COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-17-00220-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF G.V., III AND 

G.V., CHILDREN 

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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 323-102780-16 

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OPINION 

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 This case of first impression calls on us to decide whether we should apply 

Chapter 153 (“Conservatorship, Possession, & Access”) or Chapter 

161 (“Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship”) of the family code to a 

mediated settlement agreement, where 

 the Department of Family and Protective Services initiated a suit to appoint 

a managing conservator and to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental 

rights if reunification could not be achieved; 
2 

 while the termination proceeding was pending, Father and Mother entered 

into a mediated settlement agreement (“MSA”) that changed the managing 

conservatorship but did not terminate their rights; 

 the MSA recited that the agreement was “in the best interest” of the 

children and met the statutory requirements of section 153.0071 to be 

binding and enforceable; 

 the Department then dropped its request to terminate Father’s and 

Mother’s parental rights and moved to modify managing conservatorship in 

accordance with the MSA; and 

 after Father and Mother unsuccessfully objected and asked to back out of 

the MSA, the trial court entered a final order enforcing it under section 

153.0071 and without requiring the Department to put on any best-interest 

proof. 

Because we are unpersuaded that the mere possibility of termination at the time 

an MSA is entered into suffices to make section 153.0071 inapplicable—that is, 

because we disagree that the parents ought to have been able to revoke an 

otherwise-binding MSA that modified managing conservatorship simply because 

the Department initially and conditionally pleaded for termination—we affirm. 

 The MSA here reflected Father’s and Mother’s agreement that (1) their two 

young children would be placed with relatives who would be made the managing 

conservators, (2) the parents would have limited supervised visitation twice a 

month, (3) they would pay a combined $2,000 per month in child support, 

(4) they would not file a motion to modify for 48 months, but (5) they could move 

to modify in the event of an emergency. The MSA did not actually terminate 

Father’s or Mother’s parental rights, nor did either of them voluntarily relinquish 

their parental rights under the agreement, by a section 161.103 affidavit or 
3 

otherwise. Father and Mother then sought to revoke their consent to the MSA 

after the Department moved the trial court to enter judgment. Over the parents’ 

objections, the trial court rendered judgment on the mediated settlement 

agreement under section 153.0071 of the family code. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 153.0071 (West 2014). Father and Mother appealed. 

In three issues, Father and Mother assert that (1) the trial court erred by 

relying on section 153.0071(e), (2) the trial court erred by adopting the MSA’s 

moratorium on any motions to modify for 48 months, and (3) the trial court erred 

by adopting the MSA’s “emergency” prerequisite before any motion to modify 

could be filed in the interim. We affirm. 

Background 

 On January 27, 2016, the Department of Family and Protective Services 

filed its “Original Petition for Protection of a Child, For Conservatorship, and for 

Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship” against Father and 

Mother. The children involved were their two-year-old son, Andrew, and their 

three-month-old daughter, Betty.1

According to the supporting affidavits, three-month-old Betty had suffered 

non-accidental trauma. The perpetrator was unknown, and the record contains 

multiple references (one as late as April 10, 2017) both to an ongoing criminal 

 1We use aliases to refer to various individuals associated with this appeal. 

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2017); Tex. R. App. P. 

9.8(b)(2). 
4 

investigation and to the fact that “a perpetrator has not been identified.” Betty had 

numerous fractures in various stages of healing, including rib fractures, a 

clavicular fracture, a femur fracture, and distal femur corner fractures. Andrew 

had no injuries consistent with abuse or neglect. Betty attended a daycare, and it 

was the daycare that first expressed concerns on January 25, 2016. Father and 

Mother took Betty to a hospital that same evening. The Department’s petition 

came two days later. 

The petition sought to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to 

their two children under family code Chapter 161 (“Termination of the ParentChild Relationship”) of Subtitle B (“Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship”) 

of Title 5 (“The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affecting the Parent-Child 

Relationship”). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001–.211 (West 2014 & Supp. 

2017).2 The Department’s petition raised termination as a possibility if 

reunification could not be achieved. 

