A RMY• L I NEAGE· SERIES 

lohn Patrick Finn • •••. 

RoMano Dany•• 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
Military Intelligence Corps 

Regimentallnsignia 
ARMY LINEAGE SERIES 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

john Patrick Finnegan 

Lineages Compiled by 

Romana Danysh 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1998 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Finnegan, john Patrick. 

Military intelligence I john Patrick Finnegan lineages compiled by 

Romana Danysh. 

p. em. - (Army lineage series) 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

l. Military intelligence-United States-History. 2. United States. 

Am1y-Hiswry. l. Danysb, Romana, 1940- . 11. Title. lll. Series. 

UB256.U6F56 1997 

355.3'432'0973-dc21 96-44554 

CMH Pub 60-13 

For ..nle by the U.S. Government Printing OOicc 

Supo.•rint~tklcnt of Document,, M:oil Stop: SSOP. W:~<hington. DC 20-102-9328 

ISBN 0·16·048828·1 

CIP 
ARMY LINEAGE SERIES 

jeffrey j. Clarke, General Editor 

Advis01y Committee 

(As of 24 October 1997) 

Joseph T. GlalLhaar 

University of Houswn 

Edward W Arnold 

OITicc of the Deputy 

Ch1d of Staff for Personnel 

R.tymond Callahan 

Lini\-crsily of Delav.arc 

MaJ Gen. james J. Cravens. Jr. U.~. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command 

Lt. Col. Carlo D'Estc 

U.S. Army, Rclircd 

Col Roben A. Doughl) 

L <; l\hlllal) Acadcm) 

George C. Hernng 

UmYcrsily of Kentucky 

M1chael ). Kunz 

Nallonal Arch1vrs 

Col. jerry D. Morelock 

U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College 

Carol A Reardon 

Pennsylvama Stale Umversny 

Col. Evcrell L. Roper, Jr. 

U.S. Army War College 

John Shy 

Universuy of Michigan 

~tark A Stoler 

Unl\·ersJt} of \crmom 

Gerhard l.. \\Iemberg 

Umversny of Nonh C.arolma 

U.S. Army Cc11tcr of Military Histo1y 

Bng. Gen. john\\. ~1ountcc1stle, Chief of \1ilitar)' lltstOr) 

Ch1ef Historian 

Chief. r1cld Programs and llbtonctl 

'>en ices Division 

Editor in Chid 

Jeffrey J Cl.trkc 

john T. Greenwood 

john W. L lsherg 

Foreword 

I ntelligence has been defined as the an of "knowing one's enemies,'' and military intelligence is as old as war itself. However, the development of an intelligence organizalion within the United States Anny is comparatively recenl. The 

Army did not acquire a permanent peacetime intelligence organization until 

1885, and the oldest of today's military intelligence units can nace its lineage 

only back to the eve of World War 11. The Army did not formally recognize 

intelligence as a distinct professional discipline until 1962, when it finally created the Army Intelligence and Security Branch, the predecessor of today's 

Military Intelligence Branch. The Military Intelligence Corps, which incorporated all military intelligence personnel and units into a single large regiment, did 

not come into existence until l 987. 

Although the intelligence organization within the U.S. Army was slow to 

develop, il has become increasingly important both as a combat multiplier in 

war and as a source of information for the nation's decision makers in peace. As 

the nalion and its Army move into an information age, military intelligence \viii 

assume an even greater significance. 

To tell the military intelligence story in as much detail as security regulations 

currently in force allow, the U.S. Army Center of Military Hisrory has worked in 

collaboration with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) 

to produce this volume of the Army Lineage Series. lt is intended both to bring a 

relatively unknown pan of the Anny helitage to the auemion of the general public 

and to foster unit esp1it de corps among the thousands of military intelligence 

specialists now serving in the ranks of America's Army. 

ROBERT W NOONAN, Jr. 

Major General, USA 

Commanding 

U.S. Army Intelligence and 

Security Command 

JOHN W MOUNTCASTLE 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 

The Authors 

J ohn Patrick Finnegan graduated magna cum laude from Boston College in 

l 957 with an A.B. in English Literature. After a period of civilian employment 

with the National Security Agency and military service in the U.S. Army 

Counter lntelligence Corps, he went on to receive a Ph.D. in Twentieth Century 

American HisLOry from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Before accepting 

his present position as historian with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security 

Command, Dr. Finnegan taught at several American universities and at the 

University of lbadan, Nigeria, and worked as a military historian at the U.S. 

Army Center of Military History. He is the author of Against the Specter of a 

Dragon: The Campaign jor American Militmy Preparedness, 1914-1917, Mililwy 

lntelli,gence: A Picture His101y, and The Military Intelligence Story: A Photo History, 

as well as coeditor of U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War 11: A 

Documentary History. 

R omana Danysh graduated from Barnard College in 1962 and received her 

M.A. degree in history from Stanford University in 1963. Since 1964 she has 

served as a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military llistory. Ms. Danysh is 

coauthor of Tr~fantry, Part l: Regular Army, a volume in the Army Lineage Series. 

Preface 

T his bonk auempts to present an organizational history of Military Intelligence 

in the United States Arm)' from its beginnings to the present. It makes no pretense at <hscussing the operational aspects of intelligence in detail, partially due 

to the conttnuing need to ~akguard intelligence sources and methods. 

Furthermore. the book focuses 11s attcnuon on the Arm) and necessaril)' slights 

the <:omplex interrelationshipS between Arm)' intelligcn<:e and other organizations m the intelligence commumt). rmally. although the book mcludes the lincages and heraldic items of mil11ary intelligence brigades, groups. and battalions 

orgamzcd under tables of orgamzation and equipment (TOFs), it does not cover 

the numerous intelligence units, past and present, organized for one-of-a-kind 

missions under tables of distribution and allowances (TDAs). 

Preparation of this volume has been a collaborall\'e effort between the 

U ~.Ann>· Center of ~lilnary lllstOr) (CMH) and the U.~ Army Intelligence 

and SccUnt) Command (JN~C0\1) John Patrick Finnegan, \1illlar) History 

OffiLc. li\SCOM. wrote the narrauve text. Romana Danysh. Organizational 

llistor) Branch, Ct-.tH, complied the lmeages. 

Both authors owe large debts to numerous indh iduals. The 1dea of preparing an organizmional histor)' was conceived by james l.. Gilbert, lNSCOM 

Command llistorian~ janice E. McKenney, Chid of the Organizational History 

Bran<:h, CMII, was instrumental in bringing about its publication as part of the 

Arm> Lineage Series. The introductor}' text owes mu<:h to those who took the 

11me and trouble to compose unit histories, as well as to the former historians of 

the L ':> Ann) lmelligence Center. the lJ S. Army Securit) Agent}. the U.~ 

Ann) lmelligence Command, and the Office of the Assistant C h1cf of Staff for 

Intelligence Lt. Col 1\.larc ro,,c's thesis on the C\'Oluuon of the Militar) 

lntclligcn<:c D1vision from 1885 to 1917 ser\'ecl as a basK building block for the 

monograph. as did Col Bruce B1dwells unpublished eight-\ olume manuscript 

on the development of milital)' mtclligencc from the lounding ol the republic to 

19'53. The unpublished thirty-volume history of the Counter 1 ntclllgcnce Corps 

whkh t--laJ. Ann Bray and others prepared 111 the late 19'50~ also <:ontaincd a 
xii MlUTARY lNTELUGENCE 

wealth of information. Finally, preparation of the narrative would have been 

impossible withom the research assistance provided by the library and archival 

staffs of the National Archives and Records Administration, the U.S. Army 

Military History lnstilule, the Library of Congress, the National Security Agency, 

the U.S. Army Cryptologic Records Center, the Pentagon Library, and the 

Center of Military HisLOry. 

Special thanks are due to the individuals who served on the panel that 

reviewed and commented on the first draft of the narrative. These include Brig. 

Gen. james L. Coll ins, U.S. Army (Retired), former Chief of Military History; 

Romana Danysh, Morris j. MacGregor, Jr., janice E. McKenney, and john B. 

Wilson of CMH; Dianne Putney of the U.S. Air Force HisLOry Office; and Col. 

James W Dunn, U.S. Army (Retired), of the Corps of Engineers History Office. 

Others who provided a valuable ctitique include David F Trask and Robert K. 

Wright, Jr., of CMH; Dean Allen of the Defense Intelligence Agency History Office; 

Bruce Saunders, fom1erly with the History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence Center 

and School; and Henry Schorreck, fom1erly with the National Security Agencys 

Histmy Office. jeffrey]. Clarke, the Anny's present Chief Historian, devoted considerable time and energy to polishing the Onal version of the manuscript. Over 

the years, a succession of INSCOM commanders have encouraged the project of 

compiling an organizational history, wh ile former lNSCOM Chief of Staff Malcolm 

L. Hollingsworth provided steady support. 

In addition to the narrative hislOry, this volume features lineages and 

heraldic data for 108 military imelligence units-13 brigades, 10 groups, and 

85 battalions. They comprise all active and inactive Regular Am1y and Army 

Reserve TOE units as well as all federally recognized Army National Guard TOE 

units as of 30 june 1996. We did not include smaller units, such as companies 

and detachments, because they are not authorized their own heraldic items. 

However, former separate companies and detachments perpetuated by btigades, 

groups, or battalions are covered in the relevant lineages. No TDA units of any 

size are included because, in accordance with longstanding Atmy policy, lineage 

and honors are determined for TOE units only. 

The Organizational History Branch of CMH is responsible for determining 

and publishing the official lineage and honors of Anny units. The lineages in this 

volume are the result of research done by many past and presem members of the 

branch, including john Finnegan. Romana Danysh prepared all the lineages for 

publication and updated them Lo renect significant organizational changes, campaign participation credit, and unit decorations through 30 june l996. 

Each lineage is adapted from the unit's official Lineage and Honors 

Certificate, which outlines the history of the unit in a highly stylized format and 

constitutes its birth certificate, its deed to organizational properties, and verification of its service record. Although we have compressed the lineage and honors data in this book to save space, the infonnation is the same as that on the 

certificates, which accoums for the technical language used. The glossary at the 
PREFACE xiii 

end of the volume will assist readers unfamiliar with lineage terms. The parenthetical entries after each unit decoration refer to the general orders announcing 

the awards. 

Descriptions of coats of arms, shoulder sleeve insignia, and distinctive unit 

insignia approved for the units appear with the lineages. These descriptions as well 

as the color illustrations and the brief account of heraldic items were furnished by 

The Institute of Heraldty (TlOH). The authors are particularly grateful to Gerald T. 

Luchino, Thomas B. Proffiu, Nuala Barry, and james M. Hammond for their expert 

assistance in providing the heraldic material for this book. We also want to express 

our very special thanks to the late Ronald E. Dudley, an alumnus of both TlOH 

and CMH, who volunteered to type the heraldic data in the appropriate format for 

publication. ln some instances, the text relating to the heraldic items is not as comprehensive as in the original letters of approval, amendment, or redesignation sent 

to the units. Minor changes have been made to meet the need for brevity. 

Although previous volumes in the Army Lineage Series had individual unit 

bibliographies, the scarcity of open-source literature on military intelligence 

units made such an approach impracticable. Very few hislOries of intelligence 

units have been published, and historical reports submitted by intelligence 

organizations generally have been classified. The files of the lNSCOM History 

Office contain information on selected units and installations. Some imelligence 

histories are also included in the large unit history collection maintained by the 

U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. ln addition, the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, a quarterly publication of the 

U.S. Army Intelligence Cemer and Fort Huachuca, regularly features thumbnail 

sketches of various military intelligence units. 

Photographic support for this volume was provided by T. Gardner, Sr., and 

Robert j. Bills, contractors working for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, 

TNSCOM. At CMH, john W Elsberg, ArthurS. Hardyman, Catherine A. Heerin, 

Diane M. Donovan, the late Rae Panella, joycelyn M. Canery, and john 

Birmingham all participated in the various aspects of producing the book. 

As indicated, the efforts of a great many people contributed to the production 

of this volume of the Army Lineage Series. However, any mistakes, errors, or 

omissions are solely the responsibility or the authors. 

jOHN PATRICK FINNEGAN 

U.S. Army Intelligence and 

Security Command 

ROMANA DANYSH 

U.S. Army Center or 

Military History 

Contents 

Cllapcer 

Introduction . 

l. The Beginnings 

Military Intelligence in Place 

Military Intelligence in the Twemieth Century 

2. World War I . . . . . . . . . . 

Van Deman and Military Intelligence. 

lmelligence Operations . . . 

The Corps of Intelligence Police . 

Expansion. . . . . . . . . 

The Military Intelligence Division . 

The American Expeditionary Forces in France 

Communications Security in the AEF 

Sideshows. 

Conclusion 

3. Military Intelligence Between Wars . 

Military Intelligence at Peace 

The "Black Chamber" and the Signal Intelligence Service . 

4. Military Intelligence in Crisis . 

1941: MID on the Brink .. 

Counterintelligence Concerns 

The Road to Pearl Harbor 

5. World War II: Military Intelligence at the Center . 

The Reorganization ol Militar)' Intelligence 

The ULrRA Breakthrough . . . 

The Counter Intelligence Corps . . . . 

Page 

3 

7 

12 

15 

21 

22 

24 

26 

27 

31 

32 

37 

38 

39 

+1 

42 

46 

51 

55 

57 

58 

61 

63 

68 

72 
'\\'I 

Clwph'l 

The Signal SecuriL)' Agency 

Communications Security 

The Electronic Ba11lefield. 

Summation 

Paxt' 

77 

8 1 

82 

83 

6. World War II: lntclligcncc in the Field. 85 

Europe . . . 86 

The Pacific. . . . 93 

Common CollccLOrs 97 

Conclusion 98 

7. The Cold War and Korea . lO I 

RestrucLUring Military Intelligence 102 

Postwar Opermions: !Iuman lmclligencc 

and Counterintelligence . . . . . 105 

The Army SecUrtl) Agency . . . . . 109 

Postwar \ltlttaf) lntelltgcnce: Deficienetes . 111 

Korea 113 

Summmion 118 

8. From Korea to Vietnam 12 L 

Military Intelligence at the Cemer: The 1950s 122 

Reshaping the Tools . . . . 124 

The Anny Security Agency l 2 7 

Milnary lntelhgence tn the Field . . l30 

Intelligence Suppon to the Theaters . 133 

The McNamara Re"olutton 136 

The U.S. Army lntclhgcnce Command and 

the U.S. Arm>· ':>cLurit) Agency. . 138 

The Army lntclhgence and Securit) Branch 14 2 

9. Vietnam and Beyond . . . . . . . . . 145 

Vietnam: Buildup and Deployment . . . 146 

The U.S. Army lmclltgcnce Command and the I lome From. 153 

Beyond the Battle. lmclltgcnce Trends in the 1960s 157 

\\'est moreland, \I<.:( hri~tian, and ~1ilnary lntclhgcncc. 159 

Lean Years . 161 

A Time of Transitwn . 165 

10. Reorganization and Renewal . 169 

Remaking Military lnu.: lhgcncc. 169 

The lntclligencc Organization and Stationing <..tudy· Soluuons 171 
XYii 

Clwpto Pag.-

Ncw Directions for Milnary Intelligence: NSC0~1 . . . 174 

The Combat Electronic Warcfare and Intelligence Concept 179 

Military Intelligence in the Reserve Components. 182 

Military Intelligence in the 1980s . 183 

11. A Future of Uncertainties . . . . 

Conclusion: The Shaping of Army lmelligence 

Bibliography 

Glossary. . 

Heraldic Items 

Lineages and Heraldic Data . 

Milttary lmelligencc Corps 

66th ~lilitary Intelligence Bngade . 

lllth Military lmelligcnce Brigade 

ll2th \1ilitary lmelltgence Brigade 

20 1st Militar>' Intelligence Brigade 

205th Military Intelligence Bngade 

207th Military Intelligence Brigade 

319th Military Intelligence Brigade 

-+70th Military lntelligem:e Bngade 

SOOth Military lmelhgcn<.:e Bngade 

50lst Military Intelligence Bngade 

504th Milttary Intelligence Brigade 

'51 3th Military Intelligence Brigade 

525th Military lntelhgencc Bngade 

I 08th MHitary lntelhgencc Group. 

I 09th Military Intelligence Group. 

I I 5th Military Intelligence Croup. 

I 16th Military Intelligence C. roup. 

259th Military lntclltgencc Group. 

336th ~lilitary lntclltgcm:c (.roup. 

3-+~th \lilitar> lntelhgcncc (.roup 

505th ~1ilitar) lntclltgcncc C1roup. 

650th \1ilitary Intelligence (,roup 

902d Militaf) Intelligence (.roup . 

I st Military Intelligence Banal ion . 

2d MIIitai)' lmelligcm:c Bauahon 

3d Military lntelligem:c Baualion . 

187 

190 

197 

209 

213 

215 

217 

218 

220 

222 

224 

227 

229 

231 

233 

235 

237 

239 

241 

243 

246 

247 

248 

249 

250 

252 

253 

254 

255 

257 

259 

262 

263 
xdii 

l 4th Mihtary lmclhgence Battalion 

15th Xlihtar) Imclhgence Battalion 

2+th \1thtar) lmelhgence Baualion 

10 I st ~ltlnar) lmelhgence Battalion 

I Old \llhtar> Imelhgence Battalion 

I 03d \1Hnary lmelhgence Battalion 

I 04th t-.lilllar)' lmelhgence Battalion . 

l05th Mllnar)' Imelhgence Battalion . 

106th Milttary lmclligence Battalion . 

l07th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

l08th Mihtmy Intelligence Battalion . 

1 09th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

ll Oth Military Intelligence Battalion . 

I 24th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

I 25th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

I 26th Milnary Intelligence Battalion . 

I 28th Military lmelhgence Battalion . 

134th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

!35th \1tlitary Intelligence Battalion . 

!38th \hlit.u-y Intelligence Battalion . 

140th M!lnary Intelligence Battahon . 

141 st \lilitar) lntelhgcncc Battalion . 

142d \hlnary Imelhgence Battalion . 

!47th \hlnary Intclhgence Baualion . 

163d \hlnar)· Intelligence Battalion . 

I 65th ~ltlnar> lmclhgence Baualion . 

20 1st Mdnar)' lmclhgencc Banal ion 

202d ~lthtar>· Intelligence Baualion . 

203d 'v1dnary Intclhgcnce Battalion . 

20-+th Milnary Intclhgcnce Battalion 

205th Milit:uy· Imelligencc Baualion . 

206th Milttary Intelligence Battalion . 

223d Military 

Intelligence Battalion . 

22-1-th Militat') Intelligence Battalion . 

22<:>Lh M ilttar> I ntclhgcncc Banal ion . 

260th \1ilitar> lntelltgcncc Battalion . 

297th ~1ilitary Intelligence Battalion . 

10 1st ~lilitary Intelligence Battalion 

302d ~lilitary Intelligence Battalion . 

303d ~lilitary Intelligence Battalion . 

304th ~lilitary Intelligence Battalion . 

305th ~lilitary Intelltgcnce Battalion 

306th ~lilitary Imclhgcncc Baualton . 

266 

267 

269 

271 

274 

277 

280 

283 

286 

287 

289 

29 1 

294 

295 

297 

300 

301 

303 

30+ 

305 

308 

309 

.310 

312 

313 

315 

316 

318 

.319 

320 

324 

326 

327 

328 

331 

332 

333 

334 

335 

3.38 

HI 

HJ 

345 
307th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

308th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

309th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

310th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

3llth Military Intelligence Baualion . 

312th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

313th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

314th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

319th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

32lst Military Intelligence Baualion . 

323d Milita1y Intelligence Battalion . 

325th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

326th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

337th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

338th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

34lst Military Intelligence Baualion . 

344th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

345th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

368th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

372d Military Intelligence Baualion . 

373d Military Intelligence Baualion . 

376th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

377th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

378th Military lmelligence Battalion . 

383d Military Intelligence Battalion . 

415th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

50lst Military Intelligence Battalion . 

502d Military Intelligence Battalion . 

Slllh Military Intelligence Battalion . 

519th Military lmelligence Baualion. 

522d Military Intelligence Baualion . 

524th Military lmelligence Battalion . 

52 7th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

532d Military Intelligence Baualion 

533d Military Intelligence Baualion . 

542d Military Intelligence Baualion . 

549th Military Intelligence Baualion . 

550th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

629th Military Intelligence Battalion . 

Glossary of Lineage Terms . 

Index to the Narrative. . . 

xix 

347 

351 

353 

355 

357 

361 

365 

369 

371 

373 

374 

375 

376 

378 

380 

382 

383 

385 

386 

387 

388 

390 

391 

392 

393 

394 

395 

398 

400 

402 

405 

407 

409 

411 

413 

417 

418 

419 

420 

421 

425 
XX 

Illustrations 

The following photographs appear between pages 60 and 61: 

Nineteenth century intelligence collectors 

New quarters for the War Department's intelligence organization, l 908 

Pioneers of Military Intelligence 

Interrogation of German prisoners of war during World War 1 

Technology at the service of intelligence: an Army aerial photographer 

Herbert 0. Yardley, intelligence hero and villain 

Group photograph of the Signal Intelligence Service 

The new location of the SIS in Arlington, Virginia, 1942 

Signal Security Agency personnel decryptingjapanese diplomatic traffic 

Cipher machines like SIGABAs guarded the security of Army communications. 

Officers of Security Detachment D in the European Theater of Operations 

A Counter Intelligence Corps agent questioning a source in the ETO 

Soldiers of the elite Alamo Scouts in the Southwest Pacific Area 

Postwar headquarters of Army Security Agency, Europe, in Frankfurt 

A Nisei Counter Intelligence Corps agent during the occupation of japan 

The following photographs appear between pages 144 and 145: 

Antenna field during the Korean War 

Photointerpreters of the 45th ("Thunderbird") Infantry Division 

The sphinx, historically identified with Military lmelligence 

Antenna array at an overseas site 

The durable Mohawk 

Maj. Gen. Alva Fitch 

Members of a military intelligence detachment during the Vietnam connict 

An intelligence officer interrogating a suspected member of the Viet Cong 

A Special Forces team operating an AN/PRD-1 radio direction finder 

Operations room at the Intelligence Command during the Viemam era 

A soldier demonstrating a PRO-J 1 radio direction finder 

Guardrail Common Sensor mounted aboard the RC-12 platform 

Organization Day ceremonies for the Military Intelligence Corps 

New headquarters building of the Intelligence and Security Command 

Use of automation and communications systems after the Cold War 

A color illustration of the regimental insignia of the MiliLwy Intelligence Corps 

appears as the frontispiece. Color illustrations clj· heraldic items approved for militmy 

intelligence brigades, groups, and battalions appear between pages 214 and 215. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Introduction 

M ilitary Intelligence-the collection of information by commanders on the 

enemy and the battlefield environment they must confront-has existed since the 

beginnings of armies and of wars. However, the emergence of prolessional 

Military Intelligence organizations and the definition of the functions they most 

appropriately performed are comparatively recent developments. Until the nineteenth century, Military Intelligence was practiced only in wartime; methods of 

collection were mdimentary; and the conduct of Military Intelligence was considered a function of command, one which any professional officer could perform. 

Furthermore, commanders tended to be skeptical about the reliability of the information they received from spies, scouts, and their own troops. ln his monumental 

treatise On War, Clausewilz commented only Lhat "many intelligence reports in 

war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncenain."l 

The powers of continental Europe developed military staff organizations during the nineteemh century and provided a peaceLime institutional locus for 

Mil itary Intelligence organization. Staffs developed an intelligence element that 

collected maps and military statistics and dispatched attaches. Ultimately, these 

developments were replicated in the United States, although not without some 

delay. The U.S. Army was small, it had no general staff, and there were no pressing military threats to drive intelligence collection. And although George 

Washington had been a masterful practitioner of intelligence while serving as 

commander in chief of the Continental Army, this aspect of his experience has 

never become pan of the national heritage. A small Division of Military 

Information was finally set up within the Adjutant Generals Office twenty years 

after the American Civil War had ended. A few years later the Atmy dispatched its 

first military auaches abroad to provide general information on worldwide military affairs. When the Am1y at last gained a General Staff in 1903, the Military 

lnfotmation Division was transformed into the General StarTs Second Section. 

I Karl Von Clausewnz. On War. ed. and trans. M1char::l lloward and Peter Paret (Pnnccton 

Pnnccton Univcrsily Press, 1976), p. 117 
4 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

At the time, the Annys Oedgling General Staff was groping lO define its own 

appropriate mission, and these beginnings were never fully developed. A subsequent reorganization effectively eliminated the intelligence function of the staff, 

and it took America's emry into World War I to reverse the situation. To fight a 

land campaign on the continent of Europe, the Army was compelled to remodel 

itself along continental lines. An intelligence division was re-created within the 

War Department General Staff, and staffs that included intelligence officers were 

introduced at all units clown to the level of battalion. Military Intelligence 

expanded to become a "shield" as well as a "sword," as the Army became heavily 

involved in counterintelligence. 

In the field, technology helped to rationalize intelligence collection at the 

tactical and operational levels. Under combat conditions, intelligence gathering 

was accomplished not only by Military Intelligence specialists but also by the 

line troops themselves. As S. L. A. Marshall later stated, "Infantry ... is the 

antenna of the mechanism of combat intelligence. "2 Increasingly, these sources 

were augmented by what were later called "special information services" that 

engaged in various types of technical collection activities.3 World War 1 exposed 

the Army to a dazzling new array of technological enhancements to the collection process: aerial photography and reconnaissance, radio intercept, and optical and acoustical sensors used to detect aircraft and artillery. One secondary 

effect was that much of the Army's practical intelligence work was carried our 

by nonintelligence personnel: the intercept personnel of the Signal Corps; technicians manning artillery targeting devices; topographic specialists in the Corps 

of Engineers; and aviators. This situation in turn tended lO block or delay the 

further centralization of the intelligence function. 

In the long years of peace following the Armistice, Army Intelligence continued to search for an appropriate place within an Army the size of which had 

again been greatly reduced. A basic problem of Army Intelligence remained conceptual: defining what an intelligence organization should do. Army Intelligence 

offices, in fact, continued to be regarded as clearing houses for all manner of 

information functions unrelated lO intelligence. During the interwar years, for 

example, intelligence staffs managed the Army's public affairs programs; later 

they were tasked with conducting psychological warfare and writing the Army's 

htstory. It took a surprisingly long time-until the end of World War ll-for 

Army lntelhgence to shake off such extraneous functions and concentrate on its 

primary task. "knowing one's enemies.''4 At the War Department level, the 

Armys intelligence organization tended to act more as a reference library than as 

2 Quoted in Eliot A Cohen and john (,ooch. Military t'vlisfmtwu.·s: Th<' Ancuamy of Fw/w,· 111 

\\'Lir (New York: Free Press. 1990). p. 181. 

3 Roben R. Glass and Ph1lllp B. Davidson. lntdh~cncc i~ /01 Commcmdas (Harnsburg: M1lnary 

Service Publishing Co, 1946). p. 25. 

4 This useful dcfmnion 1s taken from the tulr of Emcst Mays Know111g Ont''s En.:mu:s: lntdllgencr 

AsscNm'tHs Before tit,· Tll'(l \\'orltl \\'ars (Pnnccton. Pnncellln Uni\'ersity Press. 1986). 
INTRODUCTION 5 

a positive directing force. Not until May 1945 did the War Departments Military 

Intelligence Division (MID) acquire an organization to establish intelligence pliorities and requirements, missions that finally allowed it to put into practice all components of the modern intelligence cycle: determining requiremems, collecting 

the appropriate information, processing the acquired data imo finished intelligence, and clisseminat ing the results, a circular process that often generates a new 

set of requirements, initiating the cycle again. 5 

Military Intelligence also labored unuer other handicaps in the years 

between the wars. Under garrison conditions, unit intelligence ofricers found 

themselves with little to do. Baulefield collection mechanisms seemed to have 

liule utility in peace. The Military Intelligence Division maintained a small 

counterintelligence element and for a time funded a small cryptanalytic unit; 

but the Iauer function subsequently passed over to the Signal Corps. Military 

auaches continued to report, but their purpose was somewhat anomalousgovernment parsimony and expensive representational demands made it impossible for officers without private incomes to serve in overseas posts, and their 

function seemed more political and social than military. 

These factors, along with the perceived absence of any real threat in times of 

peace, effectively marginalized intelligence work within the Army. Intelligence 

seemed unrelated to the real life of the Army, and intelligence assignments were 

viewed as curiosities at best. General of the Anny Dwight D. Eisenhower later 

commented, "I think that officers of ability in all our services shied away from 

the intelligence branch in the fear that they would be forming dimples in their 

knees by holding teacups in Buenos Aires or Timbuctoo."6 At the same time, if 

intelligence was peripheral, the Army still assumed that any officer could fulfill 

its functions.7 

In World War II these attitudes began to change. Military and political leaders alike recognized that intelligence was crucial to military success. To meet its 

information needs, the Army was forced to create a large intelligence slructure, 

manned largely by draftees and officers commissioned into the Reserves. Acting 

through its wartime operating arm, the Military Intelligence Service, tbe Military 

Intelligence Division instituted formal training for imelligence personnel in a 

diversity of disciplines. By the end of the war, various types of intelligence 

teams and coumerimelligence detachments were supporting the intelligence 

5 Military Intelligence Div1sion, A llistory of the Military Intelligence Divis1on, 7 December 

1941-2 September 1945, unpublished Ms, U.S Army Center of Military History, 1946, p. 72, 

copy m INSCOM llistory Office nles. 

6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Command in War." lecture presented to the Nauonal War 

College, Washington, D.C., 30 Oct 50. 

7 The author of one of the carhest books on Mihtal')' Intelligence 111 the U.S. Army stated, "If 

things are not going right between G-2 and G-3 .. . then a switchmg of the dmies of these is recommended. If the G-2 is not competem to beaG-1, he is not competent to be a G-2 and should 

be retired from the General Staff." Walter Campbell Sweeney. Atilwuy lncdligcncr: A Nell' \Veapon 

111 \Vw (New York. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1924). p. 135. 
6 MILITARY lNTELLIGENCE 

staffs of all tactical units in the field. Meanwhile, the Signal Corps conducted its 

own imelligcnce and security war, entering the field of radar, which was at once 

a collection technology, a new intelligence target, and a subject of possible 

countermeasures. More important, the Signal Corps provided crypLOlogic support to the War Department through lls Signal Security Agency and furnished 

theater commanders with tactical signals intelligence units. The growing importance of communications intelligence ultimately resulted in the transfer of 

responsibility for the function from the Signal Corps to Military Intelligence. 

The Army emerged from World War ll with an intelligence structure that in 

some ways prefigured that of the present. Most of the lineages of today$ intelligence units trace back to the second World War. However, this structure was 

departmentally oriemcd, fragmented, and less than fully articulated. Follov.ring 

the postwar reorganization of the Army in 1946, the Military Intelligence 

Division again emerged as the dominant institUlion in the whole architecture, 

providing overall direction, producing intelligence, and engaging in a diversity 

of operational activities. As part of its mandate, the Division commanded a vertically organized signals intelligence and security apparatus, the Army Security 

Agency (ASA), and an administratively centralized counterintelligence element, 

the Counter lmelligence Corps (CIC). Both ASA and ClC were organized into 

sizable units. However, the Army's other imetligence disciplines-human intelligence and imagery imelligencc-cominued to be essentially orphans, their personnel grouped into small teams supporting tactical commanders and their 

training base neglected. Electronic warfare remained the prO\rince of the Signal 

Corps. The system continued to be manned by a mix of detailed Regular Army 

officers and reserve officer specialists who chose to remain in uniform when the 

war came to an end. 

During the next forty years, these arrangements were reshaped by several 

diverse inOuences. The Cold War, advances in technology, and imperatives of 

bureaucracy were perhaps the most significant. To meet evolving challenges, rhe 

structure of Army lntelligence was repeatedly reorganized. Military intelligence 

was professionalized, its disciplines integrated, and the scope of its operations 

enhanced. As a result, Military lmelligence became a branch in the U.S. Army, 

and Military lmelligence professionals were affiliated with the Army's regimemal 

system through the creation of the Military lmclligence Corps. Intelligence staff 

seclions, present at all Army levels, were supplemented by specialized intelligence units up to brigade level. This book attempts to trace the long and complicated organizalional history that characterized this evolution. 
l 

The Beginnings 

I n 1885 the Division of Military Information was established as pan of the 

Military Reservations Division, Miscellaneous Branch, of the Adjutant Generals 

Office. This step gave the U.S. Army a permanent intelligence organization for 

the first time in a century. 

The long delay in giving recognition to the importance of Military 

Intelligence stemmed from various factors. One of these was the marginal position that the Army itself occupied in American society. The American tradition 

was one of libeny, democracy, and commercialism; except in time of war the 

country tended to neglect all the Armys needs. The professional Army was there 

to perform constabulary work against scauered Indian tribes in the vastness of 

the American West, to man coast defenses against the implausible threat of a 

foreign auack, and lO serve as a continuing nucleus of prorcssional expertise. 

Should a real threat lO the Republic appear, citizens would rally LO the Oag, as 

they had in all of Americas past wars, and some kind of mechanism for collecting imelligence would eventually be improvised to meet the crisis. 

Another factor retarding the development of a permanent intelligence organization until 1885 was the general backwardness of the Army. On the 

European Continent, armies had been forced to create systematic staff organizations dealing with both operations and intelligence since the beginning of the 

nineteenth century. The Prussian Great General Stall provided the model for all 

of Europe's atmies. ln the United States, with its distrust of militarism, the idea 

of such a super army headquarters was repellent. Collecting intelligence and 

laying out detailed war plans were not in the American tradition. The U.S 

Army's central staff consisted mainly of bureaus dealing with questions of 

administration and supply, and these reponed directly to the secretary of war, 

not to the commanding general of the Army. 

Without any organizational suppon, each U.S. commander served as his 

own intelligence officer, and the intelligence function was limited to simple 

reconnaissance in time of war or during an Indian campaign. In the field, 

units set up security patrols in tactical arrangements described in a now-
8 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

quaint vocabulary of pickets, \'edeues, and Cossack posts.l During major 

deployments, such as those which took place in the Civil War, cavalry served 

its traditional function as the eyes of the Army. 

Army topographic engineers and other officers trained under the U.S. 

Military Academy's engineer-oriented curriculum also made important comributions to intelligence, continuing an Army tradition that dated back to the 

explorations of Lewis and Clark. ln 1814 the War Department created a unit of 

LOpographic engineers to help with the military effort against Great Britain. 

From 1818 on, the Army maintained a topographic bureau and from 1838 lO 

1863 a separate Corps of Topographic Engineers. West Point-trained engineers 

helped lead Maj. Gen. Winfield Scotts army to the conquest of Mexico City in 

184 7.2 Reconnaissance efforts carried out by troops were often supplemented 

by civilian auxiliaries. Indian and civilian scouts brought their special expertise 

to bear on the frontier. During the Mexican War, General Scott had even 

employed a group of locally hired Mexican bandits and deserters, the "Mexican 

Spy Company," to gather specific tactical intelligence. 

Limiting Military lmelligence lO tactical collection had led to numerous disasters in the past. ln the War of 1812 Ameri can troops had crossed the 

Canadian border without maps in an abortive invasion attempt that ended in a 

fiasco. A generation later, the Army$ quanermaster general found himself with 

no idea whether or not wagons could be used to support the advance of Maj. 

Gen. Zachary Taylors forces into Mexico. In a classic breach of security, the 

Army then sem a courier to Taylor carrying unenciphered secret orders that 

stripped the general of most of his regulars. The orders were captured on the 

way, and Taylors lack of reconnaissance allowed his depleted forces to be taken 

by surprise at Buena Vista. Buena Vista turned out to be an American victory 

only due to the fighting prowess of Taylors volunteer troops. With luck on its 

side, the Republic managed to muddle through the Mexican War just as it had 

through the War of L812. ln both cases, the ultimate triumph of largely improvised forces encouraged a casual approach LOward Military lmelligence, an anitude that fit well with the longstanding American tradition of subordinating 

military concerns to other, more immediate interests. 

The nature and scope of the Civil War provided unusual opponunities for 

imelligence collection.3 Because the North and South were physically proximate 

1 Sec Anhur L. Wagner. Tht• Savin· of St'(unty and Injo11nation (Kansas City· HudsonKimbcrlcr Pubhshmg. 1893). pp. 55-67. 

2 The scrvtccs of the topographical engineers are documented in \Vdham 1-l. Goetzman. 

Army ExploratiOn in the Amcricc1n Wr:.t. 180.3-1863 (Lincoln: Umversil)' of Nebraska Press, 1979): 

Guy C. Swan Ill ct al., "Scou·s Engmccrs:· Military Review (March 1983): 61-68. deals with 

reconnaissance 111 the 1\kxican War. 

3 An excellem trcmmem of Ctv!l vVar mtclhgcnce can be found 111 Peter t-.1ask)wskl, "Mthtary 

Intelligence Sources During the Arncncan Civtl War." in Thr lntdligc·na Revolution: An 1-llstoriwl 

Prrspcdtw; Pnxeedirtg'> (lj the Thirtct•nrh MiliWry History Sympvsiwn, Unirnl States Air F()la t\((lckmy, 

eel. Walter T. Huchcock lWa~hington, D.C.: Off~ec of Air Force lltstOl)'. !991), pp. 39-70. 
THE BEGINNINGS 9 

and loyalties were desperately intermixed, both sides made extensive use of 

spies as well as the military information cheerfully turned over by an uncensored press. ln the field the rival armies often used civilian guides, willingly or 

unwillingly recruited from the population. This was an American adaptation of 

Napoleon$ succinctly brutal advice on intelligence collection: "You order the 

major to put a peasant at your disposal, arrest his wife as a hostage, have a soldier dress himself as the man's [arm hand. This system always succeeds."4 

Cavalry once again proved its indispensability. For the first pan of the war, lack 

of an effective cavalry organization left the Union armies blinded in the presence 

of their enemies. During the Gcuysburg campaign, however. the situation was 

reversed. Maj. Gen. j. E. B. Stuan:S decision to raid rather than scout led directly 

to the Confederates' accepting battle on unfavorable terms. 

Increased use of technology also contributed to innovations in the intelligence and security arena during the Civil War. The Union Army used both free 

and tethered balloons to wmch over enemy dispositions in the early stages of 

the conOict. Manned by civilian aeronauts, the balloons were successively 

assigned to the Corps of Topographic Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, and 

the Corps of Engineers.5 The Army Signal Corps, first set up in 1863, also came 

to play an intelligence role. Signal Corps communications troops posted on high 

ground often provided valuable field imelligence.6 However, their messages, 

transmiued by "wig-wagged" signal flags, could be intercepted. Similarly, the 

increased use of the telegraph by each side created opportunities both for communications imercept and communications deception. This quickly led to the 

employment of rudimentary field codes and ciphers in tactical situations. 

Most commanders on both sides continued to serve as their own intelligence officers. Confederate LL. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" jackson directly supervised the mapping of the Shenandoah Vallcy.7 AnOLber Confederate corps commander, Lt. Gen. james A. Longstreet, personally debriefed the spy who provided the nrst indications that the Union Army was on the move to Gettysburg. 

4 Martin Van Crevcld, Commancl in War (Cambridge: llan•ard University Press, 1985). p. 67. 

Army balloon activities in the Civ1l War and later periods arc covered in Tom D. Crouch. 

The Eagle Aloft: Two Cc111wies oj the Balloon in Amaica (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute 

Press, 1983). The Confederates were able w field only one balloon dunng the course of the connie!, but its perfom1ance 1mpressed at least one rebel officer. "My experience with this gave me a 

high idea of the poss1ble efficiency of balloons 111 active campaigns. Especially did we find, too, 

that the balloons of the enem> forced upon us constant troublesome precauuons m efforts to con· 

ceal our marches." General E P. Alexander, Militwy lvlt:moirs of a Cor~(cclcrat<' (Bloomington: 

Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 172-73 

o The Union Signal Corps operated both "stations of observation" and "stations of rommumratlon. · j Willard Brown, Tht' Signal Corp~. U.S.A. in th~ Ww (~f the Rebellion (New York. ArnQ 

Pres::., 1974). p. 125 The Confederate Signal Corps w;~s even more mvolvcd m mtclligencc work. 

Sec Wilham A. Tidwell ct al., Com;; Retribution· The Confederate Set ret Service and the Assctssinalivn 

of Lincoln Uackson. Univer::.ity Press of Miss1ss1pp1, 1988), pp. 80-104. 

'i This is documented 111 \lctllc Me <l Mctp of the Vallt:y: Tl1r Civ1/ \Vw joumaltl( Stomwall jad1son's 

Topogmph··•. ed. Arch1e P. McDonald (Dallas: ::,outhcm Methodist Univcrslt)' Press, 1973). 
10 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

However, there were some auempts to designate intelligence officers and to establish rudimentary intelligence organizations. During the opening days of the Bull 

Run campaign, Maj. Gen. Pierre Beauregard$ assistant adjutant general was able to 

provide the Confederate Army with early warning of incipient Union moves 

through a well-connected spy network he ran in Washington, D.C. Shonly afterward, Maj. Gen. George McClellan, the newly appointed head of the Union 

Armies, employed private detective Alan Pinkerton as his intelligence chief. 

However, Pinkerton's untutored and exaggerated evaluation of Confederate 

strength virtually paralyzed Union operations for a time.8 But amateurishness in 

the field of intelligence at this point was not confmed lO civilians: after Pinkettons 

return to private life, McClellan$ cavalry chief, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasanton, provided equally misleading information regarding the enemy$ numbers.9 

Union forces did not acquire a professional intelligence officer until the 

spring of 1863, when Maj. Gen. joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the 

Potomac, directed Col. George V. Sharpe of the 120th New York Volunteer 

Infantry to set up a bureau of information. Sharpe, a lawyer and diplomat in 

civilian life, devised an effective system making use of civilian scouts, behindthe-lines agents, and interrogation reports from deserters and prisoners of war 

to build up an accurate picture of Confederate order of battle and intentions. By 

the end of the war, Sharpe was a brevet brigadier general and assistant provost 

marshal assigned to Headquarters, Armies of the United States.lO 

Coumerintelligence organizations also made an appearance. ln one of their 

few successes, Pinkerton and his operatives rolled up the Rosa Greenhaw spy network that had funneled information to the Confederates from the nations capitaL 

At the beginning of 1862 the War Depanmem took over the rather elaborate 

nationwide counterintelligence organization built up by Secretary of State William 

Henry Seward and placed it under Lafayette Baker, a civilian who subsequemly 

operated a "secret service" of detectives that engaged in both positive collection 

and counterintelligence. In addition, Baker supervised investigations of graft and 

fraud and still found time to organize his own cavalry regiment, thus acquiring 

R To the end, Pinkerton was convinced he was right. See his autobiOgraphical work. The Spy 

of the Rebellion: Be111g a Tnte Histmy of the Spy System of the Uniw/ States Army During the LAte 

Rebellion (New York: G. W CarletOn and Co., 1883), p. 588. The best evaluation of his performance is m Edwin C. Fishel, "Pinkerton and McClellan: Who Deceived Whom?" Civil War H1story 

24 (june 1988): 115-42. 

9 Stephen V. Sears discusses the "singular ineptitude" of Pleasanton as an mtelligence officer 

m George B. McClellan: The \'oung Napoleon (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1988), p. 274. 

Pleasanton conunued to serve as cavalry chief of the Army of the Potomac even after McClellan 

stepped down. H1s reports continued to be "remarkably unreliable." Russell F. Wetgley, History of 

the United States Army, Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 2-+2. 

10 Maslowskt, "Intelligence Sources," p 40. It should be noted that Sharpe's organization 

was known as a "bureau of informauon," not an intelligence office. In nineteenth-century usage, 

the word "intelligence" equated with today's "news." The Army Intelligence Office, which the 

Confederates established in 1862. was headed by a chaplain wtth the missiOn to mform the families of wounded Southern soldiers about their care and disposition. 
THE BEGINNINGS 11 

the rank of colonel. As a result of his work in tracking down Lincolns assassins, 

Baker also ended his Civil War service as a brevet brigadier general. It 

After the Civil War, older habits reassened themselves. The vast armies were 

hastily demobilized, and the wartime arrangements for gathering intelligence 

discontinued. Sharpe returned to civilian life; Baker was fired by President 

Andrew johnson. who disagreed both with his methods and, more lo the point. 

his suspicions that unregenerate Confederates were regaining power and influence under the johnson administration. Once Reconslntction had ended, the 

Army was scaled back lOa force of some 25,000 men, thinly scattered over the 

empty spaces of the American West. Once again, each commander served as his 

own intelligence officer. Under typical conditions of Indian warfare, cavalry regiments were broken up into penny-packets and employed as standing garrisions 

or mobile strike forces. In the West, commanders relied on Indian scouts and 

civilians like Buffalo Bill Cody to fulfill their imelligence needs. Indians had 

been used in this role since the beginning of the Republic, and Congress had 

authorized a permanent Corps of Indian Scouts in 1866. Although the legislation provided for a force of 1,000 scouts, budgetary factors allowed no more 

than 300 scouts to be employed at any one time.12 

Despite its occasional wartime accomplishments, A1my Imelligence had 

been a maner of improvisation. There had been no institutional structure to 

give it historical continuity. Expertise gained in wartime had quickly dissipated. However, by the 1880s the tide began to turn. American society itself was 

rapidly changing from a loosely knit aggregation of agriculturalists into an 

industrial unit of large corporations bound together in a national market. This 

in turn led to a new emphasis on professional expertise.l3 At the same time, 

similar developments were taking place in the major nations overseas, which 

began to exhibit a renewed interest in imperial expansion, a fac t of some concern to the United States. The U.S. preoccupation with the Civil War had 

already encouraged French intervention in Mexico. As the steamship and the 

international cable continued to draw the world closer together, the actions of 

foreign powers impinged on the American popular consciousness in a way that 

had not been the case in the past. 

Slowly, Americas military institutions began to respond to these pressures for 

greater professionalization and greater access to information concerning events 

abroad. In 1881 the Army created a professional school at Fon Leavenwonh, 

Kansas, to give advanced instruction to infamry and cavahy officers. In 1882 the 

U.S. Navy set up the Office of Na\·al Intelligence with the prima1y mission of 

obsenring and reponing on new developments in maritime technology overseas. 

ll Baker told his own story, possibly with some improvements, in Histo1y of the United States 

Secret Service (Philadelphta: L. C. Baker, 1867). 

12 Robert M. Utley. Frontier Regulars: The United Scates Army and the Indian. 1866-1890 (New 

York: Madvlillan Co., 1973). p. 53. 

13 This interpretation owes much to Robert G. Wiebe. 
12 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The establishment of the Division of MiliLary Information by the Army in 1885 

was thus part of a larger pauern of historical developments. 

Military Intelligence in Place 

The Army's Intelligence organization underwent a steady evolution 

between 1885 and the beginning of the war with Spain. Initially, the Division 

of Military lnfonnation appears to have been seen as simply a passive repository for information on military-related developments at home and abroad. lts 

domestic responsibilities led to its location in the Militar}' Reservations 

Division of the Adjutant General's Office. Initial collection requirements were 

disarmingly simple. The adjutant general requested that the Army's geographical departments and technical services "whenever practicable, make repon on 

anything which it may be desirable for the Government to know in case of 

sudden war." just what son of informallon this was, however, was "almost 

impossible to specify in detail .. . but this can well be left to the imelligence 

and discretion of the officers."l4 

In 1889 the division LOok a first step toward taking on a more positive role 

when the Army dispatched military auaches to the capitals of the five major 

European powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. 

Since the attaches were charged with performing intelligence-gathering tasks in 

addition to diplomatic representational duties, they provided the division with 

its own professional collection ann. Abom the same time, the division became a 

separate body, directly subordinate lo the adjutant general, and access to its files 

was restricted to the commanding general of the Army and the bureau chiefs.l5 

Although the introduction of attaches improved the Army's foreign intelligence capabilities, it also resulted in the Army's first intelligence scandal. ln 

1892 Capt. Henry T. Borup, the American attache posted to France, was 

expelled from the country for auempting to purchase the plans for the fortifications of Toulon from a disgruntled employee of the French Ministry of Marine. 

This evem caused some consternation, especially to jefferson Coolidge, the 

American minister to France. Coolidge poimecl out that Borups action had been 

"perfectly useless"; not only was America at peace with France, but the small 

American navy could not auack Toulon.l6 However, the captains behavior, 

while indiscreet, was not totally irrational; the United States had recemly 

embarked on a program to upgrade its own coastal defenses, and Borup, an 

14 Ltr, Brig Gen R. C. Drum to Chief of Engineers, 23 Nov 1886; George W. Auxier, 

Hastorical Manuscnpl File: Matcnals on the Histor}' of Mahtar}' lntclhgcncc 111 the U.S., 

1884-1944. U.S. Army Center of 1v\ilitary HisLOry, Washington. D.C. , hereafter cited as MID 

DocumcnLS. 

15 A succinct account of the organization can be found in Elizabeth Bethel. 'The Miliwry 

lnfonnauon DiviSIOn: Ongm of the Intelligence Dtvision," Militllry Affairs ll tSpnng 1971 ): 17-24. 

l<> Alfred Vagts, The Mlluwy ALtachc (Princeton: Pnnccton Umvcrsit)' Press, 1967), p. 222. 
TIIC BEGINNINGS 13 

ordnance officer, presumably believed that any information gleaned from abroad 

would be helpful. At any rate, this mmor embarrassment did not interfere \vith 

the growth of the auache system. By 1894 five additional attache posts had been 

set up at other European capitals, japan, and Mexico. 

Meanwhile, the functions of the Military Information Division expanded 

further. In 1892 the secretary of war reorganized the divis10n, assigning it a 

wide spectrum of duties that nearly transformed it into a combined operational 

and intelligence staff. The division was tasked to collect mformauon on both the 

Umted States and foreign countnes. to direct the auache system, and to disseminate mtelhgence products and maps to the Army. In addmon, ll was to monitor 

the mllttia mobilization base, prepare mstructions to the militia inspectors, and 

formulate mobilization plans. As if all of this were not enough, the division was 

also directed to "have charge of a museum ... for the care and preservation of 

military relics."l7 

By 1893 the Military Information Division was large enough to be organized 

into four branches. The Progress in Military Arts Branch collected scientific and 

technical intelligence from the various attaches. The Northern Frontier Branch 

focused on the Canadian border: Great Britain was still thought of as a possible, 

though not probable, enemy, and Army officers were encouraged to take "hunting and fishing" leaves to reconnoiter and map certain areas of Canada. The 

Spanish-American Branch monitored developments in the troubled Caribbean, 

where Cuban revolutionaries were already plotting insurrection against Spain. 

Finally, the Militia and Volunteer Branch kept track of the various state National 

Guard organizations and performed whatever rudimentary mobilization plannmg was possible in peacetime. 

As a result, when the war with Spam began in April 1898, the Army for 

once entered upon a conflict with at least a semblance of mtelligence preparation. Eleven officers were on duty wilh the Military Information Division at the 

State, War, and Navy Building in Washmgton; 6 additional auaches went to join 

the 10 already abroad, and another 40 officers provided status reports on the 

natton's militia.l8 The Military Information Division had already collected a 

good deal of intelligence on conditions in Cuba and soon collected more using 

Army officers on undercover assignments in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The clandestine collection mission of Lt. Albert Rowan in Cuba was later both popularIzed and distorted in Eiben Hubbard's famous story, "A Message to Garcia."l9 

l Orders, Secretary of WarS. B. r:lkm:., 12 Mar 1892, MID Documents 

ltl Marc B. Powe, The Emerg,·ncr of rh,· \\'ar Dcparlmcnl 1nrdligrnu Agcntv, 1885-1918 

(~1anhattan. Kans .. MNAH Pubhshmg, 1974). p. 29. The head of the Mlluary Information 

D1v1ston at 1hc ume was Col. Arthur !:) Wagner, author of The Scrvt(e of Secunlv and ln(cmnation 

and the leachng expert on intelligence m the Army 

1<1 ror the Lrue story, sec Rowan's own ::~ccount in Milirmy lntrlhgrncc Its 1/eroes ancl 

Legends, comp. Diane Hamm (i\rling10n. Va U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, 

1987), pp 1-19 
14 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Unfortunately, the war would reveal much about the weaknesses of both 

the Army and its Military Intelligence organization. The 25,000-man Regular 

Army was increased in strength, but concomitantly 140,000 mililiamen and 

volunteers were placed under arms, creating imolerable strains on the country's mobilization capacities. The dispatch of the main Spanish fleet ro 

Santiago, Cuba, first discovered by a Signal Corps wiretap of the Spanish 

cable, led to the hasty deployment of elements of the Army's newly organized 

V Corps to that island. This expeditionary force was pulled together amid 

conditions of chaos and then committed to action under a slothful commander of dubious tactical skills. Eventual victory in Cuba owed much to the 

valor of regular and volunteer troops, but little to planning or to the effective 

use of intelligence, since the expedition's commander had refused the War 

Department's offer to set up a Military Information Division in the field to 

support the campaign. 

Meanwhile, mobilization effectively disrupted the workings of the 

Military Information Division. The natural desire of officers for field service, 

coupled with the need to stiffen the volunteer troops with regulars, drained 

the Military Information Division of its uniformed personnel; only 2 officers 

and 10 civilian clerks were left on duty in Washington when the war came to 

a dose, and all but 5 attaches had returned from their posts abroad. But during the same period the Army's intelligence needs had grown immensely. 

Following Dewey's victory at Manila, troops had been committed to the 

Philippines. An intelligence officer accompanied the expedition, but he 

labored under severe handicaps because the Military Information Division 

had never made any study of the Far East. Once a Filipino insurrection 

against American occupiers broke out, the Army in the Philippines was 

forced to expand its intelligence activities. In 1899 it set up its own independent counterintelligence center, the Bureau of Insurgent Records. 

Redesignated a year later as the Bureau of Military Information, this organization was not subordinated to the War Department's Military Information 

Division until 1902. 

The lessons of the war with Spain and the imperatives of maintaining a 

100,000-man Army to secure America's new empire led to a complete reorganization of the War Department in 1903. As a result, the Army fina ll y 

acquired a General Staff organization to carry out administrative, intelligence, 

and planning functions. Six of the forty-four officers on the new War 

Department General Staff were assigned to its Second Division, which 

absorbed the Adjutant Generals Military Information Division and was given 

the exclusive mission of collecting foreign intelligence. The arrangement 

allowed the Army's military information organization to focus its attention on 

intelligence rather than on the diversity of operational assignments that the 

Military Information Division had been given in 1892. In 1904 Great Britain 

belatedly organized its own Army General Staff, adopting precisely the oppo-
THE BEGINNINGS 15 

site solution: the British combined intelligence with operations in the same 

staff element.20 

Four major duties were assigned to the U.S. General Staffs Second Division: 

collecting and disseminating information on foreign countries; directing the 

work of the attache system and managing contacts with foreign military attaches 

in the United States; supervising mapping; and maintaining a reference collection. However, even under the new arrangements, the military information unit 

still could not perform certain vital intelligence staff functions. First, it had not 

been given the responsibility for planning Army Intelligence organization and 

operations in the field; it simply acted as a central poim for intelligence-gathering at the War Department level. Second, the organization had no responsibility 

for security or counterintelligence within the Army. Moreover, the divisions 

small staff was hard pressed to cope with its existing functions, and the War 

Department General Staff could not give the subject the attemion it deemed 

necessary. Nevertheless, at least some officers had come to realize that the criterion for staffing the new organization should have been the size of the world 

rather than the size of the Army. 

Military Inteliigence in the Twentieth Century 

The first decade of the twentieth century furnished Army Intelligence with 

new challenges. Formerly, intelligence officers had concerned themselves with 

procuring information on the neighboring states in the Western Hemisphere 

and collecting, on a more or less academic basis, technical intelligence on military developments in Europe. The acquisition of the Philippines had forced the 

Army to develop a counterintelligence capability in that area. The Army soon 

realized that the Philippine involvement, together with a growing American 

commercial and military presence in China, had a wider intelligence impact. 

Ame1ica was now a Far Eastern power. This meant that the Army now had to 

evaluate the military threat of the expanding Japanese Empire. Prejudice against 

Asian immigrants on the West Coast, which repeatedly jeopardized AmericanJapanese relations, only reinforced this need. Military observers thus went 

abroad to supplement attache coverage of the Russo-Japanese War of 

1904-1905. ln 1907 the Army began to assign officers to Japan for language 

training and shortly thereafter to China for the same purpose. 

Paradoxically, as the Army$ need for intelligence increased, the Army's capacity to meet it declined. Between 1903 and Americas enuy imo World War l, the 

Armys new General Staff strove to find an identity and a suitable role. The Armys 

intelligence organization was caught up in this bureaucratic maneuvering with 

unfonunate results. ln 1907 the incumbent adjutant general, the autocratic Maj. 

20 Thomas G. Fergusson, British Militcu:y lmc/ligenet:, 1870-1914: The Development of a Modem 

/ntelligt•ncc Or?,anization (Frederick. Mel.: University Publications of America, 1984), p. 202. 
16 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Gen. Frederick Ainsworth, restricted the aurhority of the Second Division to communicate directly with the attaches overseas, insisling that certain categories of 

correspondence pass through his office. Then, in 1908 the Third Division of the 

General Sta!f, which dealt \vith contingency and operational planning and was a 

principal consumer of the Second Divisions products, relocated to Washington 

Barracks (now Fort McNair). Unfortunately, its new and spacious quarters were 

some miles away from the Second Divisions offices in downtown Washington, 

D.C. This soon caused coordination problems, since the Third Division had only 

one auLOmobile at its disposal. To satisfy the Tbird Divisions infom1ation requirements, the Second Division was in tum moved from its own centrally located 

offices and banished to Washington Barracks. incumbent Chief of StafT Maj. Gen. 

]. Franklin Bell then decided that it was impracticable ro have two separate 

General Staff elements in the same place and directed that the two divisions be 

merged. The Army$ intelligence staff element thereby lost its separate identity) I 

The result of this reorganization was an unqualified disaster for the intelligence function at the General Staff level. Intelligence was now assigned to the 

Military lnformation Committee, all of whose members were preoccupied 

with numerous other duties. Intelligence was no longer produced for the 

Army as a whole, but for the War College Division (as the Third Division was 

later redesignated), and soon it ceased to be produced at all. A few years later, the 

chief of the War College Division had to confess that because of the press of business, "the collecting, digesting, and filing of military information of foreign countries ... appears never to have been carried on cominuously," and that "the 

work of attaches is without proper supervision and guidance, and therefore, 

to a large extem, the value of their work is lost. "22 

The outbreak of revolution in Mexico in 1911 did lillie to end this situation, although two War College Division captains were eventually detailed to 

monitor developments and compile what information about the country was 

available.23 Still, when American forces landed at Vera Cruz in 1914 they were 

essentially "vithout intelligence support. Sent down to investigate the situation, 

Capt. Douglas MacArthur reponed back to his superior that "the lmelligence 

21 Maj. Gen. Ralph Van Deman. who headed War Department Milital)' lntelhgence for most 

of World War l, commented that ··had there been sufricient automobile transportation it ts possible that the disastrous incident ... would not have occurred." The Final Memoranda: Major 

General Ralph Var1 Deman, U.S.A. Rt"t., 1865-1952: Father of MiliLaJY lntdligcna, cd. Ralph j . 

Weber (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. 1988). p. 15. 

22 Memo, Brig Gen M. M. Macomb for Chief of Staff. l3 Jul 14, sub: Employment of a 

Monograph Clerk, Record Croup (RG) 165, ser. 5, National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). Washington, D.C. A contemporary observer attnbuted the eclipse of the intelligence 

function to a personnel shortage. "The reduction of the General Staff by 12 officers in 1912 had 

made it imposstble for an lntelhgence divisLOn of any strength to be mamtamed." MaJ Gen Dcnms 

E. Nolan, Memoirs. ch. 4, p. 4, Dennis Nolan Ms. U.S. Army l'vlilitary HistOI)' Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa. 

23 Ltr, Brig Gen M t-.1. Macomb to Brig Gcn Tasker H. Bliss. 26 Oct H. Tasker Bliss Ms. 

l.ibral)' of Congress (LC). Washington, D.C. 
THE BEGINNINGS 17 

Office established by the Brigade was practically useless for my purpose. There 

seems to be no logical conception of just what information is needed and as a 

result its efforts consist largely in accumulating wild and exaggerated repons 

from a lot of scared and lying Amencan rcfugees."24 

The ombreak of general war m Europe also fa!led to re,·ive the Army's 

tntelhgence program, even though the United States was soon on the verge of 

breaking diplomatic relations with Imperial Germany over the sinking of the 

Lusitania. Although the auache system was now extensive-historian Alfred 

Vagts has pointed out that only Imperial Russia had as many military auaches 

as the Umted States-and ahhough additional militar) obsen·ers were sent to 

Europe to watch the fighting there. the mechanism for analyzmg the reports 

submttted from overseas was lacking.2s After 1915 the Military Information 

Commtttee was used simply as a bookkeeping device. Congressional appropriations listed the committee as a budget line item. but its membership comprised all War College Division officers engaged in "current General Staff 

work" as opposed to war plans.26 

The state of imclhgence work tn the Arm)' was demonstrated graphtcally 

when the War Departmem was called upon to produce a preparedness plan for 

Army reorganizauon in 1915. Preparation of the threat estimate justifying the 

plan was assigned to Capt. Dennis E. Nolan of the War College Division, who 

assembled his data from three open source references: a 1914 almanac of the 

world's armies. a shipptng register from the same year. and the Army's own Field 

Sen•tce Regulations. In the interest of stmplicity, Nolan dectded to tgnore the 

fact that the outbreak of World War I had rendered the mformation contatned 

tn these documents obsolete and changed the whole strategic situation. But by 

using this material creatively, Nolan demonstrated thm Germany, to use only 

one of his examples, could deploy a force of 435,000 men and 91,457 animals 

tn the United States wtthin 15.8 da)'S of the stan of hostilities. Although this 

estimate sen·ed to .JUSttf) the War Depanmems plans for a greatly expanded 

Army, n ignored so man) other factors as to pass beyond the bounds of reality l7 

Although Army Intelligence was collapsing at the center in the penod just 

before American entry imo World War I, there were other, more positive developments Laking place in the field. These were mostly brought abom by Signal 

Corps initiath·es in the areas of communications intelligence, aerial rcconnatssance. and commumcations secunty. A growing Signal Corps involvement tn the 

H Llr. Capt Douglas :\lact\nhur w :\1aj Grn l.~onard Wood, 7 :\tar 1-1. l conard Wood :\h, l.C. 

25 Vagts, The M1htwy Attache, p. 34. 

26 The Final Mcmmcmt/,,, p. 14 7. 

l7 I lowever, the l:pllomr of ~llluary Pohcy produced by the War Department Gcncnll 'ltaff 

m 1915 concluded that ·the accomphshmcnt of the plan outhncd ahovc for the in\'nchng force 

mstcad of bcmg a noteworthy nuhtary achtcvcmcnl would be a commonpl<1cc mihtaf} operation 

ndiculousl}' easy of <lccomphshment." Jt)hn P. l'lnnegan, Agamsl till" ')pa~t·r of a Dwg,m: Tht• 

Campmgn j1Jr Amaiccm ,\hlucuy Prcpcut'dnt'\\, 19/-1-1917 {Westport Conn : Grernwood Prc._s, 

1974), p. 5l1. 
18 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

intelligence arena came about by a circuitous route. The Signal Corps had used 

balloons for meteorological purposes when it had the mission of operating the 

U.S. Weather Bureau. After the Signal Corps turned over all but the military 

aspects of the weather function to the Depanmem of Agriculture in 1890. it redirected its aeronautical experuse toward the de,·elopmem of a manned obsen·ation 

balloon. A Signal Corps balloon, the Santiago, lOok pan in the fighting in Cuba, 

where it served chiefly to draw enemy fire. Undeterred, the Signal Corps persevered in this line of development and continued to experiment with the possibilities of aerial observation from a variety of platfonns.28 In the early years of the 

twentieth century, it made trials of traditional tethered observation balloons, a 

small powered dtngible, and the new airplane invented by the Wright brothers. ln 

1909 the Am1y purchased its first atrcraft and by 1915 had a whole squadron. 

Similarly, the Signal Corps pioneered the development of wireless for military uses. In 1914 it acquired three "radio tractors," actually White Company 

motortrucks equipped with radto sets. Although this equipment was procured 

for communications work, it could easily be adapted to intelligence purposes. 

Finally, in the field of secumy, Capt. Parker Hitt became the first Army officer to 

undertake research in the exotic field of codes and ciphers. In 1916 Hiu produced the first work on cryptology ever published m the United States.29 

About the same time, other signs of renewed interest in Army Intelligence 

began to emerge. ln March 1916 Maj. Ralph Van Deman, an infantry officer 

on detail to the War College Division, submiucd to his superiors two multipage memorandums on the subJect. Van Deman had served wtth the former 

Military Information Division both m Washington and m the Phihppines, performed undercover work in China, and held an imelligence position on his 

previous General Staff assignment from 1907 to 1910. Upon returning to 

Washington, he expressed his dismay at the extent to which the General Staff 

had allowed its intelligence function to lapse . Van Deman pointed out that 

informauon was no longer "collected-it just comes in .... But even such 

information as does come m, ts not studied and checked .... As far as any 

benefit to the Government ts concerned, the mass of this informatton might 

just as well be in Timbuctoo. It will remain in the Record Section unavailable 

to the end of time."30 What the Army needed, Van Deman fell, was a separate 

di\rision of the General Staff to deal exclusively with militar)' information.31 

Although this repon had no immediate effect, in April the acting chief of slaff 

2R In the 1903 rc\'tsed cdllton of hb book. The Sa\'tlt' of Sl'curity and lnjamwtl()n, Colonel 

Wagner mcluded an extensive treatment on the employment of observation balloons for rcconnatssancc. I am mdebted to Dr. Edward Raines of the U.S. Army Center of Military Htstory for 

thts piece of mfomtatton 

29 Parker lhn. Manual for thr '>oluuon of Mtlllary Cipher\ {Fort Leavenworth: Press of the 

Army Servtcc Schools. 1916). 

30 Tltr fm(l/ Mfmoranda, p. 104 

31 lbtd., pp. 113-L 4. 
THE BEGINNINGS 19 

of the Army ordered intelligence officers to be posted in the Army's four continental United States and two overseas geographic departments. In addition to 

supporting their own commanders, these officers would report back to the 

Military Intelligence Committee. Even before this step had been taken, the 

Army found it had new requirements for intelligence. 

In March 1916 the forces of Mexican bandit leader Pancho Villa raided 

Columbus, New Mexico, inflicting loss on troopers of the 13th Cavalry and 

causing civilian casualties. ln response, the Wilson administration ordered Brig. 

Gen. John j. Pershing to lead a punitive expedition into Mexico to hunt down 

Villas guerrilla band. Subsequently Pershing's forces deployed the widest range 

of intelligence assets which the Army had yet managed to field. 

During the American foray into Mexico, traditional collection mechanisms 

were augmented by newly emerging technologies. Pershings intelligence officer, 

Maj. James A. Ryan, organized a highly effective "service of information" that 

gave Pershing a good knowledge of northern Mexico. Ryan made use of local 

informants, supplemented by the Army's own reconnaissance capabilities. These 

were extensive. A large part of the force consisted of horse cavalty, and for the 

last time in its history the Army fielded a force of twenty Apache Indian scouts. 

ln addition, the Punitive Expedition was accompanied by the aircraft of the 

Army's 1st Aero Squadron, commanded by Maj. Benjamin Foulois, the first 

Army officer to learn to fiy. The squadron auempted aerial reconnaissance and 

even brought along an aerial camera, alLhough liule came of these efforts. The 

planes were too underpowered to fiy over the mountain ranges of Mexico and 

all eight initially assigned to the expedition crashed within two momhs.32 

Finally, motor vehicles appeared in an intelligence role for the first time in 

the Army's history. Pershing's expedition was not only supported logistically by 

trucks, but also used a few for intelligence collection. Although rugged Mexican 

terrain and the limitations of the early motor vehicle meant that ground reconnaissance still depended on horse cavalry, the "radio tractors" of the Signal 

Corps deployed with Pershing's forces monitored Mexican government communications as Mexican authorities became increasingly alarmed at the American 

probe, which soon extended 500 miles into their sovereign territory. Although 

the Punitive Expedition was a limited success-Villa's troops were engaged and 

scattered, but the leader himself escaped, and war with Mexico almost ensuedit was a m\lestone in the Army's use of mullisource intelligence. 

On 1 February 1917, the Mexican problem was suddenly eclipsed by the 

German decision to wage unrestricted warfare against all vessels carrying supplies to the Allied Powers. In addition to threatening Americas capacity to 

export, this act defied the principles of neutral rights, which the Wilson admin32 Clarence C. Clendenen gives a good account of the Punitive Expednion in Blood on the 

Border: The United States Am1y and the Mexican Irregulars (London: MacMillan Co., 1969). Chapter 

17 of the book is devoted to "Airplanes and Motors." 
20 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

tstration had upheld since the begmning of World War I. As the United States 

teetered on the brink of war, all War College students were relieved of their normal duties and instructed 10 familiarize themselves with auache reports relating 

to the war in Europe. At the same time. Secretary of War Newton Baker recommended that each state appoint a National Guard officer to receive intelligence 

training.33 However, when Congress finally declared war against Germany on 6 

Apnl 1917, the U.S. Army still had no intelligence organization. The Army 

essemiallr was moving bhndl)' mto the greatest foretgn connict in its history. 

H Powr, Tht.' Emergt'IICt' of tl1t' \\'ar Dqwllmcmlntclllgt'nct• Agt'II'Y· pp 81-82. 
2 

World War I 

T he United States entered World War I almost completely unprepared: the 

National Defense Act which Congress had passed in 1916 had provided the 

basis of a mobilization plan, not an actual army. ln early 1917 the country had 

only 210,000 men under arms, a third of them National Guardsmen who had 

been called up the previous summer to serve on the Mexican border. The Army 

had no permanent tactical organization above the level of the regiment and 

lacked adequate quantities of artillery, machine guns, tanks, modern aircraft, 

and even gas masks. Its General Staff organization was not designed to cope 

with the logistical and operational problems presented by a major connict, and 

at the direction of the Wilson administration it had made no war plans. The 

Army had no intelligence organization. 

Within seventeen months, however, the country had transformed itself into 

a fighting machine. With the help of the draft, the United States raised an Army 

of 4 million men; half of this great force was transported to France, where it 

provtded the decisive margin that led to victory over Imperial Germany and its 

alhes. American industry was also mobilized for war, but not soon enough, forcing Bntam and France to supply the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in 

France with almost all required tanks, planes, and artillery. The General Staff 

was repeatedly restructured and finally became an effective instrument of control. And under the pressures of war, the Army was forced to develop new intelligence capabilities. 

The development of Army Intelligence in World War I proceeded along two 

parallel but more or less separate tracks. At the War Department level, intelligence 

work was revived; by the end of the war. Military Intelligence had become a fullnedged staff element as one of four operating divisions of the General Staff. 

Concurremly, General john]. Pershing, commander of the AEr; built up his own 

field mtelligence organization, suuctured along rather different lines to meet tactical needs. Pershing$ ideas on Army reorganization and on the need for an intelligence apparatus were adopted by the War Depanmem in organizing troop units 

and ullimately provided the basis for reorganization of the General Staff itself. 
22 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Van Deman and Military Intelligence 

At the War Depanment level, the individual most responsible for rebuilding 

an intelligence apparatus was Maj. Ralph Van Deman, the General Staff officer 

who had lobbied vigorously but unproductively in the years before the war to 

re-create the Army's capabilities in this area. ln 1917, with the Uniled States at 

war, Van Deman tried again. He submitted a formal recommendation to Maj. 

Gen. Hugh Scott, the Armys chief of staff, urging the War Department to establish a Military Intelligence Division. This initiative was strongly supported by 

Van Deman's immediate superior, Brig. Gen. joseph Kuhn, chief of the War 

College Division.! Unfortunately, the chief of staff was not receptive. Scou was 

an old-time cavalryman with an encyclopedic knowledge of Indian sign languages and a deep interest in packsaddles, but his fanner commander in chief, 

President William Howard Taft, had described his intellectual abilities as "wood 

to the middle of his head." By 1917 he was demonstrating a disconcerting tendency to fall asleep at Cabinet meetings.2 Scott simply believed that the Army 

had no need for an intelligence organization: since America was now fighting a 

war as an ally of Great Britain and France, the United States could acquire whatever intelligence it needed from them. 

Undeterred, Van Deman decided to adopt different tactics, employing what 

British military analyst Basil Liddell Han would later describe in another context as the "indirect approach. "3 Using such diverse contacts as a lady novelist 

and the police chief of Washington, D.C., as intermediaries, Van Deman discreetly lobbied Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Baker proved to be more 

receptive to the majors ideas, and on 3 May 1917, the War College Division 

replaced its moribund Military Information Committee with the Military 

Information Section headed by Van Deman.4 Although far from an ideal organizational setup, with Military lmelligence subordinated to what was essentially a 

planning organization, it was at least a beginning. 

The Military Intelligence Section began modestly, with Van Deman, two 

other officers (one retired), and two civilian clerks. Initially, its office space was 

confined to a balcony overlooking the War College Divisions library. At first it 

had no data files, since the information collected by the old Military 

Information Division had been merged into the War College Divisions general 

files and remained there, effectively lost. Its responsibilities, however, were considerable. ln addition to supervising the existing Army attache system and 

1 Powe, The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency, pp. 82-84. 

2 Finnegan, Against 1he Specter of a Dragon, p. 45 

3 Sir Basil Liddell Han, Strategy (New York: New American Library, 1974), p. 6. 

4 In his memoirs, Van Deman highlights hiS own role in bringing about the rebirth of Army 

Intelligence. The Final Memoranda, pp. 21-23. Marc Powe finds substantial continuities between 

the old Military Information DiVISIOn and Van Deman's organization. Tile Emergence of the War 

Departmen! Intelligence Agency, pp. 77-81. 102-03. 
WORLD WAR I 23 

developing policies and plans for Arm)' Intelligence activiues, Van Deman's 

organization was charged wnh ''the supervision and control of such S)'Stem of 

military espionage and counterespionage as shall be established ... during the 

continuance of the present war."S The section was thus not only to serve as a 

staff element but was also to perform operating funcuons. 

In the beginning, Van Deman's organization depended heavily on the British 

and the French, who supplied it with watch lists of suspected enemy sympathizers and basic organizational concepts. From the British, Van Deman borrowed the fundamental division of intelligence into "positive" and "negative." 

Positive intelligence consisted of collecting informauon from the enemy; negauve intell1gence consisted of den)ring the enemy intelligence about one's own 

forces. An important pan of negative intelligence was "counterespionage," 

another new word in the Army's growing imelligence vocabulary, this one borrowed from the French. 

Doctrine and data could be borrowed from abroad, but personnel could 

not. Because of the demand for regular officers in combat assignments, no more 

than six regulars were available for intelligence duties at the General Staff during 

the whole war. To obtain additional competent personnel for his own organization, Van Deman used an informal "old boys" network that recommended civilIans for direct commissions, a practice not uncommon in the World War I 

Army. Initially, many of these men were commissioned in the Signal Corps, 

since there were unused officer billets in the A\riation Section of that branch. 

Later, intelligence officers were hastily commissioned in whatever Army branch 

could afford to give up a few of its slots. 

The buildup of the Military Intelligence element of the War Department 

General Staff took place at the same ume that hundreds of addnional intelligence o£ficers had to be found for the Army's divisions and subordinate units. ln 

july 1917 Pershing and the War Department agreed that intelligence staffs had 

to be provided to units down to the battalion level. Logically, this was an area in 

which the General Staff's intelligence organization should have had an imeresL. 

However, the Military lntelhgence Section was too small to supemse the procurement and training of intelligence personnel for the field army. Instead, this 

was accomplished through normal Army channels. The process began in july 

1917, when the adjutant general directed departmental commanders to select 

160 specially qualified men from the newly established officer trainmg camps 

for intelligence assignments. The ideal individual, the adjutant general advised, 

was a "young college instructor" with language ability.6 The Signal Corps 

trained intercept operators and photo interpreters, and the Corps of Engineers 

trained topographic personnel. The Military Intelligence Section did process 

5 History of the Countenntelligence Corps. vol. 3, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fon 

Holabird, Md, 1959, p. 1 

6 Ib1d p 4 
24 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

applications for the Corps of Interpreters, a new Army organization of officers 

and noncomrmss10ned officers set up in july 1917 to handle the Army$ language functions. Later, it procured enlisted coumcnmelligence specialists. 

Intelligence Operatio11s 

The General Staffs former Second Division had confined ils efforts to gathering positive intelligence, employing the Army's military attache system to collect 

scientific, technical, and geographic data from abroad. Although the Mtlilary 

Intelligence Secuon was responsrble for the lapsed functions of the older organization, il got off to a curiously slow stan in collecting foreign intelligence. Until the 

end of 1917, only one officer was assigned to the task, and the principal target 

was Mexico. I lowever, as his organization enlarged Van Deman was able to direct 

greater resources to this area. In doing so, Military lmelligcnce gained a broader 

definition. In addiuon to accumulating data on the military situation abroad, the 

Army began to collect informauon on economic, social, political, and even psychological factors worldv.ide. World War I was a global conflict fought between 

enttre industnalrzcd societies, where victory depended on more than military factors; the fighting atmies were only the cutting edges of much larger swords. The 

War Departments Military lmclligcnce staff element thus became the functional 

equivalent of todays Central Intelligence Agency. 

However, the War Department's efforts at collecung foreign rntelligence 

were somewhat overshadowed by the fact that the AEFs general headquarters 

(GHQ) in France was 3,000 mlles nearer the enemy and m a much bener position to gather information on the European theater. Pershing had already established his own intel ligence staff clemem, and this functioned almost 

autonomously. The great distances between the two separate organizations discouraged collaboration, as dtd Pershing's belief that he was responsible for the 

conduct of the war and that the only function of the War Department was to 

furnish htm wtth the troops and supplies he needed. 

Because of this, Van Deman directed much of his attention to the new field 

of negative intelligence, or counterintelligence.7 This was an area in which the 

Army had little previous experience. Although the Army had conducted counterintelligence work during the Philippine insurrection, not since the Civil War 

had it contended with the problems of espionage, sabotage, or subversiOn in the 

continental Unned States. llowevcr, when the Untted States jomed the war 

against Germany in 1917, it appeared that the country confronted a substantial 

threat from wilhin. The America that entered World War I was still a nation of 

7 It should be noted that Van Deman's first 1ntelhgcnce ass1gnmem, in the Ph1hppmcs. had 

been as a countcrintelhgencc officer f1ghung msurrcctos. fherc, he had ·symhcs1zed reports, analped captured documents, and prondl·d p1cturcs and dco;cnpuons of known re\·oluuonanes. 

Bnan McAihster L}·nn Tl1c U.S. Ar Ill\' ancl Courucnnsurgrncy 111 rhc Plulippmc Wm. 1899-1902 

(Charlotte: Uni\·er:.ll} of 1\onh Carohna Pre!>!">, 1989), p. 155 
WORLD WAR I 25 

immigrants, many newly arrived. German Americans were particularly suspect, 

blll the War Depanment was also concerned about the loyalties of Irish 

Americans, Scandinavian Americans, and African Americans. In addition to the 

problems that might be posed by unassimilated ethnics, there was a substantial 

antiwar movement. Finally, opinion-makers at the outbreak of war had exaggerated ideas about the scope and power of the German espionage and sabotage 

organization within the country. 

ln 1917 the United States seemed almost defenseless against these perceived 

enemies from within. The Treasury Depanment had a Secret Service, but it was 

confined by law to narrowly circumscribed duties. The Department of justice 

maintained the Bureau of Investigation, but the bureau's duties before the outbreak of war had largely consisted of investigating cases of fraud against the 

government. A few major cities had organized police "bomb squads" to deal 

with the anarchist threat of the period. The almost total lack of civilian 

resources in the field spurred the Army to launch its own major and widesweeping counterintelligence program. 

In June 1917 Van Deman took his first step, seuing up a War Department 

security force of civilian investigators drawn from the ranks of the New York 

Police Departments Neutrality and Bomb Squad. lts operations were cloaked in 

secrecy, with members working from a private office building in Washington, 

D.C., under the enigmatic designation "Personnel Improvement Bureau." At first 

intended as a guard force, the unit soon began screening military personnel and 

applicants for government employment. A month later, the Military Intelligence 

Section opened its first field office in New York City, also staffed by fonner New 

York City policemen. Six additional field offices were subsequently set up in other 

major cities and embarkation points to provide counterimelligence coverage. 

This was only the beginning. The Military Intelligence Section was concerned particularly with the problem of possible subversion within the vast new 

citizen forces being raised by the drafl. The draft act which Congress passed in 

May 1917 had been designed to tap as much of the national manpower pool as 

possible. Graming few exemptions, the act impartially swept up American citizens and resident foreign nationals, including citizens of enemy countries. 

Regarding this heterogeneous force as posing a serious threat to national security, Van Deman believed that the newly forming National Guard and National 

Army divisions were infested with German agents and sympathizers.S ln 

October 1917 he ordered the divisional intelligence officers just assigned to 

these units to come to Washington, D.C., under tight security. Upon reporting, 

the officers were instructed to set up a secret surveillance program within their 

8 Jmelligence officers professed to fear that ··unless we proceed on an extensive and thorough 

scale, the enemy, Wtlh his existing system in the United States, will be stronger than we are right 

m our own army and we will be helpless." War Depanment General Staff, War College Division 

(WCD), Ml-3, Provisional Counter Espionage Instructions, WCD 10148-37, INSCOM archives. 

Fort Belvoir, Va., Feb 1918, p. 3. 
26 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

divisions. The program was later extended tO Regular Army divisions and fixed 

installations with the assistance of a confidential pamphlet, "Provisional 

Counter-Espionage Instructions," drawn up by Van Deman$ staff. 

Van Deman conceived a comprehensive counterespionage program. lt 

envisaged the creation of a clandestine agent network extending throughout the 

Army down to company level. Nets in each division would be managed by an 

assistant to the divisional intelligence officer. He would work through a system 

of anonymous collection managers known only to himself and to their own 

immediate superiors and subordinates within the apparatus. Ar the bottOm of 

this secret pyramid, "operatives" placed in every company would submit intelligence reports on their fellow soldiers. At least two operatives, mutually 

unknown to one another, would be recruited from each company.9 Reports 

emanating from this organization would be relayed by the divisional intelligence 

officer to the Military Intelligence staff in Washington for investigation. 

Once this system was in place, it produced a growing stream of incident 

reports that drove the relentless expansion of the War Departments counterintelligence organization. To supplement the efforts of his overextended force of 

intelligence officers, Van Deman hired additional civilian detectives, recruited 

unpaid volunteers, and soon found a fresh source of investigative manpower in 

the enlisted counterintelligence specialists of a completely new military organization, the Corps of Intelligence Police. 

The Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) 

The stimulus for the creation of this corps of enlisted investigators had originally come from the AEF Soon after his arrival in Europe, Maj. Dennis E. Nolan, 

Pershing:S intelligence officer, had become concerned about the possible security 

problems faced by American troops fighting on foreign soil. In 1915 Nolan had 

written alarmingly about the possibilities of German invasion; now his work took 

on a more concrete form. In early july 1917 he requested that the adjutant general 

provide him fifty company grade officers proficient in foreign languages. In addition, Nolan asked for "fifty secret service men who have had training in police 

work [and] speak French fluently."lO This called for a category of intelligence personnel not previously imagined by anybody in the War Department, but in 

August the acting chief of staff authorized the creation of a fifty-man Corps of 

Intelligence Police made up of enlisted soldiers who would serve with the "rank, 

pay, and allowances" of sergeants of infamry.ll 

9 lbtd. 

10 1-listory of the Counter Intelligence Corps, vol. 3, p. 3. 

11 As was later pointed out, the title of the organization was a liule anomalous. "It was a 

'Corps' that was noL a 'Corps.' It was a 'counterintelligence' organization but called an 

'Intelligence' organization and iL was called 'Police' when it had no interest in crime. as such, and 

no pohce power." 1-listory of the Co~mter Intelligence Corps, vol. 3, p. 114. 
WORLD WAR I 27 

Tasked with furnishing the appropriate personnel, Van Deman ran into difficulties. Pnvate detective agencies seemed a likely source at first, but when told 

of the Army$ requirements for French-speaking investigators, the head of the 

Pinkerton Agency countered, "There ain't no such animal."l2 The War 

Department was reduced to recruiting the first CIP agents through newspaper 

advertisements. The first contingent was assembled at Fort jay in New York 

Harbor, given a months training as mfamry, outfitted with distinctive greencorded campaign hats, and sh1pped to France without civilian clothes or any 

instrucuon in intelligence work. Once overseas, the group was screened by 

French authorities, who rejected many as undesirables. Those who passed 

muster were then bustled ofT to Le Havre for instruction by veteran Allied counterintelligence officers.l3 

The initial group was not promising, but the need for enlisted counterintelligence specialists remained, and the formation of the CIP had set a precedent. 

The Military Intelligence Section found it increasingly difficult to staff its headquarters and expanding network of field offices with the existing mix of freshly 

commissioned reserve officers, civ11ian volunteers, and hired detectives. Officers 

were a scarce commodit)', and competent civilian investigators were hard to 

find, especially since the War Department paid them only $4 a day plus expenses. Thus it seemed logical for Van Deman's organization to turn to the enlisted 

ranks of the Army to solve the personnel problems m the counterintelligence 

arena. The iron broom of the draft had swept highly qualified people into the 

ranks of the Army; men experienced in law, teaching, or insurance investigation 

were especially fit for counterintelligence work. Additionally, the military 

thought that investigations of Army personnel could be carried out most appropriately by other soldiers. In November the Military Intelligence Section 

requested that it be allotted 250 CIP agents to assist its coumenntelligence program. Many of the civilians previously employed by Van Deman promptly 

enlisted in the Corps of Intelligence Police, including the twenty-three former 

policemen m the New York Field Office. 

Expansion 

The expansion of Van Deman$ organization, largely driven by operational 

responsibilities in the counterintelligence field, in tum forced a growing specialization within the Military Intelligence staff. It was no longer possible for Van 

Deman and a small group of assistants to deal interchangeably with all aspects 

of posiuve and negatiYe intelligence. The whole operation had to be put under a 

12 Tht Final Memoranda, p. 37. 

13 The commander of the Corps of Intelligence Police in France was Lt. Royden Williamson. 

His recollections, "As It Was m the Bcginmng with the Corps of lntelltgcnce Police," ll Aug 53, 

are in RG 319, NARA. 
28 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

bureaucratic regimen. Between December 1917 and january 1918, Van Deman 

divided his organization into functional subsections, all according w the British 

practice with which he was now familiar. As the organization grew larger and 

more complex, it achieved a position of greater prominence within the War 

Department. ln February, following a reorganization of the General Staff, the 

Military Intelligence Section was upgraded in status, becoming a branch of the 

newly established Executive Division. Since the Executive Division was burdened with diverse responsibilities, the reorganization was less than perfect. As 

one knowledgeable officer put It, its chief "could not know and would not 

know what Ml was doing ... when Ml papers came up to him, they were like 

Greek to him."l4 In March the Military Intelligence Branch, overcrowded at the 

War College, moved to a seven-story apartment building in downtown 

Washingwn, D.C., where it was at least in closer proximity to the Army:S center 

of administrative power. 

The Military Intelligence Branch initially consisted of eight numbered sections. Ml-1, Ml-5, Ml-6, and MI-7 were responsible for carrying out general 

support functions in the respective areas of administration, publications, translation, and management of confidential files. Later, Ml-7 assumed responsibility for 

graphics. At first there was only one section, Ml-2, exclus1vely dedicated to collatmg foreign intelligence, although MI-S soon received the new mission of coordinating the collection efforts of the attaches. Two other sections were set up to 

manage aspects of counterintelligence: MI-3, which handled counterespionage in 

the military services, and MI-4, which dealt with civilian subversion.l5 Ml-3 

worked closely with over 400 divisional and installation intelligence officers who 

supervised the clandestine counterespionage system. Other subelements served 

specialized needs: administering the District of Columbia field office, dealing with 

the specific counterintelligence problems presented by foreign-born draftees, and 

overseeing programs that dealt with particularly sensitive Army branches such as 

the Air Service and the Chemical Corps. Thousands of investigations were conducted, but contrary to early fears, only a relatively small number of troops had to 

be removed. The draft-raised Army was loyal. 

ln addition to policing the Armys own ranks, Van Deman was concerned 

that spies and agitators in the civilian community might also threaten the Army 

or at least its mobilization base. At the same time that MI-3 was created, MI-4 

came into existence to handle counterintelligence in the civilian sector. This section sought to cope with broad and ill-defined threats, initially concerning itself 

with labor unrest in the West, racial disturbances in the South and Southwest, 

and foreign disaffection in the polyglot cities of the East. Its operative premise 

H Lt Col Frank Moonnan, "Lecture Dell\'ered to the Ofr.cers of the Military Intelligence 

DIVISIOn, General Staff-Concludmg Remarks by Brigadier General Churchill," 13 Feb 20, p. 16, 

Army CryptologlC Records. INSCOM. 

I"> Bruce W Bidwell, llistoty c~{ the Milrtary Intclligencr Divi\1()11, Dcpw·tment of tht' Atrny 

Gcnaal Staff, 1775-1941 (Frcdcnck. Md.: Umversity Pubhcauons of 1\menca, 1986), p. 123 
WORLD WAR l 29 

was that "the misbehavior, disloyalty, or indifference of native Americans is as 

important a material of military intelligence as any other."l6 At one time or 

another, the organization involved itself in deportation cases, sabotage by organized labor, enemy finance and trade, and counterespionage work abroad. 

To carry out its duties, Ml-4 had to conduct an active liaison with many 

other government agencies, especially the Department of justice, which alone 

had powers of arrest and prosecution in cases of civilian offenses against the 

military. Ml-4 also relied on two civilian auxiliaries, the Plant Protective Service 

and the American Protecuve League. The Plant Protective Service was an organization of undercover civilian operatives originally established by the chief signal 

officer to protect the countrys new aircraft industry. Subsequently it spread to 

other private plants working under government contract. Almost inevitably, the 

organization came under the aegis of Military Intelligence. 

The American Protective League, larger and less official in character, comprised several vigilante groups originally put together to help the Department of 

justice uncover spies. Once in place, it also began to assist local authorities in 

enforcing the draft act, and its activities brought it into a close working relationship with Ml-4. The Army sought to curb the organizations excesses while still 

making use of its thousands of members: estimates of the league's strength 

ranged between 60,000 and 200,000, with the organization itself favoring the 

latter number. Ultimately, top American Protective League leaders were commissioned as officers in Ml-4 to enhance military control over the leagues activities. 

Although such paramilitary organizations appear alien to the American tradition, similar organizations existed in Great Britain and France, reOecting the 

intense and sometimes excessive nationalism of the period. 

ln addition to his pioneering work in establishing an Army counterintelligence organization, Van Deman also involved Army Intelligence in the exotic 

world of codes and ciphers. Th1s was an area in which the Army as a whole 

already had some expenence. C1phers had been used in the Civil War, and the 

War Department had employed a telegraph code since 1885. More recently, in 

1916, the Signal Corps' Capt. Parker Hitt had published a manual on military 

crypLOgraphy. However, it was Van Deman who made cryptology an adjunct of 

Military Intelligence. One of his first acts after setting up the Military 

Intelligence Section was to secure a commission for a youngish Stare 

Department code clerk, Herbert 0. Yardley, so Yardley could head up a Cipher 

Bureau for Van Demans organization. Although Hitt and a few other Regular 

Army officers possessed the necessary expertise in this field, all of them were 

needed for other duties when war broke out. 

The Cipher Bureau, later redesignated Ml-8, soon found itself caught up in 

a muluplicity of projects. Van Deman quickly saw that the Army had no means 

lo War Department General Stafr, Mlluary lmelhgence D1vis10n. The Functions of the Militllly 

lnt lli~rncr Dtvtsion, General Swj{ (Washington, D.C. . Government Priming Offtcc. 1918). p. 18. 
30 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

of secure communications. The War Department Telegraph Code of 1915 in use 

for Army administrative communications was a cumbrous work designed to 

save telegraph costs rather than to provide security, and in any case, it was probable that the Germans already possessed a copy of the code book. Yardley's 

bureau was hastily directed to devise new enciphering tables for the code that 

once more made it practical for secret messages. Ml-8 then prepared a completely new code that Military Intelligence as well as the rest of the Army could 

use. Regrettably, this was compromised as soon as it was issued, and a new code 

could not be prepared before Armistice Day. However, Ml-85 own communications system, which made use of the new enciphering tables, remained secure 

and was used throughout the war as a channel to transmit messages from the 

secretary of war and the chief of staff to the field. 

Ml-8 was to have more success in breaking codes than in making them. lt 

soon began to attack agent communicalions. This led Yardley's unit into the 

arcane world of secret inks, regarding which the British provided help and 

advice. It was forced also to learn to read the diverse systems of shorthand 

employed in the United States and abroad.l7 

MI-8's increasing responsibilities, together with the AEF's anticipated 

requirements in the area of codes, soon created a demand for trained cryptologic personnel. To meet the need, the Army turned to the only organization 

in the United States with cryptanalytic expertise. This was Riverbank 

Laboratories, a private research foundation set up by the eccentric philanthropist George Fabyan in Geneva, lllinois.18 One of Fabyan's hobbies was 

attempting to prove that Shakespeare's plays contained hidden cipher messages revealing that the works had actually been written by Sir Francis Bacon. 

Fabyan was wrong-no such cipher existed-but his obsession had led to the 

creation of a center for cryptanalysis at Riverbank. This organization trained 

three classes of Army cryptanalysts in late 1917 and early 1918. The arrangement ended only when MI-8 developed its own training program. Ultimately, 

two Riverbank instructors accepted Army commissions and went w France as 

cryptanalysts with the AEf 

The cryptanalytic side of its work soon led MI-8 into other fields. To supplemem physical interception of German messages, it established a radio intelligence service using selected Signal Corps personnel. These specialists monitored German diplomatic and agent communications, initially employing a 

chain of fourteen "radio tracrors'' strung out along the Mexican border and later 

using fixed intercept sites in the same locations. The radio intelligence service 

also had a large fixed station at Houlton, Maine, that monitored transatlantic 

German diplomatic communications. 

17 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret \Vritmg (New York: MacMillan Co., 

1967), pp. 352-54. 

18 Special Research History (SRH) 29, A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service, p. I, 

RG 457, NARA (hereafter. these documents will be cited by SRH number). 
WORLD WAR 1 31 

The Military Intelligence Division 

In April 1918 General Peyton C. March was recalled from France to become 

the new Army chief of staff. ln june he ordered Van Deman, now a colonel, to 

go to Europe to inspect the imelligence operations of the AEF. Van Deman left 

behind a functioning Military Intelligence organization that had a strength of 

170 officers and hundreds of enlisted agents and civilians and was still growing. 

The expansion forced the War Department to again move its intelligence headquarters, this time to the Hooe Building in Washingwn, D.C. However, the full 

development of the wartime Army Intelligence organization was not yet complete. Military Intelligence reached its final organizational development in 

World War 1 as a result of March's experiences with Pershing's AEF. 

ln August 1918 March restructured the General Staff, in the process raising 

the intelligence function to the status it enjoyed in France. He established the 

Military Intelligence Division (MID) as one of the four principal divisions of the 

War Department General Staff. The new division's enhanced prestige and 

responsibilities meant that Van Demans successor, a Field Artillery lieutenant 

colonel from the AEF with the glorious name of Marlborough Churchill, was 

advanced to the rank of brigadier general. With these changes Military 

Intelligence had finally reached the position of institutional equality on the 

Army Staff that Van Deman had long advocated. In turn, this elevation in status 

permitted a more elaborate form of organization, with Positive and Negative 

Branches now controlling the various numbered sections. 

One of the motives for the establishment of MID was March's desire to create an organization that could bring Army Intelligence training in the continental United States into line with the needs of the AEF. Mili£ary Intelligence had 

heretofore neglected this area for a number of reasons, including its limited 

charter, its concentration on counterintelligence activities, and its lack of jurisdiction over training. The perceived deficiencies of training in the United States 

had previously led Pershing to demand that all commanders and staff officers, 

including intelligence officers, spend a lengthy period in France prior to the 

arrival of their divisions. To help rectify this situation, MID recalled an experienced intelligence officer from France to head a new Field Intelligence Section, 

MI-9, that would provide MID input to the training camps. However, the war 

ended before the plans devised by the new element could be put into effect. 

In the meantime, MIDs counterintelligence operations underwent a further 

expansion. The Negative Branch extended the scope of its operations across the 

seas in September 1918, taking over supervision of the counterintelligence 

operations of military attaches. lt also created a new section to handle passport 

control duties previously shared jointly by Ml-3 and Ml-4. The State 

Department had primaty jurisdiction over foreign travel by American citizens, 

but MID also wanted to screen all individuals traveling to Europe. Military 

Intelligence was particularly interested in checking the backgrounds of the large 
32 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

numbers of welfare workers sent overseas to suppon the AEF by the Red Cross, 

the YMCA, the Salvation Army, and other organizations. 

The same month, MID also gained control over military censorship within 

the continental United States, setting up another new section, Ml-10, lO handle 

the assignment. Originally, Army censorship had been regarded as an independem function under a chief military censor, partially out of deference to the 

American tradition of freedom of speech. However, the general Army reorganization of August 1918 had made this an intelligence responsibility. Ml-lO's 

activities soon encompassed a wide variety of fields-in addition to censoring 

military mail and Army photographs, the organization also supervised a system 

of vo luntary press censorship, ran a newspaper clipping bureau, accredited 

newspaper correspondents, monitored telephone and telegraph lines running 

into neutral Mexico, assumed direction of the radio intelligence service, and 

maintained liaison with other government departmems. All this demanded a 

heavy commitmem of personnel, and by the end of the war 300 people were on 

duty with Ml-10. 

In two areas the Negative Branch ventured completely beyond the normally 

defined boundaries of intelligence activity. The branch became involved in 

investigating graft and fraud within the Army and in finding ways to enhance 

military morale. ln both cases, the transfer of these functions to imelligence 

came by default. Although the quartermaster general was originally assigned to 

deal with cases of graft and fraud, he had no trained investigative personnel. As 

a result, Ml-13 was organized in August 1918 to assume the mission. The problem of Army morale was added to the MID agenda when Corps of Intelligence 

Police investigators included instances of low morale in their intelligence 

repons. Since MID had discovered the problem, it seemed appropriate to some 

members of the Army Staff that the division find a way to counter it. Ln this 

case. however, MID was able to reassign the function to a separate Military 

Morale Section of the General Staff in November 1918. 

The armistice finally ended the headlong and rather undisciplined expansion of MID's activities. By this time, 282 officers, 250 CIP agents, and l ,l 00 

civilians were on its staff. Van Deman's labors had succeeded in building up a 

massive intelligence organization that doubtless surpassed his wildest expectations. The establishment of MID had restored the intelligence function to the 

level of the General Staff, where it would remain from then on. However, in the 

process it had acquired broad anci llary functions the precise boundaries of 

which had yet to be defined rationally. 

The American Expeditionary Forces in France 

The American Expeditionary Forces in France built up an intelligence organization parallel, but not completely similar, to MID. When Pershing took command of the AEF, he designated Maj. Dennis E. Nolan as his intelligence officer. 
WORLD WAR I 33 

Once m Europe, Pershing decided to adopt the French staff system throughout 

the AEF. Intelligence became the second section, or "G-2,'' of Pershing$ headquaners staff. Intelligence thus achieved a position of equality with other functional areas in the AEF a year before it would do so at the General Staff level in 

the continental United States, and Nolan ultimately became a brigadier general. 

Pershing arrived in France in june 1917 with a small headquarters and a 

hastily formed division of infantry. By November 1918 the AEF had grown to a 

force of twenty-nine combat d1v1sions and had opened its own front against the 

arm1e5 of Imperial Germany. The expansion and elaborauon of the Army 

lntelhgence structure ran hand m hand with the growth of the AEF it supponed.l9 lniually the AEF heavily depended on help from the Briush and French in 

this field as in many others. Intelligence officers assigned to document exploitation and prisoner-of-war imerrogation were trained at the British imeltigence 

school at I Iarrow until August 1918, when the AEF finally opened its own intelligence school at Langres, France. Students at Langres were provided with the 

umque opponunity to interrogate real prisoners of war as pan of their training. 

From the stan, the AEF trained its own photo interpreters and intercept operators. 

By the end of the war. G-2 at Pershing$ Chaumont headquarters had grown 

to a full-fledged theater imelhgence center, engaging in a span of activities that 

was even broader than that of the Mihtary Intelligence Div1sion in Washington, 

smce it also supervised deception operations and actively managed a propaganda campaign. In contrast, the work of MID's "psychological'' subsection concentrated on coordination and training. The intelligence operations of Pershing's 

G-2 staff also overlapped and duplicated those of MID. because it produced its 

own political and economic intelligence as well as dealing in combat intelligence. Pershing considered that as a theater commander, his legitimate intelligence mterests extended beyond the Immediate Western from to cover developments on the Eastern. Macedonian, and Italian fronts. In Pershing's mind, any 

overlap With the activities of MID in the continental United States was justified 

because MID was an ocean away from the main baule and the transatlantic 

cable system had limited capacities. 

The capstone of the intelligence pyramid, the Military Information Division, 

or G-2-A, produced finished intelligence reports and studies from the mass of 

information available from the AEFs tactical units and the other divisions of 

G-2.20 The division was able to draw upon the full range of intelligence disciplines (human, photographic, and signals) to supply combat intelligence, and it 

also produced political and economic intelligence, mostly from open sources. 

The production activities of G-2-A had the result of involvmg the organization 

19 1 here has never been a scholarl>• study of mtelligence work m the ALF. Bnush Military 

lntclhgence m World War I has been beucr served. See Michael Occlcshaw, Armour Against Fate: 

Bt illsh Militaty hllclligence in the First World Ww (London: Columbus Books, 1990) 

lO Reminiscences of the order of baule spccmlist on Pershmg's G-2 swff arc comained in 

Samuell llubbard, Memoirs of a Staff OJ/rc£'1 (Tuckahoe, N.Y.: Card mal Assoctatcs, Inc . 1959). 
34 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

in areas outside the field of pure intelligence: by the summer of 1918 G-2-A 

was also releasing the Army's daily public affairs communique and furnishing 

the War Department with a daily informational cable. 

The base of this intelligence pyramid within the AEF began at the level of 

the battalion, the smallest unit with an intelligence staff officer, the S-2, and 

dedicated intelligence coll ection personnel. 21 In addition to its S-2, each 

infantry battalion had a reconnaissance element consisting initially of 1 officer 

and 28 enlisted men, including 15 scouts, ll observation post personnel, and 2 

snipers. At the next level of the command structure was a regimental intelligence officer, with 8 additional observers at his disposal. Brigades were not 

authorized intelligence officers under the original scheme of organization, but in 

practice intelligence personnel were frequently detailed to these commands. 

At the division level, there was a small intelligence section headed by the 

divisional G-2, who was assisted by a deputy for combat intelligence, a commissioned interpreter, a topographic officer, and various enlisted personnel. 

This was the initial level for interrogating prisoners of war and collecting enemy 

documents. Ground observation at this echelon was supplemented by spotting 

reports from Army Air Service balloons forwarded through division artillery 

channels. Under World War 1 conditions, divisions were responsible for keeping 

watch over the section of enemy front opposite them for a depth of two miles. 

In practice, however, the length and breadth of a division's span of interest was 

often much larger. 

Balloons were used primarily for observing artillery fire, but balloon units 

also provided intelligence, especially under the static conditions of trench warfare that prevailed on the ·western front.22 The main disadvantages of balloons 

were their vulnerability and their requirement for support personnel. A balloon 

in combat had an estimated life expectancy of fifteen minutes; although fliers 

did not wear parachutes in World War I, balloonists did. It took a full company 

of 178 men to service a single balloon, because it took many hands to deploy a 

balloon in a breeze and because each company was also responsible for manning six antiaircraft machine guns to defend its fragile aerial asset. 

The intelligence officer at corps level used a wider array of resources that 

allowed him to take responsibility for surveillance of the area between two and 

five miles beyond the enemy's forward line of troops. In addition to observation 

posts and bal loons, he used aero squadrons equipped for -visual and photo21 United States Army in the World War, 1917- 1919, val. 13, Reports of the Commander i.n Chief 

AEF, StajfSections and Services (Washing10n, D.C.: Govemment. Priming Office, 1990), pp. 1-10; 

Maj Gen Dennis E. Nolan, Dictation of )Jfarch 2, 1935: Echelons of Intelligence from the Front 

Line Back to G.H.Q., Nolan :-.·is, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Intelligence Regulations, 

American Expeditionary Forces, Aug 1918. 

22 Balloons could ascend to an altitude of 4;300 feet, allowing observers to watch enemy 

positions eight miles away. Richard P. Weinen, A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962: Phase l: 

1950- 1954 (Fort Monroe, Va. U.S. Army Continemal Army Command, 1971), p. 2. 
WORLD WAR I 35 

graphic reconnaissance and sometimes even flash- and sound-ranging troops 

who detected and targeted enemy batteries. These were under the command of 

the corps artillery headquarters but under the staff supervision of G- 2. Five of 

the seven corps that the AEF committed to combat were supported by such 

troops.23 The corps also had its own dedicated counterimelligence element consisting of twelve Corps of Intelligence Police sergeants. 

The most sophisticated intelligence resources were concentrated in the field 

armies formed in mid-1918 and at GHQ, Chaumont. Each of the two field 

armies in the AEF had additional aerial reconnaissance units, including some 

that could operate at night.24 A topographic battalion allowed the army-level 

intelligence staff to draw up large-scale war maps, termed plans directeurs in the 

jargon of the day. Each Army Intelligence staff also contained a radio intelligence section that translated intercepted enemy messages. A larger radio intelligence element at GHQ engaged in cryptanalysis and supplied the subordinate 

Army sections with the necessary keying material to decode the messages. 

Intercept was provided by Signal Corps personnel who operated direction-finding and intercept equipment and manned listening posts directed again.st lowlevel enemy telephone and ground telegraph communications, a task facilitated 

by the use of induction coils rather than by direct wiretaps.25 

Pershing's radio intelligence organization not only monitored enemy ground 

communications, but also could track the movements of enemy spotter aircraft 

through their transmissions. Searchlight platoons of the 56th Engineers attached 

to the AEF~ Antiaircraft Service provided early warning of night air attacks. 

These uniL'> were equipped with multihorn and parabolic acoustical detectors 

that alerted crews to the approach of aircraft before they were in visual range.26 

At the top of this layered intelligence structure was G- 2- A at Chaumont, 

which processed and analyzed the information sent up from lower levels. Its 

efforts were supplemented by those of three other, more specialized, divisions 

of G- 2. The "secret service," G- 2-B, supervised both undercover collection 

operations and counterintelligence. Although most of th.e intelligence 

obtained by Pershing's headquarters about political and economic develop23 A panicipam clocumemed this specialized technical activity in Edward A. Trueblood, 

Observations of an American Soldier During His Service with the AEF in France in the Flash l~anging 

Service (Sacramento, Calif.: l\ews Publishing, 1919). 

24 The AEF experience produced the first clash between ground commanders and airmen 

over the priority to be given aerial reconnaissance. 1t would not be the lasL Interestingly enough, 

the recalcitrant aviator was Col. William Mitchell. See tv!aj Gen Dennis E. Nolan, Dictation 38, p. 

17 (l- 31- 36), Nolan 'tvts, U.S. Army Military History Institute. 

25 War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Final Report c!f the Radio Intelligence 

Secti.on, General StaJJ: General Headquarters, American Expediti.onary Forces (WashingLOn, D.C.: Ofllce 

of the Chief Signal Officer, 1935). An anecdotal treatment of these activities can be found in E. 

Alexander Powell, The Army Behind the Army (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), pp. 16- 22. 

26 William Barclay Parson, l11.e American Engineers in France (New York: D. Appleton and 

Co., 1920), pp. 256-61. 
36 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

ments in Germany came from open sources, G-2-B did set up "information 

centers" in Switzerland, Denmark, and Holland that ran agent nets behind the 

enemy lines. The most valuable contribution of clandestine intelligence probably came from the reports of the "trainwatchers" who monitored rail movements of the German army.27 G-2-Bs information centers competed directly 

with the MID-directed activities of the military attache offices in the same 

neutral countries and depended heavily on British and French assistance. The 

British and the French were also called upon for assistance in counterintelligence. However, the development of the Corps of Intelligence Police gave 

G-2-B an instrument of its own in this field. By Armistice Day some 450 

sergeant investigators were on duty with the AEF, not only supporting the rear 

communications zone, but also providing intelligence coverage to corps and 

divisions at the fighting front. 

Mapping was normally a function of the Corps of Engineers. But under 

combat conditions in France, it fell under the supervision of the intelligence 

staff, since battle maps included information about enemy as well as friendly 

forces. G-2-C, the Topographic, Map Supply, and Sound- and Flash-Ranging 

Dtvtsion of G-2, essentially served to coordinate the activities of the 29th 

Engineers, a bizarrely structured regiment without a headquarters that provided 

the AEF with both topographic and sound- and nash-ranging personnel. One 

battalion of the 29th manned the AEFs large map-printing facility at Langres; 

another suppHed topographic troops to the field armies; ranging companies 

from two additional battalions supported the targeting needs of the fie ld 

artillery while providing collateral intelligence. 

Finally, a fourth division, G-2-D, handled press and censorship matters. 

Censorship operations were an intelligence function within the AEF from the 

very beginning. While mail was censored at the unit level, a base censors office 

in Paris conducted spot checks of regimental mail, operated a secret-ink laboratory, and censored mail written m foreign languages. Internally, the section was 

able to translate mail written in forty-nine languages, requesting outside help 

only for messages written in Chinese or japanese. One additional function of 

this office was to censor letters containing information that servicemen did not 

want their immediate superiors to see. Such correspondence was mailed in specially issued blue envelopes. 

Managing press relations was the divisions second pnncipal function. This 

mcluded supervising the accreditation of war correspondents, censoring their 

dispatches, and making arrangements for their transponauon and billeting. In 

vtew of practices in later wars, correspondents were held on a fairly tight rein. 

