alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 20-50212 

Summary Calendar 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Samuel Zubia-Olivas, 

Defendant—Appellant, 

consolidated with 

_____________ 

No. 20-50228 

_____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Samuel Zubia-Olivas, also known as Juan Zubias-Sanchez, 

also known as Samuel Olivas Zubia, also known as Samuel 

Olivas-Zubia, also known as Samuel Zubia Olivas, also known as

Samuel Olivias Zubias, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

September 23, 2020 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 20-50212 Document: 00515575444 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/23/2020
No. 20-50212 

c/w No. 20-50228 

2 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 7:16-CR-90-1 

USDC No. 4:19-CR-747-1 

Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Samuel Zubia-Olivas appeals his Guidelines sentence of 96 months of 

imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release following his guilty plea 

conviction for illegal reentry. He argues that the enhancement of his sentence 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), which increases the maximum term of 

imprisonment to ten years, is unconstitutional because the statute treats a 

prior conviction as a sentencing factor, rather than as an element of a separate 

offense that must be listed in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. He concedes that this issue is foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). However, he seeks to preserve 

the issue for possible Supreme Court review because, he argues, subsequent 

decisions indicate that the Supreme Court may reconsider its holding in 

Almendarez-Torres. 

In Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239–47, the Supreme Court held 

that for purposes of a statutory sentencing enhancement, a prior conviction 

is not a fact that must be alleged in an indictment or found by a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This Court has held that subsequent Supreme Court 

decisions did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See United States v. Wallace, 

759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that Alleyne v. United States, 

570 U.S. 99 (2013) did not disturb Almendarez-Torres); United States v. Rojas-

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

Case: 20-50212 Document: 00515575444 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/23/2020
No. 20-50212 

c/w No. 20-50228 

3 

Luna, 522 F.3d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466 (2000), did not affect the treatment of prior convictions under 

Almendarez-Torres). Thus, Zubia-Olivas’s argument is foreclosed. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, the 

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the 

Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is 

DENIED AS MOOT. 

Case: 20-50212 Document: 00515575444 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/23/2020
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 3214

_____________________________ A KEEM W ATSON , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Jennie Kinsey , Judge

. August 30, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R AY , C.J.
, and R OWE and O STERHAUS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
#### § 97.4 Policy.

The DoD generally should make official information reasonably available for use in Federal, State, and foreign courts and other adjudicative bodies if the information is not classified, privileged, or otherwise protected from public disclosure.
EXHIBIT 15






ENSERCH Corporation:

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited condensed
consolidated interim financial information of ENSERCH Corporation and
subsidiaries (the "Corporation") for the three-month and six-month periods
ended June 30, 1998 and the period from the acquisition (August 5, 1997)
through June 30, 1998 (Successor Company Operations), and three-month,
six-month and twelve-month periods ended June 30, 1997 and the period from
July 1, 1997 through the acquisition date (Predecessor Company Operations) as
indicated in our report dated August 13, 1998; because we did not perform an
audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in the
Corporation's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,
1998, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-43811
and 333-43811-01 on Form S-3, of ENSERCH Corporation.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c)
under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections7 and 11 of that Act.



DELOITTE & TOUCHE  LLP


Dallas, Texas
August 13, 1998
#### POOLE v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

January 17, 1906.)

Evidence—Opinion Evidence—Indefiniteness.

.Where, in a personal injury action, the physician attending plaintiff testified with considerable certainty as to the condition of her head, and stated that he was unable to say that the injury to the head was likely to be permanent, his statement that the fact that plaintiff four months after the injury had spells of dizziness, had a tendency to show that some portion of the injury would remain, was inadmissible, when not followed by testimony showing what part of the injury would remain.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Eleventh District.

Action by Anna Poole against the New York City Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and BLANCHARD and DOW-LING, JJ.

William E. Weaver, for appellant.

John J. Sullivan," for respondent. •

DOWLING, J.

