IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

COLLETTE ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CENTERS FOR NEW HORIZONS, INC., a

not-for-profit Illinois corporation,

and GLORIA LAWSON, individually,

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Collette Anderson filed a complaint against Centers for New

Horizons, Inc. and Gloria Lawson alleging age discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act 

(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (counts I and II); sexual

harassment in violation of the IHRA (count III); and retaliation

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (count IV). Defendants have

moved to dismiss certain claims alleged in plantiff’s complaint. 

For the following reasons, defendants’ motion is granted.

I.

Plaintiff Collette Anderson is a 65-year-old woman who

worked for Centers for New Horizons, Inc. (“Centers”) from August

2010 until July 2011. Plaintiff was hired as a teacher. Shortly
after being hired, defendant Gloria Lawson, plaintiff’s

supervisor, began coming into plaintiff’s classroom frequently. 

In late August 2010, defendant Lawson also began making sexually

harassing comments to plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff tried to

avoid contact with defendant Lawson.

On or around October 15, 2010, Lawson informed plaintiff

that she did not like plaintiff’s teaching style or classroom

management. Lawson subsequently demoted plaintiff from teacher

to teacher assistant, removing her to another classroom and

allegedly replacing her with a younger employee. After

plaintiff’s demotion, Lawson continued to make plaintiff feel

uncomfortable. For example, in January 2011 Lawson touched

plaintiff’s bicep and triceps and stated “ooooooh Ms. Anderson.”

On April 7, 2011, plaintiff initiated a charge of

discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights

(“IDHR”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) for sexual harassment against Lawson. 

Plaintiff perfected the charge on November 15, 2011. On July 18,

2011, plaintiff filed a charge of age discrimination and sexual

harassment. On or around July 28, 2011, plaintiff was discharged

from Centers. On August 20, 2011, plaintiff filed another

charge, alleging that she had been discharged in retaliation for

filing the first two charges.

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II.

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of

the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570

F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint must include “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under the federal

notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s

motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). 

In addition to the allegations contained in the complaint,

“documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of

the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s

complaint and are central to his claim.” 188 LLC v. Trinity

Indus. Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wright v.

Assoc. Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994)). Further,

a court “may also take judicial notice of matters of public

record.” Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th

Cir. 1994). As such, I may consider plaintiff’s IDHR and EEOC

charges attached to defendants’ motion as well as IDHR records

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submitted by the parties. McGee v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

No. 01 C 9099, 2002 WL 449061, at *2 (N.D. Ill. March 22, 2002)

(citations omitted) (“the court may take judicial notice of

matters of public record, including records of administrative

bodies such as the IDHR”).

III.

A. Count I

Plaintiff concedes that she cannot bring a claim under ADEA

against Lawson as there is no individual liability under the

statute. Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses count I against Lawson. 

With respect to Centers, defendants argue that plaintiff’s agerelated discharge claim under ADEA is outside the scope of her

administrative charge. Plaintiff has effectively conceded

dismissal of her age-related discharge claim by not addressing

defendants’ argument. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Eastern Atlantic

Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2001) (by failing to

address an argument that is not frivolous or nondispositive, a

non-moving party acquiesces in the movant’s argument, and

“acquiescence operates as a waiver”); Stransky v. Cummins Engine

Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen presented

with a motion to dismiss, the non-moving party must proffer some

legal basis to support his cause of action. . . . The federal

courts will not invent legal arguments for litigants.”). 

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Defendants’ argument is not frivolous and it is dispositive. 

Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination based on her age alleges

only that she was demoted; the only charge relating to her

discharge is based on retaliation. Generally, an administrative

charge alleging only retaliation will not support a claim for age

discrimination. Lamas v. Freeman Decorating Co., 37 F.Supp.2d

1105, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citing Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co.,

96 F.3d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1996)). As such, plaintiff’s agerelated discharge claim is dismissed. Count I, however, is not

dismissed in its entirety, as defendants do not dispute that

plaintiff has stated a claim for discrimination under ADEA

regarding her demotion from teacher to teacher assistant.

