Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 1

ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 

ANALYSIS 

OF THE SALVADORAN GANGS

by David E. Spencer, PhD, Herard von Santos, and 

Juan Carlos Morales

WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER for HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES 

Adversarial System Analysis 

of the Salvadoran Gangs

by David E. Spencer, PhD, 

Herard von Santos, and Juan Carlos Morales
The views represented are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 

Perry Center, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Copies of Perry Center 

publications can be obtained on the Perry Center website at: www.williamjperrycenter.org

Editor-in-Chief: Dr. Patrick Paterson

Layout Design: Viviana Edwards

Cover concept: Three elements of Salvadoran society are reflected in the cover photo: 

members of the MS-13 gang that operate throughout the country, the soldier representing the 

state security forces, and the young girl representing Salvadoran society. 

Credit: top portion: Meredith Kohut, with permission.

Bottom portion: Jose Cabezas via Getty Images, with permission. 

ISBN 979-8-9856855-0-3

All images may be subject to copyright
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs v

CONTENTS

Chapter I: Introduction 4

Chapter II: The State of the Literature 10

Chapter III: Research Approach 16

The Adversarial Systems Approach 17

Chapter IV: Ideology 22

Chapter V: Strategy 32

Chapter VI: Leadership and Control 62

Strategic Ranfla 62

Operational Programas and Tribus 63

Tactical Level Clicas and Canchas 64

The Evolution of Leadership and Control 64

Cohesion 66

Chapter VII: The Gang Member 70

Recruiting Methods 73

Children in Gangs 74

Chapter VIII: Violence 76

Chapter IX: Politics 82

Chapter X: Territory 88

Distribution 88

Chapter XI: Resources 94

Drug Trafficking 97

Chapter XII: Popular Support 104

Chapter XIII: Conclusions 106

Annex 1 110
Author Biographies:

Dr. David Spencer has been a professor at the William J. Perry Center since 

2006. He has worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a country director in the office of Counternarcotics & Global Threats and the office of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs. He earned his PhD from George Washington University.

Herard von Santos is a writer of military history and political affairs in El 

Salvador. Before becoming a full-time author he served as a prosecutor for the 

Salvadoran Department of Justice. He is a veteran of the 1979-1992 Civil War, 

achieving the rank of Captain in the Salvadoran Army.

Juan Carlos Morales is the former editor of the magazine Revista Policía y 

Seguridad Pública. He was also the director of research at the National Academy 

of Public Security (ANSP). He has taught international relations at the University 

of El Salvador and earned his master’s degree at the José Simeón Cañas Central 

American University.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 4

Chapter I: Introduction

Gangs have existed for many decades in El Salvador. They did not receive a lot 

of attention until the 1990s. The gangs prior to the 1990s were more like the stereotypical gangs that people usually think of: misguided youth, mostly involved 

in petty crime and solicitation. They were not considered a very serious threat to 

personal or national security at that time. 

These gangs called themselves by a variety of names, but by the 1980s people 

were calling them “maras” as a general term for all gangs. The word “mara” is 

a Salvadoran slang word which means group of friends or gang in the sense that 

it refers to a tight knit group of buddies that frequently socialize together. If you 

are out socializing with your friends and your wife calls you to ask where you are, 

the answer is that I am here with “la mara” meaning I am here with my group of 

pals, the guys that one plays poker with or drinks a few beers or any other similar 

typical male social activity. The word is still used in this way, even though it has 

developed an increasingly negative connotation due to its association with the extremely violent criminal gangs. This is important because there has been a lot of 

speculation about the meaning of the word that in the authors’ opinion is improbable and counterproductive. 

Local gangs tried to raise their profile during the civil war by taking advantage of chaos of war to acquire high power weapons. For example, during the guerrilla offensive of 1989, the FMLN brought large numbers of additional weapons to 

arm the population which they believed would join them in an insurrection. This 

didn’t happen except for a few people. Among them were some of the gangs, but 

instead of fighting government troops, they used the weapons to commit armed 

Adversarial System Analysis 

of the Salvadoran Gangs

by David E. Spencer, PhD, 

Herard von Santos, and Juan Carlos Morales
5 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

robbery and as a result, the guerrillas forced the gangs to give back the weapons 

or face the consequences. The gangs today in El Salvador did not really evolve 

from these original gangs, but rather were founded in the United States, from the 

children of immigrants who migrated from El Salvador for a variety of reasons, in 

particular, fleeing the civil war during the 1980s. 

These kids growing up in the tough neighborhoods of suburban Los Angeles 

were soon exposed to gang culture and found it desirable for either reasons of 

status or self-preservation in tough neighborhoods to join or form gangs. In general, Salvadoran and Central American youth joined one of two gangs, the existing 

Mexican Barrio 18 gang, or the newly created Mara Salvatrucha Stoners. The latter 

was a drug using, rock and roll gang that developed a reputation for their quickness 

to kill rivals with their favorite weapons: machetes or knives. 

The gangs evolved and morphed. The once Mexican Barrio 18gang was eventually taken over by the Salvadorans and other Central Americans. However, they 

retained the Mexican-American or chicano street culture of the original Mexican 

leadership. On the other hand, the Mara Salvatrucha adopted the chicano culture 

from their association with the Mexican Mafia. The relationship will be explained 

later in this study, but the influence was profound, converting the Mara Salvatrucha 

Stoners into the Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13. It became one of the many Mexican Mafia subordinate gangs in the Los Angeles area. 

The issue that propelled the Salvadoran gangs to prominence was their penchant for violence. At first they killed outsiders, but somewhere early in the history 

somebody from one of the gangs killed someone from the other and a blood feud 

developed between the MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang that has persisted to the 

present. The savage nature of this feud has been the main reasons that the Salvadoran gangs have developed such a terrifying reputation in the United States and 

throughout Central America. 

United States prisons started filling up with Salvadoran gang members. To 

deal with the problem, the U.S. government began deporting them back to their 

countries of origin. However, there were serious unintended consequences of this 

policy because the Central American countries were ill-equipped to deal with the 

deported criminals. First, the lax laws in these countries didn’t keep the deportees 

in jail, and the jails were poorly run with low security and high levels of corruption. The jails became havens rather than places of punishment for the gangs. They 

also became finishing schools for the local recruits that were flocking to the gangs 

in large numbers. So, instead of solving the gang problem, deportation exacer-
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 6

bated the issue. The policy failed to eliminate gangs from the United States and 

sent hardened gang members into the midst of vulnerable populations in Central 

America that were ideal recruitment environments for new gang members and 

structures. Many of these subsequently migrated legally and illegally to the United 

States, reinforcing the gangs there. So not only did gangs get stronger in the U.S. 

but they were created all over Central America. The Salvadoran gangs became 

transnational criminal organizations.

Their transnational nature is probably the second aspect, after violence, that 

makes the Salvadoran gangs such a serious threat. They consolidated in the United 

States. They also consolidated in the so-called Central American Northern Triangle: El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. From there they soon spread north 

into Mexico and south into Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. Salvadoran gang 

clicas (what the gangs call the local groups) have also appeared to a lesser degree 

in many European countries like Spain, Italy, and Portugal. In general, wherever a 

Salvadoran population exists, the gangs eventually follow. 

The different clicas are not part of monolithic organizations, but rather are 

more like franchises. There are certain common rules, guidelines, symbols and beliefs, but the gangs have a great deal of autonomy at the national level, and sometimes even local level. Nevertheless, as will be discussed, the MS-13 in the United 

States, Honduras and Guatemala, cooperate a lot with the MS-13 in El Salvador. 

They also consider the 18th Street Gang as their enemy in each of these countries. 

So, while there is national autonomy, there is also international recognition and 

allegiances. This means that many gang crimes are coordinated and carried out 

across two or more borders. This makes it more difficult to investigate and prosecute them and conversely gives the gangs a great deal of maneuver space. Gang 

members wanted in the United States often flee to Central America and Mexico, 

and vice versa. 

In El Salvador, the government tried to deal with the gangs by extirpating 

them. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they developed polices known as “hard 

fist” and “super hard fist.” This basically gave the police the right to arrest people 

that looked like gang members and judges to impose harsh sentences for gang affiliated activities. However, this backfired as the jails were still finishing centers. 

Additionally, the jails served to recruit other criminals in jail for non-gang related 

offenses. Finally, instead of protecting society from the gangs, the jails turned into 

fortresses to protect the gangs from each other. 

Protected from outside threats, the security problems of the jails turned them 
7 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

into business centers for the gangs. Illicit rackets were run from prison, murders 

were ordered from there and gang leaders met to develop strategic plans. While 

many of these prison vulnerabilities have been greatly reduced, the prisons continue to be important command, control and finishing centers for the gangs. Overall, rather than hurting the gangs, the mass jailing of gang members helped them 

consolidate, become more sophisticated, and develop greater cohesion.

As mentioned previously, the main problem of the Salvadoran gangs is their 

prolific violence. They kill their rivals and those that oppose them without mercy 

or hesitation. They kill non-gang members who don’t follow their rules within 

their areas of control and others from outside who inadvertently wander into their 

territory. However, perhaps more disturbing is that they kill for the enjoyment of 

it. Killing is a requirement of full membership and killing is a regular activity of 

the clicas. Where other gangs might kill rarely and for specific reasons/purposes, 

the maras kill regularly and seemingly for pleasure, albeit almost never randomly. 

Their nearly total disregard for life, both their own and of others, instills fear in the 

societies where they exist. 

In the mid-2010s, the gangs figured out that their violence had an extortionary effect on their ability to negotiate or manipulate society and the government 

to get things they wanted. When they wanted to negotiate with societal or government representatives, they ordered increased or decreased number of homicides 

depending on whether they were trying to force a concession or show good will to 

coax a favor. Such a cold attitude toward the value of human life is hard to fathom 

because of how foreign it is to conventional societal values, but it is precisely this 

callousness that gives the gangs power. The government has everything to lose in 

contrast to the gangs in the short term. Paradoxically, in the long-term, violence is 

the gangs’ greatest weakness because it is what causes people to reject them. 

Nevertheless, as the state fails to eliminate or significantly reduce the power 

of the gangs in El Salvador, the people have resigned themselves to their presence and, as a result, the gangs have started to become institutionalized. The older 

generation of the gangs is gentrifying while simultaneously the criminal groups 

are being joined by large numbers of young recruits. This institutionalization of 

the gangs means that not only are they expanding, but they are establishing deep 

roots as they become increasingly embedded in Salvadoran society. This has serious security, political, economic and social implications and means that the gangs 

cannot be merely “extirpated” as a security threat, but rather must be dealt with as 

a holistic problem. This is a much more difficult task. This study aspires to develop 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 8

a holistic assessment of the Salvadoran gangs in the hopes that it can contribute to 

this type of comprehensive solution. 
9 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 10

Chapter II: The State of the Literature

Hundreds of books, articles and studies have been written on the gangs. The works 

range greatly in size and quality and can be divided into four broad categories: 

anecdotal, sociological phenomenon, criminal organization, and political actor. 

All four make important contributions to the understanding of the gangs. Within 

those four general categories are two focuses: the first examines the gangs in the 

United States, and the second that looks at the gangs as either a country or regional 

phenomenon. We will examine both, but mostly those that focus on El Salvador. 

Doing a full literature review is outside the scope of this paper, but we will briefly 

review some representative samples of the different categories of literature. 

The principal author of this report, David E. Spencer, has a particular soft 

spot for the anecdotal works. This is because some of the literature to first catch 

the attention of the American public were the anecdotal publications. The first 

that we should mention is This Is for the Mara Salvatrucha: Inside the MS-13, 

America’s Most Violent Gang by the journalist Samuel Logan published in 2009, 

which tells the story of the MS-13 in the United States through the lens of Brenda 

Paz, a young Honduran immigrant. She was one of the first persons who informed 

U.S. law enforcement about the Salvadoran gang and revealed a lot about how they 

were organized and operated on the U.S. mainland. Due to her inability to isolate 

herself from her former friends, she paid for her indiscretion with her life. This 

well-written and sobering book opened the eyes of many outside law enforcement 

to the growing threat that the MS-13 gang was becoming within the United States. 

A second work is Juan Jose Martinez’ A Year Inside MS-13, originally published in Spanish in 2015 and in English in 2019. The author, an anthropologist, 

spent a year inside the MS-13 in El Salvador. This is a very good social-cultural account that tells what it’s like for the gang members on the ground in the Salvadoran 

neighborhoods. It discusses the complex dynamics that exist between the gang 

members, the local population, and the rival gangs. It is told in a series of stories 

that are well-written and compelling. 

A third work published in 2018 by Juan Jose Martinez and his brother Oscar 

Martinez is titled, The Hollywood Kid: The Violent Life and Death of an MS-13 

Hitman. It is another representative work of this genre, telling the story of the MS13 through the eyes of Miguel Angel Tobar. This work provides some important 

details about the MS-13s origins in Los Angeles during the 1980s and the importance of the influence of the Mexican Mafia on the gang. Like the previous work it 
11 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

reveals a lot about the social-cultural dynamics of the gang in El Salvador. 

While all of these works are important, they are not analytical. They reveal 

the gangs from the perspective of individual gang members, and their interaction 

with the communities they come from and dominate. But they don’t question or 

attempt to verify the accounts of the sources. The integrity of the authors is not being questioned here. They are more than anything else, social commentaries. The 

authors are trying to make points using powerful representative stories, and that 

is a valid form of literature. However, these stories allow for significant gaps. So, 

for example, Brenda Paz, in Sam Logan’s book, mostly interacted with gangs on 

the East Coast, so a lot of the history and complexity on the West Coast is missing. 

The opposite can be said of Oscar and Juan Jose Martinez’ work about the Hollywood Kid, which have detailed descriptions about the history and dynamics on 

the U.S. West Coast, but not so much on the East. The gaps can be filled by reading 

many accounts, but all are somewhat lacking. While the reader obtains valuable 

insights into the gangs, these sources cannot be relied on to develop strategies or 

countermeasures, although they do serve as references and indicate where analytical research could be done. 

Scholarly work has been done along the general lines of looking at the gangs 

as criminal organizations or sociological phenomenon. An example of the former is the study that American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, and Insight Crime headed by Steven Dudley, Hector Silva Avalos, 

and Juan Jose Martinez, did for the United States Department of Justice in early 

2018 entitled MS13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction. This very thorough study is focused on the interests 

of the Department of Justice, that is how a criminal organization is organized and 

operates. It is impossible to not include some data on the sociological aspects of 

the organization, but the study makes conclusions about how they are distributed 

geographically, how it is organized, how it is governed, and its modes of operation. 

In other words, the focus is on the organization and its modus operandi which is 

what we call the criminal organization approach. This is a very important study 

with some very useful insights about the gangs. 

The social approach is represented by such works as Florida International 

University’s The New Face of Street Gangs: The Gang Phenomenon in El Salvador. The publication put out by the university’s The Street Gangs in Central 

America Research Initiative. This center, funded by the State Department’s Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and U.S. Agency 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 12

for International Development (USAID) has done studies on the gangs in each one 

of the Central American countries that it published in both Spanish and English. 

We will only refer to the study on El Salvador, which is the focus of our research. 

This excellent study focuses on the demographics of the gangs, who was in the 

gangs, which gangs they were in, levels of poverty, why they joined the gangs, the 

importance of belonging to the gang, how and when they left the gangs, and probably the major question of interest to the sponsors, whether or not rehabilitation of 

gang members was possible. This study does not exclude information about organization and modus operandi, but it is more interested at looking at demographic 

and social data and recommending solutions along those lines. 

The fourth category of study are those that look at the gangs as a political 

actor. This is perhaps the most controversial category of gang study and are often 

hotly disputed by those from the other categories, but particularly the social approach. 

First in this category is Max Manwaring’s work entitled Street Gangs: The 

New Urban Insurgency published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army 

War College in 2005. Manwaring is an expert on insurgency and counterinsurgency and did work on the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador 

in the 1980s. In this work, he develops the concept of generations of gangs. First 

generations gangs are traditional gangs that are local turf oriented, are horizontal 

in their organizations, and are focused on petty extortion and crime. Second generation gangs are oriented towards business, such as drug trafficking, and making 

money, are more centralized in their leadership, and cover more territory to even 

include other states. Third generation gangs are those that include the characteristics of the previous two generations plus sophisticated transnational operations and 

political ambitions. It basically asserted that third generations were very similar to 

insurgencies and should be combated essentially as such. 

This caused quite a stir when it was published for two reasons. First, the 

notion of approaching gangs as an insurgency was controversial to say the least. 

Second, the MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs shared some aspects of his definition of 

second and third generation gangs, but not many others. In 2005, this paper was on 

the fringes of the research on central American gangs. It was way ahead of its time. 

In 2021, it is much more reasonable, but still causes hesitation. 

Second is a series of papers and reports published both publicly and privately 

by Douglas Farah. In the 1980s, Mr. Farah was a reporter for the Washington Post 

in Central America and covered the insurgency in El Salvador. In recent years, he 
13 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

has become a consultant through his company IBI consultants. His papers have 

been published in a number of venues to include FIU, National Defense University 

(NDU) and the William J. Perry Center (WJPC). His arguments can be summarized 

by the WJPC publication that he co-wrote with Kathryn Babineau in 2018 entitled 

The Rapid Evolution of the MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras: from Gang to 

Tier-One Threat to Central America and U.S. Security Interests. His assertions are 

also repeated in his article written with the same co-author entitled The Evolution 

of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras, published by NDU in the journal Prism in 

2017. His primary assertion is that “The Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13) gang is now a 

tier one criminal, political, military, and economic threat in the Northern Triangle” 

because it has evolved politically, militarily and economically to challenge the survival of the state. This includes direct involvement in partisan politics, particularly 

elections, moving increasingly towards drug trafficking to include direct ties to the 

Mexican Cartels, and acquiring greater quantities and quality of weapons. 

Farah’s arguments have been controversial and received quite a bit of pushback. In particular a very strong reaction by Carlos Garcia and Juan Jose Martinez, 

author or co-author of some of the literature already reviewed here. Garcia’s and 

Martinez critiques were both published in Insight Crime in 2016 entitled 6 Common Misconceptions About the MS13 Street Gang, and International Terror and 

the Gangs of Douglas Farah respectively. Farah responded via letter that was also 

published in Insight Crime entitled The Nature of the Maras: Douglas Farah - a 

Rebuttal. He claims that Martinez’ critique is about ideological differences and 

perhaps professional jealousy. He asserts that Garcia’s critiques were mostly due to 

misunderstanding of the scope and context of the article that Garcia was critiquing. 

The main point here is to illustrate that the political actor literature elicits strong 

criticism.

To view gangs as an insurgent type organization, a particularly simplistic 

conceptualizations in this sense, is to miss the mark and to unleash state action 

that could be counterproductive. On the other hand, to dismiss the political actor 

argument out of hand threatens to miss the mark as well. There is clearly evidence 

of the gang’s involvement in politics. The question is not whether it exists or not, 

but what does it mean? Is this involvement opportunistic and sporadic or deliberate 

and systematic? The answer will determine very different government responses. 

All of these approaches have value, but to some degree an analogy is that the 

existing categories of literature is similar to the story about the multiple blind men 

describing an elephant. Each assesses the elephant very differently depending on 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 14

which part they touch. Here the differences are not as great but the emphasis, particularly of the latter three categories (criminal organization, sociological and political actor) all seem to be describing very valid, but different aspects of the same 

phenomenon. The solution is a more holistic approach to analyzing the gangs. This 

is what this study attempts to do 

 
15 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 16

Chapter III: Research Approach

This study sought to find an approach that overcame the gaps in the current literature. The challenge was not so much to do something fundamentally different, as 

the studies mentioned above have been generally very good, but rather bring them 

together into a single approach. 

Criminal approaches tend to look at gang members and actions. This is perhaps the most common approach that has been employed to understand and combat gangs. Knowing who they are and what they do helps the state make arrests 

and prosecute the individuals for crimes committed. It assumes that by punishing 

the responsible individuals, it will dissuade others from following their example. It 

also assumes that the gangs are essentially social anomalies. In Spanish, this idea 

is expressed elegantly through the term “anti-sociales” or anti-socials, which is 

applied to criminals of all types. The term embodies the concept that like cancer 

cells in the body, if removed, will allow the rest of society to progress normally. 

This approach has clearly been inadequate in El Salvador as the multiple 

“hard fist” campaigns have done little if anything to reduce the number of people 

joining the gangs while simultaneously creating huge prison populations across the 

country. This failure has caused some to reject the criminal approach and turn to a 

sociological approach to understand gang behavior and allure. 

In essence then, the criminal organization approach has been incomplete. 

While they are good at identifying gang members and their criminal acts, the visible dimensions of the problem, perhaps they are failing to see other significant 

activities and dimensions of the organization that underlie the gangs ability to survive and prosper, even during the heaviest iron fist policies in which the state had 

essentially declared war on them. 

The sociological approach looks at some of these underlying and sometimes 

invisible factors; how society is structured and functions or, in this case, malfunctions. It looks at the contradictions in society and the dynamics that lead to the creation, maintenance, and growth of the gangs. Solutions coming from a sociological 

approach often focus on existing conditions, education, opportunity, poverty, and 

living conditions. Sociological solutions may correctly seek to address root causes 

of criminality and seek to solve long-term societal problems. However, this approach tends to produce lasting results only if the policies emanating from them 

are sustained long-term. For example, they often focus on economic development 

and education as solutions, both very laudable efforts. However, due to political 
17 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

cycles of 4-8 years, strategic patience is often lacking to let these programs play 

out, and because of this the effects tend to be chronic instead of sustained.

Furthermore, sometimes these approaches eschew enforcement solutions 

advocated by the criminal approach. This does nothing to solve the short-term 

criminal threat against the populations. They also often fail to account for the new 

social dynamics that are created by the gangs themselves that prevent root causes 

from being addressed. It is akin to trying to solve a person’s - infected with parasites -- nutritional problems by feeding them more without first getting rid of the 

parasites. The parasites grow much stronger by absorbing all of the nutrients, while 

the patient only benefits marginally, if at all. So, sociological approach solutions, 

while well-intentioned, are also incomplete. The original problem that produced 

the threat to security may well be lack of opportunity stemming from poverty, but 

now the violence has added its own self-reproducing dynamic, and poverty cannot be reduced to increase the opportunity without first significantly reducing the 

violence. Programs aimed at solving socio-economic problems without simultaneously increasing security can end up strengthening the gangs, rather than healing 

society.

The more novel political actor approach emphasizes the gangs’ involvement 

in politics and their direct threat to state sovereignty, whether it be through political action or through violence. The problem with this approach can be two-fold. 

First, that authors can advocate treating the gangs as insurgent or terrorist groups, 

which while they may share many of the same characteristics, are not the same. 

The second problem is the interpretation by the readers, who think the authors are 

advocating that solution. 

This is why the political actor approach is controversial, although not without 

merit because, as we shall see, as the gangs have gotten stronger and more prolific. Almost inevitably, they have naturally begun to cross into the political realm. 

Whether occasional and opportunistic or deliberate and systemic is up for debate 

but ignoring this aspect can be just as fatal as only focusing on security or the 

socio-economic dimension. 

The Adversarial Systems Approach

In the end we chose to employ the adversarial system approach. The adversarial system approach goes beyond the sociological, criminal or political actor approaches by attempting to be holistic, examining all dimensions of an organization 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 18

that have an impact on its raison d’etre, organizational dynamics, and evolution. 

In other words, it attempts to not only look at what’s visible about an organization 

(members and events), but the dynamics that are driving the system in its current direction that are both visible and invisible. It also attempts to examine them 

across all dimensions of its action or behavior. 

This is important because as we have just discussed, when a state tries to act 

on only the visible elements of an internal threat, it often fails to make significant 

headway against that threat. As long as the other dimensions continue to exist, the 

organization can survive and regenerate when the state tires of what appear to be 

never ending and fruitless unidimensional actions or campaigns. 

The hope of this study is to tease out some of those less visible dimensions of 

the Salvadoran gangs by using the adversarial systems approach. The gang system 

is considered adversarial because they challenge the sovereignty of the state over 

the population and territory to which it has internationally recognized claim. The 

word enemy was rejected because it seemed too harsh a term that implied the need 

for a war, and the word rival because the term was too benign. The gangs are not 

benign because they considerably alter the state of security and the social life of 

the population. An adversary is less than an enemy but more than a mere rival. 

This approach was originally developed by the Colombian Military under 

the leadership of then Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzon, and much of the 

intellectual leadership came from then Brigadier General Alberto Jose Mejia1

 to 

analyze the FARC insurgent organization in their planning of the Sword of Honor 

Campaign in 2011-2012. The Sword of Honor Campaign and its branches and 

sequels brought the FARC to the negotiating table which ended in the peace agreement that was signed in November 2016. 

While the Salvadoran gangs are not by any means a political insurgency, they 

share many characteristics in common with insurgencies and impact national sovereignty in similar ways, even if the gangs’ strategic objective is not to take over 

the Salvadoran state like the FMLN’s objective was in El Salvador during the 

1980s, or like the FARC’s was in Colombia.

Prior to the Sword of Honor Campaign, the Colombian military had mostly 

analyzed the FARC in terms of its order of battle and military plans (very similar 

to the criminal organization approach). This led to attrition or body count strategies 

1

 Juan Carlos Pinzon was later named Ambassador to the United States and General Mejia later became Army 

Commander and then General Commander of the Colombian Military.
19 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

(reminiscent of iron fist policies) as well as to the most prolonged conflict to date 

in Latin American history. Among other things the prolongation of the conflict was 

due to the analysis never addressing or ignoring the non-order of battle aspects of 

the guerrillas (socio-economic and political). It merely looked at units, numbers, 

weapons, locations and violent actions. 