27 Btdwell, H1story of tht• Mthlcuy lntelltgence Division, p. 139 General Nolan felt that no more 

than 15 percent of hts mtelligencc requirements were filled by secret agents, but felt that reports 

b}' the network of trainwatchcrs tracking German rail movements across the bridges over the 

Rhme were most useful. Memoirs. ch 4, p. 9, Dennis Nolan Ms, U.S. Army Military Htstory 

ln!>tllute. 
WORLD WAR I 37 

Censorship principles insisted on accuracy; forbade releasing military information useful to the enemy; and prohibited news stories which would "injure 

morale in our forces here, or at home, or among our Allies" or "embarrass the 

United States or her Allies in neutral coumries."28 On the other hand, correspondents had free access to the troops, and G-2-D refrained from using them 

for propaganda. 

ln addition, G-2- D carried out a wide spectrum of other information-related aclivities. lt was charged with preparing propaganda to undermine German 

morale-by the fall of 1918 a rain of 3 million propaganda leaflets from G-2-D 

was blanketing German lines, distribULed by plane and balloon and even by rifle 

grenade and patrol. And while it sought to undercut German morale, the division tried to preserve that of the AEE The famous troop newspaper, Stars and 

St1ipes, was published in Paris under G-2 auspices. Finally, straying even further from any conceivable imelligence functions, the division supervised the 

Army an program, employing the services of eight soldier-painters, and was 

tasked with taking photographs for historical purposes and verifying the accuracy of their captions. 

Communications Security in the AEF 

Communications security within the American Expeditionary Forces in 

France was primarily a Signal Corps responsibi lity. Although Ml-8 was 

responsible for preparing the War Departments codes, in France this task was 

assigned in December 1917 to the Signal Corps' Code Compilation Section, a 

small group located at the GHQ at Chaumont. This organization found itself 

confronted by an immense task. The Army entered World War I with few 

effective arrangements for secure tactical communications. The insecure and 

cumbersome War Department Telegraph Code was intended for administrative use, not battlefield communications. The Signal Corps' existing cipher 

disk was a simple celluloid device designed on principles as uncomplicated as 

those of the toy code-rings that once appeared in cereal boxes. When used 

with a running key, however, at first it seemed to offer unbreakable security. 

However, cryptanalysts at Riverbank and at Ml-8 quickly discovered that 

messages encrypted this way could be broken faster than they could be enciphered. The British introduced the U.S. Army to the Playfair cipher, but this 

too was easy prey for cryptanalysts. 

As a result, the AEF decided to devise a completely new system. The first 

efforts were unsuccessful. The Code Compilation Section produced a one-pan 

trench code and a set of enciphering tables, but these proved to be impracticable for use in combat situations. What was needed was a method of encryption 

that would place as Lillie burden as possible on communicators operating under 

28 United States Anuy in the Worlcl War, vol. 13, p. 86. 
38 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

battlefield conditions.29 The solution finally adopted was the creation of a set of 

two-pan codes with separate tables for encoding and decoding. In june 1918 

the section produced the "Potomac Code," the first in a series of codes named 

after major American rivers. The "river" codes were issued to the First Army 

when it became active in August 1918. When the Second Army took the field in 

October, a separate "lake" series of codes was introduced to meet its needs. 

These codes. distributed down to regimental level through intelligence channels, carried the main burden of Army traffic. supplemented as necessary by a 

small number of more specialized codes. To ensure security, individual code 

books were replaced about every two weeks or upon evidence that they had 

been com promised. 

Regrettably, the sophistication of the AEFS cryptographic systems did not 

equate with good communications security. The mere fact that codes were available did not mean that they were used. Communicators unfamiliar with codes 

showed a marked disinclination to employ them, and tactical units evolved various private, unsanctioned codes of their own. Moreover, the AEF relied on the 

telephone rather than the radio for the bulk of its communications, and officers 

repeatedly sent plain-language messages on tactical matters over unsecured telephone lines. To eliminate such problems, the AEFs general headquarters issued 

security guidelines for Army communications and established irs own Security 

Service. Signal Corps personnel assigned to the Security Service monitored 

radio and telephone communications and reported violations of established 

procedures to control officers at the radio intelligence sections within the headquarters of the field armies. The G-2 then reported secUiity breaches to commanders, but little could actually be done to punish offenders.30 

Sideshows 

The bulk of American forces committed overseas in World War I went to 

France. However, it is sometimes forgotten that there were some peripheral ventures. An infantry regiment and support troops were hastily deployed to the 

Italian from to help shore up the morale of the flagging Italian Army after its 

disastrous defeat at Caporeuo in the fall of 1917. More importantly, two separate American Expeditionary Forces, miniatures of the larger AEF in France, 

were sem respectively to Murmansk and Siberia in the summer of 1918 as a 

result of the Bolshevik Revolution, which had forced Russia out of the war and 

29 "In view of the fact that code work is frequently done under heavy bombardment and gas 

or in the critical momems of an advance, ll does not seem advtsable to add any additional burdens to code operators." War Department, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Report of the Code 

Comp1lmion Section, Ame1ican Expt:dilionmy forces, December 1917-Novcmber 1918 (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1935), p. I. 

30 james L. Gilbert, "U.S. Arm>' COMSEC in World War 1," Miliwry Intelligence 14 (January 

1988): 19-21. 
WORLD WAR I 39 

created conditions of chaos in Eastern Europe. Both expeditions were launched 

on ill-defined missions and given liule background intelligence. 

The reinforced regiment ordered to North Russia, onginally assigned the hmaed mission of keepmg a large store of , .. ·ar supplies from German hands. became 

mvolved in operations against the Bolsheviks as pan of a much Larger Alhed effort 

and only evolved a G-2 section of its own shonly before the force was withdrawn 

in early 1919. However, Bolshevik propaganda and war-weariness after the 

armistice did confront the unit with serious problems of subversion. 

A larger force under Maj. Gen. William S. Graves went to Siberia to help rescue former Czechoslovakian prisoners of war from the Bolsheviks and incidentally 

to keep an eye on the japanese intervenuon force sent on a similar mission. Smce 

the mitial American contingent deployed from the Philippines and included elements from the Philippine Departments Military lntelhgcnce Division, it incorporated an imelligence section from the beginning. Additional intelligence personnel 

from the continental United States joined the force later. Unfortunately, intelligence efforts were largely stultified by a conflict between General Graves and his 

G-2 concemmg the nature of the Iauer'S responsibilities. Graves pursued a pohcy 

of strict neutrality towards the Bolsheviks and vetoed any auempt to gather Intelligence by usmg the serv1ces of the anti-Bolshevik "Whttc" forces.31 

Conclusion 

World War I was the watershed m the evolution of U.S. Army lntelhgence. 

Both in the War Department and m the field intelhgence work was revitalized 

and placed on a fooung of organizational equality w1th other maJOr funcuons. 

The Army ventured into new fields of counterintelligence and cryptology and 

made use of the full spectrum of imelligence sources. Although some of thesesuch as prisoner of war interrogation, captured document exploitation, and 

ground reconnatssance-were traditional, the newer dtsc1plmes of signals tntelligence, aerial photograph)', and collecuon through sensmg de,'ices were not. At 

both the War Department and theater levels, the definition of Military 

lmelligence was enlarged to include the collection of political, econom1c, and 

social data. Finally, intelligence activities were expanded to include the allied 

fields of deception and propaganda. 

The professiOnal intelligence field was still, however, in its infancy. 

Intelligence was sull considered essenually a staff-level acunt) within the Armr 

No mtelligencc units as such were fielded, although the Army did deploy a topographtc engineer regiment and acnal observation groups to France. A table of 

31 The promment htstorical no,·ehst Kenneth Roberts served on the mtelligence staff of the 

Gra\'cs Expedllton I hs recollections of the cxpenence can be found m his autobtography. I 

\\'aru,·d to \\'m,· 'Garden C ll)' '\.Y. Doublcdar and Co. Inc .. 19'*1.)), pp. 98-112 I am mdcbtcd 

to Col. Wtlham ~trobndgc L S Ann) (Ret ), ftlr callmg my aucnuon to thts fact. 
40 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

organization for a field-army radio section-a communications intelhgence unitwas drawn up, but never implemented, as Pershing chose to keep his limited 

intercept assets under direct GHQ control. Moreover, Arm)' Intelligence was not 

)'Ct considered an official career field. After the war, both Van Deman and Nolan 

became maJor generals, but they achieved their stars as tactical commanders, not 

as intelligence orficers. Still, compared with the past, much had been accomplished. For Army Intelligence, World War I represented a great leap forward. 

As an Army Intelligence organization was put together from nothing in the 

space of seventeen hectic months. many mistakes were made. MID largely concentrated its efforts on coumerintelligence operauons directed at a threat that 

proved to be large!)' imaginary. 32 Yet its concern, however misplaced, renected 

widespread perception among American leaders. The )rear before war broke out, 

even Presidem Wilsons closest confidant, Colonel I louse, fretted that "there are 

more German reservists here lin the United States] than I thoughl. "33 More 

telling is the criticism that MID spread itself too thinly by venturing into areas 

like fraud mvestigauon and morale enhancement. Even some of its foreign intelligence efforts could be quesuoned. MID maintamcd files on areas as remote 

from the war effort as the Antarctic islands and on topics as broad as 

"Christendom."H Similarly, G-2 in the AEF became deeply involved in press 

relations, a precedent which confused the duties of intelligence with those of 

public information in a way that would have an adverse application for Army 

Intelligence in the twenty years of peacetime following the armistice. 

Nevertheless, the Army had at last established a permanent strucwre for 

meeting its mtelhgence needs. After 1918 the evolution of Army lmclhgence 

would follow a twisted road, but 1l would never return to the marginal posiuon 

it had occupied pnor to World War l. 

32 There were Jlso questions as to the efftcacy of the whole cffon. On the en· of \menca·s 

entry mto World War II, the ofracer who then headed the Corps of lntelhgence Poltcc pro\1dcd a 

~athmg C\'aluauon of the World War I t:oumcrimelltgcncc program "In the Un11cd Stmcs the 

Corps of lntelltgcnc·c Pohce was composed of man}' wcll-mcantng but incxpcnenccd offtcers. 

cnhstcd men. and ctvtltans. and thctr unorgamzecl efforts accomplished practical!)' nothtng. It is 

s.ucl the orgamzatton m the Umted ~latcs may have caught one sp}'· lltstory of the Counter 

lntdltgence Corps. vol 4, p. 122 

n Fmnegan. Agtunsr rite Spccro of a Dragon. p. 149 

14 Memo for Acting Dtrector, 1\ltlttal) Intelligence Ot\ t~tlm , H Apr 20, MID Documems. 
3 

Military Intelligence Between Wars 

W oodrow Wilson had declared that America entered World War I to make the 

world safe for democracy The effon had not succeeded. Four great empires had 

collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, creating a revolutionary banleground for 

many disparate and competing political ideologies. Novelist john Dos Passes lmer 

described the year 1919 as a time for "machinegunfire and arson, starvation, lice, 

cholera, and typhus."! The peace process went awry. The victors at Versailles saddled the new republican government of Germany with great territorial losses and 

reparations payments while allowing it to remain the strongest and most industrialized power on the European Continent. Meanwhile, the growing problems 

posed by the "videning revolution in Russia went unaddressed, and animosities 

developed rapidly among the victors. Wilson had hoped that the peace senlement, however f1awed, would be redeemed b)' the establishment of a collective 

security organization, the League of Nations. But his own Senate refused to ratify 

the measure as America retreated toward isolationism. 

Within the United States, there was also unrest as the bonds that had held 

the nation together during the war began to dissolve. Motivated by wartime idealism, pundits had spoken vaguely of a postwar era of "reconstruction" that 

would lay the basis for an "industrial democracy" in which the American economic cornucopia would be shared more equitably by al1.2 Instead, the end of 

the war brought unemployment, inflation, and labor unrest. Alarmed by revolution abroad and radical labor agitators at home, the country was swept by a 

"Red Scare" leading to thousands of arrests. ln the end, a fatigued American 

people, weary of wartime idealism and srress, voted for Warren G. Harding and 

a return to "normalcy" 

Military Intelligence was intimately involved in these events, both at home 

and abroad. Twenty MID officers accompanied President Woodrow Wilson and 

I john Dos Passos, U S.A.: Nineteen Nineteen (Cambridge: Houghton Mirnin, 1946), p. 281 . 

2 For example, see Wilham Le.w•n Stoddard, "The Shop Commmee-Some Implications," The 

D•al67 (12Jul}' 1919): 7-8; "Reconstruwon Miscellany." The Survey -+2 (31 May 1919): 375. 
42 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Sixty CIP agents, directed by Van Deman, provided security for the American party, and Maj. Herbert 

0. Yardley of MI-8 furnished cryptologic suppon.3 Meanwhile, Army 

Intelligence personnel accompanied the new Third Army, the American occupation force that marched into the Rhineland under provisions of the armistice. 

On the domestic from, Bolshevik agents replaced German spies as the focus for 

MID's counterintelligence efforts. In the fall of 1919 a naive MID offtcer warned 

that "the situation in the United States [was] ... verging on revolution."4 

However exaggerated the estimate, it accurately reOected the fears of many 

Americans who found the world changing too fast for America ever to recover 

her lost innocence. 

Military Intelligence at Peace 

Nonnalcy meant a return to a peacetime Army, a process that had begun 

almost as soon as the fighting ended. The vast conscript armies that had won the 

war were hastily demobilized, and a new volunteer force enlisted. Subsequently, 

the National Defense Act of 1920 provided for a Regular Army of 280,000, 

backed up by Organized Reserves and a 475,000-man National Guard. The command and control of this force would be exercised through nine corps areas in the 

continental United States and through three overseas departments in Hawaii, the 

Philippines, and Panama. Under the terms of this legislation, MID retained its 

place as one of the four principal divisions within the Army Staff. Among its 

numerous duties were administering the attache system, supervising military 

drawings and maps, writing regulations for tactical intelligence personnel, performing liaison with other intelligence agencies, approving codes and ciphers, and 

planning censorship operations. As one of the four assistants to the chief of staff 

authorized by law, MlDs director was given the rank of brigadier general. 

Unfortunately for the Anny, the economy-minded Congress never provided 

the necessary appropriations to maintain the authorized force. By 1929 the 

Regular Army had thus shrunk to a strength of 137,000, with four skeleton 

combat divisions in the continental United States and three more in the overseas 

departments. That pan of the force assigned w the continental United States 

was scauered over a multitude of tiny posts inherited from the Indian Wars. The 

subsequent Great Depression made Congress even more parsimonious, forcing 

the Army to make do with the large but increasingly obsolescent stockpile of 

weapons left over from World War l. The Military Intelligence Division was 

direclly affected by these policies, dwindling from a peak strength of 80 officers 

J Some of the CIP agents in Paris questioned the utility of their assignments. Apart from the 

men detailed to guard President Wilson, one wrote. they were employed as "a species of bell boys, 

ladies maids, and hallmen." Gilbert Elliott Ms, p. 7, RG 319, NARA. 

4 Memo, Col C. H. Mason for Brig Gen Marlborough Churchill, 31 Oct 19, sub: Sinister 

lnerua in Present United States Sttuatton, MID Documents. 
MILITARY INTELLIGE:-JCE BETWEEN WARS 43 

and about 160 civilians in 1920 to a cadre of 20 officers and fewer than 50 c1vil1ans by 1934, and undergoing repeated internal realignments. s 

The reorganization of the Army Staff under General john ]. Pershing also 

weakened Military Intelligence. After becoming chief of staff in 1921, Pershing 

imposed the AEFs wartime model of a five-part General Staff on the Army, directing that separate divisions be established for personnel, intelligence, operations 

and traming, supply, and war plans. However, congressional legislation had provtded for only four brigadier generals on the staff, and in the savage competition 

for general officer slots the mtelhgence staff often lost. Of the seven directors of 

the Military Intelligence Division who served between 1922 and 1939, only two 

were brigadier generals.6 Military Imelhgencc thus became a second-class citizen, 

since its lesser position on the Army Staff was reflected throughout the rest of the 

Army. Implicitly, U.S. military leaders seem to have accepted the dictum of British 

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig that "intelligence is rather a spec1al kind of work 

and has a very small place in the army in peacetime. "7 

This trend was reinforced by Pershing$ insistence that G-2 undertake pubhe relauons duties as it had done in the AEF. Under pcaceume condnions, these 

responsibilities became one of the Military Intelligence Divisions principal funcuons. lntelhgence officers at corps level and below also spent much of their time 

in th1s secondary area. As a result, imelligence work often became a dumping 

ground for officers incapable of performing any more demanding activities, and 

astute officers regarded intelligence assignments as dctrimemal to their military 

careers. According to intelligence historian Thomas Troy, "intelligence was neither a profession [n]or a career; at best, it was a one-time activity in an anny or 

navy officers servtce. Hence, when closely scrutinized, the intelligence services 

[werel small, weak stepchildren of their parent organizations."S 

The weakness and lack of professiOnalism of Army Intelligence during this 

penod was reinforced by the declme m Its capabilities for intelligence collection. 

The attache system remained MID's principal means for collectmg foreign intelligence, megularly supplemented by arrangements made with American businessmen working abroad. General George Marshall would write later that interwar military intelligence was "liule more than what a military auache could 

~From 1920 on. MID strength was affected by the provisions of the Nauonal Defense Ac1 of 

1920, wh1ch hmned the number of General Staff officers on duty in Washington. DC.. to 93 

Th1s meant that ~HD would be allotted H to 16 General Staff officer:>. \\'hen the law wok effect. 

Bng. Gen. Dcnn1s :-lolan. assistant ch1d of staff, G-2. hoped that 31 more officers could be 

detailed from the lme to keep MID up to what he regarded as mmimum strength. In this, he was 

disappomted. ~lemo, Nolan for Chief of '>taff. 28 Jul 21. sub: Rehcf of Thmccn Lmc Officers on 

Dut}' w1th Military Intelligence Dinsion To Date, MID Documents 

b \rlcmo for Chief of Staff. 19 jun 37, sub: Increase in Number of Assistants to the Chief of 

S1aff, MID Documents. 

r MaJ. Gen. Sir Kenneth Strong, Men of ltlll'lllgt'tlcc (New York: St. Ma run·s Press. 1972). p. 34. 

II Thomas F. Troy, Donovan <mcllht• CIA: A History of the Establrshmenl of che Ct·ntral 

lntl'lllgt·nu J\gt'ncy (Frcdenck. Md. Um\·crsny Publications of Amenca, 19tH). p 6. 
44 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

learn ... at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups."9 Even here the limitations were severe. Postwar economies forced the abandonment of a number of 

mmor attache posts, and the scarcity of funds dictated that attache assignments 

be restricted to officers with private means of support, irrespective of their professional qualifications. Finally, the interwar years saw the rise of totalitarian 

governments and controlled and closed societies. Military auaches were allowed 

increasing!)' less freedom to collect useful intelligence in precisel)' those countries that posed the most dangerous threat to American secunty.lO 

Army Intelligence m the domestic arena was equall)' weak. This was partially 

the result of a general public rcacuon to some of the excesstve actions of the Wilson 

administration against dissidents, both in World War I and during the postwar 

''Red Scare." FOitunately the impoverished peacetime volunteer Army had little to 

worry about in the way of threats posed by espionage, sabotage, and subversion. 

Thus the Army discontinued its countersubversive system in 1920 and recalled all 

MID regulations on the subject from the field. With only six agents on duty, the 

Corps of Intelligence Police narrowly escaped extinction when wartime emergency 

legislauon expired that same year, but MID managed to keep the organization alive 

by detailing personnel to CIP duties from the Armys Detached Enlisted Mens list. 

The Negative Branch of MID, whtch had supervised the War Departments counterintelligence work, was less fortunate and closed shop in l92l. 

All attempts to collect domestic intelligence ended soon afteiWard. This was 

caused by the rash actions of Lt. W D. Long, an intelligence oiTicer at Vancouver 

Barracks, who sent a circular letter to the county sheriffs of Oregon asking them to 

maintain a surveillance of suspect organizations. Included on the lieutenants list 

were veterans' groups, the Nonpartisan League, and the American Federation of 

Labor. This list caused a considerable uproar when inevitably it was made public. 

The secretary of war ordered that all imelligence posts in the Army not authorized 

by tables of organizauon be dtscontinued, and that mtelligence officers confine 

themselves to instructing troops in combat intelligence techniques. This left most 

of the fony-five CIP agents authorized in 1920 with little to do, and the force was 

repeatedly scaled back. By 1934 the Corps of Intelligence Police consisted of just 

sixteen noncommissioned officers, and a subsequent survey found that most of 

them were used as classified file clerks rather than as investigators. Only in the 

overseas departments and in the Eighth Corps Area on the Mexican border did 

the Corps of Intelligence Police still provide useful services. II 

9 lbtd .. p. 15. 

10 One especially aggressive <llliKh~ was MaJ Truman Smtih Posted to "'az• Germany, Smtih 

obtmncd mtelhgenec reports on the l.uftwa{{e from the Amencan avtator and popular hero Charles 

Lindbergh, who repeatedly tOured German mrcraft factoncs a~ a guest of Retehsmarshal Hermann 

Gocnng and other Nazt top brass. \Vu,ltmgton Post, 4 Nov 8-+. p. A- 1 

II Of the 16 CIP agents surveyed, 10 were acting as confidcnll:ll clerks for G-2s m the vanous corps areas, 5 were engaged m mvesugauve work, and I was unfit lltstol) of the Counter 

lntclhgencc Corps. vol 4, p. 87. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN WARS 45 

If the Military Intelligence Division was collecting little foreign and less 

domestic intelligence over most of this period, it was not overly active in other 

areas. Although one section of MlD was charged with intelligence training, it 

had no statutory responsibility to supervise such work, and the assistant chief of 

staff for operations and training refused to acknowledge its authority. As a 

result, in 1931 the head of the section was forced to confess that "the state and 

extent of combat intelligence training in the Army is not known to this branch, 

as it makes no inspections and receives no training reports. "12 

Another section of MID was charged with supervising the Military 

Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps (MIORC), which had been formed in 1921 

to use the services of the large number of officers who had served in intelligence 

positions throughout the wartime Army. ln theory this organization of reservists 

should have given the Army a trained and experienced mobilization base, but 

many reserve officers were in fact journalists who had served G-2 in public 

affairs positions, and by the time they were ultimately needed, they were too old 

and too high ranking to fill the positions the Army required. The younger 

reservists in MlORC had never served on active duty. Perhaps the only lasting 

contribution of MlORC was the adoption of the sphinx as its insignia, an action 

which had the effect of permanently associating this somewhat bizarre heraldic 

item with the field of Military lmelligence.l3 

Not everything was completely bleak in the intelligence field between the 

wars. Although hobbled by budgetary restraints, the Army began to take advantage of new technological developmems that expanded the possibilities of intelligence collection. Advances in motorized transport significantly enhanced the 

Annys ground reconnaissance. By 1931 an Experimental Mechanized Force had 

been created-its scout element had armored cars and radio-equipped vehicles-and the cavahy began to field mechanized units in addition to its traditional horse troops. The Army Signal Corps experimented with methods of 

detecting aircraft and ships through thermal and electronic means, and by 1937 

the Army had a pilot model of a mobile radar set. Although limited to shortrange targeting functions, the principles it embodied would apply to more powerful sets that could perform an early-warning function. filling a critical gap in 

Army capabilities after the increased speed of aircraft had rendered acoustical 

techniques almost useless.l-+ 

The growth of the Army Air Corps also affected intelligence. Air Corps officers were incorporated into MID, and Air auaches supplemented the work of 

the regular military auaches abroad. At the technical level, aircraft development 

12 Bidwell. History of the Miluary Imclligcnc.: Divi.~!On, p. 362. 

13 Ltr with Incl. ACSl-DO, 25 Feb 63, Organization Day for Military lmclligence file, 

INSCOM History Office 

14 Rad;.u developments 1n the Army up to 1941 are covered in Dulany Terrell. "nte Si,~rwl 

Corps: Tltt• Emerg.:ncy, United States Army m World War II (Washmgton. D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Mtlitary Htstory. 1956). For earl)' experiments. see pp. 44, 46-47. 
46 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

was steady, since this was the one part of the Army that Congress was willing to 

fund. The Air Corps made significant advances in aerial photography, including 

night photography, and in aerial mapping techniques, all of which potentially 

enhanced intelligence gathering. Much of the pioneering work in this area was 

done by Lt. George Goddard, who would ultimately go on to become an Air 

Force brigadier general.l5 

In practice, the technological advancement of the Army Air Corps was a 

two-edged sword. The observation squadrons of World War l had flown in flimsy biplanes, and these aircraft could take off from grassy strips and work in 

close support of tactical commanders. But the sophisticated high-speed monoplanes with ample "greenhouse" canopies which the Air Corps developed in the 

1930s for observation work, otherwise advanced machines with greatly 

improved performance, no longer could operate from unimproved airstrips. 

Furthermore, aeronautical progress encouraged Air Corps leaders to aspire to an 

independent role. The Air Corps became increasingly interested in fighting an 

air war of its own, instead of providing ground support. Aerial reconnaissance 

was thus designed to support a strategic bombing campaign, not to assist the 

tactical commander on the battlefield. By 1935 most aircraft had been placed 

under the direct control of General Headquarters, Air Corps. Although observation groups were still assigned to Army corps areas, only eight observation 

squadrons were active, a trend that threatened to deprive Army commanders of 

adequate air intelligence suppon.l6 

The "Black Chamber" and the Signal Intelligence Service 

Army Intelligence made its greatest advances in the field of cryptology during the years between the wars. Following World War I, Ml-8$ previously comprehensive responsibilities in this field were realigned. The Signal Corps took 

over the responsibility for communications security, employing William F. 

Friedman, a former AEF officer and Riverbank Laboratories cryptanalyst, as a 

one-man code compilation bureau. The Adjutant General's Office was tasked 

with priming and distributing the codes. Officially, MI-85 responsibilities were 

reduced to approving cryptosystems for Army-wide use and establishing regulations for their employment. ln reality, however, MID continued to be deeply 

15 Goddard has provided a userut aULobiogTaphy in Overvrew: A Lifelong Adventure in Aerial 

Photography (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969). 

16 Robert F. Futrell , Command of Observation Aviation: A Study in Control of Tactical Airpower 

(Max'\vell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Umversit}'. 1956), p. 2. It should be noted that balloons and 

dingibles were in the Army inventory or reconnaissance platronns in the early 1920s. A shon but 

helpful overview or Air Corps support to ground operations between the wars is provided by 

Weinert, A History of Aviation, Phase I, pp. 2-4. In Army Air Corps Airplanes and Observation, 

1935-194! (St. Louis: U.S. Anny Aviation Systems Command, 1990), Howard Butler offers an 

alternative vtew to the standard interpretation of Air Corps history, argumg that the Atr Corps 

remarned firmly under the thumb of a ground Army-dominated General Staff dunng this period. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN WARS 47 

mvolved in cryptanalysis. In the fall of 1919 retired Maj. Herbert 0. Yardley, 

wartime chief of Ml-8, set up a clandestine government cryptanalytic unit in a 

brownstone house in New York City. jointly funded by MID and the State 

Department, Yardley$ bureau continued to work on diplomatic code-breaking, 

a task that MI-8 had initiated in World War l. Using material provided secretly 

by some of the major U.S. cable companies, Yardley and his small civilian staff 

achieved several notable successes, the most important of which was breaking 

the japanese diplomatic code in time to give American diplomats a key negotiatmg edge during the Washington Peace Conference of 1921-1922.17 

Desptte the success of Yardley$ bureau in producing hard diplomatic intelligence, it still ran into difficulties. Peacetime economies sharply reduced its 

funding. By 1929 the organization consisted of Yardley himself and a handful of 

assistants, and its functions seemed increasingly less relevant to bOLh its sponsors. The United States had just signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact purportedly 

outlawing war, the international order seemed stable, and the State Department 

saw little need for secret intelligence in a world without enemies. On the ocher 

hand, the Army had no direct peacetime interest in the diplomatic cryptosystems Yardley's group exploited. while the clandestine and civilian nature of his 

bureau prevented its servmg as a training vehicle for Army Intelligence 

reservists. By the spring of 1929 there was already a move to centralize all Army 

cryptologic functions under the Signal Corps, using Friedman's office as a nucleus. When Henry L. Stimson, a rather excessively upright statesman of the old 

school, became secretary of state that year, Yardley's fate was sealed. Discovering 

that the State Department had obtained access to decoded diplomatic messages, 

Stimson withdrew funding from Yardley's bureau. His attitude was later 

described. "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."lS 

Loss of funding led to the termination of Yardley's orgamzation. Yardley 

and hts colleagues were offered employment in the new Stgnal Corps cryptologtc agency, but they declined. The Civil Service pay scale could not match 

salanes subsidized by MID confidential funds. Instead, Yardley auempted to 

recoup his fortunes by writing The American Black Chamber, which publicly 

exposed America's code-breaking activities for the first time. The work was a 

best-seller, but proved to be a major diplomatic embarrassment for the United 

States and only further damaged American intelligence efforts. Yardley would 

later work as a cryptanalyst for Chiang Kai-shek in China and for the 

Canadtan government, but he would never again be allowed to hold a posiuon man>· U.S. cryptologtc orgamzauon. 

17 Yardley recounted-some S<l} cmhclhshed-h1s accomplishments 10 h1s book. The 

Anlt:ncctn BIHdl Chamber (New York. Bobbs Mcrnll, 1931 ). A bnd b1ography can be found in 

D;tvld Kahn. Kahn on Codes; .)cerrts of the New Cryptology (New York. l\h1cl\hllan Co .. 1983), pp. 

62-71 . 

Ill Kahn. The Codcbrcakers. p 360 i\ tktailcd study of the nsc and fall of the Yardley organization I~ contamcd in SRH 29. t\ 13ncf I hswry of the Signal Intelligence Scrv1cc, pp 3-12. 
48 MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

Upon the demise of Yardley$ bureau, Army cryptanalysis and Army crypLOgraphy were both integrated into a new Signal Corps element, the Signal 

Intelligence Service (SIS). which also assumed responsibility for secret inks. The 

new unit was set up within the Signal Corps rather than the Military 

Intelligence Division to reduce its visibility and better meet the technical 

requiremems of signals intelligence. After 1934, when it LOok over the printing 

and distribution of codes from the Adjutant Generals Office, the SIS became the 

focal point for all Am1y cryptologic activity. 

Friedman, who headed the Signal Intelligence Service until an Army officer became director in 1935, quickly recruited a small but talented stafL The 

four principal members of his initial group-mathematicians Solomon 

Kullback, Frank Rowleu, and Abraham Sinkov and japanese linguist John 

Hurt-would all become prominent figures in U.S. Army cryptology in World 

War II. At first the thrust of the work was oriented towards theory, training. 

and the development of advanced cryptographic systems. The Army had 

fought World War I using codes. In 1922 the Army adopted a simple cylindrical cipher device, the M94, for tactical operations.l9 Friedman introduced a 

more secure but cumbersome strip cipher device, the Ml38. More importantly, he began developmental work on machine ciphers. The SIS provided the 

Army with the M134 and Ml34A "conveners" lO protect top-level communications. These were electromechanical cipher machines of great sophistication 

and security.20 Meanwhile, in 1936 Friedman and Rowlett hit upon the cryptographic principles of an even more advanced machine cipher device. 

Unfortunately. funding was not immediately available to put the prototype 

imo production. 

The Signal intelligence Service also began lO set up an intercept organization, which Yardley's bureau, with its dependence on cooperative cable companies, had never attempted. A Provisional Radio Intelligence Detachmem 

was organized at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in 1933. We may discern 

something of the flavor of the times from the fact that its first commander 

found none of the twelve men in his unit present for duty when he assumed 

command-all had been detailed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civilian 

Conservation Corps. This detachmem was later expanded to become a provisional company, and the 1st Radio Intelligence Company was formally activated at Fort Monmouth in 1938. Meanwhile, in September 1936 the Signal 

Intelligence Service had set up a chain of numbered monitoring stations in the 

overseas departments and in the Eighth and Ninth Corps Areas, creating SIS 

19 The M94 was the brainchild of joseph 0. Mauborgne, an Army Signal Corps officer who 

later became a major general and Chief Signal Officer. It was nn exact copy of a device invented 

by Thomas jefferson. 

20 The early history of the S1gnal lmelhgence Service is desc1ibed in SRH 131, Expansion of 

the Signal Intelligence Service. For the use of the term "conveners," see SRH 349, Achievemems 

of the Signal Security Agency in World War II, pp. 42-43. 
MILITARY INTELLiGENCE BETWEEN WARS 49 

detachments in five signal service companies. Since the Federal 

Communication Act of 1934 had made it illegal to divulge foreign communications, this had to be accomplished under tight security.21 

These initial arrangements for providing the SIS with an intercept capability 

were not completely satisfactory. Tasking the 1st Radio Intelligence Company 

with an operational assignment interfered with the unitS primary mission, training for deployment in the field to suppon tactical elements. ln addition, the 

intermingling of intercept and regular communications personnel in the existing 

signal service companies not only posed a security threat, but also worked 

against effective personnel management. Under Army regulations, trained intercept personnel working abroad were automatically returned to the general 

Signal Corps pool when they returned to the continental United States and thus 

were lost to the SIS. To solve these problems, a centralized signals intelligence 

unit, the 2d Signal Service Company, was set up at Fort Monmouth on 1 

january 1939 to control all Signal Corps personnel at the permanent monitoring 

installations. The result was an efficiently functioning Signal Intelligence Service 

and an intercept organization that would represent the Armys principal strength 

in the intelligence field.22 

The SIS paid less attention to intelligence collection at the tactical level. 

Under the Armys Protective Mobilization Plan, a World War 1-style general 

headquarters was to be fielded in the event of any crisis demanding troop mobilization, and available troops would be concentrated as needed under one of the 

four field armies into which the Army had been divided in 1933. The actual 

field army selected would depend on the direction from which the threat was 

expected. These plans also specified that the existing 1st (and only) Radio 

Intelligence Company be placed in support of GHQ. To provide signals intelligence at field army level, the Signal Corps relied on the National Guard to organize two additional radio intelligence companies, one on each coast.23 These 

modest preparations would soon be overtaken by the rush of events. 

21 The sensiltv:ity of the whole toptc of communications intelligence dming this period may 

be inferred from a revealing piece of Signal Corps correspondence on the subject. which ended 

with the statement "It is suggested that this letter be burned after perusal." Ltr, Lt Col Dawson 

Olmstead, Executive Officer, Office of the Chtcf Signal Officer. to Col joseph 0. Mauborgne, 28 

jun 36, sub: Comment on Lieut. Corderman·s Report. Army CrypLOiogic Records. 

22 G. R. Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome, Umted States Army 

in World War 11 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966), pp. 333-35. 

23 Ltr, MaJ Gen joseph Mauborgne. Chtef Signal Officer. to Chtef, National Guard Bureau, 

13 Scp 38. sub: Organization of National Guard Radio Intelligence Companies. Army Cryptologic 

Records. 

4 

Military Intelligence in Crisis 

O minous developments in the Iauer part of the 1930s finally woke the Army 

out of its long torpor. The Great Depression, which had ravaged the economy of 

the United States and focused the interests of the American people on domestic 

problems, had also profoundly rearranged the international order and set the 

stage for the rise of totalitarianism and the advance of aggression. Adolf Hitler 

was sworn in as chancellor of Germany in january 1933. He quickly turned his 

country into a one-pany dictatorship. Under Nazi rule, Germany rapidly 

rearmed and entered into alliance with Fascist italy and militarist japan. 

International crises developed with monotonous regularity. Germany occupied 

the Rhineland in 1936, swallowed Austria in the spring of 1938, and humiliated 

Czechoslovakia with the disastrous settlement at Munich in the fall of that year. 

Meanwhile, its junior partners were also active. The Italian dictator Benito 

Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935, and japan, having seized Manchuria in 

1931, went to war against all of China in 1937. 

Britain and France responded with massive rearmament programs, but in 

the short run they relied on a general policy of appeasement to avert a European 

war, while ignoring Soviet attempts to resurrect their old World War l alliance 

with Russia. The American reaction was guarded. At President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt$ direction, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Nazi and Communist subversion in 1936, and Congress authorized modest 

steps to rebuild the nation's neglected defenses.l The size of the Army was 

increased, and the Military Intelligence Division was allowed to enlarge its 

auache system. Slowly, it also edged back into the counterintelligence arena, setting up a small Counterintelligence Branch in April 1939. That summer, concern about foreign espionage caused the Army to issue its first regulation dealing with the security of military information) At the same time, the Army and 

I Richard G. Powers, Secrecy ami Power: The Ufr of). Ed,~ar Hoover (New York: Free Press, 

1987), p. 229. 

2 The Anny Regulation. AR 380-5, much revised. is still in effect. 
52 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

the Navy formed the lmerdepanmemal Intelligence Commiuee with the FBI to 

coordinate the handling of espionage cases. However, the real threat to 

America's national interests would not be from within, but from without. 

On l September 1939. the armed forces of Nazi Germany invaded Poland. 

Two days later, in response to previous treaty commitments, Britain and France 

declared war on Germany. World War 11 had begun. President Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality but indicated that he did not expect American citizens to be neutral in their thoughts. On 8 September he declared a state of limited national emergency. 

The U.S. Am1y of 1939 was unprepared for convemional warfare. As Army 

Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall later confessed. "We had no field Army. 

There were bare skeletons of three and one-half divisions scattered in small pieces 

over the em ire United States.''3 Army troop strength was a litlle less than 174,000 

men, and much of the equipment was still of World War I vintage. Although the 

Army Air Corps had received the lion's share of Army appropriations and attention, the planes of its sixty-two squadrons were obsolete by the standards of 

European combat. The restrictions imposed by the National Defense Act of 1920 

on the size of the War Department General Staff were still in force. 

The structure of the Army's intelligence element reflected the weakness of the 

whole. The Military Intelligence Division's small staff, still headed by a colonel, 

consisted of 20 officers, 3 enlisted men, and 46 civilians. lts elements were dispersed among four office buildings in the Washington, D.C., area. Intelligence collection was limited largely to what could be cle1ived from the attache system. 

Although this system belatedly had been expanded, the representational nature of 

the auaches' mission necessarily limited the intelligence value of the product. 

Worse, only 16 Corps of Tmelligence Police agents were available to provide counterintelligence support to the entire Army. The Signal Corps' Signal Intelligence 

Service had just 14 civilians and 1 Army officer on its Washington staff when 

Europe wem to war, and they were not yet in a position to generate substantive 

intelligence. Effons to rectify this situation were slow In October 1939 a new 

imercept station was set up at Fon Hunt, Virginia. In November the Army authorized 26 additional civilians for the SIS. The headquaners of the 2d Signal Service 

Company moved to Washington, D.C., that same month, allowing it closer proximity to the Signal Intelligence Service which it supponed. 

ln the spring of J 940 the deceptive tranquility of the "phony war" in 

Europe ended. In April Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, and in May 

Hitler launched his main offensive in the West. When it was over. a little more 

than a month later, France lay prostrate, Germany controlled Western Europe, 

and only a beleaguered Great Britain and the broad reaches of the Atlamic 

1 General George C. Marshall, Biennial Repon oj rhr Chief of Sea[( of the United States Army. july 

1, 1943, 10 Junr JO. 1945. l(l rh.: Seen: cary of \VM (Washington. D.C.· Government Printing Ofricc, 

1945), p. 117 
~11LITARY INTELLIGENCE IN ( RISIS 53 

Ocean stood between the United States and the triumphant forces of totalitarianism. Meanwhile, in the East, japan threatened to take advantage of the siLUation by incorporating the orphaned colonies of the beaten Western democracies 

into her "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The world had been turned 

upside down. 

At this point the United States at last began to look to its defenses. The 

Regular Army was now rapidly mcreased in size, Congress passing no less than 

three Supplemental Appropnauons Bills for 1941, funding an Army of one million men The legislauon mstituted a one-year draft, federalized eighteen 

'Jational Guard cli\'isions, and placed Reser\'e officers on active dut)'. while the 

Army organized a wanime General lleadquarters. By the fall of 1940 the United 

States had negotiated a Destroyers-for-Bases deal with Great Britain, securing 

strategic military bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and Caribbean in 

exchange for fifty over-age destroyers. More important, during the second half 

of 1940 and throughom 1941, the Roosevelt administration labored strenuously 

to clear away or bypass neutralny legislation that impeded Amencan support to 

Great Britain. This process slowly paved the way for American entrance into the 

war well before the japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 

All these e\'ents had a great effect on Military lntelltgence. Brig. Gen. 

Sherman Miles, the former military attache lO Great Britain, took over the 

Military Intelligence Division, and the organization began to grow rapidly. As 

always, however. its initial priority was domestic, and its planners freued tirelessly about German espionage and sabotage on the home from. In june 1940 

MID, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBl signed a formal delimitations 

agreement. Under its provisions, the FBI would take the lead in domestic intelligence; there would be no repetition of the World War I scenario in which 

M1htary Intelligence had assumed responsibility for surveilling American civil 

society. The agreement did g1ve the Army responsibility for conducting investigauons of those civilians employed or controlled by the milllar)' in the continental United States and of all civilians in the Canal Zone and the Philippines. 

That same month, the Military Intelligence Division sent out confidential 

instructions to intelligence officers, ordering them to set up a countersubversive 

program that would bring potential hostile agents on military installations to its 

attention. To handle these efforts, the Corps of Intelligence Police was expanded 

to an authorized strength of 42 agents mjuly and 188 in November. 

MID planners were also concerned about the possibilities of German penetration into Latin America, where there were large ethnic German communities 

and Important German business interests. Although the delimnauons agreement 

had gi\'en imelligence responsibil!lles m this region to the FBI. the Army's 

Military Intelligence Division, with its existing auache system and military missions in latin America, would not be denied a role. Thus, in july 1940 it moved 

to strengthen its capabilities for collecting foreign intelligence on Latin America 

by setting up a branch office in New York City. It seemed 1 hat the location 
54 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

would provide both beuer access to reference material and improved relationships with American corporations doing business south of the border. About the 

same time MlD was relieved of its responsibilities for supervising Army public 

relations, a function that would have diverted it even further from its primary 

missions, had it not been moved elsewhere. 

While the Military Intelligence Division worried about domestic subversion 

and Fascist infiltration of Latin America, the more prosaic and demanding intelligence tasks were performed elsewhere. The Army Air Corps wanted an independent role in the field of mtelligence, e\'en though Air Corps officers were 

servmg on the MID staff. Largely as a result of A1r Corps initiatives. in 

September 1940 all the Army's technical services were d~rected to form their 

own intelligence staffs to collect mformation on foreign equipment and techniques. areas in which MlD appeared to have liule interest.4 In addition, intelligence staffs were created for GHQ, for the new defense commands that sprang 

into existence, for the Army Air Forces when they gained autonomy in july 

l 941, and for subordinate tactical formations. The Engineer Reproduction Plant 

of the Corps of Engineers was transformed into the Army Map Service, laying a 

foundauon that ultimately would provide indispensable cartographic intelligence for the American military.s 

Even before it was assigned responsibility for technical intelligence, the 

Signal Corps was deeply involved in imelligence- and security-related activities. Its major contribution was in cryptanalysis. ln August L 940, after twenty 

months of effort, a team of SlS civilians succeeded in breaking the japanese 

diplomatic machine cipher. The unraveling of the riddle of the so-called 

Purple machine was accomplished by purely cryptologic means, without any 

access to the machine Itself. The Purple analog built by SIS experts allowed 

the United States to read japanese diplomatic messages as fast as their intended recipients. The strams of this intellectual accomplishment ultimately sem 

William Friedman, the senior cryptanalyst. imo the hospital \vith a nervous 

breakdown. However, the feat allowed the United States to follow the tortuous workings of japanese diplomacy starting in the fall of 1940.6 Within a 

short time, the Army shared intercept and exploitation of the Purple material 

with the Navy on a daily rotating basis. The resulting decrypts of japanese 

diplomatic communications were assigned the code name MAGIC, and their 

contents were closely controlled. At times. however. the arrangement led the 

"' B1dwell, History of the M1htarv /ntt'lh~cncc Di\'iswn, p 305 

~ Blanche D. Coli, jean [. Kcuh, and Herben Rosenthal, Thr Corp~ of Engmccrs: Troo11~ and 

Eqwpment, Unued Slates Anny 10 World War II (Washmgton, D.C U.S Army Center of ~11luary 

H1St01)', 1958), pp. 441-42. 

6 Ronald William Clark, The Man Who Bro/11: PURPLE. A l.1{c of thr World's Greatest 

Cryptographer, Colonel Wtlliarn F. Friedman (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), IS the only full length 

b1ograph)' of Friedman. Its worth can perhaps be gauged by the fac1 that there are two errors m 

the title: Friedman was a cryptolog1st. not JUSt a cryptographer, and his highest rank 10 the Am1y 

Reserve was lieutenant colonel. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE lN CRISIS 55 

services to become rivals in rushing juicy tidbits produced by cryptanalysis to 

the attention of high officials. 

The success of the SIS against Purple facilitated its expansion, and another 

hundred persons were added to its headquarters. Additional personnel were 

needed not only to perform cryptanalysis and translation, but also to meet the 

cryptographic needs of a much larger Army, espec1all)' smce the SIS was now 

mtroducing 1mponant technical innovations in this area. The organization procured two new devices to improve the security of Army communications at both 

the tactical and strategic levels. For the first purpose, it acquired the rights to a 

small compact machine cipher designed by Swedish mventor Boris Hagelin. 

Under the designation M209, this became the mainstay of Army tactical communications. For high-level communications, SIS adopted the M 134C electromechanical c1pher machine from the Navy, assigning to it the short Litle SIGABA. Friedman and Rowlett had originally designed this machine, but prewar 

budgetar}' constraints had made it a Na"y project. The SIGABA used rotors 

mstead of one-time tapes for enc1phering, and th1s gave communications 

arrangements much greater flexibility. 7 

The Signal Intelligence Service was not the only Signal Corps element 

involved in intelligence-related activities. The Signal Corps also had responsibility for radar. By May 1940 the corps had successfully developed fixed and 

mobile early-warnmg radar sets. The first radar-equipped aircraft warning company began operations in Panama a month later. This would have a substantial 

long-term effect on the evolution of Army Intelligence. Some Army officers 

defmed radar itself as "another highly spectalized type of signal imelligence."8 

But radar would also become an intelligence target, and its widespread use by 

all major powers would ultimately lead to the development of what is sometimes called the electronic battldield. 

1941: MID on the Brinh 

During 1941 the Military Intelligence Division grew to a strength of 200 

officers, supported by 848 civilians. In addition to its New York branch, the 

organization now maintained regional offices in New Orleans and San Francisco 

to collect foreign intelligence. The changing nature of the international situation 

had finally refocused collection acti\'llles on Germany and Japan, as well as 

Latin America. However, MlD's traditional primary information source, the 

attache system, had only limited capabilities against wartime Axis powers, 

even though It had grown to encompass 136 attaches on duty in 50 countries. 

ln February 1941 Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the asSIStant chief of staff, G-2, 

7 SRH 349, pp. 43-44, 46-47. 

8 Memo, Air Communica11ons Division, Signal Corps, 26 Nov 41. sub: RecommendaLions on 

Signal lntelhgence Manual MID SR 30-60, Army Cryp10logic Records. 
56 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

concluded that iL was "imperative that the Army develop an efficient espionage service that can function independently of any nation," but nothing was 

clone to implement this concept<> 

The perce1ved inadequacies of American Mtlnar) Intelligence in a situauon of growmg cris1s caused deep concern. In Apnl Miles fretted that "this 

Division has expanded considerably since last May, but always in a p1ecemeal 

manner," and admitted thal "the work being done by the division is still far 

below what should be expected of the military intelligence of a great power in 

our present situation. "10 Others agreed, notably the president of the United 

States. In June 1941 Roosevelt appointed prominent lawyer and World War l 

hero William J Donovan as coordmator of information. with a large mandate 

to establish an organization to collect intelligence and conduct radio propaganda.! I But such an edifice could not be constructed overnight and its early 

efforts were, not surprisingly, somewhat amateurish. An agent dispatched to 

the Pacific, for example, reported that there would be no war that year, while 

Donovan's central staff estimated the combat strength of the German Luftwaffe 

at 29.000 war planes when m fact it was only 3,100.12 Given the lack of 

urgency that characterized MID's own approach to collecting foreign intelligence on America's most probable enemies, Donovan's organizauon filled a 

vital need. But this did not preserve it from the enmity of MID, which resented the intrusion of a civilian organization with powerful political backing into 

what it regarded as its own preserve. 

The clash between the two organizations was exacerbated by MID's having 

acquired an interest of its own in the area of propaganda in 1941. Unfounded 

credit had been given to German proficiency in manipulating publtc opinion 

and the subsequent role of propaganda in bringing about the defeat of France. 

Moreover. since the United States was not yet a belligerent, a radio war was 

about the only one in which it could participate actively. In July 1941, therefore, MID set up a special study group on "psychological warfare" under conditions of StriCt secrecy. Rivalry between MID and Donovan's office in th1s area 

thus began almost immediately and continued unabated even after America 

entered the shooting war and it became clear that it would take more than 

slogans to defeat the enemy. 

9 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, \'Ol. 4, U S. Army Intelligence Center. 1960, p. 

125. 

10 Memo, l~ng Gcn Sherman Miles for Chief of Swff, 12 Apr 41, sub: PtOJCCt for the 

Expansion of the Mllnary lntclhgencc D1v1sion. MID Documents. 

I I TrO). Donovan and the CIA, pp. 6 3. H 

12 To be sure, the Aml)-'S esum::ues of Luftwaffe strength were almost equally exaggerated. 

'>ec Dand Kahn. L S \'1ews of Germany and Japan," Ktw\\·rng One's Enelllll'': /nrt'll1grnce 

Assessment Befcue the Two Wars, ed . Ernest ~lay (Pnnceton. Pnnccton Um\'ersny Press. 198-t), pp. 

-+92-93. 
MILITARY 1\JTELLIGENCE IN CRISIS 57 

Counterintelligence Concerns 

Although MID's role in foreign intelligence and propaganda provided a matter for dispute, coexistence with the FBI in the field of domestic intelligence was 

less of a problem, as the delimitations agreement gave the Army its own secure 

sphere of activities. However, Army Intelligence developed growmg pains as it 

sought to fulfill its responsibilities. The Corps of Intelligence Police had expanded elevenfold b)' the beginnmg of 1941, and this expansiOn changed the nature 

of the force. Until then the appomtment of CIP personnel had been centralized 

at the War Department level, but m january of that year appomtment authority 

for agents was decentralized to the corps area and overseas department level in 

an anempt to gain more manpower. At the same time, MID authorized the creation of the Office of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, and the establishment 

of a CIP training school. The Army also approved the detail of officers to the 

Corps of Intelligence Police. In addition, to conduct specialized investigations, 

the Army attempted to recrun Afncan-American and Asian-American agents for 

the first time in the organizauon's history. 

The Corps of Intelligence Pollee continued to expand during the course of 

1941 In April it was authonzed a strength of 288 enlisted men, and this figure 

was ratsed to 513 in May. The growth was accompanied by renewed disputes 

over the degree to which the recruitment, assignment, and promouon of CIP 

agents should be centralized and who should supervise investigations. 

Traditionally, the G-2s of the various corps areas and departmems had carried 

out the Iauer function. But the reserve officer who became the first head of the 

Corps of Intelligence Police, Maj. Garland Williams, wanted a centralized organization structured along the ltnes of the FBI, with its chtef responsible to the 

secretary of war for "detecting and in\'eStigating" all maucrs pertaining to espionage, sabotage, and subverstOn.l3 He also believed that the decentralized personnel arrangements impaired the qualtty of his manpower. However, all proposals to strengthen the powers of the chief, Corps of lmclhgence Police, were 

vigorously rebutted by the commanders in the field, and these arrangements 

remained unchanged. Williams protested m vain that this meant he would have 

to deal with "14 different policies, 14 different practices, 14 different methods 

of work, and, in general, 14 separate and distinct units."l4 The unhappy officer 

was soon reassigned to the Infantry School. 

Lack of adequate central control over operations in the field thus presented 

a serious problem for the enure invesugative effort. Agents too often were misused by commanders unfamiliar with counterintelligence work. On the other 

hand, the investigative work load in some commands resulted in agents' being 

pressed into service without ever undergoing basic training. And as the Army 

Llllbtory ofthe Counter lntclhgcncc C.orps, vol. 4. p. 123. 

1-l lb1d., p 122. 
58 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

adjutant general later explained to one of the corps area commanders, delegation of personnel procurement amhority to the field had resulted in the recruitment of "a larger percentage of agents whose character, education, adaptability, 

and experience in no way qualified them for the dmies they would be called 

upon to perform."lS 

Another type of problem presented itself when a rival organization emerged 

in the counterintelligence field . In September 1941 the newly created Provost 

Marshal General!; Office took over the function of conduwng all personnel 

background investigations of civilians applying for mliitary or defense-related 

employment. Ninety CIP agents were transferred to the new organization, further mtensifying both the shortage of manpower and the lack of centralized 

direction. For a time, the demands of the work load forced the Army to hire 

civilian investigators to supplement its force of CIP agents. 

The Road to Pearl Harbor 

Manpower problems were not restricted to the Corps of Intelligence Police, 

but were pervasive throughout the Army Intelligence community in 1941. The 

vast expansion of the nations intelligence apparatus threatened to outstrip the 

supply of qualified people in all services. Although the Army reservists of the 

prewar Military Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps had been called up, only 

573 existed, many of whom were actually public relations specialists rather than 

trained intelligence officers. Reserve intelligence training had not been an Army 

priority. Although the Corps of Intelligence Police and the Signal Intelligence 

Service now had specialized schools, located respectively at Chicago, Illinois, 

and Fort Monmouth, New jersey, there was no institute to train intelligence personnel in other disciplines. The Operations and Training Dtvision stubbornly 

refused to give the Military Intelligence Division any authority over intelligence 

training in general. Only in the area of language instruction was there some 

progress: a handful of officers were enrolled in language programs overseas, and 

the Fourth Army established a language school at the Presidio of San Francisco 

in the fall of 1941. By the end of the year, ninety students were learning the 

japanese language. 

But even if trained intelligence personnel had been available, there would 

have been liule for them to do besides manning the traditional tactical intelligence staffs. The need for communications intelligence personnel and cryptanalysts was serious but limited, and there was no organization for gathering 

human intelligence or for acquiring information on a large scale. At the initiative 

of the State Department, both the Army and the Navy had briefly posted a 

handful of undercover agents in French North Africa in 1941, but these men 

were transferred to the control of Donovan!; new agency soon after it came into 

15 Ibid., p. 110. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN CRISIS 59 

existence m the summer of that year.l6 The entire intelligence apparatus thus 

seemed too disparate and too dtsorganized to pull itself together for the great 

contest ahead. 

On the positive side, Army Intelligence could draw on the resources of an 

experienced ally for the first time since World War I. In 1941 secret staff talks 

between the top military leaders of the United States and Great Britain were 

accompanied by an intelligence liaison between the two coun tries. ln 

February 1941 a pany from the Signal Intelligence Service visited Great 

Bntatn and established a limited collaboration in the field of cryptology. The 

Americans brought with them a Purple analog for the Bnush Government 

Code and Cypher School. the British cryptanalytic organization, thus furnishing the British with the solution for a cryptanalytic problem that had bafOed 

their best efforts. This marked the beginning of a coopemtion that would 

bring the United States unparalleled benefits. In the summer of 1941 a permanent British liaison officer was assigned to SIS. The British also helped out 

in other intelligence-related areas. In September 1941, for example, the Army 

dispatched an Electronic Training Group of 300 second lieutenants to 

England to study British developments in radar. 

By the end of 1941 the Army had also put together a tactical signals intelligence organization. Seven signal radio intelligence companies numbered in the 

100 series were now active. including the original 1st Radio Intelligence 

Company, now redesignated the 12lst Signal Radio Intelligence Company. 

Additionally, there was a signal radio intelligence company, aviation, designed to 

provide communications intelligence to the Army Air Forces.l7 

However, there were still grave deficiencies in battlefield intelligence capabilities. Apart from the success of the Signal Intelligence Service in decoding 

japanese diplomatic communications, the Army had only limited sources of 

intelligence collection and no way of moving intelligence down to commanders 

m the field, who still tended to rely on their own resources. much as they had 

done in the nineteenth century. The use of MAGIC, the Army's most valuable 

intelligence source, highlighted the problem. The cryptologic success of the SIS 

was simply not matched by intelligence exploitation of the product. Because the 

decrypts were so sensitive, they were closely held-only a few individuals within MlD and the highest military and political figures in the administration were 

aware of their existence, and intelligence analysts were kept out of the picture 

for security reasons. As a result, although policy makers were exposed to individual messages, there was never an auempt to put the Oow of the material into 

an ordered framework. As Friedman later put it, "each message represented only 

It> Ra)' S. Chne, The CIA Under Reagan, BttSh, and Casey (Washmgton, D.C.: Acropolis Press, 

1981). pp. 64-66. 

17 War Depanmem, Adjutant General's Office, Directory of the Army of the United States and 

War Department Activities, july /94J (Washington, D.C.: War Dcpanmcm, 1941), p. 32, and 

August 1941, p. 33. 
60 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

a single frame, so to speak, m a long motion picture film": unfortunately, 

nobody was in a position to sec the whole movie.l8 The same security considerations denied key Army and Navy field commanders any knowledge of the existence of the material. 

And so, in the end not even MAGIC could save the United States from military surprise at Pearl llarbor, when the japanese attacked at dawn on 7 

December 1941. High-level japanese diplomatic messages had simply not contamed any mention of japanese military plans: consular messages had contained 

clues, but resources had not been avatlable for the umely exploitation of lowb·cl traffic. The japanese f'..lavy codes were still unbroken, and the japanese 

nect that struck Pearl Harbor had approached lls target under strict radio 

stlcnce. Although radar manned by the Signal Corps' Air Warning Service 

Company, Hawaii, had detected the j apanese attack formauon 130 miles away, 

the reports were misconstrued at the operations center and no alert had been 

given. Pearl Harbor was both a military disaster and an intelligence failurc.19 

Confromed by auack in the Pac1fic and a German declaration of war, Army 

Intelligence prepared to set matters right and bnng victory out of defeat. 

II! \RII 125. Cenatn Aspects of 'Magtc" tn the Crypwlogtc Background of the Various 

Offlctallnvcsttgations into thr Pcarl llarbor Anack, p. 63. 

I <I The best study of the intelligence failure at Pearl I !arbor n:mams Roberta Wohlstenrr, 

Prw I Hcnbor: Warning ancl Dwswn (Stanford: Stanford Umversity Pt·css, 1962). 
Nineteenth-century intelligence collectors: scouts and guides of the Union 

Army in the Civil War. 

In 1908 the War Department's intelligence organization moved to new quarters at the Army War College on the grounds of present-day Fort McNair in 

Washington, D.C., and soon lost its separate identity. 
Pioneers of Military Intelligence. 

Cloclnvise, Col. Ralph M. Van Deman, 

who reestabltshed the General Staffs 

Milnary Intelligence organization in 

World War l; Col. (later Brig. Gen.) 

Dennis Nolan, G-2 of the Amencan 

Expedlllonary Forces (AEF) in France; 

Bng Gen. Marlborough Churchill, 

first ch1ef of the restored Mihtary 

lmelhgcncc D1v1s1on. (NARA) 
Intelligence in World War 1: AEF interrogators question German prisoners of war. 

(NARA) 

Technology at the service of intelligence: an Army aerial photographer. (NARA) 
1-lerbert 0. Yardley, intelligence 

hero and villain. In the 1920s his 

clandestine "Black Chamber," jointly funded by the War and State 

Departments, broke the japanese 

diplomatic code; then he wrote a 

book about his accomplishments. 

(National Security Agency) 

After 1929 the Army's tiny but supremely effective Signal Intelligence Service 

(SIS), headed by William F. Friedman, took over the dual mission of codebreaking and code making. The Army's peacetime cryptologic successes 

would be repeated in World War II. (U.S. Army Intelligence and Security 

Command IINSCOMJ) 
In 1942 the SIS relocated to Arlington Hall, a former girls' school in 

Arlington, Virginia. The organization was soon redesignated as the Signal 

Security Agency (SSA). (INSCOM) 

SSA personnel decrypt 

japanese diplomatic 

traffic enciphered by 

the PuRPLE machine. 

(INSCOM) 
SSA guarded the secunl}' of U.S. Army commumcauons, destgning and producing electro mechamcal Ctpher machines hke the SIGABAs used in this communications center. (INSCOM) 

Officers of Signal Security Detachment D, the field operaung arm 

of the Signal lntelltgence Service, European Theater of 

Operations. (INSCOM) 
A Counter Intelligence Corps agent of the 

94th Infantry Division questions a source 

in the European Theater of Operations. 

(NARA) 

Soldiers of the elite Alamo Scouts reconnoitered 

japanese-held islands in support of the Anny's campaigns 

in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). (NARA) 
Postwar headquaners of Army Security Agency Europe, m the I G. Farben 

building, Frankfurt, Germany. (JNSCOM) 

A N1se1 Counter Intelligence 

Corps agent shows Ius badge to a 

sentry of the 23d Infantry 

Division dunng the occupation 

of Japan. (NARA) 
5 

World War II 

Military Intelligence at the Center 

W orld War l1 confronted the U.S. Army with the problems of fighting a global 

connict across enormous distances. The beginnings were not easy. During the 

first six months of fighting in the Pacific, the United States suffered an unprecedented suing of military reverses. German U-boats in the Atlantic ravaged the 

sea Janes until early 1943, creating a serious shonage of shipping that threatened America's capacity to project ilS power overseas. However, the military 

problems were manageable. Americas vast industrial base allowed the United 

States to equip a mobilized Army of 8 million men, with 89 divisions and over 

1,000 squadrons of aircraft. By the end of 1943 much of this vast force had 

been deployed overseas. Following preliminary operations in North Africa and 

the Mediterranean, the invasion of Normandy in june 1944 allowed the U.S. 

Army to bring its main forces LO bear against Germany on the decisive battlefield of cominemal Europe. In the Pacific, the secondary theater of war, America 

evemually launched a two-pronged attack on the japanese Empire from bases in 

Australia and Hawaii. By August 1945 the war had been brought to a triumphant close. 

The history of Military lmelligence in the war was paradoxical. Largely 

because of the success of British and American cryptanalysts in exploiting 

enemy communications, the Army ultimately was provided with better intelligence than it had ever enjoyed in its history. Yet all during the war, there was a 

constant drumfire of criticism directed against Military Intelligence. ln late 1943 

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson agreed with his colleague, Secretary of the 

Navy Frank Knox, that "our two intelligence services are preuy bum."! The 

same year Admiral Ernest King complained of "overlaps and wasted effon in the 

various acti\'ities" of Army and Navy lntelligence.2 ln retrospect, the Army's 

World War I! deputy chid of staff, Lt. Gen. joseph McNamey, stated that Army 

G-2 "was always a headache for the War Department and was reorganized conI Tro}', Donovan crnd the CIA, p. 317. 

2 Ibid., p 316. 
62 MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

tinuously and unsuccessfully throughout the war."3 Although the intelligence end 

product was superb, the machinery that produced it was beset by disorder. The 

situation was not improved by a high rate of turnover in MID's leadership: 

between 1941 and 1944, the Army had four eli fferent assistant chiefs of staff, G-2. 

The onset of the war led inevitably to major changes in Army Intelligence. 

Pearl Harbor provided an obvious spur to greater efforts at imerservice coordination on intelligence matters. A Joint Intelligence Commiuee (llC) that 

brought together working-level representatives of MID and the Office of Naval 

Intelligence had a belated first meeting on 11 December, a month after it was 

first authorized. Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in place, a new JIC was 

formed, consisting of the heads of MID and the Office of Naval Intelligence 

(ONI). Membership in the commiuee was expanded to include representatives 

of the Coordinator of Information, the Department of State, and the Board of 

Economic Warfare. The JIC had the dual mission of providing intelligence 

advice to the joint Chiefs of Staff and representing the United States in combined Military Intelligence matters with its British counterparts. The principals 

on the jlC were supponed by a larger working group known as the joint 

Intelligence Survey Committee. With the growing independence of the Army 

Air Forces, the AAFs principal intelligence officer, the assistant chief of air staff, 

intelligence (A-2), was added to thejiC in May 1943, and the subordinate body 

became known as the .Joint Intelligence Staff.4 

This joim structure did accomplish some useful purposes by fostering interservice cooperation. Under its supervision, a joint prisoner-of-war interrogation 

center was set up at Fort Hum, Virginia, in May 1942 to process high-ranking 

German prisoners. A similar facility was organized at Byron Hot Springs, 

California, in December to handle japanese prisoners. By the fall of 1942, joint 

Army-Navy lmelligence Studies were being published, and small joint 

Imelligence Collection Agencies were later fielded in North Africa, the Middle 

East, India-Burma, and China to acquire nomactical information of potential 

use to Washington. At the end of 1942 there was even a serious proposal to 

merge MID with ONl, creating a joint intelligence agency. However, this idea 

ran into too many practical difficulties, since MID performed broader functions 

than ONl, and the two organizations were not parallel. MID, for example, was 

an element of a larger staff but ONl was not, since the Navy had no such body. 

The exchange of information between Army and Navy Intelligence was also 

hampered by tradition. Both service intelligence agencies had long been conditioned to operate independently and depanmentally. Communications intelligence was particularly sensitive: until November 1944 the Navy did not share 

all information derived from this source \vith the Army, and no joint organiza3 Ibid., p. 211. 

-1 For a funher discussion of AAF intelligence in World War II, the reader is referred to john 

F. Kre1s, ed., Piacmg the Fog: lmclligcncc and Army Air Forces Opaarions in World Wur II 

(Washington, D.C. . Air Force History and Museums Program, l996). 
WORLD WAR II: MILITARY INTELUGENCE AT THE CENTER 63 

tion to coordinate activities in this field was put in place until 1945.5 The lack 

of secure telephone links between MID and ONI, even at the end of the war, 

renected the limits on cooperation between the armed services in the intelligence field. 

Although MID was willing to work with its Navy coumerpan, it regarded 

cooperation with other players in the intelligence arena wtth distaste. Both military services distrusted the civilians, especially Donovan:S organization. This 

rivalry did not abate even after the Office of the Coordinator of Information, 

shorn of its propaganda functions, was placed under the joint Chiefs of Staff in 

july 1942, redesignated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and given a heavy 

ftll of military personnel, with Donovan himself ultimately receiving generals 

stars. MID never allowed OSS intelligence analysts any access to high-grade 

communications intelligence (COMINT).6 One of the motives behind the proposal for creating a joint intelligence agency was to strip OSS of most of its 

intelligence functions. Moreover, when plans began to be made for Operation 

TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, the joint Intelligence Committee was carefully cut out of the ptcture. Instead, intelligence support to the operauon was 

provided by a jomt Security Control group with its membership restricted to 

representatives from Army and Navy Intelligence. Later the joint Chiefs of Staff 

used this body to coordinate deception operations. 

The Reorganization of Militaty In telligence 

At the same time that Army Intelligence was beginmng to embark on mtelligence collaboration with other elements, tt was also undergoing reorganization. 

fhe first change came about as a result of a wholesale shakeup of the Army staff 

system in March 1942. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and his 

top planners decided to sharply cut back the Army staff and to centralize control 

of operations in a War Department Operations Division, which would become a 

\Vashmgton command post for the chtef of staff. Administrative duties pre\'iously 

performed at the staff level were to be delegated to new subordinate commands. 

The staff would become a body engaged exclusively in planning and supervision. 

This change, which divided the Army imo the Army Ground Forces, the 

Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply (later redesignated as the Arm)' 

Service Forces). had a major impact on the structure of Military Imelligence. 

$Ray Chne notes that \leuher the JIC Uomt lmelhgencc Commmeel \Veckly nor anr component of the OSS ever used stgnalmtclhgencc m ll!> reponing I know from Navy expcncncc that 

thl!> source was essenual for all authontallw all source mtelhgcncc, and n was a scnous hmuauon 

that OS~ had only mm1mal exposure to mtert·cpts" Jhe CIA undt'r Rt"<l,~an, Bush. and Cw.cy, p. 78. 

t> Army-Navy rivalr) m·er commun1cauons mtelligence was conducted almost at the lc,·el of 

the Cold War. At one pomt a scmor Am1y lmelhgcncc officer wrote h IS now appatcm that the 

:--=.wy proposes to do hu~mess at arm·s lcn~th \\'c should accept that ;muude and a(t accordmgtr: Memo for Gcner;tl Btsscll, sub: Army-:--=a,y Agreement Regardmg Ut TRA, m LhWHn~ w tltr 

l:ne:my, ed Ronald II ':>pector t \Vthmngton· Scholarly Resources 11}88). p. 199. 
64 MILITARY INTELLiGENCE 

Each of the components had llS own intelligence staff. Initially. Army Ground 

Forces wok over responsibtllly for combat intelligence traming. The intelligence 

organization of the Army Air Forces (MF) devoted itself to studying the technical and tactical aspects of the air-related threat, while the War Department G-2, 

in whtch MF personnel were well represented, continued to have responsibility 

for strategic air intelligence. The Services of Supply, m addnion to exercising 

supervision over countenntelhgence operations in the United States, took over 

responsibility for the intelltgcnce activi.lies of the seven Anny technical services: 

the Chemical Warfare Servtce, Corps of Engineers, Medtcal Corps, Ordnance 

Corps. Quartermaster Corps. Signal Corps, and Transportation Corps. Among 

other things, this meant that the Serv1ces of Supply now had jurisdiction over 

the Signal Intelligence Service, a step which had important adverse implications, since it placed the Army's most productive intelligence arm under a service organization with no background in inteiJigencc and with low priorities for 

obtaining personnel and resources in this area. 

The organization most affected, however. was the Military Intelligence 

Dtviswn itself. At the time the reorganization went mto effect, it was by far the 

largest single element in the Army Staff. containing 50 percent of all officers on 

the staff and 60 percent of all other personnel. The March 1942 reorganization 

reduced the division to just 26 people, 16 of them officers. To carry out all the 

operating functions-collecting, analyzing. and disseminating intelligence-the 

new and theoretically separate Military Intelligence Servtce (MIS) was set up. 

lntlially, MIS included an Administrative Group, an Intelligence Group, a 

Counterintelligence Group, and an Operations Group. By April 1942 the new 

organization already conststed of 342 officers and 1,000 enltsted men and civiltans, and it continued to expand. 

On paper, the separauon of the Military lmelltgence Dtvision from its operatmg arm, the Military lntelligcnce Service, was a drasuc change. In practice, it 

proved otherwise. The head of MID at the time was the rather imperious MaJ. 

Gen. George V. Strong. Although charged with responsibility for carrying out 

the plan. Strong emphatically did not believe in it and effectively frustrated its 

tmplementation. He justified this bit of institutional sabotage on the grounds 

that he was still responsible for providing intelligence advice to the chief of staff 

and needed to retain command and administrative control over the assets 

required to accomplish his mission. As a result, until the general depaned in 

earl} 1944, the separation between MID and MIS remained essentially a paper 

arrangement. By the end of Strongs tenure as assistant chief of staff, G-2, there 

were two organizatton charts for the Military lntelltgence Service, one drawn to 

please the reformers on the General Staff, and the other renecling actual command arrangements. 

Although Army planners had an impact on Military Intelligence orgamzation at the War Depanment level, the imperatives of the war itself were greater. 

At the time of Pearl Harbor, MID's production unit, the Intelligence Branch, was 
WORLD WAR U: MILITARY lNTELUGENCE AT THE CENTER 65 

internally divided into traditional geographic sections, and the organization 

still derived the bulk of its intelligence, apart from tvi.AGtC, from the attache 

system. The involvement of the United States in actual overseas combat 

changed both the sources of intelligence and the information-gathering 

process. Intelligence production was now assigned to the Military Intelligence 

Service. MID's former Intelligence Branch became the Intelligence Group of 

the MlS and was reorganized to reflect the various theaters of war. In addition, new functional elements sprang up beside the area elements as the needs 

of wartime expanded the scope of MIS's interests.7 

Perhaps the most importam organizational change within the MID/MIS 

organization was the development of an element charged with exploiting sensitive communications imelligence. This occurred as a result of the weaknesses in 

handling such sources at Pearl Harbor. The restrictions on dissemination that 

had been placed on the MAGIC intercepts had left Army Intelligence oblivious to 

the japanese threat. Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, Secretary of War 

Stimson called upon a prominent Chicago lawyer, Alfred McCormack, 10 examine the implications of the problem. McCormack recommended the creation of 

a branch within the Military Intelligence Service to deal with the processing of 

communications intelligence. The Special Branch was established in May 1942 

"vith Col. Carter W Clarke as its head and with McCormack, now commissioned as a colonel, as his deputy. To acquire the necessary high-caliber personnel to staff the new organization, McCormack drew heavily on lawyers from 

elite fi1ms, who were given reserve commissions.s 

The Special Branch was an important step in the rationalization of the 

Army's handling of communications intelligence. For the first time, analysts in 

sufficient numbers would have access to the material in ways that would 

allow them to exploit it properly for evaluation. MAGIC could now be viewed 

in its entirety and used to build up an intelligence picture. However, although 

the Special Branch was a step in the right direction, it was not the final 

answer. The rest of the Military Intelligence Service, cut off from compartmentalized intelligence, was forced to operate in a vacuum. Additionally, even 

though the branch received its intelligence from the Signal Intelligence 

Service, it did not control the operations of the SIS, which still remained 

under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer. 

7 Among the diverse elements of the Military Intelligence Service were MIS-Y, which ran an 

interrogation center for high-level German officers, and MIS-X, which was involved in making 

arrangements for procuring intelligence from captured Army Air Forces flight crews, as well as for 

implementing escape and evasion measures. Both organizations operated from a secret headquarters at Fort Hunt, Virginia. See Uoyd R. Shoemaker, TI1e Escape FactOJy (New York: St. Martin's 

Press, 1990). Maj. Gen. Ouo L. Nelson later commented. "Organizationally, G-2 was a mongrel, 

with many uncertain strains mixed in and not always recogmzable." National Sewrity and the 

General StO:ff (Washington, D.C.: Infantry journal Press, 1946), p. 526. 

8 A detailed history of the organization is contained in "History of the Special Branch, MIS, 

War Department. 1942-1944," Listening co the Enemy. pp. 171-94. 
66 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The Special Branch was not the only organizational innovation introduced 

into the MIS. The Military Intelligence Service had inherited from MID small 

branches located in New York City, San Francisco, and New Orleans. ln April 

1942 a new branch was established in Miami, Florida, to counter the threat of 

Axis penetration and subversion in Latin America. In August the entire Latin 

American Section of the Military Intelligence Service moved to Miami. 

Successively redesignated the American Hemisphere Intelligence Command, the 

American Intelligence Command, and the American Intelligence Service, the 

unit became what one historian described as a "huge, semi-independent military intelligence agency."9 lt engaged in both counterintelligence activities and 

positive collection, controlling subordinate field offices in the Canal Zone and in 

Brazil, and operating its own intercept system to locate possible agent transmitters throughout Latin America. Additionally, MIS expanded its overseas operations further, setting up a small secret intelligence service in 1942 and a Militaty 

Intelligence Research Section, with offices in London and Washington, D.C., for 

exploitation of captured documents in january 194 3.10 

The Military Intelligence Division also ventured into areas rather far afield 

from pure intelligence work. For a brief time, one was psychological warfare. 

The Special Studies Group that had previously dealt with the subject became 

the Psychological Warfare Branch of MID shortly after the declaration of war. 

However, one year later the joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the Office of Strategic 

Services responsibility for conducting all activities in this field, and the Army:S 

Psychological Warfare Branch was discominued. Nevertheless, MID eventually 

reassumed responsibility for the Anny:S remaining efforts in this area, setting up 

the Propaganda Branch in 1943. In a move that took the Military Intelligence 

Division even further afield from purely intelligence-related concems, in April 

1943 the organization was given responsibility for conducting the Army:S World 

War U historical program.ll 

A function more pertinent to imelligence was that of training intelligence 

personnel. The Army had decided rather belatedly that intelligence training was 

an intelligence responsibility. The Army Air Forces had led the way in this area, 

opening up an AAF Intelligence School for their own personnel in February 

1942. Classes were held at the University of Maryland until April, when the 

Army Air Forces acquired a more permanenl facility at Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania. In june 1942 the Military Intelligence Service activated its own 

9 Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Depanment of the Army, 

vol. 5, unpublished Ms. U.S. Atmy Center of Military History, l963, pp. 52-53. 

10 On the War Depanment's World War 11 secret mtelligence servtce, see National Security 

Act o.f 1947. Hearing Before the Committee mt Expendilllrc~ in the Executive Depa11ments, 80th Cong., 

lst sess (Washmgton, D.C.: Government Pnming Office. 1982), pp 7-8, 53-5-+ Funher references to this organization can be found in the footnotes to Christopher Felix (pseud.), A Short 

Cow'st: in the Secret War (New York: Dell Publishmg, l988), pp. 168-69 

II Stetson Conn. HtStoncal Worl1 in tltc Un11ed States Army, 1862-1954 (Washmgton, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 83-114 
WORLD WAR 11: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 67 

Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, a former National Guard installation. 

The Camp Ritchie center trained order of banle specialists, photo interpreters, some linguists, and general intelligence personnel. After August 1944 

the center also offered counterintelligence training. Intelligence personnel proceeded from Camp Ritchie to a staging area at Camp Sharpe, Pennsylvania, 

where they received additional combat training, were formed into teams, and 

assigned directly to theater control. Over 19,000 stud ems passed though Camp 

Ritchie's gates during the course of World War II. The training offered at Ritchie 

may not have been perfect-officers in the European theater would later complain that members of their military intelligence specialist teams showed "a lack 

of basic military training and a certain ineptness about caring for themselves"-

but it was a more extensive effort than the Army had ever before undertaken in 

this arena.ll 

To meet the special needs of the Army in the Pacific, the Military 

Intelligence Service also took over the direction of a separate school for japanese 

linguists, with a student body composed primarily of second generation 

japanese Americans known as Nisei. This school had been established originally 

at the Presidio of San Francisco, under Fourth Army control in the clays before 

Pearl Harbor. In May 1942 it became the Military Intelligence Service Language 

School, moved to Camp Savage, MinnesOLa, and was greatly expanded. To 

acquire beuer facilities, the school moved once more to Fort Snelling, 

Minnesota, in August 1944. By the end of the war, it had graduated over 4,800 

japanese-Language specialists, most of whom served in the Pacific theater as 

members of interpreter-interrogator-translator teams.l3 The Army also sponsored instruction for smaller numbers of japanese, Chinese, and Russian linguists at selected universities, and the MIS itself trained 1,750 Army censorship 

personnel at Fon Washington, Maryland, until February 1944, when the Army 

Service Forces assumed the function. Army counterintelligence personnel 

assigned to MlS had their own separate school in Chicago until 1944. 

Not all intelligence training was directly under the auspices of the Military 

Intelligence Service. The Signal Security Agency (SSA), SIS's wartime successor, 

provided cryptologic and language training for military and civilian personnel at 

Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, and maintained a school for officers and enlisted personnel at Vim Hill Farms Station, Virginia. Intelligence personnel for the 

Arm)' Air Forces continued to attend the AAF facility in Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania, until this school was relocated to Orlando, Florida, in the spring 

12 Rpt of the General Board. U.S. Forces, European Theater, Study no. 12, The Military 

Intelligence Service in the European Theater of Operations, p 8, copy in CMH files. 

l3 An account of Nisei accomplishments in intelligence is provided by joseph D. Harrington, 

Yankee Samura1: The Secret Role of Nisei ill Ame~ica's Pacific Victory (Detroit: Petugrew EmerprJSes. 

1979). For a firsthand account of one individual's experience, see lmerv, author with Mr. Harry 

Fukuhara, pt. l, 5 Jun 90, INSCOM I listory Office files. 
68 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

of 1944. Finally, the responsibilities for training soldiers assigned to tactical signals intell igence units were peculiarly fragmemed. Units were organized and 

trained both by the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces, while 

advanced training was administered under SSA supervision at its own facilities 

and at Signal Corps installations at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Camp 

Crowder, Missouri. 1 '+ 

The ULTRA Breakthrough 

Events of the spring of 194 3 would reshape the entire structure of Military 

Intelligence. In April Army cryptanalysts scored their first success against 

japanese military codes. A month later, a party of officers from MIS and from 

the Signal Security Agency visited the British Government Code and Cypher 

School at Bletchley Park. For the first time, American Military Intelligence 

became aware of the dimensions of the British success against high-level 

Gem1an communications. British efforts in breaking the German Enigma and 

other ciphers used on command links had laid bare many of the most important 

secrets of the Nazi high command. The intelligence derived from this source, 

known as ULTRA, was disseminated by the British under rigidly controlled conditions. Although such intelligence had been provided to Eisenhower during 

the invasion of Nonh Africa, U.S. Army lmetligence had not been fully aware of 

its origins. Now the British agreed to share this intelligence with the U.S. Army 

on an unrestricted basis, in exchange for reciprocal access to American communications intelligence on the japanese. 

These twin developments confronted Army Intelligence for the first time 

with the problem of disseminating communications intelligence to the field. The 

previous American success against the Purple machine, although providing 

valuable background information to Washington during the course of the war, 

had not had tactical implications. In contrast, ULTRA could be of immediate 

operational value. The problem was now to transmit this extremely sensitive 

combat intelligence from central processing centers in the United States and 

Great Britain to theater commanders thousands of miles away in a fashion that 

would avoid any compromise of the source of intelligence. 

In response, the Special Branch adopted the existing British system of handling communications intelligence. New security classifications were introduced. 

At first, high-level communications intelligence was termed ULrRA DEXTeR, lowerlevel material designated DL'XTER. Later, ULTRA was reserved for the results of highlevel cryptanalysis, while intelligence derived from breaking simpler systems was 

H These intercept units, an officer of the Srgnal Securit)' Agency commented, were "organized lind tramcd by the ground forces 111 a rather 'hu-or-rmss' manner wnhout any partrcular reference to their ulumatc employment." SRI! 169, Cemralrzed Control of U.S. Army Srgnal 

Intelligence t\cti\'ities, p. 14 
WORLD WAR ll: MILITARY lNTELUGENCE AT THE CENTER 69 

termed ORo PEARL or PEARL, and information produced from radio-direction finding was labeled THUMB. Ultimately, in order w mesh Army and Navy practice, 

PEARL and THUMB were merged into a single category, PINUP. Meanwhile, in April 

1944 the U.S. Army at last adopted a "top secret" classification to provide a satisfactory equivalent to the British "most secret." 

Terminology was only one aspect of the new procedures. The actual dissemination of ULTRA in the field was handled by special security officers 

(SSOs) selected and trained by the MIS Special Branch and operating under 

its direct command using special cipher systems. This was both faster and 

more secure than the usual practice of sending intelligence through successive 

layers of command channels. Again, this followed British practice. The first 

three American SSOs went out to commands in the Pacific in the fall of 1943. 

The British agreement that ULTRA supplied to American commanders in the 

European theater would henceforth be disseminated through American channels led to the procuremem of eighty additional special securily officers in 

December 194 3. 

At first, the SSOs were attached only to the highest level of commands. 

They had the dual mission of securing the vital ULTRA material and of explaining 

its significance to commanders and intelligence officers unfamiliar with the uses 

and limitations of high-grade communications intelligence. However, by july 

1944 the decision had been made to disseminate ULTRA directly to field armies 

and equivalent AAF commands and even down to independently operating 

Army corps. This necessitated recruiting 172 more SSOs in August 1944. ln 

addition, 65 enlisted men were brought into the system to operate communications, thus relieving SSOs from the necessily of deciphering their own messages. 

By the end of the war, the elaborate dissemination system was headed in each 

theater by a senior special security representative.l5 

The Armys own increasing successes in communications intelligence, combined with the new availability of the British COMINT product, helped bring 

about a general reorganization of the Military Intelligence Service. Because of 

the growth of its responsibilities, the Special Branch expanded to the point 

where it constituted the largest componem of the MIS lmelligence Group. This 

created a situation in which much of the analysis performed at the War 

Department level was undertaken by individuals without access to the single 

most important intelligence source exploited in the war. Only a "very select few" 

top production officials had been granted access to the whole picture.l6 

General Strongs departure in February 1944 paved the way for an institutional readjustment. In April a committee headed by Assistant Secreta1y of War 

15 See "Htstory of the Operauons of Spectal Sccumy Officers Attached to Fteld Commands, 

1943- 1945." Listening to the Enemy, pp. 199-204. 

I<> Bidwell, Htstory of the Military Intelligence Division , vol. 5, p. 221. Bidwell's treatment or 

the rull tmplications of the rcorganizauon ts necessarily unsatisfactory, since he wrote before the 

ULTRA secret-and the exact duties of Special lkanch-had been decompartmemed and released. 
70 t-IILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

John J. McCloy recommended that "extreme companmentauon" be eliminated.17 As a result, the War Department completely reorganized its Military 

Intelligence organization. The Special Branch was abolished as a totally separate 

companmented entity, although a new Special Branch was formed to handle 

dissemination of ULrRA to the field. A Military Intelligence Service separate from 

MID was reestablished and its internal structure realigned, with the organization 

ultimately reaching a peak worldwide strength of 1 ,500 officers, 2,000 enlisted 

men, and 1,100 civilians tn October 1944. 

The uming of the reorgamzation, however, demonstrated all too clearly that 

the nations strategic dectsion makers still looked upon Army Intelligence as "a 

kind of reference service for data rather than for professiOnal judgments."l8 The 

new arrangements went into effect in early june 1944. As distinguished hisLOrian and intelligence analyst Ray Cline later described the situation, the "G-2 

!staff] was so liule geared into high-level strategic decisions that it was engaged 

in a colossal struggle for office space when D-Day for the Normandy invasion 

came along: all of G-2:S files were locked up siLting in safes in the halls waiting 

for moving crews when franuc requests for data on the landing zone situations 

began to descend on the hapless Army intelligence officers, who hardly knew 

each others' phone numbers, let alone what was in the files.''l9 

The new-model Military Intelligence Service differed substantially from its 

predecessor. Internally, it was organized into three directorates: Administration; 

Intelligence; and Information, which supervised collection and dissemination. lt 

now functioned independemly of MID and was freed from some of the excessive companmentation that had hobbled previous operations. Moreover, at last 

ll could concentrate almost exclusively on the production of foreign intelligence. As a result of decisions made earlier m 1944, responsibility for counterintelhgence and censorship had been allotted to the Army Service Forces, a 

move whtch rather exphcttly downgraded the importance of these functions in 

the Army, and the Ml~ Countenmelligence Group that had previously exercised 

staff supervision over this area was thus abolished. 

In addition, cermin activities previously carried out at dispersed locations 

in the United States were now centralized in Washington, D.C. The American 

Intelligence Service operating from Miami, Florida, had been terminated in 

january 1944. Now that the war had been carried tO the shores of Europe, 

America was no longer \\ orned about Axis subversion in Latin America. 

Simtlarly, the branches previOusly established 111 San Francisco, New Orleans, 

and New York Cit)' had lost most of their usefulness as the war progressed 

and other sources of mtclhgence became available. By june 1944 the first two 

17 lbtd., p. 19. 

18 Chne, Til.: CIA tmckr /ktl)!.CHI, Bu,l!, Clnti Casey, p 81. 

IQ lb1d., p. 111. 

20 Nelson. Natrona/ Saurity crnd the Gt'naal Sw[(. p. 526 
WORLD WAR II: MIUTARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 71 

of these branches had been shut down, and the New York branch would cease 

operations that December. However, it should be noted that the Corps of 

Engineers, which had its own intelligence office in New York City, continued 

to find the data bases available there to be essential in producing strategic 

Engineer Intelligence. 

Unfortunately, while the new MIS was a changed organization, not everyone agreed that the changes had been for the beuer. The new Intelligence 

Directorate at the heart of MIS was organized on lines that soon proved to be 

confusing, with a layer of geographic "specialists" superimposed upon 

branches organized along functional lines.20 h seems to have been envisaged 

that the specialists, who had no operating responsibilities, would act as a 

group of "wise men," producing a unified intelligence picture from the myriad details coming from the functional operating echelons. However, the geographical specialists questioned how they could produce cohesive results 

without controlling any assets, and the chief of the Military Intelligence 

Service felt they should be on MID's organization chan, not his own. In practice, functional areas of responsibility proved to be overlapping, the new 

arrangements separated the researchers from the repon writers, and MIS 

found itself organized on different lines from any other intelligence organization with which it dealt. 

Two months after the new reforms had been implemented, the chief of the 

MIS declared the new system "slow and cumbersome. "21 Col. Alfred 

McCormack, now director of Intelligence, was equally unhappy: the Special 

Branch he had painstakingly assembled was now dispersed throughout "53 separate branches, sections, and subsections," and he felt MIS was now under 

"about as impracticable a scheme of organization as could be devised."22 

Additional tinkering with the system went on until the close of the war, but a 

postwar study of intelligence organization at the General Staff level concluded 

that from the point of view of producing timely intelligence, the 1944 reorganization was "a total failure."23 

Whatever its continuing internal weaknesses, MIS LOok a major institutional 

step forward. Since 1943 communications intelligence, MIS's main source of 

intelligence, had been under the control of the chief signal officer or of theater 

commanders.24 In December 1944 MIS at last secured operational control over 

the Signal Security Agency, and was able to give direction to the Army's most 

important COMlNT asset. This step also positioned MIS to take over this whole 

field of imelligence when the war came to a close. 

21 Btdwell, H1swry of the Military lmclhgencc D1v1S1on, vol. 5, p. 20 

22 SRI I 185, W,1r Experiences of Alfred McCormack, pp. 29-30. 

23 Bidwell, Htstory of the Mtlnary lmelhgcnce DI\'ISIOn, ,·ol. 5, p. 21. 

24 SRH 141, Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred l'vlcCormack. pt. 2. pp. 316-17. 
72 MIUTARY INTELLIGENCE 

The Counter Intelligence Corps 

The Military Intelligence Service was not composed solely of collectors and 

analysts. For most of World War ll, it also included personnel of the Army 

Counter Intelligence Corps (C!C), formed on 1 january 1942 as the successor tO 

the Corps of Intelligence Police. The new organization had both a more appropriate name and initially a more centralized organization than its predecessor. In 

january the War Department took over control of all background investigations of 

prospective counterintelligence agents and in April centralized the issue of credentials. The ClC would be an elite force, picking its enlisted personnel (rom the 

cream of Selective Service inductees. As Maj. Gen. George V Strong, the assistant 

chief of staff, G-2, put it, "the personnel of this Corps is of officer caliber. "25 

The question of overall control was not resolved finally, however. The service commands, as the corps areas were redesignated in March 1942, were the 

primary users of CIC agents in the first part of the war, and local commanders 

naLUrally wanted the convenience and flexibility of procuring their own counterintelligence personnel. For example, the commanding general of the New 

York Port of Embarkation began to recruit his own agents for the Transportation 

Corps in March 1942 and, although these individuals were issued Military 

Intelligence Division credentials, it was not until early 1943 that pan of the contingent was assimilated into the Counter Intelligence Corps. 

The scope of the CICs responsibilities was vastly increased in March 1942, 

when the Army expanded its existing countersubversive program and gave it 

new guidelines, modeling it after the similar Army program of World War l. The 

new countersubversive operation latticed the nation's military establishment 

with "an elaborate and fine network of secret agents. "26 Imelligence officers 

secretly recruited informants within each unit, on an average ratio of one informant to every thirty men, resulting in a program of enormous proportions. By 

the summer of 194 3 there were 53,000 operatives in just one of the nine service 

commands in the continental United States and over 150,000 such repons were 

being filed monthly once the system became fully operational. Although the 

countersubversive program was administered by unit and installation commanders, not by the Counter Intelligence Corps, CIC agents were assigned to follow 

up reports of subversive activity. At the War Department level, the process was 

monitored and coordinated by the Counterintelligence Group of the Military 

Intelligence Service, which exiled those suspected of sedition to special holding 

units in the remoter parts of the country. 

Inevitably, the new work load led to the expansion and restructuring of the 

Counter Intelligence Corps. Expansion itself generated an additional work load, 

25 U.S. Army Intelligence Cemer, History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, vol. 5, 

unpublished Ms, 1960. p. 39. 

26 Ibid., p. 127. 
WORLD WAR Il: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 73 

since the orficial CIC history later estimated that the Counter Intelligence Corps 

in the continental United States allotted half its man-hours to investigate its own 

applicants. By July 1943 the Corps was authorized a strength of 543 officers 

and 4,431 enlisted personnel. Officers previously detailed to the organization 

were now formally transferred and additional officers allotted from officer candidate schools. ln the past, all CIC enlisted men had held the rank of sergeant; 

now corporals and privates were added to the corps. This permitted functional 

differentiation. Sergeants served as special agents with full investigative powers, 

and corporals and privates held subordinate positions as agents and counterintelligence clerks. The new arrangements allowed some relaxation in the Counter 

Intelligence Corps' appointment standards. For a period in late 1942 and early 

1943, service commands once more were allowed to procure and transfer 

agents and clerks, while Washington retained full control over special agents 

and officers. In line with the renewed authority given to the field, the Counter 

Intelligence Corps School in Chicago, previously responsible for training all CIC 

personnel, now confined its activities to providing advanced courses, allowing 

the service commands to provide introductory counterintelligence training. 

Meanwhile, the Counter Intelligence Corps was forced to relocate its headquarters. At the end of 1942 the War Department, concerned that too many fit 

young officers were serving in staff assignments in Washington, stipulated that 

no more than one-third of the officers assigned to any element in Washington, 

D.C., could be below thirty-five years of age. This "Child Labor Law" literally 

drove the ClC out of town. In January 1943 the chief of the Counter 

Intelligence Corps and his staff moved to a dormitory of Goucher College, a 

fashionable girls' school in Baltimore, Maryland, that had been taken over by 

the government for the duration of the war. 

While these developments were taking place, the Counter Intelligence Corps 

was beginning to find a new role with the fighting forces. Heretofore, almost all its 

duties had been concerned with security in the service commands or in base areas 

overseas. Special agents in civilian clothes had operated from offtces, essentially 

working in much the same fashion as their civilian counterparts in the FBL ln 

some cases, CIC agents had been recruited and assigned without completing basic 

military training. However, when plans were drawn up for the American invasion 

of North Africa in the fall of 1942, it was decided that ClC personnel would be 

attached to tactical units in the field. The initial CIC experience \vith field service 

was not completely happy. The commander of the training camp to which the first 

group was assigned labeled them "a citizen army of misfits."27 Nevertheless, the 

CIC personnel attached to the North African task force ultimately demonstrated 

their value in a tactical support role.28 

27 U.S. Army Intelligence Center. History of the Counter Intelligence Corps. vol. ll, unpubhshed Ms, 1960, p. 8. 

28 Powe and Wilson. The Evolution of Miliwry lrllclligence, p. 53. 
74 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Tactical employment gave the Counter Intelligence Corps a whole new raison 

d'etre. By the middle of 1943 the Army at last began to deploy a sizable portion of 

its strength overseas. The CIC was affected by this shift. With deployment of tactical CIC detachments to combat situations imminent, the CIC School in Chicago 

put its students in uniform and placed a new emphasis on counterintelligence 

operations under battle conditions. The same concern for making counterintelligence pers01mel ready for combat led to the creation of a Counter Intelligence 

Corps Staging Area in the summer of 1943 to better prepare units about to go 

overseas. The staging area, initially located at Logan field in Baltimore, Maryland, 

soon moved to nearby Camp Holabird, beginning a long association between 

Military Intelligence and what would become known as "The Bird." 

By the fall of 1943 the Counter Intelligence Corps appeared w have solved 

its initial problems and to have become an established part of the Army. Its 

organization manual finally had been approved, and the new tactical emphasis 

placed it in step with the rest of the Army. Agents increasingly served in uniform 

with the troops rather than working as anonymous "spooks" on the fringes of 

the military establishment. finally, the War Depanmem transferred control of 

CIC personnel from the Military Intelligence Service to the using agencies, again 

bringing the Coumer Intelligence Corps into conformity with the rest of the 

military establishment. 

However, the activities of the Coumer Intelligence Corps still managed to 

generate criti.cism from both within and outside the Army, placing the corps in a 

bureaucratically vulnerable position. From the viewpoint of the wartime military, the CIC absorbed a disproponionate percentage of high-quality personnel 

and used them to accomplish what many regarded as a marginal mission. 

Tradition-minded Army officers disliked the whole business of counterintelligence operations, especially when they involved enlisted personnel investigating 

officers. The CIC:s investigations of leftist individuals and groups were not universally popular with politicians, particularly since the War Department's 

Counterintelligence Group had used the results to exclude some well-connected 

young men from Officers' Candidate School. Moreover, some investigations 

were conducted with more zeal than pmdence. ln early 1943, for example, the 

White House discovered that CIC agents had installed listening devices in the 

hotel suite of the president's wife in an attempt to monitor the activities of individuals suspected of Communist leanings.29 

Accumulated resentments eventually found ofricial expression, leading to 

the temporary eclipse of the Counter Intelligence Corps. ln july 194 3 Lt. Gen. 

james j. McNarney, the Army depmy chief of staff, directed the Army inspector 

general to launch an investigation of the CIC. On 5 November 1943, all CIC 

agents were ordered out of Washington, D.C., and a clay later Lhe inspector gen29 Joseph P Lash, Love, Ekcmor: Ut•<mor Rooscvdc and 1-!tt Frit"ll(h (Garden City. N.Y.: 

Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1982), p. 492 
WORLD WAR ll: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 75 

eral submitted a devastating critique of the corps' operations and organization. 

Charging that many ere investigations were "superficial, and unproductive of 

positive results except in rare instances," the inspector general found that the 

only thorough investigations were those made of applicants for ere or of military and civilian personnel suspected of subversion. However, these categories 

were overly thorough, since they dragged on after all immediate allegations had 

been resolved. Moreover, when officers were investigated, CIC procedures 

resulted in the indiscriminate dissemination of reports containing unverified 

derogatory information "based on hearsay, gossip, and innuendo," all of which 

was "directly contrary to the inherent right of a commissioned officer of the U.S. 

Army to be advised of imputations and allegations as to his character." In any 

case, the countersubversive program that had generated much of the work load 

was nearly worthless, since the million reports submitted in the first pan of 

1943 had identified only 600 suspects, and it was possible that many reports 

had been made on the same individual.30 

The inspector general's report equally criticized the organizational concepts 

that underpinned Counter Intelligence Corps operations in the continental United 

States. ln the security field, he found, the activities of the Counter Intelligence 

Corps at least partially duplicated what was being done by the investigators 

assigned to the Provost Marshal Generals Office. In addition, the existing counterintelligence system undermined the concept of command responsibility, since the 

G-2s in the service commands had to answer both to their commanding generals 

and to the Counterintelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Service. 

The inspector general's report led to the immediate unraveling of the 

Counter Intelligence Corps. The coumersubversive program was terminated, 

and most CIC agents in the continental United States were merged with the 

criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal's Office to form a new Security 

Intelligence Corps that operated under the control of the service commands. 

Although ClC detachments continued to serve with the Army Air Forces, the 

Manhattan Project, and tactical units, the presence of the Counter Intelligence 

Corps on the home from was effectively eliminated. The ClC School was transferred to the provost marshal general, its staging area closed, and the position of 

chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, abolished. The outgoing chief, Col. Harold R. 

Kibler, blamed the fall of his command on the enmity of the White House, 

specifically "Harry Hopkins and the Secret Service."3l A little later the 

Counterintelligence Group of the Military lmelligence Service was also eliminated. 

For the moment, the Army had decided to practically abandon the field of domeslie counterintelligence, limiting the CIC to a tactical support role overseas. 

30 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, vol. S, app. 2. 

31 FBI memo quoted m Lash, Love, Eleanor, p. -+92. A more melodramauc but less accurate 

version of the imbroglio can be found in Richard G. Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of). Edgar 

Hoove1 (New York: Free Press, 1987), pp 265-66. "Supposedly, the President had been so furi-
76 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

This role, however, proved substantial. ClC detachments rolled up nets of 

enemy agents in ltaly, landed in Normandy with the first wave of paratroopers, 

screened civilians in France, and arrested Nazi officials as U.S. forces overran 

Germany. ln the Pacific, Counter Intelligence Corps units secured enemy documents on the remote islands of Micronesia and worked with local guerrillas 

rounding up collaborawrs in the Philippines. To be sure, some distmst of ClC 

continued throughom the war. Writing in 1946, two experienced Army intelligence officers noted that "the Counterintelligence lsicl Corps (ClC) in World 

War l1 was in many ways a peculiar organization, whose personnel (chosen hurriedly and under pressure for their educational rather than military qualifications) frequently got in everybody$ hair."32 However, counterintelligence support was essential for American units operating in the midst of an alien population, and 241 ClC detachments would serve in overseas theaters during the 

course of World War ll. 

ln turn, success overseas revitalized the ClC at home. By the summer of 

1945 iL was clear that the evisceration of the Counter Intelligence Corps had 

deprived the Army counterintelligence function of essential institutional support just as needs were increasing. The Army's role in the occupation of a 

defeated Germany had placed new demands on the depleted ClC detachments 

in the European theater, and the pending expansion of military operations in 

the Pacific to the japanese mainland threatened to pose even greater potential 

counterintelligence problems. But the Army now lacked any effective mechanism either to procure new counterintelligence specialists or to redeploy those it 

already had. Although the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie 

had begun training counterintelligence personnel in August 1944, the Camp 

Ritchie program stressed combat intelligence rather than counterimelligence. 

Moreover, there was no rotation base for the Army's counterintelligence personnel, since any members of the Counter Intelligence Corps shipped back to the 

United States were reassigned as individuals to the Army general replacement 

pool and were lost to their specialty. 

These considerations led to the reestablishment of the Counter Intelligence 

Corps in the continental United States. ln July 1945 the Office of Chief, 

Counter Intelligence Corps, was restored. a new ClC Center and School organized, and both clements placed under the control of the Intelligence Division 

of the Army Service Forces. Originally located at Fort Meade, the school soon 

moved to Camp Holabird. In August the Security Intelligence Corps was 

released from the control of the provost marshal and reassigned to the 

Intelligence Division, paving the way for its eventual merger into the CIC. 

ous he had d1sbanded CIC and ordered its members sent to the South Pacific to 'fight japs until 

they were killed."' 

32 Stedman Chandler and Robert W. Robb, Front-Line Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Marine Corps, 1986), p. 113. 
WORLD WAR ll: MIUTARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 77 

The Signal Security Agency 

The development and expansion of the Army signals intelligence and communications security organization was governed by dynamics quite different 

from those affecting the structure of Army counterintelligence. Although the 

growth of the Counter Intelligence Corps was a function of the expansion of the 

countersubversive program and the need lO create new units Lo give tactical 

support in the field, the Signal lmelligence Service and its successor organizations evolved largely as a result of increasing success in accomplishing the 

cryptanalytic mission. 

The United States' entry into World War ll naturally imposed new demands 

on the Army's Signal Intelligence Service. Up to this point, the SLS had achieved 

its main successes against intercepted diplomatic communications provided by 

iLS 2d Signal Service Company, which manned seven small fixed sires located at 

Fort Hancock, New jersey; Fort Hunt, Virginia; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; the 

Presidio of San Francisco, California; Corozal, Canal Zone; Fort Shafter, Hawaii; 

and Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, 

the Signal Intelligence Service had a strength of 331, almost equally divided 

between the field sites and its headquarters in the old Munitions Building, a 

World War 1-vimage structure in downtown Washington, D.C. 

The shift from peace to war transformed the nature of the Signal 

Intelligence Service, for it now had to provide military as well as diplomatic 

intelligence. Initially, the organization concentrated on deciphering Japanese 

Army cryptosystems, since the Japanese posed the immediate military threat to 

U.S. forces. To do this, the SIS analysts had to master the elaborate and intricate 

system of japanese military codes, which worked on cryptologic principles 

completely different from those used in the Purple machine of the Japanese 

Foreign Office. This required not only the expansion of the SIS headquarters, 

but also the reconfiguration of its intercept network, especially since its most 

advanced outpost, Fort McKinley, would soon be overrun.33 

ln March 1942 the Military Intelligence Division recommended w the chief 

signal officer that the SIS move from the Munitions Building into new quarters 

with greater security. MID also recommended that the Signal lmelligence 

Service establish two new primary monitoring stations, one on each coast of the 

United States. Under wartime conditions, these suggestions met a quick 

response. In June 1942 the Army wok possession of Arlington Hall, a former 

girls' school in Arlington, Virginia, and transformed it into SIS headquarters. 

That same month, personnel of the 2d Signal Service Battalion, as the 2d Signal 

33 The fate of the SIS tmercept post at Fort McKinley and of its survivors is detailed in 

"Rcmmtscences of Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Brown," Listening 10 the Enemy , pp. 43-76, and 

in Mtchae\ Maslak, ''Signalman's Odyssey,'' Military Intelligence: Its liuocs and Legends, pp. 

133-61. 
78 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Service Company was now designated, began operations at Vim Hill Farms in 

Warrenton, Virginia, which had been selected as the site for Monitoring Station 

No. 1. A second major field station was soon organized at Two Rock Ranch near 

Petaluma, California. 

Paradoxically, as the duties of the Signal Intelligence Service became more 

important, its relative organizational position within the Signal Corps began to 

sink steadily lower as the structure of the Signal Corps itself grew more elaborate. By July 1942 the SIS was separated from the Office of the Chief Signal 

Officer by four organizational layers. As a resuh the organization was realigned, 

and since the term "signal intelligence" was thought to be too revealing, it was 

also redesignated as pan of this process, becoming the Signal Security Service in 

1942 and the Signal Security Agency (SSA) in 1943. Meanwhile, the positions 

of chief, Signal Security Service, and commander, 2d Signal Service Baualion, 

had been merged in 1942, effectively convening the baualion into a personnel 

center for the enlisted ranks at Arlington Hall and for both officer and enlisted 

personnel in subordinate detachments manning imercept stations worldwide.34 

During the first part of the war, the performance of the Armys signals intelligence organization was somewhat disappointing. In july 1942 it received 

responsibility for all intercept of diplomatic communications, a mission previously shared with the Navy, thus becoming the sole producer of MAGIC. 

However, despite its continuing successes in the diplomatic field, it found its 

main task-coping with the mysteries of Japanese military communicationsintractable. No cryptologic continuity on Japanese military communications had 

been built up before Pearl Harbor, principally because of the impossibility of 

intercepting the existingjapanese military nets either in the home islands or on 

the mainland of East Asia. It was not until April 1943 that an initial entry was 

made into one of the principal japanese Army systems, and General MacArthur's 

own cryptologic center in Australia made the discovery simultaneously. Even so, 

Arlington Hall was not able to read enough of the code to produce any intelligence until june of that year. 

The summer of 1943, however, proved to be something of a watershed for 

the Signal Security Agency. Once cryptanalysis of japanese messages proved to 

be possible, SSA expanded enormously, recruiting a largely civilian work force. 

There were 395 persons at agency headquarters at the beginning of 1943 and 

3,455 by the end of the year. Allhough two large temporary buildings had been 

hastily constructed at Arlington Hall in the winter of 1942 to provide additional 

office space for this work force, the influx of new personnel still made for 

cramped quarters. However, in 1943 the War Department gave the British primary operational responsibilities for code breaking in Europe. which freed the 

SSA to concentrate most of its energies on the japanese military problem. 

34 A conscienuous, if pedestrian, account of the unit can be found in SRH 135, History of 

the 2d Signal Service Battalion. 
WORLD WAR 11: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 79 

The year 1944 saw the full maturation of $SA's activities. In january 

Australian forces captured the codes of the japanese 20th Division at Sio on 

New Guinea. The find led to full exploitauon of japanese military communications and triggered another period of growth. By june 1944 over 5,100 civilians, 

most of them female, were working at Arlington Hall, assisted by 2,000 more 

military personnel. In the spring of 1944 the intercept facilities of SSA's 2d 

Signal Service Battalion were also extended when new fixed stations were established at New Delhi, India; Asmara, Eritrea; Fairbanks and Amchitka, Alaska; 

and Fort Shafter, Hawaii. ln the fall the steady advance of American forces in 

the Pacific allowed another ftxed site to be established on the island of Guam. 

Addnionally, the 2d S1gnal Service Battalion assumed control over former Office 

of Strategic Services "listening posts" at Bellmore, New York, and Resada, 

California, convening them into security monitoring stations.35 

ArlingtOn Hall thus became the center of an enormous web of collection 

activity. Intercept was provided not only by the fixed stations of the 2d Signal 

Serv1ce Battalion, but also by Signal Corps tactical units under theater control in 

the field. B}' the end of the war, 26,000 American sold1ers were involved, one 

way or another, with the intercept and processing of signals intelligence. In 

addition, U.S. Army collection efforts were supplemented by material forwarded 

to Arlington Hall by MacArthur$ multinational center and by British, Canadian, 

and Indian sources. To process the material, which came by courier pouch and 

through forty-six teletype lines at Arlington Hall, the Signal Security Agencys 

milttary and civ1lian work force of 7,000 was supported by a battery of 400 IBM 

punch-card machines. 

All this was conducted under the tightest secrecy, which would be mainlained for thirty years. The stringent security measures that cloaked the Armys 

signals intelligence organization, however, denied it the credit and stature it 

deserved. That the positions of chief of the Signal Security Agency and commander of the 2d S1gnal Service Battalion continued to be combined under one 

colonel throughout most of World War II indicates something of the nature of 

the problem. Col. Preston W Corderman, who had commanded the agency 

smce 1943, finally received a brigadier general's star in june 1945.36 

The assumption of operational control over the Signal Security Agency by 

MIS in December 1944 made sense for both organizations. By this time, the 

agency had become the Army's most s1gnificant producer of high-grade intelligence. The Military Intelligence Serv1ce now had control of targeting and could 

rearrange operational priorities. In addttion, the change benefited the Signal 

Security Agency. As long as the agency had been simply a pan of the Signal 

35 The OSS had ortgmally used these stauons to momtor Axts propaganda and news 

broadcasts 

lo A shon account of the SSA's code-breakmg activities 111 World ~ ar II can be found 111 

~RII 349, Achievements of the Signal Secuntr Agency m World War II pp. l-38. 
80 MILITARY INTELLiGENCE 

Corps, its request for increased personnel allotments had to pass through the 

chid signal officer and the general commanding the Army Service Forces, neither of whom were indoctrinated for communications intelligence or knew the 

true importance of the agency's mission. Col. Alfred McCormack of MlS's 

Special Branch believed that this factor had delayed the breaking of japanese 

codes by a year.37 The new arrangement ended th1s anomaly. Although the chief 

s1gnal officer still retained administrative control of the SSA, the action was a 

sigmficam first step toward the postwar integration of all Army communications 

mtelligence under G-2 control. 

