NBSIR 87-3560

An Engineering Analysis of the

Early Stages of Fire Development

- The Fire at the Dupont Plaza

Hotel and Casino

- December 31, 1986

Harold E. Nelson

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

National Engineering Laboratory

Center for Fire Research

Gaithersburg, MD 20899

April 1987

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

NBSIR 87-3560

AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF THE

EARLY STAGES OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT

- THE FIRE AT THE DUPONT PLAZA

HOTEL AND CASINO

- DECEMBER 31, 1986

Harold E. Nelson

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

National Engineering Laboratory

Center for Fire Research

Gaithersburg, MD 20899

April 1987

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler, Director
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES iv

LIST OF FIGURES v Abstract 1

Chapter 1. Overview. 1

1.1. Scope 1

1.2. Background . 2

1.3. Purpose 2

1.4. Physical Description of Pertinent Aspects of the Facility .... 3

1.5. Brief Description of Method of Analysis 6

1.6. Brief Description of Fire Development 6

Chapter 2. Details of Analysis 10

2 . 1 General 10

2.2 Mass Burning Rate 11

a. Pre-Flashover (free) Burning of Initially

Ignited Fuel Package 11

b. Post Flashover Burning of Materials in the South

Ballroom 12

c. Burning of Foyer Ceiling After Flashover of South

Ballroom but Prior to Entry of Fire into Casino 13

2.3 Rate of Heat Release.

a. Pre-Flashover (Free) Burning of Initially

Ignited Fuel Package . 13

b . Rate of Energy Flow from South Ballroom to North

Ballroom Prior to Flashover in South Ballroom 16

c. Rate of Energy Flow from North Ballroom to

Foyer Prior to Flashover in South Ballroom . 17

d. Post Flashover Energy Flow from South Ballroom 17

e. Energy Release from the Foyer Ceiling After

Flashover of South Ballroom but Prior to Entry 18

into Casino. 18

2.4 Smoke Layer Temperatures. 19

a. Smoke Temperatures in the South Ballroom. 19

b. Smoke Temperatures in the North Ballroom. 23

c. Smoke Temperatures in the Foyer Prior to

Flashover in the South Ballroom. , 24

d. Smoke Temperatures in the Foyer Following

Flashover in the South Ballroom. 24

2.5 Smoke Layer Depth. 27

2.6 Velocity of Smoke/Flame Front. 28

2.7 Mass Product in Smoke Layer. 29

2.8 Oxygen Concentration in Smoke Layer. 29

2.9 Visibility in Smoke Layer. 30

2.10 Flame Length (Extension.) 31

2.11 Flame Spread. 34

2.12 Potential Response of Sprinklers 35

2.13 Potential Response of Smoke Detectors 37

2.14 Fire Duration. 37

Chapter 3 - Summary 40

REFERENCES 42

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Appendix A. Results of Computations Related to the South Ballroom A-1

Appendix B. Results of Computations Related to the North Ballroom B-1

Appendix C. Results of Computations Related to the Foyer C-1

Appendix D. Results of Computations Related to Sprinklers D-1

Appendix E. Results of Computations Related to Smoke Detectors E-1

Appendix F. Results of Tests of the Fabric Wall Covering F-1

Appendix G. A Method for Calculating Ventilation Flow Rate G-1

Appendix H. Comparison of Results Obtained with Different Procedures H-1

iii
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. Estimated Post Flashover Burning Rates

of Materials in South Ballroom. 45

Table 2. Estimated Pre-Flashover Energy Flow From South

Ballroom to North Ballroom. 46

Table 3. Estimated Pre-Flashover Energy Flow from North

Ballroom to Foyer. 47
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Partial Floor Plan of Ground Floor 48

Figure 2. Second Floor Plan 49

Figure 3. Situation in Ballroom Complex at t+60 Seconds 50

Figure 4. Situation in Ballroom Complex at t+180 Seconds 50

Figure 5. Situation in Ballroom Complex at t+420 Seconds 51

Figure 6. Situation in Ballroom Complex Just Prior to Flashover

(t+580 sec.) 51

Figure 7. Situation in Foyer and Lobby From t+420 to t+580 Seconds., , , 52

Figure 8. Situation in Foyer Following Flashover of South Ballroom

t+600 Seconds. 52

Figure 9. Situation in Lobby From Flashover of the South Ballroom

(About t+590 Seconds) to About t+630 Seconds. 53

Figure 10. Situation in Casino Following Breakage of Glass Partition

Between Casino and Foyer. About t+720 to t+740 Seconds. ... 53

Figure 11. Estimated Flame Length/Extension in South Ballroom. 54

Figure 12. Estimated Flame Length/Extension in North Ballroom.. . . ... 55

Figure 13. Estimated Average Temperature in Smoke Layer (Ballrooms and

Foyer) 56

Figure 14. Estimated Level of Smoke Layer Interface (Ballrooms and

Foyer) 57

Figure 15. Estimated Vision Distance in Smoke Layer (Ballrooms and

Foyer) 58

Figure 16. Estimate Oxygen Concentration in Smoke (Ballrooms and

Foyer) 59

Figure 17 . Section of Building Elevation (Viewed from North) 60

Figure 18. T-Squared Fires Rates of Energy Release 61

Figure 19. Relation of T-Squared Fires to Some Test Fires 62

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ABSTRACT

This report presents the methods and results of an analysis of the fire

development through the first and second floors during the December 31,

1986 fire in the Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The analysis involved the use of fire growth models, engineering

formulae, and technical data. The report details the procedures and

data used, the reason for those selected, and the results obtained.

The analysis addressed mass burning rate, rate of heat release, smoke

temperature, smoke layer depth, velocity of smoke/flame front, mass

products in smoke layer, oxygen concentration in smoke layer,

visibility in smoke layer, flame length/extension, flame spread,

sprinkler response, smoke detector response, and fire duration. The

areas of the building analyzed include the ballroom complex where the

fire originated, the foyer that connected the ballroom complex to the

areas where the fatalities occurred, and the lobby and casino areas

where most of the deaths occurred. This report does not address smoke

movement above the first floor, the conditions that caused the deaths

of three persons caught in an elevator, or the conditions that caused

the death of one victim in a guest room on the forth floor.

Key Words: Fire engineering analysis. Fire growth models, Flashover,

Fire investigation, Dupont Plaza Hotel

An Engineering Analysis of the Early Stages of Fire Development

- The Fire at the Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino

- December 31, 1986

Chapter 1. Overview.

1.1. Scope

The analyses in this report relate to the fire that occurred on the

afternoon of December 31, 1986 in the Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino,

San Juan, Puerto Rico. Ninety eight persons died in this fire.

This report addresses the development and growth of the fire and its

effects as it progressed through the first floor ballroom complex, the

Foyer, the Lobby and entrjrway, and the Casino. The period of coverage

is from the moment of established burning of the initial fuel to

emergence of flame from the Casino. The report does not cover the

ignition event. The analysis starts when the burning of the initial

fuel (furniture in corrugated cardboard cartons) is in the range of 5

1
to 10 btu per second (approximately 5 to 10 kW) . This analysis ends

moments after flame extends through the west windows of the Casino. As

calculated, this is a period of approximately thirteen minutes. There

are, however, assumptions involved in these calculations so that a margin of error, estimated at about 25%, may exist between the time

estimated for any specific event and actual time that event occurred

during the fire.

The analysis also does not address movement of smoke or other fire

products above the lobby level, the conditions that caused the death of

one individual on the fourth floor, nor the conditions that caused the

deaths of three persons in an elevator cab. Also, the study does not

address fire fighting activities or the physical damage that occurred

in the discotheque, bar, and restaurant areas.

1.2. Background

At approximately 3:30 pm on December 31, 1986 a fire originated on

cartons of furniture located in the South Ballroom of the Dupont Plaza

Hotel and Casino. The fire rapidly broke out of the space of origin

and swept through the Hotel Lobby and Casino areas. Ninety eight

persons lost their lives. The principle initial investigation team was

provided by the National Response Team of the U.S. Department of

Treasury Bureau of Alcoholic Tax and Firearms (BATF.) This team was

joined by representatives of the Center for Fire Research of the

National Bureau of Standards (CFR) , the U.S. Fire Administration, the

U.S. Fire Academy, and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA.)

Each of the participants contributed to the investigation. The

principal resource of the CFR representatives consisted of a knowledge

of fire dynamics and predictive methods which was used to develop an

engineering estimate of the development of the fire. This contribution

along with the evidence gathered at the fire scene and interviews

conducted by the BATF team and others in the team led to the

development of a consistent picture of the principal events of this

fire

After returning from the fire scene, CFR representatives refined and

documented the analysis. This report contains that documentation.

1.3. Purpose

The purpose of this report is to document the use of quantitative

engineering tools to construct a description of the conditions that

occurred during the fire. Also, this study provides information needed

to evaluate the impact that fire protection measures, not in place at

the time of the fire, would have made on the outcome.

In addition, the occasion of this analysis has provided an opportunity

to test and demonstrate the use of quantitative engineering procedures

for fire safety analysis purposes. In selecting the calculation

methods, an effort was made to use the least sophisticated approach

that would give answers that are reasonably consistent with evidence

2
from the fire. The intent was to develop a complete and accurate

technical description of the fire. The specific approaches,

computational methods used, references to source documents describing

these methods, and the rationale involved in selecting and using these

methods are contained in Chapter 2.

1.4. Physical Description of Pertinent Aspects of the Facility

This Section addresses architectural and material descriptions of the

spaces involved. The thermophysical and combustion properties used in

the individual computations are covered in Chapter 2 as part of the

discussions of the computations.

Figures 1 and 2 are floor plans produced the National Fire Protection

Association [1] . A few minor changes have been made to clarify details

important to the computations in this report. Figure 1 shows the

ground floor ballroom area. In this report, the two sections in the

ballroom are referred to as the South Ballroom and the North Ballroom.

South Ballroom

The South Ballroom is approximately 36 ft. (11m) wide by 64 ft. (20m)

long. The floor to ceiling height is approximately 10 ft. (3m.) The

two ballroom areas were separated by a removable partition. The

partition consisted of a series of panels thought to have been

approximately 4 ft. (1.2m) wide and 10 ft. (3m) high. While almost all

of this paneling was consumed during fire, it is believed that the

panels were sandwich panels having high-pressure laminate skins, a wood

frame, and a foam plastic core. The panels were held in place by

pressure against short studs extending down from a structural beam

directly over the line of the panel. Witness statements indicated that

one of the panel sections near the east end of the partition was not in

place at the time the fire started. Since there was no surviving

panel, it is assumed that the missing panel was stored somewhere in the

general area of the South Ballroom and was consumed.

The south and east walls of the South Ballroom were of reinforced

concrete construction finished on the ballroom side with a fabric wall

covering. Discussion of the properties related to burning rate and

flame spread are covered in paragraphs 2 . 2 and 2.10. The results of

tests of the wall fabric material are included in Appendix F. Except

for a pair of wood doors, the west wall of the South Ballroom consisted

of large glass panels separating the South Ballroom from the lower

level of the Foyer. From the glass fragments, it appears that the

majority of the glass was 1/4- inch (6mm) plate glass. A pair of doors

located in the south wall near the southeast corner of the South

Ballroom connected the South Ballroom to a service corridor. One of

these doors swung into the ballroom and the other swung into the

service corridor. Each of these doors was 34 in. (2.83m) wide by 7 ft.

(2.1m) high. The floor of the ballroom was hardwood over a softwood

sub -floor. The ceiling, we believe, consisted of mineral boards in a grid framework.

3
At the time of the fire, about fifty stacked chairs were located along

the south wall of this ballroom towards the west end and cartons

containing replacement furniture for guest rooms were located at the

east end. The furniture consisted primarily of typical hotel dressers,

constructed of wood and particle board contained in corrugated shipping

cartons. In addition, about 20% of the storage area consisted of

similar corrugated cardboard cartons containing sofa beds with foam

mattresses. The evidence available after the fire indicated that the

storage pile was neatly stacked, boxes reasonably close together,

producing a storage pile approximately 6 ft. 3 in. (1.9m) high by 15

ft. (4.6m) wide in the east to west direction and 30 ft. (9.1m) in the

north to south direction, the north end of the pile being very close to

the line of the removable partition. The missing panel was described

as immediately adjacent to the furniture storage.

North Ballroom.

The North Ballroom is 23 ft. (7m) tall having a balcony at the same

level as the second floor of the building. The level of the balcony is

13 ft. (3.9m) above the floor of the ballroom. The walls of the

ballroom conkisted of concrete, plaster, and gypsum board materials.

Most of the walls were covered with the same fabric wall covering as the South Ballroom. Major portions of the west wall were glass. The

North Ballroom contains four doorways , each has a set of double doors

There also were two wood doors leading to the pantry area. The fire

damage on these two doors was limited to the ballroom side of the

doors , indicating that they remained closed during the course of the

fire. At the south end of the west wall there was a set of 10 ft. (3m)

tall by 3 ft. (.9m) wide doors. These were of decorative wooden

construction and opened from the North Ballroom into the Foyer. The

other three doors are of metal construction, each leaf of which is 3

ft. (.9m) wide by 7 ft. (2.1m) high. These doors open directly to the

outside. On the east wall of the North Ballroom, there is a shipping

door entrance of similar size that opens to a service corridor and an

archway to the outside. According to witness accounts, one panel of

the 10 ft. (3m) high door was opened and all of the leaves of the other

doors in the west wall of the North Ballroom were opened early in the

fire and blocked in that position. In addition it is understood that

the shipping door entrance was open before and through the course of

the fire. The computations in this report assume this arrangement of

doors

The north end of this ballroom is a stage elevated about 30 in. (.8m).

The stage has a ceiling level approximately 3 ft. higher than the rest

of the ballroom. Frames for stage lighting are located in this area.

4
Foyer

A two -story high Foyer (see Figure 2) housing a 10-ft. (3m) wide open

stairway provided the connecting link from the ground floor entrances

to the ballroom complex and the Lobby. In addition to the glass

partition separating the South Ballroom from the Foyer, approximately

12 ft. of the west wall of the North Ballroom was also common to the

Foyer. The center portion of this section consisted of the 10 ft. (3m)

high door and a decorative wood panel extending from the top of the

door to the ceiling. Side panels of glass completed this section of

wall

The separation of the balcony portion of the North Ballroom and the

function room at the second floor level from the Foyer also consisted

of glass partitions. A major portion of the separation between the

west wall of the Foyer and the Casino was also glass. On the first

floor, there is a glass window near the north end of the Foyer

separating the Foyer from a restaurant area. This window survived the

fire

The north (external) wall of the Foyer was of glass construction. Also

the Foyer was separated from the Lobby by a glass partition at the

second floor level. The partition ran from floor to ceiling but had an

opening at the head of the stairs approximately 14 ft. (2.3m) wide

extending from the slab to the ceiling. On the second floor, the floor

to ceiling distance is 10 ft. (3m). On the first floor level, the

south end of the Foyer extends under the stairs and was separated from

the service corridors by a closed door.

Lobby

The main Lobby area is open connecting to an entrance arcade. At the

south end of the entrance arcade is the main entrance to the hotel.

This entrance was an open arch approximately 10 ft. (3m) high by 27 ft.

(8.2m) wide. At the west end of the main Lobby an open archway

approximately 3 ft. (.9m) wide by 7 ft. (2.1m) high opened onto a spiral staircase leading to the swimming pool. North of the Lobby is

the central core of the high-rise building containing elevators,

stairs, shafts, rest rooms, and similar spaces.

Casino

The Casino wrapped around the central core area. The main entrance to

the Casino was at the east end. This door consisted of two tempered

glass leafs each approximately 3 ft. (.9m) wide by 7 ft. (2.1m) high.

At the start of the fi*re, these doors were standing open. At the east

end of the Casino, there was a second wood frame door consisting of a single leaf. This door is reported as having been standing in the open

position at the start of the fire.

5
1.5. Brief Description of Method of Analysis

All pertinent data and information available to the author were used in

conducting the fire analysis contained in this report. These included

information provided by witnesses, evidence left by the fire, and the

computational efforts described in Chapter 2 . The rationale for the

choice of data and the selection of assumptions are part of the

discussion of the computations contained in Chapter 2. Throughout the

evaluation, cross checks were made between the witness statements and

physical evidence and the development of the computations.

In general, values used for both the thermophysical and combustion

properties of materials are based on generic values for the types of

materials involved. Except as mentioned in Chapter 2, there were no

tests of the materials from this building.

For each stage of fire development, appropriate models and equations

were assembled to describe the development of fire and its impact on

the building environment. The output of each stage became the input of

the next, until a consistent set of calculations was developed to

describe the full course of events in the fire. The mechanisms and

methods are described in Chapter 2

The degree of expected variation in the predicted times is discussed in

Chapter 2 . The computations yield exact numbers , but the reader is

cautioned that a tolerance in the range of about 25% on indicated times

and somewhat smaller tolerances on indicated temperatures and

concentrations must be expected. Corroboration with witness accounts

give confidence to the accuracy of the computations . But without a rigorous re-creation of the events of this fire, the computations must

be viewed as engineering estimates.

1.6. Brief Description of Fire Development

Figures 3 through 10 schematically trace the development of the fire at

different times and places as determined by this analysis. Each of

these figures is annotated with the calculated results for the

variables at that time. The results are presented in terms of flame

height measured from the floor, smoke layer height, smoke temperature,

visibility through the smoke, oxygen concentration, and other variables

where necessary.

Figures 11 through 16 summarize the results of major calculations used

to develop the values presented in the forgoing figures.

Figure 11 shows a graph of the estimated flame height and flame

extension under the ceiling against time in the South Ballroom.

Figure 12 displays the calculated flame height and flame extension

under the ceiling in the North Ballroom. This flame is an extension of

6
the flame from the objects burning in the South Ballroom and emanates

from the opening in the partition between the two ballrooms

Figure 13 shows predicted smoke layer temperature in the North and

South Ballrooms and in the Foyer. The computed temperatures in the

North Ballroom appear consistent with the limited extent of fire growth

and damage in that space. Much of the wall covering, chairs, and the

stage were visibly intact after the fire. However, most of the balcony

area and major portions of the ceiling reveal these areas experienced

much higher temperatures, probably later in the fire. This damage is

believed to be indicative of a reentry of fire into the upper portions

of the North Ballroom at time beyond that shown in figure 13 (i.e.

later than 600 seconds) , probably after the breakage of the glass

partitions at the Lobby level of the foyer. In this analysis that

breakage is estimated to have occurred at about 720 seconds after

established burning (t+720 seconds.)

Figure 14 shows the calculated descent of the smoke level in these same

spaces

Figure 15 tracks predicted oxygen concentration in the smoke. The

plots in this figure stop at 600 seconds (the approximate time of

flashover in the South Ballroom) because the procedure used to generate

this data is not valid beyond that time. As discussed in Chapter 2,

some broad judgement estimates of further decrease in oxygen content

are made. The estimates more than 600 seconds after established

burning are not considered sufficiently quantitative to include them in

the plot.

Figure 16 follows the estimated visibility through smoke against time.

This value is an indicator of the opaqueness of the smoke. Again the

procedure used to estimate this value is not valid for the conditions

believed to have occurred after 600 seconds following established

burning

In all of these presentations , the time indicated is the time following

established burning as discussed in paragraph 2.3a. This is not the

moment of ignition but rather the moment when fire becomes established

on the corrugated cartons of the furniture pile. This report does not

address the means or manner of ignition.

Figure 17 is a simplified elevation of the building viewed from the

north. Based on the results of the analysis and on the evidence of

fire damage, the following quantitative narration is our best estimate

of the fire progress.

The fire is believed to have originated on a large pile of cartons of

new furniture in the northeast corner of the South Ballroom near the

arrow labeled number 1 in Figure 17

Smoke began to fill both the 10 ft. (3m) high South Ballroom and flowed

into the main 23 ft. (7m) high North Ballroom through the missing panel

7
in the partition as the fire progressed in the cartons. This flow is

indicated by arrow 1 in Figure 17.

