With a Foreword by

Mark M. Lowenthal

Assistant Director of Central Intelligence

JOINT

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BRINGING INTELLIGENCE 

JOINT

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Joint Military Joint Military

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Intelligence College Intelligence College

BRINGING INTELLIGENCE ABOUT

Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices

May 2003

Russell G. Swenson, Editor

With a Foreword by

Mark M. Lowenthal

Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
ii

The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encou

research on intelligence that distills lessons and improves sup

policy-level and operational consumers, and that familiariz

public with aspects of the intelligence profession.

Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practitioners

The title chosen for this book carries two meanings. The more straightforward inter

“Bringing Intelligence About,’’ and the principal one, refers to the book's coverage of w

sources and methods employed to add value to national security-related information

“intelligence.’’ A second meaning, not unrelated to the first, refers to the responsible agi

of U.S. intelligence professionals, to think and act in such a way as to navigate informatio

and interpretation duties with a fix on society's shifting but consensual interpretation of th

stitution. 

A prominent individual and ideal intelligence professional who lived both meanings of “Br

ligence About’’ was the late Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters. As an intelligence offi

attache, ambassador-at-large and ambassador to Germany, his combination of skills—

language skills—made him the epitome of a professional. Beyond intelligence service in 

ments of Defense and of State, General Walters presided as Deputy Director of Central 

during the Watergate episode, where he stood on principle and at odds with political fi

Nixon administration. His mastery of intelligence collection, analysis and politically attune

the full story of which has not yet been told, make him a near-mythic figure for aspiring 

professionals.

Although the talents and assignments of General Walters were extraordinary, his demon

intelligence aptitudes and skills are fungible across Departments and Agencies is a powe

tion that those separate institutions can also operate together as a professional communi

The papers in this publication are based exclusively on sources available to the public an

expressed are those of the respective authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official po

tion of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Gove

This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of the 

Defense (Public Affairs). Copies of this publication are available in limited quantities to U

ment officials, and to the public through the National Technical Information Service (ww

or the U.S. Government Printing Office (www.gpo.gov).

Russell.Swen

Library of Congress Control Number 2

ISBN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0-96
iii

FOREWORD

There are two anecdotes from the world of entertainment that seem apt t

this book. 

First: The great 19th-century Anglo-Irish actor Edmund Kean lay on his d

friend asked, “Is it hard, Edmund?”

“No,” he replied. “Dying is easy. Comedy is hard.”

Second: A Hollywood producer in the 1930s or 1940s was asked why a 

succeeded at the box office but another did not. He replied, “If we knew the 

that, we’d only make hits.”

Similarly, the process of intelligence is easy; good intelligence is hard. And 

figure out what made some intelligence “good” or “better” (which would re

further definition), then we would produce it more regularly.

We spend a lot of time in the Intelligence Community analyzing the vario

the intelligence process and trying to define what makes some intelligence 

other intelligence. And yet, for all that intellectual effort, we still have no

steady and reliable means of producing this “better” intelligence. We know wh

cess works and when it does not, but this knowledge does not turn into a f

greater success.

Why is that? Are we unable to learn from our own successes and failures? 

process remain so intangible at core that it eludes us even when we have, o

mastered it? My own view is that we have not yet (after more than 55 years) co

a good picture in our minds—nor have we successfully enunciated—just wh

sional intelligence analyst “looks like,” and how we train and develop this an

his or her entire career—not just at the outset. Interestingly, we do know wh

lyst’s ethos is, but we remain fuzzy on the necessary professional underpinnin

This volume helps us move down the long and difficult road of helping iden

produce good or better intelligence—by which I mean intelligence that is of us

makers and is better than other intelligence by being so used. The authors hav

range of areas of interest—identified some of the practices that work best to pr

more aptly, “to bring about”—good intelligence. Note that the preceding se

“some of the practices.” Few books could expect to identify all of the practice

and, as the authors of each chapter would undoubtedly concede, there will 

some variables and intangibles at work in intelligence: vagaries of time to perf

tion and analysis; the quality of sources; the quality of the analysts; the nature 

ality of the policymakers. Still, it is possible to identify the practices that w

practices that have to be altered over time as conditions change.
iv

dations of these chapters and shape them into a coherent program we wou

our way to producing better intelligence on a more consistent basis. Of cou

still face the issue of where that program should exist and how it shoul

because, for all of the improvements we have made in training and develo

we still do this in vertical, agency-dominated stovepipes. We have a variety 

seek to train (or inculcate) people into the broader Community aspects of in

training remains a series of isolated enterprises. Thus, even if we accept t

ideas in this book, getting them to all of the people who might benefit from 

typically problematic.

Finally, it is also important to understand that this book focuses on the 

sis. I am admittedly prejudiced in my views, but I believe that analysis is th

any intelligence enterprise: putting informed judgments in front of policym

them make decisions. This is not meant to demean clandestine activities in t

designing and operation of collection systems, or any of the other necessa

broader intelligence function. But, at the end of the day, the most consisten

ligence provides is analysis, whether it is a one-line warning or a detailed 

Infantry likes to call itself “the Queen of Battle.” This is how I feel about 

world of intelligence. This book helps analysis remain firmly placed on her 

Mark M. Lowenthal

Assistant Director of Central Intelligen

Analysis and Production

Vice-Chairman for Evaluation, Nationa

Council
v

PRACTITIONERS REFLECT ON BEST PRACT

Contents

Introduction 

Russell G. Swenson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Intelligence Pro and the Professor: Toward an Alchemy of Applied 

Arts and Sciences

Pauletta Otis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Via the Internet

John Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Visit to Mazagon Dockyard, Bombay

F.G. Satterthwaite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional Obstacles

Stephen Marrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appraising Best Practices in Defense Intelligence Analysis

Thomas A. Garin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the National Security Agency

David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The U.S. Coast Guard Joins the Intelligence Community

Michael E. Bennett LT, USCG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
vi

Map of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Author talks with an Indian Navy captain on board a third-party vessel . . . 

The Gateway to India and naval facilities in Bombay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Author and son visiting with a Hindu holyman at a curio shop in Bombay . 

There is life after naval service in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Author with makeshift head covering for visiting at Hindu temple . . . . . . . 

Functional core competencies for intelligence analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

An intelligence evaluation scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Measures of success for intelligence products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Characteristics of successful intelligence analysts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Abilities required for successful intelligence analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Skills required for successful intelligence analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Knowledge required for successful intelligence analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

U.S. Coast Guard missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Coast Guard civil/military authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
vii
viii

Dr. Russell G. Swenson directs the Center for Strategic Intelligence R

Joint Military Intelligence College. His initial exposure to the world of intel

an Air Force linguist in the mid-1960s. He holds undergraduate degrees fro

sity of Kansas, and graduate degrees in Geography from the University of W

waukee. At the JMIC since 1988, he has taught the course on strategic 

intelligence, as well as thesis research and writing seminars. He also teach

intelligence issues in Latin America. His research interests include the appl

lytic methods and the comparative study of intelligence practices, especial

ern Hemisphere. 
1

Russell G. Swenson 

with David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan

This book is the product of studious self-reflection by currently servin

professionals, as well as by those who are in a position, with recent experi

tinuing contacts, to influence the development of succeeding generations 

personnel. Contributors to this book represent eight of the fourteen orga

make up the National Foreign Intelligence Community. A positive image o

of professionals, engaged in public service, and concerned about co

improvement through “best practices,” emerges from these pages.

Practitioners anywhere in this Community are professional by any definiti

Their work requires extensive education and specialized training, and at their 

exhibit highly innovative approaches to collection and analysis. Differences i

the principal Intelligence Community partners are sometimes sharp, but simi

niques do exist, particularly at the “working level.” Community partners, such 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Nat

Agency (NSA), and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Rese

example, share responsibilities for national security issues that allow individ

analysts, issue managers and offices to work together on interagency task forc

However, commonalities may decrease farther afield, for example betwee

with a strategic focus and those involved in tactical or law-enforcement intelli

least of these differences is that, with its strategic focus, the Intelligenc

expects to be forward-looking, envisioning future developments and their 

whereas law enforcement intelligence efforts have typically focused on exp

analysis to link together the extralegal behavior of individuals and organizat

and legally acceptable evidence. Some overlap of intelligence applications 

especially in the areas of crime and narcotics, where interagency task forces w

ends of the problem—the predictive and the reactive—so that a facile claim 

differences between law enforcement and national security intelligence m

scrutiny only in terms of the scale of operations supported rather than profe

gence techniques employed. 1 We may infer from these observations that th

intelligence collection and analysis addressed in this book will apply to intelli

in the broadly overlapping cultures of law enforcement and national security 

1 Two works that document the evolution of criminal or law enforcement intel

the U.S. and internationally, are 1) Intelligence 2000: Revising The Basic Elemen

Intelligence Professionals, Marilyn Peterson, ed. (n.p.: Law Enforcement Intelligen

nia, and International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 200

McDowell, Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and 

NSW, Australia: Istana Enterprises Pty, Ltd, 1998). These books provide evidence o

in both instructional and professional standards of practice, between law enforcem

security intelligence. 
2

sists, despite the specialized character of much of their work. Further, the N

eign Intelligence Community does not remain static, as shown by its rec

formal incorporation of the U.S. Coast. The Coast Guard combines its new 

focus with its traditional broad responsibilities in law enforcement, in paramil

tions, and in public safety. As a new, young member, and a bridge between na

rity and law enforcement spheres, the USCG is in position to help reju

community by exemplifying the ideal of sharing both information and assessm

The U.S. Intelligence Community was subject during the 1990s to a con

mandated reduction in Intelligence Community personnel levels.2 This reductio

despite numerous small wars and the continuation of international criminal act

the decade. When dissenters, such as former Director of Central Intelligence Jam

“talked about the proliferators, traffickers, terrorists, and rogue states as the s

came in the wake of the slain Soviet dragon, [they were] accused of ‘creating thr

tify an inflated intelligence budget.”3 Even government reports such as that of 

States Commission on National Security (commonly referred to as the H

Report), which warned of catastrophic attacks against the American homeland 

for vigilance, were dismissed.4

Intelligence collectors and analysts have at times been subject to personn

ment, a situation favoring current operations support, and leading to the neglec

ual and corporate succession planning—to capture and pass on institutional 

knowledge. Today, collection and analysis tradecraft remain neglected pheno

focus of very few self-studies.5 Naturally, some literature known to “insiders” 

available to the general public because of the admonition not to disclose “s

2 John E. McLaughlin, CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence, notes that the reduc

percent. See McLaughlin’s “The Changing Nature of CIA Analysis in the Post-So

remarks as prepared for delivery at the Conference on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet U

1991, 9-10 March 2001 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2001), URL: <http://www

public_affairs/speeches/archives/2001/ddci_speech_03092001.html>, accessed 22 Dec

Cited hereafter as McLaughlin.

3 McLaughlin.

4 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: Ameri

in the 21st Century, The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment 

Quarter of the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis (Washington, DC: GPO

ber 1999), 49.

5 The few works that do address intelligence practices in informed detail have beco

and are widely cited. They include Sherman Kent’s Strategic Intelligence For America

icy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949); Roger Hilsman, Strategic Inte

National Decisions (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956); Washington Platt, Strategic 

Production: Basic Principles (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); Bruce D. Be

Allen E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, N

University Press, 1989); Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (

DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999) and Lisa Krizan, Intelligence Essentia

one, Occasional Paper Number Six (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Colle
3

are not very esoteric. Analytic methods used by intelligence analysts are re

to specialists in the academic world.6 The commonalities that do exist am

and analysts across the Community have rarely been noted in intelligence 

essays in this book will help fill that gap, and should illuminate for non-

important role of self-reflection among intelligence professionals who rem

ment service.

The contributors to this book share an interest in exploring and explainin

collection and analysis practices. 

Pauletta Otis, whose work has acquainted her with both the Intelligenc

and academia, outlines from experience the numerous similarities an

between communities of academics and intelligence professionals. Her rem

demics tend to be “contrarian” points up the value of academics having con

tion with intelligence experts, in support of the Community’s ideal, “nonm

following the party line) approach to issues. 

In the next essay, retired Navy Captain George Satterthwaite recounts h

and creativity when coupled with serendipity can contribute to gathering un

tion that may thereby yield valuable intelligence. By taking advantage of hi

ties as Defense Attaché to host official U.S. delegations, he gained acces

facilities in India for insight into Indian nuclear and naval capabilities. In

fessionals can readily relate to his spirited interaction with bureaucratic an

leagues in the U.S. Embassy and the host country. 

It may now be true that the value of intelligence to consumers is more 

the evaluation of information (grappling with mysteries) than on discover

If so, then the evaluation of social trends in various regions might best b

tematic exploitation of authentic or “grass-roots” reporting from newspa

mass media. In the third essay, John Turner, senior Middle East and Nor

lyst at the U.S. European Command’s Joint Analysis Center, illustrates hi

exploiting multilingual electronic news media from North Africa. Tr

reporting by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from such med

rather than comprehensive, and selections are not tailored for individual 

are removed from first-hand screening of the sources. Therefore, languag

are indispensable for any country’s intelligence personnel who seek ins

indigenous mass media. Language capabilities must mirror those tongue

the electronic media that represent the target entities. Further, as noted in 

6 Many if not most analysts have been exposed, by training or experimentatio

niques as link analysis, the Delphi technique, and analysis of competing hypothe

Jones, former CIA analyst, has distilled the less structured techniques that intelligen

employ in The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving (N

Business, Random House, 1995 and 1998).

7 For an “insider’s” comparison of secrets” and “mysteries” see John C. Gann

Director for Intelligence, speech before the World Affairs Council, 20 March 199

www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1996/ddi_speech_032096.html.
4

lived abroad typically outperform native linguists in intelligence assign

depend on language ability.8 Dr. Turner’s essay, with its emphasis on his ow

ity with North African news media reporting, illustrates that point. 

Stephen Marrin reflects on his experiences as a new CIA analyst as he addres

and how formal training programs can impart the specialized knowledge, skills, 

necessary for meaningful intelligence analysis. He examines how the customary a

cesses, and organization of intelligence may have contributed to some failed aspec

gence prior to the events of 11 September 2001. He then suggests some spec

reinvent certain aspects of the national intelligence mission to allow analysts to b

persuasiveness to their value-added information. 

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Tom Garin examines how dignity and 

among professionals may be fostered within an intelligence organization. Garin 

intelligence corporation in terms of a “learning organization” and then applies ex

dards from the Baldrige National Quality Program to selected intelligence-produ

within the Defense Intelligence Agency. This benchmarking study not only id

practices, but also shows how such professional standards could be used to identify 

offices or individuals across the entire Intelligence Community.

Available literature does not yet address the question of what knowledge, skills 

are required, from the point of view of front-line managers, to support and sustai

tion of intelligence tradecraft. David Moore and Lisa Krizan define a graduated s

to calibrate an individual’s suitability for an analytic position. Given the current 

Community hiring surge, the set of core competencies they identify for NSA also 

guide for the larger Intelligence Community to improve the professional stature 

force by defining who the analysts of the present and future ought to be. 

The last essay reveals how the U.S. Coast Guard, having only recently joined 

gence Community, has already adjusted its organizational structure and its person

expanded its participation in multi-agency initiatives, and developed procedure

effective management of its unique position between civilian and military worlds. 

developments, stimulated by membership in the Community of Intelligence pr

should enable the Coast Guard to anticipate and meet the requirements of both l

ment and national security intelligence. As a fresh-faced affiliate of the Intelligen

nity, the Coast Guard can inject an uncompromised determination to help the com

up to its name.

The essays collected here only begin to illustrate the potential of self-reflec

by intelligence practitioners. If a communitarian ethos distinguishes intellige

sionals from their more individualistic and self-absorbed brethren in academia

reflection among intelligence practitioners can also easily become a comm

Tension between a communitarian and individualistic ethos can resolve it

8 Susan Schmidt and Allan Lengel, “Help Still Wanted: Arabic Linguists,” Washing

December 2002, A23.
5

nastic tradition. The essays in this volume illustrate how, through selfrefle

sion may be resolved. For example, individual professionals can ea

connections among these essays that would quickly move the discussion 

realm—into their “culture.” That culture is typically characterized by fast-

and requirements that preclude introspection about the phenomena of intel

tion and production. 

Self-reflection not only allows the various agency sub-cultures to be disp

trayed here, but also allows “insiders” to realize the subtle connections of t

work to the overall enterprise. As a further illustration of this principle, the 

lectual effort that characterized earlier eras of intelligence production and 

as a part of the enduring culture, is evoked by the observations of Willia

World War II intelligence analyst at the UK’s Bletchley Park:

[Analysis] means reviewing the known facts, sorting out significant 

nificant, assessing them severally and jointly, and arriving at a conclu

exercise of judgment: part induction, part deduction. Absolute intell

esty is essential. The process must not be muddied by emotion or pre

by a desire to please.9

National intelligence collection management and intelligence analysis 

ently government functions, and privatized intelligence—with its prospe

congressional oversight—is even more antagonistic to the communal shari

tion than are the more stringently overseen bureaucratic fiefdoms.10 In this 

to “bring intelligence about” from the point of view of the American people 

ing back some of the thick mantle of secrecy that has shrouded individual 

management approaches—Community best practices—employed in the 

ordinary and extraordinary tasks. Readers who look closely at the observa

by the authors here will find a serviceable tool for unwrapping some of 

enigmatic enthusiasms and motivations of government intelligence professi

9 William Millward, “Life in and out of Hut 3,” in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp

The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 17

10Across the Intelligence Community, the proportion of private, “contract” empl

egories now stands at about 30 percent, and is growing. Few of these individuals ar

contractors, the great majority being associated with small or large private enterp

most such contractors hold high-level security clearances based upon background 

the proprietary interests of their “parent” organizations can be at odds with an etho

sharing of information and perspectives. For an exploration of these issues, see J

Subversion of a Government Monopoly: The Privatization of Intelligence Services 

Intelligence Consortium, Inc., 2000). For information about the author, see h

tydc.edu/academics/depts/ Interdisc/International/Jim_Sutton.htm.
6

Pauletta Otis is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at 

sity of Southern Colorado. Her Ph.D. was awarded from the Graduate School 

tional Studies at the University of Denver in 1989. Dr. Otis held the 

Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Security Studies at the Joi

Intelligence College in 1998 and then was Visiting Scholar for the National Se

cation Program 1999, under the auspices of the National Defense University. 

ues to teach summer sessions at JMIC and contributes to a number of defen

efforts. Dr. Otis maintains an active speaking schedule and has been guest s

number of prestigious meetings including those held by the National W

National Intelligence Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligen

National Security Agency, U.S. Marine Corps, the Denver Committee on Fo

tions, and other private and public venues.

Dr. Otis has special expertise in the study of sub-national violence and 

theoretical (from graduate degrees in Anthropology, Political Science, an

tional Studies) with operational experience and expertise. She has cond

research in conflict situations in South Asia, Latin America, the Middle Ea

eastern Mediterranean. 
7

AN ALCHEMY OF APPLIED ARTS AND SCIEN

Pauletta Otis

Recent events have led to an increasing realization that all of the re

American public must be engaged in support of national security. The U

community and the U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Community are inst

agers of “information as power.” Yet their potential for useful cooperation 

tion is unrealized and the relationship between the communities co

somewhat strained. This relationship has been the topic of discussions for m

somewhat benign security environment. With dramatic changes in that e

late 2001, maximizing resources through enhanced cooperation and 

assumes critical importance. How can the Intelligence Community (IC) and 

community best cooperate in support of national security? What are the inh

challenges? 

The theoretical challenge is of primary concern. Basic assumptions abou

democracy and the nature of secrecy are foundational to each of the commu

itself and of the other. The major theoretical concern for both intelligence 

communities is the apparent contradiction between secrecy and democrat

From the academic’s point of view, the U.S. Government’s stability and i

the common welfare derive from the First Amendment. If a stable democra

an informed public, the public cannot make good decisions without accur

information. Without the “self-correcting” mechanism of free speech, a gov

to be subject to centrifugal forces, to spin on its own axis, and to become 

separate from the citizenry.

Yet, on a practical level, we need to “keep secrets” from U.S. enemies, how

be defined. A certain level of secrecy is required to protect national interes

secrecy is “best” in a democracy is subject to ongoing debate.11 The pendulu

time and in response to perceived threats to national security. Subsequent to 

2001, an acceptance of “more secrecy” has accompanied public suppor

enhanced role in homeland security. It may also be assumed that eventually 

tion to perceptions of “too much” secrecy will move the pendulum back towa

center. Compromise between requirements to keep secrets must be bala

requirements of free speech inherent in the very definition of democracy. 

Stansfield Turner (1977-1981), when he was at the center of the secrecy mae

stated: “Accommodating secrecy in a democracy requires compromises with 

full freedom of speech, inquiry, and endeavor.”12 The problems inherent to thi

11Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democra

DC: CQ Press, 1995), see especially chapter 1.

12Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. Boston, 

Mifflin Company, 1985), 112.
8

with difficulty as in the relationship between academia and the national security 

This tension, albeit normal, natural, and expected, is often most apparent and m

in the relationship between academe and intelligence professionals.13

The special caveat is that patriotism is not at issue: degree of commitment t

try is an individual attribute. Whereas the intelligence professional may work 

basis with threats to this country, the academic may work on supporting the 

attitudes necessary to sustain democratic life. One focuses on external threat, t

the internal maintenance of the democratic system itself.

COMMONALITIES 

Both the IC and the academic community work in the world of word-pow

populated by dedicated and committed Americans. In most cases, cooperative 

yielded the “best” for the United States in terms of public policy and decisionm

at other times, the communities have been at serious odds. The ensuing pro

been of significant concern to the attentive public and detrimental to the com

These problems emanate not only from the theory of democracy but from c

over the nature of truth and value for the country. They can also be traced 

about the nature and processes of intelligence gathering.

The IC and the academic community have much in common: both realize th

tion is power and that power comes in the form of words. These words form 

cultural assumptions, common concepts, and grand theory. In terms of inform

dling minutiae, intelligence specialists and academic scholars do much the 

They research, write, explain, and predict with excruciating self-consciousne

ization of the power of words. Intelligence professionals and academics contrib

lic discussion in both oral forums and in written format. Intelligence profes

academics are valued and participant citizens: They attend common religiou

participate in the education of children, contribute to community service org

and talk to neighbors. At this level, both are truly in the same “game.” In 

domain, both intelligence professionals and academics contribute informatio

and opinions. These are read and integrated by the public, by policymakers, 

“other” community. This common body of public information and analysis is 

of intelligent decisionmaking in the United States. 

For 50-plus years, relations between the IC and academia have wavered bet

eration and competition. The basic tension inherent in keeping “secrets in a d

has been played out in specific activities and attitudes. These can be seen at the 

institutional, and political levels. At the individual and institutional levels, n

part because of the strong influence of Ivy League academics in World War II 

13Robert M. Gates, as CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1986, addressed 

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University on the relationship between the 

deme. His address was published as “CIA and the University,” in Studies in Intelligen

(Summer 1986): 27-36.
9

and government intelligence was maintained.Universities and study cen

involved in the ongoing relationship between the intelligence and academic 

Between 1939 and 1961, Yale University was overtly supportive of the IC.1

faculty were participants in intelligence collection and analysis. Study cente

cially supported and professional journals published. Information was 

archived (including the Human Relations Area Files). The money was cha

viduals or to institutions but seemed to raise few concerns.16 At the politi

existence of a “community” of intelligence-related agencies and offices has 

legislation, suggesting wide acceptance of the idea of government intellige

as regularized institutions with special taskings in support of U.S. national 

CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND THE DEVELOPMEN

OF DIFFERENCES

The “position descriptions” of an intelligence specialist and of an acad

opposites: The basic job of an academic is to find information, collect fac

they are useful or not–and scatter the information to the winds hoping a

make more sense of the ensuing chaos. Intelligence specialists collect simi

very specific productive purposes. Whereas the academic is spreading in

intelligence professional is collecting, narrowing, and refining data to pr

even if at the same time continuing an academic interest in the subject. The 

learn for the fun of it; the intelligence professional prefers, or learns to be a

do something with the information. In the long run, the academic must w

and contribute to the body of professional literature, but there is not th

immediate production that the intelligence professional must face. The aca

“that is interesting”; the intelligence professional must certify that “it is imp

14For example, see Roger Hilsman’s Strategic Intelligence and National Decisio

The Free Press, 1956), 7, 10. A Princeton academic, he explores the notion that “s

some respects take the place of spies,” and that academics, especially social scienti

IC “find their real home within the formal structure of government.”

15Norman Holmes Pearson, Yale graduate and former OSS official, suggeste

recruit its younger personnel from universities and urged that each university have 

spotters who would forward names of likely candidates. See Robin W. Winks, Cl

Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961 (New York: William Morrow Publishing C

315.

16Winks, 14-19, notes that Nathan Hale, a Yale graduate, is of special interest a

executed for his work. Other noted Yale personages involved with intelligence ac

Arnold Wolfers, Sherman Kent, Chester B. Kerr, James Angleton, C. Bradford 

Holmes Pearson, Dean Acheson and Richard Bissell.

17Edward F. Sayle, “The Historical Underpinning of the U.S. Intelligence Comm

tional Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 1-17.
10

of information power, whether of technical or human origin. Is the individual w

information and gives it to the “government” responsible for the ultimate 

information? Referring to scientific advances in weaponry during World Wa

scientist who invented a weapon responsible for the ultimate use of that wea

academic-scientist gave information to the government, did the very nature 

ment absolve him from guilt if it were to be used in a way not foreseeable by th

Did it matter whether the government was a “dictatorship” or a “democrac

human intelligence side: Were doctors and scientists, conducting scientific e

on human populations in concentration camps and under the direction of gover

cials, responsible for the use of that information? What if the information 

saved lives, albeit those of a Fascist regime? During the Vietnam era, the qu

raised in another context: Information concerning populations in Laos, Cam

Vietnam, collected by anthropologists, was subsequently used in support of the 

What was the ethical and moral responsibility of the information gatherer? Di

out”? And, if so, what did they sell out to? Is final use of HUMINT the combi

sibility of the collector and disseminator? The ensuing and subsequent debate

acrimonious, difficult, and divisive. 

On the West Coast, and during the Cold War, the strain between academics 

contributed to a number of very ugly scenes. Distinctions were made between 

demics who were “patriotic, loyal, and anti-communist,” and those who 

authority in any context. Simple questioning became a sign of disloyalty. U

were increasingly supported by public funding, and administrators were i

drawn from a professional management pool rather than from the scholarly c

resulting in a view that universities were simply another form of business 

Administrators were often afraid to allow challenges to government on the par

ulty out of fear of losing funding. The divisiveness of this period cannot be o

sized in explaining the nature of the contemporary public university. Adm

penalties for individual scholars included blacklisting, failure to get tenu

research support, and even dismissal from teaching positions. The public pre

“truth” was simple: teaching loyalty to the country was the real job of the te

demic. Anything contrary was a serious and significant challenge to the fu

nation. And, if the public supported the university both financially and with its 

it in turn should be able to expect loyalty on the part of its faculty employees

term effects of this controversy were devastating: a certain level of self-censor

part of academics, serious mistrust between university administrators and f

reluctance of faculty members to cooperate with intelligence agencies. The co

became unnecessarily, but understandably, polarized.18

18Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New Y

University Press, 1986).
11

bureaucraticinstitutional rigidities. The academic community is quite awar

cation could be much better but that the status quo supports the profess

change is always a bit dangerous as it usually means a diminishment of a

pendence and an enhancement of administrative power. The IC also w

bureaucratic complacency in times of peace. Changes incur costs either in 

of capability or loss of institutional “territory.” Both the intelligence profes

academic are, to some extent, prisoners of their own bureaucracies and 

resistant to change.

There is an attendant problem: Neither of the communities is monoli

that stereotype persists. Most academics do not know the difference bet

and DIA nor the nature of their specific mandates from Congress, exce

“wartime,” when such differences become more widely known through m

Similarly, intelligence professionals often lump all colleges and universi

the professoriate into one big resource group. Intelligence professionals 

business to know their colleagues in other agencies; academics know who 

“what,” the relative integrity of individuals and institutions, and the unwrit

labor in the university system. This information is buried in the collective 

of each community and remains difficult to exhume—hence the persistenc

lithic stereotype

Each community has a body of common knowledge which it assumes e

ing within the institutional framework knows and accepts. Because common 

“common,” it is not self-conscious and most individuals do not even rea

assumptions are seldom challenged. For example: the academic communit

books are good and thus libraries should have them. Individuals in the IC 

that books are inherently historical and that current information and intelli

“near-real-time” and continually refreshed. There is a distinct attitude of ar

these individuals discuss the currency of information with academics. W

issue, of course, is that the intelligence professional has to produce and is ch

indications and warning responsibility mandating inclusion of current infor

Academics are known for jargon and obfuscation; the IC is known for p

nyms seemingly at leisure. The tribal languages are difficult to learn wit

translator. Such facilitators may be hard to find because language serves to 

group and the out-group and what can or should be communicated within th

and to outsiders. To illustrate, the academic community believes that the ti

best reserved for a medical professional and that the title of “professor” c

cient recognition of achievement. However, the military and intelligence co

idly and habitually call academics “doctor,” sometimes embarrassing both 

same time, the IC has a specific ranking for directors, analysts, collector

and for military and civil service personnel. These are totally obscure for 

working within the community. They don’t know the differences and often 

take the time to learn.
12

fractious and democratic. Anyone can challenge anyone on any idea at any ti

so. Sometimes it is not very polite or courteous even when the comment beg

understand your premise, but, have you considered.....?” Bloodletting is the 

than the exception. Members of the IC appear to be more polite although “outs

assume that they derive enjoyment from more discreet disagreement. The va

of interaction are notable when individuals from the IC quietly participate in 

the International Studies Association or the Political Science Association, or 

demics vociferously contribute to conferences held under the auspices of the I

Prejudices and stereotypes held by each group toward the other are often 

and uncomfortably accurate. The intelligence professional hides in a secure b

academic retreats to the pie-in-the-sky ivory tower. The intelligence profess

excessively talkative; the academic cannot be bridled. It is assumed that aca

scholars are in never-never land with theory that cannot be proved or disproved

ligence professional is said to live in a land of basic facts without understandi

picture.” When specifically challenged, both sides recognize that one cannot 

without theory nor theory without supporting evidence. Yet the stereotypes 

there is misunderstanding and misinformation on both sides and few venue

those that cause problems in communication.

There is further the problem of “group-think” on both sides. Each assume

quently that they have a lock on reality and often simply refuse to be open-m

occurred during the Vietnam era when the IC felt itself misunderstood and abu

academic community believed that its information and personnel were bei

intelligence agencies in ways of which academe did not approve. The compl

story is well-known but the mythology remains extant.19 Part of the mythol

intelligence agencies will collect information from academics but not retu

information in a collegial manner. On the other side, the assumption on the pa

gence professionals is that the academics have a bad attitude and misunderstan

value the IC contribution to national well-being. The academic community bel

is not afflicted with the IC’s tunnel vision and can contribute to lateral thinkin

ports enhanced problem-solving capabilities.

