Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-JT-1931| February 23, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Ruth Johnson

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Anna Onaitis Holden

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE1

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Robert J. Henke

Abigail R. Recker

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorneys General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of B.D., Mother, and S.D., 

Minor Child, 

B.D.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

February 23, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1708-JT-1931

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

Marilyn A. Moores, Judge

The Honorable

Larry Bradley, Magistrate

 

1 On November 29, 2017, DeDe K. Connor filed an appearance for Child Advocates, Inc.; however, Child 

Advocates, Inc. did not file a separate appellee’s brief. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1708-JT-1931| February 23, 2018 Page 2 of 17

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

and

Child Advocates, Inc.,

Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1605-JT-487

Kirsch, Judge. 

[1] B.D. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her child S.D. (“Child”), raising the following restated issue: whether 

the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights was clearly erroneous 

because there was insufficient evidence that termination was in Child’s best 

interests. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on July 28, 2008 to Mother and K.R. (“Father”).

2

 In April 

2014, DCS filed its petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services 

 

2

Father was convicted of having sexually abused Child’s half-sister, H.A., and he was incarcerated at the 

time of Child’s termination hearing. In December 2016, Father signed consents for Child’s adoption. Father 

does not participate in this appeal. 
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(“CHINS”).

3 The 2014 CHINS petition (“CHINS petition”) alleged, in 

pertinent part, that Mother had failed to or was unwilling to provide Child with 

a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment. Mother had an extensive 

history with DCS and was, at that time, involved in a CHINS action regarding 

her daughter H.A.4 Child’s CHINS petition alleged that Mother lacked stable 

housing and had moved numerous times in the months preceding the filing of 

the CHINS petition. Further, Mother had not successfully demonstrated the 

ability to provide Child with a safe, stable, appropriate home. Accordingly, the 

CHINS court determined that its coercive intervention was necessary to ensure

Child’s safety and well-being. After the initial hearing, DCS removed Child 

from Mother’s care, and Child was placed in foster care.

[4] On May 28, 2014, Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS, and that same day, 

the CHINS court proceeded to a dispositional hearing. The CHINS court’s 

parental participation decree ordered Mother, in part, to participate in: (1) 

home-based counseling; and (2) domestic violence assessment and the 

recommended services. The permanency plan for Child remained reunification 

until April 13, 2016, at which time the CHINS court changed the plan to 

adoption. DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on May 

 

3 Mother had four children, H.A., M.D., J.D., and Child. The CHINS petition alleged that Child and two of 

her half-siblings, H.A. and J.D., were CHINS; however, Child is the only subject of the instant appeal. 

4 A CHINS petition regarding H.A. and M.D. was filed in March 2013. Tr. Vol. II at 169. Mother testified 

that she walked “in the bedroom catching [her] oldest[, H.A.,] rape her middle daughter[, M.D.].” Id. 

Mother did not successfully complete services to remedy the reasons for DCS’s involvement regarding H.A., 

and H.A. was not returned to Mother’s care. Mother admitted that she did not want H.A. to return to the 

home due to H.A.’s history of sexually abusing her siblings. 
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13, 2016. On June 22, 2017, more than three years after Child had been 

removed from Mother’s care, the juvenile court held a hearing on the petition to 

terminate Mother’s rights. 

[5] At the termination hearing, Cura Lester (“Lester”), Child’s foster care case 

manager at Children’s Bureau, testified that she visited Child at least once a 

week, visited Child’s school at least twice a month, but had little contact with 

Mother. Lester said that Child could have explosive temper tantrums, where 

intervention was necessary. Tr. Vol. II at 11-12. It was Lester’s opinion that 

Child should remain in her current placement with her foster mother, and she 

“recommended adoption of [Child] . . . just for stability and consistency for 

her.” Id. at 12. Lester said that change was difficult for Child to understand—

she required routine, consistency, and an understanding of what is going on day 

to day. 

