IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-10092

DAVID WALLACE CROFT; SHANNON KRISTINE CROFT, as Parents and

Next Friend of minor Children

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, Rick Perry

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:

David and Shannon Croft, as parents and next friends of their three minor

children (collectively, the “Crofts”), bring suit against the governor of the state

of Texas, Rick Perry (“Perry”), arguing that Texas Education Code § 25.082(d)

is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Perry, holding that § 25.082(d) had a secular

legislative purpose and was not an establishment of religion. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 16, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-10092

The underlined portions are the provisions added or amended in 2003, while the

1

stricken portions are the 1995 provisions that were deleted.

2

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Section 25.082(d) provides for a mandatory moment of silence to be

observed in Texas schools in which a student may “as the student chooses,

reflect, pray, meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to

interfere with or distract another student.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082(d). The

provision, which became effective September 1, 2003, is a subsection of a broader

statute amended at the same time under the heading “School Day; Pledges of

Allegiance; Minute of Silence” (the “2003 Amendments”). Texas Education Code

§ 25.082, in its entirety, provides as follows:1

(a) A school day shall be at least seven hours each day, including

intermissions and recesses.

(b) The board of trustees of each school district shall require

students, once during each school day at each school in the district,

to recite [pledges of allegiance to the United States and Texas flags]

(c) On written request from a student’s parent or guardian, a school

district shall excuse the student from reciting a pledge of allegiance

under Subsection (b). 

(b) (d) A The board of trustees of each school district may shall

provide for a period the observance of one minute of silence at the

beginning of the first class of each school day at each school in the

district following the recitation of the pledges of allegiance to the

United States and Texas flags under Subsection (b). during which

a During the one-minute period, each student may, as the student

chooses, reflect, pray, or meditate., or engage in any other silent

activity that is not likely to interfere with or distract another

student. Each teacher or other school employee in charge of

students during that period shall ensure that each of those students

remains silent and does not act in a manner that is likely to

interfere with or distract another student. 

As the underlined and stricken portions indicate, the amendments changed a

1995 statute that was simply entitled “School Day” and provided as follows:
No. 08-10092

3

(a) A school day shall be at least seven hours each day, including

intermissions and recesses.

(b) A school district may provide for a period of silence at the

beginning of the first class of each school day during which a

student may reflect or meditate.

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082 (1995). The 2003 statute left untouched a broader, yet

related, 1995 provision entitled “Exercise of Constitutional Right to Pray,” which

states that: 

A public school student has an absolute right to individually,

voluntarily, and silently pray or meditate in school in a manner that

does not disrupt the instructional or other activities of the school.

A person may not require, encourage, or coerce a student to engage

in or refrain from such prayer or meditation during any school

activity.

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.901.

As the district court noted, the 2003 moment of silence provision of § 25.082

differs from the 1995 version as follows:

(1) it made the provision of a moment of silence mandatory rather

than discretionary; (2) it changed “period of silence” to “one minute

of silence”; (3) it added the word “pray” to the list of designated

options; (4) it added the catch-all “or engage in any other silent

activity that is not likely to interfere with or distract another

student”; and (5) it added a provision for teachers or other school

employees to maintain discipline during the one-minute period.

Croft v. Governor of Tex., 530 F. Supp. 2d 825, 829 (N.D. Tex. 2008). The 2003

statutory section, on the whole, also made the following changes: (1) it added the

pledge of allegiance to the United States flag; (2) it added the pledge of

allegiance to the Texas state flag; and (3) it provided a procedure for exemption

from reciting either pledge.

Beyond the relative changes and additions represented by the provision

itself, the 2003 statute does not include a signing statement or preamble by

which legislative intent can be inferred. Nevertheless, transcripts from
No. 08-10092

 In articulating the purposes of the 2003 statute, Perry relies on an October 10, 2006 2

letter by Shirley Neeley, Commissioner of the Texas Education Agency, indicating the

purposes of accommodating religion, encouraging thoughtful contemplation, and promoting

patriotism. Yet, given that the letter was written several years after the statute’s adoption

and contemporaneous with this litigation, we need not defer to its interpretation. See, e.g., In

re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d 788, 807 (5th Cir. 2000) (“where an agency’s interpretation occurs

at such a time and in such a manner as to provide a convenient litigation position for the

agency, we have declined to defer to the interpretation”). 