A second step soon followed, precipitated by the growing, if belated, collaboration between the Army and the Navy in the commumcations intelligence 

field. At one point the Army had maintained closer COMlNT working relationships with the British than with the U.S. Navy. In February 1945 Admiral Ernest 

King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, 

agreed with Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall to create the ArmyNavy Communications Intelligence Board (ANClB) to direct a joint effort in th1s 

field The board would report directly to the two service chiefs, not to the joint 

Ch1efs of Staff, and would use as its staff support the existing Army-Na\'y 

Communications lmelhgence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC), a workinglevel group set up on an mformal basis in early 1944 by the Signal Security 

Agency and its Navy opposite number, OP-20-G. However, the new head of 

the Military Intelligence D1vision, Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, vetoed the idea on 

the grounds that "the Army cannot participate on an imer-service project of this 

son as long as its own signal intelligence efforts remain as decentralized as they 

now are."38 The Navy, Bissell claimed, had a monolithic communications intelligence organization, while MID controlled only the Signal Security Agency. 

Bissell$ bureaucratic ploy spurred the deputy ch1ef of staff and the all-powerful Operations Division mto relooking at the enure structure of Army signals 

mtclligence. In May 1945 the War Department requested that the three senior 

Army commanders engaged in the war against japan-Lt. Gen. Albert ]. 

Wedemeyer, commanding general of the China Theater, Lt. Gen. Daniel I. 

Sultan, commanding general of the Burma-India Theater, and General of the 

Army Douglas MacArthur, commanding general of Army Forces, Pacific-submit their views regarding the desirability of unifying the whole Army communicauons intelligence effort under a single War Department agency. Only 

MacArthur opposed the idea, and even he agreed that he had no objections 

once the fighting had stopped. The stage thus had been set for a postwar reorganization of signals mtelhgencc. 

37 SRH 141, pt. 2, pp. 221-22 

38 Memo, Maj Gcn ClayLOn Bissell for Deput)' Chief of Staff, 2 Mar 45, sub: Am1y Navy 

Communications Intelligence Board-Establishment of, Anny CryptOlogtc Records. 
WORLD WAR U: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTER 81 

Communications Security 

The Signal Security Agency was shield as well as sword in World War ll, since 

the agency had the duty of protecting Army communications in addition to 

exploiting those of other nations. Here, the agency$ performance was smoother 

since much spade work had been done before Pearl Harbor. Army communications security had already been enhanced by the development of various kinds of 

cipher machines. The problem of distribution was overcome successfully. By mid1942 the Anny had replaced its older Ml34s and M134As with the M134C, more 

commonly known by its shon title, SIGABA. Issued down to division level, the 

SIGABA served as the backbone of the Annys secure high-level communications 

throughout the war. The handy liule M209, designed for use at lower command 

echelons, was in the hands of American troops before the first American landings 

in North Africa in November 1942. 

Technological advances in this area continued throughout the war, expedited 

by the streamlining of the developmental process. Until early 1942 responsibilities 

in the area of communications security had been fragmented. The Signal 

Intelligence Service had worked out the cryptologic principles for the cipher 

devices, the Signal Corps Laboratories had prepared the engineering plans, and 

private firms had done the actual manufacturing. Wartime needs for greater security and compartmentation made this arrangement obsolete, and the Signal 

Security Agency was assigned all developmental work, introducing numerous 

innovations in the process. New crypto-communications devices produced by the 

Signal Security Agency allowed direct on-line encryption of teletype messages as 

well as speech. By june 1943 the agency had developed a secure telephone apparatus used for transaLlantic conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill and 

later employed to link theater commanders with Washington. The SIGSALY, as it 

was called, afforded high security, although with the device weighing ninety tons, 

its use was obviously confined to major headquarters. Smaller voice "scrambler" 

devices offering less security were made available to lower echelons of command. 

ln addition to producing and distributing various types of cipher machines, 

the Signal Security Agency supplied the Army with huge quantities of codes, strip 

ciphers, and key lists. It also monitored military communications to guard against 

security violations and disguised major military movements by creating false patterns of message traffic. The multifaceted communications secmity (COMSEC) 

operation absorbed the effons of a sizable ponion of agency personneL39 

39 SRI-I 349, Achievements of the Signal Security Agency, pp. 39-50. This document does 

not mention, however. that the Army suffered one major compromise and one near disaster in its 

cryptographic program. In early 1942 the Axis Powers read the coded messages of Col. Bonar 

Fellers, the Army auache assigned to Cairo. This provided them with an inside view of British 

preparations in North Africa. Kahn, Kahn on Codes, p. lOS. In 1945 an unguarded truck that contained a SIGABA belonging to the 28th Infantry Division disappeared in France. An investigation 

disclosed that the farmer responsible for the theft had only been imerested in the truck. Thomas 

M. johnson, "Search for the Stolen SIGABA," Anny 12 (February 1962): 50-55. 
82 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The Electronic Battlefield 

In addition to its traditional cryptologic functions, the Signal Security 

Agency assumed new responsibilities in the fields of electronic warfare and 

electronic intelligence. After Pearl Harbor the Signal Corps had transferred its 

Air Warning Service radar companies to the control of the Army Air Forces, 

ultimately turning over all responsibilities in radar development ro the air 

arm. However, the Signal Corps continued to exercise staff supervision over 

Army radio countermeasures and "radio or radar deception" through a newly 

formed Protective Security Branch, which was reassigned to the Signal 

Security Service at Arlington Halt in December 1942. The transfer was made 

for administrative convenience, in an attempt to sidestep the provisions of the 

same "Child Labor Law" that had forced the move of CIC headquarters to 

Baltimore. It seemed easier to relocate the unit than to replace its trained and 

specialized personnel. However, the Protective Security Branch remained 

semi-autonomous. 

Although the initial concern of the Protective Security Branch was tO protect the Armys own communications from enemy jamming, it began to consider a more positive ro le as the balance of the war started to shift. ln june 

1943 the branch laid down the first guidelines for the use of countermeasures 

in the field. Only theater commanders could authorize the use of radio or 

electronic countermeasures, although task force commanders might be delegated this authority when actually engaging the enemy. At the same time, 

Army Ground Forces fielded two provisional countermeasures detachments to 

provide support in the 194 3 summer maneuvers. In practice, however, 

American forces did not attempt communications jamming to any extent in 

World War ll, since it would risk interfering with the vital now of communications intelligence. The Americans made one significant attempt to disrupt 

enemy communications circuits during the Ardennes campaign, using electronic jamming equipment mounted in aircraft to interfere with the radio 

transmissions from German tanks.40 

ln other areas, the activities of the Protective Security Branch were more 

fruitful. The branch supported the Signal Security Agencys communications 

security program by monitoring traffic pauerns on the Armys radio teletype 

links to ensure that pending military operations would not be compromised by 

a sudden surge of message traffic between two points. Additionally, the branch 

played a role in Army radio deception operations, training personnel, procuring 

equipment, and providing technical data. The 3103d Signal Service Battalion, 

activated in December 1943 for deployment in the European Theater of 

Operations (ETO), could simulate the communications nets of large fonnations. It 

40 Alfred H. Price, The History of U.S. Electmnic Warfare, vol. 1 (Westford, Mass.: Association 

of Old Crows, 1984), pp. 177-78. 
WORLD WAR II: MILITARY INTELLiGENCE AT THE CENTER 83 

played an 1mportant role in d1vening the Germans from the real locations of 

Amencan troop concentrations before the invasion of Normandy. A smaller deception unit, the 3153d Signal Serv1ce Company, went to the Pacific in 1944.41 

The branchs activities in electronic intelligence and electronic coumenneasures-jamming enemy radars-were of even greater future significance. The 

rapid developmentS of radar technology in World War II and the employment 

of radar by both Germany and japan meant that the new device became both an 

Important new mteltigence target and an object suitable for electronic countermeasures. In this exotic war, the Protective Securit}' Branch, along with the rest 

of the Armys ground elemems. played only a small role The civilian Radio 

Research Laboratory of the Nat1onal Defense Council conducted the initial 

research on methods of blindmg enemy radar. The Army Air Forces generated 

the requirements in this field, since the threat posed by the early-warning and 

gun-laying radars of the day was against aircraft. Similarly, the Army Air Forces 

imually employed the first radar jammers and engaged in the first electronic 

imelligence operations from a1rcraft. 

However, there proved to be a role for ground-based electronic coumermeasures also. Under the aegis of the Protecuve Security Branch. a provisional unit, 

the 1st Stgnal Service Platoon (Spectal) was organized at Arlmgton Hall in July 

194 3 to find and jam enemy radar and moved almost immediately to Amchitka 

in the Aleutians. Since the Army could find no Japanese radars in the area, the 

unn subsequently redeployed to the island of Corsica in the Mediterranean and 

operated against German targets. Additional specialized companies and detachments were formed later, operating mainly in the Pacific.4.2 The Signal Security 

Agency continued to exercise staff supervision over such units until April 1945, 

when most of the functions of the Protective Security Branch were transferred to 

other Stgnal Corps agencies. It would take another decade for electronic warfare 

and electronic intelligence to be reintegrated into the Armys communications 

intelhgence organizauon. 

Summation 

The institutional evoluuon olthe Military Intelligence structure in the continental United States during the World War II was slow and painful. Many factors hindered this process: the low resource baseline from whtch it had to begin; 

1111splaced priorities; rivalr) between Regular Arm)' officers and the elite group 

of Cl\'ilians who eventuall)' rece1ved commisswns and managed much of the 

effon; and the historical accident that had placed the Army's most important 

+I Deccpuon operauons. along wath mdar countermeasures, arc ClWCrcd m Thompson and 

ll:uris, fht• Signal Corps: The Outnma·, pp 315-16. 

42 For a 1horough discussiOn or electronic warrarc in World War II , sec Price, The Hist01y of 

U.~ Hatro11ic Warfare. Operauons an the Alcutaans are discussed on page 134 
84 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

collection arm, the Signal Security Agency, under the control of the Signal Corps 

rather than the Military Intelligence Division. In retrospect, some of the effort 

seems to have been misspent. Both the coumersubversive program and the early 

focus on developments in Latin America may have diverted needed assets from 

more urgent areas. And it is clear that without British help in the way of example and assistance, the system would not have attained whatever efficiency it 

did. In the estimate of one official historian, the War Department$ intelligence 

apparatus did not become effective until late 1944. Even then. serious defects 

remained in the internal organization of the Military lntelligence Service and in 

the degree of imerservice cooperation in the communications intelligence field. 

It was not until May 1945 that the War Department developed a mechanism for 

setting intelligence priorities. It is perhaps unsurprising that the evolution of 

Army collection capabilities in the field would reflect the same pattern of awkward and uneven development. 
World War II 

Intelligence in the Field 

6 

T he Military lntelligence Service, the Signal Security Agency, and, for a time, 

the Counter Intelligence Corps were centrally directed organizations under 

the control of headquarters elements in the cominental United States. 

However, the bulk of the Army's intelligence assets were in the field, at the 

disposal of commanders in the different theaters of operation established during the course of World War II. At the beginning of World War l, Brig. Gen. 

joseph E. Kuhn had stated that intelligence was "as essential to modern 

armies as ammunition," and a second world conOict continued to demonstrate the truth of this dictum. 1 ln all the various theaters there were certain 

uniformities of intelligence organization. Army officers served on combined 

intelligence staffs with various Allies. The theater signal imelligence service 

was operated on a compartmented basis separate from other intelligence activities, and assignment of intelligence and coumerintelligence specialists to 

units was normally under centralized theater control. However, there were 

also differences in intelligence arrangements from theater to theater, depending on local conditions and circumstances. 

In its allotment of campaign credits, the U.S. Army recognized the existence 

of only three great theaters of operation in World War ll: the American, the 

Asiatic-Pacific, and the European-African-Middle Eastern. The actual command 

structure was more fragmented than this might suggest. During the course of 

World War ll, major Army formations were committed lO combat in four geographic areas: the Pacific Ocean Area (POA); the South West Pacific Area 

(SWPA); the European Theater of Operations (ETO); and the North African 

Theater of Operations (NATO), later redesignated the Mediterranean Theater of 

Operations (MTO). Paradoxically, U.S. Army contributions from an intelligence 

standpoint were greater in the Pacific area, but the European war had a larger 

impact on the ulLimate organization of Army Intelligence. Most of American 

military resources in the field went into the fight against Germany, including the 

I Powe, Tiw Emergence of tlte War Dcpartmerlllntclligence Agency, p. 84. 
86 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

bulk of Military Intelligence assets. In addition, the nature of the language problem inherent in operations against the japanese made Pacific requirements more 

specialized and less universal. The Army's focus on Europe and the relatively 

shorter distances between Washington and the field in this theater allowed 

lessons learned to translate rapidly into structural modifications. 

Europe 

The United States first entered the war in Europe as a junior partner. This 

was especially true in the field of intelligence, where Great Britain had developed extensive experience in field operations against the Axis, had a long tradition of successful intelligence operations, and had managed to break into the 

highest level of German communications with the help of its skilled cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park. British predominance in the communications intelligence 

field in Europe would continue throughout the war. The War Department was 

not apprised of the full dimensions of British success until mid-1943. The 

United States played no part in the exploitation of high-level German communications until 1944, when the Signal Intelligence Division of the European 

Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), commiued three 

American detachments in a War Department project to support the efforts of 

Bletchley Park.2 Significantly, Eisenhower had a British G-2 in each of the theaters he successively commandecl.3 

From the intelligence perspective, the war in Europe was characterized by the 

gradual evolution of independent theater-level signal intelligence services, Military 

Intelligence services, and the institution of centralized control at the theater level 

over Army counterintelligence specialists. These developments took place at first 

in the MeclitelTanean and then in the European Theater of Operations. 

When the Army entered World War ll, it envisaged only two types of tactical signal intelligence units: radio intelligence platoons organic to the divisional signal companies and signal radio intelligence (SRI) companies 

assigned to field armies on a basis of one per army. The signal radio intelligence companies were quite sizable units, each with an assigned strength of 

slightly over 300 officers and men, internally divided into a headquarters platoon, an imercept platoon, a direction-finding platoon, and a wire platoon for 

communications. Neither of the two types had any analytical personnel. 

Analysis and translation were to be accomplished centrally by small radio 

intelligence staff elements at the theater and field army levels, as had been the 

case in World War I. These elements now reported to the chief signal officer, 

2 A popular account of this effort is contamcd in Thomas Partish, The Ultra Amelicans: Tile 

U.S. Role in Bretlhing the Nazi Codes (New York: Stein and Day. 1986). 

3 Unfortunately, the memoirs of Eisenhower's G-2 were wtiucn before the release of the 

ULTRA secret. Maj. Gen. Str Kenneth Strong. Intelligence at the Top: Rccollcctiom of an lntclligcncc 

Officer (New York: Doubleday, 1969). 
WORLD WAR 11: INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD 87 

not the G-2. The arrangement left the corps level without any dedicated communications intelligence support.4 

The process of restructuring the Army's intelligence instruments began with 

the invasion of Nonh Africa in l942.The operation was launched with good 

intelligence-the British provided intensive support in this area, including furnishing the American high command \vith ULTRA-derived material. However, in 

the crunch of combat, American Intelligence organization was deemed less than 

adequate. The organization of Am1y tactical signal intelligence proved to be particularly deficient. The divisional platoons. in exposed locations near the front, 

were in tOo great a danger of being overrun to practice their specialty securely; 

the radio intelligence companies, as organized, were too large and too unwieldy 

to be used to support the corps, the command level most in need of such intelligence. Central processing proved to be impracticable, and the limited staffs 

available at the field army level to handle signals intelligence proved to be completely inadequate. At the same time, the communications practices of the 

European members of the Axis presented large volumes of material sent in clear 

or low-level codes that were susceptible to timely forward exploilation.5 

ln the initial stages of the North African campaign, the British bolstered the 

raw and badly organized Ametican signals intelligence units with their own personnel. In early 1943 the U.S. Army deployed a theater signals intelligence service to North Africa. The 849th Signal Intelligence Service-the only such service to receive a numerical designation-was originally intended lO function as 

a staff section, operating under the Signal Intelligence Division of Armed Forces 

Headquarters. Instead, in a hasty improvisation, it became a field unit. As the 

historian of the 849th SIS noted, "the unit set up in an isolated ravine in North 

Africa, without a telephone, a foot of field wire, a radio set, or a power unit, tO 

mention only a few of the more obvious necessities. "6 Even toward the end of 

the war, the unit was handicapped by the ad hoc naLUre of its creation. A report 

deemed "the present organization ... amorphous and unsatisfactory. "7 

Despite its organizational deficiencies, the 849th Signal Intelligence Service 

provided tactical signal intelligence units with the necessary analytical support. 

When the fighting moved to Italy, the problem of signal intelligence was solved 

by breaking the unwieldy signal radio intelligence companies into detachments 

and adding a small analytical element from the 849th SIS to each detachment to 

accomplish processing. Although this arrangement presented certain administrative complexities, since each element had a different parent headquarters, it 

-t SRH 391, American Signal Intelligence in North Africa and Western Europe, pp. 6-7. 

5 Memo, Col Harold G. Hayes, 1 Dec 43 , sub: SIS: Lessons from Nonh Mrica, Army 

Cryptologtc Records. 

6 SRH 124, Operational History of the 849th Signal Intelligence Servtce, Mediterranean 

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, p. 10. 

7 Memo, Lt Col M. E. Rada for Colonel Shukraft, 27 Jan 45, sub: Reorganization of 849th 

Stgnal lntelhgence Service, Army Crypwlog1c Records. 
88 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

served to pro\i cle adequate communications intelligence to American ground 

and air fo rces. Later in the war, the Army Air Forces' own signals intelligence 

units took responsibili ty for the air dimension. 

Combat experience in North Africa and the Meditenanean led to an overhaul of the entire structure of Army tactical signals intelligence in Europe. In 

1943 the War Department gave the Signal Intelligence Division of ETOUSA 

operational control of all rad io intelligence units in the theater. Further reforms 

fo llowed. A revision of the divisional tables of organization and equipment 

(TOEs) in November 1943 eliminated the radio intelligence platoon from the 

divisional signal company, although it is not clear that this change was always 

im plemented in the fi e ld . New tables provided for the incorporation of two 

radio intelligence platoons into the corps signal battalion. 

This organizational concept was not especially happy, since it repeated the mistake of lumping a small number of communications intelligence personnel with a 

larger un it performing an unrelated function , \Vith all Lhe security and operaLional 

disadvantages this entailed. In the Pacifk, when this reorganization went into 

effect, a knowledgeable intelligence officer would find the corps-level radio intelligence platoon he observed "fatally handicapped by lack of information and planning. "8 ln the European theater, however, planners found a better solution. They 

devised a completely new type of communications intelligence unit to support the 

corps-a small signal service company with an organic cellular detachment of analytical personneL These companies, numbered in a sequence beginning with 3250, 

required less Lhan half the personnel spaces allotted to the regular signal radio 

intelligence companies and were formed from in-theater resources.9 

Meanwh ile, the wars lessons and the Army Air Forces' wishes had led the 

War Departmem to authorize similarly self-contained units, designated "radio 

squadrons, mobile," to meet the special needs of the Army's air arm. These 

squadrons replaced the mix of signal radio intelligence companies, aviation, and 

mon itoring platoons in signal service companies, aviation, which previously had 

supported the Army Air Forces. ln addition to containing a large analy'tical section, the new squadrons could intercept both continuous wave (Morse code) 

and voice transmissions rrom dispersed locations. I 0 

American forces in Great Britain we re finally commiu ed to the crossChannel attack on 6 june 1944. Once fully deployed, they mustered an impres8 SRH 32, Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Representatives with Field Commands in the 

Southwest Pacific, Pacific Ocean. and China Bunna India Theaters of Operations, 1944-1945, p. 

69. 

9 A descti ption of the operations of the corps-level signal service companies can be fo und in 

SIU L 42, Third Army Radio Intelligence History in Campaign of Western Europe. This developrnent was alluded to. but not fully explained, in the official World War ll Signal Corps history. 

See Thompson and Hanis, The Signal Corps: TI-re Outcome, pp. 22, .34 7. 

LO AI\F Manua/100-1 , AAF Radio Squadrons Mobile (Washington, D.C.: !Teadquarters, Army 

Air Forces, 1944). 
WORLD WAR 11: lNTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD 89 

sive array of tactical signal intelligence units. Signal Security Detachment "D," a 

field element of the Signal Intelligence Division, ETOUSA, provided analytical 

support to the signal radio intelligence companies at the army-group and fieldarmy levels, while AAF radio squadrons furnished signals intelligence to the 

numbered air forces. The signal service companies with their organic intelligence detachments operated in support of fourteen of the American corps that 

fought under Eisenhower. A similar type of unit was fielded in the 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations in 1945. 

'In theory, the signal radio intelligence companies were designed to fill the 

Army$ communicalions security needs, as well as to provide signal intelligence. 

A section within the headquarters platoon of each company was allotted for 

communications monitoring. In practice, however, this funcr.ion usually was 

neglected because of the press of more urgent duties. As a partial solution, the 

commander of Anny forces in the Mediterranean area suggested that the Army 

develop a TOE for a new type of unit that could carry out a signal information 

and monitoring (SIAM) mission. Two such units were ultimately formed from 

Army assets in the Mediterranean: the 315Ist Signal Informar.ion and 

Monitoring Company, which was assigned to the U.S. Seventh Army to support 

the invasion of Southern France, and the 3326th SIAM Company, which operated in support of the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy These large units, each containing 

about 500 men, monitored Army communications for the dual purpose of 

checking for security violations and tracking the positions of the friendly units 

themselves. Under the fast-moving conditions of mobile warfare in Europe , normal command channels often operated too slowly; making such byproducts a 

useful tool for the field commander. I l 

Army counterintelligence organization in the field was also shaped by 

lessons learned in combat in North Africa and the l\tlediterranean. The first 

group of counterintelligence agems to be deployed had been a 71-man-strong 

detachment that accompanied the Western Task Force in the invasion of North 

Africa. Lacking in combat training, scattered in small sections over wide areas, 

and confronted by unsympathetic G-2s ignorant of the functions of the Counter 

Intelligence Corps, this initial elemem encountered many operational difficulties. However, under combat conditions, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel 

slowly resolved the initial problems. For example, new agents were trained in \ 

field security duties as well as in investigative functions. By mid-194 3, with 

operations on Italian soil about to commence, all ClC agents in the theater were 

placed under the centralized administrative control of Counter Intelligence 

Corps, North African Th.eater of Operations, United States Anny (NATOUSA). 

Also, a theater TOE had been developed, calling for 6-man divisional detachments and 13-man detachments at the corps level. Similar arrangements were 

introduced in the European Theater of Operations. 

ll Thompson and HarrL~ , The Signal Cmps: The Outcome, pp. 37-38, 65-67. 
90 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Some problems remained unsolved. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel 

were still controlled from Washington as part of the Military Intelligence 

Service. Although the rationale for this arrangement was Washington's fear that 

highly specialized counterintelligence assets otherwise might be misused, 

administration from 3,000 miles away created enormous problems. The 

arrangement slowed promotion in the field, and the CIC came to be nicknamed 

the "Corps of Indignant Corporals."l2 The attempt to run the Counter 

Intelhgence Corps from offices in Washington also hampered local efforts to 

make timely adjustments m orgamzation and doctnne based on field expenence. The 6-man divisional detachments authorized m the Mediterranean area 

were obviously inadequate, since under combat conditions some CIC personnel 

needed to stay behind to provide continuity of coverage, while others advanced 

with their units. Moreover, the War Department tables of basic allowances 

(TBAs), under which detachments functioned, proved to be impracticable. 

Although CIC units were alloned equipment for performing the most elaborate 

mvestigations, they lacked adequate transportation. 

Ultimately, these problems also were resolved. Counter Intelligence Corps 

personnel in the Mediterranean theater passed to local control in November 

194 3, and their counterparts in the United Kingdom made the same transition 

m April 1944. In January 1944 a new organizational table restructured Counter 

Intelligence Corps detachments along cellular lines, allowing units tO be tailored 

to meet the requirements of varying echelons of command. ln the ETO this 

resulLed in the creation of a 17 -man divisional CIC detachment composed of an 

administrative team and two operational teams. Larger counterintelligence 

detachments were attached to higher tactical echelons and to rear area service 

organizations. Finally, a more realistic allowance of equipment was secured, 

allocating a jeep to every two counterintelligence agents and gtving the ClC the 

mobility it needed in a combat environment. 

The problem of logically tdentifying CIC detachments was resolved in August 

1944, when separate sequences of numbers were allotted to detachments serving 

w1th various levels and types of commands. Detachments serving \vith infantry 

and airborne divisions were given the numbers of their corresponding divisional 

organization: the 200 series was reserved for detachments serving with corps, the 

300 series for those auached to field armies, the 400 series for ClC units attached 

to the theaters, the 500 series for detachments serving with armored divisions, 

and the 600 and 700 series for Counter Intelligence Corps clements attached to 

major formations of the Army Air Forces. 

Intelligence spectalists overseas not affiliated \vith the Counter Intelligence 

Corps were eventually organized under separate theater-level Milnary 

Intelligence services. These organizations evolved gradually. In the case of the 

l2 lltstory of the Counter lntclligcncc Corps, vol. 2, US. Army lmclhgcncc Center, 1959, 

p. 87 
'v\'ORLD WAR 11: INTELLIGEl\C.C 1'\l THE FIELD 91 

European Theater of Operauons, the first non-ClC mtelhgence organizations to 

deploy in England were forward clements of MlS-X and MlS-Y: spec1alized sections of the War Department's Military Intelligence Service that were tasked 

respectively with assisting the escape attempts of downed American filers and 

interrogating captured enemy personnel in depth. In April 194 3 both elements 

were merged into a Military Intelligence Service detachment under theater control W1th the arrival of addiuonal d1verse intelligence unns, such as Military 

Intelligence specialist teams, censors, topographic and photographic intelligence 

personnel, and a training team, all held agencies except counterintelligence 

detachments were folded into the mtegrated, theater-level Milnary Intelligence 

Service, European Theater of Operations, in August 1943. 

Intelligence specialists in the field operated in four types of teams during 

World War ll: interrogation, interpreter, photo interpreter, and order of battle. 

In the European Theater of Operations, the first three types were allotted two 

ofricers and four enlisted men; order of battle teams had a single officer and two 

enlisted men. The Military Intelligence Service, European Theater ol 

Operations, attached two prisoner mterrogation teams and one of each of the 

other three types to each dl\•ision, where they operated under the control of the 

dl\'iSIOnal G-2. Larger numbers of teams were alloued to htgher formations, and 

groups of teams at this level were sometimes formed into detachments with 

attached administrative personnel. Although the individual teams were small, 

the number of intelligence personnel assigned to them was considerable. The 

European Theater of Operations had 3,500 ofricers and men organized into specialist teams, not counting Military Intelligence personnel assigned to headquarters elements and to censorship duties.l3 

The collection of techmcal mtelligence was not the responsibility of the theater-le,·el Military Intelligence Serv1ce, but of "enemy equipment intelligence 

servtces" d1rected by the individual techmcal services. Tcchmcal intelligence 

personnel operated in teams at the field army level. Teams varied in size-the 

Signal Corps collection umt, for example, consisted of nve officers and six 

enlisted men.l4 The effons of the mdiv1dual technical services in the field were 

supplcmemed by those of other organizations. The Army was represented on 

the Combined lmelligencc Objectives Subcommittee, an clemem under the 

control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which fielded joinL United 

States-British, military-civilian teams to investigate scientific targets. The Army 

also plarcd a leading role in the spec1alized mission, code named ALSOS, set up 

13 Th~ acu,,ues of Mthtary lntclhgence '>ernce specialist teams m Luropc arc diScussed m 

dctatl m l..i.S Forces, European Theater. R~!I0/1 of tilt: Genrra/ &xrnl, Stud) no. 12, The Mthral) 

/ntdltgt•nn· Scrvtcr in the European Thccun of Operations (U.S. Forces. l'uropcan Theater, 1946). 

Bng. C.cn. Oscar Koch, Pauon's G-2. recalled that "each dtvtston had at least fifty auxiliary intelhgencc spcctahst personnel attached m the form of teams." Koch, Ci-2. lntdligence for Patton 

(Philadclphm· Whitmore, 1971), p. 131 

'" Thompson and Hams. Thl· Signed Corps llu: Outcome, pp 165-66, 521 
92 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

at the instigation of the director of the Manhauan Project to look for evidence of 

German atomic research.lS 

In the war against Germany, technical intelligence teams often combined 

with other intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in ad hoc task forces 

to exploit newly liberated areas of intelligence imerest. In Italy, "S Force" gave 

coverage to liberated Rome; "T Force" performed similar operations in France 

and Germany. These elements reached formidable size: the "T Force" that 

entered Paris contained representatives from seventeen different Allied intelligence elements and had a strength of 1,800, although most were administrative 

and security personnel. 

Topographic intelligence was another specialized case. During World War l, 

the American Expeditionary Forces in France had placed this function within 

the G-2 section. In World War 11 theaters of operation, the function reverted to 

the Chief of Engineers, who maintained an Engineer Intelligence office. Mobile 

Engineer topographic battalions, relying on aerial phoLOgraphy, prepared maps. 

Field armies usually had a topographic engineering baualion, and a topographic 

Engineer company was assigned to each corps.l6 

For positive collection operations in the MTO and ETO, the Army relied on 

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the independent intelligence and special 

operations organization under the direct control of the joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Although at the departmental level considerable rivalry existed between the OSS 

and the MID, Army commanders in Europe found the OSS a useful organization. ln fact, Anny personnel provided the bulk of OSS strength. ln May 1944 

friction in the European Theater of Operations was further eased when OSS and 

its British counterparts were directly subordinated to the theater commander 

under the newly created Headquarters. Special Troops, Supreme Headquaners, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. Members of OSS field units engaged bOLh in collection and in special operations. Support was provided to Army units do·wn to the 

division level. ln addition, the X-2 Branch of OSS deployed small counterintelligence detachments. These detachments, which had access to selected ULTRA 

information, did not engage in active field operations, but provided ClC detachments information on enemy agems obtained at Bletchley Park.l7 

During World War l, the AEFs G-2 had been responsible for both propaganda operations and deception. This arrangement was not repeated in World 

War Il. Eisenhower ran limited psychological warfare operations using paml'i The leader of this mission, Boris Pash. has provided a detailed account of the quest for a 

nonexistent Aryan awm bomb in The Alsos Mission (New York: Award House, 1969). 

16 For engmeer intelligence at the theater level, see Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, vol. 3, 

Engineer h1telligencc (Washington, D.C.: Government Priming Office, 1950), p. 6. 

17 OSS suppon for Am1y operations in World War II is described in Bradley F. Smith, The 

Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of ihe CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1973). p. 203, and in 

Rhodre jeffreys-jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New 1-{aven: Yale University Press, 

1989), p. 307. 
WORLD WAR 11: INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD 93 

phlets and loudspeaker unns through a special staff secuon, not through his 

intelligence staff. Planning the extensive deception operations that shrouded the 

time and place of the Allied landings was a British monopoly, carried out by the 

London Controlling Section. l lowever, the U.S. Army deployed specialized 

units to support such operations in Europe, including Signal Corps elements 

and the 23d Headquarters, Special Troops, a composite unit that used rubber 

tanks, notse-making equipment, and dummy communications nets to simulate 

an armored division. 

The Pacific 

ln the Pacific, Army Intelligence was structured a little dilferemly. ln the 

Pacific Ocean Area-the vast oceanic operational theater commanded by 

Admiral Chester W Nimitz-the Army served as an adjunct to the Navy and the 

Marine Corps, and intelligence work was largely a naval preserve. However, an 

Army officer eventually did serve as j-2 comrolling the joint Intelligence 

Center, Pacific Ocean Area OICPOA); Army topographic engineer companies 

prov1ded jlCPOA with mappmg support; and two SRI compames were ultimately deployed.lS In addition, toward the end of the war, a jomt Army-Navy 

COMINT exploitation center, RAGFOR-for Radio Group, Forward-was set 

up on recaplUred Guam to attack japanese Army and Navy mr-ground traffic, 

using the Army Air Forces' 8th Radio Squadron, Mobile, as its intercept arm.I9 

Thts unit included Nisei interpreters. Military Intelligence interpreter, interrogator, and translator teams attached to Army divisions in the Pacific seem to have 

consisted of four, rather than six, persons.20 

The major Army presence m the war against japan was located in the South 

West Pactfic Area, a theater that opened up when General Douglas MacArthur 

regrouped his forces in Australia following the American defeat in the 

Ph!lippmes. llere, organizauonal arrangements differed stnkmgly from those 

prevailing in the trans-Atlantic theaters. The creation of the SWPA committed 

the United States to the defense of beleaguered Australia. Significantly, the theater was directly subordinated to the U.S. joint Chiefs of Staff, not to the AngloAmerican Combined Chiefs of Staff. The objective situation, coupled with 

Ill Capt jasper W. Holmes srm~d as chief of JICPOA and dc~tribcs the orgamzation in 

Doublr-l:dgrd Sterets: U.S. ~dva/ lntdlrgt•na Oprratrons in the P11cr{ic Dunng World \\'ar II 

(Annapohs. ~ld: l\:a,•allnstitulc Press. Jq79). 

19 SRH 133. Report of !lhss10n to llawau and \1ananas to Study $~writ)' of 21 Sl Bomber 

Command Commumcauons. ~11'> \\l)(iS, March 1945. pp. 23-25 

lO Ch.mdlcr and Robb, Fmnt Lint' lntcllr~t·ncc p. 157. In September 1944 the TOEs for such 

hngu1~t umts were re,•ised to call for four-nMn, rather than s1x-man, teams \Var Department. 

Mrluary Intelligence Servtcc. Hrswry llf ~hlnary lntclhgencc Tramrng at Camp R1tch1e, Maryland, 

19 June I 942-1 january 19+5, pp. 65-66, copy m INSCOM llistor)' Office Illes. Howe\'er, the 

change was not rmplememed in the l·umpcan theater. The Military lntclligcncc Language School 

<ll Camp '><wage. not Camp Rachrc, pr<W1dcd hngUJsl teams in the Pacifrt 
94 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

MacArthur's autocratic proclivities, allowed him to set up a U.S. Army staff to 

direct theater operations. At the same time, only limited American military 

assets were available initially. These considerations exened strong pressure on 

the organization of intelligence in the theater. ln contrast to the situation in 

Europe, U.S. Army Intelligence personnel in the SWPA were integrated into 

combined organizations under the direction of an American G-2, Brig. Gen. 

Charles Willoughby.21 

In the spring of 1942 MacArthur set up a centralized cryptologic agency, 

Central Bureau, Brisbane (CBB). Headed by MacAnhurs chief signal officer, Brig. 

Gen. Spencer Akin, a former chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, CBB was 

jointly manned by personnel of the U.S. Army and the Royal Australian Army and 

Air Force. The American component consisted at first of two officers and a few 

intercept operators drawn from a detachment of the 2d Signal Service Company 

on Corregidor, later reinforced by a signal service detachment furnished by 

Arlington Hall. The latter detachment included Col. Abraham Sinkov, one of the 

four men Friedman had initially recmited for the Signal Intelligence Service. 

Thus, from the beginning Am1y Intelligence personnel in the Pacific were 

pan of a high-level processing cemer that eventually broke japanese military 

codes and thus generated ULTRA. Despite its name, CBB was not a static organization; an advance echelon of the Central Bureau accompanied MacArthur's 

GHQ in successive forward deployments, and by july 1945 almost the whole 

organization had been moved to San Miguel on the Philippine island of Luzon. 

By the end of the war, the Central Bureau had 1,500 personnel, more than half 

of them American, had acquired batteries of IBM machines, and was directing 

the collection efforts of four American signal radio intelligence companies and 

some ten equivalem British Commonwealth units.22 In addition to this theaterlevel communications intelligence effon, an Army Air Forc:es radio squadron, 

mobile, operated in support of each of the two separate numbered American air 

forces assigned to the theater, and at least some tactical elements appear to have 

had their own radio intelligence platoons. 

At the tactical level, communications intelligence was carried out in the 

South West Pacific Area under field conditions that differed significantly from 

those in Europe. Although the signal radio intelligence companies frequently 

operated in detachments, there was less requiremem for analytical personnel to 

21 The achievements of MacArthur's intelligence organization are documented (and glorified) 

111 Operations of the Military lntclligenct Section, GI-IQ, SWPNFEC/SCAP, 10 vols. (Far East 

Command, 1948). 

22 Discussion of Central Bureau Brisbane was inhibited for many years by the fact that the 

organization's host government preferred not to have the subject dtscussed. However, a photographtc history of the American contribution was published shortly after the war. Curiously. the 

organization even was named somewhat inaccurately. It was hardly central-the naval commumcmions intelligence effort was run on a completely separate basis--and it soon left Brisbane. One 

of the few open-source publications to mention it is D. M. Homer, High Command: Austmlia and 

Alliccl Strategy, 1939-1945 (S}'dney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 224-46. 
WORLD WAR II : lNTELLLGENCE lN THE FIELD 95 

be decentralized at unit level in the Pacific, since Japanese low-grade systems 

"were practically nonexistent."23 Furthermore, because of the vast distances in 

the Pacific, field seCllons were seldom close enough to the enemy to pick up 

low-powered tactical Circuits. 

The Central Bureau, Brisbane, was a purely cryptologic organization. A 

separate multinational organization, esoterically designated Section 22, 

General Headquarters, SWPA, was set up under Akin in 1943 to collect electronic intelligence on the rapidly increasing number of Japanese radar sets 

deployed in the theater. Section 22 differed from CBB in that it included representatives of the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as Signal Corps, Army Air 

Forces, and foreign personnel. 

Other intelligence activities in the Pacific were also conducted on a multinational basis. The Allied Geographic Service provided topographic informauon 

on this litlle-mapped theater, while the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service 

(ATIS) blended Australian and American intelligence personnel into an integrated structure. Here, the nature of the target played a large pan in the selecuon of 

personnel and in the approach to mtelligence collection. Most of the 2,000 

Americans who served in ATIS were Nisei, second-generation japanese 

Americans. Because few soldiers of the Imperial Army surrendered, the emphasis was mostly on translalion of documents wriuen in the complex and polyalphabctic japanese language. In Europe, three times as many interrogators as 

translators were needed. In the Far East, the ratio was reversed.24 

Human intclltgence collection operations in the SWPA came under the 

d1reCllon of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AlB), because MacArthur barred the 

Office of Strategic Services from the theater. In addition to employing a network 

of stay-behind Australian coast-watchers to monitor japanese shipping, the 

Allied Intelligence Bureau engaged in extensive penetration operations.25 U.S. 

Army efforts 111 th1s field focused on the Philippine Islands where guernllas 

already engaged in resisting the Japanese provided useful mtelligence assets. To 

better e.xploit th1s resource, t--lacAnhur fielded a spec1al reconnaissance clement 

largely manned by Filipinos recruited m the United States. This unit, the lst 

Reconnaissance Battalion (Special). and its auachcd 978th Signal Service 

Company inserted radio-equipped teams by submarine into the islands to link 

with the guerrillas and collect intelligence. 

~ot all Army Intelligence assets m the Southwest Pac1f1c Area, however. were 

integrated into combmed operauons. The U.S. Army ran its own counterintelligence operations, wh1ch were controlled b} the G-2 of U.S. Army Forces. f-ar Last 

21 SRlll69. p ·17. 

24 Col Sadnc} I' Mashbir headed the Allied Translator ;mcl Interpreter Sen·acc. An accoum 

of tts operauons can be found m Mashbtr':. rather melodram<llK<lll)' cnmled book. 1 \\'ct\ an 

,\mcncan Sp\ {:-.:c,, York: Vantage. 1953). 

2·, Col. Alltslm Ind . who headed the burc;m. also wrote a book. Allat'cllrttdliscna Btuf<HI. Our 

:-..vet \\'caport an th,· \\'<11 A.~ctmst)apart (:--:t•w York: ~tcKa) 1958) 
96 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

(USAFFE). the base command responsible for the admmistration and supply of 

Army clements in the SWPA. Due LO difficulties in securing counterintelligence 

agents from the United States, because of the enormous dtstances that separated 

Australia from the North American continent, a ClC school under theater control 

was set up to procure and train counterintelligence personnel. After August 1944 

Bng. Gen. Elliot Thorpe, the G-2. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, exercised control 

over thirty-nine ClC detachments scauered around the Pacific through the theater-level 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Dtvtsional detachments 

m the Southwest Pacific Area were smaller than m the European Theater of 

Operations, but were augmented by Filipino linguists once the fighting reached 

the Philippine Islands. Although coumerinteiJigence was clearly a national responsibility-the Counter Intelligence Corps in Europe reported to G-2, European 

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, not to G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionaty Force-the fact that Willoughby lacked control over counterintelligence produced much bureaucratic friction.26 Interestingly enough, when all 

Army troops in the Pacific were placed under MacAnhurs control through the 

creation of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), in April 1945, counterintelligence 

operations were again allotted to a special staff section, not to G-2. 

U.S. Army tactical elements in the theater operated under separate 

Amencan command after the end of 1942 and were supported by their own 

intelligence structure. However, interrogators and document translators were 

provided by advance echelons of ATIS. Optimally, two officers and ten men 

would be assigned to a division. ln April 1945 separate language detachments, 

numbered in the 100 series, were activated from ATIS assets. ln August the system was bolstered by fifteen headquarters elements dispatched from the Military 

Intelligence Training Center at Fort Ritchie. These received destgnations as 

numbered intelligence sen·ice organizations.27 

Army lmelligence assets m the SoULh West Pactfic Area also included an 

cine reconnaissance force, the ALAMO Scouts. This provisional unit was used to 

conduct the type of long-range operations that the OSS conducted in Europe. 

Small panics of scoULs were landed by submarine and nying boat on remote 

16 The antagomsm between the SWPA G-2, MaJ. Gen. Charle~ Wtlloughby, and the USAFFE 

G-2. Bng. Gen. Ellioll Thorpe. COllllllUed to be nourished arter the war ended The Willoughbysponsored orHcial intelhgence h•story or Far East Command cla1mcd that counterintelligence 

arrangements were "contrary to :;tarf manual:; and ultimately led to rnctlon, overlap, duplication. 

and general mdfiCtencr. • Opmllwn' of the Milirary lntelhgertcr St'cll<m. GIIQ, S\VPNFEOSCAP, vol 

3, lntdligrncc Series (I) (far East Command, General Hcadquancrs (GHQI. Milnary lntelhgencc 

Scn·•cc, General Starr. 1948), p. 14 Thorpe, m his own book, [a\t Wind. Raill' The Intimate 

Account of an lntelltgence Ojftw 111 thr Pacific (Boston. Gambu, 1969), IS more reticent. One CIC 

agent a~tp.ncd to S\VPA has wriuen personal reminiscences. Sec W1lham A. Owens, Eye-Deep 111 

lldl. A Memoir of the ltbnattOil of tht· Philippines, 1944-/945 (Dallas: Southern MethodiSt 

Umvcrsny Press. 1990). 

27 Operatior1s of the Allirtl Tramlatm and lnterpwcr SecttOil, GIIQ. S\VPA, \'Ol. 5. lnldligcncr 

Srncs (far East Command. GIIQ. 11.-hhtary Intelligence Service, General Stafr, 1948), pp. 27-28. 
WORLD WAR II: INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD 97 

islands, both to gather intelligence and to engage in special operations. The unit 

derived its name from ALAMO Force, which controlled all American tactical units 

in the SWPA until September 1944, when it was replaced by the Sixth Army.28 

Technical intelligence for the Army was collected by the 5250th Technical 

Intelligence Composite Company (Provisional), a unique unit commanded by a 

colonel and formed from intelligence personnel of six Army technical services in 

the South West Pacific Area.29 

Common Collectors 

In all of the worldwide theaters, Army tactical units also played a role in the 

Military Intelligence process. The 5-2 of each maneuver battalion had an intelligence section of 1 sergeant and 6 other soldiers, while the staff of the division 

G-2 was comprised of 2 officer assistants and 9 enlisted personnel. For reconnaissance purposes, each infantry and armored regiment had an intelligence and 

reconnaissance platoon. At the division level, a reconnaissance troop was organic to each infantry division, and each armored division had its own reconnaissance squadron.30 Groups of mechanized cavalry were available to higher echelons of command; however, in practice these units were usually employed as 

combat elements in a screening role, rather than as intelligence collectors. At the 

corps level, the field artillery observation battalion also provided some incidental intelligence inpuL 

Ground reconnaissance assets were not the only collection elements available. One major source of intelligence was provided by the L-4 "Grasshopper" 

light aircraft, organic to all divisions and artillery groups. These planes were first 

introduced in 1942, when it became clear that the semi-autonomous Army Air 

Forces, whtch had prime responstbiht}' for both photographtc and visual observation, intended to implement its mission in ways that seamed the priorities of 

the ground forces. The ten light atrcraft assigned to each mfamry division were 

used pnmarily for artillery spolling, but, at least in the European theater, they 

flew 30 percent of their missions for general intelligence support.JI 

28 An excellent article on the Al;uno Scouts 1s Les Hughes, "The Alamo Scouts," Trading Post 

45 (April-June 1986): 2-16. 

2Q Marc B. Powe and Edward E. W1lson. T11c Evolution of Amt'ltcan Mtlitarv lmelttgencc (Fon 

Huachuca. Ar1z U.S. Am1y lmelhgcncc Center and School, 1973), p 76 

30 Chandler and Robb, Front-Ltnt• Imdltgcnce, pp. 35, 83, 87. The reconnatssance troops 

were sometimes known as "tincan cavalry. and were often di\·cned to nonmtelltgence functions 

31 Report of tlte General Board, Study no. 20. Ltmson Aircraft wrtl1 Ground Forces Units (U.S. 

Forces. European Theater. 1946) The Am1}· Arr Forces observation squadrons and groups pre\'1· 

ously ass1gned to Army tactical umts were resubordtnated to AAI· A1r Ground Support 

Commands tn 1941; concurrently, 11 became all too apparent from the expencnce of the other 

warnng mr forces that existtng observauon aircmft could not SUT\'1\'e tn a combat environment. 

Ultimately, the "observation" mission was subsumed tnLO rcconnarssancc, and earned out by 

stnppcd-down convened fighters and bombers assigned to the AAF's tactical air commands. 

futrcll, Commcmd of Observation Avwtwn, pp. 6-29. 
98 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Conclusion 

Several points in the field organization of Army Intelligence during World 

War II are notable. At the tactical support level, the Army organized Intelligence 

mto a multitude of single-discipline teams and detachments. Intelligence work 

was still largely thought of as a staff function, not a line function, and intelligence specialist teams were auached to tactical formations to assist the G-2 

staff.32 This approach was reOected in unit structure. Signals intelligence, a specialized case, was carried out by company-size Signal Corps units and by the 

Stgnal Security Agency'S single oversized battalton. ln the other intelligence discipltnes, there were no units larger than detachments or teams, apart from the 

provisional technical intelligence company that operated in the South West 

Pacific Area and a one-of-a-kind provisional lst Combat Intelligence Platoon at 

Fort Richardson, Alaska. 

As the war went on, the Army made some attempts to introduce higherlevel organizational structures. To improve command and control of intelligence work in the field, by 1945 the Military Intelligence Training Center had 

activated twenty-six three-man military intelligence headquarters detachments, each capable of coordinating the efforts of several tntelligence specialist teams. The compartmented work and reporting channels of signals intelligence also produced a more hierarchical form of organization. Such measures 

were, however. exceptional. 

During the war, some commanders questioned the prevailing organizational 

concepts. Lt. Col. H. Gordon Sheen, who had served as the first chief of the 

CIC, proposed that intelligence battalions be formed from Army-Level troops 

and attached down to corps level as needed. He envisiOned an integrated muluc.ltscipline battalion, constsung of a headquarters and headquarters company, a 

counterintelligence company, an engineer topographtc company, a prisoner-ofwar mterrogation company, and a radio tntelltgcncc company.33 However, 

Sheen was ahead of his ttme It would take a dozen more years to integrate even 

counterintelligence and positive collection functions into a single unit, and 

much longer before signals intelligence could be brought under the same 

umbrella as the other intelligence disciplines. 

Whatever deficienctcs extsted in the organization of Arm)' Intelligence, tl 

had at least performed well enough to help bring about victory in World War 

II On 9 t-.. lay 1945. t\azt Germany uncondittonally surrendered to Alltcd 

forces. Japan followed sun on 14 r\ugust. The Untted States had fully achieved 

all its mihtaf)- ob.JeCttH'S. IIO\\ ever, \'tctory did not bring security. As an 

l2 "It mar be satd thm the ~cncml or~anizauonal piJn or mtdhgen~:c rort·cs 111 the Arm)' IS 

dc!itgrwd w locate the (,-2 .sl'rtwn or rts counterpart. as a stall' un11 rather than a lmc' un11 .. 

I h~wry or t-.hlitary lntclhgcnl'c 1 ramm11. m <.amp Rnchac, p. 15 

HI H!>tor)' of Llw Cl)Untcrrntclhgl'm:c Corp:>, vol. ll, U '>. 1\imy Intelligence Center. 1959, 

p. 62 . 
WORLD WAR ll: INTELLIGENCE IN TilE FIELD 99 

inevitable resuh of the destruction of German power m Central Europe, the 

forces of the Soviet Umon had extended their mnuence deep mto Europe. 

And the USSR, a totalitarian society committed to a messianic ideology, would 

prove to be as great a danger to the stahility of the world order as had the 

Axis. The war had produced a quantum advance in technical progress, but the 

most ingemous of the new devices-the atomic bomb which the United States 

had invented and employed-in the long run threatened civilization aself. It 

was now the task of the U.S. Army and its Intelligence component to help 

keep the uncertain peace. 

7 

The Cold War and Korea 

E uphoria over the American victory in World War ll was short lived. lt became 

apparent that the destruction of the Axis Powers had only created a power vacuum into which another totalitarian state, the Soviet Union, steadily and inexorably moved. The United Nations, created to guide a lasting peace, soon 

appeared LO be a hollow shell, its Security Council paralyzed by Russian vetoes. 

Confronted by Soviet repression in Eastern Europe and Communist subversion 

in the West, the United States slowly moved to meet the new challenge. ln this 

Cold War between East and West, at first the weapons were economic and 

diplomatic. The United States succored hard-pressed Greece and Turkey with 

military and economic aid in 194 7, then moved to res LOre the destroyed economy of Western Europe with the MarshaLL Plan in 1948. A Soviet blockade of the 

Western zones in Berlin was countered by a massive airlift. Finally, the United 

States abandoned two centuries of tradition and joined in a peacetime military 

alliance with the European democracies when it became a member of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. 

However, the threatening international scene was not refiected in Americas 

military posture. The vast armies fielded in World War 11 had been demobilized 

quickly. Once the draft came to an end in 194 7, the Army shrank to a strength of 

550,000. Much of this force was tied dov.rn in occupation duty, with four skeleton 

divisions in japan, two for a time in Korea, and another in Germany. In the summer of 1948 Congress renewed Selective Service, spurring recruitment and allowing a slight buildup of Army strength to about 600,000. Many Ameticans hoped 

that the American monopoly of the atomic bomb would preserve the peace. But 

the Soviets demolished this assumption in 1949 by exploding a nuclear device of 

their own. Meanwhile, stability in the Far East was deteriorating. By 1949 

Communist Chinese armies had brought all of mainland China under the red flag. 

The United States had withdrav.rn its occupation troops from South Korea, and a 

Communist government in the North now stared balefully across the 38th Parallel 

aL its democratic neighbor to the South. ln june 1950 it marched across the border. ln response, an unready America was drawn into a new war. 
102 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The shock of the Korean War-and the subsequent Chinese Communist 

intervention-transformed American national security policy. The Army grew to 

1.5 million men, organized into twenty active divisions. Large forces were 

deployed not only on the Korean peninsula, but also on the continent of Europe. 

At the time, American leaders feared that the Korean auack might be an attempt 

to divert the West from a possible Soviet onslaught against the West European 

democracies. Originally, NATO had been a paper alliance; now it was backed up 

by American steel. l For a whole generation, Ametican soldiers would man many 

of the lines first established in both Asia and Europe during the early 1950s. And 

Army Intelligence, initially reeling from two major surprises (the initial Korean 

auack and the later Chinese offensive) was ultimately revitalized. 

Restructwing Military Intelligence 

In the aftermath of World War II, Army Intelligence was affected not only 

by the massive postwar contraction of military strength, but by sustained organizational turbulence. This was brought about by two connicting types of pressure. Some policy makers simply wanted to return to prewar conditions, dismissing wanime expedients as aberrations caused by a never-to-be-repeated crisis. Others attempted to make use of the lessons learned in World War II to create a better structure. As a result, much of the Military Intelligence architecture 

with which the country had fought World War 11 was dismantled and imelligence assets placed in new configurations. 

During World War 11 , control of communications intelligence collection 

assets had been split between the Signal Security Agency and the theater commanders. This arrangemem had created significam problems, since it was 

impossible to neatly separate the tactical aspects of communications imelligence 

from the strategic ones.2 Even before the fighting had ended, the Army had 

decided to entrust exploitation o( the electronic communications spectrum to a 

single agency. On 15 September 1945, the Signal Security Agency was separated 

from the Signal Corps and became the Army Security Agency (ASA), assuming 

command of "all signals intelligence and security establishments, units, and personnel" of the Army.3 The new agency, which continued to function under 

direct control by the Army G-2 in Washington. inherited the mission, functions, and assets of its wanime predecessor and took over the communications 

intelligence and communications security resources previously at the disposal of 

theater and Air Force commanders. ln addition to unifying the Army's cryptologic struclUre, the formation of the Army Security Agency also marked a brief 

l A broad oveJYicw of U.S. defense policy during this period IS provided in Doris M. Condit, 

History of tht' Office: of the Sarcttll)' of Dtjt"nsc, Volume II: The Test of \Var, 1950-1953 (Washington, 

D.C..: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988). 

l SRI-I 169. p. 59. 

1 lbtd., p. 85. 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 103 

reversal in the tendency towards increased autonomy for the Army Air Forces in 

this field, since the AAFs radio squadrons, mobile, and other cryptologic assets 

were resubordinated to the agency. 

Army counterintelligence organization also underwent a substantial restmcturing. By the time World War 11 ended, the Counter Intelligence Corps and the 

Security lmelligence Corps formed in 1944 had bOlh been placed under the 

Army Service Forces' director of lmelligence. Agents of both organizations now 

received the same training and operated under the same regulations. Under 

these new conditions it was obviously pointless to maintain two parallel counterintelligence elements. Accordingly, in April 1946 the Security Intelligence 

Corps was merged with the Counter Intelligence Corps. ln May numbered ClC 

detachments were constitmed to operate in support of each of the nine service 

commands and the separate Military District of Washington (MOW). These 

detachments were assigned numbers in a sequence running from 107 to 116. 

President Harry S. Truman presented a different kind of organizational 

challenge to the Army when he abolished the wartime Office of Strategic 

Services on l October 1945. The assets of the OSS were divided: analytic personnel were shipped off to the State Department, bm the bulk of the organization, consisting of military personnel trained in clandestine collection, counterintelligence, coven action, and black propaganda, combined into the new 

Strategic Services Unit under the War Department. However, the organization 

was not assigned to G-2, but to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 

which created an anomalous situation. 

The existence of the Strategic Services Unit forced a reexamination of the 

entire national intelligence strucwre, a task which the LoveLL Board assumed at the 

end of 1945. An executive order early in 1946 established a new Central 

Intelligence Group, a rudimentary national-level intelligence agency. This prototype central intelligence agency was at first merely a cooperative interdepartmental 

activity that depended on the armed services and the State Depanment for its staff, 

budget, and facilities. However, it did serve as a holding area to dispose of what 

remained of the Strategic Services Unit, most of whose members were slated for 

demobilization with the rest of the Army.4 Nevertheless, in 1946 a vestigial undercover capability still remained at the disposal of the U.S. intelligence community. 

A further step in the immediate postwar reorganization of U.S. Army 

Intelligence came about in May 1946 when the Anny did away with its wartime 

suucture. Not unexpectedly. the reorganization gave greater power to the traditional Army Staff and to the heads of the old-line technical services. One important result of the post-World War l1 Army reorganization was that MID, now 

redesignated the Intelligence Division, was restored to its prewar status as one 

of five equal functional divisions on the War Department General Staff. Now 

4 Bradlc) I-. Smith doubt;; that the SSU cv..:r exceeded 750 people. The Sltculnw Warriors, p. 

408. 
104 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

headed by a director of Intelligence, the division was specifically intended to 

serve as an operating agency as well as an element engaged in intelligence planning and staff supervision. Fortunately for all parties involved, the Intelligence 

Division had already relinquished the task of preparing the Army's official histories, which it had taken on in World War 11. The Intelligence Divisions resumption of operating functions led to the abolition of the separate Military 

Intelligence Service.s In addition, the discontinuance of the Army Service 

Forces at this time resulted in the Counter Intelligence Corps' once more falling 

under the control of the War Departments Intelligence Division. 

The Intelligence Division now set intelligence requirements for the Army, 

supervised collection, conducted evaluation, produced finished intelligence, 

and disseminated this information throughout the Army. Compartmented 

intelligence continued to be channeled through the Special Security System 

created in World War 11. In November 1946 two separate detachments, both 

sharing a common commander, were set up within the division to manage the 

various Special Security Offices (SSOs). Detachment F supervised those at 

three locations in the continental United States; Detachment M directed a 

more extensive network overseas. 

The Intelligence Division focused on the global requirements imposed by 

the rapidly deepening Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. It had 

not only Army-wide intelligence taskings, but was responsible as well for satisfying national needs for political and economic intelligence. The 1946 reorganization placed the Intelligence Division and its director at an apogee of institutional power. The director of Intelligence had sole authority over the Army 

assets he needed to discharge his responsibilities. ln addition to the internal 

resources which he controlled directly, he wielded influence in the management 

oversight of the Central Intelligence Group through his membership on the 

National Intelligence Board. The director also served on the board that governed 

national signals intelligence policy. 

Almost immediately, however, the scope and autonomy of the Intelligence 

Division and its director came under attack. There were already conflicts in 

jurisdiction between the Intelligence Division and the intelligence arm of the 

now practically autonomous Army Air Forces. It was obvious that the pending 

creation of a separate Air Force, a process well under way by 1946, would result 

in the transfer of the air-oriented portions of Army Intelligence to the new service. There were other kinds of pressures at work. Many believed that lack of 

coordination between Army and Navy Intelligence had helped to bring about 

the disaster of Pearl Harbor. With tensions bet ween the United States and 

Russia growing visibly, there was a demand to create a national-level intelligence 

5 james A. Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Orgamzalion and Administration. 1900-1963 

(Washington. D.C.. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), p. 160, mistakenly mdicates 

that MIS was redestgnated as the Army Security Agenc)'. 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 105 

body with greater powers than the Central Intelligence Group to coordinate the 

activities of the service intelligence components and to specialize in gathering 

political and economic intelligence.6 

Both of these pressures came to a head in june 1947, when Congress passed 

the National Security Act. The bill created an independent Air Force and simultaneously unified all armed services under the secretary of defense. These 

actions significantly affected the structure of Army Intelligence. The Air Force 

developed a separate intelligence organization of its own. Air attaches took their 

places beside military attaches; counterintelligence assets already serving with 

Air Force units were withdrawn from the Counter Intelligence Corps; the Army 

Security Agency gave up control of its three radio squadrons, mobile, and one 

radio security detachment to the new service.7 Finally, in 1950 the Air Force 

established its own special security officer system. 

The most important impact of the 1947 act, however, came with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This new national-level intelligence authority reported to the freshly created National Security Council 

(NSC). Unlike its predecessor, the CIA was not subordinate to the services, but 

had its own budget and personnel and a large mandate to independently gather 

and produce intelligence at its own discretion. The formation of the ClA did not 

directly interfere with the independence of Army Intelligence, bUlthe role of the 

Armys director of Intelligence in inOuencing national intelligence decisions was 

decidedly curbed, although not eliminated, and the new agency assumed control over large areas of political and economic intelligence for which the Army 

had been responsible. 

Postwar Operations: Human Intelligence 

and Counterintelligence 

Under peacetime conditions, the Intelligence Division in the post-World 

War 11 period had at its disposal three major institutional elements: the Army 

attache system, the Counter Intelligence Corps, and the Army Security Agency. 

The oldest and most traditional of these, the attache system still provided the 

Army with 80 percem of its uncompartmented intelligence. The attache network was large-before the final separation of the Air Force and later 

6 Considering the substantial American Intelligence successes m World War II, one is surprised at some of the sentiments expressed during the congressional hearings that led up to the 

establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. Army Air Forces' General Hoyt Vandenberg 

expressed the opinion that the United States was "400 years behind" in the imelligence field. 

which he appeared to equate with clandestine human intelligence collection. Nationctl Security Act 

of 1947: Heating Before the Commillcc on Expenditures in the Execut1ve Departmcms, H.R. 2319, 80th 

Cong., lst sess., 27 june 1947, p. 10. 

7 ASA umts transferred to AFSS were the lst, 2d, and 8th Radio Squadrons, Mobile, and the 

l36th Radio Security Squadron. Frank M. Whitacre, A Pictorial Review of USAFSS, 1948-1973: 25 

Yem's of Vigilance (San Antonio: U.S. Air Force Security Service, 1973). 
106 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

economies by the Truman administration 285 officers were serving in seventy 

stations-and increasingly professional. As early as October 1945 the 

Intelligence Division had begun offering training courses to officers selected for 

auache duty, and by 1946 this effort was being directed by a Strategic 

Intelligence School. Although the work of its graduates was increasingly hampered by tight security measures in Communist countries, they continued to 

provide valuable military information from their far-fiung assignments. 

For a short period, the Intelligence Division also operated the Gehlen 

Organization, an intelligence apparatus inherited from the German Army of 

World War II. Maj . Gen. Reinhardt Gehlen, former head of German intelligence 

on the Eastern Front, thoughtfully had brought his complete files with him 

when he surrendered to the American Army. Gehlen, his documents, and his 

personnel were moved to the United States for a time and placed under 

Intelligence Division comrol.8 Ultimately, the organization returned to Germany, 

passed under CIA direction, and finally became the nucleus of the present West 

German Bu ndesnach richtendienst. 

For counterintelligence, the Intelligence Division relied on the reestablished 

Army Counter Intelligence Corps, responsible for the procurement, training, and 

administration of all counterimelligence personnel. ln the continental United 

States, six numbered Zone of Interior armies had taken over the functions of the 

nine former service commands following the dissolution of the Army Service 

Forces, and this brought about a realignment of existing ClC elements. Three ClC 

detachments were inactivated, and the 108th, 109th, lllth, !12th, ll3th, and 

ll5th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments were subordinated respectively to 

the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies, while the ll6th ClC 

Detachment cominued to support the Military District of Washington. These geographic arrangements would remain unchanged for twenty years. Other counterintelligence units were attached to divisions based in the United States: to the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project that dealt with the military applications of atomic 

energy, to overseas commanders, and to the Intelligence Division itself. Usually, 

investigations continued to be supervised by the local G-2s, although the most 

sensitive cases were controlled by the director of Intelligence. 

When the Counter intelligence Corps first came under the command of the 

Intelligence Division, it was supervised directly by the division's counterintelligence staiT element. However, iL proved impracticable to exercise detailed control over a Camp Holabird-based organization from the Pentagon, so the position of chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and commanding general, Counter 

Intelligence Corps Center, was authorized in April 194 7. ln short, the Counter 

Intelligence Corps had revened to the institutional status it had originally held 

during the first part of World War ll. 

8 C..chlcn's defection and early connecuon w!lh Army lmelltgcnce are descnbed 111 E. II. 

Cookndge. Geilkn, Spy of the Century (New York. Random House. 1971 ). pp. 115-54. 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 107 

Holabird, redesignated a fort in 1950, soon became an important center of 

intelligence activities. ln addition to housing the ClCs administrative headquarters and the Counter Intelligence Corps School, it was the seat of the Counter 

Intelligence Corps Board, which directed research and development and handled personnel mauers. The fort also began housing certain field activities of the 

Intelligence Division of the General Staff. ln 1950 the Central Personality Index, 

the name file which the Intelligence Division had set up the year before, was 

moved on post, and in 1951 Holabird became the home of the Army's Central 

Records Facility, which served as a centralized repository for the records of all 

the Armys personnel security investigations in the continental United States and 

contained microfilmed copies of the files of overseas ClC detachments. 

In the aftermath of World War 1, the Army had allowed its coumerintelligence function to atrophy. This course was not paralleled after World War 11. 

The Army was first confronted with the necessity of providing large occupalion 

forces abroad with counterintelligence support and then by the security 

demands of the Cold War. As a result, while total Army strength melted away in 

the course of postwar demobilization, the number of ClC personnel declined 

only modestly, falling from a high point of 5,000 in World War li to 3,800. 

However, there was a worrisome decline in quality. Rapid demobilization of veterans and the termination of the draft eliminated the reservoir of skilled and 

highly educated personnel upon which the Counter Intelligence Corps had 

been able w draw. ln World War 11, two-thirds of all enlisted agents had been 

college graduates; half had possessed law degrees or the equivalent. Now, overseas commanders were soon reponing that only 10 percent of Counter 

Intelligence Corps School-trained personnel had completed a college education. 

The Am1y partially solved the problem by increasing the proportion of officers 

in the force and authorizing the recruitment of warrant officers. Moreover, not 

all trends were negative. In 1946 members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) 

were admiued to the ClC School, and in 1950 ClC personnel were first trained 

to make use of a new and promising investigative technique, the polygraph.9 

The years following the war saw the Counter Intelligence Corps come out 

on the losing side in several jurisdictional disputes. In 1949 the corps lost 

responsibility for the Army's industrial security program to the Provost Marshal 

General's Office. It also clashed with the federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

In 1947 President Truman issued Executive Order 9835 instituting a Federal 

Loyalty Program, which directed that all investigations of civilians be performed 

by the FBI. This contradicted the existing Delimitations Agreement between the 

armed services and the FBI, in existence since before World War 11. Ultimately, 

the Army signed a new agreement with the FBI in l949, allowing the FBl to 

investigate Army civilians in the Western Hemisphere, while the Army handled 

\1 ClC activities in the postwar period are covered in llis10ry of the Counter Intelligence 

Corps, vol. 24, US Annr lntclhgcncc Center. 1959 
lOS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

investigations overseas. However, areas of friction between the two organizations continued to exist. 

One problem. as the G-2, Sixth Army, pointed out perceptively, was "a basic 

difference in concept of subversive intelligence ... The FBls responsibility was 

"primarily for accumulation of admissible evidence lO provide the basis for legal 

action against individuals or organizations. usually for acts which are already 

completed." Army Intelligence, on the other hand, functioned "primarily to 

forestall acts of violence or to prevent the spread of disorder; anticipatory planning is essential; and advance information on trends and developments must be 

continuously available."IO As it turned out, these differences in concept would 

prove even more troubling twenty years later. 

Much of the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps was performed abroad, 

as American occupation forces in Europe and the Far East first attempted to root 

out the remaining vestiges of Nazism and militarism and then faced the task of 

countering Communist subversion) I In Gem1any, all Army counterintelligence 

assets were consolidated into a single large unit, the 1 ,400-man-strong 970th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, which blanketed the American Zone of 

Germany with a network of regional and field offices. ln 1948 this was convened imo the 7970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, organized under a 

table of distribution (TD) as a one-of-a-kind unit to perform a specific mission. 

The change brought about difficulties in obtaining personnel, however, and as a 

result the 7970th was superseded by a new TOE oULfit, the 66th Counter 

intelligence Corps Detachment, in 1949.12 

The 44lst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, at one point almost as 

large as its European counterpart, played a similar role in supponing the occupation of Japan. Counterintelligence in Japan was facilitated by the activation of 

a unique unit, the 319th Military Intelligence Company, formed in 1946 of 

Nisei interpreters from MacArthur's Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.13 

Although the Counter Intelligence Corps and its predecessor organization had 

accepted Japanese-American personnel since 1940, there were too few of them 

in Japan to meet the needs of the occupation. To remedy this situation, the men 

10 Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence 01vision, vol. 6, pp. 649-50. 

11 Sometimes the Nazis were used against the Communists, as demonstrated in Allan A. 

Ryan, Jr., Klaus Barbie and the United States Government: A Report, with Dowmnwy Afll'endL'<, to the 

Attorney General of the Unrted States (Frederick, Md.: Unh·ersity Publicauons of America, 1984). 

12 For Army lineage purposes, the distinction between TOE and TD units lies in the fact that 

TOE lmns arc permanently placed on Army rolls and are acuvated and mactivated as needed, 

whereas TD unns are organized on a one-time bas1s for a particular mission and are not perpetuated after discontinuance A typical example of a TOE umt would be an infanuy batLalion, while a 

typical TO umt would be an Arm>• garnson. Because of the peculiar demands of intelligence work, 

many imelligence personnel have histoncally served in TO (later TDA, or table of distribution and 

allowances) umts 

13 However, the Translator and lmcrpretcr Service-in April 1946 it lost its allied status and 

title-continued an mdepcndent existence under G-2 controL 
TilE COLD WAR Al\iD KOREA 109 

of the 319th Military Intelligence Company were given theater counterimclligcnce credentials to make use of their mvaluable language capabiliucs in asslstmg mvesugations. 

Counter lntelhgencc Corps operations o,·erscas faced their own spec1al 

problems. Some higher commanders <lbroad objected to the idea of CIC. agents 

hvmg in Civilian clothes apart from the structure of the Army as a whole and 

sought to remilitarize the operations. At one point, all counterintelligence personnel m Germany were put back into uniform and ordered into Army billets 

With considerable loss of operational effectiveness. Another problem was that 

some CIC personnel acclimatized themselves to life O\'erseas all too well and 

had married foreign Wl\·es. In june 1950 the CIC chief 1ssued an order that any 

ClC member marrymg a foreign nauonal without gram of a waiver would be 

terminated. Finally, operational necessity drew the corps into unfamiliar activities. In Germany. for example, CIC agents helped crack down on the black market. In most overseas commands, C..old War needs forced Counter Intelligence 

Corps unns to engage m positive collection of intelligence. With no mechanism 

for gathering human mtelligence at ns d1sposal outside ol the attache system, 

the Army was forced to misapply its counterintelligence assets to fill the void. 

The Army Security Agency 

The Intelligence Divisions most important asset was provided by the newly 

formed Army Secunty Agency (ASA) In many ways the Army Secunty Agenc}' 

was unique; its official historian later wrote that it was "within, but not pan of, 

the overall military establishmem."l4 A large portion of the headquarters continued to be staffed by civilian experts, and the agency:S organizational pauern 

had no parallel in the rest of the Army. The Army Security Agency was put 

together on the "stovepipe" principle, and Arlington Hall controlled the activiues of all units through a separate ASA cham of command. This distincuve verucal command structure, wh1ch provided centralized control over all Arm} Signals intelligence and communications security assets, set ASA apart, as d1d the 

htgh walls of compartmented secrecy surrounding its sensitive operations. All 

that most members of the Army knew about the Army Security Agency was that 

they were not supposed to know anything abom it. 

As a separate entity within the Am1y. the agenc> was almost completcl) selfsuffiCient. ln add1llon to conducting 1ts own operauonal missions, ASA admimstered its own personnel system, ran its own school, arranged for its own supplies, 

and conducted its own research and development. The agency$ cryptologic aCll\'1-

ties continued to be indispensable to the nations security. The postwar drawdown 

of strength affected the ASA just as it did the rest of the armed forces, and the 

14 Anny Sccunt}' A~cncr. HistOI)' of the Army Security Agency and Subordin:uc Umts. F'l 

1951 ' \'01. L, p. 5. 
110 MiliTARY INTELLIGENCE 

organization had to be realtgned to meet new national pnonues. But the competence which had marked the activities of its predecessors was sullthere. 

In the field, ASAS principal assets were seven large fixed field stations, most 

of them left over from World War ll, at Vim !!ill rarms, Virginia; Two Rock 

Ranch, California; Helcmano, llawaii; Clark Field, the Philippines; Fairbanks, 

Alaska; Herzo Base, Germany; and Asmara, Ethiopta. Although the headquaners 

of the 2d Signal Servtce Battalion was disbanded in 1946, having become 

redundant when the Arm) Security Agency established its own personnel system, the stauons contmued to be manned by lettered detachments of the bauaiLOn until May 1950, when all of ASAS TDA elements were redesignated as numbered Army Area Units m the 8600 series. Field stauons were supplemented by 

tactical units-signal service companies and detachments-operating from 

scmifixed positions. The ASA exercised command and control of overseas elements through its regional headquarters in Europe and the Pacific, and later 

through smaller headquarters elements in Hawaii, Alaska, and the Caribbean. 

Overall direction of the Army's cryptologic effort and necessary analysis and 

production work were centralized at ASAS Arlington llall headquarters. 

Smce the Army Secunt)' Agenq·'s mission had a national impact. it had to be 

responsive to requirements generated by agenctes outstde the Army. lnitially, ASA 

operated under the umbrella of the Army-Navy Commumcations Intelligence 

Board established during World War II. Other players soon became involved in 

the results of ASI's work, however, and membership on the board was expanded. 

At first it became the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board, 

evolving a liule later into the United States Communications lmclligence Board 

(USC! B), an element which included FBI and CIA panicipation. 

As part of its mission, the agency supervised all Army communications 

security. produced and distnbuted all cryptomatenal, and served as the ultimate 

mamtcnance point for cryptomachmel')' It also had responstbility for strategic 

communications cover and deception. All this entailed a substantial commitment of resources. The Arm> Secunty AgenC)'S maJOr effort in the communications security field after World War 11 was the replacement of the super-secure 

SIGABA with a cryptomachine that operated on less sensitive design principles, 

the SIGROD, later redesignated as ASAM-5. The idea was to place SJGABA in a 

reserve status for possible wartime demands, and to use SIGROD, the compromtse of which would be less damaging. 

ASA's initial orgamzauon proved shon li\·ed. Ever smce World War II, the 

demand for the centralizauon of all ctyptologic acti\·iues under the control of a 

smgle body had been mcreasmg. By 1946 the Am1r had realized that both Arm)' 

and Navy cryptologt.c orgamzauons should be placed under the direction of a 

common agenc)' to ensure a proper coordination of effort. The creation of an 

mdependem Air Force, wtth lls own Air Force Security Sen·ice, seemed to threaten the field with greater fragmentation than ever before. ln response, during 1949 

the Armed Forces Security Agency was established under the joint Chiefs of StaiT. 
Tl IE COLD WAR AND KOREA 1 L 1 

The Armed Forces Security Agency, commanded by officers from the various services on a rotating basis, brought together at a high level all U.S. cryptologlc operations and relieved the individual services of their direction and producuon funcuons 111 this field. In practice, the des1gn concept behind thiS ne\\ 

agency proved Oawed The Armed Forces Secunt)' Agency was respons1ve only 

to the needs of the armed forces, leavmg wider national concerns unmet. 

Moreover, the planned musical chairs rotation scheme for providing the agency$ 

leadership destroyed adminisLrativc cominuity.lS In 1952 the National Security 

Agency (NSA), a civilian agency under the Department ol Defense, replaced the 

Armed Forces Secunty Agency. 

ln l949, however, it seemed that the formauon of the Armed Forces 

Security Agency would gut ASA, reducing it to the role of a residual Army cryptologic agency with a function limited to ensuring Army communications security. ln addition to giving up a major portion of its original mission, the ASA 

transferred most of liS civilian staff to the new national-level agency, including 

William Friedman and almost the whole group of Signal Intelligence Service 

p10neers. A long Army tradition that stretched back to the days of the World 

War I Cipher Bureau thus passed to a joint service organization. The Army 

Security Agency met the organizauonal challenge by restructuring itself to meet 

Army-specific needs. After 1949 the agency turned its attention to developing 

mobile field units to support tactical commanders at every level, a task accelermed by the outbreak of the Korean War in june 1950. 

Postwar Military Intelligence: Deficiencies 

There were ddinite weaknesses in the structure of post-World War 11 

Military Intelligence. Army Intelligence as yet had not become truly professional Officers served in intelligence assignments on the bas1s of detail; their commiSSions, and in many cases, the1r career interests, lay with their bas1c 

branches.l6 CominUH) in the more spectalized areas of mtelhgence, such as 

counterintelligence and signals intelligence, rested in the pool of reserve officers 

who had commued in active service after World War II . Their numbers, however, inevitably diminished. To remedy this situation, in l946 a panel of intelligence officers, the Forney Board, had recommended that a Mihtmy Intelligence 

Corps be establtshcd, consisting of both detailed and permanently assigned 

members. But other elements of the Armr Staff had \ 1gorously rejected the recommendation, on the usual grounds that any officer should be capable of performing intelligence duties. 

I'; 5RH 123, The Brownell Report, pp. 47-52 

lo Th1s tendcnq was reflected even •11 the top. ln 1949 the lloovcr Comm1ssion reported 

th;u four of the last sc,·cn G-2's were Without any mtelligencc cxpcnence whatsoc\'cr." Henry 

!lowe Ransom. Tht• lrllt'lh~t·nn: Eswblislmlt'IH (Cambndge Harvard t..:mn:rsity Press. 1970), pp 

109-10. 
112 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Training presented another problem. Under the new Army organization 

adopted m 1946, the director of Intelligence had limtted responsibilities in the 

training field. The Strategic Intelligence School, the auache training facility under 

the direct control of the Intelligence Division, was an excepnon. So was the area of 

language training. In 1946 the Military Intelligence Service Language School organized in World War ll was redesignated the Army Language School and moved to 

the Presidio of Monterey m California. There, it conunued to function under 

Intelligence Oi\ision control unul it was resubordinated to Sixth Army headquarters in 1950.17 The Intelltgence Di,·ision also mamtained lettered Language 

detachments in Germany, japan, and (briefly) Chma for advanced individual 

instruCLton. The Army Security Agency had a training school for its own personnel. Originally located at Vim !lilt Farms, near Warrenton, Virginia, the school 

relocated to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1949 and found a more permanent 

home at Fon Devens, Massachusetts, in 1951. The Counter Intelligence Corps 

maintained an equivalent institution at Fort Holabird. 

Linguists, signals intelligence personnel, and counterintelligence specialists 

were all needed in peaceume. llowever, there was no stmilar demand for photo 

interpreters and order of baule specialists. As a result, the combat intelligence spectalues were allowed to atrophy. The Military lntelllgence Training Center at Camp 

Ritchie, Maryland, which had trained combat intelligence specialists during World 

War II, was closed shortly after the war came to an end. The Army General School 

at Fort Riley, Kansas, offered some intelligence courses, but the Army Ground 

Forces, not the director of Intelligence, had jurisdiclion over its offerings. 

Lack of trained personnel, along with lack of money, meant that the TOE for a 

Military Intelligence Service Organization issued in 1948 could not be implemented. On paper, the Military Intelligence Senrice Organization was a model plan, 

calling for intelligence organizations made up of cellular teams tailored to meet 

the mtelligence requirements of each level of command. The concept called for 

administrative, linguist, and nonhngutst teams, each made up of one officer and 

two enlisted personnel. A Mihtary Intelligence Sen•ice platoon made up of appropriate teams would support each division, while MIS companies and battalions 

would perform similar functions at corps and army level, respectively. Overall 

control would be vested in a group commander at theater level. Subordinate commanders would perfonn administrative and housekeeping duties only.lB However, 

none of the larger units envisaged by the arrangement was ever organized in 

peacetime. Apart from ASA units and the CJCs oversized detachments, by 1949 

the only intelligence unit m the U.S. Army larger than a platoon was the Niseimanned 319th t-.1ilitary lntclhgence Company in japan. 

17 One of the first heads of the Army Language School wa~ Bng. Gen. Elhott Thorpe. 

MncAnhur's fom1er countenntelh~encc duef. 

Ill TO&E 30-600, M.I.S. Organ1zauon: A Pictorial Prcsentauon ... Uanuary 1952) (Fort 

R1ley. Kans.: Army General School, I Q52). 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 113 

The same problems of inadequate resources also plagued the intelligence elements in the Armys reserve components. The simauon here was considerably better than it had been after World War l, smce there were many more intelligencetrained officer and enlisted personnel, and various types of intelligence units had 

been formed. including new strategic intelligence detachments and signals intelligence units. The Armys Reserve Officer Traming Corps (ROTC) had also instituted programs for training both Military Intelligence and Army Securit> Agency officers. However, reserve untt training was weak, with equipment lacking, and the 

Military Intelligence Reserve's officer component was imbalanced. Of the over 

10,000 Military Intelligence Reserve officers, there were too many field grade and 

too few company grade personnel to meet mobilizauon needs. 

At the level of tactical collecuon, although technological advances afforded 

some improvements, this was counterbalanced by the shrinking of collection 

assets within the skeleLOn Army. Although additional aircraft were assigned lO the 

division, and a new type of light plane, the L-19 (later the 0-1 "Bird-dog"), specifically des1gned to meet Army observation requirements, entered the tn\'entory m 

1950, there were not very many divisions left to support. Similarly, the flash- and 

sound-rangmg capabilities of the field anillery observation battalion were now 

supplemented by radar, but by 1950 there was only one observation baualion left. 

Finally, there were gaps in the imelhgence architecture. What liulc electronIC warfare and electromc Intelligence capacity remamed m the Army was controlled by the chief signal officer and operated Without rderence tO the Army 

Security Agency, even though it was already all too clear that jamming would 

cenainly have a great effect on the collection of signals intelligence in any 

wartime situation. Except for the attache system, the Army still lacked any dedicated capabihties for collecting human mtelligence m peacetime. although 

Counter Intelligence Corps units overseas did provide some inctclcntal positive 

intelligence. Lt would take the impact of another crisis to force the Army to 

reevaluate ils intelligence structure and to make the necessary improvements. ln 

june 1950 the crisis arrived 

Korea 

The war in Korea confronted the U S. Army with two major intelligence 

failures withm the space of six months. The inittal North Korean invasion 

came as a surpnse, as did the later Chmese interventton. In each case Army 

Intelligence had been aware of hostile capabilities and had misinterpreted 

intentions. The reasons, apart from normal human rallibility, were unsurprismg. Peacetime budgetar)' constraints had depleted Army lntelltgence assets, 

and what remained had been targeted against Soviet Russia and the European 

threat. The Korean peninsula had been declared beyond America's defense 

perimeter and therefore outside the jurisdiction or the major theater commander in the Far East. The hard fact was that before June 1950 Korea was not 
114 ~11liTARY INTELLIGENCE 

high on the list of intelhgence priorities for either the CIA or the Army. Once 

the conflict began, poliucal and diplomatic constraints ltmited the ability of 

American collection assets to provide a definite early warning of the thirtydivision Chinese auack that ultimately materialized. 

Army Intelligence initially responded to the outbreak of hostilities in 

Korea through desperate improvisation. There were only two Korean linguists 

on the staff of MacArthur's G-2. The Technical Intelligence Section of the Far 

Cast Command had been dtsbanded in 19-+9. The four occupation divisions in 

japan had been stripped of their tactical Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, and when they deployed to Korea provisiOnal CJC detachments had to 

be cobbled together from the assets of the 44lst Counter Intelligence Corps 

Detachment in Japan. The three Army Security Agency units in the Far East 

were manmng semifixed installations and were unable to take the field. Not 

until October did the first sizable ASA unit, the 60th Signal Service Company, 

reach the Korean peninsula, and the company had to be transported from 

Fon Lewis, Washington. In the meantime, the Eighth Army depended for 

cryptologic support upon a small unit organized by making use of locallr 

available resources. Commumcauons security was lax, both among Republic 

of Korea (ROK) troops and the Eighth Army. The Etghth Arm1 had come from 

restful occupation duty 111 Japan, and the chief of the Army Security Agency 

put II, with some exaggerauon, "They receive about 400 violations a minULe 

over there."l9 Commumcauons security was threatened further by the initially 

fluid tactical situation; several high-level machine cipher devices had to be 

destroyed to prevent their capture in the early stages of the fighting. 

Chinese intervention created another set of problems. The security-conscious Chinese initially approached the baulefront completely undetected, even 

though MacAnhur personally conducted a \'tsual reconnatssance mission over 

North Korea.20 Even after the Chinese engaged, ground patrols repeated!)' lost 

contact with the enem)'. In a desperate auempt to find out more about the 

Chinese advance, Korean nattonals equipped with smoke grenades were airdropped into the intelligence vacuum to signal the presence of the enemy. 

General Matthew Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth Army in late 

December 1950 at the height of the crisis. He found himself confronted with an 

intelligence map showing only "a big red goose egg ... with '174,000' scrawled 

in the middle of it" north of hts lines, all that Army Intelligence knew then 

'" Army Secunty Agcnq '>taff :\lccung '\otes. 1-t '-:tw SO. Arm)' Crypwlog1e Records. 

20 D Clayton james Tht }nil\ "f \1ac,\lthur, ,·ol 3, 111111nph and Drsasw. 19-15-196-l 

(Boston Houghton ~1if0m. 1985), p. 216 1ntelhgence problems prl'S<.'ntcd hy the Chinese mtrrn.'nuon are dtscussed at length (m,ofar as sccunty considcrauons allowed) m Roy H. Appleman. 

'>ourh w tilt' Nahtong, Nort/1 w th(' ralu, junr-Novrmbcr 1950, U '\. Army 111 the Korean War 

(Washmgton. D.C.: U.S. Ann> Ccntc:r of Mtlitary History, 1961 ), pp 757-65, 769-70. Some 

adduionnl insights arc contamcd 111 Fliot A Cohen and John (tOll<.: h. MrltLCH:V Misfortunes: 7 h(' 

Anawmv of Failure 111 War (Nl'W York hcc Press. 1990), pp 175-82 
TllE COLD WAR t\ND KOREA 115 

about the strength and disposition of the enemy. The following month, he too 

undenook a personal aerial reconnmssanc:e behmd enemy lines.21 

The inadequacy of the Army's tactical intelltgence capabilities on the 

Korean peninsula took many months to recufy. As late as 1951 a survey 

revealed that only 7 percent of Etghth Army personnel holding mtelhgencc 

positions had either previous training or prior experience in intclltgence, 

which spurred the creation of a Far East Command intelligence school at 

Camp Drake, Japan. Intelligence explOitation was handicapped also by the 

Army's limited supply of Mandarin ltngutsts. Even toward the end of the war, 

deficiencies abounded. Ridgwa) s successor v. ith the Etghth Ann), General 

James Van fleet, commented that there were still scnous problems m aerial 

photography, aenal vtsual reconnatssance, coven collection, ground reconnaissance, and communications reconnaissance. 1 lc went on to observe: 

"During the two years that the U.S. Army has been fighting in Korea ... it has 

become apparent that during the between-war intenm we have lost, through 

neglect, disinterest, and possible Jealousy, much of the effectiveness m mtelligence work that we acquired so painfully 111 World War II. Today, our intelligence operations m Korea have not )'et approached the standards that we 

reached in the final year of the last war."22 

Nonetheless, the shock of the Korean conflict did give a new impetus to the 

development of Army Intelligence, causing a rapid growth both in personnel 

and in organizational struclUre. The strength of the Office of the Assistant Chief 

of Staff. G-2, as the Intelligence Diviston was called after April 1950, grew to 

exceed 1,000 men. The SSO system managed by G-2 was expanded to service 

the three corps which the United States commiued to Korea. In addition, the 

role of the SSO became significantly enhanced. In 1949 these officers had begun 

to pro\·ide an "eyes only" system of private communications to commanders. 

After the Korean War, special security officers became deeply involved in the 

production of fimshed intelligence for the commands they supported. 

Changes were not confined to the Arm) ~taff level. The Counter 

Intelligence Corps more than doubled; the position of chief of the Counter 

Intelligence Corps was elevated to a major general's slot. The largest CIC unit, 

the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment that supported USAREUR, 

was raised to group status in 1952. At the outset of the Korean War, a countermtelligence detachment was organtzcd to protect the Pentagon, and subse21 General M:mhew H. Ridgway. )o/dtt'l fhc: Mcmmrs of Mcrttlrnv B. Ritlgwa_y, as told to 

llarold 1:-l. Marun (Wc~tpon. Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 20'5, 2 I 6 Another semor commander 

was even more personally uwolved in reronnarssancc activities 111 this war. In january 1951 the 

:\rr Force chref of staff. Gencrall-loyt S Vandcnbrrg (a fom1er Artn)' assrstam chref of ~taff, (r-2), 

Jomcd a ground patrol twelve mrles 111 front of the main U.l'\ lmes whrle on an mspcCllon tnp to 

Korea. james F Schn.rhcl, Palicy and Ouatum: lhf First )'r.rr. lJ.S. Army in the Korean War 

(\\'ashmgton. 0 <-. US Am1y Cemer of \1rht<HY Htstory, 1990). p 327. 

22 Bidwell. I hsllll). uf the \hlital) lmclh~cncc Dwisaon. vol. 7. p. 1080. 
116 MILITAR'r 1'-ITELL!GENCE 

quently was incorporated as a subelemem into the newly activated 902d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. This unit, operating under the direct 

control of the assistant chief of staff, G-2, was tasked with conducting exceptionally sensitive worldwide missions in support of Department of the Army 

requirements. Another developmem in the counterintelligence field that lOok 

place during the Korean War was the creation of Technical Servtce 

Countermeasures teams to ferret out possible listenmg devices, an initiative 

prompted by the 1952 discovery that the Great Seal of the U.S. EmbaSS)' in 

Moscow had been "bugged" by the Soviet Intelligence Serv1ce 

In the field, large intelligence organizations were developed to meet the 

needs of the combat forces. The Military Intelligence Sen·ice Orgamzation concept at last became a reality, and tactical groups, battalions, and companies of 

intelligence specialists were formed to support the Army around the globe. The 

first Military Intelligence service group, the 525th, was organized in December 

1950; its commander, Col. Garland Williams. had been the first Chief of the 

Corps of Intelligence Pollee before Pearl Harbor.23 Two adchuonal groups were 

acuvated before the Korean War came to an end-the SOOth Militar) 

Intelligence Sen ice Group in japan, •Nhich absorbed the personnel and missiOn 

of the old Translator and Interpreter Service. and the 51 3th Military Intelligence 

Serv1ce Group in Germany. F1ve Military Intelligence Serv1ce battalions were 

also activated, along with numerous numbered companies and plaLOons. 

Additionally, four Military lmelligence Service groups and ten Military 

Intelligence Service battalions, all in the 300 series, were activated in the 

Organized Reserve Corps, redesignated the Army Resen'e in 1952. 

Korea was a lim1ted war: at first the conOict was described not as a war at 

all, but as a United Nations "police action. ".24 This had limited the scope of 

certain kinds of imelligence activities. The intelligence community made no 

attempt to revive the World War II Counter Subversive program which had 

laced the Army's ranks with informers. Censorship activities were limited, 

and the press was allowed lO operate under a "voluntary" self-censorship 

until the spring of 1951. The assistant chief of staff, G-2, did set up an Army 

Security Center in Washington, D.C., to handle high-level prisoner imerrogation and documenL exploitation, but this turned out to be less important 

than its World War II predecessors, since enemy prisoners of war were 

retained in Korea, and few high-ranking prisoners were captured. However, 

some World War II precedents were found useful In Operauon lr-.:DIA'iHL\D, 

a multidiscipline intelligence task force-a \Vorld War II "T' Force in miniature-was dispatched to s1ft through the rubble of Pyongyang after that 

23 Dunng World War II, W1lhams had also been in charge of ~upply and procurement for 

the: oss. 24 T R. Fehrenbach. Tins Kine/ of War: A Study in Unprrpcm·clr•r~s (New Ymk: MacMillan Co., 

1963), p 90 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 117 

Nonh Korean capital was overrun by United Nations troops.25 And the various collection techniques perfected in World War ll proved useful in the new 

con0ict.26 

The Korean War revitalized the Army Securily Agency, which found a 

new role in providing support to tactical operations. During the course of the 

war, the agency reorganized and redesignated its existing signal service companies as communication reconnaissance companies and activated new communication reconnaissance companies, battalions, and groups to support tactical commanders at every level.27 The new concept placed a communication 

reconnaissance group in support of the field army. The group would command subordinate ASA units and had the mission of dispatching liaison 

teams to the combat divisions. At the corps level, nexibly organized communication reconnaissance battalions directed the activities of separate numbered companies. 

By the end of the Korean War, the Army Security Agency's 50lst 

Communication Reconnaissance Group was supervising the operations of three 

attached battalions and five companies in support of the Eighth Army. Another 

major ASA tactical element, the 502d Communication Reconnaissance Group, 

commanded subordinate units giving support to the expanded Army presence 

in Europe. The 503d Communication Reconnaissance Group served as a command and comrol element for various ASA units in the continental United 

States. Additionally, new field stations had been established in Europe and the 

Far East. After 1951 the position of chief of the Army Security Agency was usually filled by a major general.28 

Finally, the Anny at last took steps to enhance its human intelligence collection capabilities. Confronted by an almost complete intelligence void in the early 

stages of the Korean War, it expanded an existing small intelligence element set up 

by the Far East Command following the withdrawal of American occupation 

troops in 1949 into a full-fledged collection organization. Initially, a provisional 

25 Memo, GHQ, FEC, Militaty Intelligence Section, 6 Feb 51, sub: After Action Report, Task 

Force INDIANHEAD. INSCOM History Office. 

26 In The Korean War (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1987), p. 2H, Max Hastings states 

that "throughout the war Umted Nations intelligence about Chmese and North Korean strategtc 

intentions remained very poor." It should be pointed out, however, that not all material bearing 

on the subject has been released yet. 

27 The buildup of the Anny Security Agency that took place during the Korean War was 

facilitated, in part. by the deployment of the two ASA companies in the National Guard and two 

other ASA companies in the Organized Reserve Corps. 

2!1 However, none of the three general officers who headed up the Army Security Agency 

during the penod of the Korean confiict possessed any background m Milaar)' Intelligence. ASA 

chief Brig. Gen. William Gillmore admitted. "I have had no experience in this line of work. I am 

going to depend on you people for guidance and suppon all the wa)' through." ASA Staff Meeting 

Notes, 15 Aug 50. Army Cryptologic Records. In contrast, the first three chiefs of the Army 

Security Agency-Brig. Gen. Preston W. Corderman, Col. Harold G. Hayes, and Brig. Gen. Caner 

W Clarke-had all served m commumcations mtelligence during World War II. 
ll8 MJUTARY INTELLIGENCE 

ClC unit, the 442d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, used tactical liaison 

office teams assigned to each division to dispatch locally recruited line-crosscrs. 

These generally unskilled and untrained Korean agents were told to gather whatever low-level intelligence they could.29 

Following the Chinese intervention, this approach expanded greatly. The 

provisional status of the 442d Counter lmelligence Corps Detachment was 

dropped. The divisional teams cominued to function, but, in addition, the 

Army undertook more ambitious collection projects. By the summer of 1951 

the Army was devoting increasing resources to the effort. Since the mission was 

not really appropriate for the Counter Intelligence Corps, the 442d was inactivated and its functions assumed by the 8240th Army Unit, a TO-based organization with elements in both japan and Korea. The Counter Intelligence Corps 

personnel initially transferred to the 8240th Army Unit were replaced gradually 

by specialists from other intelligence disciplines. 

In late 195lthe scope of the units mandate widened to include special operations. This came about when the Eighth Army unit supporting Korean guerrillas 

on the offshore islands was integrated into the 8240th A1my Unit in accordance 

with doctrine that such activities belonged at the theater level. At the same time, 

the 8240th Army Unit itself became the Anny element of Combined Command 

Reconnaissance Activities, Korea, a theater-level joint-service agency created to 

coordinate intelligence and special operations activities in the war zone. 

By the time the Korean armistice was signed in the summer of 1953, the 

8240th Army Unit had 450 military personnel assigned and had evolved into 

an Army simulacrum of the World War ll OSS. It not only provided the Far 

Eastern Command with information, but also ran a 20,000-man private army 

of Korean guerrillas, the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea. With five 

infantry and one airborne regiment, the Panisan Forces harassed the enemy 

from bases on islands off the shores of both coasts of the Korean peninsula. As 

if all this were not enough, the 8240th also engaged in an extensive program 

of ''black propaganda."30 

Swnmation 

The Korean War was another major milestone in the development of Army 

Intelligence. It revived intelligence capabilities which had grown moribund in 

the post-World War II retrenchment. lt also witnessed the developmem of 

large-scale intelligence formations in the field. For rhe first time, Army 

Intelligence personnel were organized imo groups and battalions. However, 

29 S. L. A. Marshall mentions such collection activities in hts book, Tlte River and the 

Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by tht Chines(' Communist Forces, November 1950, inlhe Bailie o.f 

the Chonchon River, Korea (New York: Morrow, 1953), pp. 3-4. 

30 Alfred H Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington. D.C.: National 

Defense Umversay Press, 1982), pp. 100-108. 
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA 119 

although the Army Security Agency imposed these arrangements on its reserve 

components in the aftermath of the war, the Army decided that large reserve 

units were not needed in the other intelligence disciplines, and by mid-1953 all 

the Military Intelligence Service groups and battalions in the Army Reserve had 

been inactivated.31 For the next few years, the Military Intelligence presence in 

the Army Reserve would be confined largely to numerous small coumerintelligence, censorship, or strategic research and analysis detachments. 

In addition, the war can be seen as a milestone in the development of 

intelligence technologies. The war itself was fought mostly with World War II 

equipment. The venerable M209 still provided communications security for 

tactical units. The light planes organic to the divisions were only slightly 

improved versions of the Piper Cubs that had given the Army reconnaissance 

support in the previous conflict. ASPS radios as well as its trucks represented 

war surplus. Yet this was beginning to change. A new family of cipher 

machines began to enter the Army inventory at this time. Scientists staned to 

nnd ways in which new and evolving technologies could be applied to the 

Military Intelligence field. ln 1953 the Army became involved in Project 

MICHIGAN, a research and development erron in which civilian scientific personnel explored the possibilities of using various types of manned aircraft, 

drones, balloons, and missiles carrying television and other sensors to allow 

surveillance and target location up to 200 miles behind enemy lines.32 The 

new technologies under development would have profound consequences for 

the structure of Army Intelligence in the years that followed. 

31 For reasons wh1ch h:we escaped documentation, all reserve component ASA units after 

the Korean War were m the Army Reserve, not the National Guard. 

32 Bidwell. History of the Military Intelligence Dh·ision, vol. 7, pp. 1102-03. 

8 

From Korea to Vietnam 

D uring the twelve years that e lapsed between the signing of the Korean 

armistice in 1953 and the first commitment of American combat troops to 

defend South Vietnam in 1965, the Army was affected by the nuctuations of 

U.S. national security policies and defense management structures. Responding 

to American dissatisfaction with the bloody and ultimately indecisive fighting 

in Korea, the Eisenhower administration that took office in 1953 adopted a 

"New Look" in defense policies. America, it declared, would no longer be 

bogged down in ground warfare at a time and place of the adversary$ choosing. 

Instead, the United States would meet aggression with the "massive retaliation" 

of strategic aLOmic weapons. 

This policy called for a reduction of land forces. The Army was drastically 

retrenched. Policy makers' belief that increasingly available tactical nuclear 

weapons would be decisive in any future confiict led to the revamping of the 

basic force structure in 1957. New "pentomic" divisions supposedly capable of 

operating in a nuclear environment were organized, and the Army regiment was 

abolished as a tactical entity in favor of smaller and more nexible battle groups. 

However, massive retaliation was never invoked. The Soviet threat continued 

after the death of Stalin, but its initiatives evolved in ways that could not be 

countered suitably by American preponderance in the nuclear weapons arena. 

The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 led to the creation of a new 

Communist state in North Vietnam. Soviet power, hitherto confined to the 

Eurasian land mass, catapulted across the oceans. Soviet arms and infiuence 

appeared in Egypt, and a pro-Communist regime came to power in Cuba. 

Simultaneously, the Soviets startled the Americans with their success in the area 

of guided missiles; "Sputnik," the first orbiting satellite, was launched in 1957. 

Taking advantage of a belief that the United States was not coping adequately with these new Soviet challenges, Democratic presidential candidate john F. 

Kennedy's campaign of 1960 focused on the need to meet the broad Communist 

challenge. Upon election. Kennedy and his secretary of defense, Robert S. 

McNamara, scrapped the strategy of massive retaliation in favor of a new doc-
122 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

trine, "f1exible response,'' in which America would meet any military challenges 

with the gradually increasing employment of deterrent force.l Coupled with a 

fresh crisis regarding the status of Berlin, the new emphasis on conventional 

forces powered the expansion of the Army, which soon rose to a strength of 1.2 

million. New Army leaders found the pentomic division organization unsatisfactory for prOLracted fighting in a nonnuclear environment, and introduced a new 

divisional structure, the so-called Reorganization Objective Army Division 

(ROAD). Finally, McNamara's zeal for cost effectiveness led to a substantial 

restructuring of the whole Defense Department and of the individual services. 

As usual, Army lmelligence was affected by the currents of the times. 

Military Intelligence at the Center: The 1950s 

At the Army General Staff level, intelligence benefited from an expansion of 

its sources and technological capabilities during the post-Korean War era. 

Previously, the foreign intelligence collection resources of the Army Intelligence 

staff during peacetime had been confined to oven human intelligence provided 

by the attache system and signals intelligence collection. Now the Army augmented these sources with other types of intelligence collection. Its capabilities 

for collecting both human and electronic intelligence became increasingly significant. In addition, photographic imelligence became a viable peacetime 

source for the first time. After 1956 imagery from national-level sources became 

available to the Army. To take better advantage of this, the Armys existing Photo 

Interpretation Cemer at Fort Holabird established a special exploitation unit in 

the Washington, D.C., area. 

Other developmems at the Army Staff level under the Eisenhower administration were also significant. On the domestic front, the assistant chief of staff, 

G-2, regained control of the Industrial Security Program from the Provost 

Marshal General's Office in 1953, a reorganization that gave it custody of the 

extensive investigative data base compiled on Army contractor employees. 

Exploitation of growing masses of intelligence data was enhanced also by G-25 

use of automatic data processing techniques. ln 1957 the Radio Corporation of 

America began work on Project ACSJ-MAT!C, an imelligence data system that 

became operational in 1960. 

However, intelligence was still something of a second-class citizen in the 

Army. ln 1955 the Army's deputy assistant chief of staff, G-2, confessed that he 

viewed his appointmem "almost as the kiss of death."2 And in two importam 

respects, the Army lmelligence staff lost ground during the Eisenhower yearsI A useful overview of defense and Intelligence-related developments during the Eisenhower 

and Kennedy admm1strations can be found m Alan R. M1lleu and Peter Maslowski, For the 

Common Defense; A Military History of the UniiCd States of Ame~ica (New York: Free Press, 1984), 

pp. 508-41. 

2 Ransom, The lntclligrnce Establishment , p. 116. 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 123 

it declined both in status and in buclgeL. In 1955 the assistant chief of staff. 

G-2, lost command of the Army Security Agency. ln 1956, during the course of 

another Army-wide reorganization, his office lost both its name and its equality 

with other major staff elements. Under the terms of the reorganization, the three 

other principal staff functions-personnel, operations, and supply-were 

assigned to deputy chiefs of staff. But Army Intelligence, now headed by the 

assistant chief of staff for intelligence (ACSl), remained at the assistant chief 

level.3 The implicit downgrade preceded budget cuts and pressure on the Office 

of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSl) to move operational personnel out of its official table of distribution and to reduce personnel occupying 

headquaners slots. Ever since the late 1940s the intelligence section of the 

General Staff had maintained smaller operating elements in the field. After 

1956, however, ACSI was forced LO shift as many operational functions as possible from headquarters to field agencies. 

The first step in this process began in 1956, when the ACSl staff element 

assigned to manage the industrial security program was reorganized as the 

Industrial and Personnel Security Group and transferred to Fort Holabird. ln 

1960 the new Technical Intelligence Field Agency assumed the mission and 

functions of ACSI's technical intelligence branch. The agency soon moved to 

Arlington Hall Station, where it was collocated with the intelligence elements of 

five of the seven Army technical services. Similarly, the OACSl component of 

the National Indications Center, a joint-service element designed to provide 

warnings of impending hostile attack, became a separate field detachment, as 

did the topographic collectors incorporated imo the U.S. Army Geographic 

Specialist Detachment in early 1961. 

Pressures on the existing structure of the Army's lmelligence staff came 

from outside as well as from within the Army. ln 1958 the Departmem of 

Defense was reorganized. The old organizational concept, under which one 

service had served as executive agent for the joint Chiefs of Staff QCS) in war 

(as the Army had clone in the Korean connict) was abolished, and the armed 

forces of the country were placed in a system of unified and specified commands under ]CS control.4 The U.S. Communications Intelligence Board and 

the lmelligence Advisory Committee were concurrently abo lished and their 

consolidated functions transferred to the new U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). 

This reorganization reduced the role of the individual services to procuring, 

training, and fielding forces that would then pass under a ]CS-directed command structure. Although the new arrangement did not immediately affect the 

Army's departmental intelligence agency, its implications for the future of 

Army Intelligence would soon become apparent. 

l Hewes, From RooL co McNamara, p. 239. 

4 Ibid., pp. 297-98. 
124 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Reshaping the Tools 

One of the most significant developments within Anny Intelligence during 

the 1950s was the conversion and expansion of the existing Counter Intelligence 

Corps Center at Fort Holabird into an Army Intelligence Center. This came about 

as an indirect byproduct of two separate initiatives. One of them was a movement 

begun during the Korean War to make intelligence more professional. 

Knowledgeable intelligence officers had become concerned about the diiTiculties 

of retaining a cadre of trained intelligence personnel in peacetime. Intelligence 

was not a basic branch of the Army, and most intelligence officers were reservists 

on detail. ln 1950 a legislative oversight had even temporarily eliminated the 

Military Intelligence Reserve first created in 1921. This had been corrected in 

1952 with the creation of two separate reserve branches, Military lmelligence 

(redesignated Army Intelligence in 1958) and Army Security. But since only 

reserve component olTicers could be commissioned in these branches, the acLive 

Army lacked any focus for intelligence career professionals. 

The massive opposition of Army traditionalists to the establishment of an 

lmelligence Branch in the Regular Army led the assistant chief of staff, G-2, to 

advocate a more modest refmm. ln early 1952 he put forward a proposal to create 

the new Corps of Reconnaissance, U.S. Army. This corps would have incorporated 

all intelligence assets at the division level and above, including the units of the 

Army Security Agency. The plan would have provided Army Intelligence with a 

centralized institutional framework, but still would have allowed commanders 

their traditional prerogative of selecting their own intelligence staffs regardless of 

the branch to which they belonged. Even though this concept posed less threat to 

vested interests than a new separate branch, it never won acceptance. 

As a fallback position, in june 1953 the assistant chief of staff, G-2, came 

up with a new program. He recommended that an intelligence board be established and collocated with a single intelligence school, a field intelligence center, 

and the intelligence units in the Armys central reserve in the continental United 

States. Fort Holabird, with its existing Counter Intelligence Corps School and 

Center and its counterintelligence records facility, would be the most logical site 

for the new arrangement. 

The second factor leading to the expansion of Holabird$ role was the Armys 

decision to make its collection of human intelligence more professional. The 

experience of the Korean War, when the Am1y had to improvise a collection 

apparatus, had caused the Army see that such work was a permanent peacetime 

requirement. At the end of 1952 General Matthew Ridgway, then Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe, specially recommended that the Army organize its 

own institutionalized human intelligence collection element. Such a force would 

meet Army needs and at the same Lime prevent any future diversion of Counter 

Intelligence Corps assets from their assigned functions. Ridgway$ recommendations were accepted and endorsed by the chief of staff in early 1953. ln 
FROM KOREA TO VlET"'JAM 125 

November 1953 the Army 1ssued a regulauon that set standards for procurement of personnel to carry out this new function. 

These twin developments resulted in a steady expansion of the scope and 

nature of the responsibilities assigned to the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. 

In April 1954 the Department of Field Operations Intelligence was added to the 

existing training facility at Fon llolabird. As a result, collection personnel began 

to tram side by side with ClC agents. This was just the beginning of a snowballmg accretion of new acuvitics that fell under the control of the ClC chief. ln 

August 1954 he assumed command of the former G-2 Records Facility at 

llolab1rd, which contained the Armys counterintelligence files. At this point, 

the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence 

Center, and the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed a new title as the 

center's commanding general. In March 1955 an Army Photo Interpretation 

Center was established at Fort llolabird. Finally, during the same month, 

responsibility for conducting training in combat intelligence transferred from 

the Army General School at Fort Riley to the new U.S. Army Intelligence Center 

and School at Holabird.S The arrangement centralized almost all mtelligence 

traming at one post. Only the G-25 Strategic Intelligence School m Washington, 

D.C.. and the Army Securtty Agency facility at Fort Oe,·ens, Massachuseus, 

remained outside the complex. 

ln practice, the original concept of an all-embracing Army Intelligence center was never quite realized. It seems to have been the intention of Maj. Gen. 

Arthur C. Trudeau, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, that Holabird would become 

the directing hub for Army Intelligence. Under the original plan, the chief, 

Counter Intelligence Corps, in his capacity as commanding general of the U.S. 

Army Intelligence Center, would not only assume responsibility for training all 

Army Intelligence personnel, but would also take over responsibility for their 

admimstrative supervision. Th1s arrangement would have extended the benefits 

of the CIC personnel structure to the rest of the Army Intelligence community. 

Although the concept was approved by the Army chief of staff, it was not completely implemented, and the center never achieved the position of Importance 

onginally envisioned for it. llowever, it did serve as a basis for more modest 

reforms and initiatives. 