THE ACADEMIC’S DECISION

The motivations for an academic to work for the IC are, of course, individ

mixed. He or she may simply want a “steady” job that pays well–even if on

over the summer break. There can also be an ego boost when intelligence ex

the information and assessment done by an academic in a particular field. 

attached to being “appreciated” for the information and analysis cannot be ov

there is very little of that inherent in the academic community. It is also poss

19Note the references to news reports and other material on websites devoted to 

abuse of intelligence during the Vietnam Era. 
13

effort designed to enhance national security. 

A number of problems may emerge if an academic goes to work for the 

contractor, or produces information that can be used by that community

native,” that is, become more “intelligence-centric” than the IC needs or de

attempt to “belong.” There is a tendency for self-delusion and thinking tha

tion contributed is going to “make a difference.” Sometimes it does; some

part of the package provided for a specific tasking. The academic really 

knowing what impact his or her work is having. 

There are special areas in which the academic can contribute to the IC. A 

tribution is in the collection of facts and information using sources that 

cluded from using. Academics can generally travel more easily than intelli

and can establish human networks across international boundaries that can 

especially in times of crisis. Academics generally are trained in the develo

lytical frameworks and employ them with a degree of ease and clarity. M

contribute a unique ability to critique or evaluate projects based on a wide 

literature combined with “on the ground” experience. The good academic i

verse thinker–looking to examine the null hypothesis or suggesting altern

tions. They tend not to accept the “generally accepted explanation.” This h

them a bit difficult as conversationalists especially if “critique” is transl

cism.” A good academic scholar will insist on “rigor,” as in following the r

test basic assumptions, validate criteria used in hypothesis building, monit

validity of hypotheses, and pinpoint the public implications of certain theor

rigor mandates “elegance”; that is, a hypothesis must be important, clear, a

Even in descriptive analysis, an academic insists on looking at a range of po

tive choices and at the internal coherence of the final product.

There is another caveat: most academics believe that intelligence profess

ter paid and have more job security for doing similar work. This may imply 

ics will skew their work in order to get the “big bucks” that the IC is as

sitting in a back room. The serious implication is that there is a potential fo

give up academic integrity and play to the audience in order to get governm

On the other hand, if it is only supplemental income for the professors, the 

can be very supportive of the academic profession at large. It is worth notin

of academics vary hugely across the spectrum of colleges and universities a

regions of the country.20 It must also be noted that if academics are taking u

taskings, they are not generally able at the same time to write for publicatio

journals. Participation in conferences is also limited and inter-academic co

suffer as a consequence.

20Approximately forty percent of all U.S. academic positions are adjunct or part-

somewhere in the range of $1,500 to $3,000 per class, which roughly translates as 

for someone with an advanced, terminal degree.
14

research, consultation on specific issues, monitoring, evaluating programs, co

with other professionals on special projects, and holding conversations on issue

concern. Most of these areas have been exploited to one degree or another. An 

often overlooked is that of professional development. After all, many professors 

a great deal of time teaching, testing, and designing learning materials. Not all 

it–but many have considerable skills that could be tapped. Another specific ar

teaching of research methodology and specialized writing. Intelligence profe

sometimes criticized on their ability to effectively and efficiently engage the 

oral presentations of their ideas and materials. Perhaps specific individuals in th

community would be helpful in teaching and supporting that skill development

The ultimate caveat: it is hard to explain to professional colleagues that “

spy.” The mystique outlives the reality. It can be overcome with honesty and s

of good humor.

There are specific benefits to the IC if academics and scholars are emplo

One of the often-heard criticisms of the IC is that it has a special susceptibility 

think” because analysts seldom have internal challenges. Projects, after all, are 

duced and tend to reduce an individual’s unique contribution in favor of the fin

The academic, simply by the nature of the job, challenges the norms, support

initiative and creativity, and values novel or unconventional thinking.

SUGGESTIONS FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT 

AND MUTUAL BENEFIT

For all of the reasons just noted, it is important that the IC encourage the p

of academics. Academics can make significant contributions in creative thinki

analysis, and professional presentation of products.

But the choice of which academic to invite as a participant and the venue fo

tion are not givens. The IC might do well to choose individual academics n

geographic convenience, near to the Washington or New York areas, but for 

scholarly work produced in their “home environment.” Some of the work is 

professional conferences such as those of the International Studies Associat

Political Science Association. Some academics, however, do not “conference

however, write and produce articles for journals and books for publication. Th

uals can be found by reputation in the community, in reading lists, and in list

publications provided by commercial book publishers. Another often-neglecte

source is the database developed by University Microfilms International (UM

Arbor, Michigan. Its widely available “Dissertation Abstracts International” in

1.5 million dissertations from the U.S. and some other English-speaking coun

It matters little whether the academic is familiar or comfortable with inte

intelligence agencies: what matters most is honest and clear communicat
15

source and that I had final say on what information went into the project. 

aware of the potential for harm to informants in an ethnic violence situatio

critical support for my contribution to a specific project. 

Think tanks are very peculiar instances of hybridization. What the IC 

realize is that Rand, Hoover, and Carnegie are assigned specific status by a

assumed that “since they get their money directly from the government,” t

how tainted. Research is suspect and academic integrity is assumed to have 

mised. Nevertheless, the tanks pay very well and very fine academ

substantially to critically needed and specifically targeted research.

Universities are not monolithic. Many will support technical research fi

U.S. Government, but distance themselves from government “intrusion” in 

ences. This is understandable but can be challenged if those interested in “p

interchange develop or appeal to a board of monitors or research advisors.2

precluded from supporting social-cultural research. There have been any nu

emanating from political science departments on topics relating to democr

opment. Economics departments are enthusiastic contributors to develop

and economic distribution issues. Most universities are giving increased att

ronmental issues including environmental security.23

Another touchy but important area is in the potential contribution of in

understanding by visiting foreign students and visiting professors. It is w

that using undergraduate students in this sense remains fairly unproductiv

ongoing debate about getting information about, tracking, or using grad

Certainly the base of internationally focused information available on u

21The University of Minnesota maintains a database for U.S. Master’s theses and 

tions These are abstracted and available through the UMI system. Further informati

on their respective websites: http://www.lib.umn.edu and http://www.lib.umi.com/d

22Widely used “Institutional Research Boards,” for example, could address e

issues even before they arise. For a useful discussion of the role of IRBs, see Bruce 

tative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn and 

chapter 3.

23Although there is no evidence of specific linkages between the IC and the follo

these academic authors are often quoted by the IC in support of new models rela

requirements to a broadened definition of security: Jack Snyder, From Voting to Viol

tization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); Georg Sorensen, 

Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder: Westvie

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free P

environment issues related to security, see Environmental Conflict, Paul F. Duiehl 

Gleditsch, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001) and Ecoviolence: Links among En

ulation, and Security, Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, eds. (Boulder, CO: 

tlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998).
16

universities have been encouraged to check on the legal status of their intern

dents, especially those coming from countries known to support internationa

International student offices and university administrators have had mixed rea

international students are a source of out-of-state tuition and contribute to 

diversity of a campus. International student counselors and offices have histor

as advocates for the guest students. There is some reluctance to take on a “la

ment” function, however much individuals may support anti-terrorism efforts.

Specific programs have been developed by the CIA and DIA for encouragin

participation with the IC. These efforts need to be encouraged, regularized, in

ized, and adequately financed. The Scholars-in-Residence program of the Cen

gence Agency is well known.24 The Fulbright Senior Fellowship program, fund

the Department of State, is invaluable. Most informal or formal interaction 

through individual consulting, sponsorship and organization of topical confere

ing of individuals for specific research of mutual interest and concern, fundin

port for research centers, and informal conversations at any one of th

internationally focused academic conferences. This interaction can be highly 

because both parties tend to focus on international issues of mutual concern

special expertise to bear for creative and constructive problem solving.

CONCLUSION

Academics and intelligence professionals are concerned with much the s

problems. The approaches to problem solving may differ but certainly the prac

ent in American democratic tradition have constructed the intellectual environ

to provide common definitions of contemporary threats and challenges. Both 

ties agree that liberty, democracy, freedom, equality, law, and property are 

American values. Cooperation between the IC and academics, and specific co

that academics can make to the production of good intelligence, can and mus

supported. It would be foolish to waste available skills and talent. There is t

stake.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berg, Bruce L. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 3rd ed. B

Allyn and Bacon, 1998.

Duiehl, Paul F. and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. Environmental Conflict. Bo

Westview Press, 2001.

24See Gates, 1986. A more recent status report on ties between CIA and profession

is in Lloyd D. Salvetti, Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, “Teaching Intellig

ing Together to Build a Discipline,” in Teaching Intelligence at Colleges and Universit

ings of the18 June 1999 JMIC Conference (Washington, DC: JMIC, 1999), 12-24.
17

1986): 2736.

Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe

Press, 1956.

Holt, Pat M. Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democr

ton, DC: CQ Press, 1995.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Jessica Blitt, eds. Ecoviolence: Links among 

Population and Security. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Pub

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. Democratic Governance. New Yor

1995.

Salvetti, Lloyd D. “Teaching Intelligence: Working Together to Build a D

Teaching Intelligence at Colleges and Universities, Proceedings o

1999 JMIC Conference. Washington, DC: JMIC, 1999.

Sayle, Edward F. “The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence 

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, 

1986): 1-17.

Schrecker, Ellen W. No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universitie

Oxford University Press, 1986.

Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist 

York: W.W. Norton, 2000.

Sorensen, Georg. Democracy and Democratization: Processes and P

Changing World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. 

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.

Winks, Robin W. Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-196

William Morrow Publishing Company, 1987.
18

Dr. John Turner is the senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the 

pean Command’s Joint Analysis Center, where he is responsible for strategic 

His past assignments concerned with the Middle East and Africa region inclu

tive, counterintelligence, and current intelligence analytical postings in th

Europe. He has traveled widely in the Middle East and Africa. Dr. Turner earn

in Near Eastern Languages and Literatures from the University of Michiga

University. 
19

VIA THE INTERNET:

NEWS AND INFORMATION FOR THE ANA

FROM NORTH AFRICAN ELECTRONIC M

John Turner

The remarkable growth of electronic media over the past decade in 

North Africa provides specialists in the region with a wealth of news and o

tion. This survey and analysis of the French-language media of Algeria, 

Tunisia examines how these media go about providing information on 

politics, economics, and culture in a way that does take account of ex

make up an important sector of the politically active population. For “o

specialize in the interpretation of the region, news media offer a “grass

prism through which future developments may be anticipated.1 Observabl

North Africa media, when carefully documented and placed in contex

contention of various authors, from Robert Steele and Gregory Trever

Hulnick, who have addressed the promises and perils of devoting a gr

intelligence resources to the exploitation open-source information. The

much more promise than peril.2

REGIONAL MEDIA CULTURE

The political context in which North African media have evolved over 

decades is chiefly one of centralized governments tending toward authorit

oligarchical in the case of Algeria, monarchical in the case of Morocco, or 

the case of Tunisia. The political institutions of each country developed se

post-colonial period and in each country a different media culture exists tha

clearly defined the role of the broadcast and print media. However, through 

Internet access and use spread to the region, the public in each country, 

expatriate North African communities in Europe and elsewhere are proving 

1 An early and prescient example of this approach to “futurology’’ is in John N

trends (New York: Warner Books, 1982). Naisbitt’s approach to trendspotting was to 

of local newspapers in the U.S. and to extrapolate trends unobtrusively from thos

sources. This approach is explained in pages 8-9 of the book.

2 For example, see Steele’s On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open Wor

AFCEA International Press, 2002); Treverton’s Reshaping National Intelligence 

Information (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter Four

Downside of Open Source Intelligence,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and 

gence 15, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003): 565-579. 
20

ing both analysis and opinion, as well as useful business information. Govern

experience strong competition from non-state run media due in large part to th

latter of the Internet.4

The political and business elites in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have s

the public demand for information to support their routine decisionmakin

increasingly over the past four decades to European and other media, Nor

desire that their domestic media mirror standards set elsewhere in the regi

world. It is in the electronic versions of the region’s print media that this expe

been most fully realized. Since the late 1990s a host of daily and weekly perio

developed electronic news sites, most backed by their parent print news org

Although the discussion here focuses on the French-language dimensions of th

enon, the reader should be aware that in each country a rapidly growing Arabi

media culture exists as well.

SURVEY OF NORTH AFRICAN ELECTRONIC NEWS ME

Algeria

Algeria’s electronic media culture is dominated by Internet versions of th

French and Arabic-language newspapers. For the former, there are a dozen Al

dailies and one Oran-based daily that cater to audiences in Algeria and Europ

below). Electronic versions of Algerian newspapers began in the early 1990s 

the Algerian community abroad, especially in France, with news.5 As of late 20

dailies6 are available on the Internet, all regularly maintained and updated dai

dailies are increasingly user-friendly and most have undergone facelifts as th

bid for an increasingly sophisticated audience at home and abroad. Gene

3 Naturally, this development is recognized by those predisposed to shape public 

the information-media contest between religious and secular forces, see Dale F. Eick

Coming Transformation in the Muslim World,’’ Current History 99, no. 633 (January 2

For further background, see Eickelman’s book, New Media in the Muslim World: T

Public Sphere (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).

4 For discussions of the pre-Internet media in North Africa during the Cold War e

cially the U.S. Army publications Algeria: A Country Study, fourth edition, 198

Morocco: A Country Study, fifth edition, 1985, 277-280; and Tunisia: A Country Stud

tion, 1986, 249-252. For coverage of post-Internet media developments, see http://w

advocacy/internet/mena/index.htm.

5 See Elias Hanna Elias, La Presse arabe (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1993), 

ernment press monopoly was only ended in 1988. A snapshot of the evolving press cul

ria in the early 1990s is given in the fifth edition of Algeria: A Country Study, 1994, 21

6 One of them, L’Expression, was dormant for most the month of November 2002

at the end of the month after a remake (www.lexpressiondz.com). Such episodes are c

other electronic dailies in Algeria, which can unexpectedly be down for long periods o

their web sites are redesigned.
21

page format. In late 2002 alone, two dailies, Liberte and Le Soir dAlge

undergone major changes in the “look and feel’’ of their web sites.

Algerian French-Language Daily Newspapers on the Internet

In contrast to the wealth of dailies represented in the electronic media, th

of Algerian weeklies available on the Internet. Some of the daily web site

end’’-oriented articles appearing in their Thursday or Saturday editions (A

and their electronic counterparts are not issued on Friday). However, only th

the time of writing had multimedia “magazine’’ supplements.7

Algeria’s government news site is the Algerian Press Service (APS),8 w

pages in Arabic, French, English, and Spanish. APS has news offices throu

and updates its web page of news items daily. Many of the news dailies di

use APS reports. However, most have their own network of reporters throu

and rely upon APS and international wire services for foreign news.

Daily press summaries are provided on two independent web sites. The 

by Agence Algerienne d’Information (AAI),9 which has a detailed daily pre

ering the headlines of the nation’s French and Arabic language newspapers

Name Internet address Remarks

L’Actualitie www.lactualite-dz.com Independent; pdf format only

L’Authentique www.authentique-dz.com Independent

L’Expression www.lexpressiondz.com Independent; connections wi

Horizons www.horizons-dz.com Independent

Le Jeune Independant www.jeune-independant.com Independent

Liberte www.liberte-algerie.com Independent

Le Matin www.lematin-dz.com Connections with Interior Min

Al-Moudjahid www.elmoudjahid-dz-com Newspaper of the FLN, the e

La Nouvelle Republique www.lanouvellerepublique.com Independent

Le Quotidien d’Oran www.quotidien-oran.com Independent; main French-la

Western Algeria; published in 

Le Soir d’Algerie www.lesoirdalgerie.com Independent; principal indepe

French daily

La Tribune www.latribune-online.com Independent

El Watan www.elwatan.com National daily of record; conn

7 These were the Jeune Independant (“JI Multimedia’’), Le Matin (MultiM@t

bune (“La Tribune Multimedia’’). In addition, Le Matin had a topical section updat

weeks.

8 www.aps.dz.

9 www.aai-online.com/revu.
22

El Watanis one of the oldest of the electronic dailies appearing on the web, a

a French-speaking audience at home and abroad. El Watan is widely cited as a 

of record.

In addition to the French-language dailies noted in the table, one cannot igno

leading Arabic language daily, El Khabar.12 Starting in 2001, daily editions of t

Arabic have been supplemented by English and French headlines pages.13 Each 

a brief summary of the daily print and electronic edition’s major stories. A

English and French sites are similar, the choice of items for summarization from 

original is not all-inclusive. Nevertheless, these pages are important for non-Ar

as an insight into the reporting focus of Algeria’s largest daily.

 Morocco

In contrast to Algeria’s thriving daily Internet news culture, Moroccan elec

media represent a combination of daily and weekly web sites. The daily prin

viders and their electronic web sites (see table below) are dominated by 

papers. However, the news culture of Morocco is also marked by a strong 

news weeklies, many of which are relatively new since the end of the 199

accession of the present monarch, King Mohamed VI, to the throne.

Moroccan French-Language Daily Newspapers on the Internet

Moroccan dailies have been appearing in electronic form since 1998, whe

official Le Matin du Maghreb et du Sahara began Internet publication. Le Mat

followed by the newspapers of three of the political parties of the center-left K

tion in the parliament. These papers still form the backbone of the electronic 

10www.algerie-guide.com/actualitie.

11El Watan: Le Quotidien Independant, http://www.elwatan.com.

12www.elkhabar.com. Links to the French and English headline pages are found 

page of the daily edition.

13www.elkhabar.com/html/pageAnglais.html and www.elkhabar.com/html/pageFran

Name Internet address Remarks

Al-Bayane www.casanet.net.ma/albayane/ Casablanca; French-language daily 

Liberation www.liberation.press.ma Casablanca; French-language daily 

Le Matin du Sahara et 

du Maghreb www.lematin.ma Casablanca; government/royalist new

L’Opinion www.lopinion.ma Casablanca; French-language daily 

L’Economiste www.leconomiste.com

Casablanca; independent daily spec

business and commercial news

Le Quotidien du Maroc www.casanet.net.ma/quotidien Casablanca; Independent daily
23

Moroccos news dailies are still largely the domain of its political parties.

Morocco’s national news agency is the Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP),15 

web sites in English, French, Arabic, and Spanish. MAP, as well as internat

vices, provides domestic news dailies with foreign news and some domest

MAP hosts a French web site that provides a daily press review of ninete

Arabic dailies.16

Le Matin du Maghreb et du Sahara has the largest print circulation and i

also dominated the electronic media after its 1998 launch. However, the firs

extensively overhauled in September 2001, changing from one primarily 

print edition to one with distinctive content that was also distinguished w

name—Le Matin.ma17—to emphasize its web status.

Tunisia

Tunisia’s electronic press remains restricted compared to that in Algeria 

with the country’s Internet activity subject to close government scrutiny. T

news dailies (see table below) and the availability of foreign print media 

time combine with government controls to produce an electronic medi

focuses heavily on business and commerce, as well as non-controversial 

foreign news items.

Tunisian French-Language Daily Newspapers on the Internet

Tunisia’s news dailies are heavily controlled by the government, with e

try’s largest non-government press house, Dar es-Sebah, having to keep wi

but very real constraints.18

14 Elias, 109.

15www.map.co.ma.

16www.map.co.ma/mapfr/fr.

17www.lematin.ma.

Name Internet address Remarks

La Presse du Tunisie www.tunisie.com/LaPresse/index.html Principal French-language 

government connections

Le Renoveau www.tunisieinfo.com/LeRenoveau/ French-language daily of t

dominant political party in 

Le Temps www.tunisie.com/Assabah/Alternate: 

www.lapress.tn

French daily published by 

Tunis

18See Elias, 108-109, for the major Tunisian press enterprises, of which Dar es-
24

The political heritage of North Africa and its impact on the region’s me

together raise the inevitable questions of editorial freedom, objectivity and ac

ideal standard for North African publications, as in other countries, is one of a

strict standards of reporting and analyzing events in a climate of universal pre

However, “red lines’’ exist in editorial freedom, objectivity, and accuracy that 

to cross. North African media have suffered negative sanctions imposed by g

officials as the result of reporting that has broken taboos.19

Objectivity is a concern for analysts and researchers in a media culture w

papers, not only those owned by manifestly political groups, but also the i

press, are controlled by interests that have a marked political agenda. Neve

both Algeria and Morocco a system of checks and balances exists, with daily 

print media and their electronic counterparts in vigorous competition for the do

foreign market. These publications maintain high standards of journalism, a

mally quite open about their particular biases or journalistic objectives. Such c

and declared interests ensure a degree of confidence in political and econom

that allows a high degree of confidence among business and government cons

seek information for decisionmaking. Tunisia, with its dearth of news dailies 

government influence in the media, remains problematic for the area specialist 

depth analysis of some events, although most economic and business reporting 

high quality and supports its citizens’ decisionmaking effectively.20

Accuracy has historically been less of a concern. A flourishing media 

rivalry among news dailies and weeklies in Algeria and Morocco ensures 

competition that normally means news items are reliable; that is, consistently 

different publications with a sufficient degree of detail and verification of fac

make them satisfactory records of events. In such an information-rich clima

by government or private parties to plant stories would be subject to immedi

and detection by the press. The latter frequently analyzes government repo

issue and takes it to task for various shortcomings, thereby ensuring, through t

reliability, that validity or accuracy is also addressed. 

NORTH AFRICAN MEDIA AS A SOURCE OF INFORMAT

The electronic media in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia remain tied to their 

roots. This is an economic necessity, as too few in these countries lack the 

income to rely on the Internet as their main source of information. Printed n

19Recent problems encountered by journalists include cutoff of advertising suppo

(El Maoukif, 21 December 2001), as well as outright government seizure of pu

Morocco (Al Mostaqil, 1 May 2002). 

20For the Arab world as a whole, these observations are supported by Dale F. Eick

Arab ‘Street’ and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,’’ Naval War College Revie

(Autumn 2002): 39-48.
25

most of the regions population. So long as the regions economic probl

there will be limits on disposable income that impact the ability of the elect

be of practical use to its intended audience.

Databases, and their extent and degree of searchability, remain i

researcher. In terms of media-based interpretation of North African countri

tle consistency in whether or not an electronic daily or weekly has links to 

and how easily they can be accessed and searched. The majority of electron

still offer no search capability, forcing readers to access past editions one 

hope of finding specific news items. Media storage capabilities often limit 

offering more than a few months’ worth of past issues. Certain publications

of the Moroccan L’Economiste, La Vie Economique, and Maroc Hebdo, 

exceptions. But with most other electronic publications from the region, th

quest is often frustrated by lack of archival depth and broken links. Remed

rent deficiencies will be slow in coming and dependent on additional data 

ability and improved website management. 

Reporting of events, as noted above, is as objective and accurate as th

where in the world. The electronic media in Algeria and Morocco are often 

source of news for outside researchers who try to interpret the climate o

incipient trends that exist in the interior of these large and increasingly com

Local news is a growth industry in Morocco, but has yet to become well

Algeria or Tunisia. However, the steady growth of electronic media and th

ization of its culture as a normal supplement to the print world promises th

papers will soon be much more available in electronic form via the Intern

however, are as likely to be in Arabic as in French, depending upon the lo

and the degree to which the outlet has an expatriate readership.

Electronic news media are slowly but certainly being augmented by inde

net sites. Such sites are still relatively few due to their lacking a solid print 

finance electronic editions. However, the provisional success of CasaNet in 

and Cirta in Algeria22 probably indicate a proliferation of these sources.

21www.casanet.net.ma is the web site address of Menara: La Portail du Ma

Morocco’s largest telecommunications company, Maroc Telecom. Menara previo

Moroccan electronic dailies Liberation and al-Bayane, but both now have their o

sites.

22www.cirtaonline.com/news/ has a constantly updated listing of world, national, 

Despite its name (Cirta is the old Roman name for the eastern Algerian city of Cons

is national in scope, leaving local news to the Arabic-language daily an-Nasr (www
26

the Internet news market in North Africa. Much depends on the fortunes of 

print media companies, trends in the news-reading public’s interests, and 

growth of the local economies in North Africa and the amount of disposable in

able to the general population to sustain further growth of the electronic media

sonal computers and affordable Internet access is commonly available, m

Africans will still rely on the print and broadcast media as their primary for

information. In this situation, access by the public to the Internet will remain l

fined to the “Internet Cafes’’ that are burgeoning throughout the region. Such 

will sustain only modest electronic media growth.

Under these circumstances, it is likely that one of the key factors in the 

North African electronic media is likely to be the expatriate community in Eur

latter enjoy sufficient disposable income and have the motivation to make use o

net to follow events in their countries of origin, including at the local or comm

The increased interest by European business and government professionals in 

can affairs also provides a potential growth market for electronic media. Th

sionals often seek and indeed require more information beyond the apparen

data currently available. Catering to such audiences—the expatriate and foreig

government community—will tend to ensure that in the electronic media wo

(and possibly English) news availability will dominate, despite likely future ga

bic in the print media world in North Africa itself.

OUTLOOK: INCREASED COVERAGE, GREATER DEPT

In general, North African, electronic French-language news media still foll

of their print counterparts. This is due to the limited access of the population to 

and the Internet, and the continued reliance of the public on broadcast and p

Further, most media advertisers remain wary of investment in Internet sites, a 

limits them to being sponsored by established media interests, such as the p

Nevertheless, the growing number of home computers and Internet connectio

ing the first steps of transformation. 

For observers of North African affairs, trends in the French-language 

news media are reassuring for the near future. Area specialists and other inte

fessionals will have a steadily growing body of information from which the

23The North African community in Western Europe numbers approximately two 

details on numbers and other particulars, see Sarah Colinson, Shore to Shore: The Polit

tion in Euro-Maghreb Relations (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs/Mid

gramme, 1996), especially the table on page102; and Migration aus Nordafrika: U

Problem, ed. Michaela Koller (Martinsried, Germany: Ars Una, 2000), especially 8ff. a
27

social information remains readily available without the geographic limi

ated with print media distribution, the confidence level in information a

this region among government and business interests worldwide wil

improve. The ability of North African intelligence specialists to take adva

tiple rather than single-source information to provide analysis to decisio

however, increasingly have to take account of Arabic-language media as 

pendent Internet news sites in order to ensure a more complete picture of 
28

Early in his career, as operations officer on the WWII Fletcher-Class des

Benham (DD796), CAPT George Satterthwaite became intrigued by t

tional aspects of being a U.S. Navy officer. The Benham was about to be tra

Peru under the Military Assistance Program, and he was to accompany 

crew to Norfolk for underway training, and then go on to Callao where th

tened Villar was to be the flagship of the Peruvian Navy. But he was 

instead to the Naval Academy to teach calculus. After a tour on a diesel sub

left active service, and joined the inactive reserves. Twenty-two years later, 

discovered that the Navy was looking for individuals to serve attaché duty 

fill jobs in the Third World. Peru was on the list, and he soon began trainin

cation to become Navy DATT/ALUSNA (Defense Attaché/American Leg

Naval Attaché) in Lima. As he was about to enter Spanish language tr

assignment to Latin America was cancelled, and he was reassigned to be 

New Delhi where he served for four years from 1988 to 1992. 

Having enjoyed his tour in India immensely, CAPT Satterthwaite asked 

signed to another Defense Attaché Office (DAO), and was sent to Jakarta for 

(1993 to 1996). During his last year in Jakarta he remarked to his Navy person

that he had enjoyed the 10 years of active duty time despite the fact that he di

go to Peru. The detailer exclaimed that he was having a very tough time filling 

ALUSNA job in Lima, and asked CAPT Satterthwaite to apply once more

CAPT Satterthwaite and his wife entered language training for the third time 

few months at the Defense Language Institute, went to Lima for a two-year a

UNITAS, the large Western Hemisphere, Navy-to-Navy exercise, was inaugu

year CAPT Satterthwaite was originally supposed to go to Peru (1960). In 199

he oversaw the planning and implementation of the 38th and 39th cruises. H

career as a Naval Attaché in a ceremony officiated by the Chief of Staff of th

Navy, who had been on the Villar (ex-Benham) as a junior officer. Also in at

that ceremony was CAPT Satterthwaite’s relief on the Benham, VADM (R

Mariscal. Coincidentally, VADM Mariscal was a 1954 graduate of the U.S. N

emy, and CAPT Satterthwaite’s father had been his sponsor.

Between active duty assignments, CAPT Satterthwaite had a varied and div

In 1979, he earned a Ph.D. in Public Administration and later taught at Th

University, the Naval War College and the Monterey Institute of International 

was also an operations research analyst at the Johns Hopkins University Appl

Laboratory, and has served as a consultant to federal, state, local and tribal go

He now teaches occasionally at the Defense Resource Management Institute

his time teaching math in a local high school, and is a member of the Monte

California, Civil Grand Jury.
29

F.G. (George) Satterthwaite, CAPT, USNR (Ret.)

Often there are many interesting places an attaché wants to see in the ho

sometimes the host government is not willing to grant permission for the vi

it is a matter of equity. Sometimes permission is not granted because the ho

orandum of understanding with another country to forbid others to see m

ment projects. At other times the host just considers the places to be visite

to allow foreigners to see what they are up to.1 At still other times denial of 

visit is due to a “we’ve never done that before, so why let someone do it no

The story related here is an example of that kind of response.

During my tour as DATT in Lima, I struck up a friendship with the Com

Peruvian Submarine Force. He had just returned from Germany where he 

Defense and Naval Attaché. He understood the value of promoting good w

by permitting foreign attachés to observe military operations of a traini

knew his attaché in Washington had been taken aboard U.S. nuclear subma

visited the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. He wanted to reciproca

me an eight-hour training ride on one of the Peruvian submarines. He mad

the spur of the moment without checking with his Director of Naval In

probably thought, as I did, that because Peru has U.S. submarines, allowin

Attaché on a U.S.-produced submarine would not be a violation of their 

The Admiral’s offer was made in the weeks just before tensions between P

dor heated up, during the summer of 1998. When I called to find out whe

scheduled, the Admiral’s aide said that all the subs were on alert and he didn

the next training ride would take place. This was a totally expected a

response given the operational situation.

1 Defense Attaché officers are bound by the “Vienna Convention on Diplomati

Optional Protocols[,] Done at Vienna [Austria] on 18 April 1961, U.N.T.S. Nos. 

