alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered June 4, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01650-CR

JORGE RIZO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-51864-T

ORDER

In this case, appellant raises an issue related to the costs assessed against him. The 

record, however, does not contain a cost bill or other document with an itemized list of costs 

assessed in this case.

Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN 

DAYS of the date of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing a detailed itemization 

of the costs assessed in this case, including but not limited to, specific court costs, fees, and court 

appointed attorney fees. We further ORDER that the supplemental clerk’s record include a 

document explaining any and all abbreviations used to designate a particular fee, cost, or court 

appointed attorney fee.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Gary Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk; Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, Criminal 

Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
### §8718. Special rule for long grain and medium grain rice

#### (a) Calculation method

Subject to subsections (b) and (c), for the purposes of determining the amount of the counter-cyclical payments to be paid to the producers on a farm for long grain rice and medium grain rice under section 8714 1 of this title, the base acres of rice on the farm shall be apportioned using the 4-year average of the percentages of acreage planted in the applicable State to long grain rice and medium grain rice during the 2003 through 2006 crop years, as determined by the Secretary.

#### (b) Producer election

As an alternative to the calculation method described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall provide producers on a farm the opportunity to elect to apportion rice base acres on the farm using the 4-year average of—

(1) the percentages of acreage planted on the farm to long grain rice and medium grain rice during the 2003 through 2006 crop years;

(2) the percentages of any acreage on the farm that the producers were prevented from planting to long grain rice and medium grain rice during the 2003 through 2006 crop years because of drought, flood, other natural disaster, or other condition beyond the control of the producers, as determined by the Secretary; and

(3) in the case of a crop year for which a producer on a farm elected not to plant to long grain and medium grain rice during the 2003 through 2006 crop years, the percentages of acreage planted in the applicable State to long grain rice and medium grain rice, as determined by the Secretary.

#### (c) Limitation

In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall use the same total base acres, payment acres, and payment yields established with respect to rice under sections 7911 and 7912 of this title, as in effect on September 30, 2007, subject to any adjustment under section 8711 of this title.

(Pub. L. 110–234, title I, §1108, May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 952; Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title I, §1108, June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 1681.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 8714 of this title, referred to in subsec. (a), was repealed by Pub. L. 113–79, title I, §1102(a), Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 658.

#### Codification

Pub. L. 110–234 and Pub. L. 110–246 enacted identical sections. Pub. L. 110–234 was repealed by section 4(a) of Pub. L. 110–246.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Enactment of this section and repeal of Pub. L. 110–234 by Pub. L. 110–246 effective May 22, 2008, the date of enactment of Pub. L. 110–234, see section 4 of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as a note under section 8701 of this title.

1 See References in Text note below.
#### Isle of Wight Owner’s Association, Inc., Respondent, v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co. et al., Defendants, and M. A. Goul et al., Appellants.

Motion by appellants for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted. The following question is certified: Was the order of Special Term, dated June 27, 1960, properly made? Pursuant to statute (Civ. Prac. Act, § 589, subd. 4, par. [a]), this court further certifies that questions of law have arisen which in its opinion ought to be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

Dated:Friday, February 24, 2012

United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois

In the Matter of

Chicagoland Aviation, LLC

v. Case No. 12-CV-1139

Todd, et al

TRANSFER OF CASE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR A

REFERRAL TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 The above captioned case is currently pending on my calendar. I recommend to the Executive

Committee that this case be referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox, the

magistrate judge designated pursuant to Local Rule 72.1. The reasons for my recommendation

are indicated on the reverse of this form.

________________________________

Date: Friday, February 24, 2012

Judge Ronald A. Guzman

ORDER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above captioned case be referred to the calendar of

Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

ENTER

FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

_____________________________________

Chief Judge James F. Holderman

District Referral - To Designated Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:12-cv-01139 Document #: 17 Filed: 02/24/12 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:100
- Conduct necessary proceedings and issue Report and Recommendation on dispositive motion specified

below, other than motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (e.g., motion for injunction, for Social

Security review, for class certification, to set aside judgment).

EXCEPTIONS OR ADDITIONS:

Motion by Plaintiff Chicagoland Aviation, LLC for preliminary injunction [14].

