
form submitted to the EBPB. The Participant may change investment choices in the
same manner as may be permitted by the PPL Deferred Savings Plan for Participant
funds in that Plan as of December 1, 2000.

6.   Payment of Account - General Provisions

(d)  So long as there is a balance in Participant's Account, the balance shall
be credited with the calculated rate of return pursuant to paragraph 5(e). For
any installment or other payment from the Account, the calculated rate of return
shall accrue until the last business day as may be practicable prior to that
payment to Participant or his beneficiary.

II.  Except as provided for in this Amendment No. 2, all other provisions of the
     Plan shall remain in full force and effect.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No. 2 is executed this _____ day of
_____________________, 2000.

                                           PPL SERVICES CORPORATION


                                           By:__________________________________
                                               Charles P. Pinto
                                               Vice President - Human Resources

                                      -2-
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-1767

STEPHEN KYPRIANIDES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

PASQUOTANK PUBLIC LIBRARY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Malcolm J. Howard,

District Judge. (CA-00-17-2-H)

Submitted: October 4, 2001 Decided: October 11, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen Kyprianides, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher W. Jones,

WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Stephen Kyprianides appeals from the district court’s order

dismissing his civil action in which he claimed gender discrimination based upon the failure of the Appellee to hire him. Our

review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses

that this appeal is without merit. As the district judge found,

Kyprianides failed to establish a prima facie case of employment

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 (1973); Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, 928 F.2d 118, 121 (4th

Cir. 1991). See also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,

517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court's finding of non-discrimination was clearly erroneous.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

We therefore affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Kyprianides v. Pasquotank Pub. Library, No. CA-00-17-2-H (E.D.N.C.

May 10, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[106th Congress Public Law 479]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ479.106]

[[Page 114 STAT. 2184]]

Public Law 106-479
106th Congress

                                 An Act

 
   To authorize the Frederick Douglass Gardens, Inc., to establish a 
memorial and gardens on Department of the Interior lands in the District 
  of Columbia or its environs in honor and commemoration of Frederick 
            Douglass. <<NOTE: Nov. 9, 2000 -  [H.R. 5331]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress <<NOTE: 40 USC 1003 note.>>  
assembled,

SECTION 1. MEMORIAL AND GARDENS TO HONOR AND COMMEMORATE FREDERICK 
            DOUGLASS.

    (a) Memorial and Gardens Authorized.--The Frederick Douglass 
Gardens, Inc., is authorized to establish a memorial and gardens on 
lands under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of the 
Interior in the District of Columbia or its environs in honor and 
commemoration of Frederick Douglass.
    (b) Compliance With Standards for Commemorative Works.--The 
establishment of the Frederick Douglass memorial and gardens shall be in 
accordance with the Commemorative Works Act (40 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF EXPENSES.

    The Frederick Douglass Gardens, Inc., shall be solely responsible 
for acceptance of contributions for, and payment of the expenses of, the 
establishment of the memorial and gardens. No Federal funds may be used 
to pay any expense of the establishment of the memorial and gardens.

SEC. 3. DEPOSIT OF EXCESS FUNDS.

    If, upon payment of all expenses of the establishment of the 
memorial and gardens (including the maintenance and preservation amount 
required under section 8(b) of the Commemorative Works Act (40 U.S.C. 
1008(b)), or upon expiration of the authority for the memorial and 
gardens under section 10(b) of such Act (40 U.S.C. 1010(b)), there 
remains a balance of funds received for the establishment of the 
memorial and gardens, Frederick Douglass Gardens, Inc., shall transmit 
the amount of the balance to the

[[Page 114 STAT. 2185]]

Secretary of the Treasury for deposit in the account provided for in 
section 8(b)(1) of such Act (40 U.S.C. 1008(b)(1)).

    Approved November 9, 2000.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 5331:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 146 (2000):
            Oct. 3, considered and passed House.
            Oct. 26, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
§ 776.43 Fairness to opposing party and counsel. ( a ) A covered attorney shall not: ( 1 ) Unlawfully obstruct a party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A covered attorney shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
( 2 ) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
( 3 ) Knowingly disobey an order of the tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
( 4 ) In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by a party;
( 5 ) In trial, allude to any matter that the covered attorney does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or
( 6 ) Request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless: ( i ) The person is a relative, an employee, or other agent of a client; and
( ii ) The covered attorney reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
( b ) [Reserved]
### §2305. Enforcement provisions

#### (a) Civil actions by persons aggrieved; preventive relief; attorneys' fees; security

Whenever any handler has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any handler is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 2303 of this title, a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved. In any action commenced pursuant hereto, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. The court may provide that no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.