500, 95-239 (see copy at URL: http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH408.tx

lines allow for accredited embassy officials, including military attachés, to engage 

by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reportin

Government of the sending State (Article 3), and provide for freedom of movemen

cifically denied areas (Article 26). For a thorough overview of the “Defense Attac

the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Communique 12, no. 5 (September/October 2000
30

As soon as the hostilities were brought to a peaceful conclusion on 26 Nove

I tried to find another date for the promised submarine ride. The Admiral’s a

they were trying to find a time and he would get back to me soon. He kept put

As my tour wound down and my relief came to Lima for an orientation to t

ment and to the job, I planned a reception and invited the Submarine Comman

others whom my relief would need to know after he relieved me. The Admira

that time that the visit was a “go,” and that it would happen in the final week 

During the last week of my tour the Foreign Liaison Officer took me out to lu

told me that the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) had countermanded the 

Admiral’s kind offer to let me ride on a Peruvian submarine. The reason g

Godavari

Krishna

Cauvery

Narmada

Mahanadi

Indus

Kabul

Ravi

Sutlej Indus

Shyok

Xiangquan

Helmand

Ganges

Gandak

Ganges

Jhelum

Chenab

Yamuna

(Brahmap

Yarlung

Ganges

Sukkar

Lahore

Peshawar

Chaman

Quetta

Fort

Sandemann

Gar

Lhasa

Jessore

Jaffna

Trincomalee

Varanasi

Cuttack

Jamshedpur

Siliguri

Leh

Jammu

Amritsar

Agra

Kanpur

Allahabad

Kandla

Ahmadabad

Nagpur Raipur

Jabalpur

Pune

Veraval

Puri

Vishakhapatnam

Guntakai Marmagao

Calicut

(Khozikode)

Mangalore

Madurai

Cuddalore

Srinagar

Simla

Chandigam

Gandhinagar Bhopal

Silvassa

Lucknow

Calcutta

Bhubaneshwar

Gangtok

Sillong

Itanagar

Kohima

A

Agartala

Bombay

Panaji

Hyderabad

Madras

Pondicherry

Bangalore

Trivandrum

Jaipur

Kavaratti

NEW DELHI Kathmandu

Bay

of

Bengal

Arabian

Sea

Mouths of the Ganges

M

Palk Strait

Gulf of

Mannar Laccadive Sea

CHINA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

NEPAL

BHUTAN

BANGLADESH

SRI

LANKA

B

LACCADIVE

ISLANDS

NICOBA

ISLAND

(INDIA

ANDAMAN

ISLANDS

(INDIA)

ANDAMAN

AND

NICOBAR

ISLANDS

90°

80° 70° The city of Chandigam is

encompassed by the Province of Chandigam.

*Note:

0

0 100 200 300

100 200 300 mi

400 km
31

embarrassed as was the Foreign Liaison Officer, and the Peruvian Navy 

show the flag to a friend. The idea of reciprocity did not seem to enter th

Building a good service-to-service relationship moves ahead when friend

allowed to see how the host services train and operate. 

How does an attaché allay either national security concerns or wrong t

part of host-country foreign intelligence officials? In my experience, it is 

advantage of visits by “high rollers” to the country. A high roller is a flag 

level civilian who comes either invited by the host or self-invited by the 

ment. Generally, combatant command commanders self-invite themselv

year or so to the countries in their Area of Responsibility. Fleet commande

deployed ships also like to visit countries in their operations area that have p

Self-invited visits generally result in gaining access to military units, whi

may have had difficulty visiting on his own. Superior to the self-invited v

sponsored by the host. Counterpart visits by chiefs of service fall under this 

the host country is usually trying to put a best foot forward to impress the v

capabilities of the host military and may be more amenable to showing off 

ties and units. 

Because the attaché is in a position to recommend an itinerary in both t

self-invited visits to the invitee as well as the host, he or she can influence th

ommending interesting places for that visitor to see. The only times I w

India’s Mazagon Dockyard was when the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations 

on two different occasions (host-invited visits), and when the staff of the 

Committee on Intelligence (on a self-invited visit) traveled to India to inv

tech developments there. The Government of India accepted both of the CN

dockyard to see submarine developments as natural requests, because bot

submarine officers (ADM Trost and ADM Kelso). I accompanied both C

visits and had a firsthand look at the Indian Navy’s first submarine constr

There were no repercussions in making these two visits. In fact, the Indian N

afterward what the CNO thought about their capability to build submarin

looking for acceptance as a modern and capable navy from the chief of the 

modern navy. It was the self-invited visit by the Senate Select Committee o

staff to Mazagon Dockyard that gave me heartburn.

Several months before the Gulf War it was announced during the emb

team meeting that three members of the staff of the Senate Select Commi

gence planned to visit India to see firsthand evidence of India’s shipbu

building, atomic research, and space research programs. The staff membe

U.S. Government employees, at least one of whom was a senior executive c

in military terms, a flag-level visitor. Typically in U.S. embassies around th

by congressional members or staff are under the auspices of the Political 

was the case for the Senate Select Committee Staff visit. A control officer f

cal Section was assigned the task of coordinating the visit. His job was to 

the Staff wanted to accomplish in India, and then present a proposed prog
32

of the proposal, the control officer drafted a diplomatic note and passed it 

embassy for coordination. It was at this point that I learned the visitors would b

to Bombay to see the Mazagon Dockyard and Bhaba Atomic Research Labor

Bombay they would travel to the South India version of Silicon Valley at Ban

visit Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, and the Indian Space Research Organization 

Author talks with an Indian Navy captain on board a third-party vessel. 

This and other photos courtesy of the author.

I called on the control officer and found he was not overly excited about 

sibilities. He didn’t want to travel with the visitors and complained of havin

other responsibilities. Also, the Department of State budget was very tight th

the Political Counselor didn’t know where the money for travel was goin

from. I immediately interpreted the control officer’s protests as a plea to pas

of handling this group to someone else. I told him I would be more than ha

the burden from him. My boss and his agreed to the switch, and I drafted a 

the diplomatic note indicating I would be the new control officer. I did not re

time that to propose something to the Indian Foreign Ministry that was a litt

from their expectations would make them attribute suspicious intentions to m

the old India hands in the embassy, like the Deputy Chief of Mission, had 

with the mindset of Indian bureaucrats, but they did not advise me about th

for Indian xenophobia to be translated into casting a pall over my bona fides

I went about coordinating the visit by contacting the visitors and making ar

for their travel and transportation within India. They arrived in country a wee
33

morning we departed from Indira Ghandi International Airport on an Indian 

to Bombay. Until this point everything was going as planned. Upon arrival 

hired a cab and took the 25-kilometer ride to the Taj Intercontinental Hote

million people in the city’s slums and over the series of interconnected isla

up Greater Bombay. We checked into the very posh Taj Intercontinental 

overlooks the Gateway to India, a memorial to the visit of King George V co

in the 20th century. I asked for my usual room on the 14th floor, because 

looking the Gateway of India, it has a panoramic view of Bombay harbor. F

room was vacant, and it was assigned to me. After checking in and unloadin

I peered out the window to see what there was to see in the harbor.

I always looked forward to trips to Bombay because my favorite restau

the Nanking. It was a Chinese restaurant specializing in seafood dishes a

able prices. It was on the ground floor in the same building as the Royal B

Club, and it was only a short walk from the hotel. Their crab with lobs

especially delicious. 

The Gateway to India and naval facilities in Bombay.
34

Author and son visiting with a Hindu holyman at a curio shop in Bombay.

The service in the Nanking was superb. My meal of crab with lobster sauce 

expectations, and after a cup of green tea I left the restaurant. 

Later that day we visited the Bhaba Atomic Research Center located abo

between the hotel and Mazagon Dockyard. We were given the regular visiti

type of tour. We did not observe any advanced research projects, but we did 

tor used for medical isotope development and were given a watered-down br

ering the entire research program. Even though we weren’t shown the whole 

so to speak, the staffers were impressed at the level of technical sophist

knowledge of the researchers at the lab. Because their mission was to ga

technical competence and not specific programs, the visit to the Bha

Research Center was successful.

The next morning we were escorted to the Dockyard, and got a windshield 

production facilities by company car. We also saw the work in progress on Sovi

destroyers and fast patrol boats. Modular construction of the destroyer was v

sive, and we were also given a status report on the production schedule. Subm

struction was left off the tour, but the chief executive officer of all the In

shipyards briefed us. He told us of the highlights and shortcomings of the e

shipbuilding industry (military and commercial). All in all, the entire visit to B

more than I had hoped for. One more night in teeming Bombay and we wou

Bangalore in the morning.
35

same type that had crashed a year or so earlier due to a faulty flybywi

were fortunate this time. The plane was on time and the flight uneventful. 

Bangalore is a much less hectic city than Bombay. It also is populate

middle class of educated professionals. Unlike Bombay with some very ric

of poverty-stricken citizens, Bangalore is more homogeneous in terms of t

living. It is also the hub of technical innovation in India. Many computer fir

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and the Indian Space Research Organization (

main centers of technology there. Because of the high density of well

sophisticated people in Bangalore, one finds more Western style retail busi

ments there as well. Many of the professional class were educated in the U

and have acquired tastes for Western food and clothing. The sari is still com

hence adoption of Western clothing style is limited to the male population

located in Karnataka State in South India and the local language is Kanada

other South Indian languages, is very different in sound, vocabulary and 

the interrelated languages of the North (Hindi, Punjabi, Marathi, Bengali, B

like). Hindi speakers cannot understand Kanada speakers and vice versa, s

tion between them is usually in English. 

We checked into the Taj West End hotel, a member of the same chain a

continental in Bombay and Taj Village in Goa. It is a one-story series of mo

and the layout and amenities have a Southern California look about them. W

official on the agenda this day, so we lounged around the pool that afterno

sea stories. 

After a breakfast of very strong coffee, somvar and idli (spicy chutn

rice), a traditional South Indian dish, we met our car and driver which h

ranged by the Ministry of External Affairs (Foreign Ministry), and heade

and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

Our visit to ISRO was interesting. The Indian Government has a very 

research program directed at putting satellites in stationary orbit above Indi

for example, that they had the capability to locate areas in India where gro

prevalent and also where the vegetation was rapidly dying. This information

erly, could support the management of scarce potable water and forest r

Indian mindset, however, appeared to be focused on the technology itself an

ing critical environmental problems. There was no effort to integrate the te

the problems of the Home Ministry (Interior Ministry). It seemed that the In

of pride about being a member of the club of nations who have the ability t

sophisticated technology.

Next we visited Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL). During WW II the 

HAL had been a facility built by the U.S. to repair and assemble aircraf

being used in the China-Burma-India Theater of the war. After the war the I
36

of our visit they were building or conducting concept design on British Torna

license from the UK, small Bell-type helicopters of indigenous design, and 

combat aircraft, also of indigenous design. We toured the plant and were gi

briefing on future plans. I was especially interested in HAL because it was th

LM 2500 General Electric gas turbine engines would be fabricated under li

installed in the Indian Taruntul seagoing patrol craft. East would meet West in 

the U.S. LM2500 would power the Soviet-designed Taruntul! That project was 

in the brief, but the international agreements had not yet been signed so no 

activity had been started. After a luncheon with the public affairs folks a

departed for the airport for a flight back to New Delhi.

From my point of view spending DAO travel funds on this trip was a good in

was able to visit places by piggy-backing or “strap-hanging” on the visit of 

staffers—places that I would unlikely have been able to visit on my own, exc

for HAL. After the staffers departed, I busily documented the trip and fired off t

report to headquarters. About one week later the real fun began. I was looking 

the next project, wondering what could top the trip to Bombay and Bangalore, 

called into the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM’s) office. The DCM told me th

Secretary for the Americas Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ha

requested that I meet with him to explain my role in the Bombay and Bang

asked what this was all about, and the DCM said he didn’t have a clue. The ch

diplomatic note spelled out my role in the visit, and since the Government o

approved the visit, he could not figure out why such a high-ranking official wou

me to his office. A Joint Secretary is equivalent in rank to an Assistant Secreta

The incumbent was in charge of international relations with Mexico, Canada, a

He had formerly served as the minister counselor (similar to a DCM) in 

Embassy in Washington and presumably knew how the U.S. Government wa

and operated. I had met him briefly at a fourth of July party, so I was not walk

complete stranger. My recollection was that he thoroughly enjoyed his tour in W

and his family was eager to return. I made an appointment to see the Joint Secre

lowing week.
37

There is life after naval service in India.

On the appointed day I took the route to the foreign ministry that pa

apartments set aside for members of Parliament. Since Parliament was in 

was much activity in the area. Clothes just washed were being hung out to 

Parliamentarians dressed in dhotis were gathered outside their apartments 

ing chai. The Foreign Ministry was located in South Block, as was Naval 

and the Ministry of Defense, except that the entry to the Foreign Minist

opposite side of the fortress-like building from the Navy entrance. U

guests were asked to sign in and show their carnet (diplomatic I.D.), and 

wait in a musty but elegant anteroom until their point of contact could be 

about fifteen minutes, and still puzzled by the purpose of the summons, I 

to the Joint Secretary’s office.

After a few introductory remarks about the cold winter weather in Ne

cup of chai, I was bluntly asked why I was doing the work of the CIA, wh

to handle visitors from the U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Community? 

Senate staffers are not from the Intelligence Community. They only con

with respect to the Community. In addition, the staffers mainly wanted to 

production facilities here in India, and the military was definitely the ba

DAO. The Joint Secretary said, “Yes, I know how it works in Washington

answer the Parliament, whose members will presume you work for the C

truth,” I said. He retorted, without further explanation, that this would put 

difficult position. I explained that what I did was a natural and reasonab

given my responsibilities as a military attaché. I wondered at that point if 
38

inconsistent with my diplomatic status as a military attaché. I kept thinking 

“How can we be having this conversation, when they (the Government of Indi

and in writing gave us permission to make the trip? This question could have 

before the official notification of approval, and the Joint Secretary would no

‘difficult position.’” 

Author with makeshift head covering for visiting a Hindu temple.

The issue was not resolved during the meeting. I suppose the Joint Sec

reacting to questions from Parliament members, and had to go through the 

calling me in and upbraiding me. I chalked it up to some communist sympat

in the Foreign or Defense Ministry who probably put the idea of my not bei

attaché into the bonnet of some receptive and Soviet-sympathizing Parliame

The price I paid for visiting some high-tech centers in India was that I w

with a brush of suspicion. In my mind it was worth the embarrassmen

chewed out by the foreign ministry. I was not declared persona non grata a

have to uproot my family. The U.S. Government was not embarrassed by th

We had followed the prescribed process of submitting a diplomatic note c

trip and therefore the Government of India could only give me a verbal 

instead of expulsion. The experience enlightened me about the complexity 

attitudes toward American diplomats. At one level it was all right to let U

see their facilities because of the Indian enjoyment of being thought of as a
39

erners promoted by the longstanding competition for the hearts and 

Indians by the U.S. and USSR. It would take some time to undo the effec

War that was waged hotly in the Third World. 
40

Stephen Marrin is a graduate student specializing in intelligence studies 

versity of Virginia, and he developed the ideas for this paper as part of his Ma

assessing the impact of the CIA’s Kent School on analytic quality. He has a

pated in CIA’s analytic process in three different capacities: in 1996 and 1997 

ship analyst for CIA’s Office of Near East, South Asia, and Africa; in 1998 

assistant for a group in the Office of Transnational Issues; and in 1999 and 200

leader for a contractor supplying analytical support to the Office of Transnati

As required, this paper has been reviewed by CIA’s Publication Review Board

no security objection to its dissemination. Their review does not confirm the 

the information nor does it endorse the author’s views. 
41

INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES

Stephen Marrin

The accuracy of CIA intelligence analysis depends in part upon an indiv

expertise, yet programs implemented to increase this expertise may not b

increase the accuracy of either an individual’s analysis or the institution

whole. Improving analytic accuracy by increasing the expertise of the anal

to achieve. Even if expertise development programs were to result in gr

expertise, language capability, or an improved application of methodolog

production process itself still takes place within an institutional context tha

ters for this expertise. The agency’s bureaucratic processes and structure c

analyst’s acquisition and application of additional expertise, preventing th

tion of the potential inherent in expertise development programs. There

reform or program intended to improve analytic accuracy by increasing th

its analysts should be supplemented with complementary reforms to 

processes — and perhaps even organizational structure — so as to increase 

that individual or institutional improvement will occur. 

The interplay between analyst and institution within the Intelligenc

remains poorly studied. As Columbia University’s Robert Jervis has obse

the intelligence community has paid too [little attention] ...to how the comm

nal structure and norms might be altered to enable intelligence to be worth 

CIA’s intelligence production may be subject to improvement, but making 

requires a sophisticated understanding of how an analyst operates within t

for Intelligence’s [DI’s] institutional context. However, empirical verifi

hypothesis is impossible since, as Jervis notes, “[r]igorous measures of 

intelligence are lacking” and are insurmountably difficult to create.2 Under 

stances, this essay is a conceptual “what-if” exploration into the interpla

acquisition and application of expertise on three levels: that of the individua

processes, and organizational structure. 

THE GOAL: IMPROVING CIA’S ANALYSIS

Improving the accuracy of CIA’s finished intelligence products could ma

ate and direct improvement to national security policymaking as well as r

quency and severity of intelligence failures. The CIA’s DI—like othe

1 Robert Jervis, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?” International Jo

gence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (1986): 41.

2 Jervis, 30
42

intelligence analysis tailored to the needs of the national security policymaker

author’s experience and observation, a DI analyst interprets the international e

through an information-processing methodology approximating the scientific 

convert raw intelligence data into finished analysis. The traditional “intellige

describes how an analyst integrates information collected by numerous entiti

seminates this information to policymakers. As William Colby—former Direc

tral Intelligence (DCI) and veteran operations officer — notes, “at the ce

intelligence machine lies the analyst, and he is the fellow to whom all the i

goes so that he can review it and think about it and determine what it means.4 

this model depicts the process in sequential terms, more accurately the analyst 

in never-ending conversations with collectors and policymakers over the status 

tional events and their implications for U.S. policy. As part of this process, 

analysts “take the usually fragmentary and inconclusive evidence gathered by 

tors and processors, study it, and write it up in short reports or long studies tha

fully synthesize and interpret the findings,” according to intelligence sc

Johnson.5

Intelligence failures of every stripe from the trivial to the vitally impo

every day for a variety of reasons, including the mis-prioritization of collectio

hasty analysis, and inappropriately applied assumptions. In the mid-1970s Ri

effectively settled the academic question of causes of failure by arguing that i

failures will be inevitable due to many inherent limitations in the analytic pro

ministrators at the Joint Military Intelligence College note that “analysis is 

many pitfalls — biases, stereotypes, mirror-imaging, simplistic thinking, 

between cause and effect, bureaucratic politics, group-think, and a host of o

failings.”7 Yet most intelligence failures do not lead to direct negative conseq

the U.S. primarily because the stakes of everyday policymaking are not high

in fact and interpretation can be corrected as the iterative process between i

3 CIA website, “The Role and Mission of the Directorate of Intelligence,” U

www.odci.gov/cia/di/mission/mission.html., accessed October 2001.

4 William Colby, “Retooling the Intelligence Industry.” Foreign Service Journal 69

uary 1992): 21.

5 Loch K. Johnson, “Making the Intelligence ‘Cycle’ Work.” International Journ

gence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 11.

6 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 

World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61-89.

7 Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, “On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst.” Def

gence Journal 6, no. 2 (1997): 48. See also: Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intellige

(CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999); Ralph K. White, “Empathy as an 

Tool,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1

Richards Heuer, “Improving Intelligence Analysis: Some Insights on Data, Concepts, A

ment in the Intelligence Community” The Bureaucrat 8, no. 1 (Winter1979/80): 2-11. 
43

and usually never even noticed. However, sometimes intelligence failure is 

by either great policymaker surprise or serious negative consequences for 

security, or both. 

The CIA’s May 1998 failure to warn American policymakers of India’

test nuclear weapons is an illustration of both kinds of failure. This lapse — 

cized by foreign policy experts and the press — highlighted intelligence li

as the DI’s inability to add together all indications of a possible nuclear tes

policymakers. According to New York Times correspondent Tim Weiner, th

included “the announced intentions of the new Hindu nationalist govern

nuclear weapons part of its arsenal, the published pronouncements of 

weapons commissioner, who said...that he was ready to test if political le

go-ahead, and ...missile tests by Pakistan that all but dared New Delhi to re

inability to integrate these indicators — a failure of analysis — led to charg

critical thinking and analytic rigor.”9 Admiral David Jeremiah—who head

investigation into the failure—concluded that intelligence failed to provi

part because analysts “had a mindset that said everybody else is going to 

work,” otherwise known as mirror-imaging.10 He then “recommended hir

lysts, improving their training and increasing contact with outside expert

conventional wisdom,” according to The Wall Street Journal’s Carla Robbin

CIA’s search for ways to improve analytic accuracy and prevent intellig

if successful—could have a positive impact on national security policyma

is arguably the centerpiece of the United States’ fourteen-agency intelligen

(IC) and “has primary responsibility for all-source intelligence analysis in th

preparation of finished national intelligence for the President and his top p

according to former CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz.12 If CIA analysis d

kind of central role in influencing policy, improving its accuracy should p

makers with the opportunity to create or implement policies that more effe

national security and advance national interests.

8

Tim Weiner, “U.S. Blundered on Intelligence, Officials Admit,” New York 

1998, A14..

9James R. Asker, “Same Ol’, Same Ol’,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 

10CIA website, “Jeremiah News Conference,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/ci

press_release/archives/1998/jeremiah.html, accessed October 2001.

11Carla Anne Robbins, “Failure to Predict India’s Tests Is Tied to Systemw

Breakdown,” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1998, A8.

12For further information on the IC see CIA’s website, “United States Intelligen

URL: http://www.odci.gov/ic/, accessed October 2001. Also see Frederick P. Hitz, 

American Espionage,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintellig

(2000):3.
44

Improving the capabilities and knowledge of the individual CIA analyst th

grams reflecting Admiral Jeremiah’s recommendation, is one way to improv

racy of intelligence analysis. An analyst’s expertise, defined as “the skill of an 

is a crucial component for the production of accurate intelligence analysis. “In 

of US intelligence professionals, ‘analysis’ refers to the interpretation by 

unevaluated [‘raw’] information collected by the [IC],” according to Loch Joh

presumption is the more “expert” an analyst is the more accurate the resulting 

tion will be. In May 2000, DCI George Tenet described the importance of a

expertise in this manner:

In our [DI] it is not enough just to make the right call. That takes luck

have to make the right call for the right reasons. That takes expertise

expertise—built up through study and experience—that combines with 

vance and rigor to produce something that is very important: insight....

analysts blend a scholar’s mastery of detail with a reporter’s sense of urg

and clarity. At its best, the result is insight. And it is insight that wins the 

fidence of our customers and makes them want to read our publication

listen to our briefings.”15

Analytic expertise is a multi-faceted concept because CIA uses a complex w

lytic specialties to produce multi-disciplinary analysis. Not hired directly by 

even the DI, most analysts are hired by the individual DI offices and assigned 

that cover specific geographic areas, and are then assigned a functional special

pline” or “occupation” in DI terminology—such as political, military, econom

ship, or scientific, technical, and weapons intelligence, according to CIA’s web

analyst’s expertise can vary depending on his or her relative degree of regio

edge, familiarity with disciplinary theory, and with intelligence methods in ge

■ Regional expertise is essentially area studies: a combination of the geograp

sociology, and political structures of a defined geographic region. The D

offices are responsible for an analyst’s regional expertise and develop it b

access to language training, regional familiarization through university cou

house seminars. 

13Merriam-Webster online, URL: http://www.m-w.com.

14Loch K. Johnson, “Analysis For a New Age.” Intelligence and National Secur

(October 1996): 657.

15CIA website: “Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet a

tion of the Sherman Kent School, 4 May 2000,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/pu

speeches/archives/2000/dci_speech_05052000.html, accessed October 2001.

16On the CIA website, see “Intelligence Disciplines” at URL: http://www.odci.gov

disciplines.html; also see on the CIA website, “Directorate of Intelligence Organizatio

nents, Council of Intelligence Occupations,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/missi

accessed October 2001.
45

analytic occupations. For example, economic, military, political and lea

sis are built on a bed of theory derived from the academic disciplines 

military science, political science, and political psychology, respectively

expertise can be acquired through previous academic coursework, on-t

ence, or supplementary training.

For the most part each CIA analyst possesses a very small area of direct 

defined by a combination of regional area and discipline as they work in 

with analysts of other disciplines and interact with other regional or discip

ists as the need arises. CIA’s small analytic niches create specialists, but th

must be re-integrated in order to provide high-level policymakers with a 

that is more accurate and balanced than that arising from the limited 

knowledge of the niche analyst. This process of re-integration—known as “

in DI parlance—allows analysts of all kinds to weigh in with their nich

pieces of finished intelligence before they are disseminated. According t

Frank Watanabe: “We coordinate to ensure a corporate product and to brin

tive expertise of others to bear.”17 Accordingly, the bureaucratic norm is fo

make every effort to coordinate a draft with other analysts in related region

ary accounts prior to submitting the draft to management for editing and 

As a result, whereas the expertise of the primary drafter of the piece usual

influence on the accuracy of the final piece, the coordination process exerts 

ence as well. 

Insufficient analytic expertise can cause inaccuracies in intelligence an

Jervis points out that “a grav[e] danger lies in not having sufficient expe

area or a problem to detect and interpret important trends and developmen

for such deficiency, analysts tend to impose on the information the con

and beliefs that they have derived elsewhere.”18 In addition, in 1991 form

field Turner noted that “[a]nother reason for many of the analytic shortc

our analytical agencies do not have an adequate grasp of the cultures of m

with which we must deal.”19 Seven years later the CIA failed to provide 

with warning of India’s nuclear tests for this very reason. To bolster CIA

in 1991 Turner suggested that analysts should be provided with “a better 

attend academic institutions, participate in professional conferences, tr

abroad, acquire language skills and thus become true experts in their areas

17Frank Watanabe, “Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts.” Studies in Intelli

fied edition (1997), URL: http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclass/axioms.html, a

2001.

18 Jervis, 32. 

19Stansfield Turner, “Intelligence for A New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 70, n

163.

20Turner, 164. 
46

years experience. They havent been to the countries theyre analyzing. They 

the language, the historical knowledge, the in-country residence time or the 

their private-sector peers,” as reported by Tim Weiner.21

CIA has recently implemented programs to increase analytic expertise. In 

Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) and current Deputy Director of Cen

gence (DDCI) John McLaughlin created the Sherman Kent School for Intellig

ysis, which was “designed to give new employees a rigorous, 26-week o

intelligence analysis” 22 as well as provide training in CIA’s analytic disciplin

ers of all levels. In addition, McLaughlin said that CIA is “going all out 

greater analytic depth. We are providing incentives for analysts to stay on the

longer. We are affording our analysts greater opportunities to travel and to br

experience. Because we claim no monopoly on wisdom, we are bringing 

experts for short tours as scholars-in-residence. We also are encouraging our 

expand their contacts with specialists elsewhere in government, in the private 

in academia.”23

Increasing expertise may not be sufficient to produce accuracy or prevent 

Jervis notes, “experts will [not] necessarily get the right answers. Indeed, the p

of those who know all the facts about a particular country that they consider to 

but lack the conceptual tools for making sense of much of what they see, is wel

In addition, “[e]ven if the organizational problems...and perceptual impedime

rate perception were remedied or removed, we could not expect an enormous 

our ability to predict events” because “(t)he impediments to understanding our w

great that... intelligence will often reach incorrect conclusions.”25 That is beca

cognitive limitations require analysts to simplify reality through the analytic p

reality simplified is no longer reality. As a result, “even experts can be wrong b

expertise is based on rules which are at best blunt approximations of reality. In 

analytic judgment will be an approximation of the real world and therefore subj

amount of error”26 and analytic inaccuracies—and sometimes intelligence failu

21Quoted in Tim Weiner, “Naivete at the CIA: Every Nation’s Just Another U.S

Times Week in Review, 7 June 1998, 5.

22Vernon Loeb, “CIA’s Analysis Becomes Transnational,” Washington Post Online, 2 

URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&conten

2001Mar30

23CIA website, “Remarks of the Deputy Director..., Princeton,” URL: http://www

public_affairs/speeches/ddci_speech_03092001.html

24 Jervis, 31-32.

25 Jervis, 28, 30.

26Stephen Marrin, “Complexity is in the Eye of the Beholder,” DI Discussion D

internal CIA bulletin board), 6 May 1997.
47

increasing DI capabilities. 

Nevertheless, the DI leadership has created multiple expertise developm

to counter perceptions of analytic inadequacy and increase the DI’s core c

analytic expertise. The unanswered question is whether the analyst can acq

relevant expertise within the institutional constraints of the DI.

FIRST INTERVENING FACTOR: BUREAUCRATIC PRO

Bureaucratic processes can impede the acquisition or application of expe

expertise development programs, thereby limiting any potential improvem

analytic accuracy. The DI is a bureaucracy, and like every bureaucracy cre

operating procedures” (SOPs) which are necessary for efficient functioning 

usually prove to be rigid in implementation.27 As former DDI Doug MacE

1994: “We have all been a part of what has been good and of what needs ch

of the practices needing change came into being as the unforeseen result of 

taken for sound constructive reasons, judged by participants at the time to h

valid and usually aimed at correcting deficiencies of the time. But collectiv

and bureaucratic evolution, they turned out to be counterproductive.”28 Som

SOPs prevent analysts from applying the tradecraft standards and other form

learned elsewhere. Jack Davis, a former DI officer and analytic methodolo

that “examples of what MacEachin would label as poorly substantiated an

seen (after training). Clearly, ongoing vigilance is needed to keep such anal

ing its way into DI products.”29 Such vigilance includes assessing the burea

for obstacles preventing tradecraft application. 

Analysts must have the opportunity to apply newly acquired expertise 

desks in the DI for any improvement to result. However, if analysts do not h

tunity to apply this expertise, it will likely wither for lack of practice. Th

many types of finished intelligence—some reportorial, some analytical, and 

tive—to meet policymakers’ varying needs for information. In addition to 

on developments worldwide, policymakers and their staffs also use informa

yses when crafting policy and monitoring its implementation. Obstacles t

ment of expertise appear when shorter product types are emphasized ove

27 If bureaucracies stultify good ideas by turning them into “standard operat

regardless of situation — as Graham Allison’s organizational process model in his E

sion implies — then a bureaucracy is forever in a state of flux, somewhere along the 

one bureaucratized extreme to the other. 

28Douglas J. MacEachin and others, The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge an

CIA (Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 1.

29 Jack Davis, “Improving Intelligence Analysis at CIA: Dick Heuer’s Contrib

gence Analysis,” in “Introduction” to Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richards 

ington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), xix.
48

current intelligence have at times been emphasized over other produc

greater relevancy to policymakers, but this emphasis at the same time has r

expertise of the DI writ large because they require different kinds of mental 

that reduce the scope and scale of an analyst’s research and knowledge. Ro

once observed that “the informal norms and incentives of the intelligence 

often form what Charles Perrow has called ‘an error-inducing system.’ That is

ing and supporting habits of the community systematically decrease the like

careful and penetrating intelligence analyses will be produced and therefore m

extremely likely.”30 Bureaucratic processes can contribute to the creation of 

“error-inducing system.”

