Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge John A. Nordberg Sitting Judge if Otherthan Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 1277 DATE 11/30/2012

CASE

TITLE

Linda Kobler vs. Illinois Dept. Human Services et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Defendants’ Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint [22] is denied. 

O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

 Plaintiff Linda Kobler has worked as a registered nurse for defendants at a mental health facility in

Rockford, Illinois. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 11, 18.) She has worked there for 38 years, and is apparently still employed.

(Id.) Defendants are several Illinois agencies and certain individuals in charge of those agencies who are

being sued in their official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that, since approximately August 2009, she has made

defendants aware that she has asthma, “which is triggered by strong or offensive perfumes and other

fragrances.” (¶ 1.) She often has to leave the nurses’ station and use an inhaler, especially when one

particular colleague is around. (¶¶ 1, 20.) Beginning in October 2009, plaintiff asked defendants for a

reasonable accommodation, including the institution of a restrictive fragrance policy. She alleges that

defendants failed to accommodate her, by proposing inadequate alternative solutions, and ultimately

retaliated against her by attempting to put her on the night shift and by lowering her performance evaluation.

(¶ 2.) She asserts a single claim pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. 

 Before the court is defendants’ motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to strike and dismiss portions of the

complaint. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must take the allegations of the complaint as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.

2007). Although the plaintiff need not plead particularized facts, the plaintiff must set forth enough facts to

pass the plausibility standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); McCauley v. City of Chicago,

671 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2011). The decree of specificity required depends on context and “is not easily

quantified.” Id. at 616-17. 

 Defendants raise five arguments. One of them, an argument concerning confidentiality, has been resolved

through the briefing process with plaintiff agreeing that this portion of her claim (¶ 64) is not viable because

it pertains only to a potential violation that did not occur. (Pl. Resp. at 2.). We address the remaining four

arguments.

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STATEMENT

 First, defendants argue that discriminatory acts occurring before February 23, 2010 are barred under the

applicable two-year statute of limitations. (Plaintiff does not dispute that the limitations period is two years.) 

As noted above, plaintiff first began seeking an accommodation in October 2009. However, according to the

complaint, this process dragged out for almost a year with plaintiff still pursuing her accommodation request

through the spring, summer, and fall of 2010. Plaintiff argues that defendants’ actions were part of a pattern

of conduct that continued into the limitations period. She seeks to rely on the continuing violation doctrine to

salvage the time-barred acts. (Pl. Resp. at 3, citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,536 U.S. 101, 114

(2002).) Plaintiff points out that after she initially sought an initial accommodation, she was persuaded to

withdraw her request and later was told to re-submit a written request, which she did in February 2010, and

that this request was not finally ruled upon later in the year. (Pl. Resp. at 5.) Defendants assert that the

continuing violation doctrine cannot apply because plaintiff made “repeated requests for the same

accommodation.” (Defs. Reply at 3.) 

 While we understand defendants’ concern about applying the continuing violation doctrine to what could

turn out to be easily identifiable discrete acts, thus potentially violating Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, we find that it is too early to assess this argument. Each side characterizes the allegations

differently. Was this one request, made the same way multiple times, with each request being rejected clearly

and definitively, as defendants contend? See, e.g., Defs. Reply at 4 (referring to plaintiff’s “thrice denied”

requests). Or did plaintiff make one long drawn-out request that was never definitively acted upon until the

summer of 2010? For example, defendants state as a fact that plaintiff’s first request was denied on

December 2, 2009. (Id. at 4.) This factual claim is based on Paragraph 29 of the complaint. But this

paragraph is ambiguous about whether defendants definitively rejected the request. The paragraph states, in

full: “On or about December 2, 2009, Defendants responded to [plaintiff’s] request that it had no action to

take due to Plaintiff’s withdrawn request.” It is not clear why plaintiff withdrew her request or whether this

should be intepreted as an outright rejection of her request. In short, the facts are in dispute. Moreover, even

if we were to conclude that some acts were untimely, we would not strike those allegations because they may

serve as evidence for the timely claims, providing background and context. 

 Second, defendants seek to dismiss the individual defendants named in their official capacities. 

Defendants in their opening brief argue that courts have “routinely and unequivocally held that Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide liability for individual defendants in their indiviudal or official

capacities.” (Def. Br. Br. at 6-7.) Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the Seventh Circuit has ruled otherwise. 

(Pl.. Resp. at 6, citing Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 912 (7th Cir. 2003).) Plaintiff argues that

state officials are proper defendants under Ex Parte Young, which permits state officials to be sued for

prospective injunctive relief. See Pl. Resp. at 6, citing Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th

Cir. 2002); see also Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of Southern Ill. Univ., 2012 WL 5077649, *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 18,

2012) (“The Seventh Circuit has found that suits against individuals in their official capacity for prospective

injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act are authorized.”). In their reply, defendants appear to concede

this latter point, except that they argue plaintiff must show that the individuals have “some connection” to the

acts alleged in the complaint. (Defs Reply at 7.) This argument is a fact question that can be addressed later

on a motion for summary judgment.

 Third, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that she is a qualified individual with

a disability. They argue that her asthma cannot qualify as substantially limiting if it is only triggered when

she is exposed to a fragrance. (Defs. Br. at 8.) To support this argument, defendants cite to several cases

holding that an intermittent flare-up is not enough to render a condition substantially limiting. (Id.) This

argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. For one thing, it is difficult to assess the seriousness and

frequency of a condition on a motion to dismiss where the complaint contains only a few short descriptions.

This point is undescored by the fact that all of the defendants’ supporting cases – Ammons-Lewis, Moore,

Jones, and McLorn (at pp. 8-9)– were decided on motions for summary judgment. In addition, as plaintiff

persuasively points out in her response brief, defendants’ cases were decided before the ADA Amendments

12C1277 Linda Kobler vs. Illinois Dept. Human Services et al. Page 2 of 3
STATEMENT

Act of 2008 expanded the definition of disability. Plaintiff also argues that, following the 2008 amendments,

courts have found episodic conditions to be covered if they would substantially limit a life activity when

those conditions were active. (Pl. Resp. at 9.) In their reply brief, defendants do not address these arguments,

thereby implicitly conceding that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage.

 Fourth, defendants argue that plaintiff’s proposed accommodation of a scent-free workplace is

objectively unreasonable and poses an undue hardship. Again, these arguments depend on facts which are

either undeveloped or disputed. There is a dispute over whether plaintiff was requesting a merely a

“restrictive fragrance policy” or a scent-free policy. (Defs. Br. at 10; Pls. Resp. at 12.) Also, it is unclear

whether plaintiff’s request related merely to one smaller unit within a larger workplace. (Id.) Moreover, part

of plaintiff’s claim is that the defendants failed to fully engage in the interactive process to find possible

alternative solutions. Plaintiff mentions other possible solutions, such as sending an email requesting that

employees refrain from using scents. (Id.) As for hardship, defendants believe that a scent-free workplace

would be unreasonable because, among other things, some patients need scented medications and because

visitors would not be bound by the policy. (Defs. Br at 10.) While these arguments ultimately may have

merit, they are premature on a motion to dismiss because they require an assessment of numerous facts that

are not a part of the complaint. This point is again evidenced by the fact that defendants generally cite to

cases addressing summary judgment motions. See Def. Br. at 9-10. 

 In conclusion, all these arguments may be raised later, if appropriate, on a motion for summary judgment. 

With the Magistrate Judge’s assistance, the parties should proceed with discovery. 

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