Witness accounts indicate that one of the doors leading from the North

Ballroom to the Foyer which contained the main staircase to the Lobby

was open during this period.

As smoke filled the ballrooms, it is estimated to have emerged into the

Foyer at approximately seven minutes. This was the first time smoke

entered the view of the general public. The smoke flow into the Foyer,

however, was cool, thin smoke at this time.

At about ten minutes after initial involvement of the fuel package,

flashover is thought to have occurred in the South Ballroom. The

flashover involved large portions of combustible wall materials, any

unignited portion of the partition between the two locations,

significant portions of the wood flooring, and the stacked chairs.

Flashover caused heat and stress to break the window partition between

the Foyer and the South Ballroom and a massive quantity of smoke and

flames was released into the Foyer (arrow 2) . Our calculations

indicate that in approximately forty seconds, from the time of

flashover of the South Ballroom, a deep, hot, toxic (depleted in oxygen

and likely containing high concentrations of carbon monoxide) smoke

front traversed the Lobby forcing the occupants to flee and blocking

both of the doors exiting the Casino into the Lobby area. (See both

arrows numbered 3) The main door being blocked almost instantly after

flashover of the South Ballroom, the rear door remaining passable for

about forty seconds

It is believed that the occupants of the Lobby and the Casino first

became aware of the serious threat to their lives with the crash

involved in the breakage of the windows between the South Ballroom and

Foyer at the time of flashover of the South Ballroom and the subsequent

flow of dense smoke into the Lobby.

Our computations indicate that with flashover of the South Ballroom, a wall of flame lapped out of the ballroom up to the wooden ceiling of

the Foyer and across a major portion of that ceiling. Very quickly,

this added the fuel from the ceiling to the fire. At about two minutes

after flashover of the South Ballroom, the temperature rise in the

Foyer caused failure of the remaining glazed areas surrounding the

Foyer (except for the first floor window between the Foyer and the

restaurant area which was probably cooled by the air flow that occurred

from the outside.) A sudden flow of hot gases and unburned fuel

traversed from the Foyer into the Casino quickly changing to a flame

front that swept the length of the Casino in about twenty seconds

(arrow 4 .

)

A large body of flame broke through the glass windows of the west wall

of the Casino. It is presumed that an eddy of flame caused the deaths

8
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Chapter 2. Details of Analysis

2.1.

General

This chapter covers the procedures used to estimate conditions that

occurred in the ballroom complex, Foyer, Lobby, Casino, and adjacent

areas during the development of the fire.

An attempt was made to accomplish the evaluation using methods that can

be quickly executed on personal computers or hand held calculators

This objective was nearly accomplished. It was necessary, however, to

resort to a more comprehensive model (FIRST, see paragraph 2.3, below)

to develop a credible estimate of the development of the smoke layer in

the South Ballroom prior to flashover in that room. FIRST was also

needed to compute the amount and unburned fuel content of the preflashover flow of smoke from the South Ballroom to the North Ballroom.

This chapter addresses the analysis of the fire from the standpoint of

the specific calculations undertaken. The organization of the

subsequent paragraph is listed below. Appendices A, B, and C present

tables, graphs, and computer printouts covering the results of

computations related to the South Ballroom, North Ballroom and Foyer,

respectively. Figures 3 through 10 depict the situation as a series of

selected times in the fire development. The titles of the remaining

paragraphs in this chapter are given below as a preview of this

discussion.

Many of the subparagraph headings in paragraphs 2. 2, 2.

and 2.4 of this

chapter include an indication of the time span of fire development

discussed in that subparagraph (eg: t+0 to about t+590 seconds.) These

are provided to assist the reader in following the course of fire

development. In some cases the actual determination of the indicated

time interval is developed in a different paragraph. Also all

indicated times are estimated times following established burning. See

Chapter 1, paragraph 1.5 for discussion of the general range of

expected variation between predicted time and actual time.

2.2. Mass Burning Rate

a. Pre-Flashover (free) Burning of Initially Ignited Fuel

Package

b. Post Flashover Burning of Materials in the South

Ballroom.

c. Burning of Foyer Ceiling After Flashover of South

Ballroom but Prior to Entry of Fire into Casino.

2.3. Rate of Heat Release.

a. Pre-Flashover (Free) Burning of Initially Ignited Fuel

Package

b. Rate of Energy Flow from South Ballroom to North

Ballroom Prior to Flashover in South Ballroom.

10
c . Rate of Energy Flow from North Ballroom to Foyer Prior

to Flashover in South Ballroom.

d. Post Flashover Energy Flow from South Ballroom.

e. Energy Release from the Foyer Celling After Flashover of

South Ballroom but Prior to Entry into Casino.

2.4. Smoke Temperatures

a. Smoke Temperatures in the South Ballroom.

b. Smoke Temperatures in the North Ballroom.

c. Smoke Temperatures in the Foyer Prior to Flashover in

the South Ballroom.

d. Smoke Temperatures in the Foyer Following Flashover in

the South Ballroom.

2.5. Smoke Layer Depth.

2.6. Velocity of Smoke/Fire Front.

2.7. Mass Product in Smoke Layer.

2.8. Oxygen Concentration in Smoke Layer.

2.9. Visibility in Smoke Layer.

2.10. Flame Length (Extension.)

2.11. Flame Spread.

2.12. Potential Response of Sprinklers.

2.13. Potential Response of Smoke Detectors.

2.14. Fire Duration.

2.2. Mass Burning Rate.

a. Pre-Flashover (Free) Burning of Initially Ignited Fuel Package, t+0

to about t+590 Seconds.

The mass burning rate of the initial fuel package was derived by

dividing the rate of energy release (see paragraph 2.3, below) by the

average heat of combustion. The average heat of combustion is

estimated at 12000 btu/lb. (27,885 kJ/kg) of consumed material. This

estimate is based on an assumption of an approximately 50/50 mixture

of cellulosic (paper and wood) and hydrocarbon (plastics and similar

resins.) A mean value of 8000 btu/lb (18,590 kJ/kg) is assigned for

the cellulosic materials and 16000 btu/lb (37,180 Kj/kg) for the

hydrocarbon portion. This estimate includes that portion of the wall

covering and panel material involved prior to flashover of the South

Ballroom. For a further discussion of the extent of involvement of

11
I

the wall covering material and the paneling see paragraph 2.10, below.

b. Post Flashover Burning of Materials In the South Ballroom. After

about t+590 Seconds.

The method used is adapted from chapter 5 of Drysdale [2]

The basic equation is:

Where

II ih

II

L

V

II in

II

( 1 )

Mass Burning Rate per unit area

Total Heat Flux on Material per unit area

Heat of Gasification

Since the prime interest is the first minutes after flashover, the

impact of charring of wood elements is not considered.

Post Flashover Fltix

The post flashover total heat flux is estimated to be 7 btu/ft.^ (80

kW/m^ ) on the exposed surfaces of the initial fuel package, the walls,

and the partition. These materials burned above the post flashover

hot gas interface in the South Ballroom. This value is typical of the

range of total heat flux found in full scale room experiments

The wood floor of the South Ballroom lies below the estimated level of

the post flashover hot gas interface. For this reason the post

flashover heat flux on the floor is estimated at 1.75 btu/ft.^

(20kW/m^.) This estimate is based on the fact that only about 50 per

cent of the floor surface showed signs of significant burning. In the

calculations in this report the involved surface area of the South

Ballroom floor is set at 50% of the floor area (1015 ft.^ or 108 m^ .

)

Heat of Gasification.

The heat of gasification is taken as 860 btu/lb (2 kJ/g) for all of

the exposed combustible materials except the fabric wall covering

material. This is a typical value representative of the values given

for materials similar to those in the South Ballroom in Table 5.6 of

Drysdale 's textbook [2]. The fabric wall covering material was tested

as bonded to concrete using the Cone Calorimeter [3.] The report of

this test indicated a heat of gasification about 3400btu/lb (8 kJ/g.)

The test results are contained in Appendix F.

12
Pyrolysis Rates.

For calculation purposes it is assumed that the surface areas of the

exposed materials did not appreciably change prior to flashover.

Equation (1) and the data listed above were used to estimate the post

flashover pyrolysis rates of materials in the South Ballroom. The

results are shown in Table 1.

Wall Covering.

The wall covering material is a fabric material having a weight of

approximately 1/7 Ib./ft.^ (700 g/m^ . ) At a post flashover burning

rate of 0.125 Ib./min/ft.^ (10 g/s/m^) the fabric is consumed in 1 to

2 minutes following post flashover involvement. There were sufficient

quantities of all of the other materials to continue burning for at

least 10 to 15 min. after flashover. Some burned for a much longer

time. See paragraph 2.15 for a discussion of fire duration.

c. Burning of Foyer Celling After Flashover of South Ballroom but

Prior to Entry of Fire Into Casino. About t+590 to about t+720

Seconds

As discussed in more detail in paragraph 2.10, Flame Length, a significant body of flame covered portions of the heavy timber ceiling

of the Foyer. This occurred immediately after flashover of the South

Ballroom.

The total heat flux from this flame to the ceiling is estimated at

3.5 btu/sec/ft.^ (40 kW/m^ ) . This level was chosen as typical of the

flux levels observed in flame spread and wall burning experiments. At

this level of heat flux, the timber ceiling surfaces can be expected

to ignite in about one minute. Based on a heat of gasification of 680

btu/lb (2kJ/g) the rate of mass loss from the ignited portion of the

ceiling was about 0.005 Ib/sec./ft.^ (20 g/s/m^) of wood surface.

Because of the deep beams, the wood surface of the ceiling is

approximately 1.9 times the projected floor area beneath it.

2.3. Rate of Heat Release

a. Pre- flashover (Free^ Bum of Initially Ignited Fuel Package, t+0 to

about t+590 Seconds.

Initial Fuel Package

The initial fuel package consisted of guest room furniture packed

in corrugated cardboard shipping cartons. Much of the furniture was

dressers made of wood and particle board. The cartons containing

dressers were stacked two high. About 20% of the total volume

contained urethane foam upholstered sofa beds.

The fuel array stood approximately 6.25 ft. (1.9m) high and covered

approximately 450 ft.^ (42m^) of floor area. The point of ignition is

13
assumed to have involved cartons containing dressers and to have been

about 3 feet (0.9m) above floor level. It is assumed that failure of

corrugated board and other factors widened the fire and involved

sufficient downward extension so that it is reasonable to assume a virtual source at floor level. All of the calculations of fire

development and appraisals of the potential response of fire

protection devices, other than smoke detectors in the South Ballroom,

are based on this assumption. In view of the early response of smoke

detectors, the calculation of smoke detector response assumes a virtual source at the level of ignition (i.e., 3 feet (0.9m)) above

floor level.

Source Data

The rate of heat release during the burning of this package was

estimated by comparing it to experimental burns of similar arrays.

Many large scale tests of material in corrugated cartons have been

conducted at the Factory Mutual Research Corporation. The results of

these tests have been tabulated by Alpert and Ward [4] . A different

presentation of the same material is contained in NFPA 204M, Smoke and

Heat Venting (1985) [5]. A report of a test of a sofa, reasonably

similar to the sofa beds in the fuel array is reported by Gross [6] in

his compilation of data for predictive modeling. A similar

compilation including the above and others (but with less detail) has

been presented by Nelson [7]

In the past several years, persons interested in developing generic

rate of heat release rates have classed open flaming fires into four

basic catagories. The categories are labeled Ultra-Fast, Fast,

Medium, and Slow. These are well described by Fleming [8.]

Figure 18 is adapted from Fleming's article. Of interest is the dashed

curve labeled "6-ft storage." The fuel array for the test that gives

this result is used as a standard in numerous tests of fire protection

systems. The test cartons for the "6-ft storage" array contain foam

plastic pails. This is expected to burn slightly faster than wooden

furniture in similar cartons. The ignition source for the test array

is a cotton wick soaked in a gasoline class liquid, placed between two

boxes

The second set of dashed lines in Figure 18 shows that shown for

"furniture" and "6-ft storage", relocated to the origin of the graph.

This is a more appropriate comparison with the generic curves . The

time difference, roughly 100 to 120 seconds in the cases shown in

Figure 18, represents an incubation period. Such a delay in active

burning always occurs with solid fuels . The length of this delay

depends on the ease of ignition of the solid fuel and the position and

intensity of the ignition source. All of the times evaluated in this

report start at the end of the incubation period. The transition from

incubation to a predictable rate of heat release rate is often

referred to as the point of established burning. Typically from the

point of established burning, free burning fires follow a relatively

14
consistent initial growth rate. This usually continues until either

the fire reaches the limits of the fuel array or a physical change,

such as the burning through of an outer layer or the collapse of the

array occurs. In this analysis the point of established burning is

the initial time of all estimates made. This point is indicated by

the letter "t" in time indications. That is, 300 seconds after the

point of established burning is shown as t+300 sec.

Figure 19 is similar to Figure 18. In this case, however, the figure

has be annotated to show the relationship of the generic curves to the

rates of heat release for various fuel arrays. The shaded area

defines the range considered to describe pre-flashover burning in the

South Ballroom. The rate of heat release curves following the edges of

the shaded area were considered and used for sensitivity analyses. A

curve approximately the same as the curve marked FAST was selected

for the evaluations conducted. The curve used is defined as one that

grows in rate of energy release as the square of time and has a growth

rate that would reach 1000 btu/sec in 150 seconds . The left hand edge

of the shaded area describes a similar curve that reaches 1000 btu/sec

in 100 seconds. The right hand curve in 200 seconds.

The general equation is

q = (2)

Where : q = Rate of Heat Release

a = A constant

t = Time (sec.)

S

rom equation (2) the values for a for the fire growth curves iscussed above are:

FOR RATE OF HEAT RELEASE

TIME TO REACH IN

1000 btu/sec. btu/sec Kw

t (sec.) a a

100 0.1 0.1055

150 0 . 0444 0.047

200 0.025 0.0264

15
Basis for Choice of Initial Fire Source.

The choice of the fire following the curve that reaches 1000 btu/sec

in 150 seconds was based on both fire test histories and sensitivity

analysis. Reported large scale test results [5] indicate that the

rate of heat release curve chosen reasonably describes a fire

involving ordinary combustibles in corrugated cartons. The

sensitivity analysis consisted of using all three curves shown above

and comparing the results to reported events in the course of the

fire. The fastest curve (1000 btu/sec in 100 seconds) condensed the

time intervals to a point inconsistent with witness accounts of the

fire. Both of the other curves produced results generally within the

range of reasonable consistency with reported events. The faster of

the two was chosen by the author based on his subjective judgement

that it is nearer the true situation. The difference in this choice

makes virtually no difference in the ultimate fire conditions. It

does, however, involve a 20 to 25 percent difference in times to reach

any given condition up to flashover of the South Ballroom. Fire

events subsequent to flashover of the South Ballroom are independent

of the pre- flashover growth rate.

b. Rate of Energy Flow from South to North Ballrooma Prior to

Flashover In South Ballroom, t+0 to about t+590 Seconds.

The rate of energy flow from the South Ballroom to the North Ballroom

was derived from a computation of the mass flow rate. Mass flow

between the ballrooms was obtained as an output from the execution of

a version of the Harvard model designated as FIRST [9]. The selection

of this model is discussed in paragraph 2.5, below. FIRST reports

vent flow ( i . e .

,

flow through the opening) in terms of temperature

,

total mass, and fraction of the mass that consists of unburned fuel.

As the fire developed, the flow contained increasingly larger portions

of unburned fuel gases. The fuel burned as it entrained air in the

North Ballroom. This constituted the major energy input into the

North Ballroom. In addition the elevated temperature of the flowing

mass also transferred energy to the North Ballroom.

An assumption was made that, up to flashover of the South Ballroom,

all of the unburned fuel that flowed into the North Ballroom found

sufficient oxygen to burn. The reliability of this assumption is a function of the oxygen content in the smoke layer in the North

Ballroom. Oxygen content was calculated assuming burning of all of

the fuel (see paragraph 2.8, below.) After t+480 seconds the

calculated oxygen concentration in the smoke layer in the North

Ballroom was below 10%. It is therefore likely that the actual smoke

temperatures in the North Ballroom were less than those calculated.

In which case the energy flow from the North Ballroom to the Foyer

might have been less than that estimated in paragraph 2.3c, below.

The rate of energy produced by the combustion of the transferred fuel

equals the rate of mass flow times the fraction of that flow that is

unburned fuel (both from FIRST) times the average heat of combustion

16
(i.e. 12000 btu/lb. - 27,885 kJ/kg.), plus the additional energy

provided by the vented hot gases given by the equation:

q = m C AT (3)

P

WHERE: q = Rate of Heat Release

ih = Mass Flow of Hot Gases

C =

p

Specific Heat (of Air)

AT = Temperature of Hot Gases Above Ambient

See Table 2. for the rates of energy release developed.

c. Rate of Energy Flow from North Ballroom to Foyer Prior to Flashover

in South Ballroom. From about t+420 to about t+590 Seconds

The first smoke to become evident in the Foyer area is believed to be

smoke that vented through an open 10 foot high door leading from the

Foyer into the North Ballroom. Based on the previous assumption that

prior to flashover in the South Ballroom, all of the fuel discharged

from the South Ballroom burned in the North Ballroom, the estimate of

energy flow is based solely on the temperature and mass of the hot

gases flowing from the door way. The details of method used to

estimate the temperature and mass flow are discussed in paragraph 2.4,

below. The rates of energy release are shown in Table 3.

d. Post Flashover Energy Flow from the South Ballroom. After about

t+590 Seconds.

Flow of Mass Generated

The mass generation (burning) rates are listed in Table 1. Even

though the doors to the South Ballroom probably stayed in place

briefly after the surrounding glass shattered, estimates are based on

all of the partition between the South Ballroom and the Foyer failing.

It is also assumed that all of the partition between the North and

South Ballrooms was down by the time the South Ballroom had fully

flashed over. Both openings then became 10 feet (3.05m) high. That

to the Foyer being approximately 36 feet (11 m) long. The opening

between the ballrooms was 64 feet (19.5 m.) wide. If this assumption

is incorrect and portions of the partition actually stayed in place

for some period after flashover of the South Ballroom, a proportionally greater mass flow into the Foyer would result. This is

because the rate of mass generation (see paragraph 2.2b above) would

remain the same while the ratio of opening to the Foyer versus opening

to the North Ballroom would increase. In view of the ventilation

17
restrictions in the Foyer, the impact would be limited to an increased

concentration of unburned fuel in the Foyer and in the products

flowing into the Lobby.

Distribution of Mass Flow

Following flashover the walls of the South Ballroom absorbed little

energy. It is reasonable to estimate energy flow as equal to the

combustion of the mass generated. The mass flow being proportional to

the relative magnitude of the ventilation factors of the openings

Ventilation factor is defined and discussed in chapter 10 of Drysdale

[10.] For the South Ballroom the relative portions of total

ventilation factor indicate a mass flow of 63% to the North Ballroom,

35.4% to the Foyer and 1.6% through the open door to the Service

Corridor.

From paragraph 2.2, the total mass pyrolysis rate following flashover

is 1,029 lb. /min (7,790 g/s . ) The heat of combustion is 12000 btu/lb

(27,885 kJ/kg.) This amount of fuel has the capability of generating

about 205,800 btu/second (217 MW.) As discussed in paragraph 2.8,

Oxygen Concentrations in Smoke Layers, it is unlikely that all mass

flowing into the North Ballroom could find sufficient oxygen to burn.

The 35.4% product flow into the Foyer produces a calculated initial

rate of energy release of 88,830 btu/sec (94MW.) Similarly that

entering the Service Corridor has a calculated initial rate of 3293

btu/sec (3474 kW)

After the wall covering material is consumed (an estimated 2 minutes

after flashover) these rates drop to 64,400 btu/sec. (68 MW) entering

the Foyer and about 3000 btu/sec (3.2 MW) entering the Service

Corridor

e. Energy Release from the Fover Celling After Flashover of South

Ballroom but Prior to Entry of Fire Into Casino From about t+590 to

t+720 Seconds.

