NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0044 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS21067

The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Shana L., Surprise

Appellee

FILED 9-26-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 In this private severance proceeding, Michael H. (“Father”) 

appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights as to his 

daughter, N.H. (born in 2016).1 Father challenges the court’s finding that 

termination was in N.H.’s best interests. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Shana L. (“Mother”) are N.H.’s biological parents. 

In 2008, Mother gave birth to N.D.H., who Father later adopted. Following

a 2017 domestic dispute that occurred when the parties were living in 

Nevada, Father left the family home and has since lived with his elderly 

parents as their caretaker, currently residing in Texas. 

¶3 A Nevada court issued a divorce decree in January 2018, 

granting Mother and Father joint legal custody of the children, with Mother 

being the primary custodial parent. The court ordered Father to pay child 

support. The visitation schedule in the decree allowed Father in-person 

visitation in Las Vegas and three video calls weekly. Mother and the 

children moved to Washington in 2019 and about two years later, they 

moved to Arizona. Mother married Christopher L. (“Stepfather”) in 

October 2021.

¶4 In June 2022, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s rights as 

to N.H. and N.D.H., alleging that Father had abandoned the children under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship. 

Mother asserted that Father had not actively parented the children since the 

divorce, engaged only in limited communication through occasional video 

calls lasting about five minutes each, did not send the children any cards or 

1 The juvenile court found that Father consented to the termination of 

his parental rights to his older daughter, N.D.H. On appeal, Father does 

not challenge that finding. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

Decision of the Court

3

letters, and had paid no child support. Mother also alleged termination 

would be in the children’s best interests because Stepfather has been their 

“psychological father” since January 2021 and the children wished to be 

adopted by him. 

¶5 Several weeks later, a social worker conducted a social study,

which included interviews with Mother, her husband, Father, and the 

children. After reviewing various records and conducting the interviews

the social worker issued a report, concluding in part that Father had 

abandoned the children and the children were “in a stable loving home” 

that provided permanency and safety. The report recommended 

terminating Father’s parental rights so “the plan of adoption [could] be 

implemented.”

¶6 The superior court held a conference with the Nevada court 

in compliance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act. See A.R.S. § 25-1010. During that conference, Nevada 

ceded its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to Arizona, allowing the 

superior court to move forward as N.H.’s home state. See A.R.S. 

§§ 25-1002(7) (defining “home state”), -1032 (defining “exclusive continuing 

jurisdiction”).

¶7 At the subsequent termination hearing, held over the course 

of three days, Mother testified about Father’s limited contact with the 

children, and that she never denied him the opportunity to contact the 

children. Mother also described how Stepfather had “bonded very 

quickly” with N.H., he was deeply involved in N.H.’s day-to-day care, and 

they both wanted to proceed with adoption. Explaining that adoption 

would bring the children “stability” and “happiness,” Mother opined that

termination of Father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best 

interests.

¶8 Addressing his relationship with N.H., Father testified that 

Mother had reduced his ability to call and visit with N.H., he had not seen 

N.H. in person since 2018, he had not paid any child support, he had no 

idea how much he was in arrears, and he was unable to obtain employment 

or visit N.H. because he takes care of his elderly parents, who have various 

medical needs.2 The court also heard testimony from Stepfather and 

Father’s sister.

2 Father testified that his stimulus check “went straight to child 

support,” but he did not provide supporting documentation.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

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¶9 In its later ruling, the juvenile court found that Mother proved 

by clear and convincing evidence that “Father failed to maintain a normal 

parental relationship with [N.H.] without just cause for a period of six 

months prior to the filing of the Petition, and the Court heard no evidence 

to rebut this prima facie finding of abandonment.” The court found in part 

that although Father “is able to parent” N.H., “he has made choices that 

resulted in no meaningful or normal parent-child relationship” and thus 

Mother met her burden to show that Father had abandoned N.H. 

¶10 Addressing best interests, the court recognized it was 

Mother’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the children’s best interests. The court then found in part 

that although there was no evidence “that the children would be harmed if 

the Court denied the request to terminate,” the termination would benefit 

the children because of the permanency and stability they could experience 

through adoption by Stepfather, as both he and the children were seeking, 

and that benefit was in the children’s best interests. The court therefore 

terminated the parent-child relationship between Father and the children. 

Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.

§ 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶11 We review a termination order issued by the juvenile court 

under the following principles recently clarified by our supreme court. 

¶12 First, we “review the factual findings made by the juvenile 

court, and its factual findings will be accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and 

inferences support them.’” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ___ Ariz. ___, 

___, ¶ 13, 533 P.3d 202, 209 (2023) (citation omitted). “This deferential 

standard is warranted ‘[b]ecause the juvenile court is in the best position to 

weigh evidence and assess witness credibility.’” Id. (citation omitted). This

applies to the grounds for termination as well as the court’s determination 

of whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Seeid.; Alma S. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018) (explaining that in addressing 

best interests, the juvenile court’s factual findings will be accepted if

supported by reasonable evidence and the related inferences).

