AlllOO Tfib?fiS

NBS

PUBLICATIONS

NBSIR 79-1749

Full-Scale Fire Tests with

Automatic Sprinklers in a

Patient Room

John G O’Neill and Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Center for Fire Research

National Engineering Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D C. 20234

It

NBSIR 79 1 749

% ' I FULL-SCALE FIRE TESTS WITH

AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS IN A

PATIENT ROOM

DEC 3

1979

nert PvCC-Gl^C

Q a 100

use.

John G O'Neill and Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Center for Fire Research

National Engineering Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D C. 20234

June 1 979

Interim Report

Sponsored principally by:

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Washington, D.C. 20201

U S- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. Juanita M. Kreps, Secretary

Jordan J. Baruch. Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS. Ernest Ambler. Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF FIGURES iv

LIST OF TABLES . v Abstract 1

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. SCOPE OF WORK 2

3. OBJECTIVE 3

4. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 3

5. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS 5

5.1. Test Area 5 5.2. Automatic Sprinkler System 6 5.3. Instrumentation 7 5.4. Test Program 8 5.5. Test Procedure 8 5.6. Automatic Sprinklers 9 5.7. Privacy Curtains 9 5.8. Test Mattresses and Bedding 9

6. HAZARD ANALYSIS 10

6.1. Fire Spread 10

6.2. Heat Flux 10

6.3. Smoke Levels 11

6.4. Gas Concentration 11

7. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 12

7.1. Cotton Innerspring Mattress 12

7.2. Fire Growth 13

7.3. Heat Flux 14

7.4. Smoke Obscuration 14

7.5. Toxic Gases 14

8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 15

9. FUTURE EXPERIMENTS 16

10. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 16

11. REFERENCES 16
LIST OF FIGURES

Page

"A Figure 1. Burn room plan view 18

Figure 2. Burn room - doorway elevation 19

Figure 3. Corridor/lobby instrument stations floor plan 20

Figure 4. Corridor/lobby instrument stations elevation 21

Figure 5. Sprinkler piping plan view ... 22

Figure 6. Load cell suspension for mattress and bedding 23

Figure 7. Privacy curtain details .... 24

Figure 8. Privacy curtain placed around bed b, fore test 25

Figure 9. Average gas temperature - wastebasket plume 26

Figure 10. Average ceiling temperature - test N-20 cotton

innerspring mattress (M-03) 27

Figure 11. Average ceiling gas temperature for tests with

privacy curtains 28

Figure 12.. Average ceiling gas temperature for tests without

privacy curtains 29

Figure 13. Smoke obscuration in burn room doorway - test N-34 .... 30

Figure 14. Smoke obscuration test N-34 corridor and lobby 31

Figure 15. Net gas velocities at burn room doorway 32

Figure 16. Carbon monoxide concentrations; test N-25 33

Figure 17. Carbon monoxide concentrations; test N-33 34

Figure 18. Carbon monoxide concentrations at doorway, .05 mm

(2 in) from floor 35

Figure 19. Carbon monoxide concentrations at adjacent patient level . 36

Figure 20. Carbon monoxide concentrations in lobby, 1.5 m (5 ft)

above floor 37

i

IV
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. List of instrumentation 38

Table 2. Test schedule 41

Table 3. Ignition source 42

Table 4. Privacy curtain details 42

Table 5. Mattress and bedding technical data 43

Table 6 . Smoke obscuration data 4 4 Table 7 CO data and calculated COHb 45

Table 8 . Maximum CO, concentrations 4 6 Table 9. Minimum 0£ concentrations 46

FULL-SCALE FIRE TESTS WITH AUTOMATIC

SPRINKLERS IN A PATIENT ROOM

John G. O'Neill and Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Abstract

The Center for Fire Research is conducting a research program to examine the use of automatic

sprinklers in patient rooms of health care facilities.

This is an interim report of eight full-scale fire tests

in which the effectiveness of automatic sprinklers was measured in terms of fire control and overall life

safety. These fire tests simulated the scenario in

which mattresses with bedding constituted the burning

items

.

Analysis of test results indicate that prior to

sprinkler operation, smoke obscuration reached critical

levels in the burn room doorway and adjacent corridor

such that rescue of patients in the burn room and the use of the corridor as an exit way would have been

seriously impeded. Immediately following sprinkler

operation, there was total obscuration from floor to

ceiling throughout the corridor and lobby area. For several tests, a privacy curtain was installed

between the sprinkler head and the bed. The shielding

action delayed extinguishment and the carbon monoxide

concentrations increased significantly. In these cases

it was estimated that the carboxyhemoglobin level for a patient in an adjacent bed would reach levels considered

hazardous. In other tests where the privacy curtain was

not installed and this shielding did not occur, the

estimated hazardous threshold was not reached.

Key words: Health care facilities; hospitals; mattresses;

smoke movement; sprinkler systems.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Center for Fire Research (CFR) and the Department of Health, Education

and Welfare (HEW) are jointly conducting a five year life safety/fire safety

research program. The program, which began in 1975, consists of projects in

the following areas: decision analysis; fire and smoke detection systems;

smoke movement and control; automatic extinguishment; and the behavior of

institutionalized populations in fire situations.

This interim report presents the results of the first phase of fullscale fire tests conducted during the period from August to November 1977.

These tests were designed to study automatic sprinkler performance in

simulated patient rooms. A second series of tests began in January 1979.

Automatic sprinklers have proven to be very reliable in controlling

fires in buildings. The National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) fire

record statistics indicate that automatic sprinklers have been approximately

1
95% successful in controlling or extinguishing fires in the United States [l]

1

. In addition, a study based on the Australian Fire Protection Association

fire records indicates that, excluding closed or inoperative valves, an even higher performance success rate of 99.8% was achieved for automatic sprinklers

in controlling or extinguishing fires. This study is based on the most

complete record available and includes every fire which occurred in New

Zealand and Australia during the period from 1886 to 1968 in which sprinklers

were present [2],

Sprinklers have been used to only a limited extent when the primary

purpose is to prevent life loss or injury. Until recently the use of automatic

sprinklers has been primarily directed at industrial, storage and mercantile

occupancies where the fuel loads and the potential for large monetary losses

are high. Insurance companies considered the reliability of sprinkler

systems to prevent large monetary losses in the event of fire in these types

of occupancy to be quite high, and offered substantial premium reductions if

automatic sprinklers were installed. The savings in insurance premiums and

reduction in the risks of a severe business interruption have motivated the

investment in these systems throughout industrial and warehouse facilities.

More recently the use of automatic sprinklers has been considered for

buildings primarily to provide life safety rather than property protection.

This has evolved to a large extent as a result of the concern by building

code and standards making groups that fires in certain types of facilities

pose a significant risk to life safety. Therefore, requirements have been

established for installation of sprinklers in these buildings.

One particular type of facility where this concern for life safety has

warranted such requirements is the health care facility, i.e. hospitals and

nursing homes. The Life Safety Code of the NFPA requires automatic extinguishing systems in all new and existing health care facilities except those

in fire resistive buildings or in one-story buildings of noncombustible

construction [3]. An added impetus to this expanded use of sprinkler systems was the introduction of a bill into the United States House of Representatives

in late 1977 "To amend the Social Security Act to require automatic sprinklers

in all nursing facilities certified for participation in the Medicare or Medicaid program, and to provide for direct low-interest Federal loans to

assist such facilities in constructing or purchasing and installing the

automatic sprinkler systems" [4]. Although this bill has not become law,

there is continuing interest in mandating the installation of sprinklers in

all skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities participating

in Medicare and Medicaid [5],

As previously mentioned, the use of automatic sprinklers has historically

been applied to reduction of property losses in industrial, warehouse and

merchantile buildings. Most of the research and development in automatic

sprinklers, therefore, has been directed toward effective extinguishment of

such fires with little work being done addressing the use of sprinklers for

life safety, especially in health care facilities. In an effort to partially

fill this gap, the CFR is conducting a research project to develop test

information concerning the effectiveness of automatic sprinklers on overall

life safety in health care facilities. Engineering design information for

automatic sprinklers in these facilities will also be developed from this

project.

2. SCOPE OF WORK

The first series of full-scale tests was based on fire scenarios

involving flaming ignitions of bedding, and mattresses, which represent

typical contents in a patient room. The sprinkler systems used in this test

'''Numbers in brackets refer to the literature references at the end of this

paper

.

2
series were designed primarily in accordance with currently established

standards [6] and use sprinkler heads which meet the current UL Standard 199

[10]. Although water flows were reduced in some tests below that required

in the current standard, the scope of this project does not include the use

of spray nozzles which do not meet the UL standard.

To assess the effects of adverse conditions on a patient in the bed

which served as the burning item, a complex arrangement of instrumentation

would have been necessary. In addition, the analysis of data from this

instrumentation would, at best, provide limited information. Therefore, the

scenario for this test series is based on the assumption that the patient in

the bed which serves as the burning item either removed himself from the bed

or was rescued. Analysis of the test results for life safety will be con- sidered in terms of a patient in an adjoining bed as well as for patients

and staff exiting in the corridor adjacent to the room.

