Panel 5 

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

Chimkent

Mazar-e Sharif

Meymaneh

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Qiemo

Shihezi

Yining

Ardabil

Aktyubinsk

Aralsk

Atbasar

Balkhash Guryev

Kzyl Orda

Pavlodar

Rudnyy

Semipalatinsk

Shevchenko

Astrakhan

Nukus

Turbat

Mashhad

Tabriz

Karaganda

Chelyabinsk

Kuybyshev

Omsk Novosibirsk

Saratov

Ufa

Tol Yatti

Ashkhabad Dushanbe

Tashkent

Bishkek

Astana

Caspian

Sea

Aral

Sea

AZERBAIJAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

IRAN

Central Asia

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

RUSSIA

250 Kilometers

250 Miles

KAZAKHSTAN 

[Qazaqstan Respublikasy]

Capital Astana

Area 1,052,100 square miles

Head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev (became 

first party secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $6,560

Defense budget (2003) $274 million

Population 15,989,000

Males (18–32 years) 2,205,000

Armed forces 65,800 active; 237,000 

reservists [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 14 

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 20.8 

Life expectancy (for men) 58.9 years

KYRGYZSTAN 

[Kyrgyz Respublikasy]

Capital Bishkek

Area 77,180 square miles

Head of state Askar Akayev (elected president, 

1990)

GDP per capita (2002) $2,950

Defense budget (2003) $24 million

Population 5,078,000

Males (18–32 years) 619,000

Armed forces 10,900 active; 57,000 reservists

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 21.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 7.2

Life expectancy (for men) 63.4 years

TAJIKISTAN 

[Jumkhurii Tojikiston]

Capital Dushanbe

Area 55,240 square miles

Head of state Imomali Rahmonov (became 

president of Supreme Soviet, 1992)

GDP per capita (2002) $1,275

Defense budget (2003) $16 million

Population 6,116,000

Males (18–32 years) 843,000

Armed forces some 6,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 17.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 19.9

Life expectancy (for men) 64.5 years

TURKMENISTAN 

[Turkmenistan]

Capital Ashkhabad

Area 186,4000 square miles 

Head of state Saparmurat Niyazov (became 

first party secretary, 1985)

GDP per capita (2002) $8,247

Defense budget (2003) $173 million

Population 4,850,000

Males (18–32 years) 589,000

Armed forces 29,000 [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 20.3

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 52

Life expectancy (for men) 62.5 years

UZBEKISTAN 

[Uzbekiston Respublikasy]

Capital Tashkent

Area 172,741 square miles

Head of state Islam Karimov (became first party 

secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $ 2,531

Defense budget (2003) $46 million

Population 25,678,000

Males (18–32 years) 3,219,000

Armed forces 50,000 to 55,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 23.1

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 22.3

Life expectancy (for men) 65.8 years

Sources: The Statesman’s Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and

Economies of the World 2004 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2003); International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance, 2003–2004 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2003).
Panel 2 

years ago because of what was then widely

perceived as rather limited U.S. interests in

Central Asia. Not anymore. The future of Central Asia and its continuing stability have

become an increasingly important concern for

the United States in the aftermath of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

American stakes in the region and its

stability are now perceived to be greater than

they were in the 1990s, when access to Caspian

energy dominated Washington’s policy concerns. At stake are the post-September 11 U.S.

military presence in Central Asia; proximity to

Afghanistan; a foothold in the backyard of

China, Russia, and Iran; and the security and

stability of a vast but poorly governed region of

nearly 4 million square kilometers and nearly

60 million inhabitants, rich in mineral wealth,

which runs the risk of becoming the geopolitical bone of contention among its neighbors

and home to a variety of local, regional, and

transnational actors whose behavior has the

potential to reverberate throughout the region

and far beyond.

In other words, American interests in

Central Asia are manifold: they include access

to the region for the foreseeable future; ability

to control others’ access to, and influence over,

the region; and steering the countries of Central Asia toward sustained independence, political stability, and economic development. Leadership succession in one or more of these states

could put at risk all three of these interests.

