U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Audit Services 

Audit Report 

Selected Aspects of the East 

Tennessee Technology Park's Security 

Clearance Retention Process 

DOE/IG-0779 October 2007 
Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

October 18, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE% SECRETARY 

FROM: 

Inspector General 

SUB.1 ECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on "Selected Aspects of the 

East Tennessee Technology Park's Security Clearance Retention 

Process" 

BACKGROUND 

The Department of Energy uses a formal process of security clearances to help prevent 

unauthorized access to sites and facilities that niaintain or store classified information 

and/or special nuclear material. As part of this process, security badges are issued to 

indicate whethcr the individual possesses a security clearance and, as a consequence, 

whctlier access to agency facilities is permitted. In addition, the Department maintains a 

Central Personnel Clearance Index to track security clearance information. In virtually 

all circumstances, policy requires that security clearances be terminated when an 

individual ends their association with the Department. A limited exception to that policy 

exists for contractor employees that arc to be reemployed within three months. Closely 

controlling security clearances and restricting access to facilities to authorized individuals 

arc essential to protecting the Department's valuable security and property assets. 

In May 2007, the Oftice of Inspector General issued a report on Thr Dep~rtrnetit~~ Azltlit 

Resolutiotl ~rtrcl Fc~llolt~-~rp Process (DOEIIG-0766). This audit disclosed, among other 

things, that security clearances at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) were 

being retained well beyond the three-month window allowed by Departmental policy. 

Because of the potential for terminated employees who retained active clearances to 

improperly access Departmental facilities, we initiated this audit to determine whether the 

practice of maintaining active security clearances at ETTP for terminated en~ployees was 

appropriate and/or necessary. 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

Our review disclosed that security clearances for terminated employees at ETTP were 

inappropriately and unnecessarily retained beyond the period permitted by Departmental 

policy. During the recently completed audit cited above, we identified at least 20 

individuals who had been permitted to retain security clearances for more than 6 months 

after the date their employment with ETTP ended. Our current review identified 54 other 

former employees who, as of June 2007, had not had their security clearances terniinated, 

as required. 
2 

 

In spite of a specific requirement that permits retention of security clearances for no more 

than three months following termination, and without consulting with Headquarters 

Personnel Security officials, the Department's Oak Ridge Office (ORO) granted the 

ETTP site contractor – Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC – permission to initiate a 180-day 

"security clearance hold list." The creation of this security clearance hold list effectively 

allowed individuals who were no longer employed at ETTP to improperly retain security 

clearances. These retained security clearances remained active in the Central Personnel 

Clearance Index and could have permitted former contractor employees to access 

facilities across the complex without authorization. Such access increases the risk of 

malicious damage to Departmental assets. As noted in our January 2006 OIG report on 

Security Clearance Terminations and Badge Retrieval at the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (DOE/IG-0716), failure to properly control security clearance 

terminations has the potential to degrade the Department’s security posture. 

After completion of our audit field work, the Office of Departmental Personnel Security 

(ODPS), within Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), notified us that they 

conducted a survey and discovered that two National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) sites – the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories – had deviations in 

place, some of which addressed provisions for maintaining clearances in an active status 

subsequent to termination. ODPS determined these were not acceptable applications of 

the deviation process and was preparing a memorandum to NNSA conveying this 

determination. 

The Department recently established the ODPS to strengthen and elevate the visibility of 

its personnel security program and to help ensure the consistent and effective 

implementation of personnel security programs Department-wide. We view this 

organizational change as a positive step that, if successfully implemented, should help 

ensure that ETTP and other sites are not circumventing personnel security program 

requirements. To aid the Department in this effort, we have made several 

recommendations designed to improve the security clearance termination process. 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

ORO and the HSS provided comments to the draft report and concurred with the 

recommendations. In particular, ORO management noted that the 180-day variance had 

been rescinded and that outstanding clearances were being terminated. Management’s 

comments have been included verbatim as Appendix 3. 

