Notes

Epigraphs: The quotation in Chapter 1 from Carl von Clausewitz, is from*On War*, Book 1, chapter 6. The quotation in Chapter 2 from Martinvan Creveld, is from *Command in War*, p. 269. The quotation in Chapter3 is from FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 69.

The Nature of Command and Control
1. Command and control the business of the commander:In Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms*, defined as: �The exercise of authority and directionby a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishmentof the mission. Command and control functions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.�

2. Authority and responsibility: Henri Fayol, *Generaland Industrial Management*(Pitman Publishing Corp., 1949), pp. 21�22.

3. The traditional view: Command in Joint Pub 1-02is defined as �the authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfullyexercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includesthe authority and responsibility for effectively using available resourcesand for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating,and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and disciplineof assigned personnel.� Control in Joint Pub 1-02 is defined in our contextas �physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assurethat an agent or group will respond as directed.�

4. Feedback as control: See Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics,or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, 2d ed.(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), pp. 95�115, and The Human Use of HumanBeings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 12�15and pp. 69�71. As applied to command and control: See John R. Boyd, �AnOrganic Design for Command and Control,� A Discourse on Winning and Losing,unpublished lecture notes, 1987.

5. The illusion of being �in control�: Peter M. Senge,*The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization*(New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990), pp. 190�193.

6. Command and control as a complex (adaptive) system:See M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edgeof Order and Chaos* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Roger Lewin,*Complexity: Life on the Edge of Chaos* (New York: Macmillan, 1992);or Kevin Kelly, *Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines: The Riseof Neo-Biological Civilization* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994).Also described as �far-from-equilibrium, nonlinear� systems in Ilya Prigogineand Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man�s New Dialogue with Nature*(New York: Bantam Books, 1984) and Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine,*Exploring Complexity: An Introduction* (New York: W.H. Freeman &Co., 1989).

7. �Success is not due simply to general causes .. . �: Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans by Michael Howard andPeter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595.

8. �Organic� versus �mechanistic� systems: T. Burns,�Mechanistic and Organismic Structures,� in Derek Salman Pugh, comp., *OrganizationTheory: Selected Readings* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971),pp. 43�55; David K. Banner and T. Elaine Gagné, *Designing EffectiveOrganizations: Traditional & Transformational Views* (Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 152�194; Gareth Morgan, *Images ofOrganization* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1986).

9. �Command� and �control� as nouns and verbs: ThomasP. Coakley, *Command and Control for War and Peace* (Washington: NationalDefense University Press, 1992), p.17.

10. Information as a control parameter: Jeffrey R.Cooper, �Reduced Instruction Set Combat: Processes & Modeling.� Presentationgiven at Headquarters Marine Corps, 5 Jan 95.

11. Command and control support structure: In JointPub 1-02: �Command and control system�The facilities, equipment, communications,procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing,and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missionsassigned.�

12. Coakley, p. 17.

13. Uncertainty as the defining feature of command:See Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1985), especially chapters 1 and 8.

14. �War is the realm of uncertainty . . .�: Carlvon Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 101.

15. Uncertainty as doubt which blocks action: SeeRa�anan Lipshitz and Orna Strauss, �Coping with Uncertainty: A NaturalisticDecision Making Analysis,� unpublished paper, 1996.

Command and Control Theory
1. The OODA loop: John R. Boyd, �Patterns of Conflict�and �An Organic Design for Command and Control,� *A Discourse on Winningand Losing*. The OODA loop is, naturally, a simplification of the commandand control process (since we have already described command and controlas a process characterized by feedback and other complex interactions).It is not meant to provide a complete description of the various phasesand interactions, but rather a basic conceptual model. Numerous individualinteractions take place within and among each of the four basic steps.Any effort to divide a complex process like command and control into neat,sequential steps is necessarily going to be partly artificial. Variousother similar command and control models exist. We have selected the Boydmodel because it is widely known to many Marines. See also William S. Lind,*Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp.4�6.

2. The information (cognitive) hierarchy: JeffreyR. Cooper, �The Coherent Battlefield�Removing the �Fog of War.� � Unpublishedpaper, SRS Technologies, June 1993. Also Cooper, �Reduced Instruction SetCombat: Processes and Modeling.�

3. Not only do people think in images, they understandbest and are inspired most . . . : Thomas J. Peters, *Thriving on Chaos:Handbook for a Management Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988),p. 418.

4. Gavish: �There is no alternative . . .�: quotedin Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 199.

5. �Topsight�: David Hillel Gelernter, *Mirror Worlds,or, The Day Software Puts the Universe in a Shoebox�How It Will Happenand What It Will Mean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.51�53. Gelernter argues that topsight is �the most precious intellectualcommodity known to man. . . . It is the quality that distinguishes geniusin any field.� (Italics in original.)

