Introduction; plaintiff's motion for judgment of its findings of facts and conclusions of law 

The plaintiff titled his 6/24/16 findings of facts and conclusions of law as a motion for 

judgment because the plaintiff believes that the defendants failed to meet their burden on their 

affirmative defense and that judgment can be entered against the defendants. The Honorable 

Judge Dow stated to the plaintiff, "one of your conclusions of law could be the expert should be 

stricken." 5/4/16 tr., 4:19, 20, Exh. XXXVI. Based upon the defendants failing to present 

significant facts to meet their burden to prove prong #1 and then prong #2, after reviewing 

everything, the plaintiff believed that the format he presented was the better option to proceed to 

the next step. Indeed, this Court stated, "I don't particularly care if you do these in paragraph 

format or you write prose. It doesn't matter to me, it's all the same." 5/4/16 tr., 1; 6:2-4, Exh. 

XXXVI. Regarding the plaintiff's previous motions to strike the economist and his report, this 

Court stated, "most of what you have here is eminently usable the next time around." id at 10:5.

The plaintiff's 6/24/16 brief has numerous facts and conclusions of law. This Court stated

that this case is "complicated" having "a lot of legal issues." 5/4/16 tr, 2:23, Exh. XXXVI. 

Despite the defendant's arguments, the 5/12/16 order did not require a particular format, but 

presented "an example of an effective format." Doc 270. The 7/5/16 order acknowledges the 

plaintiff's motion for judgment as the his findings of facts and conclusions of law. Doc 281. 

Instead of focusing on the substance of the plaintiff's 6/24/16 motion for 

judgment/findings of fact and conclusions of law and despite Judge Dow's above remarks 

regarding paragraph or prose etc., the defendants focus on the form, the format. Indeed, they 

spend nearly the first 5 pages on it and paragraphs throughout their brief. The defendant's attack 

on the format might demonstrate that the defendants know that their affirmative defense is weak. 

This is particularly true based upon the public policy the plaintiff discusses throughout his 

6/24/16 and 7/8/16 briefs to make victimized plaintiffs whole. The jury already determined that 

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the defendants broke the law. To overcome this important public policy, the defendants had to 

prove prong #1, that is, identifying an employer having a real, actual opening for substantially 

equivalent employment who would have hired the plaintiff had he applied. In their 7/8/16 brief, 

the defendants referred to this as prong #2. Some courts do also. However, even those courts 

hold that unless the defendants prove substantially equivalent employment, the analysis ends and

judgment must be entered against the defendants. For this reason, the plaintiff refers to the 

substantially equivalent employment prong as prong #1. Neither in the defendant's 7/8/16 nor 

6/24/16 brief do the defendants identify a single employer to meet their burden under prong #1. 

Thus, this Court might be inclined to enter judgment against the defendants at this point. 

Notably, though the defendants bear the burden to prove prong #1, the defendants scarcely use 

the words, substantially equivalent employment, much less prove it. This Court might find that 

the defendant's failure further demonstrates that the defendants know that their affirmative 

defense is deficient and weak.

Even if the defendants had proved prong #1, arguendo, the defendants failed to meet their

burden regarding prong #2. Prong #2 involves the defendants proving that the plaintiff did not 

take reasonable steps to mitigate. This Court might notice that the defendants explicitly and 

implicitly attempt to shift this burden to the plaintiff, e.g., the plaintiff did not prove this, did not 

prove that, but the burden rests solely with the defendants. After all, it is their affirmative 

defense. Even though at the 4/16 hearing, the plaintiff presented evidence of his many attempts 

to find work, the plaintiff did not have to as it was not his burden. Rather, the defendants had the 

burden to present evidence that the plaintiff did not mitigate his damages. This Court might find 

that the defendants did not. Indeed, the defendants did not even refute the plaintiff's 4/16 

testimony regarding his efforts. 

Instead, the defendants attempt to attack the plaintiff's credibility with peripheral, 

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collateral irrelevant issues but "the lack of credibility...is insufficient to meet the defendant's 

burden of proof". Floca v. Homecare, 849 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing District 

Court’s holding that plaintiff, a supervisory RN, was required to accept a regular RN position).

This Court may find itself wondering if the defendant's personal attacks also demonstrate that the

defendants have known that their defense is weak. Also, this Court may find that the defendants 

based their arguments on inadmissible hearsay and speculation, again, demonstrating that the 

defendants have known that their defense is weak.

Regarding the defendant's argument, p. 2, that the plaintiff did not cite the trial transcript 

relating to the jury trial, for 4 years from the filing of the complaint in 2011 until the 12/15 trial, 

the plaintiff bore the burden of proof. The plaintiff met his burden of proof and the jury returned 

a verdict for the plaintiff on all counts and against all defendants. In phase II, the defendants bore

the burden of proof. Therefore, it was unnecessary to cite the jury trial transcript. Indeed, the 

defendants point to nothing that should have been cited.

As far as Phase II, in the plaintiff's 7/8/16 brief, the plaintiff cited the 4/16 transcripts 

because they supported the plaintiff's arguments how the defendants continued to fail to meet 

their burden. The plaintiff did not cite the transcript in the plaintiff's 6/24/16 brief because His 

Honor had held at the 4/16 Phase 2 hearing that economist, Malcolm Cohen, would be restricted 

in his testimony to what was contained in his report. Therefore, the plaintiff utilized the 

economist's report to demonstrate that the defendants failed to meet their burden to prove prong 

#1 and then prong #2. The Honorable Judge Dow asserted, "if I exclude their expert or some part

of their expert testimony, then they would be without an expert on the issue or probably will not 

prevail on the points that the expert is trying to make." 5/4/16 tr., 10:20-24, Exh. XXXVI.

Despite the defendant's argument, the 4/16 hearing was only had because the defendants 

filed an affirmative defense. Otherwise, the plaintiff's damages could have been resolved on 

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briefs. The damages are not overly complicated. The defendants paid the plaintiff minimum 

wage. The defendants did not provide benefits, e.g., medical insurance, sick days etc. Pltff’s 

7/20/16 aff., ¶2, Exh. XXXII. Indeed, but for the defendant’s defense, upon the plaintiff 

submitting the calculations to this Court, this Court could have then informed the plaintiff what 

further information this Court wanted or needed to promote and protect the important public 

policy to make the plaintiff whole. Therefore, the only reason why the plaintiff and this Court 

had to be at a two day hearing was because the defendants insisted on pursuing their affirmative 

defense, despite the plaintiff’s 1/4/16 motion demonstrating how the defendant's defense failed.

