i

Shifting Human Environment:

How Trends in Human Geography Will Shape Future Military Operations

Paul T. Bartone & Mitchell Armbruster

Editors

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
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About the authors

Mitch Armbruster

Mitch Armbruster is a Research Assistant at the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. His work supports

futures research and U.S. national security policy. He is a Ph.D. candidate at the Catholic 

University of America, focusing on the security studies, alliance politics, and politics in the 

Middle East. Mitch’s dissertation examines how small members of an alliance can persuade their 

great power allies regarding threats. He holds an M.A. in politics from Catholic University and a 

B.A. in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles. 

Dr. Paul Bartone

Colonel (Retired) Paul T. Bartone, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University. Dr. Bartone’s research focuses on understanding and measuring resilient or 

“hardy” responding to stress, identifying underlying biomarkers for resilience, and applying this 

knowledge to improve selection, training and leader development programs. While on active 

duty, Bartone served as the Consultant to the Surgeon General for Research Psychology, and the 

Assistant Corps Chief for Medical Allied Sciences. He is past-President of the American 

Psychological Association’s Division 19 – Society for Military Psychology, a Fellow of the 

American Psychological Association and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 

Society, and a charter member of the Association for Psychological Science. Dr. Bartone holds 

an M.A. and Ph.D. in Psychology and Human Development from the University of Chicago.

Dr. James Keagle

Colonel (Retired) James M. Keagle, Ph.D. is the Director of the Emerging Challenges program at 

the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University. Prior to this position, Dr. Keagle served for nine years as the 

National Defense University’s Provost (effective 2004) and Vice President for Academic Affairs 

(effective 1999). While on active duty in the Air Force, Dr. Keagle served as a munitions 

maintenance officer, an assistant professor of political science at the Air Force Academy, and 

tours in political-military assignments that included direct access and interaction with Cabinetlevel government officials on national security related matters. Dr. Keagle holds a B.S. from the 

Air Force Academy, a M.A. from the University of Pittsburg, and a M.A. and Ph.D. from 

Princeton University. 
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Celina Realuyo

Celina Realuyo is Professor of Practice at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) where she focuses on U.S. national security, 

illicit networks, transnational organized crime, and counterterrorism issues in the Americas. As a 

former U.S. diplomat, international banker with Goldman Sachs, U.S. foreign policy advisor 

under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, and professor of international security affairs at the 

National Defense, Georgetown, and George Washington Universities, Professor Realuyo has 

over two decades of international experience in the public, private, and academic sectors. She 

holds an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School, a M.A. from Johns Hopkins University School 

of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a B.S. from Georgetown University School of 

Foreign Service, and a Certificate from l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris, 

France.

Dr. Paulette Robinson

Paulette Robinson, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Before 

joining CTNSP in 2013, she served as the Associate Dean for Teaching and Learning and 

Technology for the iCollege at National Defense University. Dr. Robinson is the leader for the 

Federal Consortium for Virtual Worlds, a group of over 1,600 individuals from government,

industry, and academia who are interested in the use of virtual worlds in government. She is coleading a project with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to provide secure access to virtual 

worlds for government. Before joining the Federal Government, Dr. Robinson was the Assistant 

Director for Academic Support in the Office of Information Technology at the University of 

Maryland. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland.

Albert Sciarretta

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Albert A. Sciarretta is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University. As a Senior Research Fellow, he assesses Army science and technology 

(S&T) efforts; as well as broader DoD technology and analytical needs. Mr. Sciarretta is also 

president of CNS Technologies, Inc., for which he supports DoD efforts related to assessing 

advanced military technologies, developing S&T investment strategies, and designing and 

executing tactical through operational demonstrations and experiment. A retired U.S. Army 

officer, Mr. Sciarretta’s service included operational assignments, instructing at the U.S. Military 
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Academy, acting as a technology officer on armored vehicle task forces, and serving as Assistant 

to the Chief Scientist, U.S. Army Materiel Command. He has dual M.S. degrees – Operations 

Research and Mechanical Engineering – from Stanford University and a B.S. degree in General 

Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy.

Hannah Snapp

Hannah Snapp interned at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, National Defense University during the summer of 2014 for Dr.

Paulette Robinson. She is currently a senior at Ohio Wesleyan University (OWU) in Delaware, 

Ohio, studying international relations, Spanish, and history. Ms. Snapp is an intern for the OWU

International and Off-Campus Program office (IOCP). She is also the sitting Parliamentarian for 

OWU Model United Nations Club. Ms. Snapp is interested in defense and security studies with a 

goal of working abroad after graduation.

Acknowledgments: This work was supported in part by the Office for Future Joint Force 

Development, J7-Joint Force Development Directorate of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials.
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Table	of	Contents

Preface..........................................................................................................................................................1

Megacities: Future Urban Environments and Joint Urban Warfare .............................................................3

Paul T. Bartone and Albert A. Sciarretta

Population Trends......................................................................................................................................3

The Growth of Megacities.........................................................................................................................4

Implications for Future Military Operations..............................................................................................7

References................................................................................................................................................12

Identity and Ideological Conflict: Influences of Religious, Cultural, and Pragmatic Ideologies on Political 

Groups.....................................................................................................................................................14

Albert A. Sciarretta

Importance of Ideology............................................................................................................................14

Identifying Ideological Biases.................................................................................................................15

Religious Bias ....................................................................................................................................15

Pragmatic Bias ...................................................................................................................................16

Cultural Bias.......................................................................................................................................16

No Predominant Bias .........................................................................................................................17

Additional Ideologies and Unclear Ideological Biases............................................................................17

Implications for Future Military Operations............................................................................................18

What Will Change in 2030?.....................................................................................................................19

Conclusions..............................................................................................................................................19

References................................................................................................................................................20

Nontraditional Security Threats and a New Kind of Warfare ....................................................................21

James M. Keagle

The Global Commons Under Siege .........................................................................................................22

The Hybrid Threat ..............................................................................................................................22

Access to and Stability in the Global Commons ................................................................................24

Chronically Fragile States ..................................................................................................................26

The Challenge of the Global Commons ..................................................................................................28

Outer Space ........................................................................................................................................28

Airspace..............................................................................................................................................29

Maritime .............................................................................................................................................29

Land....................................................................................................................................................29

Cyberspace .........................................................................................................................................30

Role of Defense Capabilities in Cyberspace ......................................................................................33

Space Assurance, Sea Control and Air Superiority ............................................................................34

A New Kind of Warfare...........................................................................................................................34

Implications for Future Military Operations............................................................................................35

Conclusions..............................................................................................................................................35

References................................................................................................................................................36
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The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat to U.S. National 

Security ..................................................................................................................................................37

Celina B. Realuyo

Overview..................................................................................................................................................37

The Transnational Criminal Organization Threat to U.S. National Security ..........................................38

U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.......................................................................39

Critical Enablers of Transnational Criminal Organizations ....................................................................40

The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations.............................................................42

The Criminalized State .......................................................................................................................42

The Convergence of Terrorism and Crime.........................................................................................43

Implications for Future Military Operations............................................................................................44

References................................................................................................................................................47

Uplinking into the Future: Education in 2030 ............................................................................................48

Paulette Robinson, Mitch Armbruster, and Hannah Snapp

Demographic, Economic, and Political Shifts.........................................................................................48

Trends in Teaching Methods and Techniques.........................................................................................50

Disruptive Technology in Education and Training..................................................................................54

Long Term Possibilities...........................................................................................................................57

Risks ........................................................................................................................................................59

Implications for Future Military Operations............................................................................................60

Conclusions..............................................................................................................................................61

References................................................................................................................................................62
1

Shifting Human Environment:

How Trends in Human Geography Will Shape the Future Operating World

Preface

In January 2014 the Center for Technology and National Security Policy was asked to examine 

some major trends within the domain of human geography, developments that will have 

important influence on the type of environments future military forces will be operating in. 

Experts were identified to address the following key topics:

• Population, migration and the development of megacities

• Technology change and education

• Ideological and cultural factors in conflict

• Irregular and hybrid threats

• Growth of transnational crime organizations and activities

One goal of this effort was to provide useful information to DoD policy makers engaged in 

future force planning and “futures thinking.” The papers contained in this volume all deal with 

major developments and trends in the human arena that are likely to change the way military 

forces must operate in the future. Each paper contains a section addressing anticipated 

implications for future military operations. And by presenting these papers as a package, the 

reader is encouraged to move beyond a simple recognition of particular trends, and consider how 

these factors may interact to shape a more complex and surprising future operating environment.1

As economic growth has spread to more and more of the developing world, an unprecedented 

level of migration to large urban centers has occurred in response. The first paper by Bartone and

Sciarretta explores the rise of these “megacities,” and what they mean for the future of U.S. 

defense policy. According to the United Nations, by 2025 there will be 37 megacities worldwide, 

up from 27 today. Up until now, the U.S. military has attempted to avoid operating in hostile 

urban environments whenever possible. Bartone and Sciarretta show that the military needs to 

develop significant urban warfare capabilities in order to effectively carry out future missions. 

Albert Sciarretta’s paper on ideology and decision making examines how bias shapes and 

informs the decisions that government and non-government groups make. Sciarretta reviews the 

various types of biases and ideologies that leaders have, including religious, pragmatic, and 

cultural beliefs systems. Understanding what these ideologies are, how they influence thought 

processes, and who possesses them is critical in order to develop strategies to face emerging 

threats.

																																																												

1

For a discussion of the perils of simple trend analysis and the value of more integrative thinking in future force 

planning, see Jeffrey Becker, “Contexts of future conflict and war.” Joint Force Quarterly, 74, 15-21 (2014).
2

One way that future adversaries are likely to employ force is through a mix of conventional 

warfare, irregular tactics, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyberattacks, and criminal 

behavior called hybrid warfare. James Keagle’s paper on hybrid threats explores the nature of 

hybrid threats and ways in which the U.S. can counter them. Understanding the hybrid threat is 

critical for, as Keagle explains, hybrid threats are often located in the global commons that the 

U.S. has sought to control. This paper is especially timely, as Russia has employed elements of 

hybrid warfare in its assault on Ukraine. As more and more actors turn to the tactics associated 

with hybrid warfare, the U.S. military must develop capabilities and strategies to counter them. 

Celina Realuyo’s paper addresses the rising threat the U.S. will face from transnational criminal 

enterprises. New opportunities, such as cyberspace, now allow transitional criminal elements to 

spread their operations further and faster than before. While the globalized economy has created 

previously unimaginable wealth and opportunities, it has also come with a dark side. 

Transnational criminal groups and international terrorists have used the same infrastructure to 

enrich themselves and promote their interests around the world. As transnational criminal 

networks become wealthy, they will seek to infiltrate and corrupt government institutions, 

creating in effect “criminal states” that protect and promote the interests of the gangs that control 

them. Transnational criminal networks have also found common cause with terrorist groups, with 

both operating in the same “governance gaps” that permit their behavior. A renewed whole of 

government approach to transnational criminal gangs will be necessary in order to combat this 

emerging threat. 

Robinson, Armbruster, and Snapp’s contribution on the future of education details how changes 

in technology and approaches are reshaping education, not only in the U.S. but around the world. 

New approaches to education, such as flipped classrooms, competency based education, massive 

open online courses (MOOCs), and mobile learning are challenging educational institutions to 

rapidly adapt. In addition, advanced technology makes education more affordable and accessible 

to more people, and further advances are expected to radically re-order the educational 

landscape. Virtual classrooms, augmented reality, 3D printing, and gamification are all 

challenging the traditional model of education. U.S. military leaders need to understand how 

these changes will both impact our society and how they will affect the rest of the world. 

Taken together, these papers describe an increasingly networked, technologically sophisticated 

and complex world that the U.S. military will have to operate in. By being aware of these trends, 

national security leaders and decision makers will be better equipped for the awesome task of 

anticipating future force challenges and requirements. 
3

Megacities: Future Urban Environments and Joint Urban Warfare

Paul T. Bartone

1

and

Albert A. Sciarretta

Urban operations are the most likely form of military operations facing our military forces in the 

future. More than half the world’s population now lives in cities, and the numbers are growing 

every year. Additionally, the complex topography of urban areas affords significant advantages 

to our adversaries, since dense urban infrastructures make it difficult for U.S. forces to fully 

employ long-range sensors and munitions. Moreover, civilian populations are an ever-present 

reminder of the need to avoid collateral damage. These issues associated with urban operations 

escalate tremendously when they must be conducted in a megacity. A megacity is one which has 

a population of 10 million or more. There are currently over 20 megacities in the world, and the 

number is growing rapidly. How should U.S. military forces be configured and equipped to 

function effectively in such environments? This brief concept paper addresses the rapid growth 

of “megacities” and the implications for future security and urban operations.

Population Trends

Several major population and demographic trend were recently identified by Professor Mark 

Haas of Duquesne University. 2 These are:

• High population growth in developing countries

• Massive population aging in developed countries

• Continued youth bulges in Africa and Middle East

• Growing gender imbalances in Asia and Europe

• Declining fertility in all regions

Strikingly, 98 percent of the world’s population growth from now to 2050 is expected to occur in 

developing countries, mostly in Africa, as well as India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. With the 

notable exception of the United States, most of the world’s developed countries are expected to 

decline in population. In addition, declining fertility rates in the developed world, along with the 

aging of previous “baby boom” generations, is going to mean increasing older populations. 

Figure 1 shows the median age increase in seven major world countries over a 100-year period. 

																																																												

1 bartonep@gmail.com

2 Information in this section draws upon material presented by Mark Haas at the J7 Futures Human Geography 

Seminar. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland, June 18, 2014.
4

Figure 1. Median Population Age in Major World Powers, 1950 to 2050

Country 1950 2000 2050 

United States 30.0 35.3 40 

France 34.5 37.7 42.7 

United Kingdom 34.9 37.7 42.9 

Russia 25.0 36.5 43.1 

China 23.8 29.7 48.7 

Germany 35.4 39.9 49.2 

Japan 22.3 41.3 52.3 

Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators.htm) as 

summarized by Mark Haas, J7 Human Geography Seminar, June 8, 2014. Cited with permission. 

Looking just at the period from 2000 to 2050, the most dramatic increase is occurring in China, 

where median age will increase by almost 20 years from 29.7 to 48.7. Germany, Japan, and 

Russia will increase by nearly 10 years, and the United Kingdom, France, and the United States 

by about 5 years. This will mean a smaller working age population in these countries, likely 

declines in gross domestic product, and growing government spending on providing support and 

care for the elderly. This trend will also create increasing pressure to decrease defense budgets in 

the affected countries. One implication for the United States is that traditional allies will be less 

likely to step forward and share the burden of military operations when called upon. In defending 

its strategic interests, the United States may have to act unilaterally to a greater degree than 

desired. 

The Growth of Megacities

Massive population growth in the developing world is coupled with increasing migration of 

people to urban environments. Across the globe, people are moving to cities in ever larger 

numbers. Many factors account for this trend, including better perceived economic opportunities 

in cities, declining job and farming prospects in rural areas, conflict and strife pushing people to 

seek safety in cities, and better health and education services.3 While this trend is apparent in 

cities of all sizes, the most rapid population growth is seen in what have been called 

“megacities.” Figures 2 and 3 graphically display the growth trend in world urban population 

from 1960 to 2025. Cities with 1 to 5 million people are shown as small yellow dots, 5 to 10 

million people as larger orange dots, and cities with greater than 10 million people as large red 

dots. 

The United Nations (UN) has somewhat arbitrarily defined a megacity as having a population 

over 10 million. In 1970, by this definition, there were two megacities in the world. By 2011, 

																																																												

3 As discussed in presentation by Peter Engelke, Migration and Urbanization: Overview and Implications. J7 Futures 

Human Geography Seminar. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland, June 18, 2014. Cited 

by permission.
5

there were 23.4 Today, there are 27.5 Projections are for 37 megacities worldwide by 2025.6

Today, more than half the world’s population lives in cities. By 2030, it is expected that twothirds of the world’s population will be living in cities, increasing to three-quarters by 2050.7

Megacities such as New York, London, and Tokyo have the resources, infrastructure, and 

systems to provide for the needs of their residents. However, most of the new megacities are in 

the developing world, with large numbers of poor, and have inadequate resources, infrastructure, 

and systems to support this growth. These sprawling metropolises are unable to keep up with 

their massive numbers of people, are chaotic and dangerous, and have limited or no basic 

services for health and education. Often they lack any semblance of effective government.8 As 

this urban growth continues and accelerates, the competition for food, water, and energy 

resources will also grow more acute. 

