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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Danielle R. Dunne and James M. Dunne, )

) No. 12 C 872

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Judge Thomas M. Durkin

)

Anthony Reda, in his individual capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Introduction

Anthony Reda, a Village of Addison police officer assigned to Addison Trail 

High School, called paramedics on December 15, 2010 after Danielle Dunne

(hereinafter “Dunne”), a 17-year old student, indicated that she smoked marijuana, 

drank tequila, and tried to overdose on pills. Dunne was transported to a nearby 

hospital and evaluated by a psychologist. Less than two months later, on February 

7, 2011, Officer Reda called paramedics again after Dunne, who was apparently 

frustrated with Officer Reda’s response to a complaint she had made, said to him,

“No one f***ing cares about me; if I put a gun to my head, it wouldn’t even matter.” 

Dunne was transported to a nearby hospital for evaluation against her will and 

released a few hours later. Dunne and her father, James Dunne, responded by filing 

this lawsuit against Officer Reda under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he seized 

Dunne without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They seek to 
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recover $4,766 in medical bills for the second hospital visit and other damages.

Presently before the Court is Officer Reda’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 25). 

For the reasons explained below, Officer Reda’s motion is granted.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). The court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all of the 

evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant. Egan Marine Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 665 F.3d 800, 

811 (7th Cir. 2011). Ultimately summary judgment is warranted only if a 

reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The following background is a summary of the 

material facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Dunne.

II.

Officer Reda has been employed by the Addison Police Department since 

1998. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 6; Pl. Resp. ¶ 6.) In May 2010, he was assigned to Addison Trail 

High School as a Resource Officer. (Id.) In the fall of 2010, Dunne was a student at 

Addison Trail High School. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl. Resp. ¶ 8.)

That fall, Dunne talked to Officer Reda at least seven times about an exboyfriend, Joseph Hower, who was harassing her. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl. Resp. ¶ 9.)

The first time Dunne met with Officer Reda, she also informed him that Hower 
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sexually assaulted her in the winter of 2009-10. (Pl. Add. Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 4.) When 

Officer Reda investigated Dunne’s harassment complaints, Hower claimed that 

Dunne was the one initiating the contact. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl. Resp. ¶ 9; Pl. Add. 

Stmt. ¶ 5.) Officer Reda told Hower to stop contacting Dunne. (Id.)

On December 15, 2010, Officer Reda observed that Dunne appeared to be 

intoxicated while at school. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 11; Pl. Resp. ¶ 11.) Officer Reda escorted 

Dunne to the dean’s office, where he took her cell phone and saw a text message she 

was composing, which read, “I tried to OD on pills.” (Id.) Dunne then told Officer 

Reda that she smoked marijuana and drank tequila at a friend’s house and took

some pills. (Id.) Officer Reda contacted the Addison Fire Department. (Id.) The 

paramedics arrived, spoke to Dunne, and then transported her to a nearby hospital

where she was seen by a psychiatrist and discharged. (Id.) 

At some point in December 2010, apparently at least in part as a result of 

this incident, Dunne was suspended from Addison Trail High School and began 

attending classes at a different facility. (Def. Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 8; Pl. Resp. ¶¶ 2, 8.)

On February 7, 2011, Dunne met with Officer Reda at the Addison Police 

Department to report that Hower was still contacting her. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl. Resp. 

¶ 2; Pl. Add. Stmt. ¶ 6.) Officer Reda telephoned Hower, who again claimed that his 

contacts with Dunne were in response to her contacting him. (Id.) Officer Reda told 

Dunne that Hower denied everything and said that Dunne was texting him. (Pl. 

Add. Stmt. ¶ 7.) Dunne offered to show Officer Reda text messages on her phone, 

but Reda said, “[N]o, that won’t be necessary.” (Id.) 
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At that point, although she cannot remember her exact words, Dunne 

testified that she said something in line with, “No one f***ing cares about me; if I 

put a gun to my head, it wouldn’t even matter.” (Id.; R. 27-2, Dunne Dep. at 34:9-

18.)1 Officer Reda responded that Dunne should not have said that because it made 

her a suicide threat and he would have to call her mother and the paramedics. (Pl. 