Attachment 

cc: Deputy Secretary 

 Chief of Staff 

 Under Secretary of Energy 

 Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

 Chief Operating Officer, Office of Science 

 Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management 

 Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management, NA-66 

 
REPORT ON SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE EAST 'TENNESSEE 

TECHNOLOGY PARK'S SECURITY CLEARANCE RETENTION 

PROCESS 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

East Tennessee Technoloqy Park's Securitv Clearance Retention 

Process 

Details or Finding ...................................................................................................... I 

Kccommendations and Con~ments.. .......................................................................... .3 

Appendices 

1 . Objective, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 5 

2. Prior Kcports ........................................................................................................ 6 

3. Management Comments ....................................................................................... 7 
ETTP'S SECURITY CLEARANCE RETENTION PROCESS 

Security Clearances Security clearances for terminated eniployces at the East 

Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) were inappropriately 

and unncccssarily held active beyond the timeframe 

permitted under Department of Energy (Department) 

policy. In our May 2007 report on The Deprrr-tr)le)lt!~ Audit 

Kesolzctiotl ~it1~1 F(>llo\t)-lil> Yroce.ss (DOEIIG-0766), wc 

identified at least 20 individuals who had retained security 

clearances in the Central Personnel Clearance lndex (CPCI) 

system for o\.er 6 months after their tenninatio~~ from 

ETTP. Our curre~lt rcview identified an additional 54 

contractor or subcontractor employees who, as of Sunc 

2007, had been terminated from ETTP for at least 3 months 

and whose clearances remained active. The tablc bclow 

suniniari~es the extent of retained security clearances and 

the rationale for the termination of each of the 54 

employees. 

1 10 41- 3 ('ontractor 2 Sub 

Force 

NO Reason 00-71. I (.ont.ictor I SU~ 

Family 00- I I. 0 ( 'ontractor 1 Sub 

Emergency 

Reason for 

Termination 

La) off 

Not Hirecl 10 01- 

- 

0 Contractor I Sub 

('uthacls 

Number of 

Terminated 

Employees 

3 1 

Ellcl* I 1 0 Oao I S",T ('ontract 

Clearance 

Type Q/L 

8 Q - 33 1. 

As illustrated in the table, 111ost of thcse eniployces werc 

terminated from ETTP either through layoffs or involuntary 

rcduction-in-force. Additionally, 12 of the 54 employces 

maintained "Q" clearances, the highest level of security 

clearance provided to Dcpartniental employees. 

Contractor/SubContractor 

8 Contractor - 33 Suh 1 

, --- 

Fo~untarll~ 1 PI 0 Q I 1, 

Quit 

Page 1 Details of Findirlg 

- 

I C'onlr~cto~ 0 Sub 
Security Clearance Sec~~rity clearances werc bcing licld active more than three 

Hold List months after employees were terminated because the 

Department's Oak Ridge Office (ORO) granted the ETTP 

site contractor - Bechtcl Jacobs Company LLC (Bechtel 

Jacobs) permission to initiate a 180-day "security clearance 

hold list." This hold list was designed to allou Bechtel 

Jacobs and their s~~bcontractors to rehire terminated 

personnel uithout having to take action to rcinstate 

clcarances. According to an official from the Office of 

Dcpartmental Personnel Sccurity (ODPS), however, field 

officcs do not have the authority to approve the retention of 

sccurity clearances for terminated personnel beyond the 

thrcc-month maximum permitted by Departmental policy. 

Officials from that same office told us that thcy were not 

aware of the dcviation which rcsulted in the crcation of thc 

"hold list." Based 011 their records, neither the original 

dcviation granted in 2004 by ORO, nor the extension in 

2007, wcre subjected to more extensive rcviews at ODPS 

or its predecessor organi~ation, as required. 

