Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinion s filed April 16, 2020.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 18

- 00406

- CR
ERNESTO VILLARREAL, JR , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 400th District Court Fort Bend County, T exas Trial Court Cause No. 15

- DCR

- 069295

MAJORITY OPINION Appellant consented to a search of his truck during a traffic stop, and officers found more than ninety

- five pounds of cocaine in a hidden compartment

. After the trial court denied appellant’s mo tion to suppress, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. In two issues, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and subseq u ent detention . We affirm.2 I. L EGAL P RINCIPLES AND S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A seizure must be justifie d at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the seizure in the first place. Id. A police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id. A traffic stop made for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation must be reasonably related to that purpose and may not be prolonged beyond the time to complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop. Id. During a traffic stop , an officer may request the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, and the officer may run a computer check on that information. Id. An officer may ask the driver about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop so long as the q uestioning does not measurably extend the duration of the stop. Id. ; see also Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354

– 55 (2015). An officer’s authority for the stop ends when tasks related to the traffic infraction are, or reasonably should be , com p leted. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 354 ; see also Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 191. However, if an officer develops reasonable suspicion that an occupant of a vehicle is involved in criminal activity, the officer may continue questioning the person regardless of whet h er the tasks related to the traffic stop have come to an end. See Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 191; see also Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355

. Reasonable suspicion exists if an officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from t hose facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged3

in criminal activity. Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This standard is objective ; so, courts applying it a re to disregard the subjective intent of the officer. Id. The officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain the suspect. Leming v. State , 493 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). T he po ssibility of an innocent explanation, rather than criminal activity, for the officer’s observations does not deprive the officer of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 565

. Indeed, the principal function of a traffic stop based on r easona ble suspicion is to “resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal.” Id. (quoting Woods v. State , 956 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
If a defendant shows that a search or seizure occurred withou t a wa rrant, then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or otherwise was reasonable. Ford , 158 S.W.3d at 492. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almo st complet e deference to the trial court in determining historical facts. Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190. We review d e novo whether the facts are sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion

. Id.

II. R EASONABLE S USPICION FOR THE S TOP In his first issue, appell ant conte n ds that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s truck for the traffic violation of operating a motor vehicle that has not been registered. See Tex. Transp. Code § 502.472. Appellant contends that the stop was illegal because “the rec o rd was not fully developed to justify a traffic stop from a [computer database] ‘no record’ return on appellant’s registration.”4

A. Evidence About the Stop At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State stipulated that the seizure and search in this cas e were made without warrants. The officer who stopped appellant was the only testifying witness. The officer testified that he entered the license plate number of the truck that appellant was driving into the patrol car’s computer to check variou s databas e s for information about, among other things, the truck’s registration and insurance status. These databases include the Texas Crime Information Center (TCIC) , the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the Texas Law Enforcement Telecommun ications S ystem (TLETS)

. On this occasion, the database s returned “no record” for the truck’s registration status. Based on this information , the officer believed that the truck was not registered. The officer initiated the traffic stop solely based on the “no

r ecord” return. The officer testified that the databases are managed by the Texas Department of Public Safety. He has used the databases every day for every traffic stop he has made, and he has made many traffic stops. He has found the databases to be re l iable. In his experience, on “very few” occasions the database s would show that a vehicle was unregistered when the vehicle actually was registered. The officer was not sure what “technicality” would cause such a situation. He acknowledged that it coul d be caused by the vehicle having been registered “fairly soon,” but he was “not sure what the lag time is.” 1 The trial court filed written findings. The court found, among other things, that the officer “provided credible and truthful testimo ny.”