It was only when the government forces were able to understand the whole 

system, both military and non-military aspects of the FARC, that more effective 

strategies were adopted that led to the conclusion of the fighting. 

Similarly, in El Salvador a succession of Mano Dura (Hard Fist) policies led 

to vastly increased arrests and jailing but did little towards reducing the influence 

of the gangs. It was reasoned that a similar holistic approach, adapted from Colombia and modified to be more appropriate to a gang criminal organization, could 

be useful to analyze the gangs in El Salvador. This holistic approach attempts to 

identify important aspects of the gangs that perhaps weren’t previously considered 

in the development of public security strategies to reestablish public order in El 

Salvador. 

The basic method of this approach is to figure out all of the dimensions in 

which an organization, group, or entity is having an impact or interacting with the 

nation and society, and then investigating and developing an understanding of each 

and every one of those dimensions and the degree to which the organization acts 

in each one. The sum of these dimensions and their interactions form the system. 

The first task then is to figure out what those dimensions are for the group in 

question. Many of these aspects were identified from the literature that we have 

reviewed above. Some came from other sources. Some were adapted from the 

Colombian work on FARC but were not simple transpositions of the Colombian 

FARC analysis. That would miss the nuances unique to El Salvador and the gangs. 

They were modified to better fit gangs with criminal objectives, rather than an 

insurgent organization with political-military objectives. Each of the identified dimensions will be the headings of each of the chapters of the study for which we 

will attempt to do an in-depth description and analysis. 

After significant research, discussion and review, the aspects of the gangs we 

have decided to look at for this study are ideology, strategy, leadership and control, 

the gang member, violence, politics, territoriality, resources, and popular support. 

As can be seen, this is essentially a combination of the criminal organization, social dimension, and political-actor approaches rolled into one. 

The research for this study was carried out between 2018 and 2020. It is al-
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 20

most certain that some of the information will already be out of date by the time 

this study is published. Even so, it is a good snapshot of the overall impact on 

Salvadoran society at the date of its writing, and many of its contents will continue 

to hold true over time. 

We should clarify that this study is about the gangs in El Salvador, specifically the Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13 and the Barrio 18 gangs. It more heavily 

examines MS-13 because much more data was available on that gang than Barrio 

18. It does not focus on the MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs outside of El Salvador 

although it is impossible to understand the gangs in El Salvador without some 

discussion of their franchises and associates both regionally and internationally. 
21 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 22

Chapter IV: Ideology

Many persons dismiss the idea of the gangs having an ideology. Perhaps it is because they conceive of ideology in only the political dimension. This study claims 

that to the contrary, Salvadoran gangs have a very well-developed ideology, although it is not traditional like democracy or socialism. 

Ideology can be defined as a set of aims and ideas that directs one’s goals, 

expectations, and actions. In this sense, the gangs in El Salvador display a clear 

ideology that governs their behavior. Although to many people, the gangs may 

seem like a group of violent and chaotic people who do whatever they want and 

use force to prevent others from stopping them, they are in fact guided by a set 

of concepts and rules that impose hierarchy and order to their behavior. Their behavior towards members of the gang is far different than their behavior towards 

non-members, which may be one of the reasons that people perceive them as being 

chaotic. 

The Salvadoran gang’s ideology is heavily influenced by the “Mexican Mafia” Sureños (Southerners) system, which is not from Mexico but rather is a sort of 

Caption: The “Devil’s horns” of the Mara Salvatrucha gang are painted on the wall of the prison in 

Tonacatepeque, El Salvador. 

Photo credit: Jan Sochor via Getty Images, with permission 
23 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

federation of the Mexican American gangs in Southern California. The Mexican 

Mafia or “La Eme” (The M) originated in the California prison system during the 

1950s as a means of Hispanic prisoners organizing to protect themselves against 

the predations of members of white and black gangs in prison. It later turned 

into a money-making enterprise for its members by obligating Hispanic gangs on 

the outside to pay “taxes”. These gangs complied because non-compliance led to 

isolation, physical assault and even death in prison of the gangs that didn’t pay 

the “tax”. The Mexican Mafia umbrella meant that when in prison, Hispanic gang 

members of affiliated gangs would be protected by other organized and affiliated 

gang member inmates. If you weren’t part of the Mexican Mafia association, you 

were on your own, which meant that you were easy prey to more organized groups, 

Whites, Blacks, Asians and even the Mexican Mafia itself.

Since most gang members eventually ended up in jail, and while in prison, required allies and protection, compliance was a good investment.2

 This system made the Mexican Mafia extremely rich and influential. The Mexican Mafia 

charges monthly sums to be part of the system and runs businesses outside of jail 

through its surrogate members. The gangs that belong to the Mexican Mafia system are known as the “Sureño System.”

The Mara Salvatrucha was originally known as the Mara Salvatrucha Stoner, 

a hard-rock, hard drug using, Satanic-oriented type of gang.3

 Inured to violence 

because of the civil war in their home country, the Mara Salvatrucha Stoners were 

known for their lack of hesitation to use violence, especially with blades and machetes. Because of this, other gangs feared them. 

In the first couple of years of the 1990s, the Mexican Mafia asked the Mara 

Salvatrucha to pay its quota of taxes. Most of the cliques or clicas refused and the 

Mexican Mafia gave the greenlight to all gangs in the Sureño system to kill Mara 

Salvatrucha on the outside. Furthermore, they were denied protection when they 

were incarcerated. After over one hundred Mara Salvatrucha were killed the gang 

gave in and submitted to the Mexican Mafia.4

Under the influence of the Mexican mafia, the Mara Salvatrucha transformed 

its modus operandi, adopting the fashion, speech, culture, and gothic tattoo styles 

2

 Michael Montgomery, “Gangster Reveals Mexican Mafia Secrets,” National Public Radio, September 6, 2008 at 

https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94333325 accessed on June 29, 2020. 3

 Oscar Martinez and Juan Jose Martinez, The Hollywood Kid: The Violent Life and Death of an MS-13 Hitman, 

New York: Verso, 2018, p. 42.

4

 MS-13 and Mexican Mafia Historical Gang Ties, Perplex News, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cM_hozo9gYQ, accessed on July 10, 2020. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 24

of the Mexican Mafia. As gangs affiliated with the Mexican mafia, they added the 

number 13 to their names, symbolizing “M” the 13th letter in the alphabet, to show 

participation in the Mexican Mafia confederation. This confederation included the 

gangs like Hawaiian Gardens 13, Florence 13, Playboy 13, and eventually Mara 

Salvatrucha which dropped “stoner” from their name and added the 13 in its place 

to become Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS 13.5

 However, belonging to “La Eme” 

didn’t mean that on the streets these Hispanic gangs were at peace with each other. 

To the contrary they battled each other viciously, vying for business and territory, 

but when in prison, those rivalries were left behind and they banded together under 

control of “La Eme” to defend themselves against non-Hispanic groups.6

Nevertheless, the Mexican mafia was not only a prison insurance system, but 

also exercised strategic control from time-to-time as it gained power and influence. For example, in November 1995, the Mexican mafia issued three orders to 

the Sureño gangs which it transmitted by TV, radio, and in the newspapers. These 

orders were called the “Hispanic Peace Initiative.” They included taking over drug 

areas controlled by Black gangs; taxing illegal-alien drug dealers operating in 

Sureño controlled areas; and stopping drive-by shootings. 

The order to end drive-by shootings was an attempt to reduce the death and 

injury of innocent bystanders which was making the gangs unpopular and causing 

a police crackdown which was seriously affecting the Mexican Mafia’s lucrative 

drug business. The drive-bys had to stop to reduce the pressure on this business. 

The gangs were instead encouraged to continue killing each other in face-to-face 

“walk-ups.” However, some Hispanic gangs were loath to give up drive-by shootings and the members of those gangs that failed to obey were attacked and often 

killed when they reached jail for disobeying the directives.7

 

While to date, no MS-13 member has become a “carnal” or full member of 

the Mexican Mafia, a few of the top US leaders of the MS-13 have been sponsored 

for membership that for a variety of reasons failed to get a unanimous vote. One 

can only become a “carnal” with a unanimous vote. Nevertheless, one or two of 

these same leaders do work closely with the Mexican Mafia and are considered 

5

 Oscar Martinez and Juan Jose Martinez, The Hollywood Kid: The Violent Life and Death of an MS-13 Hitman, 

New York: Verso, 2018, p. 44.

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Richard Valdemar, Mexican Mafia: The Most Dangerous Gang, Police: Law Enforcement Solutions, April 12, 

2010, at https://www.policemag.com/373488/mexican-mafia-the-most-dangerous-gang accessed on June 29, 

2020.
25 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

“comrades.”, a prestigious but slightly lower category.8

Because of the aforementioned, the Mexican Mafia was influential in the development of the Salvadoran gangs’ code of conduct. This was because the consequences of disobeying that code of conduct when one went to jail were catastrophic, so they became an ingrained part of the Salvadoran gangs’ code of conduct as 

well. These Mexican Mafia code included: 

1. A member may not be an informant or rat.

2. A member may not be a coward.

3. A member may not raise a hand against another member without approval.

4. A member must not show disrespect for any member’s family, including 

sex with another member’s wife or girlfriend.

5. A member must not steal from another member.

6. A member may not be homosexual.

7. A member must not lobby against another member or cause dissension 

within the organization.

8. Membership is for life.

9. It’s mandatory to assault/kill all dropouts.

10. La Eme comes first, even before your own family.

11. A member must not interfere with another member’s business activities.9

The latest list of MS-13 rules is attached as an annex to this study. Virtually 

all the Mexican Mafia rules except the prohibition against homosexuality are reproduced in the MS-13 list. Nonetheless, the MS-13 continue to be significantly 

homophobic.

This code of conduct expresses several ideas that are fundamental to Salvadoran gang ideology as well. The first is the idea that the gang becomes the most 

important aspect of a person’s life above all else. The only acceptable attitude is 

total loyalty to the gang and that once in, the association is for life. Showing total 

loyalty to the gang gives a member honor. Those that are disloyal to the gang lose 

their honor and must be eliminated. Providing information to the police and cowardice are considered forms of disloyalty. Desertion is another form of disloyalty 

and is punished with extermination. 

8

 MS-13 and Mexican Mafia Historical Gang Ties, Perplex News, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cM_hozo9gYQ, accessed on July 10, 2020. 9

 Chris Blatchford (2008). The Black Hand: the Bloody Rise and Redemption of “Boxer” Enriquez, a Mexican 

Mob killer. New York: Harper Collins, 2009, p. 44.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 26

The second is that cohesion within the gang and honor is maintained by showing respect to other members of the gang. This is done by respecting his person, his 

family, his property, and his business. 

The homophobia of the gangs stems from this aspect as homosexual activity 

is seen as a violation of respect for other gang members. This is probably because 

many men who go to prison without protection are raped by other prisoners. Men 

in prison perform homosexual acts, even though they are heterosexuals on the outside due to their lack of access to females and because forcing another man to have 

sex with you is a form of domination and forced submission. To the Sureño gangs, 

this type of homosexuality is dishonorable. 

These concepts, total loyalty to the gang, honor, and respect for other gang 

members promotes a high level of cohesion within the in-group. This does not 

apply to the out-group, everybody else, and especially rival gangs towards which 

behavior is completely opposite. The implacable savagery displayed against enemies and outsiders creates fear and, from this fear, respect. Respect and deference 

by non-gang members for the gang is vital and gives the gang members their sense 

of importance. It also gives them power by removing feelings of helplessness in a 

hostile world.

Caption: Gang graffiti on the wall of a neighborhood. These signs are used to mark territory and identify the 

gang, in this case the MS-13 and the specific clica Guazapos Locos. This warns other gangs and authorities 

who may attempt to operate in this area. It is prohibited to clean this graffiti on pain of death. The sign also 

contains a warning to the inhabitants of the neighborhood: “Ver, Oir, Callar” - “see, hear and shut up”. This is 

a shortened version of the entire phrase: “Ver, Oir y Callar si su vida quiere preserver” (See, Hear and Shut 

up if you want to preserve your life).

Photo credit: El Salvador National Police 
27 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

There are three additional ideas that underpin the ideology of the gangs and 

those are self-defense, territory, and the gang organization. The origins of the Salvadoran gangs are migrant Central American, mostly Salvadoran children, who 

went to Los Angeles, California where they were victimized by other Latin Americans, particularly those belonging to pre-existing Mexican gangs. Barrio 18 was a 

Mexican gang that Central American youth were allowed to join. They eventually 

coopted it (a kind of “if you can’t beat them, join them” response), while MS-13 

was formed by Central American, but mostly Salvadoran youth that were seeking to form their own gang to defend themselves against the other gangs. So, in 

this sense the fundamental purpose for their existence was self-defense from other 

gangs. 

The best way to defend the group from predatory gangs was to dominate a finite territory and keep other gangs from entering that area. This did several things. 

First, it provided the group with a defined objective in their quest for self-defense. 

Second, it gave them an identity distinct from others (“we’re from here, they’re 

from there”). Third, dominating territory allowed the gang to exploit its economic 

resources, and have a ready pool of young men, and today increasingly young 

women from which to recruit. 

A key and increasingly prominent idea among the Salvadoran gangs is the 

need for the formation of a “gang nation.” Gang members are “citizens” of this 

gang nation. This gang nation has an “army”, long-standing traditions, a path to 

“citizenship,” a means of upward mobility, organizational structure, a pseudo court 

system, and a pseudo-democracy in which the members can participate in decision-making.10 

While the gangs do not seem very interested to date in taking over any formal 

state, the “gang nation” is not only the gang territory within a single state but the 

linking together of different “islands” of the gangs across the various nations. The 

linking across many nations is probably feasible due to cell phones and social media technology, as the different islands can communicate and follow each other’s 

activities at the push of a button that is essentially available to all from any location. As we shall discuss this development of a gang nation works in fits and starts, 

but the idea and effort have persisted over the years. 

The “gang nation” is necessary because the members feel that they are not 

protected by their formal states nor have access to the means of upward mobility 

10 Alejandro Hernández Jacky, “Inkin‘, Taggin‘, Flashin‘, and Flowin‘: Defining Group Identity Through Mara 

Salvatrucha Expressive Culture,” Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2012, p.10.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 28

within its structures, such as education or jobs. This makes them feel like they do 

not really belong to any nation besides the one they have created for themselves, 

nor that any formal nation even really wants them as citizens.11

Their anti-social behavior reinforces both the concept of their belonging to 

the gang nation and their alienation from the formal state because it provokes the 

state representatives to act against them, jail them, and even kill them. It is a sort of 

self-fulfilling prophecy or vicious cycle with alienated persons acting anti-socially, 

being rejected, banding together, and being rejected as a group and so on. The concept of a gang nation is reflected in the gang’s strategy to unify all the homologous 

gangs across the world. 

In El Salvador, the concept of the gang nation as the sum of its members 

has been extended beyond the gang members alone to the communities in which 

the gang members live. A recent interview with a gang leader revealed that the 

gangs claim that they are merely taking control of the territory that the state has 

abandoned, and that they have become the only real representatives of the communities. Through their actions, they are forcing the state to pay attention to the 

communities.12

According to the gangs, Salvadoran society is broken, due to poverty and 

social disintegration, so the only real force that exists in these communities are 

the gangs.13 An MS-13 member claimed that the government were responsible for 

the continued strength of the gangs because they wouldn’t give people a hand. According to their logic, if they had jobs and opportunities, they wouldn’t be in the 

gangs.14

Sexism

Until recently the ideology of the Salvadoran gangs was highly misogynist. This 

is reflective of traditional Latin machismo culture which tends to view females as 

being inferior and weak with some notable exceptions. 

Except for mothers and grandmothers, women are looked down upon and 

disrespected. This is reflected by their terms for females associated with the gangs. 

11 Hernandez Jacky, p. 11.

12 Vice News, Gangs of El Salvador, November 30, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk, 

accessed on June 10, 2020.

13 Ibid.

14 Vice News, Gangs of El Salvador, November 30, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk, 

accessed on June 10, 2020.
29 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

A female gang member or girlfriend is called a “haina” which comes from the 

Mexican slang word “jaina” meaning “vagina.” This word both strips women of 

their humanity and turns them into objects that are to be used for male pleasure. 

Within the gang world, women are objects to be possessed and, while a gang 

member can have more than one girlfriend, he is not allowed to have sex with the 

women belonging to other gang members. As societal values are changing, this 

value is beginning to change within the gangs as well. Until recently, women 

played little role in the gangs other than to support their gang member boyfriends, 

bear their children, hide their weapons, money, and drugs, and otherwise back up 

the gang. Historically, there have only been a small number of full female gang 

members. Recently however, it seems that attitudes have opened more towards 

women as regular gang members and not just hainas. 

Women have been found to have value beyond sex because they are usually 

less suspected of being gang members which allows them to carry out a number of 

tasks with greater facility than males. For example, they can act as assassins because they can get close to a target where a man would find it more difficult. They 

can also approach targets for extortion without being suspected and suddenly draw 

a weapon trapping a target between paying up or being killed. By the same token 

they can often carry out intelligence more easily than men or cause men to drop 

their guard by appealing to their libido. 

On the other hand, women themselves have demanded to be allowed to join 

the gang to demonstrate their value, and distinguish themselves from the “hainas”, 

to avoid the abuse these women suffer.15 While women have been allowed into the 

gang since the early days, their full membership was the exception rather than the 

norm. 

Women could choose to be initiated by going through the 13-second beat 

down or by having sex with the gang members. Only those females that chose the 

13-second beat down over sex, the same way the males joined, were respected. 

Women who chose to be initiated by having sex were not really seen as true members but rather sexual objects, little better than hainas.16 

However, as attitudes towards the value and or capabilities of women have 

shifted in society in general, this is starting to be reflected in the gang’s values as 

15 Las Pandilleras Mas Locas de El Salvador, Noticias El Salvador, 2017, at https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=qWrYknJ-KJE&t=3s accessed on June 17, 2020. 16 Juan Martinez D’Aubuisson, Así viven y mueren las mujeres pandilleras en El Salvador, Revista Factum, March 

11, 2016 at https://www.revistafactum.com/asi-viven-y-mueren-las-mujeres-pandilleras-en-el-salvador/ accessed 

on June 17, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 30

well. Nevertheless, the gangs appear to still be more machista, misogynist, and 

homophobic than society in general.

Religion

The Salvadoran gangs have a tortured relationship with religion. On the one hand, 

their acts reject and violate conventional religious rules and norms. For example: 

thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not commit adultery17 and other 

Christian commandments are violated regularly. There is a general rejection of 

religion in this sense. However, they also are superstitious about the effects of 

interference with religious authorities. While gang members have been known to 

steal property from religious authorities, priests, pastors, missionaries, and others, 

they generally avoid harming them. 

There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that harming religious authorities 

will bring down the wrath of God on the gang and gang members. While gangs 

commit the most heinous crimes without hesitation, they seem to believe that deliberately harming religious representatives will provoke a more intense type of 

divine anger. Therefore, it is essentially taboo to kill or injure a priest or pastor. In 

their minds, extortion, theft and murder of normal citizens does not elicit the same 

wrath of God. 

Pragmatically however, religious representatives have often proven to be the 

only people to reach out to gang members and their families in times of crisis, 

suffering, and prison. It was Father Colindres of the Catholic Church who was the 

intermediary between the government and gangs during the gang truce negotiations of 2012-2014.18 Religious personnel also stay out of gang business and do not 

inform police or interfere with gang activity. Consequently, religious representatives are often the only people that are allowed freedom to come in from outside, 

move around gang territory, and leave without molestation. 

Perhaps because of this, one of the few ways out of the gang is through religious conversion, particularly to Protestant or Evangelical sects. Where other 

forms of requests to leave the gangs are not respected, being religiously converted 

and coming to Jesus is. These converts are often moved to better jails for gang 

17 The Holy Bible Exodus 20 verses 13-15. 18 Carlos Martínez y José Luis Sanz, La nueva verdad sobre la Tregua entre pandillas, El Faro, September 11, 2012 

at http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201209/cronicas/9612/La-nueva-verdad-sobre-la-Tregua-entre-pandillas.

htm accessed on June 29, 2020.
31 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

member converts. They are allowed more family visits and otherwise are treated 

better by prison officials. Converts are often let out earlier and many return to the 

gangs to continue evangelism within the ranks of those on the outside. Because of 

this, many imprisoned gang members convert. 

There is a lot of suspicion within the police and outside the gangs that conversions are insincere, but rather motivated to obtain better jail conditions. Furthermore, they suspect that converted gang members communicate using scriptural 

references as codes for messages about criminal activity. It is not clear if this is 

true, but this is an area for further research. What is clear is that the gangs have a 

complicated relationship of rejection and respect with most religious authorities, 

one that is a combination of both superstition and pragmatism.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 32

Chapter V: Strategy

Even though no document has ever been captured outlining a gang strategy, it is 

the finding of this study that MS-13 think and act strategically. Their strategy is not 

contained in a formal western-style document that outlines gang strategic objectives, specific objectives, lines of action, ways, means, or measures of effectiveness. Nevertheless, there is a lot of evidence of strategic objectives and lines of 

action to accomplish them in the long term. 

Plan 503

The gangs in El Salvador have been thinking strategically for at least 14 years, if 

not longer. In 2007, Salvadoran Police intelligence discovered that the MS-13 was 

developing a so-called “Plan 503.” This plan was named 503 after the international 

country code to call El Salvador via telephone. There was no document ever written, but intelligence gathered from gang leader’s conversations outlined the basic 

lines of effort of Plan 503. 

The lines of effort of Plan 503 included unification of all the MS-13 across 

the globe to carry out large-scale transnational operations; ceasing the war with 

Barrio 18 in El Salvador to carry out joint operations against the state; improve the 

military capabilities of the MS-13 by increasing the number of military weapons 

(at least 2 M-16s and 2 AK-47s) per clica; getting training in guerrilla tactics to 

include training in explosives; forming a strike force that could directly combat the 

state; getting out of the extortion and kidnapping business and conversely taking 

over the drug trafficking business because extortion and kidnapping were causing 

people to reject them; and finally, consolidating relationships with the political parties, particularly those on the left. The chart below attempts to organize each one of 

these elements into lines of effort in different areas as would be done in a normal 

multi-spectrum strategy.19

Table 1. Plan 503 December 2007 Strategic Lines of Action 

International Unify all of the MS-13 across the globe to and carry out large-scale operations.

National Cease the war with Barrio 18 in El Salvador and carry out joint operations against 

the state.

19 Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) Intelligence documents about Plan 503 viewed in October 2008.
33 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

Military 1) Improve the military capabilities of the MS-13 by 

2) increasing the number of military weapons (at least 2 M-16s and 2 AK47s) per clica. 

3) Get training in guerrilla tactics. 

4) Get training in explosives. 

5) Form a strike force that can directly combat the state.

Economic Get out of the extortion and kidnapping business and take over the drug trafficking 

business because extortion and kidnapping causing people to reject them.

Political Consolidate relationships with the political parties, particularly those on the left.

Looking back at this plan approximately 14 years later, several things stand 

out. First, that the plan does indeed demonstrate strategic thinking. Second, that 

while not all the objectives were accomplished, significant progress was made in 

all of the areas. Third, that virtually all the objectives or evolutions of the objectives remain part of the MS-13 strategy today. 

Current Gang Strategy

As mentioned earlier, to date, no gang strategy document has been captured. 

However, the leaders have identified a number of strategic lines of effort through 

different wilas20 that have been intercepted by the Salvadoran authorities. From 

these lines of effort, we can deduce the strategic objectives by grouping the different lines of effort into similar categories. The lines of effort are remarkably 

consistent with Plan 503 showing strategic thinking over time. We believe that 

the strategic objectives of the gangs, particularly the MS-13 are the following: 

a. Develop a force that can confront the state security forces on an equal or 

superior footing. 

b. Acquire political legitimacy to become a permanent part of the national 

political milieu. 

c. Develop a robust and formal economy that permits the acquisition and sustainment of the aforementioned force. 

d. Acquire permanent control of several highly profitable transnational criminal activities. 

20 Wila is a type of written message by a gang leader to other gang members.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 34

 The chart below outlines our deduction of the current gang strategy and its lines 

of effort:

Table 2. Gang Strategy

Strategic Objective Lines of Effort

Develop a force that can confront the 

state security forces on an equal or 

superior footing. 

--Develop and consolidate relationships with the 

Mexican Cartels.

--Gang alliances to confront the state.

--Increase the military capability of the gangs to confront 

the state.

--Acquire greater firepower (military weapons, 

explosives)

--Increase military training

Acquire political legitimacy to become 

a permanent part of the national 

political milieu. 

--Formal recognition of the political parties. Negotiate 

with them. 

--Politically mobilize part of the population to vote in 

specific manners.

--Negotiate jail privileges, aid programs for their 

structures and social base in different areas 

(government, international, NGOs, etc.)

--Win over the population by providing security and 

employment, not just coercion.

Develop a robust and formal economy 

that permits the acquisition and 

sustainment of the aforementioned 

force. 

--Win over the population by providing security and 

employment, not just coercion.