Figure 2. Global Urbanization, 1960

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 

http://esa.un.org/unup/Maps/maps_urban_1960.htm As presented by Peter Engelke at the June 18, 2014, Human 

Geography Seminar. Cited with permission.

																																																												

4 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. World Urbanization Prospects, 2011. New York: 

United Nations; 2012. 

5 Imhoff M., Brandenberger J., Calvin K., et al. Evaluating Long-term Threats to Environmental Security via 

Integrated Assessment Modeling of Changes in Climate, Population, Land Use, Energy and Policy. Understanding 

Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm, ed. Ehlschlaeger C. U.S. Army 

Engineer Research Development Center, Topical Strategic Multilayer Assessment. Available at 

www.kalevleetaru.com/Publish/Understanding-Megacities-Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Intelligence.pdf 6 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

7 For a summary of these trends, see Kilcullen D. Out of the Mountains: The Coming of Age of the Urban Guerrilla

Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013: 27‒31. 8 Liotta P.H., Miskel J.F., The Real Population Bomb. Washington, DC: Potomac Books; 2012.
6

Figure 3. Global Urbanization, 2025 

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 

http://esa.un.org/unup/Maps/maps_urban_2025.htm . As presented by Peter Engelke at the June 18, 2014, Human 

Geography Seminar. Cited with permission.

As more of the world’s population becomes concentrated in the sprawling urban environments of 

megacities, scarcities of food, water, and energy will lead to increased competition and conflict. 

Natural disasters such as earthquakes will continue to occur, and their impact may be greater as 

people are more concentrated in space. It is also the case that most megacities are located close 

to coastal areas, making them more vulnerable to tsunamis, typhoons, high winds, hurricanes, 

and flooding. Climate change can be expected to bring even more disruption. For example, a 

recent report by the National Research Council concludes that we know “beyond a reasonable 

doubt” that the consequences of climate change will be extensive.9 The report states that “given 

the available scientific knowledge of the climate system, it is prudent . . . to expect climate 

surprises in the coming decade, including unexpected and disruptive single events as well as 

conjunctions of events occurring simultaneously or in sequence, and for them to become more 

serious and more frequent thereafter.” With sea levels projected to rise due to global warming, 

littoral megacities are even more vulnerable to such disasters and flooding than inland cities 

are.10

The destructive impact of natural disasters will also be greater in megacities, and disaster 

response will be more difficult. Infectious diseases will also be more difficult to control in 

megacities where people are crowded together and sanitation and healthcare services are already 

weak or nonexistent. In megacities, the containment of deadly viruses, such as Ebola, becomes 

																																																												

9 National Research Council. Committee on Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on Social and Political 

Stresses. Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis. Washington, DC: The National Academies 

Press; 2012. 10 World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group. Development Actions and the Rising Incidence of Natural Disasters.

Washington, DC. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/developing_actions.pdf
7

almost impossible, as seen in the nightmare now being experienced in Freetown, Sierra Leone, or 

Monrovia, Liberia. All of this is a recipe for increased competition and conflict. Criminal groups, 

gangs, and cartels operating in megacities further increase the potential for violence and conflict. 

Megacities provide extensive cover for such groups, making law enforcement more difficult. The 

same is true for many radical ideological and religious groups, which increasingly will operate, 

plan, and train within the environment of megacities. The challenges and problems presented by 

future megacities go beyond what the military can address, of course, and will have to be 

confronted by all segments of the U.S. Government. The core role of the military is to provide 

force when necessary to protect national interests and security. While military operations have 

historically occurred mostly in open rural environments, in the future, demographic and 

urbanization trends dictate that military forces will have to operate much more frequently in the 

messy urban environment of megacities, against adversaries who will use asymmetric or 

irregular methods.11

As Kilcullen points out, these megacities are also characterized by dramatically increased levels 

of electronic connectedness, through the Internet, cell phones, and broadcast media.12 Even areas 

that are desperately poor and lacking in many basic services often have good access to the 

Internet, cell phones, radio, and television. For example, in the collapsed state of Somalia, as of 

2011 over 25 percent of the Somalian people were using cell phones.13 These communications 

technologies are being applied by groups on all sides of conflicts to increase awareness of what 

is happening in areas of operations, to share information, and to coordinate their actions. 

Communications technologies also make it possible for remotely located command groups to 

provide attacking forces with real-time information regarding developments around them, and 

minute-to-minute instructions on how to proceed. This is exactly what happened, for example, in 

the 2008 terror strikes in Mumbai, in which 10 attackers killed 172 people and wounded 304. 

The attacks were managed by a remote command cell in Karachi, Pakistan.14

Implications for Future Military Operations

Given that future military operations are more likely to occur in the urbanized, highly crowded, 

and riverine environments of littoral megacities, what are the implications for future military 

forces? The United States has proven its combat superiority on open terrain. However, many 

would argue that we do not have equivalent superiority in urban environments. This is not 

because American warfighters are less capable, but because our training, doctrine/tactics, and 

operational technologies do not provide the same advantages they provide in open, rolling 

terrain. The U.S. investment in large mechanized forces and air-to-ground engagement systems 

has provided military superiority in rural environments, but that investment does not address the 

complex urban environment, especially when constrained by rules of engagement that seek to 

minimize collateral damage. In an attempt to offset U.S. advantages in open terrain, adversaries 

often move the confrontation to the urban environment. To minimize civilian casualties and 

																																																												

11 Kilcullen. 12 Ibid., 32‒37. 13 Gagliardone I., Stremlau N., Digital Media, Conflict and Diasporas in the Horn of Africa. London: Mapping 

Digital Media Program of the Open Society Foundations; 2011: 9‒10. 14 Roy N., Kapil V., Subbarao I., and Ashkenazi I., Mass Casualty Response in the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks.

Disaster Management and Public Health Preparedness, 5. 2011: 273‒279.
8

collateral damage, U.S. commanders often choose to avoid battle in large urban areas. Our 

adversaries, however, have no such qualms about endangering noncombatants. Additionally, 

many of our strategic and operational command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems are often less effective in urban 

environments. Dense, complex structures and civilian populations make it harder to discern the 

enemy. U.S. urban doctrine for large complex cities is less tested, and our joint urban training is 

less well-developed. Current tactics and military equipment call for our military to enter a 

building mostly on the first floor (through doors and windows) or on the roof (using helicopters) 

and force the use of stairwells to move from floor to floor. Our enemies know this and will be 

able to design their defenses to exploit this limitation. The performance of U.S. warfighting 

systems will be severely limited in megacity environments. For example, huge buildings will 

block global positioning system (GPS) signals internally and degrade them externally, which will 

limit the use of precision-guided munitions, GPS-guided robotic systems, and GPS-based Blue 

Force Tracking systems. While the United States does not “lose” these battles, they reduce the 

nature of the fight to a war of attrition, which is a disadvantage to American forces.

Kilcullen provides an insightful and well-documented analysis of the implications of these 

developments for future military forces.15 By his account, there is a clear need for Marine and 

Special Operations amphibious forces, highly maneuverable Navy supply ships, and 

expeditionary logistics. Also important are rotary-winged aircraft that can move people and 

equipment quickly, as well as precision weapons and targeting systems that can operate in GPSdegraded environments and reduce collateral damage. Combat engineers and civil affairs units 

will be needed for many construction and rebuilding activities. Forces will need to be organized 

such that they can be rapidly reconfigured into smaller elements that can operate independently. 

Also, forces should be self-sufficient as much as possible with respect to food, water, and other 

essential supplies. C4ISR systems that can operate in noisy environments with extensive 

background clutter will be needed, as will sensor systems to provide early warning and 

delineation of problem areas. 

With respect to C4ISR systems, having small units (company through squad) integrated into the 

larger Service and joint networks is essential, especially Blue Force Tracking down to the 

individual warrior. Without this C4ISR integration in large, complex, joint urban operations, the 

probability of fratricide will be high. 

For all Services, more education and training time should be devoted to understanding the future 

operating environment of megacities, and littoral megacities in particular. The more we 

understand these complex environments, the better prepared we will be to conduct a range of 

operations within them. As F.G. Hoffman and G.P. Garrett have recently argued, preparing 

future military forces to operate effectively in these environments will necessitate a longer 

training and education pipeline, in order to acquire the needed culture and language skills as well 

as urban combat skills.16 Further, joint military education at all levels should incorporate the 

study of megacities, to include geographic, social, cultural, economic, and political aspects. Case 

																																																												

15 Kilcullen. 16 Hoffman F.G., Garrett G.P., Envisioning Strategic Options: Comparing Alternative Marine Corps Structures.

Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security; 2014: 13. 

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_MarineCorps_HoffmanGarrett.pdf
9

studies of megacity environments would be very beneficial in this regard and could include, for 

example, Mumbai (India), Jakarta (Indonesia), Lagos (Nigeria), Guangzhou (China), Karachi 

(Pakistan), Dhaka (Bangladesh), Mexico City (Mexico), and Sao Paulo (Brazil). 

Practical training to prepare forces for operating in megacity environments also merits greater 

emphasis. A 2006 report by the Defense Science Board indicated a pressing need for more 

realistic training facilities to train joint forces to operate in urban environments, with “urban 

training environments (physical, infrastructure, cultural, adversarial) large enough to ‘swallow’ 

a battalion.”

17 Unfortunately, this advice has not been heeded. Today, there are still no facilities 

available to adequately train a joint force operation in a large city. As an example, consider 

Operation Al Fajr (Arabic for “New Dawn”) in Fallujah, Iraq. An estimated 10,000‒15,000 

American troops launched Operation Al Fajr in Fallujah on November 8, 2004. This followed 

weeks of aerial bombardment by U.S. planes. A number of trained Iraqi forces also participated 

in the operation. Figure 4 shows the city of Fallujah, the U.S. military units participating in 

Operation Al Fajr, and the size of their operational sectors. Note the small black rectangular box 

in the upper left corner of the city. This depicts the size of a typical Military Operations on 

Urban Terrain (MOUT) training facility in the United States. 

There are numerous such MOUT training facilities in the United States, with one located at 

almost every military base. However, as Figure 4 makes clear, these are all quite small, and do 

not realistically represent the challenges of typical, let alone megacity, urban operations. The 

largest U.S. urban training facilities are found at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center 

(MUTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). However, even these somewhat larger 

MOUT facilities are lacking in realism, without a local population, transportation infrastructure, 

communications, utilities, radio signals, commerce systems, and other aspects of a living, 

breathing city. These training areas are insufficient to provide the operational realism and 

technical relevance required to evaluate a battalion-size urban operation while experiencing the 

aggregate effects provided by a realistic urban environment. This is an especially important issue 

for testing the performance of joint weapons and C4ISR systems in modern urban 

environments.18

																																																												

17 Defense Science Board Task Force, Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments. (March 2006) 

Defense Technical Information Center Accession Number ADA446191. www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA446191 

and www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA446191 18 Report on Joint Operations on Urban Synthetic Terrain Experiment. Defense Modeling and Simulation Office. 

(November 2004), https://sw.csiac.org/techs/abstract/548655
10

Figure 4. Comparison of a typical MOUT facility to the size of Operation Al Fajr

19

Source: Report on Joint Operations on Urban Synthetic Terrain experiment, Defense Modeling and 

Simulation Office, November 2004, abstract available at https://sw.csiac.org/techs/abstract/548655

More investment is needed in building realistic training and testing facilities for individual 

military service and joint operations. Battalion-size and larger “physical” facilities for training 

and testing are not necessarily needed. Perhaps the distributed integration of existing physical 

facilities with augmentation from computer-based and virtual training/testing facilities would 

provide a better approach. There is also a need for greater Navy and Air Force participation in 

urban warfare training facilities and exercises. The 2006 Defense Science Board report 

recommended that the Joint Urban Operations Activity (JUOA) at U.S. Joint Forces Command 

(JFCOM) focus its efforts on orchestrating more Service contributions to urban operations and 

take the lead in sponsoring a few major joint urban training exercises each year.20 Since JFCOM 

was disestablished in 2011 in a cost-cutting move, it is not clear if anyone in the Department of 

Defense has taken up the important role of JUOA. Some of the advances in educational 

technologies described by Robinson, Armbruster and Snapp (2015, this volume) could be applied 

in this context to provide cost-effective training and education for Urban Operations Activity. 

Advanced educational technologies, combined with realistic training facilities, could give us a 

relatively low-cost yet effective learning environment.

There are also implications for joint doctrine. Operations in littoral urban environments are not 

covered in current doctrine—for example, in the joint publication on amphibious operations21 or 

																																																												

19 Army Test and Evaluation Command proposal for Joint Urban Operations Integrated Live-Virtual-Constructive 

Tactical-to-Operational Test and Training Capability (JILT3C) Program. February 2007: 3 20 Defense Science Board Task Force. 42‒43. 1 21 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-02. Amphibious Operations. Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense; 2009.
11

in joint doctrine for forcible entry operations.22 In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps has given 

considerable attention to complex operations in urban littoral environments in its own operations 

doctrine.23 Joint forces doctrinal publications, as well as those of the Army and Air Force, need 

to be updated to include operations in the expected future operating environment of huge and 

complex coastal cities. 

If operations in complex urban environments are more likely in the future joint operating 

environment, consideration must also be paid to force structure and basing. For the U.S. Marine 

Corps, Hoffman and Garrett recommend a hybrid structure that preserves the capability to 

respond rapidly to major regional threats (for example, China) with sustainable force projection, 

while also providing expanded capacity to deal with small conflicts in urban environments.24

Under this proposal, four Marine Expeditionary Brigades would be based regionally, with one in 

the Western Pacific, one in the Mediterranean, and one on each coast of the continental United 

States. Approximately half of Marine battalions would be specialized for operations in the 

littoral, urban environment of megacities, as would the Marine Forces Reserve. These units 

would also regularly rotate into Special Operations units for joint training and support. 

While it is difficult to predict the future, the demographic trends are clearly leading to a world 

dominated by sprawling, crowded, and chaotic megacities, often with poor resources, weak 

governance, and a high potential for conflict. The U.S. Marine Corps is leading in efforts to 

prepare for such a future operating environment. The other Services and the entire Joint Force 

would be wise to do the same. 

																																																												

22 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense; 2012. 23 United States Marine Corps. MCDP 1-0. Marine Corps Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps; 2001. 24 Hoffman and Garrett. 12‒17.
12

References

Becker J. (2014). Contexts of future conflict and war. Joint Force Quarterly, 74, 15-21.

Defense Modeling and Simulation Office. Joint Operations on Urban Synthetic Terrain.

November 2004. https://sw.csiac.org/techs/abstract/548655. 

Defense Science Board Task Force. Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional 

Environments. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, March 2006. www.dtic.mil/get-trdoc/pdf?AD=ADA446191. 

Gagliardone I., and Stremlau N. (2011). Digital Media, Conflict and Diasporas in the Horn 

of Africa. London: Mapping Digital Media Program of the Open Society 

Foundations.

Hoffman F.G., and Garrett G.P. (2014). Envisioning Strategic Options: Comparing 

Alternative Marine Corps Structures. Washington DC: Center for a New American 

Security.

Imhoff M., Brandenberger J., Calvin K. et al. (2014). “Evaluating Long-term Threats to 

Environmental Security via Integrated Assessment Modeling of Changes in Climate, 

Population, Land Use, Energy and Policy.” In C. Ehlschlaeger, ed., Understanding 

Megacities with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm. U.S. 

Army Engineer Research Development Center, Topical Strategic Multilayer 

Assessment. www.kalevleetaru.com/Publish/Understanding-MegacitiesReconnaissance-Surveillance-Intelligence.pdf. 

Independent Research Group (2007). Development Actions and the Rising Incidence of 

Natural Disasters. Washington, DC: World Bank. 

http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/developing_actions.pdf. 

Kilcullen D., (2013). Out of the Mountains: The Coming of Age of the Urban Guerrilla. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Liotta P.H., and Miskel J.F. (2012). The Real Population Bomb. Washington, DC: Potomac 

Books.

National Research Council. (2012). Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security 

Analysis. Committee on Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on Social and 

Political Stresses. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Roy N., Kapil V., Subbarao I., and I. Ashkenazi. (2011). “Mass Casualty Response in the 

2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks.” Disaster Management & Public Health 

Preparedness 5, 273‒279.
13

United Nations (2012). World Urbanization Prospects, 2011. New York: UN Department of 

Economic and Social Affairs.

U.S. Department of Defense (2009). Joint Publication 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 

——— (2012). Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense.