As discussed in paragraph 2.2c, the total heat flux to that portion of

the heavy timber wooden ceiling of the Foyer covered by flame is about

3.5 btu/sec . /ft . ^ (40 kW/m^ . ) The heat of gasification is about 860

btu/lb (2kJ/g.)

The rate of energy release from the wood surface bathed by thick flame

is equal to the mass burning rate divided by the heat of gasification

times the area covered by flame. That is 0.004 Ib/ft.^/sec (20kW/m^.)

The exposed timber Foyer ceiling between the glass exterior wall and

the glass partition separating the Foyer from the Lobby areas covers

an area of approximately 2000ft. ^ (185m^.) The construction consists

of several inch thick planks supported on 4 foot (1.2m)

centers on 20 inch (0.5m) deep glue -laminated wood beams. The beams

run east to west (perpendicular to the long walls of the Foyer.) The

18
total exposed surface of wood is approximately 1.9 times the project

area of the ceiling.

The ceiling members have an inherent resistance to immediate ignition

because of their thermal inertia. At the level of energy involved in

the flame from the South Ballroom, this delay is estimated at 30 to 60

seconds. For calculation purposes it is assumed that the initial

entry of energy from the Foyer ceiling occurs at nearly the same time

as the consumption of the South Ballroom wall covering.

Since the ceiling contains only wood the heat of combustion is set at

8000 btu/lb (15,500 kJ/kg.)

From these factors it is estimated that the rate of energy release

from the Foyer ceiling is 52 btu/sec/proj ected ft.^ (590 kW/projected

m^ ) of flame covered ceiling. The rate of heat release available from

total flame involvement of the entire exposed ceiling is approximately

104,000 btu/sec (110 MW.) As discussed in paragraph 2.4d, this energy

potential is believed to have been released starting shortly after the

flashover of the South Ballroom. As oxygen is depleted, in the Foyer,

that portion of the excess fuel that flows from the room will find new

paces to burn as it encounters air.

2.4. Smoke Layer Temperatures.

Figure 13 is a plot of the estimated average smoke temperatures in the

South Ballroom, North Ballroom, and Foyer.

All times are the time from established burning. This follows the

incubation period from the moment of the presence of an ignition

source until a firm flame several inches high involving the cartons of

the initial fuel package is established.

a. Smoke Temperatures In the South Ballroom.

(1) Prior to Flashover. t+0 to about t+590 Seconds.

The method used to predict smoke temperatures in the South Ballroom

from t+0 to flashover of that space (i.e., about t+590) is that

proposed by Quintiere [11.] A programed version of this procedure is

contained in FIREFORM [12.] A further adjustment of the program

developed during this appraisal handles up to 5 different lining

materials and calculates a series of results through the progression

of time and temperature exposure. The results of applying this

procedure to the South Ballroom are contained in Appendix A. While

the printout lists the results in a manner similar to those produced

by model, each line of results represents a separate independent

calculation. In this report the specific computer program involved is

assigned the title UTEMP[13]

The results of this calculation are a function of the rate of energy

input at any time, the length of time that the lining material is

19
exposed to elevated temperatures, and the ventilation factor of the

openings

The description of the energy release rate of the fire is a continuation of the t- squared fire started at t+0. The time of

exposure of the room linings also starts a t+0.

Room Lining Materials

The procedure evaluates the effective conductance of the room linings.

To accomplish this the program requires the thermal inertia and the

thermal conductivity of each segment of wall lining. Thermal inertia

as used in these calculations is the product of specific heat,

density, and thermal conductivity of the material involved. Thermal

inertia is in terms of (MJ)^/s/m^/K^ . Thermal conductivity is in

terms of MJ/kg/K.

The South Ballroom calculation involves five different lining

materials. They are:

(1) Wood floor. Area 2304 ft.^ (214m^.) The thermal

properties are based on those of wood. The values used

are 0.16 for thermal inertia and 0.00012 for thermal

conductivity.

(2) Mineral ceiling . Area 2304 ft.^ (214m^.) All of the

ceiling was dislodged during the fire events. It appeared

to have been a mineral tile about 1 inch (0.025m) thick.

The thermal properties are based on data on gypsum. The

values used are 0.18 for thermal inertia and .00017 for

thermal conductivity.

(3) Partition Panels . Area 600 ft.^ (56m^.) The

partition consisted of separate panels each believed to be

4 feet (1.2m) wide and 10 feet (3.05m) high. It is

estimated that each individual panel weighed less than 25

lb. (11.3 kg.) All but a few square feet of the outer skin

of the partition panels were consumed in the fire. It

appears that the panel was of sandwich construction. The

sandwich appears to have consisted of thin (0.06 inch - 0.0015 m thick) high pressure laminate skins over a thermoplastic foam core. The thickness of the core is

unknown. The sandwich frame is believed to have been

common wood. For initial heat transfer purposes the core

and unexposed side of the panel were ignored. The

available data base does not have values for high pressure

laminate materials. As an approximation, the values for

hardboard were used. The values used are 0.24 for thermal

inertia and 0.0002 for thermal conductivity.

(4) Glass . Area 360 ft.^ (33.4m^.) The values used for

the glass separation between the South Ballroom and the

20
Foyer are 22.5 for thermal inertia and .0012 for thermal

conductivity.

(5) Fabric Covered Concrete . Area 1000 ft.^ (93m^.) For

purposes of heat conduction during the developmental

stages of the fire these walls were treated as having

properties similar to concrete. This is felt reasonable,

in the absence of test data, because of the lightness of

the wall covering. This approximation breaks down if the

covering delaminated from the wall. A small section of

covering surviving in the south end of the east wall of

the North Ballroom showed minor blistering. This area was

close to the South Ballroom but partially protected by the

alcove for the stairs to the balcony. Other surviving

wall covering located near the north end of the North

Ballroom did not blister. The values used are 2.9 for

thermal inertia and 0.0012 for thermal conductivity.

Determining Ventilation Factors

The majority of the air for combustion of the fire in the South

Ballroom entered through the opening in the partition between it and

the North Ballroom. The air drawn into the fire was replaced in the

North Ballroom by air from four open doors to the outside and the open

leaf of the door between the North Ballroom and the Foyer. These same

openings also served as the exit route for smoke and other gases

expelled by the fire. In view of the importance of both combustion

air and the venting of fire product, the impact of both the openings

between the ballroom sections and the openings out of the ballrooms

was evaluated. The impact of an opening on fire development is a function of the opening dimension called ventilation factor. When

there is more than one opening the impact of ventilation is

proportional to the sum of the ventilation factors of the individual

openings . The ventilation factor of an opening is equal to the area

of the opening times the square root of the height of that opening.

At t+0, one panel in the partition separating the South Ballroom from

the North Ballroom was missing. This left an opening adjacent to the

area of ignition. The estimated size of this opening is 10 feet high

by 4 feet wide. Also within the first minute of fire development a door 7 feet high by 2.83 wide leading to the service corridor was

opened. This door stayed open for the duration of the fire.

The partition panels appeared to have been held in place by pressure

against an over head member and a thermal plastic tongue and grove

like fitting between individual panels. It is estimated that each of

the individual panels fell from its position within 30 to 60 seconds

of major flame impingement on it. The approach used to estimate flame

impingement is detailed in paragraph 2.10, below.

On this basis it is estimated that the panels adjacent to the

21
initially ignited fuel package all failed within 3 to 4 minutes from

established ignition.

Also at about the time the panels close to the initial fuel package

failed, one three-foot (0.91m) leaf of the 10-foot (3.05m) high door

from the North Ballroom to the Foyer was opened. The UTEMP[13]

computations are based on ventilation provided by one 16 -foot (4.9m)

wide by 10 -foot (3.05m) high opening towards the North Ballroom and

one 2. 83 -foot (1.2m) wide by 7 -foot (2.13m) high open door to the

Service Corridor being established by t+ 180 seconds.

The vented (fuel controlled burning) phase of the fire in the South

Ballroom ends when the calculations indicate an average upper layer

temperature of about 1100 F (600 C.) This temperature was taken in

these calculations to indicate flashover. As shown in Appendix A

these calculations predict flashover of the South Ballroom in about

t+590 seconds.

(2) Post Flashover Phase. From t+590 seconds

At the time of flashover additional ventilation occurred due to the

failure of the glass partition wall between the South Ballroom and the

Foyer. Following this the burning rate is regulated by the amount of

air that can enter the South Ballroom and the rate of heat transfer

into the ballroom walls. A equation for estimating post flashover

smoke temperature is presented by Quintiere [11.] The equation is:

1/3

AT = 896{A^/h/(\A)} (4)

WHERE: AT = Post Flashover Temperature Rise (C)

Aq = Area Of Opening (m^

)

Hq = Height Of Opening (m)

hj^ = Effective Enclosure Conductance (kW/K/m^

)

A = Surface Area Of Room Lining (m^

)

UTEMP stops when temperatures indicate flashover allowing the user to

adjust the size of openings to account for breakage due to flashover.

The program saves the information on thermal properties of the lining

22
material and the duration of energy impact on the lining materials

It then executes equation 4. The results are shown the UTEMP printout

in Appendix A. The procedure is unable to account fully for the

venting of post flashover hot gases following the failure of the

partition, the probable partial depression of burning due to the mass

excess of fuel in the fire gases, and the actual venting efficiency of

the air supply routes. For these reasons it is likely that the actual

temperature may have been several hundred degrees F less than that

indicated.

b. Smoke temperatures In North Ballroom.

(1) Up to flashover of South Ballroom, t+0 to about t+590

Seconds

The Available Safe Egress Time Model (ASET) developed by Cooper and

Stroup [14] is the principle calculation tool for this phase. The

basic form (ASETB) as developed by Walton [15] and modified by Nelson

in FIREFORM [12] was used. In addition the specific form of ASETB

used includes a significant number of modifications to adjust the

input and output form to the meet author's needs and to undertake a series of related calculations. These are discussed in subsequent

paragraphs of this report. The form of ASET used, however, remains

exactly true to the computations developed by Cooper [14] and the

numerics contained in ASETB [15.] This adjusted version combining

ASETB with other procedures has been assigned the name R00MFIR[16] for

this report.

Since the upper part of the North Ballroom constitutes a closed space

ROOMFIR was used to estimate smoke temperatures in that space. In

view of the ratio of height to width of the space involved an overall

energy loss factor of 0.8 was selected. The radiant energy loss

factor was set at 0.35. The base level of the fire was set at 6 feet

(1.8m) above floor level to reflect the smoke level of the fire in the

South Ballroom. (See paragraph 2.5, below.)

(2) Following flashover of the South Ballroom. After about

t+590 Seconds.

At the time of flashover of the South Ballroom the estimated oxygen

concentration in the smoke in the North Ballroom is approaching zero. Little, if any, burning can occur in this reduced oxygen atmosphere.

With flashover and the subsequent mass burning rate (see paragraph

2.2, above), a initial fuel flow rate of in excess of 875 lbs. /min.

(6732g/s) entered the North Ballroom. For the most part this fuel

collected in the upper portions of the North Ballroom until the

subsequent failure of the window wall between the North Ballroom

balcony and the Foyer. The development of these subsequent events is

discussed in paragraph 2.4d, below. When this occurred fuel flowed

from the Ballroom into the Foyer and air flowed into the upper portion

of the North Ballroom. As evidenced by the burn patterns in the North

23
Ballroom, a localized flashover occurred in the balcony and adjacent

areas

c. Smoke temperatures In Foyer Prior to Flashover in the South

Ballroom. From about t+420 to t+590 Seconds.

The flow of smoke into the North Ballroom progressively filled the

upper portions of the North Ballroom. As shown in Appendix B, the

smoke level is calculated to have reached the 10 -foot level at about

t+420 seconds. At this point the first flow of smoke from the

ballroom complex to the Foyer started. The flow passed under the

soffit of the 10 -foot (3.05m) tall open door between the North

Ballroom and the Foyer. While the smoke was relatively cool compared

to that in the South Ballroom, it still contained energy and started . to flow to the roof of the Foyer and into the ceiling spaces of the

Lobby. If any unburned fuel was present, the flow was too cool to

ignite it.

The energy flow to the Foyer was determined using equation (3) as described in paragraph 2. 2b., above. Equation (3) requires

determination of the mass flow of hot gases. The procedure used to

estimate smoke flow through an opening is contained in FIREFORM [12.]

In making these calculations it is assumed that the venting through

the single 3 -foot (0.91m) wide door has no significant effect on the

rate of descent of smoke predicted by ROOMFIR for the North Ballroom.

Once the smoke drops below the tops of the 7 -foot (2.13m) high open

door ways, it is assumed that the venting will limit the further

descent of smoke to 6 -foot (1.8m) above the floor.

Application of the perfect gas law determined the density of the

discharged gases. In this application it is assumed that the density

of the discharged gases is approximately the same as that of air at

the same temperature. Equation 3 was then used to estimate the energy

flow rate . The calculated values are presented in Table 3

The Foyer area connected directly to the Lobby area through a ceiling

high opening approximately 14 feet (4.3m) wide. At the low levels of

energy flowing into the foyer at this stage, the opening presented

little restriction to smoke flow. This resulted in a common ceiling

area of about 8500 ft.^ (790m^.) In view of the large area involved

an overall energy loss factor of 0.6 is used. Since the ceiling layer

gases that enter the Foyer at this time are relatively cool, the

radiant heat loss is low, assumed zero. The height of the fire is 7 feet (2.13 m.) The computer program printout detailing these results

is contained in Appendix C.

d. Smoke Temperatures In the Foyer Following Flashover in the South

Ballroom. From about t+590 to about t+720 Seconds.

This portion of the analysis covered the period from the flashover of

the South Ballroom (t+590 seconds) to the subsequent flashover -like

occurrence in the Foyer area.

24
When the South Ballroom flashed over, it is expected that the 36 -foot

(10.9m) long by 10 -foot (3.05m) high window wall between the South

Ballroom and the Foyer failed. It is likely that the two 3 -foot

(0.9m) wide glass panels in the short section of wall between the

North Ballroom and the Foyer also failed at this time or soon after.

It is believed, however, that the window wall between the Foyer and

the outside, the glass partition adjacent to the top of the Foyer

stairs and the windows between the Foyer and the second floor function

rooms, the Casino, and the restaurant beneath the Casino did not break

at this stage. While the physical evidence and witness statements

cannot fully confirm this assumption, it is felt that it best fits the

reported course of the fire.

As discussed in paragraph 2.3c, above, the rate of flow of mass from

the flashed over South Ballroom into the Foyer starts at approximately

364 Ibs/min (2757 g/s . ) Approximately 2 minutes later, this drops to

a level of about 322 Ibs/min (2435 g/s) as the wall covering is

consumed. During this same period, however, the Foyer ceiling starts

to burn releasing additional energy at a rate of about 0.4

Ibs/min/ft.^ (9.5g/s/m^) of involvement. The area of involvement

being quoted on projected area rather than actual surface area. Discussion of flame impingement and extension along the Foyer ceiling

is provided in paragraph 2.10, below.

Had there been sufficient air for combustion such rates of mass flow

could have produced an initial energy level of about 88,000 btu/sec

(94MW.) The major source of combustion air for the fire in the Foyer

was, however, the 10 -foot (3.05m) high by 14 feet (4.3m) wide opening

between the Foyer and the Lobby. The ultimate source of this air

being the open 10-foot (3.05m) high by 25-foot (7.6m) wide main

entrance to the building.

The smoke temperature in the Foyer was estimated using UTEMP[13] . One

of the features incorporated in UTEMP is a test for ventilation limit.

The maximum rate of heat release is that which can obtain air to bum

within the space (Foyer.) The maximum rate of heat release being

equal to a constant (k) times the ventilation factor of the opening.

If the opening dimensions are in feet, a value of 1100 for k gives the

maximum rate of energy release in btu/sec. If the opening dimensions

are in meters , a value of 55 for k gives the maximum rate of energy

release in kW.

Since the computation program used has an internal capability of

adjusting actual heat release in ventilation limited conditions, the

input was based on the estimated potential combustion energy

available. Potential energy, in this case, is that energy which would

be released if all of the available fuel actually burned within the

Foyer

For this calculation, time zero equals the time of flashover in the

South Ballroom (t+590 sec.) The imputed rates of heat release are:

25
(1) At flashover. 400 btu/sec (422 kW.) This reflects the

maximum preflashover flow of energy through the open door

between the North Ballroom and the Foyer.

(2) Flashover + 5 seconds. 88,000 btu/sec (94 MW.) This

reflects the initial post flashover flow of fire products into

the Foyer from the South Ballroom. (See paragraph 2.3d, above.)

(3) Flashover + 30 seconds. 88,000 btu/sec (94 MW.) At this

point it is expected that timber in the Foyer ceiling will start

to pyrolyze. Progressive involvement of the flame impacted

portion of the timber ceiling is expected in the next 30

seconds. The initial area of flame involvement is estimated as extending the width of the opening to the South Ballroom

resulting from the failure of the partition between that room

and the Foyer and the 19 -foot (6m) initial extension of flame

across the ceiling. (See paragraph 2.10, below for discussion of

flame extension.

(4) Flashover + 60 seconds. 145,000 btu/sec (152 MW.) This to

reflect the addition of fuel from pyrolysis of about 750 project

ft.^ (22m^) of Foyer ceiling. Since the ceiling is totally of

wood construction the rate of energy release per unit mass

burned of ceiling timber burned is estimated at 8000 btu/lb

(18.6 kJ/g.)

(5) Flashover + 120 seconds. 200,000 btu/sec (211 MW.) This to

reflect the addition of fuel from pyrolysis of all of the Foyer

ceiling and the burnout of the fabric wall covering.

Appendix C contains the computer print out of the results. As can be

seen the burning rate is limited by the ventilation capacity of the

opening at the top of the Foyer stairs. The calculated rate of energy

release is about 25,000 btu/sec (26MW.) This burning rate uses about

800 of the over 3000 g/s of material being released. Some of the

remaining material is carried into the Lobby area in the discharged

smoke. That which can find air, shows as flame. The rest adds to the

blackness of the smoke front. Much of the excess unburned fuel

remains in the smoke accumulating in the Foyer.

The calculations also indicate that a second flashover occurs about

135 seconds after flashover in the South Ballroom. Since the fire in

the Foyer was already ventilation limited and virtually all available

fuel surfaces were pyrolyzing, the traditional concept of radiant

ignition of all unignited surfaces increasing the burning rate and

forcing a fuel controlled fire into a ventilation limited condition is

inappropriate. Rather it is likely that either the expansion forces

caused by the heating of one of the large glass surfaces or the

thermal shock of flame impacting on the glass resulted in failure of a large section of window.

26
The occurrence of such a failure would then allow more of the

available fuel to burn in the Foyer, increasing temperatures rapidly

causing the failure of the other glass surfaces. In this process, it

is believed that the failure of the glass partition between the

balcony in the North Ballroom and the Foyer released the large

reservoir of fuel gases that collected in the upper portion of the

North Ballroom following flashover of the South Ballroom.

The most likely glass surface to have been the initial surface to fail

is the glass partition between the Foyer and the Lobby. This section

of glass was the closest to the flame expelled from the South

Ballroom. Also, due to the turbulence near the smoke venting through

the South Ballroom opening, this partition would have received more

convective heat transfer.

The estimated time of this second flashover like occurrence is about

t+720. The time t+720 seconds coincides with the rise of smoke

temperature to about HOOF (600C) in the Foyer. The choice of 720

seconds is , however , an approximation made by the author based

primarily on experience and derived from witness accounts . The

development of the fire at this stage was so rapid that the maximum

potential error, in terms of time, is small.

2.5. Smoke Layer Depth

Figure 14 is a plot of the estimated height of the smoke layer above

the floor in the South Ballroom, North Ballroom, and Foyer.

