[Cite as State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, 126 Ohio St.3d 483, 2010-Ohio4450.] 

THE STATE EX REL. KNOWLTON v. NOBLE COUNTY BOARD 

OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

126 Ohio St.3d 483, 2010-Ohio-4450.] 

Sheriffs — Qualifications for office — Postsecondary-education requirement — 

R.C. 311.01(B)(9) — Writ of prohibition to prevent certification of writein candidate denied. 

(No. 2010-1512 — Submitted September 16, 2010 — Decided 

September 22, 2010.) 

IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 

___________________ 

 Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for writs of prohibition and 

mandamus to prevent respondents, the Noble County Board of Elections and its 

members, from certifying Stephen S. Hannum’s write-in candidacy for the office 

of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 general election. Because the 

board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 

311.01(B)(9) or 3513.04 by certifying Hannum’s candidacy, we deny the writ of 

prohibition. We dismiss the mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction. 

Facts 

Candidacy for Primary Election 

{¶ 2} In May 2009, Stephen S. Hannum was appointed Noble County 

sheriff after Landon Smith resigned. Relator, Denny R. Knowlton Jr., a registered 

Democrat and Noble County resident, filed a protest pursuant to R.C. 3513.05 to 

prevent the board of elections and its members from placing Hannum’s name on 

the primary-election ballot. Knowlton claimed that Hannum did not meet the 
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qualifications in R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate for sheriff. 

Knowlton was the other candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for 

sheriff. 

{¶ 3} At a hearing before the board of elections on Knowlton’s protest, 

Hannum admitted that he had not served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal 

or above for the period of time specified in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). In attempting to 

satisfy the alternative postsecondary-education requirement in R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(b), Hannum submitted two uncertified copies of his academic 

record from Washington State Community College in Marietta, Ohio. The 

transcripts indicated that Hannum had earned a total of 92 credits, including three 

for a life-experience portfolio and the remaining 89 credits for life experience, 

with 29 of those credits for Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy (“OPOTA”) 

courses, which were designated as “OPOTA I,” “OPOTA II,” and “OPOTA III.” 

At the hearing, Hannum claimed that 72 credit hours at Washington State 

Community College were equivalent to two years of postsecondary education. At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the board denied Knowlton’s protest against 

Hannum’s candidacy. 

Knowlton I 

{¶ 4} Knowlton filed an expedited election action in this court for writs 

of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the board and its members from 

certifying Hannum’s candidacy for the Democratic Party nomination for Noble 

County sheriff and placing his name on the May 4, 2010 primary-election ballot. 

{¶ 5} In State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 82, 2010-Ohio-1115, 926 N.E.2d 284 (“Knowlton I”), we granted the 

requested writ of prohibition to prevent Hannum’s candidacy at the primary 

election. We held that “the board and its members abused their discretion and 

clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Knowlton’s protest and 
January Term, 2010 

3

certifying Hannum’s candidacy for sheriff at the May 4 primary election because 

Hannum did not satisfy any of the three categories in that subsection.” Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶ 6} More specifically, we held that Hannum had failed to satisfy the 

postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because at least 29 

credits had been earned for ineligible peace-officer training: 

{¶ 7} “Notwithstanding the board’s suggestions to the contrary, the 

evidence before the board at the protest hearing supports the conclusion that 

Hannum has double-counted credits earned for peace-officer training contrary to 

our decision in [State ex rel.] Wellington [v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 

Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641]. The OPOTA courses 

specified on the transcripts that Hannum submitted refer to courses he has taken at 

the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy. In fact, the board and its members do 

not claim that “OPOTA” refers to anything other than academy courses. These 

courses are manifestly for ‘peace officer training,’ which, according to 

Wellington, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, at ¶ 30, do not 

constitute course credit that can satisfy the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondaryeducation requirement. 