United States Marine Corps (2001). Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps 

Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
14

Identity and Ideological Conflict: Influences of Religious, Cultural, and Pragmatic 

Ideologies on Political Groups

Albert A. Sciarretta1

Importance of Ideology 

Terrorist attacks are often described as being “indiscriminate,” implying that random violence is 

committed with little thought as to who or what is harmed. In practice, however, attacks by 

terrorist groups are rarely indiscriminate. Instead, target selection is determined by a number of 

factors, but mostly ideology – a set of ideas and beliefs of a group or political party.2 While 

ideology is not the only factor that determines whether a potential target is attacked, it provides 

an initial range of legitimate targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both 

to the outside world and to themselves. As an example of a factor other than ideology, terrorists 

may focus on the effects of an attack and the resultant publicity.

Ideology plays an important role in the decision-making processes of governmental and nongovernmental (e.g., terrorist organization) political groups. Ideology can provide an initial 

motive or justification for a decision or action. It can also act as a lens, albeit biased, through 

which a political group can view events and the actions of other people. Most individuals and 

political groups are motivated by an ideology, unless they are motivated purely by a desire for 

power and the benefits that come with it. 

This perception of the importance of ideology in planning and decision-making processes is 

validated in 1998 by C. J. M. Drake.3 The author evaluated numerous Western European 

terrorism case studies to surmise that ideology “provides terrorists with the moral and political 

vision that inspires their violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, and defines how 

they judge the actions of people and institution.” Drake further states that ideology “allows the 

terrorists to dehumanise those people whom they intend to harm – seeing them as symbols rather 

than as flesh and blood human beings.”

More recently, Austin L. Wright endorsed the importance of ideology.4 He developed a 

theoretical and empirical model, using data on Western European terrorism from 1965 to 2005. 

In his model-based analysis, he determined that ideology is the only consistent predictor of target 

selection by terrorists, even when other relevant strategic considerations are present. His results 

were particularly robust for nationalist-separatist groups and religious groups. 

																																																												

1 asciarretta@cnsti.com 2 Ideology. Merriam-Webster, n.d. (16 Sept. 2014) http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology 3 Drake C. J. M., The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection. Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 10. No. 

2; 1998: 53-85 4 Wright A.L., Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection. Department of Politics, Princeton University. Version 1.1, 

March 5, 2013.

16

jihad – a term often used to represent a religious struggle – is cited numerous times in the Quran. 

A non-violent religious person may use the Quran’s term jihad to support a non-violent inner 

religious struggle, in addition to the Quran’s opposition to killing innocent people. A person 

supporting violence may use the interpretation that jihad is an armed struggle against those who 

attempt to persecute or oppress Islam.

Similarly, religious biases may be seen in a person of Christian faith. In the Middle Ages, the 

Roman Catholic religion sanctioned the Crusades to secure Christian access to the Holy Land. 

Today, the “Christian right” (i.e., religious right) in the United States may support political 

decisions resulting in socially conservative policies. Just as the word jihad in the Quran can be 

used for peace or violence, so too can words in the Bible be used for peace (e.g., “...whoever 

slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also.”

6

) or for violence (e.g., text related to 

“an eye for an eye”7).

Pragmatic Bias

People who are strongly pragmatic, concerned about their country, host country, region, tribe, or 

terrorist organization, may argue that self-survival and loyalty are most important to the group’s 

decision. For example, a pragmatic leader of the Taliban – an Islamic fundamentalist political 

movement in Afghanistan, with diplomatic recognition in Pakistan – would oppose decisions that 

might result in political, economic, or military retaliation against the Taliban or Pakistan. 

Pragmatic bias has played a significant role in justifying major conflicts. Prior to World War II, 

Germany wanted to counter the Treaty of Versailles by restoring the boundaries of historic 

Germany, as well as reinvigorating national pride. Similarly, Japan needed to expand its 

boundaries because of its lack of vital natural resources. Today, Russia has cited similar 

justifications for its actions in Crimea and the Ukraine.

Cultural Bias

Eikelman states: “Culture refers generally to a set of implicit, widely shared assumptions about 

how things work in a society and how they ought to work – at least for one’s group of 

reference.”

8 A person with strong cultural values may use ideas of honor, revenge, retaliation, 

and shame to coax members of a group to take actions that would resonate with, for example, the 

Arab world. This use of culture to influence decision-making processes is reinforced by Briley’s9

description of how culture affects decision-making processes. For instance, Briley believes that 

European Americans are generally influenced by the positive consequences of a decision, 

whereas Asians appear to be more influenced by the negative consequences that may occur due 

to a decision or line of action. Cultural biases may also support illicit activities such as 

corruption and use of drug sales to finance activities. 

																																																												

6 New American Standard Bible. Matthew 5:39 7 New American Standard Bible. Exodus 21:23-21:25 8 Eickelman D.F., Culture and Identity in the Middle East: How They Influence Governance. Fighting Chance: 

Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment. Washington, DC: Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, National Defense University, Potomac Books, Inc.; July 2009: 160. 9 Briley D., Reasons as Carriers of Culture: Dynamic versus Dispositional Models of Cultural Influence on Decision 

Making. Journal of Consumer Research (JCR). Vol. 27; September 2000.
17

No Predominant Bias

A person or group with no predominant bias may place equal importance on religion, 

pragmatism, and culture – siding with the person who has the strongest religious, pragmatic, or 

cultural arguments. These individuals may also disregard all three ideologies and consider selfinterests as being most important. The desire for power and the benefits that come with it may 

significantly outweigh the importance of any ideology. 

Additional Ideologies and Unclear Ideological Biases

This paper focuses on three ideological types or biases – religious, pragmatic, and cultural – for 

several reasons. First, space limitations prevent a detailed study of many different ideologies. For 

example, terms such as political, social, ethical, and philosophical could be substituted for or 

included as additional terms in the above analysis. Second, the author’s experience in 

counterterrorism research10 has revealed that religious, pragmatic, and cultural biases worked 

quite well for the analysis of terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

Decisions can be significantly influenced by one’s past and/or current experiences – both 

ideological and non-ideological. This experiential bias may significantly augment or even alter 

ideological biases, affecting decision-making processes much more than any particular ideology. 

Preconceived notions developed while growing up, by watching television (especially American 

television), by viewing Web sites (especially propaganda Web sites), or by interacting with 

others on social media networks may have a huge impact on how an individual or ideological 

group perceives the need for or potential outcome of an action.11

In addition to identifying appropriate ideologies, it is important to recognize when ideologies 

might overlap, making it difficult to define a predominant ideology for an individual or group. 

For example, it is difficult to clearly define Islam as a religious or political (e.g., democracy, 

communism, socialism) ideology. It is a religion in the same context and group as Christianity, 

Judaism, Buddhism, among others. However, one could also consider Islam in the context of 

political/social structures such as socialism, communism, and democracy.

12 Islamic religious 

leaders are deeply involved with governments, militias, and armies throughout the Middle East. 

Examples of religious involvement with politics are the identification of religious leaders as 

political leaders (e.g., Supreme Leader of Iran13), the use of Islamic law (shariah) as the law of 

the land, and the banning of any speech deemed anti-Islam by Muslims. In addition, religion may 

create political linkages among nations. In Muslim countries, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan might be 

more closely aligned because of the preponderance of Shia Islam in those countries, while other 

																																																												

10 Participation in a Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG) counterterrorism research project, 2005-2006. Thrust of the effort was to use highly experienced 

counterterrorism experts to simulate the planning of a terrorist attack, and observe their thought processes. 11 Technical discussions with Michael Hopmeier, President, Unconventional Concepts, Inc., 7 May 2014 [Note: Mr. 

Hopmeier also participated in the CTTSO/TSWG counterterrorism research project, 2005-2006] 12 CTTSO/TSWG counterterrorism research project, 2005-2006. 13 The Supreme Leader of Iran is the head of state and highest ranking political and religious authority in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran.
18

Muslim countries might be aligned because of the dominance of Sunni Islam. Thus, Islam could 

be considered a “political religion.”

Religion may also overlap with culture. A religion may be as important as ethnicity – being 

Islamic may be just as important as being an Arab. In the case of Islamic religion and culture, 

they are closely intertwined. For example, a traditional interpretation of Islam may be used to 

prevent girls from attending school. However, in many other cases, culture is much more than 

religion and many cultures include multiple religions – as in “American culture” in the United 

States. In addition, throughout history, religions have split, creating splinter groups, each with its 

own beliefs and culture. It is no different in the Muslim world with Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

As a final example, consider the motivations of Islamic suicide bombers. Is the bomber taking 

his life because of a specific ideology: religious (oppose those who oppose Islam), pragmatic 

(loyalty to or survival of his family), or cultural (retaliation for actions against his tribe)? Or, is 

he merely seeking personal rewards in terms of money/care for his surviving family, personal 

fame, or the perceived belief of having access to 72 virgins in Paradise?14 Recent events have 

shown that a female suicide bomber may take her life to offset the personal shame associated 

with being raped. This notion has been used by terrorists to convert vulnerable women into 

suicide attackers. The mode of operation is to identify a woman, lure her somewhere to be raped, 

and then tell her that her only option for salvation is to become a suicide bomber.15

Implications	for	Future	Military	Operations

As described above, ideological biases can be used by individuals to persuade others and 

eventually come up with a plan or decision for which all members of a group agree. The 

understanding and manipulation of this dynamic can be extremely beneficial to U.S. decision 

makers. Once ideological biases of an individual or group are known, intervention techniques 

might be used to manipulate the biases and make ideological opponents undertake actions that 

are ultimately in the interest of the United States.

For example, a terrorist organization with dominantly pragmatic values would likely be 

interested in political and organizational survivability following attacks against Western targets. 

In order to preserve this interest, the terrorists might formulate a strategy that includes carrying 

out attacks against the United States with a degree of deniability to avoid pushing the United 

States into retaliating heavily against the terrorist organization and invading its host country. It 

may be assumed that eventually, a U.S. investigation will present clear proof that a terrorist 

organization was involved in the attack. Thus, following the attack, there will be a finite amount 

of time available for the terrorist organization to use an information operations campaign to 

influence various international elements to restrain the United States from retaliating. These 

activities might focus on both allies of the United States as well as allies of the terrorist 

organization. The latter effort might create enough of a potential threat to deter the United States 

																																																												

14 There is little agreement about the origin of “72 virgins in Paradise.” It may be an interpretation of a apocryphal 

passage of the Hadith, which indicates how Muslim men will be rewarded in Paradise (i.e., wed to these virgins). 

Putting aside its origin, it has become a popular belief as a reward for suicide bombers. 15 Iraq’s Female Bomb Recruiter. BBC News. February 4, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7869570.stm
19

from attacking. Knowing all of this, U.S. decision makers might want to significantly reduce the 

investigation time to identify the attacker(s), quickly launch a counter-information operations 

campaign, quickly strengthen ties with U.S. allies, and ensure that political and/or military 

retaliation is taken in a timely manner.

Similar actions should be considered for terrorist organizations that have predominantly religious 

or cultural biases. For religious biases, alliances with senior leaders of many religions may be 

helpful. Likewise, cultural leaders should be sought to speak up against terrorist organizations 

with predominantly cultural biases. For example, emphasis on the immorality of killing innocent 

women and children could have an influence on both biases. 

What Will Change in 2030?

The importance of ideological biases in future decision making will have little to no change, just 

as we have seen the importance of ideology-based wars throughout history and especially today. 

What may change is the manipulation of an ideology, as seen in the terrorists’ targeting of 

vulnerable women and converting them into suicide bombers.

Conclusions

Effective planning and actions by U.S. decision makers must include the ideological biases of 

perceived opponents. More effort must go into identifying the ideological biases of individuals as 

well as those shared by groups. The importance of ideological biases has not changed much 

historically, and it will continue to remain important in the future. It is increasingly important for 

military decision makers to view the actions of perceived opponents from the perspective of their 

ideologies.
20

References

Briley D., (2000). Reasons as Carriers of Culture: Dynamic versus Dispositional Models of 

Cultural Influence on Decision Making. Journal of Consumer Research (JCR). Vol 27.

Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG) counterterrorism research project. (2005-2006). For details, contact 

CTTSO/TSWG. For information on CTTSO, see http://www.cttso.gov/.

Drake C. J. M., (1998) The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection. Terrorism and 

Political Violence. Vol 10. Number 2. 53-85.

Eickelman D.F., (2009) Culture and Identity in the Middle East: How They Influence 

Governance. Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security 

Environment. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. National Defense 

University. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc. 157-172.

Hopmeier M., (2014) Technical Discussions. [Note: Mr. Hopmeier also participated in the 

CTTSO/TSWG counterterrorism research project, 2005-2006].

Malinowski J., (2014) Identity and Ideology. Presentation at the Joint Staff J7 Human Geography 

Futures Seminar. Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, June, 2014.

Wright A.L., (2013). Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection. Department of Politics, 

Princeton University. Version 1.1. http://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/filerepository/public/Wright_on_Terrorism.pdf
21

Nontraditional Security Threats and a New Kind of Warfare

James M. Keagle1

The global commons has long been best understood as addressing tangible physical space 

that falls outside the governance of the state. The notion of parklands in urban areas and 

suburban communities has evolved from this tradition. The central challenge has always been 

collective responsibility and management of these lands—think water rights in the Western 

United States, equitable use was the dominant consideration. As the notion of global commons 

expanded beyond tangible land to management of its resources—such as fisheries or the 

world’s ecosystem more generally—the requirement for responsible management shifted to 

supply management and protection of the planet’s ecosystem. These spaces may also

assumed increased geostrategic importance as strategic lines of communication. 

Now, the global commons in the 21st century security lexicon has expanded even further

to consist of outer space and cyberspace. Together, the aforementioned constructs “constitute

the fabric or connective tissue of the international system,” as Michèle Flournoy and Shawn 

Brimley noted in 2009.2 This is not much different from the ideas geo-strategist 

Alfred Thayer Mahan expressed in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. More 

than 100 years earlier he described the world’s oceans as “a great highway...a wide

common.” 3

Today, as we push the envelope further regarding our understanding and the importance of

the global commons, some suggest that the human species itself constitutes an essential

element of the global commons and that human rights, equitable development, ethnic

cleansing, and civil wars are legitimate parts of the expanding definition of the global

commons. Regardless, the global commons is an important part of regional and global

security and offers challenges and opportunities for cooperation as we share this planet.

Access to and development of the global commons remains important to an 

interconnected world. It is the notion that the use of the commons carries with it expense 

that brings with it fresh challenges. Part of this stems from the exploitation of the world’s 

resources in the name of globalization and the growing realization that there are finite limits to 

the world’s resources. Climate change add another dimension. Safe havens from which 

terrorists plan and launch their operations adds still another dimension. Finally, the emerging 

																																																												

1 Keaglej@ndu.edu

2 Flournoy M., Brimley S., The Contested Commons. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. July 2009: Vol. 135, No. 7. 

Note too that the inspiration for this work stems from the Global Commons Enterprise—a collaboration of 

NPS/CCMR. NDU/INSS, JFCOM/Joint Futures Group, and NATO/ACT. This introduction tracks closely with the 

July 2010 conference report introduction and specific charge, “Each partner may develop more detailed products 

related to the conference, as the conference was neither the start point, nor the end point for each member 

organization and their respective programs of research related to the issues in the global commons.” The paper 

more broadly draws on previous follow-on work Keagle writings in 2012 (DTP 97). 3 Mahan A.T., The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. In: Jablonsky D, ed. Roots of Strategy: Book 4. 

Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books; 1999: 3.
22

domains of space and cyber create new arenas for the states to contest—and develop 

conventions, rules and guidelines to regulate behavior. All of this suggests a world in which 

freedom of movement within the global commons may be increasingly competitive and 

constrained. Unlimited freedom to access and use the commons can and should no longer

be taken for granted. Real and perceived scarcity must be addressed—not through

conflict but rather through global and regional efforts to manage our planet and govern its

inhabitants more responsibly.

Now, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s claims of a resurgent Novorossiya, as well as the 

challenges posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the borderless region of 

Syria/Iraq (refugees, displaced persons, and brutal terrorist tactics combined with effective 

military operations) threaten even more directly standard military operations and doctrine. The 

purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of these security challenges and 

opportunities for expanded cooperation.

The Global Commons Under Siege

Three features of the current and expected operational landscape are most pressing, as noted

in the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review:

• Hybrid threats that blur traditional categories of conflict

• Assured access to and stability in the global commons

• Frequency and severity of problems with chronically fragile states.4

Each of these areas merits serious consideration and study.

