UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE, )

) No. 12-cv-1094

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

THE CITY OF HARVEY, a municipal )

corporation, ROBERT BUCHANAN, )

and, ANDREW JOSHUA, )

)

Defendants. )

------------------------------------------------------

) 

JANE DOE II and JANE DOE III, )

) No. 12-cv-2069

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

THE CITY OF HARVEY, a municipal )

corporation, and ANDREW JOSHUA, )

)

Defendants. )

------------------------------------------------------

) 

JANE DOE IV, JANE DOE VI, JANE DOE VII, )

and JANE DOE VIII, )

) No. 14-cv-8424

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

THE CITY OF HARVEY, a municipal )

corporation, )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs sued the City of Harvey and its Police Department (“HPD”), alleging that HPD 

maintained a policy of discrimination against female victims of sexual assault in violation of 42 

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U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. Jane Does I, II and III also allege that Andrew 

Joshua (“Joshua”), HPD’s former Commander of Investigations and Chief of Police, individually 

and in his official capacity violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause by allegedly 

mishandling their sexual assault cases. Jane Doe I further asserts claims against HPD and Joshua 

for violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause for allegedly 

placing her in increased danger of being sexually assaulted by Robert Buchanan (“Buchanan”); 

42 U.S.C. § 1985, conspiracy to deprive her of rights and privileges; and state law claims for 

fraudulent concealment and violation of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, and assault and 

battery against Buchanan, a private citizen. Discovery has closed with respect to Does I, II, III, 

and IV and the trial for these plaintiffs is scheduled for May 20, 2015. 

On March 16, 2015, defendants HPD and Joshua (“defendants”) moved for summary 

judgment on all counts asserted by Does I, II, III and IV. At a status hearing on April 13, 2015, 

the Court advised the parties that defendants’ fully briefed motion would be taken under 

advisement and considered as a motion for directed verdict upon the close of plaintiffs’ case at 

trial, given the proximity of the trial date and what appeared to be a great deal of factual issues. 

At the hearing the Court also advised that after the motion was fully briefed it would consider 

other means of resolving the motion where appropriate. The motion was fully briefed on April 

27, 2015. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and evidence and supplemental briefing on the 

issues of qualified immunity and the legal standards for plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due 

Process claims, the Court will decide certain issues and reserve others per its previous order. For 

the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Joshua’s qualified 

immunity defense as to Does I, II, and III’s claims, and Doe I’s Due Process and Illinois 

Domestic Violence Act claims is granted. 

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Background

The following facts are undisputed. Joshua was Commander of Investigations for HPD 

in 1997. In 2003, he was appointed Chief of Police, until he retired on October 12, 2007. (Pls. 

56.1 Resp. ¶ 1.) 

On August 3, 1997, Doe I’s mother Teresa Buchanan (“Ms. Buchanan”) reported to the 

HPD that Doe I had been sexually assaulted by Buchanan. That night, Ms. Buchanan took Doe I 

to the hospital where a sexual assault kit was collected. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2.) Joshua was the 

detective assigned to Doe I’s case on August 4, 1997. (Id. ¶ 3.) On August 5, 1997, Joshua took 

Doe I and Ms. Buchanan to La Rabida Children’s hospital so that a counselor could conduct Doe 

I’s Victim Sensitivity Interview. Also present for the interview were an assistant state’s attorney 

from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (“CCSAO”) and a social worker from the 

Illinois Department of Children & Family Services (“DCFS”). (Id. ¶ 4.) Doe I described the 

sexual abuse inflicted on her by Buchanan. Joshua found Doe I’s statements to be credible and 

determined that Buchanan would be arrested. (Id.; Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 106.) 