It is assumed that the door between the burn room and the corridor

would remain open during the fire, i.e., the door has not been closed by

actions of the staff nor by means of an automatic closing device. It is

further assumed in the analysis of the data that the patient in the adjoining

bed has not escaped nor been removed during the time of the fire test

(approximately 30 minutes from ignition)

.

3. OBJECTIVE

The primary objective of this project is to provide engineering design

information on the use of automatic sprinklers to minimize life loss and

injury in the event of fire in health care facilities. The effectiveness of

sprinklers is being measured in terms of:

• Overall fire control

• Time available for evacuation of patients in the fire area

• Maintaining tolerable environmental conditions for patients

who cannot be evacuated

To this end, current design criteria for sprinklers contained in NFPA 13

[6] and fire safety requirements in the NFPA Life Safety Code 101 are specifically examined to determine if these criteria can be improved, based

on both life safety and cost efficiency of system designs.

4. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK

Two previous studies of some significance were identified regarding the use of automatic sprinklers in health care facilities. First, fire tests

were conducted by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) for the Des Moines

(Iowa) Hospital Council in 1971 [7]. The SwRI report gave the results of

two tests in which sprinklers were installed in a patient room. The burning

items in the tests included foam rubber mattresses and bedding materials

reportedly of the type used in health care facilities. The test procedure

and analysis of results addressed relative response time of detection devices

and sprinklers and some measure of the potential burn injuries to patients

in the bed used as the burning item. Various smoke detectors and an infrared

flame detector, as well as 71°C (160°F) automatic sprinklers, were placed at

the ceiling in the patient room. A mannequin was placed in the bed used as the fuel source. The report concluded that response by staff to a smoke

detector alarm (under ideal conditions) would be faster than the response

time and extinguishing action of the sprinkler. It was also concluded from

an examination of the mannequin after one test that a patient in the bed may

have suffered 2nd and 3rd degree burns to 35% of the body before the sprinkler activated. No information was provided concerning the impact of heat

flux or carbon monoxide on other patients in the burn room or adjacent areas.

3
More recent fire tests were conducted by the Illinois Institute of

Technology Research Institute (IITRI) with automatic sprinklers in simulated

patient rooms [8]. The report prepared by the American Health Care Association

included the results of four full-scale tests using ceiling mounted and

sidewall sprinklers in the patient room, and ceiling sprinklers only in the

corridor. The test procedures included a flaming ignition of combustible

materials in a wooden wardrobe in the patient room. Sprinkler flow rates

ranged from 83.3 il/min (22 gal/min) to 174 £/min (46 gal/min) in one of the

tests when two sprinklers activated. The system in the test facility was hydraulically designed for an average density of 4.07 2,/min/m

2

(0.10 gal/min/

ft 2 ). The actual flow density in the patient room during the fire tests

ranged from 5.7 to 10.6 £/min/m 2 (0.14 to 0.26 gal/min/f

t

2

)

.

The wardrobe with contents was selected as the burning item since it was judged that it would result in a relatively high rate of fire growth as compared to fires involving other items in a patient room. The reported

results indicated that sprinklers in the patient ^oom prevented the fires

from extending beyond the wardrobe to the Class C

J interior wall and ceiling

finishes. In the test where sprinklers were placed only in the corridor,

flashover was not observed, but the upper part of the wall surfaces around

the bed was charred and the ceiling surfaces were scorched. Maximum ceiling

temperatures reached 760°C (1400°F) in the room. Carbon monoxide was measured 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor in several

locations, including the patient room and the adjacent corridor. Carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) percentages were calculated from these CO measurements and were based on a slightly accelerated breathing rate to reflect simultaneous

exposure to higher C0 2 and depleted 0 2 in the fire area. Maximum COHb

levels were estimated to be in the range of 17.3 to 28.8% in the tests where

sprinklers were placed in the room. These levels occurred after 16 to 18

minutes from ignition. However, COHb percentages in the test where sprinklers

were placed only in the corridor exceeded 60% in the patient room at 15

minutes from time of ignition. A COHb level of 30% was considered in the

report as a debilitation level for occupants or rescuers without breathing

apparatus. The peak levels of COHb in excess of 60%, which were reached in

the corridor only sprinkler test , were considered to result in at least

unconsciousness and in probable death after continued exposure. Although

the 30% COHb was established as a level which would prevent an individual

from effectively escaping, the 26 to 28% levels calculated from measurements

made in the tests with sprinklers in the room were not considered to be

significant. The report also concluded that the combustible interior finishes

(Class C) did not play any role in the fire development when sprinklers were

installed in the room (either pendant ceiling mounted or sidewall sprinklers)

.

It was noted, however, that the fire continued to burn inside the wardrobes

as the sprinklers operated due to the shielding action of the partially

closed wardrobe doors.

In addition to these two studies, an extensive fire research program

was conducted by the CFR to determine relative hazards of various mattresses

used in institutional occupancies [9]. The program was prompted by investigations of actual hospital and prison fires where multiple losses of life

occurred. The severity of these fires was attributed mainly to mattresses

which became involved in the early stages of the fires.

2 Sorinkler density is defined as average water flow per unit area protected

by spr inkier ( s )

.

3 Class C interior finish has a flame spread rate ranging from 76-200 based on

the American Society for Testing and Materials ASTM E 84 Tunnel Test.

4
The mattresses tested were evaluated in terms of time to reach critical

thresholds for human tenability and fire growth. Specific elements of

environmental conditions examined in this study included toxic gases (CO and

C0-), 0; depletion, high temperatures and heat fluxes, and smoke obscuration.

The fire growth hazard was measured in terms of elapsed time to flashover in

the room of origin and critical levels of heat flux corresponding to the

point in fire development when fire could spread to other areas. The results

of the test program indicated that a latex foam rubber mattress and a solid

polyurethane foam mattress (both designed for use in health care facilities)

generated critical levels in all categories of hazards considered. Both

mattresses resulted in flashover of the room with no other furnishings

present. Levels of CO, C0 2 , radiant heat flux and smoke obscuration in excess of the thresholds established for human safety were reached. A

polyurethane innerspring mattress specified for use in health care facilities,

while not resulting in flashover, did reach the other critical levels sooner

than the latex foam rubber and solid polyurethane mattresses. Tests with

two cotton padded innerspring mattresses did not result in the attainment of

the threshold levels for fire spread potential or for human safety.

Although the test program did not include automatic sprinkler tests,

it was conducted in a similar facility to the tests conducted in this

study. The results are important to this project because:

a. Many of the same testing procedures are being followed in the

sprinklered patient room tests that were used in this previous

study (e.g. room size, exposure fire, measurements).

b. The same rationale for analysis of the hazards to humans

resulting from the development of a fire is used in this study.

c. Analysis of full-scale fire tests in patient rooms can be made

based on exposure fires both with and without automatic sprinklers.

5. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

5.1. Test Area

The fire test area consisted of a simulated patient room, corridor,

and lobby located in a former barracks building. Figures 1 thru 5 in the

back of the report provide detailed dimensions, as well as the instrumentation

and sprinkler system plans.

The room where test fires were initiated, the "burn room," was lined

with 13 mm (1/2 in) cement asbestos board screwed to steel studs and channels

over 13 mm (1/2 in) vinyl covered gypsum board. For the series of tests

included in this interim report, the walls surrounding the bed were covered

with prefinished lauan plywood paneling, 4 mm (5/32 in) thick, fastened to

nominally sized 1 x 2 in furring strips. The paneling had a nominal flamespread index of 200 (ASTM E 84)

.

The flooring throughout the test area was asphalt tile. The room opened into a 2.4 m (8 ft) wide corridor with walls

and ceiling lined with 13 mm (1/2 in) cement asbestos board over 13 mm (1/2 in)

vinyl covered gypsum board as in the burn room. All of the tests except one were conducted in a closed "nonventilated"

condition. That is, all outside doors and entrance doors into the area were closed prior to ignition and no mechanical ventilation was provided.

No allowance was made for window opening or breakage. Incidental air

movement occurred due to leakage around doors. This nonventilated mode

simulates a common situation in health care facilities where, upon detection

of a fire, the air handling systems are automatically shut down.

5
In one test an exhaust system was in operation in the burn room. A

moderate flow rate of 1.2 m 3 /min (42 ft 3 /min) Was established providing two

air changes per hour in the burn room. This is the minimum rate required

by JCAH criteria [11] . Make up air came from exterior air infiltration

into the lobby and corridor.

5.2. Automatic Sprinkler bystem

The layout of the automatic sprinkler system is shown in figure 5. The steel piping extended above the fire resistive ceiling and was supplied

through a fire hose connection on the building exterior. The water supply was provided through 15 m (50 ft) of fire hose connected to a 1892 £/min

(500 gal/min) pump which was interconnected with a pressure tank to maintain

a residual pressure between 414 and 621 kPa (60 and 90 psi) . A gate valve

and flow meter at the fire hose connection permitted regulation of flow to

the sprinkler system. Prior to each test the flow rate was calibrated

through the open orifice of the same type of sprinkler head to be used in

the fire tests.

