The Cowpens 

Staff Ride and 1 

Battlefield Tour i 

bY 

Lieutenant Colonel John Moncure 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Ccmmand and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6602’7-6900 
nstitute 

CSX publications cover a variety of ‘litary history topics. The views expressed herein are those of the au r and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the 

William Ranney”s “Battle of Cowpens,“” from the 

Colllection of the State South Carolina. Shown is the episode in the battle 

when Colonel William shi~gt~n, riding too far in advance of his men, was 

assaulted by three British officers, only to be saved by his black waiter an 

an attending American officer, 
gress 

Moncure, John 1949- 

The Cowpens staff ride and battlefield tour / by John Moncure. 

pw cm. 

Includes bibliographical references 

l+ Cowpens, Battle of, 178 1.2. Staff rides-South CarolinaCowpens I. Title. 

E24 1 .C9M66 1996 

973.3 “37-dc20 95-24941 

CIP 
CONTENTS 

Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .. . . ** .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . I . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . . . . I . . . . . . I_ . . . . . . . . . ~_ I......._.............. “. . . . . . . . . . ~..l..l_ . . . . . . ~..~..~.. vii 

1. An Overview of the American Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l.l 1 

II. The Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1781...............................,............... 17 

III. “This Unexpected Event”: Annihilation at the Cowpens . . . . . _............, . . . . . 43 

IV.The StaffRide . . . . . . . . . II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . I . .._.................................. ~_................. 71 

Appendix A. Order ofBattle .~ . . . . . L ,....,..... I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I_ 91 

8. Documents Pertaining to the Campaign Leading to the 

Cowpeas, I November 1780 to 17 January 1781 . . . . . .._........ ~ . .._... 95 

C. Documents Pertaining to the Battle of the Cowpens, 

17 January 1781 ._ .. . . . . . . . 1 .,.............. I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 

D. Correspondence Pertaining to the Campaign of the 

Cowpens, 1 December 1780 to 20 January 1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 

E. MiscelEaneous Writings Pertaining to the Campaign of 

the Cowpens .I...~ . . . . . . _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~..~ . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . a .. . . . . . 1 .. . . . . . . . . I..I . .._......_... _. . . . . . . . 199 

. . . 

111 
MAPS 

1. Principal battle sites of the American Revolutionary War.. ........................... 3 

2. The southern theater of operations 1780-8 1 .................................................. 18 

3. Situation, 20 December 1780 to 14 January 1781..~. ....................................25 

4. Situation, 14 January 1781.....................;....................................................... 30 

5. Situation, 15 and 16 January 1781.............................................................. .32 

6. Situation, 17 January 1781.............. ................................................................ 33 

7. Situation, 18 January 1781............. ................................................................ .34 

8. initial dispositions, 0700, 17 January 178 1 ...................................................49 

9. British advance, 0710, 17 January 1781 ......................................................... 53 

10. Skirmish line withdraws, 0720, 17 January 1781......................................... 54 

11. British attack and militia withdrawal, 0730, 17 January 1781........................ 55 

12. Continental Line withdrawal and British attack, 0740, 

17 January 1781 ............................................................................................. .57 

13.Continentals” counterattack, 0745, 17 January 1781.................................... .59 

14. Envelopment and destruction, 0750, 17 January 178 1.. ................................ .61 

15. Staffride vantage points l-12 .......................................................................73 

V 
INTRODUCTION 

The renowned Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, chief of 

the great German General Staff and architect of the three campaigns 

that permitted the unification of Germany in 187 1, believed fervently 

that war, to be understood, must be dissected and the parts examined. 

To that end, he directed not only that a section of the General Staff 

devote its energies exclusively to the study of military history but that 

all General Staff officers, drawn from the cream of the Prussian 

officer corps, travel to battlefields, study the plans made by the 

commanders, and relive the battles on the actual ground where the 

fighting took place. In this manner, Moltke believed, his officers 

could understand the interdependence of the commanders’ plans, 

logistical considerations, morale factors, and so forth. 

The staff ride, as the practice became known, has evolved into an 

institution in a number of armies. In the United States Army, officers 

in combat umts frequently adjourn to nearby battlefields where one 

or more officers, tasked to provide a detailed study of the action, host 

a walking tour and analysis of the battle. Every branch school 

conducts staff rides for its students, and all ROTC cadets participate 

in staff rides as part of their professional military education requirements. 

When I assumed my duties as professor of military history at 

Davidson College, 1 recognized that, while by training I was a 

European historian, I could not do justice to my students-most of 

whom were destined for commissioned service in the U.S. 

Army-without addressing some of the more important events in that 

Army’s history. I was fortunate to discover the proximity of the 

Cowpens battlefield, about one and one-half hours southwest of the 

college. 

During the first two years I taught at Davidson, I assembled 

documents containing eyewitness testimony to that battle. I believe 

this documentary record is critical for the use of students studying 

the battle if they are to understand and empathize with the participants. I gave the documents to my students before we gathered for 
trips to the battlefield. It occurred to me that, while many exciting 

histories of the battle exist, none of them had been written to facilitate 

a staff ride to the battle site. Students need to relive the terror, the 

exultation of the troops, and the self-doubt and sometimes umeflectiveness of the battlefield commanders, all in the fir11 richness of the 

officers’ own language. Even the excellent accompaniments to Civil 

War battlefields prepared by Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson provide 

only excerpts ofthat testimony. Consequently, as part of the staff ride 

narrative, I assembled this collection of eyewitness accounts and 

dispatches for my students. The three chapters that precede the 

’ narrative serve only as glue to help students assemble the body of 

material more coherently. While I have consulted many detailed 

studies and determined (in cases where authorities disagree) how I 

believe events occurred, I do not pretend to supersede current scho& 

arship. Likewise, as I laced the sometimes contradictory narrative 

accounts and dispatches into my analysis, I kept in mind that some 

eyewitness accounts were in fact written long after the dead were 

buried and could be colored by the dimness of an old man’s memory 

or by the deliberate distortions of a man with a grudge to bear or a 

reputation to protect. 

I have organized three chapters to focus on the discrete components 

of the war. In order to place the campaign in the Carolinas in context, 

chapter one addresses the Revolutionary War in its strategic context-how military planners determined to prosecute the war to 

achieve its political goals-and relates the principal events of the war. 

In order to provide the environment for the Battle of the Cowpens, 

chapter two discusses operational issues and narrates the campaign. 

The third chapter focuses on the tactical aspects of the battle on that 

cold morning in January 178 1 I The fourth chapter I have included as 

a guide for the staff ride. The leader of a staff ride could use it in 

conjunction with the narrative chapters and appendix or let it stand 

alone as a guide to a study of the campaign and battle. 

A close reading of the documents in the appendixes will highlight 

a number of interesting aspects of this battle and, by extension, of 

combat in general that I do not address in the narrative. For instance, 

I am struck by remarkable differences between the correspondence 
in the two armies. The Cornwallis-Tarleton correspondence is timely 

and reveals the freedom and even deference that Major General 

Charles Cornwallis awarded his protege, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. As for the American commander, Major General 

Nathanael Greene, the graceful strategist, worried about his unit and 

lectured its commander on matters his tactical better knew perfectly 

well how to address. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, one of the 

recipients of this advice, impatiently strained at the bit but calmly 

assured his superior that he was taking the care that Greene demanded. The fact that the American correspondence always overlapped in time must have confused matters immeasurably. 

I have given short shrift to the manifest logistical problems experienced during the campaign. Guilty of concentrating on the tactical 

dimensions of battle, as are many historians, I understand Ml well 

that great military leaders dwell on far less romantic concerns. From 

the pitiable description of Sergeant Major William Seymour to the 

repetitive discussion of forage, shoes, and tents in the correspondence, it seems clear that Greene’s deployment in December 1780 

was motivated primariIy by logistical considerations, as was Morgan’s proposal to invade Georgia and his plea to rejoin the main army. 

Finally, I recognize that the assembled evidence derives mainly 

from American sources. While Tarleton and Mackenzie provide us a 

spirited and informative dispute, the British rank and file are silent, 

as are most of the offrcers. Obviously, American sources are more 

readily obtainable for me; but they are from the mouths of American 

veterans trymg to justify pensions-and perhaps embellish their 

personal exploits -after a popular war. The British sources, with a 

characteristic predilection for understatement anyway, downplay 

events all the more in the wake of the unsuccessful war. Moreover, 

although British casualties were far higher than the American ones, 

with many of the captives remaining in America after the war, these 

men were ineligible for pensions and had little incentive to make 

public the record of their military actions against their newly adopted 

country. Finally, the few Legion cavalry who escaped consisted 

primarily of Loyalists-who either removed to Canada after the war or 

would have been unlikely to trot out their memories of service against 

ix 
.- 

the United States. I trust careful readers will be able to weigh this 

shortcoming as they evaluate the evidence. 

I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of talented people without 

whose patient efforts this work coutd not have been completed. 

Foremost among them are the fine staff of the Cowpens National 

Battlefield. In particular, Patricia Ruff and Bill Kianos showed me 

every kindness and offered helpful suggestions that I have incorporated throughout these pages. 

I prepared this manuscript far from the rich source materials I 

needed to complete it. Were it not for the determined and cheerful 

efforts ofthe staff of Davidson College’s E. H. Little Library to honor 

my near-impossible requests, I could never have finished. Leading 

their efforts were Dr. Mary Beat@, Sharon Byrd, Jean Coates, Ellen 

Giduz, Cindy Pendergraft, Kelly Wood, and Suzy Yoder. With 

dedication and expertise, they ferreted out obscure sources from the 

most unlikely places 

I am very grateful to Mr. Donald Gilmore of the Combat Studies 

Institute for the professional expertise he brought to bear in editing 

this manuscript. 

I am aIso deeply indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Kondratiuk and the Historical Services Division of the National Guard 

Bureau for providing the funds with which this guide was printed. 

To several noted scholars: I owe a debt of thanks: Colonel Robert 

Doughty at the United States Military Academy and Professor 

Russell Snapp of Davidson College read an early version of the 

narrative and corrected several points of style and historical fact that 

would surely have proved embarrassing to me. 

My wife Anne accompanied me on my first visit to the Cowpens. 

She understands my compulsion to write and supported my efforts to 

complete this work. Without her gentle prodding, this book would 

have remained a working manuscript. 

Finally, I dedicate this work to my students, especially the ROTC 

cadets of Davidson College, for whom it is written. 

X 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN 

REVOLUTION 

A mysterious chemistry of Enlightenment political theory’ and the 

North American colonial frontier experience, sparked by the economic and political repercussions of the French and Indian War 

(1754-63), finally exploded into revolution at the village green in 

Lexington, Massachusetts, on 19 April 1775.2 Although the dispute 

between American colonists and the British Parliament over taxation 

was most vexing to Bostonians who made their livelihood from 

relatively unrestrained trade prior to the 176Os, broader principles 

were sufficiently pressing to elicit supporters (admiringly called 

patriots, critically labeled rebels) from all thirteen colonies, albeit not 

in equal proportions. The clash pitted a portion of the colonial civilian 

population against the armed might of one of the greatest maritime 

powers of the time. 

To suppress this dispersed and largely unorganized “rabble,” the 

English king sent to the colonies three competent professional soldiers: Major Generals Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, and Sir 

John Burgoyne.3 They brought with them additional regular British 

troops and regiments leased from the Hessian elector, many trained 

and experienced in fighting a form of European warfare characterized 

by rigid discipline, efficient concentration of combat power, and 

extensive logistics and administrative regulation. For these British 

officers, battle was more akin to a minuet than a brawl. 

Their colonial opponents, however, had little military experience. 

Men such as George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Israel Putnam, and 

Daniel Morgan had served as militia officers during the French and 

Indian War; others had served in paid provincial units (such as 

Rogers’ Rangers).4 What the bulk of American men knew of the army 

and of war, they had learned in their periodic militia drill on the 

village commons. As the American Revolution loomed on the ho& 

zon,many of these military organizations suffered from neglect5 

Still, shortly after the fighting began, the New England colonies all 

managed to raise numbers of regiments based on the geographical 

location of the militia.” At the instigation of the Massachusetts 

1 
2 

Provincial Congress, these forces (some 30,000 strong) were gathered around Boston as the New England Army. In 1775, they became 

the basis of the Continental Army. only in time, and with the expert 

and perceptive advice of General Baron von Steuben,7 was the 

Continental Army to develop the battle-worthy stamina and skill 

expected of European forces. 

In order to maintain the thirteen colonies as British possessions, 

the king needed to subdue the population and reestablish loyalty (or 

at least obedience) to the Crown. The theater for this operation was 

daunting in scale: it contained a population of a bit over 3 milEion 

settlers dispersed over almost 800,000 square miles. Lord North 

sought to divide the Colonies by applying economic sanctions to the 

most rebellious of them.’ British military objectives were fourfold: 

separate the New England colonies from the others by seizing the 

Hudson River north to Lake Champlam; isolate the “‘bread basket”’ 

colonies of Pennsylvania and Maryland; control the southern populace by holding Charleston?” Georgetown, and the line of the Santee 

River; and, finally, blockade the entire American coast to prevent an 

influx of arms from abroad (see map 1). As New England was the 

center ofrevolutionary sympathy, it logically became the first priority. A number of military historians claim that this strategy would 

have worked if the British had possessed adequate forces in the hands 

of resolute commanders. This observation is only partly accurate. The 

large army of British regulars, Loyalists, and Hessian mercenaries, a 

fleet, and 10,000 sailors indeed were sufficient to destroy the Continental Army, but British commanders never manifested the will to 

win, and they squandered typ resources, especially time, until the 

war was beyond recovery. Whether an overwhelming tacti$ 

victory would have won the war, however, is open to.conjecture. 

To achieve independence, the Americans needed to eject all British 

troops-the symbol of the Crown’s rule-from the Colonies. The 

Continental Congress would have been delighted had King George 

III granted the colonies their freedom,13 but as this bounty was not 

forthcoming, and as the strength of Britain lay in its considerable 

- 
3 

Ii 

ATLAN-fK OCEAN 

Area shown in map 2. 

Scale 

0 100 200 300 miles 

Map 1. Principal baffle sites of the American Revolutionary War 
4 

army and fleet, the Americans couid not hope to bring their oppressor 

to his knees. As historian Russell WeigleyI$as noted, “Washington’s 

was a generalship of military poverty. Often necessity breeds 

inventiveness, and in this case, circumstances led the American 

commander to several brilliant feats of maneuver. While he was 

obliged on occasion to face a major British army, he adopted early a 

strategy of attrition, at once harassing British detachments while 

avoiding battle to preserve his own strength. American diplomats in 

Paris, meanwhile, sought intervention from England’s traditional 

foes before General George Washington could be trapped by the 

king’s troops.15 

Operational Considerations 

Both sides addressed a number of operational issues. Britain’s 

most obvious weakness in its effort to subdue the rebellion was the 

distance of the theater of operations from the home country. To 

project power across the Atlantic, Britain required adequate troops 

to occupy key locations in the Colonies, sufficient transport vessels 

to carry them across the ocean and sustain them (for seven years, as 

it turned out), a?! a battle fleet to protect these extended lines of 

communication. Although the British possessed these assets, 

America was not England’s sole focus of attention. Increased pressure from England’s colonial rivals and traditional continental foes 

stretched the country’s assets to the Limit. I7 The American rebels 

sought to exploit this weakness by engaging privateers and the 

fledgling American navy to prey on British shipping and by encouraging the French to join them. The British, in turn, sought to minimize 

the troop burden by raising Loyalist units in the colonies. This 

measure, effective at least in the sense of the number of troops raised, 

eased the burden of recruitment and transportation of troops across 

the Atlantic, but it did not resolve the resupply problem. 

Still, the British were capable of projecting substantial force to 

their American colonies. As Washington observed, “The amazing 

advantage the Enemy derive from their Ships and the Command of 

the water, keeps us in a State of constant perplexity and the most 

anxious conjecture. “I8 Sea power gave the British the advantage of 
5 

lateral communications; although their armies may have been farther 

apart than those of their colonial opponents, movement by sea was 

usually much faster (though subject to seasonal storms) than by land. 

Thus, the British army in Boston could evacuate the city in the spring 

of 1776, retire to Canada, and reappear in New York later that year. 

Furthermore, once at sea, the army could strike any unguarded coast 

without telegraphing its intentions with advanced guards, lines of 

communications, or any of the other indicators upon which a defending army might rely for intelligence. 

The British also hoped to take advantage of a mixed Tory-rebel 

population. Conventional wisdom divides loyalties in the American 

Revolution into three roughly equal groups: the rebels, the Tories, 

and the indifferent. British commanders occasionally demonstrated 

sensitivity to the advantage of wooing the uncommitted; more often 

they (like Cornwallis in New Jersey and Tarleton in the Carolinas) 

inflamed the population by their cruelty. The British succeeded, 

however, in arming and organizing numbers of Tories into effective 

units that fought beside regulars in several battles. l9 The British 

strategy of pacification of the population entailed the widespread 

occupation of colonial territory-first major cities, then the surrounding countryside. 

The British command struggled with a problem often manifesting 

itself in pacification operations: there was no central point of resistance. The British could not identify a single objective the seizure of 

which would yield decisive results. No single American city held the 

strategic importance of a London or Paris. The capture of Boston, 

New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston failed to affect the American 

resolve significantly. Defeating but not destroying the American 

armies-both Continental and militia-also frustrated British hopes 

to turn the tide. In no small measure, this circumstance was a 

deliberate strategy of the American commander, who realized that 

time favored his cause. At the same time, since America was not vital 

to British national interests, the war was not universally popular in 

Parliament?’ Thus, the British suffered simultaneously an inability 

to end the war quickly to their satisfaction and inadequate political 

resolve to continue it indefinitely. 
6 

The dispersion of patriot forces and centers of gravity was not 

always advantageous to rebels. Washington was troubled from the 

outset with the problem of how to defend the same vast, sparsely 

populated land the British found so difficult to conquer. Unable to 

defend all places, he determined to fortify the most critical points, 

maintain a field army to counter regular British forces, and raise 

militia for local defense in the absence of the main army. The vast 

defenses at West Point on the Hudson River served as the best-and 

most successful-fortifications. The Continental Army became the 

Americans’ regular force. Militia units and guerilla bands ranged 

from useless to lethal Although Washington did not perceive guerrilla warfare as decisive, some militia units conducted effective 

guerrilla operations: the exploits of Colonel Francis Marion of South 

Carolina, for example, earned the colorful leader the sobriquet 

“Swamp Fox.” 

The unequal struggle played itself out in phases that the British 

would measure differently from the Americans. In the American 

view, the first successful year of war was characterized by the 

transformation of a popular armed New England mob into a conventional army that ejected the British from Boston. In its second phase, 

the Americans suffered defeat and near disaster as they were ejected 

from New York. As a consequence of this experience, Washington 

evolved a better understanding of the nature of the contest. Wintering 

at Morristown he launched the celebrated and much romanticized 

raid across the Delaware that characterized his operationsin the north 

for the remainder of the war. In 1779, American attention followed 

the British to the south. Sometimes successful, often disastrous, and 

frequently savage meetings between American and British regulars 

and militia resulted in the British decision to leave the Carolinas and 

concentrate in Virginia where, in October 1781, Cornwallis surrendered to Washington’s combined Continental-French army. 

From a British perspective, the war could be divided almost as it 

was planned. Only the outcomes distinguished the plan from the 

historical narrative. The experience at Bunker Hill led the administration in London to realize that “a rap on the colonial knuckles” 

would not end the conflict.21 Planning for a war would only then 
7 

begin in earnest. After the evacuation from Boston, Howe concentrated his military might on the middle colonies, focusing his effort 

first on New York and then Philadelphia. Once the British lost the 

disastrous campaign culminating at Saratoga, they turned to the 

south, the purported center of Tory support. A campaign to wrest the 

Carolina highlands from rebel control ended in failure and withdrawal to Yorktown, where the main British army finally surrendered. 

Conduct of the War 

When Washington assumed command of the veterans of Bunker 

Hill on 2 July 1775, he busied himself immediately with securing 

additional volunteers. Enlistments for most of the force that had 

fought at Bunker Hill ended on 1 December 1775 (some had enlisted 

until 1 January 1776), forcing the general to address himself almost 

immediately to the issue of recruitment. He suggested that Congress 

enlist the Continental Army Erom a broader geographic base. He 

fi.nther recommended a standard organization of twenty-six infantry ” 

regiments (each of 728 men), rifle and artillery units, standard 

uniforms, and Congressional control over commissions. The Continental Congress accepted all these recommendations. 22 Furthermore, 

in the implementing order of 1 January 1776, Washington established 

a basis for discipline without which no regular force could long 

survive. 

During the winter of 1775-76, the British were besieged in Boston. 

When Washington acquired from Colonel Henry Knox fifty-nine 

guns taken at Fort Ticonderoga, he was able to invest the city in a 

textbook siege. In spite of expirations in short-term recruits, the 

stranglehold on the main British army in Boston remained firm. As 

a result of the American army’s persistence, Howe evacuated Boston 

on 17 March 1776, removing his troops to Halifax. 

Lord George Germain, appointed in 1776 to be secretary of state 

for the American Colonies, was convinced of the need to protect the 

Loyalists south of Virginia, whom he believed to exist in large 

,numbers, He approved of a southern expedition, with Clinton in 
8 

command and Cornwallis as his second. Loyal Scats living in western 

North Carolina, who detested the Whig eastern aristocrats, swept 

down from the hills to show their strength in Wilmington, but failed 

to rouse the population. Finding no support of the kind he had been 

led to expect in North Carolina, Clinton sailed to Charleston, which 

he also failed to take. 

Returning to the campaign plan, Howe determined to take New 

York, which Washington had spent the summer forti@ing for winter 

quarters. After an unsuccessful effort to persuade Washington to 

disperse his army in exchange for pardons, Howe finally attacked 

New York’s 19,000 rebel defenders with 32,000 troops. Outflanked, 

Washington was forced to withdraw from Long Island, up to Manhattan, and finally to Peekskill. British troops took New York and 

chased Washington into New Jersey but could not crush his rapidly 

dwindling force. 

After Washington’s defeat in New York, patriot morale was at a 

low ebb. Most of the enlistments were expiring, and few veterans 

intended to renew their commitment. Washington planned a daring 

move to rally their flagging spirits. In December, he sallied forth with 

2,400 troops across the Delaware River and defeated a Hessian 

brigade at Trenton, New Jersey, the day after Christmas, 1776.23 

Stung and angered, Comwaliis attempted to catch Washington in 

New Jersey before the rebel general could escape back across the 

Delaware. Again Washington demonstrated remarkabEe skill, ambushing the British rear guard at Princeton on 2 January 1777. Upon 

these brilliant victories was built Washington’s reputation as a tactical commander. With his stature secure in Congress, Washingtonwas 

able to forge the Continental Army into a much more effective 

instrument. The militia forces prospered as well. Later that winter, 

the ranks of patriots swelled, as Comwallis carried out a vicious 

campaign of subjugation in New Jersey. 

The mission of the rebel northern army, commanded by Major 

General Horatio Gates, was to guard the Great Lakes and the Hudson 

River arteries. Howe, in line with the first phase of the British 

strategic plan, determined to split the rebellion by severing the New 
9 

England head from the southern body by way of a three-pronged 

attack: from the north by Burgoyne, from the west by Lieutenant 

Colonel Barry St. Leger, and from the south by Howe himself. As a 

preliminary move (and following the second point of the British 

program), he sailed up the Chesapeake Bay, landed at Head of Elk, 

Maryland, and marched on Philadelphia. He defeated Washington at 

the Brandywine River and entered Philadelphia on 26 September 

1777. An American counterattack at Germantown proved ineffective. 

Burgoyne’s force began on schedule but suffered horribly from the 

harsh environment and from the harassment of the militia forces 

opposing him. At Bennington, Vermont, rebel Brigadier General 

John Stark smashed a large reconnaissance party. St. Leger was 

stymied at Fort Stanwix. And Burgoyne was stopped at Saratoga by 

an insubordinate but brilliant General Benedict Amold.24 Washington wintered at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, where his army suffered 

from great physical privations but enjoyed the expert, if sometimes 

comical, guidance of the drillmaster, Major General Friedrich von 

Steuben. 

In May 1778, Howe was relieved at his own request and replaced 

by Clinton, who promptly moved through New Jersey to New York. 

Seeing an opportunity to sting the British again, Washington fell on 

Clinton’s rear guard at Monmouth Court House on 28 June 1778. 

Poor planning and execution by Major General Charles Lee threatened the outcome of the battle. Washington, however, personally 

rallied the Continentals, relieving Lee in a rare storm of oaths. 25 The 

Continental Line withstood several violent assaults before nightfall, 

and both armies camped on the field. Fighting a tactical draw, the 

Continental Line had proved it could match the British regulars in 

open battle. Both armies were stunned by the outcome; they would 

not meet again until Yorktown in 178 1. 

As a consequence of the Continental Army’s successes, France 

joined the war, encouraged by the American prospects for eventual 

victory. The French admiral sent to support the American cause, 

Comte d’Estaing, arrived off the Delaware capes just after the battle 

at Monmouth Court House. Although his command was far more 
10 

powerful than the British fleet in New York, d’Estaing was cautious 

and failed to bring his advantage to bear before sailing off to 

Martinique for the winter. Thus, Washington realized no immediate 

military advantage as a result of the French intervention. However, 

d’Estaing’s presence in the Caribbean together with a Spanish fleet 

in Havana (after Spain’s entry on the American side in June 1779) 

forced Clinton to send 8,000 troops to the West Indies. These 

transfers weakened Clinton so severely that he never seriously challenged Washington’s position at West Point, New York. 

Although the entry of France into the war signaled a dramatic 

change in the chemistry of th\;truggle, the British commanders failed 

to reevaluate their strategy. Clinton continued the strategic approach envisioned at the onset of hostilities. In November 1778, he 

sent Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to Savannah, which was 

captured. Later, joined by Major General Augustine Prevost, 27 he 

moved briefly into South Carolina, which proved as inhospitable as 

it had to Clinton tvvo years earlier. Campbell soon returned to 

Georgia. Offsetting this failure, 2,400 British successfully defended 

Savannah against 5,000 troops brought there by the French fleet of 

d’Estaing. 

Encouraged and still believing South Carolina to be a stronghold 

for Loyalists, Clinton invested Charleston with 10,000 men. He 

erected siege batteries in March 1780 and slowly closed in on the city 

until its defender, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered on 

12 MayX2* In reaction to the terrible news of the fall of Charleston 

and its garrison of 5,000, Congress, against the wishes of Washington, selected Major General Horatio Gates for command in the south. 

Militiamen rallied around Gates, who moved against Clinton’s field 

commander, Comwallis, at Camden. There, the colonists suffered a 

terrible defeat on 16 August 1780. Emboldened by that victory, 

ComwalIis dispatched Major Patrick Ferguson with a force consisting exclusively of Tory volunteers to western South Carolina. Westem settlers rallied to engage Ferguson at King’s Mountain, where 

they destroyed his small force. 
Given the difficulties the British faced in the south, some question 

exists as to whether Clinton should have attempted such a bold move 

with so little force. The general, however, believed that the fall of 

Charleston obviated the problem of subjugation of the colony; he 

therefore directed his deputy to move into North Carolina as the 

situation permitted. Clearly Clinton erred in his judgment, but Cornwallis compounded the problem by expanding from his logistical 

base more rapidly than he was able to recruit additional Loyalist 

forces.29 

Major General Nathanael Greene, Gates’ replacement after Camden, sent Brigadier General Daniel Morgan with a small body of 

regulars and militia into South Carolina to rally the patriot inhabitants. In January 1781, Morgan met the infamous Tarleton and 

defeated him soundly. That battle was followed by an American flight 

ahead of Cornwallis, interrupted briefly at Guilford Court House, 

Hobkirk’s Hill, and Eutaw Springs.30 Although Cornwallis won 

these engagements, he realized that he could not subdue the evasive 

Greene in the Carolinas. Maneuvering for advantage, he collected his 

forces in August at Yorktown, in southern Virginia. 

At Yorktown, the British could enjoy the advantages of lateral 

communications (Clinton was still in New York)-but only as long 

as Britain controlled the sea. Certainly, both British commanders 

recognized the potential for the French to seal Cornwallis in the 

Chesapeake. However, given d”Estaing”s performance since his arrival off the American coast in 1778, they felt secure in accepting the 

risk to their lines of communications. 

By staging in Staten Island, New York, Washington deceived 

Clinton into believing that New York was the theater for a new 

colonial offensive. Washington then stealthily departed through New 

Jersey for southern Virginia, accompanied by Lieutenant General 

Comte de Rochambeau’s French reinforcements. The French fleet 

sealed off the British inside Chesapeake Bay, isolating them from 

free access to the sea and reinforcements from Britain or Clinton. The 

siege of Yorktown began in September with the American occupation 

of Cornwallis’ abandoned outer redoubts. American and French 
12 

troops and Admiral de Grasse’s French fleet continued to tighten the 

stranglehold they held on Cornwallis. On 17 October, allied troops 

entered the town. Two days later, the British marched aut of the fort 

as their band, defiant even in defeat, played’ ‘The World Turned 

Upside Down,” 

The war would last another two years, although a cease-fire ended 

hostilities in January of 1782. The Peace of Paris formally ended the 

American Revolutionary War, and the last British troops sailed from 

New York on 23 November 1783, over eight years after that brisk 

spring day in Lexington, Massachusetts. 
NOTES 

Chaptt?r I 

1. In particular that of John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, and 

Montesquieu, L ‘Esprit des lois, 1748. 

2. In that action, the British commander, General Gage, sent several hundred of 

his troops from Boston under Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith to raid a rebel 

arms cache at Concord, some fourteen miles away. They were stopped by 

seventy rebels hastily assembled and commanded by Captain Jonas Parker. 

After scattering the rebels, the British moved on to Concord, where they burned 

the military stores. A large mob of angry farmers harassed the British withdrawal, and by the time the troops returned to the safety of Boston, 79 oftheir 

number had been killed and 147 wounded. 

3. William Howe (5th Viscount Howe, 1729-l 814), brother of Admiral Richard 

Howe, served brilliantly as a young officer in the French and Indian War. Sent 

again to America in 1775, he was present at Bunker Hill, Brandywine, and 

Germantown. He turned over his command to General Clinton in 1778 and 

returned to England. See Ira D. Gruber, The Brothers Howe and the American 

Revolution (New York: Atheneum, 1972). Sir Henry Clinton (1738-95) joined 

the army in 1757 and campaigned in Europe in the Seven Years’ War. He 

commanded British force in America from 1778 to 1781. See William B. 

Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henr) Clinton in the War of &dependence 

(New York: Knopf, 1964). Sir John Burgoyne (1723-92) purchased a commission in the Horse Guards in 1737. He campaigned in Portugal as a young officer 

and, in 1775 as a major general with three years’ seniority, was sent to Boston. 

When the British evacuated Boston, he became deputy to Fhe commander in 

Canada. After his disastrous defeat at Saratoga, he returned to England. See 

James Lunt, John Burgoyne of Saratoga (New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jovanovich, 1975), xiii, xiv, 3-l 1. 

4. Other veterans included former British regulars Horatio Gates, Richard 

Montgomery, and Charles Lee, and colonial officers Artemas Ward, David 

Wooster, and Joseph Spencer. All these numbered among the first group of 

generals created by Congress. See Robert K. Wright, The Continental Army 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19X3), 8. 

5. See John W. Shy, “A New Look at Colonial Militia,” The William and Mav 

Quarterly, 3d ser., 20 (1963): 179. The quality of the militias varied from colony 

to colony and from year to year. The frequency of their drill and their measure 

of attention varied directly with the level of tension with the Indians. See Jack 

S. Radabaugh, ‘The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts,” Military AJ%irs 18 

(Spring 1954): 13, and E. Milton Wheeler, “Development and Organization of 

Note: Appendixes referred to in the notes refer to those mentioned in this book. 

13 
14 

the North Carolina Militia,” The North Carolina Historical Review 61 (July 

1964113 14. 

6. Wright, ContinentaE Army, 1.5. By June 1775, the Massachusetts establishment, 

for instance, was planned to consist of twenty-three infantry regiments and one 

artillery regiment. 

7. Van Steuben was neither a general nor a baron, but Benjamin Franklin, who 

discovered him, correctly identified the Prussian officer as ideally suited to 

Washington”s need for a drillmaster. See Russell F. Weigley, Hisdoly ofthe 

Urzited States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1367),63. 

8. For a thorough descriptian of the events leading to the establishment of the 

Continental Army, see Wright, Continental Army, 23-25. One of the first Eight 

infantry companies raised directly to serve in the Continental Army was a 

Frederick County, Virginia, unit commanded by Daniel Morgan, 

9. Ira D. Gruber, “Britain’s Southern Strategy,” The Revolutiona~ War in the 

South: Power, Co~jlict, andleadership, ed. W. Robert Higgins (Durham, NC: 

Duke University Bress, 1979), 206,207. 

10. The names of a number of the towns have evolved since the Revolutionary War. 

Charleston, for instance, was then spelled “Charlestown,” and Charlotte was 

often called “‘Charlotte Town.” In all cases, Ihave used the modern spelling or 

name of the town. 

11. See 3. F. C. Fuller, A M%tary Histov ofthe Western World, vol. 2 (New York: 

Minerva Press, 19551,277, and Vincent Esposito, ed., The West PoiFt Atlas of 

American ‘@‘urr, vol. 1 (New York: Praeger, 19591, 4. Dave Richard Palmer 

agrees that, until mid- 1776, the British were ‘“too weak to destroy the rebel army 

and thereafter Washington was too wily to catch.‘” See Dave R. Palmer and 

James W. Stryker, The Way ofthe Fox (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1975),39. 

The number of British troops in North America grew Tom 7,000 in 1775 to 

over 52,000 in 1778. See Philip R. N. Katcher, Encyclopedia of British, 

Provinci& and German Army Units 1775-I 783 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 

1973),14l. 

12. See also Paul David Nelson, “‘British Conduct of the American Revolutionary 

War: A Review of Interpretations,“‘Journal ofAmerican History 65 (December 

1978):623-53. 

13. This was not, of course, their original aim. The Continental Congress was 

reluctant to break with the Crown. Only after the storming of Fort Ticonderoga 

did Congress take its first concrete decision to wage war, on 25 May 1775. For 

a discussion of the formation of American strategy, see Palmer, Fox, 50-76. 

14. Russell Weigley, The American Ww ofWar (New York: Macmillan, 1973),3. 

John Morgan Dederer notes a similarity in the strategic approaches of Wash- 
15 

ington and Mao Tse-tung in&&king&i&s Without Straw: Nathanael Greene’s 

Southern Campaign and Mao Tse Tungs Mobile Wap (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983). Similarities certainly exist. Weigley’s conclusion that Washington’s weaker position led him to evasion is less exotic than 

Dederer’s claim that Washington’s thinking was revolutionary and, in the 

context of eighteenth century generalship, more palatable as well. 

15. Elmer Bendiner describes the diplomatic efforts of Benjamin Franklin, John 

Adams, and John Jay in the capitals of Europe in The Virgin Diplomats (New 

York Knopf, 1976). 

16. For a discussion of the problems of provisioning the British army in America, 

see Edward E. Curtis, The Organization ofthe British Army in the American 

Revolt&ion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926), 81-134. The 

Ordnance Department owned transport vessels but contracted over 50 percent 

of its transatlantic shipments, 180, 18 1. 

17. In R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 

2775-1783 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). Bowler argues 

that the British failed to maintain dependable supply lines. 

18. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 39 ~01s. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931-44), viii, 470. 

19. As many as 25,000 Tories served the British, Loyalists in 1779 and again in 

1782 claimed that more Americans were serving under the King’s colors than 

with rebel forces. See Lerenzo Sabine, ‘“The Tory Contingent in the British 

Army in America in 178 1))) The Historical Magazine 8 (October, 1864):33 1. 

One Loyalist unit was the British Legion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Banastre TarIeton. Sabine lists thirty Loyalist offmcers in this unit, 358. W. 0. 

Raymond, Loyalists in Arms (St. John, N.B.: Sun Printing, 1904), lists 25 

officers and 341 rank and file for the Legion cavahy, 220. 

20. On 14 January 1776, William Pitt thundered in the House of Commons: “I 

rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to alE the 

feelings of liberty, as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit 

instruments to make sIaves of the rest.” See Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary 

of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 9. The parallels between this aspect of the American Revolution 

and the United States’ involvement in Vietnam are striking and paradoxical. 

21. Palmer, EOX, 38. 

22. Wright, ContfnentaE Army, 29-40. 

23. Wounded at the battle were a future president, Lieutenant James Monroe, and 

Captain William Washington, who would command the American cavalry at 

the Cowpens four years later. 
16 

24. Daniel Morgan commanded a rifle regiment in the battle. Afterward, Burgoyne 

was alleged to have told Morgan, “My dear sir, you command the fmest 

regiment in the world.” See J. D. Bailey, Some Heroes of the American 

Revolzctkm (Spartanburg, SC: Bond & White Printers, 1924), 12. Whether 

Burgoyne made this gracious remark is unknown; however, Morgan did play 

a crucial and valiant part in the American victory, and his Virginia rifles have 

been judged by the eminent military historian J. F. C. Fuller to be “the finest 

light infantry of the day,” Militay History 2,293. Morgan figures prominently 

in Trumbulls’ well-known portrayal of Burgoyne’s surrender. See David 

Meschutt, “Portraits of Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary War General,” American 

ArtJournaZ 17, no. 3 (1985):38. 

25. For an analysis of the Washington-Lee controversy, see John Richard Alden, 

General CharEes Lee II-a&or or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1951). 

26. See William B. Willcox, “British Strategy in America, 1778,” Joacrnal of 

Mi7dern History 19 (1947):97-121. 

27. Major General Augustine Prevost (1723-86) was apparently the son ofa Swiss 

officer who raised the Royal American Regiment (60th Foot). He was wounded 

as a major with Wolfe at Quebec and found himself in 1776 in command of 

British forces in east Florida. He returned to England in 1779. See Mark Mayo 

Boatner III, Encyclopedia of the Americaa Rev&&on (New York David 

McKay Company, 1976), 889. 

28. Fighting skirmishes with militia units during the siege operations was Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. 

29. See Robert B. Asprey, J%ar in the Shadows (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 

Company, 1975), 105. 

30. See chapter two for a more detailed analysis of this campaign. 
II. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS, 

17&o-1781 

When Clinton sailed south, he hoped, as a preliminary step to the 

eventual subjugation of the colonies, to secure the broad base of 

operations denied him and his predecessors farther north. The campaign plan was simple enough. Operating from a secure base at 

Savannah, Georgia, Clinton would seize the key port of Charleston 

and then destroy the isolated pockets of resistance in the upcountry. 

The French fleet had the potential to disrupt communications from 

Charleston to Savannah, New York, and England, but this threat had 

yet to be realized since the fleet’s arrival in American waters. As was 

the case throughout the war, the Americans reacted to British initiatives. Consistent with Washington’s overall strategy, militia units 

harassed the British until regulars could hurry south to counter the 

threat. 

The campaign that ensued in the Carolinas was characterized, on 

the one hand, by rapid movement of light troops, either regular or 

militia, and, on the other, by brutal guerrilla warfare of rebel and Tory 

bands. While both armies contained regular troops, terrain and tactics 

dictated the predominance of light fighters.’ The Carolinas counted 

but two cities in the eighteenth century, Georgetown and Charleston. 

Beyond these ports, scattered settlements formed a loose network of 

frontier civilization having little in common with the coastal aristocracy.’ The river network in South Carolina flowed generally southeast from the rugged hills around modem-day Spartanburg to the 

inhospitable swampland along the coast. The major water arteries-the Savannah, Santee, and Great Pedee Rivers-afforded rapid 

movement of supplies and troops by small boats only, and the vast 

pine woods in between could only be traversed slowly and painstakingly (see map 2). 

Main armies were intended for decisive action on the battlefield, 

but getting them to it was a HercuIean task. The baggage customary 

in an eighteenth-century army encumbered it on the march. An 

infantry regiment such as the 7th Royal Eusifiers, with an estabfishment of 477 men, required four wagons and sixteen horses by 

17 
18 

I 

-Nil 

ATUNT,C OCEAN 

Map 2. The southern theater of operations, 1780-M 
19 

regulation and probably hired more on campaign3 A 12-pounder 

artillery piece weighed 3,200 pounds and required a team of twelve 

horses to pull it. Even Tarleton’s light baggage became an issue as 

he raced to meet Morgan in the winter of 1780-8 1 .4 

On both sides, partisans who enrolled in provisional or militia 

companies could reasonably be expected to move as quickly as light 

infantry-which in many ways, they were. These units were raised 

because both sides suffered from too few regulars, and because the 

militia tradition was already well-established in the colonies. Since 

the partisans were not part of a regular establishment, commanders 

could not rely on their presence at a time of crisis.’ And because the 

iron discipline and restraint customary in European armies of the day 

was foreign to these stubbornly independent frontiersmen, they were 

more likely to commit the sort of excesses forbidden (if still too often 

practiced) by regulars. The South Carolina militia, having seen action 

against Indians before and during the Revolution, had long been 

accustomed to unfettered brutality. Their traditional tactics were the 

ambush and the raid; their tools were rapid movement, terror as a 

psychological weapon, and rapid analysis of intelligence gained from 

scouts and spies. In accomplishing their mission to suppress Tory 

sentiment, they tended to use their customary methods.6 One participant remarked that, when the army left, “it was now almost Fire & 

Faggot between Whig & Tory, who were contending for ascendancy[.] continued so till the 15th or 20th of May [ 178 l].,“? Reprisal 

and retaliation followed as passions became enflamed, and the conflict in the south resembled more a civil war than fighting according 

to the rules of organized warfare. 