The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an intelligence civilian career 

program within the Army. This step, first advocated by the second Hoover 

Commission on governmental reform, would augment nontacucal Military 

lmelltgence units with trained civ1ltan specialists who would provtde cominuit)' 

to operations. Three hundred such posuwns were authonzed ongmall)·. Actual 

implementation began in 1957. overseen by an AdmtniStrattve Surve) 

Dcwchment organized within the Army Intelligence Center. However, the Army 

soon began lo have second thoughts about the program. Civilians were limited 

s General Order (GO) 20, llcadquancrs. Depanmem of the Am1y (IIQDA), 1 I ~tar 55. 
126 MlUTARY INTELLIGENCE 

to working a forty-hour week and were not under coun-manial jurisdiction. 

Moreover, Army leaders believed it was counterproductive to keep civilians on 

indefinite assignments in any one single geographic area. As a result, they limited the effort to employ more civilians. 

Meanwhile, the Army Intelligence Center became involved in an attempt to 

remedy some of the perceived deficiencies in field intelligence programs. 

Initially, the commanding general, Army lmelligence Center, was responsible for 

training new field operations intelligence specialists, bU£ had no authority over 

their assignments in the field. Some human imelligence collectors were in units 

under theater control, organized years before the field operations imelligence 

program, as such, had come imo existence; others served in a detachment 

under direct ACSl control. The field operations intelligence program thus operated under a separate and less rigid personnel system than the Counter 

Intelligence Corps. Its military occupational specialty (MOS) could be awarded 

by ACSl and by theater commanders as well as by the Army lmelligence Cemer, 

and the Army could recruit individuals whose foreign connections would have 

barred them from enlisting in the Counter Intelligence Corps. 

The differences between these two intelligence elements soon led to an 

unhealthy rivalry. As one repon pointed out, "there is too much bickering and 

snideness at the [lntelligencel Center regarding these two fields."6 The situation 

was made worse by the fact that intelligence officers on the Army Staff and in 

Europe considered field operations imelligence personnel better qualified to 

handle especially sensitive counterespionage operations than CIC agents. But 

Counter Intelligence Corps members saw any such transfer of functions as "an 

emasculation of CIC."7 Another problem area arose when field operations intelligence personnel, because of the nature of their mission requirements, lacked 

an adequate rotation base in the continental United States. Although a majority 

of CIC billets were in the United States, four-fifths of those billets in the field 

operations intelligence program were overseas. 

Eventually, the ACSI decided that it would be more economical and efficient 

to merge all field operations imelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence 

Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as coumerimelligence agents and 

as human intelligence collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence Corps, 

commanded by the former CIC chie f and operating under tight centralized control, was created on 1 january L 961. The new organization incorporated slighLly 

over 5,000 personnel, aboul 85 percent of whom came from CIC. Entrance 

requiremems for the Intelligence Corps were less restrictive than they had been 

for the old Counter Intelligence Corps. 

t> Memo, Ma.J C. A. Lynch for G-3, U.S. Army lmclligence Command (USAINTC), ll Nov 

58. sub; Proposed Advisory Commiuee for USAINTC, RG 319, NARA. 

7 Memo for Commanding General, 10 Dec 58, sub: Long Range Policy and Planning 

Committee for USAINTC. RG 3L9, NARA. 
FR0~1 KOREA TO VIETNAM 127 

Auempts to bring the new organtzation even closer to the Army mainstream 

soon followed. During the l950s the Counter Intelligence Corps had embodied 

the "best and the brightcsL." Ever since the Korean War, the draft had furnished 

it with a steady stream of college-trained applicants au racted to the idea of fulfilling their service obligation by working in civilian clothes in a glamorous and 

exotic field, and the CIC had been able to choose among them. Unfortunately, 

most of these individuals did not show any propensity for makmg intelligence 

work a career. The retenuon rate was ab)'Smal-7 percent for lieutenants and 

JUSt 3 percent for enlisted personnel. Accordingly, the Army dcctded that "selection of applicants must be made wllh consideration for those offering the best 

career potenual and not necessarily the bright college studem:·s The 

Intelligence Corps would accept only applicants who volunteered for a threeyear enlistment. At the same time, the age limit for enlisting in the corps was 

lowered and brought into line with the rest of the Army; eighteen-year-old personnel now became eligible for emry-level positions involving clerical rather 

than mvestigative duties. Finally, in 1965 the minimum Army General Test 

score for joining the Intelligence Corps was lowered from 110, the same 

requtrement imposed on offtcer candidates Army-wide, to 100, which more 

closcl) approximated the Army average. 

The Army Security Agency 

If fort Holabird was one pole of Army Intelligence in the 1950s, Arlington 

I !all Station was the other. Arlington Hall continued to serve as headquarters for 

the A':JA, the largest single intelligence and security element in the Army, and it 

also came to house intelligence clements of five of the Army's technical services 

after the consolidation of NSA headquarters at Fort :-.1eade in 1957 made office 

space <Watlable. During the Etsenhower administrauon. Arlmgton Hall's mam 

Am1) tenant. the Army Secunt) Agency, grew steadily. Personnel strength rose 

from 11,500 in 1952 to 18,300 by t 957; new fteld stauons and tactical unlls 

appeared: and a substantial restructuring of the agency's mtsston took place. 

By 1954 the Army Signal Corps was fielding a number of units to collect 

electronic imelligence and continued to be responsible for the conduct of electronic warfare. Ln April 1954 the Department of the Anny analyzed the feasibilit > of combmmg all these capabtltues mto a single agenC). As a result of this 

stUd), the Arm> Secumy Agcnc)· took o,·er responstbtht) for electronic intelligence .md communications-related clectromc countermeasures (ECM) from the 

Stgnal C.orps in 1955. assummg control of a number ol dispersed unns and a 

batt.llu.m and four companies stattoned at Fon Huachuca. t\nzona. In return, 

the agcnC) surrendered its rcsponsibihucs for Army cryptOlogtstics and cr)'ptomamtcnance, along with assoctated personnel, to the Stgnal Corps. 

K ~1m , lntdhgcncc C..orps Commander' Conlcrcncc. 1961. set· 10, p 7. Rt; 319, NARA. 
128 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

In budgetary terms, the reorganization was significant: the Army was introducing a new generation of machine cipher devices to replace the venerable 

M209, and purchase of the new machines had consumed 60 percent of the 

Army Security Agency's fiscal year 1953 budget. However, the change had the 

important benefits of eliminating duplication of facilities and allowing for proper integration of signals intelligence with electronic intelligence. The term signals intelligence (SIGINT) was now redefined and used to refer to both of these 

functions. Actual implementation of this mission transfer was delayed for a 

shon time until the Signal Corps personnel transferred to the Army Security 

Agency had their clearance levels upgraded. 

The new arrangements meant that the Army Security Agency was no longer 

exclusively an intelligence organization. By acquiring responsibility for electronic warfare, the agency now managed a weapons system, even though the 

weapon was invisible. ln recognition of this change, the Army Security Agency 

became a Department of the Army field operating agency on 23 june 1955.9 It 

now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, not to the assistant chief of 

staff, G-2. However, the agency continued to focus primarily on the cryptologic 

mission, and electronic warfare in practice did not receive much emphasis. 

Having acquired responsibility for electronic intelligence and electronic warfare, the Army Security Agency made funher attempts to enlarge the scope of its 

mission. ln September 1955 the chief, Army Security Agency, recommended to 

the Army chief of staff that his organization be given the responsibility for dissemination and protection of sensitive compartmented information Army-wide, thus 

eliminating the special security oiTicer system maintained by the assistam chief of 

staff, G-2, which had just been consolidated into a single element, Detachment 

M. The rationale for this proposal was economy. However, both the Army's 

Intelligence staff and commanders in the field vigorously resisted it. Intelligence 

personnel claimed that the Army Security Agency was not qualified to produce 

the all-source intelligence which special security officers provided to their supponed G-2s. Field commanders unanimously endorsed the existing arrangement, 

pointing out that ASA units were not conveniently located in or near the major 

Army headquarters and that eliminating the special security officers would 

deprive them of their secure "back-channel" communications. The Army chief of 

staff tabled the proposal, but the Army Security Agency refused to drop the issue. 

The bureaucratic struggle over the matter would go on for the next two decades, 

at times fought with considerable acrimony. 

The Army Secmity Agency pursued other initiatives with greater success. In 

1956 the agency became aware for the first time of the possibility that emissions 

radiating from electronic data processing equipmem might compromise security 

and initiated a program, nicknamed TEMPEST, to counter the threat. In 1957 the 

U.S. Army Security Agency Board was created to provide long-range planning, 

9 AR I 0-122, Orgamzal!on and Functions, Anny Security Agency, 23 jun 55. 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 129 

and m 1960 its functions were expanded to include combat developmenl. At 

the same time, the Army Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird acquired parallel 

responsibilities for overseeing combat developments in the field of human intelligence. Meanwhile, the ASA and its field stations underwent redesignation. As a 

result of an Army-wide change, the agency became the U.S. Army Security 

Agency (USASA) on 1 january 1957. Concurrently, its fixed field stations, which 

previously had been known as numbered Army administrative units in the 8600 

senes. acqutred new designations as numbered USASA field stations.lO 

The agency$ tactical elements underwent a more stgnificant restructuring 

during thts period. During the Korean War, the Army Security Agency had 

operated wilh flexible battalion headquarters overseeing the operations of independent security and collection companies. In 1955 fixed battalions with organic companies combining both functions were created, and in 1956 all communication reconnaissance units were redesignated as Army Security Agency units. 

However. in 1957 the secretary of defense's decision to cut the Armys strength 

by a total of 50,000 threw the force structure of the agency into disarray. The 

decrement left the ASA wnhout sufficient personnel to fill its extsting tactical 

TOE units, which at the time accoumed for about a quarter of ns total strength. 

ln response, the Army Secunt)' Agency mactivated all ns TOE units and 

replaced them with mission-tailored units based on indivtdual tables of distribution. The new TO units included the 507th and 508th U.S. Army Security 

Agency Groups. located respectively in Germany and Korea, and six U.S. Army 

Security Agency battalions numbered from 316 to 321. These units were given 

the designator U.S. Army Security Agency to distinguish them from Army 

Secumy Agency TOE units. The baualions retained the fixed structure of their 

TOE predecessors. 

Originally, the Army intended this as a temporary measure, to remain in 

force only until new organizauonal tables could be drawn up. In pracuce, however, the ASA continued to operate exclusively with TD units until 1962. when 

tacucal TOE units were formed in the continental United States to support the 

Army$ new strategic reserve for contingency operations. Later, additional TOE 

elements were activated to serve in Vietnam. Some of the mission-tailored TO 

unils soon acquired new and exotic designations as special operations units and 

special operations commands. 

The U.S. Am1y Security Agency was the principal tenant at Arlington Hall 

after 1957. but not the only one. Intelligence elements of five technical services 

ulumately located there. Only the Corps of Engineers, the tmelltgence arm of 

which was concentrated in the Army Map Ser\'iCe, and the Quartermaster Corps 

held back, although the Ordnance Corps also maintained a separate missile 

intelligence cemer at Redstone Arsenal. Although most of these technical service 

intelligence units engaged in analysis and production, the Signal Corps continto(,() 58, Anny Sccuril_v Agency, I 1 Dec 56. 
I 30 ~IIIITARY INTELUGENCE 

ucd to engage in some spcc1ahzcd collection activiues even after it had surrendered its electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic warfare 

funclions to the Army Sccunty Agency. 

Military Intelligence in the Field 

Until the late 1950s the tacucal formations of the Army received their intelligence support from Mihtar) Intelligence specialist unns put together on the 

cellular principle. Combat mtelhgence units were organically separate from 

countenmelligence unns under this arrangement, and the G-2s of the supported units had to coordinate the efforts of the two diverse clements themselves. 

At the end of 1957 the Army introduced a new category of intelligence units 

organized under a concept plan entitled the Military Intelligence Organization. 

Under this plan interrogators, photo interpreters, order of baule specialists, and 

other combat intelligence personnel were integrated into single units with counterintelligence and collection clements. These new umts operated under a fixed 

table of organization and were designed to be administratively self-sufficient. 

Under the Military lntell1gence Organization concept, the basic building 

block was the Military Intelligence battalion supporting a field anny. This unn 

had its own specialized organic companies: a headquarters and headquarters 

company containing photo interpreters, order of battle and technical intelhgence specialists, and censorship personnel; and lettered linguist, security, and 

collection companies. In addition, the baualion furnished tactical units down to 

the division level with attached multidiscipline intelligence detachments. II The 

creation of the Military Intelligence Organization was one of the first steps in 

bringing truly multidiscipline intelligence support to the field. Only ASA unns 

remamed outs1de the new orgamzational structure because of the Army Secunty 

AgenC)'S vertical, or Mstovep1pe," command structure and liS ught centralization 

and compartmcntauon. 

In practice, implementation of the new force structure was lin11lcd. Under the 

Mllnary Intelligence Organizauon concept, four Military intelligence Battalions 

eventually were reorganized: 1 he 319th and 51 9th in the continental United 

States: the 532d in Germany: and the 502d in Korea. llowcvcr, onl)' the headquarters and headquarters compames and linguist companic~ were initially acti-

\'ated in the two battalions m the United Statcs.l2 Mcamd1llc. the bulk of Army 

II A maJor fae1or bchmd 1h~: ~hhtary lntclhgenc<' Orgam::.mun n1t11:cp1 was the bchcf lhat 

unda the new arrangcmcm, "pcr:.onnl'l k''-SCS rcsultmg from dc:~.:~ntr.th;:l'd .tdmmtslration or nn .. -

,tsstgnmcm arc less hkel)' to tKCur " !·older, li.Hhtal) lntelhgrncc !'>uppon 111 I he fu.-ld Ann)', I Q60. 

B<lCkground of ~II Br.m~.:h/C:otp!> hie, 1:\~COM Htswry Offtcc. ron lkl\'0\r, \'a. A more drt~ulcd 

dc~c;rtpuon ol lhe orgam;:aunn l.tn bt• rl'l111d 111 lrvmg Hcymont. Cmnhllt lntdltgt'II(C Ill M<ldl'lll 

\\'wjw,· (llarnsburg Stackpole Co , 1960), pp. 12-1-29 

12 The 5191h MthtM}' lmclhgcnn· Battalion cv~ntually rccciwd .tlltW Compames Band C 

in 1962 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNA\1 131 

counterintelligence and field operations mtelligence personnel continued to 

serve m single-discipline cellular units supporting the theaters and the Zone of 

lntcnor armies until 1961, when consolidated Intelligence Corps groups and 

detachments were formed. 

Not all mtelligence disciplines were well served by this new arrangement. In 

the continental United States, linguists had to be concentrated at baualion level, 

rather than spread among the detachments that were auached to divisions and 

other tactical units, as the Military Intelligence Organization concept dictated. 

Each detachment might be involved m several conungenC) plans, and each plan 

often reqmred expertise in a different language. There was simply no way to 

ass1gn the appropriate lingUists to a Military lmelligence detachment until actual implementation of a specific plan or major field exercise began. 

Photo Interpreters also fit rather uneasily into the new structure. At the tactical level such personnel lacked access to the imagery that nauonal-level reconnaissance elements began to generate in the late 1950s, and thus felt that their 

skills were not being adequately used. Units based in the United States had no 

operational mission, and phoLO mterpreters found themselves all too often 

assigned to housekeepmg and admm1strative posiuons unrelated to their speCialt} Detailed to kitchen pohce and other "rock-painung" chores, many felt 

slighted and complained of "harassment." 13 

To remedy the situation, in 1963 the Army Intelligence Center proposed 

that all photo interpreters in the United States be placed under centralized control m the same fashion as the Armys linguists. They could find more useful 

employment either at the Army Photo Interpretation Center or with the Army's 

lone specialized tactical photo unit m the United States. llowever, field commanders strongly resisted the proposal on the grounds that stripping Military 

Intelligence detachments of their photo interpreters would depnve G-2s of 

acces!> to this intelligence field and would result m eqUipment maimenance 

problems. The status quo thus conunued. 

Finally, the Army continued to neglect tactical-level techn1cal intelligence. 

There were no provisions for a technical intelligence company in the initial 

TOEs for the Military Intelligence battalion (field army), and it would take ten 

years for the Army to remedy this discrepancy. By that umc, the Vietnam conflict would be in full swing, creating an insatiable demand for personnel 

resources, and only one field army-b•el battalion would ever receive its technical intelligence company. 

At the tactlcal level, intelligence organization was also mfluenced by the 

Armys increasing reliance on am:raft By 1960 there were 5,000 aircraft in the 

Arm} mventol). Many of them were helicopters. items that had first seen extenSI\·e usc in medical evacuation dunng the Korean War It soon became apparent 

I\ t-.lcmo, 8 Feb 63, sub: Ccnualizallon ol Image lntcrprrtcrs under U'iAPIC, RG 119, 

'lARA 
132 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

that improved versions of rotary-wing aircraft could serve as useful reconnaissance assets. During the course of the 1950s the Korean-vintage L-19 that had 

served as the all-purpose workhorse within the division was phased out in favor 

of the helicopter, and aircraft within the division were concentrated in larger 

formations. Under the structure of the pemomic division fielded in 1957, Army 

avtation within the divisions was consolidated into company-size units. The 

ROAD division of 1962 included a complete aviation battalton, one company of 

wh1ch was equipped with scout helicopters. In addition, observation helicopters 

were assigned to divisiOnal arttllery, and a helicopter-borne aerial cavalry troop 

formed pan of the divisional reconnaissance battalion.14 

Along with its helicopters, the Anny also developed more sophisticated fixedwing aircraft for reconnaissance. In 1962 it acqwred the A0-1 Mohawk. This 

twin-engine craft came in three configurations: one equipped with a high-performance camera; one with newly developed infrared night vision equipment; and 

the third with the equally new side-looking airborne radar device. Mohawks were 

employed both in divisional aerial surveillance and targeting plaLOons, as well as 

in aerial surveillance compames that operated at corps le\·cl.l s 

In addition to developmg ns own aerial assets, the Army took steps to 

improve Its interaction wnh Air Force tactical reconnatssance. To better exploit 

aerial photography produced by Air Force reconnaissance squadrons, the Army 

fielded the lst Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion in 1959. The unit consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a signal air photo reproduction and delivery company, and a phoLO interpretation company. A similar unit, 

the 24th Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion, was activated in the Army 

Reserve the same year, thus becoming the first non-ASA imelligence battalion 

active in the reserve components since the Korean War. In 1961 the Anny activated another Regular Army air reconnaissance support battalion to support the 

Seventh Anny in Germany, and in 1962 these units were reorganized and redesignated as Military lntclltgence battalions (air reconnaissance support), or 

"M1bars." Two years later it devised a new TOE for this t}pe of unit that provided for a headquarters and headquarters company and four lcnered imagery 

interpretation detachments.l6 The diverse nature of the products which photo 

Interpreters now had to manage-infrared and radar imagery, as well as conventional photography-led to the Armys redesignaung photographic intelligence 

as 1magery intelligence in 1964. 

There were also ne\\ dc,·clopments m the Armys arrangements for ground 

reconnaissance. From 1957 on, each combat dins1on had its own reconnaissance battalion. The succcsSI\'C restruct unngs of the d1ns1on m 195 7 and 1962 

H john J Tolson, Arnnohrlrt\', 1961-1971. Vtctnam Studrcs (\V.t~hmgton, D.C.: Department 

of the Ann), 1 973). p. I 0. 

I~ Ibid., p. 12. 

l~> 373 Carel, 1st Mihtary lntclh~cncc Bn, Unit Data Bmnd1. U.'> Army Center of Milnarr 

I hstory 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 133 

meant that reconnaissance assets previously held at the regimental level were 

moved down, first to battle group, and then to battalion. An armored cavalry 

platoon and a ground surveillance section equipped with mobile radar sets 

became pan of the headquarters company of each infantry battalion. 

Intelligence Support to the Theaters 

By the late 1950s the deployment of the Army overseas had become fixed in a 

pattern that would remain largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War.l7 

The completion of the European buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, and 

the signing of a peace treaty with japan resulted in a force structure that gave the 

Army five divisions in Europe and two in Korea, commanded respectively by the 

Seventh and Eighth Armies. The diversity of the theaters, the disparate numbers 

of the supported forces in each one, and the differing naLUre of intelligence 

requirements in Europe and in the Pacific dictated that arrangements for intelligence support would not be unifonn. Moreover, even if the positioning of troops 

on the ground remained relatively static, theater command relationships did not, 

and these shifts also impacted on the theater intelligence strucLUre. 

ln Europe a continuing Oood of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain provided American forces with ample opportunities for intelligence exploitation. 

From 1951 to 1962 collection of intelligence from border crossers was carried 

out by the Seventh Army's 532d Military Intelligence Battalion, a field-army type 

of unit organized under the Military Intelligence Organization concept and 

headquartered in Stuugan-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany. During an 

average year, the baualion screened between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees. 

At the theater level, counterintelligence suppon for U.S. Army, Europe 

(USAREUR), was provided by the 66th Counter Imelligence Corps Group. This 

unit, with headquarters in Stuttgart. provided counterintelligence coverage 

through a network of regional and field offices that not only extended over West 

Germany but also reached occupied Berlin and the USAREUR Communications 

Zone in France. The 5l3th Military Intelligence Service Group, activated at 

Oberursel, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1953 to take over operations previously performed by the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center, soon was redesignated the 5l3th Military Intelligence Group and then expanded its scope of 

activities to include active collection. With the inception of an Army civilian 

intelligence career program in the 1950s, both units received large TD augmentations of civilian specialists. 

In 1959 USAREUR experimented with organizing intelligence work on an 

area rather than on a functional basis. Consequently the 513th Military 

17 StratcgtsL Edward M. Luuwalk noted m 1984, "Our deploymcm o,·erseas resembles geologtcal layer:,, each Lhe endurmg restduc of some pasl cnsis or war, now hardened imo a 'commitmcm.'" Tilt' Pcnragonand the An of \Vw (New York. Simon and ShusLer, 198-f). p. 73. 
134 MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

Intelligence Group was given northern Germany as its area of responsibility, and 

the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group (later successively redesignated as the 

66th Militmy Intelligence Group and the 66th Intelligence Corps Group) was 

allotted the south, where the preponderance of American forces was stationed. 

This anangement caused more problems than solutions and was later abandoned. 

Meanwhile, opponunities for exploitation of sources began to diminish. ln 

1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall and the simultaneous imposition of 

tighter border controls by East Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow. This 

development reduced the need LO have three large intelligence units with panially 

overlapping responsibilities in Europe. As a result, in 1962 there was a major 

realignment of intelligence resources. The 5l3th Intelligence Corps Group, as it 

was now designated, assumed complete responsibility for active intelligence and 

certain sensitive counterespionage missions for USAREUR, while the 66th 

Intelligence Corps Group was reassigned to Sevemh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated 532d Military Intelligence Battalion. During this process, 

the group lost its regional form of organization and emerged as the command 

headquarters for various numbered Army Intelligence units, including the tactical 

intelligence elements attached to the Seventh Annys corps and divisions. 18 

Cryptologic support in the theater was provided by an entirely separate 

organizational structure, in conformity with Army practice. The U.S. Army 

Security Agency maintained a theater headquarters in Frankfurt that exercised 

command and control over various field stations in Europe and over a group 

headquaners with three subordinate baualions and some other units operating 

in support of the Seventh Army. 

ln the Pacific, following the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, the Am1y 

broke up its elaborate intelligence and special operations organization, the 

8240th Army Unit. Under conditions of relative peace, the Korean partisan 

forces it had mustered were transferred to the control of the South Korean government, the least productive of its operations terminated, and its mission 

restricted to intelligence collection. The unit's Korean-based element, the Army 

Collection Detachment, cominued to repon to a theater-level Army command 

reconnaissance activity until 1961, when a number of Army Intelligence assets 

in Korea combined to form the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion. The other 

elements used to form the baualion came from the 308th Counter Intelligence 

Corps Detachment and the Eighth Army's 528th Military Intelligence Company, 

which were concurrently inactivated. 

At the theater level, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the 

Armys principal headquarters element in the Pacific until 1957. lt was supponed 

18 It should be pointed out that 111 addition to the units which supported USAREUR and 

Seventh Army during this period, the 450th Courner Intelligence Corps Detachment provided 

security to Supreme Headquaners. Alhed Powers 111 Europe. from J 95 1 on. The unit was rcdeslgmncd the 650th Milirary Intelligence Detachment in 1966 and upgraded 10 group status in 1970. 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM l3S 

by an elaborate intelligence architecture directed by the USAFFE G-2 in Tokyo, 

japan. The organizations principal human intelligence collection am1 was the U.S. 

Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East. The other major field elements 

were the SOOth Military Intelligence Group, an interpreter unit, and the 441st 

Counter Intelligence Corps Group. These three units reponed to the U.S. Army 

Intelligence Suppon Center, japan, under command of a brigadier general. 

The Eisenhower-Kishii agreement of 19S7 led to a drawdown of American 

troop strength from japan and relocation of the Army's main Pacific headquarters from Tokyo to Hawaii. The discontinuance of USAFFE and the establishment of Uniled States Army, Pacific (USARPAC), led to a rapid decrement in 

japan-based Military Intelligence assets. The SOOth Military Intelligence Group 

was inaclivated, the Intelligence Support Center discontinued, and the functions of both organizations absorbed by the successor of the U.S. Army 

Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East, the U.S. Army Command 

Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific. Following the depanure of most American 

troops from japan in 1959, the 441st Counter I melligence Corps Detachmem, 

as it was now known, was in turn inactivated. ln 1961 the U.S. Army 

Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific, was discontinued and the SOOth 

Military Intelligence Group once more reactivated to carry out all aspects of the 

human intelligence mission. This group redeployed to Hawaii in 196S, a move 

dictated by the U.S. governments auempts at that time to reduce the outflow of 

gold reserves overseas. 

U.S. Army Security Agency operations in the Far East were under the 

direction of a regional headquarters located in Tokyo until 19S8. This was consolidated briefly with ASA headquarters elements in Hawaii from 1958 to 1960 

to become the U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific. ln 1960 it returned to Tokyo, 

where it remained until it again relocated to Hawaii in 196S. The withdrawal of 

the agency$ Pacific headquarters back to American soil also came about because 

of the governments concern over the balance of payments. 

After l 957 the Eighth Army in Korea received its cryptologic suppon from 

the 508th U.S. Army Security Group (a TD unit) and the 32lst U.S. Army 

Security Agency Battalion, another TD unit. The battalion was discontinued in 

1964-another casualty of the governments worries about the gold flow. 

One unique feature of the Pacific theater was the existence of the U.S. Army 

Intelligence School, Pacific. Unlike other Army Intelligence training facilities overseas, the Pacific intelligence school, set up on Okinawa in 1958, trained foreigners, not Americans. The students from seven different countries bordering the 

Pacific basin LOok courses in combat intelligence and counterintelligence techniques umil the reversion or Okinawa to japanese sovereignty brought operations 

to a halt in 1975.19 

IQ Htslory of the U.S. Army lntelligcn'c School Pactfic, U.S. Army ltnclhgence School 

Pact fie, 1971, copy m INSCO~! History Office files. 
136 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The McNamara Revolution 

The outcome of the presidemial election of 1960 led to major changes in 

the structure of the Army and the Army's imelligence components. President 

john F. Kennedy rejected the strategic assumptions of the previous administration, believing that any military challenge had to be met through graduated 

deterrence. This approach placed a new emphasis on the importance of the 

nations conventional forces, including the Army. Kennedy selected Secretary of 

Defense RobertS. McNamara to implement the new strategy. ln canying out his 

assignment, McNamara, a former Ford Motors executive with a background in 

systems analysis, proved w be the very model of a rationalizing, cemralizing 

bureaucrat. Making the most of the powers of his office, McNamara introduced 

a series of reforms that altered the way the American military machine was constructed and had a profound effect on the Army lntelligence community.20 

Since 1958 there had been discussions at the national level concerning the 

advisability of setting up some kind of intelligence agency at the Department of 

Defense (DOD) level to better coordinate the intelligence elements of the armed 

services. In 1960 a joint Study Group had criticized the existing arrangemems 

wilhin the Military Intelligence community. Three separate and uncoordinated 

service imelligence agencies, each with its own parochial bias, could not provide DOD with the integrated intelligence it needed to formulate a coherent 

national strategy. Air Force lmelligence in particular had embarrassed policy 

makers, since its estimates of alleged "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps" between 

the United States and the Soviet Union were widely disseminated and laLer 

demonstrated to be incorrect.2L 

Once in ofrice, McNamara became a vigorous proponent of centralization, 

especially with respect to Military Intelligence operations under DOD. As a 

result, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA) began operations on 1 October 

1961. The new organization would impose the same kind of centralized direction and control on the general Military Intelligence program as NSA was 

a lready provid ing to signals intelligence. lts creation meant that Army 

intelligence would become a distinctly subordinate ement within a wider 

Military Intelligence structure and marked a further cutback in ACSl's powers 

and responsibilities. However, this did not happen immediately. At its inception, 

DIA consisted of a cadre of twenty-five people housed in 2,000 square feet of 

borrowed office space in the Pentagon. The new agency pulled LOgether rather 

slowly at first, initially taking on only the estimative, current intelligence, and 

requirements missions from the service intelligence agencies. 

20 One standard bwgraphy of the secretary of defense, Henry L. Truehiu's McNamara (New 

York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), has little to say about his role in Am1y reorganization. 

21 The role of Air Force Intelligence as a "loose cannon" and how this helped bring about the 

fo1111ation of DlA is documented in john Prados. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. hllelligrncc Analysis ancl 

Sovit't Militwy Strength (Princeton: Princeton Umversit)' Press, 1986). pp. 43-44, 93, ll5-16, 124. 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 137 

Meanwhile , McNamara was reorganizing the Army itself in ways that had a 

substantial effect on the Army's intelligence architecture. In 1962 the secretary 

of defense implemented Project 80, which involved the wholesale restructuring 

of the Anny into functional, centralized commands. In the process, ACSI lost 

control over intelligence training, research and development, and doctrinal matters. Five of the Annys technical services were abolished, with only the Corps of 

Engineers and the Office of the Surgeon General remaining in place. and their 

intelligence personnel were split up among a number of different elements.22 

A few order of battle specialists from the dissolved technical services joined 

the ACSl staff. A larger group engaged in scientific and technical imelligence 

became pan of a new Foreign Science and Technology Center or stayed in place at 

the Army Missile Intelligence Agency which the Ordnance Department maintained at Redstone Arsenal. Both of these cemers were assigned to the Am1y 

Materiel Command, which McNamara had just created. The largest group, consisting of 700 persons engaged in area analysis, was absorbed into the Area 

Analysis Intelligence Agency established at the direction of the chief of Engineers. 

The Area Analysis Intelligence Agency was intended to be only a temporary 

holding area. When DIA assumed production responsibilities in 1963, the organization was discontinued, and its personnel, together with part of the OACSI 

staff, transferred to DIA. All in all , the Army contributed 1,000 spaces and its 

ACSI-MATlC compmer system to the new DIA Production Cemer. In the 

process, OACSI lost 235 spaces, one-third of its strength, to the new agency. 

The centerpiece of OACSI had been its Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, the 

intelligence production unit. This was reduced to a shell, retaining only a residual responsibility for analyzing and interpreting national agency production in 

support of the Army and in maintaining liaison with DlA. As a resulL of this 

devolmion of responsibilities, the center of gravity of Army lmelligence would 

move from the staff in Washington, D.C., to the units in the field. 

However, even after the reorganization of 1963 DIA did not hold a complete monopoly over the production of intelligence for the Army. Subordinate 

elements 'vvithin the Army continued to conduct production activities. These 

included the Army Materiel Command, with its two scientific and technical 

intelligence centers; the Office of the Chief of Engineers, which administered 

the Army Map Service; and the Office of the Surgeon General, which still had 

the responsibility of meeting some of the Annys medical intelligence requirements. In addition, a new production element was formed at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, to support the mobile reserve forces assigned to the Continental Army 

Command (CONARC). 

Other imelligence-related functions previously perrormed by Lhe Army were 

also centralized. ln 1963 the Armys Strategic lmelligence School was merged 

with its Navy coumerpan to form a new Defense Intelligence School, which 

22 Hewes, From Roo! !0 McNamara, p. 364. 
138 MILITARY INTELLiGENCE 

began to provide training for attaches from all the military services. The process 

was carried through to its logical conclusion in 1965, when DIA assumed control over the military attache system that had served as an Army information 

source since 1889. All service attaches were integrated into the new Defense 

Attache System. Meanwhile, the Defense Language Institute had replaced the 

separate language schools previously maintained by the services. 

Although DIA acquired production and collection assets from Army 

lnlelligence, another new McNamara creation (the Defense Supply Agency) 

asserted itself on the counterintelligence front. In March 1965 this agency wok 

over the whole field of industrial security, absorbing all the related spaces from 

ACSls lndustrial and Personnel Security Group. Ever since World War ll, the 

function had rebounded between G-2 and the Provost Marshal Generals Office. 

The new arrangement seemed to mark a definitive end to this panicular jurisdictional dispute within the Army. 

OACSI responded to these institutional challenges in much the same way as 

ASA had met the threat of the Armed Forces Security Agency: it found a new 

role in devoting itself to Army-specific needs. Shorn of many of its operational 

functions, OACSI reoriented itself and began providing intensified staff supervision to intelligence areas of growing interest to the Army. ln the summer of 

1963 the Directorate of Surveillance and Reconnaissance was added to the 

Army's Intelligence staff to develop the doctrine and hardware that would allow 

the Army to glean information from the battlefield through innovative technologies. Additional new Directorates of Security and Combat lmelligence were 

formed in 1964 LO supervise functional areas of primary imerest to the Army. 

The Combat Intelligence Directorate included a section responsible for overseeing developments in the fields of special warfare and foreign assistance. Finally, 

OACSI found ways to edge back into fields of activity theoretically preempted 

by DlA. In 1963 it set up a Special Research Detachmem as a liaison element at 

NSA, soon expanding it into an all-source production elemem. The same year 

the Special Security Detachment formed an Intelligence Support Branch to provide the Army Staff with current intelligence. 

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command 

and the U.S. Army Security Agency 

The McNamara-directcd reorganizalion of the Army had significant consequences for the Army lmelligence Cemer at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The center, commanded by the chief of the Intelligence Corps, had funcLioned as a field 

operating agency under direct ACSI control. Two of iLs main assets were the 

Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence Board, charged with framing doctrine and developing specialized equipment. The McNamara restrucLUring imruded on both of these arrangemems. The lmelligence School was resub-
fROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 139 

ordinated lO CONARC and the functions of the Intelligence Board split between 

the Army Materiel Command and another McNamara creauon, the Combat 

Developments Command. 

As a result, ACSI created a new administrative emily, the U.S. Army 

Intelligence Corps Activity, which took over the remnant of the former 

Intelligence Centers assets and residual functions. The organization served as a 

vehicle through which the chtef of the Intelligence Corps could exercise control 

over those elements the McNamara restructuring had left under ACSI jurisdiction These consisted of the Arm)'S counterintelligence records facility, a new 

lmelltgence Corps Supply Acuvtty, the Strategic Intelligence School (until its 

transfer to DIA), the Army Photo Interpretation Center, and the Administrative 

Survey Detachment that supported the Intelligence Civilian Career Program 

which ACSI had started in the 1950s. However, the establishment of the Army 

Intelligence Corps Activity did nothing to alleviate the confusion in the intelligence command chain resulting from the reorganizations. Since the chief of the 

lntelltgence Corps continued to act as commandant of the Army Intelligence 

School and commander of Fort Holabird, he now reponed Simultaneously to 

three dtfferent superiors. As commandmg general of the U.S. Army Intelligence 

Corps Activity and chief of the Intelligence Corps he was responsible to ACSI, 

but he was under the jurisdiction of CONARC in his capaCity as school commandant and subordinate to the U.S. Second Army m his role of post commander. This Rube Goldberg-like arrangement offered no promise of stability. 

These changes represented only the beginning of the restructuring of Army 

countenntelligence organtzation. In 1963 and 1964 the Army undertook a 

major sllldy of its personnel security system, an effort spurred by the discovery 

that an Army sergeant m a sensitive position at the National Security Agenc) 

had been passmg information to the Soviets for years without bemg detected.23 

The study, Project SECLRtn Stnuo, found serious weaknesses both in the traditional decentrahzed approach to countenntelligence operations and in the coordinauon that existed between Army counterintelligence and the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal General's Office. SEcURITY SlltELD led to yet 

another wholesale reorganization of Army counterintelligence. 

On 1 january 1965, the Army created the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps 

Command as a Department of the Army major field command. Operating under 

a new destgn concept, the command took over centralized dtrecuon over all 

countenntelligence operations in the continental United States The Intelligence 

Corps Command assumed authont)' O\'er the se,·en lntelhgcnce Corps groups 

that had prenously operated under six armies and the Mtlnary Dtstrict of 

Washington. (The large ClC detachments in the United States had been redesigll lhc errant sergeant wa~ '>fc .Jatk Ldward Dunlap. The story of the ca~ can be found in 

James l3;unford·s popular but htghly unalllhonzcd book. Tltt: Puzzlt Ptdacc· A nq1otl 011 NSA. 

t\mn iw\ Most St·act Agency (13oston· llnuAhWn Mtfnm. 1982), pp 150-'; 3 
140 ~Ill ITt\RY I'JTELUGENCE 

nated as '"groups" between 1956 and 1959.) At the same time, the Army 

ordered the field offices of the lmelligence Corps Command and the provost 

marshal's Criminallnvestigauon Division (CID) to be brought together wherever 

possible, and the records of the CID repository removed from Fort Gordon, 

Georgia, and collocated with the coumerintelligence records at Fort Holabird. 

The creation of the lmelltgence Corps Command gave lls commander, the 

ch1el of the Intelligence Corps, operational responsibilities for the first time in 

the history of Arm) coumenmelltgence. At the same lll11C, he lost certain assets. 

'\lot all the elemems of the former Army Intelligence Corps Activity were transferred to the new command. Smce the Intelltgcnce Corps Command was 

Intended to be purely a coumcnmelligence organization, the Army Imagery 

Interpretation Center, as the Photo Interpretation Center had been redesignated, 

reverted back to the direct control of the ACSI. 

There were still certain anomalies in the new pauern of organization. 

Despite its title, the Intelligence Corps Command controlled only about half of 

all Intelligence Corps personnel in the continental United States. The rest were 

on school or organizational staffs. with the TOE orgamzauons supporting tactical elements in the field, or m the "pipeline." lmclllgence Corps personnel 

deployed outside the conunemal United States were not a pan of the new command. The Intelligence Corps Command's commander, in his other capacity as 

chtcf of the Intelligence Corps, thus had substanual admmistrative responsibilities extending beyond his own command; and the lmelligencc Corps he headed 

was engaged in active intelligence collection as well as in coumerintelligence. 

The creation of the new headquarters also had left the chain of command more 

tangled than e\·er. Its commander now wore four hats. As head of a major field 

command, he now reponed chrcctl>• to the Army chief of starr. in addition to 

reponing to ACSI, the commander or CONARC, and the commander or the 

U.S Second Army in his other various roles.24 

In one sense. th1s arrangement conformed to the ci\·ilian theories or matnx 

management popular in the 1960s. l\latrix management held that someone marketing refrigerators to l.aun Amenca should report to a vice prcsidem for marketing, a vice president ror refrigerators, and a vice prcs1dent for Latin America. 

But the scheme did not accord with nom1al Army command procedures and 

\>Vas 111 practice unworkable. Not surprisingly, reorganization plans were begun 

as soon as the new command had been assembled. The l ~. Armr Intelligence 

C..orps Command lasted JUSt s1' momhs. 

There seemed to be onlr t\\'O poss1ble solutions to the organizational tangle 

created b>· the exiStence or the Intelligence Corps C..ommanc.l. One duplicated 

.H As the l.S. Armr lnldlig..:nn· Cnrp::. Ct)mmand's own l<ltl sheet ntlted at the um~. 

"USAINTCC ts only one lac.:cl of tht• mtclhgcncc c:tm1pltx located <ll I ott llol.llmd. The intcgr01tcd 

~t.tlf serves four master::.." fau '>lwt:l , t' S. Army lmdhgcncl Corps (.nmmand. p. 2 U.S Arm) 

lntclhgcnc.:c Command ftlc IN"l Cll\1 1 hc.tMy Office 
FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM L 41 

the Army Security Agency$ centraltzed, verucal command structure, creating a 

self-sufficient organization. However, because of its mission, that agency was a 

special case, and 1ts organization had no parallel m the rest of the Army. The 

other solution. the one adopted, decentralized the structure of the Intelligence 

Corps Command 

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) •vas created on 1 july 

1965 to conduct coumelintelligence operations within the continental United 

States.25 The combined headquarters organization of the former Intelligence 

Corps Command was broken up, and the Army Intelligence School and Fort 

I ~olabird placed under separate commanders. Functions previous!)' performed by 

the Intelligence Corps Command that were unrelated to counterintelligenceadmmtstering the intelligence civ11ian career program and procuring intelligencerelated supply items-reverted to ACSl, resulting in the establishment of the 

Administrative Survey Detachment and the Intelligence Materiel Development 

Support Office as separate field operating activities. Finally. the Intelligence Corps 

itself was disconunucd in March 1966, and its personnel functions shifted to the 

Department of Army le\·el. Th1s ended the Army$ attempts to integrate human 

intelligence and counterintelligence personnel under a single organizational stmcture. Discontinuance of the Intelligence Corps also resulted in the redesignation of 

all Intelligence Corps units as Military Intelligence units.26 

The creation of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command meant that the Army 

counterimelligence organization had been turned ins1de out. The old Counter 

Intelligence Corps had selected, tramed, and administered Army coumenmelligence personnel, but counterintelltgence operations themselves had been 

decentralized under the control of local Army commanders. The new major 

Army field command was a centralized operational organization without any 

personnel or training functions. The demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a 

special tradition that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War 

I, but the new arrangements meant that Army counterintelligence was now 

ahgned with the rest of the Am1y. 

If McNamara$ organizational innovations destroyed the Intelligence Corps, 

they left the Army Security Agency substantially untouched. Because of its specialtZed mission and compartmented operations, the agency escaped the loss of 

its training and research and development functions. Instead, it expanded physically, geographically, and functionall}. An ASA element, with the in-country 

designation of the 3d Radio Research Umt, deplored to VIetnam to support the 

ongoing advisor)' effort as early as 1961.27 The agenc)' also acquired an impor25 GO 23, HQDA, 1 jul 65. 26 Intelligence Corps groups were rcdcsagnatcd :-.tilitary lmclltgence groups on 16 October 

1966 

27 One member of the 3d Radio Rescarrh Unn was Sp4c. James f Da,·is. who was kallcd an 

acuon on 22 December I 961. and whom Prcstdem Lyndon johnson later descnbcd as the rtrst 

fatahtr of the Vietnam War. 
142 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

tam new acoustical intclltgencc mission in 1962, followmg the abolition of the 

Signal Corps as an Army technical service. A year later, the Army Security 

Agency achieved a monopoly of Army electronic warfare functions when il wok 

over comrol of the noncommunicmions-jamming function and associated units 

from the Signal Corps. ln 1964 it set up its third field station in the continental 

Unned States at Homestead, Florida, to better meet new mission requiremems 

which had e\·olved in the carl)' 1960s. Final!)', the agcncys independence and 

unique position withtn the Arm) was raufied on 14 April 196-t, when ll 

achte\'ed the status of a maJor Armr field command.28 

The Army In telligence and Security Branch 

The changes within the Army lmelligence community during the l 960s 

were not confined to shifts in function and in command relationships. Army 

lmelligence took a giant step in the direction of full professionalism in 1962, 

when the Army Intelligence and Security Branch was set up as a basic branch 

of the Regular Army. This development was long overdue. Since World War II. 

mtelltgence professionals had argued that the very existence of intelligence 

units created the need for a separate intelligence branch. The logic of thts 

argument was increasingly remforced by practical necessities. The pool of 

reserve officers capable of lllling intelligence slots was becoming exhausted. 

Without a reform in the Army personnel system, analysts projected that half 

the Armys intelligence officer positions would be without qualified occupants 

by 1965. The incumbem ACSI. Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, pushed vigorously for 

the creation of a new branch to remedy the situation. Yet even the Army 

Intelligence community was divided on the issue. The ASA chief protested 

that the proposed integrauon of signals intelligence officers with other intelligence personnel would be like putting infantry and artillery into one branch 

But Fitch won his case. The new branch came mto extstence formally on 1 

july 1962.29 

The Army Intelligence and Security Branch embraced about 5 percent of 

officers in the active Army. The initial group joining the branch consisted of 283 

Regular Army and 3,652 reserve officers who had a background in intelligence 

or were assigned to intelligence positions. A quarter of the group consisted of 

cryptologic specialists; the remainder broke down about evenly imo combat 

intelligence personnel and members of the Intelligence Corps. The formation of 

the new branch sigmficantl)' enhanced the Army's capacil)' to promote and 

retam quahfied intelligence officers. 

lll GO 14, HQDA, l4 Apr M th a result of this upgrade m ~latus, the chtef, Am1r Secunt} 

Agency, :1!>sumcd the new title of commr~nchng general. Army Secunty Agcnq• 

2Q Marc B. Powe and l:dward E. Wilson, The Evo/u{!On o.f Amcriwn MiiHtll)' lnte/ligt'lw: (Fon 

lluachuca, Ariz.: U.S. Army lntclhgcncc Center and School, 197.3), p. 105. 
fROM KOREA TO VIETNAM 143 

However, the new branch had problems imually. It comained only a small 

number of Regular Arm)' officers, and many of the reserve orficers brought into 

the Army Intelligence and Security Branch lacked higher educauon or prospects 

for career advancement. The branch was designated as one that performed a 

combat service support function, not the most prestigious role in the Army. 

Finally, 1t was the only branch in the Army without a common basic course. 

Although most Intelligence officers attended Fon llolabird for trammg, Army 

Security Agency officers still trained separately at the U.S. Army Security Agency 

Training Center and School (USASATC&S) at Fon Devens, Massachusetts. 

Nevertheless, within the space of four years, much of Army Intelligence had 

been reconfigured. The new structure would meet us first test in the fore1gn and 

domestic challenges dunng the war in Vietnam. 

Antenna array of the 326th Communication Reconnaissance Company during 

the Korean War. (INSCOM) 

Photointerpreters of the 

45th ("Thunderbird") 

Infantry Division examine 

imagery of the Korean 

countryside. (NARA) 
The sphinx-historically identtned Wllh Military Intelligencestands tn from of the headquaners 

of Fort llolabtrd, Maryland, home 

of the Arm) Intelligence School 

from 1954-1971. (INSCOM) 

Antenna array of the 276th Army Securit)' Agency Company at an overseas site. 

(INSCOM) 
The durable OV-1 ~Mohawk" scrYcd as the Army's mam aerial reconnaissance 

platform for a generation. (DA Photograph) 

Asststant Chtcf of Staff for 

Intelligence MaJ. Gen. Alva Fnch 

was instrumental m establishing the 

Intelligence and Securny Branch 

(later Military Intelligence Branch) 

in the Regular Army in 1962. 

(Cou rtesy of Maj. Gen. joseph A. 

MnChristian, U.S. Anny [Ret.)) 
Members of the 25th MI 

Detachment plot suspected 

enemy positions on a map at the 

Cu Chi base camp dunng the 

Vietnam eonOtct. (NARA) 

An intelhgenee officer interrogates a suspected member of the Viet Cong (Nt\RA) 
A Special Forces team operates 

an AN/PRD-1 radio direction 

finder. (JNSCOM) 

Operations room at the headquarters of the U.S. Army 

Intelligence Command, which 

directed Army counterintelligence activities in the continental United States during rhe 

troubled Vietnam era. (NAR.A) 
As a result of the Intelligence 

Organization and Stationing Study, the 

Army formed new Combat Electronic 

Warfare and Intelligence (CEWl) units 

to support its tactical formations. A 

soldier of the 519th Military 

Intelligence Baualion demonstrates a 

PRD-11 radio direction finder. (519th 

MI Battalion Photograph) 

New systems such as the Guardrail Common Sensor mounted aboard the 

RC-12 platfom1 enhanced the Army's electronic warfare and intelligence capabilities. (DA Photograph) 
Organization Day ceremonies for the 

Military Intelligence Corps at Fort 

Huachuca , Arizona, in 1987. The 

Army had relocated its Military 

Lntelligence schoolhouse to the post 

in 1971. (U.S. Army Intelligence Center 

and Fort Huachuca) 

The Army Intelligence and Security Command, organized in 1977 to conduct 

multidiscipline intelligence and electronic warfare operations at the echelon 

above corps, finally moved into this new headquarters building at Fon Belvoir, 

Virginia, in 1989. (INSCOM) 
.. 

A Disneyland castle perched atop an artificial hill, U.S. Army Field Station 

Berlin served as INSCOM's forward outpost behind the Iron Curtain until 

termination of the Cold War brought about its closure in 1992. (JNSCOM) 

A soldier of I NSCOM's 704th 

Ml Brigade. Increased use of 

sophisticated automation and 

communications systems would 

help pave the way for Army 

Intelligence to carry out its 

diverse and demanding missions following the end of the 

Cold War. (704th Ml Brigade 

Photograph) 
9 

Vietnam and Beyond 

T he 1960s began with brave promises; however, evems soon began to go awry. 

Although successive crises with the Soviet Union over Berlin and the Soviet 

deployment of missiles to Cuba were resolved peaceably, the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam continued to fester, despite the involvement of an increasing number of American military advisers. In early November 1963 a beleaguered 

President Ngo Oinh Diem of South Vietnam was assassinated during a coup by his 

own Army. lmended to stabilize the deteriorating security situation in South 

Vietnam by removing an unpopular leader, the coup had the opposite effect. As a 

revolving-door series of ephemeral governments came and went in Saigon, 

Communists gained an increasing foothold in the countryside. Meanwhile, 

Presidem john F. Kennedy had been assasinated in Dallas; his successor, Lyndon 

B. johnson, had a wealth of experience in domestic politics but no substantive 

understanding of foreign affairs. johnson won election in 1964 on a platform of 

peace and social reform, but soon found that developmentS in Vietnam would 

imperil both goals. By early 1965 a Viet Cong victory seemed imminem. 

America responded initially with limited air raids against the Viet Cong's 

sponsor, North Vietnam. When this action proved unproductive, ground troops 

were committed to the South under the direction of the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam (MACV), a joint, Army-dominated "sub-theater" headquarters. The North Vietnamese countered by steadily increasing their war 

buildup, sending in their own regular forces to supplement the activities of 

the guenillas. Thus the United States lurched into an undeclared war.l On the 

American side, this remained a limited effort. The president's main focus was 

on constructing a "Great Society" at home, and he regarded the war in 

Southeast Asia as an unpleasant distraction. As a matter of deliberate management, the conOict was fought without passion, without censorship, without 

mobilization, and without raising taxes. Increasingly, it was fought without 

1 For a caustic evaluation of the johnson admmistration's conduct of the war, see David 

lialberstam's The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972). 
146 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

popular enthusiasm. On the other hand, for the North Vietnamese and their 

Viet Cong proxies, the war was LOtal. 

By the end of 1967 an American Army of 485,000 soldiers and marines, 

backed up by an enormous logistical system, had deployed in country; and officials talked brightly that there was now "light at the end of the tunne1."2 The Tet 

offensive at the beginning of 1968 dispelled this dream, however. It broke the 

will of an administration and shauered the confidence of the American people. 

After Tet, all roads ran downhill. The Johnson administration decided to stop 

reinforcing the war effort; its successor chose to withdraw gradually from the 

war and reLUrn the tar baby LO the luckless South Vietnamese. In the meantime, 

the United States was unraveling on the domestic front. Racial unrest resulted in 

rioting on a massive scale, while an increasingly violent antiwar movement grew 

in strength on the nations campuses. 

What ensued was an almost complete debacle. A cease-fire in place in 

Vietnam at last was signed in Paris in 1973. A similar agreement, signed in 

Korea twenty years before, had endured. However, the governmem of South 

Korea had been in full control of its own territory, and American military might 

had backed up the agreement. Neither of these conditions proved true in 

Southeast Asia. Hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese troops remained in 

place in the South, and a peaceful end to the conllict seemed remote. American 

ground forces were completely withdrawn from Vietnam, and any chance that 

the peace settlement would stand was undermined by the disintegration of the 

Nixon administration amid the toils of the Watergate scandal. Confromed by a 

North Vietnamese blitzkrieg and abandoned by its American allies, in 1975 the 

South Vietnamese government collapsed) 

All of these events had a massive impact on Military Intelligence. Some suuctural changes that took place during this period were driven by new developmems 

in technology. Most, however, were brought about by the military commitment to 

Southeast Asia and its manifold repercussions. The Vietnam conflict, its domestic 

side effects, and the economic and psychological constraints produced by the omcome of the venture all worked to reshape the organization of Army Intelligence. 

Vietnam: Buildup and Deployment 

The Vietnam conllict proved a formidable challenge to Army intelligence, as 

well as to the rest of the American defense establishment. The Army was forced 

to function in an unfamiliar environment and deal with an unfamiliar language, 

under rules of engagement giving the enemy a chance LO accept or decline battle 

l Kathleen j. Turner, Ly11do11 johllSOil's Dual \Var: Vrewam a11d rhc Press (Chicago: Uni\'ersity 

of Chicago Press, I 985). p. 211. 

3 It should be noted that the official Army photo history of 1he Vie1nam War. which begins 

ns coverage in 1945, Lactfully chooses to end its accoum in 1973. 
VIET\JAM AND BEYOND 147 

at will. The detailed, quantified mformation which the deciston makers of the 

day demanded was not easy to develop when the enemy was a guerrilla under 

jungle canopy, and when the exact state of the ''hearts and minds" of an indigenous population involved in a civil war was so hard to assess. Under such conclitions it ts not surprising that the performance of Army Intelligence engendered 

comroversies that lived on long after American troops had left Southeast Asia.4 

Previous conflicts had wanesscd a ,·ast expansion of the Army:S depanmemal-level mtelligence staff. llowever, these conflicts had been fought before 

the subordination of Army Imclltgence to unified imelltgcnce agencies. In 

Southeast Asia, the Defense lmelltgence Agency would be responstblc for the analyucal effon. As a result, the OACSI staff actually contracted over the course of the 

war, and its internal organization was shaped as much by factors such as the 

mcrcascd availabtlity of computer support, the need to manage new technologies, 

and the necessity for coping with coumerimelligence problems on the domestic 

front as it was by the war in Southeast Asia itself. The real growth of the Armys 

intelligence and security organization was in the field. The Army Security Agency 

built up to a strength of 30,000, one-fifth of which was deployed in Vietnam at 

any one ume, and other components grew correspondingly. 

As long as the American military presence in South Vietnam had been confined to an ad,isory role, the demands on the Army's intelligence resources had 

not been excessive. In early 1965 the MACV was receiving imelligence support 

from a collection detachment subordinate to the japan-based SOOth Intelligence 

Corps Group, a counterintelligence detachment, and some two hundred intelligence officers serving as advisers with South Vietnamese troops. In-country 

cryptologic work was handled by the Army Security Agency's 3d Radio Research 

Unit (RRU), which comprised aerial as well as ground-based elemems.S 

The mflux of American troops in large numbers changed all this. In 

response to the requests of MaJ. Gen. joseph A. McChnsuan, MACV assistant 

chief of staff for imelligence, or j-2, m 1965 the 525th Milttary Intelligence 

Group was deployed in packets from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to serve as 

command and control headquarters for the intelligence effon.6 It was joined by 

the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) and the 

5 L 9th Military lmelligence Battalion (Field Army). Soon afterward, two additional Military lmelligence groups were introduced, built up from cellular teams 

dtspatched from the United States. These were the l35th Military Intelligence 

" Some of the comrO\·ersies arc explored in T L. Cubbage 11, "\Vestmordand \'S. CBS: Was 

lmclhgencc Corrupted by Pohc)' Demands: lnrdhgcnce and Na!lonal .':it'CUIIIV 3 Uulr 1988) 

118-80. 

~ Opcrauons of thiS tulle-known unn an: menuoned m Ne1l Sheehan's A Bnghl Sh1mng L1r. 

john Paul Vann <mel America in Vitlnam (New York. Random House, 198tn. p. 203, and m Roben 

1:. Futrell's Thr Adv1sory Years co 1965, The Umtcd Stales Air Force m :;,outheasl As1a (Washington. 

D C. Office of A1r Force 1-llstory, 1981 ), p. 244. 

o l.t Col Arthur D. McQul'cn, "The I ion Goes to War," Milltwy lrllrlllgcnce (ApnVjune 

1977) 28-36. 
148 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Group, a counterintelligence unit, and the l49th Military Intelligence Group, 

with a collection mission. 7 The groups absorbed the personnel and functions of 

the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion's counterintelligence and collection 

companies. Meanwhil.e, the 519th was itself greatly expanded to support four 

combined United States-Vietnamese processing and production centers. The 

unit included a large technical intelligence detachment augmented by detachments from the Army technical branches. 

In the fall of 1967, following the departure of General McChristian, there 

was another substantial reorganization of intelligence units within South 

Vietnam. The 525th Military Intelligence Group restructured its subordinate 

units into six provisional battalions, respectively located at Da Nang, Nha Trang, 

Bien Hoa, Can Tho, Saigon, and (for a time) Tan Son Nhut Air Base; the l35th 

and l49th Military Intelligence Groups subsequently were inactivated.S This 

effort was supplemented by the activities of over six hundred intelligence advisers serving with the Vietnamese; by intelligence detachmems auached to all 

independent brigades and higher formations; and by aerial surveillance companies that operated in suppon of the "field forces," Army corps-level headquarters organizations with additional advisory functions. Army Special Forces and 

the Vietnamese Montagnards under their control also played a significant role in 

furnishing combat intelligence. 

Army Security Agency support in country expanded as well. At the height 

of the war effort, the agency~ 509th Radio Research Group, which had replaced 

the 3d Radio Research Unit, commanded a fixed field station at Phu Bai; the 

224th Aviation Battalion (Radio Research); the 303d and 313th Radio Research 

Battalions, each attached to an Army field force; a communications security 

company; and some twenty direct support units (DSUs) attached to divisions 

and brigades.9 Other ASA assets positioned in Thailand and the Philippines also 

supported the cryptologic effort. 

As it evolved, the Army Intelligence effort in Vietnam became heavily commilled to collaboration with the South Vietnamese, who knew the language and 

terrain and already possessed a useful, if fragmented, data base. General 

McChristian organized a Combined lmelligence Center at Tan Son Nhut Air 

Base near Saigon, manned by U.S. and South Vietnamese personnel and under 

the joim control of MACV and the South Vietnamese high command. Similar 

combined centers handled prisoner-of-war interrogation, documem exploitation, and analysis of captured materiel.lO ln a kind of reverse advisory role, 

7 The reorganization of Army lmelligence in the Republic of Vietnam between 1965 and 

1967 is described m General joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Militaty Intelligence, 1965-1967 

(Washington. D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974). pp. 3-20. 

S Shelby Stanton, Vietnam Order of Bailie (Washington, D.C.: U.S. News Books. 1981), pp. 

235-36. 

Q Ibid., pp. 233-34. 

10 McChristian, The Role of Militaty Intelligence, pp. 21-78. A description of the Combined 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 149 

South Vietnamese Military Intelligence detachments worked directly with 

American formations at the level of independent brigade and above. 

Vietnamese assistance was necessary because of some American deficiencies. Vietnamese linguists were in especially short supply, which made close 

cooperation with the South Vietnamese essential. And although there had 

been an American advisory presence in the country since the 1950s, America 

went into the war without benefit of an adequate intelligence data base. At the 

lime DIA was formed, ACSI had delegated the task of compiling order of battle data for Southeast Asia to the U.S. Army, Pacific, while USARPAC in turn 

had assumed that the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, was carrying out this responsibility. In reality, no one had done the job, and American 

combat forces deploying into Southeast Asia had been confronted with an 

intelligence vacuum. II 

Moreover, although the McNamara regime had strengthened the previously 

neglected conventional forces, the Army still lacked enough trained intelligence 

professionals to meet its needs in Vietnam. lt took a long time for the Army:S intelligence training establishmem to retool to meet the needs of the connict. The 

Army Intelligence School did not begin to offer a Vietnam-oriented short course 

until 1968, and training for intelligence olTicers serving as advisers at the district 

and province level in Vietnam was not provided umil 1970. Moreover, in this 

connict, the reserve components could not compensate for the deficiencies of the 

Regular Army. There was a substantial Military Intelligence presence in the 

reser\'es, but linguistic skills were lacking, and in any case the administration had 

declined to deploy them. This may have been a blessing in disguise, since unit 

readiness in many cases was low. Maj. Gen. Charles Denholm, commanding general, U.S. Army Security Agency, deemed the ASA reserve units "almost useless."12 

As in previous wars, communications security in the field continued to be a 

major problem for the Army. This was aggravated by the compartmentalized 

nature of the war, the extensive use of aircraft, and above all by the ubiquitousness of the radio-telephone. A Vietnam-era division, for example, had 3,000 of 

lntelhgcncc Center, Vtetnam (and much else), is contamed in Bruce E. jones, War Without 

Windows: A Trur Account of a Young Army O.fficrr Trapped in em lntdligcnce Cover-Up in Victnwn 

(New York: Vanguard Press, 1987). See also Col. Huang Ngoc Lung, lntclligeriCc, Indochina 

~lonographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mihtary History, 1982). pp. 82-83. Lung 

feels that the relauonship between U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence did not become "really close 

and effective" unnl 1969. 

II General Bruce Palmer. Jr., The 25-Ycar \\far· Amerita's Military Rolt i11 Vit:rnam (New York: 

Simon and Shuster, 1984), pp. 39-40. 

12 The Secretary of the Army's Program for Command Supervision of Readiness: Command 

Presemauon b}' U.S. Army Securit)· Agency, lO Sep 68, p. 19, Anny CryptOiogtc Records. During 

the Berlin Cnsis of 1961 the deployment of two ASA bauahons had ended m a fiasco; the unns 

were so ill trained that that they ne\·er got beyond the gates of the ASt\ Training Center and 

School at ron De,·cns, Massachuscus. Eventually, the 2-+ 1st and 277th Military Intelligence 

Dctachmems were called into federal service in the token reserve mobilization following the Tet 

offensive, but they never went {Werseas. 
150 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

these transmiuers, compared to 225 in a representative World War ll division. 

Proper communications security often required units to shift radio frequencies 

and call signs. But the crowded electromagnetic environment presented by a communications-rich war meant there were not enough available frequencies, while 

helicopter companies that operated over hundreds of miles in support of units 

drawn from a number of nations found that any change in call signs produced 

paralyzing confusion. The Armys manpack speech security devices were too 

heavy and cumbersome to be lugged through the jungle easily, and troops resorted to the use of homemade radio-telephone codes that became transparent all too 

easily. Many commanders preferred to ignore the whole problem, choosing to sacrifice security considerations to speed and availability of communications.IJ 

There were other shortfalls. At first, lower-echelon commanders complained that they were deprived of vital timely intelligence, e ither because of 

companmentation considerations or because scarce intelligence assets were 

being held under close control at higher levels. Ultimately, however, Army 

lmelligence constructed a serviceable organization in Vietnam , even though 

some of its problems were never solved. Units down to the maneuver banalion learned to coordinate intelligence with operations by establishing joint 

tactical operations centers. Commanders improvised special companies with 

the capacity to conduct long-range reconnaissance patrols; in 1969 the Army 

formally made these units elements of the 75th Infantry and designated them 

as "Rangers. " l4 The Army also met the expanding intelligence and security 

needs of the combat divisions commiued to Vietnam by expanding their intelligence detachments to full companies and providing the divisions with TOE 

ASA companies in direct support. In addition, Special Security Offices in each 

division disseminated the most sensitive intelligence derived from nationallevel acquisition systems. Inte lligence sources available only to high-level 

commanders for strategic applications during World War II now could be put 

to tactical use. As the war progressed, the number of individuals indoctrinated 

for companmemed intelligence in combat divisions tripled. 

Additional ground intelligence was provided by the teams of the 5th Special 

Forces Group, lst Special Forces, in Vietnam and the Vietnamese Civilian 

Irregular Defense Groups they advised. The Special Forces camps, scaucred 

along the thinly populated interior spine of South Vietnam, served as an outpost 

screen to detect the movement of infiltrating enemy columns. Besides engaging 

in ground reconnaissance , the Special Forces conducted intelligence and counterintelligence operations through their contacts with the loca l Montagnard 

tribesmen. Members of the Special Forces also served as the Army component 

of the MACV Studies and Observation Group, a joint service element under JCS 

13 john D. Bergen, Militmy Commumcations: A Test for Technology, United States Army in 

Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 396-401. 

14 Powe and Wilson, The Evolution of American Military lntclligenc.;;, p. 115. 
VlETNAM AND BEYOND 151 

supervision that collected intelligence and carried out special operations in 

denied areas in conjunction with its Vietnamese counterpart organization.15 

American advisers also contributed to the intelligence effort. Working 

hand in hand with their Vietnamese counterparts at the province and district 

levels, they became increasingly involved in an attempt to identify and neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure that supported the insurgency through a 

network of district intelligence and operations coordinating centers established throughout South Vietnam. The centers had "a dual mission to produce 

and exploit both VC infrastructure and tactical Military Intelligence. " 

Originally begun as a unilateral American effort to upgrade the effectiveness of 

Republic of Vietnam security organizations, the program was formally 

embraced by the South Vietnamese government in 1968 and assigned the 

dual code name PHOENtx!PHUONG TRANG.J6 

Better cryptologic support to the field came about when the Army Security 

Agency established management centers to service each Army field force and 

imroduced tactical direct support units down to the level of the individual combat 

brigades. In the process, the agency moved into the front lines. ASA special operations personnel worked with the patrols of the Special Forces, and an ASA element mounted in armored personnel carriers was organized to provide support to 

the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.l7 The guerrilla nature of the war meam that 

Army Secutity Agency personnel usually working in safe rear areas were exposed 

to hazard. The large fixed field station at Phu Bai was maintained as a fortified 

camp, bristling with minefields, concertina wire, pillboxes, sandbagged bunkers, 

watchtowers, trenches, and mortar positions. ASA casualties during the Vietnam 

conflict were many times greater than during the Korean War.l8 

15 Shelby Stanton. Green Bcrt'IS at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in SouLlu:ast Asia, 1956-1975 

(NO\"ato, C.alif.: Presidio Press, 1985). See also the same author's Vklnarn Order of BaiLie. pp. 

239-53 

16 ICEX New:;lcuer 67-4, 4 Dec 67, p. 6. By 1969, however. the Am1y command in Vietnam 

had become disenchanted by the program because of the percetved excesses of the Provinctal 

Reconnaissance Units that served as executive agents in "neutralizing" Viet Cong cadre. jeffrC)' j. 

Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, United States Army m Vtetnam (Vlashington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1988), pp. 379-80. Perhaps participants took too literally 

the injunction to take "a ·nne shot' approach" in dealing with the infrastructure problem. ICEX 

Briehng Paper, 30 Aug 67, p. 1. A recent detaHed exammation of PliOENIX is Dale Andrade, 

Aslu:s to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington. Ky.: D.C. Heath, 1990). For 

the personal accoum of an Army parllcipant in thts much maligned and misunderstood program, 

see Stuart H. Herrington, Silence \Vas a Weapon: The Wttr for the Vietnam Villages, A Personal 

Pt·,..•rwrw (Novato, Calif.. Presidio Press, 1982). 

17 Some of these ASA activnres are capwred in photographs in john P. Finnegan, t-lililary 

Jntdligcncc: A Picturt' 1/istory (Washington. D.C.: Government Pnnting Office, 1985), pp. 167-68. 

IH Casualties among Milttary lntelhgence personnel were not restncted to members of the 

Army Security Agency. During the Tet offenstve, the Hue detachment of the 525th Ml Group was 

overrun and its members killed or captured. The first Medal of Honor ever granted to a Military 

lmelhgcnce officer was awarded posthumously to lst Lt George Stsler, assiStant mtelligence orficer of a Spectal Forces team. 
152 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

In the area of communications security, the Army Security Agency sought to 

bring about improvement by changing its approach. During the first stages of 

the war, tactical units in the field received communications security support 

from their attached ASA companies and detachments. At that time, communications security was conceived of as essentially a police-type function of monitoring friendly communications and warning of possible compromises. This 

arrangement proved to be ineffective, producing conflicts with supported commanders. As a remedy. the agency evolved a new concept of "before the fact" 

assistance, having its personnel serve as advisers rather than as policemen.19 

Under this doctrine. communications security personnel assisted in planning 

operational communications procedures and insu-ucted troops on the necessity 

of communications security. To implement this better, in 1969 the agencys incoumry communications security assets were withdrawn from the direct support units and concentrated in the lOlst Radio Research Company. A similar 

centralized ASA security company was also formed in Europe. The new. nonpunitive approach was facilitated by the simultaneous fielding of the Nestor 

family of speech security devices, which eliminated much of the security problem at the source.20 

Organizational innovations in the intelligence and security field were supplemented by the introduction of new technologies. Airborne electronic support, first pioneered in Vietnam and conducted from fixed-wing aircraft and 

later from helicopters, was one.21 Other elements of Army Intelligence were 

able to make productive use of gadgets such as unattended ground sensors and 

"people-sniffers." Infrared and side-looking airborne radar sensors supplemented the traditional visual and optical techniques of aerial observation, while the 

pairing of observation and armed helicopters into "pink teams" with the dual 

missions of finding and fighting gave another dimension to traditional aerial 

reconnaissance. At the top, MACVs j-2 staff slowly automated its intelligence 

data base and collection management procedures. 

In the end. of course, it was not enough. Although Army Intelligence could 

provide the higher commanders with significant forewarnings of the 1968 Tet 

offensive, the intensity of the enemy auack was underestimated. But the fact 

remains that Am1y Intelligence could provide the kind of warning before Tet in 

1968 that it had been unable to furnish before the Baule of the Bulge in 1944. 

However, despite the similar military outcomes of the Tet and Ardennes counteroffensives-in each case, the enemy scored some disconcerting gains, but 

paid for them with disproportionate losses-TeL did something that the German 

19 USASA Commanders Conference, 5-12 May 69, Staff Presentation Roundtable 

Discussions, Army CrypLOlogic Records. 

20 Bergen, Mil!lary Communications, pp. 407-08. 

21 The 224th Aviation Battalion (Radio Research) managed the fixed-wing assets, Oying 100 

aircraft at the height of the conOict. Included in its inventory was a handful of four-motored 

reconvened patrol bombers acquired from the NaV)'· 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 153 

Ardennes offensive had not done: it convinced the home from that the war 

could not be won. The fighting went on, but negotiations and a program of 

Vietnamization became the order of the day. As the American miliLaT)' presence 

in South Vietnam shrank, so did the presence of Army Intelligence. The last 

Army Intelligence elements left South Vietnam in 1973, following the signing of 

the Paris Peace Accords.22 

The Vietnam conOict had furnished Army Intelligence with a shon list of 

lessons learned and a long list of casualties. The war's effects on the structure of 

Army Intelligence were not confined to Vietnam. The rapid turnover of personnel engendered by the policy of troop rotation adversely impacted the cohesion 

and professional capacity of units far removed from the war zone, as had the 

diversion of equipment and spare pans to the fighting from. On the home front, 

the war and the opposition it provoked led Army Intelligence into a situation 

that compromised its image. Finally, the antimilitary and ami-intelligence reaction that prevailed in America as the Vietnam conflict came to a close posed 

deep threats to the whole Army Intelligence organization. 

The U.S. Army Intelligence Command and the Home Front 

Even while the fighting wem on in Vietnam, Army Intelligence was actively 

engaged in operations in another area, the American home front. The principal 

Army player here was the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC), the 

Army counterintelligence element formed in 1965 to conduct operations in the 

continemal United States. The command had been allotted substantial personnel 

to carry out its mission. Its seven Military Intelligence groups controlled a network of 300 field and resident offices across the nation. The merger of Army 

counterintelligence and criminal investigative records into the Investigative 

Records Repository (IRR) gave the command a massive data base, which was supplemented in 1966 when USAINTC became the DOD agent administering the 

newly created Defense Central Index of Investigations, a master file of all counterintelligence and ctiminal investigations performed by the armed services, and the 

National Agency Check Center, which performed records searches on files maintained by non-DOD agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

and local police departments. By 1967 the command had extended its responsibilities beyond its original jurisdiction, assuming the case control function for routine background investigations requested by the major commands overseas. 

Centralizing counterintelligence operations in the United States under a single Anny command produced the desired effects in terms of speed and efficiency. The new organization not only had a greater capacity to coordinate and conduct counterespionage investigations against military suspects but also was bet22 lnd1vi.dual Army Intelligence personnel did remain behind as members of the Defense 

Attache'~ Office. 
154 MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

ter able to conduct background investigations. Under the old decentralized system, it had taken an average of ninety-seven days to process a standard background investigation. By 1967 USAINTC completed these investigations in an 

average time of thirty-one days. However, centralization would prove to have 

less desirable effects. It gave Army counterintelligence a high profile, and gave 

civilian policy makers an organization to task for domestic intelligence collection in what was rapidly becoming a time of trouble. The end result for Army 

Intelligence was less than salisfactory. 

Under delimitations agreements dating back to the 1940s, the FBI had primary responsibility for counterintelligence investigations of civilians in the continental United States. Army counterintelligence confined its attention to the 

military and to those civilians who applied for security-sensitive civilian and 

military positions wi.th the Army. Most of the Armys coumetimelligence effort 

and resources were devoted to background investigations of the latter. However, 

the eventS of the 1960s conspired to break down the neat demarcation line 

between military and civilian counterintelligence jurisdiction in the United 

States and to draw Army Intelligence deeply into civilian affairs. Federal troops 

were frequently alerted and occasionally deployed to restore order when local 

authorities were unable to maintain control in the numerous crises of the period. Commanders needed intelligence support, and it quickly became apparent 

that it was too late to attempt to gather intelligence once an actual troop deployment had begun. It also became apparent that the existing civilian intelligence 

agencies were fragmented and often ineffectual. 

The FBI may have had theoretical responsibility for civilian counterintelligence, but its director, J. Edgar Hoover, was aging and increasingly uncooperative. The bureau itself, although having a good track record in apprehending 

interstate car thieves, kidnappers, and the occasional spy, was primarily a crimefighting agency with neither the capacity nor the inclination to produce finished 

domestic intelligence. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of FBI agents were 

middle-aged white males, limiting the bureau's capability to conduct effective 

undercover work against the radical black and studem groups that seemed to 

pose the greatest threat to national security. As conditions of disorder became 

progressively worse, the Army moved to fill an intelligence void. 

Local commanders had first begun to request counterintelligence support 

from the assets they controlled during the civil rights disturbances in the South 

in the first pan of the decade. USA!NTC became involved in giving crisis support soon after it had been set up, as a result of Army involvement in the Waus 

rioting in August 1965. The command formulated its first contingency plan for 

collecting domestic intelligence in early 1966. STEEP HtLL, as the plan was code 

named, was designed to be implemented only after there had been an aCLual 

deployment of federal troops. 

The command soon realized that STEEP Htt.L, redesignated GARDEN PLOT in 

L967, was inadequate. r=or USAINTC to be of any help to Army commanders in 
VlETNAM AND BEYOND 155 

a civil disturbance situation, it would have to begin collection as soon as there 

was any likelihood of a deployment of federal troops. To meet the requiremem, the command devised a new collection plan , RosE HILL, later redesignated PUNCH BLOCK and LANTERN SPIKE, successively. Unrest in America's cities 

caused PUNCH BLOCK to go imo effect eight times during the summer of 1966. 

By this time, in the words of the USAINTC official history, civil disturbance 

collection had become a "minimal, but increasing" pan of the command's 

work load.23 

The troubled summer of 1967 brought mauers to a head. The LANTERN 

SPIKE civil disturbance collection plan was implemented four times, and federal 

troops were actually committed to deal with a major riot in Detroit. As a result 

of the Detroit disturbances, Deputy Secreta1y of Defense Cyrus Vance, who had 

served as the agent of the Executive Branch in handling the federal intervention, 

tasked the Army with "reconnoiteting the major cities" to gain information on 

critical elements of topography and vulnerability before troops were sent in 

again. He also suggested that "the assembly and analysis of data with respect to 

activity patterns is also needed. "24 This put the Army into the domestic intelligence business on a greatly enlarged scale. 

After the Detroit riots, the priorities of the U.S. Army Intelligence 

Command changed perceptibly. The Army now began to collect intelligence 

data that would not only allow it to imervene effectively in urban riots, but 

would also help it to cope with the threat of the increasingly violent antiwar 

movement. By 1967 the popular consensus in support of American commitment to Viemam was beginning to waver. An uncensored media had brought 

the horrors of war to American living rooms, and the johnson strategy of 

fighting a painless war by allowing generous exemptions for college swdems 

while tripling the draft call had made a time bomb out of the nation's campuses. Radical studems and others had started to challenge not only the war, but 

the whole American system allegedly responsible for it. The Army now fe lt it 

had to defend its personnel and installations from possible subversion, sabotage, and even guerrilla warfare. In response to these perceived menaces, 

USAINTC steadi ly widened its collection activities, and the files of the 

Intelligence Records Repository began to bulge with the names of Individuals 

and groups with no connection to the Department of Defense except their 

repuled opposition to iL 

23 U.S. Arn1y Intelligence Command Annual Report of Major Acuviues, FY 1971, p. 40, cop)' 

in INSCOM History Orhce riles. 

H lbtd .. p. 41. Vance was not the only htgh government official interested in Army collccuon 

capabihties against civ1l disorders. In late 1967 Attorney General Ramsey Clark established the 

Inter-Divisional Information Unit in the justice Depanmcm "to make full use of available intelligence." For the first two years of its existence. the untt drew heavtly on Army counterintelhgcnce 

for its data Paul Cowan, Nick Eggleson, and Nat licmoff, Swtc Sccrcrs: Police Surveillwtcc 111 

Amnica (New York: llolt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974 ), pp. 14-15. 
156 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The rioting that devastated the nation~ capital following the assassination of 

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was the final straw. In response, OACSI set up civil 

disturbance units in its Counterintelligence and Countetimelligence Analysis 

Branches in 1968, and the Department of the Army issued a classified Civil 

Disturbance Collection Plan levying intelligence requirements upon USAINTC 

that were so sweeping that they could not be filled by the traditional methods of 

oven collection or liaison with FBI and local law enforcement officials. 

To accomplish the tasking, the command had to initiate an extensive collection program against domestic targets. And by now, Army Intelligence elements 

other than USAlNTC were also involved in the domestic intelligence field. ln an 

independent effort, CONARC and several Zone of the Interior armies had 

deployed coumerimelligence personnel from their tactical units to engage in 

domestic collection operations and had compiled computer data bases on suspected potential troublemakers. The Army Security Agency had used its own 

assets on several occasions in 1967 and 1968 to monitor the demonstrators' citizen-band radios. 

Even at the height of this type of activity, the bulk of USAlNTC~ resources 

remained commiued to the traditional role of conducting background investigations. But the amount of activity devoted to domestic intelligence had a significance beyond its limited size. The perceived domestic crisis, coupled with 

johnson administration demands for more and more information, led Army 

Intelligence into dangerous waters. Its activities crossed the traditional dividing 

line between the civilian and military in American life and overstepped the law, 

since neither the collection activities nor the civilian intelligence data bank of 

USAINTC had been authorized by statute.25 

As early as 1969, after a change of administrations, Robert F Froehlke, 

assistant secretary of defense for administration, expressed doubts about the 

wisdom of the whole operation. The Army went beyond its own requirements 

to involve itself in civilian concerns to such a degree, and the assistam secretary 

was concerned that the Army might be diffusing its limited intelligence assets, 

trying to collect intelligence on too large a portion of American society. As 

Froehlke ruefully admitted, the demands made upon USAINTC for domestic 

intelligence had gone "substantially beyond the capability for Military 

Intelligence units to collect. They reflected the all encompassing and uninhibited demand for information directed at the Department of the Army. "26 

What ended the Army's domestic intelligence program, however. was not 

doubts, but public exposure. In early 1970 Lhe American Civil Liberties Union 

sued the Army and the U.S. Army Intelligence Command for "spying on civil25 Christopher H. Pyle. A11ny Sun•ei/lancc of Civilian Politics, 1967-1970 (New York: Garland 

Publishers. 1970), i:. a scholarly accoum of the Anny's domestic intelligence activities by a parucipant-obscrvcr and whJstlr-blower. 

2<> U.S Army lntelhgencc Command Report of Major A<.:llVlliCS, f-1' 1971, p. -18. 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 157 

ians."27 The subsequent public•t), accompanied by recriminations from politicians and journalists, led not only to the end of this particular program, but 

ultimately to the end of USAINTC itself. The whole Army Intelligence community had suffered a major setback. 

Beyond the Battle: Intelligence Trends in the 1960s 

The Vietnam War and the domestic crisis withm the Unned States were not 

the only forces exerting pressure on the structure of Army Intelligence during 

the 1960s Increasing technology also shaped its development. This was especially important for the Army Security Agency. Personnel and financial constramts also impinged upon the structure of Army Intelligence during this period. The Army was engaged in fighting a large-scale war in Southeast Asia for 

which the country had never been properly mobilized. The shon tours of duty 

in Vietnam caused constant personnel turbulence. The demands of the war gutted units outside the combat zone of equipment as well as people; ASA. with its 

dependence on high technology, was particularly affected By the end of 1968 

those ASA tactical units not actually committed to Vietnam, having been 

stripped of equipment and spare pans, delivered only 50 percent of their support requirements. 

The financial problem was compounded in that the Umted States had an 

unfavorable balance of trade, and policy makers at the national level were constantly concerned with the bleeding away of America's gold reserves. Economic 

as well as technological considerations prompted the drive to consolidate many 

of ASP\$ European operations at a major new facility in Augsburg. Financial 

pressures were also partially responsible for the consolidation of the two 

Military Intelligence groups in Europe into a single unit in 1969. The headquarters of both the 513th and 66th Military Intelligence Groups moved to Munich, 

Germany. where the 66th absorbed the personnel and functions of the former. 

Although Army Intelligence had its problems during thts era, it •mpro\'ed its 

instttutional position in a number of ways. One of the most significant advances 

was in professional development. As a result of a sLUdy undertaken by the 

Norns Board, the Army Intelligence and Secmity Branch was redesignated the 

Militar) Intelligence (MI) Branch on 1 july 1967 The new title symbolized the 

unity of the intelligence field rather than ns dtvers•ty. More 1mponam, the Army 

assigned the renovated branch an official combat support function. whereas the 

old branch had been designated as a combat sen·1ce support organization onlr 

27 Palmer, Th.: 25-rear \\'ar, p 83. A surpnsmgly measured C\'.lluauon of what all th1s 

amounted to can be found m Cow.m et al.. Sccur Sccrt•cs. p. 13 "The lWcrall p1cturc 1:. of a moder-

,udy large burcaucrauc apparatus buill to conduct formal tmerviews for lxtckground checks and 

tryin~ 10 do the imposstble job of prcdtcung maJor social disorders. lt sponged off the FBI for 

lll<lSL of 1ts mformauon and used pbmclothcs operatives for the rest. The information filled 

numerous computcn:ed files, cau~d 1rrelcvam bncfings. and d1d hule elsc-wuhm the am1)'.~ 
158 :-..IIUTARY lNTELLIGEI\CL 

The upgrade presented the prospect of attracting better officers to intelligence 

careers and providing members of the branch with greater access to the system 

of Arm}' higher education that had become professionally indispensable for military career advancement. 

As a step toward prOYldmg further integration of the various intelligence 

disciplines within the \tldaary Intelligence Branch, in 1968 the U.S. Army 

Intelligence School began to offer an MI Officers Ad\'anced Course mtended for 

Army Security Agency officers, as well as for other ~lllnary Intelligence profesSIOnals. This step was taken m accordance with the recommendations of the 

Haines Board, another Army study group that had concentrated on deficiencies 

in mtelligence training.2H The new advanced course did not completely solve all 

the problems associated with the area, since the Haines Boards proposal to consolidate the Army Security Agency Training Center and ~chool with the Army 

Intelligence School was not accepted, but the branch course represented a 

major step in breaking down the ·wall of isolation bet ween signals intelligence 

officers and those with other mtclhgence specialues. 

There were also new organizational developments The Army Intelligence 

staff mo\'ed back into the field of mtelhgence produwon, as the Army soon discovered it had needs 111 this area that DIA could not fulfill. By 1966 OACSis 

Special Research Detachmem, origmally set up as a limson group with NSA, had 

become a full-ffedged production center. The same year, OACSI created a threat 

analysis element to produce Army-specific studies. By 1967 even DlA had to 

admit that the task of conducting all Military Inte lligence production simply 

was too great for one organization and agreed that the Army and the other services should provide ''special finished imelligence" directly related to departmental missions.29 Two years later, USAREUR organized its own production element, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Europe. 

The Army$ mechamsm for disseminating its most secret intelligence also 

was expanded significantly. In 1965 ACSl had decided to auach special security 

offices to each Army chv1sion by fiscal )'ear 1968. Although every Army division 

assigned to Vietnam had such support, the constraints on resources imposed by 

the fighting in Southeast Asia prevented implementation of the plan worldwide. 

l lowever, the system expanded into other areas, as Army requirements for 

access to sensitive compartmented intelligence grew. In addition to sen·icing 

mlinary and diplomatic needs, the Special Security Detachment increasingly 

became invol\'ed in pro\ldmg private contractors wnh the highly classified 

mformation they needed to do research and development for the government. 

In 1967 the stead)' growth of these tasks led the Norns Board to recommend 

that the Army estabhsh four geographic Special Secunty rcg10ns to act as subor2R ?owe and Wtlson, lite Evoluttouof American Military lntdlrgrncc, p lOS. 

29 Intelligence Orgamzauon and Stationing Stud)· (JOSS). Aug 7'5, l'xcc Sum, p. 29, cop)' 111 

lNSCOM Htstory Offtcc ftb 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 159 

dinate headquarters for the Special Security Detachments fifty-five field offices. 

The recommendmions were accepted, and shortly afterward the status of the 

detachment was upgraded to that of a "group" headquarters. 

The Arm) Secunt)' Agenc> was substantially restructured during the course 

of the 1960s. TO[ units were remtroduced to the united States and Vietnam, 

and in 1966 all the agencys battalions were converted from a fixed to a flexible 

structure. There were also more cosmetic changes. At the end of 196 7 the 

Department of the Army decided that TDA units would no longer bear numerical designations As a result, on 15 December 1967, the Army Security Agencys 

numbered field stauons, special operauons commands, and speCial operations 

units received new geographic destgnators. Finall), the Army undertook some 

qualitau,·e miuauves m the human Intelligence field, even though resources and 

personnel allocated to this area dechned steeply after 1963. In 1969 ACSI organized a field operating agency to direct certain programs in this area. 

Westmoreland, McChristian, and Military Intelligence 

In mid-1968 the former MACV commander, General Wtlltam 

Westmoreland, became the Army chtcf of staff and subsequently supervtsed 

three major organizational changes within Army Intelligence. The first came 

about in 1969, when Westmoreland revtewed the organization of the Army Staff 

and decided that the number of field operating agencies under ACSls direct 

supervision was not compatible \\'tth the proper orgamzauon of a DA staff element. ACSJ's jOb, in Westmoreland's estimation. entailed staff supervision and 

program management, not operations. As a result, OACSI underwent a sweepmg reorganization. Six major elements were spun off and resubordinated to 

USA!NTC. These included the 902d Military Intelligence Group, which had 

prcvwusly performed high-level counterintelligence operations under direct 

ACSI control, the Admmistrauvc Survey Detachment, which ran Army 

Intelligence personnel programs: the Personnel Secunty Group. which adjudicated loyalt) and suitabtlit) case:> for the Army, the Army Imagery 

Interpretation Center; the lmelltgcnce Materiels Supply Office; and the newly 

created field operating agency for human intelligence.30 

In certain ways, the new reorganization amounted to another reinvention of 

the wheel. At the Army Staff level, it meant returning to the organizational princtples origmally adopted during World War II. The U S. Army Intelligence 

Command was transformed from the cominental Unncd States-focused counterintelligence organization originally planned into a simulacrum of the earlier 

U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity. In addition, however, the command 

assumed control of sensitive operations heretofore controlled only at the DA 

30 Departmc:nr oj tht• Anny Histonwl Summa1y, fiscal )'cal 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of 1\llhtary Htstory, l973). p. 82 . 
160 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

level, a trend strengthened in 1972 when OACSI transferred its Special Research 

Detachment to the command. 

A second change that came about at this time was an enlargement of 

OACSI's area of functional responsibilities. Army Intelligence had delegated 

oversight of the Army's mappmg work to the chief of Engineers smce World 

War ll. In 1969 Westmoreland directed ACSI to assume staff supervision of certain Army topographic activities, and the Engineer Topographic Command was 

created to carry out the map-making function by consolidating the Army Map 

Service with other Engineer elements involved in topography. ACSI also took 

over staff supervisiOn of Arm)' weather intelligence at this time. 

The last organizational innovation of the Westmoreland years initially 

promised to be the most sweeping. Early in 1969the ACSI, Maj. Gen. joseph A. 

McChristian, who had served as Wesunoreland'sj-2 in Vietnam, concluded that 

the Am1y's fragmented intelligence assets in the continental United States were 

too physically dispersed to provide the Army with enough support. Reviving the 

old proposal of the 1950s, he recommended concentrating them in a single 

imelligence center. The proposal did not, however, touch upon the operations 

of the Army Securny Agency. 

McChristian initially had an ambitious concept for the center. It would concentrate in one location an operational intelligence headquarters much like the 

one McChristian had set up in Vietnam, a countenntclligence center (essentially 

USAINTC), the U.S. Army Intelligence School, suppon troops, and tactical 

units. This would give many elements of the Army Intelligence community a 

home for the first time. The tacucal units and aircraft would be necessary 

because McChnstian felt that one of the center's main purposes would be to give 

the troops realistic intelligence training in the field. The first plans called for the 

center to have a troop base of 21,000. 

The existing Army Intelligence center at Fort llolabird, Maryland, was obviously unsuned for such an expanded role. The post was small. and the training 

requirements unposed by the Vietnam War had greatly O\'ercrowded it. The post 

was hemmed in by an industrial area that precluded expansion. Allhough the 

streets of Baltimore were as good a place for counterintelligence agents to practice surveillance techniques as anywhere, Holabird offered no room for field 

maneuvers. In addition to all these liabilities, the air space in the area was overcrowded, and the electromagneuc environment was cluttered. In a search for an 

alternative, the initial survey team narrowed the choice to Fon Rile}. Kansas, 

and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and selected the latter. 

At this pomt, the plan for a new Army Intelligence center began to narrow 

sharply in scope. Planners soon realized that although Fort Huachuca offered 

space, it had liulc water. McChristian then suggested that Fort Lewis, 

Washington, m1ght be developed as an alternative sne, but the post would have 

needed extens1vc rehabilitauon, and this would take too much time and money. 

Because of these constraints, the proposed composition of the center shrank, 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 161 

and then shrank again. lt turned out that Fort Huachuca could not comfortably 

accommodate even a brigade of supporting troops. Originally, planners had 

thought that the U.S. Army Intelligence Command would move bodily to the new 

center, leaving behind a kind of USAlNTC rear, consisting of a Directorate of 

Investigative Records to administer the commands bulky and hard-to-move data 

base. This idea was scrapped also. Since most of USAlNTCs activities were in support of the Department of the Army and other national-level agencies, the command could not practicably move beyond the Washington-Baltimore corridor. 

Ultimately. the composition of the new Army Intelligence center was scaled 

down drastically. The final version of the center included the Army Intelligence 

School and the U.S. Army Combat Development Command intelligence Agency, 

together with Army combat surveillance and electronic warfare activities already 

in place at Fort Huachuca, all of this supported by a bare minimum of tactical 

units. As part of t he process, the Anny Intelligence School was redesignated and 

given the more prestigious title of the U.S Anny Intelligence Center and School. 

The school moved to its new desert home at Huachuca in phases during the 

first pan of 1971.31 By this time, events were in process that would be much 

more damaging to Army Intelligence than the reduced plans for its new center. 

Lean Years 

The early 1970s saw the U.S. Army in decline. The decision to stage a 

phased whhdrawal from Vietnam led to a drastic cut in troop strength, and 

between 1969 and 1973 the Army shrank in size by almost half, from a force of 

1.5 million to one of 800,000. More important, its ranks were plagued with 

incidents of drug abuse, racial turmoil, and lack of discipline. The final eliminalion of the draft in 1973 deprived the Army of its reservoir of college-trained 

enlisted men and confronted it with daunting recruitment problems. Operating 

in an environment of constraints, the Army would have to rely increasingly on 

reserve forces to meet any future combat contingencies. The STEADFAST reorganization of 1973 made this dependence on the reserve components explicit, in 

addition to retrenching the Army Staff and realigning much of the Armys command structure.32 lf the Army as a whole struggled during this period, Army 

Intelligence was particularly hard hit. lt fell victim not only to popular disillusionment with the results of the war, but also to public indignation against 

alleged counterintelligence abuses. 

The unraveling of the Army's domestic counterintelligence program began 

in the first months of 1970, when the American Civil Liberties Union initiated a 

lawsuit against the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army intelligence 

31 Dr Bruce Saunders, "U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School," Miliwry Intelligence 10 

(April-June 1984): 61. 

32 Department of tlu Army r/istorical SumnWI)', Fiswl Ytar 1973 (Washington , D.C.: U.S. 

Am1y Center of Mihtary lliswry, 1977), pp. 45-46. 
162 MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

Command on the grounds that they were involved in illegal surveillance of 

civilians. The initial suit was followed by a fire storm of adverse media publicity, 

all of which culminated in a congressional investigation in early 1971. The controversy had immediate effects on USAlNTC. On 19 February 1970, all civil 

disturbance and civilian biographic data stored in the Investigative Records 

Repository were ordered destroyed. A similar purge was ordered of the independent domestic intelligence data bases maintained by CONARC and several of 

the field armies in the continental United States. The ambitious Civil 

Disturbance Information Collection Plan was formally rescinded in june. The 

U.S. Army Intelligence Command went in10 a 180-degree reversal, of course. As 

the command's official historian stated, "instead of collect, process, and store, 

the order of the day was research, screen, and destroy."33 The effect of the "spying on civilians" charges was to degrade the whole coumerintelligence mission. 

By the end of February 1971 the Anny had suspended all USAINTC countersubversive and offensive counterespionage activities. 

These new developments soon affected the organizational structure of Army 

counterintelligence. On l March 1970, the Defense Investigative Review 

Council was set up under the assistant secretary of defense for administration to 

exercise general supervision over the counterintelligence activities of all the 

armed services and to curb any possible abuses. After some deliberation, the 

council decided to centralize all service-connected background investigations 

under a new civilian body, the Defense Investigative Service, which was established at the end of 1971 and became operational in October 1972.34 

Meanwhile, contrary opinions had been voiced. In june 1970 presidential assistant Frederick Huston, unnerved by the depth of dissent over the recent 

American incursion imo Cambodia, suggested that all government intelligence 

agencies conduct their operations without regard to legal or Constitutional 

niceties. His views did not prevail.35 

The formation of the Defense Investigative Service was the beginning of the 

end for the U.S. Army Intelligence Command as a major Army headquaners. 

Conducting standard personnel background investigations had been the command's bread and butter, constituting 90 percent of its work load. USAlNTC 

had to give up 1,400 personnel spaces to the new agency. Three of its Military 

Intelligence groups were inactivated, and the number of field offices was 

reduced from 303 to 50. The command turned over control of the Defense 

Cemral Index of lnvestigalions and the National Agency Check Center to the 

Defense Investigative Serv1ce. USAlNTC retained custody of Army counterintelligence files, but the criminal investigation records held by the lmelligence 

33 U.S. Army Intelligence Command Report of Major Activities. FY 1971, p. 219. 

34 Dcpartmcm of tile Army Histoncal Summwy, f1scal Year 1973, pp. 53-54. 35 Theodore H. White, Breach of Faith: Til e Fall of Richard Nixon (New York Dell 

Publishing, 1976), pp. 174-77 
VIFTNAM AND BEYOND 163 

Records Repository were removed from its control and assigned to a new U.S. 

Arm)' Criminal Investigation Command. Since 1949 a major general had controlled Army countenmclligencc acuvtucs. By 1972 the L,.S. Army lmelltgencc 

Command was under the command of a colonel. 

After the Army lmclhgence School moved to Fon lluachuca, Fon Holabird 

became superrluous to Army Intelligence. In the interests of economy, 

USAINTC relocated in the summer of 1973 to Fon George G. Meade, 

Maryland, a large, multipurpose post. llowever, since the records of the Army 

Cnminal Invcsugauon Command rcmamed behind at llolabird, the move was a 

further blow to the concepts bchmd the SECL.Rtn SHirt D study of 1964 By 

1974, USAINTC had lost most of its mtsston respons1btliues and numbered less 

than 2,000 persons. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense criucized 

that the Armys counterintelligence structure was lOp heavy in management and 

not cost effective. 

USAINTC:S remaining activities hardly seemed significant enough to warram tts retemion as a maJor command, especially at a umc when the Army was 

under heavy pressure to reduce its headquarters establishments. The command 

was particularly vulnerable lO charges of managerial layering-it shared Fon 

Meade with the headquarters of a major subordinate unit, the 109th Military 

lmelligence Group. Another major clement, the 902d Military lmelligcnce 

Group, had been programmed to move to Fon Meade in the summer of 1974. 

As a result, the Ann) discominued the command on 30 june 1974.36 On the 

same day, the Army also inactivated USAINTCs three remaining Military 

Intelligence groups wtth area responsibilities for the continental United States 

and reassigned the Army Imagery lmerpretation Center and Special Research 

Detachment to ACSis direct control. 

USAINTC was replaced by the U.S. Anny Intelligence Agency, a field operating agency direct!) subordinated to ACSI with an innial force structure of just 

two CONUS coumcnntelligence groups: the 902d Mtlitary Intelligence Group, 

whtch lost its tracltuonal high-level m1ss1on and became responsible for the geographic area cast of the Mississippi. and the 525th Military Intelligence Group, 

of Vietnam fame, which was reactivated to perform a parallel mission in the 

western pan of the United States. The agency inherited (sometimes in 

rearranged form) some smaller miscellaneous elements from USAINTC: a techmeal service activny providing polygraph, technical serv1ce countermeasures, 

and computer secumy assistance; the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Support 

Activity, comprising the Investigative Records Repository and the Personnel 

Security Group; and the Administrative Survey Detachment. 

USAlNTC was not the only pan of the Army lmelltgence communny affected by the currents of the times. Centralization and economy were the watchlC'> Dt:partmt'nt of thr Army Histolrt'cd SumrnW)'. Frscal Yt·ar 1974 (Washington. D ( U.S. 

Army Center or Military llistory. 1977), p 42 
164 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

words of the day. In 1970 a blue ribbon panel appomted by President Nixon 

had called for much greater integration of service intelligence activities at the 

DOD level. The Defense ln vesllgative Service was JUSt one of three new 

Department of Defense agencies that the Nixon administration crea ted to 

assume intelligence functions which the uniformed services previously had performed. In 1972 the Army topographic assets that ACSI had supen·ised since 

1969 were integrated into the new Defense Mapping Agcncy.37 During the same 

rear, an attempt was made to integrate all setYice cryptologic elements into a 

Central Security Servtce that would act as the mtlttary arm of the National 

Security Agency. This threatened to strip the Army of much of its remaining role 

as a manager in the cryptologiC field. ln practice, however, the Central Security 

Service did not live up to its imtial expectations, and the reorganization did not 

bring about any substantial change in the relauonship between the Army 

Security Agency and the National Security Agency. 

The Army Security Agency, although still the largest single intelligence element in the Army, shared the problems of the greater Army during this period. 

It had to deal with strength ceilings, recruiting problems, and diminished funding. Additionally, it suffered from the problems caused b) a large shortfall of 

equipment and spare parts in the field. As a result of the demands of the war m 

Vietnam, much of the remaining equipment was obsolete and ill suited to the 

demands of a high-intensity conOict. 

The retrenchment of the agency began in 1970, when it wrned over its 

acoustical intelligence mission to the U.S. Air Force. In 1971 the Army discontinued the 507th and 508th U.S. Army Security Agency Groups, located respecuvely in Europe and in Korea, and replaced them with smaller elements: the 

502d Army Security Agency Group, a TOE unit, in Europe and an unnumbered 

field station in Korea.38 The reduction continued mexorabl)' as the agency stood 

down from Vietnam and closed long-estabhshed field stations. Of the 99 separate units which ASA fielded in 1970, only 73 still existed in 1972. For reasons 

of economy, AS!\s tradtllonal reg1onal headquarters m Europe and the Pactftc 

were dtscontinued m 1972. 

Meanwhile, the approaching end of the draft made questionable whether 

the Army Security Agency could enlist enough men to meet mission requirements. As a result, for the first time in its history the agency• began recruiting 

women for cryptologtc specialties. Although WACs had serYed with the SSA's 2d 

Signal ~en·ice Battalton in the continental United States during World War II. 

the \\'AC detachment stationed at Arlington Hall at the time of the Korean con37 Dt·partmcru of rh.- Army Hrswrilal Summary. Fbcal rear 1972 (Washmgton, DC. US 

Army Center of Mihtary Hbtory, 1974), p 44. 

38 The dtSConunuancc of th<.' 508th USASA Group m K~'rca 111 1971 took place in the con- t~:xt of a maJOr reduction in tmop strength there This drawdown \\~\Span of thr rmplcmentallun 

of the "Nrxon Doctrine," which sought to shift the main burden llf Jnovrdmg ~round forces for 

defense to our alhcs. 
\'IET'JAM AND BEYOND 165 

fl1ct had performed largely admmistrative functions. By 1976, however, onetenth of ASI\s uniformed personnel worldwide were female. 

Although the Army Security Agency was deeply affected by developments in 

the cryptologic field, it survived the STEADFAST refo1ms intact. STEADFAST had 

resubordinated almost all Army training centers, including the U.S. Army 

Intelligence Center and School, to the newly created Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC), but ASA:s vertical command structure allowed it to 

retain its own training base HO\\'cver, the 1973 reorganization of the 

Department of the Arm; d1d have its effect on Army Intelligence at the staff 

level. In line ,,;th the thrust of STF ·\DFAST, the staff of the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence was reduced by one-third between 1973 and 

1974.39 Production and support functions previously carried out \vithin OACSI 

were transferred to separate detachments with their own TDAs in 1973, and 

responsibility for administering attache personnel was transferred to the 

Administrative Survey Detachment in 1974. 

A Time of Transition 

After the setbacks of the earl}· 1970s, Army Intelligence began to regroup. 

Even though H operated under continuing personnel and fiscal restraints, the 

Army Intelligence communily undertook a series of initiatives that would put it 

in a bcucr position to respond to future challenges. 

The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA), established in mid-1974, 

was origmally intended as a low-profile organization with the narrowly limited mission of conducting the Army's residual counterintelligence operations 

in the continental United States. The assets initially assigned to the new 

agenC} were modest. Moreover, lls mission was constramed and its activities 

hampered b) congressional legislation, congressional im·estigations, and execuuve orders that cumulatively had a chilling effect on countenntelligence 

operations. 40 By early 1975 the agency's Investigative Records Reposiwry was 

required to establish a Freedom of Information Act Office to respond w 

queries from the public about the contents of the Army's fi les. However, the 

agency came into existence just at the time that the disestablishment of U.S. 

Army, Pacific, made it necessary to resubordinate USARPAC's SOOth Military 

Intelligence Group, primaril)' a collection element. For want of any more 

plausible arrangement, the Army gave the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency 

command of the orphaned group, thus acquiring an area of O\'Crseas intelligence responsibility that had been denied its predecessor, USAlNTC. Since 

11) Dcpmtment of the Army H1~l!li1WI Surnrncuy. Fiscal Yem 197-1, p 38 

40 t\ tcllmg mdicauon of the d1sfavor tmo whtch any type of milnary counterintelligence 

operation had fallen at this umc wrt!> l.lmgress' decision in 1974 to chsconunue all military censorship unns m the reserve components 
166 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

the SOOth Military Intelligence Group no longer had the mission of supporting a major Army headquarters in Hawaii, it redeployed lO japan in the summer of 1976. 

The Army's destre to realtgn ns coumerintclltgence command and control 

system LO beucr satisfy the civtltan leadership also contributed to the expansion 

of the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency's geographical area of responstbility. The 

Defense Investigative Review Council established guidelines that prohibited 

Army investigations of non-DOD-affiliated civilians within the fifty states and 

the Panama Canal Zone. but less stringent prohibitions were in effect overseas. 

To ensure uniform adherence to these polictes, it seemed wise to bring all counterimelltgence operations wtthm the council's junsdicuon under the control of a 

single agency. This again resulted m USAINTAS assuming responstbtlities that 

USAINTC had never exercised. The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency gained control of counterintelligence investigations in the Canal Zone and Hawaii and was 

assigned command of the 90lst Ml Detachment, which previously had reponed 

directly to the Defense Nuclear Agency. Moreover, the command began to diversify the scope of tts activities, upgrading and redestgnating its techntcal services 

element as the Operational Security Group and embarkmg on inittatives in collecting human intelligence. 

ACSl's Special Security Group also expanded its activi ties. With the fighting 

in Vietnam over, the group could at last find enough resources to implement its 

long-delayed plan to provide each Army division with a special security office. 

Experience gamed in Vietnam had demonstrated thts LO be a necesstty under 

conditions of modern warfare. 

The Army Security Agency also began to evolve m fresh directions. The first 

step was to give ASAS signal security aclivities in the Western llemisphere an 

organizational base that would conform to the new doctrine that stressed providing advice and support to commanders on signal security issues, rather than 

monitoring communications to detect violations. Thts concept emphastzed the 

posilive aspects of security rather than the negauve. and it allowed ASA to deal 

with the possibility that improperly secured electronic equipment could now 

pose as much of a security hazard as badly trained communications personnel. 

To facilitate this approach, the agency organized the Signal Security Activity at 

Vim Hill Farms Station in june 1975. 

The Signal Security ActiVll)' wok over a support function that previously 

had been fragmented among eleven separate units in the continental United 

States, Alaska, and the Canal Zone. Four subordinate field detachments. each 

with a Tt:MPESr capability, monitored the possibilny of information compromise 

from electronic emanations. AL the same time, the Army shifted general staff 

supervision over the communications security/signal secwity area from ACSI to 

the assistant chief of staff for communications and electronics. Among its other 

advantages. the transfer distanced the Anny Securit)' Agency from any further 

charges of "Sp)•ing on civilians." 
VIETNAM AND BEYOND 167 

Even more important for the Army Security Agency was the growing importance of electronic warfare, part of the agency's mission since 1955. In 1969 the 

joint Chiefs of Staff expanded the definition of electronic warfare beyond the 

accepted "jamming" and "anliJamming" roles to encompass the new concept of 

electronic support measures, which embraced threat detecuon and avoidance. 

targeting, and homing. Because of the nature of the combat situation in 

Vietnam, electronic warfare had played almost no role in that conflict. However, 

the rapid development of electronic warfare technology and the emphasis given 

to "radioelectronic combat" in the fighting doctrine of what was then the Army's 

most probable future adversary made It clear that things would be very different 

many potential high-intensity war.41 

Unfortunately, the agencys traditional emphas1s on its cryptologic m1ss1on 

and the damage the Vietnam conflict had caused, both to equipment readiness 

and to research and development, had left it poorly positioned to meet the electronic warfare threat In 1972 the Armys Scientific Advisory Board estimated that 

less than 10 percent of Army Security Agency resources were devoted to electronic 

warfare and poimed out that much of the available equipment was obsolete. 

In response, the agency began to restructure itself to give greater electronic 

warfare and signals intelligence support on the tactical level. Aerial platforms 

were fielded in Europe and Korea, and the agency began to develop new types 

of units 1 hat could integrate signals intelligence with electronic warfare. These 

units were to coordinate with the tactical formations they supported through 

ASA-manned elements \vithm unit tacucal operauons centers responsive to the 

needs of both the imelligence and operations staff officers. The events of the 

Arab-Israeli War of 1973 gave a striking demonstration of the imponance of 

electronic warfare even in a mtd-intensny conflict. In the aftermath of this conllict, Maj. Gen. George Goddmg, commanding general, U.S. Army Security 

Agency, proposed that his organization be redesignated the U.S. Army 

Electronic Warfare Command. Although the proposal was not accepted, it 

showed that ASA was now prepared to redefine irs traditional mtssion. 

By the end of 197 4 the structure of Army Intelligence was m flux. It was still 

adjusting to painful shortages of money and personnel, while at the same time 

major components of the Army lmelligence community were moving in new 

directions. However, changes were being made on a piecemeal basis. without any 

overall plan or centralized guidance. The A1my secured a chance to impose a new 

coherence on its intelligence structure on 31 December 1974, when the chief of 

staff direclecl the implementation of a comprehensive sLUdy he hoped would 

impose some cohesion on lhc manr significant changes in process. 

41 Don E. Gordon, Elcctron~e \\'arfarr: Ekmcnt of 5tmtcgy and ~fultiplir1 of Combat PO\\'t:r 

(New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 153. 

10 

Reorganization and Renewal 

T he year 1975 marked a low point for both Americas inOucnce on the international scene and the institutional position of the Army. The growing power of the 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counuies (OPEC), first manifested at the 

umc of the Yom Kippur \Var, seemed to threaten the econom1es of the Western 

mdustnahzed world in an unprecedented way. The Watergate scandal and the 

subsequent resignation of Pres1dent Richard Nixon under threat of impeachment 

had damaged the confidence of the nation in its government and had effectively 

undercut the foreign policy strategies with which President Nixon had been identified. Southeast Asia fell to Communist armies in 1975, and Soviet-backed 

regimes came to power in Angola and Mozambique. The A1my, underfunded and 

unpopular, was hard pressed to fill its ranks with quality personnel without the 

stimulus of the draft. It was under these unpromising circumstances that the 

Army drew up a new charter for intelligence, which emerged as a result of the 

Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (lOSS). 

