IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 113 / 06–0667 

Filed August 29, 2008 

NATALIE FROMAN and 

RANDY FROMAN, 

 Appellees, 

vs. 

KEOKUK HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. and

KEOKUK HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. 

d/b/a K.A.M.E. PHARMACY, 

 Appellants. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee County (north division), 

Mary Ann Brown, Judge. 

 Defendants in a personal injury action appeal from the denial of their 

motion for change of venue. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Chad M. Von Kampen of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, 

P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants. 

George E. Wright of Wright Law Firm, Fort Madison, for appellees. 
2 

HECHT, Justice. 

 Defendants Keokuk Health Systems, Inc. and Keokuk Health 

Systems, Inc. d/b/a K.A.M.E. Pharmacy (jointly referred to as KHS) seek 

interlocutory review of the district court’s denial of their motion to change 

venue from the Iowa District Court for Lee County at Fort Madison to the 

Iowa District Court for Lee County at Keokuk. We conclude venue in this 

case is not proper in Fort Madison, and therefore reverse the district court’s 

ruling. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 In the earliest days of the State of Iowa, Lee County was the largest 

and most populous county in the state. See Trimble v. State, 2 Greene 404, 

409 (Iowa 1850). The expansive size of the county prompted the First 

General Assembly to create two locations for the Lee County District 

Court—Fort Madison and Keokuk. An act fixing the times and places of 

holding the District Court in the first judicial district, 1 G.A. (extra session) ch. 

52, §§ 1–4 (approved Jan. 24, 1848) (“1848 Act”); see State v. Ewart, 502 

N.W.2d 624, 625–26 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). This administrative 

anachronism continues today, with a district courthouse for Lee County in 

both Fort Madison and Keokuk. 

 On January 30, 2006, Natalie and Randy Froman filed a petition in 

the Iowa District Court for Lee County at Fort Madison (north division of Lee 

County), alleging KHS negligently filled a prescription for medicine. KHS 

filed a pre-answer motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.808(1) 

requesting a change of venue to the Iowa District Court for Lee County at 

Keokuk (south division of Lee County) where KHS’s pharmacy is located, 

and where the prescription was filled. KHS contended venue was proper 

only in Keokuk because the north and south Lee County divisions of the 

district court are different counties for venue purposes. The district court 
3 

denied the motion, concluding venue for this action is proper under Iowa 

Code section 616.18 (2005) in either the north Lee County or the south Lee 

County division. We granted interlocutory review. 

II. Scope of Review. 

 This case involves a legal determination of whether the plaintiffs filed 

their suit in a proper place under the venue provisions of Iowa Code chapter 

616. We review this matter for correction of errors at law. Richards v. 

Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., 699 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Iowa 2005). 

III. Discussion. 

We are called upon in this case to construe the term “county” in Iowa 

Code section 616.18, the personal injury venue statute which provides: 

Actions arising out of injuries to a person . . . may be brought 

in the county in which the defendant . . . is a resident or in the 

county in which the injury or damage is sustained. 

Id. § 616.18.1 It is undisputed KHS resides in Lee County for venue 

purposes. Thus, under the plain language of section 616.18, venue was 

proper in Lee County. The Fromans urge us to end our analysis there, 

permitting suit in either division of Lee County. 

 KHS contends, however, the term “county,” as used in section 616.18, 

should be construed to refer to each division in a county with more than 

one judicial division. In support of its contention, KHS relies on a provision 

within Iowa Code chapter 607A, the code chapter which prescribes 

 1The parties agree section 616.18 is the relevant venue statute in this case. 

Although we assume this to be true because the parties have not asserted another statute 

controls, this court previously held section 616.17 “is controlling in those cases where the 

‘injury or damages’ exception in section 616.18 does not apply.” Tull v. Honda Research & 

Dev., 469 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 1991). Section 616.17, the general personal action venue 

statute, requires that personal actions “must be brought in a county in which some of the 

defendants actually reside” or, if no defendant resides in the state, a county in which a 

defendant may be found. In other words, “the only time section 616.18 would apply is 

when the injury or damage is sustained in a county where none of the defendants resides.” 

