U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward

a New Strategic Framework

by Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

Strategic Forum

P

resident Vladimir Putin’s support for the

global war on terrorism demonstrates

his strong commitment to Russia’s

integration with the West. His determination

has survived several crucial early tests,

notably the U.S. decision to withdraw from

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, U.S. military

deployments to Central Asia, and the

prospect of Baltic states becoming members

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Putin’s new course has not been well

received by the Russian national security

establishment.

The United States cannot take Russia’s

newfound pragmatism for granted. Sustaining

positive relations with Russia will not be

cost-free, but it is a promising investment in

a relationship and a region whose importance after September 11 has taken on a new

meaning. A strong, friendly Russia can help

bolster stability and security in Eurasia and

combat terrorism and proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Russia’s Westward progress would be

encouraged by several developments: a bilateral strategic framework that constrains

American ability to reconstitute a vast nuclear

arsenal and provides reassurances that future

U.S. missile defenses will not negate Russian

retaliatory capabilities; a new NATO-Russia

relationship in the management of European

security affairs; transparency measures concerning U.S. military operations in Central

Asia; and multilateral relief from Soviet-era

debt and other forms of financial assistance

linked to restraints on WMD exports and more

effective controls on weapons-grade material.

In 2001, President Vladimir Putin made a

strategic choice for Russia’s integration with the

West. Indicators of this decision include Putin’s

quest for better relations with the United States

and Europe, his stated commitment to Russian

membership in the World Trade Organization

(WTO), his pursuit of a new relationship with

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

and his almost casual dismissal of the potential

major irritants in the relationship with the

United States and its allies—U.S. withdrawal

from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the

likelihood of Baltic membership in NATO,

sizeable U.S. military deployments to Central

Asia, and a growing U.S. military presence in

Georgia. Putin has unequivocally crossed these

once-insurmountable red lines despite opposition from his closest advisers and the unease of

the Russian public over the American presence

in Russia’s backyard.

The May 2002 summit in Moscow and 

St. Petersburg will take place amid heightened

Russian anxieties and expectations. Russian

elites are eager to see the new strategic framework with the United States but are apprehensive about whether it will meet expectations for

a new post-Cold War relationship with the

Soviet Union’s former enemy. President Putin’s

ability to forge a credible post-Cold War strategic framework with the United States, establish

a new relationship with NATO (which will give

Russia a more prominent voice in European

security affairs), and protect Russian interests

and influence in Central Asia will be an important test not only of the U.S.-Russian relationship but also of Putin’s personal diplomacy.

Putin is approaching these tasks in a

difficult domestic environment. He is nearing

the halfway mark in his first term in office and

is enjoying high personal popularity. His job

performance, however, does not get the same

approval. The two major issues that propelled

him to the Kremlin—Chechnya and law and

order—remain the country’s biggest problems.

Hopes for a speedy resolution for the Chechen

conflict have long faded. President Putin’s

declaration of war against crime in February

2002 only underscored that his campaign

pledge of law and order remains unfulfilled.

The Russian president’s reform agenda

faces strong domestic opposition. His military

reform is getting poor marks and has been

subjected to fierce criticism in the Duma and

in the Russian media. Putin’s domestic reform

plan calls for pain and sacrifice from the

population, and his goal of WTO accession will

encounter stiff opposition from entrenched

domestic corporate and bureaucratic interests.

In addition, his pro-Western foreign policy

course has been controversial with the political

elite and general public. Without strong public

support, the Russian president is in no position

to challenge any of the entrenched bureaucratic or corporate interests in pursuit of his

domestic or foreign policy initiatives.

Putin’s ability to forge a mutually respectful and beneficial relationship with the United

States will be a crucial test for his foreign

policy course. Success—here defined as Putin’s

ability to demonstrate to the Russian public

that Russia maintains a special relationship

with America and remains a powerful voice

in world affairs—would strengthen his

hand domestically. It also would send

a strong signal at home and

abroad that he made the right

No. 192

May 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 192, May 2002 Post-9/11 Critical 

Issues Series
choice for Russia in accepting President George

W. Bush’s invitation to a new strategic relationship in the summer of 2001 and in strongly

backing the United States in the aftermath 

of the events of September 11.

The Stakes 

Why should the United States reward

Russia for its cooperative stance since September 11? After all, Russia has few means at its

disposal to interfere with American freedom of

action in Eurasia. Putin’s diplomatic and

military leverage in Central Asia is limited at

best. The Central Asian states have been sovereign and independent for over a decade, and

the United States has never recognized Russian

aspirations for a hegemonic role in the region.

Moreover, some might argue, Putin’s postSeptember 11 actions have been self-serving.