 The Virginia law to which Senator Wentworth referred in the committee meeting was 3

a mandatory “minute of silence” that was held constitutional by the Fourth Circuit. Brown

v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court actually denied certiorari, and

never ruled on the merits of the case. See Brown v. Gilmore, 534 U.S. 996 (2001). Senator

Wentworth acknowledged this distinction later, but argued that it was immaterial.

4

committee hearings and floor debates, which were summarized at length by the

district court, id. at 837–45, provide significant insight into the purpose of the

legislation. Pertinent details are as follows: 2

• On February 11, 2003, in introducing in committee the first

draft of Senate Bill 83—which did not include a pledge and

was designed to amend § 25.901 (the “right to pray” section),

not § 25.082 (the “school day” section)—its sponsor, Senator

Wentworth, repeatedly stated, “since the U.S. Supreme Court

has [just] upheld [a similar mandatory statute] in Virginia we

ought at least to give Texas students the opportunity to

reflect, meditate or pray.” The senator acknowledged that a 3

period of silence already existed in Texas law (under §

25.082), but expressed a desire to add “prayer” to “bring to the

State of Texas . . . the advantage and opportunity [that

Virginia students have] already.” Senator Wentworth also

stated that the bill was prompted by the Supreme Court

“ruling upholding a Virginia state statute,” and that although

it may not restore the audible prayer that “[m]ost Texans”

prefer, it is what the Supreme Court now allows, and all that

it allows. As to the minute of silence being required, he

thought this would help relieve controversy at the local level.

• Discussing the original bill, Senator Wentworth lamented the

“coarsening of society” and “the lack of prayer in schools.”

Yet, he repeatedly asserted that, “for purposes of legislative

intent, this is not a prayer bill. . . . It’s an opportunity to give

people a chance to spend 60 seconds on a daily basis to reflect
No. 08-10092

 The evidence presented for the April 1, 2003 House Committee and May 5, 2003

4

House floor discussions is limited to transcription of the audio tapes. 

5

or meditate or pray.” He observed, “we won’t know whether

they’re doing any of those three things . . . [t]hey may be doing

something else, because it is actually 60 seconds of silence.”

Senator Janek added that the approach is “a more civilized

moment [for voluntary prayer or meditation] . . . rather than

[] the cacophony of the school noises and lockers slamming.”

• Senator Wentworth dismissed a challenge to the silent, rather

than verbal or physical, nature of voluntary prayer activity in

the bill as arguably unconstitutional, and repeatedly stressed

his desire to conform to Supreme Court precedent—e.g., “I’m

not trying to pass a bill that’s going to be struck down by the

U.S. Supreme Court, and that’s why I’ve tailored the language

to follow another state statute that’s already been upheld by

the U.S. Supreme Court.”

• In the February 2003 committee meeting, concern was raised

by legislators about the nature of the bill as an exception to

the non-coercion rights in § 25.901, and, as the district court

recounted, witnesses testified on both sides of this issue and

the bill generally. Pertinently, Kathy Douglas of the Texas

Association of School Boards suggested that to “show . . . the

legislative intent to separate this issue from the issue of

prayer,” the bill might be better suited in amending § 25.082

(the “school day”), not § 25.901 (the “right to pray”). 

• At a March 25, 2003 committee meeting, Senator Wentworth

announced that the bill had been altered to amend § 25.082,

not § 25.091 (as urged by Ms. Douglas), include pledges to the

United States and Texas flags (with an opt-out), and require

students to stand. Witnesses testified for and against the bill.

An amendment was made to delete the rule that students

stand, and the bill unanimously passed (7 to 0) in committee.

• On April 1, 2003, the related House Bill 793 was introduced

to the House Public Education Committee by Representative

Branch. According to the Governor’s representations to the

district court, Representative Branch stated to the 4

committee—in response to challenges from colleagues that the

bill was “bathed in religio[n]”—that “silence at the beginning
No. 08-10092

6

of the day is a good thing for students, . . . [and] not only to

focus on the patriotism of the country, the love of state, but

also a common moment of preparation, deliberation, and

meditation to focus on the serious business of educating our

students that day.” Co-author Representative Bonnen added,

“I can tell you the authors’ intent . . . [i]t’s to give [students]

a time to really thing [sic] about the seriousness of the day.”