--Economic investment in the local economy and its 

long-term domination.

Acquire permanent control of 

a number of highly profitable 

transnational criminal activities.

--Develop and consolidate relationships with the 

Mexican Cartels.

--Gang alliances to confront the state.

--Territorial control of mobility corridors outside their 

traditional areas.

--Maintain the relationship with homologous gangs in 

the region: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, 

and the United States.

--Establish areas of control in Mexico, United States, 

Spain, and Italy 

Following is a discussion of how the gangs appear to be developing each of 

the lines of effort to achieve their strategic objectives. 

Develop and consolidate relationships with the Mexican Cartels. At least as 

early as 2012, the Mexican Federal Attorney General’s office claimed they had 

evidence that a very close relationship existed between the MS-13 and some of 
35 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

the Mexican cartels, such as the Zetas and the Beltran Leyva organization. The 

purpose of this relationship was to help the cartels move drugs through Central 

America into Mexico.21 They also claimed that much of the growing savagery between rival drug trafficking cartels was due to techniques taught by the Salvadoran 

gangs to the Mexican cartels to cause fear among the population, the state, and 

their rivals. While it is doubtful that the Mexican cartels needed anyone to teach 

them savagery, the relationship was confirmed in a 2019 trial in which former gang 

leader, “Noe” testified that he had sought to develop a relationship with the Zetas 

and made agreements with them to traffic drugs and weapons in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. This agreement resulted in the MS-13 receiving between 

200-400 kilos of marijuana worth 500 dollars per kilo, and nine kilos of cocaine 

through Honduras worth a total of 112, 500 dollars.22 It was not clear from the testimony if this was a one-time agreement or a recurring event.

In 2018, the Salvadoran Attorney General’s office asserted that the MS-13 

and El Chapo Guzman met on two occasions, the second time shortly after he 

escaped from jail for the second time. The purpose of these meetings was to work 

out an agreement between the gangs and the Sinaloa Cartel.23 

Maintain the relationship with homologous gangs in the region: Honduras, 

Guatemala, Nicaragua. There are clear indications of relationships between and 

across the various same gang affiliations in the various countries. This has existed 

for some time. During the 2019 mega trial resulting from Operation Cuscatlán24

in El Salvador, testimony was given that the MS-13 leadership in El Salvador had 

sent people to various parts of the world to expand the gang. Specific names were 

given of people sent to Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.25 However, while the 

Salvadoran gangs seem to be able to influence their Central American affiliates, 

evidence suggests that command and control over these gangs is a very different 

matter. 

21 La estrecha relación entre pandillas salvadoreñas y los carteles mexicanos más violentos, America Economia, 

July 22, 2012 @ https://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/sociedad/la-estrecha-relacion-entre-pandillas-salvadorenas-y-los-carteles-mexicano accessed on January 25, 2020. 22 Decapitaciones, Drogas y Armas: El eterno vinculo entre la Mara Salvatrucha y los Carteles Mexicanos, October 11, 2019 @ https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2019/10/11/decapitaciones-drogas-y-armas-el-eternovinculo-entre-la-mara-salvatrucha-y-los-carteles-mexicanos/ accessed on January 25, 2020. 23 Marianna Hernandez, Mara Salvatrucha Estrecha Lazos con Carteles Mexicanos, September 24, 2018 @https://

breaking.com.mx/2018/09/mara-salvatrucha-estrecha-lazos-con-carteles-mexicanos/ accessed on January 25, 

2020.

24 Operation Cuscatlán was a major operation in 2019, in which charges were brought against 426 members of the 

MS-13 based on informants and intelligence. 373 of the defendants were convicted.

25 Fiscalia El Salvador, Sentencia Definitiva Caso Cuscatlan, February 6, 2020, p. 165.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 36

Some history is useful here. The Salvadoran gangs originated in the United 

States, and initially many of the activities carried out in El Salvador were done 

by order of gang leaders in the United States. However, by 1999, the gangs had 

become stronger in El Salvador than in the United States and they began to resent 

control by elements outside El Salvador. A rebellion occurred in which a number 

of gang leaders who had been deported from the United States that were exercising 

control over the Salvadoran gangs on the orders of leaders still in the U.S. were 

murdered.26 In this way, the gangs in El Salvador won a great deal of autonomy 

from the gangs in the United States even if they remained affiliated and connected 

through family and friendship ties. 

Despite this national assertion of autonomy, and likely similar events in Honduras, Guatemala and elsewhere, the unification of all the Salvadoran gangs distributed across the globe into a single crime federation has been a constant objective of the Salvadoran national ranfla. Plan 503 contemplated the unification of all 

26 Herard von Santos, ‘Las pandillas salvadoreñas y su comportamiento delictivo: Prospectiva de sus formas 

organizativas y expansión territorial para el próximo decenio 2015-2025’, Revista Policia y Seguridad Publica, 

Diciember 2014, p. 189.

Caption: A member of the MS-13 gang in the Chalatenango prison, north of San Salvador, in March 2019.

Photo credit: Marvin Recinos via Getty Images, with permission
37 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

the MS-13. Sometime in the 2010s, Salvadoran gang leaders sent members into 

other Central American countries and Mexico to “grow the gangs” and to develop 

agreements to get increasingly involved in drug trafficking.27 This coincides with 

two Plan 503 lines of effort, developing the global alliance and getting increasingly 

involved in drug trafficking. Some progress seems to have been made, as between 

2014 and 2016, there began to be increasing direction and control of U.S. affiliates 

by leaders in El Salvador, especially on the east coast such as in New York, Maryland and Virginia.28 The West Coast has been more resistant to Salvadoran control 

as they are much more heavily influenced by the Mexican Mafia.

The effort mentioned in the 2019 Operation Cuscatlán trial to send Salvadoran gang members to other Central American countries indicates that the goal 

of unifying the gangs under a single command remains intact. Nevertheless, while 

liaison and advice between El Salvador and regional gangs is evident, there is 

still little evidence that the El Salvador leadership has managed to successfully 

exercise increased command and control over Honduran or Guatemalan affiliated 

gangs. Because of this, unification under a single leadership seems to remain an 

elusive goal. 

The fundamental obstacle to global unity is disagreements over who should 

exercise control. While, as will be discussed later, there does seem to be fairly 

vertical control and discipline within the clicas, programa, and ranfla of a single 

organization and sometimes control over a group of programas due to consensus 

between their leaders, absolute command and control over even the entire national 

organization, much less the regional or transnational affiliates, is not a reality. The 

control over U.S. East Coast and West Coast clicas is due to migrant gang members with direct links back to their ranflas. This is what holds them together. This 

kind of cohesion at the regional and international level is scarce.

In this sense, the gangs can be thought of as franchises much like McDonalds 

or Burger King. Each store is independently owned and operated, although to be 

able to be called by the brand name and use the logos, the franchises have to follow 

certain standards. That said, if we compare “franchises”, there is a lot more discipline, cohesion, and organization within the MS-13 franchise than the Barrio 18. 

27 Pandilla salvadoreña MS13 buscó alianzas con carteles de Mexico y Guatemala, EFE, October 11, 2019 at 

https://www.efe.com/efe/america/mexico/pandilla-salvadorena-ms13-busco-alianzas-con-carteles-de-mexico-yguatemala/50000545-4084403 accessed on March 26, 2020. 28 Por Héctor Silva Ávalos, ‘MS13 Members Imprisoned in El Salvador Can Direct the Gang in the US’, Insight 

Crime, December 5, 2016 @ https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ms13-members-imprisoned-in-el-salvador-can-direct-the-gang-in-the-us/ accessed on March 16, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 38

There is constant communication between the gangs in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States, but how much influence or control 

is exercised by one over the others is not clear and seems to fluctuate from leader 

to leader and transaction to transaction.29 

Often this communication and coordination of the gangs at the regional level 

is done to carry out very specific crimes, often of an opportunistic or technical nature. In 2014, Salvadoran MS-13 members were captured in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, Santa Barbara and Copan, Honduras. According to the Honduran paper 

reporting the arrests, the Salvadorans were in Honduras teaching their Honduran 

affiliates how to send encrypted messages.30 This is only one of many such examples of affiliated gang members from one country being found in a neighboring 

country doing work in cooperation with their franchises from that country. 

Establish areas of control in Mexico, United States, Spain, and Italy. At the 

Operation Cuscatlán trial, testimony was given that like missions to Central America, individuals were sent by the MS-13 to the United States, Mexico, Spain, Italy, 

and Brazil to spread and expand the gangs.31 

United States

Both MS-13 and Barrio 18 originated in the United States. The MS-13 started in 

the United States during the 1980s. Barrio 18 was originally a Mexican gang started in the 1950s. It was substantially taken over by the Salvadorans in the 1980s 

and 1990s. Its longevity and Mexican origins explain why Barrio 18 outnumbers 

MS-13 by five to one in the United States. The connections between the United 

States and the Salvadoran gangs run deep. 

Since 2012, the number of Salvadoran gang members in the United States 

has rapidly increased. It is claimed that the resurgence, in particular of the MS-13, 

is directly related to the surge of unaccompanied Central American minors that 

crossed into the United States between 2012 and 2016. During those four years, 

29 Herard von Santos, ‘Las pandillas salvadoreñas y su comportamiento delictivo: Prospectiva de sus formas 

organizativas y expansión territorial para el próximo decenio 2015-2025’, Revista Policia y Seguridad Publica, 

Diciember 2014, p. 194.

30 Policia de Honduras detiene a tres supuestos pandilleros salvadoreños, La Prensa, February 24, 2014, at

https://www.laprensa.hn/sucesos/policiales/477198-98/policia-de-honduras-detiene-a-tres-supuestos-pandilleros-salvadorenos accessed on March 26, 2020. 31 Op City Fiscalia, 2020, p. 161. 
39 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

approximately 300,000 unaccompanied minors crossed the border with Mexico 

into the United States and were resettled among the general population.32 A majority of these Central American youth are not gang members, but the surge in 

unaccompanied minors allowed a significant number of gang members to infiltrate 

the United States along with them. Significantly, the upsurge in MS-13 crimes has 

occurred in areas where a high concentration of minors were resettled. The states 

most affected were California, Maryland, New York, and Virginia.33 The crimes 

committed were major felonies such as murder, attempted murder, sexual assault, 

extortion, conspiracy/racketeering, drug trafficking, and sex trafficking, not minor 

nuisance crimes normally associated with youth gangs.34 

However, sources claim that despite this, MS-13 continues to be only loosely 

organized in the United States, better described as a “federation of teenage barrio cliques that share the MS-13 brand” notwithstanding efforts from El Salvador 

to control them, especially clicas on the East Coast.35 In 2018, there were approximately 10,000 MS-13 members and 50,000 Barrio 18 members in the United 

States.36

Mexico

At the beginning of 2014, it was reported that there were at least 70 different MS13 cells or clicas throughout Mexico.37 The Salvadoran gangs are thought to serve 

as foot soldiers for the drug cartels particularly to control territory.38

Law enforcement personnel from both El Salvador and the United States asserted that the MS-13 has established itself in several locations with the cooperation of the Mexican cartels, particularly along immigration routes from Central 

America to the United States. Specifically, they assert that the gang controls the 

32 Jessica M. Vaughan, MS-13 Resurgence: Immigration Enforcement Needed to Take Back Our Streets, February 21, 2018, at https://cis.org/Report/MS13-Resurgence-Immigration-Enforcement-Needed-Take-Back-Our-Str

eets?gclid=Cj0KCQjwpfHzBRCiARIsAHHzyZq9OE5apM7Qri833kgg5cJx0eA1ZmZJolwPu-bD-vMWTJHjgzhYKf0aAp_YEALw_wcB accessed on March 26, 2020. 33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Jose Miguel Cruz, Five Myths about MS-13, Washington Post, June 29, 2018, at https://www.washingtonpost.

com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-ms-13/2018/06/29/5860f1c4-7b17-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.

html, accessed on March 27, 2020 36 Ibid.

37 Patrick Corcoran, Mexico Justice Department Flags Growing Mara Presence, Insight Crime, January 1, 2014, 

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-justice-department-flags-growing-mara-presence/, accessed 

on March 27, 2020.

38 Ibid.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 40

north-south train that many immigrants ride known as “La Bestia” (The Beast). Although corroborating open source information on the gang’s control of “La Bestia” 

was not found, there is anecdotal evidence that the gangs extort and rob Central 

American migrants using the train. Several of these accounts have been published 

in the press.39

A surge of Salvadoran gangs was noted in 2017 when by mid-year state authorities had detained over ten times the number of Salvadoran gang members 

than they had captured in all the previous year. They were pretty evenly divided 

between the two major Salvadoran gangs, with 45 percent affiliated to MS-13 and 

55 percent to Barrio 18. In terms of citizenship, 44 percent were Salvadoran, 20 

percent Honduran, and 36 percent were Mexican citizens.40 The important number 

of Mexican citizens indicate the significant recruitment of locals, which is an important indicator of intent to establish permanent local structures. The increase in 

Central American gangs coincided in a duplication of state homicides compared to 

2016, and three times as many as 2015.41 

Spain

The gangs have also become a problem in Spain. In 2014, Spanish authorities 

identified “consolidated” MS-13 clicas in Barcelona, Tarragona, Gerona, Madrid, 

and Alicante. They also identified indications of attempts to form clicas in Cáceres, 

Melilla, Castellón, Lleida, and Valencia.42 The Spanish authorities asserted that the 

expansion of clicas in Spain was part of a strategy being directed by leadership 

back in Central America.43 They clarified that prior to 2012, the Spanish authorities had detected “pseudo-maras” or individuals and groups of people adopting the 

dress, culture and even identity of MS-13 without actually being members of the 

gang.44 What signaled the change was the attempted murder of a member of the 

Latin Kings in Alicante in 2012 by members of the MS-13. This led to a two-year 

investigation and the arrest in 2014, of 28 individuals, two of which were gang 

39 “Me tiré del tren al ver a los maras”: Carlos, El Imparcial TV, July 7, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=s8x4CvkoBds, accessed on March 27, 2020. 40 Parker Asmann, Are Central American Gangs Growing in Southern Mexico?, Insight Crime, July 19, 2017 at 

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/central-american-gang-growing-southern-mexico/ accessed on April 1, 

2020.

41 Ibid.

42 Jesús Duva, La mara Salvatrucha arraiga en España, El Pais, March 30, 2014, at https://elpais.com/politica/2014/03/29/actualidad/1396110792_713723.html, accessed on April 1, 2020. 43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.
41 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

members in their 40s, one in Barcelona and one in Alicante. These older men had 

been sent to take control of the clicas in Spain. This led to the discovery of documents discussing money being sent from El Salvador to Spain to set up a chain of 

bars and restaurants in Alicante to launder gang money in Europe.45

The arrests in Alicante and Barcelona revealed that in 2012, the MS-13 had 

sent two members to Spain, one to Barcelona and one to the little town of 25,000 

inhabitants known as Ibi in Alicante Province. Their mission was to establish an 

MS-13 program in that country under a plan called “Program 34.” With up to 

10,000 dollars from El Salvador, they managed to establish additional clicas in 

Madrid, Barcelona, and Girona.46 They acquired a used car dealership through 

which they obtained additional finances and laundered crime money. The clicas

also earned money through marihuana and cocaine trafficking. They set up a network to transport, store and distribute the drugs. Furthermore, each gang member 

had to pay 100 euros per month into a central account. The foot soldiers robbed 

houses and supermarkets to pay their quotas. 

As they began to expand, they began to run up against other preexisting gangs. 

To push rivals out of their way, they began to make plans to murder key members 

of the rival groups, even sending experienced shooters from El Salvador to Spain 

to plan and execute the operation. It was this series of murders, attempted murders 

and planned murders that alerted the Spanish authorities.47 While this effort was 

frustrated by the Spanish Police and Civil Guard, at the time there is no doubt that 

subsequent efforts have been made. 

Italy

In Italy, Salvadoran gangs first came to the Italian authorities’ attention in 2008 

when violence broke out between members of the MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Milan. 

An MS-13 clica was particularly active in Milan under a leader known as “Kamikaze.” This clica had taken control of public parks, subway stations and parking 

lots. They regularly committed robberies and attacked other gangs such as the 

45 Ibid.

46 Univision, Megajuicio a la Mara Salvatrucha: así intentó la banda extenderse por Europa, Univision Noticias, 

February 20, 2018 at https://www.univision.com/organizaciones/mara-salvatrucha/megajuicio-a-la-mara-salvatrucha-asi-intento-la-banda-extenderse-por-europa accessed on April 1, 2020. 47 Ibid.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 42

Caption: 1) A photo provided by the Salvadoran National Police of maras armed and equipped like the 

military or the police. 2) A well-equipped gang member in a rural area with an M-16 carbine automatic rifle 

used by the Salvadoran military and an equipment harness with at least four magazines and body armor 

underneath his harness. 3) A gang member displaying an East German AKM in good condition. He is also 

wearing some type of body armor. In the background is another gang member with a M-14 equipped with a 

scope. The East German AKM was used during the civil wars of the 1980s, particularly in Nicaragua. Some of 

these weapons were obtained by the FMLN guerrillas towards the end of the civil war. 4) This is the new face 

of the maras: no visible tattoos, if any at all, and no identifying clothes. These gang members are posing at a 

rural camp, all but one equipped with a variant of the M-16 rifle. 

Photo credit for all photos: El Salvador National Police

1

2

3 4
43 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

Latin Kings Chicago, Barrio 18, Trebol, Comando, and Nieta.48 The clica also carried out at least two attempted murders. This provoked the Milan Police to launch 

Operation Marero in 2013, in which twenty-five MS-13 members were arrested.49 

It is believed that through 2013, there wasn’t much of a connection between 

MS-13 in Italy and the gang leadership back in El Salvador. In fact, information 

obtained by the police indicated little interest on the part of the local clica in establishing that connection.50

It seems likely however, that after Operation Marero and the descent of the 

local MS-13 gang into chaos, that at least some members of the gang sought for 

some form of supervision from El Salvador to reorganize and restore the clica. 

However, this thesis is not totally confirmed. Some indications that this might be 

the case are that in December 2017, a 33-year-old gang leader was captured in 

Como, not too far north of Milan with the cooperation of U.S. authorities from 

ICE. Also, it is thought that a murder carried out in 2019 was either ordered from 

El Salvador, or that it was advised from the leadership in Central America.51 

Increase the military capability of the gangs to confront the state. In Plan 503, 

the MS-13 gang leaders attributed their victory in a campaign against an enemy 

identified as the “picaros” to their possession of 500 rifles and 2,000 pistols and 

other things, presumably some type of weapons (maybe grenades, explosives, or 

Light Anti-tank Weapons (LAW) rockets which the gangs have been known to use 

from time to time). However, they also noted that this had not been decisive as the 

enemy had recovered and acquired new strength. In addition, they admitted that 

many gang members were falling to the state and that the gang was riddled with 

infiltrators. In other words, that despite some tactical successes, that the gang was 

strategically weak. To remedy this, they talked about developing a strategy that 

included significantly strengthening their military capability.52 

Merely acquiring a larger arsenal was not enough. They discussed developing 

a strike force that could fight the government on a more equal footing as the guer48 Giovanni Giacalone, The MS13 in Italy: Dynamics and Evolution of the Infamous Salvadoran Gang, InsideOver, November 29, 2019, at https://www.insideover.com/society/the-ms13-in-italy-dynamics-and-evolution-of-the-infamous-salvadoran-gang.html. Accessed on April 1, 2020. 49 Charles Parkinson, Italy Police Dismantle ‘MS13’ Gang, Insight Crime, October 10, 2013, at https://www.

insightcrime.org/news/brief/italy-police-dismantle-ms13-el-salvador-gang/, accessed on April 1, 2020. 50 Op Cit Giacalone.

51 Ibid.

52 El Salvador National Police, Plan 503, 2008. Police Intelligence Analysis.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 44

rillas did during the civil war with weapons, organization, tactics, and discipline.53

This has been a strategic objective of the gangs ever since. 

The gangs have made progress in this effort as within the clicas an increasing 

number of gang members have been designated as “shooters.” In addition, these 

shooters are often grouped into teams that are designated “shock forces.”54 These 

shock forces are increasingly well armed and well trained. 

Recent gang operations have demonstrated military skill that did not exist 

previously. To develop this growing skill, the gangs have resorted to several sublines of effort. First, they sought to acquire increasing numbers of military grade 

weapons. This has been a gradual process with the quality and quantity of military 

grade weapons increasing over time. The El Salvador gangs have not achieved the 

kind of qualitative level in military weapons that we see in the Mexican cartels. 

Not every member of the clicas has a military-grade automatic weapon, and the 

weapons that have been captured to date are overwhelmingly those left over from 

the Central American conflict in the 1980s or stolen from the national arsenals of 

Central American countries. Mostly these are variants of the M-16 family and Warsaw Pact manufactured AKMs that were favored by the warring parties during the 

Cold War. However, what is clear is that an increasing number of gang members 

are carrying military assault rifles.

Clicas are responsible for acquiring their own pistols and revolvers. Each clica does this according to the number of members and their resources. They sometimes also acquire military rifles. A captured notebook from a clica in Ahuachapan 

detailed the purchase of seven 9mm pistols, two .45 caliber pistols, one .38 caliber 

revolver, one FN FAL rifle, one AR-15, and two AK-47s. Along with ammunition and accessories this purchase cost them 26,300 dollars.55 However, the central 

leadership has also been making a sustained effort to centrally control and acquire 

an increasing number of military grade weapons for the gang. 

According to Noe, in 2016 alone, the MS-13 acquired more than 100 firearms 

including: M-60 machineguns, AK-47, AR-15 and M-16 automatic rifles, M-1 .30 

caliber carbines, shotguns, pistols, hand grenades, body armor, and ammunition 

worth more than 300,000 dollars. This money was drawn from a general fund collected from the different gang clicas. The weapons were distributed to clicas in the 

53 El Salvador National Police, Plan 503, 2008. Police Intelligence Analysis. 54 Fuerzas de Choque.

55 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 520.
45 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

Western, La Libertad, San Salvador, the Paracentral, and Eastern zones.56

Noe knew of two specific purchases of M-60 machineguns from corrupt military officers in 2014. He gave details about the first purchase. He didn’t provide 

details about the second purchase.57 They also prioritized the purchase of hand 

grenades because of the damage they caused and psychological impact they have 

on the population and on the government.58 Grenades have been a favorite weapon of the gangs since at least Plan 503. Between 2009-2010, La Prensa Grafica

documented a rash of 22 attacks with hand grenades that killed seven people and 

wounded over 100. This same report indicated a four year pause and then the attacks starting again in March 2015, documenting another twelve grenade attacks 

through September of the same year.59 It is likely that grenade attacks have continued since then. 

There are also wilas that discuss the importation of up to 500 weapons from 

the Mexican cartels.60 This was confirmed by testimony from Operation Cuscatlán 

which indicated that the plan was to buy 500 automatic rifles from Mexico, enough 

to equip each of the 248 clicas with two rifles to create elite shock cells within 

each clica. The creation of those shock cells began in 2016.61 It is not clear if the 

weapons from Mexico were actually acquired as none of this weaponry seems to 

have been captured yet by the Salvadoran Security Forces. Another wila discussed 

acquiring weapons from Nicaragua, particularly what Salvadoran government authorities identified as rocket propelled grenades.62 Should this be true it would 

represent a qualitative leap in gang firepower.

Noe calculated that in 2019 the MS-13 in El Salvador possessed between 600 

and 700 rifles, over 1,000 pistols, and that they spent around 700,000 dollars a 

month on weapons and ammunition.63

The Fiscalia (Attorney General) concluded that according to their information they were not certain the gangs had developed the capability of an Army oriented towards confronting the state on an equal footing to carry out a war, but 

rather that their weapons were more to guarantee their domination of territory and 

56 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 515.

57 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 516.

58 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 516.

59 Jessica Ávalos, Pandilleros MS usaron granadas extraídas de la FAES para ataques, n.d. at https://www.connectas.org/pandillerosusanarmas/ accessed on April 15, 2020. 60 Wila viewed by authors courtesy of the Ministry of Public Security.

61 Op Cit. Fiscalia 2020, p. 183. 

62 Wila viewed by the authors courtesy of the Ministry of Public Security. 63 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 516.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 46

to secure their business, even though they did believe that the gangs had acquired 

a large arsenal that was being used to generate a significant amount of violence.64

The authors agree with this assessment. This does not mean that things could not 

escalate quickly in the future. The whereabouts of the weapons allegedly acquired 

in Mexico and Nicaragua is still unknown. 

More than weapons, a significant issue for the gangs has been obtaining 

enough ammunition for their weapons. Up until 2018, police and military sources 

interviewed by the authors indicated that one of the great advantages that government authorities had in firefights with the gangs, even when they were carrying 

military rifles, was that they generally only carried a single magazine of ammunition, where police and military carried between four and seven. 

This meant that they could not sustain firefights with government authorities 

and were thus at a serious disadvantage. The tendency was for the gang members 

to fire a few shots and retreat, or to only fire on police and military patrols when 

they enjoyed surprise or another overwhelming advantage. Otherwise they tended 

to avoid contact. 

64 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 524.

Caption: These photos, a series of still shots from a very low resolution video from a cell phone captured by 

police, show gang members going through military training in a rural camp. Except for the dates, this could 

have been a video from the FMLN during the 1980s. 