CIVIL PROCEDURES

Conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter:

District Referral - To Designated Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:12-cv-01139 Document #: 17 Filed: 02/24/12 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:101
#### 1228.106-71 Performance and payment bonds for certain contracts.
#### Stephen P. Mras, an Infant, by Patricia M. Mras, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. Corey Chess, Defendant, and Ida M. Beecher et al., Appellants. (And Two Other Actions.)

Herlihy, J.

The plaintiffs, passengers, have been awarded money verdicts and the sole question on this appeal is whether, as found by the jury, the defendant Chess had implied permission from the defendants Beecher to drive their automobile at the time of the accident. While there was some evidence of express permission, the jury fo'und that there was no such permission. The plaintiffs are entitled upon this appeal to the most favorable aspect of the evidence and when applied to the facts herein, justifies sustaining the verdicts. Defendants Chess and Francis *984Beecher were close personal friends both before and after the accident to the extent, among many other events, that Beecher came to the hospital after the accident and guided Chess about in a wheel chair. There was testimony that Mrs. Beecher had observed Chess drive the Oldsmobile subsequently involved in the accident on “ a couple of ” prior occasions and that he used with permission the Beecher tractor and motor scooter on public highways. On the night of the accident the two started out together in Beecher’s automobile with the assurance that Chess would be able to get home all right. He testified “He [Beecher] alleged on the way up to the party that he was going to have a good time and have a few drinks and for me not to worry, he would see that I got home all right.” This testimony in the record could be a basis for the jury inferring that there was an implied understanding that if need be, Chess could take Beecher’s automobile to go home. In addition to these specifics, and from a reading of the record as a whole, in our opinion, the statutory presumption of implied permission to drive the automobile was not overcome as a matter of law but a factual issue was presented which the jury resolved in favor of the plaintiffs and as the trial court so aptly noted, it was “ a close one Judgments and orders appealed from are affirmed, with one bill of costs to plaintiffs-respondents in each action. Gibson, P. J., Reynolds, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.
#### 1436.270 Preparation of solicitations and contracts for construction.
#### Samuel B. Piel, Respondent, v. Eli Lilly and Company, Appellant.

Resettled order entered on March 22, 1963, granting in part plaintiff’s motion to modify defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars and denying defendant’s cross motion to vacate plaintiff’s notice of examination before trial of defendant, modified, on the law and on the facts, by providing that the examination shall be in Indianapolis, Indiana, and, at the election of the plaintiff, shall be by written interrogatories or open commission. *{Bodenstadt*v. *Parke, Davis é Co.,*1 A D 2d 670.) If plaintiff elects the latter, the parties shall pay their respective expenses which may be taxed as costs by the party prevailing. The order is further modified by granting defendant’s cross motion for priority of examination of plaintiff, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs. It was an unwise exercise of discretion to require defendant to pay the expenses of the examination. In the circumstances, defendant’s notice therefor having been first served, its examination of plaintiff should precede the examination of defendant. *{Punia*v. *Dry Dock Sav. Bank,*280 App. Div. 431.) On priority of depositions generally, see rule 3106 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. Concur — Rabin, McNally, 'Stevens and Eager, JJ.; Breitel, J. P., dissents in *811the following memorandum: The modification is an unwarranted interference with the exercise of discretion by Special Term, especially as to the matter of priority of examinations. Moreover, it is judicially uneconomic to make appellate readjustment in the procedural arrangements of a case unless there has been an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial injustice. Accordingly, the order should foe affirmed. Settle order on notice.
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-335-CR

DUSTIN M. FINLEY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 8 OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered appellant’s “Motion For Voluntary Dismissal Of

Appeal.” The motion complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of appellate

procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). No decision of this court having been

delivered before we received this motion, we grant the motion and dismiss the

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 19, 2009
**CREDIT AGREEMENT**

(Revolving evolving Loan)

by and between

CoBank,  ACB,

as  Co-Syndication Agent,asAdministrative Agent, as

Collateral  Agent, and as aSyndication Party,

Party,

and

FARMLAND  INDUSTRIES, INC.

dated  as of May 10, 2000

CREDIT  AGREEMENT

(Revolving  Loan)

