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Self-Guided Tour 

THE BATTLE OF 

NEW MARKET 

Joseph W. A. Whitehorne 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington , D.C., 1 988 
Library of Congresl> Cataloging-in-Publication Oata 

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Illustrations unless fully identified under the photo are from the following sources: Edward R. 

Turner, The New Market Campaign, 1864, Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shcppson, 1912; Francis 

T. Miller, The Photographic History of the Civil War, New York: Review of Reviews, 1911; 

John W. Wayland, Stonewall Jackson's Way, Verona, Va.: The McClure Printing Co., 1940; 

the Nauonal Archives and Records Admmistration (NARA); the Mtluary History Institute; 

and the U.S. Military Academy. aps were dra\\n by John R. Treibor 

First Printing-CM H Pub. 70-24 

For 'ale b}· the Supcrintendcm of l)o.:umcnt~. U.S. Go\crnmcnt Printing Office 

Wa,lungton, D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

The visitor to this battlefield will learn that it has been preserved and 

developed in relatively recent times. Ir has, however, been an object of interest 

and reverence almost since the moment the battle ended. The participation of 

the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) cadets and the success of the other 

Virginia troops in defending their homes give the battle an added poignancy; 

the endurance, courage, and dedication of the Federals can be an equal source 

of pride. We of the profession of arms need places like this to renew our own 

dedication and to deepen our understanding and appreciation for our predecessors' skills as practitioners of the art and science of war. The military 

profession must continue to learn from the past to be ready for its future. In 

accordance with this need, the Center of Military History is producing a series 

of staff ride brochures, of which this is the first. 

Washington, D.C. 

I August I 988 

WILLIAM A. STOFFT 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 

iii 
Introduction 

The Battle of New Market was the first of a series of engagements taking 

place in the summer and fall of 1864 that destroyed Confederate power in the 

Shenandoah Valley. This first battle hardly presaged such an outcome. It was 

waged between two provisional field organizations hastily assembled by their 

respective commanders days before contact. Confederate success in the face of 

greater odds seemed to be a repetition of the days of Stonewall Jackson. Just 

as in those days of 1862, this was the result of able leadership characterized by 

a clear vision of the strategic and tactical situation, agility, and synchronization. The Federal defeat can be attributed to the reverse of these principles. 

Federal strength was frittered away in a series of doctrinaire decisions devoid of 

reality. Unit cohesiveness was disregarded, and forces were committed with 

little concept of the Federal objectives or the tactical situation. The battle may 

be summarized as a Federal movement to contact, Confederate defense and 

counterattack, and a hasty Federal withdrawal. 

Following a general briefing, this tour will go to twelve locations important 

to aspects of the battle. The first part of the tour will be by vehicle, while the 

remainder will be on foot. The approximately two miles of walking will be in 

the confines of the Virginia Military Institute battlefield park on roads and 

open field. Ground can be marshy in places after rain. Field glasses would be 

useful at several stops. The tour will conclude with a visit to the battlefield 

museum. 

Rarely has a battle demonstrated the virtues and defects of opposing 

commanders so clearly. The quality of the units on either side was never in 

question. Understanding the battle's outcome provides valuable insight into 

leadership, cohesiveness, and the operational art. 

The following "Overview" should be read before taking the tour. Stops are 

keyed to the action described in the overview. Numbered stops are those made 

by car. "CR" indicates County Road . Stops with numbers and letters are 

optional additions to tbe motor phase of the tour. Stops with letters alone are 

those made walking on the battlefield. In the Overview names of Confederate 

personnel and units appear in italic type, Union personnel and units in regular 

type. 

Washington, D.C. 

I August 1988 

iv 

JOSEPH W. A. WHITEHORNE 

Lieutenant Colonel 

United States Army 
Overview or the Baulc 

Suggested Readings . 

Notes on Ne'' Market 

Chronology . • . 

The V~11 Cadets. 

Order of Battle . 

Self-Guided Tour 

Stop I Penmylvania Monument 

Stop I A- Rude's Hill and Return 

Stop 2- St. Mauhcw's Lutheran Church 

Stop 3- Ncw Market Valley 

Stop 31\- Williamson's Hill 

Stop 4- Picnic Area 

Stop 5- llattlelield Park .. 

Stop A-Jackson's Bauery. 62d Virginia 

Stop B- Bushong's Orchard. . . . . . 

Stop C -Woodson's Monument . . . . 

Stop D- Von Klciser's Position, 34th Massachuscus 

Stop c - Fcdcral Line . . 

Stop F- Fcdcral Rear Area . . . . . 

Stop G- Overlook No. I . . . . . . 

Stop H- Battery Heights and Return. 

Contents 

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Cover: Chorg~ of th~ V.'Vfl Ne~< \furket Cudetl by Jad. Woodson, courte,)· of \':0.11 . 

v 

Overview 

Strategic Background 

On 4 March 1864 Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge moved from Thnnessee 

to take command of the Confederate Department of Western Virginia. This 

huge command consisted of nearly 18,000 square miles of rugged terrain. ll 

included all of Virginia west of the Blue Ridge and south of Staunton; the 

southern part of modern West Virginia from Greenbriar County to Kentucky; 

and as much of the last state as was under Confederate control. The dynamic 

commander's mission was to defend along a 400-mile front to assure retention 

of the region's assets and resources for the Confederacy. 

Breckinridge's district was of vital economic and strategic importance to 

the Confederate war effort. Wythe County at its center contained some of the 

largest lead mines in the South. Almost all the Confederacy's salt was produced 

in nearby Saltville. The upper Shenandoah Valley was a prime source of 

produce and livestock. These were essential to the sustenance of Robert E. 

Lee's army east of the Blue Ridge, poised to defend Richmond against an 

expected Federal onslaught. The region further contained important railroads 

running through Staunton or Lynchburg. The latter line, the Virginia and 

Thnnessee, linked the two sections of the embattled Confederacy and were of 

great strategic significance. The presence of Federal raiders and a partially 

disaffected population compounded the difficulties in assuring the security of 

the district. 

The point to which Confederate arms had declined by the spring of 1864 

may be seen in Breckinridge's being given fewer than 5,000 troops to protect 

this important area. Colonel John McCausland's Brigade, 1,268 strong, was at 

New River Narrows while Brig. Gen. John Echols with I, 769 men was based at 

Monroe Draught. Breckinridge further inherited two poorly organized cavalry 

brigades with a combined strength of about 1,800. 1\vo artillery batteries and 

a staff of couriers and signalers rounded out his forces. Other troops assigned 

to his command were on temporary duty elsewhere. Both Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. 

Wharton's infantry brigade and Brig. Gen. W. E. "Grumble" Jones' cavalry 

brigade were absent in Tennessee. One other unit, the 45th Virginia Infantry, 

was at Saltville, but at first was not under Breckinridge's jurisdiction. 

Undaunted, the vigorous commander immediately embarked upon a 

400-mile tour of his district to assess the situation for himself. This was the first 

time such a tour had been carried out by any senior official and in itself was a 

tonic for his troops and sympathetic civilians. He recognized manpower as his 

first concern. Within two weeks he increased the number of effectives through 

better organization, reduction of details and furloughs, and enforcement of 

desertion and absent-without~leave policies. By the end of March, he was able 

to organize an additional cavalry brigade, which he placed under the command 

of Brig. Gen. Albert Jenkins. His tour allowed him to gain a first-hand 
John C. Breckinridge (NARA) 

impression of the geographic vulnerabilities of his district. He thus revised old 

defense plans and prepared contingencies to cover all the possible avenues of 

approach to the district's vitals. Breckinridge's description of the scope of the 

problems facing him persuaded General Lee to order the return of Wharton's 

and Jones' brigades to the district and the transfer of the 45th Virginia to 

Breckinridge's control. He had these units in hand by mid-April, generally 

deployed to protect the assets of Wythe County. 

The former politician worked to ease the tensions further between the 

government and the population. Richmond had become very high-handed in 

its procurement practices. The district commanders often had been directed to 

impress produce and goods with little compensation. Also, huge quantities had 

been sent east with little thought for the needs of Breckinridge's district. As a 

result, he often found hungry units amidst plenty, with many disenchanted 

farmers. He ended these practices by ordering fair requisitions and by telling 

Richmond that his district bad priority before anything would be shipped out 

of it. This new policy marked another improvement in morale for the troops, 

while it stabilized relations with the civilian populace. 

Breckinridge restored leadership and direction to his command just in 

time. He had barely returned to his headquarters in Dublin when he began to 

hear rumors of Federal activity. On 27 April· he learned that a Federal column 

under Brig. Gen. William Averell was gathering at Logan, West Virginia, with 

the apparent intent of moving on Wytheville. Another Federal force was 

massing under Brig. Gen. George Crook at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, 

which threatened to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad near Dublin. A 

third Federal column was concentrating farther north at Martinsburg, West 

Virginia, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, obviously preparing to move up the 

Valley. Breckinridge knew he had just a few days to assess the situation and to 

2 
Franz Sigel (MHI) 

make the correct strategic decision. He had to determine the Federal intentions, 

identify the greatest threat, and deploy against it to achieve mass at the decisive 

point. Events were to prove that he made a masterful analysis. 

Before discussing Breckinridge's decision, a view of the Federal moves in 

their greater context is necessary. All the blue forces just mentioned were under 

the command of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel who had assumed command of the 

U.S. Department of West Virginia on 10 March. His department's mission was 

part of a Federal strategy developed by newly appointed General-in-Chief 

Ulysses S. Grant. General Grant recognized that superior Federal resources had 

not been used effectively hitherto and likened the Federal army to a balky team 

with each mule going in a different direction. He saw his job as getting that 

mule team to pull together. 

One of Grant's aides described the situation as it was in March 1864: 

"Grant inherited mass confusion in the Federal command when we came to 

Washington. There were a score of discordant armies, half a score of contrary 

campaigns, confusion and uncertainty in the field, doubt and dejection and 

sometimes despondency at home. Battles whose object none could perceive, a 

war whose issues none could foretell. It was chaos itself." 

An expression of this chaos was that at the time of Grant's assumption the 

Federals had 19 independent districts, 21 independent corps, and I independent army, along with 13 coastal enclaves working separately with the Navy. 

Grant said, "My primary mission is to achieve system and discipline and 

consolidate and coordinate these assets and to bring pressure to bear on the 

Confederacy so no longer could it take advantage of interior lines." Grant thus 

brought greater cohesiveness to the Northern war effort. He was the first 

Northern leader to be able to bring the Federal preponderance in strength to 

bear in a unified effort. He added new dimensions to the struggle by seeing the 

3 
war as more than a simple military undertaking. He reasoned that in such a 

thing as an insurrection, the entire population in rebellion had to be persuaded 

of the folly of continuing the fight. Th him the Southern ability and will to 

fight were as valid objectives as were the Confederate armies. He added 

economic, political, and psychological aspects to the war that hitherto had 

been missing. All of them revolved around his intentions to engineer a massive 

continental-scale assault to overwhelm the Confederacy. As he told Maj. Gen. 

George G. Meade, "All our armies are to move together toward one common 

center; and that is the destruction of the other's will to fight.'' 

General Grant assigned General Meade's 100,000-man Army of the 

Potomac to attack General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in 

eastern Virginia, destroy it, and capture Richmond. Meade's force would serve 

also as the strategic hinge for a great pivot through Georgia by Maj. Gen. 

William T. Sherman's army group. Each of these units had military, economic, 

and psychological objectives. Their strategic flanks were to be protected by 

other forces: Major General Nathaniel Banks was to sally from New Orleans 

against Mobile Bay. In the east, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler's Army of the 

James was to move from Fort Monroe to Bermuda Hundred against Richmond. Meade's western flank was to be secured by Franz Sigel's activities in the 

Valley. Sigel was to coordinate Crook's and Averell's moves against the Virginia 

and Tennessee Railroad and Wytheville and to prevent Confederate reinforcements from reaching Lee. Further, Sigel planned to lead a force up the VaHey 

to resupply the raiders and to draw off Confederates from the threatened area. 

The Valley was as important to the Federals as it was to the Confederates. 

A corresponding communications system graced its northern parts. The 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were 

critically important strategic routes for the Federals. Huge efforts were 

expended throughout the war to provide security for them. The road net in the 

Valley was exceptionally good; it was based on the Valley Pike, macadamized 

since 1840, linked with an infrastructure of good secondary roads. Not only 

was the place a prosperous economic unit, but also its development accommodated high-speed movement. The Blue Ridge shielded the Valley from eastern 

Virginia; however, ample gaps allowed easy egress and entry. Its northeastern 

orientation made it a natural avenue of approach into Pennsylvania or the 

Washington-Baltimore area. One has only to recognize that Harpers Ferry is on 

a parallel with Baltimore to see the significance of this topography. Conversely, 

Federals in the Valley Lhreatened Lee's strategic flank through New Market Gap 

as well as the strategic targets of the railroads and access to the Valley's bounty. 

Sigel and Grant originally intended the main effort in the Valley to be 

Crook's and Averell's raids. His force at Martinsburg was to serve as a 

distraction, with the purpose of Juring the Southern defenders away from the 

raiders. The plan called for a movement south only about as far as Cedar 

Creek, north of Strasburg. This would seem to threaten Staunton, possibly 

pulling away its defenders, while still enabling Sigel to protect the eastern half 

of his department. Sigel altered the plan when he learned that the only force 

confronting him seemed to be Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden's small Valley 

4 
District Brigade. He decided to move at least as far south as Woodstock. This, 

he thought, would have a greater chance of pulling Confederate defenders out 

of southwestern Virginia, and he intended to go on the defensive at Woodstock 

while sending out strong patrols. Sigel felt the deeper penetration additionally 

would disrupt Confederate exploitation of the Valley's resources while increasing the threat to Lee's strategic flank. 

Federal forces began coming into Martinsburg during April from all over 

northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. On l May Sigel deployed his 

infantry to Winchester while his cavalry moved even farther south to Strasburg 

and Cedar Creek. The Federals were to remain in these locations until 9 May. 

ln the meantime Genera/Imboden based at Mt. Crawford began to react to the 

changing threat. He concentrated his forces in the vicinity of Woodstock and 

on 2 May called out the Augusta and Rockingham County reserves. He also 

sent word of the situation with a request for reinforcements to General 

Breckinridge. 

Southern response was prompt and decisive. General Lee ordered Brig. 

Gen. John H. Morgan's Cavalry Brigade from Thnnessee to Wytheville, thus 

giving Breckinridge a bit more depth. He added Imboden's forces and his 

Valley District to Breckinridge's jurisdiction, assuring unity of command. Lee 

also placed the VMI Corps of Cadets at his disposal. Breckinridge watched the 

situation develop and decided that Sigel posed the greatest strategic threat. 

Therefore, on 6 May he directed Generals Echols and Wharton to concentrate 

their forces at Staunton; this was achieved by 12 May in a complex logistical 

operation using road and rail movement and supply coordination. The troops 

averaged twenty-one miles a day on the march. 

While this was going on, General Imboden continued to develop the 

situation. Captain John H. McNeil with sixty men staged a spectacular raid on 

the Piedmont, West Virginia, rail depot on 5 May. The Georges Creek railroad 

bridge, 7 big machine shops, 9 locomotives, 80 freight cars, and several miles 

of telegraph lines were destroyed. Another 3 full freight trains were destroyed 

at Bloomington. The purpose of this devastation was to make Sigel detach 

some of his strength away from his main body of troops to protect the B & 0. 

As a result, he did leave more troops guarding the railroad than he had planned 

originally. Further, he became so sensitive to the guerrilla threat that thereafter 

he deployed substantial portions of his strength to protect his trains. 

One of his first reactions was to send Col. Jacob Higgins and 500 men 

from the 22d Pennsylvania and 15th New York Cavalry Regiments from 

Winchester to Moorefield to try to capture McNeil. Higgins set out on 6 May, 

the same day Breckinridge began to concemrate his forces. General Imboden 

learned of Higgins' expedition, and on 8 May he moved to counter it. Leaving 

the 62d Virginia Mounted lnjantry in Woodstock, he headed for Moorefield 

with the 18th and 23d Virginia Cavalries. The next day, he ambushed Higgins 

at Lost River Gap near Moorefield and pursued the fleeing Federals north to 

Old Thwn, Maryland. When the pursuit ended on 10 May, Higgins' force was 

no longer a factor. 