OR0 maintains that the deviation and tlic resultant 180-day 

hold list system in place wcrc handled appropriately and 

were consistent with Dcpartmental policy. Orficials cited a 

cla~~se in thc Department's Personnel Sec~~rity Manual that 

allows the local sccurity authority to adjust thc timeframcs 

that clearances may be held activc fhr intiividuals on leave 

of abscnce or extendcci leave. How C\ er, it is important to 

note that this clause docs not pertain to tcrn~inated 

eniployees s~~ch as the 53 identified in the abovc chart who 

are the focus of this report. OR0 also indicatccl Ihat the 

impact of terminated employees niai~ltaining activc 

clcarances in thc CPCI was minimized bcca~~se othcr 

protective controls, such as the retriei al of badges and thc 

dcbr~ciing of employees at thc time of cmploymc~~t 

termination, were in place. Nevcrtheless, these actions 

would not have prevcnted acccss to other sites and perhaps 

not evcn to other Oak Ridge locations sincc the security 

clearance itas still active in CPCI. 

Finally, officials from thc ODPS indicated that there was 

no reason for the ETTP 1 80-day hold list. Under 

Department policy, reinstatcnient of a clearance within a 

1 SO-day timcframe is just a matter ofverirying the prct,ious 

clcarance and ha~aing the individual sign a new agreement. 

In fact, in A~~gusl 2007, the OR0 Acccss Authori~ation 

Branch had an averagc time of two to thrcc days to 

reinstate a clearance oncc the paperwork had bcen received. 

Page 2 Detail of ind dings 
Control Over Security As implemented, tlie dc~ iatio~in place at ETTP, which 

Clearance Termination allows sccurity clcarances to be held active for 180 days 

after an employee's termination, poses an unnecessary 

sccuri ty vulnerability to tlie Depa~t~iierit and its facilities. 

Proper controls over security clcarancc tcrrninations are 

necessary to prcvcnt ~~nautliori~cd access to information 

and facilities, and dccrease tlie risk of malicious dariiagc to 

Departmental assets. As confirmed by an official from tlic 

ODPS, unauthorired individuals could gain access to 

Department facilities i f their security clearances were not 

properly tcrniinatcd in thc CPCI systc~n cven if their 

badges had been retrieved. A temporary badgc could be 

obtained and access granted if a site security officcr at a 

given access point verified tlie activc clcarancc witli 

information from the CPCI. As such, it is imperative that 

all Dcpartnicnt security clcarancc tcrrninations occur in 

accordance u ith Departmental requirements. Prcvious 

Office of Inspector General inspections have found issues 

witli security clearance temiinations being timely at Sandia, 

Lawrcncc Livemiore, a~id Los Alamos National 

Laboratories. 

RECOMMENDATIONS Wc recommend tliat tlie Manager, ORO, in cori.j~rnction 

with tlie ODPS: 

1. Rescind thc deviation in place tliat allows 

Beclitel Jacobs to hold terminated employees' 

security clcaranccs activc fhr up to 180 days; 

and, 

2. Ensure that all current active sccurity clearances 

for individuals whose employment lias been 

ter~ninatcd for over three months be 

immediatcly terminated in tlie CPCI. 

We fi~rtlierecommend that tlic ODPS: 

3. Determine whether otlicr Departmental sitcs 

currently have similar practices of holding 

security clearances activc for more than tlirce 

months after termination. 

Page 3 Recommendations and Comments 
MANAGEMENT OR0 and the Ofice of' Health, Safety and Security (HSS) 

REACTION provided comments to the draft report and conc~~rred with 

the recommendations. OR0 stated tliat tlie 180-day 

variance was rescincled on Septcniber 5, 2007, with an 

cf'fcctivc date ocseptember 30, 2007. In addition, OR0 

req~~estcd tliat Bechtel .lacobs submit terniination 

statements to their ofice as soon as possible for those 

employees whose employment has been terminated for 

over three months. OR0 indicated that all clcarances 

associated with the 180-day variance have been terminated 

and that these actions were completed on September 28, 

2007. 