For the United States, leadership succession in Central Asia is a complicated issue for

several reasons. For more than a decade, but

especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has developed a series

of productive relationships with key regional

leaders that have paid off in tangible terms.

However, given the peculiarities of Central Asia’s

domestic politics, these relationships are highly

personalized and dependent upon the strength

of the personal regime of a given leader. The

institutional arrangements underlying U.S.-

Central Asian ties are weak, as are the counterpart institutions, which the U.S. Government

has sought to develop and enlist as partners.

The example of Azerbaijan is all the

more poignant because its former president

Heidar Aliev, unlike some of his Central Asian

counterparts, did not exercise unrestrained

power, instead allowing a considerable degree

of opposition and relatively free media to exist

in Azerbaijan. But even Aliev, despite many of

his statesmanlike qualities and reputation as

a rather benign autocrat, failed to see transition in institutional terms and treated it as

little more than a dynastic enterprise, seeking

to hand over the presidency to his son rather

than forge a meaningful compromise with the

opposition and attempt to institutionalize a

more open and transparent process.

Outstanding Issues

The United States is confronted with a

paradox: the key factors that have made it

possible for U.S.-Central Asian cooperation to

develop in the aftermath of September 11 are

also the reasons why future U.S. relations with

Central Asia have to contend with a strong dose

of uncertainty. The handful of institutional

relationships that U.S. Government agencies

have been able to establish are with institutions

that embody the most problematic aspects of

their regimes: the security services, which

regional leaders have turned into instruments

of personal political power and survival. Even

though they play an important role as pillars of

Central Asian regimes and in U.S.-Central

Asian cooperation, these institutions are also

among the likely obstacles to political stability

in the region in the long run.

In the absence of established open political systems and transparent patterns of orderly

transfer of power, the prospect of political

transition in Central Asia raises a multitude of

questions. How will transition be managed?

Who will decide on the order and timing of

political transition? What personalities and

institutions are likely to play the key role in

that process? What external players are likely to

get involved? How will U.S. interests be affected?

Is the process likely to lead to political destabilization? Will the existing institutions of power

and key power brokers be able to control the

political processes? How durable is their hold

on power likely to be after the current generation of leaders moves on?

None of these questions can be answered

definitively at this point. Nonetheless, the

record of Central Asia’s post-Soviet development

suggests a number of plausible guesses.

The Insiders

The patterns of domestic politics in Central

Asia since independence suggest that political

transition in the region is likely to be nontransparent to outsiders. It will probably be decided

by, at most, a handful of power brokers chosen

on the basis of their positions of prominence in

an official or unofficial structure—a government agency, clan, ethnic group, or family or

regional grouping. Existing constitutional and

legal arrangements are more likely to be used

to legitimize the power brokers’ decision than

serve as the guide for their action.

The execution of political transition will

be a function of the specific circumstances

necessitating it. Given the hold on power of the

current generation of leaders, the notion that

any of them would initiate an orderly succession while they are still firmly in control or

even in the event of a terminal illness appears

highly doubtful. Most are likely to view themselves as indispensable to the well-being of

their regime and country and therefore probably will cling to power until the very end.

Given the crucial role of security services

in post-Soviet regimes of Central Asia, their

senior personnel are virtually certain to play an

important role in succession. Their support of a

particular candidate will be one of the necessary preconditions for a smooth transition and

consolidation of power by the new leader.

Senior police and interior ministry personnel are also likely to play an important role

in future successions in the region. By virtue of

their control of men with guns, they may be

called upon to play the crucial role in the

event of mass disturbances triggered by leadership transition.

Senior military leadership is likely to

have an important voice, albeit a less influential one than either the secret services or the

forces of the interior ministries. This is a

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. (His previous Strategic Forum, Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11, was published

in December 2002.) Please address questions or comments to his attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu. 

