alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, Allan L. Bridgford, Chairman of Bridgford Foods Corporation (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:



|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended July 8, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 780(d)); and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: August 22, 2005



/s/ Allan L. BridgfordAllan L. Bridgford, Chairman(Principal Executive Officer)
### §8913. Assistance to build local capacity in agricultural biosecurity planning, preparedness, and response

#### (a) Advanced training programs

#### (1) Grant assistance

The Secretary shall establish a competitive grant program to support the development and expansion of advanced training programs in agricultural biosecurity planning and response for food science professionals and veterinarians.

#### (2) Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this subsection—

(A) such sums as are necessary for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013; and

(B) $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2023.

#### (b) Assessment of response capability

#### (1) Grant and loan assistance

The Secretary shall establish a competitive grant and low-interest loan assistance program to assist States in assessing agricultural disease response capability.

#### (2) Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection—

(A) $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013; and

(B) $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2023.

(Pub. L. 110–234, title XIV, §14113, May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1455; Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title XIV, §14113, June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 2217; Pub. L. 113–79, title VII, §7502, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 900; Pub. L. 115–334, title VII, §7402, Dec. 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 4817.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Pub. L. 110–234 and Pub. L. 110–246 enacted identical sections. Pub. L. 110–234 was repealed by section 4(a) of Pub. L. 110–246.

#### Amendments

2018—Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 115–334, §7402(1), substituted "2023" for "2018".

Subsec. (b)(2)(B). Pub. L. 115–334, §7402(2), substituted "2023" for "2018".

2014—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 113–79, §7502(1), struck out "such sums as may be necessary" after "Secretary", substituted "subsection—" for "subsection for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012.", and added subpars. (A) and (B).

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 113–79, §7502(2), substituted "are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection—" for "is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012." and added subpars. (A) and (B).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Enactment of this section and repeal of Pub. L. 110–234 by Pub. L. 110–246 effective May 22, 2008, the date of enactment of Pub. L. 110–234, see section 4 of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as a note under section 8701 of this title.

#### Definition of "Secretary"

"Secretary" as meaning the Secretary of Agriculture, see section 8701 of this title.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 5, 2014

t0825 

# Order

Clerk September 5, 2014

148551

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGA N,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 148551

COA: 310550

Branch CC: 10

- 109467

- FC

JAMES CHARLES WILCOX,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 26, 2013

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the

case of People v Lockridge (Docket No. 149073) is pending on appeal before this Court

a nd that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for

leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the

decision in that case.
#### 1615.070 Negotiation authority.

The authority to negotiate FEHB contracts is conferred by 5 U.S.C. 8902.

[70 FR 31379, June 1, 2005]
#### Mormile Bros. Inc., Respondent, v Prairie Construction Corp. et al., Appellants.

— In an action upon three promissory notes, commenced by service of a summons and notice of motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3213), defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 1, 1978, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and (2) a judgment of the same court, entered thereon on May 3, 1978. Appeal from the order dismissed (see *Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248). Judgment modified, on the law, by deleting so much of the decretal paragraph thereof as grants plaintiff judgment against the individual defendant. As so modified, judgment affirmed, and, as between plaintiff and the individual defendant, action severed and motion for summary judgment against said defendant denied. Plaintiff is awarded one bill of $50 costs and disbursements. Defendant John Magadino contends that his indorsement on the promissory notes made by the corporate defendant and payable to the plaintiff, was to accommodate the payee in its efforts to *701discount the instruments. Assuming the truth of this assertion, defendant Magadino, as an accommodation party, would not be liable on the notes to the plaintiff payee, the party accommodated (see Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-415, subd [5]). Moreover, since the plaintiff is not a holder in due course, parol testimony is admissible to establish the nature of the accommodating indorsement (see Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-415, subd [3]). Accordingly, a triable issue of fact is presented as to this defendant, which precludes granting summary judgment as against him. Titone, J. P., Suozzi, Gulotta and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
#### HUCK v. BISCHOFF.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 22, 1903.)

1. Appeal—Objections.

Where no exception was taken to any admission or exclusion of evidence, objection cannot be raised on appeal.

2. Sales— Warranty—Breach—Waiver.

Where the purchaser of a warranted machine retained it after discovery of defects, and made payments on the price because the seller promised to make good the defects, which promise was not fulfilled, there was no waiver of the breach of warranty.

¶ 1. See Appeal and Error, vol. 2, Cent Dig. § 1503,

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Third District.

Action by Francis A. Huele against Emil Bischoff. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

Gifford, Stearns & Hobbs, for appellant.

James A. Dayton, for respondent.

GILDERSLEEVE, J.

