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MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: HOW 

THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) WILL CONTINUE TO ENHANCE 

SECURITY FOR ALL MODES OF TRANSPORTATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 15, 2008 

Serial No. 110–105 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ERIN DASTE, Director & Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

COLEY O’BRIEN, Minority Senior Counsel 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security and Infrastructure Protection .............................................................. 5 

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Ms. Cathleen Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland Security Initiative, Aspen Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

Mr. C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Partner, Monument Policy Group, LLC: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee ................................................ 59 

Questions From Honorable Mike Rogers ............................................................... 78 

(1) 

MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: 

HOW THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) WILL CONTINUE TO 

ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL MODES OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

Tuesday, April 15, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee 

[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Clarke, Perlmutter, Lungren, and Bilirakis. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding.] Good afternoon. The subcommittee 

will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive 

testimony on moving beyond the first 5 years, how the Transportation Security Administration will continue to enhance security for 

all modes of transportation. Importantly, this testimony will discuss what the Transportation Security Administration has accomplished in the first 5 years since the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security and what work remains to be done to secure 

the Nation’s transportation system. 

Let me first of all acknowledge the presence of the ranking member, Mr. Lungren, of California, and Mr. Bilirakis of Florida. 

We are delighted that our Assistant Secretary Hawley is here 

amongst the other witnesses. Let me thank them all. 

Mr. Hawley, Ms. Berrick and Mr. Ervin, it is good to see you 

again, and, Mr. Verdery, it is good to see you, as well. 

I will attempt to yield myself 5 minutes and to speak pithily in 

my opening remarks. Many of us are double-scheduled. This is an 

extremely important hearing. I want to give time to the witnesses 

and also time for the members, who may have to go back to the 

floor. 

As I said, good afternoon, and we thank you again for coming to 

this hearing and participating, again, in the hearing that speaks 

about the first 5 years of the Transportation Security Administration. But, in light of where we are after 9/11, to really focus on how 

we improve transportation in all modes. 

We have had some challenges. As we have discussed, the needs 

for the air traffic marshals, if you will, the air marshals, U.S. air 
2 

marshals; as we have listened to the overall challenges addressing 

the question of utilization of air traffic controllers; as we continue 

to look for new technology as it impacts the air cargo aspect; as we 

find that our flight deck officers are facing maybe the possibility of 

accidental utilization of guns in the cockpit. We know that there 

is much to be done. 

As we continue to work and to make better the work in progress 

that is the transportation security screeners, we do that by inviting 

Assistant Secretary Hawley to our respective jurisdictions, as he 

did just recently in the city of Houston at the Bush International 

Airport to look at—and as he has done across the Nation—but to 

listen to and to look at ways of enhancing the training and professional development of the TSA screeners and to work on what is 

not a diminishing of security but a consistency in security. 

So, with a smile on my face, we certainly are not here, Ranking 

Member Lungren, to tip off the terrorists, because with all that we 

are trying to improve, I have said consistently that this should give 

no comfort to any terrorist. The United States is far better prepared and ready than it has ever been. Certainly the tragedy, the 

horrific tragedy of 9/11, has caused to be prepared. But we can always work to do better. For a Nation, the necessity for funding and 

the necessity for technology have to be utilized, along with oversight and hard questions. We should not run away from hard questions. 

As we welcome the witnesses today, I think we will be speaking 

about many very important issues. We recognize the significant 

milestone that is the Department of Homeland Security’s fifth year 

anniversary. This subcommittee will take the opportunity to reflect 

on the work that TSA has done to secure our Nation’s aviation and 

surface transportation systems and what work has to be done. 

First, I would like to recognize, again, the work that the TSA employees and the team have done. 

Thank you, and thank you to Assistant Secretary Hawley for 

your work. 

However, in the business of security, there is always work to be 

done for those of us charged with doing all we can to protect the 

American public from those who wish to do us harm. The work 

never ends, and we can never rest. 

As such, we are here today to discuss not only what has been accomplished in aviation and surface transportation security, but 

what needs to be done. The TSA is responsible for the security of 

highways, railroads, buses, mass transit systems, ports and the 450 

U.S. airports and employs approximately 50,000 individuals who 

have the very important mission of keeping the traveling public 

safe from terrorist threats. 

There are many aspects of securing transportation. First, there 

must be an overarching plan and comprehensive strategy under 

which all programs and policies must flow. Those programs need 

to be administered efficiently in combination with developments, in 

screening and detection, technology, to make sure that threats are 

discovered. 

We must have well-thought-out grant programs that quickly get 

money to mass transit or transit systems and an appropriate risk 

assessment so that continuing security investments can be made 
3 

that are tailored to particular transit systems to provide the most 

comprehensive security networks, an all-important component of 

security that I consider a paramount priority in the continuing 

training of front-line workers. They are our first line of defense 

against our enemies, and we owe it to them to provide them with 

the best training, supportive work environment and opportunities 

for professional development. 

With respect to technology, we must cut out the red tape. The 

longer we are engaged in red tape, the less secure America becomes. If we must screen air cargo, then we must do it with the 

latest technology. If it is available, we have to cut the layers and 

layers of approval that now the DHS subjects entrepreneurs and 

inventors of new technology that can actually help us. 

Do I want to build in fraud? Absolutely not. I want to build in 

efficiency, expediency, detailed knowledge of the technology and 

then approval, if it is a product or a technology that works. 

When this Congress passed into law the 9/11 bill, we directed the 

Department to make improvements in the aviation cargo screening, 

expanded the surface transportation security grants, defined criteria for the handling of security-sensitive materials on railroads 

and provided significant employee training programs and protections. 

I would like to think this committee has been part of the solution. The subcommittee has worked very hard on including in its 

oversight the improvement of transportation employees, security 

employees. It is vitally important that the Department continues to 

carry out the mandates created in the 9/11 bill. These provisions 

were created in a bipartisan manner with significant input from 

the Department and industry stakeholders to close security gaps 

and fulfill the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 

To be sure, the TSA has taken steps to secure the plane and the 

passenger but has still left the system vulnerable to attacks. In essence, I believe that our focus has disproportionately been on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios, such as suicide hijackings, which we should never forget, and IEDs carried out by airline 

passengers, and has not given enough attention by other potential 

vulnerabilities. 

I am encouraged by the progress that has been made within the 

TSA, such as including refining the checkpoints, advances made in 

behavior recognition. 

Assistant Secretary Hawley, I will be asking you about a success 

story we recently had in introducing technologies that improve 

screening. However, there remains cause for concern, as well. By 

TSA’s own covert testing, TSA screeners are still underperforming 

when it comes to detecting potential bombs and bomb parts, calling 

into question whether TSOs are getting the training they need to 

do the job that we need them to do and that they desire to do. 

Training, resources, we can’t nickel-and-dime the security of 

Americans. We must also not lose sight of the need for robust surface transportation security programs. I wonder how many of us 

have paid attention to the buses that travel upon the roads and 

highways of this Nation, taking hardworking Americans to work. 

The intelligence tells us that transportation continues to be the 

most significant security threat facing us today. Aviation is still a 
4 

premium for terrorists, but as attacks around the world have 

shown us, rail and mass transit is also an extremely attractive target for those who want to cause mass casualties and panic, and 

buses, as I previously said. 

When 11.3 million people are traveling by mass transit each 

weekday, we cannot afford to lose sight of this vulnerability. That 

is why this hearing is so vital. TSA is one of the most high-profile 

components of the Department of Homeland Security. It has a 

broad-based jurisdiction, and we are here to be a partner in, again, 

as I said, protecting America against threats and, as well, ensuring 

the safety and security of Americans. 

As the subcommittee with jurisdiction over transportation security and infrastructure protection, we need to be in constant communication with the TSA on how we can continue to improve transportation security. So today, in the sense of respect of the fifth anniversary of the department, let us congratulate our successes, and 

let us thank our front-line employees, but let us come together in 

our collective concern and efforts and vigilance. 

We have managed to avert a terrorist attack on our soil since the 

tragic events of September 11. But even more important than celebrating our efforts is thinking critically and creatively and with 

foresight about the systemic steps that we need to take to better 

secure our Nation’s transportation systems. As you are, we are 

here to be of assistance and to make it happen. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. With that, I yield to 

the distinguished gentleman from California for his opening statement. 

[The statement of Chairwoman Jackson Lee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE

APRIL 15, 2008 

Good afternoon, I would like to thank everyone for their participation in this 

afternoon’s hearing entitled, ‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five Years: How the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Will Continue to Enhance Security for All 

Modes of Transportation.’’ I would also like to welcome our witnesses today who 

have come to talk about this very important issue. As we recognize the significant 

milestone that is the Department of Homeland Security 5-year anniversary, this 

subcommittee will take this opportunity to reflect on the work that the TSA has 

done to secure our Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems, and what 

work has to be done. 

First, I would like to recognize the hard work and dedication of Assistant Secretary Hawley. Under Mr. Hawley, the TSA has made significant strides in making 

aviation and surface transportation more secure. This committee certainly congratulates him on his successes as the Administrator of the TSA. 

However, in the business of security, there is always work to be done. For those 

of us charged with doing all we can to protect the American public from those who 

wish to do us harm—the work never ends, and we can never rest. As such, we are 

here today to discuss not only what has been accomplished in aviation and surface 

transportation security. 

The TSA is responsible for the security of highways, railroads, buses, mass transit 

systems, ports and the 450 U.S. airports, and employs approximately 50,000 individuals who have the very important mission of keeping the traveling public safe from 

terrorist threats. 

There are many aspects to securing transportation. First, there must be an overarching plan and comprehensive strategy under which all programs and policies 

must flow. Those programs need to be administered efficiently in combination with 

developments in screening and detection technology to make sure that threats are 

discovered. We must have well-thought-out grant programs that quickly gets money 

to transit systems under an appropriate risk assessment so that continuing security 
5 

investments can be made that are tailored to particular transit systems to provide 

the most comprehensive security network. An all-important component of security 

that I consider a paramount priority is the continuing training of frontline workers. 

They are our first line of defense against our enemies, and we owe it to them to 

provide them with the best training, supportive work environment, and opportunities for professional development. 

When this Congress passed into law the 9/11 bill, we directed the Department to 

make improvements in aviation cargo screening, expanded up the surface transportation security grants, defined criteria for the handling of security sensitive materials on railroads, and provided significant employee training programs and protections. It is vitally important that the Department continues to carryout the mandates created in the 9/11 bill. These provisions were created in a bi-partisan matter, 

with significant input from the Department and industry stakeholders, to close security gaps and fulfill the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 

To be sure, the TSA has taken steps to secure the plane and the passenger but 

has still left the system vulnerable to attacks. In essence, I believe that our focus 

has disproportionately been on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios—such 

as suicide hijackings and IEDs carried out by airline passengers—and has not given 

enough attention to other potential vulnerabilities. 

I am encouraged by the progress that has been made within the TSA, such as 

including refining the checkpoints, the advancements made in Behavior Recognition, 

and introducing technologies that improve screening. However, there remains cause 

for concern as well. By TSA’s own covert testing, TSA screeners are still underperforming when it comes to detecting potential bombs and bomb parts, calling into 

question whether TSOs are getting the training they need to do the job that we 

need them to do and that they desire to do. 

We must also not lose sight of the need for a robust surface transportation security program. The intelligence tells us that transportation continues to be the most 

significant security threat facing us today. Aviation is still a premium target for terrorists, but as attacks around the world have shown us, rail and mass transit is 

also an extremely attractive target for those who want to cause mass casualties and 

panic. With 11.3 million people traveling by mass transit each weekday, we cannot 

afford to lose sight of this vulnerability. That is why this hearing is so vitally important. The TSA is one of the most high profile components of the Department of 

Homeland Security, and based on known threats, the most important. 

As the subcommittee with jurisdiction over transportation security and infrastructure protection, we need to be in constant communication with the TSA on how we 

can continue to improve transportation security. So today, in honor of the fifth anniversary of the Department, let us congratulate our successes. Because of our collective efforts and vigilance, we have managed to avert a terrorist attack on our soil 

since the tragic events of September 11. But even more important than celebrating 

our efforts is thinking critically, creatively and with foresight about the systemic 

steps we need to take to better secure our Nation’s transportation systems and ensuring that we are committed and dedicated to the implementation of these steps. 

I thank the witnesses again and look forward to their testimony. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. 

Thank you for having this hearing. 

The Transportation Security Administration is without a doubt a 

critical partner in our Nation’s domestic security umbrella. Therefore, before we move beyond the first 5 years, I believe it is important for us to reflect on what we have learned during these formative years for TSA and for our Homeland Security Department in 

general. 

First and foremost, and you alluded to this a moment ago, there 

have been no successful attacks against any U.S. transportation 

mode since TSA was established. I don’t think that is by accident. 

If anybody thinks that after 9/11 Al Qaeda put its feet up on the 

table and decided that they were no longer going to try and attack 

us, I think that person is living in a dream world. There have been 

no successful attacks since—well, in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 

2007 and thus far in 2008. I don’t think that is by accident. I think 

it is because of the hard work of many men and women around the 

world, including those involved with TSA. 
6 

So, before we look forward, it seems to me we should recognize 

and commend the outstanding work of all, including TSA, in fulfilling their mission in securing our air, rail and bus transportation 

systems. TSA has accomplished their mission, yet we know there 

is much more to be done. There is no perfection in this world, and 

we can always do better. 

We have had hearings in which we have pointed out shortcomings, as we have also acknowledged the successes within the 

Department of Homeland Security, and I hope that will continue. 

But it seems to me we on our side over here could be doing some 

things, too. We have not in the last year-and-a-half provided a 

homeland security authorization bill. That is 2 consecutive years. 

It seems to me, if we are serious about finding ways TSA could 

enhance future transportation security, passing an authorization 

bill, whether or not the Senate would move along with it, would be 

an important first step. It would show exactly we think TSA and 

the Department should be going. It would show a commitment on 

a total bipartisan basis in our effort to ensure that we continue 

with progress. 

Another helpful change that we could make would be to consolidate congressional jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Department. I know how many times we have had TSA up here. I know 

how many times we have had other people from the Department 

of Homeland Security here. 

It seems to me that TSA and the Department could focus on its 

critical transportation security responsibilities in a better way, instead of responding to and appearing before countless congressional 

committees. I mean, that was the promise of reorganization here 

in the Congress to go along with the reorganization on the Executive branch. 

I will say that my side of the aisle failed to do it, and I was hoping that maybe we would see this in the last couple of years, but 

it hasn’t. That is not a partisan issue. That is a congressional issue 

that continues. 

But we ought to step up and say, if this is a priority, we ought 

to have the courage to reorganize ourselves. Congress should also 

stop the continuous departmental reorganizations. I think this 

would stabilize the working environment and improve productivity 

in the entire Department. 

So, looking forward, TSA can enhance future security for all 

modes of transportation by not abandoning the risk-based security 

principles in pursuit of something which is elusive, 100 percent 

this, 100 percent that. One hundred percent screening solutions at 

times may sound good, but they may not in fact be the practical 

way that we deal with the problem. 

Risk assessment allows TSA and the Department to effectively 

target its financial and intelligence resources for a greater security 

benefit. Without unlimited funding, and we will never have that, 

we in the Congress have to do better. We have to be smarter. We 

have to make sure that our Department is smarter than the terrorists. We have to use our intelligence and layered security measures 

to mitigate future risks. 

As much as I would like to say it could be true, the fact of the 

matter is risks cannot be eliminated entirely, and we ought to level 
7 

with the American public on that. It can be managed and it can 

be practically dealt with and effectively dealt with in all areas. But 

that is also true in a transportation system as large as ours. 

If we tried to promise something which is impossible, bankruptcy 

will result and terrorists will win. I hope that we can continue to 

use the risk-based approach, the layered security approach, working in a cooperative effort between the Congress and the Executive 

branch, pointing out the warts where they exist, and I know occasionally you folks point out the warts which exist over here, as 

well. 

But we should be giving the American people confidence that we 

are in this together, not for partisan purposes, but on a bipartisan 

basis attempting to do the best for this country under the best of 

circumstances that we can create. So I look forward to the hearing 

today and to hear from our witnesses this afternoon. 

We have reviewed the prepared testimony. I might have to skip 

out for a short time for another meeting I have, but I will be back 

here for the round of questions and I know we will probably be interrupted by votes on the floor, too. But I will be back after that 

to make sure that we have a chance for the questioning round. 

So thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the ranking member and join him in 

accepting the challenge. Obviously, as he admitted, when the 

House was in different leadership it was quite difficult to try to disturb this jurisdictional, if you will, roadblock that we sometimes 

have. 

I can assure you that myself and the Chairman of the full committee are committed to ensuring a well-run Department of Homeland Security with minimal amount of overlapping in jurisdiction. 

We are willing to take up the challenge, and I think as we listen 

to the witnesses, who may themselves wish to comment on streamlining the jurisdictional oversight, we will work together. We hope 

that you will have the votes on your side of the aisle, and we will 

work to get the votes on our side of the aisle, because it certainly 

is an important question. 

I would like to also note that you made an important point about 

authorization, and of course we did pass an authorization bill out 

of the House last year. We really will look forward to tackling that 

again and working to ensure that it happens. But we all are concerned about those issues, and we thank you for your statement. 

Let me as well now indicate that other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under the committee rules opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Brown-Waite follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GINNY BROWN-WAITE

Thank you Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking Member Lungren for holding 

this hearing today. 

While it is important for this committee to examine the role of the Department 

of Homeland Security 5 years after the Department’s inception, I cannot overlook 

the committee’s failure to draft and pass an authorization bill. As many of my colleagues have pointed out, passing an authorization bill is a primary responsibility 

of this committee, and we must attend to this duty as quickly as possible. 

Today, I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Hawley and our other 

witnesses as they shed light on the Transportation Security Administration’s great-
8 

est successes to date, and the looming challenges they face in attempting to keep 

our transportation system and critical infrastructure secure. 

Specifically, I hope that Assistant Secretary Hawley can provide an update on the 

status of Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) enrollment in the 

State of Florida. The well-intentioned TWIC program must be implemented in a 

way that does not undo the good work of States that took meaningful steps to protect their ports before TWIC was developed. 

This committee must also address how TSA plans to test airport worker screening 

methods. As Congresswoman Lowey and I signaled with the passage of our bill, 

H.R. 1413, to create a pilot program to screen such workers, this is an issue TSA 

must confront as quickly as possible. While there has been speculation that TSA 

may launch a similar pilot program in the near future, I hope that the Assistant 

Secretary can elaborate on his plan for approaching airport worker screening. 

Finally, I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary and TSA for their dedication to keeping Americans, especially those of us who must travel frequently, out 

of harm’s way. Confronting terrorism and protecting this Nation is often a thankless 

task, but your accomplishments over the last 5 years have not gone unnoticed. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first 

witness, Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley, is very well known to 

this committee. As the distinguished administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, Kip Hawley has exhibited his 

extensive transportation technology experience in both the private 

and public sectors, his tenure as Assistant Secretary of Homeland 

Security for the Transportation Security Administration, since his 

swearing in in 2005. 

Welcome. 

Our second witness is Ms. Cathy Berrick, who is Director of 

Homeland Security and Justice at the Government Accountability 

Office. In this position, she oversees GAO’s reviews of aviation and 

surface transportation security matters, has developed a broad 

knowledge of transportation security practices and related Federal 

policies and Federal and private sector roles and responsibilities. 

Our third witness is Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, who has spent some 

of his best years in Houston, Texas. Clark Kent Ervin joined the 

Aspen Institute in January 2005 to explore the creation of a homeland security initiative. Before joining the institute, he served as 

the first inspector general of the United States Department of 

Homeland Security from January 2003 to December 2004. Prior to 

his service at DHS, he served as the inspector general of the 

United States Department of State from August 2001 to January 

2003. His service in the George W. Bush administration is preceded 

by his service as the associate director of policy in the White House 

Office of National Service in the George H.W. Bush administration. 

Welcome. 

Our fourth and final witness is Mr. Stewart Verdery of Monument Policy Group. From 2003 to 2005, he served as the first assistant secretary for policy and planning at the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security. Following his unanimous confirmation by 

the U.S. Senate, at DHS Border and Transportation Security Directorate, he led efforts to develop and implement policies related to 

immigration, visas, travel facilitation, cargo security and international trade, transportation security and law enforcement. Mr. 

Verdery supervised policy development at agencies such as the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection and the Transportation Security 

Administration. Mr. Verdery also serves as an adjunct fellow at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
9 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his 5 minute 

statement, beginning with Assistant Secretary Hawley. 

STATEMENT OF KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Hon. Bilirakis, members of the subcommittee. 

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the first 5 

years at DHS for TSA and look ahead to the next 5 years. Two 

weeks ago today, Kevin Brown walked into the Orlando Airport. A 

behavior detection manager in plainclothes saw Mr. Brown and he 

saw a few things that caught his interest as a trained behavior specialist. 

Along with additional behavior detection officers, they intercepted his checked baggage before they went to screening. When 

they had searched his bags, they found everything you need to 

build a bomb. 

Brown didn’t make it to the checkpoint and his bags never left 

the lobby. He was intercepted and taken into custody by the Orlando police, searched at curbside by the Orange County bomb 

squad and turned over to the FBI. This is layered security in action. It is an excellent example of TSA’s partnership with law enforcement and it is part of our new paradigm to recognize and use 

the skill of our workforce to add layers of security to go on offense. 

How do we do that? There are three prongs to our approach to 

upgrade security: people, technology and process. All of those need 

to be improved, and all are moving forward as we speak. We call 

it Checkpoint Evolution because we do not have the game-changing 

technology that will at once take us back to pre-9/11 convenience. 

By upgrading what we do have, our significant people and technology resources, coupled with process innovation, we can get the 

security result we need with a lot less hassle to passengers. Recently, TSA announced a prototype checkpoint that will shortly be 

tested in Baltimore. 

You will see there an integrated security checkpoint bringing together people, technology and better process. You will first notice 

a new look, but the most significant piece involves our officers. 

The checkpoint configuration and technology will support a team 

approach that will be calmer and more conducive to smart security. 

It all starts with our people. They are our biggest investment, and 

if we motivate and prepare them to their best, they will in fact improve TSA security. 

Our TSOs are ready to use that experience and skill from working with passengers every day to take security up a level. This 

committee has been forward leaning, and the Chairwoman mentioned in her opening statement their commitment to front-line 

training. TSA is committed, as well. 

We have begun a top-to-bottom retraining of our workforce. I and 

every TSO working at a checkpoint will undergo this year an extensive 12-hour retraining, bringing together the latest thinking 

from intelligence, from explosive detection and in human factors 

that can affect security. 
10 

This will give us the tools to go on offense. It is not about completing a checklist. It is about stopping terror plots. 

On the technology front of Checkpoint Evolution, we will be upgrading the technology you see at passenger checkpoints. For 

quick, less-intrusive, highly effective screening of what is carried 

on the person, whole-body imaging will be deployed, this week, to 

JFK and LAX airports. We will begin operating millimeter-wave 

technology at those airports. 

In addition, we will be purchasing at least 30 more of the machines for deployment at airports this year. I have previously said 

that we are deploying 250 multi-view advanced X-ray machines by 

midyear and today I am pleased to announce our plan to purchase 

and deploy another 580 units, totaling 830, using fiscal year 2007 

supplemental and fiscal year 2008 annual appropriations. 

We have got 250 already bought. We are announcing today we 

are going to add another 580. Multi-view advanced X-ray is a powerful platform on which to build additional software algorithms as 

new detection technologies become available, including for liquids. 

Six hundred of these machines, of the new A.T. machines, are 

going to be deployed by year-end. TSA’s strategy is to start with 

intelligence, partner with law enforcement, industry partners and 

the public and use security measures that are flexible, widely 

deployable, mobile and layered to cover the inevitable gaps that 

exist or develop in our complex open transportation network. 

We cannot afford to spend all our energy looking for listed items 

while standing behind the magnetometer. We have to look up from 

the checklist and be proactive, engaged in really evaluating risk. 

TSOs and all of us at TSA are focused not only on what we already know, but also on being alert for clues of something new, different and dangerous. That is the challenge of the next 5 years, to 

execute against known threats, but also to have the courage and 

imagination to put measures in place now that will disrupt whatever may come at us. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Hawley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIP HAWLEY

APRIL 15, 2008 

Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss how 

transportation security has evolved and what the future holds for transportation security. 

The Department of Homeland Security has reached a significant milestone in 

passing its fifth anniversary in March. Secretary Chertoff has noted that it is time 

to assess how far the Department has come and where it must go in the next 5 

years. In that context, Secretary Chertoff outlined the Department’s priorities as: 

Identifying the nature and scope of threats, assessing our vulnerabilities in relation 

to these threats, preventing these threats from materializing, and preparing responses to and recovery from disasters resulting from acts of terrorism and nature. 

As the Secretary recently noted, before September 11 we did not have an effective 

aviation security system to protect the 2 million domestic air travelers who rely on 

commercial aviation every single day. Today, the traveling public benefits from 20 

layers of screening—from hardened cockpit doors; to Federal Air Marshals; to 100 

percent screening of passengers and their bags by the dedicated men and women 

of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

In conjunction with Secretary Chertoff, TSA is focused on risk-based security 

using all of our resources—our people, our processes and our technology—to get 
11 

ahead of the terrorist threat. Namely: To stop what is in progress; to disrupt and 

deter what is being planned; and to address vulnerabilities that will strengthen our 

core. Two recent items in the news remind us of the importance of these challenges 

and of how TSA has successfully met them. 

The first concerns the eight men currently standing trial in London who are accused of a plot to conduct suicide bombings during the summer of 2006 onboard passenger planes destined for North America. As details of that plot emerge, the public 

is learning that deception and the use of unconventional tactics are two of the staples employed by those who desire to do us harm. The plot involved targeting flights 

bound for San Francisco, New York, Washington, Chicago, Montreal, and Toronto 

with home-made liquid explosives capable of being assembled and detonated midflight. In opening statements, jurors were told that these transatlantic flights, all 

leaving Heathrow Airport within 21⁄2 hours of one another, would be simultaneously 

blown up in midair with the goal of killing on ‘‘an almost unprecedented scale.’’ Immediately after the plot was foiled, TSA developed, with the help of the Science and 

Technology Directorate, the current 3–1–1 liquids policy which, to date, has proven 

to be an effective tool to manage the threat of liquid explosives. 

The second concerns a successful catch by our Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) 

earlier this month at the Orlando International airport. On Tuesday, April 1, a Jamaica-bound passenger, Kevin Brown, aroused suspicion of TSA BDOs, who, working in conjunction with the Orlando Police Department, the Orange County Bomb 

Squad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, uncovered prohibited bomb-making 

materials located in the passenger’s checked bag. Their swift action demonstrated 

that BDOs, trained to detect deceptive and suspicious behavior, are contributing to 

airline security by detecting and discovering dangerous people and dangerous items. 

Facing a risk of unparalleled dimension, TSA has clarified its mission by incorporating a risk-based and layered strategy into security operations and programs. 

In evaluating our resources, we have invested in promising technologies designed 

to more effectively aid us in achieving our security mission. To engage our workforce, we have relied upon the value of their input, provided provisions for their 

safety, rewarded their work ethic through pay for performance incentives, provided 

career progression opportunities, and invested in their professional potential with 

increased training programs. In order to leverage the value of our partners and 

stakeholders in the transportation security community, we have developed and fostered relationships with other government agencies, local law enforcement, and the 

private sector. Finally, strong management of these assets has enabled TSA to 

produce a spirit of evolution and a bold security approach focusing on people, process, and technology. 

Despite the challenges we have faced in implementing these ideals, we have made 

significant progress, which I feel privileged to highlight today. 

EVOLUTION OF SECURITY AT THE CHECKPOINT

An effective security system must constantly be evolving. TSA is in the process 

of a fundamental shift in strategy for the security checkpoint which encompasses 

people, process, and technology. This is the most significant change occurring in passenger screening since 9/11 and even since the checkpoint was first established in 

the 1970’s. TSA has taken a fresh look at our checkpoint operations to see how we 

can improve security. We took what we know from the intelligence and security 

communities, we listened to our employees, we learned from passengers, we evaluated readily deployable technology, and have come up with changes that we are piloting. 

People.—The human element is critical to achieving a high standard of security. 