The U.S. campaign in Afghanistan has eliminated a major security threat to Russia, one

that Russian military presence in Central Asia

had not been able to resolve for over 10 years.

Politically, the war on terrorism is a boon to

the Putin administration as well since it provides a much-needed political fig leaf for the

ugly campaign in Chechnya.

As to President Putin’s pro-Western strategic choice, what is the merit in rewarding it,

especially if we consider Russian options?

Russia has been weakened by a decade-long

decline and retreat and is still reeling from the

domestic socioeconomic impact of post-Communist transition. The country’s only hope of

leapfrogging to the 21st century lies in closer

relations with Europe and America. Its other

strategic options—junior partnership with

China and international isolation—have little

appeal to the Russian public. Furthermore,

rewarding Russia is not cost-free. The costs

entail financial assistance, political commitments that might limit U.S. freedom of action,

and the investment of time and political capital on the part of American leaders, all of

which are finite resources that call for choices

and tradeoffs. Why commit them to Russia,

considering its diminished clout in the international arena and limited ability to help or

harm U.S. interests?

Even a cursory examination of the alternatives should make clear why investing in a

stable and positive relationship with Russia is in

the national interest. We must not take Russia’s

pragmatism and ability to act in its self-interest

for granted. We need to look no further than the

record of Russia adrift throughout the 1990s for

proof. Russia may have achieved a substantial

degree of stability since the nadir of 1998 when

its currency collapsed and its leadership became

mired in a succession of crises and corruption

scandals. However, this achievement and Russia’s constructive stance in the international

arena should not be considered irreversible.

Russia’s ability to act in its self-interest will not

always translate into compliance with U.S.

interests. But dealing with a responsible and

coherent leadership presiding over a stable and

secure Russia is preferable to coping with an

erratic Russia.

In the short and medium term, U.S.

efforts to combat proliferation and terrorism

would face much tougher odds without Russian cooperation. Despite Russia’s diminished

stature in the international arena, its cooperative approach to U.S.-Russian relations since

September 11 has had a positive, soothing

impact on trans-Atlantic relations, making it

possible for the United States in turn to focus

its diplomatic and political energies where they

have been needed most.

The record of the 1990s offers an important lesson: a weak Russia is in the interest of

no one. The ability of Russia to put its own

house in order—from securing its nuclear

weapons to pumping oil and gas to global

markets—is an important element of U.S.

national and international security. The danger

to U.S. interests is not from a potential challenger to President Putin, who might shy away

from a good personal relationship with his

American counterpart, but from Russia failing

to consolidate its political and economic 

accomplishments of the last few years.

In the long run, U.S. interests would be

well served by a cooperative relationship with

Russia, as envisioned by President Bush. Russia

is by no measure likely to regain its global

superpower status. However, as a regional

power, it could be a useful collaborator with the

United States—from helping to balance China

to supplying energy to key markets to exercising restraint in critical areas of conventional

and WMD proliferation. Thus, shaping positive

and collaborative long-term Russian attitudes

is an important U.S. objective.

What the United States and its allies will

be able to do to help bridge the gap between

Russia and the West will pale in comparison

with the task facing the Putin administration

at home. In fact, his greatest challenge is

domestic, because relatively little in the international arena separates Russia from the West.

It is a member of most major international

organizations, and its potential membership in

groups to which it does not yet belong (such as

the WTO) or its relationship with NATO are less

a matter of international negotiation than of

real, domestic transformation, the kind the

United States and its European allies have been

urging Russian leaders to implement.

The linkage between Russia’s internal

transformation and its external direction is

crucial. Success in this endeavor could in turn

enhance the prospects of Russia becoming a

potential partner of the United States. The

tragedy of September 11 has underscored the

truly global nature of American interests. In

the short and medium term, the U.S. campaign

in Afghanistan has demonstrated the

unmatched military might and reach of the

United States. But in the long run, American

ability to protect and advance its interests on a

global scale will require a substantial degree of

burdensharing and cooperation with other

nations. A transformed Russia could be an

important partner in this regard, helping the

United States to project security and stability

throughout much of the Eurasian landmass.

This goal is achievable with patience,

diplomacy, and respect for Russian sensitivities

and interests. U.S.-Russian relations may have

to withstand some tests in the coming months

and years, such as new and unexpected turns

in the global war on terrorism, challenges to

the global nonproliferation regime, or internal

shocks in Russia or elsewhere in Eurasia. The

May summit will present a major opportunity

to steel the relationship against these shocks,

2 Strategic Forum No. 192, May 2002

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Dr. Rumer can be contacted at (202) 685–2369 or rumere@ndu.edu. Richard D. Sokolsky 

is a senior research fellow in the institute, and can be contacted at (202) 685–2249 or sokolskyr@ndu.edu.

the ability of Russia to

put its own house in

order is an important

element of U.S. national

and international security
produce short-term results to meet the immediate concerns of both nations, and cement the

foundation for a reliable and cooperative longterm relationship.

