UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

ex rel. ERICA SANDSTROM and )

ADRIENNE ISLA, )

)

Plaintiffs and Relators, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

v. ) 12 C 0622

)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY )

OF CHICAGO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on the motions of Defendants to dismiss 

the amended complaint of Plaintiffs Erica Sandstrom (“Sandstrom”) and Adrienne Isla 

(“Isla”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) and 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”). For the reasons set forth below, the 

motions are granted in part and denied in part.1

1 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI against the Board and Ayala is entered and continued pending 

the five-page submissions of the parties in light of the recent Supreme Court case, Young v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015).

1

 
BACKGROUND

I. Facts

For the purposes of the instant motion, the following well-pleaded allegations, 

derived from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, are accepted as true. The Court draws all 

reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants include the Chicago Board of 

Education (the “Board”), Dr. Asuncion Ayala, a/k/a Asuncion Estrada (“Ayala”), 

Mercedes Feliz-Matos (“Feliz-Matos”), Virgilio Santos (“Santos”), Denita Howze 

(“Howze”), Maryann Ramos (“Ramos”), Ida Roman, Leo Roman (collectively the 

“Romans”), Maria Mouroukos (“Mouroukos”), Nancy Troche (“Troche”), Yolanda 

Velez (“Velez”), Ignacio Lopez (“Lopez”), Martha Matos (“Matos”), Edwin 

Caraballo (“Caraballo”), Luz Borges-Caraballo (“Borges-Caraballo”), Carmen Cruz 

(“Cruz”), Carmen Martin (“Martin”), Rafael Boghosian, Shirlann Boghosian

(collectively the “Boghosians”), Carmen Alequin (“Alequin”), Maria Vasquez 

(“Vasquez”), Digna Mercado (“Mercado”), Brenda Vera (“Vera”), Ana Arroyo 

(“Arroyo”), John Doe and Jane Doe (collectively “Defendants”). 

A. The Parties

North Grand High School (“NGHS”) is a Chicago Public School (“CPS”) 

located at 4338 West Wabansia Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Sandstrom is a 

Caucasian female who worked as a guidance counselor at NGHS from January 2008 

until her termination on August 31, 2010. Isla also worked as a guidance counselor at

NGHS. The Board and CPS were Plaintiffs’ employers. The Board is an entity 

2
responsible for the governance, organizational and financial oversight of CPS and it 

establishes policies and standards to ensure accountability of the schools. Ayala was 

employed by the Board as the Principal of NGHS up until July 2011, serving as 

Plaintiffs’ supervisor. Borges-Caraballo was employed by the Board as the Assistant 

Principal of NGHS. Caraballo, husband of Borges-Caraballo, was a former Board 

employee who had previously worked at NGHS. Feliz-Matos was employed by the 

Board as an employee of CPS. Santos was employed by the Board and worked as a 

math teacher at NGHS. Alequin was employed by the Board as a special education 

classroom assistant at NGHS. Martin was employed by the Board and worked as a 

guidance counselor at NGHS. Vasquez was employed by the Board and worked at 

Lowell Elementary School. Lopez was employed by the Board, assigned to work at 

NGHS. Ramos, Troche, Matos, Mouroukos, John Doe and Jane Doe were employed 

by the Board and worked at NGHS. Arroyo, Vera, Mercado, Howze, Ida Roman, Leo 

Roman, and Cruz were also employed by the Board. Velez was a Cook County 

Sheriff’s Office employee. Rafael Boghosian and Shirlann Boghosian were both 

retired Board employees. 

B. Allegations of Fraudulent Misconduct 

Plaintiffs allege that as of 2008, 2009 and 2010, Ayala oversaw multiple

schemes at NGHS, including: (i) free and reduced-price lunch fraud; (ii) tuition fraud; 

(iii) fraudulent use of government facilities; (iv) fraudulent invoicing; and (v) payroll 

fraud. A majority of Defendants were allegedly involved with the main scheme 

3
involving free lunches, and the Court expounds on the details of the lunch fraud 

below. As for the remaining four fraudulent schemes, the Court provides

individualized illustrations of each in the Discussion Section of this opinion. 

The alleged lunch scheme began when Ayala and her administrative staff 

encouraged parents of NGHS students to intentionally misrepresent their household 

income, number of children in their household, and other information on forms 

submitted to the federal government (the “School Lunch Forms”). Parents submitted 

the School Lunch Forms so their children could qualify for free or reduced-price 

lunches under the federal Child Nutrition Act of 1966 and the National School Lunch 

Act (collectively the “School Lunch Acts”). 

Furthermore, pursuant to Illinois law and the Board’s policies, a CPS school 

may be eligible to receive Supplemental General State Aid (“SGSA”) from the State 

of Illinois based on the information submitted in the School Lunch Forms. SGSA is 

part of the General State Aid, which the Board and/or CPS receives from the State of 

Illinois. Required by law, General State Aid is to be distributed directly to qualifying 

schools. SGSA funds are discretionary and the principal of a qualifying school 

controls how these funds are spent. The amount of SGSA funds distributed is based 

upon the concentration level of children from low-income households. Funds are 

distributed to the schools in proportion to the number of pupils enrolled who are 

eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals under the School Lunch Acts during the 

immediately preceding year. The poverty data is taken at one point in time for the 

4
entire school system (end of September). The Board and/or CPS established a flat 

rate per-pupil amount for 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and calculated the 

SGSA allocation based on the number of eligible students for each qualifying school. 

The Board then allegedly used the above methodology when it distributed 

discretionary SGSA funds directly to CPS schools through their principals. 

From 2007 to 2012, NGHS was allocated more than $700.00 in SGSA funds 

for each NGHS pupil who was deemed eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals 

under the School Lunch Acts. Once the SGSA funds were allocated from the State of 

Illinois to NGHS, it was within Ayala’s discretion to determine how these SGSA 

funds would be spent. 

To increase the amount of her discretionary budget, Plaintiffs allege Ayala told 

her administrative staff and parents of students at NGHS to fill out free or reducedprice School Lunch Forms. If the child was not eligible, Ayala allegedly instructed 

her administrative staff and parents to intentionally misrepresent the parents’ 

household income, number of dependents in the household, and other information on 

the School Lunch Forms such that it would appear as though the child was eligible for 

free or reduced-price school lunches. Ayala then allegedly signed off on the School 

Lunch Forms and submitted them, knowing the forms contained incorrect 

information. Consequently, Plaintiffs allege that Ayala’s actions caused the parents 

and her administrative staff to intentionally misrepresent information on the School 

Lunch Forms submitted to the federal government so the federal government would 

5
provide funding to pay for each allegedly wrongfully enrolled student’s lunch for that 

year. Ayala’s actions also allegedly caused the parents and her administrative staff to 

intentionally misrepresent information on the School Lunch Forms so the State of 

Illinois would provide Ayala with additional discretionary SGSA funding. 

C. Discovery of Alleged Schemes

Beginning in 2009, Plaintiffs allegedly discovered that NGHS employees were 

submitting false School Lunch Forms. At this time, Plaintiffs allege they also learned 

of certain teachers and employees at NGHS who lived outside the City of Chicago and 

were falsifying documents to avoid paying non-resident tuition for their children who 

attended NGHS. 

After discovering the alleged fraudulent schemes, Plaintiffs attempted to 

complain about the activity at NGHS to Ayala. Ayala supposedly refused to meet 

with Plaintiffs and directed her administrative staff and her Assistant Principal, 

Borges-Caraballo, to harass and intimidate Plaintiffs in order to prevent them from 

raising any more complaints. In December 2009, Plaintiffs reported ongoing 

fraudulent activity at NGHS regarding the school lunch issue to the Board’s law 

department. The Board’s law department allegedly failed to address Plaintiffs’ 

concerns, including their claims involving Ayala’s retaliation, described below. As a 

result, Plaintiffs and other employees at NGHS began meeting to discuss the alleged 

false and fraudulent activity at NGHS in order to determine what lawful actions they 

could take against Defendants. 

6
D. Retaliation

The group attempted to keep their meetings confidential because they were 

allegedly fearful of retaliation by Ayala. Moreover, the group discussed the escalating 

racial animus by Ayala and other administrative staff against non-Hispanic employees

at NGHS. Ayala is Hispanic and allegedly displayed a clear bias and preference for 

Hispanic teachers, staff and students. After Plaintiffs complained about the alleged 

fraudulent activity to the Office of the Inspector General of CPS, Ayala and her 

administrative staff allegedly threatened and intimidated Plaintiffs. Ayala changed 

Sandstrom’s duties without notice and became overly critical of her performance as a 

guidance counselor. 

With respect to Isla, Plaintiffs allege Ayala terminated (or refused to rehire) 

Isla for a part-time summer counselor position after Isla complained about the alleged 

ongoing fraudulent activity at NGHS. Ayala removed Isla from her position as 

Counseling Department Chairperson after Isla complained about false information 

submitted in the department. Ayala allegedly took adverse employment actions 

against Isla for complaining, but would not terminate her from her full time position 

because she was Hispanic. Ayala intimidated Isla and informed her she would be “the 

next to go” if Isla complained again. 

