OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

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The State ex rel. Watts, Appellee, v. Schottenstein Stores 

Corporation et al., Appellants. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp. 

(1993), Ohio St.3d .] 

Workers' compensation -- Firing may, but does not 

 automatically, bar wage loss compensation under R.C. 

 4123.56(B). 

 (No. 92-2399 -- Submitted September 14, 1993 -- Decided 

December 29, 1993.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 

91AP-1355. 

 Appellee-claimant, Brenda J. Watts, was injured on March 

2, 1987 while in the course of and arising from her employment 

with appellant Schottenstein Stores Corporation 

("Schottenstein"). Her workers' compensation claim was allowed 

and temporary total disability benefits were awarded. 

 In mid-1988, claimant began a rehabilitation program 

implemented by Upjohn HealthCare Services ("Upjohn"), a private 

firm hired by claimant's self-insured employer. On August 12, 

1988, claimant, Schottenstein, Upjohn and appellant Industrial 

Commission's Rehabilitation Division entered into a "Gradual 

Return to Work Contract." Under the contract's terms, 

Schottenstein agreed to allow claimant to return to work on a 

part-time basis and gradually work up to a full eight-hour 

day. The claimant was to resume full-time work on August 29, 

1988, with "no extension of limited hours unless specifically 

agreed to by employer, physician, claimant and the 

Rehabilitation Division." 

 Claimant's last day of part-time employment was ultimately 

extended to October 21, 1988, with full-time work to resume 

three days later. Claimant did not come to work on October 24 

and did not contact her employer, as company policy required. 

The same was true on October 25 and 26. Immediately 

thereafter, Schottenstein, consistent with its unexcused 

absence policy, fired claimant. 

 Approximately eleven months later, claimant moved for wage 

loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B). Accompanying her 

motion was the May 25, 1989 report of claimant's attending 
physician, Charles B. May, who restricted claimant to four 

hours per day of light duty work. He stated that claimant 

could not do her former duties without the time limitation 

imposed. Claimant also submitted sworn statements attesting to 

an inability to secure other work within her physical 

capabilities through July 31, 1990. Claimant began working as 

a self-employed housecleaner on August 1, 1990, but alleges 

that she is making considerably less than she did at 

Schottenstein. 

 The commission had claimant examined by Dr. H. Tom 

Reynolds. Aware that claimant had already completed 

rehabilitation, he concluded: 

 "I do feel the claimant could perform in an eight hour 

day, taking into consideration the job modifications that were 

made as a result of her rehab plan. I do not feel she could 

return to her previous level of employment without these job 

modifications, and this inability would be permanent." 

 A commission district hearing officer denied claimant's 

compensation request, writing: 

 "* * * Claimant was given a written job offer in August 

1988. The offer was presented in conjunction with the 

rehabilitation plan * * *. The offer entailed a return to work 

plan consisting of specific modifications of the duties of her 

former position, working only four hours a day for the first 4 

weeks, then working 8 hours a day thereafter. Claimant worked 

4 hours a day for 8 weeks and was then terminated for failing 

to report for 8 hour days[.] Dr. Reynolds indicates that the 

claimant is capable of working for 8 hours with the job 

modifications outlined in the rehabilitation plan. Therefore, 

the claimant is not suffering a wage loss. She was able to 

find work consistent with her physical capabilities. 

 "This order is based on the medical reports [sic] of: Dr. 

H.T. Reynolds." 

 The order was administratively affirmed. 

 Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of 

Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission 

abused its discretion in denying wage loss compensation. The 

court of appeals agreed, finding that Dr. Reynolds's report was 

not "some evidence" supporting the commission's decision. It 

also found that the order did not adequately explain its 

reasoning as State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio 

St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, required. The court issued a 

limited writ which vacated the commission's order and returned 

the cause to the commission for further consideration and an 

amended order. 

 This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of 

right. 

 

 Larrimer & Larrimer and David Swanson, for appellee. 

 Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Darrell R. Shepard, 

for appellant Schottenstein Stores Corp. 

 Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Industrial Commission. 

 

 Per Curiam. R.C. 4123.56(B) provides: 

 "Where an employee * * * suffers a wage loss as a result 

of returning to employment other than his former position of 
employment or as a result of being unable to find employment 

consistent with the claimant's physical capabilities, he shall 

receive compensation at sixty-six and two-thirds of his weekly 

wage loss not to exceed the statewide average weekly wage for a 

period not to exceed two hundred weeks." 

 Supplementing the statute, Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-32(D) 

reads: 

 "In injury claims in which the date of injury * * * is on 

or after August 22, 1986, the payment of compensation [f]or 

wage loss pursuant to division (B) of section 4123.56 of the 

Revised Code shall commence upon application with a finding of 

any of the following: 

 "(1) The employee, as a direct result of the allowed 

conditions in the claim, returns to employment other than his 

former position of employment and suffers a wage loss. 

 "(2) The employee returns to his former position but 

suffers a wage loss. 

 "(3) The employee, as a direct result of the allowed 

conditions in the claim, is unable to find work consistent with 

the employee's physical capabilities and suffers a wage loss." 