The height of the smoke layer above the floor was estimated in each

case where R00MFIR[16] was used to evaluate smoke layer temperature

(i.e. the North Ballroom and the Foyer, see paragraph 2.4 above. The

prediction of the height of the smoke above the floor is a standard

output of the ASETB [15] segment of ROOMFIR. The amount of volume

occupied by the smoke is based on the entrainment of air in the rising

smoke column and the expansion of the gases due to the rise in

temperature

ROOMFIR was not used for the smoke level prediction in the South

Ballroom. In this space the large vent areas, presented by the

openings in the partition between the ballroom sections, in combination

with the rapid fire development caused conditions exceeding the

capabilities of ASETB [15]. The prediction in this area used a recently

developed form of the Harvard model now refereed to as FIRST [9]

FIRST has the capability of tracking the flows in and out of openings,

the mass and fuel flows involved, and the impact of this on the rate of

heat release and environment in the fire room. FIRST also has the

capability of increasing the opening conditions at a designated point

in the development of the fire. At the start of the FIRST simulation,

the openings consisted of the 2.83 ft. (0.86m) wide by 7 -foot (2.1m)

high door to the service corridor and an opening in the partition 10-

foot (3.05m) high by 4-foot (1.2m) wide. By instruction, the size of

the opening was increased to 16 feet (4.9m) wide at 180 seconds into

27
the simulation to simulate the estimated time of failure of the panels

next to the initial fuel package as discussed in paragraph 2.4a, above.

The post flashover level of the smoke at the interface between the

South Ballroom and the Foyer was estimated using a computer program

dubbed H0TVENT[17]. This program estimates the level of the neutral

plane in an opening venting from an flashed- over space. The equations

executed by HOTVENT are discussed in paragraph 2.6, below.

2.6. Velocity of Smoke/Flame Front.

The velocity of the smoke and hot gases vented from the Foyer to the

Lobby during the period following flashover in the South Ballroom is of

interest. It is believed that these gases blocked first the main

(west) entrance to the Casino (causing occupants to shut those doors to

inhibit the flow of smoke into the Casino) then the back (east) door,

again forcing Casino occupants to close the door to hold back the

smoke

Also of interest is the rate of flow of the flame front through the

Casino following flashover of the Foyer area and the failure of the

windows between the Foyer and the Casino.

The set of equations developed by Kawagoe and Sekine [18] and reported

by Lawson and Quintiere [19] under the title Ventilation Flow Rate in

their paper Slide Rule Estimates of Fire Growth was used for both

conditions. This set of equations relates the pressure driven flow

from the opening to the conservation of mass flow in and out of the

vented room. The flow and neutral plane being primarily a function of

the temperature difference between the out flowing hot gases and the

incoming cooler gases, the ventilation factor of the opening, and the

neutral plane where the total mass vented is equal to the total mass

drawn into the room. Discussion of this method, by Lawson and

Quintiere [19]

,

is included in Appendix G.

Since the calculations were based on conditions where the temperature

differences between room temperature and smoke temperatures were large

and the neutral plane was near the bottom of the opening the iterative

form was required. The computer program, HOTVENT, was developed to

handle the iterative calculations . Appendix C contains the printout of

HOTVENT giving the rate of mass flow and level of the neutral plane for

each case. The mass flow was converted to volume flow at the smoke

temperatures of the exposing fire and divided by the cross section of

the portion of the receiving space (i.e.. Lobby and entrance corridor

for the Lobby flow case and Casino for the Casino case) above the level

of the neutral plane. This produced a flow rate at that point.

In the case of the flow in the Lobby some cooling and condensing of the

volume occupied by the smoke occurred as it traversed the Lobby. It is

assumed that this had little effect on the speed of smoke travel but

probably resulted in a raising of the level of the smoke somewhat above

28
the level of the neutral plane existing at the opening between the

Foyer and the Lobby.

By these calculations the smoke front moved through the Lobby at an

initial speed of about 2.2 ft. /sec (0.67m/s.) At this rate the smoke

front traversed the Lobby in about 40 seconds

Similarly HOTVENT was used to estimate the flame front that moved

through the Casino. The speed of this flame front was about 6 ft. /sec.

(1.8m/s.) It is believed that the window closest to the main Casino

entrance failed first. From that point the Casino would become

completely engulfed in flame in about 20 seconds

2.7. Mass of Products In Smoke Layer.

The tracking of the concentration of the mass of products contained in

the smoke layer was computed as an adjunct calculation in R00MFIR[16]

The ASETB[15] routine in ROOMFIR is based on an input tracking the rate

of heat release of a fire against time. The relationship of rate of

heat release to mass burning rate is discussed in paragraph 2.2, above.

For the fuel burned in the South Ballroom, this has been taken as 0.00083 pounds of mass per btu of energy released (0.000043 kilograms

of mass per kilojoule of energy released). For the burning of the

ceiling in the Foyer, a lower number indicative of wood is appropriate.

This value is 0.000125 pounds of mass per btu of energy released

(0.000064 kilograms of mass per kilojoule of energy released).

The concentration of mass of products in the smoke layer at any time is

therefore the total mass discharged to that moment divided by the

volume of the smoke layer (area of ceiling times depth of smoke under

ceiling) . This can be expressed as the following equation:

P(n> - (S" q/«c>A (5)

Where: ?(„) ^ Mass of products concentration at time n.

q = rate of heat release

Hj. = Heat of combustion.

V = Volume occupied by smoke at time n.

2.8. Oxygen Concentration In Smoke Layer

The calculated oxygen concentrations in the North and South Ballrooms

and Foyer are shown in Figure 16

The method used is based on the oxygen depletion concepts described by

Huggett [20]Huggett showed that for virtually all common combustible

29
materials one gram of oxygen is consximed for each thirteen kilojoules

of energy produced (1 pound of oxygen for each 5866 btu)

The amount of oxygen consumed in the process was derived from the data

developed on mass concentration, see paragraph 2.6 above. The perfect

gas law, assuming no significant influence due to the relatively minor

differences in atmospheric pressure between the ambient air and fire

gases was used to determine the density of the gases in the smoke

layer

The amount of oxygen that would have normally been contained had the

upper layer consisted entirely of air, was determined on the basis of

the density of air multiplied by the normal 0.23 value for the mass

fraction of oxygen and air. The amount of oxygen consumed was then

subtracted from this total and the result compared to that which would

have existed without combustion. This produced the proportional

residual mass of oxygen in the smoke. This value was then multiplied

by 21%, the normal volumetric concentration of oxygen in air, to

produce an estimated volumetric concentration of oxygen in the smoke

gases

For convenience, these calculations were included in R00MFIR[16]

reported as oxygen concentration.

O2 21{[(0.23P3T^/TJ-(0.77P^„,H,A)]/(0.23P,T^/TJ) (6)

Where: O2 = Oxygen concentration (%)

Pg = Density of air at T^

Tq = Ambient temperature (Absolute)

Tg = Smoke temperature (Absolute)

P(n) Mass product concentration at time n. = Heat of combustion.

V = Volume occupied by smoke at time n.

If the smoke layer descends below the top of the burning material and

the oxygen drops below a critical level, the fire will go out. The

critical oxygen concentration varies with temperature but for the

purposes of these calculations, a critical calculation of 10% oxygen

has been chosen as indicative of a fire that is either at or approaching the point of flame extinction.

The procedure used by FIRST to calculate oxygen concentration is based

on the same physics but a different method of calculation.

2.9. Visibility in Smoke Layer

Figure 15 is a plot of the calculated visibility of the smoke layers.

The vision distance plotted is approximately the distance at which the

smoke blocks 95% of the light from a well lit source. At this point of

light blockage, little if any vision is possible.

30
The approximations are made entirely on a light obstructing basis.

They do not consider any irritating affects that might impose vision

problems on a person whose head was actually in the smoke layer.

The computation of vision distance is based on work by Mulholland [21].

The concept suggested by Mulholland is based on his recent experiments

and work by others. The calculations estimate the maximum vision

distance through the smoke layer using the specific extinction

coefficient of the fuel. A value of one meter square per gram for the

specific extinction coefficient means that. the smoke produced by one

gram of that fuel collected on a one square meter area would be

sufficient to block approximately 65% of the light incident on that

area.

For specific extinction coefficient values less than one, the area of

collection required to produce a density of smoke sufficient to block

65% of the light would be proportionately less. In the evaluations in

this report, the maximum vision distance was taken as that distance at

which 95% of the light was blocked. This means an extinction

coefficient of 1/3 m^/g. So the vision distance is the length of light

path in which the products of the fuel collected on 1/3 square meter

would block the passage of 95% of the light. At that value, light

transmission is reduced to about 5%.

The mass concentration is determined by equation (5). above.

Specific extinction coefficients vary extensively for various fuels. A

number of these are reported by Quintiere [22]

While a significant

portion of the materials involved were either cellulosic or hydrocarbon

in nature, there did not appear to be more than relatively small

proportions of the material that would be extremely sooty. On this

basis, a working extinction coefficient of 0.1 square meters per gram

of fuel burned was used in all of the calculations. Because of the

limited data in this area, this choice is arbitrary. The values

presented are indicative of the increasing density of the smoke rather

than exact vision distances.

The equation used in R00MFIR[16] can be expressed as follows:

V5-V(C3P,„,) (7)

Where

= Distance (meters) at which light is reduced by 95%.

Cs = Specific extinction coefficient (m^/g) = Mass product concentration.

2.10. Flame Length (Extension)

The term flame length is used in this discussion to describe either the

actual height of the flame above the floor or the height that the flame

would have reached had it not struck a ceiling or overhead that

31
prevented extension to its full height. Flame extension is used to

estimate the extent that a flame that strikes a ceiling would tend to

extend under that ceiling. Flame extension is estimated at 1 to 1.5

times the portion of the calculated flame height cut-off by the

ceiling.

Graphs of the development of flame extension in the early burning

periods in both sections of the ballroom complex is contained in

Figures 11 and 12

Two methods of calculating flame height were used. These are:

A, South Ballroom. The approach recommended by Drysdale for

free-standing flame away for walls was used for the South

Ballroom. The plot in Figure 11 for the South Ballroom was

I developed by this equation. The equation is:

L = 0.23 (8)

Where: L = Flame Height Above Burning Surface (m)

•= Rate of Convective Heat Release (kW)

B. North Ballroom and Foyer. The computation of pre-flashover

flame extension from the South Ballroom to the North

Ballroom and post flashover flame extension from the South

Ballroom into the Foyer are based on flames emitted from

windows. The work by Webster [23] and Yokoi [24] as correlated by Thomas, et al, [25 ] was used. This equation

which was designed for estimating flame heights out of

exterior windows . This approach is felt appropriate for

the window like conditions that occurred after breakage of

the partition between the South Ballroom and the Foyer.

The equation is as follows:

L„ = 18.6 (R/W)2/3 (9)

Where: = Flame Length Above Top of Opening (m)

R = Mass Burning Rate (kg/s)

W = Width of Opening (m)

NOTE: The data used to derive equation (9) was

derived from tests involving wood fuels. Where other

fuels are involved, it is necessary to revise the

value of R proportional to the comparative heats of

combustion of the actual fuel verses wood. In the

calculations relating to fuel emitted from the South

Ballroom the value used for R is 1.5 times the actual

mass burning rate.

32
Equation (9) was used to estimate the initial flame extension from the

South Ballroom into and across the timber roof of the Foyer. For this

calculation the value of R was set at 1.5 time the total burning rate

just after flashover in the South Ballroom (i.e., 7.79 kg/s x 1.5 =

11.7 equivalent kg/s of wood.) The value of W was set at the total

length of the openings between the South Ballroom and both the North

Ballroom and the Foyer (i.e., 30.5m.) This produces a value for of

9.8m (32.2 ft.) Since is the calculated flame length above the top

of the opening and the opening is about 13 ft. below the ceiling, the

flame extension across the ceiling is between 19 and 29 ft. (6 to 9m.)

The value of 19 ft. was used in calculations of rates of burning of the

ceiling. This lower value was used to assure that the calculations

reasonably reflected the areas of flame impact that actually imposed

the heat flux used in the burning rate calculations. (See paragraphs

2.2c and 2.4d, above for discussion of the burning rate of the

ceiling.

In view of the excess of fuel entering the Foyer as compared to the

rate of air entry through the opening into the lobby (See paragraph

2.3d, above) the actual extension of the flame may have been throttled

by a lack of oxygen. The very high smoke temperatures that quickly

developed in the Foyer (See Appendix C) , however, would assure the

continued pyrolysis of the ceiling.

Following the initial impact the further progression of the flame is

closely associated with the additional fuel entering the fire plume as the result of the portions of the ceiling ignited by the initial flame,

the spread of burning across the ceiling, the temperature of the smoke

near the ceiling, and the availability of oxygen to allow combustion.

Based only on the fuel entering the fire plume following ignition of a portion of the ceiling 36 ft. (11m) by 19 ft. (6m) across the surface

of the ceiling, equation (9) indicates a further extension of 7 to 11

ft. While the knowledge of flame spread concurrent with fire flow is

emerging (Quintiere [26]) the needed equations and data are not yet

sufficiently developed to attempt further prediction of flame length.

In addition the initial limited ventilation condition in the Foyer (see

paragraph 2.4c, above) could throttle the development of the flame as soon as the initial volume of oxygen in the Foyer was exhausted and

burning within the Foyer became dependent on air drawn in through the

opening to the Lobby. The latter limitation ceased with the extensive

failure of either the glass in the partition between the Foyer and the

Lobby or that in the exterior (north) wall of the Foyer.

It is believed (see paragraph 2.4c, above) that the partitions held for

about 2 minutes following flashover in the South Ballroom. By that

time the smoke temperatures in the Foyer were in the range of HOOF

(600C.) The heat flux to the wood would be in the range of 4

btu/ft.^/sec (40kW/m^ . ) At this level wood will either burn or, in the

absence of oxygen, pyrolyze. Once the glass failed and oxygen reached

the area of the heated wood, the entire surface of the Foyer ceiling

became flaming. Since the estimated smoke temperature in the Foyer

33
rises to about 900F (485C) within about 30 seconds from flashover in

the South Ballroom, this would be essentially correct even if the

partitions actually failed sooner that the time estimated in paragraph

2.4c, above

Had there been sufficient oxygen in the smoke layer in the North

Ballroom for full flame development, a similar sheet of flame would

have existed. However, since it is believed that the smoke layer in

the North Ballroom, at this stage of the fire was virtually devoid of

oxygen, it is assumed that the burning of the fuel expelled from the

South Ballroom into the North Ballroom did not take place and the flame

length predicted by equation (9) did not develop. Instead, it is

believed that unburned fuel collected in the upper portions of the

North Ballroom.

2.11. Flame Spread

Three of the four walls of the South Ballroom were finished with

combustible materials. The initially ignited pile of furniture in

cartons abutted the east wall of the South Ballroom. This wall and the

south wall of were both finished with a fabric wall covering glued to

the wall. I The wall covering material appears to be of a polyester

fiber weighing slightly more than one pound per square yard

(approximately 700 g/m^ ) . Tests of the flame spread properties of this

covering were conducted. The test procedure uses a vertical radiant

panel exposure. It is described by Quintiere and Harkleroad [27].

Wall covering samples taken from the surviving material on the wall of

the North Ballroom were tested. The test specimens were glued to

concrete substrate. The test results are shown in Appendix F. The

results indicate an ignition temperature of between 1160F (670C) and

1270F (688C.) The method of estimating lateral flame spread described

by Quintiere and Harkleroad [27] was used to estimate the lateral rate

of flame spread and the distance that flame is estimated to have

traveled away from the area of flame impingement prior to flashover.

This equation is one of the routines included in FIREFORM [10.] The

FIREFORM version was used in the computations made. This equation can

be expressed as follows:

V-(#/kpc)/(Tig -

( 10 ) Where

V = Flame (pyrolysis front) velocity (m/s)

$ = Flame heating parameter derived from the

test

kpc = Effective thermal inertia derived from

test.

T" = Ignition temperature as reported by test

Tg = Surface temperature of material before

flame effects

A characteristic equilibrium time of 42 seconds was determined as part

of the test procedures. This indicates that the surface temperature of
the wall fabric (T^ ) lagged the temperature of the adjacent smoke by a approximately 42 seconds . A lag of 60 seconds has been used in the

calculations in this report.

These calculation indicate a maximum flame spread (i.e., away from the

flame) of less than 3 feet (0.9m) per minute just prior to flashover.

The maximum estimated extent of flame travel up to a few seconds before

flashover is estimated at about 3 feet from the furthest point of

direct flame Impingement on the wall covering. This method ignores

upward flame spread and any spread that may have occurred concurrent

with flame lapping the wall near the ceiling. Even given this

assumption, these calculations suggest that the wall covering, if

attached to the South Ballroom wall in a manner similar to that in the

tests conducted, had very limited spread prior to flashover of the

South Ballroom. Following flashover, however, the material would have

been very quickly involved as discussed in paragraph 2.2, above.

The north wall of the South Ballroom consisted of a partitioning

material that has been described as a high pressure laminated plastic

sandwich with a foam plastic core. The data on these panels is so sketchy that it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of preflashover surface flame spread. For the purposes of this appraisal , it

was assumed that the panels fell from their housing before flame

propagated across them. This assumption is potentially in error (i.e.,

rapid early flame spread took place.) However, in view of the rapid

development of the initial fuel package of furniture stored in cartons

spread on the panel surfaces would have only minor impact on the speed

of fire development and time to flashover in the South Ballroom.

In view of the conditions involved, flame extension rather than flame

spread estimates were made of the movement of flame across the Foyer

ceiling. (See paragraph 2.10, above.)

2.12. Potential Response of Sprinklers.

No sprinklers were present in the areas involved in the fire. An

appraisal was made, however, of the likely response time of several

different types of sprinklers in an array of feasible locations from

directly over the fire to the maximum likely distance. The method used

was based on the ceiling temperature and heat actuated device response

correlation developed by Alpert [28]. Alpert's correlations were

gathered together into a computer program by Evans which has been

circulated under the title of DETACT-QS [ 29 ] . These temperature

correlations, however, are based on an unconfined ceiling where the

smoke layer does not develop below the ceiling jet during the time of

interest. As indicated by the calculation of smoke depth (see

paragraph 2.3, above) a ceiling layer did develop in the South

Ballroom. The simple use of the DETACT-QS computational method would

result in erroneous results indicating slower operation than should

really be expected.

35
Evans [30] has developed a computational procedure to account for the

presence of the hot smoke layer as an adjustment in the virtual source

of the fire plume. This adjustment was used. To accomplish this, with

reasonable computational difficulty, the Evans adjustments in virtual

source were used to connect the results from ASETB[15] calculations to

DETACT-QS calculations with an adjustment to the source of the fire.

Theses computations are incorporated in R00MFIR[16j.

To facilitate this calculation an adaptation was made to ROOMFIR that

vented hot gases , to imitate the venting from the opening in the

partition. When this adaption was run with an overall heat loss

fraction of 0.75 the results closely tracked those obtained for the

same conditions from FIRST (see paragraph 2.3, above.) This produced

results recognizing the additional heating effect of the gathering hot

gas layer. The results for a range of typical sprinkler head t3rpes and

locations is shown below.

a. Quick Response Head

RTI = 50 (27 metric)

Operating Temperature 140F (60C)

RADIAL DISTANCE RESPONSE TIME SMOKE SMOKE

FROM FIRE AXIS TEMPERATURE HEIGHT

feet (meters) Seconds F (C) feet (meters)

1 0.3 50 85 29 9.2 2.8

7 2.1 85 106 41 8.2 2.5

15 4.6 105 116 48 7.7 2.3

b. Faster Responding Standard Head

RTI = 200 (110 metric)

Operating Temperature 165F (74C)

1 0.3 85 102 39 8.3 2.5

7 2.1 135 140 60 6.9 2.1

15 4.6 170 185 85 6.4 1.9

c. Medium Responding Standard Head

RTI = 400 (221 metric)

Operating Temperature 165F (74C)

1 0.3 100 113 45 7.9 2.4

7 2.1 160 172 78 6.5 1.9

15 4.6 200 240 116 6.0 1.8

d. Slower Responding Standard Head

RTI = 700 (386 metric)

Operating Temperature 165 (74C)

1 0.3 120 129 54 7.4 2.3

7 2.1 190 217 102 6.1 1.9

15 4.6 235 300 150 5.9 1.8

Copies of printouts of the actual computer runs used to develop the

above data are contained in Appendix D.