[6] Elwanda Haynes (“Haynes”), a home-based therapist at Gallahue Behavioral 

Health, testified that she began treating Child in August 2014, when Child was 

five years old. Id. at 105. Child’s demeanor during sessions varied “depending 

on what was going on that day.” Id. at 106. “If she had a good day, she was 

fine and we could . . . talk about things” like feelings and behaviors. Id. at 106-

07. If Child “got in trouble in school, she was very defiant,” and she did not 

want to talk or participate in the session. Id. at 106. Child’s defiant behaviors 

included yelling, screaming, and running away. Id. at 107. Child’s case was 

closed with Haynes in December 2015 because Child began working with 
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another therapist, who was able to deal with Child’s mental health and

sexualized behaviors. Id. at 106.

[7] Patricia Phelps (“Foster Mother”) testified that, due to no fault of Child, Child 

was removed from the first foster home, and in May 2015, she was placed in 

therapeutic foster care with Foster Mother. Id. at 10, 86. Foster Mother, who 

was seventy-seven years old, testified that she had been a foster parent since 

1973, had fostered thirty-six children, and had adopted sixteen. Id. at 86, 100. 

In addition to Child, there were three other children living in Foster Mother’s

home, an adopted daughter and two “medically fragile” foster children. Id. at 

87. Foster Mother said that there was a “strong rule” in the family: “I don’t 

touch you and you don’t touch me.” Id. at 90. Child was allowed to interact 

with the medically fragile children, but only when Foster Mother or a nurse was

present. Even so, Foster Mother stressed, “[W]e do not push a deep 

relationship with these kids because . . . they’re probably not going to live long 

and . . . [Child]’s already had her share of issues . . . so we make sure they 

[Child and other adopted child] build a life that’s not included with the 

[medically fragile] kids.” Id. at 95. 

[8] Foster Mother testified that Child was, initially, well behaved, but that changed 

a few months later when Child began exhibiting some destructive behaviors. 

Child would peel paint off woodwork and eat it. Id. at 102-03. Foster Mother 

testified that Child started throwing tantrums at home, and at school, “she was 

leaving the classroom, she was stealing. She was all of a sudden out of the clear 

blue cussing the teacher, [and] throwing chairs at the children.” Id. at 90. 
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Child also displayed sexualized behaviors, including: (1) approaching random 

men or neighborhood boys, explaining the different sexual acts she could 

perform, and asking if they were interested; (2) masturbating with potentially 

dangerous objects; and (3) intentionally urinating on her clothing. Id. at 92, 

101-02. Foster Mother testified that there was a correlation between visits with 

Mother and Child’s sexualized behavior. Id. at 94. Child would go weeks 

without a visit, and the sexualized behavior would go away; however, after 

visits with Mother, Child would act out sexually. Id. Child’s behavior 

interfered with her education; “she was on the first-grade level for three years,” 

even having had a tutor for five days a week. Id. at 103. Child was treated by 

various mental health providers, and her medication was adjusted over time. 

Foster Mother testified that those changes made a “remarkable difference,” 

saying, “[Child] can keep her mind on things. Um she can um think before she 

acts.” Id. at 93. Foster Mother testified that she was willing to adopt Child. Id.

at 94. 

[9] Gabrielle Young (“Young”), a home-based therapist at Family Works, testified 

that Child began working with her in July 2015. Child met with Young once or 

twice a week and treatment goals included working on Child’s “sexually 

reactive behaviors.” Id. at 45, 51. Child said that Father had touched her 

“down there” and made her touch him in certain places. Id. at 58-59. She also

said that her half-sister, M.D., had touched her inappropriately. Id. at 60. 