#### (b) Civil actions by Attorney General; Federal jurisdiction; complaint; preventive relief

Whenever the Secretary of Agriculture has reasonable cause to believe that any handler, or group of handlers, has engaged in any act or practice prohibited by section 2303 of this title, he may request the Attorney General to bring civil action in his behalf in the appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) setting forth facts pertaining to such act or practice, and (2) requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the handler, or handlers, responsible for such acts or practices. Upon receipt of such request, the Attorney General is authorized to file such complaint.

#### (c) Suits by persons injured; Federal jurisdiction; amount of recovery; attorneys' fees; limitation of actions

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of, or combination or conspiracy to violate, any provision of section 2303 of this title may sue therefor in the appropriate district court of the United States without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover damages sustained. In any action commenced pursuant to this subsection, the court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs. Any action to enforce any cause of action under this subsection shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued.

#### (d) Federal jurisdiction; exhaustion of other remedies; State laws and jurisdiction unaffected

The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and shall exercise the same without regard to whether the aggrieved party shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.

The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to change or modify existing State law nor to deprive the proper State courts of jurisdiction.

(Pub. L. 90–288, §6, Apr. 16, 1968, 82 Stat. 95.)
#### State of Connecticut *v.*David J. Concaugh

It appearing that the defendant in the above-entitled case has failed to prosecute his appeal from the Superior Court in New Haven County with proper diligence, it is, under Practice Book § 696, *675ordered by the Supreme Court, suo motu, that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed unless the defendant files his brief on or before January 10,1975.

*John W. Kline,*for the appellant (defendant).

*Ernest J. Diette, Jr.,*assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Argued December 3

decided December 3, 1974
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**602 CA 14-01889**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

CHARLES M. ALBERT, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATHLEEN A. MACHOLS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

OSBORN, REED & BURKE, LLP, ROCHESTER (MICHAEL A. REDDY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

LAW OFFICE OF FRANK G. MONTEMALO, PLLC, ROCHESTER (FRANK G. MONTEMALO OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Ann Marie Taddeo, J.), entered June 24, 2014 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages forinjuries he sustained when the vehicle he was operating collided headon with a vehicle operated by defendant. Supreme Court erred in denying defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant met her initial burden by establishing as a matter of law that the emergency doctrine applied ( see generally Caristo v Sanzone , 96 NY2d 172, 174), i.e., she established that she was operating her vehicle in a lawful and prudent manner when plaintiff’s vehicle suddenly and without warning crossed into her lane of travel, and there was nothing she could have done to avoid the collision ( see Hill v Cash , 117 AD3d 1423, 1426; Wasson v Szafarski , 6 AD3d 1182, 1183). “Although ‘it generally remains a question for the trier of fact to determine whether an emergency existed and, if so, whether the [driver’s] response was reasonable’ . . . , we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate here because defendant[] presented ‘sufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness of [her] actions [in an emergency situation] and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question of fact’ ” ( Shanahan v Mackowiak , 111 AD3d 1328, 1329-1330).

Entered: June 12, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 15.5

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of Elron Electronic Industries Ltd. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-111310) of our report dated February 17, 2005, on the consolidated financial statements of A.M.T. Advanced Metal Technologies Ltd. appearing in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Elron Electronic Industries Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2004.

 

 

 

|                                 |   |   |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/ Brightman Almagor & Co.      |   |   |        |
|                                 |   |   |   |
| Certified Public Accountants         |   |   |   |
| A member of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu |   |   |   |
|                                 |   |   |   |
| Tel Aviv, Israel                     |   |   |   |
| July          12, 2005               |   |   |   |

 

----
|Exhibit 21(a)                      |  |                         
|---------------------------------- |  | ------------------------
|PPL Corporation                    |  |                         
|Subsidiaries of the Registrant     |  |                         
|As of December 31, 2004            |  |                         
|                                   |  |                         
|                                   |  |                         
|Company Name                       |  | State or Jurisdiction of
|Business Conducted under Same Name |  | Incorporation/Formation 
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Electric Utilities Corporation |  | Pennsylvania            
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Energy Funding Corporation     |  | Pennsylvania            
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Energy Supply, LLC             |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Investment Corporation         |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Global, LLC                    |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PMDC International Holdings, Inc.  |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL EnergyPlus, LLC                |  | Pennsylvania            
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Generation, LLC                |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Montana Holdings, LLC          |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Montour, LLC                   |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|PPL Susquehanna, LLC               |  | Delaware                
|                                   |  |                         
|WPD Investment Holdings Ltd.       |  | United Kingdom
### **CHAPTER 3—CIVIL RIGHTS**
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