From the summer of 1778, the war in the north became a stalemate; 

the armed might of Great Britain had managed to secure the city of 

New York, while the Hudson highlands and New Jersey remained 

firmly in American hands. Using the only advantage he had, the 

Royal Navy, Clinton took his army south, where it could range 

through a supposedly friendly countryside without fear of detachments being ambushed by Washington’s Continentals. By the time 

Clinton moved south, Savannah had been taken, and Prevost’s St. 

Augustine garrison had moved north to assist in the recapture of 
20 

Georgia. Clinton saw Charleston as the logical target: Charleston was 

the seat of the colony, and its seaport facilities would be essential as 

a command and control and logistics base for the eventual subjugation of South Carolina, the taking of which would assist Prevost’s 

efforts in Georgia. Lincoln, commanding the strong defenses that 

Brigadier General William Moultrie had successfully defended in 

1776, unwisely concentrated his 5,000 troops in the city against the 

seaborne threat. Clinton arrived with 6,000 troops on 11 February 

1’780, delaying until 7 March to erect batteries on the Ashley River 

opposite the city. Finally reinforced by 4,000 additional troops, 

Clinton isolated the defenders by land and sea and snipped Lincoln’s 

line of communications by sending Banastre Tarleton thirty miles up 

the Cooper River to crush a small band of American militia there. 

Over a month into the siege, Lincoln surrendered his force-including the entire Continental establishment of North Carolina, South 

Carolina, and Georgia. This may have been the greatest blow to the 

American cause in the wara 

With CharIeston a secure logistics base, Clinton was able to send 

detachments to destroy the remaining opposition in the region. Tarleton, who had already proved himself to be an aggressive, ruthless, 

and decisive cavalry leader, chased down the rebels. Because the 

militia bands traveled light and were elusive, Tarleton’s force was 

tailored to move faster than its opponents could run. The main 

component of his force was the Legion, an 800-man Loyalist force 

of light infantry and cavalry. In May 1780, Tarleton caught Colonel 

Abraham Buford’s militia at Waxhaws and destroyed them, earning 

the frightening sobriquet ‘“Bloody Tarleton.“’ With this success, 

Clinton returned to New York, hoping to catch Washington, now 

weakened from sending reinforcements south. Clinton appointed his 

deputy Cornwallis to sweep away the remaining detachments of 

partisans, secure the loyalty of South Carolina, and plan a campaign 

into North Carolina. lo Cornwallis chased the remaining rebel bands, 

led by such heroes as Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, into the 

swamps and backcountry. With the rebels on the run, long-suppressed Tories began to take their revenge. The rebellion in South 

Carolina, far from subsiding, became a vicious civil war. 
21 

As the British swept away the opposition, the Continental Congress reacted with alarm and sent more Continentals to the theater. 

Major General Baron de Kalb, one of a group of foreign adventurers 

and idealists drawn to the American conflict, was the first commander 

to come south to apply a tourniquet to bleeding Carolina, The 

Congress felt, however, that it was inappropriate for a foreigner to 

command a theater ofthe war. Against the advice of Washington, de 

Kalb was replaced by Gates who was considered to be the victor of 

Sarat0ga.l l 

Gates assumed command of about 4,200 Continentals and militia 

on 25 July 1780. Driven by local pressure to boost sagging morale 

and to preempt a British invasion of North Carolina, he immediately 

seized the initiative. When intelligence reports indicated that Cornwallis had left a detachment at Camden, Gates hurried his Continentals and militia there. In his haste, he almost overlooked his cavahy, 

which-surprisingly, considering the strength and reputation of Tarleton’s force-he held as inconsequential in any case. As one sympathetic historian has observed, Gates intended .to occupy 

breastworks and force an outmaneuvered British contingent to assault 

them. Thus, cavalry may have seemed unnecessary to him.12 In any 

event, the Americans arrived bone tired and hungry only to discover 

that Cornwallis had returned. On 16 August, an inferior force of 2,200 

British regulars scattered the North Carolina and Virginia militias and 

then outflanked the Delaware and Maryland regulars, killing their 

commander, de Kalb. Gates fled the field with the militia, discrediting 

himself in the process. Two days later, Tarleton defeated Sumter’s 

South Carolina militiamen, killing 150 patriots and wounding anclther300. 

Having defeated both Gates and Sumter, Cornwallis had reason to 

believe that South Carolina was safe-but only for the time being. 

Clinton had left Cornwallis considerable latitude in his prosecution 

of the war. He had instructed only that South Carolina, and Charleston 

in particular, be safeguarded at all costs. Cornwallis, for his part, saw 

invasion of North Carolina as the only way to achieve Clinton’s 

objectives. I3 To guarantee his recent successes, Cornwallis determined to move boldly into North Carolina. Sending a small detach- 
22 

ment to Cape Fear to establish a closer logistics base, he continued 

his march north toward Charlotte and the main rebel army and 

directed Major Patrick Ferguson on a raid against partisans in the 

west. At King’s Mountain in October 1780, Ferguson’s Loyalists met 

partisans who had come down from the Tennessee hills. There, 

Ferguson was surrounded and his men killed at long range by accurate 

rifle fire from marksmen hidden in the woods below. This first 

setback for the British caused Cornwallis to retire from Charlotte to 

Wynnsboro, centrally located to enable him to cover South Carolina 

while he waited for Major General Alexander Leslie, sent south by 

Clinton, to arrive. Together, he thought, his and Leslie’s troops could 

clear the Carolinas of rebels. 

The victory at King% Mountain was not enough to save Gates’ 

sullied reputation He was relieved in December by Greene, who had 

always been Washington’s selection for command in the south. 

Greene was a pudgy thirty-eight-year-old Quaker from Rhode Island. 

By most accounts, he was disavowed by the Society of Friends for 

having raised a company of militia in 1774. In fact, he and aequaintances had visited “a place in Connecticut of Publick Resort [a tavern] 

where they had No Proper Business.” He was subsequently suspended.14 He was not selected for captain by the men because, as a 

consequence of a limp, he cut a poor figure of an officer. Humbly, 

he served in the ranks until, in 1775, he was sel&ed by the colonial 

assembly to command its contingent to the Continental Army.15 He 

fought alongside Washington in every major action, earning his 

commander’s highest regard. Greene confronted a mixed situation in 

the south: the conditions were desperate, morale in the army was low, 

and his predecessor had failed miserably; but, on the positive side, 

he had free rein and the financial authority and moral support of 

Congress to restore the army, and he held the unlimited confidence 

of the commander in chief. Nonetheless, he approached his task 

cautiously. To Congress, Greene wrote, “He [Greene] is conscious 

of his deficiencies, but if he is clothed with proper powers and 

receives the necessary support, he is not altogether without hopes of 

prescribing some bounds ta the ravages of the enemy.“16 Despite the 
23 

reputation he earned in the Carolinas, Nathanael Greene was a 

cautious, conservative commander. 17 

The new commander of the Southern Department managed to 

assemble just over 1,000 Continentals and militia of Gates’ command. I* The task Washington had assigned him was formidable. Five 

days after arriving in Charlotte, he wrote, “Nothing can be more 

wretched and distressing than the condition of the troops, starving 

with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. ,319 He 

addressed his formidable energy to the spirit of his army, creating in 

his headquarters an impression of determination and purpose. He 

appointed a new slate of staff officers, inspected formations, prepared 

to move the army, han % ed a deserter, and demanded greater exertions 

&on his commissary. 

Although outnumbered, Greene recognized his advantages at once 

and sought to capitalize upon them. With large (if scattered) numbers 

of militia and sympathizers in the west, he could keep well informed 

of Cornwallis’ whereabouts. This asset enabled him to deviate from 

accepted rules of war. Although he could not defeat Cornwallis, he 

could nibble away at the British army, avoid destruction of his own 

force, and simultaneously attend to tyI dire logistical imperatives that 

overshadowed his operational plans. To compensate for the lack of 

forage in Charlotte, he made the often-criticized decision to move his 

army to Cheraw Hii& where Colonel Tadeusz Kosciuszko had found 

adequate supplies, This movement could have telegraphed the 

wrong message to patriots in the western Carolinas, as Cheraw Hill 

was farther from Cornwallis than Charlotte. However, Greene, by 

sending a detachment under Morgan into South Carolina, sought to 

make Cornwallis divide his forces as well.23 Logistical considerations played an important role in the planning and outcome of the 

campaign. Difficulties in foraging may have forced Greene to seek a 

plan that allowed him to disperse his force sufficiently. While he 

realized Morgan’s precarious position, he believed that intelligence 

gained from local patriots would keep Morgan sufficiently informed 

I to avoid berng surprised and to allow the army to combine quickly 

enough to defeat whatever force Cornwallis sent after him. 
24 

In his operational directive of 16 December 1780, Greene told 

Morgan to conduct a prudent campaign designed to call attention to 

itself. The order contained four critical components. First, Morgan 

was to raise such militia as could be found, in particular those led by 

brigadier generals Thomas Sumter and William Davidson (the latter 

of North Carolina). Second, he was to protect patriot settlements west 

of the Catawba River and ‘“spirit up the people.” Third, he was “‘to 

annoy the enemy in that quarter [the west].” And, finally, should 

Cornwallis snap at the bait, Greene directed Morgan to move to join 

with the main army. Paramount in the plan was the survival of 

Morgan’s forces. The directive was clear and precise in its provisions 

yet gave the experienced Virginia rifleman adequate room for interpretation as the campaign developed. 

Morgan’s actions indicate clearly his method of achieving 

Greene’s intent. Marching about fifty-five miles, he moved into 

South Carolina on 21 December 1780, arriving on the Pacolet River 

at Grindal Shoals on Christmas day (see map 3). There he encamped 

his arm~.‘~ To shelter his men f?om the elements, he directed that 

huts be constructed. From this base, he sent raiding and foraging 

parties into the countryside to raise the western counties and attract 

Cornwallis’ attention. Meanwhile, he sent word to CoIoneIs Andrew 

Pickens and Sumter to join him. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, with almost 300 horsemen, attacked Hammond’s Store, killing and wounding about 150 Tories.25 Colonel Hays of the South 

Carolina militia took fifty men to Fort William, where he chased the 

Tory garrison away and burned the fort. Reports of these forays led 

Cornwallis to fear for the safety of Ninety Six, which he considered 

to be the cornerstone of his defenses in the western part of the colony. 

Contrary to the impression left us by numerous authors,26 Morgan 

was not a prey to be cornered on the Broad River by the huntsman 

Tarleton; Morgan was boldly teasing the British into a rash move. 

For the first time in the southern campaign, and as a consequence 

of the British disaster at King’s Mountain, the Americans had gained 

the initiative in the south. Now, Cornwallis could not direct his entire 

army against either wing of Greene’s force without exposing Charleston to attack or the western region to intimidation. In response to 
+ American fOrCeS 

r, British forces 

Nap 3. Slfuatiiu; 20 December 1780 to i4 Jaauary 1781 
26 

Morgan’s foray into western South Carolina, Cornwallis directed his 

forces in three prongs, moving (in theory) within a day’s march of 

each other toward the irritating rebels. Leading was Cornwallis’ 

favorite, TarJeton.27 Bringing up the heavy troops, artillery, and 

baggage, Cornwallis would march up the east bank of the Broad 

River with over 3,300 troops. Leslie would hurry to join the army 

with his 1,500 men. Tarleton’s light force, leading the army, would 

fix the enemy, after which the regulars would destroy him. As the 

British forces marched only one day from each other, enemy contact 

wnh any prong could result in friendly forces coming to its support. 

The additional advantages of moving on separate axes were logistical, Parallel routes would reduce the length of the column and thus 

minimize the time required for the trail element to reach the front as 

it deployed for battle. Also, smaller columns would be easier to feed. 

The British plans went awry almost immediately. Cornwallis’ 

army soon became uncoupled as Tarleton moved with the swiftness 

his formation afforded him, and Leslie became mired in the swamps. 

Swollen rivers stowed the movement of all the colunms. Additionally, Cornwallis lacked the urgency required of him to catch Morgan.‘* Although he urged Tarleton to ever greater exertions, his own 

movements portray a sense of frustration, perhaps at the slowness of 

his baggage-laden cohmms. Perhaps he assumed incorrectly that the 

swollen rivers that blocked him were a barrier to Tarleton as well. He 

also dallied, hoping that Leslie, who had landed in Charleston on 14 

December, might catch up. But the dashing cavalry officer Tarleton 

saw no impediment; he swam his horses across the rivers and made 

rafts for the troops. While Cornwallis hoped Tarleton could fix and 

destroy Morgan, he knew the main army would be powerless to help. 

In early January, both Tarleton and Cornwallis were within twentyfour-hours mamh of each other and placed generally bettveen Morgan 

on the Pacolet River and Greene at Cheraw Hill. On 7 January, 

Tarleton”s baggage caught up to him at Briarly’s Creek, in the 

company of 200 recruits of the 7th Regiment, 50 dragoons, and a 

second 3-pounder. Hearing reports of reinforcements joining Morgan, Tarleton applied for and received permission to retain the 

escort.29 But the swollen rivers plagued Cornwallis’ march and 
27 

inhibited combination by the two commanders. Thus, Cornwallis 

failed to control Tarleton in a coordinated move that would have 

combined the three formations against Morgan. Cornwallis’ otherwise reasonable calculations violated the tidamental requirement 

that components of an army be synchronized. 

Morgan also found the going difficult. He complained that “Forage 

and provisions are not to be had.” And yet he feared the consequence 

of leavin 

grounds. 6 the country in search of more hospitable campaigning Greene authorized him to seek provisions as far south as 

Ninety Six, which put even greater distance between their two 

forces.3Z Without realizing it, Greene, by this direction, may also 

have led Cornwallis to fear for the safety of Loyalists in the area, thy; 

causing the British general to spur on Tarleton to find Morgan. 

Tarleton may have believed, from information hfjreceived from 

spies, that Morgan intended to threaten Ninety Six. 

Even more startling than the logistical concerns in Morgan;! 

correspondence is his plainspoken fear for the survival of his force. 

Two days before the meeting at the Cowpens, Morgan wrote to 

Greene that he would be hable to fight because of the size of 

Tarleton’s detachment, accurately estimated at between 1,100 and 

1,200 men. He knew of Tarleton’s whereabouts and believed himself 

to be the quarry. He informed his commander that he had only 340 

volunteers from three states and doubted their reliability in a battle. 

With the Continentals and Virginians, his force numbered over 900 

on that date. Then, as now, a deployed force in defensive positions 

held the advantage over an attacker.35 Thus, Morgan must have 

weighed the reputation of his opponent and the British troops very 

highly. Certainly, the reverses at Waxhaws and Camden had tempered the judgment of the American leaders, while the patriot victory 

at King’s Mountain was dismissed as an aberration. 

Lamenting his inability to control the militia and decrying his 

numbers, Morgan told his superior that he possessed inadequate 

strength for “attempts you have hinted at.“36 Greene did not direct 

Morgan in writing to fight a pitched battle. His clear instructions 

regarding the British forces were that, should Cornwallis move on 
28 

Greene, Morgan should rejoin the main army or strike the flank or 

rear of the British columns. The only clear implication in the letter 

was that Morgan should avoid battle, which is precisely what Morgan 

wanted to do. Perhaps Greene and Morgan had discussed in Charlotte 

the possibility that Morgan would be the target. Perhaps Morgan lost 

his nerve. From his subsequent behavior, the former seems more 

likely. 

Tarleton had no such misgivings. Sometimes called “‘The Green 

Dragoon”’ or ‘“Bloody Banny,” he had assumed the identity of the 

English gentry-warrior class. Cecil Woodham-Smith describes that 

group: 

War was an aristocratic trade, and military glory reserved for nobles 

and princes. Glittering squadrons of cavalry, long lines of infantry, 

wheeling obediently on the parade ground, ministered to the lust both 

for power and for display. Courage was esteemed the essential military 

quality and held to be a virtue exclusive to aristocrats. Were they not 

educated to courage, trained, as no common man was trained, by years 

of practice in dangerous sports? They glorified courage, called it 

valour, saw war in terms of valour as the supreme adventureP7 

The Tarletons were not members of this social elite, but they were 

a family of substance. A great grandfather outfined and commanded 

one of Oliver Cromwell’s warships. Tarleton’s father was a successful Liverpool businessman Jamaica plantation owner, and slave 

trader.38 Banastre Tarleton entered Oxford with his elder brother in 

177 1, and he remained there until. the death of his father in 1773. With 

an inheritance of &5,QOO, he left Oxford to study law. This subject 

appears not to have interested him; after two years of idling in gaming 

salons, he purchased azornetship in the 1st Regiment of Dragoon 

Guards, The post cost his mother &800.39 

The choice of regiments indicates young Tarleton’s character: 

cavalry represented the concepts of glory, courage, and chivalry that 

inhabited the aristocratic world to which he aspired-that of the 

knight in shining arrnor. Not only that, but the King”s Dragoon 

Guards was the senior line cavalry unit and one of the more prestigious regiments of the army. Tarleton, however, was no mere parade 

ground dandy. When an opportunity came for service in America, he 
29 

arranged to be posted to the 16th Light Dragoons. Although cavalry, 

these were field troops scorned by the status-conscious. They were 

light, agile men mounted on polo ponies, organized and equipped to 

maintain constant contact with the enemy, hunt them down, and hold 

them for the regulars to kill. The 16th was raised in 1759 after a 

successful experiment three years earlier. 40 The regiment deployed 

in the fall of 1775. 

In America, Tarleton distinguished himself almost immediately. 

At Princeton, his men captured Lee41---the young dragoon personally escorting his prisoner to Lord Cornwallis. Tarleton not only 

caught Cornwallis” eye, his success also led the patriotic citizenry of 

Liverpool to elect him captain of their volunteer company. Campaigning in New Jersey gave Tarleton greater notoriety after his 

horsemen cruelly subdued the rebellious population. With the passing 

of command from Howe to Clinton in 1778, shakeups in the staff 

resulted in Tarleton being named brigade major. It was Major Tarleton in command of the 17th Light Dragoons who charged at Monmouth, causing Lee’s withdrawal and subsequent disgrace. 42 

Grateful for the part the impetuous cavalryman played was the British 

commander, Cornwallis. Tarleton fully embraced H. Lloyd% offensive doctrine: “No army conquers merely by resisting: you may repel 

an enemy; but victory is the result of action. “43 Upon the creation in 

August 1778 of a mixed light regiment of green-clad English, Scottish, and Loyalist volunteers, the officer selected to command it was 

Tarleton, now promoted to lieutenant colonel at the age oftwenty-six. 

He could attribute his meteoric rise to feats of valor alone; neither 

wealth nor family connections (he had none) influenced his status. 

The lesson was clear: courage and resolve were rewarded; indeed, 

they were a vehicle for social mobility. 

As Tarleton hunted the ragtag Americans, his greatest problem was 

to get to Morgan before the latter could cross the Broad River and 

rejoin the main American army (see map 4). Tarleton did not consider 

defeat a possibility, although he expected Cornwallis would meet 

him, leaving the issue without doubt. He believed his commander 

was moving, albeit more slowly, to support him. Indeed, he suggested 

gently that Cornwallis hurry to Ring’s Mountain. He also expected 
Scale 

0 30 miles 

“p 

LEGEND 

El American tarces 

Eriiish iorcas 

Map 4. Situation, 14 January 1781 
31 

the third prong of the army, Leslie’s, to be within supporting distance. 

A report of the presence of American artillery-the consequence of 

an American ruse in which logs were attached to wagon wheels and 

paraded in front of Colonel Ridgely’s or Rugely’s) Tory garrison on 

28 November 1780-concerned him, ’ but Cornwallis assured Tar- 6 

leton in zx51etter dated 2 January 1781 that this information was 

incorrect. Tarleton’s instincts told him to pursue as quickly as he 

could; his commander urged the same. 

Tarleton finally found Morgan-or, more accurately, Morgan 

allowed himself to be found-at Hannah’s Cowpens, a location 

known well to locals and therefore an appropriate rallying point for 

militia speeding to Morgan’s assistance. Within an hour, Cornwallis 

had lost the most effective and mobile force available to him. Although Morgan had won a decisive tactical victory, he still faced a 

far superior, if slower, force under Cornwallis. Morgan hurried his 

small band of veterans back across the Broad River to North Carolina, 

Greene, and safety (see maps 5, 6, and 7). Still possessing most of 

his strength and determined to see the campaign through, Cornwallis 

followed Morgan and Greene north, attempting in vain to destroy the 

rebel force. The chase sapped British strength, even as Greene 

gathered supporters from heartened Carolinians. By early spring, 

Greene’s force had swollen to 4,300, while the British army had 

dwindled to about 2,000. Although Greene sought to avoid combat, 

he could not resist the opportunity Cornwallis presented him. He 

turned to meet his hunter at G&ford Court House on 15 March. 

Cornwallis won the battle but failed to destroy Greene’s army. He 

also failed to rally significant support from colonists in the region. 

Cornwallis continued to follow Greene for two week:? but the 

campaign had failed. Leaving Lieutenant Colonel Rawdon in cornmand of British troops in South Carolina, Cornwallis marched to 

Wilmington and then Yorktown Continued fighting in the Carolinas 

failed to alter the course set at King’s Mountain and the Cowpens. 

Battles were won and lost by each side, yet none was decisive. The 

outcome of the war in the south was, in large measure, a consequence 

of the operational plans of the contesting commanders. Clinton, and 

in his stead Cornwallis, saw the campaign as a series of opportunities: 
I 

Scale 

0 10 20 30 

I I I I 

LEGEND 

El American forces 

Bntish forces 

+ American forces 

b British force, 

Mop 5. Situ~tiaa, 15 sod 16 January 1781 
Scale 

30 miles 

O’p 

LEGEND 

cl American forces 

British forces 

* American forces 

+ 6ritlsi-l forces 

Nap 6. Situation, 17 January 1781 
SC& 

30 mites 

O’p 

LEGEND 

I American farces 

British forces 

+ Amerimn forces 

q British forces 

Map 7. Situatian, 18 January 1781 

-- 
35 

success at Savannah could be secured by moving on Charleston; 

complete control of South Carolina could be gained by threatening 

North Carolina. In each case, the British commander’s objectives 

became broader as his assets dwindled in a hostile country. In 

contrast, Greene’s objective was to boost the morale of colonists 

sympathetic to the American cause. This objective did not require 

open battle. While he assured the survival of his own army, he raised 

the militia to assist in the whittling down of his opponent’s forces. In 

the eighteenth century, battles occurred only when both commanders 

determined to stand and fight. In the vast wildernesses of the south, 

Greene could rest fairly assured that Cornwallis couldnot corner him. 

Thus, the American campaign plan, simple and mindful of the 

situation in the theater of war, permitted tactical commanders (including Greene) to err on the battlefield without altering substantially the 

course of the war in the south. 
I. Weigley, Army, 69-73. For a detailed analysis, see also Jac Weller, “Irregular 

but Effective: Partisan Weapons Tactics in the American Revolution, Southern 

Theater,‘” Military AJJrairs 21, no. 3 (1957): 118-3 1. 

2. For a discussion of South Carolina society, see Robert Stansbury Lambert, 

South Carolina Loyalists irz the American Rev&&an (Columbia: University of 

South Carolina Press, 19871, 4-9; M. F. Treasy, Prelude to Yo&own: The 

Sozrthern Campaign ofhkthanad Greene, I%%-I 7881 (Chapel Hill: University 

of North Carolina Press, 1963),3-12. 

3. Five wagons were delivered to the regiment in May 1777. See Curtis, British 

Army, 187, l&X. 

4. See Tarleton-Cornwallis Letters 7-10, Appendix D, 175-77. Citations without 

titles refer to primary sources reproduced in the appendix of this volume. 

5. See Appendix B, for example, the loose organization described in Sexton’s 

memoir, 1QO. 

6. See Clyde R. Ferguson, “Functi~ons of the Partisan-Militia in the South During 

the American Revolution: An Interpretation,” in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 

239-5x. 

7. Guyton memoir, 132. 

8. For a detailed description of the siege, see Sir Henry Clinton, The American 

Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New York: Archon Books, 197 11, 157-72. 

See also John C. Cavanaugh, ‘“American Military Leadership in the Southern 

Campaign: Benjamin Lincoln,‘” in Higgins, Revdutionary War, 101-3 1. 

9. The engagement is sometimes referredto as “Buford’s Defeat.” Most historians 

describe the action as a massacre, as Tarleton apparently ordered or condoned 

the kihing of Americans under a white flag, in an act thereafter described as 

‘“Tarleton’s Quarter.” However, Virginia pension records show that a substantial number of Americans, though wounded, survived the battle and were 

paroled or discharged. Given the passions aroused by this sort of war, some 

excesses are likely to have occurred; however, at some point, the killing must 

have stopped short of massacre. 

10. h-a D. Gruber, “British Southern Strategy,” in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 

228. See also Clinton, Rebellion, 190, 191. 

11. Re Kalb remained to command the Continentals in the Southern Army. 

37 
38 

12. Paul David Nelson, “‘Major General Horatio Gates as a Military Leader: The 

Southern Experience,“” in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 142. Nelson is more 

Gritical of Gates in “Horatio Gates in the Southern Department, 1780: Serious 

Errors and a Costly Defeat,” North Carolina Historical Review 50 

(1973):256-72. 

13. In a letter of 6 August 1780, Comwallis wrote: “It may be doubted by some 

whether the invasion of North Carolina may be a prudent measure. But I am 

convinced that it is a necessary one and that, if we do not attack that province, 

we must give up both South Carolina and Georgia and retire within the walls 

of Charleston.“’ Se,e Clinton, Rebellion, 448. 

14. Dederer, s%raw, 62, n. 9. 

15. John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas 

PXW-1781 (University: University of Alabama Press, 1985), 127; Theodore 

Thayer, hpafhanael Greene: Strategist ofthe American Revolution (New York: 

Twayne, 1960); Elswyth Thane, The Fight&g Quaker: Nathanael Greene (New 

York: Hawthorn Books, 1972). For fulsome praise, see the description by 

Alexander Garden, Greene’s aide, in Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War in. 

America (Charleston, SC: A. E. Miller, 1822), 76-84. 

16. Greene to the president of Congress, Philadelphia, 27 October 1780, cited in 

George Washington Greene, The Life oflvalhanael Greene, vol. 3 (New York: 

Hurd & Houghton, 1871), 35-36. 

17. This is also the conclusion of Dermis Michael Conrad, who analyzed Greene’s 

generalship in ““Nathanael Greene and the Southern Campaign,” Ph.D. diss., 

Duke University, 1979. 

18. The first returns included 2,307 men, of whom 1,482 were tit for duty; only 

949 were ContinentaIs. These and ninety cavaIry and sixty artillery comprised 

the army. In a letter Greene wrote to Lafayette, he complained that his ‘iwhole 

force fit for duty that (were) properly clothed and properly equipt (did) not 

amount to 800 men.” Greene to Lafayette, 29 December 1780, cited in Greene, 

Life, vol. 3,70. 

19. Jared Sparks, ed., Correspondence ofthe American Revolution, vol. 3 (Boston: 

Little, Brown & Company, 1853), 166. Compare Lawrence E. Babits’ figures 

in “Greene’s Strategy in the Southern Campaign, 1780-178 1,” in Aabpting to 

Ccmditions War and Society in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Maarten Ultee 

(University: University of Alabama Press, 1986), 136-37. 

20. See Greene, Life, vol. 3, 68-82; Thayer, Greene, 293; see Seymour memoir, 

Appendix B, 102. 

--- 
39 

2 1. Babits observes that ‘“fhroughouthe Southern campaign, Greene acted as if he 

were still the quartermaster general who had brought order to the suppEy ofthe 

ContinentaE Army under Washington,” in “Campaign,” 148. 

22. Since the maneuver produced the desired results, historians more often raise 

their eyebrows at Greene’s boldness; however, they invariably remark on the 

violation ofthe principle. See, for example, James Boone Bartholomees, “Fight 

or Flee: The Combat Performance of the North Carolina Militia in the Cowpens-Guilford Court House Campaign, January to March, 1781,” Ph.D. diss., 

Duke University, 1978; George F. Scheer and Hugh E. Rankin, Rebels and 

ReLkcoats (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1957), 425,426. See 

also Greene-Morgan Letter 2,2 12. 

23. For a discussion of Greene’s operational concept, see Weigley, Far, 29-36. 

See also Edwin C. Beams, The Battk ofthe Cowpens (Washington, DC: O&e 

of Archeology and Historical Preservation, U.S. Department of the Interior, 

1967), 1 I The original suggestion that Morgan conduct a raid was put forward 

by North Carolina militia General William Davidson in a letter dated 27 

November 1780. See Chalmers Gaston Davidson, Piedmont Partisan: The Life 

and Times ofBrigadier-General Wlliam Lee Davidson (Davidson, NC: Davidson College Press, 195 l), 98. 

24. For descriptions of the march, see Appendix B, Captain Kirkwood’s diary, 97, 

114; Captain William Beatty’s diary, 99; Sergeant Major Seymour’s journal, 

102-4. 

25. See Appendix B, Hammond memoir, 96; Seymour memoir, 102; Everhart 

memoir, 104; Copeland memoir, 105; Dialmemoir, 106; Guyton memoir, 108. 

26. See Richard M. Ketchum, “Men of the American Revolution XVI: Daniel 

Morgan,” American Heritage 27 (1976):97; David Schenck, North Carolina 

1780-1781 (Raleigh, NC: Edwards and Broughton, 1889), 203-4. R. Don 

Higginbotham, in a biographical sketch of Morgan, writes, “Morgan, falling 

back toward the border of the Carolinas, made a stand against Tarleton at the 

Cowpens.“’ See “‘Daniel Morgan,” American Military Leaders, ed. Roger J. 

Spiller (New York: Praeger, 19893, 219. See also Conrad, “‘Greene,” 103. 

Higginbotham’s more detailed explanation in Daniel h4organ, Revolutionary 

Rl$eman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 130-3 1, 

portrays a more accurate picture of the events. 

27. Cornwallis sent Tarleton the order to move on 1 January 1781. See Tarleton 

campaign narrative, Appendix B, 112-l 5. 

28. By contrast, ha D. Gruber portrays Cornwallis as “a confident, gregarious man, 

filled with energy, and capable of acting decisivefy even rashly.” “Britain’s 

Southern Strategy,” in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 2 13. 
29. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letters 7 and 8, Appendix D, 175-76. Tarleton bad 

requested the baggage only on 4 January; see Cornwallis-Tarleton Letter 7, 

175-76. 

30. See Appendix B, Seymour for a description of the conditions ofthe troops, 102. 

3 I. See Greene-Morgan Letter 3, Appendix D, 163-64. 

32. See Cornwalis-Tarleton Letters 1 and 4, Appendix D, 112-13, 174. 

33. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letters 1 and 4, Appendix D, f12-13,174. 

34. See Greene-Morgan Letter 4, Appendix D, 164-65. 

35. Writing from his observations a scant two decades after the battle of the 

Cowpens, the great military theorist Carl van Clausewitz wrote, “We maintain 

unequivocally that the form of warfare we call defense not only offers greater 

probability of victory than attack, but that its victories can attain the same 

proportions and results,” OB~ WQ;~, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 392. 

36. See Appendix D, Greene-Morgan Letter 8, I5 Jarmary, X69-70. 

37. The Reason Why (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960), 1. 

38. For more details of Tarleton”s background, see Robert D. Bass, The Green 

D-ragoon (Columbia, SC: Sandlapper Press, 1972), f 1-3 1. 

39. Until the nineteenth century, commissions in the British Army were reserved 

for those who could afford them, in the belief that the monied classes were 

schooled for the hardships of military service and were more likely to possess 

the courage required for it. The cost, $800, may have been a bargain; the same 

position in the Horse-Guards cost &i,200. The annual pay of a cornet of 

dragoons was only &255. See Curt&, British Amy, 158, 159. 

40. R. Money Barnes, A Histop ofthe Regiments &L Unr@ms of the British Army 

(London: Seeley Service & Co., 1964), 38,66. The first known light cavalry in 

modem Europe were Magyar volunteers. Similar formations were in use in 

European armies by the end of the seventh century, the English adopting themonly with reluctance because oftheir irregular origins. See David ChandIer, The 

Art of Warfare ipl the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Books, 

1976), 37-4 1; John W. Fortescue, A History of t/ze I7th Lancers (London: 

Macmillan, 1 X95), 5,6. For comparison, see Christopher Duffy, The Army of 

Frederick the Great (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1974), 98-102. 

41. Ironically, as an officer in the British Army, Charles Lee had actually served in 

the 16th Light Dragoons in Portugal. See Bass, Dragoon, 20. 
41 

42. Of his decision, Lee said, “‘If the British cavalry [Tarleton] had vigorously 

pushed on our right, they might have turned our flank, taken us in reverse, and 

we had been lost.” Bass, Dragoon, 45. 

43. From H. Lloyd, Continuation of the History of the Late War in GermaPly 

Between the King ojPrussia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies, Part 

2 (London: S. IIooper, 178 I), 145. George Hanger, one of Tarleton’s proteges, 

quotes this passage to refute the criticism of Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie 

that Tarleton was too precipitate in his attack of Morgan’s force. See An Address 

to the Army in Reply to the Strictzrres by Roderick Ma&en.zie (London: James 

Ridgway, 1789), 123. 

44. See Kirkwood’s diary, Appendix B, 97; See Anderson’s diary, Appendix C, 

139; Kelley’s diary, 142. 

45. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letter 4, Appendix D, 139. 

46. See William R. Trotter, ““Advantage Found in Retreat,” Military History 6 

(December 1989):38-43; George W. Kyte, “Victory in the South: An Appraisal 

of General Greene’s Strategy in the Carolinas,” North Carolina Historical 

Review 37 (July 1960):32 l-47. 

47. Lord Rawdon had been close friends with Tarleton since their days at University 

College, Oxford, in 177 1. See Bass, Dragoon, 13. 
III. ““TEIIS UNEXI’ECTED EVENT” : 

ANNIHILATION AT THE COWPENS 

In 216 B-C. on the Italian peninsula at Cannae, the great 

Carthaginian commander Hannibal, his back to the Aufidus River, 

met a Roman army almost twice the size of his own under consuls 

Aemilius and Varro. In a day-long scene of carnage, the Carthaginians hacked and speared to death 70,000 Romans at a cost of 5,700 of 

their own men2 The double envelopment at Cannae has become the 

classic example of the elusive battle of annihilation, the solution to 

the dangers of protracted, expensive, and exhausting wars of attrition. 

The Goncept of the envelopment so dazzled a chief of the Prussian 

General Staff that he designed, on a massive scale, an operations plan 

to recreate it and titled his essay on military history c~nnae.~ While 

Schlieffen’s plan, as modified by his successor, failed to achieve the 

desired result in western Europe in 19 14, Generals Paul van Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff did encircle and destroy a Russian army 

at Tannenburg the same year. 

But for those examples, the only important double envelopment 

resulting in annihilation occurred in the backwoods of South Carolina 

at the Cowpens in 178 1. The American victor certainly had military 

experience, but even compared with many of his contemporaries, 

much less Hannibal, he must be ‘called an amateur. Should Morgan 

rank with Hannibal as a great captain, or did happenstance lead to an 

outcome the American commander did not intend? Would either 

reputation suffer if it were known that each commander seized a rare 

opportunity as it presented itself? 

The Cowpens may be one of the most important battles ever fought 

on American soil from the standpoint of the tactical lessons one can 

learn from it. Far from a slugfest, the Cowpens featured both commanders as they maneuvered their troops expertly in an attempt to 

achieve decisive results (although, obviously, only one succeeded). 

Moreover, it stands as a superb laboratory for analysis of the psyehological factor in war, an opportunity to study the psychological 

makeup of the British and American commanders and the morale of 

43 
44 

their troops. In addition, it highhghts the differences in discipline and 

morale between regular soldiers and militia. But, like Cannae (and, 

for that matter, Tannenburg), the battle had little effect on the war. 

Never will the Cowpens be more than a fascinating footnote in 

mihtary history, as its effect was mereIy to nudge along the thrust of 

the campaign that had been so decisively affected (as we know in 

hindsight) by the far less interesting battle at King’s Mountain. 

At forty-four, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Morgan was older than 

many other senior officers in the Continental Army. He had served 

as a wagoner for Major General Edward Braddock during that 

officer’s ill-fated expedition into western Pennsylvania in 1755 ~ After 

Morgan raised one of the fist rifle companies authorized by Congress, his distinguished behavior in action resulted in his promotion 

to colonel. Later, he felt unrecognized as others were promoted ahead 

of him and in a pique resigned his commission.4 Upon hearing that 

his old commander from Saratoga had been badly beaten at Camden, 

however, he hurried south and was surprised to be greeted not only 

by Gates’ replacement but by orders promoting himself to brigadier 

general.” 

A better commander cauld not have been chosen for the foray into 

South Carolina. Morgan was a commander of proven courage, and 

he had an uncanny understanding of the psychofogy of soldiers and 

a frm grasp of tactical principles. An imposing six feet in height and 

of great physical strength, he also bore a large scar on his cheek that 

spoke volumes of his bravery.6 During his weeks in South Carolina, 

he followed Greene’s directive scrupulously, husbanding his forces 

and drawing Tarleton ever closer. By the middle of January, he had 

played out his hand. Tarleton was determined to catch Morgan before 

the latter could cross the Broad River and before the little American 

army could swell with militia reinforcements. On the night of 15 

January, Tarleton crossed the Pacolet River and surprised some of 

Morgan’s pickets in their camp. With the alarm “brother Ben is 

coming!“’ Morgan moved most of his command to Burr’s Mill on 

Thicketty Creek.7 Greene had expected Morgan to harass the enemy, 

“to fall upon the flank or into the rear of the enemy” as the situation 

dictated; Tarleton, however, instead moved to force a decision. 
45 

Morgan could flee, demoralizing his troops and exposing them to 

piecemeal destruction, or he could test his strength against the Green 

Dragoon in pitched battle. 

Morgan chose to fight. Violating the strict letter of his original 

instructions, he had several advantages that amended the circumstances envisioned in their writing. First, he chose the ground, giving 

him the advantage of an ambusher. Second, he knew by reputation 

the methods-and therefore the weaknesses---of his opponent. Third, 

allowing Tarleton the time to close the gap between the two armies 

gave the Americans an opportunity to assemble on a battle site of 

Morgan’s choosing, prepare their positions, rest, and eat before the 

contest of the following day. Tarleton’s troops would have none of 

these advantages. Greene sent Morgan a letter on 13 January that 

implied Morgan had permission to fight the battle. 

Morgan’s force was ideally suited to the task. Greene had assigned 

Morgan remnants of the Continental Line and Virginia state troops 

under the able Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard, as well as 

Lieutenant Colonel William Washington’s 3d Continental Light 

Dragoons8 

Hannah’s Cowpens, Morgan’s choice for his battle arena, was a 

typical landmark in western South Carolina, used for grazing herds 

by local farmers and frontiersmen bringing their cattle to market. 

Here the militia had rallied several months earlier before joining 

Ferguson at King”s Mountain. Relatively flat open ground sparsely 

scattered with red oak and pine,g the site was ideal for grazing cows 

or fighting European-style battles. From the direction the British must 

come (northwest along Mill Gap Road), a single trail opened into a 

narrow plain that sloped gently but unevenly uphill to the center of 

the pens. About 200 meters in width where the British would form 

up, the field widens to about 250 meters at its highest point (about a 

990-foot elevation) and, continuing along the trail, tapers slightly as 

the ground falls toward the banks of the Broad River some eight 

kilometers beyond. I0 As the British would see it, the field generally 

sloped downward to the right (or north) flank. In the northeast corner 
46 

of the field, a ravine divided the northern side, running parallel to and 

just behind the Continental Line. 

On 16 January, Morgan marched his small army to Hannah”s 

Cowpens, arriving there about sundown. The move not only allowed 

him to select the ground of his choosing,’ ’ it also placed him f&er 

away from Cornwallis and the danger of encirclement and gave 

outlying detachments time to gather for the battle, Years later, 

Morgan gave yet another explanation for his choice of the site: 

I would not have had a swamp in the view of my militia on any 

consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have 

detained them from it. As to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, 

and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. 