The petition also encompassed conservatorship and child-support issues 

under Chapter 153 (“Conservatorship, Possession, and Access”) and Chapter 

154 (“Child Support”), respectively, which—like Chapter 161—are also under 

 2Effective September 1, 2015, section 161.001(1) and (2) became sections 

161.001(b)(1) and (b)(2). Act of Mar. 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, § 1.078, 

sec. 161.001(b), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 18 (West) (codified as an 

amendment to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001). When we cite or quote cases 

decided under the previous section 161.001(1) or 161.001(2) designations, we 

do so knowing that the current provisions are found in sections 161.001(b)(1) and 

161.001(b)(2).
5 

Subtitle B of Title 5 of the family code. See id. §§ 153.001–.709, 154.001–

.309 (West 2014 & Supp. 2017). 

On the same date that the Department filed its petition, the trial court 

entered ex parte emergency orders appointing the Department as Betty’s and 

Andrew’s sole managing conservator; placing the children with the Smiths, who 

were family friends; and setting a date for a full adversary hearing in accordance 

with section 262.201 of the family code. See id. § 262.201 (West Supp. 2017). 

At the February 5, 2016 full adversary hearing, the trial court signed an 

agreed temporary order to the same effect. As temporary managing conservator, 

the Department was specifically given all the rights and duties as set forth in 

section 153.371 of the family code. See id. § 153.371. 

 Father and Mother filed separate answers. 

 On March 2, 2016, the Smiths were appointed Betty’s and Andrew’s 

temporary possessory conservators, and the trial court ordered that both Father 

and Mother have only supervised visitation.3

 On June 28, 2016, the Department filed a motion to remove the Smiths as 

temporary possessory conservators and, in their place, sought to appoint the 

Joneses as the children’s temporary possessory conservators. Mr. Jones is 

Father’s paternal great uncle. 

 3As part of the Department’s motion to modify possessory conservatorship 

on which this order was based, it submitted an affidavit stating that “[t]here is an 

ongoing criminal case pending to see who caused the injured [sic] to this child.” 
6 

 The following week, Jane Doe, a person who had regular contact with the 

children before their removal, filed a petition in intervention. She asserted that 

appointing either parent as sole managing conservator or both parents as joint 

managing conservators would significantly impair the children’s physical health or 

emotional development. She sought to be appointed the children’s possessory 

conservator. 

 As the Department requested, in early July 2016 the trial court removed 

the Smiths and appointed the Joneses as the children’s temporary possessory 

conservators. 

 On August 31, 2016, the trial court ordered Father to pay $1,200 per 

month in child support and ordered Mother to pay $800 per month in child 

support. 

 On October 5, 2016, the Department, the Joneses, Father, Mother, and 

Jane Doe filed a “Binding [Mediated] Settlement Agreement.” See id. 

§ 153.0071(e). There is no allegation that the parties failed to meet the 

prerequisites to a binding agreement under section 153.0071(d). See id. 

§ 153.0071(d). 

As the case approached its one-year anniversary, the trial court signed an 

order in December 2016 retaining the suit on the court’s docket and resetting the 

case’s dismissal date to July 26, 2017.4 See id. § 263.401 (West Supp. 2017). 

 4The prosecutor explained the need for the delay at the June 6, 

2017 hearing: “The reason why we extended the case was so that the [Joneses], 
7 

 On March 28, 2017, the Department filed a “Motion to Modify Managing 

Conservatorship in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship.” The 

Department sought to have itself removed as managing conservator and to have 

the Joneses appointed as managing conservators. The Department additionally 

sought to have Father, Mother, and Jane Doe appointed as possessory 

conservators. 

 On April 12, 2017, Father and Mother replaced their original attorney and 

filed a joint objection to the MSA. The unique (and limited) grounds for setting 

aside a mediated settlement agreement are set out in section 153.0071(e-1) of 

the family code. See id. § 153.0071(e-1). Father and Mother did not, however, 

raise those grounds. 

 On June 1, 2017, relying specifically on section 153.0071(e) for the 

proposition that the trial court must enter judgment in accordance with the MSA, 

the Department filed a motion to enter judgment. See id. § 153.0071(e). 