ODPS polled other Departmental personnel security offices 

to determine il'they hacl deviations in place to allow 

holding security clearances over tlirce months after 

termination. While ODPS Sound many sites did not deviate 

fi-om tlie personnel security directives in any way, they did 

find two National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

sites - tlie Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories - 

tliat had a total of l'our de\ iations in place, three of which 

addressed provisions for maintaining clcarances in an 

active status subsequent to termination. ODPS has found 

tliat these are not acceptable applications ol'tlie deviation 

process and is preparing a memorandum to tlie NNSA 

Sen ice C'cntcr to inf'orni them ol'tliis determination. 

AUDITOR 

COMMENTS 

Comments from OR0 and HSS acknowledged that 

changes were needed in tlie management controls at the 

Department to improve tlie security clearance retention 

process. Management's completed and planncd actions, as 

stated above, were responsive to tlie report's 

recommendations. 

Management's comments are included ~erbatin~ as 

Appendix 3. 

Page 4 Comments 
Appendix 1 

OBJECTIVE To determine whether the practicc ofniaintaining active 

security clearances ar the East Tcnncssce Technology Park 

(ETTP) for terminated employees was appropriate andlor 

necessary. 

SCOPE 

METHODOLOGY 

We perfbrnied tlie audit Sroni .l~~nc 2007 tlirougli August 2007 

and obtained data fi-om Headquarters, tlic Oak Ridge Office 

(ORO) and the ETTP in Oak Ridge, Tenncsscc. 

To accomplish our objective, we: 

Rc\ icwed applicable Department of Energy 

(Department) policies and proccdures implcniented at 

tlie Departnicnt; 

Held discussions m it11 Headquarters and sire officials 

regarding security clearance terminations and 

de~ iations; 

Analyted ETTP's 180-day security clearance liold list 

to dctcrmine the number oTemployees who liaci been 

terminated for niorc than 3 montlis; and, 

Pcrlbrmcd comparative analysis of E.1 TP's 1 80-day 

security clearance hold list and tlie Department's 

Central Personnel Clearance Indcx (CPCI) to confinii 

tliat teniiinated cniployecs on the liold list still had 

active clearanccs in the CPCI. 

The audit was co~ici~~cted in accordancc with generally 

accepted Government auditing standards for performance 

a~~dits and included tcsts of intcrnal controls and 

compliance \s.itli laws and reg~~lations to tlie extent 

necessary to satisry tlie audit objcctive. Accordingly, we 

assessed the signillcant internal controls and perlhrmance 

nicasures established ~~ndcr tlieCiovcrnment Performance 

and Rcs~~lts Act of 1003. BCC~LIS~ o~lreviei~ was limited, 

it \vo~~ld not necessarily have disclosed all internal control 

deficiencies tliat may liavc existed a1 tlie time of our audit. 

Wc obtained and re\ ie\\cd comp~~tcr generated data in 

order to acliievc our audit objective. We pcrfcmned 

procedures to validatc tlie reliability of the inl'ormation as 

necessary to satis@ our audit objective. 

Management elected lo naive the elit conrercncc 

Page 5 Objective, Scope, and Methodology 
Appendix 2 

APPENDIX 2 

PRIOR KEPOR'I'S 

Office of Inspector General Reports 

The. I)~~~I~~I-III~~~III '.Y :lrrcli/ Ke~.solrr/iotl rrtlrl J;i,llorz~-rrp 1'1.oc.c.s.s (DOEIIG-0700, May 2007). 

l'his audit found that the Department of Energy (Department) had made significant 

impro\.cmcnts to many aspects of its follow-LIP system. In particular, it had ensi~rcd 

Illat target closure dates were established for all agreed-upon rccommendations and 

tliat, in most cases, audit rccommendations wcre closed in a timely manner. However, 

we Iouncl that, in some cases, agreed-upon recommendations had been closed, hut 

corrcctivc actions had either not been completed or were ineffective. Our review of 

