12-158.121 July 11, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

OVERTIS SYKES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 158

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The § 2255 petitioner, Overtis Sykes, has filed a motion in

which he seeks this court’s recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

(He also seeks an order disqualifying Tyler Murray, the Assistant

United States Attorney assigned to this case and the petitioner’s

criminal cases. That request is addressed below.) Section 455(a)

requires a federal judge to recuse himself “in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” This is an

objective inquiry; the focus is on the appearance of bias from the

perspective of a well-informed, thoughtful observer. Hook v.

McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner presents three grounds for recusal. The first is

that he had filed an administrative tort claim against this court

and government counsel for false imprisonment and denial of due

process and that he had informed the court of that claim on
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November 14, 2007, while the criminal case was pending (we denied

the motion for recusal that petitioner made at that point).

Petitioner argues that the filing of the claim created a conflict

of interest that requires recusal. As far as we know, nothing came

of the tort claim (petitioner does not tell us of its ultimate

outcome). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, a litigant wanting

to manipulate a judicial assignment could simply sue the assigned

judge and then contend that he must step aside, but “courts do not

allow such easy manipulation.” In re Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 700

(7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.

2005) (“There is no rule that requires a judge to recuse himself

from a case, civil or criminal, simply because he was or is

involved in litigation with one of the parties. . . . [A] judge

would likely not harbor bias against someone simply because the

person named him in a meritless civil suit.”). The filing of the

tort claim did not and does not require recusal because it would

not create any appearance of impropriety to a reasonable observer. 

The second ground for recusal is the nature of the claims

presented in the pending § 2255 motion; petitioner asserts therein

that this court and government counsel acted in collusion to

circumvent the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act and that this

court “predetermined” the outcome of the dismissal hearing held on

December 20, 2007, in that we dismissed the original indictment

without prejudice. But judicial rulings alone almost never
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constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion; the exception is

where they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial

source or such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make

fair judgment impossible. In re Huntington Commons Assocs., 21

F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540 (1994)). The rulings that petitioner challenges in

his § 2255 petition do not rise to that level; that he labels our

rulings as “collusion” simply because we agreed with the government

and suggests that we had some sort of general bias in favor of

without-prejudice dismissals are insufficient bases for recusal. 

The third and final ground for recusal is that “should this

case require an evidentiary hearing,” petitioner would call Mr.

Murray and this court as witnesses. We doubt that resolution of

the § 2255 petition will require an evidentiary hearing; should we

find it necessary, we will cross that bridge when we come to it. 

Petitioner also seeks an order barring Mr. Murray from

participating in this case. He fails to cite any authority that

would permit us to enter such an order, and the request is

therefore denied.

Petitioner has also filed a motion requesting a copy of the

government’s response brief and asks that we issue an order

directing the Clerk’s office and the government to address their

mailings to the petitioner in a specific way. The motion will be

granted in part and denied in part as follows. The portion of the
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motion that seeks a copy of the government’s response brief is

denied as moot because petitioner has already received the response

(he has filed a reply to it). We decline to order the government

to label its mail to petitioner in any specific way, but we trust

that government counsel has taken note of petitioner’s requests.

Our own mail to petitioner will be labeled in the requested

fashion. 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s motion for a prompt ruling on his motion for

recusal [14] is granted. Petitioner’s motion for recusal of this

court and government counsel [13] is denied. Petitioner’s motion

for a copy of the government’s response brief and for orders

regarding mailings to petitioner [11] is granted in part and denied

in part. 

DATE: July 11, 2012

ENTER: ___________________________________________

John F. Grady, United States District Judge