1 Appellant adduced evidence that the traffic stop occurred on a Sunday, and the truck had been regis tered on the prior Friday.5

B. Analysis of the Stop Generally, an officer may use information obtained from checking a vehicle ’s license plate in a computer database to form reasonable suspicion. See Delk v. State , 855 S.W.2d 700, 709

– 10, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ( officers had

r easonable sus p icion to question the defendant after an officer “ran a license check on a vehicle” in a law enforcement database, and the computer indicated that the car had been stolen and the owner was a homicide victim); see also United States v. Broca

- M

artinez , 855 F .3d 675, 679

– 80 (5th Cir. 2017) (reviewing state and federal decisions; concluding that a “state computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion”) ; United States v. Esquivel

Rios , 725 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013) (n o ting that courts “ have regularly upheld traffic stops based on information that the defendant ’ s vehicle ’ s registration failed to appear in a law enforcement database ”) . Even a seemingly inconclusive report , such as “unconfirmed” insurance st atus , may be a specific and articulable fact that supports a traffic stop if the officer is familiar with the database and the system is reliable. Broca

- Martinez , 855 F.3d at 677, 680 (reasonable suspicion based on the NCIC and TCIC databases showing “unc onfirmed” ins u rance; officer testified that “[f]or the most part,” the databases were accurate and that “unconfirmed” meant the vehicle wasn’t insured). Appellant relies on two related cases from the Seventh Court of Appeals concerning the stop of a driver and passenge r when the stop was based on a database return of “unavailable” or “undocumented” proof of insurance. See Contraras v. State , 309 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d); Gonzalez

- Gilando v. State , 306 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 201 0 , pet.6

ref’d)

. 2 In the context of those case s , the words were not self

- explanatory, and the record gave no explanation for their meaning. Contraras , 309 S.W.3d at 172

– 73. The court reasoned that the information obtained by the officers was “hardly
sugg e stive of anything other than the unknown.” Gonzalez

- Gilando , 306 S.W.3d at 896. Although an officer “unilaterally opined” that the information in the database led him to believe that the vehicle did not have insurance, the court could
not a ccept the off

i cer’s inference as reasonable absent some other evidence to show: the source of the information, an explanation of the term “unavailable” in this context, an explanation of the timeliness of the information in the database, an explanation of how often use r s of the database were told that insurance information was unavailable, evidence that the database was operating at the time, or some similar contextual evidence. See id. at 896

– 97. According to the court of appeals, when there is a return of “unavailab l e” or “undocumented,” there must be some other evidence to show a foundation for the officer’s conclusion that the driver did not have insurance. Contraras , 309 S.W.3d at 173. The court reversed the trial court’s denial s of the motions to s uppress.
The F ourth Court of Appeals similarly affirmed the suppression of evidence when the sole basis for the stop was information from the Financial Responsibility Verification Program (FRVP), which the court described as a “computer

- based vehicle check ,” showing “i n surance unconfirmed.” See State v. Daniel , 446 S.W.3d 809, 811, 814 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2014, no pet. ). The court of appeals relied on Contraras and Gonzalez

- Gilando

. See id. at 815. The record contained no additional evidence concerni ng the reliab i lity of the FRVP or the officers’ experience with it. See id. at 813

– 15.

2 A driver m us t establish financial responsibility to operate a motor vehicle, and having compliant insurance is one method of satisfying the statute. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 601.051, 601.191.7

At least one other Texas court of appeals has addressed the issue of a “no record” return concerning a vehicle’s registration. T he Ninth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order s of suppression in two related cases , holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion that “there may have been some problem with the registration of the vehicle.” State v. Como , 821 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 1992, pet. ref’ d); State v. H ammitt , 825 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 1992, pet. ref’d). The officer had radioed the license plate number and received a “no record” response, which meant that either the vehicle was unregistered, newly registered, or had an altere d license pla t e. Como , 821 S.W.2d at 743; Hammitt , 825 S.W.2d at 132. In this case, the officer testified about his extensive use of the databases and that, in his experience, the databases were reliable. There had been “very few” times that the database s would show t hat a vehicle was unregistered when the vehicle in fact was registered. He was aware that the databases were managed by the Texas Department of Public Safety and that both unregistered vehicles and newly registered vehicles might result in a “no record” r eturn. This evidence, showing the reliability of the databases and the officer’s experience with them, differentiates this case from Contraras , Gonzalez