• On April 4, 2003, the senate bill was debated on the floor. At

that debate, several senators raised objections to using the

word “pray,” the mandatory nature of the measure, and that

only silent prayer is allowed. Senator Wentworth stated that

“this is not a school prayer amendment,” “this bill came about

as the result of my reading a newspaper account last year of

the United States Supreme Court’s upholding the Virginia

statute,” and “[s]chool districts still will be neutral on religion

even if this bill is passed . . . .” Senator Lucio added that the

pledge helps to “teach our kids Americanism, patriotism,” and

“to have a moment of silence really gives an opportunity for

our children . . . to pray just momentarily to their God and to

be thankful that they live in the greatest country in the

world.” After respective amendments were defeated to revisit

the issue in two years and delete the word “pray,” the bill

passed 27 to 4.

• On May 5, 2003, the bill was debated on the House floor. At

that time, Representative Branch asserted that “[t]he primary

purpose of S.B. 83 is to promote the core values of patriotism

and establish a contemplative period that underscores the

seriousness of the education endeavor. It directs school

districts to provide for the U.S. pledge, the Texas pledge, that

is the pledge to the Texas flag, and also a one minute period

of silence.”

• Finally, on May 6, 2003, the bill was debated on the House

floor. Representative Hupp offered an amendment to make a

minute of silence up to local school boards; the amendment

was defeated. In support of the bill, Representative Edwards

lamented “that a number of undesirable things happened

when we took prayer out of school.”

• In the final House debate on May 6, 2003, the bill’s sponsor,

Representative Branch, proclaimed that the bill offers “an
No. 08-10092

7

opportunity for the school children to say the U.S. pledge, the

Texas pledge and have this minute of silence when they can

do anything they want; but it does set the tone for the day

that this is serious business, education and that they can

contemplate what they plan to do with their day.” In

responding to a challenge as to the type of activity as limited

to silence, Representative Branch opined, “[a]ll this bill does

is tries to have a neutral space, a period of silence . . . [i]t

doesn’t direct any activity.” He stated further that he

understood that “a moment of silence which allows for prayer

is permissible constitutionally,” and that “although [he] might

occasionally disagree with the Supreme Court, [he] respect[s]

it as the rule of law of the land . . . .” The bill passed 132 to 4,

with 1 abstention. 

The District Court reviewed all of the legislative history and upheld the

statute. It rejected two of the purposes offered by Perry: fostering patriotism

and accommodation of religion. But the court held that the addition of “pray”

along with other “substantive changes to the activities students could engage in,

both prior to, and during, the moment of silence” did serve a secular purpose of

encouraging a period of thoughtful contemplation. Croft, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 838,

847. As a result, it survived the first prong of Lemon. The court also held that

the addition of “pray” did not have the primary effect of advancing religion or

cause excessive entanglement between government and religion, and so did not

violate the Establishment Clause. The Crofts appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

The parties dispute the correct standard of review for this case. Perry

relies on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984), to argue that a district

court’s findings on legislative purpose should be affirmed unless clearly

erroneous. But Lynch came to the Supreme Court following a trial on the

merits. See id. at 671–72; Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F.Supp. 1150, 1154 (D.R.I.

1981). The same appears to be true of the only other case cited by Perry, May

v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 242 (3rd Cir. 1985) (referencing a “final hearing”
No. 08-10092

8

and the district court making “findings of fact and conclusions of law in support

of a final judgment”).

This case, however, comes to us on the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Therefore, the normal summary judgment standard of review applies.

We review “a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal

standard as the district court.” Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Estate, 547 F.3d 273,

277 (5th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment should be rendered if the record

demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 

The Supreme Court established a general framework for analyzing

Establishment Clause challenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

Lemon has three prongs: (1) “the statute must have a secular legislative

purpose;” (2) “its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances

nor inhibits religion;” and (3) “the statute must not foster an excessive

government entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (internal quotations

omitted). In addition, a statute cannot discriminate among religious sects

without showing a compelling governmental interest and a “close fit.” See

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982).

 In evaluating a secular purpose, it “must be sincere; a law will not pass

constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is

merely a sham.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But the statute need not have “exclusively secular” objectives.

Id. Rather, the “touchstone” is neutrality, and it is only “[w]hen the government

acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion [that]

it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious

neutrality.” McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). In McCreary

County, the Supreme Court reviewed all of the times that it had invalidated a

statute because of an illegitimate purpose and determined that “[i]n each case,
No. 08-10092

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the government’s action was held unconstitutional only because openly available

data supported a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated

the government's action.” Id. at 863 (emphasis added). While the purpose

requirement “serves an important function,” it is “rarely . . . determinative.” Id.

at 859 (quotation omitted). This is “presumably because government does not

generally act unconstitutionally, with the predominant purpose of advancing

religion.” Id. at 863.