{¶ 8} “Therefore, because 29 credits that Hannum earned were for 

peace-officer training, they could not be counted toward the postsecondaryeducation requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). Furthermore, any other ‘lifeexperience’ credits related to his job as a peace officer were also ineligible for 

credit under R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already accounts for 

Hannum’s employment as a peace officer. A contrary holding would render R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(b) superfluous in these circumstances and would permit 

postsecondary-education credit even though it duplicates other distinct criteria in 

R.C. 311.01(B) for qualification as a candidate for sheriff. Thus, Hannum earned 

at most only 63 credits, which, by his own testimony at the protest hearing, is 
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insufficient to satisfy the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(b).” Id. at ¶ 32-33. 

Candidacy for General Election 

{¶ 9} On July 26, 2010, Hannum filed a declaration of intent to be a 

write-in candidate for Noble County sheriff. Knowlton asked the board of 

elections whether it had sought information from Hannum relating to his 

qualifications for his write-in candidacy, and the board then requested that 

Hannum “provide evidence of the qualifications he has acquired that were 

deemed lacking by the Supreme Court.” 

{¶ 10} On August 13, 2010, Knowlton filed a protest with respondent 

Noble County Board of Elections against Hannum’s candidacy. Knowlton 

claimed that Hannum did not meet the postsecondary-education requirement of 

R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) and that R.C. 3513.04 barred his candidacy at the general 

election after he had unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Party nomination for 

the same office at the preceding primary election. In his protest, Knowlton 

claimed that it was filed pursuant to R.C. 3519.16. 

{¶ 11} On August 24, the board of elections held a hearing on Knowlton’s 

protest against Hannum’s write-in candidacy. Hannum requested that Knowlton’s 

protest be denied because the protest erroneously referred to R.C. 3519.16 and 

thus failed to properly invoke the board’s authority. The board noted the 

objection but decided to allow the parties to address the merits of the protest and 

to decide the protest on the merits. 

{¶ 12} At the hearing, Knowlton presented no witnesses but submitted 

uncertified copies of Hannum’s transcript from Washington State Community 

College dated January 26 and February 22, 2010. Knowlton also submitted a 

letter dated August 12, 2010, in which Michael D. Whitnable, the registrar of the 

community college, stated that “the minimum of 90 credit hours at Washington 

State Community College would be equivalent to a two year post secondary 
January Term, 2010 

5

education.” The registrar, however, did not indicate whether these two years of 

postsecondary education were either the minimum required for the school or for 

the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-education requirement. 

{¶ 13} Hannum submitted both testimonial and documentary evidence. 

An August 18, 2010 college transcript established that by June 2010, Hannum had 

earned 14 credits in addition to the 92 credits he had previously earned that were 

considered by the court in Knowlton I, which represented a total of 106 credits 

earned by him at Washington State Community College. The 106 credits 

included the 29 credits for OPOTA courses that constituted peace-officer training 

and were held by the court in Knowlton I to be ineligible to be counted toward the 

postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). 

{¶ 14} In an August 19, 2010 letter from the college registrar to the board 

of elections, the registrar verified that Hannum was considered by the school to 

have completed the equivalent of two years of postsecondary education and that 

students at the school are required to carry a minimum of 12 credit hours per 

quarter to be considered full-time students: 

{¶ 15} “Please be advised that Stephen S. Hannum is considered to have 

completed the equivalent of two years post-secondary education at Washington 

State Community College. Mr. Hannum has not completed an associate degree. 

Students must carry a minimum of 12 credit hours per quarter to be considered 

full-time. 

{¶ 16} “Courses with the grade of L ‘Life Experience,’ are applicable 

towards a college degree just the same as if the course was graded with a letter of 

A, B, or C. 

{¶ 17} “All degree programs offered at Washington State Community 

College are approved by the Ohio Board of Regents.” 