American stakes in the

region and its stability

are now perceived to be

greater than they were in

the 1990s 
Panel 2 

years ago because of what was then widely

perceived as rather limited U.S. interests in

Central Asia. Not anymore. The future of Central Asia and its continuing stability have

become an increasingly important concern for

the United States in the aftermath of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

American stakes in the region and its

stability are now perceived to be greater than

they were in the 1990s, when access to Caspian

energy dominated Washington’s policy concerns. At stake are the post-September 11 U.S.

military presence in Central Asia; proximity to

Afghanistan; a foothold in the backyard of

China, Russia, and Iran; and the security and

stability of a vast but poorly governed region of

nearly 4 million square kilometers and nearly

60 million inhabitants, rich in mineral wealth,

which runs the risk of becoming the geopolitical bone of contention among its neighbors

and home to a variety of local, regional, and

transnational actors whose behavior has the

potential to reverberate throughout the region

and far beyond.

In other words, American interests in

Central Asia are manifold: they include access

to the region for the foreseeable future; ability

to control others’ access to, and influence over,

the region; and steering the countries of Central Asia toward sustained independence, political stability, and economic development. Leadership succession in one or more of these states

could put at risk all three of these interests.

For the United States, leadership succession in Central Asia is a complicated issue for

several reasons. For more than a decade, but

especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has developed a series

of productive relationships with key regional

leaders that have paid off in tangible terms.

However, given the peculiarities of Central Asia’s

domestic politics, these relationships are highly

personalized and dependent upon the strength

of the personal regime of a given leader. The

institutional arrangements underlying U.S.-

Central Asian ties are weak, as are the counterpart institutions, which the U.S. Government

has sought to develop and enlist as partners.

The example of Azerbaijan is all the

more poignant because its former president

Heidar Aliev, unlike some of his Central Asian

counterparts, did not exercise unrestrained

power, instead allowing a considerable degree

of opposition and relatively free media to exist

in Azerbaijan. But even Aliev, despite many of

his statesmanlike qualities and reputation as

a rather benign autocrat, failed to see transition in institutional terms and treated it as

little more than a dynastic enterprise, seeking

to hand over the presidency to his son rather

than forge a meaningful compromise with the

opposition and attempt to institutionalize a

more open and transparent process.

Outstanding Issues

The United States is confronted with a

paradox: the key factors that have made it

possible for U.S.-Central Asian cooperation to

develop in the aftermath of September 11 are

also the reasons why future U.S. relations with

Central Asia have to contend with a strong dose

of uncertainty. The handful of institutional

relationships that U.S. Government agencies

have been able to establish are with institutions

that embody the most problematic aspects of

their regimes: the security services, which

regional leaders have turned into instruments

of personal political power and survival. Even

though they play an important role as pillars of

Central Asian regimes and in U.S.-Central

Asian cooperation, these institutions are also

among the likely obstacles to political stability

in the region in the long run.

In the absence of established open political systems and transparent patterns of orderly

transfer of power, the prospect of political

transition in Central Asia raises a multitude of

questions. How will transition be managed?

Who will decide on the order and timing of

political transition? What personalities and

institutions are likely to play the key role in

that process? What external players are likely to

get involved? How will U.S. interests be affected?

Is the process likely to lead to political destabilization? Will the existing institutions of power

and key power brokers be able to control the

political processes? How durable is their hold

on power likely to be after the current generation of leaders moves on?

None of these questions can be answered

definitively at this point. Nonetheless, the

record of Central Asia’s post-Soviet development

suggests a number of plausible guesses.

The Insiders

The patterns of domestic politics in Central

Asia since independence suggest that political

transition in the region is likely to be nontransparent to outsiders. It will probably be decided

by, at most, a handful of power brokers chosen

on the basis of their positions of prominence in

an official or unofficial structure—a government agency, clan, ethnic group, or family or

regional grouping. Existing constitutional and

legal arrangements are more likely to be used

to legitimize the power brokers’ decision than

serve as the guide for their action.