In late March of 2010, Sandstrom took maternity leave. That summer, while 

Sandstrom was still on maternity leave, Ayala allegedly reassigned less qualified 

Hispanic employees to Sandstrom’s position. Sandstrom also alleges that Ayala 

7
intended to eliminate Sandstrom’s position from the budget. Ultimately, Sandstrom’s 

position was terminated in the summer, along with seven other employees, allegedly 

due to budgetary cuts. Only one of the seven terminated employees was Hispanic. 

That Hispanic employee was allegedly immediately rehired by Ayala into another 

position. Sandstrom alleges Ayala terminated her in retaliation for reporting false and 

fraudulent activities by employees and administrators at NGHS, because she was 

white, and as a result of her taking leave for her high-risk pregnancy. 

At all relevant times, the Board allegedly had “invariable custom and usage of 

vesting decisional authority in principals,” like Ayala, to make renewal and 

classification decisions as to guidance counselors. The Board supposedly had a policy 

and practice by which it delegated and entirely deferred to Ayala for all employment 

and personnel decisions at NGHS, including hiring, reassignments and terminations. 

Ayala was allegedly the final-decision maker as to employment and staffing matters at 

NGHS. 

E. Public Disclosure of Alleged Fraudulent Activity

On April 1, 2010, Plaintiffs and others submitted a report to the Inspector 

General of CPS, complaining of more than a dozen instances of false and fraudulent 

conduct (“Plaintiffs’ Report”). Plaintiffs attach Plaintiffs’ Report to their amended 

complaint. Between April 1, 2010 and October 1, 2010, Plaintiffs allegedly 

submitted documents, including Plaintiffs’ Report, to federal and state departments 

and agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Illinois 

8
Attorney General and other governmental agencies. Plaintiffs claim they were the 

original sources of the information submitted to these governmental departments and 

agencies. 

The Illinois Attorney General chose not to investigate or prosecute the reported 

fraudulent activities. Federal authorities did not respond in writing to Plaintiffs’ 

submissions. Eventually, the Inspector General for CPS released his own Annual 

Report for Fiscal Year 2011 (the “Inspector General Report”) addressing the time 

period from July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011, and confirming the substance of 

Plaintiffs’ Report. The Inspector General Report is also attached to the amended 

complaint. Many Defendants voluntarily left, were terminated, or were designated as 

ineligible for rehiring based on the Inspector General Report. 

When some authorities failed to act on Plaintiffs’ submissions, Plaintiffs 

provided information regarding ongoing false and fraudulent conduct to Pam Zekman 

(“Zekman”), a reporter with CBS Channel 2 News in Chicago. On July 26, 2011, 

Zekman released an article entitled “CPS Moving To Fire Principal Over Fraud In 

Free Lunch Program.” On January 2, 2012, Zekman released another article, “Report 

Details CPS Free Lunch Fraud, Improper Financial Benefits.” On January 4, 2012, 

the Associated Press published an article entitled “CPS Overpaid Subs $1.13 Million, 

Says Chicago Inspector General.” On January 5, 2012, the Chicago Tribune released 

an article called “New report chronicles misconduct within CPS” and that same day 

another article entitled “Inspector general unveils wide swath of offenses in new 

9
report.” Additionally, on January 6, 2012, Plaintiffs provided pre-filing disclosures 

to the Office of the United States Attorney and to the Illinois Attorney General. 

Federal and state authorities have thus far declined to prosecute the complained of 

activities.

II. Procedural History

On January 27, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint. On March 27, 

2012, the complaint was sealed. On April 1, 2014, the seal was lifted and the United 

States and the State of Illinois declined to intervene with the qui tam claims. On 

August 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Defendants, alleging a 

qui tam action for violation of the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 

3729, et seq. (Count I); a qui tam action for violation of the Illinois False Claims Act 

(“IFCA”), 740 ILCS et seq. (Count II); retaliation for complaining under the FCA 

(Count III); retaliation for reporting violations of the IFCA (Count IV); violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) equal protection based on race and national origin 

(Count V); violation of Section 1983 under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the 

“PDA”) (Count VI); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) for reverse race 

and national origin discrimination (Count VII); violation of the Family and Medical 

Leave Act (“FMLA”) for discrimination and retaliation (Count VIII); violation of the 

FMLA for interference (Count IX); violation of Section 1983 under the FMLA (Count 

X); violation of the Illinois Whistleblower’s Act (“IWA”), 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq.

10
(Count XI); and for retaliatory discharge (Count XII). The amended complaint has 

been served on all Defendants. 

Plaintiffs allege Counts I and II against Ayala, Matos, Martin, Santos, Howze, 

Troche, Alequin, Mouroukos, Feliz-Matos, Arroyo, Ramos, Ida Roman, Leo Roman, 

Vera, Mercado, Velez, Vasquez, Borges-Caraballo, Caraballo, Cruz, Lopez, Rafeal 

Boghosian, Shirlann Boghosian, John Doe and Jane Doe. Plaintiffs allege Count III 

against Ayala and the Board and Count IV, individually, against Ayala and the Board. 

Sandstrom alleges Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X against Ayala and the Board. 

Plaintiffs allege Counts XI and XII against the Board only.

Throughout September, some Defendants filed their motions to dismiss. 

Alequin, Arroyo, Mourokous, Troche, Velez, Vasquez, Vera, John Doe and Jane Doe 

are currently unrepresented by counsel, have failed to file a pro se appearance, and 

have not filed anything related to the pending motions to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges 

the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Chi. Lodge No. 7,

570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Essentially, the complaint must provide the defendant with “fair notice” of 

the claim and its basis. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus,

11
to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations 

that, if accepted as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

II. Rule 9(b)

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n alleging 

fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting 

fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The False Claims Act “is an anti-fraud statute 

and claims under it are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).” 

U.S. ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance–Chicago, 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted). A complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) when it alleges “the who, 

what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of a newspaper story.” Borsellino v. 

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007).

While the circumstances constituting fraud must be pleaded with particularity, 

a defendant's “[m]alice, intent, knowledge [or] other condition of mind ... may be 

averred generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A plaintiff who provides a “general outline 

of the fraud scheme” sufficient to “reasonably notify the defendants of their purported 

role” in the fraud satisfies Rule 9(b). Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d. 1016, 

1020 (7th Cir. 1992). When details of the fraud itself “are within the defendant's 

exclusive knowledge,” specificity requirements are less stringent. Jepson, Inc. v. 

Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading 

12
standard derives from “the potential stigmatic injury that comes with alleging fraud” 

and the desire to discourage a “sue first, ask questions later” approach to fraud 

litigation. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co.,

631 F.3d 436, 441–42 (7th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

I. “Shotgun Pleading”

The Court must first address the instances of “shotgun pleading” in Plaintiffs’ 

amended complaint. By “shotgun pleading,” we mean that the statement in the first 

paragraph of some of the counts incorporates prior, unrelated, paragraphs as 

reference—essentially abusing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 10(b) (allowing a party to refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier 

pleading). “Courts have discouraged this type of ‘shotgun’ pleading where each count 

incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and counts of the complaint 

notwithstanding that many of the facts alleged are not material to the claim, or cause 

of action, appearing in a count’s heading. Such pleadings make it virtually impossible 

to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” 

CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 813 F.Supp 2d 990, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2011)

(citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants failed to notify the Court of Plaintiffs’ utilization of the shotgun 

pleading technique, but we find there is “enough clarity to determine what [Plaintiffs] 

seek[] to hold” and thus, we “will decide the motion[s] to dismiss on the basis of 

13
whether [Plaintiffs] ha[ve] adequately stated valid claims, rather than requiring [them] 

to replead [their] claims yet again.” See Chriswell v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, No. 11 C 

00547, 2013 WL 5903417, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2013) aff’d sub nom. Chriswell v. 

O’Brien, 570 F. App’x 617 (7th Cir. 2014). 

II. False Claims (Counts I and II)

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b), Defendants Ayala, Matos, Martin, 

Santos, Howze, Feliz-Matos, Ramos, Ida Roman, Leo Roman, Mercado, BorgesCaraballo, Caraballo, Cruz, Lopez, Rafeal Boghosian, and Shirlann Boghosian move 

to dismiss Count I (false claims under the FCA) and Count II (false claims under the 

IFCA) against them. Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Counts I and II are 

identical. Since the IFCA is modeled after the FCA, the reasoning below applies 

equally for both. See, e.g., People ex rel. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 789 N.E.2d 844, 

850-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).

A. FCA Procedural Requirement Under Section 3730(b)(2)

Generally, Plaintiffs must comply with specific requirements when filing a 

complaint, including serving the government with the complaint while it remains 

sealed until the government determines whether it wants to intervene:

A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material 

evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the 

Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 

days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The 

Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days 

after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.