Two Agendas

Russian wishes can be broken down into

several categories: strategic, political, and

economic. From Moscow’s perspective, having

a strategic framework with the United States

has intrinsic value as a symbol of Russia’s

special status. Ideally, that framework should

include legally binding elements that would

constrain the American ability to reconstitute a

vast nuclear arsenal, as well as some reassurances that future U.S. missile defenses will not

negate Russia’s retaliatory capabilities. In

matters of European security, Russia would like

the ability to influence or block NATO decisions. In addition, Moscow would welcome a

measure of confidence that the United States is

not seeking a permanent military presence in

Central Asia. In trade and economic matters,

the Russian wish list includes relief from the

billions in Soviet-era debt that Moscow assumed in exchange for all Soviet property

abroad, as well as reassurances that the United

States will support its bid for WTO membership

on favorable terms.

American interests in Russia in the short

and medium term pertain first and foremost

to Russia’s practically unlimited WMD and

missile proliferation potential. Ending that

proliferation—or at the very least halting

Russia’s most dangerous assistance to rogue

states—and denying terrorist groups access to

Russian WMD assets are top U.S. priorities.

Russia has an equally impressive potential for

conventional weapons sales. Limiting the flow

of Russian advanced conventional weapons to

rogue states or nonstate actors is another

important American objective. The global war

on terrorism requires continuing U.S. military

access to Central Asia. Securing Russian

consent for American use of Russian airspace

and continuing political endorsement for U.S.

initiatives to combat global terrorism are also

important elements of international political

support for U.S. war efforts. Future stages of

the war on terrorism may require United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions;

Russian support in the UNSC may prove an

important element of maintaining the international coalition in current and future

American efforts. Finally, the United States has

an interest in building closer NATO-Russia

cooperation, although not at the expense of a

Russian veto of crucial NATO decisions.

Strategic Framework

Overwhelming U.S. military, economic,

and political superiority has been a growing

Russian concern since the dissolution of the

Soviet Union. The U.S. military prowess and

global reach demonstrated in Iraq, Kosovo, and

Afghanistan have only added to the feeling of

vulnerability harbored by many in Russia’s

national security establishment. The American

decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty has

made Russian strategic planners confront the

specter of losing the remaining Russian leverage vis-à-vis the United States. The U.S. shift

away from negotiated arms control treaties that

constrain its flexibility limits American options

to extend the kind of guarantees about U.S.

intentions desired by the Russian side.

Nonetheless, unilateral declarations about

U.S. objectives and intended actions, transparency, and confidence-building measures

can provide much reassurance. The purpose of

these steps would be to give substance to American rhetoric that the deployment of missile

defenses will not threaten Russia’s strategic

deterrent or confer a unilateral U.S. strategic

advantage over Russia. This goal could be

accomplished, for example, by a high-level

American statement of intent not to deploy

missile defense interceptors in numbers and

locations that could threaten Russia’s strategic

nuclear forces and by the creation of new

bilateral working groups on strategic stability

and missile defenses that would develop concrete proposals for mutual cooperation.

Nuclear Forces

In a bow to President Putin, the United

States appears ready to conclude a legally

binding agreement on strategic force reductions. However, Putin will need to address

Russian domestic concerns about the perceived

U.S. advantage in the area of uploading capabilities (that is, its ability to refit strategic

delivery vehicles rapidly with warheads that

have been decommissioned and placed in

storage). Washington could offer robust transparency and confidence-building measures to

Moscow regarding nondeployed warheads and

U.S. uploading capabilities that would extend

the amount of time that the United States

would need to reconstitute a larger strategic

nuclear force and allow Russia to confirm the

accuracy of the information provided by America. Most notably, for example, the United

States (with reciprocal Russian actions as

appropriate) could agree to:

■ a regular data exchange and confirmatory

measures on changes in the size and composition of

the U.S. warhead inventory, including the total

number of warheads in the active and inactive

stockpiles

■ centralized storage of nondeployed warheads

away from weapons storage areas at operational

bases under mutually agreed monitoring arrangements

■ the placement of more warheads into the

inactive stockpile than is currently planned.

Missile Defenses

Bilateral discussions could explore different types of measures that could help address

Russian concerns, including cooperation on

missile defenses, politically binding declarations on confidence-building and transparency

measures, and assurances.