What is important for Lemon’s purpose prong is the overall legislative

purpose of the allegedly unconstitutional provision, not a particular legislator’s

motive in supporting it. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496

U.S. 226, 249 (1990). Some legislators may have religious motives, but that

alone does not invalidate an act with an otherwise secular legislative purpose.

See, e.g., id. (“Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that

religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone

would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the legislative purpose

of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted

the law.”). Long ago, the Supreme Court found that the “daily recitation of the

Pledge of Allegiance, or even the observance of a moment of reverent silence at

the opening of class, may . . . serve the solely secular purposes of the devotional

activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of

the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of

religion and government.” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,

281 (1963). More recently, the Supreme Court and three Circuit Courts have

heard direct challenges to moment of silence statutes. 

In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute

that had amended an earlier moment of silence statute to add the option for

voluntary prayer. 472 U.S. at 61. In Wallace, the legislative history was

absolutely clear that the statute had the purpose of advancing religion. Id. at
No. 08-10092

10

56–57. The sponsor of the bill stated that it was an “effort to return voluntary

prayer” to public schools, and that the bill had no secular purpose. Id. Nor did

the state “present evidence of any secular purpose.” Id. at 57. The only

substantive change was the addition of “or voluntary prayer” to a previous

statute which mandated a moment of silence “for meditation.” Id. at 58. The

Court found that there was no secular purpose for this change, since voluntary

prayer was already protected by the previous statute. Id. Because there was no

secular purpose, the statute violated the first prong of Lemon and was

unconstitutional. Id. at 61.

Justice O’Connor concurred in Wallace, but wrote separately to examine

moment of silence statutes in more detail. She found that a moment of silence

is “not inherently religious,” and that by mandating such a period, “a State does

not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the period.” Id. at

72–73. Even if the statute specifies a student may pray, “the State has not

thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives.” Id. at 73. But if

a teacher tells children to pray, or if the face of the statute or legislative history

promotes prayer over other alternatives, then the state may be improperly

endorsing religion. Id. Examining legislative purpose, however, is a “deferential

and limited” inquiry, and courts have “no license to psychoanalyze the

legislators.” Id. at 74. “If a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for

a moment of silence statute in either the text or the legislative history . . . then

courts should generally defer to that stated intent.” Id. at 74–75. “Since there

is arguably a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in public schools,

courts should find an improper purpose behind such a statute only if the statute

on its face [or] in its official legislative history . . . suggests it has the primary

purpose of endorsing prayer.” Id. at 75. In Wallace, however, given its

legislative history and the fact that no secular purpose was advanced, Justice
No. 08-10092

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O’Connor found that “the conclusion is unavoidable that the purpose of the

statute is to endorse prayer in public schools.” Id. at 77.

Soon after Wallace, the Third Circuit invalidated a New Jersey moment

of silence statute. May, 780 F.2d 240. The District Court in May had found that

the New Jersey statute, which does not mention prayer, violated all three prongs

of Lemon. Id. at 247. The Third Circuit held that there was no violation of the

effect or entanglement prongs. Id. at 247–50. The district court, however, ruling

before Wallace, had found that the state’s proffered secular purpose—“to provide

a transition from nonschool life to school life”—was pretextual. Id. at 251. The

Third Circuit could not say that this finding was “clearly erroneous,” and so

accepted the district court’s finding that there was no secular purpose. Id. at

252. The Third Circuit did not find any evidence, however, that the statute was

passed to encourage prayer over other alternatives. Id. But “because the

Supreme Court has expressly required a secular purpose when considering a

constitutional challenge under the establishment clause and because the district

court made a finding that [the statute] lacked such a secular purpose, we hold

the New Jersey statute to be unconstitutional under the first amendment.” Id.

at 253.

In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Georgia moment of silence statute

in Bown v. Gwinnett County School District, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997). The

statute allowed for a moment of silence, but specifically stated that it was not

intended to be conducted as a religious service, and a preamble to the act stated

that the purpose was to allow a moment of quiet reflection for students. Id. at

1466. The legislative history indicated that the sponsor had brought the act

forward as part of a package to reduce youth violence. Id. at 1467. The

legislative transcripts revealed that some House members wanted to institute

school prayer and saw the act as accomplishing that goal. Id. A few members

opposed the act for that reason, although several spoke in favor and stated that
No. 08-10092

12

they did not believe that it authorized school prayer or had a religious purpose.

Id.