14
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“Section 3730(b)(2)”). Plaintiffs met these requirements for

their original complaint, but did not serve a copy of their amended complaint on the 

government. For those Defendants that argue there were no references to their 

involvement with the alleged lunch scheme in the original complaint disclosed to the 

government, the claims against them in the amended complaint are not excluded 

because of Section 3730(b)(2). See U.S. ex rel. King v. F.E. Moran, Inc., No. 00 C 

3877, 2002 WL 2003219, at *12-13 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding Section 3730(b)(2)’s 

requirements are procedural rather than jurisdictional, thus giving the court discretion 

to allow amendment under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (“Rule 15”) 

standard); see also U.S. ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 235 F.R.D. 661, 

665-66 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding Section 3730(b)(2) procedural compliance nonmandatory in the context of disclosure statements when adding additional claims). 

The Court permitted Plaintiffs’ amendments of their FCA/IFCA claims under Rule 15. 

Because Plaintiffs only broadened the scope of certain Defendants’ fraudulent activity

in their amended complaint, all of which was contained in the Inspector General

Report attached to the original complaint given to the government, the Court will not 

require re-sealing the amended complaint and re-serving the government as outlined

under Section 3730(b)(2). 

15
B. Public Disclosure Bar Under Section 3730(e)(4)

Qui tam actions are subject to the public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 

The 1986 version of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) deprives the court of jurisdiction over an 

action that is “based upon the public disclosure” of the allegations, unless the relator 

is the original source of the information upon which her lawsuit is based. 31 U.S.C. § 

3730(e)(4)(A). With the 1986 version, courts found the “jurisdictional” nature of the 

public disclosure bar as “necessarily intertwined with the merits of the case,” United 

Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 

overruled on other grounds by Minn–Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th 

Cir. 2012), and that although Section 3730(e)(4)(A) uses the term “jurisdiction,” the 

United States Supreme Court has said it actually raises an issue of substantive law. 

See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1997) (stating 

that Section 3730(e)(4)(A) not only speaks to the power of the court, but to the 

substantive rights of the parties as well). 

The 2010 version of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) disposed of the “jurisdictional” 

language and instead added language permitting the United States government to 

waive the public disclosure bar at its discretion. The 2010 version states “[t]he court 

shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the 

Government, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the 

action or claim were publicly disclosed . . . unless . . . the person bringing the actions 

is an original source of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010). Before 

16
2010, the Seventh Circuit interpreted “based upon” to mean “substantially similar to 

the allegations already in the public domain.” See Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, 

Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, the 2010 amendment incorporated the 

Seventh Circuit standard. Plaintiffs’ allegations need to be substantially similar to the 

public disclosure to establish the first step of the inquiry.

As for the definition of original source, the pre-2010 version states an original 

source: (i) has direct knowledge of the information on which her allegations are 

based; (ii) has “independent” knowledge of the information on which her allegations 

are based; and (iii) “has voluntarily provided the information to the Government 

before filing” a complaint based on her information. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 

According to the post-2010 version of Section 3730(e)(4)(B), to qualify as an original 

source “means an individual who either (1) prior to a public disclosure under 

subsection (e)(4)(A), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on 

which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge that 

is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 

transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government 

before filing an action under this section.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2010). 

Because the 2010 amendment is not retroactive, the applicable version of 

Section 3730(e)(4) is the one which was “in force when the events underlying th[e] 

suit took place.” Leveski v. ITT Educ. Servs., 719 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the 1986 version applies to Defendants’ 

17
allegedly fraudulent conduct, which occurred before March 23, 2010, and the 2010 

version applies to fraudulent conduct that occurred thereafter. See id. Since some of 

Plaintiffs’ allegations involve alleged misconduct after March 23, 2010, both versions 

must be satisfied. 

Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing that they 

were the original source of the information against Defendants because Plaintiffs 

merely assert in a conclusory fashion that they are the original sources. Plaintiffs 

provide the newspaper articles discussing the alleged lunch fraud, which were 

released beginning in July 2011. In her reply brief, Feliz-Matos attaches another 

article from July 7, 2010, entitled “2 Investigators, BGA Uncover CPS Free Lunch 

Fraud.” All of these articles report generally about the alleged lunch fraud by various 

NGHS personnel. Plaintiffs do not contest these public disclosures, but instead focus 

on the fact that they were the original sources of the information in the articles.

Based on the non-conclusory allegations in the amended complaint, it is 

presently clear to the Court that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged direct and 

independent knowledge on which the allegations in this case are based. Plaintiffs 

worked at NGHS. While helping students apply for college financial aid in late 2009, 

Plaintiffs learned Santos, Howze and Velez submitted fraudulent School Lunch Forms

by underreporting their household income on each of the School Lunch Forms for 

their children enrolled at NGHS. Plaintiffs provide the years these employees 

submitted the School Lunch Forms. Before reporting to the Inspector General, but 

18
after the original lunch form fraud complaints, Plaintiffs discovered Mouroukos, 

Feliz-Matos, Ramos, Vera and Vasquez also submitted School Lunch Forms for their 

children by substantially misstating their household incomes. Plaintiffs allege Ayala 

engaged in the school lunch fraud by instructing others to intentionally misrepresent 

their household income on school lunch applications, delegating responsibility to 

Matos to help parents improperly fill out the forms, signing the School Lunch Forms, 

and submitting them to the government in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Together, these 

allegations establish that Plaintiffs have the necessary direct and independent 

knowledge of the information on which the allegations here are based to support their 

claim that they are the original sources. 

As for Ida Roman, Leo Roman, Troche, Martin, Mercado, Alequin, Arroyo and 

John Doe and Jane Doe, Plaintiffs were supposedly not aware of their involvement in 

the alleged fraudulent schemes until after Plaintiffs reported the violations of the 

FCA/IFCA to government officials. However, according to the definition of original 

source, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs to have direct and independent knowledge of 

each Defendant’s involvement, just knowledge of information on which the 

allegations are based. Thus, at this time, we will not dismiss the Defendants who 

were not discovered until after the Inspector General Report emerged since the 

discovery of their involvement was a direct result of Plaintiffs’ reporting the 

FCA/IFCA violations to government authorities. Because the other fraudulent 

schemes involving tuition, false invoices, payroll fraud and the fraudulent use of 

19
governmental facilities were not publicly disclosed in the newspaper articles, the same 

holds true for those schemes embedded in Counts I and II. Simply because the 

Inspector General discovered additional fraudulent schemes at NGHS during its 

investigation does not prohibit Plaintiffs from now pleading them in this qui tam

action. They stem from the overarching fraudulent activity Plaintiffs initially reported 

in the first instance and which are alleged in their amended complaint.

As for Section 3730(e)(4)(B)(2)’s requirement of voluntarily providing the 

information to the government before filing an action under this section, both versions 

of Section 3730(e)(4)(B) are satisfied because prior to the newspaper reports in July 

2010, Plaintiffs allege they voluntarily disclosed the information to the government 

beginning April 1, 2010. Prior to commencing this lawsuit on January 27, 2012, 

Plaintiffs allegedly submitted copies of Plaintiffs’ Report to the FBI, the Illinois 

Attorney General, and other governmental agencies between April 1, 2010 and 

October 1, 2010. The Court finds Plaintiffs’ Report would have supplied the 

government with enough information to notify it of how Defendants were allegedly 

submitting false claims. 

Established by the reasoning above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded they 

were the original sources of the publicly disclosed information. Plaintiffs, therefore,

have met all the requisite terms of both versions of Section 3730(e)(4) to prevent the 

jurisdictional public disclosure bar from presently applying to this case.

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C. Rule 9(b) Heightened Pleading Standard

Since the Court has found that Plaintiffs are the original sources of the publicly 

disclosed information, we now must turn to whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 

9(b) heightened pleading standard required for qui tam actions. A qui tam action is 

one in which private citizens sue for themselves, and on behalf of the government, to 

recover a penalty under a statute, which provides that part of the penalty is awarded to 

the party bringing the suit and the remainder of the penalty is awarded to the 

government. See U.S. ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls–Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir.

2009). The government remains the real party of interest in qui tam actions. Id. The 

FCA imposes liability against any person or entity that “knowingly presents, or causes 

to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “knowingly 

makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a 

false or fraudulent claim.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2). To establish civil liability 

under the FCA, a relator generally must prove: (i) the defendant made a statement in 

order to receive money from the government; (ii) the statement was false; and (iii) the 

defendant knew the statement was false. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2); U.S. ex rel. Hill v. 

City of Chicago, No. 08 C 4540, 2014 WL 123833, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2014) 

aff’d sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Hill v. City of Chicago, 772 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Under the amended FCA, liability attaches “whenever a person knowingly makes a 

false claim to obtain money or property, any part of which is provided by the 

Government without regard to whether the wrongdoer deals directly with the Federal 

21
Government; with an agent acting on the Government's behalf, or with a third party 

contractor, grantee, or other recipient of such money or property.” U.S. v. McMahon, 

No. 11 C 4620, 2015 WL 115763, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (citation omitted). 