Missile Defense Cooperation. A new U.S.-

Russian working group on missile defense

cooperation could reexamine the Global Protection System (GPS) concept proposed by the

first Bush administration. As an initial step in

this direction, the United States and Russia

could push their Joint Data Exchange Center,

which focuses on sharing early warning information, in the direction of multilateral cooperation on missile defense. Even if agreement

on a more ambitious GPS ultimately stumbles

over the same issues that stymied its progress 

a decade ago—joint development, operation,

and control—the American gesture will 

resonate with Russia. Over the longer term,

potential cooperative measures might build on

the concept of putting ground-based interceptors in Russia and elsewhere to intercept rogue

missiles in boost phase or on Putin’s June 2000

No. 192, May 2002 Strategic Forum 3

American interests in

Russia in the short and

medium term pertain first

and foremost to Russia’s

practically unlimited

WMD and missile

proliferation potential
4 Strategic Forum No. 192, May 2002

proposal to work with NATO to create “an antirocket defense system for Europe.”

One relatively unexplored area of ballistic

missile defense (BMD) cooperation with Russia

is cooperation in the NATO context. Such

collaboration could focus on multilateral

exercises and simulations similar to those

conducted in the bilateral U.S.-Russian theater

missile defense (TMD) exercise program. In the

long run, the program could be expanded to

include sharing early warning data within a

NATO-Russia framework, developing cooperative research and development projects for

TMD, acquiring Russian theater BMD systems,

and establishing a NATO-Russia TMD brigade

in the context of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation in regional peacekeeping operations.

Transparency and Assurances. The

objective of any transparency regime should be

to reassure Russia that American plans to

deploy a limited missile defense system will not

threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent. The Confidence Building Measures Agreement, which

was a part of the 1997 U.S.-Russian TMD

Demarcation Agreement, could serve as a

model for a credible transparency regime for

missile defenses. Starting with this approach as

a baseline, the U.S. Government could consider

additional measures to help dispel Russian

suspicion of American intentions.

In addition to U.S. statements regarding

plans, programs, and intentions for missile

defense and visits to missile defense facilities,

Washington could offer Moscow an agreement

to monitor interceptor production facilities (for

example, Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring). These arrangements also could be

supplemented by a robust data exchange,

including notifications of movements of interceptors to operational sites and changes in the

status of operational deployments. To further

assuage Russian concerns, information must

be supplied to Russia regularly on the status of

deployed and nondeployed interceptors.

Focusing Defenses against Rogue States.

American options to address Russian interest in

quantitative limits on U.S. missile defense

deployments are likely to fall far short of meeting Russian desires. However, the United States

might make a gesture that would give substance to the statements that U.S. missile defenses will not undermine Russia’s strategic

deterrent. For example, it could unilaterally

declare that it will deploy those missile defenses

necessary to defend against limited strikes by

rogue states and scale the level of its deployments accordingly. By making this linkage, the

United States would send a clear signal that

Russian cooperation in limiting the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass

destruction that they may carry will affect the

scale of U.S. missile defenses.

Central Asia

The Russian military and other members

of the national security bureaucracy have been

wary of U.S. intentions in Central Asia. They

see the growing American military presence

there as a threat to Russian influence and

political, economic, and security interests. Even

though Russia and the United States want to

enhance the stability and security of the region,

skeptics of Putin’s pro-American tilt fear that

the United States will someday use its enhanced

presence and influence in the region to gain

unilateral advantage over Russia.

Russian fears are longstanding and predate Operation Enduring Freedom. It would

take a full U.S. withdrawal from the region—

which is in the interest of neither America nor

Russia—to lay them to rest completely. However, the United States could offer a number of

transparency and confidence-building measures, beyond requirements of the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Vienna Document, along with some multilateral military activities in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace (PFP), to help alleviate

Russian concerns. In theory, the range of such

measures is broad:

■ making high-level statements that the

United States has no plans to maintain a permanent military presence in Central Asia

■ informing the OSCE Forum on Security

Cooperation (FSC) of U.S. military assets in 

the region

■ notifying the FSC of planned military

exercises with host country forces and of changes in

U.S. deployments or major military movements in

and out of the region

■ inviting Russia to participate in multilateral

“spirit of PFP” exercises in the region or observe

bilateral U.S. military exercises with host country

forces

■ agreeing to the presence of Russian military

observers, based at local Russian embassies, at

Central Asian military facilities for liaison and

observation purposes.

Analyzing the desirability of such measures, we need to weigh a number of potential

pitfalls. In particular, avoiding measures that

could hamstring U.S. military operations or

compromise operational security would be

critical. Making notifications after the fact, such

as for military movements, or establishing

thresholds for the exchange of data on exercises, would avoid many of the common operational problems associated with data exchanges.

