[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-12276

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-10110-JLK

NEW SOUTH COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 

d.b.a. Florida Keys Media, LLC,

Plaintiff - Appellants,

versus

HOUSTON CASUALTY COMPANY, 

Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(November 2, 2020)

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Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and TALLMAN,

* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

When it made landfall in the Florida Keys on September 10, 2017, thenCategory 4 Hurricane Irma left a path of destruction in its wake. This case involves 

an insurance claim that Plaintiff-Appellant New South Communications, Inc., filed

with its insurer, Defendant-Appellee Houston Casualty Co., to recover insurance 

proceeds for hurricane damage two buildings (known as Building 35 and Building 

41) sustained. As it turned out, Plaintiffs-Appellants Florida Keys Media, LLC, and 

Robert Holladay—not New South—owned the properties involved, and they were 

also named insureds on the same Houston policy as New South. 

But before New South realized that it did not own the buildings, New South 

filed suit against Houston for failure to pay the claim. Florida Keys Media and 

Holladay later joined as Plaintiffs. After they did, Houston moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the motion. In part, it held that none of the 

Plaintiffs enjoyed standing. In the alternative, the district court concluded that the 

Plaintiffs lost on the merits.

* Honorable Richard C. Tallman, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals, sitting by designation.

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After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument, we agree 

with the district court that New South lacks standing. But we conclude that Florida 

Keys Media and Holladay have established standing. 

As for the merits, after the district court granted summary judgment to 

Houston, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal issued a new ruling concerning 

Florida insurance law that now requires vacatur of the order granting summary 

judgment as it pertains to the merits. We therefore vacate the summary-judgment 

order and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

I.

A. Factual History

After Hurricane Irma blew through the Keys on September 10, 2017, PlaintiffAppellant New South reported to Defendant-Appellee insurer Houston a claim for 

damages to two office buildings located in the Keys.1

 The properties were covered 

under an insurance policy Houston issued. 

Houston enlisted an independent adjustment firm to inspect the interiors and 

exteriors of the two office buildings at Location No. 35 in Tavernier, Florida 

(“Building 35”), and Location No. 41 in Sugarloaf Key, Florida (“Building 41”). 

1 The claim also sought insurance proceeds for four radio towers. But the parties ultimately 

acknowledged that none of the eventual Plaintiffs in this litigation owned the four radio towers, so 

the towers are not involved in this appeal.

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The initial investigation indicated that rain infiltration caused some interior building 

damage, which fell under a coverage exclusion in the policy. But within that 

exclusion was an exception: interior loss was covered if caused by rain “entering 

through openings made by a ‘named peril,’” including “windstorms” from

hurricanes like Irma. 

Blake Tuomy, retained by an agent for Houston, inspected the properties to 

determine the causes and origins of the damages and openings. With respect to 

Building 35, Tuomy attributed much of the interior moisture intrusion to conditions 

that existed before Hurricane Irma touched down in the Keys. But he did report an 

isolated patch of wall where a Hurricane Irma-inflicted roof-damage leak could not 

be ruled out. He also reported some localized interior water damage directly below

three holes believed to be made by a displaced roof-mounted antenna dislodged 

during Hurricane Irma. As to Building 41, Tuomy concluded that there was no 

indication that Hurricane Irma had damaged or breached the exterior of the building 

in a way that could allow water penetration at the locations of water infiltration. 

Based on Tuomy’s report, Houston determined that the cash value of the 

covered loss, minus the deductible, resulted in an adjusted amount of $52,217.14. 

On Houston’s behalf, Houston’s counsel sent a letter to New South’s publicadjusting firm about the adjusted amount and about Houston’s partial denial of

coverage concerning Buildings 35 and 41. Counsel explained that the policy’s 

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Interior-of-Building limitation for interior loss caused by rain (that did not enter 

through openings created by Hurricane Irma) precluded coverage beyond the 

adjusted amount. Houston also mailed New South a statement-of-loss form with

instructions to sign, notarize, and return a proof-of-loss statement within sixty days. 

Neither New South nor any named insureds under the policy ever submitted a sworn 

proof of loss.