The same day as Higgins' disaster, Sigel moved his main body from 

5 
Winchester to Cedar Creek, establishing his headquarters at Belle Grove 

Mansion. His approach compounded with bad news for Breckinridge. The 

force under Brig. Gen. Albert Jenkins that he had left to confront Crook's 

advance was defeated at Cloyd's Mountain. Jenkins was mortally wounded and 

captured; however, the fighting had been so severe that Crook was not to follow 

through on his full objectives. Averell's attack was similarly blunted at 

Crockett's Cove on 10 May by John H. Morgan-Breckinridge could not know 

this at the time. The situation impelled him late on 10 May to order the VMI 

cadets to join him at Staunton. They set out the next morning, reaching 

Staunton late on the twelfth, averaging about seventeen miles a day. 

Meanwhile, on 11 May Sigel resumed his stately passage up the Valley. He 

reached Woodstock that night and there learned through telegrams captured at 

the local office that Breckinridge was concentrating his forces against Sigel's at 

Staunton. This was the first firm intelligence he had received to show that he 

was facing more than Imboden's little force. Imboden had returned on 12 May 

from his triumph against Higgins and had set up defensive positions at Rude's 

Hill between Mt. Jackson and New Market. 

Sigel reacted to a guerrilla raid on his trains at Strasburg that day by 

sending out another cavalry force. lWo hundred men from the 1st New York 

Cavalry (Lincoln) under CoL William Boyd departed in a driving rainstorm for 

Front Royal with instructions to screen the Federal eastern flank into the Page 

Valley, and then to rejoin the force farther south. This detachment is an 

example of Sigel's pedantic approach to the situation; what Boyd could achieve 

away from the main body is difficult to perceive. At the same time, his 

departure reduced Sigel's reconnaissance capability and the size of the force at 

his immediate disposal. 

Sigel's scouts from the 22d Pennsylvania Cavalry brushed against Imboden's positions south of Mt. Jackson on the rainy morning of 13 May. While 

the desultory skirmishing went on, Boyd's column had moved from Front 

Royal east of the Blue Ridge and reentered the Valley through Thornton's Gap 

to Luray. It destroyed Confederate supplies in storage there, along with several 

wagon trains, and headed for the New Market Gap. When the Federal column 

reached the Gap, troops could be seen moving on the Pike below, heading south 

through New Market. Colonel Boyd presumed that what he saw was the head 

of Sigel's column. Against the advice of several officers, he ordered his column 

forward into the Valley. 

Imboden, maintaining his hold on Rude's Hill at 1600, was surprised to see 

the Federal cavalry corning through the Gap. He sent the 23d Virginia Cavalry 

dashing through the town to hold the bridge at Smith's Creek at the base of the 

Gap. Meanwhile, he led the 18th Virginia Cavalry farther south, then east to 

penetrate the Federals' rear. His maneuver succeeded beyond every expectation. 

The Federals were caught strung out as they tried to cross one of the creek's 

meanders, and they were decimated. Within minutes, Boyd's force ceased to 

exist. lWenty-five men were killed, seventy-five were captured, and the remainder became desperate fugitives wandering on Massanutten Mountain. Sigel had 

lost another substantial part of his force with no visible gains. While Imboden 

6 
Gabriel C. Wharton (Miller) 

was performing so effectively, Breckinridge moved his force to Harrisonburg. 

The next day, 14 May, he came fifteen miles farther north to Lacey's Springs. 

Preliminary Moves 

In the meantime, Imboden was becoming fully engaged. Major Timothy 

Quinn with 500 cavalrymen mainly from the lst New York (Lincoln) Cavalry 

had bivouacked the night of 13 May at Edinburg. Early on the fourteenth, 

another rainy day, he brought his force through Mt. Jackson and repaired the 

bridge across the Shenandoah. By noon he had forced skirmishers from the 

18th Virginia Cavalry across Meem's Bottom and over Rude's Hill. The 

intensity of the fighting increased south of the hiiJ as the defenders launched 

several charges against the advancing enemy. 

Meantime, about I 100 that day, Sigel sent Col. Augustus Moor from 

Woodstock with the 1st West Virginia and 34th Massachusetts Infantry 

Regiments and Snow's Maryland Battery. Moor added the 123d Ohio to his 

impromptu brigade at Edinburg-it had been sent forward earlier to support 

the cavalry. North of Edinburg, Moor encountered some 900 cavalry under 

Col. John E. Wynkoop (20th Pennsylvania, 15th New York, 1st New York 

Lincoln and Veteran, 2 1st New York and Ewing's West Virginia Battery). He 

ordered Wynkoop and his command forward to support Quinn. These 

reinforcements thwarted Imboden's charges, forcing him back into New Market 

by about 1600, and there his artillery halted the Federal advance briefly. At 

1700, the Federal infantry came up after nearly seven hours of marching with 

only one ten-minute break. Its added presence forced Imboden to take up 

positions south of the town as darkness set in. 

The first Confederate line was on the high ground west of New Market on 

a line adjacent to St. Matthew's Lutheran Church along the old River Road 

7 
Julius Stahel (MHI) 

(now in part Breckinridge Street). The growing Federal strength caused Col. 

GeorgeS. Smith, commander of the 62d Virginia Mounted Infantry, to pulJ his 

men farther south to Shirley's HiU overlooking the New Market Valley. Smith 

placed Capt. John McClanahan's Battery (The Staunton Horse) on the hill and 

extended a thin line of infantry south of the town east to Smith's Creek. 

The Federals established themselves in the town and in the position 

abandoned by Smith to the west. 1\vo guns from Ewing's West Virginia Battery 

were placed on the extreme west of the line, while Snow's Maryland Battery was 

based near the Lutheran church. At 2000 Moor ordered the 1st West Virginia 

Infantry skirmishers to probe Smith's positions on Shirley's Hill. They were 

repulsed vigorously by Confederate pickets and their whole regjment advanced 

to support them, volleying in the direction of the Confederate positions. A 

second probe by the Mountaineers was repulsed at 2200, after which things 

became quiet and all contact was broken as Imboden puiJed his men farther 

south. The closest support for Colonel Moor was the 18th Connecticut 

Regiment, sent to Edinburg from Woodstock by General Sigel earlier in the day. 

It bivouacked about a mile south of the town, fifteen miles in each direction 

from the larger Federal elements. 

General Imboden had joined Breckinridge briefly at Lacey's Springs to 

explain the situation. Breckinridge decided to advance to good defensive 

positions south of New Market and to entice Sigel to attack him. Accordingly, 

he had his column moving at 0100 on the rainy morning of 15 May, the VMJ 

cadets joining the column at 0130 after spending a gloomy night in the Mt. 

Tabor Church. The advance began to encounter Federal cavalry vedettes after 

going about six miles. These caused some delay but, more importantly, alerted 

Colonel Moor. Moor had his men standing to arms by 0300 and earlier had sent 

back word to Edinburg for the 18th Connecticut to advance. That unit began 

8 
a speed march so hastily about 0300 that it left Companies F and H on picket. 

These were drawn in at daylight and began a forced march without rest or food, 

running the last two miles. They arrived just in time to go into the battle at the 

moment of Breckinridge's attack. 

By about 0600 Breckinridge's force had closed to a position just south of 

the county boundary (the Fairfax line). He held them there in a heavy rain for 

about two hours while he reconnoitered Colonel Moor's position. Then, after 

sunrise, he had the 18th Virginia Cavalry probe Moor's line, hoping this would 

precipitate a Federal attack on his prepared positions. Disappointed in this, he 

placed his artillery on Shirley's Hill to continue to harass the Federals and to 

develop the situation. By then, Colonel Moor had established his line firmJy 

along the old River Road and around the Lutheran church. It continued to be 

anchored on the west by a section of Ewing's West Virginia horse gunners. East 

of them the line was ftlled by the exhausted 18th Connecticut, then the 123d 

Ohio, and the 1st West Virginia. Snow's Maryland Battery remained in the 

Lutheran cemetery, and the 34th Massachusetts briefly remained east of the 

Pike. Additional help was still far to the north. Brigadier General Jeremiah 

Sullivan left Woodstock at 0500 with the 12th West Virginia, the 54th 

Pennsylvania, and three batteries (von Kleiser's, Carlin's, and DuPont's). The 

28th Ohio and I 16th Ohio left Woodstock later at 0800 with the trains, at the 

same time that Sigel and his staff departed. Sigel could hear gunfire by the time 

he reached Edinburg, but when he caught up with Sullivan's force at Mt. 

Jackson he lingered for nearly an hour before continuing farther south. 

Meanwhile, Breckinridge's and Moor's artillery continued to engage each 

other. Part of Snow's Battery had moved forward briefly until persuaded of the 

superiority of the Confederate positions on Shirley's Hill. Major General Julius 

Stahel, Sigel's cavalry chief, arrived on the scene about 0830 and, while 

assuming command, took exception to Moor's deployment. Perhaps he was 

alert to the need to close the gap between Sigel's components. His efforts, 

however, produced confusion and a growing sense among the troops that they 

were not being led well. A measure of this confusion may be seen in the 

experience of the 34th Massachusetts: The regiment was about to breakfast in 

its position east of the Lutheran church when it was ordered back to the 

Bushong House. Shortly after arriving, it was marched back to its starting 

position and ordered to send skirmishers out. No sooner was this accomplished 

than the unit was pulled back to an assembly area north of the present 54th 

Pennsylvania monument. Then it was moved westward into its final position on 

Bushong Hill, having marched about seven miles back and forth for no 

apparent purpose. 

Battle Joined 

By 1000 it was evident to Breckinridge that the Federals had no intention 

of attacking him. Consequently, he decided to be the aggressor: "I shall 

advance on him. We can attack and whip them here, and I'll do it." He ordered 

his lines forward to Shirley's Hill and maneuvered them around to create the 

impression of greater strength. Finally, he aligned them so as to appear to be 

9 
10 
three strong battle lines, when in reality he had one line staggered in three 

echelons. Wharton's Brigade was in two lines: On the westernmost side was the 

51st Virginia, then the 30th Virginia Battalion and Smith's 62d Virginia. To the 

right rear of this line was a smaller line composed of the 26th Virginia Battalion 

and the VMI cadets. Echols' Brigade was drawn up farther east by the Pike and 

south of the village. His 22d Virginia linked with the troops west of the Pike 

while the 23d Virginia Battalion extended east until it connected with Imboden's cavalry, which screened the area up to Smith's Creek. 

After another hour of bombardment, Breckinridge's force began to move 

forward. The 30th Virginia preceded Whorton's Brigade as it dashed over the 

crest of Shirley's Hill and down into the New Market Valley. It was followed in 

the same informal manner by the veteran 51st and 62d Virginia. But no one had 

told the inexperienced cadets to proceed in open order. Consequently, they 

marched down the hill with the 26th Battalion in drill-field formation, 

providing an excellent target to the fully alerted Federal gunners and sustaining 

their first five casualties. Echols' Brigade pressed forward on the east, 

conforming to Whorton's movement. 

The Federal line was set up as described earlier, except that von Kleiser's 

New York Battery later was to come up to a support position on the Pike a 

quarter-mile north of the Lutheran church. The 18th Connecticut had dashed 

up into the line about I 100, just as Breckinridge's skirmishers came over the 

hill. A drenching rain was falling, and the guns continued to duel. Hardtack 

was issued to the newly arrived troops, but the men could not finish it because 

of adjustments being made to their line. Companies A and B and, later, 

Company D of the 18th Connecticut were sent forward from the River Road to 

the southern brow of the hill to act as skirmishers. While they were doing this, 

about 1140 Breckinridge withdrew his guns off Shirley's Hill and sent them to 

a position just south of the village. The cadet gun section joined them there. 

Only Jackson's Battery remained on the hill to support Whorton's advance 

directly. While this was going on, about 1145 Sigel and Sullivan reached Rude's 

Hill. Sigel paused briefly to watch the battle, then galloped forward with his 

retinue. Sullivan remained with his brigade just south of Rude's Hill, awaiting 

orders. 

The Confederate advance resumed about noon. Breckinridge had adjusted 

his line somewhat by bringing the 26th Virginia up to the west of the 51st 

Virginia and sending it down Indian Hollow, a small valley on the west running 

toward the Shenandoah. This left the VMJ cadets as his only reserve. On the 

other flank, Imboden's cavalry probed gingerly through woods east of New 

Market and encountered Federal cavalry facing them. This discovery led 

Imboden to propose going east of Smith's Creek to attempt flanking the 

Federal position from that side. While he and Breckinridge were discussing the 

plan, Sigel finally arrived in the battle area escorted by Companies F and M of 

the Lincoln Cavalry. Sigel left his staff at Rice's House and rode forward to the 

battle line to see things for himself. He quickly decided that there was not time 

for all his forces in the rear to come forward to Moor's original line; 

consequently, he directed a withdrawal from the original line back to the high 

11 
Infantry Firing Line. (Gilbert Gaul, USMA Museum) 

ground on Bushong's Hill. There his flanks would be protected by the 

Shenandoah's bluffs on the west and Smith's Creek on the east, and he stood 

a better chance of consolidating his force. Sigel immediately ordered Carlin's 

Battery to Bushong's Hill and von Kleiser's Battery up to support the 

withdrawing line. A few minutes later, he directed General Sullivan to bring up 

the rest of his infantry to the Bushong's Hill position. The literal-minded 

brigadier complied, leaving DuPont's Battery awaiting orders south of Rude's 

HiJI. 

Breckinridge's attack was in full force by this time. The 18th Connecticut 

skirmishers fell back on the rest of their regiment. The regiment soon extricated 

itself with some difficulty and fell back with the 123d Ohio to a line about 400 

yards farther north, almost on a line with von Kleiser's position on the Pike. 

About 1230 Sigel ordered Snow's Battery and the 1st West Virginia to withdraw 

from New Market and to set up on Bushong's Hill, thus vacating the village 

completely. A half-hour cannonade ensued in the continuing rain. While that 

was going on, Imboden moved the 18th Virginia Cavalry and one section of 

McClanahan's artillery east of Smith's Creek. The 23d Virginia Battalion 

extended its line to the creek to fill in the gap his departure created. Imboden 

then moved north to a point where his guns could enfilade the Federal flank. 

This caused General Stahel to pull his cavalry slightly north, behind a ridge just 

12 
to the north of the present Pennsylvania monument. Ewing's Battery, now back 

with the cavalry, engaged the Confederate guns to little mutual effect for the 

remainder of the day. Imboden then tried to carry out the second part of his 

task, which was to destroy the bridge over the Shenandoah at Mt. Jackson to 

block a Federal retreat. He found the water too high to cross to approach the 

bridge and rejoined Breckinridge at 1600, too late to contribute further to the 

battle. 

The 18th Connecticut and 123d Ohio resisted briefly at their second 

position, allowing Sigel's final line to form. One of von Kleiser's guns was now 

disabled on the Pike and had to be abandoned when the battery withdrew. The 

two infantry regiments were fairly shattered by this time, although Company D 

of the 18th Connecticut attached itself to the 34th Massachusetts to continue 

the fight later. Breckinridge immediately pressed forward his guns massed on 

the east as the Federals withdrew. He used his artillery almost as an assault unit 

in itself, offsetting somewhat his numerical inferiority while helping to 

suppress some of the fire of the well-handled Federal artillery. 

By about 1400, Sigel's final line was almost fully established. On the west 

overlooking the Shenandoah bluffs, Company C, 34th Massachusetts, provided support to part of a gun line extending along nearly half of the Federal 

front. Carlin's West Virginia Battery started on the bluff, and to its left was 

Snow's Maryland Battery, then von Kleiser's Battery of Napoleons. The 34th 

Massachusetts next took up the line, just about 350 yards due north of the 

Bushong farm; the 1st West Virginia was to its east. About 1420 the line was 

extended from the left flank of the 1st West Virginia to the Pike by the 54th 

Pennsylvania. It had jogged from Rude's Hill after marching from Woodstock 

with Sullivan earlier in the day. It was preceded on the field by the 12th West 

Virginia, which placed five companies behind the 34th Massachusetts and its 

remaining five about 200 yards behind Company C, 34th Massachusetts, on the 

Federal right flank. About 1430, Captain DuPont brought his battery up the 

Pike on his own initiative and held it about one quarter mile north of the line 

while he watched the situation develop. 