The execution of political transition will

be a function of the specific circumstances

necessitating it. Given the hold on power of the

current generation of leaders, the notion that

any of them would initiate an orderly succession while they are still firmly in control or

even in the event of a terminal illness appears

highly doubtful. Most are likely to view themselves as indispensable to the well-being of

their regime and country and therefore probably will cling to power until the very end.

Given the crucial role of security services

in post-Soviet regimes of Central Asia, their

senior personnel are virtually certain to play an

important role in succession. Their support of a

particular candidate will be one of the necessary preconditions for a smooth transition and

consolidation of power by the new leader.

Senior police and interior ministry personnel are also likely to play an important role

in future successions in the region. By virtue of

their control of men with guns, they may be

called upon to play the crucial role in the

event of mass disturbances triggered by leadership transition.

Senior military leadership is likely to

have an important voice, albeit a less influential one than either the secret services or the

forces of the interior ministries. This is a

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. (His previous Strategic Forum, Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11, was published

in December 2002.) Please address questions or comments to his attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu. 

American stakes in the

region and its stability

are now perceived to be

greater than they were in

the 1990s 
Panel 2 

years ago because of what was then widely

perceived as rather limited U.S. interests in

Central Asia. Not anymore. The future of Central Asia and its continuing stability have

become an increasingly important concern for

the United States in the aftermath of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

American stakes in the region and its

stability are now perceived to be greater than

they were in the 1990s, when access to Caspian

energy dominated Washington’s policy concerns. At stake are the post-September 11 U.S.

military presence in Central Asia; proximity to

Afghanistan; a foothold in the backyard of

China, Russia, and Iran; and the security and

stability of a vast but poorly governed region of

nearly 4 million square kilometers and nearly

60 million inhabitants, rich in mineral wealth,

which runs the risk of becoming the geopolitical bone of contention among its neighbors

and home to a variety of local, regional, and

transnational actors whose behavior has the

potential to reverberate throughout the region

and far beyond.

In other words, American interests in

Central Asia are manifold: they include access

to the region for the foreseeable future; ability

to control others’ access to, and influence over,

the region; and steering the countries of Central Asia toward sustained independence, political stability, and economic development. Leadership succession in one or more of these states

could put at risk all three of these interests.

For the United States, leadership succession in Central Asia is a complicated issue for

several reasons. For more than a decade, but

especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has developed a series

of productive relationships with key regional

leaders that have paid off in tangible terms.

However, given the peculiarities of Central Asia’s

domestic politics, these relationships are highly

personalized and dependent upon the strength

of the personal regime of a given leader. The

institutional arrangements underlying U.S.-

Central Asian ties are weak, as are the counterpart institutions, which the U.S. Government

has sought to develop and enlist as partners.

The example of Azerbaijan is all the

more poignant because its former president

Heidar Aliev, unlike some of his Central Asian

counterparts, did not exercise unrestrained

power, instead allowing a considerable degree

of opposition and relatively free media to exist

in Azerbaijan. But even Aliev, despite many of

his statesmanlike qualities and reputation as

a rather benign autocrat, failed to see transition in institutional terms and treated it as

little more than a dynastic enterprise, seeking

to hand over the presidency to his son rather

than forge a meaningful compromise with the

opposition and attempt to institutionalize a

more open and transparent process.

Outstanding Issues

The United States is confronted with a

paradox: the key factors that have made it

possible for U.S.-Central Asian cooperation to

develop in the aftermath of September 11 are

also the reasons why future U.S. relations with

Central Asia have to contend with a strong dose

of uncertainty. The handful of institutional

relationships that U.S. Government agencies

have been able to establish are with institutions

that embody the most problematic aspects of

their regimes: the security services, which

regional leaders have turned into instruments

of personal political power and survival. Even

though they play an important role as pillars of

Central Asian regimes and in U.S.-Central

Asian cooperation, these institutions are also

among the likely obstacles to political stability

in the region in the long run.

In the absence of established open political systems and transparent patterns of orderly

transfer of power, the prospect of political

transition in Central Asia raises a multitude of

questions. How will transition be managed?