The action is on a promissory note. The defense is that the note was given to plaintiff’s assignor for a gas machine, which said assignor warranted had been accepted by the Board of Fire Underwriters and was on their accepted list, and also that said assignor guarantied that said machine was safe and reliable, and made in a workmanlike manner from heavy, galvanized sheet steel. It was conceded at the trial that the machine in question was not on the accepted list of the Board of Underwriters, and defendant also •presented evidence to show that the machine was unsafe, unreliable, and worthless. The justice gave judgment .for defendant.

On appeal, plaintiff urges improper admission of evidence, a waiver ■of the breach of warranty, and that the judgment was against the *174evidence. As the first point was not raised at the trial, and as no exception was taken by plaintiff to any admission or exclusion of evidence, it is unavailable on appeal. As to the alleged waiver of the breach of warranty, defendant’s evidence satisfactorily shows that if he kept the machine, and paid money on account of the purchase price, after discovering the defects of the machine, it was because plaintiff’s assignor, promised to make good the defects. This promise, however, was not fulfilled. There was no waiver of the breach of warranty. As for the weight of evidence, we find sufficient testimony to sustain the finding of the justice.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### Georgia E. Fehlhaber, Appellant, v. Fred R. Fehlhaber, Respondent.

In an action to set aside a separation agreement for alleged fraud, and *718for a judicial separation, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order' of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated May 2, 1960, denying her motion for examination of the defendant husband before trial. Order affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Beldoek, Acting P. J., Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
§ 89.4 Policy. In accordance with the sense of Congress as set forth in section 539 of Public Law 111-84, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010” and DoD 5500.07-R, “Joint Ethics Regulations (JER)” (available at *http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550007r.pdf*), it is DoD policy to support the intent of the Compact by reducing the difficulty children of military families (referred to in this part as “children” or “the child”) have in transferring between school systems because of frequent moves and deployment of their parents. DoD will support the Compact by: ( a ) Designating military liaisons, by position, to State Councils of member States, the DoDEA Committee, and the MIC3.
( b ) Implementing the intent of the Compact in the DoDEA to ensure: ( 1 ) Timely enrollment of children in school so they are not penalized due to: ( i ) Late or delayed transfers of education records from the previous school district(s); or
( ii ) Differences in entrance or age requirements.
( 2 ) Placement of children in educational courses and programs, including special educational services, so they are not penalized due to differences in attendance requirements, scheduling, sequencing, grading, or course content.
( 3 ) Flexible qualification and eligibility of children so they can have an equitable chance at participation in extracurricular, academic, athletic, and social activities.
( 4 ) Graduation within the same timeframe as the children's peers.
( c ) Promoting through DoDEA and the Military Departments: ( 1 ) Flexibility and cooperation among SEAs or LEAs, DoDEA, Military Departments, parents, and children to achieve educational success.
( 2 ) Coordination among the various State agencies, LEAs, and military installations regarding the State's participation in the Compact.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Angel Casimey, Appellant.

[834 NYS2d 103]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. McLaughlin, J.), rendered April 12, 2005, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 4 to 8 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record *(see People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). The police received a detailed anonymous tip that a person who precisely matched defendant’s description was selling drugs at a particular location, and they also spoke to a security guard at the scene, who stated that he had observed defendant exchanging objects for money. This was more than sufficient to support the hearing court’s finding that the police had, at the very least, a founded suspicion of criminality, and were thus authorized to exercise their common-law right of inquiry *(see People v Moore,*6 NY3d 496, 498 [2006]). The officers merely asked defendant to stop, which, standing alone, did not constitute a seizure *(see People v Bora,*83 NY2d 531, 535-536 [1994]), and they did not go beyond the bounds of a common-law inquiry, which permits the police to ask whether the person being questioned is willing to consent to a search *(see People v Hollman,*79 NY2d 181, 191-192 [1992]). The Feople established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant voluntarily consented to the search *(see generally People v Gonzalez,*39 NY2d 122, 128-131 [1976]). We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining arguments. Concur—Andrias, J.E, Friedman, Marlow, Williams and Catterson, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Meyers, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered June 21, 1977, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. It was error to allow two of the three identification witnesses for the People to testify without being able to make an in-court identification of defendant or to adequately state their present recollections of a past identification (see CPL 60.25; *People v Brown,*60 AD2d 890). We cannot say on the basis of this record that there is no reasonable possibility that the errors might have contributed to defendant’s conviction (see *People v Von Werne,*41 NY2d 584, 588; *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 237). Furthermore, it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to grant the short adjournment requested to enable the defendant to procure the attendance of the subpoenaed witness who had been in court during part of the trial, but did not appear on the day she was called to testify. Although the application for a material witness order did not procedurally comply with *861the requirements of the statute (CPL 620.30), the court, in the interest of justice, nevertheless should have granted the application. Hopkins, J. P., Suozzi, Rabin and Shapiro, JJ., concur.
Case: 1:12-cv-00712 Document #: 6 Filed: 02/08/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:37
Case: 1:12-cv-00712 Document #: 6 Filed: 02/08/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:38
Case: 1:12-cv-00712 Document #: 6 Filed: 02/08/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:39
#### 11.702 Construction contracts.

