Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Epstein v. Davis, 2017 IL App (1st) 170605

Appellate Court 

Caption

DAVID A. EPSTEIN, Public Administrator of Cook County, as 

Independent Administrator of the Estate of Marshana Philpot-Willis, 

Deceased, Plaintiff, v. PIXIE DAVIS, Individually and as Employee 

and Agent of One Hope United, Inc., ONE HOPE UNITED, INC., and 

LASHANA PHILPOT, Defendants (MARTELL WILLIS, JR., 

Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHARLES P. GOLBERT, Acting Public 

Guardian of Cook County, as Guardian of Lamariana Philpot-Willis, a 

Minor, Respondent-Appellee).

District & No. First District, Sixth Division

Docket No. 1-17-0605

Filed December 15, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-L-1160; the 

Hon. Ronald F. Bartkowicz, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Law Offices of L. June Samuels, P.C., of Chicago (Laurie Samuels, of 

counsel), for appellant.

Robert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles P. Golbert, 

Kass A. Plain, and John David Jarrett, of counsel), for appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Connors concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Seven-month-old Marshana Philpot-Willis died while her family participated in the “Intact 

Family Services” program of defendant One Hope United, Inc. (One Hope United). The Cook 

County public guardian1filed a wrongful death case on behalf of Marshana’s estate to recover 

damages against One Hope United; its employee, Pixie Davis; and Marshana’s mother, 

Lashana Philpot. See generally Harris v. One Hope United, Inc., 2015 IL 117200. The estate 

settled the wrongful death action with One Hope United and Davis for $750,000. Following a 

hearing, the circuit court allocated 60% of the proceeds to Marshana’s father, 

petitioner-appellant Martell Willis, Jr., and 40% to Marshana’s sister, Lamariana 

Philpot-Willis. Willis appeals, contending that the court improperly denied certain motions he 

filed and that he should receive 100% of the settlement. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Martell Willis, Jr., and defendant Lashana Philpot were the parents of two daughters who 

were born 10 months apart: Lamariana Philpot-Willis, born December 5, 2008, and Marshana 

Philpot-Willis, born October 17, 2009. On July 14, 2010, both daughters were placed 

unsupervised in a single “bath tote” while in their mother’s care and while the family 

participated in a program administrated by One Hope United. The younger daughter, 

Marshana, drowned in the bath tote while her older sister Lamariana was alongside her. 

¶ 4 The public guardian of Cook County, which was named as independent administrator of 

Marshana’s decedent’s estate, filed the underlying wrongful death action. It was also 

appointed guardian of Lamariana’s minor’s estate.

¶ 5 The circuit court found the $750,000 settlement from One Hope United and Davis to be 

made in good faith, and the settlement was also approved by the probate court. The funds 

remained undistributed, pending a dependency hearing. 

¶ 6 In 2015, Willis filed a petition seeking a determination pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act 

(740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2014)) of the relative dependencies of Marshana’s family 

members. In the petition, he sought an allocation of 90% to himself, 10% to Lamariana, and 

0% to the child’s mother, Lashana. 

¶ 7 On November 10, 2016, the court hearing Marshana’s decedent’s estate case granted the 

public guardian’s request to withdraw both as administrator and attorney in that case because 

the dispute over the division of the settlement created a conflict between two of the heirs of the 

estate: Willis, the father, on the one hand, and its ward, Lamariana, on the other. That court 

resolved the matter by appointing the Cook County public administrator as successor 

supervised administrator of Marshana’s estate.

 

1We have substituted Charles P. Golbert, acting public guardian of Cook County, in place of his 

predecessor, Robert Harris. 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(d) (West 2016). 
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¶ 8 On November 14, 2016, the circuit court substituted the public administrator of Cook 

County for the public guardian as plaintiff in the wrongful death case, and allowed the public 

guardian’s attorneys to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff. The public guardian, however, 

retained its previous appointment as guardian of Lamariana’s minor’s estate and its role as her 

counsel in the dependency hearing. 