"closc~l~~ rccotii~iie~idatio~is contained in six selected reports found significant 

continuing management issilcs relating to: (1 ) ensuring that employee hadgcs werc 

returned and scci~rity clcaranccs wcre terminated as l-eqi~ired; (2) tracking visits and 

assignmc~its by I'orcign nationals; (3) consolidating di~plicativc nuclear material 

tracking systems; and, (3) resolving information tcclinology seci~rity \\,caknesses. 

llrrrlgc> Kc~/t-ic~~~111 r1i[l ,Ye>[.rrt-r/\. ('lc~rr~r1~~c3 Tor~~ri~l(r/iot~ (11 Siitlrlirr Nlr/iotr[rI I,~rt~ot-rr/ot~~~- 

Nc~t' Me~ic.o (D0E:IG-0723, April 2000). This inspection concli~ded that the internal 

controls at the Sandia National L>aboratory-New Mexico (Sandia) wcrc not adecli~atc to 

cnsurc tliat, in accordance bith applicable policies and proced~~rcs, security haciges 

assigned to tcrminati ng Sandla and subcontractor employees wcre rctric\,ed at tlic time 

of departure 01- that security clearances of terminating Sandia and subcontractor 

cmployccs wcrc terminated in a timely manner. Additionally, tlicy Ih~lnd employees 

that (lid not ha\ c complctc Security Termination Statements, as required. -PIiits, there 

was no assurance that these in&\ iduals had received the required Sccurity Termination 

Briefing a1 the timc of their termination. 

,Se~c,rrt-r/.\~ ('lc~rt-[rt~c~o 72~t.t11itrrr/iot1,s [111d Il~rrlgc~ Rc~/~*ic~\-[rl (11 1/10 12rrrz~t,c~~i(~c~ l,i~c~t~t~~or~~ 

Nrr/iot~rr/ Lrrhot.rr/ot:y (1)OEIIG-07 10, January 2000). Tliis inspection concli~dcd that 

the 1,awrcncc l,i\ ermore National Laboratory's interrial control structure was not 

adequate to cnsurc that sccurrty badges were retrieved at the timc oPcmploycc 

departure 01. that seci~r~ty clearances of departing employccs werc terminated in a 

timely manner. Additionally, tlicy foi~nd terminated cmployees that did not coniplcte 

the rccl~lircd Sccurity Termination Statements. Thus, tlierc it as no assurancc that these 

employees had scccivcd the rcqlrired Sccurity Termination Briefing. 

Sc>c.rrt-i/\. trlrrl O1t1c.r l.s,\r/(~.\ Rc~ltr~c~tl lo Orcl-Proc~c~.ssitrg of Enrl~lo\~ec>.s rr~ I<os Altrn1o.s 

Nrr~rollrrl,trho~-rr/ol-\. (DOEIIG-0077, Febrilary 2005). 7'liis inspection found that oi~tprocessing procedures at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) urerc not 

Ibllowed by more than 30 pcrcent oftlie 305 terminating employees inclilded in their 

sample. They Ih~~nd that there uas no assurance tliat, prior to departure, I.AN1, 

tcrminat~ng employees turned in security badges, completed tlic required Security 

Termination Statement, or. had their security clearances and access author~tations to 

classilicd matter andlor special nuclear material terminated in a timely manner. 

Page 6 Prior Reports 
Appendix 3 

Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

October 3, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FROM 

COMMENTS FOR IG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT. "Manayernerit 

Controls over Selected Aspects of the East Tennessee Technology 

I'ark's Secur-ity Clearance Retention Process" (A07PT039) 

SUBJECT: 

The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has reviewed the subject draft audit report 

provided by the Inspector General's Office on September 1 1,2007. Below is the response to the 

finding and recommendation addressed to HSS. 