TSA is overhauling the process at the checkpoint and relying more on personal 

interaction to detect irregular behavior. TSA’s introduction of behavior detection and 

assuming the position of travel document checker have proven to be valuable methods of identifying people who are exhibiting unusual signs of stress, fear, and/or deception at the checkpoint. Behavior detection draws a contrast between average levels of travel stress and those intending to do harm. Training all security officers to 

increase passenger interaction on a one-on-one basis will achieve a calmer, quieter 

environment that will result in heightened security. 

Process.—The current checkpoint during a peak travel period is often noisy and 

congested. Part of the noise comes from security officers shouting instructions at 

travelers. A chaotic, noisy congested checkpoint is a security nightmare because it 

can potentially conceal the enemy. The prototype at Thurgood Marshall BaltimoreWashington International Airport (BWI) gives screeners wireless whisper radio 

headsets which will allow them to perform their duties in a more low-key demeanor 
12 

and communicate more effectively with others on their team. Further, the prototype 

has light and sound elements designed to have a calming effect. 

Another simple yet effective program that improves the checkpoint process is SelfSelect Lanes currently running in Salt Lake City, Orlando, Denver, Spokane, Boston, Orlando, Cincinnati, and Raleigh-Durham, with more planned in the near future. Self-Select Lanes are comprised of a series of lanes designated by signage that 

directs passengers based on their travel needs and knowledge—Expert, for the business traveler who flies several times a month; Casual, for passengers that travel 

less frequently, but are familiar with the security process; and Family/Special Assistance, for passengers traveling with small children or strollers, elderly passengers, and passengers who may need special assistance. These lanes give passengers some control over the checkpoint process and have reduced the number of 

alarms and prohibited items at the checkpoint. 

Technology.—New technology does not currently exist to adequately address the 

threat alone so TSA, working closely with the Science and Technology Directorate, 

is investing in the development and deployment of proven technology, including 

multi-view X-ray and whole body imaging. These are the first significant additions 

to checkpoint technology since walk-through metal detectors and standard X-ray 

machines were introduced in the 1970’s. Multi-view X-ray gives the security officers 

a better look at what is in the carry-on and will potentially speed up the process 

because fewer bag checks will be required. The other advantage is the equipment 

can be upgraded as new software algorithms are mastered. 

TSA introduced millimeter wave in Phoenix, and we will roll out this technology 

at LAX and JFK this month and BWI later this spring. This technology can detect 

items concealed on the body, including plastics, through a robotic image that will 

be viewed from a remote location. TSA will be working to socialize this technology 

with the American public. It is already in use in international transportation 

venues, and will improve security while maintaining passenger privacy by ensuring 

that images will not be saved or stored. 

DEFINING OUR MISSION

Risk-Based, Layered Security 

Checkpoint evolution is based upon a risk-based strategy that requires us to envision the whole picture and implement selective and unpredictable security measures. TSA is focusing beyond the physical checkpoint—pushing our borders out and 

concentrating on persons with hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even 

if they are not carrying a prohibited item. By spreading our layers of security 

throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple opportunities 

to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our workforce, our partners, and 

our technology. 

Using this approach, we have significantly improved security at airports by deploying our workforce in new locations and for new functions. Our Travel Document 

Checker (TDC) program, which enhances security by detecting individuals who attempt to board an aircraft with fraudulent identification documents, has been implemented at all federalized airports. We deployed 1,323 Behavior Detection Officers 

(BDO) and trained them to identify potentially high-risk individuals who exhibit behaviors indicating hostile intent at over 88 of our busiest airports as part of the 

Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program. In cooperation 

with Federal, State and local law enforcement and aviation and surface transportation entities nationwide, we have also deployed Visible Intermodal Protection and 

Response (VIPR) teams, comprised of TSOs, BDOs, Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs), and Federal Air Marshals. VIPR teams enhance the security of persons 

and critical infrastructure and prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to 

acts of terrorism in all modes of transportation at any location. 

Enhanced Employee Screening.—In addition to the extensive scrutiny that employees working in a sensitive airport environment must undergo before being allowed unescorted access to the Security Identification Display Areas (SIDA) or the 

sterile areas of our Nation’s airports-criminal history records checks and namebased checks against terrorist watchlists, we have developed the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP), which conducts random and unpredictable screening of individuals employed at airports who enter secured areas of airports and their 

accessible property. 

Screening of Air Cargo.—In carrying out the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act), Pub. L. 110–53 (2007), requirement of screening 

100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, TSA is stressing effective security management of the air cargo supply chain. Collaborating with stakeholders— 

U.S.-based shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger air carriers—TSA is devel-
13 

oping a program that will facilitate screening early in the supply chain using currently approved screening methods and stringent facility and personnel security 

standards. TSA will build upon our established programs: air cargo security regulations, Security Directives, and increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams and TSIs for Cargo. 

TSA’s strategy will involve every component of the air cargo shipping system from 

the entity originating the freight to the freight consolidators/forwarders, airports, 

and finally to air carriers who transport the cargo—and the people involved in the 

process that have access to cargo at every point in the supply chain. This program 

is designed to harmonize with the international community since a large portion of 

air cargo moves on international flights. 

TSA employs 300 Cargo TSIs who are exclusively dedicated to the oversight of air 

cargo. An additional 150 air cargo TSIs will be added by the end of fiscal year 2008. 

Inspectors conducted more than 30,000 compliance reviews in fiscal year 2006 and 

initiated more than 1,300 formal investigations based on suspected non-compliance 

with TSA. Along with performing daily oversight of cargo operators, inspectors also 

conduct covert testing of the air cargo system and participate in ‘‘cargo strike’’ surge 

activities at our Nation’s largest cargo airports. 

General Aviation.—TSA is collaborating with the general aviation (GA) community and our interagency partners to develop reasonable, feasible, and effective security for GA operations while ensuring that these measures support continued operations and increased growth of the industry. TSA currently vets aircrew and passengers in certain high-interest GA sectors, including flights flying into the ‘‘Maryland–3’’ airports (Potomac, Hyde, and College Park), GA flights flying into or out 

of Reagan Washington National Airport, and certain categories of private charter 

flights and general aviation aircraft. TSA is also working with aircraft operators and 

Fixed Base Operators directly to develop voluntary programs of verifying the identification of passengers on board aircraft and maintaining facility security in and 

around GA aircraft. 

Internationally, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently issued a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will require GA operators to submit 

comprehensive manifest data about passengers, crew, and flight information electronically to CBP, as part of its Electronic Advance Passenger Information System 

(e–APIS), at least 60 minutes before the aircraft departs for the United States. Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft coming into the 

United States, such as who is and is not a U.S. citizen. Having this information an 

hour before departure will give CBP officers more time to fully pre-screen travelers 

and crews and take necessary actions to resolve threats. 

Vetting 

TSA’s Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) consolidates the management of all vetting and credentialing programs designed to 

identify known or suspected terrorist threats seeking access to transportation systems, using terrorist-related threat assessments. Since late 2003, TTAC has continually vetted flight crews and other crewmembers on commercial and all-cargo flights 

flying internationally into, out of, or over the United States or its territorial airspace, representing about 50,000 crewmembers daily. 

TTAC’s mission has expanded to include vetting in other critical sectors of transportation, including truck drivers applying for a HAZMAT endorsement and persons 

or entities within the United States engaging indirectly in air transportation of 

property on passenger aircraft. Also, each and every foreign national applying for 

flight training, leading to an additional skill, at any FAA-certified school anywhere 

in the world is vetted before beginning that training. TSA is seeking fee legislation 

to capture the costs related to these applications ensuring a self-supporting sustainable fee-funded program. 

Secure Flight.—To enhance the vetting of aviation passengers against terrorist 

watch lists, TSA published a NPRM to implement the Secure Flight program on August 23, 2007. As proposed, Secure Flight will bring the process of comparing passenger names against the watch list, now performed by aircraft operators, into the 

government and will align domestic and international passenger pre-screening. This 

will establish a more consistent and effective watch list matching process and enhance our ability to stop terrorists before they get to the passenger screening checkpoint. TSA is now evaluating the comments received from the public and industry 

and preparing the Final Rule. We have taken the time to build the Secure Flight 

program right. We have built a program with the operational requirements necessary to enhance aviation security while protecting the privacy and civil liberties 

of the traveling public. The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is 
14 

available for passengers who feel they have been improperly delayed or prohibited 

from boarding an aircraft. 

TSA has begun voluntary testing with airlines to validate the Secure Flight watch 

list matching system, in which volunteer aircraft operators provide data to TSA, 

while continuing to conduct watch list checks for their flights. TSA will compare the 

results of its watch list matching with these air carrier results to ensure the validity 

of the Secure Flight system. 

Transportation Worker Identify Card (TWIC).—The TWIC program provides a 

tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and vessels regulated under the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–295. As of April 8, 2008, TSA has 

enrolled more than 213,000 port workers at approximately 90 fixed enrollment centers and expects to complete national roll-out of 147 fixed enrollment centers and 

enroll nearly 1 million workers during 2008. 

In cooperation with the United States Coast Guard (USCG), we have initiated 

pilot programs with partners in five distinct locations across the country to test card 

readers in real world marine environments. Current participants are the Port Authorities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Brownsville, and New York/New Jersey, and 

vessel operations in Annapolis, Maryland and Vicksburg, Mississippi. We are also 

working with DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate and the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) to execute our test plan that will evaluate the 

card-reader interface under a variety of conditions and assess its impact on operations. 

EFFICIENTLY ALIGNING OUR RESOURCES

People 

TSA continues to seek efficiencies in our field operations. Through the use of the 

Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), we are able to identify operational and efficiency 

gains by better utilizing our TSOs. We have improved our TSO scheduling to more 

accurately align with passenger loads and air carrier schedules, increased the use 

of part-time employees and expanded the use of ‘‘split-shift’’ employees to increase 

staffing during high-volume periods. We have also installed computers at or near 

screening checkpoints to allow a more efficient use of TSO time for training and reduce their time away from checkpoints. 

Technology 

As a result of our close relationship with the Science and Technology Directorate, 

working through the Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process, we are constantly seeking new technology solutions. The events on 9/11 and the details of the 

London plot being made public now teach us that we must anticipate threats that 

continue to grow in sophistication and complexity. This effort includes leveraging 

the skills of our TSOs with new technology designed to increase threat detection and 

improve efficiencies in checkpoint throughput. We added 23 in-line Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for checked baggage screening at airports and are adding significant next generation technologies. We are deploying liquids scanning devices at 

checkpoints and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for non-checkpoint 

screening locations. We will begin deploying Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage, which provides TSOs with a better capability to identify 

and detect threats through improved imagery and analysis tools. 

Other technology is being evaluated. We are pilot testing whole body imagers to 

quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items without the need for physical contact on a voluntary basis. We are exploring Automated Carry-On Explosives 

Detection Systems (Auto-EDS) for inspecting carry-on items, and we are testing new 

cast and prosthesis scanners that will provide a safe, dignified, and non-invasive 

way to identify potential threats and clear passengers wearing casts, braces, and 

prosthetic devices. Finally, we are evaluating several new products that will greatly 

increase the speed of handling and screening checked baggage, particularly when integrated into an airport’s baggage handling system, while reducing the size of the 

footprint of the baggage screening location. 

The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request reflects TSA’s plan to strategically 

deploy additional technology that will improve security for passengers, generate additional staffing efficiencies, and improve the passenger’s travel experience. The request anticipates an additional $426 million annually in mandatory funds generated 

by a 4-year $0.50 temporary surcharge on the passenger security fee with a maximum increase of $1.00 per one-way trip. The temporary surcharge would be deposited into the Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) for the specific purpose of purchasing, installing, and recapitalizing inline EDS. This is being requested together 
15 

with a proposal to allow for more flexible funding of inline EDS, including the discretionary use of letters of intent. This additional funding will allow TSA and our 

airport partners to greatly accelerate the implementation of the checked baggage 

screening investment plan. 

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Mitigation 

Our TSOs undergo some of the world’s most intensive IED training to understand 

the nature of explosives and detect even the most cleverly conceived devices. To 

learn to identify anomalies and enhance detection of liquid explosives and other 

emerging threats, TSOs receive extensive classroom, checkpoint, and computerbased IED recurrent training. Practical exercises further enhance the ability to carefully scrutinize the images which appear on the X-ray machines in order to recognize IED components that are artfully concealed or disguised as innocuous items, 

such as gels, shampoos, toothpaste, and shaving cream within bottles and containers. The training is flexible and updated to respond to any new potential threat 

against the Nation’s transportation systems. Additionally, TSA deploys special bomb 

simulation kits for recurrent training purposes at all airport checkpoints. These kits 

are designed to train TSOs to ‘‘think like a terrorist,’’ by creatively constructing and 

concealing simulated explosive components and materials, and attempting to get 

them through the checkpoints. 

ENGAGING OUR WORKFORCE

The success of any operation depends on the quality of the people involved. TSA 

has had a major focus on improving security by improving the capabilities of its people. Better recruiting and hiring, better training, better incentive systems, career 

progression opportunity, more involvement in decisions effecting the workforce, and 

more recognition of the critical role played by our people—these efforts all have a 

positive effect on the security result TSA delivers. 

Training.—We are in the process of rolling out a major training package that ties 

together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, 

and ways to engage with passengers in a way that gets calmer environment and 

better security result. 

Career Progression.—The Career Progression Program has been in effect for a full 

year in fiscal year 2007. This program provides widespread career growth and professional development opportunities for high-performing TSOs. The plan allows 

TSOs to continue to advance in their work based on their skills and performance; 

this will open up more opportunities for TSOs to potentially qualify for security, protection, or law enforcement jobs elsewhere within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Policies.—Recently, I met with the second generation National Advisory Committee (NAC–2), which is a group comprised of all levels of screening personnel selected by their peers. Together, we made significant changes to the performance 

management system based on their recommendations because we want our security 

professionals engaged in their work and gaining knowledge through training as opposed to being bogged down with assessment requirements. We want our supervisors and managers on the floor, coaching and involved with the activity at the 

checkpoint, not spending all of their time with program administration. TSA leadership is serious about implementing human capital policies, including pay, that reflect the critical importance of TSA people being engaged and motivated for our vital 

job. 

Safety.—Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also critical to TSA’s 

mission. We have improved workplace safety through a series of aggressive initiatives, including Optimization and Safety Integrated Product Teams, involvement of 

the National Advisory Council in planning aspects of the Safety program including 

the Safety Week Campaign, the deployment of contract safety specialists to support 

TSA field operations, and timely investigation of incidents to identify and correct 

safety problems. We have automated the injury claim filing process for injured TSOs 

to ensure that benefits are uninterrupted, and our Nurse Case Manager Program 

is helping to return injured TSOs to productive duty once they are medically capable. As a result, we reduced the number of TSO Lost Time injuries and illnesses 

by 26.1 percent from 4,367 in fiscal year 2006 to 3,228 in fiscal year 2007—a reduction to 7.19 injuries per 200,000 work hours. 

DEVELOPING STRONG PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN ALL MODES

Surface Transportation Security 

Strong partnerships have especially proven to be critical as we expand our presence in modes of surface transportation security. TSA continues to make progress 
16 

in addressing major system wide security risks in surface transportation and build 

information sharing networks. We work closely with stakeholders in these industries, putting an emphasis on sharing intelligence, capacity, and technology with 

that of other law enforcement, intelligence or other agencies at every level of government. We also continue to work closely with the Department of Transportation 

(DOT), its various modal administrations, and the many other surface transportation stakeholders to enhance security through partnerships, proposed regulations, 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with grant planning, evaluation and awards. 

Freight Rail.—Secretary Chertoff established the priority goal of achieving a 50 

percent reduction in the objectively measured risk posed by rail cars carrying toxic 

inhalation hazards (TIH) by the end of 2008. To achieve this goal, TSA has implemented a multi-layered security strategy which includes regulatory development, cooperative agreements, and comprehensive risk-based programs. To objectively measure success in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail transportation, TSA developed a program that will track and measure the standstill time of TIH cars in high 

threat urban areas (HTUA)’s. Using a detailed set of tracking data and comprehensive field inspections, to date TSA has been able to document a 42.9 percent reduction in the overall risk. 

On December 21, 2006, TSA published a proposed rule (NPRM) to strengthen the 

security of the Nation’s freight rail systems in (HTUA). The NPRM addressed shippers, carriers, and receivers of TIHs and other security-sensitive materials by rail. 

Proposed requirements include railcar location reporting within a specific time period and the establishment of a secure chain of custody from shippers to railroads 

and from railroads to receivers within HTUAs. TSA also proposed requirements for 

designating rail security coordinators and suspicious incident reporting by rail mass 

transit, passenger rail, and all freight rail carriers. We intend to publish this final 

rule by the end of the year. 

Passenger Transit Programs and Grants.—As a strategic priority, TSA focuses on 

elevating terrorism prevention and immediate response capabilities in passenger 

transit systems through operational deterrence, security training and exercises, and 

key infrastructure protection. 

A critical component of this effort is the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE). TSA Transportation Security Inspectors assess passenger transit systems in 17 areas foundational to an effective security program. Applying the 

results of the 63 comprehensive security assessments completed to date, TSA has 

developed and implemented programs and allocated resources for counterterrorism 

training of frontline employees, dedicated anti-terrorism operational packages, and 

transit system-focused terrorism prevention and response exercises—each eligible 

for funding as priorities under the Transit Security Grant Program. 

The success of the BASE program reflects the close security partnership developed 

with passenger transit systems. To facilitate development of effective security strategies and programs, TSA established the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. Formed under the framework of the Government and Sector Coordinating Councils, the Advisory Group brings together the expertise of 15 transit police chiefs and security directors from systems across the Nation as a consultative 

forum with extensive experience to help align security strategies and programs with 

operational realities. 

Highway.—TSA is working on a number of strategies to close gaps in security in 

various aspects of the highway sector-school buses, over-the-road buses, commercial 

motor vehicles (CMV), HAZMAT motor carriers, and highway infrastructure. Collaborating with industry and our governmental partners, ongoing programs and initiatives include training and development of standards and guidelines. TSA partners with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to support these efforts. 

To facilitate information sharing, the Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) meet on 

a regular basis. TSA has also developed a Homeland Security Information Network 

Highway portal, a TSA Highway & Motor Carrier (HMC) Web page, an internal 

TSA Highway and Motor monthly newsletter for field personnel, and contributes security notes to industry trade periodicals. The Highway and Motor Carrier Industry 

Information and Analysis Center and Highway Watch programs are active and continually processing reports from highway operators and sharing information between industry and TSA. 

To facilitate domain awareness, TSA conducts Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) 

with motor vehicle transportation organizations, as well as organizations that maintain or operate key physical assets within the highway transportation community 

with a current focus on the transportation of HAZMAT by motor carriers. TSA is 
17 

developing a pilot project for testing the feasibility of tracking trucks carrying 

HAZMAT by location and load type. The pilot includes the development of a set of 

protocols capable of interfacing with existing truck tracking systems, State and local 

government intelligence operations centers, Federal law enforcement agencies, and 

first responders. The Integrated Intermodal Information System-Domestic Feasibility Study focused on the transportation of Extremely Hazardous Materials 

throughout the domestic transportation system. 

Pipeline.—TSA initiated a number of programs to assist pipeline companies in 

their efforts to secure these vital systems. For example, through the CSR Program, 

we have reviewed company adoption of the pipeline security guidelines and developed a best security practices document based on observations throughout the industry. 

TSA partnered with our counterparts in Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) to 

hold an International Pipeline Security Forum. This event provided an opportunity 

for pipeline companies, industry associations, and government representatives to exchange security information and best practices. We continue to work with NRCan 

on cross-border pipeline assessments in accordance with the Security and Prosperity 

Partnership agreement. 

9/11 Act Implementation 

Finally, the recent 9/11 Act implemented important recommendations from the 

9/11 Commission and affirmed that Congress remains one of our strongest partners. 

This legislation received overwhelming support from Members of Congress and provided TSA with much needed tools to evolve transportation security. In particular, 

we are pleased to now have the authority to establish an administrative process for 

civil enforcement of surface transportation regulations and orders, the flexibility to 

develop a robust air cargo screening program that maintains the flow of commerce, 

and the authority for VIPR teams to operate in all modes of transportation. Overall, 

the act authorized 33 programs and 20 rulemaking actions for TSA, many of which 

were already initiated by TSA. Fiscal year 2009 will be the first full year of TSA’s 

expanded inspector work force and K–9 team deployment, both strongly supported 

in the 9/11 Act. TSA will utilize this legislation as another vehicle to deliver the 

evolution of transportation security. 

CONCLUSION

The needs of people must continue to drive the focus of transportation security. 

The American people and the traveling public require a transportation infrastructure that can be secured without the expense of unreasonable burdens. The people 

in our workforce require investments that will allow them to perform effectively and 

grow professionally. The people within our homeland security partnerships and network require cooperation, communication, and leadership. The strength of these relationships has been fundamental to our progress and must continue to remain a 

focal point as we more forward. 

Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for this opportunity to highlight the 

progress TSA has made since its creation and to provide a road map for the evolution of transportation security. I look forward to our continued work together and 

would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I now recognize Ms. Berrick to summarize her statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking 

Member Bilirakis for inviting me here to discuss GAO’s work assessing TSA’s progress in securing the transportation network and 

needed focus moving forward. 

Since its creation, we have reported that TSA has made moderate progress in securing aviation and surface transportation 

modes. In other words, we reported that TSA has generally 

achieved between half and three-quarters of the expectations set 

out for them by Congress, the administration and DHS itself. 
18 

With respect to progress, we found that TSA has made significant achievements in the following four key areas: hiring, deploying, training and measuring the performance of its aviation security workforce; developing, implementing and testing procedures for 

screening passengers and baggage; deploying systems to screen 

checked baggage for explosives; and conducting risk assessments, 

partnering with stakeholders and administering grant programs for 

surface transportation systems. 

For example, we reported that TSA has developed robust training programs for TSOs, including enhanced explosives detection 

training. TSA also issued strategies for securing transportation 

modes and is pursuing a rulemaking to guide its efforts in securing 

passenger and freight rail systems. 

However, we found that other key areas need continued attention, both in the short and long terms. First, it is important that 

TSA move forward on initiatives to secure airport perimeters and 

access to restricted airport areas. 

Although TSA has completed technology pilots and issued guidelines for biometric identification systems, it has not yet determined 

how or when it will require the implementation of these systems 

nationwide. In addition, TSA is making progress in determining 

how to mitigate the risk posed by airport workers through an ongoing pilot, among other efforts. However, the agency has not yet 

made final decisions regarding how it will address this vulnerability. 

Second, with regard to checkpoint screening technologies, DHS 

and TSA have researched, developed, tested and initiated procurements of various technologies to detect explosives and plan to deploy new, enhanced technologies this year. However, to date, TSA 

has made limited progress in fielding emerging technologies due to 

performance, maintenance and planning issues. 

Third, although TSA has made significant progress in strengthening the development of Secure Flight, a government-run program 

to match passenger information against a terrorist watch list, some 

challenges remain, including the need for more sound program cost 

and schedule estimates, better management of program risks and 

test plans that reflect comprehensive systems testing. 

Fourth, TSA made progress on a number of fronts in securing air 

cargo and is pursuing a plan to meet the congressional mandate to 

screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft. However, TSA 

has placed less attention on cargo transported into the United 

States from foreign locations and DHS and TSA have made limited 

progress in deploying technologies to screen cargo. 

Finally, TSA will need to continue to define its regulatory or 

other role with respect to all surface transportation modes and 

more clearly define the mission and capabilities of its inspections 

workforce. For example, it is unclear whether TSA’s surface inspectors will be able to support the increased workload expected in implementing the requirements of the 9/11 Act and new security regulations. 

In conducting our work, we have found that a variety of crosscutting issues have impacted DHS and its components’ efforts, including TSA. These include developing results-oriented goals and 

measures to assess performance, integrating a risk-based approach 
19 

1See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission 

and Management Functions, GAO–07–454 (Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007); GAO, Department 

of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO–07–1081T (Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 2007); and GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO–07– 

1240T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007). 

to guide investments and establishing effective frameworks for coordinating with stakeholders. 

TSA has placed attention on and continues to make progress in 

addressing all of these issues. We are currently reviewing TSA’s efforts in many of these key areas and will continue to report to the 

Congress and the public on the results of our work. 

This concludes my opening statement. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK

APRIL 15, 2008 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN AVIATION AND SURFACE

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CONTINUE TO PROGRESS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS

GAO–08–651T

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and challenges in securing our Nation’s transportation systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is charged with securing 

the transportation network while ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Other DHS components, Federal agencies, State and local governments, and 

the private sector also play a role in transportation security. In carrying out its 

broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the challenge of determining 

how to allocate its finite resources within the transportation system and across all 

sectors to address threats and strengthen security. My testimony today focuses on: 

(1) The progress TSA and other DHS components have made in securing the Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems, and the challenges that remain; 

and (2) crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA’s efforts in strengthening security. My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from February 

2004 to February 2008 and selected updates to this work obtained in April 2008. 

In obtaining these updates, we reviewed documents related to TSA security efforts 

and interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials. In addition, we included 

some of our preliminary findings from ongoing work regarding the security of the 

Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems. We conducted these performance audits in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY

TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen the security of the Nation’s commercial aviation and surface transportation systems. Specifically, TSA has 

hired and deployed a Federal work force of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment at the Nation’s more than 400 commercial 

airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by law.1 TSA has since turned its attention to, among 

other things, strengthening passenger prescreening—in general, the matching of 

passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s departure; 

more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer (TSO)—formerly known as screener—workforce; strengthening screening procedures; researching and developing more effective and efficient screening technologies; and strengthening procedures to ensure the security of air cargo. TSA has 

also begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such 

as biometric identification systems, to secure access to restricted areas at airports. 
20 

2 A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series 

of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. 3Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has also taken steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on international flights operating to or 

from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in 

the United States. DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken 

actions to research and develop aviation security technologies. With regard to surface transportation modes, TSA has developed a strategic approach for securing 

these systems; established security standards for certain transportation modes; and 

conducted threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation 

assets, particularly related to passenger and freight rail. TSA has also hired and 

deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and freight 

rail systems. Finally, DHS has developed and administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes. 

While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the transportation 

network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that should be addressed to 

meet the goals and requirements set out for them by Congress, the administration, 

and the Department itself. For example, regarding commercial aviation, although 

TSA has made much progress in developing Secure Flight—a government-run passenger prescreening system—in February 2008, we reported that it can further 

strengthen its efforts by developing more-sound cost and schedule estimates, and 

strengthening security controls. In addition, while TSA has taken actions to enhance 

perimeter security and restrict access to secure areas at airports, it can further 

strengthen its efforts to reduce the risks posed by airport employees. TSA has also 

not developed a plan to guide and support individual airports and the commercial 

airport system as a whole with respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. Further, TSA is only recently beginning to deploy new checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has 

not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. With 

regard to surface transportation security, while TSA has initiated efforts to develop 

security standards for surface transportation modes, these efforts have been limited 

to passenger and freight rail. Moreover, although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of some surface transportation systems, inspectors’ 

roles and missions have not been fully defined. 

A variety of crosscutting issues have affected DHS’s and, as they relate to transportation security, TSA’s efforts in implementing its mission and management functions. These key issues include strategic planning and results management, risk 

management, and stakeholder coordination. For example, TSA has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts, fully developed performance measures, or put into place structures to help ensure that it is managing for results. In 

addition, DHS and its components can more fully adopt and apply a risk-management approach in implementing its security mission and core management functions,2 and more fully coordinate their activities with key stakeholders. DHS and 

TSA have strengthened their efforts in these areas, but more work remains. 

BACKGROUND

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November 2001, 

created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.3

TSA’s aviation security mission includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening work force; 

prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, 

baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nationwide, among other 

responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility for physically screening 

passengers and their baggage at most airports, TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for the security of airports and air cargo. Specifically, airports, 

air carriers, and other entities are required to implement security measures in accordance with TSA security requirements, against which TSA evaluates their compliance efforts. 

TSA also oversees air carriers’ efforts to prescreen passengers—in general, the 

matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s 

departure—and plans to take over operational responsibility for this function with 

the implementation of its Secure Flight program. CBP, which currently has responsibility for prescreening airline passengers on international flights departing from 

and bound for the United States, will continue to perform this function until TSA 
21 

4GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO–04–728 (Washington, DC: June 2004). 5GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges Before Implementing the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO–06–982 (Washington, DC: September 2006) and Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, GAO–08–133T 

(Washington, DC: October 31, 2007). 

assumes this function under Secure Flight. DHS’s S&T is responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the transportation sector. 

TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with Federal, 

State, and local governments and the private sector. TSA’s security mission includes 

establishing security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface transportation operators and State and local governments, and in conjunction with certain 

grants, the National Protection and Programs Directorate conducts risk assessments 

of surface transportation facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), 

the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In addition, public 

and private sector transportation operators are responsible for implementing security measures for their systems. 

DHS HAS MADE PROGRESS IN SECURING THE NATION’S AVIATION AND SURFACE

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS

DHS, primarily through TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen 

the security of the Nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems. In large 

part, these efforts have been guided by legislative mandates designed to strengthen 

the security of commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These efforts have also been affected by events external to the Department, 

including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up commercial aircraft 

bound from London to the United States, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London 

train bombings. While progress has been made in many areas with respect to securing the transportation network, we found that the Department can strengthen its 

efforts in some key areas outlined by Congress, the administration, and the Department itself, as discussed below. 

Aviation Security 

Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. TSA has taken action to strengthen the security of airport perimeters and access to restricted airport areas. However, 

as we reported in June 2004, the agency can further strengthen its efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies and reduce the risks posed by 

airport employees, among other things.4 In 2006, TSA completed the last project in 

an access control pilot program that included 20 airports, and which was designed 

to test and evaluate new and emerging technologies in an airport setting. TSA is 

also conducting an airport perimeter security pilot at six airports, to test technologies such as vehicle inspection systems. However, TSA has not developed a plan 

to guide and support individual airports and the commercial airport system as a 

whole with respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. Without such a plan, TSA could be limited in assessing and improving 

the effectiveness of its efforts to provide technical support for enhancing security. 

In addition, we reported in September 2006 and October 2007 on the status of the 

development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program—DHS’s effort to develop biometric access control systems to verify the identity 

of individuals accessing secure transportation areas.5 However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will implement a biometric identification system for access controls at commercial airports. In June 2004, we reported that while background checks were not required for all airport workers, TSA required most airport 

workers who perform duties in selected areas to undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. TSA further required airport operators to compare applicants’ names against TSA’s security watch lists. In July 2004, consistent with our 

previous recommendation to determine the need for additional security requirements to reduce the risks posed by airport employees, TSA enhanced requirements 

for background checks for employees working in restricted airport areas. Also consistent with our recommendation, in 2007, TSA further expanded the Security 

Threat Assessment—which determines, among other things, whether an employee 

has any terrorist affiliations—to require airport employees who receive an airport- 
22 

6TSA began conducting a name-based terrorist link analysis against selected terrorism databases in 2002 for workers who performed duties in selected airport areas. 7The Explanatory Statement accompanying Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110–161, Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 2042 (2007), allocates $15,000,000 in 

appropriated funds for TSA to pilot-test various forms of employee screening at seven commercial airports. Among other things, TSA is to collect data on the benefits, costs, and impacts of 

100 percent airport employee screening as well as of the alternative screening approaches, and 

brief the committees on Appropriations on the progress and results of the pilot projects no later 

than September 1, 2008. 8TSA also oversees screening operations at airports utilizing private screeners under TSA’s 

Screening Partnership Program. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. 9GAO, Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff Among 

Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed, GAO–07–299 (Washington, 

DC: Feb. 28, 2007). 

issued identification badge to undergo a review of citizenship status.6 Further, in 

March 2007, TSA implemented a random employee screening initiative—the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program—that uses TSOs to randomly screen airport 

workers and their property for explosives and other threat items. TSA has allocated 

about 900 full-time equivalent positions to the program and has requested $36 million for fiscal year 2009 for an additional 750 full-time equivalent positions. As directed by Congress in 2008, TSA plans to pilot test various employee screening 

methods at seven selected airports, including conducting 100 percent employee 

screening at three of these airports.7 TSA plans to begin pilot testing in May and 

report on the results of its efforts—as directed—by September 1, 2008. Finally, consistent with our previous recommendation to develop schedules and an analytical 

approach for completing vulnerability assessments, TSA has developed criteria for 

prioritizing vulnerability assessments at commercial airports. However, it has not 

compiled national baseline data to fully assess security vulnerabilities across airports. In 2004, TSA said an analysis of vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis was 

essential since it would allow the agency to assess the adequacy of security policies 

and help better direct limited resources. GAO is currently reviewing TSA’s efforts 

to enhance airport perimeter and access control security and will report on our results later this year. 

Aviation Security Workforce. TSA has made progress in deploying, training, and 

assessing the performance of its Federal aviation security work force. For example, 

TSA has hired and deployed a Federal screening work force at over 400 commercial 

airports nationwide, and developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at 

airports.8 These standards form the basis of TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model, which 

the agency uses to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. In response to our recommendation,9 in December 2007 TSA developed a Staffing Allocation Model Rates 

and Assumptions Validation Plan that identifies the process the agency plans to use 

to review and validate the model’s assumptions on a periodic basis. TSA also established numerous programs to train and test the performance of its screening work 

force. Among other efforts, TSA has provided enhanced explosives-detection training, and recently reported developing a monthly recurrent (ongoing) training plan 

for all TSOs. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed Federal air marshals on 

high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin crews; and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any terrorist or criminal 

acts. In April 2006, TSA implemented a performance accountability and standards 

system to assess agency personnel at all levels on various competencies, including 

training and development, readiness for duty, management skills, and technical proficiency. Finally, in April 2007, TSA redesigned its local covert testing program conducted at individual airports. This new program, known as the Aviation Screening 

Assessment Program or ASAP, is intended to test the performance of the passenger 

and checked baggage screening systems, to include the TSO work force. During our 

ongoing review of TSA’s covert testing program, we identified that TSA has implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to identify 

vulnerabilities in and measure the performance of selected aspects of the aviation 

system. However, we found that TSA could strengthen its program by developing 

a more systematic process for: (1) Recording the causes of covert test failures; and, 

(2) evaluating the test results and developing approaches for mitigating 

vulnerabilities identified in the commercial aviation security system. We will report 

on the complete results of this review later this year. 

Passenger Prescreening. Over the past several years, TSA has faced a number of 

challenges in developing and implementing an advanced prescreening system, 
23 

10GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security 

Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO–06–864T (Washington, DC: June 14, 2006) and 

GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO–07–448T (Washington, DC: Feb. 13, 2007). 11Passengers identified as being on the No Fly List must be denied boarding passes and must 

not be permitted to fly unless cleared in accordance with TSA security requirements. Passengers 

on the Selectee List are to be issued boarding passes, but they and their baggage are to undergo 

additional security measures. 12GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning 

to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO–08– 

456T (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2008). 13GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline 

Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could 

Be Improved, GAO–07–634 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16, 2007). 

known as Secure Flight,10 which will allow TSA to assume responsibility from air 

carriers for comparing domestic passenger information against the No Fly List and 

Selectee List.11 In February 2008, we reported that TSA had made substantial 

progress in instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and 

implementation, including preparing key systems development documentation and 

strengthening privacy protections.12 However, challenges remain that may hinder 

the program’s progress moving forward. Specifically, TSA had not: (1) Developed 

program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for system end-to-end testing in test 

plans; and (4) ensured that information-security requirements are fully implemented. To address these challenges, we made several recommendations to DHS 

and TSA to incorporate best practices in Secure Flight’s cost and schedule estimates 

and to fully implement the program’s risk-management, testing, and informationsecurity requirements. DHS and TSA officials generally agreed with these recommendations. We are continuing to assess TSA’s efforts in developing and implementing Secure Flight—which, according to TSA’s planned schedule, will allow the 

agency to fully assume the watch list matching function from air carriers in fiscal 

year 2010. TSA has also taken steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching 

function with the international watch-list matching function currently operated by 

CBP, consistent with our past recommendations. Specifically, TSA and CBP have coordinated to develop a strategy called the One DHS Solution, which is to align the 

two agencies’ domestic and international watch-list matching processes, information 

technology systems, and regulatory procedures to provide a seamless interface between DHS and the airline industry. TSA and CBP also agreed that TSA will take 

over the screening of passengers against the watch list for international flights from 

CBP, though CBP will continue to match passenger information to the watch list 

in fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full implementation of an integrated 

system is not planned to take place until after Secure Flight acquires the watchlist matching function for domestic flights. 

Checkpoint Screening. TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint 

screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited items and strengthen 

security; however, TSA could improve its evaluation and documentation of proposed 

procedures. In April 2007, we reported that modifications to checkpoint screening 

standard operating procedures (SOP) were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff, as well as threat information and the results of covert testing.13 We also reported on steps TSA had taken 

to address new and emerging threats, such as establishing the Screening Passengers 

by Observation Technique (SPOT) program, which provides TSOs with a nonintrusive, behavior-based means of identifying potentially high-risk individuals. For proposed screening modifications deemed significant, such as SPOT, TSA operationally 

tested these proposed modifications at selected airports before determining whether 

they should be implemented nationwide. However, we reported that TSA’s data collection and analysis of proposed SOP modifications could be improved, and recommended that TSA develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, to assess 

whether proposed screening changes would achieve their intended purpose. TSA has 

since reported taking steps to work with subject-matter experts to ensure that the 

agency’s operational testing of proposed screening modifications are well designed 

and executed, and produce results that are scientifically valid and reliable. With regard to checkpoint screening technologies, TSA and S&T have researched, developed, tested, and initiated procurements of various technologies to address security 

vulnerabilities that may be exploited; however, limited progress has been made in 

fielding emerging technologies. For example, of the various emerging checkpoint 
24 

14 Examples of projects currently in research and development include the checkpoint explosives detection system and the whole body imager. Projects that have undergone initiated procurements include the cast and prosthesis scanner and the advanced technology systems. 15GAO–07–448T. 16 Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs determine to be 

suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs 

to identify any traces of explosive materials. 17See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could 

Be Strengthened, GAO–06–869 (Washington, DC: July 2006), GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO–06– 

371T (Washington, DC: April 4, 2006), and GAO–07–448T. 18See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1603–04, 121 Stat. 266, 480–81 (2007). 19GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early 

Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO–07–660 (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2007). 

screening projects funded by TSA and S&T,14 only the explosives trace portal and 

a bottled liquids scanning device have been deployed for use in day-to-day operations. However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006. Also, in February 2008, we testified that TSA lacked a strategic plan to guide its efforts to acquire and deploy 

screening technologies, which could limit its ability to deploy emerging technologies 

to airports deemed at highest risk.15 According to TSA officials, the agency plans 

to submit a strategic plan to Congress by June 2008. We have ongoing work reviewing S&T and TSA checkpoint screening technologies efforts and will report on our 

results later this year. 

Checked Baggage Screening. TSA has made significant progress in installing explosive detection systems to provide the capability to screen checked baggage at the 

Nation’s commercial airports, as mandated by law. From November 2001 through 

June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 1,600 Explosive Detection Systems 

(EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked 

baggage for explosives at over 400 commercial airports.16 In addition, based in part 

on recommendations we made, TSA moved stand-alone EDS machines that were located at airports that received new in-line EDS baggage screening systems to 32 airports that did not previously have them from May 2004 through December 2007. 

TSA also replaced ETD machines at 53 airports with 158 new EDS machines from 

March 2005 through December 2007. In response to mandates to field the equipment quickly and to account for limitations in airport design that made it difficult 

to quickly install in-line EDS systems, TSA generally placed baggage screening 

equipment in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives.17 Based, in part, on our recommendations, TSA later developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD machines inline with airport baggage conveyor systems. The installation of in-line systems can 

result in considerable savings to TSA through the reduction of personnel needed to 

operate the equipment, as well as increased security. In addition, according to TSA 

estimates, the number of checked bags screened per hour can more than double 

when EDS machines are placed in-line versus being placed in the stand alone mode. 

Despite delays in the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the high upfront capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation of these systems 

and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund their deployment. In February 

2008, TSA submitted a legislative proposal to increase the Aviation Security Capital 

Fund (ASCF) through a new surcharge on the passenger security fee. According to 

TSA, this proposal, if adopted, would accelerate the deployment of optimal checked 

baggage screening systems and address the need to re-capitalize existing equipment 

deployed immediately after September, 2001. The Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act reiterates a requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing study for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, along with a plan 

and schedule for implementing provisions of the study, and requires TSA to establish a prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects related to the installation of in-line or other optimal baggage screening systems.18 As of April 3, 2008, 

TSA had not completed the prioritization schedule, corresponding timeline, and description of the funding allocation for these projects. 

Air Cargo Security. TSA has taken steps to secure air cargo, including initializing 

efforts to provide the capability to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on 

passenger aircraft by 2010, but its efforts are not yet complete. In April 2007, we 

reported that TSA’s Air Cargo strategic plan contained a strategy for securing domestic air cargo but did not include goals and objectives for addressing inbound air 

cargo, or cargo transported into the United States from a foreign country.19 We rec-
25 

20GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, 

GAO–06–76 (Washington, DC: Oct. 17, 2005) and GAO–07–660. 21TSA’s air cargo pilot programs include an air cargo explosives detection program; an EDS 

pilot program; an air cargo security seals pilot; the testing of hardened unit-loading devices; and, 

the testing of pulsed fast neutron analysis technology. 22GAO–07–660. 23 According to TSA, the program will allow TSA-certified shipper sand manufacturers to 

screen air cargo before it leaves the factory. The screened cargo would then be secured with a 

tamper-resistant seal and transported to the airport for shipment. 24Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. at 477–480 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)). 

ommended that DHS develop a risk-based strategy for securing inbound air cargo 

including defining TSA’s and CBP’s inbound air cargo security responsibilities. CBP 

subsequently issued its International Air Cargo Security strategic plan in June 

2007, and TSA plans to revise its Air Cargo strategic plan during the third quarter 

of fiscal year 2008 to incorporate a strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security, including how the agency will partner with CBP. We also reported that TSA 

had not conducted vulnerability assessments to identify the range of air cargo security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists, and recommended that TSA 

develop a methodology and schedule for completing these assessments.20 In response 

in part to our recommendation, TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment program in November 2006 and, as of April 2008, had completed vulnerability assessments at five domestic airports. TSA plans to complete assessments of 

all high-risk airports by 2009. In addition, although TSA has established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, the agency had exempted some 

domestic and inbound cargo from these requirements. While TSA has since revised 

its screening exemptions for domestic air cargo, it has not done so for inbound air 

cargo. TSA is also working with DHS S&T to develop and pilot test a number of 

technologies to assess their applicability to screening and securing air cargo.21 However, as of February 2008, TSA had provided a completion date for only one of its 

five air cargo technology pilot programs. According to TSA officials, the agency will 

determine whether it will require the use of these technologies once it has completed its assessments and analyzed the results. We also reported in April 2007 that 

TSA did not systematically compile and analyze information on air cargo security 

practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the Department’s overall air cargo security program, and we recommended that it do so.22 TSA has since 

begun development of a certified cargo screening program based in part on its review of screening models used in two foreign countries that rely on government-certified screeners to screen air cargo early in the supply chain.23 According to TSA, 

the agency plans to deploy this program to assist it in meeting the statutory requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by 

August 2010 (and to screen 50 percent of such cargo by February 2009), as mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.24 In January 2008, TSA began phase one of the program’s pilot tests, and as of April 2008, 

had completed tests at six airports. TSA plans to conduct tests at three additional 

airports by June 2008. 

Surface Transportation Security 

Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. In September 2005, DHS 

completed the National Strategy for Transportation Security. This strategy identified and evaluated transportation assets in the United States that could be at risk 

of a terrorist attack and addressed transportation sector security needs. Further, in 

May 2007, DHS issued a strategic plan for securing the transportation sector and 

supporting annexes for each of the surface transportation modes, and reported taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the plan. The Transportation 

Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security framework that is intended to 

enable sector stakeholders to make effective and appropriate risk-based security and 

resource allocation decisions within the transportation network. TSA has begun to 

implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan and 

supporting modal plans. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act imposes a deadline of May 2008, for the Secretary of DHS to 

develop and implement the National Strategy for Public Transportation Security. 

Our work assessing DHS’s efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface 

transportation modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of mass 

transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure 

security. We will report on the results of this work later this year. 

Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments. TSA has taken actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface 

transportation assets, particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, 
26 

25TSA conducts corporate security reviews in multiple modes of transportation to establish 

baseline data against which to evaluate minimum-security standards and identify coverage gaps 

in reviewed systems. 26 According to TSA, the agency completed 945 criticality assessments in fiscal year 2007 and 

400 assessments in fiscal year 2008. TSA officials stated that some of these assessments may 

have been conducted to update previously completed ones. 27For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–07–225T (Washington, DC: Jan. 18, 2007). 28See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006). 29See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 429–33, 454–57. 

but its efforts related to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure are in the 

early stages. For example, TSA had conducted threat assessments of all surface 

modes of transportation. TSA has also conducted assessments of the vulnerabilities 

associated with some surface transportation assets. For example, regarding freight 

rail, TSA has conducted vulnerability assessments of rail corridors in eight High 

Threat Urban Areas where toxic-inhalation-hazard shipments are transported. With 

respect to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure, TSA’s vulnerability assessment efforts are ongoing. According to TSA, the agency performed 113 corporate 

security reviews on highway transportation organizations through fiscal year 2007, 

such as trucking companies, State Departments of Transportation, and motorcoach 

companies.25 However, TSA does not have a plan or a timeframe for conducting 

these reviews on a nationwide basis. Furthermore, DHS’s National Protection and 

Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets to identify protective measures to reduce 

or mitigate asset vulnerability. With regard to criticality assessments, TSA reported 

in April 2008 that the agency had conducted 1,345 assessments of passenger rail 

stations.26 Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act has several provisions related to security assessments. For instance, the act 

requires DHS to review existing security assessments for public transportation systems as well as conduct additional assessments as necessary to ensure that all highrisk public transportation agencies have security assessments. Moreover, the act 

also requires DHS to establish a Federal task force to complete a nationwide risk 

assessment of a terrorist attack on rail carriers. We will continue to review threat, 

vulnerability, and criticality assessments conducted by TSA related to securing surface modes of transportation during our ongoing work.27

Issuance of Security Standards. TSA has taken actions to develop and issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail transportation 

modes. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, 

or determined whether standards are necessary for these modes of transportation. 

Specifically, TSA has developed and issued both mandatory rail security directives 

and recommended voluntary best practices—known as Security Action Items—for 

transit agencies and passenger rail operators to implement as part of their security 

programs to enhance both security and emergency-management preparedness. TSA 

also issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in December 2006, which if finalized 

as proposed, would include additional security requirements for passenger and 

freight rail transportation operators.28 For example, the rule would include additional security requirements designed to ensure that freight railroads have protocols 

for the secure custody transfers of toxic-inhalation-hazard rail cars in High Threat 

Urban Areas. DHS and other Federal partners have also been collaborating with the 

American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and public and private security 

professionals to develop industry wide security standards for mass transit systems. 

APTA officials reported that they expect several of the voluntary standards to be 

released in mid-2008. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act requires DHS to issue regulations establishing standards and 

guidelines for developing and implementing vulnerability assessments and security 

plans for high-risk railroad carriers and over-the-road bus operators.29 The deadlines for the regulations are August 2008 and February 2009, respectively. With respect to freight rail, TSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing 

that high-risk rail carriers conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and implement security plans. We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to issue security 

standards for other surface transportation modes during our ongoing reviews. 

Compliance Inspections. TSA has hired and deployed surface transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections for both passenger and freight 

rail modes of transportation; however, questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to enforce new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the Im-
27 

30See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1534, 121 Stat at 461–62. 31See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1405, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 402–05, 429–33, 454–57. 32See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1408, 121 Stat. at 409–11 (requiring that the Secretary develop 

and issue final regulations for the training program by August 2008). 33See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1304, 121 Stat. at 393–94. 34For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–06–181T (Washington, DC: Oct. 20, 2005). 

plementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.30 TSA officials reported 

having 100 surface transportation inspectors during fiscal year 2005 and, as of December 2007, were maintaining an inspector work force of about the same number. 

The agency’s budget request for fiscal year 2009 includes $11.6 million to fund 100 

surface transportation security inspectors—which would maintain its current staffing level. Inspectors’ responsibilities include conducting on-site inspections of key facilities for freight rail, passenger rail, and transit systems; assessing transit systems’ implementation of core transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items; conducting examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance with security directives; identifying security gaps; and developing effective 

practices. To meet these compliance responsibilities, TSA reported in December 

2007 that it had conducted voluntary assessments of 50 of the 100 largest transit 

agencies, including 34 passenger rail and 16 bus-only agencies, and has plans to 

continue these assessments with the next 50 largest transit agencies during fiscal 

year 2008. With respect to freight rail, TSA reported visiting, during 2007, almost 

300 railroad facilities including terminal and railroad yards to assess the railroads’ 

implementation of 17 DHS-recommended Security Action Items associated with the 

transportation of toxic-inhalation-hazard materials. 

TSA has raised concerns about the agency’s ability to continue to meet anticipated 

inspection responsibilities given the new regulations proposed in its December 2006 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. For example, the act mandates that 

high-risk over-the-road bus operators, railroad carriers, and public transportation 

agencies develop and implement security plans which must include, among other requirements, procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist attack.31 The 

act further requires the Secretary of DHS to review each plan within 6 months of 

receiving it. TSA officials stated that they believe TSA inspectors will likely be 

tasked to conduct these reviews. The act also requires that the Secretary of DHS 

develop and issue interim final regulations by November 2007, for a public transportation security training program.32 As of April 2008, these interim regulations have 

not been issued. According to TSA officials, TSA inspectors will likely be involved 

in ensuring compliance with these regulations as well. To help address these additional requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ additional surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface transportation inspectors have relevant transportation experience and appropriate security and inspection qualifications.33 However, it is not clear how TSA will meet these new requirements since 

the agency has not requested funding for additional surface transportation security 

inspectors for fiscal year 2009. We will continue to assess TSA’s inspection efforts 

during our ongoing work.34

Grant Programs. DHS has developed and administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes, although stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the current grant process. For example, the DHS Office of Grants and 

Training, now called the Grant Programs Directorate, has used various programs 

to fund passenger rail security since 2003. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program, the Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban 

areas to help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate used 

fiscal year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work under way 

through the Urban Areas Security Initiative program, and create and administer 

new programs focused specifically on transportation security, including the Transit 

Security Grant Program, Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program, and the 

Freight Rail Security Grant Program. However, some industry stakeholders have 

raised concerns regarding DHS’s current grant process, including the shifting of 

funding priorities, the lack of program flexibility, and other barriers to the provision 

of grant funding. For example, transit agencies have reported that the lack of predictability in how TSA will assess grant projects against funding priorities makes 

it difficult to engage in long-term planning of security initiatives. Specifically, transit agencies have reported receiving funding to begin projects—such as retrofitting 

their transit fleet with security cameras or installing digital video recording sys-
28 

35See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. 405–08, 433–35, 457–60. 36See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1406(b), (c)(2), 121 Stat. at 405–07. 37See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §§ 1406(d), 1532(e), 121 Stat. at 407, 459. 38For more information see GAO–06–181T. 39GAO–07–660. 40GAO–07–660. 41GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO–07–729 (Washington, 

DC: May 11, 2007). 

tems—but not being able to finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA 

had changed its funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and imposes 

statutory requirements on the administration of the programs.35 For example, the 

act lists authorized uses of these grant funds and requires DHS to award the grants 

based on risk.36 It also requires that DHS and DOT determine the most effective 

and efficient way to distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to 

DOT for the purpose of disbursement.37 According to the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification, to ensure that the selected projects are focused on increasing security, DHS grants are to be awarded based on risk. We will continue assessing surface transportation related grant programs as part of our ongoing work.38

CROSSCUTTING ISSUES HAVE HINDERED DHS’S EFFORTS IN IMPLEMENTING ITS MISSION

AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded the Department’s 

progress since its inception and will continue to confront DHS as it moves forward. 

These issues include: (1) Establishing baseline performance goals and measures and 

engaging in effective strategic planning efforts; (2) applying and strengthening a 

risk-management approach for implementing missions and making resource allocation decisions; and, (3) coordinating and partnering with Federal, State, and local 

agencies, and the private sector. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS 

and its components, including TSA, to strengthen these efforts, and the Department 

has made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. 

DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and has not 

yet fully developed performance measures or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. For example, with regard to TSA’s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based 

risk-management approach to securing the Nation’s domestic air cargo system, and 

that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air 

cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines.39 However, TSA had not developed 

a similar strategy for addressing the security of inbound air cargo—cargo transported into the United States from foreign countries—including how best to partner 

with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. In another example, we reported 

in April 2007 that TSA had not yet developed outcome-based performance measures 

for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, such as the 

percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA’s on-site 

assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of these programs that 

may need attention. We recommended that DHS direct TSA and CBP to develop a 

risk-based strategy, including specific goals and objectives, for securing air cargo;40

and develop outcome-based performance measures for its foreign airport assessment 

and air carrier inspection programs.41 DHS generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations with regard to air cargo, and is taking steps to strengthen its efforts 

in this area. 

Although DHS and TSA have made risk-based decisionmaking a cornerstone of 

departmental and agency policy, DHS and TSA could strengthen their application 

of risk management in implementing their mission functions. Several DHS component agencies and TSA have worked toward integrating risk-based decisionmaking 

into their security efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be strengthened. 

For example, TSA has incorporated certain risk-management principles into securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk-based approach. TSA has also incorporated risk-based decisionmaking when making modifications to airport checkpoint 

screening procedures, to include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport checkpoints. 

However, in April 2007, we reported that TSA’s analyses that supported screening 

procedural changes could be strengthened. For example, TSA officials based their 
29 

42GAO–07–634. 43GAO–07–634. 44See GAO–07–660 and GAO–05–851. 45See GAO–05–851. 46GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security Threats 

Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, GAO–07–891R (Washington, DC: July 31, 

2007). 47See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1541, 121 Stat. at 469. 48See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1305, 121 Stat. at 394–95. 

decision to revise the prohibited items list to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information—which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system—so that TSOs 

could concentrate on higher threat items.42 However, TSA officials did not conduct 

the analysis necessary to help them determine whether this screening change would 

affect TSO’s ability to focus on higher-risk threats.43 As noted earlier in this statement, TSA is taking steps to strengthen its efforts in both of these areas. 

In addition to providing Federal leadership with respect to homeland security, 

DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of key stakeholders, but 

has faced challenges in this regard. Although improvements are being made, we 

have found that the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within 

and between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are evolving and 

need to be clarified. For example, we reported that opportunities exist for TSA to 

work with foreign governments and industry to identify best practices for securing 

passenger rail and air cargo, and recommended that TSA systematically compile 

and analyze information on practices used abroad to identify those that may 

strengthen the Department’s overall security efforts.44 With regard to air cargo, 

TSA has subsequently reviewed the models used in two foreign countries that rely 

on government-certified screeners to screen air cargo to facilitate the design of the 

agency’s proposed certified-cargo screening program. Further, in September 2005, 

we reported that TSA did not effectively involve private sector stakeholders in its 

decisionmaking process for developing security standards for passenger rail assets.45

We recommended that DHS develop security standards that reflect industry best 

practices and can be measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, 

if appropriate, rail asset owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations. Regarding efforts to respond to in-flight security threats, which, depending on the nature 

of the threat, could involve more than 15 Federal agencies and agency components, 

in July 2007 we also recommended that DHS and other departments document and 

share their respective coordination and communication strategies and response procedures, to which DHS agreed.46 The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act includes provisions designed to improve coordination with stakeholders. For example, the act requires DHS and DOT to develop an annex to the 

Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments governing the specific 

roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments in addressing motor carrier 

transportation security matters, including the processes the departments will follow 

to promote communications and efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort.47 The act 

also requires DHS, in consultation with DOT, to establish a program to provide appropriate information that DHS has gathered or developed on the performance, use, 

and testing of technologies that may be used to enhance surface transportation security to surface transportation entities.48 According to TSA, the agency has begun to 

provide transit agencies with information on recommended available security technologies through security roundtables for the top 50 transit agencies; the posting of 

an authorized equipment list on the Homeland Security Information Network Web 

site; and periodic briefings to other Federal agencies. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The magnitude of DHS’s and TSA’s responsibilities in securing the Nation’s transportation system is significant, and we commend the Department on the work it has 

done and is currently doing to secure this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that the agency 

continually strive to strengthen its programs and initiatives to counter emerging 

threats and improve security. In the almost 61⁄2 years since its creation, TSA has 

had to undertake its critical mission while also establishing and forming a new 

agency. At the same time, a variety of factors, including threats to and attacks on 

transportation systems around the world, as well as new legislative requirements, 

have led the agency to reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address key 

events, and to respond to emerging threats. Although TSA has made considerable 

progress in addressing key aspects of commercial aviation security, more work re-
30 

mains in some key areas, such as the deployment of technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and in air cargo. Further, although TSA has more recently 

taken action in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, 

its efforts are still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its regulatory role 

and relationship with transportation operators is still being defined. As DHS and 

TSA move forward, it will be important for the Department to address the challenges that have affected its operations thus far, while continuing to adapt to new 

threats and needs, and well as increase the effectiveness and efficiency of existing 

programs and operations. We will continue to review DHS’s and TSA’s progress in 

securing the transportation network, and will provide information to Congress and 

the public on these efforts. 