The disillusionment resulung from the nation's long mvolvement in 

Southeast Asia was slow to dissipate. Nevertheless, the Iranian hostage crisis, 

the SoYiet mvasion of Afghamstan, and continued instability m Central America 

gradually fostered a renewed interest in American security. Although the nation 

allcmptcd to put the Vietnam experience behind it, there was no return to isolationism. From 1979 on, the country began to accelerate the buildup its defenses. By the mid-1980s the Army$ morale and strength had been reslOred, a new 

generauon of weapons for ground combat fielded, and the force structure 

increased. During this penod the lOSS reforms, conce1vcd m an environment of 

tight resources, continued lO prov1cle a viable architecture for Army Intelligence 

in a plentiful time for the Army and for mtelhgence operations m general. 

Remaking Militaty Intelligence 

The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study originated in a 1974 

memorandum from Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway to Anny Chief of 
170 t\IILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

StaiT General Frederick Weyand. "We maintain considerable information which 

JS of questionable value and seldom used," Callawa> noted, and that "really 

makes me wonder about how much money we arc wasting and raises serious 

questions as to the cost-effectiveness of our intelligence system."! 

In addition, broader considerations made an overall assessment of Army 

Intelligence appropriate. Army Intelligence resources for the 1974-1978 time 

frame had already been reduced significantly by a program-budget decision of 

the secretary of defense m 1973. The Army inspector general had recent!] 

found gra\'e deficiencies m the operauons of the Army Secunty Agency. The dismantling of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command, which had just occurred, 

meant that the Army countenntelligence and human intelligence organizauon 

was in the process of evolution. At the tactical level, the Sn:.ADFAST reorganization had abolished the ncld army command, leaving without a mission the Ml 

tactical units designed to support it. Finally, the Army in general realized that an 

overall appraisal of the intelligence structure was long overdue. Too many intelligence elements within the Army had been allowed to evolve apart from the 

development of the Army as a whole. h now seemed ume to align Arm)' 

Intelligence with the rest of the Army. The chief of staff entrusted the iniual 

steps to a panel headed by Maj Gen. joseph]. Ursano. 

After an exhaustive study of the structure and organization of Arm) 

Intelligence, the panel submiued its findings and recommendations in August 

1975. The lOSS report was cntical. It pointed out that the organization of the 

ACSl staff did not facilitate effective supervision of the Army's most crucial 

intelligence resources. The Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, ACSI's major 

contact point with the rest of the Army Staff and the other functional major 

Army commands (MACOMs), had only half the resources allotted to the staff 

elements supen·1sing mtelhgencc collection. Prionues within collection Itself 

were even more skewed. Staff supervision of human intelligence took up a 

disproportionate amount of effort. The vital signals mtelligence function was 

isolated and neglected. 

The panel found intelligence production fragmented. Various aspects of 

production were being carried on by several ACSl elements as well as the Forces 

Command; other production elemems operated under the Army Materiel 

Command and the Office of the Surgeon General. The disparate system fully 

satisfied only a portion of the Army's intelligence needs. Only a unified producuon center would, in the panel's judgment, alleviate the situation. Specific collection efforts also came under criticism. 

The Ursano panel estimated that in the security field some 80 percem of the 

Army effort went into operauons designed to counter the threat from foreign 

human intelligence organizations, and the remaining 20 percent was devoted to 

signal security. These were old and familiar functions, carried out respectively 

I lOSS, Aug 75, Exec Sum, p. 6. 
RCORGA \J IZATION AND REl\ I WAL 171 

by the U.S. Army lntelhgence Agency and the Army Sccuril) Agency. But there 

was no effort directed agamst hostile imagery intelligence and no organization 

handling the total security picture and providing support to operations security 

(OPSEC). The panel concluded that as a result the allocation of security 

resources was wildly disproportionate to the existing threat. 

The panel reserved some of its most stinging criticism for the Army Security 

Agency. The establishment of the National Security Agency/Central Security 

Service orgamzation, it found, had essemially reduced ASA headquarters LO just 

another bureaucratic layer. Lackmg any operational responsibilnies or a core of 

technical cryptologic experts, it was saddled with an immense span of control 

because of the closing of the vanous ASA theater headquarters. The Ursano 

board noted that field commanders could readily assume ASI\5 remaining support functions. Moreover, despite its best efforts, the agency was not meeting 

the Army's tactical requirements, since it could not rield enough units to support 1 he planned sixteen-division Active Army. 

A succession of previous Army rev1ews-in all, eleven had been made since 

World War 11-had upheld the Yalidll)' of the Army Secumy Agency's traditional vcntcal command structure. The Ursano panel dissemed ,·igorously. In the 

panel's opinion. the ASA pattern of organization had actually impeded the 

development of an efficient mechanism for carrying out imelligence and electronic warfare. The monopoly of signals intelligence and electronic warfare by 

an organization operating under compartmented secrecy had artificially kept 

signals intelligence out of the general intelligence now and had largely excluded 

the rest of the Army from involvement in the vital electronic warfare field. At 

the same time, ASI\s preoccupation with the cryptologic aspects of its mission 

had prevented it from keeping up with new trends in electronic warfare, despite 

the emphasis which the Ann)' now had gh·en to the latter function. 

In the field, the lOSS report charged, the Army Security Agency's organizational and functional independence worked against the effective integration of 

all-source intelligence that was now necessary. It also imposed substantial 

administrative costs, since unit G-2s at tactical operations centers had LO coordinate the intelligence now produced by three separate clements: ASA, regular 

Military Intelligence units, and the special security officer dissemination system. 

Each of these elements had its own separate communications system and its 

own separate support system. 

The Intelligence Organizatiol1 and 

Stationing Study: Solutio11 s 

The Ursano panel recommended radical surgery to correct the perceived 

deficiencies of the Army Intelligence structure. Its complex prescription called 

for both centralization and decentralization. The heart of the suggested program, however, was dismantling the Army Security Agency. ASI\s tactical units 
172 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

should be resubordinated to field commanders and ils traming and research and 

development functions assigned to other major commands m conformity with 

the pattern which the McNamara reforms and the STr:ADr-AST reorganization of 

1973 established for the rest of the Army. The lOSS report offered three alternatives for realigning Army strategic and theater support intelligence assets. Under 

the proposal finally adopted, the Army Security Agency$ headquarters and fixed 

field stations would become the core of a new maJor command. By adding the 

U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. those Military Intelligence groups engaged in a 

theater support role, and the various intelligence producuon elements to this 

base, the Army would create, for the first time, an integrated intelligence, security, and electronic warfare organization capable of fulfilling its national requirements. 

At the tactical level, the proposals called for organizational decentralization 

and funclional integration. With the dissolution of ASI\s vertical command 

structure, ASA and Ml field units could merge into a single system of unified 

intelligence and electronic warfare forces. Ln the committee's view, tactical 

Special Security Offices could become pan of the units they supported. Army 

tacucal commanders at the corps level and below would thus for the first time 

have substantially the same control over their intelligence assets as they did O\'er 

the rest of the forces assigned to them. Signals intelligence would be merged 

into the all-source intelligence needed to meet tactical requirements.2 

The recommendations raised a number of questions, one of which involved 

the issue of acceptability. The commanding general of the Army Security 

Agency, Maj. Gen. George Godding, rather predictably did not concur, not only 

because of the impending dismemberment and transformation of his organization, but also because of the proposed reorganizations possible effect on cryptologr. On the whole, howe,·er, the Armys response was very positive. The new 

arrangemems seemed to be des1gned to give the commander in the field what 

he wanted. The response from USAREUR, for instance, not onl)' expressed support for the concept, but also demonstrated Army reservations about some of 

the features previously associated with intelligence work: "MI is fighting its way 

back to acceptance by the Army community. SLOvepiping and restoring the 

'spook' image must be avoided."3 Under the LOSS concept, Army Intelligence 

would march in step with the rest of the Army, a prospect that pleased many. 

One question which the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study left 

unresoh·ed was that of command. The ACSl suggested that control of the proposed new intelligence and security command be \'CSted in himself. This 

arrangement would have gl\·en Army intelligence an mstJtutional structure 

strong!)' resembling that of World War 11 , when the G-2 had controlled the 

2 Department of t.hc A11ny I lt'>toriwl Sumnuuy, Fiscal Year 1976 (WashlllgiOn, D.C.: U.S. Armr 

Center of Military History, 1977), pp. 25-26. 

3 lOSS, Aug 75, vol. I, ch. 8, ann B. p. 2. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENEWAL 173 

Military Intelligence Service and after 1944 the strategic operations of the Army 

Signal Security Agency. 

This proposal was rejected, however, and the new major command was allotted a commander of its own. The ACSI suggestion ran against the doctrine that 

staff and line functions should be separated, and it posed another problem. After 

the adverse publicity of the early 1970s, intelligence was still a sensitive field. At 

the time Army leadership believed that any merger of policy formulation and program management functions with operational capabilities would "deny the CSA 

[chief of staff of the Am1y] a check and balance mechanism believed necessary in 

todays environment of sensitivity LO intelligence activities."4 

Implementation of the lOSS proposals began in 1976. The Army realigned 

elements within OACSI, initiated staff planning for a new intelligence and security command, and fielded the first experimental intelligence and electronic 

warfare battalion. The U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School at 

Fort Devens, Massachuseus, was resubordinated to the U.S. Army Intelligence 

Center and School at Fon Huachuca, along with its two detachments at 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, and the Navy facility at Corry Station, 

Florida. This shift achieved the long-standing Army goal of centralizing all 

Military Intelligence training and further enhanced the importance of the Army 

Intelligence Center and School itself. The latter organization already had 

achieved the status of a general officer command after absorbing the Combat 

Developments Command Intelligence Agency and the Combat Surveillance and 

Electronic Warfare School. In 1983 the rank of the Army Intelligence Center 

and School commander was elevated to two stars after the commander received 

proponency over the Military lntel1igence Branch and assumed the title of chief 

of Military lntelligence.5 

In addition, the Special Security Group was radically reorganized, losing its 

operational role in communications and its tactical elements. By the end of 

1976 tactical special security offices came under the control of ASA direct support units. Ironically, the Army Security Agency achieved the control over this 

organization, which it had sought for twenty years, just before its own demise. 

Concurremly, the Army restructured what remained of the Special Security 

Group along functional rather than regional lines through seven special security 

commands, each of which controlled subordinate offices servicing differem 

major commands.6 The culmination of the lOSS reorganization came on 1 

4 lOSS, Aug 75, voL 1, ch. 8, p. 61. 

5 Saunders, "U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School.n The transfer of Ml Branch proponency to the commandant of the U.S. Am1y Intelligence Center and School took place as pan of 

an Army-wide shHt of this function from the Army Staff to the TRADOC schools. Proponency 

allowed the chief of Military Intelligence 10 initiate and coordinate actions in the areas of force 

structure, unit deployment and sustainment, and personnel acquisition, traimng, and distribution. It did not, however, give him control over individual career management. 

6 History of United States Army Special Security Group, n.d., p. 6, INSCOM History 

Office files. 
174 MILITARY lNTELUGENCE 

january 1977, with the forma tion of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security 

Command (INSCOM) at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. 

New Directions for Military Intelligence: INSCOM 

The Anny formed the new major command, INSCOM, by redesignating the 

U.S. Army Security Agency as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command 

and reassigning the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, as well as ACSl's and 

FORSCOM'S intelligence production units, to the new command.7 At the same 

time, control of AS&, tactical units reverted to the supported commanders. The 

training, personnel, research and development, and materiel acquisition and 

administration functions which the Army Security Agency had canied out were 

assumed by other major commands and by elements of the Army Staff. INSCOM 

also assumed command of rhree Military Intelligence Groups located overseas: the 

66th in Germany, the 470th in Panama, and rhe SOOth in Japan. Previously, these 

units had been assigned respectively to USAREUR and Seventh Army, FORSCOM, 

and the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. Despite the similarity of their designations, these groups varied widely in size and mission; moreover, theater commanders continued to exercise operational control over the units. On 1 October 1977, 

the former U.S. Army Intelligence Agency headquarters became pan of INSCOM, 

and the command established a unified intelligence production element, the 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, on l January 1978. 

INSCOM provided the Anny with a single instrument tO conduct multidiscipline intelligence and security operations and electronic warfare at the level above 

corps and to produce finished intelligence tailored to the Atmy~ needs. The new 

major command merged divergent intelligence disciplines and traditions in a 

novel way. lts creation marked the most radical realignment of Army Intelligence 

assets in a generation. WithoUl fully realizing it, the Army had achieved not a 

"multidiscipline" organization, but an interdisciplinary approach to intelligence 

collection. The new command provided Army Intelligence with a framework 

within which the individual intelligence disciplines could cross-cue one another; 

rhe results of this collective effort would be greater than the sum of its parts. 

Traditionally, the Army Security Agency had been the centerpiece of the 

Army Intelligence community in terms of personnel and resources. When the 

agency melded into lNSCOM under the new realignment, it lost its vertical 

command structure, many of its functions, and thirty of its tactical units. As a 

result, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) William l. Rolya, the former ASA commanding general who became lNSCOM~ first head, found himself heading an organization considerably smaller than its predecessor, ahhough it had gained the U.S. 

Atmy Intelligence Agency, the theater Military Intelligence groups, and produc7 Department of the Anny Histmical Summary, Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History. 1979), pp. 30-31. 
REORGANIZAT100J AND RENEWAL 175 

uon elements. However, the U.S. Army lntelligence and Security Command had 

at its disposal a wide array of dtvcrse assets. Initially, these mcluded eight fixed 

field stations inherited from ASA-three of them in the Far East, two in the continental United States, two in Germany, and one in Turkey. There were also the 

three intelligence groups overseas, transformed into multidisciplinary units by 

mcorporating former ASA assets imo the previously existing clements. A fourth, 

the 50 1st Military Intelligence Group, was soon organized in Korea. Because of 

Eighth Ann}'S special requirements, the unit not only carried out a theater support missiOn, but also performed funcuons executed elsewhere b)' the Armys 

corps-level intelligence organizations. 

In the continental United States, INSCOM received command over various 

single-discipline elements: the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center; the 

CONUS Ml Group, wh ich furnished cryptologic personnel to the National 

Security Agency and controlled the two field stations in the United States; an 

expanded 902d Military Intelligence Group, which was assigned a combined 

counterintelligence and signal security support mission throughout the continental United States; the Cemral Security Facility, which mamtained the counterintelligence records in the Intelligence Records Repository; and a number of 

other specialized subordinate umts. Significantly, one function which the 

Central Security Facility previously performed- the adjudication of Military 

Intelligence-related and other sensitive clearances within the Army-shifted in 

October 1977 to a new Central Clearance Facility administered by the Military 

Personnel Center. This was clone partially w further standardize the clearance 

process throughout the Army, secondarily to remove the process from Army 

Intelligence control, on the grounds that the investigative function should not 

be combined 'vVHh the judicial 

With the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command in place, ACSI 

found it expedient to surrender control of most of the remaining operating 

funcuons to the new organization. Ever since the 1950s, the ACSis operating 

responsibilities had waxed and waned cyclically as various incumbents transferred control of field operating agencies back and forth between OACSI and 

Fort Holabird. Now came another turn of the wheel. In 1978 lNSCOM took 

over the Armys Russian Institute in Germany and in 1980 assumed command 

of the Special Security Group. A year later, OACSI discontinued its Inspector 

General's Office, since substantially all of its field activities had gone to 

INSCOM, and there was liule in the field to inspect. 

The U.S. Army lmelligence and Security Command faced certain problems 

when It started out. At first it was hampered by a shortage of resources. By the 

end of fiscal year 1978 only 10,400 people were assigned to the new command, 

debilitating shortages in key Military Intelligence specialties existed, and the 

command found itself unable to completely meet all the national collection 

requirements with which it had been tasked. However, the readiness situation 

improved steadily, as a new national consensus regarding the importance of 
176 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

intelligence brought a greater infusion of resources. By J 985, 15,000 persons 

were assigned to LNSCOM.8 

The commands institutional and structural problems wok longer to solve. 

INSCOM was designed to perform intelligence and security operations at the echelon above corps, but the precise structure of this echelon continued to be a matter of doctrinal dispute within the ATmy. The Army's traditional echelon above 

corps, the field army, had been discontinued in 1973 and replaced with a joint 

command system. lNSCOMs broad responsibilities and the diverse nature of the 

units it commanded posed another problem. Proposals were made to stmpltfy the 

command structure by creating additional subordinate headquarters overseas, as 

the Army Security Agency had done originally, but overseas headquarters elements proved expensive, and INSCOM finally abandoned this approach. 

Additionally, the commands exact role in electronic warfare remained undefined. 

Although lNSCOM was the main proponent, its units were limited in this area. 

The field of intelligence production also continued to present difficulties. 

The lOSS panel had origmally recommended that all Army Intelligence production resources be brought LOgether in a single location. llowever, Army leaders 

decided that the Armys scicnufic, technical, and medical mtelligence producoon responstbilities would contmue to be dispersed among three separate centers under the Army Materiel Command and the Office of the Surgeon General. 

lt even proved impossible for INSCOM to collocate all elements of its own production center, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. Although most of 

the center's resources were at Arlington Hall Stalion, it proved physically 

impracticable to move some of its major production functions from either the 

Washington Navy Yard or Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

How to impose a satisfactory organization on all Army intelligence production elements was resolved temporarily in 1985 by a more or less 

Solomomc decision. The lntelltgencc and Threat Analysts Center was remo\·cd 

from INSCOM and resubordinated to a new Army Intelligence Agency, a field 

operaung agency of ACSI with headquarters in Northern Virginia. At the same 

time, the new agency was given command of the Army Missile and Space 

Intelligence Center and the Foreign Science and Technology Center. The 

Surgeon General's Medical Intelligence and Information Agency had become a 

joim service organization. Army intelligence production still remained geographically dispersed, but the situation was improved when elements of the 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center moved to the Washington Navy Yard. 

The new arrangement again made ACSI a major player in the field of intelligence operations, for the Army Intelligence AgenC)', wnh a personnel strength 

of l ,500, was as large as the Army's intelligence production organization 

before the creation of OIA. 

8 One of the few menuon5 of INSCOM in open sources can be found m Jeffrey Richelson, 

fh(· U.S. Intelligence Commumty (Cambridge. Mass.: Ballinger Publishmg Co., 1985), pp. 66-68. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENEWAL 177 

Finally, INSCOM operations were impeded by physical limilations that 

split its headquarters elements between two Army posts forty miles apart. The 

physical facilities which lNSCOM inherited from its predecessor organizations, ASA and USAINTA, simply were too limited. Attempts to find a suitable 

central headquarters location either at Fort Meade, Maryland, or at Vint Hill 

Farms, Virginia, repeatedly fell to political and fiscal constraints. However, the 

withdrawal of the large DIA presence from Arlington Hall in 1985 at last 

made it possible for planners to order that all headquarters elemems be consolidated at that site during the following year. Nevertheless, a number of 

subordinate units at Fort Meade, including the Central Security Facility, 

remained behind, and Arlington Hall proved only a way station. In 1985 the 

Army finally decided that LNSCOM's permanent headquarters would eventually be located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The command finally relocated in the 

summer of 1989. 

Despite its initial growing pains, lNSCOM provided a useful base on which 

the Army could build an expanded intelligence program once the long slide in 

defense spending was arrested. Human intelligence received fresh emphasis, as 

did the expansion of the commands cryptologic activities. In 1980 lNSCOM 

established an Army presence at a joint service field station in Kunia, Hawaii. 

This was the first new Army field station set up outside the continental United 

States since the Vietnam War. Two years later, it organized another new field station in Panama from resources already in place. Later, the command fielded 

Army technical control and analysis elements to provide better cryptologic support to tactical Militaty Intelligence units. 

A major new Military Intelligence unit based in the United States, the 

513th Military Intelligence Group, was activated in 1982. The group would 

support possible operations of the Army component of Central Command 

(CENTCOM), the unified command created that year to deal with contingency situations in Southwest Asia. As initially configured, the group exercised command and control over three flexibly organized battalions: the 

20lst, 202d, and 203d Military Intelligence Battalions. Later, the 513th organized a TDA Military Intelligence baualion to deal with low-intensity connict 

situations. 

The group's 203d Military Lntelligence Battalion at first was organized as a 

technical intelligence unit, indicating the Army's renewed interest in this sometimes neglected area. The banalions main operating unit was the 11th Military 

Intelligence Company, the latest in a succession of company-size units that had 

stayed at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Matyland, since the 1960s. In 1978 this 

company had acquired the important additional mission of supporting the 

Armys Opposing Forces (OPFOR) training program. However, conflict soon 

developed between the technical imelligence battalion's mission of deploying 

overseas with its parent group in a contingency situation and its tasking to support the OPFOR program in the United States. A subsequent reorganization 
178 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

reassigned the technical intelligence function to the Foreign Materiel 

Intelligence Group, a TDA unit directly subordinate to lNSCOM headquarters, 

bUlthe 513th regained the mission in 1989.9 

By 1985 the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was redefining 

its structure and practices along a variety of fronts. The resubordination of its 

production element to the Army Intelligence Agency allowed the command to 

focus most of its energies on its principal mission-managing the Armys strategic and theater-level collection resources. However, a reexamination of 

INSCOM:S organization revealed that it was still carrying out functions of combat development and materiel development that in theory were supposed to 

have been transferred to TRADOC and the Army Materiel Command. Although 

INSCOM attempted to step out of these fields, the commands nucleus of resident experts made it difficult to abandon all its developmental efforts, since no 

other organization was prepared to address such requirements. 

More definite resolutions were found in other areas, one of which was 

coumerintelligence. As revelations of successful penetrations of Americas most 

sensitive agencies by hostile intelligence services mounted, 1985 became the 

"Year of the Spy."lO The Intelligence and Security Command moved to reconfigure its limiled coumerintelligence assets into more productive arrangements to 

meet the Armys needs. ln the process, the command moved away from a concept of providing general operational security support to all Army elements in 

favor of a narrower focus on priority objectives, such as expanding polygraph 

examinations and technical services countermeasures and providing counterintelligence support to the Army's growing number of Special Access Programs 

(SAPs)-highly sensitive projects that required exceptional security measures. 

In turn, this concern led to a reorganization of the commands main counterintelligence unit in the United States, the 902d Military lmelligence Group. 

Originally organized on geographic lines into three TDA battalions, the groups 

subordinate elements were restructured on a functional, rather than geographic, 

basis in 1985. At the same time, the group was given greater responsibility for 

handling counterespionage operations in the continental United States. 

Change continued in 1986. Beginning that year, INSCOM's five multidiscipline intelligence groups were redesignated as brigades. This transition was 

intended to be more than cosmetic; the units would now be organized for possible warfighting, rather than having structures geared to national collection 

requirements in time of peace. A basic brigade was designed to consist of a 

headquarters and headquarters company, a numbered echelon above corps 

9 The Foreign Materiel Intelligence Group was redesignated the Foreign Materiel Intelligence 

Battalion and resubordinated to the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade on 16 October 1989. In 

1996 this TOA battalion was discontinued and the mission assumed by the provisional 203d Ml 

Battalion. 

10 Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polgar, Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale (New 

York: Delacorte Press, 1988). p. 2. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENE\VAL 179 

mtelhgence center for intelligence production, a signals mtelltgence baualton, 

an imager)' analysis battalion. a counterintelligence baualion, an interrogation 

and exploitation baualion, and a collection element. Because of the diversity of 

intelligence requirements in the several theaters, however, the actual units allotted to each !NSCOM brigade would differ. ln the event of mobilization, 

INSCOM leaders planned to call up reserve component units as needed to bring 

the brigades to full strength. Addnionall)', the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and 

School drew up new TOEs that mandated the conversion of the commands 

flexible battalions mto fixed elements. 

Fmally, INSCOM took action to redesignate some of its TDA units as numbered Military Intelligence brigades, battalions, and companies in the 700 

series. Unlls redesignated included the Continental United States Military 

Intelligence Group and a number of field stations. This would provide units 

with designations more intell igible to the rest of the Army, and it would 

enhance the pride and esprit of their assigned soldiers. As a result of this step, 

existing command assets combined into three new Military Intelligence Brigades 

(the 70lst, 703d, and 704th) and a number of new battalions in 1987. 

The Combat Electronic Waifare and Intelligence Concept 

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command was only pan of the 

new organizational design which the Intelligence Organization and Stationing 

Study imposed upon Army Intelligence. The lOSS also had brought about a 

major realignment of the Army's tactical intelligence assets in the field. These 

reforms drastically reshuffled the old command channels in the tactical arena. 

With the dissolution of the Army Security Agency's vertical command structure , all former ASA tactical elements were now under the command of the 

umts they supponed. At the same time, the Army formed new integrated 

combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWl) umts to carry out functions previously performed by a variety of different organizations. This new 

type of Military Intelligence unit JOined together Military Intelligence and former Army Security Agency assets. 

Two separate institulional thrusts combined lO create the ultimate CEWl 

structure. The first was a growing belief that under conditions of modern warfare it was absolutely essential that a combat division have its own organic intelligence capability. This concept marked a revolution in Arm)' mstitutional thinkmg. The Army had reorganized the division force structure twice since the 

Korean War, creating the pentom1c division in 1957 and replacing it with the 

ROAD diVISIOn in 1962. Each time, its leaders had explicitly rejected the idea of 

makmg an intelligence unit organic to the division, partially because linguistic 

requirements would vary so greatly under different theater conditions. Until 

1969 Army divisions received intelligence support, apart from signals intelligence, from attached Military Intelligence units. Although most of these detach-
180 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

mems subsequently had been expanded to full companies, such elements were 

still only temporary attachments to the division. 

ln the mid-1970s, after intensive study and testing, the Army reversed its 

stance and allotted each division an organic intelligence company. Army policy 

makers had finally concluded that the incorporation of permanent intelligence 

units into divisions would provide better peacetime training opportunities and 

would forestall the necessity of hastily assembling the requisite intelligence 

assets whenever a war broke out. Such units would also furnish a convenient 

locus from which to manage radar and ground sensor assets previously dispersed throughout the division. One underlying assumption was the growing 

importance of various technical collection mechanisms in relation to human 

intelligence sources on the future baulefield. This technology-driven approach 

complemented the newly developed process the Anny termed "the Intelligence 

Preparation of the Baulefield," in which data on enemy, weather, and terrain 

would be plotted on map overlays to provide commanders with a graphic intelligence estimate.! I 

The second and more important element leading to the creation of CEWI 

units was the emphasis of lOSS on the need tO integrate diverse intelligence disciplines in the field, both to enhance the support provided commanders and to 

reduce overhead. The end result of this process came when a TRADOC study 

group produced the first blueprint for a CEWI type of unit in early 1976. An 

experimental combat electronic warfare and intelligence battalion, the 522d 

Military Intelligence Battalion, was fielded later that same year at Fort Hood, 

Texas, and assigned to the 2d Armored Division. The successful activation of this 

prototype CEWI battalion meant that the TOE of the divisional intelligence company, which appeared the same year. was already obsolete. The Armys acceptance of the need for battalion-size units to support divisional intelligence 

requirements demonstrated how far the discipline had come since its World War 

I beginnings, when divisions had met their intelligence needs with staffs of four 

officers and a few enlisted men and militarized civilians serving as field clerks. 

An agreed-upon TOE for an organic divisional CEWl battalion appeared in 

1979. Significantly, the TOE for this new-model Military Intelligence unit was 

numbered in a different series from previous Military Intelligence and Army 

Security Agency tables of organization and equipment. The new organizational 

table provided for a headquarters and headquarters and operations company 

containing collection management, counterintelligence, and interrogation personnel, and included a platoon of helicopters configured for electronic missions. 

II IPB: Intelligence Preparation or the Baulefield (Fon Huachuca, Ariz.: U.S. Army 

Intelligence Center and School. n.d.). The IPB process was potentially adaptable to automation. 

This seemed a necessity, since it was estimated in the 1970s that a corps commander in a 

European war scenario would have to track some 35,000 "movers, shooters, and emiuers» in the 

adversary [orce. G. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and tlte Common Defense (New Haven: Yale 

University Press. 1990), p. 145. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENEWAL 181 

It also called for three line companies that respectively carried out functional 

missions of collection and jamming, ground surveillance through radars and 

sensors, and service supporl. The new structure thus merged existing intelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare assets available at division 

level and integrated them with divisional ground sensor and ground surveillance radar elements. l2 Planners also contemplated giving the unit a long-range 

reconnaissance patrol capability, an addition initially rejected but revived a 

decade later. Subsequently, the pattern of organization prescribed by the 1979 

TOE was modified often in the field, as "company teams" containing elements 

from all disciplines were organized on an ad hoc basis LO suppon the requirements of each of a division's three brigades.l3 

Although combat divisions continued to have separate reconnaissance battalions and were now allotted target acquisition batteries, the creation of the 

CEWI unit meam that the division's tactical operations center could draw on the 

resources of a single element to meet the bulk of its intelligence, security, and 

electronic warfare needs, rather than having to deal with fragmented elements 

scattered throughout the divisional structure. The CEW1 battalion organization 

was intended to be strong enough to provide the diverse intelligence disciplines 

it contained with the necessary support. Since only a quarter of the CEWl battalions strength consisted of highly trained intelligence specialists, it allowed 

maximum use of these scarce resources.14 

The organization of the division-level CEWl battalion was only the beginning of a wholesale restrucwring of Army Intelligence at the level of tactical 

suppon. Company-size CEWl units were formed to support separate brigades 

and armored cavalry regiments. The Army also replaced all its active componem 

Military Intelligence battalions, air reconnaissance support, with "military intelligence battalions, aerial exploitation." These new units consisted of a headquarters and headquaners company, an imagery interpretation company, a combat 

intelligence company (aerial surveillance), and an electronic warfare aviation 

company (forward). When the battalion operated independently, an electronic 

warfare aviation company (rear) could be attached. The concept provided a 

suitable managemem framework for the Armys own aerial assets and integrated 

different types of mission aircraft into a single unit.l5 

12 Don Gordon. "CEWI Battalion: Intelhgence and Electronic Warfare on the BatLlefield," 

Militm)' Intelligence 5 (October-December 1979): 22-28. 

13 Company Team Commander Responsibilities, 313th Ml Bn (CEWI), 82d Airborne Dh·, 

Apr 84, copy in INSCOM History Office files. 

H Gordon, "CEWI Battalion.~ p. 27 

15 This change m force structure was m pan dtctated by the fact that relying on traditional Air 

Force photo-reconnaissance platforms in a htgh-mtensity conflict no longer seemed a vtable proposition Army aerial assets could conduct various forms of electromc surveillance while O)~ng in rclauve safety behmd thetr O\Vll [rom hnes. The disconunuance of MIBARS units m the Active Army 

meant that the Army would henceforth rely on INSCOM IMINT compames and on the reserYe components to provide tmagery mtcrpreter support [or Air Force tactical reconnaissance missiOns. 
182 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Initially the capstone of the new tactical support intelligence structure, the 

Military Intelligence group functioned at the corps level. The rirst of these units 

activated, the 504th Military Intelligence Group, went to support the Ill Corps 

at Fort Hood, Texas, in 1978.16 In 1985, the 20lst, 205th, 207th, 504th, and 

525th Military Intelligence Groups assigned to support the five corps then operational in the Active Army were all upgraded to bligade status. Each Military 

Intelligence brigade consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, 

an operations battalion, an aerial exploitation battalion, and an interrogation 

and exploitation battalion. 

Military Intelligence in the Reserve Components 

The integration and reorganization of the Army's intelligence elemems were 

not confined to the Active Army, but also affected the reserve components. The 

end result of the process was to greatly expand the Military Intelligence presence in these components. While the 24th Military Intelligence Battalion continued as an aerial reconnaissance support unit, the three existing ASA battalions 

and the single field army type of Military Intelligence baualion in the Army 

Reserve were all converted to CEWI units, and four additional battalions were 

activated. Actual implementation of the program took some time. The first 

Army Reserve CEWI unit, the 138th Military Intelligence Banalion, •vas not 

activated until late 1983, and not until 1988 did the last remaining Army 

Security Agency battalion in the reserve phase om. 

Initially, the Army had determined that all combat electronic warfare and 

intelligence battalions in the reserve structure would belong to the Army Reserve. 

The National Guard operated under state control in peacetime, and national policy makers had reservations about placing sensitive intelligence assets under state 

government control. Ultimately, the intelligence community decided that policy 

considerations did not preclude establishing such units in the National Guard. 

and the 629th Military Intelligence Baualion was organized in 1988 to se1vice the 

intelligence and electronic warfare needs of the Maryland-Virginia National 

Guards 29th lnfanuy Division. This issue did not a1ise in the case of non-CEVVl 

types of National Guard military intelligence units, and aerial exploitation baualions appeared in the Georgia and Oregon National Guards in 1982. 

One National Guard unit cominued to provide unique support to Armywide imelligence requirements. In 1980 the l42d Military Intelligence Battalion 

was organized in the Utah National Guard. replacing a similar company-size 

unit originally organized in 1960. This TDA battalion, a linguist unit, drew 

heavily from a pool of expertise provided by members of the Church of jesus 

Christ of Latter Day Saints who had previously undergone language training to 

16 This unit was created by reorganizing and redesignattng the 504th Army Security Agency 

Group, originally acltvated m 1974 to provide cryptologic support to FORSCOM. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENEWAL 183 

carry out overseas missionary work. Baualion personnel on temporary duty 

repeatedly assisted the Regular Army in meeting its linguistic needs. The concept was so successful that in 1988 the battalion was convened to a TOE unit; a 

second similar battalion was organized in the Utah National Guard; and a IDA 

unit, the 300th Military Intelligence Brigade, was created to provide command 

and control. Later, the Anny approved the organization of Guard linguist battalions in several other states. 

Training continued LO present difficulties for intelligence units both in the 

reserve components and in the Regular Army. Many intelligence specialties 

could not be exercised normally in hometown environments or even under garrison conditions. However, in 1978 the Intelligence and Security Command 

instituted the Readiness Training Program (REDTRAIN) to expose practitioners 

of intelligence disciplines throughout the Army to "enrichmem" programs. 

REDTRAIN allowed both reservists and Regular Army soldiers to further their 

skills by participating in current operations. In practice, this was accomplished 

either by assigning personnel on temporary duty tO units with an operational 

mission or by bringing the mission to the unit. 

Military Intelligence in the 1980s 

The 1980s were prosperous years for the Anny, especially for its restrucLUred intelligence component. The formation of INSCOM and the implementation of the CEWI concept not only affected intelligence operations throughout 

the Army, but also drew the Military Intelligence Branch firmly into the mainstream of the service. For the first Lime, most MI personnel were assigned to 

TOE units. By 1988 five Ml brigades and no less than thiny MI battalions had 

been formed under the CEWI concept to suppon tactical units in the fie ld, 

while another five TOE MI brigades and ten TOE single-function battalions carried out theater- and national-level suppon missions under INSCOM. Twentyfive thousand Military lmelligence specialists-over 15 percent of them 

female-were on active duty, backed up by another 8,700 in the reserve components. The active duty Military Intelligence component alone was as large as the 

entire Regular Army had been in 1885, when the Army first created a permanent imelligence organization. As retired Lt. Gen. james A. Williams, a former 

director of DLA, pointed out, the Army now had "the equivalem of two combat 

divisions in collection and analysis. "17 

There were still significant shortfalls in a number of areas. The proliferation 

of job opportunities presented by an information-based society made recruiting 

and retaining personnel in a number of intelligence specialties a pressing concern for what continued to be an all-volunteer force. The tactical-level force 

17 Benjamin F. Schemmer. ''Former DLA Director Urges That Four-Star Should Head All 

Military Intelligence," Armed Forces)ournallntemational, Feb 88, p. 24. 
184 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

structure had grown so large that some Army Intelligence professionals questioned whether it could be maintained indefinitely, given anticipated constraints 

on Army resources and the competing demands of the Army's echelon above 

corps intelligence structure. The lightning advance of technology, combined 

with convoluted contracting and procurement procedures and growing fiscal 

constraints, had left the Army saddled with equipment that fell far behind the 

state of the an in many intelligence disciplines. For much of its aerial work, 

Army Intelligence still depended upon the durable Mohawk, which despite its 

considerable virtues was now thirty years old. Almost thirty-five years after the 

inception of Project MICHIGAN, the Army was still struggling to field a satisfactory remOLely piloted vehicle-a pilotless reconnaissance aircraft. Army tactical 

signals intelligence and electronic intelligence resources in the field were 

mounted on slow and overloaded carriers that could not keep up with the new 

generation of Army tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Moreover, as 1990 

approached there were already signs that the greatest defense buildup since the 

Korean War was about to end, and this necessitated further changes in the organization of Army Intelligence. 

In 1987, however, two significant developments seemed to confirm that the 

Army had at last accepted its Intelligence arm as an equal member in its fami ly 

of branches. In May of that year the position of ACSl was upgraded to deputy 

chief of staff for intelligence (DCSlNT), a change that ended the position of perceived organizational inferiority of the Army Intelligence staff post. Lt. Gen. 

Sidney T. Weinstein became the Army's first DCSINT. That same year, Army 

Imelligence became pan of the regimental system that embodied the heritage of 

the U.S. Army. On 1 July 1987, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the esrablishmem of intell igence as a Regular Army branch, all Army Intelligence personnel, 

military and civilian, became pan of a single large regiment, the Military 

Intelligence Corps, headed by the commanding general, U.S. Army Intelligence 

Center and School. Although symbolic, the measure was significant. Maj. Gen. 

julius Parker, the first chief of the Military Intelligence Corps, called the step "a 

recognition and celebration of our evolution from a plethora of diverse and separate intelligence agencies into the cohesive M I community we enjoy today. ln 

short, it symbolizes the fact that Army Intelligence has truly arrived."l8 

Additional proofs that General Parkers statement was not overly optimistic 

were soon forthcoming. In 1987 the Army published a detailed Army 

Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Target Acquisition Plan (AlMP). The AIMP 

conceptualized the future structure of Army lmelligence as a "system of systems" and laid out a detailed and coherent road map of the measures needed to 

reshape the Army's intelligence organizations and technologies in ways that 

would satisfy future requirements. In 1989 INSCOM shifted its headquarters 

18 Ltr, Chief. Military Intelligence, HuaciJUca Scout (Mrlitary Intelligence Corps Activation 

Supplement). 25Jun 87, p. 2. 
REORGANIZATION AND RENEWAL 185 

from Arlington Hall Station to a site on the nonh post of Fon Belvoir, Virginia. 

INSCOM's new headquarters facility, the Nolan Building, was named in honor 

of Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, Pershing's G-2 in World War !.This was the first 

Army Intelligence headquarters ever designed specifically for its purpose. In 

1990 the chief of Military Intelligence became commanding general of the U.S. 

Army Intelligence Center and Fon Huachuca. This step paved the way for the 

eventual closure of the Intelligence School at Fon Devens, Massachusetts, and 

the consolidation of almost all Military Intelligence training at Fon Huachuca. 

Meanwhile, the internal evolution of Military Intelligence within the Army was 

already being affected by outside events. 

ll 

A Future of Uncertainties 

The year 1989 was an "annus mirabilis," a time of wonders, in which the 

world geopolitical framework in place since the end of World War ll was 

overturned. As military historian Michael Howard commented, "while the 

nations of Western Europe ce lebrated the bicentennial of the French 

Revolution, the nations of Eastern Europe reenacted it."l After so many years, 

the Iron Curtain finally paned, and with it the Berlin Wall and so many of the 

other symbolic and real barriers that had divided east from west. With tides 

of democracy sweeping through Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact was no 

longer relevant. The Soviet Union itself appeared in a new light-no longer 

the Great Bear of international politics, but an ideologically and economically 

bankrupt society showing ominous signs of fragmentation along ethnic and 

national lines. For all practical purposes, the looming threat of Soviet power 

that had gripped the attention of Western policy makers for so many years 

was suddenly gone. 

Since 1989 these developments have dramatically restructured America's 

defense policy. Ever since the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army had essentially staked its raison d'etre on countering a massive tank-led Warsaw Pact 

offensive against Western Europe. With this threat no longer viable, the nations 

armed forces were slowly downsized and redeployed. The numbers governing 

the rate, scope, and exact nature of this process shifted with each new indication of communism$ decline. In 1990 the Army implemented Project VANGUARD 

to bring aboUl a controlled reduction of its strength in ways that would leave as 

much of its fighting forces intact as possible, a task to be accomplished initially 

through a radical trimming of headquarters elements. 

However, just as the Soviet threat receded and pundits began to talk aboUl 

the pleasant possibilities of a "peace dividend," a new array of international 

challenges appeared. In December 1989 American forces stormed Panama in 

Operation jUST CAUSE, overthrowing the regime of its narcotics-linked strong1 Michael Howard, "The Springumc of Nations," Fomgn Affa•rs 69, no. 1, p. 17. 
188 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

man, General Manuel Noriega. Eight months later, crisis flared in the Middle 

Easl. An Iraqi invasion of the tiny emirate of Kuwait, threatening both the 

worlds oil supply and the stability of a potential new world order, led to a massive American response. The United States deployed over 500,000 men and 

women to the Persian Gulf region-the largest buildup of troops since 

Vietnam-and then committed them lO battle in Operation DESERT STORM, a 

lightning air and ground war that resulted in complete victory. 

Despite these conflicting crosscurrents of events, planning for retrenchment of the force continued. Nevertheless, it was clear that the post-Cold 

War world would continue to hold unforeseen and unforeseeable perils. In 

the unstructured international environment created by the sudden collapse of 

the bipolar world order imposed by the Cold War, crises could-and didtake place in almost any region of the globe. The prospect of a smaller Army 

and a more diffused but wider menace would inevitably affect the institutional arrangements of Military Intelligence, since intelligence organizations are 

necessarily shaped by the threat as well as the force structure in place. ln 

addition to preparing for contingency operations, Army Intelligence now had 

to moniwr arms verification agreements, fight terrorism, maintain a vigilant 

watch against espionage, and assume a counter-drug mission in support of 

civilian authorities. 

The challenges of j UST CAUSE and DESERT STORM-successive crises occurring half a world apart and in totally unrelated linguistic environments-had 

already made large demands on Military Intelligence and appeared to serve as 

a portent for the future. On the whole, the Army had met these demands successfully. INSCOMs 470th Military Intelligence Brigade and its attached 29th 

Military Intelligence Battalion had been in place in Panama when that crisis 

broke. lNSCOM's 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, with a long-standing 

contingency mission to support the U.S. Army Central Command, had been 

at least partially positioned to meet Army intelligence requiremems when 

deployment to the Persian Gulf began. Once brigade elements had moved to 

Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Army intelligence and Security Command augmented 

the unit from its own assets around the globe. As the situation reached its climax, the brigade's echelon-above-corps intelligence center was expanded to a 

full operauons battalion and placed in support of the G-2 of Cemral 

Command's Army component. Two corps CEWl brigades, the 504th and 

525th Ml brigades, and divisional CEWI units supported the intelligence 

effon in Southwest Asia with their own resources, and reserve component 

units and individual mobilization augmentees deployed lO assist. 

In this intelligence campaign, high technology at last came into its own. A 

variety of ground terminals received information provided by diverse national 

and theater intelligence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles-the new Army term 

for remotel) comrolled pilotless aircraft-were finally fielded to provide collection and targeting data, and the Am1y engaged in substantive electronic warfare 
A FUTURE OF UNCERTAINTIES 189 

operations for the first time since electronic warfare had become an intelligence 

responsibility.2 

In j UST CAuSE and DESERT STORM, however, the Army had been able to draw 

on the resources it had built up during the height of the Cold War. The fULure 

challenge for Army Intelligence would be to do more with less. Even as DESERT 

STORM came to an end, it was already evident that the smaller force structure 

envisaged for the future would necessarily lead to the inactivation of numerous 

intelligence battalions and brigades, as the divisions and corps to which they 

were assigned closed down. By 1995 the Army force structure had been reduced 

from eighteen divisions to just ten. The shrinkage of tactical assets was accompanied by a pullback of much of the Army from its forward-deployed posture. 

Presumably, this withdrawal would make lNSCOM even more central to the 

Army's intelligence effon, since tactical intelligence units in the continental 

United States would not have direct access to their intelligence targets, and 

lNSCOM alone had the necessary linkages to national systems to provide the 

Army with worldwide intelligence support. 

However, the elimination of the Soviet threat and the consequent downsizing of the Army meant that lNSCOM itself faced the greatest reorganization 

since its birth with the possibility of not even surviving as a major Army command. Flux was the order of the day. For a brief time, the command regained 

Army production functions, assuming command of the Army Intelligence 

Agency in 1991. The following year, however, AlA was disestablished and its 

subordinate production centers divided up between DlA and LNSCOM, with 

DCSINT retaining operational control of the Intelligence and Threat Analysis 

Center and the Foreign Science and Technology Center, the two elements that 

remained with INSCOM. In turn, these two production elements were merged 

into a single National Ground Intelligence Center. The Special Security Group 

that had disseminated sensitive compartmented information since World War 

II was reorganized and most special security officers resubordinated to the 

major Army commands they supported, thus creating a much smaller Special 

Security organization to set policy and deal with private contractors. 

Eventually, the unit's mission was assumed by one of the battalions of the 

902d Ml Group. 

This did not exhaust the List of changes. lNSCOMs major field stations in 

Europe and Panama were discontinued and Army cryptologic organization radically restructured. lNSCOM set up a Regional SLGlNT Operations Center at 

Fort Gordon, Georgia, manned by personnel of the newly organized 702d Ml 

Group. Since its Sl3th Ml Brigade concurrently relocated to Fort Gordon, this 

allowed strategic and tactical assets to be combined. At the same time, the com2 Details of Army Intelligence operations conducted during the DF.SERT SHIEI.O/DESERT STORM 

mission can be found in Brig. Gen. (P) john F. Stewart, Jr.'s pamphlet, Operation DESERT STORM: 

The Military Lntelligence Story A View From the G-2, 3d U.S. Army, April 1991. 
190 ~1111TARY INTEUIGEt\CE 

mand assumed host rcsponstbllnies for new sites in Luropc that would allo'' 

the Army to employ the most advanced communications technologies. 

Institutional gains were accompanied by mstilUllonal losses. INSCOM:S U.~. 

Army Russian Institute was resuborclinatecl to the European Command. A 

~o rcign Intelligence Command was organized at Fon Meade, Maryland, to proYtde beuer support w human intelligence (HUt\tiNT) and counterintelligence 

units there, but this proved to h<we the life span of a ma> fly: it was disconunued tn less than a rear as a result of the secretary of defense's deciSIOn lO incorporate Army human mtclhgcnce clements mto a Defense HLMINT Service. 

As the Army itself rcstruclUred and pulled back from Europe and Panama, 

its leaders planned to merge ll\SCOM's five extsting theater suppon brigades 

mto two force projccuon brigades. The new units would operate in a split-based 

<.:onfiguration and would have the capability to deploy tactically tailored fo rce 

packages to meet any level of contingency requirement. Additionally, beginning 

in 1993 INSCOM provided personnel to augment corps-level production centers and (for a time) jotnt tntelligence centers withtn the unified commands. 

1'\SCOM would no longer stmply operate at echelons abo"e corps, but would 

provide the Arm) '' ith "seamless connecti\'Ll}" between national-le,·el agencies 

and the warfighters on the ground. 

Finally, in 199+ the Army set up the Land Information Warfare Activit}' 

(LIWA) within I NSCOM. operating under the staff supervision of the 

Department of the Am1}'S deputy chief of staff for operations. This was inspired 

by the precedent offe red by DLst R"l STORM, in which the centralized Iraq i command structure had been effectively befuddled by deception operations and 

decapitated by the electronic and physical destrucuon of its communications 

S}'Stem. Still in the lormall\T stage, the UWA sought to bring together the techniques of clectromc warfare, psychological \\'arfare, decepuon operauons, command and control targeung. and operational secunt) to auack the informmion 

resources of the enemy whtle stmultaneously defendtng those of our own armed 

force~. Once it became fully operauonal, the LIWA would offer the larger Army 

a place for "one-stop shopping" in these areas.3 

Conclusion: The Shaping of Army Int elligence 

Although the details of the future necessarily lay hidden, Military 

lmclltgence's current traJcctor} provides dues as to tlS future organizauonal 

and mtsston directions.-+ At least five tdemifiable trends ha\'c helped shape the 

; The ·mromlallon \\;trl.u~· l"OIK~pt rcnc,tcd--()r at ka~t par;rllckd-thc rdeas or the rnnu-

··mr;ll ruturologrsts Alnn and llcrdr I orncr Sec \hu ami Anlr-\\'m ( l~n~wn ; I rule Brown. 199-+ ) . 

.-h 10. "The Knowledgt: \Vatrr<'r~ 

4 Of course clues can be nu~lcadmg Drsunguished mrln.rry hr.,wnan Rus~ll F. \Vcrglq ha~ 

wmmcntcd, "Almost all ol the hrnts of prophecy mto whKh the auth<lr wa~ r:.~shly drawn 

pnwed wrong·· /lrslor:v tl{ th<· lJnrtnl Swtt'\ Army. Enlargt·tl Fclllwn (Bit1omington: lnchana 

lfl l\'t'r~ll} Press, 1984). pp. 557 58. 
A I:UTL RL OF U:\CERTAI'\lTtr<, 191 

post-World War II histot"} ol Army lmelligence: a stead)' cb·olution of functions to national and JOint agencies; a redefinition of the Military Intelligence 

fie ld to embrace new functions; an enhanced role for technology; .1 progressive growth both in the number and size of intelligence units and in the diversity of tlllclligence disciplines they incorporated; and fmally, an increasing 

prolesswnahsm. 

I trst of all, continuing pressures for greater sen·tce mtegrauon has had a 

major tmpact on the O\'erall organization of Ann)' lmelltgencc As a result of 

these pressures. and over a penod of ume. the Anny has transferred cr)'pLOlogic, 

producuon, attache collection, and certain counterintelligence and human intelligence functions to national agcnctes. The creation of the Central lmclligencc 

Agency m 194 7 removed the Army from the fields of political and economic 

intclltgence. This preceded the partial breakup of the Army Security Agency in 

1949 to form the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), the National Security 

Agency's predecessor. More reforms followed the revision of the National 

Defense Act in 1958, which removed the Army as an instttutton from the chain 

of nattonal command and turned 11 into a mechanism for traming. administering, and supplytng land forces for the umficd commands acttng under the joint 

Chtcfs of Staff The logic olthts me' Habl>· dictated the creatton of the Defense 

lntclltgence Agency (DlA) in 1961 As DlA grew it took over Army production 

funcuons as well as certain traintng and collection functions. 

As the Army drew clown during the last stages of the Vietnam conflict, there 

was another wave of consolidation. The Defense Mapping Agency absorbed Anny 

topographic clements, the Central Sccutity Scn'ice took over certain headquarters 

funcuons of the Army's ctyptologic agency, and the Defense Investigative Sen'ice 

assumed the personnel background investigation funcuon prevtously performed 

b) Army counterimelligcncc. The first two imegrations were done ostensibly to 

promote economy and efficicnq·. whtle the last eased the Am1) out of the domeslie intelhgence field that had left H open LO charges of "spring on civilians." 

As the Army once more planned to contract in the 1990!>, these kinds of 

pressures on its Military Intelligence organization continued. If an}•thing, the 

Department of Defense Reorga111zauon Act of 1986 had placed a premium on 

joint operations. However, despite the steady trend toward integration, Army 

lmelltgencc has in fact shown a remarkable resiliency over the years. This ts 

wholl} conststem with laws of institutional behavior. Motivated recruits join the 

Arm} because they wish to ,-.ear green suits, not "purple" ones. 5 The Army 

mo:>t readtl} surrendered those intclltgence functions penpheral to liS central 

mtsswn of warfighting. 

·; l·ur an mtcrcstmg discussttm of the chllenng personalities." tdcnttttcs, ,ultl bch;mors of the 

dtlfnc111 armed ~crviccs, sec Carl l I. 1\utldcr, rltt' •'-'lasl1s ofWw: Amt·nwn Mtlrtwy .)ry/rs 111 Stralt'gv 

ancl Arw/v,i~ (lhlttmorc: Johns ll opkin~ Umn~rstt)' Press. 1989), p. 19 Butldcr notes that "the 

untqm: ~l'T\'tn tdcntitics .. :ltl' hkt·ly ttl Jll'rstst fl,r a wry long umc .. 
192 MILITARY INTELLIGENCC 

Before the creation of the Central Intelligence Agenc)', the Army had 

engaged in colleclion of political and economic intelligence for wam of a beuer 

alternative. The high-level cryptologic mission turned over to the Armed Forces 

Security Agency had implications that went beyond the Army. It was also both 

exoti<.: (most of the personnel who transferred to AFSA were highly specialized 

civilians) and a mission which naLUrally lent itself to a joint approach. 

Moreo,·er, although the 1mpetus behind the creation of AFSA had been to 

replace three sen'ice cryptOlog1c organizations with one, the end result was the 

creauon of four cryptolog~e organizations. The Army's determination to provide 

cryptologic support to Hs own commanders ensured that the Army Securny 

Agency grew larger and more important after 1949 than it had been before. The 

National SecUJity Agency later attempted unsuccessfully to integrate service 

management structures into a central security service. 

The creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency presented Army 

Intelligence with a more formidable institutional challenge. llcre, the Army and 

the other senrices pursued a strategy of more straightforward resistance, refusmg to allow their intelligence components tO be completely subsumed into the 

new organization. During the agency's formative period, Army officers posted to 

DIA found their assignments less than career cnhancmg. DIA was initially 

allowed to control onl)' a single collection element, the auachc system, and the 

Army reentered the field of intelligence production almost immediately. Even 

after thirty years, DIA had not achieved the dominant position in the general 

intelligence field that NSA had achieved in the cryptologic area. 

In 1972 the Army gave up the bulk of its counterintelligence operations in the 

continental United States to the Defense Intelligence Service, when the latter 

agency was formed to execute the mission of conducting personnel background 

111\'esugations for secunty clearances. This was a forced move, brought about by 

the fact that the Army had been brought deeply into the field of domestic intelligence during the troubled times of the Vietnam War. llowe,·er, the transfer of 

functions, again, did not impact on the Army's wartime mission. Moreover, it 

could be looked upon as a blessing, since it removed the Army from an area 

which had been a political land mine since the earliest days of its own counterintelligence operations. The Army had been forcibly extracted from domestic imelligence operations twice before-in 1920, at the end of the Red Scare, and in 194 3, 

followmg political displeasure at investigations of subversives that had touched 

upon the president's family. Three experiences of this kind were perhaps enough. 

Finall)', in 1995 DIA set up the Defense HUMINT ~en•ice (DHS), which 

absorbed all the strategic and theater-brei human mtelligence collection assets 

of the armed services. Th1s forced merger was brought about by a post-Cold 

War drive for economy and efficiency that in many ways paralleled the 

Department of Defense-level realignments of the Vietnam drawdown. However, 

once more we could argue that the Army surrendered clements not cemralto its 

perceived main mission of warfighting. 
A FUTURE OF UNCERTAINTIES 193 

A second trend evident during this period was the redefinition and expansion 

of the imelligence field. Over the years, Military intelligence organizations 

absorbed various "special informational services." This process had begun immediately after World War II, when the Military Imelligence Division assumed 

administrative as well as operational control of the Army Security Agency. ln turn, 

the logic of this realignment eventually made electronic warfare an imelligence 

responsibility. 'jamming" and collection operations were intimately related, and 

could not be conducted independently of one another. As a result, the Army 

Security Agency gained responsibility for communications electronic countermeasures in 1955. Simultaneously, it assumed the electronic intelligence (ELINT) mission from the Signal Corps. This too followed a certain logic: the agency now collected against the whole of the electronic spectrum instead of just a part. 

Continuing in the same pattern, ASA acquired the noncommunications electronic 

countermeasures mission from the Signal Corps in 1962. 

The formation of combat electronic warfare and intelligence units as a result 

of the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study brought additional collection services under the Military Intelligence umbrella. Intelligence uniLS assimilated ground sensors and ground surveillance radars. Meanwhile, Army Intelligence 

had already taken to the sky. Army aviation had developed specialized reconnaissance aircraft in the late 1950s. and the Am1y Security Agency had developed its 

own air arm during the l960s. In the late 1970s, both types of assets became pan 

of an integrated Military Intelligence baualion, aerial exploitation. 

In one area, however, the responsibilities of Military Intelligence comractecl 

after World War II. This was the field of communications security. The Army 

Security Agency, as first set up, had responsibility for all aspects of militaty cryptOlogy, including creating and distributing the Army$ codes and cipher devices 

and monitoring the security of Army communications. The 1955 reorganization 

of the Army Security Agency resulted in the transfer of the first two of these functions to the Signal Corps. As the years went on, a tendency for Army lmelligence 

to edge away from security monitoring became pronounced; many saw the task as 

intrusive, unpopular, and not particularly effective. In the long run, as far as the 

Anny was concerned, encryption of ali message traffic could render security monitoring obsolete. Meanwhile, some aspects of communications security could now 

be passed back to the communicators. In 1988 lNSCOM, which had inherited 

from ASA the mission of preparing the Army's Communications-Electronics 

Operating lnstruclions, decided that the function would more appropriately 

belong to the Armys new Directorate of Information Systems for Command, 

Control, Communications, and Computers. A liule later, INSCOM transferred 

mission responsibility for the inspection of cryptofacilities and the tracking of 

communications violations to the Almys communicators. 

Third, partially as a result of Intelligences increasing dependence on the 

technical services, the advance of technology affected almost every intelligence 

discipline. The combined impact of the communications revolution and the 
194 MILiTARY INTELLiGENCE 

growth of automalion had a profound effect upon intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. To usc only select examples, the development of 

infrared and radar imaging techniques revolutionized photographic intelligence 

and resulted in that discipline's transformation into imagery intelligence. The 

synergistic use of a variety of techniques to measure the distinct profiles displayed by an assonmem of target "shooters, movers, and emitters" created the 

new intelligence discipline, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). 

Technology even promised-or threatened-to reverse the nature of the entire 

Army Intelligence process. Traditionally. information had passed from lower levels of command, in direct confrontation with the enemy. to higher levels for 

evaluation. In the Persian Gulf conOict of 1991, however, Army produclion elements based in the cominental United States had used national intelligence 

acquisition systems to generate tactical intelligence that went clown to the field. 

Counterintelligence was also confronted with fresh challenges as a result of 

this trend. The Army faced a wider security threat as technological development 

created new vulnerabilities. Not only were the activities of hostile human agents 

now supplemented by electronic listening devices. but the radiations emitted by 

electronic media were vulnerable to detection, while the computers that supplied the masses of data on which the Army now relied could be infiltrated by 

"hackers" and menaced by computer "viruses." 

Fourth, imelligence units in the field tended to grow both larger and more 

integrated. The Army emerged from World War ll with a melange of singlediscipline intelligence elemems organized in no common pauern. They 

included counterintelligence detachments, ASA's signal service companies and 

detachments, and an assonmem of teams and detachmems that carried out 

various combat imelligence functions. Addilionally, the Signal Corps had its 

own units conducting electronic intelligence and elecuonic warfare. The 

Korean War partially revolutionized this structure, as the Army fielded groups 

and battalions to collect combat intelligence and ASA created units of similar 

size to carry out military crypLOlogic functions in support of the tactical Army. 

In the laner pan of the l950s, counterintelligence and collection personnel 

>vere integrated into combat intelligence formations under the Military 

Intelligence Organization concept, although most counterintelligence personnel continued to serve in separate CIC groups. Roughly around the same time, 

various Signal Corps intelligence and electronic warfare units were folded into 

the Army Security Agency. 

Following the lmelligence Organization and Stationing Study of 1975, the 

Army integrated all intelligence disciplines at both the tactical and strategic levels, creating CEWI units and the U.S. Arm>' Intelligence and Security 

Command. For the first time, most Army Intelligence assets were contained in 

TOE units rather than under tables of distribution and allowances. By 1990 

multidiscipline intelligence brigades had been fielded to support hoth corps and 

higher echelons of command. 
A r:u·r L R! OF U'\ICERTAI '\ Tl r \ 195 

rhe c.lc\'clopmem of large tmclligcncc units. combined "ilh institutional 

pressure!> to reduce the operational role of the Armys tntclhgcncc staff, helped 

to move the cemer of gra,·ity oltmelligence work in the Army from the staff to 

the line. It also was one of the factors that helped make Army Intelligence more 

profcsswnal. One could argue logically that just as ordnance officers should 

command an ordnance unit, mtelligcnce officers should command an intelligence unit At first the Army lntclhgence and Securit)' Branch. as its title indicated ,.,·as something of an uneasy compromise, lumping together officers of 

dl\·cr<;c backgrounds and allegiances. The branch had no common training program, and the Army Sccunty t\genC), \\ tth its verucal l'Ommand structure and 

lls roots in the Signal Corps, remained a large, unassimtlated segment of the 

Army Intelligence community. ~ lowever, the Army made greater steps to\\ard 

mtcgration in 1967, when the Army Intelligence and Sccurny Branch was redcstgnatcd as the Military Intelligence Branch and upgraded in status. The change 

\\as more than just a shift in nomenclature, since the common advanced 

schoolmg that went into effect at this lime unposed a new homogencil)' on the 

\1thtar) Intelligence field. Implementation of the lOS!> recommendations 

brought the institutional structure of Army Intelligence mto lme "ith the single 

branch concept. 

fhc professionalization of Army lntelhgcnce, combmcd \\ nh the shift to an 

All-Volunteer f-orce in the early 1970s, led in wrn to a greater emphasis on militar)' values within the field. As long as imelligem.:c organizations had been 

dominated by reserve officers, and depended on the stimulus ol the draft for 

thctr manning, intelligence personnel had tended to idenufy with their specialtics, rather than with the Army as a whole. The fact that so many of them were 

invoh·cd m speCialized tasks wnh no immediate combat relationship only facilitated this ethos. \\'hilc the mamstream of the peaceumc Arm> focused on a 

training and readmess misston, lntclhgcncc had (and continues to have) a viable 

pcaccumc mission. The bulk of ASt\ personnel, for example. carried out a 

stratcgtc cryptologiC mission at hxed mstallations, and most counterintelligence 

personnel operated in ch ilian clothes and hved on the ctvihan economy at a 

time when the rest of the Army was still in barracks and bachelor officers' quarters. When an applicant for the Counter lntelligence Corps asked his recruiters 

whether life in the CIC was an}•thing like the Army, they replied, ·'Not very 

much " I hts approach has changed mnrkedl)'.6 

In short, we can argue that b) 1990 ~lilitat)' Intelligence had become clisunctl} more mtlitary. lmclhgence personnel-men and women, officer and 

enlisted-were soldiers fir!>l. spcualists second. They trained regularly at Army 

sktlls and were held to Arm} standards of physical fitness. Separate management stnu.:turcs that tended to foster the idea that various groups ol intelligence 

personnel were an elite corps apan from the larger Army had been dissolved: 

o t\uth<Jr\ recollection. 
196 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

the Intelligence Corps was discontinued in 1966, and the Army Security Agency 

broke up ten years later. The grade strucLUre of intelligence units mirrored that of 

the rest of the Army, unlike the situation in an earlier period, when 40 percent of a 

counterintelligence detachments strength might consist of officers. The danger, of 

course, was that the process could be carried too far, and that the thrust to make 

everyone a potential warfighter might unduly divert energies from the proper performance of what remained a demanding real-world m1ss1on. 7 

Among other things, the new professionalism meam that Military 

Intelligence personnel could publicly identify with the trad1uons of the Army m 

ways that were not onginally thought possible when mtelhgencc work itself was 

identified, sometimes by its practitioners, as something appropriate only to the 

shadows. To give only one example, uniformed enlisted personnel assigned to 

Army Counter Intelligence Corps units during the 1950s wore a simple "U.S." 

as their collar insignia, officers bore the insignia of their carrier branch, and ClC 

units in the continental United States presented themselves to the public as 

"Army Research Groups." During the 1960s, however, Army Intelligence units 

boasted their own distinguishing unit insignia and their assigned personnel 

wore Military Intelligence brass. In the 1980s the Ml groups of a previous period were redesignated as Ml bngades, receiving their own shoulder sleeve 

insignia. This change would enhance troop esprit and morale by providing the 

units with more traditional military designations. Certain of INSCOM:S TDA 

field stations and other TDA clements were also given new numerical unit designations. In part, the Army made the change to distinguish troop formations 

from the geographical locations at which they worked, but it also had the desirable side effect of assigning to these units designations that were more intelligible to the rest of the Army. In short, Military Intelligence Identified itself with 

Army green, abandoning the cloak-and-dagger image of an earlier era. ln more 

ways than one, the motto of the Military intelligence Corps, "Always Out 

From," renected the new reality. 

In 1987 the chief of Military Intelligence declared, "Army Intelligence has 

truly arrived," and in one sense he was correct. In another sense, however, 

Military Intelligence was still in transit, progressively redefining itself as the 

Army, the nation, and the international situation changed. Still, wherever the 

journey might lead it in the fuLUre, clearly Military Intelligence has come a long 

way from its modest beginning in 1885 as the Division of Military Information. 

7 As a visitor to an INSCOM countenntelligence element reponed m 1989, "the stx mtlttary 

personnel asstgned .. . spend an mordmate amount of lime detatled away from the office for 

charge of quarters details, trainmg, phystcal traming, and alerts, none of whtch is optional." lie 

csumated that "the military personnel spend an average of 67% of their time away from the 

office." Memo, HQ INSCOM, IAOPS-CI-OC, 10 Oct 89, sub: Summary Report of Temporary 

Duty Travel to USAREUR 
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F or a number of reasons, it has seemed inappropriate to provide this volume 

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198 MlllTARY INTELLIGENCE 

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208 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

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Glossary 

A-2 

AAF 

ACSI 

AEF 

AFPAC 

AlA 

AlB 

AlS 

ALSOS 

ANCIB 

ANCICC 

ASA 

ATJS 

CBB 

CENT COM 

CEWI 

CIA 

CIC 

ClD 

CIP 

CO MINT 

COM SEC 

CO NARC 

CSA 

CONUS 

DCSlNT 

DlA 

DOD 

Air Forces intelligence 

Army Air f-orces 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

American Expeditionary Forces 

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific 

Army Intelligence Agency 

Allied Intelligence Bureau 

Army Intelligence and Security (branch) 

secret World War II mission to investigate Nazi atomic 

research 

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board 

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating 

Commiuee 

Army Security Agency 

Allied Translator and Interpreter Service 

Central Bureau, Brisbane 

Central Command 

combat electronic warfare and intelligence 

Central lmelligence Agency 

Counter Intelligence Corps 

Criminal Investigation Division 

Corps of lmelligencc Police 

communications intelligence 

communications security 

Continental Army Command 

Chief of Staff of the Army 

Continental United States 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Department of Defense 
210 

ECM 

EUNT 

ETO 

ETOUSA 

FBI 

FORSCOM 

G-2 

G-3 

GARDEN PLOT 

GHQ 

HUM INT 

IBM 

lNSCOM 

JOSS 

lRR 

J-2 

JCS 

JIC 

JICPOA 

lANTERN SPIKE 

MAC OM 

MACV 

MAGIC 

MAS INT 

MDW 

Ml 

MID 

MITC 

MlORC 

MIS 

MTO 

NATO 

NATO USA 

NSA 

NSC 

OACSI 

ONl 

OPEC 

OPFOR 

OS$ 

PEARL 

electronic coumermeasures 

electronic intelligence 

European Theater of Operations 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Anny (World War 11) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Forces Command 

Military Intelligence 

Military Operations 

domestic intelligence collection plan (l960s) 

General Headquarters 

human intelligence 

lmernational Business Machines 

United States Army Intelligence and Security Command 

Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study 

Investigative Records Repository 

joint intelligence officer 

joint Chiefs of Staff 

joint Intelligence Committee 

joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area 

domestic intelligence collection plan (1960s) 

major Army command 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

decrypts of japanese diplomatic messages 

measurement and signature intelligence 

Military District of Washington 

Military Intelligence 

Military Intelligence Division 

Military Intelligence Training Cemer 

Military Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps 

Military Intelligence Service 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

North Aftican Theater of Operations (World War ll); Nonh 

Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Nonh African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

National Securit)1 Agency 

National Security Council 

Office of the Assistanl Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

Office of Naval Intelligence 

Organization of Petroleum Exponing Countries 

opposing forces 

Office of Strategic Services 

intelligence derived rrom low-level enemy encrypted communications (World War !I) 
GLOSSARY 

PI!OENI\ 

POA 

RAGFOR 

ROAD 

RRU 

SECURITY SIIIELD 

SlAM 

SlGABA 

SlGlNT 

SlGROD 

SlS 

SSA 

sso 

Sl EADT'AST 

SWPA 

TD 

TDA 

TEMPEST 

THUMB 

TOE 

TRADOC 

ULTRA 

USAFFE 

USAlNTA 

USAINTC 

USAREUR 

USARPAC 

USASA 

USASATC&S 

USCIB 

WAC 

WDGS 

YMCA 

program to target VietCong infrastructure 

Pacific Ocean Area (World War 11) 

Radio Group, Forward 

Reorganization Objective Army Division 

radio research unit 

project to improve U.S. counterintelligence 

signal infonnation and monitoring 

World War ll high-level cipher machine 

signals imclligcncc 

machine cipher device 

Signal Intelligence Service 

Signal Security Agency 

Special Security Officer 

1973 Army reorganization project 

South West Pacific Area (World War 11) 

table of distribution 

table of distribution and allowances 

threat from electronic emissions 

intelligence derived from radio intelligence 

table of organization and equipment 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

high-grade communications imelligence (World War 11) 

U.S. Army Forces, Far East 

U.S. Army Intelligence Agency 

U.S. Army lmelligcnce Command 

U.S. Army, Europe 

U.S. Army, PaciJic 

U.S. Army Security Agency 

U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School 

U.S. Communications lmelligence Board 

Womens' Army Corps 

War Department General Staff 

Young Mens Christian Association 

211 

Heraldic Items 

H eraldic items for Army units include coats of arms, shoulder sleeve insignia, 

and distinctive unit insignia. Designed on the basis of a unit's official lineage and 

honors, they rel1ect each organization~ history, traditions, ideals, mission, and 

accomplishments. Heraldic items also serve as identifying devices and contribute to unit cohesiveness and esprit de corps. 

While the custom of bearing various symbols on shields, helmets, and 11ags 

existed in antiquity, heraldry was not introduced until the Middle Ages, when 

the increased use of armor made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe on the 

baulefield. Heraldic designs included mythological beasts, emblems commemorative of heroic deeds, and other identifying marks to which specific symbolism 

was ascribed. These heraldic devices were placed on a surcoat worn over the 

armor, from which the term "coat of arms" was derived. Gradually, a formal system of heraldry evolved, complete with rules for design, use, and display. 

At the present time Army regiments and separate battalions are authorized 

coats of am1S. A complete coat of arms consists of a shield, a crest, and a motto. 

The shield, the most important portion of the coat of arms, contains the field or 

ground on which the charges or symbols are placed. The crest was originally 

placed on the top of the helmet of the chief or leader to enable his followers to 

recognize him during battle. Today the crest is placed upon a wreath of six skeins 

or twists composed of the principal metal and primary color of the shield, alternately, in the order named. This wreath or terse represents the piece of cloth 

which the knight twisted around the top of his helmet and by means of which the 

actual crest was attached. Mottoes have been in use longer than coats of arms. 

Many of the older ones originated from war cries. Usually of an idealistic nature, 

they sometimes allude to a weU-known event in the history of the unit. 

The elements of the coat of arms are embroidered on the organizational llag 

(color), the central element of which is the American eagle. The shield of the 

coat of arms is on the eagles breast, a scroll bearing the mono is held in his 

beak, and the crest is placed above his head. A crest to the coat of arms is 

authorized for Regular Army units that have war service or campaign credit. 
214 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Army National Guard units display the crest of the state or states in which they 

are located, and a special crest has been designed for all Army Resen·e units. 

The currently authorized embroidered shoulder sleeve insignia had their 

origin during World War !. They serve the same purpose as the corps symbols 

(badges) used during the Civil War and the War with Spain. Most corps badges 

were of simple design and could be cut from a single piece of cloth. These 

emblems, such as a four-leaf clover, a star, or a spearhead, were easily remembered and readily identified. Not only were they worn by soldiers on their headgear, they were also incorporated into the design of unit !lags. 

The first shoulder sleeve insignia is believed to have been worn by the men 

of the 81 st Division during World War I. On their voyage to France they adopted as their insignia the ngure of a wildcat, which they used as a distinctive 

marking for the division's equipment. Wear of this insignia was officially 

approved on 19 October 1918 by a telegram from the Adjutant General, 

American Expeditionary Forces, to the division commander. Insignia for other 

units of the American Expeditionary Forces were later authorized and designs 

officially approved. Designs varied gremly. Many had their origin in devices 

already in use for organizational and equipment markings. Others were based 

on monograms and geometric figures alluding to a unit's numerical designation. 

Symbols associated with traditions, geographical locations, and unit mission 

were also included in some designs. 

Since World War I the authorization of shoulder sleeve insignia has expanded. Under the current system, separate brigades and higher echelons are authorized shoulder sleeve insignia for wear by soldiers assigned to the units. The 

msignla also appear on the organizations' distinguishing flags. Over time, the 

designs have become more clahorate and complex due to the increased number 

of authorized insignia and the availability of embroidery machinery for the production of various types of textile insignia. During the Vietnam era the policy 

governing the wear of subdued insignia on work uniforms was established. 

Distinctive unit insignia, manufactured in metal and enamel and worn by 

all unit personnel, arc authorized for separate battalions and higher echelons. 

The type of distinctive unit insignia currently in use was first authorized during 

the 1920s for regiments and certain other units. As in the case of shoulder 

sleeve insignia and coats of arms, authorization expanded as changes in the 

organization of the Army took place. The designs are based on symbols reflecting each units lineage, battle honors, traditions, and mission and usually incorporate the organizations motto. Distinctive unit insignia for most regiments and 

baualions include the same design clements as their coats of arms. 

Today, as in the past, insignia displayed on flags and vvorn on uniforms are 

highly visible items of identification. These heraldic items serve to distinguish 

speciric organizations and their members and are significant fac tors in establishing and maintaining unit esprit de corps. 
6611! Militw y lntclligolCe B1igadc 
lllth Military Intelligence Brigade 

112th Military Intelligence Brigade 
20lst Military Intelligence Brigade 

205th Military Intelligence Brigade 
207lh Mililcoy Intelligence Brigade 
319/h Militwy Intelligence Btigadc 

170th Militwy Intelligence B1·igade 
SOOth Military Tntelligence Brigade 

501st Military Intelligence B1igade 
504tl1 Military Intelligence Brigade 

513£11 Mililmy Intelligence Brigade 
525th tvlilitwy lntclligcncc Bri?,aclc 
108th .\filitwy /nrclligrna Group 

I O<Jth ,\1ilitwy lntclli~cntc Group 115lh Mililw y lntdligct1CC Gmup 

/16th Milllaty Intelligence Group 
259th Mililwy fnlelligence Croup 

650th Milrtwy lntclligcncc Croup 

902d Milita1y lntclligcnce Croup 
1st Military Intelligence 13aua/ion 

3d Military lnlclligencc Baualion 
Hth Militwy Intelligence BCllllllion 

I .501 Mililw y fntc/ligellcc Battalion 
24th Military Intelligence Ballalion 
lOlst Military Intelligence Battalion 

1 02cl Milila1:v Intelligence Bactalion 
lOJd Military fntelligence Battalion 

1 04th Military lntclligence Battalion 
I 05th Mrlitary Intelligence Battalion 

I 06111 Military Intelligence Battalion 
107th Mililwy lntrlligence Ballalic>n 

I 08th Militwy Intelligence BaUalion 
1 09tlt ,\1t/itary Intelligence Ballc1lion 

II Otlt ,\1ilitwy Intelligence Bat calion 
1 24th Military lntelligencc Battalion 

125111 Military l11tclligencc Baualion 
126th Mililwy lntclligcnrc Battalwn 
128th Militwy Intelligence Battalion 
I34til Military Jntclligencc BaLta/ion 
135th Militcuy Intelligence Battalion 
138th Militaty Intelligence Balta/ion 
1-IOth Milita1y Intelligence Battalion 
/41st MiliLW)' Intelligence Battalion 
142d Military Intelligence Battalion 
!47th Militaty Intelligence Battalion 
1 63d Military Intelligence Battalion 
165th Militwy lntclligcncc Balta/ion 

pA~I 

.•••• ••••• , ~,. 

20 J-;t Mrlitwy Intelligence Balta/ion 
202d Militwy Intelligence Buualioll 
203d Milrta~y Intelligence Ballalron 
204th Military Intelligence Battalion 
205tll Militwy lntclligt'ncc Baua/ion 
206th Mililwy lntclligcncc BaLta/ion 
22.3cl Milita~y Intelligence Bauolicm 
224th Military Intelligence Battalion 

229th M1luwy lntdllgmcc Bmwlwn 
260th Mililwy lnLelligence Baualion 
297th Military Intelligence Battalion 
301sL Military Jntelligence Battalion 
302d Militaty Intelligence Balta/ion 
JOJcl MiliiCII)' Intelligence Balta/ion 
.30-lt!J ,'v1ifitary Intelligence Battalion 
305111 Militwy Intelligence BaLtalion 
306th Militwy llltelligence Battalion 
307th Militwy Intelligence Battalion 
308th Milita1y Intelligence Baualion 

309th Militwy Intelligence Battalion 
3.1 Oth Military Intelligence Battalior1 

31 ltl! Milila~y Intelligence Battalion 
312th Militmy Intelligence Ballalion 
313th Militat)' Intelligence Baua/ion 
31-lth i\lilitan lntdllgcnce Battalion 
J19Lh MiliLaty Intelligence BaLLalwn 

.326th Militwy Intelligence Batwlion 
337th Militwy Intelligence Battalion 
338th ,\h/HW)' Intelligence Battalion 
~ 

' K}ni!l1;) 

I 

<N") rt~ ~ 

34lst Militwy Intelligence BattaliotJ 
344th Militwy Intelligence Baualion 
373d Milita~y Intelligence Battalion 
-f 15th Military Intelligence Battalion 
SO!st Milita1y Intelligence Baualion 
502d Militmy Intelligence Battalion 
5 I 1 th Militmy Intelligence Battalion 
5l9th Military intelligence Battalion 
522cl Mi/itmy lntrlligcnce Baua/ion 
524111 Mrluary Intelligence Battalrcm 
527th Military Tntelligence Battalion 
532d Mililwy lnlelligencc Bulla/ion 
533d Milita~y Intelligence Balta/ion 
5.J2d Militmy Intelligence Bactalrcm 
549th Military intelligence Battalion 
550th Military Intelligence Battalion 
629tl1 Military Intelligence Battalion 

LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CORPS 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, a key bend sinisterwise in saltire with a lightning nash 

argent, in fesspoim overall a sphinx or. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a torch or 

ennamed proper in front of two swords in saltire with hilts 

gold and blades of the first. 

ALWAYS OUT FRONT. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated wilh military intelligence. The key, flash, and sphinx symbolize the three 

basic categoties of intelligence: human, signal, and tacticaL 

The naming torch between the crossed swords suggests the illumination as provided by intelligence upon the field of battle. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

II [RALDIC ITEM!> 

SIIOULOER SLEEVL: I NSIC :\Jit\ 

DescnpLion: On a stlvcr gray hexagon, one point up, with an oriental blue 

border, an oriental blue hexagon beanng a yel low sphinx 

superimposed by a silver gray dagger hilted black. 

Symbolism: Oricmal blue and silver gray, representing loyalty and determination, arc the colors of the military intelligence branch. 

Yellow s>·mbolizes excellence. The hexagon borders renect the 

numencal destgnalion of the brigade The sphinx, a traditional 

milttar>· imelligence symbol, mdtcatcs observation, wisdom, 

and discreet stlcncc. The unsheathed dagger rd1ects aggresst\'C 

and protective requirements and the clement of physical danger inherent in the mission of the umt. 

D JS'IINCIIVE UNIT INSICrN i i\ 

Dcscnption: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of a hexagon 

composed of a cheeky of six black and white sections (one 

angle up), surmounted throughout by a smaller hexagon <nat 

side up) composed of a cheeky of nme sections of gold and 

onental blue wtth the center square charged with a gold 

sphmx head, all above a gold scroll mscnbed HONOR VALOR 

AND SECURITY in oriental blue letters. 

Symbolism: The black and white sections symboltze enlightenment and 

knowledge both clay and night around the world. The cheeky 

represents the units tactical and strategic capabilities in counterintelligence. The sphinx, a traditional mtelligence symbol, 

indicates observation, wisdom, and dtscrcet silence. The hexagon \Vtthm a hexagon funher distinguishes the numencal designation of the organization. 
Ll'\l ,\(,[\AND HERALDIC. DAIA 

LIN! i\<.,L AND HO!\ORS 

IJNI.A<.ol 

219 

Rt'\ 

(inactive) 

Constituted 21 june 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 66th Counter 

lmclhgence Corps Detachment. Activated 1 july 1944 at Camp Rucker, Alabama. 

lnacti\·ated 12 November 1945 at Camp Kilmer, "le\\ jersey. Activated 10 

November L 949 m Gennanr Allotted 20 September 1951 to the Regular Army. 

Reorgamzcd and redesignated 20 December 1952 as the 66th Counter 

lmelhgcnce Corps Group Reorgamzcd and redesignated I january 1960 as the 

66th Military Intelligence Group. Redesignated 25 jul} 1961 as the 66th 

Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 66th Mihtar)' 

Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesigna ted 16 October 1986 as llcadquaners and 

llcadquarters Company, 66th Military Lntelligcnce Brigade. Reorganized and 

redesignated 16 October 1992 as llcadquaners and llcaclquancrs Detachmem, 

66th Military Intelligence Brigade. Inactivated 16 july 1995 in Germany. 

( ·\\1PAIG' PARTICIPATIOl\: CRI Dtr 

\\'t>llcl Wm II 

Northern France 

Dt'(ORMIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS 

lllth MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

IIERALDIC ITCMS 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lN:,I(,'IIA 

Desoiplion: A gold color metal and enamel devtce consisting of the ma_lor 

port ton of a black and gold herakhc rose above and behind the 

head and wings of a gold eagle rising out of a gold disc charged 

throughout wtth a burst of reel names having eight tongues 

radiant to base and interspersed with seven five-pointed oriemal 

blue stars, the disc enclosed by an oriental blue scroll inscribed 

wnh the words MISSlON FIRST tn gold 

Symbolism: The heraldtc rose. alluding to the mstgnia of the military intelligence branch, ts symbolic of the baste mission (to collect, 

check, and make available any mformauon about a present or 

posstble cnem)), and its pos11ion at the top of the design t" 

relative to the units mouo. The phocntx (eagle) rising out ol 

names is symbohc of the former location or the unit, Atlanta, 

Georgia, and the seven states where the unit operated arc represented by the ring or oriental blue stars. 

F!J\(, 01:\'ICL: 

:-...one appro\·ed. 
LINEt\C,LS AND lll:RALDI( DATA 221 

LINEAGE t\'\.D HONOR-. 

C.onstnuted I 0 May 19-+6 111 the Arm) of the L'nited States as th~ I 11th 

Coumcr lntelligcnc~ Corps Detachment. Activated 22 May 1946 at Atlanta, 

Georg1a. Allotted 6 October I <.)50 to the Regular Army. Redcslgn.ned 1 December 

1958 as the 111 th Counter Intelligence Corps Croup Redesignated 25 jul) 1961 

as the I lith lmelligcnce Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 

111 th 1\lililary Intelligence Group. Inactivated 9 january 1971 at Fon 

\1cPhcrson. Georgia. 

Redesignated 13 \larch [ 987 as Headquarters, lllth ~hhtary lntelltgence 

l~rigade, concurrently transferred to the United States Arm) Traintng and 

Doctrine Command and activated at fon lluachuca. Arizona. 

CAr.IPAIG~ PARTICIPMIO:-.: CRI.DIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS 

112TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERALDIC ll FMS 

Dl'::iTINCII\"E UNII l"l<;IGNlA 

Description: A silver color metal and enamel devke const:.ung of a yellow 

enameled demi-sun emitting five rays surmoumed by a silver 

dagger, point up, beneath an onental blue chevron beanng 

five silver stars, all within and below an arc segment of Stiver 

oak leaves and a red scroll inscribed with the motto 

STRENGTH THROUGH SECURITY m silver leuers. 

Symlmltsm: Onental blue and stlver gra) are the colors tradn10nally associated with military intelligence. The sunburst further alludes to 

mtclligence and also suggests the former locauon of the unit, 

the great Southwest. The yellow sunburst symbolizes the wonh 

of re liable mtelligcnce. The five rays of the sunburst allude to 

the five fonner regions of the unit and the chevron, a symbol 

for support, with the fiw stars, represents the fi\·e States which 

comprised its former area of operations. The anciem dagger 

signifies the dangers and silent coven nature of intelligence ser-

\'tCe. The oak leaves are S) mbolic of the strong and enduring 

resolution of the members of the unit, and the motto ponrays 

the goal of a successful intelltgcnce organization. 

FLAG DL \'ICE 

None approved 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 223 

liNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAG£: (inactive) 

Constituted 10 May 1946 in the Army of the United States as the 112th 

Counter lmelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 21 May 1946 at Dallas, 

Texas. Alloued 26 February 1951 to the Regular Army. Redesignated 1 August 

1957 as the ll2th Coumer Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 25 July 

1961 as the 112th lmelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 1966 as 

the ll2th Military Intelligence Group. lnactivated 30 june 1974 at Fon Sam 

Houston, Texas. 

Redesignated 1 july 1987 as Headquarters, 112th Military Intelligence 

Brigade; concurrently transferred to the United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command and activated at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Inactivated 30 

january 1993 at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

20lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

liERALDIC lTE:\15 

Sttmt orR SLr:Evr I'NGNJ \ 

Dcmiption: On a shield divided from upper left to lower right, sih·er gray 

above onemal blue with a yellow border, a sword between 

two nashes all yellow. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray arc the military intelligence 

branch colors. The two parts symbolize the responsibility for 

acqu15ition and processing ol tactical and strategic intelligem:c The sword symbolizes the aggressiveness and ph)•sical 

danger mherem m military intelligence operations.The hghtnmg holts refer to the electromc \\arfarc capabilities of the 

unit and the commander's need for accurate and ready intelligence from all sources. 

DISIINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A silver color metal and enamel device consisting of an oriental 

blue d1sc bearing a silver polestar enmcled at top and sides b~· a 

black scroll inscribed WlTH COURAGE AND VISION in sliver 

leucrs, and m base three alternate wavy bars of oriental blue and 

silver supenmposed by a silver mountain peak supponing a griffin segreant graspmg a sword and a hghtnmg flash, all gold. 

Symbolism: Oncntal blue and silver gray arc the colors associated with 

military mtclligence. Black denotes secrecy. The oriental blue 

disc superimposed by the silver polestar symbolizes the world 

and the far-reaching capabilities of the unit. The oriental blue 

and silver wav> bars allude to World War II campaign participation m the Pacific. The moumam peak b representative of 

Korean War campaigns. The gnffin, ha\'lng the keen e1·esight 

of an eagle and the strength and courage of a lion, md1catc., 

the attributes of militaf) intelhgenu: and also alludes to the 

motto. The lightning flash is indH:atlvc of communicauons, 

clectromc warfare capablliues, and the ongm of the brigade as 

a signal un1t. rhe sword reflects the fighting aspect and suggests the unit's aggressiveness and the physical danger inherent m milnary intelligence operations. 
LI\JEAGES A:\D HERALDIC DATA 225 

Lli"I.AC,I AND HONORS 

RA 

LINJ.t\< ,r (active) 

ConstllUlcd 23 july 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 323d Signal 

Company, Wing. Activated l September 1942 at Miami, Florida. Inactivated 17 

October 1946 at Andrews field, Maryland. Redesignated 6 September 1950 as 

the 323d Stgnal Radio lntelltgencc Company and allotted to the Orgamzed 

Reserve Corps. Activated 2 October 1950 at Fon Mycr, Vtrgima 

Converted and redestgnatcd 3 january 1951 as lleadquarters and 

Headquarters Company. 60 bt Communication Reconnaissance Group. 

Redestgnated 5 February 1951 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

503d Communication Reconnatssancc Group. Ordered into active military service 

1 May 1951 at Fort Myer, Virginia. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 

1952 as the Army Reserve.) Released from active military service J 6 May 1955 and 

reverted to reserve status. 1nactivmed 20 july 1955 at Fon Myer, Vtrgmia. Activated 

6 january 1956 at Washington, D.C. Redesignated 3 September 1956 as 

llcadquarters and Headquarters Company, 503d Army Secunt) Agency Group 

lnacuvated 27 june 1959 at \Vashmgton, D.C. 

Withdrawn 1 September 1987 from the Army Reser\'c , allotted to the Regular 

Arm7, consolidated with the 20 I st Miiltary 1melligence Detachment (see t\NNE'\), 

and consoltdated unit redesignated as Headquarters and lleaclquaners 

Detachment, 20lst Military Intelligence Brigade; concurrent ly activated m Fon 

Lewis, Washington. 

ANNY:X 

Consllluted 12 july 19·H in the Arm) of the United <;tates as the 20 I st Coumer 

lntelhgence Corps Detachment Acll\atcd 20 August 1944 in '\e'' Guinea. 

lnacti\"<Hcd 25 Februar)' L 946 in japan. Activated 6 October 1950 in Korea. 

Inactivated 21 February 1955 tn Korea. Allotted 20 March 1956 to the Regular 

Army Al:unucd 12 june 1956 in Korea. Reorganized and redesignated 15 May 1959 

as the 20 1st Military Intelligence Detachment. Inactivated 30 June 1971 in Korea. 

Activated 1 October 1971 at Fort 11ood, Texas. Inactivated 21 june 1975 at Fort 

flood, Texas. 
226 

CAMPAllrN PARTICIPATION CRIDI1 

World \Vw J/ 

Anu~uhmannc 

t'\cw Gum~.:.t 

\\'~:~tern Pactfrl· 

Luzon 

KOit?Wl \\'til 

UN Offcnstvc 

CCI lntcr\'('11llon 

First UN C ountcroffcnstvc 

CCI <.,pnng Offcnstvc 

U'\ "ummcr Fall Offcn~•n· 

<;,nond Korean \\'inter 

Korea . ...,ummcr-fall 1952 

Thml Korc;tn \Vmter 

Korea, <.,ummcr 1953 

DECORATION', 

MlllTARY INTI·! UGEI\JCE 

Mentonous Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered PACIFIC 

THEATER (323d Signal Compan). Wmg, cited. GO 83, Twenueth Atr rorce, 4 

October 1945) 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Anny), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(20lst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 32, 1954) 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered J 7 OCTOBER 

1944 TO i JLI Y 1945 (20lst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA 

GO 47, 1950) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

205th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

Hr:RALDIC lTE:-.tS 

SHOUJ DLR SLlE\'E lNSIGt'IA 

Dcscnplion: On an oriental blue shield a white Ocur-de-hs centered in 

front of two crossed silver gray lightnmg bolts. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with 

miliwry intelligence units. The crossed lightning bolts refer to 

the convergence of all types of intelligence from all sources, 

enabling commanders to "see the baulefield." The Ocur-de-lis 

alludes to the unns original activation in france. 

DisliNCll\'t.: UNIT li'!SJGl'JA 

Descnption: A gold color metal and enamel de\·icc consistmg of an oriental 

blue ncur-cle-lts bearing in gold a dagger, pomt down, between 

a lightning nash and a propeller blade all convergcm in base on 

a silver gray background enclosed at the bottom by a gold 

wreath of nee tied in red and at the top by an oriental blue 

scroll inscnbed VANGUARD OF VIGILANCE in gold letters. 

Symholrsm: Oriental blue and sii\'Cr gray arc the colors traditionally associated \\ ith the military intelligence branch. The oriental 

blue Ocur-clc-lis refers to the units World War ll service in 

Europe. Campmgn partiCipation in Vietnam IS symbolized by 

the gold and reel wreath of rice. The lightning flash represents signals mtelligencc and electronic warfare; the dagger 

represents human intelligence; the airplane propeller represents airborne imagery intelligence. The slaming of these 

symbols of the mtelligcnce disciplines employed by the unit 

toward the fulcrum of the Oeur-de-hs represents the com·ergence of imclligencc from all sources to enable commanders 

to "sec the haulcficld." 
228 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Llt\EA(iE Ai'!D HOt\ORS 

RA 

liNEA(,[ (acuve) 

Constitmed 12 july 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 205th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acti,·ated 6 August 1944 in France. 

Alloued 6 October 1950 to the Regular Ann). Reorganized and rcdestgnated 25 

june 1958 as the 205th Military Intelligence Detachment. 

Consolidated 16 October 1983 with the l 35th Military lmelligence Group 

(see ANNEX) and consolidated unit reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters 

and Headquarters Detachment, 205th Military Intelligence Group. Reorgamzcd 

and redcstgnated 16 October 1985 as lleadquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. 

ANNEX 

Constuuted 19 March 1966 111 the Regular Army as the I 35th lmclligcnce 

Corps Group. Activated 1 june 1966 at Fort Bragg, North Caroltna. Redestgnatcd 

15 October 1966 as the 135th Military Intelligence Group. Inactivated 25 

September 1969 in Vietnam. 

G\\.IPAI(,N PARTICIPATION CREDII 

\\'enid \\'m 11 

Nonhem France 

Rhmeland 

Arclennes-Aisac.:c 

Central Europe 

v ... uwm 

Coumeroffensf\·c Phase II 

Cuunteroffen~tw, Phase Ill 

let Countewlfcnst\'l' 

Counteroffensive. Phase 1\' 

Coumeroffenst\·c, Phase \' 

Coumeroffenst\'l' l'hase \'I 

h·t 69/Coumcmffcnsive 

Summer-1:<~11 1969 

DrcoRAIIONS 

'\tone 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

207th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERAI DIC ITEMS 

SHOULDER 5Uf'\T IN5J<,NIA 

Descnptrcm. On an onental blue disc a sih·cr gra)' key and lightning bolt 

crossed slightly above center, wnh the ke)'S \\ ard at the lower 

left and the lightning bolts point to the right, centered below 

IS a dagger, point up, wnh silver gray blade and black hilt; all 

within a narrow red outline of a scvm-petalcd stylized rose. 

Symbolism; Oriental blue and silver gray are associated with m1htary intelligence. Red derives from the predommant color of the VII 

Corps shoulder sleeve insignia and black represents the 

unknown The key and lightning bolt represent electronic 

warfare and securit> and also signtf> the numeral two of the 

units designation. The styhzed seven-petaled rose has its ongin in the more traditional compass, dagger, and rose associated with the military intelligence branch and also represents 

the numeral seven of the unils designation as well as the number of the corps It supported. The circular shape of the 

ins1gnia also refers to the zero of the units des1gnation. The 

dagger denotes the counterintelligence function of the unit. 

DIS riNCTI\'1 UNIT INSIGNIA 

Descnpticm; A gold color metal enamel device consisting of an oriental 

blue fi\·e-petaled herald1c rose and centered verucally thereon a gold lightning bolt surmounted at the bottom by a horizontal gold key, surmounting the lightning bolt at center a 

while horse's head between two white wings, each with 

seven feathers. Attached to the bottom of the de\lce a scroll 

of three parts inscnbed with the words SEE STRIKE KNOW 

in black letters. 

S_vmlml1sm Oriental blue is one of the colors associated \\'ith the military 

imelligcnce branch The herald1c rose, a part of the milllar> 

intelhgcncc ms1gma, md1cates the bngade's association with 

that branch. The w1ngcd horse (Pegasus) wnh seven feathers 

on each wing signifies aerial vigilance in support of the VII 

Corps !he key denote:. the unlocking of the enemy's secrets 
230 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The lightning bolt represcms the unit's electronic warfare 

capablln> and ns ability to transmn mformation rapidl}. 

LiNEAt,L AND HONORS 

RA 

LlNEAt,L (mact ive) 

Constituted I 0 May 1946 in the Anny of the Unned States as the I 13th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acti\·ated 20 Ma> 1946 at Chicago. 

Illinois. Allotted 6 December 1950 to the Regular Army. Redestgnated 1 August 

1957 as the ll3th Coumer Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 25 july 196 L 

as the ll3th lmclligencc Corps Group. Redesignated l 5 October 1966 as the 

ll3th ~ltlitary Intelligence Group. lnacti,•ated 31 December 1971 at Fon 

Sheridan, Illinois. 

Consolidated 16 October 1983 with the 207th Military Intelligence 

Detachment (see AN~EX) and <.:onsohdated unit reorgamzed and rcdestgnated as 

lleadquaners and Headquarters Deta<.:hment, 207th Military Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 O<.:tohcr 1985 as Headquarters and 

lleadquancrs Detachment. 207th Milital"} Intelligence Brigade. lnacu,·ated 15 

january 1992 in Germany. 

ANNEX 

Constnuted 8 '\lovemher 1950 111 the Regular Army as the 207th Counter 

lmelligcncc Corps Detachment. Activated 30 November 1950 at Fort llolabircl, 

Maryland Reorganized and redesignated 25 june L 958 as the 207th Mtlitary 

lntelhgence Detachment 

CAMPAIGN PARTIC ll'ATION (RI:DIT 

Soutlnn·,t Asia 

Defense of .:.au<.h Arabia 

liberation and Defense t)f Kuwait 

Ccasc-Fm· 

DLCORATIONS 

Mcntorious Unit Commendauon (Anny). Streamer cmbrotclered I IFTH 

ARMY ARL\ 19-16 (!13th Counter lmelligencc Corps Detachment cited, Ot\ GO 

10, 1948) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 

319th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

SHOULDER SLEEVE lNSIGNLA 

Description: On a rectangle arched at top and bottom wiLh a silver gray 

border, divided beveled from upper right to lower left black 

above oriental blue, in upper left an oriental blue polestar 

pierced silver gray. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated wiLh military intelligence units. Blue also alludes to the 

Pacific and the units area of operations. Black and blue suggest 

day and night vigilance. The polestar simulates satellite intelligence collection and communications. The jagged division or 

the background is reminiscent of a lightning bolt, symbolizing 

speed, accuracy, and electronic information and systems. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A silver color metal and enamel device consisting of a silver 

sunburst within an oriental blue oval (with axis vertical) 

inscribed EYES OF THE PAClFlC in silver leuers, overall a 

diagonal reel lightning bolt from lower left to upper right 

superimposed by a silver knights helmet crested with a griffins head in shades of light brown. 

Symbolism: Otiental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence units. The griffin, a mythical 

beast, with keen eyesight and acute hearing, symbolizes constant vigilance. The helmet with the visor closed connotes 

coven capabilities as well as military preparedness. The sunburst S)'mbolizes knowledge and truth; the lightning bolt 

underscores electronic communications, speed, and accuracy 
232 ~IILITAR't 1'\/TELLIGF'\;Cf: 

LI'Jlt\G[ A'JD 1-IO'\OR" 

AR 

Ll N 1:/\(,f· (act ivc) 

Constituted 27 May 1948 in the Organized Reserve Corps as the 319th 

llcadquancrs lntelligcncc Dctachmem. Activated 15 june 1948 at Springfield, 

1\lassachuscus. lna<.:tl\ ,ned 22 September 1949 at ~pringficld, Massachusclls 

Redesignated 18 August 1950 as Headquarters. 3l9th Military lntelligcn<.:c 

CJroup Activated 1 September 1950 at San Iranusco. California. (Orgamzcd 

Rescn·c Corps redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Arm} Rcscrw.) lnacti\'ated I 

I cbruary 1953 at San Pranc1sco. California. 

Redesignated 17 September 1988 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, 3l9th Military Intelligence Brigade, and activated at Fort Lew1s, 

Washington. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICJPAI ION (RI Dll 

None. 

Dl (ORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

SIIOL'LDER SLCE\'E I ~'>IG~!A 

Dcscnptwn: On a silver gra> rectangle arched at top and bouom wnh a 

black border, a verucal oriental blue stripe and overall a 

black grif[in's head. 

Symbolism: Oncntal blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally assoCiated with military mtelligence units The three sections of 

the background refer to the three t)'pes of mtelligence: human, 

signals, imagery. The blue stripe bordered by two gray stripes 

suggests the Panama Canal and refers to collecting and funnclmg information. It also alludes to the unit's location. The griffin, a mythological creature of vigilance and strength, a 

guardian of gold, symbolizes the units missiOn. Black represents the secrecy of the operations. 

01'> ll'lCTI\'E UNIT IN'>IGNIA 

Description: A silver color metal and enamel de' icc consisting of an erect 

silver key. double-warded in base, the bow of seven radiating 

rays and surmounting overall an oriental blue torch with a 

red name. Enc1rclmg the device m base. the ends tcnmnaung 

at the opposite lower corners of the name, an oncntal blue 

scroll beanng the inscnpuon TRUTil ':>fCURlTY LOYAL rY m 

silver letters. 

Symbolism: Oricmal blue and sdvcr gray arc the colors used for military 

intelligence. The key. a symbol of authorit)', secrecy. and wardenship, refers to the basic missiOn of the orgamzation I'hc 

double wards allude to intelligence and counterintclhgcncc 

and the seven rays of the bow, a reference to the numeral 

seven, symbolize rcvcalmg light, -:;ccunt}·. and w1sdom. fhc 

torch represents guidance. Blue represents truth, and red, 

zeal and valor. 
234 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Ll!\ l.A<..,F A"' D HO"-ORS 

RA 

LlNl.AC,I (active) 

Constituted 12 july 194-1- in the Army of the United ~tates as the -+70th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachmem. Acu,·atcd 31 jul) 1944 m the (anal 

Zone Allotted 19 October 1951 to the Regular Army. Redesignated 25 jul) 1961 

as the 4 70th Intelligence Corps Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 14 

September 1964 as the 470th Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 

October 1966 as the 470th Military Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1987 as llcadquancrs and 

Headquarters Compan)'. 470th i\11litary lntclltgcnce Bngadc. Reorgamzcd and 

redesignated 16 October 1991 as lleadquancrs and Headquarters Detachmcnl. 

470th Military Intelligence Brigade. 

CA~IPt\!(,N PARTICIPAliON CRfDII 

\\'o,fd \\'ar II 

J\mcncan Thcmcr, Streamer without mscnptwn 

Annccl Forces txpt•cluwm 

Panama 

Dr c..:<. )R.\TIONS 

I\ one. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

SOOth MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

(Pacific Vanguard) 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

SHOULDER SLEEVE INSIGNIA 

Description: An oriental blue rectangle arched at Lop and bouom with a silver gray border bearing a crossed yellow lighLning nash and 

sword surmounted by an oriental blue globe gridlined and 

ouLlined silver gray, and overall a yellow torch with red name. 

Symbolism: Oriemal blue and silver gray are traditionally associated with 

the military intelligence branch. The sword signifies vigilance, 

the lighLning nash alludes to electronic communications and 

speed, the globe symbolizes worldwide service, and the torch 

and name signify knowledge. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Desoiption: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of an oriental blue conical shape with apex at base bearing a white radiant sun behind a white snowcapped black mountain peak, 

overall a gold palm tree eradicated, surmounted by a scarlet 

and ultramarine blue taeguk, and in base a gold Siamese 

headdress all between two gold bamboo trees with shoots 

arched, all enclosed at the top with a gold scroll inscribed 

SClENTlA POTENTIA EST (KNOWLEDGE IS STRENGTH) 

in scarlet leuers. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue is one of the colors used by Army intelligence 

units. Service in japan is commemorated by the silhouette of 

Mount Fuji, whi le the palm tree denotes service in Hawaii. 

This unit had intelligence responsibility for several areas: the 

Republic of Korea, indicated by the red and blue taeguk; 

Taiwan, represented by the white sun from the Republic of 

China 11ag; the Republic of Vietnam, indicated by the bamboo 

trees; and Thailand, denoted by the Siamese headdress. 
236 MIUTARY INTrLliGENCE 

LlNh\GE AND liONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (acti\·e) 

Constituted 30 June 1952 tn the Regular Army as Headquarters, 500th 

Military Intelligence Service Group. Activated I September 19S2 m Japan. 

Reorganized and redesignated 28 March 1954 as Headquarters, SOOth Military 

Intelligence Group. Reorganized and redesignated I july 19SS as I leadquaners 

and Headquarters Company. SOOth Military Intelligence Group. Reorganized and 

redesignated 24 June 1957 as the SOOth Mihtar) Intelligence Group Inactivated 

2S March 19S8 in Japan. t\cuvmed 25 March 1961 m Japan. Rcdestgnated 2S 

July 1961 as the SOOth lntelhgcnce Corps Group. Rcdestgnated 1S October 1966 

as the SOOth Mllllary Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1987 as lleadquancrs and 

Headquarters Company, SOOth Military Intelligence Brigade. Reorganized and 

redesignated 16 October 1992 as Headquarters and Headquarter<; Detachment, 

SOOth Military Intelligence Brigade 

C\MPAJ(,I\ PARfiCIPATIO'J CRt DIT 

None. 

DECORATION<; 

1\leritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embrotdered PACIFIC 

AREA 1968-1969 (SOOth "hlitary Intelligence Group ctted; DA GO 7S, 1969) 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Arm)). Streamer embroidered PACIFIC 

AREA 1972-1974 (SOOth Military Intelligence Group cited; DA GO 13, 197S) 

Army Supcnor Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1986-1987 (SOOth 

Military Intelligence Group cited; DA GO 14. L 989) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 

50lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HrRAI DIC ITEMS 

~I IOU DER SLU.\ I I ~ .... I<..N lA 

Description: On a vertical rectangle arched com·e,ly at lOp and bouom dt\·ic.lcd vertically silver gray and 01iental blue all within a yello\\ border, a double-warded inverted yellow key between two yellow 

lightning Oashcs issuing from upper left and right corner~ and 

conjotning the shaft of the key just above the double ward. 

Syml,olism Oncmal blue and stl\'er gray are the colors associated with 

mtlttal') tmelltgcnce and also refer to the constant cht) and 

night \'igilance missiOn of the untt. The key ts symboltc of 

authority and control and alludes to security The lightning 

Oashes are symboltc of worldwide electronic communications 

and the double-warded key conjomcd with the two lightnmg 

flashes "'}mboltzcs mtlitary intelligence and securit)' united. 

Dl..,nNCTIV'L U'\IT IN<;K,'\IA 

Dcsoiption: A stlver color metal and enamel device consisting of a silver color 

rectangle bounded on either side by a vertical white sword at left 

and a vertical black sword at right, potnt up, and enclosed at the 

top and bottom by two .uched oriemal blue scrolls passing over 

the ends of the swords and inscribed IN UNITATE (IN UNITY) 

on the top scroll and ET VlGILIA (AND VILIGANCE) on the 

bottom scroll in silver letters. On the rectangle a red onemal 

dragon, his body curved from left to right wi.th tail at top and 

head below, grasping in his right claw a blue lightning bolt 

crossed O\'Cr a blue double-warded key grasped in his left cia\\~ 

Symbolism Onental blue and stlvcr gray arc the branch colors of mtlttal')' 

imelltgence. The red dragon represents the Orient and the ltneagc of the organtzauon. The lightntng bolt signtfies worldwide electronic communications and the key symbolizes sccunty and control; crossed in saltire, they represent strength and 

symbolize Army Security Agency and military intelltgence 

untts. The swords arc adapted from the military mtelligence 

branch insignia. Thctr colors. white and black, signify day and 

ntght and the continuous mission of the unit. 
238 

LlNEA(,I AND HOI\lORS 

liNI.AGE 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RA 

(active) 

Constlluted 13 October 1950 m the Regular Army as Headquarters and 

llcadquaners Company, 50lst Communication Reconnaissance Group. Activated 

20 October 1950 at Camp Pickeu, Virginia. Redesignated l july L 956 as 

llcadquaners and Headquarters Company, 50 I st Army Security Agency Group. 

Inactivated 15 October 1957 in Korea. 

Redesignated 1 January 1978 as Headquarters and lleadquaners Company, 

50 1st Military Intelligence Group, and activated in Korea. Reorganized and redestgnated 16 October 1986 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 50 1st 

Military Intelligence Brigade. Reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1992 as 

llcadquaners and Headquarters Detachment, 50lst Military lntetligcnce Brigade. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 November 1995 as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Compan), 50 1st Milnary Intelligence Brigade. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Korean Ww 

CCF '>pnng Offcns1vc 

UN Summer-Fall Offcns1ve 

Second Korean Wimer 

Korea, Summer-Fall 19'52 

Th1rd Korean Wmtcr 

Korea. ':>ummer 19'53 

OL:CORATION'> 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(lleadquarters and Headquarters Company, 501 st Communicauon 

Reconnaissance Group, cited; DA GO 22, 1954) 

Republic or Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1951-1953 (lleadquarters and Headquarters Company, 50lst Communication 

Reconnaissance Group, Cited; DA GO 76, J 953) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

504th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

SHOULDER SLEEVE INSIGNIA 

Description: On an oriental blue shield wilh a yellow border a silver gray 

winged lightning nash with wings elevated, the llash topped 

with a silver gray demi-neur-de-lis. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated wilh the 

military intelligence branch. The wings suggest loftiness or the 

advantage obtained from clear observation. The lightning nash 

alludes to the unit's ability to respond accurately and quickly 

in support of the commander's needs for intelligence from all 

sources. The demi-!1eur-de-lis is a symbol both of intelligence 

and of the brigade's roots in the campaigns of Northern 

France, Rhineland, and Central Europe. Yellow signifies excellence and achievement. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of a vertical 

red enamel winged lightning !lash with wings elevated, tipped 

with a demi-f1eur-de-lis, all within a continuous blue scroll 

arched at top and base and passing behind the wings and demineur-de-lis at the sides and top and inscribed SEMPER 

PRAEPARATUS (ALWAYS YOU ARE PREPARED) in gold letters and all areas enclosed by the wings and scroll are cheeky 

of gold and silver gray. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors used for the military 

intelligence branch. Wings connote loftiness, a vantage point for 

visual observation. The lightning flash and cheeky area represent technological capabilities, symbolize vigilant leadership, 

celerity, and communications, and allude to the unit's concern 

with control over hostile communications and security of 

friendly communications. The demi-!1eur-de-lis, lightning nash, 

wings, and cheeky area also refer Lo the unit's origin as the 

l37Lh Signal Radio Intelligence Company, Aviation. The demilleur-de-lis denotes participation in European campaigns during 

World War ll, while the color scarlet alludes to the Meritorious 

Unit Commendation (Army) Streamer awarded the unit. 
240 1\11LITAR't 1'\liFI LlGEJ\CE 

l.INb\CC AND HONOR~ 

RA 

LINEAGE (acti\'C) 

Constlluted 7 Februal) 1942 in the Ann) of the L..,nired States as the l37th 

Signal Radw Intelligence Company, Aviation. Activated 20 Februat'} 1942 at 

Mttchel Field, New York. Reorganized and redestgnatcd 25 February 1944 as the 

I 37th Signal Radio Intelligence Company Inactivated 12 December 1945 at Fort 

jackson, South Carolina. Convened and redestgnatcd 15 November 1948 as the 

406th Mobtlc Radio Broadcasung Compan) and alloued to the Organized 

ReserYe Corps Acuvared 23 ovember 1948 at Ne'' York, New York Inactivated 

24 October 1950 at New York, New York. 

Redesignated 17 july 1951 as the 504th Communtcation Reconnaissance 

Group. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july l952 as the Army 

Reserve.) Rcdestgnated 21 April 1955 as Headquarters and llcadquaners 

Compan), 504th Communicauon Reconnatssance Group; concurrent!) wnhdrawn from the Army Reserve and alloued to the Regular Army Acti\'ated 16 

Ma)' 1955 at ron Devens, ~lassachusetts . Rcdcstgnated 1 ju!)' 1956 as 

lleadquancrs and lleadquancrs Company, 504th Army Securit) Agency Group. 