The Bown court first examined the statutory language, and found that the

preamble and act espoused a clear secular purpose of allowing a moment of quiet

reflection. Id. at 1469–71. While the court noted that the legislative history was

“somewhat conflicting,” it held that it was not inconsistent with this secular

purpose. Id. at 1471. Even though some of the legislators may have indeed had

religious motives, the language of the statute revealed a clearly secular purpose,

which satisfied the first Lemon prong. Id. at 1472. The court also found that

there was no impermissible effect of the statute or any resulting excessive

entanglement of the state with religion. Id. at 1472–74.

In 2001, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia moment of silence statute

in Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001). In 1976, Virginia enacted a

moment of silence statute which authorized, but did not require, schools to

observe a moment of silence where students could “meditate, pray, or engage in

any other silent activity.” Id. at 270. The Virginia legislature later amended the

statute in 2000 to require that every school provide the minute of silence. Id. at

271. In analyzing the legislative purpose, the Fourth Circuit first examined its

text and found two secular purposes: to promote non-religious meditation and

to accommodate religion. Id. at 276. The court held that a “statute having dual

legitimate purposes—one clearly secular and one the accommodation of

religion—cannot run afoul of the first Lemon prong.” Id. at 277. Nor did the

statute facially violate the second prong of Lemon “given the statute’s facial

neutrality between religious and nonreligious modes of introspection and other

silent activity.” Id. The court also did not find an excessive entanglement,

holding that the “involvement in religion is negligible, [with the teacher only]

informing students that one of the permissible options during the moment of

silence is prayer.” Id. at 278.
No. 08-10092

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In all four of these cases, none of the courts found that moment of silence

statutes had the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or fostered

excessive government entanglement with religion. All of the courts focused on

the legislative purpose of these statutes. Wallace overturned the Alabama

statute because the state did not advance any secular purpose, and the statute’s

sponsor explicitly stated that the statute was meant to bring prayer back into

schools. May overturned the New Jersey statute because the district court had

found that the proffered secular purpose was pretextual. That finding was not

clearly erroneous, and with no other secular reasons offered, the Third Circuit

was compelled to find the statute unconstitutional. All of these cases follow the

Supreme Court’s assertion in McCreary that statutes have only been overturned

on the purpose prong of Lemon if a religious purpose “permeated” the

government’s action or the secular purpose serves only as a “sham.”

DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Constitutional standing has three elements: (1) an “injury in fact” that is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the

likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Alliance Defense Fund (ADF)

amicus brief and Perry argue that the Crofts have not stated any sufficient

injury, and so lack standing to bring this case.

 “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,

373 (1976). The question then becomes whether the Crofts have alleged a

personal loss of First Amendment freedoms. It is not enough simply to argue

that there has been some violation of the Establishment Clause; they must
No. 08-10092

The Crofts have not argued that they have taxpayer standing to challenge the 5

statute, or that they have suffered “psychological discomfort,” so we need not consider those

arguments addressed by Perry and the ADF amicus. 

14

allege a personal violation of rights. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 5

for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 n.22 (1982).

The Crofts have children who are required to observe a moment of silence

every day they attend school. The Crofts’ complaint alleges that the moment of

silence statute violates the Establishment Clause and that their children’s

constitutional rights are being violated by being required to undergo the moment

of silence. Perry argues that the Crofts have not alleged any specific injury that

resulted from participating in the moment of silence.

In Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007)

(en banc), the Fifth Circuit evaluated standing in an Establishment Clause

context. The plaintiffs were challenging prayers said at school board meetings,

and the court found that unless they could prove that they were “exposed to” and

“injured by” those prayers, they lacked standing. Id. at 497. Because there was

no evidence that the plaintiffs had ever attended a school board meeting,

however, they could not prove any injury from the prayers. Id. at 499. The

plaintiff bears the burden to prove standing “with the manner and degree of

evidence required at successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 498 (quoting

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). But the Doe court specifically noted that they could

“certainly ‘assume’ that the Does may have been offended by an invocation at a

school board meeting, if they attended one.” Id. After a bench trial based on

stipulations, however, the Does had brought forward no evidence that they had

ever attended a school board meeting and heard the offending prayer, so they

lacked standing. Id. 

At this stage of litigation—summary judgment—the plaintiffs’ burden on

standing is only to raise an issue of material fact. The Crofts have alleged that
No. 08-10092

15

their children are enrolled in Texas public schools and are required to observe

the moment of silence daily. Perry does not dispute this fact, and while still a

party, the school district admitted in its answer that the Crofts’ children

attended school there. The Crofts’ children are definitely present for the

moment of silence, and like in Doe, we can assume that they or their parents

have been offended—else they would not be challenging the law. That is enough

to establish standing at this stage of the suit.