Photo credit: El Salvador National Police 
47 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

While this was still true in 2020, interviews conducted in late 2019 with soldiers and police indicated that the firefights they were having with gang members 

were intensifying. Dead gang members killed in the firefights were frequently carrying up to four magazines of ammunition, and the captured military rifles were in 

better condition than those generally captured previously. This indicates that there 

is a trend of gradually increasing the quality of weapons available to the gangs and 

the quantity of ammunition they carry.

The gangs have also focused on acquiring increased military training. In the 

early days, there were reports of ex-guerrillas providing training to the gangs. As 

the veterans of the civil war grow older, this source of military knowledge is drying up. This has been complemented by individuals that had served in the military 

since the war, either being coerced or paid to provide training to the gangs. 

In some cases, gang members were infiltrated into the police and military for 

this purpose, although often the training aspect is of secondary importance for the 

infiltrators. Their primary mission is to reduce the impact of military and police 

operations on the gangs by providing warning and intelligence to the gangs. 

Sometimes former soldiers are now recruited by the gangs for their military 

skills. However, most of the former soldiers to which the gangs have had access 

have only basic military skills, so the gangs have had to turn elsewhere to acquire 

more advanced training. In some cases, the gangs were able to get it from active 

cadre of the Salvadoran military. In the Operation Cuscatlán trial, testimony was 

given that gang members were given sniper training by an active-duty military 

instructor over the course of six months. During the period of instruction, training 

lasted two hours a day several days a week, and the instructor was paid 500 dollars 

(a month’s pay for him) for every session.65

The Salvadorans have also sent gang members to train in Mexican paramilitary camps at least as early as 2011. It was reported that in Ilopango, Barrio 18 

was selecting their toughest members to go to Mexico and Northern Guatemala 

to receive military training from the Zetas.66 It has been reported that the MS-13 

began sending their members for paramilitary training by the Zetas at least as early 

as 2012.67 It may be recalled that many of the Zetas were either ex-members of 

65 Op cit, Fiscalia 2020, p. 392.

66 Ioan Grillo, Maras and Zetas: an alliance from hell, GlobalPost, April 04, 2011 at https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-04/maras-and-zetas-alliance-hell accessed on March 23, 2020. 67 Decapitaciones, drogas y armas: el eterno vínculo entre la Mara Salvatrucha y los cárteles mexicanos, Infobae, 

October 11, 2019, at https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2019/10/11/decapitaciones-drogas-y-armas-eleterno-vinculo-entre-la-mara-salvatrucha-y-los-carteles-mexicanos/ accessed on March 23, 2020. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 48

the Guatemalan Special Forces known as the Kaibiles, or of the Mexican Army 

Special Forces known as the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE). 

This military skill and training is what led to their rapid ascension in Mexico in the 

first decade of the 2000s. Despite the fracturing of the Zetas in recent years, recent 

wilas indicate that new alliances have been made with the Sinaloa Cartel and that 

gang training continues in the paramilitary camps of this cartel.68 It would seem 

that perhaps this effort has not only continued but intensified by the results back 

in El Salvador.

Videos taken by prison guards or captured from gang member cell phones between 2018-2019 show the gang prisoners carrying out a variety of military training exercises. The first is a series of videos showing incarcerated gang members 

68 Wila shown to the authors by the Ministry of Public Security, September 2019. 

Photo title: Starting in 2013, prison authorities witnessed a series of events in which gang members would 

suddenly organize themselves into squad (9-12 persons) and platoon size groups (30-40 persons) and carry 

out a number of synchronized physical and unarmed combat exercises. Since the prisoners had been kept in 

separate cells, it was unknown how they organized and trained for these demonstrations. 

Photo credit: National Police
49 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

carrying out close order and martial arts drills in a prison yard displaying impressive displays of synchronization, discipline, and skill. What is more impressive is 

that according to the prison authorities, the gang members had not been able to 

meet up and practice these formations beforehand. How they trained for them and 

coordinated their synchronized display is unknown.69 

The second set of videos was of gang members carrying out a series of fire 

and maneuver exercises in rural camps somewhere in El Salvador. They reminded 

the authors of similar videos taken during the early stages of the Salvadoran Civil 

War (1979-1992) in which guerrilla recruits were shown being trained to conduct 

operations against the state security forces. Except for the dates, the content of the 

videos was nearly identical. An increasing number of rural training camps have 

been found since 2015, and firefights between the gangs and police/military are 

occurring in rural terrain. 

A final video that demonstrates qualitative improvement shows a gang member firing an M-16 family rifle into a gully under the instruction of another person 

who is off camera. Since the gang member is aiming as he fires, the viewer can 

assume that there are targets that have been identified or set up in the gully. However, these are not visible in the video. When the gang member finishes firing, 

the off-camera instructor gives an order that cannot be understood and the gang 

member clears the weapon and puts it on safe. The gang member then turns to talk 

to the invisible instructor, but rather than turn with the weapon, he pivots his body 

in such a way that he continues to point the cleared weapon towards the gully, 

rather than turning with the weapon pointing towards the instructor. This sequence 

of firing, clearing the weapon, securing it, and then keeping the weapon pointed 

at the target while on a range, even if the weapon is empty, are safety techniques 

that are common to the military, but not normally associated with gangs or civilian 

amateurs. This increased professionalism has had an impact on the “battlefield”. 

While this project was being researched, the gangs attacked several police 

installations. All followed a very similar pattern, so one representative case will 

be described here. On January 18, 2019, the National Civilian Police Traffic Subdirectorate was attacked by the MS-13. In the press it was described as a drive-by, 

but in fact it was much more professionally organized and executed. 

Surveillance video showed a car make several drives around the installations 

over the space of a couple of hours. This appears to have been a target recon69 Interviews with prison authorities, January 2019. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 50

naissance, and the car later was discovered to be stolen. Subsequently, the same 

vehicle pulled up to within about 200 meters of the building. Several gang members descended from the vehicle and formed a “stack,” a military formation used 

to conduct urban operations. The stack advanced to within about 100 meters of 

the objective and then pivoted and came online. They then lifted their rifles and 

fired at the guard post of the building. Luckily the police guards were not looking 

through the window at the time, so they remained unharmed by any of the bullets 

that hit the post. The gang members then pivoted, reformed the stack and advanced 

back towards the car where they got in and drove calmly away. At another point 

they abandoned this car and boarded another stolen car to get away.70 

That same day a police vehicle in San Miguel Department was ambushed 

by the gangs and two policemen killed. The police that investigated the incident 

indicated that the ambush had been professionally carried out using techniques like 

70 David Marroquín, Siete supuestos pandilleros irán a juicio por atacar Subdirección de Tránsito Terrestre de 

la Policía, elsalvador.com, February 12, 2020 at https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/pandillas-juicioataque-subdireccion-pnc/685895/2020/ accessed on March 23, 2020. The video was viewed by the authors 

shortly after the attack occurred. 

Caption: Inmates at the Izalco prison, northwest of San Salvador, during a prison security operation after 

President Nayib Bukele ordered an emergency to prevent gang leaders from directing homicides from their jail 

cells. 

Photo Credit: Abaca Press and Alamy photos, with permission 
51 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

those employed by the guerrillas during the 1979-1992 civil war. A reconnaissance 

had been carried out, police patrolling habits had been noted, and an ambush location chosen. Care was taken to camouflage the shooters’ locations and references 

chosen to serve as aim points to hit a moving target. The result was a successful 

ambush and two policemen killed.71

In conclusion, the gangs are clearly getting technically better in their use of 

violence and this is most likely the result of deliberate training from people with 

professional knowledge and skills.

Attain formal political representation at the municipal level (to date). The 

gangs realized early that they could play a role in politics by allowing or disallowing political campaigns in the neighborhoods they dominated. So, candidates made 

deals with the gangs, either giving them money or promises on the condition of 

election. However, as the power of the gangs grew, so did their demands. Conditions for political support included food, money and even jobs for gang members 

and their supporters. This helped the gangs to expand and consolidate their own 

social support base. However, these types of arrangements worked both ways. The 

increasing closeness of the gangs to mayor’s offices has also resulted in the mayors making demands and asking favors of the gangs.72 At first, the gangs were 

opportunistic about their influence on politics. They saw political campaigning as 

an opportunity to extort money, goods, and services, like any other business. Campaigning was negotiated at the local level with the clicas. However, the gang truce 

made the maras aware that they had national influence and could negotiate deals 

that would benefit the gangs across the entire country. Since 2012, the gangs have 

forced political parties to make national level deals, to the point that no political 

campaign can hope to win an election without negotiating with the gangs. 

Formal recognition of and negotiations with the political parties. While there 

has been no formal recognition by the political parties, there is clear de facto recognition by the major political parties. In a 2017 trial, a witness identified as Nalo 

de Las Palmas testified that between 2012 and 2014, the two main parties (FMLN 

71 Pandilleros ametrallan a patrulla de la PNC y matan a dos policías en San Miguel, solonoticias.com, January 

18, 2019, at https://www.solonoticias.com/2019/01/18/pandilleros-ametrallan-a-patrulla-de-la-pnc-y-matan-ados-policias-en-san-miguel/ accessed on March 23, 2020. 72 Felipe Puerta, Héctor Silva Ávalos and Steven Dudley, Symbiosis: Gangs and Municipal Power in Apopa, 

El Salvador, Insight Crime, November 2, 2017, at https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/symbiosis-gangsmunicipal-power-apopa-el-salvador/ accessed on April 1, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 52

and ARENA) gave MS-13 350,000 dollars to influence the elections.73 In a 2019 

trial, a witness only identified as “Noé”, indicated that MS-13 has been influencing elections for some time. Political parties pay the gangs to tip the scales in their 

favor. 

Several sources have alleged different payments by parties to the gangs to 

til the elections in their favor. For example, in 2014, the FMLN gave the gangs 

money to help Salvador Sanchez Ceren will the elections.74 In 2015, ARENA 

party paid the MS-13 69,000 dollars in exchange for votes in the municipal and 

legislative elections of that year.75 

Politically mobilize the population to vote in specific manners. According to 

Freedom House, gangs “mobilize” populations for elections by making deals with 

political parties in which the parties pay the gangs for specific political support or 

activity. According to the police, all parties have engaged in this activity. These 

payments are to allow or prevent parties from holding rallies in gang-controlled 

areas. The parties have also paid the gangs to coerce or intimidate voters into casting ballots for a particular candidate or party. The gangs can also be paid to provide security for their events or voting. The presence of gang members encourages 

some voters and discourages other voters from voting in particular ways. Sometimes parties make deals with the gangs to deliver certain areas in exchange for 

special access to those politicians once in power, or social services for the families 

of gang members. 76 

Negotiate jail privileges, aid programs for their structures and social base 

in different areas (government, international, NGOs, etc.) In 2012, the combined leadership of Barrio 18 and MS-13 issued a statement at the beginning of 

the gang truce which asked for: fair application of the law, better treatment/conditions in jails, social support and economic aid to gang members to reintegrate into 

the work force, educational opportunities, and non-discrimination. Jail conditions 

73 Decapitaciones, Drogas y Armas: El Eterno Vinculo entre la Mara Salvatrucha y los Carteles Mexicanos, October 11, 2019, @https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2019/10/11/decapitaciones-drogas-y-armas-el-eternovinculo-entre-la-mara-salvatrucha-y-los-carteles-mexicanos, accessed on January 25, 2020.

74 Carlos Martínez y Roberto Valencia, “El FMLN hizo alianza con las pandillas para la elección presidencial 

de 2014,” El Faro, May 6, 2016, at https://elfaro.net/es/206005/salanegra/18560/El-FMLN-hizo-alianza-con-laspandillas-para-la-elecci%C3%B3n-presidencial-de-2014.htm, accessed on October 20, 2020. 75 Op cit, Decapitaciones, Drogas y Armas.

76 Freedom House: El Salvador Political Rights, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/el-salvador, accessed on August 12, 2020.
53 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

were eased to facilitate negotiation.77 Since then, this has been a constant demand 

of the gangs and the leadership has ordered increases and decreases in murders as 

leverage to pressure the government to make concessions to their demands.

For example, in the interim period between Nayib Bukele’s election and his 

inauguration, the gangs increased their violence to attempt to force the incoming 

president to negotiate. Among their demands was to improve prison conditions 

that had been significantly tightened since the end of the gang truce.78 Bukele’s 

answer to the violence was to make a major show of force in the streets and to 

crackdown in the jails by terminating all cell phone coverage of the area around the 

prisons and to remove the phone booths. Nevertheless, the gang members found a 

way around the restrictions.79 

There was a historic drop in gang murders shortly after Bukele became president, but many analysts think it had much less to do with the iron fist policies, and 

more to do with a decision by the gangs to reduce the homicides for an unknown 

reason, perhaps in the hope of negotiating after the show of force.80

It is possible that the phone crackdown could have been partially responsible 

since all murders have to be approved by the ranfla, many of whom were in jail, 

and had not yet developed ways to communicate. Bukele did not lift the restrictions, and consequently the murder rate spiked again. In reaction, Bukele ordered 

humiliating crackdowns on gang members in jail, to include placing members 

from different gangs in the same cells. In the past this had resulted in systematic 

bloodshed.81 The message was clear, while Bukele wasn’t going to negotiate the 

improvement of prison conditions, if the violence didn’t stay low, he could make 

things infinitely worse. 

In conclusion, the 2012-2013 gang truce gave the gangs the illusion that they 

could negotiate better prison conditions. However, better prison conditions result77 Siniša Vuković and Eric Rahman, The Gang Truce in El Salvador, at https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/

blog/the-gang-truce-in-el-salvador accessed on August 12, 2020. 78 Associated Press, El Salvador: Gangs try to force incoming leader to negotiate, April 30, 2019 at https://apnews.

com/59e59d5d2aac46fcb82994072c9c8828 accessed on August 12, 2020. 79 Sandrine McDuff , El Salvador Inmates Defy Phone Ban With Toilet Paper, Toothpaste, Insight Crime, July 15, 

2019, at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/el-salvador-inmates-defy-phone-ban-toilet-paper-toothpaste/

accessed on August 12, 2020.

80 Alex Papadovassilakis, El Salvador’s Peaceful Month Not Due to Bukele Security Plan, Insight Crime, August 

5, 2019, at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/el-salvador-peaceful-month-bukele-security-plan/ accessed 

on August 12, 2020. Also see Crisis Group, Miracle or Mirage? Gangs and Plunging Violence in El Salvador, 

July 8, 2020, at https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/81-miracle-ormirage-gangs-and-plunging-violence-el-salvador accessed on August 12, 2020. 81 El Salvador Orders Further Prison Gang Crackdown, RepublicWorld.com, April 29, 2020 at https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/el-salvador-orders-further-prison-gang-crackdown.html

accessed on August 12, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 54

ed in more crime, both economic and murder that was being directed from the 

jails. This forced the government to crack down. However, this has not stopped 

the gangs from continuing to push for negotiations that include improved prison 

conditions, though under the Bukele government attempts to convince and coerce 

the administration to do so have seemed to fail. 

Territorial control of mobility corridors outside their traditional areas. A look 

at territorial trends: location of gangs, the relative power of clicas, gang attacks, 

and confrontations between the gangs and the state show a growing number of 

these indicators are occurring in rural areas and along major highways and roadways. A first indicator has been the creation of rural gang camps. Since the mid 

2010’s an increasing number of rural camps have been detected throughout El 

Salvador, but particularly in the central and para-central areas. Videos and photos 

from these camps show gang members going through basic military and weapons 

training. A lot of them show the gang members doing military drill, different types 

of tactical advances, and even practicing fire and maneuver. One video viewed by 

the authors showed the gangs building and spending the night in underground bunkers. The authors, who also did research in El Salvador during the 1979-1992 civil 

war, noted the similarity of the gang videos with guerrilla propaganda films that 

were made and distributed during the war. Initial impressions were that these rural 

camps were mostly for developing a gang force with greater military capabilities 

to confront both the state and rival gangs. 

However, a major National Police gang analyst who did a mapping of these 

camps was perplexed by many of their locations because, as a general rule, gangs 

locate in populated areas where there is an economy to be extorted. Many of these 

camps were located in areas where there was neither economy nor people. However, upon further analysis he noted that they were along routes used to move 

different things: people, weapons, and drugs. So, while the camps probably are 

to increase the military capabilities of the gangs, they seem to also have the dual 

function of increasing control over trafficking routes. 

Visits to several of the military task forces responsible for combating the 

gangs reinforced this analysis. The authors were briefed on the various task forces’ 

operations. One of the subjects discussed was the nature and number of gang incidents and confrontations with military authorities. It was notable that virtually 

all of the incidents occurred in rural, not urban or suburban areas, and that these 

were increasingly along the flanks of highways such as the main north-south high-
55 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

way from the Honduran border in Chalatenango down to San Salvador; the main 

east-west Panamerican Highway from San Salvador to San Miguel; the highway 

between San Vicente and Zacatecoluca; and the coastal road between La Libertad 

and Zacatecoluca. There were probably others, but the authors weren’t able to 

visit all of the Task Forces. This clustering of incidents in rural space along the 

flanks of the major highways seemed to confirm the gang analyst’s assessment. 

The car bombs on the highway between San Salvador and La Libertad in February 

2018, and then on the highway from Chalatenango to San Salvador in July of that 

same year may be indicative of the move to exercise increasing control over these 

routes.82 This would coincide with the gangs stated goals to take over the drug trafficking business in El Salvador and arms trafficking. The locations also coincide 

with known routes for cocaine and weapons which are brought in from Honduras. 

However, another National Police leader disagreed with this assessment and 

felt that instead, the increasing number of gangs in the rural areas was an indication 

that police policies and operations were pushing the gangs out of the urban areas 

and into the rural zones, so this presence was not an indication of spreading gang 

control, but rather increased loss of control in the urban areas. 

While it does seem that in parts of the country, aggressive police action 

through special anti-gang units has driven them out of some urban neighborhoods, 

it is unclear if all of the increased presence of the gangs in the rural areas can be 

explained solely by increased police action. Certainly, this was not the opinion of 

several gang analysts within the Salvadoran National Police. Time will tell which 

analysis is correct. 

Gang alliances to confront the state. Since Plan 503, the gangs have aspired to 

putting their differences aside and making common cause against the government. 

While they have never completely succeeded in stopping the inter-gang bloodshed, 

since in some ways the need for their existence is defined as by the need to defend 

against the other gang, there have been periodic episodes of truce and cooperation. 

The gang truce of 2012 in which the government induced a ceasefire between 

the two groups to negotiate was one of the first major experiences. Oscar Armando 

Reyes, alias “Sharky”, a Barrio 18 gang leader in the Izalco prison stated “you 

82 EFE and DPA, Estalla carro bomba y deja dos heridos en El Salvador, Prensa Libre, February 11, 2018 at 

https://www.prensalibre.com/internacional/estalla-coche-bomba-y-deja-dos-heridos-en-el-salvador/ accessed on 

April 9, 2020 and Video: Coche Bomba Explotó en El Salvador, Noticias Ya, July 9, 2018, at https://noticiasya.

com/washington-dc/2018/07/09/video-coche-bomba-exploto-en-el-salvador/ accessed on April 9, 2020. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 56

Caption: Members of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang are escorted by police into the high security prison 

at Zacatecoluca in El Salvador in 2017. 

Photo Credit: DPA picture alliance with Alamy photos, with permission 

know that if there is a death in the MS-13 gang that it affects the 18 and if there is 

a death in the 18 it affects the MS, so they want us to enter into a confrontation, but 

we aren’t willing to get sucked into this game, and we remain strong to the end”.83

However, there were too many differences between the groups to make it last for 

long. By mid-2013, the homicide rate began to rise until it reached a peak in the 

first half of 2015.84

However, suddenly the murder rate dropped by around 50%, from about 14 a 

day to 6-7 per day. On May 25, 2015 the two major gangs announced that they had 

again agreed on a truce the week before as evidenced by the significant reduction 

in the homicides in the previous days. Some analysts thought that the purpose of 

this truce was to send a message to the population that the reduction in homicides 

had much more to do with the gang’s decisions, than the policies and actions of 

83 El Salvador: tras la tregua, las pandillas piden “diálogo” y “trabajo”, Infobae, June 19, 2012, at https://www.

infobae.com/2012/06/20/1052751-el-salvador-la-tregua-las-pandillas-piden-dialogo-y-trabajo/ accessed on August 13, 2020.

84 Barrio 18 (M18), Insight Crime, August 13, 2020, at https://es.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-crimen-organizado/

barrio-18-perfil-2/ accessed on August 13, 2020.
57 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

the government.85 

While these truces did not last, they did mark the beginning of increased 

cooperation between the gangs when sharing common interests vis-a-vis the government. 

There was even talk in August 2015 of fusing Barrio 18 and MS-13 into a new 

gang that was supposed to be called Mara-503. Some people thought that this was 

the idea of Raul Mijango, the principal government negotiator in the gang truce. 

While this is uncertain, Mijango did state that the gang leaders were seriously discussing unification.86

Although this effort to unify didn’t seem to prosper, El Salvador’s two main 

gangs have moved toward forming a common front with a coordinating committee 

and a nonaggression pact that prohibits the invasion of other gangs’ territories and 

kill missions targeting members of rival gangs.

El Faro maintained that Barrio 18 and MS-13 managed to hold coordination 

meetings for several years. These meetings served to stop killing between the factions. In 2013, the government stopped allowing the meetings to be held in prison 

as part of the gang truce. However, the gangs found ways around this prohibition. 

In April 2016, they began to hold coordination meetings outside of prison, with 

no need for external facilitators. These face-to-face dialogues result in agreements 

that are then passed to the top leaders for final approval.87

Sometimes the gangs have cooperated in surprising ways. For example, during one of the discussions the authors had with the Salvadoran Police intelligence, 

they were shown a wila which discussed the purchase of automatic rifles from 

the Mexican cartels. The police asserted that MS-13 and Barrio 18 were pooling 

funds to come up with the cash to purchase the weapons together. This surprised 

the authors since although the weapons were being acquired to give the gangs the 

increasing ability to confront the state, they could as easily be turned on each other 

to gain the upper hand in their permanent rivalry.88 

However, this kind of rival collaboration to acquire a much coveted or needed 

85 David Gagne, Pandillas de El Salvador se atribuyen disminución de homicidios durante la beatificación de 

Óscar Romero, Insight Crime, May 29, 2015 at https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/noticias-del-dia/pandillas-elsalvador-atribuyen-disminucion-homicidios-beatificacion-oscar-romero/ accessed on August 13, 2020. 86 Sam Tabory, Gobierno de El Salvador alerta sobre alianza de maras: informe, Insight Crime, August 15, 2015 

at https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/noticias-del-dia/gobierno-salvador-alerta-sobre-alianza-maras-informe/ accessed on August 13, 2020.

87 Carlos Martínez, Gangs Find Common Ground in El Salvador Crackdown, Insight Crime, July 11, 2016, at 

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/gangs-find-common-ground-in-el-salvador-crackdown/ accessed on 

August 13, 2020.

88 Interviews with Salvadoran National Police Intelligence, September 2019. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 58

asset is not unheard of among rival violent groups. In Colombia, after years of extermination warfare and incompatible rival ideologies, the FARC and paramilitary 

groups in various parts of that country made agreements to share drug trafficking 

and logistics routes. In general, as long as either side stayed within the agreed 

bounds, there was peace, even if they occasionally tested each other through surges 

of violence for perceived violations of the agreement. While the rivalry remained, 

the need to export cocaine and import weapons and logistics was greater than their 

need to fight each other. There seems to be a similar situation to that of the MS-13 

and Barrio 18 in El Salvador. 

One of the measures taken by Nayib Bukele during his April 2020 prison 

crackdown was to group rival gang members together. It was feared by some and 

hoped by others that this would provoke bloodshed in the prisons. However, some 

observers felt that these policies could backfire and instead of unleashing a war 

between the rival gangs, sharing prison cells and other harsh treatment could actually facilitate the gang’s long desired for unity against a common enemy.89 There 

have been no reports of major killings of jailed gang members resulting from these 

joint imprisonments.

Win over the population by providing security and employment, not just coercion. The authors believe that the biggest double-edged sword for the gangs is 

extortion as a primary means of income. On the one hand it is the financial lifeblood of the Salvadoran gangs. It is the main way they sustain themselves. On the 

other hand, it is one of the major causes of popular rejection. 

Until recently the major incentive to paying extortion was to avoid violence, 

and while that continues to be a major motivation, there has been a subtle shift in 

the attitude of the gangs, particularly the MS-13. The gangs have started to provide 

security from other gangs and criminals in exchange for the extortion money paid. 

This has significantly reduced other forms of criminality in the areas dominated 

by the gangs. 

Providing security to the local people and businesses in exchange for their extortion payments has earned the gangs some support, as the gangs are much more 

efficient at security than the police. Because of the highly inefficient Salvadoran 

justice system, people are often not arrested for misdemeanors and those that are, 

89 Marcos Alemán, El Salvador’s jail crackdown on gang members could backfire, Associated Press, April 29, 

2020, at https://apnews.com/d8643205d614d11d413f655d49a0487b, accessed on August 13, 2020.
59 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

are often released within a few hours. Furthermore, corrupt police often collaborate with criminals by doing intelligence for the criminals and then taking a cut 

of their earnings from the criminal proceeds. Bottom line, the police and justice 

system are often not very efficient. On the other hand, the gangs are much more so. 