The Swinging Pendulum 

For much of the DI’s history, analysts acquired expertise by writing long 

former CIA officer Arthur Hulnick notes: “a great deal of research was bein

...much of it was done to enable the analyst to speak authoritatively on a cu

rather than for publication.”31 Loch Johnson agrees, saying that “[t]he pre

longer reports...is important, too, as ... a vital learning experience for analysts.

that “[I]ntellectually most satisfying to the intelligence analyst is the full-blow

project, for it allows more room for the tracing of nuances. ... Under the Reag

tration, the [DI] established a research program...[in which] each of th

offices...was told to redouble its efforts to produce solid research papers. In 

month period, more than 900 such reports were in progress... .[A]s Gates h

‘the CIA is the only place where long-range research on national security issu

done—two, five, ten, twenty years down the road. The Department of State Pla

conducts this kind of research only sporadically.’”33

By the early 1990s, however, long papers had become bureaucratized. In 

cle, former analyst Jay Young argued that “the needs of the policy-maker too o

in the time-consuming, self-absorbed and corrosive intelligence research prod

cess. The DI’s research program is run with the same rigid attention to produc

as any five-year plan in the old USSR. ... This fixation on numerical produ

managers to keep analysts working away on papers whose relevance may be i

questionable. ... In short, too much of the Agency’s longer-term research is u

subjects of marginal importance and chock-full of fuzzy judgments.” 34 He w

30 Jervis, 34.

31Arthur S. Hulnick, “Managing Intelligence Analysis: Strategies for Playing the 

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 3 (1988): 322-323

32Loch K. Johnson, “Analysis For a New Age,” 665.

33Loch K. Johnson, “Making the Intelligence “Cycle” Work,” 6-7.

34 Jay T. Young, “US Intelligence Assessment in a Changing World: The Need f

Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 2 (April 1993): 129, 134. 
49

longer papers helped develop analytic expertise, bureaucratic tendencies h

production increasingly irrelevant to policymakers.

In response to such criticisms, DI managers dictated that relevancy re

papers. In 1994, then-DDI Doug MacEachin limited “most DI analytical pa

7 pages, including graphics and illustrations.”35 Shorter reports made the D

output more useful for policymakers, but analysts acquired less expertise 

As a result, while the papers were more targeted, they contained fewer in

policymaker. Predictably, complaints then arose that the DI lacked the expe

to do quality analysis. According to former DI analyst John Gentry in 1995

For reasons that heavily reflect its changing internal culture, CIA has 

think much more myopically. It even claims now that it is emphasizin

cal’’ projects and largely eliminated ‘‘strategic’’ work. In the DI, the

are new ones for what formerly were ‘‘current intelligence’’ and ‘‘re

respectively... The change is major and is formal policy...In other wo

has given up its former mission of trying to develop the analytic expe

the information assets to forecast another Pearl Harbor in favor of c

information to serve the analytic priority of drafting the short, pithy p

the National Intelligence Daily (NID) and other current intelligence 

tions...This change is enormous — and it is enormously irresponsible

failure to devote resources to long-term collection and to the developm

maintenance of analytical expertise risks major surprises — and majo

gence failures — in the future.36

By 1997, DI management had admitted that the pendulum had swung to

were making efforts to address the decreased level of expertise. In 1997, t

McLaughlin noted that the DI’s recent “impressive record of supporting th

ligence needs of senior policymakers” made “an enormous claim on our 

resources” and the DI was “trying to balance the need for current support ag

to look ahead.”37 Since then the DI has emphasized acquisition of expertis

opportunities for analysts to gain it by arguing that “[a]nother priority f

analysis is to deliver a product that adds context and meaning to the raw i

35Center for Security Policy, “‘Say It Ain’t So, Jim’: Impending Reorganizatio

Like Suppression, Politicizing of Intelligence,” Publication No. 94-D74, 15 July 19

www.security-policy.org/papers/1994/94-D74.html, accessed October 2001.

36 John A.Gentry, “A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Intelligence Communit

remarks prepared for presentation to congressional intelligence committees, presen

eral of American Scientists at URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/, accessed Octob

37 John E. McLaughlin, “New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis,” Defense In

nal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 17. 
50

ity, and depth within the analytical ranks.

Losing Expertise to Gain Relevance

The swing of the pendulum that emphasizes policymaker relevance over an

causes the DI to produce a large amount of current intelligence that prevents 

tion and application of analytic expertise. Many analysts are facile data inter

to integrate large volumes of new information with existing knowledge, and 

based on underlying conceptual constructs — the significance of the new data 

its implications for U.S. foreign policymaking. This process provides policym

exactly what they are looking for from intelligence analysis. However, if pro

minimal time in which to integrate and process the information, the intellige

by necessity cuts corners. When the DI emphasizes intelligence “on-deman

meet the much shorter deadlines by reducing the scope and scale of their resea

as sidestepping the more laborious tradecraft procedures by not rigorously 

assumptions or comparing working hypotheses to competing explanations. M

current intelligence analysis consists of a single hypothesis — derived within th

of the tasking — that the analyst intuitively believes provides the best explana

data. Current intelligence as a product has a lesser chance of being accurate 

lacks the self-conscious rigor that tradecraft entails even though it is the best 

done under the press of quick deadlines. 

The production of a single piece of current intelligence has limited effec

tise because it draws on the knowledge and tools that an analyst has develop

training and prior analysis. However, if over time the analyst does not have 

think, learn, or integrate new information with old to create new unde

knowledge of facts and events may increase but the ability to interpret th

accurately decreases. 

In a production environment attuned to the policymaker’s current need for i

analysts will fail to apply the newly acquired expertise and instead will fall b

viding intuitive rather than structured analysis. Intelligence scholar Rob

observed that in his interviews of intelligence analysts a “repeated complaint w

lyst’s lack of time to devote to thoughtful intelligence analysis. In a separate i

CIA it was revealed that [intelligence analysts]... spend little time or effort 

analysis.”39 Therefore, the effectiveness of expertise development programs in 

analytic accuracy may depend in part on whether the CIA is able to redres

emphasis on short-term analysis. Balancing the swinging pendulum is easie

38McLaughlin, 18.

39Robert D. Folker, Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An 

in Applying Structured Methods, Occasional Paper Number Seven (Washington, DC: J

Intelligence College, January 2000), 12.
51

ligence support—may be necessary. 

A Structural Fix?

If the DI remains true to form, at some time in the future the pendulum 

far toward knowledge-creation, papers will become longer and less relevant 

ers. Perhaps there is a way to diagnose more accurately the cause of this sw

middle-ground that balances the trade-offs. The answer, however, does no

tives from the top that emphasize the utility or desirableness of one prod

another. These will likely just be encapsulated into the DI’s SOPs and move 

too far in the opposite direction. Instead, if CIA were to bifurcate its intelli

tion system to specialize both in long-term research and current intellige

would side-step the trade-offs between timeliness and accuracy that ultima

pendulum to swing, and make the best use of any expertise-development pr

lying this suggestion is a more strategic and nuanced approach to human r

agement than CIA currently uses. 

Just as there are different kinds of intelligence products requiring diff

analytic ability, individual analysts possess varying cognitive strengths an

As a senior DI analyst noted in an internal computer discussion in 1997, the

types of cognitive preferences — not “mutually exclusive”—that differentia

analyst from another: “Some people are better at...a broad range of issues, 

ciplines. These make the best current intelligence analysts because they 

quick to learn an account. ... In simple terms, these are the people who are 

ing a coherent story from a jumble of seemingly disconnected parts. ... 

expert at this kind of analysis requires a great deal of experience. ... An exp

needs to continuously cast a net over a greater range of evidence and then 

then goes on to add that it is better if this kind of analyst has experienc

accounts. Then he contrasts this expert generalist to “the other type o

lyst...who concentrates on learning as much as possible about their chosen 

or discipline. These are our specialists. They do the basic research, build 

knowledge base, and concentrate on depth rather than breadth. In the old da

managers used to call these analysts the investors. They put money in the 

which the current intelligence analysts draw out to spend. ... University s

training, language proficiency, and several years on an account are a neces

oping the type of analytical expertise we need for our specialists.”40

The DI appears to be remarkably blind to differentiation in both ana

lysts, perhaps because it assigns tasks to “analysts” and equates the outpu

sis.” As a result, “[w]e do not and never have used the term ‘analysis’ rig

[IC]” according to Robert Bovey, formerly a special assistant to a DCI.41 

40CIA officer, “Two Types of Expert Analyst,” DI Discussion Database, 28 Marc
52

ysis would better be described as political reporting and that instead of fo

analytical approach “the analyst is expected to summarize the recent repor

field—“cable-gisting.” ... [T]he reporting style is not analytical—there are fe

to dig much beneath the surface of events, to look beyond the next few wee

sider alternative explanations for the events, or to carefully marshal evidence 

support alternative views.”42 Jervis correctly differentiated the analytical i

product from its non-analytic cousin, but failed to distinguish between the an

suited for each. The DI — instead of differentiating between analysts — uses 

fits-all recruitment, placement, training, and promotion strategy, and for th

views analysts as interchangeable. As a result it has perennially had difficulty 

appropriate mix of analytic abilities and skills for intelligence production wh

or crisis develops. In particular, over time the shift in expertise correspondin

erence for longer papers or shorter more current pieces is especially noticeab

An intelligence production system bifurcated by product type would likel

many of the problems inherent in the current system. In the early 1950s CIA 

production was organized by product type. The Office of Research and Repor

basic intelligence, the Office of National Estimates provided forward-looking 

and the Office of Current Intelligence “produce[d] the President’s daily intellig

cation,” 43 according to the Agency’s website. Resurrecting an Office of Cur

gence to handle immediate requests and an Office of Research and Reports to 

term analytic papers could provide a self-selection mechanism useful for t

individual’s cognitive strengths at the policymakers’ intelligence needs. Th

would not promote the loss of expertise because different kinds of expertis

applied to appropriate product types. However, this organizational structure 

require trade-offs-examined below—that would reduce regional expertise on 

at the same time as it would allow the experts to increase theirs. 

SECOND INTERVENING FACTOR:

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The DI’s organizational structure also influences which kind of analyst 

acquired and applied in finished intelligence products. Political scientist Tho

mond argues that organizational structure impacts analytic output. He emp

mation-flow models to demonstrate that—given the same information—on

intelligence analysts organized by discipline would produce different anal

than another group organized by region. He also concludes that it is im

41Robert Bovey, “The Quality of Intelligence Analysis.” American Intelligence Jou

(Winter 1980-81): 7.

42 Jervis, 34-35.

43CIA website, “Key Events in DI History,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/histo

October 2001.
53

zational structure always affects internal information flows, and likely ou

Theoretically, therefore, an organizational structure divided along disc

will accentuate learning of political, economic, military, or leadership m

through constant, interactive contact and awareness of the projects of oth

However, regional or country knowledge is sacrificed due to the lack of s

an office structured along geographic lines, the emphasis will be reversed. T

intelligence failure provides a good illustration of how organization can a

Prior to the 1996 creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, im

had been distributed, by affiliation at least, throughout the Intelligence Comm

According to former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman, “the consolidation of 

satellite imagery in (NIMA)...contributed to the intelligence failure. By plac

of imagery inside the Department of Defense...there would be a minimum 

cross-discipline analysis required for difficult regional problems such as th

military frictions in South Asia.”46 This episode may be considered an illus

trade-offs in expertise inherent in organizational structure can affect the DI a

Over the past 50 years the DI has been structured by product type, by 

by region. From approximately the early 1960s to 1981, the DI was struct

by discipline with political, economic, military, and leadership offices each 

geography. In 1981 “(a) (DI)-wide reorganization...shuffled most analys

geographically based, or “regional” offices out of the previous organization

to former CIA officer Arthur Hulnick: “These [new] offices combined 

nomic, military, and other kinds of research under “one roof,” thus making 

analytic research feasible. After some grumbling, the new offices began to t

depth products consumers had been seeking, while still providing curre

materials.”48 This integration of analytic disciplines in regional offices pr

productive interpretation of the forces at work within a target country or r

negatively affected the DI’s ability to maintain disciplinary knowledge.

The 1995 dismantling of the DI’s Office of Leadership Analysis (LD

good case study into the trade-offs between disciplinary and regional expe

from differing organizational arrangements.49 Since at least 1963 the CIA 

dated biographic information on foreign leaders, and over time the value 

analysis as a complement to political, economic, and military analysis beca

44Thomas H. Hammond, “Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Burea

American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (May 1986): 379-420.

45CIA website, “National Imagery and Mapping Agency,” URL: http://

nima.html, accessed October 2001.

46Melvin A. Goodman, “US Intelligence Failure Shows Need for Reform,” C

Monitor, 18 May 1998, URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/05/18/p11s

October 2001.

47Gentry, URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/, accessed October 2001.

48Hulnick, 323.
54

behavior above and beyond the limited biographic scope of a leadership profil

was thus created to develop and consolidate the discipline of leadership analys

on a near-equal basis with the other established analytic disciplines. Howev

then-DDI Doug MacEachin reorganized LDA — the only disciplinary office le

existence as part of “downsizing the DI.”52 Political factors may have played a 

decision. The Clinton Administration’s Haiti policy was greatly complicated 

opposition in the wake of a leaked leadership profile produced by LDA that 

the psychological stability of Jean Bertrand Aristide.53 In any case, LDA’s elim

an impact on the expertise of the DI’s leadership analysts. 

The regional offices swallowed LDA as its component units were assigned 

vant regional office. Some regional offices kept leadership analysts together a

as to maintain the disciplinary knowledge developed in LDA. Other offices br

ship teams apart and assigned individual analysts to join multi-disciplinary cou

The distribution of what had previously been centralized knowledge of analytic 

cialized product formats, and disciplinary theory throughout the DI meant tha

ership analysts were not well trained in their discipline. These new analysts r

on the fast-dissipating knowledge of the handful of former LDA officers who h

be assigned to their team or issue. In addition, actual physical co-location di

for months — and in some cases years — due to lack of space in CIA’s overcro

quarters building. As a result of being “out of sight, out of mind,” leadership an

frequently not informed of ongoing projects, briefings, and meetings, and suc

had a negative impact on the finished analytical product. When leadership an

not included in briefings, the DI risked failing to keep its consumers fully i

both leadership dynamics and changes within the country or region. In additio

published and disseminated without coordination at times contained factual err

the wrong names or positions for foreign government officials, or distortions 

due to the lack of leadership analyst input. However, once re-organization 

regional counterpart analysts became team members, and after a shaking

began to incorporate leadership analyst contributions into their products mor

fact, the close interaction with other members of the regional team led to a bet

ration of leadership analysis into regional products than had occurred during 

49The information herein on LDA is derived from personal experience as a leade

from 1996 to 1998. 

50CIA website, “Key Events In DI History,” URL: http://www.odci.gov/c

index.html, accessed October 2001.

51Thomas Omestad, “Psychology and the CIA: Leaders on the Couch,” Foreign Pol

mer 1994): 105-122. 

52CIA website, “Key Events In DI History,” URL: http://www.odci.gov/c

index.html, accessed October 2001.

53Center for Security Policy, URL: http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1994/9

accessed October 2001.
55

increased incorporation of leadership analysis and insight into the regiona

ucts, and decreased corporate knowledge and expertise in leadership analy

pline. The same occurred for the other disciplines when their respectiv

eliminated in 1981.

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER AGAIN

By the mid-1990s DI analysts were realizing that while multi-disciplina

country teams made for better integration of disciplines, it also led to the dis

ciplinary knowledge. Former LDA analysts’ efforts to sustain their hold o

knowledge triggered similar efforts by political, economic and military analy

tain and reconstruct occupational-specific knowledge. Without the framewor

organization to bind each discipline together, over time they had each grown 

To rectify this loss of disciplinary expertise, in 1997 the DI created the 

Council of Intelligence Occupations (CIOC) with the initial intent of discip

force strategic planning...in the areas of recruitment, assignments, and train

“identify[ing] core skills and standards for expertise in the [DI].”54 In pr

became a home for senior analysts interested in learning and teaching the

methodologies. They “establish[ed] a professional development progra

employees that provides explicit proficiency criteria at each level so that ev

the knowledge, skills, and experiences required for advancement within ea

or across occupations.”55 All this was done—according to the CIA website 

DI has the expertise needed to provide value-added all-source analysis to its 

CIOC emphasized disciplinary training as a method to achieve this goal

website notes, “(t)he Council views learning and skills development as an e

work and the means whereby employees can respond to changes in custo

and the external environment.”57 In 2000, CIOC was disbanded although its 

tions have been incorporated into the DI’s Kent School and its other knowl

distributed elsewhere within the DI. 

There may be no easy solution to the expertise trade-offs inherent in 

structure. By definition, the structure will create synergies in the areas em

the opportunity cost of doing so means losing the synergies in other areas. 

54McLaughlin, 18. 

55CIA website, “Directorate of Intelligence Organizational Components, Counci

Occupations,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/cioc.html, accessed October 

56CIA website, “Directorate of Intelligence Organizational Components, Counci

Occupations,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/cioc.html, accessed October 

57CIA website, “Directorate of Intelligence Organizational Components, Counci

Occupations,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/cioc.html, accessed October 
56

DI leadership believes will most directly benefit its policymaker consumers

ing secondary institutions like CIOC or disciplinary training through the Ken

bolster the lost expertise may be the only way to preserve knowledge tha

would be lost.

TO THE FUTURE

Expertise-development programs that create the potential to improve over

accuracy—such as formal training in methodologies, regions, disciplines, or 

or informal training resulting from greater overseas experience — do not provi

the way of improvement if in fact the DI’s business practices prevent applica

hard-earned expertise. CIA’s leaders should continue to pursue ways to incre

expertise, for they could contribute to increased analytic accuracy. Yet at the 

the DI must adapt its practices to leverage the potential improvements of thes

if the CIA is to provide its policymaking customers with the intelligence the

and in the future. The creation of a bifurcated production process might remov

iment preventing acquisition and application of expertise, but other reforms m

essary as well. 

The CIA was created in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to 

and integrate intelligence information and provide strategic warning should an

United States choose to attack. With respect to the September 2001 attacks on 

it is still too soon to determine whether the CIA’s failure to provide specific w

in organizational inefficiencies, collection gaps, analytic missteps, or in som

tion of the three. Regardless, improvements in intelligence analysis must occ

provide policymakers with warning of any potential future attacks while prev

prises on issues of national security importance. Managing the DI so that it c

accurate intelligence will require an accurate assessment of the DI’s current c

an understanding of its limitations, and creative approaches to overcome them. 

business practices entail tradeoffs that prevent full actualization of the DI’s po

haps through serious study the constraints that the DI’s working environment 

analytic expertise will be understood and overcome. As Robert Jervis declares

never be able to do as well as we would like, but this does not mean that we can

ter than we are doing now.”58

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1998: 21.

Betts, Richard K. “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 

World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61-89.

Betts, Richard K. “Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate or Indi

58 Jervis, 30.
57

Bovey, Robert. “The Quality of Intelligence Analysis.” American Intellige

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Center for Security Policy. “‘Say It Ain’t So, Jim’: Impending Reorgani

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CIA officer. “Two Types of Expert Analyst,” DI Discussion Database, 28 M

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gence Occupations,” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/cioc.h

October 2001.

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plines.html. Accessed October 2001.

CIA website. “Jeremiah News Conference.” URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/p

press_release/archives/1998/jeremiah.html. Accessed October 2001

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index.html. Accessed October 2001.

CIA website. “National Imagery and Mapping Agency.” URL: http://w

nima.html. Accessed October 2001.

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Available on the Federation of American Scientists webpage at 

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58

ence Monitor, 18 May 1998, 11. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/du

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Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (May 1986): 

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1979/80):2-11.

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Game.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligenc

(1988): 321-343. 

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and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 1-23.

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cle&node=&contentId=A16925-2001Mar30

MacEachin, Douglas J. and others. The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and 

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McLaughlin, John E. “New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis.” Defense I

Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 11-21. 

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6 May 1997.

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(Summer 1994): 105-122. 

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Breakdown.” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1998, A8.

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1991): 150-166.

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Week in Review, 7 June 1998, 5.

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1998, A1, A14.
59

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60

Lt Col Tom Garin, an Air Force officer assigned to the National Reco

Office (NRO), arrived at the Joint Military Intelligence College in Septemb

occupy the General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. Chair for National Reconnaissan

He has taught graduate-level core and elective courses on missiles and spa

structured techniques for intelligence analysis, and research methodologies, a

undergraduate core course on space systems. Prior to this post, Lt Col Garin 

Organizational Development at the NRO. There, he used a balanced scorecar

to link human resource policies with the overall NRO mission. He also worke

for Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review on a performance m

benchmarking study team to help government agencies prepare for the Gover

formance and Results Act. In addition, he completed special projects as dire

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.

Lt Col Garin received a B.S. in Operations Research (OR) from the United 

Force Academy in 1982, a M.S. in OR from the Air Force Institute of Tec

March 1990, and a Master of Public Administration from the University of So

ifornia (USC) in May 2001. He is currently in the Doctorate of Public Adminis

gram at USC.
61

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Thomas A. Garin, Lt Col, USAF

An adaptable organization is one that has the capacity for internal chan

to external conditions. To be adaptable, organizations must be able to learn. 

can learn by monitoring their environment, relating this information to i

detecting any deviations from these norms, and correcting discrepancies. 

Foreign Intelligence Community at large learns by collecting necessary inf

lyzing the information, and disseminating it to users who in turn hold the o

ence collection decisions. A telling aspect of any knowledge organization 

which it manages its information. 

Knowledge management can equip intelligence organizations for the fa

technology information age. By building upon the best aspects of total quality 

and observing the criteria for performance excellence adopted for the Bal

Quality Program, managers can theoretically lead professionals to work toge

as a group in a situation in which their dealings with one another affect their 

fare. In this paper, Baldrige criteria guide an “insider’s” exploration of how 

intelligence officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency do intelligence analy

STUDY DESIGN

The DIA is expected to ensure the satisfaction of the full range of foreig

military-related intelligence requirements of defense organizations, UN Co

and non-defense consumers, as appropriate. Specifically, DIA supports: (1

operations in peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat; (2) service weapo

and (3) defense policymaking. In the past fifteen years, several analysis a

units within DIA have received prestigious awards demonstrating the c

appreciation that senior U.S. leaders have in the agency’s performance. O

these observations, a case could be made that DIA has become a world-clas

for meeting U.S. military intelligence requirements. Clearly, the DIA is a w

zation to examine for evidence of how quality intelligence analysis can be c

1 The three essential characteristics of operations research are (1) systems orient

interdisciplinary teams, and (3) adaptation of the scientific method. The Baldrige c

similar function for assessing information organizations. From a systems perspecti

criteria focus on a leadership triad and a results triad. Activity by leadership affect

results, in turn, affect the future activity of leadership. From a team perspective, the 

focus on the multiple lens of leadership, the customers or consumers, and the an

complete understanding of its operations. Lastly, the Baldrige criteria focus on 

analysis, emphasizing a fact-based, scientific approach, to serve as a foundation for 

management system. 
62

A typical analysis office consists of a manager, the senior intelligence of

analysts, liaison officers, and administration/technical support staff. The mana

a set of processes common to many organizations such as planning, organizin

directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. The SIO is a senior analys

matter expert on a grand scale, and is responsible for the content of the analyti

A typical SIO approves all finished intelligence products, coordinates budget 

external studies, and is the unit’s chief training officer. Analysts tend to be sub

experts and are accustomed to using technology to support analysis. Liaison o

nect the analysis office either to operational forces in the field or to other orga

the Intelligence Community. The administration/technical support staff provid

of functions such as disseminating the finished intelligence product, provid

support, and arranging travel.

Consumer Groups

Analysts produce intelligence for a number of different consumer groups.2 

sumer groups include: (1) civilian and military policymakers; (2) military p

executors; (3) acquisition personnel responsible for force modernization; (4) 

operators; and (5) intelligence operators. Consumer groups specific to DI

include (1) DIA leadership such as the Director, DIA, and the Director of I

(DI); (2) Pentagon senior leadership such as Generals on the Joint Staff, other 

the Pentagon, and senior civilians; and (3) senior leadership in the field such a

batant Commanders.

Participants

This intelligence analysis benchmarking study is the result of a class pro

Joint Military Intelligence College’s graduate-level course ANA 635, “Struc

niques for Intelligence Analysts.” This course helps students understand 

descriptive and quantitative methodologies to intelligence analysis. Students 

the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, National Reconnaissance Offic

Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency. The study te

2 A useful distinction may be drawn between “consumers” and “customers” of 

Customers are those who must “pay” for the intelligence service by providing liaiso

participating in the intelligence process in a way that drains away part of their own o

resources. Consumers are those who are entitled to receive either standard or tailored a

ucts, including briefings, but who do not find it necessary to obligate any of their own 

its production. DIA offices typically do not recognize this distinction, and individual 

known to scoff at the notion that anyone for whom they provide an analytic product is 

because of a perception that those who use a product are “professionals” in a sense th

the representation of value in dollar terms. 
63

ers who met with the research team had a combined total of over 100 years 

in intelligence analysis or related areas. 

Process

The team followed established benchmarking procedures in conducti

which included on-site visits and interviews with members of each unit. T

adopted a “systems” perspective that isolated the concepts of leadership, 

ning, consumer focus, information and analysis, people and resources, pro

ment, and mission accomplishment. Taken together, these seven eleme

organization (or a unit within a larger organization), its operations, and its 

The information and analysis category is especially critical to the effectiv

of an information organization like DIA. 

Exemplary Intelligence Offices

Based on their experiences, members of the JMIC faculty recommende

offices in the Defense Intelligence Agency as suitable interview venues fo

The students in a structured analytic techniques class chose a subset of the 

based on their interest in the organization. The class size limited the numb

tions that could be included in the study. Also, once officials became aware 

and the nature of the information required, certain offices deselected thems

project based on their estimated lack of ability to contribute in a meaning

organizations were not available to meet with us during our limited schedu

weeks of the spring quarter. 

The study team visited a total number of five analysis-related organizat

the organizations reside in the Directorate for Intelligence (DI). The J-2 

who was interviewed was from a fairly small office within a much large

office. He had experience in other DIA analysis offices. The JMIC responde

a relatively small number of faculty members with past analysis experienc

DI offices, the TWC is a relatively large analysis office. The OICC, on the o

relatively small analysis-related shop that draws from the analysts within 

its mission requirements in a crisis situation. Like the OICC, the OSJ-2 

small analysis shop.

1. Directorate for Intelligence (J2): JCS/J-2 provides indications and warn

current intelligence support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OS

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Staff offices, and to the Unifie

The J2 represents intelligence requirements of the Unified Commands, writ

gence doctrine, and directs intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ments for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Staff Dir

Warfighter Capabilities Assessment teams that perform detailed assessmen

matic alternatives, tradeoffs, risks, and effectiveness.
64

ian intelligence professionals and conducts and disseminates intellige

research.

Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI): This division manages the pr

military intelligence throughout the General Defense Intelligence Program. I

respond to intelligence needs of the OSD, JCS, Unified Commands, military se

other U.S. government agencies. Specifically, offices for which information is 

here are:

3. Office for Counterterrorism Analysis (TWC): Supports the Transnation

Group’s efforts to detect, characterize, and assess vulnerabilities of adversary 

for emergent counterterrorism opportunities. TWC manages and produces 

intelligence in support of warfighter, policy, and acquisition communities.

4. Operational Intelligence Coordination Center (OICC): Exists as the foc

crisis and contingency intelligence production within the DI. In this capacity

operates around the clock and supports the timely production and dissemina

source intelligence for DIA’s strategic, operational, and tactical-level consu

effort includes the management of all intelligence taskings, requests for inform

personnel augmentation requests.

5. Operational Environment Analysis Division (OSJ-2): Initiates, oversees, 

nates all-source military geographic (terrain, cultural and demographic) intelli

ysis and production required to support crisis, operational, and contingenc

efforts of the National Command Authorities (Secretaries of Defense and Stat

Unified Commands, and deployed forces.

THE EVALUATION CRITERIA 

The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Improvement Act of 1987, Publi

107, provides for the establishment and conduct of a national quality improv

gram under which awards are given to organizations that practice effective q

agement. The Act established the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality 

implementing this Act, the National Institute of Standards and Technology m

able guidelines and criteria designed for use by business, education and health 

nizations for self-evaluation and improvement of their competitive positions.3 

paper, the NIST criteria are applied to DIA, under the premise that a U.S. g

organization, through its component offices, could benefit from a systematic ev

its “competitive” position; namely, its ability to develop and maintain agility i

intensive environment. 

3 For background information, please see the website at URL: http://www.quality.n
65

Leaders influence others to accomplish a mission by providing purpose, 

motivation. Baldrige leadership criteria apply to how the analysis organiz

assigns tasks, interacts with analysts, and provides feedback. Within these th

leader-analyst relationship, there appears to be a tension between initiative 

the analyst and direction on the part of the leader. 

Task Assignment

Initiative. In many offices, analysis is self-generated. The office leade

analyst to an area of the world and constantly pushes for finished products. 

expected to act on his own initiative, do the analysis, and produce articles. I

there really is no clear top-down tasking process. One subject observed tha

to do a better job of prioritizing analysts’ work because, even as analysts as

put in databases, create briefings and produce finished intelligence produ

write on relatively insignificant items. Their workload is usually events-dr

ers call in to their office and request certain information. The analysts atte

consumer what they don’t already know. Their work may not always re

sumer’s interests. To counter this tendency, some subjects maintain, man

incorporate a perspective on vital national interests into their analysts’ tasks

Another subject identified two ways in which analysis tasks are self-gen

the analyst submits a formal proposal to do general research and, if appro

the work. In the second, the analyst submits a more structured proposal to 

of the world by looking forward perhaps about 10 years. If approved, the 

case identifies problems, examines them, and synthesizes them into m

issues. A problem and its attendant issues could become the basis for a N

gence Estimate (NIE).4

One subject noted that in a crisis situation, the analyst who answers the 

job. For example, if the phone call comes at 1600 hours on Friday, then th

has answered the phone would work with the consumer through the weeken

The study team thought that it might be difficult getting an individual to ans

on Friday afternoon. The subject, however, assured us that that was not th

tive of the personal sense of responsibility and initiative felt by analysts, h

they would actually want to get the phone call regardless of the time.

The self-generated analysis may have certain implications. First, the an

doing analysis that serves the personal interest of the analyst, but does not m

leader’s or other policymaker’s requirements. Second, the analyst may be f

4 It is not uncommon for one of the National Intelligence Officers, who are th

gence Community experts on discrete topics, and who coordinate the production o

with an individual analyst, or with small groups of analysts, to discuss such problem
66

analysis office, rather than producing analysis that is most beneficial to the I

Community. Third, the analyst may focus on easier problems that reside in the 

instead of tougher future-oriented problems in order to give the appearance of 

productive by producing more intelligence.

Directive. Each office leader tends to have a different method for assigni

tasks. In one office, the division chief ultimately assigns all tasks, regardless 

the request comes into the subordinate office. Tasks come into an office throug

wide” collection management system, through internal DIA processes, throug

telephone calls from consumers, and through person-to-person memoranda. T

may at times introduce some confusion in the office. For example, the leader 

problem deciding whom to task. It may be appropriate to task the in-house an

ing in that area of the world, a member of a crisis response team, or a terrorist 

There are certain implications when a leader directs an analyst to work a c

or problem. First, the leader may not be able to assign the “best” analyst becau

load. The best analyst may simply have too many projects on his or her plate o

some other reason for making himself or herself unavailable. Second, the 

assign a project to the wrong individual. The leader may not know who the righ

for a certain type of problem or issue. Third, the leader, by being too directive

the analysts’ own creativity or initiative by keeping the analyst too busy.