Recommendation 3: 

We further reconmiend that the ODPS: 

Determine whether other Departmental sites currently have s~milar practices of holding 

sccunty clearances over three months afier term~nation. 

Response: 

('oncur- 'I'ht. Oftice oSDcpartmental Personnel Secunty, w~thin HSS, has polled the other 

Departmental personnel security oflices to determine if they have deviations in place to allow 

liolding security clearances over three months afier termination. The offices of Naval Reactors 

(P~ttshurgh arid Schenectady jointly), Chicago, Idaho, Richland, Savannah River and 

Headquarters all reported that they do not deviate from the Department of Energy pcrsorlnel 

security directives in any way, including holding clearances active for more than three months 

after termination. The Kational Nuclear Security Adn~inistration (NNSA) Service Center 

rcoortetl that two of their sites (Lus Alamos and Sandia Kational Laboratories) have a total of 

four dcviations in place, three of which address provisions for maintaining clearances in an 

active status subsequent to termination. The Office of Departmental Personnel Security has 

found that these are not acceptable applications of the deviation process and is preparing a 

memorandum to the MVSA Service Center to inform them of this determination. 

If you have any questions, you may contact me at (301) 903-3777 or have a member of your staff 

contact Stcphanie Scott Grimes, of my staff, at (301) 903-4175. 

cc: Gerald Boyd, SC-OR 

Jeanette Miller. SC-OR 

Page 7 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

United States Government Department of Energy 

Oak Rldge Office 

memorandum 

~rr: Ocrobor 2, 2007 

nmv TO 

A- PM-733:Milla 

"- RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT, "MAh'AGEMENT CONTROLS OVER SELECTED 

MPECTS OF THE EAST TENNE6SEE TECXNOLOCY PARK'S SECURITY 

CLEARANCE RETENTION PROCESSP 

lo: Rickq R Has, Awistant Inspection Gmcral for Financial, Technology and carp om^^ Audits, 

05- of Inspector General, IG-34, FORS 

This is in rrsponk to your Soptembar 11,2007, memorandum, with attached draft report, subject 

as above. Your momorandurn roquastad that the Oak Ridge Office (ORO) rcviow the 

infodon in the draft rwprn-t and pmvide writtan commmtn within 15 working day on the 

factt pmcntad and cauluoirms reached, as well as any alternative racommendations in solving 

tho problems discussed in the mpd 

OR0 wncm in the mrt recommendations, and our comments am attached. Please feel free to 

contact me at 865-576-4446 or Pauline Douglas at 865-576-9171 if you wish to discuss this 

further. 

chisf ~inancii Officer 

cc w/attachmanol: 

O- J. Malosh, SC-3, FORS 

S. S. Grimas, HS-1.4, GTN 

K E. Goodwin, EM-3.1. GTN 

M. L Lcwir, CF-12, FORS 

P. J. Douglas, 0s-20.ORO 

Page 8 Management Comments 
Appendix 3 (continued) 

ON DRAFT 

p 

INSPECTOR GENEaAL REPORT ENTITLED 

"MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OVER SELE-D ASPECI'S OF TA& 

EAST TENNESSEE TECBNOLOGY PARK'S SECURITY CLWCE 

RETENTION PROCESS' 

RESPQNSP,ONS: 

That the me-. Oak Ridge Office, In conjusction with the ODPS: 

1. hchd the deviation iu place that allows Bechtel Jambs to bold terminatd employeen' 

dty eltnmnm a&e for up to 180 days. 

Raponme: Concur. The 180day variance was rescinded on Septrmber 5,2007, with en 

effective dab of Septmber 30,2007. 

2. Enmre thnt all r~rrant active rmrlty elemma for individeah whose employment ham 

been tcd.ted for over th months be lmmedlntely terminated In the CPCI. 