The Hybrid Threat 

What is a “hybrid” threat, and what makes it different from other kinds of threats? What 

should the United States expect regarding hybrid threats in the future? These threats are 

characterized by several features:

• Adversaries are likely to seize the initiative and employ a mix of conventional

weapons, irregular tactics, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism,

cyberattacks, and criminal behavior, supported by an information campaign.

• Higher and lower intensity forms of conflict often converge, blurring the categories

and features of warfare.

• State or nonstate actors (or a combination thereof) employ a blend of two or more

components of the spectrum of conflict, including economic, diplomatic,

informational, and or/social domains.

The 21st century is filled with examples of these types of conflicts; two examples are the

Hezbollah efforts in Lebanon in 2006 and the array of Arab Spring movements beginning 

																																																												

4 Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review. Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Pt. I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) 

(1), February 2010. www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf
23

in 2011 in the greater Middle East. Most recently, we have witnessed the Russian annexation 

of Crimea and further intervention in Ukraine in 2014 with a significant information warfare 

campaign.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has launched brutal terrorist attacks on the peoples 

of Iraq and Syria under the pretense of establishing a caliphate. The movement’s savage 

killings and information campaign to recruit support became a principal focus of the 2014 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Wales. This more complicated threat

environment is captured in the next several illustrations.

The central message of Figure 1 is that force capabilities must adjust to meet new

security challenges. As we shift up and to the right in the figure, the role of large

conventional forces engaging one another diminishes and new requirements emerge. These

new security challenges provide opportunities for collaboration and cooperation—as well

as posing nontraditional threats to security establishments. This is likely to mean smaller

conventional forces and greater attention to special operations forces, intelligence collection,

and unmanned systems. More to the point, stability operations and irregular warfare have 

become co-equal with major military operations (traditional warfare). According to the 2008 

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.07 on irregular warfare, “It is Department of 

Defense policy to recognize that irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional 

warfare. We must maintain capabilities and capacity to be as effective in irregular warfare as 

in traditional warfare. We must be capable of conducting irregular warfare independently of, 

or in combination with, traditional warfare.”

5

Figure 1. Shifting Our Weight

Source: 2006 U.S. Army posture statement, “21st Century Security environment: Our Era of Uncertainty 

and Unpredictability,” available at www.army.mil/aps/06/04_21stCent.html

																																																												

5 Department of Defense Directive 3000.07. Irregular Warfare.l. December 1, 2008. 

http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/SWAAB/IW%20Reader/DoDD%203000.07%20IW%

20Directive.pdf
24

Figure 2 even more dramatically tells the new story that avoiding war (Phase 0) is just as or more 

important than waging war or combat.6 That means that even more resources and force structure 

will be diverted to the phases that precede and follow major combat operations (Phase III). 

Reinforcing this point, a recent the 2011 U.S. National Military Strategy states that stability and 

reconstruction missions (Phases IV and V) are now co-equal with major combat missions in 

terms of priority and importance.7

Figure 2. Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort

Source: Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011.

Access to and Stability in the Global Commons

Perhaps the most pressing issue in the Asia-Pacific region is the People’s Republic of China’s 

(PRC) anti-access/area denial strategy. The PRC has leveraged military modernization programs 

combined with forward positioning of anti-ship ballistic missiles and economic and diplomatic 

policies into a position of greater influence. Arguably, by posing a greater threat not only to 

Taiwan but also to the U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, the PRC is causing other Asia-Pacific 

nations to reconsider their longer term political and military strategic alliances. The United 

States, for one, has announced the now oft-repeated pivot toward Asia—and taken steps to 

strengthen military and political ties with nations constituting the second island ring around 

China, much like its containment strategy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. How all 

this plays out in the coming decades will largely shape the balance between conflict and 

cooperation in the region. Whether China is able to leverage the Shanghai Cooperation Council 

																																																												

6 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. May 2010. 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

7 Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense; 2011.
25

and other regional forums into effective tools of its long-term strategy of influence remains to be 

seen.8

The PRC has sought to wield this regional and global influence in the Arctic as well. The first 

step was to obtain observer status on the Artic Council in May 2013, followed quickly by 

announcing an expanded research and scientific polar institute. Climate change is beginning to 

open up the Northern Route as a potential revolution in the distribution of fossil fuel resources 

from supply locations to countries that are dependent on external sources for their energy needs. 

As the map in Figure 4 highlights, Russian territorial claims in the Arctic assert sovereignty over 

a strategically important potential fossil fuel transportation route. This becomes more than just a 

race to secure fossil fuel resources in the Arctic. The greatly reduced shipping distances via a 

route that hugs the Siberian coast (and may be under Russian control) may fundamentally 

diminish the value of the Malacca Straits and other key transportation networks that currently 

serve the world’s commerce. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea may prove 

insufficient to address these emerging issues.

Figure 4. Arctic Boundary Claims

Source: http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/wiredscience/2010/09/arctic-territory3.jpg

																																																												

8 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. July 2011. 

www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf
26

Incidents in similar contested spaces in the East China Sea (November/December 2013) and 

South China Sea (May 2014) suggest that longstanding conflicting claims to common spaces 

(with some economic or prestige value) remain at the forefront of interstate issues.

Chronically Fragile States

U.S. strategy has long concerned itself with economically and politically fragile states. 

Greater emphasis has been placed on this since the early days of the war on terror. Since 9/11, 

the language has included ungovernable or ungoverned spaces. A governed space is a 

geographic space over which a state authority has both the capacity and political will to exercise 

its sovereignty responsibly (for example, to maintain order and territorial integrity in conformity 

with the principles of secure international order based on state sovereignty). In an ungoverned 

space, state capacity and/or political will to exercise responsible sovereignty is absent. 

Ungoverned spaces can be further classified as anarchic, when a regime lacks the capacity to 

govern part or whole of country and no other actor has stepped in to fill the vacuum, and in the 

case of competing governance, when other actors attempt to fill the governance vacuum resulting 

from some mix of a regime’s inability or unwillingness to govern subnational spaces or exercise 

specific governance functions. This concept does not address ill-governed spaces: regimes that 

use the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which to engage in activities that pose threats 

to the international community. 

By 2010-2013, our focus began to shift from Afghanistan-Pakistan to Yemen and al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula as an ungoverned space that provided a terrorist safe haven and the al Qaeda 

splinter group that operated with impunity therein. The geographic expansion continued into the 

Horn of Africa and the Maghreb—and by 2014 attention had turned to Iraq/Syria and ISIS. 

Within counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, ungoverned spaces have become 

breeding grounds and sanctuaries for terrorist organizations to operate and conduct operations 

with impunity. What followed are capacity development programs to defeat, deter, and dismantle 

these organizations. Both in terms of governance capacity and political will, as Table 1 suggests, 

international cooperation will be key. Moreover, increased attention needs to be paid to 

recruitment locales, such as Karachi, versus sanctuaries.
27

Table 1. Capacity and Will

• Key components of governance capacity: 

o Security capacity (police, intelligence, paramilitary, military) 

o Administrative capacity (basic infrastructure, education system, public health and 

sanitation, public finance system) 

o Political capacity (channels for political participation, system of checks and 

balances, robust government organizations) 

• Key components of political will: 

o Leaders’ volition to exercise governance in conformity with the principles of a 

secure international order based on state sovereignty. Volition is shaped by 

cultural, historical and legal contexts 

o Leaders’ willingness to expend resources and political capital to do so 

Whether best understood as nation-building, stability and reconstruction operations, or long-term 

economic development, any development program will pose security challenges and 

opportunities for cooperation for the foreseeable future. One of these is the difficult challenge of 

discriminating between civil wars, wars of external aggression, and genocide. The world has 

taken a clear position on genocide: “never again.” Yet obtaining consensus for collective action 

in these cases remain extremely difficult, however clear the facts on the ground may seem to 

some. As the world wrestles with a period of tight and austere budgets, finding the funds for 

long-term socio-political and economic development and war avoidance strategies will be 

difficult. The 2014 ISIS claims of a caliphate and military and recruiting success in the Syria/Iraq 

region directly challenge the West for an effective strategic response. Muslim/Arab and Western 

democracies must integrate their instruments of power into a coordinated effort to meet the 

threat. Topping the list of the tasks at hand are the following: addressing the government in 

Baghdad, ISIS savagery and genocide, ISIS economic pillaging of the oil and financial sectors, 

and its employment of social media recruitment methods.

While not limited to fragile states, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 

constitutes fertile ground for regional cooperation. Be it in response to the 2011 earthquake off 

the coast of Japan and subsequent tsunami and nuclear reactor breaches, or the tsunami that 

devastated Indonesia in 2008, HADR has been an essential element of the world’s collective 

response to tragic natural events. The Transformative Innovation for Development and 

Emergency Support (TIDES) program shows initial promise for such collaboration. Its goals 

include leveraging global talent, integrating multiple approaches, and sustaining longer term 

development through private sector investment. It supports the basic needs of stressed 

populations by focusing on key infrastructures—water, power, shelter, cooking, cooling and 

heating, lighting, sanitation, and information and communications technology. TIDES goes 

beyond HADR to broader support for civil authorities and building their general capacities.9

																																																												

9 See the STAR-TIDES Web site at www.star-tides.net for a more complete description of the TIDES program.
28

The Challenge of the Global Commons

Whether understood as air, land, sea, cyber, or space, these domains of the global commons 

comprise the infrastructure on which the global system operates and through which its major 

components—information, people, commerce, finance, technology, or military muscle—flow. 

Individual, national, and global prosperity and governance depend on this interconnected and 

interdependent network of relationships that operate within and across these domains. Prosperity 

and freedom can be enhanced or threatened depending on how security challenges and regional 

cooperation efforts are balanced.

Outer Space 

Society has become dependent on capabilities and information delivered to, from, and through 

space. Perhaps the most dramatic of these examples is the prosecution of the war against al 

Qaeda. While some of the operational details remain unknown to the general public, it is 

commonly understood that the combination of special operations forces and intelligence officers 

relies on outer space to transmit data in near real time regarding the location of individual human 

targets and the subsequent application of lethal force (via drones) across international airspace 

and sovereign borders. This new kind of warfare may define conflict for the next several 

decades.

Furthermore, resourceful adversaries may leverage asymmetric technologies and unconventional 

approaches to circumvent traditional advantages, negate core strengths, and exploit 

vulnerabilities of competing forces. They could exploit the outer space commons in a variety of 

challenging ways:

• Offensive computer network operations and electronic warfare with kinetic first strikes 

could disrupt battlefield network information and space systems.

• Space systems could deny the use of reconnaissance, early warning, communications, 

navigation, and weather satellite assets that enhance land-based military operations.

Equally important, we have become highly dependent on space for more routine 

communications, be it the use of global positioning systems for everyday transport of goods, 

people, and services from one location to another, or the more secure transmission of information 

that is the lifeblood of international financial markets. Figuring out the rules and codes of 

conduct that should govern this domain is both a commercial and governmental responsibility—

and one that demands cooperation and reconciliation of competing views and cultures. It goes far 

beyond simple declarations regarding prohibitions on weapons in space or antisatellite weapons. 

Space debris poses dangers in space, and when it falls to Earth, may threaten people in its path. 

Space law and emerging capabilities regarding co-orbital intercept systems, attribution, 

proportionality, and escalation (breaking through previously declared red lines) all merit 

significant international attention. Lastly, no one in the Asia-Pacific theater can ignore the 

challenges that WMDs pose. Cooperative ballistic missile defense offers one area of cooperation 

for peacefully managing the global commons and addressing those who pursue provocative 

military policies.
29

Airspace

Closely related to the challenges WMDs pose in space, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles 

could threaten ships at sea, civilian population centers, or military build-up areas. Fourthgeneration fighter aircraft and sophisticated air defense weapons could put in question local air 

supremacy or superiority.

Drones and other remotely operated or unmanned systems provide challenging international 

issues as we target terrorists hiding in sanctuaries. We face an immediate future in which 

domestic airspace will be a focus of the debate about the use of drones. We need to wrestle with 

the legal and airspace management issues associated with these systems operating over the 

homeland—and the pass-off challenges as the systems cross international boundaries.

Maritime

While state actors have been the traditional threat in regard to interrupting or denying lines of 

communications and challenging assured access to strategic resources, nontraditional threats are 

reemerging and are worthy of regional efforts to diminish if not deny their effect. Maritime 

terrorists, pirates, and criminal organizations are appearing with increasing frequency and 

complicate the defense challenges in the maritime domain. Swarming as an operational tactic has 

become increasingly common, and will likely continue to be so. Since the “enemy” often enjoys 

the advantages of seizing the initiative in battle, our forces must also adopt similar attributes of 

flexibility and speed (and stealth) to be able to respond in time. This will undoubtedly require 

cooperation and collaboration in information and intelligence sharing as well as potentially 

pooling national assets.

Expanded interests in off-shore resource development and exploitation also offer opportunity for 

cooperation as well as conflict. Be it energy in the Spratly Islands or the Arctic or minerals ripe 

for deep seabed mining, we will need more cooperation in the future to address the challenges of 

prosperity, peace, limited resource supply, and growing resource demand.

Land 

Perhaps the two most dramatic examples of this changing domain come from Central and South 

Asia. First, the International Security Assistance Force operation felt the pain of its curtailed land 

route through Pakistan using Karachi as a port of entry. The Northern Transportation Network, 

which is much more dependent on air bridges, ultimately proved satisfactory—but at a much 

higher cost.

Second, as the international community seeks opportunities for the economic development of 

Afghanistan, it is constantly reminded of the challenges of landlocked states. The future is often 

linked to a modern-day Silk Road, with trucks replacing camels and pack mules as the preferred 

mode of transportation. Moreover, if Afghanistan can finds ways to unlock its projected mineral 

wealth, then more will flow on these new roads than silk rugs and tea. Still, the inherent 
30

advantages of maritime transportation make forecasting the economic success of a new Silk 

Road problematic.

Cyberspace 

U.S. policy spokespersons repeatedly identify cyber as the greatest single security threat. 

Cyberspace integration brings new levels of vulnerability and the potential for mass disruption of 

infrastructures or functions across critical military, political, and economic targets. Complicating 

the challenge is that the overwhelming majority of targets are in the private sector, demanding a 

degree of cooperation and (classified and sensitive) information sharing across boundaries rarely 

crossed in the past.

The DOD Cyber Strategy was released in 2011. It is intended for the whole of government and 

contains five strategic initiatives:

1. Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DOD can 

take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential.

2. Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks and systems.

3. Partner with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and the private sector to 

enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy.

4. Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen 

collective cybersecurity.

5. Leverage the Nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid 

technological innovation.10

Strategic initiative 4 addresses directly the need for international cooperation:

“The development of international shared situational awareness and warning 

capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence. By 

sharing timely indicators about cyber events, threat signatures of malicious code, 

and information about emerging actors and threats, allies and international 

partners can increase collective cyber defense. Cyberspace is a network of 

networks that includes thousands of ISPs [Internet service providers] across the 

globe; no single state or organization can maintain effective cyber defenses on its 

own.”

11

At least two specific concerns complicate the problem for international and national security 

specialists:

• Advanced persistent threat–class malware attacks (targeted, zero-day, stealthy) are real 

world possibilities.

• While cyberspace relies on the digital infrastructure of individual countries, such 

infrastructure is globally connected.

																																																												

10 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. July 2011. 

www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf

11 Ibid. 
31

We are faced with similar challenges to those discussed already regarding space: domain 

incident characterization, attribution determination, firewalls versus active defense mechanisms 

in an asymmetric environment, proportionate retaliation, and the enforcement and adjudication 

mechanisms. An international cooperation regime seeking to support responsible behavior and 

oppose and dissuade those who seek to disrupt network systems would need to share warning 

capabilities, engage in capacity building, and conduct joint training activities.12

Since criminal exploits, military or industrial espionage, critical infrastructure infiltration or 

sabotage, and nationalist hacker protests might represent elements or techniques of cyberwarfare, 

figuring out appropriate cooperative as opposed to individual responses will be difficult. Such 

increased sharing and cooperation is far simpler to describe in a strategy document than to 

implement in practice. Some of the tough questions that demand common answers follow.

Incident Characterization in Cyberspace

• Is cyber warfare characterized as simply “an armed conflict conducted in whole or part 

by cyber means?” (JCS Joint Terminology)

• In addition to “military operations to deny an opposing force the effective use of 

cyberspace systems and weapons,” how does the world commonly address cyber 

intrusions on governmental services, financial enterprises, and media outlets? Would 

attacks cross the threshold for an act of war if adversaries cause physical damage to 

energy, water, or transportation systems?