        THIS AGREEMENT(“**Credit Agreement**”) is entered into as of the 10th day of May2000, by and between COBANK, ACB (“**CoBank**”) for its own benefitas a Syndication Party, as Co-Syndication Agent, as Collateral Agent, and as theAdministrative Agent for the benefit of the present and future SyndicationParties (in that capacity **“Administrative Agent**”), COOPERATIEVECENTRALE RAIFFEISEN-BOERENLEENBANK B.A., “RABOBANK INTERNATIONAL”, NEWYORK BRANCH, as Co-Syndication Agent (“**Rabobank**”) and as aSyndication Party, SUNTRUST BANK, as Documentation Agent and as a SyndicationParty, the Syndication Parties identified on ScheduleA hereto, and FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., a cooperativecorporation formed under the laws of the State of Kansas, whose address is 3315North Oak Trafficway, Kansas City, MO 64116-005 (“**Borrower**”).

Article 1. DEFINED TERMS

        As used in thisCredit Agreement, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below(and such meaning shall be equally applicable to both the singular and pluralform of the terms defined, as the context may require):
13.402 Conditions for use. If the conditions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section are present, the fast payment procedure may be used, provided that use of the procedure is consistent with the other conditions of the purchase. The conditions for use of the fast payment procedure are as follows: ( a ) Individual purchasing instruments do not exceed $35,000, except that executive agencies may permit higher dollar limitations for specified activities or items on a case-by-case basis.
( b ) Deliveries of supplies are to occur at locations where there is both a geographical separation and a lack of adequate communications facilities between Government receiving and disbursing activities that will make it impractical to make timely payment based on evidence of Government acceptance.
( c ) Title to the supplies passes to the Government— ( 1 ) Upon delivery to a post office or common carrier for mailing or shipment to destination; or
( 2 ) Upon receipt by the Government if the shipment is by means other than Postal Service or common carrier.
( d ) The supplier agrees to replace, repair, or correct supplies not received at destination, damaged in transit, or not conforming to purchase requirements.
( e ) The purchasing instrument is a firm-fixed-price contract, a purchase order, or a delivery order for supplies.
( f ) A system is in place to ensure— ( 1 ) Documentation of evidence of contractor performance under fast payment purchases;
( 2 ) Timely feedback to the contracting officer in case of contractor deficiencies; and
( 3 ) Identification of suppliers that have a current history of abusing the fast payment procedure (also see subpart 9.1).
[62 FR 64917, Dec. 9, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 57366, Sept. 28, 2006; 80 FR 38297, July 2, 2015]
#### 1432.407 Interest.

The HCA may authorize advance payments without interest pursuant to FAR 32.407.
----------
                           EXHIBIT 23
                           ----------
                                
                 Consent of Independent Auditors


We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
of Qualified Properties 80, L.P. of our report dated January 23, 1997, included
in the 1996 Annual Report to Shareholders of Qualified Properties 80, L.P. and
Consolidated Ventures.

Our audit also included the financial statement schedule of Qualified
Properties 80, L.P. and Consolidated Ventures listed in Item 14(a).  This
schedule is the responsibility of the Partnership's management.  Our
responsibility is to express an opinion based on our audits.  In our opinion,
the financial statement schedule referred to above, when considered in relation
to the basic financial statements taken as a whole, presents fairly in all
material respects the information set forth herein.


                                   ERNST & YOUNG  LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
January 23, 1997
#### Noreen M. Palette, Respondent, v. Frank A. Palette, Appellant.