About that time, the Confederate line had reached the Bushong farm after 

enduring a growing hail of Federal fire. The 51st and 30th Virginia had become 

somewhat mixed in the advance. The eastern course of the Shenandoah River 

had squeezed the 26th Virginia eastward behind the 51st Virginia. At the same 

time, the topography on the western side of the Confederate line had protected 

the 26th and part of the 51st from much of the fury of the Federal fire. This 

was not the case for the portion of the 51st and elements of the 30th around the 

Bushong farm. They had reached the farm's northern fence line, but then were 

forced back to its southern side. The 62d Virginia on their right had advanced 

a hundred yards farther before being blasted back with 50 percent losses to a 

position on line east of the Bushong House. General Breckinridge reluctantly 

directed that the VMJ cadets fill in the gap left by the 51st Virginia around the 

farmhouse. The cadets moved on both sides of the house to re-form their line 

in an orchard, and after climbing over a fence, they lay down and exchanged 

fire with the Federal line about 300 yards away. 

13 
The climax of the battle was fast approaching. General Sigel had noted the 

discomfiture of the Confederate line and ordered a counterattack, but unfortunately his orders were not clear and they were poorly executed piecemeal. 

First, about 1445, the Federal cavalry attempted to charge up the Pike. It rode 

virtually into the mouths of the guns Breckinridge had set up on the ridge 

southeast of the Federal line. The cavalry's position was worsened by the 

response of the Confederate infantry, which briefly faced the Pike on both 

sides of it, adding a wall of fire on each flank of the quickly decimated Federal 

horse. The troopers were repulsed with great loss in a matter of minutes. At 

about this time, a violent thunderstorm was adding to the confusion. Confederate fire continued to build on the Union line. Jackson's Battery was deployed 

southeast of the Bushong House and one company of the 26th Virginia inched 

close enough to focus accurate rifle fire on Snow's and Carlin's Federal 

artillerymen and their teams. 

Meanwhile, about 1500 the second part of Sigel's charge was attempted, and 

each Federal regiment in line lurched forward more or less on its own. The 34th 

Massachusetts advanced halfway to the Bushong House; however, the 1st West 

Virginia on its left moved forward barely 100 yards before it gave up. In pulling 

back, it exposed both the New Englanders and the 54th Pennsylvania on its left, 

which had gallantly pressed into the Confederates. While this was going on, the 

fire on the Federal guns became so galling that Sigel authorized their withdrawal. 

He could see the 28th and 116th Ohio, the train guards, drawing up in line of battle 

near the Cedar Grove Dunker church two miles north at the base of Rude's Hill, 

and he directed the guns there. The two Ohio regiments had run the four miles 

from Mt. Jackson. Snow got away with all his pieces; however, Carlin had to 

abandon two guns because of the loss of horses, and von Kleiser had to leave a 

second gun damaged by artillery fire. Carlin lost a third gun because it became 

irretrievably bogged down during the withdrawal. 

This withdrawal of the Federal artillery was marked by a decrease in the 

volume of fire, and Breckinridge sensed his moment had come. A few minutes 

after 1500 he ordered a general advance. The 34th Massachusetts and 54th 

Pennsylvania continued io resist valiantly until all the guns that could be were 

withdrawn. These units then defended rearward until they came under the 

protection of Captain DuPont's Battery, which delayed skillfully by echelon of 

platoon back to Rude's Hill. The Confederate line swept over the Federal 

positions, with the cadets capturing von Kleiser's abandoned gun along with 

many men from the 34th Massachusetts. Breckinridge removed the cadets from 

the advance about 1520: "Well done Virginians, well done men." Then, 

impressed by DuPont's opposition and aware of the new Federal line forming 

at Rude's Hill, he halted his attack about 1600 to reorganize and resupply. The 

Confederate artillery, including the VMI section, continued to engage the 

Federal artillery for another hour. 

The Federal main body pulled back across the Shenandoah by 1800, 

followed an hour later by DuPont and a cavalry escort, which burned the 

bridge. By the time Breckinridge had his victorious force in hand to renew the 

assault, his enemy had fled. Sigel was so eager to get away that he left his badly 

14 
wounded in Mt. Jackson and marched the rest of his force through the night 

and next day until it reached Strasburg the following evening. 

Aftermath 

New Market unquestionably was what some historians have called the 

"most important secondary battle of the war., It temporarily unhinged Federal 

plans for the Valley, preserving its resources longer for the faltering Confederate war effort. Even more significantly, it secured the strategic flank of Robert 

E. Lee's forces, by then seventy-five miles to the east, locked in mortal combat 

with Grant's and Meade's men. lt is not beyond reason to say that the battle 

extended the life of the Confederacy by nearly a year. This strategic success was 

one thing; the inspiring example of the VMI cadets was another. Theirs was one 

of several decisive contributions to the battle, the absence of any one of which 

would have been fatal to Confederate success. However, this group of young 

men averaging eighteen years of age were not hardened troops. They were called 

from their campus to fight for a cause in which they believed. They faced reality 

unflinchingly and gallantly carried out what was expected of them. Their 

performance had a lasting positive effect on Southern morale and still inspires 

their successors. 

Breckinridge's masterful performance as both a department commander 

and tactical leader distinguished him as one of the best of many good 

Confederate generals. Success was possible at New Market because of his 

prompt assessment of the situation and the flexibility he had incorporated into 

his defense plans. His innovative tactical measures including the use of 

deception and the aggressive use of his artillery combined with his strong 

personal leadership to offset many disadvantages. His success was virtually 

assured by his willingness to accept the risks necessary for victory. Thus, his 

disregard of the odds and his gamble to hold nothing in reserve at the critical 

moment were proved fully justifiable. 

Franz Sigel, on the other hand, was the antithesis of this great Southerner. 

He displayed excessive caution while failing to think through the purpose or 

value of many of his decisions. He burdened himself with excessively large 

trains requiring far too much manpower to guard. His disregard for unit 

integrity led him to send Colonel Moor forward with a mixed collection of 

units, few of which had worked together before. His lack of organization led 

to such things as Captain DuPont•s being forgotten in the heat of battle while 

von Kleiser's short-range Napoleons were disadvantageously deployed. Sigel 

failed to use his staff, personally conducting minor-level reconnaissances and 

deployments. At the same time, he thought too much of strategy and not 

enough of tactics, completely ignoring the effect of his decisions on the 

physical condition of his men. His Chief of Staff, Col. David H. Strother, said 

of him, "There is no trace of cowardice in Gen. Sigel, as there was certainly 

none of generalship. Sigel has the air to me of a military pedagogue, given to 

technical shams and trifles of military art, but narrow minded and totally 

wanting in practical capacity." Most would agree with Colonel Strother's 

conclusion, "We can afford to Jose such a battle as New Market to get rid of 

15 
such a mistake as Gen. Sigel." 

For a moment New Market made it seem as if another Stonewall had come 

to the Valley. But, although further encouraging moments were experienced in 

the summer of 1864, the South was inevitably declining. The promise of New 

Market soon was buried in Federal generalship and numerical and materiel 

superiority. Thus, by the time of the battle's first anniversary, peace had come 

to the Valley on Federal terms. The examples of courage and dedication shown 

in the battle, however, will endure forever. 

Suggested Readings 

The Battle of New Market has become one of the most chronicled events 

oft he Civil War in Virginia. The role of the VMI cadets has been the particular 

object of discussion. Any work about the Institute will have a portion devoted 

to the battle. Articles and letters in the Confederate Veteran Magazine are a rich 

source of anecdotes and comment. Unit histories and personal memoirs also 

invariably provide a few pages of valuable detail on the fight. 

Thrner, E. Raymond, The New Market Campaign, May. 1864, Richmond: 

Whittet and Shepperson, 1912. The first scholarly treatment of the battle. Still 

a sound, balanced work with useful illustrations. 

Davis, WiJliam C., The Battle of New Market, Garden City, N.Y.: 

Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1975. The only modern book-length study. Rich in 

detail, the book tends to take a Confederate perspective. 

DuPont, Henry A., The Campaign of 1864 in the Valley of Virginia and the 

Expedition to Lynchburg, New York: National American Society, 1925. A 

broader study that tries to place the battle in relation to the full Valley 

Campaign as seen by the author, a Federal officer and participant. 

Notes on New Market 

The ftrst permanent European settlement in the area was made in 1727 or 

I 728 by Germans from Pennsylvania. A village began to develop at the crossing 

of the Thornton Gap Road (US 211) and the Old Indian Road (US II) when 

John Sevier established a tavern and store there in 1765. The village Sevier 

started continued to grow, and Sevier went on to distinction as the first 

governor of Thnnessee. The presence of a racetrack was justification for the 

original name of "Cross Roads" being changed to "New Market" after a 

British town of the same name famous for its racetrack. One of the first 

16 
publishing firms west of the Blue Ridge was formed here in 1806, existing until 

recent times. While prospering commercially from its location on the Valley 

Pike (US 11 ), chartered in 1834, the town also became known for its 

educational institutions. 

In 1859 sectional tensions led to the founding of the town's own militia 

unit, the New Market Cavalry. This unit was mustered into Confederate service 

as Capt. W.H. Rice's Battery. It became part of the Second Corps, Army of 

Northern Virginia. The unit saw service in Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign and 

all of the later campaigns in Virginia leading to Appomattox. A second local 

unit, the Emerald Guards, became Company E, 33d Virginia Infantry, part of 

the Stonewall Brigade. One of the 33d's commanders, Col. John F. Neff, came 

from Rude's Hill north of New Market. Killed at Second Manassas, he is 

buried at Cedar Grove Cemetery, where Sigel's men rallied after the battle, 15 

May 1864. Confederate troops moved in force through the town three times in 

Jackson's campaign of 1862. The town also was visited in 1862 by the Federals, 

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks using the Rice House (Stanley Hall) as his 

headquarters. The town saw further Federal occupation in June 1864 when 

Hunter's force moved south to Piedmont and Lynchburg. During their brief 

stay, the Federals reburied their casualties from the May battle. That fall, the 

surrounding farms were victims of Sheridan's "burning." After the Battle of 

Cedar Creek, 19 October 1864, Jubal Early's forces regrouped at New Market 

for three weeks before probing north one final time. Major Confederate forces 

left the village for the last time in December 1864 when Early moved farther 

south into winter quarters around Waynesboro and Staunton. Ten thousand 

Federal cavalry, under Custer and Merritt, passed through the town in late 

February 1865, en route to the final battles in Virginia. 

The village was the site of the earliest Memorial Day in the South, 15 May 

1866. 

17 
1864 EVENT 

h:tl John (' Br~d.inridgc i\ <tppointcd H> 

command ( .S. Department of Wc\1 

ern Virginia. 

t\lar L. S. (.rant develops strategic 'chcmc 

111 cwrt pn:"urc and ma" <ll all 

point,, 

10 :'>tar \laj. Gen. I ran7 Sigel i~ appointed Ill 

command U.S. Department of \\'e,t 

\ ir••inia. 

30 Apr h:dcrals under Sigel advance \OUth 

lrom Martinsburg. 

5 :-.lay Capt. John H. McNeil conduct~ raid 

1111 ll & 0 'hops at Piedmont and 

Uloomington. 

6 \Ia) Col. Jacob Higgins and 500 men from 

22d l'cnnsyhania and 15th Nc" York 

Ca' .1lric' lca'c Winchester for ,\loorc· 

tic:ld . 

9 ,\fa) Sigel depart' \\'inchc,.tcr. 

9 .\lay ('root.. defeats Jenkins at Battle ol 

U11)d\ 1\.lountain. 

•9 t\1ay llil'-gin,· cavalry column is ambushed 

by lmhudcn (18th and 23d V11ginin 

Ca\'alrie') at Lost River (jap ncar 

Moordtcld, i' chased to Romney ;and 

C\entnall' Springfield, \\c,t Virginia. 

!Sr\ly mile rout end' nrght of 10 

\1ay.) 

I 0 .\lay \'\II .:adch arc alerted late ,u naght . 

Sigel .:amp' nurth of Cedar <.red.. 

II \1a~ \'\II cadet\ (:!64. induding 7 cadre) 

hcgrn mar.;h north, 0700 reach l\·1id· 

"ay. IH mile,. 

II May l·.chol'' and Wharton\ bngadc' con 

ccntr;llc at Staumon. 

II \lay Sigel conunue<. \OUth 0700, rcache' 

\\'ood,t<Xt.. 1600; there Conftoclcratc 

tclcgr.ml mc,s:1gcs arc captured and St 

gel karth ol llrl'l:kinridge\ prc,cncc 

12 :\lay Cadc:h armc at Staunton. 

I:! \h" lmhodc:n 'c" up ltne north of :O.:c" 

\larl.ct. 

• D !\1ay Col. William lloyd \lilh 200 mcnlrom 

18 

Chronology 

1~1 New York (I incoln) Cavalry arrive~ at Nc1' Mar~ct Gap; crosses 

Smith Creel. at 1700 h allacl.cd and 

di\pCN'd h) Imboden ( IRth and 23d 

Virginia Ca,alrie,). 

U :\lay 1600: Bred,inridgc lca'e' Staunton. 

14 \Ia} 0500: Hrccl.inridgc lca'c' Harri~on· 

burg (IS miles from Staunton). 

1900: Brc:d.inridgc rcache' Lacey·~ 

Spring,, 15 mile\ 

Col. Augu'tu' \1oor leaves Wood· 

"oct.. with ht Wc\t Virginia, 34th 

Mas\achmcm, 12Jtl Ohio Infantries. 

Snow\ :"-<larylam.l pht'i one-half of 

E" ing\ G hi \Vc,t Virgania Baueric-, 

and cavalr~ under Col John E. 

W)nt..oop, Wynl.oop'' 20th Pcnnsyl-

"ania (170 men), 15th :-/C\1 York (130 

men), ht New )or I. (Lincoln). ht 

NC\' York (\'ctcr;~n). 21\t :-.JC\, )or!. 

Cavalry (600 men) (c. 2.350 men of all 

arm\). 

1500: Moor become, engaged at Mt. 

Jack\on. 

1800: lie pu,hcl lmhodcn through 

New Mmkct, 'cl\ up on New Market 

Valley. 

Sigel 'cntl' I Xth Connecticut 10 

Edinburg. 

2000: Col. G. S. Smith deicnd"> with 

artillery hom Shirley', llill: he had a 

thin line fr<llll there to thc Smilh 

<red Bridge. 

Federal pmrtwn '' on llmhont!'' Hill 

south to New \larl.~:t Valle~. cast 10 

Smith\ (reel.. 

15 May 0100: Hr~:ckmridi!.C lca'c' Lacey\ 

Spring\ for Nc" l\tarkct, 7 miles. 

0130: V:'lll cadet' nlll\C out from bilouac .11 \1t lab(ll CIHm:h, Lace)'' 

Sprrng1. 

0300: Clll, \lllM ha' all hi' unih on 

line. 

• The~· 1~0 cn~agcnu;nh thnuu.HC'J tll1c."·lhlfd nl \i~CI'"' i.\Jif\ 

'lrt'll)!lh . 
05<Xl: Confederates arrhe at poim 

about 4 rmle' 'outh. 

I~ ~lay ll7<Xl: Col. ~loor karn' of the pre:,. 

encc ot Brecl-inndgc', troops anJ 

\en<h 34th ~lassachU\Cit\ bad to 

Btl\hnng\, then recalls. 

OK<Xl I<XXl: Artilkry duel. Imboden\ 

cavalry makes fei111s to dra" out 

l\1l)(H 

100(): Brecl-inridgc decides to auacl\ . 

