UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

GLADYS SHELVY, 

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

WAL-MART STORES, EAST, L.P., 

 Defendant.

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WAL-MART STORES, EAST, L.P., 

 Third-Party Plaintiff,

 v. 

U.S. XPRESS ENTERPRISES, INC., 

a Nevada Corporation, 

 Third-Party Defendant.

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No. 11 CV 9176 

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim 

August 7, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

 Before the court is the motion of Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. 

(“Wal-Mart”) requesting an order compelling Plaintiff Gladys Shelvy to authorize 

the production of her employment records from the United States Postal Service 

(“USPS”). For the following reasons the motion is granted in part and denied in 

part: 

 Shelvy alleges that in November 2009, Wal-Mart was negligent because its 

employees failed to adequately secure a trailer loaded with merchandise and that 

she suffered injuries when boxes fell out of the truck and hit her. (See R. 1-1, 
2

Compl.) In her answers to Wal-Mart’s interrogatories, Shelvy disclosed information 

about injuries she suffered prior to the 2009 incident. Specifically, she answered 

that in addition to being in car accidents in 1982, 1991, and 1999, she was also 

injured in 1993 while working for USPS. (R. 154-1, Def.’s Mot., Ex. A at 3.) 

According to Shelvy, a door on a “bar code machine” fell off its hinges and struck her 

back. (Id.) Shelvy said that USPS sent her to a medical clinic, but she could not 

recall the name or location of the facility. (Id.) 

 At the July 1, 2014 status hearing, Wal-Mart reported that it was seeking to 

obtain a copy of Shelvy’s personnel file from USPS. (R. 153.) Shelvy, proceeding 

pro se, responded that she did not oppose the release of medical records but objected 

to the release of her entire personnel file on the basis of relevance. (Id.) In the 

instant motion, Wal-Mart requests that this court order Shelvy to execute a release 

authorizing the production of her USPS personnel file. (R. 154, Def.’s Mot.) Shelvy 

timely filed her response on July 31, 2014. (R. 159, Pl.’s Resp.) 

 According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain 

discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim 

or defense.” Discovery requests are relevant if there is a possibility that the 

information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action. Clark v. 

Ruck, No. 13 CV 3747, 2014 WL 1477925, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations 

omitted). Information sought “need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery 

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
3

 District courts have broad discretion to limit a request for the discovery of 

personnel files in order to prevent the dissemination of employees’ personal or 

confidential information. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec 

Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts are instructed to consider “the 

totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of the material sought against the 

burden of providing it” and taking into account society’s interest in furthering “the 

truth-seeking function” in each particular case. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 

281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

 Wal-Mart argues that Shelvy’s personnel file is relevant because it “may 

contain information concerning [Shelvy’s] physical and mental condition and 

information concerning prior injuries and her credibility[.]” (R. 154, Def.’s Mot. 

¶ 21.) The court finds that information about Shelvy’s pre-existing injuries is 

relevant to causation and damages in this case. See Newman v. McNeil Consumer 

Healthcare, No. 10 CV 1541, 2013 WL 4460011, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013) 

(“Evidence of a possible alternative cause to an injury is relevant if it has any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable.”). 

Wal-Mart is entitled to discover evidence which might support its argument that 

Shelvy’s current injuries were caused by her prior accidents, not by Wal-Mart’s 

actions. See id., 2013 WL 4460011, at *2. Also, if Shelvy’s personnel file shows 

where she was treated after the 1993 accident, such information could lead to the 

discovery of additional medical records which Wal-Mart could then use to determine 

the nature and extent of her 1993 injuries. 
4

 Wal-Mart would still have to show a causal connection between Shelvy’s prior 

accidents and the present injury to introduce pre-accident medical records as 

substantive evidence. See Taylor v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 920 F.2d 1372, 1376 

(7th Cir. 1990). This may be a difficult task given that 16 years elapsed between 

Shelvy’s USPS injury and the 2009 incident at issue here. But relevant evidence 

need not be admissible in order for it to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Furthermore, authorizing the release of medical records in Shelvy’s USPS 

employment records imposes a minimal burden on Shelvy given that USPS 

possesses the records. Accordingly, the court finds that medical records related to 

Shelvy’s on-the-job-injuries, including the 1993 injury, in her USPS personnel file is 

discoverable.1

 While Shelvy’s personnel file may include relevant medical information, the 

non-medical portions of her file are not relevant to the issues in this case. Wal-Mart 

argues that personnel files are discoverable as a general matter, relying on Vodak v. 

City of Chi., No. 03 CV 2463, 2004 WL 1381043, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2004), and 

Smith v. Sharp, No. 11 CV 50382, 2013 WL 2298142, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2013). 

(R. 154, Def.’s Mot. ¶ 19.) Wal-Mart’s reliance on those cases is misplaced, however, 

because both Vodak and Smith involved Section 1983 claims alleging officer 

misconduct. The Vodak and Smith courts found that personnel records were 

relevant to the plaintiff’s policy and practice allegations, as well as for showing the 

 

1 Shelvy provided a signed authorization form releasing all “personnel psychiatric 

records only” to Wal-Mart as a “good faith measure.” (See R. 159, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 29 & 

Ex. 3.) This court therefore finds that Wal-Mart’s motion as it pertains to any 

mental health records is moot. 
5

defendant officers’ involvement in the events at issue. See Vodak, 2004 WL 

1381043, at *5; Smith, 2013 WL 2298142, at *3. Courts have also found personnel 

records to be relevant in discrimination cases because they have a direct bearing on 

the contested issues. See, e.g., Brunker v. Schwan’s Home Serv., 583 F.3d 1004, 

1007 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding personnel files relevant in a discrimination suit 

because the “true reason behind the [adverse] action is the very heart of the case”); 

Lee v. Chi. Youth Ctrs., No. 12 CV 9245, 2014 WL 2618537, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 

2014) (holding personnel records are discoverable in discrimination cases). But this 

case involves neither officer misconduct nor discrimination, and Wal-Mart is 

incorrect to presume that Shelvy’s personnel file is automatically discoverable. 