For the tests reported here the outlets in the corridor piping system were plugged. An initial flow for the patient room was established at

102 £/min (27 gal/min) to provide the equivalent specified minimum flow

resulting from one sprinkler head operating if the system is hydraulically

designed in accordance with NFPA Standard No. 13. The standard requires a minimum average density of 4.1 £/min/m2 (0.10 gal/min/ft 2

) for this type of

occupancy. The standard, however, states that for this type of room arrangement the system must be designed to provide this density with the sprinkler

in the burn room plus two operating outside the room. Since the required

average density is 4.1 £/min/m2 (0.10 gal/min/ft 2

) for all three sprinklers

operating, the actual density in the burn room with the single sprinkler

operating will be more than the 4.1 £/min/m 2 (0.10 gal/min/ft 2 ). For the

system calculated for the test area, the actual flow in the burn room with

only that sprinkler operating was 102 5,/min (27 gal/min) , resulting in an average 6.9 £/min/m2 (0.17 gal/min/ft 2

) density in the burn room. This initial part of the test series was set up to reflect the current

"state of the art". Therefore, a standard pendant sprinkler of a single

manufacturer with a 13 mm (1/2 in) orifice and a 74°C (165°F) temperature

rated link and lever fusible element was used in the fire tests. In one

test, however, as will be described later, a lower flow rate was desired,

and a 10 mm (3/8 in) orifice pendant sprinkler with a 71°C (160°F) link and

lever fusible element was chosen.

The range of temperatures for fusible elements allowed in a health

care facility (low hazard occupancy) is 135° to 165°F [10]. The intent was

to use a typical fusible element, operating in the higher part of the

allowable range of temperatures, and not specifically designed for rapid

response

.

In addition to the "wet" sprinkler head, three other "tell-tale"

sprinkler heads were also placed at the center of the burn room ceiling.

The purpose was to obtain data on response times of other types of sprinkler

heads in the full-scale fire tests. The tell-tale sprinkler heads were pressurized by nitrogen which was pumped through copper tubing placed above

the fire resistive ceiling. A pressure switch was connected into the

tubing to each sprinkler head and, when the sprinkler operated, the pressure

switch activated a relay which stopped a clock. Thus, response times were automatically recorded from time of ignition. Tell-tale sprinkler heads

included the following fusible elements:

6
Rapid-response 135°F (57°C)

Fusible bulb 165°F (74°C)

Link lever 165°F (74°C) duplicate of wet sprinkler head

The response times of these sprinklers will be included in another

report.

5.3. Instrumentation

The instrumentation used in the test series is shown in figures 1 thru

4 and is listed in table 1. Various heat and smoke detectors were placed

in the burn room and in the corridor. A record of their operation is not

reported here. All tests were recorded on video tape with separate coverage

of the burn room and down the length of the corridor. All instrumentation

channels were recorded at 10— second intervals on a magnetic tape data

acquisition system.

Thermocouples measured gas and surface temperatures throughout the

test area and locations are shown in figures 1 thru 4. Thermocouples were chromel-alumel type, 0.25 mm (30 gauge).

Calibrated, water cooled heat flux meters measured total heat flux at

the adjacent patient level and across the corridor from the burn room.

The patient bed and the trash container which served as the initiating

fire source were placed on a steel plate (see figure 6). The plate was suspended from a load cell mounted above the ceiling to monitor weight loss

rate during each test.

The velocity of air and gases entering and leaving the burn room and

moving along the corridor were measured with directional low velocity

probes placed in the doorway and corridor. This type of probe was developed

by Heskestad [12] , and the description and construction details of these

devices are provided in the reference. The differential pressure was measured with a calibrated diaphragm- type pressure transducer. Calibration

techniques are provided by McCaffrey and Heskestad [13]. The equation for

velocity is:

2 Ap/

p

= C(Re)

u

AP

P

VC (Re)

= measured differential pressure

= gas density (calculated from temperature of thermocouple

next to probe)

= gas velocity

= constant dependent on Reynolds number

C = 1.08 according to McCaffrey and Heskestad.

Continuous gas measurements included CO, C0 2 and 0 2 . Sampling tubes were located at the adjacent patient level, and in the doorway at .05 mm (2 in)

and 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. In addition, CO was measured in the

lobby at the 1.5 m (5 ft) level. CO and C0 2 in the burn room and doorway

were measured with non-dispersive , infrared analyzers. Gases were pumped

through cold traps to remove condensable vapors before the analysis.

Electrolytic oxygen cells were used to measure 0 2 concentrations.

7
Smoke meters developed by Bukowski [14] were used to measure light

obscuration in the doorway to the burn room and in the corridor .and lobby.

Locations are shown in figures 2 thru 4. This type of smoke meter is

essentially an extinction beam consisting of a collimated light source and

a detector separated by a one-meter long path through the smoke. The

obscuration is measured by the magnitude of attenuation of the light seen

by the detector.

5.4. Test Program

The program for the initial automatic sprinkler tests reported here

addressed these specific areas:

a. Determine the response and effectiveness of automatic sprinklers on fires involving beds in patient rooms for health care facilities. Two

specific types of mattresses with bedding were examined, representing

a wide range of performance in the earlier mattress flammability

study [9]

.

b. Determine the effect of combustible interior walls on the fire development

in the sprinklered room.

c. Determine the effect of a privacy curtain placed between the sprinkler

and the bed on the response and extinguishing performance of the

sprinkler

.

The approach used in the project was to select one mattress which did

not exceed any of the critical fire spread or human safety thresholds in

previous studies and one which exeeded all of the limiting thresholds. The

rationale in using a low hazard mattress was to determine if the action of

the sprinkler might result in reaching or exceeding any of the limiting

thresholds for human safety; in particular, smoke obscuration. The test

schedule is listed in table 2.

5.5. Test Procedure

The test procedure followed closely that of the previous mattress

flammability test program. Since the procedure was designed to provide an analysis of data from tests with and without sprinklers, it was essential

to repeat the same sequence of initial flame transfer from the trash container

to the bedding and mattress. A small polyethylene container containing 443 g

(0.97 lb) of combustibles for each test was placed next to the bed adjacent

to the wall. Table 3 lists the contents of the container. The container

was placed in contact with the bedspread, with the top of the container 0.2 m

(8 in) from the top of the bed.^ Each test began at the time the contents

were ignited with a paper matcn . Prior to test N-22 thru N-34 the burn room was conditioned to a relative

humidity (RH) of 40 to 60%, and an ambient temperature range of 18 to 27°C

(65 to 80°F) . The moisture content of the paneling was within the range of

5 to 8%. For tests N-20 and N-21 no particular attempt was made to condition

the burn room prior to tests, and ambient conditions for these two tests were approximately 27°C (80°F) and 80% RH . All of the bedding and waste

container items were kept in a 50% RH conditioning room at a temperature of

21°C (70°F) for at least 24 hours prior to each test to maintain a consistent

moisture content of these items from test to test.

Reference 9 reported good repeatability using this ignition sequence.

8
5.6. Automatic Sprinklers

Prior to each test the desired water flow was established by flowing

water through the orifice of an open sprinkler (deflector removed) of the same manufacturer and model as that planned for the fire test. A gate

valve was operated in coordination with a flow meter until the desired flow was obtained. At that point a quarter turn valve in series with the gate

valve was closed to shut off the system. While the calibration flows were

made the water pump for the site was kept continuously in operation. After

the valve was closed, the automatic sprinkler for the next test was installed,

and the quarter turn valve was then opened. During the fire tests the

water pump was kept in operation to maintain the same residual pressure on the automatic sprinkler system. During the sprinkler operations in the

fire tests the flow meter was monitored to insure that the desired flow was maintained during the test.

5.7.

Privacy Curtains

Two types of privacy curtains were examined in the full-scale fire

tests; one was a solid cotton, fire-retardant treated curtain and the

second was a cotton, fire-retardant treated curtain with a nylon mesh top.

Details of curtain construction and sizes are provided in table 4. Figures

1 and 8 indicate the position of the curtain around the bed. Each curtain

was suspended by nylon glides which slid in a steel track fastened to the

ceiling. A drawing including key dimensions of the curtain suspension is

provided in figure 7. Following the tests of the two types of curtains

which were suspended with nylon glides, another test was conducted with a solid curtain suspended from steel glides. The reason for this variation

will be discussed in the results.

5.8.

Test Mattresses and Bedding

As previously mentioned two mattresses identical to ones examined in

the previous mattress fire test program served as the mattress fuel items.

The mattress chosen from those which were found to result in the least severe fire in terms of fire growth and the attainment of limiting conditions

(i.e. the established criteria were not exceeded), was an innerspring

hospital mattress constructed with fire retardant treated cotton felt

padding, a nonretardant polypropylene interfacing fabric and a retardant

treated polyvinylchloride ticking (outermost layer) . This mattress was chosen since it was specified for hospitals.

In the previous study, two mattresses exceeded critical levels of fire

growth and the established thresholds for limiting conditions for life

safety. One was constructed of latex foam rubber and the other of polyurethane

foam used without innerspring. Since the latex foam rubber mattress is no longer manufactured in this country, it was decided to use the polyurethane

slab mattress 0

. As with the more moderate burning innerspring mattress

described above, it was designed for hospital use. Following the initial test (test N-21) which will be described later,

it was discovered that the polyurethane mattress had only one-half the

density of the M-01 mattress tested in the previous series. Although the

°This mattress is coded as M-03 to correspond to the previous work.