B. Procedural History

After it received Houston’s partial denial letter, New South filed a breach-ofcontract suit against Houston in state court. In the suit, New South listed itself as 

the only Plaintiff.

2

 The complaint alleged that Houston failed to issue proper 

payment for the cost of repairs necessary to restore the properties to their pre-loss 

condition. 

Houston removed the case to the Southern District of Florida. During 

discovery, corporate-disclosure statements revealed that other named insureds on the 

New South policy with Houston—Florida Keys Media and Robert Holladay, 

individually—owned the two buildings listed in the claim. Since New South did not 

own or lease either of the two properties, it amended the complaint and added the 

2 New South filed the original complaint in this case as “New South Communications, Inc., 

d.b.a. Florida Keys Media, LLC.” In fact, though, New South and Florida Keys Media are two 

entirely separate corporate entities, and New South was not doing business as Florida Keys at any 

time relevant to this case. 

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buildings’ owners, Florida Keys Media and Holladay, as Plaintiffs3 (collectively 

referred to as “the Insureds”).

Houston moved for summary judgment on three grounds. It contended that 

the Insureds lacked standing, failed to satisfy the policy’s conditions precedent for 

coverage and filing suit, and were unable to demonstrate an exception to the Interiorof-Building exclusion for interior loss caused by rain. Simultaneously, Houston 

filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude certain testimony by the Insureds’ expert, 

Alfredo Brizuela, concerning the causes of the openings that allowed for rain 

infiltration in Buildings 35 and 41 and the resulting damages. 

The district court held a hearing on the summary-judgment motion. During 

that hearing, among other things, the Insureds relied on Brizuela’s expert report to 

address Houston’s contention that the Interior-of-Building coverage exclusion 

precluded recovery beyond $52,217.14. Ultimately, the district court agreed with 

Houston, granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the case with 

prejudice, and denied as moot Houston’s motion to exclude Brizuela’s testimony. 

The Insureds timely appealed. 

II.

3 The amended complaint still satisfied diversity-jurisdiction requirements, as the breachof-contract claim involved Plaintiffs New South (an inactive corporation previously incorporated 

in Florida and Mississippi), Holladay (a Louisiana resident), Florida Keys Media (a Florida 

company with its principal place of business in Louisiana), and Defendant Houston (a Texas 

corporation with its principal place of business in Texas). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

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We review standing de novo. AT & T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock 

Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007). We also review de 

novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. 

Easdon Rhodes & Assocs. LLC, 872 F.3d 1161, 1163-64 (11th Cir. 2017). In 

conducting our review, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences

from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, the 

Insureds. McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1141 

(11th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party 

demonstrates that no genuine dispute exists over the material facts, and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Because this federal action is based on diversity jurisdiction and the insurance 

policy does not include a choice-of-law provision, Florida’s substantive law governs 

our interpretation of the policy. See Great Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 847 F.3d 

1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 

1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006). We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the 

policy’s language. Southern-Owners, 872 F.3d at 1164. 

III.

A. Standing

Whether the Insureds have standing raises a jurisdictional question, so we 

begin with that issue. Under Article III of the Constitution, our jurisdiction as a 

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federal court is limited to “cases” and “controversies.” Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 

941 F.3d 1116, 1124 (11th Cir. 2019). For a matter to qualify as a “case” or 

“controversy,” as relevant here, the plaintiff must establish standing to sue. See

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546-47 (2016). Article III standing exists 

when the plaintiff demonstrates that it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is 

fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to 

be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1547. 

In evaluating the Insureds’ standing here, we must consider the terms of the 

policy. But before we do that, a brief review of the relevant Florida principles of 

contract construction that govern our interpretation of the policy is in order.

Florida courts construe insurance contracts in accordance with the plain 

meaning of the policies as bargained for by the parties. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. 

Co. v. Swindal, 622 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 1993). But insurance contracts can 

sometimes include “a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity” in the 

policy’s meaning. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 

(Fla. 1986). A policy provision is ambiguous when “the relevant policy language is 

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and 

the [other] limiting coverage.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 

34 (Fla. 2000). We construe ambiguous coverage provisions and exclusions against 

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the insurer and in favor of the insured. Id. (noting that “exclusionary clauses are 

construed even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses”). 