Madam Chairwoman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this 

time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you for your testimony. 

It is my pleasure now to recognize Mr. Ervin to summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY INITIATIVE, ASPEN INSTITUTE 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and Mr. 

Bilirakis. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today on 

this important topic. Let me start with the positives. 

I think that Secretary Hawley is to be commended for the more 

open and collaborative spirit he brings to the job. Under his leadership, TSA has been more willing to listen to, respond to and benefit 

from constructive criticism. 

Operationally, I commend the move toward introducing more 

randomness into the system so as to keep terrorists off guard as 

much as possible. I think the behavior detection program is, in theory, at least, very much to be applauded. A variant of it has 

worked for many years, in fact, in Israel. It led just recently, here 

in this country, in Orlando, as we have all noticed and spoken 

about, to the detection of a passenger carrying bomb parts. 

As important as it is to spot guns, knives, bombs and other potential weapons before they are used to deadly effect, it is at least 

as important, if not more so, to try to identify people whose behavior suggests that they might use such weapons. 

My concern is whether transportation security officers are being 

trained long enough and comprehensively enough to truly distinguish between people whose movements, mannerisms or demeanor 

suggest deadly intent and people who merely look different from 

the norm. What to a behavior detection officer is behavior detection 

may to a given subject be racial or ethnic profiling. 

TSA is to be commended also for the initiative to redesign the 

checkpoint to make it more aesthetically and psychologically appealing, and, likewise, the effort to create separate lines for experienced business travelers and harried parents and others who need 

more time to go through the checkpoint is commendable. But I remain troubled by several things. 

First of all, undercover government and media investigations 

continue to the present day to show what they have shown since 

9/11: screeners far too often fail to spot concealed guns, knives and 

bombs. TSA’s response to such results is always the same: screener 

performance is only one of several, 19 layers, at airports. A con-
31 

centrated effort to defeat any one layer can succeed, certainly, but 

each layer is linked such that the whole is greater than the sum 

of its parts. Of course, screeners fail test nowadays. They are much 

harder than they used to be, and they get harder all the time. 

But to take these arguments in turn, the whole chain is only as 

strong as its weakest link. As links go, the checkpoint is the most 

important in terms of keeping weapons off airplanes. 

As a general rule, the one and only time that passengers and 

their carry-on luggage are checked for guns, knives and bombs is 

at the checkpoint. Of course we want the test to be as hard as possible. It is not as if terrorists will make it easy to spot their concealed weapons. 

TSA seems to be saying implicitly and illogically the worse we 

do on these tests, the better. The good news is that we have heard 

today from Secretary Hawley that still more technology, which is 

the ultimate key to this, will be deployed. I hope that this effort 

will be accelerated and that additional moneys will be provided to 

TSA to ensure and to further expedite the deployment of these 

technologies. 

My second concern relates to air cargo. It is good news that TSA 

is now required by law to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger 

planes for explosives by 2010, so I was initially heartened to read 

last week’s ‘‘USA Today’’ story that TSA was launching this effort 

this summer in major cities, suggesting that the deadline will be 

met sooner, rather than later. 

As I read further, though, I grew disheartened, as I learned that, 

much like the C–TPAT program that CBP employs, TSA will allow 

shippers of air cargo to volunteer to screen their own cargo. There 

is no reason to believe that shippers in any great numbers will be 

wiling to pay for the necessary personnel and equipment. 

Further, as to any shipper that would be willing to pay for the 

necessary personnel and equipment and conduct its own self 

screening, we simply cannot afford to outsource a critical security 

function like this in the post-9/11 world. Businesses are concerned 

about security, certainly, but understandably their first concern is 

their bottom line. When the two conflict, security loses out. 

My third concern relates to air marshals. I was concerned by the 

CNN story just last week that only about 1 percent of the 28,000 

commercial flights flown in an average day are covered by air marshals, according to some half-dozen air marshals and pilots interviewed by the network. If this is true, this is particularly troubling, 

and that is especially the case against the backdrop of the poor results on these undercover tests that was just mentioned. I hope we 

will probe that today during the course of the hearing. 

Then, finally, I am concerned that while pilots and flight attendants are screened, like passengers, every time they go through 

checkpoints, other airport workers, some 900,000 of them nationwide, are not. The background check process is not sufficient, it 

seems to me, when we learned that on occasion workers are caught 

with thefts and drug smuggling, other crimes. If these background 

tests are not sufficient in that circumstance, they are not sufficient 

to protect against terrorism. 

This summarizes my testimony, Madam Chairwoman, and I am 

looking forward very much to your questions. 
32 

[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN

APRIL 15, 2008 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members, for inviting me to testify 

today on the topic, ‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five Years: How the Transportation 

Security Administration will Continue to Enhance Security for all Modes of Transportation.’’ 

Let me start with the positive. I think that Secretary Hawley is to be commended 

for the more open and collaborative spirit he brings to the job. Under his leadership, 

TSA has been more willing to listen to, respond to, and benefit from constructive 

criticism. The new blog, for example, provides an easy way for TSA leaders to communicate with and hear from the public, and it provides a way for travelers to vent 

their frustrations and to get things off their chest. 

Operationally, I commend the move toward introducing more randomness into the 

system, so as to keep terrorists off guard as much as possible. 

I think the Behavior Detection Program is, in theory at least, very much to be 

applauded. It has worked, in fact, in Israel very effectively for many years. And, it 

led just recently in Orlando to the detection of a passenger carrying bomb parts. 

As important as it is to spot guns, knives, bombs, and other potential weapons before they are used to deadly effect (about which more later), it is at least as important, if not more so, to try to identify people whose behavior suggests that they 

might use such weapons. 

My concern is whether Transportation Security Officers are being trained long 

enough and comprehensively enough truly to distinguish between people whose 

movements, mannerisms or demeanor suggest deadly intent and people who merely 

look different from the norm. What to a Behavior Detection Officer is ‘‘behavior detection’’ may, to a given subject, be racial or ethnic profiling. I hope that the subcommittee will probe into this issue today. 

TSA is to be commended also for the initiative to redesign the checkpoint to make 

it more aesthetically and psychologically appealing through the use of music, lighting, and such. It is easy to make fun of such moves, but anything that makes the 

traveling experience more pleasant without sacrificing security is a very good thing, 

indeed. Likewise, the effort to create separate lines for experienced business travelers and harried parents struggling with children, luggage, and toys (and other 

travelers who, for one reason or another, need more time to navigate the checkpoint) 

is commendable. I travel in both incarnations—sometimes alone, as a business traveler, and other times with my wife and 2-year-old—and I would very much appreciate being in a separate line with like travelers under each circumstance. 

But, I remain troubled by several things. First, government and media investigations continue to the present day to show what they have shown since 9/11—screeners far too often fail to spot concealed guns, knives, and bombs. This was the case 

in 2001, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General was responsible for conducting such tests. It was the case 

in 2003–2004 during my time as the Department of Homeland Inspector General. 

It was the case in a followup DHS IG report in 2005 after I left. In the spring of 

2006, GAO reported that they were able to sneak potential bomb components 

through checkpoints at 21 different airports undetected. In October 2006, it was reported that screeners at Newark International Airport, not incidentally one of the 

airports transited by 9/11 hijackers, failed 20 out of 22 undercover tests. USA Today 

reported a year later, last October, that screeners failed TSA’s own undercover tests 

75 percent of the time at LAX, and 60 percent of the time at Chicago O’Hare. And, 

just a couple of months ago, the DHS Inspector General released its latest report 

on covert testing of screeners. Only an unclassified summary was released, and it 

is impossible to tell what the results were. But, I note that the IG made six recommendations. It is certainly possible that the results showed dramatic improvement in screener performance and the IG still found it necessary to make six recommendations. Given the foregoing background, I think it more likely that six recommendations were made because there is still considerable room for improvement. 

In any event, I hope the subcommittee has or promptly will obtain the classified 

version of the report and learn for yourselves what the results are and how they 

stack up against the foregoing ones. 

TSA’s response to such results is always the same. Screener performance is only 

one of 19 security layers at airports. A concentrated effort to defeat any one layer 

can succeed, certainly, but, each layer is linked such that the whole is greater than 

the sum of the parts. 
33 

And, of course, screeners fail tests nowadays. They are much harder than they 

used to be, and they get harder all the time. 

But, to take these arguments in turn, the whole chain is only as strong as its 

weakest link. And, as links go, the checkpoint is the most important, in terms of 

keeping weapons off airplanes. As a general rule, the one and only time that passengers and their carry-on luggage are checked for guns, knives, and bombs is at 

the checkpoint. At the boarding gate, an agent or flight attendant merely checks 

whether each passenger has a boarding pass that appears to be in order. So, if 

weapons are missed at the checkpoint, chances are that they will make it onto airplanes. 

And, of course, we want the tests to be as hard as possible. It is not as if terrorists 

will make it easy to spot their concealed weapons. TSA seems to be saying, implicitly and illogically, the worse we do on these tests the better. 

The good news is that TSA grasps that, in addition to more and better training, 

and consequences for screeners who consistently fail such tests, the key to better 

screener performance are technologies like backscatter and multi-view X-ray machines. The problem is that, almost 7 years after 9/11, and 5 years after my office 

recommended such technologies, they are still only in the pilot or testing phase. 

These technologies, and others like them, should have been tested and piloted long 

ago. By now, they should be widely deployed throughout the country, ideally at 

every airport and checkpoint, and certainly at every checkpoint at the highest risk 

airports in the country. That takes money, of course, and that is something that 

DHS/TSA has been short of since its inception, and, all too often, the dollars it has 

been given have been poorly managed. I hope that the next administration, Republican or Democrat, will make it a priority to get TSA the resources it needs to move 

beyond the drawing board to the field with these technologies that can make the 

difference between terrorists’ or DHS’ winning the next time aviation is targeted for 

attack. 

Another problem is that, on occasion, covert tests have been compromised by tipoffs to screeners that they are being tested. It is unclear how widespread this is, 

but one time is one time too many. And, of course, TSA management itself should 

never be involved in tipping off screeners, as was suggested by the now infamous 

April 2006 email that was the subject of a full committee hearing last November. 

I hope that the Inspector General is investigating this matter and, if so, the investigation concludes soon. 

My second concern relates to air cargo. It is good news that TSA is now required 

by law to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger planes for explosives by 2010. 

I was initially heartened to read last week’s USA Today story that TSA was launching the effort this summer in major cities, suggesting that the deadline would be 

met sooner rather than later. As I read further, I grew disheartened as I learned 

that, much like Customs and Border Protection relies on shippers of oceangoing 

freight to police themselves through the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (C–TPAT), TSA will allow shippers of air cargo to volunteer to 

screen their own cargo. There is no reason to believe that shippers in any great 

numbers will be willing to pay for the necessary personnel and equipment. Further, 

as to any shipper that would be willing to pay for the necessary personnel and 

equipment and conduct its own self screenings, we simply cannot afford to outsource 

a critical security function like this in the post-9/11 world. Businesses are concerned 

about security, certainly. But, understandably, their first concern is their bottom 

line. When the two conflict, security loses out. We should have learned the lesson 

the hard way on 9/11, since airlines were in charge of screening passengers and baggage at that time. The whole point of creating TSA was the recognition that, left 

to its own devices, the private sector will put profit ahead of security when the two 

conflict every time. One hundred percent of the screening should be done by TSA 

personnel. And, if, TSA needs more resources to accomplish this, TSA should forthwith be given those additional resources. 

My third concern relates to air marshals. I had been under the impression that 

our problems with air marshals (the number of them, their anonymity, etc.) were 

behind us. So, I was aghast to see the recent CNN story to the effect that less than 

1 percent of the 28,000 commercial flights flown on an average day are covered by 

air marshals, according to more than a dozen air marshals and pilots interviewed 

by the network. Of course, if true, this is even more troubling against the backdrop 

of continued poor results on undercover tests of screeners’ ability to spot concealed 

weapons. If terrorists can smuggle weapons on board aircraft, and there is no air 

marshal to defend the plane and its passengers against attack, a given plane can 

be an open target. We need to increase the budget for this vital program sufficiently 

to enable TSA to cover 100 percent of at least the highest risk flights, namely those 

into and out of the Nation’s largest cities and busiest airports, and as high a per-
34 

centage of all other flights as practicable. The air marshal force should be supplemented by trained and deputized current and former law enforcement personnel 

from other Federal, State, and local agencies, military personnel, and perhaps, even, 

veterans. And, the Federal Flight Deck Officers Program, whereby pilots are trained 

and authorized to carry a gun to protect the cockpit should be expanded. At present, 

my understanding is that there’s still only one training facility, in a remote town 

in a remote state. And, according to this just mentioned CNN report, pilots have 

to pay as much as $3,000 of their own money for lodging and meals when they take 

the course. And, Federal Flight Deck Officers do not get additional pay for being 

willing to perform this additional, vital service. They should, as a further incentive 

to encourage still more pilots (and other authorized flight crew personnel) to sign 

up. 

My fourth concern is that, while pilots and flight attendants are screened, like 

passengers, every time they go through checkpoints, other airport workers, some 

900,000 of them nationwide, are not. There have been numerous instances during 

recent years of airport personnel being involved in thefts, drug smuggling, and other 

crimes. So, if background checks are no panacea against the threat of crime, they 

are likewise no panacea against the threat of terrorism. I hopeful that the bill that 

Ms. Lowey of New York has introduced on this issue will ultimately, and sooner 

rather than later, become law. 

Finally, the title of this hearing refers to ‘‘all modes of transportation.’’ TSA has 

devoted its resources, personnel, and attention almost entirely to aviation related 

matters since its creation in 2001. Now is past time for TSA to devote considerably 

more resources, personnel, and attention to securing other modes of travel, especially mass transit. Given that terrorists aim to maximize the number of people 

killed and injured and damage to the U.S. economy, it is curious that we have yet 

to see an attack on mass transit here in the United States, especially since such 

attacks have happened since 9/11 elsewhere in the world. Major cities like New 

York are taking appropriate steps like increased armed police presence; a greater 

use of bomb sniffing dogs and bomb detection technology; the wide deployment of 

surveillance cameras; random bag searches, and public awareness ‘‘see something/ 

say something’’ campaigns. But, all these measures are extraordinarily costly, and, 

given the deteriorating economy, cities are increasingly strapped for funds. The Federal Government has an obligation to help at least the highest risk cities shoulder 

the burden of these costs, because these are the cities that are likeliest to be targeted by terrorists and an attack on any one of them would be an attack on the 

Nation as a whole. 

Thank you very much, again, for the invitation to testify today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. Verdery, if you would summarize your statement in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., PARTNER, 

MONUMENT POLICY GROUP, LLC 

Mr. VERDERY. Madam Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Congressman 

Bilirakis, thank you for having me back to the committee today. It 

is nice to be back. 

It is an interesting challenge, deploying policy, technology and 

resources to secure transportation. Over the past several years, 

TSA deserves great credit for making strides in this arena. 

I would ask the Congress to stick with what has worked—risk 

management has worked—and not load on additional layers on 

TSA that cannot be funded and cannot be properly implemented. 

Some level of risk is inherent in transportation systems, especially 

non-aviation systems, as we will talk about later. 

As you mentioned, I served as Assistant Secretary for Policy the 

first 2 years of the Department. The 2 years I oversaw TSA from 

a policy perspective were a tumultuous time, as TSA moved from 

the Department of Transportation to DHS. Unfortunately, it was a 
35 

time when TSA’s every misstep seemed to show up on the latenight comics and led to congressional oversight. 

People had not yet grasped what it means to try to secure aviation systems or transportation more broadly. What these comics 

and critics missed was the success that was being built and it was 

mentioned by both of you in your opening statements, the fact that 

there has not been a successful incident in this country, and that 

is largely because of the investments that have been made. 

Other agencies now have a public awareness of what a real level 

of performance is. When a drug boat makes it past the Coast 

Guard, when an illegal migrant makes it past CBP into the country, when the IRS, on tax day, of all days, fails to find a tax cheat, 

people say that is just what happens. We are not going to be perfect. But, somehow, TSA is held to a standard, and every time 

somebody sneaks a knife past security or every time there is a 

breach in the sterile zone, it ends up on CNN. 

We have to understand the risk in the system. I think the American public would be very surprised to learn that in fiscal year 

2007, the last full year, the TSA’s budget was 99.8 percent as large 

as the FBI’s, and the FBI has a heck of a lot broader portfolio than 

the TSA, everything from counterterrorism to public corruption. 

But that is what happens when you go and you hire 45,000 welltrained, well-compensated, well-supported employees. You have 

gotten a good bang for the buck. 

But as you build out more and more mandates and add on more 

and more equipment, there are trailing costs that may not be 

worth the investment when there are so many other needs in the 

Homeland Security arena. 

People have to remember that each layer of the 20 layers that 

have been mentioned are not meant to be perfect. The goal of 

checking IDs is not to find the fake ID. The goal of the liquids 

check is not to find the liquid. It is to identify individuals who have 

a serious intent of doing harm to passengers or to a transportation 

mechanism. 

In my written testimony, I mention several successes of Administrator Hawley over the last couple of years, and I particularly want 

to mention the traveler redress program that was launched last 

year with help of the DHS Screening and Coordination Office. This 

has been a great success, and I encourage people who have watch 

list problems to try to use it. 

I had one individual that I work with said he had a watch list 

problem and I will just read what he wrote me yesterday. ‘‘I am 

a frequent traveler who regularly checked in online, at home or at 

the airport kiosk. In preparation for a recent trip, I tried to check 

in the night before and was told I had to see an agent. I went to 

the desk and was told I had to check in because I was on a security 

list. Apparently, there was someone with my same name, even the 

middle initial. 

‘‘I went to the DHS Web site, read the TRIP process, submitted 

the required forms and documents. Within 2 weeks, it was resolved. I received a letter from DHS that reviewed my case and 

fixed the issue. I thought the process was clear, quick and responsive. I was impressed.’’ 
36 

So this is working well, but I ask the committee to go one step 

further, take advantage of H.R. 4719, Congresswoman Clarke’s bill. 

Take it up, move it. It will codify the program and expand it to 

non-transportation modes. It is an excellent bill. 

In my few minutes remaining, I want to take a couple of programs where I think TSA has missed opportunities to work with 

the private sector in ways that would be most productive. First is 

the Registered Traveler program. 

I know the committee had an oversight hearing on this recently, 

but the basic program still—and I am a member of the program— 

while you provide fingerprints as part of the application process, 

they are not used. They are not run against criminal databases. 

They are not run against terrorist databases, the logic being, well, 

we are not changing the checkpoint no matter what the background check says. 

I think this is a missed opportunity. We have to look at risk 

management, and the idea that we are going to make somebody 

take off their shoes who is going through a full background check, 

has volunteered every piece of information that they will to the 

government and take up screener time to check millions of wouldbe travelers and take off their shoes I think is a poor use of resources that could be used for other purposes. 

Moreover, Customs and Border Protection, the sister agency of 

TSA, promisingly announced yesterday that Global Entry, International Registered Traveler program for arrivals in the United 

States, these individuals will go through a full interview, full criminal check, full background check, fingerprint check. They ought to 

be cross-enrolled in the domestic program and I understand talks 

are underway to make that happen. 

Again, that is moving people into a streamlined process and allowing screeners to focus on individuals they haven’t seen before. 

We need to move forward on the Travel Document Checker program. It is part of the promising program that the administrator 

announced. We are now checking IDs instead of having it be handled by a rent-a-cop in an inconvenient, easy-to-avoid fashion. But 

there is technology in the works in driver’s licenses with watermarks that can easily be read and this will be able to find licenses 

that will be of increasing value as REAL ID is finalized. 

A true REAL ID-compliant license will be quite valuable if it is 

stolen or forged, and we need to be able to detect those. 

Madam Chairwoman, my 5 minutes is up. I hope during the 

question-and-answer period, we will have a chance to talk about 

Secure Flight, a program I worked on at DHS which remains in the 

works, unfortunately. It is a difficult program, but a priority and 

also how we can move forward in some of the other modes of transportation. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Verdery follows:] 
37 

1 As disclosed in filings with the House and U.S. Senate, Monument Policy Group represents 

several clients with a variety of interests related to transportation security. Also, CSIS does not 

take policy positions. Thus, this testimony is submitted in my personal capacity and not on behalf of any third party. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. 

APRIL 15, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to return to the House Committee on Homeland Security to discuss the challenges that the country faces in developing and deploying an effective mix of policy, technology, and resources to secure our transportation systems. I am currently a partner and founder of the consulting firm Monument Policy Group, LLC and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies.1

Not only must these programs deter and detect those who would commit acts of 

terrorism or crime, they must also facilitate the flow of travelers and goods essential 

to our economic livelihood and social fabric. Over the last several years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made great strides in striking this balance, securing our transportation systems and using its significant but ultimately 

limited resources to implement effective risk-management. I would ask the Congress, and this committee in particular, to resist the urge to hold TSA to the standard of perfection-instead, I hope that you will understand that some level of risk 

is inherent in the security arena, particularly if we want to balance security with 

the freedom of movement of goods and people. Furthermore, I urge TSA and those 

who fund and oversee the agency to rededicate themselves to working with the private sector to find solutions that utilize private sector expertise without requiring 

massive new Federal bureaucracies to secure our transportation systems. 

BACKGROUND

As you know, I served as Assistant Secretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Policy and Planning at DHS from 2003 through 2005. I was responsible 

for policy development within the BTS Directorate, working closely with Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson and Secretary Tom Ridge, in the areas of immigration and 

visas, transportation security, law enforcement, and cargo security. These policies 

largely were carried out in the field by BTS agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and TSA. 

BTS’s functions have been subsumed and enhanced under the new DHS structure, 

most notably the new DHS Office of Policy. 

I worked closely with TSA during my 2 years at DHS, serving as its advocate 

within the administration and with the Congress, foreign governments, and private 

sector stakeholders, and coordinating its activities with other DHS entities such as 

CBP. This was a tumultuous period of transition for TSA as it moved from the Department of Transportation to DHS. During this time, nearly misstep seemingly appeared on the front page of USA Today and any progress—or lack thereof—in key 

areas was often caricatured by late night comedians and critics in Congress and 

elsewhere. Unfortunately, this sort of criticism did not take into account the broader 

fact that the Executive branch deployed a new agency from scratch seemingly overnight. Furthermore, these critics failed to note that TSA has succeeded in its broad 

mission to deter transportation-based acts of terrorism in the United States. 

DISCUSSION

For most Federal agencies, the public has a general idea of an acceptable level 

of performance. And it is generally not 100 percent success. The public does not expect the Coast Guard to stop each speedboat carrying drugs to our shores; the public 

does not expect CBP’s Border Patrol to catch every family of illegal migrants crossing the border; nor, noting today is April 15, does the public expect the IRS to recognize every tax cheat. Generally, it seems, we are as a people familiar enough with 

these government entities to understand that they will not succeed each and every 

time in their mission. Unfortunately, TSA suffers from the expectation that all efforts must reach 100 percent success or else they are a failure: hearings must be 

held and someone must be held accountable. 

Partially this is a result of TSA’s own well intended effort to create metrics for 

success. TSA’s Web site prominently notes exactly how many weapons were detected 

during the past week, the number of security breaches resolved, and similar statis-
38 

tics. This mindset, however, is also a function of the constant search for perfection 

in each of TSA’s security layers. TSA now describes some 20 layers of security deployed to protect aviation, from government intelligence activity to passengers trying to protect themselves and their fellow citizens. 

While serious observers of homeland security view and value each layer for its 

multiplier effect on security, oftentimes the focus tends to be on whether a single 

layer is being executed to perfection. For example, the real goal of a travel document 

checker is not to find fake ID’s. The goal of TSA’s liquids detection efforts is not 

to confiscate expensive perfume from those who accidentally have more than three 

ounces at the checkpoint. The goal of these and other layers is to alert TSA to an 

individual whose intent is to kill or injure passengers or use the plane itself as a 

weapon. That is the goal we should all be holding TSA to, and that is the way performance should be measured. 

However, far too few of us take that approach, and as a result TSA has been stuck 

in a spiral of creating more and more programs, consuming more and more of the 

Federal security budget. In fact, I would argue that the TSA already consumes far 

too large a portion of our scarce security resources. The average American would 

be shocked to learn that in fiscal year 2007, according to the President’s fiscal year 

2009 proposed budget, government spending for TSA ($6,028,000,000) was 99.8 percent as large as that of the entire Federal Bureau of Investigation ($6,040,000,000), 

with its massive responsibilities, ranging from investigating acts of terrorism to 

combating public corruption. Clearly, hiring more than 45,000 Federal employees 

and supporting their activities with technology, equipment, training and benefits is 

extraordinarily expensive. The committee should be very wary of giving more mandates to TSA. These new mandates will not only impose new costs, in terms of employing people, buying technology and initiating training, but also in terms of maintaining that equipment, retraining those people, and replacing that equipment when 

it becomes obsolete. We should instead stop and think which security issues remain 

unaddressed yet pose significant risks to the American public, and what resources 

are necessary to close those gaps, even at the expense of slightly higher but acceptable risks in other areas. 

Interestingly, TSA’s budget has remained relatively flat for several years as an 

increasing percentage of the broader DHS budget has been devoted to immigration 

enforcement. The proposed increases for fiscal year 2009 are relatively small dollar 

programs aimed at fixing holes in aviation vetting, rather than large new initiatives 

in aviation or non-aviation transportation security. 

At the same time, these slowing budget numbers may create an increasing disconnect with TSA’s growing list of authorized mandates. For example, we have seen 

in the past year legislation to insist on 100 percent inspections of cargo carried on 

aircraft and ocean carriers bound for the United States. Obviously, not all 100 percent mandates are foolish: I was proud to help implement the US–VISIT biometric 

entry program which now enrolls essentially 100 percent of foreign guests arriving 

by air and sea. 

But in general, 100 percent mandates should be viewed with great skepticism because they essentially mean that no level of risk management is acceptable. They 

fly in the face of efforts like TSA’s recently unveiled air cargo plan, which focuses 

on increased screening by freight forwarders and via canine units. This may, in fact 

may spread the pain of cargo screening enough to be effective as a deterrent, and 

also be significantly more cost-effective. Unfortunately, many people only believe 

100 percent solutions are acceptable, and therefore will force TSA to undertake 

some sophisticated analysis and likely require a major increase in budget authority, 

to push TSA beyond the 50 percent screening goal for fiscal year 2009 to the elusive 

mark of 100 percent in 2010. 

TSA PROGRESS

Assistant Secretary Hawley, his team at TSA and the broader DHS department 

deserve great credit for stabilizing TSA’s mission over the past 3 years. They have 

restored public confidence in aviation security and are using finite but limited resources to enhance the security of other modes of transportation. I would like to 

highlight several programs that I think are the hallmark of Assistant Secretary 

Hawley’s tenure at TSA: 

SPOT.—Building on pilots begun in 2004, the use of specialized training to alert 

transportation security officers to suspicious behavior at or around the checkpoint 

is an effective security program that provides a tremendous return on investment. 

Allowing TSO’s to use their eyes and ears as part of the Screening Passengers by 

Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to detect threats amid the noise of the 
39 

checkpoint strikes me as the best possible use of screener time by transitioning the 

TSA checkpoint into a law enforcement opportunity. 

Checkpoint Evolution.—Shoehorning the TSA security checkpoint process into the 

wide variety of airport configurations has been a tremendous challenge for TSA, its 

airport and airline partners, and the public at large. The recently unveiled ‘‘checkpoint evolution’’ or ‘‘checkpoint of the future’’ will take time to implement across the 

spectrum of airport terminals, but represents enlightened thinking about how to 

maximize passenger flow, minimize passenger stress, and elevate the likelihood nefarious actors will be identified. 