 Father and Mother responded to that motion four days later. Once again, 

they did not cite section 153.0071(e-1) as the basis for invalidating the MSA. 

The next day, June 6, 2017, at the hearing on the Department’s motion to 

modify managing conservatorship and motion to enter judgment, the Department 

requested that a judgment be entered based on section 153.0071(e) of the family 

 

who had possession of [Andrew] and [Betty], would be licensed and be able to 

get foster connection benefits by being licensed for six months before we close 

the case.” 
8 

code. When the trial court specifically asked if that meant the Department was 

not going to be putting on any testimony, the Department responded, “That’s 

correct.” 

That same day, the trial court signed its “Final Order in Suit Affecting the 

Parent-Child Relationship.” Citing section 153.371, the trial court appointed the 

Joneses as the children’s permanent managing conservators and consequently 

removed the Department as managing conservator. See id. § 153.371. Father, 

Mother, and Jane Doe were appointed possessory conservators, and the court 

then identified the conservators’ statutory rights as set out in sections 

153.073 and 153.074. See id. §§ 153.073–.074. The court incorporated the 

mediated settlement agreement by reference and attached it as Attachment A.5

The MSA, as noted, included a 48-month moratorium on filing a motion to modify 

and required an “emergency” before any motion to modify could be filed within 

those four years.6 The court ordered possession as set out in Attachment B, 

 5The order did contain an unexplained variance from the MSA: the October 

3, 2016 MSA appears to recite—the copy in the record is not completely 

legible—that Father’s and Mother’s periods of possession were to be supervised 

by Family Court Services or the Smiths, the latter of whom did not participate in 

the mediation or sign the MSA. (The Smiths were the family friends initially 

designated as the children’s temporary possessory conservators, a role into 

which the Joneses stepped in place of the Smiths with the court’s July 6, 

2016 order.) The final order incorporates the MSA “save and except any 

reference to” either of the Smiths. Father and Mother do not complain on appeal, 

and did not complain in the trial court, that the trial court’s variance from the MSA 

somehow rendered it legally infirm or void. 

6Although the MSA can be interpreted to mean that an emergency would 

be necessary even after 48 months had elapsed, at the June 6, 2017 hearing 
9 

under which Father and Mother got four hours of supervised visitation twice a 

month. Finally, the court ordered that Father and Mother pay child support as set 

out in Attachment C, which simply continued Father’s $1,200 monthly payments 

and Mother’s $800 monthly payments. 

Section 153.0071(e) applies in this case 

 In their first issue, Father and Mother assert that section 153.0071(e) of the 

family code does not apply to suits to terminate the parent–child relationship 

brought under family code Chapter 161, citing In re Morris, 498 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding), and In re K.D., 471 S.W.3d 

147 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet). They contend that because 

termination under Chapter 161 was foundational to this suit, the trial court erred 

by granting the motion to enter judgment on the MSA based on section 

153.0071. Although the Department’s suit did not result in a Chapter 

161 termination, Father and Mother argue that because termination was still a 

possibility at the time they negotiated and agreed to the MSA, section 

153.0071 does not apply.7

 

both sides treated that “emergency” provision as applying only during the first 

four years, with the parents being free to move to modify on any available basis 

thereafter. 

7Despite having claimed duress in their written response to the 

Department’s motion, at the motion-to-modify hearing Father and Mother, 

through counsel, explicitly disavowed that theory: “That threat hanging over their 

head at the time of mediation, which everybody here concedes it was, is what 

makes this—I’m not making any argument that my clients signed this under 

duress or for the duress reason they should get out.” On appeal, they appear to 
10 

Section 153.0071 provides, in part: 

(c) On the written agreement of the parties or on the court’s own 

motion, the court may refer a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship to mediation. 

(d) A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the 

agreement: 

(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in 

boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the 

agreement is not subject to revocation; 

(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and 

(3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at 

the time the agreement is signed. 

(e) If a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of 

Subsection (d), a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated 

settlement agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure, or another rule of law. 