The gangs warn other criminals to stay out of their territory or suffer the 

consequences. In general, criminals who defy the gangs are usually caught and 

murdered. The gangs favor killing someone they catch with bladed weapons, but 

generally they kill them slowly to cause as much pain and suffering as possible. 

The reason to do this is to send a message to other would-be transgressors of what 

will happen to them if caught. It only takes one or two of these killings for others 

to get the message, so that when the gangs are providing security, nobody bothers 

the inhabitants except the gangs.

Because the gangs are far more efficient (not necessarily fair) at administering their informal justice, and they set clear rules, many of the local inhabitants 

support them. Such was the sentiment expressed to the authors at a local market 

controlled by MS-13. Vendors are happy because they don’t have to worry about 

petty theft, so they take home all their earnings except the quotas they pay the 

gangs. While they don’t like paying the quotas that the gangs demand, they are 

Caption: A Salvadoran army vehicle maintains security near a shopping mall in San Salvador in July 2015 

following gang attacks on bus drivers in the Central American capital. 

Photo Credit: Jose Cabezas and Reuters photos, with permission
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 60

very appreciative of the extra security, so in the end it is not all negative. When 

gangs don’t provide security, there is far more resentment.90 A recent study on extortion made similar findings.91 

In some areas, especially where there are a lot of gang families or support for 

the gangs, the gangs will even provide work and food for the population.92 In areas 

visited by the authors the gangs had often acquired businesses like bread stores, 

restaurants, car washes, auto repair shops and other businesses through which they 

launder their money. The gangs were the employers, usually hiring relatives or 

other trusted locals to work in those businesses. In one case the authors observed 

that they controlled a bus line that operated in and around Soyapango and were 

providing jobs to their social base.93 

The gangs also use their influence in local government, or participation in 

citizens committees to steer economic develop programs or social assistance to 

their constituencies.94 As the gangs move more toward providing services for the 

populations in their areas of control, they gain greater popular support. The more 

they gain popular support, the more difficult it will be to combat them.

Economic investment in the local economy and its long-term domination.

When gang members were deported from the United States to El Salvador they began to carry out such criminal activities as drug trafficking, street dealing, murder 

for hire, extortion of institutions and small businesses, kidnapping and weapons 

trafficking. These have been the mainstays of the gang economy throughout their 

history. However, as the gangs have evolved so has their economic activity.

A controversial topic has been the degree to which the gangs have been involved in drug trafficking. Several past publications have asserted that this was a 

major source of income for the gangs. Those claims were exaggerated in the past. 

For the most part, until recently, the gangs were involved in drug trafficking, but 

were not major players. Their role was more one of street vending, than trafficking. 

Extortion was always a far more important source of income. That said, the gangs 

have always had their eye on drug trafficking due to how lucrative it was, and how 

90 Interviews conducted by the author with San Salvador market vendors, July 2019. 

91 Insight Crime, Una Cultura Criminal: Extorsión en Centroamérica, la Iniciativa Global Contra el Crimen 

Organizado Transnacional, May 2019, p. 39.

92 Gustavo Arias Retana, Así funcionan las pandillas en El Salvador, La Nacion, August 8, 2015, at https://

www.nacion.com/el-mundo/politica/asi-funcionan-las-pandillas-en-el-salvador/MOKLTQVST5GORALFVU3V6E6ZWM/story/ accessed on August 14, 2020. 93 Visit to gang-controlled neighborhoods carried out by the authors in February 2019. 

94 Interviews with USAID personnel, U.S. Embassy February 2019.
61 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

shifting to that business would allow them to reduce their reliance on extortion 

which was causing them to be rejected by the population. 

In Plan 503, the MS-13 was already discussing strategically reducing its dependence on extortion and kidnapping and increasing its involvement in drug and 

weapons trafficking. The leadership perceived that not only were these businesses 

more lucrative, but they would also make the gangs more powerful. However, in 

the same discussions they recognized that the business was currently being dominated by other organizations and that it would have to go to war with these organizations to take over the business. One of the motives for unity between MS-13 and 

Barrio-18 was that it was felt that this would make the gangs strong enough to win 

the war for the control of drug trafficking.95

In Honduras, the MS-13 has successfully made significant inroads into the 

drug trafficking business. This is facilitated by the fact that Honduras is a natural 

geographical hub for shipping drugs from South America to the United States. 

There is a significant volume of cocaine that passes through Honduras on its way 

north to the United States market. The impact of MS-13s domination of certain 

sectors of the cocaine business has been described in depth by Douglas Farah and 

Katherine Babineau.96

The volume of cocaine trafficking through El Salvador is much lower because 

it is not a natural waypoint and is almost completely bypassed by major trafficking 

organizations. Therefore, even if the gangs completely dominated the business, it 

could probably never completely replace other sources of income. While it is clear 

that the gangs of El Salvador have not achieved a total domination of the drug 

trafficking, it is also clear that drug trafficking is an increasingly important part of 

their economy. 

95 National Civilian Police, Plan 503, document viewed by the authors on June 23, 2009.

96 Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, “The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras,” Prism, Vol. 7 

No. 1, 2017, p. 60.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 62

Chapter VI: Leadership and Control

Currently the MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs are organized at three levels of operation 

for which there are rough equivalents in conventional military doctrine known as: 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

Strategic Ranfla

At the strategic level is the “ranfla” as it is called by both the MS-13 and the Barrio 18 organizations. The ranfla is a type of council composed of the oldest and 

most renowned gang members. They make decisions by simple majority through 

a vote. There are some members of the ranfla that are in jail and others that are 

on the outside. Even though there are many members of the ranfla in jail, decisions are not made without the votes of all the members. There is a lot of debate, 

dissenting opinion and even fracturing between the members of the ranfla known 

as ranfleros. For example, we see this fracturing in the division of the Barrio 18 

gang into Revolutionaries and Southerners. We also see it in the emergence of the 

MS-13 dissidents, known as the MS-503. These splinters and dissidences can and 

are brought under control through murder campaigns, but sometimes those campaigns fail, and the fracturing only increases. For example, the Revolutionaries and 

Southerners have become a fairly permanent feature of Barrio 18, where MS-503 

has increasingly been reduced. However, despite this occasional fracturing there is 

a lot of unity and discipline within the gangs at this strategic level and as we shall 

demonstrate, consistent and coherent strategic guidance comes out of the leadership.

Notwithstanding the sometimes fracturing of the ranfla, within the structures 

of the organization controlled by a single ranflero, there is generally very strict 

hierarchy and discipline. The consequences for making an independent decision 

without the approval of the ranfla member are severe and the normal punishment 

is the murder of that individual. The degree of control exercised by the ranfla is 

reflected in various captured wilas97 in which gang members of a clica ask for 

permission to tattoo different parts of their body. The wilas include the name of 

97 A wila is a written communication, usually in the form of a petition (going up) or a directive (going down) that 

is shared among gang members. The wilas are often written in code and hidden in the most ingenious ways to get 

past government security measures. In addition to the ingenious ways they are hidden, they are often written in 

a series of codes, some much simpler and some highly complex, to avoid deciphering by government authorities 

until the contents are no more than history. 
63 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

the requester, their history in the gang to justify their wearing of the tattoo, the 

specific part of the body where the tattoo would be located, and a general description of what the tattoo was going to look like.98 The fact that this level of detail is 

necessary to get a tattoo approved is indicative of how even the smallest decision 

requires the permission of the respective ranflero. 

Operational Programas and Tribus

At the operational level the MS-13 has what they call Programas (programs) and 

what the Barrio 18 call Tribus (tribes). The Program is a determined grouping of 

clicas. There are programs with a few clicas and programs with hundreds of clicas

distributed across the whole country and even transnationally. 

The program is almost a completely autonomous unit. It administers the resources generated by the clicas of the program and distributes the resources as 

needed: weapons, ammunition, vehicles, clothing, lawyers, funeral expenses, and 

more back to the clicas. Program leaders are known as corredores de programas

(program runners). They approve the selection of palabreros, moderate internal 

conflicts, organize joint actions and are the representative of the program to other 

program leaders. The Salvadoran Prosecutors office recognizes 49 programs in El 

Salvador, while El Faro, a highly respected Salvadoran newspaper that does indepth investigation on the gangs, counts 54.99 It is not clear why the two numbers 

differ. 

In Barrio 18, the head of a Tribu is known as a palabrero or person with the 

word, and is a person generally trusted by the ranfleros. In both MS-13 and Barrio 

18, an important job performed is to pass the petitions of the clica or cancha members up to the ranfleros, and more importantly, to pass the decisions of the ranfleros

back down to the clicas and canchas. They are also in charge of enforcing the decisions made by the ranfla within their own program or tribe. To send the requests 

up to the ranfleros, the corredor or palabrero meets with the clicas or canchas to 

vote on decisions they want made, and these decisions are sent via messages to the 

ranfleros who approve or deny them. 

98 Wila captured by the police, examined by the author in January 2019. 99 Carlos Martinez, Lo que es necesario saber sobre la MS-13 para entender la Operación Jaque, El Faro, August 11, 2016, at https://elfaro.net/es/201608/salanegra/19067/Lo-que-es-necesario-saber-sobre-la-MS-13-paraentender-la-Operaci%C3%B3n-Jaque.htm, accessed on April 1, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 64

Tactical Level Clicas and Canchas

At the tactical level are the clicas or canchas. The average number of gang members to be considered a separate clica or cancha is around 20 members. There is 

no fixed number of members required to form one as the variables are in constant 

flux, such as murdered gang members, wounded, jailed members, the size and 

importance of the territory they control, the prevailing illicit economy, etc.). Small 

clicas and canchas can number 10-15 members and the largest units can have 

50 or more homeboys.100 Each clica has a leader, known as a palabrero (person 

with the word), and their substitutes: second and third words (segunda y tercera 

palabra).101 The clicas and canchas main task is to control their identified territory 

by extorting money from all economic activity within the territory, and keeping 

interlopers and outsiders out, often through homicide. They also recruit new members into the gang. This will be described in greater depth later. 

As mentioned before, they make decisions through a simple vote by all the 

members. However, the final decision on how to proceed must make its way up 

through the corredor/palabrero and to the ranfla or rueda (wheel). Some previously authorized actions can be decided at the operational level (tribe or program), 

but others must go up to the ranfla. It is not known exactly what decisions qualify 

for decision-making at the lower level, but for example, all murders committed by 

the programas and clicas are approved personally by the ranfla. Also, given that 

even tattoos are approved by the ranfla, there is probably not a whole lot of decisions that are left up to the leaders at the tactical and operational level. Those levels 

of leadership exist to execute and enforce the ranfla’s decisions. 

The Evolution of Leadership and Control

Supposedly the gangs are horizontal organizations. At least this was how it was 

supposed to be in the beginning. In theory, every “brincado” (initiated) member 

of the gang enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other gang member. The 

only difference is supposed to be the “respect” that a gang member has earned 

from his level of commitment and experience in actions on behalf of the gang. So 

100 Carlos Martinez, Lo que es necesario saber sobre la MS-13 para entender la Operación Jaque, El Faro, August 11, 2016, at https://elfaro.net/es/201608/salanegra/19067/Lo-que-es-necesario-saber-sobre-la-MS-13-paraentender-la-Operaci%C3%B3n-Jaque.htm, accessed on April 1, 2020. 101 Ibid.
65 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

a newly “brincado” homeboy is supposed to enjoy equal rights and privileges to 

the historic homeboys that are part of the leadership of the organization.102 In reality, the gangs have always had hierarchy, and the mythological horizontal nature 

of the gangs has proved to be somewhat of an organizational headache, impeding 

levels of cohesion and organization within the gangs. In Orwellian terms, all gang 

members are equal, but some gang members are more equal than others. As a result, the histories of both the MS-13 and the Barrio 18 have been fractured. The 

MS-13 has developed a relatively more hierarchical and disciplined organization 

and ways of doing business, while the Barrio 18 has clung to their more horizontal 

traditions, which has resulted in greater fracturing, and in some ways less strategically threatening to the state as the MS-13. In the United States Barrio 18 has far 

more members. In El Salvador, MS-13 is larger. 

Initially, the gangs were formed by youths that were mostly deported from 

the United States. Consequently, the gang members in El Salvador looked to their 

leaders in the United States for guidance. As the number of locally recruited members increased, the willingness to follow directives from the distant leadership began to wane.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the Salvadoran gangs had one of their first 

notable internal crises due to a power struggle and the lack of strong internal leadership. Some state agencies said the dispute put at risk the existence of the gang 

as the local gang members, notably from Cuscatancingo, rebelled against the leaders from the United States. Others imposed themselves by force as national level 

leaders ordered a surge of violence that later became the common way that these 

groups operated to solve disputes. 

This situation forced the leaders in the jails and those in the United States 

to make a significant course correction in terms of modifying internal rules to 

recover the leadership and control over the gangs at the local, national, and international levels. They made the local organizations more democratic by allowing 

them to make decisions though simple majorities within limited parameters. They 

removed the deported U.S. gang members from the clicas and located them in new 

higher-level structures for criminal activity knowns as “programas.” 

This internal crisis was the second opportunity for the state to act forcefully 

in all areas to take advantage of this temporary weakening to annihilate the gangs, 

but they let the opportunity slip through their grasp and the gangs regained their 

102 Ibid.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 66

strength during 2000-2001. In part this was due to the anti-gang strategy adopted 

by the government, the so-called Mano Dura (Hard Fist) and Mano de Hierro (Iron 

Fist), Citizens Committees, and so forth. These polices created a situation that 

forced the gang leaders in the United States and in the streets of El Salvador to 

adapt. 

Cohesion

Cohesion is defined as “the action or fact of forming a united whole” or in a physical sense “the sticking together of particles of the same substance.” In an organization then, cohesion is the degree to which the members feel united to that organization and the degree to which, when a decision is made, the organization moves in 

unity towards fulfilling that decision. 

In the gangs, cohesion is built and maintained through several means, structures, and rules. We have already described the structures at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. These give order and structure to the gangs that allows 

them to maintain command and control over the gang members. However, the 

notion of equality between the members both increases and decreases cohesion by, 

Caption: Salvadoran Army soldiers patrol the Amaya Community in San Salvador after families were 

threatened with death by members of the MS 13 gang. 

Credit: Jose Cabezas and Reuters photos, with permission
67 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

on the one hand making each gang member feel like his voice and vote count, but 

on the other hand, because of this very characteristic to make it difficult to make a 

unified or coherent decision. 

Within the MS-13, the rules to reduce friction have increased over time and 

they are continually evolving. Annex 1 is a snapshot of the rules as they existed in 

2019. The trend is towards increasing verticality and hierarchy and away from horizontal decision-making, precisely because the flatter the organization, the more 

difficult it is to be cohesive, so over time the rules favor increasing vertical control 

and increasingly limited horizontal spheres of action. This is more evident among 

the MS-13 than Barrio 18. 

MS-13 rule number 2 is the first rule of vertical cohesion because it calls on 

the gang member to never deny the gang, that is to never reject or betray the gang. 

The gang becomes a person’s first priority, their new family, or at least supra-family as loyalty to the gang is more important than any other loyalty including family, 

country, and God. This rule helps ensure that gang members will “stick together” 

when things are tough, as to deny the gang results in punishment by death.103 Traitors are hunted down and killed even years after the alleged betrayal. 

Rule 12 reinforces this notion as it states that it is forbidden to divide the 

gang, and if this is done, the punishment is death.104 This may have been a recent 

rule as the MS-13 went through a period where a division among the leadership 

produced a splinter group known as MS-503. It seems that most of MS-503 has 

been eliminated and most of the clicas reintegrated back into MS-13. 

The tendency towards verticality is particularly notable within the clicas and 

programas where at the national level ranfla there is much more equality and debate in terms of decision-making. The lack of verticality at the national level remains high due to the constant jailing of the top leaders and the increased security 

measures by government authorities which isolate the jailed leaders from their 

programas and clicas. This prevents constant oversight and control which can and 

does occasionally cause schisms between the ranfla in jail and the ranfla out of jail. 

However, as we have seen, the gang leaders and members constantly find ways to 

overcome their isolation from their structures, so it is a constant game between the 

gangs and the state to develop stricter isolation methods on the state side and to 

neutralize those measures on the gang side. 

103 See Annex 1, rule number 2. 104 See Annex 1, rule number 12.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 68

Some of the rules are formal and written and some un-written that establish 

the boundaries and punishments for those that violate the rules. The punishments 

are usually violent and cruel, designed to send a strong message to its members 

about the consequences of breaking them and keep the members in line. Lowerlevel punishments include 13-second beat downs and some more drastic punishments. There is little in between beat downs and death, although sometimes there 

are unspecified corrective measures. Expulsion from the gang is rarely an option. 

Once in, essentially never out, and even those that are allowed out for various 

reasons are always under the shadow of the gang for the rest of their lives. As mentioned previously, the regulation has become so strict, that to even get a tattoo and 

what it looks like requires permission. 

However, the rules do not only govern the members; they govern the leaders 

as well. Leaders that violate rules can be demoted, punished, and executed. They 

have obligations towards the gang such as taking care of the gang’s economy. 

This means ensuring that the gangs have ways to make money, but also the wise 

administration of that money; to keep the gang economically solvent, to spend the 

money prudently, and to save money for emergencies and times of need. The fact 

that the leaders also have rules and obligations towards the gang members helps 

maintain cohesion because it helps gang members know that they are not totally 

at the mercy of whatever the gang leaders say. So, while internal discipline for the 

gang members called homeboys is tough, the leaders must follow rules as well and 

can be sanctioned if they do not. 

Another means of generating cohesion is that within each gang and clica, 

there is a senior member who is designated as a sort of gang “political officer,” 

similar in function to the commissars of the Communist organizations of the past. 

This person oversees the writing and maintaining of the history of the clica and indoctrinating homeboys in the ethos and mythology of the gang and the clica. This 

helps inculcate each gang member with a set of beliefs and ethos that then governs 

their behavior. Unlike the rules and punishments which are a negative means of 

cohesion, the gang history and mythology is a method of positive reinforcement 

for gang members. This teaches why the gang exists, about past heroes and villains, the behavior that is expected of the members to be heroes and become part 

of the gang history and mythology. It fosters a sense of belonging and common 

beliefs and values. 

An event that originated externally to the gang that increased cohesion was 

the gang truce. The gang truce both helped the gangs come together as well as dem-
69 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

onstrate the level of national influence they had achieved. During the gang truce 

which ran from March 2012 to May 2013 (technically the truce is still in place, but 

since May 2013, the homicide rate returned to the previous levels), the gang leaders recovered control of their gang structures, consolidated their leadership, purged 

dissidents, and kept the government in check by controlling the homicide rates. 

This helped them increase their cohesion. They demonstrated their cohesion by 

being capable of drastically increasing the number of murders in a relatively short 

period of time (by giving their subordinate structures quotas of deaths, or order the 

murder of police, military, or prison guards) when they weren’t getting what they 

wanted from the government.105 

In conclusion, while there are fault lines within the gangs that from time to 

time erupt into fracturing and fratricide, there are also several factors that generate 

significant cohesion. Several variables contribute in both directions, but overall 

the gangs, particularly the MS-13, show a great deal of cohesion when examined 

at the general level. There are plenty of specific exceptions to this rule, but the 

rule still holds.

105 This information was acquired from several written gang directives known as wilas that were captured from 

gang members during different operations and which were made available for our examination during the course 

of this investigation. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 70

Chapter VII: The Gang Member

There is a great variety in the characteristics of gang members, nevertheless there 

are certain tendencies among “average” members. They tend to be from urban 

and densely populated neighborhoods, where poverty, unemployment or underemployment are common. In these areas, life is hard and uncertain. They tend 

to have lower levels of education. Many are from broken homes where there is 

minimal presence of the father at home, and sometimes the mother as well. The 

grandmother is the head of the family in these cases. 

Even though women (mothers and grandmothers) are authority figures to the 

common gang member, this does not extend to female peers. Machismo and discrimination against women has been notable. Only a few years ago, women did not 

have leadership positions within the gangs. The so called “hainas” were almost a 

type of sexual ornament or trophy that were shared among the gang members and 

leaders. The term “haina” used by the Salvadoran gangs is, according to the Diccionario Latinoamericano, from a Mexican slang word, originally “jaina” which 

is a corruption of the word “vagina” or the female sexual organ. The males use sex 

to dominate and control the girlfriend, woman or girl.106 The fact that the term for 

a female gang member is a term for her sexual organ is indicative of the value they 

assigned to women, that is only for male pleasure and little else. 

Nevertheless, since 2000 there has been a slow evolution of the views about 

women in the gangs. By the date of this writing, there were women clica leaders. 

These women have the reputation of being more savage than the male leaders. 

This slow change of attitude towards women has occurred because of the ease 

with which women can develop relationships with policemen or soldiers and to 

infiltrate potential target businesses or state institutions such as the Public Security 

Academy, the Army, and other places. As a consequence, the clicas saw that women were useful for a lot of special work, and then later could be trusted in positions 

of greater responsibility. Their behavior after being given more responsibility also 

helped change the attitudes of the men towards them. 

For example, several gang women have tried to infiltrate the National Public 

Security Academy. In 2017, Zuri Yamileth Garcia was captured when she was in 

her last phase of instruction before being commissioned as a police officer. She 

106 AsiHablamos.com: El diccionario latinoamericano, para poder entendernos at https://www.asihablamos.com/

www/significado/palabra/jaina, accessed on July 16, 2019. 
71 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

was accused of being the girlfriend of a gang member from Santiago Nonualco 

(La Paz) and of having participated in the extortion of the businessmen from that 

municipality.107 

Another recent example is the case of the Black Widows, a conspiracy by 

single female gang members of the MS-13 in El Salvador to seduce men, marry 

them, and get them to buy insurance policies. A few weeks later they would be 

murdered by the gang, after which the women would claim the life insurance and 

then share it among the women and the gang.108 There are many other examples. 

The other thing that is important to point out is that since 2000, there has been 

an evolution of the gang member profile. Even though many of the recruits fit the 

previously mentioned profile, circumstances have forced the gangs to adapt. In 

2000, the different policies of Mano Dura (Hard Fist) began to disrupt the normal 

life of the gangs, thrusting them into a vicious cycle of arrest, processing, freedom, 

and arrest. This caused a lot of attrition. The initial response was to create the 

“Lion’s Dens” which were safehouses where they would spend the night. Previously they would spend the night in the street. When the Mano Dura policies began 

the police would patrol the street trying to capture the gang members in the act. If 

the police didn’t see them in the street, they didn’t arrest them. The “Lion’s Dens” 

were created to keep the gang members off the street and reduce vulnerability to 

arrest. However, the Lion’s Den was a temporary fix to wait it out until the state got 

tired of those roundups. When not only Mano Dura continued, but the Super Mano 

Dura policy was implemented, they had to make more drastic changes.

The most distinguishing characteristics of the gangs were their tattoos, their 

way of dressing and the language they used (to include signs). Little by little they 

reduced and then eliminated the tattoos, began wearing normal clothes and talking 

normally in public.

The large number of gang members in jail became a huge expense for legal 

services, with many lawyers extorting the gang members or not fulfilling their 

promises to their clients. Several lawyers have been killed and continue to be killed 

by the gangs due to perceived or real broken promises and price gouging. We can 

107 Pareja sentimental de pandillero se infiltró en la ANSP, La Prensa Grafica, May 25, 2017, https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Pareja-sentimental-de-pandillero-se-infiltro-en-la-ANSP-20170525-0027.html, accessed on July 16, 2019.

108 “Viudas negras”, el grupo que reclutaba solteras y las obligaba a casarse, fue condenado a 15 y 30 años de 

prisión, Diario de Hoy, May 17, 2019, at https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/viudas-negras-el-grupoque-reclutaba-solteras-y-las-obligaba-a-casarse-fue-condenado-a-15-y-30-anos-de-prision/603788/2019/ accessed on July 16, 2019.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 72

mention just a few examples. In 2016, lawyer Ana María Benítez Quinteros and 

her law student Jessica Ivonne Pérez Estrada were killed in San Juan Talpa, La 

Paz.109 Also in 2016, in San Salvador lawyer Omar Recinos Santos was murdered 

when he went to receive payment from the gang member he had defended.110 In 

2018, the lawyer Juan José Zelaya was murdered by gang members in his house in 

Usulután.111 These are just a few of many cases.

Due to the dissatisfaction with the lawyers, the gangs are reported to have 

begun sending trusted persons to study law in the different universities of the country. This included both full-time gang members as well as trusted collaborators. 

At the beginning of 2019, a confidential source reported that of the approximately 

1,000 students at the Technological University (UTEC), they had identified 300 

with links to the different gangs, which has forced the university to suspend group 

assignments because there were police and prosecutors studying in that institution 

and they wanted to protect personal identifying information from getting into the 

wrong hands. No corroborating information about the proportion of gang affiliated 

students was obtained from another source, but if true, this is a worrisome trend. 

If the UTEC is representative of the other law schools in the country, there could 

conservatively be two or three times the number of gang sponsored law students in 

El Salvador (600-900) at any given moment.

Besides law, gang members have been allegedly detected studying other professions such as economics, business administration, and communications, among 

others. It would not be surprising if it was found that they were studying to occupy 

additional professions such as medical doctors, engineers, and others. The authors 

did not receive this information but believe that this is something that should be 

monitored.