HXXl- 1100: Confederates deploy on 

Shidc:y', Hill and mo\ c about to gt\'C 

imprc:"ion of greater number' 

.:. 1100; IKth Connecticut. lc" three 

.:ompanle>. arrive> from Edrnburg ( 15 

milc:s) and immediately deploy,, 

(I he f1N f-ederal line wa' on the brow 

111 t\lanor'> Hill.) 

c. 1100: Confederates begin ;lttack 

preceded by 30th Virginra as skirnmh 

C'l ' · 

.:. 1140: Confederate artillery dc:plt>~s 

I rom Slurll; ·, Hill to JUst \Outh of \Jt"' 

~l;trl.et on ooth sides ot the Pike. Jao.:l. 

'on\ Batter) r.-maim "ith inlantr). 

c. 12(XJ: ,\ttad. begins through ankle· 

deep mud. 

26th Virgrnia i'> broujlht on line on 

C\lrv'lll<' we't to go down lnd1a11 llnl · 

lo\\. I hac was little Federal rc\i..,tancc 

except from the 18th Connecticut op· 

pmitc the 5 ht Virginia. 

121Xl: Sigel arn'e' on the hauldidd . 

12~0: ~ .... , ~larl.e1 is compktcl~ 

.:lt:arcd of I edcrals: one-hall hour 

Cilnnonadc ell'>UC\, c. i.\00: Imboden "ith llllh and .:!

.ld 

Virgini;t (\tsollric' and four gun' 

Clll\\C\ Smith\ Creel-. to llanl. Slithd. 

'· D-15 (onfcderat<.'' rene" attacl. in 

dri,ing ram;.torrn-mud and l.nec · 

high grilin. 

Conlcderate artillery 'et> up on north 

edge ,,f rn" n. 

c. 1415: Sigel', main line j, '<'I up. 

(~ulh,an lca'c' \\',,,,<ht <.>d. 0500, ltr· 

rn~' at \It, Jad,on c. 1030 "ith 21\th 

Ohio(- ). I 16th Ohio. and Dul'<~nt', 

llatterq 

15 l\lay l' , )42(): 54th P~llll\~h;111ia \'lllllC\ intt> 

line alter a torccd march from bi,oua<· 

at ~h. Jad.son; it had left \\'oodstod 

that morning. It fullt'"ed the 12th 

\\'c,t Virginia onto the battlefield. 

1430: Dupont\ Battery arrive' >Outh 

of Rude's llill. 

1440: Part of 5 1\t Virg1n1a and 30th 

Virginia north of Bu\hong\ north 

knee arc poumkd by l·edc:ral artillery 

and be!!in to ''"'cr ;and pull back to 

fence: \\nothon's men engage in 

'harp,h<lOtlllg 1-:lc:i,er\. 

1445: Cnnkderate line j, \lallcd <"-Cr)

-

" herl' . 

Brc.l.inridgc direct' commitment of 

\' 1\11 cadet' . 

The cadet' 1110\v' through the Bushong 

property to the north fence. lhe 26th 

Virginia fill\ 111 rc\1 of gap. 

1445: Federal cavalry charges down 

the Pil.t', into artilkry with 22d Vir-

gima on \\C\t and 2Jd Virgmta on ea\t 

llan!..,, arc C<l\ily repubcd amid \io-

lcnt 1 hunder and lightning. 12th \\e't 

Virginia Oltl\C\ up behind gum and 

34th :S1a"ao.:hu,cll\. 

One comp<II1Y of the 26th \'irgrnia 

approadte' Fcder;~l battcrie' on the 

ri,er bluff. 

1500: S1!!!cl order' charge by mfantry 

on wc>t 04th :l.la"achusctts, ht West 

Virginia. ~4th l'enn,ylvania). 

I'' \\'c,t \ ir!!lllia IIIO'C' 100 yards. i' 

halted hy Confederate fire <tnd tall' 

bao.:l.. !hi' C\pthe' 1he 541h Pcnnsyl· 

\3111:1 to encirclement in ih charge . 

for.:ing 1ts "11hJra"al. 

J41h .\la"adHI,ctt' on trthcr 'ide ,,J 

ht We,t \'irgutia ad,ancc' even far-

ther. low' 2tl(l men, and retires. 

1505: Coni'..:der;llc Wt'\t line charge'>. 

34th :'>1;1\\;tdiU'i.'lt\ l:t>lllllllle\ firing 

to gi'c artillt:n tunc to \\lthdra" (54th 

Pennsylvania cont inucs resistance 

[254 ca~ualtie~ out of 566). the highest 

of any un11 engaged.) 

Snow's Battery withdra"' fir~t with 

all guns. 

Carlin h forced to abandon three 

piece\ during withdra-wal. 

1520: Brcdinr1dgc orders the cadets 

19 
out of pursuit. "Well done Virginians, 

well done men." 

I 5 May I 530: Federal line forms on Rude's 

Hill, !16th and 28th Ohio anchor line 

west from Cedar Grove Dunker 

church. DuPont delays by platoon. 

1600: Confederates pause for an hour 

to reorganize and resupply. 

Artillery duel continues, including 

VMI section. 

c. 1730: "'"ederals continue with· 

drawal. 

c. 1900: DuPont burns Shenandoah 

Bridge. 

2100: Federals retire from Mt. Jackson to Cedar Creek . 

16 May Sigel retreats to Cedar Creek. 

17 May Breckinridge's force is entrained for 

Lee's army. 

19 May Sigel is relieved and given local command at Harpers Ferry. 

21 May David Hunter takes command of Federals at Cedar Creek. 

26 May Hunter begins advance south. 

5 Jun Hunter defeats W. E. Jones at Battle 

of Piedmont. 

17 Jun Early's Corps begins to arrive in 

Lynchburg; Breckinridge places him· 

self under Early's command. 

18 Jun Hunter is defeated at Battle of Lynchburg. 

27 Jun Early reorganizes and moves down 

Valley. 

3-4 J ul Early's forees bypa~ Harpers Ferry gar· 

nson. cross Potomac at Shepherdstown. 

8 Jul Early reachc~ 1-rcderick, Maryland; 

send~ John~on\ Cavalry Ungade to 

ra1d Balt1more and Poult Plca~ant 

Prison. 

9 Jul Early defeats Lew Wallace at Baulc of 

Monocacy. 

II Jul Early reaches Silver Spring, Mary· 

land; VI Corps arrives and oc.:cupie~ 

Washington defenses; 1st Div., XIX 

Corps, en route to Petersburg from 

New Orleans, is diverted from there to 

District of Columbia. 

12 Jul Skirmishing at Ft. Stevens, Washing· 

20 

ton, D.C.: Early makes a night with· 

drawal. 

14 Jul Early crosses Potomac at White's 

Ferry, near Leesburg, Virginia. 

18 Jul General Horatio Wright establishe~ 

contact with Early at Snicker's Gap; is 

joined by Crook of Hunter's com· 

mand. Battle of Cool Spring. 

20 JuJ f'Cderal cavalry under W. W. Averell defeats Ramseur at Stephenson's Depot. 

22 Jul Federals enter Winchester. 

22-23 Jul Early defeats Crook at Second Battle 

of Kernstown; advances and wrecks 

Maninsburg rail yards; then chases 

Crook to Williamsport, Maryland, by 

26 July. 

29 Jul VI Corps returns to Harpers Ferry 

after learning of Kernstown. 

30 Jul Confederate cavalry (John McCausland and Bradley T. Johnson) burns 

Chambersburg. Pennsylvania. Early's 

northern thrust causes almost as great 

a stir as his District of Columbia raid. 

Grant decides to defeat him and/or 

make the Valley unusable to him. 

5 Aug Grant visits Hunter at Monocacy. Feder· 

als occupy Halltown pOsitions south of 

Harpers Ferry. Early sends troops across 

Potomac at WilliamspOrt and at Shepherdstown, gathering a harvest (diversion 

to help hi\ cavalry in Pennsylvania). 

7 Aug Federal Middle Military Division is 

created under Philip Sheridan to coordinate against Early. )Included VI 

Corps (Wright). VIII Corps (Crook), 

XIX Corps (Emory), and Cavalry 

Corps (Torbert).) Month of maneuvering follows. McCausland and 

Johnson arc routed at Moorefield, 

West Virginia, by Averell. 

3 Scp Meeting engagement at Berryville between Crook and Kershaw. Kershaw's 

recall is deferred. 

4 15 Sep Skirmi~hes north and east of Winchester. 

14 Scp Kershaw's divi~ion departs for Lee's 

army. 

19 Scp Shcrid<tn defeats Early at Third Battle 

of Winchc~tcr or Opcquon: Early retreats to Fisher\ Hill. 

20 Sep Sheridan follows to Strasburg, Vir-
ginia. Picket~ on opposite \ide> ot the 

village~. 

21 Sep Breckinridgc is ordered bad; to IJe· 

panmcnt of West Virginia. 

22 Scp l'arly b defeated at Battle of Fisher'~ 

Htll and is pursued t.>vcntually 10 I lar· 

risonburg; Sheridan begins "burning" 

a' far south as Staunton, Virginia. 

Fcdcml cavalry is rcorgani1cd, with 

Mcrntl and Custer gi"en divtsion~ 

k:cr~haw and Rosser, in the \'icinity of 

Culpeper, are ordered back 10 \Upport 

Early. 

23 Scr VI and XIX Corp~ ad"anc:c from 

Wood~tock, \'Ill Corps police' bailie· 

field . Early pulls back from Narro~ 

Pas~agc to Mt. Jackson, then h 

pushed back lO Rude's Hill by Federal 

cavalry. 

24 Scp VI ami 'XI\. Corp~. m Mt. Jad"'"· 

art.· JOined by \Ill Corps. Balli~ lmc 

pre"c' Earl~ south. Bncf ,J..irmi'h 

oo:c:ur' in 'lc'' ~larkct . 

~S Scp btrh o:untmuc' ,outh to Port Rcpuh· 

ht.', is joined by Jo..cr,ha\\ ·, Dt' i'"'ll o n 

:!7 September "'ihcrio..lau arri'c' at 

llarri,onburg. 

2S Sep htrly mo'e' to Rc.•ddi'h <iap; rcllc:at 

emh. 

I <kt l·arly tak' up posit ton ;tl i\lt. Sidney, 

nud"ay bct\\oecn Staurlton and ll;uri-

'"nburg. l·cding it logi,trc:ally nnp<h· 

,jblt.· to proceed farther, Shcndan c.k· 

c:ic.k' to pull north. 

5 Oc:t <irant initially agrt.-c' to "it hdra"al 

:md Sheridan burns hi' \\ay north, hut 

<ir:uu rec:on,ider\ the rno'c 

(• Oct :>hc:mlan depart< Harri,c.mburg unJ 

.:amp' HI Rud~\ Hill that t.'\Cntng. 

7 <kt htrly'' main force rc<tdte' Ne\\ 

~larkc:t 

1\ Oct Sherro..lan at rive> at Stra,hur~. Ro"cr 

pre"''' Federal ca\'alry hard: i\1ernll 

hold' ;u lorn\ RrooK: Shcndan c.:om · 

manJ, liubert to turn ;md light, 

"either "hip the cnem1 <H get 

whipped your,eJf. ·· 

9 (},:t Bailie of Tom\ Broo~ ShcnJ;m 

\\;uc.:he' It om Round Hill The 1 ight 

la't' 1\\0 hour,, I onJa\ '' pur,ued to 

\Jr. Jad,,on, Rtl\\Cr 10 Columbta 

lurna<.:e. 

10 Oct Sheridan camp' north of Cedar 

Creel.:; turn' dtm n a plan to open 

\1ana'''h < iap Railroad . 

13 O.:r Earl) do'c' for"arJ 10 l·i,her', Htll; 

he send' a lorC.:<' w flupp\ Hill and 

cnga!~C' I hohurn·, Ui,hron ''llh artil· 

ler~ (SIIc~lcy\ F;mn). Wells' and Harri,' Urigadc' deploy ac.:ross Cedar 

Cree~; 1\<·r,h<tw \ ()j, i'ion deploy~ ol f 

Hupp', Htll, llatri'' Urigadc j, forced 

had and \\'ell' i' enfiladed by Jamc." 

Connor·, Brig;tde. \lcanw hile. C<>n· 

federate .-:1\alry on thc Bad Road 

lllilck' C u\tcr 

19 0.:; Shertdan d cl<'ilh l:arly at Bailie of 

( cdar Crt.·cJ.. . 

20 Ckt Early ret ire- Ill Ne\\ ,\larJ..cr. Sl<l)' 

there lluc~o· \\eck,, cavalry ar l.:dmhurf, rt.•infnrn:mcnt' from \ourh \\br 

Vtrgulla 

2fo Ocr Fcdcr;tl c.:<l\<tlry probe j, repul\cd at 

:\1illord in htrl Valle~ . 

9 :-.lo\ <;hcrrdan pulf, hac.:J.. to Kcrn,tow n. 

10 1'<01 £ arly rno'e' w \\'ood,wcl.: 

II "<01 Skirmi'h take\ pl.~<:e at \liddleruwn. 

12 '\m In .:a,alry ,J,;irmi'h at Ccdanille. 

Conlcderate' ill<' dcle;ucJ. 

2:! 1'-.o' In sJ..irmi,h <ll Rude', llill. l'cdcrab 

arc repulsed . 

6 - 16 Ucc L:arly\ reduced force' g<> tllltl wmtcr 

.:amp' in the \ Jl'lllll) c.•f Staunton and 

\\'ayne,hnro: (iotdon\ Corps is rrc.:allcd to Ridunuml. 

1865 

:!" Feb Sheridan pru<·o:,·<h -.>uth rrom \\'in· 

~hc,ter. 

:! ~tar Remnant' oll:;uly', Ioree arc annihilated :\I \\'a~ nc,bor<l "' cu,ter. Sheri· 

dan goc\ on h.> JOin t I ram . 

21 
VMI Cadets 

In 1839 the Virginia legislature approved replacing the guard company at 

the Lexington Arsenal with a military school. The school was intended to 

provide a source of competent militia officers, engineers, and teachers. It 

proved to be the state's greatest source of officers in 1861; of sixty-four 

regiments raised that year, twenty-two were commanded by VMI graduates. Of 

1,902 VMI matriculates from 1839 to 1865, 1,781 served in the Confederate 

Army. In April 1861 the Corps of Cadets, 200 strong, performed training 

duties in Richmond . The school resumed "normal" operations in January I 862 

with 269 cadets. The corps was called out as reserve in April and May 1862 

during Jackson's McDowell Campaign and took to the field three times in 1863 

to support resistance against Federal cavalry raids in southwest Virginia. 

Following New Market, the corps was ordered to Richmond, where it served 

briefly in the city's defenses. It returned to Lexington in June to resist Hunter's 

advance, but could do little to prevent the Federal burning of Institute facilities. 

The corps was furloughed from July to October, when it was reassembled at 

Richmond where it served again periodically in the city defenses. It was 

disbanded on 2 April 1865 on the eve of the evacuation of Richmond. The 

Institute reopened at Lexington in October 1865. 

22 

VMI Casualties 

Killed in Action: 

Cabell, William H. 

Crockett, Charb G. 

Jones, Henry J. 

McDowell, William H. 

Stanard, .Jaqueline B. 

Died of Wounds: 

Atwill, Samuel A., 20 Jul 64 

Harhfield, Alva C., 26 Jun 64 

Haynes, Luther C., c. 15 Jun 64 

Jefferson, Thomas G., 18 May 64 

Wheelwright, Joseph C., 2 Jun 64 

Wounded in Action: 

Akers, Reuben C. 

Berkeley, Edmund, Jr. 

Bradford, John E 

Buster, William D. • 

Christian. Edward D. 

Cocke, John P. 

Corling, Charles T. 

* Died of typhoid April 1865 

with corps at Richmond. 

Darden, James D. 

Dickinsen, Jesse I. 

Dillard, William, Jr. 

Garnett, Griffin T. 

Garrow, Harris W. 

Gibson, Franklin G. 

Goodwin, James H. 

Harris, Willis 0. 

Harrison, Carter H. 

Hill, Archibakl G. 

Howard, John C. 

Imboden, Jacob P. 

Johnson, Porter 

Jones. Walter S. 

Macon, George K. 

Marshall, Martin 

Mead, Henry J. 

Merrill, James L. 

Moorman, Edwin S. 

Pendleton, Robert A. 

