UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FASCIA EDWARDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 00371

) Hon. Marvin E. Aspen

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL )

AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Court Judge:

Plaintiff Fascia Edwards brings a six-count complaint against Defendants Illinois 

Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”) and Illinois State Retirement 

System (“ISRS”). The counts allege violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (hereinafter “ADA”); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. § 623(a) (hereinafter “ADEA”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 

U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (hereinafter “Title VII”); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. § 794; retaliatory discharge in violation of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act;

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Edwards alleges that Defendants failed to 

rehire her after she became disabled while employed by Defendants, and that Defendants failed 

to provide appropriate accommodations. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 25.) She also claims that Defendants

discriminated against her in retaliation for filing worker compensation claims. 

Presently before us is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint. (Dkt. No. 50.) For the reasons discussed below, we grant the motion for all counts 

1
against Defendants ISRS, and for Counts V and VI against IDFPR. We deny the motion for 

Counts I, III, and IV against IDFPR.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Edwards was employed with the Illinois Department of Human Services from 

November 3, 2003, and served there until December 1, 2008, when she was transferred in lieu of 

layoff to IDFPR. At IDFPR, she served as Executive I until July 9, 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–13.)

On June 22, 2009, she suffered a back injury on the job and reported it to her superiors. (Compl.

¶ 15.) Ms. Edwards immediately sought emergency medical attention. (Id.) Her doctor 

concluded she had moderate-to-severe degenerative disk disease. On July 9, 2009, Ms. Edwards

took disability leave from work due to her back injury. (Id. ¶ 19.) She concluded treatment on

March 30, 2013. (Id.) She claims that she was medically cleared in June 2010 and was able to 

return to work, although she was restricted from “stooping, lifting, climbing, bending, kneeling, 

crouching, crawling, and reaching functions.” (Id. ¶¶ 17, 21, 31.) She alleges that, despite her 

clearance to work, IDFPR failed to re-instate her and instead hired other employees. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

On June 4, 2010, Ms. Edwards filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim with the IDFPR 

Workers Compensation Commission in connection with her workplace injury. (Id. ¶ 20.) On 

June 11, 2011, an Industrial Commission three-judge panel on appeal from IDFPR ruled that Ms. 

Edwards’ job duties caused her to suffer a work-related injury. (Id.)

According to Ms. Edwards, IDFPR failed to approach her about re-assigning her to a job 

that suited her disability. (Id. ¶ 21.) Instead, IDFPR offered her a job described within the 

CMS#104 Office of Legal Affairs, #13851-13-01-500-40-01 as a file clerk. (Id. ¶ 23.) She 

alleges that she was required to perform manual labor and heavy lifting that neither IDFPR

advertised, nor Illinois Central Management Services approved. (Id.) Moreover, Ms. Edwards

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claims that she applied to and was rejected from over 30 jobs, despite being qualified. (Id. ¶¶ 24,

29.) Lastly, she pleads that ISRS acted as IDFPR’s agent in denying her medical and retirement 

benefits. (Resp. at 4.) According to Ms. Edwards, not only did IDFPR deny her re-assignment,

but they also refused to make reasonable accommodations for her. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Ms. Edwards

pleads that on September 29, 2011, the EEOC sent her a right to sue notice, but that it was 

returned on October 4, 2011. (Id. ¶ 7.) In her response, she asserts that she “never received a 

copy of the Right to Sue letter through the U.S. Postal Service.” (Resp. at 5.)

Ms. Edwards claims that IDFPR discriminated against her, harassed her, and retaliated 

against her for seeking accommodations for her disability. First, Ms. Edwards alleges that 

IDFPR took retaliatory actions and effectively terminated her employment. (Compl. ¶ 25.)

Second, her EEOC Charge Amendment on September 26, 2011 alleges that, since filing the 

Charge, IDFPR created a hostile work environment. (Resp., Ex. A., Am. EEOC Charge.) She

claims that IDFPR threatened her “with physical violence in the work place, subjected [her] to 

abuse of power by immediate supervisor, and subjected [her] to management keeping a secret 

diary of 83 pages of false allegations prepared by non-state employees to discredit” her and 

thereby “creat[ed] a hostile work environment.” (Id.) Third, her Charge also alleges 

discrimination based on race and sex. (Id; Compl. ¶¶ 44–47.)