{¶ 18} Hannum testified that if the 29 credits for OPOTA courses were 

deducted from his total of 106 credits earned from Washington State Community 
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College, he would still have 77 credits, which exceeds the 72 credit hours 

required for two years of postsecondary education. According to Hannum’s 

counsel in his argument before the board of elections at the protest hearing, this 

calculation of 72 hours is based on 12 hours per quarter to be a full-time student 

with three quarters per year for two years. Hannum further testified that the lifeexperience credits that he earned for criminal-justice courses came from his 

experiences before January 2007. 

{¶ 19} At the conclusion of the hearing, the board of elections denied 

Knowlton’s protest. As detailed in a subsequent written decision, the board 

concluded that Hannum had met the educational requirements of R.C. 

311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible sheriff’s candidate and that R.C. 3513.04 did not 

bar his write-in candidacy. More specifically, the board made the following 

pertinent findings: 

{¶ 20} “3. Washington State Community College is a duly authorized and 

registered post secondary institution governed by the Ohio Board of Regents, and 

authorized to grant post secondary credit for degrees or elective course work. 

{¶ 21} “4. Twelve credit hours per quarter is required to maintain full 

time student status, thus requiring 36 hours per year or 72 hours over the course of 

two years to qualify as two years of full time post secondary education. 

{¶ 22} “5. All courses for grade or by portfolio were approved by an 

instructor and defined by course syllabus. 

{¶ 23} “6. Excluding the 29 hours of OPOTA course work, Respondent 

has completed 77 hours of post secondary education as of June 16, 2010. 

{¶ 24} “7. The Board further finds that §3513.04 ORC is interpreted by 

the Secretary of State’s Office to incorporate not only the initial petition for 

nomination in a primary but also the submission of the candidate’s name to the 

voters for a decision. This interpretation has been the standard interpretation of 

the Secretary of State for more than 23 years. The Board of Elections handbook 
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7

states that a candidate must run and lose a primary election before becoming 

ineligible to run as a write-in candidate in the general election, found in EL 24. 

{¶ 25} “8. Respondent was not permitted to seek nomination on the 

primary ballot due to a lack of post secondary educational requirements, which 

has now been cured as of June 16, 2010.” 

Knowlton II 

{¶ 26} On August 27, Knowlton filed this action for writs of mandamus 

and prohibition to prevent the board and its members from certifying Hannum’s 

write-in candidacy for the office of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 

general election. The board and its members filed an answer, and we granted 

Hannum’s motion to intervene. The parties submitted evidence and briefs 

pursuant to the accelerated schedule for expedited election cases in S.Ct.Prac.R. 

10.9. 

{¶ 27} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 

merits. 

Legal Analysis 

Mandamus

{¶ 28} Knowlton requests a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 

elections and its members to consider his protest in accordance with Knowlton I

and to sustain the protest, thus preventing Hannum’s candidacy at the general 

election. 

{¶ 29} This court lacks jurisdiction over complaints in mandamus if the 

allegations establish that the relator actually requests relief in the nature of a 

declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction. State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton 

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 

12. “We have applied this jurisdictional rule to expedited election cases by 

examining the complaint to determine whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather 
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than compel, official action.” State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 

437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20. 

{¶ 30} Although some of the allegations and requests contained in 

Knowlton’s complaint are couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, he 

actually seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the board’s denial of his protest was 

erroneous and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing Hannum from being a 

write-in candidate for sheriff at the general election. 

{¶ 31} Therefore, as in Knowlton I, at ¶ 16, because Knowlton seeks relief 

in the nature of declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider his mandamus claim and dismiss it. See also Stewart, 124 

Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 14. 

Prohibition 

{¶ 32} Knowlton also requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the board 

of elections and its members from certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for the 

office of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 general election. To be 

entitled to the writ, Knowlton must establish that (1) the board of elections and its 

members are about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power 

is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 

other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. 