Host countries are likely to be sensitive

about allowing Russia to expand its own regional presence along the lines described

above. The United States needs to consult in

advance with these countries to explain the

rationale for the transparency proposal and

seek their support. Finally, implementing this

regime will impose extra administrative burdens on U.S. military personnel. However, these

new requirements should not be overly taxing

and would be outweighed by the political

benefits of expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation

in Central Asia.

Debt Relief

The leakage of nuclear material and

WMD technology and expertise from Russia to

countries of concern remains a major problem

in U.S.-Russian relations and a significant

threat to U.S. national security. The past decade

has seen important progress in protecting

Russian nuclear material from theft and diversion and preventing Russian brain drain. But

the magnitude of this problem and the resources required to deal with it effectively

warrant a greater U.S. investment. One potentially promising tool that could be explored in

this context is American forgiveness of Russia’s

Soviet-era debt (roughly $4 billion including

principal plus interest) in return for specific

Russian actions (such as more effective safeguards on weapons-grade material).

the objective of any

transparency regime

should be to reassure

Russia that American

plans to deploy a limited

missile defense system

will not threaten Russia’s

strategic deterrent
The idea of debt forgiveness is likely to be

controversial. In 1992, Russia assumed all

Soviet debt in exchange for the right to keep all

Soviet property abroad. Consequently, debt

forgiveness by the United States would undermine the previous arrangement and put other

states of the former Soviet Union at a comparative disadvantage. Russian finances no longer

warrant debt forgiveness on humanitarian or

economic grounds. Many nations have found

themselves in dire financial circumstances but

have not been a proliferation risk. Thus, ironically, Russia would be rewarded for its irresponsible behavior in the area of proliferation.

On balance, the prospect of encouraging

responsible Russian behavior is worth the risk

of moral hazard. Accordingly, the United States

should announce that it is prepared to fund

$300 million a year in debt forgiveness between

now and 2020 that would free an equal

amount of Russian resources for programs to

reduce proliferation risks. The United States

should also invite other creditors to participate

in a multilateral debt-forgiveness-for-nonproliferation initiative. Since foreign creditors hold

most of Russia’s Soviet-era debt, such an initiative would be highly attractive to Russia.

The devil, of course, will be in the details.

Agreement will need to be reached on what type

of U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction

(CTR) programs will be funded with this

money. Additionally, the United States and

Russia will need to agree on the amount of

money to be allocated for specific programs; a

timetable for deliverables with agreed program

milestones; and provisions for monitoring,

accountability, and penalties in the event of

nonperformance of contractual obligations.

Furthermore, procedures will need to be worked

out to mitigate the effects of debt forgiveness on

the U.S. budget and on Russia’s international

credit rating. The administration will need to

consult and coordinate with other creditors and

Congress, since debt forgiveness would require

Congressional authorization and appropriation. If these hurdles prove too difficult to

overcome, the United States and other creditor

nations should consider a substantial boost in

direct assistance for CTR programs, once Russian compliance problems with existing arms

control commitments are resolved.

Iran and WMD

Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear

weapons and missile development programs

poses a major obstacle to improving U.S.-

Russian relations and, more importantly, a

significant challenge to U.S. global nonproliferation policy. Iranian WMD acquisition would

threaten the security of the United States and

its allies and friends throughout the Middle

East. It also would advance Iran’s geopolitical

aspirations of dominating the Persian Gulf and

driving a wedge between the United States and

its Gulf Cooperation Council partners. Without

Russian transfer of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies, it would be far more difficult

and time-consuming for Iran to develop advanced WMD capabilities. Therefore, cutting off

such assistance should remain a high priority

for the United States and a central factor in

shaping the U.S.-Russian relationship.

To date, U.S. efforts to halt Russian transfers of WMD technologies to Iran generally

have been unsuccessful for two reasons. First,

Russian WMD assistance to Iran serves powerful Russian bureaucratic, economic, and

geopolitical interests. The United States has yet

to offer Russia sufficient positive incentives that

would offset the value of such assistance. Second, the use of sanctions has poisoned the

atmosphere for Russian cooperation and, in

some cases, led to a hardening of Russian

positions. Almost without exception, the limited

extent of U.S. economic and commercial relations with Russia deprives Washington of any

significant leverage over Russian WMD assistance to Iran.

Coming up with the right combination of

incentives for Russia to change its policy toward Iran is no guarantee of success, but not

doing so is a sure recipe for failure. If ending

Russian WMD assistance to Iran is an urgent

national security priority (and it should be),

the United States should be prepared to pay a

high price to achieve this objective. At the same

time, the United States can neither submit to

Russian blackmail nor compromise other core

security interests in pursuit of a U.S.-Russian

deal on Iran and WMD.

The United States has several options to

elicit greater Russian cooperation on Iran.