The DCFS social worker interviewed Ms. Buchanan who explained during the interview 

that she was not going back to live at the home she shared with Buchanan and would never live 

with Buchanan again. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 5.) On August 6, 1997, per Joshua’s order Buchanan

was arrested at the home he shared with Ms. Buchanan and Doe I. (Id. ¶ 8.) Joshua released 

Buchanan on August 7, 1997. Joshua did not take a buccal swab for DNA from Buchanan while 

he was in custody. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) 1

 Buchanan never fully moved out of the home he shared with 

1

 Interestingly, it appears that the motivating factor to treat Doe I’s case differently, if any, is that 

Buchanan was in law enforcement at the time of Doe I’s report and his arrest. As plaintiffs mention: 

“Robert Buchanan testified that he believed that his position as a Cook County Correctional Officer may 

possibly have had some type of bearing on how he was initially treated. Robert Buchanan testified, 

‘Well, my feeling is, had I not been in law enforcement, maybe they would have put the pedal to the 

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Doe I. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

On August 6, 1997, an HPD evidence technician delivered Doe I’s sexual assault 

evidence kit to the Illinois State Police Division of Forensic Sciences (“ISP”) for processing. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) On September 8, 1997, an ISP call note indicates that Joshua called ISP and asked that 

Doe I’s rape kit be processed ASAP and to call him with the results. A September 10, 1997, call 

note indicates that Joshua was notified that semen had been identified in Doe I’s sexual assault 

evidence kit. (Id. ¶ 12.) Joshua did not seek felony review for the charges against Buchanan. 

(Id. ¶ 16.) 

On October 31, 1997, DCFS social worker Margo Cralle (“Cralle”) interviewed Joshua 

who stated that Buchanan would be arrested and instructed DCFS not to interview Buchanan 

prior to the arrest. (Id. ¶ 28.) That same day, Cralle made an attempt to contact Buchanan. At 

this time Joshua believed Buchanan to be living at his mother’s home, a different residence from 

Doe I and Ms. Buchanan. (Id.) On November 3, 1997, Cralle wrote an interview note from an 

interview with a redacted source that stated, “No proof perp (Buchanan) is in the home after ask 

to leave by [Police Department] and DCFS.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Later that day, Cralle conducted inperson interviews of Ms. Buchanan and two of Doe I’s siblings at their home. (Id. ¶ 32.) On 

November 4 and 19, Cralle followed up on Doe I’s condition, speaking with representatives from 

La Rabida hospital, Ms. Buchanan and Doe I’s therapist. (Id. ¶ 34.) As of November 4, 1997, 

DCFS did not find it necessary to take Doe I into protective custody or to seek court intervention 

for custody. (Id. ¶ 38.) 

Sometime in the summer of 1998, Buchanan began sexually assaulting Doe I again until 

2004 when she moved to Atlanta. Doe I did not report the sexual assaults that began in 1998 to 

metal. Maybe they would have forced me to this swab. I agreed, but there was no order.’” (Pl. 56.1 

Add’l Facts ¶ 108.) 

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HPD or DCFS. At the time of these assaults, she felt like she had no other options because she 

had already gone to her mother and she had already gone to “the last line of defense,” the HPD. 

(Id. ¶ 18.)

Doe II was assaulted in her home on May 24, 2007, by an acquaintance, Jacquez Dunbar 

(“Dunbar”). (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 52.) Doe II called HPD to report the assault and was told that she 

would have to wait for her mother to make a report. Doe II’s mother, Tammy Brown (“Ms. 

Brown”) called the HPD later that day and HPD police were dispatched. The officer took notes, 

wrote a report, interviewed Doe II and Ms. Brown and called an ambulance. Doe II gave the 

officer the name and description of Dunbar. Doe II was taken to the hospital by ambulance 

where a rape kit was administered. The kit was submitted to ISP on June 15, 2007, for 

processing. (Id. ¶ 53.) Dunbar was arrested on June 15, 2007. HPD’s Detective Jeffrey Crocker 

investigated Doe II’s case. That day, Crocker brought Doe II and Ms. Brown to the police 

station where, among other things, they spoke to assistant state’s attorney Desiree Berg, a female 

attorney from the CCSAO. (Id. ¶ 54.) They told her that Doe II’s medical exam revealed 

vaginal and anal tearing and that she bled after the assault. (Id. ¶ 55.) That same day Detective 

Crocker questioned Dunbar in Berg’s presence; Dunbar admitted that he had sex with Doe II, but 

claimed it was consensual. Berg then interviewed Doe II again. (Id. ¶ 54.) Berg told Ms. Brown 

that it was a “he-said-she-said” situation, that Doe II was “too calm,” and that she did not believe 

that Doe II had been raped. (Id. at ¶ 56.) Joshua was present for this meeting but did not say 

anything. Doe II and Ms. Brown were upset after the interviews with Berg and believed that the 

case was over at that time. (Id. ¶ 57.) Dunbar was released and Berg did not approve felony 

charges. (Id. ¶ 58.) 