Passenger Redress.—Working with the DHS Office of Screening Coordination, TSA 

launched the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) last year. While not flawless, TRIP has assisted tens of thousands of individuals unlucky enough to have 

similar to those on terrorist watch lists. In fact, I know first-hand of successes in 

this program, having recently directed a colleague to use the TRIP program. Several 

weeks later, he wrote me a note which said the following: ‘‘I am a frequent traveler 

who regularly checked in online at home or at the airport kiosk. In preparation for 

a recent trip, I tried to check in the night before and was told I had to see an agent. 

I went to the desk the next morning and was told that I had to check in at the 

desk because I was on a security list. Apparently there was someone with the same 

name, including middle initial. I went to the DHS website and read the TRIP process, submitted the required forms and documents and within 2 weeks was able to 

check in online or at the kiosk again. I also received a letter that DHS had reviewed 

my case and fixed the issue. I thought that the process was clear, quick and responsive. I was impressed.’’ 

To that end, I would encourage this committee to schedule a vote on H.R. 4179, 

which will codify and improve TRIP, especially as redress issues are encountered 

outside of TSA and CBP. 

TSA AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

However, as with many glasses filled to the mid-point, the empty half must be 

evaluated as well. Amidst all of the progress outlined above, I am concerned that 

TSA has missed opportunities to utilize risk management in key areas. 

Registered Traveler.—TSA has made no secret of its position that RT is not a priority program. In fact, Administrator Hawley and others have argued that it is too 

risky to provide any changes in the checkpoint process for RT enrollees without private sector development of technology that is tested and meets some criteria for enhancing the security process. I believe that there is a better approach. TSA can and 

should use the RT framework to improve the checkpoint process for travelers in 

ways that will set up risk management principles far beyond the aviation space. For 

example: 

• Despite the fact that RT applicants provide fingerprints during the application 

process, TSA does not actually compare them to databases of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. That is a missed opportunity, and I would encourage this committee to push for this process to change. While such a background 

check will not eliminate 100 percent of the risk posed by a passenger, nor does 

the background check on government employees access eliminate possible 

breaches of classified material or inappropriate access to government buildings. 

The question we must face is whether the risk of, for instance, allowing a person who has passed a biographic and fingerprint review to keep his shoes on 

through security is significant enough to spend scarce screener resources Xraying shoes of millions of people willing to place their full identity before the 

government for review. 

• This week CBP launched the Global Entry international registered traveler program for inbound U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents able to pass a full 

background check. The program will likely be opened to citizens of select foreign 

nations who enter into information-sharing and reciprocity agreements with the 

United States. Common sense would dictate that Global Entry enrollees should 

automatically be approved for the domestic RT program if they are willing to 

help pay for the operation of the RT lanes. While discussions are underway between CBP and TSA on this issue, they do not appear likely to conclude before 

Global Entry begins enrollment next month. A missed opportunity, for now, that 

should be fixed. 

• Integrating the RT card standards and looming REAL ID driver’s license requirement is essential. While I understand discussions are underway to have 

TSA provide RT vendors more specificity for their card architecture to meet 

REAL ID mandates, they need to produce results before new document requirements hit the checkpoint. 
40 

• In addition to Global Entry members, TSA should consider whether other lowrisk populations—such as individuals with security clearances or other Federal 

credentials, law enforcement personnel, active duty military and certain government employees—should be pre-approved for the RT program, subject to their 

enrollment fee. This proposal has long been called for by a range of groups supporting RT: it is time for the government to step in and make this happen. 

Travel Document Checker.—The TDC program is a solid achievement, making the 

review of an identity document a real security layer as opposed to an easy-to-defeat 

inconvenience. However, as TSA builds a new checkpoint design, it would be remiss 

if it did not build into the TDC program the ability to confirm whether a driver’s 

license is legitimate by reading imbedded watermarks now baked into most of these 

documents. This capability will become more important once REAL ID is fully in 

place and the value of a forged or altered driver’s license will skyrocket. 

Secure Flight.—The Secure Flight program also represents a missed opportunity 

to date to improve our transportation security. Almost 8 years after 9/11, and over 

3 years since Secure Flight was scaled back to a relatively simple watchlist review 

of passenger manifests, the program appears to be far from implementation. Air carriers have watched as CBP’s need to collect pre-departure biographical information, 

now known as the Automated Quick Query program, caught up to and now appears 

to be likely to be implemented while Secure Flight remains non-operational for domestic flights. It is reasonable for the government to request that air carriers redesign their data collection and transmission mechanisms one time for DHS needs, 

and it is unfortunate that the two agencies in this space have not been able to provide such a roadmap to date. 

Black Diamond.—We have also seen considerable press about the new ‘‘Black Diamond’’ screening checkpoint self-selection program. As a parent, I can understand 

the attractiveness of a screening line that gives families and others slow to move 

through the checkpoint needed time, and a more relaxed pace to do so. To date, 

however, I have not seen any hard data on the actual effects of the program on 

throughput at the checkpoint. We would be suspicious of a highway ‘‘EZ-Pass’’ program that asked drivers to pick their lane based on the 0–60 speed of their vehicle 

leaving the booth, and the program simply appears too new to evaluate effectively. 

In most locations, Black Diamond will be a poor substitute for a true RT program 

that is designed to generate additional throughput by having conducted a security 

review beforehand, not just based on a traveler’s perceived dexterity at the checkpoint. 

Biometrics.—TSA also needs to place new emphasis on the power of biometrics, 

especially when deployed in a mobile environment. The issue of controlling access 

to sensitive parts of transportation systems remains a difficult issue, especially in 

facilities never designed with today’s stringent access control regimes in mind. The 

rapid improvement in mobile biometrics capabilities offers an increasingly cost-effective way to verify identity with or without card architectures. I am particularly interested in how TSA will learn from the access control pilot underway at Denver 

International Airport and whether mobile biometrics may play a role in the exit portion of the US–VISIT program. 

General Aviation.—DHS is rightfully concerned that the relatively unregulated 

nature of general aviation aircraft represents a weakness in an otherwise impressive security array. GA flight activity represents a growing market, including from 

overseas. Luckily, the nature of the market has created opportunities for TSA and 

CBP to piggy-back on reservation services to understand who is boarding aircraft 

operating in the United States. TSA should move quickly on the Secure Fixed Base 

Operator Program (SFBOP) pilots and seek funds to expand the program quickly. 

NON-AVIATION MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

Over the last 2 years, Congress has pushed for significant new funding in other 

modes of transportation beyond aviation. This reaction is perhaps understandable 

in light of vicious terrorist attacks on mass transit and rail systems in Europe. 

I would caution the committee against trying to compare modes and especially 

against trying to replicate the TSA aviation model for subway, rail, bus, or highway 

systems. By its very nature, aviation lends itself to security processes due to its natural series of chokepoints. Mass transit, on the other hand, is meant to be diffuse 

and easy to access. Physical screening of passengers and luggage would require a 

tremendously invasive deployment of equipment and personnel in environments not 

designed for delays and chokepoints. Therefore, I would encourage this committee 

to work with TSA on new ways to effectively manage risk in non-aviation modes 

of transportation. 
41 

Additionally, I would encourage this committee to support TSA’s use of behavioral 

analysis via SPOT and VIPR teams. This is a valuable use of TSA resources, and 

new ways to grow this effort would be worthwhile. TSA should leverage the experience it has gained in these programs by offering training to localities and transit 

authorities interested in developing their own or similar capabilities. 

DHS should also encourage the use of risk management in trusted traveler programs in other transportation modes. The nature of mass transit means government 

is seeing tremendous volumes of unknown individuals. RT programs bring more information to the table for review and should be adopted in environments beyond 

aviation. 

Lastly, according to DHS figures, there is approximately $13 billion in unspent 

Federal assistance to State and local governments for homeland security needs. Recognizing that much of that money has already been spoken for in State-specific 

spending roadmaps and that States and local governments utilize that assistance 

for a wide variety of equipment and training needs, there still is room for transportation-focused spending where it is truly needed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the witnesses for their testimony and 

I remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the panel, and I now recognize myself for questions. 

Certainly the witnesses have given us a broad perspective of the 

success stories, but yet recognizing that our oversight is crucial. I 

think that we should spend our time recognizing the work that the 

vast numbers of employees of TSA have done and never let any 

question that may come forward diminish that. 

At the same time, we have precious little time to engage with the 

administration and to ensure that our concerns are sufficiently 

heard. 

So let me start first with Assistant Secretary Hawley, and tell 

me, how expanded, or how expansive, is the behavioral assessment 

program? What kind of funding resources have you invested in it? 

How many of your overall employees—and I think Mr. Verdery 

said 45,000, and as he is looking, he is saying give or take a few— 

really had the opportunity to have this training? 

Mr. HAWLEY. In terms of budget support we have gotten that, 

and the President sent up a budget amendment in the fall for fiscal 

year 2007 that has helped us, along with the 2008 appropriation, 

go from approximately 1,200 behavior detection officers that we 

have now, and we expect to have about 2,000 by the end of the 

year. 

As you know, this is a separate category in terms of rank, because one comes in as a TSO and then the behavior detection officer is an opportunity for career progression. It is a promotion and 

it is a full-time behavior detection capability. So we have 2,000 out 

of the total workforce, or will have 2,000. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think you have just made a point, will have 

2,000, and that is out of 45,000. What would that generally allow 

per airport, or major airport? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, our goal is to cover all of the hours that are 

open at the checkpoints and we will be able to get through the 

large cat X, so to speak, and the cat ones, and I am not sure how 

deep into all of the airports. However, we do have roving patrols 

that move around from place to place. 

I have to just correct one thing on a factual basis. On the CNN 

report about air marshals covering 1 percent, that number is absolutely wrong by an order of magnitude. It was a guess by the folks 

there, and I just have to say that number is completely false. 
42 

No disrespect to Clark Kent Ervin who was quoting what he 

heard on CNN, but just that number is not correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Now, would you venture to say that it is sizably larger than that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will give Mr. Ervin a chance to respond. 

Let me proceed and ask further on how much progress is being 

made on the watch list, the Secure Flight. It is a constant, if you 

will—raises continued concerns with the traveling public and the 

airlines trying to balance the necessity of security with competence, 

because it is a question of competence. We can’t seem to get an integrated and concise list. 

Mr. Hawley. 

Mr. HAWLEY. As Mr. Verdery mentioned it, it has had a stopand-start history, but it really is back on track and I think Ms. 

Berrick noted some steps yet to take. But we expect the final rule 

to be out in the summer, and the development of the program is 

going along and we are now doing benchmark testing, actually operating the system with benchmark data. 

So our expectation is that it will be ready to go, assuming the 

rule is out, in the very beginning of 2009. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me ask Ms. Berrick, what is the premier 

issue that TSA has to address if we are to move forward in our security in the transportation system? 

Ms. BERRICK. I think there are probably three areas. One is really that the airport perimeter security and access controls, and 

there is really two aspects of this. One is the implementation of a 

biometric identification system to control access to restricted airport areas. 

TSA has issued guidelines. They have done some pilot efforts to 

get this off of the ground, but this program has not been implemented nationwide. 

Another area related to airport security is the screening of airport employees, and TSA also has some efforts underway through 

random screening. They also have a pilot effort underway that was 

actually mandated by Congress to explore different options for employee screening, but they haven’t yet made final decisions, so that 

is one area. 

Another area is air cargo. As was mentioned, TSA is mandated 

to begin 100 percent of screening of air cargo on passenger aircraft 

by 2010. That is going to be a huge effort. It is going to be a big 

change in how they do things right now. 

They have got a plan to do that. GAO has been requested by this 

committee and others to look at their strategy for doing that and, 

as they roll this out, we will be looking at their efforts, but that 

is going to be a challenge moving forward. 

Then, finally, Secure Flight, as you just asked about. GAO has 

been reviewing this program for the past 4 years and I have to 

agree that Secure Flight has made significant progress the past 

year-and-a-half. There is a lot more discipline and rigor and the development of Secure Flight. 

There are a few areas that we think TSA should still focus on 

related to the program. One is cost and schedule estimates. We 

don’t think that TSA’s estimates on the cost and the schedule of 
43 

Secure Flight were developed based on best practices, and we had 

some recommendations to TSA to strengthen that. 

Another area is testing. The draft test plans that we have seen 

identify testing, but not end-to-end testing. As you are aware, Secure Flight is going to screen both domestic and international passengers, so TSA will have to coordinate with CBP in getting data 

to do matching. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How do you portend to improve the testing? 

Ms. BERRICK. We think that in the test plans it should reflect the 

end-to-end system testing from start to stop. So instead of doing individual tests at different locations within TSA, within CBP, it 

needs to be end-to-end. 

We highlighted this to TSA. TSA agreed that that is important 

and said that they do plan on doing it. We just haven’t seen it in 

the testing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The air cargo, do you see a present and future 

plan that TSA is now engaged in to lay out the road map as to how 

they meet the requirements of the deadline that Congress has set? 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes, they do have a strategy that they have rolled 

out that is moving security further down the supply chain where 

they will certify manufacturers and shippers, maintain a chain of 

custody of cargo. That practice, in fact, has been successful in some 

foreign countries that we have highlighted in past reports. 

We haven’t independently assessed that. We have been asked by 

this committee and others to do that, and we will be reviewing that 

over the next year. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Ervin, I will hold my questions for you, 

because I will now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlemen 

from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you so much for 

holding this hearing, as well. 

One of my concerns has to do with the security and safety of our 

Nation’s pipelines. There was an incident near my congressional 

district several months ago in which a pipeline carrying dangerous 

gas was breached, resulting in an evacuation of the area. 

This incident and the Federal response raised question about the 

role of TSA in pipeline security and industry compliance with the 

Federal safety and security guidance. I have a couple of questions 

for Mr. Hawley. 

Would you please explain to us how TSA assesses pipeline security threats and monitors industry compliance with Federal security standards and guidance. As well, how would you characterize 

industry compliance with those standards? 

Mr. HAWLEY. In the how do we keep them posted and how do we 

develop threat information and share that, that is something that 

we do on a daily basis and, as we identify threat information anywhere in the world, we share it with the industry. We do not, unlike some of the other areas that we regulate, have a fleet of inspectors for pipelines. 

So what we do is we work with best practices with industry associations and industry companies that the pipeline is a network and 

having security measures that keep the network operating is the 

No. 1 priority. Then individual security plans all along the way are 

things that we work with them on best practices and then go out 
44 

and do audits of whether or not they are complying with them. In 

the audits that we have done, we have found very good compliance 

and a willingness to change, as need be. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, again for Mr. Hawley. 

In your written testimony, you mention that the TSA has reviewed company adoptions of pipeline security guidelines and developed a best security practices document based on the observations throughout the industry. Are these guidelines voluntary and, 

if yes, does TSA have the authority to require industry compliance 

with these guidelines and standards? 

Mr. HAWLEY. They are voluntary and they are, from the point of 

view of we have overall authority if there were to be a particularly 

compelling need for public health and safety to get at compliance. 

However, it is an interesting area and, again, in terms of authorization legislation coming out of this committee, I think it could be 

clarified to some extent. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Do you agree with me that an act of 

vandalism against a pipeline, such as the one in my congressional 

district, carrying hazardous substances, can threaten the public in 

the same manner in which a deliberate act of terrorism against 

them? Do you believe the Federal pipeline security guidance adequate to stop acts of vandalism against pipelines like the incident, 

again, in my district, or something worse, a deliberate act of terrorism? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Vandalism is something that is pretty hard to prevent, but we look at the networks, so first of all there are controls 

within the network that would limit damage to one area. Then, 

frankly, as individual punctures, perhaps, are made, there are safeguards in place to limit the damage that could be done there. There 

are prudent security measures that go to the hardening and the 

physical security of it. 

But given the length of the pipelines in this country, preventing 

the vandalism opportunity is extremely, extremely difficult. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Are there clear roles and responsibility for TSA 

and DOT regarding preparing for and responding to pipeline safety 

and security incidents? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, we have an MOU between us and that is written down and signed. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, how does TSA differentiate between a security-related pipeline breach and a safety-related pipeline incident? 

Mr. HAWLEY. We have those issues across the board with DOT 

and we have agreements that define them. But, essentially, it is on 

a security threat, we have to share equally back and forth because 

first you may not know. But it is principally at the intel level at 

the kinds of regulatory things that we come out with or recommended practices that we come out with that would get at a security breach that may not be addressed by a safety breach, in 

other words, willful intent versus an act of God. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Madam Chairwoman, one more question. 

The 9/11 bill included a requirement for TSA to visit the top 100 

most critical pipeline facilities in the United States, six of which 

are in Florida. Does the fiscal year 2009 budget request provide 

sufficient funding to develop and implement the required strategy 
45 

to review the security plans of pipeline operators and actually carry 

out inspections to ensure their adherence to existing Federal security guidance? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I don’t know, but I will have to get back to you on 

that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you very much. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Let me acknowledge the presence of the distinguished gentlelady 

from New York, Ms. Clarke, and Mr. Perlmutter, the distinguished 

gentleman from Colorado. 

I now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlelady from New 

York. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member Lungren. 

Over the past several years, as DHS and other security-related 

agencies have implemented new procedures, one of the biggest 

changes has been the combining of several watch lists into a single 

database, I suppose in an effort to be efficient. The use of that 

database was to screen the public. 

In the years since this began, we have found that while it is a 

great idea in concept, there have been problems putting it into 

practice, as many innocent people have been mistakenly swept up, 

most commonly while traveling. 

Although the long-awaited Secure Flight program should help reduce the number of misidentifications, it will not nearly solve the 

problem by itself. It must be supported by an actual redress program. 

In February 2007, TSA, which scans more people against the 

database than any other government entity, implemented the DHS 

TRIP program, which has since been reclassified as the Department’s Office of Appeals and Redress, to provide such a program 

that should allow passengers the opportunity to clear their names 

and to avoid misidentification. 

Assistant Secretary, would you give us sort of a sense of where 

we are with that process, how accessible it is to the public and 

what your assessment of its effectiveness has been when you look 

at the mis-IDs in the data base? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, Secure Flight, I believe, will virtually solve the 

problem in that there won’t be misidentifications because we will 

be getting the data, specifically date of birth and the other data 

elements, that will allow us to resolve whether or not that is the 

person. 

So in terms of people who are misidentified, I think that problem 

will virtually go away. 

Secretary Chertoff has as one of his top personal initiatives with 

TSA putting in place whatever we can do immediately, given the 

problems that it causes for regular travelers. And is a function of 

the airlines’ reservation systems, where some airlines have a very 

good way of matching people. Others do not, so it really does depend on what is going on in the airline reservation system. 

So, working with the airlines and making some process changes 

with how we handle it, we are working actually in advance of Secure Flight to try to meaningfully address that problem so people 

don’t have to wait until Secure Flight. 
46 

Ms. CLARKE. I mean, is this real time? We have a global event 

coming up in the Olympics, where a lot of people with a lot of different types of names are going to be moving around the world, 

some coming through U.S. airports. Do you believe that we are in 

a position by the time that the Olympics start, to be able to screen 

people efficiently and effectively. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I do. I think another part of this, the Terrorist 

Screening Center, has announced, and we have supported and 

helped with reducing the actual names on the watch list, to scrub 

it and re-scrub it to have it be the smallest possible, which obviously gets at the root cause. 

I am highly confident that anybody who should be caught by the 

filter is going to be caught by the filter. The consequence of course 

is, as you note, with many configurations of names, it is possible 

to misidentify people. So that is a challenge, and I am not sure that 

that effort that I just described, to get ready before Secure Flight, 

will be ready in fact for the Olympics. But, clearly, we have a lot 

of plans across the U.S. Government for the Olympics to make 

them successful. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. Verdery, you represent the National Business Travelers Association, which has extensive experience with the transportation 

system. To what extent have they been impacted by problems with 

the use of screening programs? 

Mr. VERDERY. I have seen increasing cases of misidentification. 

Most of the times, it is just the fact that people have the same 

names, common names, and that the TSA and other screening 

agencies just don’t have enough information to differentiate the 

people on the spot. 

We did a survey earlier this year and found that there was a 

large number of people, of companies, that had had employees in 

this situation. Many of them had used the DHS TRIP program. 

Those that had used it found it successful, but not enough people 

knew about it. 

In addition to Secure Flight, which I support and hope will move 

quickly, Customs and Border Protection sees lots of people every 

day at land borders and air borders and people are screened for 

other purposes, whether it is buying guns or other purposes you 

can imagine coming down the pike for registered traveler programs 

and registered other programs. 

So that is why we have been very supportive of your bills, to codify TRIP and expand it and provide it the resources. We think a 

program of this magnitude deserves an authorization, and so we 

have been happy to work with your office and hope that the committee will move forward on it. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

It is now my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, 

Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I was 

glad that I could get back while we are still going on and before 

we have a vote. 

Let me ask the four of you, one of the controversial programs 

that was started a number of years ago was the Federal Flight 
47 

Deck Officers Program, which allows officers, that is, pilots and copilots, when properly trained, to carry weapons onboard in the 

cockpit. Do any of you have any problems with the continuation of 

that program? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, sir, I find it very effective security. 

Ms. BERRICK. GAO hasn’t reviewed this program. DHS IG has. 

They identified some positives and then also some areas for improvement. 

Mr. ERVIN. I am supportive of the program, sir. If anything, I 

think it should be expanded. My understanding is that there is still 

only one training facility in New Mexico. 

I think the number of training facilities should be expanded. I 

think more pilots ought to be allowed to participate in this program. Furthermore, my understanding is that they have to pay 

their own lodging and food expenses, so anything to increase the 

ranks, with proper training, of course, is something that I would 

very much support. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Verdery. 

Mr. VERDERY. I support it, although I get worried with all the 

tarmac delays of what kind of mood the pilots are in. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I would ask all four of you, then, we are now taking a retrospective of the first 5 years of TSA. We are looking forward. What would be your one or two top priorities going forward 

with TSA? 

Mr. HAWLEY. To work with the Congress to have the imagination 

and courage to step beyond the got-you mentality, to go at 

proactive security and I think support our officers in the training 

and their ability to act nimbly. I think that would be No. 1. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Ms. Berrick. 

Ms. BERRICK. A few. Implementing a biometric identification system for airports nationwide to restrict access to restricted areas 

within airports. Then also TSA making final decisions about what 

to do in terms of screening airport employees—they have a pilot 

right now—having made a final decision on how they are going to 

address that vulnerability. Then, finally, moving forward on their 

strategy for doing 100 percent screening of air cargo, making sure 

that their plans are solid and that they have controls in place to 

make sure that it is working properly. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Ervin. 

Mr. ERVIN. I would largely agree with Ms. Berrick, sir. I think 

it is absolutely critical, and I am pleased by what Secretary 

Hawley said today about expanding the deployment of technologies 

like multi-view X-ray technology and backscatter. I would like 

ideally to see that deployed at every checkpoint, at least at our 

major airports in the country as quickly as possible. I would support further appropriations to TSA to facilitate that. That is the 

only way, ultimately, that we can increase these performances on 

these undercover tests. 

Second, as Ms. Berrick said, air cargo, I think it is essential that 

we move forward on 100 percent screening and that all that screening be done by TSA personnel. Then, third and finally, as she said, 

I am very concerned about the fact that we are not routinely 

screening all airport workers other than pilots and flight attendants. 
48 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Verdery. 

Mr. VERDERY. Three quick ones. One is making sure to align 

your authorizing requirements with the appropriators. We are getting a little bit out of whack with authorizing language coming 

down that can’t be funded or isn’t being funded. That leaves Mr. 

Hawley and his successors in the impossible position of mandates 

that they just don’t have money to go fulfill. 

Second, your jurisdictional argument you made, I think I have 

personally appeared before 22 of the subcommittees out of the 86 

that have some jurisdiction over DHS. It is unconscionable, even 

the hearings that you see is just the tip of the iceberg of oversight 

that just swallows up so much time by the secretary on down. It 

has to be streamlined. 

Third is use of biometrics, mobile biometric equipment, especially, in a range of applications, whether it is access controls, employee screening or the construction of an exit program for US– 

VISIT. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Hawley, if I could switch gears a moment, we 

talked a lot about aviation but surface transportation and rail, 

there is a responsibility in your TSA to come up with rules with 

respect to HAZMAT, and I know you share that with DOT. I know 

DOT’s rulemaking, I believe their work that they have done is I 

think before OMB right now. I wonder, where is TSA with respect 

to it? As I understand it, you focus on where the highly HAZMAT 

cars are attended and where they are handed off between railroads 

or between a railroad and a shipper, as opposed to DOT’s responsibility. Can you give us an update as to where you are with rulemaking on that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I believe it is undergoing administration clearance. 

We have a very—it is the same things we talked about pipelines— 

a very close relationship with the Federal Rail Administration, and 

we do in fact look at particularly the HAZMAT cars, wherever they 

may be. Our particular focus is to get them out of areas, standing 

still and, particularly, unattended. So that is the center of our target area that we want to keep them out of there. 

But we have to be able to identify where they are if indeed there 

is, particularly a terrorist threat, we need to know where the cars 

that might be targets are. That is something that we share with 

DOT. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, and thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank the ranking member. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Secretary Hawley, a couple months ago you and I attended a conference out in Denver about the employee screening and I think 

under the 9/11 bill there are seven airports that are selected as 

models or pilots, thank you, for this employee screening. 

Can you tell us where we are on that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, I believe they will start next month, in May, 

including in Denver. We will have an answer for the Congress by 

the end of the year. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. The chairwoman and I and a couple of others 

visited Colorado last summer, where we were at the Transportation 
49 

Technology Center and, as part of that 9/11 bill, we also authorized 

Pueblo, Colorado, Transportation Technology Center, to be one of 

the centers of learning for transportation security. 

Are you familiar with that at all? Do you know where we are on 

that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I am familiar with the center. I am not exactly sure 

what aspect of that we are driving at. I can certainly check—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. The goal was to put together some training facilities there that not only focused on safety, which was more the 

transportation side of it, but also to develop some security measures as, for instance, subways or trains that might be subject to 

sabotage in some fashion or another. I know that that is now part 

of our whole six or seven training centers. What is it called, consortium? The national consortium. 

I can’t spell, either. I guess I can spell national. I can’t spell consortium. I can. I really can. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We won’t test you today. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Would you check on that for us? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Last question, or I guess I can have a couple 

more, Congress has appropriated a significant amount of funding 

to DHS and TSA for research, development, test and evaluation 

and deployment of checkpoint screening technology since 9/11, yet 

when I read your papers, I think that only two new technologies 

have been deployed. 

Is there anything in particular blocking the development of the 

new technologies? Maybe other members of the panel have some 

comments on this. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think if I got a couple extra on Mr. Lungren’s 

question about things for the future, I think the way the capital 

markets deal with security technology is a massive problem in that 

we get an appropriation from Congress to buy certain things and 

there are companies that step forward and say, yes, I have got 

those and we will take your money. 

However, there is a vast scientific community in the world, and 

certainly in the United States, who, if we could get them engaged 

earlier in the process to present new ideas and new technology to 

us, we would be able to move a whole lot faster. 

So I think there is an acquisition-based mentality about purchasing security equipment that does hold us back. Having said 

that, I did say we are rolling out the A.T. now at an additional 580 

machines this year, 30 new millimeter wave, 200 new of the liquid 

bottle scanner. We will have by the end of the year over 900 

handheld new explosive detection devices. 

So we are moving it out, but I think it could move faster. 

Ms. BERRICK. The GAO has reported on checkpoint technologies 

and we have reported that the deployment of these has been slow, 

I think slower than TSA anticipated. The explosive trace portals 

were deployed. There were maintenance and performance issues 

with those. The deployment was halted. The liquid bottle scanners 

were also deployed. 

Now, in the coming year, there is going to be a lot more deployments. Some of those technologies have also been delayed due to 

performance and maintenance issues. Some of the causes we identi-
50 

fied were coordination problems between DHS S&T. They do have 

a memorandum of understanding that they have been signed and 

I think coordination has improved. 

Also, Congress mandated that TSA develop a strategic plan for 

their strategy for deploying technologies. TSA hasn’t yet delivered 

that, although they can articulate, obviously, a strategy for moving 

forward on checkpoint technologies. We are going to be issuing a 

comprehensive report on how to improve the process of fielding 

technologies in a couple of months. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. 

I have a few more questions. I yield myself 5 minutes. I note the 

ranking member does. 