Ms. Edwards asks that Defendants make her “whole” and provide her “back pay and 

reimbursement for lost pension, social security and other benefits and out of pocket-expenses, 

plus prejudgment interest in an amount to be shown at trial.” (Compl. at 8–9.) She also requests 

that she be reinstated to her former position or a comparable position, that she receive front pay,

and that Defendants pay her compensatory damages in the maximum amount allowable by law.

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(Id.) She also seeks punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.)

Defendants raise a number of arguments in their motion to dismiss, which we address below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is meant to test the 

sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 

F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we must accept all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor. Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). A court 

may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only if a complaint lacks enough facts “to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. 

Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007)); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618–19 (7th Cir.

2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Although a facially plausible complaint need not give “detailed factual allegations,” it 

must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 

1949. These requirements ensure that the defendant receives “fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964.

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ANALYSIS

Consistent with the above principles, we apply a liberal pleading standard. We will first 

consider the federal claims against ISRS. We will then analyze the federal claims against 

IDFPR. Finally, we will consider the state law claims against both Defendants. 

A. Federal Claims against ISRS

As a threshold matter, we dismiss Ms. Edwards’ claims against ISRS under the ADA, 

ADEA, and Title VII because she does not claim that ISRS was her employer. Title I of the 

ADA bans an “employer” from discriminating against an employee. 42 U.S.C.S § 12111(2).

The federal statutes consider what constitutes an “employer” under equivalent standards. 42

U.S.C § 12111(7) (providing that the term “employer” will be interpreted as having the same 

meaning as it does under Title VII); E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 

1279–80 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The ADA’s definition of ‘employer’ mirrors the definitions of 

‘employer’ in Title VII . . . and in the . . . ADEA.”); Haltek v. Vill. of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp.

802, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(d), the Rehabilitation Act, “‘[t]he standards 

used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment 

discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under the [ADA]’”). Without an 

employer-employee relationship, ADA, ADEA, and Title VII claims fail. AIC Security 

Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281; Small v. Chao, 377 F. Supp. 2d 654, 658 (C.D. Ill. 2003).

Although Ms. Edwards concedes that she was not officially an employee of ISRS, she 

urges that ISRS should still count as her employer because ISRS acted as IDFPR’s agent in 

issuing medical and retirement benefits. (Resp. at 4.) However, agents are not liable 

individually; rather, the provision attaches “respondeat superior liability” to the employer for the 

agent’s violations. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281–82; Patterson v. Xerox 

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Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 277 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Likewise, agents of a state government can be 

held liable under the ADA and Title VII, but such liability falls to the government agency that 

employs her under respondeat superior, and not on the agent individually. AIC Sec.

Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281–82.

Because Ms. Edwards is not an employee of ISRS, and agency does not give rise to 

liability for the agents individually, we dismiss Ms. Edwards’ federal employment claims against 

ISRS.1

B. Federal Claims against IDFPR

1. Claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

Turning to Ms. Edwards’ federal claims against IDFPR, we begin with her ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act claims. The ADA forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a 

qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o

otherwise qualified handicapped person shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be subjected to 

discrimination under any program receiving federal financial assistance.” Alexander v. Choate,

469 U.S 287, 290, 105 S. Ct. 712, 714 (1985) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794).2 “To prevail on an 

1 Although we are dismissing the claims against ISRS for the reasons above, they would not have 

been barred, as suggested by Defendants, simply because Ms. Edwards did not file the suit 

within 90 days of the EEOC sending her a right to sue letter. In the Seventh Circuit, if the 

“plaintiff is at fault for failing to receive the notice earlier, the constructive notice rule applies 

and ‘the 90-day clock starts running once delivery is attempted at the last address provided.’” 

Balthazar v. Sw. Bell Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Reschny v. Elk 

Grove Plating Co., 414 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)). At the motion 

to dismiss phase in Balthazar, the court held that the plaintiff was not at fault because he pled 

that his failure to receive the letter was the fault of the post office, rather than his own. 494 F. 

Supp. 2d at 933. Here, Ms. Edwards similarly pleads that she never received the letter through 

the Postal Service. (Resp. at 5.) 