Doe III was sexually assaulted on April 28, 2008, and on May 15, 2008. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. 

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¶¶ 63, 73.) Joshua was retired from HPD at the time of Doe III’s sexual assault. As Chief of 

Police from 2003 to 2007, Joshua was responsible for hiring and retaining HPD personnel, 

including the detective assigned to Doe III’s April 2008 case, Detective Eric Armstrong. (Def. 

56.1 Resp. ¶ 76; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 63, 64.) Armstrong was hired in August 2004. (Pl. Ex. 25, 

HPD30891.) At the time of his hire, Joshua believed that something unusual came up in 

Armstrong’s background check, that “he was involved with the domestic.” (Pl. Ex. 28, HPD 

25903.) 

The April 28, 2008, assault occurred at Doe III’s school by an acquaintance, Michael 

Nichols. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 64.) On the day of the assault Armstrong interviewed the school’s assistant 

principal and Nichols. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 65.) Nichols stated that he believed the sexual encounter with 

Doe III was consensual. (Id. ¶ 65.) Armstrong later released Nichols from custody and ordered 

him to appear at the Information Desk at Juvenile Court the next day. (Id. ¶ 66.) Armstrong 

filled out a Juvenile Information Sheet and requested CCSAO felony approval of the charge of 

criminal sexual assault against Nichols. (Id. ¶ 68.) 

On April 29, 2008, Armstrong interviewed Doe III who described the sexual assault in 

detail, reiterating that the encounter was not consensual. (Id. ¶ 67.) Assistant state’s attorney 

Nick DiAngelo interviewed Doe III and Nichols and ultimately declined to approve felony 

charges. Armstrong subsequently completed a Petition for Delinquency and requested that the 

CCSAO prosecute Nichols as a delinquent in juvenile court. (Id. ¶ 68.) The assistant state’s 

attorney for the Juvenile Division called Armstrong regarding the case and indicated that she 

would speak to DiAngelo before deciding whether to pursue a finding of delinquency against 

Nichols. Armstrong did not submit Doe III’s rape kit for testing in 2008 on his belief that the 

identity of the alleged assailant was known and that he admitted to sexual intercourse with Doe 

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III. (Id. ¶ 69.) 

On April 11, 2012, Doe III’s rape kit was submitted to ISP for testing. (Id. ¶ 70.) The 

DNA profile taken from the sperm found on Doe III’s vaginal swabs matched the DNA profile of 

a third person, Marlon Minter. (Id.) Armstrong informed Doe III of the match to Minter and 

showed her a photo array of six photos, one of which was Minter. Doe III could not identify 

Minter from the photo array. Armstrong told Doe III to contact him if she wanted to pursue her 

case. Doe III did not pursue her case and did not contact Armstrong. (Id. ¶ 71.) 

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that there is “no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

56(c). The party seeking summary judgment has the “initial responsibility” to show that there is

no genuine issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 

91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), but the Court must view all facts and make all reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Court may enter 

summary judgment only if the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find 

for the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th 

Cir. 2000).

Discussion

1. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability for actions 

taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Walker v. 

Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity 

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where: (1) the facts the plaintiff has alleged or shown demonstrate that the conduct of the officer 

violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violation. Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). A court has 

discretion to consider either part of the test first. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 

(2014). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the constitutional right was clearly 

established. Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the plaintiff need 

not point to a case directly on point, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 

1149 (2011). In other words, “the plaintiff must demonstrate either that a court has upheld the 

purported right in a case factually similar to the one under review, or that the alleged misconduct 

constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional right.” Lunini v. Grayeb, 395 F.3d 761, 769 

(7th Cir. 2005).

Defendants argue that Joshua is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ 

Equal Protection and Due Process claims because the evidence is contrary to a finding of a 

constitutional violation. They further contend that he is entitled to immunity from Doe I’s Due 

Process claim because she fails to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional right she claims

was violated was clearly established in 1997. The Court agrees. 