As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I 

would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. 

It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot 

down those who broke from ranks. When men are forced to fight, they 

will sell their lives dearly; and I know that the dread of Tarleton’s 

cavahy would give due weight to the protection of the bayonets, and 

keep my troops from breaking as Bnford’s regiment did. Had I crossed 

the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned 

me.12 

Although a number of accounts accept this explanation, it seems 

unlikely. The Continentals had been surrounded at Camden and were 

destroyed. Eurthermore, Morgan’s instructions at the time anticipated 

their removal from harm’s way. Furthermore, the Broad River, six 

miles to the northwest, was too distant to serve as either a barrier to 

fleeing militia or an anvil for pursuing cavalry. The ground was 

optimal for Tarleton’s cavalry, as the British commander noted 

although it sloped gently upward toward the American position. lj 

The greatest virtue of the field for the Americans was that several 

detachments (including that of Washington, who was at Wofford Iron 

Works reshoeing his horses) could join Morgan without fear of 

getting lost,14 This factor may have been decisive in the choice of the 

site. 

Morgan sent a message to Sumter to join him there as quickly T; 

possible. Hearing the call to arms, militia came from miles around. 

The night gave Morgan time to prepare his men for combat the next 
47 

day, and the skilled leader made the most of his opportunity. Allowing his troops to prepare physically-cleaning their weapons, eating, 

and so forth-he walked among them to prepare them emotionally 

for the horrors of eighteenth-century battle. Major Thomas Young of 

South Carolina wrote that Morgan showed a keen sense of how to 

command militia: “He went among the volunteers, helped them fix 

their swords, joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to 

keep in good spirits, and the day would be ours.” Morgan realized 

that militiamen behaved in battle not as a reaction to years of 

disciphne and drill but based on the enthusiasm of the moment. In 

his encouragement to the volunteers, Morgan linked their performance in battle to the values all young men hold, telling them, “Just 

hold up your heads, boys, three fires, and you are free, and when you 

return to your homes, how the old folks will bless you, and the girls 

kiss you, for your gallant conduct. “I6 He ca’oled those whose enlist- 117 ments had expired to remain for the battle. On the morning of the 

fight, he rhetorically included them in the decision to meet the 

dreaded horsemen of Tarleton, asking the South Carolinians, “Shall 

we fight or fly?“‘* More than jovial banter, Morgan deliberately 

sought to raise the spirits of soldiers whose behavior in battle varied 

directly with their morale. Any army suffers emotionally and physically as it withdraws before the enemy; this small American army 

was ripe for their commander’s message. 

Before first light, Morgan laid out his plan to meet Tarleton. Some 

accounts suggest that he addressed the entire force. l9 While ““enff am[ing] the courage” of his men certainly sounds like something 

Morgan would da, that he should address more than 1,000 soldiers 

(in the dark) seems almost impossible. Indeed, Major Samuel Hammond describes the meeting in which the order was read and claimed 

that only Colonel Andrew Pickens, Colonel McCall, Major Jackson, 

and he were present. Probably this order related specifically to the 

actions of militia troops, as neither Howard nor Washington were in 

attendance. Major Joseph McJunkin, however, tells us that first 

Morgan and then Major Jackson (who had been present at the war 

council) spoke to the militia. Nonetheless, all reminiscences of 

Morgan’s words that night and the following morning verify that they 
48 

stirred the warlike spirit of the troops. Most likely, Morgan explained 

his detailed-plan to key lieutenants, drew up what officers and soldiers 

were reasonabty available, and exhorted them to be courageous, 

leaving detailed instructions to battalion officers. 

Morgan’s plan was beautiful in its simplicity. Counting that Tarleton would behave impetuously as he had in other actions, the 

Virginian designed his force to behave like a shock absorber. He 

would deploy his army facing southeast. Eight hundred meters in 

front of them, Mill Gap Road opened onto the field. Riflemen, 

accurate to 300 meters, would man the skirmish line from behind the 

scattered trees to pick off British officers and then retire into the main 

militia line. ” As the British continued their advance, the militia 

would fire three volleys (the “three fires” Young recalled fnd retire 

from the field around the left flank of the Continentals. Morgan 1 

hoped that such of Tarleton’s force as remained could be defeated by 

the American regulars and Virginia militia, all under the operational 

control of Howard.22 In any case, as withdrawal of the militia was 

part of the plan, the scheme of maneuver would not be disturbed, and 

the regulars would not be unnerved (as they had been at Camden) or 

even disappointed when it occurred. Morgan rightly feared the large 

contingent of British horse. He gathered up all available horses and 

called for volunteers to augment Washington’s 3d Continental Light 

Dragoons. Most of the forty-five additional men came from McCall’s 

South Carolina State Troops. This force he held in reserve, behind 

the gully to the left rear of his line but available for rapid deployment 

to any endangered sector of the battle. 

Exactly what troops deployed that morning, and where, remains 

uncertain. Fortunately, Morgan and Hammond give us detailed descriptions of the American deployment supplemented by f?agmentar-y observations by other witnesses. 24 While the accounts of the 

three officers do not agree in every detail-or agree exactly with other 

statements regarding the deployment-they can be blended into a 

coherent picture (see map 8). Clearly the Continental Line (consisting 

of the remnants of Maryland, and Delaware regulars) were the centerpiece of the army. They formed in two ranks, covering about 200 

yards.24 Howard differed with his commander on the location of the 
49 

X X X X Skhmishline 

0 yarda 

Map 8. Initial dispositions, 0700,X7 January 1781 
50 

position of the Virginia militia supplementing the main defense: 

while Morgan remembered Tate on the right, Howard recalled years 

later that Tate’s company was on the left with that of Triplett. Howard 

was certainly in a better position to know (as he commanded that 

portion of the troops), but Morgan’s account was written shortly after 

the battle. Because the Continentals were flanked on both sides by 

Virginians (Howard tells us Wallace was on the right, Triplett and 

Tate on the left), Morgan might well have confused the two groups. 

Less easy to identify is the position held by the militia commanded 

by Colonel Pickens. Sergeant Major William Seymour tells us the 

militia were 200 yards in front of the Continental Line, while 

McJunkin says 150 yards. However, Morgan reported only that 

Pickens’ volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia “‘were situated to guard the flank~.“*~ Major Hammond, who 

reconstructed the order Morgan gave the night before the battle, 

claims that Pickens deployed to Howard’s left flank, while Major 

Triplett deployed to his right. Young of South Carolina confirms that 

Pickens’ flank was anchored on the left of a ravine. Probably Pickens’ 

men were not directly in front of Howard but centered on his left 

flank. Wallace’s Virginia militia, who could easily have been confused with Triplett”s men of the same state, may have seemed (to 

Hammond who was farther forward with the skirmish line} to have 

been even with Pickens. 

Scattered behind trees about 150 yards in front of Pickens’ men 

were the line of skirmishers. While accounts differ as to who commanded them, Hammond may be accepted as the authority, as his 

account is so detailed, and he was actually among them. He tells us 

that the skirmishers were led, from right flank to left, by Majors 

Cunningham, McDowell, Hammond himself, and Donnolly. It was 

these men who would fire the first shots of the battle- In front of the 

skirmish line, perhaps several miles ahead in the wood line, were 

posted Captain Inman’s pickets on horseback to warn the army of the 

arrival of the British forceF6 

Behind the Continental Line, Morgan posted his reserves. Commanding the 3d Continental Light Dragoons and some of McCall’s 
51 

men, Washington poised for contingencies about 100 yards behind 

the left flank of the arm~.*~ Hammond mentions a Main Guard 

positioned behind Pickens and commanded “as at present by Colonel 

Washington’s cavalry,“’ without identifying it further. No other diarist mentions such a force, and even Hammond’s sentence concerning 

it is vague. Perhaps Hammond was describing the rallying point for 

the militia after they concluded their portion of the battle. If so, he 

may be telling us that as the militia streamed to the rear, they would 

fall under the command of Washington, at least until Pickens could 

regain control of them. 

It was a bitter cold morning, and the soldiers slapped their hands 

to keep warm as they waited in the dark for the British troops to arrive. 

No evidence remains of the time the engagement began; f;t even the 

sun would signal the onslaught on this overcast day. Only the 

adrenaline that must have coursed through them could have kept the 

raw recruits and seasoned veterans of ‘“Tarleton’s Quarter” at their 

psychologic@ peak for the last hour of darkness before the coming 

challenge. 

Tarleton”s men had been marching hard through the thick underbrush of Thicket& Creek since 0300. Their commander could sense 

the presence of his opponent, having taken his camp on the Pacolet 

River only the previous evening at 2200. His intuition was confirmed 

by the capture of several of Captain Inman’s pickets shortly before 

dawn. Tarleton, who believed the Americans had marched that night 

and turned at ba Yo with the swollen river to their backs, was eager to 

press his attack. As the British broke out of the underbrush, the 

light company of the Prince of Wales’ American Regiment, Legion 

infantry, and 7th Fusiliers in turn deployed ‘two deep, each rapidly 

falling in to the left of the unit that preceded it on the march, while 

the advanced guard of dragoons pushed back the remaining pickets.’ ’ 

According to Tarleton, he then directed his line to remove their packs 

and to file to the right until the flank force (Prince of Wales’ 

Americans) faced its counterpart directly. Lieutenant Roderick 

Mackenzie portrays a far more hurried omush without the careful 

preparation TarIeton describes. 32 While the truth cannot be known, 

such leisurely alignments in a battle with so much activity, but which 
lasted only an hour, is difficult to imagine.33 From an interview with 

eyewitnesses, Major George Hanger claims Tarleton halted the 

troops for “‘near half an hour, and made them throw their knapsacks 

and blankets to render them lighter for action. “34 However quickly 

they formed, the British found themselves facing an enemy 300 to 

400 yards to their front, deployed and holding their tire. 

Accounts of the sequence in the action at the Cowpens differ little 

and then mostly because of the perspective of the narrator. From the 

Continental Line, the battle appears to have begun with artillery fire 

from the twa small guns Tarleton had placed in front of his formation.35 This scenario is reasonable, as the guns had the greatest range 

of any weapon present, and the British could draw first blood outside 

the range of the Americans However, several militiamen claimed 

first honors for their unit, naming John Savage, who was killed later 

that mo>yrrg, as the marksman who brought down “a gayly dressed 

officer. In his report to Greene, Morgan confirms this general 

scenario, crediting the first shot to Major Charles McDowall’s and 

Major John Cunningham’s skirmishers. Tarleton does not discuss the 

first shot but states that, after the suppression of fire from raw recruits 

in the 7th Infantry, his line advanced (see map 9). The skirmishers 

performed as expected: they aimed carefully at the deployed British, 

causing at first some return fire from green msiliers and a reply by 

the 3-pounders. After sniping from behind cover at officers, they 

withdrew back into the main militia line commanded by Pickens (see 

map 10). 

Tarleton believed in momentum and, seeing the sharpshooters 

withdraw, ordered a general advance to smash the Americans. The 

entire British line moved forward shouting as they went, 37 and the 

militia braced to meet the shock (see map 11). Recognizing in 

advance that the performance of the militia was important to the 

outcome of the day, Morgan had positioned himself among them. To 

bolster their courage, he shouted over the gunfire, “They gave us the 

British halloo, boys, give them theigdian halloo, by G-,” and cheered 

the men as they$red individually at the oncoming red- and greencoated enemy. The more disciplined return fire from the British 

appears, from the casualty figures, not to have caused great impact 

-- 
53 

LEGEND 

I Anlencm fwcf 

@GE! British forces 

Map 9. British advance, 8710,17 January 1781 
..- 

4 

Map 10. Skirmish line withdraws, (E720,17 January 1781 
55 

LEGEND 

n Americanf0rco 

Map 11. British attack and militia withdrawal, W30,17 January 1781 
56 

among the militia. Perhaps, as Mackenzie argues, the exertions made 

by the British troops to meet Morgan took their toll that day. Additionally, among the line opposing Pickens were recruits of the 7th 

Fusiliers, the Legion infantry (many of whom had been impressed 

from among troops captured at Camden),40 and a small number of 

,the Prince of Wales’ Americans. Thus, the British line, which could 

be expected to behave like regular troops, might not have produced 

the same results as a seasoned, well-drilled European unit. In any 

case, the rebels fired between two and five rounds each and withdrew 

around the main defenses to their rear. 

According to Morgan’s scheme, the militia were to withdraw 

around Howard’s left formation and regroup. In fact, they streamed 

around both flanks but mostly around the left41 Tarleton saw an 

opportunity in this apparently precipitate flight and sent the fifty 

cavalrymen, placed earlier on the right flank, against the retreating 

militia in front of them.42 Apparently, this chase led the British 

cavalry behind Howard’s left flank, to be repulsed only when Washington, waiting 100 yards behind that flank, parried their thrust on 

his own initiative. 

Having vanquished the militia, Tarleton pressed his advantage. 

Along with the general advance of his line, he ordered up the 7 1 st 

Highlanders and the reserve cavalry on his left flank and the Legion 

cavalry on his right (see map 12). He chose the left instinctively but 

with good reason: the 71st was waiting in reserve behind his left 

(opposite Howard’s right flank), and the Continental Light Cavahy 

had already demonstrated its ability to protect Howard’s other flank. 

By threatening the American left with cavalry again, Tarleton obviously sought to fix the attention of Washington there, thus making 

him unavailable where the British commander sought a decision, on 

Howard’s left. Why did the Legion cavalry accompany the 71st? 

Tarleton ordered them to “‘incline to the left, and to form a line, which 

would embrace the whole of the enemy’s right flank.” He then tells 

us, however, that the infantry moved on but the cavalry balked.“3 

Nonetheless, Tarleton at that moment demonstrated several qualities 

for which he became well known. His tactical prowess was generally 

impressive: he manifested that sharp eye for opportunity essential for 
./ - 

Map 12. Continental Line withdrawal and British attack, 0740,17 January 1781 

57 
58 

the successful tactical leader. But if Lieutenant Mackenzie is correct 

and the reserves were not yet disentangled from the Thicket@ Creek 

underbrush, the Green Dragoon also showed a blind eye to the limits 

of his troops’ abilities, the same weakness that had resulted in his 

men’s exhaustion on the field that morning. 

From his position in the Continental Line, Howard could see the 

general advance of the British line and the highlanders moving up 

rapidly on his flank. To prevent this fresh unit from overwhelming 

him, he sent word to the Virginians on his right to refuse the flank. 

Had Wallace correctly understood and executed his superior’s intent, 

he would have held his left fast to the Continental Line, acting as a 

hinge, and swung the remainder of his company rearward 45 degrees 

like a huge door. Whatever the cause of the misunderstanding, 

Wallace’s men did not execute the maneuver as Howard intended. 

Rather, they faced about and began marching directly to the rear. 

Company commanders in the Continental Line misinterpreted Wallace’s actions and, believing that they had failed to hear the order for 

a general withdrawal, followed suit. only this action prevented a fatal 

gap from developing in the line between Wallace and the regulars. 

Morgan observed this development with alarm and rode immediately 

to Howard, demanding an explanation. Howard, obviously, had none. 

When Howard pointed out, however, that the regulars were withdrawing in good order, Morgan regained his composure and picked 

a spot 80 to 100 yards to the rear where he wished the line to 

re-form?4 

The unplanned withdrawal of the Continental Line had two consequences immediately important to the outcome of the battle. First, 

it caused the British to believe the Americans were on the run. 

Second, and as a consequence of the first, the British lost their 

balance, as if the resistance were suddenly removed from someone 

pushing a load. Believing the American regulars; to be in full retreat, 

they lunged forward for the kill, in the process losing the force derived 

of disciplined drill (see map 13). Suddenly the American line faced 

about again, their weapons loaded, and delivered a withering volley-Morgan calls it “a fortunate volley”45-into the face of the 

startled British barely thirty meters away. 46 The combination of 
59 

Map 13. Continentals” counterattack, 0745,17 January 1781 
60 

sudden discovery that the battle was now in jeopardy and the agony 

of being surrounded by large numbers of horribly wounded comrades 

was devastating to the relatively inexperienced British troops. Regulars, raw recruits, and Tory volunteers reeled back m panic and 

disarray. Howard recognized the opportunity before him and ordered 

his men to press home with their bayonets. 

At this moment, separate decisions led to the envelopment for 

which the battle has become famous (see map 14). Washington now 

parried the fixing attack on the American left flank and moved 

forward, past Triplett’s flank and behind the right flank of the now 

crumbling British line. Almost simultaneously, Pickens’ militia, 

which had regrouped behind the Continental Line, appeared on the 

American right, sweeping around behind the other British flank. Was 

their reappearance part of a contingency plan preconceived by Morgan? If so, he deceived the militia when he promised them freedom 

after the “three fires.” McJunkin says only that Howard ordered a 

charge, and th;mlitia returned “left and right”; Major Young is no 

more specific. Hammond, so precise in his details, makes no 

mention of any such plan. Only Private James Collins tells us that 

Morgan himself. appeared among the militiamen, still recovering 

from their recent deliverance from a cavalry charge, to exhort them 

to rejoin the battle.48 We must conclude that the return of the militia 

was the consequence of the initiative of a commander-which one, 

we may never know. 49 Both Pickens and Morgan were close enough 

to have ordered the maneuver. Either Howard or Washington, already 

in the operation, could have sent a runner to Pickens with a plea for 

his suppart. In any case, surely Pickens would have led the counterattack personally. 

Pressed by bayonet-wielding Continentals to their front, Washington’s cavalry on their right and rear, and Pickens’ militia on their left 

and rear, the British crumbled quickly. As Tarleton describes the 

;;~%I “‘an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole 

Unable to flee, pockets of men surrendered. Gunners manning the two 3-pounder cannon resisted longest. Determined to fight 

to the death, the artillerymen were convinced by Howard to surrender 

their guns; he then prevented the men from being slaughtered.51 
61 

Map 14. Envelopment and destruction, 0750,17 January 1781 
62 

Veterans disputed who received whose sword that hectic morning. 

Colonel Pickens vaguely recalls that ““every officer of that Regiment 

[the 7 1 st] delivered his sword into my hand.“‘52 Howard also remembers being given one of those same swords. In any case, the entire 

infmtry of Tarleton’s command had become prisoners or were dead. 

In a vain effort to retrieve the day, Tarleton attempted to rally his 

horsemen. Washington had beaten them twice that day; most left the 

field precipitately. Nonetheless, the Green Dragoon, ever audacious, 

took fifty loyal troopers-most of them regulars from the 17th Light 

Dragoons-again into the fray where, once again, they were repulsed. 

This engagemeiit effectively ended the Battle of the Cowpens. 

The battle ended, but its most famous moment remained for the 

postscript. As Washington and his men chased down Tarleton and 

his fifty gallant paladins, Tarleton turned at bay several hundred yards 

away from the scene of triumph and surrender, and Washington and 

Tarleton crossed swords during the sort of heroic melee expected of 

cavalrymen. The Virginian may well have been killed were it not for 

the sure aim of a black soldier who shot one of Washington’s 

assailants.53 Although Washir#on’s cavalry pursued Tarleton vigorously for twenty-two miles, they were unable to capture him or 

his little band, but the whole of his baggage was either destroyed or 

captured. 

As the gun smoke cleared, the scene must have seemed horrible. 

In that small field, ten British officers and more than 100 other ranks 

lay dead and more than 200 wounded.55 By comparison, the American toll was mercifully light: 10 to 12 killed and 50 to 60 wounded.56 

There were also more than 500 tired, hungry, and frightened British 

prisoners, now being disarmed instead of killed (as they had been led 

to believe). The total loss to the British numbered about 850. Even 

the victors must have looked unsightly. Not yet nine o’clock, the 

Americans had overcome the collective effects of fatigue, cold, and 

the fear that accompanies uncertainty in the face of combat. But it 

was over; all that remained was collecting the prisoners for transport 

to safety in Virginia and movement of the army to rejoin Greene. 
63 

The small battle on that cold gray morning in January 178 1 did not 

alter the outcome of the war or even the course of the campaign in 

the south. It did continue the momentum created by the victory over 

Ferguson’s Loyalists at King’s Mountain, and it showed the population in the western regions that Tarleton (and, even better, British 

regulars) could be beaten. The value of the Cowpens as an object of 

study lies in the tactical arena and the human drama of the participants. 

From available evidence, it seems clear that Morgan understood 

the temperament of his opponent. He lured Tarleton across the Broad 

River away from Cornwallis. Morgan’s army was too small to 

grapple with the British unaided, so he kept enough distance from 

Tarleton until he could rally the militia. To maximize the potential of 

his militia, Morgan deployed his little force to entice Tarleton to 

attack, while compensating for the potential of Tarleton’s cavalry to 

disrupt his own army. The several counterattacks Washington conducted to parry British attempts to flank him demonstrate his understanding of the proper use of reserves and cavalry. No evidence leads 

us to conclude that Morgan anticipated or planned the double envelopment. On the other hand, someone had recognized the advantage of reemploying the militia, who must have believed they had 

done their part already. The only person who could have directed 

Pickens to counterattack was his commander, Morgan. Even if he did 

not direct the attack that sealed the fate of the British, Morgan’s plan 

for the battle permitted sufficient flexibility in his men to rea& to the 

uncharacteristic collapse of spirit among the redcoated regulars. 

Daniel Morgan justly deserves the honors accorded him, not for a 

brilliant Hannibalesque maneuver but for his keen insight into the 

mind of his opponent and his men and for the construction of a plan 

that allowed for the unexpected. 
NOTES 

Chapter 3 

1. Extract from Lord Cornwallis’ letter to Sir Henry Clinton, 18 January 1781, as 

cited in Clinton, R&&on, 485. 

2. These are Polybius’ figures. Polybius, Histories, iii, 107. Livy says 45,000 

Romans and 2,700 Carthaginians, Livy, The Wur with Hannibal, trans. Aubrey 

de Selincourt, ed. Betty Radice (Baltimore, MD, 196X), 149. Historians dispute 

the actual numbers, but their ratios are about the same in all accounts. 

3. Generalfeldmarschail Graf von Schlieffen, Carmae (Berlin: E. S. Mitt& 

1913). The great German historian Hans Delbriick calls it “a brilliant, unusual 

victory,” History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political &to@, 

trans. Walter J. Renfioe, Jr., vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 

33 1. For a thorough discussion of this connection, see Jehuda L. Wallach, The 

Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986). Wallath argues that Schlieffen’s “obsession with the enemy’s annihilation by 

means of encirclement” and his failure to understand Clausewitz led to the 

Germans’ ,defeat in World War I. 

4. Alexander Garden, Greene’s aide de camp, suggests that Morgan’s failure to 

be promoted may have been a consequence of Gates’ jealousy at the accolades 

paid to Morgan’s rifle regiment by Burgoyne, Anecdotes, 58. 

5. William Waller Edwards, ““Morgan and his Riflemen,” William and Mary 

Quarterly, 1st ser., 23 (October 1914):73-105. After the war, Morgan served 

in the U. S. Congress. See Bailey, Heroes, 9-23. For a fine biography of the 

American commander, see Higginbotham, A4organ. 

6. Bartholomees says he was 5 feet 10 inches tall, “Fight or Flee,” 102. A most 

colorful description can be found in Appendix C, in the Neel memoir, 144. 

7. See Martin memoir, Appendix B, 104. 

8. Washington, of no significant relation to the commander in chief, fought 

throughout the war with distinction. Transferred to the cavalry after being 

wounded at Trenton, he fought under Lincoln in South Carolina and skirmished 

with Tarleton at Ashley Ford and Rantowle’s Bridge, Garden, Anecdotes, 68. 

9. Hammond says red oak and hickory, while Thomas says mostly pine. See 

memoirs, Appendix C, 13 1,145. 

10. See also Major Hammond’s description of the battle site, Appendix C, 131. 

Numerous accounts of the battle imply that the Americans deployed with their 

backs to the Broad River. Nothing could be further from the truth. See Burke 

65 
66 

Davis, The Cowpem-Guilfard Courthouse Campaign (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott, 1962), xii; Scheer and Rankin, Rebels, 429; Michael D. Mahler, “The 

190th Anniversary-The Battle at Cowpens,” MiIitury Review 5 1, no. 1 (January 1971):57-58. 

1 I, A locai patriot, Dennis Tramel, waiked the ground with Morgan. See Appendix 

B, Tramel memoir, 101. 

12. William Johnson, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nat&zeael 

Greene, vol. 1 (Charleston, SC: A. E. Miller, 1822), 376. 

13. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix E, 188. 

X4. For example, see Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats andRebels (New York: W. W. 

Norton, 1990>, 302. See discussion in Eartholomees, “Fight or Flee,” 115. 

15. See Appendix B, Gresham memoir, 99; and Seymour memoir, 102. Because of 

Morgan’s attention to security, not alI of the militia were able ta participate, 

Harden memoir, 105. 

16. See Young memoir, Appendix B, 96. 

17. See Moore memoir, Appendix B, 110. 

18. See McJunkin, Apppendix C, 133. 

19. See Howard, Appendix C, 126; and McJunkin, 133. 

20. This tactic was customary for light troops and considered very effective in 

disrupting the continuity of massed formations. In 1757, the celebrated French 

commander and theorist Marshal Saxe wrote, “a single fire from one of these 

irregulars perfected in his business, will in general do as much execution, as ten 

from any other. . . ,” Field-Marshal Count Saxe, Reveries or Memoirs Ecpon the 

Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 38. By comparison, muskets 

were accurate only from 80 to 100 meters; however, they could be fued twice 

as rapidly as rifles. For a discussion of Revolutionary War weaponry, see Davis, 

Cowpens, 13-15; HaroEd L. Peterson, The Book af the Continental Soldier 

(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1968), 23-57 

2 1. According to Howard, “they fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear 

of my right flank . . . ,” memoir, Appendix C, 126. By implication, then, the 

flank around which Howard expected them to withdraw was his left. John 

Baldwin, of McDowell’s command, claimed later that they were to withdraw 

around both flanks. John Thomas remembered the militia plan to move around 

the right flank. See pension applications, 145. 
67 

22. Howard was born in Baltimore County in 1752 and served with the Maryland 

Line throughout the war. He fought at White Plains, Germantown, and Monmouth before moving south in 1780. After Camden, he was the ranking 

Continental officer in the south, Bailey, Heroes, 3843. 

23. The discussion that follows relies on evidence from Morgan, Howard, Hammond, McJunkin, Young, Anderson, Sergeant Major Seymour, and Private 

Thomas, all from Appendix C. 

24. A Prussian infantry battalion, elbow to elbow, three ranks deep (with the front 

rank kneeling), occupied a front of 150 yards, Steven Ross, From Flintlock to 

Rifle Infantv Tactics, 1740-1866 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1979), 25. The Continental Line, however, preferred two lines of 

men standing about three yards apart, Ernest W. Peterkin, The Exercise ofArms 

in the ContinentalInfantry (Alexandria Bay, NY: Museum Restoration Service, 

1989),1&11. 

25. See Morgan report, Appendix C, 122. 

26. See Mackenzie calls these men vedettes, Appendix C, 15 1. See Young memoir, 

148. 

27. See Appendix C, Hammond memoir, 135. 

28. Numerous chroniciers report that the battle began at sunrise, but none mention 

the sun. On the other hand, Captain Connally of North Carohna remembered 

the day being “cold but inclined to be rainey,” 176. Even with cloud cover, 

ambient light would permEt visibility at musket range by 0700. Sunrise occurred 

at 0707 (+I’- 2 minutes), per a phone conversation with the U.S. Naval Observatory, 6 March 1992. Thus, morning twilight would have begun about an hour 

earlier. Clouds benefited the Americans, who would otherwise have bad the 

early morning sun in their eyes. Lieutenant Anderson describes the British 

forming before sunrise, Appendix C, 139. 

29. General Morgan reported that scouts told him about an hour before daylight 

that the British were within five miles ofhis position and heading in his direction 

and that he deployed accordingly. Lieutenant Anderson, Appendix C, memoir 

139, confirms the report. The British could not have marched five miles through 

the Thicket& Creek underbrush in one hour, but both time and distance are 

estimates here. 

30. Here I follow Bartholomees’ interpretation ofthe description, “Fight or Flee,” 

123. Tarleton received a report that the Broad River ran parallel to Morgan’s 

rear. See Tarleton, Appendix C, 148. 
68 

3 1 I The British trimmed their line from three to two ranks in depth, at least in part 

because their experience in America led them to accept the risk in exchange for 

increased fuepower. The practice was the subject of hot debate in British 

military circles, E. M. E. Lloyd, A Review of the History of Infantry @Vest-port, 

CT: Greenwood Press, 1976) 187 

32. Compare Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148, with Mackenzie memoir, Appendix E, 191. 

33. All other evidence being equal, I prefer to follow Mackenzie, who had less to 

gain by condemning TarIeton than the cavalryman had to lose by being 

condemned. 

34. Sir George Hanger, who served with the cavalry ofthe British Legion, published a stirring defense of Tarleton in 1789. While Hanger’s arguments bring 

caution to our acceptance of Lieutenant Mackenzie’s account, we must keep in 

mind that Hanger was not present at the Cowpens and, as a legionnaire, would 

be inclined to loyalty to the man who made his organization famous, Hanger, 

Adc&ss, 92-93. Hanger also served with Hessian troops in the war and retired 

a major general in the Hessian service, Johann Ewald, Diav of the American 

War: R HessianJoumaZ, trans. and ed. Joseph P. Tusten @ew Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1979), 4 12. 

35. See Anderson memoir, Appendix C, 139; and Dial memoir, Appendix B, 106. 

These guns were accurate to 800 meters, Davis, Cowpens, E 6. 

36. See McJunkin, Appendix C, 133, Young quotes Lieutenant Colonel Farr ofthe 

South Carolina militia as cIaiming he directed Savage to fire the shot, Appendix 

C, memoir, 135. See also Bailey, Heroes, who may be quoting Young, 191; and 

Bobby Gilmer Moss, The Patriots of the CoMrperas (Greenville, SC: Scotia 

Press, 1985). 96,256-57. 

3’7. Howard remembered the British line made a great deal of noise to intimidate 

the Americans, Appendix C, 126. Anderson noted in his diary that “three 

Huzzas” came from the British line, Appendix C, 139. 

38. Morgan’s report to Greene states that the militia fired “by regiments.” The 

actual term for volley firing is “by platoons”‘organized deliberately to keep an 

incessant fire on the enemy. ProbabIy Pickens’ men executed the first volIey 

on command. Given the state of training and organization and the conflicting 

reports of the number of rounds expended, it is more likely that the militia fired 

most of their rounds withaut command. For a discussion of eighteenth-century 

firing methods, see ROSS, Rintlock, 25,26. See also Thomas memoir, Appendix C, 145. 
69 ^ 

39. See Young memoir, Appendix C, 135. 

40. See Chesney memoir, Appendix C, 163; and E. Alfred Jones, ed., The Journal 

ofAlexander Chesney (Ohio State University), 90-91. 

41. See Baldwin memoir, Appendix C, 154; and Thomas memoir, 145. 

42. See McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 133, on the incident at this moment 

concerning rifleman Joseph Hughes and the already noted John Savage. 

43. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148. 

44. See Morgan, Howard, and Thomas memoirs, Appendix C, 122, 126, 145. 

45. See Morgan, Appendix C, 122. Howard remembered it as a “destructive fire,” 

126-31. 

46. See Howard memoir, Appendix C, 126; and Thomas memoir, 145. Lieutenant 

Anderson claims the range of the British was only ten to fifteen meters, 15 1. 

47. See McJunkin and Young memoirs, Appendix C, 133, 135. 

48. See Collins memoir, Appendix C, 145. 

49. A 1928 study of the battle suggests that Morgan was in the rear rallying the 

militia when he saw the Continentals beginning to withdraw. This study cites 

no authority for the claim, Historical Statements Concerning the BattZe of 

King’s Mountain and the Battle of the Cowpens, South Carolina (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 68. Lynn Montross echoes this 

scenario in “America’s Most Imitated Battle,” American Heritage 7, no. 3 

(1956):37. Bailey and Alice Noble Waring claim Pickens acted on his own 

initiative, Heroes, 29; and The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens, 1739-1817 

(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1962), 48. Kenneth Roberts 

describes North Carolina militia lieutenant, Joseph Hughes, as corralling the 

men as they attempted to scamper away, in The Battle of the Cowpens: The 

Great &for& Builder (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), X9-90. 

50. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148. 

51. Cannon, like regimental colors, were considered to be trophies of war, to be 

guarded and sought with great zeal. To lose either was a disgrace. See Howard 

memoir, 126. 

52. See Pickens memoir, Appendix C, 125. 
53. See Kelley, Appendix C, 142. The soldier’s name was Ball. See Carden, “: 

Anecdotes, 69. 

54. See Simmons memoir, Appendix C, 143. ; 

55. Morgan reported these numbers to General Greene shortly after the battle, 

memoir, Appendix C, 122. 

56. See Morgan memoir, Appendix C, 122;” and Fortescue, 17tlz Laracers, 58. 

Seymour reports thirty-five kiIled and wounded; he may have been referring to 

the Continentals only, memoir, 153. Compare Tarleton’s estimates of the 

casualties, memoir, 160. 
IV. THE STAFF RIDE 

Unlike many of the popular battlefields that sprawl across the 

countryside littered with memorials, the site where the battle of the 

Cowpens was fought can be viewed, almost entirely, from one spot. 

But for a single memorial to a Charleston militia unit and a marked 

trail for visitors, the field is free of obstructions. Moreover, the park 

rangers of the Cowpens National Battlefield have carefully maintained the foliage to match extant accounts of its former appearance. 

Although the boundaries of the original ground cannot be precisely 

determined, the estimated widths of the contesting forces suggest that 

the approximate shape and size of the battlefield correspond to the 

area maintained today by the rangers. 

Today, a gravel walking trail wanders in a lazy oval around the 

battlefield, extending from the Visitor’s Center through what was 

once the American camp, down the right flank of the American 

positions, past the spot where the British deployed, and to the farthest 

point of the clearing where Tarleton’s forces debauched from the 

woods the morning of the battle. As the path continues back to the 

Visitor’s Center, it passes inside the British right flank and on to the 

left flank of the Continental Line and the reserve position of the 3d 

Continental Light Dragoons. Periodically spaced along the trail are 

sketches of the soldiers who fought there, with captions describing 

the action. In many cases, taped narratives supplement the captions. 

One can negotiate the trail, stopping at each vantage point, (see 

vantages at map 15, page 73) in about an hour. This chapter will 

suggest a more detailed and extensive analysis of the battle that will 

use the same trail but consume an additional hour. 

The path suggested for this staff ride follows the trail but, because 

of the different focus of this exercise, does not generally use the 

vantages provided by the park service. To facilitate this staff ride, I 

have numbered the vantage points where significant action happened 

on maps and have generally provided anecdotes and points for 

discussion in a chronological fashion. Beginning at Vantage 2 and 

proceeding till the study group reaches Vantage 6, I orient the reader 

to troop dispositions and the planning behind them. From Vantage 6 

71 
72 

on, I analyze the battle beginning with the British advance. The trail 

is marked on the maps attached to this work to indicate the vantages 

suggested by the text. 

Note ta dkze StaffRide Lea&l-: One method of preparation for staff 

rides that personally involves the participants is to assign them roles 

prior to their visit to the battlefield. The appendixes, by providing 

sketches of the actors in the battle, facilitate such an approach. If 

sufficient numbers participate, the role of Howard, for example, 

could be assigned to one person, while someone else could be 

responsible for the perspective of, say, Sergeant Major Seymour. If 

the group is smaller, one person might be assigned to master the 

perspective of the entire Continental Line. Then, at each vantage, 

participants could act out or discuss their roles in the battle. 

Vantage 1 

(Morgan “s camp) 

Situation: From this vantage looking north about three hundred 

meters is the actual spot ofMorgan’s camp the night before the battle. 

On the night of 15 January 178 I, Tarleton surprised some of Morgan’s pickets on the banks ofthe Pacolet River. Morgan then moved 

his little army quickly to Burr’s Mill on Thieketty Creek and thence 

to the well-known gathering place at the Cowpens, closing with his 

enemy on the evening of 16 January. He immediately sent word to 

militia leaders in the district to join him there. Before he finalized his 

plan, Morgan walked over the ground be had chosen to defend, 

selecting the positions for each component of his army. * That night, 

as he prepared his forces for battle, he concentrated on three key 

factors: synchronization, logistics, and morale. Major Hammond 

explains: 

Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of 

balls prepared and ready for use, before they retired to rest. A general 

order, forming the disposition of the troops, in case of coming to action, 

had also been prepared, and was read to Colonels Pickens and McCall, 

Major Jackson and [me]? in the course oftbe evening.’ 
73 

Msp 15. Staff ride vantage points l-12 
74 

Ensuring that his soldiers were well-fed and that their arms were 

prepared for the following day, Morgan went around the campfires 

speaking with the troops. He appealed to the patriotic sentiments of 

North Carolina militiamen whose enlistments had expired, begging 

them to stay.’ One of his militia officers remembered: 

. . I long after I laid down, he was going about among the soldiers 

encouraging them, and telling them that the old wagoner would crack 

his whip over Ben. (Tarleton) in the morning, as sure as they Eve&. 

‘“Just hold up your heads, boys, three fires,” he would say, “and you 

are free, and when you return to your homes, how the old folks will 

bless you, and the girls kiss you, for yaur galimt conduct!“’ I don’t 

believe he slept a wink that night.4 

Teaching points: Leadership, logistics, planning ahead, cornmander’s intent, and morale. 

Vantage 2 

(Main limz ofdefepzse) 

Situatim: The right ff ank of the Continental Line rested upon the 

‘“head of the ravine on the right’” at approximately this spot. From 

here, in two lines, the Continentals lay across and roughly perpendicular to Mill Gap Road stretching to the northeast. General Morgan 

placed his best troops in the main line of defense on the reverse slope 

of a hill with an elevation of 990 feet. Thus, although the British knew 

where the Americans were, they could not determine the precise 

deployment of Morgan’s main defenses. Additionally, when the 

British troops advanced upon the Continental Line, as Morgan expected them to do, they would be more likely to fire over the heads 

of the Continentals, who stood at a slightly lower elevation (about 

970 feet). 

Teaching Points: Tactics, formations of 1’78 1, surprise, and operational security. 

Vantage 3 

(Mlitia line] 
75 

Situation: Morgan placed the militia about 150 meters in front of 

the Continental Line. From their right flank, at approximately this 

spot, patriots from the Carolinas, Georgia, and Virginia stood in loose 

order, parallel to the Continental Line. As they had been told the night 

before, the militia were to fire three volleys and pass around the 

regulars. Because of their numbers and their loose order, the militia 

were anchored on the edge of the woods, where the thicker underbrush would prevent the escape of grazing cattle in peacetime or, in 

this context, a formation being outflanked by British cavalry. 

Teaching Points: Operational security, the role of militia, and planning ahead. 

Vantage 4 

(Skimish line) 

Situation: On the trail about 150 meters beyond the marker for the 

colonial militia (4), stop to discuss the skirmish line, which runs 

parallel to the militia line and perpendicular to Mill Gap Road (Green 

River Road). Morgan directed that militia commanders select crack 

marksmen armed with rifles from among their troops and place them 

in a skirmish lme.5 These skirmishers, hiding behind trees, were to 

place aimed fire out to 300+ meters, selecting officers as targets. 

Eighteenth-century officers could be identified at that range by their 

epaulets and gorgets (small brass chest plates reminiscent of body 

armor). The tactic of skirmishing common in America among Native 

Americans and European units trained to fight them was a relatively 

new concept for Continental forces. Marshal Saxe advocated the use 

of such skirmishers in the 175Os, and by the time of the American 

Revolution, infantry units usually had light infantry companies designed to deploy in loose order to disrupt the continuity of the massed 

formations of the day. These formations, however, rarely carried 

rifles, which could fire accurately 200 meters beyond the range of 

muskets. 

Teaching Points: Technology and light infantry in the eighteenth 

century. 
‘76 

Situation: The British forces straddled Mill Gap Road, stretching 

from the left flank at Vantage 5 to the right flank about 300 yards to 

the northeast. Tarleton deployed his forces in typical European 

fashion, companies on line. On the extreme left flank stood two troops 

of British Legion cavalry under Captain Ogilvie. This unit, raised in 

1778 from Loyalists in the middle-Atlantic colonies, was commanded by Tarleton himself and brought south in 1779 (the other 

units under his direction at the Cowpens had only been attached). CIf 

the 250 troopers present at the battle, Tarleton assigned 50 to the left 

flank, “‘to protect their own [flank], and threaten the flanks of the 

enemy.‘“6 These men had served as the advanced guard for the army. 

Forming the infantry line were the 7tb Fusiliers, the infantry of the 

Legion, and several companies of light infantry from the 16th Foot, 

the 71 st Highlanders, and the Prince of Wales American Regiment. 