The ADF amicus claims that a moment of silence cannot violate the

Establishment Clause, as there is no active religious component. But that is a

question to be determined on the merits, which must come after determining

whether we have jurisdiction to hear the case. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank

v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S.Ct. 2709, 2716 (2008) (“[W]e bear an

independent obligation to assure ourselves that jurisdiction is proper before

proceeding to the merits.”). Because the Crofts have claimed a personal violation

of their First Amendment rights, we have jurisdiction to determine on the merits

whether those rights have in fact been violated.

B. Establishment Clause

1. Purpose

In his brief, Perry advances three secular purposes for the 2003

Amendments: fostering patriotism, providing a period for thoughtful

contemplation, and protecting religious freedom. The 2003 Amendments

changed the way that every schoolchild in Texas begins the day. They provide

for the recitation of the pledges of allegiance to the flags of the United States and

Texas, followed by a minute of silence for students to “reflect, pray, meditate, or

engage in any other silent activity . . . .” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082. On its face,

the statute seems to serve two of the above purposes: of fostering patriotism (for

both America and the State of Texas), and of providing a period for thoughtful

contemplation. From the statutory language alone, it does not appear that the
No. 08-10092

 The Supreme Court considered two other textual changes in Wallace: that the new 6

statute applied to all grades and that it changed the word “shall” to “may.” 472 U.S. at 58.

16

legislative purpose in adding the term “pray” to § 25.082(d) is to advance

religion, particularly since the bill expressly allows for any silent use of the

moment of silence, either religious or non-religious. 

Regarding the third stated purpose, of protecting religious freedom, this

purpose does not appear on the face of the statute. While the option to “pray” is

included in the 2003 Amendments, Texas already had a statute specifically

stating that students have “an absolute right” to “silently pray or meditate in

school.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.901. Any purpose of protecting religious freedom

was already accomplished by this earlier statute. There is also no state-imposed

burden on free exercise rights that the 2003 Amendments protect against, and

so “protecting religious freedom” does not seem to be a valid purpose on the face

of the statute. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57 n.45 (“[I]t is undisputed that . . . there

was no governmental practice impeding students from silently praying for one

minute at the beginning of each schoolday; thus, there was no need to

‘accommodate’ or to exempt individuals from any general governmental

requirement because of the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise

Clause.”).

Prior to the 2003 Amendments, Texas already had a moment of silence

statute that allowed districts to provide for a “period of silence” where students

might “reflect or meditate.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082(b) (1995). The 2003

Amendments, however, include several substantive changes such as the addition

of the pledges, making the moment of silence mandatory, establishing the

indefinite “period” as “one minute,” and allowing students to “pray” or “engage

in any other silent activity.” This case is thus somewhat different than Wallace,

where the Supreme Court found that the only substantive change was the

addition of the words “or voluntary prayer.” 472 U.S. at 58–59. As such, we 6
No. 08-10092

Neither change, however, had any effect on the students involved in the litigation, who were

in “kindergarten or second grade” and to whom the mandatory language continued to apply.

Id. at 59. In this case, the many substantive changes to the statute did apply directly to the

Crofts’ children.

17

must consider all of the substantive changes in evaluating the purpose behind

the 2003 Amendments.

The Crofts focus on the addition of the word “pray” without examining the

other changes. But the amendments were introduced as a package to change the

start of every school day to include the pledges of allegiance and a more

comprehensive list of appropriate activities during the minute of silence (itself

changed from a period of silence); in fact, during the legislative process, it was

purposefully changed from being a bill that amended the exercise of a right to

pray to being one that amended the beginning of the school day. This is not an

omnibus bill with provisions that have little to no relation to one another. The

Crofts do not point to any case law requiring us to parse the legislature’s intent

so finely as to go word by word looking for religious purpose. In Wallace, the

only reason that the Supreme Court focused solely on the addition of “prayer”

was because that was the only substantive change in the amendment that

affected the children at issue. 472 U.S. at 58–59. Conversely, in Bown, the

Eleventh Circuit considered as indicative of legislative purpose that the bill was

brought forward as part of a legislative package aimed at reducing youth

violence. 112 F.3d at 1467. Here, we have multiple substantive changes altering

the beginning of every Texas public school day, including the option to engage

in “any other silent activity” during the moment of silence. TEX. EDUC. CODE §

25.082(d) (emphasis added). We consider the purpose of the 2003 Amendment,

including the addition of the word “pray,” in this context.