The law set the standard which this Court uses when exercising its discretion

As stated, throughout the plaintiff's 6/24/16 and 7/8/16 briefs, the plaintiff discusses the 

public policy which this Court must use and protect when exercising its discretion to enforce 

equity. See, e.g., 7/8/16 brief, p. 4. Disregarding this well-established public policy and standard 

on p. 24, the defendants argue that the choice of the plaintiff's attorney of the format for the 

6/24/16 brief demonstrates that the "equities" weigh in the defendant's favor, but the defendants 

cite no case law, thus waiving the argument. Long v.Teachers, 585 F.3d 344,349 (7th Cir. 2009) 

("[U]nsupported and underdeveloped arguments are waived"); Echo v. Timberland, 661 F.3d 

959, 967 (7th Cir. 2011) (3 sentence argument of breach of contract without explaining how 

contract was breached was “too skeletal, and...a waiver”). Also, the defendants cite no definition 

of "equity."1 As stated, the only equity that the Court enforces is to make the plaintiff whole as if 

the discrimination, harassment and retaliation by the defendants had never occurred. After 

scrutinizing whether and how the defendants failed to meet their burden to overcome this 

important public policy, based upon the jury's verdict against all defendants, the Honorable 

1 The defendants have belatedly, and inappropriately, argued "unclean hands", but some might argue that the 

defendants approached this Court with unclean hands. The same attorneys have represented Rosebud, Carlos 

Castaneda and Rocky Mendoza. This might be a conflict of interest, perhaps illegal or unethical. Also, if 

Rosebud paid for Castaneda and Mendoza's attorney's fees and/or agreed to indemnify them --material benefits--

such might be a conflict of interest. Indeed, arguably, Rosebud has purchased the testimony of Castaneda and 

Mendoza, crucial witnesses, to testify in the manner desired by Rosebud.

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Judge Dow might decide to choose to proceed to enter judgment against the defendants. 

Though the plaintiff must produce some evidence of his damages, the only real burden that

exists in phase II rests with the defendants to prove prongs 1 and then 2

The plaintiff presented caselaw, some of which defendants cite on p. 7, that the plaintiff 

must present evidence of his damages. The plaintiff's responsibility to present evidence is not 

onerous, and indeed, light. "No mathematical certainty is required in the computation. See Bowe 

v. Colgate...416 F.2d 711, 721 (7 Cir. 1969)" as cited in Kaplan v. Intern., 525 F. 2d 1354, 1363 

(9th Cir.1975). As mathematical certainty is unnecessary, Judge Dow can use any formula to 

approximate the amount owed to the victimized plaintiff because of the defendant's illegalities. 

NLRB v. Pilot Freight, 604 F. 2d 375, 378 (5th Cir.1979). This public policy to make victimized 

plaintiffs whole is so important that the Seventh Circuit will remand the case so that the plaintiff 

can present further evidence for his damages as cited in the defendant's citation of Taylor v. 

Philips, 593 F. 2d 783 (7th Cir.1979). If The Honorable Judge Dow needs any further 

information to promote this important public policy, the plaintiff will be happy to provide it. 

Starceski v. Westinghouse, 54 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995) (“risk of lack of certainty 

with...projections of lost income must be borne by the wrongdoer, not the victim”).

Promoting public policy, the law requires that all favorable inferences must be given to 

the plaintiff and against the defendants which violated the law as determined by the jury. In the 

plaintiff's citation of Coleman v. Lane, 949 F.Supp. 604, 608, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1996), which the 

defendants also cite, the court held:

Once a plaintiff has established that his employer unlawfully terminated his 

employment, a presumption in favor of full relief arises. Gaddy...884 F.2d 312, 318 (7th

Cir.1989). The plaintiff must establish, nonetheless, the amount of damages (in the form

of lost salary and benefits) to which he is entitled. The proper measure of back pay 

damages is the 'difference between actual earnings for the period and those which [the 

plaintiff] would have earned absent the discrimination by defendant.' Taylor, 593 F.2d 

at 786 (emphasis supplied). Although Plaintiff does not give an in-depth assessment of 

his calculations, he does indicate the amount he believes he would have earned had 

there been no wrongful termination — $94,261.95 as of October 24, 1996. He also 

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reduces this figure by $6,000 representing his various income offsets. (Pl.'s Back Pay 

Petition, at 8.) Defendant, which presumably has superior access to information 

concerning the pay and benefits Plaintiff would have earned had he remained employed 

at CHA, has not rebutted Plaintiff's calculations. The court gives Plaintiff the benefit of 

the doubt and finds that his request suffices as a threshold showing of damages owed.

As in Coleman, in Smith vs. Rosebud, the plaintiff presented "the amount he believes he 

would have earned had there been no wrongful termination" $198,203.46 for back wages, 

$550,819 for future wages, Exh. XVIII, with prejudgment interest and negative tax consequences

to be computed by the parties after this Court's ruling. The defendants provided no medical 

insurance, no sick days or any other benefits, (Plff's 7/20/16 aff. ¶2, Exh. XXXII) though the trial

evidence demonstrated that Rosebud has a large complex with many trucks with a security guard

at the entrance, Plff's 7/20/16 aff. ¶3, Exh. XXXII, and grosses $36 million annually. Aff. of 

pltff's atty., Exh. XXXV. Notably, the defendants have little to no argument--with specifics--

about how the plaintiff calculated his damages. Thus, this Court might deem that the defendants 

have admitted them. The defendants, p. 8, do argue that the plaintiff did not present "record 

evidence", but failed to cite any case law that such is not unnecessary; thus waiving the 

argument. Pelfresne v. Village, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.1990) (failing to cite “pertinent 

authority. . . forfeits the point. [The court] will not do his research for him.")

Despite the defendant's argument, the plaintiff's 6/24/16 brief discussed his damages. As 

the plaintiff had presented estimates of his damages in the FPO, supra, p. 1-36 of the 6/24/16 

brief discussed how the defendant's affirmative defense failed. Consequently, the next step in the 

analysis would be to calculate the plaintiff's damages. The plaintiff discussed this in p. 37-40 

which contain his findings of fact and, along with the exhibits, conclusions of law. id. 