First, the United States should act more aggressively in obtaining European support in working both the supply and demand sides of the

equation. The high priority that Putin assigns

to integrating Russia into Europe gives America’s European allies considerable leverage over

Russian policies. In particular, Europe and the

United States need to deliver a clear message to

Russia that it cannot have the kind of relationship that it seeks with the West if it continues to

supply Iran with dangerous WMD technologies.

Thus, the United States should urge its European allies to condition their growing economic, commercial, and energy ties with

Russia upon concrete Russian actions to cut off

WMD assistance to Iran. The United States

likewise should encourage European countries

to link their budding relations with Iran to its

restraint in acquiring WMD. Europe must

receive the clear message that if it hopes to

influence the evolving U.S. policy toward

Iran—as well as the evolution of the U.S.

missile defense system, which is intended in

part to counter Iranian WMD-armed ballistic

missiles—it needs to accept responsibility for

halting or slowing Iran’s WMD programs.

Second, the United States might be well

advised to draw a clearer connection between its

missile defense program, including the

prospects for U.S.-Russian BMD cooperation,

U.S. strategic force reductions, and Russian

WMD assistance to Iran. Iranian success in

acquiring long-range ballistic missiles for

delivery of WMD will be a key driver of the scope

and capabilities of a U.S. missile defense system.

It also will affect U.S. willingness to reduce the

large strategic reserve force that it is keeping as

a hedge against uncertain WMD threats such as

Iran. Washington should emphasize to Moscow

that in return for concrete actions to cut off

WMD assistance to Iran, the United States

would consider more favorably Russian proposals to limit future missile defense deployments

and to reduce the size of its strategic reserve

force. Similarly, we need to emphasize to Russia

that we cannot discuss more advanced forms of

U.S.-Russian cooperation in developing missile

defenses as long as it transfers sensitive WMD

technologies to Iran.

Third, progress could be made by putting

on the table a package of substantial financial

incentives to compensate Russia for the economic losses that it would suffer from ending

No. 192, May 2002 Strategic Forum 5

if ending Russian WMD

assistance to Iran is an

urgent national security

priority, the United States

should be prepared to

pay a high price to

achieve this objective
its WMD assistance to Iran. Much of this increased assistance should be focused on Russian scientists engaged in the nuclear and

missile trade with Iran. It also should be used

to help Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy to

downsize, streamline, and rationalize Russia’s

bloated and inefficient nuclear infrastructure.

Finally, creative thinking might offer

promise. Other issues may be of greater importance to Russia than supplying nuclear and

missile technologies to Iran. In addition to the

tradeoffs between U.S. missile defense policy

and Russian WMD assistance to Iran sketched

out above, these might include early entry into

the WTO on terms favorable to Russia; greater

access to Western investment and technology;

debt relief; and a more equal partnership

between NATO and Russia. The United States

should explore the possibility of leveraging

these crosscutting issues to alter unacceptable

Russian WMD policies toward Iran. In general,

however, the disincentive that offers the greatest

prospect of success is foreclosing future forms

of cooperation that would benefit Russia rather

than curtailing ongoing programs.

Cooperation on Iraq

Iraq is another major item on the U.S.-

Russian bilateral agenda where a broad range

of security, political, energy, and economic

issues converge. Iraq has long been a highly

contentious issue in U.S.-Russian bilateral

relations, fairly characterized for most of the

post-Gulf War period as an impasse. The new

chapter in U.S.-Russian relations has presented

opportunities to break this deadlock while

satisfying U.S. and Russian interests yet minimizing the risk of jeopardizing the overall

relationship between Washington and Moscow.

The most promising signals from Russia

on the subject of Iraq have come from President Putin himself. A careful reading of the

president’s statements on Iraq, echoed by some

of Russia’s top officials, suggests strongly that

the Kremlin is open to a compromise on this

issue, whether in the context of a UN sanctions

regime or even the global war on terrorism and

regime change in Iraq.

Senior Russian officials, including President Putin, have made it clear that they would

not stand in the way of U.S. use of force against

Iraq, with the provision that important Russian

interests in Iraq are accommodated. Russian

officials also have made it abundantly clear

that U.S. action against Iraq would not undermine the improving relationship with the

United States and would not disrupt Russian

cooperation with the United States in the global

war against terrorism. Russian interests in Iraq

and conditions for condoning U.S. military

action against Iraq fall mainly into two categories: political and economic.

Russia’s residual great power aspirations

and desire for a voice in the international

arena top the list of its political concerns with

regard to Iraq. A major policy decision on Iraq,

made by the United States without consulting

Russia, would be seen as a sign of Moscow

being marginalized. Having a seat at the table

and a vote when the fate of Iraq—one of the

most important issues facing the international

community—is being decided matters more to

the Putin administration than the actual fate

of Iraq and the substance of that decision.