Eshleman v. Fornshell, 125 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1175, 925 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 33} Knowlton established the first and third requirements for the writ 

because the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by denying his 

protest after a hearing that included sworn testimony, and he lacks an adequate 

remedy in the ordinary course of law given the proximity of the November 2 

general election. Id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 34} For the remaining requirement, Knowlton asserted in his complaint 

that the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable 

law by denying his protest and certifying Knowlton’s candidacy as a write-in 
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9

candidate for sheriff. State ex rel. Tremmel v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 

Ohio St.3d 452, 2009-Ohio-5773, 917 N.E.2d 792, ¶ 15. “An abuse of discretion 

implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.” State ex rel. 

Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio 

St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238. 

Protest

{¶ 35} As a preliminary matter, Hannum asserts that the writs should be 

denied because, by citing an inapplicable statute in his protest challenging 

Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff, Knowlton failed to properly invoke the 

board’s authority to rule on his protest. 

{¶ 36} In his protest, Knowlton cited R.C. 3519.16, which sets forth the 

protest procedure for statewide initiative and referendum petitions. We have 

“consistently recognized that R.C. Chapter 3519 applies only to statewide 

initiative and referendum petitions.” State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 

Ohio St.3d 224, 228, 685 N.E.2d 754; State ex rel. Citizen Action for Livable 

Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 50. Protests against write-in candidacies are instead 

governed by R.C. 3513.041. 

{¶ 37} Nevertheless, because there is no dispute that Knowlton otherwise 

met the requirements of R.C. 3513.041 to submit a written protest against 

Hannum’s write-in candidacy, the board of elections did not err in determining 

that Knowlton’s mistaken citation concerning the statutory authority for his 

protest did not divest the board of authority to address and rule on the merits of 

the protest. 

R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) Postsecondary-Education Requirement 

{¶ 38} Knowlton first claims, as he did in his protest, that Hannum’s 

write-in candidacy should have been rejected for the same reason that his 

primary-election candidacy was rejected by this court in Knowlton I – Hannum 
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failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate 

for sheriff. The dispositive issue is whether Hannum satisfied the postsecondaryeducation requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), which requires a person who does 

not meet the supervisory-experience requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) to have 

“completed satisfactorily at least two years of post-secondary education or the 

equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or university authorized to 

confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the comparable agency of another 

state in which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a 

certificate of registration issued by the state board of career colleges and schools 

under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.” 

{¶ 39} At the protest hearing, Hannum presented evidence that he had 

earned 106 credits at Washington State Community College. Based on Knowlton 

I, 29 of Hannum’s 106 credits could not be counted toward the postsecondaryeducation requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because they were for peaceofficer training. Knowlton I, 125 Ohio St.3d 82, 2010-Ohio-1115, 926 N.E.2d 

284, ¶ 32-33; Wellington, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, 

¶ 30. Without these credits, Hannum earned 77 credits at the community college. 

{¶ 40} Knowlton asserts that based on the letter from the college’s 

registrar he presented at the protest hearing, a minimum of 90 credit hours was 

required for the credits to be equivalent to two years of postsecondary education, 

and Hannum’s total of 77 credits thus was insufficient to meet the R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(b) requirement. 

{¶ 41} Knowlton’s claim, however, ignores the same registrar’s statement 

that students at the community college must carry a minimum of 12 credit hours 

per quarter to be considered full-time students and that Hannum was considered 

by the college to have completed the equivalent of two years of postsecondary 

education at the school. Furthermore, Hannum testified that his total of 77 credits 

that could be counted towards the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-education 
January Term, 2010 

11

requirement exceeds the 72 hours he testified were needed for the two years 

specified by the statute. 

{¶ 42} The board of elections concluded that Hannum satisfied the 

educational requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because “[t]welve credit hours 

per quarter is required to maintain full time status, thus requiring 36 hours per 

year or 72 hours over the course of two years to qualify as two years of full time 

post secondary education.” In Knowlton I, at ¶ 6, 33, we accepted without 

discussion Hannum’s comparable testimony at the previous board hearing that 

“72 credit hours at Washington State Community College were equivalent to two 

years of postsecondary education.” 