¶ 9 Willis orally moved for “recusal” of the public guardian, asserting that a conflict still 

existed and that a private guardian ad litem should be appointed for Lamariana. On November 

16, 2016, the court denied the motions, finding that the conflict had been cured and that the 

only dispute then pending was between Willis, represented by private counsel, and Willis’s 

daughter Lamariana, represented by the public guardian. The court also found Lashana, the 

girls’ mother, in default and, after a prove-up hearing, entered a judgment against her for 

$100,000. 

¶ 10 Willis also filed a third amended motion in limine requesting that the court bar presentation 

of, among other things, any evidence of the following at the hearing on his petition: (1) his 

criminal convictions; (2) his incarceration for a parole violation; and (3) any trauma suffered 

by Lamariana, as she was less than two years old at the time of her sister’s death. On December 

1, 2016, the court heard argument on the motion in limine and concluded that such a motion 

was more properly brought in a case heard by a jury. The court stated that since it would hear 

the evidence without a jury, it would reserve judgment on admission of particular evidence 

until it was presented and “exclude any testimony that I feel to be irrelevant.” 

¶ 11 On December 9, 2016, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Willis’s 

petition for allocation of the settlement. At the commencement of the hearing, Willis’s attorney 

again requested a ruling on the motion in limine. The court responded: “No. We’ve gone 

beyond that. We talked about that.” Eight witnesses testified, and the transcript of the hearing 

spans over 400 pages. We summarize the testimony most relevant to the issues presented in 

this appeal. 

¶ 12 Willis testified that both daughters lived with him from October 17 to December 27, 2009, 

and for a few weeks in the spring of 2010. He observed no interaction between his daughters 

during that period. After December 27, 2009, the daughters lived with relatives for a few 

months. In late April 2010, Marshana was hospitalized for failure to thrive. After Marshana’s 

discharge, both daughters were removed from their parents’ household and placed in the 

custody of a relative due to a “safety plan.” The children were returned to their mother Lashana 

in May 2010. Willis had relocated to Michigan but reunited with his daughters upon his return 

to Chicago. He remained with them until Marshana’s death in July. During his testimony, he 

repeatedly emphasized that he did not observe the sisters interacting with each other. 

¶ 13 Dr. Erika Gilyot-Montgomery, a clinical psychologist, testified that she conducted a 

social-emotional assessment on Lamariana. Although Lamariana is prone to tantrums and has 

a speech development problem, her overall development was satisfactory and she showed no 

particularly abnormal behavior or signs of trauma. She opined that children can “form 

attachments” at about the age of one year.

¶ 14 Anita Stewart, a social worker for the Chicago public schools, became involved with the 

sisters after Willis complained to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 

about the mother. She saw the girls about two to three times a week and noted that they 

exhibited typical “sibling rivalry” behavior and interacted by playing and hugging each other. 
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¶ 15 Belinda Warren, a DCFS investigator, testified that Lamariana was nurturing, caring, and 

concerned for her little sister. She observed Lamariana showing “genuine concern” by trying 

to hold Marshana’s bottle to feed her.

¶ 16 Merlene Robinson-Parsons, Willis’s aunt, testified that Marshana was released to her care 

upon her birth and that she cared for both girls for about three weeks. She is now Lamariana’s 

guardian, and Lamariana has lived with her since Marshana’s death. She observed Lamariana 

trying to hold her sister, and saw the two hug and kiss, and watch television and nap together. 

She believes that Lamariana was traumatized by her sister’s death.

¶ 17 Bonnie Neuenschwander, a licensed clinical social worker, testified that she treated 

Lamariana for emotional concerns over the course of 14 months. Lamariana has indicated to 

her that she misses her sister. During play therapy, Lamariana would often place a doll baby in 

the bathtub of a dollhouse. While Neuenschwander does not believe that Lamariana suffers 

from post-traumatic stress disorder, she is at risk of it in the future. She opined that Lamariana 

was traumatized by her sister’s death and recommended she receive continued therapy.

¶ 18 Joyce Hopkins, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, testified as an expert. Her specialty 

is the field of social and emotional development of children between birth and age five. She 

stated that young children retain memories of close relations from a very early age, even their 

first year of life. She also remarked that “trauma [including the loss of a sibling] in early 

childhood has major impacts on the developing neurological systems.” Based on Lamariana’s 

nightmares, her lack of language progress, and her comments that she missed her sister, Dr. 