Attribution Determination in Cyberspace

The difficulty in identifying attackers with a high degree of confidence in a timely manner 

complicates deterrence, preemption, and common response strategies. Botnets and proxy servers 

enable attackers to operate with anonymity and impunity. Advanced persistent threats conceal or 

avoid detection of attacker identities. Challenges in detecting attacks or breaches and attributing 

correctly delay target identification and retaliatory response. Failure to detect intentions, moves, 

and origins stalls preemption and could lead to overreactions and miscalculations.

One solution to the threat of cyberattacks is resilient, layered, active cyber defenses. However, 

ownership of these defenses and the proper burden sharing responsibilities are unanswered 

questions that still need to be addressed. Is this a shared responsibility? What is the nature of the 

(financial) burden sharing? Protecting the computers, networks, and control systems in defense 

and civilian sectors requires a multilayered, defense-in-depth strategy that wields active security 

defenses. What does active defense mean? Sniping?

One place to begin is with protecting civilian and military cyberspace physical assets (computers, 

servers, controllers, cables, transmitters, satellites, and sensors—the potential targets) and their 

vulnerabilities. Next, national and collective responses are needed to develop capabilities, 

including protocol filters, content sensors, behavioral anomaly scanners, and forensic analysis, to 

																																																												

12 The White House. National Security Space Strategy. January 2011. 

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/. 
32

detect and stop, or discover and mitigate, malicious activity. Again, we need a significant 

investment in resources for these detection capabilities and a common agreement as to what 

constitutes malicious activity.

Obviously, this demands public, private, and international partnerships that share threat 

intelligence, analyze vulnerabilities, and identify risk mitigation strategies. This is far easier to 

describe in words than execute in practice, particularly in an environment that long operated on a 

need-to-know basis and with very limited sharing across national and bureaucratic boundaries.

Proportionate Retaliation in Cyberspace—and the Cross-Domain Challenge

Even if the attackers are known with certainty, a challenge exists in determining which incidents 

justify responses that involve specific uses of force.

• What are the thresholds? Substantial deaths, secondary kinetic damage, or cascading 

economic losses could justify proportionate retaliation by cyber or kinetic means.

• Does a right to counterstrike in self-defense exist if attackers target financial systems, 

public sectors or utilities such as power grids, communications networks, or critical 

defense industries?

• If origins are traced and force is the response, can collateral damage be avoided or limited 

to acceptable levels if the intrusions were launched through thousands of hijacked 

computers in third-country or target nation sites?

• Key role of signaling—how will the various actors in the “partnership” interpret the event 

and construct a common response that clearly and unambiguously signals intent and 

intended consequences (in order to avoid an escalation spiral)?

Overlapping Jurisdictions

Transnational cyber incidents underscore overlapping jurisdictions that pose control concerns for 

prosecution.

• If an attack originates from servers linked to multiple sources, sufficient evidence might 

not exist to confirm an endorsed attack from a single or multiple sources/governments; if 

the source is not a nation, what is the response, and against whom is it targeted?

• Some transnational investigative cooperation is required to enforce a commonly agreed 

body of criminal laws and to prosecute actors for attacks generated from sovereign 

territory, and it is complicated by routing of attack traffic and information acquired 

through compromised servers in a third-party country. What will be the venue for 

developing that internationally accepted body of law? How will differing standards of 

privacy be reconciled?

• Some countries may not be willing to compromise sources and methods to reveal 

knowledge.

• Some countries may not be willing to acknowledge they are blind to a specific event and 

need outside assistance (acknowledging a vulnerability).
33

• The best and most timely information may be in hands of the private sector (much like 

CNN effect that competed with our intelligence community for the ear of the commander 

in the 1980s); there is a growing body of research about crowd sourcing in the era of 

social networks that needs common attention.13

• Prosecution of enraged citizens, dedicated activists, and criminal elements, many of 

whom reside outside the targeted nation, might not still be feasible given attribution 

challenges and legal costs. All of this returns to the discussion of failed or near-failed 

states and their vulnerabilities.

One obvious conclusion is that internationally acceptable rules could promote order in 

cyberspace by encouraging states to meet their duties in protecting citizens from crime, 

upholding the right of self-defense, and applying rules of modern warfare. But that will be a long 

and difficult road to navigate.

Role of Defense Capabilities in Cyberspace 

Defense capability development considers how to counter competitors who wage warfare in the 

commons. The identification and fielding of overwhelming force, both as a deterrent and a 

defensive capability, might include abilities in the following areas:

• the traditional use of firewalls for data and critical infrastructure protection

• vulnerability mapping and anomaly detection

• attack mitigation and resiliency

• active defenses

It is worth noting that General James Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), former Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in May 2012 that the United States needed to protect its military 

systems, including the stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, from hackers: “That’s the reality of the 

battlefield we are going to be in.” Cartwright went on to add that “in military terms of offense 

and defense we are thinking 90 percent defense, 10 percent offense. That is ‘bass-ackwards’ for 

us. Our job is to kill things.”

14 This theme was reinforced with the public release of the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency’s efforts on Plan X. As Ellen Nakashima reports, this is 

part of an “ambitious effort to develop technologies to improve cyberwarfare capabilities, launch 

effective attacks and withstand the likely retaliation.” Or, as she summarizes, this “push marks a 

new offensive phase.”

15

One way to move ahead in this new world is to emulate NATO’s Smart Defense concept among 

partners worldwide. According to Henrik Breitenbauch and Bastian Giegerich, Smart Defense is 

a game-changer regarding defense planning and weapons procurement, in that it is based on true 

																																																												

13 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 9. 14 Pincus W., Retired General Talks Frankly on Defense. The Washington Post. May 22, 2012: 9A. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/retired-gen-james-cartwright-offers-a-fresh-view-ondefense/2012/05/21/gIQArRMTgU_story.html

15 Nakashima E., U.S. Builds a Cyber ‘Plan X’. The Washington Post. May 31, 2012; A1, A6. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/with-plan-x-pentagon-seeks-to-spread-us-military-mightto-cyberspace/2012/05/30/gJQAEca71U_story.html
34

international cooperation. They conclude that international burden sharing is a must—and that 

products and projects must “include partners from two or more allied nations.”

16 Some areas for 

possible collaboration are noted below.

Space Assurance, Sea Control and Air Superiority 

As rivals look for opportunities to degrade U.S. control over the global commons, they will 

increasingly look to asymmetric avenues to attack U.S. interests. Areas of the global commons 

where the U.S. is virtually unchallenged—specifically space, sea, and air—will be threatened by 

states and non-state actors using elements of hybrid warfare. 

While weapons systems designed to strike satellites are probably out of reach for most non-state 

actors, states will continue to look to ways to gain an advantage in space. In 2007, the PRC shot 

down a defunct Chinese satellite using a ground based missile system. Since then, the PRC has 

continued to develop their ability to strike space based assets. There are several ways that the 

U.S. can respond. Improved satellite protection, including redundancy, data encryption, physical 

hardening, and increased maneuverability will be critical. Emphasis on space situational 

awareness must improve in order to help the U.S. determine the intentions and attributing actions 

of foreign actors regarding U.S. space assets. Finally, U.S. space based systems must have a 

rapid reconstruction capability in order to replace critical assets that have been destroyed or 

disabled.17 Recent initiatives from OSD Space Policy have begun to develop a common 

vocabulary for space resilience. Be they in the form of disaggregated, diversified, proliferated, 

or distributed systems that rely on active and passive countermeasures and deception, such 

efforts must be in balance with deterrent initiatives to maximize the survivability and recovery of 

space assets.

Opponents will attempt to counter overwhelming U.S. sea and air power in the same fashion. 

Instead of direct challenges, rivals will develop capabilities to destroy or disable U.S. naval and 

air assets through irregular avenues. The U.S. should respond by hardening fleet protection and 

seeking to destroy enemy combat networks that enable their hybrid capabilities. Degradation or 

destruction of enemy air defense systems will be crucial in order to allow U.S. air power to 

operate in hostile situations. The Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop (OODA Loop) needs to 

evolve to account for compressed time horizons. The need to “shoot first” will lead us towards 

rules of engagement and predetermined firing procedures will take humans further from the 

decision loop to employ lethal force in specific situations.

A New Kind of Warfare 

Beyond the global commons is a contest for the loyalty of and political dominion over ethnic 

nationalities around the globe. Putin calls this Novorossiya. He has laid claim to Crimea and 

pressured other neighboring countries (Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Kazakhstan) with large 

																																																												

16 Breitenbauch H., Giegerich B., A Smart Opportunity. Defense News, May 21, 2012. 

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120520/DEFFEAT05/305200007/A-8216-Smart-8217-Opportunity. 17 Shalal A., Analysis points to China's work on new anti-satellite weapon. Reuters. March 17, 2014. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/us-china-space-report-idUSBREA2G1Q320140317
35

Russian minorities. Thugs, criminal gangs, and volunteers better describe the adversary—not 

soldiers.

Military intelligence and special operations forces permeate the leadership of such groups that 

operate with or without uniforms. They tend to rely on light weapons rather than tanks, planes, 

and ships. Operations tend to include systemized and organized attacks on police stations, 

government buildings, and the like, not attacks on large or small military units. They pursue 

flexible goals based on the resistance encountered, with no fixed timetables for victory. Almost 

always, this new kind of warfare includes a heavy dose of propaganda targeted at ethnic 

groups—the idea of “coming home to Mother Russia,” for example. This poses both political and 

military new challenges for militaries. Avoiding civil wars and confronting the adversary directly 

will be increasingly difficult in this new security environment.

Implications for Future Military Operations

These changes will shape tomorrow’s Joint Forces. The traditional size and composition 

emphasis on large forces with heavy firepower will be increasingly vulnerable and ineffective in 

the new security environment. More agile and flexible forces that can operate in austere 

environments with limited infrastructures will more likely define the future force. Resources will 

need to be shifted from carrier battle groups, air supremacy fighter wings, and armor and artillery 

units to special forces, intelligence operatives, and drones. The Joint Force will need to increase 

its resourcing of the cyber and space domains as well as culture and language education and 

training. The Joint Force will also need to develop specialists in communications attuned to 

messaging and counter-narratives.

Conclusions 

Nontraditional security threats increasingly occupy the time and resources of national security 

professionals. The cyber domain has the attention of many of us, but other domains also are rife 

with threats and opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. Given the broad array of threats 

across a number of domains, the Asia-Pacific region should expand its emphasis on cooperative 

efforts to reduce the likelihood of war—and if that fails, mitigate its effects. These new threats 

pose enormous challenges in developing a common value base. Following through with a shared 

set of responses will require constant vigilance and perhaps nearly instantaneous or even preemptive actions in order to protect and advance the security, prosperity, and freedom of likeminded nations and peoples. Ultimately, protecting these interests may require the supreme 

sacrifice of blood and treasure. We must hope that we are up to the challenge.
36

References

Breitenbauch H., Giegerich B., A Smart Opportunity. Defense News, May 21, 2012. 

http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120520/DEFFEAT05/305200007/A-8216-

Smart-8217-Opportunity.

Department of Defense. (2010). Quadrennial Defense Review. Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, 

Pt. I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1). 

www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07. Irregular Warfare l. (2008) 

http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/SWAAB/IW%20Reader/Do

DD%203000.07%20IW%20Directive.pdf. 

Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. (2011). 

www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf. 

Flournoy M., and Brimley S., (2009). The Contested Commons. U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings. Vol. 135, No. 7.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Mahan A.T., (1999) The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. In: Jablonsky D, ed. Roots of 

Strategy: Book 4. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. 3.

Nakashima E., (2012). U.S. Builds a Cyber ‘Plan X’. The Washington Post. May 31. A1, A6. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/with-plan-x-pentagon-seeks-tospread-us-military-might-to-cyberspace/2012/05/30/gJQAEca71U_story.html

Pincus W., (2012). Retired General Talks Frankly on Defense. The Washington Post. 9A. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/retired-gen-james-cartwrightoffers-a-fresh-view-on-defense/2012/05/21/gIQArRMTgU_story.html

Shalal A., (2014). Analysis points to China's work on new anti-satellite weapon. Reuters. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/us-china-space-reportidUSBREA2G1Q320140317. 

The White House. (2010). National Security Strategy of the United States.

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 

The White House. (2011). National Security Space Strategy.

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/. 
37

The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat to U.S. 

National Security

Celina B. Realuyo1

Combating transnational criminal and trafficking networks requires a multidimensional strategy 

that safeguards citizens, breaks the financial strength of criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts 

illicit trafficking networks, defeats transnational criminal organizations, fights government 

corruption, strengthens the rule of law, bolsters judicial systems, and improves transparency. 

While these are major challenges, the United States will be able to devise and execute a 

collective strategy with other nations facing the same threats. 

— U.S. National Security Strategy, May 20112

Overview

In the 21st-century global security environment, we are facing a complex set of threats to U.S. 

national security emanating from state and non-state actors. These threats endanger the key 

responsibilities of the nation-state to its citizens: to guarantee their security and the nation’s 

territory, promote economic prosperity, safeguard society, and ensure that the government 

represents their will. Illicit networks that include terrorists, criminals, and proliferators are 

presenting unprecedented asymmetrical threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. The tragic 

September 11, 2001, attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda are just one such example of threats from 

non-state actors. 

Besides terror groups, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are among the non-state 

actors that leverage their illicit activities, immense resources, and use of violence to undermine 

the security and prosperity of the United States and partner nations. The United States recognizes 

TCOs as a national security threat and has deployed a national security strategy to combat it. In 

order to attack these networks, the United States must understand and deny access to critical 

enablers needed by TCOs to operate.

The future trajectory of transnational criminal organizations is disconcerting, as they will seek to 

penetrate new markets with goods and services and establish more spheres of influence using 

corruption and violence. The cyber domain will afford them a new operating environment to 

further expand their criminal activities. Some TCOs will continue to resemble multinational 

corporations focused on maximizing profits, while others will hijack political power in the form 

of criminalized states. Another dangerous and disturbing evolution that we are already 

witnessing is the convergence of terrorism and crime where groups use criminal proceeds to fund 

terrorist activities. To combat the evolution of these threats, the Joint Force will need to develop 

more innovative kinetic and non-kinetic measures and build its own networks to neutralize 

transnational criminal networks. 

																																																												

1 RealuyoC@gc.ndu.edu

2 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. May 2010; 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
38

The Transnational Criminal Organization Threat to U.S. National Security

Globalization has dramatically improved our quality of life over the past 30 years, providing us 

with products, services, information, and technology—faster, cheaper, and better. We have seen, 

however, a darker side of globalization, with terrorism, armed conflict, international crime, 

movement of U.S. jobs to overseas markets, and economic crises dominating our headline news. 

Non-state actors, including criminals, terrorists, and proliferators, leverage the global 

marketplace with illicit activities to promote their respective interests around the world; such 

activities threaten the national security of the United States and its allies. The transnational 

trafficking of drugs, arms, people, and counterfeit goods and the money laundering that 

accompanies these illicit activities compromise the safety of consumers, rob inventors of their 

intellectual property, deny governments significant tax revenues, and undermine our economies. 

In contrast to nation-states or terrorist groups with political or ideological aspirations, 

transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are driven primarily by greed. According to the 

White House definition, transnational organized crime (TOC) refers to: 

those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally 

for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary, and/or commercial 

gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through 

a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities 

through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of 

transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.3

Crime and corruption have existed since the dawn of civilization and traditionally have been 

addressed as local security issues. In an age of globalization, the scale and velocity of 

transnational organized crime, driven by interconnected economies and technological advances 

and engendering record levels of violence, have transformed it into a global security threat. 

According to Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.):

Criminal networks have the advantage of three primary enablers. First are the 

huge profits realized by transnational criminal operations. Second is the ability of 

these organizations to recruit talent and reorganize along lines historically 

limited to corporations and militaries. The third is their newly developed ability 

to operate in milieus normally considered the preserve of the state, and often 

referred to as the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of 

national power.4

TCOs do not respect the rule of law, sovereignty, or human rights, and they wield impressive 

resources to promote and realize their illicit activities.

In many cases, international drug cartels, mafias, and gangs are better armed, funded, and trained 

than the government security forces charged with confronting them. TCOs exploit ungoverned 

																																																												

3 National Security Council. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Definition. 

www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/definition. 4 Stavridis J., Foreword. In: Miklaucic M., Brewer J., eds. Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in 

the Age of Globalization. Washington, DC: NDU Press; 2013.
39

spaces and fragile states to conduct their operations and even hijack the nation-state. More 

disturbing has been a dangerous convergence of terrorism and crime that is becoming a 

formidable threat to nation-states. Such is the case with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan, the 

FARC in Colombia, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Hezbollah’s global networks 

leveraging illicit activities to realize their terrorist agendas.5 As globalization and technological 

innovation proceed in the future, transnational criminal organizations will continue to capitalize 

on the drivers of globalization and evolve as a critical transnational threat to our national security 

and that of our allies.