As in Coleman, the defendants have superior knowledge of what the plaintiff would have 

earned, but for the constructive discharge. As in Coleman, the defendants have not rebutted the 

plaintiff's hourly rate in his chart, Exh. XVIII. Indeed the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's 

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interrogatories state that had the plaintiff continued to be employed at Rosebud, he would have 

received $.25-$.50 above minimum wage. 6/24/16 brief, p. 24, 37, 38. At the 4/16 hearing, the 

plaintiff testified that at Rosebud he worked hourly, working 50 hours weekly, 55 hours weekly, 

60 hours weekly and 65 hours weekly. 4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 42:24, 25; 43:1-8, Exh. XXVI. 

Because this Court had the plaintiff's time records, this Court stated that it was unnecessary for 

the plaintiff to testify how much he earned at Rosebud, his hours and so forth: "Mr. Smith just 

testified to what he has made this year so far, and I couldn't tell you what I've made this year so 

far". 4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 45:15, 16, Exh. XXVI. Regarding the plaintiff's time records, this 

Court stated "they'll show how many hours he worked and what he got paid for those hours. And 

then we don't have to try to remember them." 4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 45:22, 23, Exh. XXVI.

At the 4/4/16 hearing, this Court stated:

what I am trying to establish here is, there's a couple of ways we can do this. He can 

testify from his own memory. There's a certain weight that goes with that. If you have 

got a document that backs it up, that sounds like it has more weight. I'm just going to 

make my own notes here. I'm just going to make this easier for me.... Okay. But it 

sounds like for the most part there isn't any dispute on these numbers because they're all

supported with the W-2 and a W-2 is good enough for my purposes that is what it is 

purported to be. I don't see a lot of dispute in this.... But this is going to be easy. You 

guys are going to give me the W-2s and any other tax records and then I'll have 

something that I can take to the bank. I don't have to rely on anybody's memory.

4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 17:17-22; 20:4-8; 21:13-16, Exh. XXVI. At the 4/4/16 hearing, the 

plaintiff testified that, but for the defendant's constructive discharge, the plaintiff would have 

continued working for the defendants in 2008, 2009, 2010 etc. to the 4/16 hearing and beyond 

2016. 4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 2:12-25; 3:1, Exh. XXVI. The plaintiff had worked for the 

defendants from 2003-until 2008. He had worked for the defendants in 2001, left the defendants 

and then returned to working for them in 2003 as he could only find seasonal jobs, had a 

conviction, Rosebud was within walking distance of his mother's apartment where he lived, he 

did not have a car, etc. pltff's 8/13/13 tr., 32:16; 33-36, Exh. XXXIII. Based upon these factors 

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and the plaintiff's difficulties of finding a job even after 2008, the defendants do not dispute that 

the plaintiff would have continued to work for Rosebud until he would have retired, but for 

Rosebud's constructive discharge. When the plaintiff returned from his conviction, Castaneda 

told the plaintiff that "he owns my ass." Pltff's 8/13/13 tr., 39:9-13, Exh. XXXIII.

On p. 8, the defendants argue that in the FPO, the plaintiff stated that he would continue 

to work 34 hours a week, that there is no mention of a 40 hour work week or front pay. At the 

4/4/16 hearing, the defendants argued that the plaintiff stated that he worked 34 hours weekly in 

the FPO and that the defendants were "confused." This Court stated "but were not now, so let's 

go ahead." 4/4/16 tr., 10:30 AM, 46:6-11, Exh. XXVI. At, the 4/4/16 hearing, the plaintiff 

mentioned that the defendants did not object to the plaintiff's calculations of damages except to 

state that the plaintiff did not mitigate damages. This Court stated "it doesn't matter if there are 

for things that weren't going to deal with at that time." Id at 22:7-11, Exh. XXVI. In other words,

the FPO dealt with issues relating to the jury trial only, not what the Honorable Judge Dow will 

decide. Indeed, as the defendants admit, p. 8, the FPO could be amended "to prevent injustice." 

As the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendants violated the law practically daily for years, 

justice requires that public policy be fostered, as held by the Supreme Court and the Seventh 

Circuit, to make the plaintiff whole. As the plaintiff only had to present some "evidence on the 

issue of damages", and the plaintiff did, "the burden of producing sufficient evidence to establish

the amount of interim earnings or lack of diligence shifts to the defendant." Rasimas v. 

Michigan, 714 F. 2d 614, 623 (6th Cir. 1983). 

However, as stated, this Court need not reach such (prong #2) as the defendants failed to 

prove prong #1 (an employer having a real, actual opening for a substantially equivalent job who

would have hired the plaintiff had he applied). Though on p. 9 the defendants argue that the 

plaintiff's figures in Exh. XVIII are not supported by the evidence, they failed to specify any 

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facts or figures, thus waiving the argument. Supra. Thus, this Court might decide to rule that the 

defendants are deemed to have admitted that the plaintiff is owed at least the damages in the 

plaintiff's chart. Exh. XVIII. The plaintiff's figures are supported by the evidence. The plaintiff 

testified to the figures. Also, he was going to testify further regarding all of the figures in the 

plaintiff's exhibit which was a chart which the plaintiff gave this Court at the 4/16 hearing. 

However, this Court stated that such was unnecessary as the Court had a copy of the plaintiff's 

exhibit/chart. 4/4/16 hearing, 10:30 AM, 47:22-25; 48:1-13, Exh. XXVI. 

As this Court may recall, the plaintiff's chart listed the amount the plaintiff would have 

earned from 2008 until the time of trial but for the defendant's constructive discharge, along with

the amounts that he did earned with other employers. Regarding front wages, the plaintiff's 

citations to the transcripts of those employees who actually testified at trial are good evidence to 

establish the number of hours the plaintiff would have received after 2008. The defendants argue,

p. 9, that this Court should not utilize the testimony of their own employees as this Court has the 

plaintiff's time records, but such time records involve what occurred prior to 2008. Also, the 

defendants never refuted that but for their constructive discharge, the plaintiff would have 

worked 70 hours weekly. Notably, the plaintiff's chart, Exh. XVIII, does not use 30 hours of 

overtime (70-40=30), but only 15 hours weekly. If any doubt exists, the law holds that all doubts 

must be resolved against the defendants repeatedly breaking the law and in favor of the 

victimized plaintiff to make him whole. 