¶13 Second, the juvenile court’s “legal conclusions regarding the 

statutory ground for termination—which must be established by “’clear 

and convincing’” evidence at the juvenile court level—will be affirmed 

unless they are clearly erroneous.” Brionna J., ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 31, 533 P.3d 

at 209–10 (citation omitted). Similarly, the court’s legal conclusions 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

Decision of the Court

5

regarding best interests—which must be established by a preponderance of 

the evidence—will be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. See Alma 

S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18 (explaining, in the context of best interests, that an 

appellate court “will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly 

erroneous”). 

¶14 Father does not contest the court’s finding that Mother 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that he abandoned both children. 

He only contests the court’s finding that termination was in N.H.’s best 

interests. He argues the court did not consider the totality of the 

circumstances in its best-interests analysis, contending the court abused its 

discretion by “ignoring” some evidence and giving Mother’s testimony 

more credibility than Father’s.

¶15 In addressing best interests, “we can presume that the 

interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already 

found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear 

and convincing evidence.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 

(2005). Once a court finds “that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to the 

interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent.” Id. at 285, ¶ 31.

The court’s primary concern must be the child’s interest in stability and 

security. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12. But we cannot assume termination 

will benefit a child simply because she has been abandoned. Demetrius L. 

v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 14 (2016) (citation omitted).

¶16 Termination is in the child’s best interests if the child will 

either benefit from termination or be harmed if it is denied. Alma S., 245 

Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. Whether a severance proceeding is initiated privately or 

by the State, the juvenile court “may conclude that a proposed adoption 

benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the child’s best 

interests.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2, ¶ 1. In determining the best interests 

of the child, a court considers the totality of the circumstances at the time of 

termination. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13. 

¶17 Father argues the court abused its discretion by ignoring or 

failing to account for (1) Mother’s actions in changing and limiting his video 

calls with N.H., (2) issues with Mother’s credibility, (3) Mother’s decision 

to terminate N.D.H.’s “first adoptive father’s parental rights in the same 

fashion,” and (4) N.H.’s seemingly inadequate understanding of

permanently terminating Father’s rights.

¶18 To the extent Father argues the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by giving greater weight to Mother’s testimony, and finding 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

Decision of the Court

6

Father’s testimony less credible, that court is in the best position to weigh 

evidence, assess witness credibility, and resolve disputed facts. See Brionna 

J., ___ Ariz. ___, ¶ 30, 533 P.3d at 209; Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 

Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). 

¶19 Father’s arguments focus in part on the premise that Mother 

interfered with his relationship with N.H., including “changing [or]

limiting . . . video calls” and that she intended to terminate Father’s rights 

in the same fashion as she had done with N.D.H.’s prior adoptive father. 

But we do not reweigh evidence on appeal, and we presume the court has 

considered all evidence in making its decision. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004); see also Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 

Ariz. 51, 55–56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

¶20 Nothing in the record suggests the juvenile court “ignored” 

these arguments made by Father. Instead, the court addressed Father’s 

contention that “his inability to communicate with [N.H.] was related to 

[Mother’s] attempts to interfere with and alienate the children.” The court 

found Father’s testimony lacked credibility because he “did not attempt to 

arrange a set time to speak with the child or maintain any regular form of 

communication through telephone, videochat, or even sending letters or 

cards.” The court also found that the testimony indicated the infrequent 

phone calls that did occur were very brief and that Father did not have 

conversations with Mother to “try to increase his contact with N.H. or to 

learn more about her. He did not return to Court to enforce his visitation 

or contact.”

¶21 Father also suggests the court erred by considering N.H.’s 

wishes to be adopted by her Stepfather because “N.H. did not seem to 

understand permanent termination” of Father’s rights. But N.H. did 

express that she wanted to be adopted by Stepfather, who lives with her 

and cares for her already. Again, it is not our role to reweigh evidence on 

appeal. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8. 

¶22 Moreover, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding 

that N.H. would benefit from termination. Although Father had a more 

active and present role in N.H.’s life when she was an infant, he has been 

mostly absent from N.H.’s life since the divorce was finalized in early 2018. 

Father has not seen or visited N.H. in person since 2018, and the video calls 

have been infrequent and brief. Father has not paid child support and is in 

arrears of approximately $98,000. Although Father claims that Mother has 

interfered with his relationship with N.H., including “changing and 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.H.

Decision of the Court

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limiting . . . video calls,” he did not provide any evidence showing he has 

made diligent efforts to enforce his parental rights. 

¶23 As the juvenile court recognized, although N.H. is very 

young, she nonetheless expressed a desire for Stepfather to adopt her, and 

he wished to adopt her. Stepfather has been present in N.H.’s life, is bonded 

with her, and supports her financially, academically, and emotionally. 

Therefore, the court’s legal conclusion—that termination of Father’s 

parental rights is in N.H.’s best interests based on the permanency and 

stability adoption can provide—is not clearly erroneous. 

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights as to N.H.