This is one of the ordinary actions to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant. Upon the trial the physician, who attended the plaintiff and dressed the wounds' received by her, testified with considerable certainty as to the condition of the plaintiff’s head, but stated that he was unable to say that such injuries were “likely” to be permanent. The following question was then asked him:

> “If the witness testified at this present time, which is four months past the time of receiving the injury that she still has spells, when her head is turned around she feels dizziness, is it your opinion as a physician that this is apt to be permanent?”

This was objected to, the objection was overruled, and the witness answered:

> “The tendency would be that some portion of it would remain.”

A motion to strike out this answer was denied. This was error. The answer viewed in the light of the physician’s previous testimony was manifestly speculative and indefinite, and was not followed by any testimony showing or tending to show what portion of the trouble complained of as being in the plaintiff’s head would remain, nor was it shown that he could -state with reasonable certainty that any portion of it would be permanent. See Raynor v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 106 App. Div. 449, 94 N. Y. Supp. 632; Boland v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. (App. Term Nov. 1905) 96 N. Y. Supp. 262.

What effect thé admission of such improper evidence may have had upon the jury it is impossible to determine, and the judgment must be reversed.

. Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to" appellant to abide the event All concur.
#### 1.201 Maintenance of the FAR.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 1113

)

GEARXS, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendants have filed their Answer to the First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) brought against them by Microsoft Corporation

(“Microsoft”). Although this Court has made no effort to treat

with that responsive pleading in any detail (that after all is

Microsoft’s responsibility), it has noted the inexplicable

departure of Answer ¶¶10, 15, 17, 22 and 44 from the plain

roadmap marked out by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(5)--see App’x ¶1 to

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278

(N.D. Ill. 2001). Accordingly those paragraphs of the Answer are

stricken, with leave however granted to file properly amended

versions of those paragraphs on or before May 31, 2012.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 22, 2012
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3659

_____________________________

JOSEPH TETHER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Russell Healey, Judge.

April 20, 2018

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b); Fla. R. App. P. 

9.140(b)(3). Any request for belated appeal must be filed 

pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c).

WOLF, ROBERTS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Joseph Tether, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Indian Affairs

          - [212A2100DD/AAKC001030/A0A501010.999900253G]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Indian Affairs, Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice announces the extension of the Class III gaming compact between  the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota.

# DATES:

The extension takes effect on January 15, 2021.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. Paula L. Hart, Director, Office of  Indian Gaming, Office of the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs, Washington, DC 20240,  (202) 219-4066.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

An extension to an existing Tribal-State Class III gaming compact does not require approval by the Secretary if the extension does not modify  any other terms of the compact. 25 CFR 293.5. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota have reached an agreement to extend the expiration date of their existing Tribal-State Class III gaming compact to April 26, 2021. This publication provides notice of the new expiration date of the compact.

Tara Sweeney,

Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs.

[FR Doc. 2021-00778 Filed 1-14-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 704 

To provide that members of the Armed Forces performing services in the 

Sinai Peninsula of Egypt shall be entitled to tax benefits in the same 

manner as if such services were performed in a combat zone. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 23, 2017 

Mr. CORNYN (for himself and Ms. KLOBUCHAR) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To provide that members of the Armed Forces performing 

services in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt shall be entitled 

to tax benefits in the same manner as if such services 

were performed in a combat zone. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sinai Service Recogni5 tion Act’’. 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 704 IS

1 SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS PER2 FORMING SERVICES IN THE SINAI PENIN3 SULA OF EGYPT. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of the following pro5 visions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a qualified 

6 hazardous duty area shall be treated in the same manner 

7 as if it were a combat zone (as determined under section 

8 112 of such Code): 

9 (1) Section 2(a)(3) (relating to special rule 

10 where deceased spouse was in missing status). 

11 (2) Section 112 (relating to the exclusion of 

12 certain combat pay of members of the Armed 

13 Forces). 

14 (3) Section 692 (relating to income taxes of 

15 members of Armed Forces on death). 