Hopkins rendered an opinion, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that 

Lamariana exhibited symptoms of traumatic stress disorder based on the loss of her sister. She 

also characterized Lamariana’s placement of the baby doll in the dollhouse bathtub as a 

“classic manifestation of the trauma” by a child unable to express her feelings in words.

¶ 19 Following this hearing, the circuit court entered an order (1) finding that Lashana Philpot 

was the cause of death of Marshana Philpot “and in law and equity, therefore, cannot recover in 

this action”; (2) awarding Willis 60% of the balance of the wrongful death settlement; and (3) 

awarding Lamariana 40%, payable to the guardian of her minor’s estate. The court stayed its 

order pending appeal. 

¶ 20 Willis filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied on February 14, 2017. In 

its opinion denying reconsideration, the court particularly noted that it found the testimony of 

Parsons and Hopkins “persuasive” on the issue of the establishment of a relationship between 

the two sisters. Referring to the period when Marshana was alive as having a “tumultuous and 

often volatile family environment,” the court stated: “If any relationship was being formed 

during this time, it was the bond between two sisters—regardless of their respective ages—in 

the face of unreliable parenting.” This appeal followed.

¶ 21 On appeal, Willis contends that the circuit court erred by (1) denying Willis’s motion 

in limine to bar certain evidence, (2) denying his motion to disqualify the Cook County public 

guardian from representing Lamariana’s interests at the evidentiary hearing, and (3) allocating 

any of the settlement proceeds to Lamariana, in the absence of competent evidence of an 

established sibling relationship. 

¶ 22 As a preliminary matter, we note the deficiencies in Willis’s brief on appeal. The brief 

contains no appendix as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). 

Accordingly, it contains no copies of the order appealed from, the opinions of the circuit court, 

or the notice of appeal. Most significantly, it provides no table of contents whatsoever to the 
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nine-volume, 1582-page record on appeal. Our rules require that appellants’ briefs contain all 

of these materials. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(9) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). 

Supreme court rules are not mere suggestions; they are rules that must be followed. In re 

Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57. “Where an appellant’s brief fails to 

comply with supreme court rules, this court has the inherent authority to dismiss the appeal.” 

Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005). In addition, this court may strike an 

appellant’s brief for noncompliance with Rule 341. See People v. Thomas, 364 Ill. App. 3d 91, 

97 (2006). Striking a brief or dismissing an appeal for failure to comply with supreme court 

rules is, however, a harsh sanction. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132 (2005). 

Noting that the interests of a minor are at stake, and finding that Willis’s lack of compliance 

with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) does not preclude our review, we will consider the 

merits of this appeal based on the brief presented. See In re Estate of Jackson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 

616, 620 (2004) (reviewing court has choice to review merits, even in light of multiple Rule 

341 mistakes).

¶ 23 We first address Willis’s appeal regarding the denial of his motion in limine. A motion 

in limine is 

“[A] pretrial motion that seeks an order excluding inadmissible evidence and 

prohibiting questions concerning such evidence, without the necessity of having the 

questions asked and objections thereto made in front of the jury. Thus, the in limine

order will protect the movant from whatever prejudicial impact the mere asking of the 

questions and the making of the objections may have upon a jury.” People v. Williams, 

188 Ill. 2d 365, 368 (1999) (citing Reidelberger v. Highland Body Shop, Inc., 83 Ill. 2d 

545, 549 (1981)). 

In a bench trial, however, the court is presumed to have considered only competent evidence in 

making its findings. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1990). 

¶ 24 The record contains no particular written order specifically denying the motion in limine, 

but the parties extensively argued it, and it is clear the court did not find it to be meritorious. 