- Gilando , and Daniel

. Cf. Ellis v. State , 535 S.W.3d 209, 215

– 17 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wor th 2017, pet. ref ’ d) ( distinguishing these cases and affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress when the stop was based on the computer database indicating “unconfirmed” insurance status; relying on the officer’s testimony that he had used the database many times, that only a “handful” of the hundreds or thousands of returns of “unconfirmed” were erroneous, and that the database was “‘very’ accurate based on his experience”).8

A ppellant also discusses an opinion by then

- Circuit Judge Gorsuch from the United S t ates Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

. See United States v. Esquivel

- Rios , 725 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013). The court remanded to the trial court for additional evidence concerning the database ’s having “no return” for registration status because o t her evidence undermined the reliability of the database

. See id. at 1238

– 39. There was evidence that out

- of

- state temporary tags like the defendant’s “usually don’t return” in the computer database, but the record failed to show why the y don’t return or if there was other indicia of reliability for the database ; not even the name of the database was in the record

. See id. at 1335

– 36. The court contrasted the unique facts of the case with others upholding an officer’s reliance on compute r databases: “ Thi s court and others have regularly upheld traffic stops based on information that the defendant ’ s vehicle ’ s registration failed to appear in a law enforcement database

— at least when the record suggested no reason to worry about the database ’ s reliability. ” Id. at 1235.
There is no such affirmative evidence in this case to undermine the reliability of the TCIC, NCIC, or TLETS databases. And, as noted above, the officer testified about his familiarity with the databases and the likelihood th at “no record” me a nt something other than unregistered.
The dissent relies on Duckett v. United States , a case similar to Esquivel

Rios because it involved affirmative evidence undermining the officer’s reliance on the database. See Duckett v. United St ate , 886 A.2d 548 , 550

– 51 (D.C. 2005). The officer in Duckett stopped a vehicle based on a “blank” result when querying the defendant’s license plate number in a local database. Id. at 549

– 50. A sergeant testified that a “blank” result in the database w as caused by “one of two main reasons: either the DMV has not yet updated [the database] with the registration information for the vehicle, i.e. , the vehicle was registered and issued a license9

plate after the last weekly update; or a clerical or computer error of some kin d has interfered with the DMV’s download of the information.” Id. at 550. Although it was “possible” that a “blank” result meant the vehicle was unregistered, that possibility was “very unlikely in a case, such as this one, involving a metal license pla t e.” Id. at 550

– 51. The court of appeals relied on the “uncontested” testimony from the sergeant, reasoning that the likelihood of the vehicle being unregistered was “too remote a possibility, especially compared to the two most likely a nd innocuous reas o ns for the blank screen response, to have justified the inference of

non
- registration that [the officer] drew.” Id. at 551. The court held that the motion to suppress should have been granted. Id. at 553. In this case, the officer ackn owledged the poss i bility that a “no record” return meant the vehicle had been registered “fairly soon.” But in his experience, there had been “very few” occasions that a vehicle actually had been registered. Nothing in the record indicates that a new reg istration is the “ main reason” the database would show a “no record” entry. Nothing in the record indicates that the officer’s conclusion was “very unlikely” or a “remote” possibility. Thus, nothing in the record undermines the officer’s uncontested test imony that the “n o record” return indicated to the officer that appellant’s vehicle was unregistered. The possibility of an innocent explanation for the “no record” return ( e.g., that the truck was newly registered) did not prevent the officer from reaso nably suspecting t hat the vehicle was unregistered based on the “no record” return. See Hammitt , 825 S.W.2d at 134; see also Leming , 493 S.W.3d at 562, 565

. The officer justifiably stopped appellant to resolve the ambiguity. See Leming , 493 S.W.3d at 56 5 ; see also Ellis , 535 S.W.3d at 215

– 17. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.10 III. D ETENTION In his second issue, appellant contends that the subsequent detention was illegal because the officer “did not in good faith investigate the purported reason for the t raffic stop.” He contends that the five

- minute detention was unreasonable because the purpose of the stop was to investigate a potentially unregistered vehicle , but the officer frisked appellant and questioned him about other matters before obtaining cons ent to search the truck.
A. Evidence About the Detention
The officer testified that he was a K

