1000 Abernathy Rood NE S uite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30328



### Via Electronic Submission
OSWER Docket, EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822-lT, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20460

RE: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Underthe Clean AirAct, Section 112(r)(7); Request for information. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ--QEM-2014-0328.

To the Docket:
Axiall Corporation is pleased to respond to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Request for Information (RFI), Docket No., EPA-HQ--QEM-2014-0328 published in the Federal Register on July 31, 2014 at 79 Fed

. Reg. 44604-44633.

Axiall Corporation is a leading integrated chemicals and building products company. Axiall, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, has manufacturingfacilities located throughout NorthAmerica and in Asia to provide industry-leading materials and services to customers. For more information,visit www.axiall.com

. 

### Summary Axiall Corporation supportsthe goal of EPA's RMP regulations which includes reducing chemical risk at the local level by providing informationto help local fire, police, and emergency response personnel along with providing information to the members ofthe publicto help in understandingthe chemical operationstaking place in their community. Axiall believes that process safety standards in the United States, currently implemented through the Program 3 requirements in the EPA RMP rule and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals (PSM) standard, are strong and effective because they are performance-oriented. Aflexible, performance-oriented approach to process safety best protectsworkers from risk of harm, including risk ofaccidental chemical release. Each employer is in the best position to make site-specific and processspecific process safety decisions by evaluating its own equipment, onsite materials and chemicals, expertise, organizational structure, and operations. Axiall is concerned that many ofthe options under consideration by EPA would, in practice, weaken the highly effective performance-oriented approach that is currently provided for process safety and chemical management underexisting EPA and OSHA programs. lit is unclear howthe potential modifications contained in the RFI will enhance chemical facility safety. Our specific concerns are provided below.

### Harmonization ofthe PSM and RMP Standard

Axiall is concerned with the timeline presented by EPA in its RMP revision process. Executive Order (EO) 13650was specifically created to encourage agency coordination and improvethe exchange and sharing of information.There is an EO 13650Action Plan "requirement" that EPA and OSHA "harmonize" their regulations. However, EPA has committed, in the EO Working Group Action Plan, to releasing a proposal forthe revised RMP in one year and finalizing the rule within two years. OSHA is on a seven-year rulemakingtimeline fortheir PSM regulation while EPA is on atwo-yeartrack. Given the approach ofboth the EPA and OSHA, agency coordination will be challenging which could significantly impactthe regulated community.

Axiall recommends that EPA and OSHA work as closely together as possible to coordinate both oftheir review and rulemaking activities so thatthe regulated communitywill be able to effectively execute a strong, stable and consistent, chemical safety program. Updatingthe List of Regulated Substances- Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards

As ageneral statement, Axiall is notaware ofany significant changes thatwouldjustifythe revision of the RMP Standard in updatingthe list of regulated substances.

To respond to EPA's specific question oflisting chemicals based on the hazards oftheir reaction byproducts, we believe it is not afeasible approach. It is virtually impossible for national listing decisions to take into account process-and site-specific factors, which can vary widely due to the lack of
a strong risk assessment methodologyto screen reactive hazards. The numberofchemicals that can experience adverse reactions with others, orwith waterorair, is very large, and the possible combinations ofthese materials makes tryingto designate which chemicals represent reactive hazards and which do not is atask and one which should not be taken without identifying avalid and consistent methodologyto identifythreshold hazard quantities orconcentrations. Any chemical, which is benign at normal conditions, may become violent in presence ofotherchemicals orextreme process conditions (changes in operating conditions, etc.). A list does not in any way solve the problem and in many respects may introduce other unintended consequences (i.e., facilities maythinkthat ifsomething is not
on the list, there is no hazard or risk). Revising Additional RMP Elements

The RFI statesthat EPA is interested in receiving and reviewing information regarding the management system elements that were identified in the OSHA RFI, butwith afocus on the applicable RMP requirements. U.S. EPA is considering incorporatingthree (3) elements taken from the Risk Based Process Safety Program by the Centerfor Chemical Process Safety:
(1) Measurements and metrics, (2) Management review and continuous improvement, and (3) Process safety competency.

### Axiall believes that incorporatingthese elements intothe RMP standard blurs thejurisdictional line between the RMP and PSM programs which has already created confusion in the regulated community

. There has not been reasoning or information putforth by any agency indicatingthatthe existing PSM regulation does notadequately include the process safety elements necessary to develop an effective performance-based PSM system.