From the bill’s text, the obvious purpose of the pledges is to inculcate

patriotism among students. Following the pledges with a minute of silence then

allows time for reflection before starting the school day. Thus, at least from the
No. 08-10092

 Where, as here, a valid secular purpose can be gleaned from the text of the statute at

7

issue, we are not convinced of the wisdom of reviewing legislative history, an arduous and

potentially risky task. Nevertheless, because the history here supports the textual purpose,

it is unnecessary to belabor the point.

18

statutory text, it seems that the purpose of the 2003 Amendments is to foster

patriotism and provide for a period, if a student so desires, of thoughtful

contemplation. Within this context, the purpose of § 25.082(d) is clearly

permissible. In addition to adding “pray,” the new text adds “engage in any

other silent activity that is not likely to interfere with or distract another

student.” The neutral, non-coercive purpose of providing examples of

permissible silent activities during the minute of silence at the start of a now

more organized and contemplative school day is buttressed further by the fact

that § 25.901, which still provides that “[a] person may not require, encourage,

or coerce a student” vis-a-vis prayer, was intentionally left unamended. TEX.

EDUC. CODE § 25.901. 

The legislative history generally supports these secular purposes. Unlike 7

in Wallace, where the sponsoring state senator stated that his sole purpose for

the bill at issue was “an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools,”

472 U.S. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted), the supporting legislators in

Texas, particularly in the House debates, emphasized the need for an

opportunity to begin the school day with patriotic pledges and a reflective

moment. In May, the Third Circuit rejected the “transition from nonschool life

to school life” as a pretext, citing district court findings about a lack of

pedagogical support and a history of legislative efforts to “return prayer to the

public schools.” 780 F.2d at 251–52. Here, there is no pedagogical evidence to

rebut legislative intent, there are no relevant district court findings on which to

defer, and there is no evidence of a steady “prayer in schools” effort. 

Although Senator Wentworth (and at least one House member) cited “lack

of prayer in schools” in lamenting various societal ills, he repeatedly emphasized
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19

that “for purposes of legislative intent, this is not a prayer bill.” The House

sponsors also emphasized the non-religious purposes of the law even more

consistently. On the whole, the debates suggest a history more similar to Bown

and Brown, where several reasons, including the return to prayer but also purely

secular ones such as a reflective moment, were given in support of the pertinent

legislation and passed constitutional scrutiny. See Brown, 258 F.3d at 277;

Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471. “Indeed, the Wallace Court noted that even though a

statute is ‘motivated in part by a religious purpose’ it may still satisfy the Lemon

test.” Brown, 258 F.3d at 277 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56). Even if some

legislators had religious motives in promoting this legislation, there are clear

secular legislative purposes present. This is unlike Wallace or May, where there

were really no secular purposes at all. 

Finally, unlike Alabama’s “campaign of defiance” in Wallace, as the Fourth

Circuit described it in Brown, 258 F.3d at 279, and New Jersey’s history “of other

less facially neutral efforts to return prayer to the public schools” in May, 780

F.2d at 252, the effort in Texas was an isolated one to conform to current law, as

the legislature saw it. The legislative history repeatedly indicates that the

statute at hand was the direct product of the success of the Virginia statute in

Brown. In adding the word “pray,” Senator Wentworth conceded that he was

amending existing state law vis-a-vis school prayer; yet, in doing so, he was

trying to afford an “opportunity” to Texas students otherwise now enjoyed by

those in Virginia. Whether this bill was needed is debatable, but nothing in the

record can rebut the timing or purpose of Senator Wentworth’s bill marking it

as one that respects, rather than challenges, existing constitutional law. The

senator and his House colleagues repeatedly emphasized the importance of

conforming the bill to Supreme Court precedent—hardly evidence of a religious

purpose.
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While there were references by some legislators to returning prayer to

schools, the religious motives of some legislators should not deflect us from the

secular purposes contained in the plain text of § 25.082(d) and espoused by the

legislature to justify the 2003 Amendments. Our review here is deferential, and

it is very clear that the Texas legislature had a plausible secular purpose to pass

these Amendments. As a result, they survive the first Lemon prong.

2. Primary Effect

The Crofts argue that the primary effect of the 2003 Amendments was to

“advance certain forms of mainstream Protestant Christian religion, while

inhibiting less mainstream religions.” Their argument is also that by including

“pray,” the state has given religious people a benefit because they need not

consult a lawyer to know that their children can pray during the moment of

silence while non-religious people must consult a lawyer to find out that their

children may “not pray” during the same period.