^This mattress is coded as M-01 to also correspond to the previous work.

9
newer mattress had been ordered from the same manufacturer, and under the same model number, it was apparent that the foam construction was substantially

different from the previous mattress. An inquiry to the manufacturer did

not result in anything conclusive about a change in product, except that

they apparently no longer manufactured a mattress identical to the M-01 of

the previous test series.

It was still considered essential to use mattresses identical to those

in the previous program. The polyurethane innerspring mattress (M-02) was selected to represent the more severe exposure fire for the sprinkler tests.

While flashover had not been exceeded in the previous tests, the limiting

conditions for life safety were exceeded earlier when testing this mattress

than with any other mattress tested. Details of these test mattresses are provided in table 5. Each mattress was tested with bedding which was obtained from a commercial

hospital supplier and intended for use in health care facilities. The bedding

consisted of a cotton water repellant drawsheet, two cotton/polyester sheets,

a cotton/polyester bedspread, a cotton/polyester pillowcase and a pillow

which consisted of shredded polyurethane foam filling in a cotton cover. The properties of these items are provided in table 5.

6. HAZARD ANALYSIS

Consistent with specific objectives mentioned in section 3, the test

results were measured in terms of the following:

® Fire spread

® Heat flux

® Toxic gases

* Smoke obscuration

6.1. Fire Spread

The automatic sprinkler system in this first series was evaluated to

determine its performance in controlling and extinguishing fires involving

institutional type mattresses and bedding. The impact of the privacy curtain

between the bed and the sprinkler was specifically examined. It was difficult

to determine accurately the extinguishing performance of the sprinkler

systems. Since the water spray and water absorption of the mattresses

following sprinkler operation complicated the weight loss measurements from

the load cell instrumentation, visual examinations of the burned mattress

were made after each test to determine the approximate consumption.

In addition, the wall finishes near the bed were examined to determine

the extent to which they had become involved in the fire. Average ceiling

temperature data were examined to determine the relative capabilities of the

sprinkler systems to reduce ceiling gas temperatures, based on the sprinkler

flow rate and the type of privacy curtain.

6.2. Heat Flux

Any consideration of limiting conditions adverse to human safety in a health care facility must include the potential hazard of burn injuries. In

the fire scenario selected for these tests, the patient in an adjacent bed

would be in the most immediate danger. A critical level of heat flux for

human exposure is a function of time since a sustained exposure to a lower

flux can result in a burn injury equivalent to that of a short exposure at

10
higher flux. The operating automatic sprinkler could be expected to reduce

rapidly the heat flux imposed at the adjacent level. A value of 2.5 kW/m 2 radiant flux was selected as the upper limit prior to one feeling pain.

This value is based on information provided by Dinman [15] and Parker and

West [ 16 ]

.

6.3. Smoke Levels

Limiting levels of smoke obscuration for human safety were determined

for two separate hazards in this fire test scenario. The first concerned

rescue of a patient in the adjacent bed in the room of fire origin. The

second involved the use of the corridor and lobby adjacent to the room of

origin as an exit way. Two critical levels of obscuration were considered,

one measured at the doorway to the patient room and the other in the corridor

and lobby. Critical levels selected for each location were based on investigations by Jin [17,18].

The critical level of smoke obscuration was selected as an optical

density per meter (OD/m) =0.5 m- 1 in the doorway to the patient room. This

level was measured horizontally at 0.3 m (1 ft) from the top of the doorway.

The critical level for the corridor and lobby was selected as OD/m = 0.25 m- 1 as measured horizontally, 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor.

6.4. Gas Concentration

Concentrations of CO and C0 2 were measured as well as 0 2 depletion. It

should not be inferred that CO and C0 2 are the only toxic gases that are significant in terms of having adverse effects on humans in fires. These

were the only two measured, however, because of experimental uncertainties

in measuring and evaluating the toxic effects of other gases. It is known,

in any case, that CO and C0 2 are always generated in building fires.

Critical limits or thresholds were selected for CO, C02 and 0 2 depletion

based on previous studies which examined the adverse effects on humans.

Specific limitations for this study were based on quantities which resulted

in incipient incapacitation of healthy persons. Incipient incapacitation

for this analysis can be considered the point at which environmental conditions

could have an adverse effect on a person to function reliably. The critical

levels or thresholds should not be interpreted as precise boundaries but

rather as an approximation, based on the literature and unique charac teris tics

of the occupancy type being assessed, of the levels which would result in

adverse effects. In health care facilities occupants in varying states of

health may be more severely affected at the critical levels established here

than in occupancies where most persons are not physically impaired. It

would be impossible to determine every critical level which may adversely

affect patients with varying physiological problems. Therefore, by practical

necessity, the criteria established here are based on the incipient incapacitation of healthy persons, and can serve as upper boundaries for health care occupancies

.

A critical level of 8% C0 2 was established for this program based on tabulations by Kimmerle [19]. A minimum oxygen concentration of 14% was selected based on Pryor and Yuill's study [20]. However, determining

critical levels of CO is a much more complex issue. What makes CO toxic is

that it reduces the oxygen carrying capacity of the blood. CO forms COHb in

the blood and, therefore, the percent COHb is the more precise measure of CO

toxicity. The CFR has tentatively established a methodology for determining

a critical level of COHb from CO concentrations based on previous studies by

others. Stewart derived an equation of COHb from experiments with human

volunteers [21] . The volunteers were subjected to very high concentrations

and their COHb levels were then measured. CO uptake is directly proportional

11
to the breathing rate which is approximately 6.5 fc/min for an individual at

rest. The breathing rate increases with activity and also from exposure to

CO 2. A 4% concentration of CO 2 will more than double the breathing rate [22].

Since both of these factors must be considered in a fire situation, a breathing

rate was established as 18 £/min. The equation for determining COHb% is:

ACOHb% = 5.98 x 10~

4 (At) [CO]

1 ' 036

where At is time in minutes and CO is concentration in ppm. An initial value

of 0.75% was established from inf ormation provided by Alarie and Zullo [23].

A 25% COHb was established in this study as the level of COHb at which

incipient incapacitation may occur [19].

In addition to the threshold for time-rated accumulation, another limit

must be selected for CO exposure. Instantaneous doses of high levels of CO

must also be considered due to the physiological effects such as cardiac

arrythmia [24] which can occur independently of the effects of increased

COHb. Claudy [25] reported on the effects of exposure to high concentrations

of CO. The results of his work indicate that incipient incapacitation may

occur with only a few short breaths at an exposure level of 10,000 ppm CO.

And, at a slightly higher concentration of 12,800 ppm Claudy reported that

unconsciousness could occur in 2 to 3 breaths, followed by death in 1-3

minutes. Based on this an instantaneous threshold of 10,000 ppm (1.0% by

Vol) CO was selected as a criterion in addition to the time integrated

exposure resulting in COHb level of 25%.

7. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Eight full-scale fire tests were conducted in this initial phase of the

project (see table 2). Using the small waste container described earlier in

the tests was particularly useful since it resulted in a realistic energy

source strong enough to consistently ignite the mattress but not strong

enough to operate the sprinklers before the mattress became the dominant

burning item. The ignition transfer sequence was very consistent with the

exception of test N-21. In this test, at 420 seconds, the contents of the

waste container had to be reignited. Generally, in the other tests, the fire

extended to the bedding in 15 to 30 seconds. The fire involvement of the

mattresses was observed to be very consistent throughout the tests. After

the bedding on the side next to the waste container became involved, the fire

spread along the side of the bed facing the container, and within four minutes,

the mattress became involved. The fire generally spread along the edge of

and into the side of the mattress, to the corner of the pillow, and into the

pillow fill prior to sprinkler operation. Figure 9 shows the consistent rate

of temperature rise measured above the waste container plume for the tests

involving the M-02 mattresses. This fire development sequence proved to be a useful repeatable fire with which to measure the desired parameters in the

study.

Since the fire test involving the cotton innerspring mattress was unique with respect to the remaining tests, the results of that particular

test are discussed separately. The results of the other tests are discussed

together, based on the hazard analysis established for this project.

7.1. Cotton Innerspring Mattress

The fire (test N-20) involving the cotton innerspring mattress did not

activate the sprinkler system. At 906 seconds the quick operating 57°C

(135°F) tell-tale sprinkler did activate. After the contents of the waste

12
container were consumed, the fire burned in a smoldering mode along the edge

of the mattress facing the container. At 30 minutes the test was terminated;

the mattress was taken outside and extinguished with a hose. Figure 10

shows the average ceiling gas temperatures. There was no damage to the

plywood wall finish.

The limiting levels established for smoke obscuration as described in

6.3, were exceeded at the patient room doorway (860 sec) and in the corridor

(370 sec) . CO and C0 2 concentrations were minimal; maximum CO levels reached

only .03% (300 ppm) and C02 levels reached .75% at the 1.5 m (5 ft) height

in the doorway.