Inactivated 18 December 1957 at Camp Wolters, Texas. Activated I July 1974 at 

llumer Army Airfield, Georgia. 

Reorganized and redesignated 21 April 1978 as Headquarters and Operations 

Company, 50-+th ~lilital) lmelhgence Group. Rcorgam::ed and rcdestgnated 16 

April 1982 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 504th Military 

Intelligence Group. Reorgantzcd and redesignated 16 September 1985 as 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade. 

CAMPAIC,N PARTICIPATION CRIDII 

World \\'at II 

'\orth('m France 

Rhmcland 

C.cnlral Europe 

DECORATIONS 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Arm)·), Streamer embroidered EUROPEAN 

THEATER (137th Signal Radio Intelligence Compan) cited; GO 34 . 

Communicauons Zone, European Theater of Operations, 17 March 19-+5) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 

513th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

(Vigilant Knights) 

HERALDIC ITE:--15 

SIIOULDER SLEEVE INSIGNIA 

Description: On a vertical rectangle arched at the top and bottom, a field 

divided quarterly silver gray and oriental blue and thereon a 

yellow lightning bolL issuing from upper left and a white 

sword point up in saltire surmounted b)' a white front-facing 

helmet detailed sliver grar; all within a }'ellow border. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and sih·er gray are the milnary intelligence 

branch colors. The quartered field symbolizes the four primary intelligence funcuons: collection, analys1s, production, and 

dissemination of intelligence informauon. The lightning bolt 

refers to the worldwide capabilities and the electronic warfare 

functions of the unit. The sword symbolizes the aggressiveness, protection, and physical danger in he rent in military 

intelligence operations. The helmet alludes to the origins of 

the unit at Camp King in Oberursel, Germany. The helmets 

from-facmg posiuon suggests alenness and ''1gllance and the 

closed faceplate the anonymit}' and aggressiveness of CO\'ert 

collection. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT iNSIGNIA 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of a gold 

semicircular scroll bearing the words PER VIGlLANTIAM 

SCIENTIA (KNOWLEDGE THROUGH VIGILANCE) in teal 

blue leuers and containing upright between two green laurel 

branches a gold helmet facing front with teal blue rivet holes 

around the neck and a teal blue grill openmg, the throat 

encircled b} a collar of checkered white and black edged 

gold and atop the helmet a gold three-pomted coronet, the 

center point in teal blue. 

Symbolism: The Teutonic helmet with crown is an allusion to Camp King 

in Oberursel, Germany, and its from-facmg position suggests 

alertness and vigilance. The laurel branches on either side are 
242 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

S) mbolic of honor and ach1cvcmcnl. In the collar the colors 

black and \\'hltc denote the two types of intelligence collecuon 

provided by the unit and the repetition of the pattern llldlcates the dissemination of intelligence informauon. 

li'Jf \GF A'\0 HO'-'ORS 

RA 

LlNEAGI· (active) 

Constituted 22 October 1952 in the Regular Army as the 513th Military 

lmelligence Service Group. Acth·ated 15 januaf) 1953 in Germany. Reorganized 

and redesignated 20 October 1953 as the 51 3th Military Intelligence Group. 

Redesignated 25 july 1961 as the 51 3th Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignmed 

15 October 1966 as the 513th Military Intelligence Group. Inactivated 25 june 

1969 in Germany. Redesignated 2 October 1982 as lleadquartcrs and 

Headquarters Company. 513th M1l1tary lntelhgcnce Group, and activated at ron 

Monmouth, New jersey. 

Reo rganized and redesignated 16 October 1986 as ll eadquaners and 

Headquarters Company, 5l3th Military Intelligence Brigade. Reorganized and 

redesignated 16 Ocwber 1991 as lleadquaners and Headquarters Detachmem. 

5l3th Military lmclligcnce Brigade. Reorgamzed and redesignated 16 November 

1995 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 513th Military lmelltgcncc 

Brigade. 

CAMPAIC,N PARllCIPAliON CREDIT 

Soullm ,·st Asra 

Drfcnse of !>audr Ambra 

Lrbcration and Defense of Kuwau 

Cease-Fire 

DLCORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

525th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

SHOULDER SLEEVE INSIGNIA 

TAB 

Description: On a rectangle arched at the bottom with a yellow border, 

below a yellow and black checkered chief consisting of two 

rows of five squares each, a field divided from upper left to 

lower right with silver gray above oriental blue separated by 

a yellow lightning 11ash with point at lower right. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence. The lightning 11ash refers to 

the communication and electronic warfare functions of the 

unit. The checkered area alludes to the overt and covert 

aspects of the mililary intelligence mission, with the black and 

yellow colors referring to constant vigilance day and night. 

Description: Immediately above and touching the shoulder sleeve insignia, 

a black arc tab containing the inscription AIRBORNE in yellow letters. 

DISTiNCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA. 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of a black 

equilateral triangle charged with a gold lion rampant, in base 

two rows of alternating squares gold and oriental blue all above 

a volmed gold scroll inscribed FAST FACTUAL FAITHFUL in 

black letters. 

Symbolism: The gold lion rampant on a black background was taken from 

the coat of arms of Heidelberg in Germany, where the 525th 

Interrogation Team was activated in 1946. The triangular shape 

alludes w the deltas in Vietnam and symbolizes the units service in that country. The triangle and lion with the checkered 

rows allude to tenacity, Oexibility, and secrecy and represent the 

combined intelligence programs of the organization. 
244 

LINEAGE AND HONOR'> 

LINEAGE 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RJ\ 

(active) 

Constituted 21 june 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 218th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated l july i944 at Fort DuPont, 

Delaware. Inactivated 15 October 1945 at Camp Campbell, Kentucky. 

Redesignated 17 September 194 7 as the 249th Counter Intelligence Corps 

Detachment and allotted to the Organized Reserves. Activated 6 October i94 7 

at New York, New York. (Orgamzed Reserves redcstgnated 25 March 1948 as 

the Organized Reserve Corps.) Inactivated 31 December 1950 at New York, 

New York. 

Redesignated 18 April 1952 as the 218th Counter intelligence Corps 

Detachment; concurrently withdrawn from the Organized Reserve Corps and 

alloued to the Regular Army. Activated 30 April 1952 at Fort Holabird, Maryland. 

Reorganized and redesignated 25 januaty 1958 as the 218th Military Intelligence 

Detachment. Inactivated IS September 1978 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Consolidated 16 june 1979 with the 525th 1\ltlttary Intelligence Group (see 

ANNrx) and consolidated unit redesignated as lleadquaners and Operations 

Company, 525th Militar)' Intelligence Group; concurrently acti\'ated at fort 

Bragg, North Carolma. Reorganized and redesignated 16 April 1982 as 

lleadquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 525th Military Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 August 1985 as ll eadquaners and 

llcadquaners Detachment, 525th Military lmelligencc Brigade. 

ANNEX 

Constituted 18 Apnl 1946 m the Army of the United States as the 525th 

interrogation Team. Acti\'atcd I May 1946 in German)'· Inactivated 6 November 

i946 in Germany. Redesignated 6 February 1948 as the 525th Headquaners 

Intelligence Detachment Acuvated 21 February 1948 at Fon Bragg, North 

Carolina. Alloned 5 May 1949 to the Regular Army. Reorganized and redesignated 23 May 1949 as llcadquaners, 525th Military Intel ligence Platoon. 

Reorganized and redesignated 4 August 1949 as the 525th Military Intelligence 

Service Company. 

Reorganized and redesignated l December 1950 as the 525th Military 

Intelligence Service Group. Reorganized and redestgnatcd 31 December 1953 as 

the 525th Military lntelltgence Group. Rcorgantzed and redesignated 25 

September 1969 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 525th Milttary 

Intelligence Group. Inactivated 6 March i973 at Oakland, Californta. 

Redesignated 1 july 197-+ as the 525th Militar)' lntelltgcnce Group and activated 

at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. Inactivated 1 january 1978 at the 

Presidio of San Francisco, California. 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

World War II 

Rhmeland 

Ardcnnes-Aisace 

Central Europe 

\'it'IIHliJl 

Defense 

Countcroffensi\'e 

Counteroffensh·e, Phase 11 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

Tct Coumeroffen~I\'C 

Counteroffensive, Phase IV 

Counteroffensive, Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase Vl 

Tet 69/Counteroffenslve 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 1970 

Sa net uary CounteroffensiVe 

Counteroffensive, Phase \ 'II 

Consolidauon I 

Consolidauon II 

Cease-Fire 

Armt•d Forces E:cpeditlotiS 

Domm1can Republic 

Panama 

Southwest Asia 

Ddcnse of Saudi Arabia 

Liberation and Defense of Kuw<~H 

DECORATIONS 

245 

Meritonous Unit Commendauon (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIEThA't\1 

1967-1968 (525th Military Intelligence Group cited; DA GO 39, 1970) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (525th Military lntelltgencc Group cited; DA GO 52, 1974) 

Mentorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1970 (52Sth Military lntelligcnce Group cited; DA GO 52, l974) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971-1973 (525th Military Intelligence Group cited; DA GO 6, 1976) 
l08th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

DISTINC.TIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

DesCI;pLion: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of a white 

expanded horizontal scroll surmounted vertically by a gold 

quill in from of a gold demi-sun emitting eight rays; all encircled by an onemal blue scroll wrth the upper area surmounted 

by the points of the rays and m base the inscription TRUTH 

CONQUERS in gold leuers. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with military intelligence. The quill and scroll allude to the reponing mission of 

intelligence. The sun, a symbol of enlightenment, with the radiating rays, symbolizes the illumination of dark areas and 

defense against subversion and espionage. The eight rays further rder to the eight states in the jurisdictional area of the 

group. 

FU\G DEVICE 

None approved. 

liNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 10 May 1946 in the Army of the United States as the L08th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated lO june l 946 at New York, 

New York. Allotted 26 February 1951 to the Regular Army. Redesignated 1 

March 1957 as the 108th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 25 

july 1961 as the l08th Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 1966 

as the l08th Military Intelligence Group. Inactivated 31 january 1972 at Fort 

Devens, Massachusetts. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPA110N CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
l09th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of an ellipse 

divided quanerly oriental blue and black, overall a venical gold 

quU!on dagger point up with white blade and six-sectioned red 

grip extending over the ellipse at the top and base. 

Symbolism: Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with military intelligence. Black connotes secrecy and the coven methods someLimes used in accomplishing the units mission. The four segments comptising the ellipse refer to the four phases of the intelligence cycle. The dagger signifies the aggressiveness and determination required for successful achievement in performance of 

intelligence operations. Red denotes martial fortitude and the six 

sections of the daggers grip refer to the initials UDMAC (Loyalty, 

Integrity, Discretion, Morals, and Character). ln addition, the 

vertical thrust of the dagger, the ellipse, and the nine areas of 

the weapon (blade, guard, six-sectioned grip, and pommel) 

allude to the numerical designation of the group. 

FLAG DEVICE 

None approved. 

lJNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 10 May 1946 in the Army of the United States as the 109th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 24 May 1946 at Baltimore, 

Maryland. Allotted 26 February 1951 to the Regular Army. Redesignated 12 

September 1956 as the 109th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 

25 july 1961 as the 109th Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 

1966 as the 109th Military Intelligence Group. Inactivated 30 june 1974 at Fort 

George G. Meade, Maryland. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
115th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description. A gold color metal and enamel de\'tCC consisting of three 

black enamel mountain peaks charged tn base with an eightpotnted whtte enamel star, at top a gold sunburst on an onental blue enamel background, all enclosed within a convoluted gold scroll in red letters CUSTOS SECRETORUM 

Symbolism: 

FU.G DEVICE 

(CUSTODIAN OF SECRETS). 

The sunburst just above the mountain peaks alludes to the 

sun setting in the west. With the eight-pointed rising star, it 

signifies the day and night protection gt\'Cn by the group in its 

eight western state jurisdiction. Oriental blue is one or the colors used b)· mtlnary imelligence 

None approved. 

LlNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 10 Ma) 1946 tn the Army of the Unned States as the llSth 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acti\'ated 21 \1ay 1946 at Fon Douglas. 

Utah. Allotted 23 t-.1ay 1951 to the Regular Arm}~ Redestgnated 25 july 195 7 as 

the 115th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Redcstgnatcd 25 july 1961 as the 

!15th Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the ll5th 

Military Intelligence Group. Inactivated 30 june 1974 at the Presidio or San 

Francisco, Calirornia. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIOl\S 

None. 
ll6th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

liERALDlC ITEMS 

DISIINCTIVF Ur>.JIT INSIGNIA 

Descnpllon: A gold color metal and enamel de\'ICC consisting of an oriental 

blue disc withm a scarlet military belt buckled and edged with 

gold and mscnbed m gold letters VIGIL PROMPTUSQVE 

(WATCHFUL AND READY); issuing from the inner edge of 

the belt downward over the oriental blue disc a gold demi-sun 

emitting rays; surmounted by a representation of the 

Washington Monument in the District of Columbia, white 

shaded silver gray, the monument issuing from the lower 

inner edge of the belt and extending between the two words 

of the motto beyond the top outer edge. 

Sym/Jolism: Oriental blue and s1h•er gray arc military mtelhgence branch 

colors. The sun and ra)'S are taken from the shoulder sleeve 

insignta of the former United Suues Army Intelligence 

Command. They stand for light and knowledge and indicate 

that the group served under that organization. The belt refers 

to the encircling band of security provided by military intelligence and denotes the military nature of the group. The 

Washington Monument alludes to the District of Columbia, 

the place where the unit was activated in 1946. 

Fu\c, Dr \"ICE 

None appro\·cd. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINI:t\(,1 (inactive) 

Constituted 10 May 1946 in the Army of the United States as the l 16th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 31 May 1946 at Washington, 

DC Alloued 5 t>.1arch 1951 to the Regular Arm)~ Redesignated 26 june 1959 as 

the II 6th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. Redesignated 25 jul) 1961 as the 

ll6th Intelligence Corps Group Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the I 16th 

Mllllar) lmelligence Group. lnaCU\'atcd 9 january 1973 at Washmgton, D.C. 

CAMPAJ<.,N PARTICIPATION CRI Dl r 

None. 

DKOlv\IION'-> 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

259th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC lTCMS 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description. A silver color metal and enamel device consisting of a silver 

ring containing a dtsc divided into quarters alternately from 

upper left of silver gray and black enamel centered in front 

of two oriental blue griffins seated back to back all upon a 

horizontal silver platform, the griffins each holding in a claw 

at chest level the upper fold of a silver scroll cun·ing downward in three folds, the small fold centered below the platform and the scroll inscribed in black leuers with the motto 

WATCHFUL AND VIGILANT, one word on each fold; the free 

ends draped below each end of the platform. 

Symbolism: Oriemal blue and silver gray are the colors used for military 

intelligence. The griffin, a mythological creature of exceeding 

alertness and acute hearing, represents qualiues necessary to 

the military intelligence mission. The scroll held up in his 

claws alludes to the assimilation of military intelligence data 

and the disc at center, quartered in light and dark colors represenung night and day, suggests the importance of constant 

vigilance. The silver circle refers to the state of Ohio, the 

unit's original home area. 

FLAG DEVICE 

None approved. 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 251 

L!NEAGC AND HONORS 

AR 

LINF.AGl: (inactive) 

Constituted 24 November 1967 in the Army Reserve as Headquarters, 259th 

Military Intelligence Group. Activated 22 january 1968 at Sharonville, Ohio. 

Inactivated 1 March 1972 at Sharonville, Ohio. Redesignated 8 August 1995 as 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 259th Military Intelligence Group. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

336th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

liERALDIC lTEM~ 

None appro,·ed. 

LlNl·AGE AND HONOR~ 

AR 

LINEAGE (inaclive) 

Constnuted 14 May 1948 in the Organized Reserve Corps as the 336th 

Headquaners Intelligence Detachment. Activated 2 june 1948 at New York, New 

York. Reorgamzed and redesignated 6 jul)' l 950 as I icadquaners, 336th Military 

Intelligence Group. Ordered mto acuve military service 3 September 1950 at 

New York, New York. inactivated 1 December 1950 at Fort Bragg, Nonh 

Carolina. Redesignated 28 March 1996 as Headquarte rs and lleadquarters 

Detachment, 336th Military Intelligence Group. 

C\MPAIGN PARTICIPATIOl\ CRLDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

348th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

None appro,·cd. 

liNEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 18 April 1967 m the Regular Army as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Companr. 48th Military Intelligence Group. Activated 1 August 

1967 at Fort Bragg, Nonh Carolina Inactivated 26 August 1968 at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. 

Redesignated 28 March 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, 348th Military Intelligence Group; concurrently withdrawn from 

the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPA110N CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
650th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of an octagon, 

issuing from the top a white enamel wedge shape between two 

black enamel areas each surmounted with a gold sea lion facing 

outward, and extending in base over an oriental blue enamel 

area charged in the center with a gold Philippine sunburst, all 

above a gold scroll of three sections inscribed in sequence 

SECURITY TRUTH ALLIANCE in scarlet leuers. 

Symbolism: The sea lions allude to the unit:S New Guinea and Luzon campaigns in the Pacific theater during World War ll. The 

Philippine sunburst symbolizes the organization:S Philippine 

Presidential Unit Citation. The octagon refers to the number 

eight, which in numerology stands for perfect intelligence. 

The colors black and white symbolize day and night vigilance, 

while gold, the color of the farseeing sun, which appears 

bringing light out of an inscrutable darkness only to disappear 

again into darkness, stands for intuition. Oriental blue is one 

of the colors used for intelligence and security. 

FLAG DEVICE 

None approved. 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

505th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

None approved. 

LINEAGE 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

(inactive) 

Consututed 30 january 1951 in the Orgamzed Resen·e Corps a5 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 505th Communication 

Reconnaissance Group. Activated 19 February 1951 at Boston, Massachusetts. 

(Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 jul)' 1952 as the Army Reserve.) 

Redesignated 10 September 1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

505th Army Security Agency Group. lnacuvated 1 july 1959 at BoslOn, 

Massachusetts. Activated 15 February 1963 at Boston, Massachusetts. Inactivated 

31 january 1968 at Boston. Massachusetts. 

Redesignated 1 February 1990 as Headquarters and lleadquarters Company, 

505th Military Intelligence Group. Redesignated 8 August 1995 as Headquarters 

and Headquarters Detachment, 505th Military Intelligence Group. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
256 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (active) 

Constituted 12 july 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 450th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 20 August 1944 in New 

Guinea. Disbanded 22 july 1945 in the Philippine Islands. Reconstituted 25 

March 1948 in the Organtzed Reserve Corps as the 450th Counter Intelligence 

Corps Detachment. Activated l May 1948 in Puerto Rico. Inactivated 4 August 

1949 m Puerto Rico. Withdrawn 18 january 1951 from the Organized Reserve 

Corps and allotted to the Regular Army; concurrently activated at Fort Holabird, 

Maryland. Redesignated 25 july 1961 as the 450th Intelligence Corps 

Detachment. 

Redesignated lS October 1966 as the 650th Military Intelligence Detachment. 

Reorganized and redesignated 20 july 1970 as the 650th Military Intelligence 

Group. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

World War II 

NewGumea 

Luzon 

DECORATIONS 

Philippine Presidenrial Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 

1944 TO 4 JULY 1945 (450th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA 

GO 47, 1950) 
HEADQUARTERS AND 

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 

902d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP 

(The Deuce) 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

DISTlNCflVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device consisting of three gold 

sun rays behind an Oiiemal blue enamel disc surmounted at 

lOp by a gold chess piece (horse's head) and in base a red 

enamel and gold chessboard, all above a three-folded gold 

scroll inscribed in black enamel leuers STRENGTH 

THROUGH VlGlLANCE. 

Symbolism: The sun rays allude to the Philippine Presidential Unit 

Citation and to the unit's World War ll service in New 

Guinea and Luzon. The knight, a chess piece shaped like a 

horse's head, symbolizes the group's ability to make strategic 

moves while checking any hostile infiltration and advancement. The color red is used to symbolize courage, zeal, and 

awareness and with the alternating gold squares refers to the 

unit's counterintelligence mission. Oriental blue is one of the 

colors used by military intelligence. 

FLAG DEVICE 

None approved. 
258 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 14 October 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 902d 

Counter lntelltgence Corps Detachment. Activated 23 November 1944 in New 

Guinea. Disbanded 22 july 1945 in the Philippine Islands. Reconstituted l3 

November 194 7 in the Organized Reserves as the 902d Counter Intelligence 

Corps Detachment. Activated 28 November 194 7 at Fort Smith, Arkansas. 

(Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Orgamzed Reserve 

Corps.) Inactivated 2 November 1949 at Fort Smtth, Arkansas. Withdrawn 3 

january 1952 from the Organized Reserve Corps and allotted to the Regular 

Army. Activated 8 january 1952 at Fort Holabird, Maryland. 

Redesignated 15 December 1957 as the 902d Counter Intelligence Corps 

Group. Redesignated 25 july 1961 as the 902d Intelligence Corps Group. 

Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 902d Military Intelligence Group. 

Reorganized and redesignated 1 january 1978 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, 902d Military Imelltgence Group. Reorgamzed and redestgnated 16 

November 1995 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 902d Military 

Intelligence Group. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDil 

World War II 

NewGumea 

Luzon 

DECORATIONS 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1988-1989 (902d Military 

Intelligence Group cited; DA GO 15, 1990) 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 

1944 TO 4 JULY 1945 (902d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA 

GO 47, 1950) 
1st MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(The Flying Eye Battalion) 

(OAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, issuant from base a lightning flash bendwise tem1inating in a dexter hand fesswise supporting an annulet winged to 

chief all or, within the annulet a human eye proper. 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, a bundle of five arrows 

crossed with a hook-bladed machete in bend sinister, the 

arrows point down with shafts of the first barbed and flighted 

gules, the machete with handle to base azure all banded in center with a ribbon gold bearing three narrow stripes fesswise 

scarlet, all in front of a bank of clouds proper. 

INFORMARE LABORAMUS (WE LABOR TO INFORM). 

Teal blue and yellow are the colors formerly used for air 

reconnaissance support battalions. The annulet, symbolic of a 

camera lens, refers to the aerial photo interpretation mission 

in the unit:S history. The wings allude to flight; the eye represents observation. The lightning flash alludes to the former 

signal element in the unit's composition and the hand commemorates the unit:S mission of support. 

The battalion's awards for Vietnam service, for which it 

received the Presidential Unit Citation (Air Force) and five 

Meritorious Unit Commendations (Army), are represented in 

the crest. The mak, or hook-bladed machete used to clear 

fields in Vietnam, signifies the battalion's keen reconnaissance 

performance, and, together with the clouds alluding to the Air 

Force, refers tO the Presidential Unit Citation (Air Force); blue 

is the color of the award streamer. The five arrows, with points 

down signifying penetration from the air, represent five 

Meritorious Unit Commendations (Army), with arrowheads 

and feathers in scarlet, the color of the award streamers. The 

yellow band with scarlet stripes, suggested by the national flag 

of the Republic of Vietnam, also alludes to the unit:S achievements in collecting aerial reconnaissance information. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
260 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

MILITARY INTFLLIGENCt 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 14 December 1956 m the Regular Army as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detachment, 1st Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion. Activated I 

February 1957 at Fort Polk, Louisiana. (205th Signal Company [sec ANNEX ll 

reorganized and redesignated 1 May 1959 as Compan)' A; !96th Aerial Photo 

Interpretation Detachmcm !sec ANNEX 2] redesignated 15 April 1959 as 

Company B and allotted to the Regular Army; activated I May 1959 at Fort 

Bragg. North Carolina.) 

Converted and redesignated 20 March 1962 as the 1st Military Intelligence 

Battalion. lnacll\'ated 15 July 1982 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Activated 16 

January 1984 in Germany. 

ANNEl\ 1 

Constituted 24 January 1945 m the Army of the United States as the 205th 

Signal Repair Company. Activated J February 1945 at Fort jackson, South 

Carolina. Allotted 16 May 1949 to the Regular Army. Reorganized and redesignated 15 Apnl 1954 as the 205th Signal Company. lnacuvated 28 May 1955 in 

Korea. Activated 1 February 1956 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

ANNEX 2 

Constituted 16 june 1945 in the Army of the Unned States as the 196th 

Photo Interpreter Team. Activated 10 July 1945 at Fon jackson, South 

Carolina. Reorganized and redesignated 18 May 1950 as the 196th Aerial Photo 

Interpretation Detachment. Inactivated 15 November 1953 at Governors 

Island, New York. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDll 

Vietnam 

Defense 

Countcroffensl\'e 

Counteroffensive, Phase II 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

Tel Coumcroffensl\·e 

Coumeroffenst,·e, Phase I\' 

Coumcroffensl\'e, Pha5e V 

Coumcwffcnsivc. Phase Vl 

Tet 69/C.oumeroffenstve 

Summer-Pall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 1970 

Sanctuary Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Phase VII 

Consohdauon I 

Consohdauon II 

Cease-Fire 
UNEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Korean \Vat 

UN Defensive 

UN Offenstve 

CCf Intervention 

Ftrst UN Coumeroffenstvc 

CCF Spnng Offenstvc 

UN Summer-Fall Offcnstve 

Second Korean Wmtcr 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Thtrd Korean Wimer 

Korea, Summer 1953 

Company B addnionally entitled to: 

Southwest Asia 

Liberauon and Defense of Kuwait 

DECORATIONS 

261 

Presidenual Unit Citation (Air Force), Streamer embroidered SOUTHEAST 

ASIA 1966-1967 (lst Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 42, 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1965-1966 (lst Military Intelligence Baualion cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (1st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (1st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 42, 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (1st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 43, 1988) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1970-1972 (1st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 5, 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965-1971 (1st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 32. 

1973) 

Company A additionall y entitled to: 

Merilorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1950-1952 (205th Signal Repair Company cited; DA GO 94. 1952) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1953 (205th Signal Repair Company cited; DA GO 1, 1954) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(205th Signal Repair Company cited; DA GO 33, 1953, as amended by DA GO 

41. 1955) 
2d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT Of ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC llEMS 

Per chevron abased azure and argent, a chief danccuy of two 

enhanced of the last the apexes surmounted by two roundels 

of the first coumerchangcd and in base a sphinx rampant 

sable armed gules. 

None approved. 

OCULI CULTUS SECRET! (THE EYES OF INTELLIGENCE). 

The colors, white and teal blue, symbolize the baualions former status as an unassigned-to-branch unit. The battahon's 

numerical designation and mission are suggested by the two 

roundels or lenses directing their gaze downward. The sphinx 

is representative of the intelligence mission. Black alludes to 

the coat of arms of the old Rhineland district of Pfalz in 

Germany, where the unit was activated. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The disuncti\·e unn insigma is the shield and motto of the coar of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 18 October 1961 in the Regular Army as the 2d A1r 

Reconnaissance Support Battalion. Activated 15 November 1961 111 Germany. 

Convened and redesignated 16 September 1962 as the 2d Military Intelligence 

Battalion. Inactivated I 5 November 1991 in Germany. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Southwest Asra 

Defense of Saudr Arabia 

Liberauon and Defense of Kuwait 

Cease hre 

DECORATIONS 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embro1dered SOUTHWEST 

ASIA (2d Military Intelligence Baualion cited; DA GO 34, 1992) 
3d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAT or ARMS 

Slueld 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

1-li:.RALDIC ITEMS 

Per bend azure and cheeky or and gules in chief a chess piece 

with a griffin's head argent. 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, a Vietnamese sunburst of the first surmounted by a bamboo cross pierced at 

center proper. 

WINGED VIGILANCE. 

The colors oriental blue and silver gray arc used to represent 

military intelligence and scarlet and gold to symbolize military 

strength and operational excellence. The griffin, traditionally a 

creature of vision, alertness, and intelltgcncc, is shown as a 

chess piece adJacent to a chessboard, suggesung the type of 

operation, reqUiring ingenuity and intellect, which the battalion is called upon to carry out. The squares on the chessboard 

represent the many engagements in which the unit participated in Vietnam. 

The sunbursl. taken from the Hien Nhan gate to the Imperial 

City in l lue, represents Vietnam and has three principal 

Oames, suggcsung the Meritorious Unit Commendations 

(Army) awarded lO the organization. The bamboo cross stands 

for the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm 

awarded to the unit. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of anns. 

LlNEAC.F AND HONORS 

LINEA<.,[ 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 1 june 1966 tn the Regular Army as the 146th Aviation 

Company and activated in Vietnam. lnacth·ated 17 February 1973 in Vietnam. 

Convened and redesignated 1 july 1974 as the 146th Army Security Agency 

Company and activated in Korea. 

Reorganized and redesignated 16 june 1982 as Headquarters, Headquarters 

and Service Company, 3d Military Inte lligence Battalion (704th Military 

Intelligence Detachment [sec ANNEX 1] and 542d Military Intelligence 
264 MILiTARY INTELLIGENCE 

Detachment [see ANNEX 21 concurrently redestgnated as Companies A and B 

and acuvated in Korea). 

ANNEX l 

Constituted 25 September 1950 in the Regular Army as the 704th Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acm·ated 6 October 1950 in Korea. Inactivated 28 

March 1955 in Korea. Redesignated 28 December 1961 as the 704th Intelligence 

Corps Detachment. Activated 25 january 1962 in Viemam. Inactivated 7 March 

1966 in Vietnam. Redesignated l November 1966 as the 704th Military Intelligence 

Detachment. Activated 15 March 1967 injapan. Inactivated l5june 1972 in japan. 

Activated 25 September 1976 in Korea. Inacth·ated 16 Ma)' 1979 m Korea. 

ANNEX 2 

ConstitULed 7 july 1945 in the Army of the United States as the l002d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 25 july 1945 in France. 

Disbanded 24 january 1946 at Holabtrd Signal Depot, Maryland. Reconstituted 7 

December 1950 in the Regular Army as the 442d Counter Intelligence Corps 

Detachment. Activated 20 December 1950 in Korea. Inactivated 25 December 

1951 in Korea. 

Redestgnated 26 March 1965 as the 542d Intelligence Corps Detachment. 

Activated 7 April 1965 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Inactivated l 

December 1965 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Aclivated 19 December 

1969 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Redesignated 29 December 1969 as the 542d 

Military Intelligence Detachment. Inactivated 19 November 1973 at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Viet11am 

Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive Phase II 

Counteroffensl\'e, Phase Ill 

Tet Counteroffensl\·e 

Coumeroffcns1ve, Phase IV 

Counteroffenstvc, Phase V 

Counteroffensive. Phase VI 

Tet 69/Counteroffenstve 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Wintcr-Spnng 1970 

Sanctuary Counteroffensive 

CounteroffensiVe. Phase VII 

C.onsolidauon I 

Consolidation II 

Cease-Fire 
LINEAGES AND IIFRALDlC DATA 

Company A additionall y entitled to: 

Kvrnm War 

Ul': Offcnsm~ 

CCF Intervention 

F~rst Ut\ Coumcroffcnst,·c 

CCF Spnng Offcnstve 

UN Summer-Fall Offcnstvc 

Second Korean Wmtcr 

Korea. Summer· I all 1952 

Thtrd Korean Wmter 

Korea. Summer 1953 

\ 'rllndm 

t\d\'ISOry 

Defense 

Company B additionally entitled to: 

Korean \Va1 

CCF lntervcmton 

First UN Countcroffensl\'e 

CCF Spnng Offcnstvc 

UN Summer-Fall Offensive 

Second Kort'an Wmtcr 

DI'CORAT!ONS 

265 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Anny). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (I 46th Avwuon Company cited: DA GO 17. 1968. as amended by DA 

GO 1, 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Am1y), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1969 (!46th Avtation Company cited: DA GO 2, 197 1) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971-1972 (!46th A'·iation Company cited: DA GO 32, 1973) 

Army Superior Untt Award. Streamer embroidered 1985-1986 (3d Military 

lntelltgence Battalion cited; DA GO 30. 1987) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm. Streamer embrotdered 

VIHNAM 1970-1971 (I 46th Aviation Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

'vl.eritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(704th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 46. 1954) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1950-1952 (704th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 33, 

1953, as amended by DA GO 41. 1955) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Una Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1952-1953 (704th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachmem cited; DA GO 24, 

1954) 
14th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Per bend dove-tailed argent and azure, two whelk shells 

counterchanged. 

None approved. 

SUPPORT BY INTELLIGENCE. 

The two shells and the dove-tailed partition line stand for the 

three general functions of a military intelligence unit: collecting, processing, and disseminating information. The whelk 

shells, which receive and transmit sound waves and \'ibrations, refer to the collection and dissemination of information; 

the fining together of the two pans of the shield, by means of 

the dove-tailed line, refers to the process of interpreting and 

collating separate pieces of information to form an integrated 

whole. Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors used for 

military intelligence. Counterchanging the colors of the shells 

alludes to the counterintelligence function of the unit. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lNSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (active) 

Constituted 4 November l965 in the Regular Army as the 14th Military 

Intelligence Battalion. Activated 24 November 1965 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. Inactivated 31 December 1972 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Activated 

16 December 1988 at Fort Lewis, Washington. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
15th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Sh1eld: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, above a base rayonne argent, a winged sphinx 

couchant of the last and in chief two plates partially superimposed fesswise the conjoined area sable. 

None approved. 

VIGILANTIA AD FIN EM (VIGILANCE TO THE END). 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors used for military 

intelligence. The winged sphinx, all-seeing and continually 

watchful, refers to the battalions air reconnaissance support mission and also connotes the units motto. The overlapping discs 

simulate camera lenses and allude w the stereoscopic capabilities 

provided by the organization in its performance of reproduction, 

identification, and packaging of aerial imagery. The flames are 

indicative of heat sensory devices, wisdom, and zeal. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (active) 

Constituted 6 january 1966 in the Regular Army as the 15th Military 

Intelligence Battalion. Activated 25 February 1966 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Inactivated 30 Aprill972 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Acuvated 21 Aprill978 at 

Fort Hood, Texas (Detachments A, B, C, and D concurrently consolidated to form 

Company A; 13lst Military Intelligence Company [see ANNEX 1] and 156th Army 

Security Agency Company [see ANNEX 2] reorganized and redesignated as 

Companies Band C). Headquarters and Headquarters Company inactivated 31 

May 1981 at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia (Company C concurrently inactivated 

at Fort Bhss, Texas). (Compan}' A macuvated 15 April 1982 at Fort Hood, Texas; 

disbanded 15 September 1983. Company B reorganized and redesignated 16 

September 1983 as Company A, Company C concurrently redestgnated as 

Compan} B.) Headquarters and Headquarters Company redesignated 16 October 

1985 as I ieadquaners, Headquarters and Service Company and activated at Fon 

Hood, Texas (Company B concurrently activated). 
268 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

ANNEX l 

Constituted 1 july 1971 in the Regular Army as the 13lst Military 

lntelltgcnce Company and activated in Vietnam. 

ANNt:X 2 

Constituted 1 june 1966 tn the Regular Army as the 156th Aviation 

Company and activated m Vietnam. Converted and rcdestgnated 5 November 

1973 as the 156th Army Securit}' Agency Company. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDII 

Southwest As1a 

Defense of Saud1 Amb1a 

Liberation and Ddcn~e of Kuwait 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Vlt'lnam 

Consohdauon l 

Consolidation II 

Cease-Fire 

Company B additionally cnwled to: V1t~tnam 

Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Pha~e II 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

Tct Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Ph<tSl' IV 

CounteroffenSI\'C, Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase VI 

Tct 69/Counteroffens•w 

DI·CORATIONS 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spnng 1970 

Sanctuary Counter<lffcnsive 

CounteroffensiVe, Phase VII 

Consolidation I 

Consohdatwn II 

Cease-fire 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTIIW!''>T 

A-.tA (15th Military lntclligcncc Battalion cited; DA GO 12, 1994) 

Company B additionally entitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (!56th Aviation Company cited; DA GO 17,1968, as amended by Dt\ 

GO I, 1969) 

Mcntorious Unit Commcndauon (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1969 (l56th Avtauon Company cited: DA GO 2, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commcndauon (Am1)'), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971-1972 (156th Avtation Company cited; DA GO 32, 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VlrTNAM 1970-1971 (!56th Aviation Company cited; DA GO 6, l 974) 
24th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, above a base indented or a wmgcd eye, the wings displayed invened of the second, cmnung to base three rays 

throughout of the like counterchangcd 

That for the regtments and separate battalions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The Statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexmgton, Massachusetts. 

OUR EYES SUPPORT. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors used for military intelligence 

umts. The winged eye searching the land with rays of ltght is 

symbolic of the air reconnaissance mtsston of the battalion . 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
270 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

LINEAGE (active) 

Consututed 22 April 1959 1n the Army Reserve as the 24th Air 

Reconnaissance Support Battalion. Activated 1 May 1959 with Headquarters at 

New York. New York. Ordered into active military service 15 October 1961 at 

New York, New York. 

Converted and redesignated 13 April 1962 as the 24th Military Intelligence 

Battalion. Released from active mll1tary service 4 August 1962 and reverted to 

reserve status. Location of Headquarters changed 1 September 1962 to Staten 

Island, New York; changed 31 December 1968 to Fort Hamilton, New York. 

Baualion ordered into active military service 24 March 1970 at Fon Hamilton, New 

York; released from active military service 26 March 1970 and reverted to reserve 

status. Location of Headquarters changed l May 1974 to Staten Island, New York. 

(Detachment C ordered into active military service 17 january 1991 at Staten 

Island, New York; released from active military serv1ce l April 1991 and reverted 

to reserve status.) 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Detachment C entitled to: 

Southwest Asra 

Ltbemuon and Defense of Kuwatt 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
lOlst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDlC ITEMS 

Cheeky azure and argent in from of a sword and lightning 

flash in saltire a double-warded key palewise argent, on a chief 

invected of the like a sunburst throughout tenne. 

None approved. 

TRUST VIGILANCE LOYALTY. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence. The invected chief is an allusion to clouds and the atmosphere, the main field of operations for a combat electronic warfare intelligence unit. The 

sunburst, a symbol of Helios, the Greek sun god, is a funher 

reference to the atmosphere. The sunburst may also denote a 

compass rose and the multi-directional facets of the units 

radio functions. The cheeky background alludes to a chessboard and symbolizes strategy and intelligence. The sword 

refers to the unit's military ability, the lightning flash to speed 

and communications, and the key to intelligence and security. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 

LiNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LiNEAGE (active) 

Constituted 16 September 1980 in the Regular Army as the 101st Military 

Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, and activated at Fon 

Riley, Kansas (337th Army Security Agency Company !see ANNEX ll and lst 

Military lntelligence Company [see ANNEX 2] concurrently reorganized and 

redesignated as Companies A and B). Inactivated 15 November 1995 at Fort 

Riley, Kansas. Activated 16 February 1996 in Germany. 

ANNEX 1 

Constituted 1 july 1952 in the Regular Army as the 337th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company. Activated 6 August 1952 at Fort Devens, 

Massachuseus. Reorganized and redesignated 16 May 1955 as Company B, 313th 

Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. Redesignated 1 july 1956 as 

Company B, 313th Army Security Agency Baualion. Inactivated 18 December 
272 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

1957 at Fort Bragg, North Carolma. Activated 25 May 1962 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. Reorganized and redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 337th Army 

Security Agency Company. 

ANNEX 2 

Constituted 12 july 1944 in the Army of the United States as the lst Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 16 August 1944 in France with personnel from provisiOnal Counter Intelltgence Corps detachment attached to the lst 

Infantry Division. Allotted 16 February 195lto the Regular Ann)'. Reorganized and 

redcstgnated 25 january 1958 as the 1st Milnary Imclltgcnce Detachment. 

Reorganized and redesignated 26 December 1969 as the lst Military lmelligence 

Company. Reorganized and redesignated 15 April 1970 as the lst Military 

Intelligence Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 3 May 1971 as the 1st 

Military Intelligence Company. Assigned 21 july 1978 to the lst lnfanny Division. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Soutlnvest Asia 

Defense of Saudi Arabw 

Uberation and Defense of Kuwait 

Cease-Fire 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Vietnam 

Defense 

Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensi\'C, Phase 11 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

Tet Coumeroffensl\·e 

Counteroffensive, Phase IV 

Company B additionally cmnlcd to: 

World War 11-EAME 

Tunista 

Sicily 

Normandy (wnh arrowhead) 

Northern France 

Rhineland 

Ardennes-Aisace 

Central Europe 

Coumeroffcns1vc. Phase V 

Coumeroffens1ve, Phase VI 

Tet 69/Counteroffcnslve 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spnng 1970 

\"1ctnarn 

Defense 

Coumeroffcns1ve 

Counteroffensive. Phase II 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

Tel Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Phase IV 

Coumerofffens1ve, Phase V 

Coumerofffens1ve, Phase VI 

Tet 69/CountcrofffenSI\'C 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spnng 1970 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 

DECORATIONS 

Company A entitled LO: 

273 

Meritorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1965-1966 (11th Rad1o Research Unit Clled; DA GO 17. 1968) 

Meritorious Unn Commendauon (Army), Streamer embro1dered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (337th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (337th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 

Meritorious Unll Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (337th Radto Research Company cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unn Commendation (Arm)), Streamer embroidered VICTNA~I 

1969-1970 (337th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1965-1968 (337th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 21, 1969, as 

amended by DA GO 59. 1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action llonor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1969-1970 (337th Rad1o Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 

1974) 

Company B entitled to: 

Meritorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIFTNAM 

1966 {lst Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VlfT'\IAM 

1968 (1st Military lntelilgence Detachment cned; DA GO 7. 1970) 

French Croix de Guerre with Palm. World War II, Streamer embroidered 

KASSER1NE ( Lst Infantry Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

hench Croix de Gucrre with Palm, World War II, Streamer embroidered 

NORMANDY (1st Infantr) Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

French Croix de Guerre, World War It, Fourragere {1st Infantry Division cncd; 

DA GO 43, 1950) 

Belgian Fourragcre 1940 (lst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Cited; 

DA GO 43, J 950) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action at Mons ( Lst 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment ctted; DA GO 4 3, 1950) 

Cned in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action at EupcnMalmedy (lst Counter Imelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 43, J 950) 

Republic ol Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VI[TNAM 1965-1968 (1st Military lntelhgence Detachment cited; DA GO 21, 

1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action I Ionor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1965-1970 (1st Mtlita1y Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 53, 

1970) 
102d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Per fess danceuy azure and sable, a chief invected argent, and 

overall a sword bend sinisterwise point to base gules surmounted by a lightning nash issuant from dexter chief bendwise overall or. 

None approved. 

KNOWLEDGE FOR BATILE. 

Silver gray and oriental blue are the colors used for military 

intelligence units. The divisions of the shield are symbolic of 

weather and terrain, with the scarlet sword representing the 

enemy. The unit's deployment overseas is symbolized by the 

wavy blue section and the black area in base refers to the 

steep, mountainous terrain of Korea, where elements of the 

battalion served during the Korean War. The lightning nash 

sign1fies the seeking, gathering, and dissemination of information relative to the areas of weather, terrain, and the enemy 

and further denotes the constant vigilance which is inherent 

in the mission of military intelligence. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 16 September 1981 in the Regular Army as the l02d Military 

Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 2d Infantry Division, and activated in 

Korea (329th Army Security AgenC)' Company !see ANNEX 11 and 2d Militar)• 

Intelligence Company !see A.\JNEX 21 concurrently reorganized and redes1gnated 

as Companies A and B). 

ANNEX 1 

Constnuted 23 October 194 3 in the Army of the United States as the 

3106th Signal Serv1ce Platoon. Activated 1 November 1943 at Fon Monmouth, 

New jersey. Inactivated 10 February 1946 on Okinawa. Activated 19 November 

1946 at Vim Hill Farms Station, Virginia. Redesignated 1 April 194 7 as the 3d 

Signal Service Platoon. Reorganized and redesignated 25 March 1949 as the 
LINEAGCS Al\D HERALDIC DATA 275 

53d S1gnal ':>ervice Company. Alloucd 13 October 1950 to the Regular Army. 

Convened and redesignated 1 December 1950 as the 329th Communication 

Reconn:liSsance Company. Rcorgamzecl and redesignated 2 '5 June 1955 as 

Company B, 30lst Communicmion Reconnaissance Battalion. Redesignated l 

July 1956 as Company B, 30 I st Army Security Agency Battalion. Inactivated 15 

October J 957 in Korea. Redesignated 1 No,·ember 1975 as the 329th Army 

Security Agency Company and acti\·mcd in Korea. 

A'>'>F'-: 2 

Constituted 12 July 194+ in the Armr of the Unncd States as the 2d Counter 

lmelltgcnce Corps Detachment. Acuvatcd 6 August 1944 111 France wtth personnel from provisional Counter Intelhgcnce Corps detachment attached to the 2d 

Infantry DiYision. Allotted 3 February 1949 to the Regular Army. Inactivated 15 

September 1956 at Fort Lewis, Washington. Redesignated 26 February l 958 as 

the 2d Milnary Intelligence Detachment. Activated 14 June 1958 at Fort Benning, 

Georg1a. Ass1gned 30 June 1976 to the 2d 1nfamry Dh ision. Reorganized and 

redcs1gnatcd 20 February 1979 as the 2d Military lntelhgcncc Company. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRU11T 

Company A entitled to: 

\V,ltlcl \\'m 11-AP 

',Jiver b<lnd without IOSL npuon 

Km t•cm Ww 

~ccond Korean Wimer 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

llmd Korean Winter 

Koro.:<l <;ummer 1953 

C..ompan} B entitled to: 

\\'or lc/ \\'w Jl-[.,\,\IE 

:\ormandr 

l'onhcm France 

Rhmel.md 

Ardo.:nn~s-Ais.1ce 

Co.:ntml Europe 

1\mrml \\'w 

Ul\ Ddcnsivc 

Ul'\ Offcnsm: 

<. CF lnto.:r•l'ntion 

I' IN u:-.: Coumcroffcn~l\"0.: 

CCI· ~pnng Offensh·c 

Ul\ ~umma-Fall Offcns1w 

"ccond Korean \V uner 

Korl'a. 'iummcr-Fall 19'52 

llurd J..:orcan Wmtcr 

K~nca, Summer 1953 
276 

01 CORATIO'\:, 

Company A emilletlto: 

~111 ITARY 10:TELUGC'\CI 

Meritorious Untt Commendation (Artn)'), Streamer embroidered KORl-1\ 

IY51-l9"i2 (329th Communication Reconnaissance Company cited; DA GO 108, 

1952) 

~leritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered KORh\ 

1952-1951 (329th Commumcauon Reconnaissance Compan> mcd; DA CO 22. 

1954) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. Streamer embroidered KORf \ 

( 329th Communication Reconnaissance Compan) cited. DA (,0 33, 1953, as 

amended by DA GO 41, 195'5) 

Company B entitled to: 

Presidential Unit Utauon (Army), Streamer embroidered IIONGCIION (2d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 72, 1951) 

\ttcritorious Unit Commcndauon (Army), ~treamer embrotdered KOREA (2d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA (,0 32. 1954) 

Bclg1an Fourragcrc 1940 (2d lnfantr)' Di\ is10n cited. DA GO 4 3, 1950) 

( 1tcd in the Order of the Da} of the Bclg1an Army for acuon in the Ardennes 

(2d Infantry Divtston cned. DA GO 43, 1950) 

C1tcd in the Order of the Day of the Bclgwn Armr for action at Elscnhorn 

Crest (2d Infantry Div1sion Clled; DA GO 4 3, 1950) 
l03d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl t11 AR\1:-> 

Sludc/: 

Crest: 

Moller 

Sym/mlism: 

I I FRAI DIC iTEMS 

Per bend azure Jnd quanerl) gules and or. on a bend 

engrailed argem a lightnmg bolt of the second and m smister 

chief a wywrn's head of the fourth. 

f\.one approved 

TOP OF Ti lL ROCK. 

Oriemal blue and silver gray are the colors associated with 

military in telligence units. The wyverns head has been adapted from the devtcc of the 3d Infantry Dtvis10n. which this battalion support<;. The W)'Vern is a hcraldtc creature known as a 

fearless guardtan and thus symbolizes a maJOr role of the intelligence mission The ltghtmng bolt on the cngrailed bend 

alludes to the unns special interest in communtt:ations of hostile and friend!) forces as well as communicauons throughout 

the battalion. The scarlet and yellow quarters refer to the arms 

of Wurzburg in German)'. the battalion':, place of activation. 

OJ<;TINCIIVI· UNIT INSIGNIA 

rhe dtsunctive unit msignta ts the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
278 \IIUTARY INTELLIGENCl: 

LINEAGL AND HONOR~ 

RA 

I INb\t;E (active) 

Constituted 16 September 1981 in the Regular Army as the 103d Military 

Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 3d Infantry Di\ision, and activated in 

Crermany (85lst Army Security Agency Company [sec Af\ \1CX ll and 3d Militm)' 

Intelligence Compan) [sec t\\1\!EX 21 concurrently reorganized and redesignated 

as Compames A and B). 

A\1N[X 1 

Constitmed 29 December 1945 in the Army of the United States as the 

3377th Signal Service Detachment. Activated 15 january 1946 in the Philippine 

Islands. Redesignated 9 june 194 7 as the 50th Signal Service Detachment. 

Convened and rcdes1gnaLCd 2 5 October J 951 as the 85 lst Communication 

Reconnaissance Detachment and allotted to the Regular Army. Inactivated 15 

August 1956 in japan. Redcs1gnatecl 3 December 1965 as the 85 J st Arm>' 

Security Agency Detachment Acll\•atecl 15 December 1965 in the Dominican 

Republic Inactivated 14 October 1966 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Redesignated 1 july 1974 as the 85lst Army Sccunt)' Agcncr Company and activated in Germany. 

1\NNI.X 2 

Constituted 12 july 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 3d Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 3 September 1944 in France with personnel from provisional Coumer Intelligence Corps detachment auachecl to the 

3d Infantry Division. lnacuvmed I September 1946 m German)'· Alloued 3 

februar) 1949 to the Regular Ann). Activated 1 March 1949 at Fort Bennmg. 

Georg1a. Reorgamzed and redesignated 25 january 1958 as the 3d Militarr 

Intelligence Detachment. Reorgamzed and redesignated 21 Mar 1972 as the 3d 

Mllllary Intelligence Company. Assigned 21 Apnl 1974 to the 3d Infantry 

D1vis10n. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPA-llON CRI·()!T 

Company A entitled to: 

1\on·cm \\lar 

U\. Offcnst\"t' 

CCF lmcr\'Cnlllm 

Ftrsl li\; Countt•rofktbtn: 

CC.F Spnng Offctht\C 

Armed Foras Expccluwn' 

Domnucan Rcpubhl 
UNEAGES AND HERALDlC DATA 

Company B entitled 10: 

World War 11-EAME 

Tunisia 

Sicily 

Naples-Fogg•a 

Anzio (with arrowhead) 

Romc-Arno 

~outhcm France (with arrowhead) 

Rhineland 

Ardennes-Aisace 

Central Europe 

Korean War 

CCF lntcrvcnuon 

First UN Counteroffensive 

CCF Spring Offensive 

UN Summer-Fall Offensive 

Second Korean Winter 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Third Korean Winter 

Kore:a, Summer 1953 

DECORATIONS 

Company A entitled to: 

279 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(50th Signal Service Detachment cited; DA GO 101, 1951) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(50th Signal Service Detachment cited; DA GO 33, 1953, as amended by DA GO 

41, 1955) 

Company B entitled to: 

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered COLMAR (3d 

Infantry Division cited; WD GO 44, 1945) 

Meritorious Unil Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA (3d 

Counter lmelligcnce Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 22, 1954) 

French Croix de Guerre with Palm, World War ll, Streamer embroidered 

COLMAR (3d Infantry Division cited: DA GO 43, 1950) 

French Croix de Guerre, World War II, Fourragere (3d lnfamry Division 

cited: DA GO 43, 1950) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 

UI]ONGBU CORRIDOR (3d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 

20, 1953) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 

IRON TRIANGLE (3d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 29, 

1954) 
l04th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

Co. \T or AR~IS 

)hidcl. 

Crt:sl: 

!viol to: 

Symbolism: 

ll r~\LD C ITEM'> 

Azure an eagle :S head proper in from of two swords m sa lure 

argent hiltcd or and m chief a ltghtnmg flash fesswise of the 

ltke 

None appro\"ed. 

WATCII FUL AND READY. 

Ork mal blue and silver gray arc the colors associated with 

milnary inte lligence. The crossed swords attest to the unit's 

readiness: the eagle, wide-eyed and alen, is symbolic ol 

watchfulness. The boiL of lighming refers to the units elcctromc \\arfan~ capabdJL) The symbols express the words of 

the mouo and the units basic m1ss1on and responsiblllt) 

Dr ... rrNcTt\'E u~rT I'\1-.tU%\ 

The distinctive unit msignia is the shield and the mouo of the coat of arms. 

LiNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINLAGF (active) 

Constituted 16 September 1980 in the Regular Ann) as the lO·hh ~lllllm')' 

Intelligence Battalion, ass1gned to the 4th lnfanll') DI\'ISIOn, and acti,·ated at ron 

(arson, Colorado (3Hth Arm) Securit)' Agenc) Compan) lsce A:-.:i\EX 11 and 

4th Militar)' lmelhgencc Company lsee A:-.JNEX 2] concurrently reorganized and 

redes1gnated as Companies A and B). lnacti\'atcd I 5 December 1995 at hm 

Carson, Colorado. Activated 16 January 1996 at r:on llood, Texas. 

ANNI:X 1 

Constituted 21 '\lo,•ember 1963 in the Regular Army as Company C. 303d 

,\rmy Security Agency Bauahon. Acti\'atcd 20 December 1963 at Fort Lew1s, 

\\'ashmgton. Reorgamzed and redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 374th t\rmr 

Sccurit) AgcnC) Compan)". lna<.:ti\'ated 30 june 1972 at ron Carson, Colorado 

Acu,·ated 21 December 1977 at f-ort Carson, Colorado. 

Al\lNL:\ 2 

Constituted I 2 jul) 1944 m the Armr or the United States as the 4th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 6 August 1944 in hancc 

wnh personne l from pl'll\'ISIOnal Coumer lntclltgcncc Corps detachment 
U"!E\(;E~ A '\D HERALDIC DATA 281 

allached to the 4th lnfamrr Oivtston. lnacti\'aLCd 23 rebrUilr) 1946 at Camp 

Butner, North Carolina. Activated 30 '\m-ember 1946 m C.crman)'. lnacuvated 

20 April 1947 in Germany. All otted 5 January 1949 to the Regular Armr 

Activated 31 January 1949 at ron Ord, Calirornia. Reorgantzed and redesignated 2'5 January 1958 as the 4th tvlilnary Intelligence Detachment. Reorganized 

and redcstgnated 26 December 1969 as the 4th ~lilitary Intelligence Company 

Assigned 21 July 1978 to the 4th lnf.mtry Divtsion. 

C...\\IPt\10,; PARTICIPATIO~ CRFDI I" 

Company A entnled to: 

Vrrtnum 

C:oumcrt,fft:nSl\'C, Phase II 

Countcroffcnstvc, Phase Ill 

rrt l Oll11lCrof£ensl\'C 

C:ountcmffcnst\'C, Phase I\' 

Countcroffcnsl\'C. Pha!>e \ 

Countcrt1ffcnsm:-. Ph<lS<' \'I 

ret (\<>fCt)llntcroffenst\'C 

:.ummcr-Fall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 197l) 

S.mlluary Countcroffcn~t\ l' 

Countt:roffenstvc. Ph,lse \'II 

Company· B entitled to: 

\\'mit/ \\'w 11-D\ME 

Norrn.mdy (with arrowhead) 

Northern l· mncc 

Rhmdand 

Ardcnnes-Aisacc 

Ct·mral Europe 

\ 'lfl/1<1111 

CountcrofrensJ\'C, Ph.-.sc II 

(ountcroffcn:m·e. PhaSt· Ill 

Tt:t lountcroffensl\·c 

Coumcr~)ffcnstw . Phast 1\' 

Countcroflen:.i\'e, Pha~e \' 

Countl'roffcnstve. Phase \ I 

lt:t (19/Countcroffensl\'C 

"ummcr-l·all 1969 

\\'tntcr-:>pnng I 970 

"anttuary Coumcrofftnsl\l' 

Countcr(lffl'n~l\·t: . Ph a ... .: \'II 
282 

DECORATIONS 

Company A enlitlcd to: 

MILITARY INTUI.IGENCE 

Meritonous Unit Commendatton (Army), Streamer embrotdcrcd \'IETt\AM 

1967-1968 (374th Radio Research Company cited, DA GO 28, 1969) 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (374th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (374th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallamry wnh Palm, Streamer embroidered 

\'IETNA~I 1967-1969 (374th Radio Research Compan)' Cited; DA GO 3, 1970) 

Republic of V1etnam Cross of Gallantry wnh Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1969-1970 (374th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 52, 1971) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970 (374th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Ci\'il Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIET'\AI\1 1967-1969 (3Hth Radio Research Detachment cited, DA GO 53, 

1970) 

Company B emitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (4th Military Intelligence Detachment c1ted; DA GO 39, 1970) 

Belgian rourragere 1940 {-tth Infantry Division cned; DA GO 4 '3, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Da) of the Belgtan Army for action m Brlg1um (4th 

Infantry DiviSIOn cned; DA GO 4 3, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the Ardennes 

(4th lnfamry Division cited; DA GO 4 3, 1950) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETt\AM 1968-1969 (4th i\.lilitar) lmclligencc Dctachmem Cited; DA GO 3, 

1970) 

Republic of\ 1etnam CiYtl Acuon Honor 1\ledal, Ftrst Class, Streamer embroidered VIE1 '.Jt\t-.1 1968-1969 (4th Military lntclllgcncc Detachment meet; DA GO 

53, 1970) 
l05th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(Owls) 

COAT or- AIU-15 

Sl!ield: 

Crest:' 

MoLLo: 

~ymbolism: 

H ERA! DlC. ITEMS 

Azure. a pile to honor point argent bearing a lozenge throughout gules charged \\ ith an owl's head couped or. all above a 

sword and key in saltire with blade and ward to chief of the 

second between two lightning nashes palewise of the founh. 

None approved. 

BOLD VIGIL 

Stl\'er gray and oncntal blue are the colors traditionally associated with military Intelligence. The sword and key m the 

saltirewise position represent support and symbolize miluary 

leadcrshtp. The lightning flashes refer to the speed and power 

of electronic communications. The owl is symbolic of wisdom 

and watchfulness and the red diamond shape alludes to the 

unus support of the 5th Infantry Dtvbion. The two lightning 

flashes further refer to World War ll and the war in Vietnam, 

in \\hich elements of the baualion ser"ed. 

Dl'>llNCTIV[ UNIT lNSIC.,NIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
284 ~IIIITARY INl FI IIGENCE 

LlNI.ACf AND llONOR..., 

RA 

Lll':EAGE (tnacti\'(~) 

Constituted 15 i\tay I IJ67 in the Regular .\rm) as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 200th Arm) Security Agent:) Battalion, and activated at 

Fort DcYcns, Massachusetts. lnm:ti\·ated 15 December 1967 at hm Dc\'ens, 

Massachusetts. 

Redesignated l June 1 'JH2 as Headquarters, I kadquarters and Operations 

Com pan). I 05th ~lilitar) Intelligence Battalion. assigned to the 5th Infant!") 

Di\"ision. and acu\'ated at ron Polk, Louisiana (40'5th Arm) SeLUnt) AgenC) 

Company [sec A~\l[X 1) and 15th Military lntclhgcncc Company [sec N\'.[i\ 2) 

concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Companies A and B). Baualion 

inactivated 16 December 1992 at Fon Polk, Louisiana. 

\'1'\JEX I 

Constituted 31 ~Ia) 1965 111 the Regular Arm)' as the 405th Arm) Sccurit) 

Agency Dcta<.:hment. Acuvated 1 june 1965 at Fon Lew1s, Washmgron 

Inactivated 5 November 1965 111 Vietnam. Acll\ atec.l 15 july 196H 111 Vietnam. 

Inactivated 5 December 1969 in Vietnam. Activated 30 September 1971 in 

Vietnam. Inactivated 30 june 1972 in Vietnam. Redesignated 16 March 1979 as 

the 405th Arm)' Security Agency Company ami acll\'ated at Fort Polk. LoUisiana. 

·\NNE:\ 2 

Constituted 12 july 1944 tn the Anny of the Unncd StaLes as the 5th Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 6 August 1944 in France wtth personnel from provisional Counter lmclligence Corps detachment attached to the 5th 

Infantry D1vis10n. Inactivated I April 1950 at I on jackson, South Carolina. 

Allotted 12 Ma) 1954 to the Regular r\rmy. Acu' atcd l 5 june 1954 111 German)·. 

lnacuvated I july 1957 at ron Ord. Californ1a Redesignated 2 rebruar) 1962 as 

the 5th Mdltar)' lntclligence Detathment. Acllv;.ucd 19 February 1962 at Fort 

Carson, Colorado. Inactivated 25 May 1969 at I on Carson, Colorado. Anivatcd 

l 5 November 1969 m Fort Carson, Colorado. 

inactivated l '5 December 1970 at Fon Carson, Colorado; concurrenLI)' redesignated as the l '5th Militar)' Intelligence Com pan). Redesignated 2 I \larch 1976 

as the 5th \lllnarr Intelligence Dctachmcm and acthated at Fort Polk. Louisiana. 

Reorgantzcd and redestgnated 30 September I 978 as the 15th ~ltlitary 

Intelligence Company and ass1gned to the 5th Infantry Division. 
liNEAGE~ AND HERALDIC DATA 

(\\IPAIGN PARIIUPAfiO'\ ( Rl DIT 

Companr A entitled LO. 

Vrl'tnam 

Dcfcmc 

Countcmffensr\·c. Pha'>l' \ ' 

Countcwffcnsr\'c Ph<N' \'1 

Tct 6l)fCl)Untcroffcn~rw 

'>ummrr Jail 1969 

\Vintt•r ':>pnng t 970 

Consoltdatton l 

Con~oltdauon II 

Ccase-l'trc 

Company B cnutlcd to: 

World \\'w 11- T:A'<IF 

'\Jorm;md)' 

"'ort hcrn I ranee 

Rhmd.md 

Ardcnnc~ t\bace 

Central Europe 

DICORATIQN..; 

Compan)' A entitled to: 

285 

'vtentonous Unit Commcndauon (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1965 (Detachment 2, 3d Radio Research Unit, cited; D;\ (,0 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (405th Radio Research Detachment cited: DA GO 51, 1971) 

\teritonous Lnll Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered \ IETl\t\\1 

1971-1972 (-f0'5th Radio Research Dewchmem cited: DA GO 32. 1972) 

Republic of Viemam Civil Action l lonor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAt-.1 1969 (405th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 6, L974) 
106th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT Of ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

liL' RALDIC ITEMS 

Per che\ ron enhanced sable and argent, a masde gules interlaced by a nash bendwiSC and a nash bend SinistCIWISC azure, 

between four evergreen trees m pale two and two, and two 

evergreen trees in fess vert. 

None approved. 

THE NORll lERN WATCH. 

The chevronwise division of the background LOgether with the 

evergreen trees forms the illuston of a snow-covered mountain 

against the mght sky and refers to the unit's scrvtcc m Alaska 

as well as its around-the-clock m1ssion and responsibilities. 

Black represents the coven and white is for truth. Oriental 

blue is one of the colors associated with miliwry intelligence 

and reel is symbolic of courage. The two nashcs interLwined 

with the masck emphasize the complexity and interrelated 

nature of milnary mtelligence work. They allude to electronic 

capabilities, speed, and a strong defense and also represent the 

Gordian knot of mythology. The evergreens symbohze seculity 

and need for constant alertness; their number (six) alludes to 

the 6th Infantry Division. 

DISTINc.:TIVC UNIT INSIGNIA 

The d•stmwve unit insigma t'> the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 

LINI.t\GF AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 18 june 1987 in the Regular Arm}' as the 106th Militar)' 

lntclhgence Banahon, assigned to the 6th Infant!) Oi\'ision, and acll\atcd at Fort 

Richardson, Alaska. inactivated 15 June l 994 at Fort Rtchardson, Alaska 

CAMPAIGN PARTIUPATION CRU)IJ 

None. 

DECORATIOI'I~ 

None. 
l07th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(.OAT 01 ARM'> 

Shidd. 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

I l!·RALDIC ITEMS 

Per fess enhanced azure and ermine the :;1lhoueue of a bayonet fesswise argent charged \vith a lightnmg nash gules and m 

base a fret throughout of the first. 

None approved. 

THROUGII KNOWLEDGE VICTORY. 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) arc the colors traditionally 

associated with md1tary intelligence units. The ermine background is a heraldic fur and alludes to a cloak symbolizing a 

"cloak of secrecy"' and the coven activn•es of an intelligence 

organization The fret is composed of mtcrlaced pans showing 

the complexll) and mterconnections of mtclhgence informauon. It resembles a puzzle to be solved b) hndmg the proper 

key or pan, an allusion w the military Jntclligcnee mission. 

The bayonet :;igmfies readiness and response. The lightning 

nash symbolizes the radio communications and electronics 

employed to make the unit prepared and effective. 

01'> 111\JC"I lVI. UNIT INSIGI\:IA 

The dJstincti\'e unn insigma is the sh1eld and motto of the coat of arms. 

Lt~r A<..r Al\:D HONOR~ 

RA 

LlNEi\(,1 (inactive) 

Constituted 1 june 1983 in the Regular Army as the l 07th Militaty lmelligencc 

Battalion, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, and activated at Fort Ord, 

California (60Jst Army Security Agency Company !sec ANNl:X 1] and 7th Militmy 

Intelligence Company !see ANNr:X 21 concurrently reorganized and redesignated as 

Companies A and B). Inactivated 15 September 1993 at Fon Orcl, California. 

\1\;"..:L\ I 

Constituted 19 ~larch 1951 mthc Regular Army as the 60lst Communication 

Reconn;msance Detachment. Aeuvatcd 4 April 1951 at Fort jay. New York. 

Inactivated 15 August 1956 at Port jay, New York. Redesignated 21 April 1967 as 

1 he 60 I st Army Security Agency Detachmclll and activated at Fort !food, Texas. 

Inactivated 20 November 1968 in Vietnam. Redesignated 21 September 1978 as 

the 60 1st Am1y Security Agency Company and activated at Fort Ord, California. 
288 ~11LITARY I'\ Tl II IGEl\CE 

ANNEX 2 

Constituted 12 july 19++ 111 the Army of the United States as thl' 7th Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment Acti\'ated 7 August I 9-H at Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii, wtth personnel from JXO\ ~'>tonal Counter lmclltgence Corps detachment 

attached to the 7th Infantry D" ision. Inactivated 25 \pnl 1946 m Korea .\cti,·ated 

15 Decem her 1946 in Korea. Inactivated 25 t-.'larch 194 7 in Korea. Acuvated 12 

October 1950 in Korea. Alloucd 8 February 1954 to the Regular Army. 

Reorganized and redesignated 15 May 1959 as the 7th \!1ilitary Intelligence 

Detachment Inactivated 30 june 1971 in Korea. Alli\ ated 2 I januat) 1976 at Fon 

Ord. Cahfornia Reorganized and redcstgnated 21 jul) 1978 as the 7th Military 

Intelligence Company and assigned to the 7th Infantry Di\ision. 

Ci\t-.IPAIGN PART I< !PATtON CRFDII 

Armccl h.1rn•, hpcclrticms 

Panama 

Company A additionally entnlcd to: 

\'irtrwm 

Countnollcnsl\'C. Pha~ Ill 

Tet Cllllllh.'roffcnc;l\·c 

C.oumcrollcnsr,·e. Phase I\ 

C.tlltntl'roffcn~ivc, Ph<1sc V 

CountcmiTcnsl\'l', Phase \'I 

Compan) B addtuonally entnled to: 

\\'oriel \\ c11 II ·\f' 

Lcytc 

Rruk)'u~ 

DECORATION'> 

Compan)' A entitled to: 

Km.·an \\'at 

L ;--. OlfclN\'C 

CCF lmcr>l'lltlon 

F•rst UN <.ountnolknsrve 

CCF '>pnng Offensive 

Ur\ "ummn I <liiOilcnst\T 

Second Korean Wuucr 

Korea '>umma-r·all 1952 

Th1rd KN(<lll \\'rntcr 

Korea. Summer 19'53 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), ">treamer embrOidered \'IETNA~I 

1967-1968 (6015t Radio Research Detachment uted, DA GO 28, 1969) 

Company B entnlcd to· 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA (7th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 68, 1953) 

Philippme Presidential Unit Cnauon, Streamer embroidered 17 OC TOBFR 1944 

TO-+ JLLY 19-+5 (7th Counter lntclltgence Corp'> Detachmem cited. DA GO 47, 

1950) 
108th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl" OJ \R\b 

)/II del 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Svm/Jolbm: 

llLHAl !JIC ITEMS 

Azure. two swords <.rossed argent hilts to base gules. above a 

globe of the second gndhned of the ftcld, on a t.htel sable and 

between two s1ker mullets a lightmng holt palewise or terminating upon the center of the globe. 

None approved. 

VICTORY TI IRU VIC.ILANCE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) arc the colors associated 

with m1lital) intelltgence. The crossed swords in the colors red 

and whne represent 1 he units mil nary readiness and support 

misston. The holt of lightning alludes to the units technolog) 

and to the swift and accurate use of mformatton to thwart encm} 

plans. The stars and globe suggest the nrgamzattons areas of 

operauon m search of intelligence and c.:ountcnntclligence. 

DhiiNt 11\'L UNIT INSIGN IA 

The distincll\'C unit insignia i~ the shield and motto of the c.:oat of arms. 

LI~EAt.L t\'\0 HONOR'> 

RA 

Ll~F \Gt: (inactive) 

Consllluted 16 September 19Hl in the Regular Ann) as the I08th ~lilitar) 

lntelltgence Battalton, ass1gned to the 8th Infantry D1' 151011, and actt\·ated in 

German>' (4I5th Army ~ecumy Agency Company lsee A'\JNU., II and 8th 

Military Intelligence Company lscc ANNEX 21 conc.:urremly reorganized and 

redesignated as Companies A and B). Inactivated 15 November 1991 in 

<.1ermany. 

ANN E:\ 1 

Constttuted 26 june 1967 m the Regular Ann> as the 415th Army Securit} 

Agen9 Detachment and acthatcd at Schofield Barracks, ~hmaii. lna~:uvated 20 

'\ovcmbcr 1968 in Vietnam. Redcstgnatcd 1 julr 1974 as the 415th Armr 

5>ccuntr Agcnc) Company and activated m Germany. 

ANNI:X 2 

Constituled 12 july 1944 in the Arn11 of the United State~ as the 8th Coumer 

lntclltgenn~ Corps Detachment. Acti\'ated 6 August 19-H in France with personnel 
290 t\11UTARY INTELLIGENCE 

from provisional Counter Intelligence Corps dcwchment attached to the 8th 

Infantry Div1s1on. Inactivated 21 November 1945 at Holabird Signal Depot, 

~1aryland Activated 15 December 1946 in Korea . lnactl\'ated 25 March 1947 in 

Korea. Allotted 17 May 1954 to the Regular Arm) Activated 15 june 1954 at 

Camp Carson, Colorado. Reorganized and redes1gn::ucd 25 june 19'58 as the 8th 

Military Intelligence Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 21 February 

1973 as the 8th Military Inte lligence Company. Assigned 21 April 1974 to the 

8th Infantry Division. 

CAMPAIG~ PARTI<..IPATION CRLDI r 

Compan)' A entitled to: 

Victncml 

Counteroffensive, Phase Ill 

f Cl Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive. Phase IV 

Counll'roffensi\'C, Phase \' 

Counteroffensive, Phase \'! 

C01npan) B entitled to: 

World \Vw 11-E.AtviE 

Nom1andy 

Northern France 

Rhmcland 

Ardcnncs-:\lsace 

Central Europe 

DECORATION<; 

Company A entitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendmion (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (41'5th Radio Research Detachment Cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 
l09th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Sable. between two nanches cheeky argent and azure a sun in 

splendor in chief and in 'base a decrescent or, overall palewise 

a lightning nash gules. 

None approved. 

SEEK AND DISRUPT. 

Silver gray and oriental blue are the colors of military intelligence. The checkered arrangement renects the mullifaceted 

intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities of the battalion. 

The black center field suggests secrecy and symbolizes tactical 

operations security. The sun and moon symbols and two hemispheres denote round-the-clock tactical and global deployment 

capabilities. The red nash is a symbol of the offensive combat 

capability of electronic warfare as well as the long range electronic surveillance characteristics of the battalion. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lNS!GNlA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

l iNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 1 October 1981 in the Regular Army as the l 09th Military 

Intelligence Baualion, assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, and activated at Fon 

Lewis, Washington (335th Army Security Agency Company (see ANNEX 1] and 

9th Military Intelligence Company [see ANNEX 2] concurrently reorganized and 

redesignated as Companies A and B). Inactivated 15 September 1991 at Fort 

Lewis, Washington. 

ANNEX l 

Constituted 27 March 1942 in the Army of the United States as the ll2th 

Signal Radio Intelligence Company. Activated 18 May 1942 at Camp Crowder, 

Missouri. Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1945 as the ll2th Signal 

Service Company. Inactivated 23 December 1945 in the Philippine Islands. 

Alloued 20 December 1946 to the Regular Army and activated in the Philippine 

Islands as the ll2th Signal Service Company (Philippine Scouts). Reorganized 

and redesignated 1 April 1947 as the lOth Signal Service Battalion (Philippine 
292 \111 II \R'r 1'\TELUGC'\Cl 

~couts). Reorganized nnd redesignated 12 June 194~ as the I 12th Signal Scmcc 

Company (Philippme ~couts) Inactivated I june 1949 in the Philippine Islands 

Convened and redesignated 17 july 1951 as the "3)5th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company. Rede5ignated 6 April 1966 as the 335th Anny Security 

Agency Company. Acuvated 15 june 1966 at Fort Rdey, Kansas. Inactivated 5 

t\pnl 197 J in Vietnam Acll\atcd 2 L December 1977 at I on LC\\ IS, Washington 

A"!'\1":'\ 2 

Consututed 12 jul) 1944 in the Army of the Unued '>tales as the 9th Counter 

lmclhgcncc Corps Detachment Activated 16 August 1944 111 France wuh personnel from provisional ( ountcr Intelligence Corps detachment attached to the 

9th lnfanll") Dh·iswn. lnaruvmed 20 April 1947 in Germany. Alloued 5 january 

I 949 to the Regular Army. Activated 28 january l 949 at hm Dix, New jersey. 

Inactivated 12 March 1951 m Fon Dix, New jersey. Activated 15 june 1954 111 

Germany. Reorganized and redesignated 25 januar)' L 958 as the 9th t-.tditary 

lmelhgcnce Detachment. lnacti,ated 31 januar) 1962 at !·on Carson, Colorado. 

Acuvated 1 July 1966 at Fort Rlie), Kansas. lnactl\ atcd 25 S>eptember 1969 •ll 

<.,chofield Barracks, Hawau Redesignated 21 December 1972 as the 9th ~hluary 

Intelligence Compan} and acll\atcd at Fon Lew1s, \\ashmgton. Assigned 21 july 

1978 to the 9th Infant•') D1vision. 

CAMI'AICN PARTICIPA liON CIU:I)I r 

Company A entitled to: 

\\'(llld \Var /l-AP 

'-onhcm Solonwn' 

Luzon {wnh arrowhc.td) 

Com pan)' B entitled to: 

\\ ,.,(.f \\ '(tr If-&\.\ IE 

Tumsta 

'-tnly 

\.ormandr 

:\onhcrn France 

Rhmcland 

Ardennes-Abate 

Lcnnal Europe 

Vit'lnam 

Countcroflcnstvc, Ph<~'>C II 

Countcr~lffcnst\'l', l'h.hc Ill 

Tct Countcroffl'tNn' 

Coumcw!lt'tht\'l', l'lusc 1\' 

Countcrotknstn·, Pha..r \ ' 

CountcroffctN\ c. Pha.,... \'I 

T ct 69/Countaoff~·nst\'C 

Summcr-htll llJ6l) 

'vVmtcr-Spnng llJ70 

Santtu:ll)' CountL'roffcnstvc 

Coumcroffcnst\ c. Phase \'11 

\'il'llldlll 

c,,lmleroffl'n~h·c, Ph.,.,... II 

Coumeroffcn~tw. !'has..· Ill 

Tet Countcrtlfft:nsl\·c 

Countcroflcn'>t\'C, l'ha-...· I\ 

Countcroffcn~t\'C. Pha.,c \ 

CountcrnffctN\'l'. l'h~N: \'1 

Tct 69/Countrrolknstn• 

Summer-l·all llJ6l) 
Ll~fr\Gl ~ ~\ '\D HERALDIC DATA 

DI U )R:\'f 10~'> 

Company A cmitlcd to: 

293 

Meritorious Unit Comm.endmion (Army), Streamer cmhroiclcrcd VIETNAt\-1 

1967 (335th Radio Research Company Cllcd; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

196 7-I 96H 0 "35th Radio Research Company CllccJ; DA GO 28, 1969) 

\krnorious Unit Commendauon (Army), Sneamcr embrOidered VIETNA\1 

1968-196<> (335th Radio Research C.ompan) cited: DA GO 51, I IJ71) 

~kritonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIET'-A~I 

1969-1970 (335th Radio Research C.ompan) cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

'vlentorious Unit Commendauon (Army), Streamer ernbrmdcrcd VIETNAM 

1971 (335th Radio Research Compan)' cited; DA GO 32, 1973) 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 194-t 

TO 4 JLl Y 1945 (l12th Signal Radio Intelligence Company cited; OA GO 47, 1950) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of (,allamry with Palm, <.:.,treamcr embroidered 

\'ILT'\A \1 1967-1968 (335th Radio Research Company cited. DA (,0 31, 1969) 

Republic of \'ietnam Cro:.s of (,altamry with Palm. Streamer embroidered 

\'111'\A\1 1969 (335th Radio Research Companr cited: DA GO 59. 1969) 

Repuhltc of Vietnam Cross of (,altamry \\'llh Palm. Streamer embroidered 

VII I \!AM 1970-1971 (335th Radw Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam C1vil r\ction Honor Medal, F1rst Class, Streamer 

cmbro1dercd VIETNAM 1967-1969 (33Sth Radio Research Company cited: DA 

GO 59, 1969) 

Com pan)' B entnlcd to: 

Mcrnorious Unit Commendauon (Army), Streamer cmbr01dcred VI[TNAM 

I 96B (9th 'vhlllaf) lmelhgencc Detachment cited; DA GO 48. 1969) 

Bdg1an fourragere 1940 (9th Infantry DIVlSion cited; DA GO 4 3. 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Da) of the Belgtan t\m1y for acuon at the ~leuse River 

(9th lnf .. mtry DivisiOn cited; DA (,() 43, 1950) 

Cited 111 the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the Ardennes 

(9th Infantry Division cited; DA CO 43, L950) 

Rcpubllc of Vietnam Cross of (,aJlantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VWINA~I 1966-1968 (9th Milllat') Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 31, 

1969) 

Republtc of V1ctnam Cross of (,allamry \\ ith Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VII T:\A\1 19b9 (9th }.!ilitarr lntelllgcnce Detachment <.:itecl. DA C.O 59. 1969) 

Repubhc of \'ietnam C I\ II Acuon Honor 1\ledal. hrst Class. Streamer 

embro1dercd \'ICTNAM 1966-1969 (9th Mtlitary lmelligence Detachment cited; 

Di\ GO 59, 1969) 
llOth MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shrdd: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

llERALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, a chcvronnel debased or, bclo'" two griffins' heads rn 

fess pomt erased addorsed and conJoined of the like. 

None approved. 

SENl I NELS OF THE SUMMIT. 

Oriental hlue is one of the colors associated with military intelligence. Gold is emblematic of excellence and achievement. The 

chevron, a symbol of strength and suppon, suggests a mountain 

peak and connotes the units assignment to the lOth Mountain 

Division. The griffins, ever vtgilant and alert, appear above the 

mountmn peak, epnomizing the units mono and mission. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIG'\It\ 

The distinctive unll msrgma ts the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LlNl:/\GE AND HONORS 

Rt\ 

liNI 1\(.,E (active) 

ConstitULed 1 December 1988 in the Regular Army as the I lOth Mihtary 

Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the lOth Mountam Di\'ision, and activated at 

Fort Drum, New York. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRI mr 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1994 (l 1Oth Military 

lntelhgence Battalion cited: DA CO 14, 1997) 
124th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC iTEMS 

Sable a grifrin segream argent collared azure the collar charged 

with three plates all within a bordure company or the second 

and third. 

None approved. 

INTELLIGENCE FOR VICTORY. 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors associated 

with the military imelligence branch. The cheeky background 

alludes to a chessboard and symbolizes the use or intelligence 

information in formulating military strategy and coumenneasure. The griffin, noted for keen eyesight, symbolizes vigilance 

and penetration of the unknown, as suggested by the black 

area. The discs on the griffins collar allude to baule engagements in which elements of the unit participated. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lNSlGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto or the coat of anns. 

liNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 1 june 1981 in the Regular Am1y as the l24th Military Intelligence 

Battalion, assigned to the 24th Infantry Division, and activated at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia (853d Army Security Agency Company [see ANNEX tl and 24th Military 

intelligence Company [see ANNEX 2] concurrently reorganized and redesignated as 

Companies A and B). Inactivated 15 Febmary 1996 at Fort Stewan, Georgia. 

ANNEX 1 

Constituted 5 August 1944 in the Army or the United States as the 3323cl 

Signal Information and Monitoring Company. Activated 15 August 1944 at 

Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. Inactivated 30 October 1945 in Germany. Convened 

and redesignated 4 September 1947 as the 310th Radio Security Detachment 

and alloned to the Organized Reserves. (Elemems activated 16 September 

1947-1 February 1949; inactivated 21 june 1949-6 june 1950.) (Organized 

Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps.) 
296 >.lll.ITAR'I 1'\!TELLIGE'\Cr 

Redesignated 17 july 1951 as the 853d Communication Reconnaissance 

Detachment. Withdrawn 20 December 1951 from the Orgamzcd Reserve Corps and 

all oucd to the Regular Army. Activated 10 January 1952 at Fon Devens, 

Massachuseus. Inactivated I. March 19'56 in Germany. Redesignated 16 March 1979 

as the 853d Army Secunty Agency Company and activated at Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

1\l\ND\ 2 

Constituted 12 Jul) 19++ tn the Arm} of the Lntted ~lates as the Hth 

Counter lntclhgence Corps Detachment. Activated 20 August 19+t m '\cw 

(,umea with personnel from pro\'ISional Coumcr lmelhgcnce Corps detachment 

auachcd to the 24th Infantry Dh1sion. Inactivated 2 '5 l·ebruary 1946 in Japan. 

Acuvatcd 6 October 1950 in Korea. Allotted 8 February 1954 to the Regular 

Army. Inactivated 15 October 1957 in japan. Redesignated 5 june 1958 as the 

24th Military Intelligence Detachment. Activated I july 1958 in Germany. 

lnncuvated 15 April 1970 at hm Riley, Kansas. Activated 21 February 1976 at 

Fort Stewart, Georgia. Reorganized and redesignated 30 September 1978 as the 

24th Mtlitar}' Intelligence Company and assigned to the 24th Infantry Di\'ISion 

C\,IPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRt Dll 

Sc•lllllll't'SI Asia 

Defense of ~audt t\ralm 

Ltberauon and Dcfcns~ of Kuwau 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Wmlcl \Var 1/-EJ\,\IE 

Central Europe 

Company B additional!}' entitled to: 

\\'odd\\ ar 1/-AP 

:"\c\1 Gumca 

Leytc 

Luzon 

'>outhem Phthppuw~ 

Dr'CORATIONS 

Kor.·an \\'m 

L''! orrenst\'~ 

CCF lntcn·~nuon 

Ftrsl L. '\ (oum~mlkn.,tvr 

CCF Spnng orft•nstw 

UN Summa I all Olfcnstv~ 

Second Korean Wmtcr 

Army Superior U ntt Award, Streamer embro1clercd 1994 (!24th Militar}' 

lmelhgcnce Baualion !less Companies A and Bl cited; DA c,o 14, 1997) 

Company B addiuonall} cntulrd to· 

t\lcntonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KORLt\ 

1950-1951 (24th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cued; DA GO 52, 195 I) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered KORLA 

1953-1954 (24th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 77, 1954) 

Philippine Prcsidcmial Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 

TO 4 JULY 1945 (24th Counter Imclligence Corps Detachment cited: DA GO 47, 

1950) 
125th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

C..OAI tW AR\h 

'ilurld: 

Crest. 

Motto: 

Symholbm. 

Ill RJ\1 DIC ITEMS 

Azure a pak argent o\·erall between two mullets in fess a 

sword and a bayonet salmew1se or bearing a LOrteau charged 

with a heralcltL rose of the third. 

None appro,·cd. 

EYES OF LIGII1 NING. 

Oriental blue nnd silve r gray are the military imclligcnce colors. The unsheathed weapons connote read incss and the 

heraldic rose alludes to the sub rosa mtssion of the organtzation. The stars symbolize the ''arumc ser\'tee of demems of 

the unit and the color red indicates thctr dccorauons for 

action m \\oriel \\ar II, Korea, and \'teLnam 

Ot<..IINC 1'1\'l lJNII I~SIV.JIA 

I he disunctivc unit insignia ts the shield and motto of the com of arms. 

liNFr\C,l AND HONORS 

RA 

Lt;-..;r ,\(,L (active) 

Constituted 16 june 1983 111 the Regular Arm) as the I 25th l\tilitary 

Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 25th lnfamr) Ot\ iswn. and activated at 

Schoftcld Barracks. Hawait (372d Arm) Security AgenC) Company !see AN:--!EX 11 

and 25th \llilital') Imelligence Compan) lsee r\N,EX 21 concurrent!) reorganized 

and redestgnated as Compantes t\ and B). 

t\NNI''\ I 

Constituted ll May 1962 in the Regular Army as Company A, 303d Army 

Securtty Agency Baualton Acuvated 25 june 1962 at Fort Carson, Colorado. 

Reorgam:::ed and redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 3 72d Army Security 

Agcnc) Compan). Inactivated 6 l\larch 197 L in Vietnam Aclt\'ated I july 1974 at 

Helemano. Hawaii. 

,\t\1\;1 \ 2 

Consututed 12 july 1944 in the Army of the United Slates as the 25th 

Coumcr lmelligence Corps Dt·tachment. Activated 10 August 1944 in New 

Caledoma with personnel from provisional Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached to the 25th 1nlantr)' Dtvtsion. Inactivated 25 February 1946 in 
298 \IILITARY 1:--JTELLIGENCE 

japan. Acuvated 6 October 1950 in Korea. Allotted 8 l·cbruary 1954 to the 

Regular Army. Reorganized and redesignated 24 December 1958 as the 25th 

Military Intelligence Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 26 December 

1969 as the 25th Military lmelligcncc Company. Assigned 2l August 1978 to 

the 25th Inramry Division. 

(AMPAIG'\1 PARTICIPATI0'\1 CRE·OIT 

Company A entitled w· 

\'remam 

Coumcroffcnsrvc 

Coumeroffcnsiw. Phase II 

Counteroffensive. Phase Ill 

Tet Coumeroffcnsrvc 

Coumcroffcnsivc, Pha~c IV 

Coumeroffensrve. Phase V 

Company B entitled to: 

\Vorlcl \Var /l-AP 

Luzon 

Ktllt'an \\'ar 

L. 1\ Offensrve 

ccr lntcrwnuon 

F1rst UN Coumcroffcns1vc 

CCF Spring Offensrw 

UN Summer-Fall Offcn~1vc 

Second Korean Wmtcr 

Korea. Summer-Fall I 952 

Third Korean Wmtcr 

Korea, Summer I 95 3 

Dl-CORATIONS 

Compan>' A entitled to: 

Coumeroffcns1vc. Phase \ I 

Tct 69/C oumcrofknsr,·c 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spnng 1970 

Sanc!Uary Coumcroffcns1ve 

Counteroffenslvl'. Phase VII 

Vrctnam 

CoumcroffenSI\'C 

Coumcroffcns1vc. Phase II 

Coumcroffcnsrvc, Pha'c Ill 

Tet C.oumeroffcn~rvr 

Coumeroffcnsrvc. Ph,1~c IV 

Coumcroffensrvc, Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase VI 

Tet 69/Coumcrofknsrvc 

Summer-Fall 1969 

\Vinter-Spnng 1970 

Sanctuary ((lUntcwffcnsi\'C 

Coumeroffensrvc, PhJsc \'II 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966 (16th Radio Research Unit cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 28. 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIET\IAM 

1968-1969 (372d Radto Research Companr cned; DA GO 51, 1971, and United 

States Army, Vietnam, GO 690, 25 February 1971, as amended by United States 

Army, Vietnam. GO 1405, 25 April 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Republic or Vietnam Cross or Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1966-1968 (372d Radio Research Company cttcd; DA GO 48, 1971) 
LINEAGES A'\D HERALDIC DATA 299 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VILTNA~t 1969-1970 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO '5, 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action llonor Medal. First Class, Streamer embroidered VICTl\JAM 1969-1971 (372d Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Company B entitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commcnclauon (Army), Streamer embrotdcred KOREA 

(25th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 62, L 954) 

Mentorious Unit Commcndauon (Army), Streamer embrotdcred VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (25th Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA ClO L 7, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embro1dered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (25th Military lmclligencc Detachment cited; DA GO 42, 1969) 

Mcntonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIETNAtvl 

1968-1969 (25th Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 36, 1970) 

Mentonous Unit Commenclauon (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIET"lAi'vl 

1969-1970 (25th Military lntclltgence Company cited; DA GO 6, L 974) 

Phtltppmc Prestdential Unit Cnauon, Streamer embrotclcred 17 OCTOBER 

19++ TO of JULY 19-+5 (25th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 

47, 1950) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1966-1968 (25th Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 48, 

1971) 

Republtc of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIET\t\11.1 1968-1970 (25th Mtlttar}' Intelligence Detachment cned; DA GO 5, 

1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Acuon Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered\ ILTNAM 1966-1970 (25th \1dnary Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 

51' 1971) 
126th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

ClMT or AR\15 

Slue/d. 

C.: rest: 

Mollo: 

Svmbolism: 

IIFRALDIC lTEMS 

Celeste a gnffin ram pam argem gm~ping a double-warded kc) 

"ith a lightning bolt shaft gules, ''ards to chief of the second 

and the lx)\\ consisting of a heraldll rose of the like and azure 

seeded or and slipped ven. 

That for the rcguncnts and separate baualions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors. argem and celeste, the 

Lexingtlm Minweman proper. The stat uc of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common m Lexington. Massachusetts 

VlGILA\l(.[ t\ D STRENGTII. 

Onemal blue and silver gray arc the <:olors traduionally associated with military imelligen<.:e. The griffin combines the keen 

eyes1ght and mobility of the eagle wnh the courage and 

prowess of the lion. He has <ttute hearing and is alcn and 

watchful; he also epitomizes the unit's mouo. The shaft of the 

key consists of a li ghtning bolt to highlight the electronic 

nature of the units mission; the bow 1s formed by a heraldic 

rose. adapted from the military intelligence branch insignia, 

and rdcrnng to the sub rosa funlllOns of the unit. The kc). 

used both to secure and unlock. underswres military intelligcn<:c as essenualto total preparedness 

Dl"tJINCTJVE U"<IT IN~I< ol\1\ 

The chsuncti\'c unit insignia is the shield and motto olt he coat of arms. 

I INFA(,F AND HONORS 

t\R 

LINF-\Cr (inacti\'1:) 

Constnuted 16 Sc ptemhcr llJ87 m the Ann> Resen c as the !26th ~hltt<U) 

lmclhgcnce Battalion and J<.:tn·ated \\ith Headquarters at East Windsor. 

Connccucut. lnacti\'atcd 15 September 1993 at East \\'mdsor, Connecticut 

( \MPAJ(,N PARTICIPATION ( Rl Dll 

None. 

Dl ( t )RA rtONS 

None. 
128th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 ARM'> 

'>lurid. 

Crest. 

Mollo: 

'>vmholism: 

Ill R/\LDIC lTEI\tS 

Azure. a dcmi-gnfrin grasping a kc). the wards upward and 

omward forming a kC)·stone or; on a chief check) argent and 

sable, a sword and hghtning nash salt ire\\ tse of the second. 

That for the reg11nents and separate baualions of the Armr 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, the 

LexingLOn Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (ll. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lcxmgton, Massachuseus. 

KEYSTONI: TO VICTORY. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with the military 

intelligence branch. The demi-griffm stands for courage, mtelligence, and 'tgi lance and holds a ke) as the symbol of secrecy 

and secunt}'. The wards of the key form a keystone recalling 

the battalion's motLo, its home state of Pennsylvania, and the 

unit's affiliation wnh the 28th Infantry Division. The cheeky 

chief, recalling the insignia of the 99th United States Army 

Reserve Command, suggests strategy. whtlc ns colors, black 

and white, refer to night and day operations The sword represents miluar) preparedness; the lighmmg nash suggests speed 

and electronic capabilities. Gold stands for excellence 

DIS I IN< Tl\'1. UNIT INSIGNIA 

The c.llstinctive unit instgnia is a modification of the shield and mouo of the 

coat of arms. 
'302 \11LITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Lll\JEAGE AND HONOR~ 

AR 

LlNEAC.t: (acti\·e) 

Constituted 18 September 1987 in the Army Reserve as the 128th Military 

Intelligence BattaliOn and activated with Headquarters at Allison Park. 

Pennsylvania. 

C \~IPAIGN PARTICIPATI0'\1 CREDIT 

l\one. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
l34th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl 01 ARM.., 

Sludd: 

Crest 

Motto: 

Sym/mlism: 

llf-RALDIC LTEMS 

Or, a grifnn's head erased sable grasping in his beak a lightning bolt gules, a bordure quarterly azure and argent. 

That for the regiments and separate baualtons of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, or and sable, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

CapL. John Parker (H. H. Kitson , sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachusetts. 

GATHER INTERPRET INFORM. 

Oriental blue and silver gray arc the colors traditionally associated with mtlitary imelltgence units. Blue conveys loyalty; red is 

indicam·e of action, bra\'Cry, and courage. Gold reflects excellence, achtc\'emcnt, and high ideals. The gniTin combmes the 

strength and courage of a lion with the vtgtlance and awareness 

of an eagle, rcficcting the mission of the organizauon. The lightning bolt alludes to the speed and accuracy with which the 

units mission is carried out and recalls its motto. 

OlqiN< TIVl· UNIT INSIGNIA 

rhc distinctive unit insignia ts the shield and mouo of the com of arms. 

Ll'\lft\C.L AND HONORS 

AR 

LlNEAGI (active) 

Constituted 10 February 1991 in the Army Reserve as the l34th Military 

Intelligence Battalion. Activated 16 September 1992 with llcadquancrs at Eagan. 

Minnesota. Localion of Headquarters changed 30 june 1994 to Fort Snelling, 

Minnesota. 

CAMPAI(rN PARTICIPATION CRfDI I' 

I:\ one. 

DrTORATIONS 

None. 
135th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAT 0£ AR~I$ 

Slurld: 

Crl.'sl: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

llt·RALDIC lTf\1!:> 

Azure a lightning nash issuam from dexter t:hief bendwbe or. 

overall a fess argem bearing a bar m,·ected sable. 

That for the regtmcms and separate bauahons of the Army 

Reserve. On a wreath of the color:., or and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Mmuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachu~eus. 

PIERCING Ti lE FOG OF WAR. 

The colors oriemal blue and sth-cr gra) are traditionally 

associated '' ith military imelltgcnce unns. The lightmng 

nash ts S) mbohc of speed in accumulaung accurate information neccssar) to achieve total militat') preparedness. The 

stylized clouds allude to the unit's capablltues and goals to 

stnvc twenty-four hours a day to pterce enemy intelligetKC 

lines effectively and provide the info rmation necessary for 

total preparedness. 

01'- I IN( '11\'E UNIT ll\SICo!\ lA 

fhc distinctive unn msignia is the sh1eld and mouo of the coat of arms. 

LJ;-..I.AGC \~D HO\.OR<., 

AR 

I.INHc.r (active) 

Constituted 16 September 1988 in the Army Reserve as the l3Sth Military 

Intelligence Baualion and activated with Headquarters at Lenexa, Kansas. 

Location of Headquarters <:hanged I April 1993 to Olathe, Kansas. 

C\\INK.!'-: P\RTICIPAllO:'\ c RrDI r 

'\one. 

Dl C ORATIONS 

!\,one. 
138th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(.() \T Of· AR~J.;; 

':>llrdcl. 

( II.'SI 

Molle,. 

~vmho/rsm : 

Ill Rt\I.DIC. ITCMS 

Per salure sable and azure on a salttre argent a key and lightning na~h s<litirc~.>\ tsc of the second. 

That for the rcgnnems and separate hatwltons of the Arm> 

Resen·c· On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Mmutcman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (II. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common 111 I cxington, Massachusetts. 

FORTIOR EX VICILIS (STRONGER AFTFR VIGILANCE). 

Oriental blue is one of the colors of the mdttary intelligence 

branch. The color black represents sccreC)' and constancy The 

salurc alludes to the JOint functtons of intelligence and security. The blue kC) '" for guardianshrp. and the ltghtntng nash IS 

for electronrc communications. 

DI'>I!NC llVL UNIT INS!C.N!A 

The distincl ive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of 1 he com of arms. 

Lli'.l.t\t.l t\ND HO"lOR~ 

AR 

LI'-:HCE (acti,·e) 

Constituted 12 ~larch 1956 in the Army Rcsl.'r\'l~ as the 314th 

C.ommumcauon Reconnatssancc Baualton, Headquarters and llcadquarters 

Company concurrently acuvmcd at C htcago, IllinOIS. Rede~ignatccl 24 May-31 

Octobet 1956 as the 3l4th Army :,ecurity Agency Baualton. (Organic elements 

activated 27 August-1 November 195<'>.) Inactivated 21 .June 1959 at Chicago, 

lllinots. Activated l October 1962 with Headquarters at Chicago, Illinois. 

Baualion broken up 15 August 19(16 and llS elements reorganized and redesignated as follows: Headquancrs and llcadquaners Compan) as llcaclquaners and 

llcadquancrs Company. 314th Arm) Secunty Agenq Battalion, Company A as 

the '522d Artll) Sccuril)' Agenq Companr (see AI'\1'\D\ 1): Compantes Band Cas 

the 523d and 524th Army '-,ecunt) Agcnc) Companies (hereafter separate lineages); Company D as the 525th Arm) Security Agency Company (sec ANt\EX l). 

Location of Headquarters and llcadquaners Company changed 3 I March 1982 

LO Rosemlmt, Illinois. 

I kadquaners and lleadquancrs Company. 3 1. 4th Army Secumy Agency 

Battalion. reorganized and redesignated 16 November 1983 a~ l!cadquarters. 
306 MILITARY INli:.LLIGENCE 

Headquancrs and Operations Company, 138th Miliwry Inte ll igence Baualion 

(522d Army Security Agency Company [see ANNLX II and 525th Army Security 

Agency Company lsee A"-!1\!EX 21 concurremly consolidated to form Company A; 

910th ~hlitar) Intelligence Company !see Ai\;>..LX 31, 12lst Military Intelligence 

Detachment !sec A'J'\lEX 41, and 232d Milttary lmclhgcnce Detachment !see 

ANNEX 5] consolidated to form C..ompany B). 

ANNEX I 

Constituted 12 March 1956 in the Army Rc::.crve as Company A, 314th 

Communication Reconnaissance Battalion Redesignated 19 July 1956 as 

Company A, 3 Hth Anny Secunty Agency Bauahon. Acuvated 27 August 1956 at 

Chicago, lllinots. Location changed 1 June 1957 to Evanston, Illinois. Inactivated 

21 June 1959 at Evanston, Illinois. Activated l October 1962 at Evanston, 

Illinois. Location thanged l March 1963 to Chicago, Illinois. Reorganized and 

redesignated L 5 August 1966 as the 522d Army Secumy Agency Company. 

ANNEX 2 

Constnuted 23 August 1962 tn the Army Reserve as Company D. 314th 

Army Secumy Agency Battalion. Activated 1 October 1962 at Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin. Reorganized and redesignated 15 August 1966 as the 525th Army 

Securit)' Agency Company. Inactivated 31 January 1968 at Milwaukee, 

Wisconsm. Acuvated l February J 974 at Chicago, Illinois. locauon changed 31 

March 1982 to Rosemont, lllinots. 

ANNEX 3 

Constituted 28 July 1945 in the Army of the United States as the 536th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acth·atecl l 0 August 1945 in France. 

Inactivated 23 February 1946 tn France. Redesignated 4 September L 94 7 as the 

91 Oth Coumer Intelligence Corps Detachment and alloued to the Organized 

ReserYes. AcllYatcd l October 194 7 at Chicago. Illinois. (Orgamzcd Rcser\'CS 

redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps; rcdestgnatccl 9 July 

1952 as the Army Reserve.) lna<:ttvated 4 December 1950 at Chicago, Illinois. 

Redesignated 19 Ma)o: 1959 as the 910th Military Intelligence Detachment. 

Activated 1 June 1959 at Chtcago, Illinois. Reorganized and rcdcstgnated l 

\1arch 1972 as the 910th ~lilitarr Intelligence Companr Location changed 24 

february· 1980 to Arlington Hctght::.. Illinois. 

ANNEX 4 

Constituted 3 August 1945 in the Army of the Unned States as the I 020th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Acuvatcd l 0 August 1945 at Fort 

George G. \lcadc, Maryland. lnc.lCllvated 3 December 1945 at Camp Stoneman. 

California. Redestgnated 16 \Jo,·cmber 1948 as the I 21st Counter lntclhgencc 

Corps Detachment and allotted to the Organized Rescr\'e Corps. A<:uvated 3 J 
LI\JLAC,[~ AND HERALDIC DATA 307 

December 19-+8 at Chicago, lllmois. (Orgamzed Reserve Corps redesignated 9 

July 1952 as the Army Reserve.) Inactivated 25 june 195 3 at Chicago, Illinois. 

Rcdestgnatcd L 9 May 1959 as the I 21st Military Intelligence Detachment. 

Activated l June 1959 at Chicago, lllmois. Location changed 24 February 1980 

to Arlington L Lcights, 11linois. 

ANM:-. 5 

Constituted 21 June 1944 tn the Army of the Unned States as the 222d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 1 July 19-+4 at Camp 

Campbell. Kemucky. lnacti\·atcd l October 1945 tn Czechoslovakia. 

Redesignated 5 june 1947 as the 232d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment 

and allotted to the Organized Reserves. Activated 17 june 1947 at New York, 

New York. (Organized Reserves redcstgnated 25 March 1948 as the Organized 

Reserve Corps; redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve.) Inactivated 10 

November 1948 at New York, New York. Activated 18 january 1949 at Chicago, 

lllinots. Inactivated 4 December 1950 at Chicago, lllinots. Redesignated 5 

No,·cmber 1962 as the 232d Mtlttar)' Intelligence Detachment. Activated 11 

February 1963 at Chicago, Jlhnots. Location changed 24 Februar)' 1980 to 

Arhngton Hetghts, lllin01s. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRLDII 

Company B entitled to: 

Wor/cl \Vctr 11-EAME 

Rhmeland 

Ardennes-Alsace 

Centr-al Europe 

DECORATJO'\JS 

None. 
140th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT Of ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

H ERALOTC lTEMS 

Azure within an orle argent, in base a pyramid of the like and 

in chief a sun in splendor issuing to base five lightning flashes 

or and charged with a globe of the like gridlined of the firsL. 

That for the regimems and separate baualions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in lexington, Massachusetts. 

SEMPER VLGll (ALWAYS WATCHFUL). 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors associated 

with military intelligence. The sun represents the Greek god 

Helios, who, according to mythology. could bring all secrets to 

light; surrounding a globe, it represents the unit's worldwide 

military intelligence mission. The lightning nashes suggest 

electronic warfare and communication capabilities. The sun 

and lightning nashes are gold and allude to California, the 

"Golden State," the units home area. The pyramid personifies 

longevity and strength. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lNS.IGNlA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 

liNEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

LlNEAGE (active) 

Constituted 16 July 1986 in the Army Reserve as the !40th Military 

Intelligence Baualion and activated with Headquarters at Bell, California. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
14lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(O.YI OF AR~1S 

Shield. 

Crest. 

Mouo: 

Symbolism: 

1-l L;RAI DIC ITEMS 

Azure a compass rose or charged with a sword sable. grip 

gules surmounted br a globe argent, gridhned or bearing a 

lamp of knowledge or the like en named gules. 

That for the regiments and separate baualtons of the Utah 

Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors, or and 

azure, a beehive heset with seven bees all proper. 

STRENGTII TllROUGl l KNOWLEDGE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with mdnary intelligence. The shield represents the 

units constant protection of the country. while the globe symbolizes its worldw1de mission. The gold lamp of knowledge 

renects the unns cffons to gain knowledge to be read)' and 

prepared to keep world peace. The black sword exemplifies its 

vigilance. loyalty, and readiness to defend freedom, libeny, 

and country. The rays of light, adapted from the military intelligence emblem, allude lO a compass and symbolize the unit's 

readiness to respond wherever needed. 

01'-TIN< li\L UNIT INSIGNIA 

The dislincti\'e unit insigma IS a modification of the sh1cld and motto of the 

coat of arms. 

L!I'-Lt\(,[ AND llONORS 

ARNG 

(Utah) 

Organized from new and exisling units and federally recognized 8 October 

1988 in the Utah Army National Guard as the l41st Military Intelligence 

Battalion wnh Headquarters at Draper. Location of Headquarters changed 16 

Februal') 1995 to Provo. 

Home Area: Statewide. 

c \\IPAI(,N Pt\RTICIPATION (RI ()II 

None. 

01 CORATION5 

None. 
142d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

IIERALDIC ITEM~ 

Celeste. a globe enhanced azure, gridlmcd argent abo\'e <l 

wreath of four sego lilies proper overall a dagger palew1sc 

argent. 

That for the regiments and separate baualions of the Utah 

Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors, argent and 

azure, a beehive beset with seven bees all proper. 

lNTO ALL TilE WORLD. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with mililary intelligence units. The dagger srmbolizes 

military preparedness and the globe and mono represent the 

worldw1de capabilities and rcspons•blllllCS of the unn. The 

sego lilies arc symbols associated w11h Utah and reOect the 

unns locauon m that state. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of elements of the shield and crest of the 

coat of arms and incorporates the mono. 
LINEAGCS AND IIERALDlC DATA 

LINEAGE AND HONOR'> 

311 

ARNG 

(Utah) 

Organ1zed and federally recognized 12 February 1960 m the Utah Army 

National Guard at ron Douglas as the 142d Military Intelligence Linguist 

Company Reorganized 15 May 1964 as a Table of Distribution unit. Location 

changed l December 1971 to Salt Lake Cit). 

Reorganized and redesignated 1 Apnl 1980 as Headquaners and Headquarters 

Company, 142d Military Intelligence Battalion (organic clements concurrently organized and federally recogmzed). Location of lleadquaners changed 15 August 1982 

to Fon Douglas; changed 1 january 1988 to Draper. Baualion reorganized 1 April 

1988 as a Table of Orgamzat1on and Equ1pment umt. (Company A ordered into 

active federal service 3 january 1991 at Bountiful; released from active federal 

service 2 April 1991 and reverted to state control.) Location of Headquarters 

changed 1 October 1995 to ~alt Lake Cit). 

I lome Area: Northern Utah. 

CAMPAJC,N PARTIC.ll't\IION CR! DIT 

Compan) A emitled to: 

Soutlnvcst Asra 

lrbcrauon and Ddcnse of Kuwait 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
147th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl tH AR\1~ 

Sl1it'lcl: 

Crt'S I: 

Motto: 

Symholism· 

HERA I DIC 11 rMS 

Cheeky argent and sable, on a pile argem a Viking helmet of 

the second detailed or, lined gules, emitung a lighmmg !lash 

to base azure. 

That for the regiments and separate baualions ol the Armr 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and sable, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. I I. Kitson. sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexmgton, Massachusetts. 

FUROR rULMlNl'-1 (FURY OF LIGIITNlNG). 

Onental blue and c;1h·er gra) are the color.., tradiuonally assoctated wnh military Intelligence unlls. The pde rcllects accuracy and the abilit)' to pinpoint information The blue lightning 

bolt emphasizes that abilH) while symbohzing speed and electronic warfare. The cheeky background alludes to strategy. 

The Vik1ng helmet connotes protection and preparedness h 

also signifies the unil·s affiliation with the +7th Infantr) 

(V1l<ing) Division. 