“To say fraud has been pleaded with particularity is not to say that it has been 

proved (nor is proof part of the pleading requirement).” Lusby, 570 F.3d at 855. A 

relator must “identify specific false claims for payment or specific false statements 

made in order to obtain payment.” U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 

F.3d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2003). For each alleged false statement, the relator must plead 

“the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content 

of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was 

communicated . . . .” See Grenadyor, 772 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted). However, 

because Plaintiffs claim Defendants’ alleged fraudulent schemes lasted over many 

years, “[a] plaintiff who pleads a fraudulent scheme involving numerous transactions 

over a period of years need not plead specifics with respect to every instance of fraud, 

but [s]he must at least provide representative examples.” See Mason v. Medline 

Indus., Inc., 731 F.Supp.2d 730, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (where the court found the 

complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) because the plaintiff gave “concrete examples, 

identifying the individuals and businesses involved, the relevant time frames, and the 

manner in which the bribes or kickbacks were paid”).

22
Plaintiffs’ FCA/IFCA allegations fall into five categories: (i) free and reducedprice lunch fraud; (ii) tuition fraud; (iii) fraudulent use of government facilities; (iv) 

fraudulent invoicing; and (v) payroll fraud. 

1. Certification of Compliance to Government As a Condition of 

Payment

“[A]n FCA claim premised upon an alleged false certification of compliance 

with statutory or regulatory requirements [] requires that the certification of 

compliance be a condition of or prerequisite to government payment.” See Gross, 415 

F.3d at 604 (holding plaintiff’s second amended complaint failed because it did not 

allege payment by the government was conditioned upon certification of regulatory 

compliance). A relator can infer a false statement was made, provided “the inference 

. . . is a plausible one” and is pleaded with the required specificity. Lusby, 570 F.3d at 

854. 

For the lunch fraud claims, Ayala attached a blank lunch form to her motion to 

dismiss. The form states “Application for Free Milk/Meal and Reduced-Price 

Meals—Complete One Application Per Household Per School District.” On the 

bottom of the form, there is a section “School Use Only” which requires the 

“Signature of Determining Official,” the “Signature of Confirming Official,” and a 

space “Verifying Official’s Signature.” Although Plaintiffs have not yet provided the 

actual School Lunch Forms submitted by Defendants, at the present posture of the 

case, a relator does not need to produce a copy of the physical document making the 

23
false claim. Leveski, 719 F.3d at 838. As long as the requisite particularity exists, the 

same applies for any physical forms that may have required certification before 

submission to the government relating to the alleged tuition fraud, fraudulent use of 

government facilities, fraudulent invoices and payroll fraud. Whether Plaintiffs have 

pleaded the falsity of the statements to the government with the requisite specificity is 

analyzed in sequence below. 

2. Lunch Fraud 

In addition to the allegations supplied in the Background Section, Part I, supra, 

Plaintiffs supply fifteen more pages of allegations under Count I and incorporated in 

Count II, to support their assertions that Santos, Howze, Troche, Alequin, Mouroukos, 

Feliz-Matos, Arroyo, Ramos, the Romans, Vera, Mercado, Velez, Vasquez, John Doe 

and Jane Doe (the “parent-Defendants”) engaged in lunch fraud by intentionally 

submitting false information regarding their household income or family size so their 

children would qualify for free or reduced-price school lunches in 2007, 2008, 2009, 

2010 and/or 2011. Comparably, Plaintiffs also allege that Ayala, Matos, Martin and 

Borges-Caraballo engaged in school lunch fraud when they instructed or assisted 

others in submitting false information so their children could receive free lunches. As 

the principal, Ayala was purportedly the recipient of state and federal funds allocated 

for the free or subsidized lunches and had discretion on how the funds were spent. 

It is true that some Defendants worked under Ayala and did not submit School 

Lunch Forms for their children, but were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to submit 

24
the forms. For instance, Plaintiffs allege Martin, a guidance counselor, knowingly 

submitted documents to the government to allow the waiver of college application 

fees for one of Santos’s children in December 2009. This was done even though 

Plaintiffs told Martin that Santos’ child was ineligible. Indeed, general civil 

conspiracy principles apply to FCA conspiracy claims., U.S. ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW 

Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 1999), but notably, Plaintiffs do not file a separate 

FCA conspiracy claim; their allegations of a conspiracy are embedded in Counts I and 

II (the alleged violations of the FCA/IFCA). For Martin’s situation, whether she

submitted additional documents on behalf of Santos’s child and the exact information 

she heard from Plaintiffs about this child’s ineligibility are questions of fact. There 

are currently enough details about Martin’s purported role in the lunch fraud and the 

tuition fraud, Part II(C)(5), supra, to survive dismissal of the FCA/IFCA claims 

against her. The allegations against Martin with respect to Counts I and II stand. 

Focusing back on the overarching allegations of lunch fraud, according to the 

amended complaint, Plaintiffs’ interactions with the son of NGHS math teacher, 

Santos, began their inquiry about possible fraudulent activity occurring at NGHS. In 

December 2009, Santos’s son allegedly told Sandstrom in the NGHS counseling 

office, and in the presence of Isla, that Santos “purposely lied” on federal school lunch 

applications in 2008, 2009 and 2010 so that he and his sister could receive free meals 

and have other school fees waived while they attended NGHS. At that same time, 

Santos’s daughter told Sandstrom she had received free lunch since she started at 

25
NGHS in 2006 because Santos intentionally misrepresented his household income on 

the School Lunch Forms. The form Santos submitted to NGHS in 2008 and 2009

only included his wife’s monthly gross income of $1,800.00 with an annual gross 

income of $21,600.00 for a family of four. In 2009 and 2010, Santos misrepresented 

his family’s annual gross income as $22,100.00 and stated he had a family of six, even 

though his daughter’s FAFSA application indicated he only had a family size of four. 

Because of these misrepresentations, Santos’s children were eligible to receive free 

breakfast and lunch and were exempt from paying Advanced Payment exam fees and 

college application fees. Santos and other parent-Defendants maintain that they never 

submitted a false statement to the government, but only to NGHS. However, it is 

highly plausible that when these parent-Defendants allegedly misstated their family’s 

annual income on the “Application for Free/Milk Meal and Reduced-Price Meals” on 

purpose, they understood that as a public high school, government funding could have 

covered the meal costs. Under Rule 9(b), knowledge of the funding procedure and 

source of the funds is not a prerequisite. Plaintiffs only must plead that Defendants 

knew that the claim presented to the government for payment was false—which they 

have done.

For the other parent-Defendants, including Howze, Troche, Alequin, 

Mouroukos, Feliz-Matos, Arroyo, Ramos, the Romans, Vera, Mercado, Velez, 

Vasquez, John Doe and Jane Doe, Plaintiffs lodge very similar allegations against 

them. Velez, who has not filed an appearance in the instant lawsuit, was a Cook 

26
County Sheriff’s Office employee and is the only parent-Defendant who was never 

employed by the Board. These allegations about the School Lunch Forms include 

specifics on when each Defendant engaged in the conduct, how they misrepresented 

their household incomes, and for some Defendants, the exact annual income2 they 

misrepresented on the forms and other additional information disclosed by the 

Inspector General Report. As stated before, Defendants’ knowledge of the false 

School Lunch Forms can be asserted generally at this stage in the proceedings. 

The Court needs to clarify that based on the amended complaint, there are 

essentially two false submissions to the government with this alleged scheme. First, 

Plaintiffs allege that the parent-Defendants intentionally misrepresented information 

and signed off on lunch forms submitted to NGHS. These parents were allegedly 

assisted or instructed to understate their household income or overstate the size of 

their family for their children to qualify for the free or subsidized lunch programs. 

Next, the submitted forms were allegedly signed by Ayala or her staff at her direction, 

and then sent to the government. Various Defendants working as Ayala’s office 

personnel, and including Ayala, did not submit School Lunch Forms for their 

children, but allegedly assisted in signing or approving the School Lunch Forms sent

to the government. These non-parent Defendants argue they were not involved in the 

submission of the School Lunch Forms whatsoever. However, at this stage of the 

proceeding, these arguments fail. The facts surrounding the submissions will be 

2 The Court does not expect Plaintiffs to know the annual income of each Defendant at this point in the 

lawsuit.

27

 
unveiled during the discovery process, including the roles that Ayala, Martin and 

Ayala’s office personnel played in the alleged scheme to make, use, or cause to be 

made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim. See 

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2). At this pleadings stage however, the Court finds 

Plaintiffs have provided a general outline of the lunch fraud scheme throughout their 

many pages of allegations that sufficiently notify Defendants of their purported roles 

in the lunch fraud and satisfy Rule 9(b). 

3. False Invoices 

Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs’ Report about 

the lunch and tuition fraud at NGHS, the Inspector General Report uncovered even 

more information about fraud. One such scheme implicated Rafael Boghosian, the 

NGHS Technology Coordinator, his wife, Shirlann, Ayala and Cruz. From 2005 to 

2010, the Boghosians both supposedly held themselves out to the government as 

“vendors” and intentionally submitted false invoices for “work” that had never been 

performed. The Inspector General Report found “the principal [Ayala] and school 

business manager [Cruz] knew of and participated in the vendor’s [Boghosians’] 

scheme to avoid the CPS [ ] rules.” 