7.2. Fire Growth

The automatic sprinkler in the room operated in all of the tests involving

the solid polyurethane and polyurethane innerspring mattresses. Sprinkler

response times ranged from 345 to 388 seconds. In tests N-22 and N-23 it was observed that some of the nylon glides and nylon mesh failed from exposure

to the heat of the fire before sprinkler operation. The failures resulted

in approximately 1 to 1.5 m (3 to 5 ft) lengths of the curtains measured

from the wall at the head of the bed to drop from the ceiling track. This

reduced the shielding effect of the curtain and allowed the sprinkler spray

to fall directly on the end toward the head of the bed. Following these two

tests it was decided to fabricate steel glides to suspend a solid curtain,

the same type used in N-22. The steel guides were used in test N-33 and the

curtain stayed in placed throughout the test. As a result the curtain did

shield most of the sprinkler spray and, significantly reduced the impact of

the sprinkler in extinguishing the fire. As shown in figure 11, overall

ceiling temperatures, although limited by the sprinkler, were higher following

sprinkler operation than in tests N-22 and N-23, and in test N-25 (see

figure 12) , where no privacy curtain was installed. In test N-33 the mattress

continued to burn and it was almost totally consumed by the end of the test.

While the bed was shielded from the sprinkler spray, there was wetting of

the wall at the head of the bed. The wall was scorched in several places,

but there was no sign of sustained burning.

In test N-32, the introduction of the modest ventilation, 3.9 m 3 /min

(42 ft 3 /min) exhaust from the room did not significantly influence the rate

of the fire growth nor the response time and performance of the sprinkler.

The reduced flow rate using the 10 mm (3/8 in) nominally sized orifice

sprinkler head flowing at 64 J,/min (17 gal/min) resulted in fire control and

extinguishment equivalent to the flow rate of 102 £/min (27 gal/min) from

the 13 mm (1/2 in) orifice sprinkler. In reducing the flow rate, the use of

the 10 mm (3/8 in) orifice sprinkler was selected to obtain a nozzle pressure

(131 kPa (19 psi) ) approximately the same as the 13 mm (1/2 in) orifice

(159 kPa (23 psi)) sprinkler. See figure 12 for the average ceiling gas

temperatures.

As previously detailed in section 5.2, design criterion for this type

of sprinkler installation requires the system to provide an average density

of 4.1 2./min/m 2 (0.10 gal/min/ft 2

) with the sprinkler head in the room plus

two in the corridor operating. Corridor ceiling gas temperatures (5 in from

the ceiling) recorded from these tests indicate that a sprinkler head with

the same thermal response properties as the sprinkler in the room would not

have operated. A maximum temperature of 78°C (178°F) was recorded at the

corridor ceiling in test N-33. This was an instantaneous reading and generally

the temperatures stayed well below 70°C (158°F).

13
7.3.

Heat Flux

Total heat flux measured at the adjacent patient level was negligible

in all tests. Maximum levels measured prior to sprinkler operation were

around 2.05 kW/m2 (.18 BTLJ/ft 2 -sec) . 7.4.

Smoke Obscuration

In all the tests, the limiting level for smoke obscuration was exceeded

at the doorway and in the corridor, and in some tests also in the lobby

before the sprinklers operated. See table 6 for maximum obscuration prior

to automatic sprinkler operations and times to reach limiting levels for the

doorway (0.5 OD/m) and for the corridor and lobby (0.2.5 OD/m) . Although the

limiting level adverse to human safety had been exceeded 1.5 m (5 ft) above

the floor in the corridor, observations and video recordings indicated that

the visibility was clear up to 1.2 m (4 ft) from the floor prior to sprinkler

operation. Within one minute after sprinkler operation, however, there was nearly total obscuration throughout the corridor and lobby. See figures 13

and 14 for results of test N-34 which was typical of all tests where sprinklers

operated

.

Gas velocity measurements in the doorway to the burn room indicated an almost complete reversal of gas flow after sprinkler operation when compared

to pre-sprinkler conditions. Generally the result was that smoke and gaseous

combustion products accumulating in the upper portions of the corridor

outside the burn room were drawn back into the room, cooled, and pushed back

out at the bottom into the corridor. See figure 15 for the net gas velocity

profiles at the burn room doorway prior to and after sprinkler operation.

In test N-34, where an exhaust system was installed in the room, critical

obscuration levels measured in the doorway and in the corridor occurred in

less time than in other tests; however, the total obscuration measured prior

to sprinkler actuation was approximately the same as the other tests.

7.5.

Toxic Gases

After the sprinklers operated the carbon monoxide concentrations changed

significantly. Just prior to sprinkler operation the highest concentrations

were measured at the 1.5 m (5 ft) level in the doorway. Concentrations at

the adjacent patient level and at the bottom of the doorway were negligible.

Following sprinkler operation, the distribution of CO concentrations changed

significantly. The concentrations recorded at 1.5 m (5 ft) in the doorway

were reduced temporarily and the concentrations recorded near the floor and

at the adjacent patient level increased rapidly. Figures 16 and 17 illustrate

this shift in the CO distribution for tests N-25 and N-33. The same type of

shifts in concentrations was noted for all tests where sprinklers operated.

The concentrations in general did not reach what were considered hazardous

thresholds except in the tests where the privacy curtain stayed in place.

In test N-33 where the privacy curtain tended to shield the sprinkler spray

as described earlier, carbon monoxide concentrations increased significantly

as compared to test N-25 where there was no privacy curtain installed. (In

test N-25 the sprinkler flow and the quiescent test conditions were equivalent

to test N-33) . Figures 18 through 20 illustrate the differences in CO

concentrations at various locations. In test N-33 estimated carboxyhemoglobin

levels exceeded a hazardous threshold (25%) at the adjacent patient level at

approximately 20 minutes after ignition. In test N-23 where the mesh topped

curtain was installed, the curtain partially shielded the sprinkler spray,

estimated carboxyhemoglobin levels exceeded the 25% level at approximately

26 minutes after ignition. Although the CO concentrations recorded in the

lobby (1.5 m or 5 ft) were higher for test N-33 as shown in figure 19,

hazardous thresholds were not reached.

14
The instantaneous hazardous threshold for CO (10,000 ppm) was not

reached in any of the tests (see table 7)

.

In the previous mattress fire test series, two tests were conducted in

the same facility using the M-02 mattress as the burning item [9]. (These

tests were conducted with a noncombustible interior finish in the burn

room.) Maximum COHb levels for the two tests measured at the adjacent

patient level were recorded as 14.2% at 1200 seconds and 5.2% at 1800 seconds

respectively. In those tests the critical gas concentration failures were

due to 0- depletion. Times to reach 14% 0 2 were 350 and 340 seconds.

The C0 2 and 0 2 depletion in the sprinkler series never reached critical

levels in any of the tests. See tables 8 and 9 for maximum C0 2 and minimum

0 2 concentrations.

8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

For the given room arrangement, fire scenario, and test conditions

selected, and the limited tests conducted to date, the following summary and

conclusions appear justified:

a. Critical levels for smoke obscuration were reached prior to sprinkler

operation, potentially impeding the rescue of the patient in the adjacent

bed and use of the corridor as an exit way. Following sprinkler

operation, total obscuration (>.9 OD/m) occurred from floor to ceiling

throughout the test area.

b. The presence of the privacy curtain interfered with extinguishing

performance of the sprinkler.

c. The distribution of CO concentrations shifted after sprinkler actuation

and concentrations were the highest at the floor level after sprinklers

operated. Prior to sprinkler operation the highest concentrations were

recorded at the highest measuring point, 1.5 m (5 ft) level in the

doorway.

d. The CO concentrations in general did not reach what were considered

hazardous thresholds except in tests where the privacy curtain stayed

in place. The presence of the privacy curtain and the delayed extinguishment of the fire resulted in significantly higher concentrations

of CO. Calculated COHb eventually exceeded a critical level of 25% at

the adjacent patient level. A more optimum location of the sprinkler

with respect to the curtain or the use of privacy curtains which do not

extend to the ceiling may enhance the extinguishing action of the

sprinkler and reduce the CO concentration.

e. Fire tests conducted thus far in this project indicate that flow rates

lower than that required in established criteria achieved equivalent

fire control.

f. The presence of the Class C wall finish did not play a role in the fire

development or affect the fire control of the sprinkler.

g. Neither the presence of the privacy curtain nor the operation of the

exhaust system in the room influenced sprinkler response time.

15
9.

FUTURE EXPERIMENTS

In the next series of tests a more comprehensive approach will be used

to quantify the smoke obscuration in the corridor occurring after sprinkler

operation. Smoke meters will be arranged to record a profile of smoke

obscuration at several levels from floor to ceiling in the corridor.

The next phase will also include:

a. A fire involving a patient room clothing wardrobe.

b. The use of a horizontal sidewall sprinkler in the patient room.

c. A simulated rapid response sprinkler keyed to the activation time of a fusible element heat detector.

d. A smoldering ignition of bedding.

e. A ventilated patient room using a fan coil unit, a make up air supply,

and an exhaust system.

f. Measurements of sprinkler spray distribution will be made using collection

pans in an attempt to quantify the shielding of the privacy curtain on

the sprinkler spray.

10.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to express specific thanks to Mr. Richard Zile

who was principally responsible for the preparation of the facility for each

test and who also participated in all of the fire tests. Gratitude is also

expressed to Messrs. H. Wheelock, W. Stull, M. Womble, B. Ramey, T. Maher,

C. Veirtz and D. Klein, who assisted in the experimental procedure.

11.

