‘Order Form (01/2008) ' fore

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge HN RRA Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Jo W. DA H than Assigned Judge Ah

CASE NUMBER 12 C 1024 DATE VE ve { 2—
CASE Kaizmen Jackson (#K-88195) vs. Marcus Hardy, et al.

TITLE

"DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiffs renewed motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [#6] is granted. The court authorizes anc
orders the trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of incarceration to deduct $8.27 from the plaintiffs accoun
for payment to the Clerk of Court as an initial partial filing fee, and to continue making monthly deductions ir
accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the trust fund officer at the Stateville
Correctional Center. The clerk is directed to issue summonses for service on the defendants by the U.S. Marshal.
The clerk is further directed to send the plaintiffa Magistrate Judge Consent Form and Instructions for Submitting
Documents along with a copy of this order. The plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel [#4] is denied.

@ [For further d Docketing to mail notices

STATEMENT
The plaintiff, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiff claims that the defendants, health care providers at the Stateville Correctional Center, violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. More

specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate care and treatment for an injured thumb.

The plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $8.27. The trust fund officer at the plaintiff.
place of incarceration is authorized and ordered to collect the partial filing fee from the plaintiff's trust func

account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the plaintiff's trus
fund officer is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff's trust fund account in an amount equa
to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. Monthly payments shall be forwarded to the
Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing fee is paid. Al
I payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604.
attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff's name and this case number. Thi:
payment obligation will follow the plaintiff wherever he may be transferred.
(CONTINUED) ash

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STATEMENT (continued) _|
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the compa. |
Here, accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, the court finds that the plaintiff has articulated a colorable fede: al

cause of action against the health care providers who allegedly denied care or provided constitutionally deficient
care. Correctional officials and health care providers may not act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011).
The fact that a prisoner received some medical treatment does not necessarily defeat his claim; deliber: te
indifference to a serious medical need can be manifested by “blatantly inappropriate” treatment, Greeno v. Dalvy,
414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original), or by “woefully inadequate action” as well as by no acti »n
atall. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1999). It should be noted that neither medical malpractice r or
amere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment amounts to deliberate indifference. Berry v. Peterman, 6 )4
F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. Nevertheless, the plaintif ’s
allegations of deliberate indifference state an arguable claim against defendants Ghosh, Shaffer, and Williams.

However, defendants Hardy and Garcia are dismissed as defendants on preliminary review pursuant to 28
US.C. § 1915A. The plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting either defendant’s direct, personal involvement, as
required by JH. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2003), inter alia. Nor has the plaintiff
indicated that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights occurred at Dart’s or Garcia’s direction or with thir
knowledge and consent. Jd. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated up »n
fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutiot al
deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The mere fict
that Hardy is Stateville’s warden and Garcia is the head nurse is insufficient to establish liability, as the doctrine
of respondeat superior (blanket supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sve,
e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).

The clerk shall issue summonses forthwith for service on Ghosh, Shaffer, and Williams. The United Sta'es
Marshals Service is appointed to serve the defendants. Any service forms necessary for the plaintiff to compl:te
will be sent by the Marshal as appropriate to serve the defendants with process. The U.S. Marshal is directed to
make all reasonable efforts to serve the defendants. With respect to former correctional employees who no long er

can be found at the work address provided by the plaintiff, the Illinois Department of Corrections and/or Wexfcrd
Health Sources, Inc., shall furnish the Marshal with the defendant’s last-known address. The information shall be
used only for purposes of effectuating service [or for proof of service, should a dispute arise] and any
documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal. Address information shall not be maintain:d
in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal. The Marshal is authorized to mail a request for waiver of service
to the defendants in the manner prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) before attempting personal service.

The plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of
the Prisoner Correspondent. The plaintiff must provide the court with the original plus a complete judge’s coyry,
(CONTINUED)

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7 STATEMENT (continued) |

including any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, the plaintiff must send an exact copy of any court

filing to the defendants [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of tie
defendants]. Every document filed with the court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact copies
were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or that otherwise fails to comy ly
with these instructions may be disregarded by the court or returned to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is advised that there is a two-year statute of limitations for civil rights actions; he shot ld
therefore attempt to identify the John Does as soon as possible. See Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57
(7th Cir. 1993); see also Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cr. 1980).

Finally, the plaintiff s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. There is no constitutional or statutc ry
right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli y. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (2010); see also Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C §
1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an indigent litigant. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), citi rg
Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1006. When a pro se litigant submits a request for appointment of counsel, the court must

first consider whether the indigent plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own, or
conversely, if he has been precluded from doing so. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654. Next, the court must evaluate tie
complexity of the case and whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate it on his own. Jd. at 654-55. Anott er
consideration is whether the assistance of counsel would provide a substantial benefit to the court or the parti:s,
potentially affecting the outcome of the case. Id. at 654; Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); see aiso
Local Rule 83.36(c) (N.D. IIL) (listing the factors to be taken into account in determining whether to appo nt
counsel).

After considering the above factors, the court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted in this
case. First, the plaintiff has failed to show cither that he has made reasonable efforts to retain private counsel or
that he has been effectively precluded from making such efforts. In any event, although the complaint sets fo:th
cognizable claims, the plaintiff has alleged no physical or mental disability that might preclude him from adequat« ly
investigating the facts giving rise to his complaint. Neither the legal issues raised in the complaint nor the evidence
that might support the plaintiffs claims are so complex or intricate that a trained attorney is necessary. The
plaintiff, whose submissions to date have been coherent and articulate, appears more than capable of presenti 1g
his case. It should additionally be noted that the court grants pro se litigants wide latitude in the handling of thir
lawsuits. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is denied at this time. Should the czse
proceed to a point that assistance of counsel is appropriate, the court may revisit this request.

a

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