On p. 9, the defendants argue that for 18 months prior to their constructive discharge of 

the plaintiff, the plaintiff had reduced hours and the defendants had not given overtime hours to 

the plaintiff. The evidence also demonstrated that the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff 

by reducing his hours when he complained. 7/8/16 brief, p. 8. Reduced hours might have been 

needed for the plaintiff based upon the intensifying harassment in 2007 and 2008. Doc 150, ¶2, 

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36. Pltff’s 8/13/13 tr, 204:13-24; 205:1-9; 229:11-19, 254:19-21, 296:20-24; 297:1-7; 307:17-24;

308:1-4. Exh. XXXIII; Pltff's 9/18/14 aff. ¶17, Exh. XXXVII. Nevertheless the issue is whether 

the defendants would have given overtime hours to the plaintiff after 2008. As stated, the 

defendants presented no admissible evidence to refute the plaintiff's overtime claim. 

On p. 10, the defendants argue that in the plaintiff's earlier years, he was paid time and a 

half for overtime, but the defendants refer to hearsay to which the plaintiff objects. Notably, as 

stated, at the 2 day 4/16 hearing, Rosebud's co-owner did not refute the plaintiff's overtime 

testimony occurring in the morning of the 1st day. Also, he did not testify that Rosebud has 

always paid time and a half for overtime. The defendant's hearsay evidence does not overcome 

the plaintiff's testimony 1) that when he worked overtime, the defendants did not pay him time 

and a half and 2) when he complained to the head butcher, the head butcher stated that Rosebud 

does not pay time and a half, but only regular time for overtime hours. 7/8/16 brief, p. 7, 8. 

As the plaintiff argued in his 7/8/16 brief, the defendants have failed to present any case 

law or argument that the plaintiff should not receive all back wages, overtime, front wages, etc., 

under Illinois law for the Illinois Gender Violence Act claim without any deduction for any 

earnings that the plaintiff earned from 2008-2016. Consequently, the defendants have waived 

any deduction, particularly as they have no affirmative defense for such deduction. 7/8/16 brief, 

p. 1, 3, 4, 23, 38. Therefore, no amounts should be deducted from the amount that should be 

granted to the plaintiff as required by public policy.

The defendant's affirmative defense; failure to produce documents

In pages 5, 6, the defendants argue that their affirmative defense is not bare-bones, but 

the defendant's defense fails to provide any facts identifying any employer having an opening for

a substantially equivalent job who would have hired the plaintiff had he applied. Also, the 

defendants failed to provide any facts for their conclusory statement that the plaintiff did not 

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exercise reasonable diligence to find a substantially equivalent job. Indeed, the defendants failed 

to present any of these facts, despite the plaintiff filing motions to strike the defendant's deficient

affirmative defenses for failing to include sufficient facts. Doc. 250, 257, 266, 267.

As argued in the plaintiff 6/24/16 brief, the defendants also 1). failed to provide any of 

the aforementioned facts in response to the plaintiff's discovery, and 2). failed to produce the 

exhibits relating to their economist before the discovery cutoff. Though the plaintiff filed a 

motion to strike and bar the economist's report on 1/4/16, arguing that the defendants failed to 

produce the exhibits, the defendants still did not produce them to the plaintiff at that time. Doc 

250. One of the purposes of receiving all of the documents before the discovery cutoff is so that 

parties can determine how to proceed. Based upon the deficiencies in the defendant's report, the 

plaintiff made decisions regarding whether to take the economist's deposition, whether to retain 

an expert, etc. Consequently, the plaintiff would be prejudiced if this Court did not prohibit the 

defendants from disregarding the rules. Indeed, this Court striking the economist would be 

consistent with this Court's order striking the plaintiff's witnesses, though the plaintiff complied 

with FRCP and seasonably supplemented. 6/24/16 brief, p. 4. 

Also, the defendant's argument, p. 22, that the plaintiff was not prejudiced as he could 

have cross-examined their economist must be rejected because otherwise the defendants would 

be encouraged to violate the rules in the future knowing that at worst, they will just get slapped 

on the wrist. On p. 23, the defendants state that this Court could disregard their exhibits and rely 

on the economist's 2/14 report. In such a situation, the defendant's report would have to be 

disregarded as having no factual basis or underpinning, aside from and in conjunction with the 

plaintiff's other arguments regarding the deficiency of the report. 

In 3/16, just a couple of weeks before the 4/16 hearing, the defendants produced some of 

their exhibits, but not all. They produced thousands and thousands of documents to the plaintiff 

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which should have been produced in 2014--2 years prior. Aside from this, at the 4/16 hearing, 

the defendants surprised the plaintiff by utilizing other exhibits which were never produced to 

the plaintiff. The defendants do not dispute this. Instead, on p. 6, the defendants state that the 

plaintiff did not present all of the communications between the parties, but, the defendants failed 

to state how those extra communications had any bearing. Consequently, the defendants waived 

the argument. Hernandez v. Cook, 634 F.3d 906, 913, n.9 (7th Cir. 2011) (poorly developed 

arguments and skeletal references constitute waiver).

For the most part, the defendants failed to respond to the plaintiff's arguments relating to 

their failure to produce facts and documents. Please see p. 5-8, plaintiff's 6/24/16 brief. 

Moreover, the defendants failed to refute the plaintiff's brief demonstrating how the defendants 

continuously attempted to mislead the plaintiff, and perhaps entering the realm of falsehoods, by 

stating that they had produced their documents to the plaintiff when they had not. In any event, 

the defendants have waived any response. Thus, this Court may find that the defendants have 

admitted the plaintiff's arguments.

On p. 20, the defendants turn FRCP 26 upside down by arguing that they can violate it, 

not produce the required information within the required deadline and still testify relating to that 

information at trial. The defendants cite no case law for their rewriting of FRCP 26. 

Consequently, they waived the argument. Supra. Though the defendants, p. 20, state that they 

produced their economist's report in 2014, they conspicuously do not mention anything about 

producing the required documents, again, admitting, that they failed to produce the required 

documents. Indeed, on p. 20, the defendants admit that they did not produce exhibits, stating "the

report contained no exhibits." Continuing to rewrite FRCP 26 the defendants, p. 20, 21, state that

the plaintiff did not request their exhibits, but the defendants were required to produce under 

FRCP 26. The defendants cite no case law for their rewriting of FRCP, thus waiving the 

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argument. Supra. Their failure to produce is yet another reason why the defendants failed to meet

their burden on their affirmative defense.