The management system currently underthe RMP rules is essentially asystem defined by facility managers for integratingthe implementation ofthe risk management program elements and assigning responsibility forthat implementation. The extentofthe management system will depend on the size and complexity ofthe source. At many small sources, the appointmentofa person or position that has the overall responsibilityforthe development, implementation, and integration ofthe risk management program elements, may satisfy the management system requirement. For largersources, separate divisions may be responsible foroverseeing different elements ofthe risk management program.

An effective management system helps to documentthe integration offacility operations and provides a way to ensure that each department involved in the process understands its responsibilities and who should be contacted when changes orotherconcerns arise. As the rule currently stands an operating entity has the flexibility to design and manage the management system in awaythat works best forthat operation.

Axiall certainly supports the use of metrics as part ofa safety program and there is great value in measuring certain process safetyactivities. However, we do notsupportthe requirement oflagging PSM metric indicatorcollection and evaluation via regulation. While lagging indicators may provide insight into an organization's past process safety performance, there are limitsto howthis data can be utilized as a meaningful measurement and comparison point.

In addition, leading PSM metrics cannot be effectually regulated. Leading metrics simply do not lend themselves to standardization and cannot be successfully employed across organizations or industries,
as theytend to be very specific to an organization and often to an individual site, and level ofrisk.

The second element, management review and continuous improvement, which focuses on the "due diligence" ofmanagement reviews that fill the gap between day-to-daywork activities and formal audits is clearly a subjective standard, where standards or requirements would be difficultto develop and even more difficultto enforce. Ultimately, this could only be measured by the numberofmanagement reviews which then becomesjusta recordkeeping requirement with limited value. While management reviews are atool used by many in industrythe use ofthat tool is best lefttothe implementing organization to best manage its program to its specific operations and company culture.
EPA is also requesting comments on includingthree interrelated activities: (1) continuously improve on knowledge and competency, (2) ensure appropriate information is available to those who need it, and (3) consistently apply lessons learned. The main focus ofthis competency element is organizational learning so that process knowledge can be applied to situations in orderto manage risk effectively. Axiall agrees with the concept and value ofoperating entitiessharing lessons learned. However, such elements are notwell-suited to prescriptive regulation orto consistent, rational enforcement by government agencies. In essence they are best used through trade associations. They should not be added to the current regulations.Expanded Incident Investigation/Accident History Underthe existing PSM and RMP requirements regulated facilities are required to investigate incidents that resulted in, or "could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release ofa hazardous chemical." However, EPA is nowconsidering an additional requirement to have facilities report near misses in addition to reporting theirfive-year history ofaccidents from covered processes resulting in death, injuryorsignificant propertydamage. EPA is also asking whether companies should be required to conduct a root cause investigation, complete their investigations bycertain deadlines and share informationwith the public about incidents and near misses.
Axiall supports near miss reporting and the use of root cause investigations where it is clear that an incident could have reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release as is required perthe existing PSM Standard and RMP regulation. The term "near miss incident" is difficultto define across the board at a national level because what might be considered a near miss incident atone location may not be a near miss atanother location due to the specifics ofthe operation.
Third Party Compliance Audits Axiall believes that audits are an integral partofastrong process safety program but it is unfamiliarwith any data that demonstrate oreven strongly suggest thatthose third-party auditors are more effective overall than any otherform ofaudit. We do believe thatthe mandated use ofthird-party auditors would be overly burdensome and unjustified given the lack of reliable data in this area. Employers should be afforded the discretion to choose the audit method best suited to their unique operations including self-audits, second-party audits, orthird-party audits.
Define and Require Evaluations of Updatesto RAGAGEP Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEPs) are engineering, operation, or maintenance activities based on established codes, standards, published technical reports or recommended practices orasimilar document. RAGAGEPs detail generally approved ways to perform specific engineering, inspection or mechanical integrity activities, such as fabricating avessel, inspecting a storage tank, orservicing a reliefvalve. RAGAGEP also recognizes thatthere is not one wayto solve a given problem that provides similar levels of risk reduction for a diverse set ofchemical processes.
Axiall does not believe that RAGAGEP can be a single document, code, standard or practice. Covered employers must be able to utilize consensus guidance to the specific situation in each individual workplace. Also, EPA should recognize that employers with the support oftechnical experts and professionals are in the best position to analyze the specific conditions and concerns at afacility and to decide what is recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices since they are most familiar with the ongoing operations atthatworkplace Emergency Planning and Coordination with local Emergency Response Authorities Axiall believesthatthe requirement for coordination with local emergency responders is already adequately addressed in the multiple interconnected standards as well as OHSA's 29 CFR 1910. 38. This particular OSHA regulation provides the minimum requirements for an emergency action plan including that afacility must have procedures in place for reporting afire orotheremergency information to local responders. An additional reporting requirement will not provide an improved level ofworkplace safety.