In response, Ayala and Cruz argue that a violation of administrative regulations 

does not rise to the level of a false claim to defraud the government. The Boghosians 

insist the work allegedly unperformed was actually completed by Rafael Boghosian, 

and the amended complaint fails to allege the Boghosians received or obtained any 

28
funds after submitting the false invoices. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs 

provide the Board’s publicly available financial records from 2009 to 2010, which 

state 26.8% of the Board’s financial resources were State of Illinois dollars and 

federal money constituted 21.5% of Board funds. As a public school, the Court 

rightfully assumes NGHS received a part of this government funding. The amount of 

funding is irrelevant at this time. Although the Boghosians may not deal directly with 

the federal government, they can still be liable under the amended version of the FCA

for knowingly making a false claim to obtain government money. See U.S. v. 

McMahon, No. 11 C 4620, 2015 WL 115763, at *7 (FCA liability attaches “whenever 

a person knowingly makes a false claim to obtain money or property, any part of 

which is provided by the Government without regard to whether the wrongdoer deals 

directly with the Federal Government...”). 

To establish the falsity of the invoices under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs supply the 

identities of the people who allegedly partook in the scheme. In addition, they 

provide the time period, 2005 to 2010, and the method by which the Boghosians 

would submit their misrepresentations to the government—through invoices. As for 

Ayala and Cruz’s roles, Plaintiffs rely on the Inspector General Report, which names 

Ayala and Cruz as knowledgeable participants in the scheme. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(c) (it is necessary for the Court to take all facts pleaded in the amended complaint 

as true and construe all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor by reviewing the amended 

complaint and all exhibits attached) (emphasis added). Again, knowledge can be 

29
averred generally under Rule 9(b). Although Cruz claims she did not have the 

authority to approve the invoices, the fact that she is listed as the business manager

infers she had some authority to manage business matters, like invoices, at NGHS. 

Discovery will reveal whether or not that is true. 

For clarification purposes, the Court does not consider the Inspector General 

Report as evidence at this time, but as supplementation to the amended complaint’s 

allegations. Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs’ allegations contradict the Inspector 

General Report is unavailing. While the Inspector General Report states that the 

consulting work Shirlann received payment for was actually performed by Rafael, 

Plaintiffs do not allege the Boghosians were paid for work they never performed. 

Rather, Plaintiffs state that false invoices were submitted “for ‘work’ that had never 

[been] performed.” See Forrest v. Universal Sav. Bank, F.A., 507 F.3d 540, 542 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (“Where an exhibit and the complaint conflict, the exhibit typically 

controls.”). Defendants’ contention that Rafael Boghosian actually completed the 

work for his wife, Shirlann, is a factual determination that will be addressed at a later 

phase of this lawsuit. 

Therefore, after reviewing the allegations about fraudulent invoicing in the 

amended complaint, and incorporating the findings outlined in the Inspector General 

Report, it is plausible: (i) the Boghosians submitted fraudulent invoices to recover 

state and federal funds for work that was never performed; and (ii) Ayala and Cruz 

participated in the scheme and knew the invoices were false. 

30
4. Payroll Fraud 

Plaintiffs allege that Lopez, Cruz and Santos’s intentional misrepresentations of 

Lopez and Santos’s payroll records amounted to a violation of the FCA and ICFA. 

Plaintiffs claim that during the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years, Lopez’s name 

appeared on the staff roster for NGHS as a full-time English teacher. Lopez’s name 

was also listed on students’ schedules and quarterly report cards even though Lopez, 

himself, was supposedly not teaching any English classes. In fact, Plaintiffs contend

that the English classes in question were actually taught by Lopez’s brother-in-law, 

Max Malagarejo (“Malagarejo”). Malagarejo was hired by Ayala to serve as an 

AVID tutor at NGHS. In 2008, 2009 and 2010, Lopez allegedly told Plaintiffs that 

instead of attending his job at NGHS on a regular basis, he was attending doctoral 

classes, workshops and presentations at National Louis University. In 2009, Plaintiffs 

became aware that Lopez, upon information and belief, was acting in collaboration 

with Cruz, the payroll clerk. Cruz would alter Lopez’s payroll sign-in sheets and 

swipe records so it appeared Lopez continued to serve in a full-time capacity at 

NGHS. From at least September 2009 until November 2009, Plaintiffs allege Lopez 

was paid a full teacher’s salary, listed as a teacher on school documents, and paid by 

Ayala as NGHS’s Director of Professional Development. Lopez was paid all of this 

compensation even though Malagarejo allegedly taught his courses. During this same 

time period, Santos was also paid as a full time tutor at NGHS. The Inspector General 

Report supports these allegations, stating that Santos falsified attendance records by 

31
fraudulently misrepresenting that he was performing duties on behalf of the Board, 

when he actually performed duties for a different position at Malcolm X College. 

Cruz states Plaintiffs fail to identify whether Cruz had the authority to access 

payroll sign-in sheets and swipe records. Moreover, Cruz argues Plaintiffs supply 

contradicting allegations, that Cruz was both the payroll clerk and the business 

manager for the school. Santos argues Plaintiffs do not allege he had to certify any 

documents to the government for payment as a full time tutor at NGHS while working 

at Malcolm X or that he made, used, or caused another “to make or use any fraudulent 

record or statement for the purpose of coaxing a payment of money from the 

government.” Lopez supports his arguments by stating the claims made on 

“information and belief” warrant dismissal. 

The question is whether these allegations of payroll fraud arise to a 

representative example of a fraudulent scheme. First, Plaintiffs identify the actors in 

the alleged payroll fraud and the time period it occurred, including the possibility 

Cruz served as the business manager and the payroll clerk at NGHS. It is plausible 

the two positions overlap. Additionally, Plaintiffs supply information about 

Malagarejo actually performing the work at NGHS instead of Lopez, even though 

Lopez continued to be compensated while he worked elsewhere. The amended 

complaint also contains details about how Cruz assisted Lopez in altering his payroll 

sheets and how Cruz initiated the misrepresentations. Although one of Plaintiffs’ 

allegations in this section is based on “information and belief,” which generally is 

32
insufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b), Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 442, there is an exception to this 

general prohibition in cases where “(1) the facts constituting the fraud are not 

accessible to the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff provides the grounds for his suspicions.” 

Id. at 443 (citation omitted). Undeniably, the Inspector General Report revealed 

some of the inaccessible information Plaintiffs were not privy to as guidance 

counselors at NGHS, and we would not expect Plaintiffs to know details about

something like the collaboration between Lopez and Cruz to alter Lopez’s payroll 

records. This is the type of evidence Plaintiffs are unlikely to have at this pleading 

stage of litigation. Thus, based on the amended complaint, it is reasonable to accept 

the allegations that Lopez, Cruz and Santos knowingly contributed to the submission 

of payroll records/time sheets to receive payment from NGHS, a partially 

government-funded institution, for work they misrepresented as rendered. 

5. Tuition Fraud

Plaintiffs refer to the Illinois State Board of Education (the “ISBE”), which 

allocates funds to each school district based in part of the respective district’s 

population. The Illinois School Code generally requires out-of-district students to pay 

for their own tuition. The ISBE is not to distribute state and federal funds to a school 

district to cover the tuition cost for a child who seeks to attend the school, but who 

lives in a different district, absent special circumstances. Illinois law prohibits a 

parent from providing inaccurate residency information that would allow an out-ofdistrict child to attend school tuition-free.

33
Plaintiffs allege that in 2009 and 2010, certain teachers and staff at NGHS, who 

lived outside of the City of Chicago, intentionally misrepresented their addresses on 

enrollment forms (the “Enrollment Forms”). Further, Ayala and her administrators, 

Matos, Cruz, Ramos, and Martin, a counselor, allegedly worked together with certain 

parents to also intentionally misrepresent students’ residency on the Enrollment Forms

so their parents could avoid paying out-of-district tuition fees. 

According to the amended complaint, since at least 2001, Alequin lived in 

Melrose Park, Illinois. In 2006, Alequin worked for NGHS as a special education 

classroom assistant. In 2006, Ayala allegedly encouraged Alequin to enroll her child 

at NGHS, even though she lived out-of-district and told Alequin she would waive the 

fees. Ayala then instructed Cruz to process the Enrollment Form for Alequin’s 

daughter and waive the fee. Cruz told Alequin to intentionally misrepresent that her

child lived in Chicago on the Enrollment Forms. Following Cruz’s instructions, 

Plaintiffs claim Alequin intentionally misrepresented that she lived in Chicago to 

avoid paying out-of-district tuition. In 2009 and 2010, Feliz-Matos, another NGHS 

employee, supposedly lived in Oak Park, Illinois while her sister, Reysa Feliz, resided 

in Chicago. During this time period, Feliz-Matos enrolled her child at NGHS by 

intentionally misrepresenting on the Enrollment Form that her sister was her child’s 

legal guardian in order to avoid paying out-of-district tuition. Vera, an employee of 

the Board, engaged in similar activity. She resided in Oak Park, Illinois and 

intentionally misrepresented her children’s residency and never paid out-of-district 

34
tuition. As for Alequin and Vera, individually, both have failed to respond to the 

allegations against them. 