{¶ 43} Seventy-seven hours exceeds the 72 hours that the board of 

elections found were necessary to constitute two years of postsecondary 

education. The board of elections thus credited Hannum’s evidence from the 

registrar and Hannum over Knowlton’s letter from the same registrar. Based on 

the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted at the protest hearing, the 

board could reasonably do so. And given the arguably conflicting evidence 

before the board, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board. 

See State ex rel. Ross v. Crawford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 125 Ohio St.3d 438, 

2010-Ohio-2167, 928 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 41; State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca 

Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 29 

(absent evidence to the contrary, public boards and their members are presumed 

to have properly performed their duties). 

{¶ 44} Moreover, Knowlton has not established that the board of elections 

abused its discretion by failing to discount Hannum’s other life-experience credits 

because these credits either were for peace-officer training or related to his job as 

a peace officer. To be sure, some of Hannum’s testimony at the protest hearing 

relied at least in part on his experience as a police officer. But Hannum further 

testified that substantially all of his life experiences that formed the basis for his 
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college credit occurred prior to January 2007 and that he did not get separate 

credit for criminal-justice courses related to his peace-officer training. Therefore, 

under these circumstances, Hannum’s life-experience credits – other than those 

for the OPOTA courses that we ruled ineligible in Knowlton I – would not 

duplicate his training that already accounted for his peace-officer employment in 

R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b)1

 because it either predated the three-year period specified in 

R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b) or did not represent credit for peace-officer training. 

{¶ 45} Therefore, the board and its members neither abused their 

discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Knowlton’s 

protest and certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff at the November 2 

general election. 

R.C. 3513.04 

{¶ 46} Knowlton also claims that Hannum’s write-in candidacy should 

have been rejected by the board for an additional reason – that R.C. 3513.04 

barred Hannum’s candidacy at the general election following his unsuccessful 

attempt to become a party nominee for the same office at the preceding primary 

election. 

{¶ 47} R.C. 3513.04 generally prevents persons who have unsuccessfully 

sought a party nomination at a primary election from running for the same or a 

different office at the following general election: 

{¶ 48} “No person who seeks party nomination for an office or position at 

a primary election by declaration of candidacy or by declaration of intent to be a 

write-in candidate and no person who is a first choice for president of candidates 

seeking election as delegates and alternates to the national conventions of the 

different major political parties who are chosen by direct vote of the electors as 

 

1. R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b) requires that the person seeking to be a candidate for sheriff have “been 

employed for at least the last three years prior to the qualification date as a full-time law 

enforcement officer.” 
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13

provided in this chapter shall be permitted to become a candidate by nominating 

petition or by declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate at the following 

general election for any office other than the office of member of the state board 

of education, office of a member of a city, local, or exempted village board of 

education, office of member of a governing board of an educational service 

center, or office of township trustee.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 49} In construing this statute, “our paramount concern is the legislative 

intent” in enacting it. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-

Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. To discern this intent, we must “read words 

and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” 

State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, 

¶ 23. 

{¶ 50} In this regard, the applicable language of R.C. 3513.04 is 

somewhat ambiguous. “Seek” means “to try to acquire or gain: aim at” and “to 

make an attempt: TRY.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 

2055. By filing his declaration of candidacy for the primary election, Hannum 

was manifestly seeking to be the Democratic Party nominee for Noble County 

sheriff. But the word “seeks” is limited in the statute by the phrase “at a primary 

election,” which seems to require that the person attempting to become the party 

nominee actually be a choice that can be selected by voters at the primary 

election. 

{¶ 51} This interpretation of R.C. 3513.04 is consistent with the 

preeminent purpose of the statute. “The purpose of Section 3513.04, Revised 

Code, clearly is to prevent a disappointed party candidate who has failed to be 

selected as a nominee in the primary from again trying to be placed on the 

elective ballot by entering the arena as an independent candidate.” State ex rel. 