Phillip~. Samuel T. 

Piuini, Andrew, Jr. 

Preston. James B. 
Randolph, Charles C. 

Read, Charles H.·· 

Shipp, Scott 

Shriver, Samuel S. 

Smith, Charles H. 

Smith, Edward H. 

Smith, francis L. 

Spiller, George 

Stuart, John A. 

Triplett, John R. 

Upshur, John N. 

Walker, Charles D. 

Walter, Charles P. 

Watson, William P. 

White, Thomas W. 

Whitehead, Henry C. 

Wise, John S. 

Wise, Louis C. 

Woodlief, Pierre W., Jr. 

Wyatt, John W. 

VMJ Cadets at New Market. (B. W. Clinedienst, courtesy of VM/J 

23 
Both the forces engaged were provisional, assembled from scattered forces 

operating for the most part on security 

and antiguerrilla missions. The Federals 

had been gathered from numerous isolated posts over the six weeks preceding 

the battle. Few of the units had performed before in standard brigade and 

division operations. General Sigel had 

completed assembling his forces at Martinsburg and Winchester on 29 April. He 

developed his organizational structure 

during his slow movement south. Even 

more immediately, the Confederate 

forces were gathered as the Federal plan 

revealed itself. General Breckinridge began to consolidate his forces on 7 May, 

completing his new arrangement at 

Staunton on 12 May, three days before 

the battle. 

Order of Battle 

New Market, Virginia, 15 May 1864 

U.S. Department of West 

Virginia-Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel 

First Infantry Division-Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. 

Sullivan 

1st Brigade-Col. Augustus Moor 

18th Connecticut lnfantry-Maj. Henry 

Peale 

28th Ohio lnfantry-Ll. Col. Goufricd 

Becker 

ll6th Ohio lnfamry·-Col. James Washburn 

123d Ohio lnfantry-Maj. Horace Kellogg 

2d Brigade-Col. Joseph Thoburn 

24 

1st West Virginia lnfantry-Lt. Col. Jacob 

Weddle 

12th West Virginia Infantry-Col. William 

B. Curtis 

34th Massachusetts Infantry-Col. George 

D. Wells 

54th Pennsylvania Infantry-Col. Jacob M. 

Campbell 

Order of Battle 

First Cavalry Division-Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel 

1st Brigade-Col. William B. Tibbitts 

lsi New York Cavalry (-) (Veteran)-Col. 

Robert F. Taylor 

1st New York Cavalry (Lincoln)-Lt. Col. 

Alonzo W. Adams 

lsi Maryland Cavalry (del.) (Potomac 

Home)-Mnj. J. T. Daniel 

21M West Virginia Cavalry-Maj. Charles C. 

Otis 

14th Pennsylvania Cavalry-Capt. Ashbel F. 

Duncan 

2d Brigade-Col. Jobn E. Wynkoop 

15th New York Cavalry-Maj. H. Roessler 

20th Pennsylvania Cavalry-Maj. R. B. 

Douglas 

22d Pennsylvania Cavalry (det.)-lst Ll. 

Caleb McNulty 

Anillery 

Battery B. Maryland Light (3" rifle)-Capt. 

Alonzo Snow 

30th Battery, New York (12-lb. Nap.)-Capt. 

Albert von Kleiser 

Battery D. 1st West Virginia Light (3'' 

rifle)-Capt. John Carlin 

Battery G, 1st West Virginia Light (3" 

rifle)-Capt. Chatham T. Ewing 

Battery B, Sth United States (3" 

rifle)-Capl. Henry A. DuPont 

C.S. Western Department of Virginia 

-Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge 

Infantry Division 

1st Brigade-Brig. Gen. John Echols 

22d Virginia Infantry-Col. George S. 

Patton 

23d Virginia Ballalion-Lt. Col. Clarence 

Derrick 

26th Virginia Battalion-Lt. Col. George M. 

Edgar 

2d Brigade-Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton 

30th Virginia Banalion-Lt. Col. J. Lyle 

Clark 

Slst Virginia lnfantry-Lt. Col. John P. 

Wolfe 

62d Virginia Infantry (Mtd.)-Col. George 

H. Smith 

Co. A, 1st Missouri Cavalry (Inf.)-Capt. 

Charles H. Woodson 
23d Virginia Ca,alr~ (lni.I- Col. Robert 

White 

VMI Cadcls-1 t. Col Sc:ott Shipp 

Cavalry, Valley District Brig. Gen. John D. 

Imboden 

ll\th Virginia Ca,alry- Col. George W. 

Imboden 

~1i"·· dcts. 1d ~1aryland. 23d Virginia. 43d 

Virginia (Parti,an') 

\rtiller~ \rlaj. \\'1lliam ~ld aughlin 

Chapman's (Virgmia) Bauer) (4 ho\\., 2 

riOc)- Capt. George B. Chapman 

Jad,\on\ (Virginia) Balll'ry (I rinc, 3 12-lb. 

Nap.)- lst Lt. Randolph H Blain 

\lcClanahan"s (Virginia) Baucry (2 ho" ·· 4 

nOc)-Capt . John :'>k<.'lanahan 

V~11 Section (2 riOe)- Cadct Capt. C. H . 

Minge 

Total Effectives 

Federal Forces 

Infantry 5,245 (approx. 3,750 cngagl-d) 

Cavalry 3,035 (approx. 2.000 engaged) 

Amllery (22 gum) 660 (appro\. 530 engagt-d) 

Total: 8,940 (6,280) 

Confederate Forces 

Infantry and dis· 

mounted ..:avalry 

Cavalry 

Artillery (18 guns) 

Total: 

Casualties 

4,249 (appro~. 3.800 engaged) 

735 (all engaged) 

.141 (all engaged) 

5,325 (4,876) 

l·cderal: 97 KIA, ~20 \\'lA, 225 MIA 

841 (13°'o) 

Confederate: 43 + KIA, 474 + \VIA, 3 MIA 

... 531.- (' 13°'ol 

Notes on Ordnance 

Three-Inch Ordnance Rifle 

- Fires 10-lb. proJeCtile~ (conical bolt. ca,c, 

shell, canister) 

Bore diameter, 3 " 

- Tube "eight. 820 lb, .. "rought iron 

- Range, 1.830 yd,. at 5° elevation 

- \tuuk velocity, 1215 IPS 

- Usc: Infantry 'upport in open area\, 

counterbaucry. 

12-Pound Field Gun, M/857 (Napoleon) 

- Fires 12-lb. projectile; (~olid. ca~c. shell, 

canister) 

• Bore diameter, 4.62" 

- fubc \\eight, 1227 lb~ .. bronze 

- Range. 1,619 yd,. at 5° elevation 

Muzzle velocity, 1485 f'PS 

- Usc: Clo'c inrantry suppon in wooded area,, 

final dcfcmc. 

Parrot Field Rifle, 10-pounder 

- Fires 10-lb. projectiles (conical bolt, caw, 

shell, camster) 

- Bore diameter, J " 

- Tube "eight. 890 lb\., iron 

- Range. 2,000 )'d\. at 5° elevation 

- \rluzzle vclodth 1300 FPS 

- Use: Same a\ ordnance riOe. 

Field Howitzer, 12-pounder 

- Fires 12-lb. projectile\ (solid. ca\c, \hell. 

canister) 

- Bore diameter, 4.62" 

- Tube "erght, 788 lb ... , bronze 

- Range, 1,072 yd\ . at .5° elevation 

-Muzzle ,c(ocity, 1200 rPS 

- Use: High·tffi)Cctory amipcrsonnel. 

25 
26 
New Market is located along Interstate 81 about 55 miles south of Winchester and 80 miles north of Lexington. 

Thke exit 67 (New Market) and either 

begin your tour as described below or 

visit the Virginia Military Institute Hall 

of Valor. This may be reached by turning 

right off the exit, then making an immediate right onto the Collins Parkway (CR 

619). Proceed two miles north on the 

Parkway and you will see the Hall of 

Self-Guided Tour 

Valor on your left (west). 

The 54th Pennsylvania Memorial 

was dedicated by members of the regimental association on 25 October 1905. 

It was funded jointly by the association 

and the Keystone State and placed on a 

small plot donated for the purpose. Title 

to the land was transferred from Pennsylvania to the Battlefield Park in ceremonies on 19 September 1984. 

Pennsylvania Monument 

Begin your tour at the 54th Pennsylvania 

Monument on US 11. This is located 1.5 

miles north of the center of New Market. 

It may be reached from exit 67 off 

Interstate 81 by going .4 mile east to New 

Market on CR 260 and 1.5 miles north 

on US 11. The monument is on the west 

side of the road. Park and walk to the 

monument. 

The monument marks the eastern 

limit of the final infantry line established 

by General Sigel about noon on 15 May. 

The Pennsylvania troops trotted into the 

location about 1420, less than 40 minutes before the decisive Confederate 

charge. They first occupied the low 

ground north of the monument, then 

charged south approximately 200 yards 

toward the tree line before being forced 

back. A few minutes before their charge, 

the Federal cavalry had attempted to 

advance. However, as it galloped across a 

small stone bridge to the east of the 

Pennsylvanians (70 yards northeast of 

the monument) it came under devastating artillery fire compounded by rifle fire 

from both sides of the Pike as it progressed. It was repulsed with considerable loss in a matter of minutes. 

Tllis position is about half a mile 

west northwest of 1 he position occupied 

by McClanahan's gun section set up by 

General Imboden east of Smith's Creek. 

Fire from those pieces caused the Federal 

cavalry originally located ro the southwest to pull back to the ground north of 

the monument and east of the Pike. 

From there, it later launched its ill-fated 

charge. 

Boyd's cavalry was decimated about 

.9 mile east of here on 13 May after 

emerging from New Market Gap. Captain James H. Stevensen of the New York 

Lincoln Cavalry described the fight. 

As we descended the mountains we discovered a large body of troops marching up the 

27 
Valley Pike, from Mt. Jackson towards New 

Market, and we sent word to Colonel Boyd 

who came galloping to the front. 

The colonel thought [they were friendly) and 

ordered us to advance. In a shon time we saw 

a section of artillery and some cavalry moving rapidly toward the base of the mountain, 

at a point some distance south of where we 

must strike the valley .... Colonel Boyd 

. . . seemed a little staggered, but concluded 

to proceed, observing that they must be Sigel's troops. On reaching the base of the 

mountains. we found some pickets at a little 

bridge on Smith's creek, but they were 

dressed in our uniform, and Colonel Boyd 

thought they were some of Sigel's men who 

had not been informed of our approach. 

They retired on our advancing towards them 

without attempting to fire. I sent a few men 

to push them, and they set off at full speed 

for New Market. We then held a lillie "powwow;• and it was determined to cross the 

bridge, pass down the stream and try to gain 

the turnpike in rear of the column of troops 

which we had seen marching toward New 

Market. Then, if they were the enemy, we 

could show them our heels and bid them 

defiance. We crossed the bridge, and were 

just in the act of crossing the stream, which 

makes a bend across the little valley, when the 

bluff above us, on the New Market side, 

became alive with horsemen. The next instant 

we heard the well-known "rebel yen;· accompanied with a shower of bullets and shouts of 

"Now we've got the d __ d Yankees! give 

'em h __ I!" 

The firing was so hot from the bluff, and a 

shell bursting over us at that moment. the 

men under Boyd gave way, notwithstanding 

his example or courage and coolness. 

Rude's Hill and Return 

A digression from the main tour can give 

a useful sense of the dimensions of the 

northern part of the battlefield and of 

key sites. Should you wish to do this, 

continue north 3 miles to CR 616. Thrn 

rig he , go .1 mile to the Cedar Grove 

Church. Built in 1857, this was the structure noted by Sigel from Bushong's Hill, 

around which the 28th and l16th Ohio 

regiments were forming. By 1600 on 15 

May they had set up a line of battle just 

north of the church on the slope of 

Rude's Hill. Sigel directed his forces on 

Bushong's Hill to rally on the church. 

Return . t mile to US 11 and the Cedar 

Grove Cemetery. 

The Federal units fleeing Bushong's 

HiU rallied in this area before withdrawing farther north. DuPont's Battery set 

up on the south side of the cemetery 

28 

after its masterful withdrawal and engaged Confederate guns a mile away, 

which were located in an orchard now 

marked approximately by CR 767 crossing over Interstate 81. 

The cemetery contains the graves of 

many notable local persons including 

those of Col. John F. Neff, who commanded the 33d Virginia Infantry of the 

Stonewall Brigade before being killed at 

Second Manassas. His house is the brick 

building .8 mile northwest by road down 

US 11, then west on CR 730 to just west 

of the Shenandoah on the way to Interchange 68 of Interstate 81. Instead of 

turning on CR 730, if you go north 

another . 1 mile from the junction with 

US 11, on the west side o f the road you 

will see the Rude House and farm. Built 

before 1792, this was used as a headquarters by Stonewall Jackson in April 1862 
Cedar Grove Dunker Church, 1920. (Wayland) 

and by the Federal David Hunter in June 

1864. In October 1864, Capt. John H. 

McNeil was mortally wounded in a cavalry fight on Meem's Bottom, which 

stretches to the north. He was brought to 

the house where later he was interviewed 

by General Sheridan. Sheridan recognized McNeil's condition and left him 

alone. The dying Confederate later was 

removed to Harrisonburg where he expired. Meem's Bottom saw considerable 

cavalry fighting throughout the war. In 

April 1862, Jackson's men camped in the 

area. Later, Federal Brig. Gen. James 

Shields deployed his entire division 

across the Bottom as he maneuvered 

against Jackson's rear guard. In the 

course of Shields' advance, Turner Ashby's white charger, "lbm Telegraph:' was 

mortally wounded while Ashby tried Lo 

destroy the bridge. The gallant animaJ 

managed to carry his master out of 

danger up the Pike to a mile below New 

Market before collapsing. The Bottom 

was a camp site for Jubal Early's Division in November 1863. Early used "Mt. 

Airy" on Smilh's Creek to the east for 

his headquarters. The approximately 

1,500 men captured at Waynesboro 

camped on the Bottom under guard on 

6-8 March 1865 waiting for the water 

levels to drop sufficiently ro be able to 

ford the Shenandoah. While they were 

here, the remnants of Rosser's cavalry 

attacked Federal positions on Rude's Hill 

in a vain attempt to liberate the prisoners. 

Return from CR 730 3.6 miles to tbe 

54th Pennsylvania Monument. En route 

about .1 mile sou th of the cemetery, 

notice the stone marker in the field. 

This is a memorial to Cap. George 

W. Summers and Sgl. Newton Koontz of 

Page County. They were shot on 27 June 

1865 on this spot by order of a Lieutenant Colonel Huzzy of Ohio. The men 

had come over on business and did not 

29 
have the necessary parole documentation. Their execution was an unwarranted atrocity. 

Continue toward the Pennsylvania monument; as you drive south, you will pass 

the positions taken by DuPont's two gun 

platoons late on 15 May. The second 

position occupied by 2d Lt. Charles Holman's section was on the west side of US 

11 opposite the point where CR 732 joins 

US II . The position occupied by 2d Lt. 

Benjamin Nash's section is .3 mile farther south, east of the Pike opposite the 

large chicken house. Another .2 mile 

south marks Sgt. Samuel Southworth's 

position east of the Pike just south of the 

modern farm lane. Finally, Lieutenant 

Holman's first position is .18 mile closer 

to the monument on the west side of the 

Pike, about where the modern restaurant 

is located. Continue the remaining .375 

mile back to the monument. 

St. Matthew's ~ Lutheran Church "-:J 

From the 54th Pennsylvania Monument, 

drive south on US 11 1.5 miles to the 

parking lot of St. Matthew's Lutheran 

Church. In .4 mile you will come to two 

motels. These motels mark the final 

Confederate artillery positions. Breckin54th Pennsylvania Monument, 1987. (@ 

J. W.A. Whitehome) 

30 

ridge deployed his guns on the ridge east 

of the Pike that extends northeast toward 

Smith's Creek. Ten guns under the command of Maj. William McLaughlin, including the two-gun cadet section, 

brought heavy fire on the Federal line 

and were instrumental in stopping the 

Union cavalry charge. Continue .3 mHe 

to a point opposite the closed Battlefield 

Gift Shop. A modem natural wood 

house is west of US 11. This marks the 

point about where Captain von Kleiser's 

New York gunners first set up to support 

Colonel Moor's forward line. The position also marks the eastern side of the 

intermediate line occupied by the 18th 

Connecticut and 123d Ohio after they 

pulled north from the River Road. One 

of von Klciser's guns was disabled here, 

its wheel knocked off by Confederate 

fire, and had to be abandoned. Continue 

.1 mile to the Shenandoah Retiremenl 

Home. This was the home of Capt. W. 