)

Amy Cook ) Case No: 11 C 9119 

)

v. ) Judge: John W. Darrah

)

Gary E. McCullough et al )

)

)

ORDER

The clerk is directed to remove pages 7 through 50 of the preliminary approval and scheduling

order titled “Notice of proposed settlement of class action exhibit A - 1 (Amended 10/30/13),

document #80 and place it on the related case, 12 C 276, Ross v. Career Education Corporation

et al, document #113, forthwith. 

Date: 11/7/13 /s/ Judge John W. Darrah

Case: 1:12-cv-00276 Document #: 114 Filed: 11/07/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:2748
§ 552.39 Acquisition of short-term leases by local commanding officers. Local commanding officers are authorized, without approval by higher authority, to make leases of camp sites, buildings, and grounds, for troops; office and storage space for small detachments; garage or parking space; space for recruiting stations; and land or space for similar purposes, provided: ( a ) Funds are available to the local commanding officer,
( b ) Rental consideration conforms to the prevailing rate in the locality,
( c ) The premises are to be occupied not longer than 3 months or in the case of Reserve training sites, not more than 90 days per year,
( d ) Rental for the entire period of occupancy does not exceed $500, and
( e ) Clearance is made with the General Services Administration, where required.
[22 FR 9284, Nov. 21, 1957, as amended at 23 FR 10536, Dec. 31, 1958]
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 17, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-60473 Summary Calendar

NIZARALI P. PRASLA, Petitioner,

versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A78 999 751

-------------------- Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Nizarali P. Prasla (Petitioner) petitions this court to review the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) entered May 4, 2005, which upheld the decision of the Immigration Judge that the Petitioner be deported. For the reasons stated by the BIA in its order dated May 4, 2005 and for the reasons stated by the Government in its brief, we conclude that the petition for review should be denied. DENIED.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 15



TXU Electric Company:

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited
condensed consolidated interim financial information of TXU Electric Company
and subsidiaries (TXU Electric) for the periods ended September 30, 2000 and
1999, as indicated in our report dated November 10, 2000; because we did not
perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in TXU
Electric's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,
2000, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statements No. 33-69554
and 333-42985 on Form S-3, and Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to Registration
Statement No. 33-83976 on Form S-3, of TXU Electric.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c)
under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the
Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report
prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and
11 of that Act.



DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Dallas, Texas
November 13, 2000
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff 

BOK DUK KIM 

v. Record No. 2020-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

CASH FLEX MARCH 12, 1996 

AND 

LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' 

COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Bok Duk Kim, pro se, on brief). 

 (Michael L. Zimmerman; Brault, Palmer, Grove, 

Zimmerman, White & Mims, on brief), for appellees. 

 Bok Duk Kim appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation 

Commission dismissing her application alleging an occupational 

disease. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 This appeal is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in 

The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, ___ Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 

___ (1996) (holding that "job-related impairments resulting from 

cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, however labeled or 

however defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under 

the present provisions of the Act"). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision 
 2 

 Affirmed.
#### § 989.33 Environmental justice.

During the preparation of environmental analyses under this instruction, the EPF should ensure compliance with the provisions of E.O. 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, and Executive Memorandum of February 11, 1994, regarding E.O. 12898.
1.103 Authority. ( a ) The development of the FAR System is in accordance with the requirements of 41 U.S.C. chapter 13, Acquisition Councils.
( b ) The FAR is prepared, issued, and maintained, and the FAR System is prescribed, jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, under their several statutory authorities.
[48 FR 42103, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 51 FR 27116, July 29, 1986. Redesignated at 60 FR 34733, July 3, 1995, as amended at 65 FR 36014, June 6, 2000; 79 FR 24194, Apr. 29, 2014]
#### Norman F. Dacey *v.*Connecticut Bar Association

*Sturges N. Laros,*in support of the motion.

Submitted November 7

decided November 12, 1974

The plaintiff’s “Motion to Disqualify” in the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is denied. See *Evans*v. *Gore,*258 U.S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887.