 A claim for wage loss compensation has two components - - 

actual wage loss and causal relationship between the allowed 

condition and the wage loss. The commission's order is 

misleading because it states that claimant experienced no wage 

loss. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Appellants do 

not dispute claimant's assertion that she was unemployed from 

the date she was terminated through July 31, 1990. Appellants 

also have not challenged her claim that self-employment has 

been less lucrative than her position with Schottenstein. 

Thus, there is no real disagreement that after she was 

terminated claimant made less than she would have at her old 

job. 

 Closer examination suggests that the commission instead 

based its decision on a perceived lack of causal relationship 

between claimant's injury and reduced wages. The commission 

essentially ruled that "but for" her employment discharge, 

claimant would still be at Schottenstein with no diminution of 

earnings. This finding raises a question of first impression 

for our consideration: Does a claimant's discharge from his or 

her position of employment automatically preclude R.C. 

4123.56(B) wage loss benefits? 

 Arguing in the affirmative, appellants rely on the 

voluntary employment separation principles that govern 

temporary total disability. Temporary total disability 

compensation has traditionally been denied to those who have 

voluntarily abandoned their former position of employment. 

See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Indus. 

Comm. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 145, 29 OBR 162, 504 N.E.2d 451; 

State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 

42, 517 N.E.2d 533; State ex rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. 

Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 531 N.E.2d 678; State ex rel. 

McGraw v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 137, 564 N.E.2d 

695. 

 We agree that firing can constitute a voluntary 

abandonment of the former position of employment. Although not 

generally consented to, discharge, like incarceration, is often 

a consequence of behavior that the claimant willingly 
undertook, and may thus take on a voluntary character. See 

Ashcraft. We decline, however, to extend these voluntary 

abandonment principles to R.C. 4123.56(B) wage loss because 

wage loss is broader in scope than temporary total disability. 

As explained by a Georgia court in United States Fid. & Guar. 

Ins. Co. v. Giles (1986), 177 Ga. App. 684, 685, 340 S.E.2d 

284, 285: 

 "It is not the ability to perform the particular job in 

which one was engaged at the time of injury which is the 

determining factor in a case such as this, but rather whether 

the claimant's inability to find any work for which he is 

suited by training and experience is a result of the injury 

suffered." (Emphasis sic.) 

 In Giles, the claimant, an insurance claims adjuster, 

resumed his duties after injury, only to quit in favor of 

better work. He was later laid off and was unable to find 

another job, prompting his claim for wage loss compensation. 

His former employer challenged claimant's compensation 

eligibility, arguing that his inability to secure other claims 

adjuster work was due, not to the injury, but to economic 

conditions. 

 The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the claimant's right 

to benefits. The court stressed claimant's construction 

experience, teaching degree and extensive coaching background, 

and held that "while [claimant's] inability to find work as a 

claims adjuster may not be related to his injury, his inability 

to find other work for which he is suited is related to his 

injury." (Emphasis sic.) Id., 77 Ga. App. at 685, 340 S.E.2d 

at 285. 

 We find particularly persuasive the reasoning advanced by 

the Minnesota Supreme Court in Marsolek v. George A. Hormel Co. 

(1989), 438 N.W.2d 922. There, after his industrial injuries, 

the claimant returned to work and was assigned to light duty. 

Claimant's activities during a later strike, however, prompted 

his dismissal. Unable to find other employment, claimant 

sought compensation for lost wages. 

 The high court found that claimant's firing did not 

automatically foreclose wage loss compensation, starting its 

analysis "with the basic tenet that an employer is liable for 

the payment of compensation benefits * * * when an employee 

suffers a wage loss that is attributable to a work injury." 

Id. at 923. 

 The court concluded: 

 "[B]y focusing so much effort on the * * * effect of the 

misconduct, the parties' attention has been diverted from the 

essential purpose of the [Workers' Compensation] Act, * * * 

which is to compensate injured workers for a wage loss that is 

attributable to a work injury. Accordingly, for purposes of 

clarification, we now hold that a justifiable discharge for 

misconduct suspends an injured employee's right to wage loss 

benefits; but the suspension of entitlement to wage loss 

benefits will be lifted once it has become demonstrable that 

the employee's work-related disability is the cause of the 

employee's inability to find or hold new employment. Such a 

determination should be made upon consideration of the totality 

of the circumstances * * *." Id. at 924. 

 Ohio's workers' compensation system was created "[f]or the 
purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their 

dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, 

occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment * * *." 

Section 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution. Like the court in 

Marsolek, supra, we find that those purposes are not furthered 

by denying a claimant even the opportunity to show the 

potential impact on the claimant's ability to do other work. 

Accordingly, we hold that firing may, but does not 

automatically, bar wage loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B). 

 In this case, the commission did not evaluate the effect 

that claimant's injury may have had on her ability to get or 

keep other employment. For this reason, we affirm the judgment 

of the court of appeals and return the cause to the commission 

for further consideration and amended order. 

 

 Judgment affirmed. 

 Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. 

Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.