The authors conclude that it would be logical that the professional gang members would not part of the regular gang structures (clicas, programas, canchas, 

tribus, ranflas) but rather are part of clandestine gang structures that are exclusively directed by some of the ranfleros. The existence of separate structures for the 

professional gang members have not been reported by other sources, but it would 

109 Asesinan a abogada y a estudiante de leyes, Diario de Hoy, 11 de enero de 2016, https://historico.elsalvador.

com/209318/asesinan-a-abogada-y-a-estudiante-de-leyes.html, accessed on July 16, 2019. 110 Asesinan a abogado que llegó a cobrarle a pandillero que defendió, La Prensa Grafica, 20 de abril de 2016, 

https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Asesinan-a-abogado-que-llego-a-cobrarle-a-pandillero-que-defendio-20160420-0039.html, accessed on July 16, 2019. 111 Pandilleros asesinan a un abogado mientras se encontraba en su vivienda en Usulután, Cronio, 12 de marzo 

de 2018, http://cronio.sv/nacionales/sucesos/pandilleros-asesinan-abogado-se-encontraba-vivienda-usulutan/, 

accessed on July 16, 2019.
73 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

make sense given the logical desire to keep the membership of these lawyers in 

the gang secret. 

Today, the profile of the entry-level gang member may still be essentially the 

same as it was from the beginning of the gangs. However, beginning in 2000, they 

seem to be getting more sophisticated and as a consequence, less detectable by the 

traditional security forces methods. 

Recruiting Methods

Currently it is estimated that there are between 40,000 and 60,000 formally incorporated or “brincado” gang members distributed across all the groups of El 

Salvador. In the MS-13, each full gang member has been ordered to have three 

candidates in different phases of recruitment. Each of these phases has been given 

a different name. In the order of earliest to most advanced phases these are: observación, paro, y chequeo. There is no specific age nor time to be in each phase. 

The requirements to advance from one phase to the next are not clear. During each 

phase the recruit demonstrates his loyalty to the gang, participating in and carrying 

out crimes such as support, extortion, robbery, and murders. Over time, the leader 

of the clica will request permission of the ranfla for the person to advance to the 

next phase. Only the ranflero can authorize the progression. 

To be chosen to “brincar” or become a full-fledged gang member, the candidate has to be completely trusted by the gang; in the clica, the programa and the 

ranfla. Today, several sources reported that the candidate has to murder at least 

five people. Before, the requirement was fewer, but in 2019, it was reported to be 

five people.112 This high number seems excessive to the research team, but it was 

repeated by several unrelated sources, so it cannot be dismissed without further 

evidence. 

This high number can be indicative of the significant demand to become a 

member of the gangs. If there are 40,000 full gang members and each of these 

has three gang members in different phases of recruitment, there may be a total 

of 160,000 gang members just in El Salvador without considering other Central 

American countries. Even if the proportion of full gang members to trainees is less, 

instead of three, one or two for every full gang member, there is still a potential 

112 As by the end of 2019, the number of gang homicides decreased greatly by decision of the gang leadership. As 

a result of more effective government policies, the number of murders required for full gang membership may 

have been reduced again.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 74

for between 80,000-120,000 gang members. The importance of this number can be 

seen by comparing it to the wartime numbers of FMLN guerrillas. At the height of 

the war, the FMLN never attained anywhere close to the numbers of the gangs. At 

their peak, the FMLN were able to build a force of 14,000 full-time guerrillas and 

perhaps twice that number in different categories of militias, in other words around 

42,000—just a little more than the most conservative estimate of the number of 

current full-time gang members. The size alone of this force is formidable so it is 

little wonder the gangs are such a critical security problem.

This also explains why, despite large losses of gang members in battles with 

the authorities, mostly the National Civilian Police (PNC), the gang capacity does 

not seem to have been significantly, if at all, diminished. In 2015, the PNC reported 

that they had killed 320 gang members, in 2016 there were 603, in 2017 they reported 413, and in 2018 they reported 208.113

Table 3. Number of Gang Members killed by year. 

Year 2015 2016 2017 2018

Killed 320 603 413 208

Firefights 622 650 536 341

For each gang member that is killed, wounded, or arrested, there are several 

candidates to immediately replace them, so the net impact on the gangs is null. 

But there is another phase of recruitment that no one has really discussed before, a 

“pre-recruitment phase” for children between approximately 5-12 years old. 

Children in Gangs

Videos captured from the gangs show 4-6-year-old children learning the language 

and signs of the gangs. At this age they are already being indoctrinated in gang culture and the aspiration to become gang members when they are older. The source 

of these child recruits is the large number of single parent children in the poor 

neighborhoods and also the children of gang members that have a great influence 

over their peers. 

Approximately between the ages of 7-8, these children are asked to do favors 

for the gangs, serving as lookouts, running errands for the clica leaders, or taking 

113 Statistics provided by the Policia Nacional Civil, November 2019.
75 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

messages and other things back and forth. This is done because it is considered 

politically incorrect to search little children without probable cause. Between 9 and 

10 approximately, these children are allowed to participate in criminal operations, 

mostly as lookouts, but also more sinister crimes. For example, it was reported that 

they will be brought in to observe the gang torturing and murdering an enemy of 

the gang with knives. Those that show a greater disposition can even be allowed to 

inflict some of the cuts or stabs on the victim. At 11-12 years old, the children can 

be taken to commit their first murder.114 

An example of this occurred on March 3, 2016, in San Juan Opico, La Libertad, when members of the Barrio 18 gang murdered 11 electrical workers in the 

search for members of the MS-13 to avenge a Barrio 18 member who had been 

murdered the previous day. They didn’t find any MS-13 members, so they decided 

to kill the workers. A video that was subsequently captured shows a veteran gang 

member teaching a young boy, approximately 12-years old, how to kill one of the 

workers with a machete.115 

This aspect of gang recruitment has been essentially ignored until now, but 

it means that the gangs are developing a big pool of candidates from which they 

can select for the formal recruitment process. This creates a sustained production 

line that guarantees the continuation of the gangs over time. How many of these 

candidates exist is completely unknown and the state has, to date, spent little effort 

disputing this group of children with the gangs. 

It also means that when the formal recruitment process begins, these children 

have likely already become pathological killers. Most of the government programs 

to recover gang members have been directed towards persons who are either already full gang members or those in the formal recruitment process. The existence 

of pre-recruitment phase of indoctrination and grooming would seem to explain 

why most of the recovery programs have not been very successful to date, because 

the socialization and psychological formation has already taken place much earlier 

making it far more difficult to recover them when they are older. 

114 Interviews with members of the FBI vetted unit, 2018 and 2019.

115 Pandillero sobre masacre en Opico: “Matamos a la gente que no era, que no andaba metida en nada”Diario de 

Hoy, 23 de mayo de 2017, https://historico.elsalvador.com/353503/pandillero-en-opico-matamos-a-la-gente-queno-era-que-no-andaba-metida-en-nada.html accesed on July 17, 2019.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 76

Chapter VIII: Violence

Tactics

The gangs have been slowly but systematically developing increased capabilities 

as they adapt to each new police plan to neutralize them. This has resulted in 

the creation within the organization of new specialties to defend and overcome 

the police force attacks. The gangs are still clearly inferior to the state in terms 

of firepower, training, availability of material resources (weapons, vehicles, specialized equipment, etc.). However, the gang’s connection to the Mexican cartels 

has provided them with the opportunity to get advanced military training and the 

use of military weapons. A wila recently discussed sending 500 gang members to 

Mexico to receive military training and to bring back a similar number of military 

weapons.116 Another wila talks about acquiring rocket propelled grenades in Nica116 Policia Nacional Civil intelligence document consulted in November, 2018.

Caption: Sports teammates pay their last respects to their friend Marco Pimentel who was murdered by gang 

members along with his mother and three other relatives in San Salvador in February 2019. 

Photo credit: Jose Cabezas and Reuters photos, with permission
77 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

ragua.117 To date, the weapons from Mexico and Nicaragua have not been detected, 

but it has been observed that that the paramilitary operations conducted by the 

gangs recently demonstrated greater discipline and more advanced tactics, which 

could be an indication of military training in places like Mexico. 

This has also resulted in the development, equipment and training of larger 

paramilitary organizations that have seen the deployment to the countryside and 

the establishment of camps in these areas, which is far from their traditional areas 

of control. 

Many of these camps are located on or near logistical corridors, maritime 

routes, and movement corridors for contraband, drugs, or human trafficking. This 

seems to indicate that the gangs are keenly interested in controlling these key areas 

with their armed elements to control specific criminal enterprises. This is a change 

from the past where they were solely focused on controlling urban space with not 

very sophisticated elements, mostly teams of trigger men within the normal gang 

structures. 

Because of this, it is believed that they will continue to refine their combat 

capabilities and tactics. An example of this is the attack on the headquarters of 

the Traffic Police, where the analysis of the closed-circuit TVs around the station 

showed that rather than a drive by shooting that was reported in the news, the gang 

cell conducted a reconnaissance prior to the operation, then executed the operation 

in a disciplined military formation that are only used regularly by trained military 

or police forces. The skilled employment of assault weapons is evident and little to 

no improvisation was evident.118

The gangs have also used an increasing number of car bombs and explosives 

in their attacks on the PNC and Salvadoran military (Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador or FAES). In February 2018, a low-powered car bomb detonated on the highway between San Salvador and La Libertad, wounding two policemen that tried 

to move what appeared to be an abandoned car.119 In July 2018, another car bomb 

detonated along the highway between Chalatenango and San Salvador, wounding 

117 Policia Nacional Civil intelligence document consulted in January, 2019.

118 Seis supuestos pandilleros capturados por atacar a la División de Tránsito Terrestre de la Policía, Diario de 

Hoy, July 10, 2019, https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/seis-supuestos-pandilleros-capturados-poratacar-a-la-division-de-transito-terrestre-de-la-policia/619930/2019/, accessed on July 17, 2019. Also see Atacan 

División de Tránsito en San Salvador, El Mundo, January 19, 2019, https://elmundo.sv/atacan-division-de-transito-en-san-salvador/ accessed on July 17, 2019. 119 Explosión de coche bomba en carretera al Puerto de La Libertad: dos heridos del CAM de Santa Tecla, La 

Prensa Gráfica, https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Explosion-de-coche-bomba-en-carretera-al-Puertode-La-Libertad-dos-heridos-del-CAM-de-Santa-Tecla-20180211-0011.html, accessed on July 17, 2019.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 78

two additional policemen.120 Finally, in April 2019, a car bomb exploded on a soccer field in Soyapango when the police attempted to investigate a fake dead person 

inside the vehicle. The incident resulted in the wounding of the two policemen.121

Weapons

The use of homemade weapons has almost completely disappeared in the gangs 

and is now almost exclusively found in the detention centers. The current weapons requirements of the gangs are assault weapons and explosives including hand 

grenades. 

Today, when there are confrontations between the gangs in the rural areas, the 

main weapons being employed by the gangs are assault rifles while in the urban 

areas they continue to be mostly pistols and revolvers. In other words, where in 

the countryside, we see an increased use of military weapons much like guerrillas 

of the civil war, in the city the action is more like traditional confrontations with 

armed criminals. 

120 Cabo y policía lesionados tras explotar “coche bomba” en Chalatenango, El Mundo, July 7, 2018, https://

elmundo.sv/cabo-y-policia-lesionados-tras-explotar-coche-bomba-en-chalatenango/, accessed on July 17, 2019. 121 Ibid.

Caption: Prior to the Bukele government, there were increasing clashes between the gangs and the security 

forces with escalating increases in deaths and injuries. In this photo, Salvadoran Army soldiers bury one of 

their fallen colleagues. 

Photo credit: El Salvador National Police 
79 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

Training

The training of their paramilitary elements has been advancing just as some analysts predicted. Their connections to the Mexican drug cartels have given them 

access to more advanced training than they could obtain locally from ex-military 

or former guerrillas. The cartels combat experience and knowledge of the Mexican 

Army tactics, techniques, and procedures are more current than those learned locally. 

Today we see the employment of tactical formations, paramilitary organization (squads and platoons), and deliberate ambushes with remote control explosives often detonated by cell phones. 

The paramilitary structure will continue to grow in sophistication, developing 

increased capabilities that will allow them to fare better in armed confrontations 

with the security forces. Meanwhile, their hit and trigger men will continue becoming more skilled, but mainly because of practical experiences versus planned 

training. 

Technology

The gangs have been using technology available on the open market that helps 

them accomplish their objectives. They transfer money through cell phone apps 

(such as Tigo Money) to launder money from their illicit activities. They establish 

surveillance of the movement of the Police and Army using video cameras, cell 

phones, and even drones. They use other associated technologies, such as remotecontrol devices to detonate explosives (e.g., Chalatenango car bomb) The use of 

technology will increase as the gangs become familiar with them, sees their utility 

for their purposes, and become experts in their use.

Cell phone technology is used mainly for communications, extortion operations, and the planning of murders. Cell phones are also used to set up an early 

warning security network around their areas of control. 

Cell phones are also used to record events and create propaganda messages. 

Gang members love to take photos and videos of everything which they store on 

their cell phones and post to social media. Besides personal use, these videos and 

photos are used to send messages to multiple audiences to instill fear, to boast 

about accomplishments, and to recruit new gang members. Ironically, they are 

also a great source of intelligence for the state.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 80

The gangs often use slang and code words to describe various things or activities. For example, police gang analysts talked to the authors about reports and 

wilas mentioning “galactic falcons.” The police analysts believe that galactic falcon is slang for drones. If this word is indeed a code word for drones, they are 

mentioned in two contexts. First, in the context of carrying out reconnaissance 

for an attack on a high-level target and second as an attack device jury rigged with 

explosives.122 While the attack plan, from the wila does seem to have reached an 

advanced stage of planning, there is no evidence that it was ever close to being 

carried out. Perhaps the interception of the wila prevented the plan from making 

any more progress. The types of drones required to carry out the tasks described 

in the wila are likely off-the-shelf technology and show that the gangs are trying 

to think imaginatively about how to incorporate technology into their actions as 

have many other groups recently such as the Islamic State (ISIS), Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Mexican Cartels, and some Venezuelan 

anti-Maduro elements. 

A final example is from another police interview where it was claimed that 

the police had found that the Barrio 18 gang had installed a parallel security camera system to the already existing system owned by the municipal authorities in a 

market that they controlled. They used this system to monitor criminal activities 

by non-gang members or rival gangs. If they saw anything suspicious on their 

system, they would react immediately by sending a gang “reaction force” to verify 

the situation and take action.123 The investment of time and resources to install this 

security camera system indicates the importance the gang assigned to controlling 

the market, probably due to the amount of money that Barrio 18 was making from 

extorting the vendors. It probably also indicates the difficulty the gang was having 

maintaining total control of the market. It is not known if this was an exceptional 

situation, or a standard measure being taken today by the gangs.

In the end, the use of technology should not surprise anyone as it is civilian 

technology that is readily available and generally affordable by the gangs. The 

gangs are products of their societies and should be expected to use available technology to achieve their ends. 

122 Wila showed to the authors by Police Intelligence in July 2018. 123 Interview with Police Gang analyst, November 2019. 
81 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 82

Chapter IX: Politics

The gangs got involved in politics intuitively since very early in their history, particularly at the local level. When politicians came to campaign in gang-controlled 

neighborhoods, they were initially just another target for extortion; the gangs allowed them to campaign in the gang dominated neighborhoods in exchange for 

cash or other payment. As the gangs evolved, earning the acquiescence and even 

loyalty of the local community political involvement became increasingly important not only through threats and bribes but also in terms of asking for service 

projects and actions of goodwill. 

The gangs discovered that they could influence local elections by encouraging or discouraging residents to vote for a particular candidate. In exchange they 

would then exert influence on the candidate to carry out certain policies, particularly in terms of requesting payments in exchange for their support or in terms of 

how municipal funds were invested in the local communities. Some candidates 

were more willing to cooperate than others, but where gangs were prevalent, they 

became part of the political calculus no matter which party they represented. Perhaps Leftist parties tended to have more in common with the gangs, but Center and 

Right parties made their arrangements as well. It was not necessarily a matter of 

ideology but a matter of pragmatism. 

Most of the people that the team interviewed agreed that the gangs became 

conscience of their ability to affect national politics during the gang truce and 

negotiations of 2012 to 2014. As they officially reduced the murder rate from 34 

to 10 per 100,000, they were allowed to give press conferences, issue press bulletins, make declarations about their respect for women, declare school peace zones, 

participate in municipal council meetings, and hold public events with diplomatic 

observers to turn in weapons. They even met with the Secretary General of the 

Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza.124 

In the end, however, the Salvadoran population did not agree with the gang 

truce. Many felt that the concessions to the gangs in exchange for the reduction of 

the murder rate were too much. There were payments to the gang leaders, concession of privileges in jail, transfers of gang members to minimum security prisons 

124 Carlos Martinez, ¿Quién enseñó política a las maras?, El Faro, August 26, 2018, at https://elfaro.net/

es/201808/el_salvador/22358/%C2%BFQui%C3%A9n-ense%C3%B1%C3%B3-pol%C3%ADtica-a-las-maras.

htm?st-full_text=all&tpl=11 accessed on June 8, 2020.
83 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

where they were allowed to regain control of their gangs, supposedly in return for 

them helping negotiate a peace agreement and “demobilize” the gangs. 

However, extortion never ceased, and in fact increased. As murders decreased, the police decreased their pressure on the gangs, which allowed them to 

consolidate their control of the neighborhoods. They became the de facto authorities of their areas, even determining when the police could enter the neighborhood 

and where they could go. Finally, there were multiple rumors that the murder rate 

did not decrease to nearly the extent reported in the official numbers. While the 

number of bodies found greatly decreased, disappearances greatly increased and 

it was alleged that the vast majority were in fact murdered by the gangs and then 

buried in secret cemeteries. The conclusion of most observers was that rather than 

lead to peace, the gangs were greatly strengthened by the gang truce in exchange 

for very little if any benefit to the state and society.125

After the gang truce, the gangs became conscious of their potential for national, not just local or regional, influence and increasingly inserted themselves 

in national politics. No political campaign was immune to petitions, threats, and 

extortions by the gangs. No campaign could prosper without addressing the issue 

of the gangs, and while most were tough in public, in private there were a series of 

negotiations and payments. 

At the local level, the gangs have offered the reduction of violence to mayoral candidates in exchange for the promise of municipal jobs or other benefits. In 

preparation for these negotiations the National Police chief reported that in 2017, 

the gangs ordered an increase of murders in order to set up the negotiations with 

the political candidates to offer them violence reduction in exchange for political 

favors.126

President Nayib Bukele has not been the exception despite his claims to the 

contrary. Two of President Nayib Bukele’s closest advisers were found to be in 

regular contact with the gangs, Mario Durán, Minister of Government and Carlos 

Marroquín, director of Social Fabric since December, 2015.127 This was nothing 

new. Bukele had a long history with the gangs. As mayor, Bukele was accused of 

125 Alberto Arce y Marcos Aleman, Tregua en El Salvador hizo pandillas más fuertes, Associated Press, September 

7, 2014 at https://apnews.com/ce4427683cbd4f7199719424e20a7d0f accessed on June 8, 2020. 126 Tristan Clavel, El Salvador Police Chief Warns of Gang Infiltration in Municipal Elections, Insight Crime, 

November 1, 2017 at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/el-salvador-police-chief-warns-gang-infiltrationmunicipal-elections/, accessed on June 10, 2020. 127 David Marroquín, Investigación fiscal involucra a dos funcionarios de Bukele con maras, February 6, 2020, at 

https://www.elsalvador.com/eldiariodehoy/nayib-bukele-funcionarios-pandillas-fiscalia/683875/2020/, accessed 

on June 8, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 84

negotiating with the gangs during his tenure to avoid their interference with his 

capital improvement projects. During the three years of his mandate, he made concessions to the Barrio 18 Revolutionaries gang, ceding them control of some market stalls in the Cuscatlán market. Former staff and gang members also claimed 

that for his February 2015 campaign Bukele paid money to the three main gangs 

so they wouldn’t boycott his campaign.128

During the investigation several sources asserted that the gangs were promoting their own candidates to be elected local mayors or council members. However, 

no concrete evidence of this was found. Nobody identified a known gang member 

who was either a candidate or an elected official. Furthermore, nobody identified 

a candidate that had been sponsored and promoted by the gangs from the ground 

up. In other words there is no indication that the gangs are yet interested in holding formal power, even if they have discovered the benefits of manipulating and 

influencing political office. 

In the sense of political influence, gangs can and do encourage people to vote 

or not to vote for a particular candidate. In an interview with Vice News in 2015, a 

leader of Barrio 18 said that they the gangs controlled and could mobilize around 

400,000 votes.129 It is not clear if he was only referring to the votes controlled by 

Barrio 18 or the gangs generically. Either way, if true, it is a significant number of 

votes that can easily determine outcomes of elections at the local and even national 

level.

Mobilizing or influencing votes is done in several ways. We have already 

mentioned allowing candidates to campaign in areas under their influence in exchange for payments or electoral promises. However, the gangs can also campaign 

for or against candidates, and they can encourage or intimidate people to vote for a 

candidate and not vote for another. In some cases, gang members have been posted 

along routes of access to polling stations intimidating the people by implying that 

they will find out who they voted for and punish those who vote “incorrectly.” 

The gangs have not limited themselves to influencing local politics. In a 2017 

trial a witness identified as Nalo de Las Palmas testified that between 2012 and 

2014, the two main parties (FMLN and ARENA) gave MS-13 350,000 dollars to 

128 Carlos Martínez, Nayib Bukele también pactó con pandillas, El Faro, June 29, 2018, at https://elfaro.net/

es/201806/el_salvador/22148/Nayib-Bukele-tambi%C3%A9n-pact%C3%B3-con-pandillas.htm, accessed on 

June 8, 2020.

129 Vice News, Gangs of El Salvador, November 30, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk, 

accessed on June 10, 2020.
85 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

influence the elections.130 In a 2019 trial, a witness only identified as “Noé”, indicated that MS-13 has been influencing elections for some time. Political parties 

pay the gangs to tip the scales in their favor. In 2014, the FMLN gave them money 

to help Salvador Sanchez Ceren win the elections. In 2015, the ARENA party paid 

the MS-13 69,000 dollars in exchange for votes in the municipal and legislative 

elections of that year.131 

The FMLN cut a deal with the gangs to support FMLN for the 2014 presidential elections. A video was acquired by El Faro that recorded a February meeting 

after the first round of elections in 2014, between an FMLN Legislative representative from Usulután, Arístides Valencia, and representatives of the MS-13, and both 

factions of Barrio 18. Later two of the same Barrio 18 members met with ARENA. 

One of those who met with the FMLN’s Valencia was an MS-13 leader known as 

“El Chivo”, and a member of the Sureños faction of Barrio 18, known as “Rafael”. 

The FMLN had not won a sufficient advantage to obtain the presidency. The plan 

had been to win a first round victory with the help of the gangs. During the meeting 

an evaluation was made of the work the gangs had done on behalf of the FMLN 

during the electoral campaign and plans were made detailing what the gangs would 

do on behalf of the FMLN during the second round of elections. The gang members thanked Valencia for the meeting and perhaps as an excuse for the disappointing results, said that this was the first time they had gotten involved in politics at 

this level. They also claimed that there had been insufficient coordination with 

the party. In particular, they complained that on election day, the FMLN points of 

contact didn’t answer their phones when the gangs called to ask for instructions. 

Also, they didn’t have sufficient transportation to get to the polling stations since 

they couldn’t openly use public transportation. 

Valencia asked the gangs to maintain their commitment to the FMLN, and 

these in turn requested logistical support, such as transportation, and money to 

do such things as pay for the renewal of DUIs (Documento Único de Identidad

or Single Identification Document, the national identity card) for gang members 

whose documents were too deteriorated to vote. It was clear from the conversation 

that there had been several previous meetings between the gangs and the FMLN 

130 Decapitaciones, Drogas y Armas: El Eterno Vinculo entre la Mara Salvatrucha y los Carteles Mexicanos, October 11, 2019, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2019/10/11/decapitaciones-drogas-y-armas-el-eternovinculo-entre-la-mara-salvatrucha-y-los-carteles-mexicanos/, accessed on January 25, 2020. 131 Ibid.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 86

and that future meetings were being planned.132

One of the methods used by the gangs to influence the results of the 2014 

presidential elections was the confiscation of DUIs and or threatening citizens that 

were going to vote for ARENA. A protected witness told the Prosecutor’s office 

that members of the Barrio 18 gang Revolutionaries faction intimidated voters by 

telling them that they had to vote for the FMLN party during the 2014 presidential 

elections. Another witness testified that two Barrio 18 leaders known as “Nalo” 

and “Donkey” gave out money to leaders of local gangs “canchas” to go around 

pressuring people to vote for the FMLN, and to confiscate DUIs from members of 

the ARENA party. This was done prior to the first round of presidential elections. 

They were also told that for the second round of elections they were not to confiscate the DUIs but to instead tell people not to show up at the polls if they were 

going to vote for ARENA, and if they did anyway, they would have to move out 

of the neighborhood.133

In April 2016, national leaders of both factions of the Barrio 18 gang confirmed to El Faro that they had cut a deal with the FMLN party to support the 

elections of 2014. The gang leaders claimed that the FMLN had violated their 

agreement and that they were terminating all the agreements that had been made in 

years past to generate electoral support for the FMLN in their communities and to 

impede voting for the opposition. They further accused the government of hypocrisy for accusing ARENA of having met with the gangs, when in fact the FMLN 

had actually made a deal with them for electoral support at the highest levels and 

claimed that Benito Lara, an FMLN legislative representative, and the first Minister of Justice and Public Security in the Sanchez Ceren government, Medardo 

González, then FMLN General Secretary, and José Luis Merino, a top FMLN 

leader and financier had been the FMLN delegation that negotiated the agreement. 