But let me try to be very pointed with this line of questioning 

and also rapid-fire. Some of the answers, I may ask for you to put 

them in writing and I may also abbreviate your answers, and I 

apologize for that. 

As we indicated, we are grateful for the employees, and we 

should not be questioned about our commitment to the duty of the 

employees and the leadership because we are asking questions that 

will further enhance the security of this Nation. 

So I am concerned, Assistant Secretary Hawley, about the GAO’s 

high-risk list that some of the aspects of your Department are engaged in. My question is, just quickly, are steps being taken to remove the TSA from high-risk areas, according to GAO? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, a number of the recommendations made from 

the GAO reports we agree and have taken action on. I think Ms. 

Berrick mentioned air cargo, a study that they did in recommending that we evaluate an international air cargo regime and we 

have in fact done that, and in fact that is the direction that we are 

headed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But, in your tenure, do you believe that you 

can answer all the questions that placed in these aspects of your 

Department on the at-risk list? Is that something that you are 

looking to achieve? 

Mr. HAWLEY. We are addressing all the issues on the programs 

we have. We cannot get them all solved in this immediate time, because very many of the recommendations have to do with building 

long-term, sustainable processes that take time and actually taking 

the time to do it right. But I think that is the way to go. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you please give me maybe your resolutions and your status in writing—I would appreciate that—to the 

committee? 

I also would like to just hear a yes or no answer. There is a transition, there are Presidential elections coming up. Is TSA in particular looking at the transition and preparing a road map so that 

there is no gap in leadership from the time of transition from one 

administration to the next. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, can I give a short—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Short. 

Mr. HAWLEY. The deputy administrator is a career official who 

has been in the business 30 years, one of the founders of TSA. Our 

senior leadership team has been meeting for over a year without 
51 

me to prepare for this and there are three political appointees at 

TSA, so I view our preparations as complete. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you provide that to this committee in 

writing, as well? I think it is a very serious issue. 

I believe that we should look at all aspects of information 

askance, but I do believe that information in the media provides an 

important opportunity for information that we should have. As you 

well know, and you indicated, that we may have not had all of the 

accurate facts regarding the CNN story on the U.S. air marshals, 

the Federal Air Marshal Service, but can we not at least admit or 

concede that there have been discussions about morale and discussions about work conditions that need to be improved? 

My question to you is does any of that impact the security of this 

Nation and, as the person who has oversight over that service, the 

air marshals, what unique changes are being made to ensure, one, 

that there is an expanded coverage of our airlines, particularly 

when we see airlines getting larger and larger, by merger, and that 

we improve the work conditions. 

I would like Mr. Ervin, if he is in any sense aware, even from 

the time he was at the Department of Homeland Security, how we 

can fix some of the factors that are in the Air Marshal Service. 

Secretary Hawley. 

Mr. HAWLEY. When I came into the job, one of my top priorities 

was people of the Federal air marshals, that the agency was stood 

up quickly. Dana Brown, who is the director, has that as his top 

priority. He has been in the job 2 years now and they have had extensive outreach, extensive changes. I think if you were to visit 

widely with the Federal Air Marshal Service, as I do, as you know. 

I do these town halls, and there is definitely an uptick in opening 

and opening communication and their mission importance is unbelievable and I think that raises morale, as one of the most important tools the secretary has across the board for counterterrorism. 

So the VIPERs, some of these things are addressing issues such 

as I don’t want to be stuck in a plane my entire career. Give me 

some additional things where I can use my brain and keep fresh. 

We have done that and I think the results show it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I want to publicly say on the record that 

I would like to have a meeting with a number of the front-line air 

marshals that are actually flying. I hope that you would give them 

the privilege of speaking clearly and openly. I do think that is a 

concern. 

They are law enforcement officers and they have attention to 

order. We have not been able to get directly the actual impressions 

of many of them, and I would hope maybe to invite you and have 

them feel free to be able to express their concerns, which deal with 

ours, which deal with transfers, time off, but more importantly, all 

of that impacts the security of this Nation. 

Would you, Mr. Ervin, comment? You were enthusiastic about 

the Flight Deck Officers Program, but I must raise the question 

that there was an unfortunate accident that occurred by a gun 

going off by one of the pilots, one of the major airlines. There is 

some suggestion that the equipment is not appropriate. Did you see 

any need for changes or oversight that we can do better? 
52 

I happen to believe training, the right kind of equipment, it may 

not be the best kind of equipment, and the training process may 

be fractured or may be failing, and we can’t afford those kinds of 

accidents any time it is used. We hope it is not used, but we certainly hope it is used both in need, but also that it is used successfully, a weapon that a pilot may carry. Can you speak to the air 

marshals, as well as the issue dealing with the flight deck officers 

carrying guns? 

Mr. ERVIN. Certainly, Madam Chair. Thank you for the opportunity to do that. Certainly, I deplore that accident, and there is 

no question but that with regard to the Federal Flight Deck Officers Program there has got to be adequate training. That is why 

I mentioned there is still only one training facility, as I understand 

it. That has got to be expanded. Training has got to be—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you would suggest that one of our investments should be another training facility. 

Mr. ERVIN. Absolutely. In theory, the program is a great one and 

it can serve to supplement the air marshal program, so to segue 

into that—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Should we also look at the equipment that 

they use? It may not be well-suited for the flight deck. 

Mr. ERVIN. Absolutely. There is no question but that we need to 

do that. I am simply saying that in theory the program is a good 

one and it can amplify the air marshal workforce. With regard to 

air marshals, I was very careful in my testimony to say that this 

was a CNN report. 

I hope Secretary Hawley is right that the overall coverage is 

more than 1 percent, but obviously we can’t talk about that in any 

detail in open session. I just urge the subcommittee to verify what 

Mr. Hawley has said. I hope he is right. I expect that he is right, 

but to verify that by calling on either GAO or the inspector general 

to do a classified investigation of the matter. 

We have to have 100 percent coverage of at least the highest-risk 

flights into and out of our largest cities and as much coverage as 

possible of the other flights in the country. If we need to supplement the workforce with additional current and retired law enforcement personnel, military personnel, we ought to do that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you hold to the fact that morale, work 

conditions, is certainly a key responsibility of this committee in 

terms of oversight, but, more importantly, plays very keenly into 

the security of our Nation in terms of how air marshals either are 

staffed and/or what their conditions are, what the level of their performance is at the time that they are on the job? All these elements, I think, have to be improved. 

Mr. ERVIN. Absolutely. Morale is a huge issue, not just with regard to pilots and with regard to air marshals, but also with regard 

to transportation security officers. Morale is a security issue in the 

post-9/11 world. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have one more question and it goes to this 

continuing challenge that we have on the 100 percent inspection of 

cargo. You know the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 wants or dictates 

to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft 

within 18 months and 100 percent within 3 years. 
53 

Here is my dilemma, and this is to Assistant Secretary Hawley, 

I understand that you have been aggressively moving a program to 

screen all major airport activities. I understand the program is relying heavily on the use of X-ray technologies. 

I think you know there has been significant concern by passenger 

cargo carriers and their customers that the current screening process, and to some degree the use of X-ray technology has been ineffective, may cause some delays. I am committed to 100 percent 

screening. Our ranking member has indicated we may need to look 

at this and how we move it, but I am committed to technology. I 

am interested in what technologies TSA is considering. 

What is the internal process used to test and certify such technologies, given the rapidly approaching 2010 deadline for 100 percent cargo screening? What is TSA’s timeline to implement new 

cargo screening methods? Are you looking at the vast array of technology? 

For example, I had the opportunity to visit a major passenger 

cargo carrier facility and I personally witnessed the loading and 

unloading of cargo. But, during that visit, I saw not only the carrier’s current cargo screening process, I was able to see new technology on the premises that were being demonstrated by a small, 

minority-owned company, and you know that this committee, the 

large committee, is focused on these opportunities for looking for 

good technology, efficient and effective. 

I later discovered that it was the carrier that expressed an interest in this new technology, not TSA, that the technology has either 

been reviewed by TSA but certainly has not been approved by TSA 

because of the layered and complex approval process. 

Is TSA relying on carriers to source new technologies and set 

standards for treating cargo? If so, what direction, if any, is TSA 

giving the carriers? It seems TSA has placed the responsibility 

squarely on the carriers. What efforts are you making to move internally technology through the process, so that if it is good, if it 

does work, it can be implemented and be a partner with TSA to 

meet our goal of 2010 for 100 percent screening? 

Mr. Hawley. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, before giving the detailed answer, I think both 

you and the ranking member talked about being part of the solution and cooperatively working together, and I think air cargo is a 

perfect example, where I remember contentious hearings on this 

topic in the past. We worked very hard together to arrive at a solution where now our conversations, we agree on the goal. Now it is 

on the oversight of how we are to implementing it, so I think that 

is a very positive thing. 

As to the technology, last week, we put out to the airlines the 

list of technologies that they can go ahead and buy now and start 

screening with. We have worked with some of the cargo intermediaries, 60 of them, I think, and we have got about $12 million, 

where we are going to help to use that as seed money to get them 

to—it answers the question Mr. Ervin raised in his testimony 

about getting the intermediaries to step up and start screening. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We can see that X-ray is not always the best 

technology for this. 
54 

Mr. HAWLEY. That is correct, and we are looking at ways. The 

biggest problem is getting palletized freight, once it is already built 

up into a pallet, to do effective screening of that. If we could do 

that at palletized, it would open up more opportunities at the airport, whereas today what we are trying to do is get them while 

they are still in boxes screened before they are put into pallets and 

then secure it before it gets to checkpoint. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does that mean the idea of this new technology that I was able to visit, or to see, rather, and it might be 

occurring in airports or cargo areas around the Nation, is there a 

streamlined and expedited process that you can then expedite the 

review and assessment of whether these are credible new technologies and get them out there, working? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, this is probably the area I am most personally 

involved with on the air cargo program is the opening up of the accessible technologies to get at it. So it is something very, very high 

priority for me. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I would like to direct these individuals 

that are scattered across the Nation to a system that really works. 

I would ask for, again, in writing for the committee, what the process is for streamlining assessment of technologies, what is the 

array of technologies that you are using beyond X-ray and, I guess, 

your assessment of the ability to reach our goal by 2010. 

I think asking the question on December 31, 2009, is not going 

to be helpful to whether or not we get 100 percent screening. It is 

in the law now and it is certainly something that we should try to 

establish. So I would ask for a full, if you will, reporting on that 

and that assessment. 

Let me indicate that the ranking member have additional questions, and at this time I will yield to him. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. First of all, just a comment 

on the episode with the one flight deck officer. That is one out of 

many. 

Now, we have been briefed on how many there are and how 

many flights and so forth, but we can’t say that in public. All I can 

say is that was one out of very many, and that is not a bad record. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I can say for that holster, which has been in use 

for a little under 2 years, there have been over a million flights 

with that holster without a problem. I think the problem is not the 

holster. 

Mr. LUNGREN. That is not bad, one out of a million. That is kind 

of the record we set around here in Congress. We make one mistake out of a million. We kind of like that. 

Then, for the Federal air marshals, let us be honest, that is a 

tough job from the standpoint of morale. You are flying on airplanes and there is no trouble, you go on an another airplane, 

there is no trouble. You go on another airplane, there is no trouble. 

I mean, any of us who have any family members who have ever 

been in law enforcement know about law enforcement. I mean, you 

can go through boring times and then you have some exciting 

times. Then you go through some boring times. Thank God, in most 

cases, our Federal air marshals get no exciting times. 

So, I know, Mr. Hawley, you have tried to do some other things 

which allowed them, perhaps, to take on some other responsibil-
55 

ities on a rotating basis, and I know you have gotten some criticism 

for that, as well. But I understand that is an immediate challenge. 

Let me ask you a question that was brought up by the written 

testimony of Mr. Ervin, and the was talking about the behavior detection program and concern that there is adequate training such 

that we don’t have a problem of either racial profiling or ethnic 

profiling. The reason why I think it would be good for you to make 

some observations on that is just this weekend I was with some 

people who have nothing to do with law enforcement, nothing to do 

with TSA, not in politics and they were talking about that one incident, which they thought was very positive. But they say, how do 

you make sure there isn’t that kind of profiling? I tried to explain 

it to them, but maybe you could, for the record. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think it is a very legitimate question, because it 

is one of the best pieces of security we have, and we need to make 

sure that it withstands all of the tests so that we can keep using 

it. We have a very disciplined program at TSA for how we do it and 

measure it and track it. 

However, I have asked for a full civil rights, civil liberties review 

of the program, independent review, to lay out, so that people will 

have some confidence in this question, so that it is not just me answering the question that we have disciplines in it, that we will 

have an outside look. I think it is very important that the credibility of the program be strong, because it is so much more effective 

than trying to find little scraps of metal on an X-ray image 2 million times a day. 

So having that behavior-detection layer is a critical piece of the 

total security package. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is it not true that the Israelis have used that for 

years as an effective means of their screening program, particularly 

at the airports? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, and ours is different in some respects from 

theirs, and certainly law enforcement has used it over many, many 

years in different forms. Our approach is that we have it constrained very tightly and disciplined, so that we are able to explain 

why this spot intervention was made and why that one wasn’t, so 

that it is clear it is not based on race or any other thing. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now, I presume that you are—well, I hope you are 

constantly updating it such that you are taking information from 

the intelligence community and other episodes around the world 

that would give you up-to-date information on kinds of things people would be attempting to do, and therefore behavioral responses 

to those duties, terrorist duties, that they might be embarking on. 

Mr. HAWLEY. We are indeed. There are two parts of it. One is 

this training I mentioned in my opening statement, that we are 

doing 12 hours’ worth of training for everybody, and a large part 

of that are things that we have learned on the behavioral side and 

then how terrorists approach and try to do distractions, et cetera. 

The other is locking in the document checker with the behavior 

detection, so that that is a way, because you are going to be able 

to talk to the individual at the document checker. So the behavior 

person will identify somebody they want a little extra attention to 

and then the document checker can check the documents and have 

a conversation, so locking all that together. 
56 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, that is why they took so much time with me 

at Dulles Airport just 2 weeks ago. 

Let me just ask all four of you, very quickly, are we doing a good 

enough job—and I will start with Mr. Verdery and move in reverse 

order. Are we doing a good enough job in leveraging the private 

sector in this? In other words, are we doing a good enough job of 

making sure that the private sector is part and parcel of our effort? 

We spend a lot of money on budget and everything else. Of 

course, I keep thinking of registered travelers being one possibility 

where the private sector works to complement what the public sector is doing. I am not talking about the bells and whistles, but I 

am talking about some additional information and so forth that 

they might have. If we are not, do you have any suggestions about 

how we could do a better job of leveraging the private sector’s participation in this overall effort? 

Mr. Verdery. 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, on the equipment procurement side, as Mr. 

Hawley mentioned, it is a problem that the budgetary ways of Congress of allocating money year to year doesn’t match up with kind 

of the buying equipment that is very expensive and takes many 

years to recoup that investment, so that is a problem on how things 

are purchased, especially in an era when TSA’s budget is essentially flat. 

Over the last couple of years, more and more money, more and 

more DHS money is being sucked up by CBP and ICE on immigration enforcement. I won’t argue about the relative merits of it, but 

it is a fact. 

I do think, with working on the private sector, we are going to 

see two big things come together as what we are going to do with 

Registered Traveler, and I spoke to that in my statement. I am 

supportive of it and would like to see it expand. Then what we are 

going to do on the exit program for US–VISIT, which we understand the rule that is going to be promulgated imminently. The 

question is are you going to ask the airlines to do this? Are you 

going to allow Registered Traveler providers to take care of this, 

or is TSA going to take responsibility? 

We know what the administration wants to do is to have the airlines do it, but they are an unwilling recipient of the football here, 

and so it is going to be a rulemaking, we will have to fight it out. 

But those two issues are going to come together at the checkpoint, 

where you have private sector equities in play and it is going to 

require some tough decisions as to who has the responsibility and 

who can do things the most efficiently. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I just want to remind the witnesses, we are 

going to have votes in 5 minutes, and if your answers could be concise, thank you. 

Mr. ERVIN. I will be very brief. Mr. Lungren, it is really difficult 

to give a short answer to that question. It is a very big question. 

I would agree with what Mr. Verdery said about Registered Traveler. I am a supporter of that program. It is a very good example 

of a partnership between TSA and the private sector. 

As he said, I think that the contracting procedures are too cumbersome, in that they ought to be streamlined so that smaller businesses in particular can bring to the fore technologies that they 
57 

have developed. On the flip side of it, though, I would stress that 

I don’t think we should outsource security to the private sector, 

and so that is why, as I highlighted in my testimony, I have been 

concerned about this notion that airlines should be allowed to police themselves with regard to this 100 percent cargo requirement. 

I think that is going in the wrong direction. 

The whole point of creating TSA after 9/11 was the recognition 

that, left to their own devices, airlines won’t police themselves. 

Ms. BERRICK. I think partnerships have significantly improved 

since GAO started looking at aviation security 5 years ago, both in 

aviation and surface modes of transportation. Some quick examples 

on aviation: I think TSA is putting a lot more focus on coordinating 

with international partners in other countries. I think that is a 

great success story. 

Also, passenger pre-screen, matching passenger information 

against terrorist watch lists, TSA is doing a much better job coordinating with air carriers. On the surface modes of transportation, 

TSA has really reached out this past year-and-a-half to work with 

stakeholders on surface modes of transportation and work collaboratively with them, which wasn’t always the case prior to that. 

One area to focus on, I think, related to partnerships is in surface modes of transportation. I mentioned in my opening statement 

that the 9/11 Act has a lot of requirements for TSA to implement 

and also the transportation operators to implement for security. 

TSA has about 100 inspectors to do a lot of work. We have heard 

from TSA and also from transportation operators that they are concerned these inspectors are really going to be taxed. It is going to 

be hard for them to implement all of these requirements to check 

security programs, to check training programs. So I think that is 

one area of focus that TSA should focus on moving forward. 

Mr. HAWLEY. In 280 days, I shall be returning to the private sector, going back to California. I know from my previous experience 

in the private sector, I would not even consider doing business with 

the government, because it was just too complicated, too slow, too 

many requirements. I think that is a problem that the business 

community, the private sector outside of the Beltway, be brought 

into the game a little bit more in terms of thinking about the marketplace for the public through the government. I think that is a 

very important thing we need to do. 

I would disagree with Mr. Ervin’s comment in terms of I think 

we have to work with our private sector partners. They are part 

and parcel of security, and you don’t want TSA officers everywhere, 

but we need to have every airline employee, every airport employee, mass transit—all private sector, public sector, and even 

passengers, actively engaged in the security process. 

Whether or not it is natural, it has to be a part of the security 

package of this country. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank all the witnesses. 

Ranking Member, I was going to interrupt Secretary Hawley and 

rule him out of order when he said that he would be departing in 

280 days. But we thank the witnesses. In conclusion, let me just 

simply say, Mr. Hawley, I hope you will go back. We appreciate the 

private sector involvement, but it is my view that the cargo process 
58 

needs technology approved by TSA and utilized by TSA and to have 

the oversight that Mr. Ervin has spoken about. 

I also want to take note that I believe that we have made great 

strides with the U.S. Federal air marshals, but there is more work 

to be done. We appreciate an accident and one shot, but we would 

like to think that we would want to ensure that those kinds of accidents are diminished, because any suggestion that we must not be 

worried leaves us vulnerable to what could happen in flight. 

So I would ask for your response to the committee’s questions on 

the oversight of this Flight Deck Officer Training Program and the 

U.S. marshals program and, as well, I think one of the issues Ms. 

Berrick has mentioned that is very important, the perimeters of 

the airport and the IDing of the employees coming on, working 

with the employees and unions. 

Let me also say that this committee will have a field hearing on 

the issue of mass transportation and so we are concerned about 

those issues. We thank the ranking member and the members who 

are here. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee have 

additional questions for the witnesses. 

We will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those 

questions. 

Hearing no further business, thanking the ranking member and 

the committee members, the subcommittee stands now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(59) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE FOR KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOME- LAND SECURITY

GAO’S HIGH RISK LIST

Question 1. Please provide a written response to TSA’s resolutions and status on 

the steps being taken to remove the TSA from high-risk areas, as outlined in the 

GAO report. In your response, please include a thorough assessment on how the recommendations sighted in this report will be incorporated into a plan of action toward ‘‘building long-term, sustainable processes’’ as the Assistant Secretary had described. 

Answer. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not 

have any individual items on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) highrisk list, TSA is participating in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to address Department-wide high-risk items. TSA is an active participant in 

the newly formed DHS Performance Improvement Council which will provide input 

into the DHS Transformation and Integration Corrective Action Plan through the 

DHS/GAO Performance Improvement Initiative. 

Component contributions to this Initiative are still in the initial stages and each 

component will meet with GAO to receive feedback on current Government Performance Results Act performance measures and milestones. Steps will be formulated to 

address performance improvement processes and measures. TSA is scheduled to 

have its initial meeting with GAO in mid-June and as a follow-up will develop or 

revise processes and specific measures based on GAO recommendations. 

TSA is committed to adhering to DHS/GAO guidance on submitting timely reports 

on progress under this Initiative to building long-term sustainable processes for the 

future. 

CHECKPOINT TECHNOLOGIES

Question 2. Given the significant investments DHS and TSA have made in research, development, and deployment in new screening technologies to detect explosives and other threat items on passengers and their carry-on items, how effectively 

are the new technologies working in the airports? To what extent has the government’s ability to detect liquid explosives and other types of explosives at the checkpoint been improved by deployment of the explosives trace portal and the hand-held 

bottled liquid screeners? 

Answer. The Explosives Trace Portal (ETP), while improving the Transportation 

Security Administration’s (TSA) capability to detect certain explosive substances 

that may be carried by passengers, has not been entirely successful in detecting the 

full range of explosive threats of interest to TSA. TSA has worked closely with the 

ETP vendors in order to improve detection sensitivity and product reliability; however, TSA is not sufficiently satisfied with the results to commence widespread deployment. In addition to the ETP, TSA has begun operational testing of Whole Body 

Imagers (WBI) to detect a broad range of explosives and other threat items on passengers. Utilizing backscatter X-ray and millimeter wave technologies, the WBI pilots show significant promise in detecting explosives and other non-metallic threat 

items that may be concealed on passengers, while the enhanced Walk Through 

Metal Detectors (WTMD) continue to provide weapons detection of knives, guns, and 

other metal threats, as well as improvised explosives device (IED) components (i.e. 

detonators & wiring) that would be used in conjunction with the explosives to create 

an IED. To detect liquid threats, prior to the deployment of hand-held Bottle Liquid 

Scanners (BLS), TSA relied on screeners utilizing X-ray images on the TRX systems 

to identify inconsistencies, such as detonators and wiring protruding from bottles 

that were present in passenger carry-on baggage. The BLS systems that have been 
60 

deployed enable screeners to screen ‘‘3–1–1’’ permitted liquid items and larger exemptible liquids (i.e. medications and baby formula) to detect the presence of one 

of the most readily available, liquid explosives threats, even at very low levels of 

concentration. In addition, TSA is currently beginning the replacement of aging TRX 

X-ray units with a new generation of Advanced Technology (AT) X-rays. The ATs 

have demonstrated a marked improvement in the detection of liquid explosives and 

other threat items contained in carry-on items. 

BEHAVIORAL DETECTION OFFICER

Question 3. How expansive the Behavioral Assessment Program? What kind of 

funding resources have you invested in it? How many of your overall employees 

have had the opportunity to participate in the training? Additionally, what is the 

standard operating procedure for a Behavior Detection Officer, once he or she identifies a suspect at an airport? What paperwork is filed by the officer, who maintains 

those records, and what office at TSA is tasked with managing the records and identifying systemic problems that may surface? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) operates the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program at all CAT X and 

CAT I airports and a large number of CAT II airports nationwide. The specific number of airports using this program and the number of Behavior Detection Officers 

(BDO) deployed nationwide, however, is Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and 

would need to be provided in a secure setting. 

The BDO Standard Operating Procedure document is also SSI in its entirety, but 

generally speaking, the program includes the identification of specific types of behavior that trigger specific responses. Once someone manifests a cluster of these 

identified types of behavior, he or she may be referred to secondary screening or a 

law enforcement officer. 

The SPOT Program was officially launched in fiscal year 2007. Funding for fiscal 

year 2007 for Non-Personnel Costs & Benefits (non-PC&B) was $1.5 million, and the 

program was funded $41.5 million for PC&B. For fiscal year 2008, non-PC&B costs 

to date are $1.2 million and end of year estimates are $3.2 million. For PC&B these 

costs are $30.2 million and $80.1 million, respectively. 

BDO positions have been competitively offered at many airports across the country. All TSA employees who qualify at those airports have had the opportunity to 

apply for these positions, and those selected for the program receive the requisite 

training. We are still building this program and the number of employees trained 

in it changes weekly. The end-of-year goal is to have well over 2,000 employees 

trained, though the actual number is SSI and would have to be provided in a secure 

setting. 

In addition to the specific behavior detection training that the BDOs receive 

under the SPOT Program, all Transportation Security Officers (TSO) receive general 

behavioral awareness training through the TSA On-line Learning Center program 

as do many Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI). This general behavior awareness training, though not directly associated with the SPOT Program, is intended 

to enhance the overall capability of the workforce in this area of security. 

In reference to SPOT referrals, once a BDO identifies an individual manifesting 

suspicious behavior, he or she institutes what is known as ‘‘SPOT referral screening.’’ This referral screening is non-invasive and includes a bag search and engaging 

the passenger in casual conversation in order to identify the origin of the passenger’s suspicious behavior. As a result of this process, there are two types of reporting that can occur: (1) The completion of a SPOT Score Sheet and (2) completion 

of an Incident Report (produced only in the event that Law Enforcement Officer assistance is requested). 

The SPOT Score Sheet is a document that the BDO completes following each incident of SPOT referral screening. The BDO uses this document to record and outline 

the specific behavior he or she identified that led to the referral as well as the action 

taken as a result of the subsequent referral screening (if any action was deemed 

necessary, which does not occur in every case). No personally identifiable information is included on the SPOT Score Sheet. This includes name, physical characteristics, and ethnicity. A section on the SPOT Score Sheet is checked off only if the passenger is assessed an initial point if they qualify based on intel-driven specific age 

and gender information. The only other passenger information included on the Score 

Sheet is the flight data and the person’s immigration status, if applicable (illegal 

alien or self-deporting.) The Score Sheet also includes a section for the BDO’s professional analysis and comments on the event, and a section for the resulting action 

taken (if any). This score sheet is completed by the BDO at the end of the shift and 

is not done in the presence of the passenger. 
61 

Information from the completed SPOT Score Sheets is entered into a national 

database on a daily—but not less than weekly—basis, and the paper copy is filed 

in a locked cabinet at the respective airport. The SPOT Program Office at TSA 

Headquarters has full oversight of this database. The airports also have the ability 

to monitor the score sheets at their airports to maintain full visibility of their program. The Incident Reports are provided to the appropriate chain of command at 

each airport for appropriate processing/follow-up activity. 

The SPOT Program is responsible for the overall management of the SPOT database electronic records and for establishing an appropriate record retention process. 

The record retention process includes the establishment of a record disposition 

schedule for approval by the National Archives and Records Administration to develop a formal policy and procedures for SPOT paperwork. This process is currently 

in the coordination and approval phase. The only physical paperwork produced is 

appropriately maintained at the airport level. 

While BDO Transportation Security Managers at each airport are tasked with reviewing the referrals made at their airport for trends, the SPOT Program Office also 

provides oversight on a national level through its weekly review and analysis of the 

electronic data captured in the national database, utilization of a standardization 

team, and relationship management with the airports’ SPOT points of contact. The 

airport SPOT POC is the individual responsible for having local oversight of the 

SPOT program at his or her respective airport. This role may be filled by the Assistant Federal Security Director or another TSA management representative at the 

airport. 

SECURE FLIGHT—WATCH LISTS

Question 4a. What critical activities are included in the $82 million request for 

fiscal year 2009 funding for Secure Flight? 