Although most of the infantry were British regulars, they could hardly 

be considered crack troops. The 7th Regiment consisted of recruits, 

and the largest number in the line, the Legion infantry, were not 

regulars in any case. Interspersed among the infantry were the only 

two cannon present at the battle, manned by about twenty gunners of 

the Royal Artillery. Altogether, these troops numbered about 500 

men. To their right were stationed the fifty troopers of the 17th Light 

Dragoons. 

Not present in the British main line were the 1st Battalion, 71st 

Highlanders, and the bulk of the Legion cavahy, which fell last in the 

order of march. These British troops were tired and hungry and had 

been hurrying to meet Morgan for several days. After taking Morgan’s recently evacuated camp at Grindal Shoals in the late night, 

they rested briefly and renewed the hunt just five hours later at 0300 

on 17 January.7 With little rest and no hot meals, the British and 

Loyalist troops cut their way through marshes and broken ground to 

reach the Cowpens at daybreak.8 
77 

Teaching Phzfs: Formations of 1781, linear battlefiel 

logical effects of fatigue, task organization, and security. 

Vantage 6 

(British deployment) 

Sitzcation: This vantage stands on Mill Gap Road at approximately 

the spot where Tarleton’s troops emerged from the thick underbrush 

into the clearing of the Cowpens. After passing Tbicketty Creek, 

Tarleton had ordered up two troops of Legion cavalry under Ogilvie. 

Shortly thereafter, the troopers captured several scouts under Captain 

Lnman, who was posted to give early warning of the approach of the 

British. The report of this incident confirmed Tarleton’s intelligence 

that the Americans were ahead and spurred him forward. Ogilvie 

soon reported gaining contact with an American force formed for 

battle. Guides described the terrain to Tarleton accurately: open 

woods with the Broad River six miles off the left flank of the rebel 

position and curving around their rear. Tarleton (referring to himself 

in the third person) wrote: 

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton having attained a position, which he 

certainly might deem advantageous, on account of the vulnerable 

situation of the enemy, and the supposed vicinity of the two British 

corps [Lord Cornwallis’ and General Leslie’s] on the east and west of 

the Broad River, did not hesitate to undertake those measures which 

the instructions ofhis commanding offker [Lord Cornwallis] imposed, 

and his own judgment, under the present appearances, equally recommended. 

Tarletoa ordered Ogilvie to scatter the skirmishers, who obscured 

his view, and then surveyed the American dispositions personally. 

Tarleton continued: 

He discovered that the American commander had formed a front line 

of about one thousand militia, and had composed his second line and 

reserve of five hundred continental light infantry, one hundred and 

twenty of Washington”s cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen.’ 

This accurate knowledge being obtained, Tarleton desired the British 

infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing, except then- arms 

and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the rig& 

till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The 
78 

legion infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a 

3-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance 

within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, 

the 7th regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion 

infantry, and the other 3-pounder was given to the right division of the 

7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the 

corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and 

threaten the flanks of the enemy: the 1st battalion of the 71st was 

desired to extend a little to the Eeft of the 7th regiment, and to remain 

one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near 

two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve. During the execution of 

these arrangements, the animation of the officers and the alacr$y of the 

soldiers afforded the mast promising assurances of success. 

Teaching Paints: Decisiveness, audacity, flexibility, intelligence 

estimate, meeting engagement, reconnaissance and reporting, and 

reserves. 

Vantage 7 

&itish advance) 

Situation: From Vantage 6, walk northwest along Mill Gap Road 

(toward the Vistor’s Center) about 200 meters. You are now standing 

in the center of the skirmish line sent forward from Pickens’ militia. 

Two hundred meters to your front is the main militia line. After the 

British troops dropped their packs and aligned themselves on the 

enemy to their front, Tarleton gave the order to advance. The attack 

began with fire from the two light artillery pieces and ‘“three huzzas” 

from the soldiers.” Moving forward at a steady walk, the British 

received fire from sharpshooters behind the trees, The sharpshooters 

picked off several officers, then withdrew back into the main militia 

line. One memoir writer recalled: 

A column marches up in front of Brandon’s men led by a gayly dressed 

officer on horseback. The word passes along the line, “Who can bring 

him down? John Savage looked Col. Farr full in the face and read yes 

in his eye. He darted a few paces in front, laid his rifle against a sapling, 

a blue gas streamed above his head, the sharp crack of a rifle broke the 

solemn stillness ofthe occasion and a horse without rider wheeled from 

in front of the advancing column, In a few minutes the fire is generaLI 
79 

Unswerving, the British troops continued their advance. Morgan 

admiringly reported that the militia “gave them a heavy and galling 

fire.” Nonetheless, given the rate of fire, the rate of advance, and the 

maximum effective range of the eighteenth-century musket, steady 

British troops armed with sixteen-inch bayonets were an intimidating 

force to backwoodsmen armed with slow-firing rifles or a mixed 

assortment of personal firearms. After firing three voIleys, the militia 

withdrew around the flanks of the Continental Line in accordance 

with Morgan’s directive. Far from a panicked retreat, their orderly 

movement evoked the admiration of the sergeant major of the Delaware Regiment, who noted, “They retreated but in very good order, 

not seeming to be the least bit confused. t,l? Throughout the action, 

the British advanced at a steady pace. The British believed they had 

occasioned the withdrawal. Lieutenant Mackenzie reported haughtily: ‘“The military valour of British troops . . . was not to be resisted 

by an American militia. Theyi$ave way on all quarters, and were 

pursued to their continentals.” 

Teaching Points: Withdrawal under pressure, skirmishers, discipline, close combat, and assessment of battlefield information. 

Vantage 8 

(Dragoons ‘pursuit of the militia) 

Situation: Walk another 300 meters toward the Visitor’s Center. 

This spot is the center of the line of the initial position of the 

Continental Line, the left flank of which extended about, 100 meters 

to the northeast. Having fired the three volleys Morgan asked it to, 

the militia promptly withdrew, “retreating agreeably to their arders.“15 Seeing the withdrawal of the militia, the fifty troopers of the 

17th Light Dragoons fell upon them in pursuit, cutting and slashing 

at the back of the Americans. One frightened militiaman recounted 

his fear at that moment: “‘Now>” I thought, ‘my hide is in the loft. “‘16 

Available to meet this situation was Washington, charged by Morgan 

to wait “at such a distance in [the rear of the Continental Line] as not 

to be subjected to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near 

as to be able to charge [the British] should [the line] be broken.“17 

-- 
Not specifically targeted at the British dragoons, Washington was 

nonetheless ideally positioned, according to the NcJunkin memoir: 

Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His 

gun was empty, but with it he parries their blows and dodges round a 

tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on Hughes began 

John Savage was priming his rifle. Just as they pass the tree to strike 

Hughes he levels his gun and one of the dragaons tumbles from his 

horse pierced with a bullet. The next moment the rifle carried by 

Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out of his hands and inflicts 

such a blow upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires 

hanging by the mane of his horse. 

Soon, however, the militia are relieved from the British dragoons 

by a charge of the American light horse. The British cavalry are borne 

from the field. ’ 8 

The same militiaman whose “hide”” was “in the loft” was delivered 

from the saber of a British dragoon and later described admiringly 

the effect of Washington’s counterattack: 

Cal. Washington’s cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the 

poor fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to 

remount. The shock was so sudden and violent, they could not stand 

it, and immediately betook themselves to flight. I9 

According to Cornet James Simmons of the 3d Continental Dragoons, the American horsemen “after a smart Action . . . instantly 

defeated [the dragoons] leaving in the course of ten minutes 1 S of 

their brave 17th Dragoons dead on the spot . . .7’20 

Teaching Points: Initiative, mission-type orders, commander’s 

intent, shock action, and counterattack. 

Vantage 9 

(Colonel Howard’s misunderstood order) 

Situation: One hundred meters behind the militia array stood the 

Continental Line, with the attached Virginians under Wallace on the 

right flank and those of Triplett and Tate on the left. It is unlikely that 

the Americans, Continental Line or militia, stood in parade-perfect 

order.:!’ Stretched at open order in two ranks, the line would have 
81 

been about 200 meters long. The main line of defense, the Continental 

Line of Howard, was well prepared. They were fed, rested, and their 

arms and equipment ready. They had seen the militia perform as 

expected, “Well Disputin 

us,” and in good spirits. 2$ the ground that Was between them and The withdrawal of the militia, however, 

not only triggered the pursuit of the 17tb Light Dragoons but also 

caused the British, accustomed to success against Americans in open 

battle, to sense that the tide had turned their way. Tarleton directed 

the infantry to continue their advance and for the Legion cavalry to 

attack around the 7 1 st, who were attempting to go around the American flank. According to Tarleton, the British pushed forward and 

exchanged fire with the Continental Line: 

As the contest behveen British infantry in the front line and the 

continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenantcolonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a 

movement of cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy’s right flank, 

would put a victorious period into the action. The 7 1 st were desired to 

pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to 

entangle their right flank with the left of the other battalion. The cavalry 

was ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would 

embrace the whole of the enemy’s tight flank. Upon the advance of the 

71 st, all the infantry moved on: the continentals and back woodsmen f 

[Virginians] gave ground: The British rushed forwards.23 

While Tarleton saw the reaction of the Continentals to the threat 

from the 7 1 st as another sign of the rebel force giving way, the reality 

behind the American lines was far different. Howard, seeing the 

British attempt to move around his right, ordered Wallace’s company 

of Virginians to “refuse the ‘flank,” that is, to swing back about 45 

degrees thus making the flank more distant from the British column 

and therefore harder to gain. What method he chose to convey the 

order, he does not tell us, but Wallace misunderstood it. Rather than 

refusing the flank, the Virginians withdrew straight to their rear. As 

Howard recalled: 

The officers along the line, seeing this, and supposing that orders had 

been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off. Morgan, 

who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and 

expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by 

pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who 
82 

retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until 

we came to the rising ground near Washington’s horse; and he rode 

forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about. 

In a minute we had perfect line.“4 

Meanwhile, the Legion cavalry attack Tarleton had ordered never 

developed.25 

I”eaching Points: Confusion, effects of morale, maneuver, location 

of the commander, fratricide, withdrawal under pressure, synchronization, improvisation, and battlefield communications. 

Vantage 18 

(The Continental LineJires) 

Situation: Move 100 meters along Mill Gap Road to the northeast. 

The Continental Line moved here with its center of mass at this spot 

and its dispositions parallel to their primary position. 

When Howard’s Continentals reached the spot Morgan had 

marked, he ordered the men to face about and fire into the ranks of 

the attacking British, now less than fifty meters to their front. The 

surprise,was complete; the British, who believed the Continentals had 

lost their nerve at the sight of the bayonets, had broken ranks with 

the intent to deliver the killing blow. Howard recorded the British 

surprise: “‘Our men commenced destructive fire, which they [the 

enemy] little ex ected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder 

in their ranks” 2: Anderson recorded the action: 

The Enemy thinking We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us 

With their bayonets but in no Order. We let them Come Within ten Or 

fifteen yards of us then give them a ml1 Volley and at the Same time 

Charged home. They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such 

Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which 

Caused them to give ground and at last to take to the flightz7 

Tarleton admitted that his troops were thrown into confusion by 

the sudden and unexpected fire from the Continentals: “An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as 

they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw t9h;8m into confusion Exertions to make them advance were useless. 
83 

Teaching Points: Psychological impact, effect of firepower, and 

surprise. 

Vantage 11 

(Encirclement) 

Situatiorz: Looking back down Mill Gap Road at this point in the 

battle, you would see the American line advancing immediately to 

your front, with militia returning to the action around Howard’s right 

flank and Washington around Howard’s left to embrace the British 

in a double envelopment. Out of harm’s way to your right front would 

be 250 Legion cavalry. Morgan, now confronted with this sudden 

and unanticipated reversal of fortune, rapidly assessed the situation 

and directed movement of the troops in reserve to envelop the 

demoralized British. The Continental Line pushed the British with 

bayonets f?om the front, as the reserves sealed off their withdrawal. 

Accounts differ, however, as to the precise mechanism by which the 

militia and dragoons were set in motion around the flanks. Howard 

claims that Washington charged of his own volition. Young recalled 

Colonel Brandon riding up to Washington to initiate the charge-implying that an order had come from Morgan or a requesr from Pickens. 

Collins remembered that Morgan rode in front of the militia and cried, 

“Form, form, my brave fellows! give them one more fire and the day 

is ours. Old Morgan was never beaten. 9’29 Morgan, in his report to 

General Greene, sheds no light on the issue. The envelopment could 

have been the brain child of Pickens or Washington; however, 

Morgan, free with mention of the valor and virtue of his subordinates 

in his dispatch recording the battle, makes no mention of either of 

them in this context. Such coordinated movement of militia and 

Continental dragoons is difficult between peers in the best of circumstances and nearly impossible in the heat of battle between officers 

unaccustuomed to working together. Thus, Morgan is the most likely 

soume for the order. 

Finally, the combination of lack of sleep and food, the toll among 

the officers (Mackenzie believed two-thirds of the British officers 

were casualties), the surprise of the American counterattack, and the 

isolation of the British from a route of withdrawal caused the British 
infantry to begin surrendering. Said Mc.hmkin: ‘“One battalion throws 

down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences 

flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they 

too ground their arrrr~~“~~ As the 7 1 st Highlanders, 7th Fusiliers, and 

Legion infantry laid down their arms, the gunners of the Royal 

Artillery fought on. During the final British assault, the two guns must 

have been left slightly to the rear. As the British infantry withdrew 

before the American bayonets, they left the guns behind. These the 

artillerymen defended with great valor, according to Hammond: 

My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men with 

an artillery man, who appeared to make it a point of honour not to 

surrender his match. The men provoked by his obstinacy, would have 

bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to 

spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match. 

Teaching Points: Bravery, improvisation, maneuver, psychological impact, stress of combat, initiative, and coordinated attack. 

Vantage 12 

(Complete victory) 

Sitzkatian: Without moving from Vantage 11, look back to Vantage 

5 where the British deployed. Those British troops not caught in the 

encirclement to your immediate front escaped along Mill Gap Road 

and disappeared Corn the battlefield at that point. Tarleton, seeing 

the desperate circumstances of his infantry, made two attempts to 

reverse the tide of battle. First, he directed the uncommitted Legion 

cavalry ‘“to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, 

in order to check them, whilst he endeavoured to rally the infantry to 

protect the guns.” When these attempts failed, he rode to the Legion 

cavalry and exhorted them to charge, hoping, as Tarleton recalled, 

that 

the weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the enemy being 

much broken by their late rapid advance; but all attempts to restore 

order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless. About two hundred 

dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle. 
85 

Undaunted, Tarleton took the remainin~Ififty horsemen and 

charged the American cavalry without effect. Seeing the day was 

lost, Tarleton withdrew with his small band. Lieutenant Colonel 

Washington followed in pursuit, according to Kelley: 

COL. Washington & two or three men pursued Tarleton 18 or I5 miles 

& he [Kelley] understood that during this chase Washington would 

have been killed by one of the British but that one of Washington’s 

men shot the fellow[‘s] arm off and Washington made a hack at 

Tarleton & disabled Tarleton[‘]s finger;2& glanced his head with his 

sword and took a good many prisoners. 

A Lieutenant Frazier of the 71 st had been left in charge of the 

baggage. Upon .hearing of the outcome of the battle (probably from 

panicked Legionary cavalry), he destroyed what could not be evacuated and took the wagons to Winnsboro. Young, serving with 

McCall’s horsemen, made for the British trains, about twelve miles 

to the east, and captured two British soldiers, two servants, and some 

stores. Some members of his party continued the pursuit resulting in 

the capture of at least one of the enemy.33 

Teaching Points: Bravery, initiative: pursuit, and exploitation of 

success. 
NOTES 

Chapter 4 

I. See Tramel deposition, Appendix B, 101. 

2. See Major Hammond’s account for the reconstruction of the operations order 

issued on 16 January 178 1, Appendix C, memoir, 96. 

3. See Moore memoir, Appendix B, 110. 

4. See Young memoir, Appendix B, 96. 

5. These men were led (from right flank to left) by Major John Cunningham 

(Georgia volunteers), Major Charles McDowell (North Carolinamilitia}, Major 

Samuel Hammond (South Carolina militia), and Captain Donnolly (Georgia 

volunteers). 

6. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148. 

7. According to Mackenzie, the march began at 0200, letter, Appendix C, 15 1. 

8. Mackenzie describes the march as being “rapid,” Appendix C, I 5 l-54. Tarleton 

agrees substantially: but claims the march was “exceedingly slow” because of 

darkness, terrain, and advanced and flank-guard activities, Tarleton memoir, 

Appendix C, 148. Each participant obviously wishes to support his assessment 

of blame. Given the distance involved and the terrain and light conditions, the 

march was clearly forced. 

9. Compare Morgan and Mackenzie for American strength, memoirs, Appendix 

c, 122,151. 

10. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148-5 1. 

11. See Anderson memoir, Appendix C, 139. 

12. See McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 141; see also Young memoir, I35 

13. See Seymour memoir, Appendix C, 14 1. 

14. See Mackenzie memoir, Appendix C, 161. 

15. See Morgan’s report of the battle, Appendix C, 122-25. Not all accounts agree 

to the same number of rounds being fired. With rifle and musket rates of fire 

differing and the militia firing without command, the number of rounds expended by the men would have varied from one to five. 

87 
88 

16. See Collins memoir, Appendix C, 145. 

17. See Morgan’s report, Appendix C,’ 122-25. Washington initially positioned his 

force behind the left wing of the Continental Line. When the British artillery 

opened fire, Washington displaced farther to the left (not, as Young says, to the 

right) in obedience to the spirit of Morgan’s &r&ions, Young memoir, 135. 

18. See McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 133. 

19. See Collins memoir, Appendix C, 145. 

20. See Cornet James Simmons memoir, Appendix C, 143. 

2 1. See chapter 3 for a discussion of conflicting evidence of the positions of 

Howard’s units, 

22. See Anderson memoir, Appendix C,l39. Seymour reported on the state of 

morale among the Continentals, memoir, 14 1~ 

23. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148. 

24. See Howard memoir, Appendix C, 126. 

25. Tarleton gives no explanation for the Legion cavalry’s failure to comply with 

orders. Mackenzie says the Legion cavalry “stood aloof,” Appendix C, 15 E -54. 

But a vague remark by Alexander Chesney, a local Loyalist, suggests one 

answer: “the prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear 

would nat proceed against it and broke . . .” See Chesney, Appendix C, memoir, 

154-55. If by prisoners Chesney means British Legion troopers who had been 

captured at Camden, “then their own Regt” refers to Pickens” militia. 

26. See Howard memoir, Appendix C, 126. Morgan reported that the Continentals 

“formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley . .” 

This sequence is unlikely as eighteenth-century soldiers fired their muskets 

from the halt. See Morgan memoir, Appendix d, 122. 

27. See Anderson memoir, Appendix C, 139,41,. 

28. See Tarleton account, Appendix C, 148-5 I. 

29. See Howard memoir, Appendix C, 126-3 1; Young memoir, 

memoir, 145. 

135; and Collins 

30. See McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 133. 

3 1. See Tarleton account, Appendix C, 148-5 1; and Mackenzie letter, 15 l-54. 
89 

32. See Kelley deposition, Appendix C, 142. Tarleton makes no mention of the 

incident. 

33. See Young memoir, Appendix C, 135. 
APPENDIXA 

Order of BattEe 

British Force 

Light 

Infantrv 

1. Mackenzie estimated the total British cavalry force at 350 troopers. Cornwallis’ 

troop returns of 15 January 1781 show 451 in the Legion (Wafter Clark, State 

Records ofNorth Car&q vol. 17 (Cioldsboro, NC: Nash Brothers, 1896), 

1009. 

2. Adrien Carauna lists the crew for the guns at twelve but they could be operated 

by as few as three gunners, Grasshoppers arzdButter@es: TheLight S-Pounders 

ofPatterson and Townshend [BIoomfieId, Ontario, 19791, 11. The number is 

an estimate; Lawrence Babits states the number is thirty-six, Cowpens Baftlefield a Walking Tour (Johnson City, TN: Qvennountain Press, 1993),15. 

3. Cornwallis” troop returns for 15 January 178 1 show 249 men in the 1 st battalion 

and 69 in the light company, as cited in Clark, State Record, vol. 17, 1009. 

Tarleton says 200, Appendix B, memoir, 112-l 5. 

4. The regimental rolls listed 167 rank and file enlisted and 9 officers, W. 

Wheaton, Histcwical Record of the Seventh Royal Regiment ofFusiliers (Leeds, 

1875),76; Clark, State Records, vol. 17, 1009). 

91 
92 

Continental Line (American Forces) 

III I 1 

I I Delaware-Maryland Rtylment (+) 

Howard (350) 

Trlplett 

(VA mllitla) 

Wallace 

(VA mllltla) 

Tate 

(VA mllltla) 

5. Mackenzie says the Continental Line was 250, letter, Appendix C, 148-51. 

Tarleton says 500, memoir, 148-5 1, Howard recalls “about 350 men” but does 

not specify whether that number included the militia in his line. I am assuming 

his number included all those who fell under his operational control for the 

battle, as depicted here. Babits shows almost 600 in his order ofbattle, Cowpens, 

55. 

6. Beatty is not listed in Moss, Patriols, but his extensive and convincing diary 

argues otherwise, Beatty memoir, Appendix B, 99. 
93 

MiIitia (American Forces) 

Pickens 

f65Q, 

Thomas 

cw 

Roebuck 

(SC) 

i><l I-lays 

W-7 

Hammond 

w s 

Fart 

(SC) 

7. Colonel Pickens did not actually command all militia forces. They did, however, serve in his line at the battle. 

8. Brandon was born in Pennsylvania in 1741 and moved to South Carolina in 

1755. He joined Colonel Thomas’ Spartan Regiment in 1776, rising to the rank 

of major, Bailey, Heroes, 141-53. 

9. Of McCall’s command. 
94 

Cavalry (American Forces) 

Li2tFauntleroy (3d) 

3d Light Dragoons 

Washington (72}” 

Jones (3d) 

10. From Josiah Martin, who counted them on 16 January, memoir, Appendix B, 

109. 

11. From McJunkin memair, Appendix C, 133. 
APPENDIXB 

Documents Pertaining tcr the Campaign 

Leading to the Cowpens, 

1 November 1780 to 17 January 1781 

Contents 

1. Major Samuel Hammond, South Carolina Militia ..................................... s-96 

2. Major Thomas Young, South Carolina Militia ............................................... 96 

3. Captain Robert Kirkwood, Delaware Regiment, Continental Army ............ .97 

4. Captain William Beatty, Maryland Regiment, Continental Army.. ................ 99 

5. Captain George Gresham, Georgia Militia ..................................................... 99 

6. Captain Samuel Sexton, South Carolina Militia.. ......................................... 100 

7. Captain Dennis Tramel, South Carolina Militia ........................................... 101 

8. Lieutenant Nathaniel Dickison, North Carolina Militia.. ............................. 101 

9. Sergeant Major Wilfiam Seymour, Delaware Regiment ,........‘..L......* .......... 102 

10. First Sergeant Benjamin Martin, Virginia Militia ........................................ 104 

11. Sergeant Lawrence Everhart, 3d Light Dragoons, Continental Army.. ...... .104 

I2. Sergeant James Harden, South Carolina Militia.. ......................................... 105 

13. Private Benjamin Copeland, South Carolina Militia.. .................................. 105 

14. Private Jeremiah Dial, South Carolina Militia.. ............................................ 106 

15. Private Andrew Ferguson, South Carolina Militia ....................................... 107 

16. Private Jeremiah Files, South Carolina Militia.. ........................................... 107 

17. Private Aaron Guytan, South Carolina Militia.. ........................................... 108 

18. Private Josiah Martin, North Carolina Militia .............................................. 109 

19. Private Samuel Moore, North Carolina Militia ............................................ 110 

20, Private William Neel, Virginia Militia.. ...................................................... 110 

2 1. Private Samuel Park, South Carolina Militia ................................................ 111 

22. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Commander, British Forces.. ........ ,112 

23. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, 71st Highland Infantry Regiment ............ 114 
96 

1. Major Samuel Hammond of Virginia was elected a lieutenant in 

1775 and served in a number of actions with a militia company until 

1778. After moving to South Carolina in 1779, he was commissioned 

a captain and fought numerous actions against Tories, including 

King’s Mountain. At the Cowpens, he commanded McCall’s unit in 

the militia line. After the war, he represented Georgia in the U. S. 

Congress and served as secretary of state for South Carolina. The 

following excerpt fi-om a Revolutiona? War pension application 

describes Hammond’s war experiences. 

[Hammond] . . . continued until Clarks affair on Long Cane near 96 

was not in that engagement being out of command at the time was left 

behind on their retreat, followed with &joined Cal William Washington & Co1 McCall to whose command he was attached & joined Gen 

Morgan next day was in several light skirmishes with the Enemy 

previous to the battle of the Cowpens & was with the General there. 

Commanded on the left of the front line as Major of McCalls Regiment 

it is here necessary to observe that Co1 McCall had been promoted to 

the command of a Regiment of Cavahy authorized to be enrolled for 

six months & applicant appointed to the Majority Neither had yet been 

Commissioned, & very [?I few arrived with swords & pistoh+--the 

Refugee Militia attached to their respective commands enrolled in the 

Regiment and were promised by the Governor to be provided with 

clothing & arms as soon as they could be procured-not a day was lost 

in recruiting nor was the full number made up before the Battle-the 

few 25-to 30 that were equipped as Horsemen were placed under Co1 

MCall and attached to Co1 Washington Command. Those who were 

not so equipped were armed with rifles & placed under the applicant---After the action the service was so pressing & the movements 

of the Army so rapid that no accounting could be attended to & after 

Cowpens the applicant was kept constantly on detachment upon the 

Enemy’s lines, so that he could not recruit in the Army as be had 

previously done. The evening of the day of the Battle of the 27 he was 

detached by order of Genl. Morgan to look into Comwallis’ Camp on 

the Broad River, to report his movement & communicate with Genl. 

Pickins or himself daily until further orders. This service was performed regularly until the british took up camp at Ramsour’s Mills. 

2. Major Thomas Young was an officer of the South Carolina militia 

who had fought at King’s Mountain. He describes Morgan’s preparations for the battle of the Cowpens, and especially his rallying 

speech to the militia in this account:2 
97 

we . . * returned to Morgan’s encampment at Grindall Shoals, on 

the Packolette, and there we remained, eating beef and scouting 

through the neighborhood until we heard of Tarlton’s approach. Having received intelligence that Cal. Tarlton designed to cross the Packalette at Eastemood Shoals above us, Gen. Morgan broke up his 

encampment early on the morning of the 16th, and retreated up the 

mountain road by Hancock’s Ville, taking the left hand road not far 

above, in a direction toward the head of Thickety Creek. We arrived at 

the field of the Cowpens about sun-down, and were then told that there 

we would meet the enemy. The news was received with great joy by 

the army. We were very anxious for battle, and many a hearty curse 

had been vented against Gen. Morgan during that day’s march, for 

retreating, as we thought, to avoid a fight. Night came upon us, yet 

much remained to be done. It was all important to strengthen the 

cavalry. Gen. Morgan knew well the power of Tarlton’s legion, and he 

was too wily an officer not to prepare himself as well as circumstances 

would admit. Two companies of volunteers were called for. One was 

raised by Major Jolly of Union District, and the other, I think, by Major 

McCall. I attached myself to Major Jolly’s company. We drew swords 

that night, and were informed we had authority to press any horse not 

belonging to a dragoon or an officer, into our service for the day. 

It was upon this occasion I was more perfectly convinced of Gen. 

Morgan’s qualifications to command militia, than I had ever before 

been. He went among the volunteers, helped them fix their swords, 

joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to keep in good 

spirits, and the day would be ours. And long after I had laid down, he 

was going about among the soldiers encouraging them, and telling 

them that the old wagoner would crack his whip over Ben. (Tarleton) 

in the morning, as sure as they lived. 

“Just hold up your beads, boys, three fires,” he would say, ‘“and you 

are free, and when you return to your homes, how the old folks will 

bless you, and the girls kiss you, for your gallant conduct!” I don’t 

believe he slept a wink that night! 

3. Captain Robert Kirkwood was commissioned in 1776 and served 

throughout the war with the Delaware Continentals. This journal 

reflects the movement of his regiment during the months before and 

after the Cowpens battle. Kirkwood remained in the army after the 

American Revolution and was killed in action near Fort Recovery in 

179L3 
98 

Nov. 4. This day Genl Morgan’s Infantry with Col. Washingtons Horse, 

marched Down to Ridgely’s Mill, within 13 miles of Cambden; reconnoitre the Enemy. 

9th. Returned again to camp. (100 miles) 

22nd.This Day the Maryland Division arrived at Camp. 

27. This Day the troops under Command of Genl. Gates marched 

to Charlotte, where they built Hutts. 

28th. This Day had orders to hold our selves in readiness a moments 

warning to March. Accordingly left our tents standing with all our sick 

behind and marched to twelve mile Creek, which at this place Divides 

No. & So. Carolina; & fi=om thence to the Hanging Rock, the Infantry 

remained at this place until Col. Washington went down to Col. 

Ridgely”s, and with the Deception of a pine knot took the garrisons 

Consisting of one Cal. one Majr. and 107 privates:--from thence 

returned to Camp, December the second. (100 miles) 

Decmbr. 

6th. This Day Maj, Gem. Greene took command of the Southern Army 

in room of Maj. Gem. Gates. 

17th. March’d to Charotte ( 13 miles) 

2 1 st. Mamh’d to Biggon Ferry on Catawba River. (13 miles) 

Jan. 

22nd. Crossed the Ferry and Mar&d. (5 miles) 

23rd. March’d (16 miles) 

24th. March’d (13 miles) 

25th. March’d to Pacolet. (8 miles) 

1st. 

11 th. March’d. (10 miles) 

16th. March’d to the Cowpens. (12 miles) 

17th.Defeated Tarlton. 

lgth.March’d for the Catawba River and arrived the 23rd. (100 miles) 

Feb. 

lst.March’d to Col. Locke. (30 miles} 

2nd. Marched and crossed the Yadkin River. (12 miles) 

4th. March’d this night. (13 miles) 
99 

5th. March’d this day. (16 miles) 

4. Captain William Beat@, in this journal extract, describes the march 

of Morgan’s forces from Charlotte to the Cowpens. The author joined 

the Continental Army in 1776 and served almost continuously until 

his death at Hobkirk’s Hill, 25 April 1781. At the Cowpens, he 

commanded a company of the Maryland Line.” 

Genl Greene had Superseded Genl Gates in his command of the 

Southern Army a Day or two before. When I join’d the troops were 

Hutting which they Compleated a few days after. Deer 16th two 

Companies of Lt Infantry being ordered out I got Comd of the Compy 

form’d by the late 7th Regt. 

Wednesday Deer 20th 80 the Army march’d from Charlotte 10 

miles to Ford’s farm; the 21st to Richardson’s Creek 18 Miles from 

Fords; the 22nd to Brown’s Creek 19 Miles from Richardson’s; the 

23rd to Cedar Creek 16 Miles from Brown’s; the 24th Pass’d by Anson 

C. House to Haly’s Ferry, 18 Miles from Cedar Creek. The 25 was 

Taken up in Crossing the Ferry; the 26th we reach’d Hick’s Creek 15 

Miles below Haly’s Ferry in South Carolina. This being the place the 

Genl intended to take post at, we began to build small Huts, the 27th. 

January 5th 178 1 A Soldier was shot for Desertion. 

Jan. 10th A very heavy rain fell which Rais’d the River Pee-Dee and 

small Creeks so much that the troops were obliged to draw corn in lieu 

of Meal on the Eleventh. 

Friday 12th In the night I went hunting; 13th I wrote to F, & P, 

Wednesday 24th. The Army in consequence of A Victory obtain’d by 

B. Genl Morgan, on the 17thInstant over a superior force ofthe Enemy, 

Comd by Co10 Tarleton, near the cowpens fired a Few de joy’ I wrote 

to C- & G. Thursday Jany 25th 8 1 Genl Stephens Militia left us; their 

times being expired. 

5. Captain George Gresham enlisted in 1777 and served in mounted 

Georgia militia units. In 1781 he commanded a troop of mounted 

militia that fought at the Cowpens. 

. . . some reinforcement was then collected, with which in January 

1781, a party of Tares [sicJ was surprised in the fork of saluda and 

Broad Rivers. Information came to us that General Morgan was within 

a few miles, pursued by the enemy. We started immediately to join him 

and in our way, having fallen in with part of the British advance we 

had a skirmish and made some prisoners. We reached the General the 
100 

evening preceding the battle of the Cowpens and were placed under 

the command of Colonel Washington. Early the next morning the 

enemy attacked our lines but they were soon broken and retreated in 

every direction leaving their dead, wounded, artillery, baggage and 

many prisoners. We continued with the army two days and were then 

ordered away to disperse some tories who were assembling near Inoree 

River. 

6. Captain Samuel Sexton was born in 1762. A volunteer elected 

captain of his company and veteran of several battles, he describes 

here the circumstances that led to his joining the patriot cause:’ 

I was seized, while just a boy, by a party of tories, and so severely 

beaten that my life was despaired of, when Major Jonathan Davis, who 

lived in the neighborhood found me, and took me to his house, provided 

a surgeon, and rendered me every assistance at his own expense. After 

remaining at his house about nine weeks, and after I had partially 

recovered a band of tories come to the house, and again seized me, 

strapped me, and again beat me: At the suggestion of n/iajor Davis I 

made my escape, and joined the American army at the Cowpens, the 

day before the battle of the 17th of January, 1780 or 1781 was fought 

at that place. On my route to the Cowpens I succeeded in inducing 

twenty-five men to join me, and was chosen their captain. We heard of 

a contemplated attack from the tores [sic], and lay in ambush until they 

came up and defeated them. We proceded [?] and offered our services 

to the army at the Cowpens, were received and I and my Company were 

put under the command of Colonel Hays, who was under General 

Pickens under General or Colonel Morgan of the Regular or Continental Army. I was in the battle of Cowpens, at the head of and in command 

of my company, under Col. Hays. I remember Colonel Washington, 

who commanded a body of horse, and a Captain Lee, of his command 

these are all the officers, except Colonel Morgan belonging to the 

Regular army whom I now recollect nor do I recollect any of the militia, 

except Co1 Hayes regiment. After the battle I was ordered, together 

with three or four other companies, of Colonel Hays command, to 

Hillsborough. . . . I never received any commission as a captain,’ but 

was chosen by my company, was so referred to [?I, in the service, and 

was engaged in the battle of the Cowpens, and the Hanging Rock, at 

the head of my company, and was by all officers recognized, as 

Captain. 

7. Captain Dennis Tramel was a North Carolina volunteer who saw 

service at Augusta. After moving to South Carolina, he joined Colo- 
101 

nel John Thomas and fought at King’s Mountain. He also commanded a company in a number of battles. In this narrative, Tramel 

describes Morgan’s selection of the ground for the battle.g 

Applicant there joined the Regiment to which he had formerly 

belonged, which was at that time under the command of Co1 Roebuck. 

In the mean time Genl. Pickens had raised his troops, and Genl Morgan 

from the East was sent on to the South and genl Pickens joined him. 

Applicant was also attached to the Army under the command of Genl. 

Morgan and Genl. Pickens. Genl. Morgan had the principal command. 

The British army composed of British and Tories under the command 

of Col. Tarlton was there encamped upon the South side of the Pacolet 

River near Grindols shoals. The Army under the command of Genl. 

Morgan retreated to a place called the Cowpens between the branch of 

horse creek and Suck creek where the engagement took place between 

the two armies. That place being in two and a halfmiles of the residence 

of said applicant and he being well acquainted with the local Situation 

of the ground Genl Morgan called upon said applicant to assist in 

selecting the &de Ground; said applicant with the company under his 

command together with Genl. Morgan and his life-guard and Aide d 

camp went out and selected the ground upon which the Battle was 

fought. After the battle ground was chosen this applicant well remembers the expression of Genl. Morgan which was as follows; to wit. 

addressing himself to applicant said he Captain here is Morgan’s grave 

or victory. Early in the morning of the day following the engagement 

commenced, it being the 17th day of January 178 1. Soon after the battle 

was over Genl. Morgan moved off with the prisoners leaving this 

applicant with his company to bury the dead ofboth parties, and to keep 

off the scouting parties of Tories; to wit. Will Cunningham and Co1 

Young who commanded scouting parties of tories, who would commit 

depredations and flee to the Indian Nation and other remote places - 

with the tories under their command. Our wounded was taken to the 

house of Do& Robert Nelson who waited and attended upon them, he 

being within five miles of the battle ground. Applicant continued in the 

Neighborhood with his company for the protection of the wounded. . ~ 

8, Lieutenant Nathaniel Dickison was elected first lieutenant of his 

company of North Carolinal~iIiCia. He served in that capacity in the 

militia line at the Cowpens. 

The declarant entered the service of the U. S. as a substitute in the 

name and stead of one Frederick Hall in the year 1780 under Capt Jos. 
102 

Cloudin Stokes County North Carolina, his Co1 name was Tipton who 

commanded the 3rd Regiment of Militia. He thinks he recohects Co1 

Morgan & that they joined him not very far from the Cow Pens . . . 

Joined Co. Morgan in a bout eight miles of the Cowpens a bout the 

15th of Jan. 178 I. we lay there till the 16th and marched to the Cowpens 

& on the 17th we fought what is called the battle of the Cowpens where 

declarant was wounded in his left groin by a musket ball. He being so 

badly wound that to this day he is cripple from the same. He was out 

this tour three months & owing to his severe wound he was sent home 

& never after entered the service. 

9. Sergeant Major William Seymour served in the Delaware Regiment in the southern campaign and at the battle of the Cowpens. The 

following is excerpted fram his journal.” 

On the 6th December, 1780, General Greene arrived at Charlotte 

and took command of all the Southern Army in the room of General 

Gates. 

On the seventh inst. were brought into camp twelve deserters from 

the First Regiment Light Dragoons, who were making their way home 

to Virginia. 

12th December, 1780, the Tory prisoners who were confined in the 

prevost were sent to Charlotte, there to have their trial. 

Col. Washington, with the Light Horse, marched from here on the 

13th of this instant towards Hanging Rock. 

We lay on this ground from the 22nd November till the 17th 

December, and marched to Charlotte, fifteen miles. Same day General 

Smallwood set out on his march for Maryland. At this time the troops 

were in the most shocking condition for the want of clothing, especially 

shoes, and we having kept open campaign all winter the troops were 

taking sick very fast. Here the manly fortitude of the troops of the 

Maryland Line was very great, being obliged to march and do duty 

barefoot, being all the winter the chief part of them wanting coats and 

shoes, which they bore with the greatest patience imaginable, for which 

their praise should never be forgotten; and indeed in all the hardships 

which they had undergone they never seemed to frown. 

General Greene with his troops marched from Charlotte on the 20th 

December, directing his route towards Chiraw Hills, in order to forage 

and there spend the remainder of the winter. 
103 

On the 21st ult. the troops under General Morgan marched from 

Charlotte, being joined by two companies more of light infantry 

detached from the Maryland Line, directing our march towards the 

Pacolet River. First ‘day’s march from Charlotte we came to Catabo 

[Catawbaj River. Next day we crossed the river at Bizer’s ferry. Next 

day we marched to Cane Creek; next, being the 24th we were alarmed 

about two o’clock in the morning by some men on horseback coming 

to our advance picquet, at which the sentinels challenging and no 

answer being made, upon which the sentinels fired and afterwards the 

whole guard, when immediately the whole turned out and continued 

under arms til daybreak. This day we crossed the Broad River, and the 

next day, being the 25th, we encamped at Pacolet River. 

On the 27th the General received intelligence that Colonel Tarleton 

was advancing in order to surprise us; upon which there were strong 

picquets erected all round the encampment, putting ourselves in the 

best posture of defence. The rolls were ordered to be called every two 

hours, and reports given by those that were absent. We arrived here in 

five days since we set out on our march from Charlotte, fifty-eight 

miles, it being very difficult marching in crossing deep swamps and 

very steep hills, which rendered our march very unpleasant. The 

inhabitants along this way live very poor, their plantations uncultivated, and living in mean dwellings. They seem chiefly to be offspring 

of the ancient Irish, being very affable and courteous to strangers. 

On the 3 1 st December Colonel Washington was detached to Fort 

William in order to surprise some Tories that lay there; and meeting 

with a party of them near said place, upon which ensued a smart 

engagement, the latter having one hundred and sixty men killed, and 

thirty-three made prisoners. 

On the first of January, 178 I, there was one of the Tories tried and 

found guilty of desertion to the enemy and piloting the Indians on our 

army, they making great havoc among them, upon which he was 

banged on a tree the same day till he was dead. 

On the 4th there was one of Cal. Washington’s Horse tried and 

found guilty of desertion to the enemy, when agreeable to his sentence 

he was shot the same day. 