Ayala, Matos, Cruz and Martin allegedly engaged in this fraudulent tuition 

fraud conduct by: (i) reviewing and/or signing off on the falsified Enrollment Forms;

(ii) knowing that these students lived out-of-district; (iii) understanding that Alequin 

and Feliz-Matos intentionally misrepresented where their children lived on the 

Enrollment Forms; (iv) condoning such behavior; and (v) assisting Alequin and FelizMatos with such fraudulent behavior. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the 

heightened pleading standard because they provide for a representative illustration of 

the alleged fraud scheme involving Ayala and her staff. 

Feliz-Matos contends Plaintiffs have not alleged she had submitted a certified 

claim for payment to the federal or state government, or that such forms were a 

requirement for payment3

. It is evident Plaintiffs have adequately supplied the first 

paragraph of a newspaper story: Feliz-Matos, an employee at NGHS, lived in Oak 

Park, Illinois, but misrepresented her child’s address on the Enrollment Form to 

indicate that her sister, a Chicago resident, was the legal guardian of her child, in 

order to avoid paying out-of-district tuition. With respect to Feliz-Matos’s argument 

that no allegations exist stating the Enrollment Forms were a requirement for payment 

of money by the government to NGHS, Plaintiffs provide citations to the Illinois 

School Code and ISBE policy as support. What Feliz-Matos fails to acknowledge is 

3 We have previously addressed Feliz-Matos’ inquiry about certification of the claim in Part II(C)(1), 

supra. 

35

 
the absence of payment to the government for her out-of-district child resulted from 

the false information she submitted to NGHS. By not paying tuition, Feliz-Matos’s 

child reaped benefits from a school without the ISBE factoring that child in its 

distribution of state and federal funds for students who rightfully lived in that district. 

The same applies for the accusations lodged against Alequin and Vera. Defendants 

involved with this alleged tuition fraud scheme are, therefore, not dismissed. 

6. Fraudulent Use of Government Facilities

From 2005-2010, Caraballo and Borges-Caraballo (the “Caraballos”), in 

addition to being NGHS employees, also allegedly worked as “Sport Ministers” of the 

New Life Covenant Church. During this time, the Caraballos frequently used 

NGHS’s gymnasium and athletic facilities for the exclusive activities of their Sports 

Ministry without the inclusion of other students and staff at NGHS. According to the 

Board’s rules, a contract is appropriate for the private use of school or government 

facilities. Plaintiffs contend that the Caraballos never rented the facilities for their 

religious endeavors. Plaintiffs claim Ayala knew of and approved of this 

misappropriation of school facilities, but worked with the Caraballos to conceal their 

misconduct. All of this was reported in the Inspector General Report. The Court 

holds that Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient detail as to the actors involved, the alleged 

fraudulent conduct, the location, and the time period to show it is plausible fraudulent 

use of government facilities occurred at NGHS.

36
As a public school receiving government funding, these representative 

examples of the alleged schemes identify the persons involved, the times, the 

locations, the content of the misrepresentations, and the methods in which the 

schemes were executed. Plaintiffs plead these allegations with some indicia of 

reliability because their beliefs that Defendants were submitting fraudulent claims for

payment by the government developed from their positions as guidance counselors at 

NGHS. Therefore, under both versions of the FCA and the IFCA, the allegations and 

supporting exhibits Plaintiffs provide in Counts I and II of their amended complaint 

do not warrant dismissal at this time. 

III. Employment-Based Claims

A. Retaliation under the FCA and the IFCA 

Only Ayala moves for the Court to dismiss the retaliation claims under the 

FCA and the IFCA, in Counts III and IV, for reasons besides failure to timely serve 

claims—addressed in the Court’s corresponding order. For FCA/IFCA retaliation 

claims, Plaintiffs must show that: (i) they were acting in furtherance of an FCA 

enforcement action or other efforts to stop violations of the FCA; (ii) Defendants 

knew Plaintiffs were engaged in such protected conduct; and (iii) Defendants were 

motivated to take an adverse employment action against Plaintiffs because of the 

protected conduct. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); U.S. ex rel. Batty v. AmeriGroup Ill., Inc., 

528 F.Supp.2d 861, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2007). “A § 3730(h) retaliatory discharge claim 

can still proceed even if neither governmental action is taken nor any qui tam action is 

37
contemplated, threatened, filed or ultimately successful.” Luckey v. Baxter 

Healthcare Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1998); aff’d, 183 F.3d 730 (7th 

Cir. 1999). 

Ayala argues that Plaintiffs’ FCA/IFCA retaliation claims should be dismissed 

because Plaintiffs cannot show that Ayala had any knowledge that Plaintiffs were 

acting in furtherance of an FCA enforcement action or made other efforts to stop 

violations of the FCA/IFCA. Ayala asserts that Plaintiffs merely allege that they tried 

to meet with Ayala about “false and fraudulent activity,” but she refused to meet with 

them. Ayala also claims that Plaintiffs only offer the conclusory allegation that Ayala 

“knew or believed” Plaintiffs reported unidentified fraudulent activities to the 

governmental authority and to media outlets. Ayala states that the only allegation 

that Plaintiffs offer in attempt to connect Ayala to their allegations is that based on 

“information and belief,” Borges-Caraballo spoke with Ayala about Plaintiffs’ 

complaints of school lunch fraud and conspired with her to “ignore, conceal and/or 

perpetuate” the alleged fraud. Ayala insists that this is insufficient as a matter of law 

under the FCA/IFCA without some first-hand knowledge corroborating the allegation. 

Plaintiffs argue that Ayala retaliated against them in multiple ways because of 

the complaints about fraud they were making about her. To establish Ayala’s 

knowledge of Plaintiffs’ whistleblowing activity, Plaintiffs make general assertions 

that Ayala knew of Plaintiffs’ multiple complaints. Plaintiffs allege that they voiced 

multiple internal complaints to Ayala either directly or through her administrative 

38
personnel regarding the fraudulent activity. Plaintiffs support these more general 

allegations with information stating that Sandstrom tried meeting with Ayala to report 

the discovery of the lunch form fraud, but she refused when she found out the reason 

for the meeting. Instead of meeting with Plaintiffs, Ayala allegedly directed her staff 

and Borges-Caraballo, the assistant principal, to harass and intimate Plaintiffs to 

prevent them from raising complaints. Ayala also told Isla that she would be “the 

next to go” if Isla complained again. In December 2009, Plaintiffs reported ongoing 

fraudulent activity at NGHS to the Board’s law department and when Sandstrom took 

maternity leave, she reported the fraudulent lunches to the Inspector General and CBS 

Channel 2 News in Chicago. At that point, the whistle had been blown. 

It is clear that the allegations plausibly create the possibility that Ayala knew 

Plaintiffs were conferring with one another, discussing the fraudulent conduct, and 

relaying the information to the appropriate authorities. Ayala’s alleged refusal to 

meet with Plaintiffs when they desired to discuss information they had about the lunch 

fraud coincides with Ayala’s alleged threats to Isla that she would be terminated if she 

continued to disclose the fraudulent activity occurring at NGHS. Ayala’s motivation 

to take adverse employment action against Plaintiffs because of their disclosures 

about the events occurring at NGHS is allegedly, based on her own self-interest. 

Consequently, Plaintiffs are correct that the amended complaint contains 

sufficient factual allegations that state a plausible claim for retaliation for reporting 

under the FCA and ICFA. Ayala’s actual knowledge will be subject to determination 

39
at a later time, but Plaintiffs have currently pleaded enough facts to show Ayala knew 

of Plaintiffs’ investigation and subsequent reporting of the fraudulent activity 

occurring at NGHS. Counts III and IV against Ayala survive dismissal. As for the 

Board, it does not ask the Court to dismiss Counts III and IV, and at this time, these 

claims against it will also remain.

B. Ayala’s Capacity

Ayala requests that the Court dismiss Counts V, VI, VII and X against her 

because Plaintiffs fail to specify the capacity in which they are suing her. There is a 

significant distinction between a suit brought against a defendant in her individual 

capacity and one brought against her in her official capacity. Hill v. Shelander, 924 

F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991). A lawsuit against an individual in her official 

capacity “generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an 

entity of which the officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 

(1985). “An official-capacity suit is not a suit against the official as an individual; the 

real party in interest is the entity. Therefore, a plaintiff looking to recover on a 

damages judgment in an official-capacity suit can look only to the entity itself, not to 

the official.” Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 

1988). On the other hand, individual capacity claims “seek to impose individual 

liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer 

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citations omitted).

40
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not specifically identify the capacity in 

which they are suing Ayala. Plaintiffs identify Ayala as the [former] principal and 

Plaintiffs’ supervisor and that “at all times Ayala acted under the color of law.” 