Answer. 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 SECURE FLIGHT 

Critical Spend Activities 

Proposed 

Amount 

(in Millions) 

Personnel Compensation & Benefits (PC&B) for Program Full Time 

Equivalents (FTEs) and Facilities Costs ................................................... $16 

Business Operations, Program Management Office (PMO), Privacy and 

Implementation Support ............................................................................ 12 

Iterative Secure Flight System Development and post-production application support .............................................................................................. 15 

Operations and Maintenance of the Secure Flight System and associated 

hardware/software ...................................................................................... 12 

Secure Flight Resolution Service Center Operations .................................. 12 

New IT hardware purchases and technology refresh .................................. 4 

Airline Employee Vetting activities .............................................................. 5 

DHS Router Costs .......................................................................................... 6 

TOTAL .................................................................................................. 82 

Question 4b. When will the system be fully operational for domestic watch list 

matching? For international watch list matching functions? Do you believe your 

schedule is realistic, given the program’s past history? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates that it will assume full watch list matching for all domestic aircraft operators by July 2009 and 

for all international aircraft operators in early 2010, pending congressional approval 

of recommended funding levels and the publication of a final rule. 

TSA believes this schedule is realistic. As TSA works aggressively to implement 

the program, Secure Flight remains on track for acceleration. In December 2007, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) delivered a Report to Congress on Secure 

Flight’s implementation plan, outlining a schedule for achieving key program milestones. Table 1 below highlights the program schedule. 
62 

Key Milestones Estimated 

Completion 

Program planning complete after: 

• Governance infrastructure implemented, in accordance with 

industry and government best practices; 

• Integrated Master Schedule defined; 

• Life-Cycle Cost Estimates completed; and 

• Privacy and security woven into the program. 

Q1 FY07 

Completed 

Benchmark Testing begins after: 

• Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) has been granted; 

• Secure Flight Exemption Rule is effective. 

Q1 FY08 

Completed 

System complete after (release 2): 

• Design phase complete; 

• Development phase complete; and 

• System testing complete. 

Q2 FY08 

Parallel testing begins after: 

• Implementation support provided to aircraft operators; 

• Network interface engineering complete; and 

• Operational testing with first groups of domestic aircraft operators conducted. 

Q3 FY08 

Service Center staffing, training, and operational testing begins. Q3 FY08 

DHS Certification complete ............................................................... Q4 FY08 

Parallel testing complete; Secure Flight will begin full watch list 

matching responsibility for domestic flights after: 

• Operational testing with subsequent groups of domestic aircraft operators conducted. 

Q2 FY09 

Parallel testing with first group of aircraft operators complete. 

Domestic cutovers begin and Secure Flight assumes full watch 

list matching responsibility for initial group of domestic aircraft 

operators.

Q2 FY09 

Secure Flight is moving quickly toward full implementation. The program is executing a comprehensive test approach, and TSA plans to begin parallel testing with 

the first groups of domestic aircraft operators in 2008, and to take over full responsibility for watch list matching for both domestic and international aircraft operators in fiscal year 2010, pending funding and the publication of the final rule. 

Secretary Chertoff has been clear that acceleration of the Secure Flight program 

remains a priority and TSA remains committed to meeting this key recommendation 

of the 9/11 Commission Report and requirement of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

Question 4c. What are TSA’s key challenges in meeting Secure Flight scheduled 

completion dates? 

Answer. If Secure Flight does not receive approval for transfer of $24 million in 

fiscal year 2008 and the President’s request of $82 million in fiscal year 2009, the 

program will have to delay key work scheduled for the current fiscal year and will 

not be able to continue on an accelerated implementation timeline to assume full 

watch list matching for all domestic aircraft operators by July 2009 and for all foreign aircraft operators by early 2010. Further, the timely publication and effective 

date of the Final Rule will ensure that TSA is able to assume full watch list matching for all domestic aircraft operators by July 2009 and by early 2010 for all foreign 

aircraft operators. 

Question 4d. What is the status of the Secure Flight rulemaking? 

Answer. The Secure Flight Final Rule is still in the deliberative process and 

should be promulgated in a timely manner. 

100% CARGO SCREENING

Question 5a. In October 2005, GAO reported that TSA had taken a number of actions intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but factors existed that 

may have limited their effectiveness. In April 2007, GAO reported that DHS (TSA 

and CBP) have taken a number of actions to secure air cargo entering the United 

States, but many of these efforts are still in the early stages and could be strengthened. Since GAO’s reports were released, Congress enacted 9/11 Act, which mandates 100 percent screening of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Specifically, this act calls for a system to be developed and implemented to provide a level 

of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger 
63 

checked baggage to screen 100 percent of air cargo on passenger aircraft within 3 

years of the date of enactment. 

What is the status of TSA’s efforts to meet the requirement set forth in the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft within 18 months of the enactment of the act and 100 percent of air cargo within 3 years of its enactment? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the process of developing and implementing the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), a regulatory program that will enable industry to meet the screening requirements contained in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(9/11 Act). 

At this time, air carriers perform the screening of all cargo to be transported on 

passenger aircraft. However, due to the large volume of such cargo (approximately 

6,000 tons per day), air carriers alone will not be able to screen cargo in the volume 

required to meet the 50 percent and 100 percent requirements of the 9/11 Act. 

The CCSP is intended to enable the entire industry (original manufacturers, shippers, and indirect air carriers) to perform screening in order for cargo to arrive at 

the air carrier fully screened and ready to load onto aircraft. CCSP participants will 

use either physical search or non-intrusive screening methods such as X-ray and explosive trace detection systems to screen cargo destined for passenger aircraft. 

To date, the TSA Air Cargo Division has briefed over 1,000 corporate representatives on the CCSP, and the response from industry has been positive. Additionally, 

TSA is currently coordinating an aggressive screening technology pilot program in 

support of the Certified Cargo Screening Program at almost 60 Indirect Air Carrier 

locations owned by 14 different companies. These locations are high-volume cargo 

processing centers which build consolidated loads for air carriers. None of the individual sites are operational to date, but TSA anticipates that most will be operational prior to fall 2008. 

TSA is also operating a similar pilot with approximately 80 shipper locations in 

nine cities. However, these are all in preliminary development but TSA plans to 

have the majority of these locations validated, certified, and operational in fall 2008. 

Question 5b. What is the status of TSA’s report to Congress assessing each exemption granted under 49 U.S.C. 44901(i)(1) for the screening of cargo transported on 

passenger aircraft, required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007? 

Answer. In response to Section 1602 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007, on February 25, 2008, the Department of Homeland 

Security delivered a document entitled Report to Congress on Air Cargo Subject to 

Alternate Screening to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, as well as the Government Accountability Office. 

Question 5c. What progress has TSA made in implementing its targeting system 

for elevated risk domestic air cargo transported on passenger aircraft, referred to 

as Freight Assessment? 

Answer. The Freight Assessment System has completed its pre-system pilot test 

and has received authority to operate from the Transportation Security Administration Information Technology office. The system will be deployed to industry in conjunction with the Certified Cargo Screening Program. 

Question 5d. What progress has TSA made in coordinating with the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) to enhance the security of air cargo transported into 

the United States? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently collaborating with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on a key component of 

its risk-based approach for securing inbound air cargo. As part of this approach, 

TSA has engaged CBP to leverage its Automated Targeting System (ATS) and in 

a joint CBP/TSA international inbound air cargo targeting pilot. The pilot will 

evaluate the use of existing ATS trade data and its automated risk assessment program to identify elevated-risk air cargo. 

CBP has given TSA an initial briefing on the capabilities of ATS, and TSA has 

likewise briefed CBP on its authority and policy vehicles in the international environment. In addition, TSA has provided to CBP its risk assessment of inbound cargo 

on passenger planes. Included in this assessment is an analysis of threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences. Going forward, the agencies will collaborate on 

how to implement changes that address these potential risks via ATS. 

As such changes are successfully tested, the goal for both TSA and CBP will be 

to jointly consider how such integrated risk-assessment efforts could be accom-
64 

plished prior to departure of an aircraft from an international last point of departure. 

Question 5e. What is the status of TSA’s efforts to develop and implement technology to inspect air cargo? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Security 

Technology is supporting air cargo security goals and objectives by testing, evaluating, and qualifying technology to detect explosives and stowaways as well as ensure the integrity of the air cargo supply chain. TSA plans to both optimize currently available technologies and provide cargo specific screening procedures coupled 

with protocols to support these technologies in the operational environment. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Science and Technology (S&T) 

Directorate is about to conclude the congressionally directed Air Cargo Explosives 

Detection Pilot Program and provide the report on the results of that effort later 

this year. TSA will be conducting an operational test at some airports, domestic and 

international, to develop requirements, specifications, and testing protocols to qualify carbon dioxide (CO2) monitors. The CO2 monitor is expected to be qualified in 

fiscal year 2009. Heartbeat Monitors are susceptible to environmental factors at the 

airports that will be addressed in future research efforts before they are qualified 

by TSA for use by the cargo freighters. TSA has deployed certified checked baggage 

screening technologies into actual air cargo screening operations, at about twelve 

different sites, to determine all the integration, training, and operational issues. 

TSA has also initiated pilot tests to study ways to integrate counter-to-counter air 

cargo into the existing airport checked baggage screening infrastructure using Explosives Detection System (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) screening 

equipment. 

The technologies showing promise in the near-term are existing or slightly modified explosives detection screening technologies such as EDS, Cargo Optimized EDS, 

ETD, and dual energy, multi-view Advanced Technology X-ray (AT-X-ray) technologies, and some CO2 monitors for detecting stowaways. 

TSA will have screening technologies qualified to core air cargo screening requirements by January–March 2009. To get on the qualified products list (QPL) means: 

(a) That the technology has successfully completed commodity based integration test 

and evaluation (IT&E) qualification testing; (b) that the technology has successfully 

completed the subsequent operational test to ensure the product is operationally 

suitable and effective in an operational environment; (c) that the air cargo screening 

procedures and alarm resolution protocols for the technology have been developed 

and incorporated into Standing Operating Procedures for Transportation Security 

Officers and incorporated into TSA Security Directives and Aircraft Operators and 

Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Programs; and (d) that the screener training 

curriculum and course materials have been developed and validated. 

Candidate Air Cargo Screening Technologies for Use by Indirect Air Carriers in 

Screening Break Bulk Cargo 

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) 

• GE CTX 2500 

• GE CTX 5500 

• GE CTX 9000/9400 

• L3 6000/6600 

• Reveal CT–80/80DR 

Explosives Trace Detectors (ETD) 

• GE Itemiser 2 

• Smiths Ionscan 400B 

• Smiths Ionscan 500DT 

• Smiths Sabre 4000 (Particle Mode Only) 

Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray 

• AT X-ray/Small 

• L3 ACX 6.4 

• Rapiscan 620DV 

• Smiths 6040 aTiX 

Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray/Medium 

• L3 MVT HR 

• L3 VIS HR 

• Rapiscan MVXR5000 

• Smiths 10080 EDtS 

• Smiths 10080 EDtS∂∂ 

1. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the process of evaluating and testing the technologies on this list for screening air cargo. Future 

testing may result in modifications to this list. 
65 

2. ETDs must be present for use in either alarm resolution (EDS) or for use 

IN CONJUNCTION with AT X-Ray (directed search). 

3. ETDs can be used as primary detection technology. 

4. Protocols for use in screening air cargo with these technologies are being finalized and will be provided later. 

5. Not all technologies are appropriate for all commodities. 

6. The TSA would encourage Indirect Air Carriers to propose screening processes and procedures based on their unique operational needs. 

Candidate Air Cargo Screening Technologies for Use by Air Carriers in Screening 

Break Bulk Cargo 

Explosive Detection System (EDS) • GE CTX 2500 • GE CTX 5500 • GE CTX 9000/9400 • L3 6000/6600 • Reveal CT–80/80DR 

Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD) • GE Itemiser 2 • Smiths Ionscan 400B • Smiths Ionscan 500DT • Smiths Sabre 4000 (Particle Mode Only) 

Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray • AT X-ray/Small • L3 ACX 6.4 • Rapiscan 620DV • Smiths 6040 aTiX 

Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray/Medium • L3 MVT HR • L3 VIS HR • Rapiscan MVXR5000 • Smiths 10080 EDtS • Smiths 10080 EDtS∂∂ 

1. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the process of evaluating and testing the technologies on this list for screening air cargo. Future 

testing may result in modifications to this list. 

2. ETDs must be present for use in either alarm resolution (EDS) or for use 

IN CONJUNCTION with AT X-Ray (directed search). 

3. ETDs can be used as primary detection technology. 

4. Protocols for use in screening air cargo with these technologies are being finalized and will be provided later. 

5. Not all technologies are appropriate for all commodities. 

TRANSITION

Question 6. Please provide a written response as to how TSA is preparing a transition blueprint in the upcoming months. Do you have a Senior Leadership Team 

in place to assist with this transition blueprint? If so, who is a member of the Senior 

Leadership Team? In your response, please carefully and with as much detail as 

possible include TSA’s plan of action to provide incoming leadership team with identified best practices and lessons learned; standard communication forums/mechanism through which incoming leadership can discuss ongoing policy transition 

issues throughout their first year in office; and reports outlining lessons learned 

within critical components at TSA and program success and failures within specific 

offices, as well as objective recommendations on how the incoming leadership should 

move forward. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is closely working 

under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office 

of the Under Secretary for Management (USM) to ensure a smooth transition process. The Under Secretary for Management Paul Schneider and Deputy Under Secretary for Management Elaine Duke provide the overall leadership for the Department’s, and TSA’s, transition efforts. In June, RADM John Acton of the United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) will be detailed to USM to serve as DHS Transition 

Director where he will lead the USM core team that is currently in place. TSA has 

designated a senior career executive as its Senior Transition Officer to support the 

Department’s transition team. He is assisted by a career Deputy Transition Officer 

and each office within TSA has a designated Point of Contact to ensure that complete and timely information is provided to incoming appointees of the new administration. 
66 

TSA also has a longstanding Senior Leadership Team (SLT) comprised of the Deputy Administrator, all Assistant Deputy Administrators, and other office heads. The 

SLT was created in 2005 and is a forum for the career leadership of the agency to 

make key policy decisions and recommendations to the Assistant Secretary. The 

SLT meets weekly. We anticipate that the SLT will continue its critical role during 

the transition. TSA’s SLT will be able to provide the new political leadership of the 

next administration with professional advice on the programs they administer. 

TSA is well placed to respond to the demands to ensure that its core functions 

of providing security throughout the transportation networks continues during and 

beyond the transition period. TSA’s Deputy Administrator is a career civil servant 

as are all of the Assistant Administrators with the exception of Legislative Affairs 

and Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, and in each instance we have career professionals to lead those offices during the transition. Furthermore, TSA has 

been diligently working on succession planning to make certain that as some of our 

senior leaders either retire or move to other positions, there is a deep bench in place 

to continue the agency’s mission. In fact for the past 2 years a major focus of the 

SLT has been on leadership and management development programs for the next 

generation of TSA leaders to head a rapidly maturing agency that is still less than 

7 years old. 

GRANT FUNDING

Question 7a. Please describe the procedures and differences that are used in determining grant funding decisions for Tier 1 and Tier 2 transit agencies. 

Answer. Projects that have the highest efficacy in reducing our Nation’s transit 

risk are funded with transit security grants. All projects for fiscal year 2008 were 

scored using a formula as described in the grant guidance. The formula is a function 

of risk, project effectiveness, quality, and regional collaboration. All transit agencies 

had the opportunity to be provided their agency specific risk score. The project effectiveness values were laid out clearly in the grant guidance and were based on the 

type of project proposed in the application. The methodology and the formula were 

explained in detail during the stakeholder conferences. Transit agencies also had opportunities to ask questions either via email or during the weekly conference calls. 

There were differences in the procedures for how Tier 1 and Tier 2 were scored 

for ‘‘quality’’ and ‘‘regional collaboration.’’ For Tier 2, the quality and regional collaboration factors were scored by the National Review Panel composed of subject 

matter experts. Since the process for Tier 2 is competitive, applications were evaluated solely on the information submitted with the application. For Tier 1, the 

projects are awarded the maximum quality score since they are arrived at through 

a collaborative process at the Regional Transit Security Working Groups, working 

with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ensure high quality 

projects. 

Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores were then ranked separately. The recommended funding 

for Tier 2 was under the target allocation, so all projects recommended for funding 

were funded. For Tier 1, a minimum score threshold was determined based on the 

national slate of projects submitted, and funded projects generally exceeded that 

score. In Tier 1, due to excess funds in Tier 2 and the Freight Rail Security Grant 

Program, several regions received more than their target allocation announced on 

February 1, 2008, with the release of the grant guidance. These funds were allocated to regional projects that were ‘‘next in line’’ and able to be fully funded on 

the project lists submitted by regions. 

Question 7b. What are some of the barriers that TSA is experiencing to releasing 

grant funding in a timely manner? 

Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for 

administering the transportation security grants for intercity bus, AMTRAK, freight 

rail, transit, and trucking. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 

the programmatic lead for these grant programs. TSA is responsible for coordinating 

and leading the development of recommended funding for all submitted investments. TSA does not release grant funding for any of the transportation security 

grant programs. FEMA is responsible for releasing grant funds based on those recommended funding levels. There are several factors that in the past have caused 

delays in the release of funding from FEMA including lack of detailed budget submissions by agencies, and environmental historical preservation reviews. In an effort to mitigate such delays this year, TSA engaged in extensive outreach activities 

that included nationwide workshops, weekly teleconferences with both Tier I and II 

security partners, and regular, recurring meetings with Tier I groups in such cities 

as Philadelphia, San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles. As TSA’s partner and 

a full participant in all outreach activities, FEMA provided prospective grantees 
67 

with detailed information regarding requirements for budget submissions and environmental historical preservation reviews. 

Question 7c. Please discuss how TSA determines the grant funding priorities for 

the transit security grant program and discuss whether these priorities are riskbased. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed six riskbased Transit Security Fundamentals (TSFs) for implementation by transit agencies 

as a means of enhancing the security posture of individual agencies and establishing 

a security baseline throughout the transit mode. The TSFs consist of protection of 

high-risk/high consequence underwater and underground rail assets; protection of 

other high-risk/high consequence assets and systems that have been identified 

through system-wide risk assessments; use of visible, unpredictable deterrence; targeted counter-terrorism training for key front-line staff; emergency preparedness 

drills and exercises; and public awareness and preparedness campaigns. Each of 

these fundamentals supports the achievement of the National Preparedness Goal, 

as well as other national and regional strategies to mitigate risk. The TSFs, developed in coordination with transit security partners, have been the basis of project 

priorities under the Transit Security Grant Program. TSA security assessments 

focus particular attention on posture in the TSFs and the overall assessment results 

advance the development of risk mitigation priorities, security enhancement programs, and resource allocations. 

In partnership with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the mass transit and passenger rail community, TSA developed and implemented the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. The BASE program aims to 

expand TSA’s awareness and understanding of the current security posture in the 

passenger rail and mass transit mode, enable more effective targeting of security 

programs and technical assistance to elevate security, and facilitate sharing of best 

security practices. TSA’s Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) complete these 

comprehensive assessments by thoroughly reviewing and rating mass transit and 

passenger rail agencies in 17 Security and Emergency Management Action Items. 

Updated in 2006 in a collaborative effort by TSA and FTA in coordination with representatives of the mass transit and passenger rail community, the Action Items encompass security and emergency management plans, security program accountability, terrorism prevention and response training and exercises, public awareness 

campaigns, physical security, personnel security, information security, procedures to 

elevate security measures as the threat level increases, internal security audits, and 

operational security measures. As of May 15, 2008, TSA had completed 64 BASE 

assessments of mass transit and passenger rail agencies. The detailed reports TSIs 

produce of results of BASE assessments provide the data for analysis of areas and 

trends requiring improvement, both in individual mass transit and passenger rail 

agencies and nationally based on a consolidation of results. 

As one example, well-trained employees are a force multiplier for security efforts 

implemented by mass transit and passenger rail agencies. When the BASE results 

demonstrated the need for significant improvement in continuing security training 

of employees, TSA developed and published the Mass Transit Security Training Program in February 2007. Produced in coordination with the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), FTA, the Sector 

Coordinating Council, and the Transit Security and Policing Peer Advisory Group, 

this program provides detailed guidelines on implementing an effective security 

training program, citing the subject areas in which particular categories of employees should receive training. Identified course options include programs funded by 

FTA/TSA (transit specific terrorism prevention and response) and FEMA (general 

terrorism prevention and response). Supported by the Transit Security Grant Program, this initiative expanded significantly the volume and quality of training for 

transit employees. 

TSO WORKFORCE STAFFING

Question 8a. A few weeks ago TSA announced changes to the pay for performance 

system, known as PASS, for your transportation security officer (TSO) workforce. 

While some of the changes are welcomed by the workforce there are a number of 

questions, particularly on training and testing for TSOs. As part of the PASS 

changes there will be reduction in required training in 2009. 

How do you expect to refine and reduce the training requirements for 2009, and 

still ensure that TSOs are properly prepared for the duties of the job? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Human Capital 

and the Office of Security Operations (OSO) have been working with the National 

Advisory Council (NAC) Training and Performance Accountability and Standards 
68 

System (PASS) subcommittees, to review the mandatory training plan. The amount 

of training being considered for reduction will solely reflect those items not directly 

related to core security screening functions and federally mandated courses. Nonessential training will still be available as elective courses. The NAC subcommittee 

will submit recommendations for consideration in June 2008. 

Question 8b. Will TSA increase its TSO workforce so that employees can have 

time to properly train? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of Operational 

Performance/Workforce Utilization stated that funding for Full-Time Equivalency 

(FTE) positions increased from 651 to 1,473 for the fiscal year 2008 Staffing Allocation Model. TSA has changed its weekly training requirement to a quarterly requirement. This factor alone has allowed the Transportation Security Officer workforce time to complete training requirements and complete the daily security mission. Additionally, Federal Security Directors are scheduling training hours into the 

daily duty schedules. 

Question 8c. What is the percentage of workplace injury cases for the TSO workforce? How does this compare to the average across the Federal Government? 

Answer. The Total Case Rate (TCR) is the rate of injury per 100 employees. The 

TCR for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Transportation Security 

Officer (TSO) workforce is 10.96. The Federal Government does not provide a TCR 

for specific workforces, such as the TSO, however, the Federal Government overall 

TCR is 4.26. In comparison, all TSA workplace injury cases resulted in a TCR of 

9.99. Although TSA’s TCR is higher than the Federal Government’s overall TCR, 

it is important to note that for fiscal year 2008 the TSO TCR has been reduced by 

21.71 percent over the same period in fiscal year 2007. 

Question 8d. How is TSA working to ensure that your employees are aware of preventative measures for injuries and if injured, can take the time the need to heal 

properly before returning to work? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has implemented 

cross-functional teams that facilitate and expedite programs or projects designed to 

improve checked baggage and checkpoint screening efficiency by reviewing airport/ 

office space ergonomics, work environments, and health/safety risks. Additionally, 

the TSA Optimization and Safety section secures funding and support for activities 

such as workspace configuration and redesign and equipment purchase. Each of 

these initiatives is aimed at reducing TSA losses associated with Transportation Security Officer on-the-job injury claims. 

The TSA Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment program has placed Occupational Safety and Health specialists at the TSA Mission Support Centers that 

are responsible for working with each airport to ensure that there is a viable and 

effective occupational safety and health program in place which includes outreach 

and communication to TSA employees. These specialists also conduct formal safety 

inspections of each airport and ensure that incidents are investigated promptly, and 

that any corrective actions are implemented. 

Further, TSA’s Office of Human Capital has implemented a national nurse case 

management program to provide focus and direction for early medical intervention 

for injured employees. When an employee is injured, a contracted nurse contacts the 

employee within 24 hours of the injury to provide support and assistance. Through 

on-going contacts, the nurse monitors the employee’s medical condition to ensure 

quality medical care to facilitate their medical progress and return to duty when 

medically feasible. The nurse case managers ensure that the medical documentation 

received from the treating physician is clear and complete, so that limited duty assignments are appropriate and consistent with the employee’s medical restrictions. 

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR TSOS

Question 9a. Our transportation security officers are the frontline at our Nation’s 

airports and these employees do not enjoy the same rights and protections as other 

Federal employees, including whistleblower protections. TSA took steps to remedy 

this in late February by signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between TSA 

and the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). As I understand it, based on the 

MOA, MSPB will now be able to hear whistleblower cases from TSA employees. 

Have the cost details of this agreement been reconciled between TSA and MSPB. 

If not, when can we expect them to be? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) have agreed to the terms of TSA reimbursement for 

MSPB’s direct costs incurred to adjudicate transportation security screeners’ whistleblower retaliation appeals. The agencies are in the process of finalizing an Interagency Agreement addressing this issue. 
69 

Question 9b. The MOA outlines that either party upon 30 days of written notice 

to the other party may terminate the MOA—is there a contingency plan in place 

should this happen? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Merit Systems 

Protection Board (MSPB) anticipate that the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 

will be continued and will not be terminated by either party. In the event that termination becomes foreseeable, TSA and MSPB will work together to ensure that 

transportation security officers’ whistleblower retaliation appeals receive timely, fair 

resolution. 

Question 9c. What are the biggest challenges to staffing up TSA—is it finding 

qualified candidates necessary for the vacant positions? Is it competitiveness pay 

issues in some localities? How can these challenges be best addressed? 

Answer. The challenges the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faces 

today for staffing Transportation Security Officer (TSO) positions nationwide vary 

from airport to airport. For several airports the starting pay scale is not competitive 

for their labor market, such as competing with the oil industry in Wyoming, the 

hotel industry in tourist locations such as the Hawaiian Islands, and the fishing industry in remote Alaska locations. In other locations, the challenge is competition 

with other Federal employers in the same region. Higher attrition rates are experienced in these positions because many of the available work schedules are for parttime or split-shift positions, and many employees transfer to other Federal agencies 

after passing the probationary period. Additionally, the hiring process itself can be 

lengthy and candidates applying for part-time positions have accepted other jobs 

prior to our offer being made. 

To address these current challenges, TSA offers incentive pay for hard-to-fill areas 

to be competitive with starting pay scales. To attract long-term employees and reduce attrition, TSA continues to provide more extensive information to prospective 

candidates depicting a realistic job preview so that future employees understand the 

job they are accepting and the career path available within TSA. TSA is also offering incentives to current employees who recruit future employees with the hope that 

these future employees will understand the job and career path and be looking for 

long-term employment. Increased benefits are available for part-time employees, 

which not only draws candidates into applying but gives them incentive to stay. 

TSA is continually looking at the hiring process to decrease the time to hire and 

ensure candidates understand where they are in this multi-step process. 

Question 9d. A challenge across the Department is keeping qualified and committed individuals on staff. Can you please provide to us the attrition rates for TSOs 

and if exit interviews have been conducted, what have been the top three reasons 

for employee departures? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) utilizes the National 

Exit Survey to collect information regarding reasons for leaving from those employees who voluntarily depart TSA. Completion of the survey is voluntary. The National Exit Survey was revised in July 2007 to provide departing employees with 

the ability to rank the top three reasons for leaving TSA. From July 2007 to March 

2008, the top three reasons why employees leave TSA are as follows: 

Reasons for Leaving 

Response 

Rate in 

Percent * 

Pay ................................................................................................................... 54 

Career Advancement ...................................................................................... 53 

Personal Reasons ............................................................................................ 50 

* Percentages will not equal 100 percent because participants may have selected more than 

one ‘‘most important’’ reason for leaving. 

The response rate for Transportation Security Officers (TSO) employees who completed the National Exit Survey during this time period is 16 percent. The national 

average response rate for employees completing an exit survey is 20 percent. 

Transportation Security Officer (TSO) attrition statistics are in the table below. 
70 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICER (TSO) ATTRITION SUMMARY AS OF 

05/10/08 (PAY PERIOD 0809) 

Data as of 5/24/2008 

(PP 0810) 

*—FY08 YTD Includes Attrition Through 3/1/ 

2008 (Percent) 

TSO Attrition Type FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 

YTD * 

Full-Time (all paybands/reasons) ....... 18.9 18.9 16.5 14.4 14.3 

Part-Time (all paybands/reasons) ...... 72.4 55.9 45.8 44.6 42.5 

TOTAL (all paybands/reasons) 24.2 23.7 20.9 21.2 21.0 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INSPECTION PROGRAM

Question 10a. Since 2005, TSA has deployed Surface Transportation Security Inspectors at field offices across the country to identify and reduce vulnerabilities and 

gaps in passenger and freight rail and to enforce existing security requirements. 