REFERENCES

[1] Fire Protection Handbook, National Fire Protection Association, Boston,

MA (14h Edition)

.

[2] Maryatt, H. W. , Fire-automatic sprinkler performance in Australia and

New Zealand, 1886-1968, Australian Fire Protection Association, 1971.

[3] Life Safety Code, Standard No. 101, National Fire Protection Association,

Boston, MA (1976 Ed.).

[4] H.R. 9689, United States House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st

Session, October 20, 1977.

[5] Federal Register, Vol. 43, No. 235, Dec. 6, 1978.

[6] Installation of sprinkler systems. Standard No. 13, National Fire

Protection Association, Boston, MA (1976 Ed.).

[7] Eggleston, L. A., Fire tests in a hospital room, project no. 3-2947-

350, Final Report, June 25, 1971, Southwest Research Institute, San

Antonio, TX.

[8] Full-scale fire tests in a nursing home patient room. Report No. 7463,

June 1975, American Health Care Assn., Washington, D.C.

[9] Babrauskas, V. , Combustion of mattresses exposed to flaming ignition

sources, part 1 full-scale tests and hazard analysis, Nat. Bur. Stand.

(U.S.), NBSIR 77-1290, (Sept. 1977).

16
[10] Automatic sprinklers for fire-protection service, UL 199, Underwriters

Laboratories, Inc., Northbrook, IL (5th edition with revisions up to

May 18 , 1977) .

[11] Minimum requirements of construction and equipment for hospital and

medical facilities, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

Washington, D.C., May 1975 Ed and Proposed Revision, May 1977.

[12] Heskestad, G. , Bidirectional flow tube for fire-induced vent flows.

In: large-scale bedroom fire test, July 11, 1973, P. A. Croce and H. W.

Emmons, eds. FMRC Serial 21011.4, pp 140-5, Factory Mutual Research

Corporation, Norwood, MA (1974).

[13] McCaffrey, B. J. and Heskestad, G., A robust bidirectional low velocity

probe for flame and fire application, Combustion and Flame, Vol. 26,

125-7 (1976).

[14] Bukowski, R. , Smoke measurements in large and small scale fire testing,

Nat. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), NBSIR 78-1502 (Oct. 1978).

[15] Dinman, B. D., Journal of American Medical Association, Vol. 235, 2874-

5 (June 28 , 1976) .

[16] Parker, J. F., Jr. and West, V. R. , Bioastronautics data book, NASA SP3006, Scientific and Technical Information Office, NASA (1973).

[17] Jin, T. , Visibility through fire smoke, part 2, Report of the Fire

Research Institute of Japan, No. 33, 31-48 (1971). Part 5, Report of

Fire Research Institute of Japan, No. 42, 12-18 (1975).

[18] Jin, T. , Visibility through fire smoke, main reports on production,

movement and control of smoke in buildings, pp. 100-153, Japanese

Association of Fire Science and Engineering (1974).

[19] Kimmerle, G., Aspects and methodology for the evaluation of toxicological

parameters during fire exposure, Journal of Fire and Flammability/

Combustion Toxicology, Vol. 1, 4-41 (Feb. 1974).

[20] Pryor, A. J. and Yuill, C. H. , Mass fire life hazard, prepared for the

Office of Civil Defense under Contract N228 (62479) 68665, Southwest

Research Institute, San Antonio, TX (1966).

[21] Stewart, R. D., et al, Experimental human exposure to high concentrations

of carbon monoxide. Architectural Environmental Health, Vol. 26, 1-7

(Jan. 1973).

[22] Parker, J. E., Jr. and West, V. R. , Bioastronautics data book, NASA SP3006, Chapter II, Scientific and Technical Information Office, NASA

(1973) .

[23] Alarie, Y. and Zullo, P., Predicting carboxyhemoglobin for different

patterns of carbon monoxide exposure, Industrial Health Foundation

Symposium on Carbon Monoxide, pp 18-46, Pittsburgh, PA (1974).

[24] Stewart, R. D. , The effect of carbon monoxide on man, J. of Fire and

Flamm. /Combustion Toxicology, Vol. 1, 167-176 (1974).

[25] Claudy, W. D., Respiratory hazards of the fire service. National Fire

Protection Association, Boston, MA (1957).

17
4.22

CO

02£ £—I £ *_ z cc E Q.

Qu </> uj oo °° o

CO

K UJ “ o ° -J 5

Q_

OLU

CO I— Zo —it— »— ZcDO»— «t. + o O <t>©@©

LU 3

0) •H>c

(0

t—\ao

s-i c

j-i 3

CQ

0)

l-i 3

Cr> •H

Cn

18
^ = QC — S S q. O

CC OC O UJ UJ CO _J

• O O t> ^

19

Figure

2.

Burn

room

-

doorway

elevation
t«0

<t>

20

Figure

3.

Corridor/lobby

instrument

stations

floor

plan
21

Figure

4.

Corridor/lobby

instrument

stations

elevation
!

Figure

5.

Sprinkler

piping

plan

view
LOAD

CELL

23

Figure

6.

Load

cell

suspension

for

mattress

and

bedding
Ill

24

; 9

I

Figure

7.

Privacy

curtain

details
25

Figure

8.

Privacy

curtain

placed

around

bed

before

test
Cj 030) 3«fuyy7dH3.'

- S

u

2

(3 930) 3U(UVUa#OI

26

Figure

9.

Average

gas

temperature

-

wastebasket

plume
302

(j 030) 3«nivy3d»Nii

0

OJ

1 2

27

Figure

10.

Average

ceiling

temperature

-

test

cotton

innerspring

mattress

(M-03)
392

28

Figure

11.

Average

ceiling

gas

temperature

for

tests

with

privacy

curtains
200|

i

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

r

1

302

<J 030) 3aruVM3dM3.L

(3 030) 3MrUVMc*HL

CM _ "SCM

“* O

o

29

Figure

12.

Average

ceiling

gas

temperature

for

tests

without

privacy

curtains
w/oo) Noiivanoseo

o

!W

I

I

1

30

Figure

13.

Smoke

obscuration

in

burn

room

doorway

-

test

N-34
h/go) Nouvansseo

31

Figure

14.

Smoke

obscuration

test

N-34

corridor

and

lobby
inches

PRIOR TO SPRINKLER

-1.53 -1.02 -.51 m/sec .51 1.02 1.53 »u r7

1 1

1

1 1—-=

Corridor Burn Room

60

(/> o> •g 40

.E

20

i i i —L 1 l_

-300 -200 -100 ft/min 100 200 300

AFTER SPRINKLER

on -1.53 -1.02 -.51 m/sec .51 1.02 1.53 80

60

40

20

-300 -200 -100 ft/min 100 200 300

1

1 1 Corridor

1 ! 1 ^ Burn Room

i i i * ii i

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

Figure 15. Net gas velocities at burn room doorway

32

meters

meters
(Hdd) N0UVW1N3DN0D

33

Figure

16.

Carbon

monoxide

concentrations;

test

N-25
Figure

17.

Carbon

monoxide

concentrations;

test

N-33
<Hdd> NOUVM1N30NOD

35

Figure

18.

Carbon

monoxide

concentrations

at

doorway,

.05

mm

(2

in)

from

floor
O00L 1ILIIIIIII»II1111I1I

Jl»»IIII

Qf0

36

Figure

19.

Carbon

monoxide

concentrations

at

adjacent

patient

level
7000

<Wdd) NOLLVU1N3DNOO

8

37

Figure

20.

Carbon

monoxide

concentrations

in

lobby,

1.5

m

(5

ft)

above

floor
00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

4 8

Table 1 List of instrumentation

31 m from cei

31 m from cei

31 m from cei

31 m from cei

Thermocouples

Center of room, 0.05 m from ceiling

Ceiling air, average of 8 TC ' s , 0.05 m from ce Wastebasket plume, average of 9 TC's (0.30 m c ceiling

On E wall, 1.82 m from S wall, 0,

On N wall, 2.12 m from W wall, 0 On W wall, 1.82 m from S wall, 0,

On S wall, 2.12 m from W wall, 0,

Adjacent to tell-tale sprinkler 1 Adjacent to tell-tale sprinkler 2 Adjacent to tell-tale sprinkler 3 At doorway centerline, 0.05 m below top

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 0.05 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 0.15 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 0.31 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 0.61 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 0.91 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 1.22 m

3.25 m from E wall, 1.68 m from S wall, 1.53 m At doorway centerline, 1.19 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.63 m below top

At doorway centerline, 0.13 m below top

At doorway centerline, 0.30 m below top

At doorway centerline, 0.66 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.02 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.37 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.91 m below top

iling

ircle) , 0.05 m from

ling

ling

ling

ling

from

from

from

from

from

from

from

ceiling

ceiling

ceiling

ceiling

ceiling

ceiling

ceiling

Corridor station B, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station c, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station A, 0.91 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station E, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station c. 0.05 m from ceiling

At doorway centerline, 0 . 48 m below top

Corridor station C, 0.46 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 0.76 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 1.07 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 1.37 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 1.68 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 1.98 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 2.29 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 0.05 m from ceiling

At doorway centerline, 0 . 84 m below top

Corridor station D, 0.46 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 0.76 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 1.07 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 1.37 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 1.68 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 1.98 m from ceiling

Load Cell

Load cell - 500 lb.

