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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Merrimack

No. 2020-0404

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

COREY V. DONOVAN

Argued: April 14, 2022

Opinion Issued: August 12, 2022

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor 

general (Zachary L. Higham, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), 

for the State.

Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the 

brief and orally, for the defendant.

HICKS, J. The defendant, Corey V. Donovan, appeals his conviction on a 

single felony count of possession of a controlled substance. See RSA 318-B:2, I 

(2017). On appeal, he argues that the Trial Court (McNamara, J.) erred by 

denying his motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

The trial court found or the record contains sufficient evidence for the 

trial court to have found the following facts. See State v. Palermo, 168 N.H. 

387, 394 (2015) (“[W]e must assume that the trial court made subsidiary 
2

findings necessary to support its general ruling.” (quotation omitted)). On the 

morning in question, four police officers, Chief Mahoney from Andover, Chief 

Suckling and Sergeant Marvin from Danbury, and Chief Williamson from Hill, 

responded to a call that two people either were passed out or sleeping in a 

green Jeep at the Circle K in Andover. Before arriving on the scene, Mahoney

was informed that the Jeep was registered to the defendant, who had a valid 

driver’s license and was on federal probation. When they arrived, the officers 

saw the Jeep parked in front of the entrance to the Circle K. Mahoney parked 

his cruiser some distance behind the Jeep and the other officers parked their 

vehicles either behind Mahoney’s cruiser or in the same general area. 

The four officers approached the Jeep and attempted to look inside it 

before waking the defendant and his passenger. After the police had been on 

the scene for approximately two minutes, they roused the defendant. The 

defendant gave Mahoney his license and registration, which Mahoney took 

back to his cruiser. Mahoney then called dispatch to run a criminal records 

check on the defendant. 

When the defendant’s passenger awoke, Suckling asked her to exit the 

vehicle. Once she did so, Williamson observed a black case inside the Jeep. 

Williamson approached Mahoney’s cruiser and told him that there was a black 

case inside the Jeep, which he identified as a “Flambeau” rifle case.

Williamson returned to the passenger side of the Jeep and told Suckling 

about the rifle case, who viewed it and then asked the defendant about it. The 

defendant told Suckling that the case contained a guitar. After Mahoney 

verified from dispatch that the defendant was a convicted felon, he decided to 

impound the vehicle and obtain a warrant to search it. Shortly thereafter, 

Marvin, who was standing next to the driver’s side of the Jeep, saw a large, 

sheathed machete between the driver’s seat and the door. He reached into the 

Jeep, grabbed the sheathed machete and tossed it to Williamson. The 

defendant was then ordered out of the vehicle and placed under arrest. During 

a search of the defendant’s person incident to the arrest, Williamson found a 

large bundle of cash in the defendant’s pocket inside of which was a small, 

clear bag containing a controlled drug. 

After the police took the defendant into custody, they obtained warrants 

to search the vehicle and the rifle case. Several firearms were found inside the 

rifle case. The defendant was eventually indicted on several felonies, including 

four counts of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon and one count of 

felony possession of a controlled drug.

Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence about 

the rifle case and controlled drug, arguing that this evidence was “the fruit[] of 

an illegal seizure.” He asserted that he was seized “at the very least when [the 

police] ordered his passenger to exit the vehicle” because, at that point, “[n]o 
3

reasonable person would [have felt] that they were free to leave.” He argued 

that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify this investigatory stop. 

The defendant reasoned that because the officers “only observed the machete 

and the [rifle] case after they had illegally seized [him]” and because the officers 

“discovered the [controlled drug] only after illegally arresting him,” the 

machete, the controlled drug, the rifle case, and his statements about the same 

“must all be suppressed.”

The State did not counter the defendant’s assertion that he was seized, 

at the latest, when the police ordered his passenger to exit the vehicle. Nor did 

the State set forth reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify such a seizure. 

Instead, the State asserted that the investigatory stop was not impermissibly 

expanded or prolonged. The State argued that the police asked the defendant 

about the rifle case based upon their reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

he was a felon in possession of a deadly weapon.

 

At the two-day hearing on the motion to suppress, the State conceded 

that “it is clear from the [officers’] testimony that [the defendant] and his 

passenger were not free to leave.” Indeed, three of the four officers testified 

that once Mahoney took the defendant’s license and registration back to his 

cruiser and the passenger was asked to exit the vehicle, the defendant was not 

free to leave. The fourth officer, Williamson, was not asked the question. 

However, in its closing argument, the State did not set forth any reasonable, 

articulable suspicion to justify a seizure. Rather, the State argued that “[a]ny 

questioning” of the defendant “did not exceed the scope of the initial stop” 

because “[t]he questions asked were all related to the reasons why [the 

defendant and his passenger] were there until . . . this gun case[] [is] observed.” 

Defense counsel countered that “in this case, unlike the vast majority of stops 

that we’re talking about, there is no reason for the stop. There is no crime that 

[the police] believe that these individuals have committed until we talk about 

the gun case.” Defense counsel explained, 

So I think it is inappropriate to suggest that the questioning 

was appropriate because it was related to the reasons for [the 

defendant and his passenger] to be there. [The police] don’t get to 

stop these people. They don’t get to order [the passenger] out of 

the car until they have some sort of reason to do that. And not one 

of them has articulated anything that these people have done 

wrong up until the point when [the police] see the case.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. However, like 

the State, the court neither identified the point at which the defendant first 

became subject to an investigatory stop nor set forth the reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that supported the stop. 
4

The defendant unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Following a 

four-day jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of possession of a 

controlled drug, but not guilty of the other charges. He was sentenced to 12 

months in the county house of corrections, suspended for three years. This 

appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant argues under both the State and Federal 

Constitutions that the trial court erred “[b]y ruling that he was not seized” 

before the police observed the rifle case. When reviewing a trial court’s 

determination of whether a seizure occurred, we accept its factual findings 

unless the record does not support them or they are clearly erroneous. State v.