The court repeatedly emphasized that it did not wish to bar entire categories of evidence in 

advance, but instead wanted the parties to present evidence of their choosing at the hearing, 

subject to objection when the evidence was actually proffered. Since Willis’s petition was 

heard by the court, rather than a jury, a motion in limine was an inappropriate mechanism to 

prevent the admission of the evidence he sought to bar. But more importantly, the section of 

Willis’s appellate brief addressing the motion in limine consists only of argument and fails to 

cite a single case, statute, or legal authority. We therefore consider the issue forfeited. Eckiss v. 

McVaigh, 261 Ill. App. 3d 778, 786 (1994) (contentions supported by some argument but 

absolutely no authority do not meet the requirements of Rule 341). 

¶ 25 Willis’s second contention is that the court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the 

Cook County public guardian from representing Lamariana’s interests at the dependency 

hearing. Willis’s petition for determination of dependency was filed by private counsel who 

represented him throughout the evidentiary hearing and on this appeal. Orders were entered 

before the hearing substituting the public administrator for the public guardian as independent 

administrator of Marshana’s decedent’s estate. Willis asserts that the court entered these orders 

intending to resolve a conflict created when the public guardian decided to favor one heir 

(Lamariana) over another (Willis) at the dependency hearing. 
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¶ 26 In his brief, he cites ethics rules that prohibit attorneys from taking materially adverse 

positions to former and existing clients. Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) Rs. 1.7, 1.9 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2010). He then pivots away from the realm of attorney-client ethics and states (without 

authority) the proposition that administrators of estates have a duty of impartiality to each heir 

of an estate. Relying on these principles, he contends that the public guardian violated its duties 

because it “obtained privileged and sensitive information about each of the heirs in its capacity 

as the independent administrator” of Marshana’s decedent’s estate and then used that 

information “to the disadvantage of an existing and then former client Willis.” (Emphasis 

added.) Accordingly, Willis contends that the circuit court should have disqualified the public 

guardian from representing Lamariana’s interests at the evidentiary hearing.

¶ 27 This logic suffers from several flaws. First, it improperly conflates the duties of an attorney 

to a client with the duties of an estate administrator to heirs or legatees. An attorney 

representing the administrator of an estate, even if the administrator is himself, represents the 

interests of the estate, not the heirs or legatees. As the court stated in Gagliardo v. Caffrey, 344 

Ill. App. 3d 219, 228 (2003), “the beneficiaries of an estate are intended to benefit from the 

estate and are owed a fiduciary duty by the executor to act with due care to protect their 

interests,” but “[t]hey are not, however, owed allegiance by the estate attorney, who does not 

have an attorney-client relationship with the beneficiaries and whose ‘first and only allegiance’ 

is to the estate in such adversarial situations.” See also In re Estate of Vail, 309 Ill. App. 3d 

435, 441 (1999) (“The attorney for the executor does not have an attorney-client relationship 

with the beneficiaries ***. When an adversarial situation arises, the attorney for the executor 

owes allegiance only to the estate.”). An attorney indeed has a duty of loyalty to her clients, but 

for a duty to attach, there must be an attorney-client relationship. Willis’s status as an heir to 

his daughter’s decedent’s estate did not establish any attorney-client relationship between him 

and the public guardian. 

¶ 28 That still leaves the question of whether the public guardian breached any duty to Willis 

when it advocated at the evidentiary hearing for Lamariana to obtain a share of the estate at 

Willis’s expense. The relationship between an estate administrator and a beneficiary of the 

estate is “fiduciary in character.” Stone v. Stone, 407 Ill. 66, 77 (1950). But that fiduciary 

relationship does not extend to all affairs and transactions between administrators and 

beneficiaries. Id. Willis contends that when the public guardian became the estate 

administrator, he acquired a fiduciary duty to all heirs of the estate, a duty which prevented him 

from ever taking a position adverse to Willis in the future, even after he no longer served as 

estate administrator. Willis’s argument on this point is confusing and not well developed. 