The defendant's argument on p. 20 regarding the plaintiff's motion to strike and bar their 

economist's report can be rejected for several reasons. The defendants argue that the motion had 

to be filed before the 12/15 trial (though the defendants inadvertently state 12/16 trial), but the 

jury trial had nothing to do with the defendant's report. Relating to the FPO, this Court stated that

it had nothing to do with the Phase II issues, and thus, it was irrelevant. Supra. Courts reject 

defendant’s arguments that evidence of wages should be presented at the jury trial because such 

are not jury questions. Downes v. Volkswagen, 41 F.3d 1132, 1141-43, n. 9,10 (7th Cir. 1994); 

Salitros v. Chrysler, 306 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 2002). 

From the plaintiff's perspective, engaging in briefing on a motion to strike and bar the 

defendant's report before the jury trial would have been a waste of attorney's fees and judicial 

resources. Why? Phase II would have never come about unless the jury found in the plaintiff's 

favor. If the parties had briefed the issues and this Court had spent time writing a written opinion

on such issues, and if the jury had decided differently, then the parties and this Court would have

wasted time and money for naught. In the FPO regarding back wages, front wages, etc. and the 

correlative information for such, the plaintiff stated that such should be addressed after the jury's 

verdict. 10/26/15 FPO, p. 2, 3, 6, Exh. XXVIII. It also states that the plaintiff will request 

prejudgment interest along with all compensatory and equitable relief allowed under Federal and 

Illinois State law. Therefore, as stated in the FPO, after the jury rendered its verdict, the plaintiff 

presented the amounts owed to the plaintiff in his 6/24/16 brief. The defendants did not object to 

this, except to assert their defense. Though the defendants, p. 21, state that the plaintiff had some 

objections on p. 3 of the corrected FPO, the plaintiff does not see those objections. id. 

Nevertheless, the plaintiff thought and felt that delaying such objections and issues until after the

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jury decided the case was most prudent and the best use of attorney's fees and judicial resources.

On p. 20, the defendants state that the economist's report has the help wanted ads for 

Chicago and the entire Maricopa County for "occupations and categories relevant to someone 

with Smith's qualifications." The defendant's economist never determined what were "Smith's 

qualifications" or even what were the "occupations and categories relevant" to him. The report is 

unreliable. Also, p. 20, the defendants state that the economist mentions the unemployment 

percentages and duration of unemployment for the same geographical areas. Putting aside that 

the entire County of Maricopa is too large, Midwestern, infra, particularly as the plaintiff had 

little to no access to a car, as the plaintiff has argued in his filings, courts have held that such 

generalities do not provide the specifics to meet the defendant's burden. 

Even if they did, arguendo, the unemployment percentage or duration of unemployment 

would have to relate to substantially equivalent jobs--presuming that the unemployment 

percentage or duration of unemployment were not completely irrelevant. As repeatedly argued in

the plaintiff's 6/24/16 and 7/8/16 briefs, the defendants had to identify an employer having a 

substantially equivalent job with an opening which would have hired the plaintiff had he applied.

The defendants have not identified even a single employer.

On p. 20, the defendants referred to the hearsay data from Wanted Technologies. As 

previously argued in the plaintiff's briefs, the defendants have presented no proof that using 

Wanted Technologies or similar multiple levels of hearsay is customary within the profession. 

The defendant's economist speaking about his preference to use it at numerous conferences and 

attempting to persuade others to use it does not make it customary. Similarly, while economist 

Stan Smith may speak at numerous conferences about his methodology of the hedonic value of 

life, such does not mean that his methodology is accepted within the profession. Indeed, courts 

have found it unreliable. See, e.g., Stokes v. Deere, 2014 LEXIS 21725 (CD Ill. 2/21/14). 

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Ultimately, by a FRE104(a) preponderance of the evidence, the defendants bore the burden to 

establish that it's report was not inadmissible. Daubert v. Merrell, 509 US 579, 592 n. 10 (1993).

Indeed, the economist's report relies on information which is very general, having 

multilevel hearsay, having little to no specifics of names of employers, the duties and 

responsibilities relating to job openings, the conditions of employment, rates of pay, distance 

from the plaintiff's residence, etc. Indeed, the defendants have presented no evidence that even 

one of the thousands of alleged jobs relate to a real, actual job opening. The defendants had the 

obligation to present admissible evidence, not repeatedly present speculation to this Court.

The defendant's citation of Walden v. City of Chicago, 755 F. Supp. 2d 942 (ND Ill. 

2010) is inapplicable or distinguishable. Even if it were not, arguendo, the defendant's citation 

concerning unrelated issues cannot overcome the plaintiff's citations of Courts of Appeal, 

including the Seventh Circuit. Walden involved the plaintiff's expert opining that the defendant 

had a policy of coercive interrogations and illegal detentions. The plaintiff's expert researched 

other persons victimized by the defendant, including the use of the Internet. Denying the 

defendant's motion against the plaintiff's expert, the court noted that 1). the defendant did not 

challenge the reliability, relevance or the reasonableness of the reports that the expert reviewed, 

2). it was common in the profession to rely on the same type of computer searches of databases, 

3). the plaintiff's expert used different search terms through several different databases over 

several weeks to crosscheck for accuracy.

Unlike Walden, in Smith vs. Rosebud, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's report is 

unreliable, unreasonable and irrelevant. Also, unlike Walden, the defendants failed to meet their 

burden to prove that others in the profession use Wanted Technologies with its multiple layers of

hearsay. Moreover, the defendants failed to present any evidence that the economist used 

different search terms through several different databases over several weeks to crosscheck for 

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accuracy. Even if the defendants had overcome these challenges, arguendo, cases on point 

involving the defendant's mitigation affirmative defense hold that generalized data do not meet 

the defendant's burden. Though the defendants on p. 22 argue that the plaintiff used similar 

internet sources, like Monster, what the plaintiff used or did not use does not meet the 

defendant's burden to overcome the important public policy of making victimized plaintiffs 

whole. Indeed, the defendants cite no case law for their argument, thus waiving it. Supra. 

Notably, the defendants present no "record evidence", a term that the defendants use, for the 

proposition that Monster is similar to Wanted Technologies. Instead, the defendant's attorney 

merely renders her own opinion. Walden does not relate to the issues before the Honorable Judge

Dow. Therefore, it is distinguishable/inapplicable, particularly when the plaintiff's several 

citations are on point and hold against the defendants.