Tull, 469 N.W.2d at 686. The record does not disclose where the injury or damage alleged 

by the Fromans occurred. 
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procedures for the selection of jurors. Section 607A.23 provides in relevant 

part: 

In counties which are divided for judicial purposes, and in 

which court is held at more than one place, each division shall 

be treated as a separate county, and the grand and petit jurors, 

selected to serve in the respective courts, shall be drawn from 

the division of the county in which the court is held and at 

which the persons are required to serve. 

Id. § 607A.23 (emphasis added). 

 In determining what meaning the legislature ascribed to the term 

“county” in sections 607A.23 and 616.18, it is useful to review the historical 

background of the judicial divisions within the Lee County District Court 

and the development of the relevant venue statute. The practice of holding 

district court proceedings in both Fort Madison and Keokuk was codified 

soon after Iowa achieved statehood. In the 1848 Act, the legislature 

prescribed court would be held in both cities commencing February 1, 

1848. The legislation further provided the “district courts shall have 

concurrent jurisdiction in all civil causes in said county, except appeals 

from justices of the peace in the city of Keokuk and in the townships of 

Jackson, Des Moines, and Montrose.”2 We upheld the validity of the 

judicial division of Lee County in Trimble, 2 Greene at 409, noting the 

division “only affect[ed] the internal and municipal organization and 

interests of the county.” The current version of the Iowa Code dictates that 

“[i]n any county having two county seats, court shall be held at each.” Iowa 

Code § 602.6105(2).3 

 2Criminal cases were treated differently. The district court in Keokuk was to have 

exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases in the City of Keokuk and in the townships of 

Jackson, Des Moines, and Montrose; and the district court in the City of Fort Madison was 

to have exclusive jurisdiction in all other criminal cases filed in Lee County. 1848 Act 

§§ (3), (4). 

3Lee County is currently the only county in Iowa with two county seats, and 

consequently, this general statute applies only to Lee County. 
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 The venue statute that is the subject of this case has its origins in the 

1851 Code of Iowa. Section 1701 of the 1851 Code provided: 

Except where otherwise provided, personal actions must be 

brought in a county wherein some of the defendants actually 

reside. But if none of them have any residence within this 

state they may be sued in any county wherein either of them 

may be found. 

The 1851 venue chapter did not expressly address venue in counties with 

multiple judicial divisions. See Iowa Code ch. 101 (1851). Nor was there a 

reference to multiple-court counties in the jury selection chapter of the 

1851 Code. See generally id. ch. 96; State v. Higgins, 121 Iowa 19, 21–22, 

95 N.W. 244, 246 (1903) (noting, as of 1903, there was no provision in the 

Iowa Code as to the territory from which a jury should be drawn). Despite 

the lack of an express statutory grant of authority for such an arrangement, 

it appears the practice in Lee County in 1851 was to draw jurors only from 

the division in which the case was heard. Trimble, 2 Greene at 409. We 

held in Trimble this practice did not violate the Iowa Constitution’s 

guarantee of a speedy and public trial by jury. Id. at 410. The practice was 

later codified in the predecessor to section 607A.23. See Iowa Code § 335-b 

(1913). 

When considered together, section 616.18 and section 607A.23 create 

ambiguity and pose the question we must resolve in this case: Whether the 

legislature intended the two judicial divisions in Lee County to be 

considered two “counties” in the determination of proper venue under 

section 616.18. See Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 

N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002) (noting ambiguity “may arise from specific 

language used in a statute or when the provision at issue is considered in 

the context of the entire statute or related statutes”). Put another way, we 

must decide whether the legislature intended the north and south divisions 
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of the Lee County District Court be considered separate counties not only 

for the selection of jurors, but also for the determination of proper venue. 

Our resolution of this issue is aided by well-established rules of 

statutory construction. We examine not only the language of the relevant 

statutes, but also their underlying purposes and policies, as well as the 

consequences stemming from different interpretations. Iowa Comprehensive 

Petrol. Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 

359, 364 (Iowa 2000). When possible, we seek to construe venue statutes 

so as to minimize forum shopping. Richards, 699 N.W.2d at 683. 

We have noted “the purpose of venue statutes ‘is to prevent the 

hardship and inconvenience to which a defendant may be subjected by 

having to defend himself in [a] county in which he [does not reside].’ ” 

Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Bergstrom, 703 N.W.2d 415, 422 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 

State ex rel. Klabacka v. Charles, 152 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Wis. 1967)). A 

person’s “interest in not being sued in the wrong county [is] an important 

social value.” Id. at 421. 