16 (4) Section 2201 (relating to members of the 

17 Armed Forces dying in combat zone or by reason of 

18 combat-zone-incurred wounds, etc.). 

19 (5) Section 3401(a)(1) (defining wages relating 

20 to combat pay for members of the Armed Forces). 

21 (6) Section 4253(d) (relating to the taxation of 

22 phone service originating from a combat zone from 

23 members of the Armed Forces). 

24 (7) Section 6013(f)(1) (relating to joint return 

25 where individual is in missing status). 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 704 IS

1 (8) Section 7508 (relating to time for per2 forming certain acts postponed by reason of service 

3 in combat zone). 

4 (b) QUALIFIED HAZARDOUS DUTY AREA.—For pur5 poses of this section, the term ‘‘qualified hazardous duty 

6 area’’ means the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, if as of the 

7 date of the enactment of this section any member of the 

8 Armed Forces of the United States is entitled to special 

9 pay under section 310 of title 37, United States Code (re10 lating to special pay; duty subject to hostile fire or immi11 nent danger), for services performed in such location. 

12 Such term includes such location only during the period 

13 such entitlement is in effect. 

14 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para16 graph (2), the provisions of this section shall take 

17 effect on June 9, 2015. 

18 (2) WITHHOLDING.—Subsection (a)(5) shall 

19 apply to remuneration paid after the date of the en20 actment of this Act. 

Æ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Alvin Philips et al., Respondents, v Republic Insurance Company, Appellant.

— In an action, *inter alia,*to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered May 5, 1978, which denied its motion to strike plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. Plaintiffs alleged four causes of action in their suit against the defendant insurer to recover on a fire insurance policy as a result of a fire which damaged their home. The defendant insurer moved to dismiss the fourth cause of action on the ground that plaintiffs were seeking punitive damages therein and that such damages could not be awarded for breach of a private contract. Special Term denied defendant’s motion and in our view was correct in so holding. An examination of the complaint indicates that plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages was not part of their fourth cause of action but was contained solely in their prayer for relief. It has long been held that the prayer for relief is not part of a cause of action and even if the relief is inappropriate it has no effect on the cause of action *(Wainwright & Page v Burr & McAuley,*272 NY 130). Since the fourth cause of action, as pleaded, states a valid cause of action, Special Term correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. “The prayer for relief does not determine the sufficiency of the complaint and a prayer for the wrong relief does not require a dismissal for insufficiency so long as plaintiff demonstrates the right to some relief under the facts pleaded” *(Lehmann v Kingston Plaza,*44 Mise 2d 63, 65). However, the plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages was totally inappropriate in this action under a private contract (see *Garrity v Lyle Stuart, Inc.,*40 NY2d 354) and should be disregarded by the trial court upon any trial of this action (see 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3017.02). Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, Suozzi and Rabin, JJ., concur.
§ 536.80 Payment of costs, settlements, and judgments related to certain medical malpractice claims. ( a ) *General.* Costs, settlements, or judgments cognizable under 10 U.S.C. 1089(f) for personal injury or death caused by any physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, paramedic, or other supporting personnel (including medical and dental technicians, nurse assistants, therapists, and Red Cross volunteers of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), AMEDD personnel detailed for service with other than a federal department, agency, or instrumentality and direct contract personnel identified in the contract as federal employees), will be paid provided that: ( 1 ) The alleged negligent or wrongful actions or omissions occurred during the performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions (including clinical studies and investigations) while the medical or health care employee was acting within the scope of employment.
( 2 ) Such personnel furnish prompt notification and delivery of all process served or received and other documents, information, and assistance as requested.
( 3 ) Such personnel cooperate in the defense of the action on its merits.
( b ) *Requests for contribution or indemnification.* All requests for contribution or indemnification under this section should be forwarded to the Commander USARCS for action, following the procedures set forth in this subpart.
Editorial Note on Part 842
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 842 appear at 81 FR 83688, Nov. 22, 2016.