U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

In July 2011, the White House released the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime (CTOC) that clearly identifies TCOs as a national security threat to U.S. prosperity and 

security through their various illicit activities. The strategy calls for multilateral action to 

constrain the reach and influence of TCOs, deprive them of enabling means and infrastructure, 

shrink the threat they pose to citizen safety, national security, and governance, and ultimately 

defeat the TOC networks that pose the greatest threat to national security. The Mexican Sinaloa 

Cartel, Lebanese Hezbollah, Moscow Center/Brothers’ Circle, and Dawood Ibrahim’s “D 

Company” in India are among the most dangerous TCOs challenging state sovereignty and 

national security around the world. 

The U.S. CTOC strategy is organized around a single unifying principle: to build, balance, and 

integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related 

threats to national security—and to urge our foreign partners to do the same. The endstate we 

seek is to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable 

public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world. The strategy 

will achieve this end state by pursuing five key policy objectives:

• Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of 

transnational criminal networks.

• Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive

power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances.

• Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic 

markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse.

• Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by 

targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the 

criminal facilitation of terrorist activities.

• Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to 

defeat transnational organized crime.

The strategy also introduces new and innovative tools and capabilities that will be accomplished 

by prioritizing the resources available to affected departments and agencies. This includes taking 

																																																												

5 Realuyo C.B., Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators in Latin America. Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing 

Landscape: testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade, House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. February 4, 2014. 

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140204/101702/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-RealuyoC-20140204.pdf.
40

the following measures:

• A new executive order will establish a sanctions program to block the property of and 

prohibit transactions with significant transnational criminal networks that threaten 

national security, foreign policy, or economic interests.

• A proposed legislative package will enhance the authorities available to investigate, 

interdict, and prosecute the activities of top transnational criminal networks.

• A new Presidential proclamation under the Immigration and Nationality Act will deny 

entry to transnational criminal aliens and others who have been targeted for financial 

sanctions.

• A new rewards program will replicate the success of narcotics rewards programs in 

obtaining information that leads to the arrest and conviction of the leaders of 

transnational criminal organizations that pose the greatest threats to national security.

• An interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group will identify those TOC networks that 

present a sufficiently high national security risk and will ensure the coordination of all 

elements of national power to combat them.6

Critical Enablers of Transnational Criminal Organizations

To combat transnational criminal organizations, we must understand their motivations, 

operations, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Driven by greed, they resemble business enterprises in 

the legitimate private sector, seeking to match supply and demand in the market. Just like other 

organizations, TCOs require the following critical enablers to sustain their activities and realize 

their objectives (see figure 1): 

• Leadership. TCOs require leadership that marshals, directs, and manages resources to 

achieve their mission of maximizing profits. TCO leadership can be organized as 

hierarchies or, more likely, as loose networks of affiliates that diversify the “key man 

risk” associated with relying on a sole leader for command and control.

• Illicit activities. TCOs engage in a broad spectrum of illicit revenue-generating activities 

including trafficking in narcotics, arms, humans, exotic wildlife, and contraband, as well 

as money laundering, cybercrime, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.

• Logistics and supply chains. TCOs rely on global supply chains, commercial 

transportation, TCO-owned resources, and other logistical support to move materiel, 

personnel, services, and funding from supply to demand points of their enterprises.

• Personnel. TCOs must recruit and maintain personnel to support all aspects of their 

activities.

• Financing. TCOs consider revenue as both a key objective and an enabler. Financing 

serves as the lifeblood for TCOs and their illicit endeavors; they derive power from their 

																																																												

6 National Security Council. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Executive Summary. 

www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/summary.

42

information, financial, and economic) must be leveraged to effectively implement the 2011 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

The Future Evolution of Transnational Criminal Organizations 

Transnational criminal organizations are highly adaptable, constantly responding to supply and 

demand factors, their operating environment, and government countermeasures. Since TCOs are 

market-driven, they will seek out new sources and markets for their goods, services, and 

operations. As emerging markets become more affluent, TCOs will continue to expand their 

illicit activities around the world. A new frontier, the cyber domain, will further empower TCOs 

as they capitalize on new opportunities for illicit activities in cyberspace and incorporate new 

technologies to further improve their operations. According to INTERPOL, cybercrime is 

outpacing other forms of criminal activities with incalculable profits. More and more criminals 

are exploiting the speed, convenience, and anonymity of the Internet to commit a diverse range 

of criminal activities that knows no borders, either physical or virtual.8 While many TCOs will 

operate like large multinational corporations, in some cases they will act more like nation-states 

as they expand control over their operating spaces, resources, and populations and directly 

threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad.

TCOs will continue to organize as networks of affiliates and perhaps specialize in distinct illicit 

activities like cybercrime, human trafficking, or money laundering. For example, the ruthless 

Mexican cartel Los Zetas is concentrating on human trafficking and extortion rather than 

narcotics trafficking, which is dominated by their powerful rival, the Sinaloa Cartel. They posit 

that alien smuggling and human trafficking are extremely profitable, deriving income from a 

renewable resource (people); in addition, this form of crime incurs lower risks and penalties than 

drug trafficking.9 This case illustrates how quickly TCOs respond to economic drivers and 

government countermeasures to transform their illicit enterprises. The networked and flat nature 

of TCOs complicates the use of classic attacks on organizational leadership and command and 

control structures against them; comprehensive new approaches will be required to degrade 

them. 

The Criminalized State 

To secure their freedom of movement, operating space, and supply chains, TCOs will seek to 

corrupt, co-opt, infiltrate, and even take over state institutions. A few years ago, analysts were 

predicting state failure in Mexico, as the Mexican cartels were becoming more violent and 

powerful in the face of an aggressive military offensive against them under former President 

Felipe Calderon. Human Rights Watch estimates that over 60,000 were killed in the Mexican 

drug war from 2006 to 2012.10 Despite these record levels of violence, the Mexican cartels did 

not seek to overthrow and replace the central government. However, they were intent on 

																																																												

8 INTERPOL. Cybercrime. www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime. 9 Texas Department of Public Safety (2014). Assessing the Threat of Human Trafficking in Texas. 

www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/media_and_communications/2014/txHumanTraffickingAssessment.pdf. 10 CNN. Mexico’s Drug War: Fast Facts. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fastfacts/.
43

safeguarding their trafficking routes and operating areas; security analysts actually attribute 

many of the deaths to inter- and intra-cartel violence to dominate or eliminate each other.11 This 

lack of interest in political regime change by the Mexican cartels may not be the model all TCOs 

ascribe to in the future. 

There are already some reports of TCOs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America actively engaged in 

politics, sponsoring or co-opting government officials who can give them free reign to conduct 

their illicit activities. TCOs are also providing critical social and philanthropic services and 

employment opportunities to local populations in the absence of the state. Pablo Escobar, 

notorious head of the Medellin cartel and Colombian politician, was an early example of the 

criminalized state and philanthropic practices funded by drug money in the 1980s. In a 2012 

article, Moises Naim described cases in which not only did the government have ties to 

organized crime, but also its officials, police, and/or military actually took part in illicit 

enterprises; Guinea-Bissau is a current example of a mafia or narco-state.12

As TCOs evolve in the future, the concept of a “criminal state” will be an important one if TCOs 

elect to complement their pursuit of profits with actual power. Michael Miklaucic and Moises 

Naim describe the notion of the criminal state as a spectrum of characteristics: state penetration, 

infiltration, and capture. At one end of the spectrum is “criminal penetration,” which occurs 

when an illicit network, be it criminal, terrorist, or insurgent, is able to place “one of its own” 

into the state structure. That agent may conduct formal functions on behalf of the state but also 

carry out actions in support of an illicit network or criminal enterprise. “Criminal infiltration” 

occurs when the infection has spread throughout the state apparatus within the given country. 

“Criminal capture” constitutes the condition of dysfunctional governance in which criminal 

agents are so sufficiently prominent in positions of state authority that their criminal actions 

cannot effectively be restrained by the state.13 The “criminal state” model could be the future 

trajectory for some TCOs that will further empower them and threaten global security. 

The Convergence of Terrorism and Crime

The convergence of TCOs and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), reflecting the intersection 

of normally distinct types of illicit organizations, has become a growing global security concern. 

Traditionally, organized crime was considered a public security problem and was addressed by 

state and local law enforcement authorities. Terrorist and insurgent groups were regarded as 

armed groups with political aspirations, including regime change that directly threatened the 

sovereignty of the nation-state. These illicit actors actively seek out governance gaps, 

socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and character weaknesses as openings to conduct their nefarious 

activities and expand their power and influence throughout the world. With globalization, 

terrorists and criminals groups have internationalized their support and operations and brokered 

																																																												

11 Beittel J.S., Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence. Congressional Research 

Service Report for Congress. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. April 15, 2013. 12 O’Regan D., Narco-States: Africa's Next Menace. The New York Times, March 12, 2012. 

www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/opinion/narco-states-africas-next-menace.html?_r=0. 13 Miklaucic M., Naim M., The Criminal State. In: Miklaucic M, Brewer J, eds. Convergence: Illicit Networks and 

National Security in the Age of Globalization. Washington, DC: NDU Press; 2013.

45

Martin Dempsey outlined his “2-2-2-1” strategic concept, focusing on specific current and 

emerging national security threats to the United States. It comprises two heavyweights that will 

influence our future strategy, Russia and China; two middleweights, North Korea and Iran; two 

networks, al Qaeda and transnational organized crime from our southern hemisphere, and one 

domain, cyber. He stated, “Those things have influenced, are influencing me today and will 

influence you in the future. One of them or more.”

15 General Dempsey recognizes TCOs as a 

clear and evolving threat to U.S. national interests; he noted that new tools are required for 

dynamically managing a more complex security environment but shared his fear that we will not 

innovate quickly enough for new challenges given current budget constraints. 

If tasked to combat TCOs, the Joint Forces must understand this unconventional adversary in 

depth. TCOs are non-state actors that are difficult to identify due to their networked nature. They 

do not wear uniforms, do not have traditional command and control structures, and do not 

respect borders or human rights. The Joint Force must recognize their critical enablers, 

vulnerabilities, and motivations to better detect, disrupt, dismantle, and deter the TCOs that 

threaten U.S. security and prosperity. The Joint Force will have to expand its collection and use 

of intelligence to identify, target, and attack these transnational criminal networks through more 

creative kinetic and non-kinetic military operations as circumstances warrant.

As John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School has said, “It takes a network to defeat a 

network,” and the Joint Force will have to build an effective one to combat transnational criminal 

networks. Arquilla and David Ronfeldt recently expanded their description of an effective 

network-building process: 

• The network’s narrative is the story that draws people to the network and keeps them in 

it, even in the face of adversity.

• Its social basis brings together actors from diverse places and makes the network the 

focus of their loyalty.

• The doctrine or concept of operations employed—from mass popular movements like the 

Arab Spring to insurgents and, increasingly, even conventional traditional military 

operators—is to “swarm.”

• Technological “kit” is the final foundational element to which network-builders should 

be attentive. It is crucially important that a network’s communications be capable of great 

throughput, but with a high level of security. But even with the availability of high 

throughput, secure communications will prove ineffective if the organizational design of 

a network is vertically (that is, hierarchically) rather than horizontally oriented to 

maximize linkages among the many small nodes that form the best networks.16

These factors will need to be incorporated by the Joint Force and the broader U.S. Government 

to build the best networks to combat TCOs. The agility of transnational criminal networks to 

respond to and outmaneuver government countermeasures will require a Joint Force with the 

																																																												

15 Dempsey M., Gen. Dempsey’s Remarks and Q&A at the Atlantic Council's Disrupting Defense Conference. May 

14, 2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/dempsey-calls-for-innovation-in-defense 16 Arquilla J., To Build a Network. PRISM. 2014; Vol 5, No. 1 22–33, available at: 

http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/CCO/PRISMVol5No1.pdf
46

ability to analyze TCOs, understand their incentives, identify their vulnerabilities, and design 

courses of action to mitigate their impact on national security.

Under the current legal authorities in the United States, civilian law enforcement agencies have 

the lead in pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting transnational organized crime. The Department 

of Defense and U.S. Armed Forces are authorized to support law enforcement agencies pursuant 

to U.S. Code Title 10, Chapter 18.17 Much of that support is in monitoring and detection 

activities rather than interdiction itself; interdiction and prosecution are the purview of law 

enforcement agencies and the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. In combating 

transnational organized crime, the military plays a critical role in gathering intelligence and 

supporting law enforcement operations in the counter-narcotics arena. The Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics and Global Threats directs Department of 

Defense (DOD) counterdrug activities and oversaw a budget of $1.37 billion in fiscal year2013. 

These funds support local, state, Federal, and foreign law enforcement agencies to diminish the 

national security threats caused by the drug trade. DOD provides unique military platforms, 

personnel, systems, and capabilities to support Federal law enforcement agencies and foreign 

security forces involved in counterdrug missions. A key aspect of this program is the focus on 

increasing partner nation capability to combat narcotics trafficking worldwide.18 Given the 

growing national security threat from TCOs beyond the drug trade, some advocate the expansion 

of DOD authorities for military involvement in combating transnational organized crime. DOD 

and the military possess far greater resources than civilian law enforcement agencies that could 

be better applied in the fight against transnational organized crime.

The whole-of-government approach adopted in the wake of the tragic September 11, 2001, 

attacks has led to more effective interagency collaboration among military, intelligence, and law 

enforcement circles on national security issues like terrorism. However, as our adversaries, 

including TCOs, become more powerful and quickly adapt to their environment, the U.S. 

Government must broaden its definition of national security threats and enhance all agency 

authorities and abilities to combat transnational organized crime. The Joint Force must prepare 

itself to face multifaceted and complex security threats such as those posed by TCOs. The United 

States should strive to harness all resources available to combat transnational threats like 

transnational organized crime and terrorism. Transnational organized crime can no longer be 

regarded as a task solely for law enforcement to tackle but rather a national security threat to the 

sovereignty, economy, and citizen security of the United States and its allies.

																																																												

17 Department of Defense (February 2014). Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21. Defense Support of Civilian 

Law Enforcement Agencies. www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302521p.pdf. 18 Logan E., Statement for the Record before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control: Future 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan. January 15, 2013. www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearing-1-15-

14/DOD%20Erin%20Logan.pdf.
47

References

Arquilla J., (2014). To Build a Network. PRISM , 5 (1), 22-23.

http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/CCO/PRISMVol5No1.pdf

Beittel J.S., (2013). Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Sources and Scope of the 

Violence. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf.

Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21. (2013). Defense Support of Civilian Law 

Enforcement Agencies. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302521p.pdf

INTERPOL. Cybercrime. www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime

Logan E., (2013). Statement for the Record before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics 

Control, Future Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan.

www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearing-1-15-14/DOD%20Erin%20Logan.pdf

Miklaucic M., and Brewer J., (eds.). (2013). Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security 

in the Age of Globalization. Washington, DC: NDU Press. 

National Security Council. (2011). Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Orga

nized_Crime_July_2011.pdf

O’Regan D., (2012). Narco-States: Africa's Next Menace. The New York Times. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/opinion/narco-states-africas-nextmenace.html?_r=0

Realuyo C.B., (2014). Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators in Latin America. Testimony at a hearing 

entitled: Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape. Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. 

House of Representatives. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140204/101702/HHRG113-FA18-Wstate-RealuyoC-20140204.pdf

———. (2014). The Terror-Crime Nexus: Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators. PRISM. 2014; Vol. 5, 

no. 1, 116–129. http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/CCO/PRISMVol5No1.pdf

Texas Department of Public Safety. (2014). Assessing the Threat of Human Trafficking in Texas. 

https://www.dps.texas.gov/director_staff/media_and_communications/2014/txHumanTra

ffickingAssessment.pdf

The White House. (2010). National Security Strategy of the United States. 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

 
48

Uplinking into the Future: Education in 2030

Paulette Robinson,1 Mitch Armbruster, and Hannah Snapp

The educational landscape, both civilian and military, will change significantly in the coming 

years. These changes will be driven by several factors. First, changes in the developing world, 

specifically economic development, will change worldwide demand for education. New 

educational techniques will change the learning experience, both in and outside of the classroom. 

Rapid technological advances have the potential to radically upend the current learning 

infrastructure. 