- 9 handler for the Rosenberg Police Department and part of the Fort Bend County Narcotics Task Force. He was assigned to intercept narcotics and proceeds of narcoti c sales along the major thoroughfares in Fort Bend County. He stopped appellant’s “utility work truck”

— a type of vehicle with which the officer was familiar based on prior traffic stops. W hen he approached the truck on foot, he noticed an atypic al “large separation” betwe e n the tailgate and bumper. Also, t he bed of the truck was a little bit higher than the bottom of the tailgate . These fact s led the officer to believe that there could be a hidden compartment in the truck. As part of his traini ng for narcotic interdictio n , he had had received “compartment” training. He also noticed that the truck appeared clean and had no tools in it. When the officer asked for appellant’s license and proof of insurance, appellant gave the officer a Texas ident ification card and said tha t he did not have a d r iver’s license. The officer noticed that there was no luggage or other “personal items” in the truck, such as “C.E.s [sic] , receipts, trash, cigarettes, . . . paperwork in the glove box,” or the like. In t he officer’s experience, th e lack of personal items was consistent with drug trafficking.11

The officer told appellant about the reason for the stop, and appellant said the truck belonged to his brother

- in

- law. The officer asked appellant to get out of the truck and sit in the passen g er seat of the patrol car, and appellant complied. The officer briefly frisked appellant for weapons before appellant got in the car. The officer testified that it was his “standard procedure” for traffic stops to put people i n the patrol car for his sa f ety, the other person’s safety, and to make the traffic stop go quicker. He explained that with the other person in the patrol car, he could ask questions without having to go back and forth from one vehicle to another while ch ecking things on his comput e r. While the officer was verifying appellant’s information through the computer, the officer asked appellant some questions. Appellant repeated that he did not have a driver’s license, and the officer was unable to confirm if a ppellant had a license. Th e officer question ed appellant about his travel plans

— where he was going, from where he was coming , who m he was going to visit, and the like

— and whether there was anything illegal in the truck . Appellant said he was making

a one
- day trip to visit a cousin in Houston , and t here was nothing illegal in the truck . The officer noticed that appellant seemed nervous because appellant was fidgeting with his hands and avoiding eye contact. During the questioning, the officer recogn ized appellant from a prior traf f ic stop , which had resulted in the officer seizing over $250,000 in United States currency from the car. Within five minutes of the officer having approached appellant at the truck, the officer asked if he could sear ch the truck. Appellant consented. Ul t imately, officers found a compartment containing more than ninety

- five pounds of cocaine. The events of the traffic stop were recorded on the patrol car’s dashcam, and the video was admitted as an exhibit.12

B. Analysis of the Detention Appellant “concedes th a t [the officer] was duty

- bound to perform the functions” described in Kothe v. State , which include (1) requesting the driver’s license, registration, and insurance, (2) using that information to conduct a computer c heck for outstanding warrants; and (3) q uestioning the driver regarding travel plans. See 152 S.W.3d 54, 63

– 64 & n.36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Vasquez v. State , 324 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Mohmed v . State , 977 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d)). A ppellant contends that the officer “performed these functions in a manner expressly designed to delay the stop” and that the officer questioned appellant “about matters unrelated to t he traffic stop delaying the computer c h eck and eventual termination of the encounter. ” However, the trial court’s contrary conclusion is supported by the record. The officer testified that he questioned appellant in the patrol car “[w]hile running the in formation” in his computer. Thus, the r ecord does not support appellant’s contention that the officer’s questions prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of the stop. See Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 354

– 55; see also Lerm a , 543 S.W.3d at 190

– 91 (noting that th e re is no per se rule that an officer must immediately conduct a computer check on the driver’s information before questioning the occupants of the vehicle about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long a s the questioning does not measurably e x tend the duration of the stop). The officer testified that he questions motorists in his patrol car, near his computer, so he does not have to go “back and forth from the car,” which would “hinder any time of the tr affic stop.” The officer intended to “ m ake[] the traffic stop quicker.” Indeed, appellant consented to the search of the truck within five minutes of the initial stop

— a relatively brief13

encounter

. Cf. Thompson v. State , 408 S.W.3d 614, 623 (Tex. App.

