Order Fors (01/2008)
*

‘ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois \e AM

Name of Assigned Jud Sitting Judge if Oth
aoe Magistrate Judge Charles R. Norgle than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 12 C 435 DATE 7/19/2012
CASE Vincent Testa, et al. vs. County of Lake, et al.
TITLE
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV, VII, VIII, and IX [17] is granted in part and denied in part. Count I is
dismissed.
W[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Before the Court is Defendants County of Lake, Mark C. Curran, Jr., sued in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Lake County, and Lake County Sheriff's Deputies Ashley Pomazal (“Deputy Pomazal”), Jakub
Klatka, and Sergeant Timothy Jonites (“Sergeant Jonites”) (collectively, “Defendants”) partial motion to
dismiss Counts I, IV, VII, VII, and IX of Plaintiffs Vincent Testa (“Vincent”), Kathleen Testa, and Carl
Testa’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the parties agree that Count I (false arrest and unlawful
detention) should be dismissed. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed. The parties also agree that Counts VII
(malicious prosecution), VIII (respondeat superior), and IX (indemnification) are not barred by the relevant
statute of limitations. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts VII, VIII, and IX is therefore denied. The only
issue remaining is whether Count IV is sufficiently pleaded.

In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that Vincent was denied necessary medical attention while he was
detained at the Lake County Sheriff Waukegan police station. Plaintiffs aver that Deputy Pomazal tasered
Vincent in the back, near his spine, at point-blank range, and that Sergeant Jonites punched Vincent in the
head, rendering him unconscious. Plaintiffs allege that when Vincent regained consciousness, he felt
“excruciating pain in his back.” Compl. 936. Plaintiffs further allege that when Deputy Pomazal discovered
that a taser prong was lodged in Vincent’s spine, she removed the prong by “tugging at it.” Id. [39. Vincent
was transported to Lake County Jail in Waukegan and was held there for approximately seven hours.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants denied Vincent medical treatment while he was in custody despite sustaining
visible injuries as a result of Defendants’ actions and complaining of those injuries. According to Plaintiffs,
Vincent told the jail nurse that he was suffering from a severe headache, but he was not provided with any
treatment to alleviate his pain.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That is, a

12C435 Vincent Testa, et al. vs. County of Lake, et al. Page | of 2


eo STATE

plaintiff's complaint “must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d
930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court construes the complaint
“in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept{s] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw(s] all
inferences in [their] favor.” Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis., 657 F.3d
496, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff claims that he received constitutionally inadequate medical treatment while
detained prior to a judicial determination of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard applies. Ortiz v. City of Chi., 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). In determining whether a
defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, courts analyze: “(1) whether the officer has notice of the
detainee’s medical needs; (2) the seriousness of the medical need; (3) the scope of the requested treatment;
and (4) police interests, including administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.” Id. (citing
Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007). The severity of the medical condition, however,
“need not, on its own, rise to the level of objective seriousness required under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale, balancing
the seriousness of the medical need with the third factor—the scope of the requested treatment.” Id. at 531
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “the relatively short period of time that a
detainee spends in lockup is pertinent to the analysis.” Id.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Vincent’s serious medical need are insufficient
as amatter of law. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to withstand dismissal under
Twombly and its progeny. The matters raised in the instant motion are better-suited for resolution at the
summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 n.7 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[T]he ‘seriousness’ determination will often be ill-suited for resolution at the pleading stage and will
have to await summary judgment proceedings, at which point a fully developed medical record will inform
the court as to the nature of the inmate’s condition.”). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV is therefore
denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12C435 Vincent Testa, et al. vs. County of Lake, et al. Page 2 of 2