Leader and Analyst Interaction

Initiative. Most interview subjects agreed that leaders from inside or o

office do not interfere with the analyst’s work. They provide oversight only wh

lyst asks for it because analysts do not like to be micro-managed. Each manage

his or her analysts subject matter experts. They may ask the analyst, “are y

yet?” or “do you need help on A/B/C?” For additional support, analysts ofte

other experts as needed. 

The SIO for an office gets involved only if an analyst brings an issue or 

him. Sometimes, the SIO walks around the office, talks to the analysts, and loo

to help obtain certain information. The SIO gets formally involved in the analy

however, when the analyst has created the final product. Usually, it has been c

through the analyst’s peers before it gets to the SIO. The SIO makes any substa

matting corrections before the final product can leave the office.

Directive. Usually during a crisis situation, there is face-to-face interaction 

office leader and analysts from the moment the requirement appears until it i

subject agreed that there should be a constant exchange of information betwee

and the analyst even during routine analysis. Some leaders are better at it than 

lower level managers in their office worked directly with the analysts. U

assign an analyst a project, discuss with them how to do it, and continually ask 

they are doing. Another subject described the production process this way: 
67

with other staffs, and they suggest changes. 

Feedback 

Initiative. The interaction between leadership and the analyst during 

sions varies from office to office. It usually follows a similar pattern: the an

his or her findings, managers review the work; analysts make the recomme

and analysts coordinate the work with appropriate offices. In some case

decides who should coordinate on his or her analysis. Competition be

impedes the coordination process. One subject regrets that neither top-down 

tools exist to support the coordination process.

One subject said all input from leaders and peers comes after the analysi

result, the usual case is for the assessment in the final product to be concep

the analyst’s own findings. Once the feedback process concludes, analysts a

their finished products on the electronic “broadcast” media. It is usually th

person from an office will post products on Intelink.5 One office included 

posts approximately 100 products per year on Intelink. An analyst may als

directly to the consumer, or may inform specific consumers of its URL. A

product will be “downgraded” to a lower classification level by obscuri

methods to enable it to reach a wider audience on different electronic syste

In one office, analysts put together products on an ad hoc basis to answe

from consumers. Finished products are normally briefings with supple

ments—like maps or targeting materials—published either on the shop’s w

warded to the consumer by email or hard copy. Another method of 

requirement is to post the answer back into the production requirements s

office, leaders do not actively provide formal feedback to the analyst who 

age together. Informally, however, the shop’s leader will likely be trackin

the analyst is making in completing the tasking by checking the finished pr

is published in any format.

Directive. After completing the analysis, the analyst will normally pre

information to a team chief or SIO for coordination. After considering the 

SIO will give the analyst permission to send written findings forward. Beca

mation may appear unaltered in the U.S. President’s read book, an SIO do

to “wordsmith. This feedback may be frustrating and humiliating for the an

may direct the analyst to fix the logical development of an argument or to 

and better data. Some analysts will simply rework their product and resu

SIO. Others, however, will discuss the comments with the SIO. The SIO ty

the latter method because the analyst will usually understand the comme

5 Intelink is the Community’s intranet, hosting “value-added” intelligence produ
68

only rarely will a product be killed within the analysts office.

Leaders tend to squelch any negative commentary on U.S. information oper

issues. Their attitudes reflect an Intelligence Community-wide aversion to dis

problems associated with the U.S. or “blue” force. Intelligence analysts are fre

“red” force issues, but only military operations officers or “operators” are fre

“blue” force issues. As a result, decisionmakers must learn to seek informatio

“blue” force from one source and information about the “red” force from an

must combine the information themselves in order to get a full picture of the s

One subject suggested that ideally the analyst can encourage short, regul

sessions from the manager on an informal basis. For example, if the boss wante

for a future meeting, the analyst could give him some draft charts well ahead 

expect nearly immediate feedback. In practice, however, the boss often edits on

charts and returns them to the analyst who is forced under pressure of time to m

essary changes. Interview subjects frequently alluded to this problem, and opin

feedback issues remain a problem. Interview subjects nevertheless offered th

examples of good, direct feedback. First, an individual who was quite good 

changes would eliminate unnecessary words, shortening the report and makin

ing much tighter. The analysts expressed appreciation of this feedback because 

added to the product. In the second example, a manager was very good at gro

managers. He would receive an analyst’s report, then hand it to another analy

and comment. In this way, subjects noted, he was developing new leaders.

Comments

Good leadership demands high quality products to inform warfighters and 

ers. Leaders need analysis to answer tough questions. At the same time, manag

keep in mind important questions about the analysis process itself:

■ Are military leaders able to do their job better because of their analyst’s pro

■ Are the benefits of doing the analysis outweighing the costs? 

■ Are we doing risk analysis? That is, are we attempting to understand t

between threat and vulnerabilities by examining local trade-offs? 

Good leadership ensures a value-added coordination process. Analysts of

coordination process tough. One subject said that before the first draft, the a

was the best job. After the first draft, however, the analyst’s job was difficult. A

ject called into question the coordination process because of the low quality 

products posted in the database. Another subject said the coordination proces

bling experience for the analyst because it is tough to get back your paper mar

corrections. One subject said a co-worker tested the system. He worked really 

project and sent it forward. Next time, he slapped something together and sent 
69

motivation to excel. From these testimonials, one could conclude that u

(non-standard) coordination may hinder the work of analysts.

Good leadership theoretically removes such barriers to effective use 

resources by providing leading-edge administrative and computer suppo

around graphics support for urgent tasks; and hassle-free travel support. On

pared DIA administrative support unfavorably with what he grew to ex

worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. He could drop something o

graphics support and pick it up when he got to work in the morning. When h

proactive travel office would remove some of the hassles associated with 

would tell someone in the travel office where he needed to go. They would 

a short time later with all the information he needed to know about the tri

he got back from his trip, he told them what he did and they reimbursed hi

no required travel reports and no receipts. In fact, they told him to get 

receipts. In case he was caught; it would be better for no one else to know 

been! One reason the DIA may be different is the fact that the CIA focuses m

operations than the DIA. Another reason is that DIA, a DoD organizatio

accountability rules and regulations than the CIA. As a result, the DIA anal

better job of documenting their trip for accountability purposes. It would p

possible for the DIA to adopt the CIA process without some changes in the 

ern travel accountability.

Good leadership intervenes to handle sensitive, political aspects of a job

be able to supply the needed leverage or “muscle.” For example, a limited n

lysts may be qualified to handle issues in a crisis situation. A trade-off m

negotiated between support for the warfighter and support for senior policy

Pentagon, all within the Department of Defense. Further, leaders may need 

facilitate interaction between the analyst and consumers in order to ensur

anticipate and meet their consumers’ priorities.

Summary

Leadership is a critical aspect in determining the success of the intelli

process. Leadership demands high-quality products, ensures a value-adde

process, removes technical or administrative barriers, and intervenes when 

leaders assign tasks directly to the analysts. Others rely on the Senior Intell

(SIO) to assign tasks or rely on the initiative of the analysts themselves t

right problems and analyze them. Leadership tends to provide little or no in

ing the analysis process except if and when the analyst seeks it. Analysts do 

micro-managed. In a crisis situation however, the leader takes a more direc

approach. Although feedback varied from office to office, ideally the analy

short, regular feedback on an informal basis with the office leader.
70

Baldrige criteria compel an examination of how an analysis office prepare

challenges, records its institutional history, and uses academic or profession

Within the category of future challenges, a distinction may be made between 

and issue challenges. Future capability challenges deal with the people a

issues. Future issue challenges, on the other hand, are country- or target-depen

challenges deal specifically with the emerging threat to U.S. interests. Althou

the offices has a written, formal strategic plan, in most, leaders claimed to h

about strategic planning issues and were working toward a future vision. Thei

sion though was to “get the right information to the right people at the right tim

Future Challenges

Capability Challenges. Organizational capability centers on people and 

For those subjects who indicated that they have thought about the future in str

ning terms, leaders recognized that the commitment of their people to an org

ideal is a necessary ingredient for success. In practice, then, organizational 

must support strategic planning. Analysis organizations need to consider their 

bilities and ensure that staffs have the necessary knowledge, skills, and tools 

Our study subjects generally favored a team approach for intelligence analys

wanted analysts to consult with experts and coordinate with stakeholders bef

the final product to consumers. 

Most office representatives said they had just the right mix of people for th

In one instance, an office had been given an abundance of people and other 

However, if some other offices only had a few more people or more resource

too would be able to do much more for their consumers. Since they were alrea

their mission requirements, they did not expect to have additional people b

them. In fact, office leaders reported that they had to fight annually to maintai

sonnel resources, as many capabilities are fungible from one office to another

among those examined expected to hire several more entry-level people. An a

this approach is that new people tend to be more computer-literate than older 

bers. An unsurprising tradeoff is that new people also tend to be less well-ed

professional sense, in their specialty. Another subject said there was no real f

ning for their office personnel. The objective was to get analysts through iden

ing requirements so they could produce reports in order to fill databases.

Since none of the subjects claimed to use a formal strategic planning p

study team could not discuss the process with them in detail. A generic stra

ning process, however, should include (1) doing advanced planning, (2) per

environmental scan based on external and internal information, (3) setting 

direction using the vision statement, (4) translating the strategic direction into 

an implementation plan, and (5) making a performance evaluation. A perform

uation or assessment should include (1) defining goals, (2) describing succe
71

The DIA has a formal process to do strategic planning, but it was not cle

team how the organizational strategic planning process might be linked to 

els of the organization.

Issue Challenges. Concern about issues centers on the mission of each a

Evidence from this study indicates that an SIO often thinks about future issu

ple, he may hire external contractors to investigate an area of interest. One 

commissioned a study to look out 5-10 years and make recommendation

issue. Those recommendations addressed the question of what they needed 

order to prepare themselves for the envisioned future. One subject stressed t

ity of his office to remain flexible and to evolve thoughtfully, guided by its 

and instincts. As evidence in support of such confidence, he noted the o

strated ability to anticipate warfighter needs. Another subject asserted that 

ply follows issues (in the widest “all-source” sense) as they are developing 

are called to support a requirement, they are aware of what is going on 

some work completed already.

One subject offered an example of an office in CIA that he was invited 

years ago. It was a new organization and analysts joined it by invitation 

regarded it as a fun place to work because they had an opportunity to be in

office wanted to look at the world in a new way. One type of project assoc

office was a study of demographic changes and political instability within t

of a certain foreign country. He said they wrote five case study documents 

places of interest in considerable detail. Such detail on individual cities w

an Intelligence Community product, and at the same time greatly appreciat

ers. According to our subject, this office no longer exists in the CIA. When 

an example of good intelligence, he implied that it may be worthwhile for D

an office like the former CIA office to deal with today’s complex issues.
72

Most subjects said they did not have a written institutional history. There e

mal analyses of their office’s strengths or weaknesses. The office does rel

retaining experienced individuals for its corporate memory.6 Some offices mai

ings about their office’s operations as a surrogate for a written institutional hi

one assigned to an analytic unit is expected to set about building connections a

operations and systems. Only one subject said they had formed a history offic

significant events for their office, beginning in the late 1990s. Even this admi

tive, however, with its focus on events, rather that process itself, would fail to 

nuances of truly useful and recoverable institutional history.7

Academic or Professional Sources 

In the interviews, office leaders tended to support academic training, attend

fessional conferences and conventions as experiences useful to the developm

fessional expertise. However, there exist at the office level no guides or pla

professionalization opportunities.8 Within an office, professionalization app

driven from the bottom up. If an analyst learns about a class or other certifiab

opportunity, the agency’s training center resources can assist with financi

assuming office politics and workload do not intervene. Interviews reveale

6 DIA does operate a mentoring program to ensure that some corporate memory 

younger analysts. Facilitated mentoring can cut on-the-job training time by up to half a

key factor in the retention of entry-level hires. However, participation in the mentorin

relatively small compared to the entire workforce. Even if some employees enter into 

relationship, there is no guarantee that the process will be successful. Potential pitf

unrealistic expectations, supervisor unsupportive, relationship derails, shortage of go

differences (style, ethnicity, gender, age) interfere, and relationship is a poor fit. Al

Government and Department of Defense regulations do require that agency, and by exte

products and communications be preserved as official records, the combined procedur

knowledge required to create actionable intelligence typically escapes being recorded 

sonal domain of such records.

7 One exception to this rule is the Agency’s Military and Geographic Intelligenc

The Joint Military Intelligence College also offers an exception to this state of affairs, 

lications Writing with Intelligence (August 1995), Briefing with Intelligence (Augu

Research: Design and Methods (September 2000), which capture the combined exper

dent and faculty interaction in teaching and learning about intelligence studies.

8 Career development is a continuous career-long process of self-assessment and p

helps employees integrate their career goals with their organization’s mission and nee

Career Development System (CDS) is designed to assist employees in career planning 

ment. Components of the CDS include: entry level development program, designed 

develop entry-level employees, and the career service program, designed to enhance 

environment and improve employee productivity.
73

by personal interest and are authorized so long as funds exist to support it. 

Each analysis office uses academic and professional sources in a diffe

office hires contractors to provide them with computer support. Another o

over 100 contractors and academics to perform tasks in an external researc

this case, according to interview testimony, analysts are able to integra

research into their daily operations only with some difficulty. For example, 

unit had to learn how to integrate data on cyber-terrorism and IO into co

analysis. Representatives from one office visited Unified Command Join

Centers to learn to do this better. Another office used the Military and Geog

gence Cookbook (MAGIC) to inform their analysts of “everything they nee

do their job.” If the analysts had not used a specific tool in a while, then 

MAGIC to refresh their memory.

Richards J. Heuer, Jr., a senior CIA analyst, has tried to acquaint a

agency with methodological developments in socio-political analysis th

developed and tested in the academic world. He had to keep at it for more th

be heard.9 He has often met with strong resistance. Only a few academics w

to the agency to talk with the analysts. “Factions,” an analytical tool develo

systematic analysis of political instability, is a good example of research an

(R&D) work done in collaboration with members of the academic commun

1980s there was no particular pressure or encouragement across the Com

structured analytic methods. Analysts gathered the facts, looked at them in 

“logical” way, and came to some conclusions. Some DIA analysts use st

niques to do intelligence analysis. The subjects we spoke to, however, descr

lytical process as gathering facts, examining them logically and d

conclusions. More emphasis on structured techniques at DIA may be appro

Summary

Although none of our subjects had a written, formal strategic plan, mo

thought about strategic planning issues and were working toward a future c

9 Finally, on 20 June 2000, at the inauguration of CIA’s Sherman Kent School, w

curriculum for new analysts, Heuer’s campaign reached a pinnacle of acceptance by 

denced by his book’s, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center 

Intelligence, 1999), being the focus of remarks by invited speakers. Another seni

Morgan Jones, had a few years earlier published a compact summary of “Fourteen 

niques for Problem Solving,” some of them having been developed exclusively by 

in The Thinker’s Toolkit (New York: Random House, Times Books, 1995), reprin

revised edition in 1998 by Random House’s Times Business division.. 

10Stanley A. Feder, “Factions and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,’’ repri

Studies in Intelligence in H. Bradford Westerfield’s Inside CIA’s Private World (N

Yale University Press, 1995), 274-292.
74

ship about future issues. Managers know the direction they want to go in an

the need to support a strategic plan. Furthermore, a focus on important future 

as which country is most problematic clearly makes an analysis shop proactiv

time in crisis situations. 

Theoretically, the strategic management process includes (1) advanced pl

an environmental scan that includes a review of internal and external informat

ting a strategic direction; (4) translating the strategic direction into action; and 

ing performance. Consumers, stakeholders, and subjects influence the proces

their requirements, receiving products and services, and providing feedback. I

and analysis influence each step of the process by providing management wit

information, data, and feedback. 

Most of our subjects relied on the corporate memory of senior analysts 

maintaining a recorded institutional history. As senior analysts approach reti

and leave government service, analysis offices will lose a great deal of expe

offices maintained a written office history or had on file significant briefings 

office’s operations. All of our subjects used academic or professional sources 

their capabilities as needed. They also knew what commercial tools were avail

them to do more for their consumers. 

CONSUMER FOCUS

The Baldrige criteria applicable to a consumer focus suit the DIA case very 

information organization, this agency is obligated, through its analysis units

consumers’ requirements. A key question for this study is whether relationship

sumers tend to be ad hoc or the result of a deliberate strategy.

Consumer Requirements 

Consumers make their requirements known through a formal productio

telephone calls, individual initiatives, by e-mail, and through personal visits. 

their initial requirements known primarily on an ad hoc basis. The most 

requirements are informal because the analyst gets to talk directly to the cons

sequently, the analyst can help the consumer refine the formal request in the Co

intelligence production database. Some consumers make telephone calls to a

require an answer in two hours or less. This can make the analyst’s job ver

Consumers use emails, on the other hand, as a secondary contact medium and 

follow-up activities. On occasion, a consumer will come to the analyst’s offi

mize the opportunity to gain a very specific pre-deployment, contextual under

target information. One subject noted that although most analytic tasks are m

driven, there are also many self-generated products. The latter could have 

effect, especially in promoting analyst self-esteem, so long as the self-generat

are of interest to the entire Community. In one case made known to the stud

office leader asked analysts simply to produce products for their databases. 
75

deadlines, rather than picking topics that represent the tough questions a

be most useful to the Community in general.

Consumer and Analyst Interaction 

The different frames of reference that one might expect to characterize a

between analysts and consumers are on vivid display in anecdotes related 

view subjects. Much of the time, consumers appear to shy away from dir

with an analyst. On occasion, the consumer’s rank is too far above that of 

allow an analyst to directly approach an individual consumer, especially i

tion like DIA, often still characterized by a culture that finds meaning 

behavioral clues from a hierarchy of authority. Occasionally, however, inf

tion does occur, to include face-to-face conversations or telephone calls to e

of requirements. One subject noted that his contact with consumers is m

and direct. This analyst works with consumers to build training product

much as possible like the real world. Toward that end, an analyst might a

school as a student, rather than as a VIP, in order to absorb and then re-crea

tically some part of that training environment. On issues related to training

to go to wherever their consumers are located. There, they interact dire

products together. Consumers also come to DIA. For example, one analyst 

experience with a Navy SEAL who sat next to the analyst during the produ

In another example, one analyst worked closely with an Air Force consume

pilot evacuation and recovery area study.

Some subjects claimed to have little or no interaction with consumer

said there was some consumer support at the analyst-to-analyst level and 

mal channels. As a general rule, however, there is no regular contact wit

Therefore, the role of consumer often is represented by whoever become

particular publication.11 Production tasking usually passes through bureau

both the producer and consumer ends, which reinforces pre-existing tende

analysts and consumers away from each other. Suddenly, an answer to a fo

mal request simply appears. A general absence of feedback from consumer

the intelligence production process in the offices included in this study. A

with consumers that does occur happens on an ad hoc basis.

11Because most products are published electronically on systems such as Intelin

for the agency to track in considerable detail the organizations and even particu

access and explore particular documents. In practice, however, this is rarely done 

detail that allows an analyst to be certain who the consumer really may be. Even if 

concept that within the Department of Defense, information becomes actionable inte

through the briefing process, it is wise to remember that cognitive processes do de

on purposeful information-seeking activity, which can hypothetically be tracked in 

inform intelligence producers exactly who their true consumers really are. 
76

Analysts provide finished products to their consumers in a variety of ways: 

formal production requirements management database, in hard copy, posted to 

or by email. Sometimes, depending on the size of the electronic file, analysts p

uct on a “hidden” URL. Then, they call a known consumer to let them know 

have posted the product. Once the consumer has the product, the analyst c

from the system. Feedback appears in many forms. In one office, informal fee

dominates through personal contact with the consumers. Another office obtain

feedback either via the office web site’s “feedback” button, or via a verbal res

the consumer that the product met or did not meet the need. Hard copies au

include a publication office’s formal feedback form. All products do not ge

One subject said a team in their division uses a questionnaire to find out if the

ers liked their product. One office maintains a sizable travel budget so analysts 

to their consumer’s office regularly.

Sometimes analysts are told when they did a good job. They are also told 

could have done better, a phenomenon that has become more common with th

impersonal electronic communication. Consumers can be very specific. Analy

briefings to their consumers and they attend briefings by consumers. They 

phone call saying either “great job,’’ or that the Admiral wants to know why 

came to a certain conclusion. Sometimes, the analyst writes for a specific indi

individual consumer almost always responds positively in this scenario. If 

goes directly from the analytic office to an individual, then there are not man

review. In such a case, reviewers will include a (1) branch chief, (2) the DIA 

Research, and (3) the Division Chief. If, however, the analysis office broadcas

uct, then the review process can reach extremes of review and coordination.

Marketing a product can attain great importance. An analyst typically doe

his or her finished product to sit on the table in the J-2’s office. The usual desi

information to reach much lower levels, where the material remains actionab

tion, which may only later become actionable intelligence. They do this by usi

means of communication. For example, they publish their results using diffe

such as in the Military Intelligence Digest, which features strategic or operatio

ments; the general finished intelligence database, known as Intelink; serialized 

cations, and informal contacts with consumers around the world. The analyst 

the product can market it by mailing hard copies, by telling people where t

Intelink or by responding to specific requests by sending email attachments o

personal phone call. 

Summary

Building relationships with consumers tends to be more ad hoc than the 

deliberate strategy. Although consumer feedback varies from office to office, 

subjects said that “working-level” consumers support their intelligence analy

Some got feedback from an office web site. Others got it through verbal int
77

ments and get feedback about past performance. Often these consumers wil

to let them know what they need and to describe how particular, related 

been used in similar situations in the past.

Likewise, the way consumers make their requirements known varies 

office. Consumers continuously provide information as they themselves m

the analysis process.12 Analysts preferred a phone call from the consume

could coach the consumer through the process of documenting their needs 

SEUM database. Once the analyst completes the product, they market the

lysts used different methods to make their products available, improve th

getting their information to the appropriate consumers, and ensure consu

opportunity to use their product.

INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS

Information and analysis criteria address the question of how well D

meeting challenges in this core functional area, and reveal whether 

approach is being taken by the organization for measuring product qualit

tives of most of the analysis offices indicated that they are meeting the 

embodied in these criteria. Informal means for measuring analysis perform

counting products, meeting production schedules, regularly updating data

ing key consumer-oriented questions, and gauging performance based on “

Meeting Current Analytic Challenges 

Specific indicators of success that were quickly asserted by interview sub

the following:

1. Positive comments or lack of negative comments from consumers;

2. Evidence of consumer use of intelligence products;

3. Knowledge of the number of terrorist attacks averted;

4. A downward trend in the number of requests for information (RFI);

5. Evidence of improvement of analysts’ capabilities based on accumula

experience.

12DIA has begun serious promotion of collaborative intelligence production ac

intelligence agencies, military service intelligence production facilities and amon

mand Joint Intelligence Centers through the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture P

This program allows individual analysts from across the defense intelligence comm

find, access, and use trusted information of all types and classification, without know

or format, and to do their jobs easier, faster and better. JIVA provides a virtual, inte

ment for the development and exchange of responsive, tailored all-source Intellig

added analysis.
78

example, if consumers are satisfied with the analysts work, then they provi

feedback via any number of methods. The amount of positive feedback, howe

ally meager. Not surprisingly, a tendency exists for a dissatisfied consumer 

vocal. A lack of negative comments from consumers is therefore considered 

indicator of success. Consumers never want DIA to stop sending them daily 

products. Even if routine DIA assessments are only placeholders, the con

expresses a demand for the products because one article could change everyth

Whether the consumer uses the intelligence product is another indicator 

Analysts do need to know how many consumers read DIA products and find t

In actuality, a production office is only rarely able to gauge the use and impa

particular products, or the office’s overall production. Ideally, the office’s p

suited for use without modification, as formal or informal coordination is expe

tribute meaningfully to the production of each item. The concept of usability 

being able to measure whether information embodied in the office’s products 

able.” Measurement of actionability is never easy because often no recordab

required, and the producer faces the difficult task of determining whether the 

simply influenced the way a consumer views an important issue. No one from 

offices under study here claims to have an answer to this difficult issue.

Likewise, a great indicator of success would be the number of terrorist attac

It is rare, however, for DIA to learn about a terrorist cell whose members talk a

of terrorism, prepare the attack, and then stop as a result of DIA’s informing 

target or the larger public. With continued capabilities to collect information 

target’s knowledge, measurement of such occurrences is certainly fea

increased emphasis on collaborative counterterrorism analysis, some of the be

the Intelligence Community are now addressing this very problem.

DIA analysts often find themselves responding to formal Requests for I

(RFIs) from consumers. Another positive measurement standard, then, althou

rect one with the potential for unknown intervening variables, is a downward 

number of RFIs. Analysts do assume they are doing something right if the 

RFIs from active consumers are declining in number. Of course, if only a few 

up this measurement, then some means of weighting the breadth of the reque

be considered. Over the course of a year, however, the substantial number of R

allow the laws of probability to operate in support of attaching meaning to a 

significant decline in overall RFI numbers. Nevertheless, at least among the of

study, no such statistically based measurement is practiced. 

A different type of indicator of success is the level of improvement in an

given the accumulation of experience. An office’s SIO is in a good position to 

whether the analyst is making improvement. Comments from the SIOs conta

course of this study indicate that they examine the analyst’s work with a cri

determine whether the analyst is growing in the job. If it is determined that th

in fact getting better at doing analysis, then the SIO rewards the analyst with 
79

mance review. If however, the analyst does not show improvement in th

then the SIO working with the analyst and manager will attempt to diagno

and provide appropriate training to improve proficiency in doing analysis. 

One indicator of success that is not appropriate is that associated with a 

cast of events. One subject noted that one must be cautious in making such 

then watching to see if the projection is correct. Office representatives ob

approach does not constitute a good indicator of success because it may be 

track, as analysts have the opportunity to continually reshape their forecas

and professionals do not like the idea of being graded on their own judg

illustrate, one time an analyst wrote a paper on Kenya. The prediction w

would be stable over the next five years. In the third year, however, a dest

was attempted. The analyst had failed to account for a coup attempt, but 

failed, the analyst’s judgment was confirmed—he was correct. But were t

his product really successful?

A Standard Approach to Measuring Quality

No subject claimed to have plans to implement any kind of standard app

sure analytic quality. One subject said he was not opposed to some standard 

quality. He has not, however, seen a useful measure for it. In another office

publish in order to keep their database filled.” Little or no attention is gi

Either the product meets the requirement or it doesn’t. Another subject s

thought measuring analytic quality was a good idea, no one in his offic

Managers in his office, however, are examining ways to do things more ef

out destroying the office’s “can-do” ethos.

Comments

All of the subjects said they had no formal performance measurements, 

they employ informal means. To justify this situation, one subject said intel

sis is purely subjective. There are no numbers to count. If analysts meet th

schedule, then they are considered to be successful. If analysts get all of th

then they have met the minimum success requirement. If analysts get all 

done and they are also able to get ad hoc work done too, then they are co

successful. No one interviewed would accept the idea that there may exist 

tive measures of analytical success. 

Managers of intelligence analysis are ambivalent about managing for re

interested in demonstrating success, they are uneasy about being held a

poor organizational performance. There are severe problems in measuring p

practice: (1) problems in getting agreement on what good performance me

gence analysis; (2) intelligence analysis goals are unreasonable compared 

resources; (3) key performance indicators are unavailable or too costly to c

management is unwilling to make necessary changes to improve intelligenc
80

SIO is expected to contribute to an analysts performance evaluation. For ex

SIO might show the division chief examples of the analyst’s work and point 

good about it, what is a problem or an opportunity for improvement, and wheth

lyst has learned from experience. Office leaders appear to be most interested in 

products the analyst finished, even though this crude measure is not supplem

any method for independently weighting the relative value of those products.

One subject noted that his office does track certain indicators of quali

whether the consumer liked the product. A subsidiary indicator lies in e

whether the consumer responded to the product. Did anyone else want a copy 

uct? Some have developed a measure of the significance of the problems th

For example, an imminent terrorism problem, compared to a future militar

problem is more significant and would fit on of the high end of their measure

The SIO or division chief for this office would maintain a matrix of product

and subject. 

One subject prefers using the term “gauge” instead of “measure” because 

assumes some sort of reasoned technique. Often, there is a bit of a “gut che

office with respect to how well managers perceive their office to be meeting 

Most of the measurement comes in the form of ad hoc consumer feedback. A 

cuted mission, like a successful noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) f

tells the office that they are doing a good job.

Summary

Informal means for measuring analysis performance included counting 

meeting production schedule, updating databases, answering key consum

questions, and gauging performance based on perception. Two common ways 

to know if they are meeting their consumer’s needs are by a lack of negative fe

by an increase in product use. Our subjects do not keep track of forecast accura

it is too difficult to track. Instead analysts individually keep a mental check

forecasts they make and how the situation developed over time. Although n

subjects planned to implement any standard approach to measure analytic qu

near future, they continue to examine ways to do analysis more effective

destroying their organization’s “can do” ethos.

PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

The people and resources category offers criteria to examine the knowledge

experiences of the analysts and the availability of analysts’ tools. Leaders can i

quality of a product by promoting greater expertise among the intelligence a

by inducing analysts to take advantage of information found in open sources. 

jects said they need analysts who think across interdisciplinary boundaries and 

analysts who have military operations experience.
81

office was gaining personnel resources quickly because their issue is very 

recent past, the boss would train the new analysts. Today, however, the 

grown so rapidly finds that even the bosses are all new. They appear to 

training program targeted at the office level, rather than merely at individua

office whose personnel resources were static considered itself successful be

meeting their requirements. They could be better if they had better tools an

few more people in the office. They note that static personnel resourcing m

successful than they could be, but not unsuccessful. Another office claime

staffed. To make matters worse, they suggest that they have the “wrong” p

agement positions. Even within the small sample of offices in this study, t

some examples of high-interest areas where analysts whose experience ha

in other functional areas are now “parked” pending retirement. This is clear

agement practice. It is the result of an archaic government personnel syste

mon practice throughout government.

Knowledge, Skills, and Experience

According to representatives of the five offices in DIA, analysts bring 

develop certain skills to help them perform their analysis and at the same t

develop an awareness of how certain analytic pitfalls may influence their w

lytic skills include: (1) technical or topical expertise; (2) knowledge of the t

and analytic techniques; (3) ability to search and organize data; (4) ability 

data or use inductive reasoning; and (5) ability to express ideas. The an

include: (1) personal biases or inexperience; (2) lack of data or access to d

the wrong question;14 (4) misunderstanding data; (5) flaws in logic; (6) no r

uation process; (7) denial and deception by the target; (8) politicization or 

ity; (9) groupthink; and (10) mirror imaging.