Ultimately, a court cannot rewrite a contract, add meaning that is not present, 

or reach results contrary to the parties’ intentions. Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. 

& Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005); Intervest Const. of Jax, Inc. v. Gen. 

Fid. Ins. Co., 133 So. 3d 494, 497 (Fla. 2014). Rather, in construing insurance 

policies, courts must read the policy as a whole and give meaning and operative 

effect to every provision. Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 34. 

Under Florida law, a party seeking to enforce an insurance contract must have 

an “insurable interest” in the property secured, which means an “actual, lawful, and 

substantial economic interest” in keeping the property “free from loss, destruction, 

or pecuniary damage or impairment.” See Fla. Stat. § 627.405(1)–(2); see also 

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Duffy’s Little Tavern, Inc., 478 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 1985). Where an insurance policy insures multiple parties, the rights of each 

party under the policy “are separate and independent of the rights of the others.” 

Unijax, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass’n, 328 So. 2d 448, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). We 

keep these principles in mind as we evaluate the standing of the three Plaintiffs.

i. Florida Keys Media and Holladay

As owners of the damaged properties, Florida Keys Media and Holladay argue 

that they have standing to sue Houston because Houston’s partial denial of the 

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claim—irrespective of which Insured initially filed it—causes them injury. Florida 

Keys Media and Holladay point to the facts that their properties suffered damage, 

and Houston, their insurer, has refused to pay to remedy the damage that their policy 

allegedly covers. They assert that, under the policy, it is irrelevant to coverage 

whether they filed the claim or any other named insured did so, as long as one of the 

named Insureds filed a claim for the Florida Keys Media- and Holladay-owned 

properties.4 Based on the policy language, we agree.

The policy contained the following relevant language: 

PROPERTY COVERAGE PART

In this coverage form, the words “you” and “your” mean the 

persons or organizations named as the insured on the declarations

and the words “we”, “us”, and “our” mean the company providing this 

coverage.

* * *

WHAT MUST BE DONE IN CASE OF LOSS

1. Notice -- In case of a loss, “you” must:

a. give “us” or “our” agent prompt notice including a description of 

the property involved (“we” may request written notice); and

b. give notice to the police when the act that causes the loss is a 

crime. 

* * *

4 The parties also dispute whether the district court improperly disregarded Holladay’s 

sworn interrogatories and affidavit attesting that New South initially reported the claim on behalf 

of all named insureds under the policy. But the record indicates that New South became aware of 

the actual property owners only during discovery at the district court. So we find no error in the 

district court’s decision in this regard.

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(bold, italicized emphasis added). 

The policy language unambiguously defines “you” as the “persons or 

organizations named as the insured on the declarations.” In this case, the “property 

named insured list” includes New South, Florida Keys Media, and Holladay. That 

means that under the notice provision, which says what “you” must do, any of the 

named insureds—New South, Florida Keys Media, or Holladay—had to give 

Houston or its agent notice of the loss and “a description of the property involved.”

Contrary to Houston’s contention, nothing in the policy language requires—or even 

suggests—that each named insured may file a claim concerning only its own 

property. We will not rewrite the policy to effect Houston’s preferred requirement. 

See Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532. Rather, under the policy’s own terms, any 

of the named insureds could provide Houston with the required notice of the loss 

and the property involved, regardless of which of the three entities actually owned 

the damaged property. 

Under Florida law, as the owners of Buildings 35 and 41, named insureds 

Florida Keys Media and Holladay also have an insurable interest in those insured 

properties. See Travelers, 478 So. 2d at 1096. That makes them real parties in 

interest to this breach-of-contract suit seeking coverage for repairs necessary to 

restore the properties to their pre-loss condition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1); see 

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also Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 

2016). 