Raponre: Coacm. The Oak Ridge Office rcqudsted that Bbchtcl Jacobs aubmit tuminatian 

eta+ to our office as aoa+ as-poarihle Ern-those amployas whose employment has been 

taminsted for over the months. AU ckumca associatd with ihe IlO-day variance have 

been kmnhted Actions were completed on Saptanbar 28,2007. 

Page 1, I* paragraph (Security Cloamtcs): 

It is unclear whahcr Paducah and Portsmouth pcrsomal (i.8. fonncr BJC ermployacs) 

wm includcd in this numbcr (20 and 54). 

Page 2, 1" paragraph (Security Clearance Hold List): 

This rcqucst for lrcaining clcaramm far 180 days after layoff or project completion for 

specific work groups for Bcchtcl Jacobs Company UC, Oak Ridge, was initially 

approved 0x1 January 34 2004 with a copy going to Headquartem parsonno1 at SO-1 1, 

SO-23. and SC-1. The updakd exteasion of this vmiwca was approved April 16,2007. 

Page 9 Management Comments 
I(; Kcport No. DOEIIG-0770 

('IISTOMEK RESPONSE F0K.M 

'flic Ol'licc ol'lnspcclor General Iias a continuing interest in iml>roving tlic uscli~lncss of 

its products. Wc wish to liiakc our repol-ts as rcsponsivc as possible to our customers' 

rccl~~irc~iic~its, ;111d, tlicrclbrc, ask that you consitlcl- sharing your thoughts with 11s. On l.hc 

back ol'lliis Ibl-111, you nlay suggest improvcmcnts to enhance tlie cl'f'cctivcncss of ~I~LII.~ 

reports. Plcnsc incl~ldc ans\vers to the l'ollo\ving cluestions iftliey al-c applicable to you: 

I. Wliat ~~dditio~ial backgl-o~~nd information about the selection, sclicd~~li~ig, scope, or 

~roccdu~-cs oftlic i~lsl>cction MOLII~ ha\c bccn Iielplill to tlic reader in LI~~CI-standing 

this rcpol-t? 

2. Wliat acitiitiollal infor~liation ~*clatcd to lindiligs and rccommcndations could Iia~c 

bccn included in tlic report to assist management in implementing corrccti~c actions'! 

3. M'liat li,l-liiat, stylislic, 01- 01-gani~ational changes might Iiavc made this 1.cport1s 

OL era1 I ~iiess;~ge 11101-e clei~r to tlic I-cader? 

3. %'hat add~tional actions could the Oflicc ol'lnspcctor Gcncl-al have taken on tlic 

issucs discussed in this repol-t \\Iiicli \\auld lia\ e been liclpli~l? 

5. Plcasc include your name and tclcplionc n~lmbcr so that uc may contact you should 

wc haic any cl~~csrions abo~~l your comnicnts. 

Nanic - - Date _ - 

Wlicn you Iiavc completed this Ihrm, you may tclcSav it to the OSficc ol'lnspcctor 

(;enel-al al (202) 580-0038, or you tiiay mail it lo: 

Ol'licc of Inspector General (I(;- I) 

Department ol' Enel-~y 

Washington, I)(' 20585 

ATTN: ('LIs~oI~~~I- Kclalions 

IS you wish to discllss Illis rcport or your comments \sill1 a stal'l'mcmher ol'tlic Ol'licc of 

Inspector (icncral, please contact S~ldy (3arland-Smith (202) 580-7828. 
Tlic OfIicc 01' Inspcctor (;cncral wants to makc llic distribution of its reports as customer Sriendly 

ancl cost cflkctivc as possible. Thcrclhrc, this report will bc available electronically through tlic 

Intotnet at tlie Sollowing address: 

I1 .S. Dcpat-tmcnt of Energy Officc of Inspector General Home Pagc 

littp: \\ \\ \\ .iq.ctic~-c\ .co\ 

Your comments \\si11~1 \,c appreciated and can be pro\ idcti on tlie C'uslo~iicr Rcsponse Form.