There is no question that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

prevented Joshua from engaging in arbitrary gender-based discrimination when he was employed 

by the HPD from 2003 to 2007. See U.S. Const. Amend XIV, § 1; Nanda v. Moss, 412 F.3d 836, 

844 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It has been plain in this circuit for quite some time that arbitrary gender8

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based discrimination ... violates the equal protection clause.”). Although the right is clearly 

established, Joshua is entitled to qualified immunity unless Doe I can establish a violation of her 

equal protection rights. She must present evidence that she is a member of a protected class, she 

is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class, and she was treated 

differently from members of the protected class. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir.

2005). Further, a plaintiff is required to establish that she has been the victim of intentional 

discrimination. Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, 347 F. 3d 1014, 1037 (7th Cir. 

2003). She must offer evidence that the defendants “acted with a nefarious discriminatory 

purpose ... and discriminated against her based on her membership in a definable class.” Doe v. 

Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 622 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the 

defendant directly participated in the constitutional deprivation or there must at least be a 

showing that he “acquiesced in some demonstrable way” in the alleged violation. Palmer v. 

Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003). 

If true, the facts alleged are alarming. However, plaintiffs have presented no evidence 

that Joshua (or any of the defendants) treated them differently than any similarly-situated males 

and therefore fail to establish a prima facie case of an equal protection violation. See Hoskins v. 

City of Milwaukee, 259 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2008); Bauers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 

Wis., 33 Fed. Appx. 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the record reveals that plaintiffs had 

access to case files and statistics for male sexual assault victims, but chose not to present them 

for comparison. 

Further, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the facts and evidence do not 

demonstrate that Joshua acted with a nefarious discriminatory purpose due to the Does’ gender. 

Plaintiffs argue that Joshua intentionally discriminated against them because: he failed to 

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properly investigate Doe I’s case; he was active Chief of Police at the time of Doe II’s report of 

sexual assault and when HPD failed to obtain her medical exam; he hired Detective Armstrong, 

who was assigned to Doe III’s April 2008, knowing that his background check turned up an 

instance of a domestic issue; and he was Commander of Investigations and was informed of the 

sexual assault when Doe IV’s report was made. This record does not establish that Joshua’s

conduct violated a constitutional right. The Does’ status as females does not support an 

allegation of gender-based discrimination under the equal protection clause; they each must 

demonstrate that Joshua “acted with discriminatory purpose.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 

251 F.3d 612, 645 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 

1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)). Because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Joshua’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right, the Court finds that Joshua is entitled to qualified 

immunity with respect to their Equal Protection Claims. 

Regarding Doe I’s Due Process claim, the issue is whether the right Doe I alleges was

violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Hardaway, 734 F.3d at 

743. Doe I’s claim is asserted under the “state-created danger” exception to the rule that a state’s 

failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due 

Process Clause. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 

S. Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The state-created danger exception is a narrow one and 

applies only where the state creates or increases danger to an individual. Hernandez v. City of 

Goshen, Ind., 324 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2003); Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir.

2012). “When courts speak of the state’s ‘increasing’ the danger of private violence, they mean 

the state did something that turned a potential danger into an actual one, rather than that it just 

stood by and did nothing to prevent private violence.” Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 548 F.3d 

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595, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). The cases where the Seventh Circuit has either found or suggested that 

liability attached under the state-created danger exception are “rare and often egregious.” Estate 

of Allen v. City of Rockford, 349 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Doe I claims that Joshua (and thereby HPD) placed Doe I in increased danger during his 

investigation because he did not, of his own accord, secure an order of protection for her, 

instructed DCFS to delay its interview of Buchanan, failed to secure a DNA sample from 

Buchanan, and failed to request felony review from CCSAO. Doe I claims that due to these 

alleged failures Buchanan had access to her and began sexually assaulting her again. Doe I’s 

case, however, is not sufficiently similar to those cases where the Seventh Circuit has applied the 

state-created danger exception. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1979)

(police arrested a driver for drag racing and left the children passengers stranded alone in the car 

on a busy highway on a cold night); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993)

(police officers arrested a sober driver and left behind an obviously drunk passenger with the 

keys to the vehicle who later caused a collision); Paine, 678 F.3d at 511 (police arrested a 

woman in a safe place and released her in a hazardous one while she was unable to protect 

herself). In those cases, the police encountered a potential danger and turned it into an actual 

one, leaving the plaintiffs in positions worse than before the police acted. 