In an action by a wife for a judicial separation, in which the defendant husband moved to amend his answer to allege as a defense the wife’s adultery, and in which the wife made a cross motion for temporary alimony, counsel fees and custody of their infant child, the husband appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated June 18, 1964, as: (a) granted to the wife $75 a week as temporary alimony, a $750 counsel fee, and custody of the child; and (to) required the husband to pay an additional counsel fee of $75 and $10 costs as a condition to the granting of his motion to amend his answer. Order modified as follows: (1) by striking out from its first decretal paragraph the provision requiring defendant to pay $75 as a counsel fee and $10 costs as a condition to amending his answer; (2) by striking out the third and fourth decretal paragraphs awarding to plaintiff custody of the infant and fixing the defendant’s visitation rights; (3) by reducing the amount of temporary alimony from $75 to $50 per week; (4) by reducing the amount of the counsel fee from $750 to $250; and (5) by adding a provision directing that the issues of permanent alimony, further counsel fees and custody of the infant be left for determination by the trial court. As so modified, order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, without costs. The defendant’s time to serve the amended answer is extended until 20 days after entry of the order hereon. In our opinion, the issues presented as to alimony, counsel fee and custody should have been reserved for determination by the trial court. In any event, under all the facts and circumstances disclosed by this record, we believe that the present awards for alimony and counsel fee were excessive, and that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to require the defendant to pay the sum of $85 as a condition to amending bis answer. This case should be tried at the earliest possible date. Application by the *706plaintiff, made on argument of the appeal, to vacate the conditional stay heretofore granted by this court on J.uly 10, 1964, denied. Beldoek, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur. Respondent.— In an action for divorce, in which an interlocutory judgment was obtained by the plaintiff husband in his favor against the defendant wife, the husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 29,1964, which granted the wife’s motion and directed him to supply to her, at Ms expense, a typewritten transcript of the stenographic minutes of the trial on the issues of adultery and condonation; such transcript to be used by her for the purposes of an appeal. Order reversed, without costs; and motion denied. In our opinion, the wife failed to show a reasonable probability of success in prosecuting her appeal; hence, the motion should have been denied *(Reiss*v. *Reiss,*18 A D 2d 1105). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### Clifford Miner, Appellant, v. George Sherman, Respondent.

Judgment and orders unanimously reversed on the law and facts and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. Memorandum: The verdicts are against the weight of the evidence. However, reversal is required for another reason. After the occurrence which caused plaintiff’s injuries, plaintiff Miner swore to an information which charged defendant with a violation of section 45 of the Navigation Law of the State of New York, in operating his boat at such a speed as to throw plaintiff Miner’s boat upon the shore of the Barge Canal, causing injuries to plaintiffs. Defendant pleaded guilty to this information and paid a fine. This violation constituted an offense punishable by fine. Plaintiffs requested a charge, in substance, that the plea of guilty was an admission against interest and could be so considered by the jury. This request was erroneously denied and an exception was taken. After proof of the plea, the defendant should have been allowed to explain his reasons for pleading guilty and the jurors should have been permitted to determine the probative weight and value the plea was entitled to receive. “ Thus when [defendant] pleaded guilty to the traffic infractions charged against him, his plea of guilty amounted to a statement or admission by him that he did the act charged. As such, it should be treated like any other admission or confession, and subject to the same rules relating to its weight and effect.” *(Ando*v. Woodberry, 8 N Y 2d 165, 168.) (Appeal from judgment of Ontario Trial Term for defendant for no cause of action in an action for damages for personal injuries and for property damage to plaintiff’s boat by reason of negligent operation of power boat. The orders denied a motion for a directed verdict and for a new trial.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofDynamic Materials Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period endedSeptember 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Yvon Pierre Cariou, President and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to  Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 
|   |   | (i)    |   | The  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |   |   |                                                                                                                                                   |
|   |   | (ii)   |   | The  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

 

 

October26, 2007

 

 
|   |   | /s/ Yvon Pierre Cariou                 |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   |   | Yvon Pierre Cariou                     |
|   |   | President and Chief  Executive Officer |
|   |   | of Dynamic Materials  Corporation      |

 

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to DynamicMaterials Corporation and will be retained by Dynamic Materials Corporation andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

** **

** **

** **

----

** **
### §2009bb–11. Annual report

Not later than 180 days after the end of each fiscal year, the Authority shall submit to the President and to Congress a report describing the activities carried out under this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 87–128, title III, §383M, formerly §383L, as added Pub. L. 107–171, title VI, §6028, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 387; renumbered §383M, Pub. L. 110–234, title VI, §6026(c)(1)(A), May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1178, and Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title VI, §6026(c)(1)(A), June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 1940.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Pub. L. 110–234 and Pub. L. 110–246 made identical amendments to this section. The amendments by Pub. L. 110–234 were repealed by section 4(a) of Pub. L. 110–246.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 383M of Pub. L. 87–128, title III, was renumbered section 383N and is classified to section 2009bb–12 of this title.
**Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools**

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