H. Rice who raised the ShenandoahPage Battery, which he commanded until 

losing a leg at Cross Keys in June 1862. 

The house was built by his father, Dr. 

John Rice, in 1834. The building also 
Rice's Barn, 1920. (Wayland) 

was used as a headquarters by General 

Shields during the 1862 campaign. A 

barn stood until 1926 north of the house 

where the white townhouses are now. It 

was one of the main hospitals after the 

battle. Continue .3 mile to St. Matthew's 

Lutheran Church, turn west, .I mile into 

the church parking lot, and stop. The 

Federal dead from the battle were buried 

hastily in a field along US 11 between the 

church and Rice's House, because the 

local citizens did not want them in consecrated ground. They were later reinterred more substantially by Federals in 

June, then removed to Staunton after the 

war. 

Snow's Maryland Batter} set up in 

the cemetery area late on 14 May. Early 

on 15 May, Captain Snow sent a section 

forward to about where the fast food 

restaurant is located cast of the Interstate 

66 Interchange. This position was so 

dominated by Breckinridge's artillery on 

Shirley's Hill that the Federal gunners 

pulled back to their posll1ons by the 

church. The 34th Massachusetts was in 

line to the cast of this location on the 

other side of US II until it began its 

odyssey. Later. Major Mclaughlin's guns 

moved up to a po!;ition in the vicinity of 

the present school a bit farther east. West 

of the parking lot a small lane may be 

seen heading towards the interstate. This 

is the last vestige of River Road, another 

trace of which can be found west of the 

interstate. The I st West Virginia set up 

along this road from about the west side 

of the parking lot to a point midway to 

the interstate. The 123d Ohio extended 

the line to just past the interstate. Ewing's West Virginia Battery set up on the 

high ground. It was later joined, early on 

15 May, by the 18th Connecticut, which 

formed line westward from the 123d 

Ohio. The Federals were completely 

driven from this entire line by 1230 on 15 

May. 

31 
32 
An obelisk in the middle of the cemetery 

marks the Confederate burial ground. 

Also, at the entrance to the church area, 

by US ll, is a post containing a conical 

bolt fired by a Federal battery. Allegedly, 

Breckinridgc and his staff clustered on 

US 11 were the targets of this shot. No 

harm was done other than scattering the 

group with splinters. The house on the 

opposite side of the lane was built in 

1790 and was the home of Confederate 

veteran George M. Neese, author of the 

memoir Three Years in the Confederate 

Horse Artillery. 

Drive from here to the Shenandoah Valley Tourist Association Building west of 

Interchange 67. 

New Market Valley 0 

From St. Matthew's Lutheran Churcht 

drive .3 mile to the traffic light at CR 260 

(Old Cross Roads). En route, one block 

south of the church on the east at the 

corner of US 11 and Seminary Road is a 

building which was occupied by the Federal provost marshal during Reconstruction. At the crossroads, notice the large 

building on the southeast corner. This 

was the Lee-Jackson Hotel, the home of 

Dr. Joseph B. Strayer at the time of the 

battle. Stonewall Jackson reviewed his 

men from this corner in May 1862 as 

they turned east, bound for the New 

Market Gap. In the falL of 1864, the 

building was used as a headquarters by 

Maj. Gen. Jubal Early. Turn west onto 

CR 270 and proceed .4 mile under the 

Interstate and turn left (south) into the 

parking lot of the Shenandoah Valley 

Tourist Association. (You are back by 

Interchange 67.) This is the New Market 

Valley referred to earlier. South of the 

parking lot is Shirley's Hill over which 

Wharton's Brigade came, while to the 

north is Manor Hill on which the 18th 

Connecticut skirmishers deployed. 

Northwestward is some low ground 

bounded by Manor H ill and another hill 

with some houses on it. This is Indian 

Hollow down which Lt. Col. George M. 

Edgar's 26th Virginia Battalion advanced. 

The 30th and 51st Virginia dashed 

over the brow of Shirley's Hill and down 

into this area. As they pressed forward, 

Edgar's Battalion and the VMI cadets 

then marched over Shirley's Hill in formation, offering a target for the Federal 

artillery. The first five VMI casualties 

were sustained on the northern slope of 

the hill. When they got to the bottom 

into the little valley, they grounded their 

packs along the road and watched the 

first wave press the Federals north, then 

followed in reserve. 

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Shipp, 

Commandant of Cadets, described the 

situation. 

As Whanon's line ascended a knoll it came in 

full view of the enemy's batteries, which 

opened a heavy fire, but not having gotten 

the range, did but little damage. By the time 

the second line reached the same ground the 

Yankee gunners had gotlen the exact range, 

and their fire began to tell on our line with 

fearful accuracy. It was here that Captain Hill 

and others fell. Great gaps were made 

through the ranks, but the cadet, true to his 

discipline, would close in to the center to fill 

the interval and push steadily forward. The 

alignment of the battalion under this terrible 

fire which strewed the ground with killed and 

wounded for more than a mile on open 

33 
View of Shirley's Hill from St. Matthew's Lutheran Church. (7lmzer) 

View of Battlefield, looking north from Shirley's Hill, 1888. (courtesy of Coiner Rosen) 

34 
ground, would have been creditable even on a 

field da)'. 

The cadets held briefly along CR 

260 and prepared 10 advance. Captain 

Frank Preston observed, 

Marching down the first hill we were exposed 

to the enemy's batteries, but were too far to 

reply with arm~. In thi~ advance one man was 

killed in the first line, and several wounded in 

our Battalion .... After getting to the bottom of the hill we were entirely covered, and 

here we waited half an hour, while some 

change was made in the lines. A half hour of 

intense suspense-the artillery on either side 

firing-the shot and shell flying and bursting 

high over our heads-knowing that in a short 

time we must charge the infantry, whose dark 

lines we saw drawn up in the 

woods. . .. After some time the first line 

began to move forward up the hill. . . . Then 

the o;ccond line began to move, and our nerves 

were strung and our lips firmly closed, our 

breath coming short and quick, waiting for the 

crash of musketry which we expected would 

receive the first line. 

The cadets eventually headed north 

in support or the battle, as described by 

Cadet John C. Howard. 

We now marched on down the hill in front, 

which was a right steep one. There was a road 

at the bottom, and just beyond the road a 

fence. Crossing this fence we were halted and 

ordered to take off blankets and everything 

else except gun and equipment. This looked 

like business, stripping for the fight, and we 

began to think our work was really cut out 

for us. "Attention, Battalion! Forward!" 

fhis was the beginning of that longascending field, the main theater of the fight. 

The ascent at fir~t was steeper than it afterwards became, but in a very little while we 

were within range of the Federal infantry as 

well as artillery as they directed their fire 

against the line. I heard the hiss of the bullets 

and saw where they had struck the ground in 

different directions, right, left, and in front, 

but I was a green hand, and didn't know that 

this meant we were among the Minie balls. A 

few minutes after being under fire we were 

halted, and the corps commenced marking 

time; but as we lay down almost in~tant y for 

a few seconds. a cadet near me remarked: 

"What damn fool gave the order to mark 

time under this fire." We were up again 

almost instantly, and then forward. We could 

clearly hear the firing of the Southern artillery over our heads, and hoped it would 

silence some of the hostile guns in front 

-which, in a measure, it did. 

Williamson's Hill 

It is possible if you arc in a private 

automobile to drive to the final assembly 

areas of Wharton's Brigade. occupied 

before the attack. Thrn south from the 

Tourist Association parking lot and 

drive .8 mile along CR 619, which parallels the Interstate. Go to the first dirt 

dri,·eway on your left, just before the 

white frame house. Make a "U" turn in 

the driveway and halt on the side of the 

road. The driveway is a private road; do 

not block it, and be alert to traffic as you 

turn. Your route has taken you along one 

side of Shirley's Hill and behind it. 

The Confederates left US I I about a 

half mile southeast of this point and 

marched to the southern base of Shirley's Hill. The 30th Virginia Battalion 

and 51st Virginia advanced north onto 

the slope of the hill and moved around to 

give the impression of greater strength. 

The cadets took up a position along the 

fence line extending cast from the driveway where you turned. The 26th Virginia 

Battalion took up the line farther east, 

out onto the flats extending to the Pike, 

where it linked with Echol's Brigade. 

35 
Col. George S. Smith, 62d Virginia (New 

Market Battlefield Park) 

Breckinridge came up to this part of the 

line and encouraged the cadets, as recalled by Cadet Howard. 

We were ascending the slope of the long hill 

with the ridge in view, and our next stopping 

place was after crossing a fence several 

range of all hostile fire. At this point the 

Confederate lines began their advance. 

. . . When the cadet battalion reached this 

position by the fence, it was put in to fill a 

space, and became then part of the second 

line of battle, halting with the other troops 

while 1 hey watched the advance of the first 

line of battle over the ridge in front. Just at 

this point, General Breckinridge, in command of the Southern troops, rode up with 

his staff and halted ncar. He was greeted with 

something of a cheer, and said to the battalion of cadets: "Young gentlemen, I hope 

there will be no occasion to use you. but if 

there is, I trust you will do your duty." The 

instant thought in my mind was: "What do 

you mean by that? Here we are, a part of the 

second line, and if it advances, we will have 

to advance with it." My thoughts, however, 

had nothing to do with the situation, and I 

was engaged, like the rest, in watching the 

advance on the first line of battle, some 

hundreds of yards away, that was moving over 

the high crest of the hill. We had heard in 

some way that the range from point to point 

of artillery had been obtained by the Federals 

all along where they thought the baLLie was 

likely to be fought. This was probably true. 

At any rate it was true as to that particular 

hill, and we saw the bursting of a number of 

shells as the first line passed over. I think 

there was but little damage done by this fire. 

hundred yards below this ridge and out of the Return .8 mile to the Tourist Association. 

Thrn north from the Tourist Association 

parking lot, proceed across CR 270, past 

the cannon, and go .68 mile to the 

second entrance of the picnic area. Once 

across CR 270, you are on the Collins 

Parkway, which leads eventually to the 

VMI Museum. 

When you reach the crest of Manor 

Hill, .2 mile from CR 270, notice the 

buildings on the west. The 18th Connecticut skirmishers set up along here for36 

Picnic Area 0 

ward of the empty restaurant building. 

As quoted from Maj. Henry Peale, 18th 

Connecticut, 

We here awaited the approach of the enemy, 

whose skirmishers in double line could be 

seen issuing from the woods covering his 

position. The artillery duel still continued 

with considerable vigor, and the enemy 

shelled our line with great accuracy, although 

without inflicting any considerable damage. 

Companies A & B were immediately de-
ployed, and descended the hill. Severe .skirmi\hing shortly ensued. 

The enemy in three strong lines, now issued 

from the wood~ and charged down the hill at 

double quick, his skirmishers also increasing 

their step and driving ours more rapidly. 

It was at thi!> time decided that a small knoll, 

some 200 yards to the rear, would afford a 

better position, especially for the artillery, 

which could innict greater damage upon the 

enem)' who would be forced to pass over an 

eighth of a mile of nearly level ground before 

reaching our lines. The line accordingly 

marched in retreat. 

And as Maj. R. F. Lang, 1st West Virginia, recalled, 

In the center just on the left of the Valley 

turnpike through my strong field glasses I 

beheld an unfamiliar sight for the battlefield, 

a body of several hundred with bright uniforms. shining swords, . . . polished buttons, and handsome nags .. • kept the 

alignment perfect ... on came the line, 

and on came the bright uniforms. 

Another .3 mile will take you to the 

vestiges of River Road that have survived 

west of the interstate. Notice that you are 

on a parallel with St. Matthew's 

Lutheran Church, whose spire you can 

see to the east. This marks the western 

part of Colonel Moor's line and was held 

by the remainder of the 18th Connecticut. Ewing's guns were about 100 yards 

west down River Road. In his official 

report Major Peale stated, 

The new position of the regiment was most 

unfortunate ... being in a lane backed by 

barns and two rows of fence. A continuous 

rain of 5 days had rendered traveling on other 

than the roads extremely difficult, and the 

men stood knee deep in mud. As the lane was 

entered by the flank, so nothing but a flank 

movement could extricate the regiment in 

order. Companies A & B [skirmishing forward) were now strengthened by Company 0, 

leaving only 4 companies in line, in all somewhat less than 200 men. 

The skirmishers of the enemy now appeared 

on the brow of the hill and rapid firing 

ensued. . . . As our skirmishers retired 

around our nank, the line fired several volleys, when it became apparent that the line of 

the enemy greatly outnumbered our 

own . . . the order to retreat . . . was followed [starting on left brigade]. The regiment, marching by the flank at a double 

quick, on emerging from the lane found itself 

some distance in rear of the retreating line 

and was thereby thrown into some confusion, 

but with some exception!. the men were raJlied, and were reformed. 

And as Adjutant E. B. Culver, 18th 

Connecticut, wrote, 

It was no wonder there was some confusion 

in the retreat, the ground being in horrible 

condition; the mud so deep from previous 

rains that it was almost impossible to keep in 

line when no hasty movement was required. 

And to add to the confusion the rain began to 

pour again in torrents, greatly retarding the 

progress. 

A final .2 mile brings you to the picnic 

grounds maintained by the VMJ Museum. Pull in here and park. Looking 

east, you have a good view of the New 

Market Gap, Rice House, and the school 

that marks the area of McLaughlin's 

next-to-last artillery position. A few 

yards south, in the other part of the 

picnic area, the cadets sustained two 

more casualties, while another two were 

incurred about 50 yards to the northwest 

of where you are. The area was swept by 

intense federal artillery fire. According 

to Cadet Howard, 

Fifty yards or so to our right was a Confederate officer who had been wounded and was 

lying nearly prostrate on the ground. Not 

quite, however; he was resting on his left 

elbow, and, forgetful of self, apparently 

oblivious of his wounds, his handsome young 

face shone brightly and his sword waved from 

side to side in sympathetic encouragement of 

his comrades. Another shell exploded and he 

was cut down for the second time. Prostrate 

now, and with the "Last Roll Call" sounding 

in his ears, the heroic soul still waved (his 

37 
sword] back and forth under the selfrenunciatory impulse of the life leaving the 

earth and to its acclaim in heaven. lf it may 

be so vouchsafed, I pray that I may meet this 

knight of the bloody plain there on the 

bloodless plain hereafter, amid the vales of 

verdure and glades of ever-flowing green, and 

let him gather from my face how he has been 

borne for more than half a century in the 

breast of one, at least, in cherishing, revering 

admiration . 

What effect that waving sword may have had 

as a cheering incentive on anyone else-for 

many beside myself must have witnessed the 

incident-! do not know, but I know there 

was no giving back as we pressed forward 

through the storm. 

Battlefield Park 

Drive north from the picnic area .S mile 

to the gate to New Market Battlefield 

Park. En route, at .2 mile, notice the 

unpainted outbuilding and the nearby 

green mileage marker on the east side of 

the interstate. These are on a line with 

von Kleiser's first position, which you 

visited earlier. The 18th Connecticut and 

123d Ohio briefly formed a line along 

this area and delayed the Confederate 

advance. First Lieutenant Charles M. 

Keyes recorded, 

... slowly we began to retire-taking our 

cannon back through a cedar thicket, our 

pathway marked with the blood of our 

braves. As they appeared over the eminence 

we had lately occupied, they poured in upon 

us such a storm of shot and shell, so thick 

that the very air seemed alive with bullets. On 

passing through here on our way up the valley 

a monrh later, we examined this spot, and 

found scarce a tree or bush unmarked, showing that the fire at this point must have been 

severe indeed. 