The 7th Circuit recently considered this exception in Doe v. Arlington Heights, No. 14-

1461, 2015 WL 1621398, at *5 (7th Cir. Apr. 13, 2015). While reasonable arguments can be 

made on both sides regarding the applicability of the exception in that fact scenario, the facts 

presented in Doe I’s case are not as extreme. Id. at *1, 5-6 (officer responding to 911 call found 

intoxicated teenage female with three males allowed group to leave the scene together, reported 

to dispatch that subjects were not at scene upon his arrival, called off another responding officer 

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and female was subsequently sexually assaulted by one of the males). Nonetheless, on the facts 

here, the Court finds no reason to grant the exception. 

This is not a case where Doe I was safe, or even considerably safer, before Joshua acted. 

His alleged investigative failures and failures to act did not turn a potential danger into an actual 

one. When Joshua’s investigation began Doe I was not in a safe place; she was in actual danger 

already. Further, there is no way of knowing what would or could have happened if Joshua 

conducted his investigation differently. Accordingly, his conduct did not place her in a “worse 

position” than she would have been if he had not acted (or acted) at all. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 

201, 109 S. Ct. 998. Joshua had no constitutional duty to protect her, thus there is no clearly 

established right and he is entitled to qualified immunity. Moreover, because her Due Process 

Claim is based on Joshua’s actions, which this Court has found cannot form the basis of a 

constitutional violation, summary judgment will be entered as to Doe I’s Due Process claim 

against HPD. Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 596-597 (7th Cir. 1997).

2. Illinois Domestic Violence Act 

Doe I claims that defendants violated the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (“IDVA”), 

which provides that when a law enforcement officer “has reason to believe that a person has been 

abused,” the officer “shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse.” 750 

ILCS 60/304. The IDVA contains a specific immunity provision which provides that a law 

enforcement officer’s actions in enforcing the statute will not expose the officer or his employer 

to liability unless the act is the result of willful and wanton misconduct. 750 ILCS 60/205. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the statute’s enforcement 

obligation provision does not impose a “general, open-ended duty to protect,” citing Lacey v. 

Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 364 (2009). Doe I does not dispute that Lacey controls, 

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rather she contends that her case is distinguishable because in Lacey, the investigation was 

closed when the victim’s former boyfriend subsequently murdered her, and here, Doe I’s case 

was “never closed” until recently when Buchanan pled guilty to sexual assault on May 2, 2013. 

She also argues that defendants are liable for the alleged harm she suffered from Buchanan’s 

1998 abuse because they failed to use reasonable means to prevent this abuse in the initial stages 

of the investigation, and any steps that they did take “triggered” further duties under the IDVA. 

The Court is not persuaded by Doe I’s arguments.

The Supreme Court of Illinois stated in Lacey that the word “immediately” implies that 

the officer at the scene cannot delay in implementing reasonable means and also that “the officer 

is in a position proximate to the victim that can allow the officer to take reasonable steps to 

prevent further abuse.” Lacey, 232 Ill. 2d at 366. The court concluded that while the IDVA 

assumes that at some point an officer will make direct contact with the victim to carry out the 

illustrative “reasonable steps,” listed in the Act, “each of these reasonable steps is also of a 

limited duration, indicating that the Act envisioned some discrete, limited involvement by law 

enforcement officers and not an open-ended, general, or long-term duty to protect.” Id. at 366-

67. Based on the record and the undisputed facts above, the Court finds that Joshua immediately 

took reasonable steps to prevent further abuse when he was notified that Doe I had been sexually 

assaulted by Buchanan. Doe I provides no authority for her contention that the initial steps that 

Joshua took “triggered” any additional duties to protect beyond the immediate response required 

by the Act. Her trigger theory is contrary to the plain language of the Act as it “would create a 

situation where once officers were aware of the potential for violence, they would remain liable 

for the prevention of that violence for an indefinite period of time.” Id. at 368. In any event, the 

Court finds that the record does not establish the willful or wanton conduct required for liability 

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to attach. 750 ILCS 60/205. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment affirming Andrew 

Joshua’s qualified immunity defense as to Does I, II and III is granted. Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment with respect to Doe I’s Due Process and Illinois Domestic Violence Act 

claims is are granted. 

SO ORDERED.

_____________________________

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Judge

DATED: May 7, 2015

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