alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 715 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 715

  To direct the Secretary of Agriculture to release on behalf of the 
United States the condition that certain lands conveyed to the City of 
    Old Town, Maine, be used for a municipal airport, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 23, 2017

 Mr. King (for himself and Ms. Collins) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, 
                        Nutrition, and Forestry

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Agriculture to release on behalf of the 
United States the condition that certain lands conveyed to the City of 
    Old Town, Maine, be used for a municipal airport, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Removing Outdated Restrictions to 
Allow for Job Growth Act''.

SEC. 2. RELEASE OF REVERSIONARY INTEREST.

    (a) Release.--Notwithstanding section 32(c) of the Bankhead-Jones 
Farm Tenant Act (7 U.S.C. 1011(c)), if the City of Old Town, Maine, 
makes a written request to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary 
shall release, convey, and quitclaim, without monetary consideration, 
all rights, title, and interest of the United States in and to the 
lands specified in subsection (b).
    (b) Lands Specified.--The lands subject to subsection (a) include 
only the lands--
            (1) conveyed by the United States to the City of Old Town, 
        Maine, under section 32(c) of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant 
        Act (7 U.S.C. 1011(c)) by the deed dated June 5, 1941;
            (2) proposed for conveyance by the City of Old Town, Maine, 
        for the purpose of economic development; and
            (3) described in the written request submitted by the City 
        of Old Town, Maine, to the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to 
        subsection (a).
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Peter Guido, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Kings County, rendered August 2, 1960, convicting him, on his plea of guilty, of conspiracy to violate section 1372 of the Penal Law (contriving, drawing and assisting in a lottery); and sentencing him to serve a term of six months in the New York City Penitentiary. The appeal is taken solely on the ground that the sentence is excessive. Judgment affirmed. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
child The court failed to address appellant's request that respondent

solely cover the child's out-of-pocket healthcare expenses incurred up to $18,000. On appeal, appellant first contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request to modify the custody designation under the court's prior order. But appellant did not perfect an appeal from the prior order and did not establish a change in circumstances warranting a modification. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request. Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (providing that this court reviews a child custody decision for an abuse of discretion). Appellant next argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay $400 monthly in child support. Although appellant asserts that her child support obligation should be less than $400 per month, the record demonstrates that the district court considered the disparity in the parties' incomes and the costs associated with the secondary health insurance policy, and thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in calculating appellant's child support obligation. See Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543 (explaining that this court reviews a child support order for an abuse of discretion).

Lastly, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to address her request that respondent be responsible for the child's out-of-pocket healthcare expenses up to $18,000. She asserts that these costs equal more than five percent of her gross monthly income, and if respondent paid for all the costs, they would equal only two percent of his gross monthly income. See NRS 125B.085(2)(a) (providing

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947AJ.

that reasonable healthcare costs are five percent of the parent's monthly income). While the district court adjusted appellant's child support obligation to offset respondent's share of the cost of the secondary insurance policy, it appears that the district court failed to considerappellant's request that respondent be ordered to pay for all of the out-ofpocket expenses. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in failing to address appellant's request, see Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543, and we remand this matter to the district court so that the court can make specific findings in regard to appellant's request that respondent be responsible for the child's out-of-pocket healthcare expenses up to $18,000. We affirm the district court's order as to the other claims raised in this appeal.

It is so ORDERED.'

J. Hardest

Douglas

"We further deny appellant's request that this matter be remanded to a different district court judge.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3
(0) 1947A 

### (e ,cc: Hon. Linda M. Gardner, District Judge Karen G. Oki Leslie J. Shaw Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4

(0) I947A ce:o
#### 15.509 Forms.

Optional Form 307, Contract Award, Standard Form (SF) 26, Award/Contract, or SF 33, Solicitation, Offer and Award, may be used to award negotiated contracts in which the signature of both parties on a single document is appropriate. Note however, if using the SF 26 for a negotiated procurement, block 18 is not to be used. If these forms are not used, the award document shall incorporate the agreement and award language from the OF 307.

[62 FR 51230, Sept. 30, 1997, as amended at 75 FR 13416, Mar. 19, 2010]
**EXHIBIT 23**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We have issued our report dated September 5, 2006,accompanying the financial statements included in the Annual Report of Venture Catalyst Incorporated on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the RegistrationStatements of Venture Catalyst Incorporated on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-19743, effective January 14, 1997, 333-19745, effective January 14, 1997, 333-19747, effective January 14, 1997, 333-44179, effective January 13, 1998,333-82169, effective July 2, 1999, 333-47152, effective October 2, 2000 and 333-55434, effective February 12, 2001). 

/s/    GRANT THORNTON LLP 

Irvine,California 

September 5, 2006
### §7425. Authorization of appropriations

#### (a) In general

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subchapter.

#### (b) Limitation on expenditures for administrative expenses

Funds appropriated to carry out this subchapter may not be expended for the payment of expenses incurred by a board to administer an order.