On the crest of the hill beyond another stand 

was made, which checked their advance for a 

short time, but soon we were again compelled 

to fall back, this time pretty badly shattered. 

Major Kellogg, commanding the regiment, 

had his horse shot from under him and 

received quite a severe wound himself. He, 

however, was supplied with another horse by 

the officer commanding a battery near at 

hand, and again rallying his command, 

38 

which fell back in good order. 

Continue .3 mile to the museum gate. 

You can turn west .2 mile to the museum 

and visit that now, or continue .IS mile 

straight abead to the white Bushong 

House and visit the museum at the end 

of your tour. Park in the space available 

adjacent to the Bushong House. 

The next part of the tour will consist 

David H. Strother (MH/) 
Busho11g House, 1911. (7i~rner) 

of a 1.2-mile walk around the final battle 

area. Before starting this, a tour of the 

Bushong House and its grounds would 

be of interest. 

Bushong House. The Bushong family 

migrated in 1731 from Switzerland to 

Pennsylvania and were established in the 

New Market area by about 1810. The 

main house, open to visitors today, was 

built about 1825. The family endured the 

engagement in the house, taking refuge 

in the ground floor kitchen, and after 

the battle both house and barn were 

temporary hospitals. The family's kindness toward Federal wounded led to their 

outbuildings' being spared during the 

later Federal "burning." Acquired by 

VMI alumnus George R. Collins in 1944, 

the property was bequeathed to the Virginia Military Institute in 1964 to become the nucleus of the battlefield park. 

Jackson's Battery, 62d Va. 0 

From the Bushong House parking lot, 

walk about 60 yards southeast to a point 

between the blacksmith shop and Inter· 

state 81. About 30 yards south of you, 

note the single gun. It denotes the approximate final location of Jackson's 

Battery, which followed in direct support 

of the advancing Confederate infantry. 

General Breckinridge observed events 

around the Bushong House from a point 

several hundred yards to the southwest, 

closer to US I I. 

39 
VMI 

Looking directly north you will see a 

shallow gully beginning near rhe Bushong House parking lot. It is intercepted 

by the interstate but continues eastward 

about 250 yards toward US II. Colonel 

George S. Smith's 62d Virginia, with 

Captain Charles H. Woodson's Co. A, 

I st Missouri Cavalry attached, moved 

through the gully to the ridge about 200 

yards to the north . There, the regiment 

hit a wall of Federal artillery and infantry fire and fell back 10 the relative 

shelter offered by the gully. Colonel 

George H. Smith. 62d Virginia Mounted 

infantry, recalled, 

When we rea~hcd the line of the fence beyond 

Bushong's house. the right of the 51st Regiment became exposed to a heavy fire from the 

enemy's line, and the regiment halted and 

commenced firing. The 62d continued to 

advance, and on passing the slight elevation 

in front of it and reaching the depression 

beyond came under the close concentrated 

40 

54th Pennsylvania 

Monument 

\. 

artillery and infantry fire of the Federal line, 

losing in a very few minutes over two hundred 

of the men. The whole loss of the regiment in 

the fight was two hundred and forty-one out 

of an aggregate of about five hundred, including seven of the captains. These, it 

should be mentioned, were eleven in all, 

including Captain [Woodson!. commanding 

a company of Missourians, which had been 

temporarily assigned to us, which did good 

service and suffered severely. Seeing it impos-

~ible to effect anything with the remaining 

two hundred and fifty or two hundred and 

sixty men, I ordered the regiment to fall back, 

which it did, halting after passing the elevation referred to and immediately re-forming 

and upon the 22d Regiment coming on it~ 

left, and advancing with it. 

Cpl. Conrad Currence, G. Co., 62d Va., was 

killed trying to grab his colors. Of the II 

companies making up the regiment, seven 

lost their commanders. 100 out ol 442 men 

were lost in this ravine. The fire was the 

hottest I was ever under. 

Farther west, the 30th and 51st Vir-
Ground Crossed by 62d Virginia. (1ltrner) 

ginia were having an equally bad time. 

The men had forged their way forward 

against the Federal fire through the Bushong property to a fence on its north side. 

The intense fire proved too much for 

many of them and they began to drift 

back to the greater sheller offered on the 

south side of the Bushong buildings. 

General Breckinridge noticed this and 

ordered his aide, Maj. Charles Semple, 

to go over and restore order. Semple 

pointed to the cadets standing in reserve 

in what is now the open field between the 

museum building and the Bushong 

House and asked, "General, why don't 

you put the cadets in line? They will 

fight as well as our men?" Breckinridge 

replied, "No, Charley, this will not do, 

they are only children and r cannot expose them to such a fire as our center will 

receive." Semple ran over and found the 

situation irretrievable. He came back to 

Breckinridge and said, "General, it is too 

late. The Federals are right on us. If the 

cadets are ordered up we can close the 

gap in our center." Breckinridge then 

ordered: "Major, order them up and 

God forgive me for the order." Cadet 

John H. Upshur described the VMI 

Corps' movement forward. 

On the northern border of this field and to our 

front, stood Bushong's house, beyond which 

was an apple orchard. The enemy had slowly 

fallen back and taken up a third position several 

hundred yards beyond this house. On reaching 

the house, the ranks divided, A and B Companies passing to the right of the house, and C 

and D Companies to the left; A and B marking 

time until the other half came up and the line 

was reformed. 

Cadet Willis 0. Harris recalled in a 1909 

letter to Cadet Capt. Henry A. Wise, 

In passing over the ground occupied by the 

farm-house . . . and its outhouses and orchard, we were thrown into disorder, especially in geuing over a picket fence. 

41 
Bushong's Orchard 

.. 

~- Bushong Orchard, 1911. (Turner) 

Walk one hundred yards from near the 

blacksmith shop back through the parking lot north on the road until you are 

about halfway past the orchard. The 

experience in the orchard was described 

vividly by Cadet Howard. 

We were halted in an inclosure surrounding a 

dwelling, and ordered to lie down just in 

from of the house. It would have been more 

satisfactory to my inner feelings had we been 

behind the house. I look back upon that 

orchard as the mo.!ot awful spot on the battle 

field, and, as the shot and sheU tore over and 

around us, I was reminded by their malignant 

shriek of the driving snowstorm, whose 

42 

flakes I could see, and marveled not at the 

number hit, but that all were not killed. Lying 

next to me was Edward B. Smith, who was 

struck by a spent ball, though we did not 

know at the time it was spent. I heard it 

strike-the hip, I believe-and the sound was 

as if some one had struck an empty cask with 

a hammer. 1 was glad that no contemporary 

laden messenger treated me in similar fashion. Ross-next to my other side-spoke to 

Smith, asking if he were wounded. But there 

was no time for more than the affirmative 

reply when an order came to move. A crisis 

had been reached: the fire was too hot for 

irresponsive action, and retreat or advance 

was the alternative. We considered a retreat 
no part of the game, and "forward" was the 

order. We were halted for some reason before 

climbing the fence of the inclosure. I saw a 

cedar tree a yard high or thereabout, with a 

trunk as big as my thumb. Not a very effective defensive, but, no matter. anything from 

a white oak to a wheat straw was better than 

nothing, and I threw myself down behind it. 

One of the company, Ashleigh, apparently 

concluded that if a tree of that dimension 

could protect one person it might perhaps be 

stretched to protect two, and threw himself 

down full length on my body. A bullet tried 

to lind us, but fortunately failed, cutting the 

trousers of both without touching the leg of 

either. Ashleigh escaped also the rest of the 

day. ln the darkening light I gave him a drink 

from my canteen, and told him of Randolph's 

wound. 1 remember the emotion his countenance expressed. Randolph, whose wound we 

then thought fatal, was very generally popular in the Corps, and he and Ashleigh had 

been intimates. And now once more forward. 

The first thing to do was climb the fence, 

which impressed itself on me so indelibly as 

never to have been forgouen. It was an 

ordinary rail fence, probably about four feet 

high but as I surmounted the topmost rail r 

felt at least ten feet up in the air and the 

special object of hostile aim. But in clearing 

this obstruction 1 was leaving all thought of 

individuality behind. 

Woodson's Monument 

Continue north about 20 yards until you 

are on the north side of the tree shading 

the smaU monument. The modest Missouri monument was built in May 1905 

by two former members of Woodson's 

command, at their own expense. You are 

standing on the final line held by the 

Confederates preparatory to their successful charge. Once over the orchard 

fence, the cadets Jay down for about 

fifteen minutes, and for the first time in 

their long advance they were able to 

return the Federal fire. The rain and 

smoke by this time made visibility difficult. Colonel J. H. Waddell, 12th West 

Virginia, described what could be seen 

from the Federal side. 

At a given order they fell flat on the ground, 

and we could see nothing but a gray streak 

across that meadow. Directly they arose on 

their knees, and immediately a streak of fire 

and smoke flashed across that field, and the 

bullets new thick and fast through our ranks. 

The Federal line was stretched from 

east to west about 350 yards to the north 

of this position. The guns on the hill to 

the northwest symbolize the batteries of 

Snow and Carlin. The single piece by the 

lone tree marks the location of von 

Kleiser's Battery. The seventeen pieces 

Sigel arrayed on the slope extended from 

the top of the hill at least down to the 

single gun. Directly in front of this point 

and extending east to the interstate is the 

pan of the line occupied by the 34th 

Massachusetts. It approached to within 

about 100 yards of this spot in its unsuccessful charge. 

Its repulse marked the start of the 

Confederate assault. Lieutenant Colonel 

Scott Shipp described the fortunes of the 

corps during this period. 

The advance was thus continued until having 

passed Bushong's house, a mile or more 

beyond New Market, and still to the left of 

the main road the enemy's batteries, at 250 or 

300 yards, opened upon us with canister and 

case-shot, and their long lines of infamry 

were put into action at the same time. The 

fire was withering. It seemed impossible that 

any living creature could escape; and here we 

sustained our heaviest loss, a great many 

being wounded and numbers knocked down, 

43 
stunned, and temporarily disabled. I was here 

disabled for a time, and the command devolved upon Captain H. A. Wise, Company 

A. He gallantly passed toward. We had before this gotten into the from line. 

Continue north from this point about 

320 yards to the end of the lane. En 

route, notice the deep basin in the field 

west of the road. This area was planted 

in knee-high wheat at the time of the 

battle and the ground was totally saturated by the extended rains. The muddy 

surface restricted the men to a slow walk 

and sucked their footwear off as they 

struggled forward, hence the name for 

the area: "Field of Lost Shoes." As 

described by Capt. Frank Preston in the 

Lexington Gazette, 25 May 1864, 

The mud, which in many places was over the 

ankles, made it impossible to advance faster 

than at a walk, and the enemy's artillery had 

fair range all the while. 

Cadet Wyndham Kemp recalled in a 

letter to Brig. Gen. James M. Goggin, 

We had to cross a ploughed field where the 

mud was up to our ankles. Here I remember 

that one of my shoes pulled off in the mud, 

and I went through the rest of the "row" with 

nothing on one foot but a sock, and I'm 

prepared to "Make affidavit" that there 

wasn't much of that. 

Again, in the Gazette, Captain Preston 

recalled, 

In the advance of this third position, we were 

subjected to a terrible fire of artillery. When 

within four hundred yards of their line three 

of our boys feU dead from the explosion of 

one sheii-Cabell, Jones, and Crockett, and 

fifty yards further on McDowell, from my 

company, fell pierced through the hean with 

a buiJet. 

Cadet Gideon Davenport later recounted 

to Capt. Preston Cocke, 

The bursting of shells about us was incessant, 

Sigel's Hill and Field of Lost Shoes, looking north from Bushong's Orchard, 191J. 

(TUrner) 

44 
one of these passing directly through our 

colors .... About this time we passed a 

group of wounded soldiers who cheered us, 

but a shell, intended for us, burst in their 

midst, and they were silent. Suddenly there 

wa~ a crash in our from-a great gap appeared in our ranks, and 1st Sergeant W. H. 

Cabell, privates Wheelwright, Crockett, and 

Jones fell dead, and others were wounded. 

The opening was immediately closed, and the 

line went forward in the best of order. Noth· 

ing could have been finer done. 

Cadet Kemp continued to General Goggin, 

I remember here a circumstance that we, the 

Cadets, thought nothing of, believing it unusual under like conditions, but which some 

of the old soldiers, who saw it, afterwards 

applauded. In advancing under heavy fire of 

shells and shot over the uneven and muddy 

ground, the wings of our battalion pushed 

forward, making our line crescent-shaped. In 

order to correct this our commandant gave 

the order he was used to give us on the 

parade-ground at drill, that is to "mark 

time''; and this we did under fire, until the 

command "forward" was given. 

Von Kleiser's Position, Q 

34th Massachusetts V 

Continue walking the 320 yards to the 

end of the lane and parking area. Pause 

inside the split-rail fence on the gravel 

path leading toward the artillery pieces. 

You arc slightly forward of the western 

nank position of the 34th Massachusetts 

Infantry. The regiment took position in 

the slight hollow just to the north of this 

point. Von Kleiscr's five guns were in 

position close to where the single piece 

stands today. Colonel George D. Wells 

and Lt. Col. William S. Lincoln, the 

34th Massachusetts commander and second in command, described the regiment's experience in this area, according 

to lincoln, 

While the regiment was awaiting the advance 

of the enemy, the men of Moore's [sic) line 

carne back "on the double quick, some of 

them running through and over our lines." 

The advance of the Rebels. before which 

Moore's line had given way, was steady and 

continued. The air was filled with bullets and 

buNing $hells; but, as yet, we had sustained 

no harm. Colonel Wells took his position at 

the left, sending Lieut. Colonel Lincoln up to 

the right of the Regiment. Now Company G, 

Capt. leach, was detached. and sent forward 

as skirmishers to cover our front. "It went 

forward, deploying about 200 yards in advance, with a precision and steadiness ne.,.·er 

surpassed on drill"; but, upon reaching the 

crest of the hill, was recalled, and, passing 

through our lines, formed in rear of their 

proper place in regimental line. Spent bullets 

were falling thickly among and around us, 

but inflicting no injury. Now, from some 

unexplained cause, the 12th Virginia opened 

fire, over the heads of our men, causing the 

first casualties of the day; and it was only by 

the most active efforts of Gen. Sigel, and our 

own Lieutenant Colonel, who rode among 

their lines to aid their own officers, that the 

seeming demoralization of this command 

was checked, and order restored. 

And as Colonel Wells stated in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 

The officers, in the line, were giving their 

orders in low tones: and every man stood, his 

gun at the ready, his finger on the trigger, 

waiting to see the face of his foe. It was a 

marvel to me then, and is now, how men, 

who almost never before had heard the Rebel 

yell, and the terrible din of the battlefield, 

could be so entirely calm and self-possessed. 

Soon, our men in front were, by the confusion. cleared away, the Rebel lines were 

plainly seen, and the battle began. Our front 

fire was heavy; and the Artillery had an 

45 
46 
Col. George W. Wells, 34th Massachusetts 

Infantry (Miller) 

enfilading fire, under which their first line 

went down. They staggered, went back, and 

their whole advance halted. Their fire ceased 

to be effective. A cheer run along our line, 

and the first success was ours. I gave the 

order to "cease firing." 

In a letter to the Reverend Mr. James H. 

Smith, 10 March 1888, published in the 

Richmond State, Lincoln remembered, 

I well recollect even now our own position, 

Lhe field of battle, and the appearance of 

each army. We were upon the right of the 

infantry line; to our right, upon ground 

slightly elevated, a six-gun battery. The Sixtysecond Virginia, which formed the extreme 

left of the attacking force, advanced directly 

against us. To the right of the Sixty-second 

were the cadets. The line of advance was a 

little diagonal to that of our formation, and 

as it was continued the Sixty-second passed 

beyond and the cadets came directly to our 

front. Our fire, both that of artillery and 

infantry, was rapid and continuous, and, 

when the battery opened with canister, was 

destructive. As the advance was continued, it 

was apparent that the cadets were in advance 

of the general line of the attacking force. 