2 The analysis with respect to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claims are the same, except 

the Rehabilitation Act requires that the defendant receive federal funds. Gratzl v. Office of Chief 

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ADA claim, the plaintiff must show (1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to perform the essential 

function of the job with or without accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment 

action because of his disability.” Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 (N.D. Ill. 2010)

(quoting EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008)). Specifically, Ms. 

Edwards claims that she was not given “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 

mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” as an employee and that 

she was denied “employment opportunities.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) and (b)(5).

a. Disability

To establish a disability under the ADA a plaintiff first “must show that his condition was 

a mental or physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life 

activities.” Abdul-Aziz v. Show Dep’t, Inc., No. 09 C 7609, 2010 WL 3516157, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 

Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998)).

These major life activities include, but are not limited to: “‘caring for oneself, performing 

manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.’” AbdulAziz, 2010 WL 3516157, at *2 (quoting Winsley v. Cook Cty, 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A))).

Here, Ms. Edwards pleads that she has a qualified disability because of a musculoskeletal 

impairment that prevents her from performing manual tasks. (Compl. ¶ 29.) She specifically 

pleads that her injury prevents her from doing manual labor and heavy lifting, which IDFPR 

required her to do in her most recent position, despite such activity’s absence from the job 

Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th and 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Because IDFPR did not argue it did not receive federal funds, however, we merge the analysis of 

the two statutes. 

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description. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Because Ms. Edwards adequately pleads a substantial limitation of a 

major life activity, she satisfies the disability prong. 

b. Qualified Individual

To make out a claim under the ADA, the disabled individual must show under the second 

prong that “she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or 

without reasonable accommodation.” Martinez v. Bitzer Prods. Co., No. 11 C 6811, 2012 WL 

1409537, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2012) (quoting Stevens v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 

736 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

A qualified individual with a disability is “an individual who, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, [can perform the essential functions of the position] that such individual holds 

or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Ms. Edwards claims that she was qualified, and at this stage 

we have no reason to question that claim. (Compl. ¶ 29.) She describes that IDFPR offered her

a single job, after she was medically cleared, that forced her to do heavy lifting and manual labor 

that she could not perform because of her injury. (Id. ¶ 23.) She pleads that her job performance 

at all other times met IDFPR’s expectations and that IDFPR rewarded her work over five years.

(Id. ¶ 14.) She asserts that with reasonable accommodations IDFPR could have returned her to 

work after June 2010. (Id. ¶ 31.) Taken as true, she is qualified for the purposes of withstanding 

IDFPR’s motion to dismiss because she pleads that she is capable of performing the job 

functions with reasonable accommodation.

c. Adverse Action Taken Because of Disability

To plead the third prong of an ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took 

an adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s disability. Abdul-Aziz, 2010 WL 

3516157, at *3; EEOC v. Supervalu Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Ms. 

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Edwards alleges that IDFPR “failed to reinstate and/or rehire Plaintiff because of her disability” 

by rehiring other non-disabled similar employees. (Compl. ¶ 32.) She also claims that IDFPR

denied her re-assignment and refused to make reasonable accommodations for her. (Compl. 

¶ 25.) Because Ms. Edwards alleges accompanying facts in support of each element of her

claim, we deny IDFPR’s motion to dismiss the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

2. Race and Sex Discrimination Claims under Title VII

Ms. Edwards brings claims for discrimination based on race and sex, harassment based 

on race,3 and retaliation based on race and sex. (Compl. ¶¶ 44–47.) For the reasons set forth 

below, we deny IDFPR’s motion to dismiss all allegations under Title VII.

a. Title VII Discrimination

First, we consider Ms. Edwards’ discrimination claim. Title VII makes it illegal for 

employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Davis v. Metro Pier & Exposition Auth., No. 11 C 9018, 2012 WL 

2576356, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2012). For Title VII claims to survive a motion to dismiss there 

are “‘two easy clear hurdles . . . : First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail 

to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.

Second, the allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising the 

possibility above the speculative level.’” Davis, 2012 WL 2576356, at *7 (quoting Tamayo v. 

Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2007)); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 

3 In her complaint, Ms. Edwards alleges a hostile work environment based on race. (Compl. 

¶ 45.) Because she does not allege harassment based on sex, or provide facts inferring such

harassment, we interpret her complaint as alleging harassment based on race only. We disregard 

any suggestions to the contrary that she included in her response.

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773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). In “these types of cases, the complaint merely needs to give the 

defendant sufficient notice to enable him to begin to investigate and prepare a defense.” 

Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1085 (addressing motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s complaint alleged, as 

included in her EEOC charge, that she was female and that she was paid less than similarlysituated male employees because she was a woman).

In the Seventh Circuit, “a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination on the basis of 

race, sex or some other factor governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 may allege the defendant’s 

intent quite generally.” Supervalu, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1011; Concentra, 496 F.3d at 777.

“‘I was turned down for a job because of my race’ is all a complaint has to say.” Bennett v. 

Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). “To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff 

alleging race or sex discrimination needs only to aver that her employer instituted a specific 

adverse employment action against her on the basis of race and sex.” Davis, 2012 WL 2576356,

at *7.

Ms. Edwards sufficiently pleads that IDFPR discriminated against her “as an individual 

in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment on the basis of her race and sex.” (Compl. 

¶ 44.) She alleges that she was fired because of her race and that she was replaced by nonAfrican American and male employees. (Compl. ¶¶ 45–47.) As in Tamayo, Ms. Edwards made 

the same claims in her EEOC charge, and the EEOC gave her permission to sue. Because Ms. 

Edwards provides adequate notice and articulates the claims in her complaint, her Title VII 

discrimination claim is not dismissed.

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b. Title VII: Harassment

i. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a preliminary matter, IDFPR argues that we should not let Ms. Edwards proceed with 

her harassment claim because she “did not raise the allegations concerning harassment with 

respect to her EEOC Charges alleging age or disability discrimination.” (Mem. at 9.) Claims 

“alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint must be ‘like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge’ and 

‘reasonably . . . expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation or charge.’” Hankins v. Best Buy 

Co., Inc., No. 10 C 4508, 2011 WL 6016233, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2011) (quoting Peters v. 

Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 550 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

“Claims are deemed reasonably related if there is a factual relationship between them.”

Hankins, 2011 WL 6016233, at *7 (citing Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th 

Cir. 1994)). The EEOC charge and the complaint must “describe the same conduct.” Hankins,

2011 WL 6016233, at *7 (quoting Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501). “The purpose of this rule is to 

‘afford[ ] the EEOC and the employer an opportunity to settle the dispute through conference, 

conciliation, and persuasion and [give] the employer some warning of the conduct about which 

the employee is aggrieved.’” Hankins, 2011 WL 6016233, at *7 (quoting Cheek, 31 F.3d at 

501).

Here, Ms. Edwards discusses her harassment claims extensively in her EEOC charge.

She alleges that she has “been threaten[ed] with physical violence in the workplace . . . [and] 

subjected to management keeping a secret diary of 83 pages of false allegations” against her and 

that she has been “verbally harassed . . . because [she is] black.” (Resp., Ex. A., Am. EEOC 

Charge.) Because Ms. Edwards describes harassment in her Charge, she has provided her 

employer with the “opportunity to settle the dispute . . . and give[n] [her] employer some 

11
warning of the conduct about which the employee is aggrieved.” Hankins, 2011 WL 6016233, at 

*6 (quoting Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501). We conclude that she has exhausted her administrative 

remedies.

ii. Stating a Title VII Claim for Harassment

Ms. Edwards alleges that IDFPR created a hostile work environment because of her race. 

(Compl. ¶ 45.) Title VII prohibits an employer from engaging in racial harassment that creates a 

hostile or offensive working environment. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 

180, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2374 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S. 

Ct. 2399, 2404–05 (1986); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 938 (7th Cir. 1996);

Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991). As the Supreme Court 

recognized in Meritor, “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free 

from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S. Ct. at 

2405; Johnson, 91 F.3d at 938. “In order to make a claim for hostile work environment . . . 

harassment, a complaint must allege acts that are ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to make the 

workplace intolerable for the members of the group discriminated against.’” Simonsen v. Bd. of 

Educ. of City of Chi., No. 01 C 3081, 2001 WL 1250103, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2001) (quoting 

Minor v. Ivy Tech. State Coll., 174 F.3d 855, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1999)). “[W]e can say that 

whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the 

circumstances.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).