Add. Stmt. ¶ 7.) Dunne replied that “I was talking out of my butt, [you] know[] me,” 

and made a comment, “[W]here am I even going to find a gun?” (Id. ¶ 8.)

Officer Reda then told Dunne that she was not free to leave and that he was

calling her mother and the Addison Fire Department to take her to the hospital to 

be evaluated. (Id. ¶¶ 10-15.) Over Dunne’s objections, the paramedics took her to a 

nearby hospital. (Def. Stmt. ¶ 16; Pl. Resp. ¶ 16.) At the hospital, Dunne was 

assessed by medical personnel and released a few hours later. (Id.) As a result of 

this second hospital trip, Dunne was billed $3,917.00 by Alexian Brothers Medical 

Center and another $849.40 by the Addison Fire Department.

III.

A.

A seizure made to effectuate an involuntary hospitalization is analyzed under 

the Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard. Fitzgerald v. Santoro, No. 12-

1487, 2013 WL 452446, at *5 (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 2013). Probable cause exists “only if 

there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to 

 1 Officer Reda’s recollection is substantially similar; he testified that Dunne stated, 

“No one cares if I go get a gun and put it to my head and kill myself.” (R. 27-2, 

Officer Reda Dep. at 47:16-20.)
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seizure under the governing legal standard.” Id. (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 

F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)). 405 ILCS 5/3-504(b) provides that:

A peace officer may take a minor into custody and 

transport the minor to a mental health facility when, as a 

result of his personal observation, the peace officer has 

reasonable grounds to believe that the minor is eligible for 

admission under Section 3-503 and is in a condition that 

immediate hospitalization is necessary in order to protect 

the minor or others from physical harm.

A minor is eligible for admission under Section 3-503 if the facility director finds 

that the minor “has a mental illness or emotional disturbance of such severity that 

hospitalization is necessary and that the minor is likely to benefit from inpatient 

treatment.” 405 ILCS 5/3-503(a). Accord Threlkeld v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 201 F. 

Supp. 2d 834, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Probable cause to hospitalize a person against 

that person’s will exists where the facts and circumstances . . . are sufficient in 

themselves to warrant an individual of reasonable caution in the belief that an 

immediate danger exists of the person hurting herself or others.”).

The probable cause inquiry focuses on the facts and circumstances known to 

the police officer at the time of the seizure. See, e.g., Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 

980, 987 (7th Cir. 1989). “If there is probable cause [at the time of the seizure], it is 

irrelevant if the [individual] turns out to be noncommittable.” Id.

Moreover, where the material facts are undisputed, a court may determine 

whether probable cause exists as a matter of law. Id.; see also Potts v. City of 

Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Here, although Dunne and Officer Reda have slightly different recollections 

of the events of and leading up to February 7, 2011, the Court has viewed the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Dunne (as it must on summary judgment) 

and concludes that Officer Reda had probable cause to call the paramedics and send 

Dunne to the hospital for evaluation. The facts and circumstances known to Officer 

Reda at the time were sufficient for him to reasonably believe that immediate action 

was required in order to protect Dunne from harm.

There is no dispute that when Officer Reda called the paramedics on 

February 7, 2011, he knew that: (1) Dunne had been sexually assaulted by her exboyfriend the winter before, or at least that Dunne made that claim; (2) less than 

two months before, Dunne showed up to school under the influence of marijuana, 

alcohol, and pills and texted a friend that she “tried to OD on pills”;2 (3) Dunne was 

recently suspended from school; and (4) Dunne had just made a statement to the 

effect of, “No one f***ing cares about me; if I put a gun to my head, it wouldn’t even 

matter.” These undisputed facts provided reasonable grounds for Officer Reda to 

believe that Dunne presented an immediate danger to herself and that seeking an 

evaluation from a trained medical professional was warranted.