Other than a fleeting reference to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Willis’s brief fails 

to cite any authority to support this contention of error. His vague references to unspecified 

“privileged and sensitive information *** including but not limited to depositions, agency case 

files, privileged juveniles files, etc.,” without further explanation, render us unable to discern 

exactly what the public guardian may have done that breached some duty to Willis. Willis’s 

brief fails to explain which, if any, of these items was actually used at the hearing or in any 

other way. Accordingly, we consider this issue forfeited, as well. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) 

(eff. Feb. 6, 2013); see also People v. Lane, 2017 IL App (1st) 151988, ¶ 18 (“We will not 

attempt to divine the rationale behind defendant’s undeveloped argument; defendant has 

forfeited this argument.”).
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¶ 29 Willis’s third contention of error challenges the circuit court’s allocation of 40% of the 

wrongful death proceeds to Lamariana. He requests that this court remand with instructions to 

award 100% of the proceeds to him. 

¶ 30 Dependency hearings are creatures of statute established by the Wrongful Death Act (740 

ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2014)). The purpose of the statute is to compensate the surviving 

spouse and next of kin for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent’s death. In re 

Estate of Finley, 151 Ill. 2d 95, 101 (1992). At a dependency hearing, the court must determine 

the relative dependencies of these parties. Johnson v. Provena St. Therese Medical Center, 334 

Ill. App. 3d 581, 588 (2002). We review a dependency allocation for abuse of discretion. 

Adams v. Turner, 198 Ill. App. 3d 353, 356 (1990). We may reverse the court’s dependency 

determination only if no reasonable person could agree with it. In re Adoption of D., 317 Ill. 

App. 3d 155, 160 (2000). 

¶ 31 The Wrongful Death Act does not define the term “dependency.” However, case law 

establishes that the term connotes, in part, the support obtained by a party from a previously 

existing relationship with the deceased. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 592. Also relevant is loss 

of society, which includes the “companionship, guidance, advice, love, and affection” 

formerly offered by the decedent. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. 

Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke’s Medical Center, 387 Ill. App. 3d 77, 83 (2008). 

¶ 32 Recognizing that a sibling relationship may “often times [be] extremely significant,” our 

supreme court has held that, where a sibling is next of kin under the Wrongful Death Act, the 

sibling may recover pecuniary damages for “deprivation of the companionship, guidance, 

advice, love and affection of the deceased.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley, 151 Ill. 

2d at 103-04. However, “simply because the parents and the siblings of the decedent may both 

suffer legally cognizable pecuniary injury which may include loss of society, it does not 

necessarily follow that both the parents and the siblings will be treated alike for purposes of the 

application of a presumption of loss of society.” Id. at 104. An individual may recover for loss 

of a deceased brother or sister, but the individual’s damages are not presumed and must be 

proven. Id. Even in the absence of evidence of direct testimony establishing a relationship 

between the deceased and siblings because of the deceased’s severe disabilities during his life, 

loss of society may be established through such things as visiting the deceased sibling when he 

was hospitalized or including the sibling at holiday celebrations. Jones v. Chicago Osteopathic 

Hospital, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1137 (2000). 

¶ 33 Willis contends that the circuit court engaged in a “shameful manipulation of the facts” to 

arrive at its dependency allocation. He claims that “[w]itness after witness that observed 

Lamariana and Marshana together overwhelmingly testified that there was no evidence of a 

relationship based on loss of society.” The record demonstrates otherwise. Several witnesses 

gave examples of interactions between the two girls, including hugging, kissing, feeding, and 

playing. The court specifically relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Hopkins, who explained 

that even very young children form bonds with siblings. This testimony, and that of other 

witnesses, sufficed to demonstrate “deprivation of the companionship, guidance, advice, love 

and affection” as required by Finley. Willis counters with his own testimony, in which he 

repeatedly asserted there was no bond between the two girls. He also relies on similar 

testimony of other witnesses. But his argument distills down to a plea to reweigh the evidence, 

which we may not do. See Adams, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 356. Based on this record, we cannot say 

the circuit court abused its discretion in allocating a share of dependency to Lamariana. 
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¶ 34 Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lamariana a 40% share as 

opposed to her father’s 60% share. In light of Marshana’s very short life and the facts presented 

regarding Willis’s periodic absences from Marshana’s home, the circuit court could reasonably 

have determined that Willis’s and Marshana’s pecuniary damages were roughly equal, with 

Willis receiving a slightly larger share. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.