(e-1) Notwithstanding Subsections (d) and (e), a court may decline 

to enter a judgment on a mediated settlement agreement if the court 

finds: 

(1) that: 

(A) a party to the agreement was a victim of family 

violence, and that circumstance impaired the party’s 

ability to make decisions; or 

(B) the agreement would permit a person who is subject 

to registration under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal 

Procedure, on the basis of an offense committed by the 

person when the person was 17 years of age or older or 

who otherwise has a history or pattern of past or 

present physical or sexual abuse directed against any 

person to: 

 

argue duress tangentially by suggesting that the mere threat of termination takes 

the MSA out of Chapter 153 and puts it into Chapter 161. 
11 

(i) reside in the same household as the child; or 

(ii) otherwise have unsupervised access to the 

child; and 

(2) that the agreement is not in the child’s best interest. 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071. 

A. In re Lee: The supreme court holds that, with a narrow statutory exception 

that Father and Mother do not rely on, section 153.0071 removes the trial 

court’s discretion to deviate from the mediated settlement agreement. 

 In a case that did not involve termination or the threat of termination in any 

respect, the Texas Supreme Court has written that section 153.0071(e) 

unambiguously entitles a party to judgment on a mediated settlement agreement 

that meets the statutory requirements. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tex. 

2013) (orig. proceeding). The only narrow exception is when section 153.0071(e1)’s family-violence-related factors are satisfied. Id. The supreme court 

continued, “By its plain language, section 153.0071 authorizes a court to refuse 

to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA on best interest grounds only

when the court also finds the family violence elements are met.” Id. Put 

differently, the court wrote that the statute did not authorize the trial court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the parties as reflected in the mediated 

settlement agreement absent the section 153.0071(e-1) elements. Id. The court 

viewed it as “absolutely clear” that the Legislature limited the trial court’s 

consideration of best interest when entering a judgment on an MSA only to cases 

involving family violence. Id. “Allowing a court to decline to enter judgment on a 
12 

valid MSA on best interest grounds without family violence findings,” the supreme 

court concluded, “would impermissibly render the family violence language in 

subsection (e–1) superfluous.” Id. 

Because Father’s and Mother’s case does not involve the section 

153.0071(e-1) exception, under Lee the trial court was required to enter 

judgment on the mediated settlement agreement—and to do so essentially 

without any judicial oversight or review. See id. at 453–58; see also Morris, 

498 S.W.3d at 629–30. Unless, of course, and as Father and Mother urge, 

section 153.0071 does not apply at all. 

B. K.D. and Morris: Two intermediate courts hold that section 153.0071 does 

not limit the trial court’s discretion when parental rights are actually 

terminated by agreement (and, according to Father and Mother, even 

when parental rights are not terminated but termination is threatened). 

Faced with a mediated settlement agreement under which a mother signed 

away her parental rights, the Texarkana Court of Appeals balked at the idea that, 

in the context of a termination proceeding, the parties could effectively preclude a 

trial court from exercising any oversight or review. “Of course,” it nevertheless 

wrote, “we do not hold that a settlement agreement obtained through mediation 

under Section 153.0071 accomplishes nothing in a parental-rights termination 

case brought by the Department,” pointing out that the mediation “resulted in the 

execution of a valid and enforceable affidavit of relinquishment and mediated 

settlement agreement.” K.D., 471 S.W.3d at 168. That is, the relinquishment 

affidavit eliminated the Department’s burden of proving the first prong under 
13 

section 161.001(b)(1) and precluded the mother from backing out of an 

agreement in which she agreed that termination was in her child’s best interest, 

because the agreement was enforceable against her. Id.

But the critical question was whether the mother’s agreement that 

termination was in her child’s best interest bound the trial court. Id. “In other 

words,” asked the Texarkana court, “must the Department still prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of [the mother’s] rights is in [her child]’s best 

interest [under section 161.001(b)(2)] even though [the mother] agreed that it 

was,” or could “the [affidavit of relinquishment] and the MSA eliminate that 

[section 161.001(b)(2) best-interest] element of proof as well[?]” Id.

