United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-2981

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Derrick T. Haggard

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

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 Submitted: June 6, 2013

Filed: June 10, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In 2012, a jury found Derrick Haggard guilty of 27 counts of a 59-count

indictment charging eight co-defendants with conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371; bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; check-counterfeiting, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a); and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A. The district court sentenced Haggard to an aggregate term of 216 months

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in prison and 5 years of supervised release, and ordered restitution of $76,295.68. 

Haggard appeals, raising a number of claims in a counseled brief filed under Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and in a pro se supplemental brief. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

Haggard has not challenged the sufficiency ofthe evidence, which included the

testimony of six cooperating co-defendants who entered guilty pleas. Briefly, the

evidence showed that Haggard and his co-defendants participated in a scheme that

involved breaking into mailboxes and stealing mail, creating counterfeit checks using

information from some of the stolen mail, cashing or attempting to cash the

counterfeit checks at FDIC-insured financial institutions, using false identification

documents they created or obtained, and recruiting others to assist in the scheme. 

Addressing the arguments raised on appeal, we first conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw

shortly before trial, given that Haggard did not express justifiable dissatisfaction with

counsel at the hearing. See United States v. Baisden, 713 F.3d 450, 454 (8th Cir.

2013). We also find no error in the denial of Haggard’s motion to dismiss the

indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, which was not violated by the grant of

a co-defendant’s motion for a continuance. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1);

United States v. Arrellano-Garcia, 471 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2006) (under Speedy

TrialAct, exclusions oftime attributable to one defendant apply to all co-defendants).

Further, the district court properly denied Haggard’s objection to the jury pool, and

his related request for a change of venue, because Haggard did not assert that a

“systematic exclusion” of African Americans caused their under-representation on the

jury venire. See United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 790 (8th Cir. 2009). As

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, late a United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri. 

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to Haggard’s claim regarding false testimony, we note that witness credibility is

solely within the jury’s province. See United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th

Cir. 2010). 

We find none of the other alleged trial errors to be prejudicial. In particular,

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Haggard’s motion for a

mistrial and instead instructed the jury to disregard a comment by the prosecutor

during his opening statement. See United States v. Urbina, 431 F.3d 305, 310 (8th

Cir. 2005) (to be entitled to mistrial, defendant needed to establish that comments

prejudicially affected his substantial rights so as to deprive him of fair trial); see also

United States v. Patterson, 684 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2012) (jurors are presumed to

follow court’s instructions), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 992 (2013). Nor did the court

abuse its discretion in denying an overnightrecess after a witness became temporarily

ill on the witness stand, or in denying Haggard’s request to play for the jury an hourlong video of a police interview of a co-defendant who had already acknowledged

relevant content of the video during cross-examination. See United States v. Chahia,

544 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2008) (court of appeals will reverse district court’s denial

of continuance only if court abused its discretion and moving party was prejudiced

as result); United States v. Frayer, 9 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1993) (trial courts

have discretion to place reasonable limits on presentation of evidence to prevent

undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence). 

Finally, we see nothing in the record to suggest that the district court abused

its discretion in imposing sentence, and we conclude that the sentence was not

unreasonable. 

We have reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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