We lay on this ground frum the twenty-fifth December, 1780, till 

the fourteenth January, 178 1, and then proceeded on our march farther 

up the river towards the iron works in order to frustrate the designs of 

the enemy who were coming round us, Colonel Tarleton on one side 

and Lord Cornwallis on the other. We encamped on the Cowpen plains 

an the evening of the sixteenth January, forty-two miles, being joined 

105 

morning by Quarter Master Wade of the British Army with whom he 

had some previous acquaintance & by him taken to Co1 Tar&on: our 

army at this point of time being perhaps three miles in the rear-Dismounting from his horse, that offrrcer asked the petitioner after some 

previous conversation if he expected Mr. Washington & Mr. Morgan 

would fight him that day. Yes if they can keep together only two 

hundred men was the reply. Then he said it would be another Gates’ 

defeat. I hope to God it wili be another Tarlton’s defeat said this 

petitioner. I am Cal. Tarlton, Sir. And I am Sergeant Everhart. IvIy 

wounds were bleeding at this time but soon afterwards were dressed 

by the surgeon. I received from the enemy great kindness. After the 

battle, Col. Washington sent two dragoons with me about three miles 

from the ground to take care of me: Dr. Pindell = formerly of Hagerstown Maryland surgeon of our corps dressed my wounds, remained 

here until the latter part of February & went thence to Catawba river 

where I remained a few days. 

12. Sergeant James Ikden served in the militia beginning in 1777; 

after April 1780, he belonged to the company of Captain Jeremiah 

Dixon. This excerpt offers an example of the use Morgan made of 

the militia, In particular, this account indicates that not ;il available 

troops rallied to the fight on the morning of 17 January. 

When Colonel Washington and General Morgan in the latter part of 

December 1780 or early in January 1781 were detached by General 

Green against the British stations in and around Ninety Six Capt. Dixon 

with his volunteers, long thoroughly acquainted with the surrounding 

Country, were called on to bring in Supplies for the American Army. 

which service we continued to dicscharge until about tRe battle of the 

Cowpens, immediately after which General IvIorgan & Colnl. Washington retreated into North Carolina with the trophies of their victory. 

At the time of the battle we were out on the duty aforesaid, searching 

for British and Tory Scouts, within hearing of the Gums. 

13. Private Benjamin Copeland served under Lincoln at the 

siege of Charleston and volunteered his services with Washington 

during the raids against Tories ir.the fall of 1780. “Our Regiment” 

refers to the 3d Light Dragoons. ” 

. . * about the last of December 1780 our Regiment of about 70 men 

with Co1 Washington at our head & about were detached and marched 

forty miles the first day & on the next day surprised a body of Tories 

at Ninety Six [Hammond’s Store?] & about 150 we took prisoners and 
106 

& killed & wounded about forty without any loss on our side. About 

middle January 1781 we fought the Battle of Cowpens near Pacolet 

River under the command of Genl Morgan-in this battle we had about 

10 or 12 men killed & 50 or 60 wounded we took prisoners & killed & 

wounded altogether about 700 men besides two pieces of artiflery & 

several baggage waggons & dragoon horses besides several small 

arms--Gur Regiment pursued Tarletons Regiment for several miles 

when a majorety [sic] ofthem finally escaped we then marched directly 

for Dan River. 

14. Private Jeremiah Dial was born in Ireland and emigrated to 

Newberry District, South Carolina, in 1771. During the Revolution, 

he taok the place of his father-who had been drafted in 1779-and 

fought in a number of actions against the Tories. At the Cowpens, 

Dial served as a mounted volunteer with WashingtonI 

. . . when Co1 Washington came into South Carolina with a number 

of light horse troops this applicant was with several others under the 

command of Maj Hampton and attached to Washington company to 

pilot him through some parts of South Carolina in the pursuit of the 

tories, as this applicant and the others taken with him, were well 

acquainted with the Country - This was in the beginning of the winter 

of 1780. This applicant went with Washington to Hammond’s Store 

where they,overtook and put to flight a large number of tories, some 

of whom the killed and wounded-This store was in Newberry County 

Washington then sent one of his Lieutenants or captains with a small 

party of men to take Williamson’s fort on Little river in Newberry 

County not more than eight or ten miles from Hammond’s Store. This 

applicant was one of the party sent [. . .] and rejoined Washington who 

then went back towards the border of Carolina to join Genl Morgan-This applicant states that as well as he recollects Washington 

found Morgan a few days before the battle of the Cowpens and as well 

as he remembers when Washington’s company in which he was joined 

Morgan he was retreating before Co1 Tarlton and his forces-at all 

events Tarlton was in pursuit of him-When Morgan and Cal or 

Gineral [sic] Pickens who commandedthe Malitia [?] at the place called 

the Cow Pens they stoped [.ssic] to fight the British under TarltonLThis 

battle was fought on the 17th day of January 1781. This applicant 

particularly recollects this battle because it was the greatest he ever was 

in-This applicant states that Tarleton commenced this battle early in 

the morning by firing his field peeces [sic] at Morgans army but he 

does not remember how long the battle lasted- Washington’s Cavalry 

with whom this applicant fought during the engagement were stationed 
107 

in the rear of Morgan’s forces and when the British broke through the 

left wing of the Malitia [sic] Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon 

them and defeated them with considerable loss . . . 

15. Private Andrew Ferguson was one of a number of free blacks who 

fought in the Revolutionary War. Born in Virginia of free blaGk 

parents, Ferguson was drafted at age fifteen in 1780 and fought in a 

number of important engagements, including Brandywine, King’s 

Mountain, Cow-pens, Guilford Courthouse where he was severely 

wounded), Ninety Six, and Eutaw Springs.’ E; 

I am a colored man. . . . Two weeks previous to my being drafted I 

was in company with my father (Andrew Pegleg as be was called) was 

taken prisoner by the British under John and James Buzbie. We ran 

away from them becaues the [sic] whiped [sic] us with the cat o. nine 

Tails and fell in with the American soldiers under Green. Gen. Green 

told us that if the British ever [sic] got us again They would kill us and 

he had better draft us and go up around out of a little now (?) black 

lickets (?) and he told us we should go with him and must fight the 

British. I was just then under the immediate command of Captain 

William Harris and Colonel William McCormick and stayed under the 

command of this company during most of the time I was out. . , after 

the Battle he mamhedus down into South Carolina to the River Pacolet 

not far from the Cow Pens as he said to join Green but I did not see 

Green there. While we were at the river Pa&et-the British under Co1 

Tarlton came upon us and Co1 Morgan marched us up towards the Cow 

Pens but before we got there we made a Stand and whiped [sic] the 

British completely this took place I think some time in the month of 

January 1781. 

16. Private Jeremiah Files enlisted with Colonel Pickens on Chri:\ 

mas Eve 1780 and served in his father’s company at the Cowpens. 

. . . that on Christmas Eve in the year 17&O he enrolled himself as a 

volunteer under Co1 Andrew Pickens and at the time of his enrollment 

resided in Abbyville District in the State of South Carolina and 

marched from thence as a volunteer with Co1 Pickins to Grenville [sic] 

Shoals on Packlet [sic] River and there joined Cen Morgan about the 

fist of January in the year 1781 and then placed under the command 

of Capt. McKall [sic] in the Battallion of Major White in the Regiment 

of Cal Andrew Pickens of the South Carolina Militia. My father John 

Files, Lieut & Hugh Baskin ensign in said Company-and from 

Grenville ShoaEs we marched under Gen Morgan to the Cowpens and 

was in the Battle fought there against Tarlton”s Legion on the Wednes- 
108 

day morning of the 17th of January 1781--&z recollects a continental 

officer-called Co1 Howard & Co1 Wm Washington of the Light 

Horse. This Deponent was wounded by Tarleton’s Dragoons on the 

head-on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made 

with a sword & the wounds are now visible the wounds Greatly 

Disabled this Deponent--& stuned [sic] him for some time. & one Capt 

Alexander of Rowan Co North Carolina was the first man came to his 

relief & informed him of our victory-& from thence he was carried 

in a Horse Bier three days with Gen Morgans Army and arrived at the 

Town of Gilbert in North Carolina and there Left the Army and was 

taken to Gen Charles McDowells at the Quaker Meadows on the 

Catawba River and there with one Michael Cane an American and 

Sixteen wounded British soldiers were placed under a surgeon by the 

name of Rudolph (a Dutchman) & there remained sixteen days & from 

thence Left the British soldiers and removed six miles to Martin 

Deadwiler’s on Tyger River and remained there 1 X Days-& aplicant 

[sic] returned home & remained unable to do duty until the first of June 

in said year. . . . 

17. Private Aaron Guyton was a recruit from the Ninety Six District. 

Just seventeen when he enlisted with Captain Nathaniel Jefties in 

1779, he saw action in several skirmishes with Tories before arriving 

at the Cowpens. This remarkable passage addresses Colonel Washington’s raid campaign, describes vividly the organization of the 

militia, and comments on the internecine warfare in South Carolina 

following the departure of Morgan’s army. I9 

I was under Co1 Brandon who had a few Brave h4en who stood true 

for the cause of Liberty in the back part of the State who composed our 

little Army I was out the most of this time Some times we had 75 Some 

Times 150 men, and some times we had 4 or 5 Cols with from 50 to 

150 men. Each of them had Command of a Regt at home & some times 

not more than 5 of his men with him. The Cols were Brandon, Hayes, 

Roebuck, White,-in December 1780 Genl Morgan & Co1 Washington 

of the Cavalry came out and took Camp near Facolet River was soon 

joined with what few Malitia [sic] was in our part I think the 1st or 2nd 

day he came I joined him. And hearing of 2 or 300 Torys in a body on 

Bush River Morgan detached Washingtons Horse [meaning his cavairy] & the Militia to dislodge them the distance was about 40 miles. 

We came on their camp & killed & wounded numbers of them took 

many prisoners, and returned to Morgans camp. In a few days Morgan 

hearing of a detachment under Co1 Tarleton coming on him and 

dreading to engage him so near Lord Cornwallis’ Army, retreated two 
109 

days up the Country to a place called the CQW Pens. at this time we had 

no Officer in our Company 142 only two or three or four men. And the 

morning before the Battle 17 Jany 1781 we joined Capt John 

Thompsons Campy. We defeated, killed & took all except Tarleton & 

his light Horse prisoners -Tarleton let Cornwallis know how things 

was who instantly pursued Morgan. A part of us and some Georgia 

refugees followd in the rear of Walfis” Army almost to the Catawba 

River and we picked up a good many of the straglers [sic] in the rear 

of Cornwallis -. . . 

Morgan & his Army having retreated from our State it was now 

almost Fire & Faggot Between Whig & Tory, who were contending 

for the ascendancy it continued so till the 15th or 20th of May. I was 

almost constantly out. 

18. Private Josiah Martin volunteered in 1780 to serve in the 

company of Captain John Barber. This narrative describes the m2;ements and actions of his unit prior to the battle of the Cowpens. 

He belonged to a company of volunteers, about I.5 or 20 in number 

generally & commanded by Capt Barber. . . . Its movements was 

directed against the Tories of Lincoln & the adjoining county of 

Rutherford. One of its first expeditions was, in early corn planting time 

1780, to the house of one Ambrose Mills in Rutherford County on 

White oak creek of Broad river, who was supposed to be raising a 

regiment of tories. Barber’s company Stayed at Mills’ a week or more, 

lived upon his meat & corn, & ranged in the neighborhood. Mills 

promised to be neutral, & the company returned home. They learned 

that Mills, not regarding his promise raised a regiment of tories, 

received the commission of Colonel from the British, & was taken by 

the Whiggs in battle at Kings Mountain & hung. . . . Afterwards Barber 

being advanced to the rank of Major raised a company which applicant 

joined & marched with it to Morgans camps on the Paeolet river near 

Grendal’s Shoals where we elected Thos. White our captain. We 

remained in Camps [sle] with Morgan until the rains raised the waters 

when the Militia were allowed to cross the Packalet for the purpose of 

procuring provisions. Two days afterwards CoI Howard came along 

by our fires & asked where Major Barber was. We asked what was the 

matter. He said nothing much, but brother Ben was coming. We 

immediately recrossed the Packalet to Morgan’s camp. Early in the 

morning the regulars commenced march, the militia being on horseback started about 12 O’clock & overtook the regulars the evening 

before the battle of the Cowpens. Cot. Washington was there with his 

company of Cavalry which amounted to 72 as counted by the applicant 
110 

the day before the battle. The other officers who commanded in the 

battle besides those already names, he recollects Co1 Pickens Militia & 

Maj McDowell. The battle was fought early in the morning in the open 

woods. At the termination of the battle our Capt. Thos. White was 

missing, but was there the next day when we returned from the pursuit. 

We then followed after Morgan who had gone on with the prisoners. 

After overtaking them Morgan & regulars left us, & we with Co1 

Washington conducted the prisoners to Burk town. . . . 

19. Private Samuel Moore served in the North Carolina militia under 

Major Jaseph McDowell and Captain Whiteside during several campaigns of the Revolution, including the Cowpens. This account 

includes a description of the impassioned plea General Morgan made 

to the men in Moore’s unit to persuade $yrn to remain with the army 

after the expiration of their enlistment. 

. . . his [Moore’s] twelve months had expir’d a short time, say two 

months”’ before the battle at the Cowpens-Morgan was expecting a 

reinforcement of fresh troops, who had not yet arrived, and msisted that 

Capt. Whiteside and others, whose time had expired, should not leave 

him, in his exposed condition, to contend with a handful1 of men against 

a powerful and Victorious enemy. This appeal, which could not be 

heard with indifference, was not without its effect, and captain 

Whiteside and his men remained until after the Battle-and the expected Supply of troops not yef having arrived, this Declarant was not 

discharged but sent with the prisoners to Saiisbury as above stated 

[earlier in his deposition]. Amongst these prisoners there was one John 

Hailey an Englishman who now lives a near neighbor to this Declarant 

in White County Tennessee, but to whom he was not then personally 

known; and for that reasons, although the said Hailey’s son has married 

the stepdaughter of this Declarant, he cannot avail himself of his 

testimony. 

20. Private William Neel was a Virginian who served several years 

in militia units until he volunteered to go south with Captain Patrick 

BuchananF3 

In the year 1780 (as he thinks) he went as a voltmteeI- from Staunton 

in Augusta County Virginia with a company under the command of 

Capt. Patrick Buchanan with two other companies commanded by Tate 

& Cilmore to [?] the state of North Carolina and Joined Cenl Morgan 

at Six Mile Creek (after passing by Hillsborough, Salisbury &) this 

place was called head quarters where Genls Smallwood & Morgan 

-- 
111 

were encamped with their troops. At this place to wit six mile creek the 

army remained encamped for some time Colo. Washington commanded the horse Co10 Howard the regular infantry and captains 

Wallace, Brooks & Driggers [?I belonged to the regular forces. Under 

Genl Morgan he went to the Packolett’s River South Carolina and was 

at the battle of the Cowpens or Tarlton’s defeat when . . . there were 

near 500 prisoners taken. At this battle the South Carolina mounted 

militia under Co10 Brannon [sic] proved very defective in the commencement of the action but were subsequently rallied and assisted to 

complete the victory. After the battle the troops suffered greatly in their 

return to Salisbury N. Carolina with the prisoners from the high waters 

cold rains [?] and want of provisions at Broad River; Catawba there 

were several lives lost from high waters. 

2 1. Private Samuel Park served in 1780 and 1781 in the Sowth 

Carolina militia. This excerpt describes the actions of militia forces 

prior to the battle of the Cowpens. 

. . . he entered the service of the United States as a Volunteer under 

Captain James Dugan in the autumn of 1780 month of October and 

served in the Militia under the following named officers Gini. Andrew 

Pickens (The Militia Genl) Col. Joseph Hays. Major Garret Smith. Capt 

James Dugan & Thomas Stark 1st Lieut. He entered the Service in 

District ninety Six South Carolina (since Newberry County) he commenced his march from this place to Youngs where a body of torys had 

rendezvoused. Genl Pickens Co1 Hays and COP Washington with his 

horse troops met near Pacolet Shoais Joined each other and proceeded 

to Youngs to disperse the Torys aforesaid. From Youngs we who were 

under the command of Genl. Pickens continued to scour the country in 

quest of the Tories for the space of two or three months when we joined 

Genl Morgan on toward Shoals on Pacolet river and marched directly 

on toward the Cowpens which was distant about sixty miles. arrived at 

the cowpens about dusk in the evening and the next morning about 

sunrise was attacked by the troops under the command of Col. Tarleton 

and after a bloody battle in which our troops proved victorious. Cd. 

Tarleton marched f?om the Cowpens in the direction of Winnsborough 

where he Joined Lord Cornwallis. Genl Morgan and GenE. Pickens 

marched in the directgion [sic] of Guilford Court House. He recollects 

Genl Morgan. Co1 Washington with his corps of Draggoons the general 

circumstances of the service are previously [in a deposition of 14 April 

18341 stated. There was a continental regiment under the command of 

Co1 Howard at the Cowpens and also John Thomas a militia Col. and 

Capt Farris (or Harris), 
112 

22. In his third-person account of the campaign, Lieutenant Colonel 

Banastre Tarleton, commander of British forces at the Cowpens, 

describes the planning and movement of his forces prior to the 

battleF5 

General Leslie, with one thousand five hundred and thirty men, was 

greatfy advanced on his march toward the army, when the operations 

of the Americans to the westward of the Broad river laid immediate 

claim to the attention of the British. General Morgan, with the continental light infantry, Colonel Washington’s cavalry, and large detachments af militia, was reported to be advancing to Ninty Six. Although 

the fortifications were in tolerable condition at that place, and sufficiently strong to resist an assault, yet the preservation of the country in 

its neighborhood was considered as great an object for the garrison and 

the loyalists of the district, that Earl Cornwallis dispatched an aid-decamp on the 1 st of January [ 178 I] to order Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton 

over Broad river, with his corps of cavalry and inf”antry, offive hundred 

and fifty men, the first battalion of the 7 1 st, consisting of two hundred, 

and two three-pounders, to counteracthe designs ofGenerai Morgan, 

by protecting the country, and compelling him to repass the Broad 

river. Tarleton received a letter the next day from his lordship, communicating an earnest wish, that the American commander, if within 

his reach, should be “pushed to the utmostC”]; and requiring, likewise, 

his opinion, whether any move of the main army would be advantageous to the service.26 On the receipt of this letter, he directed course 

to the westward, and employed every engine to obtain intelfigence of 

the enemy. He had not proceeded above twenty miles fram Briertey’s 

ferry, before he had undoubted proofs, that the report which occasioned 

the order for the light . . . troops to march was erroneous. The secure 

state of Ninty Six, and the distance of General Morgan, immediately 

prompted Tarleton to halt the troops under his command, as well as to 

allow time for the junction of the baggage of the different corps, which 

had been left on the ground when they first decamped, as to give 

information to Earl Cornwallis of the situation and force of Morgan, 

and to propose operations which required his sanction and concurrence. 

As Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had been entrusted with the outline 

of fhe future campaign he thought it encumbent on him to lay before 

his Lordship, by letter,i7 the prabable accounts of Morgan’s force and 

designs; the necessity of waiting for the baggage of the light troops in 

their present situation, as any &ture delay might prove a great inconvenience to the army; and the plan of operation which struck him as 

equally necessary and advantageous for the King’s service. He repre- 
113 

sented the course to be taken, which fortunately corresponded to the 

scheme of the campaign: He mentioned the mode of proceeding to be 

employed against General Morgan; He proposed the same time, for the 

army and light troops to commence their march: He explained the point 

to be attained by the main body: And he declared, that it should be his 

endeavour to push the enemy into that quarter. 

Earl Cornwallis approving the suggestedoperations, the light trosps 

only waited for their baggage to proceed.28 Two hundred men of the 

7th regimem who were chiefly recruits, and designed for the garrison 

at Ninty Six, and fifty dragoons of the 17th regiment, brought the 

waggons from Brierley’s to camp. On their arrival, Lieutenant-colonel 

Tarleton crossed Indian, and afterwards Dunken creek, though both 

were considerably swelled by a late fall of rain: He hourly received 

accounts of the increase of Morgan’s corps, which induced him to 

request Earl Cornwallis, who was moving on the east of Broad river, 

to give him permission to retain the 7th regiment, that the enemy might 

be sooner pressed over Broad river, or some favourable situ&ion 

obtained, whence great advantage might be derived from additional 

numbers: Having received leave to carry forwards the 7th regiment, he 

continued his course on the 12th to the westward, in order to discover 

the most practicable fords for the passage of the Ennoree and Tyger, 

and that the infantry might avoid the inconveniences thay had undergone in crossing the other waters. An useful expedient was concealed 

under this apparent necessity. In proportion to the approach of the light 

troops to the sources of the rivers, and the progress of the main army 

to King’s mountain, General Morgan’s danger would increase, if he 

remained to the westward of the Broad river. The Ennoree and Tyger 

were passed on the 14th, above the Cherokee road, and Tarleton 

obtained information in the evening that General Morgan guarded all 

the fords upon the Pacolet. About the same time Earl Cornwallis 

advertised Tarleton, 29 that the main army had reached Bull’s run, and 

that General Leslie had surmounted the difficulties which had hitherto 

retarded his march. At this crisis Lieutenant-colonel TarIeton assured 

Earl Cornwallis that he would endeavour to pass the Pacolet, purposely 

to force General Morgan to retreat towards the Broad river, and 

requested his lordship to proceed up the eastern bank without delay, 

because such a movement might perhaps admit of co-operation, and 

would undoubtedly stop the retreat of the Americans. 

On the 15th circumstantial intelligence was procured by Lieutenant 

-colonel Tarleton of the different guards stationed on the Pacalet. A 

march was commenced in the evening toward the iron works, which 

L 
114 

are situated high upon the river; but in the morning the course was 

altered, and the light troops secured a passage within six miles of the 

enemy’s camp. As soon as the corps were assembled beyond the 

Pacolet, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought it advisable to advance 

towards some log houses, formerly constructed by Major Eerguson, 

which lay midway between the British and Americans, and were 

reported to be unoccupied by General Morgan. The necessity and 

utility of such a proceeding appeared so strong, that some dragoons 

and mounted infantry were sent with all possible expedition to secure 

them, lest a similar opinion should strike the American commander, 

which might be productive of great inconvenience. Tarleton intended 

to take post, with his whole corps, behind the log houses, and wait 

for the motions of the enemy; but a patrole discovering that the 

Americans were decamped, the British light troops were dire&ed to 

occupy their position, because it yielded a good post, and afforded 

plenty of provisions, which they had left behind them, half crooked 

[sic], in every part of their encampment. 

Patroles and spies were immediately dispatched to observe the 

Americans: The dragoons were directed to follow the enemy till dark, 

and the other emissaries to continue their inquiries till morning, if some 

material incident did not occur: Early in the night the patroEes reported 

that General Morgan had struck into byways, tending towards 

Thickelle [Thicketty] creek A party of determined loyalists made an 

American colonel prisoner, who had casually left the fine of march, and 

conducted him to the British camp: The examination of the militia 

colonel, and other accounts soon afterwards received, evinced the 

propriety of hanging upon General Morgan’s rear, to impede the 

junction of reinforcements, said to be approaching, and likewise to 

prevent his passing Broad river without the knowledge of the right 

troops, who could perplex his design, and call in the assistance of the 

main army if necessity required. Other reports at midnight of a corps 

of mountaineers being upon the march from Greene river, proved the 

exigency of moving to watch the enemy closely, in order to take 

advantage of any favorable opportunity that might offer. 

23, Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie, an officer of the 7 1 st Highlanders and witness to the battle, published these letters. Obviously hostile 

to Tarletorrb his Ietters react directly to Tarleton”s account of the 

campaign. 
1 15 

Letter IX 

My Dear Sir, 

I now proceed to examine the account which our author has given 

to the world of his defeat at the Cowpens, but previous to this investigation it will be necessary to inquire, what degree of credit is due to 

his description of the advance to the field of battle. The traits of 

self-importance which it contains are too apparento escape the notice 

of any reader; in his reIation of circumstances antecedent to this 

disaster, he says, pages 211, and 212, that [he explained the entire 

campaign to Lord Cornwallis]. How rapid was the advance of this 

gentleman to the summit of military knowledge! 

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton landed in America in the year 1777, 

with the rank of Cornet of Dragoons, and in the beginning of 178 1, we 

find him the primus mobile, the master spring which puts the whole 

mmhinery of the army in motion. It is a received maxim to listen with 

caution to the hero of his own story, but we are naturally prepossessed 

in favor of those who speak modestly of themselves, and honourably 

of others; my present object, however, is to consider bow far our author 

has followed the line which he declares himself to have prescribed. 

He says, page 220, [that the distance from Wyrmesborough to 

King’s Mountain was only sixty-five miles, and laments that Comwallis had not moved there]. 

The imputed censures in the above passage demand a dispassionate 

investigation. Let us admit, that the possession of King’s Mountain was 

a point preconstructed between Earl Cornwallis and Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton; it shall also be granted, that the attainment of that 

eminence by the main body, was a measure well calculated to cut off 

Morgan’s retreat; neither is it meant to be denied that Lieutenant 

Colonel Tarleton used means to overtake the American detachment 

which do him no discredit: but granting all that, it is contended, that 

the rapidity of his movements did not afford Earl Cornwallis time to 

arrive at the point above-mentioned; and it shall be demonstrated, tbat 

an allowance of additional time for that arrival, was entirely in the 

power of our author; and farther, that it would have been attended with 

many conspicuous advantages. 

His mode of reasoning, in the present instance, is invidious in the 

extreme, with respect to the General [Comwalkis], and equally contemptuous of the judgment of every officer in his army: it is a bold 

stroke of imposition even upon the common sense of mankind; because 

it will be readily granted, by every person, that a march of sixty-five 
116 

miles may easily be made out in the course of ten days, he, therefore, 

eagerly takes advantage of that obvious fact, to support his uniform 

drift, of attempting to render the General reprehensible. And as his 

Lordship commenced his march on the 7th or &th, if difficulties and 

obstacles, which our author artfully conceals, had not intervened, he 

might certainly have arrived at the place of destination by the 17th. Rut 

let us take a candid and impartial view of this matter, and it will clearly 

appear, that this censurer of his General’s conduct had no right to 

expect the arrival of the army at King’s Mountain, by the time which 

he specifies. 

We have his own testimony, pages 219 and 248, of his having 

received due information that the army on the 14th [of January] had 

not got farther than Bull Run. This is then the pomt, both with respect 

to time and distance, from which we are to estimate the movements of 

the main body, as well as of the detachment; and hence we are to fix 

the criterion from which we are to derive our judgment of the subsequent conduct of both commanders. 

The distance of Bull Run, where the General was on the 14th, from 

King’s Mountain, is forty-five miles. Our author’s position at the same 

period of time , was not more remote from the spot of his precipitate 

engagement [the battle of the Cowpens] with the enemy than thirty 

miles. This engagement took place on the morning of the 17th, before 

one hour of daylight had passed. Instead therefore of an allowance of 

ten days, for a march of sixty-five miles, we now find, in fact, that the 

General had only two days to perform a march of forty-five miles; and 

it is but bare justice to point out the many obstacles which the army, 

on this occasion, had to surmount. Both the ground through which his 

Lordship had to pass, and the weather, opposed all possibility of a quick 

progress. Every step ofhis march was obstructed by creeks and rivulets, 

all of which were swelled to a prodigious height, and many rendered 

quite unfordable, in consequence of a heavy fall of rain for several 

weeks; to these difficulties were also added, the encumbrance of a train 

of artillery, military stores, baggage, and all the other necessary appointments af an army. On the other hand, our author had only to lead 

on about a thousand light troops, in the best condition, and as little 

encumbered as possible; with these, as I assuredly can attest, by 

swimming horses and felling trees for bridges, means were impractical 

for his Lordship’s army, he came up with the enemy much sooner than 

expected. 

I have now laid before you a simple and fair statement of the 

advance, as well of the army as of the detachment, previous to the 

unfortunate action at Cowpens, and furnished you with a clue by which 
117 

you may unravel the windings and doublings of our author, in anxious 

quest ofmaterials for censure ofa General irreprehensib8fe in every part 

of his conduct, during the whole of this march. 

Our author’s words, page 220, [condemn Lord CornwaJlis for 

failure to keep his forces within supporting distance of each other; 

Mackenzie cites Ferguson’s defeat as a recent example3”]. 

The real province of an historian is to relate facts; by this principle 

he should abide; whenever he deviates from it, and indulges in fanciful 

conjecture concerning probable contingencies, if not totally divested 

of partiality, he is certain of misleading his readers. That our author 

was not aware of the force of this remark, is sufficiently evinced. His 

Lordship’s attention to the situation of the enemy, of the country, and 

of his own detachments, has been, with respect to Ferguson, already 

pointed out. He neither advised the advance ofthat unfortunate partisan 

into the back settlement, nor was even apprised of it; having therefore, 

no concern in the measure, he could not, in any justice, be responsible 

for its consequences, and it is the height of illiberality to throw reproach 

upon him on that account. 

Of all men, Lieutenant Colonel TarIeton shouldbe the last to censure 

Lord Cornwallis for not destroying General Morgan’s force; as it will 

appear that the provision made for that service was perfectly sufficient; 

and though it can by no means be admitted that his Lordship should 

have manoeuvred so as to get General Greene into his power after the 

defeat at Cowpens; it may, however, be affirmed, that if the troops lost 

on that occasion had escaped the misfortune which befel [sic] them, 

and had been combined with the British force at the battle of Guilford, 

the victory must have been much more decisive; and Generai Greene 

would probably have brought off as few of his army, as his predecessor 

in command, General Gates, did at Camden. 

I will hazard an additional reflection: Had Earl Comwalhs not been 

deprived of his light troops, the blockade at York Town had never taken 

place; and the enemies of our country, in consequence of the signal 

successes which attended a Rodney and a Heathfield, would have sued 

for that peace, the terms of which they afterwards prescribed. 

As the effect ofthe defeat at Cowpens was of so serious a nature, it 

becomes necessary to state the purpose for which Lieutenant Colonel 

Tarleton was detached; to enquire how far the force placed under his 

command was adequate to the service it was sent to perform; to 

examine whether proper use was made of the advantages which occurred on the morning of the 17th af January, both before and during 

the action, and to trace to its very source, a fountain that overflowed 
118 i 

with blood, and swept along its torrent destruction to the interests of 

Great Britain. 

I am, etc. 
NOTES 

1. Revolutionary War Pension Applications, 3 1 October X832 - S2187- 

M80411176, hereafter referred to as RWPA. A number of soldiers from the 

battle applied for pensions years later and described the event to prove they had 

participated. Typed copies of all pension applications in this study can be found 

at the Cowpens National Battlefield, courtesy of Professor Lawernce E. Babits 

ofEast Carolina University (Moss, Pa&&, 128; Bailey, Heroes, 116-31). 

2. Major Thomas Young, “Memoir of Major Thomas Young, A Patriot of South 

Carolina,“” The Orion 3 (October-November 1843), n. p. The Cowpens was 

fought on Young’s seventeenth birthday (Bailey, Heroes, 25066). 

3. Robert Kirkwood, The JotimaZ and Order Book af Captain Robert Kirkwood 

of the Delaware Regiment of the Continental Line, ed. Rev. Joseph Brown 

Turner (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910), 5-6. The journal 

entries reproduced here can be found on pages 12- 13. 

4. William Beatty, “Journal of Captain William Beatty 1776-l 78I, of the Maryland Line,“’ Maqlanrd Hista&ad &fagmine, no.3 (1908): 118-19. The original 

manuscript of this journal is held in the files of the Maryland Historical Society 

and is published in F%e Historical Magazine andNbtes and Queries Concerning 

t&e Antiquities, History md Biography of America, vol. 1 (Morrisania, NY: 

Henry B. Dawson, 1867). 

5. Beatty means a Ecu dejoi, in which celebrants discharge their weapons in the 

air to express elation. 

6. RWPA, 20 October 1837, W2933, M804lI 129, Moss, Patif&, 1 IS. 

7. RWPA, 17 September 1833, R9400, M804/2154, Mass, Patriots, 259. 

8. In an earlier deposition of 15 May 1828, Sexton claimed he held a commission 

in the “‘State line” from about a year after he formed his company. 

9. RWPA, 10 December 1780, R10672, M8@4/2408, Moss, Patriots, 29041. 

10. RWPA, 23 Jurre 1835, S3289, M804/814, Moss, Patriots, 80. 

11. Seymour, William. A Journal of the Sauthern Campaign (Wilmington: HistoricaI Society of Delaware, 1896), 10-15. 

12. RWPA, R6965, Moss, Patriots, 18 1. 

13. RWPA, 7 April 1834, S25068, MS041944. See also ‘“Sketch of the Life of 

Lawrence Everheart,” in Thomas Balch, Papers Relating Chie$y to the Mary- 
120 

landLine During the Revolution (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. C. Printers, 

42-52. 

1857), 

14. RWPA, 21 August 1832 ) R4592, M80411186, Moss,Patriots, 131. 

15. RWPA, 2 September 1834, S21122, File M804/650, Moss, Patriots, 63-64. 

16. RWPA, 15 August 1832, W914, M&04/808, Moss, Patriots, 79-80. 

17. RWPA, 16 August 1838, S32243, M&04/966, Moss, Patriots, 98. 

18. RWPA, 3 February 1834, S13026, M804/973, Moss, Pc&io~s, 100. 

19. RWPA, W21237, M804/1149, Moss, Patriots, 122-23. 

20. RWPA, 1 October 1832, W1047, M804/1641, Moss, Patriots, 182-83. 

21. RWPA, 11 October 1832, W2656, M804/1759, Moss, Patriats, 209. 

22. Two months is too long; Morgan was only in South Carolina thirty-two days 

when the battEe occurred. 

23. RWPA, 29 October 1832, S15945, MX04l1804, Moss, Patriots, 217-18. 

24. RWPA, 26 August 1834, S32428, M&04/f 869, MOSS, Patriots, 228-29. 

25. Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns sf 1780 and 1781 in the 

Southern Provinces ojWorth America (Dublin: T. Cadell, 1787),216-20. I have 

replaced Tarleton’s method of documentation with a modem format. 

26. All letters referred to in this passage are reproduced in Appendix D, TarletonCornwallis correspondence. See Letter 4,174. 

27. See Letter 7, Appendix D, 175-76. 

28. See Letter 9, Appendix D, 177. 

29. See Appendix D, Letters 13 and 14,178. 

30. Rode&k Mackenzie, Strictures on Lt. Co1 TarIeron ‘s Histay of the Campaign 

of IT80 and 1781, irz the southern Provinces ofNorth America (London, 1787), 

79-90. I have summarized Mackenzie’s lengthy quotations from Tarleton’s 

work. 

31, Major Patrick Ferguson, sent by Cornwallis on a raiding expedition, was 

defeated at King’s Mountain on 7 October 1780, just three months before the 

engagement at the Cowpens. 
APPENDIX C 

Dmxmeuts Pertaining to the BattIe of The Cowpens, 

17 January 1781 

Contents 

Page 

1. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, Commander of Continental 

Forces at the Cowpens . ..-....... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . v .. . . . . I . . . . . I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~.l .. . . . 122 

2. Colonel Andrew Pickens, Commander of the South Carolina Militia 

at the Cowpens . . . . . e .,...,....... I . . . . . . r ,...~.......... *..* .. . . . . ~...l,..-. . . . . . se ..-l..l....,.. ~. 125 

3. Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard, Commander of the 

Commental Line of Morgan% Force *.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~......... 126 

4. Major Samuel Hammond, South Carolina Militia . . . . -.- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. 

5. Major Joseph Mcjunkin, South Carolina Militia ,..... I . . . . - ..,...... e .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 

6. Major Thomas Young, South Caroiina Militia ..-.... - .,....... I . . . . . ..*........ . . . 135 

7. Captain Henry Connally, North CaroIina Militia .,....,.. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s .. . . . . . . . . . . . I 138 

8. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson, Delaware Regiment, Continental 

Army . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . I ,.........,,.....,...,. t . . . ..I.. e .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s .. ..I.. t ..<.I. -..s............... 139 

9. Sergeant Major William Seymour, Delaware Regiment, 

Continental Army . . . . q .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I ,...... I . . . . . . . . s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . h .. . . . 141 

10. James Kelley, Jd Light Dragoons, Continental Army . . . . . . . ~ ,,........... ~ . . . . . I . . . . . . 142 

I 1. Cornet James Simmons, 3d Light Dragoons, Continental Army.... . . . . . . . . - . . . . 143 

12. Private John Baldwin, North Carolina Militia . . . . . . . --1 . . . . . . . . . *...* ..-..... - 144 

13. Private William Neel, Virginia Militia . . . . . . I..I . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . ..* . . . . . . . . . . - 144 

14. Private John Thomas, Virginia Militia ..,......,. *... . . . . . . .% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . . . . . I . . . . . 145 

15. Private James Collins, South Carolina Militia . ..** .. . . . . s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . 145 

16. Private Henry Wells, Delaware Regiment, Continental Army . . . . . . . . ..~.......... 147 

17. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Commander of British 

Forces at the Cowpens . . . . . . . . . ~ ..,.,. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . b . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. 148 

18. Lieutenant RoderiGk Mackenzie, 71st Highland Infantry Regiment . . . . . . . ..-. 151 

19. Alexander Chesney, Loyalist Guide ..* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . 1 .,....... s .. . . . -..- .. . . . . . . . 154 

121 
122 

1. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan sent this letter to his superior, 

General Nathanael Greene, as his after-action report of the battle. 

Note that Morgan only sent his report two days after the battle.’ 

Camp on Cain Creek on Pedee 

Camp near Cain Creek, Jan 19&i, 178 1 

Dear Sir: The troops I have the honor to command have gained a 

complete victory over the detachment from the British Army commanded by Lieut.431. Tarleton. The action happened in the 17th inst., 

about sunrise, at the Cowpens. It, perhaps, would be well to remark, 

for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this 

corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they 

waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even 

insulted, after he surrendered. Had not the Britons during this contest 

received so many lessons of humanity, I should flatter myself that this 

might teach them a little. But I fear they are incorrigible. 

To give you a just idea of our operations, it will be necessary to 

inform you that, on the 14th inst., having received certain intelligence 

that Lord Cornwallis and Lieut. Cal. Tarleton were both in motion, and 

that their movements clearly indicated the intention of dislodging me, 

I abandoned my encampment at Grindall’s Ford on the Pacolet, and on 

the 16th, in the evening, took possession of a post about seven miles 

from the Cherokee Ford, on the Broad river. My former position 

subjected me at once to the operations of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and 

in case of a defeat my retreat might easily have been cut off. My 

situation at Cowpens enabled me to improve any advantage that I might 

gain and to provide better for my security should I be unfortunate. 

These reasons induced me to take this post, at the risk af its wearing 

the face of a retreat. 

I received regular intelligence of the enemy’s movements from the 

time they were first in motion. On the evening of the 16th inst., they 

took possession of the ground I had removed from in the mar&g, 

distant from the scene of action about twelve miles. An hour before 

daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. 

Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would 

admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to 

receive them. The light infantry~ commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, 

and the Virginia militia under the command of Major Triple& were 

formed on a rising ground, and extended a line in front. The third 

regiment of dragoons, under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at 

- 
123 

such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected to the line of fire 

directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should 

they be broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, 

and Georgia, under the command of the brave and valuable CoI. 

Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the 

North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the 

line, one hundred and fifty yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the 

Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front. Colonels 

Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carohnans, were posted on the right 

of Maj, McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on 

the left of Maj. Cunningham. Cap&. Tate and Buchanan, with the 

Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line. 

The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in 

front of our advanced corps. The first battalion of the 71st regiment 

was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the infantry of 

the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front 

moved two pieces of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his Gavalry, 

was posted in the rear of the line. 

The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy, upon which their whole 

line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling 

fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support. The 

whole of Col. Pickens’ command then kept up a fire by regiments, 

retreating agreeabIy to their orders. When the enemy advanced on our 

line, they received a well-directed and incessant fire. But their numbers 

being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to 

change our position. We retired in good order about fifty paces, formed, 

and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which 

threw them into disorder. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave 

orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such 

address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their 

fieldpieces in our possession. We pushed our advantage so effectually, 

that they never had an opportunity of rallying, had their intentions been 

ever so good, 

Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the TarIeton was 

cutting down our riflemen on the left, pushed forward, and charged 

them with such firmness, that instead of attempting to recover the fate 

of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his 

splendid character, broke and fled. 
124 

The enemy’s whole force were now bent solely in providing for their 

safety in flight-the list of their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will 

inform you with what effect. Tarleton, with the small remains of his 

cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagonhorses, made their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but 

owing to our having taken a wrong trail at first, we could never overtake 

him. 