Plaintiffs also allege that at all relevant times, the Board vested decisional authority in 

principals, like Ayala, to make renewal and classification decisions as to guidance 

counselors. Ayala argues that these allegations support the assumption of an official 

capacity designation. Plaintiffs insist that they have pleaded their lawsuit against 

Ayala in her individual and official capacities because the Court can infer that Ayala 

is being sued in her individual capacity, and cite Langford v. Cnty. of Cook, 965 

F.Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Plaintiffs refer the Court to their prayer for relief, 

which requests punitive damages against Ayala only for Counts VII-IX and XII. 

Ayala claims that the prayer for relief’s limited reference to certain counts only 

includes two of Sandstrom’s three FMLA counts against Ayala and the retaliatory 

discharge count, which is asserted against the Board only. More importantly, Ayala 

states that the prayer for relief which the Plaintiffs reference does not include Counts 

V and VI, in which Sandstrom asserts her Section 1983 claims. 

In Hill, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would not presume that a defendant 

was being sued in his official capacity every time that the complaint failed to clearly 

indicate which capacity a defendant was being sued. Hill, 924 F.2d at 1372. Instead, 

the Seventh Circuit stated that in cases where the capacity of the defendant is not 

specified, it would look at the substance and nature of the claim alleged:

41
Where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from official policies or customs, the 

defendant has been sued in her official capacity; where the plaintiff alleged 

tortious conduct of an individual acting under color of state law, the defendant 

has been sued in her individual capacity. 

Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Hill, 924 F.2d at 1373-74). 

In the instant matter, looking at the substance of the amended complaint “in its 

entirety,” the Court can presently infer that Plaintiffs intended to raise claims against 

Ayala in her official and individual capacities. For instance, Plaintiffs allege Counts 

V, VI, VII and X against Ayala and the Board. They do not specify that the claims 

are against Ayala in her individual capacity, but they specifically separate Ayala and 

the Board in the respective headings of each claim. Plaintiffs also allege that Ayala 

was acting “under the color of law” in Count X. Plaintiffs’ arguments are supported 

by their response, where they insist that they are suing Ayala in both capacities. The 

Court refuses to dispose of Counts V, VI, VII and X based on confusion as to what 

capacity Plaintiffs are suing Ayala. Therefore, we find that Plaintiffs have pleaded 

Counts V, VI, VII, and X against Ayala in her official and individual capacities.

In addition, Ayala moves to dismiss Counts V, VI, and VII alleged against her

in her official capacity. Her argument is based on the fact that the Court must treat the 

official capacity claims against Ayala as claims against the Board, making such 

claims redundant since Sandstrom also alleges these claims against the Board. Since 

official capacity claims against individuals employed by the Board are essentially 

claims against the Board, Moore v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 300 F.Supp.2d 

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641, 646 (N.D. Ill. 2004), and the Court has concluded that Sandstrom has properly 

alleged civil rights violations against the Board, Part III(C), infra, we dismiss Counts 

V, VI, and VII against Ayala in her official capacity as redundant. The sufficiency of 

Counts V, VI and VII against the Board and Ayala, in her individual capacity, is 

discussed below.

C. Claims Against the Board 

The Board asks the Court to dismiss Counts V, VI, VII and X because of 

Sandstrom’s failure to plead the requisite facts for Monell liability pursuant Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The doctrine of 

respondeat superior is unavailable under Section 1983 so Sandstrom must present 

evidence that the Board itself violated her civil rights. Darchak v. City of Chicago Bd. 

of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009). To support Monell liability, Sandstrom

must plead the violation of her Section 1981 or 1983 rights “was caused by a custom 

or policy within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases.” Thompson v. Bd. of 

Educ. of City of Chi., No. 11 C 1712, 2014 WL 1322958, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 

2014) (citation omitted). A “policy,” is an express policy, a widespread and 

permanent practice, or action by a person with final policymaking authority. 

McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000). Whether a particular 

official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. Wragg v. Vill. of 

Thorton, 604 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2010). Illinois law states: “The right to employ, 

discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with the board, provided that decisions to 

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discharge or suspend non-certified employees, including disciplinary layoffs, and the 

termination of certified employees from employment pursuant to a layoff or 

reassignment policy are subject to review under the grievance resolution procedure.” 

105 ILCS 5/34-8.1. 

To maintain her Section 1983 claims, Sandstrom must demonstrate that the 

Board either delegated final policymaking authority to Ayala or ratified Ayala’s 

action. Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630. Under the delegation theory, the person or entity 

with final policymaking authority must delegate the power to make policy, not simply 

the power to make decisions. “There must be a delegation of authority to set policy 

for hiring and firing, not a delegation of only the final authority to hire and fire.” 

Kujawski v. Bd of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cnty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 

1999) (citations omitted). 

The Board claims that Sandstrom does not allege that the Board had an express 

policy or widespread practice of discriminating against Caucasian-Americans, 

pregnant women or persons exercising their FMLA rights. The Board also asserts that 

Sandstrom’s allegation that Ayala “was a final policymaker” is conclusory. In the 

amended complaint, Sandstrom alleges that Ayala was a final-decision maker and a 

final policy-maker as to employment and staffing matters at NGHS. Sandstrom also 

claims in Count V that “Ayala, as a final policymaker, intentionally discriminated 

against Sandstrom based on her race and national origin by giving more favorable 

treatment (promotion and retention) to Hispanic employees.” Sandstrom alleges 

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generally that at all relevant times, the Board had “invariable custom and usage of 

vesting decisional authority in principals,” like Ayala, to make renewal and 

classification decisions as to guidance counselors. The Board supposedly had a policy 

and practice by which it delegated and entirely deferred to Ayala for all employment 

and personnel decisions at NGHS, including hiring, reassignments and terminations. 

At this time, the Court finds that Sandstrom’s collective allegations are enough 

to show that it is plausible that the Board abdicated its authority, including delegating 

Ayala with the authority to set policy at NGHS for hiring and firing, unreviewable by 

the Board. It is also possible that it was Ayala’s final decision to terminate (or not 

renew) a guidance counselor position. The extent of the Board’s abdication of final 

policymaking to Ayala will be revealed during discovery. Therefore, we presently 

deny the Board’s motion to dismiss civil rights claims against it under Sections 1981 

and 1983, based on a lack of Monell-based liability. The Board does not ask for 

dismissal of Counts VIII, IX, XI, and XII, and those claims will also stand.

D. Remaining Sections 1981 and 1983 Claims

As for Sandstrom’s Section 1981 claim against Defendants in Count VII for 

both racial discrimination and discrimination based on national origin, Defendants

move to dismiss the “national origin” element of the count. Section 1981 prevents 

only race discrimination. Perez v. Norwegian–American Hosp., Inc., 93 Fed.Appx. 

910, 913 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court notes that “race” is defined broadly in 

Section 1981 actions to include national origin, so to the extent that Count VII argues 

45
any discrimination was based on national origin, the Court will consider those 

arguments as one of racial discrimination under Count VII. Pourghoraishi v. Flying 

J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756–757 (7th Cir. 2006). The racial discrimination component 

of Count VII against the Board and Ayala, in her individual capacity, is not dismissed. 

With respect to Count V, the parties agree that Sandstrom is relying on the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution to assert this Section 1983 claim. Section 1983 provides a private right 

of action to remedy violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights committed 

under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the 

remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they 

may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under 

§ 1983.” Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 

2010 (1981). Since “a plaintiff may sue her state government employer for violations 

of the Fourteenth Amendment through Section 1983 and escape Title VII’s 

comprehensive remedial scheme, even if the same facts would suggest a violation of 

Title VII,” Count V against the Board and Ayala, in her individual capacity, stands. 

See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). 

Sandstrom bases her remaining two Section 1983 violations on the PDA (Count 

VI) and the FMLA (Count X). Defendants aver that Counts VI and X should be 

dismissed because Sandstrom does not allege any constitutional violation, but 

expressly relies on the statutory provisions of the PDA and FMLA. Defendants claim

46
that both statutes provide comprehensive remedial schemes, which should not be 

bypassed under the guise of a Section 1983 claim. 

In Count VI, an action for a Section 1983 violation of the PDA, Sandstrom

alleges that Ayala began treating Sandstrom in a hostile and threatening manner, 

including becoming overly critical of Sandstrom’s performance and for eating at her 

desk, a task which allegedly became necessary due to her pregnancy. When 

Sandstrom went to the hospital after experiencing contractions, Ayala allegedly 

criticized her for not calling the school to inform them that she would be missing 

work. Subsequently, when Sandstrom returned, Ayala criticized her for not having 

completed work due “by the end of the day,” even though she was in the hospital the 

week prior. While Sandstrom took maternity leave, she alleges that Ayala 

intentionally discriminated against her and terminated Sandstrom because of her 

pregnancy status, giving preferential treatment (retention) to non-pregnant employees. 

As a result of Ayala’s actions, and the Board’s delegation of such alleged final policymaking decisions to Ayala, Sandstrom allegedly suffered embarrassment, humiliation, 

emotional distress, and other forms of damages, including continuing injuries. 