36
The results shown are felt to bound the range of types and spacings of

sprinkler that might be present in a sprinkler protected assembly area

like the South Ballroom. As can be seen a sprinkler head faced with

the fire believed to have occurred in the South Ballroom would have

responded in 1 to 4 minutes following established burning. Even the

slowest response would have been well before flashover.

2.13. Potential Response of Smoke Detectors

There were no smoke detectors in the areas involved in the fire.

Evaluations were made, however, of how quickly smoke detectors might

have responded had they been located in the South Ballroom. As with

sprinklers, a variety of different positions of smoke detectors were

evaluated. Since most modern smoke detector have nearly identical

response to growing fires of the nature involved in the South Ballroom

distance was the only criteria. The approach used was based on the

correlations developed by Heskestad [31] and his work for the Fire

Detection Institute. Heskestad relates response of smoke detectors to

a condition at the smoke detector where Alpert's correlations for

ceiling temperatures [28] would indicate a rise in the jet temperature

of approximately 23F (13C) . On this basis, the program DETACT-QS was

used as though the ceiling were unconfined and the response of the

smoke detectors based on time at which ceiling jet temperature would

rise 23F (13C) at the positions of interest. The use of the procedure

for unconfined ceilings is appropriate in the case of smoke detectors

because the mass of fire products that triggers a smoke detector

responds only to the production of particulate matter and not to the

temperatures of the hot gas layer. Appendix E contains copies of the

output from DETACT-QS. Shown below is a distribution of the expected

response of detectors from a position directly over the fire to one at

the remote end of the South Ballroom.

RADIAL DISTANCE OF RESPONSE TIME OF

DETECTOR FROM FIRE DETECTOR

ft. (m) sec

1 (0.3) 10

15 (4.6) 35

30 (9.1) 49

60 (18.3) 69

The value of the early response available from smoke detectors depends

on the actions taken once the detector gives an alarm.

2.14. Fire Duration.

An estimate was made of the fire duration in the South Ballroom. The

definition of fire duration used for this estimate is the time that the

South Ballroom remained in a flashed over (ventilation limited burning)

37
condition. The results of this being of principle value in estimating

the impact that fire resistive barriers could have had on the

development of fire conditions, had such been present.

The ba^is for this estimate is the expectation that the burning rates

listed in Table 1 will persist until either the fuel involved is

consumed or the relationship between available ventilation and burning

rate reaches the point where the fire is no longer ventilation limited

and the fire returns to a fuel controlled state of burning.

Of interest are those fuels that were not fully consumed prior to the

return to fuel controlled burning. It is a reasonable assumption that

any items that were completely consumed during the fire were gone by

that time. Since only portions of the initial fuel package and the

wood floor survived, the burning rates of these two elements were used

in these calculations

Based on an assumption that the burning of the fuel vented from the

South Ballroom into the North Ballroom and the burning of the fuel

present in the affected areas of the North Ballroom used all of the air

drawn directly into that room, the calculations are based on the air

for combustion in the South Ballroom coming primarily through the lower

portions of the Foyer and entering the South Ballroom through the

opening created by the failure of the glass partition between the South

Ballroom and the Foyer. A much lesser source of air came through the

open door between the South Ballroom and the service corridor. Using

the method of determining ventilation limits discussed in paragraph

2.4a, above, it is estimated that the fire returned to fuel controlled

burning when the potential energy release dropped below about 65,500

btu/sec (69 MW.

)

Using the values in Table 1, the amount of floor involved contributed

about 13,000 btu/sec. (14 MW.) At the time of flashover, the initial

fuel package contributed about 68,000 btu/sec (72 MW.) Since the

floor did not burn through it is assumed that the contribution from the

burning floor continued until the overall energy level dropped below

the ventilation limit. It is, therefore, estimated that fuel

controlled burning terminated when the surface area of the initial fuel

package was reduced by about 25%.

Since the rate of decrease of surface area of the initial fuel package

has not been determined, this knowledge is of prime value in comparing

the impact of one ventilation condition against another. It is of only

limited value in estimating fire duration.

It is possible, however, to use the concepts involved to bracket the

probable fire duration as follows:

(1) The initial fuel package occupied a volume of about 3000

ft.^ (90m^.) If the weight is assumed to be 10 to 15 Ib./ft.^

(160 to 240 kg/m^ ) the total mass to burn is approximately

30,000 to 45,000 lbs. (13,000 kg to 20,000 kg.) Based on the

38
burning rate for the initial fuel package in Table 1 , the entire

content of that package would be consumed in 70 to 105 minutes.

However, after the fire, an estimated 30 to 50% of the original

fuel remained. This would tend to bracket the duration of

flashover conditions at between 30 and 75 minutes.

(2) The maximum burn of flooring occurred near the edge of the

initial fuel package. It is reasonable to conclude that this

represented the portion of the flooring ignited at the start of

flashover conditions and that burning at this point either

terminated or grossly slowed down after conditions returned to

fuel controlled burning. The depth of burn in this area appeared

to be between 1.5 and 2 inches (38 to 58 mm) deep. Using a typical density for wood of 40 Ib./ft.^ (0.66 g/cm^ ) and the

burning rates given for the floor in Table 1, the estimated

duration of flashover intensity burning was between 40 and 60

minutes

(3) The partition panels were totally consumed in the fire. It

is believed that these panels involved a light weight wood frame.

It is also assumed that, for at least the major portion of

involvement, the panels laid on the floor. On this basis, the

panels were exposed to conditions close to that of the floor.

The minimum dimension of the frame was probably at least 1.5

inches (38 mm.) The wood frame was also covered by a thin sheet

of high pressure laminated plastic. The thickness of the plastic

being about 0.06 inches (1.5 mm.) Following the same

calculations as used for the floor and adding a brief but

indeterminate time for the protection provided by the laminated

plastic, it is estimated that the fire had to be in the flashed

over phase for more than 40 minutes.

The prediction of fire duration is relevant to evaluating the impact

that fire resistive separations could have had on the development and

impact of the fire. If separations had been fire resistive, the amount

of ventilation following flashover would have been limited to openings

into the South Ballroom. Provided that the openings were sufficient to

allow flashover to occur, the post flashover condition would persist

until either the fuel was exhausted or the rate of burning dropped

below the ventilation limit. Therefore, with smaller openings the

duration would be longer but never more than the 70 to 105 minutes

estimated as needed to consume all the available fuel.

39
Chapter 3 - Summary

This report presents a series of computations which lead to a description of the tragic course of this fire that fits the information

available to the author. The analysis also provides a basis for

evaluating the impacts that differences in conditions, arrangements, or fire protection measures could have made in the course of events.

Additionally, this exercise demonstrates the potential value of

analytical methods in understanding the course of fire and the effect

of the individual materials or elements involved. It also demonstrates

the utility of an engineering approach in understanding the fire

potential in an existing building. By analytically imitating the

impact of fire, the level of safety of a building can be appraised by

simulation in a manner akin to examination of the structural

capabilities of the same facility.

While this exercise was successful in meeting its objectives, it was

purposely designed to use the least sophisticated instruments required

to do the job. Had more sophisticated studies been made, undoubtedly

additional information and understanding could have resulted.

More detailed examination and testing to discover the appropriate

properties of the various materials along with large scale fire tests

to imitate the fuel and conditions would provide more data and

additional confidence in the results.

The computations presented herein represent a practical selection of

tools in view of the resource limitations on this study. The choices

were based on the author's experience and consultation with many of his

colleagues at the Center for Fire Research. In each case, the method

used has been described or referenced so it can be accessed by any

interested party. All of the references are available through the Fire

Research Information Service of the National Bureau of Standards or the

author

Since the fire, many hundreds of hours of data gathering and

investigation have been carried on by various groups. It is likely

that some of these have discovered information that would change the

descriptions used by the author. Others may feel that different

computational approaches are superior. The data and methods presented

in this report will assist in any analysis that others may care to

make. Also, where obligations allow, it is desireable that such

analysis be made public and other views and methods of analysis be

shared with the entire fire safety community to advance the state-ofthe-art . Analyses of fires provide an excellent means of improving, testing, and

evaluating the usefulness of quantitative tools. The fire protection

community should make such analyses and expand the scope to include

40
proof testing as a regular aspect of fire investigation. This can only

results in improved understanding. Through such understanding,

improved levels of performance, economy, and acceptance of fire safety

may result.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and guidance provided

by Dr. James G. Quintiere. It is only through his guidance that a consistent and complete analysis, was possible. Special thanks is also

due to Mr. Peter Lee who provided engineering technical support. The

consideration and cooperation of the National Response Team of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the U.S. Fire Administration,

and the National Fire Protection Association for on-site and after-thefact assistance, exchange of information, the provision of details and

other support is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are due to

the U.S. Fire Administration for the sectional diagrams of the building

and to the National Fire Protection Association for the floor plans

41
REFERENCES

1. Interim Report and Findings of the National Fire Protection

Association, Fire at the Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino, 96 fatalities,

December 31, 1986; National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA,

1987

2. Drysdale, Dougal; An Introduction to Fire Dynamics; Section 5.2,

Burning of Solids; John Wiley and Sons; New York; 1985

3. Proposed Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for

Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter, ASTM E5 Proposal P 190, American Society for Testing and Materials,

Philadelphia, PA; November, 1986

4. Alpert, Etonald L. and Ward, Edward J.; Evaluating Unsprinklered Fire

Hazards; SFPE Technology Report 82-2; Society of Fire Protection

Engineers; Boston, MA; 1983

5. NFPA 204M Guide for Smoke and Heat Venting; National Fire Protection

Association, Quincy, MA, 1985

6. Gross, Daniel; Data Sources for Parameters Used in Predictive

Modeling of Fire Growth and Smoke Spread; NBS Report NBSIR 85-3223,

National bureau of Standards; Gaithersburg, MD; 1985

7. Nelson, Harold E. ; Concepts for Life Safety Analysis; IN: The 7th

Society of Fire Protection Engineers Symposium. Quantitative Methods

for Life Safety Analysis. University of Maryland, College Park MD.

March 5-7, 1986.

8. Fleming, Russell P. ; "Update on the Quick Response Sprinkler

Research Program"; Fire Journal; Vol. 81 No.l; January/February 1987;

pp. 34-38

9. Mitler, Henri E. and Rockett, John A.; Users' Guide to First, A

Comprehensive Single-Room Fire Model; NBS report to be published.

National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, MD

10. Drysdale, Dougal; An Introduction to Fire Dynamics; Section 10.1,

Regimes of Burning; John Wiley and Sons; New York; 1985

11. Quintiere, J. S.; A Simple Correlation for Predicting Temperature

in a Room Fire; Report NBSIR 82-2712; National Bureau of Standards;

Gaithersburg, MD, 1983

42
12. Nelson, H. E. ; "FIREFORM" - A Computerized Collection of Convenient

Fire Safety Computations; Report NBSIR 86-3308; National Bureau of

Standards; Gaithersburg, MD; 1986

13. Nelson, H. E. ; UTEMP, a computer program for estimating the upper

level temperature in a vented room. This program uses the formulas

contained in reference 11. The program was developed for the analysis

contained in this report and will be separately released at a later

date

I 14. Cooper, L. Y. , and Stroup, D. W. ; Calculating Available Safe

Egress Time from Fires; Report NBSIR 82-2587; National Bureau of

Standards; Gaithersburg, MG; 1982

15. Walton, W. D. ; ASETB A Room Fire Program for Personal Computers;

Report NBSIR 85-3144, National Bureau of Standards; Gaithersburg, MD;

1985

16. Nelson, H. E. ; ROOMFIR, a computer program for estimating upper

level temperature, interface level, heat actuated devise response, and

vision distance and oxygen concentration in the smoke layer of an

unvented room. This program uses formulas and procedures covered in

references 12, 14, 17 and 18. The program was developed for the

analysis contained in this report and will be separately released at a later date.

17. Nelson, H. E. ; HOTVENT, a computer program for estimating the mass

flow and level of the neutral plane in an opening venting high

temperature fire products from a space fully involved in fire. The

procedure is that contained in references 16 and 28 and discussed in

Appendix G. This program was developed for the analysis contained in

this report and will be separately released at a later date.

18. Kawagoe, K.D. , and Sekine,T.; Estimation of Fire Temperature - Time

Curve for Rooms, Ministry of Construction, Japanese Government, June

1963.

19. Lawson, J. R. , and Quintiere , J. G. ; "Slide Rule Estimates of Fire

Growth"; Fire Technology, Vol 21, No. 4, pp. 267-292; National Fire

Protection Association, Quincy, MA; 1985.

20. Huggett, C,; Rate of Heat Release - Implications for Engineering

Decisions by C. Huggett. IN: Engineering Applications of Fire

Technology Workshop Proceedings. April 16-18, 1980, NBS Gaithersburg,

MD. Co-Sponsored by Society of Fire Protection Engineers and Center for

Fire Research. H.E. Nelson, Editor; Society of Fire Protection

Engineers; Boston, MA

21. Mulholland, G. ; Personal communication February 14, 1987

43
22. Quintiere, James G. , An Assessment of Correlations Between

Laboratory and Full-Scale Experiments for the FAA Aircraft Fire Safety

Program, Part 1: Smoke; NBSIR 82-2508; National Bureau of Standards,

Gaithersburg, MD; July 1982.

23. Thomas, P. H. ; Buoyant Diffusion Flames. Letter to Combustion and

Flame . Vol. 4, No. 4, pp 381-382, 1960.

24. Yokoi, S.; Study on the Prevention of Fire-Spread Caused by Hot

Upward Current. Building Research Institute Report NO. 34, Ministry of

Construction, Japanese Government, 1960.

25. Thomas, P. H. , and Law, Margaret; The Projection of Flames From

Burning Buildings, F.R. Note NO. 921, Joint Fire Research Organization,

Borehamwood, England

j 26. Quintidre, J., Harkleroad, M. , and Hasemi, Y. ; Wall Flames and

Implications for Upward Flame Spread; Report DOT/FAA/CT-85/2 ; U.S.

Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration, Technical

Center, Atlantic City, NJ, June 1985

27. Quintiere, J. and Harkleroad, M. ; New Concepts for Measuring Flame

Spread Properties; Symposium on Application of Fire Science to Fire

Engineering; American Society for Testing and Materials and the Society

of Fire Protection Engineers; Denver, CO; June 27, 1984

28. Alpert, R. L. ; Calculation of Response Time of Ceiling-Mounted Fire

Detectors; Fire Technology, Vol/ 8, No. 3, 181-195; Aug. 1972

29. Evans, D. D. ; DETACT-QS, A computer program for estimating the

actuation response of heat detectors. Program is available from

Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Boston, MA

30. Evans, D. D. ; Calculating Fire Plume Characteristics in a Two-Layer

Environment; Fire Technology, Vol. 20, No. 3, 39-63, Aug. 1984

31. Heskestad, G. and Delichatsios ; Environment of Fire Detectors - Phase 1: Effects of Fire Size, Ceiling Heights, and Material, Volume

II - Analysis, Technical Report Series No. 22427, RC 77-T-ll, Factory

Mutual Research Corporation; Norwood, MA; 1977

32. Steckler, K.D.

,

Quintiere, J.G., Rinkinen, W.J., Flow Induced by

Fire in a Compartment, Nineteenth Symposium (International) on

Combustion, The Combustion Institute, pp. 913-920, 1982

33. Quintiere, J.G., Steckler, K. , Corley, D. , An Assessment of Fire

Induced Flows in Compartments, Fire Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.

1, p. 1-14, June 1984

44
TABLE 1

Estimated Post Flashover Burning Rates

of Materials in South Ballroom

Material Exposed Heat Flux Heat of Post

Surface Area btu/sq . ft/- Gassifica- Flashover

sq.ft, (sq.m) min

(kW/sq .m)

tion

kJ/g

Pyrolysis

Rate

Ib/min

(g/s)

Initial Fuel 825 7 2 407

Package (77) (80) (3080)

Fabric Wall 980 7 8 120

Covering (91) (80) (910)

Partition 600

(56)

7 (80)

2 296

(2240)

Stacked 150 7 2 79

Chairs (15) (80) (600)

Wood Floor 1050 1.75 2 127

(50%) (108) (20) (960)

Total Burning

Rate

1029

(7790)

45
Tim

t+s

60

120

180

240

300

360

420

480

540

590

TABLE 2

Estimated Pre-Flashover Energy Flow

From South Ballroom to North Ballroom

TempMass Flow Fuel Energy Release

Rise lbs/min Fraction Fuel Flow Total

F (C) (g/s) % btu/sec (kW)

102 31 .055 3 8 12

(39) (23) (4) (9) (13)

147 155 .166 52 71 122

(64) (117) (54) (75) (129)

223 228 .396 217 211 428

(106) (210) (229) (222) (452)

335 781 .732 1149 941 2090

(168) (591) (1211) (992) (2203)

487 829 1.08 1799 1505 3303

(253) (627) (1896) (1586) (3482)

645 886 1.48 2634 2167 4801

(341) (670) (2776) (2284) (5060)

803 935 1.95 3662 2910 6573

(428) (707) (3860) (3067) (6928)

962 968 2.49 4842 3589 8431

(517) (732) (5104) (3783) (8887)

1093 1031 3.18 6589 4365 10,954

(589) (280) (6945) (4602)(11,545)

1112 910 6.51 11,898 3917 15,815

(600) (688) (12,541) (4128)(16,669)

46
Estimate

Pre-Flashover

Energy

Flow

from

North

Ballroom

to

Foyer

(Through

10

ft.

(3.05m)

High x3

ft.

(0.91m)

Wide

Doorway)

CD O CM x—t

m

>5

M 0) CM 00 T 1 tiO oj w S '

S-l 0) \ IS o I~) r-*

(U r-l CM CM 05 C (U 4J W r—i T—

W Pd rO

o^ VO

Ml- tH ro c o r-H rH

•l-l

m 'w'

w ^ S w in 1^ 00 M O \ \ o o r—

I—

Cti 1—

W bO • . • s

I—

o o o o o 0)

4-> O

•iH •i-i s 1 1—1 <} o o M on 1 00 00 50

0) C 1 a.

C/D (U iw Q o o o o o

rH o • • « o CS3 o

<u 0) e Sw*' CO Nw' < ww CS3 in o o • o • CM CM CM

r—}-l 4J !—

r—

u tw u

<D>5

y—

cti -M S 1^ CO 00 00

bO

m CM rH 1—1

a> th >w^ s_y Nw^ ^ <U 4J CO in O PS ‘w f-H •

•JS * s O VO VO VO

on 1—1

y'~\ o

(X 0) y~s CO S w m o o

0) <1- tH H Di f=^ O rH V.O ' V.D O

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590

400 6

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0.57

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307

(222)

(1.8)

(1.1)

(1.46)

(324)
XFPxV Interim Investigation Report

Ballroom Area Level

48
UPPER

PART

STAGE

NFPA Interim Investigation Report

i

Figure 2. Second Floor Plan

49
N

NORTH BALLROOM SOUTH BALLROOM

FLAME HEIGHT

SMOKE LAYER 22.5 ft. (6.9m)

SMOKE TEMPERATURE 70F (22C)

VISION DISTANCE 1000 ft. (300m)

OXYGEN CONCENTRATION 21X

4.5 ft. (1.5m)

8 ft. (2.5m)

102F (390

58 ft. (18m)

21 %

ANY SMOKE DETECTOR THAT HAD BEEN LOCATED IN THE SOUTH BALLROOM WITHIN ABOUT 40

ft. (12 m) OF THE FIRE SOURCE WOULD HAVE DETECTED SMOKE BY THIS TIME.