A synthesis of interviews conducted for this study suggests that analyst

how to think across disciplinary boundaries. As a general rule, analysts d

think across disciplinary boundaries in school. One subject suggested that 

take (remedial) philosophy courses in order to learn how to think acro

boundaries. Another subject suggested that cross-disciplinary education con

13 Joint Military Intelligence Training Center courses are designed for studen

experience or have limited previous experience in intelligence at the joint, combi

levels and have job-related requirements for knowledge of intelligence at the natio

levels.

14The problem of asking the wrong, or the right, question is especially notice

analysis, the type of analysis produced by DIA in support of the Chairman of t

National Command Authorities. This problem has been addressed succinctly and w

Patrick J. Haney, “Soccer Fields and Submarines in Cuba: The Politics of Probl

Naval War College Review 50, no. 4 (Augumn 1997): 67-84.
82

nomics. These people also had computer skills, and 5 to 25 years of intelligen

experience each. One subject added that the people in their office who s

employment in the 1980s had fewer computer skills, but knew more about th

matter. Younger people tend to be gifted at using digits to display informa

elders claim that they lack the skills necessary to infuse meaning into the disp

One subject said they have area specialists, social scientists, former military 

former law enforcement agents, active-duty military professionals, and rese

long active-duty backgrounds. They like having an office filled with people w

different perspectives. They have senior people with lots of experience. Then th

drop-off in experience among the lower level staff members. One problem 

voiced is that new hires top out in four years at the GS-13 level, then they ha

out of the office to continue advancing in their career. A consensus exists am

managers that any office struggles to maintain their analysis capability as peop

better jobs for promotion. Having people who are career intelligence officers, e

they also possess a military operations background, is commonly cited as a ke

ity staff.

Tools

Subjects of this study reported using a variety of common tools to accom

missions. These tools included: 

■ COLISEUM (Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and 

an intelligence production requirements database);

■ JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System--featuring I

Community’s finished intelligence database), Websafe (a message handli

and VTC (Video Teleconferencing) to communicate with consumers;

■ SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network);

■ OSIS (Open Source Information System), and NIPRNet (Non-classified In

tocol Router Network);

■ DITDS (Defense Intelligence Threat Data System);

■ DIA and DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System) e-mail. 

Analysts use a variety of techniques and tools to produce intelligence. 

include pattern analysis, systems analysis, quantitative analysis, modeling, an

reasoning. Analysts use tools specific to their form of analysis. These tools 

following:

■ The Analyst’s Notebook, featuring visual investigative analysis software 

analysts by uncovering, interpreting, and displaying complex informatio

understood chart form. It includes a link notebook for link analysis and a 

book for time-event analysis.

■ Hugin Expert is artificial intelligence software based on Bayesian analysi

analysis is a compact model for representing reasoning under uncertainty.
83

tem) is a core set of application tools for organizing and analyzing geo

mation. ArcView includes powerful visualization tools to create maps.

Summary

Analysts need to be able to think across interdisciplinary boundaries and 

operations experience. Senior analysts tend to be subject matter experts. N

however, tend to be more computer literate. Our subjects liked having staffs 

mix of experiences. They recommended tools such as the analyst’s notebo

tures time-event analysis and link-analysis; Hugin Expert which features 

work analysis; and ESRI GIS which contains ARC-View. They also 

intelligence-related classified databases and other open sources.

PROCESS MANAGEMENT

Process management criteria apply to information handling, intelligence 

collaboration. Processes associated with the dissemination of informatio

gence are beyond the scope of this study, but in this area, the advent of onli

and the loosening of “need to know” rules governing access to sensitive inf

relieved some classic dissemination bottlenecks.15 Good analysts are com

terized by DIA officials as “focused freethinkers.” Other commonly ackno

ims are that the analysis process is a highly competitive process, and that a

be first to publish vital intelligence findings. At the same time, analys

together by collaborating with other analysts to ensure accuracy.

None of our subjects said they observed a formal or structured process in 

gence analysis. One subject summed up this approach as simply “sitting do

to work.” A second subject claimed to use an informal and semi-structured

process. In this mode, the analyst first has an idea related to their “account.

with their team chief the problem they are interested in solving. If they g

then they do the research. Another subject added that, likewise, he does not 

wired” approach, yet applies a routine to the process. One subject said h

process that only remains in the mind of each of the office’s analysts. It is, 

tion of this subject, an application of the scientific method or at least a disci

process. In this scheme, managers give the analyst a problem, and the 

research to determine what they have and what they need. If there is time, 

request collection of certain data. The analyst reviews the data and answer

Sometimes, the analyst will get feedback (either good job or please do bet

Typically across the offices examined here, there is no standardized way 

15Modification of the “need to know” principle as it applies to information sy

accompanied by the use of effective counterintelligence tools that allow detailed tra

taken by individual analysts in the handling of sensitive information. 
84

leaders that they try to encourage outofthebox thinking.

Information Handling

Analysts do their own fieldwork to gather any information beyond that fro

available, written sources. One SIO emphasized that his analysts “gather” i

they do not “collect” it. For example, they do not have diplomatic immunity 

are visiting other countries; they must get specific permission from the co

there. Standard Community information is derived from imagery, sign

resources, “open” sources, and other technical means. The kind of informatio

lysts use is problem-dependent. They may use operations-support products su

imagery, and target materials. Some analysts tend to use information from the 

which they feel most comfortable. For example, some like using signals infor

rely solely on it. Office leaders typically try to accustom analysts to usin

sources of information including the Internet. 

Analysts report that they try to lay down the steps of their analysis in a logic

example, they use several paths to move from general information to more sp

mation. Some analysts write their papers as if they were doing research in 

school. Others write products that look like newspaper articles. Analysts ten

their sources in a manner similar to the way newspaper reporters protect the 

their sources. They use a general description to protect the identity of the info

example, a writer may attribute a quote to a high level authority in a specific D

zation such as the Pentagon. The reader may judge for him or herself whether 

is reliable, but is unable to precisely identify the source. 

Intelligence Analysis Process

The analysis process includes (1) problem identification; (2) data gathering

sis, synthesis, collaboration, and examination of alternative propositions using 

of data; and (4) direct support to consumers with briefings and publications. 

analysts make an assessment of what the data probably mean or what the 

mean. General Colin Powell (USA, Ret.) sums up his expectations as a consum

ligence in this way: “Tell me what you know, what you don’t know, and what y

in that order.” In this oft-quoted dictum, he suggests that analysts can best con

known about the problem, evaluate the completeness of their knowledge, and 

meaning. It remains unclear whether the same guidance is as suitable for writt

as for oral briefings. In the course of analysis, whether presented in written or 

it is important for the analyst to answer for himself certain key questions:

1. What do you know about the issue?

2. What is a logical, sequential way to present the facts?

3. What conclusions or implications can be drawn from these facts?
85

of their team. Nonetheless, when the corporate analysis process works a

the teams contribute to the analyst’s final product and, as a result, the anal

superior product. Managers do want analysts to exchange information w

They have a distaste for competition among analysts. The analysts’ rationa

widespread coordination is that they consider themselves subject matter exp

Beyond the thicket of coordination and collaboration, the analysis pro

tough to execute when the office finds that several consumers demand a

once. When this occurs, the office’s cradle-to-grave, face-to-face, and surg

cess becomes overwhelmed. One subject acknowledged that the tension b

and lower echelon consumers and the tension between two or more concurr

cies gave them the most concern. Consumers typically ask the office’s leade

when they believe the office is not meeting their requirements. As a result, t

expect to have to shift priorities and perform many tasks under a great deal 

Collaboration and Competition

Collaboration. If analysts choose not to collaborate with other Comm

then the SIO may force them to do so during the coordination and review pr

ers want analysts to verify the validity of all of their information in a man

the way that they feel compelled to check and verify human-resource info

also need to confirm source reliability, be able to articulate the method they 

the information, and to confirm the information’s contextual accuracy. 

Competition. Collaboration among intelligence analysts is always a pro

analysts, like many school children, tend to be competitive with each other. 

edged lack of coordination within DIA is not a new or exceptional phen

analysts may not know who to talk to on a particular subject or where to g

information. A more senior mentor or manager can usually provide the ana

kind of information, but the exchange of information between analysts do

happen in the unsupervised work environment. Analysts are very competi

office and especially with other agencies in the IC. There is a strong desire t

a tendency that inhibits full disclosure to competing analysts. Other intellig

usually have more resources than DIA and can report an item more quic

From another perspective, one subject reflected on how analysis was do

many years ago. He said CIA analysts would initiate collaboration when 

had occasional meetings to share information. They had mixed luck with p

to their organization. Academics sometimes refused to talk to them. One ti

sador was reluctant to talk with them. Overall, he concludes that there was 

laboration “back then.” He provided two examples: 

First, all cross-office work was called “collaboration-by-staple.” One 

write the first half of the paper and the other person from a different office 

ond half. A person from a neutral third office would edit the entire paper. Th
86

have made it easier for the analysts to bounce ideas off of each other an

assumptions. Back then, everything was much more competitive even than tod

Second, message traffic came into the office mainly in paper format, rath

electronic format of today. One clever analyst would come into the office each 

earlier than anyone else. He would review the message traffic, take the good 

then produce analysis on interesting topics that he would present later in the 

his office leaders. Others in the office would be left to report on the remainin

traffic that was less interesting. In this subject’s view, the office leaders unfor

this go on without intervention.

Summary

Good analysts are “focused freethinkers.” Nevertheless, “out-of-the-box”-ty

needs to be tempered by using an informal, disciplined thought process and co

with other analysts The scientific method is a streamlined process that ensures 

doesn’t wander too far. Use of information is problem-dependent. There is, how

eral consensus among our subjects that analysts should use everything they c

hands on. Analysts also need to assess the reliability of their sources and at the 

protect the identity of sensitive sources. Collaboration tends to vary by organiza

issue. Collaboration tends to be better between analysts within DIA than betwe

from different parent organizations such as between CIA and DIA. There te

competitive nature among analysts to be the first to publish their product.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

The mission accomplishment category examines the analyst’s definition 

and proceeds to secure an estimate of the percentage of time analysts belie

successful. 

Definition of Success

All of our subjects agreed that success is a difficult concept to define. Our s

however, agree that it might be possible. First, success is positive feedback fro

ers. If they do not provide explicit positive feedback, then the analysis shop c

indirect indicators. For example, if the consumers keep coming back for mo

then analysts consider their products successful. Another informal way of mea

cess was to count complaints.

Second, an intelligence analysis success occurs when a unit that is known to 

DIA products completes its military operation successfully. If, however, ther

life during a mission, then the analysts are greatly disturbed. Their product m

some way contributed to the lack of success for the military operation.
87

developments indicate that the topic focus is perceived as interesting by 

ship. One subject labeled this type of success as “bureaucratic success.”

Fourth, success to some analysts means that evidence indicates that th

look at things in the open sources and link them in ways others could not 

analyst would observe a situation, notice a trend, and take a position on a to

following descriptions are examples of good analysis written during the 19

■ The analyst’s bosses didn’t want a paper on the future of Lebanon wri

was a tough issue. When the analyst completed the paper, the director 

wanted to see it. The bosses fought among themselves to see who would 

After reading it, the director wanted 20 copies to give to the Secretary o

■ An analyst identified a high level of tension among the cultural groups l

slavia. The analyst reasoned that strong suppression was holding the

check. When Tito dies, the analyst warned, “Look Out!” This example 

estimative studies should not be dismissed out of hand.16

■ An analyst identified problems in African cities because of a certain mix 

ing there. The paper predicted that similar problems would happen in 

suburbs began to get the same mix of people. As it turned out, the analys

Fifth, a representative from one office defined success as a function of te

If no terrorist attacks happened, then they would consider themselves suc

ever, terrorist attacks could potentially happen anytime, and if one happens

would consider itself unsuccessful. 

Sixth, analysts in general put out a lot of paper and products in supp

“force protection,” and to support the senior intelligence officers (J-2s) of t

the Unified Commands. DIA analysts consider themselves successful if th

change their behavior by doing things differently as a result of information 

Percent Successful

Study subjects clearly struggled to answer the question of how often the

ful. One subject said he had no answer: “Sometimes you will never know 

you were successful.” He could confirm in any given case that no negative 

come from stakeholders, yet he could not be sure that the consumers co

products successful. One subject said success for his office was at 90 perc

he could not elaborate.

16Perhaps the clearest exposition of how estimative intelligence can be accompli

discourage the work’s being easily dismissed is provided by Isaac Ben-Israel in “

Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process,” Intelligence and Nat

no. 4 (October 1989): 660-718.
88

rion for success was to go beyond the status quo, to clearly articulate views 

sumers, and to establish a feedback loop on utility of products. He admitted th

readily accepted measure and no guidance concerning success. One way for a

be successful was to get his work published. At least that would get his boss o

for a certain amount of time! Still another subject said all products were in 

successful. To be successful, he continued, it is important for someone to look 

ucts. One possible way to measure success is to count the number of electron

particular document on a database. If consumers are asking questions, then a

feel they are being helpful. An informal summary metric, then, is the measure 

tion flow out of the office.

Summary 

Intelligence analysis supports DoD organizations and warfighter operation

success is positive feedback from consumers or a successful completion of mi

ations. Bureaucratic success, on the other hand, results in more money to spen

analysts to do the job. Analysts consider themselves successful if their 

changed their behavior based on the information they provided to them. For ex

cessful analysts warn unit commanders of a possible terrorist attack and as a re

work, the commander takes the appropriate steps to improve unit force protect

STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE ANAL

“What is good intelligence analysis?” 

Good or useful intelligence analysis may be best defined by its opposite. 

gence does not specify what the threat is or how it will manifest itself. For ex

analyst may conclude there will be a 50 percent chance of a chemical wea

against the U.S. in the next 10 years. That conclusion is not meaningful or help

ners and users of intelligence.17 In another example, the analyst may conclu

ports are dangerous to U.S. ships. This analysis is impractical because ships 

ports occasionally.

In positive terms, good intelligence analysis enlightens commanders or co

doesn’t necessarily have formal probabilities. Instead it communicates to the c

some level of likelihood. For example, if the commander implements plan X

rorist group in this location is likely to react in the following manner. This inf

17Richards Heuer, 155, reproduces a table illustrating the different numerical prob

intelligence analysts and consumers associate with common word descriptions of pro

message is that neither form of presentation expresses probability in a reliable fashio

appeared originally in Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimated Probability,” in Donald P

Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (CIA: Center for 

Intelligence, 1994), 133-137. 
89

based on the analysis. It enlightens the commander of the current situation

gence analysis takes a position on an issue. Some current intelligence prod

anything of substance because they use normative words such as “wo

“should,” “will likely,” “might, “may,” and “can be.” These products have li

the consumer. A remaining question is “How can intelligence products be m

ful?”

Good analysts use quantitative data when appropriate. Over time there h

in the use of statistics in intelligence products. One subject observed that m

analysts rarely used statistics in their analysis. Then, some analysts used 

they didn’t write about it in their papers. He recognized statements made in 

would require use of a certain structured technique. He would call the autho

about the technique. Usually, he was right. The author(s) had used the tech

while, some authors put the data in the appendix of their paper so others m

their work. Then, analysts began to put their statistical analysis in the text p

papers. These products became more like academic research papers than th

the past. Analysts tend to respond favorably to any form of rigor in intellige

Richard K. Betts says intelligence failures are most often caused by d

who consume the products of intelligence service. The use of intelligence d

the bureaucracy than on intellect. Therefore, one can only get modest im

altering the analytic system.18 Jay T. Young, on the other hand, sees barriers 

tive analysis that could be corrected by managerial, personnel, and traini

believes that an overhaul of the U.S. intelligence community’s analysis effo

its effectiveness while reducing its overall size and cost.19

In government work, the applied nature of intelligence production would 

the opportunity to develop and apply consistent measures of productivity an

because the products are indeed used by specific consumers. If this is true

room to bring “operations research” into play as well as the Baldrige crite

age the development and collection of carefully codified, surrogate measu

tivity and quality. Successful use of these tools does not remove from th

task of decisionmaking but rather it requires of him or her rather different 

sions. In other words, using operations research tools provides manag

insight into their particular subject and hence leads them into much mor

fruitful areas. Consultants with scholarly backgrounds could come into th

analysis work environment and make vast improvement to the intelligence 

bility using such tools to assist them, in the author’s opinion. 

18Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures 

World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61-89

19 Jay T. Young, “US Intelligence Assessment in a Changing World: The Nee

Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 2 (April 1993): 125-1390
90

Our subjects offered the following questions for future study:

1. Does DIA prepare analysts for their work by acquainting them with the 

lytic tools? Does DIA provide adequate analysis training?

2. What are the implications of the substantial difference between the id

doing analysis and the way DIA analysts actually do it? For example, data are 

tradictory and vague. They do not point in any particular direction. Yet the ana

he must draw conclusions at the end of the study. Can anyone conclude any

such data? 

3. If you could have any tool (real or imaginary) to help do your analysis b

would that tool be? For example, some people like having fancy graphics in t

or as part of their analysis. 

4. What attitudes characterize DIA analysts? Do DIA analysts have a tend

more receptive to collaboration, or more competitive than government analy

agencies? 

NOT AN END, BUT A BEGINNING

This report does not represent the end of the intelligence analysis benchmar

rather it creates a platform for a wide range of beginnings. The approaches i

this report will come to life by being shared, debated, and implemented in the 

Department of Defense and Intelligence Community realities. Then, where a

they may be used and expanded upon. Intelligence analysts throughout the 

community can establish their own analysis networks and working groups to 

own best practices and lessons learned with each other.

Benchmark

123

1. Does your office leadership support analysis process? Y/N Y Y 

Usually leader assigns tasks Y Y

Usually analysts perform self-generated tasks Y Y 

Analysts usually respond to crises Y 

Little or no interaction during analysis process Y Y 

Some interaction if asked Y 

Tend to put products on electronic media Y Y

Tend to put products in many different forms Y 

Formal feedback and coordination process at end Y Y Y 

Informal feedback prior to finished product 

2. Does your office have a written strategic plan? NNN

Able to meet future capability challenges N Y Y 

Able to meet future issues challenges N Y Y 

Recorded lessons learned N N Y/
91

Responses to Interview Questions, by Office.

Use academic or professional sources YY

3. Do your consumers support the analysis process? Y/N Y 

Requirements through COLISEUM & phone calls YY

Little or no interaction during the analysis process Y 

Some informal interaction if appropriate Y 

Electronic publications and/or hard copies Y Y 

Use multiple methods to market products 

Little or no formal feedback Y Y 

4. Do you measure your analysis performance? NN

Lack of negative feedback from consumers 

Consumers find product useful 

Analysts show improvement over time Y

Don’t track forecast accuracy 

Use or plan to use standard metrics NN

5. Do you have the right people and resources? Y/N Y 

Need to think across interdisciplinary boundaries Y

Need balance between computer skills & being SME Y 

Need diverse mix of experiences 

Need military operations experiences 

Want analysts to develop and use toolbox Y Y 

6. Do you have a formal process for doing analysis? NN

Does informal process inhibit good analysis? Y Y/N 

Use all information you can get Y

Use creativity to make-up for resource shortages Y

Use open-source data more Y Y 

Information use is problem dependent 

Assess reliability of sources 

Do your analysts collaborate with other analysts? N Y/N 

7. Does your office make a positive contribution? YY

Use consumer feedback Y 

Contribute to mission accomplishment Y 

Expand budget and grow workforce Y

Consumer changes behavior based on analysis 

Successful most of time YY

12
92

author constructed the matrix after the interviews took place. All of the respon

gle column are directly related back to a specific interviewee. If the respondent 

a specific item in his response and indicated yes or no to that item, then that 

recorded on the line related to that item in the matrix. If the box is blank, then 

dent did not refer to that item in his response. In other words, the author is unc

the respondent would say concerning the item in the matrix. The interviewer 

subject the first question in the series of items directly. As a result, each box 

question in the series of items is complete. No item in the matrix has a compl

line because someone had to refer to the item in his response in order to get the 

in the matrix. The matrix provides a frequency count of items mentioned in 

the topic being discussed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Betts, Richard. “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 

World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61-89.

Brei, William S. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure. 

Paper Number Two. Washington, DC: JMIC, January 1996.

Clark, Robert M., Intelligence Analysis: Estimation and Prediction. Balti

American Literary Press, 1996. 

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periment in Applying Structured Methods. Occasional Paper Number Se

ington, DC: JMIC, January 2000.

Heuer, Richards J., Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC

the Study of Intelligence, 1999.

Hogarth, Robin. Judgement and Choice, John Wiley, 1987.

Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Prin

Princeton University Press, 1977.

Jones, Morgan. The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem So

York: Random House, Inc., 1995.

Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1

Krizan, Lisa. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. Occasional Paper Number 

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Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.

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Platt, John R. “Strong Inference,” Science 146, no. 3642 (16 October 1964)

Russo, J. Edward, and Paul J. H. Shoemaker. Decision Traps: Ten Barrie

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David T. Moore is a senior technical leader at the National Security Agen

18 years of Intelligence Community service he has completed a variety of ass

the Washington, DC area and overseas. These assignments enabled Mr. Mo

credentials in technical communications analysis, intelligence analysis, and 

research. He has created and taught intelligence analysis courses for NSA

Cryptological School as well as for other government agencies. His most rec

ment was in the Art and Science of Analysis organization where his work 

improving methodologies for intelligence analysis. He holds a B.A. in sociol

pology from Washington and Lee University and an M.S. in Strategic Intelli

the Joint Military Intelligence College. 

Lisa Krizan is a senior technical leader at the National Security Agen

described “intelligence brat,’’ she was introduced to the field by her father, C

Montecino, Jr., USAF, retired. Through diverse experience in intelligence s

production assignments, Ms. Krizan has earned credentials in technical comm

analysis, intelligence research, and foreign language analysis, and has created 

intelligence analysis courses for the National Cryptologic School. She rece

degree in Business and Management from the University of Maryland and 

Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College. Her mas

“Benchmarking the Intelligence Process for the Private Sector’’ was the result 

ing her studies in best business practices with her Intelligence Community wor

zan is also the author of Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, published in Ju

the JMIC as Occasional Paper Number Six. 

Mr. Moore and Ms. Krizan’s current work on core competencies arose from 

tinuing advocacy for best practices in intelligence analysis, as members of 

Science of Analysis organization.
95

ANALYSIS AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AG

David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan

Seekers of Wisdom first need sound intelligence.

— He

What makes an intelligence analyst successful in the profession? This que

the heart of the National Foreign Intelligence Community’s mission to prov

information to national leaders and decisionmakers. The imperative to answe

stems from two types of pressures, external and internal. Externally, the com

cies face a world that demands responsiveness, agility, and flexibility. 2 Inter

charged with transforming outdated Cold War organizational structure, menta

ods. 3 This paper argues that, at least at the National Security Agency, identif

lytic competencies that can be translated into managerial strategies is the 

ensure that intelligence analysts are successful. 

As a member of the Intelligence Community (IC), the National Se

(NSA) is now pursuing an ambitious campaign to modernize its intelligen

mission and to mold its workforce accordingly.4 Part of the modernization 

new organizational model that places all intelligence analysts under the 

analytic deployment service. In this paradigm, individual analysts are assig

production lines based on the capabilities of the former and the needs of th

ever, for this model to work, staffers need to know what assets the analys

force possess. Similarly, when intelligence agencies use precious few hiring 

bring in new intelligence analysts, they must maximize those opportunities

qualified personnel. But what is a qualified intelligence analyst? 

1 From Brooks Haxton, translator, Fragments, the Collected Wisdom of Heracl

Penguin, 2001), 33.

2 John Gannon and others, National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 20

About the Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington DC: National Fore

Board, 2000), 41, URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/; h

National Intelligence Council. For other views of security threats to America 

Johnson, Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America’s Quest for 

York: New York University Press, 2000); and Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Ana

the Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000).

3 George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 5,” 9 May 2001

instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive review 

gence. The order gives the DCI a broad mandate to “challenge the status quo.” 

4 See URL: http://www.nsa.gov/releases/nsa_new_enterprise_team_recom

1 October 1999, 16, accessed 3 November 2001. In this document, it is implicit th

NSA recognizes that the agency’s responsibility for the “production of signals intell

beyond “technical analysis of data” to “all-source” analysis of the context and impl

data, especially but not exclusively for use within the agency itself. 
96

analysis, shown in the figure below, which provides a starting point for answe

mental questions about the nature of ideal intelligence professionals, and ho

who share these ideals can go about doing their work. Keeping in mind th

nature of the threats to U.S. national security, we argue that the strategy fo

intelligence analysts and for carrying out intelligence production must becom

orous to keep pace with 21st Century foes, and to defeat them. 

Functional core competencies for intelligence analysis..

The authors began exploring the art and science of intelligence analy

agency as part of a corporate initiative to add rigor to its analytic practice. 

presented here on analytic thinking, its associated culture and process

related technologies reflect conversations with intelligence experts both 

outside of government, and observation of analysts considered by their p

successful. We realized that definitions and descriptions of common char

skills, knowledge, and abilities required for successful intelligence analysis 

ing, not only within our own agency but across the field of intelligence. We 

a set of functional core competencies for intelligence analysis that seem 

across the intelligence profession in the government setting, not just for t

analysis done at NSA. Our work has been reviewed by personnel in our age

as by individuals outside government, including academic experts on intell
97

core competencies.

Sherman Kent, who helped shape the national peacetime intelligenc

argues that intelligence requires its own literature. According to Kent, a k

this literature is to advance the discipline of intelligence. Kent believed “[a

discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrin

fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity.”6 Through t

of articles on analysis and subsequent discussion, “original synthesis of al

before” occurs.7 In keeping with Kent’s mandate to develop an intelligence 

provokes discussion and further methodological development, we seek com

ther discussion among scholars of intelligence studies. 

DEFINITIONS AND CONTEXT

Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understoo

of policymakers.... All intelligence is information; not all inform

intelligence.

— Mark Low

Intelligence is timely, actionable information that helps policymakers, de

and military leaders perform their national security functions. The intellig

itself depends on professional competencies, what John Gannon, former C

National Intelligence Council, refers to as “skills and expertise.” He n

means people—people in whom we will need to invest more to deal wit

complex challenges we face over the next generation.”9 Analysis is the pro

5 The authors wish to acknowledge individuals within the Department of Def

lenged our ideas and critiqued our work. Thanks also are due to James Holden-Rh

of New Mexico; Robert Heibel, Mercyhurst College; Hugo Keesing, Joint Milit

Training Center; Marilyn Peterson, Financial Analysis Coordinator, New Jersey Di

nal Justice; Adam Pode, formerly of Mercyhurst College; Robert David Steele, CE

Solutions; and Russell Swenson, Joint Military Intelligence College. Colleagues in 

Generic Intelligence Training Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

also provided valuable comments.

6 Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays, Donal

(Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 

7 See Sherman Kent, “The Need for an Intelligence Literature,” Studies in Intel

1955 (reprinted in Studies in Intelligence, 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Washi

ernment Printing Office, 2001), 1-11.

8 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: C

1-2.
98

effective persuasion, or, less pointedly, estimation.It does so by breaking 

problems into a number of smaller ones, involving “close examination of relat

information to determine the extent to which they confirm, supplement, or con

other and thus to establish probabilities and relationships.”11

Since the advent of the Information Age, “[collecting] information is less o

and verifying is more of one.”12 Thus the role of analysis becomes more vital a

of information available to consumers from every type of source, proven and 

multiplies exponentially. Intelligence analysts are more than merely another 

source, more than collectors and couriers of information to consumers. Further, 

[the] images that are sometimes evoked of policymakers surfing the 

themselves, in direct touch with their own information sources, are very 

leading. Most of the time, as [policymakers’] access to information m

plies, their need for processing, if not analysis, will go up. If collecti

easier, selection will be harder.13

At its best, the results of intelligence analysis provide just the right informat

ting national leaders “to make wise decisions—all presented with accuracy, 

and clarity.”14 The intelligence provided must “contain hard-hitting, focused an

vant to current policy issues....Therefore, analysis of raw information has the m

on the decisionmaker and [therefore] producing high-quality analytical produc

the highest priority for intelligence agencies.”15

Intelligence is judged, then, on its usefulness. But what criteria define “use

Kovacs asserts that useful intelligence makes a “difference” to policymakers.1

also an expectation that intelligence should be unbiased, although analysts wi

9 Director of Central Intelligence National Security Advisory Panel, Strategic Inve

for Intelligence Community Analysis (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/unclass_sip/index.html, 11, accessed 29 Septembe

10Lisa Krizan, Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, Joint Military College Occa

Number Six (Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1999), 29.

11R. H. Mathams, “The Intelligence Analyst’s Notebook,” in Strategic Intelligence

Application, 2d. ed. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, eds. (Washington, D

itary Intelligence Training Center, 1995), 88.

12 R. H. Mathams, 88.

13R. H. Mathams, 88; Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence Fo

Information (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10.

14Loch K. Johnson, “Analysis for a New Age,” Intelligence and National Secur

(October 1996): 658.

15Kevin P. Stack, “Competitive Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 13

ter 1998): 194.
99

as Michael Turner points out, analysts from below now join senior govern

in “setting the analytical agenda.”18 All policymakers and their subordina

reject intelligence findings, no matter how persuasively argued they may be

To say that policymakers may dismiss intelligence that doesn’t suppor

positions and policy objectives is to tell only half the story. There may 

reasons why policymakers do not accept intelligence. Gregory Treverton

Chair of the National Intelligence Council, indicates that intelligence is 

when it brings inconvenient news and when it offers nothing new. In wri

U.S. policy failures of the first Bush administration during the Balkan cr

wonders, “If, in retrospect, the intelligence seems on the mark, did the 

derive from intelligence unheeded, or was the intelligence heeded but eith

not really actionable?”19

Treverton adds that intelligence must anticipate the needs of policy. “By 

icy knows what it needs to know, it is usually too late for intelligence to resp

oping new sources or cranking up its analytic capacity.”20 A former policym

he asserts that intelligence is useful to policy at three stages during the life 

■ If the policymakers are prescient, when the issue is just beginning; ho

likely to be little intelligence on the issue at that point.

■ When the issue is “ripe for decision.” Here policymakers want intelligen

alternatives to be considered; however, intelligence often is only able to 

ground information necessary for understanding the issue.

■ When the policymakers have made up their minds on the issue, but only 

supports their view. They will be uninterested or even hostile when it do

their view.21

These limitations notwithstanding, Treverton suggests that policymakers c

establish a symbiotic relationship with the intelligence analysts who advise 

[If] you call them in, face to face, they will understand how much yo

and you’ll have a chance to calibrate them. You’ll learn more in fifte

utes than you’d have imagined. And you’ll also begin to target those 

to your concerns and your sense of the issue.22

16Amos Kovacs, “Using Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 12, 

1997): 148. 17Lowenthal, 4.

18Michael A. Turner, “Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence,” Intern

of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 314.

19Treverton, 178.

20Treverton, 179.

21Treverton, 183-185.
100

tionship, Sherman Kent asserts

[intelligence] performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doe

generally well informed; its job is to stand behind them with a book op

at the right page to call their attention to the stubborn fact they ma

neglecting, and—at their request—to analyze alternative courses wi

indicating choice.23

In Kent’s view, the intelligence analyst is required to ensure, tenaciously, 

makers view those “right” pages, even when they may not wish to do so. 