Additionally, Child had witnessed domestic violence between Mother and 

Father and between Mother and other men. Id. at 59-60. Young spent a long 
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time trying to get Child to express and regulate feelings and emotions, as well as 

learning body boundaries. Id. at 45-46. Child would sometimes talk about 

“rubbing herself down there.” Id. at 57. Sometimes, Child acted 

inappropriately during sessions, including intentionally spreading her legs and

dancing inappropriately. Id. at 46-47. Young attributed Child’s behaviors to 

past sexual trauma. Id. at 57. Young testified that Child has “a very complex 

trauma history,” so it is “important for her to feel stable, to feel secure and not 

to increase her anxiety.” Id. at 52. 

[10] Meghann Banks (“Banks”), a care coordinator at Choices, testified that she 

began monitoring Child’s “progress and treatment” in September 2016. Id. at 

30, 32. At that time, Child had a “behaviorist” and home-based therapy. Id. at 

32. Banks testified that, initially, Child’s behavior fluctuated. However, three 

or four months before the termination hearing, Child was referred to and 

participated in Applied Behavioral Analysis (“ABA”), “an intensive service that 

is used to address behaviors.” Id. at 33, 37. As part of the ABA, Child was 

provided with an educational mentor. Id. at 31. Banks said that Child’s 

behavior improved after ABA was put into place. 

[11] Shirley Perez (“Perez”), a DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) who had 

worked with the family for two years, testified that Mother had trouble 

complying with services. Id. at 117. Perez testified that, in the spring of 2016, 

DCS recommended that Mother have unsupervised visits with Child. Because 

Child was having “suicidal thoughts,” a safety plan was created, requiring

Mother to call 911 if Child “were to do something.” Id. at 123. When Child 
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put a jump rope around her neck and threatened to harm herself, Mother did 

not comply with the safety plan. Id. Perez testified that Mother’s noncompliance created concern as to whether Mother could provide Child a stable 

home. Child’s stability was important because Child “has such high anxiety 

that if anything changes just a bit it, it just throws her off completely.” Id. at 

127. Perez had “personally requested to keep the case just to make sure that it 

[didn’t] throw [Child] off even with an FCM coming to the home.” Id. Perez 

testified that it was in Child’s best interests to “be adopted by the current foster 

parent” because Foster Mother can take care of Child’s needs. Id. Perez

testified that Foster Mother was “a strong advocate” in regard to getting 

necessary referrals, medication, and therapy to meet Child’s needs. Id. at 127-

28. 

[12] Mark Bass (“the GAL”), a guardian ad litem for Child Advocates, Inc., testified 

that as part of his involvement with Child’s case he had attended court 

hearings, reviewed court reports, provider reports, and school documents,

spoken with numerous providers, and visited Mother at home. Id. at 143. The 

GAL testified that, typically, an individual like Child would be placed in 

residential treatment; however, that was avoided because Foster Mother has 

been “that much of an advocate” for Child. Id. at 145. Foster Mother has been 

able to handle Child’s outbursts, school issues, and sexually acting out. The 

GAL stated, “[I]t takes an experienced person and a person with a big heart to 

be able to, to handle that stuff. Um and [Foster Mother’s] experience has 

helped her do that[,] and in the years I’ve been doing this[,] a lot of foster 
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parents aren’t capable of that.” Id. at 146. The GAL said that Mother had been 

given a sufficient amount of time, but had been unable to complete services. He

said that Child needed consistency and stability to properly develop; he 

recommended that Child’s permanency plan should be adoption. Id. at 147. 

[13] In April 2016, Mother was referred to Family Works provider Bertha Rush 

(“Rush”), who helped Mother with home-based therapy and monitored 

supervised visitation between Mother and Child. Rush testified that Mother did 

well overall. Rush opined that Mother had made progress; however, Rush 

expressed concerns because she “didn’t see a long duration of stability. Um 

often times that would change within a month or two.” Id. at 195. Rush 

stopped providing services for Mother in February 2017, when she had not 

heard from Mother “in about a month.” Id. at 196. The juvenile court entered 

its order, on August 2, 2017, terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. 