6. The directed telescope: Van Creveld, *Commandin War*, p. 75 and pp. 255�57. See also Gary B. Griffin, *The DirectedTelescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command*, Combat InstituteStudies Report No. 9 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army Command and General Staff College, 1985).

7. Control as �coercive� or �spontaneous�: GregoryD. Foster, �Contemporary C2 Theory and Research: the Failed Quest for aPhilosophy of Command,� *Defense Analysis*, vol. 4, no. 3, September1988, p. 211.

8. Command by personal direction or detailed directives:See Thomas J. Czerwinski, �Command and Control at the Crossroads,� *MarineCorps Gazette*, October 1995.

9. Foster, p. 211.

10. Authoritarian (Theory X) versus persuasive (TheoryY) leadership: Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1960), chapters 3 and 4. Situational Leadership Grid(telling, selling, participating, delegating) and follower maturity: PaulHersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior*,2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 134.

11. Integrated teams (work groups): R. Likert, �ThePrinciple of Supportive Relationships,� in Derek Salmon Pugh, comp., *OrganizationTheory: Selected Readings* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971),pp. 279-304. Figure 5 adapted from Likert, p. 289.

12. Effective organizations characterized by intensecommunications: Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Searchof Excellence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 122.

13. On the relative importance of verbal and nonverbalcommunication: Psychologist Dr. Albert Mehrabian has estimated that inface-to-face conversation the actual meaning of words accounts for a mere7 percent of communication, nonverbal voice (such as tone, volume, or inflection)accounts for 38 percent, and visible signals (facial expression, body language,gestures, etc.) account for the re- maining 55 percent of the communicationthat takes place. Albert Mehrabian, *Nonverbal Communication* (Chicago:Aldine-Atherton, 1972), p. 182.

14. Supply-push/demand-pull and �demand-cascade�:James P. Kahan, D. Robert Worley, and Cathleen Stasz, *UnderstandingCommanders� Information Needs* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,1989), pp. 37�55. 

15. The effects of uncertainty and time on decisionmaking:John F. Schmitt, �Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle,� *MarineCorps Gazette*, March 1988, pp. 18�19.

16. Intuitive (naturalistic) versus analytical decisionmaking:Gary A. Klein, �Strategies of Decision Making,� *Military Review*,May 1989, and �Naturalistic Models of C3 Decision Making,� in Stuart E.Johnson, Alexander H. and Ilze S. Levis (eds.), *Science of Command andControl* (Washington: AFCEA International Press, 1988). 

17. �Satisfice� versus �optimize�: Herbert A. Simon,�Rational choice and the structure of the environment,� *PsychologicalReview*, vol. 63, 1956, pp. 129�138.

18. Intuitive decisionmaking more appropriate forthe vast majority of tactical/operational decisions: A 1989 study by GaryA. Klein (based on 1985 observations) estimated that decision makers ina variety of disciplines use intuitive methods 87 percent of the time andanalytical methods 13 percent of the time. Evidence now suggests that thisstudy was actually biased *in favor of analysis*. More recent studiesestimate the breakdown at more nearly 95 percent intuitive to 5 percentanalytical. G. A. Klein, �Recognition-Primed Decisions� in William B. Rouse(ed.), *Advances in Man-Machine System Research* (Greenwich, CT: JaiPress, 1989); G. L. Kaempf, S. Wolf, M. L. Thordsen, and G. Klein, *DecisionMaking in the Aegis Combat Information Center* (Fairborn, OH: KleinAssociates, 1992); R. Pascual and S. Henderson, �Evidence of NaturalisticDecision Making in Command and Control� in C. Zsambok and G. Klein (eds.),*Naturalistic Decision Making*, forthcoming publication (Hillsdale,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates); Kathleen Louise Mosier, *Decision Makingin the Air Transport Flight Deck: Process and Product*, unpublisheddissertation (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1990).

Creating Effective Command and Control
1. All commanders in their own spheres . . . : SpenserWilkinson, *The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German GeneralStaff* (Westminster: A. Constable, 1895), p. 106.

2. Initiative as a source of energy in crisis: Fayol,*General and Industrial Management*, p. 39.

3. Implicit understanding and communication: Boyd,�An Organic Design for Command and Control,� p. 18.

4. �A good plan violently executed . . .�: GeorgeS. Patton, *War As We Knew It* (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), p.335.

5. Hybrid information management: Kahan, et al., *UnderstandingCommanders� Information Needs*, pp. 66-67. 

6. The purpose of procedures �not to restrict humanjudgment . . .�: Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts onTwenty-First Century Warfare* (London: Brassey�s Defence Publishers,1985), p. 239.

7. �A bulky staff implies . . .�: William T. Sherman,*Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (New York: Da Capo Press,1984), p. 402.