— Au stin 2013, no pet.) (reasoning that the officer “conducted his investigation pertaining to the traffic stop in a diligent and expeditious manner, verifying after only five minutes that appellant had a valid driver’s license and a clean record with no warra nts”). The officer developed probable c a use to arrest appellant almost immediately after the stop began because appellant did not possess a driver’s license. See Tex. Transp. Code § 521.025 (person operating a motor vehicle must possess the license and di splay the license on demand of a peace o fficer, and a violation of this section is a misdemeanor offense); State v. Gray , 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Such an arrest for a minor traffic offense is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fo urth Amendment.”) ; Snyder v. State , 629 S.W .2d 930, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citing predecessor statute, “the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant due to his failure to produce a valid driver’s license”); see also Dew v. State , 214 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2005, no pet.)

. A ppellant contends that the record does not show that appellant “was not legally licensed to drive, which would have been a violation of the law,” but rather, the record shows
t hat appellant “did not have a driver’s license in his possession.” His dist in ct ion is irrelevant because the failure to possess the license while driving is an offense. See, e.g. , Tex. Transp. Code § 521.025. Appellant also challenges the trial court’s finding that appellant’s license was s uspended, but this finding is unnecess ar y to determine whether the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant. The officer had probable cause to arrest appellant for the failure to possess a license

. See, e.g. , Snyder , 629 S.W.2d at 934. Because the officer had probable cause for an arr es t, he also had reasonable suspicion for a detention. See Rubeck v. State , 61 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).14

Appellant challenges the officer’s credibility, referring to alleged conflicts betwe en a dashcam recording and the officer ’s t estimony , and to similarities between the officer’s affidavits from other cases and the offense report in this case. But the t rial court explicitly found the officer credible , and we must defer to that finding. S ee, e.g. , Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190 (“A t a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”). None of the alleged conflicts undermine the trial court ’s ultimate conclusion that the detent io n was valid under the Fourth Amendment. 3 T he offense report was not admitted as evidence, and appellant does
not assign any error on appeal based on the trial court’s exclusion of the report from evidence. Appella nt correctly notes that an officer may n ot frisk and place drivers in a patrol car simply as a matter of “r outine ” or “standard procedure,” as the officer in this case testified. See O’Hara v. State , 27 S.W.3d 548, 553

– 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding “ unequivocally that routine alone is in su ff icient to justify a pat

down” search; rejecting the State’s argument that “once an officer has ordered a person out of his car, the officer could always, as a matter of routine, order the person to sit in the patro l car, and then always, as a matter of r ou tine, frisk for weapons before allowing the suspect into the car”). But not every frisk conducted as a matter of routine will be overturned. Id. at 554. Sometimes, even when an officer erroneously conducts a fri sk as a matter of routine, the objecti ve f acts will nevertheless justify the frisk. Id. We must look at all the facts surrounding the

3 For example, appellant contends that the dashcam recording includes a d is patcher referring to “new local return, new state return” regarding registration of the vehicle. There is no context provided during the recording itself or in the testimony as to what this “local return, state ret urn” means. Nor is it even clear tha t th e dispatcher (or digital voice) is saying “new” rather than “no.” Regardless, none of the alleged conflicts cast doubt on the detention because, as noted above, the officer had probable cause to detain and arrest a ppellant.15

frisk to determine if a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have been justified in frisking appellant

. Se e i d. Because the officer had probable c au se to arrest appellant for failing to possess a driver’s license , the officer could search appellant incident to an arrest. See Williams v. State , 726 S.W.2d 99, 100

– 01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (upholding search inc ident to arrest because the officer ha d pr obable cause to arrest for a parking violation; fact that the officer “was investigating what he took to be a narcotics transaction is of no moment in this case” because the officer’s failure to have “the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reas on s which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action” (quoting Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 1 28, 138 (1978))). It is not dispositi ve t hat the officer testified he search ed appellant as part of his “standard procedure” and that appellant was not under formal arrest. See O’Hara , 27 S.W.3d at 553