In fiscal year 2007, was TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program sufficiently staffed to fulfill all of its responsibilities? If not, please explain? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2007, the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) was sufficiently staffed with 100 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) to 

achieve agency performance goals related to Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews in mass transit, Security Action Item (SAI) reviews in 

freight rail (Toxic Inhalation Hazard risk reduction), and Station Profile development in passenger and mass transit rail. Additionally, during this time the STSIP 

was able to sufficiently support numerous Visual Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) operations nationwide, conduct extensive security partner outreach, 

and provide ongoing incident response to enhance information sharing capabilities 

in the surface modes. The STSIP was authorized to hire an additional 75 FTE in 

a supplemental appropriation in fiscal year 2008 to facilitate enhancement of and 

help offset the resource requirements of the VIPR program, for a total of 175 FTE. 

This staffing level was sufficient for fiscal year 2008 as well. 

Question 10b. The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) is 

TSA’s primary tool for assessing mass transit agencies. Has TSA conducted any assessments of the BASE’s effectiveness in identifying and reducing vulnerability 

gaps? If yes, what were the results? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continuously assesses 

the effectiveness of the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program in identifying and reducing security vulnerabilities. This approach is reflected 

in the development of the program, its implementation, the application of assessment results, and quality control efforts. 

The BASE program, which commenced fully in November 2006, assesses the security posture of mass transit and passenger rail agencies in the Security and Emergency Management Action Items. Developed in a joint effort of TSA, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and mass 

transit and passenger rail operating and security officials engaged through the Mass 

Transit Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Transit Policing and Security Peer 

Advisory Group (PAG), the Action Items cover a range of areas that are 

foundational to an effective security program. Components include security program 

management and accountability, security and emergency response training, drills 

and exercises, public awareness, protective measures for Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels, physical security, personnel security, and information sharing and security. Particular emphasis is placed on posture in the six 

Transit Security Fundamentals (protection of underground/underwater infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and assets; random, unpredictable deterrence; training; exercises; and public awareness). 

TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) conduct the BASE assessments in partnership with the mass transit and passenger rail agencies’ security chiefs and directors. To date, 64 BASE assessments have been completed in 

total, covering 47 of the largest 50 agencies, 2 second assessments on top 50 agencies, 9 ranked in the 51–100 range in size, and 6 smaller agencies. The results of 

the assessments inform development of risk mitigation priorities, security enhancement programs, and resource allocations, notably transit security grants. Three representative examples illustrate these points. 

• Well-trained employees are a force multiplier for security efforts implemented 

by mass transit and passenger rail agencies. When the BASE results dem-
71 

onstrated the need for significant improvement in continuing security training 

of employees and provided insights on the cause of this situation, TSA acted expeditiously to develop and implement solutions. In February 2007, TSA published the Mass Transit Security Training Program and revamped the Transit 

Security Grant Program (TSGP) to expand the scope and quality of security 

training of mass transit and passenger rail employees. Produced in coordination 

with the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (DHS/FEMA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the SCC, and 

the PAG, this program provides detailed guidelines on implementing an effective security training program, citing the subject areas in which particular categories of employees should receive training. Identified course options include 

programs funded by FTA/TSA (transit specific terrorism prevention and response) and FEMA (general terrorism prevention and response). Acting on the 

indications that restrictions on appropriate uses of TSGP funds inhibited investment in training, TSA and FEMA, assisted with coordination by the SCC and 

PAG, adjusted the TSGP guidance to permit use of grant funds to cover backfill 

and overtime costs incurred to maintain operations when employees leave their 

normal duties to attend training courses. Additionally, a streamlined application and review process eased preparation of training project proposals for eligible mass transit and passenger rail agencies and expedited delivery of funding. 

As an example of this effort’s effectiveness, the proportion of grant awards for 

security training among eligible mass transit and passenger rail agencies in 

Tier 2 under the TSGP rose from 3 percent of the total funding allocation in 

fiscal year 2006 to 68 percent in fiscal year 2007. 

• As a strategic priority, TSA emphasizes the expansion of random, unpredictable 

security activities to enhance deterrence. The BASE results indicated the need 

for greater effort to assist mass transit and passenger rail agencies in higher 

risk areas to implement these types of measures. Through the operational package option for eligible Tier 1 mass transit and passenger rail agencies under the 

TSGP, during fiscal year 2007 DHS commenced funding of projects to assemble, 

train, and equip dedicated anti-terrorism teams to operate in a mass transit 

and passenger rail systems. The specialized expertise these teams develop enhances security through implementation of operational activities focused on terrorism prevention and by creating a specially trained and experienced cadre to 

provide training to and to share their experience with other law enforcement 

officers and employees in their organizations. 

• Building on the BASE assessment results, which show mass transit and passenger rail agencies conduct and participate regularly in drills and exercises, 

TSA enhances the focus of these activities on terrorism prevention and immediate response for threats and incidents within the systems. In partnership with 

agencies in the National Capital Region, TSA is developing a multi-phased, 

multi-jurisdictional, and cross-functional anti-terrorism exercise program. STSIs 

in the region are directly involved in this effort. The objective is to produce a 

package to facilitate planning, preparation, and execution of terrorism prevention and immediate response exercises that can be adapted and implemented 

by mass transit and passenger rail agencies nationally. This effort will produce 

the national exercise program required under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53). Drills and exercises remain among the priorities for funding in the TSGP. 

Of note, the 2-second assessments conducted on transit agencies ranked among 

the top 50 in passenger volume do reflect improvement in performance, in one case 

dramatic improvement, producing risk mitigation. We anticipate similar results as 

second assessments occur later in fiscal year 2008 and throughout fiscal year 2009. 

Additionally, the process of preparing for a BASE assessment mitigates risk as the 

agency reviews its security plans, programs, and procedures and initiated enhancements. The BASE results report, a copy of which the assessed agency received, details the agency’s status in each of the Action Items, summarizing effectiveness in 

implementation and noting weaknesses and needed improvements. The report, 

therefore, provides the assessed agency a comprehensive guide for security enhancement efforts and, for an eligible agency, informs the development of project proposals under the TSGP. 

Finally, TSA continuously reviews the data received through the BASE assessments, including the analytical reports on each agency’s assessment, in a quality 

control process to assure completeness, accuracy, and consistency in approach. Revisions of the BASE checklist templates have tailored the assessments to specific 

types of public transportation—long-distance and commuter rail, rail transit, and 

bus transit. Future phases of BASE will adjust areas of emphasis in light of devel-
72 

opments in the nature of the threat and to maintain a dynamic approach that thoroughly assesses an agency’s operational and programmatic effectiveness. 

Question 10c. Public Law 110–53—the implementing 9/11 Recommendations Act— 

required DHS to hire an additional 50 surface transportation security inspectors in 

fiscal year 2008, up from 100. What progress has TSA made on hiring, training and 

deploying these additional inspectors? What will be the primary focus for these inspectors? 

Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, (Pub. L. 110–161, December 

26, 2007), funds an additional 75 Surface Transportation Security Inspectors in an 

effort to offset the impact of Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) activities on the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP). The 

hiring process for the additional 75 is on-going. 

The 9/11 Act also contains new requirements which may impact the surface transportation inspectors such as reviewing security plans and reviewing training programs for transit agencies. 

Question 11a. Public Law 110–53 also contains new requirements which may impact the surface transportation inspectors such as reviewing security plans and reviewing training programs for transit agencies. 

Does TSA believe it has the inspector workforce necessary to meet all of the 

planned inspection activities for fiscal year 2008, including the additional requirements contained in the 9/11 legislation? If not, what is your plan for prioritizing inspector responsibilities? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) has the inspector workforce necessary 

to meet all of the planned inspection activities in freight and passenger rail industries for fiscal year 2008. The STSIP originally planned to conduct 1,344 freight rail 

toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) Security Action Item inspections in fiscal year 2008. 

Currently, we are on target to conduct 2,020 freight rail TIH inspections in fiscal 

year 2008. Additionally, the STSIP planned to conduct 50 Baseline Assessment for 

Security Enhancement (BASE) assessments on the Top 51–100 transit agencies in 

fiscal year 2008. Forty-five transit agencies agreed to allow TSA to conduct these 

voluntary BASE reviews in 2008. Regulations required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are under development. Therefore, we envision compliance inspections for these additional security requirements 

to commence in fiscal year 2009. 

Question 11b. In December 2006, TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

that proposed giving TSA regulatory authority for conducting security inspections 

of passenger rail systems, as well as additional security requirements on passenger 

and freight rail operators. When does TSA expect to issue the final rule and how 

closely will it align with the proposed rule? What process was followed to incorporate industry comments? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) final rule on rail 

transportation security is undergoing review at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Following DHS approval, the rule will go to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) for review under Executive Order 12866. We believe the final 

rule will achieve the security objectives identified in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). TSA obtained the views of our security partners by holding a public meeting and through the public comment process initiated by the NPRM. TSA 

received over 70 public comments on the NPRM from trade associations, affected 

companies, labor unions, States and localities, and private individuals. TSA reviewed and evaluated each comment and will respond to all the issues raised in the 

preamble to the final rule. 

Question 11c. TSA has previously issued security directives for passenger rail as 

well as a proposed regulation that would place security requirements on passenger 

rail systems. However, TSA has not issued security requirements for other mass 

transit systems, such as bus systems? What are TSA’s plans to do so, if any? 

Answer. In the absence of a substantial security threat or incident warranting expedited action to require specific enhancement activities, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not anticipate issuing new security directives in the 

mass transit and passenger rail mode. Rather, TSA is working to meet the requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(Public Law 110–53) for promulgation of regulations concerning security plans, assessments, and training programs for designated passenger rail and mass transit 

agencies, including bus systems. TSA is doing this in consultation with Federal security partners and the mass transit and passenger rail community as represented 

by the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council and the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. TSA anticipates the security plan regulation, when it 
73 

takes effect, will formally supersede the security directives applicable to passenger 

rail carriers. 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Question 12a. What are the key performance measures TSA uses to track performance of its surface transportation initiatives? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Surface Transportation Security Program uses the following six performance measures to track performance: 

1. The percent reduction in risk from Toxic Inhalation Hazard bulk cargoes in 

rail transportation; 

2. Percent of mass transit and passenger rail agencies that are in full compliance with industry agreed upon Security and Emergency Management Action 

items to improve security; 

3. Number of rail inspections conducted per 1,000 inspector hours; 

4. Percentage of applicable passenger and mass transit rail systems having undergone a Security Directive review; 

5. Number of high-risk Pipeline corporate systems on which Pipeline Corporate 

Security Reviews have been conducted; and 

6. Percent of highway infrastructure systems that have undergone a Corporate 

Security Review. 

These performance measures are included in the Program Assessment Rating Tool 

(PART), and results for TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Program can be 

found at the Office of Management and Budget’s Web site at www.whitehouse.gov/ 

omb/expectmore. 

Question 12b. What percentage of nationally critical surface transportation assets 

or systems by mode have been assessed and have mitigation strategies developed 

based on those assessments? 

Answer. The percentage of nationally critical surface transportation assets or systems by mode that have been assessed and have mitigation strategies developed 

based on those assessments is as follows: 

• Pipeline Mode.—As of May 2008, 84 percent of the high-risk corporate pipeline 

systems have undergone a Corporate Security Review. 

• Mass Transit Mode.—As of October 2007, 72 percent of the applicable passenger 

and mass transit rail systems have undergone a Security Directive review. 

• Freight Rail Mode.—The independently owned and operated Freight Railroads 

have identified their critical infrastructure and developed security plans that 

provide for protective measures during heightened states of alert. 

• Highway Motor Carrier Mode.—As of March 2008, 80 percent of highway infrastructure systems have undergone a Corporate Security Review. 

Question 12c. How does DHS track the surface transportation assets or systems 

by mode have been assessed and have mitigation strategies developed based on 

those assessments? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration uses the Office of Management and Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool to track the surface transportation assets or systems that have been assessed and then have mitigation strategies developed, based on those assessments. 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN (TSSP)

Question 13a. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TSSP) and its 

supporting modal implementation plans and appendixes establish a strategic approach for securing surface transportation modes based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make effective and 

appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation decisions. 

In your opinion, do these plans include the necessary specific actions and milestones, quantitatively define the costs and benefits of securing the surface transportation system, and outline the specific roles and resources each partner will contribute? 

Answer. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP) includes, as 

appendices, plans for each of the six transportation modes. These modal plans have 

varying degrees of specificity regarding actions and milestones to secure the mode. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reports implementation of the TS 

SSP to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on a monthly basis. 

A list of specific actions with milestones was developed using the TS SSP as a basis. 
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The specific roles and responsibilities for the security partners are adequately delineated. 

While TSA does not have an aggregate accounting of the costs and benefits of securing the surface transportation system, TSA quantitatively evaluates the economic impacts of regulatory actions, security directives, major guidelines, and recommended security action items to determine if the benefits are sufficient to justify 

the costs. 

Question 13b. What has been the effect of having the TSSP and strategy for surface transportation? 

Answer. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP) provided the 

sector’s partners with a definitive approach to evaluating security gaps, setting security priorities, and reaching consensus on a path forward to reduce security risks. 

It provided the mechanism for improved industry and government information exchange, increased understanding of shared responsibilities, and established enhanced cooperation for common security objectives. Improved coordination among 

the sector’s partners led to greater efficiency in identifying and implementing riskreduction initiatives, ultimately benefiting the transportation system users and taxpayers. 

Question 13c. To what extent has the development of the Transportation Sector 

Specific Plan (TSSP) and supporting modal annexes been coordinated with or adopted by industry stakeholders? 

Answer. Each mode has active Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils. While each mode is unique in the state of engagement of its 

security partners, all use these mechanisms to exchange information and to coordinate security initiatives. These councils were used extensively during the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP) drafting process and signed the published plan. They have been used increasingly for drafting the Sector Annual Reports, and as the partnership relationships are better understood and the member 

rosters stabilize, we anticipate even more effective participation during the upcoming revision of the TS SSP. TSA anticipates that as the sense of joint ownership 

of the sector plans improves, the extent of our security partners’ contributions will 

improve with a corresponding increase in the use of the TS SSP as the sector’s primary planning document. 

Question 13d. How does TSA assess the degree to which Federal and industry surface transportation security efforts are achieving the transportation security goals 

and objectives outlined in the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TSSP)? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assesses the achievement of the sector’s goals in the TS SSP through several means. First, monthly reports of the accomplishment of the specific milestones in the TS SSP implementation plan sent to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Second, periodic metrics are reported to DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection 

through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Metrics Portal. Third, TSA submits, on behalf of the Sector, an annual report to DHS that assesses the progress 

made implementing the TSSP and its goals. Fourth, progress implementing specific 

tasks is reported quarterly to the Office of Management and Budget, as identified 

in the Performance Assessment Rating Tool and in the Future Year Homeland Security Plan. 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—RISK ASSESSMENTS

Question 14. TSA is responsible for coordinating and ensuring the security of the 

entire surface transportation system. Other DHS components, including the Coast 

Guard and the National Programs and Protection Directorate also have responsibilities which cover surface transportation related assets and systems. For example, 

bridges and tunnels: How does TSA ensure Federal risk assessments of surface 

transportation assets are coordinated and not redundant? 

As required by Public Law 110–53, what is TSA progress in fulfilling the following 

requirements: 

• Complete, within 6 months after enactment (Feb. 3, 2008), a nationwide risk 

assessment of a terrorist attack on railroad carriers; 

• Require each railroad carrier assigned to a high-risk tier to conduct a vulnerability assessment and prepare, submit to the Secretary for approval, and implement a security plan; 

• Assign railroad carriers to a risk-based tier and establish standards and guidelines for developing and implementing the vulnerability assessments and security plans for railroad carriers assigned to high-risk tiers? 

Answer. In both freight and passenger rail, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has implemented comprehensive security assessment programs evalu-
75 

ating carriers’ posture in Security Action Items developed in coordination with the 

respective communities. The Action Items encompass areas foundational to effective 

security programs. The results of the assessments drive risk mitigation priorities 

and inform development of security enhancement programs and resources allocations, including Federal security grants. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has already completed much of the 

groundwork that will serve as a basis for the National Rail Risk Assessment. Prior 

to the 9/11 Act, the TSA began a national risk assessment of the rail network. TSA 

concluded that the greatest threat to the security of the freight rail network is the 

transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials. This finding led to the development of nationwide programs to reduce the risk associated with the rail transportation of TIH materials including the significant risk of standing, unattended 

TIH railcars. The Security Action Items are a component of this effort, enhancing 

freight rail security generally and mitigating the risk of rail TIH transport in particular. 

In passenger rail, systems operating in the Nation’s sizable metropolitan areas 

are among the most thoroughly assessed of all transportation modes. Since 9/11, 

they have undergone security assessments by the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA), the former Office of Grants and Training at DHS (for grant funding eligibility), the American Public Transportation Association, private sector security consultants (often funded by DHS grants), and now under the Baseline Assessment for 

Security Enhancement (BASE) program conducted by TSA Surface Transportation 

Security Inspectors (STSIs). Through the BASE program, fully implemented as of 

November 2006, TSA assesses a transit system’s security posture on the 17 Security 

and Emergency Preparedness Action Items. The Actions Items cover a range of 

areas that are foundational to an effective security program, including security program management and accountability, security and emergency response training, 

drills and exercises, public awareness, protective measures for Homeland Security 

Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels, physical security, personnel security, and information sharing and security. Particular emphasis is placed on posture in the six 

Transit Security Fundamentals (protection of underground/underwater infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and assets; random, unpredictable deterrence; training; exercises; and public awareness). 

Risk-based tiering of rail carriers has effectively been implemented through these 

collective efforts. In freight rail, TSA’s security enhancement and assessment efforts 

focus on rail carriers operating in and through designated High Threat Urban 

Areas. In passenger rail, DHS has effected risk-based tiering through the Transit 

Security Grant Program. Tier 1 consists of mass transit and passenger rail agencies 

operating in the Nation’s largest metropolitan areas—New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Tier 2 includes numerous agencies in other metropolitan areas, such as Buffalo, Cleveland, 

Dallas, Houston, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Denver, San Diego, and Seattle. This list 

is not exhaustive. The entire list may be viewed in the fiscal year 2008 Transit Security Grant Program guidance at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/ 

fyl2008ltsgp.pdf (see Table 4, pages 16–17). 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—PIPELINE

Question 15a. Has TSA completed a pipeline infrastructure study to identify the 

highest risk systems of the Nation and outline the security mitigation initiatives 

TSA will undertake to address these risks? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Pipeline Security Division has identified the pipeline systems at highest risk in the United States. TSA 

is using its Corporate Security Review program to evaluate the security planning 

and implementation at these high-risk systems and to determine security deficiencies within the mode. Through this process, TSA has identified pipeline industry 

security gaps and outlined mitigation measures to implement over a 5-year period. 

These measures are delineated in the Pipeline Modal Annex of the Transportation 

Systems Sector Specific Plan. 

Question 15b. When does TSA expect to develop a timeline and project plan for 

developing a long-term risk reduction outcome measure for the pipeline mode? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently developing a risk gap analysis tool that identifies threat, vulnerability, and incident consequence to the Nation’s highest risk pipeline systems. By the end of fiscal year 

2008, TSA’s Pipeline Security Division will utilize the risk gap analysis planning 

tool to establish a timeline and project plan for developing a long-term risk reduction outcome measure. 
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SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—COMMERCIAL VEHICLE

Question 16. The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

mandates, among other things, that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a 

tracking program for motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials by February 

2008 and complete a security risk assessment on the trucking industry by August 

2008. What is the status of these efforts? Has the hazardous materials tracking program been completed? Will TSA be able to complete a risk assessment of the trucking industry by August 2008, and if so how is the agency planning to complete this 

assessment of 1.2 million trucking firms with the resources it has? 

Answer. In December 2007 the Transportation Security Administration’s Highway 

and Motor Carrier Office developed a high-level plan for implementing Section 1554 

of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 

Act) that sets requirements for establishing a Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) 

Truck Security program. To meet the agency mission, TSA started the HAZMAT 

Truck Security Pilot project in 2005. Seven tracking vendors and twelve HAZMAT 

carriers participated in the pilot project. The pilot project has concluded and the 

final report will be published in June 2008. The results of the pilot included the following: • Frequent or continuous communications.—TSA has developed a set of tested 

protocols that are capable of interfacing with existing truck tracking systems, 

State/local law enforcement agencies and first responders, and with Federal intelligence and emergency management centers. • Vehicle position location and tracking capabilities.—TSA has implemented a 

tested and functioning truck tracking center that allows TSA to monitor truck 

locations and track load types in the continental United States. • A feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency distress 

signal.—TSA has developed and tested a concept that is being vetted by government and industry volunteers. This facilitates effective responses to drivers’ 

emergency distress signals. 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION—HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE

Question 17a. Why do the National Programs and Protection Directorate and the 

Federal Highway Administration have a greater presence with the highway infrastructure stakeholders than TSA, the lead Federal agency for transportation? What 

are the consequences? 

Answer. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is the highway infrastructure stakeholder community’s primary Federal provider of funds, safety regulations, 

engineering expertise, and cooperative activity. FHWA has been in existence since 

1938 and currently has a stronger presence in the highway environment than the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA relies on the FHWA for engineering and safety subject matter expertise in highway infrastructure matters. 

Question 17b. What benefits exist for establishing an annex to the existing MOU 

with DOT to address any underlying jurisdictional ambiguity and delineate respective roles and responsibilities, as it concerns securing highway infrastructure? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) have not experienced significant jurisdictional disputes 

in this community. As TSA matures and assumes regulatory and compliance roles 

in the highway infrastructure element, an annex with FHWA can help to avoid 

overlap and conflict by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each agency during 

this transition. 

Question 17c. Has TSA completed a highway infrastructure study to identify the 

highest risk systems of the Nation and outline the security mitigation initiatives 

TSA will undertake to address these risks? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not, to date, completed such a study for highway infrastructure, nor is there yet a formally approved 

National Bridge/Tunnel Security Strategy. However, comprehensive risk studies are 

currently underway (trucks, motor-coaches, school buses). Infrastructure will be the 

subject of a comprehensive study when these other reports (some mandated by the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act)) are 

completed. The lack of a single comprehensive report, however, should not suggest 

that TSA has not engaged in comparative risk analysis for infrastructure assets. 

Using accepted threat, vulnerability, and consequence tools, TSA has identified critical infrastructure and has encouraged our security partners to take appropriate 

mitigation steps. 

One aspect of this activity is our work within the Homeland Infrastructure Threat 

and Risk Analysis (HITRAC) program run by the Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Infrastructure Protection. This is a data call made to all States through 
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the regional Protective Security Advisors to nominate highway infrastructure for the 

Tier 1/Tier 2 critical infrastructure lists. Additionally, TSA has shared with its highway infrastructure security partners our report on results from infrastructure Corporate Security Reviews, which highlights the most common findings and recommends actions based on the best practices found in the field. TSA is in the process of reviewing the critical transportation infrastructure within certain major cities. This effort will be available to Federal Security Directors to ensure their awareness of critical infrastructure within their areas of responsibility. Finally, TSA is 

leading the creation of a multi-disciplinary National Highway Bridge Security Working Group to address highway bridge security through the following goals: • Identify, assess, and prioritize risk to critical bridges from terrorist or criminal 

acts; • Provide to bridge owners and operators standard means of risk assessment and 

risk mitigation based on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; • Establish a means to prioritize available Federal security funding to address security gaps at the Nation’s most critical bridge infrastructure; • Establish priorities for research and development and security enhancement 

projects over the long-term; and • Encourage and guide the incorporation of risk-reducing technologies and construction practices in improvements to existing bridges and future highway 

bridge design. 

Question 17d. When does TSA expect to develop a timeline and project plan for 

developing a long-term risk reduction outcome measure for the highway infrastructure mode? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) anticipates initial outcome measures for long-term risk reduction to be developed in fiscal year 2008. TSA 

is currently completing initial baseline corporate security reviews of all State Departments of Transportation and will finish the initial assessments in fiscal year 

2010. In addition, TSA has started revisiting sites that have had an initial baseline 

review. Comparing the results of the second review with the initial review will allow 

us to measure the impact of additional security measures as they are implemented 

by highway infrastructure owners and operators. 

Question 17e. What does it cost to conduct a Corporate Security Review (CSR?) 

Answer. The cost of conducting a Corporate Security Review, on average, is ap- proximately $1,900.00 (considering 1 subject matter expert for 1 night and 1 day). 

On average about $1,400 for travel and $500 for salaries. 

Question 17f. What are the challenges related to implementing a risk management framework for highway infrastructure? 

Answer. The challenges to implementing a risk management framework for highway infrastructure lie in determining the traditional elements of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) and the development and implementation of subsequent countermeasures to address the risk. 

• Although there has been a continuous stream of information concerning threats 

against the Nation’s infrastructure, there have not been credible threats identified against the Nation’s highway infrastructure. 

• The type of infrastructure, as well as its geographic location, affects highway 

infrastructure risk. Additionally, the sheer size and diversity of the highway 

community magnifies the total vulnerability. ‘‘Highway infrastructure’’ encompasses more than 580,000 steel and concrete structures—bridges and tunnels of 

widely varied construction and durability—and more than 4 million miles of 

highway. It also includes traffic management centers and commercial vehicle 

terminals. Its owners are broadly distributed and represent a challenge in aligning their efforts to enhance security. 

Question 18. Please describe the milestones for implementing the following highway risk mitigation priorities identified in the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan 

Annex D: 

• Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Implementation Plan; 

• Standardized risk assessment and risk mitigation approaches; 

• Establish measurable security action items; 

• Integrate security measures into the design on the Nation’s transportation network; 

• Explore the use of existing grant programs to support critical highway infrastructure security improvements. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed standardized risk assessment procedures and currently uses them when conducting corporate security reviews of highway infrastructure systems through State Departments of Transportation and private operators, trucking operators, school bus districts and operators, and motor coach operators. TSA has developed standardized 
78 

risk mitigation approaches in the Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Motor Carrier industry through the Security Action Items that have been developed and are in the 

TSA publication process. Additional standardized risk mitigation methods and approaches for the school bus transportation and the motor coach industries are in development. 

TSA has developed standardized risk mitigation approaches in the HAZMAT 

Motor Carrier industry through draft Security Action Items that we expect to issue 

within the next few months. These have been developed in close collaboration with 

industry security partners. Additional standardized risk mitigation methods and approaches for the school bus transportation and the motor coach industries are also 

being prepared for publication. 

TSA is working closely with the Federal Highway Administration, other government agencies and industry to develop a National Strategy for Bridge and Tunnel 

Security that includes specific security measures for the highway transportation 

network. This strategy document is currently in the review process within TSA and 

the Department of Homeland Security. 

Currently, there are two security grants programs that pertain to the highway 

transportation mode: (1) the over-the-road bus security grants program; and, (2) the 

trucking security grants program. The over-the-road bus security grants program is 

designed to enable intercity bus operators to enhance security. The trucking security 

grants program helps to train commercial drivers to identify and report suspicious 

events. It also funds information sharing between the industry and the government. 

TSA is exploring ways of developing a security grants program to help highway 

infrastructure owners and operators to enhance security. TSA has approved grant 

funding for projects involving security enhancements to bridges and other dual use 

infrastructure. 

QUESTIONS FROM HON. MIKE ROGERS FOR KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. What does the Department spend to acquire and maintain X-ray cargo 

scanning machinery? What is the range of prices for these machines? 

Answer. With respect to the air cargo environment, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) does not acquire and maintain X-ray screening equipment. 

However, TSA has piloted Explosives Detection System screening technologies, in an 

ongoing effort, at several airports in air carrier facilities, to assess performance to 

screen cargo. 

X-ray machines vary in price from $60K to $3.3 million per machine. 

Question 2. Do you expect that with the increased use of explosives detection dogs 

for screening, you will have a decreased need for X-ray technology? Or do you view 

these two systems as entirely complementary? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) views the use of 

screening technology and canines as complementary methods of screening cargo. 

TSA canines will primarily be used on-airport to complement screening performed 

by the airlines. The need still exists for X-ray, as well as other TSA-approved technologies, to enable industry to screen cargo further up the supply chain prior to its 

arrival at the airport and to ensure commerce is not impeded. 

Question 3. Can you tell us how the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request 

for cargo screening breaks down for the canine program? 

Answer. The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request includes a total of $37.7 

million for canine cargo screening that is split among two PPAs. The $86.3 million 

Air Cargo PPA request includes $19.9 million to support half of the 170 air cargo 

canine teams (85 teams) included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation. These 85 teams are led by Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs). Another 

$17.8 million is contained within the proposed Law Enforcement PPA to fund nonFederal teams, including $10.8 million to fund the remaining 85 teams included in 

the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation and $7 million to fund legacy nonFederal teams that are partially dedicated to cargo screening. 

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