38
53

54

55

56

57

58

59

79

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

82

83

84

Table 1 (continued)

Gas Concentration Probes

Carbon monoxide, at doorway centerline, 1.95 m below top.

Analyzer Range: 0 to 0.2% (+0.02%)

Carbon dioxide, at doorway centerline, 1.95 m below top.

Analyzer Range: 0 to 5% (+0.5%)

Carbon monoxide, 1.12 m from W wall, 0.36 m from S wall, 0.89 m from floor. Analyzer Range: 0 to 1% (+0.1%)

Carbon dioxide, 1.12 m from W wall, 0.36 m from S wall, 0.89 m from floor. Analyzer Range: 0 to 20% (+2%)

Carbon monoxide at doorway centerline, 0.51 m below top.

Analyzer Range: 0 to 5% (+0.5%)

Carbon dioxide, at doorway centerline, 0.51 m below top.

Analyzer Range: 0 to 20% (+2%)

Oxygen, at doorway centerline, 1.95 m below top. Analyzer

Range: 0 to 21% (+2%)

Oxygen, 1.12 m from W wall, 0.36 m from S wall, 0.89 m from

from floor. Analyzer Range: 0 to 21% (+2%)

Oxygen, at doorway centerline, 0.51 m below top. Analyzer

Range: 0 to 21% (+2%)

Carbon monoxide, lobby, 1.55 m from E wall, 3.58 m from

S wall. Analyzer Range: 0 to 1% (+0.1%)

Velocity Probes

At doorway centerline, 0.13 m below top

At doorway centerline, 0.30 m below top

At doorway centerline, 0.66 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.02 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.37 m below top

At doorway centerline, 1.91 m below top

Corridor station B, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station C, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station D, 0.13 m from ceiling

Corridor station E, 0.13 m from ceiling

Smoke Meters

Horizontal

Horizontal

Horizontal

Horizontal

Horizontal

,

light path)

Horizontal

light path)

Horizontal

light path)

Horizontal

light path)

Horizontal

light path)

Vertical in

Horizontal

,

light path)

Horizontal

,

light path)

in doorway, 0.13 m below top

in doorway, 0.30 m below top

in doorway, 0.66 m below top

in doorway, 1.02 m below top

(1.219 m light

(1.219 m light

(1.219 m light

(1.219 m light

corridor station C, 0.06 m from ceiling (1

path)

path)

path)

path)

.219 m

corridor station c. 0.91 m from ceiling (1.219

corridor station D, 0.06 m from ceiling (1.219

corridor station D, 0.91 m from ceiling (1.219

corridor station E, 0.06 m from ceiling (1.219

doorway centerline,

lobby station F, 0.

(1.772 m light path)

91 m from ceiling (1. 219 m

m

m

m

m

corridor station B, 0.06 m from ceiling (1.219 m

39
Table 1 (continued)

Number

80

81

Heat Flux Meters

Total heat flux meter, facing up, 1.12 m from W wall, 1.19 m from S wall, 0.74 m from floor; range to 20 BTU/ft 2 /sec (23 W/cm2

) Total heat flux meter, facing horizontally toward burn-room,

on doorway centerline, 2.44 m N from doorway, 1.02 m from floor;

range to 5 BTU/ft 2 /sec (5.7 W/cm2 '

Detector Board

At ceiling, 1.52 m from W wall, 1.80 m from S wall

At ceiling, corridor center, 5.10 m E from doorway center

At ceiling, corridor center, 5.10 m W from doorway center

Tell-Tale Sprinklers

At ceiling, 1.92 m from W wall, 1.22 m from S wall

40
3(1)

HJ pH 0 0 0 0 0

•H 2 2 2 2 2

4JC

ai >c —

<N CN CN CN CN 3 -H c O O O O O 0 E a rH pH rH i—1 rH pH \ E '

- •—

—' '— '

tH\(0 c*i r- r- tn-- CN CN CN CN CN x a (X x (X CO — to •— CO — CO — CO

—

u co £ co E co £ CO £ CO £

01

01 rH

C co

C co

C coG coG CO

H At •H rH •H »H • H rH •H rH •H rH 3 c O O O O O 3 •H CN • CN • CN • CN • CN • a) u \ \ \ \ \ x a rH | pH 1 rH | rH 1 rH I o to

to 1 u 1 U 1 U 1 U 1 u 0 0 o 0 0 4J X On tc ^ X [X o> IX o

to o • o • o • o • 0 • 4) in co in oo in co in co in ro

E- vo r- to r- vo r- vo r- vo r- rH a -—

rH ' ’ rH ' " rH ' x

CN

a) iHX

nj Ei >i c a u -H 0

<0 (0 Ei > a 3

•H

U •H

X

1-1 3 rH to

ftu 0 0 0 oi 0 z z to 2 z H o o o o o

rH o o o o o

03 IN CN CN CN CN

5S 1 1 1 1 1 CO to to to CO a Eh a a a

tnC * a E oo pH CN CN CN C 0) o O O O O

1-1 4-1 l 1 1 1 1 3 M 2 2 2 2 2

CQ

4J o iH CN oo in W • CN CN CN CN CN

01 0 1 1 1 l 1 E-i Z z z z Z Z G

•He\CO ro

<D X) 0 0

>H 4H 2 2

CN

O

CN

u

•H

G

4-1 0

03 •H e 4-> 0 (0

4-1 o 3 -H < 44

CN CN • *H O O - tn rH rH vo cn tn '— cm 3

pH i—1

r- =#=

O

CN CN rH 3 3

1-1 3

cd 01 3 • 14 C • tn a

05 tnC tn

4-1

C -H

XXX to •H At 01 CO — CO — CO At u E

CO £ CO £ CO

— tn o -h cd £ ai •H 4-1 i—1 a co G co G •H 4-1 44 *H rH •H i—1

•H rH 14 o o O o 0 U > a

CN • CN • 00 • 4-1 > a co \ \ \ itf a c

rH | rH | CO | U - -H 0 - tn E • 1 u 1 u 1 U X! • tn c O a 0 0 o 03 tn tn a c tn IX CTi X <T\ X rH X C 01 3 01 o • o • O • •H 14 3 - E4 uo co m co O rH tn X 4-1 3 3

vo r- vo r- vo r- • S-l

u 4-ia 0 a

rH rH ' ’ rH 'w" p—» 01H (0 o 01 00 4-1 • 4-1 E 4-1 3 c

*—

•H ,—, H >i

G

>4 cn

u tn ai

a 3

tn 3 >— > c a

a E4

01 l-i

a

a

•H 0) 01 14 c c a

l-l 3 o * a o 3 co

01 c •H tn tn

a 3

in

D > tn i4

a rd

a

14 oi oi o a

:=n

4-> 1 01 14 c o 2

in to

a c 3 E4 3 01 44 a a a oi to

•rl 4-1 01 c ns ax <

rH 14 0 E 3 tn 0 0 0 in •H oi - a

X z to 2 tn - 4-J 3 3 tn c a

(li 4-1 o 3 3 tn

a •H

U

C 0)

a CtJ 01 44 3

4-> (0 4-> cn

a S4 oi

4-> 3 o a i4 01 o o o (0 c 14 oi oi a a u c o o o E 0) a ecu G 0

CN CN CN

a 3 3 E At (0 rH 1 1 1 in oi xi x: u 3 >1

to to CO 3 14 Xl aa tia 14 c a a X 0 0) •H 01 0) C X 0

•r| rH

X 14 14

aa

u

a > At 3 3 u u 0

oi c u >i >o

a

— 03

M •H 0 a

a tn c 3 a 14 44 0 0 4a G (0 CN CN CN a a a oi •H 0) O O O 0 tn tn C CN a 1 1 1 4-1 H 3 3 C oo v cn 2 2 2 3 01 oi oi a \ u c

tn (4 rH

a

a in •H

C cd ^ tO 03 c ^ tn •H 3 c 0) 0) 0 tn tn 3 C •H 4 4 a E 03 01 14 o3 14 a a a E a 3 0 4-1 a c c o u a U to to 3 D u ^ —

a U tn

od 1 iiii rH 3 01

01 o 0) 3 o a

CN 00 0 a CN OO CN to oo 00 co U a o o O 1 1 Z 1 Z l 2 *

to

to 1 1 1 co 222 a

41
Table 3. Ignition source Wastebasket -- polyethylene wastebasket

Size: 248 mm x 178 mm x 254 mm high

Weight: 282 g (.6 lb)

Trash contents, in order of stacking

1

-- Polyethylene liner

16 -- Sheets of newspaper

1 — Paper cup, 3 oz. (85 g) , crumpled

2 -- Sheets of writing paper

3 — Tissues, paper handkerchief, crumpled

1 -- Cigarette pack, crumpled

1 -- Milk carton, 8 oz. (227 g)

2 — Paper cup, 3 oz. (85 g) , crumpled

1 — Cigarette pack, crumpled

1 -- Sheet of writing paper, crumpled

2 -- Tissues, paper handkerchief, crumpled

Total weight of contents: 443 g (.97 lb)

Combined weight, wastebasket and contents: 725 g (1.6 lb)

Table 4. Privacy curtain details

Test

N-22

N-23

N-33

Material

Fire retardant treated cotton, 5.28 oz/yd

(1.79 g/cm2

) Same as above except with 22 in (.56 mm)

nylon mesh at top

Same as N-22

Size

16 ft length x 6 ft high

(4.9 x 1.8 m)

Same as N-22

Same as N-22

42
Table

5.