Barrio 18 claimed that they had promised to reduce police action against the gang 

and to seek a path for dialogue. According to El Faro, the MS-13 had also been 

part of this deal and were also terminating their agreement with the FMLN due to 

132 Carlos Martínez y Roberto Valencia, “El FMLN hizo alianza con las pandillas para la elección presidencial 

de 2014”. El Faro, May 6, 2016, at https://elfaro.net/es/206005/salanegra/18560/El-FMLN-hizo-alianza-con-laspandillas-para-la-elecci%C3%B3n-presidencial-de-2014.htm accessed on June 10, 2020. 133 David Marroquín, “FGR investiga decomiso de DUI por pandilleros”. El Diario de Hoy, May 10, 2016, at 

https://historico.elsalvador.com/historico/188955/fgr-investiga-decomiso-de-dui-por-pandilleros.html accessed 

on June 10, 2020.
87 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

unfulfilled promises.134

Meetings also took place between the FMLN and the gangs before the first 

round of the 2014 presidential elections and after the first round of the elections 

around the same time that the gangs were meeting with representatives of ARENA. 

ARENA accused the gangs of impeding ARENA party members from going to the 

polls.

In the communique, the gangs also accused Representative Guillermo Gallegos, from the Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) party, of having broken promises as well, and instead of negotiating with the gangs, ordering their elimination 

by force. They announced that they would never again allow their canchas (local 

zones) from being used by the FMLN or GANA.to seek votes and politically organize the people in those neigbhorhoods. “We have given orders to our territories 

to not allow FMLN and GANA activities, nor the display of their symbols such as 

flags, T-shirts, hats, etc...Whoever declares war on us cannot expect that we will 

host them in our territories,” gang leaders announced.135

ARENA also approached the MS-13 and Barrio 18 during the 2014 presidential campaign. A video was discovered from February 2014 in which Ernesto 

Muyshondt, then Vice President of ARENA, and the then ARENA mayor of Ilopango, Salvador Ruan, met with leaders of the MS-13 and the two factions of 

Barrio 18. The ARENA delegation offered that if the ARENA candidate won that 

they would ease the maximum-security regime at the Zacatecoluca jail, known 

as “Zacatraz” where the main historical leaders of the gangs were serving time. 

Muyshondt also asked the gangs what they thought about former guerrilla Facundo 

Guardado as a potential minister of Security and Justice.136

134 Carlos Martínez, “Pandillas aseguran que tenían pacto electoral con el FMLN” El Faro, April 18, 2016, at 

https://www.elfaro.net/es/201604/el_salvador/18455/Pandillas-aseguran-que-ten%C3%ADan-pacto-electoralcon-el-FMLN.htm accessed on June 10, 2020. 135 Ibid. 136 Gabriel Labrador y Carlos Ascencio, “Arena prometió a las pandillas una nueva tregua si ganaba la 

presidencia.”.El Salvador: Elfaro.net, 11 de marzo de 2016.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 88

Chapter X: Territory

Distribution

According to Vice News the gangs began spreading across the country when the 

government carried out intense operations in the major cities to eliminate them 

after the end of the gang truce. They claimed that the gangs have been migrating 

away from the areas where they are being heavily attacked.137 This fits the narrative 

of the police leadership with whom the authors spoke. However, there could be 

other reasons as well to include expanding growth and control to dominate communications, commerce, and mobility. 

Territorial Control

A Department of Justice funded study categorized gangs as three types: corporate, 

territorial, and scavenger. Corporate gangs focus their efforts on making money. 

Territorial gangs focus their efforts on possessing territory, and scavenger gangs 

have little structure and focus on belonging to the group.138 Understanding the 

category that a gang fits into can help explain how they exercise territorial control. 

The authors posit that it is possible for a gang to belong to more than one category 

as it evolves and there is in fact a logical evolution from scavenger to territorial to 

corporate although some gangs may skip different phases altogether or remain in 

one or another for a variety of reasons.

For example, the Mexican mafia, one of the major influences of the Salvadoran gangs, is a corporate gang that really never had a territorial phase due to its 

dominance in prison. It is possible that it originally started out as a scavenger gang 

as belonging was important to band together to defend themselves against other 

groups in prison. However, if this is the case, it jumped from scavenger to corporate without passing through the territorial phase. On the other hand, the MS-13 

may have gone through an initial scavenger phase, but it jumped to territorial so 

quickly that it is debatable whether there was really much of a scavenger phase. 

Perhaps the scavenger phase of Barrio 18 happened when Salvadoran migrants be137 Vice News, Gangs of El Salvador, November 30, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk, 

accessed on June 10, 2020.

138 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Addressing Community Gang Problems: A Practical Guide, Washington, D.C: 

Department of Justice, 1988, p. xvi.
89 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

gan joining the Mexican gang. However, it soon transitioned to territorial when the 

Salvadorans took over Barrio 18 and it became largely a Salvadoran and Central 

American gang.

Another thought is that a gang can display characteristics of multiple types 

simultaneously, or that as they transition from one phase to the next, they display 

mixed characteristics depending on place, people, and time. So, in the case of the 

Salvadoran gangs, as time moves forward they predominantly display the characteristics of a territorial gang, but at the same time increasingly showing the characteristics of a corporate gang. 

According to Abby Cordova, a gang’s control of territory is a survival and 

empowerment strategy. Territorial control allows them to protect themselves both 

from the state and other rival gangs. It empowers them because as they dominate 

terrain, it gives them freedom of action which in turn helps them strengthen their 

organization.139 

We see this in the territorial control and expansion of the gangs in El Salvador. The clicas began as little neighborhood groups that proved themselves a nuisance in a variety of places where illegal immigrant gang members were deported 

to. However, over time they began to increasingly dominate all life in those neighborhoods and then expand their domination to adjacent neighborhoods. 

One of the author’s personally witnessed this expansion over time in the town 

of Opico where he had friends that ran some corner stores. At first, the gangs were 

just a nuisance, easily told to leave or they’d call the police when they came to ask 

for “rent.” Then as their control expanded, they had to acquire a pistol and threaten 

the gang members with armed violence if they didn’t leave them alone. Then the 

gangs murdered another small business owner in the neighborhood and the friends 

decided it was better to pay “rent.” Finally, the rent became too much, and they 

decided to sell the home and store in Opico and move into a gated community with 

armed security guards closer to San Salvador. 

They still maintained a store on the outskirts of Opico where the gangs had 

yet to expand, however, the process started all over again and as of 2019, they 

were getting ready to sell the second store because the gangs had expanded out to 

dominate the territory in this area. What has saved them so far is that this is the 

only store within several miles and many of the gang members families rely on this 

139 Abby Cordova, Living in Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods: Impacts on Electoral and Nonelectoral Participation in El Salvador, Latin American Research Review, April 10, 2019, at https://larrlasa.org/articles/10.25222/

larr.387/ accessed on June 30, 2020.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 90

store, so there was pressure on the gang not to charge too much rent so the store 

stayed open. 

Where Opico was once a safe, sleepy little town to the northwest of San Salvador, today it has become completely dominated by the MS-13. Going into town 

as a stranger is not a safe activity anymore. It is also where 11 electrical repairmen 

were murdered by rival gang Barrio 18, seeking revenge on the MS-13.

It has been reported by many that gang consolidation of territory experienced 

a qualitative increase during the gang truce that began in 2012. The gangs reduced 

their violence and the government greatly reduced police operations in the most 

gang-influence neighborhoods. This vacuum was taken advantage of by the gangs 

to increase their control over the neighborhoods, to dictate what citizens could and 

couldn’t do. Extortion greatly increased, and although dead bodies on the streets 

decreased, the number of disappearances greatly increased. Most people did not 

experience greater peace. Quite the opposite, they were increasingly harassed and 

controlled by the gangs in their communities.140 When the truce ended and police 

operations resumed, the police found their freedom of action far more limited in 

terms of what they could do in the most gang influenced neighborhoods. 

Increasingly, communities across the country are becoming like this, totally 

dominated by the gangs to the point where ironically, the police enter the towns 

only with the permission of the gangs. The authors visited a neighborhood in 

Soyapango that was so dominated by the gangs that the policemen were confined 

to their station. They were not allowed to patrol the streets. Furthermore, they 

140 Will Grant, Shaky truce: Is El Salvador’s gang war really on hold? BBC Mundo, January 22, 2014 at https://

www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-25711892 accessed on August 18, 2020.

Caption: A map captured from gang members shows where weapons were cached in a particular 

neighborhood. There are at least 17 firearms and 10 grenades shown in the map. 

Photo credit: El Salvador National Police
91 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

walked inside the station with no weapons. It was clear that they were confined to 

the premises and did not leave while on duty there. While the police may be forcing out the gangs from some parts of the country, it is also clear than in many areas 

the opposite is true. 

As the gangs expand their control and grow their numbers, they need more 

money, both because they have greater expenses but also because growing territorial domination gives them the basis and rationale for greater ambition. Ambition 

spawns plans which require more money. This is why the concept of expansion 

into the rural zones along major roads and routes for the trafficking of multiple illicit products like narcotics, weapons, and people is a logical expansion. 

Territorial expansion has brought them into conflict with other criminal organizations resulting in initial conflict usually followed by either expulsion or accommodation. In gang-controlled territory, other criminals are either blocked from 

operating in the territory, or they have to pay a cut to the gangs for permission 

to operate. A good example are the street vendors, performers, and beggars that 

operate at various intersections across San Salvador. Police gang analysts told the 

authors that each of them pay rent to the gangs and there is usually a gang member or two that are providing “security” and making sure that they don’t cheat the 

gangs of their cut. 

Sometimes the gangs are beaten back by organizations that have more money 

and more firepower. Drug traffickers are a good example. As long as they maintain their superiority, they can keep the gangs at bay, but the gangs are relentless. 

They have a seemingly never-ending supply of people so, no matter how many are 

killed, they don’t let up. Also, the gangs are savage and merciless in their methods. Most other criminal organizations don’t have the human resources or the cold 

blood to permanently withstand the gangs. However, in some cases, peace between 

the gangs and organized crime has been achieved by having the gangs provide 

security or carry out contracted tasks on behalf of organized crime in exchange for 

a cut of the profits. 

The relationship between the specialized drug traffickers and the gangs has 

been highly debated for the last several years. Many assertions were made that the 

gangs were largely earning their money through either drug trafficking or working 

for the drug traffickers. These assertions have proven mostly false as will be discussed in the resources section of this paper. El Salvador is not a major transit zone 

for drugs, so the business is not that big in the first place, and in the second place, 

it does not seem that the gangs have yet been able to dominate the drug trafficking 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 92

organizations. It appears that accommodations between the gangs and the drug 

trafficking organizations consist of grudging respect, with occasional and sporadic 

cooperation, but more integrated actions are non-existent. The Salvadoran gangs 

have a better relationship with the Mexican cartels than they do with Salvadoran 

drug trafficking organizations. A sign that the gangs are reaching the apex of territorial control would be if they were able to eliminate or subordinate more powerful 

organized crime. That has not happened yet. 

One of the signs of increasing gang territorial control is the gentrification of 

the gangs. As their domination consolidates, they begin to settle, build families, 

acquire houses, property and establish permanent businesses. This has begun in 

El Salvador. A friend of one of the authors lives in a gated community in San 

Salvador. This community was developed to keep gang members out under the assumptions that gangs were poor, street youths. However, today there are third and 

fourth generation gang members with families. Some of the oldest gang members 

are in their 50s and even early 60s. They buy property like any normal citizens, but 

they are not normal. In the friend’s neighborhood, first one house was purchased 

by a gang leader and then two or three more houses were acquired by other gang 

leaders, and their families moved in. They have not caused any major problems to 

date, but their presence makes long-time residents uncomfortable. Nevertheless, 

the gangs do dominate most of the neighborhood outside of the gated community 

making it necessary to enter and exit the community by vehicle. It is no longer safe 

to take a bus or walk to the neighborhood stores. 

In general, gang territorial expansion has been gradual, but systematic, and 

inexorable. As their territorial control has expanded it has become more difficult 

for people to evade the gangs, avoid paying rent, and increasingly likely that businesses and property belong to the gangs or their surrogates. As gang control has 

been consolidated, the gangs have projected territorial control out to mobility corridors between gang dominated areas. 

The overall effect is that it is harder and harder to find parts of the country 

where there is not gang control or at least gang influence. It is fatal to enter the 

totally gang dominated areas for an outsider. In areas where gang control is getting 

stronger it is not safe to enter at night, and if in the area, to go out at night. In the 

areas where gangs are beginning to encroach, people need to watch their wallets 

and be careful of increased petty crime. In areas where gangs are absent, people 

can generally walk around without taking special precautions. The latter type of 

areas is increasingly scarce, although they do still exist.
93 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

There are also some areas that the gangs don’t touch like tourist areas, recreation areas, and major shopping malls due to high levels of security, and because 

some gang members like to go there for recreation too. This is not a unique situation to the gangs in El Salvador. During the war against the FARC in Colombia 

and during the civil war against the FMLN in El Salvador, both guerrilla organizations generally avoided operating in what was known in both countries as “the 

pink zone.” These were major entertainment areas in both countries where both 

the guerrillas and the members of the military went to eat out, drink, dance and 

otherwise be entertained. It should not be surprising that there are similar “neutral 

zones” with the gangs. 

Over time, non-gang influenced areas are shrinking, and although many of 

them are being disputed strongly by the police, the overall trend of gang influenced 

territories is increasing. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 94

Chapter XI: Resources

An El Salvador Central Bank study on the cost of violence to the 2014 economy, that is often cited, concluded that violence and criminality cost the national 

economy just over four billion dollars a year.141 However, this is not the amount 

of money that is going into the coffers of the gangs because it included government spending on controlling violence, lost opportunity costs, and finally the direct 

value of money or other assets lost to crime. 

The study calculated that the value of money or property that was lost to 

crime was 1.303 billion dollars. This included extortion, home invasions, and personal assaults. Since there are many criminal groups and individuals in El Salvador, the home invasions and assaults cannot be attributed to the gangs, even if 

they are responsible for a portion of them. However, extortion is the specialty of 

the gangs and the study calculated that 756 million dollars was extorted from the 

Salvadoran economy in 2014.142 While the gangs are not the only extortionists in 

El Salvador, they do represent the vast majority, so if 90% were attributed to the 

gangs that would represent a total of around 680 million dollars, with the two major gangs each roughly responsible for half or around 340 million dollars per gang. 

It is known that this wasn’t the gangs’ only source of income, so potentially the 

incomes could be higher. 

However, other respectable sources claim that the figure is far lower. According to El Faro, the MS-13 and their rival Barrio 18 gangs are not very sophisticated transnational enterprises. They don’t even play in the same league as the 

Mexican drug cartels, or the Japanese or Russian mafias to whom they are often 

compared.143 This was also the same evaluation by Department of Justice officials 

interviewed by the authors in the United States and El Salvador during 2018 and 

2019. Based on evidence and documents acquired during Operation Jaque in July 

2016,144 El Faro calculated that the MS-13 annual income was around 31.2 million 

141 Margarita Peñate, Kenny de Escobar, Arnulfo Quintanilla y César Alvarado, Estimación del Costo Económico 

de la Violencia en El Salvador 2014, REDIBACEN, April 2016 p. 40, at https://www.bcr.gob.sv/bcrsite/uploaded/

content/category/1745118187.pdf accessed on April 20, 2020. 142 Ibid, p. 29. 143 Óscar Martínez Efren Lemus, Carlos Martínez, Deborah Sontag, La mafia de pobres que desangra El Salvador, El Faro, November 20, 2016 at https://www.elfaro.net/es/201611/salanegra/19580/La-mafia-de-pobres-quedesangra-El-Salvador.htm?st-full_text=all&tpl=11 accessed on April 20, 2020. 144 Operation Jaque was the first major operation carried out by Salvadoran Justice against gang finances. Over 

120 arrests were made and much money and property were seized.
95 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

dollars per year.145 This is about 10% of the amount of the Central Bank estimate 

that can be attributed to that gang. While further research needs to be carried out to 

understand and perhaps reconcile these widely divergent estimates, what is not in 

dispute is how the gangs make their money. 

While still needing more information, perhaps the key to reconcile the two 

very different calculations (30 million dollars versus 300 million dollars) of gang 

income can be found in recent evidence given in court. According to a former 

ranfla, the amount that the national leadership of the MS-13 receives from the 

programs is around two million dollars a month, or 24 million dollars a year. A million dollars a year come from the Central Zone, the Paracentral Zone provides over 

250,000 dollars a month, and the Eastern Zone deliver around 350,000 dollars a 

month.146 This is not the total amount earned by the gang, but the number acquired 

from quotas from the clicas and programas that were passed up to the ranfla. This 

number is much closer to the El Faro numbers, but there is an important difference. 

What explains the different estimates in gang revenue? The amount testified 

to in court was the amount that the ranfla was making from quotas from the clicas, 

not the entire income of the gangs. El Faro may be calculating the amount that is 

earned by the ranfla and the Central Bank figure may be measuring the amount 

earned by the overall gang. This is why El Faro’s calculation was around 10 percent of the total amount of the money being assessed by the Central Bank. 

This is a reasonable assumption as it is similar to practices in other countries 

such as the FARC where each front had its own economy and were expected to 

send a certain quota of their earnings to the Secretariat. In this manner it was accurate to say that the overall organization brought in around 500 million dollars a 

year, but documents captured from the Secretariat indicated much less income was 

obtained by the governing body.147

Most of the FARC’s money was spent on the local forces and its needs. Similarly, most of the gangs’ income would be spent by the clicas on the clicas. If MS13 “central” is earning 31.2 million dollars, it might not be a stretch to calculate 

that the total amount of money brought in by the clicas is around 300 million plus 

dollars. If they are earning around 300 million dollars a year and approximately 30 

145 Óscar Martínez, Efren Lemus, Carlos Martínez, Deborah Sontag, La mafia de pobres que desangra El Salvador, El Faro, November 20, 2016 at https://www.elfaro.net/es/201611/salanegra/19580/La-mafia-de-pobres-quedesangra-El-Salvador.htm?st-full_text=all&tpl=11 accessed on April 20, 2020. 146 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 525. 147 Instituto Internacional de Estudios Estrategicos, Los Documentos de las FARC: Venezuela, Ecuador y el archivo secreto de Raul Reyes, IISS: London, 2011, pp. 245-289.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 96

million a year is paid to the ranfla, and there are 20,000 members of the MS-13, 

then the amount they earn per gang member is around 13,500 dollars. When you 

count the recruits and families that depend on the gangs, this is not an exorbitant 

amount. MS-13 and Barrio 18 leaders are not known to live in luxury, and the 

gentrified members mentioned above are relatively scarce. Nevertheless, this is an 

area that needs much more research. 

Extortion

Extortion is traditionally, and continues to be, the principal source of gang income. 

As mentioned previously, the MS-13 in particular, is having discussions about how 

to move further away from extortion because of the rejection it causes of the gang 

among the population. The MS-13 has successfully done this in Honduras due to 

their massive involvement in drug trafficking, possible because of that country’s 

status as a major hub for shipment of narcotics from South America north to the 

United States. El Salvador is largely bypassed by drug trafficking, so this has not 

been possible.148 

The gangs are present in 94 percent of El Salvador’s municipalities and are 

reported to extort at least 70 percent of all businesses. Fear prevents people from 

denouncing extortion to authorities because the justice system can be penetrated, 

which means that people can get hurt for denouncing extortion and because the 

justice system is not very effective in punishing this crime. Between 2013 and 

2015, 7,506 reports of extortion were made to the Salvadoran National Police. 

This resulted in only 424 convictions and the punishments for extortion are not that 

severe. Gang members are soon out on the streets again to continue to extort and 

exact revenge on those that provided information to the authorities.149

A particularly favorite source of extortion is public transportation. The transportation association recently reported that they pay about 18 million dollars per 

year in extortion to the gangs.150 They also extort informal transportation provid148 Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, The Evolution of the MS 13 Gang in Central

America’s Northern Triangle: From Gang to Criminal-Political Force, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric 

Defense Studies, March 28, 2017, p. 10.

149 Molly O’Toole, Micro-extortion by gangs is costing El Salvador millions of dollars a year, $10 at a time, 

Quartz Daily Brief, June 17, 2017, at https://qz.com/1008580/micro-extortion-by-gangs-is-costing-el-salvador4-billion-a-year-10-at-a-time/ accessed on April 20, 2020. 150 Redaccion Contrapunto, Transportistas aseguran que persisten las extorsiones con una cuota anual de $18 millones, Contrapunto, December 19, 2019, at https://www.contrapunto.com.sv/politica/sociedadcivil/transportistasaseguran-que-persisten-las-extorsiones-con-una-cuota-anual-de-18-millones/12166 accessed on April 15, 2020.
97 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

ers, the bread stores, pupuserias, beer stores, corner stores, businesses, markets, 

sugar cane farms, grocery stores, taxis, and brothels. The amount charged each day 

was reported to be on average 14 dollars a day.151 The Central Bank estimated that 

the amount of money paid in extortion by all parties across the nation in 2014 was 

756 million dollars.152 

Drug Trafficking

The Salvadoran gangs have expressed an interest in getting more involved in drug 

trafficking since at least 2007. However, the constant accusations in various publications and other media that they are major drug traffickers or mostly financed by 

drug trafficking is not correct. This seems to be different for the MS-13 in Honduras, but this study is about the gangs in El Salvador. 

The Salvadoran gangs are by and large not drug trafficking organizations 

such as the Mexican and Colombian cartels because they do not generally ship or 

represent a major participant in the shipping of drugs from the countries of production to the countries of consumption. Rather, most of their narcotics related activity 

is participation in the retail of drugs to consumers in their own countries. Early 

reporting on gangs discussed their heavy use of drugs, but whether those reports 

were accurate or not, today, all but marihuana is prohibited for consumption by 

MS-13 members and only at sanctioned parties (see Annex 1). 

In 2012, the MS-13 National Ranfla met and agreed that all drug trafficking 

would be centrally controlled. The clicas could no longer buy cocaine and crack 

from independent sellers, only from the National Ranfla which would centrally 

acquire cocaine for the gang. How much they bought depended on the need or how 

much they sold. The motivation for centralizing narcotics retail seems to be to concentrate drug trafficking profits in the hands of the National Ranfla. Also, central 

purchase would presumably guarantee a better price and therefore higher profit 

margin. This would provide the national leadership with a ready source of cash to 

use as a slush fund. The profits from the street sales would be used to finance the 

criminal enterprises of the overall organization such as the acquisition of military 

weapons.153 

The National Ranfla called for a collection to be made from all the clicas to 

151 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 503. 152 Ibid, p. 29. 153 Sentencia Definitiva 2020, p. 506. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 98

buy the drugs. They had the connections with the drug traffickers who would sell 

them a few kilos at a time, up to six or so. They would pay 12,500 to 13,000 dollars per kilo and the sale would produce a profit of between 3,000 to 5,000 dollars 

from each kilo.154 

If they converted the cocaine into crack-cocaine, they could make more money. Each kilo of cocaine produces about 46 ounces of crack which is worth around 

450 dollars per ounce. Profits from crack-cocaine produced a profit rate of 7,000-

10,000 dollars per kilo of cocaine.155

How much cocaine or crack was distributed depended on the programa. 

The San Cocos program received 25-26 kilos per month. The Acajutla program 

received six kilos. It seems that the reduced amount distributed to the Acajutla 

program in comparison to the San Cocos program is that despite the centralized 

purchase directive, the Acajutla program had its own source of cocaine which was 

the fast boats that plied their way along the Pacific Coast to Guatemala and Mexico 

as the drugs made their way north to the United States.156 If the average number of 

kilos per program is ten per month, in other words 480 per month at the national 

level, and the average profit earned is around 5,000 dollars per kilo, this means a 

net income of the gangs from the sale of cocaine is around 2.4 million dollars a 

month or 28.8 million dollars per year. 

While much of the MS-13’s cocaine comes by land from Honduras, a growing amount of cocaine is reaching El Salvador by sea. The clicas and programas

located along the coast are becoming some of the largest, most powerful, and best 

armed in the country. 