Construction contracts may authorize a variation in estimated quantities of unit-priced items. When the variation between the estimated quantity and the actual quantity of a unit-priced item is more than plus or minus 15 percent, an equitable adjustment in the contract price shall be made upon the demand of either the Government or the contractor. The contractor may request an extension of time if the quantity variation is such as to cause an increase in the time necessary for completion. The contracting officer must receive the request in writing within 10 days from the beginning of the period of delay. However, the contracting officer may extend this time limit before the date of final settlement of the contract. The contracting officer shall ascertain the facts and make any adjustment for extending the completion date that the findings justify.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 4, 2018

No. 04-18-00700-CV

IN RE STEPHEN PATRICK BLACK,

From the 274th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV-15-1805

Honorable Gary L. Steel, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Marialyn P. Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 

Relator’s motion to admit supplemental exhibits is granted.

It is so ORDERED on this 4th day of December, 2018.

PER CURIAM

 ATTESTED TO: _______________________________

 KEITH E. HOTTLE,

 Clerk of Court
### §98. Fees and charges for naval stores inspection and related services; establishment, collection, etc.; authorization of appropriations; administrative expenses

(a) The Secretary of Agriculture shall fix and cause to be collected fees and charges for the establishment of standards under section 93 of this title and for examinations, analyses, classifications, and other services under section 94 of this title which shall cover, as nearly as practicable, the costs of providing such services and standards as the Secretary shall deem necessary, including administrative and supervisory costs. Such fees and charges, when collected, shall be credited to the current appropriation account that incurs such costs and shall be available without fiscal year limitation to pay the expenses of the Secretary incident to providing such services and standards under this chapter. Fees and charges shall be assessed and collected from processors and warehousers of naval stores, and inspection and related services shall be suspended or denied to any such processor or warehouser upon failure to timely pay the fees and charges assessed.

(b) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the enforcement and administration of this chapter.

(Mar. 3, 1923, ch. 217, §8, 42 Stat. 1436; Pub. L. 97–35, title I, §159(a)(2), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 376.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1981—Pub. L. 97–35 added subsec. (a). Former unlettered provisions were designated subsec. (b) and, as so designated, struck out authorization of the Secretary to employ personnel and make administrative expenditures.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1981 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–35 effective Oct. 1, 1981, see section 159(b) of Pub. L. 97–35, set out as a note under section 94 of this title.
### §§1440a to 1440d. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Sections, act June 30, 1953, ch. 162, §§1–4, 67 Stat. 108–110, which authorized naturalization of persons who served in the Armed Forces after June 29, 1950, and not later than July 1, 1955, were omitted as obsolete, since the provisions of section 1 of act June 30, 1953, required the petition for naturalization to be filed not later than December 31, 1955. See sections 1440 and 1440e of this title.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                FEDERAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION OF PUERTO RICO, INC.
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Federal Mortgage Corporation of
Puerto Rico, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December
31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter Porath, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Peter Porath
----------------------------------
Peter Porath

President, Chief Executive Officer
February 17, 2006
Exhibit 32(d)

CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
FOR PPL ENERGY SUPPLY, LLC'S 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2004

In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of PPL Energy Supply, LLC (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Covered Report"), I, the principal financial officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certify that:

| |  | The Covered Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                   
| | - | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |   |                                                                                                                                                             
| |  | The information contained in the Covered Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|Date:  March 1, 2005 | /s/ James E. AbelJames E. Abel
        Vice President and Treasurer
        PPL Energy Supply, LLC
|-------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Rose Laurelli et al., Respondents, v Memorial Hospital for Cancer & Allied Diseases et al., Appellants.

In a medical malpractice action, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated February 9, 1978, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the dismissal of this action. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements, on condition that plaintiffs’ attorney personally pay the sum of $1,000 to the defendants within 20 days after service upon plaintiffs of a copy of the order made hereon, together with notice of entry thereof; in the event such condition is not complied with, order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. The examinations before trial shall proceed at such times and places as shall be fixed in written notices of not less than 10 days each to be given by the parties, or at such other times and places as the parties may agree. In the light of the showing by the plaintiffs that their action has merit and that the delay has been due in large part to the severe and extended illness of their attorney, and the fact that defendants will not be prejudiced by the delay, Special Term was within its discretion in restoring the matter to the Trial Calendar. Nevertheless, since plaintiffs’ attorney was acutely ill, he should have suggested that they seek other counsel, rather than jeopardize their rights in this action. For his part in this protracted litigation, plaintiffs’ attorney is directed to personally pay $1,000 to the defendants for their costs in opposing the motion to vacate the prior dismissal. Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, Titone, Hawkins and O’Connor, JJ., concur.