Mother now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[14] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights 

to Child. Specifically, she contends that termination is not in Child’s best 

interests because Child “has an undisputed, heightened need for consistency 

and permanency,” which is inconsistent with DCS’s plan that Child be adopted 

“by an elderly woman who fosters medically fragile children who may not live 

long.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. “‘The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and 
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raise their children.’” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 

(Ind. 2013) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 

143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “The parent-child relationship is one of the most valued 

relationships in our culture.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “However, 

although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for 

the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his 

[or her] responsibility as a parent.” In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013) (citing In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. 

denied). Further, “‘children have an interest in terminating parental rights that 

prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous 

relationships.’” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re C.G., 954 

N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)). Therefore, parental rights are not absolute and 

must be subordinated to the child’s best interests in deciding the appropriate 

disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. 

[15] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to 

protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights 

is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. 

Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such 

that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired 

before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. 

[16] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the 

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 

1229; In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
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We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences 

therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the 

trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings 

or judgment unless clearly erroneous. In evaluating whether the 

trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights is clearly 

erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine 

whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the 

findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the 

judgment. Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that 

the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the 

child’s very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that the child’s emotional and physical 

development are threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229-30 (internal citations omitted) (internal 

quotations omitted). 

[17] As is pertinent to this appeal, to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental 

rights, DCS had to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. 

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child. 

. . . .; 
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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and 

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). The State’s burden of proof for establishing 

these allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing 

evidence.’” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, if 

the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this 

chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. 

Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). 

[18] Mother does not challenge the following findings made by the juvenile court: 

(1) Mother’s therapy—to cope with anger and understand Child’s needs—

closed in April 2017 after a month where Mother had no contact with provider; 

(2) in 2014, Child had violent tantrums, screamed, and threw objects, which 

Mother thought was typical behavior of a young girl; (3) therapist Young 

treated, for two years, Child’s sexual trauma, which was caused by being 

molested by Father and half-sister and by witnessing Mother as victim of 

domestic abuse; (4) Young has been opposed to unsupervised visits throughout 

the CHINS case, based on [Mother]’s lack of consistency and stability, and 

believes that Child should not be returned to Mother’s care; (5) Child sexually 

acts out and has had issues with body safety boundaries; (6) Mother agrees that 

Child displays behavior of having been sexually abused, but initially blamed 

Child’s behavior on foster care; (7) Mother minimizes Child’s need for 

treatment and believes everything would be fine if Child came home; (8) Child 
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is doing well with Foster Mother and has made a lot of progress with decreased 

anxiety and increased understanding of boundaries; (9) Child’s inappropriate 

behavior coincided with parenting time and was triggered by exposure to older 

men and Mother; (10) Mother was inconsistent in exercising her parenting time

and cancelled visits at the last minute, negatively affecting Child; (11) at the 

time of the termination hearing, Child had lived with Foster Mother for over 

two years; (12) Foster Mother has agreed to adopt Child; (13) Foster Mother is 

patient, calm, and a strong advocate in meeting Child’s special needs; and (14) 

while Mother loves Child and the two have a bond, stability is important to 

Child to keep her anxiety low; (15) Child needs routine and consistency in 

order to thrive. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17-18.

[19] Further, Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s conclusions that “[t]here 

is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child]’s removal 

and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied” and “[t]here 

is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to [Child]’s well-being.”

5

Id. at 18. As a result, Mother has 

waived any argument relating to these unchallenged findings and conclusions. 

See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that failure 

 

5 Mother states, she “acknowledges, without conceding, that there is evidence in this case that may prove one 

or both of the elements set out in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(B).” Appellant’s Br. at 17 (emphasis 

added). Notwithstanding Mother’s apparent attempt to keep those issues alive on appeal, Mother makes no 

cogent argument that the juvenile court’s findings as to those two matters are clearly erroneous. Failure to 

make a cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review. Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1071 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
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to challenge findings resulted in waiver of argument that findings were clearly 

erroneous), trans. denied. Instead, Mother’s argument folds together two 

requirements, claiming (1) that the termination is not in Child’s best interests

because (2) the plan for Child, which is “adoption by an elderly woman who 

fosters medically fragile children who may not live long,” is not a satisfactory 

plan. Appellant’s Br. at 4. We remind Mother that these two requirements are 

separate inquiries.