MEASURING SUCCESS IN INTELLIGENCE ANALY

Intelligence must be measured to be valued, so let us take the initiativ

ask our management, [and] the users, to evaluate us and our products.

— Jan P. Herr

Any observer can expect that a successful intelligence analyst will have 

sonal characteristics that tend to foster dedication to the work and quality of re

an analyst will also have specific abilities, skills, and knowledge to perform 

work. Finally such an analyst will have productive relationships with consume

can success in intelligence analysis be measured?

Measures of success have been based on job performance, including n

reports issued; volumes of raw data processed; or degree of consumer reliance 

isfaction with, products or services. However, these are measurements of out

one facet of success. When analysis follows a rigorous process that allows an 

“add value” to information, and that results in timely, actionable intelligence u

sumers, then it may be judged successful. Thus, an assessment of success m

by balancing measures of two basic criteria: intelligence process (processing 

value to information) and intelligence product (meeting consumer needs). As 

the figure below, each can keep the other in balance, curbing any tendency tow

sis paralysis”25 on one side, and countering an assembly-line mindset on the o

22Treverton, 191.

23Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princ

sity Press, 1949), 182.

24 Jan P. Herring, Measuring the Effectiveness of Competitive Intelligence: Assessin

municating CI’s Value to Your Organization (Alexandria, VA: Society of Competitive 

Professionals, 1996), 63.
101

An intelligence evaluation scheme.

Intelligence Process

Successful intelligence analysis is a holistic process involving both “

ence.” Intuitive abilities, inherent aptitudes, rigorously applied skills, and ac

edge together enable analysts to work problems in a multidimensional m

avoiding the pitfalls of both scientism and adventurism. The former occur

tific methodology is excessively relied upon to reveal the “truth”; the latte

“inspiration [is] unsupported by rigorous analysis.”26

25One potential pitfall of the analytic profession is the tendency to pursue anal

sake, continually seeking more information, becoming locked into analysis and faili

clusions. Rigorous methodology that emphasizes adding value to information and m

able for a specific consumer can break the cycle of such paralysis.

26Steven R. Mann, “Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought,” Parameters 22, 

1992): 67. Quoted in MSgt Robert D. Folker, Jr., Intelligence Analysis in Theater J

Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods, Occasional Paper Numbe

ington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2000), 13.
102

intelligenceproducing agency and especially between intelligence agencies. 

tendency for analysts working together to develop a common mindset. This 

typically when analysts fail to question their assumptions about their role in 

gence process and about the target. The Council on Foreign Relations’ indep

force on the future of U.S. intelligence recommends that “competitive or redun

sis be encouraged” precisely for these reasons.27

Successful analysis adds value—to the information itself, to institutional 

to fellow intelligence professionals, to the process, and to the institution or un

terms of reputation and the degree to which good analytic practices end

changes in target, consumer, and personnel. Successful analysts are those w

whenever possible goes to the level of making judgments or estimating. Th

risks in doing so are carefully calculated, for successful analysts rely on critic

Nor do successful analysts settle for the first answer their analysis reveals. R

employ rigorous methods to push beyond the obvious conclusions. However, 

toward arrogance in trend-spotting analysis are tempered by self-awareness of 

assumptions, strengths and weaknesses. And most importantly, successful anal

orate at every opportunity. Such measures ensure that analytic results, even if 

sial, remain grounded in reality.

What role does management play in ensuring analytic success? First an

management effectively uses financial and political capital to ensure that an

access to consumers, and to the resources they require to answer those consum

gence needs. This includes the organization of the work itself, allocation of m

personnel, and coordination with consumers and other producers. When man

successful, the analyst has the necessary tools and the correct information for 

intelligence analysis. Good morale among analytic personnel becomes an i

effective management. A good understanding of the unit’s mission and the an

satisfaction with his or her performance naturally produces a feeling of empow

a belief that the organization places great value on analytic talent. 

Intelligence Product

The products of successful analysis convey intelligence that meets or ant

consumer’s needs; these products reveal analytic conclusions, not the metho

derive them. Intelligence products are successful if they arm the decisionma

maker or military leader with the information and context—the answers—nee

on his or her playing field. Such intelligence enables consumers to be more e

making them smarter than they were before, smarter than the people they pla

smarter than those they play against. Successful intelligence enables consume

27Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. In

Report of an Independent Task Force, 11, URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/efr.html, acce

2001.
103

It does so by revealing decision points, actions or choices available to a con

implications of choosing one over another.

Yet, consumers rarely acknowledge explicitly the role that good intelli

their own success. While they may be quick to bring intelligence failures t

of the producing organization, consumers do not always give feedback on s

comes enabled by intelligence. Thus intelligence analysts and their manag

cally have looked within the production organization for ways to measure s

into the trap of “bean-counting.” But there is a better way.

Measures of success for intelligence products28

Six “underlying ideas or core values” for intelligence analysis, identifi

Brei for operational-level intelligence, and shown in the figure above, esta

lyst’s “essential work processes.”29 Since they are defined in terms of the c

also can be used as a checklist to rate the quality of products provided to 

Brei asserts that they “provide specific qualitative objectives for manager

and a framework for standards against which intelligence services should b

While qualitative feedback from consumers aids evaluation of some of th

the absence of consumer input does not prevent their being used in self-eva

Readiness: Intelligence systems must be responsive to existing and continge

requirements of consumers at all levels.

Timeliness: Intelligence must be delivered while the content is still actionable u

sumer’s circumstances.

Accuracy: All sources and data must be evaluated for the possibility of technica

ception, and hostile efforts to mislead.

Objectivity: All judgments must be evaluated for the possibility of deliberate d

manipulations due to self-interest.

Usability: All intelligence output must be in a form that facilitates ready comp

immediate application. Intelligence products must be compatible with the consu

ties for receiving, manipulating, protecting, and storing the product.

Relevance: Information must be selected and organized for its applicability to 

requirements, with potential consequences and significance of the information m

the consumer’s circumstances.

28William S. Brei, Captain, USAF, Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Log

Occasional Paper Number Two (Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence Colleg

29Brei, 6.

30Brei, 5.
104

ability to perform intelligence production. These two principles are limiting fac

ing what the producer can do to “achieve accurate data, objective judgments, 

mats, and relevant products.”31 Once production Readiness and Timeliness are 

the other four of Brei’s fundamental principles then can be arranged in a ch

series of questions about intelligence products. Typical questions might includ

■ Was the reported intelligence accurate? (Accuracy)

■ Are there any distortions in the reported judgments? (Objectivity) 

■ Is the reported intelligence actionable? Does it facilitate ready comp

(Usability)

■ Does it support the consumer’s mission? Is it applicable to the consume

ments? Has its significance been made explicit? (Relevance)

These four principles also overlap, and poor quality in one can affect the 

another. Brei asserts that accurate data provide the foundation for subsequen

judgments, and the expression of objective judgments in a usable form provid

the basis of a relevant product. Thus, unverified data cannot only cost an 

product its Accuracy, but also damage its Relevance to the customer.32

Although Brei’s principles do not require consumer input in the evaluatio

gence, the process of measuring the effectiveness of a product is enhanced wit

participation. Brei suggests: “[L]isten to their complaints.”33 However, this do

antee that the responses will address the product of interest. Rather, the analy

ask directly for specific feedback from the consumer. This is most effective if 

and managers have collaborative relationships with consumers. Lacking suc

ships, producers may attach survey questions to intelligence products, prom

sumers to respond regarding the utility of the service provided. Admittedly, thi

may be disturbing, as consumers are more likely to respond when they are un

the product than when they are pleased. Further, regardless of the assessment 

value, some consumers will never respond.

Brei’s principles provide a means for evaluating a given intelligence produ

the meaning it conveys and the value of that intelligence to the consumer. Hi

when combined with an “insider’s” view of the intelligence production proce

methods and personnel management practices, makes a comprehensive ev

intelligence analysis appear possible. In the sections to follow, the concept of c

tencies for intelligence analysis is developed, from which may emerge some 

gestions for operationalizing the concept of an “art and science” of intelligenc

31Brei, 6.

32Brei, 6.

33Brei, 5.
105

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

A sophisticated intelligence analyst is one who is steeped in the his

culture of a region, has lifelong interest in the area, and approaches t

of the region as a professional responsibility, and probably as an a

as well.

— Ronald D. Garst and Max L. 

Who are the most successful intelligence analysts? What makes them 

setting forth the functional core competencies for successful intelligenc

observe there are characteristics which, while not necessary for successf

analysis per se, do seem to be associated with analysts considered to be the 

ful at their trade.35 It should be noted, however, that not all successful anal

these characteristics. The characteristics highlighted in the graphic below a

tative superset, and while individual analysts do seem to share certain chara

do not share all of them in equal measure.

Probably the most indispensable characteristics of successful intelligen

high self-motivation and insatiable curiosity. Analysts want to know every

about the objects under their scrutiny. Reading and observing voraciously, 

every possible piece of information and demonstrate a sense of wonder ab

discover. As new fragments appear, novel connections are discovered bet

and older information as a result of intense concentration leading to epipha

of “aha” thinking. The most successful analysts tend to enjoy their work—

work.” Indeed, they often will stay late at the office to pursue a thorny 

engaging line of reasoning. 

These characteristics also describe the values, standards, and beliefs of a 

ing analytic culture. As such, they may be used as preliminary indicators du

process to identify prospective employees. A person with many of the chara

may be predisposed to being a successful analyst, if the appropriate skills

34Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, “On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst,” 

gence Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 55.

35The authors base their establishment of core competencies primarily on two 

as NSA in recent years. The first is an extensive formal job analysis conducted by 

chologists in the mid-1990s. Identification of some of the knowledge areas, ski

required for intelligence analysis came out of that study, which is cited extensively 

Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, JMIC Occasional Paper Number Six (Washing

1999). The second initiative is the ongoing work of the Arts and Science of Analysi

nization established at NSA in early 2000. As members of that organization, the auth

in studies and interviews yielding insights into the behaviors applied by NSA intel

on the job.
106

that acknowledge these characteristics may be most successful in initiating new 

into the analytic culture. When personal characteristics are embodied in comp

stories” told by mentors and peers, they can reinforce the cultural values of 

building corporate loyalty by reinforcing the sense of membership.

Characteristics of successful intelligence analysts.

Indoctrination into a particular analytic culture can also have negative im

Although it may build loyalty, enhance behaviors, and inculcate values, it can a

objective analysis by reinforcing “group” thought patterns and analytic met

The culture must allow for “a spirit of creativity to emerge and prosper.”36

These personal characteristics of successful intelligence analysts are but 

among many in influencing the success of intelligence process and product. A

skills provide the tools for performing good intelligence analysis. Knowledg

raw material for analysis as well as for an appreciation of the context and r

information. 

36Don McDowell, Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Manager

(Cooma, Australia: Istana Enterprises, Pty. Ltd., 1998), 216.
107

The competent intelligence analyst must have a unique combination o

— Ronald D. Garst and Max L. 

Abilities arise from aptitudes that can develop from an individual’s 

characteristics or talents. Although aptitudes may largely be determined 

genetic background, they may also be enhanced through training.38 We fin

shown here to be necessary for intelligence analysis.

Abilities required for successful intelligence analysis.

37Garst and Gross, 47.

38Conversation with Dr. S. Alenka Brown-Vanhoozer, Director, Center for Cogn

Technology, Advanced Computing Technologies, BWXT Y-12, Oak Ridge, TN, Ap
108

Almost all animate life communicates, but humans are unique in possess

structured to permit abstract, symbolic communication. Three communicati

appear necessary for various aspects of intelligence analysis:39

■ Aural: The ability to hear, listen to, and understand spoken words and sente

of the essential means humans employ to take in information. Aural abi

improved through specific techniques of “active listening.” This abil

enhances analysts’ performance of certain technical tasks, and their inter

consumers, peers and managers.

■ Graphic/Visual: The ability to see, view, and understand graphic/visu

developed early in human history. Along with the ability to interpret symbo

ability to present information in a graphic or visual manner so that others c

stand. Even in speech, a majority of human communication remains non-

is, graphic or visual).40 Developing this ability allows for effective graphic

tion of intelligence, which can dramatically heighten its impact.

■ Oral: The ability to communicate via spoken words and sentences so that 

understand is unique to humans. While the physical capability has evolved 

key developmental milestones occur during the first years of life. The deve

oral and aural abilities are closely linked. Effective oral communication dire

the intelligence analyst’s credibility.

Teaming and Collaboration

Humans are a social species, and associated abilities have evolved with hu

opment. Teaming and collaborating were essential when proto-humans move

relative safety of the trees onto the more dangerous plains of Africa. Their coll

depended on social abilities to solve problems and overcome threats. Wh

threats have changed, humans retain these abilities in order to live and work to

Teaming and collaboration abilities enhance intelligence analysis, since th

relationship with consumers, peers, subordinates, and supervisors shapes the 

production process. Formalized means of enhancing all these abilities can l

gence professionals to considerably greater effectiveness as analysts and lead

lysts. This is why the Director of Central Intelligence has indicated that collab

cornerstone of strategic intelligence.41 A collaborative environment also min

likelihood of intelligence failures. For example, had imagery analysts com

39We do not suggest that individuals lacking one or more of these abilities due 

impairment would be unable to perform intelligence analysis. However, we do sugge

absence of corrective technologies, an impaired person may not be able to perform cert

of analysis or production that depend on the impaired ability.

40Conversation with Dr. S. Alenka Brown-Vanhoozer, April 2001.

41Director of Central Intelligence National Security Advisory Panel, accessed 1 Jun
109

bombed by U.S. forces that spring may have been identified as the Chine

time to avoid the resultant tragedy.42

We identify four distinct teaming abilities, to show the complexity of the 

ically, formal training programs address leadership abilities only in the 

management function; here, we focus on the analysis process itself.

■ Influencing: Those with this ability effectively and positively influe

peers, and subordinates in intelligence work. Analysts often need to p

that their methods and conclusions are valid, and they often need to lever

resources. The ability to influence determines the level of success the

these areas.

■ Leading: Those who are more senior, more skilled, and more succes

gence analysis have an obligation to lead, that is, to direct others and 

models. The ability to lead involves working with and through othe

desired business outcomes. Thus, developing leadership abilities enhanc

intelligence analysis.

■ Following: Almost every grouping of humans has a leader. Everyone els

Analysts must enhance their abilities to work within a team, taking dire

ing on it.

■ Synergizing: Drawing on the other three teaming abilities, players in th

process cooperate to achieve a common goal, the value of which is gre

could achieve when working alone. 

Thinking

As our species designation—sapiens—suggests, the defining attr

human beings is an unparalleled cognitive ability. We think differen

all other creatures on earth, and we can share those thoughts w

another in ways that no other species even approaches.

— Terence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Sp

Intelligence analysis is primarily a thinking process; it depends upon c

tions that evolved in humans long before the appearance of language.44 T

characteristics of intelligence analysts are manifested in behaviors that r

and/or the inherent drive to think. Our national survival may depend on 

developed thinking abilities than our opponents. Three basic thinking 

42Gregory Treverton, 10.

43Terence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language 

(London: W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd., 1997), 21.

44Keith Devlin, “The Role of Conceptual Structure in Human Evolution” in B

and Guy W. Mineau, eds, Conceptual Structures: Logical, Linguistic, and Compu

8th International Conference on Conceptual Structures (Berlin: Springier Verlag, 20
110

only simultaneous application of all three may yield successful intelligence an

■ Information Ordering: This ability involves following previously defin

sets of rules to arrange data in a meaningful order. In the context of intellig

sis, this ability allows people, often with the assistance of technology, to arr

mation in ways that permit analysis, synthesis, and extraction of me

arrangement of information according to certain learned rules leads the 

make conclusions and disseminate them as intelligence. A danger arises, 

that such ordering is inherently limiting—the analyst may not look for 

explanations because the known rules lead to a ready conclusion.

■ Pattern Recognition: Humans detect patterns and impose patterns on app

dom entities and events in order to understand them, often doing this wi

aware of it. Stellar constellations are examples of imposed patterns, whi

behavior analysis is an example of pattern detection. Intelligence analysts 

detect patterns to identify what targets are doing, and thereby to extrapolat

will do in the future. Pattern recognition lets analysts separate “the importa

less important, even the trivial, and to conceptualize a degree of order out 

chaos.”45 However, imposing or seeking patterns can introduce bias. An

impose culturally defined patterns on random aggregates rather than recog

ent patterns, thereby misinterpreting the phenomena in question.

■ Reasoning: The ability to reason is what permits humans to process infor

formulate explanations, to assign meaning to observed phenomena. It is b

that analysts transform information into intelligence, in these three ways:

1. Induction: Inductive reasoning combines separate fragments of informat

cific answers to problems, to form general rules or conclusions. For exa

induction, a child learns to associate the color red with heat and heat wit

then to generalize these associations to new situations.46 Rigorous inducti

upon demonstrating the validity of causal relationships between observe

ena, not merely associating them with each other.

2. Deduction: Deductive reasoning applies general rules to specific problem

at conclusions. Analysts begin with a set of rules and use them as a bas

preting information. For example, an analyst who follows the nuclear w

gram of a country might notice that a characteristic series of events p

last nuclear weapons test. Upon seeing evidence that those same events 

ring again, the analyst might deduce that a second nuclear test is immine

ever, this conclusion would be made cautiously, since deduction wo

45Garst and Gross, 47.

46 Jerome K. Clauser and Sandra M. Weir, Intelligence Research Methodologies, An 

to Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Research in Defense Intelligence (Was

Defense Intelligence School, 1975), 81.

47Clauser and Weir, 81.
111

behavior.

3. Abduction: Abductive reasoning describes the thought process tha

“insight” or intuition. When the information does not match that exp

lyst asks “why?,” thereby generating novel hypotheses to explain g

that does not readily suggest a familiar explanation. For example, g

ping manifests, one showing oranges and lemons being shipped from 

Florida, and the other showing carnations being shipped from Delaw

bia, abductive reasoning is what enables the analyst to take an analyti

“Why is citrus fruit being sent to the worldwide capital of citrus f

carnations are being sent to the world’s primary exporter of that pro

really going on here?” Thus, abduction relies on the analyst’s prepara

rience to suggest possible explanations that must then be tested. Ab

ates new research questions rather than solutions.48

48Chong Ho Yu, “Abduction? Deduction? Induction? Is There a Logic of Exploratory 

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Education Research Associatio

LA, April 1994, URL: http://seamonkey.ed.asu.edu/~behrens/asu/reports/Peirce/Log

accessed 6 June 2001.
112

Any institution that relies on professionals for success and seeks to mai

an authentic learning climate for individual growth must require its mem

to read (to gain knowledge and insight), research (to learn how to ask 

questions and find defensible answers), discuss (to appreciate opp

views and subject their own to rigorous debate), and write (to structure 

ments and articulate them clearly and coherently).

— Gregory D. Fo

Skills required for successful intelligence analysis.

49Gregory D. Foster, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist,” Joint For

11 (Spring 1996): 74-79.
113

makeup, a skill represents learned expertise or proficiency based on a parti

set of abilities. At least eight types of skills, shown here, are required for su

ligence analysis.

Critical Thinking

It is by thinking that analysts transform information into intelligence. 

ing is the cognitive skill applied to make that transformation. Critical th

defined as

[An] intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully con

izing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating informati

ered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reaso

communication, as a guide to belief and action....Thinking about [ou

ing while [we’re] thinking in order to make [our] thinking better.50

There is a clear need to educate and train intelligence analysts to u

minds...[Only] by raising their awareness can the intelligence 

assured that the analysts will avoid the traps in being slave to co

thought, precedent and imposed cultural values—all enemies of o

analysis.51

An ordered thinking process requires careful judgments or judicious evalu

to defensible conclusions that provide an audit trail. When the results of an

troversial, subject to alternate interpretations, or possibly wrong, this audit 

essential in defending the process used to reach the conclusions.

Effective critical thinking also includes routine, systematic questioning o

upon which decisions are based. Without critical thinking, current beliefs an

not questioned, as long as they appear to produce results that can be reasona

Yet they can prevent analysts from making alternative interpretations. W

cally, Gregory Treverton asks, “If intelligence doesn’t challenge prevail

what good is it?”52

Intelligence failure can be the result when alternative premises are ig

pened from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s in Sweden. During that time

Navy expended considerable effort and ordnance attempting to “destroy” in

submarines. Swedish naval analysts (and others) repeatedly acknowledged 

nalizing it as a “David versus Goliath” contest: Sweden’s tiny navy was no 

50National Drug Intelligence Center, Basic Intelligence Analysis Course, # 9, P

sentation, April 2001.

51McDowell, 216.

52Treverton, 5.
114

defense chief Owe Wiktorin revealed the truth; detected intruders previously 

be submarines were in fact minks swimming in the waters off the Swedish coa

by the premise that the Soviets wanted to make war against Sweden, the navy h

this possible explanation for their failure to destroy “enemy” submarines, desp

that the alternative premise had been suggested as early as 1987.53 An obvious 

from this story is that corporate mechanisms for questioning analytic premises 

resolved this intelligence question nearly a decade earlier. The lesson for 

intelligence analysts is clear: corporate processes for intelligence analysis mus

and indeed, institutionalize, the questioning of premises.

Literacy

Intelligence analysis requires the reading and comprehension of written sen

paragraphs, often in multiple languages, at many points in the intelligence pr

spective intelligence analysts must be literate in order to perform their work 

basic level, making this skill a prerequisite for employment. Literacy skills are 

understanding the target, the consumer and the intelligence process. Literacy 

essary for conducting research.

Computer Literacy

It is a given that in the 21st Century, the computer is an essential tool for 

analysis. Today, analysts must be highly skilled in the use of computers themse

the use of software that will aid analysis. Word processing, spreadsheet, and p

programs, as well as specific programs that assist at all stages of the analytic p

the essential tools that can bolster success. However, tools themselves do n

“truth” (if such can be said to exist in the intelligence analysis context). R

tools for manipulation, correlation, and presentation of information are a mean

the production of intelligence. An analyst’s skillful use of them hastens arrival 

The fact that analysts are faced with massive volumes of data also makes u

tion and filtering tools essential. The analyst depends on these tools to make 

on the collected information. The tools are used to filter non-relevant inform

and retain only those items that are pertinent to the issue being analyzed.

Expression

The results of analysis are useless if they are poorly presented. “The capa

must be competent and experienced in presenting analysis both orally and in w

Effective oral and written skills are therefore essential for the intelligence an

53William H. Starbuck, “Unlearning Ineffective or Obsolete Technologies,” Interna

nal of Technology Management 11, nos. 7/8 (Winter 1996): 725-726.

54Garst and Gross, 49.
115

presented. For example, Berkowitz and Goodman note that lengthy daily or 

ings may be inadequate means for informing officials, regardless of their c

ings go “unheard because the officials [find] the hour-long briefings to be 

use of their time and [stop] attending.”55 Similarly, they conclude that inad

gence reporting of unrest in Iran in 1978 contributed to the U.S. Intellig

nity’s failure to predict the fall of the Shah.56 These examples also make 

whichever method of informing policymakers is selected, the resultant pro

concise, tailored ones that masterfully present the intelligence to the inten

or in the consumer’s frame of reference.

■ Speaking and Presentation: The oral presentation of information, 

senior officials, otherwise known as “briefing,” and often accompanied 

allows an effective analyst to tailor both the content and delivery meth

sumer’s abilities or predilections. The briefing’s timing, level of detail, fo

may all be matched to the consumer. In particular, key facts and conclu

the beginning of the exchange and determine its organization.57 Effectiv

beyond these technical considerations. The heart of the intelligence brie

senter’s relationship with the consumer, thus, “the essence of briefing is 

projection of information, but rather the art of promoting understanding 

viduals.”58 Through the briefing process, the presenter puts information 

sumer’s frame of reference, making clear the possibilities for decisio

consequences, thereby creating intelligence.

■ Storytelling: While well-honed speaking and presentation skills allow e

gence dissemination, well developed storytelling skills ensure that intel

vincingly conveyed. Storytelling involves more than just creating the s

lies in the way the story is told. In the words of transformational stor

Stephen Denning, “[the] look of the eye, the intonation of the voice, the 

is held, the import of a subtle pause, and [the storyteller’s] own respon

ence’s responses—all these aspects ... make an immense contribution t

of the story for [the] audience.”59 Too often the consumer does not under

told but important story buried in a sophisticated presentation, making 

essential skill for intelligence professionals.

55Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for Am

Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 32.

56Berkowitz and Goodman, 202.

57Krizan, 40, 42-46.

58Benjamin T. Buring, LT, USN, Function vs. Form: Successfully Briefing the In

MSSI thesis (Washington, DC: JMIC, August 2001), 24.

59Stephen Denning, The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowl

nizations (Boston, MA: Butterworth Heineman, 2001), xxii.
116

Rather, intelligence storytelling involves creating scenarios and alternative 

consumers. Intelligence assessments that provide a variety of possible 

recounted in considerable detail, can give the consumer clues to the most eff

cies or strategies. An example of varying analytic outcomes expressed as sc

be found in the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2015. Four 

futures for the next 15 years are outlined in addition to the principal scen

alternatives suggest a variety of possible outcomes based on population trend

availability, technological advances, economic conditions, ethnic identity 

nance, and local and regional conflicts. The significance for the policymake

future is fluid.60 While all the alternatives are possible, certain political an

decisions could influence which outcome is most likely to occur. Being prepa

ious outcomes enables the policymaker to be proactive and to respond appro

events unfold.

■ Writing: The basic vehicle by which intelligence historically has been purv

written report. At the beginning of the 21st Century this remains the case

contemporary intelligence analysts lack this basic skill, and improvement 

skills, basic though it may be, is often required as part of becoming a comp

ligence analyst.”61

Foreign Language Proficiency

To be truly successful, analysts must be proficient in the language(s) empl

subjects of their analysis. Without such proficiency they cannot completely c

target intentions and actions. When analysts misunderstand their targets, the 

they provide to consumers thus will be inaccurate or misleading.

Once upon a time, many intelligence analysts could rely upon the skills of p

linguists for translation of target information. Now this luxury has become un

all but a few intelligence analysts working the largest, best-funded intellig

lems.62 Foreign language proficiency has thus become a necessity for all w

intelligence analysis.

If budget and personnel cuts are insufficient reason for analysts to have f

guage proficiency, changes in intelligence targets provide additional argum

necessity. Although targets of interest have traditionally used their native lang

internal communications, many employed non-native languages such as Engli

national communications and publications. This was especially true of the firs

60National Intelligence Council, 2000, 83-85.

61Berkowitz and Goodman, 54.

62For one view of the staffing cuts at the National Security Agency, see Mathew M

Time of Troubles: The US National Security Agency in the Twenty-First Century,” Inte

National Security 15, no. 3, (Autumn 2000): 5-9.
117

ever, this is changing. The use of native languages in international comm

growing both on and off the Internet. Thus, proficiency in non-English lan

essary for analysis of information, approximately 80 percent of which “is no

online, is not in English, is not government associated, but is in the private 

not available locally to the analyst.”63

Furthermore, foreign language proficiency provides more than just a 

non-English materials. The structure of a target’s language and that targe

closely related. One well-known theory of this relationship, by Edward S

jamin Whorf, posits that “language is a force in its own right and it affects 

als in a society conceive and perceive reality.”64 Thus concepts essential to 

the target are communicated in a context that goes beyond simplistic transl

For example, the German terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft both 

English as “community.” Yet this translation ignores the interpersonal natu

tionship among the members of the first type of community, and the busin

the second. An analyst relying on translation by another might not be awar

of the “community” in the material being analyzed.

In Somali there are two pronouns for the English “we.” A speaker of S

pronoun annagu when referring to the speaker and someone other than the 

addressed. Conversely, the use of the pronoun innagu includes the 

addressed. So if someone says in English, “We are going to the movie,” t

“Who is ‘we’?” must be asked. In Somali there is no doubt: If annagu ar

movies, the person being addressed is not going; if innagu are going to th

the person being addressed is going. Again, an analyst depending on a t

English must rely on the translator to convey that contextual information. 

or exclusion from a group can be quite significant. There is a considera

between “annagu are going to blow up the embassy,” and “innagu are goi

the embassy.” This distinction is especially significant to the intelligence 

case, even if the implications for the embassy remain the same.

Even the distinction between intelligence and information is language

Sinitic term qingbao refers to a concept that can be understood either as 

or “intelligence.”65 This latter distinction is a “Western one not shared by E

guages or presumably their speakers,” according to the Foreign Broadca

63Robert David Steele, “The New Craft of Intelligence: an Alternative Approach 

Public,” Conference on The Future of Intelligence in the 21st Century, Priverno, Ita

ary 2001. The quote is from Steele’s remarks and is not in his published version of 

fication was made via personal email communication, 18 May 2001. Because 

operated under the “Chatham House Rule,” Mr. Steele is quoted with permission.

64Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle Rive

1999), 225.

65Concise English-Chinese/Chinese-English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Ox

Press, 1999), 363.
118

ji Houqu Jishu.Context must determine the translation, and an analyst lack

language skills must trust the linguist to correctly understand that context. Th

required for that understanding might render the linguist a better intellige

than the original analyst. This begs the question: “Is such duplication of 

affordable?”

We recognize that certain forms of technical analysis have previously n

foreign language proficiency. We suggest, however, that it is not truly known, 

know, whether foreign language proficiency would have enhanced that anal

technical metadata analysis clearly does not require language proficiency

analysis of other types of metadata may indeed require foreign language profi

we caution against dismissing out of hand the need for it. Furthermore, s

require that analysts review both data and metadata. Even if the metadata do 

foreign language competency, the underlying data do require it. In additio

technical meaning is lost in the translation between linguist and technical an

nical analysts often need that original source and its context. This can be g

from proficiency in the original language. Ultimately, foreign language 

enables the analyst to engage in a holistic, comprehensive analytic process.

We see a connection between the depth at which the analyst must work a ta

degree of required foreign language proficiency. If analysts work a great many 

superficial level, they need only have a casual acquaintance with their languag

larly, when analysts are assigned to an ad hoc crisis cell working a specific 

finite period, they may also need only superficial language skills. In this latter 

crisis is of sufficient importance, dedicated language assets will be assigned 

sate for their ignorance. However, should the crisis become long-term, it is re

expect them to acquire more than a passing skill in the target’s language(s).

Research

Research skills provide discipline and consistency for the creation of v

intelligence. By providing methodologies for defining the requirement to be a

well as methodologies for answering that query, research skills ensure anal

tency and enable thorough exploration of the issues. Necessary research sk

methods of problem definition that ensure that, in collaboration with the con

lysts correctly define or redefine the problem in terms of a “research questio

understand the consumer’s and the analyst’s own objectives.67 Research strate

based on the issue to be answered, help identify required sources of infor

means of information collection, and the means of analyzing and synthesizing 

66FBIS Editor’s comments on the English translation of Huo, Zhongwen and Wan

Guofang Keji Qingbaoyuan ji Houqu Jishu (Sources and Techniques of Obtaining Nati

Science and Technology Intelligence) (Beijing: Kexue Jishu Wenxuan Publishing Co., 

67Russell G. Swenson and others, “Research Design,” in Research: Design and Met

ington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001), 19-20. This publication is an es

for Community analysts developing research and analytic strategies for long-term proje
119

Information is the grist for intelligence analysis, and to be successful, 

aggressively seek it out. Different information/data manipulation skills ar

the various stages of the intelligence process.