DISTI'JCTIVE U:o-:JT lN'>IG'\ilA 

The distinctive unit insign1a is an adaptation of the shield and mono of the 

coat of am1s 

L!NEA(.;L AND llONOR':> 

AR 

(inactive) 

Constituted 18 September 1987 in the Arm) Reserw as the 1+7th Mthtary 

Intelligence Battalion and activated with Headquaners at Fort Snelling, 

Minnesota. Location of Headquarters changed 1 jul)' L 989 to Eagan. Minnesota. 

Inactivated 15 September 1992 at Eagan. \lmncsota. 

CAt-IPAIGN PARTICIPATIO~ CRI·DlT 

'\one. 

DECORATIONS 

\Jone. 
163d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(The Blue Watch) 

COAl Of ARM~ 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto· 

Symbolism: 

llERALDIC. ITEMS 

Azure on a bend cheeky argent and sable, overall a Philippine 

sun charged with a Korean taeguk in the colors of the 

Republic of Korea, scarlet and blue. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a trident argent 

interlaced with two anchors in saltire or. 

K\JO\VLEDGE IS PO\VCR. 

The sun alludes to sen 1ce in the Philippmcs during \Vorld 

War ll and to the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. The 

taeguk symboli zes the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit 

C.nation and the units ten campa1gns in the Korean War The 

black and whne check) alludes to the intelligence funcuons of 

the organizalion. Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors 

used by intelligence unns. 

The two crossed anchors allude to the two Presidential Unit 

Citations (Navy) and the trident rders to the Navy Unit 

Commendation. 

DISTIM II\ F UNIT 1--.:':iiGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of elements of the shield, crest, and 

motto of the coat of arms. 

Llr-..EAGE AND liONORS 

RA 

LINEr\C,I: (active) 

Consututed 5 Apnl 1945 in the Army of the United States as the 163d 

Language Detachment. Activated 23 April 19-1-5 1n the Philippine Islands. 

Reorganized and redesignated 25 September 1949 as the 163d Military 

lntelhgcm:e Sen·1cc Detachmem Alloned 19 De<.:ember 1950 to the Regular 

Armr. Rcorgamzed and rede!>tgnated 1 September 1952 as the 163d }vlllnary 

Intelligence Service Platoon. Reorganized and redesignated 28 March 1954 as the 

163d Milaary Intelligence Platoon. lnacuvated 15 November 1954 in Korea. 

Acuvated 26 December 1955 m ltalr 
314 :--.IILITARY INTELUC;r;-..;CE 

Reorganized and redesignated 20 September 1957 as the 163d Militar> 

lmelhgcncc Battalton. lnaeunued 25 ,\pril 1964 m hal) Rcdestgnated 1 October 

1969 as lleadquancrs and llcadquaners Compan). l63d t-.1tlnary lmelltgence 

Battalion. and activated at l'ort Hood, Texas (Company 1\ concurrently constituted and acti\'ated) (Company A reorganized and redestgnated 21 Apnl 1978 as 

Companr B; 529th Milllar) lntelltgence Company !sec Al'\'\£ >-I concurrent!) 

rcorgamzcd and redesignated as Company A.) 

t\"l'\E\: 

Constituted 14 july 19-+5 in the Army of the Untted States as the 255th 

Interrogation Prisoner of \Var Team and activated in Germany Inacti\'ated 30 

\io\'ember 19-+6 m GcrnH111)'. Redcstgnatcd L October I 948 as the 52 9th 

Interrogation Team and allotted to the Regular Army. Activated I5 October 1948 

at Fort Riley, Kansas. Inactivated I 0 February 1949 at Fon Riley, K<msas. 

Redesignated 17 ~la ch 1965 as the 529th ~lihtar) Intelligence C..ompan). 

Activated 19 March 1965 at l·on Hood, Texa::.. 

( -\\IPAJGN PARTIC ll't\!ION CRIDIT 

\\'mltl \\'w II 

l.uzon 

Kt.m·11n \\'ar 

L '\ Dcfens1w 

Ui\. Offcnsm: 

CC I lntcrvcnllon 

r.r~l U\! Coumcroffcn~IW 

(( I '>pnng Offcnsl\'C 

UN Summu-l;all Offcn~•,·c 

'>t•rond Korean \\'inter 

Kore<l, Summn-Fall 19'il 

Tlmd Korean \\m1cr 

Korea, Summer 1953 

DICORAI'IO~S 

Prcstdcntial Unit Citauon (Navy), Streamer embroidered INCHON ( l63cl 

Military lmelligencc Service Detachment cited, DA GO 63. 1952) 

Presidential Lnit Citation (1\a\)), Streamer embroidered H\\ACHOl'\ 

RESERVOIR (163d i\1ilhar) lmelligencc Service Detachmem cued; DA GO 38, 

1957) 

Na\') Unit Commendauon, Streamer embroidered PA:"\MUt\JO~t (l63d 

\hlitar) lmclligencc Service Platoon cited; DA GO 38, 1957) 

Philippine Presidential Unit Cilation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 

19++ TO-+ JULY 19-+5 (l63d L1nguagc Detachment cited. DA GO 47. 1950) 

Republic or Korea Prestdcntial Unn Citation, Streamer embrmdercd KOREA 

(l63d Military Intelligence ~crvicc Platoon cttcd: DA GO 10, 1954) 
l65th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAT l )I· AR\1S 

51udcl: 

Crest· 

Mollo: 

Syml>ol ism: 

IILRALDK ITEMS 

<..,able, a torch a::urc ts:.uing rays from an intCrL\\ med conunuous ribbon argent. 

None appro\'cd. 

QL\LITY PRIDE SuCCLSS. 

Onemal blue ts the primary color associated wnh milital) tntelligcncc organizations. The torch is symbolic of the illummation 

provided by the collection and c.ltsscminat ion of intelligence 

data. The black background suggests secrec> and stealth The 

ribbon-like symbol, in place of a name, folds back on itself and 

is rcpresentati\'C of the counterintelligence mtsswn. 

DbTI"iC"II\ 1 u'\n I,...,K.~I.·\ 

The distincli\'C unit insignta consists of elements of the shield and mouo of 

the coat ol arms. 

ll:\ l:AGE N'ID 110'\0R\ 

RA 

LlNEAc.r (ac:ti,•e) 

Constituted 27 September 1951 in the Regular Army as the 165th \1ilttary 

I melltgence Ser\'tce Detachment. Actt\ a ted 18 October 1951 tn J.qnn. 

Reorgantzcd and redesign<Hed 1 September 1952 as the l65th Military 

Intelligence Sen·tce C..ompany Reorganized and redesignated 28 March 1954 as 

the 165th \1ilitar) lmclligcncc Company Inactivated 25 janu<H) 1958 at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolma. Acuvatcd I June 1962 in Germany. 

Reorganized and rcdesignmed I july 1972 as l lcadquaners and Headquaners 

Company. l65th Mtlnary Intelligence Baualion. Inactivated 1 July 1983 in 

German) Rcdestgnmcd 16 Apnl 1984 as Headquarters. Headquarters and Service 

Compan), l65th Milttary lmelltgence Battalion, and activated tn Germany 

(organtc clcmems concurremly c.:onstiLULcd and activated). 

C\MP-\IG"-: PARTICIPMIO'\: (RrDIT 

None. 

DECORATIL)l\:S 

l'\onc. 
20lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl OF AR\1\ 

Shrcld: 

Crt:st: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HFRt\LDIC I rL.M.., 

Argent, between rn chief a terrestrial globe azure gridltned 

of the field and tn base a helm sable lined gules upon a laurel wreath proper, a sword and lightnrng flash saltirewise of 

the fourth. 

None appro\·ed. 

ACCURATE FAST ALL SOURCE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with 

milnarr intelligence. The helmet is adapted from the de\'ice of 

the 5l3th Mil11ary lmellrgencc Group, reflecung the unit's 

original assignmem. The globe refers to the worldwide scope 

of the unit's mission and alludes to the ''all source" emphasis 

of the mouo. The lrghtnrng nash and sword symbolize speed 

and accuracy of communications. The laurel wreath denotes 

achievement. Black stands for strength ~md stability. 

01\TINCTI\'l UI\IT lN!>K;~IA 

The distinctive unit rnsignia consists of elcmems of the coat of arms. 
UNEACJI:S AND liERALDIC DATA 

lt~LAGE ANO HOt'\OR~ 

Ll"lS\GI; 

317 

RA 

(acti\'c) 

Constituted 2 October 19H2 in the Regular Army as lleadquaners and 

Headquarters Company, 20 ht Military lmelligencc Baualion, and activated at 

Fort Monmouth, NC\\ jersey. (Organic clements constitmcd and activated l (1 july 

1987 at \tnt Hill Farms Stauon, Virgima) 

CAt-.1PAI(,N PARTICIPMION CRI DIT 

Sow lmt'\l Asw 

Ddt:nse of S:tudi Arab1a 

Uherauon and Defense of 1\uw,ut 

CL·a~c- Fire 

DECORATIONS 

1\lcntonous Unn Commcnd.u10n (Ann)'). Streamer cmbrotdcrcd SOUTII\\ EST 

ASIA (201st Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 14, 1997) 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1993 (20lst Military 

lmelligcncc Baualion cited; DA GO 14. J 997) 
202d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl OF AR~I'> 

Shield: 

Crest: 

,\folio: 

Symbolism: 

HERAI DIC I rt'MS 

Celeste, a lightning bolt or and torch gules fimbriated argent 

in c;altire O\'erall a dragon's head of the last, on a chief cheeky 

argent and sable a helm aflrome garnished sable. 

None approved. 

CONL!GE ET PROFICE (COLLECT AND CXPLOIT). 

Oriental blue and silver gray arc the colors trad itionally 

associated with military intelligence units. The helmet is adapted from the devtcc of the 513th Milttary lmclligencc Group and 

rcnccts the units original assignment. The helmet on the cheeky 

background symbolizes counterintelligence acti\itics. The lightning nash denotes speed and electronic warfare. The torch S)'mbolizcs truth and alludes to interrogation. The dragon, a mythical guardtan of treasure, S) mbolizes secunty and strength. 

DISllNCTIYE UNIT INSIGNLA 

The disuncti\·e unit instgnia consists of elements of the coat of arms. 

Ll"JEAGL AND HO'\JORS 

LlNEi\(,E 

RA 

(active) 

Constlluted 2 October 1982 111 the Regular Army as the 202d ~1tluary 

Intelligence Baualion and activated at Fort Monmouth, New jersey. 

CA~IPAIGN PARTICIPATION CR£'DIT 

.Smlllnve:.t Asw 

Defeno;c or Saudr Arabia 

Libcrauon and DclcrlSC or 1\U\\all 

Cease· hrc 

DECORt\TlOi\'> 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered :-.OUTIIWFST 

ASIA (202d ~lllnary Intelligence Bauallon cncd: DA GO 27, 199-t, as amended by 

DAGO 14, 1997) 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1992-1993 (DA GO l, 

L996) 
203d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERALDIC.. ITEMS 

DhfiNCTI\ £ UNIT INSKil'.IA 

Description· 

Svm/Jolism 

FI ·\G DE\ I( L 

A silver color metal and enamel device consisting of a silver gear bearing a black helmet with silver detatls, face 

forward, all centered upon a blue disc with silver grid 

lmcs encircled by a silver scroll inscribed TECHN\ClANS 

FOR VICTORY in red letters and m base two sprigs of 

green laurel. 

Oncmal blue and sih·er gray are the colors traditionally 

associated with mllnary intelligence umts. The gndlined 

sphere represents the unit's worldwide rmssion and the 

gear refers to the techmcal aspect of its rcsponsrbilities. 

The helmet is adapted from the devrce of the 5l3th 

Military Intelligence Group, alluding to the units original 

assignment and symboltzmg CO\'Crt \'igilance and preparedness. The laurel, a traditional symbol of achievement, exemplifies the motto. 

The nag device is the same as the distinctive unit insignia. 

LINEA(,[ AND HONORS 

RA 

LINLAG[ (inactive) 

Constituted 2 October 1982 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 203d Military Intelligence Battalion, and activated at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. (Orgamc clements constituted 16 October 

1988; Company;\ concurrently acti\'ated at at Fort Monmouth, New jersey.) 

Battalion inactivated 16 October 1989 at ron ~lonmouth, ~ew jerSC)'. 

CAl\IPAIGN PARTlCIIWI ION CREDIT 

None 

DH.ORATION'-. 

None. 
204th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COM or AR\15 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Svmbo/ism: 

HERt\l DIC l lEMS 

Azure, a double-warded key palcwise wnh an arched lighming 

nash on either side connecung the ward and bo" and each nash 

cnclosmg a fleur-de-hs argent and on the bow an crmme spot. 

On a wreath of the colors, argem and a::ure, a dragon sejam 

\\ith wmgs clc\'atcd and addorsed gules armed and langucd of 

the second spattered with seventeen mullets and grasping in 

his dexter claw three lightnmg nashes or 

SILENTLY WE DErEND. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with military 

mtelhgence, and a key is emblematic of authonty and security. 

The double ward and nashes represent the units concern for 

both O\ en and co\'ert security commumcauons. The flashes 

also denote celerity in oper::nion procedures and allude to the 

units signal lmeage lniually designated as the 3ll8th Signal 

Serv1ce Baualion, the units parucipation in the Northern 

France, Rhineland, and Central Europe campaigns dunng 

World War II is represented by the fieurs-de-lis and em1tnc 

spot. The design has been adapted from the badge of a predecessor unit, the 502d Army Securit) Agency Battalion. 

The dragon, a mythical beast renowned as a \ igilant guardian 

and defender, srmbolizes the hemage, m1sswn, and 1deals of 

the unit. The reel dragon all udes lO the Meritorious Unit 

Commendauon (Army) and ser\'tcC of dements of the baual1011 in Vietnam. Reel emphasizes the units courage, determination, and Yalor. The stars denote miiitar) preparedness and 

cxccllcncc 111 endeavors Serv1cc dunng World 'v\'ar II in 

Northern France, Rhineland, and Central Europe is represented b) the three ltghtnmg Oashes. 

Dt<..;TINCll\'1 Ul\!11 INSIU\.IA 

The d1stincuve unit insignia is an adaptation ol the sh1eld and motto of the 

coat of armc;. 
LINLAGLS A '\ID liLRALDIC. DATA 

Ll'\:r \GF. Ai\:D I IO?'.OR'> 

LIN LAt. I:. 

321 

RA 

(inactive) 

Constlluted 4 i\ovember L943 in the Ann) of the Unncd States <IS the 

31 18th Stgnal Service Battalion. Activrued I '5 November 1943 at Camp 

Crowder, \ltssoun Reorgamzed and redcstgnatcd 13 Apnl 1945 as the 3 I 18th 

Signal Scrvtcc Group. Reorganized and redesignated H November 1945 as the 

31 18th Signal Sen icc Battalion llcadquaners reorganized and redesignated 3 

April 1946 as Hcadquaru.·rs and Headquarters Detachment, 3118th '>tgnal 

Service Group (remamdcr of baualton concurrently disbanded). lnacmated 20 

june 19-+7 m Germany. 

Comcrted and redcstgnatcd 25 April 195 L as Headquarters and 

lleadquaners Compan), 502d Communication Reconnaissance Group, and 

allotted to the Regular Arm) ,\ctinued 15 \bt) 1951 at ron Devens. 

l\1assachuseus. Redesignated l Julr 1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Compan)', '502d Army Security AgenC)' (,roup. Inactivated 15 October 1957 in 

German) Acti\·ated 3 ~hl) L 971 111 Gennanr. Reorganized and redesignated 1 

October 1981 as Headquarters and I kadquaners Com pan), 502d Army 

Securit)' Agency Battalion 

Rcorgantzed and redesignated 16 October 1986 as Headquarters and 

lleadquaners Company, 204th Military Intelligence Battalion (409th Army 

Sccunt) Agenc> Company !see t\'\i\:EX 11 concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Compan) A: 328th Arm) Secunty Agency Company !see t\t\i\EX 21 

reorganized and redesignated as Company D). Banalion inactivated 16 july 

1995 m C.erman> 

ANNEX 1 

Constituted 1 April 1966 in the Regular Arm) as the 409th Army Securit)' 

Agency Detachment Activated 8 April 1966 at Fon George G. Meade, Mar7land. 

Inactivated 6 'vlan:h 1971 in Vietnam. Redesignated 1 July 197-+ as the -+09th 

Army Security Agenc) Com pan) and acll\ a ted in (,ermanr 

AN:\oEX 2 

Orgamzed l April 19-+4 in England as the 3250th ~tgnal Sen tee Companr 

(Constituted 12 April 1944 in the Army ol the United States.) Inactivated l3 

March 19-+6 in France. 

Con\'erted and redesignated 25 Apnl 1951 as the 328th Communtcatton 

Reconnatssance Compan) and allotted to the Regular Army. Activated I '5 May 

1951 at fort De\ ens. ~lassachusetts. Rcdestgnated 1 jul) 1956 as the 328th 

Army Security Agency Company. lnacuvated I '5 October 1957 tn Germany. 

Awvated 20 November 1968 m Vietnam. lnacti\ .ued 30 June 1972 in Vietnam. 

Acuvated l .July 1974 in German). 
322 

CAMPAI<.;N PARTICIPATION CREDI r 

\Vorl .I \\ 11r II 

\lonhcm France 

Rhmcland 

Central htropr 

Compan> A additionally cmnlcd to: 

Vtctnam 

Coumcroffen~t' c. Pha-.c II 

C oumcroffcn!tt\'C, Pha-.c 111 

ret CoumeroffcnSt\'C 

Coumcmffenstvc. Phase IV 

Countcroffenstvc. Ph<N' V 

Coumcroffemt\'C, Phase VI 

I ct 69/Counu•roffen!>tvc 

'>ummcr Fall 11.)69 

\\'imcr Spnng 1970 

<;anctu:uy Coumcroffcnsivc 

Countl.'roffenstvc. Ph,lsc \'II 

Southwrst Aslll 

Dcfen.5c of Saudt Arab1a 

l.1beraltlln and Dcfen-.c of Ktman 

Ccasc-hre 

Company D additionally entitled to: 

World War 11-EAMI· 

'\onnand) (with arrowhead) 

Ardenrws-Aisa<.:c 

Vrrlnam 

Countrroffensl\·e. Phase VI 

Tl.'t 69/Countcroffensr\'C 

'>umml:r-Fall 11.)69 

Wmtcr-Spnng 1970 

'lanctuar} CoumcroffcrN,·e 

Coumcroffensl\·c. Phase \'11 

Consohd:uion I 

Consohdatton II 

C.easc-l·irc 

DI'CORATION!:> 

'vtlll fARY lNTrLLIGFNCr 

Meritorious Unil Commendauon (Army), Streamer embroidered EUROPEAi\ 

TIIEAHR (31 18th Stgnal Service Group cned; GO 34, Un ncd States Forces, 

European Theater. 11 February 1946) 

Arm) Superior Unit A\\ard, Streamer embroidered lc.J91-J992 (204th Milnary 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 12, 1994) 
LINCAC,FS AND IIERALDIC DATA 323 

Company A addttional!)· entillcd to: 

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered I ONG BINI I-BIEN HOI\ (409th 

Radto Research Detachment cued; DA c.o 12. 1969, as amended by DA GO 28. 1969) 

Mcntonous Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer emhrotdered \ 'll T'\AM 

1966-ltJ67 (409th Radto Research Detachment cited; DA GO 17. 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIFTNAM 

1967-1968 (409th RadiO Research Detachmem cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 

?\lentonous Untt Commendation (Arm)'), Streamer embrotdered \ ll Tt'\AM 

1968-1969 (409th Radio Research Detachment ctted; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendalion (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (409th Radio Research Detachment cited, DA GO 43, 1972) 

Repubhc of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embrotdered 

VIETNAM 1966-1968 (409th Radio Research Unit cited; DA GO 60, 1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallamr)' with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

\'IET'\A\1 1969-1970 ( 409th Radio Research Detachment cited, DA GO 50, 1971) 

Republic of Vtetnam Cross of Gal!amry with Palm, Streamer embrotdered 

ViETNAM 1970 ( 409th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 55, 1971 ) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

\'lET'-:A\11970-1971 (409th Radio Research Detachment cited, DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic ofVtctnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1969-1970 (409th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 6, 

1974) 

Company D addttionally emttled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (328th Radw Research C01npan) cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

~lentorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotderecl VlrT'lAM 

1969-1970 (328th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIFl NAM 

1971-1972 (328th Radio Research Compan)' cited; OA GO 32, 1973) 

Repubhc of Vtetnam Cross of Gallantrr with Palm, Streamer embrOidered 

VIETNAM 1969-1970 (328th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 42. 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VJET\:A\1 1970-1971 (328th Radto Research Company cited: DA GO 6, 1974) 

Rcpubltc of Vtetnam Cross of Gallantr)' with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1971 (328th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 
205th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

Cn \T OF AR:-.tS 

Shield: 

Crest 

Motto· 

Symbolrsm: 

IIERALDIC Ill \IS 

Azure, on pale argcm a torch sable en flamed gules superimposed b} a sword argent hilt or gnp garn1shed gules. between 

two qwlls palewisc argent. 

On a wreath of the colors. Mgem and azure. a lightning flash 

palcw1se gules nsmg from a wreath of palm proper, OYerall an 

oriental dragon passant or armed gules and garnished azure. 

PACifiC VIC.ILAI\lCL 

Oriental blue and stlver gray are 1 he colors tradItionally associated with milnary mtelligcnce unns. Blue com·eys devotion 

and lo) alt), reel is mdicaun~ of courage and zeaL \\ htlc wh1tc 

portrays integrity. Gold reflects excellence, achievement, and 

high ideals: black reflects cO\·en Lapablhties. 1 he quills symbolize the units analyucal luncttons; the torch signines gwd 

ancc. leadership, and knowledge The sword IS S} mbolic of 

mihcary preparedness. 

The hghming flash indicates speed and accurac} and alludes to 

the baualion's hernagc and assocwuon wnh the ':>rgnal Corps. It 

is red to indtcate the Mcntorious Unit Commendation (Arm)) 

recetYed by the unn dunng World \\'ar II. The palm fronds 

stand for victory. while the oriental dragon personifies vtgilancc 

and preparedness. They suggest the Paethc are,\ and reflect the 

unit's mouo. 

0hli'1CTI\l UNII INSK,NIA 

rhe drstinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms 
LINEAGE~ AND HI RALD!C DATA 

LJI\;1:1\GE AND HOI'\OR'> 

325 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted I Januarr 19 '39 in the Regular Armr as the 2d Signal <,cn·tcc 

Company and activated with Headquarters at ron Monmouth, New Jersey 

(organic clcmem.;; concurren!l)' organized from existing units). Redesignated l4 

April 1942 as the 2d Signal <,rrvice Battalion. Headquarters. 2d Signal SetYice 

Batta!ton. disbanded 20 Apnl 1946 at Arlmgton Hall Stauon, Vtrginia. (Organic 

elements disbanded 15 May 1950.) 

llcadquaners, 2d Signal Service Bat tal ion. reconstituted I October 1991 in 

the Regular Arm) as Headquarters, 205th t-.1ilnary 1melllgcnce Battalion. 

Redesignated 31 October 1992 as Headquarters, lleadquaners and Service 

Company, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion, and activated at Fort Shafter, 

Hawaii (organic clements concurrently constituted and activated). 

CAMPt\lt.N PART(( I PATIO:\ CRr DIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

Meritorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer cmbrotderecl ARII!\JC.,TON 

1\All. ~TATION 1945 (9420th Technical Service Unit, l lcadquarters and 

Detachments, 2d Stgnal Sernce Bana!ton, cned: GO 2, Office of the Chief Signal 

Officer, Arm}' Service rorces, I Mar 19-+5) 
206th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT or ARM<; 

5/tie/d: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

HERAI DIC lTFMS 

Per chevron enarched reversed sable and celeste, nine rays 

radtating from honor point argent; tn base a !ton's head erased 

argem charged with two bars gules. 

None approved. 

COLLECTIO'J FOR DEFENSE. 

The white concentric rays represent light or knowledge gathered to a central potnt; the)' rder to the battalions mission of 

collecting strategtc mformation. The whne and scarlet lion 

on the blue background is taken from the coat of arms of 

Hesse in Germany, where the umt was acuvated. The head of 

the lion is used because it is a symbol of intelligence and rcason. The color of the background, oriental blue. also refers 

to mtlitar)' Intelligence. 

DIS11NCTIVE UNIT IN'>!C,NIA 

The distinctive unn insignia consists of elements of the coat of arms. 

liNEA(,[ A"-!0 HOt-.:ORS 

RA 

LlNEA(,F (inactive) 

Constituted 15 March 1968 in the Regular Army as the 18th Milnary 

Intelligence Battalion and activated in Germany Reorganized and redesignated 16 

OcLObcr 1986 as Headquarters and Headquarters CompJn)', 18th ilitar) 

Intelligence Battalion. (Orgamc clements constituted 16 October L 992: Company A 

concurremly activated tn Gem1any.) Battalion inactivated 16 july 1995 in Gem1an>'· 

Redesignated 13 February L 996 as the 206th Military Intelligence Battalion. 

CAMPA!CrN PARTICIPA'I!ON CRFDIT 

'\!one. 

DECORATION'> 

Army Supenor Unit Award, Streamer embrotdercd 1988-1989 (18th lvtilnary 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO I '5, 1990) 

Army Superior Umt Award. Streamer embroidered 1991-I 992 (18th \1ilitary 

Intelligence Battalion cttccl; DA GO 12, 1994) 
223d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 ARMS 

Slue/d. 

Crest. 

Mollo: 

~ymbolism: 

HFR/\LDlC ITEMS 

Argent, a lightning nash palewise gules and a double-warded 

ke}' and S\\ord saltirewise sable, overall a hun gndlined 

argent. 

That for the rcgtments and separate baualions of the 

California Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors, 

argent and gules, the setting sun behind a grizzly bear passant 

on a grassy field all proper. 

INSIGHT Til ROUGH INQUIRY. 

Oriental blue ts one of the colors traditionally associated with 

military intelligence units. The lightnmg nash denotes the 

units signal intelligence. The key is emblemauc of knowledge, 

authority, and security. The black sword is symbohc of coven 

operations and military preparedness; the globe reflects the 

units worldwide scope. 

OISIINCliVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of elements of the shield and mono of 

the coat of arms. 

Ll:--.11~\(.,1 AI\D HONORS 

LIN LA<.. I 

ARNG 

(California) 

Organized and federallr recogn~zcd 16 january 1992 in the California Army 

National Guard as the 223d Military Intelligence Baualion with lleadquaners at 

Fort i:=unston. 

Home Area: Statewide. 

C \\11'·\I<.,N PARTICIPATION C!u=nn 

~one. 

DLC<. )Jv\ r 10~'> 

None. 
224th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARI\t<:, 

Shield: 

Cn:st: 

Motto: 

Symbolism. 

III Ri\LDIC lTH1S 

Quanerly azure and argent a griffin sejant or grasping two 

Oashes saltircwise gules. 

"lone appro,·cd 

VIGILANCE ABOVE. 

Oriental blue and sliver gray arc the colors assocmted wllh the 

military intelligence branch. The crosswise arrangement of the 

background is a reference to the Republic of Vietnam Cross of 

Gallantry With Palm awarded to the unit for service in 

Vietnam. The gnrfin IS a hcrald1c creature combmmg the 

strength and wurage of a !ton "Hh the v1gliancc and awareness of an eagle; as such, n 1<> well suited to represent the 

ideals and capabilities of an intelligence unit. Its wings refer to 

the airborne mission, and the nashcs it grasps denote the electronic data collection mission of the unit. 

Dt"TINCTIVF Ui"r r l'\<;JG~IA 

The d1suncuve unit insigma is the shield and mouo of the com of arms. 

LIN! AC.E 1\ND HONORS 

Ll'\!EAGL 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted I june 1966 in the Regular Arm) as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detachment. 224th A' lation Baualton, and activated 111 Vietnam. 

Redesignated I December 1968 as lleadquaners and lleadquancrs Company, 

224th Aviation Baual ion. Converted and redesignated 19 May 1971 as 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 22-+th Army Securit}' Agency 

Baualion. Inactivated 6 March 1973 at Oakland. Caltforma. 

Redesl~?,natcd l June 1981 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Ser\'ice 

Compan), 224th ~hlnary lmelltgence Battalion, and acuvated at llunter Army 

Airfield, Georgia (172d Military Intelligence Detachment [see ANNLX ll concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Company A; I 44th Aviauon Company 

[see ANNEX 21 com·cncd and redesignated as Company Band acti,·atcd). 
Lli'\EAGF::, \'\D HER..\.LDIC DAT\ 329 

AN~!"\ I 

Constituted 5 Apnl 1945 m the Am1y of the United States as the l72d Language 

Detachment. Activated 23 t\pril 1945 in the Philippine Islands. Inactivated 15 April 

1946 in .Japan. Redesignated 14 january 1955 as the l72d Military Intelligence 

Platoon and alloued to the Regular Army Activated 7 March 1955 in Gem1any. 

ln<lCll\ <llCd 2 5 June 1958 111 (,ermany Activated 15 jul) 1959 at Fort Devens. 

~lassachuscus. Reorganized and redesignated 25 August 1961 as the l72d Military 

lmclhgence Detachment. lmKllvated I S>eptember 1963 m German). Activated 3 

~Ia) 1965 at Fort Campbell. Kentucky. Inactivated 21 August 1972 at Fort 

Campbell. Kentucky Acti\'atcd 21 Nowmber 1977 at Fon W:.unwnght, Alaska. 

i\NNI.X 2 

Constituted 1 june 1966 in the Regular Army as the \44th Aviation 

Compan) and activated in Vietnam. Inactivated 30 September I 971 in Vietnam. 

C.\MPAI<.o'J PART!( IPATI0!'-1 C.RIDII 

\ lflll<l/11 

Counteroffensive 

<..ount~roffcnst,·c. Pha-;c II 

Cl'llntcroffcnst\'C, Phase Ill 

I cl Countcmffcnst\'C 

llluntcmffcnst,·c. Phase IV 

Coum~roffenst,·c, Phase V 

Coumeroffcnst\·e, Ph.,,c VI 

l ct ()9/Counteroffcnst\'C 

:-.ummer-rall 1969 

\\'mt.:r-Spring 197(.) 

~anctuaT) Coumrroffcn::.t\l' 

Counteroflensl\·e, Pha~ \'II 

Consolidation I 

Consolidation II 

Cc.1~-Ftrc 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

World \Vm 11-AP 

lunm 

\'it'tlllH!l 

Ddt'nse 

DIC ORATI00:S 

t-..teritorious t.Jnit Commendation (Arm)), Streamer embrotdcred VIETI'\A \I 

1966-1967 (llcadquaners and llcadquarters Detachment, 224th A' iauon Baualion, 

and I 44th A\iauon Company cned, DA GO 17, 1968, as amended b) DA GO I, 

1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

I 967-I 969 (Headquarters and llcadquaners Company, 224th Avtation Baualion, 

and I 44th A\'tallon Compan)' ctted; Dt\ GO 2, 1971) 
330 ~11LITARY INTEl LICENCE 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971-1972 (224th Aviation Battalion and l44th Aviation Company cned; DA GO 

32, 1973) 

Army Superior Unit Award, ~treamer embroidered 1987-1988 (224th ~1ilitary 

Intelligence Bauallon cited: DA GO 35, 1989) 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1988-1990 (224th Military 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 2, 1991) 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1992-1993 (224th Military 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 27. 1994) 

Republi<.. of Vtetnam Cross of Gallantry wnh Palm, Streamer embroidered 

\IETi\AM 1970-1971 (224th Avtation Banalion and !44th AviatiOn Company 

Cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Arm)'), ':>treamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1965-1967 ( l72d \1tlttmy lmelhgcnce Detachment Cited; DA GO 48, L 968) 

Philtppmc Presidential Umt C..nauon, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 19++ 

TO 4 JULY 1945 ( 172d Language Detachment cited; DA GO 4 7, 1950) 

Repubhc of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1968-1970 (172d Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 51, 

1971) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Acuon Honor 1\ledal. I"=irst Class, Streamer embroidered VICT'\it\\1 1969-l971(172d ~ltlnary lntelhgence Detachment Cited; DA GO 

5, 1973) 
229th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

H ERALDIC lTEMS 

Argent, on a pale wavy azure two pallets wavy of the first 

between two griffin heads erased in fess addorsed of the second eyes and tongues gules. 

None approved. 

STRENGTH FROM INTELLIGENCE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors traditionally associated with the military intelligence branch. The griffin, noted 

for keen eyesight, symbolizes surveillance. The two griffins 

back to back represent vigilance; they also suggest the units 

original ~wo continent and two ocean area of operations. The 

wavy pale refers to the Panama Canal. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted l April 1985 in the Regular Army as the 29th Military 

Intelligence Baualion and activated in Panama. Inactivated 17 October 1991 in 

Panama. 

Redesignated 7 December 1995 as the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion. 

Headquaners transferred 15 March 1996 to the United States Army Training and 

Doctrine Command and activated at the Presidio of Monterey, California. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

At med Forces Expeditions 

Panama 

DECORATIONS 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1988-1989 (29th Military 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 8, 1991) 
260th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF AR\15 

Sludd: 

C. rest: 

Motto· 

Svmholism: 

HI:RALDlC ITEMS 

Azure. ,\ double-warded key pale'' ise "ards to base argent, 

bet\\'een two sphinx heads addorsed or, overall a quill and a 

dagger salttrC\\ tsc of the second. 

That for the regiments and separate banaltons of the Florida 

Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors, argent and 

azure, an all igator statam proper. 

lNTELLIC,E:NTIA ET VERITAS ( INTELLIGENCE AND 

TRUTII). 

Oriental blue and sih-er gray (\vhtte) arc the colors traditional-

!} assowued with militarr mtelltgence The key ts emblematic 

of kno" ledge. authority, and secunt). The quill O\'er the dagger underscores the pen as tmghtier than the sword. The 

sphmx heads, one facing m either dtrecuon. stgnify constant 

vigilance and eternal watchfulness. 

Dh I INC liVE UNIT IN~J<.,Nii\ 

The distinctive unll msignia is the shield and motto of the com of arms. 

AR\.(, 

(Florida) 

Organized and federal!) recognized 27 August 1990 in the Flonda Arm) 

Nauonal Guard as the 260th Military Intelligence Baualton wtth Headquarters at 

Miami. 

I lome Area: Southern Flonda. 

C.t\\IPt\J<.,"l PARTICIPATION CRI Dll 

\!one. 

0! CORAl 10\:S 

None. 
297th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

H ERA LDIC ITEMS 

Per bend azure and sable, in dexter base a gauntlet argem 

grasping a lighLning nash sword bendwise blade of the like, 

grip gules, pommel and quillon or. 

None approved. 

VANGUARD. 

The colors oriental blue and silver gray are traditionally associated with military intelligence. The armored fist represents 

strength; the lightning nash denotes speed. The fist seizes the 

blade of the sword to indicate readiness and vigilance. Black 

denOles dependability and suggests coven capabilities. The 

nst, upraised and grasping the sword, suggests leadership, 

highlighting the units mollo. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lNSlGNLA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coaL of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Conslituted 21 November 1962 in the Army Reserve as the 297th Army 

Security Agency Company. Activated 1 March 1963 at Atlanta, Georgia. 

Reorganized and redesignated 15 April 1966 as Headquaners and Headquarters 

Company, 297th Army Security Agency Battalion. Inactivated 31 january 1968 at 

Allama, Georgia. 

Redesignated l February 1990 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

297th Military Intelligence Baualion; concurrently withdrawn from the Army 

Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. Redesignated 17 October 1991 as 

Headquarters, Heaclquaners and Service Company, 297th Military lmelligence 

Baualion, and activated at Fon Monmouth, New Jersey (organic elements concutTemly constituted and activated). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
30lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Cresr: 

Mot co: 

Symbolism· 

H rRALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, a dagger and lightning nash dagger saltire,\ise, blades 

argem. hilts or and sable. 

That for the regiments and separate baualions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

lexi ngton Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capl. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculpLOr), stands on the 

Common in lexmgton, Massachuscus. 

THE FORCE ULTlPUER. 

Oricmal blue and silver gray arc the colors associated with 

military mtclligence. The crossed dagger and lightnmg nash 

dagger form an X, suggesting the units mono. They :;ymbolize 

strength, danger, speed, and the precise application of electronic warfare and intelligence 10 defeat the enemy. 

DISTINC.TI\ I UNI I ]NSlGNlA 

The distinctive unit msignia ic; the sh1eld and mouo of the coat of arms. 

LI NL I\C.E AND H ONORS 

LINEAGI:: 

AR 

(active) 

Constituted 6 june 1949 in the Organized Rcsen·e Corps as Hcadquaners, 

30lst t\hlilar> lmclligencc Platoon. Activated 22 june 1949 at Austin, Texas. 

Reorgamzed and redesignated 1 September 1950 as Headquarters, 30lst 

Military Intelligence Bau alion. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 j uly 

1952 as the Army Reserve.) Inactivated 23 February 1953 at Austin, Texas. 

Redesignated 16 September 1988 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Service 

Company, 30lst ~lilitary lmclhgencc Bauahon, and acuvated at Pasadena, Texas 

(organic elements concurrent!) consututed and acuvmcd). 

CAt-.IPAIGN PARTIUPMION CRr Dll 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

'\one. 
302d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT or ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest 

Motto: 

)ymbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Per fess abased argent and azure, 111 chief a red fox's mask 

proper charged on the forehead with a billet fesswisc sable, 

and m base a key pale\\ ise between two stylized ltghtnmg 

flashes of the firsL. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a fleur-de-lis barry 

of ten of the second and first, the outer petals serrated. the inner 

charged with a bayonet or point up, and on the crosspiece ol 

the fleur-de-lis a bar couped tennc with two barrulets argent. 

LOYALTY, VIGILANCE, PRIDE. 

The colors, white and teal blue, are symbolic of the baualions 

fonner status as an unassigned-to-branch unit. The battalions 

war service as a signal unit is shown by the colors of the foxs 

mask and background, while the intelligence functions of the 

unit are represented by the black censor's stamp. The ke)' is for 

the units first campaign (Normand)•) m World War II and also 

alludes to signal and mtelligence funcuons. The styhzed hghtnmg flashes symbolize md10 reconnaissance. 

The fleur-de-lis represents campaign participation in Europe. 

The outer petals of the fleUt·-de-lis, suggestive of electronic flashes, reflect the units sen'ice in communication reconnatssance. 

The bar on the crossptece is divided mto five segments repre-

!;Cnting panicipauon in five campaigns in Europe during World 

War ll. The bayonet suggests the Army's offensive spint and 

reflects the unit's association with United States Army, Europe. 

DhTINCTIVE UNll IN'\IGNIA 

The distmctivc umt insignia is the shteld and mouo of the coat of arms. 
336 MILITARY INTEl LIGENCF 

lrNEAC.I AND liOi"ORS 

R/\ 

LINEAGE (acti\'e) 

Organized l April 19++ in England as the 3252d Signal Servtce Compan). 

(Constituted 12 April 1944 tn the Army of the United States.) Inactivated 24 

November 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New jersey. Redesignated 6 May 1948 as the 

533d Signal Scmce Company. Activated 20 june 1948 tn Austria. lnacti\·ated I 

Apnl 1949 m Aumia. 

Converted and redesignated I 3 October 1950 as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detachment, 302d Communicauon Reconnaissance Baualion, 

and allotted to the Regular Army. Activated 20 October 1950 at Camp Pickell, 

Virgtnia. Reorganized and redestgnated 25 june 1955 as Headquarters and 

llcadquaners Company, 302d Communication Reconnaissance Baualion 

(Companies A and B constituted 19 May 1955; Company A acuvated 25 june 

1955 in Germany). Redesignated 1 july 1956 as the 302d Arm) Sccurny 

Agency Baualion. Inactivated 15 October 19'57 in Germany. Headquarters and 

lleadquarters Company activated 21 December 1975 in Germany (Companic::; 

A and B concurremly dtsbanded). 

lleadquaners and Headquarters Company, 302d Army Secunty Agenc) 

Battalion, reorganized and redesignated 16 April 1984 as Headquarters. 

Headquarters and Service Company, 302d Military Intelligence Battalion (33lst 

Arm)' Secunt)' Agency Company [see AN!\EX II and 327th Arm)' Secunt)' Agenq 

Company !sec ANNEX 21 concurrently reorganized and redesignated a<> 

Companies A and B). 

A'-:"-=EX 1 

Constituted 26 April 1942 in the Anny of the United States as the !14th Stgnal 

Radio Intelligence Company. Activated I3 july 1942 at Camp Crowder, Missouri. 

Reorganized and redesignated 10 january 1946 as the ll-tth Signal Service 

Company. 

Convened and redcstgnated 25 October 19'51 as the 33lst Communication 

Reconnaissance Company and alloued to the Regular Annr Reorganized and 

rcclcstgnated 25 june 1955 as Company A, 307th Communication 

Reconnaissance Battalion Redesignated l july 1956 as Compan> A, 307th Army 

Security Agency Battalion. lnacti\ated 15 October 1957 in Germany. 

Redesignated 21 September 1978 as the 33lst Army Securit)' Agency Company 

and activated 111 German)'· 

t\NNfX 2 

Constituted 4 November 1942 tn the Arm) of the United States as the lllth 

Signal Radio Intelligence Company. Activated 30 0!o\cmber 1942 at Camp 

Crowder, Missouri. Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1945 as the 

1llth Signal Service Compan)~ 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 337 

Convened and redesignated 25 October 1951 as the 327th Communication 

Reconnmssam:e Compan> and alloued to the Regular Armr lnacuvated 15 

August 1956 on Formosa. Redesignated 21 October 1976 as the 327th Army 

Security Agency Company and activated in Germany. 

C \\1Pt\IG!'-: PARTICIPATIO!\ CRI DIT 

\\'01 ld \\ell II 

Normandy 

NMI hcrn France 

Rhml'land 

Ardcnncs-t\lsace 

Central Europe 

Company B additionally cnutled to: 

Worlcl \Vm 11-AP 

NC\\ Coumca 

Lc}·lc 

Luzon 

DECORATI(.)Nc.., 

Compan)' B entitled to: 

Philippmc Presidenual Unit Citation. Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 

TO 4 JULY 1945 (lllth S•gnal Radio lmclhgence Company cited; DA GO 47, 1950) 
303d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl 01 ,\R:-.IS 

Sllidd: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Sym/Jolism: 

I-ILRt\LDIC ITC\1::. 

Or, three piles, one in chief ,mel two con,omed in base azure 

bcanng in chid an edelweiss argent seeded of the rielcl and issuing from base two beacons of th~o: last cnflamed tcnne and gold 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, in front of a st) lizcd 

wrcmh of rice or, four nashes salurewise gules. 

PRIMl NOSCERE (FIRST TO KNOW). 

Oncmal blue and sliver gray .1re the colors associated wtth militar)' mtelligence The blue plies represent the mounwms of 

Central Europe and Korea, \\here the haualions predecessor 

untts served. The edelweiss, a small \\bite nower prized b) 

European moumatncers. refers to the umts service in Central 

Europe. The two hcacons refer to Koreas ancient and effective 

system of commumcations, whiCh was accomphshed b) means 

of beacon fires on mountain tops, and also refer to the baualtons two unit decorations for setvtcc in Korea. 

The colors red and yellow arc traditional!) associated with 

Vietnam, as 1s the rice wreath. a symbol ol excellence and 

a<..hic,·ement. The red nashcs refer to the Meritorious Unn 

Commendations (Army) earned while serving in Vietnam 

and also represen t accuracy and speed. 

DISTI~<. Tl\ E L>,IT IN::.IC,-...IA 

The distinctive unH msigma 1s the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LlNF.Ac,r AND HONORS 

RA 

(acll\ c) 

Constituted 22 ~eptcmber 1950 in the Regular Army as lleaclquaners and 

Headquarters Detachment, 303d Communication Reconnaissance Baualion. 

Activated 25 September 1950 at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia Consolidated 17 

jul) 1951 wnh the 540th Signal Sen 1cc Com pan) (see A0::'\ E:"\ I) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Jlcadquaners Detachment, 103d 

Commumcation Reconnaissance Banalion. lnacuvatcd 25 June 1955 in Korea. 

Redesignated 11 May I 962 as Headquarters and llcadquancrs Company. 101d 

Arm> \ecurity Agcnc) Battalion (organic elements concurrcml> consutuied). 
Ll'.:lt\(i[\ A\!D HERALDIC DATA 339 

Battalion activated 15 june 1962 <H Camp Wolters, Texas (Compamcs A, B, and 

C reorganized and redestgnatcd 15 October 1966 as the 372d. 373cL and 374th 

Army ':>ecunt}' Agency Companies-hereafter separate lineages.) 

lleadquancrs and Headquarters Company. 303d t\rmy ~ccurity Agency 

Battalmn, reorgamzcd and redesignmed 21 April 1978 as llcaclquaners and 

llcadquaners Detachment, 303d \1ilitary lmclligencc Battalion (376th Army 

~ecurit} Agency Com pan) I sec \ '\li\fX 2] and 370th Arm) '-:.ccurity Agent) 

C.ompan} !see A:-\'\E>-. 31 concurrently reorganized and reclcstgnated as 

Companies A and B). 

ANNIX I 

Constituted 12 April 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 3253d Signal 

Service Company. Activated 25 April 1044 in England. lnactivmccl 25 junuary 1946 

at Camp Kilmer, New jersey. Redesignated 6 May 1048 as the 540th Signal Service 

Company. Activated 20 june l 94R in Austna. lnacti\·ated 1 Apnl 1049 in Austria. 

,\'\:-..:1·'\ 2 

Constituted 20 Februar> 1968 in the Regular Army as the 376th Army 

Secunt} AgenC} Company. Acuvatcd I April 1968 at Fort Bragg, '\orth Carohna. 

lnacti\·atecl 30 june 1974 at fort Bragg. North Carolina. Activated I july 1974 at 

I·on Ceorge G. Meade, Mar;•lancl. 

J\NNI~X 3 

Constituted 10 january 1967 in the Regular Army as the 370th Army 

Securit) AgenC}' Company. Aeti\'atecl I ~larch 1967 at Vim IIIII Farms Station, 

Virginta 

Ct\1\11'.\IG:\ PARTICIPATIOt-.. CRIDIT 

\\',,, ld \\',u II 

'\ormant.l} 

Nonh~:rn France 

Rhmcland 

A rdc ntlCS·A lsacc 

Cl·ntral !·uropc 

KIII<'CIII \\'ar 

C (I" lnter•enuon 

lrN U"\ Counteroffcn,rvc 

CU :->pnng Offensl\·c 

L '\ ':>ummcr-Fall Offcnsrvc 

Second Korean \\"mtcr 

Kor~:a. Summer-Fall 1952 

lhml Korean \\'inter 

Kore<l, 'iummcr 1953 

Vit'lrwm 

(.ountcroflensrv~ 

Countcroffensi\·c, Phase II 

Countcroffcnsl\'c, Phase Ill 

Tct CountcroffcnSI\'C 

Countcroffensrvc, Pha~~ IV 

C:ountcroffensrvc. Pha~t· \' 

Counteroffensi\'C Ph<N \ I 

Tet 69/Counteroffcrhl\ l' 

Summer-Fall 19M 

\ inter-:,pnn~ 1970 

Sanctuar. C.ountcroffcnsrvc 

Ct'llnteroffensm:, Ph<bt' \'II 
340 MILITARY INTELUGI·NCE 

DECOR;\110:-..S 

Memorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer cmbn.Hclered KORFA 

(Headquarters and llcadquancrs Detachment, 303d Communi<.:atton 

Reconnaissance Baualwn, cited; DA CO 22, 1954) 

Meritorious Unit Commendauon (Army), ',trcamer embroidered \'lrT'\!AM 

1966-1967 (Headquarters and llcadquaners Companr, 303d Radio Research 

Battahon, cited; DA CiO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VJrTNAM 

1967-19o8 (Headquarters and lleadquaners Company, 303d Radio Research 

Bauahon, cited; DA c.o 28, 1969, as amended b) DA GO 18, 1979) 

Mcmorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotdcred \ 1[1 '\AM 

1968-1969 (Headquarters and lleadquaners Company, 303d Radio Research 

Battalion, cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Am1y), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (303d Radio Research Baualion cited, DA GO 43, 1972) 

t-.tcntorious Untt Commendauon (Arm)'), Streamer embrotdered \'lET'lAM 

197 l (303d Radio Research Battalion cited; DA GO 32, 1973) 

Republic of t<orea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered !<ORb\ 

(Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 303d Communication 

Reconnatssance Bauahon, cited; DA GO 33, 1953, as amended by DA GO 41, 

1955) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (303d Radio Research Baualion cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class. Streamer embroidered VIETNA~t 1969-1970 (303d Rad1o Research Bauahon cited; DA GO 6. 

1974) 
304th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

CO·\T <W AR\1<; 

Sludcl: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

)ymholism: 

l ll Ri\1 DIC. ITEMS 

Azure, a ,·oidcd l'iOsccles mangle pomt up sable enclosing a 

,·ine leaf or and surmounted in ch1cf by a lozenge fesswise 

argent bcanng a Korean taeguk all bct\\CCn two lightning 

nashes, points up gules, fimbriated or. 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, a dcmi-griffin of the 

last armed and langucd gules grasping in dexter claw a dagger 

or, all within a laurel wreath of the like. 

HONOR VIC. I LANCE DUTY. 

The d1amond and taeguk simulate an e)'e, and the lightmng 

nashes connote technology; together they represent the vigilance, celcrtl)'. and communication of Arm} Security Agency 

units. The) also allude to the lineage and service of the organization in World War II and the Korean War. The vmc leaf refers 

to the Rhine provmce and denotes the unit's panicipalion in the 

Rhineland campaign. The taeguk represents Korea, where the 

unit participated in six campaigns. lt is also used to symbolize 

the award of the ~lcrnorious Unit Commendation (Army) 

Streamer inscribed KOREA. Black is used on the triangle to connote 1ron and refers to the Repubhc of Korea Pres1demial Unit 

Citation '-.trcamcr with the inscription IRO'-. TRIA '\;GLE. 

Oriental blue represents the military intelligence branch. The 

griffin, a traditional symbol of intelligence, resourcefulness, 

and courage, emphasizes the qualities required of bauahon 

personnel and recalls the European theater of operations. Its 

claws and tongue arc scarlet, denoting courage and sacrifice. It 

holds a dagger. a reference to the dangers of covert activities 

and a symbol of preparedness. The wreath refers to all honors 

and achicn·mcms associated wilh the unit during its history 

Gold s1gn1fies excellence. 

Dl'> IINCTI\'t.: Ut-:IT 1"'5lG~tA 

The dic;tincth·e unit insignia consists of clements of the coat of arms. 
342 MILITARY INTELLIGI.:NCE 

Llt-..EAC,[ Al\0 HONORS 

RA 

LlNEJ\(,1· (active) 

ConstiLUted 15 April 1944 in the Anny of the United States as the 590th Signal 

Depot Company. Activated 7 june 1944 in North Aftica. Inactivated 4 December 1945 

at Camp Patrick I knry, Virginia. Redesignated 17 March 1948 as the 848th S1gnal 

Radio Relay Company and allotted to the Orgamzed Reserves. (Organized Reserves 

redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps; redesignated 9 July 

1952 as the Army Reserve.) Activated 2 April 1948 at Rochester, New York. Inactivated 

lO November 1948 at Rochester, New York. Redesignated 11 f-ebruary 1949 as the 

848th S1gnal Service Company Activated 10 \1arch 1949 at ron !'dyer, \'irgmia. 

Ordered imo active m!lnary service I t September 1950 at Fort Mycr, Virginia. 

Converted and redesignated 2 October 1950 as lleadquaners and 

Headquarters Detachmem, 304th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Released from active military sen·1cc 25 june 1955 and reverted to reserve status. 

Inacuvatcd 18 August 1955 at Fort Myer, Virgm1a. Redesignated 1 April 1975 as 

Headquarters and lleadquaners Company, 304th Army Security Agency 

Baualion, and activated at Houston, Texas. Location changed 27 October 1976 to 

Pasadena, Texas. Inactivated 15 September 1988 at Pasadena. Texas. 

Redesignated 1 February 1990 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

304th Mihtary Intelligence Battalion; concurrently withdrawn from the Army 

Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. lleadquaners transferred 17 August 

1990 to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command and activated 

at fort Huachuca, Anz.ona. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREOn 

WClrld War II 

Rhmcland 

Korean \Vc1r 

C.C.F Spring Ofknsi\'C 

L' Summer-l:all Offcnsi,·c 

'\ccond Korean \\'mtcr 

Korea, Summcr-l·alll952 

rlmd Korean Winter 

Korea. Summer I <)53 

DECORATIONS 

Meritorious Umt Commendauon (Army), Streamer cmbr01dercd KOREA 

(Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 304th Communication 

Reconnaissance Baual ion, cited; DA GO 22, 1954) 

Army Superior Lnll Award, Streamer embro1dered 1990-1991 (304th t--.lilitary 

Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 6, 1992) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered IROl\1 

TRIAN(,J F (304th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion <.:!led; DA GO 29. 

1954. as amended by DA GO 4 7. 1954) 
305th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl 01· ARM'> 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, a saltirc argent charged wnh pyrotechnic projectors of 

the first. overall a mullet of four points tenne fimbnated of the 

second. 

On a wreath of the colors. argent and azure. issuant from the 

battlements of a tower proper a Oeur-de-lis or between two 

griffin heads respectant gules beaked or. 

AD ARCANA TUTANDA (TO KEEP OFFICIAL SECRET~ 

SAFC). 

Teal blue and white are the colors associated wllh former 

Army Security Agency battalions. The pyrotechnic projectors 

allude to the stgnal and reconnatssance missions of the unil. 

The four-pointed star refers to four World War II campaigns 

and also symbolizes imclligence, reconnaissance, communications, and signal, all mal funcuons of the baualion The color 

orange further alludes to its signal function. The salure is symbolic of the southern states that made up the Third Army area, 

the former locauon of the battalion. 

The tower symbolizes a strong defense and military preparedness. I he grifrins, persomfying vigilance, stand prepared to meet all threats. Red denotes courage and zeal. The 

tower and Oeur-de-lis commemorate the unit's World War 11 

scn·tce in Europe. 

DlSTINC..'TlVt- UNIT li':SI<.NIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 
344 

LINEAGE 

LINEAGE AND llONORS 

MiLITARY iNTELLIGENCE 

RA 

(acuve) 

Constituted 17 November 1950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 305th Commun1cauon 

Reconnaissance Battalion. Ac tivated 23 january 1951 at Atlanta, Georgia. 

Consolidated 17 July 1951 with the 3255th Stgnal Service Company (see 

ANNEX) and consolidated unit destgnated as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, 305th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. (Organized 

Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the Army Reserve.) Reorganized and 

redesignated 24 january 1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

305th Commun1cation Reconnaissance Battalion (362d Communication 

Reconnaissance Company [constituted 18 November 1955 in the Army Reserve! 

concurrently redesignated as Company A and acti\·ated at Wilmington, North 

Carolina). Redesignated 1 Ocwber 1956 as the 305th Army Security Agency 

Battalion. Inactivated 15 june 1959 at Atlanta, Georgia. 

Redesignated 1 February 1990 as the 305th Military lmelhgence Battahon; 

concurrently withdrawn from the Army Reserve and alloued to the Regular Army. 

Headquarters transferred 18 1\ fa)' 1990 to the Umtcd States Army Trammg and 

Doctrine Command and activated at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. 

AN 'lEX 

Constituted 12 April 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 3255th 

Signal Service Company. Activated 6 May 1944 in England. lnacuvated 25 

October 1945 in Germany. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRIDIT 

Wotlcl \Var II 

Nonhem France 

Rhmcland 

Ardcnnes-Alsacc 

Central Europe 

D!'CORATIONS 

None. 
306th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARM~ 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

II CRALD!C l rB-.15 

Azure, a volcano abased argem surmoumed by a pellet 

charged with a mullet of the second; in chtef a lightning nash 

lesswise tennc ftmbriatcd of the second. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a demi-griffin 

gules holding m its dexter claw a sword with blade in the 

form of a lightning nash or all in from of a wreath of palm 

fronds proper. 

NH.IO VIGILAI'\TIOR (NO ONE MORE WATCHFUL). 

Teal blue and white are the colors formerly used for Army 

Security Agency battalions. The volcano symbolizes the area in 

the Pactfic where the unn sen·ed. The black sphere charged 

with a white mullet alludes to the coat of arms of Captain Cook, 

who discovered New Caledonia, the island on which the unit 

was acti\·ated The lightnmg nash refers to the mtsston of the 

unit and the orange color represents its former status as a signal 

company. 

The griffin, symbol of courage, strength, and vigtlance, represents the intelligence mtssion of the battalion. The units origin as a signal company is recalled by the lightning nash 

sword blade, which also denotes speed of response and 

action. The palm wreath refers to the unit's service in the 

Pacific during World War II. Red signifies courage and recalls 

the award of the \1cntorious Unn Commendauon (Arm)) 

Gold stands for excellence. 

DISTI'JCTI\'[ U'\IT lN'.J(,l\liA 

The disunctive unit msigma IS the shteld and mouo of the coat of arms. 
346 

Ll'\.EAGI t\'\;0 IIO'\OR'> 

L!Nl'I\C...E 

\1ILITARY INTELLIGCNCE 

RA 

(acll\•e) 

Constituted 16 December 1944 in the Army of the United ~tales as the 

39 LOth Signal Service Company. Activated 1 February 1945 on New Caledonia. 

Inacti\•atcd 19 April 1946 on Tinian Redesignated 13 Januar) 1948 as the 303d 

Signal Ser\'ICe Company. Army, and alloued to the Organized Reserves. Activated 

23 January 1948 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Organized Rcscr\'cs redesignated 

25 i\larch 1948 as the Orgamzcd Reser\'e Corps; rcdes1gnated 9 Jul) 1952 as the 

Ann> Reserve.) Reorganized and redesignated 5 ~cptembcr 1950 as the 303d 

Signal Radio Intelligence Company. 

Com·eru~d and redesignated 3 January 1951 as lleadquaners and 

Headquarters Detachmem, 306th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Ordered into active military sen'ice I t\Iay 1951 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 

released from active mll1taf) service 16 t\lay 1955 and reverted to reserve status. 

Inactivated 20 Jul)' 1955 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Activated 6 January 1956 

at Ph1ladelphw. Pennsyl"ania Reorgamzed and redesignated I 4 February 1956 

as lleadquaners and Headquarters Company, 306th Communication 

Reconnaissance Battalion. (Companies A and B constituted 13 !\larch 1956; 

Company B acti\'ated 14 March 1956 at Baltimore, t\1aryland.) Redesignated 3 

September 1956 as the 306th Army ~ecunty Agency Baualion. Inactivated 27 

June 1959 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvama. 

Redesignated 1 r~cbruary 1990 as the 306th Mllnary Intelligence Baualion; 

concurrently withdrawn from the Army Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. 

Headquaners transferred 18 \11ay 1990 to the Unttcd States Arm> lraining and 

Doctnne Command and acuvated at f·on Devens. Massachuscus. 

CA~II',\IGN PARTICIPAIIO' CR! DIT 

World \\'w II 

Asiau<: Pacific Thc:mcr. 'ineamcr wnhout m:,<;npuon 

0ECORt\TION'-

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered PACIFIC 

THEATER (3910th Signal Semce Company cued;(,() 133. Western Pacific Base 

Command, 1 1 November 1945) 
307th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl Of' ARM~ 

Shield: 

Cn:st: 

'vi otto: 

Symbolism: 

Ill RALDIC. 1 rE~IS 

Tierccd in patrlc re,·erscd argent. azure. and gules. on the first 

and second an eagle's head erased coumen.hangcd, and on the 

thml. a key palcwisc, the ward to base. between two clectrontc 

Oashes. one m bend and the other in bendsinister ol the first 

On a wreath of the colors. argent and azure, m front of a wreath 

of laurel or an equilateral triangle point up wnh the points 

barbed gules and charged with a Philippine sun of the third. 

ELLCTROI\IC. FIREPO\\ ER. 

The eagles, known for swiftness, stamina, and keen visiOn, 

together with the key and electronic Oashcs symbolize eternal 

vigtlance and sccurit) All allude to the basic mtsston of the 

organtzation. In addition, the eagles' heads, adapted from the 

civic arms of the cities of Frankfurt am Main and Ludwigsburg 

in Germany. refer to former stations of the baualion 

The crest symbolizes unn awards received by elements of the 

baualion. The wreath of laurel refers to the eight MeritOrious 

Unn C.ommcndauons (Arm)') for service m the Pacific dunng 

World War II, tn Korea, and in Vietnam, and lO the Republic 

of Vtetnam Cross of Gallantr)' with Palm. The triangle and sun 

symbohz:e the Philippmc Prestdcnual Unn Cttauon 

DI<;TINC fiVI UNIT INSI(;NIA 

The distincttve umt msignia is the shtcld and mouo of the coat of arms. 
348 MILITARY INTL:LLIGENCE 

Ll'\EAGL ,\1\D 1-JO\:OR-, 

RA 

LINI:At.F (inactive) 

Constlluted 11 December 195 I 111 the Regular Arm) as Headquarters and 

Headquancrs Detachment, '307th Communicauon Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Activated 27 December 1951 in German)~ Rcorgamzed and redesignated 25 june 

1955 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 307th Communitauon 

Reconnaissance Banal ion (33lst Communicauon Reconnaissance Company [activated 13 july 1942) concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Compan)' A; 

Company B [constitllled 19 May 1955) acuvated 111 Germany). Redesignated 1 

july 1956 as the 307Lh Army Security Agency Battalion. Inactivated 15 OclOber 

1957 m Germany. llcadquancrs and Headquarters Company acuvated 1 july 

1974 111 Germany. (Companies A and B redesignated 2 L September 1978 as the 

33lst and 346th Arm>' Securny Agency Companies-hereafter separate lineages.) 

11cadquaners and Headquarters Company, 307th Army Sccurny Agency 

Baualion. reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1983 as llcadquaners. 

Headquarters and Service Company. 307th Military Intelligence Bauahon ()26th 

Army Secur!ly Agency Company [see ANNE}.. 1) concurrently reorganized and 

redesignated as Company A; 330th Army Security Agency Company [see ANNI:X 21 

redesignated as Company B and acuvated in Germany). Battalion inactivated 15 

December 1991 in Germany. 

ANNr\. 1 

Constilllted 3 April 1942 in the Army of the United States as the !26th 

Signal Radio Intelligence Company. Acllvated 14 August 1942 at Camp Crowder, 

Missouri. Reorganized and redesignated l September 1945 as the !26th Signal 

Service Company 

Converted and redesignated 25 October 1951 as the 326th CommuniCation 

Reconnaissance Company and alloued to the Regular Army. Redesignated I july 

1956 as the 326th Army Security Agency Company. Inactivated 15 October 1957 

tn japan. Acuvated 25 May 1962 at Fort Bragg. North Carohna. lnacti,·atcd I 4 

February l 964 at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Acuvated 23 December 

1968 at Fon Riley, Kansas. lnacti\'atcd 15 April 1970 at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

Acuvmcd 3 Ma) 197 I m Germany. 

ANN£\ 2 

Constituted 26 November 194 3 m the Army of the United States as the 60th 

Signal Radio Intelligence Company. Activated 23 December 1943 at Camp 

Crowder. 1\hssouri. Rcorgantzed and redcstgnatecl 24 l\la) 1945 as the 60th 

Signal Serv1cc Company. 

Convened and redesignated 25 October 1951 as the 3 30th Communication 

Reconnaissance Compan> and alloued to the Regular Army. Redestgnated 1 July 

1956 as the 330th Army Security Agency Company. Inactivated 15 October 1957 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 349 

in Korea. Activated 25 june 1962 at Camp Wolters, Texas. Inacti vated 30 

September 1971 in Vietnam. Activated 5 No,·ember 1973 m German)'. 

tnacuvmed 15 May 1979 m Germany. 

CAMP·\IGN PARTICIPATION C REDIT 

Souchwcst A:.w 

Defense of Saud1 Arabia 

Liber:mon and Defense of Kuwan 

Cease-fire 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

World War 11-AP 

1\:ew Gumea 

Luzon 

Korean Wm 

U'\ Summer-Fall Offensive 

Second Korean \\'inter 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Third Korean Wimer 

Korea. Summer 1953 

Company B additionally entitled to: 

Korean War 

U\J Offens1ve 

CCF lmervenuon 

First UN CoumeroffcnSI\'e 

CCF Spring Offensive 

UN Summer-Fall Offensh·e 

<;econcl Korean \Vmter 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Th1rd Korean W1mcr 

Korea. Summer 1953 

Vrccnam 

Counteroffensive, Phase II 

Coumcroffcnsivc. Phase Ill 

TeL CoumcrofTensJve 

CoumcroffensJ\'e, Phase 1\' 

Counteroffensive, Phase V 

Counteroffensive. Phase Vl 

Tet 69/C.oumeroffcn!il\'1;. 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Wimer "pnng 1970 

'anctuary C.ountcroffcnswc 

CoumcroffensJ,·e, Phase VII 

Consohdanon I 
350 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

DECORATION<., 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embrotdcred ->OUTHWLST 

ASIA (307th Military 1 ntelligcnc.:e Batt<tlion cited; DA GO 34, 1992) 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Strc~mer embroidered PACifiC 

THEATER (!26th Signal Radio lntelltgencc Company cited: GO 166, Unned 

States Army Forces, Paci fie, 14 September 1945) 

Meritorious Unll Commendauon (Arm)), Streamer embrotdcred KOR[A 

(326th Communic~tion Rcconnmssance Company Cttecl; DA GO 22, 1954) 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 19++ 

TO-+ JULY 1945 (l26th Signal Radio lmclligencc Company cncd, DA GO 47, 1950) 

Company B additionally emitlcd to: 

\lcritorious Unn Commcndauon (Army), Streamer embrotdered KOREA 

1950-1951 (330th Communication Reconnaissance Company cited; DA GO 62, 

1952) 

Mcmonous Unn Commendauon (Army). Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1951-1953 (330th Communication Reconnaissance Company cited; DA GO 22. 

195+) 

Mcritonous Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (330th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 

1\leritorious Unn Commendauon (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNA~I 

1968-1969 (330th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Army), Strc~mcr embroidered V!ET'lt\\1 

1969-1970 (330th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Meritorious Unit CommenclaLion (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971 (330th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 32, 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantr) with Palm, Streamer cmbrotdered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (330th Radio Research Compan) cited; DA GO 6, 197+) 
309th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 AR\1':> 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Argent, on a pale emnting m salurc four lighmmg flashes 

azure a key ward to dexter in base, the bow a bears head, or. 

None approved. 

SENTINELS Of SECURITY. 

Teal blue and white arc the colors former!}' used for Army 

Security Agency organizations. The key symbolizes the unit's 

mission, the guarding of security, and the golden bear's head 

on the key represents the state of California, where the unit 

was originally activated. The lightning flashes, symbolic of 

electricity, relate to the importance of electronic communications as part of the unit's functions. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT lN~IGN!A 

The distinctive umt insigma is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
352 

ltNEAGF 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

MILITARY INTELUGENCE 

RA 

(inactive) 

Constituted 31 january 1952 in the Organized Reserve Corps as lleadquaners 

and Headquarters Detachment. 308th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Activated 1 April 1952 at New York, New York. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the Army Reserve.) Reorganized and redesignated 23 janual) 

1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Communication 

Reconnatssance Baualion. Redesignated 1 September 1956 as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 308th Army Security Agency Battahon. Jnacuvated l julr 

1959 at New York, New York. 

Redesignated 1 February 1990 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

308th Military Intelligence Battalion; concurrently withdrawn from the Army 

Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. Redestgnated 17 October 1991 as 

Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, 308th Military Intelligence 

Battalion, and activated in Panama (organic elements concurrent!} consututed 

and activated). Battahon inactivated 16 September 1995 tn Panama. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

Army Supenor Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1993-1994 (308th Military 

Intelligence Baualion cited; DA GO 1, 1996) 
308th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(Ot\T OT AR\IS 

5/urld: 

Crest: 

Mollo. 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC lTEt--1~ 

Per sahire argent and azure, two griffin heads erased respectant of the first. in chief a compass rose gules. 

!\one approved. 

GUARDI1\NS Of AMERICA. 

Oncmal blue IS the pnmary color assoCiated wllh militar)' 

intelligence. The saltirc represents strength and cooperauon. 

The griffms embody v1gilance. alertness. and courage and 

rcnect the unit's motto and m1ss1on. The compass rose alludes 

to the collection. anal)'Sis. and dissemination of infom1mion 

and the worldw1dc capabilities of the unit. 

DhTl:--:UI\'E LNif '""'V'lA 

The d1stinct1ve unit insignia is an adaptation of the shield ol the com of arms 

and incorporates the motto. 
354 

LINEAC.I· 

LINI·AGE AND llONOR~ 

MiliTARY INTELLIGFNCE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 19 September 1952 m the Army Reserve as Headquarters and 

lleadquaners Detachmem, 309th Communication Rcwnnabsancc Battalion 

Acuvated I l\ovember 1952 at Los Angeles, Cahforma. Rcorgamzed .md n:designatcd 25 january 1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 309th 

Commumcauon Reconnaissance Battalion (orgamc clements constituted 29 

December 1955-4 March 1956 and activated l Fcbruary-5 March 1956). 

Redesignated I October 1956 as the 309th Army Sccurtl) Agency Battalion. 

Inactivated 15 july 1959 at Los Angeles, Cali forma. Activated 15 September 1962 

with Headquarters at Bell, Cahforma. (Companies A, B, C. and D reorganized and 

redesignated 15 August 1966 as the 518th, 519th, 520th, and 52lst Arm)' 

Secunt) Agency Companies-hereafter separate lineages.) lleadquaners and 

lleadquaners Company mactivatccl 15 July 1986 at Bell, California. 

Redesignated l february 1990 as Headquarters and lleadquaners Compan), 

309th Military Intelligence Baualion; concurrently wtthdrawn from the Army 

Resen·e and alloued to the Regular Army. llcadquaners transferred L 7 August 

1990 to the United <:>tates Ann> Traimng and Doctrine Command and acti\·ated 

at Fort lluachuca, Arizona. 

CAMPAIC.N PARTICIPAfiON CREDII 

None. 

DLCOR \flO~~ 

None. 
310th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 t\RMS 

Shield: 

c,-esl: 

Motto· 

Symbolrsm: 

lil·RALDIC 1 rEMS 

Azure, two cramps saltirewise argent surmounted by a griffins 

head erased sable, langucd gules. 

None approved. 

ARRECTIS AURIBUS (ALWAYS ON Ti lL ALERT). 

Oriemal blue IS one of the colors associated \dth military 

tntelligence. Black and white symbolize overt and coven operations and the organizatiOn's around-the-clock \'igilancc. The 

griffin embod1es alertness; it ts black, recalling determmation 

and stealth. The unit's collection and exploitation mission is 

highlighted b) the cramps or hooks. The hooks sunulate 

flashes, reprcsentmg speed and combat electronic warfare, 

while alluding to the ability to catch and hold. 

01'->T!NCTIVI UNII INSIC.,Nii\ 

The distincti\'C unit insignia 1s the sh1eld and motto of the coat of arms. 
356 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

LlNEAG( AND llONORS 

RA 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 25 February 1954 in the Army Reserve as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Detach mem, 31 Oth Commumcauon Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Activated l November 1954 at Boston, MassachusetLs. Reorganized and redesignated S February 1956 as Headquarters and Headquarters Compan>. 310th 

Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. Redesignated 1 0 September 1956 as 

Headquaners and Headquarters Company, 310th Army Security Agenq 

Battalion. (SOOth Signal Company (see ANNEX) converted and redestgnated 26 

july 1956 as Company A.) Battalion inactivated 1 july 1959 at Boston , 

Massachusetts. 

Redesignated 1 February 1990 as the 310th Milnary lmelligence Battalion: 

concurrently withdrawn from the Army Reserve and allotted to the Regular Army. 

Acuvated 17 October 1991 in Panama. Inactivated 16 September 1995 111 

Panama. 

ANNEX 

Constituted 24 December 1943 m the Army of the lmued States as the 5th 

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. Activated 2S january 1944 at Camp 

Ritchie, Maryland. Inactivated 25 November 1945 in Germany. 

Redesignated 14 September 194S as the SOOth Mobile Rad1o Broadcasting 

Company and allotted to the Organized Reserve Corps. Activated 27 September 

l94S at Corpus Christi, Texas. lnacm·ated 20 September 1950 at Corpus Christl, 

Texas. Converted and redesignated S November 1950 as the SOOth Signal Radio 

Countermeasure Company. Activated 7 December 1950 at Red Bank, New jerse}. 

(Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the Army Reserve.) 

Reorganized and redesignated 20 March 1953 as the SOOth Signal Company. 

Location changed 17 August 1954 to Fort Monmouth, New jersey. 

CAMPAIGt'-. PARTIC.IPATIO~ CREDIT 

Company A entitled to: 

\Vorld \Var 11-EAME 

Ardennes-Alsace 

DECORATIO'IS 

None. 
3llth MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC. lTEMS 

Azure, a cross quaner-pierced argent and overall two lightning 

bolts in sahire or between in each quarter as many fieurs-dehs of the second; overall a dragon passant gules. 

None approved. 

EYES OF THE EAGLE. 

The checkered field in the colors used for military intelligence 

units, silver gray (white) and oriental blue, suggests the gathering of data to aid in the formulation of military strategy; the 

lightning bolts refer to the use of electronics in the gathering 

operation. The dragon is a reference to senice in Viemam and 

ns scarlet color alludes to awards of the Mentorious Unit 

Commendation (Army). The Oeur-de-lis denote service in 

Europe during World War II. 

DISTINCTIVE UNI r INSIGN!t\ 

The dtsunctive unit insignia is the shteld and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 1 june 1954 m the Regular Army as Headquarters and 

lleadquaners Detachmem, 3llth Communicauon Reconnaissance Battalion. 

Activated 14 june 1954 at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Reorganized and redesignated 16 May 1955 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3llth 

Communication Reconnaissance Battalion (336th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company [activated 6 August 1952] and 359th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company [activated 15 August 1944] concurrently reorganized 

and redesignated as Companies A and B). Redesignated l july 1956 as the 3llth 

Army Security Agenc> Battalion. Inactivated I 8 December 1957 at Camp 

Wolters, Texas. Headquarters and Headquarters Company activated 15 February 

1966 at Fort Wolters, Texas (Companies A and B concurrently disbanded). 

Inactivated 30 june 1971 at Fort llood, Texas. (Companies A and B reconstituted 

21 September 1978 in the Regular Army as the 336th and 359th Army Security 

Agency Compames-hereafter separate lineages.) 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3llth Army Security Agency 

Battalion, redesignated 1 june 1982 as Headquarters, Headquarters and 
358 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Operations Company, 3 I lth Mtlnary Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the 10 1st 

Airborne Division, and activaLcd at Fort Campbell, Kentucky (265th Army· 

Security· Agency Company lc;ee Af\.\.EX II and 101st ~hlnary lntelltgcnce 

Company' lsee ANNEX 21 concurrently reorganized and redesignated as 

Companies A and 13). 

ANNI;X 1 

Constituted 2 March 1967 m the Regular Army as the 265th Am1y Security 

Agency Company. Activated 21 April L 967 at Fort Campbell. Kentucky. Inncuvated 

1 Apnl 1972 m Vietnam. Activated 21 june 1976 at ron Campbell, Kcntuckr 

ANN£":-\ 2 

Constituted 12 july 1944 m the Army of the United States as the l01st 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Acuvated 20 August 19-H in England 

,,,th personnel from prO\'ISional Counter lntelhgencc Corps detachment attached 

to the 10 lst Airborne D1vision. Inactivated 30 November 1945 in France. 

Allotted 7 I ebruarr 1956 to the Regular Army Acll\ a ted 2 '5 \larch 1956 at Fon 

Campbell, Kentucky. Reorga111zed and redesignated 25 January 1958 as the 

10 I st Military Intelligence Detachment Reorganized and n:dcsignated 26 

December 1969 as the lOlst Military lmelligencc Company. Ass1gnccl 21 

September 1978 to the lOlst Airborne Dh·ision. 

CAMPAIC.N PARl ICIPATION CRI;()I I 

'wutlmr't t\<;w 

Dl'kn~ l,r 'audt Araht<l 

Lrbcrauon and Dckn'>l' of Kuwait 

Compan) A addn10nall) entitled to: 

Vrctrwm 

l.ounterolknstve, Pha!:>C Ill 

Tct Countcroflensrn· 

CoumcroiTcnstvc. Ph.tsc IV 

Counterofll:nst\'e Phase\ 

LoumeroHcnst\'e, Phase VI 

Tct 69/Countcrofrcnst\'C 

':>ummer-F.III 1969 

\\'mtcr-Spnng 1970 

'l;nKtuar~ < l)lllllt'rllffcnstw 

Counterofknst\'C. Ph;lse \ II 

C..on-;oli<.l.tlton I 

Consl)lidatwn II 

Cc;l:>e-Ftrc 
LINEAGES AND IIERALDLC DATA 

Company B additionally entitled to: 

\\'mid \Vm l/-I.J\\11 

:-.:om1and} (wnh arrowhead) 

Rhmeland (wnh .mowhead) 

t\rdennc~·Ab.ICe 

Central r:urtlpe 

Vrt•trwm 

Coumcroffrnsrvc. Phase Ill 

Tct C.ountcmflcnsrvc 

Coumcrolfcn~rw. Pha~ IV 

Countcrtlflcn,rn-, l'h<\SC \' 

Coumeroflcnsrvc. Ph.lSC \'I 

Tet 69/Coumerofkn.-;r,·c 

':>ummer-rall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 1970 

Sanctual'} C.ountcn..lf[cnsive 

Countcroffl.'nsr\·e. l'ha:.c \'II 

C.on..;ohdauon I 

Consolidation II 

Dl Cl1RATIONS 

3'59 

Meriwrious Unit Commendation (Anny), Streamer embroidered ::,OUTIIWEST 

A'\IA (Headquarters, llcadquaner~ and Operations Compan)' and C01npan>· A, 

3llth \tilitar> lntclhgcnce Battalion, cncd: DA GO l, 1996) 

Company A addtuonally entitled to· 

Mcritonous Unn Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered \'II 11\lt\f-.1 

1967-1968 (265th Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Am1) ), Streamer embroidered VII l Nt\M 

1969-1970 (26Sth Radio Research Company cited: DA GO 43. 1972) 

\1eritorious L mt Commendation (t\nny). Streamer embroidered VIET\JA\1 

1911-1972 (26'5th Radto Research Company cited: DA (,0 32. 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embrotdcred 

VlrTNAM 1968 (26'5th Radio Research Company cited: DA GO 21, 1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

\ILT'\A~Il968-1969 (265th Radio Research Company cited: DA GO 43, 1970) 

Republic of Vtctnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm. 'ltreamer cmbrotdcrcd 

\1£ T'\AM 1970-1971 (26Sth Radto Re.,earch Company lllcd. DA GO 6. 1974) 

Republic of \ tctnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm. ~treamer embrotdcrcd 

Vll INAM 1971 (265th Radio Research Company cited; DJ\ GO 6, 1974) 

Republic ol Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class . .SuTamcr 

cmbrotdered \II T'\AM 1968-1970 (26Sth Radio Research Company cited, DA 

(j() 48. 1971) 
360 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Company B additionally entitled LO: 

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered BASTOGNL= 

(Counterintelligence Detachment, lOlst Airborne Di"ision, cited; WD GO 17. 

1945) 

French Cr01x de Guerre with Palm, World War ll, Streamer embroidered 

NORMANDY ( LOlst Airborne Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Netherlands Orange Lanyard (lOlst Airborne Dh'ision cited; DA GO 43. 1950) 

Belgian Croix de Guerre 1940 wnh Palm. Streamer embroidered BASTOGNI , 

cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action at Bastogne (lOlst 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 43, 1950, as amended by 

DA GO 27, 1959) 

Belgian Fourragere 1940 (10 I st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment 

cited; DA GO 43, 1950, as amended by DA GO 27, 1959) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for actwn in France and 

Belgium (lOlst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 43. 1950, 

as amended b> DA GO 27, 1959) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1968-1969 (lOlst Militar) Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 43, 

1970) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry wnh Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 197 L (lOlst Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Ch·il Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer 

embroidered VIETNA~1 1968-1970 (101st Mlinary lntelltgence Detachment 

cited; DA GO 48, 1971) 
312th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Argent, on a taeguk proper an ennamed torch palewise in 

front of two lightning flashes salurewtse of the first, on a chtef 

wa\) azure a chess knight argent 

None approved 

SEMPER VERITAS (ALWAYS THE TRUTH). 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors traditionally associated wtth military intelligence. The wavy partition 

alludes to sen·ice m the Pacific during World War ll, the 

tacguk to service in Korea. The crossed flashes refer to the 

umts origin as stgnal and Hs present combat electromc warfare and intelligence function The torch is a symbol of truth 

and renects the motto and the mission of the unit. The chess 

knight, a piece that can move covcnly, further symbolizes 

the military intelligence mission. 

Dl'>Tit'-:CTIVE U\IIT l"\SIGNIA 

The distinctive unn msignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LIN CAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 31 December 194 3 in the Army of the l...nHed States as the 23d 

Signal Construction Battalion. Activated 10 February L 944 at Camp Pickett, 

Vtrgmia. Reorganized and redesignated 24 April 1944 as the 23d Signal Light 

Construction Baualion. Reorganized and redesignated 21 August 1944 as the 23d 

Stgnal Heavy Construction Battalion. Inactivated 22 january 1946 at Fort 

Lawton, Washington. Redesignated 27 September 1951 as the 23d Signal 

Construction Battalion and alloued to the Regular Army. Activated 2 November 

1951 in Korea. lnacuvated 15 Ma)' 1953 in Korea. 

Convened and redesignated 19 May 1955 as the 312th Commumcmion 

Reconnaissance Baualion. Headquarters and Headquarters Company activated 25 

June 1955 in Germany. Battalion redesignated 1 july 1956 as the 312th Army 

Security Agenc> Battahon. Headquarters and Headquarters Company inactivated 

15 October 1957 in Germany. 

312th Arm> Security Agenc) Battahon redesignmed 1 October 1981 as the 

312th Military Intelligence Battalion, assigned to the l st Cavalry Division, and 
362 ~1lllTARY INTELLIGENCr: 

actl\'ated at I on Hood , Texas (37 1 st Arm) ~ccunty Agency Company ]sec 

ANNFX 1] concurrently consolidated with Company A; 191 st Military Intelligence 

Compan)' [sec t\N'\!EX 2] consolidated w1th Company B) 

Af''\!l '{ 1 

Constituted 1 I May 1962 in the Regular Army as Company C, 313th Army 

Security AgenC} Battalion Activated 25 l\lay 1962 at Two Rock Ranch Station, 

California. Reorganized and redesignated 15 Ot:tober 1966 as the 3 71 st Army 

~cwnty AgeiK)' Company. 

A~t\IX 2 

Constit utcd 25 September 1950 m the Regular Army as the 191 st Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachmcm. Activmcd 6 October I 950 in Korea. Inactivated 

24 june 1956 in Korea. Activated 15 October 1957 in Korea. Reorg.mized and 

redesignated 15 ~1a) 1959 as the 19lst Mdnary lntclhgencc Detachment. 

Reorgamzed and redesignated 26 Decem bcr 1969 as the 191 st Mi lilary 

Intelligence Company. Inactivated 15 August 1972 in Vietnam. Activated 21 June 

1975 at Fort llood, Texas Assigned 2 july 1977 to the 1st Cavalr)' Dl,·ision. 

C..A\1PAIG:-. PARI ICJI>ATIO'-< CREDIT 

\Vorlcl War II 

Asmll' 1\~etf'ic Thc.lll'f, Streamer wtthout tnscnpllon 

Ktllc:anWm 

Li\ -.ummcr-Fall Offcn.,tn~ 

Second Korean W1ntcr 

Korc;l '>ummer-Fall 19';2 

Thtrd Korean \\'tntcr 

.),>udm .:sr ·hill 

Dden'>t' of Saudt Arahta 

Llbcmuon and Dcfen~c or Kuw;,ttt 

Companr t\ addnionall) entitled to. 

\'trtnam 

Defcnsl 

Countcrorfcnsivc 

C.ountcrolrcnsh·c. Pha~c II 

Countcrollensiw. Ph;tsc Ill 

[Ct (.ounto.:roffen~l\'C 

Countcmfrenstve, Ph<l>C !\' 

Coumcmrfenstw, Pha~c \ 

Counterl)ffcnsin'. Ph.tsc \ 'I 

Tet 69/Counteroffcnm<: 

Summer-Jail 196\/ 

Wintn '>pring 1970 

Sanctu.tr, Countcrdlcnstvc 

Counteroffensive, Phase \ ll 
Lli\EAGCS AND HERALDIC DATA 

Company B additionally emnlcd to. 

1\1!11'<111 \\ell 

L N Offcnstve 

C C. 1• lntcrvenuon 

hN UN Coumcroffenstve 

C. Cl \pnng Offensi\·c 

\'r<tndm 

Defense 

ountcroffenstve 

C\lUntervffenstw. PhJsc II 

Countcroffenstve, Phase Ill 

I ct Counteroffenstve 

C. ountcroffensi\·e. Phase IV 

Counteroffensive, Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase VI 

lt•t 69/Counteroffcnstvc 

Summrr-Fall 1969 

\\'tmcr-Spnng 1970 

'-Jncwary Countcroffcn~t\·c 

Countcroffenst\'C, Phase \'II 

Consolidation I 

Lonsoltdauon II 

Ccasc-Ftrc 

DI·U )Rt\T ION!:> 

363 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST 

ASIA (312th Military lmelligencc Battalion dted; DA GO 27, 1994) 

Compan}' A additionall)' entitled to. 

Presidential Unit Cuation (Arm}), Streamer embrOJclcred PI riKL: PROVl:-.:cc 

(1Oth Radio Research Unit ctted; DA GO 40. 1967) 

Prestdentlal Unit Cnation (Army), Streamer cmbrotdered BII\H THUAt'\ 

PRO\ lNCL (37lst Radio Research Unit cited; DA GO 2, 1973) 

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered FISII !lOOK (3 7lst Radio 

Research Company cited; Dt\ GO 43, 1972) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1965 1966 (I Oth Radio Research Unn cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

t\1ernorious Unit Commendauon (Armr). Streamer embrOidered VIETNA\.1 

1967 11.)68 (37lst Radio Research Companr cited; DA GO 28, 1969) 

Mcrnorious Umt Commcndauon (Aml}'), Streamer embrotdcred \'lET'!t\\1 

1968- 1969 (3 71 st Radio Research Com pan> cited: DA GO 51 . 1971) 

\kntonous Unit Commcndauon (Army), Streamer embrOidered \'!ET:-.:AM 

1969-1970 (371st Radio Rc!;;carch Compan> cited; DA GO 43. 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of C.allanLry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

Vlr:INJ\t--1 1965-1969 (371sL Rad1o Research Company cited; D/\ GO 59, 1969, as 

amended b) DA GO 43, 1970) 
364 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1969-1970 (37lst Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 42, 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (37lst Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 42, 1972, 

and DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer 

embroidered VIETNAM 1969-1971 (37lst Radio Research Company cited; DA GO 

42, 1972, and DA GO 6, 1974) 

Company B addlllonally entttled to: 

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered PLEIKU PROVINCE 

(19lst Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 40, 1967) 

Valorous Unit Award, SLrcamer embroidered FISH HOOK (l9lst Military 

Intelligence Company cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(l9lst Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 53, 1952) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotdered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (19lst Military Intelligence Detachment cned; DA GO 17, 1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1965-1969 (19lst Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 59, 

1969) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1969-1970 (191st Mthtary Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 42, 

1972, as amended by DA GO 11 , 1973) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (191st Military Intelligence Company cited; DA GO 42, 

1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1971-1972 (19lst Milnary Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 54, 

1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer 

embroidered VIETNAM 1969-1970 (19lst Military Intelligence Company cited; 

DA GO 42, 1972) 
313th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(Snow Owl) 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

1 {CRALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, a fcss cheeky argent and tenne, overall a mullet of six 

points of the second. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a dragon passam gules garnished or in front of a mount vert impaled 

with twelve bamboo spikes proper, the dragon's tail interlaced with the spikes. 

SA VOIR C'EST POUVOIR (KNOWLEDGE IS POWER). 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) allude to military intelligence. The colors orange and white refer to the organization's former afriliauon with the Signal Corps, and the points 

of the mullet allude to the unit's decorations for World War 

ll and Vietnam. 

The dragon, symbolic of alertness and readiness, denotes the 

unit's service as an Army Security Agency battalion in 

Vietnam. The mount refers to the lush terram of that country 

and the spikes to the number of campaigns in which the unit 

pan ici pated. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia ts the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
366 

LINEAGE 

LINFAGE AND HONOR'> 

MILITARY INTEl LICENCE 

RA 

(acti\'e) 

Constnuted ll ~lay 19-+2 111 the Arm} of the Unned States as the 21 5th 

Signal Depot Company. Activated 2 5 September I 942 at Camp L1vmgston, 

Louisiana. lnact ivated 18 November 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New jersey. 

Converted and redesignated 21 April 1955 as Headquarters and 

llcadquaners Company. 311th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion, and 

allotted to the Regular Army Activated 16 ~la> 1955 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina (358th Commumcauon Reconnaissance Company [see A'\ '\I~ II and 

337th Commumcauon Reconnaissance Compan} lacuvated 6 August 19521 concurrently reorgamzed and redesignated as Compamcs A and B) Redesignated 1 

july 1956 as the 313th Army Security Agency Baualion. lnaclivated 18 December 

1957 at Fort Bragg, Nonh Carolina. Activated 25 May 1962 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. (Company A reorganized and redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 

358th Army Security Agenq Com pan} [see A '\\lf \ II. Compames Band C concurrently reorgamzed and redesignated as the 337th and 371 st Ann} Security 

Agency Compames-hereafter separate lineages.) 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3 I 1th Army Sccur11 y t\gcncy 

Battalion, reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1979 as lleaclquancrs and 

Headquarters Company. 313th Military Intelligence Battalion, and ass1gned to the 

82d Airborne Dl\ ision (358th Arm} Securit]' AgcnC) Com pan} [sec t\"\'\E~ II 

and 82d M1htal) Intelligence Company [sec A'\ '\L>-. 21 concurrently rcorgamzed 

and redes1gnmcd as Companies A and B). 

ANNEX 1 

Consututcd 10 june 19++ in the Army of the Unned States as the 319lst 

Signal Sen1cc Companr Acli\ated 20 june 1944 at Camp Cro,,dcr ~lissouri. 

Inactivated 25 October 1945 111 the Philippine Islands 

Con"encd and redesignated 25 April 1951 as the 358th Communication 

Reconnmssance Company and allollcd to the Regular Army. Activated 15 May 

1951 at Fon Devens, Massachuscus. Reorganized and redesignated 16 May 1955 

as Company A, 3l3th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. Redesignated I 

july 1956 as Company A. 313th t\nn> Securit} Agency Battalion ln.tcuvated 18 

December 1957 at ron Bragg. '.onh Carolina. Acll\atcd 25 \lay 1962 .u Fort 

Bragg, North Carohna. Reorgan1zed and redesignated 15 Octoher 1966 as the 

358th Army ~ccurit} Agenc}' Companr 

ANNEX 2 

Constituted I 2 july 194-+ 111 the Arm} of the lmtcd ~tntes as the 82d Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. t\ctl\ atcd 20 August 19-+4 in England wnh personnel from prons1onal Counter lntclhgcnce Corps detachment attached to the 82d 

A1rbome DiYision. Allotted 3 l~ebruary 1949 to the Regular Armr Rc<)rgamzcd and 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 367 

redesign::ued 25 january 1958 as the 82d Militar)' Intelligence Detachment 

Rcorgamzed and redesignated 11 November 1970 as the 82d ~11lllaf) lmelhgencc 

Company. Ass1gned 21 june 1978 to the 82d Airborne Division. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION (RFDIT 

World \\ ar II 

1\omund} (w!lh arnmhead) 

Nonhcm France 

Rhmehmd 

Ardcnncs-Aisace 

Central Europe 

\'ietnam 

Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Ph.lst• II 

Countl'roffensive, PhaM' Ill 

Tct Counteroffensi\'C 

Countl'roffensivc. Phase IV 

Counteroffensiw, Pha~ \ 

C.ounu:roffcnst\'C, Pha~ \'I 

let 69/C.t1lltl1Croffcns!Ve 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spring 1970 

Sanctuarr Coumeroffcns1w 

Counteroffensive. Ph<lSC VII 

Armed Forus Exprdltwns 

Domm1can Republic 

Grenada 

Southwest 'hill 

Defense of Saudi Arah1a 

Ubaatwn and Defense of Kuwa!l 

Company A additionally cnutled to: 

World \\'w 11-AP 

LUZ1.1ll 

Armed Fmus Exf't:dltiorh 

P.mama ( w11h arrt)whcad) 

DECORATION'> 

Mernonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered FRANCI 

19++ (215th S1gnal Depot Company CJLcd; GO 10, rm>t Arm)'. 17 Januaf)' 1945) 

\kmonous Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered \'IETNA\1 

1966-1967 Ol3th Radio Research Battalion ciled; DA CO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (lleadquancrs and Headquarters Compan). 113th Radio ResearLh 

Baualion cited: DA GO 28. 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIET'\!t\M 

1968-1969 (I !eadquancrs and Headquarters Company, 3l3th Radio Research 

Baualion cited: DA GO 51 , 1971) 
368 MILITARY lNTELLIGENCF 

Meritonous Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (313th Radio Research Battalion cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1971 (313th Rad10 Research Battalion ctted; DA GO 32, 1973) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST 

ASIA (313th Military lntelligence l3aualion cited; DA GO 27, 1994) 

French Croix de Guerre with Palm, World War II, Streamer embroidered 

NORMANDY BEACHES (Detachments, 215th Signal Depot Company, cited; DA 

GO 43, 1950) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (313th Radio Research Baualion cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Company A addnionally entilied to: 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 

1944 TO 4 JULY I945 (319lst Signal Service Company cited; DA GO 47, 1950) 

Cvmpany B additionally entitled to: 

Military Order of William (Degree of the Knight of the Fourth Class), 

Streamer embroidered NIJMEGE\1 (82d A1rborne DivisiOn cited; DA GO 43. 

1950) 

Netherlands Orange Lanyard (82d Airborne Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Belgian Fourragere 1940 (82d Airborne Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Da)' of the Belgian Army for action in the Ardennes 

(82d Airborne Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in Belgium and 

Germany (82d Airborne Division cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action llonor Medal, First Class, Streamer embrOIdered VIETNAM 1968 (82d Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 48, 

197 L) 
314th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARto-IS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symholrsm: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Argent, wnhin a cross quarter-pierced azure the device from 

the llag of Okinawa proper; on a chief wavy sable a dagger 

and a key wards up saltirewise of the first. 

That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Army 

Reserve. On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (ll. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachusetts. 

SAPICNTLA ET VERITAS (WISDOM AND TRUTII). 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence. The red and white 

Okinawa symbol represents the unit's service in the Pacific. 

The blue and white squares simulate a chessboard and allude 

to strateg) in gathenng intelligence mformation. Black implies 

covert operations, while the silver key and sword refer to 

securing information for military aclivities. Black and white 

also signify day and night operations. 

DISTINCTIH UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit rnsignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 
370 tvllUTARY INTELLIGENCl 

Lli\EA(,L AI\D HONOR$ 

AR 

LINI AGE (active) 

Constituted 14 December 19++ in the Arn1} of the Umtcd States as the 314th 

Headquarters Intelligence Detachment. Activated 27 r·ebruary 1945 in the 

Philippine Islands. Inactivated 25 March 194 7 in Korea. AI lolled 20 April 1948 

to the Organ1zed Re<;ene Corps. Acthated 21 t\.lay 1948 at Boston, 

t-.lassachuseus lnacth mcd 30 june 1950 at Boston, t-.1assachuseus. 

Redesignated I 0 August 1950 as lleaclquancrs, 3l4th Military Intelligence 

Baualton. Activated 30 August 1950 at Cleveland, Ohio. (Organized Reserve Corps 

redesignated 9 july 1952 as the Army Reserve ) lnacti\'atecl I Apnl 195 3 at 

Cb·cland, Ohio. Redesignated 16 September 1988 as Headquaners, llcadquaners 

and Service Company, 314th Military Intelligence Baualion, and aclivated at 

Detroit, Michigan (organic clements concurrently constituted and activated). 

C\l\IPAIGi\ PARTICIPATION CREDil 

World War II 

Ryukyu~ 

DLCORATIO'l'-

None. 
319th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAr OF ARMS 

Sl!idd: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERA! OIC (THIS 

Per pale azure and or, a Korean t~mple coumerchanged, a 

potnt quanered argent and sable. 

None approved. 

HOSTEM COGER[ (CONFINE THC ENEMY). 

Oncntal blue ts one of the colors used for military intelligence 

units; gold is S)•mbohc of knowledge and insight. The Korean 

temple represents the unit's decorations and service in the 

PaCific area. The black and while quartered base is taken from 

the arms of the Cll) of Bad Schwalbach 111 Germany,\\ here the 

organization was acuvatcd. 

Dt'-ol INCTIVI:. UNIT IN'-oi<.,NIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mollo of the coat of arms. 

RA 

lJI\;L:AGE (acll\'e) 

Constituted 14 July 1945 in the Army of the United Stales as the 319th 

llcaclquaners Intelligence Detachment. Activated I August 1945 in G('rmany. 

Inactivated 31 October 1946 in Germany. Redestgnatcd 20 December 1946 as 

the 319th Militar> Intelligence Compan)'· Activated 30 December I 946 in 

Japan Reorgantzed and redesignated 1 September 1952 as the 319th t>.1t1Har)' 

lmelltgence Sen·ice Company and alloucd to the Regular Army. lnaCU\'ated 28 

March 1954 in japan. 

Redesignated 14 january 1955 as the 319th Military Intelligence Baualion. 

Activated 7 March 1955 at Fort George G. Meade, Mar)•land. Reorganized and 

redesignated 25 january 1958 as Headquaners and Headquarters Compan). 319th 

\hlttal)· lmelligcncc Baualion. (162d \lthtal)' lmelhgence Company !sec A:'\l\lX II 

rcorgamzed and redesignated 13 Jul> 1959 as Com pan} A.) Battalion macll\ atcd 

15 f-ebruary 1968 at Fort Shafter, Hawati. Activated I Apnl 1982 at Fort Bragg. 

North Carolina (.336th Army Securny Agency Companr lsee ANNEX 21 concurrcmlr reorganized and redesignated as Company B). 

,\\;\;[;:\ 1 

Constituted 5 Apnl 1945 m the Army of the L..nncd States as the I 62d 

Language Detachment. Activated 2'3 Apnl 1945 in the Philippine Islands. 
372 MILITARY INTELLIGENCf 

Inactivated I 0 February 1946 tn japan. Redcstgnated 14 Januar) 1955 as the 

162d Military I ntelligencc PlatOon and allouecl to the Regular Army. Activated 7 

March 1955 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Reorganized and redesignated 

25 Januat) 1958 as the I 62d Military lntelhgencc Company. 

ANNI:X 2 

Constituted I july 1952 in the Regular Army as the 336th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company. Acuvated 6 August 1952 at ron De\'ens, 

Massachusetts. Reorganized and redesignated 16 May 1955 as Company t\, 

3l l th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. Redesignated l july 1956 as 

Company A, 3llth Army Security Agency Banalion. Inactivated 18 December 

195 7 at Camp Wolters, Texas. Dtsbanded 15 l·ebruary 1966. Reconstituted 2 I 

September 1978 in the Regular Army as the 336th Army Security Agency 

Company. Activated 16 September 1979 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

CA\1J>AJGN P·\Rl ICIPATIOl\J CREDIT 

::>CJw hwesl A \Ill 

Defense of Saud1 Amlm 

Ubcrauon and Odcno;c of Kuwan 

Company A addnionally entitled to. 

Wmld Wm /l-AP 

Luzon 

Armed Fore(·~ bpt'dition' 

Panama 

DI·CORATION~ 

Meritonous Unit Commendauon (Arm}), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(319th Military Intelligence Service Company Cited; DA GO 22, 1954) 

Metitorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWES-1 

ASIA (319th Military Intell igence Battalion cited: OA GO 14, 1993) 

Company A addttionall)' entilled to 

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBI·R 

1944 TO 4JULY 1945 (l62cl Language Detachment cited; DA GO 47, 1950) 
32lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

0:one approved. 

liNEAGE AND HONOR~ 

AR 

LINEAGE (inactive) 

Constituted 14 july 1945 in the Army of the United States as the 32lst 

Headquarters Intelligence Detachment and activated m Gem1any. Inactivated 30 

November 1946 in Germany. Alloucd 12 February 194 7 to the Orgamzed 

Reserves. Activated 26 February 194 7 at Chicago, Illinois. (Organized Reserves 

redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Orgamzed Reserve Corps; redestgnated 9 july 

1952 as the Anny Reser\'c.) Inactivated 31 December 1948 at Chtcago, Illinois 

Activated 24 March 1949 at Chicago, Illinois. 

Reorganized and redesignated 24 October 1950 as Headquarters, 321 st 

Military Intelligence Battalion. Inactivated 1 March 1953 at Chicago, Illinois. 

Redesignated 13 February 1996 as Hcadquaners, Headquarters and Service 

Company, 32lst Military Intelligence Banahon (orgamc elements concurrently 

constituted). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICLPATIO'- CREDIT 

None 

DECORATIONS 

None 
323d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERALDIC II LMS 

None approved. 

Ll'\JEA<..o[ Al\;0 HO'\;ORS 

AR 

LiNt:AGE (inactive) 

ConstiLUtcd 15 March 1968 111 the Regular Arm} as the 19th t\tilitary 

lntdhgencc Baualion and acuvatcd 111 Germany. lnacuvatcd 20 March 1969 111 

Germany. 

Redesignmcd 13 February 1996 as Headquarters and lleadquancrs Company. 

323d Military lntelhgencc Bauahon, withdrawn from the Regular Arm). and allotted to the Army Resen·e (organic elements concurrently constituted). 

CAMPAIGN Pt\RTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

01'C ORATIONS 

None. 
325th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERt\l DIC !THIS 

None approved. 

LlNI:A<.,f' AND HONORS 

AR 

lr"-I.AGE (macuve) 

Constiluted 14 July 1945 in the Army of the Unncd States as the 325th 

lleadquaners Intelligence Detachment and activated in Germany. Inactivated 30 

November 1946 m Germany. Allotted 7 February I 94 7 to the Organ tzed 

Reserves. Activated 24 February 194 7 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Organized 

Reserves redesignated 25 March I 948 as the Organized Reserve Corps; redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Arm)' Rcscn·e.) Reorganized and redesignated 30 

September 1949 as lleadquarters, 325th Military Imelhgence Platoon 

Reorganized and redesignated 21 june 1950 as Headquarters, 325th t-.tthtary 

lntclhgcnce Bauahon. Inactivated I April 1953 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Redesignated 13 February 1996 as llcadquaners. l leadquarters and 5,c rvice 

Company, 325th Military lmelligcnce Baualion (organtc clements concurrently 

constituted). 

CAMPA!Gl\. PARTICIPAliON CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
326th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

Per fess or and cheeky sable and argent on a pile m pomt 

party per fess azure and of the first an eagle's head couped of 

the thirdlangued gules. 

None approved. 

FROM INTELLIGENCE ACTION. 

Oriental blue ts one of the colors used for military intelligence 

units. The eagle's head with piercing eye representing vigilance, keenness of vision, and swiftness of purpose symbolizes 

the anributes mherent m the baste miSSIOn of the organtzation. The checkered area alludes tO secrecy and compartmentalized information and, together with the inverted triangle 

formed from the heraldic pile, is indicath·e of the penetrative 

methods m the gathering of mtelligence. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and the motto of the coat of arms. 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 377 

Ll~EAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

L!"'EAG[ (acth·e) 

Constituted 24 November 1967 in the Army Reserve as the 826th Military 

Intelligence Battalion. Activated 31 january 1968 with lleadquaners at Hartford, 

Connecticut Location of Headquarters changed ll October 1969 to Cromwell, 

Connecticut (Company C ordered into active mihtar) service 2+ March 1970 at 

Fort HamtlLOn, New York; released from active military service 26 March 1970 

and reverted to reserve staLUs.) (Organic elements inactivated 16 September 

1980.) Location of Headquarters and Headquarters Compan) changed 1 

September J 981 to East \\'indsor, Connecticut. Headquarters and Headquarters 

Compan) inactivated 15 September 1987 at East Windsor, Connecticut. 

Battahon redesignated 1 November 1994 as the 326th Military Intelligence 

Battalion; concurremly withdrawn from the Army Reserve and alloued to the 

Regular Arm) Headquarters transferred 1 December 1994 to the Umted States 

Army Traming and Doctnne Command and activated at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None 
337th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(.OAT 01 ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest· 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

H ERA I DIC lTL MS 

Argent, four Oashes issuant from dexter chief, sinister chief, 

dexter base, and smtster base com·ergem in fess point azure, a 

dagger point up proper, blade and pommel argent, grip gules, 

guard and garnish or winged sable. 

That for the regiments and separate battaltons of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Mi nuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common 111 Lexington, Massachusetts. 

COLLECT EXPLOIT INFORM. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with militar} 

mtelligence units. The Oashes, alludmg to speed and electronics, com·crg<\ emphasizing the collection and assimilation of 

information from all sources. They underscore the electronic 

warfare and signals mtelltgence capabilities of the unn. The 

winged dagger symbolizes the intelligence role in total military 

preparedness while characterizing the diverse mission and 

functions of the battalion 

DI5TINCTIVL UNI I INSIGNIA 

The dtstinctivc unit instgnia is the shteld and motto of the coat of arms. 
Lll\FAGES AND HfRALDIC DATA 

LINEAC,l: 1\ND HONORS 

379 

AR 

(active) 

Consututed 14 ~lay 1948 m the Organized Resen·c Corps as the 337th 

I leadquarters Intelligence Detachment. Activated 2 june 1948 at New York, 

Ne"" York. 

Reorganized and redesignated 6 july 1950 as Headquarters, 337th Military 

Intelligence Battalion. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the 

Arm) Reserve.) Inactivated 20 February 1953 at New York, New York. 

Redestgnated 1 6 ~cptembcr 1988 as I leadquaners, Headquarters and Service 

Company, 337th Mtlttarr lmelligencc 13aualton, and acuvatcd at Charloue, North 

Carolina (organic clements concurrently consllluted and acuvated). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPI\IION CREDil 

None. 

Dl CORt\TIO:\~ 

None. 
338th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01 A&\tS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo· 

Symbolism: 

llrRALDIC ITEMS 

Argent, an oval sphere azure gridlined of the field, overall a 

key wards up palewise of the last superimposed by a sphinx's 

head or garnished sable: on a chief embauled sable two flashes 

salLirewise gules. 

That for the regunems and separate battalions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common m Lexmgton, Massachusetts. 

INVENI ET uSURPA (FIND AND EXPLOIT) 

Oriental blue tS one of the colors associated with military 

intelligence. The embattled division of the shield signifies 

defense and milnary preparedness, while black and whne suggest night and day capabdities. The globe denotes the farreaching scope of the unit's tmssion. The key symboltzes security; the sphinx alludes to vigilance and strength. The red 

flashes indicate speed and action while representing electronic. 

communicauons and technolog> 

DlSTINc.TIVE UNIT IN SIG~ IA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of elements of the shield and motto of 

the coat of arms. 
LINEAGES AND liERALDIC DATA 

LINEAGE Al\,0 HONORS 

LINEAC,f 

381 

AR 

(active) 

Conslltuted 14 May 19-l-8 in the Organized Reserve Corps as the 338th 

Headquarters Imelhgence Detachment. Activated 2 June 1948 at New York, New 

York. Reorganized and redesignated 6 july 1950 as lleadquancrs, 338th Military 

lntelhgence Company. Ordered into active militar)' service ll September 1950 at 

New York. New York. Reorganized and redesignated 7 December 1950 as the 

338th Military Intelligence Service Company. 

Reorganized and redesignated l November 1951 as the 338th Military 

Intelligence Service Battalion. (Organized Resen·e Corps redesignated 9 July 

1952 as the Army ReserYe.) Reorganized and redestgnated 14 December 1953 as 

the 338th Military Lntelhgence Baualion. Released from active military service 7 

March 1955 and revened to reserve status. Inactivated 8 March 1955 at New 

York, \Jew York. Redestgnated 16 September 1988 as Headquarters, 

Headquaners and Service Company, 338th Militar> lmelligence Baualton, and 

activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (organic elements concurremly 

constituted and activated). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDI f 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
34lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT 01' i\RMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symlmlrsm: 

HERAI DIC lTL'v1S 

Per bend argent and azure, a lightning bolt bcndwise throughout or between a St)•lized representation of the Rosella Stone 

of the like detailed sable and an open book of the third 

leathered of the fourth surmounted in saltire by a qUJll gold 

and a sword pomt down of the last gnp sable. 

That for the regtments and separa te baualions of the 

Washington Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors. 

or and azure, a ra,·cn with wings endorsed tssuing out of a 

ducal coronet all proper. 

VlGll..ANTIA ET VALOR (VIGilANCE AND VALOR). 

Oriental blue and stlver gray are the colors traditionally associated wnh mtlitary intelltgcnce. The lightnmg bolt denotes 

swiftness of action and accuracy. The Rosetta Stone indicates 

the unit's role as a linguist intelligence baualion. The book 

and quill symboltzc knowledge, and the sword represents 

the unit's combat role. 

DISTI~C TI\T UNll IN"'GNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of clements of the shield, crest, and 

motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEA(,! AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

ARNG 

(Washington) 

Orgamzed and federally recognized 2 December 1989 in the Washmgton 

Army National Guard as the 34lst Military Intelligence Baualion with 

Headquarters at Seaulc. Locauon ollleadquaners changed l ~1arch 1990 to Fort 

Lewis; changed J March 1992 to Kent; changed 1 September 1993 to Poulsbo. 

I lome Area· Statewide. 