In determining the meaning of the term “county” as used in the venue 

chapter, we recognize venue controls the geographic vicinage of the 

potential jury pool. Particularly in the modern world where travel from one 

end of a county to another does not usually present a significant hardship 

for litigants, the identity of the potential jurors is perhaps the single-most 

important factor affecting a litigant’s choice among alternative proper 

venues. In recognition of the strong correlation between venue and the 

selection of members of the jury pool, our rules of civil procedure allow a 

party to obtain a change of venue “[i]f . . . the inhabitants of the county are 

so prejudiced against the moving party or if an adverse party has such an 

undue influence over the county’s inhabitants that the movant cannot 

obtain a fair trial.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.801(3); see also Ewart, 502 N.W.2d at 
7 

626 (holding where a trial court found a fair jury could not be found in 

South Lee County, order directing jurors be drawn from North Lee County 

effected a change of venue). This substantial interrelation between venue 

and the selection of jurors counsels in favor of considering the impact of 

chapter 607A when determining the meaning of similar terms in chapter 

616. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the north and south divisions 

of Lee County are separate “counties” for purposes of determining proper 

venue. 

The principles and policies underlying the venue statute support our 

conclusion. Venue statutes are intended to promote the convenience of 

litigants. Richards, 699 N.W.2d at 682 (“[I]t must be remembered that 

venue statutes are statutes of convenience.”). As between the parties to 

personal actions, the legislature has stated a venue preference for resident 

defendants by requiring such actions be brought in a county in which some 

of the defendants actually reside unless no defendant resides in Iowa. Iowa 

Code § 616.17. Although KHS makes no serious claim it would experience 

hardship if it must defend this suit in Fort Madison rather than in nearby 

Keokuk, we have previously acknowledged the judicial division of Lee 

County results in at least a modicum of additional convenience “to 

attorneys, court personnel, litigants, and potential jurors.” State v. Morgan, 

559 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Iowa 1997) (discussing Iowa Code section 607A.25). 

As the Fromans make no claim in this case their injuries were 

sustained elsewhere, venue in this case is based on the portion of section 

616.18 which correlates venue to the defendant’s place of residence. Under 

the circumstances presented here, section 616.18 plainly favors venue in 

the forum closest to the defendant’s residence. In this case, that forum is in 

Keokuk, where the defendants reside. See Gumbert v. Sheehan, 200 Iowa 

1310, 1314, 206 N.W. 604, 605 (1925) (stating matters of venue “require 
8 

that the litigation should be submitted as nearly as possible to the 

residence of the parties”). It would be anomalous to allow a party to use the 

portion of a statute designed primarily to provide the most convenience to 

the defendant to force the defendant into a less-convenient forum, even if 

the inconvenience would be slight. 

Finally, the construction of section 616.18 we adopt today prevents 

forum shopping in Lee County. By filing suit in Fort Madison, the Fromans 

not only chose where in Lee County the case would be heard, but by whom

it would be heard because section 607A.23 requires jurors be drawn from 

the division in which the court is held. As he candidly conceded at oral 

argument, the Fromans’ counsel perceived a tactical advantage in having 

the case heard by a jury drawn from the Fort Madison area, where he 

resided, rather than a jury drawn from the Keokuk area, where the 

defendants reside and do business. The plaintiffs’ motivation for choosing 

Fort Madison, then, was unrelated to the convenience to the litigants, and 

therefore did not advance the policies underlying section 616.18. 

Regardless of whether the possible tactical advantage gained by the 

Fromans as a consequence of litigating this matter in Fort Madison rather 

than Keokuk is real or merely perceived, we decline to construe the venue 

chapter to encourage forum shopping. Richards, 699 N.W.2d at 683. 

We therefore conclude each division of Lee County is a “county” for 

purposes of the determination of proper venue under section 616.18. As 

KHS resides in the south division of Lee County, and the Fromans make no 

claim their injuries were suffered elsewhere, venue in this case is not proper 

in the north division. KHS made a timely motion for change of venue to the 

south division. The district court erred in failing to order the requested 

change. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808(1) (providing where an action is brought in 
9 

the wrong county and a defendant moves for change of venue before filing 

an answer, “the court shall order the change at plaintiff’s costs”). 

IV. Conclusion. 

 Proper venue for the Fromans’ suit is in the south division of the Lee 

County District Court. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of the 

defendant’s motion to change venue, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.