In sum, Florida Keys Media and Holladay have established Article III 

standing. First, they have “personally” experienced an injury, see Granite State 

Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 

2003), in that they own the damaged properties listed in the New South claim, and

Houston has refused to pay for what Florida Keys Media and Holladay contend are 

covered losses under their policy with Houston. Second, Florida Keys Media’s and 

Holladay’s injuries are fairly traceable—indeed, directly caused by—Houston’s 

refusal to provide coverage for the losses to the two buildings. And third, a favorable 

court determination finding a breach of contract and awarding damages for the 

interior losses of Florida Keys Media and Holladay would redress their injuries. For 

these reasons, Florida Keys Media and Holladay have standing to sue. 

ii. New South

New South also claims to have standing. But unlike Florida Keys Media and 

Holladay, New South had no insurable interest in the covered property at the time of 

the loss. That is so because, as New South conceded in its motion for leave to file 

an amended complaint, Florida Keys Media and Holladay—not New South—own 

the two buildings listed in the claim. Without an actual economic interest in

Buildings 35 and 41, New South has suffered no cognizable injury because of 

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Houston’s refusal to cover damages to the properties. Rather, any recovery under 

the asserted breach-of-contract claim would be payable to only Florida Keys Media 

or Holladay, or both. So New South lacks standing to sue Houston in this suit. 

B. Satisfaction of Condition Precedent to Coverage

Next, we consider whether Florida Keys and Holladay forfeited any potential 

insurance coverage by failing to comply with their post-loss obligation, or condition 

precedent, to file a proof of loss with Houston.

5 A condition precedent requires the 

execution of an act after the contract has been entered but before the obligation to 

perform under the contract is triggered. Racing Props., L.P. v. Baldwin, 885 So. 2d 

881, 882–83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). In evaluating whether Florida Keys Media or 

Holladay failed to complete a necessary condition precedent, we again begin with 

the relevant policy language:

WHAT MUST BE DONE IN CASE OF LOSS

* * *

3. Proof Of Loss -- “You” must send “us”, within 60 days after “our” 

request, a signed, sworn proof of loss. This must include the 

following information:

a. the time, place, and circumstances of the loss;

b. other policies of insurance that may cover the loss;

c. “your” interest and the interests of all others in the property 

involved, including all mortgages and liens;

5 The parties do not assert that Holladay and Florida Keys Media’s failure to provide notice 

constituted a material breach forfeiting coverage of the policy plan. So we analyze only whether 

the failure to submit the sworn proof of loss was a material breach. 

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d. changes in title of the covered property during the policy 

period; and

e. estimates, specifications, inventories, and other reasonable 

information that “we” may require to settle the loss

* * *

OTHER CONDITIONS

[. . .]

10. Suit Against Us -- No one may bring a legal action against “us” 

under this coverage unless:

a. all of the “terms” of this coverage have been complied with; and

b. the suit has been brought within two years after “you” first have 

knowledge of the loss.

If any applicable law makes this limitation invalid, then suit must 

begin within the shortest period permitted by law.

* * *

Under the policy’s plain language, the Insureds’ submission of “proof of loss” 

represents a condition precedent to the Insureds’ ability to sue Houston. Here, none 

of the named insureds submitted a proof of loss to Houston for the damages to 

Buildings 35 and 41, so Houston argued in the district court that it had no duty to 

pay insurance proceeds for losses to those properties. The district court agreed. 

But at that time, the district court did not have the benefit of American

Integrity Insurance Co. v. Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), which 

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was issued after the district court entered its decision.6 We now reconsider the 

parties’ arguments in light of Estrada.

In Estrada, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal emphasized that “Florida 

law abhors forfeiture of insurance coverage.” Id. at 914 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In line with this perspective, Florida law construes 

“policy provisions that tend to limit or avoid liability . . . liberally in favor of the 

insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.” Id. (cleaned up). 

As a result, Estrada concluded, a total forfeiture of coverage because of a failure to 

comply with post-loss obligations occurs only when the insured’s breach is both 

material and prejudicial to the insurer.7

 See id.