Jones, 172 N.H. 774, 776 (2020). We review the trial court’s determination

regarding whether a seizure occurred de novo. Id. We first consider the 

defendant’s argument under the State Constitution and cite federal opinions 

for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). 

Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution protects individuals 

from unreasonable seizures. Jones, 172 N.H. at 777. “A warrantless seizure is 

per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement.” State v. McInnis, 169 N.H. 565, 569 (2017) (quotation omitted). 

“The State bears the burden of establishing that a seizure falls within one of 

these exceptions.” State v. Craveiro, 155 N.H. 423, 426 (2007). 

“An investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion is such an 

exception.” McInnis, 169 N.H. at 569. “In order for a police officer to 

undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, 

based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to 

be, engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 380 (2003); 

see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). To determine whether an officer 

made a lawful investigatory stop, we conduct a two-step inquiry: first, we 

determine when the defendant was seized; second, we determine whether, at 

that time, the officer possessed a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was, 

had been or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. McInnis, 169 N.H. at 

569.

“Not all personal interactions between police and citizens involve seizures 

of persons.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Indeed, a seizure does not occur simply 

because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions, or

asks to examine the individual’s identification.” Id. at 569-70 (quotation 

omitted). Rather, “[a]n interaction becomes a seizure . . . when a reasonable 

person would no longer believe he or she is free to leave.” Id. at 570 (quotation 

omitted). 
5

“In practice, there is some tension between the . . . ‘free to leave’ test and 

[the] sanctioning of these suspicionless police-civilian encounters,” United 

States v. Tanguay, 918 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019), because, as we have 

recognized, “as a practical matter, citizens almost never feel free to end an 

encounter initiated by the police,” Jones, 172 N.H. at 777 (quotation omitted). 

We resolve this tension by focusing upon whether “an officer, by means of 

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of 

the person.” McInnis, 169 N.H. at 570 (quotation omitted). “Circumstances 

indicating a show of authority might include the threatening presence of 

several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching 

of the person, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 

with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Although “mere requests to communicate generally do not amount to an official 

show of authority, the police may not convey a message that compliance with 

their requests is required.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Our analysis is objective, focusing upon “whether the defendant’s

freedom of movement was sufficiently curtailed by considering how a 

reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood his 

situation.” Id. (quotation omitted). When assessing whether a seizure 

occurred, we consider all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, and 

no single factor is dispositive. Jones, 172 N.H. at 777. 

Here, we conclude that the defendant was seized before the rifle case was 

observed and identified. The record, which includes video footage of a body 

camera worn by Williamson, establishes that before the rifle case was observed: 

four officers driving four separate cruisers approached the defendant’s vehicle;

at least three of the four responding officers were in uniform and were armed; 

Mahoney took the defendant’s license and registration back to his cruiser and 

ran a criminal records check on him; and the defendant’s passenger was asked 

to exit the vehicle. Although, as the trial court found, the defendant’s vehicle 

“was not blocked by any police cruiser,” in that he could have backed the Jeep 

out of its parking space and driven away, the body camera video footage 

establishes that the placement of the cruisers impeded his ability to do so. 

All of these circumstances objectively communicated to the defendant 

that his compliance with the officers’ requests was compelled. As we have 

previously observed, although an individual is not seized merely because an 

officer asks to examine his identification, “[a]n officer could . . . objectively 

communicate a show of authority rising to the level of a seizure if the officer 

retains possession of [the] individual’s identification, because a reasonable 

person would not feel free to terminate the encounter under such 

circumstances.” Id. at 779; see McInnis, 169 N.H. at 570 (determining that the 

defendant was not seized where, among other circumstances, the officer did 

not obtain the defendant’s identification documents). Here, not only did the 

police retain the defendant’s license and registration, but they also separated 
6

him from his passenger. We conclude that a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave or terminate the 

encounter under these circumstances, and that, therefore, the defendant was 

seized, at the latest, when his passenger was asked to exit the vehicle. See

McInnis, 169 N.H. at 570. 

The State does not argue that the officers possessed reasonable 

suspicion to seize the defendant before the rifle case was observed and 

identified. See Jones, 172 N.H. at 781. Rather, the State argues that “[e]ven if 

the interaction between the police and the defendant developed into an 

investigatory stop, the stop was lawful” under a different exception to the 

warrant requirement, the community caretaking exception. See Craveiro, 155 

N.H. at 426-27 (explaining the community caretaking exception to the warrant 

requirement and holding that the exception applies to the stop of a moving 

vehicle). The State urges us to uphold the trial court on this alternative 

ground. 

However, the State concedes that it did not rely upon the community 

caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in the trial court. Because 

the State did not argue in the trial court that any seizure of the defendant 

before the rifle case was observed and identified was lawful under the 

community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, we decline to 

address the argument on appeal. See State v. Santana, 133 N.H. 798, 807-09 

(1991) (declining to address the State’s assertion that, even if the warrantless 

entry was unconstitutional, the seized evidence should not be suppressed 

pursuant to the independent source doctrine because the State “never 

identified for the trial court the ‘independent source doctrine’ as a ground 

justifying the admission of the evidence”). 

For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the defendant’s seizure 

violated his rights under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution and that 

the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. See Jones, 172 N.H. at 

781. Because the defendant prevails under the State Constitution, we need not 

decide whether he also prevails under the Federal Constitution. See id. 

Reversed and remanded.

BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.