 Wal-Mart attempts to draw a connection between the non-medical 

information in Shelvy’s personnel file and the issues in this case by arguing that 

such information is relevant to her employability. (See R. 154, Def.’s Mot. ¶ 16.) 

Specifically, Wal-Mart contends that it is entitled to review Shelvy’s work 

attendance history and disciplinary actions in order to assess her future job 

prospects. (Id. ¶ 23.) This court disagrees. Shelvy testified that she left USPS in 

1997 or 1998. (R. 154-2, Def.’s Mot., Ex. B at 26:9-12.) Wal-Mart fails to show how 

her past work performance at USPS sheds any light on her future employability 

when it has been more than 16 years since she last worked there. There is no 

indication that potential future employers would consider, or even have access to, 

this personnel file in deciding whether to hire her. 
6

 Furthermore, Wal-Mart cites no authority to support its assertion that 

Shelvy’s entire personnel file is necessary for a vocational rehabilitation expert to 

render an opinion on her future employability. (See id. ¶ 26.) Vocational experts 

generally opine on the range of jobs available to someone with certain physical or 

mental restrictions and limitations. See Frost v. Teco Barge Line, Inc., No. 04 CV 

752, 2007 WL 518634, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2007). Such an expert is entitled to 

consider, among other things, the physical limitations placed on Shelvy by her 

doctors, functional capacity evaluations, and information gleaned from interviews 

with her. See, e.g., Quirin v. Wingfoot Commer. Tire Sys., LLC, No. 04 CV 2187, 

2006 WL 1084396, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2006); Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 

205, 207 (5th Cir. 1990). But Wal-Mart fails to explain why a vocational expert 

would need to review Shelvy’s attendance history or disciplinary actions that date 

back more than 16 years. Shelvy’s medical records should provide the data the 

expert needs to render an opinion. 

 Wal-Mart also argues that Shelvy’s personnel file is relevant to her claim for 

lost wages. (See R. 154, Def.’s Mot. ¶ 16.) Again, this court disagrees. Shelvy was 

employed by Third-Party Defendant U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. at the time of the 

2009 accident, and as Wal-Mart acknowledges, she is claiming lost wages from her 

job at U.S. Xpress, not USPS. (See id. ¶ 23.) Shelvy’s work at USPS has no impact 

on her claim for wages she would have earned at U.S. Xpress. Indeed, personnel 

files from her post-2009 employers and her file from U.S. Xpress—which Shelvy 
7

notes has already been produced—are far more relevant to determining her 

earnings before and after the 2009 accident. (See R. 159, Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 12-13, 19.) 

 Wal-Mart next points to Shelvy’s May 2013 deposition in which she testified 

that she left USPS because she “didn’t like it anymore.” (R. 154-2, Def.’s Mot., 

Ex. B at 26:15-18.) She said that she “took a constructive discharge,” explaining 

that she tried to leave “while things [were] still okay” and “before on a favorable 

[sic] decision.” (Id. at 26:20-24.) She then testified that she quit her job and was 

not fired. (Id. at 27:1-6.) Wal-Mart argues that her testimony “implies something 

was amiss” and is “tantalizing in its ambiguity,” speculating that Shelvy may have 

left USPS before management could fire her. (R. 154, Def.’s Mot. ¶ 25.) But as 

Shelvy correctly points out, whether she disliked, quit, or was fired from her 

previous job at USPS is irrelevant. (R. 159, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 11.) Unfortunately for 

Wal-Mart, intrigue does not equal relevance, and it is unclear how Shelvy’s 

departure from USPS has anything to do with her claim for lost wages or her 

capacity to perform other work in the future. 

 Nor is this court persuaded that Wal-Mart should gain access to Shelvy’s 

entire personnel file because it is relevant to her credibility. This court will not 

permit Wal-Mart to embark on a fishing expedition based on vague suspicions about 

the “real” reasons why Shelvy left USPS because Wal-Mart has not shown how such 

information is relevant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Furthermore, seeking to 

obtain Shelvy’s employment records for the sole purpose of impeaching her 

credibility is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
8

evidence. See id. A witness may not be impeached by contradiction as to collateral 

or irrelevant matters elicited on cross-examination. See Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 

F.3d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A matter is collateral if the 

impeaching fact could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other 

than to show the contradiction. Id.; United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 806 (7th 

Cir. 1994) (“[O]ne may not contradict for the sake of contradiction; the evidence 

must have an independent purpose and an independent ground for admission.”). 

Because Wal-Mart has not shown that non-medical portions of Shelvy’s USPS 

personnel file are relevant, it is not entitled to discover them. 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, Wal-Mart’s motion to compel is granted in part 

and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent that Shelvy is ordered to 

execute a release authorizing the production of all medical records related to her onthe-job-injuries, including her 1993 injury and all mental health records, contained 

in her USPS employment records. The motion is denied as to the remainder of 

Shelvy’s USPS employment records. 

 ENTER:

 

 ____________________________________ 

 Young B. Kim 

 United States Magistrate Judge