CAMPAIGN PARTI(.IPATION CRLDIT 

None. 

Dr CORATIONS 

None. 
344th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl 01 AR~tS 

SIHrlcl: 

Crest: 

Motte> 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Argent on a saltire celeste a key ward up bcndwtsc smister 

surmounted by two pikes benclwisc or. 

None approved. 

SILENT ~ENTINEL 

Oriental blue and sih-cr gray arc the colors used for mthtarr 

intelligence The key, symbol for security and secrecy, and the 

pikes, weapons used by sentries in the Mtddlc Ages, symboltze the baste mission of the organization. 

DISTIN( liVE UNII IN'\!GN!A 

Dncriptwn: A gold color metal am! enamel device consisting of a gold key, 

ward slanted upward to nght bchmd the shafts of two ptkes; 

all encircled by a conunuous oval-shaped scroll passing 

through the bow of the key, behind the pike heads, keyward 

and over the pike staffs and bearing the inscription in black 

letters SILENT SENTI\lEL. 

Symbolism: The key, symbol for security and secrecy, and the ptkes, 

weapons used by sentries in the Middle Ages. symbolize the 

baste missiOn of the organization. The shape of the bow of the 

key and the two ptkes further stmulates the numerical designation of the organization. 
384 

ltNEAGI:: AND 1 lONORS 

LINLAGE 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 5 November 1962 in the Army Reserve as the }44th Army 

Security Agency Company. Acuvatcd 28 February 1963 at Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. Reorganized and redesignated 15 April 1966 as Headquarters and 

Headquarters Compan), 344th Army Security Agency Battalion. lnacuvated 31 

january 1968 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Redesignated l February 1990 as lleadquaners and Headquarters Company, 

344th Mihtary Intelligence Baualion, concurrently withdrawn from the Army 

Reserve and alloucd to the Regular Army. Headquarters transferred 25 May 1990 

to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command and acuvated at 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

Army Superior Unil Award, Streamer embroidered 1990-1991 (344th \1ilitary 

Intelligence Battalton cited; DA GO 34, 1992) 
345th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

None appro,·ed. 

LINEAGF 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

LINEAC,E AND HONORS 

AR 

(inactive) 

Constituted 3 October 1950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

Headquarters, 345th Miluary lmclhgence Battalion. Activmed 24 October 1950 

at Minneapolis, Minnesota. Location changed L May 1952 to Fort Snelling, 

Minnesota (Orgamzed Reserve Corps redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Arm) 

Reserve.) Inactivated 1 March 1953 at Fon Snelling. Minnesota. Redesignated 8 

August 1995 as lleadquaners, lleadquaners and Service Company, 345th 

Mtlnary Intelligence Battalion (organic elements concurrently constituted). 

CAMPAIGN PARTIC.IPATION CREDIT 

None 

Dl'CORATIO'% 

None 
368th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

llERAI DIC li'EMS 

None approved. 

LINLAGE AND HO~OR'> 

AR 

ltNEAGL (inacti,•e) 

Constituted 20 September 19 50 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

llcadquaners. 368th Military lmelligence Battalion. Acunued I October 1950 at 

Los Angeles, California. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 July 1952 as 

the Army Reserve .) Inactivated 1 Fcbruar) 1953 at l.os Angeles. California. 

Redesignated 8 August 1995 as I Icadquarters. Headquarters and Service 

Company. 368th Military lntclhgence Battahon (orgamc clements concurrently 

constituted). 

CAMPA!(,\! PARTICIPAfiOt'-. CREDII 

None. 

OL:CORAI'ION'. 

None. 
373d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT or AR~I<; 

Shidcl: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, a plate charged with a key ward to chief sable and a 

lightning nash or saltirewisc upon a sunburst argent interlaced 

with a laurel wreath vert, overall m base a dagger, blade, hilt, 

and pommel or, grip gules. 

That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor). stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachusetts. 

COLLECT SUPPORT DEfEND. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with milttary 

intelligence. The plate, symbolizing the earth, recalls the 

worldwide mission of mtlitary intelligence; the sunburst 

behind it is adapted from the mtlnary mtelligence branch 

insignia. The wreath stands for honor, the key for security, 

and the lightning nash for speed. The dagger recalls the danger of the military intelligence misston. 

DISTINCTIVE l 1NIT lN<;JC,NIA 

The distinctive unit insignia consists of elements of the shield and motto of 

the coat of arms. 
372d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

'\lone appro,·ed. 

LINEAl,r 

HERA I DIC ITEMS 

LINEAGE AND HONOR~ 

AR 

(inactive) 

Constituted 2 1\.o\ ember 1950 in the Organ1zed Rescn e Corps as 

lleadquancrs, 372d Mtlitary Intelligence Battalion. Acttvatcd 15 November 1950 at 

Boston, Massachusetts. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 j uly 1952 as the 

Army Reserve.) Inactivated 28 February 1953 at Boston, Massachuseus. 

Redesignated 28 March 1996 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, 

372d t>.1tlital) Intelligence Bauahon (orgamc elements concurrent!) constituted). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATION~ 

None. 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 389 

LINEAGE AND HONOR'> 

AR 

LINEAGE (active) 

Constituted l December 1950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

Headquarters, 373d Military lmelligence Baualion. Activated 20 December 1950 

at Berkeley, California. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the 

Army Reserve.) Inactivated I February 1953 at Berkeley, California. Redestgnated 

l6 September 1988 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Servtce Company. 373d 

Military Intelligence Battalion, and acuvated ar Oakland, California (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPAT!Ot--. CRLDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
376th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERALDIC ll f MS 

None approved. 

LI'-<EAGC J\ '\!D HO"-.ORS 

AR 

L!NEJ\<.,L (inactive) 

Constituted 19 jul> 1950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as Headquarters, 

376th Military Intelligence Group. Activated l August 1950 at Dallas. Texas. 

(Organized Rcsen·e Corps redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Arm) Reserve.) 

lnacuvmcd 2 3 Febntal) 1953 at Dallas, Texas. 

Redesignated 28 March 1996 as Headquarters, lleadquaners and Service 

Company. 376th tl.lilitar)' Intelligence Baualion (organic elemems concurrently 

consututecl). 

CA\IPAIGI\: PARTICIPATIO!'; CRI DIT 

None. 

DECORATION'-. 

None. 
377th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HE-RALDIC ITEMS 

None approved. 

LINEAGr Ai\.D HOKORS 

AR 

LiNLAvE (inactive) 

Constituted 30 August 1950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

lleadquaners. 377th Military lmclllgence Group. Activated 26 September 1950 

at Fort Myer, Virgima. (Organized Reserve Corps rcdcstgnmed 9 July 1952 as the 

Arm> Reserve.) lnactlvated 1 April 1953 at Fort Myer, Vtrginia. 

Redesignated 28 March 1996 as Headquarters, lleadquarters and Scrvtce 

Company. 377th Military lmelhgcncc Baualion (organtc elements concurrently 

constituted). 

CAl\1PAIGN PART I( IPAliON CREDIT 

'\one. 

D!CORi\TlO"J'> 

None. 
378th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

None approved. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

LINEAGE (inacuve) 

Constituted 31 August I 950 in the Organized Reserve Corps as 

Headquarters, 378th Military Intelligence Group. Activated 3 OcLOber 1950 at 

Chicago, lllinois. (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the 

Army Reserve.) Inactivated 1 March 1953 at Chicago, Illinois. 

Redes1gnated 28 March 1996 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Serv1ce 

Company, 378th Military Intelligence Battalion (organic elemems concurremly 

constituted). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

0ECORA110NS 

None. 
383d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

'\one approved. 

Ll~E-\GL 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

AR 

(inactive) 

Constituted 8 February 1951 in the Organized Reserve Corps as Headquaners, 

383d Mihtary lmclligence Baualion. Activated l March 1951 at Newark, New 

jersey (Organized Reserve Corps redesignated 9 july 1952 as the Army Reserve.) 

lnacuvatcd 28 February 1953 at Newark, New jerser Redesignated 28 March 1996 

as Headquarters, Headquarters and Servtce Company, 383d Military Intelligence 

Battalion (organic clements concurrently constituted). 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

'\lone. 
415th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl or AR:-..h 

Shield: 

CICSl: 

Motto: 

Symbolism 

liERA I DIC ]·J EMS 

Azure, a lleur-de-lts or bearing a double-warded key wards up 

gules: on a kss sable a tiger courant proper. 

That for the reg1ments and separate battalions of the Louisiana 

Army National Guard: On a wreath of the colors, or and 

azure, a pelican 111 her piet} affrome with three young 111 nest, 

argent, armed and vulned proper. 

PASSEPARTOUT (PASS INTOffHROUGH EVERYWHERE). 

Onemal blue is one of the colors associated wnh milnary 

Intelligence organizations. The tiger represents strength, 

readiness. and milnary power. The !leur-de-lis is a symbol of 

Louisiana, the home state of the unit. The red key S)•mbolizcs courage and vitality in the mission of unlocking information usmg foretgn languages. 

DISTINC. TlVl UNIT IN')JGNIA 

The disuncuve umt insignta ts the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LiNEAGl t\ '\!0 H00!0RS 

ARNG 

LtNEA<..E (Louisiana) 

Organized and federally recognized l December 1989 in the LoUisiana Army 

Nauonal Guard as the 415th Military Intelligence Battalion wnh Headquarters at 

Baton Rouge. 

Home Station. Baton Rouge. 

CA~If'AIGI'; PARTlCIPAliO'l CRI DIT 

None. 

DECORATION<., 

None. 
396 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINFAC.I; 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted l3 OctOber 1950 in the Regular Army as lleadquaners and 

Headquarters Detachment, 301st Communication Reconnaissance Banalion. 

Activated 20 October 1950 at Camp Pickett, Virginia. Reorganized and redesignated 25 June 1955 as Headquarters and lleadquaners Company, 30lst 

Communication Reconnaissance Baualion (356th Communication 

Reconnaissance Company [activated 15 january 19461 and 329th 

Communication Reconnaissance Company [activated 1 November 19431 concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Compames A and B). Redesignated l july 

1956 as the 30lst Arm)' Security Agency Baualion. Inactivated 15 October 1957 

in Korea. Headquarters and Headquarters Company activated 15 December 1965 

at Fon Bragg, North Carolina. Inactivated 18 june 1971 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. (Companies A and B redesignated 1 No,·ember 1975 as the 356th and 

329th Army Security Agency Companies-hereafter separate lineages.) 

lteadquarters and Headquarters Company, 301st Army Security Agency 

Baualion, redesignated 16 September 1980 as lleadquarters, lleadquancrs and 

Operations Company, 501st Military lmelligence Battalion, assigned to the lst 

Armored Division, and activated in Germany (202d Army Securit)' Agency 

Company !see ANNEX ll concurrently reorganized and redesignated as Company 

A; 50 I st Military Int elligence Detachment [see ANNEX 21 redesignated as 

Company Band activated). 

ANNEX 1 

Constituted 15 july 1967 in the Regular Army as the 202d Army Security 

Agency Company and activated at ron Hood, Texas. lnaclivated 19 April 197 1 at 

Fort Hood, Texas. Activated 1 july 1974 in Germany. 

ANNE>-. 2 

Organized 26 August 1943 in Algeria as the 2678th Headquarters Company, 

Counter Intelligence Corps (Provisional). Disbanded 26 April 1944 and personnel transferred to the 6779th Coumer Intelligence Corps Detachment 

(Pro,·islonal). Disbanded 18 August 1944 and personnel transferred to the 501st 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachmem (constituted 12 july 1944 in the Army of 

the United States). Disbanded 26 june 1945 in Italy. 

Reconstituted 6 April 1951 in the Regular Army as the 501st Counter 

1ntelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 11 May 1951 at Fort Holabird, 

Maryland. Reorganized and redesignated 25 january 1958 as the 50lst Milnary 

Intelligence Detachmem. Inactivated 31 March 1971 at Fort Hood, Texas. 
50lst MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(Electronic Horsemen) 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

1.-IERALDlC lTEMS 

Quanerly azure and ven, in bend a lightning flash point to 

base gules fimbrimed or and in bend sinister a cavahy saber 

point to chief of the like. 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, in from of a torii gate 

gules a horses head erased sable langued of the third interlaced wilh two lightning flashes, the one behind bendwise and 

one in from bend sinisterwise of the first. 

OUT FRONT. 

Blue and green refer to the air and ground assets of d1e battalion 

and further allude to the close relationship with infantry (blue) 

and armor (green) units of the division. The red and yellow 

flash connotes the prominent role of electronic signals intelligence in modern warfare. The cavalry saber, flash, and quartered field collectively suggest the blending of the traditional 

with the latest modern developments in intelligence, reconnaissance, security, and electronic warfare capabilities within the 

military intelligence baualion. 

The black horses head, suggested by the arms of the province of 

Naples, refers to the participation of an element of the battalion 

in Italian campaigns of World War II. The torii gate alludes to 

the baualions service in Korea and the flashes connote awards 

of the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) and the 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. 

DISTINCTIVE UNil INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 
LINEAGES AND I IERALDIC DATA 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Korean War 

Second Korean Wtnter 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Third Korean Wmter 

Korea, Summer 1953 

Sowhwest Asia 

Defense of Saudi Arabia 

IJberation and Defense of Kuwatt 

Cease-Fire 

Company B additionally entitled w: 

World War 11-EAME 

Naples-Foggm 

Anzio 

Rome-Amo 

Nonh Apcnnmcs 

Po Valley 

DECORATIONS 

397 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army). Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(lleadquaners and Headquarters Detachment, 30 1st Communication 

Reconnaissance Baualion, cited; DA GO 22, 1954) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTIIWEST 

ASIA (50 1st Military Intelligence Baualion cited; DA GO l, 1996) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 30lst Communication 

Reconnaissance Baualion, cited; DA GO 33, 1953, as amended by DA GO 41, 

1955) 
502d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COA'I OF AR\1"> 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism 

H ERALDIC lll·M$ 

Argent, on a pale azure between two beacon fires in base of 

the second enflamed or, tn ch1cf a beacon fire of the first 

cnOamed of the tlmd. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, issuing from a 

"reath of laurel or with a Korean taeguk at center proper, a 

griffin's head of the third langued gules. 

FREEDO~t BY Vl(siLANCE. 

Onemal blue is one of the colors used for milital) mtelhgcnce 

un its. The three beacon fi res, representing Korea's anciem system of sending messages, allude to the three campaigns in 

which the unit ser\'cd in the Korean War. The gold of the names 

commemorates unit decorations received by the battalion. 

The gnffin IS a symbol of\ igilancc, the essential auribute for 

efkcti\'e intelligence work. The taeguk represents the Republic 

of Korea Presidential Unit Citauon, and the wreath refcrc; to 

the Meritonous Unit Commendauon (Army) awarded to the 

battalion for service in Korea. Gold ts used to represent excellence and achievements of the unll. 

01S11NCTIVE UNIT lN'>IGNtA 

The chsuncuve unn mstgnta is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 
LINEAGFS AND IIFRALDIC OATA 

Lll'IF.AGE A:-..D HOl'OR'-> 

LiNEAlol 

399 

RA 

(active) 

ConsliLUted 30 june 1952 m the Regular Army as Headquarters, 502d 

Milital)' lmelligcnce Service Battalion. Acuvated 1 September 1952 m Korea. 

Reorganized and redesignated 28 March 1954 as l lcadquaners, 502d Military 

Intelligence Baualion. Inactivated 20 january 1955 in Korea Redesignated 20 

\larch 1961 as lleadquancrs and llcadquaners Compan). 502d Mllll<H)' 

lntelligence Battalion (orgamc clements concurrcmly constituted). Baualion activated 2 5 March 196 I in Korea. Inactivated 1 january 1978 in Korea. Activated l 

October 1986 at fon Lewis, Washington 

CAMPAKoN PARTICIPATION CRrDIT 

Ko1 t'cm War 

Korea, Summer-fall 1952 

llurd Korean \\'mter 

Korea, Summer 1953 

DECORATIONS 

~lemorious Unn Commendation (Army), Streamer embrotclercd KOREA 

(Headqunners, 502cl Military Intelligence Battalion, cited; DA GO 14, 1955) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citalion, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(Headquarters, 502d Military Intelligence Service Battalion, cited; DA GO 70, 

1953) 
5llth MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crcsl: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, a Korean weguk proper and issuant therefrom to chief 

three lightning bolts argent. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, two griffins' heads 

addorsed and erased, that to dexter argent and that to sinister of 

the second both beaked and eyed or and langued gules. 

PROUD AND READY. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with the 

military intelligence branch. The lightning bolts refer to the 

importance of speed, electronics, and communications to all 

intelligence activities and represent the units participation in 

three campaigns in the Korean War and ItS multifaceted mtelligence mission. The raeguk denotes the award of the Republic 

of Korea Presidential Unit Citation to the organization. 

The griffin is a heraldic symbol of alertness and vigilance; the 

prominent eyes and ears suggest the role played by intelligence 

forces in support of the Armys mission. The contrasting colors 

and back-to-back position signify the round-the-clock and 

worldwide scope of the intelligence and sccunty functions. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The disunctive unit insignia is an adaptation of the shield, crest, and mouo of 

the coat of arms. 
LINEAGES AND IIERALDlC DATA 401 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGI (inaclive) 

Consututed 30 June 1952 in the Regular Army as the Sllth Mdttary 

lntelhgence Service Company. Activated 1 September 1952 in Korea. Reorganized 

and redesignated 28 March 1954 as the 5llth Mllitary Intell igence Company. 

Inactivated 20 May 1956 in Korea. Activated 1 June 1962 in Germany 

Reorganized and redesignated l July 1972 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, 5llth Military Intelligence Battalion. Inactivated l October 1983 in 

Germany. Redesignated 16 Ocwber 1983 as Headquarters, Headquarters and 

Service Company. 5llth Milnary Intelligence Battalion, and activated in Germany 

(organtc elements concurrently constituted and acttvated). Battalion macuvated 

15 November 1991 in Germany. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRI"'DIT 

Kon:an War 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Third Korean Wmter 

Korea, Summer 1953 

Southll'est Asia 

Defense of Saud1 Arab1a 

Llberauon and Defense of Kuwait 

Cease-Fire 

DECORAfiONS 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTI!WEST 

ASIA (5llth Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 34, 1992) 

Repubhc of Korea Presidential Unn Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1952-1953 (5llth Military Intelligence Service Company cited; DA GO 24, 1954) 
51 9th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF AR:\1" 

Shield: 

Cn:st: 

Mc>l/o: 

Symbolism. 

HERALDIC ill t\15 

Or, m base a sphtnx facing to dexter coucham azure detailed 

of the first in front of an open book of the last, fimbriated of 

the second, 1ts upper edge at fess point 111 front of a globe 

overall of the like, gridlined of the fie ld. 

On a wreath of the colors, or and azure, a garb of rice of the 

first in front of a 1 riangle gules conjoined at the up with a 

torii sable. 

STRENGTII THRU 11\JTELUGENCC 

Teal blue and yellow arc the colors formerly used for Army 

intelligence organizations. The sphinx also symbolizes Army 

mtclhgence Resung against the terresmal globe IS an open 

book, representing the knowledge made available th rough 

mastery of the languages of the world. The globe nself mdicates the worldwide scope of the battalion's activities. 

Red is the color for action, and the triangle, simulating a 

Vicmamesc sun hat, alludes to service in Vietnam. The torii 

refers to Korea, where an clement of the organization partiCIpated in seven campaigns. fhe rice stalks represent the unit 

decorations awarded during both wars. 

DISTINC TIV[ UNIT !1'-.J..,IGNIA 

The disuncuve unit insign1a is the shield and mouo of the com of arms. 
LINEAGES AND I IE;RALDIC DATA 

LINEAG£: AND HONORS 

Ll~L\uE 

403 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted l October 1948 in the Regular Army as the 51 9th Headquarters 

Intelligence Detachment. Activated 15 October 1948 at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

Reorganized and redesignated 10 May L 949 as Headquarters, 5 L 9th M tlitary 

lmrlligcnce PlatOon. Reorganized and redesignated 11 August 1949 as the 51 9th 

Militar}' lntelligencc Service Platoon. 

Reorgamzcd and redesignated 21 November l 951 as the 51 9th Milttary 

lntclhgence SerYice Battalton. Rcorgamzcd and redestgnated 31 December 1953 

as the 519th Militar} lmelltgence Battalion. Reorgamzed and redestgnatcd 25 

january 1958 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 519th t\ltlttary 

Intelligence Battalton. (523cl Military lmclltgcnce Company [see ANNEXI reorganized and redesignated IS July 1959 as Company A.) 

A'JNLX 

Constituted 25 September 1950 tn the Regular Ann} as the 523d \1tlttary 

lmclltgence Sen tcc Platoon. Activated I 0 October L 9'50 at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

Reorganized and redesignated I September 1952 as the 523d Military 

Intelligence Service Company. Reorganized and redesignated 28 March 19'54 as 

the 523d Military Intelligence Company Inactivated 15 November 19'54 in 

Korea. Activated 25 january 1958 at Fon Bragg, North Carolina. 

C \I\. I PAIGN PARTIC I PA 110~ CREDIT 

Vrrtnam 

Defense 

Countcroffcnsrvc 

Coumeroffcn~rvr Phase II 

l.oumcroffcn~rvc , Phase Ill 

Tet Countcroffcnsln> 

Coumeroffcn~1' 1.', Pha~ I\ 

Counteroffcnsl\'1.'. Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase VI 

Tet 69/CountcroffcnSI\'C 

Summer-fall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 1970 

'>anctuary Countcroffensl\·e 

Coumeroffcn.;1ve, Phase \'11 

Consohdauon I 

Consohdauon II 

Ccase-hrc 

A1111t:d Forces 1:-.\flt'diciml\ 

Panama 

'~<'lllhwtsl Asia 

Defense of ~audr t\rab1a 

Ltberation and Ddrnsc of Kuwmt 
404 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

Korccm War 

hrst u:-; Counteroffensive 

CCF Spnng Offensive 

UN Summer-Fall orrcnSI\'C 

Second Korean Wimer 

Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 

Th1rd Korean W1ntcr 

Korea, Summer 1953 

DECORATIONS 

MILITARY ll'TELUGENCE 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (Headquarters ami Headquarters Compan> and Company A, 519th 

J\1ilitary Intelligence Battalion, cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1970 (51 9th Military Intelhgence Battalion ctted; DA GO 52, 1974) 

Mentorious t.,nit Commendation (Arm)), Streamer embrotdcred VICTI"AM 

1971-1972 (51 9th Military Intelligence Baualion cited; DA GO 6, 1976) 

Company A additionally cmitled to: 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 

(523d Military lmelligence Service Company cited; DA GO 36, 1953) 

Republic of Korea Prcstdenual Umt Cnauon, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1950-1952 (523d Military Intelligence Service PlalOon cited; DA GO 33, 1953, as 

amended by DA GO 41, 1955) 

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1952-1953 (523d Military Intelligence Company CJLed; DA GO 89, 1953, as 

amended by DA GO 9, 1955) 

Company C additionally emitled to. 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIFTNAM 

1966-1967 (Company C, 519th Milttary lntelltgence Battalion, cited; DA GO 43, 

1968) 
522d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

t-.lotco: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure, on a bend engrailed plain couised between a winged 

sphmx couchant argent and a taeguk gules and azure fimbriated of the second, a lightning nash gules 

None appro\'ed. 

THE EQUALIZERS. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors used for military intelligence. The winged sphinx is symbolic of all-seeing and eternal 

\'igilance, and the taeguk refers to the units Korean War service. 

The electronic warfare mtelligence capabllity of the organization 

1s represented b> the engrailed bend, and the lightning flash is 

indicati,·e of speed m communication and intelligence gathering. 

DISTINCTIVE UNI r INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit msignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

Lll\EAGC AND HONORS 

RA 

LINLAGE (inactive) 

Organized September 1950 at Fon Bragg, North Carolina, as the 522d 

Military Intelligence Service Detachment. (Constituted 20 September 1950 in the 

Regular Arm)·.) Inactivated 28 December 1951 in Korea. 

Redesignated 2 3 June 1954 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

522d Military lmelhgence Baualton (Compames A and B concurrently constituted). Battalion acuvated 2 7 july 1954 in Germany. Inactivated 15 August 

1958 in Germany. Assigned 21 December 1976 to the 2d Armored Division 

and activated at Fort Hood, Texas. (373d Army Security Agency Company lsee 

Al\NEX I I consolidated 16 October 1979 with Company A; 502d Military 

Intelligence Compan} !see ANNEX 2) concurrently consolidated with Company 

B.) lnacm·ated 15 April 1991 at Fort Hood, Texas Activated 16 December 

1992 at Fon Polk, Louisiana. Inactivated 15 January 1996 at Fort Hood, Texas. 

ANNEX l 

Constituted ll May 1962 in the Regular Army as Company B, 303d Army 

Security Agenc) Battalion. Activated 25 June 1962 at Fort Benning, Georgia. 

Rcorgamzed and redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 373d Army Security 

\gcncy Compan). 
406 MILITARY INTEL! IGENCE 

AN'-;LX 2 

Constilllted 2 L june 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 520th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Acti\·atcd I july 1944 at Camp 

Campbell, Kentucky. Alloucd 17 December 1948 to the Regular Army. 

Reorganized and redesignated 25 january 1958 as the 502d Militar>' 

Intelligence Detachment. Consolidated 28 December 1961 with the 502d 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (sec ANNEX 3) and consolidated unit 

des1gnatcd as the 502d Mtlitar) Imelhgcncc Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 8January 1971 as the 502d Military Intelligence Company. 

AN'\[1\ 3 

Constituted I 2 july 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 502d 

Counter lntelhgcnce Corps Detachment. Acuvated 16 August I 944 m France 

with personnel from provisional Counter Intelligence Corps detachment auachcd 

to the 2d Armored Div1s1on. Inactivated 14 October 1946 m Germany. Activated 

10 May 1947 on Guam. Inacuvated H March 1950 on Guam. 

CAMPAIGN PART!( !PATtON CRLDIT 

Korean \Var 

U\J orrcn'>IW 

C<.T lntervrntion 

F1rst UN CounteroHrnsive 

CCf Spnng Offens1w 

UN Summer-Fall OffensiVe 

<;ccond Korean Wmter 

Soutlmnf A sw 

Defense of 'iaud1 Arab1a 

Ubcrauon .mel Defense of Kuwa.t 

Company B addn10nally entitled to: 

\Varlcl \Vcrr 11-tAME 

'\ormand)· 

Northern !'ranee 

Rhmcland 

Ardenne~· t\l~ce 

Ccn1ral Europe 

DlCORATIONS 

Company B emiLlcd to: 

Belg1an Fourragerc 1940 (2d Armored Dl\'ision cited; DA GO-+ 3, 19'50) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in Belgium (2d 

Armored D1vis10n Cited, DA GO 4 3. 1950) 

CiLecl m the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the Ardennes 

(2d Armored Dh·ision cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 
524th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Azure two chevronels freuy argent charged with eighteen pellets all within a bordure of the second. 

On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, a garb of rice or 

charged at base with a taeguk proper; overall a bayonet palewise. 

point up, blade sable and hilt argem all tied with a ribbon gules. 

SILENT VIGILANCE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with military imelligence. The imerlocking chevronels suggest the gathering of information from many sources processed through the 

unit and disuibutecl throughout the Army, as represented by the 

border. The black pellets suggest the units ability to interpret 

various data and to form assessments of military situations. 

Eighteen refers to the number of campaigns in which the unit 

participated in Korea and Vietnam. 

The bayonet alludes to the units participation in campaigns in 

Vietnam and Korea, represented by the garb of rice and taeguk. 

The black blade refers to secrecy and the units imelligence function. The red band of the garb refers to the Meritorious Unit 

Commendalion (Army) awarded the unit for service in Vietnam. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LINEAGE 

RA 

(active) 

Constituted 25 September 1950 in the Regular Army as the 524th Technical 

Intelligence Coordinator Detachment. Activated l 0 October 1950 at Fort Riley, 

Kansas. Inactivated l December 1951 in Korea. Redesignated 22 june 1965 as 

the 524th Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 1 july 1965 at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 52 4th Military Intelligence 

Detachmem. Inactivated 26 November 1970 in Vietnam. 

Redesignated 16 june 1982 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

524th Milita1y Intelligence Battalion, and activated in Korea. (Organic elemems 

constituted 16 Ocwber J 988; Company A concurrently activated in Korea.) 
408 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CJu:DIT 

Koram War 

CCF lmcr\'ention 

First UN Counteroffensive 

CCF Spring Olfensave 

UN Summer-fall Offensi\'C 

Second Korean \\'uucr 

Vietnam 

Defense 

Counteroffcnsaw 

Coumeroffensi\'C. Pha'>C II 

Coumeroffcnst\'C. Pha~ Ill 

Tet Coumcroffcnsan: 

Coumeroffensave Phase IV 

Counteroffensive, Phase V 

Coumeroffensavc. Phra>e VI 

Tct 69/Coumeroffcnsavc 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Wmter-Spnng 1970 

SanclUarr CoumcroffcnSI\'C 

Coumeroffensi\·e. Phase \'II 

DLCORATIONS 

WUTARY INTELLIGENCE 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VlETNAM 

1966-1968 (524th Military Intelligence Detachment cited; DA GO 67, 1968) 

Army Superior Untt Award, Streamer embroidered 1986-1988 (524th 

Military Intelligence Battalion cited; DA GO 14, 1989) 
527th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Gyronny of eight argem and sable, a pale gu les voided 

throughout argent, surmounted by a globe azure gridlined 

argent, overall two swords saltirewise also argent. 

None approved. 

STRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE. 

The shield, divided imo clark and light sections, suggests the 

ever-changing methods of counterintelligence functions and 

the day/night vigilance of intelligence gathering. The red and 

white allude to the coat of arms of Kaiserslautern in Gem1any, 

where the unit has been stationed. The globe alludes LO the 

overseas origin and duty of the unit and resembles a grid, 

which suggests the sifting of information through the uni.t to 

support Army goals. The crossed swords symbolize offensive 

and defensive counterintelligence and the defense of Europe. 

DISTINCfiVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

Description: A silver color metal and enamel device consisting of two silver 

swords in saltire, pommels to base, the lateral and base areas 

between the swords of black enamel and the upper area of red 

enamel; surmounting the swords a blue disc divided by five 

horizontal and vertical silver lines bearing at cemer a black 

square, poim up, with a silver dot; issuing from the disc three 

rays to the lateral and base areas and a broad arrowhead 

extending beyond the top all silver; on a silver scroll issuing 

from under the blades and the pommels, the inscription 

STRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE in black enamel. 

Symbolism: The square and dot simulate an observation apparatus, the 

disc represents a globe, and the divisions symbolize a network. The arrowhead connotes martial readiness, while the 

rays symbolize all facets of sound, light, and vibratory systems. All represent the collection, processing, and dissemination of information funClions of a military intelligence unit. 

The swords refer to defensive and offensive counterintelligence methods. The white arrowhead dividing the red area 

suggests the coaL of arms of Kaiserslautern in Germany, symbolizing service there. 
·HO ~11LITARY INTELUGE'\ICF 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

L!NrAGE (active) 

Constitmed 18 April 1946 in the Army of the United States as the 527th 

Interrogation Team Activated 1 May 1946 in Germany. lnaclivated 31 October 

1946 in Germany. Redesignated 6 February 1948 as the 52 7th Headquarters 

Intelligence Detachment Actl\ated 21 February 19+8 at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. Allotted 5 \lay 1949 to the Regular Army Reorganized and redesignated 23 \tay 1949 as Headquarters, 52 7th M!lnar} Intelligence Platoon 

Reorganized and redesignated + August 1949 as the 527th Military Intelligence 

Service PlaLOon. Reorgamzed and redesignated 14 November 1951 as the 527th 

Milnary Intelligence Scn·ice Company. Reorganized and redesignated 31 

December 1953 as the 527th Mtlitary Intelligence Company. Inactivated 25 

january 1958 at Fort lloocl, Texas. Activated l june 1962 in Germany. 

Reorganized and reclestgnated l july 1972 as Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, 527th Military lmelligence Battalion. (Organic clements consututecl I 

October 1982 and activated m Germany.) 

CAMPAIG1\. PARTICIPATIOi\ CREDIT 

None. 

DFCORAT!ONS 

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1990-1991 (52 7th Military 

Intelligence Battalion cited, DA GO 34, 1992) 
532d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAl OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Cr-est 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

11 E RALDIC ITEMS 

Cheeky azure and or a horse rampant sable fimbnated of the 

second. 

None approved. 

NOSCE HOSTEM (KNOW YOUR ENEMY). 

Teal blue and yellow are the colors formerly used for military 

intelligence battalions. The black horse all udes to Stungan in 

Germany. the unit's place of activation. The horse and cheeky 

field combined, symbolic of a chessboard, refer to the strategic 

and tactical funcuons of an intelligence unll. 

DI'>TINCTI\'E lJ'liT 11\SIGNit\ 

The disttnctt\'C unit insignia is the shteld and motto of the com of arms. 

LiNEAGE AND HONORS 

RA 

LINl.A<.I (aclive) 

Constituted 16 February 1951 in the Regular Army as the 532d Military 

lntclhgcnce Service Company Acuvatcd 15 August 1951 m Germany. 

Reorganized and redestgnated 20 September 1951 as the 532d Military 

lntclhgence Service Battalion. Reorgamzed and redesignated 20 October 1953 as 

the 532d ~tilitary Intelligence Battalion. Reorganized and redestgnmed 25 june 

1958 as Headquarters and Headquarters Compan}. 532d \ililitary Intelligence 

Battalion (52 1st Military Intelligence Company !sec A \INFX 11. 427th Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachmem [sec ANNEX 21. and 526th Mihtary Intelligence 

Company !sec ANNEX 3] concurrently reo rganized and redesigna ted as 

Compames A, B, and C). Bauahon inactivated 1 june 1962 m Germany. Activated 

16 October 1986 in Korea. 

A:-.:Nt::\ 1 

Organized 5 September 1950 in japan as the 52 1st ~lilitary Intelligence 

Service Detachment. (Constillltcd 7 ~eptember 1950 in the Regular Army.) 

Rcorgani:ecl and redestgnatcd 28 December 1951 .1s the 52lst Military 

lmelhgence SerYice Platoon. Reorganized and redesignated l September 1952 as 

the 52 1st Military lntelhgence Service Company. Reorganized and redesignated 

28 March 19'54 as the 52 1st Mili tar) Intelligence Comp::tn}. 
412 MILITARY lNTf IJIGENCE 

ANNEX 2 

Conslilllted 12 July 1944 111 the Army of the United States as the 42 7th 

Counter Imclllgence Corps Detachment. Acti,·ated 22 August 1944 on Corsica. 

Alloued 16 february 1951 to the Regular Arm) 

ANNEX 3 

Constit mccl 18 April 1946 in the Army ol the United States as the 52 6th 

Interrogation Team. Activated I May 1946 in Germany. Inactivated 6 November 

1946 in Germany. Redesignated 6 rebruary 1948 as the 526th Headquarters 

lmelligencc DeLachment. Acthated 21 Februar} 1948 at Fort Bragg. Nonh 

Carolina. Allotted 5 May 1949 to the Regular Army. Reorganized and redesignated 23 May 1949 as Headquarters, 526th Mtlitary Intelligence Platoon. 

Reorganized and redesignated 4 August 1949 as the 526th Military Intell igence 

Service Platoon. Reorganized and redesignated 28 August. 1951 as the 526th 

Military Intelligence Sen'ice Compan). Reorganized and redesignated 20 October 

1953 as the 526th Mtlitary lmelhgcncc Company. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CRLDI J' 

Company A emitled LO: 

Korean \Ve11 

UN Dcfcns1n: 

t.:"- Offcns1ve 

C..CI Intervention 

f1rst \., \J Coumeroffens1ve 

ccr <;pnng orrensi\'e 

UN '>ummcr-Fall Offensive 

Second Korean Wnller 

Korea. Summer-Fall 1952 

Th1rd KMcan \\'mter 

Korea, Summer 1953 

Company B entitled to: 

World \\'eu II FAME 

Rhmcland 

DECORATION':> 

Company A entitled to· 

\1eritorious Umt Commendauon (Armyl, Streamer embroidered KOREA 

1951-1952 (52 1st Militaf) lntelligcncc Service Platoon cned: DA GO 10. 1953) 

Meritorious Unit Commcndauon (Army), '-ltreamer embroidered KOREA 

1952-1954 (52 1st Militar)' lntclligcncc Service Company cited: DA GO 46, 1954) 

Repubhc of Korea Presidential Umt Citation. ':>treamer embroidered KOREA 

(52lst Militat') Intelligence Sen1cc Compan> cited. 0:\ GO 82. 1954) 
533d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT or ARt-IS 

Shield: 

Crest 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

I lFRALDIC ITEMS 

Per fess argent and azure two lightning flashes saltirewise 

coumerchanged, m ch1ef two eagles' heads conjoined erased 

sable and overall m pale a double-warded key, wards to base 

of the first. 

None approved. 

VlGILANCE WITH PRIDE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors traditionally associated wnh military intelligence. The crossed lightning 

flashes connote the banalion's mission as a combat electronic 

warfare intelligence unit The key is a symbol of knowledge 

and secunt} The double-headed eagle symbolizes watchfulness and \ 1gilance and alludes to the unn's fonner areas of serVICe, Austna and Germany. 

DISTINCTIVE UNIT INSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of anns. 

LiNCACo[ AND HONORS 

RA 

LINEAGF (inactive) 

Consmuted 15 Februar> 1952 m the Regular Arm)' as the 533d Militar}' 

Imelhgence Service Battalion. Activated l March 1952 m Austria. Reorganized 

and redesignated 25 May 1954 as the 533d t--lilitary lmclhgence Battalion. 

Inactivated 8 September 1955 in Austria. 

Redesignated 16 September 1980 as Headquarters, lleadquarters and 

Operations Company, 533d Military Intelligence Baualion, assigned to the 3d 

Armored Division, and activated in Germany (856th Arm> Security Agency 

Company lsee Ai'!NEX 1] concurrently reorganized and redcs1gnated as Company 

A, 503d Mllitar> lmclligcncc Compan) !see A:-Ji'-:EX 2] consolidated with the 

203d Military Intelligence Detachment ]see AN:\E~ 31 and consolidated unit reorganized and redesignated as Company B). Battalion inacti\·ated 15 August 1992 

in German} 

ANNF X 1 

Constlluted 4 September 1944 m the Army of the United States as the 

3 \-1-8th Signal Senice Platoon. Activated 25 September 1944 on New Caledonia. 
-+14 \IILITARY I~TELLIGFNCE 

Inactivated 30 january 1946 on le Shtma. Rcdestgnated 23 August 1948 as the 

580th Signal SerYicc Detachment and activated at Fort (,reel)·. Ala~ka. lnacu,·atecl 

I june 19-+9 at ron Greely, Alaska Redesignated 7 june 1954 as the 580th Signal 

Detachment and alloued to the Regular Army. 

Convened and redesignated 19 May 19'55 as the 856th Communication 

Reconnaissance Detachment. Activated 25 june 1955 m japan lnacuvatcd 15 

August 1956 in japan. Redesignated 6 April 1966 as the 856th Army Security 

Agency Detachment. Activated 1 '5 june 1966 at Fon Benning, Georgia. 

Inactivated 6 ~larch 1971 111 Viemam. Redcstgnated I july 1974 as the 856th 

Army Security Agency Company and activatecltn Germany. 

ANNEX 2 

Constituted 14 Ocwber 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 479th 

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 23 November L 944 on New 

Guinea. Disbanded 22 july 1945 111 the Philippine Islands. Reconstlluted 5 

january 1949 in the Regular Army as the 530th Counter Intelligence Corps 

Detachment. Activated 28 january l 949 at Fort Knox, Kemucky. Inactivated 15 

March 195 I at Fort Knox, Kentuck)'· 

Redesignated 17 March 1955 as the 503d Counter Intelligence Corps 

Detachment. Activated 5 April 1955 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Reorganized and 

redesignated 25 june 1958 as the 503d Military Intelligence Detachment. 

Consolidated 2 I November 1972 wnh the 503d Military Intelligence Compan)' 

(see ANNEX 4) and consolidated unit designated as the 503d Military Intell igence 

Company. 

ANNEX 3 

Constituted 12 july 1944 in the Arm)' of the United States as the 503d Counter 

Intelligence Corps Detachment. Activated 16 August 1944 in France wnh personnel from provisional Counter Intelligence Corps Detachmem auached to the 3d 

Armored Dtvision. Inactivated 7 October 1945 in Germany. Activated 21 February 

1948 at Fort Bragg, Nonh Carolina. Allouecl 25 june 1952 to the Regular Am1y. 

Reorganized and redestgnated I 5 November 1954 as the 203d Counter 

lntelligencc Corps Detachment. Reorganized and redesignated 25 january 1958 

as the 203d Military lntelltgcnce Detachment. Inactivated 5 ~Ia)' 1959 at Fon 

llood, Texas. Activated 5 April 1962 at Fort llood, Texas. inactivated 20 April 

1978 at Fon Hood, Texas. 

t\i\NEX 4 

Constituted 30 june 1952 in the Regu lar Army as the 503d Military 

Intelligence Service Company. Acth·ated 1 September 1952 in japan Reorganized 

and redestgnated 28 March 1954 as the 503d Military lntelltgcnce Company. 

lnaclivatcd 24 june 1955 in japan. Activated I june 1962 in Germany. 

Inactivated 25 September 1965 in Germany. 
LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

Southwest Asia 

Defense of Saudi Arabra 

Lrberauon and Defense of Kuwmt 

Cease-Fire 

Company A additionally entitled to: 

World War 11-AP 

Ryukyus 

Viemam 

CoumcrofferlSrvc, Phase II 

Cou meroffensi vc, Phase Ill 

TeL Counteroffensive 

Counteroffensive, Phase IV 

Coumeroffcnsive, Phase V 

Counteroffensive, Phase VI 

Tet 59/Counteroffensive 

Summer-Fall 1969 

Winter-Spring 1970 

Sanctuary Coumeroffrnsivc 

Counteroffensive, Phase VII 

Company B additionally emitled to: 

\Vorlcl War 11-AP 

New Guinea 

Luzon 

World War 1/-EAME 

Normandy 

Northern France 

Rhineland 

Ardennes-r\lsaec 

Cemral Europe 

DECORATIONS 

Company A entitled to: 

415 

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered SAIGON-LONG BINH (856th 

Radio Research DetachmenL cited; DA GO 48, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1966-1967 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 17, 1968) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1967-1968 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 29, 1969) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1968-1969 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 

1969-1970 (856th Radio Research Detachmem cited; DA GO 43, 1972) 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1968 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 43, 1970) 
416 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered 

VIETNAM 1968-1970 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 51, 1971) 

Republic of Vtetnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embrOidered 

VIETNAM 1970-1971 (856th Rad10 Research Detachment cited; DA GO 6, 1974) 

Republic of Vietnam Clvtl Acuon Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966-1970 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 51, 

1971) 

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1970-1971 (856th Radio Research Detachment cited; DA GO 6, 

1974) 

Company B entnled lO: 

Philippine Presidential Unit CitaLion, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 

1944 TO 4 JULY 1945 (479th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA 

G047, 1950) 

Belgian Fourragere 1940 (503d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment 

cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in Belgium 

(503d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 

Cited in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army for action in the Ardennes 

(503d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cited; DA GO 43, 1950) 
542d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HERALDIC ITEMS 

Sable, a sword and lightning flash saltirewise surmounted by a 

stylized chess piece with a grifrin's head or, within a bordure 

compony argent and azure. 

That for the regiments and separate baualions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and sable, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue o( the Minuteman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachusetts. 

THE EYES OF THE BATTLE. 

Oriental blue and silver gray (white) are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence units. Black denotes 

solidity while suggesting clandestine capabilities. Gold alludes 

to excellence and achievement. The sword and flash represent 

military preparedness and speed. The border and chess piece 

suggest strategy and countermeasure tactics. The griffin symbolizes vigilance with its keen eyesight and acute hea1ing. 

DlSTINCTIVE UNIT lNSIGNIA 

The distinctive unit insignia is a modification of the shield and mono of the 

coat of am1s. 

LINEAGE AND HONORS 

LlNEAGE 

AR 

(active) 

Constituted 16 September 1987 in the A1my Reserve as the 242d Military 

lntelligence Battalion and activated with Headquarters at Staten Island, New 

York. Inactivated 15 September 1993 at Staten Island, New York. 

Redesignated 16 September 1993 as the 542cl Military lmelligence Banalion 

and activated with Headquarters at East Windsor, Connecticut. 

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
549th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT Of ARt-.IS 

Shreld: 

Crest: 

Mollo: 

Svmbolism: 

II ERALDIC lTEMS 

Azure, a globe argent gridlined sable, overall a lightning nash 

issumg from dexter chief or m salure wrth a sword gules rn 

bend stmster, all within a border of the second. 

That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Arm}' 

Reserve. On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Minuteman proper. The statue of the MinULeman, 

Capt. john Parker (H. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in Lexington, Massachusetts. 

MODERN WARFARE. 

The global aspect of the mtsston performed by the mllnarr 

imelhgcnce branch is represented b)' the longitude and latitude lines of the world. The lightnmg nash IS symbolic of the 

electronic warfare nature of mllnary mtclligcnce. The sword 

represents the aggressive naLUre and dangerous missions 

accomplbhcd by mililary imclligcnce personnel. The border 

suggests containment and alludes to inte lligence gathering and 

its usc in defense strategy. 

DISTINCTI\'E UNIT IN\!< .• !': I\ 

rhe distinctiw unit mstgma IS the shield and moun t)f the coat of arms. 

I INr \<.,E AND HO'\OR\ 

LlNh\GF 

AR 

(active) 

Constitu ted 17 july 1986 in the Army Reserve as the 549th Mili tary 

Intelligence Battalion and activated with Headquarters at Austin, Texas. 

C..\~IPJ\IC,N PARTICIPATION CRI [)II 

t-..one. 

01 CORATIONS 

None. 
550th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

COAT OF ARMS 

Shirld: 

Cn:st: 

Mollo: 

Symholism: 

liCRAI DIC. ITEMS 

Argent, a lightning bolt bendwise pomt to base azure, all within a bordure quarter!) gules and of the hrst. 

That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Army 

Reserve: On a wreath of the colors, argent and azure, the 

Lexington Mmutcman proper. The statue of the Minuteman, 

Capt john Parker (1!. H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the 

Common in I cxington, Massachusetts. 

BLUE LIGIITNING. 

Oriental blue and silver gray arc the mtiHar) intelligence colors. Blue also alludes to the baualton's affihauon with the 

50th Armored Ucrsey Blues) Dh ision. The colors red and 

white were suggested by the shoulder sleeve mstgnia of the 

78th Di\ iston (Tratnmg), to which the battalion was auached. 

The lightnmg bolt relates to the baualion's signal security and 

electronic wnrlare mission. The quartered border signifies 

militar)' strategy. 

DISIINCliVI UNIT INSIG'liA 

The distinctive unit insignia is the shield and mouo of the coat of arms. 

Lt:\L \<.,L. A'\0 HO"!ORS 

AR 

LINJ.AGL· (inacuve) 

Constituted 16 july 1986 in the Army Reserve as the 550th Military 

lmelligence Baualion and activated with Headquarters at Pcdricklown, New 

jersey. lnacuvatcd 15 September 1993 at Pedricktown, Nc\v jersey. 

C\\11'·\IGN PARTICIPATIO'\ CRt Dl J' 

'\one. 

OJ·( ORATION'> 

None. 
629th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 

(OAT Of AR~tS 

Shield: 

Crest: 

Motto: 

Symbolism: 

HLRALDIC lTf\1':> 

Per chevron paly of six argent and azure a bend counterchanged, and olthc first in base a pamhers face proper grasping 

two lightnmg flashes conjomcd chc\'Tonwise of the second. 

That for the regm1ents and separate battalions of the Maryland 

Army Nauonal Guard: On a wreath of the colors, argent and 

azure, a cross bonony per cross quarterly gules and argent. 

STALK THF PREY. 

Oriental blue is one of the colors associated with militar)' intelligence. The upper half of the shtcld alludes to the state nag of 

t-.larylancl and identifies the home area of the baualton. The 

panther embodies the nickname of the unit, "Prowler," and is a 

predator celebrated for its stealth and patience on the hunt. 1L 

is an appropriate symbol for a tactical level intelligence unit. 

The lightning flashes refer to speed of operation and the dominant role of combat electronic warfare on the battlefield. 

DISTINCTIVL UNIT INSIGl\.1·\ 

The distincuve unit instgnia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms. 

LlNL;i\GI:: AND HONOR~ 

LINEAGE 

ARNG 

(~laryland) 

Organized and federally recognized 3 May 1988 in the Maryland Army 

National Guard as the 629th Military lmelligence Baualion, an element of the 

29th Infantry Division, with l lcadquaners at Greenbelt. Location of llcaclquaners 

changed 1 April 1994 to Laurel. 

Home Station: Laurel. 

CAMPAIG'-l PARTICIPATION (REDIT 

None. 

DECORATIONS 

None. 
Glossary of Lineage Terms 

ACTlVATE. To transfer a constituted Regular Army or Army Reserve unit from 

the inactive to the active rolls of the United States Army. The unit is usually 

stationed at a specific location and assigned personnel and equipment at 

this time; however, a unit may be active at zero strength-that is, without 

personnel or equipmem. 

ALLOT. To allocate a unit to one of the components of the United States Army. 

The present components are the Regular Army (RA), the Army Nati onal 

Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (AR), formerly known as the 

Organized Reserves and the Organized Reserve Corps. DUling World War 

Il units were also allotted to the Army of the United States. An Army 

National Guard unit is usually further alloued to a particular state or group 

of states. A unit may be withdrawn from any component except the Army 

National Guard and allotted to another; the new allotment, however, does 

not change the history, lineage, and honors of the unit. 

ASSIGN. To make a unit pan of a larger organization and place it under that 

organizations command and control until it is relieved from the assignment. As a rule, only assignments to divisions and separate combined arms 

brigades are shown in unit lineages. 

CONSOLIDATE. To merge two or more units into a single unit. The unit may 

retain the designation of one of the former units or it may have a new designation, bUL it inherits the history, lineage, and honors of all of the former 

units. Active as well as inactive units may be consolidated. 

CONSTiTUTE. To place the designation of a new unil on the official rolls of the 

United States Army. 

CONVERT. To transfer a unit from one branch of the Army to another-for 

example, from signal to military intelligence. Such a change always requires 

a redesignation; however, there is no break in the historical continuity of 

the unit. Aclive as well as inactive units may be convened, but if the unit is 

active, it must also be reorganized under a new table of organization and 

equipment (TOE). 
422 t-.tll!TARY li\JTELLIGENCE 

DESIGNATION. rhe official title ol a unit, consisting usually of a number, a 

branch or function, and a command echelon. Adchtional dcscnpli\'C terms 

may appear in parentheses. but such parenthcucalldcmifications arc not pan 

of the unus orfic1al designation. 

DISBAND. To remove the des1gnation of a Regular Army or Army Reserve unit 

from the official rolls of the United States Army. If the unit IS acttvc, it must 

also be inactivated. Disbandment is imenclec.l to be permanent and irreversible, except in extraorcltnary circumstances. 

ELEMENT. A unit that is assigned to or is pan of a larger organizauon 

fEDERALLY RECOGt\IZE. To accept an Army ~auonal Guard unu mto the force 

struct urc of the United States Army after the unn has been inspected by a 

federal representative and found to be properly stationed, orgamzecl, and 

equipped in accordance with Army requiremems. 

INACTIVATE. To place a Regular Army or Army Reserve unit that IS not currently needed in the force structure in an moperati\·e status without 

assigned personnel or eqwpmem for a hmned penod of ume. The umt is 

transferred to the inacth·e rolls of the United States Army. but it can be activated again whenever needed. Upon reacti\'ation, the unit retains its former 

hisLOry, lineage, and honors. 

ORDER INTO ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE. To place an Army National Guard 

unit on full-time active duty under the control of the United States gO\•ernment. The unit remams m federal senice unul released b)· the federal government, at wh1ch time 1t reverts to the control of its home stme or states. 

ORDER INTO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE. To place an Army Reserve unit on 

full-time active duty, usually during a war or a crisis. After completing its 

active duty, the unit may be inactivated or it may be released from active military service, reverting to reserve status. Th1s term does not apply to Army 

Resen·e umts on annual active duty for training 

ORGANLC ELEME!'\T. A unit that IS an integral pan of a larger orgamzation-for 

example, a lettered company of a baualion. 

ORGANlZE. To assign personnel and equipment to a unll and make it operative-that is. capable of performing its mission. For Army National Guard 

units, this term is used instead of ACTIVATE. (See above.) 

RECONSTITUTe. To restore to the official rolls of the United States Army a unit 

that has been d1sbanded or one whose federal recognition has been withdrawn. The reconstituted unit may ha,·e a new designation. but ll retains its 

former history, lmeage, and honors. 

REDESIGNATE. To change a unit's official title. Active as well as inactive units 

may be redesignated, but personnel and equipmem of an active unit are not 

changed unless the unit is reorganized at the same time. Redesignmion is a 

change of utle onl)·; the unit's hiStory, lineage. and honors remam the same. 

REORGANIZL To change the structure of a unit m accordance with a new table 

of orgamzauon and equipment (TOE) within the same branch of the Army. 
CLOSSAR\ OF UNEAGL fERM~ 423 

SPLClAL DESIG'\ATIO\J An official unit nickname. There are t\vo t}·pes of special designauons-a truditional designation (one that a unit has used continuously for the last thirty years or more) and a distinctive designation (one 

that a unit has used for less than thin} years or one wtth whtch a unn wishes 

to be associated). The special designation, if any, appears in parentheses after 

the umts offictal designation. 

\\ ITHDRAW FEDERAL RECOGNITION. To remove the designauon of an Arm} 

National Guard unit from the official rolls of the United States Army. f-ederal 

recogniuon ts \\ uhdrawn when the unit no longer meets Armr requirements 

or is no longer needed m the force structure. 

Index to the Narrative 

Aberdeen Pw\"lng Ground, Md.: 177 

Adjutant General's OffiCe 3. 7, 1.2, 14, 46 

Admmlstr<lU\'e '>un·e)' Dctachmrm 139, 141. 

159, 163, 165 

t\enal cxplonauon 181. 182. 184 188-89 193 

Aerial reconnaissance 35. 39, 45 -46, 114 15, 

131-32. 148. 181 

Afgham!'tan: I 69 

Afncan Amencans: 25, 57 

Amswonh. MaJ Gen. Frederick 16 

A1r auachcs 45-46, I OS 

Air Force lmclhgcncc. I 36 

A1r Force. U.S 104, 105, 132 

A1r Rcconna~:>sancc Suppon Bauahons: 132 

Aircraft l32, 149, 160 

A1rplancs, obscn·auon: 18-19. 2 I, 45-46, 113. 

119, 131-3.2 

Akin, B11g. Gcn Spencrr: 94 

Al.A\10 '><.·outs. 96-97 

Alaska. 110, 166 

All-Volunteer Force: 195 

Alhed lntelhgcncc Bureau (AlB) 95 

Alhed l mnsla10r and Interpreter Scmce (A TIS): 

95,96,108 

Amchuka, Alaska 79, 83 

Amenca. 56, 61, 101, 153. See also Unned States. 

American ad\'lscrs in V1ctnam: 145. 148-49 

The Ammcan Blm ll Chamber: 4 7 

American CiVJl i.Jbcmcs Umon (AC.LU): 156-57, 

161-62 

Amencan E:-:ped1110nary Forces (AEF). 21, 26. 

30-39.40 

Amencan Protectl\·e League 29 

Anglo-American Combmed Ch1d~ of Staff 91, 

93 

Angol:l 169 

Antiaircraft sen•1ce: 34-35 

Anuwar movements: .25 146, 153, 155 

Arab-lsraeh \\ ar 167 

Ardenne~ counteroffensive: 1 '52-53 

·\rea Anal)·sts lmclhgencc Agcnq 137 

Arlmgton llall '>tauon. \'a .. 67, 77-79, 82-83. 

94, 109-10. 123, 127, 129, 164. 174, 

176-77. 185 

Am1ed J·orces Security Agency: II 0-11, 191-92 

Armista:c 

Korea 12 I . I 34 

World War I. ~0. 32, 40 

Annored clements. 151, 152-53, 181 

Army. Department of: 1.27, 128. 156, 159. 

161, 165 

Army. US.: 3-4. 8. 14-1'5. 18-19.21,2.2-23. 

.27-28. St:l' also Army: lmclhgcnce. 

demobllizauon of: I 0 I, 107 

mtem·ar d1fficulues: 42, 51-60 

in \\orld \\'ar II 83-99 

Army A1r Corps· 45-46, 52 

Army A1r Force::. (AAF) 

postwar. 103, 104 

in World War II: 59, 62-63, 64, 66, 67-68. 

69,75,83 88-89,93.95,97 

Army ch1d of staff. 5t•r Ch1ef of Swff, Arnl}. 

Army Collecuon Detachment (Korea): 134 

Army (,cneral School: 112, 12'5 

Army Ground Forces: 63, 68, 82, 112 

Anny Intelligence. 4-6. See also Intelligence; 

~hlnary Intelligence 

begmmngs of: 15-18, 39-40 

between the wars: 44. 55-57, 58-60 

future trends. 189 

from Korea to Vicrnam: 122-23, 124, 

125-26, 128. 134-35 
426 

Arm) lmelhgcncc ~cont 

m Korean War 102. 113-14, 115 

organization of 11-12. 14 16. 20.28-30, 

31-32,39-40, 57-~9.94-95 

rcorgana:al\on 62-03. 6-+-68, 69-70, 9S. 

103-05 

rcorgamza11on and n:ncwal 169 I 70. 

171-72, 174-75. 176,179,181.182, 

18-f--85 

remuctunng: 136, I 37. lJH, 139-40. 141 , 

H2-43 

Vtetnam and hcyond 147, H8-49. 1 '50-'31, 

152-53,156 157-58.159.160-61 

163-M. lo7 

m \Vorld War I 21-23. 29 31-32. 33-3tJ, 40 

m World War II. 68-69 

Army lmelhgcncc Agenq (AlA). 176. 178, 189 

Arm) 1mclltgcncc Board. 129. 138-39 

Army lmelhgenccCenU.'T 124,125 126 139, 

160 

Am1y lmclhgcncc Corps Acu\·lt) I 39 140 159 

Ann> lmclhgcnce, Elcctromc Warf;~re, and 

Target AcqUISition Plan (AI~IP): 184 

Aml} lntclltgcnn· <;chool. 138. I 39, 141, 149, 

158, 160. 161 

Am1y lntelhgencc <1nd S('cunty Brand1. 142-43. 

157, 195 

Aml} Language '>thool 112 

Army \llap "crviu: 5-f 129, 137, 160 

Aml} \1atcriel Cllnllll<llld: 137, 139, 170, 176. 

178 

Aml} \1b~llc lmclhgenn· Agc11<.y I 37 

Arm} Miss1k and '>pace lmclhgenCl' Cemcr· 

176 

Am1y-Navy Commumcations lntclhgcnce IX'Iard 

(t\\;(.113): 110 

Arm}·-Navr Commumt<lllons lmelhgencc 

C.oorchnatmg Commlllt'C (A!\( ICC) HO 

Army Pho10 Interpretation Center 125. 139. 

~cc al\Cl Photo mtl'rpreters 

Army Reserve: 116, 119. 124, 182. 195 

Aml} Secunt} Agenc} (ASA): 6, I 02-03 

Cold W:~rand Korea lOS 109-10 111-14. 

117, I 19 

future trends: 191. 192, 193. 194 195 196 

Korcato\'ietnam: 127,128.129,130.135, 

138, 140-41, 143 

rcorgamzauon and renewal 170, 171-72. 

173. 174. 175, 176,177, 179, 180. 182 

\"ll'tnam and bcrond H7. H8, 150, 15 I. 

MILITARY INTELLIGCNCE 

Arm> Secunty Agency (com.) 

152. 157, 158-59, 160, 164. 165. 166, 167 

Army Scn1my t\gcncr Trammg Center: 1 58, 

173 

Arm}' Secumy Ct:nter: I 16 

Army Service Forces: 63. 67. 70. 76 103. 106 

Arm}· Staff 159,161,170, 173, IH 

Arullcry·2l.34, 113 

As1an Amcncans 57 

Asmara. hnrca, I thiopia: 79. 110 

Assistant (hid 1,f Staff for lntclhgcncc (ACSl) 

Kureatl>Vietn.un· 121,126,136.137 

138- 39. 1-fO. 14.2 

reorganization and renewal: 170. 172-73. 

174. 1 75. I 76, l!H 

V1ctnamandbeyond 149, 158.159.160. 

163. 164. 165. 16o 

t\tomk· bomb. 99 

Augshurg. Germany· I 33 

Austraha: 61, 78.93-94, 9(1 

Austrahan mtelhgcncc 94-95 

Aumia-llungaT}'' 12 

1\.x1s Power,;: 87 99. 10 l. .)l'<' abo Geml<ltl}', 

Iapan. 

Baker, Lafayeuc: 10-11 

Baker. :-..c,\lon 20, 22 

Balloons. obscrvauon 9, 18 

Balumorc \ld 73. 74 82, 160-61 

Baulc of the Bulge: I 52 

Bcaureg:~rd ~1aJ Gcn P1errc: 10 

Bell, MaJ. Grn j. J'ranklm: 16 

Bellmore. '\ \ 79 

Bcrlm. CJcm1any: 10 I, I 22, 145 

Berlm Wall 134 

Bien lll1a, Vlctn;un: 1-fR 

B1s~ll \hlJ Gen Clarton· 80 

BlcLthle} Park, l·ngland: 68. Bof. 92 

Bol~hc,;k Re,·oluuon 38-39 ofl-42 

Bomp, C1pt. I lcnry 1 12-I .3 

Bn1Z11: 66 

Bntam: 21. 51-52. Srr also c.rcat Bntam. 

Briush imclhgcncc: 68- 69,80 84 -85 91-93 

Burc<lll of Insurgent Record~. Pluhppmcs 14 

Byrllll 1-lot Springs. Cahf . 6.2 

Callaw:~y. llO\\;Hd: Jt,lJ-70 

Camps 

( rowder. Mo.: 68 

Drake, Iapan : 115 
INDEX 

Camps (com.) 

llolabml \ld .. 74, 76. 106-07 Sec ah<l 

Fon llolabird. 

~teade ~ld 76. 'ia also Fon \1eade 

Rttchic, :-.1d .. 67, 7ft. 112 

Savage, Mtnn.: 67 

~harpe, Pc:nn.: 67 

Cm Tho. \'tetnam: 148 

Canada.47 

Canal Zom·. Panama: 53, 66. 166. Sa ai\Cl 

Panama 

Canbbcan: 110 

Ctrhslc Barracks, Penn.: 112 

(avail)· as scouts. ~9. II 

Cease-fire m \'tetnam 146 

Censorship: 32, 16-.37, +2, 70, 91, 116, 119, 

130. 145 

C\:1\lral r\mcnca. 169 

Ct·mral Bureau, Brisbane (CBB): 94, 95 

Central Ckarance hlcilny· 175 

Central Ct)mmand. US (CF'\ TCOM). 177. 

188 

Ct•tmallmclhgcncc Agency (CIt\): 105 106. 

110 191 192 

Ccntrallmclltgcnce (oroup: 103, 104-0'5 

Central Records Factltt)': 107 

lt·mral '>ct:urtty Factluy· 175 177 

Umral ~nmty Scn·tcc 164, 171, 191 

Centralization 136. 137. 163-64. 165 

Cluumom france 33 35. 37 

Chrmical Warfare '>cmcc: 6-t 

<. htang Kat ·shck: 4 7 

Chtcago. Ill 58. 67, 73 

Chad. Corps of lntdltgcncc Pnlt<.:c 57 

C htd of Engmcers: 160 

Chad of the lntclligcnt:c Corp~. 140 

(_ hu:f of \hlttal) 1ntclltgcncc 17 3 

ChaefofStaH,Anny 128.1"10, 167,173 

Chma: IS. 18.+7. 51,62.80,101 

< hmese Commum ... ts. 101-02. 113. 114, 118 

<. hurchtll Bng. Gen \larlbortlugh: 31 

( hurchtll Wmston <;: 81 

Capher Buro.:au Ill 

Ct\tl disturbance I '5-l-55. !So. 162-o3 '>re 

also lntclltgencc, dome5uc 

Ct\·tl Dt5turhancc lnformauon Collecuon Plan: 

162 

C 1vtl War, Amcncan: 3, ~9. II 

C.tnhan Con~n·auon Corps (CCC): 48 

Clark Facld. Phtlippmrs 110 

C Iarke. Col Caner \V.: 65 

Clausewllz, Karl \'On 3 

Code-brcakmg: 47. 68, 78 )ct' also Mr\cac, 

UIIRA 

Code and Cypher School. Bruam 68 

Codes and ctphcrs 18. 29-30. 37-38, 42, 

427 

59-60, 68-70. 119 Set• cJiso Ctyptology 

Cody, Buffalo Btll I I 

Cold War. 6, 101, 104. 107. 109, 133, 188-89 

Combat Developments Command: 139 

Combat Dc\'elopmcnts Command lntclhgcnce 

Agency 173 

Combat clt·ctromc warfare and mtelhgcncc 

(C f\\1): 179-HO, 181. 182. 183 188. 

193. 194 

Combat mtclhgencc. S!'t' lmclhgcncc, combat. 

Combat '>un·ctllancc and Electronic Warfare 

SchO<)I 173 

Combmcd Intelligence Center, Vietnam 148 

Commumcauons 9. 17-19. 29-30. 37-38. 

46 77,81-81 109. 114 127. 130. 148, 

150, 152. 171, 173, 191 

Commumcations imclligcnce (COM I NT) 

Korea 117-18, 119 

World \\ar II 62-63, 65, o$-71, 77. 80, 

82-83,84,85-87.93,94-97 

Commumcauons rcconnats&mt:c. 117 131-33 

Communte,mons st•nmt) (CO\ISEC) 81. 

1+9 -50, 152, 166. 172. 173, 175, 193, 

19-t 

Commuamm/Communists. 51. 10 I, 121. 169 

Contincnwl Army Command (CONI\RC). 

137,139,140153,102 

Commrnt,lllmned o.;tates (CO:-..U~): 163. 

165, 166, 175, 192, 19-t 

(oohdge. jefferson: 12 

Cordenn<m. Col (later Bng <.ocn ) Prt'!>tOn \\': 

79 

Corozal. Canal Zone. 77 

Corp~ of l.nginecrs. Su Enganrers. Curps of. 

Corp~ of lntclhgcncc Police (CIP): 26-27. 

32,42,"14,52,53, 57-58 

Corp> of Interpreters. U.S. Army: 24 

Corps of 1 opogmphtc Engmccrs. ~9 )t't: also 

Engmccrs. topograph~t 

Corregtd!lr, Phthppmes: 9-t 

Cor!) Statton, Fla 173 

Counter Intelligence Branch. 5 I, 124 

Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC): 6, 72. 73. 

74, 75, 76.85.89.96 
428 

Coumer lntclhgcncc Corps lcont.) 

Cold Warto Vu:tnam: 115-16. 118. 126. 

127 139-"10. 141. 194. 195, 196 

rcorgamzati<m of: 90, 103. 105. 106--07, 

108-09. I H-25 

Counter lmclhgcnce Corps Detachments: 

106--07 108. 112-13. 114. I 15-16, 

118. 134. 135, 139--W 

Coumer Intelligence Corps c. roup. 66th 

133-H 

Counter lntelhgcnce Corps "<:hool 107, 124 

Countere~pl(lnagc: 23, 26, 28. I 53-54 Srl' 

also Countermtelhgcnce 

Countenmclhgcncc: 4-6, 10. 14 

between the wars: 42 -H. 51, 52,57-58 

Cold War and Korea· 103, 106, 107, 

108-09. 111. 112 I 19 

future trends. 191, 192, 194,195, 196 

Korea to Vietnam 126. 127 130-31. 135. 

139-"10, HI 

rcorgamzauon and renewal 170. 173, 175. 

178. 180-81 

Vietnam and beyond· 147-48,152,153, 

154, ISS, 159,160. 161-63, 165, 166 

World War I 2.4-27, 29, 31, 35,39 

World War II 4, 67, 70, 72, 74-76, 86. 89. 

90,95-96,98 

Countersubvcrs1vc program: 72-73, 74-75, 

84, 116, 162 

Cnmmal lnvesugauon Command, U.S. Army: 

162-63 

Cnmmallm·esugation DI\'ISIOn (CID). 140 

Cryptanalysls/cryptanai)'Sts 30. 35, 37-38. 

46-"17,48. 54.59-60.68-70.77-80 

Cryptology· S-6. 9, 18, 29. 39. 42 See cllso 

Codes and c1phcrs 

between the wars: 46--47.48, 54-SS 

Cold War and Korea. 102-03. 109-10, 111 

diplomatic: 47, 54, 60. 77-78 

KoreatoV1etnam. 127.128, H2 

recapitulation and future trends: 191, 192, 

193. 194. 195 

reorganization and renewal: 171. 172. 177 

\'1etnam and berond 147. 148. 1'>1. 

164-65. 167 

World War II 59, 77, 94-95 

Cuba· 13, 14, 18, 121. 145 

0-day: 88-89 

Da Nang. Vietnam: 148 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCC 

Ddcnsc. Department of (DOD). Ill, 122-23, 

136. 153. 155 164. 106 

Defense Ccntmllndcx ,)f lnvcsugauons. 153 

Deknsc IIUt-.IINT Service (DHS) 192 Srr also 

human mtclhgcnce. 

Defense Intelligence /\gene) (DIA) 136. 137. 

138. 139 

rcorgantzauon and renew;ll: 176, 179. 183 

189. 192 

V1etnam and beyond: 147 149. I 58, 159-60 

Ddcnse lntelhg~nce <;chool 137-38 

Defense lmclhgcncc ~crv cc 192 

Defense lnvesugau,·c Rniew Counc1l 162, 166 

Ddcnsc lnvesngativc',ervlcc.l62.16-t, l91 

Defense l~mguage lnstnute 138 

Defense Mapptng Agency- 164, 11.)1 

Defense \.uclcar Agency: 166 

Defense Supply Agency· 138 

Denholm MaJ Gen C'harb 1 -+9 

Denmark: 52 

Dcpanment of Defense Rcorgamzauon ,\ct 

( 1986): 191 

Dr,FRT SroR.\1. See Ope muon Dt>r ~T SlOR\l. 

Dewey, Admiral George 14 

DIA Production Center· L 37 

Dtcm, Ngo Dmlr 145 

D1en Bien Phu. VIetnam· 121 

Dnect support unns (DSU): 148 

D1rcctor l)f lntdhgencc US Arm) 104-05, Ill. 

D1rcctor..uc of Combat lntelhgenec: 138 

D1rectomte of r·oreign lntdhgcnec 137 170 

D1rcetoratc of Information Systems for 

Command. Control, Commumcauons, 

and Computers. 193 

Dtrcctoratc of '>ccUnt) lntclhgence 138 

Directorate of Surveillance and Reconna1ssanee: 

138 

Dtng1blc: 18, 46 

DI\'ISion of Mtlnary lnformauon· 7. 12, 196. 

Sec also Adjutant General's Office. 

Donovan Wilham J 56. 58, 63 

Dos Passns.john· 41 

Dmfi:25,27,28.29.53. 161 

Drug abuse: 16 I 

Eastern Europe. 187 

EconomiC Warfare. Board of 62 

Egypt: 121 

Eisenhower. General Dwight D. 5. 68. 86. 

89,92 
INDCX 

Eisenhoweradministrauon: 121. 122. 123, 127 

E1senhower-K1shi1 agreement (1957) 135 

Electronic mtclhgence (ELI NT): 102. I I 3, 

119. 122. 127. 128, 130. 142 See als<> 

electromc warfare. s1gnals intdhgencc 

reorganizmu:m and renewal: 171. 172, 174, 

180-81. 193, 194 

Vietnam and beyond: 152-53, 161, 167 

Elect rome Traming Group 59 

Electromc warfare: 6, 55, 82-83. 161. 167 

)ce also Flecuomc intelligence. Signals 

mtelhgence. 

past and future trends: 188-89, 190, 193, 194 

reorganization and renewal 171, 172. 174. 

176, 181, 182 

Engineer lntclhgencc Office: 92 

Engmcer Topographic Command 160 

Engmccrs, Corps of: 4, 9. 23, 35, 36, 64, 71, 

129, 137 

Engmcers. topograph1c: 4, 8, 23, 34, 35, 36, 

39,92,93.98 

Emgma 68 

Esp1onage: 23. 24, 25. 51, 53,56 

Europe 110, 117, 126, 133. 164. 167. 189-90 

European theater, World War II 67, 69, 73. 

82-83. 133 

European Theater of Operauons (ETO): 85. 

88.89,90-91,92,96 

Expenmental :0.1echamzed Force: 45 

Fab}·an, George: 30 

Fairbanks, Alaska: 79, 110 

Far East Command: 113, 114, 115, I I 7-18, 

175. Sl'C al~o Pac1flc Command 

Federal Bure;m of hwestigauon (FBI) 5 I, 52. 

107, 110, 153. 154. 156 

Federal Commumcauons Act of 1934 49 

Federal Lo}'alty Program: 107-08 

Fnch, MaJ. Gen. Alva R: 142 

Forces Command, U.S. Army (FORSCOI\1) 

174 

Fore1gn mtelhgencc H, 28. 40. 53, 56, 57, 

70,137,138, 170.175-76 . .'>endso 

Counterimclhgence, Intelligence, poSill\'e 

Fore1gn Intelligence Command. 190 

fore1gn Sc1ence and 1 echno1ogy Center: 13 7, 

189 

Forc1gn Serv1ce and Technology Center: 176 

Forney Board 111 

Forts 

BelvOir, Va: 177. 185 

Bragg, N.C. 137, 147, 176 

Devens, Mass. 112, 125, 143. 173. 185 

Gordon, Ga .. 140, 189 

llancock, N.J : 77 

429 

Holah1rd. ~1d 107, 112, 122. 123, 124. 

125. 127, 129,138-39, 140, 141. 143, 

160, 163, 175. Sec also Camp Holabtrd 

Hood, Te.x 180 

11uachuca,Anz.: 127,160-61,163,173,185 

Hunt, \'a.: 62 77 

leavenworth, Kans. 11 

Lewis, Wash· 114, 160 

McKmle}'. Ph1ltppmes 77 

Meade, Md.: 127,163, 177, 190. Sec also 

Camp Meade 

Monmouth, N_J.: 48, 49. 58. 68 

Richardson, Alaska· 98 

Riley. Kans 112, 125, 160 

Ritchie, Md.: 96 

Sam 11ouston. Tex 77 

Shafter, Hawau. 77. 79 

Snelling, Mmn.: 67 

Washmgton, Md .. 67 

Fou101s, Maj . Bcnpmm· 19 

France 12. 21. 22. 29, 38, 51. 52, 56. 76. 89, 

92. 133 

I rankfun. German>•: I 34 

freedom of lnformauon Act Office: 165 

Fnedman, W1lltam F.: 46, 47, 48, 54. 55, 

59-60, 94. Ill 

l·rochlkc, Robert F.: 156 

c.-2· 64-65. 70. 84, 89, 91-92,94. 95-96. 

97, 102, 103, 108, I H. 1 15, 116, 

122-23, 124. 128, 130. 171. 172-73. 185 

CARDH> PLOT: 154-55 

Cehlen, Maj. Gen. Remhardt 106 

(,cneral lleadquarter!>, A1r Corps. 46 

General Staff, European: 7, 14-15 

General Staff. U.S .. 3-4,14, 15. 16, 17, 18, 21. 

23,24,28,31.42,43,103-04 

Geographic Scrv1ce. Allied: 95 

C.cograph1e Spcc1alist Detachment, U S Aml}: 

123 

German Amenc;ms: 25 

Gcm1an>•: 12,17,21,41 

under Nazis 51, 52. 55. 76, 82-83, 91-92. 

98-99 
430 

c,ermany (com.) 

aft~r World \\ar II 101, IOt\-09, 116, 129, 

130, 13.3-34, 175 

c,eny:.burg. Penn 9 

Godding. M::q Gen George: 167, 172 

GllOdfdk)\\ Atr Force Ba:.c, fcx : 173 

Gra\'Cs, Maj Cen Wilham S 19 

(,reaL Brnam 12, 13, 14-15, 22, 29, 53, 59. 

68, 84, H5, 89 Src alsCl Brnain 

(,rcecc 101 

(,rccnhow. Rosa· 10 

Guam. 79,93 

c;uernlla warfare (\'tctnam)· 14 7. I 51 

c.ulf\Var. Sn· Operation DESHH STOR\L 

llatg, held Marshal Sir Douglas: 4 3 

Hames Board 158 

I larding, Warren C..: 41 

llarnshurg. Penn 66, 67 

llawau: 61, 110. 135, 166 

lldemano, llawau 110 

llelicopters: 131-32,150. 152. 180-81 

HemiSphere lmelhgcncc Command, Amcncan. 

66 

llcrzo Base, Germany: 110 

llnler. Adolf 51. 52 

lllll, Capt. Parker· 18. 29 

llomestcad, ria.: 142 

!looker, MaJ (,en. joseph. I 0 

llom·cr. J. Edgar 154 

lloover Cornrntsston. 125 

Hopkms. H;trry: 75 

lloward, Mtchael: 187 

lluman mtelhgencc (HL MINT): I I 7-18. 122, 

124-25. 126, 134 135. 138 

reorgamzauon and renewal 170. 174-75, 

177, 180, 190, 191, 192 

Vtctnam and beyond: 148, 156, 158, 166 

lluston Frederick 162 

Imagery mterpretauon 181 . Sa al'<, 

Photographic reconnaissance 

Imagery lmrrpretauon Center, U.S Amly 

140,159,163.181 Set'alsoPhoto 

lnterprctauon Center 

India-Burma theater: 62. 80 

lndtan scouts 8. II, 19 

lndustnal security program: 123, I 38 

I'ISCO\L Sa LiS Amt} lntclhgenn· and 

Sccurnr Command 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Intelligence St't' ah<> Arm} lntclhgcncc; 

Mthtar} lntelhgence 

ci\'than· 9. 25. 26. 125-26 

collcctton. •t, 7-8, 155, 174-75, 178-7<> 

attaches: 12 13. 14, 15. 16 17. 20, 

22-23.24,28. 16.42,43,44. 

45-46,51.52 53 55 65 105-06 

109, 111, 122. 137-38, 165,174-76, 

191 192 

muludt~ctpltnary appmach: 174-75, 

17P-79 

scouts: 8, 10, ll. 19 

tcchnolog}· 18, 19, 30, 33-H, 56 5t'r 

ah<l technolo~w. mnuence of. 

comhat 33-H, 45. 59. 64. 76, 112, 125. 

130. 138.142, 148 157-58, 161 

commumcanons .Scr Communicanons 

mtclhgence (COM I NT) 

domc~nc: 154, 155, 156, 161-62,191, 192. 

Ser also ct\il dtsturh,mce 

cconomtc. 105. 146. 191 , 192 

clectrtlnk. St't' El~:uromc mtclhgencc (EIIl'T). 

foretgn. Sec Fore1gn mtelhgcncc 

human Sa Human mtelligcncr (Ill \lll'T) 

1omt:62.o3,93. 147, 152 

negauw: 23. 24, 27. 31,44 Sec t~lsa 

CoumcnnteiiJgence 

pohucal 105, 191, 192 

posntve· 23. 24. 27. 31, 92.98. 109. 113 

productton 174, 176, 178-79, 180-81. 

189, 191 , 192 194 

rad10 Sec Radto mtelhgence 

role of 4. 5. 6 

signals. See Stgnals mtelhgencc (SIC.. IN 1'). 

spcct<llbts 91-92, 118. 183-8-t 

~tratcgic·t06,112,ll3,119.125.137, 

139,189-90 

support of occupation forces: 10P-09 

tacucal. Sa Tactteal mtclhg<"nce 

techntcal· 91-92,97, 116, 127. 129-30. 

131-33, 141-42. 166-67, 177 78, 

180-81. 194 See aho Technology, 

mnuencc or 

topographtc· 91. 92, 95 121. 164 

tramtng: 66-67 

lntcllig<"nce Agcnc}' U '> Anny (U~t\ 1'\TI\) 

Ins, l6(l, 171, 172. 177 

Intelligence Center Europe. L '\. Arm>·: 158 

lntclligt·nce Center and ~chool. U.S Army· 

161. 165. tn 179. 184-85 
INDEX 

lllll'lllgcncc Command, U ">.Army \U5>AIN fC): 

141. 153-5'5. 156-57, 159-60, 161-63. 

to'Hm. 170 

Intelligence Lorr~- 126, 127, 138-39, H2. 

147, 196 

Intelligence Corp!> Command. l., .S Arm}' 

139-40 HI 

lntclhgcncc, Dcput> Ch1cf of ...,taff for (IX':>INT): 

IR4.189 

lntclhgence Dl\'lslon: 10}-{H, 105, 100--07, 

109,112,115 

lmelhgcnce c. roup, Central. l 03. I 04-05 

Intelligence Matcncl Development Support 

Office: 141 

lntclhgcnce \latcnel~ Supply Office· I 59 

lntclhgcnce Orgamzmion and !>tauomng Stud>• 

(lOSS): 169 70,171-72. 173-74, 176, 

179, 180, 193. 194 

lntclhgcnce Pollee, Corps of (CIP): 26-27, 32, 

42,+4. 52. 53.57-58 

lntelhgcncc xhool, Army A1r t·orccs: 66,67-68 

lntelhgcnce School. Pacific. US. Armr 135 

lntclhgcnce and Sccunty Command, U5. Anny 

(INSCOM) 174-76 

futurr trend-. 188, 189, 190, 193, 196 

T{'orgamzauon and rcnew;tl 177, I 78, 179, 

183, 184-85 

Intelligence and Threat AnalysiS Center: I 74, 

175, I 76, 189 

lntcro:pt operauons: 23, 30, 33, 35, 40, 49, 

78,79,93 

Interrogation pcr!>onnel: 91, 93, 95, 96. 98. 

130. 148-49. 180 

lnve5ttgauve Records RepoSitory (IRR) I 53, 

155. 162, 163, 165, 175 

lraman hostage cns1s: 169 

Iraq 188. 190 

lrishAtnericans· 25 

Iron Cunain. 133, 187 

hah.m front 33, 38 

h:-tl}' 51. 76, 87, 89, 92 

J-2 )l't' lntelltgcnce. joint 

Jacbon Lt. Gen ThomasJ ("Stonewall") 9 

Japan I 3, 15, 51, 53, 55, 83, 93, 98. I 08-09. 

114, ll6, 118. 133. 135. 147. 166 

Jap,mcsc lingutsts. 6 7, 108-09 Src also 

l..;mguage trammg; l.mglust~. 

Japanrsr military communtC<Iltons: 77-78, 79, 

93. 95. St't' also Cryptanalysis; Purple 

Johnson, Andrew: l 1 

)tlhnson, lyndon B. 14'5 

Johnson :~dn11m:.tratton 146, I So 

431 

Jmnt Ch1cls ol Staff (JC'>) 62-61, HO, 91-92, 

93, 110, 123, 150-51, 167. 191 

jomt lntclhAcnce Center, Pac1fic Ocean Area 

OICPO.\) 93 

)mm Intelligence Commntce (JK.). 62. 63 

u~r CAU~I 'ire Opcmuon ju::.r (\LI~I 

Ju~uce. Department of 25. 29 

Kcllogg-Bnand Pact: 4 7 

Kennedy, john F .. 121 -22. 136, 145 

Ktblcr, Col Harold R 75 

Kmg, Admtral Ernest. 61. 80 

Kmg, Manm Luther, Jr.: 156 

Knox. Frank. 61 

Korea 

postwar 129. 130, 133,134, 135.166, 167, 

175 

m warttme· 101, 111-14. 116. 118 

Korean V.ar 102.111,113. liS. 116. 117, 118, 

119, 1.21. 124, 129, 131-32, 151, 184,194 

Kuhn, Brig Gen. joseph: 22, 85 

Kullback, <,olomon 48 

Kuma, llawaw 177 

Kuwait. 188 

Land 1nfomMJOn Warf.m:: Acuvity (IIWA): 190 

Lmgres, France: 33 

Language trmning: 58, 67, 112, 135, 138, 147. 

Su alsolmgUlsts 

1,...\'\TER:>.. SI'IKE (domcsttc mtelhgcnce collecuon 

plan) 155 

Latin Amcnca: 53-54, 55, 66, 70, 84 

League of Nauons: 4 I 

Lewis. (Menwetherl and Clark, (C,corge Roger!>( 

8 

1 iddelllian, Basil: 22 

I mcoln. Abraham: II 

LtngUISIS. 95, 96, 112, 115, 130, 131, 149, 

179, 182-83. Sec also language training. 

Long. Lt. W D.: 44 

Longstreet, It Gen james A. 9 

Low-imensny conflt" 177 

Luzon, Ph1llppines: 94 

M209: 119, 128 

MacArthur, Capt (later General) Douglas· 

16-17,78,80,93-94.95.96.114 

McChrisuan, Maj. Gen joseph A.: 147. 148, 160 
432 

~lcCiellan, \iaj. Gcn George R.: 1() 

t-.lcCioy, john J.: 70 

\lcCormack. Col. Alfred. 65, 71. 80 

Mc\:amara, Roben ~. 121-22, 136, 137 

McNamara reforms: 136-39. 141-42, 172 

McName} ll Gen joseph 61--62, 74 

MAGIC 54-55, 59-60, 65 

Manhauan Project: 75, 91-92 

Mamla. Ph1hppines 14 

March, General Peyton C.: 31 

Marine Corps, U.S : 93, 95 

\1m·sha11, General George C. 43-+4, 52, 63.80 

Marshall Plan: 101 

Marshall. S L. A.: 4 

Massi\·e retahauon strateg} 121-22 

Mcflsuremcnt and signature mtelhgcnc:e 

(MASINT): 194 

\lcd1cal Corps: 64 

Medical Intelligence and lnformauon Agency· 

176 

Mcduerranean: 51, 83 

Mcduerrancnn Theater of Operations (MTO)· 

85.86.89.90.92 

Message to Gnrc1a": I 3 

Mexican War· 8 

Mex1co: 8. 13, 16-17, 19 

M1am1, Fla.: 66, 70 

M1cronesm· 76 

M1ddle East 62 

Miles, Brig. Gen. Sherman: 53, 55-56 

t\.lihtary Academy. lJ S .. 8 

\liluarr Assistance Command. Vietnam 

(MACV): 145, 147,148, ISO. 152,159 

l\.hluarr Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Stud1cs and Ob~rvauon Group 150-5 I 

Mlluary auaches, mtclhgcncc role of· 12, 13, 

14, 15 16. 17 24. 28. 36 

between wars: 33. 42, 43, 45-46. 55 

Jfter World War II 105. 109. 113. 122. 

137-38. 165 

M1htary Dlstnct of Washmgton (~10\V): 103, 

106. 139 

\hhtary lnformauon C..ommutce· 16-17, 22 

M1htary Information DiVJs1on. 13, 14, 18, 22, 

33. 34 35.36 37-38.40.43.45,57 

\hhtar}' lntclhgencc: 3-7, 21 Sec al~o Armr 

Intelligence. 

dcfiniuon of- 24. 32, 39, 124 

past and future trends: 188, 191, 193, 195, 

196 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

l\hhtary lntclhgence (cont ) 

reorganization and renewal: 136. 171, 179, 

183. 184-85 

stalf: 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 52,56 

Mihtary lnu:lligencc Bmtahons 130-31, 133, 

177, 17S-79, 181-82 193 

24th: 182 

29th: 188 

201st: 177 

202d:l77 

203d: 177 

319th: 130 

502d: 130, 134 

Sl9th: 130, 147, 148 

522d: 180 

532d: 130, 133-34 

~11htary 1ntelhgence Branch: 28-30. 31, 32. 

37,46-47,157-58,172,173,195 

Mihtary lntelhgencc Brigades· 178-79 

470th: 188 

504th· 188 

513th• 188 

525th· 188 

70lst: 179 

702d: 189 

703d: 179 

704th: 179 

\llhtary Intelligence Commmcc: 19 

\11lunry lntclhgcnce C..ompames 

11th: 177 

319th. 10~9. 112, 130 

M1htary lntclhgencc Corps. 6, Ill, 184 

Mdunry lntclhgencc Detachments: 166 

\1dual'} lnte1hgencc DI\'ISIOn ~110): 5 6, 22, 

31-32 Sec also M1lital'}' lmelhgencc Ser\'I<:C. 

between the wars: 40. 41. 42, 43, 44, 45. 

46, 47, 51. 53. 54 

rcorgamzauon of 63-68, 69-71, 10.3-04, 

119, 136 

m World War II. 59--60, 61--62, 80, 84, 92. 

102 

~1iluary lntdligencc DI\1Sion Spwal Branch 

65,66,68--69,70-71.80 

Miluary lmclligence c.roups. 147-48. 153, 

157 162--63 

66th· 157 

109th: 163 

!35th: 147-48 

!49th. 148 

470th: 174 
INDEX 

~lllnary lmclligcncc Groups ((om.) 

SOOth: 165-66. 174 

50lst. 175 

513th 117 177-78 

902d. 159 163. 175 178 

n:orgamzauon and renewal 172, 174-75. 

177,178.182,189 

~hluary lmrlhgcncc Ofhrers Rcscrw Corps 

(M10R(.): 45. 58. 113, 11 6, 149 

'lhiHal) lmclhgcnce Org,mizauon 130, 1 33. 194 

\hhtal) 1mclltgcncc xwon 22-23. 24, 25. 

27.28,29 

Mthtary 1mdltgencc .,ervin· (M IS): 5, 6-1-65, 

66.67 69-72.74,83-84,85.90-91.97. 

104. 172-73 )n· ctlso Mtltt.tl)' 1ntclhgcnce 

Division 

~hhtal)· 1ntclhgencc ~rvicc Groups: 116. Src 

also \hhtal) lmclhgcncc (rroups. 

500th: 116, 135 

513th 116, 133-H 

525th. 116 

Mtlnary 1ntclhgencc Service L.tnguage School: 

67, 112 

~hhtal)· 1ntclhgencc ~rvtce Orgamzauon 112. 

116 

Mtlitary lmclligcnce Trammg C.t•nter (M1 fC.): 

66-67,76,96,98.112 

Mthtal)' Personnel Ccmer: 175 

Mthtary Reservations Dt\'ision 8, 12 

\1o~ow. Russta. 116 

Mozambtque 169 

Munich, Germany: 157 

\hl';solim. Benito: 51 

Nauonal Agt'ncr Check Cemcr; 153 

1\ational Amw. 25 

'\ational Defense Act 21 42 52 191 

Nauonal Ground 1ntclhgcnce C.t.:nLer: HN 

'\auonal Guard 21, 25. 42.49 182 

29th 1nfanuy Dt\·tston (Mal)·land-Vtrgmta): 

182 

Utah: 182-83 

l\auonal sccunt\': 25. 26. 29 

1'\auonal Sl'cUnl) Agency lt":,:\)· Ill. 127, 

136. 138. 139, 158. 164, 171, 191, 192 

Nauonal Sccunt) Counctl (!'SC). 105 

1'\<t\'}', us ll. 54, 58-59, 60, 93. 95 

Navy lmelhgcnce: 62-63. 80 

t"azts: 5 I 52 oS 

l\e\\' Delhi, lndta: 79 

:-Jew York Cay. 'J Y 25. 27. 53. 55. 66, 

70-71.72.79 

Nha Trang. Vtetnam: 148 

'Jnnu: Admiral C.he!>ter W 93 

'\t~t: 67. 9). 95 IOB-09, 112 

Ntxon, Rtlhard M 164, 169 

Ntxon admmistratwn· H6 

433 

'\olan. C.apt {later \laJ. Gen) Oenm!> E.: 17. 

26, 32, -+0, 18'5 

Nonega. Coeneral Manuel: 187-188 

\:ormand) France 76 

:--.oms Board· 157. 158 

Nonh Africa: 58, 61, 62, 63, b8. 73, 87,89 

'\onh Afncan Theater of Opcrauons (:--/A fO): 

85. 80-87. 89, 90, 92 . .St:r alw 

Mcdttcmmean 1 heater of Operations (MTO). 

'-;onh Atlanuc Treaty Orgamzauon (NATO): 

101 102 

North Knr,·a. 11 3, 114, 116-17 

North Vtetnam: 121, 145 

'\onh \'tetnamcsc 145-46 

Norwa)'· 52 

1\. uclear weapons: 12 I 

Oberursd, German)'. 133 

Observatton groups: 46, 97, 113 

Obsen·auon posts 34 

Offtce of the Asststam Chtef of '>taff. c.-2. 115 

Off'ice of the Assistant Chtcf of !>taff for 

lntclhgence(OACSI): 123. 137 138. 147. 

158, 159-60. 165. 173, 175 

OITtce of the Chief of Engineers: 137 

Office of 'la\'allntclltgcncc (Ol\1) 11. 53,62-63 

Off'ice of the Secreta!) of Defense: 163 

Offtce of ')trategtc ':lcrvtces (OSS): 63, 66, 92, 

95. 96, 103 

Office of the Surgeon General. 137, 170. 176 

Okmawa. 135 

Operation ObERT SIORM: 188, 189, 190 

Operauon jt·"~ C\l"'>E 187-88. 189 

Operauon Tc•RCII 63 

Operational Secttnl)' Group· 166 

Operauon~sccum~ (OPSE(): l71.IH. 175, 

176. 178. 190 

Opposing forces (Ol'I'OR) trammg pmgram; 

177-7R 

Order of battle teams 91, 112 

Ordnanct' Corps: M, 137 

Orgamzauon of Petroleum Exporung 

Coumncs (OPEC): lo9 
434 

Orlando, ria.: 67 

PaCific Command· 110, 133, 134-35. Sec al~o 

Far East Command. 

Pac1flc Ocean Area (POA) 85, 93 

Pac1fic theater, World War II· 60. 61, 69, 76. 

80.85-86 

Panama. 55, 166. 177, 187, 189, 190 SL·ealso 

Canal Zone 

Paris France. 92 

Pans Peace Accords: 146. 153 

Paris Peace Conrcrence 41-4 2 

Parker, Maj. Gcn julius; 184 

Pearl Harbor, llawaii: 53. 60, 62, 64-65. 77, 

78, 82. 104, 116 

Pentagon. 136 

Permanent mtelhgence umlS. 179-80, 181 

Pershing. Brig. Gen. {later General) john j.: 19, 

21, 23.31,32,33.40,43 

Pers1an C.ulr War· 188. 194 .Srt' also Opcrauon 

Dr:~I:RT ST(1RM. 

Personnel Secunt} Group: 159. 163 

Ph1hppme msurrection. 14, 24 

Philippmcs: 14, 15. 18, 39. 53, 76. 93, 95, 96, 

148 

PIIOENIX 151 

Photo lnterpretauon Center· 125 Sec e~lso 

lmagcl)· lntcrpretauon Cemcr. U \. Am1y 

Photo mterpreters: 23. 33. 91, 112, 130, 131. 132 

Photographic n:conna15osance· 34-35, 39, 46. 

97. I 22. Sec also Imagery mterprctation. 

Phu Bat. V1etnam 148. 151 

Pmkenon AgenC},. 27 

Ptnkerton, Alan 10 

Pleasanton, ~laJ Gen. Alrred: 10 

Poland: 52 

Polygraph 107 

Presidio or Monterey, CahL: 112 

Prcsidto or San r·rancisco. Cahl. 58. 67, 77 

Proress1onalism IQ5, 196 

ProJeCt 80: 137 

ProJect ACSI-\IATIC: 122 

PrOJCCt MICiil{u\~: 119, 184 

ProJeCt $H:URI1Y SIHI'I o 139 

ProJect \ .,:-;c;u 187 

Propaganda: 56, 57, 63, 103 

Protective \1obihzation Plan: 4<) 

Prov1s1onal Rad1o Intelligence Detachment: 48 

Provost Marshal General's Orflce· 58. 75. 107, 

122. 138, 139, 140 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

PsychologiCal warrare: 66, 92-93, 190 

PubliC relauons: 36-37. 40, 43. 45. 58 

Puerto R1co: 13 

Pt '\LH Bwu<: 155 

Pumuve expedition. 19 

Purple: 54-55. 59. 68. 77 

Pyongyang, '\orth Korea 116-17 

Quartermaster Corps: 9. 64, 129 

Racial unrest: 146. 161 

Radar 45. 55, 59 82-83. 113, 132-33, 180, 

181,194 

Radio Corporation or Amenca (RCA): 122 

Rad1o Group Forward (RAGFOR): 93 

Radto intelligence. 35. 45, 49, 56, 82-83. See 

also s1gnals mtclhgem:e 

bt Rad1o lmelhgcnce Company; 48-49 59 

p(lStwar·t03,1JQ,147-48,l50 

World War II 86, 88, 93, 94-95. 98 

Rad10 Research Units(RIW): HI, 147. 148, 

152 

RadiO-telephone. 149 

R<tdio tractors: 18-19.30 

Readmess Trammg (REDTRI\1:\)· 183 

Rcconnatssance: 7, I 7. 19. See e~lso communicauons mtcll1gcncc r.td1o mtelligence 

I st Reconnaissance Banahon 95 

reorgamzation 180-81 

m wars. 34-35. 39, 95-96, 97, 150 

Redstone Arsenal. Ala.: 129, 137 

Regular t\nnr 53 182-83. 184 

Regular Arlll)' orficers: 6. 23, 83, 142-41 

Reorgamzauon ObjeCtive ·\rmy D1vision 

(ROAD): 122, 179 

Republic of Korea (ROK) St•c Korea. 

Republic or VIetnam Srr South VIetnam 

Res<1da, Caltf.. 79 

Reserve components: 161, 183 

Reserve officers 6, 142-43, 149, 195 

Rtdgway, General Mauhew B.: 114, 115, 124 

Rl\t:rbank L1bomwnes. Ill .30 37.46 

Rolya. Bng Gen. (later MaJ Gen.) Willir~m 1.. 

174 

Rome. hal> 92 

Ro~1sevelt l·mnklin D: 51, 52, 56, 81 

R·' H!L I 55 

Rowan, Lt. Alben: 13 

Rowleu. Frank: 48 55 

Roral Au~tralian forces. 94 
INDEX 

Ru:;sta: 12,38-39. -ll , 113 Sn alwSo\1ct Umon. 

Russtan Institute, Germany· 175, 190 

R}·an, MaJ. )ames A· 19 

Saigon, Vtetnam: 14'> I 48 

San Franctsco, Calif. 55, 58,(\{), 67, 70 

Santiago Cuba 14 

<;;Hellites. 121 

Saudi Arabta. 188 

Scandinavtan Amencans: 25 

::>ctentific t\d\'lsorr Board: 167 

ScoLL. MaJ. C.cn. Hugh: 22 

Scouts, use of. 8, 10, II. 19 Srr also 

lmelhgcnce collccuon 

!'>carchlight platoons. 35 

Scntrity \gency, Pactfic. U.S Army: l35 

St:cunty Agency. C ::.. Anny (L'<.ASA) 129. 

135, 138-39, 1-ll-42, 149, 167. IN 

Security Agency Bo;trd. U.S Army 128-29 

'-ccunty ·\~enC\' Groups, L 5 Anny: 129, 135 

32lst 135 

502d: 164 

507th 164 

508th 135, 164 

~ccunty Agency Trammg Center and School, 

U.S Artn)' (USASATC&S) 143 

Sccunty Intelligence Corps: 103 

SHTRITY Sttm o. 5t•r ProJeCt StCVRITY ~IIILLD. 

Services of Supply 6J-64 5t't' also Arm>' 

Servtct: Forces. 

Seward, \\'tlliam Henry. 10 

Sharpe, Col George V 10. 11 

Sheen Lt. Col. H Gordon: 98 

Sabcria, Russaa: 38-39 

SIGABA 81, 106. 110 

Signal Corps: 4, 5, 6, 9, 14 Sn alw Sagnal 

lntclltgcnce Semce; Stgnal "ccunt}' Agencr. 

hetwccn wars: 45 'f6, 47, 48. 49, 52 

Korea to \'tctnam 1.27. 128, 129-30, 142 

rctrospccu'·e: 193, 194. 195 

World War 1: 17-18,23, JO. 35, 37 

\\'orld War II: 64, 68,91-93.94.95, qs 

Stgnal Corps Code Compalauon "cellon 37-38 

Signal information and momtormg (SIAM): 89 

~tgnal1mclhgence Dtnston~ 86, 87 88 89 

St):nallntclligence Semce '>15): 46-49 '5.2 

54-55 58-59,64,65 77 94 

~ignal radto antelligrnce 86, ~7-88, 89, 

9-l-95 98. i<'t ulstl radw mtelhgenc:( 

Stgnal Sccunty Acll\'ll)" 166 

435 

Stgnal Sccurit)' Agency St:t' c1ho Signal Ctlrps; 

Stgnal lntclhgcm:e Scn·acc 

Prot~·cuvc Sccunt}' Brand1 · 82-83 

signal scn·ice battahons 52 77-78. 79. 82. 

83 9'f, 110. 164 

signal scrvace companies. 89, 95, 114 

World War 11 67-68. 77-78, 79-80, 

81-84.85,98 102.173 

Stgnal !>en•tce Battahon, 2d 5.2, 77-78, 79. 94, 

110, 164 

Sagnals mtclligenct: (SIG I~T) 85, 86, 91-93, 

109, lll, 112 I 13, 122 128, 136. 142. 

167,170-71,172.175, 179, 181. 184, 

189, 194. 5t•r also Electrontc warfare 

Tacw.al imcllagence. 

SlGROD. 110 

">IGSALY 81 

Sanko}, Col Abraham 48. 94 

South Korea: 10 I, 146. 5rt· also Korea. 

::.outh \'aetnam: 121 145, I 50. 151, 153 5rr 

al\o \'actnam 

South Vactnamcsc 146, 148 49 

">outh West Pacaftc Area (SWPA)~ 85, 91-97 

<;outhca,;t Asta 145-46, I 'f7 157 158, I 69 

Soviet Lnaon· 99. 104,136 145,187 St'rabo 

Ru,;saa 

SO\;CL~. 101 121, 139. 169 187, 189 

">pwal Access Program (SAP}: 178 

'>pccia11 orccs. Vu:tnam. l '50-51 

'>pectal Research Dt'lachmem. 138, 1 '58-59. 

160, 163 

Specaal <;ccurity Group: 166, 173, 175, 189 

"pectal sccUnl) offu.:ers (SSOs) 69 I 04. I I 5 

ISO 158-59 171-72 189 

Speoal Security System. l 04 

'>ptes: 9 10. 28. 29 

">talin Jo~cf: 121 

'iWrs ttntl Stnprs 37 

'>tate Department 11. 4 7, 58. 62 

State, \\'ar, and :-la'y building: 13 

SlE.ADI.\\1: 161, 165, 170, 172 

STEEP 1111 .1.. Sec GARI'lf:~ Ptot 

Sumson, Henry: 47, 61, 65 

Strategac Intelligence Schot)l' 106, I 12, 125, 

137 139 

Strategtt• <>cn·ices Una: 103 

Strong, t-.l.lJ Gen George\' : 64. 69, 72 

Stuugan , German>•: 133 

Sub,·ersaor: 25, 28, 29, 53, 54, 55 

Sultan, l.t Gen. Damell · 80 
·+36 

Table of dtstributwnltahle of dtstnbuuon .md 

allowances Cl DfrDAl: 108, 118. 129. 133. 

135. 159. 161, 177 178. 179. ltD. 196 

Table of orgamzatwn and cqutpmcnt (TOE) 

88-89, 108, 112, 129. 132. HO, 150. 

159,164,179,180-81 183.194 

Tactllalmtclhgcncc 8. 190. 194 ),-.also 

Stgnals mtclhgcnn~ (51(.! NT) 

Cold \\ar Korea, and \'tetnam 113. 115, 

117-18. 129. 130- 31 

rc<Hgamzation and rcne\\al 171, 175. 177, 

179, 180-81, 182. 184 

\'tctnam and hc)·oml 150 lSI 160. I 6 7 

World War 11· 73-74, 75-76. 79, 86. 87. 

88.89 91 94-95,96-97,98 

Tan Stln Nhut Atr 13asc, Vtetnam: H8 

Ta)·lor. ~htJ Gen Zachar)·: 8 

Techmcal Scrvtcc Coumcrmcasures teams: 116 

Technolog) influence tlf 4. 6. 9. It 19 Sr.-

also Commumcauons mtclhgcnce: Ut TRA. 

bctween the war<;: 45--16, 48-49, 54-55 

past and future trends: 188-89, 191, 

193-94 St't' also clcctronll w.uf.ue. 

\'tt•tnam and bryond. 130-33, 146, 152, 

157 180, 184 

World War I 29-30, 33-35. 39 40 

World War II and Ktlrea· 91-92 96-97. 

98-99,116,119 

Telegraph: 9, 30 35 

T!:\11'bT: 128-29. 166 

Tet offensi\'e: 146, 152-53 

Thailand. 148 

Theaters of operauons, World War II: 85, 92 

Thorpe. Bng. Gen. Elliot: 96 

Tokyo,japan· 135 

ToR<.Ii. Sa Operation Tt\RCll 

Trainmg and Dm:trine Comm:md, L ':> Army 

(TRADOC): 165, 178. 180 

Transportation Corps: 64, 72 

Trcasuf)' D..:panmcm 25 

Tro>·· Thomas: 43 

Tntdeau, Maj. Gen. Arthur C. 125 

Truman, llarry S .. 103, I 07 

Truman adtmmstrauon: 106 

Turker: 10 l. 175 

Two Rock Ranch, Petaluma, Cahf. 110 

ULT 68-69.~6.87,Q4 

Umon of <,tlvict Soctahst Republic~ (l'SSR) $(, 

'-o,ict L'mon. 

MILITARY lNTELLlGENCE 

Umtcd Nauons: I 0 l, 116 

Unncd Nauons Parusan Fort"cs: 118, I 'H 

Unu~d '>tates. 22, 2'5, 39, 51. 53, 56, 59 :>t~c 

al'o Amem a. 

[rum Knn~a to Vietnam: l 0 I. 117, 121, 126, 

129. 130-31' 136 

\'tctnam and bcrond 146. 157, 188 

tn World War II: ol. 62, OR, 84,93 98-99 

L ':> ArmtC:'. 

First: 106 

'>rcond I 06 I 39 

rlmd 42. 106 

r·ourth 58, 6 7 106 

hfth• !:l9. 106 

~IXth. 97, 106 

'>cventh· 89, 132, 133, 1.34, 174 

hghth 114. 115. 117, 118, 133, l34, 1.35, 

175 

U ~ Am1y 3-4 8, 14 15, 18-19,21.22-23, 

27-28. Sec also t\rmy Intelligence 

(.kmobth:auon ol I 01 107 

mtcrwar chfficultics 42, '5 1-60 

m \\orld \\ar II 83-99 

U5 Army, Europe (U:->ARI:UR): 115, 133. 

134 158, 172, 174 

U.S. Army, Pactftc (U~ARPAC): 135, 149 165 

U ~- Ann> Command Rcconnats.sancc At'llnt)", 

Pactltc· 135 

L <;. \rm} Corps of Engmcas. Sl't' Engmeers, 

Corps of 

U S. Ann) Forces. Far East (USAI'FE): 95-9o, 

l34-35 

L S \rn'> Forces, Pactftl (ArPA(') 96 

U.S. Commumcauon~ lmelhgencc Board 

U~CIB) 110. 123 

U5. lntclhgenn· Board (USIB): 123 

Ur:;;mo ~laJ C..cn joseph j 170 

Llr::-.tno panel: 170-72 

\'an Deman, Maj. (later Maj Cen ) Ralph 18, 

22-30.40 

\'an Fleet, General Janws: 11 5 

Vance. C)·ms ISS 

\'i<:t Conf_: 145-46, I '5Q 

Vu:tnam. 150.157,158.159,160,161, 166, 

18~ S,·.; t~hv 'lonh Vietnam: .South 

Vu:uum 

\'tctnam \\'ar: 146, 157, IC1l), 164, 187, 192 

Vil'tnamcs.: C1nhan lrrrgular Defcn,;e Gr.)ups: 

150 
INDEX 

V1lla, Pancho 19 

Vmt Hill Fanns StatiOn. Va : 6 7. 78, 110. I 12. 

166, 177 

War College D1Y1S1on 16. 17. 20, 22 

War Dcpanmem: -+. 5. 6. 8, 14 

postwar 103. 104 

\Vorld \\ar I 17, 21. 22, 23, 24. 25, 26, 27, 

28,31, 34,37,39 

\l..'orld War II 57, 72, 80. 84. 88. 90 

War Depanmem Operations Dt\ISIOn: 63 

War of 1812· 8 

War w1th Spam: 12, 13, 14 

Warsaw Pact" 187 

Washmgton D.C. 13. 14, 16, 18, 22. 25. 28, 

52,68, 70,72-73,74,77,116,161 

Washmgton Barracks, Washmgton. D.C. 16 

\\'ashmgton Na''Y Yard: 176 

Washmgton Peace Conference: 47 

Watergate scandal 146, 169 

\\edemeyer. Lt Gen. Albert J 80 

\Veinstl'111, Lt. Gen S1dney T 184 

Western from 33. 34 

437 

Westmoreland, General Wilham: 159, 160 

Weyand, General Frederick: 170 

Wllhams. MaJ (later CoL) Garland 57. 116 

Williams, Lt. Gen james A.: 183 

Willoughby. Bng Gen. Charles 94. 96 

Wilson. Woodrow: 40. 41 

W1lson admim<.trauon 19-20, 21 

\Virelcss. 18. Srr also Radw mtelligcnce; 

S•gnals mtclligcnce; Technologr 

\\omen's Army Corps (WAC) 107. 164 

World War I 4, 15, 17, 19-20,22-24,34--40, 

41 92. 141 

World\Varll· 5,6,61,84-99, 159,171, 

172-73, 187,193, 194 

Yardley. MaJ llerben 0.: 29. 42,47 

Yom K1ppur \\ar· 169 
PIN : 075005-000