But Russian political stakes in Iraq are

not limited to recognition and reaffirmation

of Russian great power status. Protecting

Russian economic and commercial interests

in Iraq is a political objective as well. Russian

economic stakes in Iraq include the longstanding Iraqi debt to Russia, estimated at

approximately $7 billion, for past weapon

deliveries; exploration and production contracts awarded to Russian oil companies by

the Iraqi government; and trade with Iraq

under the oil-for-food program. Protecting

these interests undoubtedly is an important

domestic political concern for the Putin administration because behind them stand some

of the richest and most powerful lobbies in

Russian domestic politics: the energy sector

and the arms manufacturers and exporters.

Given these concrete and clearly identifiable Russian stakes in Iraq, accommodation

with Russia on Iraq should be explored. Clearly,

the United States cannot allow Russia to 

exercise a veto over a U.S. decision to use force

against Iraq. Moreover, Russian consent to U.S.

use of force against Iraq would not be cost-free.

These costs would entail a number of political

commitments on the part of the United States to

recognize and respect Russian economic and

political interests in Iraq. For example, the

United States probably would need to offer its

support for Russian claims for repayment of

debt by a future post-Saddam Iraqi government;

similar commitments would need to be extended to the Russian government with regard

to contracts held by Russian oil companies.

At the same time, Russian cooperation on

Iraq would bring considerable political benefits. Russian support for U.S. policy toward Iraq

would send some extremely important signals:

to Iraq’s leadership, that the regime’s long-time

key source of international support has been

lost and that it is now facing a united international community and UNSC; to those European allies who have reservations about the use

of military force against Saddam’s regime, that

they no longer have the pretext of Russian

obstructionism to excuse their own lack of

support for U.S. policy; and to China, that it

runs the risk of isolation in the UNSC, a

prospect that Chinese leaders have traditionally

sought to avoid. Thus, getting Russia on board

with American policy in Iraq could be a pivotal

step in sustaining the international coalition

that emerged at the outset of the global war on

terrorism. Russian agreement to expand oil

production and exports could also help to

mitigate oil price increases if U.S. military

action causes a temporary disruption of Iraqi

oil exports or other disturbances in the international oil market.

Energy Cooperation

Circumstances appear ripe for the United

States and Russia to expand energy security

cooperation. President Putin attaches great

economic and political importance to expanding Russia’s role in the international oil market. Russian oil companies, which entertain

hopes of displacing Saudi Arabia as the world’s

largest oil producer, have improved their management and business practices as well as the

efficiency of their operations. Although more

needs to be done to create a better environment

for foreign investment in Russia’s energy sector,

progress has been made in liberalizing production-sharing arrangements and creating a

more hospitable environment for foreign investment through changes in tax laws and

regulations. Nonetheless, it will take billions of

dollars in additional foreign investment to

6 Strategic Forum No. 192, May 2002

senior Russian officials,

including President Putin,

have made it clear that

they would not stand 

in the way of U.S. use 

of force against Iraq
achieve a significant expansion in Russian oil

production capacity and exports, which are

limited primarily by bottlenecks in the transportation infrastructure and lack of access to

Western oil technology. At the same time, there

is growing interest in the United States in

reducing dependence on oil imports from

Saudi Arabia and, more broadly, in diversifying

sources of energy supplies.

One idea, which has been advocated by

some energy experts, is for the United States to

purchase Russian oil, under long-term supply

arrangements, to increase the size of the U.S.

Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which

currently holds 500 million barrels, or approximately a 90-day supply of imports.1 Doubling

the stockpile to 1 billion barrels and purchasing half of this increase from Russian stocks

would yield Russia several billion dollars. In

addition, the United States should urge other

countries to increase purchases of Russian oil

to augment their national stockpiles of oil

reserves. These actions could be contingent on

Russian agreement to remove many of the

restrictions that discourage foreign investment

in the Russian oil industry.

There are several advantages to this proposal. Augmenting the SPR with Russian oil

would provide enhanced energy security, and

such purchases could be designed to help

Russia during a time of market weakness.

Increased global stockpiling would supplement

oil inventories available in a crisis; reduce the

need for the United States and other International Energy Agency countries to increase their

own stocks to cover a rise in world oil demand;

eliminate a potentially dangerous competition

for oil supplies in a crisis; and reduce Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries leverage over the global oil market. Although it

would require a change in policy on the use of

the SPR, coordinated management of all these

stocks would provide a more flexible tool for

influencing the global price of oil.

This initiative, however, has some potential drawbacks. Expanding the stockpile is

expensive, and U.S. oil companies are likely to

object if the administration gives Russia preferential treatment in making new purchases. The

costs to emerging economies of increased

stockpiling could be prohibitive. Finally, as

noted above, use of the American and other

national stockpiles for any purpose other than

insurance against a major supply disruption

would require a major change in policy that

could arouse controversy here and abroad. 