■ Collection: This stage involves gathering information from all source

gence analyst directs the collection process, causing specific resources 

Related information manipulation skills include selecting and filterin

assess whether the information and its sources are of value. 

■ Monitoring:. Reliability of sources and the validity of the information 

question. Monitoring skills focus on information review, and often may 

sis of descriptors and summaries of that data. 

■ Organizing: Skillful arrangement, formatting, and maintenance of da

and technical report generation ensure access to materials in a usable for

■ Analysis/Synthesis: Information manipulation skills can point to patt

ships, anomalies and trends.

■ Interpretation: This is the stage in the process where information is tra

intelligence by cognitive manipulation, that is, assigning meaning to ana

thesized information using critical thinking. Computers aid in this ste

study of 12 major “analytic” software tools concludes “true analysis will 

ple function, assisted by computer technology.”68

■ Dissemination: Dissemination, except for some graphic products, is 

mostly electronic. Information preparation and presentation skills allow 

tion and publication, so that the results of analysis appear in usable f

may be further tailored by users.

■ Coordination: Coordination requires analysts as well as their manag

“collegial” skills in the bureaucratic environment; these skills are also n

diluting the intelligence message down to the “lowest common level of a

■ Evaluation: Internal and intra-community evaluation allows the intellig

cussed and placed in larger contexts than that viewed by a single agency

oration may also identify the additional intelligence required to 

Evaluation can become a continuous part of the production process.69

Project/Process Management

Few analysts enjoy the luxury of working full time on only one problem o

of a particular problem. We distinguish between projects and processes. The 

have finite scope and goals whereas the latter are open-ended. Both require pl

68Leonard Fuld, Fuld Associates, “Intelligence Software: Reality or Still Virtua

petitive Intelligence Magazine 4, no. 2 (March-April, 2001): 24-25.

69See also Brei.
120

what needs to be accomplished; identifies necessary resources; creates a timelin

milestones; and makes the analyst accountable for successful completion. 

KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED FOR INTELLIGENCE ANA

Without a solid knowledge base concerning the region or issue to whic

analyst is assigned, . . . the individual will not even know what questio

ask. That is, the person will not really be qualified to be called an “anal

— Ronald D. Garst and Max L. G

Knowledge consists of familiarities, awareness, or understanding gained thr

rience or study; it includes both empirical material and that derived by inferen

pretation.72 Depending on the specific target, the knowledge required can v

Our essential subset is shown in the figure and discussed below.

70Clifford C. Kalb, “Core Competencies: A Practitioner’s View,” document 20761

Co., Inc, n.d.

71Garst and Gross, 50.

Knowledge required for successful intelligence analysis.
121

Doing intelligence analysis in the information age is often like “being dr

one with tunnel vision.”73 In the quest to answer a consumer’s questions, th

pushes aside “all the fuzzy stuff that lies around the edge—context, backg

common knowledge, social resources.”74 Yet, to do so is perilous, for thes

ance and perspective. They offer breadth of vision and ultimately allow an

sense of the information under study. By providing the context into which 

their work, fields of study such as anthropology, comparative religion, eco

raphy, history, international relations, psychology, and sociology all interac

vital knowledge about the target, which both analysts and consumers need 

Changes in the culture, religion, geography, or economic systems (among o

get may themselves be subjects of an intelligence requirement. 

Gregory Treverton asserts that intelligence “is supposed to have the peop

stand Bonn and Delhi better than they do Washington.”75 Without such u

intelligence and policy failures can occur. Treverton blames the failure of th

gence Community to predict India’s 1998 nuclear test partially on a lack of 

by U.S. analysts of “true” Indian motivations. He asserts that a questionin

coupled with greater knowledge of the reasons why India would want 

nuclear test should have led U.S. analysts to different conclusions.76

The following selection of topics exemplifies some non-traditional but e

knowledge areas required for thorough intelligence analysis.

■ Culture: Culture can be defined as a group’s values, standards, and b

culture defines that group. The study of culture reveals the roles of ind

community, and how they relate to non-members of the culture. This pro

into behaviors that are of value in predicting future behavior. This is true 

get is a people or a nation as well as when the target is a specific subgro

ual member within a culture. Adda Bozeman points out that because po

are grounded in cultures, “present day international relations are there

tion also intercultural relations ... [A]nalysts and policymakers in the W

more successful in their respective callings if they would examine the 

structures of the nations and political systems they are dealing with.”77

■ Message of Language: The message of language is a part of culture, an

ing it makes an artificial distinction, we do so to reiterate its importan

72Knowledge,” The American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1976 E

73 John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information (Boston: H

School Press, 2000), 1-2.

74Garst and Gross, 49.

75Treverton, 5.

76Treverton, 5.

77Adda Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancie

the Opening of the Modern Age, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishe
122

in understanding the targets culture. For example, much is revealed if mem

insurgent group primarily communicate using the language of the elite m

their culture. Additionally, what the language indicates about class and pe

tionships may provide clues to behaviors.

■ Technology: Technology itself can be the subject of study by the intelligen

Someone developing a target may analyze specific technologies and their 

ture as they pertain to that target. Further, the role of technology withi

nation, or people is an indicator of behavior. The domains of communicatio

transportation, manufacturing, and others, as well as the attitudes of the 

them, are rich sources of study. Technology also can provide insights into 

information that will be available to the intelligence analyst.

Professional Knowledge

In addition to understanding their targets, intelligence analysts need to know 

about the context and nature of the intelligence profession, and the resources 

help them do their job well. Understanding the plans and policies of their own 

enables analysts to frame their work in terms of the nation’s strategic and tac

tives. Intelligence consumers are government officials. Their needs drive analyt

and priorities. Analysts base collection tasking on the imperative to match 

sources to consumer needs. These information sources, such as human-sourc

signals intercepts and documentary research, provide the analyst with raw mate

creation of intelligence through analysis, synthesis and interpretation.

Determining what information must be analyzed is a precursor to the analy

Berkowitz and Goodman identify “four different types of ‘information’ [used 

gence analysts] in preparing reports and estimates: known facts, secrets, disi

and mysteries.”78 Known facts and secrets must be placed in context or “revea

formation must be discounted, and consumers must be informed that mysterie

answered. For this to occur, the types of information available and their validity

the sources of that information and their reliability, must be determined. 

In addition, analysts need to know what specific sources of information r

particular inquiry are available for exploitation. Knowing which expert sourc

ject matter experts can guide the analytic process, or can offer different or add

spectives, enhances intelligence work. The reliability of these sources is a

When different sources provide contradictory information, the reliability of 

versus another may provide insights into which information is accurate; the s

be open or secret, technical or human. 

Finally, others, known and unknown, may be examining similar informa

same or different consumers. Awareness that sources of information, possibly 

78Berkowitz and Goodman, 86.
123

stantly seeking out new connections.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 

ANALYSIS WORKFORCE

Returning to our thesis, what makes an intelligence analyst successful? 

analyst’s purpose is to create intelligence, success means following an eff

(rigorous analysis, sound management) and creating a quality product (that 

ligence and meets the consumer’s needs). To do this requires appropriate ab

edge and personal characteristics for rigorous intelligence analysis and pro

honed capabilities to communicate, cooperate and think, coupled with 

ensure technical competency, provide the means for intelligence work. I

knowledge of the issues and their background provides both content and co

ysis. Analysts who are motivated to succeed, to know targets, and to share t

ensure that consumers receive intelligence of the highest caliber.

But do intelligence analysts today approach this ideal? And can we find 

talent to serve the Community’s mission well into the 21st century? 

Of all the personnel problems the intelligence community will fac

coming years, the most difficult to solve is likely to be maintaining 

of talent the community requires to carry out its mission.... [Much

work of the intelligence community is highly specialized and 

exceptional creativity.... It is also safe to say that some of the most 

analytic skills the community will require are precisely those we 

even foresee at this time.

— Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Go

Berkowitz and Goodman’s judgment from 1989 remains true in 2002. Th

Community remains significantly challenged to maintain and enhance an 

base against numerous rapidly changing threats to national security. Furth

uptick in hiring and rising rates of eligibility for retirement mean that, a

savvy of the analytic population will continue to dwindle at the lower end a

the upper end.80 Even an adequately sized analytic workforce, lacking ade

ing and training from senior, expert analysts, will leave the Intelligenc

unable to meet security challenges. For example, while NSA’s technolog

remains widely recognized, former director General Kenneth A. Minihan 

79Berkowitz and Goodman, 154.

80External Team Report: A management Review for the Director, NSA, 22 Octo

<http://www.nsa.gov/releases/nsa_external_team_report.pdf>, accessed 4 June 200

ent but related perspective see also the report of the “internal” New Enterprise Tea

www.nsa.gov/releases/nsa_new_enterprise_team_recommendations.pdf.
124

to the Council on Foreign Relations independent report on the future of i

“less than a tenth of what the United States spends on intelligence is devoted 

it is the least expensive dimension of intelligence....This country could sure

spend more in those areas of analysis where being wrong can have major adv

quences.”82 Winning the talent war requires smart investment in the hiring, tr

deployment of analysts. 

With simultaneous greening and greying of the analytic workforce, analyst

may lack many of the core competencies necessary for successful intelligence 

strategic requirement exists to resolve this problem. However, the authors k

stratagem under consideration other than their own focus on identifying core 

cies for management attention. It may be feasible to conduct small-scale, ad h

systematic experimentation with specific analytic techniques such as that pi

Folker, to determine which techniques may hold the most promise for improv

analysis.83 We suspect that some experienced analysts do already match 

described above, although others are still operating within the outdated Cold 

digm. Further, many novice analysts also have the willingness and potential 

toward the ideal. But they need tradecraft mentors and teachers. Presently, th

enough expert analysts to do both the teaching and the performance of sophisti

ligence production.

Therefore, the Intelligence Community needs ways to enable intelligence an

on the job to enhance their professional skills. One approach to this problem i

widespread, specialized training in analytic methods. In order, however, to 

subsequently produced intelligence is accurate and useful, such training mu

rigorous analytic processes that minimize biases introduced by the analyst, the 

the sources of the information, or the information itself. Collaborative train

such as those proposed in the Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Comm

ysis offer another way by which intelligence analysts can acquire the skills n

bring greater rigor to their analyses.84

One analytic method in particular, known as “Analysis of Competing Hyp

presented by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst Richards J. Heuer, Jr.

readily applicable approach to rigorous intelligence analysis. In Heuer’s meth

used at the CIA, the analyst begins with a full set of alternative possibilities 

the apparent single most likely alternative. Then the analyst compares each p

dence against each hypothesis, and determines if that evidence supports or ref

81Quoted in Robert K. Ackerman, “Security Agency Transitions from Backer to 

Signal 54, no. 2 (October 1999): 23.

82Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, 11-12.

83Folker, Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experimen

Structured Methods.

84Director of Central Intelligence National Security Advisory Panel, 29ff.
125

chain attached to each hypothesis, the analyst selects as the most probable 

one with the least amount of evidence against it. This contrasts with conve

sis, which generally entails looking for evidence to confirm a favored hypo

ing the scientific method, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses seeks 

hypotheses, whereas conventional analysis seeks to prove them.85 The end 

former is an actionable intelligence product that adds value to the consum

ment and execution of policy or strategy. 

Folker’s recent experiments in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers provid

dence that such rigorous methods do foster analytic excellence. In four 

Folker provided analysts with one hour of training in Analysis of Competin

and then presented them with two realistic scenarios requiring analytic j

conclusions. A significantly greater number of the newly trained analysts d

rect answers to the scenarios than analysts in a control group that used the

methods. These findings demonstrate that while “exploiting a structured 

cannot guarantee a correct answer, using a structured methodology ensure

is performed and not overlooked.” 86

Folker therefore recommends widespread teaching of these methodo

“both initial and subsequent training.”87 However, training is of little valu

be immediately applied. Thus organizational structures, culture, and proc

aligned to permit and to reward rigorous analysis. Unless analysts are r

appreciated for performing sophisticated analysis, they will not embrace ch

cant recognition for high-level analysis will inspire others to follow, creatin

fosters and sustains excellence in tailored intelligence production.

Even if the entire analytic workforce were to adopt rigorous analytic t

Intelligence Community may still lack sufficient resources to meet consu

will still need to hire new analysts, either from outside the agency or from 

ever, these new employees must be highly qualified. The government canno

dial training for prospective new employees lacking the necessary abilities 

intelligence analysis. Similarly, employees transferring into the analytic di

other fields must have the prerequisite abilities and skills for analysis befo

discipline. The field of intelligence analysis cannot safely be a catchall 

transferring from downsized career fields.

85For a discussion of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses see Chapter 8 of Ri

Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study 

1999). 

86Folker, 33.

87Folker, 33.
126

intelligence, and many current employees pursue continuing studies related 

gence. However, intelligence studies at the university level tend to focus on 

and policy, not on tradecraft. Further, it is questionable whether the fledgl

intelligence studies by itself yet offers the wherewithal to support a claim of e

someone educated in that specialty, except in the narrow, self-assessed area

gence process or organization. Only one non-governmental institution in the 

an undergraduate degree in intelligence research and analysis: Mercyhurst 

Pennsylvania; there, too, advanced studies are offered in conjunction with a la

ment related degree. Within several years, the University of New Mexico expe

undergraduate through doctoral degrees in intelligence; the stated goals of th

are to focus on the tradecraft of strategic intelligence.88 Other institutions, suc

State University in Ohio, are beginning intelligence analysis programs. But 

demic programs are too small and too limited to meet the needs of governm

gence agencies for qualified analysts.

Furthermore, general academic preparation is not enough. Training new 

intelligence analysts in professional tradecraft is a Community responsibility 

tion. Analysts need both specific job-related training and enculturation app

their agencies’ missions. With the investment of adequate resources, including 

opment of modern curricula in intelligence tradecraft, Community training pr

meet these specialized analytic training needs. This investment also can inclu

ing with academic institutions offering “distance learning” programs and othe

outsourcing instructional resources.

The Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Un

Intelligence Community identified several additional actions to improve the 

analysis. These include a minimal prerequisite to visit target countries as part 

orientation, rewards for acquiring and maintaining foreign language proficien

agement to remain within substantive areas of expertise, and periodic rotatio

ments to consumer agencies.89 Enacted as part of employee training and orient

measures can substantially enhance analysts’ target knowledge and skills.

In combination with the right knowledge, skills, abilities, characteristics

odologies, the organizational and structural changes under consideration offer 

ity to genuinely transform the analytic work force. Specific changes in analy

processes, and techniques offer the Intelligence Community a unique opp

rebuild analysis to effectively cope with a changed world. The recognition th

88 James Hold en-Rhodes, personal communications, 11-14 June 2001.

89Aspin-Brown Commission, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. 

(Washington DC, GPO, 1 March 1996), 87.
127

this opportunity. 

However, it remains to be seen whether the agencies and their personn

and able to carry out this essential work. Organizational changes now unde

go far enough. Agency structures remain large and centrally planned

responses to intelligence challenges, as yet undefined, may be required to c

A Community strategy focusing both on what consumers require, and 

sional analytic workforce can be developed is a logical follow-on to the tr

the Intelligence Community already has begun. The results of implementin

egy will be profound, if the transformations remain grounded in mission an

through changes in leadership. In this climate, talented and motivated an

highly knowledgeable about their consumers and their targets will apply rig

techniques to create actionable intelligence for decisionmakers. Under e

ment, analysts will apply critical thinking skills in evaluating their own w

that it is of the highest caliber. As these analysts collaborate extensively acr

gence Community, the example they set will inspire others to excellence

vision a reality requires action. The ideas developed here can be used as a g

and an instrument of change.

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132

LT Michael Bennett enlisted in the Coast Guard in 1991. From 1991 to 1

stationed at Marine Safety Office, Houston, Texas where he responded to oil an

spills and served as a member of a U.S. Customs Assist Team and Boarding T

ber enforcing federal laws and regulations in the Port of Houston/Upper Gal

area. From 1994 to 1998, he was stationed at Marine Safety Office St. Loui

where he worked in the Port Operations Department responding to oil and chem

enforcing federal environmental regulations and acting as the Safety and O

Health Coordinator for the Marine Safety Office and its two detachments loca

enport, Iowa and St. Paul, Minnesota. In 1998, he received a Direct Comm

Lieutenant Junior Grade and was assigned to the Office of Response at C

Headquarters where he assisted with the national and international coordina

Coast Guard's Pollution Response Program and acted as the Coast Guard rep

on the U.S. National Response Team, Response Sub-Committee. Prior to at

Joint Military Intelligence College in 2002, LT Bennett was stationed at Ma

Office/Group Portland, Oregon where he was Assistant Chief of Contingency 

ness and Planning, responsible for coordinating regional efforts relating to Nat

rity, Port Security, Environmental Response, Anti-Terrorism and Force Prot

response to Natural Disasters for the Pacific Northwest
133

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Michael E. Bennett, LT, USCG

The United States Coast Guard (USCG), like many other agencies, ha

significant transformation since 11 September 2001. For example, the ev

intelligence function in the USCG was dramatically hastened, resulting in 

membership in the Intelligence Community by year’s end. The multiple resp

this service are focused on National Defense, Environmental Protection, 

Safety, Security, and Mobility in protecting the expansive U.S. Maritime 

System (MTS), which extends over 95,000 miles of coastline, 360 seaport

lion square miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)1

 Source: Vice Admiral Allen, USCG, 7 October 2002.

1 The EEZ consists of those areas adjoining the territorial sea of the U.S., the 

of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and U.S. ove

and possessions. The EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the U.S. coastlin

sovereign rights over all living and non-living resources in the EEZ. Other nation

freedom of vessel navigation and overflight within the EEZ. See http://www.uscg.m

rel/factfile/Factcards/ Homeland.htm for a description of the USCG Maritime Hom

Strategy.
134

in support of law enforcement operations related to counterdrug and mig

diction. With the migration to the Department of Homeland Security (

membership in the IC, a less sharp line now exists between National Fore

gence and Law Enforcement Intelligence collection because of the need 

anticipate and prosecute illegal international migration, piracy, and oth

tional threats. The USCG is the only organization simultaneously responsi

enforcement, intelligence, and military activities. Title 14 of the U.S. Cod

the Coast Guard with its Law Enforcement and Civil authorities, and Ti

vides this service with National Defense and Military authorities. The fig

depicts the law enforcement/military continuum for these authorities a

strates the placement of USCG intelligence as a bridge between the rea

enforcement and national foreign intelligence.

THE COAST GUARD ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE

The roots of the Coast Guard intelligence function trace back to the Rum 

ing the period of prohibition. From 1920 to 1933, the USCG provided 

 Coast Guard Civil/Military Authorities Source: Vice Admiral Allen, USCG, 7 October 
135

continue intelligence support to its many law enforcement missions, not 

it establish the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), an information f

that provides maritime intelligence support to the National Foreign Intel

munity and Coast Guard commands at the strategic, operational and tac

December 2001, through an amendment to the National Security Act 

USCG officially became a member of the Intelligence Community.3 This 

significantly expands the service's intelligence roles and responsibilitie

to other members. 

In a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, a CIA official 

source for the following observation comparing law enforcement and na

intelligence:

Today there is no clear primacy for either the law enforcement or intell

communities in the realms of international terrorism, narcotics, prolife

well as some areas of counterintelligence). Still, the law enforcement a

gence communities remain designed to operate in fundamentally dissim

ners, retaining different legal authorities, internal modes of organizatio

governing paradigms.4

As an organization straddling the boundaries between the law enforcem

gence communities, the USCG allows for collection of information dom

abroad leading to detection, preemption and deterrence of threats, and w

operations involving crisis and consequence management, and arrest and 

the maritime environment.

ON BECOMING A COMMUNITY MEMBER

Community membership is a win-win for the Coast Guard and the Inte

munity (IC). The IC gets a multi-mission agency with numerous regional

international relationships, combined with extensive law enforcement 

authorities. The Coast Guard receives recognition for their existing efforts 

national collection requirements, a clearly defined mission from the Direc

Intelligence (DCI), and increased resources to support these new mission 

2 Robert E. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coas

the Present (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 89. Also see Eric S. Ens

Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933 (Washington, DC: Joint Military I

lege, 2001).

3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 

sess., 2001, H. Res. 288.

4 Richard A. Best, “Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnation

U.S.,’’ CRS Report for Congress RL30252 (Washington, DC: Congressional Re

Library of Congress, 3 December 2001), 2.
136

development of an infrastructure ready to accept these new duties. How i

Guard handling this new responsibility?

An N2 for the Coast Guard

In October of 2002, the position of Assistant Commandant for Intelligence 

created, elevating the office to a Directorate level within the Coast Guard or

This position is held by Senior Executive Service Officer Mrs. Frances Fragos 

Her position provides direct access to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, 

filling both the N2 (Director of Intelligence) and Naval Security Group (NSG

the Coast Guard. Additionally, Mrs. Townsend and the Commandant of the C

share the responsibility as the service’s Senior Official of the Intelligence C

(SOIC), ensuring compliance with all community tasking and related oversigh

Mrs. Townsend, who came from the Justice Department’s Office of Intellig

Review, is responsible for a burgeoning Intelligence Directorate that could so

more than 150 people at the headquarters level alone. This moves the Intellig

torate out of its longtime position under Coast Guard Operations, significantly 

its responsibilities and expectations, one of them being the development of a 

to support the new mission. 

Establishing a New Career Path

Prior to community membership, being a Coast Guard Intelligence Officer 

been detrimental to one's career. It was not that the job lacked excitement or qu

ple; a recognized career path simply did not exist. An intelligence officer us

from the operational (law enforcement) or marine safety (waterways manage

ronmental response) community, did one tour as an intelligence officer, and 

back to their specialty in order to improve chances for promotion. With the cre

C2, a formal career path now exists for enlisted and officers alike, supported b

developing training and education program. 

A Direct Commission Program for Intelligence Officers seeks qualified 

officer candidates from other services who are interested in a career with the C

and who meet the prerequisites for commissioning (a Baccalaureate degree

with intelligence or law enforcement-related experience). Opportunities als

Officers to engage in post-graduate education at the Joint Military Intelligen

where they can pursue an accredited Master of Science of Strategic Intelligenc
137

National Foreign Intelligence Collection

Recent Coast Guard initiatives combined with current Coast Guard le

have laid a foundation for the collection, fusion, and analysis of informat

of the IC and Department of Homeland Security. With IC members

increase in responsibilities. The DCI will task the Coast Guard based on 

sion recently approved. Additionally, the USCG will continue to support 

collection requirements, but this will be done through its own Intelligence 

Center (ICC) and the development of newly created Maritime Intelligenc

ters (MIFC) and Field Information Support Teams (FIST). The MIFC'

fusion centers on the east and west coast that will collect, analyze and fus

in support of national objectives, and the FIST will collect law enforceme

at strategic economic and military ports throughout the country. 

The USCG is also expanding its visibility in the Community through p

numerous multi-agency operations. Although they have always participat

and regional Joint Terrorism Task Force operations, recent initiatives also 

tional participation with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligen

Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), the U.S. Northern Command, and the C

gence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) and Crime and Ter

(CTC).

Dealing with Congressional Oversight

With Community membership comes Congressional oversight, and 

Guard this means clearly defining the separation between law enforceme

gence Community duties by establishing policies and procedures for collec

agement of information within the service. In order to provide the necess

between these elements and yet maintain the continuity needed for detectio

and deterrence of threats, the Coast Guard has worked closely with the Com

agement Staff and other intelligence organizations to capture best practic

learned in order to avoid the information-sharing pitfalls experienced by o

These lessons learned were then incorporated into the Coast Guard Intellig

Document5 that delineates the role of the Coast Guard Intelligence Org

Capstone Document describes the Coast Guard Intelligence Program as a “

zation consisting of two closely linked parts: the National Intelligence El

Law Enforcement Intelligence Program.’’

5 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Capstone Document, COMDTIN

February 2003 (Washington D.C.). Cited hereafter as Capstone Document.
138

Executive Order 12333 and the National Security Act of 1947, including the 

retention, and dissemination, of national intelligence (foreign intelligence an

intelligence) under those authorities. The National Intelligence Element is 

Intelligence Community and is governed by procedures approved by the Att

eral. The National Intelligence Element consists of only those personnel or c

designated by the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, with the appro

Chief of Staff.

The Law Enforcement Intelligence Program describes the collection, ret

dissemination of information pursuant to Coast Guard law enforcement and 

authority. Persons and components that collect, process and report law e

intelligence and other information, including those persons performing i

functions as a collateral duty, are conducting functions under the Law E

Intelligence Program. These persons and components are not part of the Nat

ligence Element.6

Additionally, under provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT and Homeland S

of 2002 (HLS), the Coast Guard (in addition to other agencies) is required to p

ical information or intelligence, “gathered in the course of operations to enfor

laws,’’ to the DCI. Warning information on foreign or terrorist threats is also 

the Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in 

ment of Homeland Security as required under the Homeland Security Act of 

eign Intelligence is defined in the National Security Act of 1947 as “informatio

the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments, foreign org

foreign persons, or international terrorist activities" related to threats against 

States.’’7 These provisions are designed to eliminate obstacles for sharing la

ment information with the DCI while enhancing the ability of DHS to “conn

between diffuse bits of information’’8 in order to detect and preempt terroris

Prior to 11 September 2001 there was no one agency responsible for coord

task throughout the federal government. In the Coast Guard this responsibility 

ing rests with G-C2. By centralizing the reporting of this information within o

ate, the Coast Guard will be able to reduce circular and duplicate rep

simultaneously measure the effectiveness of Coast Guard information sharing 

6 Capstone Document, Enclosure 1.

7 United States Coast Guard, “Implementation of Mandatory Information Sharin

Under the USA PATRIOT ACT and Homeland Security Act of 2002,’’ Memorandum, 

D.C.): 23 January 2003. Cited hereafter as USCG Memorandum.

8 Richard A. Best, “Homeland Security: Intelligence Support,’’ CRS Report f

RS21283 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 4 M

9 USCG Memorandum.
139

Law Enforcement Intelligence Program, as approved by the Attorney Gen

Guard remains the only federal agency that is simultaneously a law enforce

and intelligence service. Having this capability within the newly created 

Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge now has a powerful tool: the ability t

lyze, and fuse law enforcement intelligence with national foreign intellig

lead to the critical pre-emption of transnational or asymmetric threats to h

rity or to interests abroad. As noted by one senior Coast Guard Intelligence 

different designations of Law Enforcement Intelligence and National Intell

how information is collected and not how it is used.’’10

Avoiding the Pitfalls

A CRS report for Congress has noted that several pitfalls appear “systemi

ligence Community: “lack of preparedness to deal with challenges of global 

ficiencies in budgetary planning, the lack of adequate numbers of linguists, a 

sources, and an unwillingness to share information among agencies.’’11Altho

IC, the Coast Guard is not unversed in some or even all of these problems. On

the Coast Guard has considerable experience is in sharing information with 

As a small agency with limited resources and far-reaching responsibilities, th

has developed extensive partnerships at the federal, state, and local level in o

plish its mission. Most, if not all Coast Guard operations involve multi-age

agency cooperation. However, one aspect needing further attention by the ser

of a formal language-training program. While the Coast Guard does have ling

have attended a formal language school, and even fewer have the requisite s

to meet the standards required of its Defense Department counterparts.

An October 1996 article presaged the difficulties facing a new intelligence 

notes that “launching and maintaining an intelligence system is a complex ta

part is achieving the right level of balance among the key system elements, es

published information, human collection, and analysis.’’12 In other agencies, the 

culture and information-sharing practices have often limited the flow and accur

tion between the analyst and the decisionmaker. As Lowenthal observes, “a dia

producers and consumers should take place after the intelligence has been re

makers should give the intelligence community some sense of how well their re

10 Senior Intelligence Official, at the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Intelligence, int

author, 12 March 2003.

11 Richard A. Best, “Intelligence Issues for Congress,’’ Issue Brief for Congress I

ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 6 March 

12 “Intelligence Pitfalls,’’ Management Review, 85, no. 10 (October 1996): 51.
140

with doctrine, process, and training and education are the key, systematic eleme

provide the necessary balance the Coast Guard needs as a successful member of th

As Amy Zegart concludes, “to do their jobs, national security officials m

themselves with other agencies...their activities inherently overlap and intersect.

worthy benefit of Coast Guard membership in the IC is that the service has n

“owning’’ information. On the contrary, the service has a reputation for sharing 

(while maintaining the necessary safety protections) leading to relationship-b

can provide enhanced detection, pre-emption, and deterrence, while bringing to

ian, law enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies to combat threats to the 

These combined responsibilities to collect, analyze, and fuse law enforcement a

foreign intelligence information rest with an agency that has historically had a re

public trust and confidence.

13 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2d rev ed. (Washingt

Press, 2003) 42.

14 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Cali

ford University Press, 1999), 37.
141

A 

Academia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Blacklisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Distrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Relations with Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 7, 8, 

Council of Intelligence Occupations (CIOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cime and Narcotics Center (CNC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Directorate of Intelligence (DI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Institutional Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Intelligence Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41, 48-53, 56, 6

Leadership Analysis Office (LDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Scholars-in-Residence Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Coast Guard (USCG). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (G-C2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Field Information Support Teams (FIST) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Congressional oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Colby, William. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COLISEUM Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Current Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

D

Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Attaché (DATT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 
142

Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Office for Counterterrorism Analysis (TWC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Operational Intelligence Coordination Center (OICC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Operational Environment Analysis Division (OSJ-2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (DITDS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) . . . . . . . . . 

Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

E

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Executive Order 12333. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

F

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

H

Hitz, Fred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

I

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bangalore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bhaba Atomic Research Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bombay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Mazagon Dockyard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Delhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Nuclear Weapons Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Space Research Organization (ISRO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Intelligence Analysts

Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Core Competencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
143

Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Knowledge Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pitfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

International Studies Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Internet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

J

Jeremiah, Admiral David. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Jervis, Robert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Johnson, Loch K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joint Analysis Center (JAC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joint Terrorism Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joint Terrorism Task Force Combating Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). . . . . . . . . 

K

Kent, Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

L

Law Enforcement Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

M

Malcomb Baldridge National Quality Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maritime Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

McLaughlin, John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Morocco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

N

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Security Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Security Agency (NSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

O

Open Source Information System (OSIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
144

Political Science Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

R

Requests for Information (RFI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rum War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

S

Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sherman Kent School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

T

Title 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Title 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

U

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
145

Pickert, Perry L. Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action, 1997.

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes. James S. Major, ed., 2000.

Ensign, Eric S., LT, USCG. Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 

1920-1933, 2001.

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes, 2nd Ed. James S. Major, ed., 2002.

Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. 

Goldman, ed., 2002.

Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices. Russe

Swenson, ed., 2003.