On p. 9, the defendants argue that the Court stated the parties' obligation of using record 

evidence for their findings of facts, but the defendants provide no citation to this statement. Thus,

the defendants have waived it. Supra. Indeed, at the Phase II hearing, this Court stated that the 

parties could use whatever evidence in their briefs that would support their position, including, 

the jury trial transcripts, depositions, etc. On p. 8, the defendants cite Hutchison v. Amateur, 42 

F. 3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1994), but all Hutchinson states is that once the plaintiff has presented 

evidence of his damages, the defendants bear the burden to prove their affirmative defense. 

Otherwise, Hutchinson is distinguishable and inapplicable because the jury decided the issues 

relating to back wages, etc. The question in Hutchinson was whether the district court properly 

denied the FRCP 59 motion as it could not be stated that no reasonable jury would have found 

the same way. The plaintiff's 7/8/16 brief argued that as the jury has decided that the defendants 

have violated the law, the court must promote the important public policy to make the victimized

plaintiff whole. In Stewart v. GM, 542 F. 2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1976), the court held:

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backpay is ... awarded when a Title VII violation is found. Otherwise, there would be 

little incentive for employers to obey the statute; a recalcitrant employer could continue 

plainly discriminatory practices until compelled to stop by a federal court's injunction 

without suffering any penalty for his blatant disregard of the law.... backpay is 

necessary ... to effectuate the statutory goal of compensating the victimized employee 

and placing him in as good a position as he would have been had he not been subject to 

discrimination.

The defendants, not the plaintiff, have the burden to prove the defendant's defense

The plaintiff's case law states that only the defendants bear the burden to prove their 

defense. On p. 7, the defendants argue that the plaintiff cited cases from other circuits, but the 

defendants do not argue that they are not applicable or that they are not in accord with the 

Seventh Circuit, thus, waiving the argument. Supra. Also, the defendants failed to mention that 

the plaintiff cited cases from and within the Seventh Circuit. At the 4/4/16 hearing, even though 

the plaintiff did not have to present evidence of interim earnings or lack thereof, as such is the 

defendant's burden, the plaintiff did present such evidence. Please see, e.g., 4/4/16 tr., 10:31 AM,

25:16, 17 ($3556 at Way to Go in 2012), Exh. XXVI.

"The law only requires of the employee "reasonable exertions in this regard, not the 

highest standard of diligence." N. L. R. B. v. Arduini, 394 F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1968); N. L. R.

B. v. Miami..." as cited in NLRB v. Pilot., 604 F. 2d 375, 378 (5th Circuit 1979); see also, NLRB

v. Westin, 758 F. 2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1985). On p. 10, the defendants state that "Smith obtained a 

job in March 2009" etc., but conspicuously, the defendants failed to discuss whether the job was 

substantially equivalent to the Rosebud job or not. The defendant's omission is compelling 

because the defendants bore the burden on their defense. By failing to discuss it, much less prove

it, the defendants conveyed that they know that their affirmative defense is weak. 

As discussed in the plaintiff's 7/8/16 brief (¶33, 34), in 3/09, WIS, the employer, 

suggested to the plaintiff that he resign to avoid them firing him as he did not have a car which 

was required for the job. Consequently, mitigating his damages by preventing his record to have 

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a firing, the plaintiff resigned. Also, the plaintiff decided to go to school to increase his 

probability of obtaining a job, particularly as he only earned $78 for that year at a nonsubstantially equivalent job. Id at ¶40-45. As the plaintiff had no apartment of his own, moving 

from one relative's residence to another, the plaintiff moved to Chicago because his §8 apartment

application had been approved. Id at ¶36-39. Unfortunately, the §8 apartment was in a "crimeridden" "very violent" neighborhood. Id. As the plaintiff had no money for his own apartment, he

returned to Arizona to live in a safer area from one relative's residence to another. id. If the 

defendants had not constructively discharged him, the plaintiff would not have had to experience

all of this anxiety from moving from one city to another, from one relative's residence to another.

On p. 10, the defendants state that since 6/14, the plaintiff has earned more than 

minimum wage, but the defendants failed to develop their argument, thus waiving it. Supra. 

Neither this Court nor the plaintiff should have to guess or construct the defendant's argument for

them. Indeed, unless the defendant's undeveloped arguments were not waived, then this would be

unfair to the plaintiff. The plaintiff should only have to respond to developed arguments with 

case citations. This is particularly true as all favorable inferences must be given to the plaintiff 

and against the defendants which chose, repeatedly, to violate the law for years. 

On p. 10, the defendants state that their ¶128-170 allegedly supports the argument that the

plaintiff did not establish equitable damages, but ¶120-170 does not. Indeed, in ¶133, the 

defendants admit that all the plaintiff has to do is "establish what (he) contends are his damages."

The plaintiff has done this. The defendants have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that 

what the plaintiff presented is not correct. Thus, the defendants waived the argument. Supra.

On p. 10, the defendants continue with their smokescreen by discussing "discrepancies" 

in the plaintiff's testimony, but whether the plaintiff was truthful, not truthful or confused is 

irrelevant to what the defendants had to prove regarding prong #1 and then, prong #2. The 

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defendant's tactic of attacking the plaintiff's truthfulness might violate FRE 608. The defendants 

refer to the plaintiff's "alleged” “car trouble'" or stating that he did not drive his girlfriend's car, 

though the plaintiff clarified that his girlfriend obtained 2 cars and he did not drive one of them. 

Regardless, the defendants provide no admissible evidence to refute the plaintiff's testimony. The

defendants do not even cite one case that their smokescreen is something that should not be 

rejected or has anything to do with the defendant's burden. Indeed, the case law is against the 

defendants. See, e.g., Floca; ABF vs.NLRB, 510 US 317 (1994); Pltff's 7/8/16 brief, p. 20.

On p. 11, the defendants cite the plaintiff's case law that candidates must make an honest,

good faith effort to find comparable employment, but then turn the case law upside down. The 

defendants jump on the word "honest", pull it out of context and state that the plaintiff's 

testimony has not been honest about the conviction on his employment application, using his 

girlfriend's computer etc. Some may find that the defendants went too far with their argument 

because they are misleading the Honorable Judge Dow to think and feel that the case law holds 

that if somebody is not honest about something that he said or did relating to collateral, 

peripheral matters, then he cannot be made whole. Rather, the case law states that candidates 

must make an honest good faith effort to find work. The defendants bore the burden to prove that

the plaintiff did not make an honest good faith effort to find work. The defendants failed.