Ms. Edwards satisfies the pleading standard for a Title VII harassment claim. She claims 

that “IDFPR terminated [her] employment, or failed to reinstate and/or rehire her because of her 

race in violation of Title VII.” (Compl. ¶ 45.) She further alleges that “[t]he violations became 

so frequent and severe that it created a hostile, retaliatory and offensive working environment 

12
and resulted in adverse employment acts such as threats to her life, demotion and docked 

wages.” (Id.) She recalls being threatened with physical violence in the workplace and 

“subjected to management keeping a secret diary of 83 pages of false allegations,” in addition to 

verbal harassment “because [she is] black.” (Resp., Ex. A., Am. EEOC Charge.) Because Ms. 

Edwards alleges facts supporting this claim with a right to relief above a speculative level, we 

deny the motion as to her hostile work environment claim.

c. Title VII Retaliation

Ms. Edwards also alleges that IDFPR’s discriminatory practices were retaliatory. 

(Compl. ¶ 45.) Title VII makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his 

employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); Davis, 2012 WL 

2576356, at *6.

In Tamayo, the plaintiff adequately pled a claim for retaliation by showing that she had 

performed her job in a satisfactory manner; that after she complained of her lack of equal pay,

her employer subjected her to adverse employment reactions; that she stated these facts in her 

EEOC Charge; and that she had a right to sue notice. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1085.

Like in Tamayo, here, Ms. Edwards pleads that she is black and female, lost wages, 

received threats to her life, and was demoted. She explicitly pleads these incidents along with 

the retaliation violation. In her EEOC Charge Amendment, she specifically reports that after 

filing the Charge, she was subjected to “different terms and conditions of employment” and 

“threatened with physical violence in the workplace” and that co-workers kept a diary with “83 

pages of false allegations.” (Resp., Ex. A., Am. EEOC Charge.) Because Ms. Edwards

adequately pleads retaliation, we deny IDFPR’s motion to dismiss the claim.

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C. State Law Claims against IDFPR and ISRS

Defendants moved to dismiss Count V, alleging liability for retaliatory discharge, based 

on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Mem. at 12.) Ms. Edwards alleges that IDFPR 

terminated her because she filed a Workers’ Compensation claim against IDFPR. (Compl. 

¶¶ 58–61.) Defendants also moved to dismiss Count VI, alleging liability for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Because these are both state law claims against the State of 

Illinois, we apply the same analysis to both claims.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against a state by its own citizens. Hans v. 

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S. Ct. 504, 507 (1890); Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. and Clinics 

Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 2005); Butler v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 533 F. Supp. 2d 821,

826 (N.D. Ill. 2008). “Federal district courts lack original subject matter jurisdiction over claims 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Fayemi v. Pucinski, 155 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948–49 (N.D. 

Ill. 2001) (citing Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 1994)). “Specifically, the Eleventh 

Amendment bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over actions brought by a citizen 

against a state, state agency, or state official.” Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.

1992). Likewise, under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, “except as provided in the Illinois 

Public Labor Relations Act, the Court of Claims Act, the State Officials and Employees Ethics 

Act, and Section 1.5 of this Act, the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in 

any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1. Under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, a state agency is treated as 

the state. Kroll v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991); Bottoms v. 

Illinois Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 03 C 1881, 2004 WL 1403811, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 

2004).

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Although sovereign immunity prevents a state from being a defendant in court, there are 

two exceptions: “(1) when a state unequivocally waives sovereign immunity and consents to suit, 

and (2) when Congress unequivocally abrogates the state’s immunity by invoking its 

enforcement powers under the fourteenth amendment.” Butler, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 826–27 (N.D. 

Ill. 2008) (citing Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008); Kroll, 934

F.2d at 907)). “‘A waiver of the [S]tate’s sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal.’” 

Harris v. Illinois, 753 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Watkins v. Office of State 

Appellate Defender, 2012 IL App (1st) 111756, 976 N.E.2d 387, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)).