Gottlieb v. Sulligan (1963), 175 Ohio St. 238, 241, 24 O.O.2d 383, 193 N.E.2d 

270. In State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 
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2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 26, we stated that “R.C. 3513.04, the socalled sore-loser provision, * * * generally bars a person losing in a partisan 

primary election from participating as a candidate for [the same or] another office 

in the succeeding general election.” (Emphasis added.) Because Hannum was 

ruled ineligible in Knowlton I to be a candidate for the Democratic Party 

nomination for Noble County sheriff at the primary election, he did not lose in 

that election. 

{¶ 52} This interpretation is also supported by case law. In State ex rel. 

Sweet v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Elections (Oct. 25, 1993), Hancock App. No. 5-93-

43, 1993 WL 429838, the Third District Court of Appeals denied a writ of 

prohibition to prevent the independent candidacy of a person running for the 

office of city council at the November 2003 general election when she had 

previously been disqualified by the same court from being a Republican Party 

candidate for city council at the preceding primary election. The court of appeals 

adopted the view of then-Secretary of State Bob Taft that R.C. 3513.04 did not 

bar the person’s independent candidacy because the term “seeks” in the statute 

was ambiguous and should be construed to apply only to those persons who had 

been on the primary-election ballot and had lost rather than to those persons 

whose candidacies had been rejected by a court due to a defect in their petitions: 

{¶ 53} “ ‘The public policy behind R.C. 3513.04 is to prevent a person 

who has lost an election for a party nomination from subsequently running as an 

independent candidate for either the same office or another office. Statutes of this 

nature protect the integrity of the primary election process. * * * The purpose of 

a primary election is to allow those voters affiliated with a political party to 

nominate their candidate for the general election. * * * [T]he prohibition is not 

triggered where a person merely files a declaration of candidacy, but the petition 

is rejected for insufficient signatures, or other fatal defects. In that instance, the 

individual whose candidacy is invalid is not a choice for the party voters who 
January Term, 2010 

15

must select their candidate for the general election.’ ” Id. at *3; see also State ex 

rel. Ernst v. Brunner, 145 Ohio Misc.2d 73, 2007-Ohio-7265, 882 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 

19-26 (holding that R.C. 3513.04 is ambiguous and construing it not to bar city 

council candidates who had run for party nominations in primary election from 

being candidates in general election for new, nonpartisan city council). 

{¶ 54} Finally, the board’s decision that R.C. 3513.04 does not bar 

Hannum’s independent candidacy for sheriff “is also consistent with our duty to 

liberally construe words limiting the right of a person to hold office in favor of 

those seeking to hold office so that the public may have the benefit of choice from 

all qualified persons.” See State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 34; see also Brinda, 

115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 33. 

{¶ 55} Therefore, the board of elections and its members did not abuse 

their discretion or clearly disregard R.C. 3513.04 by denying Knowlton’s protest 

and certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff at the November 2 general 

election. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, Knowlton has not established his 

entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief. Therefore, we deny the writ of 

prohibition to prevent the board and its members from certifying Stephen S. 

Hannum as a write-in candidate for Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 

2010 general election. We also dismiss Knowlton’s mandamus claim for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and MCMONAGLE, LUNDBERG STRATTON,

O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 CHRISTINE T. MCMONAGLE, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 

BROWN, C.J. 
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__________________ 

 McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Mark A. McGinnis, Donald J. McTigue, 

and J. Corey Colombo, for relator. 

 Clifford N. Sickler, Noble County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony E. 

Palmer, Special Counsel, for respondents. 

 Gottlieb, Johnston, Beam & Dal Ponte, P.L.L., Philip S. Phillips, and 

James R. Krischak, for intervening respondent. 

______________________