1. Best Interests

[20] In deciding whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the juvenile court must look beyond the factors identified by DCS and 

consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied. In making that determination, the juvenile court must 

subordinate the interests of the parent to that of the child involved. Id. The 

court need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. Id. Here, Mother recognizes that Child needs 

stability and consistency. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Mother also understands that 

“[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a 

child.” Id. at 19 (quoting In re G.L., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009)). That 

being said, “a need for permanency, alone is not a sufficient basis for 

terminating parental rights.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1006.

[21] Here, permanency was a consideration, but it was not the sole basis for the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. The evidence before the juvenile court 

revealed that Child and two of her siblings were sexually molested while under 
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Mother’s care, and Child witnessed Mother being a victim of domestic abuse. 

Tr. Vol. II at 60, 156, 169. Upon leaving Mother’s care at age five, Child had 

violent tantrums, screamed, and threw objects, which Mother thought was 

typical behavior of a young girl. Id. at 11, 173. Child sexually acted out and 

had issues with body safety boundaries; Mother initially blamed Child’s 

behavior on foster care. Id. at 79-80. Mother minimized Child’s need for 

treatment and believed that everything would be fine once Child came home. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17. Child’s inappropriate behaviors coincided with 

parenting time, and triggers of those behaviors were exposure to older men and 

to Mother. Tr. Vol. II at 64-65, 131. Mother was inconsistent with her 

visitation and would cancel at the last minute, which negatively impacted 

Child. Id. at 13. At the time of the termination hearing, Child had lived with 

Foster Mother for two years, was doing well, and had made a lot of progress 

with decreased anxiety and increased understanding of boundaries. Id. at 86, 

93. Mother’s therapy, addressing Mother’s ability to cope with anger and 

understand Child’s needs, was terminated after Mother was out of 

communication with provider Rush for about a month. Id. at 196. Finally,

Child needs routine and consistency in order to thrive. Id. The juvenile court 

did not err in concluding there was sufficient evidence that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Mother’s arguments to 

the contrary are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the 

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the 

credibility of witnesses), trans. denied.
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2. Satisfactory Plan

[22] Mother contends that, considering Child’s needs for stability, it was an 

improper plan to place Child with Foster Mother. Considering the 

requirements of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B), we restate Mother’s

argument as whether DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child’s care and 

treatment. Mother asserts that Foster Mother’s age of seventy-seven years old,

and her care for medically fragile children in her home creates an uncertainty 

regarding how stable Foster Mother’s home will be for Child. To terminate 

Mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court did not need to judge the 

appropriateness of Foster Mother’s home; instead, it was required only to 

determine whether DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child. 

[23] “Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be ‘satisfactory,’ for 

the purposes of the termination statute, it ‘need not be detailed, so long as it 

offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the 

parent-child relationship is terminated.’” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (quoting 

Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007), trans. denied). A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to 

find a suitable parent to adopt the child. Id. In other words, there need not be a 

guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will try to find 

a suitable adoptive parent. Id. Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS 

has not identified a specific family to adopt the child. Id. Part of the reason for 

this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination 

court, to decide whether an adoptive placement is appropriate. Id. Here, DCS 
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had a plan that Child would be adopted. Based on these standards, we 

conclude that DCS’s plan that Child be adopted was a satisfactory plan. 

Accordingly, we need not discuss whether Foster Mother is a suitable adoptive 

parent, that question will be within the jurisdiction of the adoption court. Id. 

[24] DCS presented sufficient evidence that termination was in Child’s best interests, 

and that adoption was an appropriate plan. 

[25] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.