El Salvador is not generally a way point for drug shipment from South America to the United States like Honduras and Guatemala. El Salvador is largely bypassed. However, the coastal clicas like the La Union, Fulton, Hemsptead, and San 

Cocos clicas have become important logistical support for the different drug boats 

plying the Pacific and have their own sources of cocaine. The clicas leave plastic 

barrels filled with gasoline, lubricants, and food that is picked up by passing go 

fasts who then resupply and make payments by leaving cocaine in the barrels. The 

cocaine is then taken by the clicas and sold on the streets of San Salvador either 

as cocaine or as crack-cocaine. It is not 100 percent clear how these deliveries are 

coordinated or payment enforced. Claims have been made about GPS tracking 

devices and other methods. However, the investigators were not shown concrete 

154 Op cit Sentencia, p. 506. 155 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 507. 156 Setencia Definitiva, p. 508.
99 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

evidence of how this is done. No matter what the precise method, the gangs are 

acquiring more money, status and power as a result. This has been confirmed by 

recent court testimony.157

The MS-13 National Ranfla also centrally controlled marihuana distribution 

to get more money for the gang. They were shipping in 200-400 kilos of marihuana 

every three weeks to a month from Guatemala. Each kilo cost the gang between 

450 to 500 dollars depending on the quality.158 Between 30-40 kilos of marihuana 

was smuggled into the jails every week or two weeks. It was smuggled into the 

jails hidden inside juice boxes. The National Ranfla earned around 25,000 dollars 

every 2-3 weeks to a month from this activity.159 Since about 10 times that amount 

was entering the country more broadly, this would indicate an approximate profit 

rate of 330,000 dollars per month and nearly four million dollars a year. So total 

profits for the MS-13 per year are somewhere around 30 to 34 million dollars from 

drugs. This is actually quite modest compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars earned by other organizations. Nevertheless, it is not insignificant and seems 

to be growing in importance, serving as a source of ready cash to buy weapons 

and develop other major gang projects. Evidence given at a recent trial indicates 

that the gang leadership is looking to increase the profits from drug trafficking by 

purchasing the drugs wholesale in Mexico and then ship it to El Salvador versus 

buying the kilos from intermediaries that take a cut.160 They were also discussing 

plans to make the clicas in Mexico direct suppliers of clicas in the United States.161

The biggest problems the MS-13 has been having is how to centrally collect 

the money. The clicas are dispersed and because it is a lot of money there is a lot 

of temptation to either not turn over the money or to not turn over all of it. This 

has led to a lot of mutual suspicions, accusations and even murders within the 

MS-13.162 This kind of internal friction over money was also common among the 

FARC in Colombia.

Money Laundering

Today the MS-13 is increasingly involved in laundering money which has created 

157 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 508. 158 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 507. 159 Sentencia Definitiva, pp. 506-507. 160 Sentencia Definitiva, pp. 514-515. 161 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 515. 162 Sentencia Definitiva, p. 515.
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 100

large amounts of discretionary “legal” money at its disposal. One of the major 

laundering methods is the stealing and selling of used cars. They have also invested in property to include motels, bars, restaurants, parking lots and other places.163

Insight Crime identified five ways that the MS-13 launders money:

Auto-theft and resale

The gangs steal cars in the United States, Mexico, and Honduras and then transport 

them to El Salvador where they are “legalized” and then sold a couple of times to 

launder them before “reselling” them in used car lots. In Operation Jaque, it was 

found that one of the major defendants, Dennie Antonio Gonzalez Mirando, was 

linked to the importation and sale of 2,000 used cars.164 

Shell companies and property 

The MS-13 uses criminal proceeds to purchase property. This is a favorite method 

because there are few regulations on transactions. This has long been a favorite 

way to launder money by criminal groups across the Americas. Operation Jaque 

also detected MS-13 owned money laundering shell companies such as hotels, 

bars, restaurants, diners, bread stores, car washes, parking lots, and brothels. These 

are run as legitimate businesses purchased with illegal money, or as high petty cash 

businesses infused with large amounts of illegal money that can be passed off as 

legitimate purchases.165 

Law enforcement representatives told the authors that often the gangs acquire 

these businesses by threatening or pressuring the owners to sell or turn over the 

businesses to them at below-market prices. These businesses are often turned over 

to gang family members who then run them on behalf of the gangs. 

163 Marianna Hernandez, Mara Salvatrucha Estrecha Lazos con Carteles Mexicanos, September 24, 2018, @ 

https://breaking.com.mx/2018/09/mara-salvatrucha-estrecha-lazos-con-carteles-mexicanos/accessed on January 

25, 2020. 164 Felipe Puerta -5 Ways the MS13 Launders Money, Insight Crime, September 7, 2018, at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/5-ways-ms13-launders-money/ accessed on April 20, 2020. 165 Ibid. 
101 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

Photo Caption: Video capture of plastic barrels floating off the coast of La Libertad filmed from a private 

yacht. These barrels are filled with gasoline, food and other supplies for the go fasts with cocaine heading 

north from South America. The contents are paid for in kilos of cocaine which the traffickers place in the 

empty barrels. The barrels are retrieved by the gangs and the cocaine is sold on the streets.

Photo Credit: author

Small Businesses

Operation Jaque also revealed that several of the businesses that had been extorted 

by the gangs were now being forced/used to launder the gang’s money. This was 

a technique employed by the FARC in Colombia and is a kind of variant on the 

Stockholm Syndrome in which victims are turned into co-conspirators by changing the relationship from a purely parasitic one, to a more symbiotic one where the 

business owner, although continuing to be a victim, also enjoys some of the fruits 

of the gang’s crimes. The gang provides the money to buy product that is sold by 

the small business. In return they demand 70% of the profits. 

MS-13 in particularly seems to be increasingly concerned with developing 

this type of cooperative relationship with the population as a way to win them over 

to protect the gang against the state, versus merely victimizing the population and 

keeping them in check through fear.166 

166 Ibid. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 102

Loan Sharking and gambling

Gangs also loan money to locals at very high interest rates. This is reported to be 

more common in Honduras than El Salvador. The interest rate is typically 30 percent per day. Failing to pay or paying late can risk severe injury or death. In other 

cases, the MS-13 organizes unofficial lotteries and betting games with better odds 

than state-run lotteries.167

Money Transfers 

The gang asks or forces victims to deposit money into their bank accounts and or 

make electronic transfers through legal means such as Western Union. This includes remittance services offered by phone providers such as Tigo Money to collect extortion or receive money from abroad. Transfers can be made of up to 750 

dollars per month with only a Tigo SIM card168 and identification card. The bank 

accounts that receive the money are usually not the gang members themselves 

but multiple family and friends to reduce the probability of detection by financial 

intelligence units.169 

Investment

Through either legal or illegal means, the gangs seem to be acquiring more and 

more businesses. The authors observed bakeries, market stalls, corner stores, car 

washes, used car lots, buses, and bus lines that were asserted to belong to the 

gangs. If the interviews are to be believed, the gangs seldom if ever pay market 

price for these businesses. They are either turned over as payment for overdue extortion accounts or are sold for deep discounts to the gangs either because of loss 

of business or gang threats against the owners to sell or suffer the consequences.170

These were being operated as legitimate businesses and reportedly being managed 

by the families of gang members. 

It is probable that many of the businesses were being used to launder money 

from other criminal activity, but they were also being used to make money through 

167 Ibid. 168 A SIM card is a Subscriber Identity Module card that can be used in cell phones to store data. 169 Ibid. 170 Interviews with Salvadoran Natioanal Police, July 2019. 
103 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

normal economic sales. Sometimes it was reported that this was done with a twist. 

For example, at the markets the gangs will determine that a certain item such as 

tomatoes will be particularly profitable that day. The word will go out that only the 

gang sponsored stalls will be allowed to purchase tomatoes from the supply trucks 

on pain of death. This monopoly on the product allows them to set a price that will 

earn them more profit from that product.171 

The increasing ownership of stores and businesses shows an increasing “gentrification” of the gangs, particularly the leadership. Where gangs used to hang out 

in the “destroyer” houses, basically hovels with members of the clica living the 

“crazy life,” now an increasing number have acquired regular houses and even residences in middle class and reportedly even upper-class neighborhoods. This may 

be because the gang leaders are increasingly middle-aged people, in their 40s, 50s 

and even a few in their 60s. This corresponds with the natural desire of people to 

settle down and have a more stable life that is not as characteristic of the younger 

generation. It may also indicate a move from a more egalitarian to a more stratified 

system with different privileges for members that have been gang members longer 

and have leadership roles. While this goes against the ethos of the gang, it is also 

a natural human tendency. 

171 Interviews with Security Ministry authorities, July 2019. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 104

Chapter XII: Popular Support

Over time the gangs have become more concerned about their acceptance and even 

support from the local population. Initially they used violence and terror to keep 

the population in check. While this worked to some degree, it also caused many 

people to feel anger towards the gangs and to inform on them. Gradually over the 

years, the gangs have taken measures to avoid giving the population cause to hate 

them. This is reflected in some of the gang rules that were divulged in 2019. From 

a list of 56 rules, there were six specifically directed at reducing the population’s 

rejection of the gangs. This included:

1. Don’t rape or sexually assault women, children, or old people. The punishment is death.

2. It is prohibited to kidnap because of the social scandal that it causes. The 

punishment is death for those that participate.

3. It is no longer allowed to dismember people and scatter body parts around 

as was done before. The punishment is execution.

4. It is prohibited to carry out massacres. The punishment is execution.

5. It is prohibited to burn people because of the social impact that it causes. 

The punishment is death.

6. It is prohibited to kill children. The punishment can vary from an unspecified punishment to death.172 

It is interesting that the punishment for all the violations against the population is death. The only one that varies from that is possibly killing children. 

Perhaps, this is because sometimes children are killed accidentally and the lesser 

punishment is for these types of accidents, in contrast to deliberate killings which 

would be punished by death. It can also be because many of the young gang members are between 14 and 18, legally minors. Sometimes the gangs are also accompanied by younger aspirants that can be between 9 and 11 years old. Some of 

these children wield weapons so under circumstances killing them might be an act 

of self-defense or the defense of fellow gang members. This is a curious departure 

from death being prescribed for crimes against the population. The overall severity 

of punishment for crimes against the population indicates that the gangs are getting 

very serious about gaining, or at least not losing popular support. 

Over time, more and more of the population are connected to the gangs. 

172 Sentencia Definitiva, pp. 124-125.
105 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

There are approximately 60,000 gang members and as many as 500,000 people 

that depend on the gangs for their livelihood. This means that approximately one 

in twelve people in El Salvador have ties to the gangs.173

As mentioned previously, the gangs are increasingly becoming business owners and providing jobs. They are increasingly providing security from other criminal groups or individuals. They are also increasingly influencing political leaders 

to provide resources to gang constituents and families. They increasingly provide 

a sort of efficient, even if not “fair,” justice to the inhabitants of the neighborhoods 

they dominate. As a result, there is increasingly less rejection of them in these 

neighborhoods, and since they have extended their dominion to an increasing proportion of the country, more and more people can be considered their constituents. 

In the end, more and more people are developing a sort of accommodation with 

the gangs that will be difficult to change in the near future without a significant 

counter effort. 

173 Vice News, Gangs of El Salvador, November 30, 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk, 

accessed on June 10, 2020. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 106

Chapter XIII: Conclusions

What unique contributions does this study make to the body of previous studies on the Salvadoran gangs? The Adversarial System Approach has indeed allowed us to develop a holistic view of the gangs that bring together the characteristics of the criminal organization, sociological and political actor approaches. The 

gang system is all of these things and these areas need to be understood to develop 

correct strategies to deal with the gangs without making the mistake of overemphasizing one approach at the expense of another. This is important to avoid leaving 

significant gaps that lead to failures to adequately counter the gangs because they 

can take refuge in the aspect of the gangs that is being ignored or underemphasized 

and then regenerate once the government tires of their failed policy. 

This approach reconfirms the strengths of the previously described approaches, but it also adds some previously ignored insights.

First, this study has revealed that the gangs do have an ideology. It is not what 

we typically think of as ideology. It is not formally a political ideology, although 

it has political impact. It is not an ideology to take control of a state, but it is an 

ideology to weaken the state and establish a parallel gang nation in the territories 

that they dominate both nationally and transnationally. This has a significant political impact at both the national and transnational level. It certainly challenges all 

of the social norms and structures that have been part of traditional society. Most 

importantly, it is an exclusionary ideology, one that only values the members and 

potential members of the in-group (the gang) while devaluing and dehumanizing 

the value of the members of the out-group (other gangs and those not in the gangs). 

This is one of the most significant challenges of this ideology and it can be taken 

advantage of by the states that are trying to combat these phenomena because most 

of the Salvadorans are part of the out-group. 

An ideology creates a narrative to explain the world and the way that it is. It 

creates a way to interpret reality. The challenge to states is not just that it needs to 

fix the problems that gave rise to the narrative because changing a reality doesn’t 

necessarily change the interpretation of that reality and doesn’t necessarily convince members of the gangs to switch their loyalty from the gangs back to the state. 

In fact, people can be convinced that the reason the state is improving conditions 

or paying more attention to problems is a positive result of the gangs. So not only 

does the state have to combat the objective conditions surrounding the gangs, but 

also to combat the narrative. Like counterinsurgency - although combating the 
107 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

gangs is not counterinsurgency - neutralizing the gangs also means neutralizing 

their ideology. To date, this does not seem to have been a significant or high priority aspect of counter-gang strategies.

Second, the Salvadoran gangs, particularly MS-13, think and act strategically. While their strategy doesn’t look like a conventional strategy that institutional 

strategists are familiar with, nevertheless it exists. This is reflected by clear lines 

of effort that have been consistently carried out over time toward strategic goals at 

the international and national level. While it was not developed or is executed the 

way that formal states develop and execute strategies, often in an uneven hit and 

miss fashion, nevertheless it does exist and it is being executed. The progress towards the accomplishment of the lines of effort have been evident over time. The 

progress has been slow, but systematic. 

One of the problems with counter-gang strategies is they have not, as far 

as the authors are aware, taken the gangs’ strategy into account. While they may 

touch on many of the gang’s strategic lines of effort, it is logical to assume that 

if the entire strategy was taken into account in the development of counter-gang 

strategies, they might be more successful. 

Third, this study has focused on how gangs recruit and expand their organization. This appears to be one of the significant strengths of the organization. The 

gangs are continuously recruiting and expanding and have developed a sort of 

production line that has both informal and formal phases. The formal phases are 

well known, those of observación, paro, and chequeo. Each full gang member is 

supposed to have one of each and to recruit new candidates as they advance and 

are initiated “brincado” into the gangs to become full members. That means that 

there are potentially somewhere between 120,000 to 180,000 recruits in different 

phases of incorporation. Even if these numbers are more modest, perhaps more 

around 60,000, it is still a large number of replacements, and makes it very difficult 

to reduce the gangs even if all of them were jailed. 

These recruits are drawn from an additional pool that appears to be part of 

an informal phase of preparation to join the gangs that starts with children of 5-7 

years old. This pre-recruitment criminal socialization, education, and incorporation of the children has been scarcely discussed in any of the literature. The process 

is such that it prepares a broad pool of eligible candidates to join the gang. Furthermore, the criminalization of these youth begins early, as young as 9-10 years 

old, and has a huge impact on the social and psychological development of these 

individuals. This means that when these individuals begin their formal recruitment 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 108

process by the gangs, their criminal behavior may already be pathological and very 

difficult to change, no matter the program. The authors of this study believe that 

this informal recruitment process needs a lot more attention if the state is to have 

any hope of having a significant impact on the recruitment and expansion of the 

gangs. 

Fourth, much more work needs to be done to understand the finances of the 

gangs. This study makes an insufficient effort. There is a lot of variation in the 

estimates of the amount of money going into the coffers of these organizations. 

Estimates have varied widely, between 30 and 350 million dollars per gang per 

year. Understanding the true level of gang finances can be important to be able to 

adequately counter the gangs. 

No matter the true amount, what is obvious is that the gangs are “gentrifying.” In other words, they are attempting to become a more permanent part of the 

economy. The gangs have gone from extortion in order to take care of immediate 

economic needs to investing their money so as to generate long term ways of keeping and making money. This includes the acquisition of property, businesses, control of marketplaces, buying houses for their families, and so forth. Yet the gangs 

baffle many analysts because the leadership generally do not live ostentatiously as 

do the leaders of the Mexican drug cartels, Colombia, or European mafias. Many 

leaders continue to live in humble dwellings in poor neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the visible yet anecdotal observation of the gangs embedding into the legal 

economy, even if through illegitimate means, is an indication of “metastasis” of the 

gangs within Salvadoran society. This should be of great concern to the national 

authorities.

Fifth, the increasing interference of the gangs in politics is of great concern. 

The inability of any political party to campaign or hope to be elected without making deals with the gangs is ominous. This means that no electoral competition is 

truly free and fair. While no democratic system is perfect, making sure that elections are as free of malicious influence as possible should be a great priority for 

any democratic state.

Furthermore, the pre-electoral interference of the gangs in political campaigns 

results in post-electoral “extortion” or influence of the elected officials, siphoning 

off significant resources to favor the gangs and their social base, rather than benefiting all of the electorate. Currently this seems to occur mostly at the municipal 

level, but this could soon have a greater impact at the national level. This may be 

happening to some degree now.
109 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

There is significant suspicion that the counter-gang strategy of President 

Nayib Bukele is a lot of theater and really represents hidden negotiations with the 

gangs, the terms of which are unknown. The state’s ability to deal with the gangs 

and develop the counter-gang narrative as mentioned above depends a great deal 

on whether or not the public believes the state and is willing to make the sacrifices 

that will be necessary to truly solve the gang problem. The level of necessary trust 

today is questionable. 

Sixth, it is clear that the gangs continue to acquire greater military capabilities. To date, they do not have nor perhaps seek the full capacity to confront the 

state as the FMLN guerrillas did during the 1979-1992 civil war. However, it is 

also clear that their training, skills, and weaponry are gradually becoming more 

sophisticated and of better quality. Both gangs – MS-13 and Barrio 18 – appear to 

be sending their members to be trained by Mexican drug cartels. Recent violent 

operations against the state demonstrate the skills they are acquiring. While there 

are persistent rumors of the acquisition of more sophisticated weaponry, there is 

yet little evidence of this. However, there is evidence that an increasing proportion 

of the gangs are equipped with military rifles and as importantly are carrying more 

ammunition which allows them to sustain confrontations with the state. Also, more 

attacks against the state are being carried out with explosives. While relatively low 

level in terms of technology and power, its increasing use is a concerning trend. 

Finally, the state will never make progress against the gangs unless they carry 

out a holistic, joint and interagency, long-term strategy that both seek to reduce the 

short-term levels of insecurity and the long term and systemic causes that produce 

the context that stimulates the existence and expansion of the gangs. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 110

Annex 1

MS-13 Rules174

(main author’s translation) 

1. Don’t raise a weapon against one or more gang members of the same 

gang. The punishment is death. 

2. Don’t deny the gang. They who do it will be punished according to the 

norms of his clica that can run from a cut (13-second beat down) for punishment to losing their life.

3. Don’t slander one or more members of the clica of the same gang. Who 

does will be punished according to the slander. If it is of death, they’ll be 

killed. If it is for correction, they’ll cut him (13-second beat down) and if 

it is for punishment, they’ll punish them. Example, not being allowed to 

come to a gang meeting or other gang activity.

4. Don’t rape or sexually assault women, children, or old people. The punishment is death.

5. Don’t remove the gang letters. Whoever does it without clica or gang 

permission is executed. 

6. Respect the Corredor and the oldest members of the clica or gang. 

7. Don’t steal from the clica or the gang. This means keeping money from 

selling drugs or from collecting “rent” (extortion).

8. Don’t consume crack cocaine. Whoever does is put to death.

9. Respect the woman or family members of the members of the clica or 

gang in general. This is punished according to the severity that can result 

in the death of one or more people.

174 Sentencia Definitiva, 2019, pp. 123-124. These are the rules as they existed in 2017.
111 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

10. Don’t kill members of the same gang. Whoever does it is called a “peseta” 

and is executed by whoever did it and all the participants.

11. Respect the rule of the gang and of the clica. Disobedience to these rules 

is punished according to the request of the clica to which they belong.

12. You cannot divide the gang. They that do it are eliminated, that is, are 

killed.

13. Don’t steal weapons from the clica. Whoever does it is executed according to the petition of the clica whether they pay for it or they are killed.

14. Don’t drink alcohol or beer unless the clica or gang has a party. Whoever 

does is punished by a cut (thirteen-second beat down) or 13 hits with a 

bat. If the violator is a Corredor or Ranflero, they lose their position and 

they are punished. If it happens more than 13 times the clica decides if 

they expel them or execute them.

15. Don’t transfer from one clica to another without authorization from the 

one you belong to. The consequence is a correction or 13-second beat 

down and you cannot change clicas without previous authorization.

16. Respect the boundaries and the internal regulations of each clica. For 

whoever fails to respect this, the clica will request a punishment for that 

gang member.

17. Don’t leave the country without authorization from the clica or gang. If 

someone does it, they are corrected where the gang finds them and then 

the same makes them return to the home country.

18. Don’t steal within the clica nor in territory of the other clica without 

consulting or asking permission from the clica where the robbery will be 

committed. If it is done the perpetrator is corrected, that is beat down for 

thirteen seconds and punished by not being allowed to share an opinion 

when decisions of their clica are made. If they have personal “rents” they 

lose them during the period of the punishment and they cannot participate 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 112

in meetings

19. It is prohibited to have sexual relations with the women of gang members 

from the same clica to which the boyfriend or husband belongs. The punishment depends on the clica to which the boyfriend or husband belongs 

and can run from punishment to death.

20. It is prohibited to stir up the territory of another clica or program such 

as killing someone, abandoning a body, or firing, resulting in the police 

capturing or killing the gang members of that place and capture weapons 

or drugs. The punishment goes from a beat-down or death for those that 

do it.

21. It is prohibited to extort without authorization of the clica or the gang. 

If it is the clica, the permission has to come from the Clica Corredor or 

the Programa Corredor. This action is punished. If it is committed by the 

Clica, or Programa Corredor or a Ranflero, they are removed from their 

position and they are punished by no position within the gang for six 

months.

22. It is prohibited to kidnap because of the social scandal that it causes. 

Those that do it are executed.

23. It is prohibited to dismember people like was done before, that is to leave 

parts of the body scattered around. Those that do it are executed.

24. It is prohibited to kill a gang family member without previous consultation nor justification for their murder. Whoever is going to do it has to talk 

to the gang member whose family member they are.

25. It is prohibited to carry out an action without the permission of the gang. 

For example, to carry out a murder without first requesting permission.

26. When the member of a clica is arrested, he must tell the police which gang 

he belongs to so they don’t detain him with rival gang members or civilians. If that happens and later he says that he is from the MS gang, and 

then they take him to a prison where there are MS, he will be considered a 
113 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

peseta and they have the green light to kill him. 

27. It is prohibited to carry out massacres. He that does it is punished by 

death.

28. It is prohibited to burn people because of the social impact that it causes. 

The punishment is death for those that commit this.

29. It is prohibited to kill children and, if someone does it, they can be punished with an unspecified punishment or executed.

30. It is prohibited for a clica to recruit one or more individuals without asking permission from the gang. If it is done the initiation is canceled and 

the clica is punished.

31. A gang member cannot be expelled from a clica without there being 

another clica to receive them. This is to prevent this gang member to be 

without control. The clica has to make the decision whether they will let 

them go or kill them.

32. No gang member that has withdrawn can retain a position within the gang.

33. Every member of the gang that wants to become a Christian has to let the 

clica and the gang know.

34. Every member of the gang that has been a Christian and wants to continue 

being one, must let the Clica Corredor know and the latter let the Programa Corredor know, and the latter let the Ranfla know.

35. It is prohibited to get tattoos, even if one has been started. To get one 

permission has to be asked from the Clica Corredor. They have to ask the 

Programa Corredor and they have to ask the Ranfla.

36. It is prohibited for members of a clica to steal from the chequeos of others.

37. It is the obligation of each clica to inform the gang when there is a change 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 114

of Clica corredor. If they don’t, they’ll be corrected.

38. The Program Corredors are elected by their programs in general. 

39. All the ranfleros are responsible for their members. If they don’t, they’ll 

be relieved.

40. It is the obligation of the ranfla to be careful with the gang economy.

41. Report all criminal actions carried out by the clica or programa in their 

zone of operations. If not the Clica Corredores or Program Corredores 

where the crime has been committed, even if they did it, will be corrected.

42. It is the responsibility of the gang to have representatives whether they are 

called clica corredors, program corredors, or ranfleros. No matter if they 

are in holding cells, jails, or in other countries, they must be organized.

43. It is the responsibility of every clica to have one or two corredores. They 

should be represented in the jail. If there isn’t a corredor that is free, the 

follow up is controlled by the corredor in jail.

44. In terms of clothing, you cannot use clothing that makes reference to the 

Mexican flag as those are the colors used by the Barrio 18. Whoever uses 

this clothing will be punished by a 13-second beat down.

45. Don’t do the countdown of the initiation on the phone from the jail.

46. It’s prohibited to give water to a person after having been corrected (beat 

down).

47. The following rules apply to those in jail: don’t see the visitor of another 

prisoner and much less insult them. This is punished by a cutting down, 

that is a beat-down of 13 seconds, and it is prohibited to get close to that 

visitor.

48. Respect the lock-up and let-out schedule. Violations are punished by a 
115 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

13-second beat down.

49. The jail beds are distributed by clicas and these are distributed according 

to their members. 

50. Respect the authorities and support them if there are sick.

51. Cell phones can only be possessed by Ranfleros, Program Corredors, and 

Clica Corredors, and prisoners that have been in a long time.

52. A prisoner can only carry out extortions by phone if they are authorized 

by the clica. If this is violated, they will be cut down (13-second beat 

down) and punished.

53. Don’t go up on the roof without the authority’s permission like they do 

when they fix an antenna or hang clothing.

54. Don’t carry firearms nor sharp objects that must be hidden in the caches.

55. Don’t attack the authorities that make searches.

56. The prisoner who joins work programs or shops that quits without having 

finished is corrected. 
Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs 116
117 Adversarial System Analysis of the Salvadoran Gangs

ISBN 979-8-9856855-0-3

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