Moreover, the seizure in this case was relatively short. Dunne was required 

to wait a few minutes for paramedics to arrive and transport her to the hospital and 

then was discharged from the hospital after a few hours. As the Seventh Circuit 

 2 Dunne apparently disputes that she was actually trying to overdose on pills, but 

the material issue here is what Officer Reda knew, not what Dunne subjectively 

intended. There is no dispute that Officer Reda saw Dunne’s text message.
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explained in Villanova, 972 F.2d at 796, courts assessing the reasonableness of a 

commitment should balance the cost of confinement against the harm the individual 

might do if released and the probability of the harm occurring. “The shorter the 

detention, the less compelling is the evidence of the necessity for it that the 

authorities need to produce.” Id. Here, the potential harm was significant (suicide) 

and the probability of it occurring was not insubstantial given that Officer Reda 

knew that Dunne had apparently already tried to overdose on pills.

Dunne argues that Officer Reda lacked probable cause because she qualified 

her statement about putting a gun to her head with an “if” and then explained to 

Officer Reda that “I was talking out of my butt, [you] know[] me.” But Officer Reda 

did know Dunne, including her apparent overdose attempt less than two months 

before. Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Reda, he was not 

required to disregard Dunne’s statement simply because she claimed she was 

joking. Most people facing involuntary hospitalization deny that they need medical 

attention; if a simple denial were enough, probable cause would never exist. Officer 

Reda is not a mental health professional qualified to make an ultimate 

determination about the seriousness of Dunne’s threat. He decided that Dunne 

should be evaluated by a professional and had probable cause to do so.

Dunne also suggests that Officer Reda sent her to the hospital as retribution 

for criticizing his response to her harassment complaints. But “[t]he probable cause 

inquiry is an objective one.” Fitzgerald, 2013 WL 452446, at *5 (quoting Carmichael 

v. Vill. of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in original). Thus, 
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in Fitzgerald, the Seventh Circuit rejected as irrelevant an argument that a police 

officer acted out of animus instead of a genuine concern for the plaintiff. Id. The 

same result is warranted here. Regardless of Officer Reda’s motivations, he had 

objectively reasonable grounds for believing that Dunne needed a mental health

evaluation.

B.

Officer Reda also argues that even if he lacked probable cause, he is still 

entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.

As the Seventh Circuit explained in Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 

(7th Cir. 1998), the qualified immunity inquiry focuses on

whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly 

believed that probable cause existed. Courts have referred 

to [this] inquiry as asking whether the officer had 

arguable probable cause. Arguable probable cause exists 

when a reasonable police officer in the same 

circumstances and with the same knowledge and 

possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question 

could have reasonably believed that probable cause 

existed in light of well-established law. Officers are 

entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity 

grounds if their actions were not objectively unreasonable 

at the time they were taken. The court should ask if the 

officer acted reasonably under settled law in the 

circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more 

reasonable, interpretation of the events can be 

constructed several years later.

(Citations omitted.) See also Sherman v. Four Cnty. Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 

402 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that qualified immunity “accommodate[s] reasonable 

errors ‘because officials should not err always on the side of caution because they 

fear being sued’”) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
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As explained above, Officer Reda had probable cause to call the paramedics 

and send Dunne to the hospital for evaluation. For the same reasons, Officer Reda 

also had “arguable” probable cause and is entitled to qualified immunity. “Police 

officers should not be forced by fear of suit to wait for a mentally unstable person to 

carry out threats before intervening.” Sherman, 987 F.2d at 402.

C.

James Dunne asserts a derivative claim under the Illinois Family Expense 

Act, 750 ILCS 65/15, because he was legally responsible for his daughter’s medical 

bills. (R. 1.) There is no dispute that if Officer Reda is entitled to summary 

judgment on Danielle Dunne’s claim, he is also entitled to summary judgment on 

James Dunne’s derivative claim for medical expenses.

IV.

With no genuine issues of material fact, Officer Reda is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. His summary judgment motion is granted in its entirety. This 

action is dismissed with prejudice.

ENTERED:

_______________________________

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: February 19, 2013