On p. 12, the defendants argue that the plaintiff was "coached" to use "the right 

buzzwords", etc., but again, the defendants failed to meet their burden to cite facts for their bald 

conclusory statement. Thus, they waived the argument. Long; Echo. Once again, the defendants 

demonstrate the weakness of their affirmative defense by making personal attacks. Though on p. 

12 the defendants state that they refuted the plaintiff's trial testimony with the "evidence 

available in the record", the defendants failed to provide any facts for this alleged refutation, thus

waiving the argument. Supra. As argued throughout the plaintiff's 7/8/16 brief, the defendants 

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make numerous arguments based upon speculation or hearsay, again demonstrating the weakness

of the defendant's defense. Indeed, some may think and feel that the defendant's continual 

speculation or relying on hearsay wasted judicial resources and the attorney's fees of the plaintiff.

On p. 12, the defendants state that the plaintiff does not cite "record evidence" relating to 

his evidence on p. 31-33 of the plaintiffs 6/24/16 brief. However, the plaintiff does not bear the 

burden to prove that he did not mitigate his damages. Rather, the defendants have the burden to 

prove this. Notwithstanding, in the plaintiff's 7/8/16 brief, the plaintiff cites the 4/16 hearing 

transcripts of the many efforts the plaintiff made to find work. Supra. On p. 13, the defendants 

admit that they could not refute the plaintiff's testimony about his efforts to find work. 

Attempting to circumvent the weakness of their affirmative defense, the defendants state that 

they "could not have anticipated" the plaintiff's trial testimony as the plaintiff's efforts were not 

in his interrogatory answers. Even if such argument were not rejected, the defendants still did not

refute any of the plaintiff's trial testimony relating to what he disclosed in his deposition and 

interrogatory answers. Also, the defendants referring to peripheral, irrelevant matters, such as, 

that the plaintiff was not consistent about where he lived continues to demonstrate that the 

defendant’s affirmative defense fails. 

Also, though the defendants state that preceding their economist's report, the plaintiff 

testified in his deposition that he did not have interviews, the plaintiff testified that the only 

interviews he did not have were with his online applications. See, e.g., plaintiff’s 7/8/16 brief, 

¶46, 47. On p. 16, the defendants state that the plaintiff "changed his deposition testimony" 

about disclosing his conviction on his employment applications, but the defendants provide no 

facts for their opinion, thus waiving the argument. Supra. Also, the defendant's attorney on p. 17 

states her opinion that it would not have been meaningful for the defendant's economist to 

consider the plaintiff's conviction when analyzing periods of unemployment, but the defendants 

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provide no "record evidence" for the opinion of the defendant's attorney. 

On p. 12, the defendants argued that the plaintiff did not make sufficient efforts to find a 

substantially equivalent job, that is, meat butcher jobs. However, the defendants have presented 

no evidence whatsoever refuting the plaintiff's evidence that the plaintiff did. Indeed, some may 

find that the defendants mislead this Court because the plaintiff did testify that he looked for 

meat butcher jobs. E.g., 7/8/16 brief, ¶78-80. The defendants merely arguing that the plaintiff did

not fails to meet the defendant's burden. The defendants have failed to identify any employer 

having a substantially equivalent job opening who would have hired the plaintiff had he applied.

As the defendants admit, on p. 12 and 13, other than looking for meat butcher jobs, the 

plaintiff looked for other types of jobs, so that he could pay his bills. Then, on p. 13, the 

defendants argue--with no admissible evidence--that the jobs where the plaintiff applied were 

entry-level, minimum wage, non-skilled jobs. Even if the defendant's argument were not false, 

arguendo, the defendants present no developed argument regarding their contention, thus 

waiving it. Long; Echo. Also, on p. 13, the defendants present no case law refuting the notion 

that a substantially equivalent job would be a meat butcher job, thus waiving the argument. 

Long; Echo. All that the defendants do is state that their economist reviewed want ads regarding 

jobs "most likely" (speculation) that did not require a college education, paid minimum wage 

etc., but the defendants cite no case law whatsoever to support their argument that such should 

not be rejected, thus waiving it. Long; Echo. Nor do the defendants meet their burden to present 

case law that such criteria is not irrelevant.

The defendant's failure to cite any case is particularly telling since the defendants have 

known about the plaintiff's arguments of the defendant's deficiencies in their economist's report 

and their failure to identify substantially equivalent jobs as early as 1/4/16 when the plaintiff 

filed his motion to bar and strike their economist. Supra. The defendants even admit that they 

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had the benefit of the plaintiff's motions prior to the Phase II briefing. Indeed, on p. 14, the 

defendants even state that they "wisely anticipated most of Smith arguments." Some might think 

and feel that based upon the plaintiff's 1/4/16 motion to bar and strike, the defendants should 

have 1) settled this case; indeed, the 1st page of the plaintiff's 1/4/16 motion discusses how the 

plaintiff made many efforts to settle Phase II with the defendants, but the defendants were 

disinterested, Exh. XXXIV, or II) withdrawn their weak affirmative defense instead of utilizing 

this Court's resources and the attorney's fees of the plaintiff. The defendant's disinterest to 

discuss settlement is similar to their rejection of the EEOC's invitation to conciliate. Exh. XXIV

On p. 14, the defendants discuss their "second prong" (the plaintiff's first prong), i.e., the 

defendant's failure to identify an employer having a substantially equivalent job opening who 

would have hired the plaintiff had he applied. In Sparks v. Griffin, 460 F. 2d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 

1972), the court held:

Mr. Bozeman asks this Court for...back pay....he sent...applications to two...districts...

and that he had also inquired about vacancies in the area through teachers and former 

teachers....The...court concluded that...(his) efforts...were insufficient....the appellees 

do not claim that at trial it was proved that there were teaching jobs available...had he 

applied. It merely asserts that Mr. Bozeman did not expend sufficient effort to find other

teaching employment. The appellees' position is without legal justification. 

In Smith vs. Rosebud, the defendants failed to meet this burden. On p. 14, the defendants 

argued that the plaintiff does not use "record evidence" to challenge their economist, but the 

plaintiff does. The plaintiff repeatedly refers to the economist's report and how it fails to meet the

defendant's burden. The Honorable Judge Dow at the 4/16 hearing restricted the economist to 

testify to only that which was contained in his report. Indeed, the defendants somewhat admit 

this on p. 15 by stating that their economist "did not offer opinions beyond the scope of his 

report." The plaintiff demonstrated that the defendants failed to meet their burden in such report. 