Chechnya

Arguably, the most difficult issue on the

U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda is Chechnya. The

plight of Chechen civilians and reports of

widespread abuses of human rights by the

Russian military cannot be ignored. As the

challenge of bridging the gap between Russia

and the West becomes increasingly a matter of

Russian domestic transformation (a fact that is

evidently recognized by members of the Russian elite), Chechnya becomes one of the largest

obstacles to Russia’s Westward progress.

Chechnya is first and foremost a domestic

political issue for Russia and Putin. Widespread

reports in the Russian press raise doubts about

the extent of the Kremlin’s political control of

the military in Chechnya. One of Putin’s greatest challenges in Chechnya appears to be

asserting full control of the military.

Given President Putin’s personal political

investment in the Chechnya issue, he probably

needs little encouragement to seek an end to

the conflict. It is unlikely that a high-profile

public campaign by the United States to push

the Kremlin toward settlement could prove

productive or generate anything other than

Russian resentment. Conditioning better relations with Russia on progress in Chechnya

would be counterproductive. It appears far

more promising to use improved U.S.-Russian

relations to encourage responsible Russian

behavior there.

The recent U.S. decision to step up security assistance to Georgia in the Pankisi

Gorge—a region reportedly used by Chechen

fighters as a refuge and staging area for attacks on Russian troops in Chechnya—should

help stabilize the situation and hopefully

remove a major irritant in Russian-Georgian

relations. The Kremlin’s reserved reaction to

the unprecedented U.S. deployment in Georgia

(a potentially neuralgic issue in Russian

domestic politics) suggests that Russian leaders understand the benefit to Russian security

from this move.

Beyond that, the United States should

continue to exert quiet diplomatic pressure on

the Putin administration, as well as on the

Chechen leadership, to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict, while making it clear that

it is an internal Russian matter and that Russian territorial integrity is not an issue as far as

the United States is concerned. Engagement

and improved relations with Russia offer a far

more realistic chance of promoting peace in

Chechnya than coercion or withholding acceptance of President Putin, whose hand in

dealing with this thorny issue could only be

weakened by such tactics.

The United States enjoys a clear strategic

advantage vis-a-vis Russia: it is in the driver’s

seat in this bilateral relationship and does not

have to take any of the initiatives outlined

above to maintain its position of unparalleled

strategic superiority. Nor are those steps guaranteed to result in a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. Furthermore, they may,

as has happened in the past, ultimately produce little more than frustrations and paralysis

once the two countries try to implement them.

However, the steps discussed here entail

relatively few risks for the United States and

offer a considerable upside: the promise of

realizing President Bush’s vision of a stable,

cooperative, and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. Moreover, while they do not

address fully all Russian concerns, they do offer

the Russian side a number of important advantages and the best guarantee for Russia and

President Putin of a predictable, good—even

special—relationship with the United States.

Few predicted the Soviet Union’s demise

15 years ago at the outset of Mikhail

Gorbachev’s reforms, and few can predict

Russia’s future 15 years from now. It could

emerge as a significant Eurasian power, or it

could continue its decline. The agenda described here will position the United States to

meet the challenge of either outcome.

Note1

This discussion draws heavily on a recent Council 

on Foreign Relations report by the Task Force on Strategic

Energy Policy: “Challenges for the 21st Century,” available at

<http://www.cfr.org>

No. 192, May 2002 Strategic Forum 7

engagement and

improved relations with

Russia offer a far more

realistic chance of

promoting peace in

Chechnya than coercion
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8 Strategic Forum No. 192, May 2002

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members of the National Defense University as well as

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from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding 

the Strategic Consensus

Joseph McMillan

(No. 186, November 2001)

China: Making the Case for Realistic

Engagement

Michael E. Marti

(No. 185, September 2001)

Do European Union Defense Initiatives

Threaten NATO?

Kori N. Schake

(No. 184, August 2001)

Regional Conflicts with Strategic

Consequences

M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and 

Richard D. Sokolsky

(No. 183, July 2001)

A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps 

in U.S.-Indian Relations

John C. Holzman

(No. 182, July 2001)

Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: 

Can It be Severed?

Kimberley L. Thachuk

(No. 191, May 2002)

Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the

Korean Peninsula

James J. Przystup

(No. 190, March 2002)

Homeland Security: The New Role 

for Defense

Steven J. Tomisek

(No. 189, February 2002)

U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization 

in the Future?

Judith S. Yaphe

(No. 188, January 2002)

Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: 

A Neglected Challenge

John F. Reichart

(No. 187, December 2001)