A QUICK RESPONSE SPRINKLER LOCATED DIRECTLY OVER THE FIRE WOULD ALSO HAVE

OPERATED BY THIS TIME.

N

FIGURE 4. SITUATION IN BALLROOM COMPLEX AT t-»180 SECONDS

NORTH BALLROOM SOUTH BALLROOM

FLAME HEIGHT 13 ft. (3.9 m)

SMOKE LAYER

SMOKE TEMPERATURE

VISION D I STANCE

OXYGEN CONCENTRATION

19 ft. (6 m)

82F (28C)

72 f t . (22 m)

21 X

12 ft. (3.5m)

(2-4 ft EXTENSION)

6 ft. (1.8m)

354 F (1790

18 ft. (6 m

)

20X

ANY SPRINKLER HEAD HAVING AN RTI OF LESS THAN 200 WITHIN 15 FEET OF THE FIRE

SOURCE OR HIGHER RTI RATED HEAD WITHIN 7 FEET OF THE SOURCE WOULD HAVE

ACTUATED.

AT THIS TIME THE CALCULATIONS ASSUME THAT AT LEAST 12 ADDITIONAL FEET OF PANEL

PARTITIONS FAIL.

50
N

NORTH BALLROOM SOUTH BALLROOM

FLAME HEIGHT 18.0 f t . (5.5 m) 23 ft . (3.5m)

(13-20 ft. EXTENSION)

SMO<E LAYER 10 ft. (3 m

)

6 ft. (1.8m)

SMOKE TEMPERATURE 256F (1250 365F (1850

VISION D I STANCE 6 ft. (2 m

)

15 f t . (5 m

)

OXYGEN CONCENTRATION 13% 12%

AT THIS POINT SMOKE STARTS TO FLOW UNDER THE SOFFIT OF THE OPEN 10 FOOT HIGH

DOOR BETWEEN THE NORTH BALLROOM AND THE FOYER.

N

NORTH BALLROOM SOUT H BALLROOM

SMOKE LAYER 6 ft. (1.8 m

)

7 ft . ( 2 ,. 1 m

)

SMOKE TEMPERATURE 5 00 F (3100 1 1 12F ( 6000

VISION DISTANCE 4 ft. (1 m) 3 ft. (1 m ) OXYGEN CONCENTRATION 7% 7%

WITH FLASHOVER AT ABOUT T + 583 SECONDS THE SMOKE TEMPERATURE I N THE SOUTH

BALLROOM RISES TO OVER 1 500 F (8150; SMOKE LEVELS GO TO NEARLY THE FLOOR

LEVEL; VISIONlDROPS TO ZERO; AND THE OXYGEN CONTENT IN THE SMOKE AND GASSES

BOTH BALLROOM APPROACHES ZERO. WITH FLASHOVER THE GLASS PARTITION BETWEEN THE

SOUTH BALLROOM AND THE FOYER FAILS.

51
N

FIGURE 7. SITUATION IN FOYER AND LOBBY FROM t -i

2 0 TO t 5 8 0 SECONDS.

HOT GASES FLOW FROM DOOR BETWEEN NORTH BALLROOM AND FOYERACTUAL ENERGY

CONTENT OF THESE GASES IS SLIGHT. COND I T I ONS LISTED ARE A T t + 580 SECONDS .

SMOKE LAYER 21 f t . (6 .3 m

)

SMOKE TEMPERATURE 92 F ( 33C ) VISION D I STANCE 80 ft. (24 m

)

OXYGEN CONTENT 21 %

THE CONDITIONS DESCRIBED EXISTED IN THE FOYER AND LOBBY. THE LAYER DID NOT

BECOME DEEP ENOUGH TO PASS UNDER THE DOOR WAY SOFFIT TO THE CASINO OR INTO

OTHER SPACES SEPARATED FROM THE LOBBY BY DOOR WAYS.

N

FIGURE 8. SITUATION IN FOYER FOLLOWING FLASHOVER OF SOUTH BALLROOM t>600

SECONDS.

FLAME HE I GHT/EXTENS I ON

SMOKE LAYER

SMOKE TEMPERATURE

VISION DISTANCE

OXYGEN CONTENT

FLAME LAPS BETWEEN 1/2 AND 3/4 THE WIDTH OF THE

T I MBER CEILING.

ABOUT 10 - 12 ft. (3-3.5 m) ABOVE THE FLOOR.

ABOUT 900F (480C)

N I L NEAR ZERO

A SHEET OF FLAME AT LEAST AS WIDE AS THE OPENING CAUSED BY FAILURE OF THE

GLASS PARTITION BETWEEN THE SOUTH BALLROOM AND THE FOYER (36ft. (11 m)) RISES

FROM THE PARTITION OPENING AND ACROSS MOST OF THE TIMBER CEILING OF THE FOYER.

52
-« E

SECONDS TO ABOUT t-»-630 SECONDS.

SMOKE FLOWS THROUGH THE LOBBY AT ABOUT 2.2 ft. /SEC. (1 m/s.)

SMOKE ENTERS FROM FOYER AT ABOUT 1000F (540C.)

SMOKE TEMPERATURE DROPS AS IT TRAVERSES LOBBY BUT IS STILL INTOLERABLE AS IT EXITS FAR END OF LOBBY . SMOKE IS OPAQUE AND HAS LETHAL CONCENTRATION OF CARBON MONOXIDE.

SMOKE BLOCKS EAST DOOR TO CASINO ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER FLASHOVER OF SOUTH

BALLROOM AND WEST DOOR ABOUT 40 SECONDS LATTER.

FIGURE 10. SITUATION IN CASINO FOLLOWING BREAKAGE OF GLASS PARTITION BETWEEN

CASINO AND FOYER. ABOUT t-*-720 TO t*740 SECONDS.

FLAME AND FUEL RICH SMOKE ARE DISCHARGED FROM THE FOYER INTO THE CASINO.

A FLAME FRONT TRAVERSES THE CASINO AT A SPEED OF ABOUT 6 ft. /SEC. (2 m/s.)

FLAME COURSES CASINO IN ABOUT 20 SECONDS.

_

FLAME BREAKS OUT WEST WINDOWS. EDDIES LAP TONGUES OF FLAME DOWN TO POOL DECK

LEVEL .

53
FLAME

LENGTH

/

EXTENSION

IN

SOUTH

BALLROOM

hh.’ (0 (O

CO

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CO

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CM in

CM t-2 00

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54

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
FLAME

EXTENSION

INTO

NORTH

BALLROOM

J

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55

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
DUPONT

PLAZA

HOTEL

FIRE

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
DUPONT

PLAZA

HOTEL

FIRE

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60

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57

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

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(sec.)
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HOTEL

FIRE

E to M M

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M

3

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150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
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PLAZA

HOTEL

FIRE

M

3

ao

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h-

(%) U3AV1 d3ddf1 dO N0IlVaiN33N03 N39AX0

59

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
60

Figure

17.

Section

of

Building

Elevation

(

viewed

from

North
(S/nig) 0

61

igure

18.

T-Squared

Fire,

Rates

of

Energy

Release
Cartons

15

ft.

high,

various

contents,

fastest

if

empty

or

containing

plastic

foam

1

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o o o o o o

o o o o o o

CO lO CO CVJ

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ll

LU

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62

Figure

19.

Relation

of

T-Squared

Fires

to

Some

Fire

Tests
APPENDIX A

RESULTS OF COMPUTATIONS RELATED TO THE SOUTH BALLROOM

This appendix contains tables , graphs and computer printouts that give

additional details of the computational results from procedures used to

estimate the development of conditions in the South Ballroom as follows:

a. Printout from computer program UTEMP[13] used to estimate smoke

temperature. This program executes the pre and post flashover

correlations proposed by Quintiere [10.]

b. Table of results obtained from FIRST [9.] FIRST was used to estimate

the smoke level and the oxygen content of the smoke.

c. Printout from computer program ROOMFIR[16j. This program is an

adaption of ASETB [15] as discussed in paragraph 2.4b. ROOMFIR was used

to estimate vision distance in the smoke in the South Ballroom.

d. Printout from computer program HOTVENT used to estimate post

flashover neutral plane between the South Ballroom and the Foyer.

e. Figure A-1, Graphic summary of estimated conditions in the South

Ballroom.

A-1
•k'it'k-k^ificickifkick-k-kifk'k'k’kifk^tic-kit'ifk'k-k-ifkitifk-icit-kifkifk-k'k'kic'kifk-kitifk'k-kicit'ickitifkifk-k-kifk AVERAGE UPPER LEVEL SMOKE TEMPERATURE' ********************************************************************

SOUTH BALLROOM

ROOM SURFACES ARE;

SURFACE NO. 1 2304 SQ. FT. OF 1.5 INCH THICK WOOD FLOOR

SURFACE NO. 2 2304 SQ. FT. OF 1 INCH THICK MINERAL CEILING

SURFACE NO. 3 600 SQ. FT. OF . 06 INCH THICK PARTITION PANELS

SURFACE NO. 4 360 SQ. FT. OF .25 INCH THICK GLASS

SURFACE NO. 5 1000 SQ. FT. OF 6 INCH THICK FABRIC COVERED CONCRETE

FIRE ROOM OPENINGS

DOOR: 10 FT. HIGH BY 16 FT. WIDE

WINDOW: 7 FT. HIGH BY 2.83 FT. WIDE

WINDOW IS OPEN TO A HEIGHT OF 7 FT. AND A WIDTH OF 2.83 FT

FIRE IS ENTERED AS AN EXPONITIONAL FIRE GROWTH FORMULA

WITH A GROWTH RATE CONSTANT OF .0444 AND AN EXPONENT OF 2

TIME RATE OF HEAT RELEASE UPPER LEVEL SMOKE TEMPERATURE

(SEC) (BTU/SEC) (kW) (DEGREES F) (DEGREES C)

0 0 0 70 21

30 40 42 84 29

60 160 168 110 43

90 360 379 141 61

120 639 674 178 81

150 999 1,053 219 104

180 1,439 1,516 264 129

210 1,958 2 , 064 313 156

240 2 , 557 2,696 364 184

270 3 ,237 3,412 418 215

300 3 , 996 4,212 475 246

330 4 , 835 5,096 534 279

360 5,754 6,065 595 313

390 6,753 7,118 659 348

420 7 ,832 8,255 724 385

450 8,991 9,477 792 422

480 10,230 10,782 861 461

510 11,548 12 , 172 932 500

540 12,947 13 , 646 1,005 541

570 14,426 15,205 1,080 582

UPPER LEVEL TEMPERATURE INDICATES FLASHOVER AT 583 SEC.

600 15,984 16,847 2,093 1,145

A2
Table of results for SOUTH BALLROOM ( from FIRST )

TIME UPPER LAYER TEMP. SMOKE LAYER POS. 02 CONCENTRATION

(sec) (F) (C) (ft.) (m) (%)

60 101.9 39.0 8.17 2 . 49 20.90

90 121.4 49.6 7.02 2.14 20.72

120 146.6 63.7 6.00 1.83 20.45

150 180.9 82 .

9

5.28 1.61 19 . 99

180 222 .

9

106.1 4.80 1.47 19 .35

210 270.2 132.4 5.97 1.82 18 . 62

240 335.1 168.4 6.4 3 1.96 17.89

270 409 .

8

209 .

9

6.52 1.99 17 . 07

300 487 .

2

252.9 6.52 1.99 16.34

330 567 .

3

297 .

4

6.46 1.97 15.43

360 645.9 341.1 6.46 1.97 14.51

390 725.9 385.5 6.43 1.96 13 . 51

420 803 .

0

429 .

6

6.39 1.95 12 . 42

450 883 .

3

472.9 6.43 1.96 11.23

480 962 .

2

516.7 6.49 1.98 9.95

510 1046.7 558.2 6.36 1.94 9 . 22

540 1093.7 590.7 6.62 2.02 7.86

570 1106.6 597.0 7.02 2 . 14 7 .30

600 1111.6 599.8 7.38 2.25 6.75
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 VISION DISTANCE (SOUTH BALLROOM)

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70 . 2 21.2 10.0 3.0 0.1 0.1

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 3000.00 m (9840.00 ft)

60.0 89 . 2 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 17.69 m ( 58.01 ft)

120.0 130 . 1 54.5 7.7 2.3 639.4 606.4

Vision distance (smoke layer) = 7.17 m ( 23.51 ft)

180.0 206 . 3 96.8 7.3 2.2 1438.6 1364 .

5

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 5.56 m ( 18.25 ft)

240.0 320 . 0 160.0 7.4 2.2 2557.4 2425.7

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 5.49 m ( 18.02 ft)

300.0 452 . 9 233.8 7.4 2.3 3996.0 3790.2

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 5.45 m ( 17.88 ft)

360.0 595 . 2 312.9 7.4 2.2 5754.2 5457.9

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 5.10 m ( 16.71 ft)

420.0 748 . 9 398.3 7 .

3

2.2 7832.2 7428 .

8

Vision distance ( smoke layer) = 4 . 59 m ( 15.06 ft)

480.0 915 .9 491.1 7.3 2.2 10229.8 9702 .

9

Vision distance (smoke layer) = 4 . 11 m ( 13.47 ft)

540.0 1097 . 0 591.6 7.2 2.2 12947.0 12280.3

Vision distance (smoke layer) = 3 . 69 m ( 12.12 ft)

600.0 1292 .4 700.2 7.1 2.2 15984.0 15160.8

Vision distance (smoke layer) = 3 .35 m ( 10.99 ft)

UPPER LEVEL TEMP. INDICATES THAT FLASHOVER HAS PROBABLY OCCURRED BY 599 SEC.
*********************•§(********************************************

- - HOTVENT VERSION 1.0 4-4-1987 - 04-06-1987 - FLOW FROM FOYER TO CASINO JUST AFTER CASINO WINDOW BREAKS; ABOUT t+720 ******************************************************************

ESTIMATED FLOW FROM VENT AND DEPTH OF CORRIDOR WAVE

VENT FLOWS FOR A BURNING RATE OF 430 g/s GIVEN AN UPPER LEVEL

TEMPERATURE OF 1800 C WITH AN EXTERNAL TEMPERATURE OF 21 C

THROUGH AN OPENING 3.7 in WIDE AND 3.05 m HIGH ARE

AN OUTFLOW OF ** 10719 g/s ( 64.2 m^3/s 0 1800 C) ********** WITH AN INFLOW OF *** 11154 g/s ( 9.5 m^3/s 0 21 C) ********** AND A NETURAL PLANE AT *** 0.49 m high

A-5
SOUTH

BALLROOM

'C

SOUTH

BALLROOM

33NViSia NOISIA

(3) 3bnivtiadH3i

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APPENDIX B

RESULTS OF COMPUTATION RELATED TO THE NORTH BALLROOM

This appendix contains tables, graphs and computer printouts that give

additional details of the computational results from procedures used to

estimate the development of conditions in the North Ballroom as follows:

a. Table of energy vented from the South Ballroom into the North

Ballroom. The data in this table was obtained from FIRST [9.]

b. Printout from the computer program R00MFIR[16]. ROOMFIR was used to

estimate smoke temperature, smoke level, oxygen content in the smoke and

vision through the smoke in the North Ballroom.

c. Figure B-1, Graphic summary of estimated conditions in the North

Ballroom.

B-1
Table of variables from FIRST

TIME MASS FLOW FUEL FRACTION LAYER TEMPERATURE

sec .

)

(kg/s) (kg/ kg) ( k )

60 0.228 5.52 E-04 3 . 07 E+02

120 1.17 1.66 E-03 3.37 E+02

180 2.10 3.96 E-03 3.79 E+02

240 5.91 7.32 E-03 4.41 E+02

300 6.27 1.08 E-02 5.26 E+02

360 6.70 1.48 E-02 6.14 E+02

420 7 . 07 1.95 E-02 7.03 E+02

480 7.32 2.49 E-02 7.90 E+02

540 7.80 3.18 E-02 8.63 E+02

600 6.88 6.51 E-02 8.73 E+02

HEAT OF COMBUSTION : 2.870 E+07 J/kg

Energy vented into NORTH BALLROOM from SOUTH BALLROOM

TIME E(CONV) E (UNBURN) E(SUM)

(sec.

)

(kW) (kW) (kW)

60 3 .

1

3.6 6.8

120 51.3 55.7 107.0

180 180.3 238.7 419.0

240 873.8 1241.6 2115.4

300 ' 1459.9 1943.4 3403 .

3

360 2149.7 2845.9 4995.6

420 2897 .

6

3956.7 6854 .

3

480 3636.9 5231.1 8868 .

0

540 4444.8 7118.7 11563 .

5

600 3989 .

4

12854.4 16843.8

B-2
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 NORTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .8

FIRE HEIGHT = 6 ft 1.8288 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 23 ft 7.0104 m

ROOM AREA = 5186 sq ft 481.7794 sq m

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 0 ft. HIGH 0 ft. WIDE WITH A

FIRE TIMES AND HEAT RELEASE RATES

TIME (sec) HEAT RELEASE RATE (kW)

60 6.8

120 107

180 419

240 2115.4

300 3403.3

360 4995.6

420 6854.3

480 8868

540 11563.5

600 16843.8

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE

sec F C ft m kW

0.0 70.1 21.2 23.0 7.0 0. 1

Product Factor ( smoke layer) = 0.00 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 3000.00 m (9840.00 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 21. 0 % (%)

60.0 70.9 21.6 22.5 6.9 6

.

8

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 0.08 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 296.81 m ( 973.55 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 21. 0 % (%)

120.0 74.5 23 .

6

21.3 6.5 107. 0

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 0.39 BTU/CU. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 57.45 m ( 188.42 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 20.9 % (%)

180.0 82.1 27.8 19.6 6.0 419.0

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 1.03 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 21.87 m ( 71.72 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 20.7 % (%)

240.0 105.9 41.1 17.1 5.2 2115.4

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 2.93 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 7.67 m ( 25.15 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 19.9 % (%)

300.0 142.5 61.4 14.5 4.4 3403.3

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 5.59 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 4.02 m ( 13.19 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 18.5 % (%)

360.0 190.3 87.9 12.1 3.7 4995.6

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 8.60 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 2.61 m ( 8.57 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 16.3 % (%)

ft. HIGH SILL

FIRE

BTU/sec

0.1

0 kJ/cu. m)

6.4

3 kJ/cu. m)

101.5

15 kJ/cu. m)

397 .

4

38 kJ/cu. m)

2006.5

109 kJ/cu. m)

3228.0

208 kJ/cu. m)

4738 .

3

320 kJ/cu. m)

B-3
420.0 256.1 124 ' Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

9.9 3.0 6854.3

12.10 BTU/CU. ft. ( 1.86 m ( 6.09 ft) = 12.9 % (%)

6501.3

451 kJ/cu. m)

480.0 347.0 175.0

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

7.7 2.4

15.99 BTU/CU.

1.41 m ( = 7.3 % (%)

8868.0 8411.3

ft. ( 596 kJ/cu. m)

4.61 ft)

540.0 471.8 244.3

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

5.3 1.6 11563.5

20.09 BTU/CU. ft. ( 1.12 m ( 3.67 ft) = 2.8 % (%)

10968.0

748 kJ/cu. m)

600.0 647.2 341.8 1.9 0.6 16843.8 15976.3

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 24.29 BTU/cu. ft. ( 905 kJ/cu. m)

Vision distance (smoke layer) = 0.93 m ( 3.03 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = -7.3 % (%)

THE DROP OF THE UPPER LEVEL TO THE TOP OF THE BURNING ITEM AND

AND THE LACK OF OXYGEN IN THE SMOKE INDICATE VITIATION OF THE COMBUSTION

COMBUSTION AIR WITH FIRE PRODUCTS. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE BURNING

RATE WILL BE DEPRESSED POSSIBLY SMOTHERED.