Who will decide on the order and timing of

political transition? What personalities and

institutions are likely to play the key role in

that process? What external players are likely to

get involved? How will U.S. interests be affected

Is the process likely to lead to political destabilization? Will the existing institutions of power

and key power brokers be able to control the

political processes? How durable is their hold

on power likely to be after the current generation of leaders moves on?

None of these questions can be answered

definitively at this point. Nonetheless, the

record of Central Asia’s post-Soviet developmen

suggests a number of plausible guesses.

The Insiders

The patterns of domestic politics in Centra

Asia since independence suggest that political

transition in the region is likely to be nontransparent to outsiders. It will probably be decided

by, at most, a handful of power brokers chosen

on the basis of their positions of prominence in

an official or unofficial structure—a government agency, clan, ethnic group, or family or

regional grouping. Existing constitutional and

legal arrangements are more likely to be used

to legitimize the power brokers’ decision than

serve as the guide for their action.

The execution of political transition will

be a function of the specific circumstances

necessitating it. Given the hold on power of the

current generation of leaders, the notion that

any of them would initiate an orderly succession while they are still firmly in control or

even in the event of a terminal illness appears

highly doubtful. Most are likely to view themselves as indispensable to the well-being of

their regime and country and therefore probably will cling to power until the very end.

Given the crucial role of security services

in post-Soviet regimes of Central Asia, their

senior personnel are virtually certain to play an

important role in succession. Their support of a

particular candidate will be one of the necessary preconditions for a smooth transition and

consolidation of power by the new leader.

Senior police and interior ministry personnel are also likely to play an important role

in future successions in the region. By virtue o

their control of men with guns, they may be

called upon to play the crucial role in the

event of mass disturbances triggered by leadership transition.

Senior military leadership is likely to

have an important voice, albeit a less influential one than either the secret services or the

forces of the interior ministries. This is a

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 2 

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. (His previous Strategic Forum, Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11, was published

in December 2002.) Please address questions or comments to his attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu. 

American stakes in the

region and its stability

are now perceived to be

greater than they were in

the 1990s 
Panel 5 

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

Chimkent

Mazar-e Sharif

Meymaneh

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Qiemo

Shihezi

Yining

Ardabil

Aktyubinsk

Aralsk

Atbasar

Balkhash Guryev

Kzyl Orda

Pavlodar

Rudnyy

Semipalatinsk

Shevchenko

Astrakhan

Nukus

Turbat

Mashhad

Tabriz

Karaganda

Chelyabinsk

Kuybyshev

Omsk Novosibirsk

Saratov

Ufa

Tol Yatti

Ashkhabad Dushanbe

Tashkent

Bishkek

Astana

Caspian

Sea

Aral

Sea

AZERBAIJAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

IRAN

Central Asia

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

RUSSIA

250 Kilometers

250 Miles

KAZAKHSTAN 

[Qazaqstan Respublikasy]

Capital Astana

Area 1,052,100 square miles

Head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev (became 

first party secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $6,560

Defense budget (2003) $274 million

Population 15,989,000

Males (18–32 years) 2,205,000

Armed forces 65,800 active; 237,000 

reservists [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 14 

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 20.8 

Life expectancy (for men) 58.9 years

KYRGYZSTAN 

[Kyrgyz Respublikasy]

Capital Bishkek

Area 77,180 square miles

Head of state Askar Akayev (elected president, 

1990)

GDP per capita (2002) $2,950

Defense budget (2003) $24 million

Population 5,078,000

Males (18–32 years) 619,000

Armed forces 10,900 active; 57,000 reservists

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 21.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 7.2

Life expectancy (for men) 63.4 years

TAJIKISTAN 

[Jumkhurii Tojikiston]

Capital Dushanbe

Area 55,240 square miles

Head of state Imomali Rahmonov (became 

president of Supreme Soviet, 1992)

GDP per capita (2002) $1,275

Defense budget (2003) $16 million

Population 6,116,000

Males (18–32 years) 843,000

Armed forces some 6,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 17.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 19.9