Axiall already provides informationto various regulatory agencies and organization as part ofother regulatory requirements including EPA's Risk Management Plan, EPA's SARA reporting requirements,and the DHS's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard (CFATS) program. Prior to adding an additional facility reporting requirement EPA and OSHA should instead lookto how it can best coordinate and harmonizethe already established emergency response planning information that exists within other regulatory agencies.

Mechanical IntegrityofAny Safety-Critical Equipment Axiall believes thatthe existing six categories currently listed in Paragraph 

### (j) ofthe existing PSM standard sufficiently cover safety critical equipment involved in the handling ofhighly hazardous chemicals. And EPA has not provided any reasoning orexamples in the RFI to explain howthe existing standard is not adequately addressing safety critical equipment or how chemical safetywould be improved by the options presented by EPA in the RFI.

As previously identified, Axiall believes that a risk-based approach already exists in the current PSM standard and is adequate to address mechanical integrity safety concerns. Any additional listing of covered equipment, which is not risk-based, could result in stretching facility resources to cover less critical equipmenttaking away from critical site-specific equipment.
Promoting InherentlySafetyTechnology (1ST) In its original RMP rulemaking EPA acknowledged that it did not believe that an 1ST requirement would produce additional benefits beyond those existing underthe general program structure. EPA acknowledged that assessment ofinherently safer design alternatives has the greatest benefit in the development of new processes. Industrygenerally examines new process alternatives to avoid the addition of more costly administrative orengineering controls in orderto mitigate adesign that may be more hazardous in nature. Although some existing processes may be misconceived as being inherently less safe than other processes, EPA believed these processes could be safely operated through management and control ofthe hazards without spending resources searching for unavailable or unaffordable new process technologies. Inherentlysafer approaches orsafer alternatives have been and will continue to be considered by facilities as a matterofcourse. Chemical facilities consider 1ST in preparing Process Hazard Analyses (PHAs) that are required for both the PSM and RMP standards. As EPA has acknowledged previously, PHA teams regularly suggest viable, effective (and inherently safer) alternatives for risk reduction which may include features such as inventory reduction, material substitution and process control changes. These changes are made as opportunities arise, without regulation oradoption ofcompletely newand unproven process technologies. Analyzing process changes requires considerable judgment by facility personnel with expertise in process safety, operations, health, environmental issues and security because the benefits ofpotential risk reduction measures must be balanced against a host ofotherfactors such as employee safety, public safety, environmental impact and ongoing operation and maintenance costs. Consequently, it is still the facility operatorwho is in the best position to have a comprehensive picture ofwhat may or may not be feasible and howthe facility environment will be impacted by process changes. Companies must be permitted to continue to use all risk managementtools and options at theirdisposal, and the consideration ofavailable options must be placed in the context ofthe complexities oftheir unique operating environments. Because ofthese complexities, regulating the use ofsafer alternatives is not practicable.Conclusion As stated in the beginning ofour comments, Axial! believes that compliance with the existing RMP standard already in place is effective in reducing chemical risk at chemical facilities. Compliance with already existing regulations is more likely to contribute to the reduction ofprocess hazards and chemical incidentsthan the promulgation ofadditional requirements forfacilities. Additionally, Axial! is concerned with the timeline presented by EPA in its RMP revision process. Axial! recommends that EPA and OSHA work as closely together as possible to coordinate boththeir review and rulemaking activities so thatthe regulated communitywill be able to effectively utilize existing resources while building astrong, chemical safety program which is the goal for all RMP stakeholders.

Axial! respectfully requests that EPA take into careful consideration the points provided in this correspondence priorto movingforward with any changes to the RMP standard.

Tim R. Cobaugh
Vice President, EHS&S