 The answer in K.D. was that the Department still had to prove the bestinterest element regardless of a relinquishment affidavit and an MSA. “After 

comparing the mediation process in a parental-rights termination case brought by 

the Department against the mediation process involving private parties,” and then 

“evaluating the results of that comparison in light of constitutional due process 

considerations,” the court concluded that “due process requires the [Department] 

to still prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s 

best interest.” Id. at 168–69. The court noted that “a mediated settlement 

agreement and an affidavit of relinquishment in a parental-rights termination case 

may be binding between the parties,” but that fact “does not eliminate the 

Department’s burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence under [section 
14 

161.001(b)(2)] that termination is in the child’s best interest or the trial court’s 

power to deny termination in the absence of such proof.” Id. at 169. 

The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals effectively adopted K.D.’s 

analysis in its Morris opinion. 498 S.W.3d at 631–34. 

C. Discussion 

 We agree with Father and Mother that the Department filed this suit to 

terminate their parental rights under Chapter 161—but it was also more than a 

termination suit. The Department sought conservatorship for itself, and, if 

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, it sought to have the 

conservatorship placed in someone other than the parents. The suit thus 

encompassed both Chapter 161 and Chapter 153 and was ultimately resolved 

under Chapter 153. 

 The cases on which Father and Mother rely—K.D. and Morris—were ones 

that entailed mediated settlement agreements resulting in the explicit termination 

of parental rights. Morris, 498 S.W.3d at 626; K.D., 471 S.W.3d at 153. It was the 

fact of those terminations that unquestionably put K.D. and Morris within Chapter 

161, unlike here, where Father’s and Mother’s parental rights were not 

terminated. 

 Although their rights were not in fact terminated, Father and Mother argue 

that section 153.0071 nevertheless does not apply because the Department 

pleaded for termination and because termination was still on the table when the 

mediation occurred. We disagree. The precise question asked in K.D. was, “Does 
15 

Section 153.0071(e) Foreclose a Best-Interest Review Under Section 

161.001(2)?” K.D., 471 S.W.3d at 165. The answer was no, that it does not. Id. at 

169.8 Similarly, in Morris, the court held that section 153.0071(e) does not 

“preclude a trial court from determining under section 161.001(2) whether the 

plaintiff has proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination would be in 

the child’s best interest.”9 Morris, 498 S.W.3d at 634. 

 8The K.D. court wrote: 

[A] mediated settlement agreement and an affidavit of 

relinquishment in a parental-rights termination case may be binding 

between the parties, but it does not eliminate the Department’s 

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence under Section 

161.001(2) that termination is in the child’s best interest or the trial 

court’s power to deny termination in the absence of such proof. 

Id. Later in the opinion, the K.D. court wrote more broadly: “In the absence of any 

clear Legislative intent to the contrary, we find that Section 153.0071(e) does not 

foreclose judicial review of the best-interest element of proof in a parental-rights 

termination case brought by the Department.” Id. at 174. To us, the more specific 

language controls, and the broader language of the sentence just quoted does 

not expand the holding to mean that section 153.0071 does not apply whenever 

the Department simply pleads for termination. 

9The full quote suggests, at first blush, that Morris is written more broadly 

but in context is not: 

[W]e conclude that section 153.0071(e) does not apply to suits for 

termination of the parent-child relationship under Chapter 161 of the 

Family Code and that a mediated settlement agreement [effectuating 

a termination] therefore does not preclude a trial court from 

determining under section 161.001(2) whether the plaintiff has 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination would be 

in the child’s best interest. 

Id. 
16 

Both K.D. and Morris—which, we reiterate, involved settlements in which a 

parent actually agreed to termination—focused specifically on the MSA’s effect on 

the section 161.001(b)(2) best-interest finding that a court must make. Because 

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, there is no section 

161.001(b)(2) finding to review, nor did the trial court need to make such a finding. 

To the extent K.D. suggests that its analysis applies even to termination 

suits that do not actually result in termination, any such suggestion would be dicta. 