The defendants failed to specify any of their economist's testimony that should have been 

discussed by the plaintiff, thus, waiving the argument. Long; Echo.

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The defendants cite. Roundy's Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 674 F.3d 638, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) to 

state that experts cannot render legal opinions, but the defendant's citation is inapplicable 

because it involved the expert opining about Wisconsin property law. Only the court can 

determine what is the law. On p. 18, though the defendants attempt to argue that the plaintiff's 

case law, NLRB v. Midwestern, 508 F. 3d 418, 427 (7th Cir. 2007), is not applicable, the 

plaintiff's case law is applicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restrictions on Dr. Cohen, the 

same economist that the defendants utilized in Smith vs. Rosebud. The Seventh Circuit noted 

that the economist's report was irrelevant as being Statewide. Even if the economist's report did 

not have other deficiencies, like Midwestern, it was broad, involving the entire County of 

Maricopa instead of the city where the plaintiff lived, i.e., the "relevant geographical area”, id, 

particularly as the plaintiff had little to no access to a car. Supra. Though the defendants argue, p.

19, that their economist provided "specific data" for the relevant area, the defendants cite no 

specifics, thus implicitly admitting that their defense is weak.

Also, like Midwestern, the defendant's economist failed to provide any data regarding the

applicants, failed to provide any insight into whether the victimized plaintiff would have secured 

the jobs had he applied. Moreover, like Midwestern, the defendant's economist provided no 

information regarding the hours, wages and locations of the "supposedly available positions". Id. 

Thus, this Court may, like the Seventh Circuit, find that "it is reasonable...to reject expert 

testimony regarding generalized labor market" i.e., the defendant's economist, Malcolm Cohen.

Notably, the defendants admit, p. 16, that the only information that their economist had 

about the plaintiff at Rosebud was that he "worked behind a meat counter." See economist's 

report, p. 2, Exh. XIV. The economist did not even know what the plaintiff did behind the meat 

counter. Did he do janitorial duties? Did he clean the bathrooms? Was he a meat butcher? Did he

work in the backroom? Did he serve customers? Did he sort the various types of meat to give to 

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the meat butchers? The defendant's economist knew none of this. On p. 16, the defendants 

confirm and admit that their attorney provided all of the information regarding this case to their 

economist instead of allowing the economist to do his own independent review. The defendants 

failed to discuss, much less distinguish, all of the plaintiff's cases finding that the defendant's 

tactic makes their economist's report unreliable. See, e.g., plaintiff 6/24/16 brief, p. 15, 16.

On p. 16, the defendants state that the plaintiff's challenges to their report are opinions of 

counsel, but they are legal challenges to the report's deficiencies. On p. 18, the defendants state 

that their economist providing information relating to minimum-wage entry-level positions and 

unemployment rates would help, but the defendants failed to provide any facts or case law of 

exactly how it relates to what the defendants must prove. If the defendant's argument were not 

false, the defendants would have specified all of the facts supporting their position with case law,

but they did not. The fact that they did not continues to demonstrate the weakness of their 

affirmative defense. Not only that, but on p. 18, the defendants even direct this Court how he 

should rule by stating that this Court has already made a decision regarding the economist's 

report, though this Court has not ruled yet.

On p. 19, the defendants refer to one of the many reasons why the economist's report 

failed, that is, referring to a generalized labor market analysis. The defendants argue that the 

plaintiff cited 2 cases for the plaintiff's argument, but the 2 cases that the defendants cite are not 

the cases that the plaintiff cited for his argument. Rather, the plaintiff 6/24/16 brief, p. 17, 18, 27,

cited NLRB v. Midwestern, 508 F. 3d 418, 427 (7th Cir. 2007), Prine v. Sioux, 95 F.Supp.2d 

1005, 1013 (N.D. Iowa 2000) ("that the economy is good, and that jobs are available...does not 

satisfy its burden.") and Kuper v. Empire, 2003 LEXIS 2362, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 

In Kuper, aside from rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff did not use 

reasonable efforts to find a job, citing Seventh Circuit case law, the court held that the defendants

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failed to meet their burden to prove prong #1, that is, that an employer had an opening for a 

substantially equivalent job and would have hired the plaintiff had he applied.

Instead, the defendants in Kuper only offered "expert testimony that 'insurance adjusters, 

examiners and investigators had a strong occupational outlook with faster than average growth 

expectancy." Id. See also, Zerilli v. NYC, 973 F. Supp. 311, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting that 

"this industry has been growing very quickly within the last year and therefore is one of the 

fastest growing sectors of the economy"). The court noted that such "generalized evidence" is 

deficient for the defendants to prove that a substantially equivalent job existed. The same 

reasoning would apply to the report of the defendant's economist in Smith vs. Rosebud, for 

example, the economist testifying that thousands and thousands of jobs existed and about the 

unemployment rate. Furthermore, Kuper held that the defendants failed to meet their burden 

because their expert only testified that the plaintiff could have acquired a claims adjuster job, but

such job was not substantially equivalent to a fraudulent claims managerial position. Id.

In short, the defendants have failed to meet their burden regarding prong #1 and/or prong 

#2. Therefore, the Honorable Judge Dow might determine to enter judgment against the 

defendants on their affirmative defense. Then, this Court may decide to foster the important 

public policy and make the victimized plaintiff whole as the defendants violated the law, 

repeatedly, daily or nearly daily, for years. If this Court needs further information for the 

calculations to promote the important public policy and if this Court can inform the plaintiff, the 

plaintiff will do his best to provide such information.

Respectfully submitted,

______________________________

Joseph A. Longo

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LONGO AND ASSOCIATES LTD.

Joseph A. Longo, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff

2100 West Haven

Mt. Prospect, IL 60056

(847) 640-9490

Longo-Associates@SBCglobal.net

Attorney No. 53635

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Joseph A. Longo, an attorney, certify that I served this PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 

DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE/FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

OF LAW by electronic filing on 22 July 2016 before 5pm. Under penalties as provided by law 

pursuant to 735 ILCS, Sec 5/1-109, I certify that the statements set forth in this Certificate of 

Service are true and correct. 

____________________________

Joseph A. Longo

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