Again, the Crofts focus very narrowly on the addition of the word “pray”

while ignoring all of the other substantive changes to the statute. Their

argument that parents must consult a lawyer to determine that their children

may “not pray” is misguided given the fact that the 2003 Amendments clearly

state that children may pursue “any other silent activity” during the moment of

silence. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.082(d) (emphasis added). “Not praying” is thus

covered by the catchall provision added by the 2003 Amendments. 

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the primary effect of the

2003 Amendments is to advance Protestant Christianity. The statute is facially

neutral between religious and non-religious activities that students can choose

to engage in during the moment of silence. See Brown, 258 F.3d at 277. Nor

does the word “pray” by itself connote an endorsement of Protestant

Christianity. 
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21

As Justice O’Connor stated in her Wallace concurrence: “It is difficult to

discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful

schoolchildren.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73. None of the courts examining moment

of silence statutes have found that the primary effect has been to advance or

inhibit religion, and the Crofts point to no case law that supports their

contentions. Instead, the primary effect of the 2003 Amendments seems to be

the same as the legislative purposes shown above: fostering patriotism and

mandating a moment of quiet reflection. Especially when analyzing these

Amendments in a facial challenge, we should not allow speculative fears to creep

into our analysis. See Brown, 258 F.3d at 277–78. The 2003 Amendments do

not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and so survive the second

Lemon prong.

Nor do arguments that the 2003 Amendments discriminate among

religious sects have merit. The Crofts claim that other religious sects may need

to make noise or motion in order to pray, and so the Amendments allow

Christian prayer while not allowing other forms of prayer. But as the May court

found, this “is a non sequitur. The statute simply does not address the problem

of accommodating the beliefs of those whose prayer must be oral or otherwise

self expressive. Undoubtedly the school environment requires limitation upon

the time, place, and manner of such self expression, even when it is religiously

motivated.” 780 F.2d at 248. The statute provides for a minute of silence and

allows any non-disruptive silent activity. This requirement that the activity,

including possible prayer, be silent does not discriminate among religious sects.

3. Excessive Entanglement

The Crofts argue that the 2003 Amendments cause excessive government

entanglement with religion by requiring that teachers regulate student behavior

to ensure silence and no distractions during the moment of silence. The Crofts

argue that this is a delegation of legislative power to teachers. 
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Again, no court has ever accepted—especially on a facial challenge—that

a moment of silence statute is excessive government entanglement with religion.

Teachers are simply enforcing silence and preventing classroom distractions. As

the Bown court explained: 

The fact that a teacher must stop a student who prays audibly or

otherwise makes noise during the moment of quiet reflection does

not result in excessive government entanglement with religion.

There are many times during any given school day when teachers

tell their students to be quiet and when audible activity of any kind

is not permitted. The fact that this particular period of silence is

mandated statewide does not create entanglement problems.

112 F.3d at 1474. Delegating this responsibility to teachers is not a delegation

of legislative powers, as the legislature would not normally have the power to

enforce discipline in classrooms. Rather, it is direction to the executive branch

to enforce the law.

The Crofts raise the possibility that teachers may confiscate prayer beads

as distracting or prohibit certain religious or non-religious activities. All of these

speculative possibilities may be fertile ground for as-applied challenges to the

statute if they occur. But we should not engage in such speculation on a facial

review of the law. The statute here is neutral and simply instructs teachers to

maintain discipline in their classrooms during the moment of silence. This is

not, on its face, an excessive entanglement with religion, and so the 2003

Amendments survive the third Lemon prong.

CONCLUSION

The Crofts have standing to challenge the 2003 Amendments. But the

Amendments are constitutional and satisfy all three prongs of the Lemon

analysis. There is no excessive entanglement, and the primary effect of the

Amendments is not to advance religion. The most difficult prong—for this and

for moment of silence statutes generally—is legislative purpose. But our review

of legislative history is deferential, and such deference leads to an adequate
No. 08-10092

23

secular purpose in this case. While we cannot allow a “sham” legislative

purpose, we should generally defer to the stated legislative intent. Here, that

intent was to promote patriotism and allow for a moment of quiet contemplation.

These are valid secular purposes, and are not outweighed by limited legislative

history showing that some legislators may have been motivated by religion.

Because the 2003 Amendments survive the Lemon test, they are not an

unconstitutional establishment of religion, and the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.