B-4
NORTH

BALLROOM

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NORTH

BALLROOM

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APPENDIX C

RESULTS OF COMPUTATIONS RELATED TO THE FOYER

This appendix contains tables, graphs and computer printouts that give

additional details of the computational results from procedures used to

estimate the development of condition in the Foyer as follows:

a. Table of values used in computing the preflashover venting of energy

from the North Ballroom into the Foyer. See paragraph 2.3 c. for

discussion.

b. Printout from computer program R00MF1R[16] used to estimate smoke

temperature, smoke level, oxygen content in the smoke and vision

distance in the smoke in the Foyer, prior to flashover of the South

Ballroom.

c. Printout from computer program UTEMP[13] used to estimate smoke

temperature in the Foyer following flashover in the South Ballroom.

d. Printout from computer program H0TVENT[17] used to estimate the

neutral plan in and the volume of smoke flow through the opening between

the Foyer and the Lobby after flashover of the South Ballroom. This

program executes the calculations described in paragraph 2.6.

e. Printout from computer program HOTVENT used to estimate the flow of

flame and hot gases from the Foyer into the Casino following window

failure in the wall between the Foyer and the Casino.

f. Figure C-1, Graphic summary of estimated conditions in the foyer.

C-1
(se

420

440

460

480

500

520

540

570

600

TIM

( se

420

440

460

480

500

520

540

570

600

Summary of parameters for smoke venting into the FOYER

SMOKE LAYER SMOKE :LAYER VENT AREA SMOKE VENTED

TEMP. (F) POS. (ft) (sq. ft) (cfm) (cms)

256.09 9.92 .24 9 4.24 E-03

283.24 9.19 2.43 309 0.145

313.47 8.46 4.62 861 0.406

346.97 7.72 6.84 1654 0.780

384 .36 6.95 9.15 2731 1.290

426.11 6.15 11.55 4121 11940

471.84 6.00 12 . 00 4630 2.180

551.37 6.00 12.00 5069 2.390

647.19 6.00 12.00 5550 2.620

Summary of parameters for energy vented into the Foyer

SMOKE LAYER SPECIFIC DENSITY DELTA TEMP. ENERGY VENTED

TEMP. (K) (kg/m3) (K) (kW)

397.64 .74 104.49 0.32

412.73 .71 119.58 12 .31

429.52 . 68 136.37 37.64

448 .91 .65 154.98 78.57

468.91 .63 175.76 142.84

492.10 .59 198.95 227.71

517.51 .56 224 .36 273.71

561.69 .52 268.54 333.74

614.92 .47 321.77 396.22

C-2
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 FOYER

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .

6

FIRE HEIGHT = 7 ft 2.1336 Itl ROOM HEIGHT = 23 ft 7.0104 m

ROOM AREA = 8500 sq ft 789.65 sq Iti THERE IS A WALL OPENING 0 ft. HIGH 0 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft

FIRE TIMES AND HEAT RELEASE RATES

TIME (sec) HEAT RELEASE RATE (kW)

20 .32

40 12.31

60 37.64

80 78.57

100 142.84

120 227.71

140 273 . 89

170 333.74

200 396.22

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE

sec F C ft m kW

0.0 70.1 21.2 23.0 7.0 0.1

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 0.00 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 3000.00 m (9840.00 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 21.0 % (%)

20.0 70.2 21.2 23.0 7.0 0.

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 0.01 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 2147.97 m (7045.36 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 21.0 % (%)

40.0 71.9 22.2 22.8 7.0 12.

Product Factor (smoke layer) = 0.08 BTU/cu. ft. ( Vision distance (smoke layer) = 281.35 m (^922.83 ft)

Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer) = 21.0 % (%)

0

0

3

60.0 74.2 23.4

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

80.0 76.9 25.0

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

22.6 6.9 37.6

0.18 BTU/cu. ft. ( 7

126.86 m ( 416.10 ft) = 21.0 % (%)

22.3 6.8 78.6

0.30 BTU/cu. ft. ( 11

76.02 m ( 249.36 ft) = 20.9 % (%)

100.0 80.4 26.9

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

120.0 84.5 29.1

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

22.0 6.7 142.8

0.44 BTU/cu. ft. ( 16

51.07 m ( 167.51 ft) = 20.9 % (%)

21.6 6.6 227 .

7

0.61 BTU/CU. ft. ( 23

36.77 m ( 120.61 ft) = 20.8 % (%)

140.0 88.5 31.4 21.2 6.5 273.9

C-3

. HIGH SILL

FIRE

BTU/sec

0.1

kJ/cu. m)

0.3

kJ/cu. m)

11.7

kJ/cu. m)

35.7

kJ/cu. m)

74 .

5

kJ/cu. m)

135.5

kJ/cu. m)

216 .

0

kJ/cu. m)

259 .

8
Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

160.0 92.0 33.3

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

180.0 95.3 35.2

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

200.0 98.5 36.9

Product Factor (smoke layer) = Vision distance (smoke layer) = Oxygen Concentration (smoke layer)

0. 78 BTU/cu. ft. ( 29 kJ/cu. m)

28 .86 m ( 94.67 ft)

20. 8 % (%)

.8 6.3 313. 8 297.6

0. 92 BTU/cu. ft. ( 34 kJ/cu. m)

24 .32 m ( 79.76 ft)

20. 8 % (%)

.3 6.2 354 . 6 336.3

1. 06 BTU/cu. ft. ( 39 kJ/cu. m)

21 .26 m ( 69.74 ft)

20. 7 % (%)

.9 6.1 396. 2 375.8

1. 18 BTU/cu. ft. ( 44 kJ/cu. m)

18 .99 m ( 62.27 ft)

20. 7 % (%)

C-4
********************************************************************

AVERAGE UPPER LEVEL SMOKE TEMPERATURE' ********************************************************************

FOYER (POST FLASHOVER t = t+583)

ROOM SURFACES ARE:

SURFACE NO . 1 3511 SQ. FT. OF 4 INCH THICK WOOD ROOF (INCL. BEAMS)

SURFACE NO. 2 2668 SQ. FT. OF 6 INCH THICK CONCRETE

SURFACE NO . 3 984 SQ. FT. OF 1 INCH THICK PLASTER

SURFACE NO . 4 1734 SQ. FT. OF .25 INCH THICK GLASS

FIRE ROOM OPENINGS

DOOR: 10 FT . HIGH BY 14 FT'. WIDE

THE ROOM HAS NO WINDOW OR OTHER VENT EXCEPT THE :DOOR

FIRE IS ENTERED AS A DESCRIPTION[ OF THE HEAT RELEASE RATE AS A FUNTION OF TIME

FIRE WAS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

TIME RATE OF HEAT RELEASE

sec

.

btu/sec (kW)

TIME RATE OF HEAT RELEASE UPPER LEVEL SMOKE TEMPERATURE

(SEC) (BTU/SEC) (kW) (DEGREES F) (DEGREES C)

0 17,920 18,888 178 81

THE BURNING RATE AND RESULTING UPPER LEVEL TEMPERATURE IS LIMITED

BY THE VENTILATION CAPACITY OF THE ROOM OPENINGS FROM THIS POINT

ON THE AMOUNT OF ENERGY THAT CANr BE RELEASED WITHIN THE ROOM IS

LIMITED TO 24978.03 BTU/SEC. ROOM TEMPERATURE MAY CONTINUE; TO RISE

10 24,978 26,327 772 411

20 24,978 26,327 855 457

30 24,978 26,327 908 487

40 24,978 26,327 947 509

50 24,978 26,327 980 - 526

60 24,978 26,327 1,007 542

70 24,978 26,327 1,030 555

80 24,978 26,327 1,051 566

90 24,978 26,327 1,070 577

100 24,978 26,327 1,088 586

110 24 , 978 26,327 1,103 595

THE UPPER LEVEL TEMPERATURE INDICATES FLASHOVER AT 116 SEC.

120 24,978 26,327 1,307 708

130 24 , 978 26,327 1,323 717

140 24 , 978 26,327 1,338 726

150 0 0 1,353 734

C-5
'k'k^'kic'k'tcick'kiticicic’kifk’k’k'kic'k'k'k'k'kitit'k'icit'kiciiitifkifkicic'k'ic^ic'kltitit'kicit'kic'k'k’kie'k'kit'k-kititic - - - - HOTVENT VERSION 1.0 4-4-1987 - - 04-06-1987 - POST FLASHOVER SOUTH BALLROOM TO FOYER

ESTIMATED FLOW FROM VENT AND DEPTH OF CORRIDOR WAVE

VENT FLOWS FOR A BURNING RATE OF 2758 g/s GIVEN AN UPPER LEVEL

TEMPERATURE OF 1145 C WITH AN EXTERNAL TEMPERATURE OF 21 C

THROUGH AN OPENING 11 m WIDE AND 3.05 m HIGH ARE

AN OUTFLOW OF ** 34899 g/s ( 143.0 m^3/s 0 1145 C) ********** WITH AN INFLOW OF * * * 37631 g/s ( 32.0 m^3/s 0 21 C) ********* AND A NETURAL PLANE AT *** 0.53 m high
******************************************************************

_ - - - hOTVENT version 1.0 4-4-1987 - - - - 04-06-1987 - FLOW ’FROM FOYER TO LOBBY ABOUT t+600 SECONDS ******************************************************************

ESTIMATED FLOW FROM VENT AND DEPTH OF CORRIDOR WAVE

VENT FLOWS FOR A BURNING RATE OF 1394 g/s GIVEN AN UPPER LEVEL

TEMPERATURE OF 577 C WITH AN EXTERNAL TEMPERATURE OF 21 C

THROUGH AN OPENING 4.27 m WIDE AND 3.05 m HIGH ARE

AN OUTFLOW OF ** 14265 g/s ( 35.0 m^3/s 0 577

WITH AN INFLOW OF *** 15648 g/s ( 13.3 m^3/s 0

AND A NETURAL PLANE AT *** 0.60 m high

C) **********

21 C) *********

C-7
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APPENDIX D

RESULTS OF COMPUTATIONS RELATED TO SPRINKLERS

This appendix contains printouts from the program ROOMFIR[16] covering a variety of sprinkler head locations and response time index situations.

Discussion of the manner in which ASETB [15] and sprinkler response prediction

equations are combined in these computations is discussed in paragraph 2.12.

Each page in this appendix is a separate situation coordinated with the

listing of potential sprinkler head activations in paragraph 2.12.

D-1
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 1 ft ( .3048 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 50 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 27.60435 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH AO ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DECS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity ss: 0.92 ft/sec ( 0.28 m/sec)

10.0 71.6 22.0 9.9 3.0 4.4 4.2

LINK TEMPERATURE = 71.8 DEGS F ( 22.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 83.6 DEGS F ( 28.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3.40 ft/sec ( 1.04 m/sec)

20.0 74.1 23.4 9.8 3 .

0

17.8 16.8

LINK TEMPERATURE = 79.7 DEGS F ( 26.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 104.3 DEGS F ( 40.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.40 ft/sec ( 1.65 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 94.7 DEGS F ( 34.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 129.0 DEGS F ( 53.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 7.07 ft/sec ( 2.16 m/sec)

40.0 80.7 27.1 9.5 2.9 71.0 67.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 116.0 DEGS F ( 46.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 156.9 DEGS F ( 69.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 8.56 ft/sec ( 2.61 m/sec)

50.0 84.8 29.3 9.3 2.8 111.0 105.3

LINK TEMPERATURE = 142.4 DEGS F ( 61.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 187.5 DEGS F ( 86.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 9.93 ft/sec ( 3.03 m/sec)

D-2
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

'heat loss fraction = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 in ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 7 ft ( 2.1336 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 50 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 27.60435 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

ft. HIGH SILL

TIME TEMP TEMP

sec F C

0.0 70.2 21.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 15.0 72.8 22.7

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 30.0 77.2 25.1

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 45.0 82.7 28.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity =

60.0 89.3 31.8

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 75.0 97.2 36.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 90.0 106.6 41.4

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity =

LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

ft m kW BTU/sec

10.0 3.0 0.1 0.1

70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

70.6 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

0.25 ft/sec ( 0.08 m/sec)

9.9 3.0 10.0 9.5

71.3 DEGS F ( 21.8 DEGS C)

81.0 DEGS F ( 27.2 DEGS C)

1.23 ft/sec ( 0.37 m/sec)

9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

77.2 DEGS F ( 25.1 DEGS C)

98.1 DEGS F ( 36.7 DEGS C)

1.95 ft/sec ( 0.60 m/sec)

9.4 2.9 89.9 85.3

88.9 DEGS F ( 31.6 DEGS C)

118.8 DEGS F ( 48.2 DEGS C)

2.57 ft/sec ( 0.78 m/sec)

9.0 2.8 159.8 151.6

105.9 DEGS F ( 41.1 DEGS C)

142.7 DEGS F ( 61.5 DEGS C)

3.13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

8.7 2.6 249.8 236.9

127.8 DEGS F ( 53.2 DEGS C)

169.8 DEGS F ( 76.6 DEGS C)

3.64 ft/sec ( 1.11 m/sec)

8.4 2.5 359.6 341.1

154.0 DEGS F ( 67.8 DEGS C)

200.1 DEGS F ( 93.4 DEGS C)

4.13 ft/sec ( 1.26 m/sec)

D-3
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-14-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT « 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT =* 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 15 ft ( 4.572 itl) DETECTOR RTI = 50 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 27.60435 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F

0.0 70.2

C

21.2

ft

10.0

m

3.0

kw

0.1

BTU/sec

0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.4 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.13 ft/sec ( 0 . 04 m/sec)

15.0 72.8

LINK TEMPERATURE

22.7

70.7

9.9

DEGS F ( 3.0

21.5

10.0

DEGS C)

9.5

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 77.7 DEGS F ( 25.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.65 ft/sec ( 0.20 m/sec)

30.0 77.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

25.1

73.9

9.7

DEGS F ( 2.9

23.3

40.0

DEGS C)

37.9

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 89.7 DEGS F ( 32.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.03 ft/sec ( 0.32 m/sec)

45.0 82.7

LINK TEMPERATURE

28.2

80.5

9.4

DEGS F ( 2.9

27.0

89.9

DEGS C)

85.3

Ceiling Jet Temperature — 104.4 DEGS F ( 40.2 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 1.36 ft/sec ( 0.41 m/sec)

60.0 89.3

LINK TEMPERATURE

31.8

90.7

9.0

DEGS F ( 2.8

32.6

159.8

DEGS C)

151.6

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 121.4 DEGS F ( 49.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.66 ft/sec ( 0 . 50 m/sec)

75.0 97.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

36.2

104.3

8.7

DEGS F (

2 .

6

40.2

249.8

DEGS C)

236.9

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 140.9 DEGS F ( 60.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.93 ft/sec ( 0.59 m/sec)

90.0 106.6

LINK TEMPERATURE

41.4

121.2

8.4

DEGS F ( 2.5

49.6

359.6

DEGS C)

341.1

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 162.8 DEGS F ( 72.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2.19 ft/sec ( 0 . 67 m/sec)

105.0 117.7

LINK TEMPERATURE

47.6

141.3

8.1

DEGS F ( 2.5

60.7

489.5

DEGS C)

464.3

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 187.5 DEGS F ( 86.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2.44 ft/sec ( 0.74 m/sec)
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 1 ft

DETECTOR RTI = 200 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5

]

( 110.4174

( .3048 m)

[ (m-sec) ^ . 5]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3.0 0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.92 ft/sec ( 0.28 m/sec)

15.0 72.8 22.7 9.9 3.0 10.0 9.5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 71.4 DEGS F ( 21.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 93.3 DEGS F ( 34.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 4.46 ft/sec ( 1.36 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 78.1 DEGS F ( 25.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 129.0 DEGS F ( 53.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 7.07 ft/sec ( 2.16 m/sec)

45.0 82.7 28.2 9.4 2.9 89.9 85.3

LINK TEMPERATURE = 92.2 DEGS F ( 33.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 171.9 DEGS F ( 77.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 9.26 ft/sec ( 2.82 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.8 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 114.7 DEGS F ( 45.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 220.7 DEGS F ( 104.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 11.20 ft/sec ( 3.42 m/sec)

75.0 97.2 36.2 8.7 2.6 249.8 236.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 145.5 DEGS F ( 63.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 274.8 DEGS F ( 134.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 12.98 ft/sec ( 3.96 m/sec)

90.0 106.6 41.4 8.4 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 184.6 DEGS F ( 84.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 334 .

1

DEGS F ( 167.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 14.63 ft/sec ( 4.46 m/sec)

D-5
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 in ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 7 ft

DETECTOR RTI = 200 [ ( ft-sec) ^ . 5

]

( 110.4174

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft.

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

( 2.1336 m)

[ (m-sec) ^ . 5]

)

WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

TIME TEMP TEMP

SGC F G

0.0 70.2 21.2

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity = 30.0 77.2 25.1

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity

60.0 89.3 31.8

LINK TEMPERATURE

Ceiling Jet Temperature = Ceiling Jet Velocity =

LAYER

ft

10.0

70.0 DEGS F ( 70.6 DEGS F ( 0.25 ft/sec ( 9.7

72.1 DEGS F ( 98.1 DEGS F ( 1.95 ft/sec (

LAYER

m

3.0

21.1

21.4

0.08

2.9

22.3

36.7

0.60

9.0

82.6 DEGS F ( 142.7 DEGS F ( 3.13 ft/sec ( 90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3

LINK TEMPERATURE = 104.9 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Temperature = 200.0 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Velocity = 4.14 ft/sec ( 120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8

LINK TEMPERATURE = 141.2 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Temperature = 270.9 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.05 ft/sec ( 150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 192.9 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Temperature = 356.9 DEGS F ( Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.90 ft/sec (

2.7

28.1

61.5

0.95

2.5

40.5

93.4

1.26

2.4

60.7

132.7

1.54

2.3

89.4

180.5

1.80

FIRE

kW

0.1

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

40.0

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

159.8

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

359.6

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

639.4

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

999.0

DEGS C)

DEGS C)

m/sec)

FIRE

BTU/sec

0.1

37.9

151.6

341.1

606.4

947.6

D-6
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 in ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 15 ft ( 4.572 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 200 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5

]

( 110.4174 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3.0 0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DECS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.4 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 0.13 ft/sec ( 0.04 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 89.7 DEGS F ( 32.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.03 ft/sec ( 0.32 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 76.7 DEGS F ( 24.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 121.4 DEGS F ( 49.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 1.66 ft/sec ( 0.50 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2 .

5

359 .

6

341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE — 89.1 DEGS F ( 31.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 162.8 DEGS F ( 72.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 2 . 19 ft/sec ( 0.67 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54 .

8

7.8 2.4 639 .

4

606.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 110.0 DEGS F ( 43 .

3

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 215.0 DEGS F ( 101.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2 . 68 ft/sec ( 0.82 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2 .

3

999 .

0

947 .

6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 141.2 DEGS F ( 60.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 279.9 DEGS F ( 137.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 3 . 13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

180.0 207.1 97 .

3

7 .

5

2 .

3

1438 .

6

1364 .

5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 184.2 DEGS F ( 84 .

6

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 358.8 DEGS F ( 181.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3.56 ft/sec ( 1.09 m/sec)

D-7
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 1 ft ( .3048 lt\) DETECTOR RTI = 400 [ ( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 220.8348 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kw BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity — 0.92 ft/sec ( 0.28 m/sec)

15.0 72.8 22.7 9.9 3 .

0

10.0 9.5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.7 DEGS F ( 21.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature =r 93 .

3

DEGS F ( 34.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 4.46 ft/sec ( 1.36 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37 .

9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 74.2 DEGS F ( 23.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 129.0 DEGS F ( 53.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 7 . 07 ft/sec ( 2.16 m/sec)

45.0 82.7 28.2 9.4 2.9 89.9 85.3

LINK TEMPERATURE = 82.0 DEGS F ( 27.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 171.9 DEGS F ( 77.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 9.26 ft/sec ( 2.82 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2 .