Life expectancy (for men) 64.5 years

TURKMENISTAN 

[Turkmenistan]

Capital Ashkhabad

Area 186,4000 square miles 

Head of state Saparmurat Niyazov (became 

first party secretary, 1985)

GDP per capita (2002) $8,247

Defense budget (2003) $173 million

Population 4,850,000

Males (18–32 years) 589,000

Armed forces 29,000 [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 20.3

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 52

Life expectancy (for men) 62.5 years

UZBEKISTAN 

[Uzbekiston Respublikasy]

Capital Tashkent

Area 172,741 square miles

Head of state Islam Karimov (became first party 

secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $ 2,531

Defense budget (2003) $46 million

Population 25,678,000

Males (18–32 years) 3,219,000

Armed forces 50,000 to 55,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 23.1

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 22.3

Life expectancy (for men) 65.8 years

Sources: The Statesman’s Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and

Economies of the World 2004 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2003); International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance, 2003–2004 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2003).
Panel 5 

No. 203, December 2003 Strategic Forum 5 

Chimkent

Mazar-e Sharif

Meymaneh

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Qiemo

Shihezi

Yining

Ardabil

Aktyubinsk

Aralsk

Atbasar

Balkhash Guryev

Kzyl Orda

Pavlodar

Rudnyy

Semipalatinsk

Shevchenko

Astrakhan

Nukus

Turbat

Mashhad

Tabriz

Karaganda

Chelyabinsk

Kuybyshev

Omsk Novosibirsk

Saratov

Ufa

Tol Yatti

Ashkhabad Dushanbe

Tashkent

Bishkek

Astana

Caspian

Sea

Aral

Sea

AZERBAIJAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

IRAN

Central Asia

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

RUSSIA

250 Kilometers

250 Miles

KAZAKHSTAN 

[Qazaqstan Respublikasy]

Capital Astana

Area 1,052,100 square miles

Head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev (became 

first party secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $6,560

Defense budget (2003) $274 million

Population 15,989,000

Males (18–32 years) 2,205,000

Armed forces 65,800 active; 237,000 

reservists [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 14 

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 20.8 

Life expectancy (for men) 58.9 years

KYRGYZSTAN 

[Kyrgyz Respublikasy]

Capital Bishkek

Area 77,180 square miles

Head of state Askar Akayev (elected president, 

1990)

GDP per capita (2002) $2,950

Defense budget (2003) $24 million

Population 5,078,000

Males (18–32 years) 619,000

Armed forces 10,900 active; 57,000 reservists

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 21.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 7.2

Life expectancy (for men) 63.4 years

TAJIKISTAN 

[Jumkhurii Tojikiston]

Capital Dushanbe

Area 55,240 square miles

Head of state Imomali Rahmonov (became 

president of Supreme Soviet, 1992)

GDP per capita (2002) $1,275

Defense budget (2003) $16 million

Population 6,116,000

Males (18–32 years) 843,000

Armed forces some 6,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 17.7

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 19.9

Life expectancy (for men) 64.5 years

TURKMENISTAN 

[Turkmenistan]

Capital Ashkhabad

Area 186,4000 square miles 

Head of state Saparmurat Niyazov (became 

first party secretary, 1985)

GDP per capita (2002) $8,247

Defense budget (2003) $173 million

Population 4,850,000

Males (18–32 years) 589,000

Armed forces 29,000 [estimate]

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 20.3

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 52

Life expectancy (for men) 62.5 years

UZBEKISTAN 

[Uzbekiston Respublikasy]

Capital Tashkent

Area 172,741 square miles

Head of state Islam Karimov (became first party 

secretary, 1989)

GDP per capita (2002) $ 2,531

Defense budget (2003) $46 million

Population 25,678,000

Males (18–32 years) 3,219,000

Armed forces 50,000 to 55,000 active

Birth rate (per 1,000 population) 23.1

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 22.3

Life expectancy (for men) 65.8 years

Sources: The Statesman’s Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures and

Economies of the World 2004 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2003); International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance, 2003–2004 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2003).