Illinois has waived immunity under the Court of Claims Act, which provides that “[t]he Court [of 

Claims] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine [a]ll claims against the State 

founded upon any law of the State of Illinois.” 705 ILCS 505/8(a); Watkins, 976 N.E.2d at 394.

Also, “[t]he [C]ourt [of Claims] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear . . . claims against the 

State for damages in cases sounding in tort.” 705 ILCS 505/8. “Any state law remedy which 

may be available to plaintiffs must come in a state court action.” Fayemi, 155 F. Supp. 2d at

948–49. Although the State of Illinois has waived Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for 

actions in tort in the Court of Claims, it has not done so for federal courts. Feldman v. Ho, 171

F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1999).

1. Retaliatory Discharge

Although the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305, “itself does not 

recognize a cause of action for employees who are fired in retaliation for exercising their rights 

under the statute, Illinois courts have recognized an implied private action, to ‘ensure that the 

sound public policy underlying the [Act] c[an]not be frustrated by the actions of an employer.’” 

Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2013); Hinthorn v. Roland’s of 

15
Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill.2d 526, 529, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ill. 1988). Retaliatory discharge is 

a tort. Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 2013). 

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not waived by a statute authorizing civil liability 

for employers who discharge an employee in retaliation for a workers’ compensation claim.” 63

C.J.S. Municipal Corps. § 861. In Butler, the court held that a plaintiff could not sue the Illinois 

Department of Transportation in federal court for retaliatory discharge because of sovereign 

immunity. 533 F. Supp. 2d at 827.

Likewise, here, the Eleventh Amendment and the State Lawsuit Immunity Act bar Ms. 

Edwards from suing for retaliatory discharge. She argues that her retaliatory discharge claim 

also implicates violations under Title VII. However, as Butler indicates, she cannot use a federal 

claim to establish jurisdiction over a state claim barred by sovereign immunity. 533 F. Supp. 2d

at 827. Ms. Edwards cites the State Lawsuit Immunity Act that allows plaintiffs to bring claims 

“under Title VII” in state or federal court. 745 ILCS 5/1.5. She concludes that because the 

retaliatory discharge claim contains facts that would violate Title VII, she can also bring the 

retaliatory discharge claim. (Resp. at 13.) The statute she cites does not, however, allow for 

these state law claims to go forward in federal court simply because she alleges a Title VII claim.

On the contrary, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over matters in tort against the 

state. 705 ILCS 505/8. 

Consistent with Butler, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Edwards’ retaliatory 

discharge claim. 533 F. Supp. 2d at 827.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Like her retaliatory discharge claim, Ms. Edwards cannot bring her intentional infliction 

of emotional distress (“IIED”) tort claim in federal court because sovereign immunity and the 

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State Lawsuit Immunity Act bar it. Just as in retaliatory discharge claims, lawsuits against the 

state for damages in tort under an IIED theory must be filed in the Court of Claims. 705 ILCS 

505/8.

Ms. Edwards argues in her response that because the damages are anticipated to exceed 

$100,000, the Court of Claims would not have exclusive jurisdiction. (Resp. at 13.) We 

disagree with Ms. Edwards’ unsupported interpretation of the statute. Although the State 

Lawsuit Immunity Act generally caps damages in a tort case to $100,000, that limitation has 

nothing to do with the scope of the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction. See 705 ILCS 505/8(d); see 

Barrett v. Davol, Inc., No. 10 C 3426, 2010 WL 4156441, at *3–4 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2010)

(interpreting the State Lawsuit Immunity Act as not depriving the Court of Claims of its

exclusive jurisdiction merely because a plaintiff alleges claim for damages in excess of 

$100,000). For the reasons discussed above, we dismiss Counts V and VI without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

As detailed above, Counts I, II, III, and IV against Defendant ISRS are dismissed.

Counts V and VI against both Defendants are dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. ISRS is thus terminated as a party. IDFPR’s motion to dismiss as to 

Counts I, III, and IV is denied.4 It is so ordered.

Marvin E. Aspen

United States District Judge

Dated: Chicago, Illinois

March 27, 2014

4 IDFPR did not move to dismiss Count II, which alleges an ADEA claim, as asserted against it.

(Mot. at 2 n.2.) 

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