Estrada provides the relevant framework for conducting this analysis. See id.

at 912, 914-16. Under it, we first consider whether the insurer pled and proved that 

the insured materially breached a post-loss policy provision. Id. at 912. If so,

6 “[W]e are bound to apply the specific law that would govern if this case were brought in 

state court.” Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1165–66 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, the case was 

initially filed in the Circuit Court of the 16th Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, so where 

a conflict among Florida’s Circuit Courts of Appeal exists, we must apply decisions of Florida’s 

Third District Court of Appeal. 

7 Estrada agreed with Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal’s analysis in Allstate 

Floridian Insurance Co. v. Farmer, 104 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), which required that the 

insurer be prejudiced by the insured’s failure to comply with a material post-loss condition before 

insurance coverage would be forfeited. But the Fourth District Court of Appeal has concluded in 

at least some cases that the insurer need not have been prejudiced by the insured’s failure to comply 

for the insurer to enjoy a valid coverage defense. See, e.g., Rodrigo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 

144 So. 3d 690, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). As we have explained, see supra at note 6, we follow 

the Third District Court of Appeal, since this action was initially filed in state court in that state 

District.

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prejudice to the insurer is presumed, and the burden shifts to the insured to prove 

that the breach did not prejudice the insurer. Id. at 916.

i. Material Breach of the Policy’s Proof-of-Loss Condition 

Here, as we have noted, the post-loss condition in question required at least 

one of the named insureds under the policy to file the required proof of loss. A

failure to provide a sworn proof of loss to prove damages can be a material breach

of a policy’s conditions precedent. Rodrigo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 144 So. 3d 

690, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); see also Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Drummond, 970 So. 

2d 456, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (concluding that the insured’s failure to submit to 

an examination under oath, a post-loss obligation, “was a material breach of a 

condition precedent to [the insurer’s] duty to provide coverage under the policy”).

Here, none of the Insureds ever submitted a signed and sworn proof of loss to 

Houston for the two damaged properties listed in the claim. They therefore breached 

a material post-loss obligation.

The Insureds try to avoid this result by offering several excuses for their 

failure to comply with this condition. None is availing.

First, they argue that Houston never legitimately requested a sworn proof of 

loss because it demanded that the Insureds sign a document swearing that certain

interior water damages were excluded and that the amount of the claim was limited 

to $52,217.14—a position with which they disagreed. But nothing in the policy 

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required the Insureds to submit a proof of loss on a particular form. So nothing 

prevented the Insureds from providing their proof of loss to Houston in the form that 

the Insureds desired.

Second, the Insureds maintain that the facts associated with their explanations 

for noncompliance with their post-loss obligation to provide proof of loss are in 

dispute, so they are reserved for a jury determination. See Haiman v. Fed. Ins. Co.,

798 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). That argument fails for the same reason 

the Insureds’ first one did: nothing in the policy required the Insureds to comply 

with the proof-of-loss requirement by signing the form that Houston provided. 

Third, the Insureds contend that Houston waived the proof-of-loss 

requirement because it conceded that some portion of the claim (specifically,

$52,217.14) was covered and that the exception to the Interior-of-Building exclusion 

applied. But under Florida law, an insurer’s investigation into “any loss or claim 

under any policy” or an insurer’s partial payment to “engag[e] in negotiations 

looking toward a possible settlement of any such loss or claim” does not waive any 

policy requirement, including failure to provide proof of loss. Fla. Stat. § 

627.426(1)(c). 

In short, Houston has established that the Insureds materially breached a 

proof-of-loss condition. 

ii. Prejudice 

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Under Estrada, then, the burden shifts to the Insureds to establish that their 

material breach of the proof-of-loss requirement did not prejudice Houston. But as 

we have noted, Estrada was not issued until after the district court granted summary 

judgment to Houston. So the parties had no reason to present evidence concerning 

this requirement in the district court, and the district court had no opportunity to 

analyze the prejudice inquiry in the first place. For these reasons, we remand for the 

district court to consider Estrada’s prejudice inquiry in the first instance and, if it 

wishes, to allow the parties to submit additional evidence concerning that issue. 