As I was obliged to move off of the field of action in the morning, 

to secure the prisoners, I cannot be so accurate as to the killed and 

wounded of the enemy as I could wish. From the reports of an officer 

whom I sent to view the ground, there were one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, and ten commissioned officers killed, and 

two hundred rank and file wounded. We now have in our possession 

five hundred and two non-commissioned officers and privates prisoners, independent of the wounded, and the militia are taking up stragglers continually. Twenty-nine commissioned officers have fel into 

our hands. Their rank, &c., you will see by an enclosed list. The officers 

I have paroled: the privates I am conveying by the safest route to 

Salisbury. 

Two standards, two fieldpieces, thirty-five wagons, a travelling 

forge, and all their music are ours. Their baggage, which was immense, 

they have in a great measure destroyed. 

Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I 

have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very 

small. 

From our force being composed of such a variety of corps, a wrong 

judgment may be formed of our numbers. We fought only eight 

hundred men, two-thirds of which were militia. The British, with their 

baggage-guard, were not less than ane thousand one hundred and fifty, 

and these veteran troops. Their own officers confess that they fought 

one thousand and thirty-seven. 

Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be 

attributed, under God, to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our 

troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every 

sentinel in the corps I have the honor to command. In justice to the 

brave and good conduct of the offircers, I have taken the liberty to 

enclose you a list of their names from a conviction that you will be 

pleased to introduce such characters to the world. 

Maj. Giles, my aid, and Capt. Brookes, as brigade-major, deserve 

and have my thanks for their assistance and behavior on this occasion. 
125 

The Baron de Gleabuch, who accompanies Major Giles with these 

dispatches, served with me as a volunteer, and behaved in such a 

manner as to merit your attention. 

I am sir, your obedient servant, 

Daniel Morgan 

Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve 

killed and about sixty wounded. The enemy had ten commissioned 

officers and upwards of one hundred rank and file killed, two hundred 

rank and file wounded, and twenty-seven officers and more than five 

hundred privates which fell into our hands, with two pieces of artillery, 

two standards, eight hundred stand of arms, one travelling-forge, 

thirty-five wagons, ten negroes, and upwards of one hundred dragoon 

horses. 

Although our success was complete, we fought only eight hundred 

men, and were opposed by upwards of one thousand British troops. 

2. Colonel Andrew Pickens was born in 1739 in Pennsylvania and 

emigrated with his family to South Carolina as a boy. When war 

erupted in 1775, Pickens declared for the rebel cause and was present 

at the fighting in 1776 at Ninety Six fort. He commanded the South 

Carolina militia at the Cowpens. He was an extremely popular officer 

with local troops, having recently won a skirmish against British, 

Tories, and Indians at Kettle Creek. He sat at the Constitutional 

Convention and was elected to Congress in 1794. This brief description of the Cowpens is extracted from a letter Pickens wrote in 18 11 

to Henry Lee, who was compiling a history of the campaign in the 

south.:! 

Pendleton District 28th Aug. 18 11 

Dr. Sir, 

Your favor of the 3rd alto I have reed, & in answer to some of your 

interrogatories, I can answer pretty correctly; others being of a more 

delicate nature ought not to be too highly coloured- 

[The next four pages describe Pi&ens’ childhood and his service in 

the war until the Cowpens campaign. Unfortunately, he assumed that 

Lee knew the story of the battle, thus depriving generations of his 

eyewitness account, except for this brief remark.]-You know the 

particulars of the battle of the Cowpens-That part of the 71st which 

was there surrendered to me & I believe every officer of that Regiment 

1 

I 
126 

delivered his sword into my hand-1 see in a publication, the life of 

the late Genl Jackson of Georgia, by a Judge Carlton of Savannah%’ 

that Major McCarthur [sic] of the 7 1st Regiment delivered his sword 

to him-1 think Jackson never told him so-Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword 

to me-Jackson acted with me at that time as Brigade Major-I sent 

back to Genl Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the 

sword-When I met Coln Washington with his cavalry in pursuit of 

Tarleton, I ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly 

as possible with as many mounted militia as he could get-We pursued 

with Coin Washington 22 miles & made prisoners of several of Tarleton’s rear [guard] but could not bring him to action. We did not get 

back to the battle ground till the next morning & overtook Genl Morgan 

with the prisoners, in the night at Gilbert’s Town [near Rutherfordton, 

North Carolina] - Next day Genl Morgan ordered me to take charge 

of the prisoners & take the upper rout, while he with the Infrantry [sic] 

under Coln (John) Howard & Coln Washington’s cavalry took the 

lower rout, to draw Lord Cornwallis after him-We all got safe over 

the Catawba River &joined again at Sherral’s ford (on the Catawba) 

after a grueling march of four days with the prisoners - Most of the 

other scenes of the war at that time & in that quarter are known to you 

therefore it would be superfluous to dwell upon them. e ~ f 

3. Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard commanded the Continentals in Morgan’s army, General Greene’s aide, Alexander Garden, 

described Howard admiringly as having every requisite for the perfection of the military character-patience, judgment, intrepidity, and 

decision.5 Howard wrote these two excerpts some time after the 

battle, to correct inaccurate reports of it and answer questions about 

it. 

A6 

Morgan was careful to address the officers and men, to inspire 

confidence in them. As to what Morgan has since said, “I would not 

have had a swamp in the view of the militia”-I do not think it deserves P 

any consideration. They were words used in conversation, without any 

definite meaning. I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my teft. 

Major M’Dowell was of North Carolina. I do not think there was such 

an eminence; there was a slight rise in the ground; nor was Washington’s horse posted behind it, but on the summit; for I had a full view 

of him as we retreated from our first position. 
127 

Seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to 

change the front of Wallace’s company, (Virginia regulars;) in doing 

it, some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole of the 

company commenced a retreat. The officers along the line seeing this, 

and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men 

about, and moved off. Morgan, who had m&y been with the militia, 

quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I 

soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the 

men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me 

to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington’s harse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for 

us to halt and face about. In a minute we had a perfect line. 

The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very 

destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks. While in this conf?,&on, Iordered 

a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity. 

As the line approached, Iobserved their artillery a short distance in 

frant, and called to CaptainEwing, who was near me, to take it. Captain 

Anderson (now General Anderson, of Montgomery county, Maryland) 

hearing the order, also pushed for the same object, and both being 

em&us for the prize, kept pace until near the first piece, when 

Anderson, by placing the end of his espontoon forward into the ground, 

made a long leap which brought him upon the gun, and gave him the 

honour of the prize. 

My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men 

with an artillery man, who appeared to make it a point of honour not 

to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his obstinacy, would 

have bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them 

to spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match. 

In the pursuit, I was led towards the right, in among the 71st, who 

were broken inta squads, and as I called to them to surrender, they laid 

down their arms, and the offtcers delivered up their swords. Captain 

Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers, gave me his sword, and stood by 

me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and 

he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him 

what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give 

no’quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming 

up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put 

him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years 

afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life. 
128 

Their artillery was not thrown into &rear, but was advanced a little 

at the head of the line, and was taken as I have mentioned. Washington 

did not encounfer the artillery. He moved to the left from our rear, to 

attack Tarleton’s horse, and never lost sight of them untit they abandoned the ground. Major M’Arthur very freely entered into conversation, and said that he was an officer before Tarleton was born; that the 

best troops in the service were put under ““that boy”” to be sacrzpced; 

that he hadjlattered himselfthe event would have been d~@erent, ifhis 

advice had been taken, which was to charge. with all the horse, at the 

moment we were retreating. 

B” 

The 1st question you propose is 

When my regiment fell back at the battle of the Cowpens, was it by 

my order for the purpose of extricating my flanks or was it occasioned 

by the fire of the enemy? 

A, It was not occasioned by the fire of the enemy. The militia were 

formed in front of me, and the moment the british militia [the Legion] 

formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate, 

and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially 

the riflemen’ to fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and 

part of them fell into the rear of my right flank where they afterwards 

renewed the action. The british advanced until my regiment commence 

firing. I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 

800, that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my 

right [word “‘flank” crossed out], where they were pressing forward to 

gain my flank.-To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my 

right to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank. 

Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded 

from any other cause, in attempting this movement same disorder 

ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished 

them. The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced 

about and retreated but in perfect order. At this moment Genl. Morgan 

rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washington’s horse about 100 

yards, and there form.-This retreat was accidental but was very 

fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy. As soon as 

the word was given to halt and face about the line was perfectly formed 

in a moment. The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting 

the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards 

of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave 

them an unexpected and deadly fire. Observing that this fire occasioned 

some disorder in them I ordered a charge which was executed so 
129 

promptly that they never recovered. When I came up to the two pieces 

of artillery which we took, I saw some of my men going to bayonet the 

man who had the match. He refused to surrender it, and I believe he 

would have suffered himself to have been bayoneted, if I Rad not 

rescued him rather than give up his match. 

I can account for the retreat but I suppose it would not be necessary 

to introduce the matter into your history, and as it may involve the 

character of an officer I wish it to be forgotten; however, I will state 

the fact and you may make what use you please of it-This company 

on my right were Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some 

time previous had formed a eonnexion with a vile woman of the camp, 

and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had 

this woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He 

seemed to have lost all sense of the character of an officer. He was in 

this state of mind at the time of the action. As well as I can recollect 

Morgan afterwards reprimanded him severely & forced him to break 

off the connexion. As soon as we joined the army he was ordered to 

join his regiment and at G&ford was killed. It was generally said by 

the officers that he distinguished himself in that action as if determined 

to retrieve his character. 

Question 2nd. Was the fire which I gave, after this circumstance & 

before I charged bayonet, before or after the charge bade by Colo. 

Washington, & was his charge mainly on the british cavalry, or had he 

reached the infantry before they were thrown into disorder? 

An. The militia all rode to the ground and their horses were tied in 

the woods in the rear of my left flank. about the time of our retreat, a 

large body of british cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued 

the flying militia to their horses. Washington observing this charged 

them. As well as I can recollect this charge was made at the same 

moment that I charged the infantry, for as soon as we got among the 

enemy & were making prisoners I observed the enemy’s cavalry 

retreating the way tRe[y] had advanced, by our left fIank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance-You 

will observe by this statement that Washingten’s charge had no connexion with mine as his movement was to the rear in a quite different 

direction. 

I will take this opportunity of mentioning a fact which you may 

notice or not. Washington had given positive orders to his men to fire 

a pistol. In the pursuit he had got a head of his men, perhaps 30 yards. 

Three of tRe british officers observing this wheeled about and made a 

charge at him. The officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him 
when a Sargent [sic] came up and made a stroke at this officer which 

disabled his arm.-The officer on the left [I‘was preparing” is crossed 

out] at the same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when 

a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength to wield a sword, drew his 

pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third 

person, wha Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him 

which he parryed. This person then retreated 19 or 12 steps and 

wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington’s horse. 

In Tarleton’s account of this action it is stated that a party of 

Americans had pushed down the road some distance and had taken the 

baggage and that a part of Tarletons horse charged them & retook the 

baggage. We had a German a volunteer who had been in the Hussars 

in Europe. He called himself the Baron Glaubeck but turned out to be 

an imposter-He met with some five or six mihtia men well mounted 

had pushed down the road and got a head of Tarletons horse and had 

taken the baggage which he was obliged to leave and the baggage was 

destroyed by this body of Tarleton’s horse. [Howard’s marginal note 

here says: “Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged Washington’s horse and drove them back to the . . . This is not correct. This 

affair checked Washington’s pursuit, but he did not fall back.“] 

Question 3rd At Guilford did Co10 Gunby command the same 

regiment which was at the Cawpens & was you with him or on the 

flanks with Washington or Lee? 

Answer. The Maryland line consisted of 7 regiments about half full 

when we marched into Carolina. After the actions of the 16th and 18th 

of August 1’780 what men we had left were formed into two regiments 

and the supernumerary officers sent home.-The Marylandtroops with 

me at the Cowpens were picked out of the two regiments. I had also a 

company of Virginians under Cant Wallace, as before stated, and two 

companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt 

Tripolet [sic] from Fauguhar, the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge 

or one of the western Counties. Tate joined us again afterwards and 

was with Lee at Guilford, where he was wounded and I believe died 

of his wounds. 

When we joined Genl. Greene’s army at Guilford before the retreat 

into Virginia, my light infantry were augmented, but before the action 

at Guilford we were ordered to join our respective regiments, and then 

I acted as Lt. Cola. under Gunby. 

In the book I have mentioned there is a correct plan of the ground 

and different positions of the troops in the action at Guiiford. If I 
131 

thought you had this book I would refer to it and could describe the 

situation in a few words. 

There was a new regiment (Regiment Extraordinary) sent out from 

Maryland which had been raised by the state, and it was thought that 

the offricers had been more favored than the officers of the old regiments. It joined us a few days before the action and there were such 

jealousies among the officers that Genl Greene sent all the new officers 

home, and made a new arrangement of the two regiments. This was at 

the time my light infantry joined their regiments. The most of the new 

men were thrown into the second regiment which was very deficient 

of officers. 

4. Major Samuel Hammond commanded the left flank of the militia 

line at the Cowpens. A native of Virginia, Hammond moved with his 

father’s family to South Carolina in 1779. As he had military experience, he was commissioned and fought in a number of skirmishes 

prior to joining Morgan. His account is important as the only recreation of Morgan’s operations order for the Cowpens. After the battle, 

Hammond remained in South Carolina under the command of Colonel Pickens.g 

On the evening of the 16th of January 1781, General Morgan 

encamped near a place called the Cowpens. The author of these 

remarks, being then out with a detachment, did not join the camp until 

8 o’clock in the evening, when he was informed by the general, that 

he intended to give the enemy battle the next morning, if he should 

press hard upon him. The ground on which the troops were placed, was 

a small ridge, crossing the road at nearly right angles. A similar ridge, 

nearly parallel with this, lay between three hundred and five hundred 

yards in his rear. The valley between was made by a gentle slope; it 

was, of Gou.rse, brought within range of the eye; passing from one to 

the other ridge, the land was thickly covered with red oak and hickory 

with little if any underbrush. The valleys extending to the right of the 

general’s camp, terminated in a small glade or savanna. 

Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds 

of bails prepared and ready for use, before they retired to rest. A general 

order, forming the disposition ofthe troops, in case of coming to action, 

had also been prepared, and was read to Colonels Pickens and McCall, 

Major Jackson and the author of these notes, in the course of the 

evening. No copy was ever afforded to either of these authors, before 

the battle, and the author of these notes has never since seen them, but 

in the course of the same evening he made the following notes upon 
132 

them, then fresh in his memory, and which was shown to Major Jackson 

and Colonel McCalE, and approved by them as correct as far as they 

went. To show those concerned what would be their stations, the author 

drew out a rough sketch of the position set forth in the general order, 

and after the action, the rough sketch of the enemy3 position was 

added. No perfect or accurate sketch of the enemy’s position was ever 

drawn: this was only taken by the eye, not with mathematical instruments; and yet no opportunity has been afforded of correcting it. 

Nevertheless, this gives you a still better idea of the affair, than could 

be obtained without it. 

The order commenced in substance thus: 

As the enemy seems resolved to force us into action, the numbers 

and spirit of this little band of patriot soldiers seems to justify the 

general in the belief that they may be met with confidence, defeated 

and driven back. To prepare for which, the following order will be 

observed: 

The front line will be composed of that part of CoEoneE McCall’s 

regiment of South-Carolina State troops, who have not yet been 

equipped as dragoons, under the command of Major Hammond; the 

Georgia volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, 

and the North Carolina volunteers, under the command of Major 

McDowal. Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right, Major 

McDowal on the left of the line, southwest of the road, upon the rising 

ground beyond the valley in front, three hundred to three hundred and 

fifty yards in rear of this cantonment or camp, with the left resting upon 

the road. Major Hammond will take post on the left of the road, in line 

with Colonel Cunningham; supported on the left by Captain Donoly, 

of the Georgia refugees. 

The second line will be composed of the continental regiment of 

Maryland troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard; on the 

left of the second line, falling baGk one hundred yards in its rear, a 

continuation of the second line, or third line, will be formed, advancing 

its left wing towards the enemy, so as to bring it nearly parallel with 

the left of the continental troops, upon the second line. The Virginia 

militia, commanded by Major Triplet, with the South-Carolina militia, 

commandedby Captain Beaty, will form to the right of the second line; 

the left nearly opposite to the right of the second line, one hundred 

yards in its rear; the right extending towards the enemy, so as to be 

opposite to or parallel with the second line. The main guard will hold 

its present position, and be commanded as at present by Colonel 

Washington’s cavalry, with such of Colonel McCall3 regiment of new 
133 

raised South-Carolina State troops, as have been equipped for dragoons, will be a reserve, and form in the rear of Colonel Pickens, 

beyond the ridge, one or two hundred yards, and nearly opposite the 

main guard, north of the road. 

This is not meant as a correct report of the general order, but as 

nearly so as the memory, influenced by such events, could be expected 

to retain. The sketch annexed will give you a t%rther ilustration of the 

important event. 

5. Major Joseph McJunkin wrote this, advertised as a memoir, 

although it seems more to be a fanciful history of the campaign. Major 

McJunkin served as an officer in Pickens’ militia. A Pennsylvanian 

by birth, he moved with his family to South Carolina in 1755.10 

When Morgan was apprised of Tarleton’s approach he fell back a 

day% march from his position on the Pacolet. He perhaps doubted the 

propriety of giving battle at all. His force was considerably inferior to 

that arrayed against him. The officers and men comprising the entire 

bady of his militia were almost wholly unknown to him except by 

report. He could not know what confidence to place in their skill and 

courage. A retrograde movement was necessary to enable him to call 

in scattered detachments. On the night of Jan. 16 the last ofthese joined 

him some time after dark. He now bad his entire force and the question 

must be decided, ““Shall we tight or fly?” The South Carolina Militia 

demanded a Eight. Their general could, from past experience and 

common fame, command their courage in their present position, but 

let them cross Broad River and he would not answer for their conduct. 

Here the final decision is to risk battle. The Cols. Brandon and 

Roebuck, with some others, had the special. charge ofwatching Tarleton’s movements from the time he reached the Valley of the Pacolet. 

They sat on their horses as he approached and passed that stream and 

counted his men and sent their report to headquarters. They watched 

his camp on the night of the 16th until he began his march to give battle. 

Morgan appears to have had the most exact information of everything 

necessary. 

On the morning of the 17th he had his men called up. He addressed 

them in a strain well adapted to enflame their courage, Major Jackson 

of Georgia also spoke to the militia. The lines formed and the plan of 

battle disclosed. Three lines of infantry were drawn across the plain. 

First the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to 

where the final issue is expected. In front of these the main body of 

militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 1.50 yards. 
134 

Stilf in front of these at a distance of 150 yards a corps of picked 

riflemen is scattered in loose order along the whole front. 

The guns of the vedettes [a screen of mounted troops], led by Capt. 

Inman, announce the approach of the foe, and soon the red coats stream 

before the eyes of the militia. A column marches up in front of 

Brandon’s men led by a gayly dressed officer on horseback. The word 

passes along the line, ‘“Who can bring him down?” John Savage looked 

Col. Farr full in the face and read yes in his eye. He darted a few paces 

in front, laid his rifle against a sapling, a blue gas streamed above his 

head, the sharp crack of a rifle broke the solemn stillness of the 

occasion and a horse without a rider wheeled from the front of the 

advancing column. In a few moments the fire is general. The sharpshooters fall behind Pickens and presently his line yields. Then there 

is a charge of the dragoons even past the line of regulars after the 

retreating militia. Numbers are cut down. 

Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His 

gun was empty, but with it he parries their blows and dodges round a 

tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on Hughes began 

John Savage was priming his rifle. Just as they pass the tree to strike 

Hughes he levels his gun and ane of the dragoons tumbles from his 

horse pierced with a bullet. The next moment the rifle carried by 

Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out af his hands and inflicts 

such a blow upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires 

hanging by the mane of his horse. 

Soon, however, the militia are relieved from the British dragoons 

by a charge of the American light horse. The British cavalry are borne 

from the field. Meanwhile the British infantry and the regulars under 

Col. Howard are hotly engaged; the fight becomes desperate. Howard 

orders a charge, the militia comes back, and fall in right and left. The 

British line is broken, some begin to call for quarters, the voice of 

Howard is heard amid the rush of men and cfangor of steel: “Throw 

down your arms and you shall have good quarters.” 

One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. 

Anather commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his 

cavalry and they too ground their arms. In the conclusion of this foray 

you might have seen Major Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken 

ranks of the 7 1 st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while 

they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Cal. Howard 

interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes. 

At the end of the strife you might have seen the same young man, Major 

McArthur,’ l the commandant of the British infantry, to Gen. Morgan 
135 

and receiving the General’s thanks for the gallantry displayed on the 

occasion. You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, 

well clad soldiers, the flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of 

militia clad in hunting shirts “‘blacked, smoked and greasy.” 

The plain was strewn with the dead and dying. The scattered 

fragments of the British Army were hurrying from the scene of carnage. Washington hastily collected his cavalry and dashed off in pursuit 

of Tarleton. He was preceded, however, by a party that started with a 

view of taking possession of the baggage wagons of the enemy. The 

victory was complete. 

The militia engaged in this battle belonged to three States, the two 

Carolinas and Georgia. Two companies from Virginia were present, 

but were in line with the Maryland Regiment under Howard. The North 

Carolina militia were led by Major McDowell. The Georgia militia 

were under the immediate command of Majors Cunningham and 

Jackson; the Captains were Samuel Hammond, George Walton, and 

Joshua Inman. Major Jackson also acted as Brigade Major to all the 

militia present. The South Carolina militia were directed by Gen. 

Pickens. The Colonels were John Thomas, Thomas Brandon, Glenn 

Anderson, and McCall; the Lieutenant Colonels, William Fan: and 

Benjamin Roebuck; the Majors, Henry White and Joseph M&u∈ 

Captains, John Alexander, Collins, Elder, Crawford, with Lieuts. 

Thomas Moore and Hugh Means. . . 

On the night before the battle forty-five militia soldiers were enrolled as dragoons and placed under the command of Cal. McCali and 

annexed to Washington’s cavalry.12 These officers and men, in the 

respective commands, were far from being tyros in the art of war. They 

were marksmen and had generally been in the war from the commencement. In regard to the conduct of Major McJunkin on this testimony 

of those who acted under him and with him is to this effect: That he 

exhibited undaunted courage in action and contributed largely in 

bringing the militia in order to the final onset by which the battle so 

honorably terminated. 

6. Major Thomas Young, an officer of the South Carolina Militia who 

had fought at King’s Mountain, here describes his observations of the 

Battle of the Cowpen~.~~ He appears to have served in McCall’s 

cavalry. 

Our pickets were stationed three miles in advance. Samuel 

Clowney was one of the picket guards, and I often heard him afterwards 

laugh at his narrow escape. Three of Washington’s dragoons were out 
on a scout, when they came almost in contact with the advanced gnard 

of the British army; they wheeled, and were pursued almost into camp, 

Two got in safely; one poor fellow, whose horse fell down, was taken 

prisoner. It was abaut day that the pickets were driven in. 

The morning of the 17th af January, 17&I, was bitterly cold. We 

were formed in order of battle, and the men were slapping their hands 

together to keep warm-an exertion not long necessary. 

The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and 

very little under growth in front or near us. The regulars, under tke 

command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed in two ranks, 

their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The 

militia were formed on the left of the regulars, under the command of 

Col. Pickens, their left flank resting near the head of the ravine on the 

left. The cavalry formed in rear of the centre, or rather in rear of the 

left wing of the regulars. About sun-rise, the British line advanced at 

a sort of trot, witk a loud halloo. It was the most beautiful line I ever 

saw. When they shouted, Iheard Morgan say, “They gave us the British 

halloo, boys, give them tke Indian halloo, by CL”; and he galloped 

along the lines, cheering the men, and telling them not to fire until we 

could see the whites of their eyes. Every officer was crying don’t fire! 

for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it. 

I should have said the British line advanced under cover of their 

artillery; for it opened so fiercely upon the centre, that Cal Washington 

moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right wing. 

The militia fired first. It was for a time, pop-pop-r-pop-and then 

a whole volley; but when the regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet 

of flame from right to left. Oh! it was beautiful! I have heard old Cal. 

Fair [Lieutenant Colonel William Farr] say often, that he believed John 

Savage fired the first gun in this battle. He was riding to and fro, along 

the lines, when he saw Savage fix his eye upon a British officer; he 

stepped out of the ranks, raised his gun-fired, and he saw the officer 

fall. 

After tke first fire, the militia retreated, and the cavalry covered their 

retreat. They were again formed and renewed the attack, and we retired 

to tke rear. They fought for some time, and retreated again-and then 

formed a second line. In this I can hardly be mistaken, for I recollect 

well that the cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army 

and the enemy. I have understood that one of the retreats was ordered 

by mistake by one of Morgan’s officers. How true this is I cannot say. 
137 

After the second forming, the fight became general and unintermitting. In the hottest of it, I saw Cal. Brandon coming at f&l1 speed to the 

rear, and waving his sword to Cal. Washington In a moment the 

command to charge was given, and I soon found that the British cavalry 

had charged the American right. We made a most furious charge, and 

cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled and charged them in the 

rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever 

rode; it was the quickest swap I ever made in my life! 

At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and 

making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in the rear of the British 

line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col. Howard 

gave the word “charge bayonets!” and the day was ours. The British 

broke, and throwing down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the 

wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running! 

After this Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an 

excursion to capture some of the baggage. We went about twelve miles, 

and captured two British soldiers, two negraes, and two horses laden 

with portmanteaus. One of the portmanteaus belonged to a paymaster 

in the British service, and contained gold. Jolly insisted upon my 

returning with the prize to camp, while he pursued a little farther. I did 

so. Jolly’s party dashed onward, and soon captured an armorer3 

wagon, with which they became so much engaged that they forgot all 

about me. I rode along for some miles at my leisure, on my fine gray 

charger, talking to my prisoners, when, a11 at once I saw coming in 

advance, a party, which I soon discovered to be British. I knew it was 

no time to consider now; so I wheeled, put spurs to my horse, and made 

down the road in hopes of meeting Jolly and his party% My horse was 

stiff, however, from the severe exercise E had given him that morning, 

and I soon found that they were gaining upon me. I wheeled abruptly 

to the right into a cross road, but a party of three or four dashed through 

the woods and intercepted me. It was now a plain case, and I could no 

longer hope to engage one at a time. My pistol was empty? so I drew 

my sword and made battle. I never fought so hard in my life. I knew it 

was death any how and 1 resolved to sell my life as dearly as possible. 

In a few minutes one finger on my left hand was split open; then 1 

received a cut on my sword arm by a parry which disabled it. In the 

next instant a cut from a sabre across my forehead (me scar from which 

I shall carry to my grave,) the skin slipped down over my eyes, and the 

blood blinded me so that I could see nothing. Then came a thrust in the 

right shoulder blade, then a cut upon the left shoulder, and a last cut 

(which you can feel for yourself) on the back of my head-and I fell 
138 

upon my horse’s neck. They took me down, bound up my wounds, and 

placed me again on my horse a prisoner of war. 

When they joined the party in the main road, their were two tories 

who knew me very well-Littlefield and Kelly. LittlefieEd cocked his 

gun, and swore he would kill me. In a moment nearly twenty British 

soldiers drew their swords, and cursing him for a d-d coward, for 

wanting to kill aboy without arms and aprisonerran him off. LittIefield 

did not like me, and for a very good reason. While we were at Grindall 

Shoals with Morgan, he once caught me out, and tied to take my gun 

away from me. I knocked him down with it, and as he rose I clicked it, 

and told him if he didn’t run I’d blow him through. He did not long 

hesitate which of the two to choose. 

I asked Kelly not to tell the British who I was, and I do not think the 

fellow did. Col. Tarlton sent for me, and I rode by his side for several 

miles. He was a very fine looking Mann, with rather a proud bearing, 

but very gentlemanly in his manners. He asked me a great many 

questions, and I told him one lie, which I have often thought of since. 

In reply to his querry whether Morgan was reinforced before the battle? 

I told him “he was not, but that he expected a reinforcement every 

minute.” “He asked me how many dragoons Washington had.” I replied 

that “he had seventy, and two volunteer companies of mounted militia-but you know they won’t fight.” ““By G-d!‘” he quickly replied, 

“they did to-day, though!” 

7. Captain Henry Connally volunteered at the request of the governor 

ofNorth Carolina to command a combined company of draftees and 

men who had enlisted for eighteen months or who had joined for the 

duration. This excerpt describes his part of the action and the weather 

during the battle. I4 

I . . in December just before Christmas Gen Nathanil [sic] Greene 

from the north took command of us all. This was in 1780. We all by 

his proclamation and the orders of our Governor was placed under his 

command and assembled at Charlotte, from then this applicant was 

placed under Co1 Washington and marched to S CaroIina to Augusta 

and Ninety Six, after marching in a southern direction for several days 

news came that Tarleton was after us. We were all now under Gen. 

Morgan, and a terrible conflict ensued at the Cowpens between Tarletons men and the army under Gen Morgan, at the “Cow Pens” Here the 

Americans were victorious and took a great many military stores & 

cannons baggage and six or seven hundred british and tory prisoners 

This was in January, 178 1 it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey 
139 

during the battle the company which belonged to this applicant was 

placed under a Co1 Howard on the extreme right flank of the division 

and this applicant commanded a company in the action our company 

when just about to catch up our horses which was tied about four 

hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle fell upon us with great 

fury but we was fortunately relieved by Washingtons legion that 

hastened to our assistance after the engagement we all formed a 

junction with Gen. Greene. 

8. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson compiled a journal of his service in 

the Delaware Regiment f?om 1780 to 1782. This extract describes the 

Cowpens campaign and battle. In many instances, the entries match 

verbatim those of Captain Kirkwood, of the same regiment, as if, 

perhaps, they had been dictated. The important difference, of course, 

is in his detailed description of the action of 17 January ET8 1 =I5 

Nov 4, This day Genl Morgans Light Infantry With Co1 Washington’s 

Cavalry March’d down toward Rudgeley’s Within 13 miles 

of Camden to reconiter [sicj the Enemy and return’d to camp 

On the 9th Inst March “d 100 

“22d This day the Maryland Division arrived here, 

“27 The army under the Comd of Gem Gates march’d to Charlotte 

to Huts, 

“28 Received Orders to hold ourselves in readyness to March at a 

moments warning Accordingly left Our tents Standing with all 

our Sick behind and March’d to 12 Mile Creek This creek is 

the line between North and South Carolina from thence We 

march’d to the Hanging Rock, Where the Infantry remain’d 

Whilst Co1 Washington With his Cavalry Went down to Col. 

Rudgely’s and With the deception of a Pine top took the 

Garrison Consisting of One Coln, One Major, three Captains, 

four Lieuts, One hundred rank and file, From thence Return’d 

to Camp with the Prisoners and arrived On the 2nd Decbr (100 

miles) 

Dee 6th Gem. Greene took Command of the Southern army in the rom 

of Genl Gates Who was recafl’d. 

“17 march’d to Charlotte (15 miles) 

‘“21st Was join’d With two Compys from the Maryland line Commanded by Capts Dobson, & Anderson and March’d to Biggers Ferry on the Catawba river. (15 miles) 
140 

Crossed the River and march”d. (5 miles) 

March’d (16 miles) 

March’d (13 miles) 

March’d (8 miles) 

Jany 1781 

March’d (10 miles) 

March’d to the Cowpens (12 miles) 

7th. Before day Reced Information that Co1 TarIton Was Within 

Five Miles of us With a Strong Body of Horse and Infantry 

Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle by 

day Light they Hove in Sight Halted and Form’d the Line in 

Full View as We had no artillery to annoy them and the Genl 

not thinking it prudent to advance from the ground We had 

form’d, We look’d at each other for a Considerable time, about 

Sunrise they began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces 

of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly On our riflemen that Was posted in front Who Fought Well Disputing the 

ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree 

to another at last being forst [sic] to give ground they fell back 

in Our rear the Enemy Seeing us Standing in Such good Order 

Halted for Some time to dress their line Which Outflanked 

ours Considerably The [sic] then advanced On boldly under 

a Very heavy fire until the got Within a few yards of us but 

their line Was So much longer than ours the turn’d our Flanks 

Which Caused us to fall back Some Disstance The Enemy 

thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us 

With their bayonets but in no Order We let them Come Within 

ten Or fifteen yards of us then give them a full Volley and at 

the Same time Charged them home. They not expecting any 

Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in 

amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give 

ground and at last to take to the flight But We followed them 

up so Close that they never Could get in Order again until1 We 

Killed and took the ,Whole of the Infantry Prisoners, At the 

Same time that We Charged, Co1 Washington Charged the 

horse Which Soon gave Way We followed them ten miles but 

not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the 

field of Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & 

Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work 
141 

March this day 20 

Jan 18, March’d off With the prisoners for the Catawba River arrived 

at it On the 23d Inst being, (100 miles) 

Febry 1st The Enemy under the Comd of Earl Cornwallis 

Crossed the River below Where Genl Davidson With Some 

of the South Carolina Militia Was posted, Killed the Genl and 

Some of the men Which Caused us to March for Salisbury for 

fear that the [sic] Would get between us and our army Which 

Was on the Way for Guilford We arrived at Cal Locks before 

day every step up to our Knees in Mud it rained On us all the 

Way (30 miles) 

9. Sergeant Major William Seymour served in the southern campaign 

and at the battle of the Cowpens. The following is excerpted from his 

journal. l6 

[Preceding this account the author described the campaign leading 

to the battle. That account is reproduced in Appendix B] Next day 

being the seventeenth January, we received intelligence a while before 

day, that Colonel Tarleton was advancing in our rear in order to give 

us battle, upon which we were drawn up in order of battle, the men 

seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight. The militia 

were dismounted and were drawn up in front of the standing troops on 

the right and left banks, being advanced about two hundred yards. By 

this time the enemy advanced and attacked the militia in front, which 

they stood very well for some time till being overpowered by the 

superior number af enemy they retreated, but in very good order, not 

seeming to be the least bit confused. By this t&e the enemy advanced 

and attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms, where 

meeting with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our 

right flank, to prevent which Captain Kirkwood with his company 

wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they 

were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that 

they soon gave way. Our left flank advanced at the same time and 

repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us 

entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of 

twelve miles, insomuch that all their infantry was killed, wounded, and 

taken prisoners. This action commenced about seven o’clock in the 

morning and continued till late in the afternoon. 

In the action were killed of the enemy one hundred and ninty men, 

wounded one hundred and eighty, and taken prisoners one Major, 

thirteen Captains, fourteen L,ieutenants, and nine Ensigns, and five 
142 

hundred and fifty private men, with two field pieces and four standards 

of colours. Their heavy baggage would have shared the same fate, if 

Tarleton, who retreated with his cavalry, had not set fire to it, burning 

up twenty-six waggons. This victory on our side can be attributed to 

nothing else but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in 

the field of their best troops, and we not eight hundred of standing 

troops and militia. 

The troops against us were the 7th or Royal English Fusileers, the 

First Battalion of the 7lst, and the British Legion, horse and foot. 

The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action 

is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times 

of the action rode from right to left of the line encouraging the men; 

and indeed all the officers and men behaved with uncommon and 

undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave captain Kirkwood 

and his company, who did that day wonders, rushing on the enemy 

without either dread or fear, and being instrumental in taking a great 

number of prisoners. 

Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one 

Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were 

of Captain Kirkwood’s Company of the Delaware Regiment. 

10. James Kelley, who served with Washington’s cavalry, rendered 

this account of the battle when he applied for veteran’s benefits in 

1835.“7 

. . . he returned to Camden county - in a very shart time he vofunteerd 

under Col. Washington. they did not rendizvous [sic] at any particular 

place-there was but 2 or 3 volunteerd when he did-Washington had 

about 300 horse at that time-Declarant was a horseman 6% found his 

own horse he cannot recollect the name of his captains there was with 

Washington Co1 Howard & Gal Pickens-all the men he thinks 

amounted to 300. We marched to a garrison called Rugeleys occupied 

by tories and some British-we got a pine log & Hacked it to look as 

much like a cannon as possible & put it on an old pair of Waggon 

wheels & run it up near the fort & sent in a Flag ,& Co1 Rugeley (a 

Tory) surrendered the garrison. [?] marched on to the [sic] join Genl. 

Morgan & did join him at the place where the battle of the Cowpens 

was fought & but a few days before said battle-Declarant fought 

under Co1 Washington in said battle The battle ground was part in the 

woods & part in an old field-the militia were in front 8.z the regulars 

in the rear Washington and his men on the wing-They barely got 

formed before Tarlton made his charge-the militia soon run--the 
143 

British began to cut down the militia very fast & Washington & 

Howards men charged [?] & with the regulars of Morgan soon routed 

the British - Cal. Washington & two or three men pursued T&ton 18 

or 15 miles & he [Kelley] understood that during this chase Washington 

would have been killed by one of the British but that one of Washington’s men shot the fellows arm off & Washington made a hack at 

Tarlton & disabled Tarltons fingers & glanced his head with his sword 

and took a good many prisoners. Morgan took the prisoners on towards 

virginia. , . . 

11. Cornet James Simmons, 3d Dragoons, made this statement in 

support of Sergeant Lawrence Everhard% petition for a pension in 

1803. Apparently his statement was taken by a clerk who experienced 

difficulty maintaining the first person; both “I” and “you”’ refer to 

Simmons. l8 

That about the dawn of day on the 17th of January 1781, you 

selected Sergeant Everhart from your Regiment and ten men, wham 

you sent to reconnoitre Lt. Colonel TarIetons Army. The advanced 

guard of this army were mounted as we understood, and believed, on 

some of the fleetest race horses which he had impressed from their 

owners in this Cauntry, and which enabled them to take Serjeant 

Everhart and one of the men-but the other ten men returned, and gave 

you information of the approach of the enemy. 

Immediately after the Battle of the Cowpens commenced, you wilI 

recollect that your first charge was made on the enemy’s Cavalry, (who 

were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart Action, you 

instantly defeated, leaving in the course of ten minutes 18 of their brave 

17th Dragoons dead on the spot, and whom you will recollect were 

deserted by Colo. Tarletan’s Legeonary Cavalry. 

The former wore a uniform of red and buff, with Sheep Skin, on 

their caps; the latter wore a Uniform of Green with black facings. In 

pursuit of their Cavalry you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners, but the Drivers of the Horses who were 

Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until 

after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be 

Shot; after securing these fieldpeices [sic], your third Charge was made 

on the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary [sic] 

Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the 

Command of Major McArthur,) and who, under the Operation of a 

Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their 

Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered; immediately 
144 

after Securing the Prisoners your 4th Charge was in pursuit of their 

Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, 

Shot him with a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot 

remember particularly which) being then intermixed with the enemy, 

Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just 

Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, 

and his horse as well as I can recollect, was given to Everhart, whom 

I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons. It was at this period after the 

Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men, Lt Bell having 

previously taken off with him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly 

a fourth part of your Regt. The enemy were obliged to retreat, and were 

pursued by you 22 Miles taking several prisoners, and wounded. To 

the best of my recollection Sergeant Everhart was so disabled by his 

wound, that he was discharged from you, and he retired from the Army. 

12. Private John Baldwin of Burke County, North Carolina, fy;ght 

the Indians and served with Major McDowell at the Cowpens. 

I . . he served under Capt. Alexander Erwin in a Rifle Company & 

with Col. Jo. McDowell, Burke County, he says he was at the battle of 

the Cowpens where Genl Morgan commanded, at the commencement 

of this battle the attack was just made on his militia, he recalled that 

McDowell told his men to take aim when they fired, and as they 

retreated to divide to the right & left & form in the rear. Margan defeated 

the British with his Regulars, after they conceived the Americans were 

all running, - the British as he understood lost 900 prisoners and a great 

many tories were taken-after this battle he returned home. . . . 

13. Private William Neel was a Virginian who served several years 

in militia units until he volunteered to go south with Captain Patrick 

Buchanan. This memoir is a priceless description of General Morgan.20 

Second Company of Militia Patrick Buchanan Capt. Lieut’s name 

not remembered some of the non commissioned officers and privates; 

James Young and James Graham Sergeants, John Kerr, Nicholas Clark, 

Louis Courser (?), Gilbert Christian, John Bodkin, and Ephraim Bates. 

Genl Morgan’s personal appearance to bee over Six feet high, his metle 

[sic] to be of much Bodily strength, with a large Scar on his Cheek 

wore no marks of distinction as an officer his Sword excepted, Battle 

at Cowpens, Tarleton’s defeat, the Army paraded before day a cold 

morning, formed in single file with the Militia on the right of the 

Regulars, stood in ranks till Sun rise, at which time the battle commenced, to all this I was an Eye witness, marched off in haste with the 
145 

Prisoners, recrossed the Broad River encamped the first night on the 

north bank. . . . 