– 54; see also State v. Sanchez , 538 S.W.3d 545, 550 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The formalitie s

as sociated with arrest do not seem to matter to the Supreme Court in the search

incident

- to

- arrest context as long as the arrest was close in time to the search and the requisite probable cause to arrest (that justif ies the arrest and search) arose befor e th e search.”). 4

4 Even if the frisk were i ll eg al, the inquiry would not end. An illegal search or seizure does not automatically invalidate consent that has been freely and voluntarily given. See Juarez v. State , 758 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), ove rruled on other grounds by Boyle v. S ta te , 820 S.W.2d 122, 132 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Appellant does not mention the factors discussed in Brick v. State for determining whether a defendant’s consent to search has been tainted by a prior illegal sear ch or seizure. See 738 S.W.2d 676, 67 8

– 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Nor does appellant provide any other framework for analyzing how the brief frisk of a person, which revealed no contraband or incriminating evidence, might taint a subsequent voluntary cons ent to search a vehicle and thus requ ir e suppression of contraband found in the vehicle as fruit of the poisonous tree. See, e.g. , Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 48816

Moreover, w e conclude that the officer developed additional reasonable suspicion of narcotics trafficking during the traffic stop , and therefore, justifiably prolonged the stop to briefly investigate and question appellant . The officer k ne w that (1) appellant was driving without a license; (2) the separation of the tailgate from the bumper and the height of the bed of the truck indicated the possibility of a hidden compartment; (3) the utility work tr uck was clean and missing tools; (4)
p er so nal effects were absent from the truck; (5) appellant appeared nervous by fidgeting with his hands and avoiding eye contact; and (6) the officer recalled appellant from a prior traffic stop that resulted in the sei zure of over $250,000 in cash. Althoug h so me of these facts , such as nervousness or the prior encounter between the officer and appellant, would not necessarily establish reasonable suspicion in isolation, the combined force of the facts known to the offic er support the trial court’s conclusio n th at the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant for an investigation into possible narcotics trafficking

. See Hamal v. State , 390 S.W.3d 302, 307

– 08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (upholding trial court’s deni al of a motion to suppress when the of fi ce r prolonged a traffic stop to wait for a drug

- dog ; reasonable suspicion established because the defendant was speeding at night, had multiple prior drug arrests including one seven months prior, told the officer sh e had never been in trouble before, an d ap peared nervous with shaking hands); Villarreal v. State , 565 S.W.3d 919, 923, 928 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2018, pet. ref’d) (upholding trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress when the officer continued detai ning the driver to investigate drug tr af fi cking; reasonable suspicion established because there was a report that a matching truck had been flagged at a border patrol for possible involvement in trafficking, appellant gave a (1963) (addressing whether evidence was discovered “by exploitation of the illeg ality or instead by means sufficientl y di stinguishable to be purged of the primary taint”).17

seemingly rehearsed story and a ppeared unusually nervous, the driver wa s not carrying any cargo and was driving in the dead of night, and the smell of fresh paint indicated a possible hidden compartment); see also United States v. Estrada , 459 F.3d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a driver’s consent to search a truck

wa s not tainted by an unconstitutional detention because reasonable suspicion supported continued detention; reasonable suspicion established when the officer observed scratch marks and adhesive around the gas tank bec ause the discovery created a reasonabl e be lief that the vehicle contained a hidden compartment; “evidence indicating the existence of a hidden compartment also supports the lesser standard of ‘reasonable suspicion’”); cf. United States v. Inocencio , 40 F.3 d 716, 723

– 24 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholdi ng s earch of truck based on driver’s consent and probable cause in part because the driver appeared nervous and gave conflicting statements, and the bed of the truck was higher than normal and had fresh paint, which co ntributed to a reasonable belief that th e truck contained a false compartment). Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
IV. C ONCLUSION Having overruled both of appellant’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Ken Wise Justice

Pan e l consi st s of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Wise and Hassan

. (Hassan, J., dissenting)

. Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b).