§ 842.52 Who are proper claimants. Claimants include inhabitants of a foreign country who are: ( a ) Foreign nationals. In a wrongful death case, if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, even though his or her survivors are U.S. inhabitants, the FCA will apply.
( b ) U.S. nationals residing abroad, unless the claim arises from a benefit, privilege or service provided to them by the U.S. Government, or they reside in the foreign country primarily because they are employed directly by the United States, or sponsored by or accompanying such a person, or employed by a U.S. civilian contractor in furtherance of a contract with the U.S. Government, or sponsored by or accompanying such a person.
( c ) U.S. corporations with a place of business in the country in which the claim arose.
( d ) Foreign governments and their political subdivisions, including a municipal and prefectural government.
( e ) Foreign companies and business entities.
[55 FR 2809, Jan. 29, 1990. Redesignated and amended at 81 FR 83692, 83693, Nov. 22, 2016]
Case: 1:11-cv-09228 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 12/28/11 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:3
Case: 1:11-cv-09228 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 12/28/11 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:4
Case: 1:11-cv-09228 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 12/28/11 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:5
### §918. General prohibitions

#### (a) No consideration of borrower's level of general funds

The Secretary shall not deny or reduce any loan or loan advance under this chapter based on a borrower's level of general funds.

#### (b) Loan origination fees

The Secretary may not charge any fee or charge not expressly provided in this chapter in connection with any loan made or guaranteed under this chapter.

#### (c) Consultants

#### (1) In general

To facilitate timely action on applications by borrowers for financial assistance under this chapter and for approvals required of the Rural Electrification Administration pursuant to the terms of outstanding loan or security instruments or otherwise, the Secretary may use consultants funded by the borrower, paid for out of the general funds of the borrower, for financial, legal, engineering, and other technical advice and services in connection with the review of the application by the Rural Electrification Administration.

#### (2) Conflicts of interest

The Secretary shall establish procedures for the selection and the provision of technical services by consultants to ensure that the consultants have no financial or other conflicts of interest in the outcome of the application of the borrower.

#### (3) Payment of costs

The Secretary may not, without the consent of the borrower, require, as a condition of processing an application for approval, that the borrower agree to pay the costs, fees, and expenses of consultants hired to provide technical or advisory services to the Secretary.

#### (4) Contracts, grants, and agreements

The Secretary may enter into such contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements as are necessary to carry out this section.

#### (5) Use of consultants

Nothing in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Secretary to retain the services of consultants from funds made available to the Secretary or otherwise.

(May 20, 1936, ch. 432, title I, §18, as added Pub. L. 101–624, title XXIII, §2353, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 4039; amended Pub. L. 103–129, §2(c)(4), Nov. 1, 1993, 107 Stat. 1364; Pub. L. 103–354, title II, §235(a)(13), Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3221; Pub. L. 115–334, title VI, §6602(b)(1), Dec. 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 4776.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 115–334 struck out "and the Governor of the telephone bank" after "The Secretary".

1994—Pub. L. 103–354 substituted "Secretary" for "Administrator" wherever appearing.

1993—Pub. L. 103–129 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), inserted heading, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).
PUBLIC LAW 110–271—JULY 15, 2008 122 STAT. 2489 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 5517: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 154 (2008): 

Apr. 14, 15, considered and passed House. 

June 27, considered and passed Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 110–271 

110th Congress 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 7231 FM 

1960 in Humble, Texas, as the ‘‘Texas Military Veterans Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. TEXAS MILITARY VETERANS POST OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 7231 FM 1960 in Humble, Texas, shall be known 

and designated as the ‘‘Texas Military Veterans Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Texas Military Veterans Post Office’’. 

Approved July 15, 2008. 

July 15, 2008 

[H.R. 5517] 


dkrause on GSDDPC44 with PUBLIC LAWS