This paper will present several educational developments, some of which are quickly being 

absorbed into the mainstream, and others that are currently on “the edges” of the formal 

educational system. There are several possible outcomes – anything from small incremental 

modifications to a complete upending of the way we approach learning. This paper will look at 

both changes currently underway and also speculate on what the future of education could 

possibly look like. These predictions present several possibilities for what education will be in 

2030, along with developments that could take education and training in unpredictable 

directions. 

Demographic, Economic, and Political Shifts

According to the United Nations (UN) Population Fund, the vast majority of world population 

growth over the next decade will be in the developing world. Using the UN Population Fund’s 

medium variant estimates, by 2025 the world’s population will rise to an estimated 8.1 billion 

people, up from approximately 7.1 billion in mid-2014. Population growth is projected to 

continue in the decades afterwards as well, up to approximately 9.6 billion in 2050 and 10.9 

billion by 2100. Most of this growth will be in what is now referred to as the developing world; 

almost all of the additional 3.7 billion people in the world of 2050 will live there. In fact, 

population growth rates over the next four decades will be seven times greater in the developing 

world than in the developed countries of Europe and North America.2

Analysts predict that the world’s population will continue to move to cities. As of 2014, more 

than half of the world’s population lives in cities, the highest percent in history.3 Increased 

urbanization, especially in the developing world, will create new issues to which governments 

and nongovernmental actors will have to adapt. According to the UN Department of Economic

and Social Affairs, increased urbanization means that “managing urban areas has become one of 

the most important development challenges of the 21st century.”

4

																																																												

1 robinsonp@ndu.edu

2 United Nations Population Fund. World Population Prospects. New York: United Nations; 2013 3 World Health Organization. Global Health Observatory. Urban population growth, 2014. 

www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/en/. 4 United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs. World’s population increasingly urban with more 

than half living in urban areas. July 10, 2014. www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/worldurbanization-prospects-2014.html
49

In 1980, urban areas with a population over one million housed only 13 percent of the world’s 

population. In 2014, over 22 percent of the world’s population lives in urban areas with more 

than one million people. This number is expected to rise to 27 percent by 2030 of the world’s 

population is expected to live in urban areas of more than one million people by 2030. Overall, 

more than half of the world’s population will live in some type of urban area.5 One of the most 

prominent changes in the urban environment is the rise of the megacity, cities with over 10 

million in population. The growth of megacities will pose major challenges for US and world 

security (Bartone and Sciarretta, 2015, this volume). The vast majority of urbanized growth has 

been, and will continue to be, in the developing world. A demographic shift on this scale will 

continue to produce significant new problems in public health, national and transnational crime, 

security, and economics.6 As the global center of population rapidly shifts to the developing 

world, all major U.S. institutions, from military to healthcare to education, will need to respond.

Changes in global economic conditions over the next several decades will also prove disruptive. 

Much like expected demographic and urban transformations, the developing world will be at the 

forefront of the changing global economy. By 2025, the World Bank estimates that the majority 

of worldwide economic growth will be generated in the developing world.7 Overall, developing 

states recovered from the economic dislocation of 2008–2009 relatively quickly, returning to 

their previous high growth rates. By contrast, the developed world struggled to regain its footing 

after the most acute period of the global economic crisis, and more than half a decade after the 

collapse, economies across the developed world remain weak.8 As the economies of the 

developing world afford their citizens greater affluence, those economies themselves will 

become more important through their increased purchasing power, driving demand for 

education.

The demographic and economic transformations that the world will undergo over the next 

several decades will also alter the political and strategic landscape. As the developing world 

continues to grow demographically and economically, its political importance will increase 

dramatically as well. While the states of the developing world will grow more powerful and 

politically relevant, the established powers of the developed world will begin to take more of an 

interest in areas of the world they formerly considered peripheral. Developed nations’ interest in 

the developing world as an emerging economic powerhouse will drive political and economic 

engagement.

How will education change over the coming decades? What will the world of education look like 

in 2030? Much like the demographic, economic, and political changes that the world is currently 

experiencing, major transformations in education are under way. These developments in 

education will interact with the other major worldwide trends, producing a strategic environment 

that is much different than the one the United States currently inhabits. New approaches and 

																																																												

5 Ibid.

6 Norris F., For Biggest Cities of 2030, Look to the Tropics. The New York Times, July 11, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/business/for-biggest-cities-of-2030-look-toward-the-tropics.html 7 World Bank. Multipolarity: The New Global Economy. Washington: World Bank; 2011. 8 Ibid.
50

innovations will be paired with cutting-edge technologies to spread personalized educational 

opportunities farther and wider than ever before. 

Trends in Teaching Methods and Techniques

Several educational innovations are currently disrupting and reshaping the way we teach and 

learn. Advances in technology and pedagogy will allow teachers and institutions to customize 

educational methods, assessments, and desired outcomes for individual students. The changes 

currently underway in education are diverse, but the general theme that unites all of them is 

personalized learning.

At its broadest level, personalized learning offers individual students the opportunity to shape 

their own learning through use of new approaches and new technologies. Colleges and 

universities have started supporting personalized learning through the use of learning data keyed 

on each student. The data provides students with recommended courses, as well as updates to 

program, project, and course progress. Institutions can monitor student progress for advisement 

and institutional metrics of value that could include staff performance, budget and financial 

health, student retention and graduation rates, and so forth through online dashboards. Some 

states offer state-wide educational e-portfolios that can collect not only transcripts from courses, 

but also student learning artifacts that follow students through their educational pursuits. These 

artifacts help facilitate learning by highlighting student strengths and weaknesses and can allow 

students to make better choices about their own education. Personalized learning will evolve to 

meet the needs, interests, and ambitions of individuals both in and outside of traditional 

educational environments.

While personalized learning has always been with us in terms of lifelong learning, data-driven 

approaches are dominated by educational institutions. However, individuals are increasingly 

able to take charge of their own education through alternative forms of learning. At the 

kindergarten through 12th-grade levels, home schooling has offered latitude for parents in 

tailoring their children’s education. Parents have self-organized to expand their curricula to 

shared courses amongst their children. In some cases, local schools have allowed home-schooled 

students to drop in for courses when a class requires lab equipment or more specialized 

knowledge in order to enhance their educational experience. A large number of parents have 

paired their children with mentors in their areas of interest to further enrich their student’s 

education. Mentorship allows parents and students to leverage the human resources in their 

communities to personalize and advance their educations. Like other educational innovations, the 

increase in home schooling has been enabled by technological advances that allow information 

to be more widely distributed at a lower cost.9

Across higher education, programs that allow students to create their own multidisciplinary 

majors are becoming increasingly popular, if still relatively rare. Most higher education 

institutions primarily offer more traditional degree and certificate programs where most 

coursework and learning outcomes are predetermined based on students’ age for everyone. As 

personalized education becomes more of an expectation among students and teachers, the 

																																																												

9 Andrade A., An Exploratory Study of the Role of Technology in the Rise of Homeschooling. Ohio State University; 

2008.
51

exclusive role of colleges and universities will change. Shared credit between higher education 

institutions will be more flexible and inclusive, leveraging the strengths and expertise of their 

faculty regionally and globally breaking down exclusive programmatic requirements and 

business models. 

Competency-based education offers students a more individualized approach from traditional 

curriculum assessment requirements. While still tied to an institution, students enrolled in 

competency-based educational programs are required to demonstrate a competency or skill rather 

than achieve a grade. Competency-based education reduces the time needed to earn a degree and 

allows students to tailor their learning to specific requirements or skills of employers. This 

approach helps develop particular skill sets and abilities through projects and specific tasks, 

tracking student progress from point A to B through their knowledge acquisition.10 Using this 

more personalized approach, students can develop competencies more broadly in and outside of 

traditional institutions. 

The traditional role of higher education institutions as assessors of knowledge may shift to 

outside brokers supported by employers and learners. These changes disaggregate institutions’ 

instruction and learning from assessment, giving students more freedom to create their own 

learning program of study. Students will be able to learn from multiple models that include 

courses, games, mentorship, communities of interest, etc. gaining competencies relevant to the 

student and their personal aptitudes. This approach calls into question the certifying business 

models and values of educational institutions. It’s likely that traditional educational institutions 

will no longer require students to exclusively study with them to gain certification. Faculties 

have begun, in some cases, to establish their own brands that are not exclusively tied to the 

institution. 

This trend is likely to accelerate in the near future. Certifying institutions will be concerned 

primarily with guiding students to broad learning resource options that go beyond their own 

particular institutions. Schools would then assess student competencies and match them with 

appropriate employers or help them select further educational opportunities. The business model 

serves both students and employers like a matchmaker offering a consolidation and brokerage of 

learning experiences and competency evaluation. Like the institutions they inhabit, educators 

will also be able to shift from dispensing knowledge to mentoring and facilitating regardless of 

institutional affiliation. This faculty model is evident in educational institutions using adjunct 

faculty who often teach at a number of institutions. 

Advances in online and mobile education will continue to allow students to personalize their 

educations, both by prioritizing avenues to pursuing the competencies they need and freeing 

them to engage in learning events remotely and at a time of their own choosing. Mobility and 

online learning are complementary trends. Both are currently altering the traditional “brick and 

mortar” approach to education. Students can access information from any place in the world and 

at any time. Methods of acquiring competencies can range from more traditional courses, to 

																																																												

10 United States Department of Education. Competency-Based Learning or Personalized Learning. 

http://www.ed.gov/oii-news/competency-based-learning-or-personalized-learning
52

multiplayer games, communities of interest collaboratives, virtual labs, virtual worlds 

simulations, etc. 

An older model of education took place primarily inside of a classroom – faculty delivered 

information to students, engaged them critically in various ways to help them further grasp the 

information, and then assessed their knowledge of that information. Online and mobile education 

allows for much of the delivery of information to take place outside of a classroom – students 

can have information delivered to them in a way that best suits them. Faculty can assist with 

information delivery to students, but delivery would take place primarily outside of the 

classroom. This development is strongly linked with the overall trend of personalization in 

education. Students are able to customize how they will receive information. For some students, 

this will likely continue to be reading traditional books and papers. Others, however, will be able 

to utilize increasingly advanced online based multimedia that will better suit their learning goals. 

Technological advances are helping researchers and educators understand how students learn, 

and some of these advances will be explored later in this paper. 

If predictions about global trends in demographics and economics prove accurate, the developing 

world will become increasingly important, and demand for education in the developing world 

will rise dramatically. Online and mobile education can offer the most efficient and costeffective way to deliver educational in the developing world. While physical infrastructure is 

often acutely lacking in large parts of the developing world, access to the internet, primarily 

through mobile platforms such as cell phones, is quite comprehensive. For example, there are 

currently more than twice as many cell phone users in Africa than there are people in the United 

States.11

One of the most innovative and discussed online learning platforms are Massive Open Online 

Courses (MOOCs). These internet-based courses can enroll thousands of students at a time. 

MOOCs leverage online learning without the business model of tuition on a massive scale. 

While the design and delivery of MOOCs are constantly evolving, the option of packaged 

information available to anyone from experts in the field has captured those who have an interest 

in personalized learning rather than fulfilling a prescribed curriculum to complete a degree 

program.

12

MOOCs, or something similar to them, have enormous potential to improve DoD training and 

education. With service members spread around the globe, often in remote places with little in 

the way of traditional military education, MOOCs and other online educational tools have the 

potential to open up educational activities to service members while they are in the field. 

Connection via the internet, either on a computer or a mobile device, can allow military 

personnel to access specialized training as they need it. Not being constrained by a traditional 

																																																												

11 Yonazi E., Kelly T., Halewood N., and Blackman C., The Transformational Use of Information and 

Communication Technologies in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank; 2012.

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDT

ECHNOLOGIES/0,,contentMDK:23262578~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282823,00.html

12 Lushnikova N., Chintakayala P.K., Rodante A., Massive Open Online Courses from Ivy League Universities: 

Benefits and Challenges for Students and Educators. 

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254132&rec=1&srcabs=2350964&alg=1&pos=2 
53

educational framework, such as a syllabus or prescribed course of study, a service member can 

access training to acquire skills they need on the spot. 

As MOOCs continue to become more accepted as a legitimate alternative to physical classroom 

instruction, certification and degree programs that use MOOCs will become increasingly 

common. Georgia Tech is the first prominent university to offer a degree program that can be 

completed solely via MOOCs. The program, a master’s degree in computer science, received 

twice as many applicants as the comparable traditional computer science graduate program at 

Georgia Tech. At $6,600 total for the MOOC-based degree, the program is significantly more 

affordable than the traditional classroom-based degree, which costs approximately $44,000.13

Critics of MOOCs point out that they tend to have high failure and dropout rates compared to not 

only traditional classes, but also to online courses as well.14 While it is unlikely that MOOCs, or 

something like them, can be a substitute on their own for more traditional educational methods, 

MOOCs can be an important part of a competency-based system where students pick and choose 

content that reinforces their personalized learning plans. Many courses have components that a 

student may want to study, without the need to complete the course. While exactly where 

MOOCs will fit into the arena of higher education is still being explored and experimented with, 

it is likely that instructional platforms that can accommodate massive numbers of students 

outside of an institutional affiliation will be a factor in the near term future of personalized and 

competency-based education.

MOOCS are not the only educational method that can be mined for the future. Many of these 

new methods are possible due to technological advances or the widespread adoption of existing 

technology. Though these new approaches differ methodologically, they all have the effect of 

personalizing education to better fit student needs and goals.

The flipped classroom upends the traditional model of education while still working within the 

traditional environment. In a flipped classroom, students do their problem sets and “homework” 

in class, and watch recorded lectures and other appropriate videos (such as “Kahn Academy,” 

documentaries, and other assignments) at home. This allows teachers to assist students with their 

work in a way they have been unable to do in a traditional classroom. Flipped classrooms give 

instructors unprecedented time to devote to helping students work through problems rather than 

relying on them to solve the problems at home.15 Students that need more time with instructors 

can benefit greatly by having teachers who work through problems with them in person before 

assignments are due. While the technology is not new, the widespread adoption of the internet 

opens a space for more and more students to take advantage of this new technique. 

One of the more experimental and innovative approaches to education offered in a physical space 

is being pioneered at the new Ecole 42 in France. The Paris-based school, founded by French 

																																																												

13 Belkin D., First-of-Its-Kind Online Master's Draws Wave of Applicants. Wall Street Journal. October 29, 2013. 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579166112833252206. 14 Parr C., MOOC completion rates below 7%. Times Higher Education. May 9, 2013. 

http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/mooc-completion-rates-below-7/2003710.article 15 Tucker B., The Flipped Classroom: Online instruction at home frees class time for learning. Education Next. 

2012. 82–83. http://educationnext.org/the-flipped-classroom/
54

billionaire Xavier Niel, has no teachers, books, tuition, labs, student centers, or almost anything 

that is normally associated with a higher education. In fact, the school even lacks specific 

courses. Instead, the entire student body, between 800–1,000 students per year, works in a single 

building housed in the middle of Paris. Students are given coding challenges that must be 

completed as part of a team. All projects are collaborative, and students must turn to each other, 

rather than to instructors, for assistance. The challenges increase in difficulty as students advance 

through the program. The school does not charge any tuition, and students can complete the 

program in 2 or 3 years.16

Disruptive Technology in Education and Training

While technology has been integrated into new approaches to education such as flipped 

classrooms and MOOCs, more technologically intensive education methods will further disrupt 

traditional education. Driven by both technological advances and the pressures of budget cuts, 

bloated administrations, and increasingly prohibitive costs, these changes have the potential to 

radically reform education. At a minimum, these technologies and pressures are forcing 

educational institutions to change their approaches and business models to adapt. 

Experiential and immersive technologies are slowly making their way into traditional education 

as a mainstream approach to teaching and learning. Gaming, 3–D virtual worlds, online 

scenarios, simulations, interactive role playing, modeling, and online apprentices are all ways for 

students to apply what they are learning through problem-solving, critical thinking, and 

creating.17 Approaching learning through these techniques puts the student at the center of the 

learning experience with the faculty as a guide or mentor, asking critical questions and guiding 

students to resources. Students are encouraged to be creative and innovative with their solutions 

to complex problems that are designed to have multiple answers. 