8

159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 95.0 DEGS F ( 35.0 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 220.7 DEGS F ( 104.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 11.20 ft/sec ( 3.42 m/sec)

75.0 97.2 36.2 8.7 2 . 6 249.8 236.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 113.8 DEGS F ( 45.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 274.8 DEGS F ( 134 . 9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 12.98 ft/sec ( 3 .96 m/sec)

90.0 106.6 41.4 8.4 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 138.7 DEGS F ( 59 . 3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 334.1 DEGS F ( 167.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 14 . 63 ft/sec ( 4.46 m/sec)

105.0 117.7 47 . 6 8.1 2.5 489.5 464 . 3

LINK TEMPERATURE = 170.0 DEGS F ( 76.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 398.4 DEGS F ( 203 .

6

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 16.16 ft/sec ( 4.93 m/sec)

D-8
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 7 ft ( 2.1336 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 400 [ ( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 220.8348 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kw BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.6 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.25 ft/sec ( 0.08 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2 .

9

40.0 37 .

9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 98.1 DEGS F ( 36.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 1.95 ft/sec ( 0.60 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 76.7 DEGS F ( 24.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 142.7 DEGS F ( 61.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3 . 13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 89.4 DEGS F ( 31.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 200.0 DEGS F ( 93 .

4

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 4.14 ft/sec ( 1.26 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8 2.4 639 .

4

606 .

4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 111.1 DEGS F ( 44 .

0

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 270.9 DEGS F ( 132.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.05 ft/sec ( 1.54 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2.3 999.0 947 .

6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 143.9 DEGS F ( 62 .

2

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 356.9 DEGS F ( 180.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.90 ft/sec ( 1.80 m/sec)

180.0 207.1 97 .

3

7.5 2 .

3

1438 .

6

1364 .

5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 189 .

4

DEGS F ( 87 .

4

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 459.3 DEGS F ( 237 .

4

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 6.72 ft/sec ( 2 . 05 m/sec)

D-9
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION “ .75

FIRE HEIGHT « 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT ^ 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR 15 ft ( 4.572 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 400 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 220.8348 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = . 0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3.0 0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.4 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C) « Ceiling Jet Velocity 0.13 ft/sec ( 0.04 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37 .

9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.6 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 89.7 DEGS F ( 32.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.03 ft/sec ( 0.32 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 73.5 DEGS F ( 23 .

1

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 121.4 DEGS F ( 49.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.66 ft/sec ( 0.50 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 80.3 DEGS F ( 26.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 162.8 DEGS F ( 72.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2.19 ft/sec ( 0.67 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8 2.4 639.4 606.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 92.3 DEGS F ( 33.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 215.0 DEGS F ( 101.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2 . 68 ft/sec ( 0.82 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2.3 999.0 947.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 110.9 DEGS F ( 43.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 279.9 DEGS F ( 137.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3 . 13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

180.0 207.1 97.3 7.5 2.3 1438.6 1364 .

5

LINK TEMPERATURE — 137.7 DEGS F ( 58.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 358.8 DEGS F ( 181.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3.56 ft/sec ( 1.09 m/sec)

210.0 259.7 L26.5 7.5 2 .

3

1958.0 1857 .

2

LINK TEMPERATURE = 173.9 DEGS F ( 78.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 450.8 DEGS F ( 232.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3.98 ft/sec ( 1.21 m/sec)

D-10

1
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 1 ft ( .3048 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 700 [ ( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 386.4609 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kw BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 71.1 DEGS F ( 21.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.92 ft/sec ( 0.28 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 72.5 DEGS F ( 22.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 129.0 DEGS F ( 53.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 7.07 ft/sec ( 2 . 16 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 85.1 DEGS F ( 29.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 220.7 DEGS F ( 104.8 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 11.21 ft/sec ( 3 . 42 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 112.7 DEGS F ( 44.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 334.2 DEGS F ( 167.9 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 14 . 64 ft/sec ( 4.46 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8 2.4 639 .

4

606.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 158.6 DEGS F ( 70.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 467.9 DEGS F ( 242 .

2

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 17.61 ft/sec ( 5.37 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2.3 999.0 947 .

6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 224.5 DEGS F ( 107.0 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 621.1 DEGS F ( 327.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 20.18 ft/sec ( 6.15 m/sec)

D-11
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 in ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 7 ft ( 2.1336 m)

DETECTOR RTI = 700 [

( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 386.4609 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH AO ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DEGS F ( 21.1 DEGS C) • Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.6 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 0.25 ft/sec ( 0.08 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37.9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.6 DEGS F ( 21.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 98.1 DEGS F ( 36.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.95 ft/sec ( 0.60 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 73.9 DEGS F ( 23.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 142.7 DEGS F ( 61.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 3.13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 81.6 DEGS F ( 27.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 200.0 DEGS F ( 93.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity — 4 . 14 ft/sec ( 1.26 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8 2.4 639.4 606.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 95.1 DEGS F ( 35.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 270.9 DEGS F ( 132.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 5.05 ft/sec ( 1.54 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2.3 999.0 947.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 116.0 DEGS F ( 46.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 356.9 DEGS F ( 180.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity — 5.90 ft/sec ( 1.80 m/sec)

180.0 207.1 97.3 7.5 2.3 1438.6 1364.5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 145.8 DEGS F ( 63.2 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 459.3 DEGS F ( 237.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 6.72 ft/sec ( 2 . 05 m/sec)

210.0 259.7 126.5 7.5 2 .

3

1958.0 1857 .

2

LINK TEMPERATURE = 186.1 DEGS F ( 85.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 577.5 DEGS F ( 303.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 7 . 52 ft/sec ( 2.29 m/sec)

D-12

1
ROOMFIR VERSION 1.0

04-15-1987 IF SPRINKLER HAS BEEN IN SOUTH BALLROOM

HEAT LOSS FRACTION = .75

FIRE HEIGHT = 0 ft 0 m

ROOM HEIGHT = 10 ft 3.048 m

ROOM AREA = 2304 sq ft 214.0416 sq m

RADIAL DISTANCE FROM FIRE TO DETECTOR = 15 ft ( 4.572 in)

DETECTOR RTI = 700 [ ( ft-sec) ^ . 5 ] ( 386.4609 [ (m-sec) ^ . 5 ]

)

THERE IS A WALL OPENING 10 ft. HIGH 16 ft. WIDE WITH A 0 ft. HIGH SILL

ALPHA VALUE FOR T-SQUARED FIRE = .0444

TIME TEMP TEMP LAYER LAYER FIRE FIRE

sec F C ft m kW BTU/sec

0.0 70.2 21.2 10.0 3 .

0

0.1 0.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.0 DECS F ( 21.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 70.4 DEGS F ( 21.4 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 0.13 ft/sec ( 0.04 m/sec)

30.0 77.2 25.1 9.7 2.9 40.0 37 .

9

LINK TEMPERATURE = 70.3 DEGS F ( 21.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 89.7 DEGS F ( 32.1 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity 1.03 ft/sec ( 0.32 m/sec)

60.0 89.3 31.8 9.0 2.7 159.8 151.6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 72 .

0

DEGS F ( 22.2 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 121.4 DEGS F ( 49.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 1.66 ft/sec ( 0.50 m/sec)

90.0 106.5 41.4 8.3 2.5 359.6 341.1

LINK TEMPERATURE = 76.1 DEGS F ( 24.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 162.8 DEGS F ( 72.6 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2.19 ft/sec ( 0.67 m/sec)

120.0 130.6 54.8 7.8 2.4 639.4 606.4

LINK TEMPERATURE = 83.4 DEGS F ( 28.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 215.0 DEGS F ( 101.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 2.68 ft/sec ( 0.82 m/sec)

150.0 163.8 73.2 7.6 2 .

3

999.0 947 .

6

LINK TEMPERATURE = 94.9 DEGS F ( 35.0 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 279.9 DEGS F ( 137.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3.13 ft/sec ( 0.95 m/sec)

180.0 207.1 97 .

3

7.5 2 .

3

1438 .

6

1364 .

5

LINK TEMPERATURE = 111.8 DEGS F ( 44 .

3

DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 358.8 DEGS F ( 181.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3 . 56 ft/sec ( 1.09 m/sec)

210.0 259.7 126.5 7 .

5

2 .

3

1958 .

0

1857 .

2

LINK TEMPERATURE = 135.2 DEGS F ( 57.3 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 450.8 DEGS F ( 232.7 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 3 . 98 ft/sec ( 1.21 m/sec)

240.0 319.0 159.5 7.5 2.3 2557.4 2425.7

LINK TEMPERATURE = 166.1 DEGS F ( 74.5 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Temperature = 554 .

1

DEGS F ( 290.0 DEGS C)

Ceiling Jet Velocity = 4 .40 ft/sec ( 1.34 m/sec)

D-13
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s
APPENDIX E

. RESULTS OF COMPUTATIONS RELATED TO SMOKE DETECTORS

This appendix lists the results of execution of DETACT-QS (See paragraph 2.13)

to estimate the potential response of smoke detectors.

E-1
SOUTH BALLROOM SMOKE DETECTOR EVALUATION

FIRE TO DETECTOR ROOM

CEILING AXIAL DIST. TEMP,

(ft.) (ft.) (F)

7 1 70

TIME (sec) RHR(kW)

0 0 **** DETECTOR ACTIVATION AT

JET (F)

70

0

10

20

30

0

5

19

42

70

74

81

89   detector activation at

0

10

20

30

40

0

5

19

42

75

70

73

77

82

88 ** ** detector activation at

DEVICE

rating

(F)

93

RTI

(English)

.001

HEAD/DET. (F)

70

10.0 SECONDS  

NEW RADIUS OF DETECTOR FROM FIRE AXIS (ft) IS 15

70

74

81

89

34.5 SECONDS ** **

NEW RADIUS OF DETECTOR FROM FIRE AXIS (ft) IS 30

70

73

77

82

88

48.6 SECONDS  

NEW RADIUS OF DETECTOR FROM FIRE AXIS (ft) IS

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0

5

19

42

75

117

168

70

72

74

77

81

85

89 ** ** detector activation at 68

60

70

72

74

77

81

85

89

,5 SECONDS ****

E-2
APPENDIX F

RESULTS OF TESTS OF THE FABRIC WALL COVERING

Several tests were conducted to obtain information on the burning properties

of the fabric wall covering used in both the North and South Ballrooms . The

NBS experiential ignition and flame spread apparatus described by Quintiere

and Harkleroad [24] and the Cone Calorimeter [3] were used.

In these test the carpet was cemented to the sooth surface of a 2 inch (50mm)

thick, well cured concrete substrate. The adhesive used to cement the fabric

to the concrete is believed to be similar to that used in the ballrooms. The

adhesive used was 72 Pressure Sensitive Adhesive manufactured by 3M

Corporation. A thin coat of adhesive was spray applied to cover the entire

surface of the concrete face. No adhesive was applied to the fabric. As soon

as the adhesive surface became tacky, the fabric was hand pressed in place.

The fabric was conditioned for several days prior to attachment at 70 F (2 1C)

and 50 % relative humidity. After cementing the fabric to the concrete the

assembled test sample was returned to the conditioning room for about 30 hours

before testing. The test facility is housed in an air conditioned laboratory.

The following properties were indicated by these tests:

a. Heat of Gasification - approximately 8 kJ/g

b. Ignition Temperature - 1160F (670C) to 1270F(688C)

c. Thermal Inertia/ phi - 72 to 94

d. Critical Ignition Energy - between 4.6 and 5.4 kW/m^

.

Included in this appendix are:

a. Figure F-1. Wall lining (vertical) rate of heat release and heat of

combustion at 50 kW/m2 irradiance. Cone Calorimeter

b. Figure F-2. Wall lining (vertical) rate of heat release and heat of

combustion at 60 kW/m2 irradiance. Cone Calorimeter

c. Figure F-3. Ignition results for wall lining

d. Figure F-4. Correlation of ignition results for wall lining

e. Figure F-5. Correlation of spread velocity for wall lining

F-1
Rate

of

Heat

Release

(kW/m^")

Rate

of

Heat

Release

(kW/'

WRLL COVERING 50 KH/M2 VERT TEST 0460

Time ( s

)

Rate of Heat Release (kW/m2)

Eff. Heat of Combustion (MJ/kg)

gure F-1. Wall Lining (vertical) Rate of Heat Release and Heat of

Combustion at 50 kW/m2 Irradiance, Cone Calorimeter

WRLL COIVERING B0 KH/M2 VERT TEST 24B4

400

35f!

son

250

2 on

150

1 on

fO

0

120 240 3B0 480 600 720 840 960 1080 1200 1320 1440

Time ( s

)

Rate of Heat Release (kW/m2)

Eff. Heat of Combustion (MJ/kg)

50

40

30

20

10

0

Figure F-2. Wall -Lining (vertical) Rate of Heat Release and Heat of

Combustion at 60 kW/m2 Irradiance, Cone Calorimeter

F-2

Eff.

Heat

of

Combuetlon

Comboetlon
{o.

ig)

/

q"

(e)

Time

(sec)

DUPONT PLAZA WALL LINING

0

I I I 1 L I 1 IQ I r -I 0 .7 1.4 2.1 2. B 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.6 6.3 7

q" (e) (W/cm2)

I

I

')

i

Figure F-3. Ignition Results for Wall Lining

DUPONT PLAZA WALL LINING

O’

Sqrt (t) (s -1/2)

- LIFT - CONE CALORIMETER

_ LIFT ~ CONE CALORIMETER

Figure F-4. Correlation of Ignition Results for Wall Lining

F-3
/2

(mm/s

-1/2)

DUPONT PLAZA WALL LINING

.5

.25 h

a X

3 A

. i_

6

-j.8

^ - lift

0 - CONE CALORIMETER

1

-I

10

q" (e) F(t) (W/cm2)

Figure F-5 . Correlation of Spread Velocity for Wall Lining

F-4
APPENDIX G

A METHOD FOR CALCULATING VENTILATION FLOW RATE

FROM

Slide -Rule Estimates of Fire Growth

J.R. Lawson & J.G. Quint iere [19]

Now that methods have been presented for estimating burning rates and AT in a fire compartment, it is time to consider ventilation flow rates in the fire.

It was pointed out by Steckler, et al. [32] that the flow of air and gases in

room fires has a significant influence on the development of a fire. As a fire develops, the air and gas flow rates control compartment temperature and

heat transfer which then affects the rate of fire growth. When a compartment

fire reaches a fully involved state, the air flow rate usually controls the

fire, and the fire is then considered to be ventilation controlled. The mass flow rate of air and gases will be estimated first in this section, and

ventilation limit conditions will be examined later.

In order to further understand the terminology of vent flow refer to Figure

G-1. Under natural convection conditions and after the hot gases fill the

compartment and spill out of the vent, the flow will be countercurrent at the

vent. Air will enter at a rate m^ and combustion products will flow out at a rate m^ . These flows result from pressure differences (Ap) set up at the vent

due to the differences in compartment and ambient gas temperatures. At the

flow reversal point in the vent, the Ap is zero and this position is termed

the neutral plane. The flow rates depend on the fuel mass release rate , the height of the neutral plane X2

, the height of the hot gas layer x^ , its

temperature T, and the vent dimensions and W^ . In general, the vent

equations are coupled nonlinear algebraic equations which we will avoid

solving, but suggest the approximate procedure below.

G-1
To make this ventilation flow rate estimate, it is necessary to assume a free

burning condition. The first step in making this estimate is to calculate a fuel mass burning rate, m^ , with one of the methods found in section 2, and

then calculate the compartment gas temperature by the formula presented in

section 8. At this point, the dimensionless mass flow rate can be

calculated [33] using,

+ '!>)] (1 - (G-1)

I - Ig

and Y2 = X2 /Hq can be estimated as 0.5 to 0.6 for rp < 1 and for wellventilated fires where m^/m^ is small as found in reference [33]

.

For the ‘ case of larger xj) and m^/m^ not small, the neutral plane can be estimated from

the work of Kawagoe and Sekine [18] or from reference [33] in which = 0

:

^2 tn f

1 +

m,

2/3

(G-2)

This will yield the lower limit for y2 when the hot layer tends to the floor

and the enclosure tends toward a uniform gas temperature. Then mass flow rate

out, , can be calculated using.

2 ^

“o - 3 cpa H,

3/2 (G-3)

where C = opening flow coefficient which is ~ 0.7

= density of ambient gas surrounding area

g = acceleration of gravity (9.8 m/s^

)

= opening width

Hq = opening height

The mass inflow rate of air, m^ , can be calculated by,

m. = m^ - nif (G-A)

for which steady flow conditions have been assumed. Of course, if nif/m.

is found to be large, then iteration is required in the above computations.

Moreover the ratio m^/m^ should be compared with the mass stoichiometric fuel

to air ratio to examine whether the fire is ventilation limited. We will

return to this point shortly.
APPENDIX H

COMPARISON OF RESULTS OBTAINED WITH DIFFERENT PROCEDURES

For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, a sophisticated model, FIRST; a simple

model, ROOMFIR; and an engineering correlation UTEMP were all used to evaluate

conditions in the preflashover stages in the South Ballroom. All three

predict the average temperature in the smoke layer. FIRST and ROOMFIR also

predict the elevation of the smoke layer and the oxygen concentration in that

layer. Figures H-1. H-2, and H-3 are graphic plots showing the comparisons.

H-1
COMPARISON

OF

UPPER

LAYER

TEMPERATURE

O

o o O O O o o o o o O

o in o in o in o in o in

in m OJ

xcH o cn to cn -iH

(d) 3UniVU3dW3i U3AV1 d3ddn

H-2

I a:0) u

3

150

225

300

375

450

525

-600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
COMPARISON

OF

SMOKE

LAYER

INTERFACE

r^CDlA^^fOCMC4w4 • r • • • • • • •

OGDlDCD 'tHCDCD'^OJ CVJ T-i tH

U3AV1 3X0WS 30 NOIlISOd

CN

I

(1) U

3

bO •H

H-3

150

225

300

375

450

525

600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
COMPARISON

OF

OXYGEN

CONCENTRATION

150

225

300

375

450

525

-600

675

750

TIME

AFTER

ESTABLISHED

BURNING

(sec.)
NBS-1T4A (REV. 2-8C) U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET (See instructions)

1. PUBLICATION OR

REPORT NO.

NBSIR 87-3560

2. Performing Organ. Report No, 3. Publication Date

MAY 1987

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

An Engineering Analysis of the Early Stages of Fire Development

- The Fire at the Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino

- December 31, 1986

5. AUTHOR(S)

Harold E. Nelson

6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION (If joint or other than NBS, see in struction s) NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

GAITHERSBURG, MD 20899

7. Contract/Grant No.

8. Type of Report & Period Covered

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND COMPLETE ADDRESS (Street, City, State, ZIP)

NBS

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Document describes a computer program; SF-185, FIPS Software Summary, is attached.

11. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or literature survey, mention it here)

This report presents the methods and results of an analytical analysis of the fire

development through the first and second floors during the December 31, 1986 fire

Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino, San Juan, Puerto Rico. The analysis involved

the use of fire growth models, engineering formulae, and technical data. The repor

details the procedures and data used, the reason for those selected, and the

results obtained. The analysis addressed mass burning rate, rate of heat release,

smoke temperature, smoke layer depth, velocity of smoke/flame front, mass products

in smoke layer, oxygen concentration in smoke layer, visibility in smoke layer,

flame length/extension, flame spread, sprinkler response, smoke detector response,

and fire duration. The areas of the building analyzed include the ballroom

complex to the areas where the fatalities occurred, and the lobby and casino areas

where most of the deaths occurred. This report does not address smoke movement

above the first floor, the conditions that caused the deaths of three persons

caught in an elevator, or the conditions that caused the death of one victim in a guest room on the fourth floor.

12. KEY WORDS (S/x to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only proper names; and separate key words by semicolons)

Fire engineering analysis; fire growth models; flashover; Fire investigation;

Dupont Plaza Hotel

13. AVAILABILITY ~

rXl Unlimited

I I For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

I I Order From Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

20402.

Order From National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA. 22161

14. NO. OF

PRINTED PAGES

113

15. Price

$18.95

USCOMM-DC 6043-P80
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