14. Private John Thomas was a member of the Virginia Militia.21 

On the 3rd day of October 1778 [sic] he entered the service under 

the Command of Capt James Winn. He was drafted for six months as 

a militia man William Daring [sic] was 1st Lieutenant 1st Sergeant 

named Sanders John Obannion or Banyan he is not certain which was 

2nd Searjeant [sic] At the time deponent entered the service there was 

a line of soldiers [?] to Francis Triplets the other Iine of battle The rifle 

men under the command of Genl Morgan were 200 yards to the front. 

the orders said that not a gun was to be fired without orders-the riff e 

men were to fire and passed [?I breaks in the Centre and fall off to the 

right and flank of the Musquet Line. They Stood in their first position 

for some time until the Brigadge [sic] Major rode up to Gel. Morgan 

and informed him that the British were in Sight. Gel. Morgan then rode 

down to the rifle men and gave them orders to fire. They fired five 

rounds and broke in the centre and flanked the right and left of the 

musquetry. The British then charged bayonets [?] on the musquety. The 

musquetry then had orders to %e but doesn’t know how many times 

they fired before they retreated. They retreated from aboutt [sic] 80 

yards and were ordered to wheele [sic] and fire. They did so, the British 

being within aboutt [sic] 30 steps of them. The shot & firing continued 

about an hour and forty minutes and then the British broke and run. 

The Americans took about 600 prisoners. The Americans had no 

cannon on that occasion, the British had two field pieces stationed 

aboutt the center of their division Lieutenant Dearing of the Company 

to which deponent belonged was wounded through his hand on this 

occasion and bled to death. He died the next day. The battle took place 

in the woods & the timber was mostly pine. The whole American Army 

who fought at the Cowpens started with the prisoners for Salisbury and 

marched to the Catawba River. There the militia from Fauquier 

Augusta and Rockingham Counties VA left the army. And Major 

Triplett (who upon the resignation of Captain James Winn was made 

Major and commanded both companies that marched from Fauquier.) 

took command of the militia detachment with them from the three 

before mentioned counties and conducted the prisoners to Salisbury. 

15. Private James Collins serkd in the South Carolina militia during 

the campaign in the so~th.~~ 

It was not long until it became necessary for us to seek safety by 

joining Morgan, who was encamped at the Cowpens, but we were not 
146 

permitted to remain long idle, for Tarieton came on like a thunder 

storm, which soon put us to our best mettle. After the tidings of his 

approach came into camp,-in the night,-we were all awakened, 

ordered under arms, and formed in order of battle by daybreak. About 

sunrise on the 17th January, 178 1, the enemy came into full view. The 

sight, to me at least, seemed somewhat imposing; they halted for a short 

time, and then advanced rapidly, as if certain victory, The militia under 

Pickins and Moffitt, was posted on the right of the regulars some 

distance in advance, while Washington’s cavalry was stationed in the 

rear. We gave the enemy one fire, when they charged us with their 

bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses, Tarleton’s cavalry 

pursued us; (“now,” thought I, “my hide is in the loft;“} just as we got 

to our horses&hey overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, 

however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty 

much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing 

creek frolic, but in a few moments, Col. Washington’s cavalry was 

among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor fellows began to kneel 

from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so 

sudden and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook 

themselves to flight; there was no time to rally, and they appeared to 

be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a 

Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was 

out of hearing and quickly out of sight; by this time, both lines of the 

infantry were warmingly engaged and we being relieved from the 

pursuit of the enemy began to rally and prepare to redeem our credit, 

when Morgan rode up in front, and waving his sword, cried out, “Form, 

form, my brave fellows1 give them one more fire and the day is ours. 

Old Morgan was never beaten.” We then advanced briskly, and gained 

th right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by 

Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long. They began to 

throw down their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war. The 

whole army, except Tarleton and his horsemen, fell into the hands of 

Morgan, together with all the baggage. After the fight was over, the 

sight was truly melancholy. The dead on the side of the British, 

exceeded the number killed at the battle of King’s Mountain, being if 

I recollect aright, three hundred, or upwards. The loss, on the side of 

the Americans, was only fifteen or sixteen, and a few slightly wounded. 

This day, I fired my little rifle five times whether with any effect or 

not, I do not know. Next day after receiving some small share of the 

plunder, and taking care to get as much powder as we could, we (the 

militia) were disbanded and returned to our old haunts, where we 

obtained a few day’s rest. 

* 
147 

16. Private Henry Wells was a soldier in the Delaware contingent of 

the Continental Line and fought at Trenton, Germantown, and the 

Brandywine. His description seems a bit fmcifUl,23 

In the Spring of 1780 Col. Hall Still commanded my Regt. and Capt. 

McKennan my Company, we were marched into South Carolina. I . , 

We left the encampment at Camden [sic] in the winter. I think about 

the 1 st of Jarmary 178 1 and marched towards the Cow Pens. An express 

had come for Gem. Marion aboutt [sic] the time of our leaving Camden 

and he and most of his cavalry left us. We pursued our march under 

our old officers until within about one and a half days before we arrived 

at the “Cow-pens” when we fell in with the brave Col. Morgan and his 

par& and he assumed command of the detachment and CoI. Washington was Second in Command. Our whole force at this time numbered 

Some thing less than 900 men a greater proportion of whom were 

militia & less than IO0 horse. By this time our Delaware Rigiment [sic] 

were reduced at least one half-Some died on the field. Some fell by 

disease-and Some died from hard treatment while prisoners-Two 

of my Cosins [sic] felI into the hands of the enemy at Camden, and died 

from the Severity of their treatment-the other lived to be exchanged, 

but he returned with a Shattered Constitution. A few days after our 

junction with Co1 Morgan having halted for a day or two we fell in with 

a much Superior force of the enemy, at the Cowpens under Col. 

Tarleton. He outnumbered us with infantry and he had three or four 

times as many Cavalry Yet notwithstanding our great disparity of force 

we came of [sic] victorious, having killed and wounded between 4 and 

500 men and taken 500 prisoners. The result of this victory is mainly 

owing to the Skill and bravery of Cols. Morgan & Washington, for who 

could refuse to follow, & fight for such leaders-The total loss of the 

Americans in this engagement, in killed & wounded, was considerably 

under 100 men I think not more than fifty--The BattEe commenced 

about 10 or 11 Oclock A. M. and continued ‘til late in the evening. At 

the onset we were much alarmed by the Superiority of the Enemy in 

numbers, but the powerful and trumpetlike voice of our Commander 

drove fear from every bosom, and gave new energies to every arm. 

During the day, at every turn we Seemed to gain new advantages. 

Washington & Morgan knew how to turn every circumstance to good 

account+ey were a host within themselves - after the Battle was over 

it was reported in the Camp that Some Strayfingers were found on the 

field which were Said to belng to Col. Tarleton. The Bayttle was fought 

about the middle of January 178 1, CoI. Tarleton was hardrun by a small 

detachment of American horse and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generdy agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could easily 
148 

have been Shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take 

him alive. In this fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of 

Tar&on’s Troapers, With his Sword with Swch Violence, that the coiar 

[sic] of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the 

flest & skin Sleight@ [sic] scratched and bruised so much so that there 

was a considerable not [sic] or welt on my &older for a number of 

days,- The prisoners taken in the engagement were Sent into the 

interior of the Country. (The name of the place I do not now recollect) 

and a part of the troops were Sent to guard them, the ballanee [sic] of 

us went into winter quarters, and remained near the Cowpens, . . . 

17. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, in this reading, describes 

the movement of his troops to the battlefield, his analysis of the 

terrain, enem dispositions, and course of action, and the deployment z4 of his forces. 

Accordingly, at three o’clock in the morning on the 17th, the pickets 

being called in, the British troops, under the command of Lieutenantcolonel Tarleton, were directed to follow the route the Americans had 

taken the previous evening, and the baggage and waggons were ordered to remain upon the ground till daybreak, under the protection of 

a detachment of each corps. Three companies of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry, formed the advance; the 7th regiment, 

the guns, and the 1st battalion of the 71st, composed the center; and 

the cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear. The ground 

which the Americans had passed being broken, and much intersected 

by creeks and ravines, the march of the British troops during the 

darkness was exceedingly slow, on account of the time employed in 

examining the front and flanks as they proceeded. Before dawn 

Thickelle [Thicketty]25 creek was passed, when an advanced guard of 

cavalry was ordered to the front. The enemy’s patrole approaching, 

was pursued and overtaken: Two troops of dragoons, under Captain 

Ogilvie, of the legion, were then ordered to reinforce the advanced 

guard, and to harass the rear of the enemy. The march had not continued 

long in this manner, before the commanding officer in front reported 

that the American troops were halted and forming. The guides were 

immediately consulted relative to the ground which General Morgan 

the occupied, and the country in his rear. These people described both 

with great perspicuity: They said that the woods were open and free 

from swamps; that the part of Broad river, just above the place where 

King’s creek joined the stream, was about six miles distant Eram the 

enemy’s left flank, and that the river, by making a curve to the 

westward, ran parallel to the rear. 
149 

Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having attained a position, which he 

certainly might deem advantageous, on account of the vulnerable 

situation of the enemy, and the supposed vicinity of the two British 

corps on the east and west of Broad river, did not hesitate to undertake 

those measures which the instructions of his commanding officer 

imposed, and his own judgment, under the present appearances, 

equally recommended. He ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the 

militia parties who covered the front, that General Morgan’s disposition might be conveniently and distinctly inspected. He discovered that 

the American commander had formed a front line of about one thousand militia, and had composed his second line and reserve of five 

hundred continental light infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington’s cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen. This accurate 

knowledge being obtained, Tarleton desired the British infantry to 

disencumber themselves of every thing, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they 

became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion 

infantry were added to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, 

this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three 

hundred yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th 

regiment was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, 

and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: 

A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps, 

who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the 

flanks of the enemy: The 1 st battalion of the 71 st was desired to extend 

a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and 

fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred 

cavalry, composed the reserve. During the execution of these arrangements, the animation of the off&m and the alacrity of the soldiers 

afforded the most promising assurances of success. 

The dispositions being completed, the front line received orders to 

advance; a fire from some of the recruits of the 7th regiment was 

suppressed, and the troops moved on in as good a line as troops could 

move at open files: The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged., 

and the British approached the continentals. The tire on both sides was 

well supported and produced much slaughter: The cavalry on the right 

were directed to charge the enemy’s left: They executed the order with 

much gallantry, but were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by 

a charge of Colonel Washington’s cavalry. As the contest between the 

British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally 

balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the 

advance of the 71 st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve 

to threaten the enemy’s right flank, would put a victorious period into 
150 

the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 7Ist 

were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were 

directed not to entangale [sic] their right flank with the left of the other 

battalion, The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form 

a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy2 right flank 

Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on: The 

continentals and back woodsmen gave ground: The British rushed 

forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge: An 

unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as 

they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless. The part of the 

cavalry which had not been engaged fell likewise into disorder, and an 

unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line. The Americans, who before thought they had lost the action, taking advantage of 

the present situation, advanced upon the British troops, and augmented 

their astonishment. A general flight ensued. Tarleton sent directions to 

his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, 

in order to check them, whilst he endeavoured to rally the infantry to 

protect the guns. The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the 

effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual: Neither promises nor 

threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and 

abandoned the guns to the artillery men, who defended them for some 

time with exemplary resolution. In this last stage of defeat Lieutenantcolonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the 

charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the 

enemy being much broken by their late rapid advance; but all attempts 

to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless. Above two 

hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle. 

Fourteen officers and forty horse-men were, however, not unmindful 

of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer. 

Colonel Washington’s cavalry were charged, and driven back into the 

continental infantry by this handful of brave men. Another party of the 

Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on 

the road from the late encampment, were dispersed, and this detachment retired towards the Broad river unmolested. On the route Tarleton 

heard with infinite grief and astonishment, that the main army had not 

advanced beyond Turkey creek: He therefore directed his course to the 

south east, in order to reach Hamilton’s ford, near the mouth of Bullock 

creek, whence he might communicate with Earl Cornwallis. 

The number of killed and wounded, in the action at the Cowpens, 

amounted to near three hundred on both sides, officers and men 

inclusive: This loss was almost equally shared; but the Americans took 
151 

two pieces of cannon, the colours of the 7th regiment, and near four 

hundred prisoners.26 

18. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie published this letter. He was an 

officer of the 7 1 st Highlanders and witness to the battle.” 

Letter X 

The defeat of the British detachment at Cowpens, which I informed 

you would be the subject ofthis letter, has been variously represented 

by different authors; it is a point, however, in which they all agree, that 

at a particular stage of the engagementhe whole of the American 

infantty gave way, and, that the legion-cavalry, though three times the 

number of those of the enemy, contributed nothing to complete their 

[the American] confusion, 

Ramsey2@ states this action as follows, Volume II, page 196: [Ramsey here notes the two field pieces, five-to-four superiority in infantry, 

and three-to-one superiority in cavalry, and describes the deployment 

(in two lines) of Morgan’s troops. He describes the retirement of 

American militiamen, who were then rallied by their officers.]. 

The Marquis de Chastellus, in his Travels in North America, accounts for the defeat thus: [de Chastellux’ describes Morgan’s two 

“wings” of infantry, one of which that officer commanded to wheel to 

the right, retreat thirty to forty paces, and recommence firing, and 

credits this maneuver with the victory]. 

The Ammal Register for 178 1 gives the following account: [Herein 

is described the withdrawal of the militia to lure the British infantry 

into a deadly fire from the second line]. Our author [Tarleton] is so 

materially concerned, as the principal agent of this scene of ruin, that 

an impartial account is not to be expected from him; his statement of 

his own conduct on that day, if authentick, would do honour to the 

immortal Frederick [the Great, of Prussia]! 

The Marquis’s exposition of the defeat, in spite of his assertion, that 

it has the sanction of General Morgan, is flimsy and erroneous. The 

editor of the Annual Register has been deceived; consequently, of these 

several accounts, that given by Doctor Ramsey deserves more attention. 

I was upon the detachment in question, and the narrative which I 

now offer has been submitted to the judgment of several.respectable 

officers, who were also in this action, and it has m.et with their intire 

[,ssic] approbation. 
152 

Towards the latter end of December, 1780, Earl Cornwallis received 

intelligence, that General Morgan had advanced to the westward of the 

Broad River, with about one thousand men. Two-thirds of this force 

were militia, about one hundred of them cavalry, the rest continentals. 

His intention was to threaten Ninety Six, and to distress the western 

frontiers. To frustrate these designs, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was 

detached with the light and legion-infantry, the fusiliers, the first 

battalion of the 71 st regiment, about three hundred and fifty cavalry, 

two field pieces, and an adequate proportion of men from the royal 

artillery; in all near a thousand strong. This corps, after a progress of 

some days, arrived at the vicinity of Ninety Six, a post which was then 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Allen. An offer of reinforcement 

from that garrison was made to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. The offer 

was rejected; and the detachment, by fatiguing marches, attained the 

ground which Morgan had quitted a few hours before: This position 

was taken about ten o’clock on the evening of the 16th of January. The 

pursuit re-commenced by two o’clock the next morning, and was 

rapidly continued through marshes and broken ground, til day light, 

when the enemy were discovered in front. Two of their videttes were 

taken soon after; these gave information that General Morgan had 

halted, and prepared for action; he had formed his troops as described 

by Ramsey, in an open wood, secured neither in front, flank, nor rear. 

Without the delay of a single moment, and in despite of extreme 

fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusiliers were ordered to form in 

line. Before this order was put into execution, and while Major Newmarsh, who commanded the latter corps, was posting his offteers, the 

line, far from complete, was led to the attack by Lieutenant Colonel 

Tarleton himself. The seventy-first regiment and cavalry, who had not 

as yet disentangled themselves from the brushwood with which 

Thickelle [Thicketty12’ Creek abounds, were directed to form, and wait 

for orders, The military vaIour of British troops, when not entirely 

divested of the powers necessary to its exertion, was not to be resisted 

by an American militia, They gave way on all quarters, and were 

pursued to their continentaIs: the second line, now attacked, made a 

stout resistance. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed 

forty men, was ordered to charge the right flank of the enemy. He cut 

his way through their line, but, exposed to a heavy fire, and charged at 

the same time by the whole of Washington’s dragoons, was compelled 

to retreat in confusion. The reserve, which as yet had no orders to move 

from its first position, and consequently remained near a mile distant, 

was now directed to advance. When the line felt “the advance of the 

seventy-first, all the infantry again moved on: the continentals and 

backwoods-men gave ground: the British rushed forwards: an order 
153 

was dispatched to the cavalry to charge. ‘30 This order, however, if such 

was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, they stood 

aloof, without availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping 

the laurels which lay before them. The infantry were not in condition 

to overtake the fugitives; the latter had marched thirty miles in the 

course of the last fortnight; the former, during that time, had been in 

motion day and night. A number, not less than two-thirds of the British 

infantry officers, had already fallen, and nearly the same proportion of 

privates; fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss 

of blood. Morgan soon discovered that the legion-cavalry did not 

advance, and that the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to 

come up with his corps; he ordered Colonel Washington, with his 

dragoons, to cover his retreat, and to check the pursuit. He was obeyed; 

and the protection thus afforded, gave him an opportunity of rallying 

his scattered forces, They formed, renewed the attack, and charged in 

their turn. In disorder from the pursuit, unsupported by the cavalry, 

deprived of the assistance of the cannon, which in defiance of the 

utmost exertions of those who had them in charge, were now left 

behind, the advance of the British fell back, and communicated a 

panick to others, which soon became general: a total route ensued. Two 

hundred and fifty horse which had not been engaged, fled through the 

woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing down such officers as 

opposed their flight: the cannon were soon seized by the Americans, 

the detachment from the train being either killed or wounded in their 

defence; and the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which 

had retarded the pursuit, had now an equal effect in impeding the 

retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion. 

Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with 

no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington’s cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small 

body of ofJ%ers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of 

dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion; the 

loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the 

whole body was repulsed. 

Whether in actions of importance, or slight skirmishes, I every 

where can trace exaggerated accounts of this author’s prowess. On his 

retreat after the above defeat, he says, page 21 g, ‘“Another party of the 

Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on 

the road from the late encampment, were dispersed.” Earl Cornwallis, 

in his dispatches to the Commander in Chief, writes, that “Lieutenant 

Colonel Tarleton retook the baggage of the corps, and cut to pieces the 

detachment of the enemy who had taken possession of it; and after 

destroying what they could not conveniently bring off, retired with the 

155 

overtook them before 10 oclock near the Cowpens on Thick&y Creek 

where we suffered a total defeat by some dreadful bad management. 

The Americans were posted behind a rivulet with Riflemen as a front 

line and Cavarly [sic] in the rear so as to make a third line; Co1 Tarleton 

charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British 

Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of 

Camden; the Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 7 1 st Regt under 

Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty, but the prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear would not 

proceed against it and broke; the remainder charged but were repulsed-this gave time to the front line to rally and go in from the rear 

of their Cavalry which immediately charged and broke in the rear of 

the 71st (then unsupported) making many prisoners: The rout was 

almost total. I was with Tarleton in the charge who behaved bravely 

but imprudently the consequence was his force disperced [sic] in all 

directions the guns and many prisoners fell into the hands of the 

Americans. 
NOTES 

Appm&c C 

1, James Graham, The Life ofGenera Daniei Morgan of the Erginia Line ofthe 

Army of the United States (New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856), 467-70. A 

somewhat abbreviated version appears in Daniel Morgan, Cowpens Papers, 

Being the Correspondence of General Morgan and the Prominent Actors, 

camp. Theodorus Bailey Myers (Charleston, SC: News and Courier, 1881), 

24-26. 

2. Lynda Worley Skelton, ed., General Andrew Pickens: An Autobiography 

(Clemson, SC: Pendleton District Historical and Recreational Commission, 

1976), 17-l 8; Bailey, Heroes, 24-35. 

3. He refers to Thomas Usher Charlton, The Life of Major GeneralJan& Jackson 

[Augusta, GA, 1809). 

4. Colonel John Eager Howard. Skelton inaccurately inserts parenthetically that 

Howard commanded the Virginia militia. These troops were under his operational control during the battle but only because Howard, from the Maryland 

Line, was the senior Continental officer remaining. 

5. Garden, Anecdotes, 60. 

6. Lee, Henry, Jr., The Campaign of I781 in the Carolinas (Chicago: Quadrangle 

Books, 1969), 96-99. This account can also be found in Hugh F. Rankin, The 

American Revolution O\rew York G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1964), 270-72. The 

original account was not broken into paragraphs. 

7. A copy of this letter may be found in the holdings of The Cowpens National 

Battlefield marked Howard to ?? MS 102, Box 4. 

8. As a consequence of the greater time required to load the rifle. 

9. Joseph Johnson, Daditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American RevoEution in the South (Spartanburg, SC: Walker&James, 1972), 507,5 12,526-32. 

This text is a reprint of an 185 1 edition published in Charleston, SC, by Walker 

& James, Moss, Patriots, 128. 

10. James Hodge Saye, Memoirs ofMajor Joseph McJunkin: Revolutionary Patriot 

(Greenwood, SC: Greenwood Index-Journal, 1925), 32-34, reprinted from the 

Richmond, VA, Watchman and Observer of 1817. See also Bailey, lieroes, 

214-49. 

11. Major McAuthur was more than forty at the time. 

157 
12. James Kelley was probably one of these men. See James Kelley in this 

appendix. 

13. Young, ‘“Memoir,” 88,100-102. 

14. RWFA, 1 August 1833, W8188, M804/627, MOSS, Patriots, 61. 

15. Thomas Anderson, “Journal of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware 

Regiment, 1780-1782,“‘Historical Magazine, 2d ser., I (1867):208,20!?. Like 

Captain Kirkwood, Lieutenant Anderson kept a record of the miles he marched 

during the campaign. At the end of his published journal, he had accounted for 

4,5 13 miles and had participated in the battles of the Cowpens, Guilford Court 

House (15 February 1781), andEutaw Springs (8 September 1781), 211. 

16. Seymour, &MI&, 1 O-l 5, 

17. RWPA, 28 April 1835, M804/1466. 

18. RWPA, 7 April 1834, S25068, M8041944. It is reprinted in Balch, Maryland 

Line, 45. 

19. RWPA, S6565, M804/123, Moss, Patriots, 15. 

20. RWPA, supplementary statement, 19 March 1836, S15945, M&04/1 804, Moss, 

Patriots, 217-l 8. See Appendix B for Neel’s description of the campaign. 

21. RWPA, 9 August 1832, S16271, M&04/2370, Moss, Patriots, 284. 

22. James Collins, Autobiography of a Revoktionary Soldier (Clinton, LA: Feliciana Democrat, 1859), 56-58, Moss, Patriots. 

23. RWFA, S11712, M80412529, Moss, Patriots, 304,405. 

24. Tarleton, Campaigns, 220-24. 

25. Tarleton may be calling the creek “Thickelle”because of the label of that stream 

on a 1770 map of the area. The original of the map may be found in the 

Caroliniana Library. 

26. Compare these figures with those offered by Brigadier General Morgan or 

Sergeant Major Seymour. 

27. Mackenzie, Strictures, 9 l-103. I have summarized Mackenzie’s lengthy quotations from Tarleton’s work. 

28. He refers to David Ramsay, The History of the Revolution in South Carolina 

(Trenton, NJ, 1785). 
m 

159 

29. Hanger insists that the 71 st was but 300 yards behind the line in which the other 

units were deploying, Hanger, Address, 104, 107, 116. 

30. Here Mackenzie quotes Tarleton’s Campaigns, 217. In the 1787 edition, this 

passage is on page 223. 

3 1. Janes, Jauntal, 2 l-22. 
APPENDIX D 

Correspondence Pertaining to the Campaign of The Cowpens, 

1 December 1780 to 20 January 1781 

Contents 

Page 

1. Correspondence between Morgan and Nathanael Greene . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 

2. Correspondence between Tarleton and Cornwallis *..l..l.....,.,..l....~.~............. 172 

3. Miscellaneous correspondence of Cornwallis . . . . . ..*........................**......-..*.n 179 

4. Correspondence from David George to Tarleton........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IS . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 182 

161 
162 

1. Greene assumed command of the Southern Army from General 

Horatio Gates in December 1780. These letters between Greene and 

Margan (whom he appointed in Letter 1 to command the expedition 

that met Tarleton a month later at the Cowpens) demonstrate both 

Morgan’s anxiety and Greene’s optimism. 

Letter 1: 

To Brig. Genl. Morgan’ 

SirYou are appointed to the command of a corps of Light Infantry, a 

detachment of militia, and Lt. Col. Washington’s Regiment of Light 

Dragoons. With these troops you will proceed to the West side of the 

Catawba river, where you will be joined by a body of Volunteer MiIitia 

under the command of Brig. Genl, Davidson of this State, and by the 

militia lately under the command of Brig. Gem. Sumter. This force, 

and such others as may join you from Georgia, you will employ against 

the enemy on the West side of the River, either offensively or defensively as your own prudence and discretion may direct, acting with 

caution, and avoiding surprizes by every possible precaution. For the 

present I give you the entire command in that quarter, and do hereby 

require all Officers and Soldiers engaged ‘in the American cause to be 

subject to your orders and command. The object of this detachment is 

to give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people-to 

annoy the enemy in that quarter-collect the provisions and forage out 

of the way of the enemy, which you will have formed into a number of 

small magazines, in or near the position you might think proper to take. 

You will prevent plundering as much as possible, and be as careful of 

your provisions and forage as may be, giving receipts for whatever you 

take to all such as are friends to the independence of America. Should 

the enemy move in force towards the Pedee, where this Army will take 

a position, you will move in such direction as to enable you to join me 

if necessary, or to fall upon the flank or into the rear of the enemy as 

the occasian may require. You will spare no pains to get good inteiligence of the Enemy’s situation, and keep me constantly advertised of 

both your and their movements. You will appoint for the time being a 

Quarter Master, Commissary and Forage Master, who will follow your 

instructions in their several lines. 

Confiding in your abilities and activity, I entrust you with this 

command, being persuaded you will do everything in your power to 

distress the enemy and afford protection to the country. 
I 

2 

163 

Given under my hand at Charlotte, this 16th of December 1780. 

Nath. Green 

/ Letter 2: 

Camp on the Cheraws, on the east side of the Pedee’ 

Dec. 29th, 1780 

Dear Sir: We arrived here the 26th inst., after a very tedious and ~ 

disagreeable march, owing to the badness of the roads and the poor and 

weak state of the teams. Our prospects with regard to provisions are 

mended, but this is no Egypt. 

I have this moment received intelligence that Gen. Leslie has landed 

at Charleston, and is on his way to Camden. His force is about two 

thousand, perhaps something Less. I am also informed that Lord Cornwallis has collected his troops at Camden. You will watch their motions 

very narrowly, and take care and guard against a surprise. Should they 

move in force this way, you will endeavor to cross the river and join 

us. Do not be sparing of your expresses, but let me know as often as 

possible, of your situation. I wish to be fully informed of your prospect 

respecting provisions, and also the number of militia that has joined 

you. 

A large number of tents and hatchets are on the road. As soon as they 

arrive you shall be supplied. Many other articles necessary for this 

army, particularly shoes, are coming on. 

I am, sir, your most obedient servant, 

Nathanael Greene 

Letter 3: 

This letter informs Morgan of the arrival of General Leslie and 

suggests that Morgan is the object of the British movements.3 

Camp Hicks’s Creek, on Pedee, Dec. 30th 1780. 

Dear General: I inclose you a number of Ietters, by a sergeant of 

Lieut. Col. Washington’s regiment, which I bope will arrive safe. We 

are at present in a camp of repose, and the general is exerting himself, 

and everybody else, to put his little army in a better condition. Tents in 

sufficient numbers for a larger army than ours, are coming from 

Philadelphia; they are expected to arrive early in January. We also 

expect a number of shoes, shirts, and some other articles essentially 

necessary. 
164 

Col. Marion writes the generaE, that General Leslie landed in Charleston, with his command, on the 20th inst., and that he had advanced 

as far as Moncks’s Corner. You know Lord Cornwallis has collected 

his force at Camden-probably they mean to form a junction, and 

attempt to give a bIow to a part of our force while we are divided, and 

most probably that blow will be aimed at you, as our position in the 

centre of a wilderness is less accessible than your camp. I know your 

discretion renders all caution from me unnecessary; but my friendship 

will plead an excuse for the impertinence of wishing you to run no risk 

of a defeat. May your laurels flourish when your locks fade, and an age 

of peace reward your toils in war. My love to every fellow soldier, and 

adieu. 

Yours, most truly, 

0. H. Williams 

Letter 4 : 

In this letter, General Morgan interprets British movements differently from WilIiams.4 

Camp on Pacolet Creek, Dec. 3 1 st 178 1 

Dear General: After an uninteresting march, I arrived at this place 

on the 25th of December. On the 27th, I received intelligence that a 

body of Georgia tories, about two hundred and fifty in number, had 

advanced as far as Fair Forest, and were insuIting and plundering the 

good people in this neighborhood. On the 29th, I dispatched Lieut. CoI. 

Washington, with his own regiment and two hundred militia horse, who 

had just joined me, to attack them. Before the colonel could overtake 

them, they had retreated upwards of twenty miles. He came up with 

them next day, about twelve o’clock, at Hammond’s store-house, forty 

miles from our camp. They were alarmed and ffew to their horses. 

Lieut. Cal. Washington extended his mounted riflemen on the wings, 

and charged them in front with his own regiment. They fled with the 

greatest precipitation, without making any resistance. One hundred and 

fifty were killed and wounded, and about forty taken prisoners. What 

makes this success more valuable, it was attained without the loss of a 

man. This intelligence I have just received by the Baron de Glaubec, 

who served in the expedition as a volunteer. To guard against any 

misfortune, I have detached two hundred men to cover the retreat of 

the fortunate party. When I obtain a more particular account, I shall 

transmit it to head-quarters, and recommend those men who have 

distinguished themselves on this occasion. 
I have the honor to be, &c., 

Daniel h4organ 

165 

The militia are increasing fast, so that we cannot be supplied in this 

neighborhood more than two or three days at farthest. Were we to 

advance, and be constrained to retreat, the consequence would be very 

disagreeable; and this must be the case should we lay near the enemy, 

and Cornwallis reinforce, which he can do with the greatest facility. 

General Davidson has brought in one hundred and twenty men, and 

has returned to bring forward a draft of five hundred more. Col. Pickens 

has joined me with sixty. Thirty or forty of the men who came out with 

him have gone into North Carolina to secure their effects, and will 

immediately repair to my camp. 

When I shall have collected my expected force, I shall be at a loss 

how to act. Could a diversion be made in my favor by the main army, 

I should wish to march into Georgia. To me it appears an advisable 

scheme, but should be happy to receive your directions on this point, 

as they must be the guide of my actions. I have consulted with General 

Davidson and Cal. Pickens, whether we could secure a safe retreat, 

should we be pushed by a superior force. They tell me it can be easily 

effected by passing up the Savannah and crossing over the heads of the 

rivers along the indian line, 

To expedite this movement, should it meet with your approbation, 

I have sent for one hundred swords, which I intend to put into the hands 

of expert riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with Lieut. Col. 

Washington’s corps. I have also written to the quarter-master to have 

one hundred packsaddles made immediately-should be glad if you 

would direct him to be expeditious. Packsaddles ought to be procured, 

let our movements be what they may> for our wagons will be an 

impediment, whether we attempt to annoy the enemy or provide for 

our own safety. It is incompatible with the nature of light troaps to be 

encumbered with baggage. 

I would wish to receive an answer to this proposition as soon as 

possible. This country has been so exhausted, that the supplies for my 

detachment have been precarious and scant ever since my arrival, and 

in a few days will be unattainable; so that a movement is unavoidable. 

At my particular request, Col. Malmady has been so obliging as to 

undertake the delivery of these dispatches. He will be able to give you 

a just idea of our situation and prospects. 
166 

N. B.-Should this expedition be thought advisable, a profound secrecy will be essentially necessary, as you know the soul of the 

enterprise. Cal. Lee’s corps would ensure its success. 

D. M. 

Letter 5: 

Camp on Pacolet, Jan. 4, 17815 

Dear Sir: As soon as I could form a just judgment of your situation 

and prospects, I dispatched Col. Malmady to give you the necessary 

information, and I flatter myself he has done it to your satisfaction. The 

account he brings you of Lieut. Cal. Washington’s success at Hammond’s store is as authentic as any I have been able to collect. Et was 

fallowed by some small advantages. Gen. Cunningham, on hearing of 

Water’s defeat, prepared to evacuate Fort WiIliams, and had just 

marched out with the last of his garrison, as a party, consisting of about 

forty militia horsemen under Cot. Hays, and ten dragoons under Mr. 

Simmonds, arrived with an intention of demanding a surrender. The 

enemy’s force was so superior to theirs, that they could effect nothing 

more than the demolition of the fort. 

Sensible of the importance of guarding against surprise, I have used 

every precaution on this head. I have had men who were recommended 

as every way calculated for the business, continually watching the 

motions of the enemy; so that unless they deceive me, I am in no danger 

of being surprised. 

I have received no acquisitions of force since I wrote you; but I 

expect in a few days to be joined by Cols. Clark’s and Twigg’s 

regiments. Their numbers Icannot ascertain. The men on the north side 

of Broad river I have not yet ordered to join me; but have directed their 

officers to keep notice. I intend these as a check on the enemy, should 

they attempt anything against my detachment. 

My situation is far from being agreeable to my wishes or expectations. Forage and provisions are not to be had. Here we cannot subsist, 

so we have but one alternative, either to retreat or move into Georgia. 

A retreat will be attended with the most fatal consequences. The spirit 

which now begins to pervade the people, and call them into the field, 

will be destroyed. The militia who have already joined will desert us, 

and it is not improbable but that aregard for their own safety will induce 

them to join the enemy. 

I shall wait with impatience for your directions on the subject of my 

letter to Cal. Malmady, as till then my operations must be suspended. 

__--- 
167 

I am, sir, truly yours, 

Daniel Morgan 

Letter 6: 

This letter responds to Morgan’s letter of the 3 1sk6 

Camp South Carolina, at Kurshadt’s Ferry, east side of 

Pedee, Jan. 8th, 178 1. 

Dear Sir: Col. Malmady arrived here yesterday, with your letter of 

the 3 1st December. Nothing could have afforded more pleasure than 

the successful attack of Lie&. Col. Washington upon the tories. I hope 

it will be attended with a happy influence upon both whig and tory, to 

the reclaiming of one, and the encouragement ofthe other. I wish you 

to forward to me an offtcial report as soon as possible, that I may send 

it to the northward. 

I have maturely considered your proposition of an expedition into 

Georgia, and cannot think it warrantable in the critical situation our 

army is in. I have no small reason to think, by intelligence from 

different quarters, that the enemy have a movement in contemplation, 

and that in all probability it will be this way, from the impudence of 

the tories, who are collecting in different quarters, in the most inaccessible swamps and morasses. Should you go into Georgia, and the 

enemy push this way, your whole force will be useless. The enemy 

having no object there but what is secure in their fortifications, will 

take no notice of your movement, but serve you as General Prevost did 

General Lincoln, oblige you to return by making a forward movement 

themselves; and you will be so far in the rear that you can do them no 

injury. But if you continue in the neighborhood of the place you are 

now at, and they attempt to push forward, you may interrupt their 

communications with Charleston, or harass their rear, both of which 

will alarm the enemy not a little. 

Ifyou employ detachments to interrupt supplies going toNinety-six, 

and Augusta, it will perplex the enemy much. If you think Ninety-six, 

Augusta, or even Savannah can be surprised, and your force will admit 

of a detachment for the purpose, and leave you a suffticiency to keep 

up a good countenance, you may attempt it. But don’t think of attempting either, unless by surprise, for you will only beat your heads against 

the wall without success. Small parties are better to effect a surprise 

than large bodies, and the success will not greatly depend upon the 

numbers, but on the secrecy and spirit of the attack. 

-- 
I must repeat my caution to you to guard against a surprise. The 

enemy and the tories both will try to bring you into disgrace, if possible, 

to prevent your influence.upon the militia, especially the weak and 

wavering. 

I cannot pretend to give you particular instructions respecting a 

positian. But somewhere between the S&da and the north branch of 

Broad river appears to be the most favorable for annoying the enemy, 

interrupting their supplies, and harassing their rear, ifthey should make 

a movement this way. 

Ifyou could detach a small party to kill the enemy’s draft horses and 

recruiting cavalry, upon the Congaree, it would give them almost as 

deadly a blow as a defeat. But this matter must be conducted with great 

secrecy and dispatch. 

Lieut. Col. Lee has just arrived with his legion, and Cal. Green is 

within a few days’ march of this, with a reinforcement. 

I am, dear sir, truly yours, 

Nathanael Greene 

Letter 7: 

Greene wrote this letter to Morgan to answer his letter of the 4th. 

Camp on the Pedee Jan. 13th, 178 1 

Dear Sir: I am at this moment favored with your letter of the 4th 

inst. Col. Malmady also delivered me your dispatches of the 31st of 

December, which I answered on the 8th inst., wherein I informed you 

that I cannot think an expedition into Georgiaeligible at this time. Since 

I wrote you I have received letters from Virginia, informing me of the 

arrival of Gen. Phillips, with a detachment of 2,500 men from New 

York. This circumstance renders it still more improper for you to mave 

far to the southward. It is my wish also that ‘you should hold your 

ground ifpossible; for I foresee the disagreeable consequences that will 

result from a retreat. If moving as far as Ninety-six, or anywhere in the 

neighborhood of it, will contribute to the obtaining more ample supplies, you have my consent. Col. Tarleton is said to be on his way to 

pay you a visit. I doubt not but he will have a decent reception and a 

proper dismission. And I am happy to find you have taken every proper 

precaution to avoid a surprise. 
I wish you to be more particular respecting your plan and object in 

paying a visit to Geargia. 

Virginia is raising 3,000 men to recruit this army. 

I am, &c., 

Nathanael Greene 

Camp at Burr’s Mill on Thicketty Creek, 15 January 178 1: 

Dear General: Your letters of the 3rd and 8th instanf came to hand 

yesterday just as I was preparing to change my position, was therefor 

obliged to detain the express until this evening. 

The accounts I have transmitted to you of Lieutenant Colonel 

Washington’s success, accord with his opinion The number killed and 

wounded on the part of the tories must depend on conjecture, as they 

broke on the first charge, scattered through the woods and were pursued 

in every direction. The consequences attending this defeat will be fatal 

to the disaffected. They have not been able to embody. 

Sensible of the importance of having magazines of forage and 

provisions established in this country, I have left no means in my power 

unassayed to effect this business. Idispatched Captain Chitty, (whom 

I have appointed as commissary of purchases for my command), with 

orders to callect and store all the provisions that could be obtained 

between the Catawba and Broad rivers. I gave him directions to call on 

Colonel Hill, who commands a regiment of militia in that quarter, to 

furnish him with aproper number of men to assist him in the execution 

of this commission, but he, to my great surprise, had just returned 

without effecting any thing. He tells me that his failure proceeded from 

the want of the countenance and assistance of Colonel Hill, who 

assured him that General Sumpter directed him to obey no orders from 

me, unless they came through him. 

I find it impracticable to procure more provisions in this quarter than 

is absolutely necessary for our own immediate consumption: indeed it 

has been with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to effect 

this. We have to feed such a number of horses that the most plentiful 

country must soon be exhausted. Nor am I a little apprehensive that no 

part of this state accessible to us, can support us long. Could the militia 

be persuaded to change their fatal mode of going to war, much provision might be saved, but the custom has taken such deep root that it 

cannot be abolished, 
170 

Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion 

that nothing can be effected by my detachment in this country which 

will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The 

enemy’s great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main 

army, will enable Lord Cornwallis to detach so superior a force against 

me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action; nor 

will this always be in my power. No attempt to surprise me wilI be left 

untried by them, and situated as we must be, every possible precaution 

may hot be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes it 

impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not 

the case, it is beyond the art of man to keep the militia from straggling. 

These reasons induce me to request that I may be recalled with my 

detachment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be 

left with the militia of North and South Carolina and Georgia. They 

will not be so much the object of the enemy’s attention, and will be 

capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all I can effect. 

Colonel Pickens is a valuable discreet, and attentive officer, and has 

the confidence of the militia. 

My force is inadequate to the attempts you have hinted at. I have 

now with me only two hundred South Carolina and Georgia, and one 

hundred and forty North Carolina, volunteers. Nor do I expect to have 

more that two-thirds of these to assist me, should I be attacked, for it 

is impossible to keep them collected. 

Though I am convinced that were you on the spot, the propriety of 

my proposition would strike you forcibly; should you think it unadvisable to recaI1 me, you may depend on my attempting every thing to 

annoy the enemy, and to provide for the safety of the detachment. I 

shall cheerfully acquiesce in your determinations. 

Col. Tarleton has crossed the Tyger at Musgrove’s h411; his force 

we cannot learn, It is more than probable we are his object. Cornwallis, 

by last accounts, was at the cross-roads near Lee’s old place. 

[As a result of last-minute intelligence, Morgan added] We have just 

learned that Tarleton’s force is from eleven to twelve hundred British. 