For the first time in years, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on March 25, 

2015 regarding the scope of the PDA. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 

S.Ct. 1338 (2015). Although the Supreme Court did not mention Section 1983 actions 

brought under a violation of the PDA, for the sake of fairness, the Court will allow the 

parties to address any implications Young’s statutory interpretation of the PDA has on 

47
the underlying PDA violation, including information about the PDA’s remedial 

scheme, in a concise, five-page submission to the Court.4

Count X, a Section 1983 violation of the FMLA, is alleged against the Board 

and Ayala. It is true that the “Seventh Circuit has [still] yet to rule on whether the 

enforcement mechanisms in the [] FMLA [is] sufficiently comprehensive as to 

preclude enforcement of the statutes through Section 1983.” McGee v. City of 

Chicago, No. 11 C 2512, 2011 WL 4382484, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2011)5

. The court in 

McGee found that the FMLA enforcement mechanism is modeled on the FLSA and 

that nothing in the language of the FMLA statute fails to provide for comprehensive 

enforcement of the rights it creates. Id. at *3-4. Although district courts are split on 

the issue with regard to the FMLA, the Court finds no compelling reason to divert 

from the sound reasoning explained by the court in McGee: 

“[D]espite the fact that there is no administrative component to FMLA 

enforcement, there is still potential for conflict between Section 1983 

enforcement and the enforcement mechanism of the FMLA. The FMLA 

provides for private rights of action, as well as for action by the Secretary of 

Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(2), (b), & (d). In the event that the Secretary 

pursues a claim, the private litigant may no longer pursue an individual claim. 

29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(4). Allowing a litigant to circumvent this procedure by 

filing a Section 1983 claim simultaneously would frustrate the scheme 

Congress provided.”

Id. at *4. Thus, “where a federal statute provides its own comprehensive enforcement 

scheme, that scheme may not ordinarily be bypassed by pleading an underlying 

4 This analysis also applies to Count VI against the Board. 

5 Both attorneys for Ayala and Sandstrom should be familiar with the ruling in McGee since they are 

listed as the counsels of record for that case.

48

 
violation of the statute and bringing suit directly under section 1983.” Alexander v. 

Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985). The Court hereby grants 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count X in its entirety. 

E. Sandstrom’s FMLA Claims

As for Sandstrom’s FMLA claims, she alleges that she worked more than 1250 

hours for Defendants in the twelve-month period prior to requesting FMLA leave, and 

before taking leave for the birth of her child. At all relevant times, Ayala was 

allegedly Sandstrom’s employer under the FMLA, as she acted in the direct interest of 

CPS and the Board relative to Sandstrom. 

On December 16, 2009, Sandstrom provided Ayala with a copy of a notice 

from her obstetrician that confirmed Sandstrom had a high-risk pregnancy and would 

require intermittent periods of rest. The doctor’s note requested that NGHS provide 

Sandstrom with the intermittent leave that she required for her high-risk pregnancy. 

Sandstrom alleges that Ayala knew that she was in need of FMLA leave due to her 

high-risk pregnancy and related complications, considered a serious medical condition 

under the FMLA. Ayala allegedly ignored Sandstrom’s note and took no action to 

investigate if Sandstrom required intermittent FMLA leave. However, Sandstrom was 

allowed to take FMLA leave when she gave birth and during the recovery time 

thereafter. 

Throughout January and February of 2010, Sandstrom allegedly followed up 

with Ayala regarding her doctor’s note and her requests for intermittent leave due to 

49
her high-risk pregnancy. Ayala continued to ignore Sandstrom’s requests for leave, 

denying her right to intermittent FMLA leave. Sandstrom then took maternity leave. 

After Sandstrom initially requested intermittent leave in December of 2009, she 

claims that Ayala began confronting and criticizing her. Ayala became hostile and 

threatening towards Sandstrom, including becoming overly critical of Sandstrom’s 

performance and for eating at her desk. 

On March 8, 2010, Sandstrom began to feel contractions and two colleagues

drove her to the hospital during the school day. Sandstrom was held at the hospital 

for observation until March 12, 2010. On March 15, 2010, Ayala allegedly criticized 

Sandstrom for not calling the school to inform them that she would be missing work. 

However, Sandstrom contends that her sister had called in and informed other faculty 

members in her office that Sandstrom was being held at the hospital. Ayala then 

criticized Sandstrom for not having yet completed certain work activities, which were 

to be due at the end of the day on March 15, 2010, even though she had been at the 

hospital most of the previous week. 

1. Violation of the FMLA (Discrimination/Retaliation)

Sandstrom alleges that Ayala denied her intermittent FMLA leave for months 

prior to her giving birth. Ayala further discriminated against Sandstrom and allegedly 

violated the FMLA when Sandstrom was on leave by reassigning her to a different 

position, which Ayala had planned to eliminate as part of a “budget-cutting process.” 

Sandstrom claims that Ayala willfully and intentionally discriminated and/or 

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retaliated against Sandstrom and selected Sandstrom for termination because 

Sandstrom sought and took FMLA leave.

The Board does not request dismissal of Count VIII and Ayala only asks for the 

Court to dismiss Count VIII based on delay of service, which the Court addressed in 

its corresponding order. Thus, we will not dismiss Count VIII against the Board or

Ayala. 

2. Violation of the FMLA (Interference) 

In addition to allegedly subjecting Sandstrom to discriminatory treatment, she

alleges that Ayala interfered with her right to FMLA leave. Ayala’s actions, 

described above, were allegedly an attempt to discourage Sandstrom from exercising 

her rights under the FMLA, and interfered with, and discouraged, Sandstrom from 

being able to take FMLA leave. Sandstrom contends that Ayala’s actions constituted 

an intentional and willful interference with and denial of her rights to take her 

statutorily protected FMLA leave intermittently. 

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to 12 weeks of unpaid leave during a 

12-month period in order to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health 

condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The FMLA further provides that “[i]t shall be 

unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the 

attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 

To prevail on a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff is required to prove that: (i) 

she was eligible for the FMLA’s protections; (ii) Ayala is an employer as defined by 

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the FMLA; (iii) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (iv) she provided 

sufficient notice of her intent to take leave; and (v) she was denied FMLA benefits to 

which she was entitled. Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). 

“Interfering with” the exercise of any employee’s rights includes refusing to authorize 

FMLA leave and discouraging an employee for using such leave. 29 U.S.C. §

825.220(b). As with any claim for FMLA interference, Sandstrom is only entitled to 

relief is she was prejudiced by the alleged violation. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World 

Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002) (“[A]n employee must prove, as a threshold matter, 

that the employer violated [29 U.S.C.] § 2615 by interfering with, restraining, or 

denying his or her exercise of FMLA rights. Even then, § 2617 provides no relief 

unless the employees has been prejudiced by the violation.”).

Ayala argues that Sandstrom’s FMLA interference claim should be dismissed 

because Sandstrom fails to plead that she actually requested a particular intermittent 

leave, such leave was denied, and that she suffered real consequences. Ayala also 

claims that nothing in the amended complaint indicates that Sandstrom actually 

needed to take time off or was denied the ability to do so. Sandstrom also asserts 

Count IX against the Board, which does not request dismissal of this claim. 

The Court finds that Sandstrom’s allegation that she “submitted a request to 

Ayala by personally submitting a doctor’s note which included such a request” is 

enough to satisfy that she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave. We 

can infer that Sandstrom requested FMLA leave when submitting her doctor’s note, 

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which will be produced during discovery. Once the letter is in evidence, the Court 

will be allowed to assess if Sandstrom truly intended to take leave or whether her 

doctors advised her that leave was a possibility. However, at the present posture, the 

allegations about the doctor’s note are sufficient. Additionally, Sandstrom has 

properly pleaded that she was denied FMLA leave and that she was harmed by 

Ayala’s interference of her FMLA leave. The distress Ayala experienced with her 

high risk pregnancy and Ayala’s harassing conduct discouraged Sandstrom from 

going to the hospital again or using FMLA leave prior to giving birth. Accordingly, 

Count IX against Ayala and the Board remains. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, Counts I and II remain against Ayala, Matos, Martin, Santos, Howze, 

Troche, Alequin, Mouroukos, Feliz-Matos, Arroyo, Ramos, Ida Roman, Leo Roman, 

Vera, Mercado, Velez, Vasquez, Borges-Caraballo, Caraballo, Cruz, Lopez, Rafeal 

Boghosian, Shirlann Boghosian, John Doe and Jane Doe. Counts III, IV, V, VIII and 

IX, XI and XII remain against the Board. Counts III, IV, VIII, IX remain against 

Ayala. Counts V, VI, and VII are dismissed against Ayala, in her official capacity. 

Count V remains against Ayala, in her individual capacity. Count VII against the 

Board and Ayala, in her individual capacity, remains as to the racial discrimination 

component only. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI against the Board and 

Ayala, in her individual capacity, is entered and continued pending the five-page 

submissions of the parties in light of the recent Supreme Court case, Young v. United 

53
Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015). Parties’ submissions are due seven days 

from the entry of this opinion. Count X is dismissed against the Board and Ayala, in 

both of her capacities. It is so ordered. 

____________________________________

Charles P. Kocoras

United States District Judge

 

Dated: 4/27/2015

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