(Pub. L. 104–127, title V, §526, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 1048.)
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Tellabs, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Timothy J. Wiggins, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Timothy J. WigginsTimothy J. WigginsChief Financial OfficerDate: March 10, 2005
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
118 FY 2018 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT | U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

The goal of the Grants Oversight and New Efficiency 

(GONE) Act of 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-117) is to 

close out grants and cooperative agreements that 

are in manual closeout with zero dollars and undisbursed 

balances and whose period of performance has exceeded 

two years.

Starting with an October 3, 2016, baseline of 8,948 

grants and cooperative agreements totaling approximately 

$2 billion in various statuses of the closeout process, the 

THE GRANTS OVERSIGHT AND NEW EFFICIENCY (GONE) 

ACT OF 2016

Department succeeded in closing out 100 percent of the 

required grants and cooperative agreements during FY 

2018, as reflected below.

The Department continues to use the GONE Act’s 

methodology and is integrating a financial monitoring 

curriculum into the Department’s grants training, 

updating our grants management system and updating the 

policy Handbooks for discretionary and formula grants.

Source: G5, grants management system linked to the Department’s general ledger system.

Category 2–3 Years >3–5 Years > 5 Years

Number of Grants/Cooperative Agreements 

with Zero Dollar Balances - - -

Number of Grants/Cooperative Agreements 

with Undisbursed Dollar Balances - - -

Total Amount of Undisbursed Balances - - -

Table 7.
#### 1413.305-2 Agency responsibilities.

Policy governing the use and administration of imprest funds within the Department are contained in 330 DM, in addition to the policies and regulations outlined in FAR 13.305-1. HCAs shall establish written procedures for designation, by name, of personnel authorized to approve requisitions and make purchases using imprest funds. The procedures shall include a periodic review of imprest fund transactions by acquisition personnel.
#### Rita Graham, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Stockholders of J. Eisenberg, Inc., Appellant, v. Jesse Safir, Respondent.

Order, entered on October 5, 1962, dismissing the complaint under rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice unanimously affirmed, without costs to either party. As between *601the corporation (in behalf of which plaintiff sues) and defendant attorney, the corporation had the power to acquiesce in, and thereby “ratify”, the payment of a forwarding fee to defendant attorney by the retained attorneys, although the fee was not based upon a division of service and responsibility and there was no prior disclosure. This follows from the fact that the corporation client could have, as between it and defendant attorney, consented to such distribution in the first instance (cf. Restatement, Agency [2d], § 84; 2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations [Perm, ed.], § 752). On the present submission it is not concluded that the client corporation would not have had the power to consent to a sharing of the legal fees. The element of acquiescence is compelled, for the purposes of this action, by the complaint allegation that, after request, the corporation refused to sue. No other question is decided. Particularly the court does not pass upon any remedy which may be available in a derivative stockholders’ action against the management of the corporation for the ratification, nor does it otherwise pass upon the consequences of the conduct described. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

NOEL DEJESUS GARCIA , Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 1899

[ December 14, 2017 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Krista Marx , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2015

- CF

- 005669

- AXXX

- MB

.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez

- Orosa, Se nior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

G ERBER , C.J., C IKLIN and L EVINE , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### In the Matter of Leon M. Forman, an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner.

First Department,

November 1, 1960.

*George G. Hunter, Jr.,*of counsel *(Eric Nightingale,*attorney), for petitioner.

*Leon M. Forman,*respondent in person.

*Per Curiam.*

The Referee has sustained all eight charges filed against respondent. The evidence presented by petitioner uncontrovertibly supports the Referee’s findings and conclusions — in fact, was in most respects not seriously disputed by respondent. He did not file an answer to the supplemental petition reciting six of the charges.

Upon one charge the Referee found that respondent had converted to his own use the sum of $600 entrusted to him to be held in escrow. On another, respondent forged the payee’s name to a client’s check for $70.55, entrusted to him to settle a case, and pocketed the proceeds. He also converted $222.44, representing part of the share of two clients in the sum for which a negligence action was settled. On three other charges the evidence established gross neglect of his duty and responsibility to clients. On a seventh charge it was proven that respondent divided fees with a layman in connection with the referral of several cases; and on an eighth charge that he had issued 16 worthless checks over a period of four months.

The Referee appropriately commented that he could find no mitigating circumstances to bring to the attention of the court.

The respondent should be disbarred.

Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Valente and McNally, JJ., concur.

Respondent disbarred.
#### § 34.50 Purpose of termination and enforcement.

Sections 34.51 through 34.53 set forth uniform procedures for suspension, termination, enforcement, and disputes.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                           4,496
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,593
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        128
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,482
<PP&E>                                          52,212
<DEPRECIATION>                                  16,888
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  47,370
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,290
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,525
<OTHER-SE>                                      32,511
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    47,370
<SALES>                                         12,597
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,935
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,209
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,967
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    869
<INCOME-TAX>                                       521
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                348
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  2,267
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,615
<EPS-BASIC>                                       5.58
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     5.58


</TABLE>
#### 1353.300 Scope of subpart.