C. Interior-of-Building Loss Exclusion 

We now consider whether, as Houston asserts, the policy’s Interior-ofBuilding loss exclusion bars coverage for damages beyond what Houston has 

previously acknowledged it would pay ($52,217.14). As always, we start with the 

policy language. It excludes from coverage “loss to the interior of buildings or 

structures or to personal property in the buildings or structures caused by rain” unless 

the rain entered through “openings made by a ‘named peril.’” The policy defined 

“named peril” to include a “windstorm.”

When a policy’s exclusion contains an exception, like the policy here, the 

insured must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that the exception applies. E. 

Fla. Hauling, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 913 So. 2d 673, 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). 

As Houston readily concedes, rain entering through openings Hurricane Irma created 

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caused at least some of the damage in the Insureds’ claim for Buildings 35 and 41—

namely, damage the cash value of which was $52,217.14. But Houston asserted that 

the hurricane did not cause any damage beyond that. So we must determine whether 

the Insureds satisfied their burden to demonstrate that at least a material issue of fact 

remains concerning whether Hurricane Irma’s winds created openings in the 

buildings that allowed for rain to enter and cause interior damage beyond that 

conceded by Houston. 

In the district court, the Insureds filed the two-page affidavit and 327-page 

report of professional engineer Alfredo Brizuela, who inspected the site one year 

after Hurricane Irma made landfall. But the affidavit itself does not identify any

specific locations within the buildings where openings Brizuela attributed to 

Hurricane Irma allowed for claimed water intrusion. Nor does it cite any pages 

within the 327-page report that pinpoint any such locations. 

Rather, Brizuela’s affidavit simply claimed in a conclusory manner that he 

“identified several areas wherein the Properties sustained wind created openings by 

Hurricane Irma that allowed for moisture intrusion.” And even on appeal—both in 

their brief and at oral argument—the Insureds still failed to direct this Court to any 

specific part of the record supporting their position. Instead, they again state in a 

conclusory way that “substantial evidence” demonstrates wind-created openings 

caused by Hurricane Irma, which, in turn, allowed water infiltration and damage 

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beyond what Houston has acknowledged. It does not help that they effectively try 

to send us on a hunt for treasure that may or may not exist by generally citing two 

technically written exhibits in the record, totaling nearly 500 pages, with the hope 

that we will discover any relevant portions (if there are any) that might defeat a 

finding of summary judgment.

But that is not how our adversary system works. The advocates—not the 

courts—are charged with identifying the evidence that supports their claims. Indeed,

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8) expressly instructs that the appellant 

bears the responsibility for providing the court “with citations to the authorities and 

parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” See also Mendoza v. United States 

Atty. Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1286 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that failure to include 

“citations to the . . . parts of the record on which the appellant relies . . . may result 

in waiver or abandonment of issues on appeal”).

Perhaps the Insureds do not specify any particular parts of Brizuela’s report 

because no part appears to conclude that Hurricane Irma was the “but-for” causation

of building openings that permitted rain and moisture intrusion, which in turn caused 

interior damage beyond what Houston has already identified. In his report’s 

summary chart of alleged “wind force and water damage caused by Hurricane Irma,” 

Brizuela identified only categories of damages, such as “interior dry wall” and 

“interior/exterior door and window damage,” without reference to their exact 

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locations, causes, or contributions to moisture intrusion and interior loss. Brizuela 

then concluded in his professional opinion that “the wind pressure, wind gusts and 

airborne debris produced by Hurricane Irma, created openings at exterior 

fenestrations, mechanical attachments and roof assemblies for moisture entry.” 

These conclusory assertions without reference to the corresponding specific 

interior damage—let alone the specific building where that damage occurred—are 

not sufficient to create a material issue of fact concerning whether the exception to 

the Interior-of-Building exclusion applied to more damage than Houston conceded. 

See Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985). For this reason, 

should the Insureds demonstrate on remand that Houston was not prejudiced by their 

failure to file proof of loss, the Insureds’ recovery for property damage is limited to 

$52,217.14.

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s determinations that New 

South lacked standing and that the Interior-of-Building limitation applied to 

coverage beyond $52,217.14. We reverse the conclusion that Florida Keys Media 

and Holladay lack standing. We remand for further proceedings on the Estrada

prejudice inquiry, consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

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