Mattress

and

bedding

technical

data

cpc

•H

4J M- X O, CP CP CD

•-H

M ^

<d a) 3 cc

(Pi (Pi

CD

d)

4J XI x -h

Cr>

X

i-t CD

d> 3 s Xou

CP X

m

vO VO

X

rH

X -—

fO (ji cp

m

X -H

M

O d) vo

E-< 3 o

(N

d>N

•i-l CO

XX

CPc

d) J E c

•HmO

in • r~ cm E C

•hmo

in • r- in c 6

•Hmo

in . [" <N

xX

T3 H3 E c

•h <n

oo E C

•h a\

oo E c

•H Ol

00 ov • ov • cp • no mo mo

d) nou

(Nm 0 o 1 l 2 2

co(0

dJPXX

rtJ 2

<u <u c c tr> CP

(fl njC c

X! £ -n •H x X P P

d) o aa P P CD G CO

T3 3 3 P 0 P

•H >i >1 d)X <u rH r-H rH C X c 0 0 0 c 0 c

CO ca Ca

H

U

H

rH

X

—

O o r-' vo

O

«5X CP VO o VO i—1

o>

X cpX • . • . . • 0 -H '

o o rH o o o

Eh d) 3

<M 00 in o o o E o cn o m 00

H \ r—IrH CN 1 CN 1—1

Q. CP • . . 1 • • X o o o o o

>i~ 4J ro *H £ LO o in in LO

CO \ r- r- CN 1 i-" G CP r- in m i m rd) X Q

CD

CD

<u

— <N 00 o c e rH CN m i rH X E • . . i • • o — o O o o o

•HX

Eh

d) "d•H

CM 0 P P 0

•H d) 0) d) rH p - X - X G x: •H G CD C CD u

(0 0 d) 0 d)

X •—i 0 X >, X >, X >.

Qj

X rH

X rH d)a E a 0 0 O 0 P G •H 0 0 U Ca u ca 3 0 > u p >i X >i

-p c>P c»P 0\° 0\P r-l

X i—1 0 o o vo o o 0 u in m CO rH ca u CU

XX

T> (T\ CT> <p <7\ H VO VO r- vo VO 3 • . • . • ,—, O <N CN o O

V« _E

XX

X

XX

XX rm

m CN ro

tp o 00 CP

m to c • . • . • d) rH X i—i o o X p0

CP

X

G o

•H

p d) rH d) X X > 0

CP -P •H

Op c d) X O ca x E d) 1 1 ^0 CD s: CD T3 s s T3 X w X 3 0 o

d)

M S <u d) rH rH

ca o P rH rH u X ca •H *H Q cn cn ca ca 43

Pillow

Case

0.53 x

0.91

50%

Cotton,

0.21

595

0.125
Sprinkler

(OD/m)

00

p* in

00 *J< I 00 2

00 LO

00 1X1 I 00 2

fC

4-> (0 'dco

•HpGpGu

CO no

d)og

CO

co

CD pH

rQ

rtf Eh

CM 0>

co

h1 I co

O 13

Q)

CO

LO

O

cm1 co 2

CO CO

CM CO I co

13

CM

O

CM LO I CO 2 —

cm r- I i—i

13 co ao

•H

4->

rtf O0 o

kO o

CM

kO o

kO

CM

O

00

O

00G\

CO

r- kO

oo co

co

CM

00 CM £

r-

-PMH

LOI>1

rtf £ U P O O 0 O i—I

t) 44 S g o o o P

Pi 44

44 44

p G3

O 0 0O d) +J 4-1 rH 4-1 cn cn M-l • G G d> O O

d) 5 g d) -P o cn t3 .—

p — P p c g 0 g O 44 O -P 0 o CN

in rH1 m r-4 ,

d) • 44 • 44 g o i—l i—i — 4-> G g g m G O, 0 0 • cn

4-1

p 4-1 P i—i c

44 44 44 44

—

O

M •P G

m -P in 4-1 4-> 4-1 it) i 44 1 44 44 P i—1 P P G PQ o in O m in Cn

T3 TS i •P

•H ** •H *• >. d) •• P g p g a ai P 0 P 0 n pi o 0 0 0 0 0 u p U P pi 4= 2

cng

CD i—I dop

QjG0

•H

-p

+jG

(VgGP

-P

COG0P

0)G

di

13G

•H

<upcG

to -pG

U

<u

CO

CN CO O -P <T> I 10 | S d) 2

Eh oo

ro

Pa (0

OO

(N s

CO o i CM 2 (N

co

CO o 1 CM 2 CM

d>>

d) PIco

•H

-pGPGU

co 13O

CN

ro1 2

LO

CNI 2m

CNI 2

coo

ro

CNO

in

CN <2<2

oo

•^r CNo

CN

roI o

in

CNo

00CN < < 2 2 C < 2 2 o oo

00 CM CM CO O O

CO 00 co CO o o

cm

CM CO o o

00 CO

CM CO o o O kD

CO CO

rtf u

•p

+J Hpu

CN

CN1 2 om

CN I o

-p

dJg

EH

CN o o o o 1 rH LD o 2 kO kD kD 00

or

CM o O

O o i kO r* CM CM 2 00 co LD

Gu

•H i—I

-p d)

g

•H > \ P «Q U PI O

g

g

g

G 0 o 0

•P

—

p—

p P g P4 g 44 44

00 P m 4J in 4-) ^

4-1

O • 44 • 44

g

44 0 1—1 i—l i—1 “ in in in

in 44

G -P - 4-1 - i—! 0 >1 g 44 g 44 g

•P

G 0 0 0

4-> Ss P in o in o 4-1 G P 44 I P I P 44 U o P P 0 0 — 0 44 0 44 in

PI TJ

g 'G 0 T3 0 i g r-' •p p P P >i P P 4-1 0 P 4-1 0 13 0 0 • p cn o P cn O 13 O 0 »P 0 G i-4 0 d)H 0 i—1

Pi

—

U dJ 44 CJ s 44 P3 44

p021 <2 I

44

available
Table

7.

CO

data

and

calculated

COHb

Lobby

5

ft

(1.5

m)

1

Time (s)

NA NA NA

1800 1600 1290 1650 1480

Peak

(ppm) NA NA NA 593 176 216

1860 620

Doorway

5

ft

(1.5

m)

Time (s)

1090 1260 350 620 830 500 730 510

Peak

(ppm) 602

1366 1120 2650 1270 1690 3100 1520

Doorway

2

in

(.05

m)*

Time (s)

1430 1200 600 690 480 770 520

Peak (PP m)

440

1438 3170 2490 1990 5400 2500

Calculated

COHb

at

Adjacent

Patient

Level Time (s) NA NA 1800 1800 1600 1600 1800 1800

Peak (%) NA NA 13.5 28 17 15 40 17

Time

to

25%

(s) NA NA NR 1550 NR NR 1190 NR

Adjacent

Patient

Level

Time (s)

1500 1150 810 620 700 490 780 520

*Distance

from

floor

NA:

Not

available

NR:

Never

reached

Peak

(ppm) 365

1018 1340 2740 1760 1620 3660 1635

Test

N-20 N-2

1

N-22 N-2

3

N-25 N32N-3

3

N34

45
Table 8 . Maximum C0 2 concentrations

Test

Adjacent Patient

Level

Doorway

( .05

2 in

m) * Doorway

(1.5

5 ft

m)

Peak Time Peak Time Peak Time

(%) (s) (%) (s' (%) (s)

N-2 0 .33 1470 . 34 1430 .78 970

N-21 . 58 1040 .90 1190 1.10 1280

N-22 1.70 750 NA - NA - N-23 2.74 520 1.82 600 2.08 560

N-2 5 1.61 680 1.52 690 1.34 680

N-3 2 1.86 480 1.64 468 1.20 500

N-33 2.99 740 2.91 760 1.86 800

N-34 1.84 510 1.71 510 1.86 510

*Distance from floor

NA - Not available

Table 9. Minimum 0 2 concentrations

Adjacent Patient Doorway 2 in Doorway 5 ft

Test Level ( .05 m) * (1.5 m)

Peak Time Peak Time Peak Time

(%) (s) (%) (s) (%) (s)

N-20 19.61 1500 19.97 1430 19.19 1550

N-21 17.89 1050 19.15 1180 18.44 1280

N-22 19.08 650 NA - 19.03 850

N-23 17 . 08 620 18 . 25 600 17 .39 620

N-2 5 18.00 710 18 . 58 690 18.40 680

N-32 17.28 500 18 . 59 460 18.16 500

N-33 15.00 768 16.68 820 16.84 800

N-34 18.68 510 18.43 510 19.19 510

* Distance from floor

NA: Not available

46
NBS-1 1 4 A REV. 9-78)

USCOMM-DC