DOC Forms will not be illustrated in this CAR. Persons wishing to obtain copies of DOC forms prescribed in the CAR may do so in accordance with 1353.107.
### §7218. Planting flexibility

#### (a) Permitted crops

Subject to subsection (b), any commodity or crop may be planted on contract acreage on a farm.

#### (b) Limitations and exceptions regarding fruits and vegetables

#### (1) Limitations

The planting of fruits and vegetables (other than lentils, mung beans, and dry peas) shall be prohibited on contract acreage.

#### (2) Exceptions

Paragraph (1) shall not limit the planting of a fruit or vegetable—

(A) in any region in which there is a history of double-cropping of contract commodities with fruits or vegetables, as determined by the Secretary, in which case the double-cropping shall be permitted;

(B) on a farm that the Secretary determines has a history of planting fruits or vegetables on contract acreage, except that a contract payment shall be reduced by an acre for each acre planted to the fruit or vegetable; or

(C) by a producer who the Secretary determines has an established planting history of a specific fruit or vegetable, except that—

(i) the quantity planted may not exceed the producer's average annual planting history of the fruit or vegetable in the 1991 through 1995 crop years (excluding any crop year in which no plantings were made), as determined by the Secretary; and

(ii) a contract payment shall be reduced by an acre for each acre planted to the fruit or vegetable.

(Pub. L. 104–127, title I, §118, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 904.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Contract Payments for Wild Rice Acreage

Pub. L. 106–78, title VII, §727, Oct. 22, 1999, 113 Stat. 1164, provided that: "None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Agriculture in fiscal year 2000 or thereafter may be used to administer the provision of contract payments to a producer under the Agricultural Market Transition Act (7 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) for contract acreage on which wild rice is planted unless the contract payment is reduced by an acre for each contract acre planted to wild rice."

Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriations acts:

Pub. L. 105–277, div. A, §101(a) [title VII, §727], Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–28.

Pub. L. 105–86, title VII, §734, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 2110.
#### § 3.1 Purpose.

This part consolidates rules that implement section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547, as amended, and have a significant impact on the public. Section 845 authorizes the Secretary of a Military Department, the Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and any other official designated by the Secretary of Defense, to enter into transactions other than contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements in certain situations for prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense.

[67 FR 54956, Aug. 27, 2002]
### §1459. Repealed. Pub. L. 101–649, title IV, §407(d)(20), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 5046

Section, acts June 27, 1952, ch. 477, title III, ch. 2, §348, 66 Stat. 267; Oct. 24, 1988, Pub. L. 100–525, §9(gg), 102 Stat. 2622, related to admissibility in evidence of statements voluntarily made to officers and employees in course of their official duties and penalties for failure of clerk of court to perform duties.
### §9096. Signature authority

#### (a) In general

In carrying out this title and title II and amendments made by those titles, if the Secretary approves a document, the Secretary shall not subsequently determine the document is inadequate or invalid because of the lack of authority of any person signing the document on behalf of the applicant or any other individual, entity, general partnership, or joint venture, or the documents relied upon were determined inadequate or invalid, unless the person signing the program document knowingly and willfully falsified the evidence of signature authority or a signature.

#### (b) Affirmation

#### (1) In general

Nothing in this section prohibits the Secretary from asking a proper party to affirm any document that otherwise would be considered approved under subsection (a).

#### (2) No retroactive effect

A denial of benefits based on a lack of affirmation under paragraph (1) shall not be retroactive with respect to third-party producers who were not the subject of the erroneous representation of authority, if the third-party producers—

(A) relied on the prior approval by the Secretary of the documents in good faith; and

(B) substantively complied with all program requirements.

(Pub. L. 113–79, title I, §1613, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 710.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This title and title II, referred to in subsec. (a), are titles I and II of Pub. L. 113–79, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 658, 713. Title I of the Act is classified principally to this chapter. Title II of the Act enacted, amended, and repealed numerous sections and provisions set out as notes in Title 16, Conservation, and Title 43, Public Lands. For complete classification of titles I and II to the Code, see Tables.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-40142

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TAVORI TERRELL JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:18-CR-142-2

Before HAYNES, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Tavori Terrell Jackson has moved 

for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Jackson has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief 

and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 6, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-40142 Document: 00515300487 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2020
No. 19-40142

2

appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the 

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 19-40142 Document: 00515300487 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2020
### §599. Definitions

When used in this chapter—

(1) The term "person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations.

(2) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture.

(3) Except as provided herein, the term "foreign commerce" means commerce between any State, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside of the United States or its possessions.

(4) The term "grapes" means vinifera species table grapes, European type, whether or not they have been in storage.

(5) The term "plums" means both European and Japanese type, whether or not they have been in storage, but does not mean Italian-type prunes, nor damson-type plums.

(Pub. L. 86–687, §9, Sept. 2, 1960, 74 Stat. 735.)