B. Count II

Defendants argue, in relevant part, that count II must be

dismissed because plaintiff has failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Plaintiff argues indirectly that she

has exhausted her administrative remedies because the EEOC issued

a right to sue letter in relation to her age discrimination

charge and that an IDHR investigator stated that the IDHR did not

plan to further investigate the relevant charge. Plaintiff’s

arguments fail to persuade. First, “a right to sue letter from

the EEOC does not serve as a substitute for a final order from

the [IDHR].” Jimenez v. Thompson Steel Co., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d

693, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Hankins v. Best Buy Co., Inc., No. 10

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CV 4508, 2011 WL 6016233, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2011) (“the

fact that [the plaintiff] received a right to sue notice from the

EEOC does not establish that he may bring suit under the IHRA”). 

Plaintiff filed her age-related charge, the only one of her three

charges to claim discrimination on the basis of age, on or around

July 18, 2011. Because 365 days have not passed since plaintiff

filed her charge, see 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(2), she cannot

initiate a lawsuit without a final order from the IDHR. 775 ILCS

5/7A-102(D)(3)-(4). And while plaintiff states that the IDHR

does not intend to take any further action on her July 18, 2011,

charge, this is likely because she voluntarily withdrew the

charge on or around September 19, 2011. As a result of having

withdrawn the charge, plaintiff cannot now exhaust her

administrative remedies and is barred from proceeding with her

civil lawsuit against defendants based on age discrimination

under the IHRA. See Slaughter v. Fred Weber, Inc., 570 F.Supp.2d

1054, 1057-58 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (dismissing the plaintiff’s IHRA

claims where she had withdrawn her IDHR charge) (citations

omitted); Johnson v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 98 C 4440, 2000

WL 876093, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2000) (holding that the

plaintiff, who voluntarily withdrew a discrimination claim before

the IDHR, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies becuase

“[a]bsent a request to review the IDHR’s actions, this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an IHRA claim”). Because

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plaintiff has not, and cannot, exhaust her administrative

remedies, count II is dismissed with prejudice.

C. Count III

As with count II, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to count III. 

Plaintiff filed two charges alleging sexual harassment. The

first charge was filed on or around July 18, 2011; the second was

initially filed on April 7, 2011, and perfected on or around

November 15, 2011. As stated above, plaintiff cannot bring a

claim based on the July 18, 2011, charge because she has not

exhausted her administrative remedies. By plaintiff’s own

admission, she has not yet exhausted her administrative remedies

with regard to the second charge. In her response to defendants’

motion to dismiss, plaintiff admits that the November 15 charge

is assigned to the IDHR. (Pl.’s Resp., at 6). In addition,

because the IDHR does not begin its investigation until a

claimant’s charge is perfected, McGee, 2002 WL 449061, at *3

(citations omitted), I must look to the November 15, 2011, date

when determining whether 365 days have passed since the filing of

the charge. 365 days have not passed, and therefore plaintiff

has not yet exhausted her administrative remedies. Plaintiff

argues that I should find that she has sufficiently exhausted her

administrative remedies for the following reasons: the EEOC

issued right to sue letters on two other charges, the IDHR

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informed her that it was not investigating the two other charges,

and judicial efficiency requires all claims be brought at once. 

But plaintiff cites no supporting case law for the proposition

that I may take into consideration factors other than those

explicitly provided for by statute when determining whether

plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. As stated

above, plaintiff cannot rely on the EEOC right to sue letters

that she received to establish a right to sue under the IHRA. 

Further, the IHRA, “together with the [IDHR’s and the Human

Rights] Commission’s rules and regulations, establish

comprehensive administrative procedures governing the disposition

of alleged civil rights actions.” Blount v. Stroud, 328 Ill.Dec.

239, 245 (Ill. 2009). Because the IHRA specifically limits a

court’s jurisdiction to claims that meet specific procedural

requirements, see 775 ILCS 5/7A-102, plaintiff cannot escape the

statutory requirements by relying on the status of her other

charges or on general principles of judicial efficiency. As

such, count III is dismissed.

D. Count IV

Finally, the parties agree that there is no individual

liability under Title VII. Plaintiff accordingly acquiesces to

the dismissal of count IV against Lawson. However, as defendants

have not raised an issue as to whether plaintiff has stated a

claim against Centers, count IV is not dismissed as to Centers.

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion is granted. 

Count I against Lawson is dismissed, as is plaintiff’s agerelated discharge claim against Centers in Count I. Count II is

dismissed with prejudice as to both defendants. Count III is

dismissed as to both defendants. Finally, count IV is dismissed

as to Lawson.

 ENTER ORDER:

 ____________________________

 Elaine E. Bucklo

 United States District Judge

Dated: June 25, 2012

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