Various types of high-tech learning spaces are emerging and will continue to provide students 

with new options. Technology will be integrated more fully into traditional classrooms as 

teachers adapt to new technologies and institutions compete for student enrollments. Students 

expect high-tech access. Studio-style learning spaces, where learning is primarily accomplished 

via peer-to-peer interaction with faculty facilitation, are growing as a best practice. This learning 

model demonstrates how corporation like Microsoft and IBM have underwritten educational 

innovations for its clear resourcing benefit. More collaboration between institutions will be 

common as the boundaries between academia, industry, and students become more fluid. Finally, 

virtual spaces that can be tailored to almost any imaginable group of students or scenario will 

allow students to robustly interact within various environments at a low cost. As the developing 

world demands more education in tandem with increased economic growth and worldwide 

demands for skilled workers, virtual education will be a cost-effective way to provide cuttingedge training. 

																																																												

16 Tweney D., This French tech school has no teachers, no books, no tuition — and it could change everything. 

Venture Beat. June 13, 2014. http://venturebeat.com/2014/06/13/this-french-tech-school-has-no-teachers-no-booksno-tuition-and-it-could-change-everything/ 17 McClarty K.L., Orr A., Frey P.M., Dolan R.P., Vassileva V., McVay A., A Literature Review of Gaming in 

Education. Pearson Report. 2012
55

Gamification and digitized learning environments will become prevalent as the cost of the 

underlying technology falls, the capabilities become more sophisticated and intuitive for learners 

to achieve targeted competencies. Other forms of advanced technology will also become 

standard learning approaches. 3–D printing, object-embedded intelligence, and the “internet of 

things” will make learning spaces more interactive and provide real-time relevant data.18 Maker 

spaces and traditional classrooms will seamlessly combine online learning with physical 

application, allowing students to access the best of information technology while working with 

peers on collaborative projects.19

Advances in gaming and simulations are of special interest to military education. Online gaming 

and simulations can bring in students and instructors from around the world, allowing 

participation on previously unimaginable scales. Not only does this allow more students from 

geographically dispersed regions take part in educational activities, but it allows for sharing of 

information and expertise on a much larger scale than previously possible. This diversity of 

expertise and interests allows students to learn from each other, not just instructors. 

Virtual and augmented realities will allow students to practice and improve a vast array of skills 

not only with increasing realism and utility, but also at a time convenient for them. Freed from 

the need to be physically present at an educational institution, students will experience flexibility 

to pursue personalized learning goals. Technical fields such as medicine and engineering where 

hands-on repetition is crucial will benefit from virtual and augmented realities.20 Virtual reality 

systems such as Oculus Rift can create a rich immersive platform for learning. Augmented 

realities are a hybrid environment where the participant interacts with the physical world, with 

additional information being provided by a heads up display. This interaction is “augmented” 

through the use of virtual reality components such as 3–D displays, sound effects, personalized 

annotation, photography, and other interactive components that can be added or modified by 

instructors and students. The result of introducing both virtual and augmented reality into 

education is to create a far more enriching environment. Collaboration, shared learning, and 

distance learning will all be greatly enhanced through the use of virtual and augmented 

realities.21

Big data has the potential to change the teaching and learning landscape in ways that have not 

been possible in the past. Applying big data to teaching and learning will be the engine that 

drives personalized learning portals; each individual will have a better understanding of his or 

her performance on multiple competencies. Access to—and ability to understand—this 

information will also allow students to use global resources to improve performance. These can 

be adjusted based on the individual student’s interest, aptitude, health, and the needs of 

employers. 

																																																												

18 Zappa M., Envisioning the Future of Education Technology. June 2014. http://www.envisioning.io/education/ 19 For an example of a creative space using 3–D printing, see the MakerBot Academy. 

http://www.makerbot.com/faq/

20 Parr C., The Future of Higher Education? Five Experts Give Their Prediction. Times Higher Education. March 

2014. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/the-future-of-higher-education-five-experts-give-theirpredictions/2011867.article

21 Canbeck N.G., J. Hargis, Connecting Augmented Reality to Higher Education: Mash-Up. International 

Association for Technology, Education and Development (IATED) Proceedings, July 2011.
56

Big data will contribute in critical ways to learning science, helping educators, parents, and 

students all better understand and take advantage of how learning takes place. Until recently, 

most education data sets have been too small to fully understand how people learn. With the 

onset of large data sets, tailored algorithms, and visualization tools, the education community 

will be able to provide real-time and effective personalized learning environments. Adaptive 

learning technologies are an example of how learning can be tailored based on big data. For 

example, the Khan Academy is using adaptive learning tools to teach a wide variety of 

mathematics online. Their tools are able to administer just-in-time lessons to inform gaps in 

assessment, iterate problems tailored for the individuals learning needs, and move the students 

through the learning process from simple to complex math skills.22

One form of data that will help inform learning will be the enormous amount of information 

generated by advanced neuroscience technologies and techniques. Advanced neuroscience 

technologies not only will allow scientists to monitor and understand when the brain is signaling 

readiness to learn a particular skill, but also will inform us as to how to stimulate and augment 

areas in the brain to enhance learning. 

The “internet of things”—devices that are constantly reporting data to the cloud from wearable 

devices and sensors—will enhance education science in new and significant ways. Soon, it will 

be possible to monitor sleep, exercise, heart rate, emotions, and so forth in order to understand 

the impact of the whole person on learning. Optimizing learning will not be limited to 

information and assessment. In addition, sensors will become ubiquitous in our environment, 

providing a deluge of data that can be used in student research projects and original contributions 

to the world’s body of knowledge. 

There are several possibilities for how these trends will change the current system of education, 

both civilian and military. While no one can predict the future, several possibilities can be 

considered along a spectrum of plausible outcomes. On one end of the spectrum is an educational 

infrastructure similar to what exists today. New technology and teaching methods will 

supplement the existing education system. Most institutions will continue to operate as they do 

now, with only minor changes. On the other end of the spectrum is a radically changed education 

system with little in common with today. 

If information delivery becomes no longer required as the primary activity for teachers, how will 

classes need to change and adapt? Are educational events, such as classes and lectures, necessary 

when access to information is readily available? Faculty roles may become similar to mentors 

who guide students, rather than simply conveying information. In the future, what constitutes 

“faculty” may include a much broader set of individuals across a range of age and expertise. 

Social media and communications technology will allow students to leverage the knowledge and 

expertise of members of their community outside of educational institutions. Everyone will be 

teacher.

																																																												

22 Khan Academy. About. https://www.khanacademy.org/about
57

Long Term Possibilities

Looking beyond the immediate future, advances in education technology have the potential to 

totally recreate the entire educational system. One way to imagine the difference between the 

previous changes and the longer term ones is to think of the short-term changes as “disrupting” 

the educational landscape and the long-term changes as “revolutionizing” it. These long-term 

technologies have the potential to absolutely rupture our entire process of learning. How will 

these over-the-horizon technologies shape education?

What is the future prognosis for educational institutions themselves? Will educational 

institutions as we know them exist by 2030? If not, how will society continue to equip 

individuals with these three general capabilities? 

Predicting the future, especially when concerning advanced technology, is an inherently difficult 

proposition. Simply consult the predictions of flying cars and colonies on the moon to see how 

forecasting can go awry. However, it is possible to make a number of projections based on the 

current trends in technology related to education and information. These are possibilities for the 

future of learning that could revolutionize the field if they come to pass. 

There are several advanced educational technology scenarios that are entirely realistic. One 

possibility for beyond 2030 could easily include direct brain input of information. In this future, 

information is downloaded from a computer directly into a person’s brain. These capabilities are 

currently evident as augmentations to guide prosthetics. Brain-to-brain transmissions are already 

being successfully piloted.23 Connected to a wireless network, young children will be monitored 

for neuro-readiness and information will be delivered at the optimal time. 

This technology could extend beyond children. Warfighters in the field could receive just-in-time 

mission information that will allow them to act in sync with other warfighters and networked 

equipment. Optimal information uploads will be determined by precise personalized data. There 

will be no need to seek out information and use inefficient methods of attempting to learn and 

retain; all the information needed will be instantly available. Nicholas Negroponte posits yet 

another method for instantly attaining information. He suggests that we will be able to ingest 

information using small capsules, similar to medicine.24

Learning scaffolds, taxonomies, and structures will come with information to assist in the 

organization of the facts for efficient retrieval, use and application. The larger question that 

would need to be examined is: Who determines the scaffolds for the uploaded information?

Examples of how to efficiently use information will be uploaded as a basis for building expertise. 

Educational institutions will no longer be required to deliver information; it will be as ubiquitous 

as air. What will be the focus if information delivery is no longer required? 

																																																												

23 Grau C., Ginhoux R., Riera A., et al. Conscious Brain-to-Brain Communication in Humans Using Non-Invasive 

Technologies. PLOS One. August 19, 2014. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4138179/ 24 Negroponte N., A 30-Year History of the Future. Technology, Entertainment, and Design. March 2014. 

https://www.ted.com/talks/nicholas_negroponte_a_30_year_history_of_the_future?language=en.
58

Individuals will be augmented with implanted chips to enhance learning and processing of 

information. These implants will enable individuals to electronically interface with not only 

computer systems, but directly with other people as well. What one learns as an individual 

instantly becomes the learning experience of everyone connected to a network. It is crowdsourced thinking at the level of the brain. This will lead to almost unimaginable growth in social 

learning, where individuals learn directly from one another rather than through a third party such 

as a school. Communication will be triggered using the body and mind, rather than an external 

device.25

Experiential and immersive learning will take a variety of forms. Through triggers in the brain, 

individuals will have the ability to immerse themselves in a 3–D virtual world, the real world, or 

both simultaneously. Through sensor information tied to the internet of things and data stored in 

a cloud network, these worlds will be rendered based on real data. Imaginary or creative designs 

will be visualized and then rendered. Designs will be prototyped using 3–D print technologies 

from blueprints updated on the fly shaped totally within an individual’s thought process. We will 

be able to reinvent who we are and collaborate easily and immediately with anyone.

Problems will be embedded in particular virtual world contexts and presented to students to 

solve. All student actions will be monitored in robust data collections, adjusted to student 

responses and learning needs, and with progress reported into individual learning portals. 

Students will determine who has access to their learning data. It will no longer be owned and 

controlled by the institution certifying the data. Students of all ages will also have the 

opportunity to participate in creative maker spaces that will include members from several 

generations working and learning together to create, design, and manufacture new inventions or 

products. These spaces will be in communities with high-end 3–D printers, computing, and 

precision equipment. Virtual maker spaces will intersect physical spaces facilitating cloud 

resources and distribution of finished products. Age will not determine the teacher or mentor in 

these spaces; education will be a collective experience with each person respected for what they 

have to offer. 

Mentor networks will link learners and those who are willing to offer their time as mentors. 

Mentorship capabilities will be authenticated by data, not age or credentials. Similar programs 

have already shown success in the business world.26 Competency-based progression will allow 

everyone the opportunity to become an educator or mentor. The proof of their ability will be in 

their success in assisting learners to meet their competency goals. Teachers will become brands 

and collect online and geographical followings that will go beyond an institutional affiliation. 

Mentors will be able to create avatars that can represent the person at various stages of the 

mentoring process. Peer-to-peer networks will enable education to become much more 

innovative and dynamic, allowing everyone to contribute to their own and others’ education as 

facilitators and mentors.

Educational institutions in this scenario would probably not disappear but rather transform their 

core functions. They will serve as the institutional structure that creates scaffolds, experiential 

																																																												

25 Kurzweil R., The Singularity is Near. New York: Penguin Press; 2006. 26 de Janasz S.C., Sullivan SE, Whiting V. Mentor networks and career success: Lessons for turbulent times. 

Perspectives. November 1, 2003.
59

learning environments, and assessments to verify educational attainment. Without the limited 

structures of age groupings, these schools will advance learners on readiness, ability, and 

competency. Age cohorts and structured lock-step curricula will give way to collaborative and 

flexible learning environments, tailored to the needs and interests of each student. Schools 

could create resource-rich and engaging environments, available for groups or individuals to 

integrate particular concepts and skills. Physical technological resources can be based out of 

schools, allowing individuals to have easy access to specialized learning technologies. Schools 

will provide hubs for teaching and mentoring. Traditional educational events like courses and 

lectures will be replaced by immersive experiences. Schools could serve as brokers that match 

employers with students based on competencies that fulfill skill requirements for particular jobs. 

But the role of broker could also easily move to an external agent or industry that would be an 

independent verifier of competencies. 

Risks

One significant issue that could challenge policymakers in the future will be access to these new 

educational technologies. Those with the resources to augment and provide data-rich quality 

information for upload will have the advantage over those who do not have the resources. This 

could be particularly true for developing countries that contain large “youth bulges,” with a 

significant percent of their population being young. A considerable divide could also arise not 

only between the developed and the developing world, but also within states. The investments in 

these changes are not only monetary, but also cultural. How can the future education system 

take advantage of technologies and new research on how people learn? How do we share those 

advantages with the global populations on which we may depend for labor in the future? 

While cybersecurity has become an increasingly important concern, demand for it will skyrocket 

as the world becomes more networked and dependent on technology. The more advanced 

technology becomes, the more it will penetrate our lives, opening individuals, institutions, and 

entire countries to increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks. It will be more focused on a hybrid 

of digital bio with future bio computing systems. Information security concerning education 

today primarily consists of preventing the theft of sensitive private information, such as grades 

and financial records. A computer virus that can be delivered to an individual’s brain through 

technology interfaces ceases to become only a computer virus and becomes almost 

indistinguishable from a biological disease. In an environment where educational technology 

directly interacts with human biology, cybersecurity becomes a matter of life and death. 
60

Implications for Future Military Operations

A military that is part of a lifelong learning culture with access to the world’s knowledge 

instantly uploaded into their brain anywhere at any time is a superior force. Tied together into a 

“hive,” this shared collective intelligence will provide a coherent and singular force that can act 

as one. Mission information, battle plans, and so on could be distributed completely and 

immediately to the entire unit. Direct group sharing of information of an ongoing mission would 

enable effective and efficient responses in the field based on immediate feedback of the battle 

conditions shared immediately with the larger collective force. The physical and mental 

conditions of all individuals in the military action would be known and could be adjusted when 

needed by direct brain stimulation. 

Mission rehearsals could be created to encompass entire teams anywhere by using virtual worlds 

or avatar surrogates. Performance data and mission improvements would be carefully monitored 

through data tracking and analytics. Adjustments will be made in real time and mission 

challenges adjusted during rehearsals in response to actions by soldiers in training. 

Military education, and Joint Professional Military Education in particular, is different from 

civilian counterparts in several aspects. Military institutions tend to place a greater emphasis on 

learning from practitioners, often active duty or retired military, than civilian schools. The war 

colleges in particular operate almost like professional schools in the civilian world.

27 Faculty at 

the war colleges have traditionally relied almost exclusively on lectures and small seminars, 

relying on the Socratic method for fostering debate and discussion. Many critics have alleged 

that this method does not adequately prepare students to think critically about an increasingly 

complex world.28

Advances in educational technology and teaching methods presented in this paper can allow 

students new and innovative ways to study pressing national security issues. Combining new 

educational innovations with social media platforms new, online war gaming programs allows 

students and faculty to work together solving problems. One example of this is the increasing 

popularity and usage of the Massive Multiplayer Online War Game Leveraging the Internet 

(MMOWGLI) war gaming platform throughout the DoD.29

																																																												

27 Lamb C., Porro B., Next Steps for Transforming Education at National Defense University. Joint Force 

Quarterly. 2005; Issue 76, 1st Quarter, pgs. 42-43. 

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/12362/jfq-76-next-steps-fortransforming-education-at-national-defense-university.aspx. 28 Ibid. 29 Robinson P., Bartels E., Cordero G., Feltz L., Wendt V., Law R., NDU Massive Game Pilot Paper. Washington, 

DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy Working Paper.
61

Conclusions

If the projections for world demographic, economic, and political changes prove to be accurate, 

then the world of military education will need to adapt to meet new challenges. Advances in 

educational technology and approaches will both be shaped by these changes and drive them. As 

the developing world becomes more important to the United States economically and as a source 

of labor, military education will increasingly look to address regional issues and problems. 

Content will be tailored to each individual situation, to deliver maximum usability. Through 

mining big data stored on the cloud, educators will be able to compare performance results and 

best practices in even the most remote environments. 

Advances in education will not just respond to the world; they will shape and drive it. In the 

future, education will be global, instant, and connected. Will our cultural and social structures 

change rapidly enough to leverage a future where information is ubiquitous, but knowledge and 

wisdom may be the challenges of the system? All 650 million cell phones in Africa are potential 

learning platforms that citizens could leverage in order to improve their lives. A population that 

can rapidly become more educated and productive can also rapidly change the circumstances of 

their home society. Peer-to-peer learning platforms and philosophies will allow information to 

rapidly spread horizontally, removing a key role formerly held by educational institutions. 
62

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