Father’s and Mother’s reliance on Morris is distinguishable for the same reason: 

Morris involved a suit to terminate parental rights that ended in a mediated 

settlement agreement terminating the mother’s rights. 498 S.W.3d at 627. Any 

language in Morris suggesting that its analysis applies even to termination suits 

that do not result in termination is dicta as well. Contextually, both K.D. and Morris

appeared to have used the broader language precisely because their facts 

involved termination suits that resulted in termination, meaning that section 

161.001(b)(2) was necessarily implicated. In contrast, nothing in the settlement 

agreement here implicated section 161.001, because no parental rights were 

terminated. 

At oral argument, Father and Mother argued that just as a criminal 

defendant may back out of plea bargain and go to trial, so too should they have 

the right to back out of their mediated settlement agreement and go to trial. But a 

criminal defendant does not face a non-negotiable statutory dismissal deadline, 

as the Department here did—July 26, 2017. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 
17 

§ 263.401 (providing that a Department case seeking termination or to have the 

Department appointed conservator must be dismissed, if not tried, no later than 

180 days after the suit’s one-year anniversary).10 If parents could unilaterally 

revoke a mediated settlement agreement, they could play havoc with that 

dismissal deadline. Additionally, and most importantly, children need 

permanency and stability. See In re C.T., 491 S.W.3d 323, 328–29 (Tex. 2016) 

(orig. proceeding). An irrevocable MSA lends itself to those goals; a revocable 

MSA potentially undermines them. Ultimately, of course, this is an issue for the 

legislature. For Father’s and Mother’s and for our purposes, the legislature has 

spoken. This case was resolved under Chapter 153 and did not terminate the 

parents’ rights; therefore, section 153.0071 applies. 

We hold that the trial court did not err by applying section 153.0071(e). We 

overrule Father’s and Mother’s first issue. 

Father’s and Mother’s remaining issues are not ripe 

 Father’s and Mother’s remaining two issues attacking (1) the 48-month 

limitation before they can move to modify and (2) the “emergency” exception are 

 10Underscoring the time-sensitive nature of these kinds of cases, we are in 

turn directed to do everything in our power to hand down a decision within 

180 days from the date a notice of appeal is filed. Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a). 

The dissent correctly notes that the rule is not absolute, but we have not 

exceeded 180 days a single time since 2015. Without elaboration, we also note 

our disagreement with some of what is implied about timing issues concerning 

the majority opinion. Finally, although the dissent does not mention or suggest it, 

we invite the parties to move for rehearing so that everyone can at that point 

receive what we know will be a thorough and deliberate dissent in this important 

case. 
18 

not ripe. See Waco I.S.D. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000); 

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 

442 (Tex. 1998). 

 Ripeness and standing are subject-matter-jurisdiction components and 

cannot be waived. Waco I.S.D., 22 S.W.3d at 851. Under the ripeness doctrine, 

courts consider whether, at the time the plaintiff sues, the facts are sufficiently 

developed “so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being 

contingent or remote.” Id. at 851–52 (quoting Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442). The 

ripeness analysis thus focuses on whether the case involves “uncertain or 

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at 

all.” Id. at 852 (quoting Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442). By focusing on whether 

the plaintiff has a concrete injury, the ripeness doctrine prevents premature 

adjudications and serves the constitutional prohibition against advisory opinions. 

Id. A case is not ripe if determining whether the plaintiff has a concrete injury 

depends on (1) contingent or hypothetical facts or (2) events that have not yet 

come to pass. Id.

 In this case, neither Father nor Mother has filed a suit to modify 

conservatorship. No trial court has ruled on Father’s and Mother’s contentions 

that the 48-month provision and the “emergency” provision are invalid. Any 

opinion we might give on the matter would be advisory in anticipation of such a 

future motion to modify conservatorship. We may not give advisory opinions. See 

Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 443. 
19 

We overrule Father and Mother’s second and third issues. 

Conclusion 

 Having overruled all of Father and Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr 

ELIZABETH KERR 

JUSTICE 

PANEL: WALKER, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ. 

WALKER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

DELIVERED: December 18, 2017