I am, dear general, 

Truly yours, 

Daniel Morgan 

Letter 9: 

Camp on Pedee, Jan. 19th, 178 1 *s 
171 

Dear Sir: Your favor ofthe 15th was delivered me last evening about 

12 o’clock. I am surprised that Gen. Sumter should give such an order 

as that you mention to Cot. Hill, nor can I persuade myself but that 

there must be some mistake in the matter; for though it is the most 

military to convey orders through the principal to the dependents, as 

well from propriety as respect, yet this may not always be convenient, 

or even practicable; and therefore to give a positive order not to obey, 

was repugnant to reason and common sense. As the head was subject 

to your orders,, consequently the dependents are also. I will write Gen. 

Sumter on the subject; but it is better to conciliate than aggravate 

matters, where everything depends so much upon voluntary principles, 

I wish you to take no notice of the matter, but endeavor to influence his 

conduct to give you all the aid in his flower. Write to him frequently, 

and consult with him freely. He is a man ofgreat pride and considerable 

merit, and should not be neglected. If he had given such orders, I am 

persuaded he will see the impropriety of the matter and correct it in the 

future, unless personal glory is more the object than public good, which 

I cannot suppose is the case with him, or any other man who fights in 

the cause of liberty. 

I was informed of Lord Cornwallis” movement before the receipt of 

your letter, and agree with you in the opinion that you are the object. 

And from his making so general a movement, it convinces me he feels 

a great inconvenience from your force and situation. Gen. LesIie has 

crossed the Catawba to join him. He would never harness his troops to 

remove you, if he did not think it an object of some importance; nor 

wouId he put his collective force in motion if he had not some respect 

for your numbers, I am sensible your situation is critical, and requires 

the most watchful attention to guard against surprise. But I think it is 

of great importance to keep up a force in that quarter; nor can I persuade 

myself that the militia alone will answer the same valuable purposes 

as when joined by the continental troops. 

It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a 

manifest advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing 

to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. 

Regard not the opinions of the day. It is not our business to risk too 

much, our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and 

nursing to give them a better tone. 

If General Smnpter and you could fix a plan for him to hold the post 

which you now occupy, and he to be joined by the militia under General 

Davidson, and you with your force and the Georgiaand Virginia militia, 

to move towards Augusta or into that quarter, I should have no 

objection, provided you think it wiE1 answer any valuable purpose, and 
172 

can be attempted with a degree of safety. 1 am unwilling to recall you 

if it can be avoided, but I had rather recah you than expose you to the 

hazard of a surprise. 

Before we can possibly reach you I imagine the movements of Lord 

Cornwallis and Colonel Tarleton will be sufficiently explained, and 

you obliged to take some decisive measures. I sharl be perfectly 

satisfied if you keep clear of misfortune; for though I wish you laurels, 

I am not willing to expose the common cause to give ycm an opportunity 

to acquire them. 

As the rivers are subject to sudden and great swells, you must be 

careful that the enemy do not take a position to gain your rear, where 

you can neither retreat by your flanks or front. The Pedee rose twentyfive feet last week in thirty hours. I am preparing boats to move always 

with the army; would one or two be of use to you? They will be put on 

four wheels, and made to move with little more difficulty than a loaded 

wagon 

General Davidson is desired to receive orders, and in conjunction 

with Gen. Sumter, to consult with you a plan for a combined attack 

upon one ofthe divisions of Lord Cornwallis’s army, and also respecting your movements into Georgia. 

I am, with great esteem, kc., 

Nathanael Greene 

2. This exchange of letters includes all available correspondence 

between Cornwallis and Tarleton written during the latter’s movement to the Cowpens. 

Cornwallis discovered that Morgan’s army had entered South Carolina in mid-December 1780. Me dispatched this letter to inform 

Tarleton of the developmenL9 

Wynnesborough, Dec. l&h, 1780 

Dear Tarleton, 

Lord Rawdon has received intelligence, which, however, he does 

not credit, that Morgan’s Corps and the Cavalry had passed the Catawba. I have sent out everybody that I could engage to go, but the 
173 

friends here are so timid & stupid that I can get no intelligence. I have 

heard nothing from 96, but a man who came here from Broad River 

says that Gen’l Cunningham has beat Clarke and wounded him mortally. I shall be glad to hear a confirmation of this. I apprehend we must 

first dislodge Lacey etc. from Turkey Creek & then march up the West 

Side of Catawba to some of the fords above Tuckaseege. I wish you 

would take pains to inform yourself as thoroughiy as possible of the 

state of the roads, Provisions, forage, Mills, etc. I hear a good account 

of the Recruits in general. Ihope to march fkom here 3500 fighting men 

barring those I mentioned to you upon the frontier. 

Lord Rawdon very readily agreed to undertake Watson so we shaI1 

be relieved of that plague. 

I trust you will make every possible shift rather thango much further 

back, as I should in that case be uneasy about McArthur, and as soon 

as you have been able to get information about the Country, I should 

be glad to see you to talk over our march. 

I am Dear Tarleton 

Very Sincerely Yours 

Cornwallis 

Letter 2: 

Cornwallis sent two letters to Tarleton on 26 December 1780. They 

express the concern Cornwallis felt about Morgan’s movements and 

hint at the urgency of defeating him before the French could cut 

British lines of communications between Wilmington and Charlestonto 

[To Tarleton] 

A man came this morning from Charlotte town; his fidelity, however, very doubtful; he says, that Greene marched on Wednesday last 

toward Cheraws, to join General &swell, and that Morgan, with his 

infantry and one hundred and twenty-four of Washington’s light horse, 

crossed Bigger’s ferry, on Thursday and Friday last, to join Lacey. I 

expect more intelligence before night, when you shall hear from me 

again. 

Letter 3: 

[To Tarleton] 
174 

I sent you the reports of the day. First, Morgan and Washington 

have passed Broad river; secondly, a brig from Cork says, that a packet 

had arrived there from England, and that accounts were brought, that 

six regiments were under orders for embarkation, supposedly to be 

destined for Carolina; thirdly, and worst report of all, if true, that one 

thousand French are got into Cape Fear, who wiil probably fortify 

themselves at Wilmington, and stop our water communication with 

Charles town with provisions; fourthly, that an embarkation was taking 

place, under General Phillips, from New York, said to be destined for 

the Cheaspeak. 

Lord Rawdon mentions, that by a letter from M”Kinnon to England, 

he is afraid that the accoutrements for the 17th Dragoons are coming 

up by the slow process of General Leslie’s corps. Try to get all possible 

intelligence of Morgan. 

Letter 4: 

In this letter to TarEeton dated Wynnesborough, 2 January 1780; seven 

o’clock a.m., Cornwailis directs aggressive pursuit and discounts the 

report that Morgan% force has artillery.” 

Dear Tarleton, 

I send Haldane to you last night, to desire you would pass Broad 

river, with the legion and the first battalion of the 71st, as soon as 

possible. If Morgan is still at Williams’, or any where within your reach, 

I should wish you to push him to the utmost: I have not heard, except 

from M’Arthur, of his having cannon; nor would I believe it, unless he 

has it from very good authority: It is, however, possible, andNinty Six 

is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost. 

Yours sincerely, 

Cornwallis 

Let me know if you think that the moving of a whole, or a part of 

my corps, can be of use. 

Letter 5: 

In this exchange of letters (5 and 6), Tarleton asks his commander for 

information and reinforcements; CornwallisI~plies with speculation 

and assurances that troops are forthcoming. 

[To Cornwallis] 
175 

Somers Plantation 

Jan’y 3 l/2 past 6 a. m. 

My Lord, 

I am well here-1 move directly towardkfonses M/l a proper course 

m I have no intelligence 

I have the Honor 

to be 

Your Lardships 

Most Devoted Serv’t 

Ban. Tarleton 

If the 7th or 7 1st 

Battalion was at Byerly’s 

it would be well 

Letter 6: 

[To Tarleton] 

I received yours of this morning. I suspecthe enemy are retired. If 

so, I would lose no time. Which side of Broad River do you think it 

best for you to march? The 7th regt are ordered to Byedy’s. 

Be quite sure that 96 is safe. 7threg”t will take your old gun toNinety 

Six. 

Letter 7: 

In this letter of 4 January 178 1 to Cornwallis, Tarleton reports the 

presence of Morgan and proposes how to prevent an attack on Ninety 

Six.l’ 

[To Cornwallis] 

Morse’s Mill 

Jan’y 4 2 p.m. 

Morgan, with upwards of one thousand two hundred men, being on 

this side of the Broad river, to threaten Ninty Six, and evade your 

lordship’s army whenever you may move, I beg leave to offer my 

opinion how his design may be prevented. 

I must draw my baggage, the 7 1 st and legion? are deposited at my old 

cramp, to me. I wish it to be escorted by the 17th light dragoons, for 

whom horses are ready; by the yagers, if to be spared; and by the 7th 
176 

regiment. The 7th I will send, as soon as I reach Ennoree, with the field 

piece, to Ninty Six. My encampment is now twenty miles from Brierley’s, in a plentiful forage country, and I can lay in four days flour for 

a move. 

When I advance, Imust either destroy Morgan’s corps, or push it before 

me over the Broad river, towards King’s mountain. The advance of the 

army should commence [when your lordship orders this corps to move) 

onwards for King’s mountain. Frequent communication by letter can 

pass the Broad river. I feel myself bold in offering my opinion, as it 

flows from zeal for the public service, and well-grounded enquiry 

concerning the enemy’s designs and operations. 

I have directed Captain M’Pherson, the bearer of this letter, who is 

going on the recruiting service, to deliver a letter to Lieutenant Munroe, 

whom I left at my camp, to bring up my baggage, but no women. 

If your lordship approves of this plan, Captain M’Pherson may give 

my order to Lieutenant Munroe to escort to me three puncheons of rum, 

and some salt; and, upon their arrival, I will move. 

I have the Honour 

to be 

Your Lordships 

Most Devoted Serv’t 

Ban. Tarleton 

Letter 8: 

In this letter and the next (Letter 9), Cornwallis respnds to Tarleton’s 

request to chase Morgan across the Broad River. 

January $1781 

Dear Tarleton, 

I received your letter sent yesterday 7 o’clock a. m. I have ordered 

the baggage of your Corps to Byerley’s Ferry, under the care of the 7th 

Regt. I propose marching on Tuesday next. You will continue to 

correspond with me, keeping on my left Flank, either on the east or 

west of Broad River, as you will judge best according to the intelligence 

you may receive. McArthur will of course march with you. 

Yrs. 

Cornwallis 
Letter 9: 

Wynnesborough, January 5th, 

eight o’clock P. M. 

Dear Tarleton, 

Since I wrote to you this morning, I received yours, dated yesterday, 

two P.M. You have exactly done what I wished you to do, and under: 

stood my intentions perfectly. Lest my letter of this morning should 

miscarry, I repeat the most material paragraph. 

Your baggage is ordered to Brierley $ under care of the seventh 

regiment. Ipropose to march on Sunday. 

Yours sincerely, 

Cornwallis 

Letter IO: 

To Colonel Tarleton, 6 January: *6 

I received yours of yesterday. You will see that some parts of your 

wishes are already anticipated. I am that you have already.reeeived 

three of the Q’r, Master Gem’s waggons at Byerleys. Isent another two 

loaded with rum and salt; you will easily conceive that we have not 

many to spare. Ishall march on Monday & direct my course for BulIock 

Creek. Leslie will march on Teusday by the river road for the same 

place. I approve of your proposal relative to the 7th reg’t. I shall send 

orders to the comm’g officer accordingly. 

Letter II: 

McAlister’s Plantation 

January Icth, 1781 7 P.M. 

Dear Tarleton, 

I have just received yours, 7th January, three o’clock P. M. I shall 

remain here tomorrow, march to cross roads on Wednesday, halt 

Thursday, and reach Bullock’s creek meeting house Saturday. 

I have no news. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Cornwallis 
178 

Letter 12: 

n/l’Alister’s, January 9, 1781 

three P.M. 

Dear Tarteton, 

Nothing new since yesterday; some of Washington’s cavalry, who 

had been escorting prisoners to Charlotte town, returned over Broad 

river. I have taken every means in my power to find out Morgan’s 

movements, and whether he repasses Broad river. 

I received yours January 8th. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Comwallis 

Letter 13: 

Bull Run, Jan’y 14th, 1780, 10 P. M. 

Dear Tarleton, 

I received yesterday morning your letter dated Duggins, Indian 

Creek, Jan’y I ith, 5 a. m. By report however of the man who brought 

it I conceive it ought to have been dated Jan’y 12 as he assures me that 

he left you on Friday morning. 

I shall march tomorrow to the head of Tardy River & the next day 

to HilEhouse near Bullock Creek Meeting House. Leslie is at last got 

out of the swamps & reached this day the neighborhood of Rocky 

Mount. I have not heard of Morgan’s moving, but conclude he will now 

cross Broad River, as I hear it has fallen very much. 

Yrs. sincerely 

Comwallis 

Letter 14: 

To Colonel Tarleton, from Hillhouse Plantation on Turkey Creek, 16 

January 1781: 

1 have not heard from you since the Il. I fear Morgan has too much 

the start of you. I have ordered meal to be ground & propose marching 
179 

in three or four days to Beatty’s Ford. Leslie will join me tomorrow or 

Thursday. 

Letter 1.5: 

This was Tarleton’s last letter to Cornwallis before the battle.17 

Pacolet Jan’y 16th 

8 a. m. 

My Lord 

I have been most cruelly retarded by the waters. 

Morgan is in force and gone for Cherokee Ford. 

I am now on my march. I wish he could be stopped. 

I have the Honor 

to be Your most Devoted Serv’t 

Ban. Tarleton 

Letter 16: 

Cornwallis apparently lost no confidence in his brash young field 

commander because of his defeat at the hands of Morgan. See 

Mackenzie’s assessment (Appendix E) for another interpretation of 

Cornwallis’ motive.’ * 

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, 

You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer, by the 

unfortunate event of the action of the seventeenth instant; the means 

you used to bring the enemy to action, were able and masterly, and must 

ever do you honor; your disposition was unexceptionable; the total 

misbehavior of the troops could alone have deprived you of the glory 

which was justly your due. 

Lord Cornwallis 

3. These letters represent miscellaneous coEespondence from Cornwallis concerning the Cowpens campaign. 
Letter I : 

To Lord Rawdon: 

9 January 1781(?) 

I think it prudent to remain here a day or two longer, otherwise by 

the corps on my flanks being so far behind, I should be in danger of 

losing my communications. I have not heard from Tarleton this day, 

nor am I sure whether he has passed the Ennoree. 

Letter 2: 

12 January 1781 

To General Leslie: 

I have not heard from Tarleton since Tuesday, Ibelieve he is as much 

embarrassed with the waters as you are. 

Letter 3: 

To Lord Balfour: 

12 January 1781 

The Rains have put a total stop to Tarleton and Leslie, & I do not 

think it right to advance too far with a large train of provision waggons 

and so small a corps. 

Letter 4: 

12 January I781 

To Lord Rawdon: 

The Rains have impeded all operations on both sides. Morgan is at 

Scull’s Shoals on .Pacolet, & Tarleton I believe still on the south of 

Ennoree unable to pass either that River or the Tyger. The Broad River 

is so high that it is with difficulty a canoe can pass. If Leslie had not 

been likewise detained, Imight have tried to stop Morgan’s retreat, but 

the Corps I have with me altho’ very good, will not afford a strong 

detachmento take care of Baggage & Provisions. 

Letter 5: 

On 18 January 1781, Cornwallis reported the results of the battle to 

his superior, Sir Henry Clinton.20 
181 

Camp on Turkey Creek, Broad River, i 

18th January, 1781 

Sir: 

In my letter of the sixth of this month, I had the honor to inform 

your Excellency, that I was ready to begin my March for North 

Carolina, having been delayed some days by a diversion made by the 

Enemy towards Ninty Six. General Morgan remained on the Pacolet, 

his Corps by the best accounts I could get, consisted of about five 

hundred men, Continentals & Virginia State Troops, & one hundred 

Cavalry under Colonel Washington, & six or seven hundred Militia, 

but that Body is so fluctuating, that it is impossible to ascertain its 

number, within some hundreds, for three days following Lieut. Colonel 

Tarleton with the Legion & Corps annexed to it, consisting of about 

308 Cavalry & as Many Infantry, & the 1st Battalion of the 7 1st 

Regiment, and one three pounder, had already passed the Broad River, 

for the Relief of Ninty Six. I therefor directed Lieut. Colonel Tarleton 

to march on the West of Broad River, to endeavor to strike a blow at 

General Morgan, & in all events, to oblige him to repass the Broad 

River. I likewise ordered that he should take with him the 7th Regiment, 

and one three pounder, which were marching to reinforce the garrison 

of Nin’cy Six, as long as he should think their Services could be useful 

to him. The Remainder of the Army marched between the Broad River 

and the Catauba. As General Greene had quitted Mecklenburg County, 

& crossed the Pedee, Imade not the least doubt that General Morgan 

would retire on our advancing. The Progress of the Army was greatly 

impeded by heavy Rains, which swelled the Rivers & Creeks; yet Lieut. 

Cal. Tarleton conducted his march so well & got so near to General 

Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make it dangerous for 

him to pass the Broad River, and came up with him at 8330 AM on the 

17th instant. Everything now bore the most promising Aspect. The 

Enemy were drawn up in an open wood and, having been lately joined 

by some Militia, were more numerous; but the different Quality of the 

Corps under Lieut. Cal. Tarleton’s Command, and his great superiority 

in cavalry, left him no room of doubt of the most brilliant Success. The 

attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7th 

Regiment, the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry 

annexed to it; & Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank the 1st 

Battalion of the Zlst, and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the 

reserve. The Enemy’s Line soon gave way, & their Militia quitted the 

Field; but, on our Troops having been thrown in some disorder by the 

pursuit, General Morgan? Corps faced about & gave them a heavy fire. 

This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion in the first 
182 

Line. The 1st Battalion of the 71st & the cavalry were successively 

ordered up; but neither the exertions, entreaties, or Example of Lieut. 

Colonel Tarleton couId prevent the panic from becoming general; the 

two three pounders were taken, & I fear the Colors of the seventh 

Regiment shared the same fate. In justice to the Detachment of the 

Royal Artillery, I must here observe that no terrors could induce them 

to abandon their Guns, & they were all either killed or wounded in 

defense ofthem. Lieut. Colonel Tarleton with difficulty assembled fifty 

of his Cavalry, who having had time to recollect themselves, & being 

animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to 

victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington’s Horse, retook the 

Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy 

who had taken possession of it, & after destroying what they could not 

conveniently bring off, retired with the Remainder, unmolested, to 

Hamilton’s Ford, near the Mouth of Bullock’s Creek. The Loss of our 

Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 ofthe Infantry are either 

killed or wounded, or taken. I will transmit the particular account of 

the Loss, as soon as it can be ascertained. 

It is impossible to foresee all the consequences, that this unexpected & 

extraordinary event may produce, but your Excellency may be assured, 

that nothing but the most absolute necessity shah induce me to give up 

the important object of the Winter’s Campaign. I shall direct Lieut. 

Colonel Balfour to transmit a Copy ofthis Letter, by the first opportunity, to the Secretary of State. 

I have the Honor to be Your most obedt. & most humb. Servt. 

Cornwallis 

4. These letters from a British sympathizer in South Carolina, David 

George, with erroneous information, served to alarm and mislead 

Tarleton. The letters arrived at Tarleton’s camp in the late afternoon 

of 1 January 1781.” 

Letter I : 

My Wifes sister Last Night came to my house out of strong Rebel 

Settlement up at Princes fort; by her I have heard the Design & Intention 

ofthe Rebels; as far as their Captains have any Knowledge; as she came 

she Informs me that she got into some of their Camps on the south side 
183 

of the Pacolate River at one Grimes Mill about Ten or Twelve Miles 

beEow the Iron Works on Lasons Fork-she understood from Captain 

Francis Princes and Henry Princes Wives; That they were waiting for 

Colonel Morgan & Colonel Washington who was on their March; in 

order to Join Them Morgan with five or six Hundred Light horse had 

Crossed broad River at Smiths ford a few Dayes agoe; and Washington 

with their artillery and foot men was to Cross broad River at the same 

ford yesterday; That they intended to march against Ninety Six and 

agusta; they say they will have Three Thousand men; tho go against 

Them places: but I have alwayes observed that they alwayes make the 

Most of There men. 

Letter 2: 

I have sot [sic] down to acquaint you with what I have Heard a few 

Moments agoe Morgan & Washington Had Joind the party that Lay at 

Grimes Mill yesterday & they all moved to Colonel Henderson Plantation about a mile this side of the mill and I am well Informed that 

they Intend to March as fast as they can to Ninty Six I don’t believe 

they have as many men at it is Reported to my Wifes Sister. 
NOTES 

Appendk D 

1. Morgan, Papers, 9-l 0. 

2. Graham, Lift?, 27 1. 

3. Graham, Life, 272. 

4. Graham, Life, 267-69. Obviously Morgan or Graham has misdated this letter; 

it should read 3 1 December 1780. 

5. Graham, EjZ, 274-75. An abbreviated version can be found in Bass, Dragoon, 

146. 

6. Graham, Life, 272-74. 

7. Johnson, Correspondence, 370-71; and Graham, L$z, 285-86. 

8. Graham, Li&, 287-88. In Johnson, Correspondence, 373-74, this letter is dated 

incorrectly as 9 January. 

9. Bass, Dragoon, 139-40. 

10. Bass, Dragoon, 141. 

11, Tarleton, Campaigns, 250-5 1, The original letter was misdated 1780 instead of 

1781. Tarleton recognizes the error in his history, 250. Quoted in Bass, Dragoon, 143; and Edwards, Morgan, 97. 

12. Bass, Dragoon, 144. 

13. Tarleton, Campaigns, 25 l-52. 

14. Letter 8 is reproduced in Bass, Dragoon, 145. Letter 9 is from Bass, Dragoon, 

146; and Tarleton, Campaigns, 252-53, 

15. The sentence in italics was encoded in the original message. Tarleton, Campaigns, 253. 

16. Letters lo-14 may be found in Bass, Dragoon, 147, 150. 

17. Bass, Dragoon, 15 1. 

18. Reprinted in William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution so far as 

it is related to the States oflvorth and South Carolina, and Georgia (New York: 

David Longworth, 1802), 257-58. General Moultrie served in the Revolution 

185 
186 

and afterwards was elected governor of South Carolina Mackenzie dismisses 

this letter as “goodness of his heart,” Strictures, 10% George Hanger, who had 

served as a major with the Legion in South Carolina but was not present at the 

Cowpens, insists that this letter is a genuine reflection of Cornwallis’ sentiment 

toward Tarleton and not a mere consolation, Hanger, Address, 9 1. 

19. Bass, Dragoon, 148-49. 

20. Clark, StateRecmds, vol. 17,981-82. 

21. Bass, Dragoon, 142. 
APPENDIXE 

Miscellaneous Writings Pertaining to the Campaign 

of The Cowpens 

Contents 

Page 

1. Tarleton’s assessment of the battle of the Cowpens, 1787 ........................... 188 

2. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie’s letter published in the 

London Morning Chronicle, 9 August 1782 ................................................ 190 

3. Mackenzie’s assessment of Tarleton, 1787 ................................................... 190 

187 
188 

1. Tarleton’s assessment of the Battle of the Cowpensv” 

A diffuse comment upon this affair would be equally useless and 

tiresome: Two observations will be sufficient: One will contain the 

general circumstances which affected the plan of the campaign, and 

the other the particular incidents of the action. It appears that Earl 

Cornwallis intended to invade North Carolina: Before his march 

commenced, an irruption was made by the enemy into the western part 

of South Carolina: In order to expel hostility from that quarter, he 

directed Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton to proceed with a corps, and 

“push the enemy to the utmostS3; at the same time desiring to know if 

any movement by the main army would be useful. Tarleton, finding 

the Americans not so far advanced as was reported, halted his troops, 

that he might convey his opinion, by letter, to his commanding officer. 

He proposed that the army under Earl Comwallis, and the corps of light 

troops, should commence their march at the same time for King’s 

mountain, and that he would endeavour to destroy the enemy, or push 

them over the Broad river to that place. Earl Comwallis replied, that 

Tarleton perfectly understood his intentions [Letter 8, Miscellaneous 

Correspondence, Appendix D]. After three days move from Wynnesborough, his lordship sent intelligence that General Leslie was retarded 

by the waters, and that he imagined the light troops must be equally 

impeded. Tarleton shortened his mamhes till he heard that the reinforcement was out of the swamps, though he had more difficulties of 

that nature to struggle against than could possibly be found between 

the Catawba and Broad rivers: This delay being occasioned by General 

Leslie’s corps, rather astonished him, because the troops under that 

officer’s command were not mentioned in the first proposal; and ifthey 

were deemed necessary for the combination, one forced march would 

have brought them from the banks of the Catawba to the middle road, 

which Earl Comwallis was then moving on, between the two great 

rivers, and where no creeks or waters could obstmct their advance 

towards Tryon county. On the 14th Earl Cornwallis informed Tarleton 

that Leslie had surmounted his difficulties, and that he imagined the 

enemy would not pass the Broad river, though it had faIlen very much. 

Tarleton then answered, that he would try to cross the Pacolet to force 

them, and desired Earl Comwallis to acquire as high a station as 

possible, in order to stop their retreat. No letter, order, or intelligence, 

from head quarters, reached Tarleton after this reply, previous to the 

defeat on the 17th, and after that event he found Earl Comwallis on 

Turkey creek, near twenty-five miles below the place where the action 

had happened. The distance between Wynnesborough and King’s 

mountain, or Wynnesborough and Little Broad river, which would 
189 

have answered the same purpose, does not exceed sixty-five miles: Earl 

Cornwallis commenced his march on the 7th or 8th of January. It would 

be mortifying to describe the advantages that might have resulted from 

his lordship’s arrival at the concerted point, or to expiate upon the 

calamities which were produced by this event. If an army is acting 

where no co-operation can take place, it is necessary for the cornmander in chief to keep as near as possible to his detachments, if such 

a proceeding does not interfere with a manoeuvre which in itself would 

decide the events of the campaign. A steady adherence to that line of 

conduct would prevent the misfortunes which detachments are liable 

to, or soften their effects. Earl Comwallis might have conceived, that, 

by attending to the situation of the enemy, and of the country, and by 

covering his light troops, he would, in alI probabihty, have alternately 

brought Generals Morgan and Greene into his power by co-operative 

movements: He might also have concluded, that a11 his parties that were 

beaten in the country, if they had no corps to give them instant support 

or refuge, must be completely destroyed. Many instances of this nature 

occurred during the war. The fall of Ferguson [at King’s Mountain] 

was a recent and melancholy example: That catastrophe put a period 

to the first expedition into North Carolina; and the affair of the 

Cowpens overshadowed the commencement of the second. 

The particular incidents relative to the action arise from an examination of the orders, the march, the comparative situation of Morgan 

and Tarleton, the disposition, and the defeat. The orders were positive. 

The march was difficult, on account ofthe number of creeks andrivers; 

and circuitous, in consequence of such impediments: The Pacolet was 

passed by strategem: The Americans to avoid an action, left their camp, 

and marched all night: The ground where General Morgan had chosen 

for the engagement, in order to cover his retreat to Broad river, was 

disadvantageous for the Americans, and convenient for the British: An 

open wood was certainly as proper a place for action as Lieutenantcolonel Tarleton could desire; America does not produce many more 

suitable to the nature of the troops under his command. The situation 

of the enemy was desperate in case of misfortune; an open country, and 

a river in their rear, must have thrown them entirely into the power of 

a superior cavalry; whilst the light troops, in case of repulse, had the 

expectation of a neighboring force to protect them from destruction 

The disposition was planned with coolness, and executed without 

embarrassment. The defeat of the British must be ascribed either to the 

bravery or good conduct of the Americans; to the loose manner of 

forming which had always been practiced by the King’s troops in 

America; or to some unforeseen event, which may throw terror into 

the most disciplined soldiers, or counteracthe best-concerted designs. 
190 

The extreme extension of the files exposed the British regiments and 

corns, and would, before this unfortunate affair, have been attended 

with detrimental effect, had not the multiplicity of lines with which 

they generally fought rescued them from such imminent danger. If 

infantry who are formed very open, and only one or two deep, meet 

with opposition, they can have no stability: But when they experience 

an unexpected shock, confusion will ensue, and flight, without immediate support, must be the inevitable consequence. Other circumstances, perhaps, contributed to so decisive arout, which, ifthe military 

system admitted the same judicious regulation as the naval, a court 

martial would, perhaps, have disclosed. Public trials of commanding 

officers after unfortunate affairs are as necessary to one service as 

another, and might, in some instances, be highly beneficial to the 

military profession. Influenced by this idea, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, some days after the action, required Earl Cornwallis approbation 

of his proceedings, or his leave retire till inquiry could be instituted, to 

investigate his conduct. The noble earl% decided support of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton’s management of the King’s troops, previous to 

and during the action, is fully expressed in a letter from his lordship. 

2. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie served in the Tlst (Frasier’s) 

Highlanders at the battle of the Cowperrs. After his return to England, 

he attacked his former commander, Tarleton, in the press. This ptter 

appeared in the Landon Morning Chronicle on 9 August 1782. 

You got yourself and your party completely ambuscaded, completely surrounded, upon all sides, by Mr. Morgan’s rifle men. What 

was the consequence? The two detachments of British were made 

prisoners after a great slaughter was made among them, your Eegion 

dragoons were so broke by galling fire of rifle shot that your charging 

was in vain, till prudence, on your side, with about twenty men who 

were well mounted, made your retreat good, by leaving the remains of 

the poor blended legion in the hands of Mr. Morgan who I must say, 

though an enemy, showed great masterly abilities in this manoeuver. 

Thus fell, at one blow, all the Provincial Legion, with about &ee 

hun&ea! veterans [italics in Commager edition]!” 

3. Mackenzie’s Assessment of Tarleton. 

Letter XI 

My dear sir, 
191 

As a circumstantial detail of the actian at Cowpens was given to 

you in my last letter, observations upon the causes of that disaster shall 

be the subject of this. 

You have already my opinion, that Earl Cornwallis is incapable of 

wilful [sic] misrepresentation; leaving then to the judgment of others, 

the propriety of producing a confidential letter5, written by his Lordship in the goodness of his heart, evidently with design to console our 

author under a severe misfortune, and never meant for publication; I 

only contend, that this letter, is altogether inadequate to the purpose to 

which this journalist [Tarleton] has converted it, that of transferring the 

blame from himself to the troops. 

It has been before shewn, that the dispatches of Earl Cornwallis, 

with respect to the action of Blackstocks, had bestowed a laurel on 

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, which should have adorned the brows of 

General Sumpter, but then, as now, his Lordship drew his information 

from a corrupted fountain. That the “unqualified decision” of that 

nobleman in favour of our author, in regard to the action of Cowpens, 

was “made without any opportunity of personal observation” has been 

happily noticed by others6 It is a transcript of Lieutenant Colonel 

Tarleton’s report, and therefore, like the evidence of a man in his own 

cause, totally inadmissable. 

Our author, through the whole of his narrative, seems to have Julius 

Caesar inview; but Caesar’s mind was above any occasion forrecourse 

to vanity, ostentation, or detraction. It was his pride to bestow due 

praise on deserving officers, while this journalist distinguishes himself 

by lavishing reproaches directly on his General, and obliquely on 

others who had the misfortune of serving under his command. As an 

individual on this detachment, credit may be given to me for an 

acquaintance with every circumstance which is here described. If to be 

disinterested is necessary for the investigation of truth, I come so far 

qualified for this talk. Unconnected with party, devoid of spleen, and 

too unimportant to be affected by general reflections on collective 

bodies of military men, candour and impartiality may be allowed 

me---But to proceed. 

The first error in judgment to be imputed to Lieutenant Colonel 

Tarleton, on the morning of the 17th of January, 178 1, is, the not halting 

of his troops before he engaged the enemy. Had he done so, it is evident 

that the following advantages would have been the result of his 

conduct. General Morgan’s force and situation might have been distinctly viewed, under cover of a superior cavalry; the British infantry, 

fatigued with rapid marches, day and night, for some time past, as has 

? 
192 

been already observed, might have had rest and refreshment; a detachment from the several corps left with the baggage, together with 

bat&men, and afficers servants, would have bad time to come up. and 

join in the action. The artillery all this time might have been playing 

on the enemy’s front, or either flank, without risk of insuft; the 

commandants of regiments, Majors M’ Arthur and Newmarsh, officers 

who held commissions long before our author was born, and who had 

reputations to this day unimpeached, might have been consulted, and, 

not to dwell on the enumeration of all the advantages which would 

have accrued from so judicious a delay, time would have been given 

for the approach of Earl Cornwallis to the preconcerted point, for the 

unattainment of which he has been so much and so unjustly censured. 

The second error was, the un-officer-like impetuosity of directing 

the Iine to advance before it was properly formed, and before the 

reserve had taken its ground; in consequence of which, as might have 

been expected, the attack was premature, confused, and irregular. 

The third error in this ruinous business, was the omission of giving 

discretional powers to that judicious veteran M’Arthur, to advance 

with the reserve, at the time the front line was in pursuit of the militia, 

by which means the connection so necessary to troops engaged in the 

field was not preserved. 

His fourth error was, ordering Captain OgiEvie, with a troop, to 

charge, before any impression was made on the continentals, and 

before Washington’s cavalry had been, engaged. 

The next, and the most destructive, for I wih not pretend to fobllow 

him through all his errors, was in not bringing up a column of cavalry2 

and completing the rout, which, by his own acknowledgement, had 

commenced through the whoEe American inf”antsy. 

After what has been said, there may not, perhaps, be a better 

criterion to judge the conduct of those corps, upon whom Lieutenant 

Colonel Tarleton has stamped the charge of “total misbehaviour,‘” than 

by an examination of the state of discipline they were then under, of 

their general conduct upon every former occasion, and of the loss 

which they sustained on this. 

The fusihers had served with credit in America from the commencement of the war, and under an excellent officer, General Clarke, had 

attained the summit of military discipline: they had at this time, out of 

nine officers who were in the action, five7 killed or wounded. 

The first battalion of the 7 I st regiment, who had landed in Georgia 

in the year 1778, under the command of Archibald Gampbeh, had 
193 

established their reputation in the several operations in that province, 

at Stone Ferry, at the sieges of Savannah and Charlestown, and at the 

battle of Camden. Now, not inferior to the 7th regiment in discipline, 

they were led by an officer of great experience, who had come into the 

British service from the Scottish Dutch brigade: Out of sixteen officers 

[including the light company of the 2nd battalion] which they had in 

the field, nine8 were killed or wounded. 

The battalion of light infantry had signalized themselves separately 

on many occasions. The company of the 16th regiment’ was well 

known by its services in the army commanded by Major General 

Prevost; those of the seventy-first regiment were distinguished under 

Sir James Baird at the serprise of General [Anthony] Wayne in Pennsylvania, of Baylor’s dragoons in New Jersey, at Briar Creek in 

Georgia, at the capture and subsequent defence of Savarmah, at the 

battle near Camden under Earl Cornwallis; and even Lieutenant Colonel did them justice at the defeat of Sumpter, just after the last 

mentioned action. 

The Ii@ infantry company of the Prince of Wales’s American 

regiment, when but newly raised and indifferently disciplined, acquired reputation under General Tryon at Danbury; their only officer 

[Lieutenant Lindsay] was here wounded. 

The infantry of the legion had seen much service, and had always 

behaved well: this our author will surely not deny. 

The troops of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, when ordered 

into action, displayed that gallantry with which they had stamped their 

character on every former occasion. They had here but two officers, 

both of whom were wounded, one mortally.*l The detachment of 

artillery was totally annihilated. 

Such were the troops whom this journalist has so severely stigmatized. Few corps, in any age or country, will be found to have bled more 

freely. 

It is an established custom in armies for the commanding officer, 

whether victorious or vanquished, to account for the loss which he has 

sustained. In the present instance it requires no extraordinary sagacity 

to discover, that Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had his own particular 

reasons for withholding such an account; and it is evident that had this 

loss of officers, to which that of the soldiers probably bore a near 

proportion, been faithfully published, the veracity of our author’s 

account might have been justly called in question, and the cause of the 
194 

defeat, instead of being left to a “perhaps,” [italics original] might have 

been reduced to a certainty. 

In describing the particular incidents of this action, our journalist 

says, page 22 1, “The extreme extension of the files always exposed the 

British regiments and corps, and would, before this unfortunate affair, 

have been attended with detrimental effect, had not the multiplicity of 

lines with which they generally fought, rescued them from such 

imminent danger.” He still continues to furnish argument against 

himselfE if his files were too extensive, why did he not contract them? 

for he says, in the same page, that “the disposition was planned with 

coolness, and executed without embarrassment.” Any other mode of 

attack, or disposition, therefore, which he might have planned, wouEd 

doubtless have been executed with equal promptitude. The latter part 

of this quotation is not less inconsistent. I would ask Lieutenant 

Colonel TarIeton in what action, during the campaign of which he 

treats, did the multiplicity of lines rescue the British troops from 

imminent danger? and on what occasion did their front line, or any part 

thereof, give way I believe it will be found that it fell to Lieutenant 

Colonel Tarleton alone to lead the troops of Britain into a situation, 

from which they could be driven by an equal; or even by double or 

treble their number. 

When Earl Cornwall& fought the memorable battle near Camden, 

his force, considerably under two thousand men, was opposed by 

upwards of six thousand. At Guilford, his Lordship, with not one third 

of the enemy, obtained a glorious victory over General Greene, the best 

commander in the American service; and Lord Rawdon upon 

Hobkirk’s Hill, routed the same General, who had now added experience to his other talents, and this, though his numbers compared with 

his enemy, did not bear the last mentioned proportion. Many other 

proofs could be brought of the fallacy of our author’s reasoning, but 

these which have been adduced will, I trust, sufficiently shew the 

impossibility of forming a multiplicity of lines, with so manifest an 

inferiority of numbers; nay, I venture to affhrn, that the disparity of 

force at Cowpens was smaller that it had been in any engagement 

during the southern campaigns, consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton had it in his power to engage with greater advantages than 

occurred either previous to his defeat or since. 

Ramsey has well observed, Volume II, p. 203, 

whilst Lord Comwallis was anticipating, in imagination, a rich 

harvest of glory, from a rapid succession of victories, he received the 

intelligence, no less unwelcome than unexpected, of the complete 
19s 

overtbrow of the detachment led by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. So 

contemptible, from their conduct at Camden, was his Lordship% opinion of the American militia-so unlimited was his confidence in the 

courage and abilities ofLieutenant Colonel tarleton, that, of all improbable events, none seemed to him mare improbable, than that an inferior 

force, two-thirds militia, should gain such a decisive advantage over 

his favourite hero. 

I have now done with the action at Cowpens, and on this occasion 

confess that I am not without my feelings as an individual for so wanton 

an attack on characters and entire corps, whose conduct had been, til 

then, unsullied. There is not an officer who survived that disastrous 

day, who is not far beyond the reach of slander and detraction; and with 

respect to the dead, I leave to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton all the 

satisfaction which he can enjoy, from reflecting that he led a number 

of brave men to destruction, and then used every effort in his power to 

damn their fame with posterity. 

I am, etc. 
I 

NOTES 

Appendix E 

1. Tarleton, Campaigns, 225-28. 

2. See Letter 4, Cornwallis to Tar&on, Appendix E, 1’74. 

3. Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of “SeventySix, vol. 2 (Indianapolis IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), x. 

4. Mackenzie, Sttictures, 104-18. I have summarized Mackenzie’s lengthy quotations from Tarleton’s work. 

5. Mackenzie cites a letter from Cornwallis to Tarleton reproduced in Appendix 

D, 179. 

6. Mackenzie cites the Critical Review af May 1787. 

7. Mackenzie lists Captain Helyar and Lieutenant Marshal killed, Major Newmarsh (the commander) and Lieutenants Harling and LEstrange wounded, 

Strictures, 110). 

8. Mackenzie lists Lieutenants Macleod and Chisholm killed and Lieutenants 

Grant, Mackintosh, Flint, Mackenzie (the author}, Sinclair, Forbes, and 

Macleod wounded, Strictures, 111 tjl 1 i 

9. Sir Frederick Maurice tells us that the 16th Foot was with Cornwallis at the I 

I time of Tarleton’s defeat, in The 16th Foot (London: Constable & Company, 

193 l), 67. Returns of 15 January 1781 indicate that the army contained only 

three companies of the 16th, totaling only forty-one rank and file present for 

duty, Clark, State Records, vol. 17, 1009. 

10. This is the only mention of the presence of the Prince of Wales’ American 

Regiment, raised in June 1777. In some accounts, it is described merely as “the 

light company”; in others, it may be lumped in with the British Legion, 

Raymond, Loyalists, 209. 

11. These were Lieutenant Nettles and Cornet Patterson. Patterson was mortally 

wounded, Stricrures, 113. 

197 
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