Here their forward movement ceased, and for 

a moment it seemed as if their advance was 

checked. But what seemed a check was in 

reality a halt, during which "those boys" 

marked time, dressed their ranks, and when 

again aligned on the left, came forward in 

most admirable form. The whole thing was 

done with as much precision and steadiness 

as if on parade, and this while all the time 

subjected to a destructive fire. No one who 

saw it will ever forget it. No command but 

one most admirably drilled and disciplined 

could have done it. 

The two Bay State officers further recalled the Federal charge and withdrawal. Said Wells, 

Just then, Colonel Thoburn, Brigade Commander, rode along the lines, telling the men 

to "prepare to charge." He rode by me, 

shouting some order I could not catch, and 

went to the regiment on my left, which 

immediately charged. 1 supposed this to be 

his order to me, and commanded to fax 

bayonets, and charge. The men fairly sprang 

forward. As we neared the crest of the hill, 

the regiment on my left, which first met the 

fire, turned and went back, leaving the 34th 

rushing alone into the enemy's line. I shouted 

to them to halt, but could not make a single 

man hear or heed me; and it was not until 

they had climbed an imervcning fence, and 

were rushing ahead on the other side, that I 

was able to run along the lines, and, seizing 

the color bearer by the shoulder, hold him 

fast, as the only way of stopping the regiment. The wings surged ahead, but losing 

sight of the colors, halted. The alignment 

rectified, we faced about, and marched back 

to our position, in common time. 

And to continue, Colonel Lincoln rendered in his account of the battle, 

A charge of the whole line was now ordered. 

Our men sprang forward with a cheer. Our 

dogs, of whom we had a small army, ran 

frolicking and barking before us, as they had 

so often done, on drill. Receiving the fire of 

both lines, they were nearly all killed. Here, 

at the very front of our advance, fell Lieut. 

R. W. Walker, of A, as was then supposed, 

mortally wounded. We poured a rapid and 

well directed fire into the enemy; which, 

aided by the heavy enfilading fire from our 

artillery, checked his advance. For a moment 

47 
he staggered, appeared to give way, and the 

day seemed ours. The rain was falling in 

torrents; and this, with the smoke, which 

settled down thick upon us, hid the field 

from observation. Gallant as was our own 

charge, the order had met with feeble response on our left, where the troops, turning, 

went back, suffering little loss, and inflicting 

less upon the enemy. While Breckinridge was 

moving his main force against our front 

. . . opened his artillery within point blank 

range. Exposed to this flank fire, the 54th 

Pennsylvania, after a short but stout resistance, was led from the field by its brave 

commander, upon his own responsibility. 

An order to retreat came up to us from the 

left. We fell back slowly, and in good order; 

the men, as well as the officers, crying out, 

"Steady! Keep your line! Don't run, 34th!" It 

was impossible to see to any considerable 

distance, so thick was the smoke and rain. 

Suddenly, [Cpt] Bacon's voice was heard, 

calling upon his men to stand by the colors; 

and in response to what was supposed to be a 

general movement of the line, the right companies were halted, faced about, and became 

again warmly engaged. A determined charge 

upon our from, and a withering fire poured 

into our left flank, and rear; from the now 

contracting lines of the Rebels, was too 

much. The Color Company turned; its gallant Captain received his death wound, and 

the companies of the right wing followed 

their comrades to the left in retreat. Just at 

this moment our Lieutenant Colonel [Lincoln] fell, severely hit by shot, and shell, and, 

unable to continue in retreat, was left in the 

hands of the enemy. Our troops kept on in 

slow and sullen retreat till they reached 

Rhude's (sic] Hill. 

Federal Line 

Walk about 30 yards from the von 

Kleiser/ 34th Massachusetts position to 

the graveled service road where it leaves 

the parking lot and passes through a gate 

in the fence into the pasture. Notice the 

54tb monument due east across the interstate highway. Colonel Jacob M. 

Campbell, commander of the Pennsylvanians, reported on his regiment's charge 

as the battle climaxed. 

. . . my regiment . . . took posmon on 

the left of the First West Virginia and in the 

extreme left of the line of battle. We remained 

in this position, partly shielded from the fire 

of the enemy by the crest of a hill in front 

until, observing the regiment on my right 

making a charge in the absence of orders, 

presuming it proper to imitate their example, 

f ordered the Fifty-fourth also to charge, 

which was done with alacrity and spirit. 

Advancing beyond the crest of the hill, a 

rapid, vigorous, and, as I believe, effective 

lire was for some time kept up on the enemy, 

and every effort made by them to advance on 

48 

the front occupied by my regiment was firmly 

and resolutely resisted and proved abortive, 

although we sustained a galling and destructive fire, in which many of my men were 

killed and wounded. The enemy, however, 

pressed forward his right, which extended 

some distance beyond our left, and was rapidly flanking me in that direction despite the 

most determined resistance, when my attention was called to the fact that the regiment 

on my right ... had given away, and the 

enemy advancing at almost right angle with 

my line and extending beyond the rear and 

right of my regiment. A few minutes only 

would be required to completely surround my 

regiment, and in the absence of any appearance of advancing support I was reluctantly 

compelled to order my command to retire. 

This was done in as good order as the circumstances would allow, two stands being made by 

a portion of the command before passing beyond musket-range, and the whole of it finally 

rallying and forming at a point indicated by the 

Colonel commanding the brigade. 

Walk 50 yards north along the service 
road until you reach a hedge line. This 

was the location of five companies from 

the 1st West Virginia. The 34th Massachusetts with the I st West Virginia were 

pushed back through this area, and CoL 

George D. Wells recalled, 

... The Rebel line advanced, until I could 

see, above the smoke, the battle nags on the 

hill where the artillery had been posted. I 

ordered a retreat, but they either could not 

hear or would not heed the order. I was 

finally obliged to take hold of the color 

bearer, face him about, and tell him to follow 

me, in order to get the regiment off the field. 

They fell back slowly, firing in retreat, and 

encouraging each other not to run. 

But the Rebels were coming on at the double 

quick, and concentrating their whole fire 

upon us. 1 told the men to run, and get out of 

fire as quickly as possible, and rally behind 

the first cavalry line found to the rear. The 

colors were halted several times, by different 

officers, in positions where it was impossible 

to make a stand, and would only start again 

at my direct order. I felt much relieved on 

receiving an order from Gen. Sullivan, who 

was conspicuous on the field, that the line 

would be formed on the ridge, and no stand 

made before it was reached. I directed the 

color bearer to march directly there, without 

halting; and, after getting out of fire, rode to 

the rear, and went round into the pike, and 

towards the front, looking for stragglers. I 

saw none; and, meeting the colors, found 

most of the regiment with them. 

Captain Charles J. Rawling of the 1st 

West Virginia continued the account. 

The order was given to fall back . . . in rear 

of the former position, where, being exposed 

to a withering fire of musketry and canister, 

was for a short time thrown into confusion; 

rallying . . . took position on Rude's Hill. 

View of Bushong's Farm from Sigel's Hill, 19/1. (Turner) 

49 
Federal Rear Area 0 

Walk about 60 yards west on the service 

road running parallel to the hedge row 

until it cuts through the hedge again. At 

this point, look to the north. The other 

five companies of the 1st Wesl Virginia 

were on the knoll about 200 yards to the 

north of the hedge. General Sigel spent 

most of his time in this general area and 

farther toward the next stop. A staff 

officer's view of the situation was given 

by Sigel's Chief of Staff, Col. David H. 

Strother. 

Sigel seemed in a state of excitement and rode 

here and there with Stahel and Moor, all 

jabbering in German. In his excitement, he 

seemed to forget his English entirely, and the 

purely American portion of his staff were 

totally useless to him. I followed him up and 

down until! got tired, and finding a group of 

his staff officers together near a battery, r 

stopped and got a drink of whiskey and a 

cracker which an artillery man gave me. 

These officers said the General had ordered 

them to remain there, but seeing him riding 

rapidly to the artillery position on our right, 

we started to join him. Just then the enemy 

appeared, advancing in two lines of battle 

extending unbroken along our whole front, 

while along the front of the cavalry a line of 

skirmishers was seen pushing forward. Our 

artillery immediately opened, all the guns 

firing with great rapidity. The enemy's artillery played chiefly on our cavalry which after 

making a few futile movements was totail)' 

withdrawn to the rear. The Rebel infantry 

continued to move in advance; in spite of our 

furious artillery fire their lines were steady 

and clean, no officers either mounted or on 

foot appearing among them. When within 

three hundred yards they began to yell as 

usual, and the musketry from both lines 

opened with great fury. 

Overlook No. 1 

Follow the service road about 40 yards 

from the hedge to Overlook Number One. 

Look south up the North Fork of the 

Shenandoah River. Shirley's Hill may be 

seen in the distance, half cleared-half 

wooded. The eastward bend of the river 

caused the 26th Virginia Battalion to be 

squeezed east itself, as it emerged from 

Indian Hollow. This caused it to form 

unintentionally in a line behind part of the 

51st Virginia. You can see from here how 

the 26th and elements of the SIs! were 

shielded by the terrain from most of the 

Federal fue. This was the area occupied by 

Company C, 34th Massachusetts, placed 

50 

here to support the west flank of the guns 

and to bring rifle fire on Confederates 

advancing along the river's edge. The company was cut off and captured during the 

Federal withdrawal. 

Walk directly east from the Overlook 

about SO feet until you get a view of the 

guns to the south and US 11 north. 

General Sigel gave his version of events 

in this area. 

There was an interruption of a few minutes, 

when the enemy's lines recoiled, and our men 

cheered; then the fire began again and lasted 

about thirty minutes; the enemy again 
View of Shirley's Hill and north fork of Shenandoah from Sigel's Hill, 1911. (1Urner) 

charged, this time especially against our batteries; he came so ncar that Lieutenant Ephraim Chalfant of Carlin's battery rode up 

to me and said that he could not hold hb 

position. I immediately ordered two companies of the 12th West Virginia to advance and 

protect the piece~. but to my surprise there 

was no disposition to advance; in fact, in 

spite of entreaties and reproaches, the men 

could not be moved an inch! At this moment, 

Major Mcysenburg of my staff came up to 

me, and, to save the guns, I determined to 

make a counter-charge of the whole right 

wing, and requested him to transmit the order 

to Colonel Thoburn, who was not far from 

me toward the left. 

I was chained to my advanced position on the 

right by a circumstance that is unpleasant to 

record. Desiring to know what was going on 

to the left, I soon turned to ride out of the 

smoke, and so gain a survey of the whole 

field. As I did so, the companies placed 

behind the batteries quickly rose from the 

ground and followed me, as if by command. 

I immediately turned around, brought them 

back to their position, and remained at my 

post. ln spite of the seriousness of the situation, it seemed to me almost comical that a 

major general commanding a depanment 

and an "army" was condemned to the function of a "watchman." Then came the charge 

1 ordered from our right. The disagreeable 

incident mentioned prevented me from performing an important duty. 

Two miles to the north, Rude's Hill may 

be seen with the green-roofed, whitesided Cedar Grove Church at its base. 

Sigel could see the 28th and I 16th Ohio 

forming around the church and directed 

the withdrawal toward it. 

51 
Battery Heights and Return ® 

Walk 30 yards south along the service 

road to tbe guns. You are in the area of 

Snow's Maryland Battery. Carlin's West 

Virginia Battery occupied the ground to 

the east, midway to the single tree and 

the gun symbolizing von Kleiser's position. The guns were set up about 14 feet 

from each other. To the south is the Field 

of Lost Shoes, behind which you can see 

the Bushong farm. Elements of the 26th 

and 51st Virginia charged across the field 

immediately to the front and left, capturing two of Carlin's guns left on the 

field. The VMI cadets charged farther to 

the left on a line from the farmhouse to 

von Kleiser's position. Farther east, 

north along US II, Capt. Henry A. 

DuPont made the deployments mentioned earlier that eventually slowed the 

Confederate pursuit. As he related, 

On the cast side of that highway, the Union 

forces were in total rout and makjng for the 

rear in the wildest confusion-infantry and 

cavalry mingled with what was left of von 

Kleiser's battery. 

No general officer was in sight, but l was at 

once pounced upon by a number of young 

and inexperienced staff officers who proceeded to give me (upon their own initiative 

but in the names of Generals Sigel or Stahel) 

the most absurd and contradictory orders 

with respect to putting the battery in position . . . but common sense, reinforced by 

eight years of continuous military instruction 

and military discipline, made it easy to reach 

an instant decision as to what ought to be 

done, and, although under fire for the first 

time in my life, l then and there made up my 

mind to ignore the conflicting instructions 

and to take such measures as seemed right 

and proper. In brief, I was compelled to act, 

and did act, upon my own judgment and of 

52 

course assumed all responsibility. This was 

the last that was seen of the staff officers in 

question, who evidently went promptly to the 

rear with the rest of Sigel's forces. 

... The battery was in the open and entirely without support, but the curtain of 

smoke which hung over the field prevented 

the Confederates from discovering this fact, 

and it seemed necessary to risk the loss of 

some of my guns in order to cover and protect 

the retreat of the Union troops. The leading 

platoon (two guns) under Second Lieutenant 

Charles Holman, was at once put in position 

close to the turnpike and on its right, or west 

side, and instantly opened fire. Thking advantage of this, l ordered the other four 

pieces to the rear, and riding back, put the 

center platoon, under First Sergeant S. D. 

Southworth, in position some 500 or 600 

yards farther to the rear and in immediate 

proximity to the east side of the turnpike, 

with orders to open fire as soon as he was 

unmasked by Holman. Indicating a slight 

swell of the ground some 500 or 600 yards 

still farther to the rear, I also instructed 

Second Lieutenant B. F. Nash, commanding 

the left platoon, to go into position at that 

point. These dispositions, known in the tactics of that day as "retiring by echelon of 

platoons:• consumed but a very few moments, when l galloped back to the front and 

remained with Lieutenant Holman's pieces 

which continued to fire with great rapidity 

and precision until we found ourselves entirely alone, with not a single Federal soldier 

in sight save the members of our own battery. 

Thlling Holman that he had "to get out of 

this" and ordering him to go back at a gallop 

and take the best position he could find some 

500 or 600 yards behind Nash's platoon. 

From the guns, walk south along the 

service road; follow it west of the Bushong barn to its junction with another 

farm lane, turn east and walk past the 

Bushong House to the parking lot (.3 
New Market Gap, looking east from the town. (Tltmer) 

mile). As you walk along the road, notice the sharp drop of the ground to the 

west. This configuration protected the 

26th Virginia Battalion and five companies of the 51st Virginia from the brunt 

of the Federal fire. Members of the 26th 

Virginia Battalion edged forward sufficiently to bring a withering fire on the 

Federal artillerymen and their teams 

from behind the ridge along which you 

are walking. 

The 26th Virginia Battalion, 51st 

Virginia and 30th Virginia Battalion had 

become quite mixed by the time of the 

final charge. Major Peter Otey of the 

30th, for example, commanded the three 

easternmost companies of the 51st Virginia as they moved across the boggy 

field. 

If you have not done so earlier, drive .3 

mile from the Bushong House to tbe 

museum to see it before completing your 

tour. We hope that this tour has clarified 

the events of the battle for you and that 

it has heightened your appreciation of 

the sacrifices made by the brave men and 

boys who fought here for the causes 

important to them. This is, indeed, a 

field of honor. 

53 
Notes 

54 
Acknowledgments 

Many people have contributed to making this work possible and all have my deepest 

gratitude. I especially would like to thank the entire staff of the New Market Battlefield Park 

for their cheerful interest and support. Special thanks go to Rae T. Panella and Arthur S. 

Hardyman for making production and editing a pleasure. Linda M. Cajka designed the 

brochure, and Sharon Dougherty did her usual perfect typing job of the manuscript. Finally, 

this work could not have been done without the support and interest of the Army leadership 

and the Virginia Military Institute. Thank you one and all. The errors are mine; the credit is 

yours. 

J. W. A. Whitehorne 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. A. Whitehorne is an active duty U.S. Army officer assigned to 

the Inspector General's Office at the Pentagon as its historian. The first book of his 

multivolume history of the IG Corps was published in August 1987. The author of numerous 

military history articles, he has lectured at the Smithsonian Institution, the University of 

Maryland, and Montana State University. His most recent duties have involved the Civil War 

history of the Shenandoah Valley.